SELF-RESPECT AND MORAL EDUCATION

by

CHARLOTTE ROSALIND COMPTON OLIVER
B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1972

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Education

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April, 1980

© Charlotte Rosalind Compton Oliver, 1980
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that
the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.
I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis
for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or
by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication
of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my
written permission.

Department of _Education_

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date _April 22, 1980_
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the role of self-respect in moral education. The first chapter argues that there are three distinct senses of self-respect and that these senses pick out significantly different kinds of human attributes. The first kind of self-respect involves feeling worthwhile because one has adequate peer approval and is at least on a par with his peers overall in such things as occupational status, looks, wealth, and talents. The second kind of self-respect consists in feeling worthwhile because, by virtue of being a person, one has certain rights. It also includes treating oneself appropriately, for example, affirming one's rights. The third kind of self-respect is feeling worthwhile because one lives up to a moral value system with which he is satisfied.

The second chapter attempts to show that failure to distinguish among the senses of self-respect has led to confusion in philosophical literature and uses two examples to demonstrate this—John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, and Elizabeth Downie and R. S. Telfer's *Respect for Persons*.

Chapter three describes the ways in which the three senses of self-respect are important to moral education. It also critically examines a number of approaches to moral education, including values clarification, moral reasoning approaches based on the work of R. M. Hare, the moral components approach, the Kohlbergian approach and the character building approach, in order to determine how, if at all, these approaches address the problem of developing self-respect, and how they relate self-respect to other goals of moral education.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>ANALYSIS OF &quot;SELF-RESPECT&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Analysis of &quot;Respect&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-Respect E</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Self-Respect P</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Concept of a Person</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Self-Respect M</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lack of Self-Respect</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Self-Respect: A Summary</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>THE TREATMENT OF SELF-RESPECT IN CURRENT THEORETICAL THEORY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rawls</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Private Morality</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>SELF-RESPECT AND MORAL EDUCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Respect E</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Respect P</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Respect M</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values Clarification</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Reasoning</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Components</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character Education</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Respect E</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Respect P</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Respect M</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to Dr. Donald Brown, Dr. Jerrold Coombs, Dr. Le Roi Daniels and Dr. Murray Elliott for their generous assistance in the preparation of this thesis.

I would also like to thank Richard Oliver and my mother, Barbara Green, for so kindly typing early drafts of this thesis.
INTRODUCTION

To have self-respect is to feel that one is worthwhile. That much seems clear. It is, however, no easy matter to determine the relevant grounds of this feeling of being worthwhile, or why this is regarded as important for human beings.

Close examination of arguments concerning self-respect reveals that the term is being used in different ways.* This thesis is directed to the task of clearly explicating the different senses of self-respect and of considering certain implications which this analysis has for moral theory and moral education. I shall argue that serious difficulties arise from conflating various senses of self-respect.

Chapter I is chiefly an analysis of the term "self-respect." I begin with an analysis of the term "respect" which proves to be a fruitful avenue from which to approach "self-respect," as there are important parallels between various senses of the word "respect" and "self-respect." I identify and describe three different senses of self-respect, one having to do with esteem due to the approval of others, one concerned with feeling worthwhile due to one's perception of oneself as a person, and the third concerned with having regard for oneself on the basis of one's moral principles.

In Chapter II, I consider ways in which my analysis could contribute to the resolution of certain philosophical problems. For example, John Rawls

*In this thesis I do not distinguish between the word "self-respect" and the concept of self-respect, as I assume that the language is a true reflection of the concept.
has some difficulty in showing that the best way in which to promote self-
respect is by extending basic liberties to all. I show that his difficulty is,
in part, failure to differentiate among the senses of self-respect. In this
chapter I also look at the notion of private morality and demonstrate that
attempts to characterize the realm of private morality by such philosophers
as R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer fail because of confusion in their
analysis of self-respect.

In Chapter III, I argue that all three senses of self-respect are im-
portant to moral competence and thus to moral education. I examine
several popular moral education theories and programs and suggest ways
in which the various sorts of self-respect fit into their schemata, explicitly
or implicitly. In conclusion, I give a very brief indication of how the
various types of self-respect might be fostered.
Chapter I

ANALYSIS OF "SELF-RESPECT"

1. Analysis of "Respect"

Because to have self-respect is to have respect for oneself, an exploration of the term "respect" might shed some light on the concept of self-respect.

In what ways do we commonly use the term "respect?" A number of different uses can be detected in ordinary language:

1. I respect Sheila's musical talent.
2. I respect your honesty.
3. I respect his work.
4. I respect his temper.
5. We ought to have respect for persons.
6. I respect her right to privacy.
7. I respect the law.
8. I have great respect for Gary.

Consider the first two examples. It is quite common to respect a particular quality or talent in a person. For example, we might say, "I respect Joan's courage" or "I respect Martha's ability to do philosophy." To respect a trait or talent is to believe that it is both desirable and significant. It would be odd for me to respect Martha's ability to do philosophy if I thought philosophy to be a waste of time. Similarly, we would be unlikely to respect someone's tidiness, as tidiness is not considered by most people to be significant. We might admire a person's ability to keep his house in order, but we should be unlikely to respect that quality. I shall explore the interrelationships among "respect" and similar terms such as "admire" presently. At this point I want merely to establish that respect, at least
in the sense of respecting a trait or talent, implies believing that the trait or talent is of some importance. Although it is generally the case that we approve of how a person uses a talent we respect, it need not be the case. For example, I might respect Jack the Ripper's cleverness in eluding captivity. In such case, what I think desirable is cleverness; I need not approve of how that cleverness is used or of the person who has it.

Another feature of this sense of respect is that the person who respects a particular talent or quality generally has standards for judging that talent or ability. I should be unlikely to have respect for someone's diamond-cutting ability if I had no way of telling whether a diamond had been cut well, nor any knowledge of the process involved in cutting diamonds. It is usually the case that for one to respect a talent or ability of another, he himself is on the "inside" or is very knowledgeable about what it involves. I might admire a hockey player, but a teammate would be in a better position to respect him. It is quite possible to have degrees of respect for talents. I might respect Dan's ability to do philosophy, but respect Martha's talent even more. Respect may depend upon how difficult something is to achieve. We will not normally respect a quality which requires no effort to develop, e.g., beauty. Degree of respect thus may be a function of the difficulty of attaining excellence, the degree of excellence attained, and the value or significance of the talent or quality. In most situations where respect of this sort is felt, it is for a talent that is equal to or greater than one's own. If I were a very good pianist I should be more likely to respect those whom I considered to be better than myself than those I considered to be good, but less able than myself. There is usually an element of "awe" or "looking up to" in respect. In order to
respect a person, we feel that he is considerably above the norm, that he has achieved high standards.

Consider the third example in the uses of the term "respect," "I respect his work." To say that we respect a particular person's work, such as that of an artist or novelist, is to use "respect" in the same sense as above. That is, respecting the work of a person is no different from respecting that person's ability to paint, write, etc. In such cases it is not the objects of art themselves that are respected. We would be unlikely to say, "I respect his first book, but none of his other works." More likely we would say, "I thought his first book was very good but the rest were poor." Respect grows as the result of a number of judgments that someone performs well. Although we can lose respect for a person's talent, respect for a talent is not generally something that fluctuates very much. It is a feeling we have for someone's talent based upon an appraisal of that talent.

Let us summarize this first sense of respect. To have respect for a person's talent or character trait is to have a positive feeling toward that talent, to think that it is significant, and to believe that it meets certain standards. It is usually a feeling based upon a general appraisal rather than upon a particular appraisal made on a given occasion. It does not imply any particular behaviour, although we would expect a person who respected another's talents to praise him, encourage him, etc.

I have said very little about the quality of the feeling of respect, except to indicate that there is an element of awe in it. I am not sure what more I can say about the feeling. There is some sense in which we hold dear, cherish, or value those talents which we respect, but this
language might be too strong. I shall consider this problem again at the end of my analysis of respect.

I have said that to respect a quality in a person is to regard it as desirable. An apparent counter-example comes to mind. Do we not say "I respect his temper" (#4) when we mean something like "I steer clear of him when he is in a bad mood."? We are not claiming to esteem his temper at all; on the contrary, we may find it to be a deplorable trait. I am not sure about this, but it seems quite possible that this respect is an extension of the respect for talent sense. What we are really saying is something like "I am a little bit in awe of his temper"--the awe in this case comprising more fear and dread than veneration or wonder. Or perhaps it is an extension of another sense of respect which we shall consider shortly, that of respect for persons. Perhaps what we are saying is "I behave toward him as though I believed that he had the right to vent his temper." It does not particularly matter which (if any) of these is correct because this usage is not central and will not figure in my argument.

Let us consider the second central use of the term "respect." This sense is exemplified in #5, "We ought to have respect for persons." The phrase may not be used commonly in ordinary language but the concept is common enough. To have respect for persons is not to admire any particular quality in any particular individual; rather it is to recognize that persons, by virtue of being persons, have rights. It is both to recognize what a person is and to treat persons in an appropriate manner.

Because the concept of a person is very important to this sense of respect (and to a corresponding sense of self-respect), I shall attempt to give at least a rough account of the meaning of "person" in the next section. For now, let us assume that persons are rational beings with
feelings, intentions, and the like by virtue of which they are assumed to have certain rights and responsibilities. Hopefully this will suffice for my present purpose, which is to give some sense of how respect for persons differs from having respect for a particular person's talent.

Notice first that to have respect for persons is not necessarily to feel positively toward any particular individual or his attributes. It is weaker than this in that to have respect for persons one must merely feel positively toward persons in general or, more specifically, toward those attributes of persons which make them count as persons. I may think that Joe is not a very talented or gifted individual and that there is really not very much in him to admire. Yet I also know that Joe has feelings, intentions and the like, and in that sense has rights as does anyone else. While I may not respect Joe in the sense of thinking very highly of him, I do respect him in the sense that I would not violate his right to life, to pursue his own interests, etc.

To have respect for persons is to apply a much weaker set of standards to persons than we apply to those particular talents for which we have respect. To respect a talent is to judge that it is above the norm; to have respect for persons is merely to judge that being a person has significance. There are degrees of talent and of respect for talent but there are not degrees of personhood (once one reaches a minimum standard) nor degrees of respect for persons. We should not that, whereas the first sense of respect could be applied to both moral and non-moral traits (for example, we can respect both a person's honesty, sense of justice, etc., and her ability to skate, sing etc.), the second sense has to do with how we ought to treat persons and is thus peculiar to morality.
I have said that having respect for persons requires some positive feeling toward them and a value belief to the effect that persons, qua persons, have worth. Unlike having respect for a talent, where the behavioral or dispositional component is relatively unimportant, to have respect for persons is very definitely to treat them in certain ways. It is to avoid interfering in their reasonable pursuit of their own aims, to avoid demeaning them, etc.

Let us consider two uses of the term "respect" which I believe are extensions of the "respect for persons" sense. The first is #6, "I respect her right to privacy" and the second is #7, "I respect the law." When I respect a person's right to something, I avoid interfering with that right because I believe that by virtue of having certain characteristics, that person has that right. Respecting the right to privacy is more a matter of doing something than of having a feeling or judging something to be worthy. Similarly, to respect the law may involve some minimal feeling toward the law but it definitely involves acting in accordance with the law. Because these uses, like the respect for persons use, involve a strong dispositional component, I am inclined to lump them together.

The third and final central use of the term "respect" which we find in ordinary language is that of respecting a person when we do not intend to pick out any particular quality. To say, "I have great respect for Gary" (#8) usually means that the person we respect lives by moral standards of which we approve. The feeling component in this sense of respect is
probably the strongest of the three components. It would be difficult to have respect for a person's moral character and integrity without having a strong feeling toward that individual. There are few things about a person which can be more significant or important than his moral system.* If we have respect for a person morally, then we will probably feel something akin to gratitude (because he is upholding what is important to us), love or even awe for that person.

We must be careful not to confuse "I respect X's moral system" in the sense of thinking X has a right to his own values with "I respect X's moral system" meaning that I approve of that system. It is only the latter sense for which I am arguing that some sort of positive feeling is required.

One might plausibly argue that there are really only two sorts of respect, one being to look up to X (as in the case of particular qualities in a person or a person as a whole, because that person has achieved certain standards) and the other being to look out for X (as in the case of "respect for persons" which implies a disposition not to violate their rights). This would be to conflate the first and third senses of respect. Thus it may seem that respect in the third sense is merely the moral version of respect in the first sense. This is not quite accurate, I think, because the third sense does not pick out any particular moral attribute. It is possible for us to respect a particular moral attribute in a person without respecting that person in the third sense. For example, if Jane is very honest but enjoys torturing her children, I might say, "I respect Jane's honesty," but would not say "I respect Jane." To respect someone in the third sense is to make an overall judgment. I also think that respect in the first sense and third sense requires different degrees of feeling.

*Throughout this paper I intend to use moral system in a broad sense to include a person's character, moral ideals, and principles.
I return now to the problem of the feeling of respect. It is entirely possible that the reason it is difficult to pin down the quality of the feeling of respect is because that feeling differs according to what is respected. Indeed, it may be that it is not different senses of respect that I have isolated but different kinds of things that we respect, each of which emphasizes a different component of respect. Let us suppose that respect has a feeling component, a belief component, and a behavioral or dispositional component. Then respect for talents emphasizes the belief or judgmental component, respect for persons emphasizes the behavioral or dispositional component, and respect for moral character emphasizes the feeling component.

It might be useful in rounding out our understanding of the term "respect" to sort out some of the differences between "A respects X" and the following:

- "A likes X."
- "A values X."
- "A admires X."

For A to claim that he likes X is to say something about himself, not about X. To like X is to have a positive feeling toward X which does not require justification or imply the prescription that others ought to like X, while to respect X implies not only a positive feeling toward X but also a positive judgment of X (and, in some cases, certain actions toward X) which does require justification. It is quite possible for me to like John and for one of my friends to dislike John without there being need for argument. Suppose I like and respect John very much and my friend tries to change my mind about John by pointing out that John never considers other people and always acts to his own advantage. It would not be nonsense for me to say, "I know, but I like him anyway," but it would be very
odd to say, "I know, but I respect him anyway."

As in the case of respecting X, we expect A to have good reasons for valuing X. To value X is to believe that X is worthwhile. To value X is not to prescribe X for everyone, however, so it does not require justification in the sense that to respect X does. A can value all sorts of things which he could not respect—X's friendship, his health, a crystal vase. The words "value" and "respect" operate in very different ways, but it is probably a precondition of respecting X that we value X.

Although "admire" and "respect" are rather similar in meaning, there are important differences between the two words. In both cases there is the same sense of looking up to, but it seems that one can admire something he does not know very much about, whereas to respect X is to understand the standards of excellence involved in X. For example, I might admire Beethoven's ability to write symphonies, but it would be odd for me to respect his talent unless I knew something about writing symphonies, or what counts as a good symphony. And, whereas we might admire almost anything—a smashing new coat, a person's good looks, a person's courage—we tend to respect those things which require some effort on the part of the person who has them.

In this first section we have analyzed the term "respect" and identified three senses of the term, each of which seems to emphasize a different component of respect. The first sense has to do with admiring a particular quality or trait in a person who has achieved some standard of excellence in that trait. In this sense, the belief or judgmental component of respect is important. The second sense has to do with having regard for the rights which persons have by virtue of being persons. In this sense, the
behavioral component of respect is emphasized. The third sense of respect has to do with an overall regard for a person because of his character. In this sense, the feeling component of respect is emphasized.

Self-respect, I hope to show, has three senses roughly parallel to the three senses of respect outlined in this section.

2. **Self-Respect E**

You will recall that the first sense of respect which we isolated had to do with esteeming certain qualities and traits of persons. There is a sense of self-respect which seems related to that sense of respect. Consider the following examples:

"X is very outgoing, popular and sure of herself. She has a lot of self-respect."

"How can you expect Y to have any self-respect? You're always criticizing her."

To have self-respect in this sense (henceforth, self-respect E) is to feel that one has worth or value because one has traits or achievements which are worthy of esteem.

There are no absolute standards which one must attain to have self-respect E: people tend to value good appearance, social skills, athletic ability, wealth, status, intelligence, talents, virtue and the like, but one need not excel in all these areas in order to have self-esteem. People tend to base their self-respect E upon those things in which they excel, and to consider as less important those things in which they do not excel. Thus a person who values wealth, good looks and the ability to play tennis well is likely to have self-respect E if she compares favourably or at least is on a par with her peers in these areas. To have self-respect E is to have a positive self-image, to perceive oneself as being on a par with others.
People tend to seek out other people who value the things in which they excel. Psychological literature abounds with articles on the importance of the roles which others play in helping a person to achieve self-esteem, and this point cannot be overemphasized. For example, in *The Identity Society*, William Glasser (1975) maintains that the approval of others is essential to self-respect. He argues that if a person is to continue to feel good about himself, what he does must eventually be recognized by others. Thus there is reason to believe that the approval of others is an empirically necessary condition for self-respect E. Theoretically, a person could maintain self-respect E though no one else approved of him or valued him, but I doubt that such a person exists. Other senses of self-respect might be able to be maintained without others' approval, as we shall see, but this first sense is too bound up with what others think of us to be maintained without others' approval.

This is not to say that one's self-respect need be bound up with the approval of people in general or the values of society in general. For example, members of a gang of hoodlums might rate one another and base their own evaluations of themselves upon the frequency and violence of their crimes. They might gain status and self-esteem by behaving very badly toward people outside their gang. Similarly, teenagers may care very little about what their parents think of them but be very concerned with having the approval of their peers. What is necessary is the approval of important others, those whose opinions we value.

It is important to distinguish between actually being good at something and having the approval of others, and believing that one is good at something and has the approval of others. In order to have self-respect, only the latter condition need apply. A person has self-respect E if she believes she is valuable and worthwhile as an individual and that others approve of
her regardless of whether or not her belief is true. Similarly, one may in fact be very good at something and yet not perceive that she is, and thus fail to have self-respect. It is not necessary that her assessment be accurate. Thus, it makes sense to say "X has too low an opinion of herself" or "Y thinks he's God's gift to women" (implying that Y thinks that women approve of him more than they actually do).

Although a person who sees herself as comparing favorably with others in the things she values and as having the approval of others will have self-respect in general, she will not necessarily have self-respect at any given time. A person might have set very high standards for herself, say to break her own record for the high-jump. Even when she wins the high jump and exceeds all of her peers, she may suffer a loss of self-esteem or self-respect because she failed to meet her own standards and expectations. In the same fashion, a person who sees herself as rating poorly in comparison with others may still have self-respect. She may have set her own standards quite low, and may feel self-esteem when she meets them. Although all her friends can run ten miles easily, she has successfully completed a mile for the first time, and this contributes to, rather than detracts from, her feeling of self-worth.

People sometimes speak of having different sorts of self-esteem. Thus I might have low social self-esteem because I find it difficult to socialize with others and high intellectual self-esteem because I get good marks in school. I think that this way of looking at self-esteem is misleading. Self-esteem is a general rating of oneself. That is, taking everything into account, how do I rate? It may be that I see myself as not very good-looking or musically talented, but this does not mean that I lack esteem in any way. What self-esteem inventories often measure are how I rate myself in a
particular area but not how I feel about myself in general, and my general rating is what is important. It is only if my general rating is very low that it might be useful to get at particular areas of weakness to see how I might improve my abilities or change my perceptions of my abilities in those areas.

Self-respect is not an all-or-nothing quality; people can have it in varying amounts. Also, it is quite possible for a person to suffer a temporary loss of self-respect due to some setback such as being fired, producing a poor paper, etc. It is never desirable that a person lose his self-respect in general, because those who suffer from feelings of inadequacy do not enjoy the same quality of life as others. However, it might be desirable for a person to suffer a temporary decrease in self-respect in order to be motivated to improve. This is a moot point, for it might be argued that people base their self-respect upon the wrong sorts of things and that it is inappropriate to suffer a loss of self-respect when one, for example, loses her beauty. It is not my purpose here to comment upon the rationality of basing self-respect upon wealth, beauty, talents and the like. I am merely trying to outline the basic features of the concept. It is interesting to note in passing, however, that in the analysis of "respect," good looks was not an appropriate object of respect.

In a recent paper, Kenneth Strike distinguishes a sense of self-respect similar to that which I have outlined here, which he calls "self-esteem," as opposed to "self-respect."* Strike uses the concept of "market value" as the basis for self-esteem:

First, esteem is often a function of what turns out to be one's market value. Occupational status hierarchies are the most obvious manifestations of this factor. The status which is attached to educational attainment or achievement is also part of this agenda since the perceived market value of achievement is part

*Strike's treatment of self-esteem and self-respect is based upon John Rawls. Rawls' work will be examined in more detail in Chapter II.
of what makes it valued. Self-esteem, then, has an obvious connection to economic values and practices.

A second source of esteem is personal competence. People may have a higher regard for themselves when they can successfully perform in some way. Personal competence may, of course, be linked to market value. We may value one competence more than another because it has some economic attachment. More important, however, is the fact that this is not necessarily the case.

The third source of self-esteem is virtue. People value themselves positively when they believe themselves to be good, honorable and otherwise moral or virtuous individuals. One concern here is that people need to feel that they are leading useful and productive lives. This is, I believe, part of the message of the work ethic (1979, p. 10).

The difference between what I call self-respect E (or self-esteem) and what Strike calls "self-esteem" is that I have not tied the concept quite so closely to market value. Strike himself admits that we do not necessarily value a talent with an economic attachment above one without such an attachment. (I also believe that Strike is confounding two sorts of self-respect in his third paragraph. This will become obvious in a later part of my paper.)

Strike also makes the point that the rational basis for self-esteem is culturally relative and will accord with the norms a society has for evaluating people. Indeed, self-esteem tends to be bound up with cultural norms but, as I pointed out with the hoodlum example, it need not be. It is possible for a number of individuals to have different values from those of their culture, and to use these as norms for evaluating one another.

Before considering a second sense of self-respect, I should like to make a brief comment on the difference between self-concept and self-esteem. If one has a well-defined self-concept, one will in some sense know the answer to the question, "Who am I?" If one has self-respect E, one will in some sense know the answer to the question, "Why am I valuable as an individual?" I am not clear, however, that there is any difference between
having self-esteem and having a positive self-concept.

3. **Self-Respect P**

When an American says that he loves his country, he means not only that he loves the New England hills, the prairies glistening in the sun, the wide and rising plains, the great mountains, and the sea. He means that he loves an inner air, an inner light in which freedom lives and in which a man can draw the breath of self-respect.

Adlai Stevenson  
Speech, New York City  
August 27, 1952

Of the three senses of self-respect which I distinguish, the second will perhaps seem most counterintuitive, as it is based upon seeing oneself as a person, rather than being based upon one's merit as an individual. I think that it will become clear, however, that we do speak of self-respect in connection with being persons entitled to rights. Consider the following examples:

"How can you let your husband talk to you like that in public? Have you no self-respect?"

"She wouldn't lower herself to doing that pornographic scene in the movie. She has too much self-respect."

The sense of self-respect in the above quotation by Adlai Stevenson is that which is based upon having the right to be treated as persons, to be free from oppression or slavery.

This second sense of the term (henceforth, self-respect P) is parallel to respect for persons. To have self-respect P is to recognize that one counts as a person and to treat oneself accordingly.

Jerrold Coombs, in his list of attainments of the morally educated person, recognizes the importance of this sense of self-worth. His tenth component is "a sense of self-worth, including the belief that achieving one's plans, pursuing one's interests and so on, is important." He goes on to explain:
What is required here is not the sense of self-esteem that comes from achieving excellence at something. It is, rather, the sense of worth that is associated with seeing oneself as an autonomous agent, rather than as a creature to be used or manipulated by others. He who has this sense of self-worth believes that he and his interests count just because he is a person, a human being. This attainment is necessary because it provides the basis for his appreciating that persons and their interests are significant (1978, p. 19).

Not just any concept of a person can serve as the basis of self-respect P. To have self-respect P, one must have a concept of a person which makes one appreciate that persons have rights. Suppose that X has a concept of a person which does not include the idea that persons and their interests have significance. In this case X has a concept of a person but not the appropriate, morally relevant concept of a person. His concept provides no basis for his objecting to being demeaned or abused by others. In this case we would not grant that he had self-respect P. It is tempting to explicate self-respect P without reference to the concept of a person. Using something like the converse of Kant's maxim, one might claim that an individual has self-respect when he applies the same rules in determining the proper treatment of himself as he applies in determining proper treatment of others. The difficulty with this view is that it has the unacceptable consequence of requiring us to regard those who have little or no regard for their own rights as having self-respect so long as they have the same lack of regard for the rights of others.

In the paper mentioned earlier, Strike isolates a sense of self-respect which is based on the concept of a person. This sense is similar to that which I have called "self-respect P" though it does not include treating oneself in a particular way as part of the concept. For Strike, self-respect is the feeling of being worthwhile, the rational basis of which is that one is a person. Persons, by virtue of being persons, have a
fundamental equality such that they fall into the class of entities to whom
rights apply, and such that they are to be treated impartially with respect
to the principles of justice.

One of the reasons for Strike's making the distinction between self-
esteem and self-respect is that he wants to prescribe that persons base
their sense of self-worth upon being persons rather than upon their market
value:

Perhaps a person who lacks self-esteem will be psychologically
debilitated, but this may be the result of confusing self-
respect with self-esteem. . . . It is certainly possible that
people can recognize that they are less able, less attractive,
less whatever, than others without losing a sense of their own
worth. Indeed, the fact that this is both possible and de-
sirable is an important reason for distinguishing self-esteem
and self-respect (1979, p. 9).

Strike claims that because the rational basis of self-respect is being
a person, refusing to extend rights to someone will decrease her self-
respect. The problem with Strike's argument here is that it is not clear
how or why a person makes a connection in her own mind between not being
accorded rights and not having worth. He suggests further that a person
need not have the concept of a person in order to have self-respect or to
lose it when she is denied her rights. He discusses two mechanisms by
means of which the structure of a set of ideas gets reflected in the feel-
ings and behavior of individuals without the ideas having to be understood
by each of these individuals.

1. First, there may be key individuals who, having grasped the
structure of the set of ideas, function as models or sources of
information to others concerning how to feel and act.

2. Second, there are cases where people seem guided by ideas, but
where they cannot attend to them or formulate them. Rules of
grammar are the standard case. . . . Perhaps the logical rela-
tions linking equality, rights, and self-respect function as a
kind of grammar governing what counts as appropriate conditions.
It does seem to be the case that people whose rights are denied
intuitively feel demeaned and intuitively see the denial of their rights as an attack on their basic worth, and they do this without a conscious grasp of the logic of the ideas which govern the situation (1979, p. 8).

With regard to the first mechanism, I am not sure that I would want to acknowledge that those who learn how to feel and act from models necessarily have self-respect. They may satisfy the second condition of self-respect P in that their behavior is the sort of behavior that a self-respecting person might have, but they do not necessarily behave in this way for the reason that they regard themselves as persons with intrinsic worth.

In the description of the second mechanism, it is not clear that the people are lacking the concept of a person. It is at least arguable that persons who understand a concept in the same way that they understand grammar (intuitively) do indeed have the concept.

I think that Strike is wrong to suppose that persons can have self-respect without making the connection between the intrinsic worth of persons and rights. I think, too, that Strike is remiss in not making clear that both the conditions of regarding oneself as a person and of treating oneself accordingly are necessary to self-respect. Someone who had the concept of a person and yet failed to stand up for her rights could not be said to have self-respect, nor could one who stood up for her rights not because she had the concept of a person but merely because she had seen others do so.

Self-respect P involves having an appropriate concept of a person (though not necessarily being able to articulate it) and treating oneself accordingly. It involves the refusal to let others violate one's rights and the avoidance of activities which are demeaning to oneself. It is never appropriate that a person lose her self-respect P, that is, she should always
regard herself as a person just as she should always have respect for
others because they are persons. Self-respect P is appropriate to all per-
sons, both those who are morally good and those who are immoral. Both
count equally as persons and thus have the same basis for having self-
respect P. As we shall see, the next sense of self-respect which I isolate
is appropriate only for morally good, as opposed to immoral, beings.

Since having self-respect P implies having the concept of a person,
in the following section I shall discuss several analyses of the concept of
personhood. Until we have at least a rough sense of what personhood in-
volves, no serious educational effort can be made to increase people's self-
respect P.

4. Concept of a Person

I should make clear at the outset that I am not using "person" in
the sense of "human being" as it is often used in ordinary language. A
human being is readily distinguishable by certain physical traits and
physiological functions whereas a person is distinguishable by certain
features which give him rights and responsibilities. As I use the term,
some human beings would not count as persons and some non-human beings
might count as persons. In this section I would like to examine plausible
characteristics of persons which might justify the claim that persons have
certain rights. I do not intend to contribute an original analysis of the
concept of a person but, rather, to review ideas of other philosophers
which seem to get at some of the essential elements of personhood.

One view of the concept of persons worthy of consideration is that
put forth by Richard Peters. Peters discusses the concept in the context
of respecting persons:
The notion [of being a person] is...that of an assertive point of view; of judgments, appraisals, intentions, and decisions that shape events, their characteristic stamp being determined by previous ones that have given rise to permanent or semi-permanent dispositions. The shaping of a pattern of life in this way is constitutive of what we call an individual person. When it is said that a man who brainwashes others, or who settles their lives for them without consulting them shows lack of 'respect for persons,' the implication is that he does not treat others seriously as agents or as determiners of their own destiny, and that he disregards their feelings and view of the world. He either refuses to let them be in a situation where their intentions, decisions, appraisals and choices can operate effectively, or he purposely interferes with or nullifies their capacity for self-direction. He ensures that for them the question 'What ought I to do?' either scarcely arises or serves as a cork on the tide of events whose drift derives from elsewhere. He denies them the dignity which is the due of a self-determining agent, who is capable of valuation and choice, and who has a point of view about his own future and interests... (1966, p. 210)

For Peters, the essential elements of personhood appear to be the ability to be self-determining, to have feelings and to have an individual point of view of the world, that is, to be the originator of judgments.

In attempting to answer the question, "What makes a human being a person?", R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer (1969) build on Kant's idea that what gives a person (in the generic rather than idiosyncratic sense) worth is the possession of a rational will. For them, to have a rational will includes the following:

1. The ability to be self-determining. To have a rational will is to be capable of both thinking and acting rationally. This involves the ability to choose for oneself and to formulate purposes, plans and policies of one's own, as well as the ability to carry out decisions without undue reliance on the help of others.

2. The ability to govern one's conduct by rules and to adopt rules which one holds to be binding on oneself and all rational beings.

3. The ability to feel and express a wide range of sustained emotions.

In his "Conditions of Personhood," Daniel Dennett (1976) explores six themes which other philosophers have suggested as necessary conditions of personhood. These six themes seem to include most of the ideas
which Peters and Downie and Telfer put forward. Dennett argues that each is a necessary condition on some interpretation. The first three conditions, he claims, are mutually interdependent:

1. Persons are rational beings.

2. Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which psychological or mental or intentional predicates are ascribed. Dennett concentrates upon intentional predicates.

3. Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it. The particular stance which Dennett has in mind is the Intentional stance, that is, taking the stance that persons have intentions and using this as a tool to predict and explain their behavior.

Dennett claims that "nothing to which we could not adopt the Intentional stance with its presupposition of rationality, could count as a person" (p. 180). However, since we might successfully adopt the Intentional stance toward certain animals and even chess playing computers, the first three conditions are merely necessary conditions of personhood, and not sufficient.

4. The object toward which this personal stance, (i.e., Intentional stance, is taken must be capable of reciprocating in some way (of itself adopting the Intentional stance). In sum, a person must be capable of having beliefs about the beliefs and desires of himself and others.

Dennett does not give any argument as to why this fourth condition is necessary to personhood. The first four conditions are still not jointly sufficient conditions for personhood, as certain animals could be interpreted as adopting the Intentional stance.

5. Persons must be capable of verbal communication.

Dennett uses "verbal" in the sense of "involving words," not "spoken rather than written."
The ability to use language is essential to the concept of moral responsibility for, without it, the question-and-answer game of giving reasons for one's actions cannot get started. Dennett considers such an exchange to be "a feature of the optimal mode of personal interaction" (p. 191).

And what is so important about being able to participate in this game is that only those capable of participating in reason-giving can be argued into, or argued out of, courses of action or attitudes, and if one is incapable of "listening to reason" in some matter, one cannot be held responsible for it (p. 191).

The argument for the importance of the capacity for verbal communication is also relevant to the importance of Dennett's sixth condition:

6. Persons are distinguished from other entities by being conscious in some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other species is conscious.

The special consciousness which Dennett expounds is that put forth by Harry Frankfurt. Dennett strongly supports Frankfurt's condition of personhood, that persons be capable of "second order volitions."

Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are... . No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires (p. 192).

One reason that Dennett supports this as a condition of personhood is that he can think of no counterexamples. Non-human animals, mentally defective people and small children may have first-order desires but not second-order volitions and so are ruled out as persons. Another reason is that he regards Frankfurt's "reflective self-evaluation" to be genuine self-consciousness. This can be achieved only by adopting toward oneself the stance of reason-asker and persuader. We must ask ourselves what our desires, etc. are and then, where necessary, offer ourselves persuasions, arguments, threats, bribes, and so forth, in the hopes of inducing
ourselves to change.

Dennett believes we cannot claim that these six necessary conditions of personhood are also jointly sufficient, because the concept of a person is "inescapably normative," and any "passing grade" will be arbitrary (p. 193). He also argues that human beings can only aspire to being approximations of the ideal.

Dennett's account gives us an overview of most of the features which philosophers have thought significant for distinguishing persons from non-persons, and might serve as a useful basis for educators in attempting to develop self-respect.

Although intriguing, Dennett's notion of an ideal which is imperfectly realized in individuals does not seem to me to be a very fruitful way of characterizing a person. To count as a person, one must meet minimal standards; for example, those of minimal rationality and not ideal rationality. He also seems to be confused with regard to necessary and sufficient conditions. We may have trouble in setting standards and in determining when they have been met, but this does not mean that we cannot have a set of sufficient conditions for personhood. It is arguable that Dennett's list of necessary conditions could be seen as also sufficient.

A human being would not count as a person in the full sense unless she met the minimal standards, but surpassing those standards would not make her more of a person. There is a sense in which we might have degrees of personhood, in that animals, children, mentally deranged people, etc., would have certain aspects of persons, but could not count as full-blooded persons.
5. **Self-Respect M**

Never esteem anything as of advantage to thee that shall make thee break thy word or lose thy self-respect.

Marcus Aurelius Antonius  
A.D. 121-180

We have considered self-respect E, a feeling of esteem we have for ourselves based upon our perception of our status in terms of abilities, appearance, occupation, and the like. We have also considered self-respect P, comprising a feeling of being worthwhile because we count as persons and a disposition to act in accordance with this feeling. I should now like to explore a third sense of self-respect which roughly parallels the sense of respect which we have for persons of moral integrity. For example, we might say of someone who let another be punished for his misdemeanor, "No self-respecting person would do that."

To have self-respect M is to feel worthwhile because one sees oneself as a morally principled person. As is the case with self-respect E, one can have degrees of self-respect M. It depends upon how adequate one deems his moral value system to be and how strictly he perceives himself as following his principles.

Generally, those who are virtuous will have more self-respect M than those who are not; self-respect M has to do with how we treat others. There is, however, no guarantee that one who has self-respect M will be morally competent. Many people who have been conditioned or indoctrinated have self-respect M because they act in a way that they think is right. They are not aware that their principles are not held on rational grounds. (I am assuming that only those who do hold principles on rational grounds can be properly called "morally competent.")
Self-respect $M$ is appropriate for moral, but not for immoral persons. We do not expect moral reprobates to have very much self-respect $M$; indeed, we think they are wrong to have it. A criminal who does not have a defensible moral value system would not have an adequate basis for self-respect. A criminal who has a defensible moral value system but does not suffer any shame when he contravenes his own principles is also wrong in having self-respect $M$. We expect people who violate their moral codes to suffer a temporary loss of self-respect $M$, that is, to experience shame. George Bernard Shaw was at least close to the truth with, "The more things a man is ashamed of, the more respectable he is" (Man and Superman, 1903) in that he recognized the link between self-respect $M$ and shame.

It may be suggested that self-respect $M$ is merely one component of self-respect $E$. There is definitely an element of truth in this which I hope I will be able to articulate with sufficient clarity. What I try to explain here will perhaps become more clear in the section on the theory of Lawrence Kohlberg.

Children, as well as many adults, may well do what they think is the right thing to do because they think that others, such as parents, friends and society, will approve of them and this will make them feel good about themselves. At this point in their moral development, self-respect $M$ is very much a subset of self-respect $E$. It may happen, however, that a person becomes autonomous and bases his moral judgments and actions upon internalized moral principles. The approval of others is no longer particularly important to this person, and the respect which he has for himself is no longer based upon the belief that he is as good as or better than his peers at something. Rather, it is based upon seeing oneself as
living up to one's own moral standards which one regards as important.

Even if it is true that, at some level, self-respect M is a component of self-respect E, it is probably still useful to keep them distinct. The quotation by Antonius is meant to point out the fact that one can have self-esteem without having self-respect M. We might value ourselves because we have fancy cars, are gourmet cooks, and super athletes, and not consider morality to be particularly important. Self-respect M is entirely concerned with one's view of oneself as a moral agent. When we say to someone, "Have you no self respect?" when he cheats an old man over a used car, we are not asking him about his general level of esteem, but about his feelings about himself based upon his moral principles.

In the section on "respect," we looked at three components of respect—the feeling component, the belief component, and the behavioral or dispositional component. I said then that it might be the case that I had not isolated different senses of "respect," but, rather, different kinds of things that we respect. Similarly, in my analysis of self-respect, it may be that what I have isolated are not different sorts of respect, but different senses of the "self" which we respect. It may be the case that it is some combination of the two. This is an important point to consider, although it will not have any great effect on the implications of my distinctions. It might be worthwhile to try to determine if there is any parallel between the senses of respect (or objects of respect) which I isolated earlier and the three senses of self-respect. You will recall that I thought it plausible to argue that respect for talents emphasizes the belief or judgmental component of respect, respect for persons emphasizes the behavioral or dispositional component and respect for moral virtue emphasizes the feeling component. If the parallel between respect and self-respect (or the objects of respect and self-respect) holds, then self-respect E will emphasize the
belief component, self-respect P will emphasize the dispositional component, and self-respect M will emphasize the feeling component. I think that this probably is the case, though I do not want to make any strong claim about it here. I do not intend to decide the issue of what it is that is parallel, but it might be an interesting topic to pursue.

6. Lack of Self-Respect

Since we do not often speak of self-respect except in terms of its absence, it might be helpful to examine under what conditions we say that a person is said to lack self-respect.

To say that a person lacks self-respect E is generally to imply that she feels inferior in an all-round sort of way. The person might lack confidence, feel depressed, put herself down, or be very apathetic. It is desirable that persons should lack self-respect E to this extent because they will not enjoy the same quality of life as others.

A person who suffers a temporary lack of self-esteem, or has negative feelings about one aspect of her personality or accomplishments might suffer shame. Shame comes about as a result of letting oneself down in terms of one's own life ambitions. If, for example, a person has decided that the important thing in life is for her to excel as a concert pianist, failure to pursue actions to realize this plan may cause her shame. Thus, a very talented musician who fails to practice and does a poor recital may well suffer shame.

A person who is lacking in self-respect P might fail to recognize her rights, let others demean her, allow herself to be used by others, or treat her body with total disregard. We have noted that it is always desirable that persons have self-respect P; it is never appropriate that they come to regard themselves as less than persons. Even when fundamental rights
are legally denied a person, for instance, when she has committed a serious crime, the person must realize that such punishment is appropriate only to persons; we do not generally punish those whom we consider to be non-persons.

Self-respect M involves both having a moral system and living up to it. If either one of these conditions is not met, a person may not have self-respect M, but it is important to distinguish among not having self-respect M at all, having one's self-respect M lowered because one comes to see one's system as inadequate, and suffering a temporary loss of self-respect M because one has violated one's principles. The first case is never desirable, whereas the other two cases may be. If one has no self-respect M at all, one may have very little motivation to act morally. What one does not have, one does not miss. A temporary loss of self-respect M because one sees one's system as inadequate may be healthy, as it might motivate a person to improve his moral system in order to recover his self-respect. It is also appropriate that a person who violates his own moral principles should suffer a temporary loss of self-respect. Since people do not like to feel shame, the avoidance of it serves as a motive to act morally.

John Rawls distinguishes among regret, natural shame, and moral shame. We may regret the loss of almost any good. "Regret is the general feeling aroused by the loss or absence of what we think good for us." Shame, on the other hand, is "the emotion evoked by shocks to our self-respect, a special kind of good" (pp. 442-443).

Natural shame arises "from the injury to our self-esteem owing to our not having or failing to exercise certain excellences" (p. 444). Though we may not be to blame for, say, our appearance or slow-wittedness, we
may find that their absence interferes with our quality of life. It is our plan of life that determines what we feel ashamed of, and so feelings of shame are relative to our aspirations. According to Rawls we do not feel shame because of a loss or absence of exclusive goods, i.e., goods such as items of property which are good primarily for the possessor. I assume this means that the presence of such goods does not enhance our self-esteem. I am sure that this is not true. It would be nice if we could merely regret lack of wealth and not be ashamed of it, but it seems that people are ashamed of shabby furniture, run-down living quarters and other things which are the direct result of lack of wealth.

For Rawls, moral shame is the result of failing to achieve the good of self-command and feeling unworthy of one's associates upon whom one depends to confirm one's sense of worth. Moral shame is brought about by failing to act in accordance with what one has accepted is right.

Rawls implicitly recognizes that loss of self-respect due to failing to achieve excellence is not the same as loss of self-respect due to failing to live up to certain standards of moral conduct. It is interesting that he never distinguishes the positive, that is, the two different sorts of self-respect which correspond to natural and moral shame. It is also interesting that Rawls makes no mention of loss of self-respect P, since in his arguments for the importance of equal liberty, this sense of self-respect figures prominently.

7. **Self-Respect: A Summary**

To have self-respect in any of the three senses is to feel worthwhile because one has met certain standards. In the case of self-respect E, the standards are values shared with significant others; in the case of self-respect P, the standards are those of being a person; and in self-respect M, the standards are one's moral principles.
Although distinct, these different kinds of self-respect are interrelated in various ways. Self-respect E and self-respect M reinforce one another. That is, feeling that one is worthwhile (self-respect E) generally makes one more inclined to do the sorts of things that contribute to self-respect M, and having respect for one's own moral integrity (self-respect M) is likely to support one's feeling of general worth.

Self-respect E is not particularly associated with the moral realm, whereas self-respects P and M are. Although all three types of self-respect are desirable, it may sometimes be appropriate to lose self-respect E and self-respect M temporarily but it is never appropriate to lose self-respect P.
Chapter II

THE TREATMENT OF SELF-RESPECT IN CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY

Unless distinctions are to aid in the solution of important problems, there is little use in making them. In this chapter I shall attempt to show how the foregoing analysis of self-respect can contribute to the solution of problems currently troubling ethical theorists.

In the first case, John Rawls is at pains to show that the most effective means of distributing self-respect equally, which he deems to be of prime importance, is to distribute basic liberties equally. I will argue that this would be more convincing if he did not conflate self-respect E with self-respect P.

In the second case, R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer attempt to find a use of the term "self-respect" which would parallel respect for persons, so that they could have a concept which would be the supreme principle of private morality, just as respect for persons is the supreme principle of public morality. I shall argue that their failure is in large part due to conflating self-respect P and self-respect M.

1. Rawls

In his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls (1971) considers self-respect to be perhaps the single most important primary good. A "primary good" is something which every rational man is presumed to want because it has a use whatever one's rational plan of life. Rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, and wealth are examples of "social" (at the disposition of
society) primary goods. Rawls assumes that self-respect is something that can be distributed and is thus a social primary good. Every rational person would want to have self-respect because "without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity become empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism" (p. 440).

For Rawls, there are two aspects of self-respect, or self-esteem (he uses the words interchangeably). The first is the sense of one's own worth. The second is the confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions. I am not sure what Rawls means by "so far as it is within one's power," but I assume he means something like "so long as external forces do not interfere."

One circumstance which Rawls believes will support the feeling of being worthwhile (which is the responsibility of the individual, rather than society) is having a rational plan of life and, in particular, one that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle. A second circumstance is finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed. Rawls argues that supporting the two principles of justice, especially the equal liberty principle, will ensure equality in the social bases of esteem. (The two principles of justice will be explained presently.)

It will become apparent that Rawls is sometimes arguing for the promotion of self-respect E and sometimes for self-respect P. Let us consider his arguments in more detail.

First, having a rational plan of life and, in particular, one that satisfies the Aristotelian Principle will, according to Rawls, promote self-esteem. By "rational plan of life" Rawls does not mean a detailed blueprint
for action but, rather, a set of general aims with the subplans being filled in at the appropriate time. When we unpack Rawls' notion of a life plan, we see that it means little more than having desires, aims, priorities and the like. The sort of person one is, is evaluated in a large measure by the things he or she finds important in life. Rawls defines the Aristotelian Principle in the following manner: "other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and the enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity" (p. 426). Rawls argues that a person tends to be more confident of his value when his abilities are both fully realized and organized in ways of suitable complexity and refinement.

It would seem clear that what Rawls is referring to so far is self-esteem or self-respect E as I have distinguished it. When he shows how others may promote self-respect, however, he vacillates between self-respect E and self-respect P.

According to Rawls, we need the appreciation of others in order to maintain the conviction that our endeavors are worthwhile, and others will not appreciate our endeavors unless what we do elicits their admiration or gives them pleasure. "Conditions for persons respecting themselves and one another would seem to require that their common plans be both rational and complementary" (p. 441). Rawls maintains that these conditions can be generally satisfied, that it is not the case that "only the limited association of highly gifted individuals united in the pursuit of common artistic, scientific or social ends" would result in self-respect's being promoted (p. 441). For the application of the Aristotelian Principle is always relative to the individual. "It normally suffices that for each person there is some association to which he belongs and within which the activities that are rational
for him are publicly affirmed by others" (p. 441).

In another section, Rawls argues for respecting others in order to promote self-esteem in quite a different way:

Now our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing. Hence for this reason the parties [in a just society] would accept the natural duty of mutual respect which asks them to treat one another civilly and to be willing to explain the grounds of their actions, especially when the claims of others are overruled (pp. 178-179).

This is not the same sense of respect as esteeming others' life-plans. It is respecting that others' life-plans are important to them and deserve to be taken into account, whether or not we personally think highly of them. This is respect for persons, which would support not self-esteem, but self-respect P. Rawls has slid over to self-respect P without being aware of the shift. Indeed, when he tries to justify the principles of justice on the grounds that they will promote self-respect, he is clearly referring to self-respect P. Let us consider his argument.

The two principles of justice are as follows:

1) The equal liberty principle—each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.

2) The difference principle—social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and b) attached to positions and offices open to all (p. 60).

These principles are to "govern the assignments of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages" respectively (p. 61). Rawls believes that the two principles of justice publicly express people's respect for one another:

For by arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining from the exploitation of the contingencies of nature and social circumstances within a framework of equal liberty,
persons express their respect for one another in the very constitution of their society. In this way they insure their self-esteem as it is rational for them to do (p. 179).

Rawls also argues that one reason the principle of equal liberty is prior to the difference principle is that equal liberty provides a better basis for self-respect:

The basis for self-esteem in a just society is not then one's income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. [These are such liberties as political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, freedom of the person along with the right to hold property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure.] And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar and secure status when they meet to conduct the common affairs of the wider society (P. 544).

Rawls argues that equal liberty will promote self-respect better than will economic position. He reasons that not everyone could be in an advantaged economic position so that only the elite could have self-respect if it were based upon relative economic position. Since it is desirable that all persons have self-respect, this cannot be the basis for self-respect.

If Rawls wants to argue that equal liberty is superior to relative distribution of wealth in promoting self-respect P, then he is unquestionably correct. Self-respect P has much to do with rights and nothing to do with wealth. However, if we take Rawls to be arguing that equal liberty will promote self-esteem better than will wealth distribution, then he will have more difficulty. It is impossible to sever the psychological connection between wealth and self-esteem because relative wealth is one of the important bases of self-esteem for most people. Self-esteem tends to be based upon how well we compare with others, rather than upon attaining a certain standard. To use current educational jargon, self-respect E is criterion-referenced whereas self-respect P is norm-referenced. It is interesting to recall an earlier section on shame and lack of self-respect, in which Rawls
argued that things which were good primarily for the possessor such as material goods, were not important to self-esteem (pp. 442-443).

If Rawls were to distinguish between self-respect E and self-respect P, he would be able to argue that self-respect P is the essential primary good. Strike takes this line in his paper on self-esteem and self-respect. Having distinguished between self-esteem and a concept similar to self-respect P, he argues that only the latter is a primary good. If Rawls took this line, he would have no contender for the best means to promote self-respect.

Another line of argument which Rawls might take is that both self-esteem and self-respect P are primary goods necessary to carry out one's life-plan. Self-respect E can best be obtained through mutual support of one another's life plans, while self-respect P can best be attained through equal liberty. Rawls would still have the problem of showing that wealth would not be important to self-respect E in a just society. He could probably do this by showing that wealth is only one small part of what contributes to people's self-esteem.

It is interesting to note in passing that Rawls uses all three senses of self-respect though he distinguishes only the first sense in his definition. His distinction between natural and moral shame shows that there are two different sorts of self-respect which one may lose temporarily, the former to do with a feeling of worth which results from having the excellences and other talents; the latter to do with a feeling of worth which comes about from acting in accordance with one's sense of right. We have seen in this section how Rawls has shifted from self-respect E to self-respect P. This lends support to my contention that there are three senses of the term "self-respect."
2. **Private Morality**

Does it make sense to speak of "personal" or "private" morality? That is, if a person does things which harm only herself and affect no one else, can we ever judge her actions to be morally wrong, or can we at most say that they are unwise or stupid--prudentially wrong? The answer to this question has implications for moral education. If people are morally required to treat themselves in accordance with certain standards, then educators have the responsibility to teach these, and certain moral sanctions will be appropriate for those who fail to comply with these standards. If people are not morally required to treat themselves in any particular way, the most educators need do is give students prudential reasons for treating themselves with respect.

I believe that it does make sense to speak of "private" morality or duties to oneself, but that the range of actions properly included in private morality is much narrower than some philosophers believe. Richard Peters (1966), for example, suggests that whenever we seriously consider what we ought to do, we are engaged in moral deliberation. This means that a person who is deciding whether he will be a baker or a plumber is making a moral decision, as is a person who is deciding whether to spend his leisure time playing bingo or bridge. R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer claim that decisions about whether or not to develop one's talents are moral decisions even when such development would not significantly affect the interests of others. One has, they claim, a duty to oneself to develop his talents. Such broad conceptions of "private" morality have significant drawbacks. If we accept these conceptions there appears to be no way of differentiating moral judgments from prudential judgments. Not only would the loss of this distinction unnecessarily impoverish our
normative language, but it could also lead to serious misunderstanding concerning our moral obligations. When we judge an action to be morally obligatory, we regard failure to take the action as blameworthy and deserving of censure, or even of punishment. Thus a person who fails to become a plumber or to take up bridge when we judge he ought to, would, on this broad conception of morality, be a legitimate candidate for blame, censure, or punishment. Surely a conception of private morality with this implication is unacceptable. If we do accept it we run the risk of having genuine immoralities seen in the same light as the "immorality" of failing to become a plumber or to learn to play bridge.

Coupled with the problem of delineating private morality in a defensible way is the problem of enforcing private morality, since it is commonly believed that moral obligations and prohibitions ought to be enforceable in some way. But what sort of sanctions are appropriate for one who harms only herself? There is also the problem of determining when someone is, indeed, treating herself immorally. Is it not the case that an individual is in a better position than any outside judge to determine best her own needs, wishes and desires?

Such problems have prompted many philosophers to abandon the notion of private morality altogether. I shall try to show that there is a way of characterizing private morality which is both clear and defensible. This conception of private morality is based upon the notion of self-respect. The idea is found in Downie and Telfer's *Respect for Persons*.

Downie and Telfer characterize social morality in terms of the principle of respect for persons and then attempt to characterize private morality in terms of self-respect.
If respect for others is the supreme principle of public morality, then respect for self is the supreme principle of private morality (1969, p. 83).

To support this idea, they cite the fact that we can say of a person, "He has no self-respect," meaning that he is morally deficient in ways which affect no one but himself.

If a man voluntarily allows himself to be systematically "pushed around" by another person we might regard his undue submissiveness as a moral deficiency—a failure to respect in himself the ability to be self-determining which is an essential aspect of being a person—and yet his conduct might not essentially affect anyone other than himself. We might say that the "self" in "self-respect" is basically the generic human self, that we ought to respect human nature whether in our own person or in that of another. In this claim we should have the backing of Kant (pp. 83-84).

What Downie and Telfer seem to be characterizing is what I have called self-respect P. If they had continued in this vein, they would likely have been successful. But, as becomes apparent, their failure to distinguish between self-respect P and self-respect M leads them astray.

Unfortunately, there are good reasons for doubting that the private aspect of morality can be adequately analyzed in terms of the ordinary concept of self-respect, that 'self-respect' provides a link with respect for others. Doubt over the validity of a close comparison is suggested by the fact that whereas it is always a good thing to respect others, it does not always seem to be a good thing to respect oneself. For example, if a man says, "I could never respect myself again if I did X," and then he does X, we think that he ought to lose his self-respect. Thus, whereas it is sometimes morally appropriate that a man should lose self-respect, it is never morally appropriate that he should lose respect for others (p. 84).

Let us examine this passage, keeping in mind the distinction between self-respect P and self-respect M. The example that Downie and Telfer give of its not being a good thing to respect oneself is of a person's doing something which falls below his own moral standards. This is clearly what I have called self-respect M. It is sometimes appropriate to lose
self-respect $M$, in the case where we fall short of our own standards.

The important question to consider is that of whether or not it is ever a good thing to lose self-respect $P$. Can we imagine a case in which it is desirable that one should regard oneself or treat oneself as less than a person? I cannot think of such a case. Had Downie and Telfer made the appropriate comparison, that is, had they compared respect for persons with self-respect $P$ rather than with self-respect $M$, they would have found the required parallel, that it is always a good thing to respect others and it is always a good thing to have self-respect $P$.

To solve their problem, Downie and Telfer take a curious route. To begin with, they isolate two senses of self-respect which are extremely confused. The first is the "estimative" sense.

When a man says, "I could never respect myself again if I did X," and then he does X, what he loses is his good opinion of himself (p. 84).

According to Downie and Telfer, the respect involved is analogous to "I respect his talent." We respect ourselves when we have grounds for this attitude in our own qualities of character. Now Downie and Telfer seem to be conflating the concepts of self-respect $E$ and self-respect $M$. The "respect" involved in someone's losing respect for himself by acting immorally is self-respect $M$, which is not analogous to "I respect his talent" but, rather, to "I have great respect for him." Loss of self-respect $M$ may well decrease one's self-respect $E$, but these are not equivalent.

Downie and Telfer's confusion becomes even more apparent:

For respect for someone else, in the sense of thinking highly of him, implies that he is above the ordinary, has unusual merits. But self-respect does not imply this. A man who has self-respect merely thinks he comes up to scratch... (p. 85).

Downie and Telfer claim that loss of self-respect means regarding oneself as below par, not just ceasing to think well of oneself. Loss of self-respect
is loss of belief that he attains some minimum standard. It is true that to respect a person in the sense of thinking highly of him implies that one regards him as above the ordinary. There is no reason, however, to assume that a man who has self-respect "merely thinks he comes up to scratch." It may be the case that a person can have self-respect E or M if he believes he has attained some minimum standard, but it is more usual for a person to think of himself as above the ordinary in the qualities which give him self-respect E or M. Similarly, loss of self-respect need not mean regarding oneself as below par. It may, indeed, mean that one ceases to think well of oneself, although he recognizes that his performance is well above the average.

Downie and Telfer reject the estimative sense of self-respect as the link between social morality and private morality because the sense of "self" is different in respect for "other selves" and respect for "self." In the former it is the generic self that is respected; that is, because people are distinctively human, they are respected. In the estimative sense of self-respect, the self is the idiosyncratic self of the specific individual. I believe that Downie and Telfer are correct in their rejection of this type of self-respect as providing the basis for personal morality. They turn to another sense of self-respect in the hope that it will provide the parallel to respect for persons. Unfortunately, instead of isolating the notion of self-respect P, they come up with a rather confused "conative" sense, which they call the "motive" of self-respect.

Self-respect can be an explanation of how a man behaves... 'Self-respect prevented me'... . 'He did it out of self-respect.' ... 'Have you no self-respect?'... . [Estimative] self-respect is something which is lost as a result of failure ... (p. 86).
This sense suggests that failure shows self-respect to be already absent, Downie and Telfer argue. It is something everyone ought always to have.

It seems to me that this does not pick out any distinct sense of self-respect. Each type of self-respect which I have distinguished can be a motive. To act out of self-respect E is to act so as to increase one's status or feeling of worth: "I had to pass the test or I would have lost my self-respect." To act out of self-respect P is to affirm oneself as a person: "I had to stand up to him or I couldn't have maintained my self-respect." To act out of self-respect M is to do something because it meets one's own moral standards: "I had to own up to burning a hole in the rug with my cigarette to maintain my self-respect." I think it becomes even more clear that no one type of self-respect is being distinguished when one glances down at Downie and Telfer's list of "shortcomings" which would provoke us to say, "Have you no [conative] self-respect?" In parentheses, I note which type of self-respect each of the cases lacks.

1) a man willing not to be his own master. Dependent, dominated, less than a human being. (A clear case of lack of self-respect P.)

- lack of fulfilment of one's purposes and exercises of purposiveness. (If, as Rawls claims, persons are those beings who have purposes, then this is again lack of self-respect P. If failing to fulfil purposes is due to lack of regard for those purposes, as opposed to absence of purposes, then the above indicates lack of self-respect E.)

- lack of tenacity, being overcome by adverse circumstances. (Could be connected to lack of any of the three types of self-respect P.)

2) not in control of oneself, enslaved to drink, emotion. (Lack of self-respect P.)

- lack of self-control such as courage and temperance. (Could be connected to lack of self-respect E or P.)

Downie and Telfer believe that when we say, "Don't you have any self-respect" to a man who is cheating, we are not appealing to the morally
best motive (his sense of justice) but rather to one which is "egoistically tinged" (p. 90). If B treats A well out of self-respect alone, they argue, then he has a lack of respect for others. They conclude that conative self-respect will not supply the missing link, since motivation is of an egoistic type rather than the "agape" of respect for persons. (What Downie and Telfer mean by "agape" is "regard for others as rule-following with an active sympathy with them in their pursuit of ends" (p. 29).

At this point, I wish to examine whether or not Downie and Telfer's claims about conative self-respect's being too egoistical will stand up. It seems clear that to appeal to someone's self-respect E is to appeal to egoistic motivation, but neither self-respect P nor self-respect M need to be so "tinged." To say to someone who is demeaning himself, "Have you no self-respect?" is not so much to appeal to his idiosyncratic self as to his generic self. That is, we are saying, "you ought to treat yourself as a person because you are a person." This is not to appeal to any particular characteristics which make him a particular type of person. When we appeal to another's self-respect M, we are appealing to the person's moral standards, to his own belief that people have the right to be treated decently. It may be the case that a person will feel better about himself if he lives up to his standards, but this does not mean that to act out of self-respect is somehow an inferior motive. In fact, since self-respect M is based upon acting upon a value system in which one believes, there can hardly be a more noble motive.

Downie and Telfer claim that if someone, say, refrains from cheating out of self-respect alone, that he lacks respect for persons. In light of what I have said above, this is unlikely to be the case.
Since Downie and Telfer reject both their senses of self-respect as the necessary parallel to respect for persons, how do they resolve their difficulty? The argument that we need a bridge between private and public morality depends upon the premise that public and private moralities are two 'moralities' they point out (p. 91). What they propose instead is that public and private will appear as two aspects of a single moral outlook characterized as "respect for human nature in one's own person or in that of another" (p. 92). It might seem that what Downie and Telfer at last have in mind is what I have called self-respect P, but I will show that this is not the case.

Downie and Telfer speak of duties to develop virtue in oneself. They have two arguments. The first is that, since virtue and the development of attributes are good in themselves and, since it is the agent alone who has the ability to develop them, the agent has the responsibility to develop them. To say this, they claim, is to say that the agent has a duty to respect human nature in his own person. "Private" now merely indicates the location in which a set of attributes can be developed (p. 92). The second argument is that the obligation to develop one's gifts may "sometimes successfully compete with duties of social morality and, since only a duty can override a duty, it seems clear that what we have called "private morality" is no less basic than its public counterpart." Private morality is not to be confused with self-respect, however; it is concerned with respecting the distinctive human endowment as we find it in ourselves (pp. 92-93).

The first argument is certainly not a satisfactory solution to the problem. For one thing, the move from "X is good and only A can produce X" to "A has the responsibility to produce X" is not legitimate. Suppose it would be a good thing for our town to have a cultural centre and I am
the only person wealthy enough to provide such a centre. Am I thus under obligation to fund the building of the centre? Secondly, I do not think that to respect human nature in one's own person requires the development of talent. Surely the requirements are more minimal. Suppose I had the potential to be a great ballerina, but that I preferred not to develop that gift. Am I failing to respect human nature in my own person? Downie and Telfer assume that "generic self" is equivalent to "human nature" which is equivalent to "development of human qualities," but these are not equivalent. "Human nature" is a vague concept, which can mean something like either "the fundamental traits of generic man" or "the traits peculiar to a particular individual." By sliding over the ambiguity of the expression "human nature," Downie and Telfer are also able to make the jump from generic self to development of human talents. Finally, to make "private" refer to location where talent can be developed rather than to refer to treatment of oneself as opposed to others, seems patently absurd.

The second argument is also unsuccessful. The case that they consider is that of an unmarried daughter who debates with herself in all sincerity whether she ought to develop some distinctive quality—say, an artistic gift—or to devote herself to caring for her aged parents. Downie and Telfer argue that if there could be a situation in which hesitation would be morally sincere, we must interpret this as the recognition of a duty to develop distinctive human qualities, that is, if we accept the premise that only a duty can override a duty.

I think the premise is false. A duty can be outweighed by a right. In the above example, I do not think that we need assume that the girl's hesitation involves the recognition of a duty to develop her artistic gift. I would regard the development of talent as one's right, and I would think
the girl's hesitation to be in deciding whether or not to exercise that right or to do her duty and care for her parents (though it is questionable whether caring for her parents is, in this case, a duty or an act of super-erogation).

It would seem that self-respect P is a sensible way of delineating the sphere of private morality. That is, if a certain action is deemed inconsistent with self-respect P, then it is a proper subject of moral judgment. Let us consider a few examples.

Suppose X has a very great talent for playing soccer yet decides he cannot be bothered to go to practices and so fails to develop his talent. Is this a proper subject for moral judgment? First of all, we should ask ourselves the question, "Is this affecting X's self-respect P?" Is he failing to regard himself as a person or to consider his own wishes, intentions or interests? It would seem not, and so this is not a case for moral judgment.

The second case we might consider is that of the person who does not stand up for her rights and who lets herself be pushed around or demeaned by others. Downie and Telfer say that persons who behave in this way are morally blameworthy because they are failing to respect in themselves the ability to be self-determining which is an essential part of being a person. It seems fairly clear that this sort of case violates one's self-respect P and belongs in the realm of personal or private morality. In fact, this sort of case would seem to be the paradigm case of lack of self-respect P, where a person fails to attach adequate significance to her rights.

Consider now the case of a person who attempts to commit suicide. To try to kill another person would certainly count as violating respect for persons, so to attempt to kill oneself is at least a prima facie case of violating respect for self. Though suicide is thus a proper subject
of moral judgment, it is a rather special case, because we can hardly ever judge it to be morally wrong. For one thing, many who attempt suicide are not in a rational frame of mind and so moral judgment is inappropriate. For another, a person who is in a rational frame of mind and attempts suicide is probably in a better position than anyone else to determine whether or not her life is worth living, as she will usually have the most complete set of relevant facts about her life. (This is not to deny the possibility that she is missing relevant facts which, if she had them, would alter her decision.)

The fourth case is that of the person who abuses his body by taking too many drugs, eating junk food, failing to exercise, and drinking and smoking excessively. This is a very difficult case, and I am not sure to what extent we could say that self-respect P has been called into question. Perhaps there is a parallel here between private and interpersonal morality. Interpersonal morality is primarily concerned with the avoidance of harm to others. It usually does not require positive action but, rather, refraining from action. There are occasions, however, when we would want to morally require persons to act positively, for example, when they could rescue a drowning child at little inconvenience and no risk to themselves. Possibly, the person who fails to put in some minimal effort to keep himself functioning as a person is, in some sense, failing to treat himself as a person. Certainly we would blame him if he cared for his child in this way.

My purpose in arguing for a conception of private morality is not to give the self-righteous a criterion for selecting appropriate targets for moral censure. In fact, I do not believe that actions in the realm of private morality are generally blameworthy. Lack of self-respect P is more often a cause for lament than censure. For example, we do not
blame a slave who thinks of himself as less than a person, but may regret that he will live his life without knowing what it means to be a person in the full sense. While we typically do not attach blame to individuals who fail to exhibit self-respect P, it would be wrong to suppose that this is merely a prudential matter. The words "demeaning," "degrading" and "using" have a definite moral flavour, and to watch a person "lower" herself by begging someone to do something for her may provoke the judgment, not that she is unwise, but that somehow, human beings ought not to act like that.

The reason that it is important to delineate the realm of private morality is that it gives us a basis for directing our educational efforts. If it is not a moral matter that persons understand that they may have rights and that they act accordingly, then the issue need not concern moral educators. If this is a moral matter, then educators ought to teach the concept of a person and to expect good reasons for failure to treat oneself with respect. Conversely, if private morality excludes the development of talents, then educators cannot pressure students into developing talents on the grounds that they have duties to themselves to develop talents. At most they can act as advisors, counseling students as to which talents they might develop in order to maximize their own satisfaction.

It may be that there are occasions when moral censure seems appropriate to a person failing to exhibit self-respect P, in that the person has the requisite concepts but fails to act on them. Suppose A understands that his employer does not have the right to make him work overtime for nothing and that he feels angry but is too timid to stand up for his rights. A friend might feel justified in remonstrating with him. In this case, what has gone wrong is that A lacks the courage to approach his boss.
Thus, A's failure is more closely related to lack of self-respect M than to lack of self-respect P. A has the requisite concepts and attaches weight to them, but lacks the character to act on them. Moral censure is really a motivating device in this case.

In this chapter we considered the treatment of self-respect in two significant philosophical theories. I argued that confusion resulted from failure to distinguish among the three senses of self-respect, and showed that using my distinctions could do useful work in each case.

These issues are interesting in their own right, but they are also important to moral education. The theories of philosophers such as Rawls and Downie and Telfer have direct influence on moral educators, and confusions in these theories will be reflected in approaches to moral education.
Chapter III

SELF-RESPECT AND MORAL EDUCATION

In this final section I shall attempt to show that my thesis has important implications for moral education. If, as I shall argue, all three senses of self-respect are important to moral competence, then it would seem that moral educators ought, at the very least, to be aware of the different senses (or bases) of self-respect.

Even though very little explicit attention is given to self-respect in the various approaches to moral education, the failure to understand the distinctions could have serious consequences. Suppose, for example, that a particular approach to moral education led to a temporary lessening of self-respect M. This might be a very good way to help people develop more justifiable value systems. Since it is generally desirable that persons always have self-respect E and P, confusion could easily lead to criticism of an approach which reduced self-respect.

I shall also, in this section, examine several popular approaches to moral education to see where self-respect in its three senses fits in, implicitly or explicitly.

It is not the function of a theoretical paper to include concrete prescriptions for practice, such as the means by which the various types of self-respect should be fostered, but I shall offer a few ideas on this subject, nevertheless.
Self-Respect E

It is not difficult to find empirical studies which support the claim that one's self-esteem is important to how he treats others. For example, in reviewing the literature of prosocial behaviour, Irwin Staub writes:

Many research studies have shown that specific successes in contrast to failures, the experience of competence in a particular activity, and good experiences of any kind enhance helpfulness, kindness, and generosity. These effects are probably achieved in part because they temporarily influence self-esteem ... . Consequently, long-range individual differences in self-esteem may also affect the willingness or capacity to behave prosocially (1978, pp. 27-28).

Reflection upon our own actions will probably reveal that we are most likely to treat others well when we are reasonably satisfied with ourselves. As Rawls points out, without self-esteem we lack zest for life (1971). It is unlikely that we will be actively interested in the quality of others' lives if we are apathetic about our own.

It seems that the importance of self-esteem has not been overlooked by educators. The literature abounds with articles on self-esteem, how to foster it and how to measure it. Low self-esteem is blamed for discipline problems, low achievement, and a variety of other ailments. It is seldom linked explicitly to moral competence. Having self-esteem is not so much a component of moral competence as a precondition to it. I would be unlikely to get any substantial refutation to this claim and yet virtually no one thinks it a significant enough point to mention it. Further conceptual and empirical research is much needed here.

Self-Respect P

We have already seen that having self-respect is important to the realm of personal morality. If a person does not treat himself as a person or lets others trample on his rights, then he is violating the requirements
of personal morality. Even if one cannot accept the notion of duties to oneself, or personal morality, there is good reason to believe that self-respect P is important to interpersonal morality. Indeed, it seems quite plausible that if one regards himself as a person and does not see that as a reason for respecting himself, he is unlikely to regard others as persons and see that as a reason for respecting them. As we shall see, the work of some authors on moral education is seriously flawed by their failure to distinguish self-respect P.

Self-Respect M

To have self-respect M is to be committed to a moral system of which one is proud, and to act in accordance with that system. If one loses confidence in the adequacy of her system, she may suffer a loss of self-respect M which she will not recover until her moral system is changed in such a way that see sees it as adequate. Similarly, if one fails to live up to one's principles, one will suffer shame, or a temporary loss of self-respect M. These two senses of loss of self-respect M are different in quality, but both are unpleasant, and serve as powerful motivation to have a moral system of which one is proud and to live up to one's principles.

There is support for the claim that long term loss of self-respect M is not merely unpleasant, but also psychologically debilitating. William Glasser claims that the need to feel worthwhile to ourselves and others is one of the two basic psychological needs of persons, and that this need cannot be fulfilled unless we maintain a satisfactory standard of behavior. Before one can have any success in helping persons to regain their self-respect, they must be confronted by "the disparity between the values they recognize as the acceptable norm and the lives they lead" (1965, p. 58).
Self-respect M is very much bound up with having principles. If a person claimed to have the principle that we ought to tell the truth, yet suffered no shame when he lied, we might doubt that he really had that principle. In the same vein, if a person claimed to believe that cheating on tests was all right, yet he suffered terrible shame when he cheated, we might think that he did not really hold the principle he espoused.

It is partly because of self-respect M that the role exchange test (How would you like it if you were in the shoes of the person most disadvantaged by your moral decision?) and the new cases test (testing a person's principle with relevantly similar cases) have point.* Discovering that a particular principle one holds is inconsistent with her other principles will somewhat shake one's pride in one's system and may motivate one to change her principles to improve her moral system. Self-respect M is also important to the realm of the morally good in that it provides one of the main sources of motivation for people to live up to their moral ideals. For example, a person who has the moral ideal that persons ought to share their resources might be motivated to donate some of his salary to charity because doing so will make him feel good about himself, or increase his self-respect M.

It seems fairly clear that all three senses of self-respect figure importantly in moral competence. I shall now examine some popular approaches to moral education—values clarification, universal prescriptivism, the moral components, Kohlbergian, and character education—to determine the role of self-respect, explicit or implicit, in each. I shall point out some of the pitfalls in failing to take into account the various kinds of self-respect.

*For a full explication of these principle tests, see Coombs (1971, pp. 54-61).
Values Clarification

The values clarification approach draws heavily upon the work of Louis Raths, who analyzes valuing into seven components:

Prizing one's beliefs and behaviors

1) prizing and cherishing
2) publicly affirming, when appropriate.

Choosing one's beliefs and behaviors

3) choosing from alternatives
4) choosing after consideration of consequences
5) choosing freely.

Acting on one's beliefs

6) acting
7) acting with a pattern, consistency and repetition

(Simon et al, 1972, p. 19)

The values clarification approach does not attempt to instill any particular set of values; rather, it encourages students to get clear about what they do value, by engaging in the above seven aspects of valuing.

Values clarification has fallen into disfavour among many educators because it is not educative. That is, students are expected to make choices but they are not taught any standards for making those choices; "I like X" and "X is good" are not distinguished. The specified goals of the values clarification approach do not take self-respect into account, but it seems to me that values clarification can do much to promote both self-esteem and self-respect. Only when a child feels that his thoughts and ideas are accepted can he begin to feel esteem. If what he values is criticized by his friends or teacher, he may feel insecure or of little value. Many values clarification exercises provide the student with the opportunity to
assert his values in a context in which he need have no fear of criticism.

In the introduction to *Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students* by Sidney P. Simon, Leyland W. Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum, the claim is made that through values clarification, students have become "less apathetic," "more zestful and energetic" and "more likely to follow through on decisions" (p. 20). If this claim is true, it indicates that values clarification has a part to play in self-respect E because an increase in self-respect E is the most plausible explanation of their increased interest and zest.

The problem with values clarification or, indeed, with any non-directive approach, is that it can build a child's self-respect M without giving that child any basis for judging whether or not his moral system is justified. The values clarification approach tries to help young people build their own value system, including moral values, by getting them to choose, prize and act on their beliefs. If a child does this, his self-respect M is likely to be developed. But self-respect M is not an asset in itself—it is only desirable when it is based upon a rational and justifiable moral system. Moral educators must be very wary of fostering self-respect M unless that self-respect is soundly based. Otherwise they run the risk of hampering moral development, because those who have self-respect M are not motivated to improve their moral systems.

It is entirely appropriate for moral educators to attempt occasionally to create dissonance in a student, or to lower her self-respect M temporarily in order to get her to re-examine her principles. Educators have perhaps shied away from such tactics because they have failed to distinguish among types of self-respect. It would almost never be appropriate to try to reduce one's self-esteem, and it would be immoral to lower one's self-respect P.
Perhaps this confusion has led to our trying to increase students' self-respect by whatever means possible. Those who use values clarification as an approach to moral education must be very careful to ensure that it is only a first step in thinking about moral issues, and that not every principle suggested can be accepted as being equally good.

Moral Reasoning

Richard Hare's (1965) account of moral reasoning has been fairly influential in moral education. A noteworthy example of its influence is to be found in the work of John Wilson (1973). Wilson's work will be discussed in some detail below, because it is a good exemplar of the "moral reasoning" approach to moral education. Before considering Wilson's work, however, it will be useful to consider the relation between self-respect and moral argument as Hare explicates it.

According to Hare, moral argument proceeds through conjecture and refutation. That is, we use deductive reasoning not to show that a proposed course of action is right, but to try to show that it must be rejected. Our judgment that a course of action is right is "justified" when we have sincerely tried and failed to show that it must be rejected. The four necessary ingredients of moral arguments are:

1) having at hand a set of facts about the case
2) the logical framework of the word "ought" (i.e., moral judgments are a kind of prescriptive judgment, in the imperative mood and they are universalizable). Hare calls this "universal prescriptivism." "I ought to do X" means that it is right for anyone in similar circumstances to do X.
3) inclinations--caring what happens to oneself and others
If all of these ingredients are present, and moral argument does not persuade a person that a proposed course of action ought to be rejected, then the person is justified in regarding the course of action as right. An action's being "justified" in this sense does not imply that it will be acceptable to all reasonable people. It signifies only that the agent has done all that the logic of moral reasoning requires of him. Hare admits that certain fanatics will be able to make "justified" moral judgments such as "All Jews ought to be killed." The arguments we would be likely to advance against such a fanatic will fail to persuade him if having no Jews in the world is more important to him than life itself.

I want to suggest that it is not only fanatics who will be unpersuaded by the sorts of moral arguments we ordinarily give. Anyone lacking self-respect may be similarly untouched by our arguments. Consider the following example. Harry is contemplating whether or not it is all right to force Barney, who is frail and weak, to be his servant. Harry thinks to himself, "It would be all right for someone in this sort of circumstance to make Barney his servant. In fact, if I were in Barney's shoes, it would be all right for someone to make me a slave." Notice that all of the necessary ingredients of moral argument are present in this case: (1) Harry has the facts about the case; (2) he has the inclinations—he cares about what happens to him; (3) he has and uses his imagination—he imagines what it would be like to be forced to be someone's servant; and (4) he makes a universalizable prescription—he accepts that it would be all right for anyone in similar circumstances to force another person (including him-
self) to be his servant. Harry is able to universally prescribe what most of us could not, because his desire to make Barney his servant is stronger than his desire not to be the servant of anyone. However, if Harry had self-respect P, he could not have reached this conclusion, for he could not have prescribed that he himself should, in the same circumstances, be forced to be someone's servant. If a person lacks self-respect, there is, so far as I can tell, no limit on the actions he may be able to universally prescribe, for there is no limit to the things he may desire more than he desires what we ordinarily take to be basic human rights. Hare believes that there are relatively few cases of genuine fanatics. It is not clear to me, however, that there are relatively few persons lacking in self-respect P.

Clearly, teaching students to engage in the sort of moral reasoning explicated by Hare will not ensure that they will not arrive at conclusions that are abhorrent to most civilized persons. This is not to say that Hare's account of moral reasoning is wrong. It is, however, to suggest that teaching people to reason in this manner cannot, by itself, constitute an adequate moral education; otherwise we would have to give up our very strong intuitions that things like genocide and slavery are morally wrong, for our moral education would permit people to see these as justified. An adequate program of moral education will want to maximize the probability that persons using the moral reasoning Hare explicates do not merely have inclinations, i.e., care about what happens to themselves and others, but have inclinations that come up to some minimum standard. In my view, self-respect P embodies a plausible set of minimum standards for the inclinations of moral agents. Our ordinary moral arguments are, I think, directed toward persons presumed to have self-respect P. For such
persons they are persuasive. Moral reasoning is primarily reasoning about how persons should be treated. If inclinations play a significant role in this reasoning, and I think they do, then it is reasonable to suppose that they should be the inclinations of one who respects herself as a person. It is persons for whom one is universally prescribing.

Moral Components

Building on Hare's analysis of the logic of moral argument, John Wilson has attempted to describe in some detail the knowledge, abilities and dispositions a person must have if he is to be morally competent. As the result of his analysis, he specifies the following as necessary components of moral competence:

| PHIL (HC)  | Having the concept of a "person." |
| PHIL (CC)  | Claiming to use this concept in an over-riding, prescriptive and universalized principle. |
| PHIL (RSF) (PO & PO) | Having feelings which support this principle, either of a "duty oriented" or a "person oriented" kind. |
| EMP (HC)  | Having the concepts of various emotions, (moods, etc.). |
| EMP (1) (CS)  | Being able, in practice, to identify emotions, etc., in oneself, when these are at a conscious level. |
| EMP (1) (UCS)  | Ditto, when the emotions are at an unconscious level. |
| EMP (2) (CS)  | Ditto, in other people, when at a conscious level. |
| EMP (2) (UCS)  | Ditto, when at an unconscious level. |
| GIG (1) (KF)  | Knowing other ("hard") facts relevant to moral decisions. |
| GIG (1) (KS)  | Knowing sources of facts (where to find out) as above. |
"Knowing how"--"a skill" element in dealing with moral situations, as evinced in verbal communication with others.

Ditto, in non-verbal communications.

Being, in practice, "relevantly alert" to [noticing] moral situations, and seeing them as such (describing them in terms of PHIL, etc., above).

Thinking thoroughly about such situations and bringing to bear whatever Phil, Emp and Gig (1) has.

As a result of the foregoing, making an overriding, prescriptive and universalized decision to act in others' interests.

Being sufficiently whole-hearted, free from unconscious counter-motivation, etc. to carry out (when able) the above decisions in practice (1973, pp. 38-39).

Wilson puts a fairly stringent restriction on his moral agent—that he have the concept of a person—though he admits elsewhere that "a firm and clear grasp of this concept is not common even amongst adults." What is involved in having the concept of a person, according to Wilson, is "the ability to conceive of all people as forming one class, and (given the facts) to identify any "person" as a member of that class."

To have the concept is to see that intentions, needs, language use, etc., make one count as a person and to behave differently toward people and non-people for a reason, i.e., that he sees them as different in terms of this criterion. Wilson allows that a person can be "on the way toward having the concept" but argues that he has it or does not; he cannot have part of the concept. Wilson includes so much in his PHIL (HC) that it is difficult to imagine how one could have the concept of a person without also having self-respect P. He does say, however, that having the concept does not entail using or wanting to use the concept. If this is the case (though it seems to contradict his defining "persons" to include behaving
differently toward them for a reason), then it would be quite possible to have the concept without applying it to oneself. Self-respect P, however, would seem to be implicit in Wilson's components PHIL (HC) and KRAT (2) are taken together. Thus we would have the concept of a person, apply this concept to our moral deliberations, and act on our decisions. I am assuming that for one to have the concept of a person, one must be able to identify oneself as a person. But Wilson says that we may have a concept without having the practical ability to recognize a case of it, because we might not have the facts we need about the case. This leaves open the possibility that we could have the concept of a person without recognizing ourselves as persons. Thus, it is possible to have the aforementioned components without having self-respect P.

The fact that Wilson's set of components, if fully realized, probably includes self-respect P, does not mean that his system is a very fruitful way of developing it. There are too many loopholes through which self-respect P can be lost: I might have the concept of a person, yet fail to recognize that I am a case of the concept; I might have the concept, yet be disinclined to apply it; or I might have an underdeveloped concept of a person, such that I recognize instances of persons but fail to understand them in the context of having moral rights and responsibilities. It might be wise for Wilson to take explicit account of the development of self-respect P. Working through the concept of self-respect P rather than through PHIL (HC), PHIL (CC) and KRAT (2) might be a more effective way to achieve the requisite concept of a person which would enable one to devise a moral value system. It seems likely to be easier to appreciate what it is to be a person having rights in one's own case than in the case of others. Thus, it might be appropriate to learn about personhood
by starting with oneself as an exemplar.

Self-respect M is also missing from Wilson's components of moral competence. Nowhere does Wilson take into account the set of principles which a morally competent person must hold, except to say that a person must claim to use the concept of a person as an overriding, prescriptive and universalized principle. This makes little sense to me, and I do not intend to explore what Wilson might mean by this. It does seem that further explanation is necessary as to how a person can be morally competent without having some sort of system of moral principles. KRAT (2), being sufficiently wholehearted and free from unconscious counter-motivation to carry out one's moral decisions, would be closely connected to self-respect M, as acting according to one's moral principles is a rational basis for self-respect M.

**Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development**

For those unfamiliar with Kohlberg's theory of moral development, I will here give a brief summary.

Kohlberg believes that children progress through a hierarchical series of stages of moral development, a stage being defined in terms of the quality of moral thought usually exhibited by the person. A person progresses from one stage to the next through being exposed to reasoning above his own level. He will prefer reasoning at a stage one above his own. Cognitive dissonance is created when a person prefers the reasoning of those above him to his own. As a result, he will gradually move to the next stage. The stages are as follows:

1. **PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL**

   At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action,
punishment, reward, exchange of favors, or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. This level is divided into two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences.

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Reciprocity is a matter of you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours.

II. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but one of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to images of what is majority behavior.

Stage 4: The law and order orientation. An orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the social order for its own sake.

III. THE POST-CONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL

At this level there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have application apart from the authority of the groups and persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards which are critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. An emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. This is the official morality of the American Government and the Constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehension, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract
and ethical, like the Golden Rule, and not moral imperatives like the Ten Commandments. At heart these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (1969, p. 100).

Kohlberg's theory does not deal explicitly with self-respect but does include a number of provocative ideas. I shall indicate some areas which seem to warrant further study.

There appears to be a strong link between a person's concept of a person and her stage of moral development. A person at Stage 1 does not understand that being a person gives one rights. Rather she sees rights as being determined by authority figures such as parents and other adults. Similarly, someone at Stage 2 regards persons as instrumental in satisfying her own needs, rather than as entities having rights independent of their usefulness to her. At Stage 3 a person is guided by what others will think of her, and what is considered to be the good thing to do. She is not guided in her deliberations about others by the nature of persons. Again, at Stage 4, a person acts according to what will maintain the status quo. It is not, it seems to me, until Stages 5 and 6 that a person's moral deliberations are guided by principles based upon an understanding of the concept of persons.

At Stage 5, right action is largely defined in terms of general individual rights. The concept of individual rights is empty without the understanding of the concept of a person. At Stage 6 one of the guiding principles of conduct is "respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 100). Since having the concept of a person is necessary to having respect for persons, Stage 6 rests upon understanding the concept of a person.
I am not arguing that people at the lower stages do not have the concept of a person in the sense of being centres of consciousness, determiners of their own actions, being rational, etc., but that they do not appreciate that being a person gives one rights and responsibilities. Thus, the fact that someone is a person is not seen as a reason for them to treat her in any particular way. It is only at Stages 5 and 6 that someone's being a person gives one motivation to act toward her in any given way.

It may seem to follow that persons at Stages 1 to 4 will not be able to have self-respect P, as they do not have the requisite concept of a person. Since self-respect P is something that is desirable for all persons to have, such a conclusion would be very disturbing. I have already argued that persons may have degrees of self-respect P, depending on, among other things, their grasp of the concept of a person. Thus, a person at Stage 4, for example, might have a less than full-blooded self-respect P based upon seeing himself as entitled to the rights and responsibilities accorded persons by the conventions of his society. There is also another possibility. A person may not be at Stage 5 or 6 in the sense that he normally reasons at that level, but he may understand concepts and principles at that level, in which case he could still have the concept of a person and, thus, self-respect P.

It may be that one of the reasons that self-respect E and self-respect M seem so closely linked is that they are not very different until one reaches a level of principled morality. That is, if a person bases her moral decisions on what others will think of her (Stage 3), then her feeling of self-worth at having carried out her decision will be at least partially based upon others' approval of her. At higher stages, the approval of others is entirely separate from the feeling of self-worth one gets from living
up to one's principles.

It is interesting to explore the concept of self-respect in connection with Kohlberg's stages. Self-respect is appropriate at every stage of reasoning because at every stage a person can feel good about herself for acting according to what she thinks is right. Even those who are at the early stages might suffer shame of a sort if they did what they believed to be wrong. It seems now that there is probably some connection between undermining one's self-respect and creating cognitive dissonance in a child. In both cases, the child comes to see that someone else's value system is better than hers and her preference for that value system creates cognitive dissonance, or a disruption of her self-respect. This is unpleasant for the child and serves as a motivation for her to improve her principles in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance or to increase her self-respect. It is quite possible that Kohlberg and I are using different vocabulary to describe a similar phenomenon.

It may be that if Kohlberg were to take the concept of a person and self-respect into account, he would have a more direct means of promoting moral development than that of discussing dilemmas. Perhaps if explicit teaching of the concept of a person were attempted, this would expedite moral development.

Character Education

To many, moral education is synonymous with the building of character or virtues. Most proponents of the character education approach stress the importance of habituating children into virtue at an early age, before they are capable of understanding reasons for their actions. As Richard Peters puts it, we can enter the "palace of reason through the courtyard of habit." Cornel Hamm argues that it is better for children
(and adults who fail to grow up morally) to do the right thing for inadequate reasons rather than not to do the right thing at all, though we might want to call this "substitute morality" rather than moral education. He goes on to argue:

What makes a quality a virtue is not how one views a rule but how morally acceptable a certain practice is (based on whether or not it is an instance of a moral principle) and how thoroughly a rule enjoining that practice has become internalized as a feature of one's character. Thus it is appropriate to talk of virtue at every level of Kohlberg's developmental stages. A person may be said to have the virtue of honesty if he has learnt to be honest; and whether he views honesty as a practice required by his peers or one required by a fundamental moral principle does not detract from his having the virtue. What matters is that honesty be morally justifiable and that it has become dispositional (1975, p. 38).

I have many misgivings about this approach which do not concern self-respect but I shall try to limit my discussion to those which do.

Let us suppose that philosophers like Peters (1974) and Hamm (1975) are right—that it does make sense to habituate a person into at least certain virtues. If a person behaves "virtuously" out of habit, and not for the reason that he believes it to be the right way to behave, then what he does is unlikely to affect greatly his self-respect in any sense. It may be that he will receive approval from the adults who tried to instil the virtues into him, but this is the most we could say.

What of a person who has internalized these rules in Hamm's full sense, that is, has internalized a rule as a feature of one's character, presumably because one sees it as right to do so? Self-respect M will be satisfied. Self-respect E may be a precondition to one's caring about internalizing these rules. Notice that what is left out of this account of character education is self-respect P. A person could have all the virtues in this sense and yet not see herself as having rights or responsibilities.
She might learn to behave in a particular way toward persons, yet have a very limited concept of a person or respect for persons.

I mentioned earlier that I would indicate some directions in which moral educators might head in trying to foster the various types of self-respect.

Self-Respect E

Since self-esteem is based upon comparing favourably with others, educators will have to provide diverse ways for children to succeed. A not-so-bright youngster might be a good athlete, actor, artist, musician, etc. Those who have no outstanding talents but who try hard or have pleasing personalities should be recognized. Self-respect E is also heavily based upon the approval of others. In our classes we should find ways to express our approval when a student deserves it.*

Self-Respect P

Kenneth Strike (1979) suggests that a good way to promote self-respect P is to extend to students their rights and treat them as persons. We can also help students to grasp the concept of a person, which will give them a reason for treating themselves as well as others, with respect.

Self-Respect M

One difficulty with trying to teach self-respect M is that the teacher must be sensitive enough to know when a person's moral value system is "deserving" of self-respect M and when it is not, and to act accordingly. Perhaps she can do no better than to ensure that students base their systems upon reason and learn to apply standards to value decisions. In the realm of morally good, or virtues, what we need are "model" educators

*For a number of practical suggestions for promoting self-concept in the classroom, see Jack Canfield and Harold C. Wells (1976).
whom students will want to emulate. Since we do not have the right to foist virtues upon people (unless they are morally required virtues, such as honesty and fairness) then the best we can hope for is that students will want to develop the virtues which they admire in others. What else can be done to make a person care about attaining a virtue? As Ryle suggests, we may learn to care through our parents, "who reprimanded certain sorts of conduct in quite a different tone of voice from that in which they criticized or lamented our forgetfulness or our blunders" (1972, p. 441).

This chapter considered how each of the three kinds of self-respect is important to moral competence and examined a number of approaches to moral education to determine the extent to which they take self-respect into account. It was found that while some of the approaches were likely to develop one kind of self-respect, none of them was likely to promote all three kinds. It was suggested that programs of moral education, if they are to be sound, should include the development of the three kinds of self-respect among their explicit goals. Finally, some suggestions were made as to how these goals might be realized.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has been directed to the task of analyzing "self-respect" and of pointing out implications of the analysis for moral education.

I began by differentiating three kinds of respect, each having a different rational basis. The first was the sort of respect one has for talents, the second was the kind of respect one has for a person qua person, and the third, the respect given a person because of his character. This formed the basis for distinguishing three roughly parallel senses of self-respect. Self-respect E was esteem based upon one's relative merit and the approval of others; self-respect P was regarding oneself as a person and treating oneself appropriately, and self-respect M was feeling worthwhile due to living up to one's principles and ideals.

In the second chapter, I examined two prominent philosophical treatments of self-respect, those of Rawls and Downie and Telfer. These treatments were chosen because of their influence among moral educators. For example, Strike basis his paper, "Education, Justice and Self-Respect" upon Rawls' analysis of self-esteem and Downie and Telfer's arguments on duties to develop talents, are taken seriously by several moral educators. I argued that, in both Rawls' case and that of Downie and Telfer, failure to differentiate among kinds of self-respect led to confusion, and I showed how the appropriate distinctions could be useful to them.

In the final chapter I argued that each type of self-respect was important to moral competence and thus ought to be taken into account in any approach to moral education. An examination of a number of
popular approaches revealed that none was likely to promote all three kinds of self-respect. I concluded by arguing that educators need to have a clear grasp of the concept of self-respect, and that they should pay explicit attention to fostering the various kinds of self-respect.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


