

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF
GROUP DYNAMICS IN A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER,
CONSENSUS LAND USE PLANNING PROCESS**

by

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ABSTRACT

In March 2001, after more than four years of negotiations, participants in the Lillooet Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) process failed to reach consensus on a single plan for the Lillooet forest district and instead produced two plans they submitted to government. Up until this point, other LRMP in the province had reached consensus, so why did participants in the Lillooet LRMP process fail in their attempts? What can we learn from this?

I address these questions by drawing on four years of participant-observation, various secondary sources of information, and in-depth interviews with core participants. I focus on the dynamics created by the province's requirement that this particular consensus, multi-stakeholder process include both local and outside interests. This requirement was peculiar to the Lillooet LRMP process.

The Lillooet LRMP was a process pulled in different directions by local and outside interests. One of the main points of departure among participants was over the issue of Protected Areas. Fundamentally different views on what the Lillooet forest district needs to survive and the role of Protected Areas in that vision led to the formation of sub-groups at the Table. These sub-groups had difficulty trusting one another and so were unable to work together to produce a land use plan.

Failure to address this underlying conflict ultimately led to an unraveling from the consensus-oriented approach into mediation and eventually arbitration. The final plans, one produced by local, and outside industrial interests, and the other primarily by outside conservation and recreation groups, reflect the reality of local dependence on the forest industry. Further, they reveal some of the difficulties of requiring both local and outside interests to participate in multi-stakeholder consensus processes.

These findings have implications at the policy and process level. While policy dictates that LRMP must be open to all interested parties, it must be recognized that including both local and outside interests in this type of process is a design trade-off and will likely create barriers to reaching consensus on a single plan. In such a case, it is particularly important to directly address the role of group development during the process, to help participants make the transition from working in their respective sub-groups to working as part of a larger Table.

Care must be taken to avoid reinforcing sub-group differences and building into the process what might be perceived as structural inequalities. Yet conflict must be exploited to help sub-groups establish a common framework for working together. Finally, failure to reach consensus during the planning process should not be seen as a failure. Provided differences among sub-groups are not exacerbated, the outcome of the process can be useful to decision-making.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BCFS	British Columbia Forest Service
CC	Communities Coalition
CORE	Commission on Resources and Environment
CRB	Lillooet District Community Resources Board
CRTC	Conservation, Recreation, Tourism, and Community
FOSA	Final Offer Selection Approach
GMZ	General Management Zone
LRMP	Land and Resource Management Planning
LLRMP	Lillooet Land and Resource Management Plan
LUCO	Land Use Coordination Office
LRUP	Local Resource Use Planning or Local Resource Use Plan
MOF	Ministry of Forests
MSRM	Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management
ORC	Outdoor Recreation Council of British Columbia
PAS	Protected Areas Strategy
PST	Process Support Team
RMZ	Resource Management Zone
SMZ	Special Management Zone
THLB	Timber Harvesting Land Base
TSA	Timber Supply Area
TSR	Timber Supply Review
WC ²	Western Canada Wilderness Committee

PREFACE

There are a couple of things I wanted to clear with you before you start to read this work. The first is the use of the terms 'rural' and 'urban' and the second is the use of the terms 'local' and 'outside' to describe participants or stakeholders in the process. These terms are controversial for the same reasons – few like being categorized, and saying that someone is 'rural' or 'urban' or 'local' or from 'outside' is doing just that.

The point I am trying to make in this thesis is that the different groups involved in the Lillooet LRMP process do have different views of how the area should be planned and managed. To me, and the literature does happen to back me up on this one, it is a logical extension that these things are likely shaped somewhat by where and how we choose to live and how we view others who have chosen the same, or a different lifestyle and location. As a result, the terms 'rural' and 'urban' do seem to describe (though not perfectly by any stretch) the general 'flavour' of these groups.

I have also used the terms 'local' and 'outside' to describe participants. Not only are these categories; they are virtually impossible to describe: what is the line that separates 'local' from 'outside'? Truth be told, I hope that by the end of this document, you will begin to believe, as I do, that often what is 'local' and what is 'outside' could simply be in the eye of the beholder. In fact, it was often these terms that the groups used to describe *each other*, rather than titles that they would assign themselves. However, I found them handy descriptors and so adopted them for my own use here.

In short, what I want to make really clear is that I certainly do not mean to offend anyone with my use of these terms – they were just useful for describing patterns that I found during the course of this research project. I hope this clears things up. Sit back and enjoy the rest of the show.

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- All of the people who were willing to chat with me about the Lillooet LRMP process in interviews. Despite it's weaknesses, I hope this document provides a reasonable record of the events in Lillooet.
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- Finally - all of my supervisors – past and present. I learned something from each of you. I hope you are able to say the same.

Thanks everybody, and good night.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

March 2001, after four years of negotiations, participants in the Lillooet Land and Resource Management Planning (LLRMP) process, unable to achieve consensus on a single land use plan, submitted two plans to government. The provincial government would have to decide which of the two plans would guide planning and management of the Lillooet forest district.

Why were LLRMP process participants unable to achieve consensus on a single plan? And why is this significant? LLRMP participants' submission of the two plans came after more than a dozen other LRMP processes around the province reached consensus on land use plans for their respective areas. So what made this planning process different from the others?

The Lillooet LRMP process experienced the same difficulties as other, similar consensus, multi-stakeholder land use planning exercises – lack of timely and up-to-date information and analysis. However, what made the LLRMP Table different was the inclusion of both local and 'outside' interests during negotiations. Other LRMP Tables were composed mainly of "people who live and work in the area" "sectors from the community" and "local public and government representatives," (MSRM 2002). The LLRMP Table consisted of local people, as well as interested parties from outside the area.

Exploratory work pointed to this arrangement as a major stumbling block to reaching consensus. It is in large part the dynamic between local and 'outside' interests that can be used to explain the Table's failure to achieve consensus on a single plan. But how did this dynamic work? What happened during negotiations around the land use planning Table itself? How did the combination of local and 'outside' interests at the LLRMP Table contribute to a failure to reach consensus on a single land use plan for the Lillooet forest district?

This project is an in-depth case study of the LLRMP process and is meant to answer the above research question. It uses theories of group dynamics to explain the interaction of local and 'outside' interests in this particular land use planning exercise. In doing this, it uses group dynamics theory in a way seldom seen in the literature. Research on groups has tended to focus on therapy, lab, classroom, and other such groups, often in either highly-controlled or 'low-stakes' situations.

Similarly, research into the success and failure of multi-stakeholder consensus and other collaborative processes has tended to overlook the role of group dynamics. The success of any process will depend on its purpose (Buchy and Hoverman 2000:23). However, there have been attempts to develop, from the literature, criteria and principles for the design and evaluation of successful processes and outcomes

(Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Ward 1993; Penrose 1996; Jackson 1997; Warburton 1997; Duffy et al. 1998).

Comparably, there have been attempts to understand what makes a successful – or not so successful – process by analyzing various processes (Brenneis 1990; Crowfort and Wondolleck 1990; Wilson 1995; Howlett 1997; McAllister 1998; Owen 1998; Williams et al. 1998b; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Schuett et al. 2001). Some studies have included both a search of the literature and evaluation of past processes (Gunton and Vertinsky 1991; Wilson et al. 1996; Penrose et al. 1998; Dorsey and McDaniels 2000).

Evaluative work has included looking at the long-term sustainability of plans produced by such processes (Boswell 1996), or the effectiveness of on-the-ground management (Cooperman 1998). Some have evaluated these processes based on the needs of specific groups (Reed 1997; Williams et al. 1998a; Dovetail Consulting 1999). Other work includes comparisons of BC processes with those in other jurisdictions (Weetman 2000b), and exploration of practical issues such as implementation (Rutledge 2000, Weetman 2000a).

While many of these works recognize the interpersonal nature of collaborative resource management planning processes, few examine it in detail. Works that mention the interpersonal tend to do so because of unusual or influential characters (Susskind 1981:198) or the potential of processes to draw out such participants (Gregory et al. 2001). One study did mention the value of good relations among participants before a process (Salamon et al. 1998). Another mentioned group dynamics, though it was as a consideration in allowing participants enough time (Buchy and Hoverman 2000).

This project looks at the role of group dynamics in the Lillooet LRMP process. It does this using participant-observation, a document review, and in-depth interviews with participants. This is a longitudinal study;¹ therefore it asks and answers different questions than work done over shorter times. The result is a detailed examination of the interaction between local and 'outside' interests during negotiations. This approach complements previous work in contributing to a more complete picture of how the negotiation component of these processes operates over time.

There are obvious limitations in generalizing from single case research, as discussed in Chapter Three. However, I would hope that there are some common sense generalizations to be made to other planning processes, from what is described here.

¹ Longitudinal research involves the collection and analysis of data over time. Its major advantage is being able to show the "temporal ordering of a relationship" (Menard 1991:1).

Organization

This chapter provided information about the nature of this project. Chapter Two provides background to the case including the case context and relevant theory.

Chapter Three is a discussion of the methods used to investigate the case while

Chapter Four presents the results of these methods. Chapter Five is a discussion of results and implications for theory and practice. Chapter Six summarizes some of the conclusions of this research.

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND

This chapter presents background, historical and theoretical, important to understanding the case. It begins with the case context, then moves into a brief description of land use planning in BC leading up to Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP). It then explores theory behind elements of LRMP, including multi-stakeholder processes, group development, consensus building, and interest-based negotiation. It also introduces the role of trust in group processes and some of the challenges presented by a rural-urban dynamic.

Case Context

The Lillooet forest district is located in south-western BC (figure 1). At approximately 1.1 million hectares, it is one of the smaller forest districts in the province. Both Highway 1 (Trans Canada Highway) and Highway 99 run through the area; it takes only a few hours to drive from the Lower Mainland to the district's major centers. A 1996 census showed the population of the district as 6538, which is less than one percent of the total provincial population (MoF 2001). Approximately half of this is situated in and around Lillooet itself.




Figure 1. Lillooet Forest District

The western portion of the Lillooet forest district sits on the eastern slopes of the Coast Mountain Range. This is a transition area from the wetter conditions of the coast to the drier interior conditions (MoF 2001). As a result, the western portion of the district experiences a wet coastal influence, while eastern parts tend to be drier. In addition to the Coast Mountain Range in the western portion of the district, there are the Pacific Ranges in the west, the South Chilcotin Ranges in the north, and the Pavilion Ranges in the east. The variable topography – the coastal craggy in southern parts of the district and the rolling hills and flatter plateaus in the north – gives rise to a variety of landscapes.

Differences in climate and topography are reflected in the vegetation. The district contains seven of the fourteen Biogeoclimatic Zones (BGCZs) found in the province, including: Bunch Grass (BG), Ponderosa Pine (PP), Interior Douglas fir (IDF), Coastal Western Hemlock (CWH), Montane Spruce (MS), Englemann Spruce-Subalpine Fir (ESSF), and Alpine Tundra (AT) (MoF 2001). Each zone is classified according to vegetation, soils, and climate; zones in the district range from dry, valley-bottom grasslands and semi-desert to lush coastal-type forests to harsh, high-elevation parkland. This combination of physical and biological features creates opportunities for a wide variety of human uses.

The Lillooet forest district and the Lillooet Timber Supply Area (TSA) share the same boundary; this is also the boundary used to define the Lillooet LRMP plan area. Of the total 1,125,187 hectares within this boundary, approximately 505,933 hectares are forested lands. As of 2000, only about one quarter (approximately 26.3%) or 296,311 hectares of the plan area were classified as being in the Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB) (LLRMP 2000). Land in the THLB is land that is potentially available for harvesting timber.²

Timber harvesting provides a variety of jobs for local people, including local contractors, who harvest and haul trees, and those who work in the local mills; it also means jobs for those who develop and maintain roads and those who administer and enforce provincial harvesting and silviculture guidelines. As of 2000, the forest industry employed about 840 people, directly and indirectly, making up about 27% of local employment (Enemark and Robinson 2001). It is an important contributor to the economy of the Lillooet district, making up about 27% of the local economic activity (Enemark and Robinson 2001).³

Due to the natural diversity of the area, and its proximity to the larger centres of the Lower Mainland, the Lillooet forest district receives a lot of attention. The district provides conservation and recreation opportunities not easily found so close to these larger centres. Certain areas of the district are particularly desirable. The popularity of the Stein drew provincial, national and international attention in the early 1980s (McGonigle 1988; Wilson 1998). The South Chilcotin Mountains or "Spruce Lake" area has caught the eye of people from outside the district since 1937, when the Vancouver Natural History Society proposed that the area be protected as an area of unprecedented natural beauty and recreational opportunity.

Brief History of BC Land Use Planning

Tension over whether to protect or develop certain areas was not limited to the Lillooet forest district - this conflict of interests was playing out in many areas of the province and had been for some time. Until nearly the middle of the twentieth century, the main focus of land use planning was ensuring a steady timber supply (CORE 1994a). It was not for another twenty to thirty years that other values, such as wildlife and recreation, were recognized. Eventually, there was considerable concern about the loss of opportunities and non-timber values, and indeed, the

² The Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB) is defined as "the portion of the total land area of a management unit considered to contribute to, and be available for, long-term timber supply" (ABCPF 1993:99).

³ According to most definitions, the towns of Lillooet and Lytton, and the smaller outlying communities in the district, are both single industry communities as "a large percentage of the basic labour force [in each of these towns and in the district] is involved in a dominant industrial activity" (Robson 1995:4). More specifically, they are forest dependent - they currently "depend on the forestry sector for [their] continued vitality" (Robson 1995:17).

timber itself. Ultimately, concerns over loss of the forests and forest values forced the restructuring of land use planning for BC.

Throughout much of the middle part and up to the last few decades of the last century, planning for Crown Land was generally carried out as planning for Timber Supply Areas (TSAs). These TSA plans tended to emphasize managing the timber resource, with other resource uses and values given minor consideration (Lui 1994). Public involvement in these processes tended to be limited to commenting on proposed plans. Planning for crown land in the province was primarily the responsibility of the BC Ministry of Forests (MOF) (Williams et al. 1998b).

In the 1970s and 1980s, some local planning, with public involvement, did occur, but this was determined within each forest district by the District Manager. This planning often fell under the general term 'Local Resource Use Planning' (LRUP) (Vance 1990; Lui 1994).⁴ The scale of the planning, typically one or two watersheds, tended to limit the range of options available to participants and it was generally understood that public values would be accommodated only to the extent that they did not impact resource development.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, tensions over land use escalated, erupting in conflict over areas of 'high value' for both timber and recreation or conservation (Owen 1998). Efforts to manage these conflicts were uncoordinated and localized; not surprising, given that they were driven by "valley-by-valley" conflicts, such as the Walbran, the Stein, the Carmanah, Clayoquot, and South Moresby (Duffy 1991; Ward 1993; Duffy et al. 1998; Wilson 1998). Public concerns stemmed from a perception that land use decisions included only select interests, while public values were largely ignored (Penrose et al. 1998, Williams et al. 1998b, Wilson 1998)⁵.

It soon became clear that the small-scale planning processes being used to handle conflict over resources were not working. This approach did not prevent conflict. At best, it responded to it. People were often dissatisfied with the results of local land use planning processes, feeling that they did not take into account important values. And provincial decisions rarely satisfied those involved because they tended to be 'win-lose', so when they did resolve a situation, often it was not for long (Ward 1993). BC needed a comprehensive planning process that would involve interested parties and give them enough power to find a solution to satisfy all (Brenneis 1990; Williams et al. 1998b).⁶

⁴ It included: Resource Folio Plans, Coordinated Access Management Plans (CAMPs), Integrated Watershed Management Plans (IWMPs), Coordinated Resource Management Plans (CRMPs), and Local Resource Use Plans (LRUPs) (WCEL 1999).

⁵ Johnson (1993) describes a similar escalation of conflict and dissatisfaction in Ontario at that time. At the national level, this led to the creation of provincial Round Tables (Howlett 1997).

⁶ Formal processes, at the provincial, federal, and international level, also identified the need for comprehensive land use planning. These included: Dunsmuir, Dunsmuir II, the Forest Resources

In January 1992, the provincial government responded to the calls for an end to the conflict and the need for comprehensive planning by establishing the Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE). CORE was meant to end the escalating land use conflict through comprehensive regional land use planning (CORE 1992). Under Commissioner Stephen Owen, CORE developed a Land Use Strategy for BC, part of which consisted of processes designed to make land use allocation decisions at the regional level and resource management and planning decisions at the community level (CORE 1992, 1994a).

CORE Regional Planning Tables would use shared decision-making, founded on the principles of interest-based negotiation and consensus building (CORE 1992, Penrose et al. 1998). Shared decision-making means "on a certain set of issues, for a defined period of time, those with an authority to make a decision and those who [will] be affected by that decision are empowered to jointly seek an outcome that accommodates rather than compromises the interests of all concerned" (CORE 1992: 25). This approach involves participants in the design and development of the process and this is believed to contribute to its success (CORE 1992, Owen 1998).

It was believed that this approach would prevent conflict rather than simply responding to it. Plus, it was believed that more inclusive public involvement in land use planning and decision-making would result in decisions that more fully reflected public values, and this would encourage public acceptance of these decisions. With this new decision-making structure, BC was moving away from "an assortment of limited participation, uncoordinated review and narrow appeal mechanisms towards a more integrated set of preventative and adjudicative dispute resolution tools" (CORE, 1994a: 33). The first step was to initiate CORE planning Tables in some of the more contentious areas of the province (Owen 1998).

While none of the four initial CORE regional planning Tables reached consensus on a land use plan, all made some progress (Wilson, 1998). In most cases, land use issues and conflicts were more clearly defined and land use options had been explored. In some cases, there was even some measure of agreement on land allocation in parts of the plan area (Owen 1998). Also, it had opened up the decision-making process to non-traditional groups (Hoberg 1997:393). What CORE was attempting to do with these Tables had never been done at this scale in BC. The first Tables provided an opportunity to work out some of the procedural and substantive details and informed a new way of planning for public lands (McAllister 1998).

Following the completion of the first round of regional land use plans, no new CORE Tables were started. CORE spent the next year or so completing other

Commission in 1989, the federal Green Plan, the Old Growth Strategy, the Bruntland Report, Parks and Wilderness for the '90s, and the BC Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (CORE 1992).

aspects of its mandate. In 1996 CORE was disbanded, leaving ongoing sub-regional, multi-stakeholder, consensus Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) as the primary forum for public involvement in land use planning in BC (Duffy et al. 1998, Wilson 1998). By this time, the first sub-regional plan had been successfully completed for the Kamloops area, and three more planning processes – Kispiox, Bulkley, and Vanderhoof - were near completion (Wilson 1998).

So, for a short while, CORE and LRMP coexisted, but when CORE regional Tables had difficulties reaching consensus and LRMP Tables seemed to be making progress, it was felt that LRMP would take up where CORE left off (Wilson 1998). The Land Use Coordination Office (LUCCO), originally established to coordinate the work of the different ministries working with CORE, would oversee LRMP for the province (Wilson 1998). So after a few years of working behind the scenes, LRMP emerged as the new strategic, multi-stakeholder, consensus land use planning process for the province.

Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) had learned from the CORE experience. LRMP would be done for smaller areas. Plans would typically cover areas of 15000 to 25000 square kilometers, following MoF Timber Supply Area (TSA) boundaries (IRPC 1993). Government agents would be more central to the process compared to their advisory roles in CORE processes (Wilson 1998: 294). Also, some of the provincial policy that was absent during CORE Tables was developed by the time LRMP became the primary land use planning tool for the province.

Like CORE regional Tables, LRMP processes would “draw on provincial principles... goals and strategic policies; the needs, ideas and information provided by the widest possible range of local and regional sectors of interest; and technical data and expertise provided by provincial agency officials in the region” (CORE 1994a: 31). Each LRMP Table would produce “a land use designation system... including protected, special management, intensive use and settlement areas; management objectives for each area; policy direction on economic transition and development, plan implementation and monitoring; and priority direction for local planning (CORE 1994a: 31). It is essentially a zoning exercise (Weetman 2000a:324) and zones range from full protection to a mix of industrial and recreational uses (IRPC 1993).

One of CORE’s major tasks had been to implement the Protected Areas Strategy (PAS). The PAS committed the province to ‘developing and expanding a Protected Areas system to protect 12% of the province by the year 2000 (Province of British Columbia 1993).⁷ The primary objective of PAS is to protect “representative examples of the ecological, cultural heritage and recreational diversity of the

⁷ The 12% figure was derived, some say arbitrarily, from the Bruntland Commission’s recommendation for the need to triple existing protected area.

province's land base, including special features, wilderness areas and predator/prey systems" (CORE 1994a: 25). Protected Area cannot be sold, and no industrial resource extraction or development – logging, mining, or oil or gas exploration or development – is permitted in them (Province of BC 1993:5).

But the PAS was not fully elaborated until 1993, when the first round of CORE processes was nearly complete.⁸ The job of implementing the PAS now fell to LRMP Tables that would have to identify the size, number, and location of new parks (CORE, 1994a). While initially the twelve-percent provincial target was applied to both the provincial and regional levels, it was recognized early on that the exact percentage of each region eligible for adoption would likely vary somewhat above or below this provincial target (Province of BC 1993). But while there was some direction on the percentage for each region, it was not determined what this would mean for sub-regional processes (Wilson 1998). There were also concerns that, as the province approached 12%, there would be reluctance to allow more Protected Areas in remaining LRMP processes (WCEL 1999).

The Lillooet LRMP

The Lillooet district also experienced this evolution in land use planning. Tension over how to manage the land was first addressed through small-scale land use planning processes, such as the Bralorne and Yalakom Local Resource Use Planning (LRUP) processes (BCFS 1993, BCFS 1998). More contentious areas, namely the Stein Valley and the South Chilcotin Mountains were the focus of repeated 'integrated' land use and 'folio' planning exercises, though there was no resolution (MoF 1981, MoF 1984, M'Gonigle 1988). While these were multi-stakeholder processes, the area and issues were tightly proscribed and public participants had limited influence on outcomes.

The need for comprehensive, higher-level planning for the Lillooet area was clear. Some people in the district who felt strongly about this formed a local planning committee – the Lillooet District Community Resources Board (CRB). On November 23, 1995, the provincial government announced that the Lillooet forest district would undergo LRMP, while at the same time designating the Stein Valley Nlaka'pamux Heritage Park (LLRMP 1997b). The Lillooet LRMP (LLRMP) would "provide strategic land and resource management direction for activities occurring on Crown land within the planning area" (LLRMP 1997b:1). The planning area would be the Lillooet forest district.

⁸ Shortly after the initiation of CORE regional Tables, a list of study areas - candidates for the PAS - was announced. This list was the culmination of recommendations from the amalgamated Parks and Wilderness for the 90s process and the Old Growth Strategy, and was entitled Towards a Protected Areas Strategy for BC (British Columbia 1993). The list underwent revisions in 1993 for regional planning and in 1994 to prepare for sub-regional LRMP (Province of British Columbia 1993).

Like LRMP throughout the province, the Lillooet LRMP would be a multi-stakeholder consensus land use planning exercise. The designation of the Stein Valley Park at the same time that the LLRMP was announced brought the Protected Area total for the Lillooet forest district to 9.8%.

Multi-Stakeholder Processes

Like LRMP processes throughout the province, the Lillooet LRMP (LLRMP) was a multi-stakeholder exercise. According to *LRMP Principles and Process* multi-stakeholder processes are processes where “all parties with a key interest or stake in the plan must be invited and encouraged to participate” (IRPC 1993:5).⁹ But who are these parties? Many different groups make demands on forests – the term ‘stakeholder’ is used to describe all of them, and it implies that they have some legitimate claims to forest values. These groups may have an impact or influence on the forest, or, conversely, they may be affected by activity in it (Bass 2001:222-223).

It has long been recognized in the public participation and public involvement literature that it is important to involve in a decision those who can affect or who could be affected by that decision. There are good reasons for this. It is believed that public involvement can lead to better-informed decisions, as this interaction yields information about public values and opinions; it can also provide a more complete set of information (BCRTEE 1994:4, Lui 1994). From a decision-maker’s point of view, public involvement can mean increased ‘buy-in’ or acceptance of a decision in which the public was involved (Dorcey et al. 1994; Thomas 1995).


Not only is it important to involve the public in decisions, increasingly, they demand it (Dorcey et al. 1994:4). In BC, for example, there is a general feeling that the public should have a ‘say’ in what happens on public land. Yet, because of the tradeoffs of public involvement, including increased time and cost, those in decision-making power may not want to fully involve the public all the time in every decision (Thomas 1995). Factors to consider in deciding what form and level of public involvement is appropriate might include how easy it is to identify the relevant ‘public’, the availability of information, and the extent to which public and government goals are already in agreement (Dorcey et al. 1994).

As a result, the degree to which the public is involved in a given decision-making process varies. Figure 2. is a spectrum of public involvement in decision-making. To the left are more superficial forms of public involvement where the public is involved during the later stages of the process. To the right are processes that require higher levels of involvement where the public has more ‘say’ or weight in a decision. Typically, this will also mean that the public is involved in the earlier stages of the

⁹ The stakeholder or ‘round table’ approach to planning adopted by CORE and LRMP and involving face-to-face negotiation among stakeholders reflected a larger trend throughout Canada and the Western world. However, BC is the first jurisdiction in Canada to employ the round table approach throughout an entire province (McAllister 1998:126).

process. But there are tradeoffs: increasing involvement also means greater time and other costs, and greater commitment.

Figure 2. Spectrum of Public Involvement (adapted from Dorcey et al. 1994).



As shown in Figure 2., LRMP is one of the more intensive forms of public involvement. Consistent with more demanding or 'meaningful'¹⁰ forms of public participation, LRMP requires that the public be involved throughout the process. The public is involved during the earliest stages, from determining their desired level of participation and formulating guidelines for working together – terms of reference – to deciding the outcome of the process (IRPC 1993).¹¹ This is done through face-to-face negotiations. This form of public involvement has become synonymous with the 'round table' approach (Gregory et al. 2001).¹²

Multi-stakeholder and round table processes have been used for a variety of issues, from determining where to locate local toxic waste facilities to negotiating large-scale, comprehensive planning (Gregory et al. 2001). Despite initial concerns that stakeholder decisions might be too political and less scientific than 'expert' decisions, stakeholder decisions are often of better quality, adding new information, ideas and analysis (Beierle 2002, Bass 2001). They also tend to fetch higher levels of public support (Owen 1998). Some of their popularity stems from the additional benefits that can come from bringing together a diverse group of what are often competing interests. It presents an opportunity to resolve conflict (Susskind 1981:186).

So how does one go about identifying who should be involved? Because LRMP specifically states that all with an interest or 'stake' in the plan area or plan outcome

¹⁰ According to Buchy and Hoverman, "participation stops being meaningful when there is no transfer or share of power in decision-making" (2000:17). This has been a criticism of the Canadian Model Forest program - stakeholder groups are not able to influence the integration of their findings into policy and practice (Sinclair and Smith 1998).

¹¹ More accurately, the public or stakeholders involved in the process decide amongst themselves. This 'decision' is brought to the actual decision-maker, the provincial government (IRPC 1993). Because the public does not have authority to make a decision, this 'decision' is referred to as a 'recommendation'.

¹² Not all multi-stakeholder processes are 'round tables' involving face-to-face negotiation. O'Riordan (2001) describes a process of consulting separately with different stakeholder groups to compare various land use planning scenarios.

should be involved (IRPC 1993) it avoids the tricky issue of determining geographically who is eligible to participate.¹³ It becomes a matter of making sure that all who want to have an opportunity to express their interest in participating (Loikkanen et al. 1999:225). Characteristically, a two-tiered approach is used, where the process is advertised as widely as possible, and anyone who has expressed an interest in the plan area in the past is notified (Buchy and Hoverman 2000:21).

The LLRMP was advertised widely. Groups and individuals who had expressed an interest in the plan area, the Lillooet forest district, were also contacted directly by the Ministry of Forests (MoF). This attracted considerable interest from outside the district. This was in addition to the local interest that had taken the form of a local planning board, the Community Resources Board (CRB), even before the LLRMP was even announced. 'Outside' interest in the area included both industrial, and recreation and conservation interests.

Once potential public participants or stakeholders were assembled, it was necessary to determine who would participate directly in the process. It can be unwieldy to have too many participants involved in an exercise of this sort; it is also unnecessary¹⁴ - so groups with similar interests may decide they only require one representative at the 'Table' representing their collective interest.¹⁵ This limits the number of participants involved in negotiations. Table 1. shows the typical composition of the LLRMP Table - typical in that this shows who might be at a monthly Table meeting.

Table 1. Typical Lillooet LRMP Table Composition.

Category	Number of People
Lillooet District Community Resources Board (CRB)	10
Non-Government Participants Representing Specific Sectors (i.e. industry, 'outside' conservation groups)	11
First Nations	1 ¹⁶
Provincial Government (i.e. MoF, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Ministry of Environment, Lands, and Parks, BC Assets and Lands Corporation).	10 agencies
Local Government	1 regional district
Federal Government (i.e. Department of Fisheries and Oceans)	1 agency
Support Staff (i.e. LLRMP Coordinators, facilitator(s))	7
Total ¹⁷	41

¹³ Elsewhere there is work being done to determine the relative 'weighting' of stakeholders, based on such factors as distance from the plan area and degree of dependence on the forest (Bass 2001).


¹⁴ Theoretically, consensus decision-making means it should not matter whether an interest or sector has one or several representatives.

¹⁵ Each representative also has an 'alternate representative' to step in when the primary representative is unable to attend meetings.

¹⁶ The LLRMP terms of reference state: "land use decision-making shall incorporate, support and not interfere with negotiations on Aboriginal self government and treaties. Aboriginal peoples shall be encouraged to be active participants in decision-making" (1997:12). However there was limited direct participation in Table negotiations by First Nations people.

The final Table composition was a combination of local and 'outside' interests or sectors, in addition to government representatives, government support staff, and First Nations. Figure 3. shows the structure of the LLRMP Table. It reflects the special role of the CRB as central to the LLRMP process. Other public participants included 'outside interests' or sectors, which tended to be either industrial in nature, or have recreation or conservation leanings.¹⁸ Whether by accident or design, three informal coalitions or sub-groups of Table representatives quickly formed – the CRB, 'outside' industrial interests, and 'outside' conservation and recreation groups.

Figure 3. LLRMP Table Structure (Adapted from LLRMP 1997b).



LRMP generally, and the LLRMP process, follow a structure similar to CORE processes, where each Table member or 'representative' represents the interests of a much larger group or 'constituency' or 'sector'. So, for example, a representative for recreation must be able to represent the interests of a much larger group or sector of recreationists at the Table during negotiations. Information must flow back and forth through this representative – his or her constituents' needs and interests must flow through him or her to the Table, and he or she must relay information from the Table back out to this larger group.

¹⁷ The total number of Table participants varied somewhat. Part way through the process, the Table lost one of the facilitators. Later, additional support staff were added. The full complement of CRB members was sixteen, though this fluctuated and not all CRB members participated in the LLRMP.

¹⁸ I am simplifying things a bit here to draw out the larger patterns at the Table.

It is possible to see how not informing these larger constituent groups of a Table's work could result in agreement around the Table but little else. Obviously, communication is easiest with a clearly defined constituency, such as with an organized group. As members of the CRB pointed out, local people are not always organized, at least formally, into 'groups' – there is no community 'membership' or 'list'. Further, as one LLRMP participant said, "even if there was, we're not in a position to be able to stand for their behaviour" as might be expected of a sectoral representative in a stakeholder process. This difference between local and other LLRMP participants led the CRB to adopt a 'perspectives approach'.¹⁹

In summary, the multi-stakeholder or round table approach to decision-making is popular because of the many benefits it has to offer. The LLRMP Table began as a combination of local and 'outside' interests, loosely organized into three coalitions or sub-groups at the Table. The local planning board was assigned a central role in the structure of this process, and there were differences in how the local planning board and the other public interests or 'sectors' viewed their relationship to the broader public. It is this bringing together of different interests, or in this case, sub-groups, to work as a single, large group that makes multi-stakeholder processes challenging. Some aspects of group theory are considered next.

Models of Group Development

Any group of people brought together to accomplish a task will develop as a group over time – this is true of multi-stakeholder groups brought together for a land use planning exercise and it is true of participants at the Lillooet LRMP Table. Theory on group development suggests how exactly a group develops depends upon the nature and composition of that group. However, all groups are expected to experience certain stages of development.

Despite the many theories on group development (Geller 1962; Feinstein and Waxler 1963; Tuckman 1965; Ammon and Avent 1967; Wilson 1973; Tuckman and Jensen 1977; Napier and Gershenfeld 1985; Sarri and Galinsky 1985), most support, either empirically or theoretically the idea that a group will move through four to five main stages during its lifetime. Typically, there is a forming or orientation stage, a conflict stage, a norming or integration stage, and a performing or achievement stage. The original model, proposed by Tuckman (1965) and based on the literature to date, did not contain a final or 'termination' stage. This was added following testing and additional research (Tuckman and Jensen 1977).

There have been challenges to this basic model of group development. Some feel that there are fewer or more stages than what is found in the basic model (Caple 1978; McClure 1998). The model is criticized for not paying enough attention to

¹⁹ CRB members "represent particular values or perspectives within the community without being directed by or accountable to specific groups or organizations" so that the CRB "is accountable to the community at large and board members represent the broad general interests of the community" (LLRMP 1997b:7).

specific aspects of group development or to background conditions (Caple 1978, Bernand 1990, McClure 1998). However, most proposed changes to the model tend to involve condensing or expanding certain stages and so are more of an elaboration of the model than a true challenge or change. For the purpose of examining the 'patterns' or types of phases any group will experience – as a “framework of generic temporal change” (Tuckman 1965:398) - the four or five-stage model is sufficient (Douglas 1983:64).

Each stage of the model is characterized by certain group member behaviours, as group members move from independence to being part of the group. The first or 'orientation' stage is characterized by a niceness or politeness, as group members test boundaries, in terms of other group members, and in terms of the group task. It also tends to be characterized by a certain amount of anxiety, as group members search for meaning and structure. The conflict or 'storming' stage is characterized by conflict and polarization around interpersonal issues and notions of the group task. Often there are power and control issues and considerable frustration. Values are fought over as the group tries to develop ways to work together.

The third or 'integration' stage is the calm following the conflict. Group members listen to one another. There is an increasing sense of direction for the group as a whole, and increased cohesion; resistance has been overcome. By this stage, group members tend to experience a balance between the group and the self, or the sub-group. During the next stage, 'achievement', the interpersonal aspect of the group is genuine and strong and the group is productive. This tends to be the most desirable stage as the group is able to work together to achieve its goals – the group is fluid but structured, and this structure supports the group's task. The final stage, 'termination' is where the group prepares to disband, typically after it has completed its task and accomplished its goal - reaction to termination can be quite intense.²⁰

Most believe a group's development through these stages is sequential, with each stage building on the last. All stages are important and none can be skipped – the stages together form a structural whole. Again, there have been challenges to this idea of a group progressing through different stages of group development, but these challenges simply suggest that this progression is neither as regular nor as predictable as one might imagine, and that the stages are not as discrete as their descriptions might suggest (Douglas 1983: 63; Mennecke et al. 1992). Other criticisms are that the model overlooks changes in individual members versus those of the group (Cissna 1984). None of these are serious challenges and similarities exist for integration (Mennecke et al. 1992).

²⁰ It is interesting that this stage was originally left off of the model, as it is now recognized as a 'significant stage' (Tuckman and Jensen 1977:426) important for addressing unresolved emotions (Ammon and Avenet 1967). If a group does not 'terminate' well, group members will need to deal with the resulting emotions (Rose 1989:531).

But these challenges raise some interesting points. While all groups are expected to eventually move through the complete set of stages, different groups will move through at different speeds (Feinstein and Waxler 1963; Tuckman 1965). And while all stages are important, the 'achievement' or 'performing' stage is usually the most desirable – this is where the group moves beyond 'process' issues to substantive ones – it becomes focused on completing its task. Such is the case with groups like the Lillooet LRMP Table. The main reason for the group – the group's main task – was the development of a land use plan. To do this, the LRMP Table would need to get beyond interpersonal conflict to a point where it was focused on this task.

What makes the achievement or performance stage so productive? It is in this stage that group members are able to function comfortably within a known structure – they know their task and know how they fit into the group (Rees and Segal 1984). The group has achieved the cohesiveness²¹ required to operate as a productive unit (Tuckman 1965, Tuckman and Jensen 1972). Group members no longer have to worry about how the group is going to work. The details have been worked out and they are known and agreed to by all. The group can concentrate on its task.

Some argue cohesiveness alone does not ensure productivity (Stodgill 1972). This is true; we can envision a highly cohesive group that accomplishes nothing; however, the converse is less likely. A non-cohesive group is not going to be highly productive – group members simply have not worked out and agreed to the group's task, and their roles in relation to this task; furthermore, they just 'do not get along'. So while increasing cohesiveness may not also mean increasing productivity, it seems intuitive that a group must have some minimum level of cohesiveness to be productive – there is a threshold that must be reached for the group to work well.

Another qualifier on the achievement stage is that it is not free of conflict. Some believe that cohesion in a group means that there is no conflict – this is not the case. However, while conflict is present, it is decreased from the levels found in earlier stages (Theodorson 1962). And it tends to be constructive rather than destructive, as it might be in earlier stages – it contributes to exploring group members' areas of agreement and disagreement regarding their task and how to proceed. What is important to cohesiveness is a commonly accepted frame of reference, developed in earlier stages (Theodorson 1962:60).

So, the achievement stage, characterized by some minimum level of cohesiveness is the desired state, and if given long enough, most groups should get there. But as easily as groups can move forward through the stages of group development, they can move back. Any event that disrupts the group can set the group back to the early stages of development. For example, newness to the group, such as with the

²¹ Generally, a cohesive group is one "whose members, for whatever reason, want to be in this group more than they want to be out of it" (Balkwell 1994:121).

introduction of a new member, is greeted by orienting or early stage development behaviour (Tuckman 1965). A new member needs to learn the subtleties of group communication, and the group needs to adjust to this unfamiliar member (Argyle 1972:27).

Not only can a group experience set backs in its development, it may stay indefinitely in any one phase without progressing (Cissna 1984). To advance, a group must have acquired the necessary skills and relationships or structure of its present stage to prepare it for the next (Caple 1978:476). A group 'stuck' in any one stage likely has not been entirely successful there. Trying to advance without successfully completing a particular stage can seriously affect a group's subsequent development (Caple 1978). This is particularly true of the formative or 'orientation' and 'conflict' stages.

It is in the formative stages, particularly the conflict stage, that a group begins to establish a framework for working together. This framework guides the behaviour of individual group members – group members know what is expected of them and how they fit in to the group. But they also know what to expect from others (Tuckman 1965). Since all group members have constructed this framework, it governs other's behaviour as well. The result is a group environment where each member understands his or her role and knows what to expect from others. In this way, the framework establishes reliability and predictability within the group – in short, it helps to establish trust.²²

Being able to predict what other group members will do – to *trust* others - in the context of a shared group agreement establishes a safe and familiar environment for group members (Geller 1962, Douglas 1983). With safety and trust comes open communication – the key to becoming a functional unit (Douglas 1983). Trust and open communication are especially important in something as 'high stakes' as an interest-based negotiation, where participants must feel comfortable enough to move beyond their initial, often highly inflated demands to seek agreement on a outcome that will be acceptable to all.

Only once this environment is established, and the group is able to communicate effectively can it begin to focus on its task (Geller 1962). Typically, this should happen by the end of the second stage. Conversely, failure to develop a sense of familiarity and trust within a group and the resultant problems with communication represent impediments to group development and productivity (Tuckman 1965, Douglas 1983). Smith describes this as a balance of energy. Group members have a finite amount of energy available in a group situation and the amount absorbed by establishing and maintaining the internal group structure is subtracted from the amount available for group productivity (1957:213).

²² Deutsch defines as the basis of 'everyday' trust in someone, the ability to predict what that person will do; to know what to expect from that person (1958:265).

Given the importance of these early stages, particularly the second or 'conflict' stage for later group development and functioning (McClure 1998:168), how can we help a group get the most out of this stage and move on? As the name would indicate, conflict plays a vital role, allowing group members to explore areas of similarity and differences to ultimately develop a set of common values – a framework for working together (Theodorson 1962). Once this is established, the group becomes more cohesive and begins to function as a unit, and group members can focus their energies on the group task. In this way, conflict serves a useful, even necessary role – it paves the way for later discussion, communication, and ultimately, productivity.

Yet often there is a tendency, among certain group members, to avoid conflict by keeping the group to safe topics. It has been shown that if this happens and conflict is suppressed, the group will never be able to explore areas of agreement and disagreement and may never be able to achieve cohesion (Theodorson 1962). Suppression of conflict can retard group development. While the group may be able to function, it tends to do so just barely, stress aggravating difficulties among group members (McClure 1998:168). If this persists and is not dealt with, the destructiveness of the group becomes "reified" (McClure 1998:169). The importance of conflict in the early stages of formation cannot be understated. Because of this, conflict needs to be acknowledged and exploited.

Also key to advancing out of the second stage and into the third or 'integration' stage is for group members to begin to find a balance between the group and the self (Tuckman 1965). As the group begins to take shape, individuals will begin to sense a tension between their own needs and wants and those of the group (Scheidlinger 1964). It is this struggle between remaining independent and becoming an interdependent member of a group that is the source of much of the conflict in the conflict stage. This transition is a difficult one for any group member; it is equally, or perhaps even *more* difficult, for sub-groups coming together as part of a larger group.

The Role of Sub-Groups

Why do sub-groups within a larger group pose such a challenge? Because all groups, whether the larger LLRMP Table or the three sub-groups formed by the CRB, 'outside' industrial interests, and 'outside' conservation and recreation interests, have their own dynamics. Sometimes, these sub-group dynamics can work in opposition to the dynamics of the larger group.

It has been shown that individuals in a cohesive group will identify more strongly with the people in their group and less strongly with people from outside of their group (Owen et al. 1999); this is not surprising. What is surprising is that differentiation between those *in* the group and those outside the group, or in another group, does not have to be based on any real differences. This was demonstrated by Sherif, who, after arbitrarily dividing a relatively homogenous group of individuals

into two sub-groups, found that each of the two sub-groups became increasingly cohesive, while becoming increasingly hostile toward the other, relatively similar group (Sherif et al. 1961; Sherif 1966; Brown 2000:258).

Individuals in a group identify more strongly with the people in that group and less strongly with people outside of that group. They tend to see more differences and variety among people within their own group, seeing people outside of this group as homogeneous, though different, from the group that they are in - this can lead to 'stereotyping' (Markovsky 1994:79; Owen et al. 1999). Further, group discussion can amplify preexisting tendencies (McGrath 1984:236). So group discussion about other groups or others outside of one's group will tend to reinforce group members' feelings that these 'others' are homogenous yet different from them; it will also tend to exaggerate the magnitude of the differences - real or perceived - between and among these groups. This is referred to as 'polarization' (Plous 1993:208).

The power of the group, or the sub-group in this case, is not easily overcome. Groups that are working well - that are cohesive - tend to maintain themselves. To their members, the group is safe and familiar (Elliot 1970). This has serious implications for forming a group whose members consist of smaller sub-groups. In joining the large group, sub-group members face leaving, though not completely abandoning, the safety and familiarity of the sub-group for the unfamiliar, and potentially unsafe, larger group. They face the ultimate conflict of group formation - balancing the self with the group, yet in this case, the 'self' is the sub-group.

At this point sub-group members must ask themselves which group best reflects their views of the world and where are they most comfortable (Greene 1983:16). The decision to leave the sub-group for the larger group depends on the relative strength between the sub-groups' cohesion and the cohesion of the larger group (Lawler 2001). As a sub-group becomes more developed, it is more difficult for members of that sub-group to become more active in the larger group (Goldbart and Cooper 1976:254). Ultimately, if the larger group is not able to present an appealing enough environment, it becomes a loosely connected set of sub-groups, "each promoting a stronger source of common identity than the larger unit" (Lawler 2001:348).

In summary, to move out of the second or 'conflict' stage, a group must embrace conflict and group members must balance 'self' and group. This is true whether the group is composed of individuals or of sub-groups. Similarly, conditions exist for moving out of the other stages. Fortunately, there has been work to identify strategies for helping a group move from one stage to the next (Mills 1977).²³ A group that is aware of this approach and aware of its own development should be able to use these strategies to its advantage. For this reason, some advocate making

²³ A variation on this idea is that a group must address particular "doubts" or "problems" at each stage to progress to the next stage (Bernard 1990).

groups more self-aware (Carlisle and Leary 1981:183, Pedigo and Singer 1982; Kuypers et al. 1986).²⁴ A supplement or alternative to this is for the group to acquire the assistance of an outside or 'third' party, such as a facilitator.

The Role of the Facilitator

Simply, a facilitator helps people talk with one another; a group facilitator is an individual who enables groups and organizations to work more effectively – to collaborate (Kaner 1996).²⁵ Typically facilitators are seen as neutral parties who do not advocate a particular point of view (Hansen 1998; Gregory et al. 2001).²⁶ Because of this, they can advocate for a fair, open, and inclusive process to accomplish the group's task (Susskind 1981; Kaner 1996:xi). They are also able to monitor and diagnose group development so that the group performs optimally, and, where necessary, they can propose strategies to help group members work together more effectively (Kaner 1996).

Participants in LRMP are at once dealing with the complexities of working in a group and negotiating the substance of a land use plan. It is not surprising that LRMP Tables are encouraged to secure a facilitator (IRPC 1993:12). According to the guidelines for LRMP, this person "must be acceptable to all participants. Until a final appointment is ratified by participants, an interim facilitator must be named to co-ordinate the public process during the early planning steps" (IRPC 1993:13). When negotiations began at the Lillooet LRMP, the Table had two facilitators. The first was the facilitator for the local planning committee, the CRB. The second was a facilitator from outside of the area.

The facilitator can help a group, or LRMP Table, in two main ways. First, a facilitator should help that group function effectively (Hansen 1995:59). Second, a facilitator can help the group 'problem-solve,' its task, or in some cases, resolve a dispute (Moore 1996). This is done by helping group members resolve their own problems (Maser 1996:4; Hansen 1998:19).²⁷ This 'arms-length' approach is what differentiates facilitation from more interventionist types of third-party assistance (Dorcey and Riek 1988; Hansen 1995; Moore 1996; Hansen 1998), such as mediation and arbitration, which tend to rely on hostile as well as conciliatory tactics to affect outcomes (Ford 1994:251).²⁸ When done properly, either alone or with the help of a facilitator, group problem solving should result in a decision, ideally, consensus.

²⁴ Despite Pedigo and Singer's (1982) slightly different 'take' on the phases of group development, they stress the importance of making group work more transparent so a group can help itself progress.

²⁵ Although receiving less emphasis at present, Maser also points out the potential of facilitation in helping to achieve 'moral transformation' (1996:3).

²⁶ Some argue a facilitator should take sides when there are issues of justice, and distribution of power and resources, though this may appear biased (Hartman 1981:207).

²⁷ Facilitation as described here is not limited to public matters. Gordon (1975) promotes a classic facilitation approach to parenting where parents help children 'problem-solve' their own problems.

²⁸ During mediation, groups work through an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power. Arbitration involves the assistance of an impartial and neutral third party to make

Consensus Decision-Making²⁹

Consensus or 'consensual decision-making,' as used in LRMP (IRPC 1993:20), is a form of decision-making or a 'decision-rule'.³⁰ According to an early description of the role of consensus in the LLRMP, "... consensus is purpose-driven; it is specific to the solution sought. It is inclusive not exclusive; everyone who has an interest in the outcome needs to be part of the decision... they design the process... it operates within time limits set by the participants... and finally, consensus focuses on actions and outcomes rather than on definitions and rules" (CRB 1997).³¹ Key to this description is that consensus emphasizes an outcome or settlement – ideally, this outcome will accommodate all involved. This is accomplished by involving these parties in the process, even in process design.

LRMP defines consensus as "general agreement or acceptance of decisions by participants" (IRPC 1993:20). But while participants should be in agreement with a decision, they do not have to be in full agreement. According to CORE, "the intent behind seeking consensus is to reach an agreement that, while not necessarily anyone's ideal solution, is one that everyone can live with... participants may not agree with every provision of an agreement, but are prepared to accept the package as a whole in order to produce a result that is acceptable to all" (1995:103 also captured in NRTEE 1996:4). In this way, consensus promotes the idea of some degree of sacrifice for the greater social good (Gregory et al. 2001).³²

This 'general agreement' or 'acceptance' is left up to the group to define, so some LRMP Tables might define it as less than unanimous agreement (IRPC 1993:20).³³ For participants in the LLRMP process, consensus was defined as "general agreement by all participants or lack of expressed objection by any participant" (LLRMP 1997b:13). As in most consensus-based processes, provisions for disagreement include "blocking" where an individual can express dissatisfaction with a decision and

a decision on a contested issue. Both mediation and arbitration tend to limit direct interaction between competing parties (Dorcey and Riek 1988, Moore 1996:8-9).

²⁹ 'Consensus' can be used to describe a form of negotiation as well as a mode of decision-making (Wood 1994). I have chosen to discuss separately the method of decision-making – consensus – with the mode of negotiation - interest-based negotiation - though often the two are 'packaged' together.

³⁰ The 'decision-making' I refer to here is among group members. LRMP Tables have no real decision-making power – they simply make recommendations on land use to government. As Susskind and Cruikshank argue, "officials with statutory power must retain their authority in order to ensure accountability" (1987:11).

³¹ For a full list of principles of consensus, see NRTEE (1996:7), CORE (1995a:130), IRPC (1993:20).

³² A more positive spin is that it "elevates the quality of decisions by bringing to bear the best information and knowledge in a problem-solving atmosphere" (NRTEE 1996:5).

³³ Participants in the Cassiar Iskut-Stikine process defined consensus as "...general agreement, or no substantial disagreement, by everybody-but-one on an issue or on the final package or recommendations" (Cassiar-Iskut-Skikine LRMP 1997:2). This was meant to prevent single members from blocking, though measures would be taken to address the 'blocker's' concerns before applying this definition of consensus.

ask for help to address this, and “standing aside” where the dissatisfied individual registers this with the group but allows the group to move ahead with a decision.

It is the first of these two that is considered among the strengths of consensus and why some might describe consensus as attempting to “mitigate the power imbalances among participants” (Wood 1994:188). The ability of an individual to stop a decision puts consensus in direct opposition to such procedures as majority rule. Because of this, consensus, at least theoretically, is thought to be able to prevent ‘tyranny of the majority’. A majority cannot impose its will on a minority, even if that minority is a single person, because that minority now has the power to ensure that its voice is heard and, ideally, accommodated in a decision (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

Some see this strength as a weakness, raising questions about the utility of a process where every participant “has veto power over the conduct and content of every step, as well as veto power over the choice of alternatives” (Gregory et al. 2001:416; this concern is also expressed in Hansen 1995:36).³⁴ Other concerns revolve around the idea that, in the ‘rush for agreement’ participants might avoid controversial issues or topics, opting instead to look at those most amenable to consensus (Gregory et al. 2001:417). A final concern is that failure to achieve consensus might be seen as a failure (Gregory et al. 2001).³⁵

Larger concerns have to do with limitations to consensus – that it may not be appropriate for every situation. Hartman proposes “consensus building can only be a goal for certain planning processes... when certain well-defined issues are to be decided and when basic resource allocation decisions are not under dispute” (1981:206). He specifically warns against the use of consensus for processes “that touch fundamental urban and social issues of distribution of power and wealth” (1981:206).

Interest-Based Negotiation

If consensus *is* possible, it can only be reached by having the participants in a process talk to each other face-to-face to discuss their views – this is called negotiation (NRTEE 1996:10). Generally, negotiation can be either competitive or collaborative. Competitive negotiation - also called positional bargaining - tends to focus on winning and losing and often results in deadlock or compromise. Collaborative negotiation adopts a problem-solving approach – this is often referred to as interest-based, or ‘principled’ negotiation (CORE 1995b:48).

³⁴ This veto is actually a ‘check’ or a ‘delay’. An individual who ‘blocks’ a decision must explain how the decision is unacceptable so that others can work to address the blocker’s concerns. If this person fails to do this, he or she must live with the decision or withdraw from the process (IRPC 1993:20).

³⁵ Some recognize this outcome is still able to inform the decision-making process by clearly defining problems, narrowing the scope of issues, and identifying a range of alternatives for resolution (CORE 1994a, Owen 1998).

In competitive forms of negotiation, also called 'positional' or 'adversarial' negotiation, parties tend to perceive each other as adversaries and are suspicious and fearful of each other's motives. They are quick to demand the outcomes or positions that they seek and spend little time finding out what is really important to other parties involved in the negotiation. Such negotiations tend to operate on the 'fixed pie' approach – there is only so much to 'go around' so it is important to get as much as one can; others will have to settle with less. Strategies associated with competitive negotiation include starting with inflated demands – a 'position' – and "playing your cards close to your chest" (Grzybowski and Duffy 1997, CORE 1995b:40). Others suggest more devious tactics.³⁶

This more competitive form of negotiating can be effective in certain situations, such as those with few other parties (CORE 1995b:40). It is possible to imagine other situations, such as buying a car, where this form of negotiation might also be appropriate. However, there is usually a cost. Because parties tend to perceive a fixed pie, there is the tendency to compromise, and because it is important to get what one wants, even at the cost of the other parties, long-term relations among parties are often strained.³⁷ Finally, this form of negotiation is not transferable to complex, multi-party negotiations (Grzybowski and Duffy 1997, CORE 1995, Fisher and Ury 1981).³⁸

Conversely, collaborative negotiation, or 'interest-based negotiation' is more appropriate for the type of negotiation found in LRMP. Because it involves exploring interests rather than stating 'positions' it is appropriate for multi-party negotiation. And rather than working against each other to get 'the best deal', parties work together to solve a problem – this approach tends to preserve relationships (Fisher and Ury 1981, CORE 1995b:40). Finally, by encouraging open communication and an exploration of interests, it is believed that more creative solutions can be found to existing problems – in this way, interest-based negotiation avoids the notion of a 'fixed-pie' and its associated problems (Fisher and Ury 1981).

This is best illustrated by the story of the two sisters who quarreled over an orange, one saying she wanted to eat the orange and the other saying she needed it as an ingredient to bake a cake. Given that each seemed to need the orange as much as the other, the only solution seemed to be a compromise – they would cut the orange in half. Yet after each discussed the exact nature of her interest in the orange, it was discovered that one sister needed only the orange rind and the other wanted only the

³⁶ For example, Ilich suggests getting an 'edge' on your 'opponent' by hanging a crooked picture on your office wall to distract him or her (1980:2).

³⁷ McCarthy (1985) criticizes interest-based negotiation as being *too* focused on long-term relationships, saying this might not always be a factor, such as in union negotiations. Fisher addresses this and other perceived deficiencies in the same journal (Fisher 1985).

³⁸ As Fisher and Ury point out, in a negotiation involving dozens of parties or more, it is too difficult to employ positional negotiation – to whom do you make a concession? (1981:7).

fruit. After exploring these interests, each was able to find a solution that was better than a simple compromise.³⁹

It is proposed that “principled negotiation produces wise agreements amicably and efficiently (Fisher and Ury 1981:86). So how does one practice interest-based negotiation? There are four principles to follow (from Fisher and Ury 1981):⁴⁰

- Separate the people from the problem. Simply, this means paying attention to the fact that, in addition to the content of the negotiations, others involved in the negotiation have their own perceptions and emotions.
- Focus on interests not positions. This involves using different strategies for exposing interests, such as asking questions of others to get ‘behind’ their positions.
- Invent options for mutual gain. This principle stresses the importance of creativity and ‘inventing’ different possible solutions that might meet a broad range of interests.
- Insist on Using Objective Criteria. It is important that all parties involved agree on the criteria that will be used to evaluate the result of negotiations. These criteria should be explicit and ‘fair’.

The key to interest-based negotiation is open communication – communication that is both honest and genuine. It is open communication that encourages negotiating parties to abandon their positions and explore their interests in search of creative solutions to the ‘fixed pie’ problem; obviously, as stated in the first principle, open communication is also important for dealing with the human side of the negotiation equation. As established earlier, group members require a safe and familiar environment to communicate openly with one another. In short, they need to establish a certain level of trust to achieve the open communication important to interest-based negotiation.⁴¹

A Little Thing Called Trust

Trust was described earlier as the general condition where an individual is able to predict what another person will do and knows what to expect from that person (Deutsch 1958:265). This rather old definition has much in common with the many definitions of trust found today, including trust “to mean that one believes in, and is willing to depend on, another party (McKnight et al. 1998:474) or as “an attitude implying expectations founded on a sense of another person’s motivation and competence” (Haight and Ginger 2000: 740) or a condition so that “where there is

³⁹ Adapted from Fisher and Ury (1981:59).

⁴⁰ See Dorsey for an application of these principles in a BC resource management context (1986:143-146).

⁴¹ McCarthy criticizes Fisher and Ury for underplaying the role of trust in interest-based negotiation, saying: “trust is important partly because it fosters informal contracts and a readiness to expose one’s hand” (1985:62).

trust there is the feeling that others will not take advantage of me” (Porter et al., 1975:497 in McAllister 1995:25).⁴²

Most definitions of trust contain two elements – prediction of another’s behaviour and a positive outcome for the person ‘doing’ the trusting. A definition based on a review of the literature yielded this general definition which serves the purposes of this discussion: “trust is an expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can receive based on the expected action of another party, in an interaction characterized by uncertainty” (Bhattacharya et al. 1998:462). Defined in this way, it is easy to see how trust plays a role in most human relationships (Das and Teng 1998:503, Jones and George 1998:531).⁴³ Trust among parties in any given situation facilitates open communication, allowing and even encouraging collaboration (Haight and Ginger 2000).⁴⁴ So how do parties go about obtaining trust?⁴⁵

Without the benefit of a history together, it would seem that they have little on which to base a decision about whether to trust one another. Research into initial levels of trust in relationships reveals that other factors come into play (Bigley and Pearce 1998). One particularly useful model identifies three factors. The first is personality-based – is the individual involved in the relationship predisposed to trusting others? The second is institution-based. This involves the feeling of safety – that if things ‘go wrong’ that there is a safety net, or structural assurances like regulations or a contract to increase chances of success. The third and final is cognition-based. This has to do with the cues and associations of the other person or group – is the other party associated with a group that can generally be trusted? (McKnight et al. 1998).

According to this model, these three factors taken together decide the level of trust assigned another individual or group at the start of a relationship. A high or low level of trust will be assigned – this is a starting point. In most contexts, there needs to be a certain amount of trust present in the initial stages for any relationship to be formed and to begin to function (Das and Tang 1998:494). Whether and how trust is built from this point on is based on each party’s firsthand knowledge of the other party as

⁴² Much of the literature on trust focuses on the individual level; however it is generally considered transferable to the organizational or group level as well. McKnight specifically states this of his study (McKnight et al. 1998:477).

⁴³ McAllister states, “under conditions of uncertainty and complexity...sustained effective action is only possible where there is mutual confidence or trust” (1995:25). While on the opposite end of the equation, Bhattacharya et al. point out that, “trust cannot exist in an environment of certainty; if it did, it would do so trivially” (1998:461). So trust is not needed in conditions of certainty, but in uncertainty, it is required for functioning relationships.

⁴⁴ Some differentiate between levels of trust that can be achieved – a very high level of trust, unconditional trust, can mean that a group works as a team. A high level of trust, conditional trust, means that group or organization is able to accomplish its goals, but it does not reach the synergy characteristic of a team. An absence of trust means the group is not able to function (Jones and George 1998).

⁴⁵ I limit this discussion to trust. Some challenge the idea of trust and distrust as one bipolar construct, suggesting that they are separate dimensions and can coexist (Lewicki et al. 1998). I do not disagree with this, I just want to keep this discussion focused on simpler notions of trust for the purposes of this study.

the relationship unfolds (McKnight et al. 1998). This is sometimes called their 'interaction history' (Sitkin and Roth 1993).⁴⁶ On the basis of this interaction history, trust can be built and destroyed (Bigley and Pearce 1998).

One of the key factors in building trust is reciprocity (Jones and George 1998). It seems that parties presented with a demonstration of trust will respond with a show of trust (Das and Teng 1998:503, Deutsch 1958:277). Similarly, mutual trust is most likely to occur when people are "truly oriented to each others' welfare" (Deutsch 1958:278-9). Trust may also be tied to perception. One study in particular found that "defying a negative stereotype is key to improving perceptions of trust and credibility" (Peters et al. 1997:54). Another way to dispel misconceptions between parties is through contact (McKnight et al. 1998). Finally, Das and Teng suggest that preservation of procedural and distributive justice can help to build trust.⁴⁷ Parties must feel that the process *and* outcome will be fair for them (1998:504).

Trust is not easily attained. But it is easily destroyed, particularly in a conflict situation.

"As a dispute escalates, any trust, goodwill or concern for the other party decreases between the disputants... at some point, individuals in an escalated conflict become over committed and entrapped... they realize how much time and money has been expended but they are reluctant to give up their investment, hoping instead that the other party will give up first, so that they can still enjoy a victory. Barring victory, they become determined to make certain that the other party loses as much as they themselves do" (Owen et al. 1999:9-10).

Sometimes, differences between or among parties are insurmountable and it is not possible even to build the trust that they require to work together as a unit. Such is the case with obvious value differences. Values are defined as "preferences for 'ways of life'" and "preferred modes of conduct or end states of existence" (Kinnier 1995:18). A more inclusive definition describes values as "concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviours that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviours and events, and are ordered by relative importance" (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987:551 in Kinnier 1995:19). A person's value system determines which types of behaviours, events, situations, or people are desirable or undesirable (Jones and George 1998:532).

Serious value differences prevent the formation of trust. When the differences among parties are great enough – when they are based on values – each party sees the

⁴⁶ Included in this 'interaction history' is the role of moods and emotions, which are used by parties to evaluate the ongoing quality of their trust experience (Jones and George 1998:536).

⁴⁷ Conversely, inequalities, real or perceived, can make it difficult to develop an environment of trust. According to Ridgeway, "power and regard in interaction are especially potent triggers for emotions" (1994:226).

other as operating in a way that is so incompatible with him or herself that the other's entire world view becomes suspect (Sitkin and Roth 1993). Each sees the other as someone who 'does not think the way we do' and so brands that person a 'cultural outsider' (Sitkin and Roth 1993:371). If the parties are not able to relate to one another, if the differences among parties "preclude the ability of each to take the role of the other, trust will not develop..." (George and Jones 1998:538).

There has been research to look at implications of these findings for group work, particularly in organizations. Naturally, people will tend to group themselves with others they feel are similar, but they will also tend to view people outside this group as "dishonest, untrustworthy, and uncooperative" compared with their own group members (McAllister 1995:28). This can become a problem when different organizations must work together as a single group – where two different groups representing different organizational cultures must be blended (Das and Teng 1998). The 'cultural clash' often results in a failure of the large group because the different cultures involved – the two different systems of shared values - were not compatible (Das and Teng 1998:507).

Some might argue that the inclusion of local and 'outside' interests at the LLRMP process introduced into the process certain cultural differences. It has long been recognized that there exist in BC differences between different regions. This is not a phenomenon limited to BC or even Canada.

A Rural-Urban Dichotomy

The rural-urban dichotomy model, also called the hinterland-metropolis, the hinterland-heartland, or the periphery-core model (McCann 1987:4) is a tool used to describe differences among regions. In all of these models, 'regions' are not just political (Matthews 1983:14) but are instead based on economic, social, settlement, and political processes, as well as geographic factors (McCann 1987:4). These factors give rise to a certain 'culture' – a set of values, interests, and concerns that are shared by the region's population. The defining mark of a region is a combination of culture, common behaviour, and identity (Matthews 1983:14).

Regionalism implies certain attachments to a region. It implies identity and commitment. To what extent does an individual identify with the region? How hard will that person work for its well being? Will he or she continue to live there (Matthews 1983:22-24)? Regionalism also implies that the people of that region recognize that they are socially and culturally different from other people (Matthews 1983:16). In the rural-urban model, there are two regions or cultures: a rural region or 'hinterland' and an urban region or 'heartland'.

Physically or geographically, urban regions or heartlands usually develop in areas with favourable physical qualities that have good accessibility to markets. Economically they tend to have a diversified profile of secondary, tertiary and quaternary industries.

Socially, these areas are highly urbanized, with a concentrated population. In contrast, the rural regions or hinterlands lie beyond the heartland. Hinterlands tend to emphasize the production of primary resources or 'staples'.⁴⁸ They tend to have scattered populations and weakly integrated urban systems. Scattered populations tend to mean limited political power (Harris 1987:548, McCann 1987:4).

The relationship between the heartland and hinterland is one of dependency (McCann 1987:4). In this model, it is the urban region that creates the demand for staple commodities; it then manufactures these commodities into products. The hinterland consumes these manufactured products and continues to supply the heartland with raw materials (Harris 1987:548). In addition, the rural region must rely on these urban areas for supplies of capital or technical expertise (McCann 1987).

The heartland's characteristics make it suitable for the concentration of corporate headquarters and financial institutions. This arrangement tends to influence the flow of profits from the rural regions into the urban region, making it difficult to raise development capital within the periphery (McCann 1987:12). In short, in this model, the power – the ability to innovate and control – belongs to the heartland (McCann 1987:10). It is suggested that the heartland has an interest in maintaining its hold over the hinterland, encouraging this dependency by exerting its influence over these outlying areas (Matthews 1983).

This relationship exists at the international, national and provincial level; BC is simply a microcosm⁴⁹ (Bradbury 1987:401, McCann 1987:7). On the provincial level, the physical geography results in two main regions - the coast and the interior (Bradbury 1987:403). The coast or southwestern portion of the province demonstrates the characteristics of a heartland or urban region – this is where the bulk of the provincial population can be found. This region consists mainly of the centres of Vancouver, and to a lesser extent, Victoria (Bradbury 1987:437). Of the two cities, Vancouver has the larger population, concentration of manufacturing activity, share of provincial wealth and control of political power (Bradbury 1987:404).

The rural portion of the province consists of collections of smaller communities lying beyond this heartland. True to the model, BC's hinterland is in the business of staple production (Bradbury 1987:430). Secondary manufacturing tends to be limited to various small-scale industries and business. These businesses tend to fluctuate with the boom and bust cycles of the resource extraction sector (Bradbury 1987:429). As Bradbury points out "today's boom in production and corresponding high wages can

⁴⁸ A staple is "a commodity with a high natural resource content that requires little on-site processing and that lends itself well to export" (Robson 1995:1). Examples include gold, coal, lumber, and hydro.

⁴⁹ While some access by smaller communities to national and international markets means that it is not a perfect heartland-hinterland relationship, the southwestern portion of the province still exerts an obvious influence over the rest of the province (Bradbury 1987:414).

readily become tomorrow's economic downswing, with low profitability, layoffs, and unemployment" (Bradbury 1987:432).

The dependence of many smaller communities upon a single industry or in some cases, a single company, leaves these communities in a precarious position. A significant change in the success of the industry, whether an improvement or a decline, can mean significant changes for the community built around and sometimes for, that industry (Robson 1995). So, when the industry is forced to "re-tool, downsize, or shutdown, so too must the community" (Robson 1995:10). Too often, these changes are thought to be brought about by managers and decision-makers in distant urban centres (Bradbury 1987:432).

The characteristics of these two regions and the relationship between them gives rise to different perceptions of the rural-urban dichotomy. Typically, those in urban areas may feel 'expansive' about the country on which their economy relies and over which they tend to feel they have a certain amount of control. In contrast, those in the outlying rural areas tend to be suspicious of urban areas. This suspicion can be said to stem from jealousy and from a sense that local circumstances are controlled by the uninformed from afar (Harris 1987:548). Similarly, urban dominance is sometimes described as 'exploitation' of rural areas at no cost to urban ones (Harris 1987:543).

Friction between rural and urban cultures is not unheard of in BC land use planning. A frustration expressed during the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process involved some rural participants' concerns about the fact that most CORE staff were based outside of the region. This precipitated concerns about 'city slickers' – process managers who did not understand the region's needs (Penrose et al. 1998:39). In other jurisdictions, 'outsiders' imposition of a particular form of management on a local area is seen as a failure to recognize the local community's pre-determined, though not formal nor official, structure for managing local resources (Matthews 1993:94).

In the Lillooet forest district, the local people tend to describe this rural-urban phenomenon as a Lower Mainland influence on local matters. Many express frustration with this perceived control, citing designation of the Stein Valley Park as an example of urban areas imposing their will on powerless communities. One resident of the region provided an historical overview of this relationship:

People have come in, taken what they wanted, and left. I mean first the miners came in and they mined gold and then when the gold ran out they left. And then BC Hydro came in and they dammed the rivers and made lakes and generated power and they left. Now we've got the guys from the coast come in and give us hell and want to save the whole damn country for themselves...

In summary, this chapter has provided an overview of the literature on group dynamics and LRMP. The research described here is an investigation of the dynamics that can evolve among highly polarized groups during negotiations in a land use planning process situation. In the next section, I describe the methods used to investigate the Lillooet LRMP in my efforts to answer the question: how did the inclusion of local and 'outside' participants contribute to a failure to achieve consensus on a single plan for the Lillooet forest district? In Chapter Five, the literature introduced here is used to explain the results of the investigation of the Lillooet LRMP case study. From this case, while we can not necessarily answer what will happen in this situation, we can answer what *can* happen, because it did happen at the Lillooet LRMP process.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

This project is a case study of the Lillooet LRMP. Case study research is different things to different people – it is a subject of study, “a bounded system” with “working parts” (Stake 1994: 236) or “a format for reporting” (Wolcott 2001:91). Still others define it as the outcome of a “‘how’ or ‘why’ question about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin 1994:9). All of these definitions apply to this research; however, for defining this case, I prefer Hamel et al.’s definition of case study as “the in-depth study of a particular case” (1993:34). This project is simply that; an in-depth look at the Lillooet LRMP in an attempt to gather information to explain how the combination of local and ‘outside’ participants contributed to a failure to reach consensus on a single plan.

Often, single case studies are criticized for being less ‘robust’ than multiple case studies; after all, it would seem that there is more to be learned from looking at more than one case. But this is not always true – with one case, it is possible to investigate in-depth; this detail is sacrificed when there is more than one case. However, like all things, the choice of single or multiple cases depends on what is being studied and how it is examined. For my purposes, in-depth examination of a single case is appropriate for investigating the mechanics of a land use planning exercise. The in-depth approach also complements some of the other cross case and survey research being done on LRMP (Penrose 1996; Duffy et al. 1998; Frame et al. 2002). On a more practical level, resources did not allow investigation of more than one case.

Selecting the Case

A researcher can select a case to investigate a research question or to find out more about that case; the former is called instrumental study and the latter is intrinsic (Stake 1995:2). When I began observing the Lillooet LRMP, I simply wanted to know more about that particular case. Later, it became clear that the information from this case might be used to understand larger issues to do with land use planning, such as how group composition might present obstacles to reaching consensus, and the important role of communication in this type of process.

Some question the extent to which findings from a single case study can be generalized to other cases. Yin (1994) distinguishes between statistical and analytical generalization. Where statistical generalization involves making inferences about a population based on empirical data collected from a sample, analytic generalization means generalizing a particular set of results to broader theory; this theory may then be used to examine other cases (1994: 30-37). It is generally assumed that case study implies analytical generalization. However, I believe there are some common-sense lessons to be learned from this case that may be applied to other situations.

Case Structure

There are two main parts to this case study – the first is exploratory and the second is descriptive, validating the exploratory work. By definition, when undertaking exploratory research, a researcher does not have preconceived notions of what will be found (Zikmund 1991:94). The information gathered during this initial, exploratory work provided a general idea of how the LLRMP process worked and helped me to develop a conceptual framework to focus the rest of the investigation. The methods used were situation analysis and participant observation. Each is described below.

Situation Analysis

Situation analysis is an exploratory procedure most often used in market research. It involves using a number of methods, often rather informally, to immerse oneself in a situation and form a general idea of the issue to be studied (Zikmund 1991:96).

Situation analysis can be useful in research because it tends to require little investment of time, money and energy, yet the information gathered can be used to help focus a research project. However, because it involves informal data collection, it is not necessarily rigorous or systematic and is best used for exploratory work.

Situation analysis of the LLRMP consisted of literature and document reviews, informal interviews, and initial observations. These three things provided information on the background to the case and the evolution of land use planning processes in British Columbia and the Lillooet forest district (see Chapter Two). It also provided direction to the participant-observation component of the project.

Participant Observation

Participant observation is sometimes referred to as “the core of qualitative research” because at some point most researchers will observe what they are studying (Wolcott 2001:91). So, what does it involve? According to McCall and Simmons it is “... the blend of methods and techniques that is characteristically employed in... studies that involve repeated, genuine social interaction on the scene with the subjects themselves as a part of the data-gathering process” (1969:3). But while it may involve different methods, the focus is squarely on observing. Participant observation falls between the involvement of complete participation and the detachment of direct observation. A participant observer “... may assume a variety of roles... and may actually participate in the events being studied” (Yin 1994:87).

Because participant observation involves interaction with subjects and settings, it has its own set of opportunities and challenges. Some question how a researcher can report on events he or she may have influenced. Others question whether a researcher might get too involved in the situation being studied and therefore be either less able to pursue certain aspects of the research or less able to take an objective view of the situation (Miller 1969:87). Related concerns are the possibility that those being researched will withhold information because they associate the

researcher with one thing or another (Glesne and Peshkin 1992 in Creswell 1998:114). With these potential pitfalls, why continue to use participant observation?

Participant observation's strength is that it allows the piecing together of information about the case from the inside rather than the outside; Yin remarks some believe that this inside perspective is required for an 'accurate' portrayal of case study phenomena (1994:88). By engaging with the situation and people, the researcher is able to observe, with his or her own eyes, events as they unfold. This provides a more direct account of what is happening than if this information were gathered through a second-hand account of the situation. For example, in an interview, the person retelling the event may choose to leave out things that he or she might have done.

While few would argue that the participant-observation can be subjective, some do not see this as a problem (Stake 1995:45). Hamel et al. claim "the researcher's subjectivity does intervene, but to the extent this intervention is clearly stated, it then becomes objectified into an object that is clearly the sociologist's point of view, or more precisely, the sociological point of view" (1993:43). This is echoed by Zonabend who argues that objectivity and subjectivity cannot be contrasted: "we must be aware that the most rigorous objectivity is only possible through the most intrepid subjectivity" (1992:53 in Hamel et al. 1993:43). According to some, it is only by becoming deeply subjective that we can become objective.⁵⁰

I began observing the LLRMP in the fall of 1997 as an interested member of the public. Eventually I became an alternate representative for the Outdoor Recreation Council of BC (ORC). The LLRMP Table met for one-and-a-half to two days each month, from mid-1997 to spring 2001. The number of Table meetings per month was adjusted given the amount of work to be done. As an alternate, I also attended working group meetings. Working groups were subsets of the larger Table, created to discuss specific issues. These meetings were scheduled as needed and each lasted a few hours, attracting those with an interest in the issue being discussed. During this research, I attended a total of approximately sixteen working group meetings, on Protected Areas, recreation, tourism, and access.

I did not develop a specific observational protocol when I started observing Table and working group meetings. I began by taking very general notes on who was present, topics being discussed, and some of the interaction observed. In some cases, I noted my own reactions to this interaction. I also collected meeting summaries. The result of this participant observation, a description of the LLRMP process highlighting certain events, is found in Section One of Chapter Four. Following extended participant observation of the Lillooet LRMP Table, I formulated some general ideas about the direction in which the process was going

⁵⁰ Initially, I did not spend much time contemplating arguments in support of and against, participant observation. Participant observation seemed a logical way to observe the LLRMP process. It also complemented other research on LRMP (Penrose 1996, Duffy et al. 1998.) at the time.


and the workings of the different groups involved. The next step was to validate these findings through further research. First it was necessary to narrow the scope of the project to only those parts of the LLRMP process that were of interest and would be helpful in answering the research question. The following conceptual frameworks show the aspects of the LLRMP that I chose to focus on within the larger context of the LLRMP process timeline and structure.

Conceptual Frameworks

A conceptual framework can be thought of as “the researcher’s map of the territory being investigated” (Miles and Huberman 1994:20). This map illustrates elements and interactions of interest within their larger context, and is often developed out of theory and fieldwork (Miles and Huberman 1994:21). For this project, I use two frameworks to explain the LLRMP process and my interest in it. The first framework looks at the development of the process over time and the second looks at specific parties involved in the process.

In his model of group decision-making, Kaner (1996) identifies four main stages or ‘zones’ that groups move through, when making a decision: a divergent zone, a ‘groan zone’, a convergent zone, and a closure zone (Figure 4.).⁵¹ So, a group that must make a decision will first move through a divergent zone characterized by diverse thinking and exploration. The group then moves into the ‘groan zone’ where group members often experience conflict and confusion. A group that moves successfully through this zone should emerge with a better understanding of the decision to be made and each other, setting the groundwork for convergence. Once in the convergent zone, group members work towards a common goal. A decision marks the closure zone and a decision, ending the process (Kaner 1996).


Figure 4. Model of Group Decision-Making (from Kaner 1996).



⁵¹ Kaner’s model is less ‘academic’ than other models of development; however, it is precisely because it is designed for practicing facilitators that it is more “user friendly”. Further, it is one of the only models combining group development and decision-making within a single, simple graphic - making it perfect for illustrating the focus of this project. For an academic model of group decision-making, see Hirokawa et al. (1989).

The LLRMP followed a similar pattern, except participants did not converge on a single land use plan for the Lillooet forest district. Figure 5. is Kaner's model of group decision-making modified to reflect the reality of the LLRMP – a process that did not end with the group converging on a single outcome. This reality is the focus of my research. This case study addresses the departure from what would be expected of a typical group involved in decision-making, by looking at why LLRMP participants failed to converge on a single plan. To explain this outcome, I look at group interaction and development during three main stages of the LLRMP process: initiation, negotiation, and the final stages of the process.

Figure 5. LLRMP Group Decision-Making Model (adapted from Kaner 1996).




But what to focus on? As was shown by Figure 3 in Chapter Two, the LLRMP Table, like most Tables, involves many parties with direct or indirect influence on the process. There is a central core of groups directly involved in the process, and there is the larger public. There is government involvement at all levels, from agency representatives sitting at the Table to government bodies directing the LLRMP and other Tables around the province. Depending on the Table, First Nations may choose to become involved, though there was limited involvement in this process.⁵² My exploratory work prompted me to look at two groups: the Lillooet District Community Resources Board (CRB), and the other public participants ("sectors") involved in the workings of the LLRMP Table; they are shown in bold in Figure 6.

Participant observation provided information on how individuals from these two groups interacted throughout the process; I now wanted to investigate participants' perceptions of the same. Specifically, I wanted to hear about their expectations entering into the process, their experiences during negotiations, and their views on

⁵² First Nations' participation in LRMP varies with the process and the group. Reasons for not participating are lack of resources and/or capacity, and lack of recognition at the start of the process. At the LLRMP, there was involvement by some groups at certain points during the process. Shortly into the process, the provincial government appointed a First Nations liaison to ensure information was flowing to and from the Table and different groups. During interviews, there was disagreement on whether there was enough effort put into making the Table a place where First Nations would be comfortable participating.

the final plans. Because I was interested in Table interaction, the timeline for this project starts in the fall of 1997, when initial Table membership was settled, and ends in March 2001 with the production of the two plans.⁵³

Figure 6. LLRMP Table Structure Highlighting Groups of Interest (adapted from LLRMP 1997b: 19).



In addition to gathering information about participants' perceptions through interviews, I chose to undertake a document review of the final plans. The decision to review these documents and to conduct interviews was informed by the exploratory research done during the first part of the case study. The document review and interviews are described below.

Document Review

A document review typically involves some type of systematic examination of printed or visual materials, such as newspapers, diaries, and official records and statistics, that can be used to learn more about the subject of study (Mann 1985). Documentary evidence is a part of most case studies (Stake 1995:68), though documents are generally used to supplement or support other information that has been gathered, rather than serving as the main source of information about a case (Yin 1994:81). To get a sense of how the two final Lillooet LRMP plans differed, I conducted a review of these documents.

⁵³ With a process this long and messy, it is difficult to draw clear bounds; this is especially true of the LLRMP where what happened before and after the official process contains valuable clues to understanding why we failed to reach consensus on a single plan. Sensitive to this, I remained open to all information throughout this project. The boundaries drawn by these frameworks simply help to manage this information.

The degree to which and how documents are used as evidence in the social sciences varies, as do methods of analyses (Manning and Cullum-Swan 1998). My approach was straightforward: because the two plans followed a template, I was able to make direct comparisons, noting the differences in the amount of the land base allocated to various types of zones and to management strategies. Wording of different sections, indicating 'maximums' and 'minimums' was also noted. A comparison of the two plans can be found in Section Two of Chapter Four.

Interviews

A logical next step to comparing the two plans was to examine participants' perceptions of these plans through interviewing. Perhaps interviewing is best understood as a conversation, but it is a conversation where one party, the researcher, defines and controls the situation, no matter how subtly (Kvale 1996:6). A researcher can conduct an interview with one or many and the interview can be highly structured or more fluid. For this project, I chose to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews.

In-depth interviewing, in contrast to more superficial and often highly structured forms of interviewing such as survey interviewing (Fowler and Mangione 1990), allows us to collect detailed or 'rich' data about what people are experiencing (Lieblich et al. 1998:9). This information can then be used to help explain why people act the way they do (Seidman 1998:4). Of course, the detailed information gathered through in-depth interviewing does not easily allow a researcher to generalize to a large population, but other links can be made. According to Seidman, when interviewees' stories are captured in enough detail, readers can see connections among the stories of individuals affected by the same event and they are also able to connect through similarities with their own experience; these connections replace the surface considerations of representativeness and generalizability (1998:44-45).

While the qualities required of an interviewer depend on the type of interview used, a successful interview of any kind seems to require a sufficient degree of personal skills (Fowler and Mangione 1990; Kvale 1996). According to Seidman "the most important personal characteristic interviewers must have is a genuine interest in other people" (1998:78), but this should be balanced with professional competence (Hall and Hall 1996). Even the most skilled interviewer must be aware of how dress, behaviour, facial expressions, and verbal cues can affect interviewees' response to the interviewer (Stacey 1969:73; Seidman 1998:74).

One way to help minimize any influence upon interviewees is to bring some sense of structure and purpose to the work. "Without a thoughtful structure for their work, [researchers] increase the chance of distorting what they learn from their participants... and of imposing their own sense of the world on their participants rather than eliciting theirs" (Seidman 1998:33). Avoiding this takes some preparation and planning. To that end, I used a semi-structured approach.

Interview Design

I used a semi-structured interview format with open-ended questions, as there were aspects of the process that I wanted to examine. Within this larger structure, I wanted participants to describe their own experiences (Seidman 1998:9). The main areas of inquiry for the interview were derived from the analytical framework: I asked questions about interviewees' expectations entering the process, their experiences during negotiations, and how they viewed the production of the two plans. Each section of the interview started with broad questions and got increasingly specific, and questions were simple and direct (Kvale 1996; Dillman 2000). As a pre-test, colleagues and peers reviewed the interview and changes were made. Interview questions can be found in Appendix I.

Selecting Interviewees

Time and resources would not permit me to interview all LLRMP participants, so I had to make some decisions about how many to interview and whom. In terms of how many to interview, the literature highlights tradeoffs between sample size and detail obtained, but rarely provides clear direction on how to proceed. For example, Sandelowski writes "an adequate sample size... is one that permits – by virtue of not being too large – the deep, case-oriented analysis that is a hallmark of all qualitative inquiry, and that results in – by virtue of not being too small – a new and richly textured understanding of experience" (1995:183). I chose instead to focus on selecting participants from whom I could learn about the case, an approach advocated by Stake (1995).

I used a combined purposive and convenience sampling strategy. Purposive sampling – also called judgement sampling or criterion-based selection – is sampling people or events based on certain criteria, with the final sample providing information that could not have been gathered as well from other samples (Zikmund 1991: 463, LeCompte et al. 1993:69; Maxwell 1996: 70). When selecting interviewees, I wanted people who were involved in the process for most, if not all, of the timeline mentioned earlier, and who had taken part in Table negotiations. However, some LLRMP participants were interviewed because it did not require much additional time or resources to do so (Zikmund 1991:463).

I interviewed seven members of the CRB and seven non-CRB public participants from the LLRMP Table. I chose also to interview a facilitator and a process coordinator, as both observed or were otherwise involved in the entire process. Ultimately, the final selection of interviewees was informed by my own observations of, and participation in, the LLRMP process.

Ethical Considerations

Since I conducted participant-observation and interviews, I underwent UBC's ethical review process, part of which required that I describe how I would approach research

participants and how they would be treated during research.⁵⁴ I contacted interview candidates directly by e-mail and regular mail to ask if they would participate in interviews. These introductory emails were personalized but all followed a similar structure.⁵⁵ In total, sixteen letters were sent and all had favourable responses. In addition, before each interview, interviewees were asked to sign a consent form.

Further to the formal ethical requirements of the University, I have tried to treat the participants in this research, and their information, with sensitivity. In a lengthy public process like this, confidentiality in the strictest sense might never be achieved, and for some participants, it might not matter.⁵⁶ However, despite the difficulties, and despite some participants' apparent comfort with their involvement in this research, I have done what I can to ensure confidentiality. The purpose of this work is not to single-out LLRMP process participants or their views, but rather to learn from their experiences and opinions to better understand processes like the Lillooet LRMP.

Conducting Interviews

Interviews ranged from just under an hour to several hours in length. Fifteen were conducted in person and one was conducted over the phone. All participants were asked the same questions from the interview guide, though some questions were modified for the facilitator, the process coordinator and one CRB member. Tape-recording interviews allowed me to participate in the conversation and helped ensure an accurate record. I also took notes. Pausing for notes allowed interviewees to process questions and formulate responses and functioned as a type of prompt (Moser and Kalton 1977:277). Other prompts or probes were developed during interviews, based on the question and individual. Following each interview, the general atmosphere and level of rapport were recorded.

Analysis of Interview Data

While it is convenient to think of analysis as a distinct stage, the basic activities of analysis - data reduction and organization - happen throughout a project, particularly as it becomes more and more focused (Bryman and Burgess 1994:217; Miles and Huberman (1994) devote an entire book to making this point.). For example, I might argue that the decision to look at only one aspect of the LLRMP and the questions I chose to ask interviewees constitute a form of data analysis; however, explicit data analysis also does occur. For the interviews just described, analysis consisted of two main activities: transcription and coding.

⁵⁴ For the interviews, I also inquired of a process coordinator and a facilitator whether there was a formal process outside of the University for contacting LRMP participants; there was none.

⁵⁵ Perhaps the introductory emails were a little too personalized. One participant thought that he alone was my case study because the email I sent was addressed only to him and the content was also clearly meant for him. It is possible that another person might have been put off from taking part in this project.

⁵⁶ I was surprised when one person I was about to interview mentioned being asked by another I had just interviewed: "has Des come to interview you yet? It's a blast!"

While it appears there is no standard way to transcribe research interviews, one common-sense guideline is to be consistent (Sandelowski 1994; Kvale 1996). Similarly, the style used in the final transcription depends on how the information is used, and the audience for the final text (Kvale 1996:171). Given that I wanted to learn about LLRMP participants' experiences, each interview was transcribed as accurately as possible, with an eye to preserving not just the words that were said, but also, to the extent possible, the spirit of those words. Some text, such as frequent repetitions and 'fillers' were eliminated. I chose not to include the transcriptions in this document because, in some cases, they contain information I was asked not to share, about specific events or individuals.

Once all interviews were transcribed, I began coding the data. Put simply, coding is "the process of noting what is interesting, labeling it, and putting it into appropriate files" (Seidman 1998:107) and it seems to require both structure and some degree of intuition. Using intuition when looking for patterns in text means having the confidence to know when finding something of note. Marshall calls this 'responding' to meaningful chunks of transcript, and states that what is required is a "close reading plus judgement" (1981 in Seidman 1998:100). But while intuition plays an obvious role so too does structure. Being clear about the development and use of criteria not only helps the researcher sort and cull data but it can also make the process more transparent to others (Seidman 1998).

I find coding is two processes: it is at once discarding information that is not relevant or important, while also organizing information around patterns or themes. What is left is a framework for making sense of the mass of information with which one began, and ultimately, some tentative answers to research questions. I used interviews to test earlier observations made about the Lillooet LRMP process, so I had a general structure to organize information. However, a ready-made structure can make it easy to ignore information that is not a good 'fit' even when this information might be important. With this in mind, I was careful to look for unexpected information and contradictory views (Hall and Hall 1996).

The 'Good' Project

It is one thing to collect information on a case, but how do we know if this information is trustworthy? We can use various criteria to judge the trustworthiness of our research (Devers 1999), but the most common measures are reliability and validity. To meet these criteria, we follow certain procedures, typically when collecting and analysing data. Some challenge the usefulness of these procedures, saying they create a false sense of security and should be replaced by common sense and good judgement (Seidman 1998: 20); I see no reason not to use both. Below, I outline some specific steps I took to ensure reliability and validity during this project.

McMillan and Schumacher define reliability as “the consistency of a measurement, the extent to which the results are similar over different forms of the same instrument or occasions of data collecting” (1984: 126 in Hayes 1991:41). Reliability is the research equivalent to precision, the intent of both to minimize respondent errors and biases (Yin 1994:36). To address reliability issues, I standardized my data collection procedures. Further, interview questions were in simple, conventional language, and I avoided leading and double-barreled questions. The interview had a logical flow, and care was taken to ensure that a response from one question did not bias subsequent questions.

If reliability is precision, then validity is akin to accuracy; essentially, it answers the question “are you measuring what you think you are measuring?” (Kerlinger 1979:40 in Hayes 1991:38). There are different aspects of validity (Yin 1994:33) but generally, it means making sure you are getting a complete and accurate picture. To do this, triangulation is used, where information is collected from a diverse range of individuals and settings using a variety of methods (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). Theoretically, triangulation should overcome the limitations and potential bias of single method or single source research (Maxwell 1996:76). For this project, I used a variety of methods to collect information from a variety of sources.

Limitations of this Research

I have already described some of the limitations of this project with respect to specific methods, but generally, time and money were limiting factors in this research. The project is self-funded, and this affected some decisions, particularly sampling decisions. And, given that time was limited, decisions had to be made about the level of detail that would be reported. Further, it was difficult to put a time-line to this process because, as one participant said, it has been going ‘since before God was born’. Even as I write this report, the process is not finished, though it no longer involves face-to-face negotiations among stakeholders and is now largely government-driven. Therefore, I believe the time-line selected, from local initiation to the submission of two plans to government, captures the story of the LLRMP.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to report the data collected on this case. Section one is a description of the Lillooet LRMP, based on the situation analysis and my observations of the process. Section two contains the results of the document review; it is a comparison of the two final plans. Section three presents participants' perceptions of the process, based on in-depth interviews. Chapter six uses these results to explain how the inclusion of both local and 'outside' parties contributed to the production of two plans instead of a single, consensus plan at the Lillooet LRMP.

Section One: Description of the Lillooet LRMP

Following is a description of how the Lillooet LRMP process unfolded. It is intended to capture how the Table operated both day-to-day and through time. Given the length of the process, I have had to summarize information so this is a select account. Where possible, I have used events to illustrate some of the difficulties encountered.

Initiation of the Lillooet LRMP

On November 23, 1995 the provincial government announced that the Lillooet forest district would undergo Land and Resource Management Planning to "provide strategic land and resource management direction for activities occurring on Crown land within the planning area" (LLRMP 1997b:1). In the same press release, the government announced its decision to make the Stein Valley into a Class A Provincial Park – the Stein Valley Nlaka'pamux Heritage Park.

But folks in the Lillooet district had already identified the need for strategic planning. About a year earlier, concerned that Lillooet either would not undergo LRMP or that an LRMP process for the district would be combined with another forest district, some people and organizations within the communities of Lytton and Lillooet met. They discussed how they might work with government to design a community-based land use planning process (MoF 1996). The Lillooet District Community Resources Board (CRB) was formed. Up to then, local resource boards and round tables that formed were generally initiated by the provincial government or CORE.

At its fullest, the CRB is a sixteen-member committee meant to represent the full range of perspectives or values held by citizens in the District (MoF 1996). The CRB uses a perspectives-based approach, rather than the more typical 'sector' based approach, to represent community interests. The CRB is meant to reflect the full range of values or perspectives in the district, but individual members are not directly accountable to specific groups or organizations in the community (MoF 1996). It was envisioned that the CRB would prepare a land use plan, with advice from government, 'outside' interests, and the rest of the community.

Given the Provincial Government's commitment that all interested parties would have an opportunity to participate in LRMP, the announcement that the Lillooet district would undergo LRMP received mixed reviews locally. Those who had formed the CRB felt strongly that the CRB represented all perspectives in the District and that it was time for a 'local solution' to the District's land use planning and resource management issues. There were concerns that a process that allowed parties from outside the area to participate might not yield this type of solution.

To recognize local interest in planning and to acknowledge concerns about 'outside' interests, the provincial government made a number of changes to the typical LRMP structure. The CRB and provincial government staff would form the 'nucleus' of the planning Table (LLRMP 1997b). The CRB would also be active in the administration of the LRMP process as part of the Process Support Team (PST). The process coordinator suggested that this structure represented a compromise between adhering to government policy and recognizing the CRB's role (MoF 1996).

January 11, 1997, after much discussion about whether and how to proceed, the provincial government invited the CRB and all interested 'outside' parties to discuss membership. Fifteen CRB members were present, as were thirteen individuals representing various organizations (LLRMP 1997a). A representative from the Land Use Coordination Office (LUCCO) told all present that the Table would have to be broader than the CRB alone (Thompson 1997). By the end of the meeting, some of the 'outside' groups decided not to participate (LLRMP 1997a).

The official meeting summary recorded that it was "... clear how troubled all people are and how little trust exists between many interests. However, much willingness to 'get on with it' and 'work things out'" (LLRMP 1997a). Following this meeting, CRB members spent a weekend debating, before agreeing to attend four LRMP training sessions with 'outside' interest groups to decide who would sit at the LRMP Table (Roshard 1997a; Roshard 1997b). Six of the 'outside' groups were invited to these working meetings (Roshard 1997b). Some CRB members resigned and there were more resignations over the following months, over concerns about opening the process up to 'narrowly focused, high powered sectoral interests' (Roshard 1997c).

There were meetings in March, April, May and June. The group explored the CRB's 'perspectives approach' and had one training session in interest-based negotiation offered by two facilitators from outside the district, to get a sense of their own and each other's interests. Group members also reviewed other land use plans and discussed some general directions for the process and expected products and began to establish ground rules for working together. By June, terms of reference, based on the CRB's original terms of reference, were approved and initial Table membership decided; it would include the CRB, representatives of sectors, local and provincial government, and First Nations (PST 1997, Roshard 1997e).

During this time, the CRB struggled with the community's concerns about 'outside' interests at the Table. It was criticized for not standing fast to the idea of a purely local land use planning process (Fehr 1997). The Mayor of Lillooet expressed concerns that the CRB no longer adequately represented the economic base of the forest district and that with membership dwindling, the Table was moving toward a Table with no CRB and too many 'outside' participants (Roshard 1997d). Given that many CRB resignations were by people associated with the forest industry, the CRB specifically invited participation by this sector (Roshard 1997e).

Negotiations

From this point, the group that would comprise the initial LLRMP Table met nearly every month for a one-and-a-half to two-day meeting for about the next four years. Table meetings tended to increase in frequency as the Table approached deadlines so some months there was more than one Table meeting. Conversely, two times the Table did not meet for a few months, namely one summer when government needed time to gather information and a second summer when Table members waited to hear the results of meetings between the industry and conservation sectors. In addition to Table meetings, 'working groups' would meet to discuss various issues.

By the first official LRMP meeting in September 1997, the CRB had returned to its full complement of sixteen members (Roshard 1997f). There were two facilitators – a local facilitator who had been working with the CRB since it was formed, and one of the facilitators who had helped with training in interest-based negotiation. I started attending meetings in October 1997. Most of the early meetings consisted of 'scoping sessions': learning about available information and determining what would be required. It was suggested that the Table would have to decide whether to set 'targets' for such things as amount of Protected Area.

By November we had moved from gathering and identifying available and useful information to understanding policies and tools; we were expected to move to the solution-building phase in January 1998. At the November meeting, there were concerns that a newsletter produced by a Table member promoted a letter writing campaign to prevent development of part of the plan area, and that this might be considered a contravention of the Table's terms of reference (ToR).

This brought up larger concerns that there was no time or place to discuss the effects of short-term operational planning at the LRMP Table. Two groups were formed: one to discuss the specific incident, and one to discuss larger issues of lobbying and undermining the Table. It was reported that representatives do not always have full control over their constituents' actions. Also, Table membership requires honesty, integrity, and respect, and participants should let the Table know of groups' actions so that misunderstandings could be avoided.

Participants spent the next months learning about various land use planning tools – such as zoning and strategies – used in LRMP. The next step in the process would be developing proposals that would apply different management tools. We needed to start putting lines on maps if we were going to finish a plan in two years.

In July 1998, a group representing timber interests put forward a ‘Strategic Zoning Plan’ – the starting point for a proposal. There were concerns that the proposal tried to reduce negative impacts to timber rather than addressing other interests at the Table. At the end of the meeting, participants were encouraged to continue developing maps and trying to come up with creative solutions to some of the issues in the district.

Through August and September, the Table would start the ‘Solution Building Phase’ of the process; it was expected that the Table would produce a draft plan by the end of November. During the August meeting, some Table members expressed anger about a recent Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC²) Educational Report on the Lillooet area as it was learned that certain Table members had been involved in the production of the Report. Some Table members said this had undermined their trust and that the issue had to be dealt with before moving to the agenda.

The LLRMP coordinator stressed government’s commitment to the Table and the process and encouraged all participants to do the same. It was decided that the Table would continue with the original agenda, though certain issues would be left until the trust issue was dealt with. The Table returned to the issue the next day and decided to produce a public statement reflecting this support and discouraging groups or individuals from pursuing Lillooet district-related issues outside the process.

Later during this meeting, a subset of the Table, consisting largely of local people and calling themselves the ‘Whole Earth Group’, brought forward a proposed plan for how to zone the district. This group’s approach to planning included starting with a vision and viewing the District as something ‘alive’ and having a place at the Table along with the consideration of all interests already present. And, as one of the creators of this plan describes, “we tried to write it as though everybody could be trusted”. A conservation sector proposal was also presented.

The October meeting was held in the other major centre in the district - Lytton. The Saturday meeting began with a interest-based negotiation exercise, as there were concerns that this was not being practiced well, or by all at the Table. During the exercise, Table members were asked to demonstrate an understanding of others’ interests by describing these interests to the Table. There was resistance - some had difficulty and others refused to take part.⁵⁷ In December, after concerns that we

⁵⁷ Please see the next section on interview results, for some participants’ views on others’ interests and general concerns about interest-based negotiation.

might not be able to proceed with the process come spring, the Process Coordinator informed the Table that LUCO had given permission to proceed 'in the red' though they expected a plan by April.

In the New Year, we continued to meet as a Table. Throughout the process, the Table brought in experts in various areas to inform the Table about particular issues. Early on, a group of people at the Table requested that the Table hear a presentation by a professional bear biologist who had been asked by the Western Canada Wilderness Committee (WC²) to look at grizzly protection areas in the district. During the presentation, there were questions about discrepancies between what was presented and what a government bear biologist had presented.

New versions of the Conservation and Recreation and Whole Earth proposals were presented. The new focus of the Conservation and Recreation proposal was protection of grizzly bear habitat, while the Whole Earth proposal remained unchanged. Timber also presented an updated proposal. Each of the proposals was mapped onto a clear plastic sheet so the group could look for overlap. It was decided that the whole Table would work toward a single map, starting with the community-initiated Whole Earth map; the discussion now focused on Protected Areas.

The Table discussed where to go with the process. The facilitators suggested the need to prioritize – some items had 'working agreement', some required work before the end of the month, and some did not look like they would reach agreement any time soon – for these, the Table would have to prepare options for government to consider. There were concerns raised about trying to move to agreement too quickly, and questions about whether government would make decisions based on 'working agreements'. In March, we were informed that we would break for a few months – the Table needed to wait for information from government before moving forward.

The Table returned in June to find that the 'outside' facilitator was no longer involved with the process; the CRB cited funding as the reason. We spent the next few meetings working on 'scenarios', where each group would illustrate how the district ought to be managed using different percentages of Protected Area (PA) and Special Management. The facilitator suggested that there was a great deal of similarity among the three maps. Simultaneously, the Table worked on wording for some of the less contentious items in the plan – the 'general text'. There was discussion of holding an open house meeting in early 2000.

February 2000, the Table met before the open house. There were concerns about a WC² flyer advertising the open house. People were informed that the flyers were distributed throughout the Lower Mainland and Lillooet district. Most of the day was spent discussing the flyer and the possibility of people from the Lower Mainland overwhelming the process. Given the large numbers of 'outside' people expected, there were questions about what would be done with public feedback. Table

members were reminded that public input would not be considered by majority rule. A large number of local people and people from the Lower Mainland came to the open house, looked around, then left.

Some Table members asked whether they could hold open houses in the Lower Mainland, given that their constituents were there. A Process Coordinator explained that government's policy is to hold open houses in the LRMP area only, but that Table members could hold presentations outside the plan area using the materials generated for the event. There were concerns about 'outside' groups taking information to their groups and presenting it. Coordinators suggested that it should not matter who presented it if it was the whole Table's plan.

By April and over its allotted time, the Table was being pressured by government to conclude the process with a clear description of areas of consensus and "options" by September. More staff were committed to the process and a consultant was hired to help clarify the roles of government. The consultant also helped facilitate the Table. In April, it was announced that two CRB members, 'local greens', had resigned. Some Table members raised concerns about the 'green versus brown' composition at the Table. There were also concerns raised about the CRB's special role on various committees administering the LLRMP. Several Table members expressed a desire for greater 'transparency' in terms of how the CRB operated.

It was clear that there was polarization at the Table between the industry and conservation interests. Representatives of these groups discussed holding 'off-Table' meetings⁵⁸ to test options and seek agreement on Protected Areas through mediation. It was agreed that there would be no government people at the process because both groups felt that this would not create an environment where the two groups would be able to test out how far they were willing to go. They asked whether the Table would support these meetings; the Table said it would. Off-Table meetings ran throughout the summer.

The Table met in September. We would try to have something to the public by November so that the final 'package' could be done by January. There were concerns about government rushing the process. Table members discussed the likelihood that Cabinet would consider a plan following the announcement of an election. And the opposition – likely the new government – did not seem to support LRMP or the Protected Areas Strategy (PAS) and this would mean that a new government would represent a high risk to conservation interests. There were concerns about Table members rushing the process for reasons of political expediency.

⁵⁸ The meetings were 'off-Table' in the sense that they were held separately from Table meetings. The groups involved asked the Table's permission to enter into these talks and were expected to report back.

In early November the Table was introduced to a 'phased' approach to completing the plan. Phase 1 would involve the 'big-ticket' items like Protected Areas and areas requiring special management, and the general text – the less contentious issues. Phase 2 would focus on the details of what was agreed to during Phase 1, and Phase 3 would be implementation. A decision was made to try to produce a document for the end of March. There was a suggestion that government might need the package by February and so where agreement could not be reached, alternatives be presented.

By late November there were again requests for a public review of the Table's products outside of the Lillooet TSA. Some CRB members did not agree with spending resources on this and were concerned about the influence of urban centers. A comment was made that local people should feel that the plan is connected with the community and that doing public reviews elsewhere would not address local peoples' fears about being overwhelmed by 'outside' influences. Without consensus, the Table could not support open houses in communities outside the district.

During the meeting, some CRB members said they wanted to meet with some of the groups from the Lower Mainland to see the true nature of their interest in the community. At a late night meeting between these two groups, community members expressed their concerns about Lower Mainland groups' actions at the Table and described local peoples' perceptions that these groups were interrupting an otherwise easy-to-agree-upon process. Each of the 'outsiders' present was asked to explain his or her interest in the district and in the community; this question was also asked of an industry representative from outside the area. Responses were that 'outside' groups were familiar with what the communities were going through.

The Final Offer Selection Approach

By January 2001, those involved in the off-Table sessions, industry and recreation and conservation interests, had reported back to the Table. While representatives for the two groups had closed the gap between their expectations, the preliminary agreement was not well-received by their constituents. At the January meeting, the mediator gave an overview of the multiple-caucus approach being used with conservation and industry groups. The Table continued to work on the general text and was told that it might be expected to make decisions on items coming from the mediated sessions.

The off-Table sessions continued throughout early 2001. Before the second open house in February, a subset of the Table met in Lillooet for two days to refine some of the work that had been done by the off-Table groups in their second attempt. At this point, the mediated sessions were open to anyone who wanted to attend. Groups worked in separate rooms, on separate proposals, each proposing a zoning scheme for the district. The mediator 'shuttled' between the two rooms, looking for areas of agreement. The two groups were brought together only occasionally to present their respective proposals.

In February, there were a few days of mediated sessions in Kamloops. Those who attended continued to work on zoning proposals for the plan area based on the original proposals driven by industrial and conservation interests. Part way through these sessions, some CRB members said they were unhappy with the two proposals, saying that neither addressed community interests. They decided to put together their own, 'community' proposal.

On March 9th and 10th the Table met for the last time. By now, it seemed doubtful the Table would submit a single, consensus land use plan to government, so another approach was proposed – the Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA). The FOSA approach would build on the mediation. The plans that were currently being developed would be competing 'offers'⁵⁹ submitted to government. Key to this approach was that there would be only two offers submitted and all participants would agree to accept whichever government chose. The selection of one of the offers or plans would signal the end of Phase 1. During Phase 2, LLRMP participants would work on the details of the selected plan.

The mediator reviewed the 'Final Offer Selection Approach' (FOSA) and the Table asked questions of both the mediator, and a Director from LUCO, about whether the Provincial Government 'bought in' to this approach and who would make the decision and when. Each of the three groups presented its plan and the Table asked questions. There was talk of some groups presenting plans in addition to the three. The afternoon was spent deciding whether to adopt the FOSA.

The second day of the meeting, those who originally backed the industry plan expressed support for the community plan. Local government representatives present also expressed support for the community plan. There were again two plans. The Table decided to proceed with the FOSA provided government accept one or the other offer in its entirety. Each group would submit a final plan to government the following Tuesday. The general text would be submitted the next week. It was decided that other plans could be submitted but would not be part of the FOSA. The Table broke for the last time.

For the next few days, each group worked on its plan. The CRB and industry groups worked in Lillooet on what would be called the "Community Coalitions" (CC) plan or offer. In Vancouver, a group consisting mainly of Lower Mainland recreation and conservation interests worked on what would ultimately be called the "Conservation, Recreation, Tourism, and Community" (CRTC) offer or plan. The 'community' in the title reflected the two CRB members who ultimately signed on to support this plan.

⁵⁹ There was an avoidance of the word 'options' as this term indicates a failure to achieve consensus. Participants in the LLRMP did eventually reach consensus – this was not on a plan, but on the process – the FOSA process itself.

On the Tuesday, the plans were submitted to government. The following Monday, each group submitted its version of the general text. As part of the agreement, each Table member signed onto a plan. Shortly after this, each group presented its plan to a committee of Assistant Deputy Ministers. The day before the election was called the government announced that it had accepted the CRTC proposal and had made part of the Southern Chilcotin Mountains area a park by Order in Council.⁶⁰ They had selected the plan prepared primarily by the 'outside' conservation and recreation groups.

In summary, the Table was divided from the start, mainly along local-'outside' lines. At the start, there were three main groups: the CRB, 'outside' industrial interests and 'outside' conservation interests. LLRMP participants appeared most comfortable working in these 'like-minded' groups and so most of the time, the Table operated as a collection of groups, putting forward different plans or scenarios for consideration by the whole Table. Throughout the process, there were events that highlighted, and reinforced, the divisions in the Table and differences among these groups. Many of these events focused on Protected Areas, or concerns about the relative balance of 'greens' or 'browns' at the Table.

During the process, these groups tried a variety of approaches to achieve consensus on a single plan. Over time, and particularly near the end of the process, while local-'outside' divisions remained, there was some merging of the local or CRB group and the 'outside' industry group. At the end of the process only two plans were submitted to government – one plan largely backed by the local and industrial groups, and another backed by 'outside' conservation groups.⁶¹

Section Two: A Comparison of the Two Plans

In this section, I examine the similarities and differences between the two plans or 'offers' and look at the likely impacts of each (Enemark and Robinson 2001). This analysis is limited to the plans that were submitted to the provincial government in March 2001. These plans mark the end of the FOSA and the end of Phase 1 of the Lillooet LRMP. Because these two plans are the product of intense negotiations, they also represent the most complete picture of what each of the two final groups

⁶⁰ While the rest of the story is beyond the scope of this project, it is interesting to note that those backing the community-industry proposal were unhappy with government's decision. Given the timing and nature of the announcement, those whose proposal was not selected – primarily CRB members and 'outside' industrial interests – expressed concerns that the decision was a result of political pressure. And, given that the South Chilcotin Mountains Park was created by Order in Council and there was little word on the rest of the plan, some felt that the government had not upheld the Table's original agreement that one entire plan be selected. The issue was pursued with the incoming government and, once elected, the new Liberal government undertook a review of the process and plans. It also essentially disregarded both original proposals and initiated a new, largely government-driven consultation process.

⁶¹ This is not to suggest that all that signed on to a plan were completely satisfied with that plan. Some indicated that it was a 'lesser of two evils' type of choice; however, this reflects a decision.

was ultimately 'willing to live with' – each plan might be considered the 'bottom-line' for the group that produced it.

The Components of Each Plan

Each 'plan' that government received actually consists of two components: a framework document and a plan and accompanying map, with the framework document making up the bulk of each package. In addition to the standard LRMP information, such as background on the plan area, a glossary, terms of reference, and other such items, the framework document outlines what will happen in the portions of the plan that are placed into General Management Zones (GMZ). While this document is the largest part of each package, it is also the least contentious and so is not the focus of this discussion.

The plan itself is a short document that provides overall direction for each package. It describes the percentage of Protected Areas, resource management zones (RMZs), and deferral areas.⁶² As well, it describes incremental impacts to the Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB) for the management of values such as endangered species and riparian areas, and recommendations for transition and mitigation. The accompanying map shows the portions of the plan that can be represented graphically. The plan and map highlight the main points of disagreement between the two groups. Therefore the focus of this discussion is a comparison of these items.

The two plans follow the same basic format. Each includes a list of supporters, an overview of the major points, and some background on the plan area and why the plan has been put forward. In addition, each discusses how it addresses various interests at the Table and describes measures for transition and mitigation as the plan is implemented. As mentioned earlier, the main elements of each plan are the Protected Areas, resource management zones, and deferral areas, as well as provincial strategies. These items are discussed in turn.

The Two Plans Compared

A glance at the maps (see Figure 7. Community Coalitions Proposal and Figure 8. Conservation, Recreation, & Tourism Proposal) would suggest that the two plans are largely similar, but there are notable differences. Table 2. provides an overview of how each plan will apply zones and strategies to the landscape. Where possible, this allocation of land to zones or management policies is shown as '% THLB' or '% Plan Area'.⁶³ These units reflect how decisions are framed in land use planning: as a loss of land available for industrial development such as forestry or mining, and an impact

⁶² Deferral areas are areas where development is not allowed (it is deferred) for a certain amount of time. This might be an arbitrary amount of time, or until some condition is met (i.e. detailed planning).

⁶³ Plan area includes the total number of hectares in the entire Lillooet forest district or Timber Supply Area (TSA). The Timber Harvesting Land Base is that portion of the forest district or TSA that is available for harvesting trees.

Figure 7. Community Coalition Proposal





Figure 8. Conservation, Recreation, & Tourism Proposal



to these interests. THLB is specific to forestry and is consistent with the currency of the Lillooet LRMP. The data below are from the plans submitted to government in March 2001 (CC 2001; CRTC 2001) and Enemark and Robinson (2001).

Table 2. Comparison of the Two Plans in terms of Zones and Strategies ⁶⁴

		Communities Coalition Plan (CC)	Conservation, Recreation, Tourism, Community Plan (CRTC)
ZONES			
Protected Areas	New Protected Areas: (% Plan Area) (% THLB) Total Protected Areas, including existing. (% Plan Area):	5.7% 4.3% 15.6%	8.8% 7.3% 18.8%
Resource Management Zones	# Zones: % Plan Area:	10 zones 38.3%	11 zones 38.9%
Deferral Areas	Category 1 (Short-term) Category 2 (Longer-term) % Plan Area Total Deferral Area (% Plan Area)	6 areas – 2.6% 3 areas – 2.2% 4.8%	3 areas – 1.8% 2 areas – 1.3% 3.1%
Other Deferrals	First Nations Deferral	-	1 area – 0.2%
Other Zones	Community Forest Tenure Areas	3 areas proposed	-
STRATEGIES			
	Grizzly Bear	8000 ha (2.7% THLB)	8000 ha (2.7% THLB)
	Riparian Forest Cover	3000 ha (1.0% THLB)	4000 ha (1.35% THLB)
	Mule Deer Winter Range	6000 ha (2.0% THLB)	6000 ha (2.0% THLB)
	Spotted Owls	1000 ha (0.3% THLB)	1000 ha (0.35% THLB)
	Totals:	18000 ha (6.0% THLB)	19000 ha (6.4% THLB)

Protected Areas

One of the more contentious issues in the plans was the amount of land dedicated to Protected Area. Typically, this description implies maximum protection from industrial development such as mining or forestry; however, there are other reasons for designating Protected Areas, including the availability of specific tools for managing recreational use. Protected Areas include parks, ecological reserves, and other such designations.

⁶⁴ Plan area not accounted for in this table would fall under General Management. General Management is described in the general text and not part of this comparison.

When viewed as a percentage of the plan area, there is only a small difference between the two plans in terms of how much area will be fully protected. The Communities Coalition (CC) plan proposes that an additional 5.3% of the plan area be designated as Protected Area. Combined with pre-LRMP Protected Areas, 15.4% of the plan area will receive full protection. The Conservation, Recreation, Tourism and Community (CRTC) plan proposes that an additional 8.84% of the plan area receive full protection, bringing the total to 18.94%. In terms of reductions from the Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB) the CC plan proposes a 4.3% reduction, compared with the CRTC plan's 7.32%.

The largest area of difference is the South Chilcotin Mountains area or "Spruce Lake". While both plans propose a core of strict protection around Spruce Lake itself, the CRTC plan is more generous at 6.3% of the plan area compared with the CC plan's 3.8%. But while both buffer this core area with either more Protected Area or with some type of 'special' management, the CC plan does allow resource extraction, though mainly in the longer term, in the zones adjacent to this core. The CRTC plan does not.

Resource Management Zones

Resource Management Zones (RMZs) are areas where a particular type of management is required to protect a certain species or to manage values such as recreation or scenic quality. Drawing a line around an area and calling it an RMZ does not preclude industrial development, it just implies different management than what is happening outside of that area or than what would take place under general management. Because each RMZ is defined by the values it is meant to protect, they are difficult to compare. However, since management is done with an eye to protecting identified values, this means restricting development. It follows that the more area designated as RMZs, the more restrictions there are on industrial interests.

Mining interests were particularly concerned about RMZs. According to mining representatives at the LLRMP, while these zones theoretically allow industrial development, management within them can be so tightly prescribed that it limits exploration and therefore precludes investment. The extent of this problem is such that these zones, more typically known as 'Special Management Zones' (SMZs) are sometimes referred to as 'parks-in-waiting'. The LLRMP Table tried to address the concerns associated with the more well known SMZ label by using the term Resource Management Zone (RMZ). The CC plan even states specifically that these zones "are not 'special management zones'" (CC 2001:4).

The CC plan identifies 10 areas, making up 40% of the plan area, for RMZ status. The CRTC plan proposes 11 zones, but there is no percentage given. However, comparing the two maps, it is possible to estimate that the two plans propose that similar amounts of the plan area be put into RMZs. The most interesting difference is that the CC plan does not commit any of the proposed RMZs, with the exception

of the South Chilcotins RMZ, to permanent RMZ status. It states that "if 'general' management direction can be developed that addresses the interests and values in these areas it's possible that some of these areas may not ultimately be recommended as RMZs" (CC 2001:10). Therefore, it is possible that the CC plan could have a much smaller percentage of RMZs than what is currently shown on the map.

Deferral Areas

While there is much variation between and even within the two plans in terms of what is being deferred and how, each plan identifies two basic types of Deferral Area: Category 1 areas tend to be shorter term and Category 2 areas are longer term. And while all of these areas will eventually be open to development, they have an impact in that they do not allow development of certain areas for some period of time. Given the variety of deferral areas within and between the two plans, it is difficult to define this impact. However, it is useful, in a general way, to say that the more areas in deferral, and the longer that development of these areas is deferred, the greater the potential impact to industrial interests.

The CC plan proposes six areas for short-term deferral, while the CRTC plan proposes only three. While individual areas in Category 1 deferral are of similar size on each map, the larger number of areas in the CC plan means a larger total area is protected from development in the short-term. Over the longer term - and this is defined differently in each plan and even for different Category 2 areas within a single plan - the CC plan proposes three areas for long-term deferral and the CRTC plan proposes only two. The key difference between the two plans is the CC plan clearly tries to limit the amount of time that areas are in deferral, often just to the end of Phase 2, while the CRTC plan suggests deferring development until certain requirements are met, and the timeline is not clear.

Other Zones

In addition to the zones mentioned above, there are two other zones proposed. The first is a Community Forest Tenure Area. While this concept is not unique to the LLRMP, the idea of designating a community forest through land and resource management planning is unprecedented. Community forests are typically awarded in a separate process. However, some of the people at the LLRMP Table, particularly those who eventually formed the Communities Coalition (CC), felt that more of the benefits from local forests should flow to local communities. They felt local forest tenures might be the best way to capture these benefits.

There are three Community Forest Tenure Areas, though the exact location, shape, and size of these areas has yet to be determined. Since the details have not been worked out, it is difficult to compare this aspect of the CC plan to the CRTC plan. This also begs a question about measuring impacts of certain zones. Clearly, devoting parts of the plan area and part of the timber supply to local communities

will have an impact on forest companies operating in the district. These costs should be considered against the potential benefits to the communities.

The second type of zone is a First Nations Deferral, proposed only in the CRTC plan. This area is meant to acknowledge the unresolved First Nations issues in one particular area and prescribes a 10-year deferral until the interested First Nation and government can resolve certain issues. The deferral applies to all road-building activities and specifically to forest development, though it would also apply to any mining that requires roads. As such, this deferral area might be considered additional area that is temporarily unavailable for development for an extended period.

In terms of zones, the immediate impacts of each of the two plans are quite similar. The amount of plan area 'permanently' unavailable for development and the amounts of land where development is deferred over the long and short-terms are quite similar; this can be seen by comparing the two maps (Figures 8 and 9). For the most part, both plans identify the same lands for additional management consideration. While the exact shape and nature of the resultant zones differs somewhat, the overall immediate impact of these zones appears to be quite similar.

Strategies

For certain values, such as those relating to riparian areas and grizzly bears and others, the provincial government has developed its own management strategies which the Table had to address. Whether, and how, to apply these strategies was the source of considerable debate. Strategies are not as straightforward as zones - mobile species need protection that adapts to changing conditions - yet it is possible to calculate an impact in terms of the amount of otherwise harvestable area temporarily used or 'allowed' for buffers or patches, for example. While the Table was free to decide the extent to which it applied individual strategies, there was a province-wide recommended limit of 6% impact on timber supply (Cashore et al. 2001).

Both plans seem respectful of this limit, with the CC plan weighing in with a 6.0% impact to the THLB and the CRTC plan at 6.4%. The two plans differ slightly, as the CRTC plan proposes riparian management receive an additional 0.35% for a total of 1.35% THLB, compared with the CC plan's 1.0%. Otherwise the number of hectares and amount of THLB allocated to riparian areas and the management of identified wildlife is closely aligned. Other values - visual quality, stand and landscape level bio-diversity and water quality - are mentioned in one or both of the proposals but are not considered here as they do not require a THLB allowance.

One difference between the two plans is in the way these allowances are used. The CC plan states that the total amount of the allowances or budget "represents a 'maximum'" (CC 2001:14). So, while it is possible to redistribute the total amount of THLB among the values, the total amount of THLB will not to be increased in Phase 2. In contrast, the CRTC plan describes the budgets as "impact parameters" (CRTC

2001:13) that might need to be reconsidered in Phase 2 if they are found to be inadequate to protect identified values. What differentiates the two plans is whether THLB allowances are 'capped' in Phase 1 or are subject to further debate in Phase 2.

A Final Word on Differences

Aside from the locations and amounts of plan area and THLB 'budgeted' to manage certain values, there are two major differences between the two plans, both difficult to quantify. The first is the amount of planning and decision-making to be worked out in Phase 2. The CC plan tries to limit most major decisions to the end of Phase 1 with the selection of one plan. Conversely, the CRTC plan leaves a number of decisions to be finalized in Phase 2, even leaving open to further, though limited, discussion, issues such as amount of Protected Area.

The second major difference is in the use of qualifying clauses. For both plans the section on entitled "Deferral Areas" and the section entitled "Economic Transition, Mitigation, and Diversification", the CRTC plan states that "... not adopting this section WOULD NOT constitute not adopting this offer" (CRTC 2001: 8&16). Leaving out these two sections of the CRTC plan would result in a different plan over the short term.

Longer Term Impacts

The forest industry faces a minimum 14.5% THLB reduction with the CRTC plan and a maximum 10.8% THLB reduction with the CC plan. Mining has access to 81.2% of the plan area with the CRTC plan, while it has access to 84.4% with the CC plan. But what do these impacts mean for the long term? And what impact might they have in terms of jobs? The *LLRMP Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment of Phase 1 Framework Proposals: Final Report* (Enemark and Robinson 2001) evaluates each plan plus a third scenario, the status quo or 'Base Case', looking at a variety of factors over time. While the authors of the report acknowledge the uncertainty associated with projections of this kind, it is still a useful comparison.

For the CC plan, "fall-down" or a serious decline in the supply of timber, occurs in year 21, while this occurs a decade earlier, in year 11, under the CRTC plan. In terms of the costs and benefits of implementing the two plans, the *Report* projects the CRTC plan will have no revenue impacts for ten years but that there will be a \$1.8-\$3.4 million annual impact to forestry revenues by year 21. The CC plan will have no revenue impacts for twenty years, and will have an estimated \$0.9-\$1.7 million annual impact to forestry revenues by year 21. In terms of jobs, the CC plan will place a maximum of 2% of the plan area employment at risk in thirty years, compared with the CRTC plan which places 4% of the overall plan area employment at risk by this time. It is recognized that these impacts may be offset by factors such as economic growth or changes in the forest and other industries over this time period.

In summary, the two plans appear similar when looking generally at areas of management concern. This is surprising given the final breakdown of Table negotiations and ultimate failure to reach consensus on a single plan. Even in terms of the percentages of plan area and Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB) allocated to zones and to management strategies, there are no large differences, other than the size and configuration of zones in the South Chilcotin Mountain or "Spruce Lake" area. Difficult to quantify is the intent of the two plans. While the CC plan tries to limit major decisions to the end of Phase 1, the CRTC plan delays some of these decisions until Phase 2. In addition, the CRTC plan has two somewhat 'optional' parts, and leaving out these two parts would mean a slightly different plan.

Section Three: Perceptions of the Process and the Two Plans

It is one thing to describe a process as it unfolded; it is another to hear how participants experienced it – that is the purpose of this section. It is divided into four main parts: participants' expectations for the process, their views on negotiations, and their opinions about the Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA) and the two resulting plans. The final part is participants' reflections on the process: why there were two plans instead of one, whether the process was a success or a failure, and whether interest-based negotiation makes a difference to this type of process.

Because of the amount of information from interviews, it was necessary to summarize. However, where possible I have used quotes to illustrate what is being discussed, as I feel the best way to tell participants' stories is with their own words. When selecting quotes, I have purposefully tried to capture a range of perspectives. Because of this, there is more to read, but I think this is important for getting a sense of how differently people can interpret the same event. I also tried to avoid quotes that might be considered too personal – for example, quotes that identified individuals⁶⁵ – while still trying to relay what was said. Each section is followed by a summary of overall trends in the interview data.

Expectations

To get at participants' expectations for the process, I asked what hopes and concerns they had entering the LLRMP. Responses clustered around a number of themes. One was general distrust of government people and government processes:

"There is an attitude, in a lot of places, that 'we represent the public. We represent the power, what the fuck are you saying to us?' And that was what the local people didn't want at the Table; that was how they saw all government departments."

⁶⁵ When selecting quotes, I tried to avoid the types of comments about which one interviewee said "this is the stuff you're going to lock away in your computer, right?". The purpose of using quotes is not to embarrass; it is to communicate the feeling behind what was said.

"There's this sort of the standard sense about government processes - you go to the meetings and you work as hard as you can and you really care about the thing. And then it disappears and it comes back in some form that you can't recognize anymore."

Another theme that emerged was the role of Protected Areas in the planning process. There were questions and comments about how designating the Stein Valley as a Protected Area would affect the process and the fate of another popular area, the South Chilcotin Mountains locally known as "Spruce Lake". For example:

"We always knew that there was going to be a park in one place or the other. And when government one-offed the Stein in '95 what they basically were saying.. to the conservationists is 'we think that we can make a park here... and you guys are going to have to negotiate your own park with this bunch of sharks over here'."

However, the bulk of concerns situated on whom would be involved in the process. Many local CRB people expressed a desire for a "community driven... and participatory process" with a prominent CRB. Some of those I interviewed from outside the area expressed an interest in a more inclusive process, and talked about having to "fight our way in there". Of these 'outside' groups, some expressed concerns about the CRB's unique role in the LLRMP. Concerns ranged from the CRB being "influenced by industry" to the fact that they had drafted the initial terms of reference - indicating a measure of control over the process - to the CRB's participation at the Table:

"The CRB goes and meets about an issue and then brings eight people to the Table to present that position. They'd deflect things from the Table, too, and say 'well, the CRB needs to decide'."

Similarly, the CRB members interviewed had concerns about 'outside' involvement. This was even though at least one CRB member explicitly recognized that "you could be in big trouble trying to make an LRMP with just local representation" because once it was opened up for comment by others "the plan would be attacked and shredded from all sides". So while it was seen as necessary, there were concerns. In particular, concerns were that the general public might be lost in a process that involved groups that were "better organized than we are".

"Local people needed to have a significant role in the process and their views were not valued or understood by many other players... There's big government, big companies, big unions, big environmentalists and the rest of us."

"Citizens can be overwhelmed by the money and the power, like a company or government has in those situations... The difficulty is just having citizens be able to be present and not overwhelmed by the categories... the greens versus the browns and that kind of thing.. As citizens, you're not all one colour."

While there was general concern about 'outside' group involvement, some did not view all 'outside' groups equally:

"So the process got opened to all the interested parties from the Lower Mainland as they consider this their playground."

"There were [these outside conservation groups] and their claim that they represent hundreds of thousands, tens of thousands of people in Vancouver and all of a sudden you knew you were outgunned... Whereas, realistically, [a forest company] is just one licensee in an area..."

Most interviewees expressed expectations for the process and process outcomes; not surprisingly, some simply wanted to produce a plan. Several others attached particular significance to the plan, saying that it would establish "a new precedent". There were some hopes and concerns about the process and whether it would 'work'; in particular, how and whether participants and government would understand it and embrace the idea of working in an interest-based, consensus building fashion. A subset of expectations was expressed by CRB members:

"I was sort of seeing it as a 20-year process... That over 20 years, if we could get a plan that said 'this is what we think should be done' and then we actually spend the first 10 years seeing if any of it was going to happen."

"The people that knew consensus thought 'we may not even get to agreement on this plan, but we will get closer together with people who think differently... there'll be more understanding generated'. Benefits further down the line, in the communities or whatever we do together."

When asked whether Table composition was balanced, comments ranged from it being "truly unbalanced representation" to "about as best as you could achieve". Some felt it was skewed, putting one group or another at an advantage:

"I would say it was balanced from the view of people from the outside, particularly operating at the political or quasi-political level, it looked like it had balance because it had people from the outside who were clamoring to get in..."

"There definitely was a bias towards the forest industry from the people at the Table... There was people from the industry themselves who were representing the companies and then there's the different SHARE groups involved as well."

Members of both the CRB and 'outside' groups raised concerns about the varying approaches to representation at the Table, and how these approaches would mesh.

"Unfortunately, there were people there who saw themselves as stakeholders and they were in there to bargain their stakes and there were other people who saw themselves as participants with perspectives. And I don't think the word stakeholder is compatible with consensus process..."

"We spent a lot of time at the beginning arguing about perspectives versus sectors. It either would make or unmake the CRB as the controller of the process if it was all perspective and there wouldn't be any room for sectoral representation."

Related concerns about the process had to do with perceived inequalities, such as some groups having control over other groups or the process being otherwise 'unfair':

"The locals who depend on industry were not able to stand up for their own interest, or even support other interests."

"There were some rules that were made at the beginning which said that you couldn't communicate directly with government during this process and this made for a bit of a bias because companies are always corresponding with government."

I asked participants – how do you define interest-based negotiation? There was a range of views on what it is, but most talked about how it requires a certain amount of letting go of preconceived notions: "it's presenting your desires from a point of view of what it is you want to achieve, not how you want to achieve it". Many described interests as something that must be thought through, talked about; some described it as requiring an intellectual process:

"It requires a deliberative forum; you have to be able to discuss each others' interests and ask questions."

"... A position is a bundle of interests... So let's take the bundle apart and assume they're not dependent upon one another... So that's your position, that's my position, now let's break the bundles apart and line up where we're similar."

For some, interest-based negotiation requires going beyond intellectual exercises and a more substantial commitment on the part of participants to acknowledge other's interests and "show a real interest in the other person".

"The interest has to be something you can internalize and put back out again. So as soon as an interest is there in that condition, it becomes everybody's... The intellectual, emotional connection to information, that's what makes it work. If you're just taking it intellectually, you can't find solutions to things and you can't understand the other person's point of view because it's coming from those places."

In summary, in soliciting participants' expectations for the Lillooet LRMP, I anticipated that local and 'outside' participants would have different ideas of who should be involved in planning for the area. Local participants were generally more interested in a planning process carried out by local people and there were concerns

about 'outside' involvement and whether that might overwhelm the process and local participants. But while there were concerns about 'outside' groups generally, most concerns centred on what some called the "Vancouver conservation groups"; industry interests at the Table were not seen by all to be as threatening and by some, were seen to be more 'in line' or 'in tune' with local interests.

In contrast, participants from 'outside' the area, particularly the "Vancouver conservation groups" who were initially excluded from the Table, wanted a more inclusive process and were concerned about the level of control the CRB had over the process and the perceived animosity toward them. All of these concerns – both local and 'outside' – carried over to the process itself, where there were concerns expressed by various members of each 'group' that the Table, or the process, was somehow skewed, giving one group or another an advantage.

I also anticipated that there would be some difference of opinion about the role of Protected Areas, particularly the Stein Valley Nlaka'pamux Heritage Park, in the process; this also happened. Many local people interviewed appeared unhappy with the Stein decision, seeing it as cutting into the 'budget' for Protected Areas in the LLRMP; this is also true of industry. For the most part, 'outside' conservation groups, while acknowledging that the Stein decision could complicate things, expressed an interest in making a decision around the unresolved South Chilcotin or "Spruce Lake" area.

Negotiations

The bulk of the process consisted of negotiations around the Table. I wanted to know how people felt about these negotiations, including how people felt participating at the Table and more generally, how they felt the group functioned. A big part of working as a group is communication; people need to feel heard. To elicit whether people felt heard at the Lillooet LRMP Table, I asked interviewees whether they understood others' interests and whether they felt that others understood theirs.

For the most part, the people I interviewed seemed to feel as though they understood or tried to understand most of the interests at the Table. As one interviewee put it: "Well, everybody thinks they do, I suppose." Others said that, when it came to the other participants, they at least "knew where they were coming from." A few interviewees pointed out some of the difficulties they had understanding others' interests, such as "some were not explained and some were not honest... also, some had a government advocate to provide a clearer picture and some didn't".

Conversely, when asked whether they felt their interests were understood, no one that I asked stated unequivocally that he or she felt this at the LLRMP Table. Some felt understood only in certain circles:

"I think maybe not everybody, but the core group of 6, 8, 10, whatever it was, I think they knew what our issues were. They didn't quite know how to get what we needed but then there isn't an easy answer to it."

"I think everybody at the CRB Table did because like I said, I trusted all these people that they could represent my interest... I will not say the same about any of the people from the outside; partly they didn't have the context to do that; they come from a different world entirely than I do."

Many commented that they did not feel heard and that their interests "definitely weren't taken seriously". Others felt that their interest "was understood, it just wasn't embraced" or that "it's just a case that they're not able to accept that they're valid" or that "they didn't care". In one participant's words: "neither side was willing to accept that the others' interests were really that important."

I asked interviewees whether they felt that we had achieved interest-based negotiation at the Lillooet LRMP. Only one person felt that we achieved interest-based negotiation, though this was later qualified. Some felt that overlap in the two final plans meant we must at least have been somewhat interest-based, though obviously "we weren't completely successful in doing that". All other responses were either that we failed as a Table or that interest-based negotiation was limited:

"Hell no... No matter who it was... all they were interested in was me, me, me - our interest, and what they could get out of it."

"I think that sometimes people came not to be interest-based... But there was definitely a segment of people that were prepared to be interest-based all the time."

"Occasionally it felt like people were getting warm. There were a few points when [IBN] was brought about by one of the facilitators, but it didn't happen any time on its own."

When asked to explain our difficulties achieving interest-based negotiation, some pointed to it being contrary to what we see in everyday society "from day one, what do we teach in school? We teach debating". Others pointed out that being interest-based "came easier to some people – just because of their personality, background, and previous experience". Still others observed that working in an interest-based manner is just difficult to do, especially in stressful situations, whether as part of, or outside the LLRMP:

"Changes in circumstance – you lose your job or you get moved somewhere else. Or suddenly you're going through a phase where your personal future is really shaky and you don't really give a fuck whether somebody else is worried about trees, you know?"

Some felt it centered on certain issues, such as Protected Areas:

"Whenever it came down to Protected Areas, [industry] was as rigid as ever. Not just Protected Areas, but even with the idea of putting science to logging practices."

"I think we had troubles with interest-based all along.. You know, there were certain things people all agreed on, like not tearing up the alpine – but I don't think we had to park everything to solve that problem."

Others pointed to problems with the process itself, that it didn't support interest-based negotiation "because the agendas were so structured, there was not enough time. The opportunity to understand interests was stifled". There were comments that "people don't like training – and the training wasn't necessarily that well done". And related problems:

"When a group is acting in an interest-based manner, there is a certain willingness to give up your own dearly held goal or outcome and if you're encouraged to do that, that's great. But when the facilitators, coordinators, government personnel were kind of wanting to divide it up into camps and really keep people separate, that really worked against it."

Finally, one person specifically questioned whether it is possible that some interests can not be reconciled:

"Ultimately, what you identify as your interest is based often on your values... Sometimes you can't reconcile the interests because the interests are at the very root positional; because they're you."

I wanted to get a sense of how participants felt that the Table functioned – whether the Table worked as a team. Responses were generally that "we didn't work very well as a team for sure". Or that successful teamwork was limited to particular individuals or circumstances, such as working groups where "there was less posturing necessary" and focused topics meant "there was a better chance of finding a meeting ground – a coincidence of interests."

Some explained why they felt we did not work as a team. Several comments were made about the terms of reference being either 'too broad', not focusing the Table on the task to be done, not being defined well enough around behaviour at and away from the Table, and being enforced when people were not abiding by them. Other explanations included the difficulties of having participants come and go from the process. Some described the Table as a number of different teams:

"Actually, there were two teams... The interests that were looking after the forests for harvesting and the interests that were looking after the forests for preservation were not working as a team - they really weren't."

"It seemed like we worked in two groups looking for two different end results... When we broke into groups it was usually the same people breaking into the same groups."

"I would say the Lillooet people, along with the forest industry portion, wanted no restrictions; total freedom to continue to do their thing. Then there were the conservationists who felt there was a different approach. And those two kept stepping around each other, all the time..."

"When the Table was working well, it was beautiful – that happened very rarely... The two extremes both burned my ass... They were behaving as if we were voting individually and the points counted... Rather than there was a true and honest sharing of information and concerns and fears and hopes and all the rest of it."

"The challenge between the [outside conservationists] and the local greens was a dynamic all along. Actually, [the industry groups] and their local employees has also been a dynamic – so I'm trying to keep a balance here. Because I don't want to say the environmentalists fucked the whole process, I don't think that's true..."

"The CRB was a little different - there was a little different feeling there, about people being local, part of the same communities, realizing that we're going to be around here for a long time..."

When describing the general atmosphere or level of comfort and understanding at the Table, people made reference to things like intimidation and power struggles. Two people specifically commented on the fact that there was a lot of emotion at the Table, particularly anger, which "wasn't being admitted to". One person stated that "it wasn't an easy place to speak" and that "if everyone there had regarded each other as peers and valuable contributors, it would've been fine. Yet to me, that's where the rot set in".

When describing the Table's progress, some described it as "a lot of wheel-spinning", where we "would start in one direction, then peel in another direction" the result being "we spent years and years to make very incremental progress". Some described a perceived reluctance to address the "thorny issues":

"... The SCM Park area – both sides wanted a park there, it was only a case of how big? Yet we never got around to talking about that until March of 2001."

"Nobody wanted to talk about Protected Areas and Spruce [Lake]... So we spent too much time on it and yet not enough time, because it was never resolved."

Despite obvious problems with the Table, some interviewees identified a sense of community at the Table:

"There was still a sense of being all in this together, I think... And the Table had that – even if you wanted to reach over and whack somebody."

Not surprisingly, a theme that emerged was facilitation. Comments on the facilitation ranged from concerns that the facilitation "wasn't bad, but needed a sense of

urgency" to comments that the facilitators "pandered to economic interests" and that they "didn't call bullshit enough," taking to task Table members who were saying things that others thought were untrue. Other comments were that the facilitators had too much control over the process, not allowing participants to get to the "meaty issues". Yet there was recognition by some that the facilitators did try to help Table members "build personal relationships" and "control negative dynamics."

Comments about individual facilitators focused mainly on the two original facilitators. Of the CRB members who mentioned facilitation, all commented that they were more comfortable with the local facilitator and/or that they were less comfortable with the 'outside' facilitator. One person commented "I knew [his] background and I didn't trust him from the get-go". Conversely, of the interviews with people not on the CRB, those who commented on the facilitators expressed concerns about the local facilitator, who was "part of the CRB matrix". Some expressed a preference for the 'outside' facilitator, while acknowledging that "he had a strong personality and style and some people were uncomfortable with that".

Another theme was distrust of government and government processes: "if you weren't there, you were going to lose" and "government was going to pull the rug right out from underneath us at some point and go back and do something". Other comments were that people were not happy with how government directed the LLRMP processes. These comments tended to be directed at higher levels of government, rather than individuals who sat at the Table as government representatives. A number of interviewees expressed frustration that the Table lacked government guidance on key issues:

"The Lillooet process was really very open – just go there, have fun – solve the impossible, because we don't have the gonads to do it as government... They were afraid to provide Protected Area targets, they were afraid to provide guidance to the Table because they knew if they went 18% the miners would light their hair on fire and if they went something like 13-14% then the conservationists would – it was a no-win. Yet the public went there, trying to solve a no-win. And it was frustrating."

Other comments were that "government ministries didn't produce the data we required" or that government people did not fully understand the process and what it required. Some CRB members felt that government never really acknowledged the CRB and its special role in the LLRMP process. As one participant said, "... government didn't understand our process. Some of the regional people came to respect local people, but as far as I can tell, LUCO never did." Still other CRB members felt, over time "government drove the process that we'd invented to do ourselves..."

Other concerns about government had to do with the government people directly involved with the Table, both representatives and those in supporting roles. Again, there were concerns that many of the government people were "some of the least

interest-based people at the Table". There were comments that this lack of understanding did not help, and in some cases, government people even exacerbated problems at the Table "by always defining 'green' and 'brown'". Further, "there was always a schism about the degree to which the government people were contributing to decisions, making decisions, or just providing information".

In summary, I anticipated that, during the bulk of the process, participants tended not to feel heard or understood by many of the other people at the Table. Participants reported that this is largely what they felt. So, while many felt that they tried to understand others' interests, they also felt that this was not reciprocated; this contributed to overall feelings of frustration and lack of trust. Also, or perhaps in part as a result of this, people tended to work with others at the Table who they felt best understood them. This led to the Table tending to work not as a 'team' but as different 'teams': industrial interests, 'outside' conservation interests, and the CRB.

Likely in part because of this fragmentation, the process seemed to progress very slowly. While common concerns and distrust of government tended to unite all parties at the Table it also seemed to create general anxiety – that government could end the process at any time. Concerns around facilitation tended to add to the tension between local and 'outside' interests.

The FOSA Process and the Two Plans

Finally, I wanted to know how participants felt about the Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA) and the two final plans. In terms of the FOSA process, some were very comfortable with it, with one person saying "just wish it had happened sooner." Others were a little less enthusiastic, but "basically thought that's what had to happen" or that it "was appropriate given the circumstances – we had reached a point where there was a fork in the road – two 'takes' on the same document".

Some of the CRB members interviewed discussed the initiation of their own plan - the "third offer" - part way through the FOSA, and how it was received:

"It was like something different happened when there was a moment there when it looked like things had really gone too far apart... So that got this other [community] alternative going, which still eventually did become this 'industrial community coalition' thing, but it really was – it still was different. Even the process of doing that was more CRB and more interest-based and based on the CRB having this long time together and not being as polarized..."

"From the moment it was presented, it was watered down by those who wanted to participate in it because it was good press, but still wanted their own views represented."

Some saw the FOSA process as necessary but "a bit of a crapshoot". Several interviewees pointed out that once the process went to government, it became too political, putting some parties at an advantage:

"There was definitely a point there that I felt the process of decision-making kind of went out of our hands as LRMP members. And it went into this process of who could lobby and who had the ability to convince various bureaucrats and ministers that 'this is the right way to go'."

"The two offers is a political way of doing it. And as it turned out, it was more beneficial to the [Lower Mainland Conservation Groups] because they're in Victoria all the time; they've got the government's ear..."

Some felt aspects of the FOSA process could have been handled better. There were comments about how it was difficult to participate as a volunteer in the process as the timelines were quite tight, though there was also recognition that timelines moved the process along. Other concerns with the process had to do with whether people acted fairly during the process, with comments about people "jumping groups" as plans were being produced. Other concerns focused on whether the process itself was fair.

A group of interviewees were very unhappy with the FOSA process. As one interviewee said, "I wasn't comfortable with it... I really wasn't. And I still don't know what made me agree to it, honestly". Several comments got at how the FOSA was "a totally different process... the conflict model versus put everything on the Table, take responsibility collectively and use that to solve the problem". Others described it as "divisive" and "position-building" exacerbating divisions in the Table:

"There was this real 'green-versus-brown' type of thing... Those negotiations were definitely handled differently, too, like trying to put people in different rooms, doing the shuttle thing, and there were things about that that tended to make sure you knew you were in a different camp."

"Even with all our bickering and blasting at each other, the Table created a sense of community which was destroyed by that boiling pot."

Given the apparent similarity between the two plans, I wanted to know what participants thought about how similar the plans were and where the differences lay. As expected, most people identified Protected Areas as the largest point of difference between the two plans, specifically the South Chilcotin Mountains or "Spruce Lake" area. Other differences were the amount of area requiring Special Management, and the allocation of budgets. Some also identified a difference in the 'openers and mitigation' section:

"Basically Spruce Lake. And there was more special management in the CRTC offer that was aimed at protecting the watersheds, the owls and things of that kind. And there were two or three more parks than they had, but they were not big parks; they were not going to change the world in any way."

"Major differences were Protected Areas, given the template we were working with. The other differences were in openers and mitigation, but mostly it was around Protected Areas. There wasn't even that much difference in triggers and in the way the two different offers were written..."

"See the difference between us and the conservationists is they had almost 20% so you had about 4% difference in parks which wasn't that much. But we didn't agree to 16%; I'm at 12% as my highest, but we decided maybe if we go for 16 and the other guys come down from their 20, then we have an agreement. But we went up to 16 and they didn't come down at all! But that's why all of a sudden the difference is not that great, but it is greater... Other than the actual percentage, the big difference is, in my eyes, Spruce Lake – it's been a stumbling block ever since we started."

"The level of deferrals and uncertainty was really high. The way it was in the community proposal was basically it was maximums and in the conservation proposal it was starting places..."

"Protected Areas was a big thing... But at the last minute, the conservation guys pulled a good pile of the mitigation stuff that we'd co-negotiated off the Table by saying 'failure to accept this mitigation package does not constitute not accepting the deal'. And in fact, by saying that they're saying 'give us our Protected Areas, fuck the communities', pardon my French..."

In summary, there were varying levels of comfort with the Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA) process. For the most part, 'outside' groups tended to see it as a logical next step to bring the process to a conclusion, while many of the community people interviewed felt very uncomfortable with it and driven to it by 'the two extremes' and government. An attempt to create a third 'community' plan was met with mixed results and the FOSA process ended as it began, with two plans going to government.

Ultimately, the process did help bring the two plans closer together in terms of content, but it also drove the groups at the Table further apart, destroying any sense of community that had developed and making it more difficult for the groups to agree *in principle*.

Despite apparent similarities between the two plans and agreement on some of the larger substantive differences, the impacts of the two plans are perceived quite differently. Those who signed on to the initially accepted Conservation Recreation Tourism Community (CRTC) plan tended to agree that the two plans were largely similar, while those who signed on to the Community Coalitions (CC) plan mostly pointed out large differences. For some, the way that the plans were written confirmed that their interests were not taken seriously by the other group.

Reflections on the Process

I asked participants: what do you think were some of the reasons that two offers were submitted to government rather than one plan? Some pointed to process issues, including terms of reference that were not clear about "what constituted working

against the Table” and “what to do with a non-consensus item”. Another process issue was lack of information. Specifically, some interviewees agreed, “there was no credible analysis of the full economic implications of Protected Areas on the TSA – no impartial analysis accepted by everyone at the Table”.

Some felt that government also played a role in the production of two separate plans. Again, there were comments that government did not give the Table adequate guidance, particularly on the issue of Protected Areas:

“Because of a lack of direction from the government, we were so far apart. Like if the government had said ‘we’re going to protect 18%’ then I think we could’ve come and agreed to what that 18% was going to be – possibly there could’ve been a consensus on that. But because we were so far apart, it just ended up being too positional.”

Some felt government simply did not understand consensus. Others made comments to the effect that the government of the day, the New Democratic Party, “were getting pounded on for Spruce Lake and, obviously with the politics with the Green Party coming up, they needed to have some good news on that side of the equation”. Some felt that government, rather than pushing the process, let it happen by refusing to “force [the two extremes] off their corners to make them consider consensus as a real option. Nobody at the Table had the ability to do that and the government of the day didn’t have the balls to just say ‘do it or leave the Table and we’ll do it without you’”.

The majority of comments had to do with what people described as various divisions in the Table. Most identified either an ‘industry/conservation’ or a ‘urban/rural’ dichotomy:

“I would say that the players enforcing the two options were basically [industry] and the coastal part of the conservation caucus, and one of the major similarities both groups have is they are major players who live outside the region.”

“It ended up being a split between urban and rural because they had different expectations than we did.”

“The xenophobia that was there about people who were from outside the region had a pervasive negative impact... Constantly it would create an ‘us’ and ‘them’ thing..”

These divisions were explained as being the result of some fundamental differences between and among different groups. And “it wasn’t just a matter of, ‘let’s take another few weeks and we’ll get this all straightened out’... it’s kind of a philosophical difference...”:

"The outside environmental groups saw Protected Areas as being the only way they could protect their interests... Protected Areas work for them because it's a higher level of protection that removes it out of the hands of us rapacious resource users... Because I do believe we could manage within the absence of Protected Areas."

"It's a value thing that they do not see the need for Protected Areas; they literally don't value them as a designation on the land – they're unnecessary in their mind. So that's a piece of it. There's also this myth that never got broken that forest industry is the driving blood of that community."

There were various descriptions of how this manifested itself at the Table and ultimately led to the production of two plans:

"From the industry's point of view, there was no advantage for them to come to any consensus, because they were still logging and – you know, the process didn't really make any difference to their interest. Where, from a wilderness side, we were losing wilderness continually through the process."

"The conservation side kept adding Protected Area candidates... And you get the perception all of a sudden that recreation was more important than anything else. But I guess here we place the fact that we can still live here and work here as way more important."

As one interviewee put it, "it always came down to Protected Areas". More specifically, there were comments about how the Stein decision had affected the process. One person commented that the Stein decision in 1995 left some of the local people at the Table "looking for compensation, is a nice way to put it; sometimes I got the feeling retribution was more like it." Other comments tended to focus on the South Chilcotins or "Spruce Lake".

"Spruce Lake – that's the scary part for a lot of local people... All the places in the district that are genuine wilderness, important sites for preservation, are going to lose because [Spruce Lake] has all those bodies on the Lower Mainland proposing it."

It will continue to be a very political one... Anywhere around Spruce Lake will be a difficult place to do business, whatever the size of Spruce Lake."

But it wasn't all Stein and Spruce. There were comments that industry is not only interested in how much land is 'lost' to parks; it is interested in how much and what types of management will be required outside of these. Even more interesting is how participants aligned themselves on other issues:

"The balance of disputes didn't remain consistent all the way through. Fine, we may have all fought over the South Chilcotins, but on the next issue... I was getting support from people that I would've never expected to see supporting my view of the South Chilcotins! So that the split wasn't always a perfect line – it tended to shift on the issue that was in front of us."

I asked interviewees to comment on whether they felt the process was a success or a failure. Despite the fact that the Table did not agree on a single consensus plan, there was a range of answers to this question. One participant did say that it was a failure "because we didn't come up with a plan." A number of others felt that, up until two plans were submitted to government, it was "a success, but not a raging success" because at least "it addressed the split" and the Table had reached consensus on a process, if not a plan.⁶⁶

Asking participants whether they considered the process a success or failure was not a simple question. To some, "it's really both". While there were obvious failures, many pointed out little successes, such as people learning about how government manages resources and government learning about peoples' interests, and "the information that is now available". Still others pointed to benefits for themselves and the community:

"To be honest with you, it's helped me... And I think everybody learned a lot at the LRMP – so it sure is a learning process – you learn a lot of stuff and you meet a lot of people."

"The process brought out and honed the skills of a number of key leaders in this community."

"Was it a success? Yes, in most ways. What we're striving for is what the community needs. Did it achieve the finality that we all had in our expectations? No, it didn't. But maybe our expectations of the process were greater than what the process could ever deliver."

Given this experience with the process and the mixed results, I wanted to find out whether participants felt that interest-based negotiation is worthwhile for land use planning processes. Obviously, peoples' views on this depended upon how they defined interest-based negotiation, but without exception, all felt it was important that interests be part of this type of process – that, at the very least, "your interest has to be known and understood and you go from there".

Interviewees gave a variety of reasons for using interest-based negotiation. Some felt that knowing everyone's interests would produce a better plan. Many contrasted the results of this type of process with traditional negotiation, pointing out that interest-based negotiation has the potential to produce "original solutions" and to "lead to amazing results, as far as actual plans, actual solutions... and knit community in a way never seen before in BC". Whereas with traditional negotiations, "it's a fun way to spend some time, but in the end, you're not any closer to the goal of achieving good land use". Besides, as another interviewee pointed out "the agreements you get

⁶⁶ Not surprisingly, those who produced the plan that was selected by the NDP government were satisfied with the process to that point, though they were unhappy with what happened from then on. But they were not alone in criticizing the new government's handling of the process. As one person stated, "the current government's intervention is a total failure".

any other way don't last because somebody always loses... It's not working – that's how we got here”.

There were some suggestions for how the process might be improved, including having a firm time frame and time-lines, and better guidance from government in terms of what would be decided by the Table. Some expressed a desire for a process that was more “structured” or “formal”; conversely, there were concerns that government not be “over-riding”.

Some felt interest-based negotiation is a useful tool but it is not always going to result in complete agreement. There were a number of comments that, while interest-based negotiation might help articulate interests, it is not necessarily always best paired with consensus. Several people felt that conflict at the Table should have been addressed through some more formal conflict resolution process before expecting the Table to reach consensus on a land use plan. In this case, using consensus as a form of conflict resolution limited the Table:

“When people still feel like they're really on opposite sides of the fence – they don't even have a background of relatedness of some sort – they don't really think they go together at all. It's just like 'you're against me and I'm against you; we'll never get together'... It's better to resolve some of the conflict, and then when people share a common goal they can work on reaching consensus...”

In summary, participants felt there were a number of things that contributed to the production of two plans rather than a single consensus plan, but one of the major factors was the division in the Table. Most described the divisions as rural/urban and industry/conservation and centering on the level of protection of the land. Typically, ‘outside’ or ‘urban’ conservation interests were described as favouring more protection of the land, while some of the industry and rural interests appeared to favour management, not necessarily formal protection. These are the types of things that cannot be resolved quickly or easily.

Not only was this difference in opinion not resolved, many felt that it underlay all the work of the Table. A key trust issue for many was the South Chilcotin Mountains or Spruce Lake area; how this was handled was perceived by members of both groups to reflect the extent to which the other group recognized and respected their interests. Further, participants' initial respective fears about local or ‘outside’ control of the process carried through the process. What participants perceived as happening at the Table was coloured by their concerns going into the process. While over time the Table did learn to work together in some situations, for the most part people felt unheard and there was not a high level of trust among participants. Most felt the Table never did learn to work together as a group.

While some participants felt the process failed because no plan was produced, some found successes in other things. Many of the CRB people commented on the benefits to themselves and to the community.

All participants interviewed agreed that interest-based negotiation should continue to be a part of land use planning – that it is important to have people involved and to find out what the interests are in an area. Not all people felt that interest-based negotiation needs to be packaged with consensus decision-making, nor will practicing interest-based negotiation always lead to consensus, though there were comments that perhaps participants at the Lillooet LRMP Table did not even get an opportunity to practice interest-based negotiation. Some felt that tying everything to consensus in this particular case made it more difficult for participants to find agreement on even some of the smaller issues.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this section is to discuss the results of this case and to begin to answer my research question: how did the participation of both local and 'outside' interests in the Lillooet LRMP contribute to a failure to reach consensus on a single plan for the Lillooet forest district? There are three sections in this chapter. Section one is an overview of the case study results. Section two explains these results using the theory introduced in Chapter Two, emphasizing the role of group dynamics. Section three explores implications of this research for both theory and practice.

Section One: Overview of Case Study Results

An examination of the two plans submitted by LLRMP participants to government would suggest that, while there are some differences in the amount and degree of protection on the land, the two plans are quite similar in content. So why the need for two plans at all? Why, after four years of meetings, were participants in the LLRMP unable to bridge the gap between these two visions to achieve consensus on a single land use plan for the Lillooet forest district? Answers lie in an examination of the interaction between and among groups at the LRMP Table, and the perceptions that these groups had of the process, and of each other.

Observations show that, over four years, LLRMP participants made many attempts to find agreement on a land use plan. However, attempts were typically made by self-defined "like-minded" groups within the larger Table. Throughout the process, there was much frustration, anger, and distrust, and the process had difficulty advancing, continually being held up by different 'events' that tended to highlight, and sometimes even reinforce, differences among groups. When the process ended, two plans were produced. While there was some merging of groups during the process, the groups supporting the two final plans can be traced back to the start.

Interviews with participants support and begin to explain these observations. At first glance, it would appear to be a simple tension between local and 'outside' participants. The members of the CRB and members of the 'outside' industry and conservation groups that were interviewed tended to have different views on most aspects of the LLRMP, from whether to have a locally driven or inclusive process, to whether the FOSA was appropriate. But the final plans show a merging of much of the CRB with 'outside' industry, with 'outside' conservation groups on their own. So what happened?

One could argue that members of the local CRB and industry were forced together at the end of the process. Although there was a point during the last Table meeting when these two groups did formally combine to produce a single plan, there was

some merging of these two groups earlier in the process as well.⁶⁷ Perhaps more accurately, it was not entirely a case of local and industrial interests merging as it is a case of these two groups differentiating themselves from the third group, the 'outside' conservation group.⁶⁸

Both the interviews and final plans support the fact that Protected Areas were a key issue for groups involved in the LLRMP. This is not surprising as LRMP are essentially zoning exercises and a Protected Area is a type of zone. But Protected Areas were more than a contentious issue in Lillooet; they were a key trust issue as well. It was around Protected Areas, particularly the South Chilcotin Mountains and how it was handled, that we begin to see a coming together of members of the community and industrial groups and the movement of these two group away from the 'outside' conservation group.

Protected Areas influenced the LLRMP even before it began. Designation of the Stein Valley Park along with the announcement of the Lillooet LRMP in 1995 confounded the process. Participants wondered: did the Stein Valley Park contribute to the total percentage of Protected Area allowed in the district? For many local people, the Stein also represented an imposition of 'outside', mainly urban, interests on local people, with little or no perceived benefits to the community, and a potential for large negative impacts.

During the process, participants heard about the need for Protected Areas to maintain certain conservation and recreation values. They also heard about the impacts of protection, including withdrawals from the Timber Harvesting Land Base (THLB) and potential loss of local employment. Not surprisingly, 'outside' conservation groups tended to express a preference for protection, while industrial interests favoured fewer or no parks. CRB members tended to fall somewhere between these two views, but many had concerns about the perceived impacts of parks to the community and often expressed a preference for other forms of management.

Over time, some groups began to be known for whether they preferred "big parks or no parks".⁶⁹ 'Outside' conservation groups were perceived as only interested in protection, particularly for the South Chilcotin Mountains or "Spruce Lake" area.⁷⁰ Another large park would mean a withdrawal from the THLB with unknown impacts

⁶⁷ Some local people identified a difference between outside conservation and outside industry groups from the beginning of the process, saying that a timber company is 'just one licensee' whereas conservation groups are able to mobilize 'tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of people'.

⁶⁸ There were people who did not comfortably fit into any one group. What I am trying to illustrate in this description of the process is the main tension at the Table.

⁶⁹ This is obviously an oversimplification. Often, when someone describes a group, they describe the views of its most extreme member(s). There is a range of views to be found in any group.

⁷⁰ It is important to remember that what is reported here are individuals' and groups' perceptions of other groups; this is not necessarily how these groups would describe themselves.

for the community. For some local people, it also meant being 'shut out' of areas. Others feared a park in this area would use up the 'park allotment' so smaller, locally important areas would go unprotected. Further, this preference for protected status was seen by some as implying a lack of trust in how local people use and manage the land. At best, it demonstrated ignorance of the differences between rural and urban needs. At worst, it showed a lack of care and respect for the community and local peoples' hopes and concerns.

But concerns about parks went both ways. While an assertion for parks, particularly a large park in the South Chilcotin Mountains area, was met with industry and community concerns, a challenge or dismissal of the need for parks was seen by the 'outside' conservation group as a failure to recognize its interest. Continual questioning of the need for Protected Areas as a tool to manage particular values was viewed by 'outside' conservation groups as, at best, a lack of understanding of their interest. At worst, it was a rejection of their interests and an unwillingness to see these interests as legitimate, or to take them seriously.

Adding to these substantive concerns, each group felt the other had an advantage. CRB members expressed concerns about the 'outside' conservation group's resources: their experience with these types of processes, 'paid' representatives, in-house technical support, and the political pressure they could bring to bear. Conversely, there were concerns about the CRB's special role in the process, including the Table's adoption of the CRB's terms of reference. There were concerns about CRB representation on the committee coordinating the process,⁷¹ and the fact that the CRB met independently of the Table and sometimes seemed to operate by different rules.⁷² Concerns about facilitation added to this.

The Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA) formalized the division. Groups worked separately, brought together only to compare 'competing' plans or scenarios at certain points. It began with 'outside' conservation and industry groups trying to close the gap between their two visions for the district. Near the end of the process, the FOSA was opened to all Table members. At one point, unhappy with either of these visions, a group of CRB members decided to create their own plan. When this plan was presented at the final meeting, industry once again joined with CRB members in backing one vision for the district⁷³ while the 'outside' conservation groups brought forward their own plan.

⁷¹ According to the Process Coordinator, while other LRMP have had Community Resources Boards (CRBs) the Lillooet CRB is the only CRB that had representation on the Process Support Team (PST) in addition to the usual government staff. A PST coordinates process activities, including scheduling meetings, developing agendas, and arranging facilitation.

⁷² For example, the CRB could admit members without Table debate, whereas others applying to the Table required consensus to join.

⁷³ For some community members, this was an uneasy alliance. Some felt the community plan was 'watered down' to accommodate industry.

Through mediation, the two groups were able to move closer together in terms of the content of a final plan. However, as the content of their plans moved closer together, the groups themselves were driven further apart. In the end, the two final plans represent, for each group, the other group's unwillingness to recognize their interests.

Section Two: Theoretical Foundation for failure to reach Consensus on a Single Plan

The Lillooet LRMP had group processes operating at two levels. First, there was the development, or lack of development, of the Table as a group. Second, there was the interplay between the three sub-groups – the CRB, 'outside' industry and 'outside' conservation and recreation interests - and the Table. In this section I provide an overview of how the Table developed as a group, then I discuss the role of sub-groups in this development, or more accurately, this failure to develop as a group.

Group Development

According to the generic model of group development introduced in Chapter Two, the LLRMP Table was a group mired in the second stage of group development: conflict. Throughout the process, the group struggled with its task – producing a land use plan. There was little agreement on how the Table should begin its task. Lack of a single, unified vision for how to undertake land use planning for the district created a void that sub-groups at the Table repeatedly tried to fill with different plans and proposals.

Interpersonally, the LLRMP Table epitomizes the second stage of the model. In interviews with participants, there was little recollection of the Table working as a 'team'. Most comments were that the Table worked as a number of different teams or as individuals out for their own interests. Those who felt the Table did work as a team said it happened only in particular situations, such as working group meetings, or that it was limited to particular groups. Not surprisingly, comments about teamwork tended to refer to sub-groups at the Table rather than the Table itself.

Theoretically, all groups experience this second stage of development but most move through it, often on their own, to become productive, cohesive units (Feinstein and Waxler 1963; Tuckman 1965). So why did the LLRMP spend so much time in this necessary, but potentially destructive space? To move out of the second stage, a group needs to develop a strong sense of its task. And, quite simply, group members need to get along. However, it is not until a group has adequately dealt with the latter - interpersonal problems - that it can focus on its task (Smith 1957; Geller 1962; Tuckman 1965). This is where we will begin our discussion.

Participants in the LLRMP process were unable to move beyond this second stage because they did not fulfill the conditions of the stage (Caple 1978, Mills 1978). Conflict among group members - key to developing a framework for working

together (Theodorson 1962) - was not fully exploited. What this means is that participants in the Lillooet LRMP process were not encouraged to discuss the source of much of their disagreement, which lay around Protected Areas. In fact, as mentioned by participants in interviews, conflict was suppressed and the issue of Protected Areas, particularly the South Chilcotin Areas, tended not to be discussed.

As a result, participants at the Table, namely the two groups - the one made up primarily of local and industrial interests and the other of 'outside' conservation and recreation interests - were not able to fully explore areas of agreement and disagreement beyond a very superficial sense that they were from very different backgrounds and therefore simply 'could not understand each other'. Because of this, members of these two groups did not develop the trust required to foster cohesiveness between them (Geller 1962; Theodorson 1962; Douglas 1983). Without this, these two groups were not able to work together as a single group on one land use plan for the Lillooet forest district.

The Table fractured along 'rural-urban' lines (McCann 1987). While the group initially showed tensions of a local-'outside' nature, this tension soon gave way to a rural-urban division. As with cultural difference (Das and Teng 1998), differences among participants identifying with more 'rural' or 'urban' values made it difficult to establish trust. Without trust, participants did not develop the cohesiveness required to become a functioning group (Tuckman 1965; Douglas 1983). Failure to resolve interpersonal differences meant the group was not able to concentrate on its task (Smith 1957; Geller 1962; Rees and Segal 1984) - producing a land use plan.

Throughout the process, the Table remained divided. Stagnation in the second stage of development left the group barely able to function (McClure 1998). Over time, the group became more polarized and destructive and unable to work as a single unit (McClure 1998). Yet toward the end of the fourth year, the LLRMP was expected to produce a land use plan. Many at the Table felt they had no choice but to try mediation. Mediation did help produce a more unified vision of land use planning for the Lillooet forest district, but it also drove those on opposite sides of the rural-urban divide further apart.

The Role of Sub-Groups

This description of the Table, unable as a group to move out of the second stage of development, then forced into mediation, leaves out some important details. The Lillooet LRMP Table was not simply another collection of participants who failed to learn to work together as a group. The LLRMP Table was three distinct, though informal, subgroups that failed to learn to work together as a single group. Following is a discussion of the role these sub-groups played in the LLRMP Table's failure to reach consensus on a single plan.

While the second stage of group development is characterized by the formation of cliques and splinter groups (Tuckman 1965), the LLRMP faced this challenge from the start. The process essentially began with three sub-groups: the CRB, 'outside' industrial interests, and 'outside' conservation and recreation interests. Yet these sub-groups shifted over time. Initial tension between local and 'outside' gave way to a more fundamental value difference between rural and urban contingents.

It is around values that groups can thrive or fail. People will work with others they feel are similar – they trust those who share similar values (McAllister 1995). Conversely, value differences within groups have been their undoing (Das and Teng 1998). Serious value differences prevented the formation of trust at the Table. Yet the exact nature of the value differences between rural and urban interests at the LLRMP Table is difficult to describe. Rural and urban are cultural distinctions – they imply a certain set of values, interests, and concerns (Matthews 1998). Perhaps more applicable to a land use context, the values associated with these terms indicate preferences for 'ways of life' (Kinnier 1995).

We saw evidence of this at the LLRMP process. At the start of the process, there was clearly a lack of trust between local and 'outside' interests, likely based on initial impressions each group had of the other and on past interactions (Bigley and Pearce 1998; McKnight et al. 1998). But this tension, or lack of trust, soon settled into a difference between rural and urban interests. The lack of trust between these two groups was persistent and it was clear during negotiations between these two interests or groups at the Table – as they developed an 'interaction history' (Sitkin and Roth 1993). It was also clear during interviews.

Interviews revealed that local participants who might have more 'rural' interests felt unheard by 'outside' conservation and recreation groups. Comments tended to revolve around local people having a different lifestyle than urban people. Many stressed that the two groups just have a different way of looking at the land and what needs to be done to manage it.

Explanations for these different views had to do with local people living in the area – they felt they were more familiar with it – rather than visiting it for recreational purposes (Matthews 1983). There were comments that this very different starting point meant that the two groups simply could not understand each other because they were just 'coming from very different places' (Das and Teng 1998).

In other words, these two groups – rural and urban – held very different values (Sitkin and Roth 1993). This chasm was widened by some rural participants' frustration over 'outside' influence on local matters (Harris 1987) – such as was experienced at the start of the LLRMP with the designation of the Stein Valley.

There were some comments that 'outside' industrial interests also did not fully understand local people's needs. And the relationship between some local people and 'outside' industrial people was not without difficulties. However, it is clear that, on the whole, industry's preference for management of the landscape rather than full protection was reasonably consistent with many local people's preferences and concerns about the implications of 'locking away' pieces of land.

In this way, the values of 'outside' industrial interests were more closely aligned with the values of local people living in the Lillooet forest district than were those of the 'outside' conservation and recreation group. These values reflected both local peoples' and 'outside' industry's desire to manage the landscape rather than to protect it by means of tools such as Protected Areas as this might preclude the option to use these lands now and in the future.

There were also concerns that anything that affected the operation of industry within the forest district, such as the designation of a large number or amount of Protected Areas, would in turn affect the local community and local jobs (Robson 1995).

Similarly, some of those who fell into the 'outside' conservation and recreation group – those representing 'urban' interests - indicated that they did not feel that their interests were understood. Others reported that it is possible that these interests were understood but that they were not recognized as legitimate. Many felt their interest in – what they saw as a need for - protection for certain parts of the landscape was not embraced or even recognized.

Further, it seemed to some that there was no recognition of the fact that, the longer the process continued, the more likely it was that they would lose opportunities to protect the values of interest to them. Most of the local people simply could not relate to this predicament (George and Jones 1998). As a result, the two groups were not able to develop the trust required to communicate with each other in an interest-based manner.

Again, many pointed to a difference in lifestyles as a way to explain the discrepancy between the two views of how the land should be managed. Some in the 'outside' conservation and recreation group indicated that they felt 'outside' industrial interests had been misleading local people into believing in the importance of industry - the forest industry in particular - to the communities in the Lillooet forest district.

For 'outside' conservation and recreation groups, another factor that played into a lack of trust of the 'rural' component of the Table – the CRB - was perceived procedural inequalities. It was felt that the CRB's central role in the LLRMP process provided the CRB certain advantages. Many 'rural' participants commented that certain privileges afforded the CRB – using 'perspectives' rather than secular representation, having a presence on the Process Support Team (PST), and being able

to admit members directly to the LLRMP Table – meant the CRB potentially had more influence than public Table members. This added to the lack of trust of the CRB.

Protected Areas, and the South Chilcotin Mountains area in particular, was a key trust issue in that the way that it was discussed revealed the values of the speaker. A participant's views on Protected Areas answered for others questions such as 'does this person share my values? Does this person feel the same way that I do about what this district needs to survive? Will this person understand my point of view? Can I work with this person?'

In this way, the issue of Protected Areas sorted out who could work with whom; more importantly, it determined who could trust whom. 'Outside' industry and local groups, while not in perfect agreement with one another, tended to coalesce around a similar vision for the forest district. 'Outside' conservation and recreation groups clearly had a different vision and so were in a group on their own. These two visions involved different views on the roles of Protected Areas in the future of the forest district.

These two different views or 'visions' of how to manage the Lillooet forest district left these two groups unable to trust one another. Neither group felt that the other group fully understood or embraced its interests. Given that the two visions were somewhat in opposition to each other, one group's insistence on having its interests heard was most often seen by the other group as a failure to recognize its interests. Over time this became the source of much frustration at the LLRMP Table.

This fundamental value difference was never addressed during the process, therefore, it is difficult to say whether it could eventually have been overcome. While there was much tension at the Table, participants were never really able to engage in a full discussion – to engage in a form of conflict – over these differences. Many mentioned in interviews that the one issue that created the most difficulties for them was never resolved. As a result, the conflict key to helping the rural and urban sub-groups explore their similarities and differences remained untapped. And the Table was never able to create a shared framework for working together.

Without a framework for working together as a Table – without an environment of trust and safety in the larger group, individuals opted for the safety and familiarity of their sub-groups (Greene 1987, Goldbart and Cooper 1976). As one participant observed "with like-minded groups, at least you knew where you stood". With similar values, trust was more easily acquired and participants fell into a pattern of working together.

Working together in these two groups did two things – it strengthened the sub-groups and it weakened the larger group (Goldbart and Cooper 1976, Elliot 1970, Plous 1993). As the sub-groups became more cohesive, the rift at the Table widened. Participants began to identify more strongly with those in their own sub-groups (Owen et al. 1999, Markovsky 1994). They also began to see those outside of that group, in this case, the other sub-group, as less like themselves (Plous 1993). Constituencies likely fuelled sub-groups' feelings about each other.

Perceived inequalities further reinforced this division at the Table. They confirmed sub-groups' concerns that the other group had an advantage in the process (Das and Teng 1998). Inequalities in the process, whether real or imagined, seemed to justify emotional outbursts at the Table (Ridgeway 1994) further widening the gulf between the two sub-groups. Participants reported that they did not feel heard or understood by others outside of their sub-groups. Many reported that the Table environment was hostile and unpleasant.

Participants remained firmly in their sub-groups, unable to let go of these ties and create new ties within the larger Table (Greene 1983). The smaller, more cohesive sub-groups created a greater draw than the non-cohesive larger group (Lawler 2001). The larger group was unable to fully take shape and instead became a loose collection of sub-groups (Lawler 2001). For the most part, the sub-groups worked somewhat independently on their plans or 'visions' for the Lillooet forest district. With its component parts working in isolation, the Table never moved beyond the second stage of group development.

Those traditionally in a position to help the Table advance could or did not. Neither of the two facilitators was seen by the Table as neutral, a key requirement of a facilitator (Hansen 1998; Gregory et al. 2001). Because of this, an attempt by either facilitator to help the Table to function more effectively was usually viewed with suspicion by one component of the Table or the other. This left facilitators unable to help the group address the underlying conflict created by the rural-urban tension.

Similarly, government intervention in the process served to further undermine the stability of the Table. It is likely that distrust of government worked in much the same way as any challenge to the process. This created an environment where participants did not feel comfortable or safe (McClure 1998). Concerns that government might end the process at any time increased anxiety in the large group setting and competition among groups (Wilson 1973).

Unwittingly, the government put additional pressure on the Table by continually reminding participants that their best chance for acceptance of a plan was to reach consensus. Uncertain whether government would accept anything other than consensus, and given that consensus looked unlikely, participants were unable to explore opportunities for agreement on smaller items.

Toward the end of the process, the options that had been outlined for these smaller items were attached to one group or the other – the ‘CC’ or ‘rural’ offer or the ‘CRTC’ or ‘urban’ offer. Once certain options were attached to one offer or the other and the differences between these two groups were becoming insurmountable, it became less and less likely that a group would adopt an option that came from the other offer or that was proposed by the other group. In this way, the possibility for agreement on smaller items was reduced.

The push for consensus could also explain, in part, an avoidance of controversial issues such as Protected Areas and other items unlikely to reach consensus. It is common for a group striving to achieve consensus to avoid areas of strong disagreement, under the mistaken impression that avoiding these issues will lead to quicker agreement (Gregory et al. 2001).

In the case of the LLRMP, this tendency may have led to the avoidance of the one important issue – protected areas – around which there lay large value differences between rural and urban components of the Table. But it was also around Protected Areas that the two groups may have been able to develop a common understanding for working together.

With its rural and urban-flavoured groups working somewhat independently, the Table remained in the second stage of group development, unable to advance. Yet time was running out on the process. The mediation approach, adopted at the end of the process, had groups work fully independently, though a mediator. While the mediation did bring the two groups’ alternate visions for the forest district closer together in content, it also emphasized and intensified differences, real and imagined, between the two groups (Sherif et al. 1961; Sherif 1966; Brown 2000). In so doing, it formalized the differences between them.

The arbitration aspect of the Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA) required that government select one of the plans in its entirety. Government’s selection of one of the two plans created a win-lose outcome in the eyes of participants. The group whose plan was not selected had in some way ‘lost’. And as one interviewee put it, “we have great images of [losers] and nobody wants to be that person”.

Section Three: Implications for Theory and Practice

As stated in the methods section, there are limits to which one can generalize from a single case study; however, I would argue that there are obvious ways to apply what was learned. What happened at the LLRMP has implications for theory and practice that are considered here.

Creating a land use plan is a difficult task. Expecting a group of people to undertake this task adds an additional layer of complexity. But the needs of the group are rarely

taken as seriously as the task it must do. We seem resigned to the fact that some groups succeed and others fail. However, group development is predictable and often attention to this development can be used to help a group overcome obstacles and become a productive unit.

The Lillooet LRMP is a case of a group that was so divided by a trust issue that it could not work productively. Throughout the process, this issue was not addressed; in fact, the division was sometimes aggravated. This made it so the group was not able to complete its task.

An obvious question is what could have been done differently? Since the Table was unable to move out of the early stages of group development, the answer would be anything that would move it forward to become a more productive group. Following are some general observations of the LLRMP process and some suggestions for that might guide other processes.

Embracing Conflict

Key to moving out of the second stage of group development is conflict. Conflict, when used constructively, allows group members to explore areas of agreement and disagreement and learn how to work together. Learning how to work together helps build group cohesiveness. Yet, for various reasons, participants in the LLRMP process never had an opportunity to fully explore their similarities and differences around different issues. Conflict was seen as contradictory to building consensus.

But it needs to be embraced. Participants in these processes need to understand the role that conflict plays in building trust and creating a cohesive group. Conflict must be allowed to take place in such a way that participants are able to explore areas of agreement and disagreement. This is where interest-based negotiation can play an important role – group members must probe others' statements to fully understand their interests and the potential for areas of agreement. Where participants are uncomfortable probing to determine others' interests and values (i.e. at the start of a process or over a particularly contentious issue) the facilitator must encourage participants to do this – explicitly and through modeling – or do it themselves.

But perhaps the groups at the LLRMP Table were simply too far apart? Perhaps these value differences, to the extent that they were explored, could not be overcome. Had this been the case, it may be more appropriate to enter into formal dispute resolution. It seems that LRMP is being used, rather informally, as a conflict resolution process.⁷⁴ While this may be an outcome in processes where only

⁷⁴ Owen proposes that in conflict situations, Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) approaches be used. These are informal, low cost, low risk unofficial processes – they focus not on substantive issues, but on getting disputing parties to talk about their interests and differences in the conflict with an eye to improving interactions, clearing up misunderstandings, and building mutual trust and understanding (Owen 1999:14).

superficial differences exist among groups, a group with fundamental differences, such as the LLRMP Table, should not rely on such a structure to resolve major differences. It is only once these differences are resolved that the group can try to build consensus on a single land use plan.⁷⁵

Facilitation

Finding facilitators that are acceptable to all is key in this situation. Typically, the way to ensure that a group is comfortable with a facilitator is by having the entire group agree on a facilitator. In Lillooet, having two – a local facilitator and an ‘outside’ facilitator – seemed like a reasonable compromise at first, but this ultimately became another manifestation of the underlying tension in the process. When the ‘outside’ facilitator was removed from the process, this left one group feeling as though it no longer had anyone looking out for its interests and as though the local and industry groups had an advantage.

What seems to have been a key issue in Lillooet is the history that these two original facilitators brought with them into the process. Comments about not trusting one facilitator or the other tended to refer to perceived biases, often felt to be a result of past work or affiliations. Potential facilitators should be seen by all as acceptable. This may require going further afield in search of facilitators than was done in Lillooet, where the selection of facilitators seems to have been based more on convenience than actual fit and acceptability.

Procedural Equality

The unusual significance of facilitators in this process highlights a larger issue present during the Lillooet LRMP. At the start of the process, the CRB was built into the administrative structure of the LLRMP, as part of the Process Support Team (PST). It was the CRB that essentially initiated the need for an LLRMP, and all involved wanted to acknowledge this body’s importance – what better way than to make the CRB and government the core of the Table? However, how this ultimately played out seemed to add to the Table’s difficulties in the end.

While the CRB might not have felt as though it had any real weight on the PST,⁷⁶ the CRB’s perceived influence over the process, as a result of its representation on the PST, caused a certain amount of anxiety for some in the ‘outside’ conservation group. The CRB was involved in the decision to dismiss the ‘outside’ facilitator and this was

This is slightly different from the approach now taken in LRMP as it removes the pressure to reach some sort of settlement – it is more exploratory.

⁷⁵ Potapchuk et al. (1998:5) are looking at how “parallel processes” designed to build social capital among groups in a land use planning process might help foster interdependency among these groups, leading to the development of trust (in Owen et al. 1999).

⁷⁶ In fact, some CRB members expressed frustration with how little sway the CRB had over the process through the PST. Some felt it was insufficient involvement with this coordinating body that led to the process eventually slipping away from the community and into government’s hands.

a decision made without the input of the rest of the Table. The CRB met separately from the Table and could freely admit or deny members, while those seeking general Table membership required consensus. And it was the CRB's terms of reference that were reviewed and adopted by the Table early in the process.

While it was important that the CRB be recognized, how this was done strained the relationship between the two groups. That certain things were agreed to early in the process – adopting the CRB's terms of reference, allowing for CRB representation on the PST – does not mean they were acceptable to all parties. The formative stage of any group is characterized by a reluctance to speak out. This is especially true of Lillooet, where relations between groups were so strained that no group would have spoken up, despite displeasure with the situation. Care must be taken during group formation so that perceived inequalities are not built into the process.

The Issue of Protected Areas

In addition to addressing communication and power and control issues at the Table, there was an obvious deficiency that might have been better addressed to help the Table out of the second stage of development – this is the issue of Protected Areas. In addition to being a key trust issue, Protected Areas were one of the main sources of confusion during the process. The group never agreed to the total percentage of Protected Area for the Lillooet district, and whether this total percentage would include the Stein Valley. Those in the local and industry group and those in the 'outside' conservation group clearly had different expectations around this issue.

However, for obvious reasons, suggesting that Protected Area 'targets' be set seems inappropriate for a process using interest-based negotiation. After all, a target is a position – it is a pre-determined amount that is not based on what is best for the area or those involved in the planning process. But while a target may not have been the answer, some general direction on Protected Areas might have helped – for example, how did the Stein Valley factor in to the LLRMP? In the absence of government direction on this issue, it should at least have been discussed more thoroughly by the Table to advance a common understanding.

But perhaps this is a red herring? As discussed in Chapter Two and in the previous section, a group will likely not settle on substantive issues until interpersonal issues have been resolved. In this case, more attention to group development may go further in solving the problem around Protected Areas than any amount of direction from government on this issue.

The Role of Government

A Protected Areas issue that did confound the process was the designation of the Stein Valley Park. It established a context of government mistrust from the very beginning of the LLRMP. Many local people seemed unsure of the government's announcement that there would be an LRMP *and* a park... Why was the LLRMP not

allowed to decide whether there would be a park in the Stein Valley? This move, along with a general distrust of government processes, made for a somewhat unstable platform on which the entire LLRMP was perched.⁷⁷ Government intervention at all levels was viewed with suspicion, but there was particular distrust of higher levels of government.

Letting Go of Consensus

In a twist, higher-level government's insistence or perceived insistence on consensus may have been counter-productive. With consensus the only acceptable outcome, yet unlikely throughout much of the process, the question became what happens if we do not achieve it? This uncertainty resulted in participants holding back during negotiations, for fear the process would ultimately change venues and there would be bargaining.

Consensus also seemed to discourage exploration of smaller issues on which agreement may more easily have been reached.⁷⁸ The result was two plans and various other issues, firmly attached to their respective sub-groups and reluctance on the part of either group, or their constituencies, to embrace individual elements of 'the other plan'.⁷⁹

Keeping Interest-Based Negotiation and Accepting Less than Perfect Results

But while it might not be reasonable to expect consensus from every process, interest-based negotiation was considered a useful tool. Despite the fact that they did not feel the Table achieved it, interviewees felt that interest-based negotiation is essential to exploring the interests in a particular area or on a particular issue. This begs a re-examination of our tendency to sell consensus-based decision-making and interest-based negotiation as a package. But it begs a larger question – is it possible that the interests represented at the LLRMP, no matter how fully explored and embraced, were simply incompatible?

The theory on interest-based negotiation suggests that if a group tries hard enough, it should be possible to accommodate everyone's interests in some way in a final outcome, to the extent that all can 'live with it'. Even such mutually exclusive interests as mining and conservation should be able to coexist, provided they are accommodated spatially, meaning that they will not happen in the same space, but

⁷⁷ Sadly, the Liberal government's decision to scrap the earlier process and start fresh with a new consultation process seemed only to confirm participants' worst fears of government processes. Interestingly enough, this is one of the only things most everyone agreed on.

⁷⁸ Schuett et al. mention that one of the keys to successful collaboration in these types of processes is "successes during and after the process" (2001:590).

⁷⁹ Gregory et al. (2001) propose 'decision-aiding' as another alternative to consensus. In this approach, the degree of support for various participant-designed solutions or alternatives is measured and this information is then given to decision-makers.

can both happen on a large enough piece of land. But might some interests might simply be irreconcilable?

It is not possible to say whether the interests represented at the LLRMP could have been accommodated in a plan that was agreed to by the whole Table. This is something we do not know because there were so many other things that happened during the LLRMP that prevented participants even from getting to the point where they could truly discuss their interests. The literature on group dynamics and development helps explain some of these 'stumbling blocks' that prevented participants in the LLRMP from being able to even fully explore their interests in search of consensus.

But perhaps the two groups and their interests were so fundamentally at odds that no process, no matter how well navigated, could have led to consensus? Perhaps we need to be more realistic about consensus. There seems to be the assumption among many process initiators that consensus is always possible... it might not be. Process initiators and facilitators need to consider the way we now use consensus as a goal: should it be? Is it always appropriate? And why is it so important?

In the case of Lillooet, having two groups define their competing interests more clearly was not a sign of "failure", but rather a sign of success, in that this resulted in an understanding of the full extent to which each of these two groups was willing to move. This clarity in terms of where groups ultimately stand, whether it comes at the start of a planning process that eventually produces a plan, or at the end of a 'failed' one like the Lillooet LRMP, is essential to the process of problem-solving. Eventually a decision will be made about how the Lillooet forest district will be managed. The LLRMP will have contributed to this decision and in this way it has been a success.

The failure of the LLRMP, if there is one, lies in the formalization and reinforcement of sub-group differences throughout the process and particularly as a result of mediation and the Final Offer Selection Approach (FOSA). The artificial exaggeration of group differences and creation of a 'winner' and 'loser' made acceptance of the final decision awkward and further strained relations between the groups likely making future agreement even more difficult to attain.

Who Can Come and Play?

Perhaps one of the more pressing question coming out of this research is whether to include both local and 'outside' interests in these types of processes. Most people would agree that local interests have a right to be involved, so what about those from outside the area? And how do we know what is inside and 'outside', or rural or urban, for that matter?

Geographically, we can roughly say who is 'in' or 'out' but are these categories accurate? And is it really geographically based? Plus, the way that one person categorizes another may not be the way that person would categorize him or herself. But should we even be deciding who should be in and who should be out from the very beginning?

The direction for LRMP is that anyone with an interest or 'stake' in the plan area or outcome should be able to get involved. And realistically, deciding not to involve a group in a process such as this will likely mean that group will seek input into the decision through some other venue or at a later date. It will delay involvement, but not forever. So if all interested groups are going to be involved, how can we prevent the type of problems that occurred in the Lillooet LRMP?

There is some work being done to identify how to differently weight the stakeholders or interests in a stakeholder process so that, while all can be involved in the process itself, those most directly affected by a decision will have the most 'say' during the process (Bass 2001:224). In the Lillooet process, local participants were given more 'weight' by having different roles in the process.

The special role given the CRB to ensure its separation from other public participants at the LLRMP seems to have created more problems than it solved. If local groups are to be distinguished from other members of a planning Table, care must be taken not to build into the process perceived inequalities, where one group is able to influence the nature of meetings and to make important decisions that affect the whole Table.

In summary, in a true multi-stakeholder process, such as the Lillooet LRMP Table, where all interested parties are involved, regardless of geographic origin - one thing is certain - regardless of the balance struck between local and 'outside' involvement, emphasis must be placed on helping the Table to function as a productive group. This involves avoiding the pitfalls that can accompany the involvement of different interests - in this case rural and urban - with fundamentally different values.

In the final analysis, it is important to pay attention to group development with any group. This is especially important with groups that include both local and 'outside' interests. While all groups can be helped in their development, groups that include both rural and urban interests will likely require additional assistance because the value differences between such groups can mean that these groups are unable to develop the trust required to work together.

In this case attention should be paid to the fact that these groups will often have pre-established differences, and to structural process issues, such as the set-up of the process so that these differences are not exacerbated or encouraged.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

This research project is a case study of the Lillooet Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) process. Using participant observation, various secondary sources of information, and in-depth interviews with core participants, I set out to answer the question: how did the inclusion of local and 'outside' interests at the LLRMP Table contribute to a failure to reach consensus on a single land use plan for the Lillooet forest district?

The inclusion of local and 'outside' interests at the LLRMP Table introduced into the process a value difference that divided the Table. Soon into the process, participants formed three groups – the CRB, 'outside' industrial interests, and 'outside' conservation and recreation groups. While the initial tension between local and 'outside' groups was somewhat overcome, a more fundamental difference was not, shifting the tension to two new groups: one consisting mainly of CRB and 'outside' industrial interests, and another consisting of 'outside' recreation and conservation groups.

What prompted the formation of these two groups were different visions of what the Lillooet forest district needed to survive. Key to these visions was the role of Protected Areas, particularly the South Chilcotin Mountains or Spruce Lake area. In essence, it was a value difference based along rural and urban lines. This fundamental difference meant the two groups were never able to establish the trust they needed to work together and without trust, they could not communicate effectively. This was exacerbated by suppression of conflict and perceived structural inequalities.

The LLRMP Table became a loose collection of groups working independently. The groups put forward various proposals, but the Table could not seem to coalesce around a single plan for the forest district. With time running out on the process and with government expecting a product from the Table, the two groups entered mediation. While mediation did bring the content of the two visions closer together, it also formalized the differences between the two groups, further straining relations.

Cardinal and Day (1998) state that to progress in our ability to plan effectively, we must learn from these initiatives and incorporate these real world experiences into future planning programs (in Williams et al. 1998:5). What have we learned from this case study of Lillooet LRMP? We have learned that interpersonal differences in a consensus, multi-stakeholder exercise can sometimes overwhelm the process and so this aspect of the process needs to be recognized and addressed directly.

More specifically, we have learned that the inclusion of local and 'outside' – particularly rural and urban – stakeholder groups can introduce into a process fundamental value differences. These differences may lead to significant trust issues, making it difficult for these groups to work together and introducing additional

obstacles to achieving consensus on a single plan. This said, it is important to maintain an inclusive process, as groups excluded from a process will seek input at some point, whether through lobbying, public appeals, or other means. So if we wish to maintain an inclusive process, what can be done?

In a case where these differences result, or may result, in the formation of informal sub-groups, care must be taken to avoid reinforcing sub-group differences and building into the process what might be perceived as structural inequalities. Further, conflict must be exploited to help sub-groups establish a common framework for working together. And efforts must be made to help participants make the transition from working in their respective sub-groups to working as part of a larger Table.

But beyond this, we need to examine the role of consensus in land use planning. But do we really need to push for consensus in every case? Is consensus always possible? We must also be aware of the potential for the desire to achieve consensus to introduce into processes additional complications such as were seen in the Lillooet LRMP Table. Consensus is an admirable goal, but it might not always be realistic. As a requirement of a process, it may end up being counter-productive.

There are great expectations of consensus. In some cases, consensus is basically being used as a form of conflict resolution – this might not always be appropriate, especially in cases such as Lillooet, where value differences made consensus seem unlikely and resolution of these differences even less likely. In some cases, it may be appropriate to undergo some form of conflict resolution before entering into a consensus process. More specifically, it may be useful to simply explore the potential for agreement before requiring that participants attempt agreement on a specific substantive issue.

When a process involves groups with such fundamental differences as were found in Lillooet, consensus may not work despite our best efforts. A failure to reach consensus on a single plan during the planning process should not be seen as a failure. Provided differences among sub-groups are not exacerbated, the outcome of the process can make significant contributions to informed decision-making.

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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Start-time: _____

Location/setting: _____

Purpose of the interview:

My project focuses on people's experiences during the actual negotiations of a land use planning exercise; that's why I've chosen to do a case study of the Lillooet LRMP.

During the interview, I'll be asking you questions to get at your views of how the process was structured, your expectations of this type of process, and how things went for you while actually sitting around the Lillooet LRMP Table.

The timeline I'm looking at is from when the process started in 1997 to the wrap-up (of sorts) last March; or, the parts of this timeline when you were involved in the process.

But first, I'd like to start off with an easy question...

Mind if I use a tape recorder?

- How would you define your role in the Lillooet LRMP (i.e. representative of an organization, representing a certain 'perspective' or 'interest')?
- When did you become involved in the Lillooet LRMP?
- What motivated you to become involved in this particular process?
- Were you involved in any land use planning in the area before the Lillooet LRMP? Outside of the area?

EXPECTATIONS/GROUP DYNAMICS

- What hopes did you have entering the LRMP? What concerns did you have entering the LRMP?
- Did you feel that it was a balanced group of stakeholders who were brought together to create a land use plan for the Lillooet FD?
- Who do you think should be involved in a land use planning exercise for the Lillooet Forest District?

- How would you describe the group dynamics of the Table (i.e. did the Table work as a team)?
- Did this affect the way the Table functioned, on a meeting-to-meeting basis?

CONSENSUS

- Do you feel the process was a success or a failure? Please explain.
- What do you think were some of the reasons that two offers were submitted to government rather than one plan?
- What do you see as some of the major differences between the two offers?
- Were you comfortable with (supportive of) the production of offers at the end of the process? Please explain.

INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION

- How would you define IBN?
- Would you say that the participants at the Lillooet LRMP achieved IBN?
- Do you feel this was continuous throughout the process?
- What difficulties were there in maintaining IBN? At what points?
- Do you feel that you had a good understanding of others' interests?
- Did you feel that they understood yours?
- Do you have any examples, to share with me, of when you felt your interests were not being taken seriously or were not understood?
- Do you feel that IBN makes a difference to this type of process?
- That concludes the questions I have for you – anything to add? Any comments or questions for me?

End time: _____

What information was given before the interview?

What was the social and emotional atmosphere like?

What was the degree of rapport during the interview?

What questions were posed?

How was the interview guide organized?

How much did we debrief afterward?