BECOMING PHOTOGRAPHS: AESTHETICS OF IMMANENCE

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Abstract
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Becoming Photographs: aesthetics of immanence

Potential rolls in to roll on, in an experiential openness of clutter and invention.


The "eventfulness" of the photograph—the force of its becoming and its continued potentiality—is the primary concern of this dissertation. My work is informed by recent philosophical discussions regarding processes of thinking and seeing, and by the multiple histories and theories of photography that have arisen since its invention as a reproductive technology.

I work with a small selection of photographs, all of them portraits of one sort or another, dating from the end of the nineteenth century through the first few decades of the twentieth century, and produced in diverse geographical, cultural and political settings. From the moment when I first encountered each of these photographs, they appeared to exceed any signification that can be attributed to them by current theories of photography. In the course of my analysis, I argue that this is because all of the images are "atypical" in a way that, according to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their interpretation of minor literatures, heralds potentiality. These photographs were implicated in political economies of transformation. I propose that, at the time they were made, all of these pictures were futural: the stuff of collective becomings. The images present as multiples: how they were seen was dependent on who was doing the looking. The "atypical expression" that I claim for each photograph emerges only at distinctly marked sites and under exceptional conditions of "seeing." Here my findings intersect with, and modulate, concepts of "seeing photographically" that have recently been put forward by a number of scholars, most notably by Celia Lury in Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity (1998).

Deleuze and Guattari both did and did not extend their understanding of atypical expression to include photographs. Whereas, in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987), they suggest that the photograph is closer to a "tracing" than to a "map" (21), in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, they show the ways in which that author figures photographs as maps of the most potent kind. I believe that Deleuze and Guattari's theory of expression, as most recently elaborated by Brian Massumi in his introduction to A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari (2002), can be productively engaged to revitalize our perception of what these photographs did. An investigation of how these photographs functioned is important for the way in which it opens on to another tremor in the shock to thinking/seeing, the move into virtual reality and digital imaging.
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The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e. is not a fact but a fable, an approximation on the basis of a meagre sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for – there is no "truth."

Friedrich Nietzsche The Will to Power
This is for Tara Henley, Rob Henley, and William B. James

and in memory of

Phyllis and William C. James

I wish to thank my family for supporting and sustaining me throughout my time as a graduate student. Their generosity towards me, coupled with their unshakeable faith in my decision to do my doctorate, allowed me the time and space to pursue my studies. As well, special thanks go to Richard Ingram, good friend and colleague, to fellow members of the Ephemeral Theory Collective (Richard Ingram, Charles Barbour and Jim Overboe), and to my associates in the working group Access/Excess. Without everyone involved in these two collectives the journey would not have been nearly so rich, exciting and provocative as it has been to date. I look forward to our continued friendship and to the ongoing development of our collective practice. Dr. Sneja Gunew, Dr. Derek Gregory, Dr. Rose Marie San Juan and Dr. Michael Zeitlin have all contributed in important ways to this work, and I thank them for their efforts on my behalf. With great skill and perceptivity, Sneja Gunew guided me through a process that was at times daunting. Further, the genesis of this thesis would have been impossible without the encouragement and insight provided by Derek Gregory from the project's inception. Thanks to Dr. Rhodri Windsor-Liscombe, Chair of the Individual Interdisciplinary Studies Graduate Program, for creating an environment that provided me with a substantial base from which to venture forth. The support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and of the University of British Columbia was critical for the realization of this work and is gratefully acknowledged.
Preface

...I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 'manufactures' something that does not as yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it. One 'fictions' history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth.
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge 193

All this is to say that one cannot "come to" the text, for the text is precisely without a shore.
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject of Philosophy 12

In the same way as Foucault and Lacoue-Labarthe suggest, then, it is impossible to "come to" photographs, for they are "precisely without a shore." There is no place where a photograph ends and the world begins. There is no measure by which we can trace out boundaries that will allow us to approach and take hold of an essential meaning. It is not as though there is some Truth that waits for us in the image: some total understanding of ourselves that will reveal itself upon interrogation. No. The "Truth" is a fiction. It has always been fiction. We will proceed, then, to fold words in and through images in full knowledge that we will always be left desiring, always aware we have not grasped any Truth.... But perhaps we can take up Nietzsche's challenge and cease to be "pious". Perhaps we no longer need to whore after the Truth, perhaps we are ready to ask the question that Lacoue-Labarthe reiterates for Nietzsche: "Are we capable of atheism?" Or, do we still need to believe in absolutes, in Transcendence?
Introduction

The question is not, Is it true? But, Does it work? What new thoughts does it make possible to think? What new emotions does it make possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?


Figure 1: Photograph taken aboard the French naval vessel Gladiateur, 1876

A man dressed in ethnic costume avoids the gaze of the camera. His body is pulled into itself, taut and still. He appears ill at ease in front of the lens. It is unclear whether he has consented to the making of this picture, yet the image was not caught by chance, some level of posing was necessary.

Figure 2: Photograph taken in the barrio of Colonia de la Bolsa, Mexico, Spring 1928

In a setting of chaos and obvious poverty a young girl stands. Again, as in the photograph above, her look evades a confrontation with the camera's eye. Even though she is obviously posed, it is equally evident that she is uncomfortable. Her body does not give itself up to the lens. In this photograph the girl's ethnic dress is ragged and barely signifies itself.

Figure 3: Photograph taken in the French protectorate of Morocco circa 1915 – 1917

The woman pictured, (we assume it is a woman), is visible only as she is identified by her dress. The photograph, classically beautiful in the traditions of painting, turns the tables on the viewer. It impossible for us to "fix" the figure at which we look. Instead, we feel
strangely exposed, as perhaps we ourselves have become the object of the intensity of the gaze.

Each of these images is exemplary, so I will argue, in its presentation of that ineffable quality of photographs that has plagued the medium since its invention in the early 1800s. As we shall see, each of these photographs, drawn from the collections of Pierre Loti, Tina Modotti, and Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault respectively, is excessive in what it brings to visibility. Like all of the images I have chosen for this study, these pictures of particular bodies, made in a specific time and place, engage in novel ways the discussion that has kept the status of photography in a state of uncertainty since its inception: How can we know the meaning of any given photograph? Why have the strategies, proscriptions, and practices that have been implemented to limit and contain the extravagantly unstable proliferation of meaning that constantly threatens to undermine any sense that we might attribute to a photograph, proved so inadequate to the task?

While each of these photographs is a portrait that can be assigned a particular authorship, I am neither interested in engaging the problematic of intentionality, nor in producing a unified totalizing critique of the images I discuss. It is for these reasons that it has been critical to organize this thesis around an approach initiated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their groundbreaking A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In the study that follows I develop a series of intensities (Deleuze and Guattari call these "plateaus") that emerge from an investigation of the specificity of each of the photographs. A plateau is formed when the energy of focusing on the relation of the photograph to its emergence is "sustained long enough to leave a kind of afterimage
of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities, creating a fabric of intensive states between which any number of connecting routes could exist" (Massumi, User's Guide 7). In other words, the activity of bringing to visibility many of the connections, virtual and actual, associated with these photographs, without attempting to integrate these connections into a unified "interpretation," creates intensive states that allow fresh possibilities to emerge. These intensities or plateaus, taken together, form unique constellations of image-thoughts\(^1\) that diagram, so I will argue, new ways of existing.

The "eventfulness" of the photograph—the force of its becomings and its continued potentiality—is the abiding concern of this dissertation. Working with a small selection of photographs produced in France, Mexico and Morocco at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, I argue that radical potential is an inherent aspect of the photographic portrait. That is, whether we are looking at various types of "traditional" portraiture, defined here as those photographs modelled on the conventions of painting, or more "experimental" images, like those initiated by the Surrealists, the medium itself is always involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in "becomings."\(^2\)

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\(^1\) My use of the term "image-thoughts" will become clear in the following chapters. The term is not associated with the philosophical meaning attached to Deleuze's term "images of thought": a reference to particular historical systems of thought, the principles of which, Deleuze asserts, form "images" of sedimented ways of thinking in philosophy. See Gilles Deleuze, "The Image of Thought" in Difference and Repetition 129-167.

\(^2\) Although I suggest that all portraits are implicated in processes of becoming, I do not suggest that they are equally so, nor do I maintain that all photographic portraiture is engaged in, as are those photographs distinguished by this study, "processes of subjectification" (a concept I will elucidate in the following pages).
Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of "becoming," most notably developed in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, hinges on notions of immanence. While there are a number of historically significant theorists whose work has inflected recent attempts to think through the implications of a theory of becomings, I will be focusing primarily on the work done by Deleuze and Guattari on Nietzsche's understandings of the relation between philosophical concepts of duration and multiplicity, and the constitution of subjectivities. Deleuze and Guattari's work, like that of Michel Foucault, is particularly fitted to my project precisely because all three of these philosophers have developed languages, conceptual tools, and styles of writing that make it possible for me to ask the questions I will be posing throughout this study. Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault can each be said to exercise a politically potent philosophy of pragmatics: philosophy meant to be used; philosophy that does things; philosophy that conceives of thought as experiment.

In the context of philosophy, as in art, the question of form is an important one. Deleuze aligns the "style" of a writer (of Foucault, of Nietzsche) with the invention of

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3 Henri Bergson's *Time and Free Will* and *Matter and Memory* have been of the utmost important to Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault and Maurice Blanchot. Deleuze situates Bergson as one of a number of philosophers, including Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume and Nietzsche, who formed a "counter history" of philosophy. In conversation with Claire Parnet in *Dialogues II*, Deleuze says that in Bergson's writings "there is something which cannot be assimilated, which enabled him to provide a shock, to be a rallying point for all the opposition, the object of so many hatreds: and this is not so much because of the theme of duration, as of the theory and practice of becomings of all kinds, of coexistent multiplicities" (15). Deleuze develops this influence in *Bergsonism*. Bergson's writings continue to inform contemporary philosophers, see for instance, Dorothea Olkowski, *Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation* esp. 118-133.

4 Brian Massumi, in *User's Guide* describes Deleuze and Guattari's use of "style" as follows: "Each segment of Deleuze and Guattari's writing tries to combine conceptual bricks in such a way as to construct this kind of intensive state in thought [a plateau]. The way the combination is made is an example of what they call 'consistency'—not in the sense of a homogeneity, but as a holding together of disparate elements (also known as a 'style'))" (emphasis added, 7). Massumi goes on to explain that "style" used in this sense is not limited to writing: "Filmmakers, painters, and musicians have their styles, mathematicians have theirs, rocks have style, and so do tools, and technologies, and historical periods, even—especially—punctual events" (7). See also, Claire Colebrook, "A Grammar of Becoming" esp. 120. Colebrook remarks on
new modes of existence and thought: new "styles" of writing conceive and are conceived by creative lines of approach, make productive and unexpected connections, provide renewed possibilities of living, and thereby open up new lines of flight, new ways of thinking. I want to emphasise again that my use of the Deleuzian style of writing by plateaus (developing continuous areas of intensity that do not move toward an "endpoint," but rather, always remain as a "middle" that refuses culmination) has been of the utmost importance because it allows me to locate the event of the photographic portrait as a plane across which it is possible to make multiple connections. This approach, characterized by Deleuze and Guattari as "rhizomatic thinking," favours the delineation of a number of points of singularity—a diagrammatic constellation that provides opportunities for observing certain disjunctive syntheses that make new connections—and runs contrary to "arboreal" logic—the progressive development of a unified and totalizing whole.

There are many reasons why individual images from the photograph collections of Pierre Loti (Fig. 1), Tina Modotti (Fig. 2) and Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault (Fig. 3) deserve to be freshly read. In the chapters that follow we will see how each of the photographs considered here appears to exceed any signification that could be attributed

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Nietzsche's emphasis on the importance of "style" in such a way that it becomes clear that this is another area in which Nietzsche's influence on Deleuze has been great.

5 Deleuze, "Life as a Work of Art," in Negotiations 100-101.

6 This use of the term "plateaus" is borrowed from Gregory Bateson who is quoted by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in On The Line 49.


8 Deleuze bases this approach on the principles of affirmation and connection, concepts he borrows from Nietzsche and Hume. See Deleuze, Pure Immanence.

9 On the differences between "arboreal" and "rhizomatic" thinking see Deleuze and Guattari A Thousand Plateaus 3-25.
to them by current theories of photography. In an engagement that is not a belonging—a "becoming" in Deleuze's and Guattari's terms—these photographic portraits work on and with modes of identity and subjectivity. From a place that is neither outside nor inside hegemonic constructions of identity, and cannot be assigned to any one location, each photographic imag(ine)ing traverses multiple subject positions, moving within each, carrying traces of one to another, ineluctably scattering difference as it oscillates between and among possibilities.

These photographs, then, mark places of folding, wherein a dominant discourse rounds into its Others: spaces that map the impossibility of keeping the two, and the many, separate and apart as discrete entities. As such, these photographs, produced at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, are necessarily implicated in discourses of state power and its institutions, colonialism, imperialism, questions of national identity, and the politics of gender and sexuality, class and ethnicity.

While there exists a considerable corpus of critical writing on the regulatory and proscriptive uses of photography's representations of bodies in nineteenth-century disciplinary and institutional principles, practices, and procedures, there has been markedly less exploration of the ways in which photography was used historically to

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10 The concept of "folding" is most readily associated with Deleuze and his text The Fold, but Deleuze himself refers to concepts of folding and unfolding as "specifically Foucauldian acts of thought," that are present in Foucault's early work and "eventually [become] the basis of the process of subjectification" Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 97. Deleuze also associates the concept of folding with a correlate activity of folding in Foucault's "style": "This idea of folding (and unfolding) always haunted Foucault: not only is his style, his syntax, shaped by folding and unfolding, so is the way language works in the book on Roussel ('folding words'), the way thought works in The Order of Things, and above all the way what Foucault discovers in his last books as an art of living (subjectification) works" Negotiations 111-112.

11 During the past two decades this term has been used in a variety of ways. See Derek Gregory's Geographical Imaginations passim. In relation to Deleuze and Guattari's ideas, my specific use of concepts of mapping in photographic portraiture is defined below. Gregory's use of the term in reference to Benjamin's project (215-216) is close to the definition posed by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus.

12 Tagg, Burden of Representation; Sekula, Photography Against the Grain and "The Body and the Archive"; Burgin; Bolton.
destabilize dominant codes governing authorized modes of subjectivity. One notable exception is Anne Maxwell's "Colonial photography and indigenous resistance in Hawai'i: the case of the last royal family," in Colonial Photography and Exhibitions. Maxwell shows how Hawai'i's Queen Lili'uokalani and Princess Kaiulani used the photographic portrait catachrestically, to refigure notions of identity and difference, in their struggle against the annexation of Hawai'i by the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. Queen Lili'uokalani used photography in the service of "inventing" the tradition of the Royal Family—a practice that began with Britain's Queen Victoria—by circulating images of herself executing her duties as head of state. She also had herself and the Hawai'ian royal family photographed in the manner and in the dress of the *European* elite, thereby coding them as legitimate recipients of the status, power and prestige afforded the royalty of Europe. The effect of these portraits commissioned by Queen Lili'uokalani was to picture Hawai'ain subjects *in the place of Europeans*, the import of which necessarily interfered with dominant perceptions of subjectivity.

The restrictive, colonizing function of photography's gaze has been explored at length. So, too, has photography's constitutive role in the nineteenth-century production of the middle-class body and bourgeois identity, and the "undoing" of that

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13 Maxwell shows how members of the royal family consciously employed (captured and redirected) conventions of European photographic portraiture to represent themselves as elegantly legitimate and powerful heads-of-state. Princess Kaiulani was groomed for the camera from a very early age and became a great favourite with European and North American audiences. In addition to circulating very cleverly orchestrated images, the family made extensive use of the North American and European press in their distribution of politically staged photo-portraits produced specifically to garner widespread sympathy for their cause.

14 See Ryan, *Picturing Empire* 13-16. Ryan details the extent of Queen Victoria's early knowledge of the technical processes of photography (she and Prince Albert had installed a dark-room in Windsor Castle) and her conscious and astute use of the medium as a political tool.

15 Alloulah; Brown; Maxwell; Marien; Bate; Vergara.

16 Lalvani; McClintock; Doy, *Materializing Art History*; Gallagher and Laqueur.
identity through uses of photography in such practices as fetishism. However, the possibility that photography was, at this time, also used by those who were subjugated not only in order to construct competing representations of selves, but also, importantly, to function in the service of "a people to come," in the service of collective becomings, has yet to be examined. Just as photography was instrumental in processes of containment and control, in delimiting bodies and "subjects," so too was it productive in processes of expansion, in proliferating and extending virtual spaces of multiple becomings. The concept of "becoming" recasts our understanding of the virtual and the actual.

"Becoming" is immanence. In terms of the past, present, and future: "The present is what we are and, for that reason, what we are already ceasing to be; the actual is not what we are but rather, what we are becoming, what we are in the process of becoming... the actual is the formation of the new." Deleuze and Guattari elaborate Nietzsche's concept of "becoming" as follows:

A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification [...] Becoming produces nothing other than itself [...] What is real is the becoming itself,

17 Abigail Solomon-Godeau's "Legs of the Countess" 266-306, provides an excellent example of this type of scholarship. In relation to Surrealism see Rosalind Krauss, "Corpus Delicti."
18 Deleuze links this the force of "a people to come," to what he describes as "the collective of expression still in [the] throes of continuing formation," see Massumi, Shock to Thought xxviii.
19 Dorothea Olkowski's reading of artist Mary Kelly's work in Ruin of Representation, offers a provocative account of how Deleuze's ideas can be put to work in understanding the political implications of contemporary cultural production.
20 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? 112. For a full discussion of time, the "actual," and the image, see Deleuze's Bergsonism. Further, see Deleuze's "The Actual and the Virtual," Dialogues II 148-152, and 158, ftn. 5. For a succinct description of the meaning of the terms "actual" and "virtual" see Massumi's User's Guide 167-170, 170 ftn. 44. See also Olkowski's reading of the virtual and the actual against psychoanalytic thinking in Ruin of Representation, esp. chapter 6, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" 147 - 176; and Régis Durand's articulation of Bergson's particular understanding of the photograph in relation to the concept of modulation, "How to See (Photographically)" 143.
the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes [...] *This is the point to clarify: that a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself* (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 237-238, emphasis added).

The photographs under consideration here, then, are not viewed as "objects" existing outside, separate and distinct from "subjects." This study rests on the acknowledgement that these portraits confound the very notion of a subject/object dichotomy so that the potential of these images can only begin to be explored if we understand them as being in some way *generative* of the "subject." But the point of such an exercise is not primarily to determine the effect of the photograph on the "subject" it pictures—a determination that subsequently fixes that subject in contemporaneous social formations—rather, it is undertaken in order to investigate the force of expression *prior* to its capture as code, *prior* to its inscription within recognized modes of knowledge and power. For that reason throughout this study a "subject" will be understood as a *temporary, fluid assemblage.*

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21 The use of the term "fluid assemblage," and the concept of "becoming," signals the extent to which this research relies on Nietzsche's legacy. All of the philosophical voices I am invoking here—Sarah Kofman, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault—owe a debt of the greatest proportions to Nietzsche: the man who was born "posthumously." Deleuze extends this debt toward the "one" into a refrain that passes through the many. The melody of this refrain reaches back to Lucretius, through Hume, Spinoza and Bergson, and is articulated by Deleuze as a "secret link constituted by the critique of negativity, the cultivation of joy, the hatred of interiority, the exteriority of forces and relation, the denunciation of power," Gilles Deleuze, quoted in Massumi User's Guide 2. A "secret link," then, that is forged by Nietzsche's "will-to-power," and "the eternal return," and represents an alternative to the construct of the autonomous, interiorized, rational subject of modernity. For an extended discussion regarding the components of this "secret link," see Deleuze's exquisite essay "Nietzsche," in *Pure Immanence* 53-102, and the essay on Hume in the same text, 35-52. For the reference to Nietzsche having been born posthumously see *The Anti-Christ*: "This book belongs to the very few. Perhaps none of them is even living yet. Possibly they are the readers who understand my Zarathustra: how could I confound myself with those for whom there are ears listening today? — Only the day after tomorrow belongs to me. Some are born posthumously" *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Anti-Christ* 125.
The idea of the "subject" as becoming and as assemblage connects with Foucault's concept of "subjectification" as developed in his later work. "Subjectification" for Foucault, is closely associated with a way of existence, an art of living, and Deleuze and Guattari have worked extensively with this concept. In this study I am using the idea of "subjectification" to articulate a primary aspect of the function of visual culture and cultural production in collective becomings. The concept of "subjectification" as developed by Foucault and used by Deleuze and Guattari is one that is crucial to my argument in that it anticipates misunderstandings regarding uses of "biography" and "the subject." For the purposes of this study, each of the photographs under consideration is understood as an element in processes of subjectification: "the production of a mode of existence [that] cannot be confused with a subject, unless it is to dismiss the latter from all interiority and even from all identity."23

Deleuze uses the concept of subjectification to refer to an event that is beyond the notion of "subject," and functions as affect, an intensity that gathers together the energies of a particular time, space and place. Throughout this thesis I will be seeking to develop

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22 The differences between the terms "subjectification" (subjectivation in French) and "subjectivation" (asujettissement in French) can be confusing because of discrepancies in translation. For instance, Rabinow refers back to Foucault's use of "asujettissement,"—which he translates as "subjectivation" (a term earlier translated as "subject") to designate a "neologism that signals Foucault's technical, and more positive, usage" of this concept (Ethics XLIV). However, Eleanor Kaufman, in her essay "Madness and Repetition" retains the French "subjectivation" (Deleuze, Pourparlers 1972-1990 156) as "subjectivation" in her translation into English (235). This same passage is translated by Martin Joughin (Negotiations) as "subjectification" (115). A number of other essays in the Kaufmann collection also retain the French "subjectivation" in English as "subjectivation." Brian Massumi, who translated A Thousand Plateaus in consultation with the authors, Deleuze and Guattari, uses the English "subjectification" for the French "subjectivation." Because of the collaborative nature of Massumi's translation I have in the present study used "subjectification," except where I use direct quotations from texts that translate the term as "subjectivation." A few more examples: Horst Ruthrof in "Deleuze and the Body," maintains that "Deleuze distinguishes subjectivation as the formation and fixing of subjectivity from subjectivation, or the self-positing of subjectivity" (185). Whereas, Derek Gregory, in Geographical Imaginations, demonstrating his characteristically lucid and insightful engagement with current confusions within discourse, refers to "the double process of asujettissement: subjectification and subjectivation" (191). 23 Gilles Deleuze quoted in Eleanor Kaufmann, "Madness and Repetition" 235.
those areas of intensity from which the photographs of Loti, Modotti and Clérambault emerge. The conceptual shift from "subject" to "processes of subjectification" thus displaces the proper names Pierre Loti, Tina Modotti and Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault onto that which is by definition unnameable. Each of these photographs, so I will suggest, marks out a field of activities on a material level, which parallels modes of potential in the virtual, and which can in turn be extrapolated to diagram collective imaginings that open new possibilities for existence.

How does this work? Once again, it is useful to turn to Deleuze and his reading of Foucault:

The last approach opened up by Foucault is particularly rich: processes of subjectification are nothing to do with "private lives" but characterize the way individuals and communities are constituted as subjects on the margins of established forms of knowledge and instituted powers, even if they thereby open the way for new kinds of knowledge and power. Subjectification thus appears as a middle term between knowledge and power, a perpetual "dislocation," a sort of fold, a folding or enfolding (Deleuze, Negotiations 151).

"Subjectification" in this usage, then, is a concept that signals perpetual dislocation, i.e., it does not represent "striated" or coded space, and can therefore provide a way of thinking about the multiple effects produced by the photographic portraits under investigation. The distinction between "the subject," and "processes of subjectification"
is crucial. Processes of subjectification work in concert with becomings, and the recognition that processes of subjectification entail perpetual dislocation allows us to consider movement itself as a force that propagates particular forms. Because processes of subjectification emerge from and in larger social formations—and we must remember that these formations themselves are never static or fixed, but are also in a state of perpetual dislocation—any investigation of processes of subjectification is necessarily tied to an analysis of social formations. Processes of subjectification and subjectivation always exist in concrete conditions of the social and are components of what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as "assemblages," (agencement) and Foucault as "apparatuses" (dispositif).  

Thus, in the chapters that follow, each of the photographs I consider will be examined within the larger assemblages that form the context of their production.

Foucault developed his particular understanding of the concept of subjectification in his later studies in *The History of Sexuality*, volume 2, *The Use of Pleasure*, and volume 3, *The Care of the Self*, to designate the emergence of a relation to the self as a folding. Deleuze says that after Foucault finished with his earlier works wherein he formulated the dimensions of power/knowledge and had asserted that within this axis there are also always instances of resistance, he did not know how to "think" this resistance. How did resistance happen? What were its mechanisms? "Processes of subjectification" provided Foucault's answer to these questions. If earlier understandings of the processes of subjectivation entail force acting on objects, beings, and other forces (an example of which would be the forces of the State acting on bodies to form subjects),

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24 Deleuze describes the different terms in the following conversation: "I differed from [Foucault] only on very minor things: what he called an apparatus, and what Félix and I called arrangements, have different coordinates, because he was establishing novel historical sequences, while we put more emphasis on geographical elements, territoriality and movements of deterritorialization" (*Negotiations*, 150).
by contrast, Foucault's later reworking of this concept can be understood as the designation of force acting on itself, i.e. a line of force folding back to act on the organism that is formed as "self."

Deleuze situates "subjectification" as the third of three points of similarity between Foucault and Nietzsche: the first is their joint conception of power as the relation of force not just to a being or an object, but also in relation to other forces; the second place of agreement (very important, as we shall see, to Deleuze and Guattari's theory of expression), is the relation between forces and form; and the third, subjectification, is distinguished from the first two as the relation of a force to itself, the folding movement of a force acting on itself (Deleuze, Negotiations 117-118).

Deleuze describes "processes of subjectification" as "a third dimension of [Foucault's] 'apparatuses', as a third distinct term that provides a new approach to forms of knowledge and articulates powers in a new way, thereby opening up a whole theory and history of ways of existing" (Negotiations 118). Although other critics have framed Foucault's idea of subjectification as the re-introduction of "the subject" into his thinking, Deleuze is adamant that Foucault's use of "processes of subjectification" has nothing to do with a return to "the subject." Instead he insists that the assertion that Foucault was re-instating the subject involves a fundamental misunderstanding of Foucault's work. Processes of subjectification, Deleuze maintains, entail not a subject, "but a production of subjectivity." He goes on to say "subjectivity has to be produced, when its time arrives, precisely because there is no subject" (Negotiations 113-114).

Likewise, the present study involves neither a recuperation of the subject, nor a redemption of biography per se. Rather, I am attempting to discern the emergence of
particular processes of subjectification—singular "ways of existing," or "new possibilities of life" (Negotiations 118) in Nietzsche's terms—prior to their codification into forms of knowledge and power.

Picture me

Over the last four decades it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the multiple histories and practices of photography were inextricably woven through and into the building of disciplines and institutions that were fundamental to European and North American nineteenth- and twentieth-century understandings and constructions of identity and subjectivity. While it is the case that photographs cannot be isolated from the context of their making, distribution, and consumption, neither are they stable components of disciplinary apparatuses; rather, they present us with a Penelope's web of meaning: a continuous making and undoing, a mobility of becoming. Therefore, the analysis presented in this dissertation turns on the acknowledgement of this axis of undecidability. As such, the arguments presented here are offered as additions to the tremendously productive work that has already been done in the field.

As remarkable instantiations of the "thousand tiny struggles" (Massumi, Shock to Thought xix) that define the force/flow of change, the photographs with which we are here concerned allow us to reiterate the question: How does the expression that is a photograph—of the self, or of other selves—become content in the aggregate formations

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25 From its emergence in the middle of the 1800s, virtually no discipline or institution (i.e. juridical, criminal, psychiatric, medical, anthropological, ethnographical, geographical, or the school, factory, prison, family) remained outside photography's thrall. See John Tagg's "God's Sanitary Law: Slum Clearance and Photography in Late Nineteenth-Century Leeds," in The Burden of Representation for a wonderfully lucid account of photography's deployment in processes of governmentality in nineteenth century Britain. See also John Tagg "The Proof of the Picture" Grounds of Dispute for further discussion of the photograph as evidence.
situated as the "I" of this "self"? Furthermore, how do we understand that which in the photograph exceeds content, refuses certainty, and remains immanent: the quality designated by Deleuze and Guattari as "atypical expression," that elusive quality which, according to their analysis of minor literatures, heralds potentiality? My study takes up Deleuze and Guattari's line of thinking about "atypical expression" and directs it towards a consideration of the photographs of Loti, Modotti, and Clérambault. Given that expression cannot be consigned to the time/space coordinates of its emergence as a particular form—in this case, the moment of concrete production of the photograph as image/object—but rather, in keeping with the definition of "becomings" provided above, is also, and no less significantly, generated in perception, how these photographs were, and are seen, depends on who was, and who is, doing the looking. This affirmation of the ongoing multiple effects of the photographs is a simultaneous recognition that the photographs continue to be implicated in the effects of power, and thus are involved in political economies of transformation. Moreover, while it is an important aspect of minor and major languages that they are marked in relation to hegemonic significance by hierarchies of power, I would suggest that they are also a matter of geography: How much space do they take up and where? What are the discernable perimeters of the territories they occupy? What ways of existence does the terrain sustain? And, importantly, is it necessary to understand significance primarily in relation to centres of hegemonic power? What are the possibilities offered by nomadic movements, ways of existing, that do not hinge on this relation? In the chapters that follow, the quality of "atypical expression" that I claim for each photograph emerges only at distinctly marked

26 On the concept of "minor literatures" see Kafka. See also, Deleuze and Guattari "IV. Language Can Be Scientifically Studied Only under the Conditions of a Standard or Major Language," in A Thousand Plateaus 100-110, especially 105-106.
sites and under exceptional conditions of "seeing," and in so doing, engages each of these questions in turn.

Here my findings intersect with, and modulate, concepts of "seeing photographically" that have recently been put forward by a number of scholars, most notably by Celia Lury in her landmark study, Prosthetic Culture: Photography, Memory and Identity. The notion of "seeing photographically" is founded on the premise that the invention of photography engendered new ways of thinking and seeing. In chapters two, three and four, my analysis of photographic portraiture coincides with Lury's understanding of ways of seeing, most particularly in our respective re-workings of Roland Barthes' theories of photography. I believe that the "intensity" that alerts the reader/viewer to what Deleuze and Guattari understand as instances of "atypical expression" is, in fact, closely related to the photographic effect of the "punctum," with which Barthes was so taken. In Camera Lucida, Barthes, eschewing the conventions of art historical analyses, braved the consequences involved in leapfrogging disciplinary boundaries, and dared to pronounce on how photographs make meaning by using himself as the object of his inquiries. The "punctum," that which Barthes describes as the singularity of the photograph in its relation to the viewer—and translates as the wound inflicted on the viewer of the photograph—refers, I suggest, to precisely those areas of

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27 This term was first used (although in a very different way than in the present study) by the photographer Edward Weston (1886-1958) in his essay "Seeing Photographically," reprinted in Classic Essays. More recently—to realize the spectrum of ways this term is being employed—see Patrick Maynard, "Photofidelities I: 'Photographic Seeing'," in Engine of Visualization 191-227, and for a very different use of the term see Régis Durand, "How to See (Photographically)."

28 While I find Barthes' theory of the punctum useful, I want to distance myself from his repeated assertion of photography's essential relation to the "real," and to what he terms the "that-has-been" irreducible quality of the photographic experience. See John Tagg's elucidation of this point in his essay "The Pencil of History," Fugitive Images 295-300.
intensity that Deleuze and Guattari have designated as "the gap" that is of interest to them in their investigations of atypical expression.

Lury's analysis of prosthetic culture is in part framed by Barthes' text. She lifts his formulation of the punctum out of the context of the psychoanalytic readings within which it has most often been inscribed (indeed, Barthes himself marks the work in this way) and refigures it as an integral component of "seeing photographically." My own use of Barthes' notion of the punctum differs from Lury's: whereas Lury situates the punctum in relation to the prosthetic potential of the photographic portrait, my own insistence on immanence and becomings effectively displaces the notion of prosthetics—the term by definition retains the idea of a pre-existent "something" for which it is an addition—in favour of an emphasis on processes of subjectification. Reading Barthes' notion of the punctum, as I will be doing here, for its points of connection with Deleuze and Guattari's theory of expression, as well as, contrarily, for the ways in which it coincides with psychoanalytic understandings of the fetish, demonstrates the power of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking to multiply connections by recognizing points of significance, rather than being primarily concerned with determinations made through practices of interpretation.

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29 Foucault develops a similar theory of "the gap" as that which alerts one to thinking that is itself situated as thought's "outside," see "Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside," in Foucault/Blanchot 9-13, esp. 12.
30 See, for instance, John Tagg's critique of Barthes' formulation of the punctum and Christian Metz's and Régis Durand's use of the same.
31 Lury's continuing commitment to some notion of a coherent subject is illustrated when, in a reference to Deleuze and Guattari's use of "becomings" she equates "becoming" with "self-making" Prosthetic Culture, 132, ftn.35.
32 I am here treating the coincidence of Barthes' thought with that of Deleuze and Guattari as a singularity within the broader sweep of their respective writings. For, as Massumi makes clear in User's Guide, "Barthes's orientation is entirely different from Deleuze and Guattari's" (155), see also 154 and 155, ftn.45. The difference in orientation, however, does not preclude the possibility of making connections. For a different reading than Massumi's, of possible connections between the thought of Deleuze and Guattari and Barthes, see Olkowski's understanding of the "punctum" (which is close to my own) in her study of Mary Kelly's work in Ruin of Representation, esp. 190-210.
Deleuze and Guattari both did and did not extend their understanding of atypical expression to include photographs. Whereas in *A Thousand Plateaus* they suggest that the photograph is closer to a "tracing" than to a "map" (21), in *Kafka* they show the ways in which that author figures photographs as maps of the most potent kind. In Kafka's writing photographs figure on occasion as, "[expression] freed from its constricting form and bringing about a similar liberation of contents" (61). For Deleuze and Guattari tracing is an aspect of arboreal logic, a characteristic of representative thought. Tracing is always reproduction, always a reference back to something that comes "ready-made." Tracing is a mechanism of representation. Massumi describes a tracing as an activity that places "the process of emergence on a level with its substantial products" (Massumi, *Shock to Thought* xxiii). In other words, tracing mistakes the thing for the process; equates the force of expression with the content of form. A map, on the other hand, is always "experimentation in contact with the real" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 12). Contrary to the thought of Michel de Certeau for whom "The journey is not the map," in Deleuze and Guattari's thinking the map *engenders* the territory. In relation to the processes of subjectification discussed earlier, when what we are talking about is "perpetual dislocation," i.e., constant movement, then, says Deleuze "The map expresses the identity of the journey and what one journeys through. It merges with its

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33 The rest of this passage reads: "But in *The Trial*, we see a proliferating power of the photo, of the portrait, of the image. The proliferation starts at the beginning, with the photos in Fraulein Burstner's room—photos that have the power to metamorphose those who look at them (in *The Castle*, it's rather the people in the photo or portrait who gain the power to metamorphose [...] In short, the portrait or the photo that marked a sort of artificial territoriality of desire now becomes a center for the perturbation of situations and characters, a connector that precipitates the movement of deterritorialization." Throughout *Kafka* Deleuze and Guattari diagram the many functions of the photograph in Kafka's work.

object, when the object itself is movement" (Deleuze, Essays 61). The map, when we are concerned with becomings, functions within processes of rhizomatic thinking. Maps, as defined in the context of the present study, are performative.

In keeping with Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that expression can never be reduced to that which simply represents, describes, or corresponds to a pre-existent and autonomous content, I believe that their theory of expression, as most recently elaborated by Brian Massumi in his introduction to Shock to Thought, can be productively engaged to revitalize our perception of what the photographs under consideration here, did. An investigation into how these photographs functioned is important for understanding how change happens, and because photography opens on to another, more recent tremor in the shock to thinking/seeing, the move into analogue/digital imaging; a move that, like the invention of photography, engenders new ways of thinking and seeing, new ways of existing.

The aesthetics of emergence, or expression is an event.

In his introduction to Shock to Thought, Brian Massumi shows how Deleuze and Guattari go beyond communicational, ideological and postmodern models of expression, all of which, so they maintain, share "an attachment to a concept of determination predicated, in one way or another, despite any protestations to the contrary, on conformity and correspondence" (xiv). In other words, whether we are looking at expression as the re/presentation of a mirrored, molded content, as in the communicational model of information exchange; or, as a focus on the mediation of the dynamic exchange between the subject/object of the ideological model, wherein expression itself modifies the
content; or indeed, as an unmooring of the signified from its designation, as in the celebration of the absurd taken up in the postmodern model: it remains the case that each of these models relies on the essential stability of objects of expression which are, overtly or otherwise, presumed to precede that expression. This is the case, even in postmodern theories of expression, because an "unmooring" cannot happen unless something static, secured, is present—"moored"—in the first place. Massumi makes the point that Deleuze and Guattari are suspicious of the postmodern reliance on parody and irony precisely because these responses depend on the possibility of delineating distance from the very "Truth" that they are lambasting: without this "Truth," parody loses its force. Moreover, Massumi observes, postmodern inductions of parody and irony have come under attack because they "seem distinctly to manifest a personal desire for a certain kind (a cynical kind) of masterful presence" (xvi), and have, therefore, been accused of harbouring a nostalgia for the "master-subject whose 'death' postmodernism manifestly announced" (xvi). In other words, these formulations appear to gesture toward a coherent and controlling subject.

As has already been outlined above, in Deleuze and Guattari's understanding, there is no subject, not even one that is constituted by the operation of interpellation.\textsuperscript{35} There is no subject, and expression is an event. Therefore, the relation of the "subject" to expression can no longer be realised in terms of cause and effect. Massumi puts this succinctly: "The event is everything. There is no subject before or behind it whose deed it would be" (Massumi, \textit{Shock to Thought} xxiv). In this model of expression, the energy, the impulse of expression, surges, emerges, and is only subsequently acted upon by other

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{35} Louis Althusser's concept of interpellation is developed in the essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in \textit{Lenin} esp. 170-177.}
forces and tamed, or slowed, into recognizable form. Understanding expression in this way has direct implications for the "subject" who is, in this model, no longer figured as the recipient of a form of expression that conveys a circumscribed and knowable content, but rather, is itself the expression of emerging forces that have been transformed into form. Moreover, the body is also articulated as a becoming inextricably involved in expression's potentiality: "Expression gains momentum cascading through the body's many levels, like a contagion" (Massumi, Shock to Thought xxxii). This model of expression, then, is closely aligned with Foucault's work on subjectivation and subjectification. The body gains full admittance. The subject is formed at the site of the body, inside and outside of discourse, a nexus of forces that have actual effects on the physical body. Thus, it is possible for Deleuze to state: "The world does not exist outside of its expressions" (Deleuze, The Fold 132).36

For expression to be recognizable, visible, the energy and violence of the impulse must be domesticated, the charge drained, and the expression transformed, upon perception, into an acceptable form. Expression's potentiality is stabilized once it has been apprehended by form. The atypical expression referred to by Deleuze and Guattari as heralding potentiality is, then, that which escapes striation (sedimentation into coded form), and remains a force that emerges as "that thinking feeling"37—a force that is not yet formed and cannot, as yet, be named. Deleuze states that the critical difference to recognize in the formulation of a theory of expression that is able to embrace the mobility

36 Massumi begins his introduction to Shock to Thought with this quotation as the title of the first section, (xiii).
37 "That thinking feeling," is the title for Part One of A Shock to Thought, and indicates with the following quote from Antonin Artaud that the section covers: "...everything which introduces doubt about the position of mental images and their relationship to one another..." 1.
of eventfulness and account for the stability of form is that "emergence, mutation, change affect composing forces, not composed forms."\(^{38}\)

Photography and representation's "outside"

The relation of the expression of the photograph to its content is not one that is "naturally" given.\(^{39}\) In keeping with Deleuze and Guattari's declaration that expression can never be assigned "the function of simply representing, describing, or averring a corresponding content," I develop the assertion that photographs are both tracings and maps: a photograph functions at times as representation, a tracing, and at other times as event, a map, in which there is a non-resemblance,\(^{40}\) i.e. a lack of correspondence, between the force of expression and that which is "pictured." In the case of non-resemblance, the eventfulness of a photograph creates a gap between expression and

\(^{38}\) Deleuze quoted in Massumi, Shock to Thought xvii.

\(^{39}\) At its invention, the occlusion of everything in photography that was not compatible with its definition as a mirror of reality has been well documented. Martin Jay's Downcast Eyes contains an economical recounting of this history, and an excellent bibliography for further research. However, Jay's study is antithetical to the trajectory of my inquiries here in that he evidences a deep mistrust of Deleuze and Guattari's project. Jay is, in the last instance, still engaged in a quest for certain, static objects of knowledge on which it is possible to take a stand. If we contrast this to Nietzsche's understanding that everything is in flux, that the "subject" is a flow built on other flows, and Deleuze's assertion cited above, that it is crucial to be mindful that "emergence, mutation, change affect composing forces, not composed forms," the distance between these approaches is evident. John Rajchman, in his essay, "Foucault's Art of Seeing," makes a similar point regarding an essay Jay published prior to his text Downcast Eyes, titled "In the Empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century Thought." Rajchman says that while Jay "provides a useful inventory of some of the places where Foucault discusses matters visual [...] one finds a familiar pattern of disqualification of contemporary French thought" (89 - 90, fn. 4).

\(^{40}\) In this study I am using "resemblance" in two ways: the first, as in the passage above (5), in the Deleuzian sense to mean that which effaces difference and is subsumed under the same (once again, it is a question of emphasis, the portrait photograph, in this case, when it is perceived primarily as resemblance, is understood as being more along the lines of the same as, rather than different from, the "person" it pictures. See Deleuze, "The Image of Thought," Difference and Repetition, 129-138); and the second way "resemblance" is employed in this study can be usefully illustrated by a passage in Derek Gregory's Geographical Imaginations, which makes reference to Walter Benjamin's understanding of "dialectical seeing": "Benjamin's way of working – of seeing? – was directed [...] toward the construction of a constellation that would embody 'a stringent economy of the object which nevertheless refuses the allure of identity, allowing its constituents to light each other up in all their contradic toriness'" 235: resemblance as that which points to the constellation of which it is an element.
content. This gap, however, is not that which is defined by the distance between the content or form and its referent (a "gap" which has already been much theorized), but is instead, closer to concepts of the sublime in that it does not easily lend itself to "rational" thought, theoretical closure or resolution. It cannot be interpreted or explained away, but remains, persistently, doggedly, a gap. In Deleuze's and Guattari's terms it comprises a "smooth space,"\(^{41}\) a force that has not yet been "striated," coded and thereby rendered intelligible, accessible to discourse. It is this gap that remains immanent when trying to account for the particular force in and of some photographs. And it is that force which transforms a tracing into a map. In the following study, I investigate the photographs of Loti, Modotti, and Clérambault in their capacities as both tracings and maps. Not then, in terms of resemblance or difference, but rather, in terms of resemblance and difference.

I suggest that all histories of the photographic portrait circle around the capture of "expression," (as it has been defined above), and its subsequent transformation into a particular form of content that can then be apprehended by hegemonic structures of power and applied to general concepts. Yet, these captures, these encodings, have never been complete. My study presents a genealogy of some of the ways in which the photographic portrait eluded apparatuses of capture—enticed those apparatuses into diverting their gaze elsewhere—thereby creating mobile spaces for becomings that were temporarily able to escape surveillance.

\(^{41}\) Music theorist Pierre Boulez was the first to use the terms "smooth space" and "striated space," see Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* "The Musical Model," 477-478. These ideas are infinitely more powerful and understandable when thought about in relation to music. Thinking about them in this way relieves them of any "moral" charge and emphasises their uses as structural relations.
Becoming photographs

The body, fresh in the throes of expression, incarnates not an already-formed system but a modification—a change. Expression is an event.

Massumi, *Shock to Thought* xvii.

In order to move Deleuze and Guattari's theory of expression through the body in photography (and the body of photography), I use Brian Massumi's recent explication of this theory.\(^{42}\) As I have already stated, the relation of the expression of a photograph to its content is not a naturally given one. It is important to recognize that, at its advent, the articulation of the photographic portrait with "nature," as one element of reality, did not necessarily have to be made,\(^{43}\) and was, in fact, even at that time, contested in important ways.

Jonathan Crary, in his 1988 *October* article, "Techniques of the Observer," (elaborated and extended in his 1990 book of the same title) diagrams some of these disjunctions by showing the ways in which the optical devices that followed the camera obscura represent a rupture, rather than a continuation, in ways of seeing. Crary, in direct contradiction to a range of conventional analyses that cite the camera obscura as the basis of modern vision, maintains instead, "a precondition of modernization was the 'uprooting' of vision from the delimited and static relations of the camera obscura" (22). Proceeding from this assumption Crary tracks the early nineteenth-century demise of notions of

\(^{42}\) Massumi does not work with photography, but with the example of Foucault and the prison system, yet his analysis offers a remarkably clear description of a conceptually difficult idea, and is therefore extremely useful in my own explication of why Deleuze and Guattari's ideas are productive for my investigations. See Massumi, "Introduction," *Shock to Thought*, xviii-xxi.

\(^{43}\) For a concise overview of the history of the ways in which photographs have been made to make meaning see Allan Sekula's essay, "On the Invention of Photographic Meaning," in *Photography Against the Grain* 3 – 21. Sekula tracks the multiplicity of sites wherein William Henry Fox Talbot's description of photography as "nature's pencil" was extended and developed.
vision as a mechanism of correspondence to and reflection of an objective world, and the
subsequent rise of the "techniques of the observer" with which he is concerned.

In his demonstration of the radical move away from the perspectival certainty of
the camera obscura model of vision, Crary goes into some detail to explain the workings
of the stereoscope: a device he describes as providing the "most significant form of
visual imagery in the nineteenth century, with the exception of photography" (24). The
invention of the stereoscope is most closely associated with theorists Charles Wheatstone
and Sir David Brewster, and in spite of its significant differences as an imaging
technology it has historically been linked with the arrival of photography. Crary
demonstrates that while the stereoscope "utilized photographic imagery [...] its invention
preceded photography and in no way required photographic procedures" (24). Both
Wheatstone and Brewster wrote extensively on "optical illusions, color theory,
afterimages, and other visual phenomena," and the construction of the stereoscope
emerged from these theoretical interests and investigations. Crary uses the stereoscope
as a powerful example of the "unbinding" of vision that occurred with a number of the
"philosophical toys" that like the stereoscope were popularized in the early years of the
nineteenth century. Crary maintains that these toys were instrumental in the
disintegration of a belief in "objective" vision, and in the complementary recognition that
perception was generated in the body of the observer. That is, these toys worked to
demonstrate the embodiment of vision as an autonomous and subjective phenomenon.
Thus, the corporeality of vision was emphasised. Crary's study makes it clear that the
"conceptual severing of visual experience from referent" (15), on which my analyses of

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44 Derek Gregory's explication of Donna Haraway's challenge to contemporary technoscience's
decorporealization of vision makes clear exactly what the stakes are in this discussion, see Geographical
Imaginations 65-66.
the photographs under consideration in this study are based, had already begun before the advent of photography, and that the technologies of photographic seeing and thinking were at once constitutive of and constituted by these wider discourses, circumstances and events.45

Brewster's stereoscope is notable here precisely because it worked on an axis that is not dissimilar to my proposal that photo-portraits were concerned primarily with the relation of the body to its potentiality. According to Crary, "the desired effect of the stereoscope was not simple likeness, but immediate, apparent tangibility" (emphasis in original, 28). Moreover, Crary shows that the realism of the stereoscopic view presupposed "perceptual experience to be essentially an apprehension of differences" (27). The viewer who looked through the eyepiece of the stereoscope was absolutely aware of the fact that they were looking at images on two flat surfaces whose differences resulted in the perception—generated in themselves, as "subjects"—of a depth of field that was powerfully evocative of "the view out there," that is to say, of "reality."

That said, however, it is important to recognize that the particular understanding of the visual, which melded the photographic image to its function as a mirror of the empirically determined world—itself the cumulative result of ways of seeing and

45 After the publication of Techniques of the Observer in 1990 Crary was taken to task by a number of scholars for what Linda Williams, in her essay "Corporealized Observers: Visual Pornographies and the 'Carnal Density of Vision'" suggests is "Crary's strangely neuter conception of the observer" (8), and for the fact that "his study is remarkably insensitive to any notion of the gender or sexuality of different observers" (7). However, I would suggest that critiques such as this one put forward by Williams and others are based on a misreading of Crary's project, and stem from the failure to recognize the extent to which Crary's work is informed by the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari. I suggest that, in keeping with Deleuze's image of a concept as a "tool box," Crary, in his concern with the techniques of the observer, is developing conceptual tools that can then be picked up and used. In fact, this is exactly what Williams, in her interesting and provocative essay, has done. She has used the tools that Crary has crafted to open up new ways of looking and thinking, and in so doing, has produced new understandings of the effects of the proliferation of "pornographic" images in the early nineteenth century.
knowing generated by specific constellations of cultural, social and political forces—maintained discursive sovereignty during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Indeed, it has been the task of contemporary theory to show how the photographic portrait was harnessed by institutional and disciplinary interests to construct bodies appropriate to their needs. While it is the case that this scholarship has been vital to understanding the changing and multiple functions of the photographic portrait, it is to the provocative excess that remains as the "unthought," the "outside" of these images that the present study is directed.

My hypothesis is that the photographic portrait is a form of expression that, rather than being primarily involved in the correspondence of appearances—in the "realistic" portrayal of a "self"—is instead a form of expression that throws forward the relation of the body to its potentiality. In other words, the "subject" in the self/image equation is dismantled. To reiterate my point: I am proposing that the expression, for which the photographic portrait is a form of content, can best be articulated as the relation of the body to its potentiality. I am placing the emphasis, then, on the assertion that all photographic portraits are concerned, in some way, with the body as a material marker of becomings. The "tracing" of this body, the ability of a photograph to capture a body's likeness, is only a secondary effect. This proposition—that the primary effect of the photo-portrait is its potential as map, and that the tracing mechanism is only a secondary effect—is one that is key to understanding my thesis.

This distinction is a difficult one, yet, as I have indicated, it is one of the most important propositions of my thesis. For the photographic portrait to be relegated to the position of a tracing—a one to one correlation between "selves" and their images—
autonomous, interiorized modern subjects and "their" images—it has been necessary to privilege appearances above all else, indeed, to such an extent that the photograph's mapmaking functions have been all but obliterated. Construing the photo-portrait in terms of these criteria both limits it to an indexical function (even if, as is often the case, that function is understood as multiple and capable of being interpreted in a number of ways), and more importantly, ultimately surrenders its political potential to established apparatuses of power to do with it what they will. In other words, there is no room in this analysis for attempts to understand the photographs as elements in processes of subjectification, as "potential" in the thousand tiny struggles that come together to form new ways of existing. Bringing to visibility the expression of each of the images I am working with here, as that which is concerned with the relation of the body to its potentiality, loosens the ties that bind it to interpretations that continue to be hegemonic. Instead, if we understand these photographs in the terms I am proposing, we can begin to consider what the photographs look like if they are seen as instances of the micropolitics that mobilize temporary war machines: assemblages that do not look to or define themselves in terms of, indeed often do not recognize or care to acknowledge,

46 In addition to continuing an investment in critical practices that are ordered hierarchically within the discipline of art history, these interpretations also carry forward assumptions of homogeneity in the viewing experience itself. See Linda Williams, "Corporealized Observers: Visual Pornographies and the 'Carnal Density of Vision'," 5–6. As well, Amelia Jones, in her 1998 Body Art, identifies the terms of engagement that are precisely those with which I am concerned here. I am going to cite Jones at length because she corroborates, importantly, my understanding that it is necessary to register particular underlying assumptions that continue to shape art historical critical practices. In a long footnote to her introduction Jones states:

One of the motivations of this book is my frustration with the ongoing tendency to replicate the basic assumptions of this model: the particular meaning of the object is held to be implicit within its forms, which are seen to translate more or less directly the emotions and intentions of the making subject. The art historian/批评 is situated as the privileged reader who possesses a special insight and a trained eye such that she or he can decipher this meaning and confirm this value. Even art histories that stage themselves as "new" tend to perpetuate this logic of judgment in that they continue to hierarchize practices and objects—though now generally through terms of "political" or "social" rather than aesthetic value—and to insist of particular meanings as "correct" 242-243.
centres of power, state or otherwise; assemblages then, that constitute new ways of existing.

Finally, I want to raise one more point in this diagram of thinking. Massumi maintains the following about the effects of expression:

The force of expression [...] strikes the body first, directly and unmediatedly. It passes transformatively through the flesh before being instantiated in subject-positions subsumed by a system of power. Its immediate effect is a differing. It must be made a reproduction (my emphasis, xvii). 47

If this is the case, and my study is premised on the assumption that it is, then a photographic portrait, a photograph of the "body," constitutes an extremely complex example of expression. In chapters two, three and four, we will investigate both the potential effects of differing and their instantiation in subject-positions subsumed by systems of power.

Photography, colonialism and imperialism

The idea of the nation is inseparable from its narration: that narration attempts, interminably, to constitute identity against difference, inside against outside, and in the assumed superiority of inside over outside, prepares against invasion and for "enlightened" colonialism.

Geoffrey Bennington, "Postal politics."

47 This necessity for expression to be "made a reproduction" has been demonstrated at the most literal of levels when photographs have been shown to people who had been previously unaware of their existence; in each case those in question had to be taught to read the "language" of the photograph. In other words, they had to accommodate new ways of seeing/thinking.
The photographs under consideration here are all located at the interfaces between cultures and must necessarily negotiate multiple crossings. Each of the images traverses the literal and imaginary topographies of European/Other distinctions. These photographs are literally *unthinkable* outside of their connections to colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, an investigation of photography's intervention into colonial practices and spaces is a critical component of the analyses presented in chapters two, three and four. Although these chapters use the proper names of three individuals to whom the production of the photographs is attributed, the photographs cannot, as I indicated in the opening paragraphs of this introduction, be assigned to any one location. They only *improperly belong* to the proper names of Pierre Loti, Tina Modotti and Gaëtan Gatian de Clerambault. Taken together, the three constellations of which the photographs of Pierre Loti, Tina Modotti, Gaëtan Gatian de Clerambault are elements, follow the lines of a delicate filigree of connections, each creating a unique diagram of the complexity of ways in which these photographic interceptions were enacted.

While Modotti's photographs show straightforwardly the ways in which her images posed a threat to U.S. imperialism in Mexico, the photographs of Pierre Loti offer a different challenge to analyses of the subversive interventions of photography. Clerambault's enigmatic images—claiming, as they do, authority in the areas of fine art and ethnography, and only very obliquely admitting their intimacies with psychiatry—extend an altogether different invitation to the articulations of the power.
Photography maintained strong connections with the emerging institution of psychiatry in that institution's never ending quest to render detailed pictures of "empirically" determined notions of normalcy. These investigations were always drawn as binary oppositions: normal/abnormal, European/Other, primitive/civilized, subject/object (or abject), etc. Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), Martinique-born philosopher, political activist, and psychoanalyst, was one of the first writers to reveal the ways in which psychoanalysis was integral to the mobilization of imperialist agendas. As we will see in chapter four, Fanon presented a radical challenge to twentieth-century psychiatry when he declared, in his influential 1952 collection of essays, *Black Skin, White Masks*, that "the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man" (161). More recently, Anne McClintock, in her book *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, has taken up this theme and called for "a renewed and transformed investigation into the disavowed relations between psychoanalysis and socio-economic history" (8). Chapters two and four demonstrate the utility of overcoming the conventional separation between psychoanalysis and history. Fanon's essay, "Algeria Unveiled," is particularly relevant to my discussion of the Clérambault photographs. Fanon's interpretation of France's occupation of Algeria shows clearly how inextricably tied to psychoanalytic thinking was the history of that colonized country. As such, Fanon's astute analysis provides another example, so I will argue, with which to diagram the photography/colonialism/psychiatry connections. Moreover, introducing Fanon into an analysis of the fetishistic uses of Loti's photographs shows how they fold into processes of both subjectification and subjectivation. Indeed, each of the

48 See also Max Horkheimer's and Theodor Adorno's anti-imperialist, Freud influenced text, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. 
investigations of photographs undertaken here engage notions of fetishism as one aspect of their intensity: Clérambault and his fetishistic relation to cloth; Modotti as the object of the fetishistic gaze.

A critical analysis of European colonialism cannot ignore the function of the Great Exhibitions and their uses of photography as primary mechanisms in the construction of European identity and the making of modern bodies. The 1990s witnessed the publication of a remarkable number of books that revaluated and re- visioned the significance of colonial photography and the nineteenth century world exhibitions. I will be drawing on a selection of these texts in the investigations that follow.49

Also of relevance here, because the territories at stake in these discussions were not mere metaphors,50 are recent re-visionings of the history of geographical discourses and their role in the Westernization of the globe. As a leading architect of a particular mode of "seeing" that was quintessential to European colonial and imperial aspirations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the imaginative reach of geography encompassed that which was far-flung and that which remained close at hand. James Ryan's Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire demonstrates the ways in which the "imaginative geography of Empire constructed through photography [...] collapsed and confused the space of home with those of afar," to show that "photography was a powerful means by which distant spaces were domesticated and reconstructed in an image of home" (218-219). Alongside communicative media of all kinds then, images,

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49 Of particular use in my work has been Susan Buck-Morss', The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project. See especially 322-324, World expositions in Benjamin's Passagen-Werk, and 493.

50 The etymological meaning of the word, geography, is after all, based on "geo-graphy, earth writing."
and specifically photographic images, were integral to the development of geography's field of influence.\footnote{See Derek Gregory's essay on the use of lantern slides: "Between the book and the lamp: imaginative geographies of Egypt, 1849-50."} Ryan specifically examines photography's role in the construction of the imaginative geographies of Empire. He details the multiplicity of ways that photography was integral to not just the geographical enterprise, but was also, importantly, essential in the "success" of the colonial process itself. Ryan's study thus emphasizes the inextricable relation between the colonial process of geographic exploration and the photographic project. In the course of his argument Ryan documents the ways in which both the colonial and photographic processes were contracted and reduced into the autobiography of the traveller or photographer, and then collapsed into a kind of autobiography of Empire that itself rested upon the attendant "truth" value accorded to accounts of autobiographical experience.

Felix Driver's Geography Militant: Cultures of Exploration and Empire rehearses these reductions in his analysis of photography's fundamental role in geography's history, and in its ability to extend and exercise its influence.\footnote{Driver tells us, that the "Geographical Association, the major professional body for school-teachers in the UK, was founded in 1893 partly as a response to calls to exploit the educational potential of photography" Driver, F., Geography Militant 206; Ryan also evokes this moment in geography's history and goes on to expand at length on the simultaneous development of geography and photography, and the implications of these correspondences, "Introduction" Picturing Empire 11 - 27.} Driver records that by the early years of the twentieth century British geographers such as Halford Mackinder were declaring that the colonisation of the globe was a completed project.\footnote{Felix Driver, Geography Militant 199. However, Ryan complicates this understanding of the status of colonisation when he points to the diversity of ways in which photographs, that people such as Mackinder attempted to use to forward such views, were received, Picturing Empire 220.} He quotes a passage from a 1923 essay, wherein novelist and explorer, Joseph Conrad, penned an account of what was felt throughout Europe to be a persistent and pervasive malaise
associated with the passing of an epoch.\textsuperscript{54} Conrad lamented: "Nothing obviously strange remains for our eyes now" (200). The bygone era of exploration, characterized by Conrad as "Geography Militant," was a time during which "civilized" populations were tantalized by the siren call of unexplored territories: physical and psychic spaces that held endless possibilities for discovering that which was as yet unknown.

In Felix Driver's analysis, Conrad's \textit{Heart of Darkness} provides us with a specific example of a much wider phenomenon, and is an indication of the intensity that propelled the development of a uniquely Western understanding and use of metaphor built precisely on this fascination with unknown and darkly dangerous regions. In this understanding, the call to explore, claim, map, Christianize and fictionalize the whole of the world functioned as an antidote to the constriction and containment perpetrated by a civilized Europe. This modality of European thought will be important to keep in mind as we look at chapters two and four and the photographs of Loti and Clérambault. Each of these collections is intimately involved in the nostalgia that was at the time associated with non-European cultures. Chapter three, and the photographs of Tina Modotti, intersects in another way with this nostalgia that revolves around concepts of the "natural." My reading of her images is, in part, based on the idea that Modotti, as an Italian woman, is herself implicated as an object of these metaphorical fascinations.

\textsuperscript{54} However, Buck-Morss suggests that Walter Benjamin had a different interpretation of the motivation behind the phenomenon of wide-spread nostalgia for times past. Buck-Morss citing Benjamin states: "On the one hand, it is an 'attempt to master the new experiences of the city' and of technology 'in the frame of the old, traditional ones of nature' and of myth. On the other hand, it is the distorted form of the dream 'wish', which is not to redeem the past, but to redeem \textit{the desire for utopia} to which humanity has persistently given expression [...] the harmonious reconciliation of subject and object through the humanization of nature and the naturalization of humanity" [emphasis added]. Buck-Morss, \textit{The Dialectics of Seeing} 145-146.
In addition to the writings of geographers and explorers, the work of nineteenth-century artists, poets and novelists, as well as that of anthropologists and ethnographers, all detail a nostalgic longing for the "authenticity" of a pristine and innocent time recently lost to the grinding progresses of modernization. Certainly, Pierre Loti's travel writings and Clérambault's ethnographical studies of drapery are rife with a romanticized yearning that took the shape of a desire that cultures and spaces be left alone to remain as they were "originally" before the contaminating influence of the West left them sullied and compromised. The historical interest of painters and photographers in "documenting" colonized cultures before they "disappeared" is a well-known theme. The influence of these ways of thinking about non-Western cultures reached into the fabric of all the disciplines and institutional practices of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By way of illustration, chapter three makes connections to the writings and practices of Paul Gauguin, and to Griselda Pollock's critique of Gauguin that highlights these dimensions of nostalgia in his work and its relation to the twentieth-century avant-garde.

These attitudes and assumptions were tied to and complicated by the fact that the developing human sciences came to be based on an analogy of loss. There was a widespread belief that although the West held the key to progress, rationality and order, this state entailed the loss of a simple innocence, purity, and naturalness: qualities that quickly came to be associated with those beings—women, children and domestic and foreign Others—that were relegated to the lower rungs of the evolutionary scale and were, therefore, capable of existing in a more "natural" state. Each chapter explores the particular resonances between disciplinary and institutional knowledges that grew out of these ways of thinking, alongside dominant themes in psychoanalytic thought:
specifically, the preoccupation with a sense of loss that is most fully articulated in Jacques Lacan's understanding of "lack" as that which is constitutive of the (human) subject. The resulting analyses of the photographs explicitly displace this sense of loss with an articulation of Nietzsche's philosophy of affirmation and excess as the force/flow of becomings.

The work of Michel Foucault has informed every aspect of my research, but nowhere is Foucault's influence more direct than in chapter two, in which I focus on the Loti photographs. *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1, has been an invaluable source of information and, in addition, has provided a guide for rigorous methodological procedure. The photographs of Loti mark the place where bourgeois French heterosexual identity folds into its opposites, mapping a space of incompossibility. The analysis of these photographs picks up on the connections, outlined earlier in this introduction, between the photograph as trace and as map. In keeping with my commitment to a Deleuze and Guattarian philosophy of pragmatics—and with my earlier assurance to the reader that I would be looking at these images both in terms of their potential effects of differing and their instantiation in subject-positions subsumed by systems of power—I also work with Jacques Derrida's and Judith Butler's theories of identity and difference as those "tools" best suited for the task of investigating questions of liminality in relation to the Loti photographs.

I show that earlier analyses of liminality, such as the one introduced by Victor Turner in 1966, can be refigured in terms of Derrida's (de)conceptualisation of (re)iteration as repetition/alterity. (Re)iteration as repetition and difference is a construct

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55 See Massumi, *User's Guide* 166, fn.37. See also Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 263.
56 Deleuze defines a concept as: "Precisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools." *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961- 1984* 76.
that is also consistent with Butler's assertions about the constitution of subjectivity: normative prescriptions of identity require constant re-production through performative processes of citation and reiteration; and the moment of reiteration is precisely the moment when reinscription of prescribed identities is most vulnerable to revision since the reiteration can never be quite the same, there is always "something" left over, a remainder, an excess. Butler is not doing anything untoward in grafting this understanding of iteration onto her theory of subjectivity. Derrida himself does not restrict the scope/range of these theories to the study of language. For example, in a lecture delivered in Montreal in 1971 he followed an analysis of the "classical concept of writing" with these questions:

Are these three predicates, along with the entire system joined to them, reserved, as is so often believed, for "written" communication in the narrow sense of the word? Are they not also to be found in all language, for example in spoken language, and ultimately in the totality of "experience," to the extent that it is not separated from the field of the mark, that is, the grid of erasure and of difference-of-unities of iterability, of unities separable from their internal or external context, and separable from themselves, to the extent that the very iterability which constitutes their identity never permits them to be a unity of self-identity? (317-318, emphasis added).

Chapter three and the Modotti photographs pursues the lines of an investigation of the ways in which identity and subjectivity are constituted, this time in relation to the construction of a Mexican national identity. Modotti's photographs, unlike those of Loti, are not made primarily for private use; rather, they are produced from within a fine arts practice wherein Modotti was attempting to reconcile art and politics, a photography practice and a practice of social activism. This chapter applies Régis Durand's theory of "photographic seeing," and demonstrates the importance of what Barthes has termed the "subtle-beyond-the-frame" of the photograph, alongside a discussion of the photographs in terms of an application of Sarah Kofman's theorization of the fetish as oscillation, to the processes involved in viewing photographs, in order to bring to light certain underexposed aspects of the images. In a practical demonstration of processes of subjectification, I will be exploring the ways in which the photographs produced by Modotti fold back on themselves to create an envelope of potential for Modotti.

In contrast to chapters two, and three, chapter four works with the photographs of Clérambault, which were made both for private use and public consumption. In addition to their production as fine art, these images mark the event that sees Clérambault mapping the "psyche" of western psychiatry from the body and culture of its Others: both its domestic other—poor and working-class women—and its foreign other—the Islamic bodies pictured in his Moroccan photographs. In this chapter I will be taking Régis Durand's assertion that photographs can produce "a moment of pure thought," and applying this idea to the photographs that Clérambault made in Morocco. To do this I map the explicit and implicit preconditions—the conditions of possibility—that I believe
were the ground for Clérambault's unique use of photographic seeing in the formulation of his concept of "mental automatism."

Before I proceed I must, however, distinguish my own definition of the photographic experience to which I believe Durand refers. In describing the thought entailed in this process as "pure," Durand necessarily invokes an ideal. I would like to reconfigure this "pure thought" of Durand's formulation as a manifestation of what I am going to call "photographic thought." I would then add to this definition by saying that this notion of photographic thought has as its precondition an acknowledgement of the immanence of the photographic image. Making Clérambault's photographs visible as "instances of pure thought," or as thinking images, supported by a thorough investigation of their time and context, demonstrates that I am not projecting recently coined concepts (pure/photographic thought) back on a time where they do not register, but am instead tracking the very conditions of possibility necessary for the emergence of these concepts.
Chapter 2: Rhizome

Pierre Loti was the nom de plume of Julian Viaud (1850-1923), an oddly charismatic and extremely influential author in late nineteenth century France. A very public figure and a prolific writer, his work was popular, well known, and financially successful. In recent years his travel narratives—stories that constructed such tenacious thematic stereotypes as Madame Butterfly—have come under critical scrutiny for the way in which they relate colonialism and imperialism to gender, race, and class in the construction and representation of the self and its others. As has been shown by several scholars including myself, his writing gives form to a profound and common ambivalence about sexuality in fin de siècle France. His preoccupation with sexuality was at the heart of his stories about non-European cultures.

A direct contemporary of Sigmund Freud, Loti was a high-ranking French naval officer who regularly wore make-up, used feminine accessories in his dress, and frequently indulged in various kinds of disguise. In addition to being a successful writer whose books were translated into many languages and circulated throughout the world, he was also an accomplished visual artist and his ethnographic illustrations were often used in travel magazines. A pillar of the French state, Loti was a wealthy and respected bourgeois with aristocratic pretensions, and a prominent member of the Parisian cultural elite.
PLATEAU: Smooth and striated space

There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds. All these pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchange-ability, but of elaborate specificity and difference and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another's point of view.

Donna Haraway, (Quoted in Gregory, Imagined Geographies 68).

Chapter two presents a theoretical approach that can be productively engaged to reshape art historical inquiry around the way in which, in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France, various forms of visual representation worked to install unauthorized constituencies and modalities of marginal subjectivity in the larger body politic. Judith Butler's analysis of the constitution of subjectivity and Jacques Derrida's understanding of iteration and citation, are placed in constellation with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's formulations of nomadism and subjectivation, and Michel Foucault's power/knowledge/subjectification hypothesis, and focused through a provocative collection of photographs of Pierre Loti dressed in the ethnic costumes of non-European cultures. I am not suggesting that the theoretical positions taken by Derrida and Butler, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, go together in any "natural" way, nor that they can be reconciled to a single, totalizing analytic approach. Rather, I am interested in the
productive tensions that arise when their ideas are placed in relation to one another, and the effect that these tensions have on the visibility of the images.

Although Butler's theory of performativity has generally been applied to understanding only contemporary emanations of subjectivity, it is here employed to suggest ways in which visual representations that obliquely acknowledged "transgressive" subjectivities, disrupted nineteenth-century prescriptions of normative identity. I will be arguing that in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France, photography and its discourses, in concert with other types of cultural production that also made strategic use of iteration and citation, were instrumental in the installation of a multiplicity of sexual subjectivities. My analysis is grounded in the historical specificity provided by the works of Michel Foucault, Jeffrey Merrick, Robert Nye, Ann Laura Stoler, and Victoria Thompson.

The discussion that follows presents each of the photographs as a plane across which it is possible to map modes of potential. In an activity that Deleuze and Guattari describe as "rhizomatic" I am going to, as outlined in the introduction, animate a

58 Once again, I want to emphasize that Deleuze's and Guattari's concept of the "rhizome" is a significant departure from systems of thought based on binary logic. What follows is their working definition of the terms "rhizome" and "plateau." See Deleuze and Guattari, "Rhizome," On the Line, for a still fuller elucidation of these concepts:

[A] rhizome is a map and not a tracing [...] If the map is opposed to the trace, it's because its whole orientation is toward establishing contact with the real experimentally. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed on itself; it constructs it [...] Contrary to a tracing, which always returns to the "same," a map has multiple entrances. A map is a matter of performance, whereas the tracing always refers to an alleged "competence"(25-26). The rhizome proceeds by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, stitching. Unlike graphics, drawing, or photography [as by now is clear, I disagree with Deleuze and Guattari on this point and argue that photography is both a map and a tracing], unlike tracings, the rhizome refers to a map that must be produced or constructed, is always detachable, connectable, reversible, and modifiable, with multiple entrances and exits with its lines of flight. The tracings are what must be transferred onto the maps, and not the reverse. In opposition to centered systems (even multi-centered), with hierarchical communication and pre-established connections, the rhizome is an a-centered system, non-hierarchical and non-signifying, without a General (or a boss), without an organizing memory or central autonomy, uniquely defined by a circulation of states. In a
number of "plateaus" that range over historical, theoretical, political, cultural and social sites and move them over the Loti photographs. The strategy of writing in "plateaus" counters any movement toward narrative coherence, and instead produces an effect that resists the temptation to "fix" the photographs, even as it introduces forms of dislocation in art historical inquiry. These readings of the photographs develop "intensities" that come together to constitute assemblages, discernable formations with permeable boundaries, flows of meaning that converge in unexpected ways and coalesce through, around, and on the body of Loti. Once again I want to stress that my aim is not to integrate the intensities that develop over the course of this chapter, but rather to articulate them as singularities from which the photographs become visible in new ways.

PLATEAU: "The Drag of the Body": photography, masquerade, and cultural history

In a reading of Jacques Derrida's "Double Session," Christopher Norris cites passages from Angela Carter's novel, Nights at the Circus. Carter's novel is what Norris calls "a species of magic realism" because it tells the story of:

a young American, Walser, who starts out as a down-to-earth cynical observer of the scene [the circus], but who then finds himself increasingly drawn into its magical orbit. When he first joins the circus and puts on his clown's make-up then, we are told, "he experienced the freedom that lies

Or, coming at it again from a slightly different direction a plateau is: "every multiplicity connectable with others by shallow underground stems, in such a way as to form and extend a rhizome...A plateau is always in the middle, neither a beginning nor an end. A rhizome is made of plateaus" (48–50).
behind the mask, within dissimulation, the freedom to juggle with being, and, indeed, with the language which is vital to our being, that lies at the heart of burlesque" (51).

I was not surprised to come across, in the context of Derrida's work, a similar emphasis on the unique relationship that exists between processes of masking and the constitution of subjectivity. Indeed, masking is a form of citation, and citation is a key concept in Derrida's deconstruction of the Western metaphysics of "presence." Judith Butler's analysis of the constitution of the subject is strongly influenced by Derrida's work and the idea of the mas(k)querade informs her notion of performativity; and, for Butler, performativity is central to the constitution of subjectivity.60

My inquiry focuses questions about the relationship of masking to performativity, and of performativity to the constitution of subjectivity, through a number of photographs of Pierre Loti dressed in the ethnic costumes of non-European cultures (such as the one shown in Figure 1).

In this chapter we are working with a productive paradox that is entirely in keeping with Michel Foucault's findings in the History of Sexuality, Volume I. While it is correct that Loti was a powerful member of France's cultural elite, and that he modelled and upheld normative definitions of heterosexual bourgeois masculinity, it is also the case that he was, in his work and in his person, actively engaged in what Foucault found to be a common practice in fin de siècle France, "the dissemination and implementation of polymorphous sexualities." Foucault's construct of "subjugated knowledges" is crucial to understanding the discursive dispersions of sexual multiplicity that took place in this period.

60 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter passim.
Foucault defined "subjugated knowledges" as not only those recovered bodies of knowledge that have been previously "buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation" (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 81), but also as "a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (Foucault, Power/Knowledge 82). He goes on to say that he believes:

that it is through the re-emergence of these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges [...], and which involve what I would call a popular knowledge (le savoir des gens) though it is far from being a general commonsense knowledge, but is on the contrary a particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it—that it is through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these disqualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work (82).

Foucault then comments on his categorization of these two different kinds of knowledges as "subjugated knowledges," and in so doing, further elaborates their differences:

However, there is a strange kind of paradox in the desire to assign to this same category of subjugated knowledges what are on the one hand the products of meticulous, erudite, exact historical knowledge [that is, previously buried and disguised but institutionalised knowledges], and on
the other hand local and specific knowledges which have no common meaning and which are in some fashion allowed to fall into disuse whenever they are not effectively and explicitly maintained in themselves (82).

Certainly, Foucault extends these "local and specific knowledges" to include knowledges of "the self." In this context I propose that those who spoke from within communities that stood outside of heterosexual normativity, as did Loti, were involved in the implementation of discourses that can be designated as "subjugated knowledges."

Necessarily, then, this chapter engages discussions concerning the place of gender and sexuality within the constitution of subjectivity. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick is one of a number of scholars who have, over the past two decades, investigated the extent to which "many of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentieth-century Western culture as a whole are structured—indeed, fractured—by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition."61 Judith Butler has also worked extensively with the philosophical underpinnings of theories of gender and sexuality, and their implications for concepts of subjectivity. I will show—using the photographs of Pierre Loti—that Butler's theories can be used to achieve an historical re-visioning of the way unauthorized constituencies were constantly re-installed, albeit obliquely, in the social body. In

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61 Sedgwick, E.K., Epistemology of the Closet 1. Sedgwick goes on to say: "homo/heterosexual definition has been a presiding master term of the past century, one that has the same, primary importance for all modern Western identity and social organization (and not merely for homosexual identity and culture) as do the more traditionally cruxes of gender, class, and race" (11).
arguing for the efficacy of using Butler's work to plumb what has been historically elided, I am acknowledging the many interrogations of "essentialism" in recent scholarship.  

The Loti photographs are positioned as significant cultural markers that, when mined, expose ruptures in the social fabric of nineteenth century France. At this time, the country was undergoing a process of remodeling, one social hierarchy was being replaced with another, the terms of normative identities, sexual and otherwise, were being placed under forcible revision; and, if Butler's assertions are correct, spaces for transgressive subjectivities were, through processes of citation and iteration, being subversively installed. For it is the very fact that prescribed identities must be constantly and consistently reinscribed in the social realm, and are, therefore, extremely unstable, that renders those identities susceptible to violation and revision.

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62 For instance, see Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference.
63 V Thompson, "Creating Boundaries: Homosexuality and the Changing Social Order in France, 1830-1870," Homosexuality in Modern France 122. Thompson's essay offers a thorough and insightful analysis of the emergence of homosexuality as a category in nineteenth century France.
64 Butler is drawing directly on the work of Derrida when she uses the terms citation and iteration (and Derrida, in turn, is heavily indebted to the work of J.L. Austin. For Derrida, iteration is repetition and is inextricably linked to alterity (iter comes from itara, other in Sanskrit). So iteration then is repetition/alterity: there is no repetition without difference; there are always remainders, something is left over, that which cannot be contained, some difference that cannot be absorbed completely in the reiteration. Derrida talks about citation as duplication and duplicity. That is, all signs (in the broadest sense of this word) can be cited, they can be put between quotation marks and moved or grafted onto/into a different context, thereby creating new contexts—and losing any sense of "origins" (although the analysis that Derrida is presenting here directly challenges any sense of 'origin' as it is used in the history of Western philosophy. At times, in order, he says, to avoid confusion, Derrida collapses the two categories of a repetitive or citational structure into a single term: the iterable structure. So, then, an iteration is a citation or a repetition and every iteration is a reiteration: there can be no origin because signs are representational systems, they are always referring to that which they cite, repeating that which has already been iterated. This presentation is intimately connected to the concept of performativity in Judith Butler's theory of the constitution of subjectivity.
65 It is also the necessity of reinscription that corrodes any notion of essentiality in terms of the nature of particular bodies. That gender must be constantly reasserted and policed is evidence that it is not a given, a materiality that exists previous to its specific interpretation.
All this garrulous attention which has us in a stew over sexuality, is it not motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labor capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations: in short, to constitute a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative?

I still do not know whether this is the ultimate objective. But this much is certain: reduction has not been the means employed for trying to achieve it. The nineteenth century and our own have been, rather, the age of multiplication: a dispersion of sexualities, a strengthening of their disparate forms, a multiple implantation of "perversions." Our epoch had initiated sexual heterogeneities.


The extant collection of photographs of Loti dressed in ethnic costume is ineluctably provocative. And there are far too many photographs to pass them by without comment. Dressing in the clothes of non-European cultures was a widespread practice that varied in its application. For example, as well as being popular among France's upper classes and cultural elites, it was also common for tourists to dress in the clothes of the foreign cultures they were visiting in order to have a souvenir photograph to carry home with them. However, this fact only begs the questions: What were the specific functions of such activities? What purposes did they serve? We are prompted to ask exactly what Loti was doing when he repeatedly donned the traditional dress of non-European cultures and posed to be photographed? What were these images constructing? How can we
understand Loti's predilection to dress up, masquerade, as an/Other? And how are Loti's performances marked by his time, by the prescribed identities available to a bourgeois European male in late nineteenth and early twentieth century France? It is important to ask here what the answers to these questions tell us about some of the ways that the photographic portrait worked in relation to the constitution of subjectivity? In keeping with the larger project of my study, what do the images bring to visibility regarding the way in which space and place are reclaimed by those bodies that fall outside the normative domain? What can they tell us about parallel modes of potential in the virtual that diagram collective imaginings that open new possibilities for existence?

The questions are many and varied. If, as Judith Butler states, "collective disidentifications" with dominant norms "can facilitate a reconceptualization of which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as critical matters of concern" (Butler, Bodies That Matter 4), can we then frame Loti's redress of his body as a sub/version of prescribed boundaries of normative male sexual identity? In these photographs is Loti displaying, as I will show he does in his literary works, underlying subjectivities that cannot, and must not in the general course of things, be openly alluded to? And if, again referring to Butler, the formation of the subject "requires the simultaneous production of abject being," (that is, the contours of the subject are defined by the simultaneous

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66 I am using capital O, Other, to mean an/other than cannot be recuperated within the self; an instance of radical alterity, i.e. the foreign other.
67 Ibid, 3. Abjection in this context means that the subject is defined by that which it is not, i.e. the European bourgeois subject defined itself over and against those who were Other. I must, for the sake of clarity quote Butler's summary of Julia Kristeva's use of the abject, because an understanding of the way she is using this term is essential to my analysis of the photographs: "The 'abject' designates that which has been expelled from the body, discharged as excrement, literally rendered 'Other.' this appears as an expulsion of alien elements, but the alien is effectively established through this expulsion. The construction of the 'not-me' as the abject establishes the boundaries of the body which are also the first contours of the subject[...]The boundary of the body as well as the distinction between internal and external is established through the ejection and transvaluation of something originally part of identity into a defiling otherness" (133). See J Kristeva's Powers of Horror. Also see Iris M. Young, "Abjection and Oppression:
construction of that "other" which it is not, that "Other/abject" which is refused), then
how can we understand Loti's performative appropriation of identities that are, in late
nineteenth century France, following this definition, abject? Can we perhaps view these
photographs in wider terms and look at the way they are contiguous with the work of
Empire being carried out in Loti's stories? In the European imaginary, do these cross-
dressing colonizations of foreign bodies that blur the boundaries between a domestic
body and a foreign body also give way to a smudging of the lines demarcating and
containing particular sexual identities, thereby casting Loti—and the bourgeois European
male body—adrift in a liminal space that is subject to a number of threatening
dislocations?

Loti's privileged status is central to this formulation—it is not just any(body) that
can transgress boundaries in this way. Rather, it is only those bodies that fall within
(even as it is being performatively redrawn, reconstituted, and rearticulated) the
normative domain and, a space that, at the end of the nineteenth century, was colonized
by the European bourgeois male body. In the following analysis I will show that Loti's
"transgressive" acts can only be understood within a paradigm that shows that these
activities at once resist and embrace that which is being transgressed. Loti's insertion of
the photographic image into the heart of the masquerade gives us just such a register to
explore. I propose that in these photographs foreign locales and bodies, as sites of

Dynamics of Unconscious Racism, Sexism, and Homophobia," a paper originally presented at the Society
of Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Meetings, Northwestern University, 1988 and subsequently
published in Crisis in Continental Philosophy. Butler uses Young's work in her analysis of the construction
of subjectivity: "As Iris Young has suggested in her use of Kristeva to understand sexism, homophobia, and
racism, the repudiation of bodies for their sex, sexuality, and/or color is an 'expulsion' followed by a
'repulsion' that founds and consolidates culturally hegemonic identities along sex/race/sexuality axes of
differentialion." Gender Trouble 133.

68 I am using the term "imaginary" here in the sense suggested by Benedict Anderson Imagined
Communities, alongside the racialization of the term in Homi Bhabha's Nation and Narration.
abjection, are figured simultaneously as the constitutive "outside" of European culture and as the playground of the privileged white male. The images, then, figure spaces that offered occasions for the disavowal of compulsory heterosexuality even as they upheld East/West divisions and hierarchies of power. Spaces, that provide a proving ground for Foucault's contestation of the "repressive hypothesis." Further, as indicated earlier, I am hypothesizing that the images are constitutive—just as Loti's stories are constitutive—of "subjugated knowledges" that ran virtually unsanctioned and unobstructed, alongside official discourse, claiming the territories of sexuality as their own to define and propagate.

PLATEAU: In My Secret Life

I recount the facts, just as they happened, insofar as I am able to recollect them; this is all that I can do [...] a secret life must not leave out anything...


It is the diary of a summer of my life, in which I have changed nothing, not even the dates.

Pierre Loti, Preface, Japan: Madame Chrysanthemum, 1887.

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69 I read the "abject" in line with Fanon. See pages 54–55 of this chapter.
70 Adrienne Rich coined the term "compulsory heterosexuality". Butler describes Rich's use of the term as "characterize[ing] a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model of gender intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality," (Butler, Gender Trouble 6).
71 Foucault cites My Secret Life in "The Repressive Hypothesis" and says that "at the end of the nineteenth century, the anonymous author of My Secret Life submitted to the same prescription [as did de Sade]; outwardly, at least, this man was doubtless a kind of traditional libertine; but he conceived the idea of complementing his life—which he had almost totally dedicated to sexual activity—with a scrupulous account of every one of its episodes [in eleven volumes]" (305).
In *Archive Fever*, Derrida repeatedly returns to the point that the "public" and the "private" are not the same as, and cannot be equated to, the "non-secret" and the "secret."

Whereas this understanding is relevant for each of the three archival collections of photographs used in this study, nowhere is it as crucial a distinction as with the Loti photographs. Loti's "secret life" was a kind of consensual secret. It was a titillating "secret" subscribed to by Loti himself, by his reading public, by his colleagues and superiors in the navy, by the popular press, etc. Seen in this light his "transgressions" are cast into the register of metaphor: a rhetorical move that provides us with an apt example of Foucault's assertion that it is, contrary to the claims of the "repressive hypothesis," the endless transformation of sex into discourse that can be said to characterize the Victorian era. However, Foucault did not deny the prohibitions of sex attendant on the turn to discourse, and it is important not to gloss over the real dangers involved in the activities in which Loti participated. Indeed, if we are to understand the polymorphous effects of power generated by what was shown in these photographs, we must consider certain aspects of the historical conjuncture that will provide us one basis for "reading" the bodies contained in the photographs.

Sexual cartographies

Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a thing one administered. It was in the nature of a public potential; it called for management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses (Foucault, *History of Sexuality* Vol.I, 24).
Victoria Thompson's essay, "Creating Boundaries: Homosexuality and the Changing Social Order in France, 1830-1870," shows that whereas in France in the 1830s and 1840s sexual categories tended to be rather fluid and loosely defined, after the bloody June Days of the 1848 uprising, permeable boundaries came to be associated with disorder and chaos, and that "cultural categories—in particular those of class, gender, and sexuality—became increasingly fixed" (103). As well, France was one of the first industrial powers to experience a stagnation and decline of its population rate.  

Historian Robert Nye maps the ways in which concern over this development saw the "formation of a 'natalist' movement whose efforts aimed at solidifying marriage, increasing family size, improving the health of mothers and children, while attempting to stamp out obstacles to reproduction such as alcoholism, pornography, and neo-Malthusian propaganda." All of these changes contributed to what Foucault refers to as a technology of health and pathology that was organized around the positioning of sexuality as "a medical and medicalizable object" (Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. I, 44). The prevailing climate made it very easy for the homosexual, "as someone who threatened the gender balance that was at the basis of all other social distinctions" (Thompson 122), to be viewed with suspicion and fear. And, during the latter half of the nineteenth century the homosexual emerged as a type "increasingly used to symbolize 'a reversal of the regular order.'" Concomitant with this classification of sexuality into categories presented as symmetrical binary opposites—heterosexuality and

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72 R A Nye, "Michel Foucault's Sexuality and the History of Homosexuality in France," Homosexuality in Modern France 230.
73 Ibid 230
74 Ibid 104. See also Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol I, "The Perverse Implantation" 36 – 49.
homosexuality—the homosexual, the "invert," became further contained and defined within medical and criminal discourses as aberrant and dangerous to the "natural order," and progressively came to function as the dark underside of normative social prescriptions governing identity (Sedgwick 9).

Imperial desiring machines

This outside (the Orient) passes in fact through our inside, but of course it does so by way of a history and a logic which make of its passage the history and logic of a blindness.

Philippe Sollers

Now we must take this understanding of the position occupied by the "homosexual" a step further because, so I have argued, the constitution of the subject was secured in relation to that which it refused, that which was Other. And this brings us, inevitably, into the realms of Empire and face to face with imperial and colonial management strategies. As Ann Laura Stoler has shown: "Discourses of sexuality do more than define the distinctions of the bourgeois self; in identifying marginal members of the body politic, they have mapped the moral parameters of European nations" (7). Invoking Foucault, Stoler goes on to explore:

the ways in which racial discourse reverberated between metropole and colony to secure the tenuous distinctions of bourgeois rule; how in this 'management of [bourgeois] life,' middle-class distinctions were made not only in contrast to European-based working class, but through a racialized

75 However, as I have already stated, this chapter is built on Foucault's complication of these prescriptions—again see History of Sexuality, "The Perverse Implantation."

notion of civility that brought the colonial convergence of—and conflict between—class and racial membership in sharp relief (97). 

In other words, discourses of race were mobilized in conjunction with discourses of sexuality, both working together to constitute and regulate the "properly" attributed bourgeois body. Therefore the constitution of the European bourgeois subject was inseparable from questions of sexuality, and definitions of sexuality were worked through questions of race. The deployment of imperial policies and colonial practices rendered the contours of the European body intelligible through citation and (re)iteration of hierarchy and difference. In this context, Loti's predilection to masquerade as a non-European is thrown into sharp relief.

As a career naval officer, Pierre Loti straddled the two worlds of metropole and colony. However, because he was identified as a French subject, and officer of the State (Fig. 4)—as distinct from a French colonialist—his stories carried the full authority and enacted the work of Empire. In the photographic images we are concerned with here, he oscillates between European (Fig. 5) and Other (Fig. 1); in masquerading as an/Other, Loti was rehearsing or acting out a precariously liminal subject position. Yet the photographs evoke more than the double identity of European/Other. As I have already mentioned, the homosexual came to be identified as a threat partly because of the fears of degeneration evoked by France's falling population rate. And, in relation to this, it is significant that by the middle of the nineteenth century the problem of how to define and

77 Stoler's reading of sexuality offers a clear definition of the "constitutive outside" of subject formation as first formulated by Henry Staten in Wittgenstein and Derrida 23, (a concept that was then picked up by Derrida and Ernesto Laclau). Thank you to Richard Ingram for bringing the Staten text to my attention. In Stoler's example the bourgeois is the "subject", the European proletarian is its "other" and the colonized its "Other"—i.e. bourgeois "subject", proletarian "object, colonized "abject."
regulate the progeny of cross-race relations (calling up as it did anxieties around racial contamination) had become an enormous headache for France. I suggest that Loti's ambiguous sexuality located him, symbolically and practically, in a space similar to that of the mixed-blood subject in relation to dominant discourses of degeneration. That is, I am suggesting that Loti's "impurity" (his refusal to position himself publicly as unambiguously heterosexual) constituted, like the "impurity" of the mixed-blood subject, a similar threat to the stability of Empire and the continuation of the race. These images, then, do more than transgress racial boundaries: they also worry geographical, gender, sexual, and class boundaries, thereby challenging the moral authority central to Western internal and external domination. I want to turn now to Loti's written work and use it to frame my larger argument around the ways in which the photographs were productive.

PLATEAU: Desiring production and the production of desire

Although the most important role may appear to devolve on Madame Chrysanthème, it is very certain that the three principal personages are
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myself, Japan, and the effect produced on me by that country.

Pierre Loti, Preface, Japan: Madame Chrysanthemum

[T]he author [Loti] will go on describing cities, in Japan, in Persia, in Morocco, i.e., will go on designating and searchlighting (by emblems of discourse) the space of his desire.

The multiplicity of Pierre Loti has been eloquently navigated by Roland Barthes in his essay, "Pierre Loti: Aziyadé." Under Barthes' pen the tableaux vivants of Loti by Loti (that are pictured so lavishly in his writings) quicken into images of "desire [as] a force adrift" (119). The insights contained in Barthes' essay are not limited to the text that he takes as his object; rather he uses Aziyadé to trace Loti's œuvre in its entirety.

Taking Barthes' lead, then, this section will explore the geographies of Loti's desiring production: the contexts, material and imaginary, across which Loti wrote the (multiple) self and its others. For, above all, the sites of transformation of the self, whether they are metaphorical, or occur through the transcriptions of transvestism, are the spaces of Loti's writings. Identifying the ways in which Loti's Madame Chrysanthème relates colonialism and imperialism to gender, "race," and class in the construction and representation of the self and its others will show how and where the text intersects with dominant ways of reading colonial sexuality. Madame Chrysanthème was immensely popular in its own time, and, as I have already indicated, I believe this popularity was due, in part, to the way in which the text articulates sexual ambiguities.

Time/Space/Place Trajectories

[T]here is no binary division to be made between what one says and what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such things, how those who can and those who cannot speak of them are distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or which form of discretion is required in either case. There is not one but many silences,
and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.

Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*. Volume I, 27.

Loti’s representation of his protagonist, Chrysantheme, is complex and multivalent: Loti evokes and engages contemporary representations of the "exotic" woman, but, as I will show, his emphasis and attention are elsewhere. In addition to constructing and representing a popular, dominant stereotype of the "Oriental" woman, Loti’s narrative also obliquely addresses what was perhaps a not uncommon experience in the life of the nineteenth century bourgeois male: homosexual encounters are often referred to in contemporaneous literary works, even though, as has already been stated, their existence was not officially acknowledged except in discourses concerned with policing normative male sexuality. This is a significant point because it directs us to a problematic terrain that if mapped could provide a picture of previously obscured and silenced spaces.

More specifically, I am interested in elucidating the ways in which Loti’s construction of "woman" opens onto assertions of other kinds of subjectivities that can be designated as outlawed and outcast in late nineteenth-century France. I believe that the whispered utterances buried in Loti’s texts can be understood in terms of Judith Butler’s notions of performativity, as “that aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce what it names,” and as "the discursive mode by which ontological effects are installed” (Butler 4). If Loti’s narratives functioned in this way, then his stories, in addition to repeating sexist, racist, and misogynist representations of women that were fundamental to the construction of European bourgeois male identity, also serve to subvert normative
male sexuality, and to acknowledge and install space for individuals occupying alternate sexualities. In other words, his stories, by giving shadowy form to male bodies that embraced transgressive sexual practices, contributed to subjugated knowledges that traced into existence alternative collective imaginaries, even as they destabilized hegemonic notions of normative male sexuality.

Madame Chrysantheme is fraught with contradictions. Certainly, it is a difficult text with which to work. Loti’s disturbing representations of Japan and the young Chrysantheme, coupled with the reality that this poorly written book was not one Loti felt drawn to writing, but rather was a project hastily undertaken primarily for economic gain, makes it a problematic text. However, these difficulties are also the basis of my interpretation: in Madame Chrysantheme it is this very fact—the carelessness of Loti’s expression—that allows us access to attitudes, values, and beliefs that are paradoxically both more submerged and more obvious than those contained in the crafted storytelling of his other books.

Figuring Loti

Loti was a celebrity in nineteenth-century France. Not only was his work extremely popular and financially successful, he also associated with the rich, famous, and talented people of his day, and was himself a person worthy of note in the popular press. Among the many examples of the formal recognition afforded him was his election in 1891 to the Académie Française (he defeated the candidacy of Emile Zola); on the occasion of his death in France an enormous state funeral marked his passing in 1923; and in 1934, the “Pierre Loti” museum was inaugurated to commemorate his memory. Loti’s influence
was pervasive and far ranging. "Aziyadé" masquerade balls, where participants dressed as characters from his novel of the same name, were something of a rage in Paris in the early decades of the twentieth century, and when young male "candidates for entry into the Ecole Navale were asked to state what had inspired their naval vocation, 'the great majority said it was through reading Jules Verne and Pierre Loti'" (Hargreaves, 82).

Madame Chrysantheme, a formulaic romance about Loti’s time in Japan, is presented in its preface as a travel narrative—"It is the diary of a summer of my life, in which I have changed nothing, not even the dates"—but in actuality is a story cobbled together from a string of anecdotes and descriptive passages interspersed with stereotyped clichés about the country of Japan and its people. The genre of this narrative is important in that the autobiographical travel narrative constitutes a particularly seductive form of truth telling, because it putatively offers an authoritative vision of a reality accurately rendered. The question of veracity is an unavoidable one in works that purport to be an accurate form of life writing. Factuality in the modern world has been synonymous with authority. In practice, the autobiographical nature of the genre of travel writing both complicates and distorts the representation of non-European cultures, one significant example of which is the Butterfly trope. Loti was in earnest, perhaps more so than he realized, when, as the epigraph of this section illustrates, he presented Madame Chrysantheme as a tale primarily about himself and his relationship to Japan. And, as I will show, it is in keeping with other nineteenth-century cultural and institutional practices concerned with defining the self in reference to negative identifications of the Other, that Loti’s representation of the European bourgeois male operates through the staged representation of a Japanese woman. In Loti’s work, as in other examples of
contemporaneous cultural and institutional production that I cite, people and their customs and habits are presented as static entities in an ahistorical world. Sometimes they are villainized, and sometimes they are romanticized, but always they are diminished and stereotyped; they are constructed as Other, an Other that ultimately serves to construct the identity of those who are not Other—the white, European, bourgeois male. Loti's stories are replete with examples of descriptions of an Other negatively identified as all body, animal-like, mindless, identifications that can be understood as operating within Julia Kristeva's notions of the abject. These are but a few of Loti's references to the people of Japan:

[T]he mousmés come out of their holes like so many mice [...] , these tiny personages with narrow eyes and no brains (Madame Chrysanthème, 271-272).

[The] indefinable odour of mousmés, of yellow race, of Japan, which is always and everywhere in the air (Madame Chrysanthème, 278).

At the moment of my departure, I can only find within myself a smile of careless mockery for the swarming crowd of this Liliputian curtseying people,-laborious, industrious, greedy of gain, tainted with a constitutional affectation, hereditary insignificance, and incurable monkeyishness (Madame Chrysanthème, 328).

And it is at those moments that their little slit eyes open, and seem to reveal something like a mind beneath their puppet-like exteriors.

But a mind which, more than ever, seems different in kind from my own; I feel that my thoughts are as distant from theirs as from the
fleeting ideas of a bird or the daydreams of a monkey.

[...whose hand] had, he could not help feeling, the terrible, chilling look of a monkey's paws.

Yet these hands were small and delicate, and were attached to her stout arms by very slender wrists. But the way in which the palms lacked colour and the half-tinting of the fingers has something non-human about it which was terrifying' (Hargreaves, 36-67, italics and translation in the original)

Looking awry and seeing otherwise

To see differently [...], to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future "objectivity"—the latter understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. [...] There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing"; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity," be.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Gay Science 374.

As we make our way through Madame Chrysanthème (laboriously, it must be said), it quickly becomes evident that, in the midst of this crassly racist and misogynist text, Loti
is also *writing something else*. Even a first reading of *Madame Chrysanthème* reveals that apart from Loti's descriptions of the young Chrysanthème, which are, in fact, vitriolic, the only passages where the prose is alive and emotionally intense are those that also evoke a homoerotic sensibility. Rather than being structured around the title character, Madame Chrysanthème, the narrative actually threads back and forth through the figure of Yves, a character who, as the object of the narrator's affections and loyalty, holds the storyline together.

When I recognized Yves' place in the structure of the story, I examined the rest of Loti's work and discovered that an emphasis on the expression of an ambiguous sexuality held a prominent place throughout his writings. Moreover, this analysis of the structure of *Madame Chrysanthème* is not only supported by Barthes' general understanding of Loti's work, it proves to be precisely in keeping with his reading of *Aziyadé*. Barthes describes the structural function of Loti's young woman protagonist in that story as follows: "Aziyadé is the neutral term, the zero term of this major paradigm: discursively, she occupies the front rank; structurally, she is absent, she is the place of an absence, she is a fact of discourse, not a fact of desire" ("Pierre Loti," 114). In the same way then, an interrogation of the quotidian backdrop of *Madame Chrysanthème* registers particular constructions of subjectivity and identity that mark Chrysanthème as "the zero term,"—"a fact of discourse." Once again evoking Butler's work, I suggest that these constructions were a way of writing into the social, or at least implicitly acknowledging, sexual identities that transgressed the boundaries of prescribed normative male sexuality. And as I indicated earlier, we could go further: What if the move to binary distinctions in the realm of hegemonic discourses of sexuality shifted those discourses concerned with
articulating sexual multiplicity into the position on the power/knowledge axis of what Foucault designates as "subjugated knowledges"? Is it possible that these knowledges then became a constituent element of the collective imaginaries of illicit sexualities?

By the time he arrived in Japan in 1885, Loti was an old hand at turning his various visits to ports-of-call into fictionalized travel narratives. Madame Chrysanthème is ostensibly structured around Loti’s actual marriage to a young Japanese girl named Okané-San. Indeed, many of his stories are built around roughly the same plot: Western man travels to "exotic" land, meets "Oriental" woman, who immediately recognizes the man as a superior being and falls in love with him; they have a relationship, and the man moves on to the next port leaving the woman behind. Madame Chrysanthème is unusual in the larger context of the early Butterfly narratives because the woman does not kill herself or die of a broken heart after the hero departs. Yet, as I have already suggested, in spite of the apparent focus on heterosexual relationships, all of Loti’s stories also carry a homoerotic charge. Clive Wake addresses this theme of Loti’s sexuality and structures his book around the assertion that the novelist was actually a homosexual who perpetrated a heterosexual myth upon his reading public. However, contrary to Wake’s interpretation, it is by now evident that the binary of homo/heterosexuality was not so clearly defined, and further, because of impossibility of maintaining distinct boundaries, it is likely that at least some of the reading public actively engaged, welcomed and colluded with Loti’s representations of diverse masculine sexual identities.

There have been other approaches to the representations of masculinity and sexuality in Loti’s writing. Christian Gundermann’s “Orientalism, Homophobia, Masochism: Transfers between Pierre Loti’s Aziyadé and Gilles Deleuze’s ‘Coldness and
Cruelty” again invokes Barthes in his Freudian-Lacanian analysis of Aziyadé. Gundermann declares that what interested him about the novel “is precisely the way it wields colonialist stereotypes and simultaneously engenders the potential […] for a ‘campy’ subversion of the stable normative masculinity that purports to lie at the heart of the colonialist project” (151). His analysis of Aziyadé rehearses the themes of Edward Said's Orientalism, and figures the central motif of the novel as that of a masked homoerotic relationship, one wherein the Orient, viewed as woman, works to feminize and make into passive, (penetrable) objects, and both its female and male subjects. Thus the male figure that acts as intermediary between the narrator and the woman Aziyadé serves also as an object of desire. Moreover, Gundermann situates Loti’s work in the context of a colonialist discourse that maps the Orient as a space that sheltered sexual transgression:

[T]he barely dissimulated descriptions of Loti’s "homosexual conduct" have prompted Barthes to read as the novel’s central theme that "pâle débauche" that Loti practices at night on the streets of Istanbul. [...] The Orient is clearly set up as the space where homosexuality is tolerated and practiced, and innumerable passages confirm that Aziyadé is hardly even the "cover up" that Barthes sees in her. In a gesture of double entendre, "elle" is quite (un)equivocally the homosexuality that is neither tolerated nor even acknowledged in the novel’s West (163).

Certainly, if we return to Barthes for a moment, it becomes clear that Loti’s Madame Chrysantheme is formulaic in more ways than the one referred to earlier:
A motif appears here—which is visible in other [of Loti’s writings] as well: no, *Aziyadé* is not altogether a novel for well-brought-up girls, it is also a minor Sodomite epic, studded with allusions to *something unheard-of and shadowy*.

The paradigm of the two friends is therefore clearly formulated (the friend/the lover), but it has no consequence: it is not *transformed* (into action, into plot, into drama): the meaning remains somehow indifferent. This novel is an almost motionless discourse, which posits meanings but does not resolve them (Barthes, "Pierre Loti" 111).

*Madame Chrysantheme*, published eight years after *Aziyadé*, was received by a reading public already well versed in the ambiguities of Loti’s gendered representations. We know that Loti, who actually spent a total of only thirty-four days in Japan during the visit ostensibly "chronicled" in *Madame Chrysantheme*, was not much interested in the writing of this story. He did not like the country or the people, but, as he wrote to his sister shortly after his arrival: “It would be […] a poor piece of investment policy not to profit from my stay by having a bit of a look round the interior and earning my money by spinning a tale out of it” (quoted in Hargreaves, 81). At the same time he wrote to a friend: “Working hard, writing Japanese novel [*Madame Chrysantheme*], must deliver by August; big money matter. Novel will be daft. Am getting same way myself” (quoted in Hargreaves, 81). *Chrysantheme*, then, is a kind of lazy version of *Aziyadé*, a version that lacks the defining features that make *Aziyadé* such a good example of the way that the Orient, woman, and normative male sexuality were constituted in relation to one another.
Telling Tales

Not only does the writing, proceeding from desire, constantly touch on the forbidden, alienate the writing subject, and baffle him; but even (this being merely the structural translation of the foregoing) the functional levels are multiple: they tremble within each other.

Roland Barthes, "Pierre Loti: Aziyadé" (121).

In Madame Chrysanthème, Yves is a fellow officer who accompanies the narrator, (Loti), to Japan. The two friends are inseparable. It is Yves who suggests to Loti that he take a wife while he is in Japan, and it is he who later picks out Loti’s bride. However, very early in the story the narrator begins to worry about the negative effects that his young Japanese wife may be having on his friend, Yves. As I have already said, it is significant that this jealous worry and its resolution develop into the main narrative interest in the story. Chrysanthème, rather than being a central character, is figured only as she is perceived, that is, negatively, as a threat and a danger to the relationship between the two men. The productive paradox at play here is figured by Loti's dual performance of dominant male heterosexuality and its simultaneous subversion that opens the spaces of desire recognizable to a certain constituency of his readership. The following passages show how Loti uses displacement strategically. It is displacement that allows Loti to ventriloquize the voice of the bourgeois heterosexual male subject even as he marks out Yves as the primary object of his emotional attachment:

Yves is now in bed and sleeping under our roof [...] Sleep has come to him sooner than to me tonight; for somehow I fancy I had seen long
glances exchanged between him and Chrysanthème [...] I have left this little creature in his hands like a toy, and I begin to fear lest I should have thrown some perturbation in his mind. I do not trouble my head about this little Japanese girl. But Yves, it would be decidedly wrong on his part, and would greatly diminish my faith in him. (160)

As Chrysanthème crouches in front of her smoking-box, I suddenly discover in her an air of low breeding, in the very worst sense of the word [...]. I should hate her [...] if she were to entice Yves into committing a fault, -a fault which I should perhaps never be able to forgive. (162)

I embarked with Yves on board a sampan; this time it is he who is carrying me off and taking me back to my home... On land, a delicious perfume of new-mown hay greets us, and the road across the mountains lies bathed in glorious moonlight. (178)

While it can be said that such commentary operates within heterosexual codes of masculine honour and women as property, it is significant that the attention focused on Yves emerges as an obsessive one, and continues throughout the story. Yves is present on virtually every page of the text. Indeed, his presence is so keen that on occasions when he is not present his absence is tangible for the reader. The sublimated erotic tension achieves release when the narrator confronts Yves with his misgivings:

I risk the remark: "You will perhaps be more sorry to leave this little
"Chrysanthème than I am?"

Silence reigns between us.

After which I pursue, and, burning my ships, I add: "You know, after all, if you have such a fancy for her, I haven’t really married her; one can’t really consider her my wife." In great surprise he looks in my face: "Not your wife, you say? But, by Jove, though, that’s just it; she is your wife."

There is no need of many words at any time between us two; I know exactly now, by his tone, by his great good-humoured smile, how the case stands… he considers her my wife, and she is sacred. I have the fullest faith in his word, and I experience a positive relief, a real joy, at finding my staunch Yves of bygone days. How could I have so succumbed to the demeaning influence of my surroundings as to suspect him even, and invent for myself such a mean, petty anxiety?

We will never even mention that doll again.

We remain up there very late, talking of other things, gazing the while at the immense depths below our feet, at the valleys and mountains as they become one by one indistinct and lost in the deepening darkness. Placed as we are at an enormous height, in the wide free atmosphere, we seem already to have quitted this miniature country... (289)

Although Madame Chrysanthème does not engage in the more obvious homoerotic innuendo found in Loti’s Aziyadé, the narrator’s preoccupation with Yves and the fact
that this preoccupation is central to the unfolding of the plot, situates Chrysanthème as a decoy in the main action of the story.

Home Truths

Gundermann's attempt, cited above, to establish the possibility of a "campy subversion of stable normative masculinity" in Loti's literary production, and its particular positioning in Madame Chrysanthème, is consistent with accounts of Loti's personal life. Loti seems always to have been simultaneously constructing and transgressing the prescribed masculine identity of a nineteenth-century bourgeois male. He was remembered as someone who "loved both men and women passionately, and if there had been a third sex he would have loved that too" (Blanch 10). According to historical accounts, his mother was his closest female companion. Although he married a woman, Jeanne Blanche Franc de Ferrière, who was his social equal, and had a child with her, he also took as a common-law wife Crucita Gainza because of fears about continuance of the family line. He established the young Basque woman in a small house in his hometown and had four children with her. However, he did not spend much time with either of these women. In the course of his career as a naval officer he was often away from both homes and his letters and journals confirm that he engaged in long-term intimate same-sex relations (Szyliowicz 30-31 and 127, note 33).

The ambivalent figure that Loti cut was not lost on the French public. The caricature of him shown in Figure 6, one of many published in contemporary magazines, drives home this point. The way that this image details the infamous high-heeled boots Loti teetered around in to give himself more height, the emphasis on the ever present
make-up, the Turkish fez that recalls Aziyadé, along with Loti's sexually provocative, precarious balance atop the steeple, and his preoccupation with his own image as he stares into the mirror, suggest a familiarity on the part of the French public, with many of the closeted circumstances in his work. The existence of this knowledge recalls Derrida's admonition, referred to earlier in this chapter, that the public and the private cannot be equated to the non-secret and the secret. The caption reads "Pacha" (pasha in English), and refers to a high-ranking Turkish officer. Loti, a high-ranking French naval officer, who is identified as such (with the exception of the fez) by the uniform he is wearing, is designated as a "Turk." This caption alerts us to the first of many doubles in play here. Loti, as a representative of the French empire, is placed far above the ground in the Imperial seat of power: an elevated position from which he is able to survey the entire expanse below. However, he does not occupy this position as intended. Rather, he is lost in the image reflected back from the mirror held in front of him. He is immersed, deeply engaged in this surface. But, the reflection in the mirror is ambiguous at best. Finally, we cannot leave this image without further addressing the obvious sexual innuendo. The East, depicted as a place that permits transgressive sexual practices—the penetration of men by other men—is in this image the site of a power reversal: Loti straddled atop the obviously phallic representation of a mosque can be seen as being penetrated, both in terms of (homo)sexual penetration, and (contrary to the trope of Orientalism that figures, as in Puccini's opera Madama Butterfly, a feminized East penetrated by the West) as a French subject penetrated by the Turkish "abject." Furthermore, the caricature itself commits the travesty that is its object because as Barthes tells us, in the practice of masquerade, the costume:
is a problem of identity, and since what is abandoned—or adopted—is a total person, there must be no contagion between the two costumes, the Occidental cast-offs and the new garments; whence those sites of transformation, those transformation chambers [...], those airtight sluices where identities are scrupulously exchanged, one dying (Loti), the other born (Arif) [Loti's masquerade in *Aziyadé*] ("Pierre Loti" 115).

Seen in this light, this caricature is, quite literally, one site of Loti's public undoing.

Still-life on the high seas

Loti, like a number of his contemporaries, had received training in the visual arts and was an accomplished draftsman. A consideration of some of the many drawings and photographs kept in the Loti archives is instructive in the attempt to acknowledge and confront the silences contained in his work. Photographs of Loti—alone, almost always in costume, and with various of his male friends—when placed beside drawings he made of his fellow shipmates over a period of several decades, provoke distinctly sexualized readings. The three drawings I have included here are compelling. The first drawing (Fig. 7) was made in 1868-69, at the beginning of Loti's naval career. It is a composite drawing of Loti's fellow officers and shipmates. The individual images are small in relation to the size of the paper, and each head and shoulders motif is given its own space. In this drawing, the captain of the ship is set in the central space of the composition and further identified with the letter "C." In another such drawing Joseph Bernard, a close friend of Loti's, (they were companions for many years and Loti went to a great deal of trouble to have himself relocated to Bernard's ship when Bernard was
promoted to another position), occupies a place of honour at the drawing’s centre. The photograph of Loti and Bernard (Fig. 8) is notable for the intensity with which Bernard appears to focus on the young Loti. The above drawing almost certainly uses as its model a similar, earlier photograph of Loti and Bernard, taken aboard the vessel, Bordo, on which they were stationed for several years. A later drawing (Fig. 9) dealing with the same subject as the first two drawings, Loti’s shipmates, creates a very different impression: the men are no longer represented by pristine head and shoulder cameos. We see these men's bodies, and they are shown in different stages of undress. The scanty undershirts clothe virile, muscular forms that are no longer separated in the pictorial space. The bodies touch, overlap and intermingle. The harlequin in the centre of the composition is a provocative element alluding to Loti’s love of the masquerade. The figures are set against a cloud-swept sky and a butterfly with a fluid gossamer train flies out of the left of the drawing.

Figure 10 gives us an example of a more extended study executed around the same time. The two men are figured in a formal composition that makes ironic references to the moralizing narratives of eighteenth-century genre painting. In addition to the obviously erotic rendering (this drawing would not be out of place in twentieth-century gay visual culture)—muscular limbs and chest, the draped, soft lines of the cloth of the men’s rolled trousers, and the close and familiar proximity of their bodies—the motif of the small, limp birds scattered over the deck and held in the hand have particular associations. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century genre painting, birds were associated with penises, copulation, and the erotic. Not only would Loti's training in visual art have made him aware of the meanings he was calling up in these images, but
such readings also circulated in many forms of popular culture. Loti’s appropriation of imagery associated with sexuality is also found in his literary work. In her analysis of Loti’s *Fleurs d’ennui*, feminist literary theorist Irene Szyliowicz points out that the protagonist (Loti) turns down the invitation of a young and beautiful prostitute “in favour of a wild horseback ride with his friend,” a character modelled after another of the author's naval companions. Szyliowicz observes, “the horseback ride, a symbol of passion in nineteenth-century literature, usually associated with female characters to identify the unspoken, is here inverted to encompass Loti and his male friend” (86-87).

Tableaux Vivants

In his daily life, Loti’s love of dressing-up and disguise was so extensive that his friends spoke of him "as putting on a mask to buy a croissant" (Szyliowicz, 23). Indeed, there are numerous references in the secondary literature to Loti’s cross-dressing. For example, Szyliowicz notes that his “penchant for high heels, perfume, make-up, jewellery, and elegant dress extended beyond the fancy-dress parties he loved," and goes on to quote one of his friends as saying that Loti often wore "accessories of feminine gear" (23).

Furthermore, Loti’s love of costume at times put his career in jeopardy:

> Even when in the navy, he wore makeup, sometimes in excess. One commander recommended that this man never be promoted because he wore too much. But another commander later recommended promotion, in spite of the makeup, insisting that he was an extremely competent officer” (Blanch 188). 

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78 Also see Jay Paul Minn's "Translator’s Introduction" to Pierre Loti’s *The Desert*. 

When Loti's ships reached port, he went ashore fully disguised in local dress, and wandered around fixed in the fantasy that he was perceived as a native. Feeling safely camouflaged, Loti committed various infractions that violated the boundaries of local customs. If any of his fellow officers or shipmates came across him during his adventures, they knew they were not to acknowledge him in any way and passed by him as if he were a stranger (Blanch 118-121).

Loti's preoccupation with masquerade, and his rare ability "to dress exotically without seeming to be in disguise," is characterized by Barthes as "transvestism" ("Pierre Loti" 112). This argument is of particular interest to us in reference to a passage from Loti's collection of essays, Japoneries d'automne (1889), which Joshua Mostow has cited in his essay "Iron Butterfly," (although to illustrate a different point than the one I will make here). Loti's describes the annual ball held to celebrate Emperor Meiji's birthday:

At the top of the staircase, four persons—the hosts—smilingly await their guests at the entrance to the drawings rooms. I pay little attention to a gentleman in white tie, decorated with many medals, who is no doubt the minister; instead I immediately turned my curious eyes upon the three women standing beside him, especially the first, who must be the "countess." I stop in surprise in front of a person with a distinguished and refined face, wearing shoulder-length gloves, impeccably coifed in suitable manner; her age indeterminate, obscured by white rice powder; a long satin train of very pale lilac color, very discreet, decorated with garlands of little forest flowers, of deliciously varied nuance; her bodice

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forming a slim sheath and covered with a stiff embroidery studded with pearls: in short, an attire that would do very well in Paris and is really worn very smartly by this astonishing parvenue. So, I take her seriously and offer a polite greeting. She, in turn, is equally polite and above all courteous, and she offers me her hand in American fashion with a self-confidence that quite devastates me.

Clearly, Loti does not disdain all Japanese women. He is, on this occasion, perfectly able to appreciate the distinguished, refined features and devastating self-confidence of the countess (Mostow 143). But, is it not the masquerade of gender rather than the woman herself that Loti holds up to admiration? Certainly it is nothing to do with class privilege that draws Loti to distinguish this woman, whom he refers to as an "astonishing parvenue." After all, what Loti lingers over in his reminiscence of this event are the minutiae of her costume: her white rice-powdered face, impeccably coiffed hair, and her dress, the bodice of which forms "a slim sheath covered with a stiff embroidery studded with pearls." I suspect that what Loti—the master of masquerade—recognizes and so admires in this woman, is the fact that she is also an accomplished practitioner in the arts of transformation.

Loti's intense love of masquerade also found expression in the "house of enchantment" which he created for himself in the family home at Rochefort (Genet and Hervé 329). Although many theorists have noted the significance of the nineteenth century bourgeois interior, Loti created a particularly hermetic environment, one that prefigured the Paris Exposition of 1900 in its oppressive articulation of the material cultures of many of France's colonial holdings. The interior that he made seems to lurk in
some twilight zone between ethnographic fascination and an obsessively articulated dream-world of the Other. In the house's enormous halls and chambers, he replicated the environments he had travelled the world to experience. A photoengraving of Loti reclining in what is just a corner of the Turkish room illustrates the excess of the surroundings (Fig. 11). The cavernous rooms were ostentatiously appointed with ethnic decoration and the plunder from his travels. As well, he owned authentic costumes that complemented each themed setting, and he wore these costumes in the elaborate masquerade balls he frequently staged for Paris society. The archival photograph collection contains dozens of pictures of Loti in these "exotic" outfits: costumes that run the gamut from the rusticity of Basque peasant clothes to particularly lavish robes and headpiece borrowed from a member of the Chinese Imperial Court (Fig. 12). The excess exhibited in the printed invitations and menus, as well as that shown in the photographs documenting these balls, is staggering. The photograph of Loti dressed as Osiris (Fig. 13), shows him ready to take part in the masquerade and illustrates the extremes he went to in his entertainments. Nor was he alone in his obsessions: group pictures show that his friends and associates were also ready, willing, and financially able to participate in these extravagant fantasies.

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80 See Williams, *Dream Worlds*. Buck-Morss in *The Dialectics of Seeing*, paraphrases Walter Benjamin's observations on this subject: Already in the nineteenth century, the interiors of bourgeois dwellings were "a kind of casing," in which the bourgeois individual as a "collector" of objects was embedded with all his appurtenances, "attending to his traces as nature attends to dead fauna embedded in granite" (66).
What's in a name?

He who speaks (Loti) is not he who writes (Pierre Loti); the utterance of the narrative emigrates, as in a hand-over-hand game, from Viaud to Pierre Loti, from Pierre Loti to Loti, then to Loti-in-disguise.

Roland Barthes, "Pierre Loti: Aziyadé" (121).

So, whence comes the name "Loti?" The nom de plume, "Loti," that Julian Viaud began using in 1872 when he was in Tahiti, is the name of an island flower. This was, at the very least, an eccentric choice of name for a naval officer. The origin of this pen name is alternately credited to a Maori girlfriend who “pronounced ‘Loti’ over and over again, as proof of her love for him” (Szyliowicz 25) and to Loti’s fellow officers who “nicknamed him Loti after an Indian flower.” His first name, Pierre, was borrowed from a close friend, Pierre Le Cor. Le Cor was the model for Yves in Madame Chrysantheme. He and Loti served together for many years, and Loti’s journals show how much he admired his friend:

When Pierre removes his clothes, one would think he were a Greek statue removing his course exterior, and one admires him. In the same bronzed alabaster, hard and polished, are outlined the mobile bulges of his muscles and the powerful lines of an ancient athlete (Szyliowicz 29).

This statement calls to mind the sensual drawings of Loti’s shipmates. It will by now be clear that what is interesting here is certainly not whether Loti himself could be designated, in today's terminology, as bisexual, straight, or gay. It is more pertinent to our inquiry to ask: What was going on in the performative displays of the masquerade
balls and in Loti's extensive use of disguise? It is also important to consider how the double meaning characteristic of his stories contributed to their popularity. And finally, how do these considerations affect the various intensities developed in the photographs and the rhizome of which they are a part?

The after-life of photographs

A further brief look at some of the material circumstances surrounding the writing of Madame Chrysantheme helps to highlight the difficulty, referred to earlier, that is presented by the lack of distinction in the novel between autobiographical account and creative fiction. One of the events Loti describes in Madame Chrysantheme is a trip that the narrator, (Loti), Yves, and Chrysantheme make to have their photograph taken at the studio of a local photographer. In the book the narrator says: “To-day, Yves, my mousmé and myself went to the best photographer in Nagasaki, to be taken in a group together [...] We shall send the photograph to France [...] Chrysantheme slowly settles herself in a very affected style, turning in the points of her toes as much as possible, according to the fashion” (emphasis added, 251-252). With these words Loti describes an actual portrait photograph of Loti, Pierre Le Cor and Okané-San—the young girl who was the model for Chrysantheme—taken while Loti and Le Cor were stationed in Nagasaki in 1885 (Fig. 14). This image is central to an anecdotal passage in which Loti paints a very unflattering picture as he comments on Japanese society through a description of the busy photographer's crowded shop. In the photograph that is left to us the young girl who is sitting, looks unsure of herself, and she is flanked by the confidently erect white-suited,
standing men. But what place does this photograph hold in the scheme of the larger narrative?

Photographs such as this one were in this period understood as factual evidence. The linking of the photographic event with the veracity of the rest of Loti's narrative demonstrates one of the ways that travel writing functioned, and shows how the genre occupied an ominous position of power in the construction and representation of peoples, and particularly women, of non-European cultures (Szyliowicz 76-77). In this Japanese carte-de-visite sent back to his reading public in France, Loti presents just enough detail—the identity of the three people involved and the turned-in feet of the young girl—to communicate a convincing scenario of the event. If the picture and other artefacts are as Loti describes them (and he describes Japanese architecture, household items, foods, as well as local customs and celebrations in great detail, and includes several drawings of them in the book), does this confirm that his construction of the young Chrysanthème and of her country, Japan, is an authentic one? Where does fact end and fiction begin? (Szyliowicz 76-77).

My point here is not to cite biography to secure the nuances of a written text, but rather to notice the distance that exists between Loti’s life and dominant tropes of exotic female sexuality elicited by his stories. Discovering this distance opens up a reading of Madame Chrysanthème as multi-valent, and as occupying a place in colonial discourse that was in fact fraught with the needs and desires of competing constituencies. Loti's writings engaged dominant constructions of racialized female sexuality. In works such as Aziyadé, this construction (in a "straight" as opposed to “campy” reading) is fully articulated—the woman is presented as sexually alluring and available, beautiful and
mysterious, and devoted to the western male protagonist, and in the end she dies because she cannot live without her western man. This same construction recurs in Madame Chrysanthèse, and is so fragile that when the young girl removes her clothes for the daily bath, the charade crumbles and—in sharp contrast to the ecstasies evoked in Loti when his friend Le Cor undresses—we are left instead with Loti’s unadorned racist and misogynous comments:

A Japanese woman, deprived of her long dress and her huge sash with its pretentious bows, is nothing but a diminutive yellow being, with crooked legs and flat, unshapely bust; she has no longer a remnant of her artificial little charms, which have completely disappeared in company with her costume. (216)

With this interpretation of feminine identity as masquerade, Loti’s text echoes his own extensive use of masks and disguises as ways of playing with and developing—using both autobiographic fiction and photographs as prostheses—a multiplicity of complex sexual identities. In this case, there is a resonance between Loti’s life and work and Butler’s assertions about the performative quality of gender identification and the ways in which sexual binaries can be undone.

PLATEAU: Imag(in)ing Culture

In contrast to the use which Loti makes of the group portrait, a photograph of the young Okané-San, probably commissioned by her parents for the marriage broker (Fig.15) presents us with a different view: a beautiful young girl, probably no more than thirteen
years of age, looking out at the camera with a tentative look that suggests both vulnerability and innocence.

The portrait photograph of Okané-San calls up the relationship between photograph and text used by Gauguin in his 1892 painting, Manao Tupapau (Spirit of the Dead Watching; Fig. 16). Gauguin travelled to the French colony of Tahiti seeking a new and ostensibly "primitive" subject matter that would provide an antidote to French bourgeois culture at the end of the nineteenth century. While Gauguin had gathered information on Tahiti at the 1889 World Exposition in Paris, (the exposition emphasized France’s "civilizing" mission in relation to its colonial holdings), what is particularly relevant here is that his friend and fellow painter, Émile Bernard, introduced Gauguin to Loti’s Marriage de Loti (1880). Loti has himself travelled to Tahiti under the auspices of the French navy, married a young girl, and then written a fictionalized account of his experience. Both men were captivated by the author’s “glowing phrases of the Eden-like existence to be enjoyed on the South Sea Island” and his descriptions of "exotic" Tahitian women:

A lovely land is Oceania!-Beautiful creatures those Tahitian women;-not classically Greek as to features, but with a beauty of their own which is even more attractive, and antique figures and limbs! Mentally, incomplete creatures whom one loves like the fine fruit or fresh waters and gorgeous flowers [...] (214). The temper of Tahitians is a good deal like that of children; they are whimsical, perverse, suddenly sulky for no reason at all, always honest and well-meaning, and hospitable in the widest scope of the word [...] . The contemplative side of man is strangely developed in them;
they are alive to every aspect of nature, sad or gay, and open to all the vagaries of imagination. (39-40)

Loti’s description of Tahitian women bears a close relationship to Gauguin’s Manao Tupapau painting. Gauguin wrote in his autobiographical narrative on Tahiti, Noa Noa, which included a reproduction of this painting and a photograph of the young woman, Teha'amana, his "wife" who modelled for the painting, "I want...above all (to) render the native mentality and traditional character [...] the mood is one of fear. But what sort of fear has possessed her? [...] it is, of course, the tupapau (spirits of the dead)” (quoted in Pollock 12). According to Gauguin, the fear experienced by the young girl in his painting is not rational, not Western fear, but rather springs from a mind less intelligent than that of the man who "creates" her. Like Loti’s Tahitian women, she is “mentally incomplete [...] open to all the vagaries of [the] imagination,” and meant to be “love[d] like fine fruit or fresh waters and gorgeous flowers.” While the representation of Chrysantheme in Japan is more derogatory than the romantically enthusiastic evocation of this Tahitian woman, what is evident in both these examples is the fact that women in Tahiti and Japan are constructed as lesser beings compared to their creators: “incomplete creatures” with "child-like" or "animal-like" dispositions.

It is no accident that the circumstances surrounding the painting of Manao Tupapau are strikingly similar to those surrounding the writing of Madame Chrysantheme. Gauguin and Loti both travelled to foreign lands and "married" young women. Using their "wives" as models, both men produced cultural works that re-inscribed and re-presented familiar notions of "exotic" women. Both men were
participating in experiences that engaged them at the level of State, cultural, and personal narratives, and that ultimately secured their fame as artists. Gauguin travelled to Tahiti with the blessing of the French government: "[He] left France on 1 April 1891 amid considerable publicity equipped with letters from the Ministry of Public Education and the Fine Arts commissioning him to 'study and ultimately to paint the customs and landscapes of Tahiti'" (Pollock 12). The impetus behind Gauguin's relocation was an economic as well as a professional move: "On this French colony he hoped to be able to live cheaply and paint enough to support the intended resumption of his marriage to Mette Gauguin, mother of his five children, with whom he had not lived since 1887" (Pollock 12). Upon arrival he "married" a thirteen-year-old, set up house, and went about the business of establishing himself as a force to be reckoned with in the world of nineteenth-century avant-garde painting. But just as Loti was unimpressed by Japan, Gauguin did not like what he found in Tahiti: "Almost immediately disappointed by Tahiti, Gauguin nevertheless spent two years there before he managed to persuade the French government to repatriate him" (Pollock 12). Artists such as Loti and Gauguin were part of a much larger set of forces that regulated the way other cultures were represented. Constructions of "Oriental" women were supported at many different sites of cultural and institutional power. For example, Loti's Marriage de Loti produced images of Tahitian women for public consumption just as his book on Japan worked to circulate and naturalize stereotypical images of Japanese women.\footnote{Interestingly, it has often been noted that Loti's Japanese chronicle was Vincent Van Gogh's favourite book. Loti's text led Van Gogh to an in-depth study of Japanese prints that was to greatly influence his later work.}
Playing for high stakes

Gauguin’s and Loti’s images of racialized woman figured as "exotic," sexually alluring and available take us back to the questions provoked by the initial reading of Madame Chrysanthèse: What was at stake in a society that so enthusiastically embraced these stories? What part did Loti’s work—and its significance to the unfolding of the "Butterfly" narrative—have in the powerful self/other binary that was at play in nineteenth-century Europe? Was he mapping transgression into the spaces of the everyday, and in the process acknowledging and inserting into the social body the possibility of alternative sexual identities—ones that exceeded this binary? The productive paradox at play here is that Loti’s work functioned to construct and reinforce images of women that have become an historical trope, yet, as I have maintained, his writing was a subversive voice in the construction of a normative masculine identity in nineteenth century Europe and its colonies.

The construct of Madame Chrysanthèse was not a construction of the Other at all—in this sense Loti admitted no alterity. His Chrysanthèse was primarily a projection of his attempts at and anxieties about self-identity. I am not suggesting that his representations did not perform the work of Empire. Not only were they successful in this regard during Loti’s lifetime, but also it is still the case that the Butterfly narrative continues to have power as a significant cultural and political trope.

Fast Forward

By way of example, David Henry Hwang’s play M. Butterfly (1986) and David Cronenberg’s film M. Butterfly (1993), can be considered as re-presentations of the
underlying tensions that define Madame Chrysanthème. If we hold Loti's version of the Madame Butterfly narrative alongside the Hwang/Cronenberg productions, the resonances are clear. A century after Madame Chrysanthème was first published, M. Butterfly gives voice to some of the many silences contained in Loti's work. Not surprisingly, both Hwang's play and Cronenberg's film shift the Butterfly trope in significant, though somewhat differently figured, ways. By framing East/West relations overtly in terms of gender and sexuality, they subvert and complicate, or at the very least open up, the conventional Butterfly narrative, irretrievably altering its power to contain and define the figures it constructs. Through their refusal to fix identities or stave off ambiguities, these productions foreground the political economy of Butterfly's complex narrative tradition, thereby echoing the multiplicity of subject positions produced in Madame Chrysanthème. However, as Rey Chow and Richard Cavell have, differently, demonstrated,82 in terms of projecting the possibility of alternative sexualities, and thereby complexifying the binary of gender, Cronenberg's M. Butterfly is the more successful of the two revisionings.

The world of colonial abundance that eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe thought lay at its feet quickly became figured as an abyss: an unknown and unknowable foreign space—a zone fraught with anxiety. Loti's narratives participated in Europe's impossible bid to secure a fixed and stable identity for itself in the face of this threat. But they were also fault lines that simultaneously opened up, and if Butler is correct, installed, alternative subjective spaces for the paradigmatic bourgeois European male to occupy: ones that resisted the compulsory heterosexuality embedded in the founding

identifications of the hegemonic and embodied subjects of modernity. Arguably, Cronenberg's representation of the Butterfly myth occupies the shifting terrain of these developing multiplicities of otherness.

PLATEAU: Stage settings and setting the stage

I want to return to the photographs with which I began this chapter in order to activate another intensity, another plateau. I have argued that in Loti's stories non-European subjects are routinely figured as objects—sometimes they are vilified and sometimes they are romanticized, but always they are diminished, stereotyped—in short, objectified. Those "objects," who are Others, also point to another, different form of Other, in that they function as masks for subjectivities that resist normative masculine identity, and destabilize hegemonic notions of male sexuality. That is, Loti, putatively an adherent to prescriptions of normative masculinity, writes a properly heterosexual story about a foreign Other, but this Other—being only a cover for Loti's other Other—is in turn a stand-in for the redemption of a space in which multiple sexual subjectivities can be traced into being. With a few carefully articulated strokes of the pen, Loti manages to uphold the supremacy of the bourgeois European male, and, arguably, provides a narrative for an audience that would identify with alternative sexual subjectivities. I argue in this section that the photographs function in a similar way.

The terms that frame my discussion, mise-en-scène, mise-en-abîme, and scenography, are defined as follows: Mise-en-scène is a theatrical and cinematic term that literally means that which is put into a scene. It is commonly used to refer to the elements that "set the scene," the things that provide a context—the material contiguity of
a scene. The term is particularly useful in reference to Loti's staged photographs of himself in the guise of an/Other. I am using it to evoke, and to designate as theatrical constructs the elements of the photographs and their making that are most readily available and (seemingly) self-evident as masquerade, as disguise, as trafficking in misidentification. However, the *mise-en-scène* must also include, as the site of production of Loti's photographic representations of self as Other, that which will allow consideration of the obscured conditions of their making: those conditions that delimit and contour the body and its signification. For this purpose I enlist the term *scenography* as used by Luce Irigaray to refer to that which makes representation feasible, representation as defined in philosophy, that is, the architectonics of its theatre, its framing in space-time, its geometric organization, its props, its actors, their respective positions, their dialogues, indeed their tragic relations without overlooking the mirror, most often hidden, that allows the logos, the subject, to reduplicate itself, to reflect itself by itself. All these are interventions on the scene; they ensure its coherence so long as they remain uninterpreted (quoted in Butler, *Bodies that Matter*, 27).

And finally, I wish to invoke a specific reading of the term *mise-en-abîme*. Eleanor Kaufman in her essay "Madness and Repetition" makes particular use of this term in an exploration of the connections between Deleuze and Foucault, and it is this usage that is important in the context of the Loti photographs. Deleuze published a book on Foucault shortly after Foucault's death and Kaufman quotes what he says about why he felt
compelled to write and evokes, by way of explanation, the importance of the double in Foucault's work:

Foucault is haunted by the double, including [...] the alterity peculiar to the double. I wanted to extract a double from Foucault, in the sense that he imparted to this word: repetition, lining, return of the same, imperceptible difference, unlining, and mortal fissure (Kaufman, "Madness and Repetition 234).

It is the "repetition, lining, return of the same, imperceptible difference, unlining, and mortal fissure" that I find of interest in the mise-en-abîme—the picture(s) within picture(s)—of the Loti images. Is it possible to extract, as it were, a kind of double from the reading of Loti I have developed? One that, when animated by the discussion that follows, would allow for a radical interpretation of what following Deleuze, we can refer to as the Loti effect: that which is both Loti the person and his corpus, and Loti as emblematic of, opening onto, a constellation of events and forces? In the following discussion I borrow these terms—mise-en-scène, mise-en-abîme, scenography—and bend them to my purposes, using them for their ability to signal different, yet mutually dependent, registers of inquiry. Taken together, the terms allow us to move back and forth between the axiomatic and the obscured constitutive elements of the photographs so as to speculate about whispered utterances: to sound out some of the many silences signalled by Foucault. For the following assemblage of readings—"plateaus" that together add to the presentation of a "rhizome," another "becoming" in the history of the Loti photographs—we will turn back to focus primarily on the image of Loti aboard ship, either arriving from or about to depart on one of his excursions (Fig. 1).
PLATEAU: Liminality

Earlier in the chapter I made the point that transgression could only come from within the hegemonic formation. I suggested that it is not just any(body) that can transgress prescribed boundaries in such a way as to rearticulate, redraw, and reconstitute those boundaries. Rather, I said, it is essential that performatively transgressive acts at once embrace and resist that which is being transgressed. Now, there are many ways that we could situate ourselves on this particular plateau. Needless to say, an entire book could easily be given over to the mapping of this terrain. But for now we will content ourselves with a glance here and there: to adjust ourselves to new surroundings made possible from this viewpoint, to acquire a rudimentary sense of the lay of the land, and to distinguish a number of lines of flight.

Over the past three decades the concept of liminality has been taken up by the disciplines of psychoanalysis, philosophy, linguistics, as well as by postmodern and postcolonial studies. In 1966, anthropologist Victor Turner delivered a series of lectures presenting a model for thinking about liminality. These lectures were published as The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-structure (1969), and the text has since become a classic. Turner showed that within the community he was studying, permission to enter a liminal space (a space where many of the usual prohibitions of the society were transgressed) was granted only on the basis of the subject's return into normative society at the end of a specified period of time. In Turner's example, the subject(s) entered into a liminal space where boundaries of prescribed behaviour were dissolved and status was disregarded: no matter what position a person held in the community, they became abject as soon as they entered this liminal space. The experience of liminality, then, functioned
as a kind of levelling mechanism within society, one that restored individually held
power to community control. The subject who entered into a liminal space was expected
to return from that space, and to give the benefit of the experiences of liminality back to
the community. In other words, you received permission to transgress for a while, but
when it was over, it was over, and you were expected to conform again. So, in this model,
entry into liminal space was legitimized only under the condition of a subsequent return
to social normativity. However, embedded within this movement is necessarily the idea
of difference—the subject who enters the liminal space and transgresses normative
prescriptions of identity re-enters the community transformed by those experiences—the
subject who enters is not the same subject who returns. Necessarily then, as members of
the community were changed by these individual subjective experiences, so too did the
community change. That is, the community could exercise some control over the context
of the experience of liminality, but it could not control the effect of these experiences.

To return to the wider social and political purposes served by identifications of
the liminal, what are we to make of Loti's physical transformation of his body into one
visibly occupying a liminal space? In Figure 1 Loti's body is erased to leave as little as
possible of the body of the bourgeois European male—but of course, that body cannot be
entirely effaced, there is always a residue that disallows any resolution of the dialectical
image of European/Other. If, as Walter Benjamin suggests, a dialectical image holds the
history of its "origins" we could say that the Loti image is both imploded and exploded
by the history of the Western world. This photograph of Loti presents us with a figure
that haunts, just as it is haunted. Ultimately, the "drag of the body" cannot be resisted
and we are prompted to ask: Where is the liminal space for Loti more properly drawn?
There seems to be at work here a kind of patrolling liminality that cuts a number of ways—into the body of the bourgeois European male and into the transgressive dragged-out body of the Other. We are confronted by multiple subjectivities contained and altered by a field of shifting signifiers, the movement of one setting off a counter-motion among others. Finally, it becomes impossible to locate Loti either in his European gentleman persona or in one of his many (dis)guises. The reciprocal haunting that goes on among these aspects of the Loti image is itself haunting: a kind of doubling of an historical moment that is irreducible in its undecideability.

PLATEAU: The psychoanalytic register: "My excitement is the oscillation"

Orthodox Lacanian psychoanalysis lacks concepts that would take account of ethnic and cultural difference. For this reason, I am supplementing its terminology by turning to Frantz Fanon, Martinique-born philosopher, political activist and psychoanalyst, who maintained in his influential 1952 collection of essays, Black Skin, White Masks, that "the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man" (Fanon 161). However, Fanon complicated this understanding by arguing that the white man "monopolizes otherness to secure an illusion of unfettered access to subjectivity" (Fuss, Identification Papers 142-3). Therefore, as well as declaring that the Black man is situated as the Other of the white European male, Fanon is also saying that, in terms of Lacanian psychoanalytic understanding, the small "o" other which designates the primary identification of the Imaginary order, and the large "O" Other that refers to the secondary

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83 In relation to Deleuze and Guattari's use of "becomings" Brian Massumi alerts readers to their approach to the "person" as "nobody": "The person as empty category is inscribed in the semantic ambivalence of the French personne ('person', 'nobody'). Its etymology (from the Latin persona, 'theatre mask') expresses its nature as a generalizing overlay" (Massumi, User's Guide 162). In terms of my analysis of the Loti photograph this casting of the person as "nobody" is a useful one, see A Thousand Plateaus 105-106.
identification of the Symbolic order, are both colonized by white European male subjectivity—which implies that the black man is, in effect, "relegated to a position other than Other." To restate this point: the black man is not just repressed but foreclosed—not relegated from the Symbolic to the Imaginary, but from the Symbolic and Imaginary to the Real. To translate Fanon's theory of racial(ized) Otherness into the framework of my discussion of Loti's life and work, I am arguing that Loti (as a representative of the white European male) is an undecidable figure who both does and does not admit alterity. These photographs, then, are concerned with what Diane Fuss has called "interior colonies" (Fuss, Identification Papers 141). Therefore, throughout this section I refer to Fanon's seemingly contradictory doubling of "otherness" using the term capital O/Other to denote both cultural other and the psychoanalytic other of the imaginary and symbolic registers.

As previously stated, at the time when this image was made, photography was generally thought of as a transparent medium, allowing such photographs to claim authority as transcriptions of reality. In the light of this understanding, I want to linger for a moment in the vicinity of the scenography—those other scenes that lurk in the photograph's background, the photograph's unconscious, as it were—in order to investigate its repression(s).

I believe that there is something very important about the photograph's ability to mirror back to the subject an image of itself. Jacques Lacan's concept of the "specular image" helps to elucidate this process. In Lacan's "mirror stage," the preverbal child recognizes itself as "whole" when it sees its reflection in the mirror. But because this reflection exists outside of the body, the child also sees itself as other, and therefore as
fragmented. In the "specular image" the child is simultaneously itself and an/other. Lacan first introduced this formulation of the mirror stage in 1936, but continued to revise the concept throughout his career. By the 1950s Lacan came to see the mirror stage less as a moment in the life of the infant, than as a "permanent structure of subjectivity" in which the subject is both "caught and captivated" by its own image (Evans, 114). The subject is caught and captivated because the dual nature of this image is such that at the same time as it proffers the reflection of a whole, coherent self, it also threatens the dissolution of this self. For Lacan, the Imaginary order is rooted in this relationship of the subject to an image of its body. The captivating/capturing power of the image is thus both seductive and constraining. On the one hand it affords a point of identification with a coherent, whole self, and therefore opens subjective space. On the other it presents as its effect a series of static fixations that in turn limit the possibilities of subjectivity (Evans 83). It is my view that the production of the fetish offers a way of negotiating these static fixations.

Photography is admirably suited to this operation. Before the invention of photography it was possible to masquerade as an/Other, but it was not possible to have oneself reflected back "whole" so as to possess, in the form of a photograph, the self that masquerades as an/Other. As well as being an image, the photograph is also, in relation to the body, an object: something "to have and to hold," something to thicken one's relationship to the Imaginary, even if its status as an object outside of the "self" is illusory. So what does it mean, then, when the whole that is being reflected back, the "specular image," is of oneself as other, and in fact, as Other (Figure 1)?
This section of the Loti case study is organized around two key psychoanalytic concepts: the "mirror-stage," particularly as formulated in the later work of Jacques Lacan, and the "fetish." I am once again focusing my examination of these concepts, and their significance for understanding some particular aspects of late nineteenth and early twentieth century representational practices, through a single photograph of Pierre Loti. I will be arguing that this photograph (Figure 1), taken in 1876 aboard the French navy vessel, the Gladiateur, in addition to displaying many of the properties traditionally associated with the fetish object, Lacan's objet petit a, also suggests an extension of the bounds of psychoanalytic theory with regards to the function of the fetish. That is, I will argue that in a doubling (at least) of effect, this image (and others like it) both fulfills the function of the fetish in marking a site of loss and averting the danger that acknowledgement of this loss would court, and, in thickening a particular, outlawed "sense of self," declares and models (imagines) transgressive modes of subjectivity.

I will show how the Loti photograph functions within a particular interpretation of psychoanalytic definitions of the fetish, then I will argue for an understanding that extends the productive force of the fetish, and, finally, I will point to the ways in which photographic enactments of this extended economy of desire can be instrumental in making psychic and social spaces available to those designated as outlaws and outcasts. I suggest that in this way the images set up an "imaginary field" that can then be drawn on (re-territorialized) by individuals and communities in the re-imagining of subjective spaces that offer alternatives to those spaces already prescribed and proscribed by the dominant order.
The photograph—Figure 1—that I am focusing on here is taken, like the others I have already discussed, from the large collection of photographs housed in the Pierre Loti archives. Of the many portraits included in the collection, this photograph of Loti dressed in the ethnic costume of a non-European culture belongs to the very distinct subset of pictures I referred to in the earlier part of this study. I will focus only on those aspects of the image that are pertinent to the argument I am making. However, as I hope I have already shown in the preceding sections, these photographs also open onto a number of complex readings regarding Loti's fraught relations to issues of colonialism, imperialism, misogyny and sexuality.

This investigation circles around and folds itself into Sarah Kofman's essay, "Ça cloche." Kofman's essay presents a reading of Derrida's 1974 Glas, a text in which Derrida plays on and with Freud's notion of the fetish. Extending Derrida's reiteration of Jean Genet's phrase, "My excitement is the oscillation," Kofman identifies the fetish as the site of tension or oscillation between the acknowledged and the unthought. The title of her essay, "Ça cloche," ("something is not right, off kilter, doesn't ring true"), includes the word for bell or bell-jar, thus carrying associations of both "sounding" and "silencing" or "damping down," and signifying the tension between these movements that are opposed but cannot be reconciled—on the one hand, sounding, on the other, damping down—is the aspect of the "jar" or "jarring." In Kofman's interpretation, the pleasure afforded by the fetish, and indeed, the formulation of the fetish itself, is to be found in this constant oscillation, this jarring indecidability.\(^{84}\) It is in relation to this understanding

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\(^{84}\) In the translation of Kofman's essay the term "indecidability," rather than the more common "undecidability", is used.
of the fetishist as one "desiring to play in two scenes simultaneously" (Kofman 125) that I will begin to situate the Loti photograph that is under investigation here.

What can we say about this photograph and others like it tucked away in relative obscurity? Particular aspects become noticeable as we look at the image: tension in the hand, the neck, and the jaw; the face is tightly set around the lips; the eyes are resolutely cast down and away; the left arm is wrapped around the body and held close into the waist; the hand of the extended right arm loosely fisted against the surface of the trousers, creating hills and gullies in the stiff material: everywhere a sense of tension and unease.

The photograph is taken aboard ship, below deck, the figure slung in against the banister of the wooden stairs, paraphernalia connected with the ship frames the head and shoulders, a large, softened hook for securing the pulley at the top of the picture moves into the right shoulder and chin of the subject: the setting has the appearance of spontaneity, is "found" rather than constructed. From the mise-en-scène — appropriated ethnic costume, downcast eyes, tightly controlled body posture, and starkly utilitarian physical setting — to the more fleeting, less definable feeling that there is an excess, a snag, something that interrupts, a folding back into itself of the subject who is caught, but not caught off-guard, in the camera's lens — all of this points to(wards) a state of suspension, suspended animation, a figure at once apprehended and apprehensive.

In this image, Loti's costumed body erases the body of the bourgeois European male without entirely effacing it. There is always a residue, an excess, a "snag," that spoils any resolution of the dialectical image of European/Other.

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85 This aspect of my analysis recognizes Barthes' notion of the "punctum," but moves it into a different register (see Chapter 1, Introduction, of this study).
Unlike the previous image, in the photograph of Loti in European dress (Figure 5) a confident Loti looks directly at the viewer, thereby staking a claim for equality and access to social space. For our purposes, the significance of the differences between these portraits is found not in the obvious points of contrast but in the fact that when the subject of a photograph does not meet and return the gaze of the viewer, the subject may become object or abject. And in the images of Loti in ethnic dress, this failure to meet and hold the viewer's gaze also opens the way for the visage of Loti—the trait in the photograph most readily identifiable as "Pierre Loti"—to become interchangeable with the visage of an/Other.

As discussed earlier, cultural categories such as "race," class, gender and sexuality were becoming increasingly fixed in late nineteenth century France. In this social restructuring, foreign bodies came to function as the constitutive outside of the European subject. That is, they were the necessary condition, the outside, the "not-me" that established the boundaries of the body which provided the contours of the European subject's identity, but, as Fanon noted, in a "doubling" of affect, foreign bodies also functioned as sites of "abjection"—irredeemable Otherness. It has already been noted that by the end of the nineteenth-century the demarcations between heterosexuality and homosexuality—categories that were first articulated in the middle of the century, partly in response to fears of degeneration provoked by France's falling population rate—were also becoming rigidly defined. Homosexuality was understood as the "inversion" of a compulsory heterosexuality. Moreover, permeable boundaries in one cultural category were felt to threaten boundaries in all areas of social life.
The person in Figure 1 then, both is and is not Loti: he is both a bourgeois European male and an/Other. In this doubling, the subject exceeds its boundaries. The unsaid breaks through as a kind of stutter, never fully articulated. The identity of the subject/object/abject slips back and forth, oscillates, cannot be contained, put in its proper place, secured.

Up to this point I have been focusing on ideas that concern the fixity of identity, but now that I want to re-introduce the concept of "becomings"—in relation to the Loti photographs and specifically to Loti's becoming-Other—I will briefly reiterate the definition I gave earlier of this term:

A becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification [...]. Becoming produces nothing other than itself [...]. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes [...]. This is the point to clarify: that *a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself* (emphasis added; Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* 237-238).

As I have already discussed, "becoming" is immanence. In terms of the past, present, and future, "The present is what we are and, for that reason, what we are already ceasing to be; the actual is not what we are but rather, what we are becoming, what we are in the process of becoming [...] the actual is the formation of the new" (Deleuze and Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* 112).
Photographs such as this one, show Loti in a becoming that cannot be contained or codified: these images move outside the codes, float between racial and sexual markers, continuously cross-referencing in rhythmic oscillation. In the clothes of the Other, Loti is at once camouflaged and costumed, hidden and disguised: the camouflage covers the space of the absent utterance (that which overflows heterosexuality), and the costume serves to divert attention away from the very existence of such scandalous excess. Yet, in a paradoxical movement, this body flaunts that which escapes codification and cannot be absorbed.

This photograph of Loti figures a moment when the world folds in on itself and produces something outside of existing codes, a becoming not yet captured within articulated form. The movement in this image, its inherent intensity, is that which lies outside the frame. This re-framing of the photograph involves a radical departure from concepts of "representation" and moves instead to embrace a Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy of "Becoming" as opposed to a traditional philosophy of "Being." The objet petit a is the becoming-photograph: that which sets desire in motion and is the surplus, the excess, of both meaning and enjoyment. In this photograph Loti is, in effect, his own fetish.

Now, I have said that I am arguing for an understanding that extends the productive force of the fetish, that is, I am suggesting that the fetish, as well as being the condition that makes possible the negotiation of tricky psychic terrain, also extends and replenishes the spaces of social imaginaries. And in regards to these photographs, extends and replenishes the imaginary spaces that were the initial impulse for their production. What do I mean here?
If, as stated earlier, the imaginary is rooted in the subject's relationship to an image of its body, the fetish as oscillation between the acknowledged and the unthought fulfills the very conditions—is in fact, the condition of possibility because it operates simultaneously in two fields—for the transgression of existing norms. In Loti's photographs of himself as Other we find an example of exactly this kind of renegade effect. The photographs (themselves sites of undecidability), as well as fulfilling the function of the fetish ("my excitement is the oscillation"), in thickening a particular outlawed "sense of self," declare and model (imagine) transgressive modes of subjectivity. How else to account for these images whose visual effects alternate between concealment and unconcealment?

It is precisely in this jarring tension between on the one hand sounding, on the other damping down, in this undecidability, that imaginary spaces are opened, extended and replenished. No longer one or the other, not even one and the other, Loti enacts something not yet formed, certainly not yet "represented"—a becoming yet to be named. (We will revisit this point in the following chapter because the definition of the operation of the fetish provides an exemplary description of the mechanism of oscillation that determines the way we "see" photographs.) And here we can return to Sarah Kofman's reading of Derrida's investigation of the Freudian fetish:

Each sex...binds the one to the other, becoming undecidable, speaking the language and in the tongue of the other, penetrating the other; neither feminine nor masculine, neither castrated nor non-castrated, not bisexual, but striking between the sexes..." (Kofman 128).
In this becoming, space is cleared, and because it is not yet captured and named, it opens the way for other becomings: fluid spaces capable of supporting multiple enactments. I want here to posit the idea of Loti as a "subjectification."

PLATEAU: Nomadism and Subjectification

[Subjectification] is the production of modes of existence or styles of life [Subjectification] as a process is an individuation [...]. There are individuations of the "subject" variety (this is you...this is me...), but there are also individuations of the event variety, without a subject: a wind, an atmosphere, an hour of the day, a battle. It is not certain that a life, or a work of art, is individuated like a subject, in fact to the contrary.

Gilles Deleuze 86

It is useful to understand Loti as constituted within this idea of individuation as something that is of the order of a subject/event: Loti as subjectification, an assemblage that is an agencing through which what cannot be heard achieves a level of audibility.87 I say subjectification rather than subject because to be a subject requires a certain level of sedimentation, a certain level of settlement. By contrast, the state of becoming that is subjectivation requires a constant level of mobility—requires, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a kind of nomadism.88 And "nomadism" is, in my view, the necessary

86 Kaufman, "Madness and Repetition" 236. As discussed in the introduction (13, fn.22) Kaufman actually uses "subjectivation" untranslated from the French rather than employing the more widely used translation of the English, "subjectification" (replaced in the above quotation from Deleuze).
87 The idea of "agencing" as "achieving a level of audibility" was introduced in a lecture given by Ross Chambers in March 1999 at the Autopathologies conference, held at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
88 A recent, unfortunate, example of the power of the nomadic construct is evident in the ineffectuality of the post-911 "war on terrorism." "Terrorism" has constructed a perfect "war machine," one that, in its
condition in the becomings of unauthorized subjectivities: the effect of "subversive repetition and transgressive reinscription." In other words, the process of constant relocation and/or territorialization, and dislocation and de-territorialization, offers a mechanism by which to both escape detection and install a space for errant subjectivities. I am, of course, not implying this is a voluntaristic process.

The movement that we sense in the Loti photograph (Figure 1), its inherent intensity, seems to be drawn from that which lies outside the frame. As I have said, the image figures a moment when the world folds in on itself and produces something outside of existing codes, a becoming not yet captured within articulated form. Loti's transgressive sexuality (dis)located him in a constituency that was, at first glance, "refused the possibility of cultural articulation." However, as we have discovered, rather than being refused articulation, the shared imaginaries critical for the formation of community were, in fact, enacted on the basis of what Foucault has called "subjugated knowledges." Those knowledges that run parallel to authorized discourse but were subordinated to such an extent that their existence was neither acknowledged nor legitimated. Moreover, I have argued, that photographs were an important element in the development of those subjugated knowledges for which the "Loti subjectivation" was emblematic. The photographic portrait provided a unique opportunity, within assemblages of subjugated knowledges, for the constitution of both individual and collective subjectivities. This is because the oscillating movement integral to processes of "seeing" photographs (and indeed, to "seeing photographically"), is also precisely that motion necessary to evade apparatuses of capture. In a situation such as the one that

strategies of constant movement, local knowledges and molecular power organization, will continue to elude efforts to detect and crush its becomings.
evolved in late nineteenth and early twentieth century France when, as Foucault has demonstrated, sex was being transformed into discourse, the spaces of transcription were locales of power. The extended economy of desire engendered in the Loti photograph that has been the primary object of our investigations (Figure 1), contributed to the re-territorialisation of spaces dedicated to the multiple becomings of those subjectivities officially designated as aberrant. This photograph offers us an example of one of the ways in which the phenomenon that has come to be designated as "seeing photographically" has intervened at the most basic levels of the constitution of the self. In the following chapter we will explore in detail the concept of "seeing photographically" through a series of photographs produced by Tina Modotti.
Chapter 3: Rhizome

Tina Modotti (1896-1942) was born in a highly politicized working-class district in the town of Udine, Italy. In 1913 Modotti immigrated to the States with her family and while a resident of San Francisco's Italian quarter achieved popularity as a stage actress, and then a modest degree of Hollywood fame when she became one of the silver screen's early prototypes of the Latin femme fatale. An active member of southern California's arts community, in 1923 Modotti was one of the many American artists who took up residence "south of the border." Her political affiliations were reawakened in post-revolutionary Mexico where she and her partner, American photographer Edward Weston, quickly became part of an international elite of intelligentsia and artists.

During this time, under Weston's tutelage, Modotti became a photographer in her own right. When Weston, who found the political climate in Mexico incompatible with his Modernist art practice, left to return to the States, Modotti took over the studio they had operated together and went on to achieve a high level of visibility and respect for her documentation work with the Mexican muralists as well as for her own creative work.

At the same time as Modotti was achieving recognition and success for her artistic production she was also becoming ever more deeply involved in political activism. While living in Mexico she became an important functionary in the Communist Party. Modotti started the first Italian Anti-Fascist Committee, was a prominent force in the Hands-off Nicaragua Committee campaigning against American intervention in Nicaragua, aligned herself with the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas, and, by the time she was expelled from Mexico in 1930, was in charge of the International Red Aid, a Communist front organization that worked on behalf of political prisoners worldwide.
PLATEAU: Picturing the impossible

Roland Barthes' assertion in Camera Lucida that a photograph is "an image without a code—even if, obviously, certain codes do inflect our reading of it," (88) speaks directly to the ideas explored in my introduction concerning the transformation of the force of expression into particular forms. Tina Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs pose a particular challenge within the course of this dissertation precisely because the codes (the form of expression) that inflect our readings of these photographs are so strong that they tend to smother all attempts to see the photographs otherwise. I am suggesting that because these images were produced within an artistic practice that was consciously grappling with, and attempting to affect a reconciliation of politics and art, they have not yet been able to escape being read in relation to how they are positioned within these discourses. Indeed, wherever Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs have been referred to in art historical discussions they have been designated as journalistic or documentary photography.

I have not found this easy labelling useful because when I look at these photographs they seem to me flooded by that which is not pictured, that which has not been secured, is outside the frame, cast out and outlawed. What the photographs invoke

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89 It is also the case that the Clérambault photographs I am working with in chapter four must as well be seen within discourses of the history of art, but, as will become apparent, the emphasis is different. The Clérambault photographs represent not an internal struggle undertaken within art to define itself differently, as do the Modotti photographs. Rather, the Clérambault photographs illuminate a struggle between art and psychiatry over which institution will gain authorial rights for the newly discovered "unconscious."

90 Although it is not my concern here it would be interesting to look at the genre of documentary photography in terms of that which Derrida, in conversation with Maurizio Ferraris in "I Have a Taste for the Secret," maintains is the "autobiographicity that greatly overflows the 'genre' of autobiography" and is prevalent in all forms of production (41). Derrida goes on to say that this phenomenon is "that which in the autos [the self/same] disturbs self-revelation, but always in an existential experience that is singular, and if not ineffable at least untranslatable or on the verge of untranslatability" (41). I am caught by the way in which Derrida's assertion that every experience is realized from with the autos (and, of course, Derrida is not the only, nor the first theorist to say this—Paul de Man and Roland Barthes come immediately to mind) coincides with the process that is referred to as "seeing photographically" (1-93).
is not, I suggest, confined to a process of translation or decoding of the material information, nor to a curiosity about their status as "truthful" evidence, both of which are movements towards interpretation that are instigated by a journalistic or documentary reading of the images. Rather, the experience that I have in front of these photographs is much more akin to what Barthes describes as the prick or the wound of the punctum, and Deleuze and Guattari as a recognition of atypical expression, than to anything else: what catches and holds me is the photographs' eventuality in my own life, in other words, their continuing potentiality. In part, the reason for this resonance is, I think, the sense that in many ways Modotti was asking, and with a similar urgency, the same questions as I am revisiting here. How do photographs work? How do representational practices, in this case photographic portraiture in its widest sense, function? The inflammatory Colonia de la Bolsa series of photographs produced by Tina Modotti in Mexico during the spring of 1928, and subsequently published in the Mexican Communist Party newspaper El

91 As was suggested in the introduction of this study, the association of photography/truth/evidence has a history that has been articulated in a number of ways. For instance, manipulation is a theme that has been frequently addressed in the histories and theories of photography. There has been an entire ontology of photography as a paradigm of truth, and a deeply modernist reaction to photography in wanting to keep it "pure." In relation to the history of photography as truth an early debate between the President and Vice-President of Bulletin de la Societe francaise de photographie, July, 1855, 187-200, revolved around this question: "where will be the guarantee of Truth if the suspicion of retouching is always possible." Debates issuing from questions of what amount of retouching performs a technical service and what amount interferes with the truth-value of the image, originated with photography and have played a major role in subsequent ideologies including that of "Straight" photography. James Ryan provides, by way of highlighting the stakes involved in questions about retouching, two photographs showing British treaty making in East Africa in the late 1880s, that he claims are the same image retouched. These photographs, according to Ryan, have been drastically (and invisibly) altered, in order to privilege the power of the Queen's Empire in Africa, Picturing Empire 219-220. However, when I looked at these photographs with a photographer's eye it was evident that no amount of retouching—with the methods and technologies available at the time—could so seamlessly achieve what Ryan claims. Closer inspection shows that the photographs are indeed two different images, one taken immediately after the other, no doubt, but two separate and distinct photographs none the less. This is not to say that I disagree with Ryan's analysis of the uses to which photographs were put in the work of Empire, on the contrary, I point out this discrepancy precisely because Ryan's argument is well founded and the use of these particular images is unfortunate in this respect.
Machete were certainly made in an effort to have them *do* something. What they did and how they did it are the questions asked in the discussion that follows.

I will be concentrating on two photographs from the Colonia de la Bolsa series: "Railway Worker's Daughter" (Fig. 2) and "Misery" (Fig. 17). Within months of publishing these photographs, Modotti was arrested and tried as an accomplice in the murder of her companion, Cuban revolutionary Julio Antonio Mella. Although she was acquitted, she again found herself facing trumped-up charges several months later, at which time she was imprisoned and then deported from Mexico for plotting against the State. Several weeks prior to her deportation, the offices of El Machete were raided, their contents confiscated and the paper forcibly shut down by the Mexican authorities.

Questions of national identity are called up in these photographs taken in what was at the time, one of the poorest barrios of Mexico City: Colonia de la Bolsa. Whereas photographs have often been used to produce an illusion of continuity—to weave together a coherent narrative where otherwise there is none—I suggest that the Modotti photographs that I am examining here were engaged in a contrary performance: they threatened to fragment or undo an existing narrative of coherence and continuity that mobilized a particular hegemonic construction of Mexican national identity. I show how Modotti's photographs both contaminated this image of modern Mexican identity, and, in turn, through depictions of bodies that re-assembled this construction as difference, diagram parallel modes of potential in the virtual, spaces in which new possibilities could be imagined.

As well, I will be proposing that there is a double movement happening in the "becomings" enacted in these photographs—that in addition to working to *dismantle*
particular constructions of identity and to engender new collective imaginaries, these photographs were also instrumental in opening up imaginary spaces of alternative identities for Modotti herself.

PLATEAU: Becoming revolutionary

After 1917 the Mexican government became increasingly active in attempts to forge a national Mexican identity that would work to unify the country. In a plan to consolidate power through the beleaguered body of the peasant, the Alvaro Obregón government, in 1920, set in motion the necessary institutional structures to support the construction of an idealized national identity. The fabrication of this monolithic figure called into play a diversity of forces and provided a rich vocabulary within which to delineate the contours of a new imaginary. The invention of a unified national character emerged as a vitally important strategy in Mexican domestic and foreign policy. The institutional, ideological and cultural structures for this construction were already well articulated by the time Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs were published in El Machete towards the end of 1928. I am proposing that, with these photographs, Modotti was interfering with the State's mobilization of visual constructions of the "new Mexico." Her photographs were "unbecoming" in two senses: they proffered images of Mexican bodies that were unflattering to the Mexican nation-state; and they were instrumental in the "undoing" of hegemonic constructions of national Mexican identity.

My use of the term "imaginary" is informed by both Ernesto Laclau's essay "New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time" (1990), and Benedict Anderson's Revised Edition of Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1991), and is here defined as the constellation of forces that go into the construction of a national identity.
In 1921 José Vasconcelos was appointed Minister of Education for the Obregón government marking the beginning of what came to be known as the "Mexican Renaissance." The National Department of Education was charged with the incorporation of the marginalized Indian population, and Vasconcelos was given the money and the authority to set in place a number of programs that together initiated an inclusive cultural order. These programs revolved around the recuperation of an idealized pre-conquest identity of the "pure Indian" as the basis for the construction of a newly minted Mexican identity. This identity was based on the assertion that every Mexican had an ancestry that was linked, somewhere in their history, to that of the indigenous population. Thus, the reaching back to a pre-colonial past constituted a myth of origins that posited the unbroken continuity of an essence of Mexicanness. The body sculpted around this essence was that of the Mestizo: Mexicans of mixed European and Indian heritage. The cultural register of a myth of national Mexican identity was organized, in large part, around the conflation of the concept of "essential Indianness" with an assertion that the Indian possessed an enhanced potential for creativity. Enormous amounts of time, money and energy were channelled into the production of this symbolic figure of the "new" Mexico. A diversity of government, popular and

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93 The year of Vasconcelos's appointment has, until recently, been cited as the moment of the arrival of Modern Art in Mexico. This historical configuration that associates the coming of modern culture to Mexico with the consolidation of post-revolutionary regimes, and its inclusion in the canon of Western art history speaks eloquently of the success of these political/cultural strategies. The myths generated at this time became embedded in the historical process itself.

94 Mexico's indigenous population moved in and out of favour with hegemonic state power and was defined accordingly. After the revolution they became a useful symbol on which Mexico's changing fortunes were thought to hinge. See Roger Bartra, The Cage of Melancholy especially Chapter 12, "Toward Metamorphosis," 89-96. Bartra's wonderful study traces the transformation of representations of Mexico's indigenous population from "pelado" to "mestizo": a changing mythology characterized according to the political and social necessities of the moment.
cultural institutions, as well as independent groups of artists on both sides of the Mexico/U.S. border, cooperated in its genesis.

Like much of the work produced by Americans and Europeans living in Mexico at this time, Modotti's earlier works can be seen as contributing to a thickening of the mythical space of the "cosmic race" as proposed by Vasconcelos. Modotti's first body of work is purely modernist in approach. Produced under the tutelage of Edward Weston, Modotti's highly aestheticised images of closely framed roses in full bloom and novel perspectives on exquisite details of Mexican architecture are formally abstract, tightly composed and engage a rich and varied tonal field, devoid of any specific context they are imbued with a timeless quality and convey a sense of classical beauty even when the subject matter is modern. While it is the case that all of Modotti's work exhibits a concern with the formal aspects of modernism and adheres to the tenets of "straight" photography, her photographs began to take on social and political content very early in her career in the form of emblematic images of political struggle and pictures of working men, women, and children, of families, of village ceremonies and activities, and of the rhythms and tasks of everyday life. (For ease and clarity of reference I will classify this

95 Again, see Bartra's analysis of the political impetus behind the transformation of the pelado into revolutionary force, 90-93.
96 In the early years of the twentieth century the American avant-garde, as it revolved around Alfred Stieglitz and his Gallery 291, embraced a modernist aesthetic that promoted an abstract purity in photographic work. The baby of the late Stieglitz aesthetic was "Straight" photography. Straight photography's mission was to secure the acceptance of photography as one of the "high arts." Practitioners of Straight photography rejected the concerns and techniques of the traditional plastic arts and instead maintained that it was necessary to work with and develop the qualities that were unique to the medium of photography. In practice this meant that aesthetic decisions were made during the exposure, the image was printed as framed by the camera, and darkroom techniques such as dodging or retouching were permissible to correct only very minor faults. "Pictorial" attempts at narrative or any "gimmicky" affect or manipulation of the mise en scene of the photograph were eschewed. Political considerations were anathema and their inclusion was felt to contaminate the aesthetic integrity of the work. The aesthetic orientation of Straight photography remained the basis of all of Modotti's photographic production, even her attempts to negotiate the political in her work.
rather diverse collection of photographs as Modotti's "second" body of work, and the Colonia de la Bolsa series as her "third"\textsuperscript{97} and final significant body of work.)

Photographs such as "Bandolier, Corn, Guitar," (Fig. 18) and "Sickle, Bandolier, Guitar," (Fig. 19) in their glorification of Mexico's revolutionary spirit, call to mind the traditional "corridos"\textsuperscript{98}—ballads of the peasant classes—that chronicled the country's history. These iconic images seal the place of music and song as a necessity of revolutionary transformation, and in their oblique referencing of the corrido recognize, importantly, that the narration of the country's history by the popular classes sits side by side with State-authorized versions of that history.\textsuperscript{99} However, in spite of their references to the subversive potentiality of the corrido, these photographs in romanticizing and idealizing the revolution, subtly position it as an event that happened in the past, something that is over and done with, and in so doing, they manage to still sit comfortably within a framework that was both familiar and palatable to Mexican state interests. This is a critical point, because at the time these photographs were made the Mexican government was coming under heavy criticism on a number of fronts from those who felt that the regime had forsaken the goals of the Revolution, and had instead taken up old authoritarian and despotic forms of power that left the popular classes no better off than they were before the Revolution took place (Sherman). These photographs were widely distributed. They were reproduced in reviews and critical articles and were used

\textsuperscript{97} The photographs in this portfolio are actually organized as a two part series. The first part is titled "Contrasts of the Regime" and consists of a number of photomontages with captions. Precisely because these are montages they work in very different ways than the second part of the collection—the "Colonia de la Bolsa" photographs—a "Benjaminian" analysis is more appropriate to understanding their functions. For this reason I will not be looking at the "Contrasts of the Regime" photographs here.


\textsuperscript{99} Corridos are still a powerful means of the collective chronicling of events in popular culture. I recently received a call for papers that asked for submissions concerning the representations of "disability" in corridos.
extensively in magazines and newspapers, as well as being used directly in political contexts in the form of images for political posters.

Until the last two years of the 1920s, then, Modotti's photographs can be said to fall within, even if only marginally, the state-sanctioned view of itself that Mexico was broadcasting to the world, and that the regime was popularizing at home in an attempt to patch over the deep rifts within Mexican society. A brief accounting of Mexico/U.S. relations in the time before the making of these photographs is useful here.

PLATEAU: U.S./Mexico Relations

In the early years of the decade leading up to WWI, American policy toward Mexico revolved around the production of an identity of the Mexican people as self-determining. In practice, however, this policy of the Wilson administration recognized the Mexican people as self-determining only within a complicated set of criteria, the upshot of which was that they were self-determining only if they "self-determined" a liberal-democratic state. Anything less left Mexico open to intervention, and indeed, invasion, by the U.S.\(^\text{100}\)

The grounds of dispute between the States and Mexico shifted slightly in 1933 when the Roosevelt administration began to institute the "Good Neighbour Policy". Whereas in the first decade of the twentieth century constructions of Mexican identity were often imposed from without, after the 1917 Revolution the Mexican government became increasingly active in constructing its own representation of national identity. In a plan to consolidate power through the beleaguered body of the peasant, the Mexican

government promoted the construction of a mythology that by the beginning of the 1930s can be characterized as that of the "Homo Mexicanus". a symbol for the new Mexico. This construction of the Homo Mexicanus emerged as a vitally important strategy in Mexican domestic and foreign policy, and was mobilized in a number of ways, including through the production and distribution of images. However, I would suggest that the institutional, ideological and cultural structures for this construction were already well-articulated in the early 1930s when the American photographer Paul Strand was commissioned to supply the official images, in photographs and in film, that were circulated by the state, both in Mexico and internationally, to consolidate this new ideal image of the Mexican imaginary.

Strand's "official" representations of the Mexican people stand in direct counterpoint to Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs. Ironically, in terms of the Mexican regime's supposedly populist stand, Strand's photographs—such as "Men of

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101 This nomenclature is borrowed from the title of Calvin Taplay's unpublished paper presented at the UBC Art History Graduate Conference in 1996.
102 In 1933 Strand was appointed Chief of Photography and Cinematography, Department of Fine Arts, Secretariat of Education, for Mexico City. In 1934 he supervised the production of the film Redes, which was released in the U.S. as The Wave, and at that time took the photographs that were released in 1940 as a limited edition fine-art book The Mexican Portfolio.
103 I say this even though throughout his career Strand engaged in a political rhetoric that privileged the sovereign subject and has been understood as a politically active artist. However, I suggest that his work can be seen as contained within the ethos of what John Tagg has figured within photography's histories as "a multi-national humanism." Strand's positioning within this discourse is illustrated by the introduction of the 1967 edition of his Mexican Portfolio, reiterated from a talk given by the Mexican artist David Alfaro Siqueiros from his workshop on Public Art in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in September of 1967: "Our Mexican pictorial movement with its plastic concepts and new realism in open rebellion against formalism, took as its basis Man, the physical world in which he moves, struggles and dies. Paul Strand, coming to Mexico in 1932, penetrated the terrain of moving pictures with an unquestionable documentary and technical power...his film "Redes" (Nets), [is] a work of dynamic realism, emotional intensity, and social outlook. It is a masterpiece, a classic of the Mexican, and by extension, of the Latin American milieu. This is equally true of the photographs that make up the Mexican Portfolio. Strand's point of view paralleled that of the pioneers of Mexican mural painting in their opposition to formalism. Both as a film-maker and as a still photographer he has continued to develop his fundamentally humanist vision in later works [...] I wish to pay homage to the greatness of this "American-Mexican," or better, this citizen of the world, whose work has illuminated the most objective art of our time." Mexican Portfolio, (emphasis added), unpaginated.
Santa Ana," which pictures Mexican men lounging in a doorway (Fig. 20)—were taken surreptitiously, without the knowledge of those he was photographing, with a camera he designed specifically for this purpose. By way of contrast, Modotti never attempted to conceal the activity of making photographs. With her large format camera she was a visible participant in the photographic assemblage she entered, and she recognized that she stood in relation to those she was photographing, even if, as is the case with the "Misery" photograph, that relation was one with the populace at large—others who would witness her taking photographs—rather than directly with the "subjects" of the photograph. The point is that Modotti was not seduced into acting as if the camera offered objectivity.

These photographs by Modotti were published in the Communist newspaper El Machete towards the end of 1928. With these photographs, so I have suggested, Modotti interfered with what were the nascent stages of the State's mobilization of visual constructions of the "new" Mexico, and this contributed to her being placed on the wrong side of a line that was drawn to eradicate opposition to the Mexican regime and to American interests in Mexico. It cannot be said that it was only or simply the fact that she was a communist that caused all her difficulties, because just prior to her deportation she was offered a position as curator of photography at Mexico's National Gallery, but refused this offer on the grounds that the government had failed to act in the event of Mella's death, to bring his murderers to justice. However, in spite of this offer (which was perhaps simply a politically expedient one for the regime), Modotti, as a committed member of the communist party was experiencing an increased level of harassment and

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104 It would be difficult to find an image that is more effective in illustrating, unwittingly, the problematic characterizations of representations of the Mexican character that are the subject of Bartra's book.
interference. And it was not just harassment that she had to be concerned about, the Portes Gil government created a climate of terror: known Communists were illegally jailed, abducted, deported, and even murdered (Sherman). Framing Modotti's photographs as "unbecomings", allows us to give shape to previously unexamined ways in which these photographs that figure the "undoing" of hegemonic constructions of Mexican identity have been productive.

The Mexican government, in its suturing together of past and present in the figure of the Homo Mexicanus, was attempting to construct an imaginary space capable of seducing the disenfranchised Mexican peasantry, while at the same time avoiding the censure of the bourgeoisie, the remnants of the old aristocracy, and big business interests, both domestic and international. By creating as a nodal point, around which to gather support, the "look" of a traditional people honoured and revered as the noble ancestors of a modern Mexico, the government hoped to manage the rapidly growing tensions, fuelled by extreme poverty and despair, that had so often in Mexico's past broken open into the revolutions that toppled previous regimes. The point to stress here is that as representations of the Mexican people, the collection of photographs that comprise the second body of Modotti's work operated, for the most part, within acceptable boundaries in relation to the dominant ideology of the Mexican regime. However, even so, the Communist affiliations demonstrated in this work did become increasingly problematic as the Mexican regime swung away from a tolerant stance toward Communism as it came to align itself with the States at the end of the 1920s.
PLATEAU: Popular culture, Mexican Folkways, and the Muralists

The influential journal *Mexican Folkways* (Fig. 21) also frequently published photographs from Modotti's second body of work. Available between 1925 and 1933, *Folkways* figures largely in the constructions of Mexicanness initiated by the Obregón government and perpetuated by subsequent regimes. Funded by Vasconceles, and founded by an anthropologist, the American expatriate Frances Toor, *Folkways* was in the business of packaging Mexican culture for both Mexican and American consumption. Produced in English and Spanish it was widely disseminated throughout Mexico, the United States and Europe. The journal was endorsed by a diverse readership that included high profile Mexican and American artists and intellectuals, government officials and wealthy patrons, as well as luminaries such as the influential anthropologist Franz Boaz. *Folkways* articulated a prodigious number of voices that together animated the body and soul of a new Mexican identity. As such it was an important source of legitimation in the popularization of Mestizaje. *Folkways* brought to its readers a wide range of offerings that included essays by Adolfo Best-Maugard, the person responsible for the innovative introduction of pre-Hispanic teaching methods on which the Open Air Schools in the Vasconcelos period, were based; as well as essays by Alfonso Caso, one of Mexico's leading archaeologists; contributions from government officials for the various ministries; summaries of lectures given at the National University of Mexico, such as a series on "The Indian Basis of Mexican Civilization"; articles that show-cased regional crafts and presented the histories of traditional items of clothing such as the rebozo; interviews with artists, craftspeople, and writers; the lyrics of corridos and popular songs; poetry, photographs, and drawings; and reproductions of the many murals that were
always in progress—all working to produce a nationalist discourse and the homogenization of a concept of "Mexicaness."

Modotti was herself a contributing editor and regularly published photographs in *Folkways*. However, the nature of her involvement was very different in 1925 than in 1929. As long as Modotti remained within the realm of the photograph as "High Art," the formal concerns and orientation of her photographic work abstracted its content and placed the whole primarily within the discourses of art. The coolness of modernism was a strategy that worked to distance the viewer from the political content of the image. Her iconic photographs depicting the Revolution (such as those I referred to earlier) and many of her quotidian images of Mexican life after the Revolution were a permanent fixture in the magazine—including such photographs as "Worker's Parade" (1926) Figure 22 and "Campesinos Reading El Machete" (1929) Figure 23. This latter image of a group of workers reading the Mexican communist party newspaper is one that would have served as a reminder to the government of its promise of universal literacy, at the same time as it ironically figured the implications of this literacy. Modotti's *Colonia de la Bolsa* pictures, however, were not published in *Folkways*. This is perfectly in keeping with the journal's political mandate because *Folkways* remained, until it closed in 1933, a legitimizing voice for hegemonic constructions of national identity. As we shall see, the *Colonia de la Bolsa* photographs worked against strategies to consolidate the regime through representations of a unified Mexico.

The great mural projects of the 1920s and 1930s were also intimately involved in the constitution of the nation and the creation of a national Mexican identity. The
muralists were very much a part of Modotti's daily life. She documented all of their work and to varying degrees shared their political convictions. Modotti and the muralists saw themselves as cultural workers. José Clemente Orozco was perhaps closest to her in his predilection to unearth the scandalous conditions of everyday life in Mexico and in his refusal to glorify the Revolution in the production of a national identity. Each artist among the muralists was positioned differently in a complex set of relations to State apparatuses of censure. As is illustrated by this 1928 lithograph "Tourists and Aztecs" (Fig. 24), Orozco drained the romance out of carefully constructed representations of Mexicanness. At the same time, his work reveals some of the tensions among the muralist's diverse responses to the construction of these myths by finding the artists themselves culpable in their propagation. The muralists' works can be, therefore, understood as being both complicit with and resistant to State-sanctioned constructions of national identity. However, because painting functioned very differently than photography, even though the muralists worked constantly with the danger of overstepping politically sanctioned limits because of the content they chose to picture, their work always had the advantage, however slight, of being understood as an interpretation that could be countered and debated. Photographs were still seen as a direct translation of reality, as transparent, and as evidence. When Modotti moved into her Colonia de la Bolsa photographs, the margin of safety involved in the abstraction of "High Art" disappeared. Moreover, in 1928 Mexico, this type of work had not yet been integrated into systems of commodification and was therefore understood by the Mexican regime (rightly so if we are convinced by Foucault's analysis of processes of subjectification) as politically dangerous.
The government-funded great mural projects and the journal *Mexican Folkways* were just two of the many political and cultural institutions that were put in place throughout the 1920s to nurture and thicken a particular construction of national identity that was founded on a myth of origins. Dominant constructions of identity, such as those that rendered intelligible modern Mexican man, rely on processes of simplification and generalization in order to deliver representations that are also totalizations—representations whose reach is totally encompassing—representations that work to *naturalize* particular identities. The mobilization of a hegemonic representation of identity such as "Homo Mexicanus," is successful to the extent that it manages to foreclose the possibility of alternate undesirable identifications. And "foreclose" is the operative word here because as soon as other possible identity formations are admitted then the dominant construction of identity can no longer be considered "natural," that is to say, inevitable. When difference is introduced into established identities their contingent nature is revealed and the moment of power or "decision" is reactivated. This process results in dislocations that create gaps or fissures in the dominant mythical space. By re-inscribing some of who and what is left out of the spaces of national identity, Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs reactivate contingency and consequently, contest the relations of power that are sedimented in the propagation of a national identity founded on a myth of origins.

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105 This formulation relies on the model of discourse analyses as presented in *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. 
PLATEAU: Photographs of Colonia de la Bolsa

It is by way of this process that Modotti's photographs of Colonia de la Bolsa were interpreted as a threat to the Mexican regime. Her dislocation of dominant constructions of identity necessarily makes room for other possibilities to emerge. As the discussion of Foucault's concept of subjectification shows, dislocation presupposes the creation of a gap, a clearing, a smooth space, which then become available to be re-territorialized. Modotti's very specific images that work to undo hegemonic constructions of national identity reactivate a sense of contingency and therefore contest the relations of power that are being set-up in the propagation of this identity constructed around a myth of origins. Furthermore, because she is working with singularities, Modotti's images are not generalized enough to serve as dominant representations, so do not enter the debate in terms of one representation over and against another. Her images, in their specificity, admit that which dominant constructions, any dominant constructions, inevitably must leave out or block: the very possibility of difference, even if they later become subsumed under dominant discourse as an example of a "type" within documentary or journalistic photography. This is why Foucault says of processes of subjectification that they open up new ways of existing, even if their force is subsequently re-territorialized within newly established forms of knowledge and newly instituted powers. These images, then, rather than attempting to settle the contours of a particular representation of national identity, that is, rather than adhering to what is a totalizing framework, instead propose singularity in multiplicity. Because of this, in terms of a dominant construction of national identity, the multiplicity activated in Modotti's photographs is read as excess, as representations' "outside." And it is this excess that demonstrates the impossibility of
concepts of identity that contain everyone. In these photographs Modotti re-inscribes some of who and what is left out of the spaces of national identity. In her Colonia de la Bolsa photographs the process of moving around or changing one part of the assemblage that constitutes the figure "national identity" sets all the parts in motion and a new assemblage is formed. More importantly, the very possibility of difference is opened up along with the possibility of other, different, as yet unrealized assemblages of identity. In this way Modotti's photographic imaginings are for "a people to come."

How does this work in the photographs? Two themes run consistently through Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa images: people are always photographed in the contexts of their lived situations; and Modotti always frames the scenes to include elements that are symbolic of traditional Mexican culture counterpoised to signs of modernity. Moreover, Modotti does not privilege either tradition or modernity but rather, pictures both as debased. "Railway worker's daughter" (Figure 2) shows a young girl within the context of her living situation, and juxtaposes symbolic elements of the old and the new, the traditional and the modern in Mexican culture. The "rebozo," the Mexican shawl that identifies girls and women as members of specific villages, and the traditional olla (water jug), are found in the chaos and poverty of a scene that highlights the intensity of the labour involved in subsistence living. The young girl's look evades direct confrontation with the viewer's gaze and as such is unsettled and unsettling. The radical dislocation of dominant myths of national identity in this picture is evident when we contrast it to images of Mexican life produced during the same period by other American and European expatriates in Mexico.
The romanticization involved in "Women of Oaxaca" (Fig. 25), American artist Henrietta Shore's 1927 painting of a line of women, water jugs balanced gracefully on their heads, is present in many images of Mexican life produced at this time by non-Mexican artists. Faceless, their rebozos no longer identifying them as members of any particular village, the women stand as vertical elements ranged across the horizon of undulating hills and billowing clouds. These women are represented as a collective type rather than as individuals, and symbolize the enduring traditions of Mexican peasant life. The sensual harmony and the evocation of tranquility and peace are very much at odds with the extreme difficulty and deprivation much of Mexico was experiencing during the 1920s.

Weston's modernist 1926 photograph of ollas (Fig. 26), like Shore's painting, is also involved in the idealization of traditional Mexican life. The beauty of the form of the olla, emphasizing the clean lines and sensual patina of its surfaces, is presented within a modernist frame. The aestheticization of the objects erases the arduous aspect of domestic life that Modotti foregrounds in her image. Through their representations of the timeless and essential qualities of "Mexicanness," these images work to thicken and embellish hegemonic constructions of national identity.

Modotti's "Railway Worker's Daughter" (Fig. 2), on the other hand, literally punches holes in these idealized imaginings of Mexican life. In her photograph, the traditional olla, sitting on the ground to the left of the girl, has a ragged hole in its base rendering it useless. The tin buckets and coils of rope clustered in the corner of the picture highlight the fact that the olla is an implement that must be used daily to bring water into a living situation that does not include indoor plumbing. The buckets and the
age of the young girl who must perform the chore of bringing water are testimony to the intense physical demands of daily life. The arduousness of this life is further pictured in the squalor of the girl's surroundings. This photograph worries dominant constructions of Mexican identity that attempt to simplify and totalize. Modotti, in picturing the specificity of one young girl, rather than the creation of a type, shows some of what is left out, what is absent from the nationalistic myths of Mexican identity that seek to reinterpret and glorify the plight of Mexico's poor and dispossessed classes.

Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs do very different work than the contributions of artists such as Shore and Weston who, as I have suggested above, ameliorate these myths, by transforming the olla—which can be interpreted as a symbol of the deprivation involved in not having access to running water, and all that this lack implies about the quality of life—into a revered object that speaks of the noble and enduring presence of tradition. In the examples of the Shore painting and the Weston photograph, the visual production obfuscates the practical reality and in its place offers a completely different picture of the state of the nation.

"Misery" (1928) Figure 17 is, I suggest, again working with notions of "excess." This photograph pictures two women in front of a pulqueria—a local Mexican pub that served a beverage, pulque, made by fermentation of a particular kind of cactus. The pulqueria, a tradition of Mexican life, also became a symbol of the local colour of Mexico. Tourists prized folk-art postcards of the murals that decorated the façade of the pulqueria, and images of these same murals, made by well-known photographers such as this one by Edward Weston (Fig.27), were revered as objects of High Art. In the mid-1920s the pulqueria and the pulque beverage became sites of popular resistance to
corporate attempts to replace pulque with mass-produced beer from the North. This resistance provided the occasion for a range of artistic productions. However, many of these works indulged in the same kind of idealization as Henrietta Shore's painting and Edward Weston's photograph. A case in point is artist Pablo O'Higgins' 1924 painting "En la pulqueria" (Figure # 10). While it certainly functions within this resistance, in that it provides positive references to the traditional offerings of the local pulquerias—the warm pleasures of enjoyable leisure time spent in the company of friends—this image, paradoxically, also sits comfortably inside hegemonic constructions of Mexican identity, and can be seen an exercise in reinforced stereotypes, simplifying and romanticizing Mexican culture. Nowhere in these three works are there references to the extremely complex sets of relations that the pulqueria as a social institution represents. Contrary to most of the work produced at this time, in Modotti's "Misery" (Fig. 17), the immediate agent of the woman's suffering, the pulqueria, is represented in the background, and as such calls up the many competing discourses within which the photograph is immersed.

Modotti's depiction of a drunken woman presented a challenge on many fronts. This representation of Mexican woman, like the figure in "Railway Worker's Daughter, worked to destabilize post-revolutionary constructions of Mexican identity. The photograph does not coincide with any of the prevalent mythologies that idealized and romanticized women. It cannot, for instance, be positioned within the constructions of women promoted by Diego Rivera's murals: constructions that often tend to conflate women and nature, and to figure women in primarily sexual or sensual terms. As well, "Misery" lent support to a line of reasoning popular at the time, one that equated progress

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106 Pablo O'Higgins was an American expatriate who became a long-time resident of Mexico. Born Paul Higgins in Salt Lake City, Higgin's changed his name first to Paul O'Higgin's and then, later to Pablo O'Higgins. After arriving in Mexico he apprenticed with Diego Rivera. See South of the Border 179-180.
and modernity with the corruption of Mexican peasantry in general, and women in particular. These women pictured in Modotti's photograph are rural women in the slums of Mexico City, and as such they call up a particularly virulent form of criticism that intersected with other more general forms of protest over the plight of the Mexican peasant. Much of rural Mexico had been decimated in the years leading up to, during, and following, the Revolution. Much of the peasant population had, through a succession of politically orchestrated manoeuvres been left with no land or livelihood. Women often ended up in the cities by default, destitute and reduced to prostitution to stay alive. Because they were forced to endure physically and emotionally debilitating circumstances, excessive alcohol use frequently became a problem, and pulque was an inexpensive, accessible form of intoxication.

In "Misery" the figure of tradition huddles in the corner, withdrawn and defeated, hiding her face in the rebozo. The window above the intoxicated woman sprawled in the foreground of the picture is blank, has been walled in, it has no alternate reality to offer. The door to the pulqueria opens onto an inner world that is alive with the activity of Mexican men and women in dressed in modern European clothes—a world from which the women are cast out. The popular and identifying painted wall of the pulqueria is not shown. As with Modotti's "Railway Worker's Daughter," tension is created within the image by the inclusion of traditional objects that are immersed in a hostile environment. The mythology customarily associated with these objects—in this case the traditional garb of the woman in the corner, and even, I would suggest, traditional Mexican woman as object of the Revolution—is radically disrupted. The photographs in this series, with their graphic descriptions of the poverty, despair and squalor that still existed in many
parts of rural and urban Mexico, challenge dominant representations of the government's programs of renewal.

"Misery" dissembles the myths that constructed the identity of the Mexican peasant woman as wholesome and content within time-honoured traditional roles; woman as the foundation of the nation; the woman of the tourist posters; and the woman whose diverse histories were investigated in Mexican Folkways. Within this context it is clear that Modotti's work was increasingly at odds with the dominant aesthetic, political and social projects implemented within Mexico at this time, because her photographs worked to undermine constructions of a national identity championed by these initiatives.

During the 1920s official government policy was adamantly and actively opposed to dissemination of any visual work that ran counter to a vision of Mexico that articulated a progressively noble and idealized construction of the identity and integration of the Indian. When the Colonia de la Bolsa images are considered in the context of

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107 For instance, in the mid-1920s U.S. artists working in Mexico experienced a great deal of trouble when shipping their work back to the States. Any images referring to the poverty of rural Mexico, even those that presented their subject matter in romantically idealized terms, were turned back at borders and even at post offices. These difficulties were encountered when trying to export images in any medium, but the problem would have been particularly acute with photographs because, as I have suggest, they were understood as a reflection of the "truth" and seen as forms of "evidence." Everett Gee Jackson, an American painter living and working in Mexico throughout the 1920s reports in his published memoirs that the paintings he sent back to the U.S. were subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the postmaster, who rejected any he felt were detrimental to Mexico's image. Jackson reports the words of the local official when he vetoed a number of paintings: "He said that those straw shacks of the Indians which I had painted would give the wrong impression about Mexico, and that I should paint Spanish señoritas, especially if I wanted to mail my paintings back to the United States." quoted in South of the Border 81 (and these were paintings, photographs, were even more likely to be censured.) This censure of images of Mexico was not the result of the whims of a particular postmaster but rather, was carried out in accordance with official government policy that understood the power of visual imagery and put in place strict regulations governing the dissemination of representations of Mexican culture and Mexican bodies. By the mid 1930s, and the recuperation and glorification of the figure of the "pure Indian" and of the traditional Mexican peasant, this policy changed dramatically. In the February, 1936 edition of Art Digest another American artist working in Mexico talks about this change in policy:

the present government has reversed the former attitude towards tendentious propaganda. A year ago all artwork which might be construed as damaging to Mexican prestige was confiscated at the border. Nothing indicative of poverty or squalor was countenanced. Now however, artists are free to depict any phase of Mexican life and its picturesque surroundings. Quoted in South of the Border 81.
discourses that define photography as truth and evidence, the problematic nature of this work is self-evident. The photographs show too much. They are excessive in their picturing of modern life in Mexico. Photographic images showing this face of Mexican life are not seen again until nearly a decade later in the work of American photographer Dorothea Lange: "An old woman waiting for the international street car at a corner to return across the bridge to Mexico" (1938) Figure 28. By the time Lange produces this somewhat analogous photograph to one of Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa images, shifts in the political climate result in a reception of Lange's photograph that serve to highlight the importance of context. Concerning questions of reception it is useful here to contrast Modotti's photograph, "Misery," with the Lange photograph, "An old woman waiting for the international street car at a corner to return across the bridge to Mexico" produced nearly a decade later in 1938. This comparison will allow me to show the ways in which the historical moment was critical in the reception of these works. Unlike Lange's photograph, Modotti's was produced at a time of high political tension within Mexico. In terms of the political sensitivity of images, the height of the Mexican government's interest in the construction of national identity had passed by 1938,

108 when Lange made her photograph that calls up Mexico/U.S. relations in its border scenario. By then, Mexico had become overwhelmingly preoccupied with problems of economics and internal and international tension. In the late twenties when Modotti's "Misery" was made there were fewer images that dealt with the themes of hopeless struggle and despair in everyday life, and photographic images working with these themes were extremely rare. The 1938 photograph "An old woman waiting for the international street car at a corner to return across the bridge to Mexico" was produced in the U.S. by an American,

\[108\] Refer back to page 113, footnote 94.
Lange, working under the auspices of the government funded Farm Security Administration program of the Department of Agriculture. In the making of this photograph Lange was working within authorized, established and well-articulated discourses of documentary photography: this image was produced to highlight the condition of Mexican migrant workers in the States.

There are obvious similarities in these photographs. Both have as primary subjects women who do not know their picture is being taken. There is a traditional Mexican presence in each image. Lange's woman is framed by tradition: the rebozo and the white skirt, the hand-embroidered and lace cloth are all present but within this tradition the woman is soiled, ragged and weary. The traditional elements in the woman's dress appear all the more worn in relation to the shiny white ceramic tiles she rests against, and the plate glass window above her that reflects the modern world, mobility and activity. In Modotti's photograph tradition huddles in the corner, withdrawn and defeated, hiding her face in the rebozo. The window above the intoxicated woman sprawled in the foreground of the picture is blank, has been walled in, it has no alternate reality to offer. The door to the pulqueria opens onto an inner world that is alive with activity, modernity and progress are represented by the European dress of those who are inside. The popular and identifying painted wall of the pulqueria is not shown. As with Modotti's "Railroad Worker's Daughter" tension is created within the image by the inclusion of traditional objects that are immersed in a hostile environment. The mythology customarily associated with the traditional objects—in this case the traditional garb of the woman in the corner, and even traditional Mexican woman as object of the Revolution—is, as I have argued, radically disrupted.
Lange's photograph was contained within the dominant discourse of the Farm Security Administration project. It was circulated and received as one of a body of images that sought to address social inequality and oppression with a view toward the creation of a more just society. Within this type of photographic practice the photographer claimed to offer a sympathetic window on to the reality of a subject's life. However, this claim can be contested when we realize that in reading this photograph from within the frame of FSA rhetoric the specificity of the Mexican subject is subsumed in a more generalized reading of the woman as poor, landless and oppressed. The woman's singularity and the historical and geographical contingencies she lives as a Mexican woman are altered, and the image is tamed and contained by its inclusion in this hegemonic discourse that defines the Mexican peasant in terms of its own concerns. Lange's photograph works well in the service of U.S. hegemonic constructions of the Mexican peasant that are primarily informed by the emerging social philosophy of the New Deal. The rhetoric of this construction is further determined by its imbrications in the Roosevelt administration's implementation of the Good Neighbour policy along with the socially oriented theory and practices of Documentary Photography.

The Mexican government, in its suturing together of past and present in the figure of the Mestizo, was attempting, so I have asserted, to construct an imaginary space capable of seducing the disenfranchised Mexican peasantry, while at the same time avoiding the censure of the bourgeoisie, the remnants of the old aristocracy and big business interests. By creating as a nodal point around which to gather support, the "look" of a traditional people honoured and revered as the noble ancestors of a modern Mexico, the government hoped to manage the rapidly growing tensions, fuelled by
extreme despair, that had in Mexico's past broken open into the drawn-out Revolution that toppled previous regimes. In the series of images that Modotti made in Colonia de la Bolsa, she transgresses the limits of an official government policy that labelled as "tendentious propaganda" images that were indicative of poverty or squalor. As well, Modotti's images of outcasts, by showing that which cannot be contained in the myth of national identity, threaten to rupture the coherence of that identity. Once the figure of a unified Mexican body is undone, space becomes available for other imaginary reconfigurations of identity. In "picturing the impossible"—the fact that a lot of people had been left behind in Mexico's re-imagining of itself—these photographs run counter to State policies and practices that sought to block from sight the plight of the popular classes.

It is then, in my view, in the series of images that constitute her third body of work that Modotti transgresses the limits of an official government policy that labelled as "tendentious propaganda" images that were indicative of poverty or squalor. These photographs, published in the Communist Party paper El Machete, are vigorously and overtly political. I have placed this work as a distinct and separate portfolio because I believe this collection of photographs of the Mexican people, crossed the line of what was tolerated by the Calles regime. I have argued that in effect, these photographs enacted "becomings" that placed Modotti in direct opposition to the hegemonic forces involved in the programmatic construction of a homogenous Mexican identity: a social imaginary that the government hoped would engender a sense of unity among the Mexican people and would, in turn, consolidate and secure its power.
The concept of "becomings" attributed to photographic portraits is a difficult one to negotiate within critical practices of the social histories of art that are based on materialism. But, Modotti's photographs also pose other problems in relation to their placement within art historical discourses. The difficulties Modotti confronted in her attempts in the late 1920s to produce political art were symptomatic of larger ongoing disputes over the conflicted and contested terrain of photographic meaning. As I have already indicated, in the context of these disputes the fact that Modotti was working in the interstices of art and politics means that her photographs run the risk of being critically reduced to a form of journalistic photography, and their constitutive functions for identity disavowed or foreclosed. Indeed, as I have remarked, Modotti's images of Colonia de la Bolsa, such as "Railway Worker's Daughter" and "Misery", when referred to at all, have been categorized as a form of documentary photography. That is, they have been contained in a reading that suggests that there is nothing more to say after their positioning as documentary photographs has been carried out. So for instance then, the historian or critic who is interested in placing Modotti's work within the existing historical frame of "documentary" photography would investigate whether Modotti was familiar with the ethos and aims of documentary photography. Whether, for instance, she would have known about or seen copies of the photographs of Jacob Riis and Lewis

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109 From photography's invention in 1839 through the early decades of the twentieth century, the production and consumption of photographs has been framed by what Alan Sekula terms, in his essay "On the Invention of Photographic Meaning," a kind of binary folklore. He designates the two arms of this lore as "a 'symbolist' folk-myth and a 'realist' folk myth" (108). Sekula states that "[t]he misleading but popular form of this opposition is 'art photography' vs 'documentary photography'" (108). The first of these "art photography" designated photography in terms of its affective function, and the second "documentary photography" in relation to photography's informative function. Sekula's essay complicates the terms of this opposition through a discussion of the work of the two turn-of-the-century American photographers, Alfred Stieglitz and Lewis Hine, to show the ways in which these two schools of photography share fundamental assumptions about the "truth value" assigned to photographs.

Hine. They would also investigate the context in Mexico and look to see if there was other work being done that falls within this generic classification. In short, Modotti's work would be analyzed and evaluated, interpreted, from within the criteria of "documentary" photography. An analysis of this sort would take these photographs and form them into something quite different from that which concerns me here. The photographs would, in effect, emerge as other photographs than those with which I am working.

However, while I do not wish to read these photographs in terms of the way they might function within understandings of documentary photography, I do want to invoke this reading as one of the multiplicity of ways in which these images reach visibility. For it is precisely by calling attention to and acknowledging the excess of meanings that can be, and in fact are piled on any given image/event, that it becomes possible to collapse the idea of what it means to represent something and move from the work that the photograph does as tracing to its function as map.

As was discussed in the introduction for this study, to "represent" requires that there is some defined entity, some thing to represent, and also the practice of representation requires distance, the ability to stand-back from this "something" in order to delineate its essential qualities and re-present them. Understanding these photographs as "becomings" extinguishes both of these criteria: becoming is not being, there is no definable, bounded something to grab hold of, becoming is a process not yet complete, a

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111 In the States at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, through the work of photographers Jacob Riis, Lewis Hine and others, a discourse grew around a socially committed practice of photography. This practice was later subsumed under the category of documentary photography (although the term "documentary" was not, in fact, coined until 1926). Documentary photographers believed that it was possible to bring about social change through dissemination of images that documented, and therefore provided "proof," of the sufferings and transgressions of the dispossessed. This belief, of course, hinges on the assumption spoken about above (see page 110, footnote 91), that "truth value" resides in the photograph itself and a photograph can therefore be seen as a legitimate record of what is being documented.
flux, a flowing; and, as well, there is no distance. Therefore, to understand the photograph as map is to enter into its becoming: its becoming becomes our becoming. It is no longer possible to enact a relationship that proceeds from the autonomous knowing, seeing subject, apprehending as separate and apart from its "self" a knowable, distinct object: the photograph. The concreteness of the subject/object relationship is dissolved. Representation has literally imploded under the weight of so many conflicting and contradictory interpretations. This process of implosion is, in part, the basis on which I can propose to look at photographs in terms of the immanence of their constant "becomings."

If we turn to Alan Sekula's "The Invention of Photographic Meaning," it could be said that my attempts to read photographs as "becomings" are nothing more than a reversion to the early nineteenth-century aesthetics proposed by Alfred Stieglitz, wherein a photograph "is believed to encode the totality of an experience" (100). Stieglitz's series of metaphoric works titled "Equivalents" (1920s) demonstrate this commonly held belief that photography is capable of producing an affect in which "an interior state is expressed by means of the image," (101). The difference in what I am proposing is that the affective claims I am making for the photographs do not refer to feelings or unconscious resonances that are "expressed" in the photograph. Rather, I am saying that the photographic portrait is itself an affect of composing forces. In proposing to read photographs as becomings I am suggesting that there is not an "interior" as opposed to an "exterior" state but instead, that subject and object, self and other, viewer and image, are component parts that together comprise a machinic assemblage in which they exist in a rhizomatic association to each other. Viewing photographs in this way, as becomings,

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112 See footnote 109 above, for an elucidation of Sekula's critique of photography.
means that movement in any part of the assemblage necessarily creates a new, different assemblage. This is a form of "seeing photographically."

PLATEAU: Singularity in multiplicity—effecting the turn.

The "eyes" made available in modern technological sciences shatter any idea of passive vision; these prosthetic devices show us that all eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life.

Donna Haraway, "Simians and Cyborgs" 113

Photographs attempt, often in a panic, to capture a thought as it tries to materialize, to image itself, in an object or a scene. The choice of object or scene is of course not indifferent. Indeed, their presence may be so strong that it sometimes blocks the process it is intended to materialize. What matters is that, whatever the outcome, a photograph is the search for a novel imagining of a thought—it is an image-thought (hence its inchoative nature).

Régis Durand, "How to See (Photographically)" 147-148

Before I continue, it is necessary to orchestrate a shift in the way we have been viewing photographs and imagine instead a different kind of looking. The Régis Durand passage I have quoted above allows me to affect this turning, and to begin talking about photographs as particular assemblages of "image-thoughts." In order to establish a plane

113 Donna Haraway, "Simians and Cyborgs," (190) quoted in Celia Lury's Prosthetic Culture 153
of resonance, to register an intensity, for the second part of what I have proposed is a
double movement in Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs—the possibility that
these photographs mark, on a material level, a field of activities which parallel modes of
potential in the virtual, i.e. imaginary spaces of alternative identities for Modotti
herself—I want to investigate current theories of "seeing photographically" as developed
by Durand in his seminal 1995 essay "How to See (Photographically)." If, as I have
suggested, the first movement enacted in Modotti's "Misery" photograph ("first" does not
here indicate temporal order) is one that contaminates hegemonic constructions of
Mexican identity—and in so doing pictures Mexican bodies as "other"—it can also be
said, I think, that the second movement in this image is likewise one of contagion. I am
here referring to a parallel movement in the virtual; one that Massumi makes visible
when he identifies expression's journey through the body as a contagious force. The
image both infects and affects Modotti's sense-of-self, or personal identity. The
argument that I am making in this section is concomitant with, though not contiguous to,
the analysis of photographs as fetish—that which at once reveals and conceals lack—
carried out in the previous chapter on Pierre Loti.

Based on the critical writings of Jean Louis Schefer, Roland Barthes, and Gilles
Deleuze—writings that suggest that the film-still carries widely divergent meanings for
each of them—Régis Durand concludes that: "There have to be, in front of this image,
acts of looking and of thinking that are more powerful than the image itself, and which
submerge it completely, to the point that it becomes secondary" (142). Turning his
attention then to images that are not filmic, are not "swept-away by the flow," that is, to
photographs, Durand goes on to focus on how the photographic image is looked at. For Durand, it is at the divide, the edge "between things and their representation, and between representation and the materials of representation" that the process of "seeing photographically" is performed. In the present study this "edge" has been articulated as representation's "outside."

In his essay Durand extends the logic of the photograph as fetish into an explication of the processes by which thought happens, and situates photographs as "image-thoughts." There are, he tells us, a few reasons why it is that photographs are more suited to this operation than earlier types of imaging such as painting. Foremost, among these is photography's formidable analogical power, and secondly is its introduction of temporality into the image. Durand says these two characteristics of photography—it's "analogical power and its speed [...] allow a kind of immediate inscription and visualization of the process, an almost instantaneous return of the image onto original thought" (148). Durand understands the temporal force of photographic images to be found not in their relation to the objects they represent as "having-been-there" as Barthes would have it, but rather (following certain of Freud's ideas about the nature of psychic time) in their resonance with "the temporality of the workings of the thinking process, or one possible version of the thinking process...."

To reiterate then, for Durand, photography "echoes the unconscious process [of thought], not in its subject matters or in its affects, but in its very inchoative energy," (and I equate the "inchoative energy" that Durand finds significant, with the immanence associated with the force of expression). He traces the shape of photography's difference from language in forms of thinking: "Contrary to the operation of language, which is
homogeneous to the process it is called upon to represent, photography introduces the radical discontinuity and heterogeneity of the visual image onto the original thought" (148). Durand defines this "original thought" as the "initial encounter between an energy and an outside world" (149) and says that the movement in photographs that he is describing does not actually entail a chronology as it were, but rather "the imaginary reconstruction of a process which cannot really be broken down as such" (149). Durand's references here can be, once again, aligned with Deleuze and Guattari's theory of expression as aesthetics of immanence, whereby the force of expression is first of all a differing that is only subsequently slowed or sedimented into form.

Durand goes on to speak of the "radical discontinuity" introduced by the photographic image into symbolic and abstract processes of thinking as being akin to the injection of a "foreign body" whose opacity "has a considerable absorbing power, so much so that the original impulse may be arrested, like radiation by thick metal plating" (148)—to translate Durand's words again into the terms of this study: force captured and tamed into form. He continues his analysis using Freud's understandings of the concept of "psychic time" to conclude that photographs are:

...the visible traces of unconscious "gestures." Not *illustrations* of them, but rather like a rebus, a code which, even though it is no simple translation or figuration, must have some affinity, some sense of a connection with the original impulse. There lies something, in the photograph, of unconscious desire, but hardly anything on its surface can lead back to the source [force]—except precisely the sense of its having
come from a source [force] and of the ensuing transformation and loss.

(149)

I want to take this idea and run it through Deleuze and Guattari's thinking and ask the question: what happens if we look at the photographs as moments of desiring production, rather than as containers or vessels of unconscious desire, and therefore acknowledge that they are at least as much about excess as about lack? This line of questioning leads us to another of Durand's assertions about the way in which photographs function, and has to do with the implosive quality of the photographic image. As we shall see, Durand's statement, in spite of his reference to photographs as coded images, in fact, brings us very close to Barthes' assertion that a photograph is "an image without a code." If photographs are understood as the visible traces of unconscious gestures, in Durand's terms, or, as I would like to modify his formulation, as instances/instants of desiring production, it is also important to understand, (and Durand accentuates this) that they "remain in visible forms which generate in turn other associations, other desires and call up other images. It is like an infinite proliferation of small branching-outs, which end up covering up completely the original trace and leading the mind astray in many directions" (149). (In spite of his use of the arboreal term "branching-outs," Durand's description of the process of expression's tumultuous journey through the body offers a wonderful description of rhizomatic thinking.) It is for this reason that although it is possible to see photographs as forms of desiring production, it is not possible to do more than gesture toward naming anything like an "original" impulse of this desire: rather, there are many simultaneous impulses, each moving in tune with its own necessity. But, this movement of desire,
animated in the making of and looking at photographs, is also characterized by its inevitable collision with the patrolling border of the photograph's frame, whereupon it collapses back onto itself. The movement of approach and retreat that looking at a photograph entails is reminiscent of the discussion in chapter two of Sarah Kofman's theorization of the fetish as a dynamic phenomena marked by a diachronic oscillation of fascination and repulsion. Oscillation—a continuous movement which rehearses the pulsations that are, for Freud, the basis of psychic temporality—is a continuous fluctuation that effectively defers any sedimentation of meaning, and at the same time operates alongside processes of association that assure the proliferation of possibility in the photograph. But, oscillation also occurs between the pull exerted by the object of representation, the referent of the photograph, and what Barthes termed the "subtle-beyond-the-frame": that which is not figured in the image but is called up by the associative processes that the image sets in motion. The image as representation simply implodes under the weight of the multiplicity of possible readings that are thus generated. That is, the implosive character of the photograph is to be found in the constant movement between a proliferation of associations and the violent confrontation with the image's outside, its frame.\footnote{Even when it is a relation to that which lies "beyond-the-frame," the frame itself is still that boundary which inscribes inside and outside, within and beyond, identity and difference.} It is neither the one aspect nor the other but the movement of oscillation itself—from image (and proliferation) to collision with the frame (and limitation)—that determines the implosive nature of the photographic image. I suggest that the phenomenon that Barthes' refers to as the "punctum"—the prick or wound that opens the one who is seeing onto highly specific registers of experience—is located in this gap between image and viewer: photograph as inter/ruption, as rupture. Herein lies
the subversive potential of photographs. This is what Durand is referring to when he says that photography's "inchoative energy" echoes processes of thinking. And this is why it is that we could just as easily point to photographs as excessive, as we can to defining them in terms of lack.\textsuperscript{115} (Indeed, Durand acknowledges this point, but continues to figure excess as always leading back to lack or absence.) We can now see why it is futile to suggest that a particular reading of a photograph is \textit{the} reading, or to attempt to limit or confine readings to only those that can be legitimated in terms of a particular ideology. Photographs are proliferation. \textit{They enact multiple becomings.} It is important not to confuse their analogical power with the idea that their meaning is anchored to, and therefore determined by an essence, or by an essential relation with the real.\textsuperscript{116}

\begin{footnotesize}\
\textsuperscript{115}Maurice Blanchot in a section that explores writing as fragment in \textit{The Step Not Beyond} speaks to the incessant demands of lack and excess as "a lack that marks itself only by a surplus without place, impossible to put in place" in such a way as to "oppose a lack to a lack" or to mark an aporia (50).

\textsuperscript{116}Photography's relation to the real continues to be an unspoken assumption, despite protestations to the contrary, in contemporary analyses. For instance, see Gen Doy's analysis of Modotti's photographs in \textit{Materializing Art History}. Doy's reading rests upon the persistent and elusive belief that photographs are essentially linked to a reality and that this fact is, in itself; a degree zero of meaning that positions any potential meaning, any potential ways of seeing. As well, the current nostalgia for the real has been the basis of Hal Foster's \textit{The Return of the Real}. Michael Taussig in "A Report to the Academy," the preface of his book \textit{Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses}, addresses this preoccupation with a nostalgia for the real in contemporary scholarship and critical theory. It is worth quoting him at length here, because it is precisely the fascination with the idea that there is some \textit{Real} real to which we can refer, and that underlies all forms of ephemera, which I am countering in my analysis of photographs as becomings. Taussig frames his study with the following words:

But just as we might garner courage to reinvent a new world and live new fictions [...] so a devouring force comes at us from another direction, seducing us by playing on our yearning for the true real. Would that it would, would that it could, come clean, this true real. I so badly want that wink of recognition, that complicity with the nature of nature. But the more I want it, the more I realize it's not for me. Nor for you either...which leaves us in this silly and often desperate place wanting the impossible so badly that while we believe it's our rightful destiny and so act as accomplices of the real, we also know in our heart of hearts that the way we picture and talk is bound to a dense set of representational gimmicks which, to coin a phrase, have but an arbitrary relation to the slippery referent easing its way out of graspable sight.

Now the strange thing about this silly if not desperate place between the real and the really made-up is that it appears to be where most of us spend most of our time as epistemically correct, socially created, and occasionally creative beings. We dissimulate. We act and have to act as if mischief were not afoot in the kingdom of the real and that all around the ground lay firm. That is what the public secret, the facticity of the social fact, being a social being, is all about. No matter how sophisticated we may be as to the constructed and arbitrary character of our practices, including our practices of representation, our practice of practices is one of actively forgetting such mischief (xvii).
\end{footnotesize}
"Seeing photographically" then, just as it echoes processes of thinking, also recognizes seeing as a process that does not deliver objects to a subject. In other words, what we see is not separated from we who are seeing. Rather, what we see is, along with our seeing, in a constant state of "becoming." As viewers we cleave to the images we are looking at, tumbling along in Nietzsche's flow, on the move, we become an effervescence of nomadic perceptual assemblages. Indeed, Nietzsche's thought is particularly relevant to our understanding of "seeing photographically." In a passage in The Gay Science, Nietzsche talks about the use of the aphorism as a form that allows momentary flashes of insight:

I approach deep problems like cold baths: quickly into them and quickly out again. That one does not get to the depths that way, not deep enough down, is the superstition of those afraid of the water, the enemies of cold water; they speak without experience. The freezing cold makes one swift. – And to ask this incidentally: does a matter necessarily remain ununderstood and unfathomed merely because it has been touched only in flight, glanced at, in a flash? Is it absolutely imperative that one settles down on it? that one has brooded over it as over an egg [...] as Newton said of himself? At least there are truths that are singularly shy and

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117 It is interesting to note that Celia Lury makes a similar point in relation to Barthes' idea of the punctum. She emphasizes Barthes' assertion that the existence of the punctum in any particular photograph is a function of the combination of viewer and photograph. Lury extends this line of thinking to include the photographic operation itself and asserts that the power of photography does not reside in either the technology (the camera) or perception (the viewer) but in the space between (90-91).

118 Blanchot's The Step Not Beyond consists entirely of fragments and his description of the relation of the fragment to writing and to thinking/philosophy, bespeaks a close affinity with Nietzsche.
ticklish and cannot be caught except suddenly – that must be _surprised_ or left alone..."\(^{119}\)

In a move that resonates to Nietzsche's affirmation of the glance (and similarly, to Blanchot's assertion of the "fragment," and to Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualization of the "line-of-flight"), Durand explores the importance of the "quick look" in viewing photographs. The "quick look," Durand tells us, is integral to the operation that is "seeing photographically." He is here once again referring to the radical instability of the photographic image: the ineffability of photographs when they are called on to receive anything other than a quick look.\(^{120}\) "Seeing photographically," mimics processes of thinking. When we have a thought it is immediately intercepted, overlaid, modulated, etc., by other thoughts and thought fragments—the process of seeing photographically is not dissimilar. From the moment the photographer frames an image through the viewfinder, a movement begins that continues for as long as the photograph exists to be seen. Just as it is impossible to hold thought still—from the instant of its inception a thought is already a flow—so too is it impossible to hold a photographic image in place. This is why it is only possible to look at photographs quickly. In the quick look an associative process begins that produces, in effect, a multiplicity of images. Ironically, contrary to the material processes that _fix_ the image on paper, photographs come closer to materializing the _fluidity_ of relation.


\(^{120}\) Durand acknowledges that it is possible to take a reverential attitude towards looking at photographs but says: "an attitude of piety (of a prolonged, respectful contemplation) is nothing but the other side of the same problem [i.e. repulsion/need to look away that necessitates the quick look]" (146). The "long look" then is, once again, indicative of the fundamental misunderstanding that insists that photographs contain some essential, unalterable meaning, a meaning that is discrete and exists apart from the look of the one who is seeing them, and that can be deciphered if only one digs deeply enough.
To approach this from a slightly different direction: the photographer makes a photograph of an image-thought. Both aspects of this assemblage—image and thought—(although it is an artificial division to speak of them as separate) are in a constant state of change. But, the photograph, unlike a thought, is material: an image become object. It is this fixity, the fact that a photograph is an object as well as an event, which is deceptive. There has been in photography's history, too much emphasis placed on the literal translation of the properties and processes of photography into the register of ontology. Throughout the articulations of the various critical histories of photography, theorization has often snagged on this one-to-one mapping that places the weight of interpretation on the indexicality of the medium. In this context it is pertinent to assert, once again, that although it is the case that the photograph exists in all its materiality as an object, this fact does not in itself give the photograph its meaning.

The significance of the photograph, as distinct from earlier forms of imaging, is that while it is the case that photographs incessantly confront us with the impossibility of certainty, of knowing, it is also the case that they proffer a way of tracking the movement of undecidability. If we carry this analysis back to Modotti's photographs and attempt to see them photographically, what is the outcome? In the Durand epigraph at the beginning of this section we are told that photographs are attempts "to capture a thought as it tries to materialize, to image itself, in an object or scene." Nonetheless, it is also the case, according to Durand, that the "presence [of the object or scene in the photograph] may be so strong that it sometimes blocks the process it is intended to materialize." Durand shows us, as well, how the perceptual operations involved in viewing photographs, while they work in the same register as psychic time, also bespeak a
"radical discontinuity" with processes of thinking as they adhere to language. This discontinuity is so great, he suggests, that the introduction of the image into processes of thinking is powerful enough to arrest the "original impulse" and redirect it into multiple becomings, so that, although photographs have desire folded into their surfaces, we know little of the shape of this desire. What happens when we read Modotti's Colonia de la Bolsa photographs in terms of Durand's theory of desire in the photograph—or, as I would revise Durand's articulation à la Deleuze and Guattari—the photographs as instances of desiring production? What happens when we look at these photographs as having moved out from a complex multiplicity of desire, not the least of which may have been Modotti's desire to loosen constructions of self in which she had previously been constrained and to thereby call up other subjective spaces that facilitated her interpellation into revolutionary forms of identity? Even if, and again this is in keeping with Foucault's understanding of processes of subjectification, that revolutionary identity itself becomes a limiting construct as the force of the expression that was its impetus becomes sedimented into a form of identity. What happens if we attempt to "see" the photographs as desiring productions, as materializations of an impulse toward a reconfiguration of social and psychic space. How does this work?

First I have to retrace my steps a little and talk about the ways in which Modotti's identity was constructed in the public sphere. It was, as we shall see, a tricky transformational process to jump from, as she attempted to do, being seen (and perhaps seeing herself) as she was pictured in Hollywood, as a femme fatale, a figure of seduction, into the position of radical social critic. Certainly, we know that she found her reputation as "a great beauty" and the stereotypes attached to her Italian heritage difficult
(if not impossible) to negotiate. Her public identity was framed primarily by reference to these two characteristics: beauty and heritage. First as a film star, then later as a nude model for a series of widely acclaimed photographs made by Edward Weston, and again as a nude model for a number of Diego Rivera's murals, her body became a site of inscription for seductive constructions of "woman" as nature and as siren. Ironically, even though, as Laura Mulvey and Christopher Wollen have noted, when Modotti took up the camera she cast a very different look on those she photographed than had been trained on her, her body was ultimately the agent of her undoing as she was never able to shake the residue of these earlier associations. It is difficult, for example, to find any reviews of her photographic work that are not overdetermined by the fact of her beauty and her Italian heritage. This can be seen in writing that was done at the time she was exhibiting her work,¹²¹ and it is still the case that much of the recent re-evaluation of her work reiterates that she was a great beauty and had to struggle to be taken seriously.

These associations went further than the confines of aesthetic considerations, however. There could be no more graphic illustration of the dangers of being publicly identified as a femme fatale than the circumstances surrounding her arrest and trial for conspiracy in the murder of her companion Antonia Mella, after he was gunned down at her side. She was publicly maligned and demonized by the press for weeks on end. The most intimate details of her personal life were splashed across the front pages of the

¹²¹ See for example, Carleton Beals' review of her 1926 show in Mexico City, published in Mexican Folkways, Vol.2, No.1, Mexico City, April-May 1926. "Tina Modotti, has done marvels in sensibility on a plane, perhaps more abstract, more aerials, even more intellectual, as is natural for an Italian temperament." And Beals again in an essay published in Creative Arts, Vol.4, No.2, New York, 1929—(while asserting that Modotti took up photography in 1923 "largely as something to fill the gap left by the death of her husband" Beals goes on to compare Modotti's work to that of Edward Weston "His [Weston's] subtlety rebelled at the obvious ease of making striking images in Mexico. With Tina Modotti, herself of Latin origin, this problem did not present itself [...] her earlier work[s] all delineate an innate sensibility which is at bottom Italian [...in her portraits] her selection imparts to them a subtle relationship to the poorer classes of Italy."
Mexican dailies and the killing was characterized as a "crime of passion" in keeping with her reputation as a fiery Latin woman. The nude photographs made of her by Weston, along with a series of nude photographic studies of Mella that Modotti had made, were all produced in court in a transparent attempt to bring about a conviction by inciting moral indignation and outrage.

One of the functions of these reactionary representations of Modotti as femme fatale in the press at that time was to minimize the threat that she posed to hegemonic forces in Mexico. Even after her expulsion from Mexico these events, which had received international coverage, followed her around the globe as she attempted in one country after another to gain political asylum and refuge from Mussolini's agents who wanted her returned to Italy where she would certainly have been executed. She was met at each port by newspaper headlines declaring the arrival of "The mistress of Julio Antonio Mella" (Hooks 214-215) and when the press were given permission to interview her they subsequently wrote little about the dangerous political position she was in, nor did they speak out in favour of asylum for Modotti, instead they once again highlighted her beauty alongside titillating accounts of aspects of her personal life.

When we look at "Railway Worker's Daughter" and "Misery," these photographs marked by time and place and the participation of other selves, other bodies, do things. In traversing multiple registers of production—thought, action, image—desire, set in motion, moves to actualize itself. I propose that these photographs (image-thoughts that are also image-events) diagram Modotti "seeing" herself differently. And they also provoke others to "see" her differently. When Modotti produces the Colonia de la Bolsa photographs she not only pictures Mexican bodies in ways that intercept and therefore
interrupt particular dominant constructions of Mexican national identity, she also presents
herself differently. As these images work towards Modotti's "becoming-photographer"
they simultaneously displace existing ideas about who she is. The photographs mark
both identity and difference. If we place these photographs beside other pictures of
Modotti that were widely circulated at the time (Fig. 29, film-still; Fig. 30, Weston nude;
Fig. 31, newspaper photo with headlines; Fig. 32, Rivera mural detail) we can get an idea
of some of the possible displacements that "Railway Worker's Daughter" and "Misery"
may have animated. These differences in perception, in constituting an/other Modotti,
generate multiple Modottis, as it were. The move from the "one" to the many is
similar to that which was described earlier in the analysis of the construction of national
identity in relation to the opening of personal and public space: as soon as even one other
identity is admitted, the contingency (and fluidity) of all identity becomes evident. The
emphasis in "seeing photographically" is on the desiring production of self and other, of

\[122\] When I propose that seeing these images photographically generates "multiple" Modottis, I am once
again following closely lines of thinking introduced by Nietzsche and taken up by Deleuze and Guattari.
For each of these philosophers the notion of "multiplicity" posed a practical, and therefore a political
problem. The implications of this modality of thinking—one that displaces notions of a subject (Being)
with the concept of multiplicity (becoming)—is articulated by John Rajchman in The Deleuze Connections:
"To think of ourselves and one another as "multiple," or as "composed of multiplicities," is not to imagine
that we have many distinct identities or selves (personalities, brain modules, etc.). On the contrary, it is to
get away from understanding ourselves in terms of identity and identification or as distinct persons or
selves, however many or "dissociated." It means that we never wholly divide up into any "pure" species,
races, even genders—that our lives in fact can never be reduced to the "individualization" of any such pure
class or type. Before we are fit into distinct species or strata or classes, we thus compose a kind of
indefinite mass or "multitude," just as before "major" standards or models of identification or recognition,
we each have our "minorities," our "becomings." Multiplicity is not diversity, and making it requires [and
this is wholly derived from Nietzschesian thought] another conception of Life—it is rather as if, under the
"second nature" of our persons and identities, there lay a prior potential Life capable of bringing us together
without abolishing what makes us singular." [emphasis added]. This "Life" is for Nietzsche figured as the
"will-to-power" and "the eternal return" and for Deleuze and Guattari it is designated by the concept of
"desire" as in "desiring production."
other by self and of self by other. "Photographic seeing" is, ultimately, the seeing of interconnectness.123

"Seeing photographically" brings to visibility processes of relation, and in so doing, actively maps our world. "Thinking photographically," is the activity of thinking in, with and through the photographic image: thinking like images. Hence, it is for this reason that Lury links "seeing photographically" to the phenomena of "recovered memory" which is figured as a memory of images. For Lury the concept of "seeing photographically" moves our understanding of the way photographs function from the mimetic to the prosthetic, and therefore allows her to figure photographs as part of postmodern technologies of the self. As was suggested by Donna Haraway in the quote that began this section" all eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, building in translations and specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life." Photography can be, therefore, recognized as constitutive of, able to engender, as it were, subjective space. The concept of "seeing photographically" situates photographs differently in the order of things. This theorization of photography (which I will further develop in the following chapter) retrieves photographic images from the margins of Western thought: no longer relegated to the descriptive, illustrative, or indexical functions they have so often been fitted to occupy—no longer separate from and subordinate to language, as in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory—"seeing photographically" acknowledges the importance of the image as constitutive of our becomings, and of the invention of new ways of existing. As we have seen, contrary to

123 Lury highlights this when she refers to Barthes articulation of the punctum—as an operation that happens in the space between the subject of the photograph and the viewer—as an instance of Barthes' "seeing photographically."
photographs confirming the fixity of the world, what they offer us is a glimpse of its perpetual movement: immanence.
Chapter 4: Rhizome

The French psychiatrist Gaëtan Gatian de Clerambault (1872-1934), a teacher of Jacques Lacan, was chief doctor at the Paris Police Prefecture's Special Infirmary for the Insane. During his tenure at the Special Infirmary he was responsible for the incarceration of some 13,000 people. In psychiatry Clerambault is best known for his development of the theory of "mental automatism." Although Clerambault's views were extremely conservative in most respects, "he agreed with Freud and the Surrealists, that madness was close to truth, reason to unreason, and coherence to delirium" (Roudinesco 23-24). However, unlike Freud and the Surrealists, he rejected any changes in conventional treatment practices and kept a tight reign on those patients who were placed in his care. Clerambault's deployment of the concept of mental automatism to justify the severity of his treatment came under attack by the Surrealists and a public war was waged over which institution, psychiatry or art, would win the right to speak for the unconscious.

In 1915 and again in 1917 Clerambault was sent to Morocco to recover from injuries sustained in the war; while he was there he made more than 4,000 photographs of local inhabitants. A selection of these photographs was later exhibited in the Moroccan Pavilion of the 1922 Marseilles Colonial Exhibition and as a result of exhibiting these photographs Clerambault was invited to lecture on Arab drapery at the École des Beaux-Arts. His involvement in the arts complicated the battle that ensued between himself and the Surrealist André Breton, who had also trained as a psychiatrist.

124 My work on Gaëtan Gatian de Clerambault began in collaboration with Richard Ingram. Richard and I twice presented our initial research findings at conferences: at UBC's IISGP symposium in February 2000; and at "Image into Identity" an international conference held at Hull University, UK, in September 2000.
In the 1930s Clérambault's eyesight was failing and he underwent an operation for cataracts. When it became apparent that the operation was not a success he delivered an autobiographical account of the operation, *Souvenirs d'un médecin opéré de la cataract*, [*Memories of a Doctor Following a Cataract Operation*], to his publisher and then went home and shot himself while standing in front of a mirror.

Introduction

What's silk got to do with it?: Enigmas of the image

Clérambault's taste for folds of Islamic origin, and his extraordinary photographs of veiled women [...] amounts, despite what has been said, to much more than a simple personal perversion.

Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold* 38

Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault was at the heart of one of the great struggles in the history of Western thought: the advent of the unconscious and the disciplinary and institutional battles to lay claim to this invention. As such, his act of repetitively, compulsively, folding thousands of photographs of non-Western bodies into the spaces of his thinking about clinical psychiatric practice, provoked a disturbing uncertainty that at the time of his death proved to be intolerable for his contemporaries, and as the above quotation from Deleuze indicates, continues to worry scholars and critics that view his photographs today.

Clérambault was situated at the convergence of a number of forces. As an army officer in the French protectorate of Morocco, and later as the chief psychiatrist of the
Paris police prefecture's Special Infirmary for the Insane, he indelibly marked the place of state power and authority. It was from this position that he attempted to affix his signature to discourses that declared psychiatry's ownership of the emerging unconscious. However, as we shall see later in this chapter, André Breton and the Surrealists hotly contested this claim.\textsuperscript{125}

In this section I am proposing that Clérambault's photographs occasion what Régis Durand has described as "a moment of pure thought,"\textsuperscript{126} and that these images have a great deal to tell us about the ways in which photographs have changed how we think about ourselves.

The argument that follows suggests that the struggle between Clérambault and the Surrealists was carried out on a site where contestation over the supremacy of different kinds of knowledges had enormous consequences for the history of Western thought in general, and for the ways in which the psyche has been thought, in particular. If, as I argue, Clérambault's photographs were instants of "pure thought," it is also evident that in the connections they made across discourses, and in the diversity of ways in which they functioned, it is also the case that they were much more than this thoughtful activity of the virtual. It is this "much more" that gestures towards the multiplicity figured in the

\textsuperscript{125} In her article "Charcot and the Spectacle of the Hysterical Body: The 'pathos formula' as an aesthetic staging of psychiatric discourse—a blind spot in the reception of Warburg," Sigrid Schade traces the first stirrings of this fight for ownership of the unconscious to an earlier time: A competition for privileged access to the unconscious had arisen in \textit{fin de siècle} Paris between the medical avant garde, Charcot and Bernheim, and the literary and artistic avant garde, particularly Edmond de Goncourt, Daudet, Baudelaire, Gautier, Huysmans and Gallé [...] Whereas the writers and artists were engaged in a 'cultivation of the nerves', by maintaining that they could produce vibrations of the senses though psychodynamic forms (of poetry or of ornamentation), i.e., texts and works of art, the medical scientists staged demonstrations of this kind of influence in spectacular presentations of hypnosis (499-500).

\textsuperscript{126} As I noted in my introduction, while it is the case that I take issue with Durand's designation of "pure thought" (which necessarily implies an \textit{ideal}), I do agree that what is taking place in this event is significant in a way that is distinct within the wider understandings of the phenomenon described as "photographic seeing."
images. While it is the case, I will argue, that Clérambault used these photographs to think the Western mind, these pictures bring more into being than the reflective imag(ine)ings he suggests are inspired by his use of the photograph as Muse. For folded into the surfaces of these images are a multiplicity of bodies: the bodies of the nascent disciplines of psychiatry and ethnography; the bodies of Western art and Surrealism; and the bodies of the French nation as well as its Islamic other.

If, as Heidegger suggests in "Dialogue on Language," Europe is defined as "a logic—a mode of reasoning, a metaphysics," then Clérambault's photographs, and by implication, psychiatry as the policing of non-reason, can be understood as the folds in which we can see the weight of Western rationality nestled. For Clérambault, the conceptual domination asserted by the assumption of reason as the foundation of Western thought, is carried out through the bodies and culture of the Other, and is therefore susceptible to "contamination" fears (as was explored at length in relation to the Loti photographs presented in chapter two). Indeed, I suggest that these fears are among the factors contributing to the loss of authority and esteem to which Clérambault was posthumously subjected, and that Deleuze gestures toward in the epigraph of this chapter.

In a move that the reader will by now recognize as common to my project in its entirety, I will attempt to understand Clérambault's photographs as part of a machinic assemblage. In keeping with this presentation I want now to begin to trace out the elements of this assemblage. The subsections of the plateaus are presented as a number of folds in the surface of the investigation.
PLATEAU: Colonialism and geographies of experience: the registers of Clérambault's practice

Clérambault was 43 years old when he arrived for the first time in Morocco in 1915 for a stay of convalescence that would allow him to recover from wounds sustained in WW1. During this visit and a subsequent one that lasted from 1917-1919, when he was again sent to Morocco after being wounded, Clérambault made over 4,000 photographs of local residents (Fig. 33, 34). In 1922 forty large prints of the photographs of draped and veiled Moroccan bodies were shown in the Moroccan Pavilion of the Marseilles Colonial Exhibition. These photographs were so well received that Clérambault was honoured with a gold medal (Rubens 164). On September 28, 1921, Clérambault had delivered a lecture to the "Congress on the History of Art" at the Sorbonne that was billed as an "Introduction to the study of Arab draped costumes." Clérambault's biographer, Alain Rubens reveals that having been shown "forty small figurines draped to perfection—surprise came over the amphitheatre when the alienist [Clérambault] presented a live model exhibiting a haik and a toga" (Rubens 164).¹²⁷

Paul Léon, the Under-Secretary of State for the Fine Arts and Director of the French Institute saw Clérambault's Moroccan photographs at the Marseilles Exhibition and, after some negotiations, invited Clérambault to lecture on drapery at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. When he saw Clérambault 's work, the director must have felt that he had found a solution to a gap in the Ecole's curriculum, because the focus of the institution that year was on Morocco. Moreover the project for the prestigious Grand Prix competition was to design a residence for France's representative in Morocco.

¹²⁷ All translations of Ruben's text are credited to Richard Ingram.
Clérambault accepted the director's offer, lectured at the Ecole from 1923 to 1926, and achieved a high level of visibility for what became extremely popular lectures.

In spite of the celebrity that he achieved with these classes, Clérambault's lectures on drapery did have a precedent at the Ecole. Léon Heuzey, who was retrospectively referred to by Clérambault's first biographer Élizabeth Renard, as the "master of classical dress" lectured, as a full professor, on the history of costume and drapery at the Ecole from 1862 to 1884, and in a modified role, continued to do the "practical work" of the lectures until his retirement in 1910 (Doy, Drapery 36). In a letter to Léon, Clérambault claimed that Heuzey knew and was interested in his work (Doy, Drapery 119). And Paul Léon was Heuzey's successor at the French Institute, the body responsible for overseeing programs at the Ecole. In 1922, the year before Clérambault began this teaching, a book detailing Heuzey's lectures, lavishly illustrated with black and white photographs, was published (Histoire du Costume Antique d'après des études sur le modèle vivant). In a letter dated 4 September 1921 (Doy, Drapery 254, ftn.48), Clérambault assures Léon that, like Heuzey, "he would base his teaching on demonstrating the art and science of drapery on the live model" (Doy, Drapery 119), (Fig.35). Clérambault's use of live models and his habit of demonstrating specific patterns and traditions of draping, were both methods that had been previously employed by Heuzey. And, in a move that showed his ambition to distinguish himself both as an ethnographer and as an art historian, Clérambault published a paper that established that hems were used in ancient Greek clothing, a finding that directly contradicted and replaced Heuzey's earlier analysis (Renard 62-63). Certainly this is not the only confirmation we have that Clérambault was intent on making his name in the associated fields of ethnography and art history. Rubens reports

128 All translations of Renard's text are credited to Richard Ingram.
that, in keeping with the concerns of ethnography, Clément's lecture at the Sorbonne called for "a complete inventory of types of drapery," and "blasted archaeologists who wait for the death of things to talk about them and the Orientalists devoted to folklore and linguistics" (Rubens 164). The clearest statement of Clément's aspirations to become a force in the disciplines of art and art history comes in a letter that he wrote to Paul Léon dated October 25, 1922:

> The combination of lines, the surface movements, the inner passages of translucent fabric, the fluidities of cloth where parts are caught by the light, all these effects for which my photographic images will have fixed the prototype (without pretending to approach/render their intensity) have not yet been sensed/perceived by Orientalist Artists as Art Themes... the result of my teaching moreover, will be nothing less than to introduce, at last, Drapery into Orientalist Painting (Ruben 165-166).129

In a critique of Clément's work that I will explore later in this chapter, Joan Copjec maintains that Clément, in keeping with the nineteenth-century predilection to classify primarily in terms of function or use-value, was not interested in, nor occupied by "any discussion of the symbolic power of cloth [but] focussed instead on its construction, its articulation of structural and functional elements" (Copjec 77).

However, I would suggest that this analysis of what Clément is doing with cloth does not adequately take into account how he was working with photographs of cloth. The lectures and the photographs register two distinct activities: the one directed toward a specific public, the other representing a more complex undertaking. It is desirable to treat these two activities—the lectures at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts and the production of the

129 Translation by Richard Ingram.
Moroccan photographs—as separate, though complementary spheres. And, to these two related practices must also be added a third: Clérambault's extensive liaisons, in the role of psychiatrist, with the women that he incarcerated after diagnosing them as fetishists for their "erotic" use of cloth. Fabric is the element common to all three activities, but in order to give a context to this interest I want first to say something about the fascination with cloth of all types that was prevalent around the turn of the century.

PLATEAU: Seductions of a material kind

The conjunction, in the nineteenth-century, of the invention and mass production of new kinds of cloth with the introduction of the department store, resulted in the democratization of an experience of the sensuality of cloth and clothing that had previously only been available to society's elite. The large department stores' spectacular and evocative displays of the new materials worked to commodify and package sensuality, and make it available to the masses, even if many of them were only able to attain this experience by criminal means. This was certainly the case with the women fetishists that Clérambault had locked up after they were apprehended for masturbating with stolen pieces of fabric. Women who had had little or no access to the experiences afforded by the soft glow and rustled murmurations of jewel coloured silks, risked all when they found that these materials returned the caresses of their admirers.

This instance of the eroticisation of cloth was not as strange as it may first appear, but rather, was echoed by similar phenomenon in other cultural and social contexts. A look at the emergence of psychiatric case studies allows us to illustrate this point.

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130 Williams, Maxwell and Ross all characterize this experience as the "democratization of luxury," however, Clérambault's interrogations of the women he incarcerated and Zola's Ladies' Paradise, compel me to describe the moment in sensual as well as material terms.
Forensic medicine in France was just beginning to come into its own by the middle of the nineteenth century. Case studies were produced and published for the purposes of teaching, but also as a method of validation for the construction of the category of "expert witness." This strategy worked because by mid-century the courts increasingly commissioned case studies and psychiatry gradually ingratiated itself as integral to the effective workings of the judicial system. At this time much of the emphasis in the determination of guilt revolved around the designation of legal responsibility: whether or not a person could be held legally responsible for their actions (Murray, O'Brien). The issue of legal responsibility was the mechanism by which psychiatry was able to insert itself into judicial processes; the level of authority and legitimation achieved in this area carried over into all other aspects of its practice. The example of women and theft provides us with a picture of one such moment in the intersection of the courts, psychiatry and state policing of behaviour and values. Indeed, it was precisely at this moment—of rising department store theft, the development of forensic medicine, and the necessity for psychiatry to authorize itself by proving its usefulness in the assertion of social order—in which the psychiatric case study was born.

Clérambault diagnosed, certified and incarcerated working-class and poor women for their crimes involving their "erotic passion for cloth." In contrast, bourgeois women engaging in the same or similar sets of behaviours were classified as kleptomaniacs and were almost always acquitted by the courts. The etiology of the term kleptomania provides ample proof that the differences in the two diagnoses—on the one

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131 I am using this particular phrase because it is part of the title of Clérambault's published paper on the subject: "Passion érotique des étoffes chez la femme" (1908).
hand, women diagnosed as insane and incarcerated, and on the other, women diagnosed as suffering a form of kleptomania and sent home—was primarily class based (O'Brien).

The term kleptomania first appears as a diagnostic category in an 1840 article written by a forensic specialist named Dr. Marc, but the outlines of the condition had been drawn much earlier in a work published in France in 1816 by a Swiss doctor, André Matthey. Initially, the definition of kleptomania (used almost exclusively in relation to women) revolved in large part around issues of utility: "a distinctive, irresistible tendency to steal' that was not characterized by need." However, as it progressed it came to be defined by hereditary disposition and women's sexuality. By the 1880s the extent to which psychiatrists attempted to unearth hereditary susceptibility to mental instability was extreme: "The theft itself was nearly lost sight of in the psychiatrist's concern with pathology—those diseased events that preceded, resulted in, and survived the act of theft and were woven together to form the fabric of a pathological condition" (O'Brien 67).

Furthermore, alongside the focus on hereditary degeneration, a genteel version of Clérambault's women's "erotic passion for cloth" was consistently factored into the diagnoses of bourgeois women caught stealing: the actual event of stealing itself came to be wrapped in terms of aberrant sexuality and women's physiological states. However, women's erotic experiences with cloth were perfectly contiguous with the increasingly widespread recognition in the culture at large of the more general phenomena of a conscious eroticisation of commodities. The merchandising strategies of the large department stores came under attack on many fronts for causing—with their excessive, luscious and provocative displays of goods—what was thought to be an erosion of values

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132 Dr. Marc, 1840, quoted in O'Brien 70.
and morals in their susceptible customers of the weaker sex. Among the goods referred to, it was cloth of all kinds that figured most prominently in these discussions and those adjacent to them. For instance, as early as 1905 prominent psychiatrist Pierre Janet described the passion for silk, and the extreme behaviours, moods, and emotions it was capable of inciting. And, as is well known, in A Ladies' Paradise Emile Zola wrote eloquently about the strategic seduction of women by department store owners. In addition to the writings of artists and doctors, discourses generated around fabrics of all kinds were propagated throughout popular culture. Authors went to great lengths to describe, in overblown and erotic language, the characteristics of different types of cloth. Varieties of silks were particularly privileged, and an elaborate vocabulary was developed to evoke the differences in the "cry" of one kind of silk over another, and to describe the desirability of each variety in terms of its "stiffness." Most of the senses were included in this catalogue of desire: affects of sight, sound, touch and smell, were lovingly detailed. Seen in this light, Clérambault's women's intense involvement with the cloth itself, is in keeping with more general social and cultural obsessions provoked by the development, availability, and display of fabrics of all kinds.

PLATEAU: Psychiatric power

[T]he nineteenth-century psychiatric hospital [was] a place of diagnosis and classification...but also an enclosed space for a confrontation, the scene of a contest, an institutional field where it is a question of victory and submission. The great asylum physician...is both the one who can tell the truth of the disease through the knowledge he has of it and the one who can produce the disease in its truth and subdue it in its reality, through the power that his will exerts on the patient himself. All the techniques or procedures employed in the asylums of the nineteenth century...[were] designed to make the medical personage the "master of madness": the one who makes it appear in its truth (when it conceals itself, when it remains hidden and silent) and the one who dominates it, pacifies it, absorbs it after astutely unleashing it.

Michel Foucault Ethics 43.

In attempting to trace the line of flight that Clérambault took when he used these photographic images to think—and I am once again referring here to photographs as "moments of pure thought," that is, as immanence—we must expand our vision to include a wider frame. Clérambault's use of the Moroccan photographs can be more readily understood if we turn to the context within which he was working as a psychiatrist and as an instructor of fine arts. The forensic psychiatry that was practiced at the Special Infirmary, and the art historical, studio and ethnographic work that took place...
at the Ecole, all made extensive use of photography. Moreover, both people and practices moved easily between and among these emerging disciplinary territories. For instance the photographer, Paul Richer, a professor of anatomy at the Ecole who documented all Heuzey's lectures and whose photographs illustrate the two Heuzey texts, was a neurologist who worked closely with Jean-Martin Charcot as one of his colleagues at the Salpêtrière. Richer, a trained artist, was an accomplished draftsman, and in addition to producing photographs in collaboration with Charcot, he used photographs to provide sets of highly articulated drawings that extended and stylized the iconographical language of the photographs. Not surprisingly, then, the aesthetics of photographs made at the Ecole were closely aligned to those photographs produced by Charcot and his assistants at the Salpêtrière: the influences flowed back and forth between the two institutions. The influence from the Ecole on the Salpêtrière can be seen in ways in which patients were made to pose for the camera, and also in the subsequent manipulation of the photographic print; and, from the Salpêtrière to the Ecole, in Heuzy's writings wherein he stresses the "usefulness of the photograph in providing 'sincere' factual [i.e., scientific] information for the student and teacher interested in this field of study" (Doy, Drapery 38). In the text illustrating Heuzy's teachings, photographs of draping on the live model were accompanied with detailed drawings of the art of antiquity from which the studies were taken (Figs. 36, 37, 38, 39).

The patients sent to Clérambault were photographed upon their arrival at the Special Infirmary. But not surprisingly, the practice of photography in state penal and

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136 L. Heuzey, Histoire du Costume Antique, see fn.3, and a later text published posthumously by Heuzey's son, J. Heuzey, Histoire du Costume dans l'Antiquité classique. L'Orient.
137 See Didi-Huberman Invention de l'hysterie. Also Schade credits Didi-Huberman with showing the extent to which the Ecole des Beaux-Arts influenced the use of photography at the Salpêtrière (509).
criminal institutions was fraught with contradiction. Unlike the pristine installation conditions illustrated by the photograph of an installation at the Chicago World's Fair exhibit (Fig. 40)—that boasted about the introduction of photographic technology in policing practices, and emphasized the objective certainty that the photographic process supposedly introduced into practices of policing and the incarceration of criminal populations—the actual photographic event was often a tumultuous affair characterized by violent resistance on the part of those having their pictures "taken." As this second image shows (Fig. 41), the cool objectivity indexed by the World's Fair Exhibition installation becomes, in practice, anything but.

The artifice involved in the photographs made at the Special Infirmary is in part revealed by the request that Clémambault made of another doctor, in a letter dated 28 January 1914 (Doy, Drapery 105). Clémambault asked of his colleague that a particular "picturesque" woman patient, who had only recently been admitted and was about to be released, be retained for a few days longer than necessary in order for him to photograph her. And, contrary to the kind of "objectivism" that photographs such as these were said to embody, Clémambault stipulated that the photograph he wished to make of this patient demanded that "the woman should have her hair undone, without any pins, so that 'it is sticking up everywhere' ("bien hérissée de toutes parts")."\(^{138}\) This request, in keeping with the fact of Clémambault's absolute authority over those brought to his clinic, is consistent with other methods routinely used in his interrogation of "patients" on their arrival. Clémambault's "welcome" of future inmates is important here for the ways that it foregrounds technologies of seeing. As might be expected from one working for the penal arm of the state, Clémambault focussed entirely on diagnostic procedures that allowed for

\(^{138}\) Quoted in Doy, Drapery 105.
classification of the disease and incarceration of the patient. He was entirely uninterested in pursuing any kind of therapeutic treatment. His exacting, and for the "patient" exhausting interrogations, were predicated on the notion of bringing to light that which was in some way hidden.

The roughness of Clérambault's procedures when admitting and diagnosing patients has been remarked on by a number of writers. Elisabeth Roudinesco in her *Lacan and Co.* has this to say about Clérambault's emphasis on seeing when ferreting out confessions:

He was a superb emblem of the repressive function of a state apparatus and his position as chief physician of the special Infirmary reflected his doctrinal stance. Without any private practice, he spent his life perfecting his eagle-eye gaze; he manipulated and observed his patients without ever listening to them, did not judge, but noted and obtained admissions in the manner of a confessor of genius. He composed his certificates of internment in telegraphic style, resorting profusely to visual notations, capital letters, theatrical strokes seeming to emerge from the stock of ancient tragedy [sic] (106).

However, Roudinesco goes on to say that Clérambault cannot be contained in a designation that places him entirely in the service of the state. In another of the productive paradoxes that characterize my study, she tells us that the "young interns of the 1930s [saw him as a] psychiatrist of genius" (107). Roudinesco goes on to suggest that it was as though Clérambault's "blindness to dynamics and psychogenesis allowed him [in his sexualization of erotomania that had up to then been described as platonic] to
take into account the vestiges of an object whose value had escaped the prevailing mode of knowledge" (107). So for the same reasons that the Surrealists singled out Clérambault as particularly worthy of attack (as we shall see later), many within his profession hailed him as a genius.

Charcot's legacy and the aestheticisation of the medical gaze

For a long time, medicine, psychiatry, penal justice, and criminology remained—and in large part still remain—within the limits of a manifestation of truth inside the norms of knowledge and a production of truth in the form of the test, the second of these always tending to hide beneath and getting its justification from the first. The current crisis in these "disciplines" does not simply call into question their limits or uncertainties in the sphere of knowledge; it calls knowledge into question, the form of knowledge, the "subject-object" norm; it questions the relations between our society's economic and political structures and knowledge (not in its true and untrue contents but in its "power-knowledge" functions). A historico-political crisis, then.

Consider, first, the example of medicine, with the space connected to it, namely, the hospital. The hospital was still an ambiguous place quite late, a place of investigation for a hidden truth and of testing for a truth to be produced (Foucault, Ethics 39).

In his study of the crisis brought about in nineteenth-century psychiatry, Foucault found that the tension between the perception of the psychiatrist as the agent who uncovers the
knowledge or "Truth" of a mental disease, and the suspicion of that same agent as the one who produces the disease in question, culminated in Charcot's work with hysterics. After Charcot there was a concerted (and one would have to say ultimately futile) effort to assure that the "physician's sovereign science does not get caught in the mechanisms that it may have unintentionally produced" (Foucault, Ethics 46).

As we shall see when we consider Clérambault's fraught relationship to the Surrealists, the situation that Foucault describes above sets the scene for certain constraints being placed on the legitimacy of Clérambault's clinical practice. Most certainly, in terms of psychiatry's history, the request Clérambault made of his colleague to retain a patient for no other reason than to provide a photo opportunity was made in conscious awareness of his predecessor Charcot's earlier photographs of women diagnosed as hysterics. Clérambault would have been familiar with Charcot's Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière series. This seductive collection of case studies accompanied by graphs, amply illustrated with photographs and "verbatim transcriptions of patients' utterances during hysterical attacks" (which are included without comment, immersed in a flurry of empirical information of "temperatures taken, drugs administered, attacks arrested") (de Marneffe 71) shifted the focus of psychiatry's gaze from the static presentation of clinical subjects found in previous photographic representations (Gilman, Seeing the Insane and Face of Madness; Stafford), to imagings more in line with theatrical spectacle. And this shift is further complicated by the fact that Charcot himself was heavily invested in the aesthetic value of photography for the psychiatrist. Charcot's conviction that photography's artistic merit was inextricably tied
to its scientific value for psychiatry is evident in comments he made when looking at a series of photographs documenting hysterical attacks in males:

> All this part of the seizure [attack] is very fine, if I may so express myself, and every one of these details deserves to be fixed by the process of instantaneous photography.... You see that from the point of view of art they leave nothing to be desired, and moreover they are very instructive (de Marneffe, 82).

Charcot set a new standard for the uses of photography in psychiatric diagnosis when, in the last decades of the nineteenth-century, he had a fully equipped photographic studio built at the Salpêtrière for the purposes of documenting his studies, and those of his assistants and collaborators, of pathologically disordered and disorderly subjects. In so doing he was carrying on the recently instituted tradition of applying photographic methods to medical diagnoses. The first physician to investigate the uses of photography in relation to the medical diagnosis of "madness" was Hugh W. Diamond. Diamond published a collection of photographs in 1856 and his confidence in the prosthetic use of photography to extend the penetrating vision of the psychiatrist seemed to be absolute. In another allusion to photography's ability to draw back the veil on heretofore hidden and illegible signs, Diamond declared: "the Photographer secures with unerring accuracy the external phenomena of each passion, as the really certain indication of internal derangement" (quoted in de Marneffe, 78).

It is clear that this belief of Diamond's had currency at the Salpêtrière during Charcot's reign. In another reference to photography's prosthetic abilities, Albert Londe,

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139 See also Schade for a critical summary of the complex interweavings of art and medicine in Charcot's life.
the hospital's Director of Photography, wrote: "the photographic plate is the true retina of the scientist" (de Marneffe, 79). And Charcot, when questioned about the possibility that it was his interference with patients diagnosed as hysterics, that is, his suggestions to them, that produced their symptoms, ingenuously exclaimed "But in truth I am nothing but a photographer; I register what I see" (de Marneffe, 79). However, as I have implied when linking Clérambault's clinical photographic practices to Charcot's, this "registration" of the real was not without enhancement. Of the large numbers of photographs that are part of the series *Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière*, many have undergone extensive touch-ups to enhance particular qualities. De Marneffe says about this photograph (Fig. 42):

A striking feature of the series taken as a whole is the liberal use of white paint or gouache on the surfaces of the drapery, and in some cases on [the patient] Augustine's hair [...]. The application of paint to the drapery creates a sculptural effect, [...] These images [...] are made weighty and solid, and Augustine, surrounded by her heavy drapery, is imbued with static permanence. The addition of paint creates a contrast in dimensions and surfaces that renders Augustine's skin comparatively soft and luminous. Her vitality becomes tender and seductive in juxtaposition with the painted fabric.

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140 See also Jean-Martin Charcot, *Charcot the Clinician: The Tuesday Lessons*, translated with commentary by Christoper G. Goetz, M.D., (Raven Press: New York) 1987, pp.107-8. Goetz translates the same line as follows: "But in fact all I am is a photographer. I describe what I see" (107).
141 As we will see, Augustine reappears in her invisibility when her case is taken up by the Surrealists to further their claim to the ways in which notions of the unconscious figures the human mind.
142 Certainly the Surrealists responded to this aspect of the photographs. See Roudinesco 6.
Using the physician's written report about the details of the hysterical attack to question the assertion of the calm progression that is documented by the photographs, de Marneffe concludes:

Such a superabundance of hysterical symptoms [as described in the written text] suggests a more frenzied and chaotic expression than is depicted by the orderly sequence of photographs. In light of the variability in manifestations of symptoms, and the recorded difficulty with which an attack could be accurately observed, the arranged presentation of the stages of attacks in the photographs appears as a contrivance intended to support the medical veracity of their fixed sequence (80).

De Marneffe refers to the fact of the photograph's contrivance, coupled with the captions that were attached to each image, as working to render the "perfect attack" (79) \(^\text{143}\) (Fig. 43, 44). These photographs echo the Chicago exhibition installation highlighting the police uses of photography that we looked at earlier. Both types of images sanitize what is, in actuality, a much messier, less determinate experience.

In addition to the ways in which the photographs were touched up to emphasize particular qualities, Sigrid Schade in her 1995 article "Charcot and the spectacle of the hysterical body" points to the poses displayed in the images. She links the poses recorded in Charcot's women hysteric's to the iconography of the "pathos formula" in Western art history. She goes on to note that this history was also consciously acknowledged and put to use by the stage actors and actresses of the day, including such

\(^\text{143}\) Charcot's use of the photographic series as "proof" of a particular nosography brings to mind a similar methodology currently employed by psychiatry in the production and implementation of the DSM, the psychiatrists' "bible" (Richard Ingram presentation of a critical overview of the DSM at the May 2002 conference "Narratives of Disease, Disability and Trauma," held at UBC, has been particularly useful here).
well-known figures as Sarah Bernhardt (510). Thus it is that Charcot's Salpêtrière photographs have a look that is closer to theatre than to the traditions of painting.

Sighting pathology

A direct action upon illness: not just [to] enable it to reveal its truth to the physician's gaze but to produce that truth.

Michel Foucault, Ethics 40.

I suggest that traces of Charcot's methodology can be found in the exercise of power that marked the reach of Clérambault's authority. Charcot's insistence on prolonged visual interrogation—"Look, look again, always look: it is only by this means that one come 'to see'"—lends itself quite readily to the intensity of the gaze that Clérambault trained on his patients. Moreover, it does not take a great deal of imagination or an excess of conjecture to tie the interviews carried out in the Special Infirmary to the technologies of seeing employed in the production of the Moroccan photographs. In fact, Clérambault's method with the photographs in Morocco and his close attention to the folding actions of cloth is highly reminiscent of Freud's description, published in 1893, of Charcot's diagnostic methods: after first categorizing the clinical presentation of symptoms into a particular "archetype" and then using this classification as "a point of departure, the eye could travel over the long series of ill-defined cases—the 'form frustes'—which, branching off from one or other characteristic feature of the type, melt away into indistinctness" (de Marneffe 74).

As previously mentioned, Foucault in his lecture "Policing Psychiatry" shows that the nineteenth-century crisis in psychiatry appears immediately following Charcot's work with hysterics. However, he says that the crisis took the form not of "neutralizing the physician's power [but rather] of displacing it on behalf of a more exact knowledge". I suggest that Clérambault's Moroccan photographs, and the application of the knowledges that Clérambault indicates they provided, are implicated in this search for "a more exact knowledge" with which to shore up psychiatry's crumbling legitimacy. Clérambault's exacting interrogations in the clinic of the Special Infirmary and the intensities involved in his photographic practice are concomitant with the great nineteenth-century project of bringing to light what is hidden from view, unavailable, tucked away from the probing gaze of the physician.

What is interesting in the development of psychiatric knowledge during this period is that as the patient's pathology is uncovered, brought to light, minutely revealed in all its aspects, the psychiatrist effectively recedes into silence and utter invisibility. His is a power that is orchestrated as an absolute, because it is cultivated as "objective," and objective in this situation is synonymous with "true." After it became apparent that the relationship between Charcot and his patients produced the very symptoms Charcot sought to uncover as the "Truth" of the disease, psychiatry was, once again, obligated to prove itself as a science. Foucault says of this moment that it is "a rough equivalent of the discovery made by Pasteur that the physician transmitted the diseases he was supposed to combat" (Foucault, Ethics 45). And, I submit, we could extend this equivalence to include the ethnographical aspect of Clérambault's photographs. As with

the truth claims of psychiatry in relation to late nineteenth-century medicine, they mark, for the French state, the place of contagion.

I am not alone in the contention that Clérambault's interdisciplinary practices harkened back to the teachings and methods of Charcot. Elisabeth Roudinesco says as much:

At a time when French clinical practice was completing its dismemberment of Charcot's teaching, Clérambault rechanneled the archaic passions of hysteria into the psychotic register [...] Before Lacan, before Breton, before Bataille, Gaëtan the bachelor, Gaëtan the paranoid, Gaëtan the cop, Gaëtan the misogynist remade contact with the world of [the] Salpêtrière and transposed into the colonial universe of the first third of the century a vision of woman that his contemporaries had abandoned. Whether it took the name of "delusional love" or a "love of draping" it was no less sexualized through and through (108-9).

For Roudinesco, therefore, the similarities between Charcot and Clérambault revolve around Clérambault's attack on the feminine and his displacement of the psychiatric gaze from Charcot's poor and working-class European women to the veiled bodies of Moroccans. However, I see this somewhat differently. In my view, it is Clérambault's continuation of the aestheticisation of the medical gaze—and the conviction that photographs were productive for psychiatric thought—that constitutes the site of his alliances with the Charcodian school. However, the photographs coming out of the Salpêtrière have a different "look" than Clérambault's Moroccan images because, among

146 There are, of course, other coherences between these two sets of photographs. For instance, it is hard to deny that the operation of the fetish is at work in both Clérambault's and Charcot's photographs.
other things, Clérambault chose a different medium on which to model the technologies of this gaze than did Charcot: as has already been noted, for Charcot this process was based more in theatre and spectacle, than on the conventions of modernist painting that were Clérambault's inspiration.

Clérambault, instructor

Clérambault's lectures represent a very public forum. Both in the preparation of the lecture materials and in their delivery, Clérambault addressed himself to a public. Indeed, Clérambault's ambitions in this area can be seen in the personal invitations to attend these lectures that he extended to important academic figures and highly placed state officials (Doy, Drapery 116). As I have already argued, in writing and publishing an article that debunked his predecessor's teachings, he was also concerned to establish his place in the annuls of art history. And, as Joan Copjec points out, he was working within a context that both recognized and valued his preoccupation with the classification and ordering of cultures by clothing style. Indeed, Clérambault succeeded in making a name for himself in this area, as is evident in an obituary written for the newspaper Le Figaro:

Clérambault was the first to consider the flowing folds of clothes as the signature of a race, a tribe. He conducted his research on Assyrian tunics, Greek Chlamys, Roman togas, Arab cloth. He studied their curve and their sense; he made them speak" (Copjec 72).

His photography practice, however, represents a very different type of activity. Moreover, while there are certain shared knowledges produced that are common to both the lectures and the photographic activity, I suggest that Clérambault had already singled

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out the Moroccan photographs for a unique kind of looking before he ever passed through the doors of the lecture hall at the Ecole. This is a point that I believed has been overlooked by Copjec in her otherwise useful and insightful discussion of the Clérambault photographs. Clérambault's intense study of drapery in relation to clothing types happened, for the most part, after the Moroccan photographs were made. While it is the case that during a visit to Tunisia in 1910, and later during his time in Morocco, Clérambault "began a study of Arab dress" and that "these photographs are obviously a part of that study" (Copjec 69), it is also important to recognize that Clérambault began working at the Prefecture in 1905 and was publishing articles as early as 1908 that took as their object women's erotic passion for cloth. It is at this time, I propose, that the genesis of his interest in cloth is more properly placed. The detailed descriptions that Clérambault extracted from women held under duress as psychiatric patients, concerning the pleasures afforded them by pieces of stolen cloth, were significant, I think, in the photographs he subsequently made in Morocco. The work with which Clérambault was engaged when he was making his photographs can productively be thought of as a fold in his subsequent work as a psychiatrist at the Prefecture, and as a lecturer at the Ecole.

Clérambault, instructed: Clérambault's "patients," female fetishism and the inexorable extension of psychiatry's reach

took place with Aimée rather than with his analyst Rudolph Loewenstein, or any of psychiatry's luminaries of the day (Roudinesco 120). Moreover, she affords Aimée a place of central importance in the subsequent development of Jacques Lacan's theories about the structure of the psyche. I would suggest that credit must similarly be given to the women that Clérambault had incarcerated when they were sent to him at the Special Infirmary. Like Aimée's gift to Lacan, it can be said that these women gave Clérambault their words, their stories, their familiar knowledges of cloth...and their obsessions. For these were the women who inhabited the margins of Zola's *The Ladies Paradise*: not "ladies," to be sure, but prone, nevertheless to the same intense provocations to "un/reason/able" desires that bourgeois women, in spite of (or perhaps, because of) all their privilege, were likewise unable to resist. In short, I am suggesting that the women brought to Clérambault provided him with revelations born of the forced intimacies occasioned by his rigorous interrogations at the Special Infirmary: information that he then used in his investigations into the nature of the psyche and its pathologies.

Site(ing) the Moroccan photographs

In his search for a 'psychology of human expression', [art historian Aby] Warburg came to recognize the stereotyping of memory images in gesture language in the history of art as the linguistic matter of a body language (emphasis added, Schade 105).

I have argued that Clérambault's Moroccan photographs functioned in two complementary ways, the one folded into the other: 1) that he used them to think his
clinical practice, and moreover, that they are the very spaces of his thinking about his clinical practice; 2) that they represent a manifestation of his aspirations towards art and ethnography. I want now to develop these ideas to show that Clérambault was working with the visual to get to language.

If Huezey was Clérambault's predecessor in the world of art, Charcot was, as I have suggested, his predecessor in the world of medicine. For Charcot and Clérambault feminine (and feminized) bodies were thought to be the locus of particular forms of Truth. This truth, written in a language that was as yet unintelligible, held the key to the veiled workings of the pathological mind. Clérambault, like Charcot before him, became the translator of this foreign language. In both cases, Charcot's clinic photographs and Clérambault's Moroccan photographs, women's bodies were quite literally turned into images—the images themselves a language (as suggested in the above quotation by art historian Aby Warburg)—in startling displays of the dominance of the visual over the spoken word. We should not be surprised by this correlation between the two sets of images because Charcot proclaimed himself as "visuel, a man who sees" (Freud quoted in de Marneffe 92), and Clérambault was no less committed to the visual, to acts of looking rather than listening, in his clinical practices and diagnostic procedures. The relevance to psychiatric clinical practice, of the iconographies generated at the Salpêtrière is that, in this formulation of pathography, the bodies spoke for the subjects and rendered the words that those subjects uttered to be of no account.

It is Sigrid Schade's view that the excessive documentation engaged in by Charcot—he used drawings, plaster casts, wax models and photography to document all aspects of his work—was undertaken in lieu of his ability to "translate" effectively the
symptoms of hysteria. In other words, Charcot produced a plethora of visual records over which he had control—to order, systematize, interpret and name—because of his failure to bring to reason, bring to order, bring to language, that is, to establish an organic, and therefore legitimate, cause for the condition of hysteria. In my view, the difficulties that Clérambault ran into with his Moroccan photographs are tied to the ultimate failure of Charcot's enterprise.

How does this work? The photographic image was being made to "speak" for the bodies it presented both before and after Clérambault made his Moroccan photographs. In addition to the uses of photography in psychiatry and neuropathology, Muybridge's famous motion studies; the composites produced by phrenology for medical and criminal sciences (by Paul Richer as well as many others); and the extensive use of the ethnographic photograph to establish "types" were all complicit in this larger project. In Clérambault's study of cloth, his move to abstraction, to shed light on the workings of the mind, was a step away from the indexical nature of the uses of photography in all of the above practices. It is, in my understanding, this aspect of his use of photography—which is, after all, what I have designated as photographic seeing and thinking—that alienated him from his peers. I am suggesting that the "slippage" in his photographs has to do with geography: the iconography of Clérambault's images was too far removed from the common ground of his time and the prevailing assumptions and beliefs regarding photography's relation to the real. I am, in this formulation, suggesting that Clérambault himself was "speaking" an unintelligible language when he worked in the way that he did with photographic studies of the surfaces of fabric.
Re-sighting the Moroccan photographs

[A]n artist is better able to create a work that is 'more vibrant and emotionally infectious' than someone who merely has a camera or a cold scalpel available to him as an instrument.

1900 lecture by the artist Gallé, quoted in Schade 500.

I have argued that Clérambault's Moroccan photographs can best be read in terms of his dual aspirations as both scientist (psychiatrist/ethnologist) and artist (photographer/lecturer at the Ecole). And I have noted that Charcot's Salpêtrière photographs were more indebted to theatre than to the conventions of traditional painting. My aim here is to show that Clérambault's photographs were, by contrast modelled on the plastic arts. This is no accident, but a response to the particular circumstances in which both men where using photographs to make science. The citation above taken from a turn of the century lecture by a prominent artist gives us a clue to these differing circumstances.

Charcot died in 1893 and by 1900 his theories, along with their photographic proofs, had fallen into disrepute. The Gallé quotation is indicative of the ongoing wars between the institutions of medicine and art over which discipline was better equipped to plumb the depths of the human psyche. And as we know from earlier chapters in this study, Gallé's disparaging comment about the camera is testimony to the internal battles being waged within the discipline of art over photography's status. At the time of Clérambault's Moroccan photographs, the uses of photography to mimic or simulate

\[148\] Charcot had a complex relationship with classical painting; using it to legitimate his naming of hysteria. Once again we arrive at the site of naming and find contested ground. This aspect of Charcot's work with images and language cannot be engaged within the confines of this chapter, but will be the subject of a future paper.
painting were beginning to be overtaken by those—and the Surrealists were prominent in this movement\textsuperscript{149}—who recognized that the medium had more innovative creative potential than this orientation allowed. As I have already suggested, Clérambault was conservative in his habits and tastes. It is not surprising that he would, in his efforts to make "authentic" contributions to both the sciences and the arts, consciously strive to replicate those qualities of the image that had already been legitimated in official art history. Nowhere was this authority and expertise in the art of portrait painting more evident in the first decades of the twentieth century than in the work of the renowned painter John Singer Sargent (1856 – 1925).

Sargent, sixteen years Clérambault's senior, lived, worked and exhibited in Paris during much of Clérambault's adolescence. Clérambault came from an aristocratic and cultured family and was intensely interested in the arts. Consequently, he would almost certainly have been exposed to Sargent's celebrated life-sized paintings. At a time when Sargent was being internationally toasted as a portrait painter, the inordinate amount of press he received in France—in the daily newspapers as well as in magazines and art journals—would have, in itself, made it impossible for Clérambault to be unaware of the artist's work. Sargent, dubbed by his friend Auguste Rodin "the Van Dyck of our times" (Ormond 3), exhibited his paintings during Clérambault's formative years in the high profile and prestigious annual Salons, events that yearly drew hundreds of thousands of people to their galleries. In addition to the Salon there were numerous small exhibition societies that maintained "salonnets,\textsuperscript{150}" that were an integral part of the Paris art world. Indeed, these venues—where Sargent's paintings were regularly exhibited—were thought

\textsuperscript{149} For a thorough treatment of this aspect of photography see Krauss, "Corpus Delicti" and also Maxwell's mention of the same, 13.

\textsuperscript{150} Simpson 34, 35 and 160 ftn. 11,12,13.
to be essential to "l'intellectual alité de notre Parisianisme [the enlightened Parisian intellectual]" (Simpson 35).\textsuperscript{151}

It is a well-known critical strategy for artists to position themselves by referencing in their own work that of successful artists of an earlier period. This link, stylistic or otherwise, establishes the pedigree of the aspiring artist's work, placing it on a continuum and lending it authority and legitimacy. In the quality of light, the composition, the monochromatic palette, and the close attention to drapery, Clémambault's photographs are highly reminiscent of the characteristic signature of Sargent's portraits. To illustrate this resonance I will refer to five of Sargent paintings: one genre painting—\textit{Fumée d'ambre gris} (Fig. 45)—exhibited at the 1880 Paris Salon; two life-size portraits—\textit{Madame X} (Virginie Avegno Gautreau) and \textit{Mrs. Albert Vickers} (Fig. 46)—shown respectively at the 1884 and 1885 Paris salons; and two details—\textit{El Jaleo} (Fig. 47) and \textit{Mrs. Henry White}—shown respectively at the 1882 and 1885 Paris salons.

\textit{Fumée d'ambre gris} is primarily of interest to us here in terms of the choice of "exotic" subject matter, an obvious precedent for Clémambault's predilections in the Moroccan photographs. In addition, the combined effect of Sargent's carefully controlled palette of creams, whites and grays, offset with small local areas of rich colour, is to make the woman's drapery a dramatic centrepiece for the composition. Familiar too, in the rendering of the cloth, is the rich tactile sense of its stiffness, a quality that Clémambault was so taken with in his images.

The \textit{Madame X} and \textit{Mrs. Albert Vickers} portraits extend this sense of familiarity in relation to Clémambault's photographs. Once again we have, in both paintings, a largely monochromatic palette that directs the viewer's attention to the subtleties of the

\textsuperscript{151} Translation by Richard Ingram.
textures that play across the painting's surface. In *Madame X*, the pale softness of the woman's skin, the hard rich lustre of the wood table, the deep shimmering black of the satin gown, and the fact that the woman's gaze is directed away from the viewer, work to create a strong sense of sensuality and voyeurism.\textsuperscript{152} And again, we see in this painting the precise rendering of the particular tactile qualities of the satin silk fabric: its firm texture, its weight, its sculpted fall into folds and pleats that catch the light are all well articulated.

*Mrs. Albert Vickers* demonstrates this point further. The woman's grey silk dress, trimmed with black and detailed with a sheer silk neckline and sleeves, is set against a warm brown background; the creamy, thick texture of the magnolia she holds in her hands is complemented by her own pale glowing skin. The luminous colour of the dress is modulated across its surfaces and once again the stiffness of the grey silk is highlighted: it is almost possible to "hear" the rustle and cry of the dress as the woman shifts slightly under the painter's prolonged gaze. In mood and tone Sargent's concerns in this painting have much in common with the Moroccan photographs, such as the one shown in Figure 48, in spite of the obvious differences in the representation of cultural modes and mores.

The soft glowing light that we see in all these paintings is brought to a high key in this detail of *El Jaleo*. The extreme contrast between lights and darks in the woman's silk skirt give the illusion that the light emanates from the subject. Likewise in the dress shown in the *Mrs. Henry White* painting: the rendering of the minute details of the woman's dress is of almost no account in comparison to the sense of illumination from

\textsuperscript{152} Indeed, this painting caused a scandal when it was exhibited, and this fact is commonly held to be the reason that Sargent left France to live in London.
within that the painting evokes. The quality of light in these paintings is remarkably close in mood to what we find in many of Clérambault's photographs (Fig. 49). The subdued palette afforded by the photographic medium, the desire to focus on drapery, and the particular choices over the importance and uses of the qualities of light are all aspects of Clérambault's photographs that I believe lend themselves to a reading that intimates his familiarity with Sargent's portraits. Given Clérambault's emphasis (referred to earlier in the chapter) on the fact that the "Orientalists" had not, as yet, discovered "drapery," and given Clérambault's habitual use of the metaphors of painting in his psychiatric practice, it is reasonable to think that he would have turned to an earlier moment in the history of painting to secure a model for his photographic work: a project that was, I have maintained, and I will develop this point further, meant to transform both the practices of psychiatry and the practices of "Orientalist" art.

I stated earlier that what Clérambault was doing with cloth does not adequately take into account what he was doing with photographs of cloth. This is an important difference because Clérambault's photographs inscribe and acknowledge a radical site of resistance to European domination: the veil. Moreover, in photographing veiled figures that represent Europe's Other using the traditions of European portraiture—as shown in their familiar proximity to the Sargent paintings for example—Clérambault interferes with the European/Other distinction. That is, his photographs no longer leave "Europeaness" unthought, but visually and conceptually challenge this position. At the moment of folding Europe into its Islamic other, that which is unthought, that which is assumed, Europeaness itself, is called into question.

153 In the introduction I gave an example of the way this strategy was used by the Hawai'ian royal family at the end of the nineteenth century precisely in order to disrupt the codes of European portraiture just enough to allow insertion of their own bodies into the legitimacy that the tradition conferred.
The other who arrives at the constitution of the self, is, Derrida shows us, always already there. There is no constitution of the inside, the self, without an outside, an/other, who is always already there. The self requires the other to have arrived at/on the site of its constitution, yet the condition of this arrival is departure. That is, the other who comes to constitute the site of the self, must also simultaneously, be made to leave. The coming must also be a going, anything less (as we have seen in the Loti photographs) amounts to contamination. Following this line of thought I would like to propose that the formal traces of European portraiture, within which the Moroccan bodies in Clémambault's photographs are wrapped, map the site of a scandalous intermingling. The other who was always already there has failed to leave. The other, far from constituting the subject's outside, its boundary marker, has instead pulled this subject into its otherness. As such, these photographic events opened over a chasm of instability that threatened dissolution of the self of the European subject. Clémambault's photographs do not stay within the bounds of the ethnographic study, instead, they foreground its voyeuristic quality. Nor are the bodies figured in these images "proper" subjects for the kind of aesthetic representation Clémambault affords them.

Spectacular Bodies

While it is relatively easy to substantiate the claim that the pictorial traditions of European portrait painting inform Clémambault's Moroccan photographs, there are, I think, less obvious influences drawn from representations of the body in popular culture that impact on the analysis of these images and their reception. I want to look at two of

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154 I refer here to the phenomenon of "going native," a motif in nineteenth-century writing that has been discussed at length elsewhere.
these here: the first, displays of non-European bodies in the Great Expositions; and second, the no less spectacular displays of synthesized bodies in the form of elaborate mannequins employed in the expositions and used extensively in the great department stores.

The significance of Clérambault's mingling of the categories European/Other in his photographs can be discerned when we consider the function of representations of non-European bodies in the Great Expositions that took place in metropolitan centres around the globe from the middle of the nineteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth. "Human exhibits" were introduced at the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1867, and thereafter were included in all of the expositions that followed.\textsuperscript{155} Anne Maxwell shows that France set the pattern for these ethnographic or anthropological (as they came to be known) displays throughout the world. Although the messages relayed by these displays were determined according to the priorities of the country hosting the event, they were all nonetheless, "harnessed to scientific discourse" (Maxwell 6) and made to serve a distinctly imperialist agenda. Besides being turned into spectacle, colonial peoples imported for the expositions were extensively photographed, measured, tested—and found wanting—in accordance with the emphasis on racial theories of European evolutionary superiority that were promoted to gain public acceptance for imperial expansionist policies. Among the earliest photographic representations of non-European peoples were those, made and catalogued by anthropologists, of the people put on display at the Great Expositions.

\textsuperscript{155} The exhibits, like the expositions themselves, changed over time according to economic and political forces. See Maxwell, \textit{Colonial Photography and Exhibitions}, chapter one "The native village in Paris and London: European exhibitions and theories of race, 15-37. See also Brown, passim.
Anthropological displays drew on the practice of "tableaux vivants," a popular form of entertainment in eighteenth-century aristocratic circles. In tableaux vivants, (or living paintings or pictures), "famous scenes from history or literature were staged for home amusement, with the living characters on stage remained motionless—that is resisting the temptation to move" (Goethe, quoted in Žižek 87). Clérambault studied art before he entered medical school and painting metaphors remained prominent in his thinking about psychiatry throughout his career. Indeed his famous legacy to medical students regarding diagnostic procedures in clinical practice is his exhortation:

15 lines, no more, and a whole individual is described to us, a whole pathology on parade... Young people, learn this clinical gaze and this art of the small frozen painting (Papetti et al 7).

The "small frozen painting," the mainstay of the great expositions, was the prototype for the procedure by which colonial peoples were required to offer up their bodies for display and classification. It is evident that this metaphor was appropriate to the goals of Clérambault's clinical practice: providing the means for quick and "accurate" diagnoses of large numbers of people. However, tension is created is we attempt to view Clérambault's photographs through the same lens. The knowledges generated in the Moroccan photographs step outside the civilized-European/savage-Other distinction that the tableaux vivants of the anthropological displays were committed to maintaining. The Moroccan bodies in Clérambault's photographs are not offered up for display. On the contrary, these bodies are invested with the power of the gaze: they are able to see without being seen seeing. We begin to get a sense of the difficulty that this situation
presents when we return to Anne Maxwell's findings regarding colonial photography.

Maxwell states that:

Most of the photographs of colonized peoples produced in the late colonial period, however, empowered Europeans by upholding the binary opposition of civility versus savagery. Those that did not conform to this pattern tended to be unpopular with both the general public and colonial governments and were therefore not produced in large quantities (14).

Once again, it is evident that Clérambault's photographs transgress a number of the borders erected to keep in place European/Other hierarchical distinctions.

Seductive simulation

The exchange between the universal expositions and the "grands magasins" or large department stores has been explored in depth by Rosalind Williams in *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France*. The practical application of this exchange is underlined in the following quotation taken from publicity materials advertising exhibition space for the 1900 Paris exposition:

Expositions secure for the manufacturer, for the businessman, the most striking publicity. In one day they bring before his machine, his display, his shop windows, more people than he would see in a lifetime in his factory or store. They seek out clients in all parts of the world, bring them at a set time, so that everything is ready to receive and seduce them. That is why the number of exhibitors increases steadily (59).
However, there was also an important shared aesthetic at work in this relationship. Williams shows how both institutions were engaged in what she refers to as an "aesthetic of exoticism" (70) that was integral to the mass consumer revolution that was assured by the early decades of the twentieth century. One of the ways that she elaborates this aesthetic is as follows: "the décor of the department store repeats the stylistic themes characteristic of the [Grand Exposition]: syncretism, anachronism, illogicality, flamboyance, childishness. In both cases the décor represents an attempt to express visions of distant places in concrete terms" (69). Therefore, just as France's universal expositions built on images and scenes depicting its various colonial holdings, so too did the "grands magasins" use this leitmotif to their advantage: exotic objects from France's colonies and elaborate Orientalist backdrops were all packaged into the phantasmagoria of seductive store displays.

In addition to the parallels in subject matter, the similarity I wish to highlight between department store mannequin displays and the Clérambault photographs has to do primarily with the uses of light and the treatment of fabric. (In this context it is interesting to note that one of the compelling sights that attracted a great deal of attention at the 1893 Paris Exposition was the display of exquisitely made, elegantly dressed life-sized wax mannequins enclosed in glass cases and illuminated with electric lighting.) I will refer to Emile Zola's descriptions of the environments and practices of the large department stores in Au bonheur des dames. The Ladies' Paradise (1882), to support my claims regarding the suggestive correspondences between Clérambault's photographs and the large department store displays. In nineteenth-century studies Zola's novel has been acclaimed as an indispensable archive of material history. Zola spent many years
researching his book, and his expertise was publicly acknowledged by his collaboration with architects on the design of new stores. For these reasons, and because so many aspects of his research have been verified elsewhere in the records of contemporary institutions, (such as those of the criminal justice system), his information is generally recognized as being accurate and dependable.

Clérambault, a man who staked his reputation on the diagnoses of a cadre of women who stole bits of silk and small items of clothing from department stores, would have learned much about draped mannequins and provocative displays from his interrogations of these women. Moreover, it was "virtually unavoidable," according to Kristin Ross (x), for anyone living in Paris at that time to be insensitive to the "orchestrated spectacle[s]" of the large stores. And, in addition to this fact, Clérambault himself owned many life-sized and miniature wax mannequins that he used at home in his investigations of cloth, and at the Ecole in his lectures, as demonstration models.

Zola's The Ladies' Paradise shows the extent to which seductive lighting techniques brought the erotic qualities of mannequins and their clothing to a level of visibility bordering on the orgasmic. Electric lighting was first introduced into the Parisian department store in 1883, when Clérambault was eleven years old. It is highly likely that, if the spectacle of the department store display was as overwhelming as has been suggested, then the advent of electric lighting would have made an impact on a young boy. As well, the mannequins themselves were an exotic sight. The price tag heads of these well-clothed representations of femininity were clearly intended to focus all attention on the clothing and its charms. In addition to the disturbing symbolic value of these faceless, headless models, these omissions certainly eliminated any distraction
from the clothes themselves. Zola's description of women's experiences in the department store leaves no doubt that the mannequins presented an alluring vision of woman not easily distinguished from the real thing:

groups of women [...] devour[ed] the finery with longing, covetous eyes.
And the stuffs became animated in this passionate atmosphere: the laces fluttered, drooped and concealed the depths of the shop with a troubling air of mystery; even the lengths of cloth, thick and heavy, exhaled a tempting odour, while the cloaks threw out their folds over the dummies, which assumed a soul, and the great velvet mantle, particularly, expanded, supple and warm, as if on real fleshly shoulders, with a heaving of the bosom and a trembling of hips (Ross xii).

And if the mannequins were eroticised in their presentation, the fabric displays were no less so. Again, we can do no better than to turn to Zola:

...an exhibition of silks, satins, and velvets, arranged so as to produce, by a skilful artistic arrangement of colours, the most delicious shades imaginable. At the top were the velvets, from a deep black to a milky white: lower down, the satins—pink, blue, fading away into shades of a wondrous delicacy; still lower down were the silks, all the colours of the rainbow, pieces set up in the form of shells, others folded as if round a pretty figure, arranged in a life-like natural manner by the clever fingers of the window dressers. Between each motive, between each coloured phrase of the display ran a discreet accompaniment, a slight puffy ring of
cream-coloured silk. At each end were piled up enormous bales of the silk of which the house had made a specialty, the "Paris Paradise" and the "Golden Grain..." (7).

This description helps to explain why it was that one of the women sent to Clérambault after she stole a piece of silk protested that if the displays were not so seductive she would not steal.\(^{156}\) I would suggest, furthermore, that with displays such as these, it is quite likely that the democratization of the experience of sensuality that I discussed earlier in relation to the experiences of Clérambault's detainees, would not have been limited to the women fetishists that he had locked away; but rather represents a more generalized reaction affecting, to a lesser or greater degree, the population at large, including, of course, Clérambault himself.

The uncanny lighting and extravagant attention to cloth displayed in Clérambault's thousands of Moroccan photographs are congruent with the concerns of the window-dressers who turned out splendid visions of mannequins draped in cloth and clothing of all kinds, and with those of a Parisian population intoxicated by the new and plentiful abundance of fabrics provided by the growth of France's textile industry, and by the magical lighting possibilities of electricity. The exquisitely robed figures bathed in the golden light of an exotic land would not have been unfamiliar (Fig. 50): these references in Clérambault's photographs would, therefore, have been legible to his

\(^{156}\) Some turn-of-the-century physicians lent credence to this point of view. They called department stores "dangerous places," and suggested that they were culpable partners in crime: "These display-case provocations are one of the factors of theft. They exist in order to arouse desire. They are the preparation of an illusion. They fascinate the client, dazzle her with their disturbing exhibition. [Department stores] stir up the social order and can be called the 'apéritifs' of crime." Alexandre Lacassagne, "Les Vols à l'étalage et dans grands magasins," Revue de l'Hypnotisme et de la Psychologie Physiologique (September, 1896), II: 77, cited in O'Brien 73.
contemporaries. Why is it then, that the images caused such a ruckus when they were discovered after Clérémbault's death? Why were they were so objectionable that they were sequestered by the state and closeted away from public view until 1990? Why was he publicly maligned and accused of fetishism and other "perversions" by the press and others for months after his death? And why is it that so many authors in the recent resurgence of interest in his work have felt that they must absolve him from these charges? It is important to ask exactly what these images were doing that precluded their assimilation into French culture. How do these photographs appear when placed beside other photographic images in circulation at this time? To attempt to answer these questions I want to look at yet another form of representation of the body of Europe's Other: similar images that were widely distributed in the realm of popular culture in France and its colonies.

PLATEAU: Postcards home

We must not lose sight of the fact that the psychiatrist is the defender of the Race, and not just the Individual.

Clérémbault

Something very important is in play in Clérémbault's work, the folding of a gaze (or more precisely a text) on madness into a gaze (the photographs) on the colonized.

Philippe Pignarre, 1992

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157 Clérémbault, 1911 quoted in Rubens, p.141
We must here turn our attention to the relationship between Clérambault's Moroccan photographs and his power as an agent of the state. It simply would not have been possible for him to make the necessary arrangements to photograph the local inhabitants of Fez if it were not for the fact that he was a doctor. The production of his photographs involved kinetic processes: Clérambault had to manipulate the cloth, the camera and lighting apparatus, and the subject with whom he was working. And, social processes: he had to find models and secure a space that could function as a studio. These requirements were not easy to fulfill in a country where the relationship to the image was such that photographing people was a transgression. I am here referring to the politics of photography in a culture where capturing images (especially of women) was generally not permitted. However, as Clérambault remarked in a lecture given at the Congrès d'histoire de l'art on September 28, 1921, the process was made much easier by the status and authority his position as psychiatrist carried. Nonetheless, even the fact that Clérambault was compelled to comment on this aspect of the photographs suggests that it must have been, on the whole, difficult to negotiate all this.

Furthermore, the level of his participation in the oppressive practices of imperialism must be noted. For instance, while in Morocco he was called on, at intervals, by Resident General Lyautey, the colonial governor, to function in an "expert witness" capacity and advise Lyautey in relation to military decisions regarding France's North African subjects. When asked by Lyautey if Senegalese troops would remain loyal to French rule over the Arabs, Clérambault sent him the following diagnosis of the character of the Senegalese—a report heavy with racist allusions:

159 Cited in Doy, Drapery 117 and 254, fn. 47.
The Negro is the appointed policeman of the Arab. The Negro will always march alongside the European against the Arab just as the dog accompanies the man against the wolf and the fox. This is because of: 1) the profound feeling of European superiority; 2) the traditional scorn of the Arab for the Negro (less, however, in Morocco than in other regions) (quoted in Rubens 125).

A few years before Clérambault arrived in Fez, Lyautey had put down a local uprising by bombing the city (Rubens 116). Clérambault held Lyautey in high esteem and invited him and his wife to attend the lectures he later gave at the Ecole.

Once Clérambault was able to make the photographs he then had to turn his gaze to France and find ways to disseminate the images, interact with other artists and ethnographers, and enter the discourses of a variety of schools of thinking. Nor was this aspect of the process smooth for Clérambault—this is the site of the extremity of his altercations with the Surrealists. When he returned to Paris after his war service the photographs became the template for his work at the police prefecture clinic, work that he then folded into his lectures at the Ecole. It is significant that Clérambault understood Morocco as a space in which the occlusion of the foreign and domestic other, enacted through a unique visualization of thought, allowed him to come to terms with, to bring to term, to name, first as "mental automatism," then as "syndrome of passivity," a previously muddled area of psychiatric thought.

Nowhere was it more evident how completely photographic images were at the service of the dominating gaze of the French State than in the plethora of postcard images of "Oriental" women that were widely disseminated in France and other parts of Europe
during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Clérambault's photographs along with the postcard images must be considered within the context of the French occupation of North Africa. As Frantz Fanon has so eloquently argued, the French state was bent on unveiling the Arab woman as part of its program to first destabilize and then dominate the North African cultures of its colonial holdings (Fanon, "Algeria Unveiled"). In their earlier forms these postcard images masqueraded as documentation: through various manipulations of mise-en-scène the viewer was offered a "snapshot" of "local colour." Classifications of types (Fig. 51), such as "Moorish woman in city attire" and "Young woman from the south" (Alloula 13, 62), soon gave way to pornographic displays of half-naked Algerian women. These images built on and extended existing fantasies of an excessive or perverse Arab sexuality. Malek Alloula's book, The Colonial Harem, has shown that even in its "documentary" guise the postcard was a powerful, and virulent form of colonization.

The ethnographic alibi that sustained Clérambault's photographic work as an academic enterprise was also the avowed basis of these postcards. The commercial success of the postcards was surpassed only by their cultural impact. Images of Algerian women became surfaces of inscription on which to write messages home (Fig. 52). The sign bordering on and hemming in the flesh—a symbolic containment inflicted—marked the realm of colonial domination.

As surely as the postcards, carried messages to those at home, so too, were the surfaces of Clérambault's photographs inscribed with communiqués to the Nation. But, in a reversal that proved to be catastrophic, rather than these messages cancelling out the threat represented by the images on which they were written—as was the case with the
Clérambault unravelled

In Clérambault's prolonged, enigmatic involvement with these photographs, he probably lingered too long in uncharted territories. His subsequent offerings to the institution of psychiatry of what he brought back from the liminal zones he visited—the concept of "mental automatism" and his distinctive understanding of "erotomania"—were not enough to protect him from the taint of contamination he incurred. After all, the production of some 4,000 photographs cannot be passed off as a minor interest. The time invested in their making—even without consideration of the psychic investment and Clérambault's later use of them as Muse—suggests that Clérambault would have been saturated with their becomings. As was the case with the Loti photographs we looked at earlier, this failure to maintain a proper distance between the self and its Others contravened the unacknowledged limits that maintained the "Otherness" of the other as distinct from the (bourgeois, European and male) self. However, unlike the pictures of Loti, the threat Clérambault poses in these photographs is not figured in terms of self-portraits. It is, then, not so much what is pictured in the images that evokes the threat and simultaneous censure involved in the erosion of the boundaries between the European self and its foreign Others; rather, it is what the photographs set in motion, an affect that is not so immediately visible on the smooth surface of the image. The alarm that the collective realisation of the existence of such great quantities of photographs produced, can be explained in terms of the recognition of the processes associated with their
making, and the uses to which they were subsequently put. It is at this point that we must return to Clérambault the psychiatrist and look at the photographs in relation to his continuing legacy to the institution of psychiatry and the recent renewed popularity of his work that is due in large part to his influence on Jacques Lacan.

Seeding/ceding psychoanalysis
As is perhaps fitting, it is a psychoanalytic reading of Clérambault's photographs presented by Joan Copjec in Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists that gives us the most extensive, careful and insightful consideration in English of Clérambault's work. In her compelling analysis Copjec situates Clérambault's photographs historically in terms of colonialism and utilitarianism, and psychoanalytically in terms of the function of the superego and the mechanics of fetishism. In so doing, she draws a parallel between Clérambault's interpretation of the erotic use of cloth by women fetishists, and the West's perception of the veiling and draping of Moroccan bodies. In both cases cloth is associated with a useless and excessive sexuality: Clérambault tells us that women fetishists, unlike their male counterparts, do not fantasize about a partner, but rather, enjoy the cloth for itself; and the draped bodies of non-European cultures are thought to veil "the bloated presence of [an] enjoyment that would not release itself into the universal pool" (Copjec 106). Each of these uses of cloth can be seen as both a literal and symbolic blocking of utilitarianism's doctrine of the greatest happiness for the common good. That is, the women fetishists are not directing their erotic energies toward reproductive sex, and the Moroccan others, in continuing to veil themselves from Europe's dominating gaze, are refusing assimilation. The fetishists are denying France
an expansion of its domestic population, and the Moroccan others are denying France an expansion of its Empire.

However, I would maintain that the concept of utility is of over-riding importance in another aspect of Clérambault's work with cloth. As Copjec has shown, the utility of Clérambault's lectures is apparent in the careful and meticulous delineation and categorization of the various draping customs of particular cultures. But also, I want to emphasize that alongside the form of utility evident in the lectures, there is utility in Clérambault's deployment of the photographs to plumb the folds, crevices and gullies of the draped cloth in order to understand, for psychiatric clinical practice, the way the mind works. But strangely—and this may be the reason that this aspect of Clérambault's practice has gone largely unremarked—the utility of Clérambault's mapping of the mind defies the understanding of utility upheld by a utilitarianism that demands to see "in every effect evidence of some actually existing cause" (Copjec 103).

"Seeing photographically," enables us, I believe, to locate these images in a machinic assemblage that shows how they serve a different type of utility. Functioning as prosthetic devices, their utility derives from the ways in which they facilitate movement along a number of trajectories, enabling them to work in concert with Michel Foucault's admonition that "desires do not point in a single direction" (Foucault, Reader 76).

In her acknowledgement of Clérambault's participation in the utilitarian project, Copjec pinpoints his transgressions of the tenets of this project:

[Clérambault's] doubling and splitting of his project into a consideration of cloth's usefulness and his fetishization of its uselessness were precisely the
problem. Clérambault's lectures, his explanations, were perhaps too painfully clear in their demonstration of a split to which utilitarianism had to remain blind (Copjec 116).

Whereas Copjec's observation of the "doubling" or "splitting" of Clérambault's project works along the lines of his ethnographical and artistic activities, set against his fetishistic uses of cloth, I am primarily interested in his desire to think the Western mind through the cloth that he himself manipulated and photographed. It is essential, then, to remark that it is precisely the aspect of Clérambault's work that gives us access to this process—the formulation of his concept of "mental automatism" and his revisioning of psychosis—that Copjec circumscribes as falling outside of the perimeters of her study of Clérambault's photographs.

"Mental automatism"

In relation to the ideology of utilitarianism and Clérambault's classifications of draped cloth in terms of their utility, Copjec makes the point that "colonialism was the historical partner of functionalism's rise" (85). We should not be surprised, then, that Clérambault's study of the folds of Moroccan cloth—in a conflation of the domestic other and the foreign other—was put to use to think the "psychotic" mind: one aberration, draped and veiled bodies that refuse the dominating gaze of the West, is mapped onto another,

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160 Clérambault's fetishistic "uses" of cloth mark the site of a contradiction, or at least a problem (and a point of disagreement for myself), in Copjec's argument. My understanding rejects the opposition Copjec is proposing in this part of her analysis.

161 Copjec states: "This is not the place for a discussion of this important concept, but the crucial point is that while the whole of psychiatry was busy tracing psychic automatism to delirious ideas, Clérambault argued that these ideas (of persecution, hypochondria, etc.) were secondary effects of the illness, provoked as reactions to the morbid state" (249, ftn. 31).
"un/reason/able" patient's transgressive uses of cloth wrongfully procured. Moreover, Western philosophy's long history of using the metaphors of veiling and unveiling in its search for Truth was easily extended to a venue that allowed Clérambault to literalise this search. A quote from Heidegger is particularly apt at this juncture of our discussion: "The prospect of the thinking that labors to answer to the nature of language is still veiled, in all its vastness." In what follows, I suggest that Clérambault used exactly this metaphor of veiling in his animation of the image in a process designed/destined to bring the unthought to language.

Clérambault's most important contribution to psychiatry and to Lacanian psychoanalysis was his formulation of the concept of "mental automatism," an idea that according to Lacan, completely revised psychiatry's understanding of psychosis. Clérambault formulated the construct of "mental automatism" as a primary mechanism present in all types of delusional states. Prior to this theory, psychiatry had been attempting to distinguish the many presentations of symptoms into a nosology of discrete types of psychosis. Clérambault theorized that the form that any particular state takes is based on this initial mechanism. He found that the diversity of clinical "pictures" occurs when the mechanism that is mental automatism manifests itself through processes of refraction and differentiation (Miller 47). That is, delusions and hallucinations are

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162 "Clérambault's syndrome" is the eponym by which the phenomena Clérambault described is known to present day psychiatry (see Lerner et al, 441). This paper highlights a site of confusion arising within psychiatry as a discipline, from the naming of this syndrome. However, as well as articulating an understanding of mental automatism that differs from one that I believe is more productive presented by Jacques-Alain Miller in his Returning to Freud (cited below), the authors have made a number of errors in the biographical information they have included. In my estimation the Lerner, et al, article, rather than clearing up the confusion with nosography, as they propose, instead tends to compound it. So then, I think that for the reader's understanding here it is sufficient to distinguish between mental automatism as the initial mechanism of psychosis which is then secondarily associated with a passion, thereby producing particular forms of psychosis such as erotomania.

163 For a more detailed description of Clérambault's formulation of this concept and Lacan's later use of it see Jacques-Alain Miller, "Teachings of the Case Presentation," in Returning to Freud 42-52.
secondary phenomena that arise out of the particularities of a person's lived existence. In this way psychosis can be said to have an internal logic. Clérambault's insight is one of the points that Lacan picked up on and used in the development of his own work. Lacan linked the mechanism of mental automatism to language. His later structural analysis of the psyche and his "discovery" of the symbolic order is credited to Clérambault's clarification of the autonomy of the mechanism of mental automatism from which the diversity of forms of psychosis arise (Miller 48).

Clérambault's concept was important to the development of psychoanalysis, and particularly to later clinical applications of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, precisely because it contradicted Freud's declaration that psychosis was beyond the realm of treatment. Freud maintained that the psychotic was unable to enter into and sustain the necessary relationship to the psychoanalyst on which all treatment is predicated. Because of this, there was nowhere for the analyst to intervene, because there was nothing (no possibility of a common/sense or meaning) with which to work.

From his first psychiatric studies in 1909 through to his late work, Clérambault sought to determine the nature of delusional psychosis (Lerner et al. 442). It is important to note, as Copjec does in passing, that although Clérambault published his definitive work on mental automatism, "Définition de l'automatisme mental" in 1924, he was, in fact, already developing this concept in the context of his teaching from 1919 onward (Copjec 249, ftn 31). It is significant then, for our purposes, to recognize that Clérambault initiated this concept in his clinical practice and instruction directly after his return from Morocco and the production of the photographs. We will have occasion to return to this point later.
The term "mental automatism," (which was already in use, though was not one that Clérambault was ever comfortable with) was eventually replaced with one that he himself coined: "syndrome of passivity," which he would later shorten to "S" (Copjec 88). Heidegger tells us that the word gives us, makes a gift of, the thing: "Only where the word for a thing has been found is the thing a thing. Only thus is it". If this is the case, Clérambault's uneasiness with the nomenclature of his crowning contribution to clinical psychiatric practice, and its eventual renaming, are events that mark the site of his gift to the discipline. But does this site mark more than this?

For Heidegger, the site at which we witness language, at which we are able to catch a glimpse of the process of language "languaging" is the moment when we cannot find the word we search for, when language does not issue forth effortlessly. It is the moment when language eludes us and we are thrown back on language as a phenomenon, and forced to recognize that it emanates from outside of our being and exists in its own right, folding us, as it were, into its own determinations. As Heidegger has famously stated: "Sentences sentence."

What I am suggesting here is that if naming marks the site of the gift—as I have just intimated it does in Clérambault's concept of mental automatism/syndrome of passivity—his Moroccan photographs mark the site of the naming. Heidegger's investigations on the nature of language allow me to draw an analogy as to how I think it is that Clérambault was able to think the Western psyche in the space of its colonial other.

I noted earlier that Clérambault began working with the idea of "mental automatism" directly after his return from Morocco. And, to reiterate, I have stated that the Moroccan photographs were the sites of the development of his thinking on this
concept. My hypothesis then, is this: The recognition that Clérambault's close scrutiny of cloth afforded him is that the cloth itself is the structural element that carries light and movement across its surfaces. Likewise, that mechanism of psychosis, mental automatism—constitutional and innate—is the surface across which a variety of presentations play themselves out. This is why Clérambault can refer to the mind of the chloralic as being "surrounded by a veil [wherein] the play of folds gives an uneven transparency" (Deleuze, The Fold 154, ftn.6).

Jacques Lacan referred to Clérambault as "our only master in psychiatry" for this gifting of his unique interpretation of "mental automatism." As I have already indicated, Clérambault's structural analysis was the inspiration for Lacan's structural model of the psyche and language, and for his work with psychosis. Lacan took Clérambault's theory and connected it—by a series of linked thoughts that wind their way through the importance of our acquisition of language—to a profound recognition of the ordinariness, the normality of psychosis, a process of thinking that eventually led him to wonder: "How can one not be mad?" (quoted in Miller 48). When a perplexed Lacan goes on to ask: "How do we not sense that the words we depend upon are imposed on us, that speech is an overlay, a parasite, the form of cancer with which human beings are

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166 Lacan develops this line of thinking through asking the question "Why does the normal subject, who is no less affected by speech, who is no less xenopathic than the psychotic, not become aware of it?" Miller goes on to comment: "By what inversion do we misconstrue the fact that we are the puppets of a discourse whose syntax preexists all subjective inscription? What is normal is the xenopathia. A subject for whom the Other is no longer veiled is certainly not going to be attained through our imaginary manipulations" Miller 49.
afflicted?" (quoted in Miller 49), his question refers to a process that is, I believe, directly analogous to the mechanism of thought that is referred to in the notion of "seeing photographically" that is integral to my own study.

For what Lacan is decrying here is the insufficiency of the *immanence* of the human condition, the immanence on which is built the shaky sense of self with which we as humans are constantly struggling. His use of the word "cancer" exceeds metaphor, is excessive. With regards to language, what Lacan is identifying is the ability of language to take us over. Much as a cancer multiplies without consideration of its host, so, says Lacan, does the proliferation expended by language come from an Other at whose mercy we remain. "Psychosis," in this moment, is simply a revelation of this structure of human existence: "delusions," the end point of Heidegger's understanding that sentences speak us.

Moreover, as I understand it, Lacan's explanation of the inevitability of our subordination to language hold the key to the relation of image and language that brought Clérambault to his articulation of a new way of seeing psychosis. That is, what Clérambault understood about the photographs is precisely their immanence in the way that they can be understood as doubling processes of thinking. This understanding was possible, I suggest, because he discovered and then recognized, in the activity of photographing draped bodies, the very processes that he was attempting to trace in his study of delusional psychosis. His intense and obsessive attention to the fabric showed him that, to one who pays attention, the fabric when it is rearranged takes on a completely different look: the effect of light on the newly created falls of cloth presents new

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167 Paradoxically, this does *not* mean that for Lacan there is no such thing as "mental illness." Rather, this comment relays his recognition that the mechanism termed mental automatism is inherent in the structure of the psyche.
configurations of surfaces, but the fabric remains the same piece of cloth. So too, in terms of his understanding of mental automatism as the mechanism of psychosis: the psychosis is there, constitutional, innate, it is the cloth, on the surfaces of which will play out a variety of symptoms depending on the specifics of the context. This recognition was the discovery that Clérambault developed as his interpretation of "mental automatism." However, he did not go on to extend and elaborate a similar explication of this same process in the photographic image. Clérambault did allude to his ideas regarding the use of metaphor in the formulation of ideas. He is quoted as saying: "And those metaphors that superimpose themselves so perfectly on psychic events could well be the exact statement of psychic events."168

However, Clérambault's failure to further articulate this relation of thinking to the image resulted in a gap in understanding between the production of the photographs and their reception.

And his gift is aporetic in another way, for even as it names for psychiatry the object of its study, it marks that object with a condition of impossibility: the nominal erasure of the boundaries between normality and sanity, the erasure of the object as such.169 That Clérambault did not pursue the line of thought, line-of-flight, suggested by the photographic processes' simulation of thinking—or as I am suggesting here, the photograph as thinking—does not diminish the fact that what Clérambault engaged in his photographs, and subsequently gifted, was predicated on the notion of image as thought and thought as image.


169 I say "nominal" because although these boundaries are in theory called into question by Lacan, in practice they are still inextricably inscribed.
PLATEAU: Doctoring Surrealism/Doctoring the Surreal

M. de Clérambault could find no better outlet for his brilliant faculties than in the prison system, and indeed he wears the title of head doctor [sic] at the special infirmary of the jail nearest the Prefecture of Police. It would be surprising if a consciousness of that calibre, a mind of that quality hadn't found the means to put itself entirely at the disposal of the bourgeois police and justice system.

André Breton

It is important to look at psychiatry's confrontations with the Surrealists because it happened on a number of fronts, all of them significant in the struggle to define reality and what it was to be human. What was at stake in the battle between Clérambault and André Breton was nothing less than a revolution in thought. The power/knowledge claims that were being contested in these confrontations were critical for the ways that they translated into the politics of everyday life. Furthermore, in the context of my study, it is important to investigate this conflict because our lives—certainly as they pertain to institutional regimes—often now proceed as if the classifications and nosographies that are the legacies of Clérambault's time define what is real rather than constructed; discovered rather than invented; a natural condition rather than a theoretical concept.

170 André Breton, "Psychiatry Standing before Surrealism" Break of Day 68.

171 For instance, homosexuality, classified as a form of mental illness, was voted out of the psychiatrist's bible, the DSM (Diagnostic Statistical Manuel) only very recently. See Herb Kutchins and Stuart A. Kirk, "The Fall and Rise of Homosexuality." Making Us Crazy: DSM: The Psychiatric Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders (chapter 3), 55-99. Kutchins and Kirk point out the following: December 1973 APA Board of Trustees voted to delete "Homosexuality." April 1974 – APA referendum narrowly supported the deletion. But, DSM-III (1980) still contained "Ego Dys tonic Homosexuality," which was subsumed under "Sexual Disorders N.O.S." for DSM-III-R (1987) and DSM-IV (1994) and DSM-IV-1R (2000). In other
Given that all of these issues are concerned with ways of seeing that cannot be separated from ways of understanding, and photography was uniquely situated in its impact on how we see and understand the world, Clérambault's photographs offer an opportunity to examine this situation more clearly. In the age of the Internet, cyberspace and Virtual Reality, we are poised on the brink of new ways of seeing/thinking. I believe that mapping changes embodied by the advent of photography will better help us to understand the encounters precipitated by digital imaging.

As has already been indicated, at the time of Clérambault's public confrontation with the Surrealists, the institution of psychiatry was still struggling to establish itself in France. The alienists and concepts of hereditary degeneracy dominant throughout the 1800s were beginning to give way to the dynamic model instigated by Pierre Janet, but the stigma attached to psychiatry had not yet abated (Dowbiggin). Psychiatry, since its inception, had been struggling for legitimacy within medicine, and for recognition as a discrete discipline. Until the second-half of the nineteenth-century psychiatrists were confined to practice within asylums and institutions such as the police infirmary. Although Charcot, a neuropathologist rather than a psychiatrist, made enormous gains in the recognition of the existence of "nervous diseases," he did this within the space of the asylum. It really was not until Freud that psychiatry made significant inroads in "polite" society. Before that, Charcot gestured toward a study of mental disease that moved

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words, homosexuality can still be diagnosed as a mental disorder under "sexual disorder not otherwise specified." My thanks to Richard Ingram for pointing this out and providing me with the information. Dowbiggin provides an in depth study of this shift and its socio-politically defined causes. See also Michel Foucault "Psychiatric Power," for a precise investigation of the ambiguities traversing psychiatric practice that were part and parcel of the discipline's efforts to define and legitimize itself. Foucault asserts that the practice of psychoanalysis was, if fact, provoked by the excesses of Charcot's work with hystérics, and the resultant loss of legitimacy and esteem suffered by psychiatry as a profession. He maintains that the privacy of the one-to-one relationship that constitutes the psychoanalytic model and the supremacy of the psychiatrist in this relation constituted:
away from strictly organic origins when he named psychologically traumatic events as "dynamic lesions" (de Marneffe 75). However, Charcot did not continue in this direction: for his part he still insisted that these events were merely provocateurs of an underlying organic "hereditary propensity to nervous disease" (de Marneffe 75). Thus, before Freud, because of the prevalence of this belief in hereditary degenerative tendencies, even middle-class patients carried the taint of the asylum and of "madness."

And, as we have seen with Clérambault and the Special Infirmary, to be diagnosed as mad was to be stripped of any rights.

Clérambault's fight with the Surrealists revolved primarily around two figures: André Breton and Antonin Artaud. These men proved, for different and complementary reasons, to be formidable adversaries: Breton had himself trained and interned as a psychiatrist, and received recognition in the field as a person of great promise; and Artaud underwent, and wrote extensively about, years of incarceration and "treatment" as a psychiatric patient. Clérambault was anathema to them, and was singled out as being particularly worthy as an object of their scorn against and exasperation with psychiatric practices of the day. The outlines of this struggle are well known so I will here just touch on a few of the events that are important for our purposes.

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a withdrawal outside the asylum space in order to obliterate the effects of psychiatric superpower; but a reconstitution of medical power as truth-producer, in a space arranged so that that production would always remain perfectly adapted to that power. The notion of transference, as a process essential to the treatment, is a way of conceptualizing this adequation in the form of knowledge; the payment of money, the monetary counterpart of transference, is a way of preventing the production of truth from becoming a counterpower that traps, annuls, overturns the power of the physician (Ethics 47).

174 Joseph Babinski—a psychiatrist of note who was later to dismantle Charcot's teachings, and about whom Foucault said that he was critical of the process of "depsychiatrization" undertaken at this time—was greatly distressed when his student Breton left psychiatry, and Breton, in turn, acknowledged Babinski with words of praise in his later writings.
Clérambault and the Surrealists, in particular André Breton, were engaged in specific ways with the genesis of the idea of "the unconscious." There were ways in which Clérambault's thinking was in harmony with that of Breton, and ways in which it clashed.

In the renewal of the obligation to prove itself that took place in the wake of Charcot's work with hysteria, psychiatry was confronted with the need to present empirical proof of its effectiveness as a science. Martin Murray traces this historical moment through the work of Lacan—and psychiatry's and the state's attempts to determine culpability in terms of the law—to show that Clérambault's understanding of the psyche was symptomatic of a difficulty that has continued to trouble contemporary psychiatric and psychoanalytic discourses. This problem centres on the ultimately undecidable nature of psychotic disturbances in terms of organic causes. In his argument Murray first locates a rupture in Clérambault's concept of "mental automatism," then he maps the historical, material and theoretical contexts of this inconsistency to demonstrate the ways in which it marks a number of the skirmishes between art and medicine in the struggle to define the unconscious. Murray characterizes this rupture in Clérambault's theory as "a quite fearful contradiction in its utilisation of structural theory and methodology alongside a dogmatic insistence on organic cause": "fearful" because this theoretical assumption had quite disturbing consequences in Clérambault's practice of psychiatry (62). In other words, although Clérambault recognized the structural character of most psychotic disturbances, he also, perversely and paradoxically, insisted on the fact that each of these events could be attributed to underlying organic causes. Nevertheless, this inconsistency in his theory did not preclude Clérambault from sharing common
conceptual ground with the Surrealists. For instance, in discussing their joint investigations into automatic phenomena Murray emphasizes that:

Both Clérambault and Breton [...] identified a mode of mental functioning or behaviour whose cause could not be strictly or straightforwardly accounted for (despite [...] Clérambault's theoretical preferences) in biological or empirical terms (64).

I would maintain that it is the ambivalence of this position that marks the shifting ground of the discourse: psychiatry's legitimation as an institution depended on its ability to establish itself as the authority on "mental illness," and in large part this authority depended on psychiatry finding organic causes for the diseases associated with the psyche. The stakes were high in these disciplinary manoeuvrings, and Clérambault's conceptualization of automatism carried through its centre a fault line that had the potential of destabilizing the claims of psychiatry, a fact that helps to account for the violence of the public arguments between Clérambault and Breton.

An article published by Lacan in collaboration with Pierre Migault and J. Lévy-Valensi in 1931 marks the place where the battle lines were drawn in Clérambault's public fight with the Surrealists over the definition of the unconscious and its implications for the "treatment" of psychoses (Roudinesco 109). This paper on "Inspired Writings"175 investigated the case of a young woman incarcerated by Clérambault after he had diagnosed her with erotomania and paranoia. The analysis was original because it was based on the woman's written letters. Lacan and his associates "defined the structure of her paranoia on the basis of semantic, stylistic, and grammatical disturbances [and

linked] those disturbances to a syndrome of mental automatism" (Roudinesco 109).

They then went on to show that rather than the woman's "states of inspiration [being] spiritualistic [as they appeared]," they could be attributed to an automatism "understandable in the context of the Surrealist experiment of the same name" (Roudinesco 109). The authors stated that the Surrealist writing, "whose method [the Surrealists] have described quite scientifically show[s] what a remarkable degree of automatism written automatisms, outside of any hypnosis, can achieve" (Roudinesco 109). Moreover, the authors asserted that the text of the letters could not be wholly attributed to pathological affect. Rather, they suggested, the writing also contained an element of play and invention that must not be overlooked. In this way they modified the definition of mental automatism to include some degree of intentionality. Whereas Clérambault saw the mechanism of "mental automatism" as an indication of the incurability of insanity, rendering treatment redundant, the Surrealists understood the same mechanism as the frontier of freedom in the human psyche. Lacan and his associates privileged the work of the Surrealists and came up with a definition of mental automatism that showed that the Surrealists' "automatic writing" laid claim to the same mechanism that Clérambault designated as "mental automatism."

Salvador Dali is key to understanding the configuration of relationships between psychiatry and Surrealism. Whereas Clérambault was opposed to the Surrealists, his student Lacan took their ideas seriously in the development of his own theories. At the beginning of the 1930s investigations into the principles that govern the life of the psyche

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176 This approach is in keeping with the fact that it has been established that Lacan had already been, by this time, reading Saussure, (Roudinesco, 206).

177 Likewise, Clérambault's theory of "mental automatism" also privileged an element of intentionality. Murray suggests that "automatic phenomena were taken, by Clérambault and the surrealists [...] to have meaning for the subject" (64). This understanding contradicted the tenets of empirical science in that for meaning to exist at all it had to be objective rather than subjective.
were actively being carried out by the Surrealists. Again, it is important to remember that a high percentage of their number had trained and practiced as medical doctors; the smooth turn away from medicine and towards art was indicative of the permeable borders between and the complicity of the two institutions. The terminology—the processes of naming privileged by Heidegger as that which gives us the thing—was also shared and fought over by the two institutions. We know, for instance, that Lacan and Salvador Dali, in their attempts to understand the forces governing paranoia, were both working in the territory that Clément occupied. Before Lacan formalized his analysis in writing, Dali had already produced a series of double-image paintings to map delusion as an interpretation of reality that was organized in a logical manner. He named this phenomenon "paranoia-criticism." Roudinesco tells us: "In 1930, Dali abandoned the notions of convulsion and automatic writing in order to systematize, under the rubric of paranoia, a coherent method of knowledge and of creative interpretation of reality" (111). Dali's finding was in direct contradiction to Charcot's work with convulsion and Clément's work with automatism. Roudinesco's observation shows that psychiatry and the Surrealists, medicine and art, were all simultaneously attempting to stake out the territory of the unconscious. By now it is clear that the idea of using artistic processes as a methodology capable of bringing to light an understanding of questions about the psyche was not unique to Clément.178

My point, then, is that at the turn of the twentieth century there was an implicit understanding of some form of the notion that images think, and that recent discussions revolving around this idea are attempts to come critically to terms with earlier works such as Clément's photographs that were produced under similar, albeit unacknowledged,

178 It is from this point of departure that my next research project began.
theoretical conditions. Certainly, my study is embedded in these relations. Ultimately, it was left to Lacan to introduce the primacy of the unconscious over the conscious into clinical understanding and practice (Roudinesco 114). And, I have argued, this revolution in the Western understanding of the psyche began with the revelations afforded Clérambault in his use of photographic thought.

PLATEAU: Hemming an edge

An anachronistic and marginal thinker, Clérambault was simultaneously behind his time (since he favored a narrow constitutionalism to the detriment of a dynamic perspective) and ahead of his contemporaries (since he grasped the pertinence of structural theses necessary to a new organization of knowledge) (Roudinesco 106).

What was it that allowed this man, brutally authoritarian and narrow-minded, to escape the bounds of his conservatism and to gesture toward a theory of knowledge that inspired those who came after him? It is my understanding that the productive paradox at work here was thoroughly informed by Clérambault's relationship to the image. The reason that this controversial man was distinguished by the likes of Jacques Lacan and Gilles Deleuze is precisely that he understood (without ever going on to articulate this understanding) that images think.

Similarly, when Durand says that at times photographs represent "a moment of pure thought," he is referring to the way that the purely visual—in this case the minute striations in cloth—can bring thoughts to language, to form. In other words, what Clérambault was doing when he made image after image of draped bodies, was thinking.
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that that was not all he was doing. To again cite Foucault, "desires do not point in a single direction" (Foucault, Reader 76). To look at these photographs *only*, or even *primarily*, in terms of their uses in Clérambault's rethinking of psychosis would be to re-enact the erasure of the bodies supporting the cloth that Clérambault was so intent on photographing. And it is for this reason that it has been necessary to think these photographs "rhizomatically,"—to *think* them through the multiplicity of their presentations, past and present, to *see* them both as tracing and map.

Without diminishing the problematic nature of these images, what remains interesting about these photographs is the fact that Clérambault intuited in the folds of Moroccan cloth with which he was obsessed, and in the no-less seductive surfaces of the photographs that registered these modulations, a site for the formulation of particular knowledges. My conjecture, in this chapter, that Clérambault was using these photographs in this way has been based on the recognition of particular historical circumstances pertaining to photography and the construction of knowledge. I have been concerned to articulate a context that makes intelligible his use of the Moroccan photographs as the spaces of thought. I have maintained that prevailing beliefs and practices would not only have supported this way of understanding what photographs *did*, but indeed, were the very conditions of possibility in this aspect of Clérambault's work. Moreover, I have suggested that in light of recent philosophical insights, these photographs can, at the very least, be seen to constitute productive articulations of thought (even if they must be framed as productive paradoxes). As such, they offer valuable evidence for our understanding of how photography has *thought* the world. The
photographs advance our understanding of "thinking images"/"how images think" despite Clérambault's failure to communicate his discovery that the photographs functioned as "instances of pure thought."
Conclusion

Afterimages and the force fields of photography

The afterimage—the presence of sensation in the absence of a stimulus—and its subsequent modulations posed a theoretical and empirical demonstration of autonomous vision, of an optical experience that was produced by and within the subject.


For Deleuze and Guattari, a plateau is reached when circumstances combine to bring an activity to a pitch of intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a climax leading to a state of rest. The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities, creating a fabric of intensive states between which any number of connecting routes could exist.


I began, in my introduction, with an explication of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's theory of expression. Thus, throughout this paper I have argued that photographic portraits must be seen as dynamic events that are constantly recreated in an after-life that both encompasses and surpasses the moment and place of their making. I have maintained that the advent of photography, and specifically of the photographic portrait, set in motion a machinic force of expression that carried enormous potential for the
deterritorialisation of previous topographies of seeing/thinking and moreover, was intimately involved in the crisis of the subject that was to become a distinguishing characteristic of nineteenth-century Europe. I have shown, so I hope, that in spite of the many histories of photography that have insisted on its indexical nature—and the myriad subtle ways in which photography continues to be tied to this legacy—the photographic portrait was no more able to provide a straightforward correlation between subjects and their images than was the stereoscope able to leave intact the perception that it merely proffered reflections of an empirically determined objective world.

Reading the photographs—Pierre Loti in the ethnic costumes of non-European peoples in chapter two; Mexican bodies set aside in determinations of national identity in chapter three; the psychiatrist Clérambault's Moroccan photographs in chapter four—in terms of their many apprehensions by apparatuses of capture, did not, so I have argued, suffice to engage the intensity of desire, the nagging excesses of the images, that I designated in the introduction as marks of their "atypical expression." Instead, it has been necessary to understand the multiplicity of these photographic imag(ine)ings as both tracings and maps, so as to be able to recognize them as, among other things, instances of the thousand tiny struggles that are part of the force/flow of change. Bringing the images to visibility in this way showed that new ways of seeing, as well as engendering unique sources of pleasure and power, also created anxieties elicited by the disjunction between perception and its articulation.

These disjunctions lead us back to the "gap" that I referred to in my introduction as distinguished by Deleuze and Guattari as the marker of atypical expression: a form of expression characterized by a "recursive futurity." Massumi says it is recursive because
"its coming to pass envelope[s] a series of prior events" (Massumi, *Shock to Thought* xxvii). In designating the photographs used in my study as instants of atypical expression, I have been interested to understand the ways in which they enveloped—folded into their surfaces—the forces that assembled their passing: forces which paralleled virtual potentialities that diagrammed new possibilities for existence.

A people to come

[Even the most ostensibly personal expression may be directly political, in that it envelopes a potential collective. For example, the subject of literary expression, to the extent that it is effectively creative, is not in the individual author but a "people to come." The atypical expression emits the potential for an unlimited series of further (collective) expressions.]

Brian Massumi, *Shock to Thought*.

This thesis has examined some of the ways in which photography was a generative force in ways of seeing and thinking that were, so I have argued, already well underway by the middle of the nineteenth century. I have shown that each of the photographic portraits under consideration created disturbances within widely accepted understandings of coherent subjectivity, and the attempts to form, control and regulate bodies that were consistent with these understandings. My investigations visualized plays of forces from within which dominant forms had emerged, and located the photographs as foci of resistance to these forms. In so arguing, I distanced myself from the concept of the "subject," and maintained instead, that these photographs swirled around "the guise of the
'anomalous individual' serving as a pivot for a collective becoming" (Massumi, *Shock to Thought* xxxvii, fn. 21). In this way, I have shown how the photographic portrait was inseparable from, and in fact worked alongside of and on, other objects, practices, and forces in a field of immanence from which subjectivities were animated. My study has proposed, in relation to photography, a general theory of expression, and in relation to the photographic portrait has produced local analyses that take into account the particular sexed, gendered, "raced," and classed bodies figured in these images: the body of Loti that is distinguished by practices that even as they seem to comply with codes of normative heterosexual male identity, worked to disrupt and dis/figure that identity; the body of Modotti and of those she pictured, all cast outs from national identity and "subject" instead to the penalties incurred by the fact of their poverty and marginality, or of their failure to adhere to "proper" codes of sexuality and (political) passivity; the bodies effaced and erased by Clérambault, much in the same way that he himself proceeded as if it were possible to refuse embodiment. Thinking through anew the impact of photographic imaging, a technology that worked with ways of looking and seeing—imag(ine)ing—has allowed us to glimpse the reciprocity involved in the meeting of expression and perception: to acknowledge that just as desire traverses the surface of photographic portrait, so too is perception traversed by desire.

The flow of recursive futurity

Virtual reality expresses what might be called *the shock of the real immanence of the metaphysical*. We thought that the metaphysical lay "beyond" us. Now we find it sticking to anything and everything and
pushing us around. VR brings to an end the regimes of separation, which would, through the operation of certain representations, deny the interactive reality of the virtual and the actual in favour of a simple facticity of stable bodies and fixed states of affairs. Yet we are only at the beginning of the end of these regimes.

Andrew Murphie, "Putting the virtual back into VR" 192.

Deleuze-Guattarian rhizomatics is a process of proliferating connections. I have, in this study, attempted to add to scholarship in the field—not to replace it. It is a common misunderstanding of Deleuze and Guattari's work that they are advocating an ontology to replace earlier systems. This is not, however, the case—their thinking is above all else one of connection. Deleuze especially had little patience for negative critiques. Like Nietzsche he was most interested in affirmation. The eternal return is the figure of thought that best exemplifies this philosophy. So then, this is what I have tried to achieve, affirmation and connection.

My investigation of the interface between technologies and bodies, expressive potentiality and its transformations into forms of content, carried out through the photographs of Loti, Modotti and Clérambault opens onto another tremor in the shock to thinking/seeing: the move into virtual reality and digital imagining. Digital imaging and techniques such as hypertextuality, bring to visibility some of the pluralities that were immanent, so I have argued, in the photographs we have looked at. In digital imaging, the image has been made to coincide with its own intensity, with its inherent potentiality for becomings.
Digital imagining systems have thoroughly undermined the material connection of the technological image to its status as "Truth" and "evidence." This fact changes, in fundamental ways, our relation to images. In the passage cited above, Andrew Murphie suggests that the advent of virtual reality brings an end to "regimes of separation" based on the "facticity of stable bodies and fixed states of affairs." And, in the preceding study I have argued that these regimes of separation were already on shaky ground. That in fact, each of the photographs I investigated marks out a field of activities on a material level, which parallels modes of potential in the virtual, and which can in turn be extrapolated to diagram collective imaginings that open new possibilities for existence. In light of this understanding of the photographic image, what unique possibilities for existence does digital imaging engender? In terms of the new forces with which humans are now combining, what very special and precarious conditions will assemble our becomings? Deleuze maintains "a new form" is emerging out of the forces with which man is now coming into relation, "and it's already ceased to be human." \(^{179}\) What form will emerge as "human" in the twenty-first century, and how will it be assembled through new forces of imaging, new forces of seeing?

\(^{179}\) I here make reference to Deleuze's musings over what he terms "this simple, precise, and grand theme in Nietzsche and Foucault." Deleuze, *Negotiations* 118.
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Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Mexican Folkways 7:3 (July-September 1932). Cover design by Diego Rivera. Private collection.
ESTUVO LA CIUDAD EN GRAVE PELIGRO
NUEVAS PAGINAS DEL "DIARIO" DEL
ESTUDIANTE JULIO ANTONIO MELLA

SOÑABA CON UNIR A
TODOS LOS PUEBLOS
DE ESTE CONTINENTE

El Celebre "Huelguista del
Hambre" Tenía en Proyecto
Escribir un Drama Social
ENTRE EL AMOR Y LA LUCHA
Mella, en París Asesor, en sus Primeras Vistas de su Antología y México.
LÉON HEUZÉY
Drapant le modèle.

Fig. 35
Fig. 54. — LE BRAS DROIT TENU DANS LE MANTEAU.
Pose du modèle vivant.
Fig. 53. — LE BRAS DROIT TENU DANS LE MANTEAU. D'après une statue.
Fig. 125. — Ajustement ordinaire de la grande toge.
Pose sur nature.
Fig. 124. — Ajustement ordinaire de la grande toge.
Statue de Tibère.
p. Praecinctura ; s. Sinus ; u. Umbo ;
1 Tarinio
Figure 24. Attempting to photograph a prisoner, New York.
ATTITUDES PASSIONNELLES
Moorish woman taking a walk.

FIG. 51
Algerian types. Moorish woman. (Written on card: I am sending you a package to be picked up at the railway station. The babies are doing well; they have just taken a walk by the beach. I shall write you shortly at greater length. Warm kisses to all of you. [signed:] Martha.)