POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY
IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSES OF
THE NEW STATES

by

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ABSTRACT

The emergence since World War II of many new states in Asia and Africa has stimulated a renewed interest of sociology and political science in the non-western social and political process and an enhanced concern with the problem of political development in these areas.

The source of contemporary concepts of political development can be located in the ideas of the social philosophers of the nineteenth century. Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, and Weber were the first social observers to deal with the phenomena of social and political development in a rigorously analytical manner and their analyses provided contemporary political development theorists with seminal ideas that led to the identification of the major properties of the developed political condition. But the "before-and-after" models of these social philosophers were essentially static and did not explain the movement of societies from a condition of political "backwardness" to one of political development. Accounts of various paths to political development were sought in evolutionary and diffusionary theories of social change.

In addition to formulating various conceptualizations of political development, both as a condition and as a process, contemporary theorists have attempted to discern possible
instruments of political development in the new states. Among those identified were elites, ideologies, parties and groups. The capacity of such instruments to effect political development in the new states has been the subject of considerable discussion and debate among theorists. While such instruments may aid in the acquisition of political modernity in the new states, effective and enduring political development appears to require a fundamental human transformation. Such a transformation encompasses two conjoint developments: a fundamental alteration in the political status of individuals in society that is summed up in the concept of citizenship; and a fundamental change in the social and psychological attributes of individuals involving their acquisition of a sense of political effectiveness and a capacity to associate and cooperate in the pursuit of common political goals.

The discussion reveals that political development theory constitutes a fusion of the sociological and philosophical dimensions of political analysis. This property of contemporary political development theory places it in the tradition of classical social and political thought.
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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF THE QUEST

Unless the study of politics generates and is guided by broad, bold, even if highly vulnerable general theories, it is headed for the ultimate disaster of triviality.

Robert Dahl

The dominant characteristic of the contemporary non-western and underdeveloped world can be summed up by the word "change" -- change in the attitudes, values, and beliefs of an ever-increasing proportion of the inhabitants of these areas; change in their behavior which involves breakdowns in traditional and age-old patterns of social relationships with the emergence and formation of new social roles; and change in the structures and institutions within which social interaction takes place. The veneration of the past and the acceptance of the status quo as the best possible solution to the problems confronting men are giving way to new expectations about the possibilities contained within the future. Spiritual solutions to the dilemmas of social life are being supplanted by secular utopias; the future and its promises are eagerly awaited. Villages are being supplemented by the modern city and people are becoming mobile, both socially and geographically. Traditional authority structures -- the extended family and its headmen, the village and its elders, the tribe and its chieftains -- are weakening with the assault of new forms of political organization such as the political party, new ruling elites, and new ideologies that define a larger social collectivity, the nation.
The nation-state has emerged as the new source of pomp, splendor, and power designed to encompass and subordinate all other sources of legitimate authority.

I

The politics of the developing areas is a "politics of change". It is a politics of change in at least two respects: it is an involvement of the political system with an attempt to change the form and content of the economies and societies of these areas and it is a change in the political system itself. Some elaboration on this distinction is necessary. To speak of a politics of change in the first sense implies a relationship between the political system and the larger social system; in this view the dependent variable is the society and its changes, while the independent variable is the political system and the matter of concern is the impact of the latter on the former. Such studies of political change have usually been couched in the phraseology of "nation-building" focusing on the creation of national societies, national integration, and political unification. To speak of a politics of change in the second sense is to regard the political system as the dependent variable and to analyze the manner in which it is changing and the internal and external forces that are contributing to its transformation. Such studies of political change have focused on the "state" or "political system" rather than the nation. This essay will concern itself with the politics of change in both these senses but the emphasis will be on the latter. That is, we will concern ourselves with political aspects of change in national societies but we will be even more
concerned with the changes in the political subsystems of such societies.

What are we to understand by the word "change"? While it is often useful to speak of change by comparing what was (tradition) with what is becoming (transition) and with what will be (developed, modern), the opposite of change is not the ancient or traditional but rather the notion of permanence or persistence. What has characterized the peasant communities and tribal societies of the non-western world for past millennia and what characterizes many of them still is the persistence of their governance by received tradition; the application of tried and tested past solutions to present problems of social, economic, and political life. Since the governance of received tradition persists in the form of social values, behavioral norms, and social structures, change may be seen to involve alterations in these. While all societies are characterized by both continuity and change — one sociologist writes that a "major task" of social science is to discover the relationships between the two processes — the degree of change in the developing areas appears to be greater than in developed nations. What distinguishes western societies is their "institutionalization" of change by means of a highly differentiated, rational, and efficient social structure; a relatively optimistic value system; and individuals who can perform the great variety of complex


roles that a modern society requires. Most traditional societies, on the other hand, have institutionalized continuity and the persistence of customary practices. In this view social change is a process involving alterations in the value system, change in social structures and institutions, and behavioral changes in the social roles of individuals. "Political" change then becomes a process of alteration in the political values, political structures and institutions, and political behavior of individuals. However, it is important not to think of political change as simply the addition of new values, structures, and roles; rather, as Kilson points out "...the process of political change involves its own set of inter-related norms, institutions, and procedures." Thus, old institutions, patterns of behavior, and values may be capable of adapting to the demands of social and political change.

In discussing social and political change and in contrasting it with continuity a further distinction is required—that between changes within a system and system changes. When we speak of social change in the context of most modern western political systems what is usually referred to are alterations in some attitudes, changes in public policy, and structural changes such as the formation of new administrative agencies and the growth of the bureaucracy—as has been the case with the development of the welfare state—or the emergence of new political movements and parties. What usually does

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not happen in modern western political systems is the destruc-
tion of political institutions, the major symbols and
offices of these institutions, and their legitimacy. Per-
sonnel and policies change but not the system of government
itself. In the developing areas, in contrast, the intrusion
of western colonial powers in some cases destroyed and in
many cases altered the nature of traditional political struc-
tures out of all recognition; destroyed or reduced the author-
ity of traditional rulers; and enveloped the traditional
societies within an administrative colonial state possessing
its own symbols and legitimacy. "Thus," writes Kilson refer-
ing to Africa "...the establishment of a colonial state is
the beginning of ...political change, and the proper analysis
of African political change must accordingly commence here."

In both Asia and Africa, but especially in the latter, the in-
trusion of western colonialism established an entirely new
political system based upon the power of the colonial state.

The inheritance of the colonial state by the nationalist
intellectual elites and their attempt to utilize it in the
construction of viable nations and in the development of
modern societies and economies has again been the occasion
of major political system change. More than offices and per-
sonnel changed, the bases of legitimate authority and the sup-
porting symbols were also altered. It is for these reasons
that it is possible to speak of a "political of change" in the

new states. Political change in these societies satisfies the definition given to it by Easton as

...a fundamental transformation in a political system when support has shifted from one set of authorities to a different set, in which the organization, solidary symbols (that is, symbols validating and defining limits of power), and central characteristics with regard to the way in which power is used have all undergone change. Once support begins to shift away from these aspects of authority, which I shall call collectively the structure of authority, the systems will be said to be in a process of change. 6

II

Models premised upon an assumption of the permanence and persistence of political forms were of limited utility when applied to the study of non-western societies characterized by rapid social and political change. Political scientists made this discovery following World War II when the great colonial empires began to weaken and break apart followed by the emergence of a large number of new states that exhibited unusual permutations and combinations of western norms and values and curious mixtures of western ideas and institutions woven into the fabric of traditional cultures and social structures. Armed only with concepts that were rooted in western political practices, political scientists soon discovered that new approaches to the study of politics in such societies were required.

There was a body of knowledge about the old societies of Asia and Africa that political scientists could draw upon.

In the first place, there was a substantial amount of information, primarily of an historical nature, collected by area specialists in Asian and African studies. A significant proportion of this was the work of colonial historians who had sought to document the colonial expansion of the western powers. This was supplemented by the accumulated insights and knowledge of fifty years of anthropological research into the tribal societies of Africa and the Pacific Islands, and the village communities of Asia. While the accumulated data of area specialists and colonial historians were valuable for their descriptions of non-western societies and their documentation of colonialism, the body of anthropological knowledge was not only descriptive but contained systematic propositions and general explanations about simple societies and their transformations.

Area studies, anthropological, and political science knowledge were mixed together in the literature of political development and nation-building. Some political scientists deliberately set out to familiarize themselves with the historical data provided by area specialists and colonial historians and with the concepts and theories of anthropologists, combining and synthesizing these sources of knowledge with their own political science training. In other cases, interdisciplinary study groups and institutes developed, bringing together interested scholars from several

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7 However, anthropological studies of social and/or cultural change during the colonial period emphasized the durability or persistence of these societies — the orientation was to explain why change was difficult.

8 The work by David Apter and James S. Coleman are cases in point.
social scientific fields for the purposes of discussion and research.

Within American political science the new interest in the politics of the developing areas was accompanied by an enhanced concern with the systematic empirical study of political life that came to be known as behavioralism. The behavioral mood had the effect of reinforcing the concern of many students of the non-western political process with the systematic analysis of politics in accordance with the canons of science. Since there was no branch of the discipline entrenched in the study of non-western politics, it was relatively easy for the new practitioners to adopt the philosophy and methods of behavioralism without encountering resistance. Lacking obstacles within the discipline, the philosophy of behavioralism gave young American scholars an impetus that led to an almost imperialist-like expansion of American academic political science into these areas. Out of this activity has emerged a virtually new field within political science that seeks to make systematic comparisons of nations at various

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9 Two examples are the University of Chicago Committee for the Comparative Study of the New Nations and the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

10 The rapid build-up of American social scientific scholarship dealing with the new states has been nothing less than phenomenal. In addition to the factors mentioned above that may have stimulated such activity, the conscious identification of some American scholars with the emergence of the new states as a repetition of the early American experience was probably important. For examples see Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation, London, Heinemann, 1963 and William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation, New York; Oxford, 1963. Even more important were the great American foundations that have sponsored research in the new states, most notably the Ford and Carnegie Foundations. The former has contributed substantial
levels of social, economic, and political development. Unlike the established study of comparative "government" which concerned itself with providing minute descriptive accounts of political institutions and sought to make comparisons only in a random or ad hoc fashion, the new field of comparative "politics", believing that the comparative method was at the heart of science, sought to compare in a systematic and thorough manner.

While seeking to satisfy the scientific imperative expressed in systematic and comparative analysis, studies of the new states have also consciously sought to meet the requirements of the holistic imperative by studying the political process of the new states within the context of the larger social system. "As holists, conscious of [the] interdependence and interested in the maintenance, integration and transformation of total societies, political scientists are particularly affected by this new challenge. It is the holistic imperative that enjoins political scientists to

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search for what has been termed 'a more complete and systematic conception of the political process as a whole'. The concern for holism in the analysis of the new states attests to the impact of the structural-functional perspective as a dominant research orientation. The holistic imperative reflects a view of societies as inter-related wholes of subsystems and lesser component parts each of which is more or less bound up with the other contributing to the continuance of the totality. However, the two imperatives of "science" and "holism" which studies of the new states seek to satisfy involve an inherent dilemma. For the extent to which the researcher is able to satisfy the scientific imperative by making precise micro-scopic analyses is a measure of the denial of the holistic imperative which pushes research to a macro-scopic level in order that the total system may be brought within the compass of the study. It would appear that students of the new nations have been more successful, and indeed more willing, to satisfy the holistic imperative even if the cost is less analytical precision and excessive generalization. The importance and legitimacy of a macro-scopic approach has been emphasized by Shils who writes that

The central concern of the study of the new states is with the formation of coherent societies and polities. Its concern with particular institutions, beliefs, and practices concentrates on their significance for this process. In other words, the study of new states is a

macrosociological study: it is a study of societies, and when it studies parts of these societies it studies their contribution to the functioning of the society as a 'whole'. 14

Macro-analysis leads to an emphasis upon insight and imagination. Imagination has played an important role in the political analyses of the developing areas that have been carried out so far. Imagination is a necessary requisite for an understanding of societies for which the analyst does not have a natural "feel". Moreover, the transitional societies of the underdeveloped world can usually be seen in only limited perspective by the western social analyst. Confined to first hand contact with a small segment of the total society he is forced to rely upon his ability to visualize those parts of the society beyond his view. Many of the aspects of political development discussed in this essay are the outcome of imaginary leaps by perceptive theorists trying to surmount the difficulties of depicting the nature and outlines of a process of change which they are unable to see.

14 Shils, Old Societies and New States, p. 20.

15 Contemporary social and political analysts of the non-western world have resorted to vision and imagination for precisely the same reasons that justified their use by the great political thinkers of the past: to overcome the spatial and temporal obstacles to the perception of political life "in the round" as a total process or system. In the words of Wolin "...most political thinkers have believed imagination to be a necessary element in theorizing because they have recognized that, in order to render political phenomena intellectually manageable, they must be presented in what we call 'a corrected fullness'. Theorists have given us pictures of political life in miniature, pictures in which what is extraneous to the theorist's purpose has been deleted. The necessity for doing this lies in the fact that political theorists, like the rest of mankind, are prevented from 'seeing' all political things at first hand. The impossibility of direct observation compels
The necessity for a sociological imagination that the study of the new states requires has been accompanied by a new recognition that a strict empirical approach in political science which denies the legitimacy of imagination is "...headed for the ultimate disaster of triviality." 16

...empirical political science had better find a place for speculation. It is a grave though easy error for students of politics impressed by the achievements of the natural sciences to imitate all their methods save the most critical one; the use of the imagination. Problems of method and a proper concern for what would be regarded as an acceptable test of an empirical hypothesis have quite properly moved out of the wings to a more central position on the great stage of political science. Yet surely it is imagination that has generally marked the intelligence of the great scientist, and speculation -- often-times foolish speculation it turned out later -- has generally preceded great advances in scientific theory. 17

III

The contemporary social science literature that deals with the underdeveloped areas is characterized by a lack of consensus on the meaning of the concepts employed. There is usually agreement on the more readily quantifiable economic concepts such as economic development -- increase in per


17 Dahl, Politics and Social Life, p. 25.
capita national income -- but less consensus is encountered in attempting to define and come to grips with the more elusive "development", "modernization", "political modernization", and "political development".

Development is usually regarded as the most general phenomenon of the 20th century. Bendix views it as a broad process of social change comprising "industrialization" -- economic changes resulting from applied scientific research and the application of a technology based upon inanimate sources of power -- and "modernization" -- social and political concomitants of industrialization. Apter regards development as a "particular form of social change" and includes modernization as a "special case" of development with industrialization "the most limited case of all." Modernization itself is viewed by Apter as a process of "choice" and "increasing complexity" in human affairs leading to a condition of modernity where "self-conscious choice" guided by rationality becomes the norm. Apter speaks of the "politics of modern-


21 Ibid., p. 3.

22 Ibid., p. 10.
ization" and views government as a "mechanism for regulating choice". Kilson also regards modernization as a broad process of social change but gives special emphasis to its economic aspects and sees as its essence "...those peculiar socio-economic institutions and political processes necessary to establish a cash nexus, in the place of a feudal or socially obligatory system, as the primary link relating people to each other, and to the social system, in the production of goods and services and in their exchange." As with Apter, Kilson views the political system -- in his study the colonial state -- as a means or instrument for modernizing the society and economy.

Attempts to define political development and/or political modernization have proven even more difficult. Some definitions have focused on the conditions of these phenomena rather than the phenomena themselves. Lipset found a significant correlation between political development -- which he chose to equate with democracy -- and indices of wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. Coleman


25 Ibid., p. 428.

repeated the approach and also found that democracy — "political competitiveness" — was correlated with economic development thus validating Lipset's hypothesis. Political development has been viewed as the political prerequisites or political consequences of economic development. Still others have conceived political development as the mobilization and direction of the masses in pursuit of the goals of the state. Some students equate political development with modernity or political aspects of modernity assuming that a developed or modern political system is simply one that exists in a modern society. Thus Ward and Rustow identify eight sociological characteristics of political modernity while Eisenstadt notes four.

Criticisms have been directed at the equation of political development with modernization. La Palombara feels that

29 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, vol. 55 (September 1961), pp. 493-514. The equation of political development with selected social or economic requisites has been inspired by the search for measurable indicators of the phenomenon. At this stage in research no simple indicator of political development — like the ratio of national income to population used to measure economic development — has been found. The best examples of the search for indices of political development are: Deutsch, American Political Science Review, vol. 55 (September 1961), pp. 493-514; Phillips Cutoff, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review, vol. 28 (April 1963), pp. 253-264; Lyle W. Shannon, "Is Level of Government Related to Capacity for Self-
the use of "modernity" in reference to political systems contains an economic bias, is unintentionally normative, and suggests "...a deterministic, unilinear theory of political evolution." He would prefer to speak of "political change" and suggests four dimensions or variables of change by which political development might be measured. These include: the degree of structural differentiation, the magnitude of the involvement of the political system in society (the ratio of political activity to all social activity), the degree of achievement orientation in political recruitment and role differentiation, and the degree of secularization of political

30 Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, "Introduction", Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, eds. R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 7. These include: "A highly differentiated and functionally specific system of government organization; A high degree of integration within this governmental structure; The prevalence of rational and secular procedures for the making of political decisions; The large volume, wide range, and high efficacy of its political and administrative decisions; A widespread and effective sense of popular identification with the history, territory, and national identity of the state; Widespread popular interest and involvement in the political system, though not necessarily in the decision-making aspects thereof; The allocation of political roles by achievement rather than ascription; and Judicial and regulatory techniques based upon a predominantly secular and impersonal system of law."

31 S.N. Eisenstadt, "Political Modernisation: Some Comparative Notes," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 5 (January 1964), p.7. These include: "...the development of a highly differentiated political structure in terms of specific political roles and institutions, of the centralization of the polity and of development of specific political goals and orientations. Second, political modernisation is characterized by growing extension of the scope of the central legal, administrative, and political activities and their permeation into all spheres and regions of the
functions. Huntington suggests that to equate political development with modernization "drastically limits the applicability of the concept in both time and space" making it impossible to speak of developed political systems in pre-modern societies as with fifth century B.C. Athens. He suggests that political development be measured by a different set of criteria from modernization thus permitting the possibility of developed polities in pre-modern societies (and the reverse) and the criteria he proposes relate to "the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures." Pye objects to thinking of political development as political "modernization" because of the difficulty of "differentiating society. Third, ...the continuous spread of potential political power to wider groups in the society -- ultimately to all adult citizens. Further, it is characterized by the weakening of traditional elites and of traditional legitimation of the rulers, and by the establishment of ...ideological and ...institutional accountability of the rulers to the ruled...."


33 Ibid., pp. 39-46.


35 Huntington writes: "This concept liberates development from modernization. It can be applied to the analysis of political systems of any sort, not just modern ones." Huntington, World Politics, vol. 17 (April 1965), p. 393.
between what is 'Western' and what is 'modern'".

Lately, serious attempts have been made to formulate a concept of political development that avoids the pitfalls inherent in relating political development to certain social conditions or in equating it with the political aspects of modernization. The most recent attempt by members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council has identified three major traits of the "development syndrome" which include "capacity", "differentiation", and "equality":

The political development process is thus seen as an interminable contrapuntal interplay among the processes of differentiation, the imperatives of equality and the integrative and adaptive capacity of a political system. In these terms political development can be regarded as the acquisition by a political system of a consciously-sought, and qualitatively new and enhanced, political capacity as manifested in the successful institutionalization of (1) new patterns of integration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation, and (2) new patterns of participation and resource distribution adequately responsive to the demands generated by the imperatives of equality.


37 The notion of capacity was inspired by Almond in his recent article "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems", World Politics, vol.17 (January 1965), pp. 183-214.


39 Coleman, Education and Political Development, p. 15.
While definitions are no substitute for knowledge their importance for clear thinking is recognized. This essay will therefore attempt to be guided and informed by the above-noted distinctions and definitions. However, the terms "political development" and "political modernization" will be used interchangeably since our discussion is framed in the empirical context provided by the emergence of the new states of Asia and Africa. In our view political development in the new states is inextricably bound up with, though not directly dependent upon, the more general processes of change referred to as development and modernization.

IV

Our object is to inquire into the nature of the political development process both generally and as it is encountered in the gestation and birth of the contemporary new states. In the course of the analysis an attempt will be made to address, if not to answer, the following questions: How have various analysts perceived or visualized the process of political development? What are the intellectual sources of the political development concept? What are some of the dimensions of the process? That is, how does the process manifest itself in terms of structural, ideological, and behavioral changes? What is the nature of the process in terms of change over time? Is it an evolutionary process? Does it proceed in terms of identifiable "stages of development"? Is the end result of the process, if there is indeed an end result, more or less similar social and political configurations for all nations? Or are there different styles of
political development which permit considerable variation within the modern condition? Is political development an absolute or relative condition? That is, does a developed state of political modernity constitute the end process of change and the emergence of a permanent political order or is the notion of "modern" or "developed" really only relative to the level reached so far by the western nations? Is political development inevitable in the new states; or can it be either temporarily or permanently arrested with the continuation of social disorganization and political instability? To what extent do the prospects of political development in the new states reflect the hopes and wishes of students who analyze them? Is it true, as Huntington suggests, "...that an underlying commitment to the theory of progress is so overwhelming as to exclude political decay as a possible concept." To what extent does the political development prospect in the new states rest upon a social scientific wish? Some of these questions will be discussed in detail, others will be dealt with more briefly, all will be mentioned if only in passing.

Our concern is with reviewing the literature of political development. We are not suggesting that our activity is one of semantic clarification; we perceive it to involve


41 While an attempt was made to review the bulk of the theoretical literature on political development, the discussion of empirical materials has been restricted mainly, although not exclusively, to African experiences.
the interpretation and evaluation of concepts and ideas rather than terms. At a time when new theories of political development are being produced at an ever-increasing rate the need for a re-thinking and re-evaluation of the political process in the new states seems in order. As in political philosophy, there is a requirement in empirical social and political theory for thoughts about thoughts, for an evaluation of the ideas of others. This essay is an attempt at re-thinking some selected aspects of the political development process.
PART I

CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS

OF THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
CHAPTER II

THE IDEA OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Modern societies are perhaps the first in history, not just to change, but also to be aware of change as the very nature of society.

Raymond Aron

Historical developments are not infrequently the enemy of social scientific wisdom. The analytic constructs of social scientists must often be altered in response to historical change. Changes in social relations, the emergence of new forms of social organization and the disappearance of others, changes in attitudes and values — all may upset the concepts of social scientists and necessitate a re-examination of established assumptions.

The historical developments that have occurred in the non-western world since World War II are an illustration of the relationship between social change and changes in social theory and research. The designation of World War II as a major watershed of contemporary social change is not arbitrary. "Such global cataclysms," writes Emerson, "...not only hasten or retard existing trends, but also themselves set in motion forces which reach far beyond the ending of hostilities and shape the destinies of peoples only remotely, if at all, concerned in them." The war was followed by the

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rapid withdrawal of western colonial powers from Asia and Africa and the appearance of a multiplicity of new states beginning in the late 1940's with such Asian countries as the Philippines, India, and Pakistan followed in Africa in the late 1950's by Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria (1960) and more recently a host of others. The extension of the nation-state with its special political structures, institutions, and ideologies to the societies of Afro-Asia had the immediate effect of enlarging the empirical universe of interest to political scientists. Students of comparative government with an interest in these developments were forced to re-examine their ideas about the nature of the universe of political life. Not only did the spatial dimensions of this universe change, the nature or essence of the newly discovered portion was found to be quite different from the old. The seemingly formless and fluid non-western political process both taxed and challenged the knowledge of political scientists.

The knowledge of some nineteenth century social philosophers was similarly challenged by the social and political upheavals that transformed European society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A seemingly permanent social order gave way to major changes brought on concomitantly with the industrial revolution and the type of society that was emerging appeared to be fundamentally different from that which had been. The economic, social, and political changes of the European transformation attracted the attention of a variety of scholars bent on understanding them. Marx
saw in them an inevitable historical process marked by successive leaps generated by the conflict of productive relations. The social evolutionists -- particularly Spencer, Morgan, and Tylor -- perceived an evolutionary and unilinear progression of societies from the simple forms supposedly characteristic of primitive tribes to the complex aggregates exemplified in the industrializing societies of Western Europe. Bagehot saw in them evidence of the superiority of a "polity of discussion" which could harness and increase the highest qualities of human nature thereby ensuring the continuation of progress.

Historians had always been interested in social change -- indeed, they specialized in presenting chronological accounts of socially significant past events -- but their work was essentially descriptive and was not characterized by any systematic attempt at connecting the spatial and temporal dimensions of social phenomena in conceptualizations with explanatory value. Attempts at analytically reconstructing the changing configurations of societies were new and required both an awareness of change as an inherent aspect of social life and a spirit of sociological inquiry. The social changes themselves provided an opportunity for the former while the latter was served up by Comte and his followers who postulated a science of society -- a "social physics"

which sought to explain the nature of social progress. "Like many of his contemporaries," writes Aron, "...Comte believed that modern society was in crisis; as a result one social order was disappearing and another social order was being born." The idea that society was something different than it had been and that it would come to be something quite different in the future attracted the attention of a number of nineteenth century social observers. But what had it been and what was it becoming? These questions were asked by interested scholars, notably Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, and Weber, and in their answers can be found the roots of modern ideas about political development.

Social scientists have found it very difficult to think about "moving societies" in the process of transformation. It is difficult enough to perceive and "see" through the mind's eye whole societies; it is much more difficult to visualize societies both in the round and in the process of change. Thought about social change has therefore been greatly facilitated by the use of so-called "before and after" models -- sociological snapshots that outline the dimensions and configurations of social space at a particular point in


time. Insight into the transformation of societies can be obtained by conceptualizing models or ideal-types of historical societies and comparing them with contemporary ones. The differences in the dimensions and configurations of the models will constitute a rough measure of the amount, type, and direction of social change that occurred during the temporal period involved. Utilizing such an approach, social change becomes the movement of societies from one classification to the next.

There are, of course, both dangers and difficulties with such an approach. There is, in the first place, the danger of what has been referred to as the "fallacy of the golden age"--the tendency to reconstruct models of previous societies that incorporate the idealistic and subjective images of the analyst. There is also the opposite danger of constructing models of past societies which incorporate selected aspects that have negative connotations. There is a second danger that is more clearly methodological, the "fallacy of retrospective determinism" -- the tendency to assume that past social structures could only change in the direction and manner that they in fact did change. "... we must conceive of the future as uncertain, in the past as well as the present. ... The fact is that the eventual development of past social


47 Ibid., p.12.
structures, was uncertain as well." In other words, our models of the historical development of real societies must be probabilistic rather than deterministic, and we should recognize that there is scope for considerable variation in the configurations that societies may take as they pass through time. Awareness of this fact will allow us to understand how any two societies which appear to start from the same beginning might very well transform themselves into quite different social units.

Attempts at reconstructing models of historical societies are also hampered by the state and nature of historical research into such societies. Not only may historical research into some societies be imperfect or incomplete as is often the case with much non-western historiography; it may also rest so completely on the implicit, but nevertheless significant, "thought model" of the historian that other attempts to utilize the data in the construction of alternative models may prove futile. Indeed, the so-called "facts" that are contained in historical research are very often not objective events recorded by historians but items in reconstructed histories or "conceptual translations" of the past.

In spite of such difficulties, the social philosophers of the nineteenth century attempted to construct and compare

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"before and after" models which would permit them to comprehend the process of societal change they were witnessing.

The first systematic attempt to fashion a dichotomous scheme for the explanation of development was made by the English jurist and legal historian, Sir Henry Maine. Maine conceptualized two types of societies -- one based upon status relations, the other on contractual ones -- and viewed development as a movement from "Status" to "Contract". Development or the "law of progress" involved a transition away from social relations based upon family or kinship ties toward others resting upon contractual agreement between separate parties. According to Maine, "Contract" is "...the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family....Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of individuals...the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." In perceiving development as a movement away from societies whose social relations were based upon ascribed status toward ones characterized by rational contractual relationships, Maine outlined a fundamental sociological


51 Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 163-165, (His italics).
distinction that has been retained in modern social scientific thought.

Maine's use of dichotomous categories to contrast changes in social relations was taken up by Ferdinand Toennies who developed and contrasted ideal-type constructs: Gemeinschaft (Community) and Gesellschaft (Society). It is important to note that unlike Maine's categories, those of Toennies' were ideal-types comprising social relations that did not exist in the real world: "What they represent are ideal types, and they should serve as standards by which reality may be recognized and described." Gemeinschaft-like societies possess social relations that are affective, spontaneous, emotional, and devoid of rational calculability, as might be found to exist between status positions in kinship groups, peasant communities, villages, and so on. Gesellschaft-like societies, on the other hand, are characterized by rational social relations based upon the capacity of men to correctly relate means to ends, as one might expect to find in the public bureaucracies.

52 The significance of Maine's insight into one of the essential differences between traditional and developed societies has been acknowledged by Parsons who writes: "Intimate knowledge of a non-European society (in this case, India) as well as of Western legal history played a dominant part in Maine's thinking. His developmental formula of the process of shift from 'status' (to which the modern sociologist would be inclined to add the adjective 'ascribed') to 'contract', where rights and obligations could be voluntarily assumed, was a landmark in the analysis of social structures." Talcott Parsons and others, ed., Theories of Society, New York, Free Press, 1965, p. 91.

53 Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), New York, Harper Torchbook, 1963 [First published in 1887].

54 Ibid., p. 248.
of modern governments or in large business enterprises. Since Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were posited as ideal types, Toennies skirted the necessity to seek out their real counterparts and relate the transition from one to the other. He did, however, suggest that Gemeinschaft usually preceded Gesellschaft although the order of development might be reversed.

The tradition of making paired comparisons was continued by Durkheim and modified by Weber. Toennies had viewed Gemeinschaft as a "living organism" (organic solidarity) in contrast with Gesellschaft which he referred to as a "mechanical aggregate and artifact." Durkheim, in his *De la division du travail social*, reversed Toennies' categories of social solidarity and characterized small-scale simple societies as integrated by a "mechanical" solidarity -- a shared system of attitudes and values enforced by repressive social sanctions -- with an undifferentiated social structure based upon an elementary division of labour. In contrast, developed

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56 Toennies contrasted the two types as follows: "All intimate, private, and exclusive living together...is understood as life in Gemeinschaft (community). Gesellschaft (society) is public life - it is the world itself. In Gemeinschaft with one's family, one lives from birth on, bound to it in weal and woe. One goes into Gesellschaft as one goes into a strange country.... Gemeinschaft is old; Gesellschaft is new as a name as well as a phenomenon...." Toennies, *Community and Society* (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), pp. 33-34.

57 Ibid., p. 35.

societies were marked by a complex division of labour and extensive specialization of both economic and social roles, and a multiplicity of different interests and values which were integrated by a highly specialized legal system based upon restitutive sanctions or "co-operative law" resulting in an "organic solidarity." "This law," writes Durkheim, "... plays a role in society analogous to that played by the nervous system in the organism." As the division of social and economic labour in society increases -- allegedly caused by population growth -- the ratio of repressive to cooperative law diminishes and the complex web of social bonds produced by the specialization of social roles results in a social solidarity that does not require repressive sanctions to enforce established norms of behavior.

The use of dichotomous categories was continued but modified in the writings of Weber. Following Toennies, Weber distinguished two different types of social relationships -- the "communal" and the "associative" -- which closely parallel Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. "A social relationship," writes

59 Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, pp. 111-132.

60 Ibid., p. 128.

61 The importance of Durkheim's analysis for the study of political development has been underscored by Pye who writes: "A central contribution of Durkheim to any theory of nation-building was the proposition that a national consensus built on merely a common set of shared values would always be more fragile and more open to authoritarian rule than one built on the need to aggregate the diverse but intensely real interests of all the elements of a society. Durkheim thus pointed to the fundamental importance of social roles and their relationships in the development of the modern and more complex society, and to the fact that the differentiation of roles increases rather than decreases the solidarity of a society." Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962, p. 35.
Weber, "...will be called 'communal' if and so far-as the orientation of social action...is based upon a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together." An "associative" relationship, on the other hand, is one in which social action "...rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement...." Examples of "communal relations" -- shared feelings of solidarity -- are religious brotherhoods, the esprit de corps of a military unit, or a national community. "Associative" relations, by contrast, are seen to be exemplified in the market place, in voluntary associations based upon perceived self-interest or in similar groups where ties are based upon interest in the values or goals that will be realized through collective action. An important contribution of Weber to the study of political development was his observation that in the great majority of social relationships both the "communal" and "associative" types were mixed in varying degrees. Such an observation opened the possibility of conceiving intermediate categories between the polar extremities of paired comparisons; of the concept of transition between tradition and modernity. Such an intermediate category was utilized by Weber in his typology

63 Ibid., p. 136.
64 Ibid., p. 137.
of authority in which he distinguishes authority based upon traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimacy.

The writings of Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, and Weber contained the seminal ideas that were later enlarged upon by contemporary social scientists in their efforts at conceptualizing the political development process in the new states. In Maine we have the recognition that the social ties of developed societies can be distinguished from those of traditional ones by their contractual quality and voluntary nature. This distinction was carried forward by Toennies who further differentiated developed and traditional societies according to the degree of rationality and affect in social relations. In this view, developed societies were characterized by their rational and affectively-neutral social ties based upon the calculability of perceived interests. Durkheim introduced the notion of the importance of structural differentiation and functional specialization -- the complex division of labour -- and the organic integration of differentiated units as the distinguishing features of a developed society. Finally Weber, elaborating on Toennies' distinctions between the subjective

66 Weber writes: "In the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order....In the case of traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person or the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is...bound by tradition. But here the obligation of obedience is not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of accustomed obligation. In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma." Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 328.
and affective ties of community and the objective and rational ones characteristic of developed societies, observed that few forms of social groupings were entirely affectual and traditional or rational and modern. This recognition of the mixed bases of social solidarity in modern society was supplemented by the identification of intermediate social types, as with his authority typology, which opened up the possibility of thinking about societies that were neither wholly traditional nor modern.

II

Weber had introduced the concept of social action as a unit of sociological inquiry in which individuals were oriented to one-another according to rational, affectual or traditional considerations. Social action could only be understood, Weber argued, in terms of the meanings involved in the choices made by actors in a given situation. Implicit in this notion was the idea that choices in different types of societies were governed by the meaning residing in different orientations. In the ideal-typical modern society social choices were made according to the rational relations of means to ends; in traditional societies such choices were made out of habit; while in transitional ones they were determined by the "specific affects" and "states of feelings" of the actor.

68 Ibid., p. 115.
The use of dichotomous categories was elaborated and refined in the writings of Talcott Parsons and his associates. Parsons accepted Weber's concept of social action as a unit of sociological analysis and postulated that actors must make five specific dichotomous choices before a situation could have a determinate meaning. One side of each of the five dichotomies or "pattern variables" had to be chosen before the meaning in a situation could be determined and the corresponding action taken. The five pattern variables were seen to encompass all possible alternatives that could be made by any actor confronting a situation of choice. Three of the five pattern variables have been particularly useful in differentiating the norms of behavior that characterize traditional and modern societies. These are the distinctions between ascription-achievement, universalism-particularism, and specificity-diffuseness. Using the pattern variables traditional societies are distinguished by the assignment of roles and status according to ascriptive considerations, that is, according to birthright or membership in a group, caste or class. In contrast, modern societies are inclined to assign roles and accord status in reference to the achievements, acquired skills or objective qualifications of individuals. Modern societies are characterized by universal standards of behavior while traditional ones utilize particularistic con-

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70 Ibid., p. 76.
siderations such as friendship or kinship obligations in evalu­
ating role performance. Finally, social roles in modern
societies and the aggregates of such roles -- social struc­
tures -- are specific; that is, they are highly specialized.
Traditional societies, on the contrary, are distinguished by
a lack of specialization in social roles and structures --
by their diffuseness -- in which individuals perform a variety
of roles and institutions serve a number of purposes.

The contribution of the pattern variables to the study of
political development rested in the fact that such distinctions
could serve as a means of differentiating societies according
to behavioral criteria. By analyzing items of behavior in
real societies with reference to pattern variables, it became
possible to categorize such societies as modern or traditional.
However, this very advantage in the application of pattern
variables to the study of political development has also been
the object of criticism since they do not provide intermediate
categories for the identification of behavior that is neither
traditional nor modern. A more fundamental criticism is that
of Almond who argues that no real polities or societies pos­
sess the purely traditional or modern properties that the
pattern variable dichotomies imply: "All political systems --
the developed Western ones as well as the less-developed non-
Western ones -- are transitional systems in which culture

71 Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity, p. 37.
change is taking place." To this Pye has added that when reflecting on political development "...we cannot think simply in terms of a quantitative decline in traditional role characteristics and a rise in modern ones. We must consider instead what mixture, or rather fusion, of traditional and modern patterns will lead to national development."

III

From the ideas of Maine, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons modern political development theory has derived and elaborated a list of characteristics or "traits" of a developed political system. The condition of being politically developed is usually identified by the following general characteristics: a preponderance of rational norms of political behavior; an efficient and effective political structure capable of absorbing and acting upon political demands; a highly differentiated and specialized political structure; a multiplicity of organizations and associations to articulate demands; a populace with the skills and attitudes for associating together; and finally, a relatively high degree of


73 Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity, p. 38.
political participation generated by the ethical imperative of equality. Political development theory does not suggest that any empirical political system possesses all of these attributes completely or that any are entirely without them. Rather, such a typology of traits is viewed as a general measuring rod by which the development of real political systems might be judged. Developed political systems are usually regarded as those possessing a preponderance of such traits while transitional polities are seen to manifest some of these characteristics and traditional ones only a few. The condition of political development in an empirical political system is seen as a tendency or inclination rather than an absolute state.

**Rationality**

The most recurring and enduring characteristic of political development alluded to in the literature is the behavioral attribute of rationality. The source of the idea of rationality as a property of political development can be traced to the historical sociologists of the last century. Again, it was Weber who developed the idea most fully and used it to build his theory of the modern institutional system. Modern social action is seen to be guided by rational norms in contrast with the habitual and uncritical acceptance of sacred values characteristic of traditional societies. The principle of rationality runs through much of Weber's sociology but is most evident in his theory of bureaucracy. Bureaucratic organizations are the repositories par excellence of
rational norms of behavior and are only fully developed in those societies already permeated by such norms: "Bureaucracy ...is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state, and, in the private economy, only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism." It must of course be kept in mind that Weber's rational bureaucracy was an ideal or pure type; the same is true of his concept of rational-legal authority. The legitimacy of political authority in modern societies was seen to rest in the acceptance of rules or laws that adhered to universally accepted standards or procedures in their application: "Today the most usual basis of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure."

To Weber, the most distinctive characteristic of modern social and political life was the systematization of rational norms of behavior. This view is common among contemporary political development theorists. One of the traits that Ward and Rustow felt to be characteristic of a modern political system was "The prevalence of rational and secular procedures for the making of political decisions." Huntington has argued

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that political modernization involves, among other things, the rationalization of authority -- the replacement of a large number of familial, religious, and ethnic political authorities by a single, unified, and secular national political authority. Rationality, more than any other single characteristic, is seen to be the benchmark of developed political systems.

Efficiency and Capacity

Rational social action -- the ability to adjust behavior for the realization of desired goals or the adaptation of behavioral patterns to rational norms -- is closely related to and often confused with the concept of efficiency. Efficiency is the effect of rational action and is usually measured by the ratio of costs (inputs) to output or product. In economics an efficient organization is one that is able to increase output while maintaining costs or maintain output while reducing costs. For economists developed nations are efficient nations; their economic productivity is high and the costs per unit of production are relatively low resulting in a high per capita national income. Not surprisingly, the economic definition of development has influenced students of political development. Organski, for example, defines political development as "...increasing governmental efficiency

77 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Modernization: America versus Europe" (A paper read at the 1965 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., mimeo.).
in utilizing the human and material resources of the nation for national goals." Riggs has suggested that political development involves increases in the output of political systems; and changes in output are related to changes in the performance of political systems, the latter being regarded as an indicator of political development. Eisenstadt, and more recently Almond, have taken the same view that modern political systems possess the capacity to sustain, cope with, and absorb the continuous demands made upon them. As Eisenstadt puts it "...this potential capacity to sustain continuously changing, new types of political demands...develops only within those processes which can be denoted as political modernization or initial 'pre-modernization'."

Differentiation and Specialization

If one accepts the view that modern political systems are characterized by, among other things, their capacity to respond to demands, the question that immediately comes to


79 F.W. Riggs, "Political Behavior in Non-Western Countries" (Syllabus paper, July-August 1964, Ann Arbor, Michigan, mimeo).


81 Eisenstadt, Bureaucracy and Political Development, p.98.
mind is how they are able to perform so effectively? The answer usually found in contemporary political development theory is: modern political systems perform well because they are structurally differentiated and functionally specialized, and the structures and functions are relatively well integrated. Differentiation and specialization are the principal structural characteristics of political modernity and, as with rationality, the source of the idea can be traced to the writings of the nineteenth century sociologists. It was Durkheim who contrasted modern and pre-modern societies by reference to the extent of the division of labour and argued that the greater the division of labour the more a society resembled an organism in which the specialized parts carried out their functions and were integrated, contributing to the well-being of the whole society. While not agreeing with Durkheim on the causes of the division of labour — population growth — contemporary theorists are at one with him on structural differentiation and functional specialization as a fundamental property of developed societies. "What is peculiar to modern political systems," writes Almond, "... is a relatively high degree of structural differentiation (i.e., the emergence of legislatures, political executives, bureaucracies, courts, electoral systems, parties, interest groups, media of communication), with each structure tending to perform a regulatory role for that function within the political system as a whole."

It is generally held, then, that the fundamental distinguishing structural characteristic of modern political systems is their extensive differentiation of specialized roles and institutions. Pre-modern societies are said to be characterized by a paucity of these, that is, by a multifunctional social and political structure. While there is a danger in overdrawing this distinction between modernity and tradition—of transforming it into a rigid dichotomy—it remains true, nevertheless, that differentiation is a hallmark of developed societies and constitutes a suggestive general insight into the study of political development.

Organizations and Associations

The recognition of structural differentiation as a benchmark of political modernity leads to an awareness of the great number of specialized institutions, organizations, and associations that are found in developed societies. Within the political sphere alone, modern society is characterized as possessing a vast array of these. The governmental cores of developed political systems contain a growing number of specialized institutions; an historical development that is especially evident in the burgeoning public bureaucracies of the welfare state. Outside the governmental core can be found political parties and a great variety of articulating mechanisms—interest groups, organizations, and associations—making continual demands, pressing particular grievances, and generally seeking to effect a governmental response to a particular problem. Clearly, political development involves the
growth and institutionalization of the complex machinery of the state, but this implies more than the creation of effective and enduring administrative organizations. It suggests the formation of a host of specialized associations in the society at large which can mediate between the decision-making centres of the political system and the masses at the periphery. Within developed political systems, particularly the democratic variety, a great number of interest groups exist and function to generate and give expression to the felt needs, demands, and requests which guide and influence decision-makers in the shaping of public policy. Indeed, a great deal of legislation in modern democratic political systems may be viewed as constituting public responses to the demands of specific interests.

Specialized interest associations deflect and guide the political behavior of individuals into meaningful activities which provide them with a sense of purpose and identity. Interest associations mobilize the energies and commitments of people, helping overcome the social inertia and frustration which may result when an awareness of an interest or goal is accompanied by political inarticulateness and a lack of political skills. Pye suggests that "...it may be fruitful to think of the problems of development and modernization as rooted in the need to create more effective, more adaptive, more complex, and more rationalized organizations...modernization entails the development of an array of organizations that can provide the individual with the necessary range of choices for association, so that whenever he steps beyond the
family he can find opportunities to test his talents and to find his full identity as a social and psychological being."

The "Art of Associating Together"

The recognition of manifold specific interest associations as a property of political modernity leads to a consideration of the behavioral and psychological attributes that a developed political condition requires of individuals. The formation and operation of interest associations depend upon the capacity of individuals to cooperate and compromise in the pursuit of their perceived interests; in the words of Tocqueville, it depends upon the ability of individuals to learn and practice the "art of associating together."

The attitudes and skills required for the formation of effective and enduring political associations — an ability to cooperate, compromise, and make restrained political demands that are not calculated to destroy the political system — are often lacking, or at least very weak in transitional political systems. The long history of political evolution in Europe and the very short history of the experience of non-western people with the operation of the nation-state indicates that the acquisition of such attitudes and skills is a time-consuming process. Historical developments in the new states also suggest that these traits together with western political


institutions cannot be exported: "It is apparent to most observers today," writes Burke, "...that it is no longer possible, if it ever was, to export and import institutions like sacks of grain or boxes of ball bearings." The belief that institutions and the skills required for their effective operation were exportable was as naive as the premise that such a belief rested on: that non-western societies were empty vessels into which western institutional forms and practices could be poured. Such a premise failed to recognize that while African and Asian states were indeed new, their societies were most certainly not. The new states and their political forms were grafted to old societies which already possessed political and social institutions of their own.

Old societies do not lack social and political structures; their antiquity is indicated, rather, by the manner in which such units operate, the recruitment of their members, and the purposes they pursue. Members of traditional societies do indeed have the capacity to organize themselves politically but the manner in which recruitment takes place (usually ascription); the ties that bind them together (usually tribal, ethnic, religious or linguistic bonds); and the purposes they serve (usually the maintenance of the traditional order and the existing distribution of wealth, status and power); all militate against the creation of other forms of association.

86 This is the theme of a recent compendium on modernization. See Clifford Geertz, ed. *Old Societies and New States*, New York, Free Press, 1963.
oriented toward the new national political system. Political development requires new, and for traditional people, novel forms of political association as well as associational skills based on something other than tribal, ethnic, religious or linguistic interest. However, such a statement should not be looked upon as precluding the possibility of adapting traditional organizations to the requirements of a modern political system; nor should it be regarded as suggesting that traditional skills of associating together are entirely out of place in a modern society. Perhaps the remarks of Colin Legum best sum up the institutional requirements of political development:

...its essential requirement is to create new institutions at every level — right up from local government to the national parliament, and including the civil service, the judiciary, the army and police, and the education system. These institutions must fulfill three functions in modernising, pluralist societies....They must be comprehensible to, and capable of being worked by, the people whose interests they are designed to protect and promote. They must also reflect the traditional methods and cultural ideas of the different components of the nascent nation. Finally, they must be capable of harmonising the competing ethnic and regional interests with each other as well as with the central government. 87

Participation and Equality

Closely related to the "art of associating together" is the notion of participation as a characteristic of political development, and the ethic of equality in which such a notion is rooted. Developed political systems -- whether of the democratic or totalitarian variety -- tend to be participatory systems in which political relationships have been extended

87 Colin Legum, "Beyond African Dictatorship?", *Encounter*, vol. 25, no. 6 (December 1965), p. 52.
from the centre to the periphery of society involving the total population in the resulting nexus. Developed political systems are characterized by political relations that permeate the whole of society, and while these need not be reciprocal, as is the case in non-democratic regimes, they do nevertheless reach out and involve virtually all citizens. All citizens of modern states are taxed by governments and all, or nearly all, receive government services and are subject to government controls of one kind or other. The very word "citizen" is indicative of membership in a political society and membership usually implies responsibilities and rights. The modern citizen is in, even if he is not of, the political system. His involvement is accompanied by some form of participation, though it may be ritualistic or forced as with elections in the Soviet Union. Political participation, whether of the genuine variety indigenous to democratic societies or of the forced or expected type often found in totalitarian regimes, is in either case a behavioral manifestation of the egalitarian ethical imperative. While such an imperative might be restricted in some regimes to rigged and non-competitive elections and other forms of essentially ritualistic and manipulated mass participation, the need to create the effect of mass support reflects the force of equality as the "...core ethos and ethical imperative pervading the operative ideals

of all aspects of modern life."

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The origins and evolution of the political development idea in the literature of social science have been traced and the properties of the developed political condition reviewed. The before and after models of some classical and modern social theorists were outlined and a typology of political modernity was formulated. But how do societies reach a developed political condition and what paths lead there? These and related questions must now be dealt with.

CHAPTER III

PATHS TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The real problems of economic and political development in the new states have suddenly made us realize that we had never actually resolved the issues between the concept of social evolution and the principles of cultural relativism.

Lucian Pye

The analysis of political development as a process of transition is a difficult and hazardous undertaking. To visualize social change as a transitional process is difficult, more difficult than outlining the configurations and properties of political systems at specific points in time. Not only must the theorist imagine and reconstruct the unit of analysis (which in many studies of political development is the national political system) and portray it "in the round" at two different points in time, but the transitional movement from one condition to the next and the changes occurring during the transitional process must be grasped as well.

The challenge and difficulties posed in the analysis of social change has, as we noted in the last chapter, sometimes resulted in recourse to the use of before and after models. There have, of course, been other responses. The principal of these has been the common perception of change as an evolutionary process involving a series of stages through which
societies are believed to pass in the course of their development. This was the characteristic approach to the study of development taken by such nineteenth century social evolutionists as Spencer, Morgan, and Tylor. The social evolutionists were imbued with a deep-seated belief in the desirability of "progress" which, when combined with their limited and often incorrect knowledge of simple societies, usually resulted in deterministic and ethnocentric conceptions of development.

They saw but one path to modernity -- that which had already been traversed by the Europeans (particularly the Anglo-Saxons) -- and all "backward" societies, if they hoped to progress, would have to pass along that arduous path, a journey of hundreds or even thousands of years.

The cultural imperialism of the social evolutionists was decisively repudiated with the ascendancy of cultural relativism as the dominant ethos of twentieth century compar-

90 It is sometimes believed that the social evolutionists applied Darwin's ideas to the study of society and culture, but this is definitely not the case. Levi-Strauss comments that: "The doctrine of biological evolution admittedly gave sociological evolutionism a decided fillip but the latter actually preceded the former....Spencer and Tylor, the two founders of social evolutionism, worked out and published their doctrine before the appearance of The Origin of Species or without having read that work." Claude Levi-Strauss, Race and History, France, Paris, 1958, pp. 15-16. On this point also see: John C. Green, Darwin and the Modern World View, Toronto, Mentor Books, 1963, pp. 80-81; and Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service, ed., Evolution and Culture, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1961, pp. 3-4.
Cultural relativism was a repudiation of the view that non-western cultural achievements could be evaluated by reference to western ones, and an affirmation of the inherent worth and intrinsic importance of the values, customs, social organization, and material attainments of non-western people. The ethic of relativism was an important advance in the relations between the West and the more exotic cultures of the South and East for it induced an attitude of tolerance, admiration, and respect on the part of most social scientists and many public officials in their relations with the inhabitants of these areas. But, carried to excess, cultural relativism created problems of its own. An excessive commitment to the relativistic ethic that was calculated to protect primitive and peasant peoples from the potentially destructive assaults of westerners sometimes had the opposite effect of denying those people the western material advances they actually wanted. The ethic hindered the development of a truly comparative social science since there is in cultural


92 Margaret Mead has commented on this effect of cultural relativism: "...most anthropological theories of change up to and during World War II were permeated by attempts to protect the people whose cultures were threatened from the results of purposive attempts to change them, either by their own Western educated elite, or by the political, religious, or economic emissaries of foreign powers. Thus, in concentrating on the risks and dangers of purposefully induced change, we gave very scant attention to the other side of the coin, to what "Western" or "higher" or "more developed" peoples not only did not force on other peoples but actually denied them." Margaret Mead, New Lives for Old, New York, Mentor Books, 1956, p. 369(her italics).
relativism the belief that "all societies are created free and equal" and cannot therefore be compared in terms of their level of development. The difficulty with an extreme form of relativism for the comparative study of social and political change is its postulate that each society or culture is a more or less unique entity - that the social and cultural achievements of mankind are marked by constant variety and extensive diversity making comparisons at best vague and misleading, and at worst spurious. Such a view leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to devise a neutral and objective measuring rod for determining the level of development of any society since "...there is no single scale of values applicable to all societies."

The relativistic ethic precipitated the rapid demise of the evolutionary perspective which remained moribund for several decades and only recently began to emerge again as a legitimate intellectual orientation to the study of development.

93 The French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss has written: "...that the development of human life is not everywhere the same but rather takes form in an extraordinary diversity of societies and civilizations...in the present, as well as in fact and in the very nature of things in the past, the diversity of human cultures is much greater and richer than we can ever hope to appreciate to the full." Levi-Strauss, *Race and History*, pp. 8-10.


There are at least two reasons for this: it has resulted from an attempt to correct the apparent static bias in the social systems model that dominated sociological, social anthropological and, to a lesser extent, contemporary empirical political theory; and it has resulted from a revived interest in the theory of social change and the utilization of the systems model in the analysis of change occasioned by the emergence of the "third world". In anthropology, Radcliffe-Brown found it necessary to utilize the evolutionary idea as an explanation of the tendency for social structures to become diversified and increasingly complex with the passage of time. In sociology Eisenstadt argues that the concept of evolution permits systems theory to be utilized as a useful conceptual tool in the systematic analysis of societal change. And Parsons postulates that the concept of evolution permits a search for universal organizational developments that all


96 "I think that social evolution is a reality which the social anthropologist should recognize and study. There has been a process by which, from a small number of forms of social structure, many different forms have arisen in the course of history; that is, there has been a process of diversification. Secondly, throughout this process more complex forms of social structures have developed out of, or replaced, simpler forms." A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society, New York, Free Press, 1965, p. 203.

97 He writes that "...reappraisal of an evolutionary perspective is contingent on a systematic explanation of the processes of change within a society, the processes of transition from one type of society to another, and especially the extent to which such transition may crystallize into different types or 'stages' that evince some basic characteristics common to different societies. Despite contrary claims,
societies must "hit upon" to become modern. Thus, contemporary social science seems to be on the verge of reestablishing the concept of evolution as a legitimate perspective in comparative studies of development.

II

The evolutionary perspective has been revived and reformulated in two recent studies of social and political change. Talcott Parsons, interested in the more general phenomenon of the development of all societies, has suggested that such development is evolutionary and is marked by progressive "stages" or "evolutionary universals" - points in time when societies independently "hit upon" similar organizational solutions to common problems which further their evolutionary adaptation and increase their capacity for survival. Organski, focusing on the more specific phenomenon of the political development of societies engaged in nation-building and economic development, has argued that nations move in an identifiable sequence from a stage of partial national integration or "primitive unification" through several intervening stages to a condition of high technological complexity based upon the cybernetics revolution. Each of these approaches will be analyzed in turn.

the conceptual tools recently developed for the analysis of systematic properties of societies and social institutions may be used to analyze the concrete processes of change within them." Eisenstadt, American Sociological Review, vol.29 (June 1964), pp. 375-376.

For Parsons, the development of social organization is characterized by a series of identifiable stages when societies, independent of one-another, arrive at similar responses to common problems. These "evolutionary universals" can be identified and are seen to follow one-another in a determinate order, making it impossible to reach successive stages without overcoming or passing through the previous ones. In the words of Parsons "...an evolutionary universal ...is a complex of structures and associated processes the development of which so increases the long-run adaptive capacity of living systems in a given class that only systems that develop the complex can attain certain higher levels of general adaptive capacity." 99

Among the universals identified by Parsons are the development of stratification, cultural legitimation, administrative bureaucracy, market economy, universalistic norms, and democratic association. The development of class systems constitutes a break from the allocation of status, power, and wealth according to membership in a kinship group, while the emergence of cultural legitimation reflects a movement away from legitimacy attached to the leaders of a particular kinship group toward one resting on a broader base. These two universals -- stratification and cultural legitimation -- occur in the development of pre-modern societies. In societies "that have moved considerably past the primitive stage" a

second pair of evolutionary universals develop: administrative bureaucracy and a market economy based upon money as a medium of exchange. Both bureaucracy and a monied market economy "incorporate" and are "dependent on" universalistic norms which define the powers of office "in terms of access to it", as well as property rights and "contractual relations" between parties involved in transactions. Thus, the development of universalistic norms is regarded by Parsons as an evolutionary universal that "ushered in the modern era of social evolution." The final universal identified -- democratic association -- is a consequence of the development of a legal order based upon universalistic norms. Democratic association, including elective leadership and universal adult suffrage, is institutionalized in "modern" societies because no other type of political organization is able to so effectively "...mediate consensus in its exercise."

Together, bureaucratic organization, monied market economy, a universalistic legal system, and democratic political organization define the structure of modern societies.


101 Ibid., p. 351.

102 Ibid., pp. 355-356 (his italics). Parsons believes that "communist totalitarian organization" is less developed than "democracy" and will either remain totalitarian, and therefore less effective and more unstable, or will move in the direction of elective democracy, the most effective form of political organization with the greatest integrative capacity.
Comparatively, the institutionalization of these four complexes and their interrelations is very uneven. In the broadest frame of reference, however, we may think of them as together constituting the main outline of the structural foundations of modern society. 103

Parsons is less concerned with the specific universals identified than with the idea of evolutionary universals as sequences that different societies strike upon in the course of their development. His concern is whether the concept of evolutionary universals is appropriate for explaining the process of development in all human societies. An evaluation of its usefulness in explaining the specific type of social change referred to as "development" will only be ascertained by its systematic application in the empirical study of both contemporary and historical societies. As a theoretical orientation to the study of development, it rests upon the largely deductive premise that cultural properties common to all societies set limits for the making of choices or "load the dice", allowing societies far apart in time and space to hit upon similar responses in a situation of choice with each response setting up and re-loading the dice for the next choice situation and so on. In essence, Parsons believes that all societies confront similar situations in the course of their development and, that given this fact, it is probable that comparable choices will be made as they adapt to new circumstances.

The history of science offers an analogy to the developmental model presented by Parsons. In the development of science it has been noted that multiple discoveries -- where, unknown to each other, widely separated scientists make the same discoveries -- are the rule rather than the exception. What makes the analogy less compelling is the fact that scientists work within a common intellectual tradition and, although discoveries have been made in widely separate places by men who were unaware of the activities of their counterparts, all are presumably familiar with the content of their disciplines up to the frontier of their discoveries. The probability of simultaneous discoveries by two or more individuals having equal access to the intellectual resources of a discipline is therefore quite considerable. However, it seems less probable that separate social systems, widely spaced in time and distance and isolated from one another, will strike upon the same universal. Levi-Strauss admits the principle of probability in the cultural achievements of diverse societies but unlike Parsons does not load the dice in favour of the gambler, stressing the importance of societal interdependence and culture contact in contributing to common achievements.

Men have doubtless developed differentiated cultures as a result of geographical distance, the special features of their environment, or their ignorance of the rest of mankind; but this would be strictly and absolutely true only if every culture or society had been born and had developed without the slightest contact with any others.

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Such a case never occurs...our argument is not to deny the fact of human progress but to suggest that we might be more cautious in our conception of it ... progress... is neither continuous nor inevitable; its course consists in a series of leaps and bounds.... These leaps and bounds are not always in the same direction; the general trend may change too, rather like the progress of the knight in chess, who always has several moves open to him but never in the same direction. Advancing humanity can hardly be likened to a person climbing stairs and, with each movement, adding a new step to all those he has already mounted; a more accurate metaphor would be that of a gambler who has staked his money on several dice and, at each throw, sees them scatter over the cloth, giving a different score each time. What he wins on one, he is always liable to lose on another.... 105

The idea of evolutionary universals, of societies finding similar solutions to common problems, is more compelling if it recognizes the possibility of cross-cultural borrowing in development and if it is confined to societies in similar historical circumstances, confronting comparable problems, and equipped with, or at least aware of, the existing cultural resources available for their solution. The situation facing the contemporary new states in their task of nation-building and modernization more closely approximates the circumstances that have resulted in multiple discoveries by scientists working within a common disciplinary framework. For modern culture -- the reservoir of available material and intellectual resources -- loads the dice for decision-makers in the new states much as the existing scientific body of knowledge does for scientists of similar callings who arrive at the same discovery. Thus, the idea of evolution becomes more credible if it is applied to societies in which the choice situation is structured and if the number of alternatives open

to decision makers is limited. This is the situation confronting political elites in the new states: they find themselves in similar circumstances with respect to their own underdevelopment; and they face an expanding and developed western culture which contains values they affirm, intellectual and material resources constituting a framework within which development might occur, and power to enforce compliance with modern norms in an international world where developed nations make up the rules of the game. It is in such a context that Organski uses the imagery of evolutionary theory.

Organski identifies several stages through which all nations must pass in the course of their political development. These are: (1) the politics of primitive unification; (2) the politics of industrialization; (3) the politics of national welfare; and (4) the politics of abundance. Within the context of these generalized stages Organski postulates political development as an evolutionary process but carefully avoids infusing his approach with any of the ethnocentricism characteristic of earlier evolutionists: "The world is not necessarily marching toward monogamy, Christianity, free enterprise, and two-party government. It does, however, appear to be marching toward industrial efficiency and national political organization." Moreover, he indicates that political develop-


107 Ibid., p. 4.
opment -- which he defines as "increasing government efficiency in utilizing the human and material resources of the nation for national goals" -- is a relative concept, that change is a continual process.

The first stage of political development identified by Organski is "the politics of primitive unification" or what is more commonly referred to in the literature as national integration or nation-building, the emergence of the nation as a viable political unit. At this stage the fundamental problem of government is "the creation of national unity" by overcoming the divisive ties of kinship, language, race, and various particularisms that threaten to destroy the nascent nation. Political control must be successfully extended from the centre to the periphery of society encompassing lesser authority structures (provinces or villages) while legitimacy must be generated for the central authority to bolster a control based primarily upon force. Public bureaucracies develop as a means of extending central authority and executing national policies in an efficient and continuous fashion. Finally, destruction of the peasant society is begun; groundwork is laid for the development of an economy based upon industrial production; and the entire population is integrated into the national society by forced mobilization either public or private.

108 Organski, The Stages of Political Development, p. 7 (his italics).

109 Ibid., pp. 20-54.
The second stage of political development, "the politics of industrialization", embraces problems surrounding the goal of economic development. During this stage all three types of government -- bourgeois, Stalinist, and fascist -- "make possible" a shift of political power from the traditional elite to the new industrial managers; "permit and assist" the accumulation of capital; and "preside over" the mass migration of agrarian peasants into the new industrial cities and their transformation into an urban proletariat.

During stage two the mutual dependence of people and government has steadily increased and is completed in stage three, "the politics of national welfare". "The power of the state has come to rest upon the ability of common people to work and to fight, and the common people, along with the lords of industry, have come to depend upon the national government to protect them from destitution in depression and from destruction in war." Stage three is marked by the creation of the welfare state and the complete mobilization and integration of the masses into the nation. Mass society is the touchstone of the politics of national welfare, but this need not necessarily imply mass democracy. Most of the

111 Ibid., pp. 158-177.
112 Ibid., p. 12.
developed nations of Western Europe and North America including the older members of the Commonwealth have now reached this stage and are passing into the fourth — "the politics of abundance" — which is characterized by a new technology based upon the cybernetics revolution. These nations have barely entered this final stage which is distinguished by "great concentrations" of economic and political power and a "...new class structure headed by a small elite of planners who run the economy and the government, supported by a minority of highly skilled workers and technicians."

There is nothing inevitable about the stages here set forth, but it is striking that in all the world's many nations development has been in the same direction: toward industrialization, higher productivity, and higher living standards; toward political complexity, political efficiency and increased dependence upon the state. To this point there is no single case of a nation's sliding back to an earlier stage.

Implicit in Organski's conceptualization of the political development process is the view that political change is correlated with economic development, especially industrialization and the development of modern technology. He reduces political development to the politics of industrialization and technological change and in so doing almost invites the charge of economic determinism. As with Kautsky, who is quite explicit about the necessity of an economic interpretation of

115 Ibid., p. 16.
political change, Organski implies that tradition is a condition of economic backwardness and development a process of economic growth. Such a conceptualization contradicts the dominant contemporary social scientific view of development as an all-encompassing process of social change in which not only economies and polities but total societies are transformed.

Organski's evolutionary perspective can be criticized for viewing political development as a unilinear progression involving a series of sequences that follow one another in an established order. Such a position violates the contemporary view of evolution as a multi-linear progression. While Organski's uni-linear conception of political development might accord with the historical experience of Western Europe it seems far less applicable to an analysis of Eastern European or non-western experience. Political elites in non-western states try to emulate the modern nations of the West not as they once were but as they are now. This point was made by Trotsky in his History of the Russian Revolution where he referred to "the privilege of historic backwardness" that permits developing countries to adopt the social and material achievements of advanced ones, "skipping a whole


series of intermediate stages." On the basis of this observation Trotsky formulated his Law of Combined Development:

The law of combined development reveals itself...in the history and character of Russian industry. Arising late, Russian industry did not repeat the development of the advanced countries, but inserted itself into this development, adapting their latest achievements to its own backwardness. Just as the economic evolution of Russia as a whole skipped over the epoch of craft-guilds and manufacture, so also the separate branches of industry made a series of special leaps over technical productive stages that had been measured in the West by decades.119

There appears to be no necessary sequence of stages along the path to political development. Thus welfare states are being constructed before economic development is really under way and the very latest types of modern technology -- hydro-electric installations, nuclear reactors -- are being introduced into societies that are still divided by ethnic, linguistic, religious, caste, and tribal particularisms. India, one of the more industrialized of non-western states, divided by forces of caste and religion, failed in a recent attempt to institute Hindi as a national language. Similarly, in Ceylon the Tamils and Sinhalese experienced great difficulties in sublimating their primordial feelings and binding themselves together into one nation. Indeed, there may be several paths

119 Ibid., p. 7.
to a condition of modernity that permits a measure of variation in the form and content of social, economic, and political arrangements.

III

The history of Europe, the experience of advanced nations located outside Europe, and contemporary events in the new states indicate that political development can derive from indigenous or exogenous sources (and from a combination of the two) or from the mobility of political cultures and institutions across geographical space.

By virtue of its island insularity and continuity with the past, the modern English political system constitutes an outstanding example of political development that has arisen almost entirely from indigenous sources. Rose points out that the English political system is characterized by an indigenous dynamic that has permitted it to adapt while at the same time maintaining a relatively stable and integrated society devoid of the outbreaks of violence and discontinuity with tradition which has marked political development in some continental nations, notably France. Although the functions of political institutions have often changed with time — Parliament, for instance, has functioned both as an instrument of royal authority and as a mechanism for its control — many "can trace

their origins back to medieval times." England offers perhaps the best illustration of a political system that has developed almost entirely through evolutionary adaptation over the course of centuries; a process devoid of societal upheavals and irreconcilable conflicts (Rose reminds us that the Civil War of the seventeenth century ended in compromise) establishing a tradition of moderation and consensus about political fundamentals. "Today, political differences with deep historical roots do exist in English society, but the differences are not about the nature of basic aspects of the system -- the community, the regime, and cultural values." The process of political development in England has been one of continual adaptation of traditional political institutions to periodic social changes; surely an example of the flexibility of traditional institutions and a denial of the view that modernity requires their destruction.

The "first new nations" are examples of political development that resulted from the mobility of political cultures and institutions across geographical space. Not surprisingly, this has occurred in areas where traditional societies have been weak and very vulnerable to intruding political forces.


123 Ibid., p. 254.

124 By "weak" we do not mean to imply that they contained social structures or cultural values that were intrinsically unimportant or of no consequence, but that they were unable to resist the encroachment, superior technology, and military power of intruding Europeans.
The conquest and subsequent Europeanization of North America, Australia, and New Zealand are cases in point. The simple societies that occupied these areas — the numerous but scattered Indian communities of North America and the Aboriginal and Maori societies of Australia and New Zealand — were too weak to integrate elements of their cultures and social organizations into the intruding European societies. These new societies were what Hartz calls "fragments" of Europe that had been "hurled outward onto new soil" following the great European explorations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were extensions of Europe at the time of their founding and constituted instances of political development that derived entirely from the mobility of political cultures and institutions modified only by the ecological demands of the new environment. Perhaps the ease with which these European fragments were transplanted in North America, Australia, and New Zealand lent false credence to later generations of Europeans that the Europeanization of Africa and Asia would also be a matter of merely establishing their institutions in these new lands. But the strength of the indigenous societies and the numerically large size of Asian and African populations eventually demonstrated that political development in these areas would likely be characterized by a fusion of European and indigenous sources. This seems to have happened in the political modern-

While no society is entirely modern, Japan is distinguished for possessing a political system that is a symbiosis of indigenous traditional elements and exogenous modern ones that derive mainly from Western Europe. The Japanese absorbed, in successive periods, a number of western ideologies -- liberalism, Marxism, fascism -- and constitutional concepts while at the same time adapting traditional institutions to the needs of the development process. The Meiji leaders revitalized the emperorship, not just a traditional but an archaic institution, and moulded it into "...an extraordinarily effective symbol and instrument of national unity, discipline, and sacrifice." According to Ward and Rustow "This may well be one of the classic instances of the systematic and purposeful exploitation of a traditional political institution for the achievement of modernizing goals." In an evaluation of the relative importance of environmental and foreign contributions to Japanese modernization, Scalapino


128 Ibid., p. 445.
has concluded that

foreign influence has increased rather than decreased as the modernization process has gathered momentum, for new avenues of communication have thereby been opened up. At the same time, some purely indigenous forms and uses have gained a new vitality as they have been accommodated to the changed conditions and needs of the society. One cannot naively conceive of 'indigenous influences' as static, 'foreign influences' as dynamic. Both have elements of dynamism just as both incorporate obsolescent elements. 129

If the experience of Japan is instructive we should expect the new states of Asia and Africa to transform themselves by a symbiotic fusion of the cultural resources of their old societies with selected aspects of western values and institutions. 130 Japan has demonstrated that traditional societies do possess cultural resources that are amenable to the political development process. Whether other old societies possess adaptable resources that facilitate political development to the same degree as those of Japan is still an open question, for none have had adequate time to experiment with adapting their traditional institutions and values to the needs of political modernization. Japan may prove to be particularly well endowed in this regard; in Turkey the traditional social structure and culture were less suitable to the requirements of


political modernization.

IV

The view that political development in the new states will likely be characterized by a symbiosis of the indigenous and the exogenous, by a fusion of the traditional and the modern, leads to a perception of modernization as a diffusionary process in which extra-societal influences collide and are to some extent integrated with the indigenous social pattern. In adopting this view we must be careful to avoid some of the pitfalls inherent in it, especially the hypothesis that items of culture or "cultural traits" are exportable elements that flow from one society to another and are "adopted" or "rejected" in accordance with the needs of the recipient society. Mair points out that this is an oversimplified and excessively mechanistic view of social change: "An irreverent reader who has not found this scheme of study useful cannot help conjuring up pictures of salesmen meeting with sales resistance, of cultural traits spread out on a counter as housewives go shopping, or, in the metaphor suggested by the word 'mosaic', of some kind of puzzle from which pieces are taken here and there and others substituted."

131 Ward and Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, pp. 445-447.


When we think about political development as a fusion of the indigenous and the exogenous, of the traditional and the modern, we must remember that societies are not mechanical constructs comprising replaceable parts; their essence is grasped much more adequately by the metaphor 'organism'. Societies are dynamic wholes comprising nexi of social and political relationships that shape and are in turn shaped by attitudes and values, ideas and beliefs. Social change may be said to occur when the patterns of social relations are altered and take on a new or modified form. Alterations in the pattern of social relations are, in turn, a reflection of changes in social behavior and social roles. Changes in the pattern of social relations may result from an internally generated dynamic as was evidenced in the political development of England; on the other hand, they may be externally stimulated through exposure to foreign ideas and contact with foreign groups.

We are presently in the midst of the greatest period of contact among the societies and cultures of the world and the study of political development must take this into account when trying to grasp the nature of political change in the new states. The revolution in transportation and communications techniques that has grown out of the larger technological revolution in the West has become an important factor in the political modernization of the non-western world for it is leading to far greater levels of exposure between peoples. The transportation revolution has made increasingly large
numbers of people mobile giving them the opportunity for
first-hand exposure to new lands and peoples. The communi-
cations revolution has given an increasing proportion of
people everywhere an "eye on the world" and the opportunity
for constructing a "world view" based upon the image. Though
the image may be faulty and the "world view" distorted, extra-
societal awareness does take place. Members of elite groups
are likely to be most affected by such developments. Non-
western elite groups are usually the first to be exposed to
western intellectual and material culture and to be shocked
by the relative "backwardness" of their own societies' social
and technological development. Following contact the indigen-
ous elite groups and many non-elite members of the indigenous
society come to evaluate themselves in accordance with what
was once a western, but is rapidly becoming an international,
standard of achievement in cultural, social, economic, and
political affairs. Increasingly, the normative standard by
which societies and nations evaluate themselves is becoming
a world standard established by the attainments of advanced
nations in the West. The standard set by the West in indust-
rial development, technological sophistication, administra-
tive expertise, and political unification is a measure that
new states must accept if they are to survive as fully quali-
fied members of the international system.

134 "Up to a point all societies must adjust to the his-
torical facts of our era, and they must adapt their economies,
societies, and polities to the world system and the world
culture. Thus we can see that the under-developed countries
are sharply limited by their own historical experience in
being introduced into the world community and by their con-
tinuing need to preserve their identity and sovereignty in
The emergence of the new states has been accompanied by and is connected with the development of a supra-national society and culture that has been emerging concomitantly with the technological revolution in transportation and communications. The new "world society" and its attached "world culture" is not a juridical entity but should be identified by the attitudes, values, and norms its members share; it is a collectivity defined by common life-styles and social outlooks. In the words of Pye "... it does have a degree of inner coherence, and it is generally recognized as being the essence of modern life. It is based upon a secular rather than a sacred view of human relations, a rational outlook, an acceptance of the substance of and spirit of the scientific approach, a vigorous application of an expanding technology, an industrialized organization of production, and a generally humanistic and popularistic set of values for political life." The world culture is the culture of an elite stratum whose members are likely to have more in common with their fellows, who may be nationals of distant nations, than with their pre-modern countrymen. Thus, emerging simultaneously with the world

the world community of states.

All this is to say that there is a minimum level of what were once Western but are now world standards which the new states must accept if they are to survive in a world of independent nation-states. Thus the international political and cultural fashions of the day set the general direction of development for the new states." Lucian Pye, "Democracy, Modernization, and Nation Building", Self Government in Modernizing Nations, ed. J. Roland Pennock, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 15.

135 Ibid., p. 15.
culture is an international system of social stratification based upon the separation of people according to modern or pre-modern life-styles.

The horizontal stratification of international society is not a new phenomenon; witness the European aristocratic class of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries that transcended national boundaries. Emerson has written that "On the European stage the class differences prior to the 19th century were so great that often no national linkage was acknowledged across the class lines, as religious differences have at other times and places overrides national ties. Mme. de Stael spoke of the French nobility finding its compatriots among the nobles of all countries rather than among its fellow citizens in France..." What is new is the criterion by which the international elite stratum is identified — modern life-styles — and the extent to which members of such a stratum can be found around the globe. This creates a paradox in political development for while modernization requires elites possessing advanced political, administrative, and technological skills, nation-building requires the development of closer ties between elites and masses and the mobility of the latter for national goals. Social mobilization, without reliance upon force and coercion as in the Chinese case, requires communication and understanding between urban elites and the mass of rural peasantry so that the latter might be induced to

share the values and make the commitments that national unification and the legitimacy of the central government requires. One of the major obstacles to political development in the new states is the great social, psychological, and spatial gap that separates the modern urban elite from the traditional rural mass.

V

There is in the development of the new states the prospect that they may acquire the characteristics of the developed nations of the West. This is not to suggest that they will mirror the social and political life of western nations but one should expect that at least some of the great diversity which has for so long characterized man's social universe will likely disappear. The experience of Europe, the United States, and the older Commonwealth nations as well as that of Japan suggests that modern life sets limits upon variety in the ideological, behavioral, and structural dimensions of societies. The extent of these constraints is, of course, not exactly known. Bendix believes that the mix of modernity and tradition involved in the development process permits considerable diversity among advanced nations. "Important as industrialization is as a factor promoting social change, and similar as many of its correlates are, the fact remains that the English, French, German, Russian, or Japanese societies are as distinguishable from each other today as they ever were." 137

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Strauss admits the possibility of a relatively uniform social life for modern societies but denies its certainty, feeling that there may be a "principle of diversity" in mankind's social life that regulates uniformity among nations. "It is quite possible that there is a regulating principle in mankind, what I would call a principle of diversity, which will make it compulsory for differences to appear within this world-wide society to compensate to some extent for its uniformity....The tremendous development of communications makes it much easier for the younger generation to build up a culture of its own different from the culture of the previous generation. So in that case we will still have diversity to work with. It will not be exactly the same kind, but it still will be diversity."

While social and political development may involve the reduction of diversity for the social observer, such need not be the case for the participant. Modernity opens a world of diversity to the village or tribal peasant whose traditional society confined him to a humdrum and limited existence. From the viewpoint of those trying to break into it, modern social and political life offers far greater opportunities for choice and variety in social relations. Modernity offers traditional man the possibility of making choices between valued alternatives: the chance to innovate and explore, to break the confining norms of tradition. Social and political development opens up heretofore unimagined vistas of choice in human

affairs, greatly increasing the possibility for "participant
diversity" while at the same time reducing the "diversity of
the spectator".

The degree of spectator diversity permitted by modernity
is a matter for conjecture and will only be ascertained ex
post facto. For those who lament the "westernization" of man's
social and political life some reassurance is offered by
Deutsch who reminds us that western civilization is itself an
amalgam of diverse elements.

What we call today Western civilization is in a very real
sense a World civilization, not merely in what it brought
to other countries, but also very significantly in what
it received from them. Perhaps its 'Western' peculiarities
lie, then, not only in its ability to originate, but also
in its ability to innovate, that is, to learn actively
from others. All these traits of creativity and of the
ability to learn are present in all great civilizations
of the world, and the West here, too, has perhaps gone
faster and farther on a road travelled to some extent by
all. 139

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This section has examined some broad conceptual aspects
of the political development process by tracing the origins
of the political development idea, by outlining a typology of
significant traits of political modernity, and by dealing
with the process of becoming politically developed from the
perspective of evolutionary and diffusionary theory. In the
next three chapters our focus will narrow to an analysis of
several principal instruments of political development in the
new states.

139 Karl Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent
Patterns of Political and Social Integration," World Politics,
PART II

INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW STATES
CHAPTER IV
ELITES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

No new state will modernize itself in the present century without an elite with force of character and intelligence. No new state can modernize itself and remain or become liberal and democratic without an elite of force of character, intelligence and high moral qualities.

Edward Shils

The foremost problem of political development in the new states is nation-building. In Europe nations developed gradually over the course of centuries as commerce, communications, and a common lingua franca spread within various regions. The European style of nation-building was evolutionary and the slow maturation of the human community we designate "nation" was accompanied by a parallel growth of ideas and beliefs about the nation.

No nations have been born outside Europe except Japan whose island insularity and cultural homogeneity made her the only non-western country to begin the assault on modernity as an integrated national society. The first "new nations" were fragments of Europe established in new geographical areas while virtually all new states have been grafted to old Asian

and African societies internally divided by ascriptive particularisms of assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion, or custom. Such particularisms constitute a fundamental obstacle to the growth of national sentiment - a feeling of community and identity extending outward beyond the village, tribe or region embracing the entire populace of a politically demarcated geographical area. The new states are divided by an equally serious social and geographical "gap" that separates the usually educated, westernized, and urban elite at the apex of the social structure from the mass of illiterate, tribal, and village peasantry at the bottom.¹⁴¹ This gap that divides the populations of new states is at once geographical and social. It is geographical since it involves the separation of city and town dwellers from the great majority of people who still reside in the country. It is social in two respects: it involves the separation of individuals who have adopted, more or less

¹⁴¹ Shils states that: "This 'gap' in the structure of territorial loyalty and in the class structure is paralleled by the wide divergence in the styles of life and the associated outlooks of those with a modern ('Western') education and those without it. There is nothing quite comparable in Western countries, where the least and the most educated are educated in the same language and share, to some extent, certain important common symbols. Even in Great Britain, where the most educated are still unlikely to have passed through the same educational system as the less educated, they have at least been educated in the same language; and for the years in which both classes were at school, there were certain common elements in their course of study and in the culture of childhood. This is not so in the new countries, where the mass of the population has not been to school at all." Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, Gravenhage, The Netherlands, Mouton, 1962, pp. 17-18.
completely, western values, tastes, and life-styles from those who have not; and, it involves the separation of rulers and ruled. In the new states the political separation of elite and mass which corresponds generally to the separation of rulers and ruled has resulted from the creation of an instrumental political system that absorbs most, if not all individuals who are sufficiently educated to perform the administrative and technical roles that the pursuit of modernity requires.

This gap - between city and countryside, modernity and tradition, elite and mass, rulers and ruled - identifies the social and political structure of the new states and offers a clue to the nature of their politics. The marked social and geographical distance between rulers and ruled distinguishes the politics of the developing areas from modern democratic or totalitarian politics. A fundamental characteristic of modern democratic polities is the vast and complex organizational "infra-structure" comprising an array of interest groups that constitute the connective tissue of the body politic. Most contemporary totalitarian political systems bridge the gap between rulers and ruled with a massive political party that effectively carries out socialization, education, and communication functions aided by regular organs of the mass media. Without developed political infra-structures the democratic model remains out of reach in the new states while the intensity of primordial sentiments in what are essentially plural societies and the limited development of the communications media inhibit
realization of the totalitarian model. Although mass political parties are common in the new states and Marxist ideology fashionable, an outright commitment to the Soviet or Chinese models is seldom made. Thus, we are left with a transitional political process that inclines toward totalitarianism and Marxism employing mass political parties as mobilizing instruments but stops short of the Soviet or Chinese models and assumes the characteristics of what might be called populist elitism.

Politics in the new states are populist in that elites desire and strive for popular support; they are elitist since genuine political participation is confined to individuals at the apex of the social structure. Transitional politics are restricted to elite groups, especially intellectuals and the military, and are increasingly characterized as one-party, one-man rule.

I

Etymologically, the word "elite" originally meant to choose, and came to connote the best choice or a class of individuals with "superior qualifications". Kerstiens suggests that "It is the notion of superiority that in many cases leads to the identification of the term 'elite' with one particular elite, which is superior in the political

sense, that is, the governing elite." For Bottomore a political elite is a small group "... which comprises those individuals who actually exercise political power in a society at any given time." It is possible to speak of high ranking bureaucrats, army officers, intellectuals, colonial administrators, and industrial managers as elites and in many historical and contemporary societies elites such as these have sometimes become politicized and transformed into political elites. In the contemporary new states fewer elite groups exist but most, if not all, tend to become politicized since, in Apter's words, "Politics becomes itself society rather than any part of it." When we speak of elites in the new states we refer to the "... new political elite, which after independence; claims special solidarity acceptance because of its leadership in the struggle for liberation, and ... tends to widen its leadership from the political to the economic and social fields. It tries 'to direct all the social developments of the


144 Bottomore states that: "The extent of the political elite is, therefore, relatively easy to determine: it will include members of the government and of the high administration, military leaders, and, in some cases, politically influential families of an aristocracy or royal house and leaders of powerful economic enterprises." T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society, New York, Basic Books, 1964, p.9.

country, especially the raising of the standard of living and the development of new occupations and the mobility within them."\textsuperscript{146} 

Among the most highly politicized elite groups in the new states have been the revolutionary and nationalist intellectuals and the military. The military has been an important political force in the Middle East and North Africa where there has been a tradition of political activity and rule by the officer cadre and is of increasing importance in tropical Africa where five military coups recently took place.\textsuperscript{147} While acknowledging the growing importance of military elites in the new states, our analysis will focus on the role played by intellectuals in political development. Two qualities identify intellectuals as an elite group in the new states: the high status attributed to their members that reflects the importance of their role as leaders in the fight for independence; and, the extent to which their members exhibit attitudes, tastes, and behavior equated with modernity. In much of contemporary Asia and Africa the new ruling elites are revolutionary and nationalist intellectuals who inherited the mantle of colonial rule.

\textsuperscript{146} Kerstiens, \textit{The New Elite in Asia and Africa}, p. 8.

II

The rapid erosion of the legitimacy of colonial rule following World War II led to the creation of political vacuums in many old societies of Asia and Africa. The vacuums created by the waning legitimacy of colonial rule could not be filled by traditional authorities who had frequently collaborated or cooperated with colonial rulers as exemplified in the British practice of indirect rule. Apart from indigenous intellectuals, who were alienated both from colonial and traditional authorities, there were no groups with sufficient status to fill such vacuums.

In so many of the colonial countries, the princely dynasties were in decay, their powers and their capacities withered.... Chiefs and princes squirmed under foreign rule; they intrigued and schemed, and at times even resorted to arms, but they organized no political movements and they espoused no ideology. They sought only, when they protested, to retain or regain their own prerogatives. There were no great noble families producing, in generation after generation, courtiers and ministers who with the emergence of modern forms of public politics moved over into that sphere as of right, as they did in Great Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The traditional intellectuals, the custodians of sacred texts, usually... had no political concerns... there was no profession of politics which men entered early, usually from some other profession, and remained in until final and crushing defeat or the end of their lives. There were very few merchants and industrialists who out of civic and 'material' interest took a part in politics on a full or part-time scale.... There was and there still is scarcely an endogenous trade union movement which produces its own leaders from within the laboring class.... There was no citizenry, no reservoir of civility, to provide not only the audience and following of politics but the personnel of middle and higher leadership. In short, if politics
were to exist at all in underdeveloped countries under colonial rule, they had to be the politics of the intellectuals.148

If the intelligentsia were the chief adversaries of colonial rule, it was the structure and operation of the colonial system itself which contributed to the creation of an intellectual cadre bent on its overthrow. By either providing or permitting the education of indigenous youths colonial regimes that sought to train such personnel for minor clerical roles in fact estranged them from their traditional attachments without providing alternative sources of status, income, and influence within the colonial system that could satisfy their felt need for dignity and self-respect.149 The occupational structure of many colonial regimes did not permit status-satisfying employment for individuals who had made their way through the missionary school system and, in some cases, through local and even foreign universities. This disequilibrium in colonial systems - the training of individuals in administrative and technical skills without a corresponding increase in the demand for indigenous persons with such skills - led to the creation of a significant group of mal-employed intellectuals who were naturally hostile to regimes that had encouraged their education without making provision for their employment


149 Ibid., pp. 331-332.
in satisfactory positions upon its completion. These mal-employed intellectuals which it was in the nature of colonial regimes to produce became a preponderant factor in their ultimate downfall.

Intellectuals not only developed an emotional hostility to colonial regimes, but in the course of their exposure to western political ideas which was a socializing by-product of their formal education, they acquired distinctive political attitudes and skills which could be used against such regimes. A significant number of individuals travelled abroad - usually to England, France, or the United States - in search of higher education and greater exposure to western societies. During such sojourns abroad they often imbibed or had reinforced their own egalitarian sentiments and nationalistic ideas. "The London School of Economics in particular," writes Shils, "... has probably contributed much more to the excitation of nationalistic sentiment than any other educational institution in the world. At the School of Economics, the late Professor Harold Laski did more than any other single individual to hearten the colonial students and to make them feel that the great weight of liberal Western learning supported their political enthusiasm."

More important than the acquisition of democratic, nationalistic, and socialistic ideas advanced by western

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150 Shils, World Politics, p. 337.
academics committed to Asian and African self-government were the nationalistic and often clandestine organizations formed by the students themselves. For some students, the acquisition of organizational skills and the excitement of clandestine political activity were placed before the desire for an education. Nkrumah's experiences abroad are suggestive: "My purpose in going to London was to study Law and, at the same time, to complete my thesis for a doctorate in philosophy." As soon as I arrived in London, therefore, I enrolled at Gray's Inn and arranged to attend lectures at the London School of Economics. It was here that I met Professor Laski when he lectured there in political science, a subject in which I was keenly interested.... In spite of this, it was only a matter of weeks before I got tangled up with political activities in London. As in my American days, I associated myself with all political movements and parties...\[151\] Out of such emigre student activity developed nationalistic consciousness and the organizational and propagandistic skills necessary for the creation and direction of political movements that could press for self-government.

Moreover, such western educated individuals often exhibited unique attitudes toward their own societies, the West, and politics in general. Western education and socialization may produce "assaulted" intellectuals who

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have tasted the fruits of the developed West, yet are unable
to deny the inherent worth of their own society without
denying a part of themselves. Westernized and committed
to the modernization of their societies, these intellectuals
turned to political activity as the key to colonial overthrow
and the development of a modern society. Nkrumah's admonition
was apposite: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all
things shall be added unto you." Politics was viewed as
a panacea, as the most efficacious means not only for over­
throwing colonial rule but for developing a modern society
afterwards.

Dedicated to the goal of self-government, imbued with
western political beliefs - nationalism, socialism, demo­
cracy - and armed with the organizational and oratorical
skills of the political revolutionary, some Western educated
intellectuals returned home to work toward ousting the
colonial regimes. Political parties were shored up and

152 Mary Matossian writes that: "The first problem
of the 'assaulted' intellectual is to assume a satisfactory
posture vis-a-vis the West. The position taken is fre­
quently ambiguous, embracing the polar extremes of xenophobia
and xenophilia. The intellectual may resent the West, but
since he is already at least partly Westernized, to reject
the West completely would be to deny part of himself. The
intellectual is appalled by discrepancies between the stan­
dard of living and 'culture' of his own country, and those
of modern Western nations. He feels that something must
be done, and done fast..." Mary Matossian, "Ideologies of
Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities",
Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John
given greater coherence and effectiveness or were started anew. In the Ivory Coast, for example, a number of small political organizations were forged toward the end and immediately following the Second World War. These "electoral alliances" were "... designed to elect leaders to the offices made available to Africans as a result of reforms in the colonial system." The most significant was the Syndicat Agricole Africain, organized and led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a French trained doctor who renamed the movement the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire and by dint of exceptional political skill and some good luck succeeded in winning widespread support. In the Gold Coast the War was also accompanied by political reforms instituted by the colonial regime. These led to the formation of the United Gold Coast Convention whose leaders sought the return of Nkrumah from London to become secretary and chief organizer of the movement. "A capable organizer and a sophisticated politician, he became a popular idol almost overnight. His objective was immediate self-government, and toward this end he threw his energies. His acquaintance with Marxism and his abilities as an orator gained him a following among the young, the disadvantaged, the disillusioned, and the ideal-

Nkrumah's success in transforming the United Gold Coast Convention into an effective political movement with affiliated youth organizations and an ideological programme - "Positive Action" - was more than its moderate leaders bargained for and led to the formation of his own mass movement - the Convention People's Party - composed mainly of his youthful followers.

In these and similar parties elsewhere, highly politicized intellectual elites played on the feelings of unrest and discontent of ex-servicemen who had experienced higher standards of living while serving in colonial forces abroad and acted upon the frustrations of under-employed youths who had failed to secure satisfactory clerical posts and were unwilling to do menial labour. Many youths who had had their taste for modernity and socio-economic betterment whetted by the elementary education that colonial systems encouraged were among the first to develop hostility to those systems, lending their support to the political movements fashioned by their better educated countrymen. In the Gold Coast many young people were recruited by the nationalist


155 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 171. In his autobiography Nkrumah writes: "The idea of a political party as such never occurred to them (the moderate leaders) and the party system was alien to them. In fact one of my numerous so-called crimes, according to my political opponents, is that I have introduced the party system into the country." Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, p. 57.

156 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 165.
movements to serve as a bridge between the leaders and the partly acculturated individuals that a successful independence movement required. 157 The rise in anti-colonial sentiment that was fed by nationalist, socialist, and Marxist newspapers became a convenient weapon for focusing the hostility of such groups upon the colonial presence. As one historian of colonialism put it: "Anticolonialism... was an emotion that could be felt by all, and it could be and was exploited to the full to drive out the colonial powers, a definite and attainable end." 158

By shaping and organizing effective nationalist political movements, by formulating specific programmes of political action and carrying them out, by activating and directing the hostility of partly acculturated segments of society at the colonial authorities, and, finally, by playing on the moral sensitivities of western rulers and weakening their resolve in maintaining the status quo, nationalist intellectual elites succeeded in ousting or inducing the withdrawal of almost all European powers from the Afro-Asian world.

157 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 165.

III

Successful in removing colonialism from much of Asia and Africa, the nationalist intellectual elites assumed the mantle of rulership in their new states. After a brief period of euphoria derived from the sense of accomplishment that accompanied the realization of the right to rule and the anticipation of building the promised land, the new elites confronted the very real difficulties involved in consolidating their authority in fragmented traditional societies and the immense problems involved in their transformation into modern nation-states. The skills and tactics of political agitation so successful in the fight for independence were found to be less useful in establishing national rule and modernizing backward societies.\footnote{159}

It is of course true that most nationalist movements were not met with an institutional \textit{tabula rasa} at independence.

\footnote{159 We refer to the oratorical, agitational, and demagogic skills that revolutions inspire and probably require but which inhibit the development of the stable and effective institutions that political modernization depends upon. This point has been made by Shils who writes: "The first condition of the establishment of a modern political order is the creation of an effective administration, stable institutions of public opinion, modern educational systems, public liberties, and representative, deliberative, legislative institutions. These are the prerequisites of the growth of a polity, of an order to which the inhabitants of the sovereign territory will feel they belong and to whose authorities they will attribute legitimacy. Demagogy, or rhetorical charisma, which used to be called "rabble-rousing" and is now called "mobilization of the masses", sometimes appears to be a short cut to this objective. But in its attempt, by flamboyant oratory and the display of a radiating personality, to incorporate the mass of the population into a great national effort, it almost always arouses the more clamorous}
"They took over particular structures of central and local government, systems of law and education. They assumed responsibility for the direction of economies which had been developed in particular ways to meet particular demands during the colonial period." However inadequate they were for purposes of nation-building and modernization, the new elites did inherit institutions from colonial regimes that had to be "worked" if order and continuity in law and administration were to be maintained during the immediate post-independence period. In India the problem was less serious since the colonial bureaucracy had been penetrated to a considerable extent by indigenous personnel. In Africa, on the other hand, virtually all important technical, economic, educational, and administrative offices were held by whites; the indigenous Africans had barely succeeded in reaching the lowest echelons of the institutional structure. In Ghana, Nkrumah tried to solve the problem by inducing overseas among them to demands and expectations which far exceed the possibility of fulfilment. It tends to encourage the 'masses' to believe that the occasion of their persistently or momentarily felt grievances results from the deliberate action of the demagogue's opponents. Thus it causes commotion; it produces changes which are only of the moment; it generates conflicts which impede the growth of a progressive, modern political order. Far from being a short cut, demagogy is one of the greatest menaces to the political development of the new states." Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States", Communications and Political Development, ed. Lucian Pye, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 64.

officers to remain for a temporary period offering them compensation for loss of their careers when a programme of africanization was complete. However, in Ghana as in most new states, the indigenization of the bureaucracy was actively pursued in response to patronage pressures and for the psychic gratification it gave which outweighed any of the "costs" that might be brought in its train. And the costs were real enough: "Whatever other ends have been achieved," writes Coleman, "... the rapid departure of trained and experienced staff, and the sudden massive input and rapid promotion of largely untrained and inexperienced indigenous staff, unquestionably meant a drop in efficiency."  

The discovery by the new elites of what Apter calls the "natural conservatism of cultures" - the very real difficulties encountered in the attempt at overcoming societal fragmentation and the social, economic, technical, and administrative obstacles to rapid modernization - were often met by a political response. "It is characteristic of new nations that, having won their freedom through political action and having taken over from civil service oligarchies responsible for the major activities of social life and welfare, they should


continue to view progress in purely political terms."\(^{163}\)

Since "political" action had been the key to the achievement of national independence the new elites were often inclined to rely upon it in nation-building and modernization. But the techniques developed for overthrowing an alien ruler were not designed to solve post-revolutionary problems of government; the skills of revolution were not the skills required in governing and transforming a society.

Pre-independence politics in the new states had been oppositional politics. "It was," writes Shils, "... the opposition of politicians excluded or withdrawn from the constitutional order, who accepted neither the rules nor the ends of the prevailing system."\(^{164}\) The intellectuals and nationalists who fought to oust colonial regimes from Asia and Africa came to view political action as a struggle with an illegitimate adversary. Politics was the art of opposing and overcoming alien adversaries and inheriting the right to rule. After independence it was often discovered that the problems of rulership could not be resolved quickly by the application of past political techniques and the oppositional temperament inclined some ruling elites to seek out and identify opponents accused of obstructing nation-building and development. Those usually identified were: "neo-colonialism"; disaffected intellectuals and politicians

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in opposition parties; and traditional authority structures. Sometimes all were linked together as the obstacle to progress:

As the nationalist struggle deepens in the colonial territories and independence appears on the horizon, the imperialist powers, fishing in the muddy waters of communalism, tribalism, and sectional interests, endeavour to create fissions in the national front, in order to achieve fragmentation. Ireland is the classic example, India another. The French dismembered the Federation of West Africa and that of Equatorial Africa. Nigeria was broken into regions and is anticipating further partitions. Ruanda-Urundi has been fragmented with independence. Because we in Ghana survived pre-independence attempts to split us, the British foisted on us a constitution that aimed at disintegrating our national unity. The Congo, hastily invested with independence, with malice aforethought, immediately became the battleground of imperialist-fomented division.

These are all part of the policy of intentional balkanization of Africa for manipulation by neocolonialism, which in effectiveness can be more dangerous to our legitimate aspirations of freedom and economic independence than outright political control.165

The perception of hostile adversaries bent on the destruction of the nascent nation often led to the justification of one-party or one-man rule in the new states. Authoritarianism seems more acceptable, and therefore more legitimate, when justified by reference to covert forces of division and dissension that threaten, or are perceived to threaten, the regime. In this sense authoritarianism may facilitate the creation of national identity without succeeding in laying the foundation for an enduring sense of national solidarity.

The nationalism of oppositional politics is a beginning, but only a beginning, to the establishment of a common consciousness, of a common feeling of affinity with others who together comprise the populace of a new state. "It is... true that the mere carrying on of an extended and concerted struggle is in itself a significant factor in the creation of national sentiment, but a more basic identity is necessary if the national unity is to endure. The sense of belonging together through the experience of a common history and of facing a common destiny is not something which can be created overnight."166

The formation of new states is therefore often followed by what Lipset calls a "crisis of legitimacy".167 In a sense the minimum condition for the establishment of a nation is the creation of an authority which commands not only obedience but also allegiance from individuals subject to it. If political development requires the mobilization and reorientation of great numbers of people to perform new social and political roles then the political directives that seek to alter their behavior should be acceptable to them. That is, such directives - rules, decisions, policies -


should be regarded as legitimate to have their desired effect.\textsuperscript{168}

The discussion of legitimacy in the political development of the new states is usually premised on Weber's typology of authority. It will be recalled that Weber identified three grounds upon which the legitimate exercise of authority may rest: (1) the grounds of tradition, when political authority is obeyed because "they are our rulers and we have always obeyed them"; (2) rational-legal grounds, when political authority is obeyed because of its adherence to a system of rules which has been popularly accepted and agreed upon; and (3) charismatic grounds, when political authority is obeyed because of the exceptional qualities or gifts believed to be held by the leader.

Many students of the new states have remarked how legitimacy often rests on the charismatic appeal of the leader. Pye has been struck by the prevalence of charismatic leaders in non-western politics and speculates whether they will be succeeded by the institutionalization of rational-legal authority or by confusion and chaos. "The critical factor seems to be whether or not the leader encourages the development of functionally specific groups within the society that

\textsuperscript{168} Of course the crisis of legitimacy is not so much of a problem in political systems that rely upon coercion and the threat of violence or terror for the enforcement of political rules, as is the case with totalitarian polities, although it is doubtful if a system of authority could be maintained by the application of coercion and terror alone.
can genuinely represent particular interests." In Ghana, the charisma of Nkrumah has been viewed by Apter as providing an organizational unity to overcome pressures of local separatism while channeling political energies into nation-building activities. With respect to the general African situation, Wallerstein views the charismatic leader as a symbol of the nation who "... legitimates the state by ordaining the obedience to its norms out of loyalty to his person.... The charismatic justification for authority... can be seen as a way of transition, an interim measure which gets people to observe the requirements of the nation out of loyalty to the leader while they (or their children) learn to do it for its own sake."  

As a transitional stage from a traditional and/or alien-rulled society to one based on rational-legal authority, charismatic leadership has not been confined to the contemporary new states. Lipset has argued that even for the "first new nation" this transitional period was bridged through the application of charismatic authority in the person of George Washington. "The early American Republic, like many of the new nations, was legitimized by charisma. We tend to forget


170 Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. 303.

today that, in his time, George Washington was idolized as much as many of the contemporary leaders of new states."^172 However, Lipset goes on to state that unlike many of these contemporary leaders, Washington resisted pressures to become an autocrat by withdrawing from the presidency while still in good health and thereby permitted the institutionalization of rational-legal procedures proclaimed in the Constitution. 173

It is remarkable how many political analysts of leadership in the new states have utilized the concept of charismatic authority in accounting for the legitimacy of their political elites. This may have resulted from the applicability of the concept to many new Asian and African countries; that is, the concept may "get at" something germane to their political systems. However, there does seem to be a tendency for many analyses to either (1) create charismatic leaders where they cannot be found; or (2) attribute too much to charismatic authority, regarding it as "functional" when it may well obstruct nation-building and the political development process.

Many analysts seem to search for charismatic authority to explain the apparent legitimacy of some regimes. But in West Africa, argues Lewis, "... only a minority of... Presidents or Premiers have wide charismatic appeal in their

own countries." The authority of most West African rulers is not based on legitimacy at all, but on "... the oppressive tactics which so many Presidents use." Moreover, where charismatic leadership is identified as the primary ground for political legitimacy it may be due more to the weakness of either traditional or rational-legal norms than to the strength of the leader's appeal. Kennedy may have had as much charisma as Nkrumah, but Ghana was without the institutionalized rational-legal grounds that political authority rests upon in the United States.

Moreover, some charismatic leaders have striven to establish their connections with traditional sources of authority presumably to bolster their acceptability and legitimacy. In his autobiography, Nkrumah explicitly alleges his lineage relationship as a descendant of an early Akan chief, Aduku Addaie, whose sister gave birth to his matrilineal descent group, the Anonas. It is interesting to quote Nkrumah for he cannot prove this relationship though he feels compelled to assert it: "She [his mother] ... related in detail the history of my ancestors, of the chief Aduku Addaie, the first of my forbears to settle in Nzima centuries ago, whose sister Nwia gave birth to my matrilineal line. She also told me of my claim to two stools or chieftaincies in the


175 Ibid., p. 3.
country, those of Nsaeum in Wassaw Fiase, and Dadieso in Aowin. I took notes of all that she told me and always carried them with me until one day I lost them in a New York subway."176 When the political elites of new states feel compelled to acknowledge the value of traditional authority, customs, and practices they do so for the legitimacy these confer. New elites are interested in the symbolic and ceremonial aspects of the tribal past so that the emotional commitment these engender may be utilized in support of their regimes, their policies, and themselves. Thus, when Nkrumah became the first President of the new Ghanaian Republic in 1960 he took his oath on a traditional tribal sword and addressed the House of Assembly seated on a throne whose design was based upon that of a traditional Akan stool while outside the chamber tribal music played.177

Apart from perhaps overcoming the temporary "crisis of legitimacy" following independence, charismatic authority may be of little value for the institutionalization of rational-legal norms with which political development is identified. Lipset reminds us that in the United States it was the willingness of Washington to step down from his pre-eminent position of leadership that hastened the emergence of a rational-legal system. In the contemporary new states,


Shils believes that "Charismatic personalities do not ordinarily build the institutions which are indispensable for carrying on the life of a political society." 178 Indeed, recent political changes in the new states - in Ghana and Indonesia, for example, where charismatic leaders have been deposed or have had their authority curtailed for corruption, political ineptitude, and excessive personal aggrandizement - lend credence to the view of Lewis that charismatic leaders are no substitute for the institutional controls that developed political systems use to harness the drives of ambitious politicians without risking the dangers of their corruptibility and self-interest: "... a political system which relied mainly on the public service instincts of politicians would have absurd results. The test of a political system is not ... whether the self-declared aims of the politicians are noble enough to justify their means. It is rather whether the system contains a set of controls adequate to enable society to rid itself of unworthy operators." 179


178 Shils, Political Development in the New States, p. 40.

While charisma may engender the minimum amount of legitimacy necessary for the temporary continuity of public order and administration following independence, it hardly seems sufficient for establishing the legitimacy of policies that require cooperation from large sections of the public over long periods of time in connection with plans that may well be unpopular, requiring major alterations in socio-economic behavior and considerable personal and material sacrifice, as, for example, with forced savings for capital accumulation. Charisma is at most a temporary palliative in political development in the new states, not a long-term asset. Weber himself pointed to the inherent instability of charismatic authority and was concerned with understanding the manner in which it could become "routinized", into either traditional or bureaucratic institutions.180 Charismatic leadership seems to arise when the usual rules and norms that guide social and political relations are no longer accepted by significant groups of individuals. While charismatic authority may provide a temporary basis for legitimacy in such situations, its very success in so doing might be the source of difficulties in instituting impersonal legal authority based upon rational norms afterwards. For, by relying on an emotional basis for authority, charismatic

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leaders, perhaps unwittingly, at the same time discredit the idea of the impersonal rule of law that a rational-legal system rests upon. Thus, far from being a means to the development of a rational-legal system of authority, as some theorists suggest, charismatic leaders may in fact turn out to be one of the major impediments to the establishment of an institutionalized system for the conduct of political and administrative affairs in the new states.

What, then, does political development require of elites in the new states? It requires, in the first place, governing, administrative, and legal skills to operate a modern institutional system based upon rational-legal legitimacy rather than emotional manipulative techniques and leadership charm. It requires, secondly, that ruling elites possess, or acquire, civic attitudes of service, tolerance, and restraint in their efforts at inducing individuals to change their behavior; in re-orienting them to the new social, economic, and political roles of nation-building and modernization. In this sense, elites must be willing to at least accept, if not encourage, divergent political expressions, to tolerate political opposition, to accept the disinclination of many to change without reliance upon the simple expedient of coercion when plans seem thwarted either by the inertia of masses or the resistance of oppositions. Conciliation and compromise should be the bywords in elite competition and elite-mass relations in the new states. Finally, political development requires that elites first encourage the
development and then accept the constraints of political institutions and the impersonal rule of law that regulate political relationships in rational-legal systems. We agree with Lewis that "Social organization tries to harness personal ambition to public service by making it difficult to achieve social esteem (money, prestige) except by serving the public need" but recognize that effective institutions must be worked by individuals who not only accept, but have a deep attachment to them. We have outlined the emergence and role of intellectual political elites in colonial systems, difficulties surrounding their inheritance of the instruments and power of the colonial state, and their attempts at nation-building and modernization. In the next two chapters their use of ideologies and political parties in their approach to these goals will be discussed.

CHAPTER V
IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

It is... precisely at the point at which a political system begins to free itself from the immediate governance of received tradition, from the direct and detailed guidance of religious or philosophical canons on the one hand and from the unreflective precepts of conventional moralism on the other, that formal ideologies tend first to emerge and take hold.

Clifford Geertz

While it is sometimes argued that ideology is coming to an end in western democratic political systems, that ideological conflict is being replaced by widespread consensus over the distribution of scarce values - power, status, wealth - and the acceptance of the pragmatic bargaining process involved in their allocation, most analyses of developing nations are replete with references to the importance of the various "isms" in the political process of these societies.

Whether colonialism or imperialism, nationalism or socialism, Marxism or fascism, few discussions of politics in the new states are undertaken without mentioning the influence of ideologies. But the analysis of ideologies need not necessarily imply theorizing about the role of ideology in the political process. Unfortunately much of the literature dealing with developing political systems is of the former variety - it does not seek to present an analytical account of the ideological variable in the
political process but rests content with providing a descriptive, and often biased, interpretation of such "illegitimate" ideologies as nationalism, communism, imperialism, and so on. However, the renewed interest in an objective and comparative social science has resulted in a concern with abstracting ideology as a sociological phenomenon in developing societies and, even more, with theorizing about ideology as a general category of analysis.182 This chapter will explore the relationship between ideology and political development in the new states in this more strictly analytical sense; first, by discussing its meaning and usefulness as a category for political analysis both generally and in the context of political modernization; second, by examining the social conditions which usually accompany the emergence of ideology as an important sociological phenomenon and by discussing the general functions attributed to ideology in societies possessing such conditions; and finally, by reviewing the ideological responses of elites to the problems posed by colonial rule, nation-building, and modernization.

As an organizing principle for the analysis of selected aspects of social and political behavior, the concept of ideology is clearly a controversial one. No sooner had the term been coined - by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy in 1801 - than it was subjected to abuse by Napoleon who referred to it as a "dark metaphysic". This pejorative meaning given to the concept has never been lost, indeed as Geertz notes, the dominant conception of ideology in contemporary social science is still an evaluative one. Marx and Engels viewed ideology as a "false consciousness" or "illusion" of reality held by members of different social classes. Ideology, they argued, had a way of turning one's view of the world "upside down", a result of the historical and social situation of the individual, of his social milieu. "If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process." This idea that all social and political thought...


reflects the social position of the actor was carried forward by Mannheim who tried, but did not completely succeed, in constructing a concept of ideology that was entirely non-evaluative. 186

The difficulty of many social and political theorists to treat the analysis of ideology in an objective and non-evaluative way has led some modern researchers to eschew the concept altogether. 187 The rapid acceptance of the concept "political culture" by many political scientists seeking to explain why some societies are supportive of certain political institutions and practices while others are not has tended to supplant the use of ideology as an analytical concept. 188

Much of the discussion of ideology seeks to define it in terms of what it is. For Loewenstein, ideology is "... a consistent and integrated pattern of thoughts and beliefs, or thoughts converted into beliefs, explaining man's attitudes toward life and his existence in society, and advocating a conduct and action pattern responsive to, and


187 In a recent article Converse writes that "A term like 'ideology' has been thoroughly muddied by diverse uses. We shall depend instead upon the term 'belief system'...." P. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter, New York, Free Press, 1964, p. 207.

commensurate with, such thoughts and beliefs." ¹⁸⁹ And Friedrich describes ideologies as "... sets of ideas related to the existing political and social order and intended either to change it or to defend it." ¹⁹⁰ However, rather than define ideology by seeking to explain what it is, greater insight can be attained by asking the more astute question: What does ideology do?

What, then, are the functions of ideologies? For Friedrich they are "action-related systems of ideas" that unite individuals into purposeful social and political organizations. "The ideology is a set of ideas which unites a party or other group for effective participation in political life." ¹⁹¹ For Apter ideologies perform two main functions in society: "... one directly social, binding the community together, and the other individual, organizing the role personalities of the maturing individual." ¹⁹² Both Friedrich and Apter point out the dynamic property of ideology and its function of providing solidarity for social collectivities.


¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 89.

moreover, notes the importance of ideology in shaping the political orientation of individuals.

Apter and Loewenstein see ideology as a link between the political thoughts and the political action of groups, parties, and classes. From this perspective, ideologies are patterns or systems of political thoughts which help shape the actions of individuals and groups who hold such thoughts in common. Of course, rather than adjust their behavior to an ideology, some groups may do just the opposite. Moreover, to view ideologies as the links between thought and action is not to deny that other factors may intervene. Both personality factors and institutional norms may "deflect" ideologically conditioned behavior to some extent. It is precisely at this point that we can begin to see why ideologies as guidelines for social and political behavior are important in new states; for the normal institutional controls usually provided in the traditional culture have been weakened, throwing both collective and individual roles into disorganization.

In a perceptive article drawing on philosophical analyses of the function of symbols in social behavior, Geertz has formulated a concept of ideology as a symbol or cultural system. In his view, symbol systems or culture patterns "... are 'programs'; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes,
much as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organic processes."\(^{193}\) Unlike other forms of animal life, what distinguishes man is his possession of culture: a system of symbols which supplements the very broad control of his behavior by intrinsic genetic programmes. Human behavior, as Geertz reminds us, is very plastic and, to be effective at all, must be controlled to a significant extent by cultural or symbol systems. Ideology is such a system which helps orient man to the political aspects of his social life: "The tool-making, laughing, or lying animal, man, is also the incomplete - or, more accurately, self-completing - animal. The agent of his own realization, he creates out of his general capacity for the construction of symbolic models the specific capabilities that define him. ... it is through the construction of ideologies, schematic images of social order, that man makes himself for better or worse a political animal."\(^{194}\)

Should we conclude that political man is perforce ideological man? Geertz suggests a negative reply. The politics of traditional societies are non-ideological for a differentiated political structure has not yet emerged and the unified and integrated system of culture is still adequate

\(^{194}\) Ibid., p. 63.
to define the total system of behavior in these societies. Traditional culture prescribes the political behavior of men in a more or less complete and unambiguous way; there is little room or need for the formulation of an autonomous cultural system or ideology. But, when traditional culture begins to weaken, either due to internally generated changes or to external culture contact, the way is opened for the appearance of ideologies. 195

Periods of rapid social and political change are productive of disruptions or strains in social and political behavior which have the effect of disorienting individuals. "It is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located." 196 Ideologies replace the obsolete images of reality contained in the traditional culture with images that claim to more adequately grasp the meaning of the new situation, permitting effective action for the disoriented individuals and groups. Ideologies enable individuals to think about and deal with politics in a way meaningful to them. For the political

195 Geertz, *Ideology and Discontent*, p. 64.
196 Ibid., p. 64.
analyst it matters less that the thought model might be inaccurate or deceptive—as with a good deal of Marxist ideology—but that it is meaningful for the disoriented individual enabling him to "perceive" the outlines of the emerging political order and his place in it. It is this claim of ideology to "unlock" the mysteries of the social and political universe for men that probably goes a long way toward accounting for the intensity with which, once acquired, ideologies are often held.

II.

Ideologies are for political men what much more sophisticated and far less value laden conceptual models are for the social scientist—symbol systems or thought models that permit an "understanding" of social and political reality. This should not be surprising if it is recalled that earlier conceptual models held by social scientists were very often what would today be referred to as ideologies. The best example of this is Marxism which has been called both a social science and an ideology. ¹⁹⁷ But, ideologies also differ sharply from the conceptual models of contemporary social scientists, for in addition to providing an understanding of the phenomenal world, they prescribe a course

of action or programme for either the preservation or alteration of that world. They are prescriptive as well as cognitive; they establish guidelines for behavior and provide the moral imperative for taking the prescribed action.

Once it is recognized that ideologies are both explanations of reality and prescriptive imperatives for social action, we are in a position to explore their links with social change and more specifically political development as a species of social change. Not all symbol systems are ideological, only those which contain specific programmes designed to sustain or change the existing order can properly be called ideologies. That is to say that the broad cultural systems of traditional societies cannot be called ideologies since they contain no action programmes that are the product of the speculations of any ideologue or group of ideologues. As symbol systems and action-oriented programmes, ideologies were and are the product of attempts by some men to perceive the nature of their society and the manner in which it might either be sustained or altered. But societies had to begin to change, and to be perceived as such, before men could formulate action programmes which sought to preserve them as they were or change them further.

Social change, or more exactly the disorientation caused by social change, made ideology necessary, for the individuals affected by change could no longer establish their individual
and social identities by reference to a system of symbols that could not be demonstrated to accord with reality. The theory of the divine right of kings could only have force if it could be demonstrated to reflect the structure of the real social order. When that order changed, as it so abruptly did in France in 1789, its supporting ideological apparatus had to be altered as well since it no longer defined the roles and relationships of classes and groups nor provided them with a meaningful explanation of the social world. "The reason why the French Revolution was, at least up to its time, the greatest incubator of extremist ideologies, 'progressive' and 'reactionary' alike, in human history was not that either personal insecurity or social disequilibrium were deeper and more pervasive than at many earlier periods - though they were deep and pervasive enough - but because the central organizing principle of political life, the divine right of Kings, was destroyed."\(^{198}\)

When it is suggested that the social changes which accompany early modernization require a supporting cultural system, there is no wish to imply that all members of society have become disoriented and are in need of a new symbol system that can reestablish their \textit{raison d'être} and provide them with a new collective myth. Only those affected by

\(^{198}\) Geertz, \textit{Ideology and Discontent}, p. 64.
the social changes are in need of a new symbol system. In Europe, the first class to need an ideology in response to the disorientation of early modernization was the urban bourgeoisie who had become detached from the culture and society of the rural community. The protestant ethic, which legitimated and indeed made a virtue of entrepreneurial activity, and the liberal theory of the state provided many European bourgeois with the ideological re-orientation they required. The second wave of men affected by modernization was the urban proletariat who were literally forced off the land - in England, as a result of the enclosures - and into the new cities to perform the industrial roles that the nineteenth century capitalist system required. The tensions, shock, and disorientation that accompanied such forceful industrial mobilization led to a search by proletarian leaders for a new ideological system which would first, reestablish the identities of the landless peasantry pressed into industrial labour and, second, provide a programme of action to change the existing order and elevate urban labour to a position of dignity and security. Ideologies were forthcoming, and various brands of utopian socialism appeared, to be succeeded later, by Social Democracy or Marxism.

In our own day, the socio-psychological strain accompanying the emergence of the new states has given rise to a small but increasing number of individuals who, disaffected
from traditional culture, no longer possess "... a sense of being at home in the universe." This sense is lacking either because the institutional and normative framework of their traditional societies have become weakened usually through contact with a technologically superior society or because they have left, by choice or coercion, the security of their traditional society for the increased opportunity and excitement of the intruding modern and urban society. Ideologies are sought by such individuals to replace an inadequate traditional culture and permit an orientation to the emerging nation-state, its institutional apparatus, and, above all, its authority structure. For these individuals, ideology is compelling since it purports to unveil the form of the system that is emerging and reveal the shape of the political future.

This claim of ideology to provide a diagnosis of political discontents and a prescription of the future made it a particularly efficacious instrument of political control in the developing areas. Ideology could be used by elites to identify a colonial adversary, to outline the form and content of the emerging nation, and to indicate the alterations in social, economic, and political behavior required

by modernity. These are its positive functions stressed in the contemporary literature of political development, but there are also negative ones that the literature tends to ignore. If ideology can be used by elites to alter and control the behavior of individuals for goals subsumed under the term "political development", it can also be used (and frequently is) to consolidate the political control and tyranny of autocrats over individuals in the new states. Ideology, like most social or technological innovations, can be used for good or ill, as its manipulators choose.

However ruling elites choose to utilize ideology - whether to help bring about the development of a national and modern society or to entrench an oppressive tyranny - ideologies in the final instance act to legitimate the policies and regimes of its manipulators. Before the revolution, ideology was illegitimate and often clandestine; after independence it becomes legitimate and itself legitimizes the social order it helped bring about. In the new states this stage has not yet been fully reached; the colonial regime has been evicted and self-government attained but the revolution is still unfinished, the nation has yet to be created, the society modernized. The ideology that helped mobilize the resources and energies required to oust the colonial regime may be found wanting when directed toward the more demanding tasks of nation-building and modernization. Ideologies of national independence movements
are usually negative and simplistic; they point to the unwelcome intruder and call for his removal while probably only affirming the equality of all people and the rights of self-determination. They are, in a word, anti-colonial and pro-freedom without being much else. Nation-building and modernization require new emphases, new guidelines for behavior, new moral precepts, new, or at least altered, ideologies.

III

It is possible to identify at least three ideological responses of elites to the challenges posed by nation-building and modernization: the adaptation of elements of the traditional culture as was the case in Japan and parts of South Asia, notably India; the utilization of nationalism, common in virtually all parts of the contemporary developing world; and, finally, the adaptation and application of socialism (including Marxism).

The use of traditional culture patterns to facilitate the alterations in behavior and attitudes necessary for nation-building and political development has the advantage of providing continuity for the modernization process. If the traditional culture contains adaptable and dynamic

200 The Indian case must be regarded as an exception where the Congress developed a highly sophisticated ideology of colonial overthrow.
elements that can be used in the construction of a development ideology there is an advantage in utilizing them, for the necessary tensions and shock which inevitably accompany the modernizing process will perhaps be reduced. An example of such an element is the concept of dharma in the Sanskrit tradition of India, which as we shall see in a moment, seems to be accommodative of social and political change.

However, suitable traditional concepts are often inadequate or are lacking in some states necessitating the utilization of exogenous ideologies. The most common of these is nationalism. Nationalism is the ideology of the new nation, of the fight for independence from colonial domination and the establishment of national sovereignty. Nationalism is the ideological vehicle that helps orient individuals to the newly created nation-state, shaping new roles and attitudes that accord with the institutional apparatus of that state. But to be sovereign is not enough, to be a nation is not enough - one must be developed, one must be modern in order that survival in the contemporary international system of states is assured. "Development is not an ideology, but it embodies hope and a positive notion of the future.... The ideologies employed in development seek to transcend negativism and to define hope in programmatic terms."201

In many new states socialism is the ideology of modernity; it defines the future and claims to know the path to that

201 Apter, Ideology and Discontent, p. 16.
future. Socialism embodies the plans however faulty and the hope however inflated for the modern future; and places the acquisition of modernity within the foreseeable rather than the distant future.

Concepts about the social and political universe contained in the traditional culture may prove advantageous for the formulation of developmental ideologies. Some traditional societies have possessed cultural resources that were adapted to the goals of modernization. The best instance of this is traditional Japanese culture which contained elements particularly well-suited to the ideological requirements of modernity. Some elements in traditional Indian culture may also facilitate the psychological and behavioral re-orientations that modernization seems to require, though not to the same degree as in the Japanese case.

Traditional, that is pre-Restoration, Japan was particularly well endowed with cultural resources amenable to political modernization. We have already mentioned how a traditional institution - the Emperorship - was resurrected and given new life after 1868 providing a focal point for the development of a national identity that nation-building seems to require. "Japan," writes Scalapino, "... unlike some parts of the non-Western world, did not come into the modern world tabula rasa, and therefore the legacies of the
past were certain to colour the new order." Indeed, Ward argues that while the 1868 Restoration is normally regarded by historians as the beginning of political modernization, the threads of the process reach far back into the Tokugawa period. The latent institutional and attitudinal preparation, especially exemplified in the accomplishments of Tokugawa education and the spread of literacy in pre-Restoration Japan, paved the way for the more manifest political modernization which followed the Restoration. "When evaluating the modernization of Japan, it is useful to keep in mind this long, complex history of covert preparation from which the society benefited." 

Japan's island insularity and ethnic and linguistic homogeneity also aided in the creation of a national sentiment long before the beginning of the so-called modern period. In terms of ethnic composition, Japan is reported to be 99.3 percent homogeneous. "The contemporary Japanese... inherit a myth of national unity at least twelve hundred years old. Despite the fact that much of the history of this period


204 Ibid., p. 582.
was marked by localism, civil strife, and the emergence of powerful clans and nobles with high degrees of independence within their own territories, the tradition and forms of national unity and of a Japanese state have always been maintained. The period of "primitive unification", to use Organski's phrase, was attained prior to the Restoration; the latent national sentiment was there and the re-institutionalization of the Emperor provided a symbolic fixation to reinforce the level of unification that had already been attained. "Nationalism either preserves an identity that is carried over from the traditions of the past or creates a new set of attachments centering on the modern state." Japan is clearly an example of the former case - a vision of the nation preceded the modern period, making nation-building an easier task for the traditional elite entrusted with the responsibility for her development.

The achievement in education and literacy, the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, the national focal point provided by the symbol of the Emperor, the implicit nationhood of Japan - all were lacking in India at national independence. At first glance, traditional Indian society and culture would

seem to contain few elements that could be adapted to the modernization process. "When we examine the social institutions which have developed in India," writes Bondurant, "... we are struck by the highly formalized, rigid, and time-honoured demands which bind upon the individual and which often burden him." However, behind the apparently rigid social structure are traditional concepts which would seem to permit experimentation and innovation in social relations. "... the value structure of traditional Hindu India is ... socially rigid and conservative, but spiritually experimental and dynamic, the two standing in such relation that while the one provided almost too much stability to the social structure, the other provided plenty of innovation and change and mobility, but only in restricted fields of human endeavor." Bondurant takes "spiritually experimental and dynamic" to include "intellectually experimental and dynamic" as well. She argues that the traditional concept of dharma - which has a number of meanings including duty, virtue, law, justice - includes the notion of the spiritual and intellectual freedom of the individual and his capacity to innovate and experiment with ideas. "The key to social

209 Ibid., p. 7.
revolution is to be found by noting the manner in which this spirit of freedom and speculation and creativity which characterizes the intellectual heritage of India can be and has been extended to the institutional structure; the key to political change in modern India may be found by analyzing the manner in which this approach was applied to the problems of a subject nation."\(^{210}\)

The concept of dharma, by extolling the virtues of the religious and intellectual experimenter, could be, and was, used by Ghandi and others to re-interpret the traditional cultural system of India without overthrowing the past. In the words of Bondurant:

The accommodative characteristics of the dharma concept has allowed for change without overthrow of basic principles. We find here, then, everything which is necessary for the transvaluation of values. Within such a conceptual framework, revolution - even in the political sense - may be effected without the shock of violence. New values may be introduced through reinterpretations, and through the transformation and not the overthrow of earlier precepts. This is what happened in the Ghandi era. \(^{211}\)

This concept and others enabled an astute nationalist elite to adapt traditional cultural elements to the political needs of the independence movement and overcome British colonial domination in the sub-continent. That these concepts aided in the acquisition of national independence seems clear; that

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\(^{211}\) Ibid., p. 10.
they will be as useful when applied to the problem of
nation-building and modernization is less certain.

Unlike the old countries of Europe and Japan, most of
the new states of Asia and Africa were unable to begin
their assault on modernity as nations. In Europe nations
evolved gradually, almost organically, within the framework
of a common cultural and linguistic tradition. Professor
Strayer has traced the roots of European nation-states to
the barbarian regna which arose following the collapse of
Rome. In the West, nations evolved more by chance than
design, almost as a result of a series of historical acci­
dents; in the developing areas, especially in the post-
colonial developing world, attempts are being made to contrive
them out of the disparate particularisms that fall within
arbitrarily drawn boundaries inherited from the colonial
era. Nowhere is this more true than in tropical Africa.

In the vast intervening stretches of black Africa,
the usual assumption is that each of the new states
which has been inherited intact from the colonial
regimes is the breeding ground of a new nation, but
these states are singularly arbitrary and recent
creations which, up to the moment of independence,
might have been given a different form and which may
still undergo drastic change. Certainly, they were
not brought into being because of the cultural homo­
geneity and traditional unity of the people composing

212 J. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-
Building in Europe", Nation-Building, ed. K. Deutsch and
them; each was made up, in very varying degrees, of disparate ethnic groups forced into a single political form by the imperial power.\textsuperscript{13}

The fundamental difference between the process of nation-building in the new states as opposed to the historical experience of the West has led Foltz to conclude that "The old argument over the priority of state or nation is being resolved by these countries' leaders in favour of first building the state as an instrument to bring about the nation."\textsuperscript{214}

As the cultural system that defines and legitimizes the nation, nationalism has differed between the old and new states. Nationalism followed or developed concomitantly with the nation in the West. "In the Western world, in England and in France, in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, in the United States and in the British dominions, the rise of nationalism was a predominantly political occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future national state, or, as in the case of the United States, coincided with it."\textsuperscript{215} Nationalism in the West could take the nation for


granted; in the new states it is confronted with the task of aiding in the creation of one. Taking the nation for granted, nationalism in the West could act as a conservative force that sought to protect it. In the new states nationalism is radical, it seeks to create a nation by projecting a vision of it for all to see.

In the developing areas elites use nationalism to provide disoriented individuals with a visual image of the nation-state that, hopefully, is to be. Prior to independence nationalism was used to mobilize individuals in the anti-colonial struggle by projecting an image of freedom, equality, and improved economic well-being after victory. But more than mobilizing individuals to act - in fact only a minority of individuals ever participate directly in the fight for independence - nationalism mobilizes their emotional support and commitment to the cause creating a sentiment for independence among far larger numbers of individuals than those actually participating. Nationalism also establishes a relationship, not organizational but psychological, a relationship of empathy between the mass of partly acculturated individuals and the nationalist elite. In so doing, nationalism serves as a bridge between the authority of the nationalist elite and the individuals imbued with the nationalist vision. The compelling nature of the image of the post-independence future that nationalism projects makes it a significant force in aiding the overthrow of colonial regimes.
Immediately after independence, nationalism passes through its apotheosis as, in the words of Apter, "... parochial and personal interests pale before the accomplishments of independence." Ostensibly, the image projected by nationalism prior to independence has now materialized in the acquisition of power by the nationalist elite and in the formal creation of the state; the ideology appears to have transmogrified its vision into the structural apparatus of the new state. The euphoria that normally accompanies independence is a temporary phenomenon however, and begins to wane with the realization that the acquisition of self-government and the inheritance of the institutional apparatus of the colonial regime does not radically transform the socio-economic conditions of society. The manifestation of utopia is temporary, and following independence it rapidly recedes again into the future. The acquisition of the right to rule and the inheritance of the colonial machinery of the state has preceded the creation of the nation; the nationalism which was successful in colonial overthrow and in establishing an emotional relationship between the new elite and their mass following must now be applied to the task of creating a national community.

Compared to the problems posed in nation-building and modernization, the task of achieving independence was relatively easy. Independence resulted from a battle between

adversaries which could be fought and won; the enemy could be identified and routed. Nation-building and modernization are creative activities, not destructive ones, requiring sophisticated skills and responsible attitudes. It is easier to mobilize the activities and emotional commitments of individuals in the struggle against an easily identified colonial adversary than to construct nations or organize an assault on modernity. In the fight for independence a simplistic, and therefore compelling, nationalism diagnoses the malady, identifies the disease, and prescribes the cure. The malady is economic and social backwardness, the villain colonialism, and the cure is revolution and self-government. The simplistic pre-independence nationalism fulfills its promise; victory is achieved; the colonial regime overthrown.

The mobilizing skills and resources developed in the fight for independence are found wanting when applied to the problem of nation-building and modernization. Nationalism is nevertheless retained. But the post-independence situation it seeks to define is fundamentally different from the pre-independence era. No longer are the villains the colonial regime, indeed, the most likely candidates for that appellation are the vague and covert threat implied in the term "neo-colonialism", hostile counter elites, and the traditional authorities or tribal past.
In spite of the tendency to maintain the pre-independence nationalistic fervour by identifying covert threats to the newly established regime, post-independence nationalism is vaguer and less compelling. It is easier to identify with a movement bent on overthrowing a highly visible colonial enemy than to maintain the commitment long after independence has been won even if new threats are perceived. The temporary apotheosis of nationalism following independence is often succeeded by disillusionment born out of the belated awareness that the promise of a material utopia is still a long way off. Thus in Africa Wallerstein notes "There was a touch of the utopian hope characteristic of every revolution, even when nationalist movements were peaceful and unmilitant.... And there were many in all African states who thought that freedom meant the end of social control or the immediate radical redistribution of wealth. The cadres of the nationalist parties may not have had such naive expectations, but it is understandable that among the peasants or uneducated urban dwellers such illusions existed. Even if these illusions were only momentary, unfulfillment meant a sense of disappointment. Independence was not magic."217

In defining the new nation and the path to modernity the old nationalism must be revamped and supplemented by ideological elements more supportive of nation-building and

development roles. Post-independence nationalism must be redefined from one of enmity and hostility to an alien order to one of affection, respect, and loyalty to the new regime. Since this is no mean task, since, as Wallerstein reminds us, the leadership elite "... cannot assume a residual loyalty to the state among the majority of its citizens", there is a temptation to revert to the displacement of hostilities on real or imaginary enemies, to indulge in charismatic politics, or to resort to tyranny and oppression.

Nationalism in the new states is often supplemented by socialism. Nationalism can define the nation, its organizational and symbolic components, and relations between rulers and ruled but it cannot define modernity. In this sense, nationalism is less an ideology than socialism. Socialism purports to define modernity; in its various forms it does outline a programme and the procedures involved in modernizing a society. In the new states, socialism is attractive because it relies on the apparatus of the political system as the central mechanism for the attainment of modernity. By emphasizing the importance of government in the modernizing process, socialism enhances and affirms the pre-eminent position of the new ruling elite. In this sense socialism legitimizes the new ruling elite and their policies and in so doing becomes "... the ethic for a system of political

Strictly speaking, socialism is less a political ideology than an economic one. It visualizes and tries to institutionalize a concept of the economy in which the government is directly involved in most of the major economic, especially industrial activities. This distinction is perhaps less usefully applied to the new states where the political system dominates and permeates the social and economic life of the society so completely, yet it does point to the need for ideology to orient individuals to new economic roles, to equip them with an ethic of hard work and sacrifice. In the underdeveloped societies of the twentieth century, socialism attempts to perform the same function as the Calvinism of an earlier age: it seeks to legitimize and give impetus to secular economic roles that facilitate development. It was Weber's contention that the worldly ethic of Calvinism promoted hard work and thrift and in so doing oriented individuals to the secular world equipping them with a moral imperative.


220 Dahl states that there is a "tendency to confuse political and economic systems" and that this stems from "ignorance of the historical origin of these terms". Historically, the terms 'democracy' and 'dictatorship' have usually referred to political systems, whereas 'capitalism' and 'socialism' have referred to economic institutions...." Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 7-8.
to fulfill their worldly role by unstinting and diligent effort. The effect of Calvinism, Weber argued, was to "trigger" capitalist development. Whether the protestant ethic can be sustained as the "primary cause" of the behavioral and attitude changes that a capitalist "take-off" required is not our concern; what we do wish to emphasize is the view that religious and ideological systems can re-orient persons, persuade them to perform, and sustain them in new economic roles.

In the new states socialism is being used by elites to emotionally equip individuals for modernizing roles. Socialism is attractive to ruling elites for several reasons. In the first place it emphasizes rationality and a planned and systematic approach to development. Rationality is regarded as the behavioral and normative key to successful modernization; rationality is equated with efficiency and efficiency is often thought to be the touchstone of advanced societies. Socialism emphasizes a planned assault on the problems of social backwardness; social and economic planning come to be regarded as a panacea for the ills of


222 Apter states that "... socialism offers a set of unified developmental goals, that stress roles functional to modernization and the achievement of a workmanlike, rational society in which people lend one another a helping hand
underdevelopment. Most of the new states have their plans—five year, seven year, ten year—and the activity of planning becomes a significant aspect of the assault on modernity. However, planning can become an end in itself. Frequently the new states are found to be only in the first stages of their plans; when old plans fail to realize the development they predicted they are often replaced with new ones. Thus, planning may become a ritual in the new states devoid of the real substance of development.

Socialism is even more attractive to elites for the emphasis it places on the political system as the central instrument for developing a society. The state establishes the goals, sets the priorities, and then takes upon itself the task of bringing modernity about. Moreover, by affirming the paramount position of the state in society, socialism concomitantly affirms the pre-eminence of political roles. Political leadership roles are accorded high status and legitimacy by socialist ideology making it especially attractive to political elites.

Perhaps the most attractive feature of socialism for ruling elites is its association with modernity itself. This may well be due to its emergence later than capitalism as an ideology and its association with rapid economic development, first in the Soviet Union and now in China. Socialism,
particularly its Marxist variant, stresses the importance of science; indeed the latter goes as far as claiming scientific validity for its own tenets. Science carries great prestige, especially for individuals confronted with the demanding task of modernizing backward societies. By laying claim to the scientific validity of its own tenets and by projecting a vision of a socialist society purported to be based upon scientific principles, Marxism confers on those who espouse the ideology the status of "social scientist" and enhances their role as "social engineer". Marxism makes its advocates not only the exponents but the architects and builders of a modern society. Converts are made by its assertion of claims to scientific validity and by transforming an almost universal wish for modernity into a prediction that only Marxism can bring it about and in the shortest possible time. Doubtless many leaders in the new states find it difficult to resist the temptation Marxism offers - that it is able to transform a wish into a reality.

IV

But ideology, like charismatic leadership, is not a panacea for political development in the new states. It performs a number of functions for an emerging political order, yet at the same time, its contributions to nation-building and modernization are limited, mainly, to the psychological and cultural realm of political behavior.
Ideology is an interim measure for the development of a broader set of cultural values, symbols, and myths that come to be held by the national populace, rather than by only the members or sympathizers of a political movement or party who have set themselves the task of building a nation and modernizing a society. As cultural systems, ideologies seek to establish the identities of mobile and disoriented individuals in emergent nations and the psychic bonds that might unite them for common political action. They help men perceive the outlines of the emerging nation and the locus of authority in that nation. Permitting a vision of the state, ideologies serve authority by legitimizing the political system, the new indigenous ruling elite, and its actions and policies. In addition, ideologies seem to embody a moral imperative as well. They prescribe types of social activity that are deemed necessary for the order they seek to institute; and the social activity so prescribed is sanctioned as right and proper.

However, the final test of an ideology is its effectiveness in institutionalizing the political order it prescribes. That is, the norms and behavior sanctioned by an ideology should materialize in the formation of new roles and social structures. In the words of Loewenstein, "... to be effective a political system 'institutionalizes' its political ideology. Ideologies materialize themselves in the political institutions
and techniques corresponding to them. The ideology of
democratic equality will rationalize itself in either refer-
endal or genuinely representative institutions and techniques,
both premised on universal suffrage and the free choice of
alternatives. The ideology of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, on the other hand, institutionalizes itself in
the single party and the technique of compulsion applied to
public opinion managed from above." 223

In many of the new states, this has so far not happened.
Ideologies abound, but their institutionalization into con-
gruent political patterns has not occurred. In the new states,
ideologies frequently seem to be employed solely to secure
the entrenchment of regimes and compliance with the personal
whims of rulers. But, if the order that ideologies in the
new states prescribe is not actively sought by ruling elites,
their ideologies will come to be regarded as worthless
fictions of a future that political leaders do not sincerely
seek to bring into being and the regimes themselves, the
leaders, and their policies will be discredited. Political
development requires ideology and the serious intents of
ruling elites; without some attempt at implementation, ideo-
logies lose their attraction to subject adherents and thus
their capacity to influence social behavior.

223 Loewenstein, *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 6
(December 1953), p. 698.
Ideologies are not the sole influence governing the pattern of social and political relations in a society. They are cultural systems, but they are only cultural systems and as such are subject to the limitation of all cultural systems in ordering social behavior; they rely on moral suasion. Individuals do not behave as they do for reasons of culture or ideology alone. Behavior is also directed and controlled by more explicit means such as authority and social organization. Therefore, the alterations in social and political behavior that modernization requires are in part engendered by other non-ideological means of political direction and control. In the new states, two of the frequently mentioned mechanisms that aid in this task are interest groups and political parties. The next chapter deals with some of the relationships between groups, parties, and political development.
CHAPTER VI

GROUPS, PARTIES, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In all societies of any degree of complexity the individual is less affected directly by the society as a whole than differentially through various of its subdivisions, or groups.

David Truman

In modernizing systems... parties are rarely limited to the more or less passive role of transmitting private wants to the makers of public policies. Nor are they aggregative devices, collecting varying expressions of want, belief, and outlook in some faithful manner. Quite the contrary, the political parties of a modernizing society play an active entrepreneurial role in the formation of new ideas, in the establishment of a network of communication for those ideas, and in the linking of the public and the leadership in such a way that power is generated, mobilized, and directed.

David Apter

One of the more striking differences between traditional and modern societies can be observed by contrasting their geographical and social dimensions. Traditional societies, especially pre-literate simple ones, are usually characterized by their geographical and social "smallness": the scale of social relations is restricted, very often, to face-to-face relations and prolonged and intimate interaction among a limited number of individuals, permitting political decisions to be reached by a direct dialogue between rulers and ruled. In developed societies, on the contrary,

political distances are usually much greater necessitating the use of intermediate mechanisms to link rulers with ruled; in most modern societies politics has long ceased being a direct relationship between governors and the governed.

Transitional societies are identified, among other things, by an expanding social universe and an increase in the scale of social and political relations. The limited social universe of the tribe or village is transcended as individuals become mobilized and re-oriented to the larger emerging social order. The universe of the city is larger than that of the village; the universe of the emerging nation-state is greater than that of the tribe or traditional society. The urban dweller is drawn into a variety of relationships - economic, social, religious, political - with the specialized sub-units of the emerging structurally differentiated and functionally specialized urban society. The world of the city is larger and more complex than that of the village and the boundaries of the emerging nation-state extend well beyond those of the traditional society, involving great numbers of individuals in an extensive and complex web of relationships. Social and political scale increase concomitantly with modernization.

The social structure of transitional societies is discontinuous and characterized, as Shils has noted, by "gaps" between the new ruling elite and the traditional or partly acculturated mass of ordinary individuals; between the
relatively modern urban dweller and his rural counterpart in the countryside. Modernization increases social and political scale, but not in a continuous or uniform fashion, so that discontinuities occur in the ensuing network of relations that emerge. Consequently, a fundamental task of political development in the new states is the building of bridges between the mass of illiterate peasants or partly acculturated townsmen and the modern ruling elite. Geographical distances are overcome by the development of communications and transportation systems—roads and railways, river and air transport, telegraph and telephone networks, radio and television. These have the effect of contributing to a reduction in social distances by permitting increased mobility and bringing individuals into greater contact with one another. But developed societies overcome the problems posed by increases in social scale by sociological as well as technological means. Modern societies have dealt with the sociological problems of increased scale by developing complex organizational structures which link the individuals at the periphery of society with the centres of power and authority. Modern society is large-scale society; it is also, and for this reason, organizational society.

While modernization involves increases in social and political scale, it is also accompanied by social
fragmentation and atomization which are closely linked with urbanization and the social and geographical mobility urbanization implies. Mobility from country to city, from a relatively close-knit and integrated peasant or tribal culture disrupts traditional social ties. But once in the city, mobile individuals have the opportunity of meeting with one another and re-establishing affective social ties, either on the basis of kinship or tribal links common to early modernization, or on the basis of perceived common interests. Wolin has argued persuasively that the fragmentation which accompanied the forced mobilization and urbanization of nineteenth century European peasantry led to a search by their articulate spokesmen - the intellectuals and social philosophers - for a new basis upon which the affective ties of community could be re-established.

"... the political and social thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries largely centered on the attempt to restate the value of community, that is, of the need for human beings to dwell in more intimate relationships with each other, to enjoy more affective ties, to experience some closer solidarity than the nature of urbanized and industrialized society seemed willing to grant."

Modern society is organizational society, modern political society possesses a complex organizational infrastructure which links individuals to each other and to the state. In a democratic society the organizational basis is associational and voluntary; in a totalitarian one it tends to be coercive and is enforced by the power of the state. In a democratic society functionally specific interest associations emerged more or less autonomously and operate more or less independently from the state, making claims on the policies and actions of the state in return for support and legitimacy. In a totalitarian society functionally specific interests exist, usually organized on an occupational principle, but they act primarily to serve or effect the directives of the party and to create support for the regime without making legitimate public demands. Presumably, demands are made in the Soviet political system by various, probably economic, organizational units but they must of necessity be of a covert, non-public nature since the regime is ideologically committed to deny the possibility of conflict in Soviet society.

The organizational and associational basis of modern political societies has often been remarked upon. Tocqueville was clearly struck by the ubiquitous nature of associations in America when he wrote: "In no country in the world has
the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in America. Besides the permanent associations which are established by law under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private individuals .... In the United States associations are established to promote the public safety, commerce, industry, morality, and religion. There is no end which the human will despairs of attaining through the combined power of individuals united into a society."^{226}

First Bentley and then Truman made the associational nature of modern democratic political societies the basis for a compelling theory of politics as the interaction and conflict of competing interest groups.^{227} The development of interest associations and the group basis of political life was viewed by Truman as a world-wide historical development linked with structural differentiation and technical specialization:

... the vast multiplication of interests and organized groups in recent decades is not a peculiarly American phenomenon. The causes of this growth lie in the increased complexity of techniques for dealing with the environment, in the specializations that these involve, and in associated disturbances of the manifold expectations that guide individual behavior in a complex


and interdependent society. Complexity of technique, broadly conceived, is inseparable from complexity of social structure. This linkage we observe in industrialized societies the world over. In the United States the multiplicity of interests and groups not only has been fostered by the extent of technical specialization but also has been stimulated by the diversity of the social patterns that these changes affect and by established political practices such as those that permit ease and freedom of association. Diversity of interests is a concomitant of specialized activity, and diversity of groups is a means of adjustment.228

Political development in the new states is often seen as a need to create effective organizations to mediate between the newly mobilized and politicized "citizen" and the administrative and political instrumentalities of the new indigenous state.229 With Africa in mind, Burke has argued that political development depends, to some extent, on the capacity of Africans to "sociate" with one another; that is, to shed traditional values, beliefs, and behavior and re-group to form new solidarities that give expression to the urban and industrial values that are congruent with a modern political society.230 As Wallerstein points out, traditional societies are not without their "associations", but, unlike modern ones,


the organizational principle that serves as a basis for their existence is usually membership in kinship, caste or tribal group or age or sex set - membership which is usually neither voluntary nor associational, that is, which does not rest upon the principle of freedom of association.

But the mere existence of interest associations need not be a sufficient condition of political development. The interests that do exist must learn to make restrained demands on the political system, and ruling elites must come to accept the presence of groups that not only support, but oppose, their policies. In much of the underdeveloped world where interests do exist they are frequently based upon a total way of life and possess highly intense political convictions and personal loyalties that inhibit the development of a competitive political culture in which group

231 Wallerstein writes: "Entry into these associations was largely ascriptive (based on age and sex). Even if certain achievements were required for admittance, it was assumed that all, or almost all, persons would be able to meet the requirements. These associations were functional divisions of the tribe for the attainment of certain traditional social objectives, such as the practice of warfare, the production of certain craft articles, and so forth. The associations were few in number, and, in theory, were fixed entities. The individual did not in principle choose to enter; rather, he was assigned a certain social role which involved membership in a certain association. The associations operated on the same basis as the over-all political structure: the acceptance of traditional ways as the only legitimate activities of individuals within the society." Immanuel Wallerstein, "Voluntary Associations", Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, ed. James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964, p. 318.
conflict is restrained and rests upon the acceptance of the "rules of the game" by all competing parties. In India, according to Weiner, the case is somewhat altered. While many interests have been organized - though frequently resting on a caste, religious, linguistic or ethnic base - and many seemingly reasonable demands made, the political system is often unable to respond for lack of economic, material, and personnel resources. Bureaucrats and national politicians have shown hostility to the particularistic interests that do exist, viewing them as obstacles to rational government planning and economic development while interest group leaders, disillusioned over their failure to induce an appropriate governmental response and disenchanted with the democratic rules of the political game, have turned to political protest, civil disobedience, and more violent measures. Political development must imply more than the existence of interest groups; the interests that are organized must recognize and respect the rules of the political game making limited demands that do not tax the government in its response. Moreover, political and administrative leaders must accept the presence of organized interests as


a feature of modern political systems and learn to deal with their demands, taking action where action is possible rather than viewing them as impediments to economic development and social progress. 234

II

In the colonial situation, especially in Africa, the intrusion of imperial powers triggered the processes of urbanization increasing the social and geographical scale of relationships and the social and geographical mobility of individuals from tribal or peasant communities to the new provincial towns where the seat of colonial authority was located. "The European powers enlarged the scale of West African political units from many tribal to the present territorial ones." 235 From diverse tribal or traditional materials the European powers fashioned a new social entity - the colony - which was held together not by a common set of cultural values but by the authority of the colonial administrative structure. 236


Colonialism brought the growth of towns - administrative and commercial centres which helped give effect to colonial policy. The growth of towns *ipso facto* involved the mobility of a growing number of persons from tribal or traditional communities to the new urban areas. "The effect of the new towns is to split men into separate self-seeking atoms. But ... African townspeople find a variety of ways of linking themselves together again. This linking process, on a basis other than simple kinship, is helped partly by the existence of physical centres ... where men and women, with particular interests in common, can collide with one another: churches and chapels, schools, halls, clubs, bars, shops, cinemas. The exuberant growth of associations in African towns is a point which has often been noticed." 237

The growth of associations was in part a response to the colonial situation. In some cases urban immigrants were encouraged to form their own associations by colonial authorities who recognized their efficacy as mechanisms of social control. 238 In some cases, especially with the earliest voluntary associations in Africa, they were inspired by


European administrators acting in a personal capacity. Usually, colonial authorities were only indirectly involved in their formation, offering verbal and occasionally financial support. In other cases new associations were formed by better educated indigenous town-dwellers, as with Danquah's Gold Coast Youth Conference, which agitated mildly for improved social and economic conditions without pressing for self-government as such.

The development of associations was in part a response of new townsmen to cope with the social and psychological problems posed by urban life. Whether based upon tribal affiliation, the contiguity of residence or common interests, associations aided in overcoming the isolation of urban life. Durkheim pointed to *anomie* as a possible "abnormal" result of the division of labour in urban and industrial societies and modern sociological studies have viewed the formation of voluntary associations as palliatives for the isolation of urban living. In addition to aiding individuals in

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overcoming social isolation, some theorists see associations as cushions for the shock of transition to urban living.\textsuperscript{242} In this view, associations help socialize persons to the culture of the city, teaching them new urban values and attitudes while at the same time helping them adapt to urban mores. In the colonial context, new associations were seen to redefine their roles while at once linking them to the larger and more complex social, commercial, and administrative structure of the colonial town.

Associations are also seen to carry out important functions for the developing urban society. They often provided basic social services as in Africa where they compensated for the weakening of the traditional system of social security "... by protecting their members against the normal human emergencies - operating as Friendly Societies and Burial Clubs."\textsuperscript{243} In southern Nigeria, according to Hodgkin, service organizations were particularly ubiquitous and Improvement Unions, Welfare Leagues, Community Leagues, Tribal Unions, Patriotic Unions, and Progressive Unions were "too numerous to mention."\textsuperscript{244}

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\textsuperscript{243} Hodgkin, \textit{Nationalism in Colonial Africa}, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., p. 86.
\end{flushright}
Lastly, by carrying out important communications functions and by creating national groups comprising individuals who were linked together horizontally by new bonds of interest and activity which overcame the affinal bonds of ethnicity or kinship, associations were seen to encourage an incipient sense of national consciousness.  

While some interest groups were formed either through the encouragement or in response to colonial authorities many more were formed after World War II. "Even more than the First World War," writes Emerson, "... the Second emphasized the themes of freedom, democracy, and the fundamental rights of man - all of profound import to the dependent peoples..." And in Africa, a historian has more recently observed that "The turmoil and propaganda of World War II provided a climate of opinion and a range of new experience conducive to the rise of nationalism..." Following the war, according to Hodgkin, a number of factors including: the democratic expressions of the United Nations; the


246 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 32.

weakening of colonialism in Asia, especially South Asia; the experience of African servicemen abroad; and post-war inflation stimulated the growth of more specifically political associations in Africa.\textsuperscript{248}

The functions performed by the new associations were seen to have important consequences for the eventual overthrow of colonial governments and the acquisition of self-government. Some of them served as a training ground for the development of future political leaders by providing them with an opportunity for acquiring important organizational skills.\textsuperscript{249} In some cases associations were held to facilitate the emergence of a general political consciousness providing a wider focus of loyalty.\textsuperscript{250} Indeed, some of the voluntary associations that proliferated in Africa following World War II came to constitute the basic "... blocks of popular support

\textsuperscript{248} Hodgkin, \textit{Nationalism in Colonial Africa}, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{249} Hodgkin states: "They \textsuperscript{gave} an important minority valuable experience of modern forms of administration - the keeping of minutes and accounts, the handling of records and correspondence, the techniques of propaganda and diplomacy. In this way they ... made it possible for the new urban leadership to acquire a kind of informal professional training ...." Hodgkin, \textit{Nationalism in Colonial Africa}, p. 84.

out of which mass parties have initially been constructed."251 Thus in a very real sense interest associations were often the precursors of parties, providing the latter with skilled leaders and committed followers and, in turn, serving as the organizational links between the new nationalist elite and the small but growing number of politically mobilized individuals lower in the social structure. In West Africa, notes Lewis, "The new parties tended to be all-embracing. They swept into their fold, by affiliation or otherwise, nearly all existing organizations, whether literary societies, trade unions, village improvement societies, farmer's co-operatives, tribal unions, or anything else. Nowhere else in the world have such mass followings been gathered in so short a time."252

But to point to associations as important precursors to the formation of political parties is not to overlook the decisive effect that constitutional reform had in their emergence. In Africa, according to Coleman, constitutional

251 Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties, Penguin Books, 1961, p. 48. Morgenthau points out that this was only true of the mass parties in French-speaking West Africa: "Mass parties generally sought the adherence of every single individual.... The patron parties usually terminated their structure simply with the adherence of influential notables or patrons...." Morgenthau, Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa, p. 337.

reform was the "really decisive factor", "the precipitant", which provided for the devolution of a sufficient amount of power without complete self-government to "induce" nationalist elites to transform their movements into political parties while at the same time introducing political institutions and procedures which enabled a constitutional search for power. In French West Africa, institutional changes and concessions by the metropolitan power were correlated with the formation of parties. There, voting rights and the rights to organize political parties came only after World War II while power to legislate and execute decisions not until after 1956. Prior to 1956, parties could only legitimately perform representation functions and were excluded from real power and responsibility.

In tropical Africa, constitutional reform led to a proliferation of nationalist movements and political parties prior to independence. However, independence itself had the effect, at least in some areas, of sharply reducing the number of parties and of witnessing the emergence of single party systems or the single party dominant tendency. In many parts of West Africa, except in Nigeria and Sierra Leone,


the party holding power at independence either absorbed or suppressed opposition parties. Lewis has been critical of this development while others have sought its sociological justification. For Hodgkin, a single dominant party, a parti unique, was the only effective means that could counter the power of the colonial state and succeed in winning independence, while Wallerstein justifies its presence after independence as the only means to prevent either anarchy or military regimes or a combination of each. Legum holds a similar view: "I believe that the One-Party State is probably an inevitable transition during the period between independence and the consolidation of the 'nation-state'."

For Coleman and Rosberg, the emergence of single-party or single-party dominant regimes in tropical Africa reflects the "staggering burden" placed upon the political system following independence: "Two particularly significant aspects of the immediate postcolonial situation are (1) the heavy functional load thrown upon the new polity the state builders are seeking to stabilize and legitimate, and (2) the fact that, initially at least, the party is, or is

255 Lewis, Politics in West Africa, p. 29.


rationalized as being, the most visible, immediately available, national organization for the performance of many, if not most, of the functions involved. ... it is a fact that in the immediate postcolonial period in many African states the dominant party seemed to be the national institution most capable of performing a variety of political functions."\textsuperscript{258}

It is curious how a search for a functional explanation of the development of authoritarian single-party regimes often ends in a justification of them. This may in part be one of the more unfortunate effects of utilizing the functional model as a sociological tool for the analysis of political development in the new states. At the same time, it may reflect a double standard of political evaluation that western social observers, perhaps unwittingly, apply to the politics of the new states.\textsuperscript{259}


\textsuperscript{259} Lewis is particularly candid on this point: "In my experience, the main effect of people persuading themselves that Africans are different from other peoples is that they abandon normal standards of decent human behavior and end by thinking that anything is good enough for Africa, even though they would not for one moment consider it for Europe or North America." W. Arthur Lewis, "Beyond African Dictatorship", \textit{Encounter}, Vol. 25 (August 1965), p. 4.
III

Political development in the new states involves overcoming, or at least mitigating, by whatever means - technological, ideological, or organizational - the effects of the "gap" in the social structure, and establishing the social bonds of a newer and larger national community. Both the democratic and totalitarian variants of modern society have found a different organizational solution to this problem. The organizational solution wrought by totalitarian, notably Communist regimes, is the centrally directed re-organization of society through the development of a massive political party with functionally related but subordinate organizations which serve its needs by transmitting its directives to their members thereby deflecting behavior into patterns desired by the party directorate. The totalitarian party and its functional sub-groupings is a massive modernization instrument that attempts to direct the activities of masses of individuals in accordance with the goals established by the political elite. The democratic solution is to permit, with minimum government direction or legal restraints, the development of an autonomous political infra-structure comprising various associations and parties which give expression to the diverse interests of an open society. The democratic solution to the problems posed in the integration of a large-scale political society is a formless one - a
largely undirected political process in which interests are permitted to form and crystallize, effect demands, and compete in the distribution of scarce values in a more or less free and unhampered manner.

In the new states the desire for an instrumental political system on the part of many political elites usually results in a response to the problems posed by the "gap" in the social structure that is neither wholly totalitarian nor democratic. In tropical Africa the response has generally been to utilize single parties or systems in which a one-party dominant condition obtains for the goals of nation-building and political development although these may be either elite (cadre) or mass parties. Where political life has inclined toward centralized authoritarian control - as in Guinea, Mali, and Ghana - an attempt has been made to make the associational infra-structure subordinate to and dependent upon a monolithic party while in the more pluralistic states - Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Cameroun - the single party has not dominated the control of political life to the same degree. 260 The Southeast Asian response, if it is

possible to generalize to that extent, has been paradoxical: a number of interest associations have emerged - a development that colonial authorities apparently encouraged - but were generally confined to urban areas and thus failed to bridge the rural-urban "gap" in the social structure. According to Pye, although eighty-five percent of the inhabitants of the region depend upon agriculture they are unable to make many effective demands in the political system; the political system is an essentially urban one that usually responds only to urban interests. "This is, of course, only another way of emphasizing the extent to which the political processes of Southeast Asia are divided between the urban-dominated national level and the more traditional village-oriented levels."261

The Japanese response to the problem posed by an increase in political scale was different again. Associational interest groups and parties were at first regarded as illegitimate due to traditional hostility toward political "factions".262 According to Scalapino and Masumi "During this first era, the overwhelming number of officials, high and low, regarded them with hostility: parties at best were premature, unsuited


to Japanese society in its current stage of development; at worst, they were subversive, dedicated to overthrowing the government.\textsuperscript{263} The development of political parties was inhibited by a ruling class capped by the "institutional charisma\textsuperscript{264}" of the emperor which sought to bridge the distance between elite and mass itself. The authority structure of immediate post-Restoration Japan is not entirely dissimilar from the colonial practice which sometimes tried to link colonial decisionmakers and traditional or tribal authority structures - as with the British practice of Indirect Rule - and thereby exclude nationalist movements from power. But in the Japanese case the emergent political parties could not oust the imperial power - in this case, Meiji leadership - but could only win their toleration. Dynamic, creative leadership in the parties was not a feature of early Japanese political modernization.

While the traditional elite in Japan carried out, without the use of political parties, the preliminary organizational bridge-building of political development, traditional leaders

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in the Middle East have been less successful. Halpern has argued that the creation of a single and enduring political culture in Middle East nations will not be accomplished without the construction of effective political parties.

No other existing institution in the Middle East is capable of instilling a sense of citizenship and organizing public participation in political decisions as effectively as political parties. Only a party can be in daily contact with the constituency, teach, propagandize, or put pressure upon that constituency to adopt new ideas and patterns of action. Only a party can stimulate involvement in campaigns for literacy and higher production no less than particular political issues, and gather new talents and thus regularize recruitment into the new elite.

Political parties have peculiar advantages as instruments of social change. They are a form of organization unknown in traditional Islamic society. Hence insofar as they are not novel disguises for restricted traditional cliques, but rather truly voluntary associations operating in a public realm, they cease being organically related to the old social structure and so can move themselves and others beyond the established order.

Only parties can link leaders and masses in almost daily contact ....265

The historical intensification and expansion of political party activity in Turkey has to some extent overcome the cleavages and discontinuities characteristic of traditional Turkish society: "In general, political activity has spread from the leaders to the followers, from the elite to the masses, and from the capital cities to the towns and villages."266


266 A. Payaslioglu, "Political Leadership and Political
In Tunisia, the Neo-Destour Party has also been moderately successful in narrowing the distance between elite and mass but in this case the bridge has been both psychological and organizational. The party has succeeded in organizing political cadres to link itself with the larger society and provide a pool of "... politically sophisticated leaders who by background and education remained close to the people." In addition, a concerted effort has been made to reduce psychological obstacles to progress by transforming values, by investing social capital in schools, and by radical social reforms such as the alteration of the traditionally inferior social status of women and the redistribution of land. According to Micaud, a true "social and psychological revolution" has been accomplished by the Neo-Destour and its cadres which will, hopefully, pave the way for economic development to follow.

IV

The variety of political responses to the problems of increasing political scale and overcoming structural

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discontinuities in the new states make it difficult to generalize about the nature of political parties and develop categories for their classification and analysis. However, it does seem clear that the categories developed in the analysis of western or totalitarian parties and party systems—as exemplified in the work of Duverger— are of limited utility when applied to the political formations denoted "parties" in the new states. The problem of classifying the Neo-Destour of Tunisia has been remarked upon by Moore: "Though a well-organized political party with a mass following, the Neo-Destour is neither a constitutional mass nor a totalitarian party. The categories of Western political scientists ... cannot adequately explain Tunisia's dominant party. The Neo-Destour resembles the Congress Party of India, the CPP of Ghana, and various territorial offshoots of the RDA in French-speaking Black Africa more than it resembles European political parties. Political scientists have not yet devised a generally accepted model to characterize these newer but highly structured parties."

Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties involved, some attempts have been made to generalize about and classify

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political parties and their connection with the processes of modernization and political development in the new states. Apter has proposed that political parties be analyzed in relation to the larger socio-political framework in terms of their role as dependent, intervening, and independent variables.\textsuperscript{271} As dependent variables political parties are, in the view of Apter, affected by the total socio-political framework including the degree of modernization, the constitutional structure, and the social groupings in society which together shape their content and form.\textsuperscript{272} As intervening variables between the public and government, Apter sees political parties as organizing public opinion, and testing and transmitting attitudes to government leaders thereby permitting reasonably close accord to develop between rulers and ruled.\textsuperscript{273} As independent variables he views parties as "subgroups" in the political system with "their own means of generating power"; as such, and this is particularly relevant in the new states, the party may be the microcosm of the future society.\textsuperscript{274}


\textsuperscript{272} Ibid., pp. 181-182.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., p. 181.

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., p. 182.
Viewed as dependent variables, political parties in the new states are sometimes seen as expressions of the indigenous culture pattern. Thus, Hodgkin regards African political parties as primarily African institutions: "African political parties have to be understood as essentially African institutions - as much as lineages, age-sets, or secret societies - and in the context of the particular social systems in which they have emerged."275 In a similar vein, Morgenthau writes that "Parties were among the oldest existing national political institutions in the West African states, wholly Africanized long before governments and civil services, which still are not. Parties grew according to African specifications, for they had to and did become representative of the major forces in the total society."276

Parties are also seen to reflect western influences. Since political parties were historically a western political innovation it seems understandable that their creators in the new states have been influenced by models - both totalitarian and democratic - of political parties that developed in the West. In Africa, European mass parties of the Left either influenced some political parties as the French

276 Morgenthau, Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa, p. 330;
Socialist Party did in Senegal or were consciously used as prototypes. In Tunisia, the Neo-Destour was apparently modeled on the French Socialist Party borrowing its tactics, organization, and even its slogans.

Viewed as intervening and independent variables, political parties are often regarded as organizational instruments of modernization and nation-building. Apter believes that parties are such a critical modernizing force in most contemporary new states that frequently the "pattern of modernization" adopted is determined by them. Wallerstein has noted that in Africa, where the party and its leadership are weak, so too are the processes of modernization and national integration. And Moore believes that political parties are the only practical alternatives to military dictatorships which can marshall the "energies" that the "formidable task of modernization seems to demand".

As modernizing and nation-building instruments, political


278 Moore, Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, p. 84.


281 Moore, Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, p. 70.
parties in the new states are frequently distinguished from their western counterparts by the greater number of functions they perform. In French-speaking West Africa the mass parties "... were interested in everything from the cradle to the grave in birth, initiation, religion, marriage, divorce, dancing, song, plays, feuds, debts, land, migration, death, public order - not only in electoral success."\textsuperscript{282}

In Africa as a whole, the mass parties have frequently performed a multiplicity of functions including those of a judicial, administrative, social welfare, educational and police nature in addition to the regular electoral and parliamentary ones. "In the case of parties in opposition to a colonial regime, this is liable to mean that the party becomes, in effect, a parallel State. In the case of parties in power it may mean a blurring of the distinction between the functions and responsibilities of the party on the one hand and those of the Government and Administration on the other."\textsuperscript{283}

Perhaps the most important function attributed to mass parties in the new states is integration. Mass political parties are frequently held to be the thread of organization, authority, and legitimacy that binds the various indigenous

\textsuperscript{282} Morgenthau, \textit{Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa}, p. 341.

\textsuperscript{283} Hodgkin, \textit{African Political Parties}, p. 167.
particularisms into one common national political society. For Apter, "The fact that this multiplicity of organizations, each having some functional role to play in the community, is joined in some fashion within a political party under-scores an important function - linkage - of political parties in modernizing areas. The union of the various societies, organizations, and auxiliaries brings the highly complex but often discontinuous features of life into some kind of organizational harmony and control." 284 Others see political parties functioning to supplement leadership charisma to build national unity in the new states. In Tunisia, according to Moore, the Neo-Destour Party supplemented the charismatic appeal of Bourguiba's personality providing a training ground for political cadres and a forum for the discussion of political issues. 285 In North Africa and the Middle East the party has been viewed as an important factor in the achievement of political unity and a viable political society: "A political party offers an opportunity for binding together four forces which can ... create a viable political culture: charisma, ideology, organization, and accountability to an increasingly larger constituency." 286


However, others have disagreed about the integrational value of mass parties in the new states. In connection with West Africa, Lewis has argued that the single mass party is bound to fail as an effective instrument of political integration because it requires a homogeneous, stratified society devoid of ethnic or regional particularisms. According to Lewis, the plural nature of West African society does not provide these conditions:

One of the odder claims made for the single-party system is that it offers stable government; more so, for example, than coalition government. This is not so. West African single-party government is highly unstable.... All the tensions and conflicts of the society come to be concentrated in the struggles of the upper hierarchy of the party, whose members become identified with conflicting interests and policies. When these tensions become too great, the leaders turn upon each other, with deadly violence.... Absence of an alternative party means not only great instability in the governing party but also grave errors of policy, because decisions are made without using all available advice. ... the single-party thus fails in all its claims. It cannot represent all the people or maintain free discussion; or give stable government; or above all, reconcile the differences between various regional groups. It is not natural to West African culture... since what would be natural in these countries would be two or three parties representing different regions.287

Lewis advocates a two or multiparty system for West Africa believing that such a system would allow political tensions

287 Lewis, Politics in West Africa, pp. 60-63.
between different groups or regions to express themselves more naturally without endangering the incipient nation-state. But elsewhere in Africa, the two-party system has brought with itself its own set of problems that seem to hamper the prospect of political stability and national integration. In Zanzibar, according to a recent study, the emergence of a two-party system has so politicized society that social relations have become increasingly "segregated along party lines". Outside the political realm, few "politically neutral" associations exist which might bind individuals into a national unity or solidarity above partisan political allegiances.

Political parties are also seen to play an important role as instruments and channels of political communication and political socialization in the new states. Since political parties, especially mass parties with their subordinate associations, are often the only organizations that extend from the centre to the periphery of society and since the mass media is often weak and ineffective and occasionally absent altogether, there is no alternative medium for the transmission of public information and directives and the sampling of popular opinion. Thus in Tunisia during the

Bizerte crisis of 1961 the Neo-Destour Party, utilizing its organizational apparatus, was able to communicate word of the events as they occurred, thereby maintaining the support of the masses. In West Africa, Lewis acknowledges the role of political parties as communication mechanisms but suggests that this is a coercive measure intended to control the populace rather than inform it. Political parties are usually depicted as instruments of political communication and socialization in the new states, but such a view should not obscure the fact that parties may well perform functions of "political indoctrination" and "political control". Like charismatic leadership and ideology, political parties may serve as instruments for keeping the populace in line and as mechanisms for informing them of public policy, sounding their opinions, and transforming them into participating citizens.

V

Political development theory usually views political parties, especially mass parties, as major instruments for the creation of viable nations in the new states. As organizational networks linking leaders in the political elite with grass roots followers, parties are seen as major vehicles of national integration. By providing an arena for the acquisition of oratorical, propagandistic, and administrative skills, political parties are viewed as training grounds for political

cadres who can occupy the subordinate organizational positions and play the minor political roles that contact, mobilization, and control of the masses depend upon. By utilizing charismatic leaders, by employing ideology, and by manipulating symbols and slogans, parties are believed to socialize individuals to a political culture of modernity and nationhood, teaching new political attitudes, establishing new political mores and norms, and providing new thought-models for comprehending the emerging political order. Thus, political parties are viewed as creating and performing roles largely "functional" to nation-building and political modernization.

The tendency to attribute to parties the performance of functions that are perceived to be necessary for political development is both a common characteristic of many analyses of the new states and a source of weakness in the theories of such analyses. While some parties doubtless perform many, and occasionally all, of the political functions attributed to them, it seems mistaken to believe, as some theorists do, that these functions must be served and that parties or some other sociological mechanisms (charisma, the military) exist for this purpose.

Such a belief reflects two separate but related assumptions - one conceptual and the other normative - that many analyses of the new state rests upon. It reflects the largely
deductive premise of functional analysis that all persisting societies are successful in having a number of basic functions performed. Such a premise leads many analysts to search for the manifest or latent means which societies are presumed to utilize in order to ensure survival. In many analyses of the new states the sociological mechanisms that are believed to perform the required functions become the foci of study and are justified as interim measures or as necessary conditions for the development of more substantial and enduring political institutions. In addition, the sociological justification of charisma, authoritarian mass parties or military regimes has been heightened by the reaction of many sociologically inclined theorists to the still widely held view of historically and legally oriented scholars that political development in the new states must imply the presence and effective operation of western constitutional and parliamentary forms. Many sociologically oriented researchers were unwilling, both on theoretical and ethical grounds, to assume that ineffective parliamentary forms were a reflection of "political backwardness" in the new states. In retrospect, such a reaction seems to have been both necessary and fruitful in order that political development theory might escape from the legal-institutional constraints of constitutional experts and historians. Unfortunately, as a reaction to the sociological and cultural weakness of many institutional studies, some theorists came to regard many of the political changes that occurred in the new states
both prior to and following independence as "political development". Thus, charismatic leaders, however ineffective or corrupt, were lauded; political parties, however oppressive their tactics or atrophied their organizations, were affirmed; and, increasingly, military regimes, however lacking in modern technological and organizational expertise, were justified.

Many western sociologists and political scientists justified and supported such developments in the hope that they would be followed by the more effective and enduring political institutions and citizenship rights that ordinary individuals in the new states were seen to deserve. As Huntington observes "The line between actuality and aspiration is fogged. Things which are in fact occurring in the 'developing' areas become hopelessly intertwined with things which the theorist thinks should occur there". Huntington is critical of this characteristic of political development theory, yet it seems inevitable that studies which focus on empirical historical changes in the new states while seeking to perceive the outlines of both the probable and desirable political future will involve a mixture of observation, prediction, and prescription.

The fusion of the empirical and normative components of political development theory is evident in its attempt at ascertaining the human attributes of the developed political condition. Like Aristotle, contemporary political development theorists are concerned, among other things, with discovering the nature of "civic virtue". The next section and final chapter of this essay will deal with this human goal of political development: the development of political man.
PART III

THE HUMAN GOAL

OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL MAN

The key elements of political development involve... a change from widespread subject status to an increasing number of contributing citizens, with an accompanying spread of mass participation, a greater sensitivity to the principle of equality, and a wider acceptance of universalistic laws.

Lucian Pye

Political development begins and ends with the transformation of individual human beings; a transformation of political attitudes and behavior and a transformation of political status. Indeed, political development, as all processes of social change, involves major alterations in the political "life-styles" of individuals and groups of individuals. In the final analysis, political development must transform man.

But what is the nature of the human transformation that political development demands of men? Fundamentally, individuals must alter their political behavior; that is, they must learn to perform many of the new political roles equated with modernity. They must learn to participate in the political life of society not as passive subjects responsive to the whims of tribal elders or traditional rulers, but as active and fully qualified members of political society with the right to demand as well as the responsibility to obey. But participation is more than a matter
of rights; it is also a question of skills and sentiments. Political development requires skills of association and organization coupled with civic attitudes of responsibility and restraint, of respect for the political activities of others. Politics is both cooperation and competition, but developed politics requires that the latter be tempered by civility, conciliation, and compromise.

Viewed from a more strictly analytical perspective, the transformation in political behavior implied in the development of political man involves two separate developments: one institutional and legal; the other social and psychological. The transformation of human beings implies, in the first instance, a transformation in the institutional order so that new roles and relationships implicit in nation-building and political development are not only permitted but, indeed, are legitimated and encouraged. In the second place, political development involves equipping individuals with the socio-psychological attitudes and skills which enable them to perform and take advantage of newly-sanctioned roles and relationships. The human goal of political development in the new states is therefore: (1) the creation of new institutions by and through which individuals may be encouraged to perform the new political roles implied in the ethical imperatives of equality; and (2) the socialization and education of individuals in the art of political participation by the transformation of values, attitudes, tastes, and skills.
The human transformation that political development requires thus involves a correlation of legal-institutional changes with changes in the social and psychological attributes of individuals themselves. In the history of political development in Western Europe and North America such an institutional and human transformation did take place; the new states, however, have been only partially successful in this regard. New, usually western, institutions have been adopted or adapted but these frequently lack the vitality and importance that they have for the conduct of public affairs in the West; and some individuals (most often urban dwellers) have been partially acculturated to the values, attitudes, and tastes of political modernity, but many more (usually rural peasants) remain significantly outside the new realm of public politics, neither able to comprehend nor to partake of its ways.

Social theorists have traditionally differed with respect to the relative emphasis that should be placed on the institutional as against the socio-psychological factors involved in directed social change. The debate has been most noticeable in economics. Orthodox economists have argued that economic development is primarily a problem of making certain structural changes in the economy and of acquiring, either through savings or by borrowing, the necessary capital. Developmental anthropologists and a growing number of sociologically oriented economists have disagreed with this
view believing that economic development also requires alterations in the attitudes and values of individuals that will enable them to adapt to a competitive market culture. Hagen is critical of the dominant economic approach which he claims

...was to assume that any barriers to growth that might exist are economic ones, and that the process of economic growth is adequately dealt with by economic analysis alone. The reasoning underlying this approach is as follows: Almost all individuals in every society seek higher income. Hence it seems natural that everywhere individuals should seek improved methods of production. Since knowledge of improved methods is now available, there seems no reason why people everywhere should not be improving production techniques—rapidly. But they are not. Hence there must be some barriers which prevent them from doing so. Since these barriers do not lie in the nature of human desires, they must be economic ones.293

To the contrary, Hagen suggests that the obstacles to economic development lie precisely in the nature of human desires, in human personalities, and in the cultural determinants of personality.

The debate is relevant to the analysis of political development in that it illuminates two aspects of the problem of altering human behavior that cannot be overlooked—the legal-institutional and the socio-psychological. The literature of political development has focused on both of these factors in political role change, though with emphases that have varied among theorists. As with orthodox economists,


some political and sociological analysts have stressed the objective requirements - the legal-institutional changes - while other researchers have sought the cultural and personal attributes that permit effective participation and political role-playing. The basic legal-institutional requirement for the transformation of political man is the acquisition of citizenship status that is a mark of his right (but not necessarily his inclination or ability) to participate in the public politics of political society. The basic socio-psychological requirement is the acquisition and possession of social skills, values, and attitudes that induce and facilitate participation in the public life of political society - socio-psychological attributes referred to by Almond and Verba as a sense of "civic competence" and a capacity for "civic cooperation". Political development requires those legal-institutional alterations in the political status that are implied in the concept of citizenship as well as congruent alterations in the socio-psychological capacities of individuals which permit political participation in public life thus giving sociological substance to their citizenship rights.


I

Political development theory is inclined to view "citizenship" as a distinctive mark of a developed society. While citizenship may be regarded as a statement of legal status, it has, in addition, a profound sociological meaning. It is the right of individuals to be not only "in" but "of" political society: to participate in shaping political society by making public demands that are regarded as legitimate and by receiving public allocations and benefits. Political development involves a trend toward the extension of citizenship status and the rights of political participation to an ever-larger number of individuals in society. In the West this trend was bound up historically with the extension of the franchise to the lower classes and to women during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Bendix "...citizenship at first excludes all socially and economically dependent persons. In the course of the nineteenth century this massive restriction is gradually reduced until eventually all adults are classified as citizens". Virtually all developed western nations, with the exception of Switzerland where it is still withheld from women, have extended the franchise to all adult members of society.

While the right to vote is the central symbolic component


297 Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, p. 74.
of citizenship, it embodies a fundamental ethical principle. Equality is the ethical imperative behind the extension of citizenship rights to all adult members of a political community. As an expression of the ethical imperative of equality, citizenship may be seen to imply full membership and equal status with others in a political community. In this connection, Marshall writes:

Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed. 298

Citizenship implies civil, political, and, increasingly, social rights. For Marshall these rights imply: (1) civil rights - "liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice"; (2) political rights - "the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body"; and (3) social rights - "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the

full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society."

In the West, especially in England, citizenship rights were first held by individuals belonging to a privileged social class: at first the aristocracy and later the middle class. Following successful ideological and organizational protest by spokesmen for the disenfranchised proletariat and later by members of the women suffragette movement, civic rights and political rights were secured for virtually all legally defined adults in society, barring the psychologically incompetent and the criminally deviant. Eventually, even social rights were secured for the economically deprived as a result of political protest and increased public sensitivity to socio-economic inequities. Today, in most developed western countries, virtually all adult citizens have full civil and political rights as Marshall defines these while the process of reducing the relative deprivation of certain groups and classes is still in progress and is being attacked by increasingly expanded measures of health, welfare and education.

In totalitarian societies - the Soviet Union for example - social and, to a lesser extent, civil rights have been extended to the bulk of adult "citizens" while real political rights have so far been denied. The ethical

299 Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development, p. 78.
imperative of equality has manifested itself, mainly, in the expression of social rights while real political rights of voting and participation have been denied though their importance has been acknowledged symbolically by the institutionalization of regular elections (with no real possibility for a meaningful choice of candidates) and ideologically by the commitment to "real" (proletarian as opposed to bourgeois) democracy.

II

Political status in pre-modern societies is significantly different from "citizenship" in both the democratic and totalitarian variants of modern society. Generally, social (including political but with the failure to differentiate the latter) status in pre-modern (including tribal) societies is based upon ascription, that is, upon what are believed to be innate or inherited abilities. Ascribed social status usually rests on such particularistic criteria as birthright, sex, age, class, or caste and it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish political status from total social status. In tribal societies this seems to be at least partially due to the "fusion" of political institutions and roles with other social, economic, and religious institutions. "In


301 Ibid., pp. 115-116.
Africa," notes Radcliffe-Brown, "...it is often hardly possible to separate, even in thought, political office from ritual and religious office." Various forms of political inequality usually identify tribal societies and the most common criteria for the differentiation of political status are sex and age: "...men usually take far more part than women, not only in war, but also in maintaining internal order, and older men, as a rule, have more authority than younger ones."

However, while inequality in political status is frequently the norm in tribal societies, it is mitigated in some cases by the principle of a "clientage" relationship between individuals of different status. The clientage principle, while perpetuating and, indeed, sanctioning political inequality, at the same time made explicit the reciprocal rights and duties that every client had to his opposite number. Such clientage relationships were common in some East African tribal societies described by Mair: "...[they] can sometimes be seen to run through the whole society from top to bottom, everyone except the king being somebody's client and everyone except the lowliest peasant having clients of his own. He followed him on journeys, to court, or to war.... A client who fulfilled his obligations expected to be able to count


303 Ibid., p. xxii.
on his lord's protection in most kinds of trouble." 304

Similar master-servant relationships have been found in other pre-modern societies. The best example is of course European feudalism where "ties of dependence" also extended from the top to the bottom of society and where social groups, usually classified according to occupational criteria, power or prestige were also hierarchically ranked. 305 The clientage relationships of European feudalism denied to the vast majority of individuals, notably peasants, the right to political participation in effecting the allocation of public values and thereby excluded them from effective political membership in society. The right to exercise influence by participating in the political struggle was determined by social and political statuses which were largely ascribed - the hereditary principle of noble families - or by institutional immunity as with the Church and municipal corporations:

...the individual enjoys rights and performs duties by virtue of his status, which are defined by heredity... or by membership in an organization possessing certain immunities or liberties. Except for a handful of the most powerful men... status involves a mediated relation in the sense that the vast majority of persons do not stand in a direct legal or political relationship to the supreme authority of the king.... In sum, medieval European societies excluded the majority of the people from the exercise of public rights which depend upon grants of immunity. This is tantamount to exclusion from political participation...." 306

Indeed, politics in pre-modern societies, including many tribal and feudal ones, are "palace" or "court" politics rather


than "public" politics since there is usually no larger political society beyond the palace or court within which political tensions and demands can conflict and be conciliated or compromised. In point of fact however, the cultural legitimation of the existing hierarchical socio-political structure is so effective that pressures for alterations in the distribution system of scarce values emanating outside the palace or court are unlikely.

Thus, political relationships in pre-modern societies tend to be hierarchical: based upon reciprocal rights and obligations between individuals or groups arranged on a social scale. The idea of public politics and thus the idea of citizenship where virtually all adult individuals are accorded equal rights to legitimately participate in the political life of society is absent. Pre-modern societies might be graphically represented by a series of concentric circles in which the smallest represents the effective "political" society - palace or court politics - within which the struggle over the allocation and distribution of scarce values takes place. And the principle governing political relations in society is: "Give me milk; make me rich; keep me in mind; be my father; I will be your child."


308 Cited in Mair, Primitive Government, p. 169.
The history of western nations suggests that political development involves the progressive reduction of political status differences among individuals and groups in society and the gradual involvement of all adult individuals in a relationship with the centre of power and authority. The extension of the nexus of political relationships goes hand-in-hand with the extension of citizenship rights. With the successful creation of the nation-state "...each citizen stands in a direct relation to the sovereign authority of the country in contrast with the medieval polity in which that direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men of the realm. Therefore, a core element of nation-building is the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens."

Most contemporary states confer upon adult citizens a mixture of the civic, political, and social rights inherent in the right of citizenship. While these rights are most meaningful and "real" in western democratic states - meaningful and real in that they are an operative fact rather than a legal fiction - they are not altogether absent in totalitarian states nor in the single-party populist autocracies or military regimes of Afro-Asia. Though citizenship rights, especially political ones, are sometimes little more than legal fictions in totalitarian countries and in some of the new states, their presence at least attests to their

309 Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, p. 74.
importance as symbols of political modernity.

III

If citizenship lacks sociological force in many of the new states, it is perhaps because its extension to the masses of ordinary individuals has only been accomplished in a legal sense. It has not been accompanied by a corresponding socialization or training of such individuals to make the exercise of its rights and responsibilities meaningful. To have force and meaning, citizenship requires that citizens be educated in the ways of public politics.

In the new states, some elites may have denied substantive citizenship rights while affirming it as a symbol of nation-hood and modernity. Others who have extended real civil and political rights (few are as yet sufficiently developed economically to extend substantive social rights) have probably been less successful, and perhaps less interested, in giving their citizens the skills and habits of mind that meaningful citizenship and effective political participation rest upon. This may be due to their distrust and dislike of public politics, perhaps, as Crick suggests, because they understand it too well. "They object to its most characteristic features - compromise, conciliation, uncertainty, conflict; to its necessary ambivalence or tensions between preservation and creation; and to its curious movements between bureaucratic anonymity and the magnification of personality in politicians". India is a case

in point where the slowly developing political culture of bargaining and compromise found in state and local government and in the politics of the village *panchayat* is the subject of criticism by the urban elite centered in New Delhi. The planners, some national political leaders, the senior administrative class, and the English speaking intelligentsia view such political activity as an obstacle to rational planning.

Meaningful and effective citizenship seems to require the presence of at least two prior conditions if it is to be realized at all. The first is the existence of a "public" politics which can provide the setting or arena in which individuals, but more often individuals associated in groups or parties, may compete and bargain for the scarce values that can be obtained through political action. This condition is frequently absent in the new states and the second condition is often only partially met: the presence of a significant proportion of individuals who possess both the inclination and the ability to associate together for political action. Political development requires individuals with a sense of "civic competence" and a capacity for "civic cooperation", to use Almond and Verba's terms. The human goal of political development in the new states is the inculcation of individuals with a sense of civic competence and their education in the skills of civic cooperation; put

another way, individuals must be socialized in the culture of political modernity. Viewed from the perspective of political culture, political development becomes a problem of culture change in which values, attitudes, and skills must be made congruent with the political institutions and legal citizenship rights of public politics.

It is a sense of political incapacity and a disinclination to cooperate for the purpose of pursuing common ends that distinguishes many transitional societies. Nowhere has this been more evident than in Banfield's study of a southern Italian village which was found to contain villagers who were both disinclined and incapable of associating together for the purposes of political action. Banfield believed that the "backwardness" of the village could be explained "...largely (but not entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good, or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family". The villagers were found to possess no purposeful social attachments or commitments beyond the immediate family and lacked any sense of civic pride or public spiritedness. Though hostile to the indifferent local officials of the provincial or central


314 Ibid., p. 10.
government bureaucracies, who were identified, not unjustifiably, with a disinterested provincial or central government, they made no attempt to press grievances by organized political action, believing that their predicament was a matter of "fate" and quite beyond their control. Political associations were therefore non-existent while parties remained ineffective and sometimes corrupt and party officials exerted themselves no more than was necessary "to keep their places" or "to earn promotion".

Banfield believes that such organizational incapacity may be common among "non-western" cultures: "There is some reason to doubt that the non-Western cultures of the world will prove capable of creating and maintaining the high degree of organization without which a modern economy and a democratic political order are impossible. There seems to be only one important culture - the Japanese - which is both radically different from our own and capable of maintaining the necessary degree of organization". The less speculative analysis of Almond and Verba seems to support such a contention at least with respect to both Italy and Mexico. Indeed, the belief that associational skills and sentiments are basic elements contributing to a society's general capacity for self-government is widely shared among political

316 Ibid., p. 8.
development theorists. Weiner believes that "organizational talents" may be as crucial to political development as entrepreneurial ones are to economic growth - and validates a postulate of classical political theory.

And modern theorists, like their classical predecessors, while recognizing a principal behavioral attribute of political development are still uncertain about the conditions in society that are supportive of it. Weiner believes that some societies may have a general organizational capacity that is equally present in the economic, educational, administrative, as well as political realm, yet is led to conclude that "Surprisingly little is known about the conditions for the development of effective political organizations". Pye believes that political development is related to a society's capacity for cooperative action which in turn is believed to rest upon sentiments of trust, a capacity to postpone gratification, and a belief that separate demands need not conflict with and damage others. And it was precisely such associational capacities that struck Tocqueville in his analysis of the first political society that was successful in perfecting them:

As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or feeling which

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they wish to promote in the world, they look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another out they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example and whose language is listened to. In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made.

Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased. 321

EPilogue

...the sociology and philosophy of politics are intrinsically linked. But not only are they both inseparable; they are also in a specific sense interminable.... Nor is there any useful sense in which one can be claimed to be more important than the other; it is equally important not only to continue to ask about how societies do behave, but also how they ought to.

W.G. Runciman

Political development theory constitutes a fusion of the sociological and philosophical dimensions of political analysis for it seeks answers to empirical, normative, and prescriptive questions, which, though connected in practice, are analytically separate. The first is clearly empirical and can be answered, more or less satisfactorily, by observation: "What is the nature of the political process and the historical political changes that are occurring in the new states?" The second is normative for it speculates about the attributes of an "ideal" political condition by reference to which the political attainments of societies might be evaluated: "What should be the nature of the political process and the historical political changes in the new states if they are to be termed 'political development'?" The third is prescriptive and seeks to identify the sociological mechanisms that might aid in the acquisition of modernity: "What do the new states have or need to become politically developed?" By asking such questions in their analyses of the new states political development theorists place them-
selves in the classical tradition of social and political thought.

To say that the concepts and ideas of the political development theorists discussed in this essay are in part the result of an empirical exercise in observation and prediction is perhaps to labour the obvious. Few scholars in comparative social science would disagree with the proposition that the rapid growth of non-western comparative social and political studies occasioned by the emergence of the new states is concerned with making rigorous observations and comparisons of social and political life in non-western societies. Most would probably agree that a dominant object of these analyses has been to make as precise empirical observations and comparisons as is practicable given the present sophistication of analytical tools and research techniques. Such analyses sought to understand non-western societies in order that social scientific knowledge could be informed of social and political arrangements that did not obtain in the West. The studies of the new states endeavored to make the existing body of social scientific knowledge at once less ethnocentric and more general, especially in its theories.

To say that political development theory is in part a normative and prescriptive exercise in imagination and speculation is perhaps to invite objections from those who believe that modern comparative social science is wholly empirical. Yet there does appear to be more than an empirical element
in contemporary political development theory which was engendered by certain research difficulties contained in its subject matter - the political vicissitudes of the new states and certain conceptual difficulties in its goals - the articulation of a body of propositions about the "developed" or "modern" political condition and the identification of sociological mechanisms that might be instrumental in attaining such a condition. Some elaboration on these difficulties is necessary.

The political process in the new states presents the analyst with some especially difficult obstacles to research. It is very "fluid" and is generally not marked by the institutionalization of political procedures and practices that identifies western or totalitarian societies. Not only is the form and content of political life vague and difficult to discern, it is also not especially well documented or studied and the usual sources of governmental and statistical data available to students of western nations are quite often inaccessible or are absent altogether. This means that the analyst must rely on his capacity to imagine the outlines and content of the political order to a greater extent than in comparable analyses of western polities where considerable information of both a statistical and documentary nature already exists and where innumerable previous studies can be drawn upon.

The conceptual requirement of "holism" furthered the
need for skills of imagination in the analysis of the new states. Contemporary political development theorists sought to reconstruct and articulate the outlines and contents of the new states not in a partial or narrowly institutional fashion, but in a holistic rendering of the total society or polity, relating the components or sub-systems to one-another and to the society or polity as a whole. The holistic imperative required that the imperfect or partial empirical picture gained from direct observation and the review of available information be completed. This inclined analysts away from a strict concern with empiricism toward an implicit acceptance of the need for a sociological imagination.

The utilization of imagination was again called for in addressing the question: "What should a developed political system be like?" Clearly it was not possible to simply assume that the standard for a developed polity was exemplified in political systems like the United States or Great Britain without inviting the charge of ethnocentrism. Nor was it desirable to lapse into a sterile relativism that denied, a priori, the possibility of making comparisons of societies in terms of their relative level of development. And since it was admitted that all "real" political systems were in some sense "mixed", possessing both modern and traditional elements, it became necessary to locate the properties of political modernity not in the empirical world but in conceptual
constructions (typologies and models) that depicted an "ideal" condition of political development.

Political development theory is empirical insofar as it seeks to directly observe the nature of the political process and the direction of historical political change in the new states. It is normative insofar as it attempts to construct culturally neutral models or typologies of the developed political condition for evaluating the political attainments of the new states. But political development theorists are also interested in identifying and prescribing the levers of political development in the new states. Many sociological analysts, equipped with a "functionalist" orientation to their subject matter and unwilling to accept the narrow legal-institutional view that political development in the new states required the presence of western parliamentary forms, were inclined to search for the manifest or latent means that could serve the goals of political development. Among those identified were charismatic leaders, nationalist and socialist ideology, groups and parties, and, increasingly, the military. Political development theorists tended to focus on the positive value of such instruments, ignoring or overlooking their possible dysfunctional effects. Their "functionalist" orientation became fused with the hope that these would bring more enduring and effective political institutions in their train. Thus, there was an element of faith embodied in the
identification and prescription of instruments of political development in the new states.

Political development theorists asked not only "What are the political systems in the new states like?" or "Where are they going?" but also "What should they be like?" and "Where should they be going?" if their movement is to be considered "political development" and "What are the instruments required to get them there?" Answers to these questions, if they were to avoid the pitfalls of ethnocentrism without lapsing into an easy and excessive relativism were bound to invite speculation about political "ideals" - not of the "good life" or "best polity" but of the ideal attributes of political development - and prescription of the best available means for their attainment in the new states.

The sociological and philosophical dimensions of political analysis are fused in contemporary theories of political development. Yet like Moliere's hero who was surprised to learn he had been speaking prose all his life, some contemporary political development theorists might also be surprised to hear that they have been writing in the best classical tradition of social and political theory.
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