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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  
IN  
BRITISH COLUMBIA'S COMMUNITY COLLEGES

By

PETER COLEBROOK

B.A., Notre Dame University of Nelson, 1966  
M.L.S., University of Illinois, 1967  
M.P.A., University of Victoria, 1977

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Department of Administrative, Adult and Higher Education

We accept this thesis as conforming  
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Department of Administration, Adult and Higher Education,  
Faculty of Education

The University of British Columbia  
Vancouver, Canada

Date

April 18/91

## ABSTRACT

This study examines collective bargaining in 14 unionized community colleges in British Columbia. It provides a broad overview of bargaining in the colleges and insights into the tensions commonly associated with collective bargaining. The study combines qualitative data and quantitative data through the use of interviews, contractual analysis and two questionnaires. One survey examined the opinions of board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders on various aspects of collective bargaining. The latter included the competitive characteristics of distributive bargaining, governance, the scope of the collective agreements and a number of proposed modifications aimed at improving bargaining in the colleges. The study is significant as it fills a void in the research related to the above issues in British Columbia's colleges.

The literature review encompassed a wide range of research. This included material related to the evolution of collective bargaining in higher education; factors that influence opinions of bargaining; constructive conflict, destructive conflict and dysfunctional competition; conflict resolution techniques associated with bargaining; and integrative bargaining.

The study revealed a competitive collective bargaining climate in the colleges, characterized by such factors as a

lack of trust and respect, inexperienced faculty negotiators, contractual constraints and a lack of bargaining priorities. The competitive climate was aggravated by a number of external factors (government policies); internal factors (the management style of a president); the composition of the faculty associations (combined vocational and academic faculty associations); and personal factors (age and political preferences). In terms of governance issues, the scope of the collective agreements and their political orientation, the board members and the senior administrators are essentially from the same population. The faculty leaders come from a different population. The respondents favour modifications that would enhance communications, training, and equal access to information, as well as the resolution of labour matters at the local level rather than at the provincial level.

Distributive bargaining will likely remain the cornerstone of negotiations in British Columbia's colleges. Although it does not have to be as competitive as it is, the distributive model appears to be best suited to the resolution of Level I issues, e.g. salaries, benefits. Given the collegial traditions of higher education, the varying professional needs of the faculty, the issue of management rights and the intrinsic values of the parties involved, a more collaborative model of bargaining is necessary to accommodate Level II issues. The latter include faculty participation in college governance, peer evaluation, and the selection of other



faculty. The study contributed to the research literature and produced a number of recommendations for practice.

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## 1

## THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Community colleges are an important part of British Columbia's postsecondary educational system. They deliver a comprehensive array of educational and training programs in response to the ever changing educational demands of their local communities. In order for the colleges to achieve the goals set out in their mission statements, the collective bargaining process and the resulting collective agreements must contribute to the effective allocation of a college's human resources. This requires a labour relations atmosphere characterized by cooperation rather than one characterized by dysfunctional tensions. Given the paucity of knowledge of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges, this study attempts to fill part of that void.

Collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges paralleled the development of collective bargaining in the public sector. The first community college in British Columbia was established in 1963, but it was not until 1974 that four community colleges signed collective agreements with their faculty associations (Perra 1979; Stewart 1983:113).

Although the four colleges were under the jurisdiction of the local school boards and hence the Public Schools Act, the faculty associations opted for certification as labour unions under the Labour Code. Between 1974 and 1977 there was a domino effect as fourteen of the fifteen community colleges signed collective agreements. One college adopted the fair comparison method for determining salaries, benefits and related working conditions. The other fourteen community colleges and their respective faculty associations, however, entered a new era of labour relations by adopting the distributive approach to collective bargaining (Birnbaum 1980a, 1980b; Walton & McKersie 1965). The latter approach is sometimes commonly referred to as the trade union model, the industrial relations model or the adversarial model of collective bargaining.

In 1971, Wollett, with reference to collective bargaining in United States institutions of higher education, described the distributive approach to collective bargaining as a political process. This reference indicates the pluralistic, dynamic and increasing formal nature of collective bargaining. The introduction of collective bargaining to higher education was not a "...Mysterious phenomenon" (Crispo 1978,146) to be feared because "...Professionals have learned that if they don't have it in the agreement, they don't have it". "...Unions do not depend on the grace of the governing board and the administration in respecting employee interests



(Kemerer & Baldrige 1976,60). During the ensuing years various authors, including Birnbaum (1980a, 1980b), Crossman 1978; Fisher & Ury (1981), and Thomas (1976), have suggested that the distributive approach to collective bargaining can lead to dysfunctional tensions or conflict within institutions (Masuch 1985). Birnbaum (1980, 1980b) also suggests that the adversarial nature of the distributive model of collective bargaining is incompatible with the higher education's traditions of collegiality and the faculty's professionalism. Using personal interviews with collective bargaining practitioners, factual institutional data, collective agreements and an opinion questionnaire, this study examines various aspects of collective bargaining in British Columbia's unionized community colleges.

#### RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS

This section focuses on the study's research problem. It also defines the primary research question, presents a number of related sub-questions and states the study's general null-hypothesis.

##### Research Problem

One of the general problems in this field of research is whether or not collective bargaining contributes to or hinders the effective management of a college's human resources to meet a community's educational needs. It is assumed that a higher level of cooperation among the parties concerned may

result in a more effective management of a college's human resources and more effective educational programs and services. More specifically, if the tensions commonly associated with the distributive model of collective bargaining are dysfunctional, what modifications could be introduced to reduce those tensions?

#### Research Question

What are the opinions of a sample of board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders in British Columbia's unionized community colleges toward various aspects of the distributive model of collective bargaining? The latter include competition, governance, the scope of collective bargaining and specific proposed modifications or alternatives to collective bargaining that might reduce any dysfunctional tensions.

#### Sub-questions

Is there a significant and meaningful difference in the opinions among the three populations, i.e., faculty leaders, senior administrators, board members, toward two aspects of the distributive approach to collective bargaining, i.e., competition, governance; toward the scope of collective bargaining and toward proposed alternatives or modifications to collective bargaining?

In the event there are significant and meaningful differences in the opinions among the faculty leaders, senior

administrators, board members, do the respective opinions tend toward the distributive approach to collective bargaining or toward the integrative approach to collective bargaining?

Is there a significant and meaningful difference between the independent variables, e.g. age, gender, political preference, as defined in the study and the dependent variables? In this case the latter includes the respondents opinions on two aspects of collective bargaining, i.e., competition and governance and the scope of collective bargaining.

If there is a significant and meaningful difference among the opinions of the three populations, how can those differences be modified to reduce any dysfunctional tensions associated with the collective bargaining process?

#### Null-Hypothesis

In general, the null-hypothesis ( $H_0=H_1$ ) is that there is no difference in the opinions among the three populations toward the two aspects of the distributive approach to collective bargaining, i.e., competition, governance; toward the scope of collective bargaining, or toward the proposed alternatives or modifications to collective bargaining.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This research is significant in several ways. This is the only study, to the researcher's knowledge, that examines the opinions of board members, senior administrators and

faculty leaders toward various aspects of collective bargaining, i.e., competition, governance; the scope of collective bargaining; and proposed modifications to the distributive approach to collective bargaining in British Columbia's unionized community colleges. While there have been several studies of collective bargaining in Canadian universities (Adell & Carter 1972; Ponak & Thompson 1979, 1983, 1985; Thompson 1975) there is a conspicuous absence of empirical research related to collective bargaining in community colleges. Although several studies have examined various facets of collective bargaining in Canadian community colleges (Dennison 1987; Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Michael 1981; Newcombe 1982; Papale 1983; Perra 1979; Skolnik 1985; Stewart 1983; Wood 1986) none are as comprehensive as this study with respect to British Columbia's community colleges.

Collective bargaining is a critical ingredient in the effective allocation of a college's human resources. The collective bargaining process and the collective agreements must contribute to, not hinder, the achievement of a college's educational objectives. Given the important role community colleges play in British Columbia's postsecondary system and the amount of funds the colleges allocate to personnel, it is important to better understand one of the factors that can have a significant influence on the success of those colleges. In this same vein, this study may suggest modifications in labour relations structures or procedures to accommodate the

professional needs of college faculty. It is anticipated that this study will contribute to the knowledge of the field and in a practical sense to the knowledge of the labour relations practitioners within the colleges.

#### CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

The study's conceptual context provides a bridge between theory and empirical data. In this case, open systems theory provides a foundation (Berger & Cummings 1978) for understanding the dynamics of the collective bargaining process, the relevant literature, the collective agreements, the results of the interviews, the factual institutional data and the material obtained from the opinion survey. It is anticipated that the conceptual framework may assist with the selection of improvements to the current collective bargaining process.

Kochan (1980) suggests that labour relations research has generally followed a historical approach, an economic approach or an organizational approach. Open systems theory is organizational in nature and cuts across an organization's structural, personnel, cultural, economical and political spheres (Bolman & Deal 1984). The various labour relations models that have been developed over the years, provide a basis for using open system theory as the conceptual framework. In spite of its shortcomings (Gunderson 1982). Dunlop's (1958) structural model of labour relations was one

of the first attempts to explain labour relations through the integration of organizational and environmental factors. Although it was referred to as a system, Dunlop's model does not appear to use many of the terms now associated with open systems theory (Robins & Oliva 1982). His model continued to be modified by other researchers (Allan 1971; Peterson 1971; Walker 1969; Wood et al. 1975). It was not until Craig's (1975) labour relations model that an approach was developed which included concepts from open systems theory (Anderson & Gunderson 1984; Bolman & Deal 1984; Boulding 1956; Easton 1965; Katz & Kahn 1966). Craig's model has subsequently been modified by other researchers (Larouche & Deom 1984; Shirom 1985). Open systems theory (Boulding 1956; Easton 1965) incorporates both internal and external aspects of organizations and provides a framework for examining the adaptation and continued survival of organizations within dynamic environments. It is beneficial to describe a few of the primary characteristics of open systems theory and comment on their relationship to collective bargaining.

Ironically a system's survival depends on two conflicting forces; change and no change. Change can be disruptive but a system cannot remain viable without it. It is important for a system to maintain a balance, a steady state or equilibrium between the ever changing and cyclical demands of its external environment and its internal hierarchical sub-systems. Homeostasis, however, is difficult to maintain because of the

natural tendency of a system's sub-systems toward local autonomy. Each sub-system within a system attempts to thicken its boundary between itself and other sub-systems in order to achieve more self-determination. Although the various sub-systems are required to cooperate to achieve the objectives of the main system, there is a natural and inherent tension between the many parts of any system. Unlike some of the early management writings, which perceived conflict as a violation of the rational order and to be avoided, open systems theory views conflict as a natural and necessary phenomenon. "Conflict is the essence of industrial relations because industrialism necessarily generates stratifications, which in turn, necessarily generate tensions among those stratified" (Barbash 1984,130).

Although sub-systems are often in contact with different parts of the external environment, their distinct knowledge bases must contribute to the goals of the main system. Yet, because of the natural tendency of each sub-system to strive for more autonomy there may be an unwillingness to share this information. The sub-systems may develop their own opinions and attempt to make their own decisions on how best to use their resources to satisfy their needs or the demands of the external environment. These decisions may not always be in the best interests of the main system or the other sub-systems. Subsequently, this natural trend toward local autonomy may lead to goal divergence or value divergence

between the various sub-systems or between a main system and its hierarchical sub-systems. In turn, this divisiveness may lead to the ineffective and inefficient use of the resources available. Tensions between the sub-system and the main system may escalate to the point where the conflict will become dysfunctional and lead to the demise of the main system or one or more of the sub-systems (Barbash 1984; Glasl 1984; Masuch 1985). From these preceding perspectives, collective bargaining is a boundary spanning mechanism that links an organization's hierarchical sub-systems for the purpose of realizing the goals of the organization and its sub-systems as well as maintaining an organizational equilibrium.

The primary purpose of a system is to provide products, programs or services that satisfy the needs of other systems in the external environment. Community colleges, therefore, must continually scan their environment and adjust their programs and services to meet the demands of their local communities. If they fail to be sensitive to the evolving and often cyclical educational needs of the job market, or if they are unable to adapt for some reason, e.g., restrictive clauses in the collective agreements, then the college or a part of the college may no longer remain viable. It is imperative for a college's sub-systems, e.g., board members, senior administrators, faculty and the latter's sub-systems, e.g., university transfer faculty, trades faculty, to be aware of the changes that are occurring in their sphere of influence



and to be able to adjust to those changes. Community colleges must maintain a balance among its various parts, e.g., board, administrators and faculty, if it is to achieve its objectives as set out in the College and Institute Act and mission statements. If the college's mission statement and related management strategies are unclear, are not current, are not communicated effectively or are not accepted, then there may be a divergence of goals. This could result in morale problems including a lack of trust and power struggles. These differences could subsequently lead to tensions during labour negotiations, e.g., an unwillingness to settle, unrealistic demands or offers, rigid positions, lockouts, strikes. The faculty may also seek working conditions that would provide for additional professional autonomy and control over their own activities. Despite the natural tendency for a system's sub-systems desire to increase their autonomy, no one part can dominate or the college may be in jeopardy. In severe cases, students may decide not to attend the college, students may withdraw from a program, programs may have to be cancelled, graduates may not be able to obtain jobs, the private sector may no longer offer scholarships, a college president may be terminated, an entire college board may be dismissed and so on.

Open system theory also suggests that there are a number of predictable responses to the natural tensions between a system and its sub-systems. In its quest for increased

autonomy, when a sub-system begins to diverge from the main system, the latter will generally begin to move to restore the equilibrium. For example, the main system's central policy makers may impose more rules, centralize decision making powers, exercise its management rights, control the flow of information, restrict resources, isolate or terminate specific sub-systems and so on. In return, a sub-system may attempt to strengthen its autonomy by seeking alternate resources, by eliciting the support of other sub-systems so together they can control the main system, by withdrawing its services, by attempting to impose its own new rules and regulations, by demanding more power and so on. Another response is for the sub-system to comply with the demands of the central system. Still another choice is for the two sides to reach a compromise that actually may not be satisfactory for either side in the long run. In certain situations the conflict may be so extreme that the sub-system may sever its relationship with the main system and strike out on its own. In still other situations the sub-system(s) and the main system may not be able to either restore the balance between them or separate. In these instances the tensions may immobilize and destroy them both. In these action-reaction situations, it is in the interests of all concerned to reach a new point of equilibrium that satisfies the principles of each party.

Open systems theory suggests that boundary spanning mechanisms are used to facilitate communications between a system and its environment and a system and its sub-systems. It is when these communication channels become unintentionally or intentionally blocked that the balance point may become disrupted. Essentially these mechanisms are feedback processes that enable the system to maintain its equilibrium or homeostasis through the acquisition of new knowledge, the sharing of information and participation in the decision making process. In this way the system and the sub-systems generally experience only incremental change rather than severe dislocation. Open systems theory suggests that the active participants in the bargaining process should be experienced negotiators so as to know what is required to incrementally balance the entire system. Collective bargaining is one way for sub-groups within an organization to express their ever changing needs and to thereby influence and change the main system in an orderly fashion. In addition to the formal negotiation process there may be several boundary spanning mechanisms which could facilitate change, e.g., faculty membership on the college board, a general academic council, professional development committees, a faculty selection and appointment committee, faculty membership on committees to select senior administrators, instructional evaluation committees, program evaluation committees, joint faculty-college human relations committees, joint professional

development sessions, department meetings and open meetings of the board and its committees. Regardless of the other purposes they serve these boundary spanning mechanisms are essential for an organization's well being.

Open systems theory provides a conceptual benchmark for understanding the background literature and the empirical data. It can accommodate both the internal and external dynamics associated with collective bargaining. Sensitivity to the demands of the cyclical changes of the environment, centralization, autonomy, homeostasis and boundary spanning mechanisms are all important to understanding the collective bargaining process in British Columbia's community colleges.

#### DISSERTATION OUTLINE

This dissertation consists of eight chapters, a bibliography and an appendix. In addition to Chapter One, the dissertation is organized in the following fashion. Chapter Two is a review of the literature. It builds on Chapter One by providing background information on the evolution of collective bargaining in higher education, including British Columbia's colleges, and by examining a broad range of literature related to opinions toward collective bargaining, conflict and conflict resolution. Chapter Three outlines the study's scope and research design. Chapter Four summarizes fourteen interviews with collective bargaining practitioners. Chapter Five describes a wide variety of factual institutional

data on collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges. In overview of a representative sample of collective agreements in Chapter Six, complements the other material. Chapter Seven represents the heart of the research project. It presents the results of the self-administered survey of randomly selected college board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders toward two aspects of collective bargaining, the scope of collective bargaining and proposed modifications to the current approach to collective bargaining. Chapter Eight draws the study's material together and presents the study's conclusions. Following Chapter Eight is a bibliography and appendixes containing pertinent data.

## 2

## REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of the literature review is to provide a historical framework for the study and to examine the literature pertinent to the research problem. It was anticipated that the literature review would also assist with the development of an appropriate research design. The first part of the review presents the background material that deals with the evolution of collective bargaining in the private and public sectors. It includes higher education and British Columbia's community colleges in particular. The other major sections consist of three separate streams of literature associated with the research problem. One collection of thought deals with factors that appear to influence people's opinions of collective bargaining. Another stream deals with various aspects of the conflict often associated with distributive bargaining and various aspects of conflict resolution. The third section describes the integrative model of collective bargaining and the fourth section outlines a number of limitations of the research literature. This material is the foundation for the remaining portions of the study.

## COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND HIGHER EDUCATION

### Public Sector

Before examining people's opinions of collective bargaining it is necessary to develop an appreciation of the evolution of collective bargaining in the public sector and higher education, including British Columbia's community colleges. The origin of British Columbia's community colleges in the 1960's and the 1970's took place during a period of social ferment (Anderson & Gunderson 1984; Dennison 1987; Dennison & Gallagher 1986). From a global perspective, the surge in research and high technology related to the space race, the emergence of the women's movement, the increased social consciousness associated with the Vietnam War, student activism, and the twin economic factors of double digit inflation and high unemployment, contributed to an atmosphere of social change. These social changes were both preceded by and paralleled by increasingly supportive legislation related to collective bargaining, particularly in the public sector.

Legal reforms in the field of labour relations, particularly collective bargaining, originated in the private sector but over a period of 30 years gradually impacted public sector employees. In the United States the National Labour Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), was the first major step toward making it an unfair labour practice for an employer not to engage in collective bargaining with employees (Canada, Royal Commission 1985; Carr 1973; Carter 1982; Garbarino

1975). The Canadian government passed a number of bills in the early part of the twentieth century related to collective bargaining in the private sector, e.g., Dominion Conciliation Act, 1900, Railway Dispute Act, 1903, Industrial Disputes Investigations Act, 1907, Conciliation and Labour Act, 1908, (Carter 1984; Canada, Royal Commission 1985; Woods 1973).

This early legislation, unlike the American legislation which was designed to establish bargaining units, was oriented toward the resolution of disputes. The process initially involved voluntary conciliation prior to a strike or a lockout but was later changed to compulsory conciliation. The government's Privy Council Order 1003, which was approved in 1944, was a milestone in Canadian labour legislation. While the legislation was designed for Canada's parliamentary system of government, the Act was patterned after the United States legislation. Privy Council Order 1003 contained a number of fundamental collective bargaining concepts. These included the right of employees to organize trade unions, the certification of bargaining representatives selected by the employees, compulsory negotiation, bargaining in good faith, binding agreements, grievance procedures, contracts of at least a year in duration, a two stage compulsory conciliation process prior to a strike or a lockout, exclusivity of representation, and internal union control over its affairs (Woods 1973). Carter (1982), Ponak (1982) and Woods (1973)



note that over a period of time, the provinces introduced parallel legislation.

The gradual emergence of collective bargaining in the private sector allowed the process to mature and for a comprehensive legal support system to emerge. It was not until the 1960's however, that "The social environment was conducive to challenging authority and the status quo in general, making it a particularly precipitous time for public employees to undertake major changes in social norms" (Ponak 1982,349).

Collective bargaining for many areas of the public sector in North America, including Canada and British Columbia, is between twenty and thirty years old. The public service, which includes federal employees, provincial employees, municipal employees, health care workers, teachers and employees of assorted government enterprises, experienced its most rapid rate of growth from 1956 and 1965 (Ponak 1982). Although there were a number of public sector trade unions, e.g., Municipal employees, prior to the mid 1960's (Ponak 1982), the association-consultation approach to establishing working conditions dominated labour relations from World War I to the mid 1960's. "The associations that public employees formed opposed strike action and eschewed compulsory membership requirements...Stress was laid on a variety of consultation mechanisms..." (Ponak 1982,345). At that time there was a general perception that bargaining was improper

(Carr 1973) and the feeling that the government would take care of its employees and would treat them fairly (Carr 1973; Ponak 1984). With the rapid evolution of social changes in the 1950's and 1960's, this process of "collective begging" (Crispo 1975) began to break down (Ponak 1982).

In the United States, President Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order 10988 granted limited collective bargaining rights to federal public employees and in 1963, the Canadian government proclaimed the Public Service Staff Relations Act. The Act which provided collective bargaining rights for federal employees was followed by a succession of provincial acts that granted similar collective bargaining rights to provincial employees (Canada 1985; Carter 1982; Ponak 1982; Woods 1973). The introduction of this favourable legislation coincided with the massive growth of the public sector from 1956 to 1965 (Ponak 1982; Rose 1984). Rose (1984,91) with reference to Ponak (1982) notes "...That the shift from "association-consultation" to "union-collective bargaining" was as much a function of public policy changes as of disillusionment with the consultation process ... Dissatisfaction led to changes in leadership as staff associations began to model themselves after unions. Public sector employees were also influenced by the bargaining gains that private sector unions secured, as well as by the general climate of social change during the 1960s".

It is worth noting some of the significant characteristics of public sector collective bargaining. At the federal and provincial level the government is both employer and regulator. This means that governments can unilaterally alter collective bargaining agreements through the introduction of restrictive legislation. Governments are also not subject to the same demand and supply mechanisms of the private sector markets and governments can raise taxes to cover any additional costs. They can also save money by locking out employees or by not discouraging a strike. Another characteristic of public sector bargaining is the phenomenon called "phantom" bargaining (Ponak 1982,354). Although often governed by local autonomous boards, e.g., community colleges, schools, hospitals, many provincial governments have gradually assumed almost full responsibility for funding these quasi-governmental agencies. Hence, many labour unions would undoubtedly prefer to deal with the primary source of funds, the provincial government, rather than deal with the local boards. In these instances the union(s) may perceive that the local governing body may not have complete power over its own resources, in which case the union may attempt to bring pressure to bear on a higher level of power (Millett 1985). In addition, it has been pointed out that "decentralized decision-making structures can impede union effectiveness" (Thompson & Swimmer 1984,111). This underscores that notion

that collective bargaining in the public sector is indeed a political process (Wollett 1971).

### Higher Education

At the same time as radical social and economic changes were taking place, the 1960's experienced an extraordinary phase of postsecondary education expansion. Dennison & Gallagher (1986,81), with reference to a paper by Axlerod, "Propelled by buoyant economic conditions, favoured by free-spending politicians, and buttressed by widespread public support, higher education during the 1960's became one of Canada's major growth industries...Popular faith in the economic value of postsecondary education reached unprecedented heights". Coupled with the preceding factors was the higher retention rates of the secondary school system, the increase in the number of college age students, the increased ability of parents to pay for higher education, and a greater awareness of the value of education in an industrialized society (Dennison 1987). Dennison (1987) with reference to the Economic Council of Canada's 1964 Annual Report, notes that this latter concept grew out of the human capital movement. In addition, the push for expanded higher education facilities and programs was encouraged by the federal reports, e.g., Massey Commission, 1951, and federal funding programs, e.g., Established Programs Financing Arrangement, 1977. Formalized collective bargaining began to

emerge on the heels of this massive expansion in higher education.

Prior to the appearance of the community college, the university and the trade school were the primary delivery methods of higher education in both Canada and British Columbia. Not unlike the previously mentioned consultative associations in some of the other public service sectors, consultative university faculty associations were not uncommon during the 1940's and the 1950's. Although a number of Canadian universities had a history of authoritarian presidents (Thompson 1975), some university administrations would invite the faculty to select a few of their colleagues to meet with the university administration and to engage in informal and voluntary bargaining (Thompson 1968). This approach was consistent with the university tradition of collegiality and therefore did not require a formal codified process (Dennison & Gallagher 1986). The resulting arrangements "...were gentleman's agreements and they [had] no force in law" (Green 1971).

By the mid sixties, "chinks in the armour of collegial institutions in Canada began to appear...at a time when collegially governed institutions were coming under internal and external attack for being unresponsive" (Dennison & Gallagher 1986, 222). Faculty were becoming dissatisfied with the wages, poor job security, the perceived erosion of traditional faculty rights, a lack of legal protection and

what they perceived to be the unilateral capricious action of administrators (Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Thompson 1982).

Consistent with open systems theory, it has been hypothesized that when personal or group efficacy diminishes in institutions of higher education and a sense of powerlessness sets in, those involved will take corrective action (Danese 1977; Dull 1971; Walker & Lawler 1980). Crist (1983), with reference to Ponak & Thompson (1983), suggests that the variance in governance systems and the lack of definition of shared governance in higher education makes comparisons difficult.

A number of writers (Anderson 1985; Begin 1974; Bigoness 1978; Carr & VanEyck 1973; Franke 1972; Feuille & Blandin 1976; Garbarino 1975; Gerhart & Maxey 1978; Grossvickle 1980; Herman 1975; Ladd & Lipset 1973); McInnis 1972; Thompson 1975; Volpe 1982) have suggested that in addition to the dissatisfaction with salaries and other basic working conditions, part of the movement toward collective bargaining in higher education was precipitated by a perceived loss of participation in the decision making process. Perra (1979,21) with reference to the writings of Ryor, suggests that academics saw that "the only effective way to stop the erosion of their power and to re-assert their proper role in the decision making process" was to turn to unions. In the late 1970's, Crispo (1978,146) wrote "Unionism for professionals is not a mysterious phenomenon". It is not

difficult to understand why professionals are turning to collective bargaining to solve some of the problems they have been vaguely dissatisfied about in the past. A collective bargaining contract embodying principles and practices of participation, as well as protection against capricious management, is more effective than a policy statement adopted unilaterally by management or dependent on the whims or favourable budgets of a law-making body...Professionals have learned that if they don't have it in the agreement, they don't have it".

Thompson (1982,382) refines these previous thoughts a bit further. He suggests that "The motivation of professionals for adopting collective bargaining may be classified as defensive or offensive. Defensive collective bargaining is defined as when faculty "organize themselves to avoid inclusion in a bargaining unit or union dominated by non-professionals". His research suggests that many professionals embraced collective bargaining as a defensive mechanism and that at least initially the agreements focused on fundamental issues such as salaries, benefits and basic working conditions. "Professional motives are offensive when they organize to achieve their own economic or social objectives through bargaining..." and "...usually respond to a real or perceived deterioration in their working conditions which often challenges basic values of professionalism- autonomy, pride in work, and economic security" (Thompson

1982,382,383). Thompson suggested that management's actions, as a centralized organizational authority, are often the cause of offensive actions. This same idea is noted in an earlier article by Hammer & Berman (1981) in which they say that collective bargaining is a response to managerial power.

In the higher education sector these defensive and offensive relationships developed in spite of one view that suggests "College administrators, college board members and college faculty members are not normally adversaries in the same ways that supervisors and workers may be in other workplaces; they often share similar social philosophies, they hold common institutional objectives and they want most of the same day-to-day results (Dennison & Gallagher 1986,223). With reference to the private sector, however, Kochan et al. (1984B,265), had noted earlier that while "American managers had never abandoned their philosophic opposition to unions...the costs to management of opposing unions was too high...". Given the evolution of collective bargaining in the public sector, it is not unreasonable to assume that the previous sentiments may apply equally to the public sector and more specifically to higher education. All of these factors undoubtedly contributed to a domino effect among community colleges both in the United States and Canada.

Yet, since its appearance in higher education as a means to counteract the deterioration of faculty involvement in the bi-lateral decision making process, collective bargaining does



not appear to have increased the opportunities for faculty involvement in institutional governance, e.g., senates, academic councils (Baldrige 1981; Benjamin 1985; Ponak & Thompson 1979; Spritzer & Odewahn 1978). It appears to have formalized the bargaining process (Baldrige 1981; Bohlander 1985; Dayal 1984; Hines 1984; Ponak & Thompson 1984b) which in some instances may make collective agreements more difficult to reach. Driscoll's (1972) and Plumley's (1978) findings suggest that perhaps it is not just the lack of participation in the decision making process that is critical but the faculty's lack of trust in the decision makers, i.e., Administration. In their research Katz et al. (1985) found a correlation between high conflict and low trust. Mortimer's research (1978), however, suggests that generally, college faculty do not expect to participate in an institution's decision making process to the same extent as university faculty. This last finding may be misleading in that when the research was conducted the bargaining process had not matured in the college sector. In addition, it may have generally reflected the heterogeneity of college faculty but may not have accurately reflected the strong desire of a college's university transfer faculty to achieve professional rights more akin to their university counterparts.

Millet's (1984) research suggests that when there is a centralization of administrative functions, e.g., statewide administration of college systems, as noted a decade earlier

by Ryor (1978), faculty sought compensation for the perceived loss of power or autonomy by expressing a desire to move to system wide collective bargaining. These cyclical stages of development are consistent with Thompson & Swimmer's (1984) observations regarding the evolution of collective bargaining. Riley's (1979) research suggests that when certain functions, including collective bargaining, are centralized at a state level, there is an increase in the tension between the local bargaining units and the college boards or college administrations, as well as an increase in the tension between the boards and the state ministries. This is significant, since the state ministries usually control the majority of a college's funds, program approvals, and other similar matters.

The perception in British Columbia is that there has been a gradual shift to more Ministry involvement in local college governance (Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Hollick-Kenyon 1979; Michaels 1981). In time this may result in more pressure by some of the local and autonomous faculty associations to move to a form of province-wide collective bargaining. This in turn could place more pressure on the college boards, senior administrators, faculty associations, and the College-Institute Educator's Association. The latter is a professional association representing many of the certified college faculty associations, but excludes all BCGEU locals. Based on these observations, the structure of the collective bargaining process may be an emergent issue in the future. It

is against this tumultuous social and economic tapestry that the community college originated.

### British Columbia's Community Colleges

The growth of the community college system in British Columbia paralleled the growth of community colleges in other parts of Canada and the United States. Dennison & Gallagher (1986) note that as early as 1932, Knott had developed a master plan for a system of community colleges in British Columbia, entitled "The Junior College in British Columbia". However, it was not until the amendments to the Public Schools Act in 1958, the tabling of the Report of the Royal Commission on Education (Chant Commission) in 1960, and the work of Macdonald in 1962, that a diversified higher education delivery system began to receive more consideration. One of the critical elements of Macdonald's report was the need for "...Diversification of opportunity, both in respect to the kinds of educational experience available and the places where it can be obtained..." (Macdonald 1962,19). Dennison (1987) suggests that a new type of institution was required to provide greater access to higher education for both full time and part time students, to provide local access to higher education, to provide a broad based curriculum and to provide courses and programs that could cope with the technological changes that were occurring in society. In 1977 these tenants of comprehensiveness found their way into the College and

Institute Act. Section 7 of the Act states that "The objects of a college are to provide comprehensive (a) courses of study equivalent to those given by a university at the first and second year post secondary level; (b) post secondary education and training; and (c) continuing education.

Across Canada there were many variations on this theme. In addition to having a community orientation rather than a provincial mandate, an emphasis on access rather than elitism, a student orientation, autonomous boards of governors and a propensity for teaching rather than research, it was the British Columbia college's comprehensive curriculum that set it apart from many of the other college systems in Canada (Dennison 1987; Dennison & Gallagher 1986). This concept of comprehensiveness, was later set out in the 1977 College and Institute Act. Only Alberta's college system was and still is comparable to the British Columbia model.

Perra (1979) notes that British Columbia's community colleges, which were established during the period from 1963-1976, were initially the responsibility of the local school boards and therefore fell under the jurisdiction of the Public Schools Act. This came about through the amendment of the Public Schools Act in 1963, which enabled local public school boards to "...establish and maintain and operate..." Community colleges (Dennison & Gallagher 1986, 29). The colleges continued to be the responsibility of local school boards until a separate College and Institutes Act was

introduced in 1977. From the beginning these college boards, unlike the universities or the vocational schools, had responsibility for both academic and administrative decision making (Dennison & Gallagher 1986). A factor that would have an impact on college labour relations was the combination of administrative and academic decision making, as set out primarily under Section 12 of the College and Institutes Act, was a departure from the university tradition of collegial or participatory decision making with respect to academic matters.

At the time of writing, the community colleges, unlike the universities, fell under the jurisdiction of the provinces's Industrial Relations Act. The labour act prior to the Industrial Relations Act was called the Labour Code. In 1973, the Labour Code was substantially revised by the government of the day, the New Democratic Party. In 1974, the Labour Code was amended to permit the certification of professional employees, except those covered by the Public Schools Act. According to the May 13, 1975 minutes of the UBC Faculty Association, the faculty voted to implement a special plan for determining salaries, benefits, conditions of appointment, promotion and dismissal. Other working conditions were left to the respective faculties and academic decisions were left to the legislative mandate of the academically oriented university senate. In 1977, the Social Credit government revised the Universities Act, and disenfranchised the

university faculty in the area of collective bargaining (Perra 1979).

The Colleges and Institute Act (1977) provided three methods for the colleges and their professional employees to determine salaries, benefits and other working conditions. Under Part 1 of the Act a professional employee is defined as "... an employee of an institution who provides educational services to students and includes an employee who is a librarian or an administrator..." but "...does not include persons designated by the minister as serving the institution in a managerial or confidential capacity...". The three methods include certified collective bargaining, the bilateral agreement method and the fair comparison method. Perra (1979,28) suggests that while the bilateral and fair comparison methods have "...the potential for meeting the needs of professionals and for fostering their professionalism: participation in management, peer group evaluation and professional growth..." that "...unless faculties can be provided with assurances that they will enjoy some autonomy under the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act, it is doubtful that they will seek to decertify their union status granted under the Labour Code". At the time of writing no autonomous faculty association has pursued that course of action.

The Industrial Relations Act provides a number of advantages that the other two methods do not offer. It affords the right of a binding contract, the right to strike or lockout, internal union security, the right and the flexibility to bargain about anything the two sides want to discuss, and employee protection from unilateral administrative decisions. In addition, the Labour Code affords the parties the body of law associated with industrial relations, British Columbia's labour relations precedents and due process. Since the time of its inception the Labour Code has been supplemented by other legislative acts, e.g., Essential Services Act, Human Rights Act and the Compensation Stabilization Program (1983). Notwithstanding the provision for autonomous governing boards under the College and Institutes Act, in the early 1980's concerns were raised about the erosion of the boards' autonomy. One of the concerns expressed in the literature (Calader 1984; Corwin 1984; Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Hollick-Kenyon 1979; Michaels 1981; Newcomb 1982; Perra 1979) is the perception of increasing provincial interference in college autonomy. These authors cite, as examples of the drift toward provincial centralization of the college system, the lack of local school board members on college boards, the apparent political nature of board appointments, the appointment of board members without a specific term of appointment, the abolition of the administrative councils in 1983, the introduction of a

province-wide system of formula funding and the introduction of Section 66 of the Act which every five years requires colleges to show cause why they should continue to exist. From a collective bargaining perspective these shifts raise questions related to phantom bargaining, province-wide collective bargaining, participatory decision making in academic areas, the autonomy of college boards and management rights.

In addition to the various policy shifts, British Columbia's colleges have been subjected to cycles of financial expansion and financial retrenchment (Dennison 1987; Dennison & Gallagher 1986). Following the rapid expansion of higher education, the first hint of fiscal restraint came in 1964, when the government of the day moved to limit the school teacher's salaries. Hit by both double digit inflation and high unemployment, the expansion of the 1960s began to slow down with the New Democratic Party's budget restraint program prior to the 1975 provincial election. In spite of the pressures on the colleges to expand to meet the educational demands of their regions, the Social Credit government, following their success at the polls in 1975 and again in 1983, reduced community college budgets. Right across the public service staff layoffs and job security became critical issues, which in turn placed pressure on the collective bargaining process. These and other aspects of labour relations have been a concern in British Columbia's colleges



for some time. Newcomb (1982), notes that in a report for the Ministry, Michaels (1981), uncovered a number of labour relations concerns in the college system. These included such issues as the anti-union tone of the government's legislation; centralization versus local autonomy; the disastrous use of third party labour experts; the expensive and cumbersome process of mediation and arbitration; the inequitable distribution of financial resources among the colleges and the respective faculty associations; the slow response time and the lack of understanding of the BCGEU headquarters staff to local situations; trade unionism versus professionalism; the adversarialness of collective bargaining versus collegiality; the lack of a common information base for negotiators; the frequent turnover of college presidents; the lack of internal labour relations expertise; the lack of labour relations training opportunities; the partisan nature of board appointments and the lack of a strategic provincial manpower plan.

Unlike Ontario, Quebec and some of the other provinces, negotiations in British Columbia's fourteen colleges certified under the Labour Code are handled at the local level as opposed to the provincial level (Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Perra 1979). Some colleges have separate associations for the academic and vocational faculty, while other colleges have one association for all of the instructional faculty. In one college both the academic and vocational faculty are part of a

British Columbia Government Employees Union local and in another college the academic faculty, vocational faculty and the support staff are all part of the same bargaining unit. In those colleges that have a separate union for the vocational faculty, the union is a local chapter of the province-wide British Columbia Government Employees Union. This arrangement is a carry over from the time prior to the inclusion of the vocational schools in the community college system. On the academic side, Perra (1979) notes that as early as 1978 there was talk about province-wide collective bargaining through the auspices of the College Faculty Federation, a loose knit federation of the various academic faculty associations in the province. The Federation was later re-named the British Columbia College-Institute Educators Association. Although the Association provides labour relations advice to its member faculty associations, it does not participate in any province-wide bargaining. It is worth noting that there does not appear to be any public literature that describes the feelings of the British Columbia Government Employees Union toward the academic faculty associations and the BC-CIEA which did not appear to be inclined to join the main stream labour movement, but sought similar benefits.

While many of faculty associations were and continue to appear to be uncertain as to the role of province-wide collective bargaining, the board members of the early 1980's

were also split in their opinion of provincial-wide collective bargaining. Michaels (1981) and Newcomb (1982) reported that many of college board members were opposed to province-wide bargaining on the basis that it would substantially reduce local autonomy, interfere with the collective bargaining process, interfere with the purpose of the local colleges and produce fractious labour relations. On the other hand there were those that thought province-wide bargaining would reduce local internal tensions, avoid the leap frogging effect of salary settlements, and allow colleges to share labour relations expenses. Michaels (1981) indicated that discussions at the time focused on a two tier approach to province-wide bargaining.

This background material is important for several reasons. It offers a number of insights into the evolution of collective bargaining in the public sector and higher education. It also provides a base upon which to examine the other streams of relevant literature and forms a point of reference from which to better understand the pre-survey interviews, the factual institutional data on collective bargaining, the collective agreements and the results of the opinion questionnaire. Many characteristics of open systems theory can also be found in this background material, e.g., cycles of change, environmental changes, demands for autonomy, hierarchical structures.

## FACTORS WHICH MAY INFLUENCE OPINIONS AND BEHAVIOUR

The second part of this literature review focuses on two areas. One collection of thought deals with the factors that appear to influence people's opinions of collective bargaining. Another stream of literature explores various aspects of conflict and conflict resolution that are often associated with collective bargaining.

### Opinions on Collective Bargaining

While factual data represent one area of research, opinions of issues represent another area of research. Opinions, which are boundary spanning mechanisms, link parties together in the bi-lateral decision making process called collective bargaining (Walton & McKersie 1965). Crist (1983,352) says that people's opinions of collective bargaining are important to consider since the "...personalities and attitudes of the administration, union representatives and faculty leaders involved in the process will determine the nature and extent of the impact collective bargaining is to have on the overall decision making process". Owens (1981,290) goes on to say the outcome of the collective bargaining process is determined by people's perceptions and "...perception is the key to behaviour. The way persons see things determines they way they will act". The literature connotes that the opinions of one party may create similar opinions in the other party (Bacharach & Lawler 1981; Druckman

et al. 1972). This suggests that if the opinions of one party are positive, cooperative or constructive, then the actions of the other party will likely be similar. If, however, the actions of one party are negative, uncooperative, domineering, autocratic, adversarial and competitive then it is likely that the actions of the other party will follow suit. Pruitt (1981) also found that destructive opinions and behaviours can reinforce each other with the result that in some situations differences of opinion may not be able to be resolved through a collaborative solution. These notions of negative re-enforcement are found in both Glasl's (1982) predictive model of conflict escalation and in the empirical research of Masuch (1985) and Mondy (1980). The two latter authors suggest that internal tensions in an organization can lead to viciously destructive, escalating circles of conflict.

Factors that affect opinions of collective bargaining are important for other reasons and are related to the nature of community colleges in British Columbia. Walton & McKersie (1965,184) stress that "The issues in labour negotiations involve important human values..." and are "...strongly contingent upon attitudes...". These sentiments are echoed in the work of Bolman & Deal (1984) in which they say that conflict is related to the values held by the protagonists. According to Birnbaum (1980a, 1980b), Coser (1956) and Likert & Likert (1976) when conflict emerges in an organization with a tendency toward homogeneous values, the conflict will be

slow to erupt, but when it does flare up it will be more intense than in organizations with heterogeneous values. Based on these research findings it would appear that given the heterogeneous nature of community colleges in British Columbia tensions could emerge more frequently and rapidly in the college sector than in the university sector. It also suggests that in homogeneous academic departments that may have professional values and expectations, e.g., university transfer departments, that once aroused the emotion associated with the conflict would likely be more intense. The research findings of Boulding (1964) Guetzlow (1984) and Judd (1978) supplement the previous findings by indicating that regardless of the sector, when conflicts do arise between various parties, the feelings will be more intense when the tensions involve matters of principle or cultural traditions, e.g. academic freedom, participatory decision making, tenure, as opposed to more substantive matters, e.g. salaries, benefits, parking. It would appear reasonable to assume that while a divergence of opinion regarding Level I bargaining goals (Kleingartner 1973; Ponak 1981) may result in increased tension between the parties, it is when there is a divergence of opinion regarding Level II bargaining goals, that the tension is likely to be much more intense. Level I needs are those associated with basic conditions of employment, e.g., salaries, benefits, while Level II needs are those conditions of employment which are more professional in nature, e.g.,

autonomy, decision making, peer evaluations. Baron (1985), drawing on the literature on aggression, complements the preceding findings when he suggests that conflict will be intense when one party associates the other party's negative attitudes and behaviour with internal causes or feelings, e.g. values, as opposed to external factors, e.g. salaries. A perceived lack of personal interest or sincerity may also intensify existing tensions between the parties involved (Karim & Pegnetter 1983).

It appears that perhaps a hierarchical, centralized and more rigid approach to administration as noted in the background material, may also play a part in the formation of opinions of collective bargaining. Coser (1956), Deutsch (1973) and Rubin (1979), with references to Glassman (1979) and Weick (1976) suggest that there will be more conflict within rigidly structured organizations than in more loosely structured organizations. These authors, along with Birnbaum (1980a) suggest that loose organizations, e.g., universities, deal with conflict in an open and forthright manner and are capable of dispersing tensions more easily. On the other hand, organizations that are more rigid, more hierarchical and that are more administratively centralized, e.g., Colleges as described in the Act, tend to suppress conflict and therefore do not deal with it as effectively as more loosely structured organizations.

The preceding literature supports the notion that it is important to consider opinions of collective bargaining. It is also important to examine a number of the factors that the literature has identified as influencing the formation of opinions of collective bargaining. While the participants in this study include the board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders, there appears to be limited literature on the opinions of board members toward collective bargaining (Michaels 1981; Newcomb 1982) and little literature on the opinions of administrators toward collective bargaining (Spritzer & Odewahn 1978). The opinions of these two groups are important, but in view of the dearth of literature in these two areas, the following section deals almost exclusively with the opinions of the instructional faculty toward collective bargaining. It is assumed that some of the salient factors that appear to influence faculty opinions toward collective bargaining may also influence the opinions of college board members and senior college administrators.

#### Environmental Factors

As noted earlier, faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining appear to be influenced by a large number of environmental factors, e.g. cultural, structural, economic, legal, external agents. Many authors have commented on the impact of culture on an organization and the personnel in that organization (Hall 1976; Roberts 1983; Peters 1983; Clark



1984; Easton 1965). Several have also noted the impact of culture on collective bargaining (Proulx 1971; Walker and Lawler 1980; Anderson and Gunderson 1982; Carr & VanEyck 1973; Garbarino 1975; Dolan 1979). The evolving centralized structure of American higher education also appears to be related to changes in faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining (Millet 1984; Carr & VanEyck 1973; Dolan 1979; Garbarino 1975; Kemerer and Baldrige 1975; Rubin 1979; Stubbs 1981; Skolnik 1985). In addition to the perceived capricious administrative actions, inflation, unemployment and boom and bust cycles in institutional funding have also been shown to be contributing factors in the movement towards public sector unionization (Thompson 1975 1984c; Carr & VanEyck 1973; Mintz 1979; Ponak 1982; Wollnet 1971; Stubbs 1981; Garvin 1980; Anderson and Gunderson 1984). In the United States, the multiplicity of the various external professional associations, i.e., AAUP, NEA, AFT, also appears to have influenced the move toward or the lack of movement toward collective bargaining (Ladd and Lipset 1973; Carr & VanEyck 1973; Garbarino 1975; Kemerer and Baldrige 1975; Proulx 1971; Adell and Carter 1972; Thompson 1975; Alutto & Belasco 1974; Kelly 1976; Begin 1974). One of the most significant factors to emerge during the formation of collective bargaining in the public sector, including the higher education sector, is what Garbarino (1975) referred to as creeping legalism. The ever increasing formalization of

the bargaining process coupled with the introduction of enabling legislation in both Canada and the United States resulted in the establishment of the necessary judicial and bureaucratic systems to handle public sector collective bargaining (Adell and Carter 1972; Thompson 1975; Anderson 1982; Ponak 1982; Wollnett 1971; Birmingham 1980; Stubbs 1981; Canada, Royal Commission 1985). The impact of this legalistic, formal and rule oriented approach to organizational conflict resolution, has been a move away from dealing with internal tensions in a personal, consultative or collegial manner. Instead there has been the introduction of a more depersonalized, legalistic, or adversarial approach to conflict resolution.

It is difficult to determine whether or not there is a causal relationship between these environmental factors and the attitudes of faculty toward collective bargaining, but the literature suggests that there is a high correlation. The literature seems to suggest that the environmental factors may have prompted a defensive response to Level I bargaining goals (Kleingartner 1973; Ponak 1981; Thompson 1982). While these environmental factors are important, much of the empirical research of the past twenty years has focused on the variables at the personal level.

### Personal Factors

The existing literature suggests that researchers have long been interested in the impact of a number of personal factors, e.g. age, years of experience, academic rank and tenure, gender, job function, subject discipline and other miscellaneous factors. To obtain a broad picture the literature has been drawn from studies associated with instructors in the college, university and public school sectors.

Age. While age is one of the most widely studied personal factors, there does not appear to be a consensus regarding the relationship between age and attitudes toward collective bargaining. Many of the empirical studies indicate that younger staff members tend to be more supportive of collective bargaining and often tend to be more militant. This has shown to be the case in the public school sector (Corwin 1974; Black 1980; Vornberg 1984; Wohnseidler 1975; Conklin 1981; Cocanougher 1971; Davis 1972; Alutto and Belasco 1973), in the community college sector (Woolston 1976; Jones 1976; Moats 1982), in the university sector (Kemerer & Baldrige 1975; Bigoness 1978; Ponak & Thompson 1979, 1984; Shirom 1977; Gress 1976; Ladd & Lipset 1973; Ramsey 1976; Little 1979; Riley 1976; McInnis 1972) and in the public sector (Farber 1980). It has been suggested that the young staff members tend to be more militant because they lack organizational power.

Cocanougher's findings (1971) and Donnenwerth's findings (1978) suggest that the older workers are less supportive of collective bargaining efforts because they are more satisfied. Donnenwerth (1978) also reported that there was a decline in militancy among older workers because the more militant and dissatisfied workers may have left the organization. Still other research studies have suggested that it is not the younger staff members who are the most supportive of collective bargaining but rather those in the 30-39 cohort (Fox and Wince 1976; Jennings 1976; Franke 1981; Conklin 1981). This age cohort may be more supportive of collective bargaining and participate more in the bargaining process because of their domestic responsibilities, e.g. dependents, career objectives, maturing power needs. Some research studies, however, show no significant correlation between age and attitudes towards collective bargaining (Warren 1970; Plumley 1978; Feuille & Blandin 1976; Schutt 1982). While there does not appear to be a consensus regarding the impact of age on faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining, age may well be a factor in specific situations.

Experience. The impact of a person's years of experience in an organization appears to be as ambiguous as the age factor in determining attitudes toward collective bargaining. Various studies have found that it is staff with less experience in the organization who are more supportive of

collective bargaining (Ponak & Thompson 1984; Ramsey 1973; Jones 1976; Little 1979; Rossi 1974; Foster 1976). Yet various studies have found that it is not the most inexperienced staff who are the most militant or the most supportive of bargaining but rather those who have between five and ten years of experience (Fox and Wince 1976; Dull 1981; Franke 1981; Vornberg 1984). On the other hand, some findings suggest that there is little correlation between experience and attitudes in either the public school sector (Warren 1980; Wohnseidler 1975) or in the higher education sector (Moats 1982; Smith 1976; Ponak & Thompson 1979). These research findings parallel the research related to age and again they do not appear to be conclusive.

Rank and Tenure. While the issue of rank and tenure does not apply to the college sector, it may become a factor in the future. Research into the variables of rank and tenure in the university sector reveal similar patterns as the variables of age and years of experience but offer some additional insights. On the one hand, some studies have shown that faculty in the lower academic ranks or those without tenure are more prone to support collective bargaining (Ladd & Lipset 1973; Feuille & Blandin 1974; Woolston 1976; Foster 1976; Riley 1976; Streams 1978; Carnahan 1978; Ponak & Thompson 1979; Kubiak 1981; Franke 1981; Maher 1982; Hines 1984). Yet a small number of other studies have not

found any relationship between rank and tenure and pro-union attitudes (McInnes 1972; Smith 1976; Plumley 1978).

Interestingly, several studies have found a negative correlation between a person's rank or tenure status and collective bargaining (Kazlow 1977; Moats 1982; Ponak & Thompson 1984b). In other words, in these cases it has been the more senior staff that supported collective bargaining. The rationale here is that they have turned to the faculty bargaining unit to protect their established interests. Kazlow (1977) found that in a specific university, many of the tenured faculty were threatened by the young aggressive untenured faculty who were interested in moving up the career ladder and who were more actively involved in research and publishing.

Since many of the faculty members who joined the colleges in the mid to late 1960s are now reaching middle age, the tight funding situation, the tight job market and the demands of their dependents may combine to force the older more experienced faculty members to turn to collective bargaining to protect their interests. The gap between the senior instructional staff and the younger faculty may also increase the conflict within college faculty associations.

Gender. Gender, like age, is often considered when examining attitudes on collective bargaining. In the past, females in the public school, college, and university sectors,

appear to have been generally less supportive of collective bargaining and less militant than males (Seeman 1961; Warren 1970; Hellriegel 1970; Dull 1971; Alutto & Belasco 1974; Ladd & Lipset 1973; Davis 1973; Corwin 1974; Wohnseidler 1975; Fox and Wince 1976; Plumley 1978; Miller 1975; Dolan 1979; Conklin 1981; Black 1983).

Conversely, some studies have not found a significant relationship (McInnis 1972; Little 1979). Not unlike the studies considering the age factor, some research studies have shown that it is not necessarily the gender of the person that is significant but whether or not the person has dependents. Those with dependents tend to favour collective bargaining and tend to be more aggressive in their demands (Feuille & Blandin 1974; Jennings 1976; Schutt 1982; Streams 1978; Riley 1976).

The influence of gender on the formation of attitudes toward collective bargaining, unlike some of the other personal factors, may be more complex. Many of the studies cited above were done prior to the emergence of the woman's movement and prior to the increased number of women in the work force, including higher education. These two factors coupled with the increased number of single parents in the work force of the 1980's may present radically different results than the earlier studies. This is suggested in a recent article by English (1985). A more valid study in view of today's trend may be a recent study by LeLouarn (1982). He found that females were less satisfied than the males and were

more outspoken in their demands during negotiations. A 1971 study by Cocanougher tracked teachers who temporarily left the job force to have a family. He found that in many cases the woman's salary represented a family's second income which reduced their demands. In spite of these trends in today's work force, little attention appears to have been paid to this factor in the recent literature.

An interesting development is the pioneering research by Gilligan (1982). In her work, Gilligan determined that women approach personal tensions and problem solving in a different manner than males. Drawing on her work, the question that immediately arises, is how would the current adversarial approach to collective bargaining be affected if more women were on the faculty and college negotiating committees or if more women served as mediators or arbitration chairmen? The new environmental conditions as well as the new research into how women approach conflict, will undoubtedly raise many new questions in the years ahead.

**Job Function.** Except for Plumley's 1978 study, there is little evidence in the literature that the level of a person's degree is significantly related to attitude formation. During the formative years of collective bargaining in the mid 1960s, it was noted that the college sector tended to be unionized more rapidly than the university sector (Carr & VanEyck 1973; Garbarino 1975). Following this line of thought, numerous



examinations of universities have shown that faculty who carry heavy teaching loads or those who are not heavily involved in research, tend to be more supportive of collective bargaining (Kazlow 1977; Kames 1978; Herman 1974; Stecklein & Willie 1982; Ponak & Thompson 1984; Ladd & Lipset 1973; Lipset 1975; Feuille & Blandin 1974; Franke 1981; Woolston 1976; Jones 1976; Plumley 1978; Riley 1976).

The implication for colleges is that since colleges are primarily teaching institutions, the faculty may be more supportive of collective bargaining than university faculty. In addition to the professional autonomy and collegiality that exist outside of the bargaining unit, many university faculty not only enjoy the financial and professional rewards of research, they also enjoy the power and autonomy that accompanies research (Neuman 1974). Some college faculty on the other hand, e.g., university transfer faculty, may be deprived of those outlets and therefore like the nurses (Ponak 1981), may have to turn to collective bargaining to seek both Level I rewards, e.g., economic rewards, and Level II rewards, e.g., professional rewards.

In the university sector there appears to be a relationship between a faculty member's subject discipline and their opinions of collective bargaining. Faculty in the social sciences and humanities tend to be more liberal in their values than the science faculty and hence more supportive of collective bargaining (Ladd & Lipset 1973;

Franke 1981; Jones 1976; Smith 1976; Streams 1978; Plumley 1978; Riley 1976; Foster 1976; Neuman 1974; Ponak & Thompson 1979). Ladd & Lipset (1973) suggest that in elite universities while the social science and humanities faculty may be philosophically inclined towards bargaining, the tenured faculty resist collective bargaining. They apparently resist bargaining in order to preserve various aspects of their professional environment, such as the university's system of meritorious promotion and its associated benefits. Neuman (1974) found that science faculty in the university sector did not support collective bargaining because they perceived that they had more power within the organization and had more independence because of their external research grants. It is difficult, however, to generalize these findings to the college faculty since the colleges lack the independent research base and the tradition of participatory decision making. It is likely, however, that a similar range of values or perhaps a wider range of values exist in the heterogeneous faculty associations of some of British Columbia's community colleges.

Career Mobility and Aspirations. Career aspirations and career mobility may also be related to the attitudes people hold toward collective bargaining. Perhaps predictably, those faculty associated with administrative functions or who aspire to administrative positions may be less supportive of

collective bargaining and less militant than other faculty members (Lindeman 1975; Feuille & Blandin 1974; Ramsey 1973; Moats 1982, Ponak & Thompson 1984; Riley 1976; Cocanougher 1971). In both the public school sector and the higher education sector it also appears to be the people frustrated by the lack of career advancement or mobility who are more militant (Donnenwerth 1978; Woolston 1976; Black 1983; Schutt 1982; Farber 1980; Walker & Lawler 1980).

Miscellaneous Personal Factors. A number of other personal factors, i.e. political affiliation, race, religion and social background are also often referred to in the research studies related to attitudes toward collective bargaining. A number of studies have shown that those faculty who are liberal or left of centre in their political ideology, e.g., NDP, Democrats, tend to favour collective bargaining (Davis 1972; Kazlow 1973; Ladd & Lipset 1973; Rossi 1974; Wohnsiedler 1975; Riley 1976; Woolston 1976; Jones 1976; Streams 1978; Ponak & Thompson 1979, 1984b). With respect to another factor, Sonnenwerth (1975) did not find a significant relationship between a faculty member's religion but other studies have found that Catholics (Ladd & Lipset 1973; Fox & Wince 1976; Franke 1981) are more supportive of collective bargaining than Protestants. The research suggests that there is perhaps a positive correlation between politics and religion. In addition, those with a European background tend

to support collective bargaining more than indigenous North Americans (Fox & Wince 1976). A number of studies suggest that the faculty who come from blue collar families or who have otherwise been exposed to the benefits of unions, tend to be more supportive of collective bargaining (Bakke 1945; Jennings & Niemi 1968; Wohnsiedler 1975; Riley 1976; Fox & Wince 1976; Schutt 1982; Cotgrove 1982; McShane 1985).

### Professionalism

The matter of faculty professionalism in higher education is an important factor in collective bargaining. Referring to the emergence of the American college movement, Stecklein & Eckert (1958,4) observed that "...college teachers seem to have entered this field more by accident than by design". This point was reinforced by Perra (1979,4) when he observed that in the British Columbia college system "Few of the instructors in the community college system had selected college teaching as a career. The three sectors (university transfer, career and vocational) knew or understood little of the philosophy of the other or their particular needs and wants". College instructors were drawn from the public school system, the business sector, the universities, the professions, the quasi-professions and the trade schools (Carr 1973; Dennison 1987; Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Garbarino 1975; Kemerer 1975; Perra 1979). Unlike the universities, the colleges "...have not had a long history through which

collegial conventions and customs could be developed" (Dennison & Gallagher 1986,221). These conventions may also have been partially limited by the parameters of the College and Institute Act, e.g., role of the board. Rather than professional colleagues in the meritocratic environment of a university, community college faculty were and are often perceived to be more like employees than colleagues (Dennison & Gallagher 1986) and are in fact referred to as employees in the College and Institute Act, 1977. These diverse experiences, values, and expectations not only laid the ground work for potential tensions between the faculty and the colleges, but between the various sub-units within the respective faculty associations.

Although Etzioni (1964) referred to faculty as semi-professionals and college faculty in British Columbia are defined as professional employees by the College and Institute Act, most community college faculty would undoubtedly refer to themselves as professionals. Perra (1979), with reference to a number of previous research studies, suggests that true professionals are concerned with professional associations, controlled accreditation, autonomy, self-employment, self-regulation, shared decision making, peer evaluation, specialized expertise and other similar attributes. Thompson (1984) and Ponak (1981), with reference to Kerr et al. (1977), identify a number of similar, though perhaps more liberal, characteristics of professionalism.

These include expertise, prolonged training, dedication to the profession, close association with fellow professionals, an obligation to render service without concern for one's self interest, ethics, autonomy and the collegial maintenance of standards.

Given the variety of backgrounds (Carr 1973; Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Garbarino 1975; Kemerer 1975; Perra 1979) and their diverse instructional functions, one might anticipate that the various groups within the ranks of a college faculty association may well have widely differing views of professionalism. This was in fact substantiated by Gerhart & Maxey (1978). For instance, a trades instructor, a university transfer instructor, a nursing instructor and a business instructor with a Chartered Accountant designation may not view professionalism in the same way. During collective bargaining these different perceptions are likely to be expressed in the demands or goals of each group of instructors. Ponak (1981) indicates that Kleingartner (1973) refers to the basic collective bargaining issues such as wages, fair treatment on the job, fringe benefits and so on as Level I goals. Level II goals, or professional bargaining objectives include items such as job satisfaction, career development, peer evaluation, participation in the organization's decision making process, workloads, establishment of joint committees for the consideration of policy matters, and other similar issues related to

professional autonomy. Kleingartner (1973) also pointed out that since Level II goals deal with power, authority and matters of principle, these bargaining objectives may be in conflict with the college administrator's fundamental values and views on management rights. These issues raise questions about the scope or the content of collective bargaining.

Thompson (1982), with reference to two studies (Ponak 1981; Ponak & Thompson 1979), suggests that the scope of the negotiation strategies of professionals is inconclusive and varies according to the profession. In one study, a group of nurses indicated that they preferred to bargain for professional goals rather than economic goals (Ponak 1981). In another study, Ponak & Thompson (1979), a group of university faculty "...revealed much less interest in bargaining over non-economic items (for example, teaching evaluation, committee assignments, procedures for selecting department chairmen) than salaries, pensions, sabbaticals..." (Thompson 1982, 393). In view of the differences, Thompson (1982) suggests that in the one case the university faculty were probably able to satisfy their professional needs through other established consultative or collegial channels.

In a similar vein, Gerhart & Maxey (1978) in an earlier article, point out that in large established institutions of higher education there may be less need to bargain for professional or Level II benefits since they may already be well established, e.g. participation in academic decision

making. Kleingartner (1973) says that Level I bargaining goals must be satisfied before employees focus on Level II goals. In Thompson & Ponak's study, the faculty either did not see the need to negotiate Level II goals, were apprehensive about losing those benefits that they had or were more concerned about their Level I goals. The nurses may not have had the same professional opportunities as the university faculty and wanted to actively pursue their professional objectives through the bargaining process. It is not clear from the literature whether or not there is a relationship between the Level I and Level II needs of employees and the overall maturation or evolution of collective bargaining in the organization. Another factor in these cases may be the evolutionary nature or the maturity of these organizations. Compounding the matter of Level I and Level II needs is the issue of management rights as perceived by college board members and the senior administrators. Given the perceived tradition of faculty professionalism in some sectors of higher education, it is likely that the issue of faculty professionalism in the community colleges is also a driving force in the collective bargaining arena.

The question of governance is not an unrelated issue. In the formative stages of collective bargaining in the colleges and universities there was the question whether or not collective bargaining would replace the traditional forms of institutional governance, e.g., Senates, or whether collective



bargaining would focus on issues other than governance (Baldridge & Kemerer 1976; Garbarino 1975). The former concept was referred to as the competitive model and the second was referred to as the dual track model. While Brown (1982), Porter (1973) and Walker & Lawler (1980) suggest that faculty will move to collective bargaining and will support collective bargaining in the absence of governance opportunities, Ponak & Thompson's (1984c) findings suggest otherwise. Their work suggests that faculty in Canadian universities do not expect the collective bargaining process to concern itself with institutional governance, but rather to concentrate on basic working conditions or Level I goals, e.g., salaries, benefits, grievance mechanisms. The question in all of this for the college sector is whether or not the different factions within the college faculty associations vary in their expectations of the collective bargaining process. For example, will one faculty group expect the collective bargaining process to meet their professional or Level II objectives as the nurses did in Ponak's (1981) study and will another faculty group focus on Level I goals as in the Ponak & Thompson (1984b) study. On another plane, Driscoll's (1972) and Plumley's (1978) findings suggest that perhaps it is not the faculty's lack of participation in the decision making process that is related to the negative organizational attitudes, as much as it is the lack of trust in the decision makers and the decision making process within

the institution. Ironically, if the perceived loss of autonomy and perceived increase in the bureaucratic power of the administration pushed faculty toward collective bargaining, collective bargaining appears to have increased the number of rules and regulations (Ponak & Thompson 1984; Dayal 1984; Hines 1984; Bohlander 1985). This suggests that the scope of the collective agreements has been expanded to compensate for the absence of a key ingredient of professionalism; faculty participation in the governance process.

#### Organizational Satisfaction

Along the same lines as professionalism is the issue of organizational satisfaction. Research in both the public school sector and the university sector, support the hypothesis that personal job dissatisfaction leads to support for collective bargaining and militant behaviour (Davis 1972; Giandomenico 1973; Ramsey 1973; Feuille & Blandin 1976; Begin 1979; Dolan 1979; Araghi 1981; LeLouarn 1982,; Herman 1983; Ponak & Thompson 1984b). Job dissatisfaction may increase the level of internal organizational stress. One study reported that when there was a high level of stress within the organization, the faculty were inclined to be more supportive of collective bargaining (Alutto & Belasco 1974). There appears to be, therefore, a close tie between organizational satisfaction and faculty satisfaction.

A number of studies have shown that if the faculty's general impression of their institution's administration is favourable then they will be less likely to support collective bargaining and less militant (Zalesny 1985; Cowan 1982; Volpe 1975, Feuille & Blandin 1974; Ponak & Thompson 1984c). If the faculty's view of the institution's administration is negative, e.g., in the sense that the administration has too much influence (Ponak & Thompson 1984c), then the faculty will likely look to collective bargaining to counteract this imbalance of power (Anderson 1985, Porter 1972; Cocanougher 1971; Maher 1982; Herman 1975, Feuille & Blandin 1976; Gress 1976; Ponak & Thompson 1984c; Thompson 1975). Jennings (1976), as well as Stecklein and Willie (1982), reported that if the faculty perceive that the administration does not respect the faculty, then the faculty will attempt to overcome their perceived loss of power by being more active in the collective bargaining process.

#### Economic Satisfaction

One of the variables on which researchers have focused is the relationship between faculty members' economic needs and their attitudes toward collective bargaining. Baker (1984) has suggested that faculty want unions, at least initially, to satisfy their basic economic or Level I (Ponak 1981) needs, e.g., salaries. This economic deprivation may be absolute, in the sense that the individual faculty member may need a salary

increase to survive or it may be relative to the salaries of comparable cohorts. This propensity to favour unionism for economic reasons was noted by some of the early labour relations researchers (Bakke 1945; Seeman 1951; Christrup 1966). Economic deprivation, whether absolute or relative, appears to have been one of the contributing factors to the formation of local bargaining units in the university sector (Bigoness 1978; Ponak & Thompson 1984; Grossvickle 1980; McInnis 1972), the college sector Stecklein & Willie 1982), the public school sector (Donnenwerth 1978; Dull 1971; Davis 1972; Corwin 1972) and the public sector in general (Farber 1980; Schutt 1982). Fox & Wince's (1976) work complements the concept of economic relativity by demonstrating that males who have lower salaries are more prone to support collective bargaining than males with higher salaries. This of course raises the question of whether these particular faculty support collective bargaining because of their age, their salary level or both. On this issue Donnenwerth's (1978) research suggests that there is a positive correlation between a faculty member's age, salary level and attitudes toward bargaining. Feuille & Blandin (1974), Lagoe (1979) and Bigoness (1978) found that the level of economic deprivation to be one of the best predictors of employee attitudes toward collective bargaining.

## CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Although collective bargaining can be considered a shared decision making process, the process necessarily involves tension or conflict (Barbash 1984; Birnbaum 1980,1981; Strauss 1982). Since "Conflict, latent or manifest, is the essence of industrial relations..." (Barbash 1984, 130) it is necessary to examine the nature of conflict before considering the various methods of conflict resolution.

### Conflict

The definition of terms is one of the most common problems of empirical research (Berger & Cummings 1979). Webster's Third World Dictionary defines conflict using terms like clash, competition, interference, indecision, uncertainty, restlessness, and incompatible inner needs. In the organizational behaviour literature, the definition of conflict varies widely. For example, Glueck (1977) refers to conflict as a disagreement of issues, Deutsch (1973) as incompatible acts, Thomas (1976) as one more powerful party frustrating the needs of a less powerful party, Baron (1985) as thwarting behaviour, March & Simon (1958) as a breakdown in communications, Millett (1984) as a centralization of power, Pondy (1969) and Druckman (1973) as a disagreement over the distribution of scarce resources, Robbins (1974) in terms of personal differences, Wilson (1981) as a confrontation of divergent views, Pondy (1969) in terms of goal divergence,

Balke et al. (1965) in terms of mutually exclusive intents, Likert & Likert (1976) as a lack of understanding what other people do, and Judd (1978) in terms of dissimilar values. Given the concept of pluralism in open systems theory, conflict might be seen as the tension between the various sub-systems and the central system that are the result of attempting to satisfy their respective needs of centralization and autonomy. Jandt (1983,31) found that when "...subgroups within an organization tend to think of themselves as primary, and the members of each group tend to apply their own standards to the other subgroups...conflict is inescapable". However valid, these diverse definitions do not appear to address the central issue of how to distinguish between normal or constructive conflict and dysfunctional or pathological conflict (Barbash 1984). From a theoretical perspective and from a practical perspective collective bargaining conflict appears to lie on a continuum with constructive conflict toward one end and pathological conflict toward the other end. Barbash (1984,132) suggests that "It is not yet possible to determine analytically the nature of the boundary..." between the two extremes. In this vein, Barbash (1984,134) echoes the thoughts of Thomas's (1976,889) notion that "Conflict itself, is no evil, but rather a phenomenon which can have constructive or destructive effects depending on its management".

Constructive Conflict. Toward one end of the conflict continuum is constructive conflict. Classical organizational writers perceived that all conflict was dysfunctional since it violated the concept of rational and structural order. While recognizing the negative side of conflict, recent writers also discuss the benefits of conflict. They suggest that organizational conflict demonstrates that the organization is interacting with its internal and external environments in such a way that it helps to ensure an organization's survival by both forcing organizational change and by maintaining a level of homeostasis (Bartos 1977; Boulding 1956, 1964; Coser 1956; Druckman 1973; Wilson 1981). It is in this latter sense that Barbash (1984, 102) uses the term tension instead of conflict. Robbins (1974), Tjosvold (1984) and Townsend (1970) note that conflict is essential to the well being of an organization, that you cannot eliminate conflict and that the absence of conflict would lead to the demise of the organization.

Consistent with the perspective of open systems theory, Kohn (1986), with reference to Jonson & Jonson (1981), refers to constructive conflict as friendly excursions into disequilibrium. From the constructive perspective, conflict is seen as a social facilitator that increases the growth of the organization by re-establishing social values and norms, assisting in goal formation, by ensuring greater participation in the activities of the organization, by stemming withdrawal

from the decision making process, by maintaining group order, by forcing the organization and it's sub-systems to adopt to changes in the external environment, by overcoming "group think", by balancing power, by ensuring an appropriate distribution of resources, by re-establishing blocked communication channels or feedback mechanisms and by providing an organizational steam valve (Coser 1956; Deutsch 1973; Gleuck 1977; Hall 1977; Jarvis 1972; March & Simon 1958; Subbarao 1985; Thomas 1976; Tjosvold 1984). Within the above parameters the conflict that is so often associated with collective bargaining would assumed to be constructive if it contributes to the success of the system as a whole and its various stratified sub-systems.

Dysfunctional Conflict. Toward the other end of the conflict continuum is dysfunctional conflict. This form of conflict would appear to be conflict that inhibits the organization and one or more of its sub-systems from successfully adapting to the ever evolving external environment. In extreme circumstances, this type of conflict could result in bankruptcies, employee terminations, discontinuation of product lines, programs or services as well as violent and prolonged strikes. Judd (1978) suggests that these various forms of destructive conflict accentuate the differences of a group or groups, rather than stressing the positive or the common good. Kochan et al. (1984B,265) found



that under certain circumstances the distributive model of collective bargaining "...became less responsive to growing environmental, organizational and workload pressures". The existing literature indicates that destructive conflict has been characterized by many writers in many ways (Barbash 1984; Beres 1984; Birnbaum 1980,1981; Boulding 1964; Coser 1956; Deutsch 1973; Douglas 1984; Javis 1972; Kohn 1986; Likert 1976; March & Simon 1958; McCarthy 1981; Pondy 1969; Thomas 1976; Wynn 1972). These writers have characterized dysfunctional conflict using such terms as competition, stereotyping, belittling attitudes, hateful language, dogmatic statements, low tolerance for others and their positions, a simplistic view of problems and solutions, deception, secrecy, rigid positions, over confidence in one position, a fixed pie perspective of the resources available, conflict that is no longer related to the cause, face saving positions, excessive adherence to rules, too many rules, compromise, arbitrary time lines, and win-lose or lose-lose attitudes and positions. Destructive conflict has also been characterized by violence, civil disobedience, the termination of unions, declining productivity, domination, the use of sanctions, the exclusion of organizational units from the work force, distorted communications, a lack of fair representation, excessive professionalism and excessive unionism, unnecessary resistance to change, time delays, excessive autonomy or centralization, and the use of knowledge to attack the other party. Clearly

there are a variety of views and the transition point between constructive conflict and dysfunctional conflict is unclear (Barbash 1984). The literature on competition, however, helps a little to clarify the boundary between the two ends of the conflict continuum.

Competition. The constructive and destructive aspects of conflict have been captured in Thomas' (1976) two way model which is based on the work of Blake & Mouton (1964). The model depicts the adversarial or distributive approach to bargaining on one plane and the integrative or cooperative approach to collective bargaining on another plane (Walton & McKersie 1965). In a more recent work, Fisher & Ury (1984) referred to these two approaches to bargaining as hard and soft bargaining. While the latter may be more desirable, the apparently inherent adversarial nature of "Distributive bargaining is central to labour negotiations and is usually regarded as the dominant activity in the union-management relationship" (Walton & McKersie 1965,11). In a more general sense, Kohn (1986,156) suggests that "What makes disagreement destructive is not the fact of conflict itself but the addition of competition" and in this context "...the point is to win rather than to reach the best solution...". Walton and McKersie (1965:167) also say that, "In distributive bargaining there is pure competition for some limited value". These comments graphically capture Thomas' model which delineates

between the terms lose-lose, win-lose and win-win. The introduction of competition into the bargaining process can lead to vicious destructive circles (Kohn 1986; Masuch 1985; Mondy 1980) and which in turn can lead to a rapid and irreversible escalation of conflict that can ultimately destroy a system (Glasl 1982). Within the context of open system theory these processes are akin to the struggle for autonomy and centralization as a system thickens its boundary or skin (Glasl 1982,124).

The literature suggests a number of specific factors that may contribute to competition between two parties. Perhaps not surprisingly many of these have already been mentioned in the previous section on destructive conflict. A number of the factors include the inexperience of those involved in the bargaining process (Barbash IRRA-3; Bazerman et al. 1985), the lack of established social norms and social expectations (Beres & Schmidt 1982), over confidence of one side or the other (Bazerman et al. 1985), a risk seeking mind set (Tversky & Kahneman 1981), a fixed pie perspective (Bazerman et al. 1985; Glasl 1982; Walton & McKersie 1976), a lack of self esteem (Barbash IRRA-3; Kohn 1986), over confidence (Bazerman 1983), conflicting values (Beres & Schimdt 1982; Birnbaum 1980a,1980b; Coser 1956; Likert & Likert 1976), structurally rigid organizations (Coser 1965, Deutsch 1973; Glassman 1973; Rubin 1979; Weick 1976), a lack of set goals, bargaining priorities or external constraints (Bazerman et al.

1985; Pruitt 1983), a lack of accountability or a lack of a feeling of shared responsibility (Bazerman et al. 1985; Kohn 1986), too many rules that constrain the bargainers (Kohn 1986), a continued and increasingly rigid adherence to a fixed position (Bazerman 1983), when the size of the bargaining group is too large (Jonson & Jonson 1981), and people with competitive values that perpetuate the competitive approach to collective bargaining (Kohn 1986). Gilligan's (1984) research suggests that competitive behaviour may be more a natural characteristic of males than females, which raises a number of other issues related to collective bargaining.

While conflict is both natural and necessary, the literature suggests that conflict appears to become dysfunctional when it is characterized by aspects of competition. Conversely, the literature implies that conflict is positive or constructive when the above factors are absent. With this critical concept in place, we can now examine a variety of approaches to conflict resolution.

### Conflict Resolution

The literature of management of labour relations conflict is reviewed in terms of the traditional methods usually associated with the distributive model of collective bargaining. The traditional approaches to conflict resolution, often associated with the private sector, have in

turn received wide spread use in the public sector, including higher education. These methods of conflict settlement include mediation, fact finding, conventional arbitration, mediation-arbitration, and final offer selection. In the area of conflict resolution there has been a parallel development of Canadian private sector and public sector labour law. As noted earlier, however, many of the market constraints that are present in the private sector and work in conjunction with the various forms of conflict resolution, are largely absent in higher education.

Mediation. Mediation appears to be one of the most widely used and successful third party intervention approaches in collective bargaining (Gallagher & Pegnetler 1978; Kochan & Jick 1978). It appears to be most effective in low conflict situations, when both parties are highly motivated to settle and do not hold back, when the bargaining zones of the two parties overlap, when at least one party in the dispute is inexperienced and when the dispute involves issues of principle rather than substantive issues (Anderson & Kochan 1977; Glasl 1982; Kochan 1980; Kochan & Jick 1978; Rubin 1980). It also appears to work best when it is used at a late stage in the bargaining process (Glasl 1982) and in conjunction with a strike threat. In view of this point, it may be that mediation might be successful when used in conjunction with a variation of final offer selection.

Kolb (1983) found that mediation helped parties to narrow their differences but did not necessarily help to bring about a settlement. Hasson (1983) also showed that mediation assisted the parties to define their problems and Byrnes (1978) found it to be a useful relief valve.

In one United States study, mediation appears to have been less satisfactory when dealing with basic issues or Level I bargaining goals, e.g., inability to pay, unrealistic economic expectations, salaries, benefits (Kochan 1980). Based on this American study, if a round of negotiations is focusing on Level II, or professional, issues rather than on Level I issues, then mediation may be an effective tool to use. These empirical findings are consistent with the use of mediation in Glasl's (1982) theoretical model of conflict resolution. Ironically, when needed the most, e.g., high conflict situations dealing with Level I items, mediation appears to be the least effective approach to conflict resolution (Bigoness 1976 ;Deutsch 1976; Kochan & Jick 1973; Rubin 1980; Thibault & Walker 1975). In fact, in these situations, mediation appears to harden the positions of the parties involved. Although mediation may be an effective Level I conflict resolution technique in Canada, there appears to be an absence of literature in this area.

**Fact Finding.** Kochan (1980) reports that fact finding is one of the primary conflict resolution techniques in the

American non-uniformed public sector. In Canada, fact finding or conciliation, is used mainly by the federal government and the government of Ontario. Fact finding generally follows mediation but precedes arbitration, although in some cases it may be the final step in the resolution process. It is more formal than mediation but less formal than arbitration.

Gallagher (1982) and Gerhart (1981) both reported that when fact finding is used in conjunction with arbitration, it was time consuming and expensive. Gerhart (1981) found that it was most effective when used in conjunction with the total package approach to final offer selection. Since it is so similar to mediation it is not surprising that Kochan (1980) found fact finding was most effective under many of the same conditions that mediation was effective.

Conventional Arbitration. Conventional arbitration is one of the most widely accepted forms of conflict resolution associated with collective bargaining in North American higher education (Douglas 1984). Arbitration is designed to instill enough uncertainty surrounding government or third party intervention into the decision making process, that the parties settle voluntarily. Thompson & Cairnie (1973) found that arbitration worked best when the arbitration criteria were unknown and the arbitration process was perceived to be a great risk to the parties concerned. They also found rigid time lines helped to increase the risk associated with

arbitration and that arbitration was more effective in small groups where political and personal factors converged to produce additional risk. Arbitration appears to offer a viable alternative to a strike (Thompson & Cairnie 1973) where strikes are prohibited by law, prohibited by contract (Farber & Katz 1979; Stevens 1966), or perceived to be unacceptable by the parties involved. Connally (1983), Feuille (1985) and Thompson & Cairnie (1973) reported, however, that there was no difference between the end result of arbitrated settlements and non-arbitrated settlements. In the long run they found that cases which proceeded to arbitration often involved catch up agreements. Feuille (1985) and Farber & Katz (1979) reported that it was not necessarily the arbitration itself that was important in the conflict resolution process but rather its availability to the parties involved in the conflict.

The literature frequently refers to the chilling and the narcotic effects of arbitration. Chilling refers to the notion that parties will refuse to engage in meaningful bargaining knowing that they can save face and perhaps obtain a better settlement by referring the problem(s) to an external agent. The narcotic effect refers to the notion that once parties use an external agent to settle their differences they will likely continue to use arbitration over and over rather than settle their differences at the table.



The research appears to be divided on the chilling effect of arbitration. In a comprehensive review of the empirical and experimental literature, Anderson (1981) found that while the field research tended to show that arbitration contributed to the chilling effect, the experimental research showed that the threat of arbitration induced movement toward a settlement. Notwithstanding the preceding review, Magenau (1983) in a more recent study, found that arbitration had a chilling effect when the conflict was high and the parties perceived that they had to save face. Glasl's (1982) model of conflict escalation and conflict resolution, supports the use of arbitration in high conflict situations. Similarly, there is a difference of opinion regarding the narcotic effect of arbitration. Although Kochan's (1983) research suggests that there is not sufficient evidence to support the theory of the narcotic effect of arbitration, Feuille's (1985) suggests otherwise.

In addition to these concerns, there is the perception that arbitrators tend to split the parties positions. In the case of Level I items, e.g., salaries, this may not be critical. Thompson & Cairnie (1973) found that arbitration was most effective when it was limited to Level I issues. If an arbitrator attempted to split Level II items, items of principle, it is unlikely that either party would be satisfied and the problem may well be further aggravated. This latter

point is consistent with Thomas's (1965) lose-lose view of compromise solutions.

Mediation-Arbitration. This form of conventional arbitration is where the arbitrator can act as a mediator during the arbitration process. It is an attempt to bridge the gap between the informal and flexible nature of mediation and the rigidity and formality of conventional arbitration (Kochan, 1980). The limited literature on Mediation-Arbitration suggests that this conflict resolution technique has not been subjected to sufficient systematic research to be able to judge its strengths and weaknesses. It appears that while the Mediation-Arbitration process sometimes assists to narrow the differences between the parties, in most cases the conflict is ultimately settled by arbitration.

Final Offer Selection. Final offer selection takes a variety of forms and according to the literature has been used at a Canadian university, i.e., University of Alberta (Swimmer 1975). In one form of final offer selection, the parties submit their final offers to a single arbitrator or tripartite panel and the arbitrator(s) select one of the proposed packages. In this form there is a clear winner and a clear loser. Alternatively, an arbitrator may select from the two proposals on an issue by issue basis. In this type of final offer selection both parties stand to gain and lose. In still another form, the two parties may each submit two final

offers. One offer represents a political and face saving offer and the other offer represents a realistic offer. In some instances the parties are permitted to continue the bargaining process after they have submitted their final offers up to the time of the arbitration award. In this last form of final offer selection, the arbitrator may mediate between the two positions.

The literature suggests that final offer selection is most effective in forcing the two sides to settle when the two parties must submit a final offer in package form, where the parties are not allowed to bargain or otherwise alter their final offer during arbitration, and where the arbitrator must select one of the two offers (Delany 1984; Hoh 1984). Research by Weitzman & Stocking (1980) suggests that the package form of final offer selection is comparable to a strike. It creates an intense pressure on the negotiators where neither side can afford to adopt a take it or leave it attitude, since the arbitrator cannot split the difference between their final offers. Kochan (1980) indicates that this approach to final offer selection forces the parties to submit realistic packages. The research submits that when the parties are aware that they must settle their differences during negotiations or face final offer selection, the pressure exerted on the parties by this form of final offer selection only comes into play during the last stages of the

collective bargaining or mediation process (DeNisi & Dworkin 1981; Gallagher 1979; Magneau 1984).

Several other empirical findings are noteworthy in that they point out some limitations of the process.

Champlain (1982) reported that while final offer selection narrowed the differences between the parties, generally there was not sufficient pressure to settle all of the outstanding issues. DeNisi & Dworkin (1981) found that final offer selection, unlike the research on mediation, was only effective when the parties were experienced negotiators, when there were clearly defined issues, when the parties clearly understood the implications of their actions, and when the parties had a stake in the outcome. Based on these findings, and taking into account the literature on conventional arbitration, final offer selection may be best suited for Level I items and may not be suited to resolving disputes related to Level II items.

In spite of this apparent potential effectiveness under certain situations, final offer selection is not a widely accepted form of conflict resolution in North American labour relations, let alone higher education. For example, one study reported that in the United States, four out of five settlements referred to a third party, were handled by conventional arbitration (Delaney & Feuille 1984).

Summary. The preceding approaches to conflict resolution are traditional impasse procedures associated with the distributive or adversarial model of collective bargaining. According to Thomas's (1976) model, these traditional methods of conflict resolution represent either win-lose solutions or lose-lose solutions. Therefore, depending on the issues, these approaches may not resolve the underlying conflict between the parties. The literature appears to suggest that mediation may be best suited for the resolution of Level II issues and arbitration or final offer selection best suited for the resolution of Level I issues. These approaches, represent one approach to conflict resolution and regardless of their short comings, should not and will not be discarded readily. Rather, an effort should be made to better understand their strengths and attempt to improve their effectiveness.

#### Intergrative Bargaining

Integrative bargaining, a term used by Walton & McKersie (1965), is not a traditional or common form of resolving organizational conflicts. Integrative bargaining, as a working approach to collective bargaining, seems to have gained popularity during the early seventies. This was during a time when there was a perceptible decline in American private sector unions and a swing to human resource management concepts (Kochan et al. (1985). Over the years Birnbaum

(1980,1981), Crossman (1978), Follett (1941), Deutsch (1976), Fisher (1964,1981), March & Simon (1958), Thomas (1976) and Kochan et al. (1985) have advocated that organizations consider shifting from distributive bargaining to a form of integrative bargaining. Judging from the various descriptions in the literature, it appears that integrative bargaining is comparable to principled bargaining (Fisher & Ury 1981) and single team bargaining (Crossman 1978).

This approach to conflict resolution emphasizes the human resources side of the organization rather than the political or structural sides of an organization. Integrative bargaining attempts to generate a win-win attitude by focusing on the substantive issues rather than on the people issues, on a collaborative problem solving approach to resolving issues rather than on power and sanctions, by re-establishing effective communication channels, by increasing each party's sensitivity to the other party's constituent interests, by negotiating from principles rather than power, by encouraging flexibility, and at the outset of the process by establishing common bi-lateral goals. It is a process that builds on the common strengths of the two sides, e.g., values, goals, needs, and by involving all concerned in a common problem solving exercise (Crossman 1978). Knowledge is not used as a weapon but rather to resolve common problems and is not used to attack the other side or to defend one position against another. This approach is built on the general concept that

agreements between people are more likely when the level of cooperation is greater than the level of competition. The authors also suggest that communications may not be effective if the parties are competitively oriented or when either party can threaten the other (Deutsch & Krauss 1960). Deutsch and Krauss' laboratory findings are consistent with Thomas' (1976) theoretical model.

While integrative bargaining is promoted in the literature there do not appear to be many empirical research studies on its use, its success or its limitations. Although the references cited usually involved a number of issues, some observations have been made. Weinstein (1978), a labour relations practitioner, points out that single team bargaining only appears to be effective in discussing non-monetary issues. Weinstein's observation is echoed in a study by Dyer et al. (1973). Dyer's study, as well as those by Horvitz (1982) and Ruggles (1981) found that collaborative decisions were thought to be most beneficial in non-economic areas, e.g., quality of work, but not in areas associated with economic issues. The integrative model closely parallels the academic model of collegiality and the preceding studies suggest that it may be best suited to negotiations related to professional or Level II needs. The literature suggests that for integrative bargaining to work there are a number of preconditions. Since this form of bargaining is oriented toward joint problem solving, the parties have to be motivated

to settle, there has to be more emphasis on the communication process rather than the contractual language and there has to be a great deal of trust (Walton & McKersie 1965). On the other hand, integrative bargaining may also work where the bargaining relationships have deteriorated to the point where the two parties are willing to try anything in order to re-establish an organizational equilibrium. For this method of bargaining, the literature indicates that there has to be structural changes to the bargaining process, a longer time frame, the development and implementation of creative problem solving techniques, the use of joint sub-committees to research common concerns, and the use of third party neutrals (Birnbaum 1981; Crossman 1978; Fisher & Ury 1981).

#### Future Conflict Resolution

Upon reviewing the literature related to conflict and conflict resolution, a number of questions remain unanswered. For example, if "There is a feeling that our system of industrial relations leaves much to be desired...that collective bargaining is archaic and that the adversary system is not working...there must be a better way" (Downie 1984, 317), then the question is what type of bargaining is best suited for what type of bargaining goals, what are the best conflict resolution methods for what situations, what are the alternatives, how do we modify or change the process and will the new processes become permanent?



Consistent with the concepts of open systems theory, the literature implies that change is difficult to introduce and once changes are implemented it is difficult to sustain them over an extended period of time. According to the decision tables developed by Coleman & Fraser (1979), with reference to Loomis (1954), the chances of an innovation that would reduce some of the adversity of the current distributive collective bargaining process, would have something in the order of a one in ten chance of being sustained over time. The tendency toward system homeostasis is just too great to expect significant changes to occur and to remain in place.

In this vein, Katz et al. (1985,523) say that many people "...have traditionally assumed that the time tested institutions and practices associated with collective bargaining are the most effective means of managing the diverse interests that exist in employment relationships". However, Downie (1984,318) notes that "...while there is disaffection with the current industrial relations situation, it is equally true that the adversary process will remain the cornerstone of our industrial relations system". Coleman & Fraser (1979), Kochan (1984c) and Strauss (1984) have all indicated that change, innovation and collaborative ventures between employers and employees are hard to introduce, are fragile and difficult to sustain. Kochan (1980,417) goes on to suggest that one of the reasons for this apparent resistance to change is that "...the institution of collective

bargaining is too central..." to modern industrial relations "...and deals too effectively with recurring economic problems...to expect that some new reform effort...can replace collective bargaining". Kochan (1980b,412) says that "...change is not easily introduced into our collective bargaining system. In fact, perhaps the major lesson to be learned from the history of previous efforts to introduce changes into the bargaining process is that they came very slowly and only with great difficulty. A complex array of structural and political constraints limits the spread and enthusiasm with which demands for changes are created by union and management practitioners".

Notwithstanding the previous comments, some authors are sounding a cautious note of optimism. Barbash's (1980,5) words, "I think the time has come for reevaluation of the adversary principle", parallel the thoughts of Downie and Berber. Downie (1984,318) noted in a recent article that "...within the context of the adversary system, however, cooperative programs seem to be playing a larger role". Derber (1982,1) goes on to say that "...the long time adversarial system is being significantly modified...by a more integrative, mutualistic approach" to collective bargaining. Kochan et al. (1984B) and Burton (1987) suggest that there is a shift in some private sector industries to include the employees in the strategic planning of the companies. Some companies "...share information and consult with union leaders

about major business issues, competitive costs, technological change or other factors affecting the long-run employment prospects" (Kochan et al. 1984b,270). This can result in what is referred to as strategic bargaining (Kochan et al. 1984,270) where negotiations "...specifically involve trade-offs of changes in wages, benefits or other contractual provisions in exchange for new investment or employment commitments". If organizations are experimenting with modifications to the current adversarial approach to collective bargaining, the question of how to sustain relevant modifications remains a formidable task.

Various researchers (Barbash 1984; Downie 1984; Goodman 1980; Kochan 1984b; Kochan & Piore 1984; McKersie 1985) suggest that for a collective bargaining innovation to be sustained it must satisfy a number of conditions. For example, the change must be perceived to assist both sides in achieving their respective goals, must be seen as free from any co-opting by either side, must be seen as relatively risk free for both parties, must be introduced incrementally over time, must be localized and must procure quick tangible results for both sides. The literature suggests that however attractive the changes are to the adversarial process, the changes will be difficult to introduce and sustain since all those participants involved in the cooperative projects experience cyclical changes in attitudes toward the project and the changes (Kochan 1984c). In addition to a genuine

commitment to the innovation by both parties, success appears to also depend on stable representation on both bargaining teams over an extended period of time. Downie (1984), Kochan (1984c) all say that perhaps the biggest challenge facing labour relations practitioners is to ensure that the various approaches to conflict resolution, no matter how traditional or innovative, can exist side by side.

This survey has considered the concepts associated with conflict and some approaches to conflict resolution. It appears that institutions will not be as effective as they could be if they rely on one approach to conflict resolution and ignore other approaches that may be more suited to the issues at hand. Clearly, when the literature is viewed as whole, it suggests that while the current adversarial or distributive system will remain as the dominant force for some time to come, that incremental changes will occur and persist over time.

#### LIMITATIONS

There are a number of limitations inherent in the background material and the various streams of literature reviewed. A limited number of the empirical studies are directly related to Canadian postsecondary institutions. In view of the educational social, economic, legal, political and cultural differences between Canada and the United States, caution must be exercised when applying the United States

material to Canadian situations. The situation is also complicated by the dearth of collective bargaining research on British Columbia's community colleges. Another caution is the differences in the time when the studies were conducted. For example, some of the studies were conducted prior to certification elections (Begin 1974; Danese 1977; Feuille & Blandin 1976; Herman 1975; Plumley 1978) when emotions probably would have been running high. Still others were conducted some time after the formative years (Dayal 1984; Maher 1982; Ponak & Thompson 1984b; Stecklein & Willie 1982) when feelings may have subsided and stabilized.

While many of the studies relied on original data, at least one study did not (Carr & VanEyck 1973). Most of the studies cited, developed their own instruments or used portions of instruments developed by other scholars (Bigoness 1978; Birnbaum 1983; Davis 1972; Dull 1971; Grossvickle 1980; Plumley 1978; Ponak & Thompson 1984b). While the studies cited the faculty as their main source of data, with the exception of one study (Zalesny 1985) it was unclear whether or not the term faculty included all segments of faculty, e.g. department heads, librarians, counsellors. As noted earlier, there is an absence of material on the opinions of community college board members and senior college administrators. The factors that affect faculty members opinions of collective bargaining may or may not influence the board members of the senior administrators.

Cross section studies dominate the literature but there are very few longitudinal studies (Baldrige 1981; Birnbaum 1983; Kelley 1976; Stecklein & Willie 1982). Longitudinal studies may provide a different perspective of collective bargaining as well as additional data. A more general observation was that in many research studies the conceptual framework was unclear. By and large very few of the studies (Hackett 1980; Ponak & Thompson 1984b, 1984c) appear to have obtained their information other than by the questionnaire approach, which raises questions about the triangulation of the studies.

A number of the studies on conflict resolution (Anderson 1981), were conducted in controlled laboratory situations using university students. It is unlikely such simulations could adequately duplicate the pressure and the risks associated with collective bargaining or the reactions of experienced negotiators. Without any participant observer studies of conflict resolution techniques in action, the results of these laboratory studies may or may not be relevant to actual collective bargaining situations.

The literature on integrative bargaining must also be treated with caution. While it is a creative and positive oriented approach to negotiations, the literature in this area appears to be primarily theoretical and speculative. There does not appear to be any major empirical research studies on this model of collective bargaining. In a similar vain, there

does not appear to be any research that examines the Level I and Level II needs of community college instructors, particularly within the collective bargaining context. While many writers deplore the adversarial nature of the distributive model of collective bargaining, there are few studies that link the perceived adversarialness of collective bargaining to competition. Gillian's research on women's approach to conflict and conflict resolution opens a new area for future research, but caution must be exercised in applying the results to collective bargaining.

All of the preceding factors, in one way or another, may contribute to the variance in the results of the studies cited. Yet, as noted in one of Ponak & Thompsons' (1984b, 450) studies, "...despite considerable variation in the nature of the samples, type of instrument, ...sampling methodology..." and theoretical models and concepts used, the "...studies suggest some common patterns..." It is these common patterns upon which future studies can be based. An awareness of their limitations can assist with construction of more effective studies.

#### SUMMARY

Chapter Two outlined the evolution of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges, highlighted many of the factors that may contribute to the tensions often associated with distributive bargaining and

assisted with the development of the study's research design. The background material delineated the evolution of collective bargaining in higher education, including British Columbia's colleges, and the complex array of forces that can influence the collective bargaining process. The literature focused on some of the factors that may influence opinions of collective bargaining and in turn affect the behaviour of the parties concerned. The study's research design largely flowed from the literature because in response to some of the limitations of other studies, it was deemed necessary to attain a balance of original qualitative and quantitative material. Similarly, many of the questions raised during the pre-survey interviews and the many of the factors used in the main survey questionnaire, were identified in the literature.

The literature encompassed many areas of collective bargaining that could not be reasonably pursued in this study. Some of those areas included the impact of collective bargaining in specific institutions over an extended period of time; the impact of more women on college boards, as senior administrators, as faculty members, as faculty leaders, as negotiators, as mediators and as arbitrators; participant observer studies of the collective bargaining process and the various methods of conflict resolution; empirical studies of integrative bargaining; in depth research on a possible correlation between collective bargaining and institutional morale; studies on the impact of a college president, board



chairman or faculty association president on college morale and subsequently on collective bargaining; studies related to the rationale for including specific clauses in the collective agreements; and additional work on the factors that shape the opinions of college board members and senior administrators.

## 3

## RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of Chapter Three is to provide details on the study's research design. It includes the scope of the study, the rationale for the study's design, and reviews the various parts of the data collection process.

## SCOPE OF THE STUDY

## Community Colleges

As noted previously, British Columbia's community colleges are an important part of the province's postsecondary education system. This research study focuses on the 14 unionized community colleges. Under the auspices of the Colleges and Institute Act and the Industrial Relations Act, these 14 college faculty associations selected collective bargaining as the method for determining salaries, benefits and other related working conditions.

North Island College was excluded because it does not have a certified faculty association but rather uses the fair comparison method for determining faculty salaries and related working conditions. The fair comparison method is unique to the colleges' legislation in British Columbia. Salaries, for example, are struck by collecting information from the other

colleges and then using complex mathematical techniques to establish salary ranges and an appropriate salary for each range.

The province's other postsecondary institutions were excluded from this study because they do not share many of the same mandates or characteristics as the public colleges. For example, the British Columbia Institute of Technology, the Emily Carr College of Art and Design, the Justice Institute, and the Pacific Marine Technical Institute have less comprehensive programs than the colleges, have more homogeneous faculty associations, and have provincial rather than regional mandates. The British Columbia Institute of Technology was excluded because of its unique programs and its recent association with the former Pacific Vocational Institute. The three universities were also excluded from this study since they are so different from the community colleges. These other postsecondary institutions would have introduced too many uncontrolled variables into the study.

At the outset of this study some consideration was given to examining collective bargaining in community colleges on a national basis. The substantial variance in the provincial community college systems (Dennison & Gallagher 1986) would also have introduced too many uncontrolled variables into the study. A comparative study of collective bargaining in the Alberta and British Columbia college systems, perhaps the only two provinces that have comparable college systems (Dennison &

Southern 1985), was also ruled out. Other research projects related to collective bargaining in the Alberta college system were underway at the time of writing. In view of the preceding comments, and the researcher's personal experience, British Columbia's 14 unionized community colleges were selected as the research base.

### Populations

On the instructional side of the colleges, the board members, senior administrators and faculty represent the three internal groups within each college that are primarily involved with the collective bargaining process. Each of these distinctive groups bring different values, needs, experiences, responsibilities and expectations to the collective bargaining table.

College Boards. Members of the college boards were included in this study because under Section 12 of the Colleges and Institutes Act, board members are responsible for all administrative and academic decisions. British Columbia's community colleges are each governed by an autonomous board of provincially appointed lay people and under Section 6 of the Act, "...the Board of a college shall consist of 5 or more members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council". The Act is silent regarding the terms of appointment, which means that the board members serve at the pleasure of the government. Unlike the governing boards in some of the other

Canadian college jurisdictions, e.g., Alberta, Section 11 (1) of the Act states that, "No employee or student of an institution shall be appointed to, or continue as a member of, the board of an institution".

These distinctions have a number of implications for collective bargaining. While the colleges offer university courses, there is a substantial difference between the way the colleges and the universities are governed. Unlike the college boards, the university boards are only tacitly responsible for academic decisions and policies. The colleges do not have the equivalent of a university senate. The latter are empowered by the Universities Act to be responsible for academic governance. The colleges, as noted in the review of the literature, do not have the entrenched university tradition of collegiality, e.g., participatory decision making. These preceding factors may influence the perceptions of the academic faculty in the colleges and their respective associations, thus bringing the college faculty into conflict with the colleges' management rights. This in turn may affect the tenor of the bargaining process and the scope of the collective agreements. For many of the college faculty, e.g., trades instructors, the question of the boards' jurisdiction in the academic decision making process may not be an issue at all. In many of these instances a top down approach to administration is consistent with their experiences in the private sector. This may, however, create internal conflict

within some of the more heterogeneous faculty associations that include faculty from a wide range of disciplines, e.g., vocational programs, university transfer programs. Under Section 25(1) of the Act, the board is required to appoint a chief executive officer "...who shall, under the direction of the board, supervise and direct the instructional, administrative and other staff of the institution and exercise powers and perform duties assigned to him by the board". Some sectors of the colleges' instructional staff may perceive this to be a more rigid management style than their counterparts enjoy in the university sector. A further irritant for some may be the flexible and permissive legislation related to the establishment of a program advisory committee under Section 12 (1b) of the Act. Given the college boards' legislated management rights, the terms of office, and the management traditions of higher education, the above factors have the potential to create tensions between the boards, the administrators and the faculty. Another group that is critical to this study is the group referred to as the senior administrators.

Senior College Administrators. Sections 25, 28 and 29 of the College and Institute Act either directly or indirectly refer to this group of employees. Although the Act directly refers only to the chief executive officer and the bursar,

under Section 29, the board may authorize the chief executive officer to "...appoint employees it considers necessary to carry on the business and operations of the institution...". By definition the Act excludes all managerial personnel from the faculty associations. Typically this includes academic deans or vice-presidents, campus principals, administrative vice-presidents, deans and directors of human relations or personnel. For the purpose of this study, the physical plant directors or comparable positions were excluded on the basis that they are not likely to be directly involved in instructional matters. Similarly, academic department heads were presumed to be members of the faculty associations.

Since senior college administrators are legally not part of the faculty associations, the faculty may perceive them as representing managerial values rather than academic values, thereby creating potential tensions during negotiations. This point is underscored by Gerhart & Maxey's (1978) research which indicates that college administrators may not be as discipline or academically oriented as their university counterparts. There is little literature on college administrators' views of collective bargaining or their related values. Spritzer & Odewahan's (1978) early research suggests that administrators felt that faculty did not understand collective bargaining, faculty unions were divisive, faculty unions would lead to mediocrity, and faculty leaders would unlikely support the goals held by the

administrators. The existing research suggests that administrators also believed that the faculty lacked the necessary experience and training to handle collective bargaining. Given the colleges' legal mandate for comprehensiveness, accessibility and responsiveness, as well as these preceding administrative views of collective bargaining, the issue of management rights may be a controversial issue (Dennison 1987; Dennison & Gallagher 1986). As compared to the university sector, the potential differences between administrators and faculty may be further aggravated by the colleges' more hierarchical or rigid decision making process (Rubin 1979). Like the board members, the senior college administrators represent a significant group in the collective bargaining process.

**Faculty Leaders.** Faculty leaders are the third group involved in this study and are covered under the Act's definition of a professional employee. For the purpose of this research, the faculty are those professionals who provide direct instructional services to students. While librarians, counsellors, academic department heads and other similar professionals are included in many of the bargaining units studied, there is no attempt to examine many of the unique issues associated with these sub-groups. The faculty leaders are those who have served on a faculty association executive, a collective bargaining team, or both.



The faculty in a community college add a complex dimension to the collective bargaining process. Their varied career origins, the penchant for collegiality by some faculty factions, the emphasis on teaching, their orientation to subject disciplines, their professionalism, their reportedly left leaning political tendencies and other similar factors make them somewhat unique in public sector bargaining. In addition, their certification as bona fide labour unions and the many variations in the structure of the their faculty associations add to the complexity of negotiations.

#### RESEARCH PROCEDURE

The study employed a multi-pronged approach to the collection of data (Borg & Gall 1983; Yin 1984). The study involved a number of pre-research steps, pre-survey interviews with labour practitioners, the collection of factual institutional data, an analysis of a sample of collective agreements and a self-administered opinion survey. To offset the criticisms in the literature that attitudinal research is too subjective and therefore not as valid as factual research, some scholars are calling for research studies that combine both factual data and attitudinal data (Katz et al. 1985; Salanick & Pfeffer 1977). In response to these criticisms an effort was made to collect both qualitative and quantitative data from a variety of sources. An attempt was also made to

design the study in such a way so that it could be used as a basis for a longitudinal study.

#### Pre-research Procedures

This research project involved a number of procedural steps prior to the data collection stage. Initially, the research proposal, along with the required documents, was sent to the University of British Columbia's Behavioral Sciences Screening Committee for Research and Other Studies Involving Human Subjects. Once the project was approved, letters of transmittal outlining the purpose, scope and significance of the study were sent to 14 community college presidents. The letters invited each college to participate in the study. Initially, 10 college presidents indicated a willingness to participate in the study. Follow-up discussions resulted in two of the four remaining presidents agreeing to participate in the project. One of the remaining two presidents said that he regretted he could not participate due to a lack of staff to collect the factual institutional data. The other president, while unable to complete the questionnaire, indicated a willingness to participate in a personal interview. Whenever a response was received from a college president, a thank you letter and the questionnaire related to the factual institutional data was sent to the president. After the researcher received the completed institutional questionnaire a letter was sent to the president expressing the researcher's

appreciation for completing the survey and explaining the next phase of the research project.

### Pre-Survey Interviews

Prior to the development of the main opinion survey questionnaire, informal interviews were conducted with 13 labour relations practitioners. The purpose of the interviews was to develop a feeling for the relevancy of the study's conceptual context, the literature, the contractual analysis and the factual institutional data; to sensitize the researcher to British Columbia's labour and community college environments; to secure additional ideas for the development and refinement of the survey instrument; and to obtain a number of ideas for improving collective bargaining. The practitioners who were interviewed represented a broad spectrum of the labour relations field. A complete list of those interviewed can be found in Chapter Four. For economic reasons the interviews were limited to the lower British Columbia Mainland. The majority of the interviews were conducted in person during April, 1986. Two additional interviews were conducted in the summer of 1988 with one of the latter interviews conducted by telephone.

In keeping with Yin's (1984) recommendations, the interviews were informal and open ended. The exploratory purpose of the pre-survey interviews made it unnecessary to employ elaborate recording and coding procedures. Prior to

this phase of the research a list of areas the researcher wanted to explore was prepared. This list formed a core for each interview. As new issues emerged from the interviews, they were incorporated into the succeeding interviews. The interviews were also used to corroborate information obtained in preceding interviews. The same questions were not always asked in the same order or in the same manner as they would have been in a more formally structured type of interview.

At the outset of each interview, each participant was made aware of the purpose of the study, the nature of the interview, and the matter of confidentiality. During each interview notes were made in point form. Later the same day the notes were reviewed and re-organized into categories.

#### Factual Institutional Data

It is important to comment on the purpose of collecting the factual institutional data, what data the researcher collected and on the sources and limits of the data. It was anticipated that the background data would provide a picture of what had happened or what was happening in practice, provide a frame of reference for better understanding the results of the pre-survey interviews and the main opinion survey, assist with the preparation of the main survey instrument, and provide a benchmark for any future studies.

In view of the history of the British Columbia college system and the introduction of the Colleges and Institutes Act

in 1977, the researcher initially decided to collect institutional data for the period of 1977 to 1988. The categories of data that were collected for each college included the number, type and affiliation of the bargaining units, the composition of the college and faculty bargaining units, the chairmanship of the negotiating teams, the number of collective agreements signed since 1977, the time each contract took to negotiate, the method of settlement, the number of grievances and how the grievances were settled, the number of strike votes, the number of strikes, the number of lockouts, and other types of decision making opportunities for the faculty, e.g., joint faculty-administration committees. In the preparation of the background questionnaire, there were a number of other factors which may have also been good indicators of a college's labour relations climate but which were impractical to collect, e.g., statistics on alcohol or drug abuse, records on absenteeism and sick leave, institutional evaluations, faculty and program evaluations, the success of a college's students in other postsecondary institutions, and the placement of graduates. The inclusion of these other factors may have taken the study in a direction beyond the scope of this research project. In addition to the preceding background information, the various colleges were also asked to submit a list of senior administrators, board members, and faculty leaders, as well as a copy of their latest collective agreement(s).

There were a number of problems that arose during this phase of the project. The researcher underestimated the time it would take for the colleges to complete and return the completed questionnaires. Many cited both the lack of staff and records for the delay. Two colleges expressed their concern with the amount of data requested and withdrew from the project, again citing the lack of staff and historical records as the primary reason for withdrawing. One of the colleges subsequently agreed to submit a limited amount of data, while the other college did not participate in the project. The problem of incomplete college records resulted in several of the colleges only submitting data for limited time spans and for specific questions. In one instance the request for part of the data was passed along to the respective faculty association, but no data was ever received. In another instance, the researcher was asked to contact the organization's two Faculty Associations for some of the details. In this instance no information was received from the academic faculty association and the agent of the BCGEU referred the researcher to the President of the BCGEU to seek permission for the local bargaining unit to participate in the study. For a number of reasons the data was unavailable. Some of the questions were poorly constructed with the result that the data was hard to quantify or describe, e.g., the question on committees. In addition, several colleges did not send copies of their faculty contracts.

Another problem that became apparent during the course of the study was the absence of one common source of institutional data on collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges. Wherever possible, the background institutional data received from the colleges was checked against similar data obtained from the Ministry of Labour's Research Office, the provincial government's Mediation Services and provincial government publications, the College and Institute Educators Association, the British Columbia Association of Colleges, and the British Columbia Public Employers Association.

#### Contract Analysis

Although the researcher was unable to obtain a copy of all of the collective agreements, twelve current collective agreements from nine colleges were reviewed. The purpose of the contractual review was to sensitize the researcher to the scope, complexity, length, language and tone of the different agreements. There was no intention to carry out an exhaustive inter-college contractual clause by clause comparison or analysis in the fashion of Dennison (1987), Chandler & Julius (1979) or Stewart (1983). This latter type of research was clearly beyond the scope and mandate of this research project. The observations gleaned from the contractual analysis were intended to supplement the factual institutional data, the pre-survey interviews and the main opinion survey.

### Opinion Survey

A mail-out self-administered survey instrument was also used to collect data. The opinion survey approach was selected as a primary method for securing personal opinions on specific aspects of collective bargaining. For this portion of the study, the time period 1983-1988 was considered an optimum time frame. It was felt that prior to 1983 people may not accurately recollect critical events, personal experiences or opinions. It was also felt that 1983 was a critical year for British Columbia's community colleges, e.g., budget restrictions, dissolution of the three provincial councils, elimination of local school board representatives on college boards.

This portion of the study involved three distinct community college populations, i.e., board members, senior administrators, and faculty leaders in 13 unionized British Columbia community colleges. The population of board members was determined to be those board members who served from 1983 to 1988. The faculty leaders included those who had either served as a member of the local faculty bargaining unit's executive or negotiating team or both from 1983 to 1988. This portion of the study did not include any BCGEU faculty leaders. The population of senior administrators embraced all relevant current senior administrators, including presidents, principals, vice-presidents, campus principals, deans, directors and bursars. The names and addresses of the



board members were obtained from the British Columbia Association of Colleges and the colleges. The names and addresses for the faculty leaders and senior administrators were obtained directly from the colleges or the respective faculty associations. In an effort to ensure sample sizes that were statistically acceptable (Borg & Gall 1983), the samples included six board members, six faculty leaders and six senior administrators from each of the 13 colleges. There were 78 board members; 78 senior administrators and 78 faculty members, for a total of 234 participants.

The questionnaire's items grew out of open systems theory, the relevant literature, the pre-survey interviews, the factual institutional data and the contractual analysis as well as the researcher's personal experiences. The questionnaire attempted to determine the sample population's opinions of various aspects of the research problem and sub-questions, i.e., competition, governance, scope of the collective agreements and proposed modifications to the distributive bargaining process. These three sections employed measurement scales designed to measure the direction and intensity of the participants opinions. For statistical purposes a four point Likert scale was used (Borg & Gall 1983; Sudman & Bradburn 1982; Yin 1984). The scale was as follows: -2=strongly disagree, -1=disagree, +1=agree, +2=strongly agree. A fourth part of the questionnaire contained a number of independent variables, which came from the literature.

They were related to personal information of the respondents, e.g., age, gender, years of employment or association with the institution, prior collective bargaining experience, political preference. Since not all of the independent variables were applicable to each of the three populations, three versions of this section were developed and used.

Every effort was made to ensure the survey's reliability and validity. It was anticipated that the four point scale would encourage the respondents to respond to each statement and thereby avoid common rating error problems. The researcher also attempted to address such issues as double barrelled questions, leading questions, length of time to complete the survey, and other similar factors (Borg & Gall 1983; Sudman & Bradburn 1982). The questionnaire was checked by an expert in the development of questionnaires and then piloted. A number of changes were made as a result of the pilot test.

The data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Non-parametric statistics, e.g., Chi-square test, and parametric statistics, e.g., F test, were used in the analysis.

## 4

## PRE-SURVEY INTERVIEWS

The informal pre-survey interviews were the next stage in the data collection process. This chapter outlines the purpose of the interviews, describes the sample, comments on the interview process and presents a synopsis of the findings. The latter includes a number of proposed modifications to collective bargaining.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the interviews was multifold. It was anticipated that the interviews would build on the literature, assist with the development of the main survey instrument and sensitize the researcher to collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges. The interviews were also conducted to solicit ideas from labour relations practitioners for improving the current collective bargaining process. As noted in Chapter Three, it was also expected that the interviews would add a qualitative dimension to the study. In retrospect all of the objectives were achieved.

## SAMPLE

Thirteen labour relations practitioners were interviewed. They represented a cross section of experts familiar with collective bargaining in the private sector and public sector, including higher education. Given the informal nature of the interviews, there was no attempt to adhere to a rigid stratified random sample representing the three populations to be studied. Rather, the list was compiled through personal contacts and referrals. The sample was limited to a manageable size and for various reasons, e.g., economics, time constraints, was limited to practitioners in British Columbia's Lower Mainland. The sample included:

## Faculty

T. Kozar	Faculty member, British Columbia Institute of Technology
J. Sayre	Faculty member, Capilano College
J. Shields	President, British Columbia Government Employees Union
J. Waters	President, College-Institute Educators Association, 1985-87

## Human Resource Directors-Colleges

D. Jones	Director of Human Resources Vancouver Community College
U. Haag	Director of Human Resources, Kwantlan College

## Human Resource Directors-Other Post-Secondary Institutions

- R. Bell            Director of Human Resources, British Columbia  
                         Institute of Technology
- E. Stewart        Director of Personnel Services, University of  
                         British Columbia

## Human Resource Director-Private Sector

- R. Sawka           Director of Human Resources, DOMTAR  
                         Former Director of Human Resources,  
                         Douglas College

## Independent Representatives

- K. Bigesby        British Columbia Association of Colleges
- B. Gallagher     Labour Lawyer  
                         Chairman, Worker's Compensation Board  
                         Former Vice-Chairman, B.C. Labour Relations  
                         Board
- L. Hobbs           Director, British Columbia Public Employers'  
                         Association  
                         Former Director of Human Resources,  
                         British Columbia Institute of Technology

## Provincial Government's Mediation Services

- F. Long            Mediator

## INTERVIEW PROCESS

The majority of the interviews occurred during the same time period and followed a similar format. They were conducted primarily during April of 1986, but in order to round out the sample, three interviews were conducted in the summer of 1988. Considering the purpose of the interviews, the sensitive nature of the topic, the need to establish a sense of trust with each participant and to ensure the

participants cooperation, the decision was made to conduct the interviews in an informal manner (Yin 1983). Prior to the start of the interviews a list of topics was compiled. The list was expanded slightly during the course of the interviews. The items, which were based on the literature and personal experience, included the following topics:

- labour climate in British Columbia
- labour climate in individual colleges
- implications of relevant legislation
- professionalism and unions
- adversarial bargaining and collegiality
- differences between the private sector and public sector
- differences between the postsecondary education sectors
- impact of the composition of the bargaining units
- management rights
- scope of the collective agreements
- appointment of board members
- impact of financial retrenchment on bargaining
- provincial unions and professional associations
- time required to negotiate collective agreements
- province-wide bargaining
- impact of college presidents on negotiations
- lack of continuity on the negotiating teams
- mediation, arbitration and final offer selection
- single team bargaining
- strikes and lockouts
- collective bargaining and participatory decision making
- composition of the negotiating teams
- trust
- respect
- training opportunities for negotiators
- use of third parties in negotiations
- impact of personal factors, e.g., political preference
- local autonomy and collective bargaining
- differences between faculty associations contracts
- suggestions for improving bargaining
- impact of government policies on bargaining

By and large, these topics were generally covered but not all of the areas were covered with each person. The topics, however, were not discussed in the same order or in the same

context during each interview. The interviews were conversational in tone and lasted between one and two hours each. Notes were kept during the interviews which were recompiled following each interview. In the absence of a formal coding system the researcher had to be careful not to editorialize or to add any personal thoughts that were not expressed during the interviews. During succeeding interviews the recompiled notes were used to clarify specific items raised in the previous interviews and to explore new topics. At the conclusion of the interviews, the responses were reviewed and grouped into broad categories.

The reaction of the participants to the pre-survey interviews was one of interest, enthusiasm and cooperation. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, several of the participants specifically asked that their comments be off the record and that the conversation not be recorded. In spite of some of these concerns, the participants were candid and appeared to welcome the opportunity to discuss collective bargaining. Each practitioner offered to pursue the interview at a later date.

#### SYNOPSIS

The responses to the interviews were categorized into broad headings. Those categories included provincial labour climate, college labour climates, autonomy, governance, previous negotiations, negotiating teams, sector differences,

faculty and faculty associations, collective bargaining and conflict resolution, miscellaneous and suggested modifications.

#### Provincial Labour Climate

During the interviews, the participants often referred to British Columbia's labour relations climate. It was pointed out that a very high percentage of British Columbia's private sector and public sector labour forces are unionized. It was also noted that over the years, but particularly during the last five years, there had been an increasingly confrontational relationship between labour unions and the Social Credit government. There appeared to be a general consensus among the faculty representatives that many of the tensions in the public colleges and institutions during the past few years were a direct result of the haphazard policy decisions of the government. These included an absence of long range budget guidelines for the colleges and strategic plans for postsecondary education and manpower. There was a feeling that the government was placing the local college and institute boards in almost impossible positions with respect to labour matters. They perceived that the situation was compounded by the government's interest in privatization, reduction in funds for people services, and anti-union stance. Concern was also expressed about the government's use of federal transfer payments for non-educational programs. Two



people familiar with vocational training and who had a trade union orientation, expressed the perception that perhaps there was less support for vocational training than in the past because the trades students were potential trade union members. A cross section of those interviewed felt that in the early years of the New Democratic Party's mandate that there was less confrontation between labour and management. One explanation given for this was that the New Democratic Party was supportive of labour and did not discourage unionization in the fledgling community colleges. One faculty representative, however, expressed the view that in the end the New Democratic Party proved that they were no better than the previous Social Credit government.

#### College Labour Climates

Many of the participants mentioned the significant differences in the labour relations climates of British Columbia's community colleges and institutes. Along this vein they commented on the impact of college boards, college leaders, and opportunities for participation in institutional decision making.

College Boards. There were a number of diverse views expressed regarding the college boards. On the positive side, one faculty representative felt that the quality of the boards had improved dramatically once the school board members were dropped. His perception was that while they were on the

college boards the school board representatives did not understand higher education or the role of a community college, undermined faculty professionalism and held a public school mentality toward labour relations. Another faculty representative agreed that the quality of the board members had improved in recent years and said that in spite of the political nature of the boards, the board members were committed to higher education. This individual felt that the board members' loyalty to their respective colleges superseded party obligations and that board members astutely used their political connections to the advantage of their colleges.

On the negative side, there was a perspective that the politically appointed board members were and always would be hesitant to challenge those who had appointed them. Therefore, during tough economic times or when the government interfered in an institution's autonomy, the local board members would not speak out against the government's actions for fear of reprisals. One non-faculty representative said that some board members appeared to be more conservative than the government. Under certain circumstances, some felt that there would be increased board-faculty conflict in the years ahead. A private sector practitioner said that there was very little trust between the colleges and the their faculty and faculty associations. This sentiment was echoed by others and a faculty representative

felt that the behaviour of the college boards and college administrators indicated a lack of respect for the faculty.

Personalities. Many of those interviewed commented on the importance of the personalities involved. They attributed some of the differences in the general college and labour relations climates to those in leadership positions. A number of non-faculty participants felt that the faculty leaders were naive about the administration of colleges. They also felt that some faculty leaders participated on the negotiating teams because they had personal axes to grind. During the interviews the practitioners made reference again and again to the impact of personalities on the college climates and labour relations climates. Primarily, those comments focused on the college president and secondarily on the board chairman. Many of those interviewed felt that the chief executive officer's educational qualifications, experiences, attitudes, values, management style, perceptions of faculty and unions, interpersonal skills, expectations and other similar factors, set the tone of labour relations within each college. One faculty representative gave an example of a college where the president was authoritarian, uncooperative and anti-union, while his successor was just the opposite. In this example, it was noted that there was a substantial change in the institution's labour relations climate from one president to the next. Another faculty member said that while a college

president had to be fair and tough, the president also had to listen and understand the faculty's perspective. Several people cited specific examples of dominant board chairmen and their negative affect on their respective colleges. While many recognized the short term impact of a dominant board chairman, they felt that it was really the chief executive officer that affected a college's labour relations climate. One person indicated that in some cases these perceptions had been born out through the mandatory institutional evaluations.

Communications and Information. There was a common interest in unfettered access to institutional information. Some of the participants indicated that those colleges with positive labour relations climates appeared to be the ones with easy and open access to institutional information. This included a lack of secrecy and a willingness to discuss issues openly at all levels of the organization. An experienced practitioner said that often a lot of time was wasted at the beginning of bargaining arguing over each other's information or misinformation. One administrator felt that it was critical for college administrators to communicate directly with individual faculty members rather than have to go through the respective faculty associations. One faculty representative suggested that if faculty members were allowed to sit on the college boards and that if there was more of a balance between political appointees and faculty members, then there may be less secrecy and less institutional tension. One

example of cooperation between a college administration and a faculty association was where one college president had appointed union representatives to three senior management committees.

### Autonomy

Several people raised the matter of board autonomy with respect to a broad range of issues. A number of the people who had direct involvement in community colleges said that the government had become more than just a provider of funds and talked about provincial intrusions into college autonomy. As examples of these changes, they cited the changes in the composition of local college boards, the appointment of board members without term, the introduction of formula funding, the mandatory five year institutional evaluations, and the perceived centralization of the decision making process after the dissolution of the three advisory councils in 1983. As outlined in the College and Institute Act, the latter three administrative councils were supposed to coordinate funding and program development throughout the college system.

Several people cited the government's former Compensation Stabilization Program, as another example of the government's interference in free collective bargaining. Another person with a faculty perspective gave a specific example of where the politicians and Ministry officials, rather than the Board

and the administration, appeared to be directly involved in determining the academic programming of one institution.

A public sector representative, however, suggested that many of the college boards, as well as many faculty associations, had unrealistic expectations with respect to government funding and accountability. In other words, during a period of retrenchment it was politically naive to assume the government would completely respect local autonomy and take a hands off posture since they provided the majority of funds to operate the colleges. The same person felt that many public sector agencies, including colleges, had a narrow vision of their mandate and had not been aggressive enough in developing alternate sources of revenue. This person went on to say that the government was likely to respond more positively to those colleges that initiated a number of local financial initiatives than those colleges who depended on provincial handouts. In order to reverse the recent decline in the financial and political status of the colleges, this person suggested that the colleges should develop projects and services that would enhance their funding base, thereby increasing the colleges' political leverage. Generally, both management and academic personnel felt that the attitude and behaviour of the Social Credit government had politicized higher education which in turn had affected the labour relations climate in the public colleges and institutes.

## Governance

During the interviews the relationship between institutional governance and labour relations was discussed by a number of people. The faculty representatives drew attention to the differences in the origins, familiarity with unions, education, working conditions and expectations of the various faculty groups, e.g., academic faculty, vocational faculty. It was suggested by a number of people that the academic faculty viewed themselves as professionals. The notion of professionalism coupled with the tradition of collegiality in the university transfer sector made that group of faculty more inclined to want to maximize their participation in an institution's decision making processes. They pointed out that since faculty are not allowed to sit on college boards and there are often inadequate academic councils, perhaps some faculty groups turned to collective bargaining and the collective agreement, to ensure professional autonomy. From the perspective of several academic faculty representatives, those colleges which had good labour relations climates were those with comprehensive collective agreements that enshrined professional interests and faculty power in the agreements. One faculty representative said that there was clearly a great deal of difference among the colleges in this regard. According to a number of those interviewed the vocational faculty, due to their backgrounds, may not share the same interest in

professional matters as the more academic oriented faculty. The result they said was that the vocational faculty contracts focused on more basic labour issues, e.g. salaries, benefits, are simple and do not contain many of the governance clauses of the academic faculty contracts. Those familiar with the separate vocational union's situations, indicated that in some colleges there was so little trust and respect and the political environment so tense, that more comprehensive collective agreements were becoming absolutely necessary to ensure stability within the colleges.

#### Previous Negotiations

There were a number of comments related to the impact of earlier collective agreements on current labour relations within the colleges. One faculty representative suggested that during the next few years there could be more tension between faculty associations and college boards, as the boards attempted to recoup what they perceived to be lost management rights. This sentiment was echoed by a cross section of the practitioners. Several people with an administrative bias suggested that in the formative days the board members who had been appointed by the New Democratic Party supported collective bargaining with the result that a number of college administrations of the day gave up too many management rights. They went on to suggest that this problem was compounded by the fact that in many cases, the early contracts were



negotiated by the academic vice-presidents. On this point, the view was expressed that the academic vice-presidents' lack of collective bargaining experience, previous instructional experience, bias toward faculty involvement in the decision making process, and their desire not to offend their staff, simply gave away too many management rights. Not unlike the college presidents the academic vice-presidents were seen as academic leaders and therefore there was the suggestion that academic vice-presidents should not serve on college negotiating teams.

A faculty perspective that was expressed suggested that prior to certification, the faculty were at the whims of the college administrations and therefore turned to certification out of frustration. They said that this frustration often appeared to be a result of unilateral and arbitrary administrative decisions, as well as an apparent lack of respect for the faculty by the administrators and the board members. It was mentioned that many of the vocational faculty were part of the BCGEU when they were transferred from the provincial government's vocational schools to several of the colleges as per Section 29 of the College and Institutes Act. In addition, many of the trades faculty came out of unionized industries so that they were more familiar with trade unions than the academic faculty.

A faculty member said that some of the faculty associations were and still are perceived to be quite left

wing. This person pointed out that when the faculty associations sought advice regarding certification and collective bargaining, the only people that were prepared to offer assistance were the organized labour unions, especially some of the more radical labour unions.

### Negotiating Teams

Administrative Negotiating Teams. Many of the practitioners interviewed held strong views on the membership and the continuity of the administrative and faculty negotiating teams. There was a general consensus that a college's administrative bargaining team should not be chaired by a board member, a college president or an academic vice-president. There was also a strong feeling that a president or vice-president should not even serve on a college's negotiating team. The rationale was that it was the function of these two positions to motivate the faculty and to develop team spirit. The perception was that if they were on a college's negotiating committee, they may compromise their positions as college leaders. One person said that it was imperative for a president and a vice-president to be free to informally assist with the bargaining process and to act as playmakers in the background. Another point was that the skills required as a negotiator are not necessarily the skills of an administrator and visa-versa. There was, however, support from all quarters for an influential member of the

board to serve as a member of a college's committee. The thought was that it was good for the board to be aware of what was going on at the bargaining table since the board would ultimately have to ratify the contract. The rationale for not having the Personnel Committee of the Board handle negotiations was that the entire administrative structure could then be by-passed and that a college's board members were not usually in a position to be cognizant of the legal nuances of collective bargaining. An administrator suggested that if a college's bargaining team consisted of only board members or if it included the college president, the faculty would expect too much from the bargaining process and would be dissatisfied regardless of the settlement. Another comment was that if the administrative team consisted of board members or the president, that it would be perceived there would not be a further internal court of appeal.

Both administrative and faculty representatives agreed that collective bargaining yielded the best results when the administrative team was chaired by a Director of Human Resources or the equivalent. There was recognition, however, of the difference between the large and small colleges with respect to the availability of specialized staff and the role that the bursar often played in the smaller colleges. It was noted that in one small college where there was no Director of Human Resources, a board member with substantial private sector collective bargaining experience

had made a significant contribution to the bargaining process. Several participants said that members of the two negotiating teams should be internal staff rather than external consultants or lawyers. Generally, the faculty and the administrative practitioners disliked the use of external agents in the collective bargaining process.

Faculty Negotiating Teams. A number of observations were also offered about the faculty bargaining teams. The faculty representatives expressed concern about how difficult it was to get faculty to participate on collective bargaining teams. There was also some concern expressed about the faculty who became involved because of a personal need, a personal problem, or their political inclinations. From the faculty's point of view it was critical that the faculty members on the negotiating team had to have adequate release time to participate in the bargaining process. It was mentioned that the trades faculty usually had to teach more hours per week than the academic staff and that there was often just one or two instructors per subject area. The result was that the trades faculty often found it more difficult to participate in collective bargaining than the academic faculty. The point was also made that often the administrators, e.g. Human Resource Managers, who did the bargaining for their colleges usually did not have many other administrative responsibilities. This perceived inequity therefore placed

the faculty association negotiators at a disadvantage. Several faculty representatives said that the key to ensuring the best faculty participated in negotiations was to provide workload relief. They felt that the respective faculty associations should be prepared to compensate the colleges financially for the relief time. People recognized that there were some faculty who did not offer to serve on the bargaining teams because they were satisfied with their working conditions, they were frustrated with their work or the college, they simply did not want to become involved with union activities, they did not want to be perceived as trouble makers or they considered unions beneath their professional status.

One of the greatest concerns expressed by all of the participants, was the lack of continuity on the faculty bargaining teams from one contract to the next contract. This perception was qualified to some extent in that some people felt the turn over was less prevalent among the vocational associations than the academic associations. The lack of continuity appeared to create a number of significant problems for both the management and faculty negotiating teams. Taken together, these concerns included a lack of historical background information on various contractual issues; a lack of sensitivity to the contract language; unrealistic expectations; rigid bargaining positions; an inability of the

faculty negotiators to say no to departmental proposals and therefore an inability to set bargaining priorities which resulted in too many items on the table; an inability to know when to move on issues or when to strike a deal; a lack of knowledge with respect to mediation, arbitration and the entire legal process; and a lack of sensitivity to the nuances of the collective bargaining process itself. An experienced administrator said that each new round of new talks usually required the administrative team to train the faculty negotiators. He said that it was frustrating to always be dealing with new faculty negotiators. One participant said that in his experience, faculty associations were the most difficult sector to deal with in mediation due to the lack of labour relations experience. It appeared that the high faculty turnover rate created additional tensions during negotiations at a time when the emphasis should be on resolving the issues.

#### Sector Differences

Those with experience in other sectors, e.g., private sector, universities, public institutes, commented on several points related to the differences among the various sectors. There were a number of comments related to the heterogeneous composition of the various faculty bargaining units. It was suggested by several people that the diverse mix of instructor's backgrounds, educational levels and functions

contributes to a variety of interests, values, aspirations and expectations within some faculty association. They said that this diversity often leads to a lack of equitable working conditions and mutual respect within the same association, which in turn contributes to internal union tensions. Several administrative people felt that in their experience, contract negotiations were generally easier with the vocational faculty than with the academic faculty and that the vocational contracts were more straight forward. One human resource director said that unlike the college sector, in the private sector the professional staff often do not participate in many of the administrative decision making processes, the lines of authority are clearly defined, decisions are often top down, professional salaries are often negotiated on an individual basis, salaries are often based on merit and there are usually financial incentive plans. Unlike some of the other sectors, there appeared to be a common perception that the present collective agreements stress equity and mediocrity, do not provide any incentives for the staff and do not adequately recognize or compensate for the differences among the members of the joint academic-vocational faculty associations.

During the conversations there were often references to professionalism and unionism. Some of the non-faculty participants felt that once the faculty had joined certified bargaining units, they forfeited the right to be called professionals and were really just employees. Along this same

line of thought, these same participants generally perceived the collective agreements to be nothing more than traditional blue collar contracts with their emphasis on rules and regulations. Yet, several faculty members said how amazing it was to see the variation in the faculty contracts, given that each college offers approximately the same academic programs, operates under the same legislation and functions under similar funding arrangements. Among the practitioners some college's contracts were recognized as comprehensive faculty orientated contracts that gave the respective faculty associations a great deal of say in the development of institutional policies. Other less comprehensive contracts were perceived to be management dominated contracts.

A number of points were made related to contract settlements, to strikes and to lockouts. Several people commented that in the college sector there are few incentives for either the boards or the faculty associations to settle quickly, with the result that contract talks often take eighteen months to settle. Two non-faculty participants said that, as compared to the vocational faculty, the academic faculty association negotiators tend to carry on protracted discussions regarding contractual issues. On this point one faculty member said, "What do you expect? Things move slowly in academia".



Several non-faculty people noted that in the private sector and sometimes in certain areas of the public sector, contract talks and work stoppages are short in duration. They attributed this to the number of incentives to settle, e.g., loss of personal and corporate income. Several participants said that the absence of private sector market like conditions in the public sector, including higher education, often prolonged negotiations. A faculty member said that he felt that the Compensation Stabilization Program had introduced market like conditions, while two management people felt that the program interfered with free collective bargaining. It was also noted that under the Act, college boards are required to return any savings from a lockout to the provincial government thereby eliminating an incentive for using lockouts as an offensive weapon. The participants suggested several other reasons for sluggish settlement periods. They said that the colleges are not considered essential services by the government and therefore the faculty do not have much political leverage at the provincial level. They noted that at the local level, especially in the more rural communities, the college faculty represent some of the top wage earners in the community and along with their fringe benefits, e.g., holidays, weekly classroom hours, sabbaticals, are not likely to receive much local community sympathy in the event of a strike. One person said that in a protracted labour dispute in the Lower Mainland, students could consider transferring to

other institutions, thereby further reducing the power of a faculty association. Both faculty and non-faculty people said that in their experience, the faculty are client oriented professionals and therefore are not generally strike prone.

#### Faculty and Faculty Associations

In addition to the items mentioned in the previous sections, a number of other issues were raised with respect to the faculty side of the collective bargaining process. A concern expressed by several people, regardless of their background, was the financial inequity between the colleges and faculty associations to finance legal counsel, labour consultants, grievances and arbitrations. It was recognized that the BCGEU has an advantage in this area since it offers training courses in a number of areas and has large financial and human resource bases upon which to draw. The local faculty associations, on the other hand, are largely dependent on their own local resources. One person suggested that these inequities among the associations was why there appeared to be a resurgence of interest in the British Columbia College-Institute Educators Association's approach to coordinated legal advice. A labour representative said while the relationship between the College-Institute Educators Association and the BCGEU was cordial, there was some feeling on the part of the BCGEU that the College-Institute Educators Association and its member associations wanted all of the

benefits of organized labour but were not prepared to join or support the main stream labour movement. The labour representative also suggested that the BCGEU's hard fight for increased salaries and additional benefits had indirectly benefitted the non-BCGEU faculty associations. Someone said it was surprising that, given a college's personnel costs represented approximately 70% to 80% of the college's operating budget, the British Columbia Association of Colleges was not more active in the field of labour relations.

Another potential source of tension that was identified was the professional stagnation of the college faculty. It was pointed out that there appeared to be less and less career opportunities, faculty often taught the same courses year after year, faculty in the smaller colleges were generally isolated from peers in their discipline and few faculty participated in university style research or consulting. The implication was that these conditions could lead to faculty boredom, frustration and dissatisfaction, which in turn could indirectly increase the tension within a college. It was felt that these potentially frustrated or bored faculty may attempt to vent their personal concerns via the bargaining process.

Several people with an administrative bias observed that perhaps one of the reasons for tension between the two parties at the negotiating table was that faculty associations often present the same requests year after year. They said there appeared to be a lack of new approaches by the faculty.

associations to existing college and labour problems. They suggested that faculty associations appeared to have difficulty in establishing bargaining priorities and consequently too many items were often placed initially on the table. Similarly, it was noted that the faculty associations always asked for concessions from the colleges and rarely, if ever, displayed a willingness to discuss ways of increasing the faculty's effectiveness or productivity.

#### Province-Wide Bargaining

There were diverse opinions with respect to the matter of province-wide collective bargaining. Although the BCGEU representatives favoured province-wide bargaining, all of the non-faculty participants and all of the academic faculty representatives, with the exception of one, were against any form of province-wide bargaining. Those in favour of local bargaining said that it was imperative that the colleges retain the right to manage their own internal affairs. They felt the colleges were too diverse and that in the long run province-wide bargaining would pull each college down to the lowest common denominator, would inhibit local autonomy, and would not allow the colleges to respond to local conditions. As noted above, one non-BCGEU faculty representative felt that in order to increase the political pressure on the provincial government, that at some point in the future, it may be more

advantageous to bargain for certain items, e.g., salaries, at the provincial level rather than at a local level.

### Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution

During the interviews, both labour and management participants offered a number of general comments on collective bargaining, including various conflict resolution techniques. Many of the most experienced practitioners felt that the current model of collective bargaining was an effective way to handle negotiations and it worked best when experienced negotiators were involved. While they agreed that the process is adversarial, they also suggested that it is the best way to ensure there is a balance of power between employers and employees. It appeared from the comments, that some of the more experienced practitioners approached negotiations as a problem solving exercise, while the inexperienced negotiators appeared to approach negotiations in a more confrontational manner. One person suggested that if the government would stop meddling in the free collective bargaining process that labour relations in the province would return to normal. Some practitioners, however, were not entirely satisfied with the present system and made a number of suggestions that are listed in the section on suggested modifications.

It was noted that certification under the Labour Code included access to the traditional private sector conflict

resolution techniques such as strikes, lockouts, mediation and arbitration. In discussing mediation, it was pointed out that a legal lockout or strike cannot be called until a mediator is appointed and his report is filed with the government. Those interviewed who had first hand experience with mediation said that in their experience, mediation worked best when there was sufficient pressure on both sides to settle, when there was a real commitment by both sides to settle, when one side was inexperienced, when one side needed to save face, when one side needed assistance in establishing its goals and priorities, when one side needed assistance in understanding the traditional collective bargaining process and when one side did not fully comprehend the legal ramifications of collective bargaining. Some went on to say that mediation sometimes preformed a problem solving role. One experienced practitioner said that in his experience, impasses at the college level were far more difficult to resolve through mediation than private sector disputes or other public sector disputes.

It was mentioned that in the event of an impasse, under British Columbia's Labour Code, both parties have to mutually agree to proceed to arbitration unless it is a part of their contract. In their experience many of the participants suggested that very few colleges and faculty associations proceeded to arbitration. There appeared to be an almost unanimous feeling among the human resource officers and the

academic faculty representatives that arbitration was too blunt an instrument for conflict resolution. For many of the practitioners, arbitration was an unacceptable method of conflict resolution on the basis that it resulted in the loss of control over local matters. For many, the resolution of internal college problems via the assistance of an external third party was an unacceptable method of conflict management. They suggested that generally arbitration does not appear to resolve the underlying problems that lead to the impasse, that an arbitrator generally appears to split the two positions and that arbitrators often only address the monetary issues and ignore many essential non-economic issues. The latter, it was pointed out, are often the causes of some of the real internal conflicts in the colleges. On the other hand, those associated with the BCGEU, felt that arbitration was an acceptable form of conflict resolution. They recognized that it took time, was consistent with the adversarial nature of collective bargaining and suited the needs of their members. A number of people from both sides, suggested that if either the college or the faculty felt strongly enough about an issue, they should exercise their right to strike or lockout. It was noted that the colleges' lockout option had rarely been used. On this point, one practitioner suggested that unlike the private sector, there is not much of an incentive for the college boards to exercise their lockout option, e.g., no monetary incentive, bad public relations, increased bad staff

morale. Citing a couple of examples, two human resource directors said that lockouts or the threat of a lockout had proved to be effective in restoring a balance of power in the bargaining process, in curtailing wild cat work disruptions and preventing sympathy strikes.

Only one of those interviewed had had direct experience with the final offer selection form of arbitration. It was suggested that this form of arbitration had only been used once or twice in British Columbia's community colleges. Several people felt that final offer selection was just too risky for both sides and rejected it as a means of conflict resolution. One person thought that it did not create a strike like pressure, since it did not have a direct impact on the faculty's pay cheques or the employer's revenue. One of the academic faculty felt that the issue by issue form of final offer selection, would be an acceptable method of arbitration. It was pointed out that the collective bargaining process in British Columbia's community colleges was relatively young and that the current collective bargaining process needed an opportunity to mature.

#### Miscellaneous Points

During the interviews several other miscellaneous items were raised. One of those items was the lack of a common source of information for the negotiating teams. It was mentioned by several people, that often there is a great deal



of unnecessary conflict and time wasted during the bargaining process due to the lack of a common source of institutional data. Another item that was raised by some of the faculty representatives was the matter of local versus provincial financial power. A couple of faculty representatives said the faculty associations sometimes found it very frustrating when they could not negotiate with the people who had the ultimate financial power; the provincial government. They suggested that this was often the basis for discussions related to province-wide bargaining.

Several participants had had personal experience with single team bargaining at one institution. One administrator said that relations among the administration and the faculty had deteriorated to that point where they had to try something radical in order to salvage the relationship. While the Director of Human Resources and a labour representative were positive about their experience with single team bargaining, one faculty member was not as enthusiastic. This latter person said that while the single team negotiation process was initially successful, unfortunately the cooperative spirit vanished after the agreement was signed. He reported that the two sides reverted to an adversarial stance regarding the interpretation of one section of the agreement soon after it was ratified. It was suggested that single teams bargaining was one approach, but that it may work only when and where there was a great deal of trust and cooperation. One person

mentioned that single team bargaining was being considered by another British Columbia institution.

#### SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The pre-survey interviews produced a number of suggestions aimed at improving the current collective bargaining process in the unionized community colleges. In some cases the suggestion was representative of several of the participants, while in other cases a suggestion came from one of the practitioners. The suggested modifications were generally aimed at improving the current collective bargaining system rather than proposing radical innovations to the system.

##### Suggested Modifications

Several of the non-faculty representatives felt that issues should not be left to fester during the life of a contract. It was recommended that critical issues, excluding salaries and benefits, should be subject to negotiation when they occur or at regularly scheduled intervals during the year. For example, the negotiating teams should meet three or four times per year to deal with emergent issues.

Based on one member's experience in the private sector, it was suggested that consideration should be given to continuous contracts which could be amended at any time by a letter of agreement signed by both parties.

A human resources officer suggested that negotiations should be carried out in an informal atmosphere and the seating organized in such a way that the people from the two sides could sit side by side instead of across the table from one another.

Two human resource officers suggested that initially, contract discussions should avoid discussing issues in terms of formal contract language. This approach would allow the parties to concentrate on the issues and to focus on solving mutual problems instead of having to deal simultaneously with the issues and the language. The nuances of the formal contractual language could be sorted out after a general consensus had been reached on the issues.

Perhaps one of the most common modifications proposed by a wide spectrum of the administratively oriented participants, was that there should be mechanisms to ensure continuity on the faculty bargaining teams over an extended period of time, e.g., staggered terms.

Another idea put forth by several of the administratively oriented participants and a government official, was that there should be joint collective bargaining training sessions for the faculty, administrators and board members. Several people recommended that these sessions should be sponsored by the provincial government's Mediation Services. It was pointed out by the BCGEU representatives that the BCGEU

currently provides training opportunities for its representatives.

Two human resources officers and a government official suggested that, in addition to the training sessions, new ways of improving the internal communications had to be found to improve the before and after negotiations climate. It was noted that trust and improved communications could not be legislated. For example it was suggested that there should be regular meetings between the college administration and the executive of the local faculty and support staff unions to explore items of mutual concern.

Similarly, it was recommended that consideration should be given to establishing a joint management-union contract administration committee. The committee, which could also be the two negotiating teams, would be charged with the responsibility of monitoring the contract during its life and attempt to resolve difficulties as quickly as possible.

It was recommended that arbitrations should be resolved quickly and that the time frames should be shorter, e.g., fast tracked.

Several non-faculty representatives felt that the faculty associations required professional assistance to establish realistic goals and bargaining priorities.

Both faculty and non-faculty practitioners agreed with the concept of release time for faculty members to participate in faculty association activities, including collective bargaining. It was suggested that this should be on the basis that the Faculty Associations reimburse the colleges for the release time.

Based on one human resource officer's experience in both the college and the private sectors, it was suggested that the collective agreements should deal with only basic economic matters and all other items should be set out in mutually agreed to policies.

Unlike many of the other practitioners, several non-faculty participants felt that consideration should be given to moving away from the traditional "industrial relations" or adversarial approach to collective bargaining and focus on various problem solving approaches to collective bargaining. One human resources officer suggested single team bargaining as an option. There was also the observation that single team bargaining was not appropriate for dealing with economic issues.

Contrary to many of the participant's views, a government official and a human resources officer suggested that the Labour Code was inappropriate for college faculty associations. The implication was that the faculty

associations should decertify and consider using alternative methods to determine salaries and working conditions.

One faculty representative suggested that in the future, consideration should be given to some form of province-wide collective bargaining for the non-BCGEU faculty associations. Although another faculty member was a strong advocate of local collective bargaining, the representative suggested that under certain conditions, province-wide collective bargaining might be worth consideration if it were limited to salaries and benefits.

A faculty representative suggested that tripartite bargaining, i.e., government, colleges, faculty, could replace the current practice of local faculty association-college negotiations.

A cross section of practitioners suggested that there should be a common source of institutional information that both parties could access.

One human resources officer suggested some form of the Compensation Stabilization Program should remain indefinitely.

There was almost unanimous agreement that the President and the Vice-President Academic should not be on a college's bargaining team.

There was a general consensus that the provincial government should provide the college and institute boards with three to five year budget guidelines.

Both faculty and non-faculty practitioners suggested that one board member should be a on a college's negotiating team.

## 5

## FACTUAL INSTITUTIONAL DATA

Chapter Five represents another part of the study's multi-pronged approach to collecting relevant information. It sets out the purpose for gathering the institutional material, the data collection process, and a description of the information collected.

## PURPOSE

Chapter Five served several purposes. One of the main purposes was to obtain factual material that would complement and expand on the opinions expressed in the pre-survey interviews. Another purpose was to obtain factual information that might shed light on aspects of collective bargaining mentioned in the literature. It was anticipated that the data would also assist with the development of the main survey. The items that were included in this institutional questionnaire were based on the literature, the pre-survey interviews and personal experience.



## DATA COLLECTION

### Process and Sources

A variety of sources were used to obtain the data for this section of the study. The main source of information was a questionnaire which was mailed to the participating colleges. In addition to the questionnaire, data was also obtained from a number of secondary sources. These included official government documents and publications, correspondence with officials of British Columbia's Ministry of Labour, and statistics produced by the British Columbia Public Employers Association.

### Limitations

Although the institutional questionnaire proved to be a rich source of information, it had a number of limitations. Ten colleges agreed to participate in this portion of the study. The colleges which did not participate indicated that while they supported the study, they were unable to participate due to limited budgets, limited staffing, and severe time constraints. Similar restraints were also reflected in the data submitted by several of the participating colleges in that some of the data that was submitted was incomplete. It became apparent that many colleges do not maintain comprehensive or easily accessible files related to collective bargaining.

In order to determine the populations from which to draw the study's samples, one part of the questionnaire asked for the names of the faculty who had served on either the local faculty association executive, the local negotiating team or both. The researcher was unable to obtain the required faculty lists from one of the faculty associations and, for a number of reasons, the names of the faculty leaders of five BCGEU vocational faculty association locals were also unavailable. Therefore, the question of faculty continuity could not be considered across the complete college spectrum. This also meant that one of the academic associations and all of the separate vocational faculty bargaining units had to be excluded from the study's main survey. Attempts to resolve a number of the preceding logistical problems underscored the apparently sensitive relationship between some college administrations and the faculty associations as well as accentuating the differences between the autonomous locals and the BCGEU affiliated locals.

The lack of historical collective bargaining data was not only apparent in the colleges but also in government circles. The Province's Mediation Services do not maintain easily accessible historical records related to mediation, and what there is, is confidential. Another source of secondary data was the province's Ministry of Labour. The Ministry's publication, the Labour Research Bulletin, was discontinued in 1983, so the Ministry's Research Branch was contacted

directly. The British Columbia Public Employers' Association's statistics were another source of data. Each of these separate sources was used to build as complete a picture of collective bargaining activities as possible.

While most of the respondents did not appear to have difficulty in completing the majority of items, the statement related to college committees was not clear enough. Therefore, the data from this item was not used as intended. In view of the preceding limitations, care had to be exercised in drawing any system wide generalizations from the factual institutional data.

#### ANALYSIS

The description of the data obtained from the questionnaire and the other sources follows the sequence of the questions in the questionnaire. This includes the age and structure of the bargaining units, the structure of the bargaining teams, contract negotiations, strikes and lockouts, and grievances.

## Age and Structure of the Bargaining Units

Table 5.1

## Bargaining Units

College	First Opened	First Contract	# of Certified Bargaining Units
Camosun	1971	1974	2
Capilino	1968	1974	1
Cariboo	1970	1976	1
Douglas	1970	1976	1
East Kootenay	1974	1976	1
Fraser Valley	1974	1977	1
Kwantlan	1981	1981	1
Malaspina	1969	1974	2
New Caladonia	1969	1976	1
Northern Lights	1975	1977	1
North West	1976	1977	1
Okanagan	1963	1974	2
Selkirk	1965	1974	2
Vancouver	1965	1965	2

The data indicated that, while some of British Columbia's community colleges first opened their doors in the mid 1960's, many of the first collective agreements were not signed until the mid 1970's. Twelve colleges signed their first agreement between 1974 and 1977. As noted in Chapter 1, the data confirmed that there was considerable variation among the colleges with respect to the structure of the certified bargaining units. Nine of the fourteen colleges have one bargaining unit which represents both academic and vocational

faculty. One college, Fraser Valley college has a bargaining unit that represents academic faculty, vocational faculty and all of the non-instructional support staff. Five colleges have separate bargaining units for the academic and vocational faculty. In these latter cases the vocational bargaining units are part of the BCGEU. Prior to the integration of the provincial vocational schools and the community colleges, the instructors in the vocational schools were members of the BCGEU. This data points out the relative youthfulness and the immaturity of the collective bargaining process in British Columbia's community colleges. It also indicates the difference in the composition and political orientation of the various collective bargaining units as well as their degree of local autonomy.

#### Negotiating Teams

College Negotiating Teams. Data was available on the composition of eleven college negotiating teams. The material revealed that the number of college personnel on college negotiating teams ranged from three to six people, with an average of four people. There did not appear to be a difference in the number of people on a college's negotiating team relative to the geographic location or size of college, e.g. large urban colleges, smaller interior colleges. The responses to the questionnaire suggest that although the people may change over time, the positions of the people who

serve on the team generally remain fairly constant, e.g., Director of Human Resources, Bursar. The questionnaire did not address the matter of continuity on the college negotiating teams. Personal experience and comments from some of those interviewed would suggest that usually those who serve on college negotiating teams remain in their administrative positions for extended periods of time. Therefore, as compared to faculty negotiating teams, there is a higher probability of continuity on the college negotiating teams.

There was a high degree of consistency with respect to the positions represented on these negotiating teams. Eight of eleven colleges reported that the Academic Vice-President or equivalent was on the team. Eight of eleven colleges also reported that the Director of Human Resources or the Personnel Officer served on the team. Four colleges indicated that at least one board member also currently served on the college's team. One college reported that a board member used to serve on the negotiating team but that this was no longer the case. In two of the four cases the board members were the Chairman of the Board's Personnel Committee. Two relatively small colleges reported that the college President served on the negotiating team. In both cases, a college board member also served on the negotiating team. Three colleges reported that the Bursar was on their team. In two of these latter three cases, the colleges were small and did not appear to employ

a Human Resource Director or Personnel Officer. All of the colleges indicated that a variety of other positions were represented on their negotiating team, e.g. Assistant Deans, Information Officers, Administrative Vice-Presidents, but there was a lack of consistency in these miscellaneous positions. Although there are a wide variety of possible configurations, the make-up of the colleges' negotiating teams was remarkably similar and were consistent with comments made during the pre-survey interviews.

Faculty Negotiating Teams. The data on the faculty negotiating teams confirm several of the observations made in the pre-survey interviews. The material also points out some unique differences between the college and faculty negotiating teams.

Data on 10 faculty negotiating teams was available but as noted earlier, it did not include any data on the BCGEU locals. The bargaining teams represented either combined academic-vocational faculty associations or separate academic associations. The faculty negotiating teams generally contained more people than the college negotiating teams. The number of faculty on the bargaining committees ranged from a low of three to a high of seven, with an average of six. Two teams included the President of the Faculty Association and six teams included an officer of the Faculty Association other than the Associations's President. All 10 reported that the

teams included members of the faculty other than just members of the Faculty Association executive. Four of the ten faculty associations said that their faculty at large were elected to the negotiating committee and two indicated that the faculty were appointed. In six of the ten colleges, the Chairman of the faculty negotiating committee was an officer of the Faculty Association other than the President.

The pre-survey interviews raised the question of the continuity of faculty from one bargaining team to the next and the movement of people in and out of the collective bargaining process over time. Most associations reported that, like the college teams, positions on the faculty bargaining teams remained constant over time, e.g: President of the Faculty Association, but that the people changed frequently.

The lists of faculty members serving on the various negotiating teams were examined in an effort to determine people's participation on the bargaining teams over a period of time and the continuity from one negotiating period to the next. The examination was based on seven colleges for the period 1977 through 1986. In the most stable situation, nine people served on one Faculty Association's negotiating teams during that period of time. In the most unstable situation, 33 people served on another Faculty Association's negotiating teams for the same period of time. On average, 18 people served on a Faculty Association negotiating team over approximately a decade. Of the 128 faculty who served on the



teams during this period of time, 56.25% served on one negotiating team; 27.34% served on two negotiating teams; 11.72% served on three negotiating teams; 3.9% served on four negotiating teams; 0% served on five negotiating teams; and less than 1% served on six negotiating teams.

While these figures demonstrate the participation rates of people over a ten year span, they do not depict the continuity rates from one bargaining session to the next. For example, a faculty member may serve on a negotiating team and then not serve on another negotiating team for nine years. The continuity rates from one bargaining team to the next bargaining team varied greatly from bargaining session to bargaining session and from college to college. The continuity of people from one bargaining session to the next bargaining session ranged from a low of 26.7% in one college to a high of 68.8% in another college. The data showed that, on average, 45.4% of one bargaining team served on the next or subsequent bargaining team. These figures by and large reflect the observations made during the pre-survey interviews.

Depending on the year and the college, the participation figures, coupled with the contract to contract continuity rates, suggest that there is the high probability that there will be quite a bit of inexperience on the faculty negotiating teams. One caution is that the questionnaire was not designed to determine whether or not the faculty serving on the various

negotiating teams had had any formal labour relations training prior to serving on the faculty negotiating teams. The questionnaire also did not address the reasons why the participation and continuity rates were not higher or lower than they were. For example, these rates could be affected by the length of time it takes to settle a collective agreement, the long hours of preparation that are required, the lack of workload relief for faculty, a budget crisis, internal faculty association politics, the resolution of a personal concern, the amount of tension between individual faculty and college negotiators during negotiations, the lack of personal satisfaction with the process and so on.

### Contracts and Negotiations

The analysis of the contract negotiations considered the length of contracts signed, how the contracts were settled and the lag time between the expiration of one contract and the signing of a new contract. Thirteen colleges were examined in this section. In spite of incomplete data, there was sufficient data to present a broad picture of contract negotiations in British Columbia's community colleges.

The data revealed that for the colleges studied, 106 individual contracts were signed during the 1977-1986 period. This included 53 contracts which were one year in duration, 48 contracts between one and two years in length and five contracts longer than two years. It is useful to distinguish

the differences in the length of the contracts according to the type of faculty association, i.e., combined academic-vocational, separate academic, separate vocational.

Table 5.2

## Length of Collective Agreements

Length of Contract	Type of Faculty Association			Total
	Combined	Academic	Vocational	
1 year	15 contracts	20 contracts	18 contracts	53 contracts
2 years	22 contracts	12 contracts	14 contracts	48 contracts
2+ years	5 contracts	0 contracts	0 contracts	5 contracts

During the 10 year span studied, few colleges and faculty associations opted for collective agreements that were more than two years long. Although the data is limited, there appears to be some difference between the length of the collective agreements in terms of the type of faculty association involved. It appears that those faculty associations which are more homogeneous opted for shorter contracts. If this data were tracked over an extended period of time this pattern may or may not continue. To help to see this pattern more clearly it is beneficial to express the previous data in terms of the average number of contracts per

college according to the type of faculty association and the length of the contracts signed.

Table 5.3

Length of Collective Agreements, Average

Length of Contract	Type of Faculty Association		
	Combined	Academic	Vocational
1 year	1.86 contracts /college	4.0 contracts /college	3.6 contracts /college
2 years	2.75 contracts /College	2.40 contracts /college	2.80 contracts /college
2+ years	.63 contracts /college	0 contracts /college	0 contracts /college

Table 5.3 reveals a number of interesting points. The separate academic and vocational faculty associations clearly tend toward one year agreements. In terms of two year agreements, all three types of associations are fairly comparable. The separate vocational faculty associations, however, had a slightly higher average rate of two year contracts. Without conducting in depth interviews related to each contract, it was impossible to determine the rationale for the one year, two year and three year contracts.

Another area of interest was the method used to settle each contract. The data obtained from the questionnaires and other sources is best depicted in chart form.

Table 5.4

## Collective Agreements, Method of Settlement

Method of Settlement	Type of Faculty Association			Total
	Combined	Academic	Vocational	
Bargaining	26 contracts	30 contracts	24 contracts	80 contracts
Mediation	11 contracts	3 contracts	5 contracts	19 contracts
Arbitration	4 contracts	0 contracts	0 contracts	4 contracts
Final Offer	3 contracts	0 contracts	0 contracts	3 contracts

The data clearly substantiates what was said in the pre-survey interviews. Eighty of the one hundred and six contracts studied during this 10 year period were settled by free collective bargaining. An additional 19 were settled through mediation. Only seven were settled through interest arbitration or final offer selection. Not only do the more homogeneous academic and vocational faculty associations tend toward one year contracts, they tend to settle their agreements through the free collective bargaining process. This is as opposed to the use of mediation, arbitration or final offer selection. Table 5.5 indicates that the same

pattern exists when the above data is expressed in terms of the number of institutions in each of the three types of faculty associations.

Table 5.5

Collective Agreements, Method of Settlement, Average

Method of Settlement	Type of Faculty Association		
	Combined	Academic	Vocational
Bargaining	3.25 contracts /college	6.00 contracts /college	4.80 contracts /college
Mediation	1.38 contracts /College	.60 contracts /college	1.00 contracts /college
Arbitration	.50 contracts /College	0 contracts /college	0 contracts /college
Final Offer	.36 contracts /College	0 contracts /college	0 contracts /college

The more heterogeneous combined academic-vocational faculty associations appeared to require more assistance to settle their differences than the separate academic and separate vocational faculty associations. This pattern may be due to chance alone and therefore a more longitudinal view is probably needed to discern a significant pattern over time.

One might inadvertently assume that since approximately 75% of the contracts were settled without any form of third

party intervention, that there was little if any tension in the collective bargaining process. One of the concerns expressed in the interviews was the length of time it often took to negotiate new contracts. Therefore, the time between the end of one contract and the time a new contract was signed was examined. This interval of time is referred to as the lag time. In reviewing the data, the lag time between the expiration of one contract and the successful agreement on a new contract appeared to be one of the few indicators of tension among some of the college administrations and the faculty associations.

The data were based on the same 106 contracts cited earlier. Of those contracts, 15 were eliminated due to lack of lag time data. Another nine were eliminated because the contracts were signed prior to the expiration of the collective agreements. In other words, approximately 10% of the contracts studied were signed prior to the expiration of an existing agreement. These represented four combined associations, four separate academic associations and one separate vocational association. Almost 90% of the new contracts were signed after the expiration of the old contract. The following lag times were averaged and rounded off to the nearest week.

Table 5.6

## Lag Times, Averages

	Type of Faculty Association		
	Combined	Academic	Vocational
Lag Times	32.8 Weeks	16.4 Weeks	26.0 weeks

While the lag times ranged from 16.4 Weeks to 32.8 Weeks, the overall average was 25.6 Weeks or approximately six months. There was, however, a considerable amount of variation within each type of faculty association. For example:

Table 5.7

## Lag Times, Ranges

	Type of Faculty Association		
	Combined	Academic	Vocational
Range			
Low	19.0 Weeks	7 Weeks	10.8 Weeks
High	43.2 Weeks	27.8 Weeks	38.2 Weeks

Not unlike the previous examples, the combined faculty associations experienced the longest average lag time, as well as the highest single lag time. Contrary to the some of the



opinions expressed in pre-survey interviews, the separate vocational faculty associations experienced a much longer average lag time than the separate academic faculty associations and only slightly less than the combined faculty associations. On this same point, it is worth noting that in the five colleges where there were separate academic and vocational faculty associations, all five of the vocational associations had longer average lag times. Only one separate vocational faculty association signed off a new agreement prior to the expiration of an old agreement.

The preceding data indicates that there may be a pattern of behaviour among the various types of faculty associations. The data suggests that the more homogeneous faculty associations tend toward shorter contracts, tend to settle their agreements without third party intervention and tend to have shorter lag times. These figures may be indicative of the level of conflict or tension in certain types of associations. Yet, the data may also reflect such factors as the negotiators' holiday patterns, the time it takes to prepare complex negotiating strategies, the difficulty faculty have in accommodating both their teaching and negotiating functions, the difficulty in establishing bargaining priorities for the more heterogeneous faculty associations, and other similar factors. The data also suggest that from an administrative perspective, the separate vocational faculty

associations are not necessarily easier to deal with as was mentioned in the pre-survey interviews.

### Strikes and Lockouts

This section is based on the same 106 contracts mentioned earlier and for the period 1977-1986. The data that was obtained from all sources can be described as follows:

Table 5.8

#### Strikes and Strike Votes

	Type of Faculty Association			Total
	Combined	Academic	Vocational	
Number of Strike Votes	8	1	3	12
Number of Strikes	4	1	1	6

Table 5.9

#### Strikes and Strike Votes, Average

	Type of Faculty Association			
	Combined	Academic	Vocational	
Number of Strike Votes /College	1	.2	.6	
Number of Strikes /College	.5	.2	.2	

In terms of the combined faculty associations, Table 5.8 and 5.9 reveal a similar pattern as existed in Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. In spite of the tensions associated with these strikes and strike votes, 94 collective agreements, or 88% of all the collective agreements studied during the 1977-1986 interval, were reached without strike votes. Ninety-four percent of all the agreements were settled without a strike. Although the numbers are very small, the more heterogeneous combined faculty associations appear to have more difficulty in obtaining their settlements than the more homogeneous associations. Yet, the data is somewhat misleading in that eight of the twelve strikes took place during the tumultuous 1981-1984 period. As mentioned in the pre-survey interviews, the data shows that the strikes were generally of a short duration, i.e., 1 day, 2 days, 2 days, 5 days, 14 days, and 30 days. Based on the data that were available, the main issues associated with the strike votes and the strikes appeared to involve level I items, e.g., wages, various aspects of job security. These facts suggest that changes in the environment had quite an impact on the labour relations climates within the various colleges. After a strike in 1977, one of the colleges and its respective faculty association agreed to a binding interest arbitration clause in their collective agreement.

While there were twelve strike votes and six strikes during the 1977-1986 period, there were only two employer

initiated lockouts during this same interval. The data tend to support the pre-survey interviews, in which it was noted that college boards do not often revert to lockouts.

### Grievances

Grievances, like lag times, strike votes, strikes and lockouts, are another indicator of the labour relations behaviour within British Columbia's community colleges. Nine colleges responded to this part of the questionnaire. Each college had one or more grievances during the 1977-1986 period. The number of grievances for the nine colleges are as follows: 1, 6, 9, 9, 10, 16, 44, 47, 54. These figures demonstrate that three of the nine colleges experienced noticeably higher grievance levels than the other colleges during this period of time. Interestingly, these were some of the same colleges that were identified in the pre-survey interviews as having a great deal of internal conflict. The two colleges which had 44 and 47 grievances also had above average lag times during contract negotiations. The college with 54 grievances experienced three strike votes within a three year period. The data represent a small sample, but a longitudinal study may reveal a correlation between various factors, e.g., strike votes, strikes, grievances, contractual lag times. Although one of the colleges had only nine grievances, those grievances occurred from 1980 to 1987 with six of the nine grievances occurring in 1984. This data

appears to reflect the perceptions expressed during the interviews that there was quite a bit of variance among the colleges with respect to their internal labour relations climates and that colleges were susceptible to environmental pressures.

By and large the grievances appeared to be the result of individual disputes or concerns, rather than the general faculty association disputes. For example, in the college that had eight grievances in 1984, all eight grievances were related to individual layoffs. Although there was a lack of data, generally the grievances involved such areas as hours of work, work loads, retirements, layoffs, discipline, contract duties, sick leave and other personal matters. The majority of the preceding items appeared to be Level I items. These issues may have been generated by individuals or by conditions beyond the control of the college and the respective faculty associations, e.g. reductions in base funding. The data does not give any indication whether or not the bargaining process itself contributed to the grievances or whether the grievances contributed to tensions during the bargaining process.

Another indicator of the behaviour within the colleges is the way these grievances were settled. Seventy-five percent of the grievances studied were apparently either withdrawn or accommodated internally in a mutually satisfactory manner. Certainly, the latter is an indicator of the ability of the colleges, the faculty associations and the individuals

concerned to reconcile personal concerns without the use of external agents. While 25% of the grievances required the intervention of a third party, this figure is deceiving. The data showed that 38 of the 49 individual grievances settled by arbitration were from the college which had 54 grievances. The other 11 individual grievances that were settled by arbitration were split fairly evenly among three other colleges. This data suggests that generally there are few grievances in the college system. The few that exist are handled at the local level without the use of third parties.

#### Decision Making and Committees

The institutional questionnaire contained a section requesting information on the number and types of committees within each college. The objective of this question was to determine the opportunities for the faculty to participate in the decision making process in each college other than collective bargaining.

As it turned out this question was of limited value. It became clear upon receipt of the completed questionnaires that this specific question had not been designed correctly. It did not ask the colleges for adequate information on the purpose, composition and usefulness of the various committees, nor did it ask whether or not the committees were contractual. Notwithstanding the foregoing problems, some useful information was obtained.

Among the six colleges that did respond, there was a total of 37 college-wide committees. On this limited basis it would appear that within British Columbia's community colleges there probably are a number of opportunities for the faculty to participate in college decision making processes besides collective bargaining. One might assume that there are numerous opportunities to resolve internal problems and to satisfy professional Level II needs through these committees. Yet, it was not clear whether the committees had any real decision making power, whether the faculty were adequately represented on the committees, whether the committees were dominated by department heads, whether the faculty felt they could speak out freely on these committees, whether the committees were dominated by senior college administrators, whether the faculty representatives were elected by their peers, appointed by the faculty associations or appointed by the college administration and other similar questions.

#### SUMMARY

Although Chapter Five had a number of limitations it proved to be a good source of factual data related to the collective bargaining process in the colleges. The material also complemented the literature and the pre-survey interviews, all of which assisted with the development of the main survey questionnaire.

It could be argued that the small number of strike votes and strikes, coupled with the fact that many of the colleges settle their agreements and grievances without third party intervention, indicates that collective bargaining is working well in the colleges. Many of the comments in the interviews and this data suggest otherwise, e.g. lag times. More specifically, the data suggest that perhaps the larger and more heterogeneous faculty associations tend to experience more difficulty in managing and negotiating their agreements than the other types of associations. While the vocational associations appear to experience less difficulties than the combined associations they appear to have more difficulties than the homogeneous academic faculty associations. For the most part the strikes and grievances deal with Level I items. What is not clear from the data is the method used by the colleges to resolve matters of principle or Level II items. The interviews suggested that these types of issues may go partially unresolved, e.g., failure of arbitrators to deal with these items. These issues may follow other avenues of resolution, e.g., votes of non-confidence in a college president, lack of continuity on the faculty negotiating teams. The experimental research by Deutsch & Kraus (1960) suggests that during negotiations, the passage of time hardens the participants' positions which in turn reduces the level of cooperation and increases the level of competition. As the pre-survey interviews implied, the long lag times may be due

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in part to the inexperience of the negotiators. The relative immaturity of collective bargaining in the colleges and the participation and continuity rates of the faculty negotiating teams confirm many of the observations made during the pre-survey interviews.

## COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Collective agreements, like the institutional material in Chapter Five, reflect the behaviour of college administrations and college faculty associations over time. The following sections describe the purpose of this review of collective agreements, the method used to examine the contracts, the limitations of the chapter, and a number of general observations.

## PURPOSE

The examination of 11 collective agreements served a number of purposes. One purpose was to provide a qualitative overview of the contracts that would build on the data in the previous chapters. It was also anticipated that the review would provide additional insights into the differences between the various types of faculty associations and the scope of the respective agreements. The identification of areas of potential conflict was also of interest. It was also anticipated that a review of the agreements would shed some light on the implications for province-wide collective bargaining.

This chapter was not intended to be an in depth quantitative analysis or comparative analysis of the various clauses (Baristow 1976; Dennison 1986) or the language of the contracts (Chandler & Julius 1979; Stewart 1983). These latter approaches to contractual analysis were well beyond the scope of this study. Rather, this portion of the research was intended to provide a very broad view of the contracts and their implications for the collective bargaining process in British Columbia's community colleges.

#### METHOD

This qualitative review involved several steps. Initially, seven collective agreements from five colleges were examined in some detail and the major items in the agreements were roughly grouped for comparative purposes. Following this, five other contracts, representing four colleges, were examined but in much less detail. These 11 agreements represented combined faculty associations, separate academic faculty associations and separate vocational faculty associations. Dennison's (1986) comparative analysis of 17 community college contracts was examined and used as a benchmark for comparative purposes.

#### LIMITATIONS

There were a number of limitations associated with the review of the collective agreements. One limitation was that copies of all of the colleges' collective agreements could not

be obtained. Another limitation was that the differences in the organization, definitions, language and scope of the agreements made direct comparison difficult. More than ten years ago, Bairstow (1976) made the same point when he said that "Currently, the format and content of community college agreements vary so widely that any attempts at comparison are difficult ...". The result was that a general qualitative approach was taken versus a more quantitative approach.

Collective agreements are, in many ways, historical records of labour relations in the respective community colleges. Personal experience suggests that once items are placed in an agreement they are rarely removed. The agreements, therefore, do not necessarily reflect the current state of affairs within a college. Along this same line, the contracts reveal little about the many variables that shape collective agreements, e.g., personalities, presidential management styles, faculty morale, working conditions in the local communities, community demands, expectations of the various internal faculty interest groups, the success or failure of joint faculty-college committees, and other similar factors.

#### OBSERVATIONS

The observations were grouped into four broad areas, i.e., the purpose of collective agreements, environmental factors,

contractual variations according to association type, and implications for province-wide collective bargaining.

#### Purpose of Collective Agreements

It appears as if the primary purpose of the collective agreements is to provide a stable employment relationship for a definite period of time. The agreements are formal, bi-lateral, and legally binding boundary spanning mechanisms that attempt to provide an equilibrium between the colleges and their respective faculty associations. In this sense the contracts attempt to balance the management rights of the colleges and the faculty's desire for increased benefits, professional autonomy and so on. Although collective bargaining takes place during cyclical windows of relative instability, the contracts attempt to dampen even that instability by providing for the continuation of the existing contracts until new ones are signed. The contracts are also designed to dampen instability during the life of the agreements in that they set out the rules of behaviour to which the two parties must adhere. The degree of stability varies from one contract to another, e.g., salary scales based on academic qualifications, seniority clauses, layoff and recall provisions, programs that allow for the retraining of existing faculty, procedures which outline the internal re-assignment of qualified faculty, position bumping, the regularization of part-time faculty, clauses protecting the

employees from technological change, lists of acceptable mediators or arbitrators and grievance procedures.

In many instances the colleges appear to counter the faculty associations' desire for more benefits and power by employing such management devices as term certain contracts for all faculty, regular faculty evaluations, separation clauses in the event of program terminations, management rights clauses and other similar clauses. Although the majority of the contracts contain management rights clauses, a few do not. One college has what is referred to as a consultative clause. Personal experience suggests that many of the management rights clauses are very general. The strength of these clauses is tempered by the scope or comprehensiveness of the respective contracts. What is not apparent in the contracts, is whether or not administrative practice, lack of use, or precedent, has compromised the colleges' management's rights with respect to any of the clauses in the contracts.

While all of the contracts examined were similar in the area of Level I items, e.g., salaries, benefits, grievance procedures, there was a difference with respect to Level II items, particularly governance. Specifically, there appeared to be a difference among many of the colleges in the area of faculty participation in institutional decision making. Some colleges have many more formalized college-faculty committees than other colleges. These joint committees cover such areas

as the selection of faculty, department heads and senior administrators; educational leave; professional development; termination; mediation; workloads; initial salary placement; regularization of part-time faculty; non-renewal of contracts; faculty evaluations; sexual harassment; labour-management relations; on-going contract management; suspensions; budget development; technological change; the pursuit of professional excellence; faculty reductions; training programs and the establishment and adherence to professional standards and ethics. Depending on various factors, the lack of these preceding Level II boundary spanning clauses may account for the differences in the colleges' industrial relations climates noted in Chapter 5. Some of those factors might include the type of faculty association, the educational background or prior experience of the faculty, the professional expectations of the faculty or segments of the faculty associations, the management style of a particular college administration, changes in personnel, and the desire of an administration to reduce faculty participation in an institution's decision making process.

#### Faculty Associations

In many ways, the contracts mirror the composition of the respective faculty associations. For example, there appeared to be a difference between the contracts of the smaller homogeneous and separate vocational faculty associations as

compared to the larger and more heterogeneous combined academic-vocational faculty associations. The former contracts tend to be shorter, use simple language, are less complex and focus mainly on basic working conditions or Level I factors. These agreements often include Level I items that are generally not found in most of the other college contracts. These items are more often associated with non-professional, support staff or blue-collar contracts. For example, they often contain references to shop stewards, union insignia, union bulletin boards, coffee and lunch breaks, automatic bank deposits, shift differentials, overtime differentials, safety and health, classification and re-classification procedures, red circling of salaries, protective clothing and parking. As noted in the interviews, these separate vocational contracts appear to place less emphasis on professional matters, e.g., faculty evaluations, academic freedom, and external consulting. While some of the agreements do call for joint college-faculty committees, there generally appears to be fewer joint college-faculty committees than those contracts which include academic faculty members. By and large the vocational faculty seem to work more hours per week and more months per year for less money than their university transfer colleagues. There was also a difference in one area of organizational power; communications. In several BCGEU contracts the college administrations were required to communicate directly with the BCGEU agents or the



President of the BCGEU rather than with local elected faculty representatives. This could well be a source of tension between a college and its faculty members, just as it could lead to charges from faculty members that the BCGEU staff are too far removed from the local situation to be sensitive to local needs.

At the other end of the spectrum are the larger and more heterogeneous combined academic-vocational faculty associations. These contracts tend to be longer, contain more definitions, use more complex language, and involve more variations. For example, the salary scales include more variations in academic qualifications, there are more complex definitions of employee categories, and there are more policies that apply only to specific segments of the faculty association. While there is considerable variation among this group of contracts, there is generally more emphasis placed on Level II factors or professional matters, e.g., statements on the philosophy of various contractual clauses; complex workload formulae for each category of faculty member, program and type of instruction; professional development; study leaves; faculty evaluations; academic freedom; human rights; conflict of interest; external consulting; authorship and copyright; college mission statements; community work; and faculty participation on a wide array of joint college-faculty committees. With respect to this last point, there is a great deal of diversity among the colleges in this group. These

complex contracts reflect the heterogeneous nature of the respective faculty associations. While they might settle an issue or a series of issues once and for all, they also give the impression that they would be difficult to manage and renegotiate. The result could be that there may be more potential for misunderstanding and conflict; that it may be harder to establish bargaining priorities; that they may take longer to negotiate and therefore the associations may experience a high negotiator burnout rate; that there may be more internal faculty association stress; and require considerably more collective bargaining experience to negotiate.

Between the two ends of the spectrum lie the more homogeneous academic faculty associations. Given the inherent academic nature of the constituents, these contracts tend to be quite similar to the contracts associated with the combined associations. Yet, in many ways they appear to be less complex, e.g., less complex definitions and groups of constituents.

#### Environmental Changes

As noted in the pre-survey interviews, a number of environmental issues can be potential sources of conflict and affect the colleges' labour relations climates. The contracts contain a number of boundary spanning mechanisms that reflect the college's external environment. These mechanisms include

competitive salary scales, comparable benefit packages, similar workload formulas for similar types of faculty, layoff procedures due to provincial budget cuts, seniority clauses, re-training clauses due to technological change, clauses that prevent or restrict the college from contracting out its instruction, programs or services, and professional development or educational leaves. Each of these, depending on the economic, political or educational conditions at the time, may become contentious points during the bargaining process. While these types of clauses and the other clauses in a collective agreement contribute to a temporary balance of power between a college and its faculty associations, they are a double edged sword. Given that a community college's mission is to be responsive to the educational demands of its local community, the collective agreements could inhibit or be perceived by college administrators to inhibit a college's ability to adjust to its changing environment, e.g., lack of enrollment in specific programs, local demand for new programs.

#### Province-Wide Bargaining

During the pre-survey interviews, the matter of province-wide collective bargaining was raised. Some of the participants felt that province-wide bargaining should be considered, at least for some Level I items, e.g., salaries. Others said that province-wide bargaining should be avoided at

all costs. A review of the representative contracts provided additional insights into this issue. When reviewing the collective agreements the practicality and logistics of such a move was overshadowed by the complexity of the contracts. Many other items would also have to be addressed, including the impact on board autonomy and management rights, faculty workloads, the colleges' mandate to meet local educational needs, local program delivery costs, faculty professionalism including faculty participation in local decision making processes, educational quality, faculty morale, and other similar factors. The mere difference in the scope of the existing collective agreements would suggest that some faculty associations would probably not be willing to sacrifice their hard won comprehensive benefits in the interests of standardization or as some would suggest, mediocrity. In fact, it may be that those comprehensive contracts may not be appropriate for all faculty associations. The BCGEU contracts are relatively simple collective agreements but even then Michaels (1982) found that faculty involved said that the BCGEU headquarters staff were insensitive to local needs. In spite of their comparability in such a basic area as salaries, the latter are always tempered by local economic conditions. The task would be much more formidable considering the multitude of Level II or professional items in many of the contracts. Provincial integration of clauses dealing with a local balance of power in a college would be difficult to

accomplish. Considering the magnitude of such an undertaking and its implications, there is little doubt that in order to manage the colleges, special deals would be made at the local level, thereby violating the spirit of a master provincial collective agreement (Skolnik 1985).

#### SUMMARY

This brief qualitative examination of a sample of collective agreements provided insights into the scope of the agreements and highlighted differences among the agreements on the basis of type of association. It complimented the previous chapters by identifying potential sources of tension.

In comparison to the separate vocational and academic faculty associations, the contracts involving large combined faculty associations contained more rules and regulations, were longer, used more complex language, and placed more emphasis on Level II needs involving value laden matters of professional principle and organizational power. In many cases these contracts seemed to substitute legally binding contracts for tradition, collegiality, trust, and respect. While these contracts may have been intended to resolve a wide range of issues once and for all, they may also be more difficult to negotiate. Such contracts could account for some of the spin-offs noted in the pre-survey interviews and Chapter 5, e.g. difficulty in establishing bargaining priorities, more strike votes, longer lag times. In turn,

prolonged negotiations could account for the number of inexperienced faculty negotiators due to lower participation rates and lower continuity rates from one faculty negotiating team to the next. The situation may be further complicated by the personalities involved or severe changes in the college's environmental conditions. It appeared that the colleges which have combined academic-vocational or heterogeneous faculty associations may have more built-in potential for competition and hence more dysfunctional conflict. The absence of some of these characteristics in the contracts associated with the more homogeneous associations, e.g., separate academic associations, separate vocational associations, may account for the data noted in Chapter 5, e.g., shorter lag times, less strikes. It is worth noting that even if there was the will to move to province-wide bargaining, this contractual review suggests that the contractual obstacles and logistics are formidable.

This review of some of the community college contracts raised a number of issues that could be addressed by future researchers. For example, it would be beneficial to trace the evolution of specific college contracts and correlate the changes over time with environmental and internal administrative changes; to examine the culture of specific colleges and compare them to the development of the colleges' collective agreements; and to determine if there is any significant correlation between the collective agreements and

the attitudes of the board members or senior administrators toward the faculty and vice versa.

The qualitative review of the contracts complimented the data in the previous chapters. It also assisted with the development of the main survey questionnaire.

## 7

## MAIN SURVEY

In addition to the pre-survey interviews and the factual institutional data, the study included a self administered opinion survey of senior administrators, board members and faculty leaders. The purpose of the questionnaire, the methods followed in developing, administering and analyzing the questionnaire, and some of the limitations of this section of the study are outlined in the following pages. In each section, a discussion of the results follows the presentation of the results. A copy of the main survey instrument and the detailed data are located in the appendices.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the survey was to assist in determining whether or not there was a difference in the opinions of board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders toward the three areas of collective bargaining outlined in the research problem. The latter included aspects of competition and governance, the scope of collective agreements and proposed modifications to the current collective bargaining process. The survey was also designed to obtain a descriptive profile of the participants. It was also expected to provide



information on the relationship between some of the collective responses to the personal statements and the first two sections of the survey. The material was expected to complement the pre-survey interviews, the factual institutional data and the analysis of the collective agreements, thereby providing an additional quantitative element to the study.

#### METHOD

This section explains how the three sample populations were selected, how the questionnaire was developed and administered, and the rate of return. It also includes an overview of the statistical methods used to analyze the data.

##### Sample Selection

The study's populations included college board members, senior administrators and faculty leaders. A sample population was selected from each of the three populations. The names and addresses of college board members who had served during the period 1983-1988 were initially obtained from the British Columbia Association of Colleges and then confirmed by the individual colleges. From these lists six board members from each college were selected at random to participate in the study. The names of faculty leaders who had served on a faculty association executive, or a faculty negotiating team, or both, during the period 1983-1988, were obtained from the respective faculty associations and

colleges. The names of six faculty leaders from each college were selected at random to participate in the study. The selection of the senior administrators followed a slightly different pattern. The names of current senior college administrators were obtained from the various participating colleges. Six senior administrators from each college were then selected at random to participate in the survey. Unlike the two other sample populations, the senior administrators represented those currently employed as senior administrators and not necessarily those who were employed as senior administrators during the 1983-1988 period. This latter deviation was necessary since it would have been too difficult to locate the senior administrators who had left the various colleges. The three sample populations included 78 board members, 78 senior administrators and 78 faculty leaders, for a total of 234 people.

#### Development of the Questionnaire

The content of the questionnaire was based on the literature, the pre-survey interviews, the institutional data and the collective agreements. The first section of the questionnaire dealt with two aspects of collective bargaining: competition and governance. Competition and governance were seen as being closely allied to the balance of organizational power and hence the equilibrium of an organization. The review of the literature suggested that dysfunctional conflict

was often associated with factors related to competition. The odd numbered statements in this section of the questionnaire represented some of those key factors, e.g., inexperience, trust, rules and regulations, respect, win-lose attitudes, number of bargaining issues.

The even numbered statements in the first section of the survey instrument represented a broad range of governance issues commonly associated with higher education. As well as being prominent issues in the literature many of the items were also mentioned in the pre-survey interviews. The factors appeared to be at the crux of such Level II issues as professionalism, autonomy, collegiality, participation in decision making, and management rights.

The second section of the questionnaire dealt with the scope of the collective agreements, i.e., what items should be or should not be included in a collective agreement. The importance of examining the scope of the collective agreements is that it is related to the faculty's Level I and Level II needs, a college's management rights and an individual's values. They are also critical to the long term balance of organizational power. The literature suggested that the inclusion of Level II needs in collective agreements vary according to the profession involved. The contractual analysis also indicated that there were differences in the scope of the agreements with respect to Level II items. The differences varied according to the type of faculty

association. Given the traditions of higher education and the potential tension between the concepts of professionalism and unionism, as well as the tensions between faculty professionalism and management rights, some differences of opinion were expected between the three sample populations in the area of Level II items. The literature implied that Level II needs are often value laden and therefore there is likely to be more tension associated with these factors than with Level I needs. Recognizing that not all the contracts contained all of the items, an equal number of representative Level I factors, e.g., salaries, benefits, parking, and Level II factors, e.g., faculty participation on joint college-faculty committees, were selected from various collective agreements. In the questionnaire the odd numbered statements represented Level I needs and the even numbered statements represented Level II needs. The importance of the responses to the individual Level I and Level II items were not as important as the overall responses to each of the two broad categories of statements.

The third section of the questionnaire focused on the selection of possible modifications to the current collective bargaining process. These proposed modifications came from the literature, the pre-survey interviews, the factual institutional data, the analysis of the contracts, informal discussions with a wide variety of colleagues, the researcher's thesis advisors and personal experience. The

items are representative of the many possible modifications to the current process. One underlying thought behind this section was whether or not the proposed modifications would help to reduce the tensions often experienced during the collective bargaining process. Another thought was to attempt to determine to what extent the ideas would be acceptable or unacceptable to the three sample populations.

The fourth section of the questionnaire involved a series of statements designed to yield a descriptive profile of each of the three sample populations. The list of items was slightly different for each of the three sample populations. The factors that were selected represented some of the more prominent factors identified in the literature, e.g., age, gender, years of employment or association with a college, years of experience in that position, instructional discipline, occupations, prior collective bargaining experience, political preference.

The questionnaire went through a number of developmental stages. Initially, long lists of potential statements for each section were compiled. These lists were gradually reduced to what appeared to be the most representative elements for each section. Every effort was made to improve the questionnaire's reliability and to make the statements clear and unambiguous. To this end the mechanics of the questionnaire, e.g. positive statements, negative statements, double-barrelled questions, leading statements, placement of

questions, simple statements, length of the questionnaire, were reviewed by an expert in the development of questionnaires. The researcher's advisory committee also made numerous suggestions. The section on the scope of the collective agreements was similar to a previous study conducted by Ponak & Thompson (1984).

A four point Likert scale was selected for the first three sections of the study. The four categories were Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree and Strongly Disagree. For statistical purposes, the four categories were later assigned the numeric values of +2, +1, -1 and -2 respectively. It was assumed that the scale would demonstrate the direction of a participant's opinions and the magnitude of those opinions. In order to avoid a problem often associated with questionnaires, there was no neutral option, i.e., Don't Know, for the participants to select.

Once a draft survey instrument had been developed and approved by the researcher's thesis committee, it was piloted at the researcher's Alberta community college. Since the main purpose of the pilot test was to check on the mechanics of the questionnaire, it was decided that the differences in the collective bargaining process between the researcher's college and the British Columbia colleges would not significantly distort the results of the pilot test. The pilot questionnaire was administered to experienced negotiators representing board members, senior administrators and faculty

leaders. A number of the statements and part of the questionnaire's format were revised as a result of their comments. The changes were relatively minor and the survey did not have to be re-piloted. The researcher's advisory committee then reviewed the questionnaire and several more adjustments were made prior to its distribution.

#### Administration of the Questionnaire

The administration of the questionnaire involved a number of steps. The questionnaire was mailed in mid-November, 1988. A letter outlined the purpose of the study and included a guarantee of confidentiality. The participants were not required to identify their college and there were no identifying marks on either the questionnaire or the self-addressed and pre-stamped return envelope. Each package contained a self-addressed and pre-stamped acknowledgement card. The thought was that if the participants mailed the acknowledgement cards as well as the completed questionnaires, the returns could be monitored and late returns could be followed up without breaking confidentiality. In an effort to increase the rate of return, reminder cards were mailed in mid-January, 1989 and letters were sent out in early February, 1989 to all those participants who had not returned the acknowledgement cards. A number of phone calls were also made in February 1989.

### Rate of Return

As mentioned earlier, 234 questionnaires were mailed to 78 board members, 78 senior administrators and 78 faculty leaders. One hundred forty-one usable questionnaires were received which represented an overall return rate of 60%.

Table 7.1

### Rate of Return

Group	Sent	Received
Board Members	78	41 (53%)
Administrators	78	56 (72%)
Faculty Leaders	78	44 (56%)
Total	234	141 (60%)

Twelve other questionnaires were returned. They were not completed for a variety of reasons, e.g., respondent had moved, the respondent was recently deceased, lack of time to complete the questionnaire, a perceived lack of collective bargaining experience, a perception that the questionnaire was too sensitive to be completed. Unfortunately, after the cut-off date, i.e., end of February 1989, several individuals who had initially said that they were unable to complete the questionnaire, offered to complete it. Similarly, once the analysis was underway, a member of the provincial executive of



the BCGEU indicated a willingness to have the local BCGEU faculty leaders complete the survey. These offers were declined.

#### LIMITATIONS

Not unlike some of the earlier chapters, Chapter Seven has a number of limitations. As was expected, some of the board members selected to complete the questionnaire had no direct collective bargaining experience and therefore may not have been entirely familiar with the nuances of collective bargaining or the questionnaire's statements. Similarly, some board members were no longer active on a college board. Consequently, over time their opinions may have become influenced by other factors or they may not have accurately recalled their earlier experiences, impressions or opinions. While these factors may have affected the study's validity, the lack of information in the literature on board members' opinions of collective bargaining and the need to obtain such opinions outweighed the limitations. Similar charges could be levelled against some of the faculty leaders selected to complete the questionnaire. While the board members and the faculty leaders were selected in a comparable random manner, the senior administrators were not. While this may have contributed to a difference in the results, personal experience and the pre-survey interviews suggested that senior administrators tend to remain in their positions or comparable

positions for extended periods of time. Therefore, it was perceived that the process used to select the senior administrators would not distort the study's results. Another limitation of this section of the study is that the faculty sample did not include faculty leaders from any BCGEU vocational locals. As noted above, for a number of reasons, the names of the vocational faculty leaders were unavailable until after the questionnaire had been distributed and the analysis begun. With respect to this matter it can only be assumed that, given the comments in the pre-survey interviews and the factual data available on the separate vocational locals, the results may not have been exactly the same.

The questionnaire method itself had a number of built-in limitations. For example, questionnaires depend on the participants' interest in the topic to return the questionnaires, they are prone to rater error, and the researcher can not interact with the participants to clarify questions or to solicit additional information. Another limitation is that questionnaires are limited to a fairly short response time and therefore a questionnaire cannot include too many items. The overall research methodology attempted to counteract some of these limitations by including the pre-survey interviews, the chapter on institutional data and a brief analysis of the collective agreements.

Another limitation may have been the lack of a neutral option on the four point Likert Scales. While the researcher wanted people to state their opinions on specific issues, there were instances where people genuinely did not appear to have an opinion, e.g., due to a lack of personal experience. In these instances most people noted their lack of opinion by indicating just that, by leaving the question blank or by checking both Agree and Disagree. In these instances the data was treated as missing data.

## ANALYSIS

### Introduction

The data collected via the main survey was examined and described from several perspectives. These include a description of the analysis process, a descriptive profile of the respondents, and a detailed analysis of the three sections of the survey. There is also an examination of the collective responses to the first two sections of the questionnaire in relation to a number of the personal factors in the profile of the respondents.

### Analysis Process

Prior to the statistical analysis of the data, a number of steps were followed. As each questionnaire was received it was assigned a number for control purposes. On the basis that statements one through seventy-six were to be rated on a quasi-interval scale, which had a perceived equality of scale

intervals, the terms strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree were respectively assigned the numeric values of +2, +1, -1, -2. Statements one through seventy-six could then be evaluated using parametric and non-parametric statistics. The statements that described the respondents consisted of ratio scales, e.g, age, years of employment; and nominal scales, e.g., gender, political party preference. In these cases non-parametric statistics were used to examine the data. Wherever possible, the data was analyzed using the statistical package Minitab. A number of the statements describing the respondents had to be compiled by hand, e.g., board members occupation, subject disciplines.

Initially, Chi-square analysis was used to determine those statements where there was a difference between the expected and actual means at the 95% significance level. Where the means were not significantly different it was assumed that the sample populations came from the same population and therefore  $H_0$  was equal to  $H_1$ . Where the means were significantly different it was assumed that the samples came from different populations and  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ . Where there was a significant difference and  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ , the statements were subjected to one way analysis of variance, F Tests, in an attempt to better identify the source of the difference. In other words, was the significant difference between the senior administrators and the faculty leaders; between the administrators and the board members; or between

the faculty leaders and the board members? Descriptive statistics were used to determine the magnitude and the direction of the responses to all of the statements.

The next step in the analysis process was to determine whether there was any significant difference in the collective responses to statements one through forty-six in relationship to a number of the factors listed in the respondents' profiles. The combined or collective responses to each statement were examined in relationship to the personal factors. These latter factors included age, gender, years of employment or association, prior collective bargaining experience, and political preference. In Table 7.2, key words have been used to represent the factors used in the survey. A complete copy of the statements used is located in the Appendix.

Table 7.2

## PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Factor	Board	Administration	Faculty
Age			
range	33-71	36-59	34-60
mean	52.27	46.81	45.36
Gender			
male	26	52	36
female	15	4	8

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Factor	Board	Administration	Faculty
<hr/>			
Employed/Associated with this College			
range	1-15	1-22	3-21
mean	6.12	10.58	12.59
Length of time employed in present position			
range		1-15	
mean		5.69	
Prior faculty member			
no		23	
yes		33	
Current/Prior subject discipline			
university transfer		24	25
certificate/diploma		11	18
trades/vocational		6	6
other		1	2
Employment status			
part-time			0
full-time sessional			3
full-time regular			35
department head			8
Served on a collective bargaining team			
no	24	2	8
yes	17	53	36
I was a member of the			
employers' team at this college	14	44	1
employers' team with another organization	8	16	8
employees team at this college	0	6	35
employees team with another organization	0	9	0
Prefer the following federal political party			
Conservative	24	16	5
Liberal	5	11	7
New Democratic	1	4	25
Other	0	1	0

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### Profile of the Respondents

A similar but separate series of questions was used to obtain a descriptive profile of each of the three sample populations. The factors that were selected were based primarily on previous studies noted in Chapter Two: the literature review. For convenience, a discussion of the results follow immediately after the presentation of the data for each factor.

Age. The range of ages and the mean ages of the three sample groups turned out to be remarkably similar. A longitudinal study would be required to determine whether or not the average ages of the three populations had been or would remain relatively constant over a long period of time.

Upon reviewing the results, the average age of the senior administrators, 46.8 years, was lower than expected. There was no way of determining whether or not this mean had increased or decreased over the years in response to such environmental conditions as early retirements, institutional evaluations or faculty votes of non-confidence in college presidents. Given the relatively young age of many current senior administrators, the future administrative opportunities for existing college faculty members may be limited. Given the large number of faculty who appear to have moved into administrative positions, over 50% of the faculty leaders who responded to the questionnaire, the current situation could

restrict some faculty members' career mobility. The combination of the age of faculty who generally participate in negotiations and the limited career opportunities in administration could result in a number of frustrated faculty. This in turn could impact the bargaining process by creating additional tensions.

The data support the research noted in the literature review, that found it is the middle-aged faculty who are active as faculty leaders and who participate in the collective bargaining process. These data are also consistent with comments in the pre-survey interviews. Some of the literature suggest that this cohort is likely to be most concerned with Level I needs, e.g., job security, purchasing power, career mobility and Level II needs, e.g., opportunities to utilize their institutional experience in a college's decision making process. The research also suggests that people move in and out of the bargaining process according to their personal interests or needs. With regard to these two points, tensions between the faculty negotiators and the college negotiators may be more frequent, since many of the basic Level I labour issues may affect the faculty leaders personally. The data in Chapter Five support this observation in that the strike votes, strikes and individual grievances involved fundamental Level I needs. In view of the previous research in this area and given the average age of the faculty leaders, there appears to be a built-in potential for tension.



The board members' wide range of ages was not unexpected given the nature of board appointments. Unlike the senior administrators and the faculty leaders, the board members' age range suggests that they would probably bring diverse values, experiences and expectations to their positions. The difference in ages between the three populations may also be a potential source of tension.

Gender. The data suggest that there are some real differences in the composition of the three groups with respect to gender. While there appears to be a reasonable balance of men and women on the college boards, this balance does not appear to be reflected in the sample of faculty leaders or the sample of senior administrators. Overall there are few senior college administrators who are women.

There are several points worth mentioning in a discussion of the data. The material does not provide sufficient information on the ratio of women to men within the various faculty associations and who serve on the faculty association executives or negotiating teams. The only indication of this ratio comes from Statistics Canada's 1987-88 report, "Education in Canada". The report indicates that in British Columbia, males account for 70% of the community college instructional staff and females account for 30%. In this study's sample of faculty leaders, males represent 82% of the sample population while females account for 18%. In terms of

gender it would appear that the composition of the faculty leaders may not reflect the actual composition of the faculty associations.

Years Employed or Associated With The College. While the ranges in this area were similar, there was a difference in the means of the three sample populations. The data suggest, on average, that both the senior administrators and the faculty leaders had been employed by the college for some time, i.e., 10.6 years and 12.6 years respectively. In spite of their long association with their colleges, the senior administrators had, on average, only been in their position for 5.7 years. For over 50% of the senior administrators, approximately half of their time at the college had been spent as a faculty member. The average number of years that the board members had been associated with their respective colleges was roughly half as long as the other two groups, i.e., 6.1 years. This latter figure was approximately the same length of time as the senior administrators had been in their current positions.

A couple of observations emerge from the results. Although over half of the administrators had been a faculty member and had only been in their current positions for approximately 6 years, there was a substantial difference in the political preferences of the faculty leaders and the senior administrators. The data indicate that the faculty leaders and the senior administrators would in many cases be

negotiating with former academic colleagues. It would be interesting to determine the impact, if any, on the negotiation process of these two points.

Subject Discipline. The data indicate that the majority of the senior administrators who originally came from the faculty ranks and the current faculty leaders, share similar academic backgrounds, i.e. university transfer programs.

This data raises a number of points. Since the university transfer faculty leaders appear to be a dominant force, there may be a tendency to emulate the university model of governance and seek university type benefits, e.g. Level II professional benefits. The university model of governance may or may not mesh with the most appropriate model of governance for a community college. This could lead to additional tensions between the faculty associations and the college administrations, e.g. management rights, professional expectations.

Faculty Employment Status. The data indicate that the majority of the current faculty leaders are full-time regular college employees.

There is no way of knowing how these figures relate to the proportion of part-time sessional, full-time sessional or full-time regular faculty in the various colleges. For whatever reason, the part-time and sessional staff do not appear to be members of the faculty association executives or

the collective bargaining teams. If the part-time members of these faculty associations do not participate by choice that is one thing, but if they are excluded, then that could be a point of contention within the various faculty associations. In the event that the needs of the part-time and sessional staff aren't addressed because of their absence from the negotiating committees, then more tension could result. These groups may feel that the colleges do not care about them or respect them.

Prior Collective Bargaining Experience. The data on prior collective bargaining experience brought to light a number of differences among the three populations. A number of board members did not respond to this question. Those who did revealed that, compared to the other two groups, fewer board members had served on a collective bargaining team. This corroborates the data from the pre-survey interviews, which suggested that few board members are directly involved in the collective bargaining process. Of the 17 board members who had served on a bargaining team, approximately half had served on another employer's negotiating team. The sample population with the most collective bargaining experience and with the greatest breadth of experience was the senior administrators. Although the faculty leaders had a lot of collective experience, they lacked the breadth of experience of the senior administrators.

In spite of their extensive collective bargaining experience, the pre-survey interviews and institutional data suggest that the faculty leaders' experience is somewhat negated by the low participation and continuity rates of the faculty negotiators. As pointed out in the literature and the pre-survey interviews, the lack of experience may contribute to rigid positions during the negotiation process and thus increase the level of competition. The pre-survey interviews and the institutional data also indicate that the colleges may not be taking full advantage of the board members' prior labour relations experience.

Political Preference. Judging by the appended comments, the respondent's political views are a very private and emotional matter. The data indicate that the board members prefer the political right of centre, the senior administrators lean toward the right of centre and the faculty leaders prefer the left of centre.

These data support the research literature and the comments made during the pre-survey interviews. Although the faculty leaders and the senior administrators appear to have come from the same chronological era and therefore are likely to have had common educational, social and cultural experiences, they clearly approach the bargaining table with different political values. It is not unrealistic to suggest that their political preferences are a proxy for their personal

philosophical values. The data suggest that philosophically there are really only two populations, i.e. the board member-senior administrators population and the faculty leaders population, and not three populations. This dichotomy of values is somewhat surprising in view of the fact, as mentioned earlier, that approximately 50% of the senior administrators are former faculty members. The literature suggests that when matters of principle are involved, e.g. Level II items, any disagreements will likely be more intense than when only Level I issues are involved.

Occupations of Board Members. The occupations of the board members who responded to this particular question were arranged into broad groups and tabulated by hand. The figures below demonstrate that the board members generally represent the professional and business sectors of their respective communities.

18 Professionals, e.g., lawyers, doctors, accountants, dentists

10 Business, e.g., personnel managers, travel agents, real estate agents, health care administrators, business consultants

10 Miscellaneous, e.g., retired, teachers, housewives, ministers, community volunteers

This material suggests that there may be a positive relationship between the board members' political values and their occupations. It is quite probable that their conservative or right wing values have an effect on the policies of the colleges and hence on the collective bargaining process. Therefore, the continuing appointment of board members from similar backgrounds could well contribute to more labour tensions in the colleges.

#### Opinions of Collective Bargaining

In addition to obtaining a broad overview of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges, one of the research problems was to examine the opinions of the three sample populations regarding two aspects of collective bargaining; competition and governance. This section of the chapter presents the relevant data related to competition and governance, and discusses the findings.

Competition. As noted earlier, the literature suggested that there were a number of factors that reduced the level of cooperation and increased the level of competition during negotiations. It suggested that competition was not productive, but rather dysfunctional. In the literature and the pre-survey interviews some of the key factors that characterized competition included a lack of trust, a lack of respect, inexperienced negotiators, too many items on the bargaining table, too many rules and regulations, and

adversarial or win-lose attitudes. Each of these concepts formed part of the eight statements to which the sample populations were asked to respond. For example, one of the statements in the survey was: At this college inexperienced negotiators contribute to the difficulties often experienced during negotiations. Using key words, e.g. inexperience, from the eight statements, Table 7.3 summarizes the findings.

Table 7.3

## Opinions of Collective Bargaining, Competition

Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
1. inexperience	21.226(*)	a 0.091 f 0.568 b -0.538	a/f 3.52(*) a/b 5.39(*) f/b 14.81(*)
3. trust	31.602(*)	a -0.073 f -0.767 b 0.541	a/f 8.62(*) a/b 6.75(*) f/b 24.83(*)
5. adversarial	4.943	a 0.018 f 0.045 b -0.415	
7. rules/regulations	16.424(*)	a -0.250 f -0.977 b -0.474	a/f 10.34(*) a/b .84 f/b 5.02(*)
9. admin./contest	39.721(*)	a -0.411 f 0.860 b -0.634	a/f 31.58(*) a/b .94 f/b 36.73(*)
11. faculty/contest	3.446	a 0.232 f 0.136 b -0.073	



Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
13. respect	33.330(*)	a 0.113 f -0.614 b 0.650	a/f 9.02(*) a/b 6.20(*) f/b 25.51(*)
15. too many issues	13.920(*)	a 0.832 f -0.140 b -0.103	a/f 4.49(*) a/b 4.15(*) f/b 0.02

Note: (\*) Significant difference,  $H_0 \neq H_1$

Chi-square analysis identified those statements where the responses were not from the same population at the .95 significance level. Of the eight statements associated with competition, there were six instances where there was a significant difference in the responses and where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ . Seventy-five percent of the time there was a difference in the responses with respect to such matters as trust, respect, win-lose attitudes of the administrative negotiators, the relative value of prior negotiating experience, the number of issues brought to the bargaining table, and the constraints imposed by the rules and regulations of the various collective agreements.

Those statements where  $H_0$  was not to equal to  $H_1$  were subjected to one-way analysis of variance. The purpose of the test was to determine if there was a significant difference between the senior administrators and the faculty leaders (a/f

group), the senior administrators and the board members (a/b group), and the faculty leaders and the board members (f/b group). In addition to the table in the Appendix which describes the complete results of the F Test analysis, Table 7.4 summarizes the findings:

Table 7.4

Competition, Variance

Group	Competition	
	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1
a/f	1	5
a/b	2	4
f/b	1	5
Total	4	14

Eighty-three percent of the time there was a significant difference of opinion between the administrators and the faculty leaders, and an 83% difference between the faculty and the board members. The figures also point out that 67% of the time, there was a significant difference between the senior administrators and the board members.

The data suggest that for the most part, the three sample populations come from distinct populations. These differences of opinion regarding the industrial climates of the colleges,

indicate that there is the potential for misunderstanding and tensions. Although the interviews and institutional data suggested that there may be a significant difference between the views of the a/f group and the f/b group, the difference between the a/b group was unexpected. In the next section, each of the eight statements is examined along with a discussion of the results.

1. At this college inexperienced negotiators contribute to the difficulties often experienced during negotiations.

There was not a significant difference of opinion between the senior administrators and the faculty leaders. The two groups tend to agree with the statement. The board members, on the other hand, did not agree with the statement. There was a significant difference between the a/b and f/b groups, with the greatest difference of opinion between the faculty leaders and the board members.

In both the literature and the pre-survey interviews, prior negotiating experience was identified as a positive and necessary ingredient in the negotiating process. The lack of negotiating experience was generally viewed as an undesirable element and one which contributed to competition. The data suggest that the two groups most familiar with negotiations, the faculty and the administrators, recognize the importance of prior collective bargaining experience. The group with the least exposure to negotiations, the board members, do not

appear to appreciate the importance of prior experience and its negative implications.

3. At this college there is trust between the administration negotiators and the faculty negotiators.

The board members agreed that there was trust between the negotiating teams. The administrators and the faculty leaders disagreed with the statement. The direction and magnitude of the faculty leaders' response to this statement illustrates the substantial difference of opinion between the faculty leaders and the board members.

An absence of trust between the two parties at the negotiating table was cited, in both the literature and the interviews, as one of the major factors which contribute to a competitive negotiating climate. The data suggest that those most familiar with bargaining, the faculty leaders and the administrators, both feel there is a lack of trust in the colleges. Those most unfamiliar with collective bargaining, the board members, appear to be unaware of this critical problem.

5. Collective Bargaining is too adversarial at this college.

The Chi-square analysis indicated that the responses to this statement could have occurred by chance alone. Although there is a difference in the direction of the responses by the three sample populations, there is no significant difference

in the opinions of the three sample populations. The three groups are from the same population and the results are inconclusive.

Considering the comments in the literature and the interviews regarding the adversarial nature of the distributive model of collective bargaining, it is somewhat surprising that the responses to this statement are inconclusive. Yet, the results are significant in that they reflect the diverse feelings about this approach to collective bargaining. A number of the researchers indicated that in spite of its shortcomings the distributive form of collective bargaining will be the cornerstone of negotiations for some time to come. On the other hand, some of those interviewed felt very strongly that there was nothing wrong with the current form of collective bargaining. It could be that the faculty leaders who disagree with this statement are expressing similar sentiments to those expressed in response to statement 16. In this latter case, they agree that collective bargaining has improved the administration of their respective colleges.

7. The collective agreement at this college places too much emphasis on rules and regulations.

All three parties disagree that their respective collective agreements place too much emphasis on rules and regulations. There is, however, a difference in the intensity of feelings.

The faculty disagree much more strongly with the statement than the senior administrators, who only marginally disagree with the statement. The responses from the senior administrators and the board members indicate that they come from the same population. There is a significant difference in the responses between the a/f and f/b groups.

Open systems theory suggests that rules and regulations are boundary spanning mechanisms that limit the power and the behaviour of both parties. The literature suggests that the less trust there is, the more one side perceives an imbalance in the organizational power equilibrium or the less opportunities there are to participate in an organization's decision making process, the more pressure there is to increase the number of rules, e.g., clauses, so as to restore the balance of power. The responses are somewhat surprising given the complexity and the comprehensive nature of a number of the collective agreements. The data appear to suggest that the faculty leaders are of the opinion that more rules, e.g. comprehensive contracts, are needed to compensate for the lack of trust and respect between the two sides, as well as the perceived win-lose attitudes of the college's negotiators. The latter perception was noted in the responses to statement 9. In light of the comments in the pre-survey interviews that suggested the college administrators had given away too many management rights, it is surprising that the senior administrators and the board members do not agree with

the statement. In this case, the board members may be unaware of the administrative implications of comprehensive contracts. The administrators, as noted in statement 4 in the section on governance, may not really be overly concerned about comprehensive contracts since they do not feel that collective bargaining has eroded their power.

9. The administration negotiators at this college tend to view collective bargaining as a contest in which one side wins and the other side loses.

The administrators and the board members disagree with the statement and they are from the same population. The faculty leaders agree with the statement and are not from the same population as the other two groups. This statement elicited the largest significant difference between the administrators and the faculty and between the faculty and the board members.

The data indicate that the faculty leaders perceive the college's negotiating teams to be adversarial and competitively oriented. While the responses to the adversarial nature of collective bargaining in statement 5 were inconclusive, the results in this case leave little doubt that generally, there are competitive collective bargaining climates in the colleges.

11. The faculty negotiators at this college tend to view collective bargaining as a contest in which one side wins and the other side loses.

Although the board members and the senior administrators agree with the statement and the faculty leaders do not, the Chi-square analysis suggests that all of the responses come from the same population. In other words, there is not a significant difference in the responses and  $H_0$  is equal to  $H_1$ .

The results are inconclusive and could have occurred by chance alone.

13. At this college there is mutual respect between the faculty and the board.

The analysis of the responses to this statement indicate that the three samples are not from the same population. The administrators and the board members both agree that there is mutual respect between the board and the faculty. There is, however, a significant difference of opinion between the administrators and the board members. The faculty leaders disagree with the statement and they are from a different population than the other two groups.

Respect, like trust, was one of the factors cited in the literature and the interviews as a necessary ingredient for a positive and cooperative negotiating environment. Like the statements on trust and the administrators win-lose attitudes, this statement produced a large difference of opinion between the board members and the faculty. The difference echoes the comments in the pre-survey interviews which suggested that there is a lack of mutual respect between the parties.



Contrary to the faculty opinions expressed in the interviews and in response to this statement, the board members evidently are of the opinion that they respect the faculty.

15. At this college one or both of the parties bring too many issues to the bargaining table.

The senior administrators agree with the statement, thereby echoing the administrative perception expressed in the interviews, that faculty negotiators often bring too many issues to the table. Both the faculty leaders and the board members disagree with the statement. This difference in the direction of the responses results in a significant difference of opinion between the a/f and a/b groups.

It was suggested in the interviews that the faculty place too many issues on the bargaining table. It was the perception that this lack of bargaining priorities makes it more difficult to reach a settlement. The literature suggested that a lack of priorities tends to result in unnecessarily rigid positions which in turn contribute to a competitive bargaining climate. This complements the data in Chapters 5 and 6, which comment on the complexity of the contracts associated with heterogeneous combined academic-vocational faculty associations and the resulting behaviour, e.g. long lag times.

Undoubtedly, these faculty leaders may place many items on the bargaining table since they represent a large, complex and

diverse community. While inexperienced negotiators may bring too many items to the bargaining table and may lack bargaining priorities, experienced negotiators may deliberately produce a long list of demands. In the latter case they may want to draw attention to some of their concerns but never intend to negotiate them. The board members may feel that neither side places too many items on the table. Yet, since so few board members actually participate in collective bargaining, they may be unaware of the apparent concern of the senior administrators and the resulting behaviour.

The preceding data suggest that in addition to the natural tensions associated with negotiations, many of the factors associated with a competitive collective bargaining environment are present in British Columbia's colleges. These include a perceived or a real lack of trust and respect, inexperience, a win-lose attitude toward bargaining by the administrative teams, and a perception that the faculty leaders often lack bargaining priorities and therefore place too many items on the table. The difference between the administrators and the faculty leaders and between the faculty leaders and the board members was not unexpected. The variation between the administrators and the board members, however, was not anticipated. Considering the average lack of tenure on college boards, the lack of participation and the relative inexperience in the collective bargaining process, college board members may be isolated from the realities of

the colleges' labour relations and collective bargaining climates. Taking into account the right wing political values of the board members and the senior administrators, it may be that there is not really a substantial difference between these two sample populations. The difference may only be in their relative awareness of the current industrial relations climates in their respective colleges. The preceding data complements some of the comments in the interviews and suggests that the general collective bargaining environment in the colleges is adversarial and competitive. The other part of this section of the survey included the sample populations' opinion of a number of governance related matters.

Governance. In the tradition of postsecondary education, governance plays a large role and is most closely associated with the Level II needs of professional employees. Although governance covers a wide spectrum, eight governance factors, e.g. opportunities for faculty to participate in a college's decision making processes, impact of personalities on governance, were selected from the literature and the pre-survey interviews. They were then framed in the form of statements. For example: In addition to collective bargaining, there are many other opportunities at this college for the faculty to participate in the college's decision making process. The intent was to determine whether the three sample populations agreed or disagreed with the statement and

to determine whether the three sample populations were from the same or different populations. Using key words from each of the eight statements, Table 7.5 presents the findings.

Table 7.5

## Opinions of Collective Bargaining, Governance

Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
2. decision making	34.495(*)	a 1.429 f 0.159 b 1.500	a/f 32.54(*) a/b 2.80 f/b 14.42(*)
4. autonomy eroded	15.666(*)	a -0.073 f -0.786 b -0.512	a/f 9.22(*) a/b 3.14 f/b 1.04
6. management style	5.174	a 0.800 f 1.023 b 0.737	
8. less collegiality	14.640(*)	a 0.304 f 0.068 b -0.390	a/f .83 a/b 8.48(*) f/b 2.79
10. personalities	6.643	a 0.964 f 0.727 b 0.500	
12. economic issues	8.901	a -0.109 f -0.465 b -0.077	
14. faculty/power	4.628	a 0.833 f 1.114 b 0.750	

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Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
<hr/>			
16. improved admin.	28.111(*)	a -0.365	a/f 10.65(*)
		f 0.442	a/b .15
		b -0.405	f/b 9.81(*)

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Note: (\*) Significant difference,  $H_0 \neq H_1$

Chi-square analysis identified those statements where the responses were or were not from the same population at the .95 significance level. Of the eight statements dealing with governance, the data suggest that 50% of the time there is a significant difference in the opinions of the three sample populations. There was not a significant difference between the three sample populations with respect to four areas: the impact of the president's management style on collective bargaining, the impact of personalities on the collective bargaining process, the relative value of Level I needs to Level II needs, and the perception of the faculty's desire to maintain a balance of power. In these latter cases the responses are statistically from the same population and  $H_0$  is equal to  $H_1$ . On the other hand, the responses indicate that the three groups are not from the same population and that  $H_0$  is not equal to  $H_1$  in such areas as collegiality, the opportunities for the faculty to participate in a college's decision making process, the impact of collective bargaining

on administrative autonomy and the impact of collective bargaining on the management of the college.

Those statements where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ , were subjected to one way analysis of variance or the F Test. The purpose of the tests was to determine if there was a significant difference between the senior administrators and the faculty leaders (a/f), the senior administrators and the board members (a/b) or the faculty leaders and the board members (f/b). In addition to the table in the Appendix which describes the complete results of the F Test analysis, a summary follows:

Table 7.6

Governance, Variance

Group	Competition	
	$H_0 = H_1$	$H_0 \neq H_1$
a/f	1	3
a/b	3	1
f/b	2	2
Total	6	6

Table 7.6 indicates that while overall there is less divergence of opinion related to governance than to competition, there is still a substantial amount of difference

between the opinions of the administrators and the faculty leaders. There is, however, less of a difference between the administrators and the board members on these more value oriented issues. The inherent values of the board members and the administrators appear to be more in line with each other. This was also noted in the statement related to their political preference. There appears to be two populations: the board-administrators population and the faculty leaders population. Where as the board members may not have been aware of the reality of the internal labour relations climates as described by the factors associated with competition, this data probably describes their management philosophy.

The eight statements related to governance issues are examined in detail. Each response includes the results and a discussion of the findings.

2. In addition to collective bargaining, there are many other opportunities at this college for the faculty to participate in the college's decision making process.

All three sample populations agree that there are other opportunities for the faculty to participate in the colleges' decision making processes. There is, however, a difference in the magnitude of opinion among the three groups. While the faculty leaders only marginally agree with the statement, the board members and the administrators feel quite strongly about the availability of such opportunities for the faculty. The board members and the administrators are from the same

population, but there is a significant difference between the a/f and f/b sample populations.

Participatory decision making, a critical concept in higher education, is a Level II factor. The board members and the administrators perceive that there are opportunities for the faculty to participate in college governance. On the other hand, the data suggest that the faculty, as noted in the interviews, are not completely satisfied with their role in institutional decision making. This may, as noted in the interviews, be related to the faculty's desire for more comprehensive Level I and Level II collective agreements. This in turn reflects the struggle for a balance of power between management rights and the expectations of the faculty leaders. Considering the different expectations of the three types of faculty associations noted in the interviews and reflected in the associated collective agreements, this struggle for Level II needs may be more intense in the separate academic and combined associations. In these types of associations, it is conceivable that the lack of genuine opportunities for the faculty to participate in a college's decision making process could lead to an increased demand for more comprehensive agreements. This could lead to more rules and regulations, which in turn could result in increased levels of competition.



4. Collective bargaining has eroded the administration's autonomy at this college.

All three sample populations disagree that collective bargaining has eroded the administration's autonomy. The F Test suggests that the opinions of the faculty and the board members come from the same population. The administrators are a different population as there is a significant difference between the opinions of the administrators and the faculty leaders regarding this matter. While the administrators only very marginally disagree with the statement, the faculty leaders feel quite strongly about the issue.

This data and the interviews suggest that the faculty may feel that the college administrations have too much power. This is reflected in some of the faculty's comments during the interviews related to equal access to institutional information and the faculty's call for comprehensive collective agreements.

The administrator's response was unexpected given that collective agreements can limit an administration's powers. During the interviews, the faculty representatives also noted that management may attempt to recapture a number of management rights. Yet, it may be that collective bargaining and the resulting agreements have enhanced the autonomy of the college administrations, not diminished it. What flexibility, departmental freedom, and informal arrangements may have existed prior to certification have been replaced by

a more formal process. The latter may allow the college administrations to legally control the faculty via the formal process of bargaining, by forcing the faculty to focus on Level I items rather than on the more limiting Level II items, by accepting less comprehensive agreements than they really desire, by restrictive clauses in the contracts, or by limiting access to institutional information.

6. Even though a college president may not be at the bargaining table, the management style of the president influences the amount of tension during negotiations.

The Chi-square analysis revealed that the three groups agree that the management style of a college president influences a college's industrial relations climate. The data indicate that the three sample populations are also from the same population.

The pre-survey interviews suggest that the management style of the president sets the tone of a college's labour relations climate. For example, the inference is that if the president is autocratic, favours strong management rights, does not encourage open communications and the exchange of information, or does not provide opportunities for the faculty to participate in the governance of the college, then there may be a faculty backlash during negotiations. This may take the form of more demands placed on the table, more comprehensive agreements, more rules, less trust, and less flexibility in

bargaining positions. All of these could result in more competition between the parties involved. The concept of a backlash is related to the responses to statement 14. The latter indicates that the faculty will move to restore a perceived imbalance of organizational power. These responses underscore some of the comments in the interviews related to the impact and importance of individual personalities on collective bargaining.

8. At this college collective bargaining has reduced the collegiality between the administrators and the faculty.

While the board members disagree with the statement, the administrators and the faculty leaders agree that collective bargaining has reduced the level of collegiality between the two groups. The F Test indicates that the f/b and a/f responses are not significantly different and that the administrators and the faculty leaders are from the same population. The administrator's perspective and the perspective of the board members are significantly different. These two sample populations are from different populations.

The perceived reduction in collegiality, e.g., cooperation, participation in decision making, may be a result of a more formalized process and the restrictive agreements. The situation may be further aggravated by other factors, e.g. a lack of trust, a lack of mutual respect, the faculty's perceived win-lose attitudes of the administrators, and the

difference in the respective political values. As previously noted, the college administrations also may be able to control the faculty associations via the bargaining process. These factors likely have all contributed to the decline of collegiality within the colleges. It could be that the board members, especially the newer ones, are simply not aware of the decline in collegiality. This view is consistent with the earlier observation that the board members are somewhat isolated from their college's internal labour relations climate.

10. At this college the amount of conflict during negotiations is determined by the personalities at the table.

The three sample populations agreed with this statement. The Chi-square analysis indicate that they all came from the same population.

As in the case of statement 6 and the pre-survey interviews, personalities appear to play a major role in setting the tone of an institution's labour relations and collective bargaining climate. All three groups recognize the importance of personalities and appear to realize that governance is more than policies and procedures; it is also people. Although there is no data to support the following personal opinion, in view of the literature and the interviews, it may be that the climate of negotiations could

depend on the competitive values of those involved, i.e. faculty leaders, administrators, board members.

12. Economic issues, e.g., salaries, are more important to the faculty at this college than professional issues, e.g., faculty participation in academic decisions.

All three of the sample populations marginally disagree that economic issues or Level I needs are more important to the faculty than professional issues or Level II needs. The results also show that there is not a significant difference in the responses of the three groups and hence, they all come from the same population.

The data suggest that Level II needs are at least equally important as Level I needs to the faculty leaders. This data is consistent with one academically oriented faculty representative's comments during the interviews. The representative called for comprehensive Level I and Level II collective agreements. The data in Chapter 5, however, suggest that the faculty may be prepared to fight harder for Level I items than Level II items. For example, most of the faculty associations' strike votes and strikes, as well as many of the individual faculty grievances, are related to Level I issues.

In retrospect, the reverse of this statement should have been asked in order to determine whether or not professional

issues were perceived to be more important to the faculty than basic economic or Level I needs.

14. When the faculty perceive that they lack the power to influence a college's decision making process, there is likely to be more tension at the bargaining table.

All three groups agree with the statement. The three sample populations come from the same general population. The position of the three sample populations support the research which indicate that groups move to counter a disturbance in an organization's equilibrium of power.

At the core of this statement are the open systems theory concepts of autonomy, centralization and the balance of power. The faculty leaders' desire to retain a balance of power may manifest itself in such ways as demands for more comprehensive agreements. Such demands could produce less emphasis on bargaining priorities and a rigidity of bargaining positions, which in turn could result in more competition.

6. Collective bargaining has improved the administration of this college.

The administrators and the board members do not feel that collective bargaining has improved the administration of their respective colleges. The faculty leaders, on the other hand, agree that collective bargaining has improved the administration of their respective colleges. While the board

members and the administrators are from the same population, there is a significant difference between the a/f and f/b groups.

In spite of the fact that the faculty leaders feel that collective bargaining has resulted in less collegiality and has not eroded the administration's power, they feel that collective bargaining has improved the administration of their respective colleges. From their perspective, the collective agreements have likely reduced the capricious and unilateral actions of college boards and administrators and provided a legal process to remedy mutual difficulties. The interviews suggested that in some cases, management had lost a number of management rights.

Governance is part of the culture of postsecondary education and the literature treats it as a Level II professional need or expectation. The opinions of the faculty leaders regarding the impact of collective bargaining on management rights, collegiality, participatory decision opportunities, and improved administration, do not necessarily coincide with the views of the other two groups. It appears that although collective bargaining may have reduced collegiality, the faculty leaders perceive that it has improved the administration of the colleges. At the same time, collective bargaining may have strengthened the hand of college administrations, in the sense that the latter now have a powerful legal vehicle for limiting the scope of collective

bargaining as well as the powers of the faculty and the faculty associations. Governance is more than a sterile process and the respondents appear to recognize that governance is influenced by the people and their personalities, e.g. values. The responses of the board members appear to suggest that they may be partially unaware of the impact of collective bargaining on such areas as collegiality. In this section on governance issues there is not the same divergence of opinion among the three sample populations as in the section on competition. These governance issues are critical matters for the colleges. The presence of tensions associated with professional needs, management rights, management styles and personalities, coupled with a competitive labour climate could prove to be counter productive.

#### Scope of Collective Bargaining

The second major section of the survey dealt with the scope of the collective agreements. Respondents were asked whether or not the various items should or should not be included in a collective agreement. A complete copy of this section of the survey and the results are located in the appendix. As with the sections on competition and governance, the results are immediately followed by a brief discussion of the results.

Not unlike the first section of the survey, this section was split into two sub-sections. The odd numbered statements



represent the basic or Level I needs of the faculty. The even numbered statements represent the higher level professional or Level II needs of the faculty. Since the items are representative of these two types of issues it is not necessary to examine the response to each item in detail. An overall or global perspective is an adequate treatment of the data.

A Chi-square analysis of the respondent's responses revealed a substantial difference in the opinions expressed. In the case of both Level I and Level II items, there was a high incidence of instances where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ . Table 7.7 summarizes this latter point.

Table 7.7

Scope

	$H_0=H_1$	$H_0 \neq H_1$
Level I	0	15
Level II	2	13

There is a significant difference in the responses to all 15 Level I items. The largest variations are associated with items that have an impact on employee stability, e.g., job security, restrictions on a college's ability to contract out,

procedures for the appointment of part-time faculty to full-time faculty, and retraining of redundant faculty. In the case of the 15 Level II items listed, there is a significant difference in 13 of the responses. The largest variations in this section are associated with a number of key professional issues, e.g., faculty participation in the selection of other faculty, faculty participation in the selection of department heads, workloads and access to personnel files.

In an effort to locate the source of the difference, the responses, where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ , were subjected to one-way analysis of variance. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 list the results of the F Tests for the Level I and the Level II items. In the case of both Level I and Level II needs, the responses show that the administrators and the board members come from the same population. The faculty leaders do not come from the same population as either the board members or the senior administrators.

Table 7.8

Scope, F Test, Level I Needs

Group	Level I	
	$H_0=H_1$	$H_0 \neq H_1$
a/f	1	14
a/b	15	0
f/b	3	12

Table 7.9

Scope, F Test, Level II Needs

Group	Level II	
	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1
a/f	1	12
a/b	10	3
f/b	0	13

In reviewing the data, the results indicate that there is a significant difference between the college administrations and their instructors related to the scope of the collective agreements. The faculty leaders' position is consistent with the views expressed by the faculty representatives during the pre-survey interviews, in that they both favour comprehensive agreements. While the BCGEU representatives in the interviews favoured comprehensive Level I agreements, the more academically oriented representatives indicated that they favour comprehensive Level I and Level II contracts. The survey data support the notion that the academically oriented associations and faculty leaders want comprehensive Level I and Level II contracts. Several of the faculty representatives interviewed felt that the college administrations would fight to regain some of their lost management rights. This suggests that these interview

participants felt that the college administrations did not favour comprehensive Level II agreements. The survey data is consistent with this view.

In addition to their different political views, it appears that the colleges and their employees approach the collective bargaining process with substantially different views of what should or should not be in a collective agreement. These differences could result in a lack of bargaining priorities and too many items being placed on the bargaining agenda. This, coupled with the negotiators inexperience, could result in rigid negotiating positions. The end result could be less cooperation and more competition.

An examination of the direction of the responses helps to clarify the various positions of the three sample populations. Tables 7.10 and 7.11 show the direction of the responses of the three sample populations with respect to the Level I and Level II items listed in the survey.

Table 7.10

Scope, Direction of Responses, Level I Needs

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Group	Level I	
	Agree	Disagree

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a	13	2
b	14	1
f	12	3

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Table 7.11

Scope, Direction of Responses, Level II Needs

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Group	Level II	
	Agree	Disagree

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a	9	6
b	7	8
f	14	1

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Table 7.10 shows that, in spite of the difference in their positions, all three parties agree that the majority of the Level I items should be included in a collective agreement. There is more disagreement, however, with respect to the Level II items. The only Level II item that the faculty leaders feel should not be in a collective agreement is a college's mission statement. The board members and the administrators, on the other hand, are not comfortable with contracts that contain many of the Level II items listed in the survey. The administrators and the board members generally perceive that such items as academic freedom, faculty participation in the selection of various levels of personnel, faculty participation on various college committees and the freedom to do external consulting should not be in the collective agreements.

The interviews, the analysis of the contracts, and this data related to the scope of the collective agreements, suggest that the faculty want comprehensive agreements. This data supports the earlier observation that the more academically oriented associations want comprehensive Level I and Level II contracts. In part this may be due to the diverse professional expectations of the faculty involved. It also likely reflects the industrial relations climates of the respective colleges, e.g. the level of trust, the level of respect, the need to restore a balance of power, the management style of the president, the personalities involved, and the opportunities for the faculty to participate in a college's decision making process. The faculty associations' quest for comprehensive agreements enshrines aspects of governance, e.g. faculty participation on various college committees, in the collective agreements, rather than depend on the good will of a college's senior administration or board.

Since Level II items involve professional expectations, matters of principle or academic culture, they may clash with management rights. If, as mentioned in the pre-survey interviews, a college's administration perceives that it gave away too much in earlier rounds of bargaining and attempt to realign the balance of power, negotiations could become particularly contentious. The issue of the scope of the collective agreements is fundamentally tied to the open

systems concepts of response to environmental changes, autonomy, centralization and the cyclical ebb and flow of organizational power.

#### Statements and Profile Factors

One of the research problems was to attempt to determine if there was a significant difference in the responses to the statements on competition, governance and the scope of the collective agreements, in view of a number of the personal factors, e.g., age, gender, political preference. One way analysis of variance was used to determine whether or not there was a significant difference of opinion associated with statements one through forty-six and five of the factors from the section on the profile of the respondents. The combined responses of the three sample populations to each statement were used. The five factors which were selected were representative of the types of influential factors mentioned in the literature. They included age, gender, years of employment or association with a college, prior collective bargaining experience and preferred federal political party.

Table 7.12 presents the findings in terms of a ratio. The first number in the ratio indicates the number of statements in a category where there is a significant difference. The second number in the ration represents the total number of statements in that category of the survey. For example, the ration 5:8 with respect to the two categories of competition

and political party, means that there is a significant difference in 5 out of 8 of the statements.

Table 7.12

Selected Profile Factors

FACTOR	COMPETITION	GOVERNANCE	SCOPE	
			LEVEL I	LEVEL II
Age	2:8	1:8	7:15	5:15
Gender	1:8	0:8	0:15	0:15
Years of Employment	0:8	0:8	6:15	1:15
Prior member of a CB team	1:8	0:8	4:15	1:15
Political Party	5:8	3:8	13:15	13:15

The data suggest that the significant difference in the participants' responses to the statements on competition, governance, Level I needs and Level II needs, varies according to the personal factors involved. For example, a person's age, gender, years of association with a college or prior bargaining experience appear to have little to do with their view of the internal industrial relations climate, e.g. competitive factors, governance factors. Yet, a person's age, years of association with a college, and prior collective



bargaining, appear to be associated with their opinions of the Level I items. A person's age also appears to impact on their opinions of the Level II factors. In this study, gender does not appear to be associated with the formation of the participants' responses.

Of all of the factors involved in this portion of the data analysis, a person's political preference is the most dominant variable associated with the variation in the participant's responses to the statements on competition, governance, and the scope of the collective agreements. The profile of the respondents revealed that the three sample populations generally come from two populations. It indicates that the board members and the senior administrators tend to come from the political right, while the faculty leaders tend to come from the political left. This dichotomy of values complements the dichotomy found in the participants' responses to the statements on the scope of the collective agreements.

The data in Table 7.12 is comparable to the research literature that found age and political preferences play a role in determining peoples' views of collective bargaining. For example, the data parallel the research that found it was the middle aged cohort and those with approximately 10 years experience that were active in the bargaining process. Unlike many of the other factors, a person's political preference appears to have a major influence on their view of a college's industrial relations climate and the scope of the collective

agreements. The dichotomy of underlying values between the board members-senior administrators group and the faculty leaders group may be one of the greatest sources of tension in the collective bargaining process.

#### Proposed Modifications

The purpose of this section of the survey was to solicit and determine the responses of the three sample populations to a number of possible modifications to the current collective bargaining process. Unlike the earlier two sections of the questionnaire, there are no sub-divisions within this section. The statements are a representative selection of the many potential modifications to the current collective bargaining process. The proposed modifications came from the literature, the pre-survey interviews, the factual institutional data, the analysis of the contracts, the researcher's advisors and from personal experience.

Chi-square analysis was used to identify those statements where there was a significant difference in the responses and where the representative groups were not from the same population. The statements were examined in terms of the three sample populations' tendency to agree or disagree with the statements. As in the earlier sections, the statements where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$  were subjected to one-way analysis of variance. The Chi-square analysis revealed that

there were 15 statements where  $H_0$  was equal to  $H_1$  and 15 statements where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ .

The results show that of the 15 statements, or proposed modifications, where there was no significant difference in the responses, there were 11 cases where the three sample populations agreed with the modifications and 2 cases where they all disagreed with the modifications. There were also two instances where the results were inconclusive.

The 11 cases where  $H_0$  was equal to  $H_1$  and the sample populations all agreed, included the following statements:

48. Board members, administrators and faculty should participate in joint problem solving training sessions.

49. The administration negotiating team and the faculty negotiating team should meet regularly during the life of a contract so they can monitor the effect of the collective agreement.

50. Each college should establish a joint Administration-Faculty Labour Relations Committee.

56. There should be a single source, e.g., Bursar, of common institutional information for the faculty negotiating team and the administration bargaining team.

57. Joint administration-faculty committees should be used to research items of mutual interest to the two bargaining teams.

58. During the life of a collective agreement, emerging labour issues should be dealt with before the expiration of the agreement, e.g. quarterly, semi-annually.

60. Rather than exchanging lists of demands prior to the commencement of collective bargaining, the two sides should exchange lists of perceived labour problems.

62. Experts should conduct negotiating workshops for the administration and faculty negotiators.

69. Every college administration should employ at least one experienced labour negotiator.

72. Non-economic items should be negotiated at the local college level.

75. The provincial government should establish tentative three year operating budget guidelines for the colleges.

These results suggest that any of the above modifications could probably be continued or implemented without much opposition from the participants. There also appears to be a desire to enhance the level of trust, respect and experience through access to information, joint research of common concerns, and the quick resolution of issues. In addition, the participants all want to settle issues at the local level rather than at the provincial level. The provincial government, however, should provide a reasonably stable fiscal climate to facilitate both planning and negotiations.

The two cases where there was not a significant difference in the responses, and where the three sample populations all disagreed with the modification, includes the following statements:

59. Before the start of negotiations compulsory mediation should be used to assist both parties to define their needs and priorities.

65. In the event of a bargaining impasse, either side, without the agreement of the other side, should be able to invoke arbitration proceedings.

These results complement some of the comments made during the interviews. Clearly, the participants would prefer to settle matters without third party intervention either prior to bargaining or to resolve any bargaining impasses. There is also a desire to maintain a balance of power in the process.

The two cases where there was not a significant difference in the responses but where the direction of the responses were inconclusive included the following statements:

54. Final offer selection should be the preferred method of binding arbitration used to settle collective agreements.

71. Neither faculty nor administration negotiating teams should include non-college personnel, e.g., labour lawyers.

F Tests were performed on the 15 statements where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ . Table 7.13 shows that the greatest difference of opinion was between the a/f and f/b groups. With few exceptions, the administrators and the board members come from the same population, while the faculty come from a different population.

Table 7.13

Proposed Modifications, F Test

Group	$H_0=H_1$	$H_0 \neq H_1$
a/f	2	13
a/b	12	3
f/b	2	13

Using key words from the proposed modifications, Table 7.14 summarizes the data from the four statements where there was a significant difference in the responses, i.e., where the respondents were not from the same population and therefore  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ . Yet, with respect to these four modifications, the three sample populations all agreed with the proposed modifications. The differences are not one of disagreement but rather one of intensity of feeling for the modification.

Table 7.14

Modifications,  $H_0=H_1$ , All Agreed

Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
53. cooling off period	21.767(*)	a 0.830 f 0.256 b 1.243	a/f 5.86(*) a/b 5.81(*) f/b 18.22(*)
64. prov.-wide committee	28.730(*)	a 0.393 f 1.262 b 0.770	a/f 19.02(*) a/b 1.46(*) f/b 23.64(*)
70. faculty training	22.953(*)	a 0.946 f 1.432 b 0.825	a/f 11.30(*) a/b .52 f/b 14.19(*)
74. workload relief	39.787(*)	a 0.196 f 1.364 b 0.027	a/f 36.93(*) a/b .45 f/b 39.87(*)

Note: (\*) Significant difference,  $H_0 \neq H_1$ 

Since there is no basic disagreement with these proposed modifications, the results suggest that these ideas could likely be implemented. Due to the significant difference in the opinions of the participants, however, there may be some reservations about implementing some of these modifications, e.g. workload relief for faculty leaders who participate on negotiating teams.

In the category where  $H_0$  was not equal to  $H_1$ , there were three statements where all of three sample populations disagreed with the proposed modifications. This category

included the following proposed modifications and Table 7.15 describes the results:

51. There should be only province-wide collective bargaining for the community colleges.

55. Salaries and benefits only should be negotiated at the provincial level.

68. The college president should be on the administration negotiating team.

Table 7.15

Modifications,  $H_0 \neq H_1$ , All Disagreed

Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
51. prov.-wide barg.	16.416(*)	a -1.018 f -0.750 b -1.415	a/f 1.12 a/b 2.70 f/b 8.44(*)
55. salaries/prov.-wide	15.422(*)	a -0.782 f -0.286 b -1.268	a/f 3.57 a/b 4.61(*) f/b 15.22(*)
68. president on team	12.864(*)	a -1.286 f -0.636 b -0.900	a/f 8.81(*) a/b 2.99 f/b 1.01

Note: (\*) Significant difference,  $H_0 \neq H_1$

Considering the previous response to statement 72 and the responses to statements 51 and 55, there is not much support for province-wide bargaining for either Level I or Level II



matters. The college's desire for local autonomy was evident in the interviews as well as the participants' rejection of the modifications involving third party intervention. Local autonomy is very important to the college administrations and the faculty leaders. A note of caution is in order with respect to statement 55. Since the faculty leaders' margin of disagreement is comparatively small, it may not take much for them to support some form of province-wide collective bargaining. The interviews suggested that a college president should not serve on a college's negotiating team, so as not to compromise the president's leadership. The participants' response to modification 68 supported the interviews.

It is necessary to examine the eight proposed modifications where H0 was not equal to H1 and where there was a difference in the direction of the responses, i.e. agree, disagree. Table 7.16 summarizes the data related to those eight statements. The section on each statement includes a synopsis of the results and a discussion of the results.

Table 7.16

Modifications,  $H_0 \neq H_1$ , Agreed and Disagreed

Statements (keywords)	Chi	Mean	F Test
47. Faculty/Ex. Committee	38.148(*)	a -1.382 f 0.250 b -0.683	a/f 56.76(*) a/b 9.82(*) f/b 10.42(*)
52. 50% continuity	20.288(*)	a 0.218 f 0.955 b -0.079	a/f 11.98(*) a/b 1.43 f/b 20.10(*)
61. single team	18.388(*)	a 0.056 f -0.721 b 0.325	a/f 8.49(*) a/b 1.03 f/b 14.64(*)
63. retain savings	47.126(*)	a 0.339 f -0.841 b 0.625	a/f 21.23(*) a/b 1.47 f/b 29.01(*)
66. standardized govern.	29.995(*)	a -1.809 f 0.233 b -0.895	a/f 34.29(*) a/b .82 f/b 16.43(*)
67. board rep. on team	18.809(*)	a -0.179 f 0.773 b 0.225	a/f 13.01(*) a/b 1.76 f/b 3.94
73. set budgets first	17.130(*)	a -0.054 f -0.674 b 0.125	a/f 5.89(*) a/b .49 f/b 8.14(*)
76. decertify	52.356(*)	a -0.411 f -1.273 b 0.026	a/f 12.61(*) a/b 2.87 f/b 20.59(*)

Note: (\*) Significant difference,  $H_0 \neq H_1$

47. A member of the faculty Association Executive should be a member of the college's senior management committee, e.g., Executive Committee.

Although the senior administrators and the board members do not support the proposal, the faculty leaders support it. There is a significant difference in the responses between all three sample populations. The difference between the administrators' responses and the faculty leaders' responses is quite large.

Although one interview participant indicated that this proposal had been implemented at one institution, the data indicate that this sample population of administrators clearly do not view this idea with favour. They may perceive it to be an infringement of their management rights, and such a proposal may upset the balance of organizational power. The data could also portray a lack of trust or philosophical unwillingness to initiate or expand faculty participation in the decision making process. The board members appear to be less opposed to the idea than their senior administrators. The faculty's interest in the idea, may be related to their perception that there are not enough opportunities to participate in the colleges' decision making processes.

Indirectly, this statement raises a question about the role of faculty associations in community colleges. For instance, should faculty associations be limited to dealing with matters

related to collective bargaining or should they actively participate in college governance at the administrative level?

52. A minimum of 50% of the members of one faculty bargaining team should serve on the next faculty bargaining team.

There is a significant difference in the responses between the administrators and the faculty and between the faculty and the board members. The administrators and the faculty leaders, however, agree with the proposal. The board members do not agree with the proposed modification.

As mentioned in the interviews, those most familiar with bargaining appear to recognize the benefits of prior collective bargaining experience. Therefore, they recognize the need for continuity on the faculty negotiating teams. The board members may not agree with the statement due to a lack of negotiating experience. On the other hand, they may feel that the 50% rate is too high.

61. The faculty and administration negotiating teams should approach the negotiation of collective agreements as a single college team.

The administrators and the board members agree with this concept while the faculty disagree with it. In this case, the administrators and the board members come from the same population but the faculty leaders come from a different population.

The literature and the interviews suggest that such a proposal would be difficult to implement without a great deal of trust. It may be that the faculty reject the idea on the basis of their mistrust of college administrators, a lack of mutual respect, and the administrators' apparent win-lose attitude to collective bargaining. They may also perceive that this approach could fluctuate with each new college president's management style. The positive response of the administrators is surprising. On the one hand, they may perceive the idea to be a way to co-opt the faculty outside of the normal bargaining process. On the other hand, they may genuinely feel that the idea would reduce some of the existing competitive tensions associated with the distributive bargaining process.

63. Colleges should be able to retain any money they save as a result of a strike or a lockout.

The administrators and the board members favour this statement and they come from the same population. The faculty do not support the idea and they do not come from the same population as the other two groups.

The board members and the administrators likely view the idea as a logical modification since it would more closely resemble private sector bargaining. This view was expressed by several administrators in the interviews. The faculty probably reject the concept on the basis that it is an administrative

weapon which could potentially upset the current balance of organizational power during negotiations.

66. Faculty participation in college governance should be standardized in all college collective agreements.

The senior college administrators and the board members disagree with the idea of standardizing the faculty's role in college governance. There is also a significant difference between the faculty and the other two sample populations. The faculty do not come from the same population as the administrators and the board members. While the faculty leaders support the concept of standardizing college governance, their support is marginal.

As with other statements, the administrators and the board members appear to support the idea of local autonomy. These two groups may also view the proposal as an incursion into the area of management rights. The idea could also be viewed as having an impact on the rights of individual colleges to determine the appropriate level of faculty participation in local governance.

67. There should be one board member on the administration negotiating team.

Both the board members and the faculty agree with this concept. These two groups come from the same population. The administrators, on the other hand, do not agree with the

statement and they come from a different population than the other two groups.

As noted in the interviews, a couple of colleges have a board member on their administrative negotiating committees. The board members likely agree with the statement because it would give them more opportunity to participate in the negotiation process. They may perceive it to be a way of getting more directly involved in college activities and finding out what is happening within the colleges. The faculty leaders may well support the idea since they would have direct access to the ultimate source of power in the college; the Board. The administrators probably reject this idea for a number of reasons, e.g., they may feel that the board could become too involved in the day-to-day administration of the college; the faculty leaders may be able to gain direct access to the board members, thereby bypassing the senior administrators in the process; administrators may lose some of their power or influence; board members may not have the time required; board members may not have the expertise or understanding of college issues required to participate in the collective bargaining.

73. Collective bargaining should not commence until after the provincial government has determined the colleges' annual budgets.

Although the descriptive statistics indicate that there is a difference in the direction of their responses, the data indicate that the administrators and the board members come from the same population. The faculty do not agree with this statement and there is a significant difference between the a/f and f/b groups.

While this idea may have some merit and sounds rational, in certain situations it may unduly influence the bargaining process by strengthening the position of one side or the other.

76. Faculty should give up the right to strike.

Although the administrators and the faculty leaders do not come from the same population, neither party favours decertification. While the board members tend to support the idea, they come from the same population as the administrators.

These data complement the comments in the interviews. The latter indicated there was little support for the faculty to give up their right to strike or decertify. The faculty leaders likely view the right to strike as a powerful tool for maintaining the balance of power in the collective bargaining process. In the interviews the administrators perceived the faculty's right to strike as an opportunity for the faculty to demonstrate their commitment to their demands. Both sides likely perceive that the right to strike is an integral part of the distributive bargaining process.



Several themes emerge from the data on the proposed modifications. These include the need for additional training of all concerned, the need for on-going and timely communications, the need to implement a joint approach to research common concerns, the desire to deal with labour matters quickly before they escalate, the recognition of experience as a valuable asset, the desire for equal access to institutional information, the wish for budget stability and the need to negotiate collective agreements at the local college level. While many of the ideas could be implemented relatively easily, a number of the ideas could not be implemented without a great deal of tension. Generally, the latter include any modification that would upset the balance of power or erode the local autonomy of the college or the bargaining process.

## 8

## CONCLUSION

Chapter Eight reiterates the purpose of the study and outlines the study's research design. It also summarizes and interprets the results and discusses the implications of the findings.

## PURPOSE

British Columbia's community colleges play a special role in the province's post secondary system in that they provide ready access to comprehensive instructional programs at a low cost to their local communities. This unique mandate necessarily requires a heterogeneous cadre of faculty. Notwithstanding the professional nature of many of the faculty, the faculty associations studied selected collective bargaining as the method to determine their salaries and related working conditions. There are three types of faculty associations in these colleges, i.e., separate vocational, separate academic, combined vocational-academic.

This research had several purposes. In addition to presenting a broad overview of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges, the study sought to explore the opinions of college board members, senior

administrators and faculty leaders on several aspects of collective bargaining, e.g. scope of collective bargaining. It also sought to determine whether or not there was a significant difference in the opinions of the three sample populations, as well as exploring the relationship between a number of personal factors and the opinions of the respondents, e.g. age, gender, prior bargaining experience. The study was also intended to determine whether or not the collective bargaining climates in the colleges tend toward the distributive model of collective bargaining and involve dysfunctional tensions as exhibited by competitive characteristics, such as distrust, disrespect, inexperience, win-lose attitudes, too many rules, a lack of priorities. As well, it was designed to demonstrate the reactions of the respondents to a number of proposed modifications aimed at reducing the tensions commonly associated with collective bargaining.

Given the paucity of information related to collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges, this study is significant for several reasons. It is the first comprehensive review of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges and therefore is a benchmark for future studies. It is also one of very few studies that explore the views of Canadian college board members and senior administrators, as well as college faculty leaders, on various aspects of collective bargaining. The

study is important in that it examines the nature of the distributive model of collective bargaining within Canadian community colleges. The research also considers the respondents' opinions on various governance issues, the scope of the collective agreements as related to the Level I and Level II needs of college faculty, and on a number of proposed modifications to collective bargaining.

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

The study's research design included both qualitative and quantitative data. Initially, informal interviews were held with a diverse group of 13 labour practitioners familiar with collective bargaining in British Columbia's postsecondary system, including the public colleges. Following this, an institutional questionnaire and related sources provided information on collective bargaining across the college system. A review of a sample of representative collective agreements provided additional insights into bargaining within the colleges. The preceding steps were followed by the distribution of a self-administered questionnaire to three sample populations: 78 board members, 78 senior administrators and 78 faculty leaders. The overall rate of return was 60%, while for each sample population it was as follows: board members 53%, senior administrators, 72%; and faculty leaders 56%. The questionnaire dealt with several aspects of collective bargaining, i.e., competition,

governance, the scope of the collective agreements, and modifications to the existing collective bargaining process.

#### SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

Unlike the detail in the four previous chapters, this section integrates the qualitative and quantitative data and highlights a number of points. As compared to the private sector, collective bargaining in British Columbia's colleges is relatively young. At first glance, the data suggest that the distributive model of collective bargaining in the colleges has been very successful. During the past decade, the majority of the collective agreements have been settled through the distributive bargaining process with a limited use of mediation, arbitration, strike votes and strikes. Yet, this is deceiving in that the study's data indicate that competitive, and therefore dysfunctional, tensions associated with collective bargaining have existed and continue to exist in the colleges. The data suggest that collective bargaining in the colleges is affected by a number of external and internal factors.

Collective bargaining and the related climates in the colleges is impacted by many environmental factors. The external influences include the philosophical values, policies and funding of the government of the day, government legislative acts, partisan board appointments, the decisions and actions of provincial union affiliates and professional

associations, the degree to which the provincial government is perceived to be intruding in the autonomy of the colleges, national inflation levels and other similar factors.

Although the colleges each operate under the same legislation and are funded in essentially the same manner, the qualitative and quantitative data indicate that each college has its own unique industrial relations climate. The data suggest that these internal differences and the resulting tensions are determined by many factors, e.g., the management style of a college president, the personalities and values of those involved in the bargaining process, the composition of a college's negotiating team, the presence or absence of opportunities for the faculty to participate in a college's decision making process, the lack of workload relief for faculty, a lack of negotiating experience, low participation and continuity rates on the faculty negotiating teams, the financial inequity between the colleges and the faculty associations, secrecy, and a lack of access to common institutional information. The tensions are also associated with the perceived current balance of power between the faculty association(s) and the college administration. On this latter point, the data suggest that there may be more tensions at the bargaining table if the faculty leaders perceive a detrimental shift in the balance of power between the faculty and the college administration.

In addition to the tensions created by the preceding factors, tensions during the collective bargaining process appear to be associated with the type of faculty association(s) involved. For example, as compared to the separate vocational and separate academic faculty associations, the combined vocational-academic faculty associations tend to have longer and more complex collective agreements, include more Level II or professional items, take longer to settle the contracts, and involve more mediation, arbitration, strike votes and strikes. The interviews and the examination of the collective agreements indicated that there was quite a difference among the contracts related to Level II items. The interviews suggested that the situation may be compounded by the faculty negotiation teams' lack of bargaining priorities and hence too many faculty demands. Although the type of Level I items in the agreements were fairly consistent among the three types of associations, the collective agreements associated with the separate vocational associations, i.e., BCGEU faculty unions, tended to also contain Level I items which would be more readily associated with blue collar contracts, e.g. coffee breaks, union insignia. While the faculty indicated that economic issues are not more important to them than professional issues, Level I issues were most commonly the basis of the arbitrations, strike votes, strikes and personal grievances.

With respect to the scope of the collective agreements, i.e. Level I and Level II items, the board members and senior administrators come from one population and the faculty come from a different population. Despite this dichotomy, both populations tend to agree that the majority of the Level I items listed in the survey, should be included in a collective agreement. There is an obvious divergence of opinion as to whether all of the Level II items listed should be included or excluded from a collective agreement. On one hand, the faculty leaders are of the opinion that all the Level II items listed should be included in a collective agreement. Yet, the board members and the senior administrators tend to be of the opinion that roughly half of the Level II items listed should not be in a collective agreement. The Level II needs tend to involve the faculty's professional needs or expectations and the college's management rights, which could potentially affect an organization's balance of power.

Tensions created by the preceding external and internal factors appear to be further aggravated by a number of personal factors. For example, while a respondent's gender or prior collective bargaining experience did not appear to be related to the opinions of the respondents, their age was associated with the differences in their responses to the scope of the collective agreements. Similarly, the differences in their political values were strongly associated with their responses to the statements dealing with



competition, governance and the scope of the agreements. The data show that the board members and the senior administrators tend to be politically right of centre, with the faculty politically left of centre. This indicates that there are two distinct populations involved in the collective bargaining process, with each approaching the negotiating table from different ideological perspectives. While this polarization of values is partially evident in the way the three sample populations responded to the statements on governance, this dichotomy of views is particularly evident in the way the sample populations viewed the statements on the scope of the collective agreements.

Both the qualitative and quantitative data depict a competitive and adversarial collective bargaining atmosphere in the colleges. It is characterized by such factors as inexperienced faculty negotiators as a result of low continuity and participation rates on the faculty negotiating teams; a lack of trust and respect between the faculty leaders and the colleges' board members and senior administrators; the faculty leaders' perceived win-lose attitude of the college negotiators; the administrators' perception that the faculty are unable to set bargaining priorities and therefore place too many items on the negotiating table; secrecy; and a lack of common institutional information. In some cases, e.g. combined faculty associations, the competitive atmosphere is compounded by lengthy contractual lag times, the use of

arbitration, strike votes and strikes. The data suggest that the tensions may also be aggravated by the faculty's perceived lack of opportunities to participate in a college's decision making process, the personalities and personal needs of those involved in negotiations, a less collegial atmosphere than in the past and the management style of the college president.

The participants did not reach a consensus on a number of the proposed modifications to the current model of bargaining. For example, a college's right to retain the savings from a lockout or a strike, the standardization of governance in the colleges, the appointment of a faculty member to a college's administrative executive committee, and decertification of the unions. On this last point, however, many of those with the most collective bargaining experience, i.e. labour practitioners, faculty leaders and senior administrators, agreed that the faculty associations should not decertify.

Although there was sometimes a difference in the respondents' intensity of opinion, the three sample populations did support many proposals that would enhance the relationship between the participants. For example, additional labour relations training for all those involved in negotiations, the establishment of labour relations committees, on-going discussions during the life of a collective agreement, the early resolution of emergent labour issues, the use of joint research committees, workload relief for faculty negotiators, the quick resolution of arbitrations,

and the establishment of a common source of institutional information. Local autonomy was important to the participants, for just as the participants did not want to see unilateral arbitration or the use of third party neutrals to assist with the preparation of negotiations, there was also broad support for negotiations at the local college level rather than at the provincial level. There was also a general consensus that a college president should not sit on a college negotiating team, and that one board member should sit on a college's negotiating team.

#### INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS

The interpretation of the study's data is informed speculation in that the qualitative and quantitative material can not be statistically correlated. The study is a portrayal of collective bargaining in the British Columbia community colleges that were considered during this research. For example, the qualitative and quantitative data were complementary and the size and composition of the sample populations, as well as the rate of return, contributed to the study's validity.

The colleges use the distributive method of collective bargaining to determine both Level I and Level II working conditions. The data revealed that with respect to the perceived status of the internal industrial labour climates of the colleges, the three groups were from different

populations. Given the general lack of involvement in the collective bargaining process, the board members appear to be unaware of the labour issues in the colleges. With respect to many Level II governance issues and the scope of the collective agreements, there are only two populations; the board member-senior administrative population and the faculty leaders population. This same dichotomy can also be seen by the difference among the participants' political preferences.

Although the colleges are subject to similar legislation, funding and policy adjustments, and other external conditions, the colleges have diverse internal industrial relations climates. While the external conditions contribute to labour tensions, it is unlikely that on their own they contribute to the varied competitive internal climates of the individual colleges. The data suggest that there is a relationship between the presence of a number of factors that reduce cooperation and increase competition. In other words, it appears as if the personalities of the negotiators; the management style of a college president; the inexperience of the negotiators; the type of faculty association involved; the complexity of the collective agreements; the lack of bargaining priorities; the amount of secrecy and the lack of access to institutional information; the degree to which the board members are aware of the faculty's concerns; the opportunities for the faculty to participate in a college's decision making process; the age of the negotiators and the

different inherent values of the participants, e.g. political left or political right, can all act as barriers to cooperation. These factors, either on their own or through their complex interaction, appear to produce varying competitive climates in the colleges.

The competitiveness of the college climates is reflected in the opinions of the participants, as well as their behaviour. On the one hand, mistrust, a lack of respect, perceived win-lose attitudes, and a sense of less collegiality are representative of the participants' competitive opinions or attitudes. Lengthy lag times, the use of arbitration, strike votes, strikes, and low continuity or participation rate with the resulting lack of negotiating experience, reflect the participants' competitive behaviour.

The data suggest that perhaps the level of cooperation or the level of competition in individual colleges will vary according to the presence or absence of the factors that contribute to competition. In other words, there are degrees of competition that form part of a constructive-destructive conflict continuum. While some of the practitioners interviewed and some of the researchers feel that the distributive model of bargaining is too adversarial and therefore inappropriate, it cannot be said that distributive bargaining is simply no good or dysfunctional. It may depend on the severity of the competition. In very broad terms, a mild level of competition may result in poor staff morale,

frustration or longer lag times. A more severe level of competition may result in a prolonged or a more intense form of poor faculty morale, a vote of non-confidence in a college president, or a prolonged strike. More serious levels of competition could result in the dismissal of a college president or college board. The variation in the institutional data, the differences in the contracts, and the change in faculty leaders, board members and college presidents over a period of time, suggest that the degree of competition may go through cycles. Therefore, individual college industrial relations climates will likely vary over time in proportion to the level of competition present.

The data suggest that each side will respond to their perception of the level of competition within a college and the shift in the equilibrium of organizational power. For example, in a highly competitive situation, the faculty may press for more comprehensive agreements or the administrators may attempt to recapture some management rights. Those most familiar with the bargaining process, the faculty leaders and the senior administrators, perceive a decline in collegiality within their organizations. Ironically, the collective bargaining process and the constraints of the collective agreements, do not appear to have eroded the senior administrator's autonomy. In part, this may be due to the lack of collective agreements that contain comprehensive Level II articles, e.g., opportunities for the faculty to

participate in organizational decision making. It may also be due to a shift from an informal, loose and decentralized decision making process prior to certification, to a more centralized, formal and legalized decision making process, i.e. collective bargaining. These latter factors may have inadvertently given the senior administrators more power because they can now legally influence the negotiation process and the content of the negotiations. For example, in a legally competitive process such as distributive bargaining, the administrators can justify controlling access to institutional information.

The scope of the collective agreements reflect a number of issues. The concept of contractual comprehensiveness may be relative to the level of competition in a particular college at some point in time. For example, if the faculty leaders perceive a shift in organizational power and there are many barriers to cooperation, then there will likely be an increased demand for a more comprehensive agreement. While both the separate vocational faculty associations and combined academic-vocational faculty associations want comprehensive collective agreements, the notion of "comprehensiveness" appears to be related to the type of association. For example, the separate vocational associations may want comprehensive Level I agreements, while those associations with a strong academic component or who have to cater to diverse faculty factions, appear to want comprehensive Level I

and Level II agreements. This suggests that the scope of the agreements are related to the expectations of the type of faculty involved, e.g. vocational, academic. The data appear to indicate that comprehensive level I and Level II contracts are a substitute for the postsecondary tradition of participatory decision making. This in turn may increase the rigidity within the colleges and therefore increase the potential level of competition.

Although some of the pre-survey interviews suggested that there was nothing wrong with distributive bargaining, other practitioners felt that this approach was inappropriate for community colleges and professional faculty. In spite of these concerns, the degree to which the distributive bargaining process is entrenched in the public sector, will ensure that it continues to be the cornerstone of bargaining in the colleges for some time to come. None the less, an effort should be made to reduce the level of competition in order to increase the level of collaboration and cooperation. To accomplish this objective, there has to be more sensitive methods developed for dealing with Level II items, improved communication and training, increased sharing of institutional data, the establishment of key priorities, and conscious effort to focus on the issues instead of focusing on the inherent philosophical differences of the parties involved. The participants did not want to see the leadership role of



the college president compromised by the tensions of the bargaining process.

In view of the long range policy implications for the colleges, the board members must be made more aware of both sides of labour issues. If the parties are to ever increase the level of trust and respect, they must interact in a positive manner and accept responsibility for their actions related to labour relations. This means that the bargaining process must remain at the local level and must not be moved to the provincial level. College policy makers, administrators and negotiators must be increasingly sensitive to the potential relationship between sound management practices and the professional needs of the faculty.

It has taken almost two decades to develop the systems that are now in place. Any changes will come slowly, particularly in collaborative processes that involve the participant's values or principles, e.g. Level II issues. Over the next decade, it may be that the unique traditions of higher education, the varying professional needs and expectations of the diverse faculty associations, the continual demand for improved management practices, and the board members increased awareness of labour relations issues will assist in the maturation of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges.

## IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

The implications of the findings can best be discussed in terms of two areas; research and practice.

### Implications for Research

The implications of the findings for research generally follow the sequence of the material in Chapter Two. The relatively short time frame in which all of the faculty unions were certified suggests that, at least initially, the faculty associations in the colleges were acting in a defensive manner (Thompson 1984). While there will always be a defensive element to negotiations, the unions appear to be currently in a more offensive mode, e.g., individual and professional interests. The interviews suggest that the vocational faculty unions want more comprehensive Level I collective agreements. The interviews and the main survey indicate that the academic and the combined faculty associations want more comprehensive Level I and Level II collective agreements. In both cases, this desire to have comprehensive agreements tends to support the research related to the perceived erosion of faculty power and the unilateral actions of college administrations (Crispo 1978; Dennison & Gallagher 1986; Hammer & Berman 1981; Perra 1979; Thompson 1984). To this end, the data also tend to partially support the notion that the collective agreements are the legal equivalent of the informal and collegial

traditions of the university sector of higher education (Dennison & Gallagher 1986).

With regards to the scope of the collective agreements and the political preference of the three sample populations, there were really only two populations; the faculty leaders group; and the board-administrators group. This fundamental division raised doubts about the notion that these three sample populations share common social values (Dennison & Gallagher 1986). Indeed, if they shared common values, then there would probably be far less tension and competition at the bargaining table than currently seems to exist. Nor would there be such an obvious division of opinion on the scope of the collective agreements, especially where Level II items are concerned. If the political preferences of the board members and the senior administrators are an indication of their general values then it is quite probable that these two populations are philosophically opposed to unions (Kochan 1984b). As noted earlier, such a value laden and deep seated philosophical division between employers and employees may well be an underlying source of some of the conflict in the colleges. The data suggest that this conflict may also be influenced by the dynamics of individual personalities.

The research literature suggested that the more formalized and complicated the collective bargaining process became and the larger and more complex the unions became, the more difficult it was to finalize collective agreements (Baldrige

1981; Bohlander 1985; Dayal 1984; Johnson & Johnson 1981; Ponak & Thompson 1984b). Deutsch & Krauss (1960) also found that the longer it took to negotiate a bargain, the more rigid the positions became, with the result that there was a decrease in cooperation and an increase in competition. The interviews and the survey also suggested that often too many items are placed on the bargaining table as a result of a lack of bargaining priorities. Much of the preceding data appear to support the research, which suggests that organizations with heterogeneous interest groups and values tend to erupt more easily and frequently than those with homogeneous values (Birnbaum 1980a, 1980b; Coser 1956; Likert & Likert 1976). In the case of the combined faculty associations, the institutional data on the time required to re-negotiate agreements, the number of strike votes and strikes, as well as the methods required to settle the agreements, parallel the research literature. In Chapter Two, it was noted that Michaels' (1982) report raised a number of issues related to labour relations in British Columbia's community colleges. Over half a decade later, this research affirmed many of that report's findings.

The research literature cites a number of personal factors that may influence faculty opinions of collective bargaining and hence their behaviour. Given that the faculty leaders tend to be middle-aged, it would appear that the data support those research studies which found that it was the middle-aged

cohort (Fox & Wince 1976; Jennings 1976; Franke 1981; Conklin 1981) or those with approximately 10 years of experience (Fox & Wince 1976; Dull 1981; Franke 1981; Vornberg 1984) who actively participate in collective bargaining.

Over the years Likert & Likert (1976) and others have commented on the association between political preference and peoples' views on collective bargaining. The survey's findings reflect the research literature and show the difference among the three sample populations' political views and the participants' combined responses to the various statements. Another critical factor cited in the literature was professionalism. The literature suggested that the community colleges have not had the time to develop collegial management traditions and that faculty members were often perceived to be employees rather than professionals (Dennison & Gallagher 1986). This is partially confirmed by the descriptions of faculty in the College and Institute Act, by the level of comprehensiveness of many of the collective agreements, by the expressed desire for comprehensive agreements, by the perceived level of collegiality and by the degree to which faculty are able to participate in the decision making process. The literature indicated that university faculty with research responsibilities were less supportive of collective bargaining than those with heavy teaching responsibilities and that they saw collective bargaining as a means to deal with Level I, but not Level II

items. The study's findings suggest that unlike their university counterparts, the academically dominated college faculty associations appear to depend on collective bargaining to satisfy not only their Level I needs but to also compensate for the lack of professional traditions, e.g., collegiality (Kleingartner 1983) by wanting comprehensive Level II collective agreements. Along the same lines, the research literature (Jennings 1976; Ponak & Thompson 1984c; Stecklein & Willie 1982) suggested that if one group perceived that it had lost some of its organizational power it would move to restore the balance of power. The survey data support those findings, in that all three populations agreed that if a faculty association perceives it lacks the power to influence a college's decision making process, then there will be more tension at the bargaining table. Collective bargaining is clearly seen as a means to expand or restore an organization's power equilibrium as well as to satisfy the faculty's basic Level I needs and Level II professional needs.

The research literature suggests that tension at the bargaining table may be related to the presence of competitive factors. The study's data confirm that factors associated with competition are present in the colleges, e.g., lack of trust, lack of respect, too many items on the table, a lack of bargaining priorities, win-lose attitudes, inexperience. The data indicate that, with respect to their perception of the competitive nature of the internal industrial relations

climates, the three sample populations are from different populations. This difference of opinion and level of awareness indicates that these fundamental differences could lead to such observable dysfunctional symptoms as fixed "pie" perspectives, over confidence, rigidity, face saving positions, strict adherence to rules, low tolerance of others, dogmatic statements, belittling attitudes, and secrecy. Driscoll (1972), Katz et al. (1985), and Plumley (1978) found that a lack of trust in the decision makers could lead to a high level of conflict within organizations. Deutsch and Krauss (1960, 188) with reference to other research by Deutsch, indicated that "...communication may not be effective between competitively oriented bargainers". Kohn (1986) also found that competition can develop and be sustained when collective bargaining involves people with competitive values. Although there is no data in this study to support the following personal opinion, it may be that the advanced training, i.e., higher education, of the faculty leaders and the senior administrators, as well as the business orientation of many board members, has instilled competitive values in these three populations. If this is the case, then the relationship between the faculty leaders and the college administrations may be aggravated by their competitive values as well as their different philosophical values.

In addition to the preceding comments, this study has contributed to the research in a number of other ways. The study is significant in that it is the first comprehensive review of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges and is one of a very few studies of collective bargaining in Canadian community colleges. The study provides a benchmark for future studies of collective bargaining in British Columbia's college system.

In view of the absence of research literature in this area, the data is significant because it provides insights into the opinions of Canadian and British Columbia board members and senior administrators on various aspects of collective bargaining. The study's attempt to explore the link between the tensions often experienced during collective bargaining and competition also establishes a benchmark in the literature related to collective bargaining in Canadian postsecondary education. The material enhances the research literature in the area of the scope of collective agreements as related to this specific group of professionals, i.e. faculty. Although there may be a difference in what "comprehensive" means to the various faculty associations, the latter look to collective bargaining to provide comprehensive agreements. The study also provides insights into what modifications to the existing approach to collective bargaining might improve the collective bargaining process in these unique institutions of higher education.



### Future Research

As noted in Chapter Two, the study raises the matter of future areas of research. Further research is necessary to establish the relative importance of the various critical barriers to cooperation and their impact on creating a competitive labour climate. Such research could eventually lead to the development of a diagnostic instrument. More work could also be done on the impact of a person's competitive values on organizations and labour relations. Since personalities appeared to play a role in collective bargaining, future research should explore the relationship between labour relations and management styles. Along this same line, future researchers may want to consider the hiring implications of a potential president's values on labour relations and collective bargaining in a given college. It would also be interesting to examine the impact on collective bargaining of faculty who are right of centre and board members who are left of centre.

Given the educational mandate and broad based curriculum of British Columbia's community colleges, it would be beneficial to trace the long term impact of the university transfer faculty leaders on collective bargaining and the collective agreements. In view of the new degree granting programs in some community colleges, such research may be critical to understanding the evolution of bargaining in the colleges. It would also be productive to track the evolution

of the demands of the faculty members of the BCGEU unions in order to determine whether over time, the members exhibit a desire for additional Level II items in their contracts. If this were to happen, it would be interesting to determine the effect on their affiliation with the BCGEU. More work needs to be done on the relationship between Level II items, management rights, and good management practices. At the provincial level, additional research may be required to clarify the role of the provincial government as labour interventionist or facilitator.

Considering the infancy of the research, more research needs to be done in the area of the impact of women on collective bargaining. This includes not only the implications of their specific needs on the collective agreements but also the impact of women as senior administrators, faculty leaders, negotiators, mediators and arbitrators. These are just a few of the many additional areas that need to be considered by future researchers.

#### Recommendations For Practice

In addition to making a contribution to the research literature, another objective of the study was to provide a number of practical recommendations aimed at improving current collective bargaining practices. In spite of this competitive nature, the distributive model of collective bargaining will,

as noted in the research literature, likely remain the cornerstone of labour relations in British Columbia's college system. The following suggestions recognize the strengths of the distributive model of collective bargaining, the fragile nature of innovation and the need for incremental change as opposed to radical change. There is also a recognition of the amount of time and effort required to develop mutual respect and to establish trusting relationships. The recommendations also recognize that fundamental principles or values are usually non-negotiable and must be dealt with in a collaborative manner.

The recommendations fall into two broad categories. Group One are suggestions that emerged directly from the qualitative and quantitative data. Group Two are personal opinions based on the research. In this latter case, it includes some items which may not have been endorsed by all three participant groups but which appear to be reasonable modifications.

#### Group One

1. College presidents and academic vice-presidents should not serve on college negotiating teams.
2. One board member should serve on a college's negotiating team.
3. Wherever possible, a college should employ one full time experienced labour negotiator.

4. Members of faculty negotiating teams should receive workload relief.

5. A minimum of 50% of the members of one faculty negotiating team should serve on the next bargaining team.

6. Faculty negotiators should receive collective bargaining training before assuming their duties.

7. Experts should conduct negotiating workshops for the administration and faculty negotiators.

8. Board members, administrators and faculty should participate in joint problem solving seminars.

9. Collective bargaining, for both Level I and Level II items, should take place at the local college level rather than on a province-wide level.

10. Broad institutional labour concerns should be identified, and lists of the identified items exchanged and discussed by the two sides prior to the concerns being placed on the negotiating table in the form of demands.

11. The colleges and the faculty associations should agree on one relatively neutral source of institutional information, e.g., Bursars Office, and there should be equal access to that information.

12. College and faculty negotiating teams should use joint college-faculty research committees to research items of mutual interest or concern.

13. The administration negotiating team and the faculty negotiating team should meet regularly during the life of a collective agreement.

14. In the event that Number 13 is not feasible, then each college should establish a joint Administration-Faculty Labour Relations Committee.

15. Emergent labour issues should not be left to fester until the next round of negotiations. They should be dealt with before the expiration of the agreement, e.g. quarterly, semi-annually. If necessary, the contracts should be amended by a joint memorandum of agreement.

16. The provincial government should establish tentative three year operating budget guidelines for the colleges.

17. A province-wide government, administration and faculty committee should be established to discuss the impact of government policies and funding on labour relations in the colleges.

18. Faculty associations should not give up the right to strike, i.e., decertify.

19. After the submission of a Mediator's report there should be a 14 day cooling off period before a strike or a lockout.

#### Group Two

1. For the immediate future, the distributive model of collective bargaining should continue to be used to negotiate Level I items, e.g. salaries. A more collaborative, problem solving or integrative approach should be used to settle disputes involving Level II items, e.g. faculty participation in various forms of college governance. Since these two approaches to problem resolution are so different, two different bargaining teams, two different sets of negotiations and two different agreements may be required.

2. Mediation, rather than arbitration, should be used to assist parties in narrowing their differences where those differences involve matters of principle, i.e. Level II items.

3. Mediation should be used to assist the parties in narrowing their differences when the negotiators are inexperienced, the bargaining zones of the two sides overlap, or there is a genuine desire to settle.

4. Arbitration, rather than mediation, should be used to settle impasses involving Level I items but should not be used to settle impasses involving Level II items.

5. Final offer selection should only be used as a form of arbitration when the issues are clear, when the negotiators are experienced and the issues involve Level I items.

6. Both sides, particularly the faculty associations, should establish clear bargaining priorities and limit the number of demands they place on the table.

7. Third party neutrals should be used by the individual bargaining teams when they need assistance in establishing priorities.

8. Third party neutrals could be used to facilitate the discussion of broad institutional labour concerns. These discussions should take place other than at bargaining time.

9. Consideration should be given to holding annual off-campus retreats to discuss a wide range of college issues including labour issues. These retreats should include all board members, all senior administrators, all members of the faculty association executive and faculty bargaining teams.

10. There should be college activities that enable the board members, the senior administrators and the faculty leaders to meet each other in social settings, rather than dealing with each other as strangers across the bargaining table.

11. Wherever possible, the board members, senior-administrators and faculty leaders should attend the collective bargaining training sessions together.
12. Mechanisms need to be established to ensure that college board members are well informed about labour issues.
13. College administrations need to ensure that the collective bargaining process, including their concern for management rights, does not preclude the use of effective management practices. The latter might include additional opportunities for the faculty to participate in a college's decision making process.
14. It is essential for college administrations to communicate directly and regularly with the faculty as well as communicating with the executive of the faculty associations.
15. Each college should identify one administrator to be the chairman of its negotiating committee. The administrator should be the college's labour relations expert. If no expert is available, then if required, the administrator appointed should receive additional labour relations training.
16. Faculty associations must ensure that their negotiating teams represent their constituents, e.g. age, gender, discipline, years of bargaining experience, full-time vs. part-time.



17. The heterogeneous combined academic-vocational faculty associations need to discuss ways in which to address some of their unique difficulties, e.g., wide variety of interest groups and demands, bargaining priorities, complex contracts, extensive lag times.

18. The college administrations and faculty associations should discuss the role of the faculty associations in the colleges. For example: Should faculty associations limit their activities to the negotiation of Level I items? Should faculty associations be more involved or less involved in professional matters, e.g., governance, professional development, faculty evaluations, selection of and the appointment of faculty members? What is the role of a faculty association with respect to internal college communications?

19. When hiring a new college president, college boards must pay particular attention to such factors as the candidates' management styles, values, views on the role of faculty in college governance, views on unions, views on leadership versus management, and other related issues.

#### SUMMARY

This study analyzes collective bargaining in 14 unionized community colleges in British Columbia. It provides a broad overview of collective bargaining in the colleges and insights

into the tensions commonly associated with the distributive model of collective bargaining. Through the use of interviews, a contractual analysis and two surveys, the qualitative and quantitative data reveal several salient features of collective bargaining in the colleges studied.

The distributive form of collective bargaining is commonly associated with adversarial relations and conflict. While, as the literature suggests, conflict can be beneficial it can also be non-productive or dysfunctional. In these instances, the literature suggests that conflict is associated with competition. The latter is characterized by such factors as a lack of trust, a lack of respect, a lack of experience, too many items to consider, a lack of priorities, and win-lose attitudes. Generally, this study found that the colleges' industrial relations climates are competitive but the level of competition appears to vary from college to college. The lack of trust and the lack of respect among the partners involved appears to be associated with such factors as the type of faculty association, the management style of the college president, the personalities involved, the level of negotiating experience, the degree to which bargaining priorities are established, and the perceived win-lose attitudes of the administrative negotiating team. The data also reveal that although three sample populations were included in the main survey, there are actually only two populations involved; the board-senior administrators group

and the faculty leaders group. A critical element that appears to distinguish the two populations is the differences in their value systems. In this latter case, their political preference was used as a proxy.

Although the distributive model of collective bargaining is likely to remain the cornerstone of negotiations in the colleges for some time, an effort should be made to move toward a more cooperative and collaborative bargaining atmosphere. To this end a number of modifications were recommended. Many of these focused on the composition of the negotiating teams, increasing the level of negotiating experience, continuity of the faculty bargaining teams, training, communications, local autonomy, joint research committees, problem solving, on-going discussions during the life of the agreements, and other similar suggestions.

This study is significant in that it is the first comprehensive look at collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges. It is anticipated that the research will spawn future studies that will increase the level of understanding related to the complex process of collective bargaining.

APPENDIX 1

INSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Research Project: Collective Bargaining in B.C.'s community colleges

Researcher: Peter Colebrook  
Acting Vice President Administration  
Medicine Hat College

Program: Doctoral Program, Higher Education  
University of British Columbia

A. Background Information

The following data is essential for a complete understanding of collective bargaining in British Columbia's community colleges.

Please complete the following questions.

Q U E S T I O N N A I R E

1. What year was the Faculty Association(s) certified as legal bargaining units under the labour code?

\_\_\_\_\_ Faculty Association

\_\_\_\_\_ Vocational Faculty Association (if separate from the  
academic Faculty Association)

\_\_\_\_\_ other (name) \_\_\_\_\_

2. Please provide the following data related to all faculty contracts from 1977 to date.

<u>Name of Association</u>	<u>Duration of Contract</u>		<u>Date Settled</u>	<u>Method of Settlement</u> <sup>(1)</sup>
	FROM	TO		
<u>example:</u>				
1. Faculty Association	<u>1/ 4/80</u>	<u>31/ 3/82</u>	<u>1/ 8/80</u>	Bargaining
2. BCGEU #57	<u>1/ 4/80</u>	<u>31/ 3/81</u>	<u>1/12/80</u>	Mediation
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____
_____	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	<u>/ /</u>	_____

- (1) Please use the following terms in this section:

Bargaining, Mediation, Post-mediation, Interest Arbitration, Final Offer Selection, Strike, Lockout.

[illegible]

Please provide the following data related to faculty grievances from 1977 to date.

[illegible]



Please provide the following data related to strike votes from 1977 to date.

[illegible]

Please provide the following data related to strikes since 1977 to date.

[illegible]

## 6. Lockouts

Please provide the following data related to lockouts from 1977 to date.

Date	Issue(s)
------	----------

FROM TO

example

1/12/80	25/12/80	Lay off clause, wages
---------	----------	-----------------------

## 7. Support Staff Picket Lines

If the Faculty have ever crossed picket lines manned by your support staff, please complete the following data.

Date	Name of Picketing Group
------	-------------------------

FROM TO

example

1/12/80          6/12/80          Support Staff, BCGEU #53

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Handwriting practice lines showing slanted strokes on a three-line grid. The first two lines each contain two slanted strokes, while the third line is empty.

## 8. Size of Faculty

Please provide the following information related to the members of full-time, part-time/sessional faculty that are in your Faculty Association(s).

Number of  
Full-time or  
Permanent

Number of  
Part-time or  
Sessional

Faculty Association

Vocational Association

Other (name) \_\_\_\_\_

Please provide the following information related to the opportunities for faculty to participate on college committees.

<u>Name of Committee</u>	<u>Level of Committee</u>				<u>Elected or Appointed</u>					
<u>example</u>										
<u>Curriculum</u>	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Dept.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divisional	<input type="checkbox"/>	College	<input type="checkbox"/>	Elected	<input type="checkbox"/>	Appointed	<input type="checkbox"/>

B. List of Board Members, Faculty and Senior Administrators

Three groups are involved in this research project. It includes all members of the college boards from 1977 to date, all members of the Faculty Association Executive and negotiating teams from 1977 to date and the college's current senior administrators.

1. Board Members

Please review the attached list of people who have served on your Board of Governors from 1977 to date. Note any errors, omissions or correction, and indicate if they have moved or if they are deceased

2. Senior Administrators

One of the groups involved in the study is the current senior administrators in your college.

Please provide a list of your College's senior administrators and their positions.

<u>Title</u>	<u>Name</u>
President/Principal	_____
Campus Principal(s)	_____
	_____
	_____
Vice-Principal, Academic	_____
Vice-Principal, Administration	_____
Directors/Bursar/Deans	
Position:	
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____



APPENDIX 2

MAIN SURVEY



# Opinions on Collective Bargaining

307

Listed below are some observations on the current collective bargaining process. Please indicate whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) with the sentiment expressed:

	SA	A	D	SD
1. At this college inexperienced negotiators contribute to the difficulties often experienced during negotiations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
2. In addition to collective bargaining, there are many other opportunities at this college for the faculty to participate in the college's decision making process	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
3. At this college there is trust between the administrative negotiators and the faculty negotiators	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
4. Collective bargaining has eroded the administration's autonomy at this college	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
5. Collective bargaining is too adversarial at this college	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
6. Even though a college president may not be at the bargaining table, the management style of the president influences the amount of tension during negotiations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
7. The collective agreement at this college places too much emphasis on rules and regulations	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
8. At this college collective bargaining has reduced the collegiality between the administrators and the faculty	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
9. The administration negotiators at this college tend to view collective bargaining as a contest in which one side wins and the other side loses	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
10. At this college the amount of conflict during negotiations is determined by the personalities at the table	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
11. The faculty negotiators at this college tend to view collective bargaining as a contest in which one side wins and the other side loses	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
12. Economic issues, e.g., salaries, are more important to the faculty at this college than professional issues, e.g., faculty participation in academic decisions	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
13. At this college there is mutual respect between the faculty and the board	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
14. When the faculty perceive that they lack the power to influence a college's decision making process, there is likely to be more tension at the bargaining table	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
15. At this college one or both of the parties bring too many issues to the bargaining table	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
16. Collective bargaining has improved the administration of this college	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

# The Scope of Collective Agreements

308

The list below contains items that are often found in community college collective agreements. For each item listed below please indicate whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) that the item should be included in a community college collective agreement.

	SA	A	D	SD
17. salaries	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. faculty participation on an educational leave committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. fringe benefits	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. workloads, eg: sections, preparations, class sizes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. grievance procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. management rights clauses	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. parking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. faculty participation on a faculty selection committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. inter-campus travel costs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. sabbatical leaves	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. health and safety	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. faculty participation in the selection of senior college administrators	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. restrictions on the College's ability to contract out	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. faculty evaluation procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31. retraining of faculty	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32. faculty participation in the selection of academic department heads	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33. faculty seniority for determining layoffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34. protection of academic freedom	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35. procedures for the appointment of part-time faculty to full time	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
36. faculty participation on a committee to monitor the contract	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37. layoff procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38. faculty access to personnel files	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39. sexual harassment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40. faculty participation on a curriculum committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41. provision for technological change	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
42. college's mission statement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
43. provision for mediation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
44. external work, e.g. consulting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
45. provision for binding interest arbitration	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
46. non-instructional college responsibilities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Listed below are a number of suggested modifications to the current collective bargaining process. Please indicate whether you strongly agree (SA), agree (A), disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) with each of the statements.

	SA	A	D	SD
47. A member of the Faculty Association Executive should be a member of the college's senior management committee, e.g., Executive Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
48. Board members, administrators and faculty should participate in joint problem solving training seminars	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
49. The administration negotiating team and the faculty negotiating team should meet regularly during the life of a contract so they can monitor the effect of the collective agreement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
50. Each college should establish a joint Administration-Faculty Labour Relations Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
51. There should be only province-wide collective bargaining for the community colleges	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
52. A minimum of 50% of the members of one faculty bargaining team should serve on the next faculty bargaining team	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
53. After the submission of a provincial mediator's report there should be a 14 day cooling off period before a strike or a lock out	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
54. Final offer selection should be the preferred method of binding arbitration used to settle collective agreements	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
55. Salaries and benefits only should be negotiated at the provincial level	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
56. There should be a single source, e.g., Bursar, of common institutional information for the faculty negotiating team and the administration bargaining team	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
57. Joint administration-faculty committees should be used to research items of mutual interest to the two bargaining teams	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
58. During the life of a collective agreement, emerging labour issues should be dealt with before the expiration of the agreement, e.g. quarterly, semi-annually	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
59. Before the start of negotiations compulsory mediation should be used to assist both parties to define their needs and priorities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
60. Rather than exchanging lists of demands prior to the commencement of collective bargaining, the two sides should exchange lists of perceived labour problems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	SA	A	O	SD
61. The faculty and administration negotiating teams should approach the negotiation of collective agreements as a single college team	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
62. Experts should conduct negotiating workshops for the administration and faculty negotiators	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
63. Colleges should be able to retain any money they save as a result of a strike or a lockout	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
64. A province wide government, administration and faculty committee should be established to discuss the impact of government policies and funding on labour relations in the colleges	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
65. In the event of a bargaining impasse, either side, without the agreement of the other side, should be able to invoke arbitration proceedings	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
66. Faculty participation in college governance should be standardized in all college collective agreements	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
67. There should be one board member on the administration negotiating team	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
68. The college president should be on the administration negotiating team	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
69. Every college administration should employ at least one experienced labour negotiator	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
70. Faculty negotiators should receive collective bargaining training before assuming their duties	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
71. Neither faculty nor administration negotiating teams should include non-college personnel e.g., labour lawyers	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
72. Non-economic items should be negotiated at the local college level	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
73. Collective bargaining should not commence until after the provincial government has determined the colleges' annual budgets	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
74. Members of faculty negotiating teams should receive workload relief	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
75. The provincial government should establish tentative three year operating budget guidelines for the colleges	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
76. Faculty should give up the right to strike	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

#### Note

If you have any other opinions on collective bargaining or on how to improve the current collective bargaining process, please put your comments on a separate sheet of paper.

Personal Information

311

Board Members

77. Board member

78. Age

☐ years

79. Gender

☐ male

☐ female

80. I have been or was a member of the College Board for

☐ years

81. I have been a member of a collective bargaining team

☐ no

☐ yes

82. If yes: I was a member of the

☐ employers' team at this college

☐ employers' team with another organization

☐ employees' team at this college

☐ employees' team with another organization

83. I prefer the following federal political party

☐ Conservative

☐ Liberal

☐ New Democratic

☐ Other (please specify):.....

84. My occupation is:

.....

Faculty Leaders

77. Faculty leader

78. Age

☐ years

79. Gender

☐ male

☐ female

80. I have been employed with this college for

☐ years

81. I am currently a

☐ part time instructor

☐ full time sessional instructor

☐ full time regular instructor

☐ academic department head

82. My subject discipline is

☐ university transfer specify the subject area:.....

☐ certificate/diploma specify the program:.....

☐ vocational/trades specify the program:.....

83. I have been a member of a collective bargaining team

☐ no

☐ yes

84. If yes: I was a member of the

☐ employers' team at this college

☐ employers' team with another organization

☐ employees' team at this college

☐ employees' team with another organization?

85. I prefer the following federal political party

☐ Conservative

☐ Liberal

☐ New Democratic

☐ Other (specify):.....

Senior Administrators

77. Senior Administrator

78. Age

☐ 1 years

79. Gender

☐ male

☐ female

80. I have been employed with this college for

☐ years

81. I have been employed in my present administrative position for

☐ years

82. I was a faculty member before I became an administrator

☐ no

☐ yes

83. If yes, my subject discipline was

☐ university transfer specify the subject area:.....

☐ certificate/diploma specify the program:.....

☐ vocational/trades specify the program:.....

84. I have been a member of a collective bargaining team

☐ no

☐ yes

85. If yes: I was a member of the

☐ employers' team at this college

☐ employers' team with another organization

☐ employees' team at this college

☐ employees' team with another organization

86. I prefer the following federal political party

☐ Conservative

☐ Liberal

☐ New Democratic

☐ Other(specify):.....

APPENDIX 3

OPINIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

CHI-SQUARE



## OPINIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

CHI-SQUARE: columns 1-16

COMPETITION				GOVERNANCE			
	df	chi-square	H0=H1 HO≠HI		df	chi-square	H0=H1 HO≠HI
1.	6	21.226		x			
2.					6	34.495	
3.	6	31.602		x			x
4.					6	15.666	
5.	6	4.943	x				x
6.					6	5.174	
7.	6	16.423		x			x
8.					6	14.640	
9.	6	39.721		x			
10.					6	6.643	
11.	6	3.446	x				x
12.					6	8.901	
13.	6	33.330		x			x
14.					6	4.628	
15.	6	13.920		x			
16.					6	28.111	
Total				2	6		4

## NOTES:

Chi-square

.95 significance

df 6

chi-square 12.590

APPENDIX 4

OPINIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

HYPOTHESIS

## OPINIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

HYPOTHESIS: columns 1-16

	COMPETITION			GOVERNANCE		
	a/f	a/b	f/b	a/f	a/b	f/b
1.	H0=H1	HO≠H1	HO≠H1			
2.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
3.	HO≠H1	HO≠H1	HO≠H1			
4.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO=H1
7.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
8.				HO=H1	HO≠H1	HO≠H1
9.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
13.	HO≠H1	HO≠H1	HO≠H1			
15.	HO≠H1	HO≠H1	HO=H1			
16.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1

## APPENDIX 5

OPINIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

## OPINIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

F TEST: columns 1-16

COMPETITION					GOVERNANCE				
GROUP	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1	
1.	a/f	1/97	3.52	x					
	a/b	1/92	5.39					x	
	f/b	1/81	14.81					x	
2.	a/f				1/98	32.54		x	
	a/b				1/94	2.80	x		
	f/b				1/82	14.42		x	
3.	a/f	1/96	8.26						
	a/b	1/90	6.75					x	
	f/b	1/78	24.83					x	
4.	a/f				1.95	9.22		x	
	a/b				1.94	3.14	x		
	f/b				1/81	1.04	x		
7.	a/f	1/98	10.34						
	a/b	1/92	.84	x					
	f/b	1/80	5.02					x	
8.	a/f				1/98	.83	x		
	a/b				1/95	8.48		x	
	f/b				1/83	2.79	x		
9.	a/f	1/97	31.58						
	a/b	1/95	.94	x					
	f/b	1.82	36.73					x	

COMPETITION					GOVERNANCE					
GROUP		df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠HI		df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠HI
<hr/>										
13.	a/f	1/95	9.02		x					
	a/b	1/91	6.20		x					
	f/b	1/82	25.51		x					
15.	a/f	1/96	4.49		x					
	a/b	1/92	4.15		x					
	f/b	1/80	.02	x						
16.	a/f					1/95	10.65			x
	a/b					1/89	.15	x		
	f/b					1/78	9.81			x

## APPENDIX 6

## OPINIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

## DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

## OPINIONS ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: columns 1-16

	GROUP	COMPETITION		GOVERNANCE	
		MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
1.	a	0.091	1.251		
	f	0.568	1.265		
	b	-0.538	1.354		
2.	a			1.429	.759
	f			0.159	1.430
	b			1.150	.864
3.	a	-0.073	1.136		
	f	-0.767	1.250		
	b	0.541	1.070		
4.	a			- 0.073	1.136
	f			- 0.786	1.159
	b			- 0.512	1.287
5.	a	0.018	1.272		
	f	0.045	1.257		
	b	-0.415	1.140		
6.	a			0.800	0.989
	f			1.023	1.067
	b			0.737	1.131
7.	a	-0.250	1.225		
	f	-0.977	0.976		
	b	-0.474	1.059		



		COMPETITION		GOVERNANCE	
GROUP		MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
8.	a			0.304	1.190
	f			0.068	1.388
	b			-0.390	1.115
9.	a	-0.411	1.108		
	f	0.860	1.125		
	b	-0.634	1.135		
10.	a			9.64	0.981
	f			0.727	1.020
	b			0.500	1.157
11.	a	0.232	1.160		
	f	0.136	1.133		
	b	-0.073	1.212		
12.	a			-0.109	1.181
	f			-0.465	1.260
	b			-0.077	1.222
13.	a	0.113	1.086		
	f	-0.614	1.298		
	b	0.650	0.949		
14.	a			0.833	0.906
	f			1.114	0.813
	b			0.750	0.954

---

		COMPETITION		GOVERNANCE	
GROUP		MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD

---

15.	a	0.382	1.147		
	f	-0.140	1.283		
	b	-0.103	1.119		
16.	a			-0.315	1.043
	f			0.442	1.240
	b			-0.405	1.166

---

APPENDIX 7

SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

CHI-SQUARE

## SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

CHI-SQUARE: columns 17-46

LEVEL 1 NEEDS				LEVEL 2 NEEDS			
	df	chi-square	H0=H1 HO≠HI	df	chi-square	H0=H1 HO≠HI	
17.	2	17.374	x				
18.				6	39.959		x
19.	4	20.296	x				
20.				6	58.497		x
21.	4	28.482	x				
22.				6	7.418	x	
23.	6	21.239	x				
24.				6	60.464		x
25.	6	38.231	x				
26.				6	42.207		x
27.	6	25.045	x				
28.				6	45.147		x
29.	6	75.143	x				
30.				6	48.971		x
31.	6	48.986	x				
32.				6	60.896		x
33.	6	39.556	x				
34.				6	49.895		x
35.	6	63.432	x				
36.				6	47.930		x
37.	6	34.758	x				
38.				6	59.287		x
39.	6	24.210	x				
40.				6	42.966		x
41.	6	39.013	x				
42.				6	11.430	x	
43.	6	22.163	x				
44.				6	16.298		x
45.	6	16.593	x				
46.				6	25.431		x
Total						2	13

## Notes:

Chi-square

.95 significance level

df 2 5.991

df 4 9.488

df 6 12.590

APPENDIX 8

SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

HYPOTHESIS

## SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

HYPOTHESIS: columns 17-46

	LEVEL 1 NEEDS			LEVEL 2 NEEDS		
	a/f	a/b	f/b	a/f	a/b	f/b
17.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
18.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
19.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
20.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
21.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
23.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO=H1			
24.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
25.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO=H1			
26.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
27.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
28.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
29.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
30.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
31.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
32.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
33.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
34.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
35.	HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			
36.				HO≠H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1
37.	HO=H1	HO=H1	HO≠H1			

	LEVEL 1 NEEDS			LEVEL 2 NEEDS		
	a/f	a/b	f/b	a/f	a/b	f/b
38.				HO $\neq$ H1	HO $\neq$ H1	HO $\neq$ H1
39.	HO $\neq$ H1	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1			
40.				HO $\neq$ H1	HO $\neq$ H1	HO $\neq$ H1
41.	HO $\neq$ H1	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1			
43.	HO $\neq$ H1	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1			
44.				HO $\neq$ H1	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1
45.	HO $\neq$ H1	HO=H1	HO=H1			
46.				HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1	HO $\neq$ H1

## APPENDIX 9

SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE



## SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

F TEST: columns 17-46

LEVEL 1 NEEDS					LEVEL 2 NEEDS			
GROUP	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1	df	F TESTS	HO=H1	HO≠H1
17. a/f	1/98	13.46		x				
a/b	1/95	1.16	x					
f/b	1/83	22.17		x				
18. a/f					1/97	24.04		x
a/b					1/94	.07	x	
f/b					1/83	19.38		x
19. a/f	1/98	13.00		x				
a/b	1/95	1.21	x					
f/b	1/83	21.99		x				
20. a/f					1/98	38.53		x
a/b					1/95	.00	x	
f/b					1/83	35.17		x
21. a/f	1/97	10.31		x				
a/b	1/94	3.79	x					
f/b	1/83	38.31		x				
23. a/f	1/98	16.19		x				
a/b	1/95	3.18	x					
f/b	1/83	3.73	x					
24. a/f					1/98	37.62		x
a/b					1/95	.12	x	
f/b					1/83	43.05		x

GROUP	LEVEL 1 NEEDS				LEVEL 2 NEEDS			
	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1	df	F TESTS	HO=H1	HO≠H1
25. a/f	1/98	14.70		x				
a/b	1/95	1.28	x					
f/b	1/83	23.64		x				
26. a/f					1/98	17.15		x
a/b					1/95	.37	x	
f/b					1/83	25.12		x
27. a/f	1/98	11.55		x				
a/b	1/95	1.00	x					
f/b	1/83	6.49		x				
28. a/f					1/97	39.89		x
a/b					1/94	.12	x	
f/b					1/83	41.53		x
29. a/f	1/97	43.87		x				
a/b	1/94	1.74	x					
f/b	1/83	58.95		x				
30. a/f					1/98	36.92		x
a/b					1/94	.13	x	
f/b					1/82	28.76		x
31. a/f	1/98	27.75		x				
a/b	1/94	.43	x					
f/b	1/82	16.15		x				

LEVEL 1 NEEDS					LEVEL 2 NEEDS			
GROUP	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1	df	F TESTS	HO=H1	HO≠H1
<hr/>								
32. a/f					1/98	43.88		x
a/b					1/95	1.92	x	
f/b					1/83	51.75		x
33. a/f	1/98	13.77		x				
a/b	1/94	3.93	x					
f/b	1/82	30.08		x				
34. a/f					1/98	61.78		x
a.b					1/91	1.43	x	
f/b					1/79	33.28		x
35. a/f	1/98	48.53		x				
a/b	1/95	.03	x					
f/b	1/83	48.49		x				
36. a/f					1/97	18.15		x
a/b					1/92	2.00	x	
f/b					1/79	9.32		x
37. a/f	1/98	3.93	x					
a/b	1/95	3.63	x					
f/b	1/83	13.32		x				
38. a/f					1/98	21.02		x
a/b					1/95	9.50		x
f/b					1/83	61.27		x
39. a/f	1/98	13.05		x				
a/b	1/95	.64	x					
f/b	1/83	8.15		x				

LEVEL 1 NEEDS					LEVEL 2 NEEDS			
GROUP	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1	df	F TESTS	HO=H1	HO≠H1
40. a/f					1/98	28.95		x
a/b					1/95	10.66		x
f/b					1/83	4.69		x
41. a/f	1/98	12.52		x				
a/b	1/95	1.10	x					
f/b	1/83	20.68		x				
43. a/f	1/98	7.95		x				
a/b	1/95	.06	x					
f/b	1/83	6.50		x				
44. a/f					1/97	8.74		x
a/b					1/94	.12	x	
f/b					1/81	9.31		x
45. a/f	1/97	4.05		x				
a/b	1/91	.08	x					
f/b	1/78	2.45	x					
46. a/f					1/97	3.90	x	
a/b					1/94	6.11		x
f/b					1/83	15.89		x

APPENDIX 10

SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

## SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: columns 17-46

GROUP	LEVEL 1 NEEDS		LEVEL 2 NEEDS	
	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
17.	a	1.714	0.456	
	f	1.977	0.151	
	b	1.610	0.494	
18.	a		0.746	1.058
	f		1.659	0.713
	b		0.805	1.054
19.	a	1.554	0.601	
	f	1.909	0.291	
	b	1.415	0.632	
20.	a		0.768	1.112
	f		1.886	0.493
	b		0.756	1.157
21.	a	1.564	0.601	
	f	1.886	0.321	
	b	1.342	0.480	
22.	a		1.000	1.106
	f		0.795	1.456
	b		0.775	1.250
23.	a	-1.268	0.924	
	f	-0.318	1.427	
	b	-0.878	1.229	

		LEVEL 1 NEEDS		LEVEL 2 NEEDS	
GROUP		MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
24.	a			-0.054	1.354
	f			1.432	0.974
	b			-0.146	1.236
25.	a	0.250	1.311		
	f	1.205	1.133		
	b	-0.049	1.244		
26.	a			0.786	1.074
	f			1.568	0.728
	b			0.659	0.938
27.	a	0.339	1.311		
	f	1.182	1.126		
	b	0.585	1.024		
28.	a			-0.473	1.274
	f			1.091	1.158
	b			-0.561	1.205
29.	a	-0.127	1.292		
	f	1.500	1.110		
	b	-0.463	1.247		
30.	a			0.357	1.242
	f			1.636	0.718
	b			0.450	1.260

		LEVEL 1 NEEDS		LEVEL 2 NEEDS	
GROUP		MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
31.	a	0.446	1.094		
	f	1.523	0.902		
	b	0.600	1.194		
32.	a			0.143	1.242
	f			1.477	0.821
	b			-0.220	1.314
33.	a	0.661	1.225		
	f	1.500	0.976		
	b	0.150	1.272		
34.	a			-0.375	1.342
	f			1.477	0.902
	b			-0.027	1.424
35.	a	0.286	1.171		
	f	1.681	0.708		
	b	0.244	1.157		
36.	a			0.464	1.111
	f			1.349	0.897
	b			0.763	0.820
37.	a	1.286	0.868		
	f	1.636	0.892		
	b	0.951	0.835		



GROUP	LEVEL 1 NEEDS		LEVEL 2 NEEDS	
	MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD
38.	a		0.268	1.328
	f		1.409	1.106
	b		-0.537	1.185
39.	a	0.054		
	f	1.023		
	b	0.268		
40.	a		-0.411	1.247
	f		0.955	1.275
	b		0.390	1.115
41.	a	0.786		
	f	1.500		
	b	0.561		
42.	a		-0.964	1.128
	f		-0.349	1.429
	b		-0.195	1.400
43.	a	1.000		
	f	1.523		
	b	1.049		
44.	a		-0.036	1.250
	f		0.721	1.278
	b		-0.125	1.244

---

		LEVEL 1 NEEDS		LEVEL 2 NEEDS	
GROUP		MEAN	SD	MEAN	SD

---

45.	a	0.304	1.278		
	f	0.837	1.344		
	b	0.378	1.210		
46.	a			0.545	1.102
	f			1.000	1.181
	b			-0.049	1.244

---

APPENDIX 11

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS

CHI-SQUARE

## MODIFICATIONS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

CHI-SQUARE: columns 47-76

	df	chi-square	H0=H1	H0≠H1
47.	6	38.148		x
48.	6	5.222	x	
49.	6	7.823	x	
50.	6	6.907	x	
51.	6	16.416		x
52.	6	20.288		x
53.	6	21.767		x
54.	6	9.583	x	
55.	6	15.422		x
56.	6	3.819	x	
57.	6	8.269	x	
58.	6	6.633	x	
59.	6	4.803	x	
60.	6	5.258	x	
61.	6	18.338		x
62.	6	8.233	x	
63.	6	47.126		x
64.	6	28.730		x
65.	6	7.118	x	
66.	6	29.995		x
67.	6	18.809		x
68.	6	12.864		x
69.	6	4.205	x	
70.	6	22.953		x
71.	6	4.726	x	
72.	6	4.232	x	
73.	6	17.130		x
74.	6	39.787		x
75.	6	8.139	x	
76.	6	52.356		x
Total			15	15

Chi-square

.95 significance level

df 6 12.590

APPENDIX 12

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS

HYPOTHESIS

## MODIFICATIONS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

HYPOTHESIS: columns 47-76

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	a/f	a/b	f/b
47.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO \neq H1$	$HO \neq H1$
51.	$HO = H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
52.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
53.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO \neq H1$	$HO \neq H1$
55.	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$	$HO \neq H1$
61.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
63.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
64.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
66.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
67.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
68.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
70.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
73.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
74.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$
76.	$HO \neq H1$	$HO = H1$	$HO \neq H1$

---

## APPENDIX 13

## ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

## MODIFICATIONS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

F TEST: columns 47-76

	GROUP	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO $\neq$ H1
47.	a/f	1/97	56.76		x
	a/b	1/94	9.82		x
	f/b	1/83	10.42		x
51.	a/f	1/98	1.12	x	
	a/b	1/95	2.70	x	
	f/b	1/83	8.44		x
52.	a/f	1/97	11.98		x
	a/b	1/91	1.43	x	
	f/b	1/80	20.10		x
53.	a/f	1/94	5.86		x
	a/b	1/88	5.81		x
	f/b	1/78	18.22		x
55.	a/f	1/95	3.57	x	
	a/b	1/94	4.61		x
	f/b	1/81	15.22		x
61.	a/f	1/95	8.49		x
	a/b	1/92	1.03	x	
	f/b	1/81	14.64		x
63.	a/f	1/98	21.23		x
	a/b	1/94	1.47	x	
	f/b	1/82	29.01		x
64.	a/f	1/96	19.02		x
	a/b	1/93	1.46	x	
	f/b	1/79	23.64		x
66.	a/f	1/97	34.29		x
	a/b	1/92	.82	x	
	f/b	1/79	16.43		x
67.	a/f	1/98	13.01		x
	a/b	1/94	1.76	x	
	f/b	1/82	3.94	x	



GROUP	df	F TEST	HO=H1	HO≠H1
<hr/>				
68.	a/f	1/98	8.81	x
	a/b	1/94	2.99	x
	f/b	1/82	1.01	x
70.	a/f	1/97	11.30	x
	a/b	1/93	.52	x
	f/b	1/82	14.19	x
73.	a/f	1/97	5.89	x
	a/b	1/94	.49	x
	f/b	1/81	8.14	x
74.	a/f	1/98	31.93	x
	a/b	1/91	.45	x
	f/b	1/79	39.87	x
76.	a/f	1/98	12.61	x
	a/b	1/92	2.87	x
	f/b	1/80	20.59	x

APPENDIX 14

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

## PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: columns 47-76

GROUP		MEAN	SD
47.	a	-1.382	.828
	f	0.250	1.314
	b	-0.683	1.350
48.	a	0.800	1.095
	f	0.932	1.021
	b	0.902	1.044
49.	a	0.618	1.009
	f	0.841	1.098
	b	0.707	1.123
50.	a	0.607	1.399
	f	1.000	.915
	b	0.923	.839
51.	a	-1.018	1.328
	f	-0.750	1.164
	b	-1.415	.921
52.	a	0.218	1.166
	f	0.955	.888
	b	-0.079	1.194
53.	a	0.830	.975
	f	0.256	1.347
	b	1.243	.435
54.	a	-0.226	1.171
	f	-0.195	1.400
	b	0.061	1.368
55.	a	-0.782	1.228
	f	-0.286	1.349
	b	-1.268	.895
56.	a	0.214	1.275
	f	0.143	1.372
	b	0.343	1.235

GROUP		MEAN	SD
57.	a	0.873	.924
	f	0.605	1.198
	b	0.541	1.070
58.	a	0.800	.931
	f	0.955	.888
	b	0.459	1.145
59.	a	-0.792	1.063
	f	-0.791	1.146
	b	-0.658	1.214
60.	a	0.393	1.139
	f	0.000	1.175
	b	0.500	1.134
61.	a	0.056	1.323
	f	-0.721	1.278
	b	0.325	1.207
62.	a	0.455	1.119
	f	0.682	1.235
	b	0.300	1.181
63.	a	0.339	1.180
	f	-0.841	1.380
	b	0.625	1.079
64.	a	0.393	1.139
	f	1.262	.701
	b	0.077	1.403
65.	a	-0.436	1.151
	f	-0.227	1.344
	b	-0.410	1.251
66.	a	-1.809	.920
	f	0.233	1.324
	b	-0.895	1.158
67.	a	-0.179	1.478
	f	0.773	1.054
	b	0.225	1.459

---

GROUP		MEAN	SD
68.	a	-1.286	.986
	f	-0.636	1.203
	b	-0.900	1.194
69.	a	0.382	1.284
	f	0.409	1.127
	b	0.300	1.244
70.	a	0.946	.780
	f	1.432	.625
	b	0.825	.844
71.	a	0.411	1.332
	f	-0.071	1.351
	b	0.150	1.331
72.	a	1.036	.894
	f	1.000	1.012
	b	1.225	.698
73.	a	-0.054	1.227
	f	-0.674	1.304
	b	0.125	1.244
74.	a	0.196	1.212
	f	1.364	.718
	b	0.027	1.166
75.	a	1.304	.807
	f	1.191	1.087
	b	1.049	1.048
76.	a	-0.411	1.156
	f	-1.273	1.264
	b	0.026	1.325

---

APPENDIX 15

PERSONAL FACTORS AND SELECTED STATEMENTS

# AGE, COMPETITION AND GOVERNANCE

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F Value		
	Competition	Governance
1.	1.02	
2.		2.14
3.	2.31	
4.		.86
5.	1.01	
6.		1.17
7.	.54	
8.		.53
9.	1.92	
10.		1.38
11.	1.18	
12.		2.29
13.	.66	
14.		1.92
15.	2.97	
16.		1.09

---

For the above figures the degrees of freedom range from 5/128 to 5/135, so that at the 95% level of significance a critical F score was 2.21 and over. In the area of competition, statements 3 and 15 were significant. In the area of governance, statement 12 was significant.

## AGE AND SCOPE

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F Value		
	Level I	Level II
<hr/>		
17.	3.31	
18.		3.36
19.	3.77	
20.		2.41
21.	6.17	
22.		.35
23.	.88	
24.		.83
25.	2.88	
26.		2.48
27.	.81	
28.		.81
29.	4.08	
30.		1.87
31.	.79	
32.		.86
33.	4.63	
34.		1.32
35.	1.94	
36.		.25
37.	5.69	
38.		4.50
39.	1.82	
40.		.48
41.	.79	
42.		1.72
43.	.69	
44.		.92
45.	.47	
46.		3.01

---

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 5/130 to 5/135, so that at the 95% level of significance a critical F score was 2.21 and over. Seven of the fifteen Level I needs were significant and five of the Level II needs were significant.



# GENDER, COMPETITION AND GOVERNANCE

---

	F Value	
	Competition	Governance
<hr/>		
1.	4.31	
2.		2.53
3.	.12	
4.		.67
5.	.33	
6.		.14
7.	.96	
8.		.02
9.	.08	
10.		.32
11.	.29	
12.		1.63
13.	0.00	
14.		1.04
15.	.85	
16.		.44

---

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 1/32 to 1/139, so that at the 95% level of significance a critical F score was 3.84 and over. Only statement 1 was significant.

## GENDER AND SCOPE

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F Value		
	Level I	Level II
<hr/>		
17.	1.83	
18.		.07
19.	.10	
20.		.58
21.	2.88	
22.		.06
23.	3.76	
24.		1.04
25.	.01	
26.		0.00
27.	.02	
28.		0.00
29.	.01	
30.		.63
31.	.42	
32.		0.00
33.	.11	
34.		2.33
35.	.71	
36.		.56
37.	2.89	
38.		.28
39.	2.93	
40.		2.73
41.	1.69	
42.		.60
43.	1.43	
44.		.34
45.	.95	
46.		1.05

---

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 1/32 to 1/39, so that at the 95% level of significance a critical F score was 3.84 and over. There were no significant statements.

---

YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT OR ASSOCIATION, COMPETITION AND GOVERNANCE

---

F Value		
	Competition	Governance
<hr/>		
1.	2.08	
2.		2.19
3.	2.32	
4.		.17
5.	.67	
6.		.90
7.	1.58	
8.		.96
9.	1.85	
10.		.50
11.	1.53	
12.		.72
13.	2.12	
14.		.78
15.	.57	
16.		1.33
<hr/>		

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 4/129 to 4/136, so that at the 95% level of significance a critical F score was 2.37 and over. There were no significant statements.

# YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT OR ASSOCIATION AND SCOPE

	F Value	
	Level I	Level II
17.	3.54	
18.		2.30
19.	2.67	
20.		1.25
21.	4.46	
22.		1.03
23.	2.53	
24.		.81
25.	2.49	
26.		.33
27.	.51	
28.		2.31
29.	1.80	
30.		.36
31.	.71	
32.		2.18
33.	.84	
34.		.76
35.	.92	
36.		.80
37.	2.28	
38.		2.81
39.	2.53	
40.		.25
41.	2.17	
42.		.26
43.	.70	
44.		.75
45.	.55	
46.		1.23

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 4/131 to 4/136, so that at the 95% level of significance a critical F score was 2.37 and over. There was a significant variance in six statements associated with Level I needs and a significant variance in only one case associated with Level II needs.

PRIOR BARGAINING EXPERIENCE, COMPETITION AND GOVERNANCE

---

F Value		
	Competition	Governance
<hr/>		
1.	3.05	
2.		.04
3.	.83	
4.		1.06
5.	.48	
6.		.05
7.	.30	
8.		.57
9.	.56	
10.		.07
11.	1.33	
12.		.56
13.	.39	
14.		.07
15.	.45	
16.		1.13

---

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 2/131 to 2/138, so that at the 95% level of significance a significant F score was 3.00 and over. There was only one statement with a significant variance in the area of competition and no significant statements associated with governance.

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 PRIOR BARGAINING EXPERIENCE AND SCOPE
 

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	F Value	
	Level I	Level II
17.	3.70	
18.		2.07
19.	2.40	
20.		.14
21.	3.70	
22.		.07
23.	1.02	
24.		.78
25.	1.30	
26.		1.47
27.	1.01	
28.		2.49
29.	1.93	
30.		.12
31.	3.09	
32.		1.43
33.	2.21	
34.		1.56
35.	1.06	
36.		4.26
37.	3.89	
38.		2.94
39.	1.64	
40.		.86
41.	2.99	
42.		1.76
43.	.42	
44.		1.47
45.	1.91	
46.		.98

---

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 2/133 to 2/138, so that at the 95% level of significance a significant F score was 3.00 and over. Four Level I statements were significant and one level II statement was significant.

PREFERRED POLITICAL PARTY, COMPETITION AND GOVERNANCE

---

F Value		
	Competition	Governance
<hr/>		
1.	5.00	
2.		3.15
3.	5.48	
4.		.72
5.	1.61	
6.		2.10
7.	2.60	
8.		.95
9.	8.69	
10.		.90
11.	.48	
12.		2.95
13.	3.55	
14.		.67
15.	.59	
16.		3.53
<hr/>		

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 4/129 to 4/136, so that at the 95% level of significance a significant F score was 2.37 and over. Five of the eight statements associated with competition were significant and three of the statements associated with governance were significant.

# PREFERRED POLITICAL PARTY AND SCOPE

	F Value	
	Level I	Level II
17.	3.55	
18.		3.10
19.	4.91	
20.		4.87
21.	3.44	
22.		2.00
23.	5.05	
24.		6.65
25.	5.85	
26.		3.96
27.	4.17	
28.		9.91
29.	13.12	
30.		4.56
31.	4.56	
32.		6.45
33.	7.93	
34.		7.95
35.	6.53	
36.		5.63
37.	5.16	
38.		7.13
39.	3.17	
40.		4.04
41.	6.13	
42.		1.03
43.	1.16	
44.		3.25
45.	1.81	
46.		3.83

For the above figures the degrees of freedom ranged from 4/129 to 4/136, so that at the 95% level of significance a significant F score was 2.37 and over. In the case of both Level I and Level II needs, thirteen of the fifteen statements were significant.



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