AN EXPOSE OF THE GENERAL LITERATURE IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND THE APPLICABILITY TO WEST AFRICA

by

JOSEPH C. BLELL

B.A. (Hons.) St. Mary's College of California, 1972
M.A., University of British Columbia, 1973

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
School of Community and Regional Planning

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
June, 1978

© Joseph C. Blell, 1978
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

School
Department of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date 26-2-79
The purpose of this study is to show there is no special economic or general development theory tailor-made for West Africa. Maybe, when all general theories are valid, some are more valid than others.

The recent emergence of "development theories" from academics in the "Third and Fourth World" countries is both an expression of serious doubts with orthodox development theories, as well as a serious search for self-assertion. These attempts to devise an appropriate theoretical concept geared towards the interpretation and analysis of the development process in these regions are, at bottom, also a response to the dynamics of economic and social change. The growing awareness of these views reflects the extent to which these processes of change are at work.

As we shall soon observe, the attempts by the various orthodox authors of development theories to diagnose the underlying causes of development, the link with the world systems and the proposed future strategies, have very little in common. Take, for example, the economic system of the sixteenth century that generated modern industrial capitalism. This system was made up of three interdependent parts: a developed core in Western Europe, a partially developed semiperiphery in southern and eastern Europe, and an underdeveloped periphery of the rest of the world. From this, one can see, with some persuasion, that the dynamic of
capitalism (or of a fully developed market economy) is based on the structural imbalance created by integrating the West Africa economies at different levels of development in what Prof. Wallerstein called a "world-system." There are probably few who would quarrel with this part of the formulation - although its neglect as a serious theory of economic development by economists, is, to this author, certainly one of the more interesting occurrences in modern history. The question that is open to debate is the degree to which this imbalance (in West Africa) tends toward permanence - the degree to which "underdevelopment" develops along with development to become a relatively stable economic adjustment.

None of the development theories reviewed in the thesis has sufficient time depth to assess the question of permanence with empirical data, nor do they attempt to do so.

Instead, the problem is tackled as follows. The nonindustrial nations of the world have not developed because they have failed the preconditions for it - a market mentality, local economic differentiation, "modern" socio-cultural institutions receptive to economic development (entrepreneurship). But none of these holds in the indigenous societies of West Africa where there is no lack of entrepreneurship and little in the way of social and cultural impediments to growth. The most common alternative explanation is that the "surplus" necessary to endogenous growth is being drained in export-import trade with the developed systems.
This thesis explores the dimensions of development in the economies like those of West Africa which are in a period of drastic change and dissatisfaction with the conventional paradigms.

Structurally, this study has been divided into five chapters. The introductory chapter defines the uniqueness of the West African case. This uniqueness arises from uncensured acceptance of Western norms and models and reliance on growth - through capital-intensive imported technology. Coupled with this is also the idea of measuring the successes (if any) and the failures with the yardsticks accepted and applicable in the West. Chapter two will review the general literature in development (Dualism, Strategical, Foreign Trade, Sociological and Psychological, and Marxist theories) and then prescribe an indigenous model, Self-Reliance, as an alternative to the reviewed theories. Chapter three examines the physical environment and economy of the region. Chapter four deals with the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis that is, when all general theories are valid, some are more valid than others and Chapter five deals with the policy implications and conclusions.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ................................................. ii

**CHAPTER I**

Introduction .......................................... 1
Scope of the Problem ..................................... 2
Development .............................................. 4

**CHAPTER II**

Review of Development Theories ...................... 9

- Dualism Theory ......................................... 10
- The Urban Industrial vs. Rural Agricultural Bias ..... 11
- Strategical Theories ................................... 14
- Foreign Trade Theories ................................. 17
- Sociological and Psychological Theories .............. 19
- Marxists Theories ..................................... 21

- Can Poverty be Understood by the Affluent? ......... 28
- How Relevant are These Theories ..................... 32
- Fundamental Obstacles ................................. 34
- Export and Aid ......................................... 43
- Unemployment and Foreign Investment ................. 47
- Planning for Local Self-Reliance ..................... 51
- Planning for Personality Enhancement ................. 51
- Grass-Roots Participation ............................. 52
- Participatory Mobilization ............................ 53

**CHAPTER III**

Characteristics of Area ................................. 54

- West Africa's Legacy .................................. 75
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER IV</th>
<th>West Africa's Development at the Cross Roads</th>
<th>82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development for Whom?</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development Misconstrued</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning and Development from Within</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Reliance: a Choice or a Challenge?</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V</td>
<td>Policy Implications</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Distribution of Labour Force in Eastern African Countries</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Exports of Selected African Nations, 1969</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Growth of Selected Primate Cities</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Selected Characteristics of Capital Cities</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Sectorial Distribution of Stock of Private Investment in the Developing Regions, 1967</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

I Regional Economic Map of West Africa.............. 73(a)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An acknowledgment is always a welcome chance to thank mentors and friends without whom it could not have been possible to complete this work.

My debts to mentors are numerous that I cannot possibly list them with fairness. Those who have been kind enough to read the drafts of this thesis with a critical view include Edward Greene of the University of the West Indies, I am grateful for his comments to those who typed and edited it I owe a similar debt.

I would like to thank Brahm Wiesman the Director of the School of Community and Regional Planning. His encouragement throughout helped me sustain the delusion of those so short-sighted in the school of the problems of Third World Development.

I especially want to express my gratitude to my Mother and my Aunty Salma, without them it would have been impossible to be here.
THE DEVELOPMENT SET

Excuse me, friends, I must catch my jet
I'm off to join the Development Set;
My bags are packed, and I've had all my shots
I have traveller's cheques and pills for the trots!
The Development Set is bright and noble;
Our thoughts are deep and our vision global;
Although we move with the better classes,
Our thoughts are always with the masses.
In Sheraton hotels in scattered nations
We damn multi-national corporations;
Injustice seems easy to protest
In such seething hotbeds of social rest.
We discuss malnutrition over steaks
And plan hunger talks during coffee breaks.
Whether Asian floods or African drought,
We face each issue with an open mouth.
We bring in consultants whose circumlocution
Raises difficulties for every solution -
Thus guaranteeing continued good eating
By showing the need for another meeting.
The language of the Development Set
Stretches the English alphabet;
We use swell words like 'epigenetic'
'Micro,' 'Macro,' and 'logarithmic'.
It pleasures us to be esoteric -
It's so intellectually atmospheric!
And though establishments may be unmoved,
Our vocabularies are much improved.
When the talk gets deep and you're feeling dumb
You can keep your shame to a minimum:
To show that you, too, are intelligent
Smugly ask, "Is it really development?"
Or say, "That's fine in practice, but don't you see:
It doesn't work out in theory!"
A few may find this incomprehensible,
But most will admire you as deep and sensible.
Development Set homes are extremely chic,
Full of carvings, curious, and draped with batik.
Eye-level photographs subtly assure
That your host is at home with the great and the poor.
Enough of these verses - on the mission!
Our task is as broad as the human condition!
Just pray God the biblical promise is true:
The poor ye shall always have with you.

Ross Coggins

INTRODUCTION

The presence and stubborn persistence of economic and social disparities in any society (particularly of West Africa) at the different stages of economic development have been identified as a peculiar facet of the process of economic and social change. Generally, it would not be rational to expect economic development to take place equally in all parts of a country at the same time. Rather, within any nation, there are some places where economic and social change takes place much faster than in others. Such areas may, usually, have a good natural and human resource base, well integrated communications, availability of power and a particular advantage. In addition, unequal rates of economic and social development may occur because private investors become attracted to more dynamic areas of a nation in the expectation of exploiting the potential of external economies.

As a consequence of the above, the development process can lead to political tensions because of economic and social disparities between various regions and groups within a society. These disparities may reinforce geographic and linguistic differences. Such growing disparities in economic and social positions of the different regions and groups within one nation can cause a severe strain on a
nation's political framework. To avoid this situation, appropriate action will have to be taken to ensure that regional economic and social disparities are reduced over time.

One example of a political system that tends to give sharp focus to tensions arising from these disparities is a federal system (such as, for example, that of Nigeria) which consists of economic and political units with varying social and economic disparities.

However, as we shall demonstrate, economic development since independence in the West African States has not utilized the available developmental resources to reduce disparities within the various regions of the different States. It will be increasingly difficult for a nation to function smoothly unless development programmes entail a positive and continuous effort on the part of the National Governments to change the pattern of resource flows and shares of the various regions (provinces) in national income. Unfortunately, the theories of development do not go far enough in providing a framework which can guide national decisions regarding such an allocation of both public and private resources, and the organization of economic activity in the West African States.

Scope of the Problem

In view of the conditions spelled out in the preceding section, the problems which (will be dealt with) in this study have two dimensions:
a) The theoretical aspect which has arisen from the fact that the theory of economic development planning up till now has not fully come to grips with the problems of planning in West Africa and b) The applied dimension, which will be specifically focused on explaining the failures of development planning in the region of West Africa.

First, an attempt will be made to carry out a clarification of the concept of 'development' with a view to building a theoretical framework of planning for development in the region of West Africa. Second, a review will be made of the development theories with a view to indicating where they failed to interpret West Africa's history. Are they sufficient to give answers to today's events and also give guidelines for constructive action?

To begin, the bundling of all societies into the same crudely linear concept of developmental process ignores the bulk of human history. To argue that West Africans were underdeveloped or undeveloped peoples was tantamount to saying that they had no history of their own. Whereas, in fact, it lies beyond any serious question that they were in no way underdeveloped or undeveloped in terms of their own frameworks. Third, an attempt will be made to show the policy implications of the region's experience and to suggest some complementary policies for sustaining the objective of 'development', and for pursuing it.

With regard to the theoretical dimensions of the study, it should be noted that development planning models and general frameworks for the allocation of both public and
private resources for economic development in both unitary and federal states in West Africa, have so far tended to emphasize the singular objective of maximizing gross national income. This narrow focus is inappropriate in a region as diverse as West Africa where it is equally important to attain the additional objective of the equitable participation of the various segments of society in the process of development.

More specifically, the output maximization emphasis neither takes into account the constraints imposed on the path of 'development' in the nation state; the difference in the economic and social positions and preferences of different entities in the nation state; nor the fact that the very survival of the nation state depends on the participation of the diverse regional (provincial) entities in the development process, in addition to their sharing of benefits generated from development. This study will attempt to provide a broader conceptual framework for development planning in regions as diverse as West Africa.

Development

It will probably not alarm the development planner to realize that it is difficult to give a precise meaning of 'development'. This is because there are many definitions of this concept which have appeared in the literature. For some, economic development is only one aspect or dimension of general development, because although the nation state is usually regarded as a unit for development, 'national development' is a term which should
include at least social and political changes as well as economic changes.

To some, 'development' implies growth accompanied by change, since there are essential qualitative features in the process of development that are often absent in the quantitative growth or expansion of an economy. Some of these qualitative features are improved efficiency of factors of production, the development of institutions, and a change in the society's attitudes and values.

Furthermore, to some economists, 'development' means industrialization. But the entire gamut of the society may not be affected, and indeed, as in most of the regions of Africa, industrialization has only affected a small proportion of the population (see Table 1.1). Alternatively, 'development' has also been viewed as the achievement of a number of ideals of modernization. Such ideals include:

- A rise in productivity, social and economic equalization, modern knowledge, improved institutions and attitudes, and a rationally co-ordinated system of policy measures that can remove the host of undesirable conditions of the social system that perpetuate a state of under-development.

Finally, development has also been seen as 'economic independence' which is usually echoed by leaders of the present-day developing countries or by the developed countries whose economies are dominated by foreign investment. The 'dependence' of these countries on export
TABLE 1.1  Distribution of Labour Force in Eastern African Countries (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing and Mining</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

markets and foreign capital is often regarded as "foreign domination" or "exploitation" which, as the argument goes, must be prevented by adopting import substitution policies and limitations on the flow of external private capital. However, the emphasis on national identity and independence through inward-looking policies may impede rather than stimulate 'development', narrowly defined.

The various meanings of 'development' reviewed above would seem to imply change in the economic structure and institutional framework of the society concerned. This change takes the form of rising incomes and increases in the volume of goods and services, that are associated with systematic and predictable variations in such features of the economic structure as: output composition of the gross domestic product, rates of savings and investment, income distribution pattern, per capita incomes, consumption levels, utilization of capital and labour, capital-output and labour-output ratios, and the pattern of trade.

Any deviation from the normal path of development of the West African economy can be made possible through the creation of new international trade patterns; by changing the tastes of society; by making new demands and problems resulting from the process of change; or through an economic integration or union of formerly autonomous economic units.9

The above view of 'development' does not, however, consider the unsolved problem of social welfare,
particularly as nothing precise can be said regarding the extent of the improvements in individual welfare as a consequence of development and the problem of making comparisons between the social positions of different individuals is next to impossible. For example, the extended family system may be high on the list of social values of a particular society.

What is the impact of development and of European civilization on the African family which is deemed very important in the entire organization of African life? The importance of the family has been indicated by the large amount of study which has been devoted to the analysis of the effects of European contacts and control in its organization and functioning under changing conditions. In fact, the study of the family provides the most fruitful approach to the study of development in West Africa. Dislocations in any part of the indigenous social structure are reflected in the family, while the disruption of the family system affects the entire social structure.
CHAPTER II

Review of Development Theories

There is a rapidly increasing number of theories of economic development. The object of development theory, the social process called development, has been explored much more thoroughly during the last decade. Strangely enough, this has not led to a basically new theory or to definite answers to the differences in theoretical approaches during this time. To what extent do these theoretical approaches play a role in the real development of an area such as West Africa? The response to this question provides a basis for certain inferences regarding the usefulness of the theoretical approaches which up till now have been employed.

In the following, some of the theoretical approaches currently playing a role in the discussions of the problems of the developing countries, of which West Africa is a part, will be explored. Each of these approaches represents partial constructions which analyze a limited aspect of the possible causes of poverty and which increase the external dependence of underdeveloped countries. The integration of these various theories into a general theory of development in the image of 'Self-Reliance' will be explained later in this chapter. The various theories of development are grouped below according to their contents. Some of the theories might also have been classified under more than one heading. This
classification of development theories is undertaken in order to make it easier to review the various theoretical approaches.

Dualism Theories

- The theory of economic and social dualism of Boeke. 11
- The theory of technological dualism of Eckaus. 12
- The theory of regional dualism of Gaunage. 13

The dualism theories proceed from the hypothesis that dual economic and social structures characterize the developing countries. The individual authors emphasize different aspects. Economic dualism lies in the existence of an unintegrated subsistence sector and a market sector. Technological dualism refers to the division of the economy into a traditional sector, in which labour-extensive techniques predominate; and a modern sector, for which modern capital-intensive production methods are typical. Regional dualism describes the situation in which the various regions of a country are connected by inadequate means of communications, so that little or no interregional trade within the economy takes place. The capital of the country, frequently located on the coast, is an enclave from which no impulses emanate. Geographically, it belongs to the developing country; but economically, to the metropolis. These economic, technological, and regional dualism is often the consequence of social dualism, that is, the lack of integration between different groups of the population arising from racial, religious, class, ethnic, or linguistic differences. Such dualistic structures within a
society represent decisively important barriers to development. Overcoming the dualism by creating intermediate and transitional states leading to an integrated economic, social and political structure (nation-building) is therefore a precondition for economic development.

The Urban Industrial vs. Rural Agricultural Bias

In the field of development, dualism is a value-loaded subject, but the problem of allocating development effort between the sectors is discussible in neutral terms. This is hardly so, however, for there are close links between the two debates, especially when the discussion is carried on at the level of the simplest - or principal - dichotomy: that between agriculture and industry. Until very recently, it has been an almost universal assumption that a country, dependent mainly on agricultural production, as it is with most of the West African States, and with a very high proportion of its population in agriculture, is 'backward'; and that the path of progress is to get people, capital and a far greater share of total production into industry and the towns. This argument follows directly from the historical experience of Europe and North America; it follows equally from the hothouse pattern of development followed by the Soviet Union. It is only in the most recent period, and especially so in China, that a viable, and perhaps even preferable, alternative has emerged into the view of planners and writers of development.  

There are multiple reasons for the urban-industrial
bias which grew and flourished despite the constant snipping of a minority of critics. It is a historical fact that the powerful nations of the last 150 years have been the industrialized nations; the policy-makers of developing countries have seen in industrialization a means of catching up and of reducing their state of dependency. Such thinking gained enormously from the experience of the late industrializing nations: Japan and the Soviet Union. It gained, also, from an embittered belief that any sort of 'expert' persuasion to concentrate on improvements in primary production and marketing was motivated by a wish to keep developing countries in a state of economic subservience. K. Nkrumah in one of his works quoted:

"There are, however, imperialist specialists and apologists who urge the less developed countries to concentrate on agriculture and leave industrialization for some later time when their populations shall be well fed.... But even to make agriculture yield more the aid of industrial output is needed; and the underdeveloped world cannot forever be placed at the mercy of the more industrialized...we are convinced that we shall be able to adjust the balance in our favour only be developing an agriculture attuned to our needs and supporing it with a rapidly increasing industrialization that will break the neo-colonialist pattern of which at present operates."15

The coincidence of such political arguments with the persuasion of an economic growth theory has proved decisive. We recall the emphasis given to the emergence of manufacturing sectors in Rostow's stages and the whole thrust of the theory of economic dualism. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that growth targets and the supporting development
plans of the West African nations immediately after independence has placed heavy weight on industrialization.

In general, the pro-industry argument is still preferred, though disenchantment with the results of industrialization policies have led to a strong revival of the agricultural thesis. Although a fuller explanation of this disenchantment belongs further in the argument, when we come to discuss the question of inter-dependent development and self-reliance, some of the reasons can most usefully be presented here.

After an initial burst, the pace of industrialization has slackened in a great many developing countries. The easiest road to industrial expansion has very often been through import-substitution industries: these industries have not always led to a diminution of foreign exchange spending, because many process or assemble intermediate product, require imported fuel for power, and involve large foreign payments for licence fees and expatriated profits to foreign owners or participants. Once an initial range of 'simpler' industries is established, further growth will move into a more complex range, requiring heavier capital investment and larger scale; they may be unable to operate efficiently without access to larger markets. Many secondary industries do not generate very large employment and therefore, their growth has failed significantly to check the rise in unemployment levels, effective demand in the internal economy is not sufficiently increased, and the agriculture sector is not greatly stimulated. Lack of
adequate markets, and of the external economies of mass, have aggravated a trend toward inefficient operation; comparatively little new capital is, therefore, generated. Furthermore, the growth of highly-capitalized industry has often tended to eliminate labour-intensive manufacture in small plants and households. In Havana, Cuba, to cite only one example from a developing area, the net effect of 'modern' industrialization has been to reduce total industrial employment in the city. These considerations have led to the 'intermediate technology' thesis advanced in recent years, particularly forcibly expressed in the Cambridge volume by E.F. Schumacher. His argument has spatial implications, but it accords closely with Singer's view that the increasing unsuitability of modern technology for developing country conditions is creating a new and more deadly form of dualism. It is easy to say, as many do, that no intermediate technology exists, but this is simply to say that no expressed demand has brought it into existence in the countries of West Africa.

Strategical theories
- The take-off theory of Rostow.
- The theory of the 'big push' by Rosenstein-Rodan.
- The theory of critical minimum effort of Leibenstein.
- The theory of balanced growth of Nurske.
- The theory of unbalanced growth of Hirschman.
- The theory of poles of development of Perroux.
- The theory of circular causation of Myrdal.
The 'take-off' is that phase of economic development in which our economy becomes capable of self-sustained growth. The concept is analogous to the take-off of an aeroplane. In order to reach the 'take-off' phase, two conditions must be fulfilled: net productive investment must increase in a short space of time from 5% to 10% of national product; and certain political, social and institutional requirements for growth must be met. According to Rostow, the 'take-off' is the critical stage of the five stages of economic growth: traditional society, society in transition, take-off, the drive to maturity, the age of mass-consumption.

The theory of the 'big push' attempts to formulate the conditions for the take-off more precisely. Here, an investment theory is propounded which proceeds from the thesis, that, the gross social returns (i.e. private return plus external economies) of a large investment is greater than the gross social cost of the investment (private cost plus external diseconomies). The conditions which must be fulfilled for this theory to hold are: (i) the availability of a sufficient quantity of funds from the private sector for investment and, (ii) a simultaneous demand for these funds for investment purposes.

The proponents of the theory of critical minimum effort argue similarly. Here, a critical minimum effort is supposed to be necessary in order that the concentrated availability of a certain quantity of capital should lead to a rate of growth exceeding the rate of population increase. Only by exceeding the rate of population increase is it possible to
prevent the development process from retrogressing to and beyond the initial level.

The theories of balanced and unbalanced growth lay down the strategies to be followed in overcoming poverty. The balanced growth strategy argues that isolated investments are insufficient for the attainment of overcoming poverty, and that a set of complementary investments chosen with regard to their mutual effects must be planned. In carrying out these investments, the demand necessary to sustain and make effective these investments is created.

The strategy of unbalanced growth, on the other hand, assumes that capital and entrepreneurial talent are scarce. Therefore, the selective promotion of some industries is recommended. In this way, bottle-necks in suppliers' or purchasers' sectors necessarily appear which attract the private and public entrepreneurs' attention. Investment activity results which in turn creates new bottle-necks and potentially profitable situations in other sectors. The linkage effect in production techniques, as well as in the generating of income and demand, induces activity in the supplying as well as in the consuming sectors. A claim of disequilibria should propel the development process forward.

Perroux's theory of poles rests on a similar argument. On the other hand, the theory of circular causation points to the danger of forming poles. Myrdal, the chief proponent of this theory, attempts to demonstrate that within a national area there is an observable tendency for the wealthier regions to become richer and the poorer regions more
improverished. Myrdal distinguishes between spread effects and back-wash effects. Using Ohlin's\(^{25}\) analysis of trade between distinct regions, he shows that certain regions experience culmulative processes of expansion and contraction. In the poorer regions contractive processes occur since capital, labour and potential entrepreneurs migrate to the more prosperous regions (Northern Sierra Leone is an example of this).

**Foreign Trade Theories**

- The theory of the dominant economy of Perroux.\(^{26}\)
- The theory of the secular deterioration of the terms of trade of Prebisch\(^{27}\) and the "two sectors" model of Lewis.\(^{28}\)
- The theory of growth by Bagwati.\(^{29}\)

The theory of the dominant economy has been developed by Perroux. Experience shows that, historically, there is no tendency towards equalization of internation growth. However, according to Perroux's thesis, this is to be explained by the intentional or unintentional domination of poorer countries by the developed countries. According to Peroux, this dominance is due to differences in negotiating strength both in the size of the countries involved, and in the types of economic activity which they pursue. This dominance enables the dominant country to take advantage of specialization and division of labour, whilst the dominated land continues to be confined to unproductive areas of production. The structure of the dominated country is adapted to the production of raw materials. The attempts of the developing countries at industrialization are, be it consciously or unconsciously,
frustrated. Thus, the developing countries continue to be sources of inexpensive raw materials for the industrialized nations, just as they were during the colonial times.

The theory of the secular deterioration of the terms of trade also builds on the ideals contained in Perroux's theory. The expression "terms of trade" (commodity) refers to the relationship between a country's export prices and the prices it pays for its imports. In the long run, the prices of raw materials in the international market decline, whilst the prices of manufactured goods rise, resulting in a deterioration in the trade situation for the developing country. From this tendency the developing countries derive a moral basis for increased economic aid.

The theory of unequal propellant growth is a logical extension of the terms of trade argument. Underlying this theory is the assumption that as a consequence of a one-sided promotion of a developing country's export sector, the increased output of agricultural and raw materials will cause a further drop in their places and a continued deterioration in the terms of trade. The real profits in the export sector will be brought to nothing by a transfer of income abroad. Thus, the expansion of the export sector will/may hinder economic development due to a misallocation of resources. This thesis appears valid for countries with a monocultural structure producing mainly for agricultural export (Gambia and Senegal).
Sociological and Psychological Theories

- The theory of achievement motivation of McClelland.  
- The theory of Social Change of Hagen.  
- The evolution model of Levy.  
- The alternative model of Apter.  
- The acculturation model of Almond & Coleman.  

In McClelland's view, the cause of underdevelopment is to be sought in the absence of achievement motivation, which he defines as the desire to do well, not so much for the sake of social recognition or prestige but to attain an inner feeling of personal accomplishment. From each of the 40 different countries he investigated, 21 selected representative children's stories and fairy tales with a view towards determining the presence of achievement motivation. He then compared the index thus obtained for each country with its growth rate. This comparison revealed a high correlation.

This investigation necessarily provokes the question: What determines the different manifestations of achievement motivation? Hagen has provided an approach towards answering this question. He has developed a social-psychological theory of social change which departs from the thesis that a society's stability depends upon its ability to satisfy the problems of its individual members during their childhood. Inducing change in the social system can have the result that a group which was formerly content becomes frustrated. The resulting behavioral response within the family influences the children's environment (father-son
relationship), so that the children receive an impression of discontentment with the traditional society which leads them to adopt an alien value system. The frustrated children become potential innovators, from whom an impulse towards social change and economic progress is to be expected. In this connection, the role of minorities deserves mention: given a dynamic social situation minorities will frequently behave in the manner just described. This thesis is supported in a historical context by empirical investigations of the role of the Calvinists in Europe and North America, of the role of the Jews in a number of countries, and of the role of the Lebanese in West Africa.

In addition to the above enumerated analytical approaches to some aspects of the problem, attempts have been made to analyse socioeconomic development with the help of the so-called 'modernization' theories. At the risk of excessive simplification, the basic hypothesis of the modernization theories may be formulated as follows: if one subtracts the "underdeveloped societies" from the "industrialized societies" the remainder represents a programme of development. That is to say, the central aim of modernization theories is the attainment of the conditions prevailing in the industrialized societies.

In Levy's evolution model, modernization is conceived as an evolutionary change leading to the ascribed goal of becoming a modern society. This change is brought about by increasing specialization in the social organization which necessarily causes a reduction in the independence enjoyed by
the members of the society affected.

Apter understands socioeconomic development to be a change taking place in qualitative forward leaps. His alternative model assumes discontinuities in the transition from the traditional to the modern, liberal society.

Almond and Coleman, in their acculturation model, describe the process of modernization as the integration of the traditional framework of relationships into modern structures. Whilst in the first stages, traditional and modern structures exist unintegrated, side by side; in the later stages, the modern structures dominate. Communications data may serve as a standard of measurement (literary rate, number of newspapers, wirelesses, port deliveries per 1,000 inhabitants).

These modernizing theories suggest a political programme for development which, on the one hand, promotes specialization and on the other, integration. An orientation towards individualism and achievement motivation accompanies a process which, in the political sphere, has a tendency towards democratization.

**Marxists theories**

A series of Marxist theories have been developed which proceed from the basic thesis that poverty in the developing countries is a consequence of the colonial exploitation and the neocolonial policy of the industrialized nations. The most important theoretical approaches are:
- The theory of the three worlds of Horowitz.  

- The theory of Lenin.  

- The theory of the national liberation movements (revolutionary warfare) of Frantz Fanon and E. Che Guevara. 

- The theory of 'dependencia' of Andre Gunder Frank. 

- The theory of African Socialism of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. 

Underlying Horowitz's theory of three worlds is the following thought: the first world includes the market economies of the Western world, the second world the central planning economies of the East. The third world is made up of the so-called non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The first and second world are overdeveloped, that is to say, they possess the necessary productive capacity to attain prosperity but their social structure impedes an equitable distribution of the national product. The third world is not faced with a mutually exclusive choice between socialism and capitalism, but rather should develop mixed forms (syntheses between private and collective institutions in the economy, combinations between freedom and coercion in economics and politics). These new mixed forms would require the revolutionary elimination of the feudal and bourgeois structure of power prevailing in developing countries. A side effect of mixed economic and political systems in the third world would be a contribution towards reducing the international polarization around two blocks. 

The theory of mixed form is rejected by Leninists.
Lenin argues that the backward countries represent areas of exploitation which are necessary for the functioning of the capitalistic system. The danger of overproduction in the capitalist economy can only be eliminated if the excess goods can be exported to the backward countries. In this way the unemployment in the industrialized countries is exported to the backward countries. He further elaborated on this theory by adding the thesis that the capitalist system is under compulsion to export capital, since the rate of profit has a tendency to fall, thus reducing the investment possibilities.

The profits obtained from the direct investments made with the capital exported flow back to the developed countries - a further characteristic of exploitation. At the core of these theories is the thesis that the poverty in the developing countries is a consequence of their exploitation by the industrialized countries. This poverty can only be eliminated by creating a revolutionary situation in the developing countries since they represent markets and the principal sources of raw materials for the imperialistic powers. The creation of a revolutionary situation in the developing countries should also contribute to increasing the capitalistic economies' susceptibility to economic crisis. This is precisely the function assigned to the anticolonial movements of national liberation. As a result of these revolutionary movements, the conflicts within western capitalistic societies would become apparent and the exploiting class, indigenous or foreign, would be so weakened by the loss of its imperialistic privileges that it would no longer be able to maintain its
previous ruling position. The liberation of the third world would lead to the collapse of the imperialist-capitalistic system. Since the greatest part of the world's population lives in countries making up the third world, it is there that resistance on a global scale has its greatest opportunity.

With this in mind, Che Guevara predicted a phase of national guerrilla warfare which should proceed from the agricultural hinterland where "the greatest number of the population lives", "the worst suffering prevails" and attacks "can best be mounted". In the specifically Chinese concept of the national war, which goes forward in three stages (retreat - deadlock - attack), the creation of a revolutionary situation also proceeds from the agricultural hinterland, finally conquering the cities in the ultimate stage. The strategy of socio-economic development is identical to the struggle of the village and the city. This theory is a synthesis of theoretical considerations and practical experience in China, Algeria and Cuba. In this connection, Frantz Fanon's concept of the Algerian Revolution is a case in point. The idea of the agricultural hinterland, which cuts off the cities from their source of subsistence and so starves them into submission, is extended further to the international system. North America and Europe are considered as urban cultures whereas, Asia, Africa and Latin America represent the world's (rural cultures). This world revolution involves the encirclement of the cities as a consequence of the revolutionary activity of the villages - this being the only way to overcome the existing global exploitation and poverty.
Andre Gunder Frank could be regarded as one of the pioneers of the 'dependencia' concept. His 'metropole-satellite' model of underdevelopment already carried most of the basic ideas of the 'dependencia' concept. Most 'dependencia' representatives however, separate themselves from Frank's strong vertical (heirarchical) scheme that runs from the centre of the metropole to the hinterland of the periphery.

According to Havelock Brewster, another member of the 'dependencia' school of thought, economic dependence reflects a lack of capacity to manipulate the operative elements of an economic system because the dynamism of the system is of external origin. The term is applied "most generally to a situation where the growth of income of a country is substantially, if not entirely, dependent on external factors, specifically exports, imports and external finance and technology. The level of dependence is assumed to be higher the greater their concentration in the economy." To view development problems from this stand-point, continues Brewster, has the advantage of high-lighting the fact that the so-called developing countries have been developing backwards in as much as their own technological knowledge and powers of invention are continuously outpaced by the technology inherent in their production and in as much as the economic structures has contributed to a growing social and psychological incohesiveness. In the same view, the admonition of the incidence of dependence and the advocation of internalizing the development process in the developing countries imply a strong connotation of self-reliance. These features permeate the
African school of thought.

In all his works, the late Kwame Nkrumah identified and linked Africa's underdevelopment to the colonial situation. Colonial domination, argued Nkrumah, conditioned the immediate life of every colonized African and, not infrequently, even the enlightened African servants of the colonial administration lost contact early in life with their traditional background. These people became proof to accept some vague theory of universalism, assumed attitudes entirely at variance with the reality of their people and environment, and began, instead, to fulfill the hopes and expectations of their guides and guardians the colonialists patrons. Nkrumah maintained that the principles which form the basis of capitalism are in direct conflict with the socialist egalitarianism of the traditional African society. The philosophy of the emancipation of man must find its weapons in the environment and living conditions of the African people.

This requires two aims: first the restitution of the egalitarianism of human society (in Africa) and, second, the logistic mobilization of all resources towards the attainment of that restitution. The philosophy which must stand behind such a social revolution is philosophical consciousness. Nkrumah advocated mass participation, not just in the strict developmental process, but also in the political, economic, social and cultural transition because people are the reality of national greatness. The African people need a strong continuing link with their past and an assured bond with their future; but that future must be socialist in form and
content. He extolled and expounded the idea of political and economic integration in Africa as a buffer against foreign domination.

Talking about socialism, Julius Nyerere's emphasis is on development from traditional patterns of living in order to create something that is uniquely African. Man, according to him, should be the purpose and justification of all social activity. Himself a strict egalitarian, Nyerere postulates that socialism, as a system, is in fact the organization of men's inequalities to serve their equality. While paying due respect to the intellectual contribution of Marx and Lenin, Nyerere rejects the universality of Marxism. "It is no part of the job of a socialist in 1968 to worry about whether or not his actions or proposals are in accordance with what Marx or Lenin wrote." If Marx "had lived in Sukumaland or Masailand...he would have written a different book than Das Kapital, but he could have been just as scientific and just as socialist."

Thus, according to Nyerere, there is neither a Westminster model nor a Moscow - Peking model for Africa, neither does Africa need a certificate of approval from the guardians of these models. Africa can learn from the relevant experiences of other countries, but the attitude should be to learn and not copy, and all efforts should be geared towards self-reliance. Africa's task is to look first at her position and needs, then to consider other experiences and suggestions in the light of her requirements; but she has to think, not imitate.
Following this short enumeration of the theories of development, we turn now to the question: What role do these theories play in practice? One would obviously expect that the activity of research in West Africa would be directed towards further development of the theoretical approaches already submitted to suit local conditions. Since research in the social sciences in West Africa is policy oriented, that is, its task is to explain the causes of poverty and to serve as an auxiliary to the instruments of social and economic planning, it is instructive to observe that the theoretical approaches, which have been developed to date, play but an insignificant role for the politicians and local planners. Although this view rests on experience in Sierra Leone, the insight obtained here is valid for all of former British West Africa. The various foreign trade theories concerning the secular deterioration of the terms of trade which have penetrated the public consciousness are an exception (UNCTAD in New Delhi) as are some aspects of the Marxist theory of development. The researcher in West Africa generally proceeds inductively: his task is to describe reality. Put negatively, one could describe this activity as random research concentrated on isolated problems.

Can Poverty be understood by the affluent?

Need for control over development used to be, and to many is today, self-evident. A state, society or economy is in need of development. Consequently an expert, agency, government, takes action in regard to this economy or society
so as to cause it to develop. In so doing, the agent of development will attempt to achieve certain goals he has set with regard to his object of development. Both for purpose of goal-setting and of deciding upon the appropriate means towards those goals already set, the agent employs a given body of knowledge on which his expert status is founded. What is remarkable in these attempts is that there are as many definitions of development as there are 'developmentalists.' Moreover, it is difficult to conceive how Western or Eastern Economists, working under conditions of affluence, can fully understand and appreciate the incidence of poverty and underdevelopment to the extent that they can propose the desired solutions.

Testifying before the United States Senate's Select Committee on Human Needs, Norman Borlongan, 1970 Nobel Prize Winner, suggested that "we might have better agriculture and food production policies if all those government officials who were involved would---quit eating for 14 days before they were going to make decisions on policies on pricing for food and priorities for investment in agriculture, and then also during the last three days go without water, Maybe they would not only learn something about the value of food from a biological standpoint but also something, to their distress, about the behaviour of human beings under shortage of food and under famine." One cannot really appreciate the problem of poverty, let alone offer its therapy, without literally becoming a part of it, and for a prolonged period, for that matter. For one
thing, the years of study and work that these 'developmentalists; have devoted...using models devised to explain the operation of industrial economies, makes it already hard, if not impossible, for them to grasp the mechanism of a very different type of economy. These economists are naturally conditioned by their own education with their built-in value systems. Their backgrounds, models and experiences are essentially of their own immediate milieu. Armed with their industrial and technological achievements and driven by their cultural arrogance, they view and interpret the 'pre-industrial' societies from irreconcilable stand-points. Underdevelopment for them, then, is that lacuna between their standards and any other standard, and development consequently is tantamount to catching up with their standard, which, in effect, confirms their original prejudice.

The idea of polarizing the world into the 'developed' and the 'developing' carries the bias already analysed. This division is based on the simplistic assumption that the 'underdeveloped' regions, of which West Africa is a part, are merely inefficient versions of the more developed ones, inhabited by people who have somehow failed to achieve anything better. There is no doubt that all countries are developing, none of them is stagnant; some may be progressing slowly, some more quickly, others might be retrogressing, but they are all developing. Zeylstra has suggested that the idea of this division was merely to promote aid.

In West Africa, according to Samir Amin, the culmination of the colonial trade system was balkanization,
in which the "recipient" micro-regions had no "interest" in "sharing" the crumbs of the colonial cake with their labour reserves. Moreover, continues Amin, the colonial system organized the society so that it produced on the best possible terms from the point of view of the mother country, exports which merely provided a very low and stagnating return to labour. This goal having been achieved, one can hardly talk of traditional societies in modern West Africa; rather those which exist in West Africa today are dependent, peripheral societies.

Amin places the evolution of the "dependency" system in West Africa on a time axis in order to accommodate its historical content. From the premercantilist period prior to the 17th century, through the mercantilist period of 1600-1800 and the assimilation into the full capitalist system of the 19th century, and to final colonialism, "the traditional society...was completed as a dependent society, a peripheral one and hence a dead-end. It...retained certain traditional appearances which constituted its only means of survival. The colonial type trade covered all the subordination-domination relationships between this traditional society integrated into the world system and the central capitalist society which shaped and dominated it." Amin emphasizes that the relative stagnation of agriculture (the main vehicle behind West Africa's development) was part and parcel of this dependent system. A first step, therefore, to authentic development for West Africa, should be the rehabilitation of agriculture right from the subsistence,
non-monetary sector, but such an approach should be geared towards improving the conditions of the people of the rural areas.

How relevant are these Theories

My attempt to reduce all these theories to one single scheme by extracting only what seem to be their essential elements may give rise to a number of criticisms, but it is a legitimate procedure insofar as it discusses certain epistemological principles underlying positions which, when seen from another point of view, appear completely divergent. These principles can be summed up as follows:

(i) Development means advancement towards certain well-defined general objectives which correspond to the specific condition of man and society to be found in the most advanced societies of the modern world. The model is known by different names (modern society, industrial society, mass society and so on.)

(ii) Underdeveloped societies will progress towards this model as soon as they have eliminated certain social, political, cultural and institutional obstacles. These obstacles are represented by 'traditional societies,' 'feudal' systems, or 'feudal residues', depending on the particular school of thought.

(iii) Certain economic, political and psychological processes can be singled out as allowing the most rational mobilization of national resources and these can be categorized for the use of economic planners.
To all of the above is added the need to coordinate certain social and political forces in support of a development policy and to devise an ideological basis which organizes the will of various nations (the West African nations in this instance) in the 'tasks' of development.

To criticize these assumptions is to criticize in its essence a theory of development which seeks to become a discipline of its own as all development theories have become.

In the first place, the model of a developed society which most development theories use is formal and ahistoric and, therefore, an ideological abstraction. What is a developed society? The best known models are those of the United States, Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union, and it is thought that the central problem is how to "arrive" at a stage similar to that which they represent. It is also claimed that the historic experience of these countries must be repeated or, at least, that development must lead to a society closely resembling them.\textsuperscript{55} It is generally thought that one can reduce development to a formal model whose content would be subject to historical variation. For example, it is supposed that development requires the existence of a particular agent of change which might as well be the entrepreneur (in the case of capitalist countries) or the State (in Socialist countries). The differences between the two social systems are seen as variables which fulfill the same function while assuming different forms. Such assumptions, however, lack scientific validity because of their ahistorical character. Historical time is not uni-linear and future societies, such as those of West
Africa, will not be able to attain stages reached by the developed societies at a previous time. All societies move together towards the future and towards new forms of modern society. The historic experience of developed capitalist societies has been completely transcended; their basic source of private capital formation in foreign trade, the incorporation of vast masses of workers in industrial production, their indigenous technological development, constitute options no longer open to West Africa and the other underdeveloped countries of today. The history of the developed socialist societies is noted in the experience of 'socialism in one bloc,' of 'primitive socialist accumulation' at the expense of peasant agriculture, of the autarkic establishment of a heavy industry, and of the closing off of foreign trade and the 'iron-curtain.'

The theories of development in existence are, therefore, not to be repeated, nor can 'models' of developed societies be taken as a crystallization of aims to be achieved by the West African countries.

Fundamental Obstacles

Another fundamental error of approach lies in the orientation of the study of development towards the resistance which traditional societies may offer to change. West African societies in the twentieth century face an entirely different situation to those faced by the developed countries in the early stages of their development. For example, they do not have external colonies to exploit and they are faced with pre-existing
industrial states which have the power and the will to intervene in their internal affairs. Clearly, the social structure created during the period of colonialism and primary exports has a very great capacity for resistance and survival. However, this is due, fundamentally, not to those structures themselves, but rather to the characteristics of the process of development in dependent countries.

To restrict the problem to the economic, social, political and institutional resistance offered by the traditional society is to impair irremediably our ability to give an explanation of the West African crisis. Analysis should not concentrate on an abstract and formal relationship between two stages of a system (traditionalism-modernism, capitalism-feudalism). Rather, it should seek out the concrete relationship prevailing in these so-called underdeveloped societies which, as we shall show, are better-termed dependent societies.

Development cannot, therefore, be the passage from a state which is relatively unknown towards a state which will never exist. In other words, the theories of development must be concerned with the laws of development of those societies which we seek to understand. We must discover to what extent one can also identify them with the laws of development of advanced societies, be they capitalist or socialist.56

The crisis of the theories of development, which has dominated development models, in West Africa, has thrown the science itself, into a crisis. The very notions of development and underdevelopment and the explanatory power of these concepts have lost credibility. In this situation, the concept of
dependence has appeared to offer a possible, if partial, explanation of these paradoxes, seeking to explain why West African development has differed from that of today's advanced countries. The international relationships which have conditioned development can be defined as relationships of dependence whose effect is governed by certain specific laws which allow us to speak of dependent development. 57

As West Africa is a great diversity, the development theories fail to explain, as will be seen in Chapter three, the differential rate of development between areas. There is a great variation in such indices of economic development as per capita income, gross national product and, important in West Africa, overseas trade per head of population. In general it is the larger countries and the coastal countries which stand out. Using these indices, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ghana are the most developed. The inland countries show a much lesser development, as do the smaller coastal countries.

Within each of these countries however, there is a wide gap between various parts: the cities are more developed than the rural areas, the coastlands than the interiors and so on. It is possible to trace a pattern of differentiation, which is general and irrespective of national boundaries but which remains unexplained by the development theories.

Under any development strategy, great attention must be given to the education of the masses, specialists, and the duties of solidarity. Yet one must ask: Solidarity for what? At times, solidarity aims at harnessing the energies of all in order to abolish absolute poverty and scandalous in-
equalities among persons and social classes. Recent studies show that few countries have adopted this as their priority or have achieved great success. Again, one notable exception is the People's Republic of China, which has deliberately set out to meet the basic needs of all the populace in a highly egalitarian manner. Not only does that state guarantee employment to everyone who seeks it, it also provides health, education, and transportation to all at nominal costs. An income policy deliberately minimizes differences in wages. Most visitors, including even those who are unsympathetic to China's ideology, have reported that no one is hungry, unemployed, or bereft of basic health services in that land. The elimination of mass famine, endemic disease, and unemployment in China would have been impossible in the absence of an overarching incentive system anchored in moral solidarity and requiring all to contribute for the benefit of all. The ideal is to achieve what one author calls "a modest but fair livelihood." Personal entrepreneurship is condemned as bourgeois selfishness and, though much stress is placed on working productively and rapidly (to increase) the available stock of goods and services, equal insistence is placed on producing more for the benefit of all, especially of those in direct need. Nowhere is social struggle so frequently and so prominently invoked as pedagogically necessary as in China; the nation of "walking on two legs" as a recognition of the need to live in tension between conflicting demands. The choice of a moral incentive system to lend dynamism to its development effort contributes, therefore, a basic option taken
by China which effectively commands development strategies in domains of investment priorities, locational decisions, and modes of enterprise administration. A successful policy in domains such as health, population, education, and transportation, on the other hand, is conditioned by the incentive system which presides over mobilization efforts made by the nation struggling to achieve development. Certain financial, material, and labour input become possible only if moral incentive systems prevail. Conversely, and in other societies, certain policies can be adopted only where the over-arching incentive system allows market competition to favour individual or corporate entrepreneurs and consumers.

As noted earlier, no incentive system can totally dispense with some mixture of material and moral goals. Even within market capitalism the assumption is usually made that inequities will be offset either by mechanisms of corrective state distribution, by formal and informal policies constituting some form of charity, or, more frequently, by the putative "trickling down" of benefits from the "haves" to the "have-nots". This is generally the case even where policy-makers accept Kuznet's view that an initial period of development produce wider income disparities than previously existed. One difficulty with any "trickle-down" vision is that incentive systems, like other societal mechanisms, are self-reinforcing; they develop inertia and a momentum of their own, usually reinforcing initial trends. Myrdal long ago acquainted students of development with the 'vicious circle' of poverty, an image which reappears in his later writings. There exists, analogou-
sly, a vicious circle of reinforcement of vested interests at work in overall incentive systems. Once an economy is organized in response to the stimuli of individual achievement, it becomes extremely difficult to introduce a new catalyst into the system without having it neutralized.

Clearly governments may act as intermediaries between the profit-maker and the needy consumer bereft of buying power. Yet, even equitable social-welfare policies must overcome the dominant influence exercised on sectoral policy by the basic incentive systems. Wealthier taxpayers, who provide the funds governments use to pay their welfare role, must at the very least perceive the gain to themselves as worth the cost. Not surprisingly, powerless, needy groups are neglected while potentially dangerous ones are appeased. The perdurability, within industrial countries, not only of "pockets of poverty" but also of numerous social groups "left out" of the putative benefits of development suggests that neither trickle-down nor governmental correctives to the "invisible hand" of the profit incentive can abolish poverty. Champions of capitalism usually claim that moral incentives lead to excessive sacrifices in efficiency. There is doubtless some truth to the claim. Yet, no development strategy can avoid making a basic choice: either to "develop" for the benefit of those who are already privileged or who constitute promising potential candidates for "modernity," or to embrace a pattern of "development" aimed at abolishing dehumanizing misery for all its citizens and to create an incentive system of institutionalizing this priority. Some form of "walking on two legs" is inevitable. The almost
universal failure of "trickle-down" and welfare statism suggests, at least tentatively, the greater promise lying in granting privacy to moral incentives. All strategies, however, will fail without suitable doses of imposed austerity.

Austerity, as understood as "Self-Reliance", is the only path which can directly attack the poverty of the poorest majority in West Africa. All other measures can have but palliative effects at best. This view formally repudiates all versions of the "trickle-down" theory, according to which the material improvement of the poorest can come only from a growth in wealth. It is also opposed to conventional distribution theories which concentrate mainly on reapportioning wealth downstream, that is, without affecting basic ground rules governing access to resources upstream (before they have been exploited or processed.) The disappointing results of endless discussions regarding a new regime of the seas and of seabed resources suggest the near impossibility of applying technology to creating new systems of resource equity without a prior commitment to the principle of sufficiency for all as a priority.66

Why should self-reliance policy not be applied absolutely? Because even countries with a dearth of resources will need advance technology or even relationship with the outside world; they need a judicious choice in whatever relationships they enter. Not every country with a small-market can be self-reliant even in the production of modest consumer goods; much more so African countries with single crop (see Table 2.1). However, if these societies place high premium on
TABLE 2.1 Exports of Selected African Nations, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>% of Total Value of Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Cacao</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Coffee, Cacao, Wood</td>
<td>50%, 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Coffee and Tea</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Tabacco and Tea</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Groundnut</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Groundnut and Oil</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Cacao and Coffee</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Groundnut</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the twin freedom from external dependence and from the determinism tied to competition in the ever-shifting race after new goods, self-reliance becomes unavoidable. The message is not that self-reliance is desirable but that it is necessary if national freedom is valued. Self-Reliance constitutes one of those basic options which, if pursued coherently, sets limits to development strategies and to specific sector policies. This is why we need to challenge the several conventional theories of development.

The development models derived from the theories designed during the late colonial period and inherited by most independent planners in anglophone West African countries assumed that:

(i) development occurred only with central planning and control, and the day-to-day decision-making activities of peasants was very much of a traditional meaningless merry-go-round;

(ii) industrialization and expansion of a "modern sector" was the only means leading to development. This meant that one followed a development path that over-concentrated resources in urban areas often at the expenses of rural areas;

(iii) to industrialize, one must increase control over foreign capital to enable a country to purchase the requisite capital equipment for development. To control foreign capital, one had to rely on foreign aid and an exanding export trade.

Both exports and aid were seen as necessary to bridge the gap created by increased imports and limited
earnings from exports.

Exports and aid

The rural development approach, derived from the above rationale, was to expand cash crops for export in order to support the financing of national development. For example, Ivory Coast, independent since 1960, experienced a boom that was comparable in magnitude to no other West African Nation. Incidentally this boom began before the coming of independence: that is, it was not, a product of independence. Approximately between 1950 and 1965, the Ivory Coast's rate of economic growth is said to have run at an annual average of 9 percent, increasing, from the beginning of the period. Once again, there was primarily an export boom: exports quadrupled - not of minerals, as was the case with her neighbour Liberia, but of farming products, coffee export quintupled; cocoa exports more than doubled; others also rose ...and they are still rising.

At first sight, a visitor to Ivory Coast may well think that he is seeing the birth of a system which, while modeled on that of France, is becoming independent of France: self-generating, autonomous, increasingly in command of its own destiny. The capital city of Abidjan erupts with skyscrapers; its luxury shops are, indeed, full of luxuries; its streets encumbered with private cars. Moreover, behind these signs of consumer prosperity are other indicators of a capitalist-type expansion.

Perhaps more convincingly, there is evidence for a
shift to a monetary economy. Production of the main food items has nearly doubled, however, as rising food imports show, even this increase has not been substantial enough to provide for the new urban dwellers. This is due to the heavy emphasis placed on export-crop production. Food imports, of mainly wheat and rice, rose from 27,000 tons in 1950 to 92,000 in 1965, the latter providing food not only for about three quarters of all urban consumers, but also for 14 percent of rural consumers. In other words, ever-increasing numbers of the population have been paying cash for their food. Given the mechanisms of the market, this means a steady transfer of wealth from rural consumers to urban traders, and this, of course, is another way in which one would expect a greater class stratification to appear, and, with that, a bourgeoisie. 67

Yet, what does one find when viewing the structures which have resulted from the boom? For one thing, there are many more African plantation owners than before, some of whom are large property-holders. Furthermore, in towns, there are certainly a number of people who enjoy a bourgeois life-style and, with it, the "appropriate values system". However, it would appear that this elite barely forms even the skeleton of a class capable of progressing towards, much less exercising, a domestic capitalist hegemony in Ivory Coast.

There has conceivably been an extension of capitalism in the country. However, as Samin Amin remarks "there is no ground for saying that (this) is the development of an Ivory Coast capitalism. This society ".of...middleclass
pretensions..." has no autonomy of its own; it has no being without the European society which dominates it. Here, the workers are Africans. But the true bourgeoisie is absent, domiciled in Europe, which provides capital and the men who use it.\textsuperscript{68}

On one hand, the greater part of the salaries paid out at high levels goes to Europeans. On the other hand, exports of wealth by transfer of savings, dividends, and other means has meant, we are told, that the whole capital surplus annually generated in Ivory Coast has been finding, and continues to find, its way abroad. Once again, this is, undoubtedly, growth, but it is growth without development: and growth, primarily, for the benefit of an already established capitalist systems, mainly that of France.

What, for example, will West African countries do in the future when the abundant natural resources have entirely disappeared? If these countries cannot develop the kind of agriculture, how will they feed the rapidly-growing urban populations which the doctrine of survival-by-growth incessantly demands?

To pose such questions, as you see, is not to make an ideological point, though an ideological point could no doubt be made. Survival by growth-of-what-exists as presented to us by the case of an evolving capitalism in West Africa - appears generally to provide little hope, and in most cases no hope at all, of leading to "take-off," "development," or any other of its proposed objectives. The case for believing this does not rest entirely on preconceived objections of a
theoretical nature; the point here is that it rests on the ascertainable facts of the matters. To understand this situation, is to look at the problems facing Nigeria today. Are alternative courses of policy and action possible? Clearly, they must be: that West Africa will eventually find the means not only of safe survival, but also of all-round progress, may appear more than possible.

However, dependence on the export of raw materials from agriculture and mining, supplemented with external aid to finance national development, has failed to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries. The gap keeps widening.

Though developing countries are obviously losing the race, even in aggregate terms, their reliance on the above approach keeps pushing planners to urge for more exports and more aid thereby compounding their dependence on foreign sources of finance for development.

A dependence on foreign capital leads to requests for loans, the repayment of which threatens to choke any future development. Moreover, dependence on the export of raw materials, as shown by studies, is frustrated by a relatively decreasing demand for exclusively tropical products such as sisal, pyrethorum, cotton. Also, such export trade does not generate enough local multiplier effect and domestic investment.

Many planners of African development are, growing more and more skeptical of the belief that increased foreign aid is the sole means to accelerated national development.

They are, particularly, questioning this belief,
when it appears to aim primarily at creating employment opportunities for technical experts and markets for machinery dealers from developed countries. The fact that most projects are funded only after the completion of feasibility studies carried out by "unbiased", "objective" foreign consultants, selected because of their low involvement with the affairs of the aid-receiving country and therefore very uninformed, is itself a growing source of discontent.  

Unemployment and Foreign Investment

The failure of foreign investment in most West African countries to generate significant employment, or even to indicate a willingness to do so through the choice of labour-intensive technology, has led policy-makers to look for alternative development strategies which would involve the majority rather than the very few. The present growth rate of unemployment, ranging from 15 to 40 percent in most developing countries, is not likely to be relieved by the creation of more jobs in the area of industry, service, or the manufacturing sectors. In Kenya, for example, the employment growth rate is between 0.5 percent and 2.5 percent, in spite of higher rates of capital investment.  

The continued import of knowledge from the outside must be evaluated carefully. On an international level we have a very imperfect knowledge of human systems, behaviour, rulership, national guidance and of what type of society we should aim for. It is, therefore, extremely naive to believe that some external "expert" has the answer to the problems of
national social development for a West African Country. He may have tentative models to offer, models which have proved successful in Europe, or "port-models" which are unreliable.  

Dependency on such knowledge systems should be accompanied by the realization of their experimental nature and of their possible irrelevance to dynamic national processes, that is, non-directive change.

External knowledge can incapacitate a country by generating values and aspirations which lead to consumer demand that cannot be met and to heavy imports of consumer goods. Such values and attitudes can also lead to levels of aspirations and job selectiveness which can paralyze huge sections of the economically active population through induced unemployment.

The concentration on agriculture in West African countries reflects a very small urban base and, indirectly, indicates a very limited industrial base, as this concentration in agriculture is not being reduced by any significant development of rural industries.

The implications of this concentration are clear:

(i) The majority of the population is involved in small-scale farming practices where they, as farm families or as small communities, are the major decision-makers and where governments and development agencies have very limited controls;

(ii) West African ecology, physical and socio-economic, is extremely varied and complex. There is also
very limited knowledge about micro-level ecological factors which affect production decision-making. Therefore, planners have continued to suffer from limited information and to continue to make plans of dubious reliability. Access to reliable local-level knowledge is achieved through reliance on local-level capacity and information sources;

(iii) Agricultural operations among West African cultivators are complex and cannot be reduced to the simple principles upon which a commercial firm operates. It is, therefore, often difficult for government to introduce centralized control mechanisms. They find it more realistic to rely on local-level organizations such as cooperatives and village communities.

Such dependency on agriculture, in which governments and development agencies have limited control, is a problem only so long as the myth that all development occurs under central guidance is still valid. As long as this myth is kept alive, then the abilities of national governments to guide subsistence activities, food production policy and rural income increase will be very limited.

In the synthesis of economic theories, this intellectual challenge is slowly being met. As to some form of development therapy for Africa, there are the suggestions of socialism, self-reliance, institutional changes and so on. We are concerned here with an additional element of how to give this development process a realistic and appropriate meaning for the people it serves. While foreign aid can be helpful, it must not be the basis for
economic development. As Nyerere wrote in the Arusha Declaration, "A poor man does not use money as a weapon."  

He told Tanzanians flatly: "The only people we can rely upon are ourselves." Self-reliance is not merely a development strategy; it has to become a way of life. It is essential for a return to the African heritage that forms the basis for socialist transformation.

Work cannot lead to self-reliance unless it is organized. Leadership is crucial. Nyerere outlines a humane nonauthoritarian leadership consistent with African "familyhood." According to Nyerere, Ujaama-:

- calls for leadership, but not for orders to be given; it directs the people along the socialist path, but excludes attempts to whip them into it - saying clearly that you cannot force people to lead socialist lives.

Nevertheless good leadership and a carefully planned programme are imperative. At one point, Nyerere stated bluntly that "Progress in socialist rural development does in fact depend almost entirely on leadership at all levels."

However, leadership must be based on communication and education, not on coercion. Nyerere told an audience of future leaders at the University of Dar es Salaam:

Let me emphasize that this leadership I am now talking about does not imply control any more than it implies bullying or intimidating people. A good leader will explain, teach and inspire. In an Ujaama village he will do more. He will lead by doing. He is in front of the people, showing them what can be done, guiding them, and encouraging them. But he is with them. You do not lead people by being so far in front, or so theoretical in your teaching that the people cannot see what you are doing or saying.
You do not lead people by yapping at their heels like a dog hearing cattle. You can lead the people only by being one of them, but just being more active as well as more willing to learn-from them and others.

Such a concept of leadership is fairly easy to envisage and even to implement at the local-level, where leaders are local men and women selected by and in daily contact with their peers.

**Planning for local-self-reliance**

Many sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists have argued that self-reliance and self-help increase a sense of responsibility, eliminate suspicion and alienation, and also enhance creativeness. Their discussions are based on the observation that behaviour is always directed by the way people define their common world. This definition is patterned by their experiences.

Self-reliance is enhanced when planners and developers utilize and integrate local knowledge, systems and operational principles into their programmes. Local decision-making frameworks should be socio-cultural, socio-technical knowledge models which are specific to localized situations, which are real, and which are able to determine local action. Some of the appropriate ways of enhancing self-reliance, therefore, include:

**Planning for personality enhancement**

Social planners are agreed that individuals and communities have personality. They also agree that the easiest
way to gain commitment and self-involvement is to choose themes, activities and symbols which reinforce their self-image. The change strategy which ridicules farmers as illiterate, ignorant or conservative, should be replaced by one which searches for local insights, local identification of needs, local organizational principles, etc., and one which builds on these.

**Grass-Roots Participation**

The essential stages of project development include, pre-planning, need identification, assessment of feasibility, planning including the specification of dimensions of problems, resource assessment, goal choice (priorities) programme design and implementation, including resource mobilization, operations and management; finally, evaluation and reassessment. All these stages should be initiated at the local community level where populations are clear about their goals but not necessarily agreed on their priorities. At this level, local people control indigenous leadership, local incentive patterns and local resources and are more familiar with local constraints.

The system of participation can be realized through the division of activities into small neighbourhood group and through the use of government resources and experts as advisers and catalysts. Alternatively, participation can also be realized through representation in village and district committees where experts and local representatives work together.

The most critical factor in meaningful participation
is dialogue; that is, the discussion of issues at all levels in order that the people may educate themselves and may eventually define their own choices, their own identity and that they may agree on national and local constraints and select activities consistent with technical principles, national guidelines and identifiable constraints.

Participatory Mobilization

Many scholars of rural development are convinced that many farm and community resources are paralyzed due to the dependency problem and the continued suppression of the self-assertiveness of the rural communities. 84

So long as farmers must rely on government agents, they will not exploit their farm production issues. They will be relatively less imaginative and more willing to go on using the same old tools, following the same practices, year in and year out.

However, more significantly, they will not normally release those resources at their disposal as family labour, leadership, social control and discipline. To increase mobilization, more education of the masses is necessary as well as among the members of the community and the 'agents of change'. 85 A sense of obligation and responsibility arises only when communication exposes all relevant issues and indicates necessary patterns of decisions.
CHAPTER III

Characteristics of Area

In my opinion no single geographic area of the world has suffered so much misrepresentation of ignorant outsiders as West Africa. In the eighteenth century its people were regarded as savages, fit only to be slaves. In the nineteenth century West Africa became "the White Man's Grave," one of the darkest parts of the Dark Continent", a land of hideous pagan practices. At the beginning of the twentieth century, after being made the subjects of the colonial powers of Europe, the peoples of West Africa found themselves regarded as incapable of managing their own affairs. Only during the past two decades, with the revolutionary growth of African nationalism, have the countries and peoples of West Africa come to be accepted into the community of nations.

West Africa is a clearly defined region of continental scale. It is about 2,000 miles as the crow flies from Dakar to Lake Chad and 800 miles from Accra northward to the bend of the River Niger at Bourem. This is equivalent to an area enclosed by the quadrilateral London - the Caspian Sea - Basra - Barcelona - London, or the whole of the U.S.A. east of the Rockies.

Within such a large area there will obviously be great differences in the physical environment, the economy and the society. West Africa, however, lacks the extreme variety and the complexity of regional differentiation
encountered in the area between southern England and the Caspian Sea. Although the whole of the area is regarded as being economically underdeveloped, the progress towards a modern market economy in agriculture, industry, and commerce does vary widely from place to place. Social homogeneity is less pronounced, though over the last century at least its principal external influences have been Western in general and British and French in particular. These have been a distinct unifying factor, even if a somewhat superficial one. In short, while it is easy to over-emphasize the monotony of the physical features, it is equally easy to over-emphasize the regional differences which are minor if viewed on a world scale.

The Atlantic Ocean extends westward and southward clearly separating West Africa from the outside world and in the past a major factor in its isolation from the rest of the world. This is reinforced by the coast, which functions more as a barrier, separating land and sea by screens of surf and mangrove swamp and by lack of natural harbours, than as the zone of contact in the North Sea basin or in the Mediterranean.

To the North lies the broad barrier of the Sahara Desert. It was so long an impediment to circulation that it has become a cultural divide separating Tropical Africa (L'Afrique Noire of the French writers) from the Mediterranean lands (L'Afrique Blanche). The southern shores of the Mediterranean have more affinity in their landscape, culture and economy with the northern shores than with Tropical Africa. There is a strong case for regarding the Sahara rather than the Mediterranean as the northern limit of Africa.
Even today there are only two motorable routes northward from West Africa, the Mauritanian route from St. Louis de Senegal to Agadir and the Hoggar route from Agades to Ghardaia in Algeria. Only to the East is there a possibility of questioning the limits of West Africa. Gautier regarded the Benue Trough as the boundary. But associated with this structural trough is the series of plateaux descending north eastward from the 4,069 metre volcano of Mount Cameroon to the low lying and swampy basin of Lake Chad.

These plateaux are sparsely peopled and in the southern part at least, inhabited by the Bantu peoples, who are culturally and linguistically distinguishable from those of Guinea and the Sudan. Furthermore, the communications across this barrier are very poor. South of Lake Chad is a good road from Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria to Fort Lany, capital of the Chad Republic. But the only accessible crossings are in the extreme south, a very bad one across the Bamenda Plateau and one which is still very poor in places from Manfe to Doreala. Prior to 1960, when the British Cameroons were administered by Nigeria, the eastern flanks of Mount Cameroon were drawn into the ambit of Nigeria, but this area, together with the Bamenda Plateau, became in 1962 part of the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

Thus West Africa is cut off by land from the outside world, and for passengers or freight West Africa is linked with other parts of the world by sea and air. None of these barriers, however, is complete. The Sahara was crossed regularly and
frequently after the domestication of the camel about the seventh century. The desert, too was outflanked by sea, after the period of Portuguese explorations in the latter half of the fifteenth century. But these barriers were difficult and still are costly to cross. They were the cause of the isolation of West Africa that is its first notable characteristic, though during the present century this was broken down more and more.

While it was true that there was a considerable trade across the desert, gold, slaves and 'morocco' leather moving northward in exchange for salt, weapons and armour, and while Muslin culture followed in the wake of this trade to the Sudan, it is as well to remember that such basic inventions as the wheel and the plough were unknown to the indigenous cultures of West Africa. It was therefore impossible for the latter to make any significant technological advance. In contrast, however, the use of iron was widely though not universally known. It is also well to recall how many of the present day staple foods are exotics. Cassava, Maize, and rice, all staples of the Guinea Coast, were introduced during or after the sixteenth century.

This isolation from external influence is matched by internal isolation, and this in spite of monotonously level relief and lack of mountain barriers. It is the result of a combination of sheer distance and lack of navigable rivers with extensive forests and woodland, and the widespread occurrence of trypanosomiasis, transmitted by the tsetse fly, which preclude the use of draught or riding animals. Only in
the Sudan zone, south of the Sahel zone could horse or camel be used.

Even today, with an even extending road network and expanding vehicle fleet, this internal isolation still persists. In some areas, such as western Nigeria, Southern Ghana and south eastern Ivory Coast, the road network is relatively close meshed and the traffic flow heavy. But in other areas the road network is rudimentary and circulation limited. Even where road networks are developed, they are internal and do not extend over international or even provincial boundaries. In 1960 there were only three motorable roads across the 650 mile (1,165 kilometres) western frontier of Nigeria and only 8 roads across the 1,200 miles (1,930 kilometres) of Ghana's land frontiers. In addition, trunk roads and railways tend to run north and south rather than east and west or more correctly from the seaports (administrative centres) (see Table 3.1) inland. This is partly because, until recently, most of the cash cropping was for export to overseas markets.

Paradoxically, the attainment of political independence has tended to increase isolation by strengthening the existing frontiers. Independence in general and the fragmentation of the Federation of French West Africa in particular have led to the erection of customs barriers and immigration control where none existed before. On occasion frontiers have been closed for long periods, as those between Senegal and Mali, between Ghana and Togo and between Guinea and Sierra Leone. While it is true that these frontiers have little or no meaning from the viewpoint of local circulation, and while smuggling is on a large scale,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Population (Millions)</th>
<th>Urban Population ( Millions)</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

they have affected large-scale movement along the trunk roads, which can be easily controlled.

Isolation, both internal and external, is therefore the first essential characteristic of West Africa. The breaking down of this isolation is the essential prerequisite of economic development. But this involves heavy cost, especially where there are the physical barriers such as coastlines and forest to be overcome. Secondly, the difficulty of providing the whole of West Africa with a transport system of uniform quality and universal extent has been a basic cause of differential development between and within the various countries. Thirdly, it has put a premium on development of the interior. For high transport cost effectively reduces the revenue from exports and increases the price of imports. A higher proportion of the price received on world markets of export crops is absorbed by transport cost. Higher transport costs raise the price of essential imports such as petroleum, metal goods and cement in the interior compared with the coast.

The second major characteristic is the low overall density of the population and its uneven distribution. This very large region had only just over 111 million people in 1970 (see Table 3.1). The exact number is impossible to calculate, because of the unreliability of many censuses and the different dates on which they were held. There is thus an approximate density of 35 per square mile (13.5 per square kilometres), very low by the standards of many monsoon lands, but nevertheless, West Africa is on the whole more densely populated than is tropical Africa in general. Data on the size
and structure of agricultural holdings are widely scattered in the geographical, anthropological and agricultural literature, where the results of innumerable case studies have been reported. At the national scale, data on size of holdings are usually based on sample surveys and are subject to large sampling errors. Holdings are, however, small, varying in size from less than half an acre to over 20 acres, although the evidence suggests that the majority are between one and five acres in extent. Variations in size of holdings is as much a feature of densely as of sparsely settled areas. Factors affecting these variations include the availability of land, the area that can be satisfactorily cultivated given the technical limitations and, in densely settled areas where land can be purchased, the wealth of the cultivators.

A subsistence area of half an acre per head of population is usual in the forest regions. This is probably increased to three-quarters of an acre or more in the Savanna regions for the root crops typical of the forest yield more heavily than cereals, the task of clearance in the forest is more burdensome, and fallow periods are shorter there. Holdings consist of small plots ('farms') widely scattered through the village lands. Fragmentation results from the process of allocation of lands to the cultivator. It is least where land is abundant and fallows are long, particularly where settlements are dispersed in small compound units. It is most marked where settlements are large, where there is pressure on land resources. Within this broad framework there
is considerable variation within individual communities. In Kumbaw, a village in the Bamenda Highlands of West Cameroon, the average acreage cultivable by each woman is 1.34 acres in an average of eight farms. At one extreme is a woman with a holding of four farms totalling 1.04 acres, all within ten minutes walk of her hut. On the other hand, is a woman cultivating 1.8 acres in fourteen plots, the largest of which is some ninety minutes' walk from the hut over two steep hills. Amongst the Lobi Birifor of Western Gonja in Central Ghana, most of the holding is made up of the family farm cultivated by the farming group to supply foodstuffs. More scattered bush farms are used to provide cash crops. Similarly, at Wum in the Bamenda Highlands one large block of land is cultivated by the women, who grow the foodstuffs, and the cultivated portion is rotated around the village area, as fallow follows cropping in the cultivation cycle.

West Africa has the highest average population density in tropical Africa, yet its population pattern has no simple explanation. It conceals in rural population densities as those of Iboland, South Eastern Ivory Coast, and the Kano Close Settled Zone, where figures may locally reach or exceed 500 persons per square mile (195 per square kilometres) on the one hand, and wide areas such as the Middle Belt of Nigeria, the forest of southwest Ivory Coast and Western Gonja in the eastern part of Dagomba District in Ghana's Northern Region, where population density is nowhere above 49 persons per square mile.

There is evidence to suggest a connection between population density and agricultural practice, and that the
practice becomes modified as density changes. Shifting cultivation is found only where population densities are low, usually less than 25 persons per square mile. Generally rotational bush fallowing is practised where population densities are higher. But increasing population density (or the spread of cash cropping) eventually reduces the length of the fallow periods until the practice must be classified as semi-permanent or permanent. Obviously no absolute rule can be established. Even though population densities are very low, the Konkomba of Ghana maintain individual rights over the fallows for limited periods. Bush fallowing is practised in parts of south-eastern Nigeria where densities exceed 600 per square mile and exceptionally high by West African standards. However, this suggested direct relationship between population density and agricultural practice may be of fundamental importance for development planning.

A distinguishing feature is the contrast between areas with relatively high population densities and contiguous areas of very low density. To some extent the population can be said to be arranged zonally, following those of climate and vegetation. Thus in general the coastlands and the forests are the most densely populated. The Sudan zone fairly heavy, the Guinea Savannah sparsely inhabited and the population in the Sahel is very low indeed.

The true picture, however is not so simple.
Population distribution in West Africa tends to concentrate into discontinuous 'islands' separated by areas of much lower densities. The largests and most important 'islands', such as
the cocoa belts of Ghana and of Western Nigeria, Iboland in
Eastern Nigeria and the timber zone of the Ivory Coast are to
be found in the forest. But here also are the sparsely
populated areas of south-western Ivory Coast, of south-western
Ghana and the Cross River Basin of Nigeria. There are also
important 'islands' in the Sudan zone, notably the Mossi area
of Upper Volta and the Sokoto and Kano region of Northern
Nigeria. In the Middle Belt, which Harrison Church equates
with the Guinea Savannah woodlands, such 'islands' are fewer
and less important. They are confined to those areas around
Korhogo and Bouake in Ivory Coast, to the Yomba, Nupe and Tiv
lands in Nigeria and to some mountainous areas such as the
Central Atacora and Jos Plateau which act as refuges in
troubled times.

The population is predominantly rural. Even in
the indigenous Yoruba towns the majority of the inhabitants
are farmers. Urbanization, though proceeding with increasing
rapidity, especially in the coastlands and forests, has not
yet affected the majority of the population in any region (see
Table 3.1). Though urban development ante-dated the
European penetration into West Africa, and the urban component
of the population had become sizeable, further urbanization
proceeded at an impressive rate in the course of the twentieth
century. In general, urban land use in the West African
Savannah is rather space-consuming since housing densities tend
to be fairly low. Urbanization thus involved substantial reduc-
tions of cultivated or potentially cultivable land. But of
greater significance for the present argument is that
urbanization produced a rising demand for food.

While there are obvious differences in the size and growth of urban centres, in the wealth and occupations of the urban population, and in the quality of housing and social services available, there are important similarities from one country to another. First, most growth occurs in the respective private cities, Table 3.2 shows this phenomenal growth in absolute terms over the last four decades. Almost all primate cities in West Africa have doubled their populations in the last decade. Second, migration is a major contributing factor to this growth. Populations from the surrounding rural areas and smaller towns are attracted by the economic opportunities (real or perceived) of their country's major industrial-commercial-political centre. Third, much of the economic growth, capital investment, and politico-economic foundation is concentrated in the private cities, largely a carry-over from colonial times (see Table 3.3). The primate cities are the meeting ground between the national and international economies, and are situated in strategic and convenient locations. Fourth, in all but a handful of states, the primate cities account for more than half of the urban populations: Conakry 59%, Banjul 100%. Fifth, a high percentage of the urban population is located in cities of 100,000 and more, and there is a large disparity between the primate cities and the smaller towns. The rank-size rule applies very poorly, which means the hierarchical arrangement of towns and cities associated with developed countries is generally absent and the spatial distribution of wealth and
TABLE 3.2 Growth of Selected Primate Cities (Estimates, in Thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1930's Year</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>1950's Year</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>1960's Year</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>1970's Year</th>
<th>Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N'Djamena</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3.3 Selected Characteristics of Capital Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West Africa</th>
<th>Capitals</th>
<th>Indigenous City</th>
<th>Ex-Colonial Capital</th>
<th>New Postindependence Capital</th>
<th>Primate City</th>
<th>Only Major City</th>
<th>Main Seaport</th>
<th>Lake River Port</th>
<th>Main Airport</th>
<th>Main Rail Head</th>
<th>Main Manufacturing City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Porto Novo</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>N’Djamena</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Banjul</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Bissau</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Bamako</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Nouakchott</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Niamey</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Lome</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>Ouagadougou</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

development is highly concentrated. Sixth, the major urban areas are witnessing acute shortages of housing and rising unemployment as migration adds to the local population increase.

Migration can be both the causes and consequences of population growth. In West Africa they play an especially important role in urban growth, the circulation of income, the diffusion of ideas and values, and have contributed to the concentration of industry, economic growth, and political power in relatively small areas at the expense of the surrounding regions. While important in the development process of contemporary West Africa, migration has occurred throughout history and has contributed to the contemporary patterns of distributions, densities, and economies. They can be voluntary or involuntary, permanent or temporary, within or between states, rural-urban, urban-rural, rural-rural, urban-urban, involving individuals or groups. They are the response to charges (either real or perceived) in the natural environment, and social, political, and economic systems in either the migrant's place of origin or place of destination or both.

While the predominantly rural population is undergoing social and economic changes, extremely rapid in some areas, very slow in others, the economy is still largely subsistence based. A varying proportion, over 90% in some areas, of the output from farming, herding, collecting and hunting is consumed by the family producing it. A subsistence-based economy is characterized by its slow rate of change, though it is never static, because of its low level of technology and of capital equipment. Even in a subsistence economy that lacks major
monetary exchange, however, some forms of capital accumulation are possible. 97

In the classical African subsistence economy there is plenty of land for every cultivator in the community. Every cultivator, however, has a right to as much land as he can cultivate, and this depends on the size of his/her family. Wives are therefore a valuable economic resource and may be looked on as capital. In addition the cultivator has a few simple tools, hoes, cutlasses (machetes) and fish-nets. Trees may also be regarded as capital. Customary law preserves harvest rights to the person planting trees, even when these are on fallow land which has reverted to the tribe or clan. 98 Members of this large group also enjoy rights of collection from wild trees as well as hunting and fishing rights.

Obviously a subsistence economy was everywhere the original basis, though some form of exchange would have evolved at an early date. It is, however, possible to distinguish a number of successive stages of economic development which overlaid the subsistence basis as a sort of palimpsest. Quickening economic development was as much a feature of later colonial times as of the Independence Era.

The subsistence stage can be called the Indigenous Economy, the second stage the Proto-Colonial, which spans the period 1450 to 1885. While there were considerable developments of Trans-Saharan trade during the medieval period and up to the eighteenth century, which were part of a general flowering of civilization in the Sudan, general economic development cannot be said to have begun until the present century
and then as a consequence of European penetration. The first permanent European trading stations were set up on Goree Island (off Dakar) in 1445 and at Elmina (Ghana) in 1482. But though numerous 'factories' were set up all along the coast by at least half a dozen European nations, their influence remained very limited for four centuries. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that increased activity by explorers and traders led to the partition of West Africa in the period after the Berlin Agreement (1885) chiefly by France and Great Britain. There were, Portuguese and Spanish influence were even more limited, while from the first Liberia was nominally independent. In 1821 the Americal Colonization society obtained land at Cape Mesurado which become the site of Monrovia and planted there and at other places on the coast numbers of freed slaves from the southern states of the United States of America. The Republic was constituted in 1847.

The third stage, the Colonial Period began with the Berlin Agreement of 1885 and last until about two decades ago. Partition of West Africa among the colonial powers led to the imposition of European law and administration, the way thus being cleared for economic exploitation. The principal form this took was the encouragement of export cropping by peasants farmers. The flow of export crops and of imported trade goods was eased and extended by railway construction from 1885 onwards and by the rapid spread of lorry haulage after World War I. At first therefore the main capital investment was in transport. To a lesser extent it went into mining and lumbering, activities which themselves led to further transport development. The
other principal objective of investment was in commercial enterprises such as the distribution of import goods and the buying of export crops.

The inter-war years saw great expansion in cash cropping and some development in industries processing crops, minerals and timber for export. The depression years of the 1930's were a considerable setback, especially in capital works, but experts enjoyed some preference in the respective metropolitan countries.  

The fourth stage, called here the Independence Era, though most countries did not become independent until the 1960's it began in the years immediately after World War II when the pace of development quickened, both the cause and the consequence of vastly increased capital investment. This came in the form of aid from the metropolitan countries and, after independence, from bilateral and multilateral agencies. Capital was invested in creating an infra-structure of ports, roads, railways, electric power and water supplies. Minerals were also further developed for future explorations, exploration for oil and the exploitation of iron ore particularly. Local capital went mainly into road transport, into houses for rent in the cities and larger towns, and into small workshop industries and retail businesses.

In all these activities employment and output rose rapidly. But through agricultural production increased, it was more through increased population and some modification of peasant production than through the application of capital and
technology. Compared with the others, the agricultural sector tended to stagnate. Though employing the majority of the active population, it remains basically unaffected by investment and innovation, in spite of constant governmental efforts to remedy the situation (see Table 3.4).

The objectives of governments, colonial and independent since 1945 may be summed up, as far as the economy is concerned, as being to increase exports to gain foreign currency and make West Africa more dependent on the metropolitan economy. They are also concerned to maintain a flow of aid funds and foreign capital to supplement overseas earnings. All this is in an effort to reach the stage of 'take-off,' when it is said, economic growth will be self-sustaining.¹⁰⁰

This development, has however, been very uneven, varying from country to country and from region to region within each country. The main growth points have been the larger coastal cities. Abidjan, Accra, Freetown, Dakar and Lagos have reached a size and an employment structure in commerce, service industries and even manufacturing that put some of them into the world class of major cities. The rural areas, however, vary greatly among themselves. In terms of infra-structure, numbers of motor vehicles, development of small market towns and growth of purchasing power, the south eastern Ivory Coast and the cocoa belts are as economically advanced as any rural area of tropical Africa.¹⁰¹ But other points, such as the East Cross River Basin of Nigeria and that of Ivory Coast west of Bandama river, have scarcely begun to be developed except perhaps for timber exploitation. On the whole,
### TABLE 3.4 Sectoral Distribution of Stock of Private Investment in the Developing Regions, 1967.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Western Hemisphere</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>$M</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>2,597.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>4,485.5</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,236.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>6,652.7</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1,279.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2,016.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>398.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1,668.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>496.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>607.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utilities</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1,370.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>516.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1,648.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6,591.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>18,449.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basic industry and processing industry

- Metallurgy
- Construction
- Chemistry
- Oil

Saharan zone: Mixed mesocrops including commercial plants

- Millets
- Livestock

Savannah zone: Multi-crop subsistence farming
- Commercial, cash, beans, timber, cotton, and commercial crops

Sub-Saharan zone: Commercial plantations (oil palm, rubber, coffee, cocoa, etc.)
- Subsistence crops (maize, manioc, plantains)

Food industry
Timber industry

Details of basic industry and processing industry are shown on the individual country maps.

Transport routes of animals on the hoof

South Saharan zone: Crop, livestock, and commercial crops

Export routes of animals on the hoof

Subsistence crops (maize, manioc, plantains)

Scale 1:20,000,000

Principal ports:

- Dakar
- Casablanca
- Alexandria
- Lagos
- Port Harcourt

Communication, transportation:

- International road
- Railways
- Principal ports
- Major fisheries

The width of the arrow is proportional to the amount of traffic with a width of 3 million tons of traffic.
other areas have not evolved as far as has the Coast in its economic and social development. The Guinea Savannah and the Sahel zones are only moderately affected by modern development. But these zones illustrate plainly the fact that economic progress inland tends to be concentrated into corridors along trunk lines of communication, for there is to be found what little development has taken place.

As a general rule, countries with a higher proportion of their area within the Forest, which includes the greatest concentration of natural resources, are the most advanced in terms of per capita income. These are notably Ivory Coast and Ghana. In 1973 the former's per capita income of $380 was the highest of all West African states. For Ghana the figure was $300. Otherwise, only Cameroon and Nigeria exceeded $200 per head, while the land-locked countries of Mali and Upper Volta achieved only $70 per head respectively.

On the whole, while economic development is as rapid as in most tropical areas, per capita figures for gross national product and for export trade remain very low. To this difficulty may be added political fragmentation. Only Nigeria with a population of over 70 million, is large by world standards. Thus the purchasing power and potential markets within each country, with the possible exception of Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria are very limited. This inhibits the establishment of a large scale manufacturing industry, at least on a competitive basis.

It must be concluded that in spite of the rapid
pace of development since 1945 in the former colonies, much of the indigenous economy remains more or less modified, but essentially unimpaired and the income gap between the developed (former metropolitan powers) and the developing (former colonies) is increasing (much to the favour of the farmer).

West Africa's Legacy

By conservative estimate, 24,000,000 slaves were exported from West Africa and Angola alone and about 50,000,000 from Africa as a whole. Leading slavers included the Portuguese, the English, the Dutch, the French and the Danes. As in any other commodity relationship, the slave-dealers were naturally interested in the best commodity - the able-bodied men, women and children.

Enough has been recorded in history on the devastating impact of slavery and Colonialism in West Africa, yet one finds that there are still some scholars like Professor P.T. Bauer who deign to make a case in its defence. In his book Dissent on Development, Bauer claims he know the ex-colonial countries even better than the inhabitants of these countries (a crime often committed by some Development Planners, when dealing with 3rd World Countries), and then proceeds to attack those Africans who are voicing dissatisfaction with the whole notion of colonial rule. Bauer postulates, for instance, that his "...familiarity with several of these countries suggests that the majority of people know little about such matters...and do not ascribe any of their problems to present or past actions of western countries...that it is untrue that
colonial status is incompatible with material advancement...
that it is highly probable that over the last century or so
the establishment of colonial rule in Africa and Asia has
promoted, and not retarded material progress...that the colonial
government established law and order, safeguarded private
property...organized basic transport and health services. These
contacts also acquainted the population with new wants...and
commodities...and the changes engendered a new outlook on
material advance and on the means securing it: for good or evil,
these contacts promoted the erosion of traditional values,
objectives, attitudes and customs obstructing material advance.
It is unlikely that in the absence of colonial rule the social,
political and economic environment in Colonial Africa and
Asia would have been more congenial to material progress."
Then in a last gesture of insult, clinging to Barzun's 'desire
status of victim," Bauer says that "It is emotionally comforting
to be told that external factors explain the failure to achieve
specific goals, including material prosperity. 104 Bauer even
suggests that African resources could have remained untapped,
were it not for Europeans, and that Africans allowed the influx
of foreign capital. Whose and What material advancement he
refers to is not very clear; because, the West Africans in
traditional situations were wisely irresponsible to 'material
advance,' the type that has become a nightmare to contemporary
Europe, including Bauer's England. Galloping alienation is the
price exacted of societies (as Bauer's) which pursue 'material
advance' through technology. Thus pursued, technology reduces
the totality of human meaning to those of its elements which are amenable to problem-solving. Widespread alienation is an eloquent sign that the meaning of life hitherto supplied by cultural belief systems cannot be replaced by technology. Psychologist Erich Fromm points to the equally dehumanizing effects of "alienation in affluence" and "alienation in misery." His perception stands valid even in the face of the conventional retort that "it's better to be rich and miserable than poor and miserable." What psychologists have learned of relative deprivation suggests that even if poor individuals harbour no hope for personal improvement, the mere vision of a "better" material life on the horizon gives them grounds for escape in fantasy. The form of relief is no longer available, however to those whose material fantasies have nowhere else to go. Nevertheless, vicarious identification with "successful" people, especially those who have climbed the ladder from one's own social origins, provides an alternative outlet to fantasy.

There was law and order in West Africa before the colonialists arrived and there were great African Kingdoms such as Mali, Songhai, who had traded with the people of North Africa, exchanging salt from the mines of Taghaza, Taodeni and Tastek for gold and other goods. This trade was carried by camel-caravan along recognized trade routes running from the cities of North Africa through the oases and the salt mines to the towns on the southern edge of the desert. The trade they carried flourished down the centuries until the arrival of European traders on the West
Coast and anarchy by Islam in the western Sudan combined to turn the direction of trade south towards the sea and commerce with the north declined.

With the advent of the British, French, German and Portuguese colonial rule, the trade operating on the West African Coast and the voluntary labour of the hinterland were both replaced by wage labour. All colonial governments introduced some form of head tax that had to be paid in cash, forcing the Africans into new regions and into new life-styles. One of the consequences from the introduction of a money economy and from urbanization in West Africa, is the dissolution of the joint family, a universal institution, more universal than the nuclear family of contemporary Western society. Factors of such change, whose destructive effects are generally recognized, include the dispersal of kin, contacts with strangers, and prevalence of market values. The colonial set up shifted the economic basis and the political super-structure from West Africa's own environment to the distant colonial metropolis. Institutions inconsistent with the needs of an industrial society were slowly undermined, and the extended family broke up the more easily (as) European societies had a millenary tradition of simple kinship structures. Today, the West African countries are all of a sudden provided with modern plants of the largest possible scale, with comparatively little need for individual skills (an important factor in the growth of an individualistic middle class), so that a repetition of the Western process should by no means be expected.
When economic changes are occurring in many areas and in several spheres, the total impact on the society is greater. The disorganization of the family structure is but the beginning of a larger problem. Six roles have been upset, the division of functions has been disturbed, and the equilibrium of the family pattern has been superseded by a situation in which new balances have to be struck with the emergence of a vigorous individualism. The old statuses based on age are giving way to new statuses based on education and affluence. West African society had formerly been developed on the basis of a strong family link. Some of this link remains. The basis has not been static but it has been stable. The changes introduced into the social ecology by the changes in techniques and the accompanying attitudes call for a re-adjustment of social institutions and the development of those institutions which will minimize the cost of transfer to the new order.

Economic development means extension of the means of production and increase in the level of living. So long as the socio-economic goals were designed to meet the requirements of mere subsistence, the demands of the aged, the poor, and the infirm were rudimentary. The social unit could, without gravely depressing the consumption level, meet this requirement. But the level of living has been rising at a very fast pace. The needs of the unemployed, the disabled, and the old has risen with the needs of the wealthy, and the obligations to meet the needs of the indigent and non-productive members of the household has become increasingly onerous. Even
the expense of feeding the unemployed has become burdensome. Evasions of responsibility are, therefore, more frequent now that they were two decades ago. It would appear that indigenous institutions for the maintenance of social cohesion are breaking down and something ought to be done to replace them if the social disorganization that is thus exposed is to be remedied.

If we were asked what has been the most significant change in West African society in the twentieth century, the answer would readily be found in the individualization of activity which seem to have taken firm root in most areas of African society. Some observers have viewed the social change with alarm. It has been described as an unhappy development leading to social disintegration and chaos. Underneath this alarmist note is a nostalgic cry for a return to the good old days and a belief that the social cost of economic development has been exorbitant. The implication is that it is unfortunate that the pre-existing social system should be allowed to break down. It is easily forgotten that no social system is invariant in the face of external influences.

Unquestionably, further development in the present and next decades will place greater strain on the indigenous institutions. The problems that will be faced will call for more than a mere lament over the disappearance of pre-existing institutions. What is required is that the West African nations find in the new society some of what they have lost from the old. This requires, as Alport has pointed out, that the
individual be given the opportunities whereby he can restablish some communion with his surroundings, find a status in his new position as a wage earner, and find some room for his ambition vis-a-vis 'nation-building'. Development policies has, therefore, to assure that the individual in loosing both the benefits and the burdens of the old society acquire no weightier burdens and at least as many benefits as he had in his previous station. If this assurance can be given through the development of institutions based on the concept of "Self-Reliance", so much the better; if not, the emergence of a positive welfare state in the various West African countries will be inescapable.
CHAPTER IV

WEST AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT AT THE CROSS-ROADS

Development for Whom?

Future historians may well look back on the mid-twentieth century and pick out development as the great obsession of the times. Most of the world remains underdeveloped, poverty and deprivation are ubiquitous and not just in the third world and the problem may be getting worse. One commentator has called development the greatest failure of the century and there is a growing pessimism in the development agencies themselves.

What are the reasons for this situation? Many explanations have turned on relatively discrete (in some senses almost inevitable) causes, exploding populations and inadequate resources, inflation and commodity prices, inappropriate political environments. But much blame has also attached to the plans of development and to the planners. For a long period after World War II the economists were a dominant influence in development planning. As criticisms against, for example, the First Development Decade mounted there was an attack on conventional economic approaches led initially by rebellious economists and strongly supported by other social scientists. The thrust of the attack was basically that conventional planning operated under assumptions that were not valid, without enough reference to the social and political environment. Planning could not be based on long
term certainties, and the comprehensive master plan came to be replaced by annual programmes. There are attacks too on the highly economic nature and cost benefit bias of planning.

Development Misconstrued

Many sectors of the underdeveloped world have also achieved some measures of development defined in the Western sense. This development is often obscured by inadequate information, aggregated statistical averages or poorly defined indicators. Also, as McGranahan has pointed out, indicators reflect conceptions of development as much as real conditions, and vital social factors are very difficult to measure. In most Third World regions there is considerable variation in the wealth of villages, families and individuals. In many areas this wealth is deliberately concealed, because of fears of appropriation by officialdom, jealousy, witchcraft. But as often it seems that the image of peasants or proletariat as poverty stricken is (self-fulfilling, even a self-fulfilling prophecy). There are good examples of this process in the Third World slum literature. There is a widespread attitude amongst developers that the proletariat especially is characterized by an intractable culture of poverty as Lewis called it, in which social and economic problems are linked in a vicious circle in degrading slums. Some people living in squatters settlements may be much wealthier than the authorities think, and may be able to afford to move out, but prefer to remain for social reasons in what they feel to be a far from repulsive setting.
Shame only enters their attitudes as a reflection of feelings. In any case the new generations seem to move out of the slums if they wish without many constraints. Once again the culture of poverty is an ethnocentric or rather a class centric concept.

Certainly, too, there have recently been very serious food problems caused by climatic changes drought (notably in the Sahelian region) or floods (eg. in Bangladesh). The Indian sub-continent too has long been regarded by Western observers as an area of constant grinding hunger. Apathy and even a complete breakdown of society were the apparent results of this situation. But in some cases at least the Sahelian drought only caused the hunger because outside administration had removed traditional defences against such calamities, notably nomadism, by making people sedentary farmers and also because of increase in the population of this region.

A good case study of the problems of interpreting the average or making misleading ethnocentric assumptions is contained in Polly Hill's analysis of Hausa villages in Northern Nigeria and her criticism of the conventional approach by economists. Hill argues that it was very difficult in the first place to accurately assess income because it was very nearly impossible to monitor all sales and purchases and in particular prices, because of the reticence of the people, because the groups break up during the year, etc. Hill's conclusion was in fact that rural inequality could be better related (and this indeed was the people's interpretation) not
to overall income but the ability to withstand hardships and hunger (and not having to beg or borrow) during the later stages of the farming season. The "poor" were those then who suffered in the pre-harvest period. The village could be divided into four categories of degrees of poverty with some being "rich" and some being poor but most being in the middle. Relative wealth was correlated with the number of size of holdings, trading, etc., but also with key factors of working as a garden units (i.e., a two generational farm where father and son worked together).

Up to the sixties it was argued that a major reason for underdevelopment was that African wants were restricted particularly by fatalistic attitudes. This was part of a more general argument that economic motivation was low in the African (Third World) context of ethnocentrically that people do not want what they need. Farmers in the Third World were seen as "irrational" generally unresponsive (or less responsive than farmers in developed countries) to changing opportunities, especially commercial opportunities. Similarly demands for income or wages were held to be static. There was in the well known phase: a backward sloping supply curve of labour. Higher prices resulted in less, not more, effort and supply. To some extent low demand was seen as stemming from social or cultural disincentives because the individual was caught in the web of his community or ascriptive systems. The argument was also extended to constraints over labour. From Marx, Weber, and Sombart came the idea, put forward for example by Macpherson, that in pre-industrial or rural
societies individuals could not alienate their labour, not only preventing a market economy developing, but also competition for goods, status and power that give the dynamic to industrialized societies. More simply Schultz and others argue that the problem was basically technical, that peasant societies are characterized by an image of limited goods, ie. where the desired things of life appear limited in supply and beyond grasp. Consequently there is apathy, fatalism or selfishness. McClelland and his followers have claimed that the trouble is that there are very few natives to achieve success mainly because the dynamics which operated in the Weberian Protestant Ethic situation are lacking or weakly developed. Upward mobility, achieved not ascribed status, is seen as the development key. Certainly there is some evidence to support this thesis notably from the Mediterranean and Latin America, though also contradictory evidence, not just Redfield's (eg. Pitt-Rivers). Certainly too there may be situations where demand is low; for example, bad health and malnutrition may lead to apathy. Some very depressed rural areas or slums probably fall into this category. Here development may first of all be a medical problem. Certainly in other areas too there are endemic diseases which sap the strength of the population overall, and reduce the expectancy of life. Various social mechanisms, notably the division of labour, may help to minimize the effects of the health environment. Certainly too in some areas climatic factors affect demand and motivation, but again generally the social calender has
accomodations for these facts of life. Work activity is built round the harmattan and the siesta is universal.

From about the mid-sixties the pendulum swung the other way. The emphasis was now on the "rationality" of the traditional West African farmer and his great knowledge of the environment and evidence was put forward of the obvious willingness of traditional farmers to accept innovations, including many new crops. The blame was put on the outsider's approach of intensifying the output of the land without adequate environmental knowledge, or ignoring key factors such as labour bottlenecks, communications, etc. The backward sloping supply curve of labour was replaced by the very opposite revolution of rising expectations. The people of West Africa aware through the mass communications of the Western World's wealth, instantly tried to achieve similar levels.

Much of this was probably true (certainly truer than the negative model), but the argument was still put up in an economic frame. The question of peasant rationality was in many senses if not irrelevant then certainly less important in peasant action than other factors. Nair, for example, has shown how farmers in highly commercialized U.S. farming may show all the antithetical development traits which were supposedly typical of Afro-Asian farmers - "traditional bound irrational attitude to life and work, strongly resistant to changes."

Similarly the distinction made between economic and "cultural" obstacles was in many senses artificial. There were certainly cases where economic factors were important,
especially in times when there were dramatic economic
movements up or down, and there were other times and places
where cultural or social factors were significant, and
sometimes the two were confused\textsuperscript{139} not only because of the
bias of the observer, but also the people themselves used
one as an excuse or a cloak for the other.\textsuperscript{140} How much
expectations rose reflected many other factors.

An example of this has been work and its
relationship for goods and wealth. Many Western (and
western trained) observers in the field of development, have
pointed to low work levels as a major reason for underdevelopment,
part of the "uncapitalistic" ethic.\textsuperscript{141} Again ethnocentric
models have prevented a proper appreciation of work patterns.
Sometimes observers in village situations have simply
observed the siesta, the close link between work and leisure,
the long periods of apparent inactivity and concluded that the
people are lazy or apathetic. The point, however, is that
work effort is different but not necessarily less efficient in
terms of local needs and aspirations. Work is intensive
rather than continuous, built around the climatic conditions.
Once again the greatest intensity of work activity occurs
often in preparation for ceremonials, the key rituals in the
system. At this times there is feverish work activity.
Leisure may be interspersed with work, but this is often an
incentive, lightening heavy tasks with a sleep or a joke.

In some discussions of underdevelopment the critique
of work organization is taken farther and related to the
conception of time. Rezsohazy\textsuperscript{142} has argued that the manage-
ment and control of time is a necessary precondition for
development. This allowed activities to be valued,
rationalized, and synchronized and particularly for
progressive plans and forecasts to be made.

Traditional societies are often pictured as
lacking time perspectives and appreciation, lacking a history,
or notions of the future. Leaving aside the debatable
question of time organization and development, there is much
evidence to show that time is measured, utilized and planned in
underdeveloped societies. Usually, however, this is because the
economic activity, even when-commercialized, does not require a
inger grade. Morning and afternoon and evening may be good
enough divisions for the farmers in Sierra Leone.

A further criticism has been that whenever or
wherever possible the indigenous peoples of the developing
world (especially Asia) have an aversion to and contempt for
manual work or dirty work of any kind. But this is far
two sweeping a generalization. Whilst it is perhaps time
that landowners of the upper crust in India, for example, do
not work on farms, this is largely a matter of status and
evaluation of particular tasks, not a psychological trait.
In even the most mechanized or commercialized farming systems
lowly regarded rural tasks are assigned to low ranking social
groups, sometimes non-European (eg. the Bantu in racist South
Africa), sometimes European (eg. the Italian migrants in Anglo
dominated Australia) or sometimes occupational groups (eg.
the sharemilkers or shearers in New Zealand). In all farming
communities status hierarchies emerge and labour like any other
facet of social relationships is ranked relatively. This exists whether or not there is a traditional system of ascriptive status. Nair has even argued that the abolition of Caste has not changed the situation dramatically and what is necessary is to increase the price of labour. Even this expedient may not work; my own observation in West Africa has indicated that different status tend to emerge despite (perhaps because of) attempts at increasing wages.

Aversion to, or preference for, certain kinds of work is often closely related to identity rather than any other factor. Smock has provided a good example from Eastern Nigeria. When people in one of these communities were asked why they do not climb palms, they said it is not because they are afraid to climb but that it is not their "nature" to be climbers. It was not the work of their forefathers, so it cannot be their work. In another community people said they consider climbing to be dirty and smelly task and thus beneath their dignity. Similar comments were made about fishing, but other villages or groups are equally proud to be fishermen or climbers.

What then is our answer to avert this backwardness and stagnation dilemma of development?

Planning and Development from Within

West Africa and the other 'comrades-in-poverty' have the unprecedented advantage to learn from the tremendous successes of the industrialized nations. But is it far-fetched to assume that we can learn more from the failures rather than the
successes of the West?

History is to a large extent, how one views it, how one envisions it and how one interprets it. If we insist on clinging to the past, this will not only reflect our escapist attitude but also get consumed in all its intricacies; let us give the historians their dues. But if we convert this past into a challenge, then the first direction would be to avoid, as much as possible, those elements that have made our experience, both past and present, so frustrating. Supposing then, for the purposes of realizing these objectives, we assume that there was no colonialism and the other "isms", how could our forfathers have developed? What could they have handed over to us.

This assumption carries one advantage, namely that with our frustrating experience of initiative development, our choice lies in going back to fundamentals, linking up with our past by putting much more emphasise on 'Rural-Planning' and also humanizing the whole process of development.

Foreign economics (both East and West) we have inherited from the colonial era embody the wisdom of native bourgeois society, and those aggregative categories with which we now work (such as labour, full employment, savings, etc.) are incompatible to the way in which the non-industrial economies operate. Also, such policy tools as nationalizations, land reforms, self-reliance, are absent from the entire framework of present-day economics and theories of development. On the contrary, modern (Keynesian) economics in fact assumes institutions as given, whereas one of the main
problems we face in West Africa is precisely which institutions to change and how. This means that the theories we inherited and profess to work with were built for other countries and hardly take into account the history and persuasions of our environment. Joan Robinson has noted that "English economists from Ricardo to Keynes, have been accustomed to assume as a tacitly accepted background the institutions and problems of the England each of his own day; when their works are studied in other climes and other periods by readers who import other assumptions, a great deal of confusion and argument at cross-purpose arises in consequence,"\textsuperscript{146} and the confusion generated by this transplantation seems to be great in West Africa. If economics is the study of the conditions and laws affecting the production, distribution, and consumption of the national wealth, this would mean that the case for indigenous economics for West Africa becomes exceedingly urgent; a problem postponed is a problem unsolved.

Such indigenous economics should be concerned with the basic and authentic fabric of the economic life of the West African societies. It should address itself to such activities as the indigenous systems of internal distribution, indigenous yardstick for measuring our progress and failures, subsistence farming, cattle raising, internal trading, domestic credit systems, induced migrations, the incentives to save and invest in agriculture where farmers are bound by traditional agriculture, production for export, etc.

If the post-independent West African personality is shaped by the indigenous aspirations to regain his personal
integrity, autonomy and dignity, there is no reason why
they should not be extended to this science of self-assertion - indigenous economics. This is intellectual independence.
In the Introduction to his Stone Age Economics, Sahlin has suggested that "Formalism versus substantivism amounts to the following options: between the ready-made models of orthodox economics, especially the "microeconomics," taken as universally valid and applicable 'Grosso Modo' to the primitive societies; and the necessity .. supposing this formalist position unfounded .. of developing a new analysis more appropriate to the historical societies in question and to the intellectual history of Anthropology. Broadly speaking, it is a choice between the perspectives of business, for the formalist method must consider the primitive economies as underdeveloped versions of their own, and culturalist study that as a matter of principle does honour to different societies for what they are."147 As Chairman Mao said: "Go to the practical people, and learn from them; then synthesize their experience into principles and theories; and then return to the practical people and call upon them to put these principles and methods into practice so as to solve their problems and achieve freedom and happiness."148 The intellectual and indigenous challenge is to explore this nexus.

The emphasis here on modern capitalist economics does not imply an acceptance of Marxist economics. The work of Marx is an inspiration, but not a solution because Marx never offered one. "What Marx bequeathed to prosperity,"
according to Carr, "was...not an economic prospectus of socialism, but an economic analysis of capitalism; his economic tools were those appropriate to the capitalist system. 'Political Economy,' with its familiar categories of value, price, profit, was something that belonged essentially to capitalism and would be superceded with it." In the socialist countries, the economic policies of the transition periods through which the revolution must pass in the struggle to create the socialist order had to be worked out empirically by the workers themselves. That was intellectual emancipation.

In our review of development theories, this intellectual challenge is slowly being met by individuals (Samir Amin, Frantz Fanon, Julius Nyerere, Terry McGee Onyemelukwe, Walter Rodney, Rweyemamu, Nkrumah, Denis Goulet and Clive Thomas amongst others).

As to finding solutions to the problems of underdevelopment, there are suggestions of socialism, self-reliance, institutional changes favouring the rural areas, etc. These are all necessary entry points into the reality of our development process. We are concerned here with an additional element of how to give this development process a rural emphasis.

What our forefathers ceded to us was a sense of community, a sense of common destiny, a cultural heritage, the love for and the creation of beauty, the respect for life. The underlying idea in the humanistic and communalistic society of our forefathers has been equality...
and brotherhood in "Commune-ism."

Our cultural heritage suggests that we are not in need of the credos of Marx or Lenin in order to restore a just and egalitarian society. A conscientious revival of this heritage, of the West African personality, his self-image, with its humanistic traits, a fulcrum of social regeneration, these are what we need. After all, development economics, more so its development, is a part of culture.

"Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts: the essential core of culture consists of traditions (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values, culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning element of further action."150

But the restoration of these elements becomes meaningless unless we remove those baneful influences that have oppressed them from all sides and then secure for them conditions for independent and authentic (indigenous) development. There was no evidence of poverty in the days of our forefathers; theirs, in fact, was the 'authentic affluent society.'

Rejecting in toto what is at hand may be short-sighted. As McLoughlin stated "......, however, that the dynamics of rural change are already present, very strongly in some areas."151 The challenge is to utilize what is at hand as judiciously as possible with the participation of the entire society.

This gives participation a political content and
elevates it to a political ideology that would help create the structure and organization needed for its existence, and provide the opportunity for peoples to analyze possible models of participation that is consistent with their respective situations.

But one also has to avoid the all-too-possible chance of ready-made concepts of peoples participation becoming a tool in the hands of an elite wanting the people to participate in the development effort, but on their own elitist terms.

Onyemelukwe has noted that "...people everywhere adopt changes slowly, but can adapt more easily if their new situation has some link with the past. Bringing traditional people into line with a development strategy is not a simple social process. The claimed scarcity of entrepreneurship in the underdeveloped areas of West Africa arises from the use of technologies and ideas which are out of the reach of their Psychological scope. Frustrations result from a development process which is imposed on peoples unprepared for a major break with their surrounding."

What we are saying is essentially that the development of the West African countries, should be consistent with the realities of the West African environment.

No Third World country can successfully pursue a fully autarchy course. Even China, in spite of its continental size and a high degree of economic self-sufficiency, could not exclude all contacts with the outside world. Similarly, although Burma in the 1960's adopted a policy of excluding foreign investors and tourists, the country still
needed to export rice and oil to outside markets. Besides, nations like Tanzania and Sir Lanka have not interpreted the doctrine of self-reliance to mean exclusion of ties to other countries, to international agencies, or even to world markets. Nevertheless, important differences of degree are discernible among nations; some are more highly integrated with outside systems than others. At times, links are one-sided, as in the case of Cuba and its ties with the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist nations. Algeria, on the contrary, provides an example of wide diversification, deliberately sought, in its linkages with other countries and regions. In Brazil, the primary integration sought is with the international market, not with a single nation or region. Preferences as to kind, degree, and focus of integration constitute a strategic development option fraught with consequences for technology policy. Indeed one major thesis propounded by Latin American dependencia theorists states that domestic constraints on successful development are mainly due to structures of dependency imposed by outside forces operating in symbiosis with interest groups representing the social forces of "internal colonialism." Once Brazil's planners decided to compete in the world market's own terms, they were automatically giving directions to their strategy on other fronts and foreclosing alternative options.

By tying development fortunes to an industrialized power or by striving to achieve competitiveness in world markets, a nation commits itself, often irreversibly, to
certain industrial priorities or to large-scale industrialized agriculture over and against other alternatives, to certain patterns of consumer-goods production favouring the privileged classes, to supplying export needs over meeting internal demands, and to other policies having greater or lesser impact on technological choices. This is so because the "rules of the game" set by the world market or by the hegemonic big powers are biased in favour of obtaining development benefits in modes of large-scale competition, orientation toward higher purchasing power, and of a shifting "competitive edge" on the strength of changing technology.

More importantly, the decision to seek such integration necessarily relegates the concern for social equality to second rank. That the international economic order was designed to favour the already prosperous is conceded by no less moderate an observer than Gunnar Myrdal, who writes that:

the theory of international trade was not worked out to explain the reality of underdevelopment and the need for development. One might say, rather, that this imposing structure of abstract reasoning implicitly had almost the opposing purpose, that of explaining away the international equality problem.157

The existing global economic order is uncongenial to the pursuit of equity and equality because it wheels are lubricated by forms of competition founded on comparative efficiency. And using the capitalist, neocapitalist, and even socialist calculus of efficiency (to the extent that the latter "competes" in the world arena), such values as
equity and equality are necessarily treated as "externalities" not to be "internalized." Therefore, whenever a national development plan in any of the West African nations requires a high degree of integration with the global or regional export market, a whole gamut of supportive infra-structure investments is ipso facto rendered necessary so as to assure competitive efficiency. Choosing integration implies selecting technology which is capital-intensive and of standardized international quality. It also signifies plant scales opposed to the requirements of small and medium industry as well as an agricultural policy which favours small minorites within the agricultural sector to the detriment of the poorest and least productive. Implied also are an employment policy which provides training and subsidies to small numbers of skilled and professional personnel - to the neglect (at least relative) of large numbers with lesser skills - and monetary and fiscal policies ill-suited to produce equitable redistribution inasmuch as subsidies favour "efficient" export sectors. For these reasons developmental efforts aimed at integration to big powers or to the world market set limits to strategies which can effectively be adopted. The recognition by Third World leaders that the present international economic order is biased in favour of such integration helps explain their insistent demands for a new order. Their interest in the international order is dictated by a recognition of the enormous impact their links to the world system have on their own domestic economies and policies. That is to say that their technology
policies are directly affected by basic options regarding the degree and nature of these ties.

Integration with outside systems often means reliance on foreign "aid" as well as a commitment to produce for world-export markets. And linkages through "aid" are as crucial to technology policy as linkages through trade.\(^{159}\)

In a speech to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1972, Robert McNamara urged the adoption of development strategies which make a frontal attack on the poor of the Third World who have not benefited from past developmental growth or progress.\(^{160}\) World Bank loans, he argued, should be granted if they reach this strategic portion of the population of the poor countries. Dudley Seers later raised the spectre of raising unemployment as a further dimension of "failed" development.\(^{161}\) Since then many strategists speak as though reducing poverty and creating jobs should be the care of their development strategies. Among those who most insistently plead for such strategies is Mahbub ul Haq. Recognizing that even expanding "modern sectors" cannot absorb a traditional sector whose absolute numbers grow even more rapidly, Haq concludes that the inequalities generated by modernization strain "the limits of tolerance of many societies." He then asks why, if a dual economy exists, a dual development strategy should not likewise be formulated. His recommended strategy operates in two areas:

- On the one hand, a modern sector which grows fast and experiments with all kinds of price incentives and tolerates the prevalence of
inequalities for some time. On the other, a large traditional sector where organization and institutional framework overcome the scarcity of capital and development is taken to marginal men through the organization of rural and urban works programmes.\textsuperscript{162}

Haq wants greater self-reliance by poor nations in choosing development paradigms. His emphasis is valid because the nations which adopt an autonomous model of development, founded on optimal degrees of self-reliance, are also the ones most likely to insist on alternative approaches to technology.

Self-Reliance a choice or challenge

The chances of our indigenous technology surviving and succeeding will be greater if the concept of self-reliance becomes at once a political ideology and a development strategy. The advocacy of self-reliance does not often go beyond waxing eloquent about the inappropriateness of Western technologies and the need to develop labour-intensive techniques. There is a good deal of talk about developing 'intermediate' technologies - intermediate in the sense that it involves traditional methods of production and less of Western methods. It is a combination of those parts of modern technology which are of value and developments oriented in a labour-intensive nature.\textsuperscript{163}

Tanzania takes pride among African nations advocating self-reliance as a strategy for development. One constant principle is the thought of President Nyerere is that "there is no model for us to copy." He writes that:
in 1965 Tanzania adopted its own form of democracy - we rejected the Western model and said it was not appropriate for our circumstances despite the fact that all our constitutional development had until then been based on it....

When we introduced this new system, we were criticized for 'abandoning democracy'....In response to this criticism we tried to explain what we were trying to do and why we thought our new system was both democratic and suitable for our conditions. But having done that we did not worry about what the Western countries said or what democratic theorists said. For in rejecting the idea that we had to follow the 'Westminster Model' if we wanted to be democratic, we had also overcome the psychological need to have a certificate of approval from the West in relation to our political system.164

What Nyerere claims for a political system - freedom from servility to previously existing models - he likewise urges upon his nation in its approach to development problems:

We have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out of our own roots, but in a particular direction and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, and extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the Twentieth Century world.165

The economy must be organized so as to free people from manipulation by the market; "the first priority of production must be the manufacture and distribution of such goods as will allow every member of society to have sufficient food, clothing and shelter, to sustain a decent life."166

A bond is forged between self-reliance - in defining goals and setting priorities - and development strategy. At a state
banquet honouring Chou En-lai on 4th June 1964 Nyerere declared that both China and Tanzania are engaged in a revolutionary battle against poverty and economic backwardness. He added that for Tanzania the "long march" is economic. Other nations may learn from China that success requires not only courage, enthusiasm, and endurance but also discipline and as well the intelligent adaptation of policies to the needs and circumstances of each country at a given time. This is the heart of self-reliance": the commitment to creative innovation and adaptation in the light of local constraints, values, priorities and heritage. Any nation pursuing a self-reliant strategy of development must adopt a criteria for choosing technologies and modes of their utilization drawn from outside the technological market place. Foreign technologies are not excluded on principle, but imported will be only those types of technology which foster locally defined goals. Schumacher contrasts the "self-balancing, self-adjusting, self-cleaning" attributes of nature with technology which recognizes no self-limiting principles as to size, speed, or violence. He concludes that "in the subtle system of nature, technology, and in particular the super-technology of the modern world, acts like a foreign body, and there are now numerous signs of rejections." Critics view industrial societies as no model for export; accordingly, they experiment with new models of small-scale "community technologies" which enhance self-reliance in small local groups. They teach that a basic option for self-reliance infringes on one's stance (if one is consistent!) toward technology.
The quest for greater self-reliance at the national level is the exclusive prerogative neither of nations consisting of the West African countries nor of those which have chosen socialism. Even countries as the United States sounds their wishes to be self-reliant in meeting their energy needs within a few years. Their desires are prompted by the need to reduce the kind of vulnerability any country experiences as a result of its integration with outside market forces. To be more precise, the aspiration after self-reliance in development models, in sources of capital or of technology, is motivated by the desire to reduce unacceptable forms of dependency. If the prevailing mode of exchange with others if interdependence with high reciprocity, there is correspondingly less "need" to be self-reliant. But if interdependence is characterized by differential strength or bargaining position (that is, by law mutuality or reciprocity) then a higher degree of self-reliance becomes desirable.

One important difference, however, distinguishes the self-reliance sought by groups within the developed nations (United States) from the basic option to pursue self-reliance as a major mode of obtaining development in West Africa. In the latter's circumstances, emphasis is placed on small-scale technologies geared to rural activities.

The Chinese example appears to be a far cry for most of the developing countries. Differences in political philosophy and organization apart, their current efforts at research and development at such technologies exhibit little
of the Chinese vigor and orientation. Whether or not it is a consequence of low level of income, investment in research and development is miniscule. It ranges from 0.2 to 0.5 per cent of GNP for most developing countries in contrast to the reported 1.5 per cent figure for China. More disconcerting than the quantitative dimension are the pattern and nature of these activities. Even these low levels of expenditure, as Hans Singer has observed, are directed at marginally contributing to 'pushing the frontiers of knowledge' in ways and directions automatically determined by the conditions and factor proportions of the richer countries, a phenomenon labelled by the Sussex Institute of Developmental Studies economists as the 'internal brain drain' as opposed to the 'external brain drain' or the mass movement of qualified personnel to the developed countries.

China serves as an exceptional example of a nation adopting a developmental strategy which emphasizes self-reliance not only at the national level but also within regional, local, and productive - unit levels. Nevertheless, even self-reliance cannot be an absolute principle, and it must not be interpreted to mean excluding outside influences. Moreover, even when national planners do not choose self-reliance as their primary policy, it is possible within limited sectors (industry, agriculture, or housing) to champion a self-reliant approach which will have important repercussions on choices and modes of technology. This seems to be the context within which India has encouraged local leadership to create small technologies in industr.
Self-Reliance doubtless has to be paid for by sacrifices in efficiency (at the beginning); conversely, higher integration, although it may improve efficiency, may exact sacrifices in terms of social justice and lead to excessive industrial concentration or vulnerability to price fluctuations over which national decision-makers have little control.

Other things being equal, if a West African Country subscribes to the image of a procession of nations struggling to "catch-up" to the developed, it will ipso facto be influenced by a powerful bias in favour of choosing integration (via aid, trade, imported capital intensive technology, and the adoption of international standards) as its basic options. If, on the contrary, the primary image it adopts is one of an ideological platform, the chance exists that self-reliance will hold an important place in its basic development strategy (Tanzania). Practical constraints of a military, economic, or political nature may sometimes overrule this preference, as in the case of Cuba, which chose to become highly integrated - militarily, financially, politically and technologically with the Soviet Union.

Self-reliance is not synonymous with isolation or the rejection of cooperation. It highlights the need for relationships between the developed and the developing countries which do not threaten the "self" or perpetuate the "reliance" on outside nations.

It also means the redistribution of economic and political power, an involvement of the people in the decision —
making process, an awareness of the individual as a responsible and creative being, "for when the individual becomes aware of himself and his place in his society, he demands the power to challenge the injustices he sees." 172
Policy Implications and Conclusions

There is no all-purpose formula for development policy handily applicable to all the countries of West Africa. But there are policy guidelines of a general sort suggesting an alternate mode in place of present day conventional theories and practices.

Development in conventional theory and practice characteristically comes from above, externally imposed by governments or bureaucracies, whether conceptualized as altruistic or exploitative. Knowledge of and links with the recipients is often minimal. Development plans reflect ethnocentric tendencies or similar structural features in development agencies or donor subcultures. 173

In West Africa, as with many developing countries, the objectives specified in the development plans are socialist in character. The objectives in the Third National Development Plan of Nigeria 1975-80, are as follows: 174 To establish Nigeria firmly as (a) a united, strong, and self-reliant nation; (b) a great and dynamic economy; (c) a just and egalitarian society; (d) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and (e) a free and democratic society. Recognizing that these "five national objectives" are not operational magnitudes against which the success of the plan could be unambiguously measured, the policy makers considered
that the objectives however provide "a broad view of the ultimate aspirations of the society." Unlike the second plan, the third plan gave the specific short-term objectives which will be used to facilitate the ultimate realization of the national objectives as: (a) increase in per capita income; (b) more even distribution of income; (c) reduction in the level of unemployment; (d) increase in the supply of high level manpower; (e) diversification of economy; (f) balanced development, and (g) indigenization of economic activities.

In Sierra Leone, the objectives of the National Development Plan, 1974/75 - 1978-79, have a particular importance for the development of Sierra Leone because the Plan is expected to represent the 1973 Election Manifesto of the ruling party, the All People's Congress. It may be summarized as follows:

(1) Preserve political and economic stability as one of the main prerequisites for uninterrupted and continuous economic and social advancement;

(2) Attain a higher degree of economic self-sustained growth, since political independence can be made meaningful by achieving economic emancipation;

(3) Increase the welfare of the broad mass of population as the ultimate aim of development, and to that end achieve more equitable distribution of wealth and income;

(4) Achieve rapid expansion of productive capacity of the economy to create the basis for an accelerated pace of economic and social progress;

(5) Continue and intensify economic co-operation with other
African countries, particularly with neighbouring West African

countries.

Nigeria and Sierra Leone are similar in many ways to
the other nations in this region especially when dealing with
development problems. The objectives are similar in nature
but the outcome may differ in many instances.

We would like to believe that these objectives are
not mere rhetoric - that there is instead a serious intention
to realize the objectives and it is in this frame of mind
that what follows is written.

To many, the objectives will be regarded as desirable.
By emphasizing the need in both plans to reduce social and
economic inequality, the objectives draw attention to the
proposition that development should not be concerned with just
one statistic - high rate of growth of the economy as implied
in the theories of development, but should also be concerned
with securing an overall improvement in standard of living and
well-being of the masses. The objectives go a long way to
giving "feel" to development planning and in appealing to the
nationalist sentiments of the people. To the extent the
objectives are found acceptable by a cross section of the
nationals, they can generate some enthusiasm for implementing
the plan. But objectives however noble, like the plan
documents themselves, remain words on paper until they are
realized. For the realization of the objectives one needs
appropriate policies. But appropriate policies can only be
framed if the objectives are well conceived, clear and
meaningful in operational terms that will involved the entire
An important issue in making a case for development planning is whether imbalances and inequalities will be restored by the unhindered operation of socio-political and economic forces as explained by the theories or alternatively, whether societies display an inherent tendency towards continued polarization and increasing disparities in favour of the urban centres if left to take their course. As has been demonstrated by a great many development analysts, the evidence available suggests that societies are remarkably persistent in polarizing power and development. But even if one were to argue that it is too early to judge whether disparities in developing countries will sort themselves out or not, this would not negate a need for public intervention and planning. It is for the very reason that planning and planners have a role as catalysts and amplifiers of the spontaneous forces of society and can be instrumental in the acceleration of certain developments and the slowing down of others, that their raison d'être seems beyond debate.

What is the general state of planning for rural development in West Africa? Of relevance to the present thesis are the systems that had come about to make the rural people respond to the produce and demands of western economies. The initial pivot of these systems being aliens in colonial government and private enterprise who resided at and operated from major shipment points (primate cities), the structures that evolved display from the very beginning a strong element of foreign control and dependence, a high degree of (See Map)
centralization, and an emphasis upon the commercial linkage of individual rural production sites with internal and outside markets. Setting only limited objectives and especially geared to the efficient tapping of labour and land resources, the formulation of rural development programmes and their implementation through the administrative machinery and commercial network down to the scale of the individual production site, tended to be dominated by those economically and technologically - minded people in government and private enterprise who supposedly knew the more important ins and outs of raising rural productivity. There seems little doubt that this particular emphasis in orientation and the organizational structures that were set up for working towards it were well - fitted to the objectives of the times. Taking regular recourse to strict administrative directives and, where need be, to disguised or outright coercion, they were fairly effective in achieving the limited purposes for which they were primarily designed, ie. the enhancement of commercial production and the increase of foreign-trade.

But it has been realized in some of the West African nations and especially Nigeria, for quite some time that the 'colonial' arrangement for mobilizing labour and rural produce will not serve to bring about a genuine integration of rural groups into the main-stream of Nigerian society, and that a new approach is needed. Of particular promise is believed to be the present insistence on (Self-Reliance) and also, that more substance should be given to subnational levels of policy making and strategy formulations. Whether subnational
planning used as a tool for national development will succeed where highly centralized planning failed remains to be seen and should to a large extent depend on the form of planning that is adopted and on the expertise available.

Disaggregation of national planning has been compared to a 'translation' of centrally-set objectives into down-to-earth action. This is very apt and emphasises a main difficulty in the planning process. The privileged few who make up the regional or local authority are expected to initiate action which takes account of national objectives and yet allows for conditions peculiar to the region and locality. In addition to reviewing guidelines and directives from higher levels and gathering and processing information concerning other regions and the constituent parts of the territory under its jurisdiction, each authority is simultaneously engaged in constant compromising between paper abstraction and real life conditions and in reconciling impulses from both above and below.

This asymmetric situation of deeply committed jack-of-all-trades at the subnational levels and relatively unbiased specialists at the national level may seem oversimplified, but it is believed to be fairly typical of relationships existing in several developing countries. The breakdown in communication which will occur as a result will leave the subnational component little choice but to improvise and to think in terms of the immediate future only.

By showing that the preparation and formulation of a programme of action at subnational levels is more than disaggregation of national and sectoral guidelines and
aggregation of, for example, local realities, aspirations, and needs and that subnational specialist expertise is often in low supply, the setting has been completed to make a case for an adjusted type of planning and specialist group of planners. In this context, some reservation should first be expressed with regard to the view that regional and local subsystems would be lower levels of synthesis. 182

National and sectoral planners need counterparts outside the capital with equal specialist expertise. This is to say that for rural development to transcend the phase of short-term improvisation, people are urgently needed who have made subnational levels of synthesis their special trade and that a mere transfer of central planners from the capital will not suffice. This peculiar condition of subnational entities and the structural nature of most rural problems, whereby the solutions lies as much outside as within the rural sphere, demand special skills. To be effective, therefore, many initiatives intended to promote rural development should be a function of a distinct sort of planning and planners, the identity of which will be in a unification of rural people and their habitat, urban settlement and countryside, urban and rural activities, dominant and dependent groups, and micro target and micro realities in a single framework of analysis and in an integrated and consistent programme of action. 183 Although regional planning and regional planners can be expected to play an increasingly prominent role in this due to their comprehensive and interdisciplinary orientation, it should be
remembered that sufficiently complete expertise to cope with the regional complexity will only be found in multi-disciplinary teams consisting of students of various disciplines, each concentrating upon a particular domain of enquiry. It is in such teams that a place should be reserved for analysts who combine considerable insights into the intricacies of rural life with a special regional outlook and who are willing to adjust the scope of their investigations to provide specialists inputs to a regional planning effort.

Summing up, my argument is simply that there are many roads to development and many different conceptions of development. Far more attention needs to be paid to the differing social contexts of development, especially at the grass-roots level, and to the complexity of the social relations involved in the exchange of goods and services. Multi-disciplinary approaches are needed for the study of these situations (as the economist has so far failed). But although the perspectives need to be broadened and to be made more flexible, a greater concentration on understanding the local cultures is very much needed.

Conclusions

The major conclusions of this study are relatively simple even if the problem is complex. First, there have been much misunderstanding of regional disparities with a very strong urban bias on the developing countries especially West Africa. In the mid-60's inquiries into the nature of cultural reality at the local level took on a new importance. In many
situations and subcultures development in one sense or another has been taking place in this region often within traditional contexts usually unrecognized or unappreciated by the development agencies and developers, the cultural differences between the poorer nations and the variety in the historical circumstances through which they have been brought into the orbit of the rich nations would seem to invalidate the development of a theory which outlined a uniform process of change. Yet the common goals of these nations and the growing persuasiveness of a style of life among the elite of the world have encouraged the formulation of such theories.

Though the terminology of these theories may differ we must clearly distinguish between economic growth and development, and between change in economic and social sphere. Growth implies a rising national income without any concomitant change in the economic structure; thus the production of a given export commodity may rise - more local industries may be established without substantially affecting the dominance of foreign capital, the dependence upon the industrial nations, the economic imbalance between primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Development occurs when these and other similar factors are altered. Growth and development are clearly related; economic growth may provide the opportunities for development; development may be a prerequisite for continued growth. But the relationship is over a short period of time, not inevitable. Leonard Barnes has compared the economies of Guinea and the Ivory Coast (two former French West African Colonies). The
The latter has retained close ties with France and thus has facilitated private capital investment; the economy has grown but not developed. The experience of the Ivory Coast in the last twenty years has many lessons to offer. It can be summed up in the phrase 'growth without development' - growth generated and maintained from outside, without the establishment of a social structure capable of bringing about an automatic transition to the further stage, that of internally centred and self-regulating growth. Andre Gunder Frank has called this 'the development of underdevelopment.' The Ivory Coast is certainly no longer the primitive country that it was in 1950. But it has become well integrated, like its neighbour, Senegal, into the World Capitalist system.

On 28 September 1958 Guinea, alone among the territories of the former French Colonial empire in black Africa, declared for immediate independence. Guinea's 'No̱n' to the French African Community saw a massive pullout by France; the French withdrew participation and radical changes were made in the country's economic and political structure. As stated by Amin "... it may be said that Guinea's performance, in general growth rates, in the establishment of industries, and in education, has not been worse than that of many other African countries; and that this performance has been achieved without the massive 'technical assistance' involved elsewhere. This last may be a fundamental point. In 1958 it was reckoned that an African state could not survive without technical assistance; and a rapid collapse was expected after the massive departure of colonial officials
from Guinea. This was proved false as Guinea kept all the institutions of government in fact after the massive pull out by the French.

The critique of development theories draws heavily upon the seminal essay of Andre Gunder Frank; in which the emphasis is placed on the role of the individual in altering the structure of institutions, at the expense of the values which maintain it.

The various theories of development evidently differ widely in their approach, and have evolved towards new forms in recent years. This evolution has itself reflected other changes; in the interest of the various forces seeking to contribute to or retard development, and indeed the very difficulties which have arisen from various attempts to explain underdevelopment and development. My attempt to reduce all these theories to one single scheme by extracting only what seem to be their essential elements may give rise to a number of criticisms, but it is a legitimate procedure insofar as it discusses certain epistemological principles underlying positions which when seen from another point of view appear completely divergent.

The discussion may be summed up as follows:

(a) The theory of development must analyse the process of development in its various historical manifestations.

(b) It must extract, through such a historical analysis, the general principles of development of the societies it chooses to investigate.

(c) In formulating these principles, development theory must
take into account the internal contradictions of the process, abandoning any formalistic attempt to reduce it to a unilinear transition from one type of society to another. Rather the theory would have to show how through these very contradictions society as a whole can reach higher forms of organization. These factors, and the social forms they imply, are better described as social trends than as models of a future situation to which we should aspire.

The objective - as it was in the analysis of the assumptions of development theories - is to show how these schemata and these concepts can be reduced from positions which are often apparently opposed to one another, to an adequate model of development for West Africa which from our point of view has underlain, and to a large extent, still underlies scientific research, government policies and the programmes of parties and political organizations.
FOOTNOTES


2. For example, the breakup of the Pakastani and West Indian federations and some of the problems plaguing the Canadian and Nigerian Federations, were due to lopsided distribution of benefits.

3. This is because the theory of economic planning has so far ignored the constraints imposed on the planning process by federal and national institutions responsible for decision making and economic development. Furthermore, the theory of planning has so far emphasized only one major objective - the maximization of gross national product over time, without considering the fact that regional objectives may be different as a result of disparities in the growth rates of the various regions in a country.


14. Industrialization was regarded as the golden remedy for 'underdevelopment' for more than a generation. In the early 1940's P.N. Rosenstein - Rodan argued that industrialization is 'the way of achieving a more equal distribution of incomes between different areas of the world by raising incomes in depressed areas at a higher rate than in the rich areas. Later W.A. Lewis and Paul Prebrich called for industrialization of the Caribbean countries and Latin America respectively as by far the best opportunity to capture the advantages of technical progress.


The Wretched of the Earth (New York, Grove Press, 1968).


Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development (London, Heineman, 1964.)


Ujamaa, Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 68).


41. For a detailed analysis of the dependencia model, please see works of Andre Gunder Frank.


46. ibid, p. 15.

47. ibid, p. 16.


53. *ibid*, p. 190.

54. In many cases a decisive role has been attributed to one or the other of these factors, this growing rise to sociologistic, psychologistic and other schools of thought.


56. Some Theoreticians have clearly been disconcerted by the specificity of the Chinese and Cuban experiences of development, and increasingly so by those of North Vietnam, Rumania, Albania, all of which like Yugoslavia before them, demonstrated the historical specificity of their road to socialism.


60. For the opposing view - that there is famine in China - see Miriam and Ivan D. London, series of three articles on "The Other China" in *World View*, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1976), pp. 4-11; No. 6 (June 1976), pp. 43-48; and nos. 7/8 (July/ August 1976), pp. 25 ff.


63. These have been examined in several agricultural communes by Professor Neville Maxwell and his Colleagues at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford University. Much valued information can be found in Maxwell's field notes and unpublished seminar reports to the Oxford group.


68. ibid, pp. 206-207


70. ibid, pp. 130-158


80. ibid., p. 183.

81. ibid., pp. 183-84.


93. *ibid*, pp. 282-83


105. This phenomenon is studied under the name of the "confidence mechanism" in Charles Elliott, *Patterns of Poverty in the Third World* (New York, Praeger, 1975).


115. Figures from the U.N. World Economic Survey show a declining per capita growth rate from 1950. One author estimates that 60% of the world's population received 13.2% of the world's income in 1950 compared to 11.1% in 1964. See M. Faber & D. Seers (eds.) *The Crisis in Planning* (London, Chatto & Windus, 1972) p. 81.


117. An early criticism has come from the "Sussex" school, Faber and Seers, Streeten, Anthorpe or American writers like Friedmann. Conventional planners has of course its staunch dependants like Tinbergen and Papanek.
118. For a critical discussion of indicators see the papers in the Journal of Development Studies, p. 8, No. 3 (1972), special issue. If we compare the various types of indicators used, there is much discrepancy about what is included and what is left out (compare, for example, the UNRISD (1970) care list with that of Adelman and Morris in Journal of Development Studies (1971) Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 91-105.


120. See, for example, the sweeping generalizations by D. Lerner in H. Miner, (ed.) The City in Modern Africa (New York, Praeger, 1967).


123. This point was made as long ago as 1943 by: W.F. Whyte, Street Corner Society. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1943). Also see: C.A. Valentine Culture and Poverty (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1968).


125. P. Hill. The Myth of the Amorphous Peasantry (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1968).


132. For example, R. and E. Blum, Health and Healing in Greece. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965.)


138. T.W. Schultz. op. cit.


143. This point is repeatedly made in Myrdal. op. cit.

144. K. Nair. op. cit.

145. Smock, op. cit.


160. Address delivered in Santiago, Chile, 14 April 1972.


165. *ibid.*, p. 11.


176. ibid., p. 29.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Dalton, G. Tribal and Peasant Economies. (New York:


Eisenstadt, S.N. Comparative Perspectives on Social Change. (Boston: Little Brown, 1968).


McGee, T.G. The South East Asian City. (London, Bell, 1967).


Zeylstra, W.G. *Aid or Development*. (Sijthoff/Leiden, 1974).
ARTICLES


