A CRITICAL STUDY OF A THEORY OF AESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

by

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Abstract

Parsons' cognitive-developmental theory of the aesthetic experience of children envisages aesthetic development toward a particular "end state." This thesis critically examines the end state to which the development purportedly leads. The thesis also considers pedagogical questions involved in a programme of aesthetic education designed to bring about appropriate aesthetic responses.

It is argued that Parsons' theory is based on an objectivist aesthetic theory which, though widely accepted, does not do justice to some aspects of our experience of art. In particular, it is argued that because the theory misconstrues the logic of expression it fails to see how works of art can express emotions and thus does not take into account the full measure of our imaginative and emotional experience of art.

It is further argued that certain aspects of an Expression Theory of art give a more satisfactory account of how works of art can function to express emotions and of our emotional experience of art. In advancing this point the arguments of Sircello and Elliott are put forward and an attempt is made to show how Leavis's critical practice implicitly recognizes the points Sircello and Elliott make.

The dissertation also compares Parsons' theory with the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg and makes use of criticisms directed at the theories of the latter two to criticize Parsons' work. An expressionist critique of Parsons' theory is then made.
Finally, the expressionist position argued for is used as a basis for exploring the kinds of educational considerations that seem relevant for a programme of aesthetic education.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a critical examination of Parsons' cognitive-developmental theory of the aesthetic experience of children and its implications for education. The topic therefore raises both theoretical and pedagogical considerations. The theoretical considerations concern the norm on which Parsons bases his sequence of development and the "end state" he envisages; the pedagogical considerations have to do with questions involved in a programme of aesthetic education designed to bring about appropriate aesthetic responses. The nature and frequency of problems in aesthetic education encourage the belief that fresh insights into, and perhaps a better understanding of, the difficulties encountered in these areas might be gained by studies guided by a cognitive-developmental view. But before such studies can profitably take place, the theory needs to be critically assessed. This assessment involves making clear the assumptions on which the theory relies, and whether these assumptions are defensible. The study also includes a consideration of the kinds of implications which this developmental scheme might have for educators concerned with the arts. A brief sketch of the theory shows why it is important to determine what issues are raised, whether these issues have been properly dealt with, and what implications they have for aesthetic education.

Much research in the area of aesthetic development has concentrated on children's developing abilities in the arts, that is, on children as they create or attempt to create works of art rather than
as they respond to them. Parsons is the first to sketch a developmental theory of aesthetic experience or awareness concentrating on the child as he responds to works of art rather than as he creates them. His theory envisages a four-stage developmental sequence beginning with the child's undifferentiated egocentric, quasi-aesthetic response to works of art (stage one) and ending when the child becomes completely decentered and locates qualities in the object itself (stage four). What develops and changes, the theory maintains, is the child's sense of aesthetic relevance. At the first stage, the child is unable to distinguish between what is relevant or irrelevant in his aesthetic experience and so his response is, in Parsons' phrase, "confusedly aesthetic." This situation changes over time as the child develops an increasing sense of relevance. This sense of relevance structures the child's experience into qualitatively different stages and determines both what the child responds to in the work of art at each stage and the feeling with which he responds. There is thus both a cognitive and an affective component to the development.

The cognitive aspect concerns the developing sense of aesthetic relevance while the affective side deals with the child's emotional response to the work of art. Because the emotional response to the work is dependent on what the child judges to be relevant in the aesthetic situation, both aspects undergo a qualitative change at each stage of the development. Thus at each stage the child's judgement of aesthetic relevance determines the kind of experience he has of the work. The stages are therefore stages of aesthetic judgement as well as of aesthetic experience.
Parsons' theory does not, however, simply describe the various stages of the development of aesthetic awareness, although he claims to have done no more than propose a "series of advances in a sequence that seems central to the development of aesthetic experience" (Parsons, 1976, p. 314). The theory makes certain normative assumptions concerning the end state to which the development leads. By so doing it sets the standard for the end state and by implication what should count as development from each stage to the next. This normative aspect of the theory is obviously crucial, for the judgement of what is relevant or irrelevant in an aesthetic experience depends on what the theory takes to be constitutive of such experience. One cannot, therefore, decide when, whether, or how far the child's aesthetic experience has developed unless one knows something about the mature aesthetic experience, the end point of the development. Parsons himself recognizes this, but, as we shall presently note, does not provide an adequate description of the end state.

In the introduction to "Developmental Stages in Children's Aesthetic Responses" (Parsons et al., 1978), an empirical study by Parsons of children's responses to painting, we find an indication of his conception of this end state: "In our case, we must be able to give an account of the kinds of features of aesthetic objects found to be relevant in the aesthetic experience of sophisticated adults" (Parsons, 1978). This account is not provided, however, and the reason given is that this is "primarily a matter for the philosophy of art, or at least of art criticism." I disagree. A developmental account of aesthetic
experience ought to make clear what it takes that experience to be and so leave no doubt as to what is assumed to be the highest point of development. In Parsons' case this is particularly important because part of the plausibility of the theory, I shall argue, lies in the appeal of the particular view of art and aesthetic experience that is assumed. It will be recalled that both Piaget and Kohlberg, on whose theories Parsons' are modelled, have very definite and clear notions about the end state of their developmental sequences, and they describe and explain these at considerable length. Parsons chooses rather to "point" to the tradition represented by the work of Beardsley and his followers. "That tradition", he writes, "says that what is finally found to be important about a painting (considered as an aesthetic object) is its appearance - whatever is phenomenally available to the perception of any qualified observer" (Parsons, 1978, p. 85). This view can be generalised to cover the other arts and when so generalised it means that the aesthetic object is seen as an object possessing phenomenally objective (publicly observable) qualities, and aesthetic experience consists in sensing or apprehending these qualities. I have, following Elliott (1973), labelled this point of view and the theory that lies behind it, "objectivist", because it appears to interpret aesthetic experience rather strictly on the model of inspecting and coming to know an object. I shall argue that although this aesthetic theory seems to be the dominant one at present we do not have to accept it because it is not beyond question. I shall go further and try to show that in some important respects the objectivist aesthetic theory does not do justice to some aspects of our experience of art. These
aspects include our imaginative and emotional experience of art. I shall also argue that this defect is present mainly because the theory misconstrues the logic of expression and thus fails to see how works of art can express emotions. In any case, the objectivist aesthetic theory is only one among a number of competing theories and although it has been extremely influential in determining the methods and the attitudes of art educators and their pupils in the last few years, not to mention the parents of those pupils, I shall contend that this influence has not been all good.

So the first general criticism I shall make of Parsons' theory is that it relies on an objectivist aesthetic and that this determines both what he sees as developing and the end state of that development. This will be the subject matter of chapter two.

In chapter three I discuss aspects of Expression Theory that seem to me to deal with certain elements in the nature of art and our response to art in a more satisfactory manner than the objectivist aesthetic theory on which Parsons relies. In discussing these aspects I examine the arguments of Sircello (1971) and Elliott (1967) and go on to show how Leavis's critical practice implicitly recognises the points Sircello and Elliott make. Chapter four compares Parsons' theory with the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg and applies to Parsons some of the criticisms that have been made of Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories. The chapter ends with an expressionist critique of Parsons' theory. In chapter five I deal with the development of an emotional response to a work of art and in chapter six I summarize the main issues that have been dealt with in the thesis and review the educational considerations.
It is clear from what has been said so far that, although I refer to empirical findings in developmental studies of children's aesthetic abilities and experiences, this thesis is not an empirical study. Rather I am concerned to provide a critical assessment of Parsons' theory, to clarify its assumptions, and to evaluate the use it makes of empirical findings. I agree with Hamlyn (1971) when he states that "the most important part of trying to assess any theory is determining which questions are being asked." Mine is thus a critical evaluation of the questions Parsons' developmental thesis deals with and the implications they have for aesthetic education. This, I believe, is the distinctive contribution which a philosophical critique should make, and my criticisms of the theory are made in three areas: the theory's aesthetic assumptions, its developmental aspects and its educational implications.
CHAPTER ONE

EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE STUDY OF AESTHETIC DEVELOPMENT

1.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a discussion of some of the problems that beset those concerned with art education and the development of a literary sensibility. Then it delineates the two main positions that have been taken concerning aesthetic education. There follows a review of the previous work in aesthetic development and a demonstration of how this work corresponds to the pattern already set by the two views already considered. The chapter concludes with a discussion of why I think Parsons' theory might provide a fresh approach to the educational problems mentioned at the outset.

1.2 Educational Problems

The main motivation for undertaking this study lies in two distinct but related dissatisfactions - with the present state of art education generally and with the teaching of literature. Anyone who has observed the teaching of art in schools and who has read some of the literature on art education cannot fail to be impressed by the general lack of direction that characterizes the whole enterprise. There are various conflicting aims and no one is quite certain about what the goal should be. What seems clear, judging from the various provisions that are made in schools for children to practice art, is that society is concerned that art should become a better understood and more truly felt part of our lives. "Yet at the same time," writes
Field, "the procedures of the art teachers, whose task is to put this concern into practice, are characterized by confusion and lack of direction" (1970, p. 2). There are various reasons for this, and some of them are pointed out by Field. There is a chronic weakness in communication, so that art teachers in the field seem to be working in isolation. This, he points out, is the combined result of the mystique surrounding the art teacher's job, genuine differences of opinion and a preoccupation with means that excludes any discussion of ends. These problems are further complicated by the absence of any central focus for the dissemination of ideas, and the lack of research. Field concludes that for these reasons, and because the problems of art education are in constant flux, this is an area where developments are urgently necessary.

A similar need for development and change was felt by Steiner who ten years ago presented a bleak picture of the study and teaching of literature at university in an essay which appeared in *Language and Silence*:

A man would have to be an outright optimist or gifted with self-deception to argue that all is well in the study and teaching of English Literature. There is a distinct malaise in the field, a sense of things going wrong or by default... Motives are unclear or faintly hypocritical.

(Steiner, 1967, p. 67)

The general feeling of dissatisfaction with the enterprise which Steiner presents can be traced to certain specific failures in the teaching of literature. The literary work often elicits only a stereotyped response cloaked in empty verbal symbols that reflect the absence of any real convictions. There is frequently complete
insensitivity to literary passages of merit, despite attempts to point out what there is to be seen. Finally, one gets the impression that, despite strenuous efforts, no real love for the literary work develops. These are problems, the solution of which might demand a complete re-thinking of aims and strategies, or perhaps a new shift in focus.

Steiner's worry about the specific case of English literature and Field's concern about the teaching of art are only two instances of a general concern about the failure of aesthetic education. What these concerns illustrate is that the aesthetic form of understanding which the teaching was supposed to increase has not been enhanced. There is also a strong feeling that initiation into the arts has failed to bring about the expected transformation in how a person views the world and conducts himself in it. The humanities, as Steiner puts it, have failed to humanize. But the belief remains strong that the arts with their unique combination of the cognitive and the affective are especially suited to bring about a transformation of the whole person, his reason and his emotions.

In view of the fact that the various new teaching methods tried so far have not brought about the desired change that would enable individuals to engage more fully in the arts, it is doubtful whether further trials will make a difference. Change is indeed called for, but what kind of change? Developmental studies in other areas have generated new insights and approaches and stimulated research into various aspects of the child's learning abilities. These are highly valued by educators for reasons which have been variously stated.
Broudy writes:

"...if we understand the natural or even the regular sequences of changes in the child, we would try to capitalize on them in pacing instruction. We would use to advantage those times when the pupil learns most easily and refrain from pressing upon him activities for which he is not ready.

(Eisner, 1976, p. 87)

While this provides one of the reasons why we value the developmental findings of Piaget for example, it is necessary to add that developmental studies of children's art, a topic we shall be examining shortly, have provided a useful if one-sided picture of the development of children's artistic abilities. The sequence of artistic development that has been charted, from scribbles through abstract shapes or figures to heads and bodies, seems to hold good for most children but it provides a description of children as practitioners of art only and this seems to me to be an incomplete picture. If we are really interested in bringing about changes in aesthetic perception and appreciation then we should be concerned about the child's ability to respond to works of art as well as his ability to create. Indeed, a proper understanding of creativity in this context, as Field has argued, should include an awareness of the procedure of the artist and an understanding of the end product:

In this sense creative activity cannot be confined to the process of experiencing art by practising it, for the process of 'discovering about' art can also be creative. Thus the practice of art and the discovery of art should go hand in hand as one broad and unified activity leading to understanding in the twin senses of grasp and use.

(Field, 1970, p. 21)
What Field refers to as "discovery of art" could perhaps be more accurately described as the understanding and appreciation of art, an aspect of aesthetic education which needs to be emphasized because it is this which enables the child to have an aesthetic response and determines the kind of response that he has. Thus a theory of aesthetic development which concentrates on the child as he responds to works of art rather than as he creates them might provide the new focus that would enable educators to make a fresh start. Such a theory might perhaps show that children's powers of perception and appreciation often outstrip their abilities to make works of art. Whatever the result, it seems likely that the kind of research findings such a theory might generate would certainly make a difference to our approach to teaching. Finally, such a theory could, as did Kohlberg's theory for moral development, generate a new interest in, and an awareness of, the way children develop aesthetic concepts.

The theory I have in mind was put forward by Parsons (1976). He has since carried out an empirical study of children's responses to painting (Parsons et al., 1978). This study identifies six topics in connection with painting which reveal developmental stages. The stages are arrived at by an analysis of the children's responses; the results seem to support the plausibility of the theory. But before going on to discuss Parsons' theory it is necessary to set the theory in its context. This I shall do by discussing the two main positions that have been taken concerning aesthetic education, and I follow this with a review of earlier work in aesthetic development.
1.3 The Progressive and New Curriculum Movements in Aesthetic Education

Writers who have expressed views on aesthetic education can be grouped roughly into two camps - those who reflect the views and arguments used by the progressive movement in education and those who stress the importance of teaching skills and content in art. The two may be identified respectively, as the progressives and those who espouse the new curriculum movement. Representative figures of the progressive movement are Read, Lowenfeld and Brittain while those of the new curriculum movement are Broudy, Smith and Reimer.

The progressives stress children's innate abilities to do art. These abilities, they argue, should be allowed to develop with little or no interference from adults. Lowenfeld speaks of the unfolding of the potential creative abilities of the child (Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1964) and he sees most adult effort to direct the child as interfering with his creative urge. The progressives, as one would expect, strongly emphasize doing and children's drawings are seen not as inadequate or poor imitations of adult drawings but as full expressions of the world as it impinges on the child's consciousness. Read sees the child's efforts as the "direct and unsophisticated expression of its own world of feeling" (Read, 1958). This emphasis on the child's expression is reflected in the way the progressives view the nature of art. Art for this group is expression. No sophisticated view of expression is intended here. The child is said to express himself in what he creates, and the product or work of art is the expression. Read sees art as merely one method of human expression or communication and so within the reach of all children.
What then would be the aim of aesthetic education for the progressives? There are two aims really, an immediate one and an overall one. The immediate aim is to enable the child to develop a new medium of expression and to create works of art. The overall aim is to achieve the moral and intellectual wholeness of mankind. For the progressives then the aim of aesthetic education is ultimately extra-aesthetic. This overall aim is part of what Read had in mind when he advanced the thesis that "art should be the basis of education" (Read, 1958).

In contrast to this group the new curricula people maintain that children have limited abilities to do art but have greater powers of perception and appreciation. What is important, they argue, is not emphasis on doing so much as guidance towards a fuller aesthetic appreciation. There is no assumption here that children's creative abilities develop naturally but a clear belief in the idea that children's powers of aesthetic perception outstrip their ability to produce art. This seems to me to be a useful corrective to the progressives' excessive adulation of the child's creative effort, an adulation influenced by a romantic view of the child - inherited perhaps from Rousseau.

Where the progressives see art as something which the child naturally produces, the new curriculum movement stresses that there is a cognitive core to art which must be emphasized in teaching. Reimer (1970) argues that the art of music possesses a structure which has to be carefully taught. Broudy (1972) sees works of art as setting
standards of excellence and argues for the inculcation of these standards if the pupil is to make any worthwhile progress in art. In Smith's "Aesthetic Criticism: The Method of Aesthetic Education" (1968), there is a similar emphasis on "the content or subject matter of formal instruction" in aesthetic education. There is, behind all this, a clear conviction that art is an achievement and that not everything the child produces is art.

For the new curriculum movement, then, aesthetic education aims at achieving an enlightened beholding - Broudy calls it "enlightened cherishing" - in the aesthetic domain of human experience. The goal is reached when aesthetic response or judgement is justified by appeal to relevant criteria in terms of which objects are deemed worthy or unworthy of acclaim. The overall aim is thus purely aesthetic. It must be added, however, that Broudy sees aesthetic education as leading towards a general education in "values" and this sets him apart from the others in the new curricula group.

There is behind the new curriculum movement's emphasis on the primacy of content in aesthetic education the conviction that schools are institutions that are primarily places where formal instruction takes place, that most people can and do profit from this formal instruction in the arts, but that only a few people can and do become artists in any community. The latter in any case works best when not hampered by the demands of institutions. They are people with individual needs which institutions cannot satisfy, whether these institutions be schools or places of higher learning, such as universities.
In support of this view Griffiths (1965) argues, concerning universities:

The university environment, with its air of public criticism, is often inimical to the artist. Artists do not always fit well into institutions, especially ones not primarily dedicated to their purposes. Above all, we do not want to turn poets into literary critics, painters into art historians, or great musical innovators into teachers of elementary harmony: and this is not for the sake of universities but for the sake of poetry, literary criticism, painting, art history and Schoenberg.

(Archambault, 1965, p. 119)

If this is so, we can conclude that the new curriculum movement is right to insist that enlightened response and judgement be the focus of attention in aesthetic education. Smith (1968) argues that learners be taught "how to decide what is aesthetically relevant, valuable and unique" and he advocates aesthetic education be by the route of aesthetic criticism - description, analysis, interpretation and evaluation.

These two opposing views of aesthetic education recur frequently in the literature discussed in this thesis. It will be seen that traditional approaches to the study of children's abilities in the arts reflect the bias of the progressives and concentrate on the child as he creates or attempts to create works of art rather than as he responds to them. There have, however, been a few recent studies that deal with the child as a responder to art and, in setting up criteria for the evaluation of children's responses, these studies reflect the views of the new curriculum movement.

The view of the child as potential artist, and the consequent concentration of attention on his developing creative abilities is one
which is shared even by psychologists who have not concerned themselves directly with the study of the artistic development of the child. Freud, for example (see Gardner, 1973, p. 18), was fascinated by the fact that the child at play behaved like a creative writer, creating a world of his own and taking it very seriously but at the same time separating it from reality, and Piaget was puzzled by the fact that the child's early manifestations of creative activity did not show the same continuous progression that his intellectual development showed. But recognition that the early creative promise of the child is rarely fulfilled by the adult has not diminished the faith in the child's creative potential. Arnheim, for example, goes so far as to assert: "I can think of no essential factor in art or artistic creation of which the seed is not recognisable in the work of children" (Arnheim, 1954, p. 164). Kellogg (1970) and Di Leo (1971) in their separate studies of children's art go along with Arnheim although they emphasize the importance and intrinsic interest of children's creative efforts. Kellogg's conclusions from her patient study of children's art from various cultures represent the current opinion about the stages of children's artistic development and are worth recapitulating. She demonstrates that the child first goes through the scribbling stage, making straight or curly lines back and forth across the page. This is followed by the placement stage in which lines are placed in certain basic ways on the page. No attempt is yet made to draw specific objects. This is the achievement of the next stage where the mastery of certain shapes allows patterns to be built in the form of crosses, circles and mandalas. This may be called the
pre-schematic stage. At about the age of four the child starts to represent aspects of the world - persons, buildings, trees, etc., and begins to exploit some visual schemes, e.g., trees as people without arms. This is the schematic stage or the stage of representation, and it goes on until the child is five or six, when he starts making pictures that suggest stories and passes from the representational stage to that of realism.

The general movement from scribbling to representation is also documented by Di Leo whose careful work on the drawings of normal and abnormal children from thirteen months to six years is a fascinating document. In discussing developmental sequences he observes:

There is general agreement that two distinct stages can be identified in the spontaneous graphic activity of young children: an earlier kinesthetic or scribbling stage and a later representational stage.

(Di Leo, 1971, p. 17)

The accounts of Kellog and Di Leo have, as Gardner (1973) notes, "been supported by more systematic experimentation." He highlights certain points of general agreement:

Of particular note is the universal conviction that general schemes (circles, squares) precede the presentation of objects. The human figure is generally the first and most popular representation. The child initially draws what he knows about objects and only gradually comes to realise that he may attempt to draw directly after nature; attempts to draw in perspective do not generally emerge until 9 or 10 years of age, though some preschoolers already attempt the practice. There is a period of preadolescent regression, in which the child either ceases to draw altogether or draws in a more primitive manner. And in our culture there is a general shift to verbal means of expression and to ornamentation in writing after the years of middle childhood.

(p. 217)
We may note here how certain aspects of the developmental sequence sketched have parallels in the development of aesthetic awareness outlined by Parsons. After the scribbling stage the child starts on his graphic exploration by drawing what he knows. As we will see, this is paralleled in Parsons' scheme by the fact that the child first identifies with the subject of the painting and relates the work to himself. From drawing what he knows the child goes on to copy nature, i.e. he conforms to some external rules of art. The parallel with Parsons here is that in the second stage of aesthetic response the child locates the source of aesthetic pleasure more objectively in the work itself, i.e. in the satisfaction of standards external to himself. This shows a measure of decentering as the child passes from the first egocentric stage to one in which factors outside himself influence his aesthetic response. In the third stage of his creative evolution the child begins to try to draw in perspective and we find that in Parsons' developmental sequence this is when the child begins to realise that "there may be many alternative sets of rules by which works can be judged" (Parsons, 1976, p. 313). That regression sets in during the preadolescent years of creativity is paralleled in Parsons' work by the loss of certain distinctions previously achieved during preadolescence often followed by a reversal to an earlier egocentric stage. These parallels lend a certain plausibility to Parsons' stage theory, but I shall argue later that the theory also derives some of its plausibility from its normative aspects. Although Parsons does not give a detailed account of the normative assumptions of his theory I shall show that
they are important to the theory and are derived from a particular aesthetic theory which, though widely accepted, does not do justice to some important aspects of our experience of art.

The studies mentioned so far have concentrated on the child as he creates or attempts to create works of art and the authors have been at pains to defend the freshness, sincerity and validity of the child's vision of reality. I do not want to deny any of these claims, but it should be remembered that artistic development is toward an end state, the production of mature works of art, and it is against this end state that the child's work is measured. Gardner provides a good reason for conceiving an end state when he writes:

There is a sense in which it is necessary to speak of a developed artist or critic, just as one would speak of a developed scientist or businessman, not to denigrate other individuals (including children), but to describe an ideal type or end state toward which development proceeds.

(Gardner, 1973, p. 24)

Judged by the standards of the end state, then, most children's drawing must be seen as "lacking a sense of proportion, 'proper' orientation in space, and aesthetic sensitivity" (Di Leo, 1971, p. 134). The child still has to acquire a great deal of experience and technical expertise; he still has a lot of living to do. These things take time. With luck, hard work and patience he may make it. We must not pause too long to stare at, and lavish too much praise on, work that is really only the first step toward mature creation. Gardner's remarks about the absurdity of regarding the young child of seven or eight as a mature artist are relevant here. "He requires", Gardner writes, discussing
the child artist, "at the very least, additional knowledge about the medium, more understanding of the culture in which he lives, increased flexibility in the way he regards artistic objects, and greater psychological insight about human nature, as well as superior technical skill permitting him to realise desired effects in particular media" (Eisner, 1976, p. 104). The objective adult standards by which Di Leo says we must not judge children's work are ultimately the only standards we have, and we do the children less than justice to pretend otherwise.

It is interesting to note that, for all their readiness to lavish praise, those who have examined a great deal of children's artistic output admit that the work is of varying degrees of excellence. Some drawings and paintings are clearly better than others however carefully they have been selected. Some show more originality, some a more accomplished sense of style and some a clearer vision. The fact that such differences in quality of produced work are noticed makes it obvious that an external standard is being applied. Di Leo writes: "All children draw, but only a few will eventually impart to their drawings those tactile values and movement, that elusive life-communicating something that Berenson calls Art" (1971, p. 134). The standards of excellence with which all art is measured come from great art, and this is an adult achievement.

The concentration of attention on the child's creative efforts by Lowenfeld, Kellog, Di Leo and others might lead one to believe that the child's ability to respond to art lies dormant while his creative potential develops. This is clearly not the case. "By the time he is
four and a half", Di Leo observes, "the child is able to make an aesthetic judgement when presented with three pairs of faces. He will surprise his mother by selecting the prettier of each pair of girls, reflecting the aesthetic standards of his culture" (1971, p. 134). In fact studies by Machotka (1962; 1966) and by Gardner, Winner and Kircher (1975), both of whom I shall presently review, suggest that children are able to make aesthetic judgements as early as three years of age or even earlier. The conclusion Parsons draws from his own findings is that certain aesthetic discriminations are made quite early, perhaps as early as when the child begins to scribble. W. Wolff asks: "Is not the aesthetic sense revealed in the child's ability to suggest reality with the greatest economy of means?" (cited in Di Leo, 1971, p. 134). The answer to this question must surely be positive. No one can produce work to which descriptions like graceful, elegant, precise, suggestive, etc., apply who has not himself acquired, however embryonically, the aesthetic qualities which these adjectives suggest. Yet throughout their analyses of children's art, both Kellog and Di Leo show no interest in trying to elicit the aesthetic awareness of their subjects or their capacity to respond aesthetically by getting them to talk about their art or other people's. What is required, as Ecker (1973, p. 62) suggests, is "a systematic analysis of children's talk about art to match Kellog's analysis of children's art." No such analysis has yet been done. There have been a handful of less ambitious efforts. One of the more interesting of these is Machotka's study - to which I now turn.
1.4 Developmental Studies leading to Parsons' Theory

Machotka (1966) did a careful study of the reasons children give for their choices of paintings. He found that younger children tended to base their preferences on subject matter and colour while children between the ages of seven and eleven referred increasingly to realism as the reason for their choice. These children also gave harmony and clarity as reasons for their choice. At adolescence, children began to base their choices on "style, composition, affective tone and luminosity" (p. 877). Machotka argued that the three different reasons picked out at the three stages reflected Piagetian developmental stages. Thus the younger children who gave subject matter and colour as reasons showed that they were at Piaget's preoperational stage; those who picked realism showed that they were at the stage of concrete operational thought while adolescents who showed interest in style, composition, etc., were giving reasons that reflected the stage of formal operations "in which the operations characterizing the previous stage became fully mental, independent of concrete illustration, and consequently hypothetico-deductive" (1966, p. 878). Machotka also noted that the child's ability to represent objects mirrored Piagetian trends and pointed out that "by age 11, the child's knowledge of representation has outdistanced his ability to represent; this should mark his highest appreciation of realistic representation - of an ability which he prizes but cannot attain" (1966, pp. 878-879). This last point is further confirmation of remarks I made earlier about children's appreciative talents being greater than their ability to create works of art.
Machotka does not attempt to generalize his thesis to cover the other arts - which might lead one to conclude that the developmental stages he describes apply only to painting, but a more generalised Piagetian trend is confirmed by other investigators, notably Gardner, Winner and Kircher (1975), who have explored areas other than painting. These authors tested children between the ages of four and sixteen and on the whole confirmed Machotka's findings although they add two interesting facts about the responses of children in their mature age group (14 - 16 years). These thought that art required native ability, talent or genius as opposed simply to hard work or skill. They also exhibited a kind of relativism in their judgements and this the authors thought was a return to the relativism of the early years (4 - 7). Gardner, Winner and Kircher conclude that their study "reveals the existence of a number of qualitatively different views about the arts over the course of childhood" (p. 74). They point out that there is "no evidence that these steps of thought are taught or imitated: rather they appear to be spontaneous constructions at a certain developmental stage" (p. 74). Finally they stress that the way children think about the arts reflects the way in which they think about the world generally.

Other researchers have come up with findings about children's responses to the arts which have added some interesting details to the main conclusions arrived at by Machotka and Gardner, Winner and Kircher. Gardner (1973) summarizes these findings in his chapter on experimental research and concludes that more research and tests are needed to probe
the pattern of aesthetic development that the present findings suggest. There is clearly a need for further research but such research has to be preceded by a guiding theory that takes note of the present findings and relates them to a total picture of the development of aesthetic awareness. Parsons does provide such a theory and I shall now give a very brief summary of it before discussing some of the ways in which it might provide new approaches to the educational problems mentioned above.

Parsons calls his theory a "cognitive-developmental theory of the aesthetic experience of children" and he intends it to explain the facts, discovered by Machotka and others, about children's aesthetic experiences. The theory focusses on the child as he responds to works of art, rather than as he creates them, and discusses the cognitive structure that lies behind the child's experience of art. In a four-stage developmental sequence the theory envisages a gradual process of decentering as children pass from an initial stage of egocentrism where there is complete identification with, for example, characters in a story, to a mature stage of making objective aesthetic judgements about the work of art. What develops is the sense of aesthetic relevance and this affects both the kind of response that the child makes and the feeling with which he responds. Parsons gives the following guiding summary of his four stages:

Children at the first stage speak as if these (aesthetic) qualities lie in an egocentrically close relation between self and object. At the second stage, children conceive them as residing in the satisfaction of a specific set of rules. At the third stage, account is taken of a variety of possibly conflicting sets of rules, and authority for
judgements lies either in the artist's intentions or with individual and characteristic response. Finally, at the mature stage, aesthetic qualities are thought of as qualities of the object itself, being in principle publicly accessible and based on the perceptual or intentional aspects of the object. With respect to judgements, one might summarize the stages by reference to the notion of rules: the first stage has in effect no rules; the second has a clear set of rules; the third has many and conflicting sets of rules and falls back either on the artist's intention or on some form of relativism; the fourth has principles of relevance, to wit, that aesthetic qualities are public and are based on the perceptual or intentional aspects of the object. With respect to experience, the central thread to these stages is the passage from a highly egocentric response to a response that is highly sensitive to aesthetic qualities as such, i.e. to a power or highly relevant and subtle feeling.

(Parsons, 1976, p. 309)

He argues that the theory sketched applies potentially to all of the arts, but that it requires a serious engagement with each art form for its realisation. Thus he is concerned with what is distinctive about aesthetic experience across the arts.

Parsons goes on in the article to describe each of the first three stages in detail showing how the young child passes from an undifferentiated egocentric response to works of art (stage one) to a state in which he begins to locate aesthetic qualities in the object itself (stage four). The fourth and last stage which Parsons takes to be the end point of development is not described in any detail but he assumes that philosophers of criticism have been engaged in discussing the nature of this stage. This is the stage of the adult response where objective reasons are given to support an aesthetic response or judgement.
It is clear from this brief summary that Parsons envisages the child going through qualitatively different stages in the development of aesthetic awareness. The theory is thus similar to Kohlberg's theory of moral development. It is, however, much less detailed than Kohlberg's but Parsons believes he has sketched enough of the theory to allow "a more thorough investigation of the facts to take place" (Parsons, 1976, p. 314).

In considering the ways in which the theory might generate new insights into some of the educational problems mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, we might begin by discussing the "facts" on which the theory is built and which demand investigation and corroboration, and the effect these facts, if confirmed, might have on the teaching of the arts. But, first, a general observation. Parsons' theory, by concentrating on the child as he responds to works of art draws attention to the child's role as "audience member" and "critic" (Gardner's terms) and so invites the educator to gear his teaching toward developing the child's understanding and appreciation. This certainly provides a welcome shift from the previous exclusive concern over the child's creative potential, a concern which often limited the art teacher's role to one of merely providing a suitable environment for the child to "make art."

What are the facts on which Parsons' theory is built? There is, first of all, the developmental sequence. Parsons claims that the child moves from an egocentrically close relation to the aesthetic object to one in which he distances himself from the object and locates
the aesthetic qualities in the object itself. The development thus involves both a decentering process and an acquisition of a sense of aesthetic relevance which determines both the kind of thing the child responds to in the work and the quality of that response. This sense of aesthetic relevance changes over time so that some things that are judged to be irrelevant at an earlier stage later become important while others that are considered important at an earlier stage may later be found irrelevant. If these suggestions are confirmed, art teachers might have to modify both their methods of teaching and the content of what they teach. There would be no point in trying to get a child to respond objectively to a work of art or an aesthetic object at a time when he is not yet able to distance himself from the work and has not developed an adequate sense of aesthetic relevance. Nor would there be much point in trying to get a response to a work whose demands are well beyond the child's developmental stage.

Secondly, there is the matter of the stages themselves. In the follow up study of children's responses to painting already noted (Parsons, et al., 1978), Parsons and his colleagues report that the idea of representation in painting dominated responses at stage one. This would seem to suggest an earlier stage when paintings were not seen as being about anything, as studies of very young children's paintings indicate. The idea of a painting representing something or someone would then be a later achievement. This is one of the findings that clearly need corroboration, for if there is a stage before stage one, might there not be other stages between two and three and between
three and four? Whatever the findings turn out to be, they will certainly make a difference to our choice of material for teaching and our expectations of pupils.

While on the topic of stages we might consider Parsons' description of stage two as the stage in which the notions of rules and standards in art become important to the child so that he begins to judge works of art according to external standards. Conventions about subject matter also become important at this stage and the young child comes to prefer certain kinds of subjects for art. These usually exclude the painful and the tragic - perhaps because the child is not yet psychologically able to deal with such subjects. These suggestions, if correct, would certainly affect when and how the teacher introduces works of art that deal with certain kinds of subjects. Problems encountered in the teaching of literature such as inadequate response to, and lack of love for, the literary work, might partly be solved by a sensible choice of works based on the appeal of certain subjects at different developmental stages.

These educational implications provide a certain justification for studying Parsons' developmental theory. In the chapters that follow I shall consider the educational implications of other aspects of the theory.
CHAPTER TWO

PARSONS' THEORY AND THE OBJECTIVIST AESTHETIC THEORY ON WHICH IT RELIES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a detailed exposition of Parsons' cognitive-developmental theory of aesthetic experience. This is followed by a discussion of the objectivist aesthetic theory on which it relies. It concludes with an examination of the implications of this theory for aesthetic education.

Parsons suggests four stages in the development of aesthetic experience and judgement beginning with the undifferentiated egocentric response to the work of art observed in the five or six year old child. Then follows a gradual process of decentering and the realisation in preadolescent years that there are standards in art. The recognition of the existence of different and possibly conflicting sets of standards comes in adolescence and the decentering process ends at the final stage when aesthetic response is based on qualities of the work that are in principle publicly accessible "and not in some more egocentric relation" (Parsons, 1976, p. 314).

2.2 Stage One

The child at stage one does not, according to Parsons' theory, distinguish clearly between art objects and natural objects, is often heavily influenced by subject matter in paintings, and does not distinguish between the pleasure he derives from the appearance of the painting and the pleasure he derives from associations suggested by the
painting. Parsons gives the example of a five and a half year old boy who liked Currier and Ives' painting *Preparing for Market*, a scene of farm life. The boy gave as his reason for liking it the fact that it reminded him of his cowboy hat. The picture does not, of course, have any cowboys or cowboy hats in it but it does have a horse and it is all too likely that it was the horse that triggered off the pleasant associations with the cowboy hat. In addition, the child thought that saying that he liked the painting was the same as judging it to be good. A second example is given of a somewhat older girl who said she liked the painting because the farm depicted in the painting was the sort of place in which she would like to live. Parsons comments that the girl had responded more fully and relevantly than the boy because she had attended more closely to the details of the painting, but, like the boy, she had failed to "distinguish the pleasure of imagining herself living on the farm from that due to the appearance of the painting" (Parsons, 1976).

These two examples serve to illustrate the characteristics of the stage one response mentioned above - the confusion of what is perceptually present in the work with what is not, the inability to distinguish between liking and judging, the attention to the subject matter of the painting rather than to the representation itself. Parsons sees these characteristics as peculiar to the child's response to art and as what distinguishes the child's response from the adult's. An adult's experience of art would be free from these elementary confusions.
Parsons argues further that these three failures - the failures to distinguish between liking and judging, between what is perceptually present in the work and what is not and between the subject matter of the painting and the representation itself - are connected with Piaget's notion of egocentricism and the child's inability to role-take, i.e. to take the point of view of another. Because the child's attention is centered on himself and he is unable to take another person's point of view, he considers what he likes to be what every other person would like. Or rather, it does not occur to him that what he likes might not be what other people would like. Thus the distinction between personal preference and objective judgement is not made. The child of the first example "speaks as if, though we cannot say he thinks it, others would be reminded of their cowboy hat just as they would also see a horse" (Parsons, 1976). Thus he fails to distinguish between what is perceptually present in the work and what is not. Finally, the reason given by the girl of the second example for liking Preparing for Market - that the farm depicted in it was the sort of place she would like to live in - can be seen as further illustration of egocentrism. Her response showed that "she had...projected herself into the farm, and did not distinguish the pleasure of imagining herself living on the farm from that due to the appearance of the painting" (Parsons, 1976, p. 310).

The two examples show then that the child's response to art falls far short of what one might call an "appropriate" aesthetic response. Still the response, Parsons argues, does fall within the
domain of the aesthetic, since it is a response, however unsatisfactory, to the appearance of the painting. We may note here that Parsons, following Beardsley and others, assumes that the aesthetic object is a perceptual object, one that appeals to the senses, and that a response to how the object appears falls within the range of the aesthetic. Beardsley (1958) in fact describes paintings as "visual aesthetic objects" (p. 34).

In order to characterize further the features of the stage one response, Parsons introduces the notion of "favourites." Children at this stage, he argues, often say they like a painting because it contains their favourite colour. This shows that their response is influenced by their personal attachments to particular colours. Where an adult, for example, would point out a particular colour and the effect it has on the work as a whole in an effort to justify his response to it, the child simply says, "Red is my favourite colour", and that for him is a sufficient justification for liking the painting. The idea that being a favourite colour is not an objective feature of the work and that others may not respond similarly does not occur to him. If he is particularly attached to the colour red he would find all reds attractive in the same way and no further discrimination would be possible. This emphasizes once again the egocentric nature of the stage one response.

These various inadequacies in the child's experience of art lead Parsons to conclude that the response at this stage is "confusedly aesthetic." Even so, stage one is the basis for future development.
What develops is the child's sense of aesthetic relevance. His present inability to distinguish between what is relevant or irrelevant in his aesthetic experience ceases as he begins to develop certain discriminatory powers.

2.3 **Stage Two**

While the stage one response is more or less egocentric, the stage two response achieves a certain measure of decentering. The child at this stage, Parsons (1976) argues, abandons the notion of favourites "because it begins to conflict with the facts of perception and of social life" (p. 311). The source of aesthetic pleasure or satisfaction is now located more objectively in the work itself, and the arbitrariness of the child's initial response to particular colours starts becoming obvious to him. This, Parsons argues, is a result of his development with respect to role-taking. Other people's feelings and points of view begin to matter and the child becomes less certain that his own response is the right one. "This is a limited but real step forward in decentering" (p. 311). The child now begins to find a work attractive "because it satisfies a certain kind of rule" (p. 311). Parsons is using "rule" here to mean standard or accepted convention for he gives as examples of rules that are followed in art, "realism", "form" and "subject matter." An artist may employ certain devices in order to achieve a realistic painting. These devices, however, are more like conventions than rules. The ones that are employed differ according to the artist and the nature of the work. Thus the child is said at this stage to begin to respond favourably to works of art...
that are "realistic" in the sense that some paintings, for example, employ standard modes of representation in depicting a subject and in doing so represent persons or things as they actually appear. Parsons recognises that it is not altogether clear how realism would apply to music and that there are problems about its application to literature. But the general idea is that the child at this stage finds satisfying works of art (especially painting) that are in some way or other seen as realistic, i.e. they approximate to what the child takes to be a "correct" portrayal of reality. This is a considerable advance on the first stage as the child's response is now influenced by, and his judgement based on, publicly observable criteria.

The child's response to form in art, Parsons argues, also begins to show the same objectivity. Parsons cites studies that have shown that children of elementary school age tend to comment on formal matters such as balance, harmony, contrast, repetition, etc., and argues that these comments show a movement away from idiosyncratic responses towards response and judgement that are based on "the observable satisfaction of certain conditions" (p. 312). A point now arrives when the child can judge a work good even when he does not like it. Though this could lead to an over-reliance on standards, Parsons sees it as "a positive and necessary step forward" (p. 312).

An awareness of realism and form in art, Parsons argues, helps the child at this stage to distinguish between the subject matter of a painting and its execution. "At this age children can talk of the difference between a good horse poorly painted and a poor horse
well-painted" (p. 312). Although this distinction can be maintained, Parsons argues that "the appeal of subject-matter per se continues its tyranny for a long time" (p. 312). Only certain subjects are considered fit for art. For painting these would include "the pretty, the picturesque, the nostalgic, the magnificent" (p. 312). These subjects would evoke, in Parsons' view, an unhesitating response from the child. The painful, the ugly and the tragic would be excluded. Yet outside of painting we find children responding "unhesitatingly" to subjects that one would normally call painful or tragic. Witness, for example, the violence that is depicted in popular children's books. Why does this literature have such an appeal for children? "This is because children respond very much in terms of heroes and villains, and these works are shaped to encourage this" (Parsons, 1976, p. 312). The experience of these books, Parsons argues, is not found to be painful or tragic because children identify with the heroes and the violence happens to the villains or to persons with whom the children do not identify. "Hence there is no repugnance to be overcome in their response" (p. 312).

At stage two, then, the child becomes aware of the existence of external standards by which works of art could be judged and this fact influences his response to art. The response becomes less idiosyncratic. At the same time the child develops the ability to take the point of view of another, and this, along with his acceptance of standards, takes him out of his egocentric stage. Not completely, however, because he retains strong preferences for certain subjects
and exhibits a certain rigidity in aesthetic response. Still enough is achieved to make this stage a clear advance on the preceding one and to lead to further development.

2.4. **Stage Three**

Parsons explains that stage three begins when the child is about twelve and comes to realise that there may be "many alternative sets of rules by which works can be judged" (p. 313). Once again for "rules" read "standards." The child also notes that the existence of alternative sets of standards might conflict with his own and this realisation brings about a certain hesitancy in response and judgement. Parsons quotes the following comment from a child who was confronted with Klee's *Head of a Man*:

> This one here, I'm not too sure. I'm not too sure what it means. You know, what he was trying to say, what feeling he was trying to put down. I'm confused. . .I do not know what I'm supposed to be looking for. It's not that I really don't like it, it's O.K. but I don't know what he's trying to say.

The child's words here illustrate some of the features which Parsons maintains are characteristic of the stage three response. There is the hesitancy and confusion resulting from the fact that the child is lacking a foothold on the artist's intention, an awareness of which becomes important at this stage. There is also the feeling that there might be other sorts of standards by which the work could be judged. On this Parsons comments:

> There is here an unwillingness to condemn a work because it does not conform to the obvious rules; and instead an awareness that there might be another set of rules which would make all the
difference. ("What I'm supposed to be looking for"). This set of rules seems to depend on what the artist intended to do with his work. The effort therefore is to identify with the artist rather than simply with a main character in the work. This seems to represent a further and more difficult step in the decentering process, one which would require multiple role-takings where there is more than one main character in the work. (p. 313).

The identification with the artist also leads the child to see the work of art as the expression of emotion, as something personal, and Parsons maintains that the concentration on the expressive qualities of art which happens at this stage contrasts with "the rather formal approach of the previous stage" (p. 313).

Parsons explains further that there is an interest in genres and different kinds of art at this stage and he attributes this development to the child's increasing awareness of the variety of possible intentions of the artist. The recognition of different kinds of art often leads to relativism in judgement, Parsons argues, as the child entertains the idea that any work may be good of its kind, and the failure to appreciate a particular work may be his fault rather than the result of any deficiency in the work. The work may, in other words, conform to other people's standard of a good work of art. Parsons notes the parallel here with the relativist view that appears in Kohlberg's moral development scheme "with the realisation that one's society's code of morality is only one of many possible and competing codes" (p. 314). This does not mean that the notion of relevant reasons for judgement has been abandoned. Rather the reasons for judgement are now located either in the artist's intention or the
viewer's inclination, and this fact makes the response at this stage much less egocentric than the earlier stages. However, the reasons for judgement are not yet located in the aesthetic object itself and this, in Parsons' view, indicates that there is a further developmental stage.

2.5 **Stage Four**

This further stage, the fourth and final one, is the end state toward which, according to Parsons, aesthetic development moves. Parsons does not go on to give a full description of this final stage. His excuse is that "philosophers of criticism...have been engaged in the discussion of the exact nature of that stage for a long time", and he sees no point in "trying to add to that discussion here" (p. 314). He does, however, point out that at this final stage aesthetic judgement is non-relativist and is based on qualities of the work of art that are in principle perceptual or intentional and are publicly accessible.

This fourth stage, Parsons further argues, "is the end point of development because it marks the end of the decentering process, by locating aesthetic qualities firmly in the aesthetic object itself and not in some more egocentric relation" (Parsons, 1976, p. 314). There is here an emphasis on the objectivity of the aesthetic judgement, and a judgement, according to this account, is objective if it is based on features of the aesthetic object that are, at least in principle, publicly accessible. The features of the aesthetic object that are picked out must also, of course, be relevant to the kind of judgement being made, which is why Parsons earlier described his account of
aesthetic development as a development of "the ability to respond relevantly to a work of art as an aesthetic object" (p. 306). Response and judgement, he points out, go hand in hand. The features of a work that affect one determine the kind of response that is made and the judgement that follows. At the same time, the kind of judgement one is disposed to make determines the features one responds to in the work.

The stage four response then should be the kind of response that we would expect from a sophisticated adult. It should be free from any traces of the egocentricism that characterizes the earlier stages while remaining sensitive to the various subtleties and complexities of the work of art.

Parsons' developmental thesis clearly implies that aesthetic experience and judgement at this stage are better than what they are at the earlier stages. But he does not make his normative conception explicit by discussing the nature of the stage four response, the end stage to which the development leads. We must now make explicit his normative conception of the end state of the developmental sequence and then go on to discuss the aesthetic theory on which it relies.

We have seen earlier that the response at stage one is completely egocentric as the child is quite unable to discern phenomenally objective qualities of the work of art and has not yet developed the ability to "role take." He does have preferences, however, for the appearances of things but Parsons stresses that he "does not distinguish the pleasure due to the appearances of things from the pleasure due to other features of his experience, and this
influences the way he attends to the aesthetic object" (p. 309). This fact makes the response "confusedly aesthetic", that is, there are elements in the response that fall within the domain of the aesthetic but there are others that are completely irrelevant to an aesthetic experience of the work. There is a clear implication here that the stage four response to which the development points would have the characteristics which are lacking at stage one, for Parsons does want to stress the differences and hence the gap between the responses at the two stages. The stage four response would be one in which the viewer is able to discern phenomenally objective qualities of the work, and these would include not just the obvious ones such as shape and colour but the more subtle features picked out by, for example, such adjectives as graceful, delicate, elegant and garish. Beardsley has argued that "the cheerfulness of the painting, the rhythmic order of its shape, the sharp contrast of its hues" are as much part of the phenomenal painting as its colour" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 38).

The person responding at stage four would also be able to take the point of view of another and so recognize standards in the work of art which have nothing to do with his own particular preferences. He would certainly not confuse, as the stage one viewer does, aesthetic pleasure or satisfaction with pleasure derived from other sources in his experience. If he praised Currier and Ives' Preparing for Market this would be because of features he could point to in the work, and not because of some irrelevant association or lack of it. The aesthetic response, in other words, would be shaped by
features that are relevant to an appreciation of the work. Clearly, then, from the point of view of doing justice to a work of art as an aesthetic object, i.e., appreciating it fully, the stage four response is better than the response at stage one. It is also better, according to this theory, than the responses at stages two and three. For while at stage two the child accepts the idea that there are standards by which works of art could be judged, his aesthetic experience and judgement is still largely influenced by strong idiosyncratic preferences for particular subjects and by an inability to cope with the ugly, the painful and the tragic in art. Stage three represents an advance from this with its broadening of the notion of what are appropriate subjects for art and the acceptance of the idea of different kinds of art, but it falls short of locating the reasons for judgement in the aesthetic object itself.

The inadequacies of these two stages are overcome in the stage four response. Here the decentering process is complete and in an aesthetic experience attention is directed outward to the aesthetic object itself. Beardsley has described the characteristics of an aesthetic experience in answer to the question, "What is an aesthetic experience?" (Smith, 1970, p. 9). Since Parsons makes it clear that Beardsley's argument is part of the "tradition" he relies on in his conception of the stage four response, I shall give a summary of Beardsley's points below as an account of a stage four response which is at least acceptable to Parsons. According to Parsons' theory, it is only at stage four that a person can properly be said to be having
an aesthetic experience. This experience has in Beardsley's account (Beardsley, 1970, p. 9-10) the following five characteristics:

(1) Attention is directed to the whole or part of a phenomenally objective field, either perceptual or intentional, and to its elements and internal relationships.

(2) There is an awareness of form, i.e., the perception of the phenomenal field as a complex of relationships between the parts which combine to form a unity.

(3) It involves an awareness of "regional qualities", e.g., the faint sadness of a line, the cheerfulness of a painting, qualities that are described by words taken over metaphorically from human contexts.

(4) In comparison with ordinary everyday experiences, it has a fairly high degree of unity. This unity comprises two parts - coherence and completeness. The various perceptions, feelings, inferences, etc. fit or belong together (coherence), and the experience marks itself off fairly definitely from other experiences (completeness).

(5) It is intrinsically gratifying. Gratification here must be understood to include not just pleasure but the kind of fulfillment and satisfaction that can be derived from painful and tragic aesthetic experience. Beardsley admits however that the connection between aesthetic experience and aesthetic gratification may be a contingent one.

We may note here the public nature of the experience as described by Beardsley. All except the last characteristic given refer to things in the public domain, and this accords with Parsons' earlier
characterisation of the stage four response as one in which aesthetic qualities are located "firmly in the aesthetic object itself" (p. 314) where they are "publicly accessible." This stress on the public nature of the aesthetic experience relies on an account of the aesthetic object as one possessing phenomenally objective qualities which are "publicly accessible." It relies, in other words, on an objectivist aesthetic. We must now examine this aesthetic theory.

2.6 The Objectivist Aesthetic Theory

We might begin by noting the distinction, borrowed from the psychology of perception, which Beardsley makes in the early part of his Aesthetics, between the phenomenally objective and the phenomenally subjective parts of the phenomenal field, which comprises everything of which we are aware or conscious at any given time (Beardsley, 1958, p. 37). This distinction may be illustrated thus: Suppose you are contemplating an object you have just acquired, say, a car. As you stare at it you get various sensations from it, the dark blue colour of the paintwork, the smell of the leather upholstery, the design of the cockpit. You are also aware of a pleasurable feeling of expectation - you will soon be able to get into the driver's seat and take off on the highway. The car appears as something out there, independent of you, having its own qualities. It is thus phenomenally objective. Your feeling of expectation, however, appears to be something going on in your self. You distinguish this self, the "I", from the objects around you, and the pleasurable feeling is "here" in the self, not "there" in the object. It is thus phenomenally subjective.
Ordinarily we have no difficulty in deciding whether something which we find in our phenomenal field is phenomenally objective or phenomenally subjective, but there may be borderline experiences with no clear orientation either toward the phenomenal self or away from it. Beardsley asserts that "the distinction is fundamental to our consciousness, and almost omnipresent in it" (p. 38).

How important is this distinction in understanding the character of aesthetic objects, especially works of art? Beardsley argues that this distinction is the basis on which we describe and experience all works of art. A painting, for example, is phenomenally objective. Its shape, size, colour and position within the visual field are part of the "given." They are qualities of the phenomenal object. But, apart from these qualities, the painting may also be described as cheerful, gloomy, exciting or drab. Are these qualities also phenomenally objective in exactly the same sense as the shape and colour of the painting? Beardsley insists that they are and argues that the cheerfulness is in the painting, not in your self. To say that a painting is cheerful, the argument goes, is not the same thing as to say that it makes me feel cheerful.

If these two statements meant the same thing, neither could be true unless the other were, but the statements are in fact logically independent. No doubt a cheerful painting would often help to cheer me up. But even when, under some circumstances, the sight of the cheerful painting only increases my own melancholy, by reminding me of what I lack, I can perceive its cheerfulness nevertheless, and in fact it is precisely this perception that makes me feel sad.

(Beardsley, 1958, p. 38)
The statement, "The painting is cheerful", then, says something about the painting, the phenomenal object, not about one's own subjective feeling. It is important to note that this explanation of the statement is not the only one that could be given or has been given. It has been cogently argued, for example, that the statement "The painting is cheerful" means "The painting expresses cheerfulness", a translation which, as we will see, locates the quality of cheerfulness in the painting but not in the way the objectivists have conceived of it. We shall examine this explanation and its implications in the next chapter.

What about the statement, "The music is sad?" Beardsley argues that the musical composition, like the painting, is a phenomenal object. Its location is "out there" not within the self. And this is so even when I have composed the music or written the tune myself. The music has its own individuality and the statement describes its character, not my own subjective state. It would, of course, be strange if no one was ever touched by sad music but we do not call the music sad because of its effect on people. How then does music acquire the human attribute of sadness? This is a particular way of putting the broad question of how in general works of art can be correctly characterized using terms normally used to ascribe attributes to humans. The question will come up again in the next chapter when we discuss the expressive qualities of art but it is as well to deal now with some of the explanations that have been given for the application of human qualities to works of art or parts of works of art.
Some works of art can occasionally be responded to without the attribution of any "human" quality but some works of art seem clearly to be endowed with human qualities. "The interplay of tones or lines strikes one as grand, or graceful, or stark, or monumental, or noble, or restless" (Hospers, 1971, p. 109). Impressed by this feature of our experience of art, Hospers concludes that "in art all percepts are suffused with affect." How is this phenomenon accounted for? One theory explains the attribution of human qualities to a work of art on the basis of association. When we describe a melody as sad or gay we are saying something about the lines of association that are awakened in us when we are exposed to the work. This makes the attribution of the human quality entirely subjective. If two people have different mental associations the melody will strike each of them differently. One might perceive it as gay, the other as sad. It begins to look as though no agreement could ever be reached on how a melody sounds or on whether the colours of a painting are warm or cool. To avoid this outcome, the theory maintains that most of the associations are not mere peculiarities of the individual viewer's or listener's biography. Some have a basis in human psychology and so may be common to all human observers. Others have their basis in features of our environment which again are common to all or almost all human beings. For example, "warm" colours are so described because of their association with fire, the sun and so on.

The point about this theory, however, is that it assumes that the human qualities of the melody or the painting are distinguishable
from the sound of the melody, or the colour of the painting and that
these human qualities - the sadness of the melody or the warmth of
colours of the painting - are somehow acquired by the works in question
and this acquisition needs to be explained. Beardsley's view is that
there is no evidence of any such acquisition and therefore nothing to
explain. To look for an explanation of how, for example, a jagged
line in a work came to acquire the quality of restlessness is to assume
that there was a time when it didn't have that quality. But there is,
as Beardsley sees it, no evidence that this was ever the case. Nor is
there any evidence that a person who could see and who understood the
use of words could describe the jagged line as calm rather than
restless. We perceive the line's restlessness just as we perceive
its jaggedness and we describe the jagged line as restless simply on
the basis of its similarity to a restless person. "But there is
nothing surprising here", writes Beardsley, "a line that changes its
direction frequently is like an uneasy or unsettled mind, wavering
between alternatives, or subject to contrary impulses; to call the
line 'restless' is to borrow the term on good collateral" (Beardley,
1958, p. 94). In short, affective terms when used to describe art
operate as metaphors whose effectiveness lies in the similarity
between the work of art described and the human quality picked out by
the description. Bouwsma (1954) illustrates this when he argues that
we call some music sad because the music has some of the characteristics
of sad persons. "It will be slow, not tripping: it will be low, not
tinkling. People who are sad move slowly, and when they speak they
speak softly and low." In other words, people who are sad and music that is sad have characteristics in common and when we describe the music as sad it is by virtue of these common characteristics. This appears to be a more straightforward explanation than that which tries to account for the attribution of human qualities by association and, as Hospers points out, it seems to explain the universal attribution of certain human qualities to certain patterns of tones in music. Pratt writes:

A person says, for example, that he feels restless. A description of what it feels like to be restless might include references to such things as increased rate of breathing and heartbeat, unsteady organics in the region of the diaphragm, tapping of the feet or fingers, inability to keep still, etc. It requires no great knowledge of music to appreciate the fact that much the same kind of movements may easily be produced in musical phrases. Staccato passages, trills, strong accents, quavers, rapid accelerandos and crescendos, shakes, wide jumps in pitch - all such devices conduce to the creation of an auditory structure which is appropriately described as restless.

(Cited in Hospers, 1971, p. 113)

One of the reasons why the objectivists find this explanation satisfactory is that it falls in neatly with the objective/subjective distinction which Beardsley makes concerning the phenomenal field. When music imitates the movements of a restless person, the restlessness is heard in the music, that is, it is a phenomenally objective quality of the music and is distinguishable from the listener's (subjective) reaction or response to it.

An elucidation similar to that of the human qualities of painting can thus be given. When we describe a piece of music as sad
we do not mean that it makes us sad, though it may well do so. Whether or not it makes us sad is a different thing from saying that it is sad. "The sadness", Bouwsma writes, "is to the music rather like the redness to the apple, than it is like the burp to the cider." That is, the sadness of the music is a phenomenally objective quality of the music just as the redness of an apple is a phenomenally objective quality of the apple.

Does the objective/subjective distinction apply to literature? Is literature a phenomenal field in the way painting and music are? Beardsley maintains that it is. Novels and plays, he argues, present us with persons and places and the things that happen to them. These the reader attends to, and they are as much aspects of the phenomenal field as the marks on the paper or the sound of the words. In attending to these literary forms the reader clearly sees himself as separate from that which he contemplates. Beardsley writes:

When you think of Hamlet you can distinguish him from your feelings about him - which, of course are your feelings, not his. He is not before you as a real person could be, even when you see the play, for it is not Hamlet you see on the stage but someone acting Hamlet. But he is complex and substantial, someone you can study, and reflect upon, and discover new things about.

(Beardsley, 1958, p. 40)

The play then is phenomenally objective. Its human qualities can be explained in the same way as those of painting and music, as aspects of the objective features of the aesthetic object. Thus the tragic quality of Hamlet is in the play and distinct from the reader's or spectator's response which might be anything from sadness to delight.
In the same way, what is vivid, frightening or exciting in a novel is a phenomenally objective part of the work, distinct from the reader's response. And, what is true of novels and plays is also true of poems. "In every poem", Beardsley writes, "...there is some concept, however dim or abstract, of a person and a situation, and so there is always something for the reader to regard and to contemplate" (1958, p. 41). But as well as this there are the emotional qualities of the poem. These too, like the joy and sadness of music and painting, are phenomenally objective and so distinguishable from the reader's joy and sadness. Bouwsma urges us to "suppose that the poem is as hard as marble, ingrained, it may be, with indelible sorrow." If the poem is sad, the sadness is in the poem, as much part of the poem as the words that compose it.

Clearly then, the distinction between what is phenomenally objective (the features and qualities of the aesthetic object) and what is phenomenally subjective (the individual's response) applies whether the aesthetic objects are visual, auditory or verbal. However, the distinction has been applied so far to the way aesthetic objects are conceived or described. But it extends beyond this to the way aesthetic experience is conceived. In this account the way the aesthetic object is conceived determines how it is experienced. This immediately becomes obvious if we recall the five characteristics of aesthetic experience which Beardsley (1970) gives. Let us examine each of them in some detail beginning with the first. In an aesthetic experience,
(1) Attention is directed to the whole or part of a phenomenally objective field, either perceptual or intentional, and to its elements and internal relationships. Since the aesthetic object has already been described as possessing phenomenally objective features it is only to be expected that an experience of the work should consist in directing attention to these features. But note that these features, as defined, are publicly accessible, a characterisation deliberately designed, among other things, to prevent the aesthetic appreciation from committing what Wimsatt and Beardsley in a famous essay have called "the intentional fallacy", that is, going beyond the text of a poem, for example, to discover what the author's intentions were when he wrote the poem, in the belief that this would enhance the poem's meaning. Beardsley (1970) insists that the literary work - the aesthetic object - is independent and autonomous. Not only does it have its own properties but these properties are decisive in checking interpretations and judgements. Directing attention to the phenomenally objective features of the work also prevents the individual from confusing what the work is with what it does to him. Finally, directing attention to the objective features of the work is a way of ensuring that critical discussion constantly refers to features of the work and thus remains relevant. For even when he is describing his response, the good critic would have to point to those features of the aesthetic object that he is responding to. He will also do this when he tries to justify his response.
(2) There is an awareness of form, i.e. the perception of the phenomenal field as a complex of relationships between the parts which combine to form a unity. Aesthetic perception is understood chiefly as perception of aesthetic qualities - Beardsley has argued that the aesthetic object is a perceptual object - but "perception" is here used in an extended sense, so that an aesthetic quality may be a content of thought or imagination rather than of sight or hearing. Thinking about an aspect or a feature of the work or imagining an event or a place mentioned or described in the work are both different aspects of "perceiving" the aesthetic object. Although Beardsley allows that there is more than one mode of awareness of the objective features of a work, his account, as we shall see in the next chapter, seems to play down the role of imagination in the experience of art.

(3) There is an awareness of "regional qualities", e.g., the faint sadness of a line, the cheerfulness of the painting, qualities that are described by words taken over metaphorically from human contexts. Beardsley argues, as we have seen, that emotional qualities like joy or sadness are phenomenally objective qualities of the form or gestalt character of a work or of a part of a work. In this he is followed by Hospers, Bouwsma and Hepburn. These qualities are not
treated by these writers as distinct from other qualities commonly attributed to works of art. The conclusion is surely inescapable that these emotional qualities are perceived in exactly the same way as other qualities are perceived, that is, in order to appreciate the work it is necessary only to sense or recognise these qualities, just as we sense or recognise the colours of a painting or the progressions of musical tones. This interpretation is supported by the way these emotional qualities are characterised. Beardsley insists that the redness of a painting and its cheerfulness are both phenomenally objective in exactly the same sense, implying that both are perceived in the same way. Bouwsma, in the article already referred to, invites us to conceive of the relation between the emotional quality and the work of art as exactly the same as the relation of redness to apply in a red apple, implying thereby that we are aware of both in the same manner. But since both writers insist that the perceiver need not himself feel the emotion he apprehends in the work, the question then arises as to the sense in which he perceives the emotional quality. I am willing to admit that our experience of works of art does involve the apprehension of "phenomenally objective" emotional qualities, but, like Harold Osborne, "I am puzzled to know what import attaches to such statements as 'the music is cheerful' after you have said that the cheerfulness to which the statement refers is not something experienced by the work of art (for works of art do not experience emotions) nor something experienced by the listeners nor something experienced by the composer" (Osborne, 1963, p. 39). How
does one unpack the notion of experiencing an emotion in a work if there is to be no feeling involved? What would the experience of such an emotion consist of? These questions reflect my basic dissatisfaction with a theory that accounts for our emotional experience of art simply in terms of the logic of recognition. In the next chapter I examine an alternative account of aesthetic experience that presents a somewhat different picture while accepting some of the basic contentions of the objectivists.

(4) In comparison with ordinary everyday experiences it has a fairly high degree of unity. This unity comprises two parts - coherence and completeness. The various perceptions, feelings, inferences, etc., fit or belong together (coherence), and the experience marks itself off fairly definitely from other experiences (completeness).

This description concentrates on the subjective aspect of the aesthetic experience but it still indirectly refers to the objective aspect of the phenomenal field. The perceptions are perceptions of the phenomenal object, the feelings, feelings sensed from the object, and the inferences, inferences drawn from the object. The feeling of completeness seems to be entirely subjective. It is located within the self and is the result of the special kind of attention
characteristic of aesthetic experience. Although this attention is often highly concentrated we are aware of its being different from our ordinary attention to matters of practical concern. Beardsley is right when he says that "the experience detaches itself, and even insulates itself, from the intrusion of alien elements." Even when the experience is interrupted for some reason, it is not difficult to assume the attention again when aesthetic contemplation is resumed.

(5) It is intrinsically gratifying.
The experience of gratification is clearly in the self, for, although occasioned by the phenomenal object, the feeling of enjoyment and final satisfaction are located within the individual. One need not, of course, enjoy the work. The experience of it may be disturbing or profoundly unsettling, or it may generate a mood of indifference. This is why Beardsley feels that the connection between aesthetic experience and aesthetic gratification may be a contingent one. But whatever the nature of the final feeling one is left with, it is the result of a concentration of attention on the whole or part of a phenomenal field, the aesthetic object, and is intimately connected with it.

If we return now to Parsons' theory we shall see that the developmental scheme is based on the objective/subjective distinction we have been discussing and we shall also see that what determines development from his perspective is an increasing awareness of, and a movement towards, the phenomenally objective qualities of the aesthetic object. Parsons' theory maintains that at stage one the
child is unable to distinguish between what is relevant or irrelevant in his aesthetic experience and that this is a source of confusion in his aesthetic response. The confusion is clearly the result of the child's inability to distinguish between the objective and the subjective aspects of the phenomenal field. The five and a half year old child in Parsons' first example picks out certain elements in Currier and Ives' *Preparing for Market* to which he responds favourably. So far his response is appropriate and relevant since it is directed to phenomenally objective features of the work. But he also responds with equal pleasure to what the picture reminds him of. Indeed since he gives as a reason for liking the picture the fact that it reminds him of his cowboy hat, one must conclude that during the experience his attention shifts from the picture to a specific pleasant association; that is, from a contemplation of the phenomenally objective features of the work to an indulgence in a private association (the phenomenally subjective element). This is the source of the aesthetic irrelevance and the confused response of which Parsons speaks. It is significant that the child at this stage confuses liking with judging. Liking has to do with the individual's subjective feeling; judgement requires a reference to, and a consideration of, the objective features of the work. This is why the latter is aesthetically relevant. The failure to make this distinction is also evidenced in Parsons' second example where the girl failed to "distinguish the pleasure of imagining herself living on the farm from that due to the appearance of the painting."
At stage two the child achieves a measure of decentering and, from the point of view of the distinction we are discussing, there is a gradual separation of the self from the object, and the source of aesthetic pleasure is now located more objectively in the work itself, that is, in the phenomenally objective field. The child now becomes increasingly aware of external standards to which works of art, and his own judgement of them, must conform. The external object and its characteristics begin to dominate the child's experience as he gradually moves into what Beardsley calls the "aesthetic domain." This is not to say that the child should not be at all concerned with his own feelings. What is important is that the distinction is made. Beardsley writes:

We do sometimes ask other people how the object made them feel. But on the other hand, we also ask people what the object is like, and when we ask this question we don't want them to reply by telling us about their feelings. So it is well for us if those we ask are capable of telling the difference between the two questions.

(Beardsley, 1958, p. 43)

The child at stage two has just begun to appreciate that difference and this shows in the less idiosyncratic nature of his response. But he still retains certain strong preferences that intrude on his attempt at objectivity. These he does not shed until the next stage.

The decentering process goes further at stage three as the child recognises the existence of alternative sets of standards in works of art. But the attention sometimes shifts from the objective features of the work to the artist's intention, and the impression is
often given of a loss of distinctions achieved earlier on. However, there is a concentration on the emotional qualities of art and this further expands the aesthetic experience. But because the child has difficulty in locating the source of his emotional response entirely in the phenomenal object, some development still has to take place. This is the stage at which the child comes to realise that there are different kinds of art and that these demand different approaches. This might be seen as further exploration of the phenomenally objective field leading to a better appreciation of its complexities.

Finally, at stage four, the decentering process is complete and the child locates aesthetic qualities in the aesthetic object itself. He has moved, in other words, from a position of complete egocentrism to one where he is completely decentered and is now able to base his aesthetic judgement on phenomenally objective features of the aesthetic object. His response at this stage can now properly be described as aesthetic.

We can use the metaphor of "distancing" to characterise the development from egocentrism (complete subjectivity) to objectivity. At stage one, the child is almost one with the object, that is, there is no distance at all between the subject and the object and consequently no distinction is made between the two. At stage two the child achieves a certain distance from the object as he begins to make the distinction between the subjective and the objective aspects of the phenomenal field. At stage three there is a further increase in distance between subject and object as the child tries to locate
his aesthetic pleasure in various aspects of the phenomenal object. At stage four his judgement is finally based on the objective features of the aesthetic object and he achieves maximum distance from the object.

Beardsley's distinction is, as we have seen, basic to Parsons' theory. From the point of view of the objectivist aesthetic theory, Parsons' developmental thesis therefore seems plausible. Whether it will look equally plausible from the point of view of expression theory is the subject of the next chapter. I conclude now with an examination of some of the implications of the Beardsley-Parsons position for aesthetic education.

In an obvious way the Beardsley-Parsons position is reflected in the current practice of art education in the schools. In appreciation classes attention is constantly directed to the objective features of the work of art for criticism and analysis. Personal response is encouraged but the response must be related to, and justified by reference to, the whole or part of the perceptual object. Here is the report of an experiment carried out in an attempt to improve the way fifth and sixth grade students look at paintings. The groups had been studying Picasso's Guernica:

Of particular note were the significant differences in the way the control and experimental groups analyzed and noted relationships in paintings and made judgements about the paintings based on analysis. The experimental groups also directed their attention toward the sensory qualities, Shape and Color and the formal aspects. Movement-Direction and Value Contrast, more than did the control groups. It was most interesting to note that the number of references to literal aspects of paintings was reduced significantly.
as the experimental groups gained skills in perceiving aspects other than literal.

(Hurwitz & Madeja, 1977, p. 60-61)

What is interesting about this report is not so much the concentration of attention on the perceptual features of the work as the fact that the authors who quote the report with approval feel no need to justify the approach. It is accepted as obviously right. A further illustration of this is seen in what the authors call "A depth approach to a single work." The work is Pavel Tchelitchew's *Hide and Seek*.

Again the report is quoted with approval:

Some details are quickly seen and identified - other details more subtle and sometimes a part of two images, demand very thoughtful "reading" of the picture. Most of us viewing the picture will quickly find the hand and the foot of the central multiple image of the painting. Many of us will have difficulty seeing the trunk of the tree as the head of an aged Viking with its left eye formed by the butterfly on the tree trunk, its right eye by the arm of the girl spread eagled against the trunk, its nose formed by the girl's torso.

(Hurwitz & Madeja, 1977, p. 61)

Emphasis on the phenomenal object of aesthetic contemplation and its internal relationship is at the heart of this approach to aesthetic education. Indeed Arnheim in *Visual Thinking* argues that since the perceptual process is a cognitive function of human intellect, it should be the basis of the study of works of art, for example, paintings. The perceiving of a painting is not accomplished suddenly, he maintains.

The observer starts from somewhere, tries to orient himself as to the main skeleton of the work, looks for the accents, experiments with
a tentative framework in order to see whether it fits the total content, and so on. When the exploration is successful, the work is seen to repose comfortably in a congenial structure, which illuminates the work's meaning to the observer.

(Arnheim, 1969, p. 13)

This is in line with Beardsley's insistence that attention be directed to the different parts of the work in order to perceive the various internal relationships that hang together to give the work its overall structure. Clearly, the objectivists are right in recommending attention to the objective features of the work and in so far as art teaching endeavours to ensure this it is doing something important. One should not, of course, conclude from this that all experiences of art must be strictly perceptual in the sense just discussed. Attention should properly be directed to the objective features of the work but if at some point imagination takes over and the viewer finds himself in the world of the work or beyond, we should not hastily dismiss this as irrelevant, for such imaginative experience may result in a more heightened realisation of the work. It is particularly important for art teachers to keep this in mind when dealing with children's responses to art.

The practice of literary criticism also reflects the kind of attention the Beardsley-Parsons position calls for. "The critic's aim", writes Leavis, "is, first, to realise as sensitively and as completely as possible this or that which claims his attention" (Leavis, 1976, p. 213). To "this or that" that Leavis talks about are the literary works that the critic examines. These in all their complexities are properly regarded as the focus of the critic's attention.
But Leavis also maintains that the critic's response must be personal, or it is useless. This, as well as meaning that the critic must not be unduly influenced by other people's ideas about the work, implies that the critic's personal reactions are as important in literary appreciation and in trying to reach any kind of evaluation of the work as are the objective characteristics of the work itself. I will return to a discussion of some of Leavis's views in Chapter Three.

1. See page 97 and page 143 et passion for further discussion of the notion of appropriate aesthetic response.
3.1 Introduction

In chapter two I argued that Parsons' developmental thesis relies on the objectivist aesthetic theory propounded by Beardsley and his followers and I suggested that the developmental thesis seemed plausible from the point of view of that aesthetic theory. That plausibility, however, ultimately rests on the acceptability of the objectivist account of aesthetic experience. I want to question that account in this chapter by explicating the alternative account of aesthetic experience provided by expression theory and discussing reasons why the expressionist account might be preferred to the objectivist. In chapter four I will use these ideas as part of my critique of Parsons' theory.

3.2 Expression Theory

Let us start by seeing how opponents of expression theory view that theory. I am here largely following Beardsley's (1958) exposition (p. 327). "The musical piece expresses joy" means (1) that the composer was moved by joy to compose the piece of music; (2) that he has given the piece a joyful quality; and (3) the piece of music has the capacity to give the listener the same feeling of joy when he hears it. Thus stated the theory says something about the music and its relation both to the composer and the listener. Beardsley, of course, rejects the Expression Theory in this compound form, arguing,
firstly, that we can never know how the composer felt and even if we could, such knowledge would be irrelevant for we could not predict that a piece of music would sound joyous just on the knowledge that the composer felt joyous when composing it. Secondly, it is doubtful whether music can truly be said to arouse emotions, for emotions have objects and involve appraisals. My fear is fear of X, my rage rage at Y, my delight is delight at Z. Part of what it means to be afraid is to perceive a situation as threatening. So a cognitive element enters necessarily into the having of an emotion. It is hard to see how music could provide the object and the cognitive element that are the necessary parts of having an emotion. Music can of course be said to arouse feelings, as distinct from emotions, but if this is what is meant it is better to use the term "arouse" rather than "express" for we can talk about the effects of music on the feelings of listeners without reference to the composer and his feelings.

This leaves the middle statement (2), and this can be translated to "the music is joyful" which is a description of the music with no reference to either the composer or the listener. This is the aspect of Expression Theory that Beardsley endorses, and he argues that if the theory is thus taken it is useful in understanding the internal constitution of aesthetic objects, for we can and do talk about works of art possessing "human qualities" or "feeling qualities" without them being either the cause or effect of emotions. These feeling qualities, he argues, are phenomenally objective qualities of the works of art and they are on a par with other
qualities such as the lines or colours of a painting, or the tonality or rhythm of music. So when we characterize works of art as, for example, sad, cheerful, witty, pompous, terrifying or sombre, we are describing objective features of these works. A "theory" of art as expression, therefore, in order to be meaningful must be interpreted as coming to no more than that art works have properties designated by the same words which designate feelings, emotions, attitudes, moods and personal characteristics of human beings. When so construed, however, the theory, Beardsley argues, loses much of its force:

The Expression Theory has called our attention to an important fact about music - namely, that it has human regional qualities. But in performing this service it has rendered itself obsolete. We now have no further use for it. Indeed we are better off without it. "The music is joyous" is plain and can be defended. "The music expresses joy" adds nothing except unnecessary and unanswerable questions.

(Beardsley, 1958, p. 331)

With this Bouwsma agrees. We should, he recommends, say, unabashed, that "The music is sad" and refrain from saying that this means "The music expresses sadness" (Bouwsma, 1948). That way, he concludes, "our language may save us from some torture."

But this dismissal of the notion of expression in art seems to me to be altogether too quick. Critics often talk about the way a painter views a scene, about the way a poet treats a subject or about the way a composer handles a theme, and this kind of talk is often not translatable, in Beardsley's recommended fashion, to talk about either the human qualities of the design or those of the subject matter of the work of art. In other words, while it is true that we
describe works of art as cheerful, sad and so on, by virtue of their design or subject matter, there are many other cases in which works of art are properly described as expressing cheerfulness or sadness by virtue of what the artist does in the work, e.g. certain ways of handling a scene or depicting a subject. These "artistic acts", to use Sircello's term (1971), are what account for the expressiveness of these works.

Sircello, whose argument I shall presently discuss, has, in my view, made a convincing case for the retention of the notion of expression in art against the claims of philosophers such as Beardsley who maintain that the use of the term expression in this context just generates confusion and who want to reduce all references to expression in art to straightforward descriptions of the objective features of works of art.

There are also frequent occasions when a critic is able to experience a work as if it were human expression, and this kind of experience can be shown to be different from, and in some important ways superior to, the perception of objective qualities that the Beardsley/Bouwsma thesis appears to insist on. Elliott, whose argument I shall also be presenting shortly, has, it seems to me, made a good case for according a central place to the experience of a work of art as expression. I examine Sircello's argument first.

3.3 Sircello's Argument

Referring to the Beardsley/Bouwsma position on the question of expression in art as "the Canonical Position", (Hospers in The
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 47, advocates the Beardsley/Bouwsma position, thus "canonizing" it.) Sircello (1971) maintains that while it is true that that position has thrown some light on the concept of expression in art, "it is, nevertheless, false in some respects and inadequate in others." He argues that, on the question of the attribution of "anthropomorphic predicates" ("feeling qualities" or "human qualities") to works of art, the Canonical Position has two incorrect presuppositions. The first is that works of art are like natural objects such as roses and apples. Beardsley, as we have seen, compares "sad music" to "red rose", and Bouwsma, to "red apple", both implying that as far as the anthropomorphic predicates are concerned, works of art are no different from natural objects. The second presupposition is that anthropomorphic predicates are not essentially different from simple colour or shape terms like "red", "yellow", "round" and "square." Sircello demonstrates the wrongness of the first presupposition of the Canonical Position by showing, from an examination of the different ways in which anthropomorphic predicates apply to works of art, that in two important respects the use of these predicates differs from the way they apply to natural objects, and these differences emphasize some of the ways works of art differ from natural objects. He demonstrates the wrongness of the second presupposition by arguing that anthropomorphic predicates are quite unlike simple colour or shape words because the former are relational terms and what they do is relate various forms of human emotions, feelings, attitudes and moods to persons. None of these terms has a logic like the logic of colour terms. Let us examine these arguments more closely, beginning with the first.
Sircello starts by presenting several examples of the application of anthropomorphic predicates to art. These examples range from the description of Raphael's *La Belle Jardiniere* as "calm and serene", a description which is partly based on the design and subject matter of the painting and partly on the way the artist views his subject, through the "gay and carefree" character of Mozart's music for Papageno, to the "impersonal and detached" music of John Cage's *Variations II* (Sircello, 1971, pp. 305-309). These examples show three different ways in which works of art may properly bear anthropomorphic predicates:

(1) Anthropomorphic predicates may apply to works of art by virtue of features that the works share with natural objects. Thus the "calm" of Raphael's painting applies in part to the configuration of lines and shapes that make up the composition, which sorts of features are shared by natural objects.

(2) Works of art may bear anthropomorphic qualities by virtue of their subject-matter, that is, what the works describe, depict or portray. These are often referred to as their "representational" aspects. In the Raphael painting, for example, the calm and serenity are due in part to the countryside, the sky, the garments and the faces depicted. "In cases of this sort", Sircello writes, "it is clear, neither paintings nor poems are comparable to natural 'objects' with respect to the way they bear their anthropomorphic qualities."

(3) Finally, anthropomorphic predicates may be applied to art works by virtue of what the artist does in those works. Thus, to quote the examples from Sircello's discussion
(a) La Belle Jardiniere is calm and serene partly because Raphael views his subject calmly and quietly;

(b) The Rape of the Sabine Women is aloof and detached because Poussin calmly observes the violent scene and paints it in an aloof detached way;

(c) Wedding Dance in the Open Air is an ironic painting because Breughel treats the gaiety of the wedding scene ironically;

(d) "We Are Seven" is a sentimental poem because Wordsworth treats his subject matter sentimentally;

(e) "The Dungeon" is an angry poem because in it the poet angrily inveighs against the institution of imprisonment;

(f) "The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock" is a compassionate poem because the poet compassionately portrays the condition of his "hero";

(g) Prokoviev's Grandfather Theme is witty because the composer wittily comments on the character in his ballet;

(h) Cage's Variations II is impersonal because the composer presents his noise-like sounds in an impersonal, uninvolved way.

The underlined verbs in each case show what is done in the work. Sircello describes what the verbs designate as "artistic acts" and argues that it is the presence of these "artistic acts" in works of art that make those works expressions and "thereby shows that the Canonical Position has missed a great deal of truth in classical Expression Theory." First, Sircello points out, the similarity between "artistic acts" and the way people express emotions via the expressions on their faces; for example: "A person may scowl angrily, and thereby have an angry scowl on his face; he may smile softly and thereby have a sad smile on his face; he may gesture impatiently and thus make an impatient gesture" (Sircello, 1971, p. 313). In such cases the public
signs can provide grounds for the truth of characterizations of the persons as sad, angry and so on. The reason is that sad smiles are characteristic expressions of sadness in a person; angry scowls of anger, etc. One does not infer from the smile on a person's face that he is smiling, the reason being that "smiling is not an act which produces or results in a smile so that something could interfere to prevent the smiling from bringing off the smile. 'Smiling' and 'smile', we are inclined to say, are simply two grammatically different ways of referring to the same 'thing'" (Sircello, 1971).

And so it is with "artistic acts" in works of art. The grounds for the truth of the description of Poussin's painting as aloof are in the painting itself - "the cold light, the statuesque poses, the painstaking linearity." These can all be seen in the work. We can either say that Poussin paints his violent scene in an aloof, detached way or that the "Sabine" picture is an aloof, detached painting, and in either case we would be talking about the work of art and how Poussin painted it. Similarly, we can say either that Wordsworth in "We Are Seven" treated his subject sentimentally or that "We Are Seven" is a sentimental poem and in either case we would be talking about the poem. As in the case of facial expressions and what they tell us about the persons responsible for them, the grounds for the truth of an anthropomorphic description of an "artistic act" are in the work of art itself. We do not have to go beyond the work for biographical information about the author, for such information would be totally irrelevant to the establishment of the truth of the
anthropomorphic description. This blocks a possible counter move by a proponent of the Canonical Position to the effect that talk about "artistic acts" is really biographical talk about the historical artist, unconcerned with the work of art. Nor do we have to infer, Wordsworth's sentimentality (i.e. his sentimental treatment of the subject) from a reading of the poem. The sentimental poem is Wordsworth's treatment of it. "A test for statements describing art in anthropomorphic terms is always, and quite naturally, to scrutinize the art, even when the terms are applied in virtue of 'artistic acts'" (Sircello, 1971).

The immediately preceding discussion shows that anthropomorphic predicates such as "sad", "cheerful", etc., do not always apply to art in the same way that predicates apply to natural objects, and, more importantly, they sometimes apply to art rather as they apply to verbal, facial and gestural expressions of persons. "And, herein", writes Sircello, "lies an all-important point which the Canonical Position has missed in its interpretation of the Expression Theory of Art." For precisely because of the close similarity between what the artist does "in" the work of art to warrant the application of an anthropomorphic predicate (his "artistic act") and what a person does in the case of common human expressions, works of art may in certain circumstances function "to express those feelings, emotions, attitudes, moods and/or personal characteristics of their creators that are suggested by the 'anthropomorphic' predicates applicable to the works of art themselves" (Sircello, 1971). And when we talk about them
functioning in this way we use the kinds of locutions that Beardsley wants to correct. We say "The music expresses sadness" or "The composer expresses sadness in the music" or even, simply, "The music is sad", meaning not (or not simply) some objective quality anyone can point to in the music but the composer's sadness as expressed in the music. Thus the epithet "sad" in this context has an explicit relational function: it relates the character of the music to a person's sadness.

From this we can see that the first presupposition of the Canonical Position - that as far as the application of anthropomorphic predicates is concerned, works of art are no different from natural objects, is clearly wrong. And we can see that the second presupposition, that anthropomorphic predicates are not essentially different from simple colour or shape terms, is also wrong because those predicates have relational functions that simple colour or shape words do not have. They "essentially relate to various forms of the 'inner lives' of human beings. And that", says Sircello, "is where Expression Theory begins." He concludes: "The Canonical model of the red rose (or apple) fails utterly to help us understand how anthropomorphic predicates apply to art, because those predicates are not (very much) like simple quality words and what they apply to are not (very much) like natural objects."

It might be thought that the Canonical Position could be saved by a move which Beardsley (1958) makes when he suggests that all statements about the expressiveness of a work of art be "translated"
into statements about the anthropomorphic "qualities" either of the subject matter or of the design of the work. (This is in line with Beardsley's general belief that all critical statements should refer to the work only.) This would in the present context mean that anthropomorphic descriptions of artistic acts in a work of art can be substituted for descriptions which make no reference to artistic acts. This defence will not work however. For instance, Poussin's _Rape of the Sabine Women_ is described as aloof and detached, but there is nothing about the violent subject matter or the formal elements of the painting to which the description "aloof and detached" is applicable. The subject matter is merely violent. None of the characters is aloof or detached, not even Romulus the general in charge, whose expression in any case is not sufficiently detailed for us to tell whether it is aloof or detached. The lines and colours of the design are certainly not "aloof", whatever that might mean. Clearly then, in this case, as perhaps in several others that could be similarly analysed, the anthropomorphic predicate can only be applied to the artistic act and to no other "objective feature" of the work. It can apply neither to the subject matter nor to the design of the work.

Thus descriptions of artistic acts cannot be "translated" into logically equivalent descriptions of formal elements and/or represented subject matter, though the formal element and subject matter may be cited when a justification of the anthropomorphic description of artistic acts is being made. In other words, although in justifying the aloofness and detachment of Poussin's painting one
would have to mention its "objective features" such as the subject matter or design, the description of these features does not entail aloofness and detachment. The "features" serve to "ground" the description of the painting as "aloof and detached" but they do not entail that description. This is so for the simple reason that the same "features" could provide grounds for a description of the painting that was incompatible with the description "aloof and detached." This often explains why two critics while pointing to the same "features" in a work give different and opposed evaluations of the work.

This fact about anthropomorphic descriptions of artistic acts is shared by ordinary acts of human expression. No descriptive feature or movement of a person entails that the person is expressing anything in particular. Rather the descriptive features, movements, etc. form a pattern which can justify an expression attribution. (The Canonical Position seems to hold that certain descriptive features do imply an anthropomorphic predicate, just as a rose being red implies that the rose is red.) Justification is required, however, because the particular features might not be part of a genuine expression of X. For example, while an angry scowl on a person's face may be the way people typically express anger, the person may be affecting anger, imitating someone else's attitude or portraying a character in a drama. Similarly, a poet who writes compassionate poetry, for example, may be affecting compassion, imitating someone else's style of writing or portraying the particular style of a character in a play or novel who is represented as having written the poem.
What these facts show is that the justification of anthropomorphic descriptions of artistic acts in a work of art would depend on certain background features or "conditions" having to do with the artist's seriousness and competence, the coherence of the work, etc. These conditions cannot be specified in general for all cases but are fairly easy to see in most. However, it is probably not true to say that the artist must be serious, competent and so forth or that the work must be coherent in order for an anthropomorphic predicate to properly apply to a work. "What these terms should be taken as denoting", writes Sircello, "is, rather, 'parameters' according to which an artist or a work can be measured in whatever respect is relevant in a particular case" (1971, p. 325). He concludes that "what the recognition of such 'parameters' means is that any attempt to save the Canonical Position by 'eliminating' descriptions of artistic acts in favour of 'logically equivalent' descriptions of formal elements and/or represented subject matter is doomed to fail (1971, p. 326).

I don't want to suggest - and neither does Sircello - that all works of art with "artistic acts" express emotions. Mine is the more moderate thesis that some works of art, because of what the artist does in them, can function as expressions of emotions, and when they do they can be experienced as expressions. A theory of art which tries to explain either the nature of art or our response to art must recognise this. The version of Expression Theory I am interested in addresses itself to this fact about art. Now let us go on to Elliott's argument.
3.4 Elliott's Argument

Elliott (1967) maintains that a version of Expression Theory provides a better account of our experience of art than the Beardsley/Bouwsma objectivist aesthetic. The version of Expression Theory he wishes to endorse is embodied in the statement that some works of art can be experienced as human expression, and experiencing a work as expression is different from perceiving objects or objective qualities. "By 'expression'" he writes, "I mean only that expression which is perceived as qualifying or issuing from the person, especially gesture, speech and such internal activities as thinking and imagining" (p. 112). Thus a poem, for example, "can be perceived not as an object bearing an impersonal meaning but as if it were the speech or thought of another person and... it is possible for us to make this expression our own" (p. 112). It is important to note that when the reader of the poem experiences it as someone's expression and makes the expression his own he does not thereby reproduce in himself the creative activity of the poet. Such exaggeration has in the past acted as a hindrance to better understanding of the function of imagination in aesthetic experience. All that is being asserted is that in experiencing the poem as expression the reader imaginatively enters the world of the poem and reads the words as though they were being uttered by himself. A work, Elliott argues, may be experienced "from within" or "from without", and he goes on to elucidate the meaning of these terms:
So far as poetry and painting are concerned, experiencing a work from within is, roughly speaking, experiencing it as if one were the poet or the artist. If a work is experienced as expression, experiencing it from within involves experiencing this expression after a certain imaginative manner as one's own. Experiencing it from without is experiencing it as expression, but not experiencing this expression as if it were one's own.

(Elliott, 1967, p. 112)

A lyric poem particularly lends itself to the first mode of experiencing, experiencing from within, since the poet is actually represented as experiencing an emotion, and, as Elliott argues, "to experience the poem at all we have to give it a real or virtual reading in which we embody the poet's expression in our own voice" (p. 113). When this is successfully done, the reader is able to "experience the poet's expression and the emotion expressed from the place of the experiencing subject rather than from the place of one who hears and understands the expression from without" (p. 113). A little later Elliott gives a more detailed description of what this involves:

In experiencing a poem from within, the reader keeps more or less explicit contact with the poet. Sometimes he seems to be there together with the poet, as if they inhabited the same body and as if the poet were speaking or thinking with the reader's voice; sometimes the reader seems to be there in the place of the poet, expressing and experiencing the poet's emotion as it were on the poet's behalf; sometimes the reader seems even to have supplanted the poet, but still without experiencing the expressed emotion as the product of his own fantasy. On occasions, as Longinius recognised, the experience is so vivid that it seems almost as if the reader were actually in the poet's situation. He has to return to himself, rather as if he were waking from a dream.

This description seems to portray the experience of those who have
been drawn imaginatively into the world of a poem. The feeling of waking from the experience as if from a dream, a feeling that has been frequently documented by literary critics, is one reason why some critics insist that all literature is in some sense "dream." [See, for example, Northrop Frye, "In the anagogic phase literature imitates the total dream of man", Anatomy of Criticism, p. 117-119.]

The dream, however, is one from which the reader can awake at any time by relinquishing the imagined situation and breaking off his communion with the poet. "We rarely", Elliott writes, "experience a poem entirely from within, but are drawn into the world of the poem at certain points and later once more experience it from without, usually without noticing these changes in our point of view" (p. 114).

These two modes of experiencing a poem, Elliott explains, may be compared to alternative manners of performing a work. The comparison is apt for just as two performances of the same work often differ in intensity of realisation and convey different emotional effects, so also a poem conveys different effects depending on whether it is experienced from within or from without. "Two critics", Elliott writes, "may find the same poem to be vivid and unified, but for one it has the vividness and unity of an observed event, for the other a vividness and unity more like those of an experience in which he actively participates...In one case the poem arises as a complex content entirely at the objective pole of consciousness, in the other it is realised as an experience, the description of which involves a reference not simply to an objective content but also to the subject (p. 115).
Elliott discusses two examples of poems whose emotional impact is considerably altered when they are experienced from within and from without. The two poems are Holderlin's elegy, "Homecoming" and Donne's poem "The Sunne Rising." He argues that the reader of Holderlin's "Homecoming" who experiences it only from without will not get beyond a certain understanding of the development of the poet's mood from initial serene expectation through loving reflection on the homeland to final gratitude. This understanding, though important, falls short of the greater insight and fuller appreciation which comes from experiencing the poem from within. When the poem is experienced from within the feeling of strangeness, which is partly generated by the extreme nature of the emotion expressed and partly by the idiosyncracies of style, gives way to an appreciation of the poem as "a sublime expression of a great human emotion which it enables us to experience eminently, though non-primordially." At the same time there is recognition of the emotion as one which we have felt in real life. "The difference in what the poem means to us could hardly be greater", Elliott concludes and observes that "the inability to experience such a poem from within is a deprivation for which no exquisiteness of taste can compensate" (p. 116).

Donne's poem, "The Sunne Rising", Elliott argues, has to be experienced according to both modes if we are to evaluate it justly. From without, the poem appears as aggressively clever conceit but from within "the lyrical aspect of the poem is experienced more convincingly and we feel a sense of the power and glory of sensual
love." But in this case it is important that the two modes of experience complement each other for both aspects are important for a complete understanding of the poem. The tone of aggression is established in the very first line of the poem where the sun is addressed as "Busy old fool, unruly Sun." The poet, represented as being in bed with his mistress, is angered by the interfering rays of the sun which pierce through the curtain. The poet's tone and impatience give an impression of arrogance as the sun is dismissed contemptuously.

"Saucy, pedantic wretch, go chide Late schoolboys and sour prentices."

When the poem is experienced from without, Elliott argues, this is the aspect that impresses us. But when we experience the poem from within, the dramatic character of the poem is appreciably softened and lines such as these take on more prominence:

Love, all alike, no season knows nor clime, Nor hours, days, months, which are the rags of time.

"Now", Elliott writes, "it seems to us that the poet diminished the sun only to glorify a greater god, one whose power we ourselves feel in experiencing the poem from within" (1967, p. 117).

What these two examples illustrate is the way the lyric poet represents the structure of a developing mood and enables the reader to reproduce in imagination, from the place of the experiencing subject, the various ways in which the emotion manifests itself as he experiences the poem from within. "The reader", writes Elliott, "must himself contribute the appropriate feeling and emotional tone,
but his feeling will be appropriate not only to the imagined situation but also to the expression he has made his own" (1967, p. 117). In this way the emotion comes into being in him. Thus in an aesthetic experience of a lyric poem the experiencing subject is actively involved in the imagined situation and feels the emotion expressed but without necessarily being affected by it.

The implications of this account for an objectivist aesthetic are obvious. The proponents of that theory maintain, as we noted earlier, that aesthetic perception is an awareness of certain qualities of an objective content. That is, in an aesthetic experience of a lyric poem such as the one just described the reader senses or recognises the emotional qualities of the poem. These qualities, it is argued, are as much part of the objective content of the poem as the words that compose it, and, to emphasize this, Bouwsma (1954) urges the reader to "suppose that the poem is as hard as marble, ingrained, it may be, with indelible sorrow." This suggests the picture of a completely detached aesthetic observer whose response is simply to recognise the emotional qualities of a work, these qualities being seen as phenomenally objective qualities of the work.

It may be that the emotional qualities of a work can sometimes simply be recognised in this way but notice what a difference there would be between such an experience and the aesthetic experience of the critic or lover of beauty. The critic or lover of beauty, in allowing his imagination to run freely and in bringing into play an uninhibited emotional response as he contemplates a work, is more
likely to benefit from the richness and complexity of the great works of art than the unmoved aesthetic observer who practices what Elliott calls "aesthetic asceticism", seeing his task as that of detecting or recognising phenomenally objective aesthetic features. The unmoved observer aiming at an austere ideal usually does get something from a great work of art, but it will surely be the case that those aspects of the work - and these are frequently the most important aspects - which cannot in any straightforward way be described as phenomenally objective and which often involve the expressive aspects of the work will elude him. In her article, "Aesthetic Concepts", Meager (1970) cites the example of the deadly sense of entanglement that permeates the world of Aeschylus's *Agamemnon* and comments:

This is not simply an aspect of the play which may or may not dawn upon spectators, according as they have or have not developed the requisite 'perceptual viewpoint', leaving the judgement by A that there is no such aspect to the play as acceptable as the judgement by B that there is such an aspect, in the way that the more naive judgement that a penny seen sideways on looks round is as acceptable as the more sophisticated judgement that it looks elliptical, since both are merely 'phenomeno-logical' reports from different 'perceptual viewpoints.' Those who perceive the sense of human entanglement, by unknown Gods, by our own passions and conceit, in the *Agamemnon* would find it part of the essential truth and power of the work - hardly a dispensable 'phenomenological' aspect of it.  

(Meager, 1970, p. 320-321)

Similar examples can be multiplied and not only from literature. In such cases it is more appropriate to speak of the power of the work to provide experiences of imaginative and emotional
intensity rather than a feature of the work to be noted by a refined exercise of detection. Elliott's account of experiencing a work from within, as we noted earlier, shows that when the work is so experienced the so-called "phenomenally objective" features become inseparable from the experiencing subject and an adequate account of the aesthetic object must include a reflexive awareness of certain aspects of the aesthetic experience.

Let us take stock so far. Elliott argues that a version of expression theory "provides a better account of our experience of art and of the nature of a work of art" than the Beardsley/Bouwsma objectivist aesthetic theory. Some works of art, he maintains, can be experienced as if they were human expression. When the work is experienced as human expression it can be experienced from within or from without. When a poem, for example, is experienced from within, the reader, by an imaginative leap, assumes, as it were, the voice of the poet and experiences the emotion expressed as if the words were issuing from himself. He thus enters the world of the poem and makes it part of his world instead of contemplating it as if it were an object in his world. By doing so the reader attains a level of imaginative insight and understanding of the work that goes far beyond any mere "recognition of emotional qualities."

Philosophers of the Beardsley/Bouwsma persuasion consider any version of the Expression Theory unsatisfactory and subscribe to an objectivist aesthetic because they feel it provides the most defensible view of the work of art, the aesthetic experience of the
work and the relationship between the aesthetic object and the experiencing subject. But, as we have seen, the objectivist position fails to explain how it is that a work of art can express emotions and so provides an incomplete account of the nature of art or of our experience of art.

Elliott does not deny that we apply emotional predicates to music according to the two criteria Bouwsma mentions (see p. 47-49 above), but he argues that we also use the sentence "The music is sad" to mean that the music expresses sadness. However, to perceive the sadness expressed in the music we have to hear the sounds as if they were expression. Sometimes when we listen to music "we find ourselves hearing some passage as if someone were expressing his emotion in and through the sounds as a person does in and through his voice**, and with pure music, Elliott believes, we hear the expressed emotion as if it were our own expression. Hearing the music as if it were the expression of emotion is, Elliott argues, like seeing the restless movements of a tree blown hither and thither in a strong wind as a "restless and fearful agitation." To see the foliage in this way is to see it as if it were an agitated person, but if one concentrates on the movements one ceases to see the tree as if it were a person and the experience becomes less absorbing because less interesting. It is the same with music. A concentration on the sound as pure sound prevents you from hearing it as expression and so from experiencing the emotion expressed in the most vivid way.

Experiences of this kind occur frequently in life as in
art. You can see a dancer's movements as so many complicated steps or you can see the movements as expression, in which case the various complicated steps take on a unity as they express whatever feeling or emotion is appropriate. The emotion expressed may be the dancer's, or the composer's or even that of the character the dancer is impersonating. It may even belong to nobody in particular, but this is not a hindrance to our experiencing the emotion as expression. We value experiences of this kind precisely because in them the expressed emotion is most vividly realised. As Elliott puts it, "hearing the music as expressing emotion, whether from without or from within, is an instance of imaginatively enriched perception, one of many which we encounter in the experience of art" (Elliott, 1967, p. 119).

In painting, too, the spectator has opportunities to move from ordinary aesthetic contemplation of objective features to an experience of the reality represented in the pictures. Elliott (1967) discusses the examples of Rouault's Flight into Egypt and Grunewald's The Buffetting (or The Mocking of Christ) (Vesey, 1973, p. 89). In both pictures the spectator is able to enter imaginatively into the world portrayed, and experience the scene or the events depicted as if they were real. Grunewald's picture has the power to force the spectator-participant to identify with the soldier aiming a blow at Christ and although the soldier's arm is raised but does not descend to deliver the blow, this does not prevent the spectator from "living the movement of striking through to its consummation in imaginal time." An imaginative experience of such power and immediacy is only possible
when the spectator experiences the work from within. An account of aesthetic experience and of the work of art which does not permit adequate recognition of this, misses what is most valuable in art.

It is necessary at this point, I think, to summarize briefly the ways in which the objectivist and expressionist positions I have been concerned with differ from one another. The objectivist maintains the following:

(a) Anthropomorphic predicates apply to art in the way that they apply to natural objects and this is the only way that they apply to art, e.g., "sad" applies to music in the same way that "red" applies to rose (Beardsley) or to apple (Bouwsma).

(b) The logic of an anthropomorphic predicate when it applies to art is exactly the same as when the predicate applies to a natural object, i.e., "sad music" and "red rose" have the same "thing-property" relation, hence the objectivist's object-quality interpretation of Expression Theory.

(c) The qualities or "properties" that warrant the application of anthropomorphic predicates are in the work.

(d) Aesthetic perception or experience consists in "recognising" the emotional qualities that the anthropomorphic predicates pick out.

Against this the expressionist maintains the following:

(a) Anthropomorphic predicates do not apply to art in only one way; they apply to art in a variety of different ways. In particular they sometimes apply to art in ways which are
quite unlike the ways in which such predicates apply to natural things. For instance, an anthropomorphic predicate can apply to a work by virtue of what Sircello calls an "artistic act." When the predicate applies in this way, the work of art may function to express feelings or emotions.

(b) The logic of an anthropomorphic predicate when it applies to art is not the same as when the predicate applies to a natural object. For example, "sad music" and "red apple" do not both describe object-quality relations. "Sad" in "sad music" has a relational function which "red" in "red rose" does not have. "Sad" in "sad music" functions to relate the quality to a person's inner life; "red" in "red rose" simply describes an objective quality of the rose.

(c) The expressionist agrees that the relevant qualities or properties are in the work of art. This is the only point of agreement between the expressionist and the objectivist. But even here there is a crucial difference in the way the two positions interpret the presence of "emotional qualities" in a work of art. The expressionist does not accept the objectivist's insistence that "emotional qualities" are fundamentally objective qualities of the work having the same logical status as other qualities commonly attributed to works of art, such as colour, etc.
(d) Aesthetic experience of emotion does not consist simply of "recognising" the emotional qualities of a work. If the work is seen as expression it can be experienced as the expression of emotion and this kind of experience of the work entails a level of personal involvement that the objectivist position fails to appreciate. In particular it involves an emotional response of the kind Elliott describes.

3.5 The Objectivist Position

In fairness to Beardsley and the position I am criticizing, I would like to emphasize that the objectivists agree that the apprehension of the emotional qualities of a work of art is an important part of the aesthetic experience of the work. The contrast is not between cognition on the one hand and affect on the other. Both occur simultaneously in an aesthetic experience, as Parsons notes in the introduction to "Developmental Stages in Children's Aesthetic Responses" (1978). In discussing the child's developing sense of relevance in his encounter with works of art, he argues that "to find something relevant in an aesthetic experience is to respond to it with some feeling" (1978, p. 84). "What develops affectively", he writes, "is not so much the power of feeling (all children have that), but the power of feeling relevantly, i.e., in the direction of increased complexity, subtlety and responsiveness" (1978, p. 84). From this we can see that Parsons clearly acknowledges the importance of an emotional response to a work of art and his
developmental thesis outlines the way the child's sense of relevance changes and affects his total response to the work of art. Parsons can't be charged then with failing to consider the importance of the emotional aspect of a response to a work of art. However, he does base his conception of mature aesthetic experience, i.e. stage four in his developmental scheme, on the work of "Beardsley and his followers." He writes:

Any developmental scheme implies a normative conception of the end state to which development leads. In our case, we must be able to give an account of the kinds of features of aesthetic objects found to be relevant in the aesthetic experience of sophisticated adults. This, of course, is primarily a matter for the philosophy of art. . . .Our understanding of what this means has relied heavily on the work of Monroe Beardsley.

(1978, p. 84-85)

And a little later on the same page he writes: "We have not attempted to provide a detailed description (let alone justification) of the 'end state', and simply appeal to the work of Beardsley and his followers for this" (1978, p. 85). Parsons then relies on "Beardsley and his followers" for a detailed characterization of what it means to have an aesthetic experience of a work of art which would include an emotional response to the work. If we turn now to the work of "Beardsley and his followers" we find that, although they say that an emotional response is often an important part of an aesthetic experience of a work, their actual description of what the emotional response entails is in terms of "a recognition" of emotional qualities. This conclusion is borne out by the way these emotional
qualities are characterized by these writers. Here is Beardsley on the similarity between the quality "red" in "red rose" and the emotional quality "joyous" in "joyous music":

When we say that a rose is red, we have only one thing, namely the rose, and we describe its quality; in exactly the same way, when we say the music is joyous, we have only one thing, namely the music, and we describe its quality.

(Beardsley, 1958, p. 331-332)

In other words, the sentences "The rose is red" and "The music is joyous" behave in exactly the same way; they describe thing-property relations. How do we tell that the rose is red? We see the rose and we recognise it redness. How do we tell that the music is joyous? We hear the music and we recognise its joyousness. Don't we have to feel the joy in the music when we hear or experience it? Not necessarily, and on this point Beardsley's "followers" - the ones, I presume, Parsons has in mind - are more explicit than Beardsley is. As we have seen, Hepburn, on the subject of experiencing emotion in works of art, says:

Of the two ways of speaking - the evocation of emotion and the recognition of emotional qualities - the latter is truer to our actual experience in probably a majority of aesthetic contexts.

(Hepburn, 1965, p. 198)

For Hepburn then, our emotional response to works of art consists in recognising their emotional qualities. On this Bouwsma (1954), another of the Beardsley "followers" Parsons probably has in mind, is exactly in agreement with Hepburn. On how we should respond to emotional qualities in a poem, he writes, as we saw earlier:
Hear the words and do not imagine that in hearing them you gulp a jigger to make yourself foam. Rather suppose that the poem is as hard as marble, ingrained, it may be, with indelible sorrow. 

(Bouwsma, 1954, p. 98)

The poem, in other words, has a **gestalt** character which we call sad, and we perceive the sadness in the poem as we perceive qualities like redness in a red apple (Bouwsma's example).

Yet another of the Beardsley "followers", Morris-Jones, practically uses the same words as Hepburn and Bouwsma to describe our response to emotion in art. What I do when I read a sad or happy poem or listen to a sad or happy song, he argues, is "to **recognise** (italics his) the sadness or happiness, and I implicitly claim that others should recognise them, too, if they have undergone those perceptual or imaginative experiences which constitute an exhaustive appreciation of those works of art" (Morris-Jones, 1962, p. 21).

Why do "Beardsley and his followers" who clearly must agree that works of art can provide profoundly moving experiences write in this way about how we respond to emotional qualities in works of art? Why do they seem to reduce our emotional responses to a mere recognition of emotional qualities? We should first note that it is largely because they talk in this way that writers like Elliott (1967) describe them as providing us with an impoverished concept of aesthetic experience. Osborne (1963) makes this forthright declaration concerning these objectivists ("Beardsley and his followers") talk about "apprehending" or "recognising"
emotional qualities in art: "I do not believe that the solution lies in a theory that aesthetic experience involves the cognition by direct acquaintance of non-experienced mental states" (1963, p. 40).

The considerations that have led Beardsley and his followers to talk in this way about the experience of emotion in art would appear to be as follows. Works of art, Beardsley argues, are objects which we encounter in our phenomenal field, and, as such, they are to be sharply distinguished from our subjective responses. These objects (i.e., the works of art) comprise - and this is the heart of the objectivist position - phenomenally objective features including aesthetic ones. Thus, for example, the colour of a painting and its joyousness are both phenomenally objective in exactly the same sense, and we perceive both in the same way. Referring to these two kinds of properties of works of art as "regional properties", Beardsley writes concerning our perception of the regional properties of music: "We can recognise, that is, hear, the regional quality of a work before we analyze it in any very detailed way...." (1958, p. 331). Sometimes, to distinguish emotional qualities like sadness or joy from other qualities like redness or rhythm, Beardsley refers to the former as "human regional qualities" but he clearly assumes that their logical status is exactly the same as those of other properties of works of art. On this Osborne (1963) comments:

The notions that constellations of visual and auditory perceptions display regional, non-summative properties emergent at various levels is by now well established. What is new, and indeed strange, is the idea that emotional qualities are objective in this
way, that there are perceived properties of things which are expressive of emotion without provoking emotion in the perciept or being interpreted as the sign of emotion in some other sentient being.

(1963, p. 42)

Beardsley does say - and his followers are in agreement with him on this - that we can talk, for example, about the sadness of a piece of music without reference to the composer's feelings or the effect the music has on a listener (Beardsley, 1958, p. 326-332). Obviously we can and often do. But our being able to talk in this way in no way denies that the composer may have expressed his emotion in the music, and when we describe it as sad we are referring to the expressed emotion in the music. Indeed our very use of the emotional predicate, "sad", is necessitated by certain expressive properties of the music which make it an expression of emotion. The objectivists' mistake - and this is brought out clearly in Sircello's argument - is to suppose that emotional predicates apply to art in only one way, that, for example the expression "sad music" simply characterises, in a metaphorical way, some objective quality of the music which the listener hears or recognises. Of course there is something about the music which makes us describe it as "sad" rather than say "joyous." But the term "sad" in "sad music" has a different function from say, the term "red" in "red rose." "Red" picks out a simple property of the rose. "Sad" has a relational function. Its function is to relate the character of the music to human sadness, just as the term "happy" in "happy
"smile" relates the character of the smile to a human emotional state. It is this relational function of emotional terms when applied to art that distinguishes them from simple descriptive terms like "red." And when works of art function as expressions of human emotion, they demand, in Elliott's view, a different kind of response from that which Beardsley and his followers seem to allow for by their often repeated phrase, "the recognition of emotional qualities." As we have seen, Elliott argues that a full appreciation of such works demands that the expressed emotion be experienced in a concrete way. This involves at least feeling an appropriate emotion and perhaps imaginatively entering the world of the work in such a way as to achieve an intense and complete realisation of the work. He argues that in experiencing the expressed emotion in a poem "I do not merely recognise that the poet is expressing, for example, sadness, but actually feel this sadness" (1967, p. 113).

Let us agree that the objectivist aesthetic, in drawing attention to the objective aesthetic features of a work which must be perceived, has performed a useful service. The critic ought to be concerned with what is there in the work not with his own private associations. Having said this, we must be careful not to fall into the trap of saying that the recognition of these qualities or features is all there is in an aesthetic experience. Such an account would leave out what is of the utmost importance - the imaginative experience of the work. "To underplay the experienced response is a fatal error in any attempt to explain the nature of aesthetic value" (Meager, 1970). One must stress the fact that there are aesthetic
experiences, often the ones we value most, that involve the total absorption of the spectator's imaginative and emotional powers of response, including, as we noted earlier, his very self-awareness. As Leavis (1964) notes, "words in poetry invite us...to 'feel into' or become - to realise a complex experience that is given in the words" (p. 212). Let us now turn to a brief discussion of Leavis's views on the nature of aesthetic criticism.

3.6 Leavis's Criticism

Does the mature response to literature suggested by some literary criticism differ from Parsons' conception of the stage four response to art? If so, what implication does this have for Parsons' end state? If the mature literary response is different would this imply different teaching strategies? These are the questions that will be addressed in the next chapter. In preparation for that I shall discuss the critical views of one particular literary critic - F. R. Leavis. This is because I agree with Casey's statement that in Leavis's criticism "we have the most thoroughgoing attempt to retain, on the one hand, the emphasis on the emotional importance of literature, and yet to provide, on the other, objective criteria for judging the quality of emotion a poem presents" (Casey, 1966, p. 154). This statement about Leavis's work has obvious relevance for an expressionist account of art, for basic to Expression Theory is the notion that works of art express emotions, and I shall be showing how Leavis, although finding it natural to use expressionist language, avoids the usual expressionist difficulties. Leavis's
critical practice, I shall argue, illustrates the fact that one's aesthetic judgements can have objective validity without the necessity of having to adopt the anti-expressionist aspects of objectivist aesthetic theory.

In his discussion of the difference between reading poetry and reading philosophy, Leavis (1964) writes:

Words in poetry invite us not to 'think about' and judge but to 'feel into' or become - to realise a complex experience that is given in the words. They demand, not merely a fuller-bodied response, but a completer responsiveness - a kind of responsiveness that is incompatible with the judicial one-eye-on-the-standard approach....

(p. 212)

The words "feel into or become" describe the kind of response that we had earlier talked about in discussing Elliott's response "from within". The reader is expected to enter imaginatively into the world of the poem and "realise the complex experience given in the words." This is the kind of response that is "incompatible with the judicial one-eye-on-the-standard approach", and also incompatible, I would suggest, with a mere "recognition" of emotional qualities, and it may even go beyond the perception of objective features. But there is no suggestion here that the reader needs to abandon his critical intelligence. On the contrary, Leavis is insistent that the reader bring to bear on the words of the poem all his powers of perception, judgement and analytic skill. These are to be employed in the effort to achieve an "intelligent realisation" of the work. Analysis, for Leavis, is "the process by which we seek to attain a complete reading of the poem:"
There is about it nothing in the nature of 'murdering to dissect'. . .We can have the poem only by an inner kind of possession; it is 'there' for analysis only in so far as we are responding appropriately to the words on the page. . .What we call analysis is, of course, a constructive or creative process. It is a more deliberate follow-through of that process of creation in response to the poet's words which reading it.

(1941, p. 309)

To respond appropriately to the poem, the reader must attempt to realise to the full the experience given in the words of the poem. He must aim at complete responsiveness, at what Steiner describes as "a kind of poised vulnerability of consciousness in the encounter with the text" (Steiner, 1967). The reader proceeds with an attention which is close and stringent, and the poem is "realised" by a process in which understanding and imagination supplement and progressively correct each other. Needless to say, this kind of "realisation" is not confined to the reading of poems. Drama (the text rather than the stage production) and the novel are "realised" in the same way. This "realisation" involves an evaluation of the work, but the evaluation arises from response, it does not initiate it. We get a clearer idea of what is involved from the following passage in which Leavis describes the activity of the critic, the "reader of literature:

The critic's aim is, first, to realise as sensitively and completely as possible that or that which claims his attention; and a certain valuing is implicit in the realising. As he matures in experience of the new thing he asks, explicitly and implicitly: 'Where does this stand in relation to...? How
relatively important does it seem? And the organisation into which it settles as a constituent in becoming "placed" is an organisation of similarly "placed" things, things that have found their bearings with regard to one another, and not a theoretical system or a system determined by abstract considerations.

(1964, p. 213)

Casey (1966) has correctly observed that the key words in this passage are "and a certain valuing is implicit in the realising." That is, by becoming aware of more and more of the features of different works of literature, and of different experiences, we are able to compare them with one another, to relate them to each other. This map of relations is our value scheme. Certain works of literature become part of the critic's intellectual landscape. The critical judgement (the "placing") is a result of a complex of activities, "finding that this wears well", "coming back again to that", and so on. The "placing" is thus a result of particular decisions made in response to the concrete presentations in a work. It does not depend on "a theoretical system or a system determined by abstract considerations." And this is why Leavis has always resisted demands that he set forth the general criteria or standards by which he judges literary works. He believes that judgement must be based on particular responses to particular works and that readers are rightly suspicious of any general criteria anyone might set up for judging works of art. The critic, Leavis (1964) points out, does not ask, in judging a work, "How does this accord with these specifications of goodness in poetry?; he aims to
make fully conscious and articulate the immediate sense of value that 'places' the poem (1964, p. 213). This is one of the entry points of aestheticians' talk about the uniqueness of a work of art, the feeling that there is a sense in which the individual work ultimately contains the standard by which it is to be judged. "My whole effort", writes Leavis, "is to work in terms of concrete judgements and particular analyses" (1964, p. 215).

The question now arises as to how these "concrete judgements" are justified. For it might be objected that in relying on his own individual response and independent judgement, the critic's assessment of the work - the "placing" - may be unjustified. How does Leavis attempt to justify his critical judgement? First, he points to the evidence on which a particular judgement is based. For example, in "Thought and Emotional Quality", Leavis (1945) compares D.H. Lawrence's poem "Piano" with Tennyson's "Tears, Idle Tears." He finds in "Piano" a presentation of "a specific situation, concretely grasped", and, although "the presenting involves an attitude towards", the "attitude" is one of "disinterested valuation." This disinterestedness holds in check the emotion presented in the poem. In other words, the emotional effect of the poem is qualified by the critical attitude of the poet, and so the poem is saved from being sentimental. Tennyson's "Tears, Idle Tears", on the other hand, "moves simply forward with a sweetly plangent flow, without check, cross-tension or any qualifying element." The poem invites the reader to flow along with it, suspending his "thought." In
Lawrence's poem "feeling" is not divorced from "thinking" as it is in "Tears, Idle Tears." Here, Tennyson "offers emotion directly, emotion for its own sake without a justifying situation, and, in the comparison, its inferiority to Lawrence's poem compels a largely disparaging commentary." Leavis's final judgement is that Tennyson's poem is sentimental, and, for Leavis, a 'sentimental' attitude is false in a particularly radical way, for it determines how the author views a particular set of objects. So that to say that a poem is sentimental is to say that the poet fails to grasp the reality of a situation and to present it disinterestedly. This way of talking should not lead one to suppose, however, that Leavis is trying to infer something about the state of mind of the author from the work. Rather he draws attention to those characteristics of the work which give rise to the critical judgement, e.g. the use of language. "The way the poet uses language is the central criterion of how he feels, and the condition of his having certain feelings is his capacity to use language in a certain way" (Casey, 1966, p. 164). As in Sircello's examples discussed earlier, one can either say that "Tears, Idle Tears" is a sentimental poem or that Tennyson treats his subject sentimentally, and in either case one would be talking about both the poem and Tennyson's treatment of his subject. Leavis also makes no distinction between the thing expressed and the expression of it, and so avoids the usual expressionist difficulty of trying to infer the 'thing expressed' from the passage which 'expresses' it. The grounds for the description of "Tears, Idle Tears" and of Tennyson's attitude as sentimental are in the poem itself, and these the critic points to. Thus
the objectivist critic and the expressionist critic have this much in common; they both refer to characteristics of the work.

In pointing to certain characteristics of a work, one is "describing" it in a certain way. This description, according to Leavis, is, in certain circumstances, an evaluation. In the context of a discussion in the connection between thought and emotion in Shelley's poetry, he writes:

in the examination of his poetry the literary critic finds himself passing, by inevitable transitions, from describing characteristics to making adverse judgments about emotional quality; and so to a kind of discussion in which, by its proper methods and in pursuit of its proper ends, literary criticism becomes the diagnosis of what, looking for an inclusive term, we can only call spiritual malady.

(Leavis, 1945, p. 60)

For Leavis, evaluating does not take the form merely of inducing an attitude to the facts, or of persuading people to 'choose' in a particular way, but consists also of persuading people to 'see' the facts in a particular way. But, as Casey says, "someone may accept the analysis of a poem as, say, weak in realisation, and, by the same token, sentimental, and by the same token unintelligent, but still refuse to accept that it is bad" (Casey, 1966, p. 169). If, however, he accepts the analysis of the poem but persists in denying that this amounts to saying that the poem is bad, we may wonder whether he knows what he is saying, whether he has the concept of evaluation. In the same way, if a person persists in denying that a poem is sentimental however many sentimental-making features we point out, "we may be permitted to wonder what, if anything, he is saying, and whether he has the concept of sentimentality" (Casey, 1966).
Leavis attempts, then, to justify his critical judgements by showing that they are based on certain descriptions of the literary work, these descriptions implying ways of seeing the work. An acceptance of the descriptions means an acceptance of the judgements. One may, of course, question the descriptions. Are they appropriate, comprehensive, etc.? Do they illuminate or distort? A question about the appropriateness or comprehensiveness of a description is ultimately a question of how good a critic Leavis is. Does his theory give the best account of the facts, including the best evaluation of the facts? If it does, then his critical judgements are justified.

I have said above that Leavis, like an objectivist critic, bases his judgements on characteristics of the work that are publicly accessible. In what way then does he differ from his objectivist counterpart? He accepts the notion that a poet may express his emotion in his work, ("Works of art express emotions") although he would insist that the evidence that the poet expresses his emotion in his work is in the work itself.

Would Leavis's stress on the emotional importance of literature and his emphasis on the full participation of the aesthetic experience suggest a different developmental structure from Parsons'? Leavis, of course, is not a developmentalist and he is really only interested in a mature response to art. Hence his repeated stress on literature that appeals to the adult mind and on the kind of response which an "adult sensitive modern" should make. However, his stress on the emotional features of literature and on the reader's participation might make a difference to certain aspects of Parsons' theory. In spite of his constant
reference to what is there in the poem or novel, Leavis would probably not be concerned with the idea of distancing in relation to Parsons' thesis. In "Literary Criticism and Philosophy" he writes:

The business of the literary critic is to attain a peculiar completeness of response and to observe a peculiarly strict relevance in developing his response into commentary; ... His first concern is to enter into possession of the given poem (let us say) in its concrete fullness, and his constant concern is never to lose his completeness of possession, but rather to increase it.

(1964, p. 213)

Leavis is really more clearly an expressionist in the sense in which I have been using the term in this thesis than I have indicated so far. I argued earlier that to say, for example, that a piece of music is sad is to say that the composer has expressed sadness in the music. The epithet "sad" in this context has an explicit relational function: it asserts that there is a relation between the character of the music and a person's sadness. It follows therefore that any comment about the sadness of music can be construed as a comment about the author's sadness in the music. In other words, talk about the expressed sadness could in some cases be talk about both the music and its creator. Similarly, talk about the expressed emotion in a poem could be talk about both the poem and the poet. This is exactly Sircello's position. "Works of art", he writes, ".....may function to express those feelings, emotions, attitudes, moods, and/or personal characteristics of their creators that are suggested by the 'anthropomorphic' predicates applicable to the works of art themselves" (Sircello, 1971, p. 318). Elliott goes much further and talks about responding to the expressed emotion in a poem as if one were in the
poet's presence listening to his words, thus linking the expressed emotion to the poet. Both these writers see critical comment about the expressed emotion in a work as possible comment about the work or its author. And there is no need to suppose that in commenting about the work and the author one has to go beyond the work. Leavis's criticism is an example of how a critic can quite properly make comments about a work and its author through an examination of the work itself. A good example is Leavis's adverse comments about Shelley's poetry which are also comments about the poet, made through an examination of Shelley's "When the Lamp is Shattered".

The abeyance of thought exhibited by the first three stanzas now takes on a more sinister aspect. The switching off of intelligence that is necessary if the sentiments of the third stanza are to be accepted, has now to be invoked in explanation of a graver matter - Shelley's ability to accept the grosser, the truly corrupt, gratifications that have just been indicated. The antipathy of his sensibility to any play of the critical mind, the uncongeniality of intelligence to inspiration, these clearly go in Shelley, not merely with a capacity for momentary self-deceptions and insincerities, but with a radical lack of self-knowledge.

(Leavis, 1972 A, p. 207)

Here Leavis clearly thinks it right and proper to make critical judgements about the poem and the poet from an examination of the emotion expressed in the poem.

Now, Beardsley and other objectivist philosophers would call this sort of criticism "intentionalistic". The critic, they would say, should talk about the work, not about the author, and they would try to translate comments such as the above into comments about just the poem and delete all references to the author of the poem. Beardsley (1958) in fact does this with some examples of what he calls "intentionalistic" criticism (p. 27-28), and recommends that we carry out this practice in
our reading of criticism. Beardsley's recommendation, however, assumes a false dichotomy - that critical commentary must be either commentary about the work or about the author. But there is no reason why a critic cannot, as in the above example of Leavis, talk about both the work and the author. Indeed, the relational logic of anthropomorphic predicates serves to encourage precisely this when it is concerned, as in the example from Leavis, with discussing the expressive qualities in a work. And the critic does not have to go outside the work for evidence to support his comments about the work and its author. The grounds for the truth of the critical judgements made about the work and its creator come from the work itself. Beardsley assumes that whatever evidence there is in the work must be evidence to support statements about the work. However, as our discussion of "artistic acts" has shown, in applying anthropomorphic predicates to works of art, we may well be making just the sort of relational claim Beardsley would proscribe. Thus when, on the basis of an artistic act, we characterize a poem as sad, the predicate can function to relate the emotional quality expressed in the poem to the inner life of a person, in this case, the author, just as a smile, for example, relates to and thereby expresses the inner life of the person smiling. When a critic, then, makes a critical judgement of the quality of emotion expressed in the poem, his statements may apply both to poem and poet, for the expressed emotion relates to the poet in the same way that the (expressed) smile relates to the person. The critic thus finds in the poem, as Leavis does, evidence to support his statements about both the poem and the poet. And herein lies the difference between the expressionist critic and his objectivist counterpart. Because of their failure to fully appreciate the logic of
of anthropomorphic predicates, the objectivists posit an artificial gulf between the work of art and its creator. The expressionist critic, however, accepts the fact that an author can express his emotion in his work, or, to put it another way, the work can function to express its author's inner life. And when this happens the expressed emotion can be experienced as expression bearing the same relation to the poet as any ordinary human expression bears to the person doing the expressing. When the work is so experienced, critical judgements can be made about both the work and its author. Leavis's critical practice is a demonstration of this. In his assumption that it is legitimate to comment on the author, using the work of art as his source of justification, Leavis has implicitly recognized the point Sircello is at pains to make - anthropomorphic predicates are relational and can be used to link work of art and author. His method of criticism embodies this sort of assumption. I have, therefore, chosen him as an example of what aesthetic criticism can legitimately involve if one accepts the expressionist position.

The emphasis which Leavis lays on the emotional importance of literature would also make a difference to the Beardsley/Parsons' conception of the perception of emotional qualities in works of art. Parsons (1976) argues that, in aesthetic response, it is the power of relevant feeling that develops in the young child. This development, however, rests on the child's ability to perceive emotional qualities in works of art. The Beardsley/Bouwsma position on which Parsons relies is, at the very least, open to the charge that the perception of these qualities takes the form of a recognition. One need not feel the emotion so recognized. Leavis, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of a
totality of response, including an intense emotional response to a work. The reader clearly must feel the emotion expressed in the work. How else would he experience it? "Poetry", Leavis writes, "can communicate the actual quality of experience with a subtlety and precision unapproachable by other means" (1976, p. 17). The reader will clearly experience very little of that "subtlety and precision" if he is not capable of feeling the emotions expressed. Leavis talks about the poet's power of "making words express what he feels" and of the technique he employs to "compel words to express an intensely personal way of feeling." These statements imply that the reader must respond appropriately to the expressed feelings by experiencing them in a concrete way. Only in so doing will the work enlarge his own range of feeling and enable him to do justice to its emotional power. This capacity to experience concretely the feelings or emotions expressed in a work is one of the things that makes literary criticism a central, life-giving pursuit.

All this has obvious bearing on a developmental theory that sees response to emotion in works of art as involving no more than the recognition of emotional qualities, these qualities being seen as phenomenally objective in the way that other non-feeling qualities of a work are. Such a theory clearly cannot accommodate the kind of response to literature that Leavis and Elliott recommend without changing some of its basic assumptions. In chapter four I shall discuss what implications Elliott's emphases on the emotional importance of literature and on the critic's ability to experience the emotion expressed in literature, have for Parsons' theory and for aesthetic education.
CHAPTER FOUR

CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF PARSONS' COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

4.1 Introduction

I want to discuss the possibility of constructing a cognitive-developmental theory of aesthetic experience of children, somewhat parallel to the work of Kohlberg on the development of the moral judgements of children.

(Parsons, 1976, p. 305)

This is the sentence with which Parsons begins the exposition of his theory, and, in the article in which he and his assistants present their empirical findings about children's responses to painting, he writes: "In looking for answers we have had in mind a parallel with the work of Piaget, Kohlberg and Selman: we were seeking a cognitive-developmental account of aesthetic response" (Parsons, 1978, p. 83). Parsons' cognitive-developmental theory invites comparison with Piaget's and Kohlberg's, although he is anxious to maintain that he and his colleagues have "not tried to apply to thinking about the arts the stages described by Piaget or by Kohlberg," since paintings are not objects for scientific or moral analysis. Nevertheless, the parallel with Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories is obvious. Like Piaget's, Parsons' theory is concerned (in a general way) with intellectual development and, like Kohlberg, Parsons sees aesthetic development occurring in a series of clear-cut qualitatively different stages that lead toward a culminating point or an "end state." In this chapter I want to examine in some detail the extent to which Parsons' theory is similar to Piaget's and Kohlberg's and then to see how far the criticisms that have been made of Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories apply

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to Parsons' theory. Finally, I shall consider the adequacy of Parsons' theory in the light of an expressionist theory of art.

4.2 Piaget's Theory

In order to make the comparison easier I shall start with a schematic description of stage development as it occurs in the theories of the three developmentalists, beginning with Piaget. Piaget sees intellectual development as consisting of four broad stages: there is a "sensorimotor stage," occupying the first two years of life, during which the child gains a practical knowledge of the physical world about him, coming to understand, for example, that objects have a permanent existence within a framework of space and time. This is followed by an "intuitive" or "semiotic" stage, ("preoperational"), extending from age two to six or seven, during which the child explores various kinds of symbols and images representing the world, but does not yet do so in a systematic or logical way. Then comes a "concrete operational" stage, extending from about the age of seven to the age of twelve, during which time the subject is able to think logically about objects, to classify them consistently, and to appreciate their continuity despite alterations in the momentary appearance. Finally, there is a "formal operational stage," starting in early adolescence, at which time the child is able to reason logically using words and other symbols, so that he can create a world and make deductions about it, while still remaining at the "abstract" or "theoretical" level.

We might make a few comments by way of footnotes to this schematic account. First, development is seen as a gradual process of decen-
terior. The infant begins life in an undifferentiated state. He does not, or is unable, to separate the self from the environment or wish from reality. He is centered about the self. In the course of development the infant advances from this undifferentiated state to one of greater separation of the self from the environment. He decenters from the self. Secondly, the order of the stages is invariant. Stage one has to come before stage two and so on. For example, the various explorations of the sensorimotor stage have to be carried out before the child can reach the transition to symbolic thought which marks the beginning of the development of language and the end of sensorimotor representation. The reverse cannot occur. Thirdly, development takes place as a result of the child's adaptation to his world. This adaptation, or development of "schemata," is the product of the child's interaction with his environment. Cognitive structures are built up through the slow process of assimilation of reality to prior schemata and accommodation of these schemata to the external reality. Finally, the developing child, for Piaget, is not a passive being shaped by his environment. When some environmental event occurs the child does not register it passively, but instead he interprets it. It is this interpretation, not the event itself, which affects his behaviour. We might say then that the child "constructs" reality, he modifies raw experience as much as it changes him. Of the four factors which Piaget lists as responsible for developmental change; maturation, experience, social transmission and equilibration, he considers the last to be "the principal factor" and the co-ordinator of all the others. Equilibration, unlike the first three factors, is an active process of self-regulation, whereby the individual advances his own development through the successful
revision, broadening and inter-relation of the partial understandings which arise from his action on his world. As a result of this self-regulatory process the child attains a higher degree of equilibrium at each stage of development. Equilibration is the backbone of mental growth.

4.3 Kohlberg's Theory

In contrast to Piaget's general theory of intellectual development, Kohlberg's theory is concerned solely with moral development, although it should be emphasized that Piaget in The Moral Judgement of the Child (1965) provided "what is probably the most widely discussed theory of how children's understanding of morality develops" (Lickona, 1969, p. 337). Kohlberg has, in fact, elaborated on Piaget's three stages of moral development in which the child was seen as moving from an egocentric stage to one of "incipient co-operation," where his moral consciousness acquires a social dimension and finally to a stage of "genuine co-operation" where real autonomy is achieved and the child sees himself as the equal of others and desires to assist in the formation and modification of the moral code. In Kohlberg's theory the child goes through six stages which are distinguished by the form of the child's moral reasoning rather than the content of his moral beliefs. At the first stage, the child's moral reasoning shows his orientation towards punishment and obedience. Rules are seen as dependent upon power and external compulsion, and right action is therefore that which leads to the avoidance of punishment. At the second stage, the child conceives of rules as leading toward the satisfaction of one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others, and right action is seen as that which leads to rewards and the satisfaction of needs. The first two stages, which occupy the years from four to ten,
are labelled "pre-conventional" because the child's moral reasoning at this age has not yet acquired a social dimension. The self is still very much the centre of attention. The orientation changes somewhat at stage three, the beginning of the level of conventional morality, where the child seeks to be a "good boy" or "nice girl" and sees rules as ways of obtaining social approval and esteem. Stage four brings a law and order orientation. Rules are seen as leading toward the maintenance of the social order and the child seeks to do what is right in order to avoid censure by those in authority. At stage five the child moves out of the level of conventional morality, and his moral reasoning acquires a contractual, legalistic orientation. This is the beginning of the "orientation to principles of justice and welfare" (Kohlberg, 1971) and the child begins to be aware of the relativism of his personal values. At stage six the child's orientation is toward decisions of conscience and self-chosen universalisable moral principles. Stages five and six are labelled "post-conventional" or "autonomous," and Kohlberg's theory maintains that it is only at this level that the child can properly be regarded as an autonomous moral agent for it is here that "there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups." (Kohlberg, 1971) Although this level of post-conventional morality generally represents higher and better moral reasoning than the two previous levels, it is really only at stage six that the individual becomes a fully autonomous moral agent, for it is here that he is capable of making moral judgements that are both "prescriptive" and "universal" -
Kohlberg's thesis is clearly a prescriptive one. He is saying that we should be reasoning at stage six, for stage six reasoning is what moral reasoning ought to be. Here, I think, there may be a difference in emphasis between Kohlberg's theory and Piaget's, for although in his general theory of intellectual development, Piaget's formal operational stage is qualitatively different from the earlier stages, he does not seem to emphasize that it is better than the earlier stages in the way that Kohlberg emphasizes that the principled stage of morality is better than the earlier stages of morality. This difference is further brought out in the kinds of educational strategies the two theories might suggest. Educational strategy, as Piaget sees it, should be designed in such a way as to ensure that the child has time to fully explore each of the stages while the progression from stage to stage -- which occurs naturally -- takes place. At least this is what his theory would seem to suggest. Kohlberg, on the other hand, could be interpreted as wanting adults to do everything they can to ensure a rapid acceleration through the stages. We shall have more to say about this later.

In addition to his thesis that moral development occurs in stages, Kohlberg claims that the sequence of stages is invariant. It holds across all cultures. "Each individual child must go step by step through each of the kinds of moral judgement outlined" (cited in Beck, 1971, p. 36). His third major claim is that the stage sequence is logically necessary. "Since each new basic differentiation at each stage logically depends upon the differentiation before it, the order of differentiations could not
logically be other than it is" (cited in Beck, 1971, p. 48). Here, once again, Kohlberg follows Piaget, who has copiously illustrated the thesis about the stages having a definite invariant sequence depending on the relationship between concepts in the case of elementary physics and mathematics, and, to a more limited extent, in the moral sphere. So Kohlberg's stages could not occur in any other order. This does not of course mean that individuals in all cultures must go through all the stages. For various reasons a person may fixate at a stage and progress no further, and indeed Kohlberg believes that even whole cultures do not progress through to the final stages of principled morality. Kohlberg's main point is that where moral development takes place it follows this particular sequence of stages across cultures and, because of the relationship of the concepts involved, the stage sequence could not have any other order.

4.4 Parallels Among the Three Theories

The stages of aesthetic development outlined by Parsons are clearly not (or not yet) as extensively illustrated as Piaget's stages of intellectual development or Kohlberg's stages of moral development. Parsons himself recognizes this. Indeed it would appear that he is prepared to modify his initial description of the stages considerably if, upon investigation, the facts suggest a somewhat different developmental picture. In the original article he writes:

I have said nothing regarding the question whether the stages I have described are simply mileposts marking qualitatively different but continuously connected points in development, or whether they are relatively separate plateaus joined by brief transitional periods; not whether or how the responses of individuals may scatter over these stages. At
present I should prefer to regard them as heuristic devices. I have proposed a series of advances in a sequence that seems central to the development of aesthetic experience; and hope that their description will enable a more thorough investigation of the facts to take place.

(Parsons, 1976, p. 314)

This makes it difficult to make a detailed comparison between the theory he has sketched and the more full-bodied theories of Piaget and Kohlberg. However, Parsons has presented enough of the theory to allow some sort of comparison to be made.

To begin with, there is an obvious parallel between Piaget's egocentric stage and Parsons' early stages. As already observed, the infant in Piaget's general theory of intellectual development begins life in an undifferentiated stage and development is a gradual process of decentering as a result of which the self is gradually separated from the environment. The child's initial response to art, in Parsons' theory, is similarly undifferentiated. He fails to "distinguish between the pleasure due to the appearances of things from the pleasure due to other features of his environment, and this influences the way he attends to the aesthetic object" (Parsons, 1976, p. 309). But the more interesting parallel is between the general thrust of Piaget's early stages of moral development and that of Parsons' early stages of aesthetic development. Piaget describes his early stage as egocentric where the child does not know or follow the rules, is completely centred about himself, and fails to take into consideration another person's point of view. Parsons also reports that at the beginning of aesthetic development the child's response to art is determined by an egocentrically close self-object relation. This
egocentric relation results in certain confusions that characterize the aesthetic experience at the beginning. The child "confuses what is perceptually present with what is not, liking with judging, and the appeal of the subject matter with that of representation as such" (Parsons, 1976, p. 310). For Piaget, egocentrism defines certain properties of thought observed in young children which appear to be unavoidable and which must be overcome before the child can reach a more mature level of cognitive functioning. This seems to be generally true, as both Kohlberg's and Parsons' stage one descriptions confirm. As the child develops the ability to take another's point of view, he moves out of the egocentric stage and gradually becomes decentred. In Piaget's theory the child's moral consciousness then acquires a social dimension; in Kohlberg's the child moves into the level of conventional morality where right action is seen as that which pleases or helps others, and in Parsons' theory, the appeal of the work of art is now located in the fact that the work satisfies certain external standards.

After this initial comparison, however, the developmental parallel seems to be closer between Parsons' theory and Kohlberg's. In Parsons' theory what changes is the sense of aesthetic relevance. The situation is confused at the beginning with the child not being able to distinguish between what is relevant and irrelevant in his aesthetic experience. As he develops the requisite discriminations, what he judges to be aesthetically relevant at each stage determines the kind of experience he has of the work. Similarly, in Kohlberg's theory, what changes is the way the child conceives of rules. The child changes from seeing rules as ways
of avoiding punishment, through seeing them as ways of maintaining the social order, to seeing them as "articulations of social principles necessary for living together with others" (Peters, 1972). Then there are similarities in the normative conceptions of the end states of both theories. In Kohlberg's system the reasons the child gives for action are not fully moral until he is at the principled level of morality - stage five or six. In Parsons', the child's response, as seen from the reasons he gives, is not fully aesthetic until based on qualities of the work of art that are in principle public - stage four. In Kohlberg's theory the mature moral judgement must be based on the formal principle of justice. (He regards justice as the most defensible moral principle when we are concerned with the formal aspects of morality and rather than the contents of particular moral systems.) In Parsons' the mature aesthetic judgement must be based on objective features of the work of art. (He accepts Beardsley's contention that aesthetic response must be response to phenomenally objective features of the work.) Kohlberg can be criticized and has been, notably, by Peters (1971), for prescribing a morality, and we have also questioned the adequacy of the Beardsley/Parsons objectivist aesthetic theory (see Chapter Three) in accounting for the expressive qualities of art and our experience of these qualities. Because of this close parallel in the accounts given of the two cognitive-developmental theories, I shall concentrate, in the section that follows, on the criticisms that have been made of Kohlberg's theory and see how far they (or similar ones) apply to Parsons' theory. I shall have to be selective even here, for the criticisms that interest me are those that apply, or can be made to apply, to Parsons' theory.
4.5 Criticisms of Kohlberg

There have, of course, been various criticisms of Kohlberg's theory and most of these have been criticisms of particular aspects of the theory. The critics, while accepting Kohlberg's general developmental thesis, take exception to the treatment he gives, or fails to give, to particular topics covered by his theory. One such critic is Peters, who, in a series of interconnected essays, has questioned the lack of attention to the affective domain, the function of habit in moral development, the relationship between virtues and principles, and, in the process, developed a spirited defence of the role of virtues, traits and habits in morality. I shall be referring to relevant aspects of Peters' arguments in the discussion that follows, but the criticisms I want to concentrate on are those made by Phillips and Nicolayev (1979). These criticisms amount to a total rejection of Kohlberg's theory and his research programme, and some of the points they make seem to me to be applicable to Parsons' Theory.

Phillips and Nicolayev begin by showing that Kohlberg's theory of moral development forms a "research programme" in the Lakatosian sense (see Lakatos and Musgrove, 1976). There is an identifiable "hard core" consisting of the three claims that there are stages of moral development, that these stages form an invariant sequence of development, and that the stages are logically necessary. In addition to the "hard core" there is a "protective belt" whose main function is to insulate the hard core against attack in the form of counter evidence. Phillips and Nicolayev first direct their arguments against the three claims that form the "hard core" of Kohlberg's theory.
Against the claim that there are stages of moral development, they point out that Kohlberg's researchers find it difficult to assign many of their experimental subjects to a definite stage because these subjects used more than one stage of moral reasoning. Such evidence of individuals straddling stages abounds throughout the experimental reports and this presents immense difficulties for the stage hypothesis. Phillips and Nicolayev (1979) write:

> When roughly one half of the sample is definitely straddling at least two stages and the other half is more than likely doing so, talk of stages seems somewhat strained. What sense could be made of insect development if at any random point in time fifty percent of the observed population was halfway between two stages, or perhaps even straddling three?

They conclude that the stage hypothesis is "at best, a rough heuristic, one which does not approximate the realities of human development."

The claim that the stages of moral development form an invariant sequence would, of course, become irrelevant if the stage hypothesis is abandoned. But suppose the stage device is retained, does the invariance claim then stand? Phillips and Nicolayev argue that it doesn't. Numerous cases of regression have been found, they point out, and Kohlbergian researchers have failed to diffuse the evidence in spite of repeated trials. Clearly, the claim of an invariant sequence of stages in development cannot hold if individuals are found to regress from a higher stage to a lower one. Phillips and Nicolayev observe that the issue can be settled only by careful longitudinal studies. "Unfortunately," they conclude, "Kohlbergians often seem to rest their case not on relevant studies of this type,
but on the belief that their assumption about invariant upward movement could not possibly be mistaken."

What about Kohlberg's third claim that the stages are logically necessary? Phillips and Nicolayev argue that Kohlberg's Stage One is not a logical presupposition of Stage Three and, although "the realisation that one is suffering avoidable pain (Stage I) may well occur before the realisation that other people are not objects but are individuals like oneself (Stage III)", this order is not necessitated by logic. Peters makes a similar point in his criticism of this aspect of Kohlberg's theory. He argues that although one can see in a general way that Kohlberg's version of Piaget's autonomous stage could not precede any of the earlier stages, "it is not clear why, logically speaking, a child cannot see a rule as being connected with reward or advantage to himself before he sees it as connected with punishment or harm to himself" (Peters, 1972).

After their examination of the "hard core" of Kohlberg's theory, Phillips and Nicolayev then turn their attention to the "protective belt." They find that this consists of ad hoc adjustments to scoring methods (used by the Kohlbergians to give the results called for by their theoretical assumptions) and three ways of diffusing the evidence of regression, all of which fail. This leads them to conclude that:

there are no clear steps of moral development - at best they are arbitrary fictions having little or no verisimilitude; the order in which individuals "move through" these arbitrary fictions is far from invariant, and the sequence of the stages is certainly not logically necessary. Furthermore, the protective belt seems unable to restore the credibility of the hard core.  
(Phillips and Nicolayev, 1979)
The authors observe, further, that there are no signs that the Kohlbergian programme of research is maturing: it has merely been "patched up" with a series of "pedestrian empirical adjustments" which try but fail to save the theory. "In the final analysis," Phillips and Nicolayev write, "the philosophers of science must come to endorse the conclusion reached by common sense - the Kohlbergian programme is degenerating and has little recognizable merit."

4.6 Application to Parsons

Could similar criticisms be made against Parsons' theory, and, if so, would they lead to the same sort of conclusion? Because Parsons' theory has not been around long enough to generate a research programme similar to Piaget's or Kohlberg's, it is not possible to apply in detail the kinds of considerations that Phillips and Nicolayev bring to bear on Kohlberg's Theory. Indeed, in Parsons' case, it is particularly important to bear in mind Lakatos' (1976) warning that

to give a stern 'refutable interpretation' to a fledgling version of a programme is dangerous methodological cruelty. The first versions may even 'apply' only to non-existing 'ideal' cases; it may take decades of theoretical work to arrive at the first novel facts and still more time to arrive at interestingly testable versions of the research programmes. . .

(p. 131)

It is appropriate, therefore, to regard Parsons' original article and the report of the investigation of children's responses to paintings (Parsons et al, 1978) as constituting the first steps of a possible programme of research. Parsons himself observes that the report merely shows that "a cognitive-developmental approach along these lines is very plausible."
He is of the opinion that there might be further stages of the development of aesthetic response to be discovered and says that the report is presented in the hope that it will stimulate further research. Nevertheless, it is not entirely out of place to ask certain questions about the cognitive-developmental aspects of the theory sketched so far. Such questions might even lead towards the formulation of a better and more comprehensive theory.

To begin - are there clear-cut stages of the development of aesthetic response? Parsons (1976) argues that aesthetic experience must have a distinct developmental history to be investigated, and suggests the existence of four stages of the development of aesthetic experience and judgement in children. He gets some sort of confirmation of the stage hypothesis from the single study so far carried out. In "Developmental Stages in Children's Aesthetic Responses," the report already mentioned, Parsons, Johnson and Durham (1978) showed three large reproductions of well-known paintings to individual students from grades one to twelve (thirteen from each grade), and asked them questions relating to the following six topics: semblance, subject matter, feeling, artist's properties, colour and judgement. From the answers received, the authors were able to identify at least three stages of development for each topic, and speculate, from the nature of the answers, that there must be an earlier stage than stage one, and a later stage than stage three, in nearly all the topics discussed. So there may in fact be a total of five or more stages. One can't be sure, since the authors did not interview preschool children. A somewhat different picture may emerge when data for this group is available. One should not read too much into a single study and it would certainly be rash to suppose that this one study should
support or refute the whole stage hypothesis. For one thing the study confines itself to a single art form - painting, and, even within this, the authors feel "unable to speak of aesthetic stages in general, that is, stages across all topics" (p. 87). All the more reason, then, to avoid generalizing the stage thesis across all the other art forms. There just hasn't been enough empirical research to back the stage hypothesis, and, as we noted in the last chapter, a researcher with a different aesthetic theory might well "discover" a different developmental picture. Maybe there are stages of aesthetic development such as the ones Parsons suggests, but whether there are or not will have to be decided on the basis of available evidence backed by considerations about the most appropriate aesthetic theory from which to operate, for the aesthetic theory may well decide both the nature of the evidence and how it is interpreted.

But suppose we accept the stage hypothesis as true, could we maintain that the sequence of stages is as Parsons outlines it? One can see, in a general way, that the child, for example, must overcome certain aspects of his egocentric response which result in the confusions already mentioned (stage one), before he can get satisfaction from the fact that the work of art conforms to certain external standards (stage two). So, in that sense, stage one must precede stage two. But we will see shortly (4.7) that there are occasions when a response to a work of art which, according to Parsons' theory would be classed as stage one, may in fact be appropriate. And this is not a matter of a stage four response having the appearance of a stage one response and being mistakenly classed as such. It is rather, that, from the point of view of a different aesthetic theory, a response which the Parsonian view would judge as inappropriate
is seen as appropriate. This, I think, is a fundamental difficulty that would confront researchers seeking to verify Parsons' claims, unless, of course, they all shared the Beardsley/Parsons' objectivist aesthetic theory on which Parsons bases the normative aspects of his theory. We will return to this below.

Is the order of Parsons' stages logically necessary? Parsons, once again unlike Piaget and Kohlberg, does not make the claim that his stages are logically necessary in the sense that stage one, for example, is a logical presupposition of stage two, and so on. But if such a claim were made of the theory as it now stands, could the claim be defended? In some instances perhaps, in others, clearly not. Take the report which Parsons and his colleagues (1978) give concerning their first topic: "semblance." They describe stages one and two thus:

Stage 1, Semblance. The concept dominating this first stage is the idea of representation .... Paintings represent objects by portraying their important features, both what can be seen and what is known to be true about them: a person's head must have two eyes, a nose, a mouth; a hand must not have six fingers. ... The chief demand is that the painting be comprehensible. Often this is articulated as the demand that things look "real," or like they are "supposed to." We call this the stage of schematic realism.

Stage 2, Semblance. The new distinction achieved at this stage is that between schematic and visual realism. Paintings are still required to represent, and to look "real"; but what is to be represented is the visual appearance of objects, rather than simply what is known about them. This amounts to a more precise set of expectations, which we called "photographic realism." This change requires a degree of decentring because it takes account of what can be seen by anyone. 

(pp. 87-88)
It is obvious from this description that the stage of "photographic realism" presupposes that of "schematic realism." A child has to have had the idea that paintings represent objects before he can come to appreciate the accuracy or otherwise of the representation. The one is clearly a logical prerequisite of the other, or, the one logically presupposes the other. That is, stage two semblance logically presupposes stage one. But we cannot say the same of their second topic, "subject matter." Consider the stage one and two descriptions which the authors give of this topic:

**Stage 1, Subject Matter.** At this stage, the character of the subject matter dominates the response to a painting. The child thinks paintings should be about pleasant, and customary subjects; they should be about happy rather than sad things, and it is better if there is some action going on . . . .

**Stage 2, Subject Matter.** The range of suitable subject matters expands to include much that was previously thought unsuitable - in particular sad, nostalgic, and unpleasant subjects. However, violent, cruel, or tragic items are still rejected, often on moral grounds. (p. 90)

While it is true that the child's preferences of subjects for art would go from a limited to a more extended range, it is not the case that the more extended range logically presupposes the limited one. In fact there is no reason why, logically speaking, the child cannot go from preferring an extended range of subjects to preferring a more limited range. There is nothing here, then, to tell us that stage two cannot occur before stage one. One is therefore forced to the conclusion that any claim of logical necessity may be true for some topics, and possibly, for some art forms.
but false for others.

4.7 Expressionist Critique of Parsons

Let us at this point take another critical look at Parsons' stage developmental thesis, this time in the light of our earlier discussion of the expressive properties of art and aesthetic response to these properties. Using as it does the objectivist model of stage four, Parsons' Theory, as we saw in Chapter Two, maintains that the child's response at stage one is aesthetically confused. At this stage he is very much influenced by subject-matter in paintings and he fails to distinguish between the pleasure he derives from the painting and that derived from other sources in his experience. His response is completely egocentric, i.e., when confronted with a work his attention is centred on himself rather than on the work and he sees everything in relation to himself and his interests. Thus, confronted with Currier and Ives' *Preparing for Market*, the first example Parsons gives, the child says he likes it because it reminds him of his cowboy hat. That he should say this even though neither cowboy hats are in the picture is illustrative of his egocentricity. The painting is not being responded to appropriately and it is clear that the child's egocentric nature governs what he likes and why he likes it. Parsons' second example further illustrates this. The girl said she liked painting because "if she were to live in the farm in the picture, she would like it." (p. 310). Parsons interprets this reply as showing that the girl had projected herself into the picture and, like the boy of the earlier example, liked it because of a private and irrelevant association.

What would be a parallel stage one response to a literary work?
Let us discuss a response to Wordsworth's "The Solitary Reaper."

The Solitary Reaper

William Wordsworth (1770-1850)

Behold her, single in the field,
Yon solitary Highland Lass!
Reaping and singing by herself;
Stop here, or gently pass!
Alone she cuts and binds the grain,
And sings a melancholy strain;
O listen! for the Vale profound
Is overflowing with the sound.

No Nightingale did ever chaunt
More welcome notes to weary bands
Of travelers in some shady haunt,
Among Arabian sands:
A voice so thrilling ne'er was heard
In spring-time from the Cuckoo-bird,
Breaking the silence of the seas
Among the farthest Hebrides.

Will no one tell me what she sings?—
Perhaps the plaintive numbers flow
For old, unhappy, far-off things,
And battles long ago:
Or is it some more humble lay,
Familiar matter of today?
Some natural sorrow, loss, or pain,
That has been, and may be again?

Whate'er the theme, the Maiden sang
As if her song could have no ending;
I saw her singing at her work,
And o'er the sickle bending;—
I listened, motionless and still;
And, as I mounted up the hill,
The music in my heart I bore,
Long after it was heard no more.

Imagine a situation in which a child, who has pondered over this poem, says he likes it because it reminds him of his parents' house in the country. There is, of course, no description or even mention of a country house in the poem, so this response would appear to be on a par
with that of the child in Parsons' first example. In both cases, what
the child is reminded of, i.e. the image which is suggested to him by
the object perceived, is not depicted or described in the work, and
therefore, Parsons would add, it is irrelevant because the child's focus
is shifted from the work to some aspect of the child's private life. But
let us examine more closely what is happening here.

The child's association of the experience presented in the poem
with the house in the country may have been suggested by the opening lines
of the first verse, which set the girl alone in a field harvesting grain:

    Behold her, single in the field,
    Yon solitary Highland Lass!
    Reaping and singing by herself;
    Stop here, or gently pass!

Farming here might be associated in the child's mind with living in the
country and hence with a particular house in the country. Or perhaps
it is the overall effect of the girl's song that triggers off the child's
association. The last two lines of the first stanza invite the reader
(or listener) to imagine the entire valley "overflowing with the sound"
produced by the singer's voice. It is reasonable to maintain, therefore,
that the child's response is in part an imaginative entrance into the world
of the poem, the world in which the girl's song, described in the next
stanza as surpassing that of the Nightingale and the Cuckoo-bird in its
thrill and beauty, brings a feeling of new life and energy as one might
experience at the end of a vacation in the country. This would be consistent
with the reason the child gives for liking the poem - that it reminds him
of his house in the country, a house surrounded in his imagination by the
exquisite sounds of the countryside; sounds which in combination provide
music very like that to which the poet listened and remembered "Long after
it was heard no more." We can see that the child is here responding to
the poem as human expression and responding, to use Elliott's term, "from
within."

According to Parsons' theory the child who gives such a reason
for liking the poem has responded irrelevantly and therefore inappropriately
to the poem. He has allowed himself to be carried away by a personal and
private association and has not responded to the poem as a work of art.
But the 'world' of Wordsworth's poem invites the kind of association the
child makes and it may be that imaginal associations of this kind are just
what make the experience described in the poem more meaningful and poignant.
If the child can imaginatively relate to the song of the 'solitary reaper'
by way of the association with a house in the country and all that that
pleasant memory conveys, how much more effective will be the later impres­
sion of a sudden and permanent expansion of spirit which the last four
lines of the poem convey when the child has just experienced in imagination
both joy and comfort. I do not want to claim that all poetry can or should
be responded to in this way. But the experience of some poetry, certainly
of a lot of lyric poetry, gains by this kind of imaginal entrance into
the world of the poem. Wordsworth's poem may be said to have suggested
the child's imaginal association and provided an environment for it.

Now, what does all this amount to? The example we have been
discussing is one in which a plausible stage one response to a poem turns
out, on examination, to be, equally plausibly, part of an appropriate
aesthetic response to the poem. This seems to be contrary to Parsons' theory, for according to it a stage one response of this type is aesthetically confused and quite inappropriate. Responses at stages two and three show some advance towards aesthetic relevance but if is not until stage four that aesthetic response achieves complete relevance and objectivity. If, as I would like to maintain, we have no constructed a plausible stage one response that contradicts the theory, then we are forced to say one or other of two things. We could either say that, with some poetry, a stage one response is an appropriate aesthetic response, or that the stage theory as described and illustrated by Parsons does not apply "across the board" to literature. To say the former would amount to denying the normative assumption of the developmental thesis, i.e., that the response at stage one is aesthetically confused and that it is only at stage four that an aesthetic response can properly be described as appropriate. To say the latter would be to deny Parsons' contention that his stage theory accounts for development across the arts.

But suppose a defender of the Beardsley/Bouwsma position were to deny that the child's response to "The Solitary Reaper" (my example) was equivalent to Parsons' first example in which a five-and-a-half-year-old child said he liked Currier and Ives' Preparing for Market because it reminded him of his cowboy hat. The objector might maintain, for example, that while the response to Wordsworth's poem could be seen as a relevant imaginative entrance into the world of the poem, the response to Preparing for Market is a clear example of aesthetic irrelevance because the child is preoccupied by the image of his cowboy hat and his attention shifts
from aesthetic contemplation of the painting to a private and irrelevant association.

This objection needs to be considered very carefully. We might begin by examining Parsons' interpretation of the child's response to *Preparing for Market*. Parsons comments on the response thus:

> Of course, there are no cowboy hats in the picture, nor any cowboys. Presumably he was reminded of his hat by something in the picture, probably the horse; and it appears that what he was reminded of was quite as relevant and important a part of the experience as what he actually saw.

(Parsons, 1976, p. 309)

The underlined statement is crucial, for the distinction Parsons is anxious to maintain is between what is *there* in the painting as part of the given and the associations that the viewer brings with him to the work. A person who subscribed to this distinction would hold that in talking about the "given" one is talking about the phenomenal object, the work of art, while in talking about the associations one is talking about oneself or other things besides the work. Thus Parsons argues that the child's response to *Preparing for Market* is inadequate because he fails to make the important distinction between what is there in the picture and what he is reminded of and because the child regards what he is reminded of as an important part of the aesthetic experience, as important as what he actually sees.

I shall argue that the child's response to Currier and Ives' painting can, like the response to Wordsworth's poem considered above, be seen as a relevant imaginative entrance into the world of the painting which makes the picture more meaningful for the child.
Currier and Ives' *Preparing for Market* shows a detailed homely scene of farm life. The farmer in the foreground is in the act of handing a loaded basket from the cart to his wife whose hands are outstretched to receive it. There are two horses, one attached to the cart and the other standing idly by. Slightly to the left of the foreground a child looks on from the door of the house which is presumably their home. The painting induces the spectator to share in the peaceful character of the scene and the five and a half year old child's response can be seen as an imaginal entrance into the scene depicted and this child can accomplish without much difficulty. From within, the child sees himself sitting on one of the horses wearing his cowboy hat, a hat, incidentally, not unlike that worn by the farmer in the act of unloading the cart. It is quite likely that the child identifies with the farmer wearing his hat, though it is possible for a spectator to become imaginally involved in the world of the work without identifying with any character in it.

The child's response may be said to have been invited by the picture and is therefore perfectly appropriate. What he is reminded of while contemplating the scene depicted is an important part of the aesthetic experience because in responding he has enjoyed imaginally the experience of being in the farm where cowboys and cowboy hats have a place. He does not of course lose the sense of being an aesthetic spectator looking at a painting depicting a detailed scene of farm life. He does however adapt himself to the demands of the work and in doing so he follows Osborne's advice which I believe to be sound:

> In making contact with particular art works no single rule is more important than that
of flexibility and complete adaptability to the demands of each work.

( Osborne, 1970)

It is therefore not entirely correct to say, as Parsons does, that because a cowboy hat is not depicted in the picture the child's mind has wandered away from a contemplation of the picture to an irrelevant association. This view has a certain plausibility because we do sometimes fall into a daydream at a concert, for example, or even while staring at a painting in an art gallery, and begin to worry about the next day's business. Here it is wholly false because the child's mind, far from wandering away has through the power of his imagination entered into a right relation with the work and make the absent present. The same may be said of the girl in Parsons' second example. She said she liked the painting "because if she were to live in the farm she would like it" (Parsons, 1976, p. 310). The girl could say this only if she had entered imaginatively into one world of work and responded to its peaceful character. Some paintings clearly do call for this kind of imaginal experience which goes beyond the mere perception of what is depicted. The works of Corot are an obvious example and, as Elliott suggests, "It may be that persons of unready imagination simply do not get to the heart of the work, no matter how skilled they may be in perceptual discrimination" (Elliott, 1972).

Our discussion of stage one aesthetic responses has shown that children's responses to art are not significantly different from adults', or, to put it differently, stage one responses to art may be just as aesthetically adequate as stage four responses, depending on the particular
works being examined. One has, of course, to allow for the fact that children might find some works difficult because of their complexity or obscurity, or because of their vocabulary. Parsons, I would argue, had supposed the stage one responses he discussed to be examples of aesthetic irrelevance because he was too much influenced by an objectivist aesthetic. This aesthetic interprets aesthetic experience rather strictly on the model of inspecting and coming to know an object and, in its extreme form, is completely unsympathetic to the operations of Imagination which I have tried to describe in discussing Wordsworth's "The Solitary Reaper" and Parsons' stage one examples. In discussing this view Elliott writes:

> According to this view the aesthetic spectator is not called upon to imagine anything but simply to apprehend what is there to be seen. No one would deny that perception is an important end of aesthetic contemplation, but the presupposition that the only consummatory experiences of Art are strictly perceptual ones is challengeable...

> In its less extreme form the objectivist aesthetic does not maintain that Imagination has no place whatever in aesthetic contemplation, but it presupposes that the work is phenomenally objective: that is, whenever the work appears to us it appears as something "given" at the objective pole of consciousness, separated from the perceiving subject by an intentional space.

(Elliott, 1972, p. 99)

Because of this supposed "distance" between the phenomenal object of aesthetic perception and the experiencing subject Parsons finds it necessary to construct a theory that purports to explain in four stages "the way in which aesthetic qualities are conceived" by the experiencing subject. "The variable," he writes, "is the location as between persons and the object
of these qualities" (p. 309). In the guiding summary which he gives, Parsons describes how children (the experiencing subjects) conceive the aesthetic qualities of the object at each of the four stages.

The development then is seen as one of a gradual increase of the distance between the self and the object, so that the close relation between the self and object in stage one is transformed in stage four to the situation in which the self attains maximum distance from the object and aesthetic qualities are viewed "as qualities of the object itself." This developmental scheme clearly assumes that in an aesthetic experience the experiencing subject must always be separate from the object experienced. "But," as Elliott (1972) observes, "an experience can be an experience of an object without having a structure of this type, and an experience which does not have a structure of this type may yet be peculiarly appropriate to the object experienced." We have seen that in cases where imagination transports the individual from his world to the "world" of the work, the experiencer and the object experienced become part of a world in which it makes no sense to speak of the aesthetic object being entirely separate from the experiencing subject. These are not rare cases or exceptions. On the contrary, we are constantly urged by literary critics to try to enter imaginatively into the world of the literary work in order to acquire its most profound and valuable meaning. When we do this and succeed in becoming entirely involved in the work, or "spirited away" by it, we should remember that, on such occasions, the important thing is the quality and significance of the experience as a whole, not qualities of the work as a separate phenomenal object.
I have argued for the retention of the idea of expression in art because I believe this notion captures important aspects of the nature of art and of our response to it that are missed by the objectivist aesthetic theory, with its emphasis on the perception of phenomenally objective aesthetic qualities. I have also argued that attention to the expressive qualities of art exposes difficulties in the normative aspects of Parsons' stage-developmental sequence. I would now like to go over some of these difficulties briefly by way of summary.

In Chapter Two we saw that all four stages of Parsons' developmental scheme depend on what the objectivist aesthetic theory takes the notions of aesthetic object and aesthetic experience to be. In each of his developmental stages Parsons assumes that the work of art is composed of stable and unchanging objective qualities and that it is the child's relation to these that develops in an aesthetic encounter. The trouble with this assumption is not so much that it is wrong as that it underestimates the more fundamental importance of the experience of the work. An account of the aesthetic object must, as we have seen, include the reflexive experience of the subject. For Parsons this means that the work of art and the child's response to it should be taken together and not treated as forever separate. Once it is admitted that the child's response can be, and often is, central to an appropriate aesthetic response to the work, Parsons' stages would have to be restructured to reflect this. The concentration on examples from painting comes naturally as a result of the assumption that aesthetic response is response to the way the object appears; or as Parsons says "whatever is phenomenally available to the perception of any qualified observer" (1978, p. 85). But, as Meager
(1970) has observed, "once we leave the visual arts, the emphasis on 'phenomenological' qualities fits strangely on those aesthetic qualities we find of vital importance."

As we saw in Chapter Two, the development from stage one to four is seen as a gradual increase of the distance between the self and the object so that the close relation between the self and object in stage one is transformed in stage four to the situation in which the self attains maximum distance from the object and aesthetic qualities are seen as phenomenally objective qualities of the object, entirely separate from the self. We have discussed several examples that show that the self and the object do not always remain separate in an aesthetic experience. Indeed in the most consummatory aesthetic experiences the subject is completely transported into the world of the object and a state of rapture is often reported. This, I believe, is the magic which art never ceases to perform on the spectator willing to submit himself completely to the demands of the work of art, and is counted among the ultimate values. Parsons' developmental scheme, by assuming as it does the distance between the object experienced and the experiencing subject, encourages an unduly reverential attitude toward the work of art and this could lead to a suppression of the imagination.

The remarks which Elliott makes at the end of his "Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art" contains advice which I think ought to be kept in mind in all discussions of aesthetic experience, and so I quote them in full:
Our experience of art, like our religious or moral experience, has its own character but is not yet transparent to us. It is this, in all its variety and complexity and with all the problems it presents, that Aesthetics should exhibit and examine, not only for the sake of remaining in contact with ordinary lovers of art but in order that through Aesthetics we may attain a better understanding of ourselves. A version of aesthetic experience adapted in a comparatively simple manner to our intellectualist preferences is not an acceptable substitute.

(Elliott, 1967, p. 126)

I have, in the discussion of aesthetic response to expressive properties of art, suggested that in responding to a work of art as expression, one enters into a right relationship with the work, exploring in imagination the various suggestions contained in the work, feeling the emotion expressed as if it were one's own yet at the same time remaining aware of whose emotion it is. This suggests a relationship very much like that of friendship between persons. I want now to explore further what might be involved in this kind of personal relationship with a work of art, as a way of examining what we should be doing in education to ensure that in their encounters with art our pupils do justice to both the nature of art and the complexity of aesthetic experience.

If one were to list qualities that a relationship such as that of friendship between persons might call for, then perhaps some of the following will appear on such a list: patience, understanding, love, imagination, tolerance, knowledge, sympathy, honesty and sincerity. These qualities too are called for in a personal relationship with a work of art. Recall Wordsworth's reminder that "a poet is a man speaking to men." Read the poem, therefore, as though you were listening to a speaking voice,
the voice of a friend. Gradually a relationship will be established that will enlarge the experience and enhance the life of the reader as well as transforming the work of art itself. Thus there is need for patient regard in aesthetic contemplation. "What matters," writes Forster (1975), "is the accent of his voice, his song." That has to be caught and the only way to catch it is to read with patience, humility and imagination. Forster is discussing Dostoyevsky as an example of the supreme artist in his role as novelist, poet and "prophet." Unless we read him in this way we are likely to miss what is of most value in his work.

Dostoyevsky's characters ask us to share something deeper than their experiences. They convey to us a sensation that is partly physical - the sensation of sinking into a translucent globe and seeing our experience floating far above us on its surface, tiny, remote, yet ours. We have not ceased to be people, we have given nothing up, but 'the sea is in the fish and the fish is in the sea.'

(Forster, 1975, p. 138)

This brings out the kinds of features of aesthetic experience that are intimately connected with seeing the work as expression and responding accordingly. The reciprocity between the work of art and the lover of art should be seen as a creative process of great value which should be recognized in education. I am deliberately contrasting this approach and its value with that encouraged by the objectivist aesthetic theory with its emphasis on the use of analytical tools in discerning or investigating the "objective features" of a work of art.

Elliott (1972) urges us not to confuse aesthetic experience with analytical reasoning, and stresses the loving relationship with art
which should be emphasized in education. He writes:

Many philosophers of art tend to think of aesthetic experience as if it were a form of enquiry. The work is conceived as an object rather like a map, and the spectator as seeking to discern its objective aesthetic qualities, good or bad, in order to arrive at an overall judgment of its merit. Engagement with it is identified with critical contemplation and thought to be worthwhile in very much the same way as intellectual activities like history and pure science.

As we have seen, the impression is certainly given of a look-recognition theory of aesthetic experience by writers of the Beardsley/Bouwsma persuasion. It seems to me we must go beyond this objective approach and seek to achieve a relationship with a work of art which Elliott describes as that of the "lover of art." He writes:

For the lover the work is not objective in this way. Personal knowledge of the work is an aspect of his engagement with it, but his chief intention - or rather hope - is to enter into a relationship with the work which has the character of friendship... he will claim that shared experience is part of the value of art as it is part of the value of friendship, and that sometimes this sharing occurs at the level of his deepest concern. To achieve at this level a personal relationship which has almost the character of an identity seems to him a miracle the value of which he cannot properly express... There is a reciprocity between the lover and the work. If asked further concerning the value of art the lover will not think immediately of the actualization of mental powers or of enjoyment but will talk about the inspiration and perhaps the consolation he derives from art, and may say that some of the works which matter to him constitute or embody a criticism of his own personal mode of life.

(Elliott, 1972)
Something of this kind of value is intimated by H. S. Broudy's description of "enlightened cherishing" as "a love of objects and actions that by certain norms and standards, are worthy of our love" (Broudy, 1972, p. 6). Aesthetic education should be concerned with getting pupils to recognize the value and special nature of the aesthetic response and teachers of analytic disciplines as well as those of the arts should consider how easily and unwittingly they might come to discourage this. It may be that the kinds of distinctions and emphases made by the objectivist approach will ultimately put the aesthetic in danger, in our society, "withering like Blake's sick rose" (Gregor, 1972, p. 162). Witness Osborne's (1967) comments:

. . .It has frequently been remarked of recent years that the analytical habits of mind and the practical outlook fostered by our technological culture run counter to modes of awareness and attitudes of attention which are essential to appreciative commerce with the arts. This appears to be one reason why some of the most intelligent and highly educated persons today find themselves in adult life obtuse to the arts and without aptitude to appreciate them. The word they use is "understand."

It is my contention that an over-reliance on the approach intimated by the objectivist aesthetic theory would indeed lead to constant attempts to "understand" a work of art rather than to appreciate it. Already there exists a crop of educators who are merely interested in objectifying and measuring in art education, an approach which shows that they have really lost all contact with art. There is need to redress the balance by emphasizing again the expressive qualities of art. Such emphasis will achieve two things: do justice to the work of art and enable aesthetic
theory to remain in contact with ordinary lovers of art. In Chapter Five I shall summarize the various points of view I have discussed and draw together the ramifications they would likely have for aesthetic education.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO A WORK OF ART

5.1 Introduction
We have earlier discussed the importance of an emotional response to a work of art. This chapter concentrates on the narrower question of what it means to have an emotional response to a work of art and the kinds of implications this question might have for aesthetic education.

5.2 Considerations for Aesthetic Education
The discussion in this section and the next involves an attempt to answer the following general question: What difference in educational practice would result from the adoption of an expressionist view as compared with the adoption of the objectivist view? I have argued that the basic difference between the expressionist view and the objectivist view is that the expressionist view recognises and stresses the fact that works of art can express emotions. In our facilitation of aesthetic development, therefore, the expressionist would have us give an important place to the development of an understanding of how works of art do so.

If we also accept Elliott's view of how we ought to respond to certain works of art, then we will need to address the educational problems involved in developing appropriate emotional responses to works of art. In either case, educational practices will likely be different from what they would be if we follow the objectivist's view with its stress on recognition and its misunderstanding of the logic of expression. The programme of aesthetic education envisaged here then is one that gives central place
to the development of an emotional response to a work of art.

What is involved in an emotional response to a work of art? We should first note what it is to which a person responds emotionally. Here Sirceillo's analysis is relevant. Anthropomorphic predicates (including emotional terms), he argues, are sometimes applied to a work of art by virtue of something which the artist embodies in that work - an "artistic act". It is the presence of these artistic acts in works of art that makes those works on some occasions expressions of emotion. And when works of art express emotions an emotional response may well be appropriate. What the person then responds to is the emotion which the anthropomorphic predicate picks out. What constitutes the response? Here Elliott's (1967) remarks are helpful. The person responding feels the expressed emotion but "the emotion that I feel in experiencing a work of art from within (and that which I feel as another person's in real life) may be present in me without being predicable of me." The emotion, he goes on,

is present in me because I do not merely recognize that the poet is expressing, for example, sadness, but actually feel this sadness; yet the emotion I feel is not predicable of me, i.e., it would be false to say that I am sad or even, unqualifiedly, that I feel sad. (p. 113)

This account of emotional response to a work of art is clearly similar to emotionally empathizing with a person in real life. You may feel the other person's emotion as you feel that expressed in a work of art but at the same time you remain aware of whose emotion it is.

We may note here that not all aesthetic responses are
emotional responses. I am concerned here only with cases where the appropriate and adequate response is also an emotional response. How would one go about getting people to respond in this way? To answer this question we should first note that emotional responses logically depend upon seeing. You can't respond to what you can't see, so our first task is to get people to see correctly. Sibley (1962) writes: "It is with an ability to notice or see or tell that things have certain qualities that I am concerned" (p. 45). With this I agree, but how does one get people to "see" or "notice" or "tell" correctly?

The first thing to be said is that terms like "seeing", "noticing", etc. do not describe skills. You cannot practise seeing or noticing. These terms express what White (1967) calls "reception concepts". They pick out receptions or upshots, things which result from, but are not themselves exercises of, our abilities and skills. In a sense they happen to us as a result of abilities we have and use. Daniels and Parkinson (1976) have a useful discussion of reception concepts under the general heading of "The Logic of Empathy concepts". They write:

> Reception verbs ... differ from achievement verbs since receptions cannot be, while achievements can be, the "objective of a task." It makes sense to say that we are trying to discover, to cure, or to win. It is very odd to say that we are trying to notice, realise, or become aware of something.

(p. 335)

This being so we cannot teach people by having them practise seeing or noticing certain qualities in, or properties of, works of art. We can only orient them or get them to orient themselves in such a way that they come
to see or notice these qualities. The orienting might take the form of providing the person with the concepts that will enable him to see qualities, or it might take the form of repeatedly pointing out certain features of a work until the person comes to see or realize them.

The logical features of these reception concepts also hold for concepts which pick out emotional responses. They too are upshots produced by our perceptions of things. Recent philosophical analyses of emotion concepts (see, for example, Dearden et al., 1972) have made us aware of the fact that emotions usually have objects. For example, my anger is anger at X, my fear, fear of Y and my envy is envy of Z. Besides having objects, emotions involve what Peters calls 'appraisals.' "These are constituted by seeing situations under aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable, beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions" (Peters, 1970). So once again the appropriate pedagogy is that of orienting. One can only bring about the response by getting the person oriented appropriately. One's particular emotional response to a work of art is a product of how one sees the work or certain features of the work and this in turn depends on factors such as one's knowledge, education or aesthetic sensitivity. Sensitivity, of course, can be developed. A teacher can get pupils to be inclined to notice certain things in a work of art and respond appropriately to them.

In discussing the quotation from Elliott above, about the content of our emotional response to a work, I mentioned the close similarity between responding emotionally to a work of art and empathizing with another person in real life. In fact there are cases in which our
response to a work of art is quite literally empathic. I am thinking of those cases in literature when part of our total emotional response to a work is a response to a particular character's emotion, say Othello's grief. We can empathize with Othello, that is, feel jealousy on his behalf and see and feel Desdemona's behaviour as suspicious through Othello's eyes, etc. When we empathize in this way with a fictional character, what we do is no different from what we do when we empathize with a real person. This is a way of saying that empathic understanding is an important requirement for appropriate and adequate emotional responses to some works of art. The educator who is concerned with appropriate emotional responses to works of art must be prepared to get his pupils to cultivate empathic understanding and its necessary ingredient, imagination. But again empathy is not the sort of thing one can practise. As Daniels and Parkinson (1976) note, "Neither 'having empathy' nor 'being empathic' ...... suggest that the empathic person does anything. Empathy is a 'passive' phenomenon - i.e. we don't do empathizing; rather, empathizing happens to us or we become empathic" (p. 334). We can't therefore directly teach someone to empathize, nor can we teach him to "imaginatively enter" the world of a work of art. What we can do is help students to orient themselves to allow upshots like empathy and "imaginative entrance" into the world of a work to occur.

Imagination of course plays a supremely important role in the experience of art. It enables a spectator to experience a work most powerfully and vividly. And, as Warnock (1976) has argued, imagination enters into our perception of the ordinary world and enables us to interpret it
in one way rather than another. Its role in our experience of art is illustrated by Elliott (1973) in his discussion of our experience of Grunewald's The Buffeting (or the Mocking of Christ). The picture, he argues,

induces the spectator to identify with the only powerfully active character in it, a soldier whose fist is raised in the act of striking Christ. Imaginarily the spectator-participant has already gathered up his force and is ahead of himself at the moment of impact. Now there is nothing to stop the blow from descending, since in so far as he is experiencing the movement from within it is no longer something which he can be aware of only through sight. The experience is a momentary one. It is as if I were in the world of the picture, in the place of the striking soldier delivering a blow at the Christ, whom I see from my ordinary spectatorial standpoint. But although in the place of the soldier, I am not performing the action on his behalf. The satisfaction that I feel is not his but my own. From within, it is as if I had been substituted for him, and am behaving like him; but from without I still see the soldier with his fist upraised. Imagination has no difficulty in accomplishing a powerful synthesis of these two aspects of the experience: the inner one in which I am the striker and go through with the blow; the outer one in which the striker is a soldier and the movement is frozen in an instant.

It is obvious from this description that the spectator's imagination invests the work with a power and immediacy it would not otherwise have, and the spectator can thus achieve what Leavis describes as "a complete realisation" of the work.

How can the educator bring about imagined responses of this kind
that seem to be required by some works of art? As mentioned above, he
can't directly teach people to "imaginatively enter" the world of the
work in the way described by Elliott. What he can do is expose pupils
to particular works of art and keep drawing attention to features which,
when seen, are likely to lead to the occurrence of the kind of imaginal
entrance described above.

What I have discussed so far in this section are the kinds of
considerations that a programme of aesthetic education aimed at bringing
about the kinds of aesthetic response the expressionist envisages would
have to take into account. What makes these educational considerations
different from the kinds that an objectivist would take into account? The
main difference lies in what I have called an "emotional response" to a
work of art and teaching aimed at bringing this about. The objectivist
would no doubt emphasize correct seeing, noticing, etc. of the objective
features of the work. In so far as these are features other than those
picked out by anthropomorphic predicates, the educational practices of
the objectivist and the expressionist would be the same. But when it
comes to those features picked out by anthropomorphic predicates the
educational practices of the two positions would differ considerably be-
cause of the different attitudes to the logic and significance of these
emotional predicates. The objectivist maintains that these predicates
apply to art in only one way, namely, they describe objective qualities of
the work and all the spectator has to do in an aesthetic experience of the
work is recognize these qualities. It follows from this that teaching
should simply be aimed at getting people to "see" or "recognize" certain
features. The expressionist, while agreeing that emotional predicates
do apply to some works of art in the way the objectivist says they do, insists that there are other cases - perhaps a lot more - in which the predicates function to draw our attention to the fact that the works are expressions of various forms of human emotion. And he will then add that when a work is perceived as an expression of emotion it can be responded to emotionally. This kind of emotional response is clearly different from what the objectivist position would allow and requires the kinds of pedagogical considerations I have dealt with in this section.

5.3 The emotions of the aesthetic experiences

There is, however, a related but distinguishable aspect to aesthetic education which involves the emotions of the aesthetic experiencer. As Peters (1970) notes, "Emotions have in common the fact that they involve appraisals elicited by external conditions which are of concern to us or by things which we have brought about or suffered" (Peters, 1970). They thus involve an evaluative element. We can, therefore, talk about the correctness or reasonableness of an appraisal and consequently of having this or that emotion. Emotions can have adequate or inadequate grounds, be justified or absurd. As a result they may be educable.

Such education will be concerned, for a start, with bringing about appropriate appraisals. It will also be concerned with "ousting vague and imprecise or crude emotions by more specific, appropriate and discriminating ones; with preventing emotion-experience from stagnating - replacing jaded and repetitive habit-emotions with fresh and keen emotions, coupled logically to new individualized ways of seeing" (Hepburn, 1972).
Leavis's talk about the "scrupulous use of intelligence" in achieving a "concrete realisation" of a work, if practised, ought to affect the way a person makes appraisals and the kinds of appraisals that he makes. It should also contribute to the freshness and particularity of a reader's emotions. Professor Hepburn (Hepburn, 1972) quotes the following well-known passage from Anna Karenina (pt. VII, Ch. 16) where Levin expresses his emotion at seeing his new born child for the first time:

What he felt towards this little creature was utterly unlike what he had expected. There was nothing cheerful and joyous in the feeling; on the contrary, it was a new torture of apprehension. It was the consciousness of a new sphere of liability to pain. And this sense was so painful at first, .... that it prevented him from noticing the strange thrill of senseless joy and even pride that he had felt when the baby sneezed.

Hepburn then comments:

How can the reading of a passage like this be emotionally educative? Because emotion is being made the object of a sensitive, attentive study in its own right - not simply being lived through unreflectively: not classified in the rough and distorting way our normal practical, utilitarian interests encourage. Most of all, the individuality, unexpectedness and intricacy of emotion are not denied, in the way the generalizing cliches of everyday life deny them and reduce them to greeting-card emotion-stereotypes.

(Hepburn, 1972, p. 486)

A writer need not, of course, name the emotions in the way Tolstoy does in the above passage. Shakespeare often achieves great precision in expressing a particular emotion without naming it. The expressed emotion
is sometimes related to a particular and precise way of seeing, the appreciation of which enlarges our own emotional dimension. We therefore talk about literature being creative of new emotions by eliciting a new way of seeing, a way that is logically inseparable from a way of feeling. "A work of art", Hepburn writes, "is not constructed for the titillation of feelings we already have known, but for the enlargement of our emotional experience" (Hepburn, 1972, p. 486). Here we have, I think, a rough way of distinguishing literature from, say, pornography. The pornographic work endlessly offers the reader the same stimuli, the same contortions and fantasies and thus prevents him from experiencing any new feeling as well as largely depriving him of the use of his imagination in a fresh, creative way. The literary work, by contrast, engages the reader in a creative process that adds a new element to his emotional life.

As well as enriching his emotional life, literature often makes it possible for a reader to experience quite precise emotional responses to situations that would normally be too complex for him to apprehend in real life, and about which he would therefore have confused and anxious emotions.

This emphasis on the freshness, particularity and precision of emotion which a proper teaching of, and a response to, literature encourages, has relevance in a person's moral life. Questions of honesty and sincerity in an individual's private and public life are affected by the kind of understanding he has of his own emotions and those of the people he deals with. A response to literature may perhaps undermine the reader's reliance on the emotion-cliches generated by the popular
culture of his day, and so increase his emotional freedom. "An aesthetic education", Hepburn writes, "is an introduction to countless alternative possibilities for feeling: the options are shown to be immeasurably more diversified than the cliches allow" (Hepburn, 1972, p. 488). Steiner puts the matter starkly when he writes: "It is a matter of seriousness and emotional risk, a recognition that the teaching of literature, if it can be done at all, is an extraordinarily complex and dangerous business, of knowing that one takes in hand the quick of another human being" (Steiner, 1967). To the extent that Steiner and others are right, Leavis is correct to emphasize, as he does, the emotional importance of literature and the kind of response that this demands.
CHAPTER SIX
TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION

6.1 Introduction
This concluding chapter summarizes the major questions dealt with in the thesis with regard to Parsons, objectivism and expression theory. It also reviews the educational considerations discussed earlier.

6.2 Parsons and Objectivism
The two major lines of inquiry which have been pursued in this study concern theoretical aspects of Parsons' developmental thesis and educational issues raised by various aspects of his theory. In this section I shall concern myself with the conclusions arrived at in the discussion of the theoretical aspects of Parsons' thesis. As we noted in Chapter One, much research in the area of aesthetic development has concentrated on children's developing abilities to produce arts, that is, on children as they create or attempt to create works of art rather than as they respond to them. Parsons, we noted, is the first to outline a developmental theory of aesthetic experience that concentrates on the child as he responds to works of art rather than as he creates them. His theory suggests a four-stage developmental sequence "somewhat parallel to the work of Kohlberg on the development of the moral judgements of children" (Parsons, 1976, p. 305). The sequence begins with the child's undifferentiated, egocentric response to works of art, which Parsons describes as "confusedly aesthetic", and ends when the child becomes completely decentered and is able to locate aesthetic qualities in the object itself. The movement
from stage one to stage four is thus a gradual separation of the child from the object of his awareness or a distancing of the self from the object, with the result that at stage four the child attains maximum distance from the aesthetic object and is able to view it objectively, that is, see the aesthetic qualities as objective qualities of the work. What changes in this sequence of development, Parsons argues, is the child's sense of aesthetic relevance. From the stage (stage one) in which he is unable to distinguish between what is relevant or irrelevant in his aesthetic experience the child acquires, in a gradual manner, an increasing sense of relevance which structures his experience into qualitatively different stages and determines what he responds to in the aesthetic object at each stage.

We saw that both in his conception of development and in his view of the end state to which the development leads, Parsons relies on an objectivist aesthetic. Indeed he says so himself, as we saw earlier. Parsons thus accepts the account of aesthetic experience given by "Beardsley and his followers" - the objectivists - as a satisfactory account of the most advanced stage of the development of aesthetic experience. This account of aesthetic experience therefore forms the goal of aesthetic development as he sees it, and hence of aesthetic education. This norm can of course be assessed independently as a desirable end state whether or not the developmental portion of Parsons' hypothesis is defensible. The norm, however, determines what constitutes development at each stage.

I argued that the objectivist aesthetic theory is right in drawing attention to objective features of a work of art. However in its
assumption that emotional qualities of works of art are objective in the same way as simple qualities like "red" and in its characterisation aesthetic response as "recognising" these emotional qualities, the objectivist aesthetic theory:

1. gives a distorted view of the nature of art;
2. misconstrues the logic of expression in art;
3. fails to do justice to the power and complexity of our emotional response to art, and thus
4. underplays the role of the aesthetic experiencer in the appreciation and evaluation of works of art.

I maintained that because it does these things it offers an inadequate account of the goal of aesthetic development and thus incomplete goals for aesthetic education. We may, therefore, find certain elements in Parsons' hypothesis dubious, or at least in need of reconsideration and expansion. In particular, the objectivist notion of what is relevant in an aesthetic experience excludes much that would contribute to a more heightened, intense and therefore more adequate response to a work of art. In emphasizing the objective features of the work of art that must be perceived in an aesthetic experience, however, the objectivist position draws attention to the fact that the relevant features of the work of art are in the work. I believe this to be true and important. But the dismissal of the idea that works of art can express emotions, and all that that idea entails, leaves the objectivist account - and Parsons' norm - vulnerable to the charge of misrepresenting the nature of art and aesthetic experience. The objectivist position and Parsons' norm clearly need to be revised or modified in such a way as to include the sorts of things emphasized by Expression Theory.
6.3 Expression Theory

In the discussion of Expression Theory I dealt with the arguments of two writers - Sircello and Elliott - who approach the problem of expression in art in two different ways but whose accounts can be seen as complementary. Both writers assert that works of art can express emotions. Sircello deals with the logic of expression and gives an account of how works of art bear anthropomorphic predicates and, in so doing, function to express emotions. Elliott is more interested in analyzing how we respond, or ought to respond, to expressive works of art. Both writers reject the objectivist account of expression, Sircello pointing out that the account "ignores complexities in works of art which are essential in understanding how they can bear anthropomorphic predicates" (1971, p. 311), and thus how they can sometimes express various forms of human emotions, while Elliott insists that the objectivist account ignores the fact that "some works of art are capable of being experienced as if they were human expression and that we do not experience expression exactly as we perceive objects or ordinary objective qualities", (1967, p. 112). Elliott's positive account of experiencing a work of art (e.g., a lyric poem) as expression, that is, experiencing it "from within" includes:

1. an imaginative entrance into the world of the poem in which the reader places himself in the poet's situation "and experiences the poet's expression and the emotion expressed from the place of the expressing subject";
2. feeling the expressed emotion, as it were, on the poet's behalf, (This appears to be similar to empathizing with another person's emotional state in real life);
3. remaining conscious of the fact that the expressed emotion is the poet's and not one's
own, hence "the emotion that I feel .......
may be present in me without being predicable
of me."

Experiencing the poem "from within" thus brings the reader so close to
the imagined poet's situation that it sometimes appears as if "the poet
were speaking with the reader's voice". This comes close to Leavis's
insistence that "we can have the poem only by an inner kind of possession",
(1941, p. 309), a statement that suggests an imaginative and emotional
involvement in the effort to realise to the full the experience given
in the words of the poem.

Elliott accepts the fact that for some works of art the kind
of experience which the objectivists characterize as "perceiving objective
qualities" or "recognising emotional qualities" would probably be adequate,
but he insists that this kind of response would be both inappropriate and
inadequate for some works of art. These works, he argues, demand the kind
of response which he characterizes as response "from within" if we are to
appreciate their full imaginative and emotional power. Once again there
is a connection between this and Leavis's recommendation that the reader
"feel into" the emotional situation depicted in the poem in order to
achieve a "complete realisation" of the poem.

How does one know when the work of art demands this kind of
response? This is the same question as asking how one knows when the
work of art is, or functions as, an expression of emotion. One attends
to what is there in the work, the language and style of the poem and the
treatment of its subject, the lines and colour of the painting and the
treatment of its subject, etc. Sircello writes:
One knows by looking at Poussin's painting that he has painted the scene in an aloof, detached way. The cold light, the statuesque poses, the painstaking linearity are all visible in the work. Similarly, we recognize by reading Wordsworth's poem that he treats his subject sentimentally. That is just what it is to give the child, who believes that the dead are present among the living, the advantage over her matter-of-fact interlocution .......

A test for statements describing art in anthropomorphic terms is always, and quite naturally, to scrutinize the art, even when the terms are applied in virtue of "artistic acts".

Leavis's critical practice, as we have seen, shows him, in Sircello's terms, "scrutinizing the art" - in his case Literature - and modifying his response and ours accordingly.

The connection between Sircello, Elliott and Leavis can perhaps be stated thus: All three are expressionists. Sircello tries to show how it is that works of art can express emotions; Elliott tries to describe how we ought to respond to those works that express emotions; and Leavis shows how, in practice, a critic actually responds to the expressed emotion in a poem.

The expressionist position which Sircello and Elliott in their different ways argue for and which is exemplified in Leavis's critical practice suggests a different "end state" from that which Parsons envisages in his developmental sequence. The Parsons - Beardsley objectivist "end state," while useful in directing attention to what is there to be seen in works of art, fails, as we have seen, to do justice either to the nature of art or to aesthetic experience. The expressionist "end state", on the other hand, stresses the fact that works of art can function to
express various forms of the inner lives of human beings and suggests that this fact is often the most important feature of the art. When works of art function as expressions of emotion they demand a different kind of response from that suggested by the Parsons - Beardsley objectivist "end state". The Sircello-Elliott-Leavis expressionist "end state," while stressing this expressive function of art and our emotional response to it, also directs attention to what is there to be seen in works of art - only adding that "what is there to be seen" includes expressive properties to which the kind of response advocated by Elliott and fostered by Leavis's critical practice is appropriate. The expressionist "end state" therefore suggests a different goal for aesthetic education, one that stresses the importance of the role of emotion in the experience of art. Let us now bring together and review some of the educational ramifications of what has been put forward here.

6.4 Review of Educational Considerations

In chapter one I discussed, as background to Parsons' developmental theory, two opposing views of aesthetic education, held by the progressives and the new curriculum movement, respectively. The progressives, it was pointed out, see art as something which the child naturally produces and place their educational emphasis on getting the child to make art. They thus encourage the development of the child as an artist. The new curriculum movement, by contrast, stresses that there is a cognitive core to art which must be emphasized in teaching, thus encouraging the development of the child as "critic" or responded to art.
It was pointed out that these two views of aesthetic education were reflected in developmental studies of children's abilities as artists and critics and that many more studies had focussed on the development of children as artists than on their development as critics. Parsons' theory was then introduced as one that concentrates on the child as he responds to works of art and thus invites the educator to gear his teaching towards developing the child's understanding and appreciation of art. But it was pointed out that specific teaching strategies would have to await the confirmation of certain aspects of Parsons' developmental hypothesis. For instance, Parsons argues that the child's sense of aesthetic relevance changes as he develops so that some things judged by the child to be irrelevant at an earlier stage may later be seen by him to be important and relevant while others considered relevant at an earlier stage may later be seen to be irrelevant.

If this is so, teachers of the arts would have to organise their teaching methods and the contents of what they teach in such a way as to appeal to the child at a particular stage in the development of his sense of aesthetic relevance. The stage of the child should influence the choice of teaching material and influence the teacher's expectations of his pupils. Also the fact that the subject-matter of art appeals differently to pupils at different developmental stages would affect when and how the teacher introduces works of art that deal with certain kinds of subjects. Finally, it was observed that the proper matching of teaching content with developmental stage might solve problems encountered in the teaching of literature, such as inadequate
response to, and lack of love for, the literary work.

I also discussed the influence of the objectivist position on the current practice of art education in the schools. This is seen in appreciation classes where attention is constantly directed to the objective features of the work of art. The child's response is related to and justified by, the whole or part of the perceptual object. I questioned whether this approach might not discourage the use of imagination in the experience of art. The child is asked to concentrate on, and respond to, what he can see in the work not what the work leads him to imagine. This, it seems to me probably does less than justice to the suggestive power of complex works of art and their ability to carry the reader beyond the world of immediate experience. The point about this is that there are aspects of a work of art, which do not fit into the category of the simple phenomenally objective but which are nevertheless important and have to be experienced for the work to be truly appreciated. And there are other aspects, the existence of which the objectivist position explicitly denies, which demand a different response from that which is suggested by this approach. The teacher of the arts has somehow to alert his pupils to both of these while pointing out the phenomenally objective features of art.

I argued that aesthetic education should concentrate on developing in pupils a particular kind of relationship with a work of art, a relationship very much like that of friendship between persons. This I feel is implied by the expressionist position, especially by Elliott's suggestion that, in responding to some works of art, one enters into a
right relationship with the work, exploring in imagination the various suggestions contained in the work, feeling the emotion expressed as if it were one's own. I characterized this kind of relationship with a work of art as that of the "lover of art" and contrasted it with that encouraged by the objectivist aesthetic theory; with its emphasis on perceiving objective features and "recognising emotional qualities", an approach which leads to attempts to "understand" a work rather than to appreciate it. I suggested that the reciprocity between the work of art and the lover of art should be seen as of great value and that this should be recognised in aesthetic education. Aesthetic education, I suggested, should be concerned with getting pupils to recognise the value and special nature of the aesthetic response and to see it as endangered by an exclusive interest in objectifying and analyzing. Finally I suggested that if the expressive qualities of art are emphasized in teaching, such emphasis will do justice to the work of art and enable aesthetic theory to remain in contact, with the full range of possibilities embodied in works of art.

In Chapter Four I compared Parsons' cognitive-developmental theory with those of Piaget and Kohlberg and suggested that one of the similarities between Parsons' theory and Kohlberg's was that both would probably want the educator to adopt such means as would accelerate the development through the stages so that Kohlberg's individual would advance rapidly from the pre-conventional stages of morality to the principled stages when he becomes an autonomous moral agent, and Parsons' would rapidly become decentered and get to the point when his aesthetic
judgement is based on objective features of the work of art rather than on some more egocentric relation. The point about this is that for Kohlberg the individual is not truly a moral agent until he gets to the principled stage of morality, and for Parsons the individual does not engage in a proper aesthetic experience of a work of art until he gets to the stage (stage four) when he can "locate aesthetic qualities, firmly in the aesthetic object itself". Whether or not one wants to try to accelerate development it seems to me that Parsons' theory requires that special care be exercised in the selection of works of art so that the child is not questioned about works that are far above his level of comprehension or that treat subjects with which he is emotionally ill-equipped to deal. It is important, too, to remember Piaget's discovery that the child differs from the adult in his approaches to reality, in his views of the world, and in his use of language. This imposes on the educator the need to make a special effort to understand the unique properties of the child's experience and ways of thinking, either generally or as they are manifested in particular areas such as the moral realm (Kohlberg) and the aesthetic realm (Parsons). In the aesthetic realm it is necessary for the educator to distinguish between the developing child artist and the developing "critic" so that he can find teaching strategies that will cater to these different possibilities.

6.5 Conclusion

We have also seen Leavis's stress on emotional expression in literature. This stress calls for changes in certain aspects of Parsons'
theory, in particular, his conception of mature aesthetic response. The emphasis on the expressive qualities of art requires that in addition to "seeing" of the features the objectivist stresses, the student should learn to see what Siricello calls "artistic acts" and respond appropriately to such works of art. That means bringing about a kind of involvement with works of art which the objectivist overlooks.

Apart from the fact that the kind of response which some works of art elicit shows that the expressionist is clearly right, we want our experience of art to somehow go beyond what is immediately presented to the senses. I cannot put this more succinctly, but Warnock's (1976) remarks at the conclusion of her *Imagination* capture what I mean. She writes about

> The belief that there is more in our experience of the world than can possibly meet the unreflecting eye, ..... this kind of belief may be referred to as the feeling of infinity. It is a sense (rather than an item in a creed) that there is always more to experience, and more in what we experience than we can predict. Without some such sense, even at the quite human level of there being something which deeply absorbs our interest, human life becomes perhaps not actually futile or pointless, but experienced as if it were. It becomes, that is to say, boring.

(Warnock, 1976, p. 202-203)

Aesthetic education, it seems to me, should give people the opportunity of never being, in this sense, bored by works of art.
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