THE JUSTICE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

by

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This is a case study and analysis of the Justice Institute of British Columbia, a Board-governed provincial post-secondary institute. Under contract to various provincial government ministries, the Justice Institute's five Academies and two central Divisions train municipal police, provincial court and correctional employees, fire service personnel, ambulance attendants and provincial emergency program personnel, and provide programs for professionals and the public in the areas of justice and public safety.

Although the proposed organization was conceived to meet training and educational needs that existed under the umbrella of the Ministry of Attorney-General, shortly before its formal establishment the Justice Institute was captured by the proposed Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act and now came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Two fundamental issues emerged from the case study: jurisdictional ambiguity, involving the relation between the Justice Institute and the Ministries of Education and Attorney-General; and internal organization, involving the relation between the five Academies and the central Justice Institute administrative structure.

These emergent issues were found to be primarily structural in origin. Therefore a structural analysis was conducted, based on Mintzberg's "extended configuration hypothesis," which identifies and explains fundamental relationships among organizational design parameters and characteristics of the environment in which the organization exists. Within Mintzberg's framework the Justice Institute was identified as a divisionalized form. The case study and emergent issues were analyzed in relation to the main characteristics of the divisionalized form. In the context of jurisdictional ambiguity, it was found that decentralized internal structural
relationships, and client grouping as opposed to functional grouping, may have been key factors in the survival of the Justice Institute in a period of environmental turbulence during the early to mid 1980s, and in its demonstrated effectiveness in fulfilling its organizational mission. It was further found that a strong central structure was required to stabilize the Justice Institute, particularly at times when the environment was inimical to the continued existence of the Justice Institute. It was suggested that this apparent contradiction lay at the roots of the instability of the early organization.

The study recommended that the Justice Institute recognize the weaknesses, and build upon the strengths, of the divisionalized form. Further, it found Mintzberg's extended configuration hypothesis to be an effective instrument for performing a structural analysis of an organization.
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I wish to thank those who read and commented on drafts of the historical case study: Chief Robert J. Stewart, Lawrence E. Goble, Paul C. Smith, Patricia Ross, Anthony Williams, John Laverock, P. Dean Winram, Phil Crosby-Jones, Bernard J. Doyle and Dr. Gerald B. Kilcup. I bear sole responsibility for any errors or omissions in the case study, as well as for the analysis, conclusions and recommendations. Throughout my coursework it was a privilege to study under the guidance of Dr. John Dennison. My graduate research committee, consisting of Dr. Ian Housego (research supervisor), Dr. Graham Kelsey and Dr. John Dennison, provided much valuable criticism, advice and encouragement. Their support of this project was gratifying. Dr. Jamie Wallin kindly interrupted a sabbatical to assist in examining the thesis. Dr. Henry Mintzberg, whom I have met only through his writings, was a source of inspiration. Hege Glittenberg contributed her considerable desktop publishing expertise to the formatting of the organization charts. For their unconditional support of this project both in word and in deed, I wish to express special appreciation to Paul Smith and Larry Goble of the Justice Institute, and to Fire Commissioner Richard Dumala.

This study is dedicated to my wife, Jean and our children, Erika and Justin. During my studies, they spent far too many evenings and weekends without their husband and dad. Mere thanks cannot begin to express my gratitude for their patience, understanding and love.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Justice Institute

The subject of the study is the Justice Institute of British Columbia, a provincial post secondary institute as defined under the British Columbia College and Institute Act (1983). Located in Vancouver, the Justice Institute trains British Columbia municipal police, provincial courts and correctional employees, fire service personnel, ambulance paramedics and provincial emergency planning personnel, and provides programs for professionals and the public in the areas of justice and public safety.

Purpose of the Study

The study identifies and analyzes fundamental organizational dilemmas facing the Justice Institute. These dilemmas are examined in the context of the organization's past and present circumstances. Insights derived from the literature in organization theory and studies in higher education are utilized to analyze and explain the organizational dilemmas and to seek ways of dealing with them.

The present endeavour is not the first attempt to study the Justice Institute. In the brief history of the organization, which was formally established in 1978, a number of studies have been undertaken (e.g. Stonecrest Services, 1980; Ministry of Attorney-General and Ministry of Education, 1983; Pollick, 1984; Goble, 1984). These early studies were characterized by much
questioning and soul-searching as the organization wrestled with a number of troublesome issues.

Studies undertaken a significant time after this period (e.g. Touche Ross, 1987; Justice Institute, 1989) reaffirmed the existence of many of the same or similar problematic issues.

There is no question that the studies previously undertaken are substantive, competent and insightful. The present study builds on these previous efforts in that it examines the impact of their findings and recommendations on the organization. This process is intended to determine the extent to which the recommendations addressed the organizational dilemmas. The explicit application of insights from organization theory further differentiates the present study from previous studies.

The rationale for conducting the study is threefold. The first reason is to search for possible ways of understanding and thereby dealing with the organizational dilemmas, in the belief that disciplined studies in higher education may legitimately aim toward the understanding and improvement of institutions of higher education.

The second reason for the study is to find and put to the test concepts derived from the literature on organization theory and higher education. If an analytical tool or set of tools proves helpful—or, for that matter, unhelpful—in understanding the dilemmas faced by an institution of higher education, it should follow that other administrators in higher education institutions may benefit from this knowledge.

The third reason is to tell the story of a unique and unusual part of British Columbia's college and institute system. Although it was never intended as such, the Institute can to some extent be seen as an experiment. There appears to be no precedent for combining
training for the different sectors of the justice and public safety community under one roof. Even more unusual is that this organization is designated a provincial institute. The Justice Institute has received attention across the country and internationally for the manner in which it is bridging traditional barriers in training between the various elements of the justice and public safety system.

**Background of the Justice Institute**

The Justice Institute's stated mission is "to improv[e] the quality of justice and public safety by developing and delivering training programs and educational services to professionals and the public" (Justice Institute, 1989:3). In achieving this mandate, "A primary objective of the Justice Institute is to encourage sharing of learning resources and opportunities among people and agencies involved in justice and public safety" (Justice Institute, 1988:5). The full Justice Institute Mission Statement is given in Appendix 1.

One important goal is to provide cost effectiveness and efficiency as well as an opportunity to nurture a common core of training experiences for the many different sectors of the justice and public safety community (Justice Institute, 1989). Another goal is more philosophical, indicating that the public is best served when justice and public safety personnel have been trained to understand and work in harmony with other components of the system. For example, a seemingly simple problem such as a juvenile who repeatedly sets fires may involve many components of the system. Fire fighters will respond to the alarm and work with police in investigating the cause. Police may pursue and apprehend the suspect. Ambulance personnel may be on hand to treat heat- and smoke-related injuries. Any of these personnel may subsequently be called to court to testify. Followup may include the courts, probation
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officers, police and fire departments, social workers, psychologists, school staff and others. Will this young offender be bounced from one agency to the next with no communication among them? Will police and fire departments work with community agencies to educate parents on the extent of the problem of juvenile firesetting? Where can the school counsellor, the fire prevention officer, the social worker or the probation officer go to learn more about this perplexing and potentially lethal problem?

Another example is training for disaster preparedness, in the event of a natural disaster such as flood, tornado or earthquake, or major accident such as a plane or bus crash. In a matter of minutes or hours small armies of rescue personnel will be on scene to mitigate the disaster. Will police, fire, ambulance, medical personnel, provincial emergency employees and many other agencies each have trained their staff in isolation from the rest? Or will there have been an opportunity to communicate and learn from one another before the disaster has taken place? (In view of the increasing threat of a catastrophic earthquake along the San Andreas fault on the west coast of the North American continent, this question is not merely academic.)

These are but two brief examples of the extent to which components of the justice and public safety system are interlinked. The concept of training toward a common language and understanding is fundamental to the Justice Institute identity and mission. The Justice Institute is uniquely mandated to provide integrated training in a multi-faceted and often fragmented justice and public safety system. From its earliest days, the Justice Institute concept was built on the notion that the whole would be more than the sum of its parts— that the organization could "enhance...the quality of justice in this province" (Goble, 1984:1). Such a centre could "support the efforts that were underway to co-ordinate and integrate various...
programs and initiatives taking place within the system...[and provide] training and development programs to meet both the independent and interdependent needs of the various divisions of the Ministry [of Attorney-General]" (Goble, 1984:5).

The Ministry of Advanced Education and Job Training has primary responsibility for the Justice Institute as a whole, including the funding of infrastructure costs (e.g. central administration, facilities and capital) and core program support costs (i.e. Educational Services Division, which is responsible for extension programs, media and library services, and various non Academy-specific programs). The five Academies (Corrections, Emergency Health Services, Fire, Police, Provincial Emergency Program) are funded by their client ministries; i.e., Solicitor General; Health; Municipal Affairs, Recreation and Culture; Attorney General. A senior-level representative from each client ministry sits on a Policy Advisory Committee, which provides a liaison among the various client ministries.

Apart from its client ministries, the Justice Institute is free to pursue training contracts with various public and private agencies at the federal, provincial and local levels, as well as relationships with other colleges and institutes. In addition, it may offer justice and public safety-related programs on a cost recovery basis, in the manner of unfunded extension programs.

A variety of training formats is used, ranging from simulations, lectures, workshops and seminars to distance education by means of print packages, tutors, travelling training units, television (Knowledge Network) broadcasts and videotapes. Course duration ranges from less than one day to several months full-time, as well as several years of part-time study in the case of some certification programs. In the 1988-89 Academic Year, the Justice Institute delivered
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over 900 courses to some 23,500 students for 87,000 student training days with expenditures of $7.5 million (Justice Institute, 1989). The Justice Institute has a full-time staff of approximately 125, including administrative, instructional, seconded and support staff. In addition, a large number of part-time and volunteer persons assist in delivering training programs at the community level around the province.

The concept of integrated training and shared resources brings with it both benefits and a number of challenges. The benefits can be attested to simply by the fact the sponsoring ministries continue to support the organization and its various components. The Justice Institute mandate also presents a number of challenges.

Design

Research Questions

The existence of a number of significant studies into the Justice Institute indicates the presence of problematic issues that continue to resurface. The most recent Justice Institute strategic plan identified a number of these, including issues of varying dimension in the following areas:

- Corporate identity
- Visibility and support at senior levels of government
- Evidence of integrated training
- A research role in justice and public safety
- Interaction with colleges, institutes and other organizations
- Academy versus central Division roles
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- Roles of the Board, Principal and Executive Committee
- Shared training standards and procedures

In view of these and other recurring issues, the study addresses three problems: (1) What are the basic organizational dilemmas that underlie these issues, and why do they exist? (2) What light can a conceptual model borrowed from the field of organization theory shed on the sources and possible resolutions of these dilemmas? (3) Do the answers to questions 1 and 2 suggest particular avenues to resolve the dilemmas?

Data Sources

The data gathered for analysis in the study are derived from published literature, historical documents and informal interviews: (1) the literature provides data on the historical context of higher education in British Columbia and analytical approaches in organizational analysis; (2) the documents range from legislation to internal corporate documents; (3) informal interviews with key participants in the history of the Justice Institute provide data to clarify gaps in documents and contextual issues.

Data Collection

Various types of data were gathered, consistent with Merriam’s observation that different types of evidence may be gathered so long as one does not attempt to "reach conclusions across studies conducted from different paradigms" (Merriam, 1988:2). The framework utilized in the present study remains in the qualitative domain, and is based on an explicit and consistent theoretical framework.
Applicable studies in the areas of organization theory and higher education in British Columbia set a theoretical and naturalistic context for an examination of the Justice Institute. Cooper's model (1984) of the integrative review is used as a basis for conducting the literature review. In brief, Cooper describes the integrative review process as summarizing past research "by drawing overall conclusions from many separate studies that are believed to address related or identical hypotheses" (1984:11).

The study of historical and current documents provides the foundation for a well-rounded, chronological picture of the Justice Institute from its roots in the early 1970s to the present. Merriam (1988) notes that documents "are a product of the context in which they were produced and therefore grounded in the real world" (1988:109). This advantage makes documents a particularly rich source of information for a descriptive case study. For the sake of consistency, a model was designed to assist in the selection and weighting of documentary evidence (Figure 1.1).

The Study

This is a case study of the Justice Institute as an educational organization. Merriam (1988) describes a case study as "an examination of a specific phenomenon such as a program, an event, a person, a process, an institution, or a social group" (1988:9). She categorizes the case study research design as a qualitative process:

Discussions of case study are embedded in the growing body of literature on qualitative research and naturalistic inquiry. That is not to imply that qualitative research equals a case study or that one cannot use quantitative data in a case study. Rather, the logic of this type of research derives from the worldview of
CLASSIFICATION OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

The following definitions were used to classify documents and establish the extent of their relevance:

1. **Legislation** (provincial Acts and Regulations, Orders-in-Council related to Justice Institute and client ministry mandates and affairs)
   - Advantages: Factual; sets out clear legal imperatives
   - Disadvantages: Intentions behind legislation not evident; broader context not clear

2. **Official publications** (documents published by the Justice Institute for the purpose of public consumption--e.g. Annual Reports, Newsletters, Strategic Plans)
   - Advantages: Good source of information such as statistics, budgets, training programs, formally approved plans, yearly summaries, events
   - Disadvantages: Generally put forward the best face of the organization; many serve public relations function

3. **Internal documents** ("unintentional" [Borg and Gall, 1989] documents such as minutes, correspondence, memoranda, internal reports)
   - Advantages: Most can be used as primary sources of information; information is in raw, uninterpreted form
   - Disadvantages: Many are products of complex situations; may not reflect events "behind the scenes"; authors may have ulterior motives

4. **Commissioned studies** (studies and analyses--generally at policy level--written to satisfy a formal request from an authority having jurisdiction--e.g. Task Force or Royal Commission reports, management consultants' reports)
   - Advantages: Focused toward clear objectives; source of information on problems and recommended solutions
   - Disadvantages: Give no indication of follow-up activities; tend to be political (i.e. report what the requestor/sponsor wants to hear)

5. **Operational studies** (studies focused toward specific operational issues--e.g. facilities plans, curriculum design plans)
   - Advantages: Provide factual information; indicate how policy-level decisions are operationalized
   - Disadvantages: May be superficial

6. **Academic studies** (unpublished papers, theses)
   - Advantages: May be written by disinterested persons; may provide theoretical viewpoint
   - Disadvantages: Authors may not have subject matter expertise; "insider" information may be difficult to obtain
qualitative research.... Overall, however, in a qualitative approach to research the paramount objective is to understand the meaning of an experience. In contrast to quantitative research, which takes apart a phenomenon to examine component parts (which become the variables of the study), qualitative research strives to understand how all the parts work together to form a whole.

(1988:16)

Van Maanen, Dabbs and Faulkner (1982) note the increase in qualitative analysis in the context of organizational studies.* They describe the growth of qualitative research in the previous decade as a more visible and identifiable methodology within the social sciences" (1982:13). In their view, "...organization research is, in all its guises, hardly a process marked by the accumulation of detached, neutral, or purely descriptive observations. Research is inherently a social and cultural process with deeply rooted moral, political, and personal overtones" (1982:14).

Borg and Gall (1989) list ten generally accepted characteristics of qualitative research:

1. Qualitative research involves holistic inquiry carried out in a natural setting.
2. Humans are the primary data gathering instrument.
3. There is an emphasis on qualitative data gathering methods.
4. Sampling is purposive rather than random.

* Interestingly, Van Maanan conducted ethnographic research in police agencies where, in his own words, "...for the past twelve years I have been slipping in and out of various research roles. Primarily from the bottom up, I have been trying to make sense out of the police life, its consequences upon the people who live it and upon those subject to it" (1982:104). It is difficult to imagine that such experiences could not yield a wealth of insight about many aspects not only of policing but as well of modern life in America.
5. Data analysis is inductive.

6. Qualitative research develops "grounded theory" (\textit{a posteriori} as opposed to \textit{a priori}).

7. Design emerges as the research progresses

8. The subjects play a role in interpreting outcomes.

9. Intuitive insights are utilized.

10. There is a focus on social processes.

The present study will exhibit most of these characteristics.

\textbf{Validation of the Study}

The case history was reviewed by key participants (Appendix 2) each of whom has first-hand knowledge of events in the Justice Institute history. They are used to "triangulate" (Guba and Lincoln, 1981) key elements of the historical description by primary sources. Borg and Gall (1989) describe a primary source as "a direct description of an occurrence by an individual who actually observed or witnessed the occurrence" (1989:115). Reviews were followed up by informal interview when necessary for clarification. The interviews were exploratory and largely unstructured in order to prevent undue introduction of biases.

\textbf{Data Analysis}

The validated historical study of the Justice Institute is searched for patterns or emergent issues. These are then discussed in relation to the theoretical model derived from the literature on organization theory.
The subject of the case study is an organization. One can infer from the mere existence of a vast body of literature in organization theory that organizations are complex phenomena. Therefore a conceptual framework is useful to assist in understanding how organizations work. How is such a framework determined? In Bolman and Deal's *Modern Approaches to Understanding and Managing Organizations* (1984), the authors describe four major theoretical approaches to understanding organizations and place them into one or a combination of four categories ("frames"). They describe frames as windows on the world:

Frames filter out some things while allowing others to pass through easily. Frames help us to order the world and decide what action to take. Every manager uses a personal frame, or image, of organizations to gather information, make judgments, and get things done.

(1984:4)

The four frames and their proponents are described as follows:

1. **Rational systems** theorists, who emphasize organizational goals, roles, and technology.

2. **Human resource** theorists, who emphasize the interdependence between people and organizations.

3. **Political theorists**, who see power, conflict and the distribution of scarce resources as the central issue in organizations.

4. **Symbolic theorists**, who focus on problems of meaning in organizations.

Rather than promote the inherent superiority of any one frame, or even suggest an alternative frame, Bolman and Deal argue that all theoretical approaches can be categorized into one or a combination of the four frames. Their arguments in favour of viewing organizations through these frames is more pragmatic than it is based on any theoretical underpinning. As an example, they state that by using multiple frames, "you can improve the odds [of success as a
manager] in your favour with an appreciation of each of the frames and how they can be used in real organizations" (1984:26).

Raffael (1985) finds that the authors go "a long way toward getting the field [of organizational behaviour] to integrate its perspectives in a practical way" (1985:419). He states that each chapter and frame "does a fine job of distilling the essence of what the major authors or proponents have written about that particular view of organizations" (1985:416). Apart from cautioning that Bolman and Deal's approach could confuse managers who do not have a good grounding in organization theory, Van Meter (1985) finds their approach helpful in understanding organizational phenomena:

It is not so much a matter of finding correct answers to organizational problems but rather of being able to look at situations with contrasting and thereby creatively informative visions of reality, which in turn lead to responses that are richer in complexity and detail.

(1985:135)

Van Meter concludes states that the authors "integrate a relatively large portion of what we currently know about organizations" (1985:137). Zammuto (1986) likewise favors the practicality of Bolman and Deal's approach with the exception that he would like to see it become even more application-oriented than it appears in their book. Owens (1984) finds that Bolman and Deal give an "even handed treatment" to different organizational theories.

Another prominent proponent of the multidimensional approach is Morgan (1986). Adopting a somewhat polemical tone, Morgan discusses eight different frames or "metaphors" of organization. While generally praised for its creativity, Morgan's approach has been subject to some criticism. Kopelman (1987) finds Morgan's metaphoric images of organization impractical, particularly in that the perspectives vary between management viewpoints and social criticism.
In a similar vein Austrom (1987), while acknowledging the value of Morgan's "holographic" metaphor, finds that the use of metaphors "can both clarify and confuse" (1987:752). Weiss (1985) protests against the use of various metaphors and the like to understand organizations:

One cannot build a theory of organizations by imposing macrosociological assumptions, literary concepts like metaphor, linguistic notions such as signs and symbols, or anthropological categories such as culture on a class of phenomena that has a different social character.

(1985:384)

While recognizing, therefore, that there are many ways to view organizations, the analysis can not view the case study from four different perspectives in adequate depth to do justice to any one of the four frames presented in Bolman and Deal or the eight metaphors proposed by Morgan. Furthermore, without a unifying theory to tie together the different frames or perspectives, the researcher could be accused of adopting a superficial or utilitarian approach to different theories of how organizations work, alternately using them and discarding them depending on their apparent utility to explain the phenomena at hand. Such a "unifying" theory would have to be contingency-based and itself be tested in relation to competing theories--matters that lie well outside the bounds of the present study.

Therefore the analysis in the present study will focus on one of the four well established models presented in Bolman and Deal, and use it as a primary framework for analyzing the case study. The history of the Justice Institute and the nature of the issues identified in Chapter 4 suggest that one particular conceptual framework for their analysis would be best fitted. This conceptual framework is discussed in Chapter 5. The effectiveness of such an approach will be discussed as part of the conclusions and recommendations at the end of this study. Thus the examination of the conceptual framework becomes part of the subject matter of the study.
Reporting the Findings

The analysis of the case study and the emergent issues, seen through a conceptual framework derived from organization theory, is related to a current profile of the organization as a whole, with conclusions and recommendations to follow. The findings are reported narratively, addressing the dilemmas identified in the study. The success of the conceptual model employed is also discussed.

Restrictions and Limitations

It is not intended in this study to deal in a practical or operational manner with specific strategic issues raised in the Justice Institute Strategic Plan (1989). These issues are formulated and addressed in the Plan. Rather, it is the intent to analyze and explain, from a historical and theoretical viewpoint, the context from which these and other issues emerged.

Although the author is an employee of the Justice Institute of British Columbia, the choice of topic and method was made independently of that relationship. Tuition support and some professional development time were provided by the Justice Institute. Although many Justice Institute staff members both past and current were consulted and interviewed in the data gathering process, the author alone is responsible for the recording, analysis and interpretation of the data, as well as for the conclusions and recommendations.

Two predominant biases must be stated here. First, the author is a proponent of the concept of integrated training in the administration of justice and public safety services, and the study assumes the intrinsic merits of that approach. Second, the author is committed to the
Justice Institute mission and goals and to the Institute itself as an agent for the improvement of justice and public safety in our society.

Overview of the Thesis

Following the Introduction, Chapters 2 and 3 are a history of the Justice Institute. This history is a factual, chronological account, obtained primarily from a variety of documents and interviews. Chapter 2 looks at the early roots of the organization; Chapter 3 describes the growth of the organization from its formal establishment in 1978 to the present.

Chapter 4 identifies key issues that emerge in the history of the Justice Institute as described in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 presents a conceptual model from organization theory that is used to analyze the historical account of the Justice Institute and the emergent issues which arise from this account. Chapter 6 presents the analysis, and Chapter 7 presents conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis.
Chapter 2

ROOTS OF THE ORGANIZATION (1971-1978)

The present chapter chronicles the historical background of the Justice Institute of British Columbia up to the point of the formal establishment of the organization. The purpose of the history is to provide a context for understanding the growth of the organization which is described in Chapter 3, and the subsequent analysis in later chapters. In general, a chronological approach is used as a framework for the historical narrative. However, detailing the history of individual Justice Institute components requires, at times, the use of concurrent mini-histories told sequentially. These mini-histories, or "threads," are tied together at appropriate junctures when their convergence forms a part of the history of the Justice Institute organization. Further, because several major studies of the Justice Institute were undertaken in the early years, forming a significant part of the organization's growth, their reflections on the past as well as the future of the organization must interrupt the chronological flow of the historical narrative at times. The present chapter looks at the events over the early and mid 1970s that led to the establishment of the Justice Institute.

The Origins

The Justice Institute of British Columbia officially came into being by provincial Order-in-Council April 27, 1978. The Order-in-Council, signed by then Premier Bill Bennett and Minister of Education Pat McGeer, designated the Justice Institute a "provincial institute" (British Columbia, 1978). By this Order-in-Council, the Justice Institute fell under the
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jurisdiction of the *Provincial Colleges and Institutes Act* (British Columbia, 1979), which had been tabled in 1977. The Act was administered by the Minister of Education.

The Act differentiated between institutes, which had province-wide responsibilities, and colleges, which served a designated region of the province. Under the Act the Justice Institute was required to take the form of a Board-governed institution. Its specific mandate, spelled out in the Order-in-Council, was to:

(a) provide courses of instruction which are consistent with identified needs specifically for, but not limited to, Police, Corrections, Courts and Sheriffs;
(b) identify the educational and specific training needs for all components of the British Columbia Justice System, including fire services;
(c) develop a co-operative system of co-ordination between its own programmes and those of the other institutes, colleges, universities, public schools and community-based organizations; and
(d) provide a provincial forum for discussion and examination of justice and socially-related issues.

(British Columbia, 1978)

The Board of Directors held its inaugural meeting May 17, 1978 and, among other business, established a search committee to fill the positions of Principal and Bursar as required under the Act. The Principal selected was Gerald B. Kilcup, former Director of the B.C. Police College. The Chairman of the Board was Chief Robert Stewart of the Vancouver Police Department. In its first year of operation, the Justice Institute ran 133 courses for a total of 2191 students or 25,741 student training days, with total expenditures of just over $2.8 million. The operation was well under way, and the messages in the first Annual Report from the Chairman and the Principal were enthusiastic and optimistic.

Obviously such an organization did not appear overnight. In fact, its establishment represented a convergence of a number of separate, loosely related events or "threads" that
developed throughout the early and mid 1970s:

Thread # 1: Justice Development Commission
Thread # 2: The Police Act
Thread # 3: Professionalization of Courts Staff and Correctional Officer Training
Thread # 4: Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act
Thread # 5: The Public Safety Dimension

Each of these threads is now traced individually.

**Thread # 1: Justice Development Commission**

On the 3rd of May, 1974, the provincial government passed the *Administration of Justice Act* (British Columbia, 1974), which established the provincial Justice Development Commission. The creation of the Justice Development Commission was prompted mainly by a report written by the British Columbia Branch of the Canadian Bar Association which was submitted to the British Columbia Law Reform Commission (British Columbia Branch, Canadian Bar Association, 1972).

The report was based on a motion passed by the B.C. Branch on November 27, 1971 for a "...full inquiry (with power to make recommendations) with respect to the administration of justice, both criminal and civil, in the Province of British Columbia" (quoted in British Columbia Branch, Canadian Bar Association, 1972:2). The report noted that although the Law Reform Commission had had, since its establishment in 1969, a positive effect on the examination and reform of the *substance* of the law, less attention had been focused on the *administration* of the law:

It seems to be widely accepted that the most enlightened body of substantive law is of little value if the machinery of its administration is inadequate. It is paradoxical,
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therefore, that the machinery of justice and the administration of the law have never been the subject of systematic and comprehensive review.

(British Columbia Branch, Canadian Bar Association, 1972:1)

The report pointed to a host of problems with the current system including fragmentation, delays, lack of standardization, lack of accessibility, a need for legal aid, inadequate court space, poor service in rural areas, and a number of related issues.

Thus the Administration of Justice Act gave the Justice Development Commission a wide-ranging mandate in exploring avenues to improve the administration of justice. The Act defined administration of justice as:

1.(i) the provision, maintenance, and operation of
   (a) courts of justice in the Province;
   (b) court registry and land registry offices;
   (c) correctional centres as defined in the Corrections Act, and prisons and lockups operated by police forces;
   (d) the offices of coroner, Crown counsel, probation officers, court workers, and sheriffs, and their officers; and
   (e) the police forces,
for the purpose of their functions, including functions given to the courts or offices, or to any official thereof under an Act or rule or regulation made under an Act;

(ii) the prosecution of offences; and

(iii) the provision of adequate legal services, including the operation of legal aid offices.

(British Columbia, 1974)

In simpler terms, the overall goal of Justice Development Commission was "...to ensure that all the citizens of B.C. are provided with the best quality of justice by improving the courts, policing, corrections, and the delivery of legal services" (Justice Development Commission, 1974:i). Functions of the Commission were to include future planning of the total justice system, financing and organization research into any aspect of the justice system, and setting up experimental projects and programs. The Commission reached into all areas of the
province through a network of decentralized Justice Councils which had a broad mandate to obtain "citizen participation" (Lajeunesse, 1976:28) in the justice-related affairs of the Ministry of Attorney-General and to "open up" (1976:1) the system.

The Commission established a number of task forces, one of which was the Training Task Force. In 1974 the Training Task Force consolidated previous discussions and proposed the establishment of a Justice Education Centre which would emphasize two themes:

(i) that a "total system" approach be taken i.e. that the highly complementary roles of the various components in the justice system be recognized and co-ordinated, and
(ii) that the training and education of justice personnel should be, and appear to be, part of a larger community endeavour.

(Justice Development Commission, Training Task Force, 1974:2-3)

The report proposed that the Justice Training Centre be set up as a "brokerage" which

...will have at its disposal two main resources, namely, the existing adult educational institutions in the Province, and a facility where components of the justice system would put on special courses which the normal educational system would not be able to service e.g. a proposed British Columbia Police College will deliver some aspects of basic recruit training for police work and other components of the system will make similar arrangements.

(1974:53)

The authors envisaged a facility that would integrate training for personnel from corrections, courts, legal services and police with public community education programs. The Centre would include a specialized public library, classrooms, recreational facilities for the public, potential for double use as a convention centre, theatre, media labs, simulation areas, and board and conference rooms. The Centre would also provide legal aid and counselling, as
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well as operate as a community correctional centre. A variety of training programs was envisaged, including legal continuing education for law firms, public education programs, and mid-management and executive training.

True to the adjurations of the Administration of Justice Act, the concept was open-ended and experimental. The authors of the report acknowledged:

It is impossible to predict the nature of many of these programmes, how they might be taught, where they would be centered, or who would teach them. The Centre will have a co-ordinating function and may delegate many of the programmes to universities or colleges. All sources and opportunities must be looked at, as there is no desire to accommodate all activities at the proposed site.

(1974:14)

The report noted the need for close co-operation among components in the post-secondary system, the justice system and the Director of Manpower Development of the Justice Development Commission. Thus a Senior Policy Committee was established, composed of the Deputy Minister of Education and the Deputy Attorney-General of the day. The document illustrated these relationships in two of the first of many subsequent organizational concepts of the institution that was to become the Justice Institute (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

The search for a site was assisted by the services of an architectural firm, which developed a comprehensive preliminary feasibility study for a facility to accommodate the Justice Training Centre. The site explored was the Dawson School in Vancouver. Interviews by the firm with various persons noted a number of concerns, including the practicability of coordinating several components of the justice system on one site; the possibility that the Centre would become a training centre only as opposed to a community resource; for probationers' coming into conflict with police and security personnel on site; the potential
Figure 2.1

EARLY ORGANIZATION CONCEPT # 1

Source: Justice Development Commission Training Task Force (1974.5)
Figure 2.2

EARLY ORGANIZATION CONCEPT # 2

potential for the proposed Police College to dominate the site; and that the courts and police should "not only be, but appear to be, separate in function and facility" (Cornerstone Planning Group Ltd., 1974:9). The Dawson site turned out to be unavailable, and several other sites were explored over the next eighteen months. In the meantime, discussions were under way between the Ministries of Attorney-General and Education to seek ways in which the training needs of the Attorney-General's staff could be coordinated with program offerings in the province's colleges and universities. Outside the Senior Policy Committee, there was no structural link between the Ministries of Attorney-General and Education, and the creation of the Justice Training Centre fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General.

Thread #2: The Police Act

Prior to 1974, police training lay within the jurisdiction of the municipalities. The Police Act of 1974 transferred responsibility to the British Columbia Police Commission in the Ministry of Attorney-General. The training situation was summarized in a Report to the Justice Development Commission in 1974 (British Columbia Police Commission, 1974). Twelve municipalities had their own police forces with a combined total of some 1300 police officers.

The remaining municipalities were policed by contract with the RCMP, which numbered approximately 2700 officers in British Columbia. The RCMP had its own training school in Regina and therefore training was not a concern for RCMP-policed municipalities. Vancouver Police Department had a training academy at HMCS Discovery Canadian Forces Base in Stanley Park, where police recruits underwent a 21-week basic training program. This school also made seats available when possible for West Vancouver, New Westminster, and several Vancouver Island Departments. Some training was also conducted at Camosun College in Victoria by the
Saanich Police Department. Delta Police Department operated a part-time facility as needed for the training of new constables.

Apart from a few specialized courses at Vancouver Police College (e.g. Breathalyser, Explosives), no on-going in-service training was available to municipal police officers, let alone any specialized management courses for senior-level officers. Although the option was available to take courses at both pre- and post-employment levels in colleges and universities,

These courses are reported by officers taking them as being very uneven in quality ranging from the very good to the useless. The epithet "Mickey Mouse" is often attached to such courses in the justice field, where the instructor has no credibility with those enrolled in the course because of what is most often lacking, e.g., in courses touching on policing matters, is an ability to relate a body of theoretical doctrine to its applied aspects in police work.

(1974:7)

The Report went on to discuss the need for a combination of both education and training:

If the word "education" would better reflect the broader scope and compass of what a young officer needs to take on to the street to assist in the handling of citizen encounters, then the related question arises of how best to achieve a broad and liberal outlook whilst maintaining the necessary degree of technical excellence within the scheme. It is no use having an officer who understands the conflicting emotions involved at a scene of crisis, if he does not have the competence to put into operation some of the alternative responses available.

(1974:8)

The report authors saw value in integrating police training and education with the mainstream post secondary system in the province, including contact with civilian students, access to resource persons such as psychologists and sociologists, and recognition of police training within the established educational system. However, a number of difficulties were noted in the Report.

Perhaps the strongest argument against integration was Section 5 (1) of the Police Act (1974) which gives the British Columbia Police Commission the duty to
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(c) establish, subject to the approval of the minister, minimum standards for the selection and training of constables; [and]
(d) establish and carry out, or approve and supervise, programs for training and retraining constables and persons who intend to become constables.

(British Columbia, 1974)

The difficulty here lay in the requirement of the Police Commission to maintain close control of the training conducted for police officers who, even at the recruit stage, were under the employ, supervision and discipline of the police department. Thus the notion of regular police training appeared to be incompatible with the autonomy and general supervisory jurisdiction of the colleges. Further difficulties were seen in matters such as the incompatibility of the college semester system with the police education and training cycle; the need at times for rapid changes in curriculum which "could not be processed in time though normal academic channels" (1974:10)--as, for instance when new legislation was to come into effect--and the perceived police preference for choosing educational specialists who were adept at relating academic programming to the everyday policing context as opposed to taking whomever the colleges had to offer. As it was, some resistance to the idea of a police college could be anticipated and did in fact occur:

Some dead-ended police constables and non-commissioned officers viewed the new BCPC-B.C. Police College training plans as a threat, feeling that they would be bypassed by the younger recruits coming through these programmes. Resistance to democratizing the police structure, to putting more responsibility in the constables, and to the ideas of modern management principles emerged as well.

(Nikitiuk, 1977:90)

The Report urged the immediate establishment of the British Columbia Police College, which would provide core police training that would not compete with but, rather, be complemented by college certificate and degree programs in related areas. Robert Stewart of the Vancouver Police Department was seconded to the Police Commission to work on the development of the Police College. The rationale for the name was that
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In this way the educational function of the college will be given clearer recognition in its title and the emphasis will be moved away from police training as a trade-school concept. In addition to placing it on par with institutions of higher learning, the use of the expression Police College will conform to the equivalent institutions operating elsewhere in the police service in Canada.

(1977:15)

The British Columbia Police College was established in 1975 in a group of mobile trailers behind the Seaforth Armory in Vancouver. Over the next two years the Police Commission worked with Robert Stewart and Justice Development Commission to develop the concept and the search for a home. The Director of the Police College, Gerald B. Kilcup, was asked by the Ministry of Attorney-General to assemble the final components of the Justice Training Centre. When the Justice Institute was formed in 1978, the Police College was incorporated into the Institute as a division and the name changed to an Academy from a College. Kilcup was selected as the Institute's first Chief Executive Officer. The British Columbia Police Commission announced the establishment of the Academy with considerable enthusiasm: "We look forward to 1978 with the expectation that the affiliation of the Academy with the Justice Institute of British Columbia will provide an expanded opportunity to integrate and coordinate police service training with other justice training programs" (British Columbia Police Commission, 1978:8).

Thread # 3: Professionalization of Court Staff and Correctional Officer Training

Both Court and Correctional staff operate directly within the system of administration of justice, and their work puts them in contact with almost all aspects of the system.
Court training involves personnel from the Court Services Branch in the Ministry of Attorney-General. Court Services personnel include court clerks, deputy sheriffs, court recorders and Justices of the Peace. Their training needs involve levels from recruit to supervisory levels as well as specialty programs. Although the Court Services Division had a significant involvement with the Justice Development Commission, it did not become involved with the original Justice Training Centre concept to any significant extent.

Prior to 1978, courts personnel were trained at the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) and Vancouver Community College (VCC), which operated training programs by contract with the Division.

A Report to the Justice Development Commission noted a serious lack of trained court reporters, many of whom were recruited either from other provinces or from the United States or Britain (Courts Division, Justice Development Commission, 1974).

Through the early to mid 1970s, the roles of sheriffs were steadily enhanced by new responsibilities, emerging from mainly civil proceedings to assumption of a wide range of duties in the criminal sphere formerly conducted by police agencies. Among these new roles were service of documents, courtroom security and arrests, and escort of accused, convicted and mentally ill persons. As described in a Task Force Report on Sheriff services, the changes met two objectives:

1. To assign the duty of carrying out the orders of the Court to a neutral body removed from association with the prosecution;

2. In so doing, to release police officers for law enforcement duties.

(Task Force on Sheriff Services, 1977:1)
The Report further noted,

Many of these duties are unpleasant or dangerous....To perform their duties, Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs are empowered as peace officers under the Criminal Code. As peace officers they are given certain responsibilities and privileges which may make them legally liable for misconduct in the discharge of their duties.

(1977:2-3)

One of the mandates of the task force was to study the training requirements for sheriffs in their expanded roles with the attendant responsibilities. The report noted in particular the lack of upgrade and management training, a matter of "great concern" (1977:111). Although this concern, as well as other training needs, was discussed in the report, no mention was made as to where or how such training should be delivered, other than that correspondence courses might address some of the needs. There appeared to be no commitment to the concept of joining the Justice Training Centre or exploring the feasibility of associating with it in some way. Sheer happenstance had it that basic sheriffs and other Court Services training conducted at the Willingdon School by the British Columbia Institute of Technology had to find a new location in order to make room for the Lower Mainland Regional Juvenile Detention Centre. Thus in 1978 Court Services training moved to the Justice Institute, albeit with some reluctance. Two reasons appeared to be arguments about program control as well as a political debate concerning the need to maintain courts administration at arm's length from the Ministry of Attorney-General (Stonecrest Services, 1980). When the training was transferred to the Justice Institute, the personnel thus moved remained Court Services Branch employees, and they inhabited a section within the central Educational Services Division rather than form an Academy with a separate existence from the Branch.

Correctional officers are staff employed by the Corrections Branch of the Ministry of Attorney-General, and are governed by the Correction Act (1979[a]). These staff include internal staff of penal institutions as well as community staff such as probation officers. Training is 30
required both at the recruit and advanced levels, as well as for professional development in specialized content.

Prior to 1960, training of institutional staff was conducted mainly on the job. A senior employee recalled:

When I started to work at Oakalla (February 1956), the minimum educational requirement was to be able to read and write English legibly.... Bear in mind that the wages were poor and the working conditions were bad so at best the staffing was transient. With this in mind, training was usually delayed a number of months to see if the staff member was going to hang around long enough to make it worth their while to train.... Back in those days, a lot of the staff were the hard nosed old line screws that perpetuated their attitudes into the new staff.

(Purgavie, 1988)

The writer went on to relate that a riot at Oakalla prison in the mid 1950s resulted in attempts at reform and increased training of institutional staff.

Institutional staff training continued on the job with some in-service classes held at Oakalla as well as the Haney Correctional Institute. In September 1967, the Corrections Branch began a dedicated training school at the Vancouver Island Regional Correctional Centre (Wilkinson Road), with on-site accommodation for students and four full-time instructors. The main program was a six-week recruit training course. In May 1970 the Wilkinson Road school moved to Pierce Creek Camp in Chilliwack Valley, and grew over the next four years to nine full-time staff. The facility contained accommodations, kitchen and dining rooms, classrooms and a gymnasium for physical training.

The programs continued to concentrate on basic recruit training, but owing to high turnover of staff in the corrections system large backlogs of untrained staff grew in the system. In 1975 the training facility moved to a building on Kingsway in Burnaby. During this time,
community officers were trained at a separate site in Vancouver, in the New Haven Correctional Centre and subsequently at the Marpole Training Centre.

As an example of the problems in the training system, in one year a backlog of 200 untrained staff was working on the job. Part of the problem was the difficulty in freeing staff from their daily duties for training. The situation became intolerable, and the Branch began to establish policies to create positions to cover work absences for in-service training leaves as well as to prevent untrained staff from being assigned to active duty. Correctional workers as well as community workers were increasingly expected to professionalize and obtain further education in order to advance up the career ladder. New roles were seen for these staff members, as described in a Corrections Branch document:

Correctional workers must be prepared to play an advocacy role in ensuring that adequate resources are made available to assist the offender to make constructive changes in his own behaviour.... The police and the courts are equally interested along with the correctional workers in routing the neglected and the helpless from the official machinery of justice toward more helpful and effective resources.

(Campbell, 1974)

In addition to training in the technical aspects of the job, a need was seen for training in human relations. The Branch noted the need for people trained to diploma, baccalaureate and masters levels in the provincial corrections system. Further needs were seen in the area of creating "...a career ladder and staff development procedures which foster individual competence in facilitative skills rather than in custodial skills" (Corrections Branch, 1976). In addition, a need was seen for a resource centre for employees and BCIT was identified as a possible site (Campbell, 1974).

As part of the mandate of the Justice Development Commission, the Corrections Branch worked with the Commission to identify training and educational needs of correctional
Considerable time has been invested in meetings and data gathering for the development of a Justice Education Centre. Liaison with other Justice System Training Divisions has been initiated and will provide an opportunity for cooperative planning in the designing and implementing of training programs.

(Corrections Branch, 1974[a]:21)

There was clear evidence that these discussions were taking root in the Corrections Branch training plans. Among the Branch's lists of objectives and tasks from 1974 to 1976 were the following:

Objective: To ensure a co-ordinated and integrated approach among all Justice System components in manpower planning, training, and staff development.

Tasks:
1) To participate with other Justice System training divisions in the development of a Justice Education Centre.
2) To liaise with other Justice System training divisions in the designing and implementing of training programs from the basic recruit level to senior management level, and to co-ordinate and integrate such programs whenever appropriate.

(Corrections Branch, 1974:21)

The Branch further noted:

This entire area of staff development is full of interface possibilities. The primary contact within the Justice Development Commission for this portion of the interface will be the Manpower Planning and Staff Development section.

(1974:21)

The discussions on training in this planning document give a clear picture of new directions under way in the Branch, and are worth quoting at length:

PRE SERVICE TRAINING
A. Objectives:
1) To ensure development of relevant corrections and criminology pre-employment and educational programs at the regional colleges, universities, and technical institutes.
2) To ensure an adequate supply of trained, educated, and informed correctional staff.
B. Tasks:
   1) To continue to develop the Summer Employment Program to involve students in all phases of correctional operations, planning, and research.
   2) To liaise with educational institutions, and provide input in the development of programs to ensure that content areas are relevant to Corrections.

C. Interface:
   [Some of the liaison with educational institutions]...may be done in a co-ordinated manner through the Manpower Planning and Staff Development Section [of the Justice Development Commission.

SENIOR AND MIDDLE MANAGEMENT TRAINING
A. Objective:
   To ensure that all middle and senior management personnel receive adequate training, management and supervision skills, and opportunities to engage in programs relative to the philosophy and goals of the Corrections Branch toward the development of an adaptability to change....

INSERVICE TRAINING FOR LINE STAFF
A. Objective:
   To develop skills and attitudes of all Corrections staff to ensure the fulfillment of individual and organizational goals, and to maximize the potential of all line staff through providing opportunities for continuous upgrading.

B. Tasks:
   1) To develop recruit programs which ensure that all staff are properly trained prior to undertaking line responsibilities, and to ensure that an understanding of the philosophy and goals of the Branch is an integral part of recruit training.
   2) To develop a refresher course program to ensure that all staff are regularly involved in the upgrading of their skills and job knowledge.
   3) To develop training programs which ensure an adequate level of training prior to advancement to new positions and responsibilities at each level within the hierarchical structure.
   4) To develop training programs which, whenever possible, allow for the integration of theory with practical on-the-job application (i.e. field work and tutor programs).
   5) To develop a clear-cut career ladder system in Corrections, giving recognition to inservice training, education, and experience.
   6) To develop standards of job performance relative to each job function in the Department.
   7) To conduct manpower analysis of all Corrections staff, to assess educational levels, length of experience, and job functions.
   8) To provide financial assistance for Corrections employees to upgrade their educational qualifications through workshops or attendance at universities or colleges.

   (1974:22-24)

During this time discussions were under way in the Branch as to whether training for
Correctional staff should be centralized in the province or regionalized. The Director of Staff Development, John Laverock, summarized the discussion as follows:

Although it would appear that there are a number of ways in which certain staff development functions can be regionalized, and in some cases decentralized, it would also appear that in order to maintain standards, maximize use of resource people and resource materials, and ensure a priority is placed on policy development and overall planning for staff development activities, that a centralized staff development section is both necessary and desirable.... As it appears that the Branch will continue to be involved in a change process as methods, philosophies and objectives continue to develop within the total criminal justice field, it would follow that staff development programs which would assist staff in responding to changes should be a major thrust within the Branch. It is important, therefore, that there be a close link between the policy board, the deputy minister, and the staff development section in order that provincial priorities and trends may be initiated or responded to by effective staff development programs and policies.

(Laverock, 1976)

In 1978 the Corrections Branch, Staff Development Section moved to the Justice Institute and formed its own Division, funded via a contract with the Ministry of Attorney-General. The Section Director, John Laverock, was transferred to the Justice Institute to take the position of Director of the Division, but remained directly on the Branch payroll. New standards and policies were in place to cover mandatory recruit and refresher training, supervisory and management training, and the curriculum was revised, improved and updated (Corrections Branch, 1978). Thus,

...over a period of approximately twenty years the Corrections Branch moved from a position of having a non-existent training system to a comprehensive and sophisticated training system offering a broad range of training programs and services for all levels of Corrections Branch staff.

(Justice Institute, 1982:18)

Thread # 4: **Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act**

Prior to August 1977, the concept of a Justice Training Centre grew out of a need to meet the training and educational needs of personnel who worked in, or under the jurisdiction
of, the Ministry of Attorney-General. Any discussions with the Ministry of Education were undertaken mainly for the purpose of coordination with the provincial colleges and universities.

Then in August 1977 the Government of British Columbia introduced the provincial Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act. The Act gave a new corporate status to the province's colleges and institutes, and removed them from the jurisdiction of the Public Schools Act. The colleges were now to be run by Boards rather than regional councils, and institutes were established and designated as having provincial mandates as opposed to the regional focus of the colleges. Funding for the colleges and institutes was now to be provided by a direct provincial grant rather than by local taxation in the manner of school districts.

The Act was in many ways a culmination of developments in post secondary education in British Columbia over the previous 15 years. These developments were catapulted forward in 1962 when, responding to a number of concerns, John B. MacDonald, President of the University of British Columbia, made sweeping proposals to build a system of community colleges across the provinces (MacDonald, 1962). His Report noted that British Columbia, in spite of being endowed with vast natural resources, had a poor record in providing post secondary training and educational opportunities for British Columbians. MacDonald passionately and eloquently expressed deep concerns about the future of the province should vast efforts not be made to meet its post secondary educational and training needs.

The Government followed up swiftly with amendments to the Public Schools Act (1963) to allow regions to conduct plebiscites and bylaws to fund the establishment and operation of colleges. The main characteristic of the colleges that grew during the 1960s and 1970s was their roots in the community, as noted by Dennison and Gallagher (1986):
Summarizing the development of non-university post-secondary education in British Columbia, the major factor was the role by the wider community in the process of establishing colleges. Neither the products of provincial government initiatives nor of massive injection of government funding, British Columbia's colleges were conceived, born, and nurtured through the expression of local and regional support for an idea which represented a new concept of educational opportunity.

(1986:31)

Before long the provincial government began to view the colleges as part of a system to be co-ordinated and managed provincially rather than regionally in a process of what Beinder (1983) unambiguously termed "rationalization."

One effect was that, in search of increased efficiencies, various provincial vocational schools were merged with the colleges in 1971. A memorandum released by the Ministry of Education in 1971 stated reasons for this move, including the provision of

...the opportunity to co-ordinate technical, trades-training and other career programs offered by the various post-secondary institutions throughout the province and by so doing avoid unnecessary and costly duplication of facilities and programs.

(Ministry of Education, cited in Beinder, 1986:57)

This search for efficiencies in the post secondary institutions, part of the trend away from the "community" notion of the colleges and toward increased provincial control and coordination, resulted increasingly in what Beinder terms "provincially controlled technical/vocational schools" (Beinder, 1983:19).

With the social upheavals of the 1960s and early 1970s, the winds of change swept through the province. In 1972, British Columbians elected their first New Democratic Party (NDP) government. This government's directions included an increased emphasis on the community service role of the colleges as well as accessibility. Dennison and Gallagher (1986) note that such priorities "required more direct government intervention on both a financial and
policy level than had previously been the case" (1986:91).

A subsequent return of the Social Credit party to office in 1975 ushered in a period of tight fiscal control and efficiency-seeking. Two major studies commissioned by the government in 1976 resulted in reports (Winegard Commission, 1976; Goard Commission, 1977) that called for increased central co-ordination of post-secondary academic as well as vocational and career training in order to reduce duplication and inefficiencies, and also called for improved accessibility around the province in terms of geographical as well as other restrictions.

Out of this milieu the **Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act** was born.

When the new **Act** was under discussion during the Fall of 1977, Gerald B. Kilcup, the Ministry's representative appointed to work on the establishment of the Justice Training Centre, wrote his now historic memorandum to the Deputy Attorney-General:

> The intention of this Ministry to establish a Justice Training Centre is now inconsistent with the proposed legislation contained in Bill 82--**Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act**. The proposed Bill clearly captures the developing Justice Training Centre as a Provincial Institute within the developing interpretation of the legislation and effectively removes it from the direct control and authority of the Ministry of the Attorney-General.

(Kilcup, in a memorandum to R. Vogel, Deputy Attorney-General, August 9, 1977; cited in Goble, 1984:9-10)

In this memorandum Kilcup further proposed a joint endeavour of the Ministries of Attorney-General and Education, with shared funding and co-operative programming, but with the proviso that "guarantees were available that would preserve the integrity and control of justice training programs within this Ministry [of Attorney-General]" (Kilcup, 1977; cited in Goble, 1984:10).

The Ministry of Education offered space at the former Provincial School for the Blind
The Justice Institute of British Columbia at the Jericho Hill site in Vancouver. Both Ministries found advantage to this arrangement and on April 27, 1978, the Order-in-Council was signed that established the Justice Institute as a provincial institute under the College and Institute Act. A Board was appointed and the operation was under way.

Thread # 5: The Public Safety Dimension

In the Order-in-Council that established the Justice Institute (British Columbia, 1978), part of the mandate of the Institute was to include identification of educational and training needs for the fire service. Not long after the establishment of the Justice Institute, a further request came from the Ministry of Health to train provincial Emergency Health Services Commission (EHS) employees; i.e., ambulance attendants or emergency medical assistants (EMAs). Both these requests rounded out the concept of justice to include the aspect of public safety in the Justice Institute mission.

With regard to the fire services, in British Columbia there was (and still is) no mandatory requirement upon a municipality to provide fire suppression services. The only requirement under the Fire Services Act was to conduct fire inspections and investigate fire causes. Fire Departments were established through a local bylaw as permitted in the Municipal Act. However, responsibility for the administration of the Fire Services Act was placed within the Ministry of Attorney-General. Beyond administration of the Act, the provincial government had no statutory obligation to regulate the Fire Services, as opposed to the justice-related services such as police, courts and correctional personnel.

Thus the addition of fire services to the Justice Institute mandate added de facto a
new dimension to the concept, that of **public safety**. Although it could be argued that policing and corrections have a public safety aspect, these services are normally associated primarily with the administration of justice. The public safety dimension was not an overt part of the original concept of the Justice Training Centre. However, because the fire service had certain statutory duties under the **Fire Services Act**, which was administered by the provincial Fire Marshall under the Ministry of Attorney-General, the Justice Institute was as good a place as any to deal with the training needs of fire fighters. Of the reality of these training needs there was little doubt.

In the early to mid 1970s national fire loss records showed that British Columbia had a significant fire problem, in terms of both fire deaths and dollar (property) loss. In the ten-year period 1965–1974 British Columbia had the second highest death rate of all provinces (i.e. fire deaths per 100,000 population), which in real numbers added up to 1,059 men, women and children who died as a result of fire in ten years (Dominion Fire Commissioner, 1974, Table 2:10). In the same period, British Columbia's dollar losses due to fire were 57% higher than the average losses of the other nine provinces (Dominion Fire Commissioner, Table 6b:17). In response to this record, as well as to pressure from the fire and insurance industries, the Attorney-General A.G. Macdonald requested a study to be undertaken on the condition of the fire problem in British Columbia. A Commission was established, headed by Hugh Keenleyside. Keenleyside conducted an exhaustive investigation of the fire services in British Columbia and wrote a landmark Report titled **The Fire Fighting Services in British Columbia** (1975).

Keenleyside pulled no punches in his condemnation of the "shameful" record of fire deaths and property losses in British Columbia. Among the host of problems he recorded were the lack of fire prevention regulations and public fire education, and the chaotic state of many
of the hundreds of fire departments in the province, each seemingly operating in isolation from
the others.

The report was written in a time of rapid societal changes with which the fire service
was struggling to cope. These changes are well described by Baird (1986):

The postwar expansion, prosperity, new technology and architecture brought with them
new fire situations to challenge the resourcefulness of the fire service, the building
and fire prevention codes writers, and the whole technology of fire protection. In
cities growing with a new population boom, people and their commerce were being
accommodated in buildings of increasing heights and areas. The high-rise office, hotel
and apartment building arrived and proliferated. City people also began moving
underground for rapid transportation, all-weather shopping and easy movement from
one building to another. Even their automobiles were stored underground.

Arrays of new processes, chemicals, bulk transport of high-energy fuels, and other
problem materials came to perplex the fire chief and his staff....Growing
sophistication and competence in the professional fire service of larger cities was [sic]
matched by more difficult fire problems.

(1986:218-19)

Against this social backdrop Keenleyside proposed a number of remedies including a
comprehensive Act to deal with fire services and the establishment of a provincial Fire
Commission with branch offices around the province to regulate the fire services. Further, he
recommended:

A Provincial Fire College or Academy should be created as part of the Fire Marshal's
establishment to provide specialized training for officers and prospective officers and,
in cooperation with the Fire Marshal's branch offices, to maintain an extension
service to provide a competent training system throughout the province for all fire
fighters.

(Keenleyside, 1975:1)

Keenleyside predicted that "a properly organized and operated Fire College could
become the centre of significant progress towards the remedial action this Province so badly
requires" (1975:84). He suggested the possibility of associating the college with one of the
existing universities or colleges, with the prospect that such a relationship could eventually lead
to a four-year degree course in fire services administration, as has been done in many countries around the world including the United States. In spite of such a possible association, however, it was clear that such an academy or college should be operated as a part of the Fire Marshal's Office.

The release of the Keenleyside report spurred renewed interest within the fire service in the establishment of a provincial fire academy. Shortly after the Justice Institute was established, the Attorney-General requested the Justice Institute to write a proposal and action plan. The study was undertaken jointly by Larry Goble of the Justice Institute and Clare Foster of the Fire Marshal Office. The proposal cited the findings of the Keenleyside Report, and noted that "...almost all of the basic components needed for establishing a B.C. Fire Services Academy are already in place--land, classrooms, office space, resource centre, cafeteria, dormitory and recreation facilities" (Goble and Foster, 1978:5). The first priorities of the Academy were ranked in the following order:

1. A senior management training program.
2. A train-the-trainer program, which would be delivered around the province by a travelling unit.
3. A summer program for volunteer fire chiefs.
4. Recruit training programs for professional fire fighters and specialty courses.

The submission contained a proposal for a live burn training facility, including a drill tower, training and drill grounds, a fire research laboratory, a live fire training building, flammable liquid burn pits and a driver training area. Although the facility was not forthcoming, the Fire Academy was established as a Justice Institute division in October, 1978, and a Director was hired in November of the same year.
A further addition to the Justice Institute's public safety mandate was made when the Emergency Health Services Commission in the Ministry of Health expressed a wish to establish a training academy for ambulance attendants. Prior to 1974 ambulance services were provided by various means. In some areas the fire departments ran ambulance services under contract to the Ministry of Health. Other jurisdictions contracted private companies to operate ambulance services. The entire area of pre-hospital emergency care was largely unregulated. Programs in the United States to train Emergency Medical Attendants to a high level of skill were shown to have a significant benefit in the saving of lives, particularly in the case of cardiac emergencies (Wilson, 1982). Statistical analysis showed that, at least in the Greater Vancouver Regional District, demand for ambulance service was increasing at a much faster rate than the population growth, and rationalization of the system was required to keep response times to a safe level (Swoveland, 1974). In view of the labour-intensiveness of the ambulance service, there would obviously be a growth in staffing and in demand for training.

In 1973 the NDP government commissioned a report on all aspects of medical care associated with emergency treatment, including training. In March 1974 the government of British Columbia passed the *Emergency Health Services Act* (British Columbia, 1974[a]). The Act established the Emergency Health Services Commission within the Ministry of Health, with the following scope of responsibility:

5. The Commission has the power and authority...

(c) to assist hospitals, other health institutions and agencies, municipalities, and other organizations and persons, to provide emergency health services and to train personnel to provide such services, and to enter into agreements or arrangements for that purpose;

(f) to recruit, examine, train, register, and licence emergency medical assistants.

(British Columbia, 1974[a])
The Commission set about to overhaul and upgrade the ambulance system and unify it as one provincial service. On July 24, 1975, regulations were set out by Order-in-Council (British Columbia, 1975) to establish three levels of emergency medical assistants (EMA I, II, III). The Order-in-Council included detailed training and certification requirements:

2. The Commission shall recruit, examine, train, register and licence Emergency Medical Assistants and for those purposes shall
   (a) establish prerequisites for recruitment,
   (b) establish course content for training,
   (c) prescribe the form, frequency, content and passing grade of examinations.

(British Columbia, 1975)

The Order-in-Council further mandated what was in effect a training school or academy for EMAs:

8. The Commission shall provide sufficient classroom facilities with materials for the use and instruction of Emergency Medical Assistants and shall employ a sufficient number of persons on the administrative and instructional staff to provide adequate teaching and supervision of persons in training.

(British Columbia, 1975)

The initial training took place in a training school in Vancouver operated by the Metropolitan Ambulance Service. In October 1979 the Commission approached the Justice Institute with a request to conduct a two-week training program. On December 12, 1979, a task force commissioned by the Board of the Justice Institute submitted a proposal to the Board to develop a plan for the creation of the Emergency Health Services Academy. The plans were submitted and approved by the Board March 24, 1980. On August 11, 1980, the Justice Institute received an Order-in-Council formally transferring the Commission’s training function to the Emergency Health Services Academy at the Justice Institute.

With the originally unplanned addition of the Fire and Emergency Health Services Academies, the public safety aspect was now firmly planted alongside the justice-related components of the Justice Institute.
In 1978 most of the threads that had developed over the past seven or eight years became increasingly intertwined in pattern to form the early tapestry of the Justice Institute organization. Under the umbrella of the Ministry of Attorney-General and various pieces of legislation, the British Columbia Police College and Corrections Training Divisions became increasingly involved with the Justice Training Centre proposed by the Justice Development Commission.

In separate developments, the fire and emergency health services were undergoing significant developments in terms of training and professionalization. The introduction of the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act under the Ministry of Education in 1977 was the catalyst in the creation of a new vehicle to meet the training needs of Ministry of Attorney-General and justice-related personnel, as well as to accommodate the similar needs of two significant components of the public safety services.
Chapter 3

GROWTH OF THE ORGANIZATION (1978-1990)

The present chapter continues with the history of the Justice Institute, beginning in 1978 when the organization was formally established. The first few years were turbulent, to say the least. There was a mixture of excitement, idealism, confusion and frustration experienced by those who fought for, against, in and around the organization. It is therefore difficult to separate the battle accounts from the battles themselves; both become inextricably intertwined aspects of the history. The present account tells both, from the early days of the organization’s existence as a formal entity to the present.

The story proceeds from early optimism, through a series of crises, and to some of the new directions undertaken in recent years.

Early Optimism

Over the first few years of the Justice Institute, the principal and directors built the educational and administrative infrastructure of the Justice Institute. By the end of 1980 the organization consisted of the Police, Fire and Emergency Health Services Academies and the Corrections Staff Development Division, as well as the central Educational Services and Finance and Administration Divisions. Goble (1984) provides a colorful description of the first years:

It was a time of excitement and growth. A variety of students were arriving at the Justice Institute to discover for themselves what this new institution was all about. For the first time in North America, police officers, corrections officers, probation officers, deputy sheriffs, court clerks and administrators, paid and volunteer fire fighters, ambulance attendants and paramedics all found themselves participating on a common campus, sharing facilities and beginning to interact with each other in the
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hallways, cafeteria, gymnasium and other common areas. It was a beginning...a vision
that not only saw ways to improve training within the system, but also to support
many of the cross system initiatives that were underway at the time.

(Goble, 1984:15)

The first mission statement of the Justice Institute read as follows:

The Justice Institute of British Columbia, as a post-secondary educational institution,
provides leadership and coordination to support, develop and deliver a wide range of
training and educational programs and services for people working within the field of
justice and public safety in the community. These programs and services are designed
to improve the quality of justice and public safety for all citizens of British Columbia.

(Justice Institute, 1979:3)

A set of goals was developed to accompany the mission statement. By 1980 they read:

I  To develop and provide programs, courses of instruction and services consistent
   with the identified needs of,
   A) the Corrections Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney-General,
   B) the Court Services Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney-General,
   C) the Emergency Health Services Commission of British Columbia,
   D) the Fire Services Commissioner of British Columbia, and
   E) the Police Commission of the Province of British Columbia.

II To develop and provide courses of instruction and services consistent with the
identified needs of,
A) other components of the Ministry of Attorney-General,
B) other Ministries of the government in justice and public safety related areas,
   and
C) private agencies and community groups engaged in justice or public safety
   activities.

III To provide opportunities through continuing education for the community to
   participate in activities that promote a better understanding of justice and public
   safety issues.

IV To develop a cooperative system of coordination between the Institute's own
   programs and those of other institutes, colleges, universities, public schools and
   community based organizations.

(Justice Institute, 1980:5)

Achievement of the first goal constituted the bulk of the Justice Institute’s training
activities, with the exception of Court Services which, along with most of the other goals, was
held under the wings of the central Educational Services Division.

Although the roles of each of the training academies appeared to be relatively straightforward in that each had a clearly defined client groups, the role of the central Educational Services division was less simple to define. Educational Services had originally been created to assist the Divisions or Academies with learning resources, including a media centre and library, and to offer extension and interdisciplinary programming, as well as psychological and physical training services. In addition, its function was seen partly to "bring coordination and a better cross-systems understanding and communication to justice and public safety elements with the Province" (Justice Institute, 1978:11). Educational Services was in a way one Division that could serve the broader needs of the community than could the individual Academies, as well as support the Academies in program planning. The existence of this division was an important symbol of the Justice Institute concept. Apart from its direct funding through the Ministry of Education—which formed the basis for an extremely successful mix of program offerings to the justice and public safety community—the cross-divisional role set out for the Division relied mainly on the interest, support and cooperation of the Academies and their client sponsors. The potential of this division lay at the core of the Justice Institute concept, and formed part of the optimism surrounding the early years of the organization.

In an attempt to fulfil its coordination role in justice and public safety, the Justice Institute established the Provincial Coordinating Committee on Justice Education and initiated an ambitious study on and a survey of core curriculum possibilities and justice training and education overlap in the provincial post secondary system (British Columbia Provincial Coordinating Committee on Justice Education, 1980; 1981), which heavily involved the Educational Services division. In spite of such efforts, however, the Division appeared to find its main
successes in providing community programming and contract services to the Academies. The external and internal coordinating roles did not emerge as a dominant characteristic of this Division, as each Academy expended most of its energies to build training programs for its own client sponsor.

Growing Pains

In spite of the early idealism and mission and goal statements, there were early indications that the fabric was undergoing a fair amount of strain. The rapid structural changes experienced by this growing organization can be evidenced by a comparison of Figures 3.1 through 3.3, which illustrates differences in the organizational chart between August, 1978 and March, 1979. Further, there was what Goble termed a "dual reporting relationship" of the Academies or Divisions. Academies were responsible both to the principal of the Justice Institute and to their client groups. It became increasingly apparent that all was not well, either in fact or in the opinion of a number of persons brought in to analyze the organization.

The Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act required all colleges and institutes to have a five-year plan. In compliance with this requirement, the Justice Institute initiated a planning process. A consultant was retained to assist in the development of the plan. In April 1980 the first phase of the plan was released. As noted in the Preamble to the plan, significant organizational issues needed to be resolved before a plan could be drawn:

It would be much more convenient from the planner's point of view if the Justice Institute was a mature organization whose relationships were fixed, whose administrative structure was firmly settled, and whose mandate was refined to the point of exactness. But this is not the case and the purpose of the Justice Institute's
Source: Goble (1984)
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology

Ministry of Attorney-General

BOARD

Principal

Corrections
Staff Development

Fire Services
Academy

Police
Academy

Educational
Services

Finance and
Administration

Source: Justice Institute of British Columbia (1978)
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first educational five-year plan must be to suggest solutions to long-standing problems as its first priority. Accordingly, the description which follows resembles a management study more than a conventional planning analysis. Rather than offering detailed predictions concerning future growth and a workplan that can be followed to bring them to fruition, the Plan for the Future outlines the conditions that must be satisfied if growth itself is to be made possible.

(Stonecrest Services 1980:1)

Reviewing the history of the Justice Institute, the report identified a number of unresolved issues that the Justice Institute had "inherited." Among these were issues related to the manpower planning role in relation to the Ministry of Attorney-General staffing needs; the target community to be trained; issues of territoriality of the component services; and the diffusion of authority over and within the Justice Institute.

In relation to the manpower planning role, the early concept of the Justice Institute involved not only coordination and integration of training, but also a means to conduct manpower planning and development for, and under the direct control of, the Ministry of Attorney-General: "Far from being affected by legislated constraints set down by the Ministry of Education, it [the Justice Institute] was seen as a vehicle to influence other educational establishments in a manner rewarding to the Attorney-General" (Stonecrest Services, 1980:2).

The report cautioned, "...a Justice Education Centre contains the potential to isolate training from the operational branches of the Attorney-General's Ministry unless the relationship between ministerial policy, manpower planning and training programs is bound by a clear and well-publicized agreement" (1980:6).

Another issue was noted in that early ideas about the Justice Training Centre within the Justice Development Commission had gradually changed from a view of the Centre as an amalgamation of the Ministry of Attorney-General's training Branches to a much wider and less
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focused concept, including public education. The extent to which the Justice Institute should become involved in this wider area, and to which such endeavour might infringe on other jurisdictions, was not clear.

Further, although integrated training sounded appealing in principle, the practicality of the idea translated into reality presented some complexities:

The organization necessary to produce a unified front when negotiating with other participants in the post-secondary field also revealed a degree of territoriality between the training groups which the eclectic approach to training originally had been designed to irradicate [sic]. Some feared that amalgamation and integration "might jeopardize the unique features and identity of individual program [sic]," forgetting that the first arguments in favour of an integrated training facility set out to accomplish precisely that end.

(1980:6)

Perhaps most problematic of all, with the passage of the Provincial Colleges and Institutes Act, there quickly appeared on the scene a proliferation of committees and councils operating under the authority of the Minister of Education, including the Occupational Training Council, Program Advisory Committees and Occupational Advisory Committees. As noted in the report,

Given that ministerial responsibility is a political fundamental in parliamentary systems, it would have been improper for the Attorney-General to allow policy decisions affecting organizational development, research and manpower planning to be made external to his Ministry.

(1980:12)

As a result of this situation, negotiations between the two ministries resulted in an agreement that would:

1. exclude the complete transfer of personnel to the Justice Institute;
2. agree to share the core resources, space and services of the Institute;
3. offer full participation in the coordinating of justice training throughout the Province;
4. undertake to cooperate fully in achieving the objectives and the effective
management of the Institute; and
5. establish a formula to reimburse the Institute for services rendered.

(Stonecrest Services, 1980:13)

How these agreements would affect the practical operation of the Justice Institute remained an open question. Although it was agreed that Board members would be co-selected by the two ministries, the Attorney-General's financial contracts with the Academies were the key factor in allowing the Attorney-General ministry to influence the Justice Institute. In all this complexity, the division of responsibility among the two ministries and the Justice Institute remained largely undefined, particularly in the area of program control.

In January, 1980, a Memorandum of Agreement between the Justice Institute and the Ministry of Attorney-General laid out general principles concerning the relation between the two entities (Ministry of Attorney-General, 1980). The Memorandum affirmed the dual funding arrangement between the two ministries, with direct costs of instruction and instructional support funded by the Ministry of Attorney-General and support costs funded by the Ministry of Education. It also established a Ministry/Institute Coordinating Committee which was to meet quarterly to "review programs, identify training needs and coordinate the overall relationship between the Ministry of Attorney-General and the Justice Institute of B.C." (Ministry of Attorney-General, 1980). The Coordinating Committee was to be composed of two Board members, representatives of the Corrections, Police, Fire and Courts client representatives, as well as from the Ministry of Attorney-General Policy Planning and Support Services Branch, and the Divisional or Academy Directors.

By this time the reporting relationships were becoming increasingly complex and perplexing. Figure 3.4 depicts one interpretation of the various existing as well as theoretically possible reporting relationships within as well as without the Justice Institute.
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The Justice Institute fabric was beginning to look more like a Gordian knot than like the tapestry that was envisioned in its earlier days.

The Stonecrest Services report made 17 recommendations, from which the following points are summarized:

1. Redraft the Justice Institute's mandate.
2. Directly employ all educational staff.
3. Assume responsibility for all programming.
4. Make manpower planning policies available to the Justice Institute as a condition of contracting training.
5. Establish integrated management structure in the Justice Institute, including two new vice-principal positions.
6. Establish an Executive Coordinating Committee to improve the working relationship between the Justice Institute and the clients.
7. Reform the funding arrangements.
8. Adopt a standard contract with all clients.
9. Prepare a master agreement among all related agencies and the Ministry of Education.

The recommendations of the report, which came to be known as "Phase I" of the Justice Institute's five-year planning process, were assembled in a separate document which was widely circulated to officials from both ministries as well as in the Justice Institute. The reactions received were reflected in a document that came to be known as "Phase II," which was
SOME POSSIBLE JUSTICE INSTITUTE REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS

![Diagram showing reporting relationships between various bodies and committees related to justice and education in British Columbia.]

Source: Stonecrest Services (1980:30)
submitted to the Board of the Justice Institute by the Principal, Gerald B. Kilcup. This report was not fully supported by the Principal, as noted in the foreword:

The subsequent recommendations to the Board for action in some cases are significantly different from those of the consultants, and should be considered as the recommendations of the Principal of the Institute to the Board of the Institute.

(Justice Institute, 1980[b]:i)

Among the recommendations from the Principal to the Board were the following proposals. The mission and goals statement was slightly modified, with the main effect that the public participation aspect included in the earlier goals was deleted. The issue of direct employment was not seen as requiring action by the Board, as this was already policy. Although a majority of staff were already direct employees of the Justice Institute, negotiations would continue to bring the Courts and Corrections staff to the Institute as regular employees. With regard to program responsibility and manpower planning, the Board was asked to endorse a lengthy statement that recognized the following principles:

i) The Ministry of Education must be recognized as the final authority to which the Justice Institute is responsible;

ii) The reporting obligations prescribed by the governing legislation of agencies external to the Ministry of Education and the Justice Institute must be respected;

iii) The Justice Institute's identity should not be bound exclusively to the operational interests of its major clients;

iv) Instructional services provided under contract by the Justice Institute must be seen to serve the maintenance concerns of client agencies, the global objectives of the Ministries within which those agencies operate, and the objectives declared in the Institute's guiding mandate.

(Justice Institute, 1980[b], Appendix 3)

Client agencies would be expected to inform the Justice Institute of manpower planning directives, develop job performance standards for Justice personnel to be trained by the Justice Institute, enter joint needs analysis ventures with the Justice Institute, and supply job performance evaluations to the Justice Institute. Conversely, the Justice Institute would work with the client groups in developing clearly defined philosophies and principles to guide program
development and delivery. In other words, the Justice Institute would function more independently from the clients in terms of direct control but within more clearly defined perimeters.

In terms of the management structure, it was not recommended that the dual vice-principal structure proposed by Stonecrest Services be adopted, this proposed arrangement being viewed as an unnecessary hierarchial layer in the organization. However, the report recommended that the Board endorse a streamlined structure, with Corrections, Courts, and two areas that were currently in Educational Services—Land Registry and Coroners—consolidated in one division. Management training for all Divisions was to centre in Educational Services. Firearms training, physical education and driver training was to go to the Police Academy, which would coordinate these aspects for all Divisions; first aid training for all Divisions would likewise go to the Emergency Health Services Academy; and all Divisions would be represented at a senior level in the organization by means of an Executive Committee composed of the Divisional Directors, the Dean of Educational Services, the Bursar and the Principal (Chairman).

It was also recommended that Agency Coordinating Committees be established for each Academy that would consist of the Academy Director, the head of the Academy's respective client, the Principal, and one or two others as needed. The purpose of the Committees would be to meet as required to review the annual academic plan, financial plan and support services plan and formalize annually all contractual arrangements.

Further, the report recommended that the Institute adopt the Post Secondary Activity Classification Structure (PACS) financial arrangement that obtained between most colleges and institutes and the Ministry of Education, with the client agencies funding Function
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I (Conventional Instruction, Non-conventional Instruction, Instructional Delivery, Program Development, Learning Resources, Staff Development, Educational Leave, Instructional Administrators, Articulation Committees) and student expenses (travel, meals and accommodations) only. Recommendations concerning client-Institute contracts and a master agreement stated that it was the responsibility of the Justice Institute to initiate these.

Most of these recommendations were ratified by the Board, with an overall emphasis on reinforcing the responsibility and authority of the Justice Institute to manage its affairs (Justice Institute of British Columbia, 1980[c]; 1981). Phase II of the plan, in the words of the Principal:

...consolidated the relationship of the Institute with its clients and established an organizational framework through which the Institute would honour its mandate for training and educational programming for the wider justice and public safety community.

(Justice Institute, 1982:1)

Phase III built upon the discussions in Plans I and II in setting forth a concrete five-year plan. Phase III identified four key roles of the Justice Institute. The first role was training in justice and public safety. This aspect represented the training conducted by contract with the various client ministries. The second role was education in justice and public safety. This function was to be directed to the wider justice and public safety community by contract with sponsoring agencies or by tuition. The third role was service role in justice and public safety. This function was intended to provide ancillary support to the justice and public safety community, and included psychological services, media and library resources, program development, personnel assessment, and human resources planning. Finally, the fourth role was a leadership and advisory function in justice and public safety. This role involved the Justice Institute’s expertise in relation to government, other colleges and institutes, and service
providers (e.g. police or fire departments), and could also include applied research in related areas that may from time to time arise.

Figure 3.5 indicates the new organizational structure as it appeared in Phase III of the Plan. The Plan announced the establishment of Agency-Institute Coordinating Committees for each Academy or Division, and Curriculum Advisory Committees that would be advisory to the Coordinating Committees and ensure that common program development, delivery and evaluation standards would be applied to all curriculum. Each of the individual Academy or Divisional plans embodied in the Plan indicated growth projections in terms of student populations, budget requirements and student training days. In addition, a number of capital project needs were identified, including increased on-campus residences, classroom space, a fire training ground and an indoor firearms range.

In an analysis at the end of the document, four alternatives were seen to deal with the increasing demand from government and taxpayers that education become more efficient and less of a drain on public funds: the development of the maximum use of [educational] technology; the restructuring of program allocation and program responsibility within the province; the gradual shift of post-employment basic/recruit training currently provided to the major clients of the Institute to pre-employment training; and the establishment of post employment training as apprenticeship programs under the provincial Apprenticeship Branch.

In March, 1982, the Justice Institute submitted a report to the Minister of Education in response to the Sunset Clause of the College and Institutes Act. The report restated the extant assumptions about the Justice Institute's raison d'être:

The Ministry of Attorney General was committed to a cross-systems learning centre that would modify the barriers that appeared to isolate Corrections, Courts, Fire,
Figure 3.5

A NEW ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

Source: Justice Institute (1982:12)
Legal Services and Police; would promote greater ministry-wide cooperation; eliminate
duplication of training programs and support services and provide general public
education to the wider community on justice related issues. The project became a
reality through the partnership and support of the Ministry of Education.

(Justice Institute, 1982[a]:1)

The Report described the four roles set out in Phase III of the Justice Institute five-
year Plan, as well as the mission and goals statement. After reviewing the successes of the
Justice Institute in providing cost-effective and integrated training in the field of justice and
public safety, the report requested the Minister to endorse the continuation of the Justice
Institute, amend the founding Order-in-Council to "reflect more accurately the range of justice
and public safety training and educational activities provided through the Institute, undertake
the required capital development projects, and support the growth of community and continuing
education programs of the Justice Institute" (Justice Institute, 1982:9).

The Sunset Report's growth forecasts were grounded in reality. In these first few
years, the organization grew steadily and the Jericho Hill site underwent some capital
improvements. Student training days grew quite rapidly:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>STDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>25,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>29,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>61,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>60,141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New and creative programs proliferated, and increasing numbers of students walked
the halls of the Justice Institute campus. In spite of the positive aspects of the operation,
however, the roles of the two ministries, the client groups, the Justice Institute and the
Academy directors remained ambiguous. One troublesome issue was the reluctance of the Courts
and Corrections Branches to transfer their training staff to Justice Institute employees; even
more problematic was an ongoing feud between the Principal of the Justice Institute and the Fire Commissioner, culminating in the firing of the Fire Academy Director by the Principal without the consent of the Fire Commissioner. This action, probably more than any other, brought into profile the question as to who was in control. These difficult issues, as well as the uncertainties as to the Justice Institute's roles among government officials, initiated serious questions as to the viability of the Justice Institute.

In early 1983, a study team comprising two members from the Ministry of Attorney-General and two from the Ministry of Education was assigned by the two ministries the following task:

The mandate of the study is to identify alternatives for the provision of trained personnel for the Ministry of Attorney General and for other ministries of government. For each alternative, there are advantages and disadvantages which should be identified, including financial impacts. The report should be fully sensitive to the particular circumstances and development of attitudes necessary for those individuals working for the Ministry of Attorney General.

(Ministry of Attorney-General and Ministry of Education, 1983:1)

The study examined four alternatives: (1) continuation of the Institute, (2) dispersal of Institute functions among a number of post-secondary institutions, (3) the centralization of training in an Attorney General-run training centre, and (4) the dispersal of training functions among individual Branches of the Ministry.

The study began by identifying staff training and development issues that were seen as fundamental to the analysis. One issue was the staff training model: "There is little evidence that a clearly defined Staff Training Model exists which defines the processes by which training programs are developed and implemented...[without which] there will continue to be confusion of roles..." (1983:30-31). For another thing, the study noted frustration particularly
among the staff who had been transferred from the Ministry of Attorney General to the Justice Institute in 1982: 
"...the staff who transferred...must accept that they no longer have any formal power within their former Divisions" (1983:34). A more significant problem was found in the relationship between the Fire Academy, the Justice Institute and the Fire Commissioner:

It appears that of all the Academies, the Fire Academy is the least developed and the least integrated. This is in part attributable to the fairly limited resources which have been allocated but, more significantly, this situation reflects some of the overall problems over the role and powers of the Fire Commissioner.

(1983:49)

The study asserted that the Fire Commissioner should be an "equal partner" (1983:50) in staffing and course matters concerning the Justice Institute. It suggested that because of the limited powers of the Fire Commissioner over the fire service, he would have an enhanced need to exert control over training, to the point where the continued existence of the Fire Academy at the Justice Institute might not be feasible. Implications of this suggestion on the wellbeing of the Justice Institute as a whole were not discussed.

The study noted continuing weaknesses in policy communication and linkages between the Board and the two ministries. This was seen as a matter in urgent need of improvement. In addition, there appeared to be little understanding of what the concept of integrated training really meant:

There can be no effective integration of training if there is not a clear articulation of why such integration is desired. Whatever the rationale, be it cost savings, acculturation, cross fertilization, etc., there is going to be a price to pay in such areas as autonomy, scheduling, and perhaps quality.

(1983:37)

Further, the study hinted at the presence of suspicions that programs were costing more than they should. The study did not confirm these suspicions but, rather, attributed their
existence to misunderstandings about how the Justice Institute operated and lack of communication, as well as lack of a system for determining program costs in a meaningful way.

After reviewing in depth the four alternatives for delivery of justice and public safety training, the recommendations were presented. In general, over the 32 recommendations the authors recommended more detailed planning, procedures and communication by and among the involved agencies; clarification of roles; clarification of what integration of training meant; exploration of pre-employment training; a study of the long-range role of the Fire Academy; improved cost reporting methods. The 12 pages of recommendations were followed by 13 pages of dissenting opinions and objections by various committee members.

Death Row

During the retrenchment period in 1982-83, a number of seconded staff were returned to the field, and the Corrections, Courts and Land Titles training divisions were amalgamated into the Justice Programs Division.

In December, 1983, the Ministry of Education instructed the Justice Institute to close down by March 31, 1984. In this period of severe fiscal restraint in the provincial government, the Justice Institute did not rank as a high priority. The Ministry of Education intended to supply space at Douglas College to continue various training programs as necessary. In Goble's words,

As a result of the Ministry of Education representatives' involvement in the [Interministerial Study Team], it is little wonder a short nine months later, when the Ministry of Education was faced with the need to make extensive cutbacks, that they felt justified in withdrawing their financial support for the Justice Institute. It must have seemed obvious to them that the other partners were not that supportive of the
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existing set-up. Since other alternatives had been identified in the report, they simply moved to implement one that would save them 2.4 million dollars.

(Goble, 1983:42)

Viewing these developments, the Ministry of Health seriously considered removing its Emergency Health Services Academy from the Justice Institute and placing it at Riverview Hospital in Coquitlam. Dissolution of the Justice Institute seemed imminent.

Reprieve

The Board and Principal began intensive work to save the Justice Institute (Goble, 1984). Clients were surveyed and senior government officials and politicians were lobbied. The Ministry of Attorney-General came to the rescue. On March 28, 1984, an Order-in-Council was signed transferring responsibility for the Justice Institute to the Ministry of Attorney-General, which ministry was now "determined as the ministry of the Executive Government that will exercise the duties and functions under the Act and all enactments made under it" (British Columbia, 1984).

It was a new start, and a time requiring some rapid changes. In spite of a bare-bones budget and a resultant 30% reduction in staff over the period of 1982-83 to 1983-84, increased efficiencies resulted in a small drop in student training days in 1983 and a steady climb since then. The Land Titles section of the Justice Programs Division was dropped. The Fire Academy reorganized and laid out a new plan for the future (Smith, 1983). The organization chart looked more streamlined than ever before (Figure 3.6). A new agreement was established between the Justice Institute and the Ministry of Health to continue the Emergency Health Services Academy at the Justice Institute.

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Source: Justice Institute (1984)
Yet the Treasury Board was not certain that the Justice Institute was the most cost-effective way to conduct training. It was a continuing period of province-wide fiscal restraint, and few areas were exempt from the scrutiny of Treasury Board financial analysts.

Thus in 1984, shortly after the Justice Institute’s reprieve, another study of the Justice Institute was conducted by the Ministry of Attorney General, this time at the request of Treasury Board (Pollick, 1984). The two main issues to be dealt with in this study were the following: Is the Justice Institute model the most cost effective way of meeting both current and future training requirements; and would there be any substantial cost benefit to the government by moving the Justice Institute to a different site?

Apart from the issue of cost effectiveness of training at the Justice Institute, the author noted that the main issue was the value of the site on which the Justice Institute stood—an extremely attractive location with a sweeping view of the city, Stanley Park, English Bay and the North Shore mountains. A number of options were studied in detail, leading to the conclusion that the current site was the best option currently available. It was further found that pre-employment training, a means of shifting costs, would actually cost more than the current arrangement. The costs would increase substantially as the programs would be subsidized by the Ministry of Education through the colleges in a much less centralized and efficient manner. Apart from the financial aspect, Pollick noted in studying these issues that the delivery models he had analyzed "could not be studied in isolation from a consideration of the role, purpose, scope and nature of justice and public safety training" (Pollick, 1984:7a). No firm decision was reached either to move the Justice Institute or to keep it on its Jericho Hill site, and the status quo prevailed.
Internal changes continued as the organization settled into an increasingly workable pattern of structure and systems. Over the next year, the Justice Programs Division was disbanded and the Corrections section returned to being an individual Academy. For the first time as well, Court Services established an Academy at the Justice Institute. In 1984-85 the Justice Institute continued to decrease its staff and spending while increasing student training days. Also, training activities proceeded unabated. To sample a few events at random, the Emergency Health Services Academy was distinguished by becoming the only ambulance school in Canada to receive full accreditation of all its three ambulance service levels by the Canadian Medical Association. The Academy was increasingly using the Knowledge Network to deliver training programs to outlying areas of the province. The Police Academy offered extensive training to prepare for Expo 86 in such areas as surveillance skills, explosives recognition, VIP protection and the like. Increasingly, videotapes were developed to assist in police training. The Fire Academy continued major new initiatives in distance education delivery of fire fighter and fire officer training. Educational Services offered hundreds of fully subscribed courses to professionals and the lay public in the area of justice and public safety. An era ended when the founding principal, Gerald B. Kilcup, resigned to take a new position at a British Columbia community college. He left behind an organization that had survived a series of major challenges to its existence and that had all the while continued to provide increasingly efficient training and an array of innovative program offerings, as can be evidenced in the Annual Reports of the day.

New Directions

The Justice Institute was slowly able to emerge from its survival mode. The years 1985-86 and 1986-87 were a time of new directions for the Justice Institute. Cautious optimism
was increasingly evident. In his message in the Annual Report of 1985-86, the Chairman of the Board, Robert J. Stewart, stated: "The Board is secure in its feeling that the worst part of restraint is behind us. We now look forward to the many exciting challenges that lie ahead..." (Justice Institute, 1985:1). In spite of the cutbacks, uncertainties, endless studies and reports of the years immediately preceding, these words of optimism were not mere platitudes.

Although the organization structure appeared to remain fairly stable, the responsibility for the Institute was moved from the Ministry of the Attorney General to the newly created Ministry of Solicitor General. Other changes were in the wind. The new principal selected was Bernie J. Doyle. Doyle took the entire organization through a process of reevaluation of the Justice Institute mission and goals. It was a period of soul searching and reflection involving all members of the Justice Institute. The result of the process was a new, focused mission statement that formed the basis for a number of new endeavors. In particular, one of Doyle's initiatives was to continue to raise the corporate profile of the Justice Institute and seek efficiencies by taking on a marketing stance. Touche Ross was commissioned to carry out a marketing audit of the Justice Institute. In the process of the audit many senior-level staff of the Justice Institute were surveyed. The findings showed that many of the issues raised in the earlier studies had not yet disappeared. Specific weaknesses to be addressed before a corporate marketing endeavour could begin included the following:

Consistency of image—despite the benefits which can come from the umbrella image of the Institute there is no consistency in its presentation to either core clients or the "outside world."

Low cross-pollenation/cohesion—the limited interaction which occurs between Academies or Divisions at the Institute stems from a variety of factors, among them the lack of common clients [and] the need to service those clients before servicing the needs of even other Academies.

(Touche Ross, 1986:5-6)

Among the strategic issues noted were "Organizational Issues":

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The key organizational issue facing the Institute is the role that the Institute should play in marketing. There is a general consensus that the Institute can do little more than nudge or nurture the Academies to market, since its power does not come from above (i.e. its position relative to the Academies is relatively weak since they do not, largely, depend on the Institute for funding or support). Instead, what power it might have is based on the personal relationships built up between Institute and Academy members.

In the same way, there are only weak forces binding one Academy to another. The lack of cohesion and cross-pollenation in the Institute suggests that in the short run, marketing internally—putting in place informal systems to let those within the Institute know what each other is doing—may be a better investment than external marketing. In essence, why should an external client use an Academy for training when the Academy next door hires an outside contract for the same thing?

(1986:10-11)

The seemingly minor issue of marketing Justice Institute materials to new target groups had in fact raised some fundamental issues about the organization that clearly were either at or near the surface. As it turned out, the marketing stance proposed by Doyle focused directly on the corporate identity of the Justice Institute. These questions became increasingly important as rapid changes in the provincial government ministry structures required almost constant justification as to the rationale and efficiency of the Justice Institute organization.

Doyle's efforts raised a new awareness of the Justice Institute identity, spurred in part by the mission-searching process, and by establishment of an internal marketing committee given a broad-ranging mandate to make recommendations concerning all aspects of the corporate identity and image of the Justice Institute. Doyle left the Justice Institute in 1988 to accept a government position in the Northwest Territories. The Dean of Educational Services, Larry Goble, was appointed principal of the Justice Institute. Shortly afterward, the Justice Institute was moved back to the Ministry of Advanced Education and Job Training.

In 1989 the public safety dimension of the Justice Institute was further strengthened

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with the addition of the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) Academy, after several years of planning. Prompted by several disasters and near-disasters in British Columbia related to oil spills, tsunami and earthquake warnings and floods, the issue of disaster preparedness gained a high profile in the media. One outcome was increased funding and training for PEP staff and volunteers, with the result that the PEP Academy was initiated and housed at the Justice Institute.

Another important step was the establishment of the Pacific Traffic Education Centre, a joint endeavour between the Justice Institute and the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia. Reporting through the Educational Services Division, the Centre conducts specialized training and research in a complex at Boundary Bay airport in Delta. The facility includes classrooms as well as a series of specialized training road track on a converted runway leased from the RCMP.

The 1988-89 Annual Report revealed record numbers of courses and training days conducted, at increasingly lower costs per STD. The Justice Institute continued to undertake new challenges. For example, three Academies of the Justice Institute began working together to develop a common First Responder training program to permit continuity in a layered response to a medical emergency by fire, police and ambulance personnel. Further areas for integrated training included emergency driver training, dangerous goods response, major emergency planning, and others. The Fire Academy began working toward diploma and degree programs in conjunction with the Open Learning Agency and other colleges and institutes. In one year Educational Services delivered programs by contract to 65 different ministries, agencies and educational institutions, and reassumed responsibility for Court Services training. The Division continued to deliver a Conflict Resolution program which attracts participants from
A major contract was signed with the marketing arm of the Open Learning Agency to market the hundreds of training manuals, books, videotapes and related materials developed by the Justice Institute across North America and abroad. The Emergency Health Services Division received continued accreditation by the Canadian Medical Association, and launched an open learning program for part-time Emergency Medical Attendants. The Police Academy continued its training, but without funding for recruit student meals, travel and accommodations. A program to test peace officer physical abilities developed by the Police Academy and Physical Education in Educational Services received recognition and adoption across Canada.

The Justice Institute by this time had a streamlined structure, with many of the early committees designed to expedite communication and good relations with Ministries disbanded in favour of one Policy Advisory Committee, which was made up of a senior government official from each sponsoring agency, and meeting regularly with the Principal, Bursar and Dean of Educational Services.

As one of his first priorities, Goble initiated a strategic planning process. Surveys were conducted of staff, students, Board members, the Executive Committee, and members of the Policy Advisory Committee. Key strategic issues to be addressed were identified in fourteen areas (Justice Institute, 1989):

1. Leadership in promoting the corporate identity of the Justice Institute.
2. Strengthening of the financial arrangements through long-term financial planning.
3. Development of a comprehensive marketing plan.
Clarification of the Justice Institute's policy and operational roles.

Increased integration of training programs and sharing of resources.

Establishing bases for program evaluation.

Establishing a Justice Institute site plan.

Review of the mission and goals statement.

Establishing a consistent organizational structure.

Increase in student involvement.

Building the Justice Institute's corporate image.

Striving to meet the needs of its client groups.

Obtaining funds to conduct applied research.

Pursuing new educational technologies.

The strategic plan could be seen as a blueprint for the Justice Institute. It represents the thoughts and comments of many of the Justice Institute's staff and many of its external stakeholders. For purposes of the present study, it marks the end of one period of the history of the Justice Institute organization represented by a little more than a decade, as well as the beginning of a new decade.

Summary

In spite of early optimism in the new endeavour toward integrated training in the field of justice and public safety, a number of problems emerged. A strategic planning process revealed apparently unresolved questions about the organization, its mission in relation to client groups and other matters. The provincial government commissioned a major study on the Justice Institute, but the report writers, from both the Ministries of Attorney-General and Education,
were unable to come to agreement as to their recommendations on the future of the Justice Institute.

Although the Justice Institute clearly had a successful performance record, the Ministry of Education withdrew funding in 1984 during a period of intense fiscal restraint. The Ministry of Attorney-General assumed responsibility for the Justice Institute and its funding. Later that same year, Treasury Board requested another study into the Justice Institute. The study found that the present model was the best of four studied. In spite of continued uncertainty as to the Justice Institute's future, the organization continued to increase productivity and efficiency in working toward the achievement of the Institute's mission and goals.

A marketing survey conducted in 1986 pointed out a number of organizational issues that needed to be addressed before the Justice Institute could embark on a cross-Academy initiative. In particular, the issue of individual Academy identity versus corporate identity was identified as an area for further work. In 1989, a strategic planning process was completed, addressing a number of significant issues facing the Justice Institute in the past and requiring attention as the organization was to head into the 1990s. The organization grew out of strong roots, and has survived twelve years of both good and bad times. It has a solid record of performance and innovation, as well as increasing efficiency. New initiatives are under way in integrated training as well as links with other institutions. The question then arises, why has the Justice Institute faced such adversity in the past? And why do many of the questions raised in the past continue to surface in the present? The following chapter will revisit the Justice Institute case study, with the purpose of identifying underlying issues that emerge in the study of the organization's history.
Chapter 4

EMERGENT ISSUES

Chapter 1 proposed the possible existence of basic issues confronting the Justice Institute. The discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 identified and described the birth and growth of the Justice Institute, providing a context for an examination of the emergent issues. The first research question is, What are the basic organizational dilemmas that underlie the problems that emerge in the case study of the Justice Institute? Two recurring dilemmas emerge which appear to underlie the issues that have surfaced during the existence of the Justice Institute. This chapter discusses these two key issues: jurisdiction and internal structure.

Jurisdiction

The earliest roots of the Justice Institute grew out of a perceived need to improve the system of justice administration in British Columbia. As identified by the Bar Association, the system, consisting of courts, correctional, police and related personnel and agencies, suffered from inefficiencies and fragmentation, caused largely by a lack of comprehensive system planning and cross-component communication. The Justice Development Commission was established by the Administration of Justice Act to initiate a "total system" (Justice Development Commission Training Task Force, 1974:3) approach to coordination of, and training for, personnel working in the system. The issues to be addressed were mainly administrative in nature, as opposed to dealing with the substance of the law.

The establishment of a Justice Training Centre was seen as one possible solution to
the fragmentation and inefficiency of the system as it was. Personnel from the various services would be trained in a common facility, and thus have opportunity to interact and participate in common core programs of an interdisciplinary nature. Although the facility would "broker" a number of courses throughout the colleges and institutes of the province, it would be operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Attorney-General and directly serve the needs of ministry and related personnel. The need for a formal link with the Ministry of Education was confirmed by the establishment of a Senior Policy Committee consisting of the Deputy Ministers of the two ministries. Thus it was evident at a very early stage that a multiple agency training endeavour would require a structural means to address jurisdictional issues between the two ministries.

In a parallel development, the Ministry of Education was in the process of developing new legislation to establish colleges and institutes as independent, board-governed organizations. When the Justice Institute was formed as an Institute under the new Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act, fundamental changes took place in the original concept of the Justice Training Centre. Control of the organization was now vested in the hands of a Board of Directors jointly appointed by the Ministries of Education and Attorney-General. The Justice Institute as a whole existed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education; yet its purpose was to serve the training needs of the Ministry of Attorney General.

A large portion of the training requirements of the Ministry of Attorney-General was directly or indirectly mandated by legislation. Further, in some instances--i.e., courts and corrections--the training divisions were directly connected to policy and manpower planning within the Ministry of Attorney-General. For these reasons, as well as for reasons of practicality, it was not seen as feasible to meet all the ministry's training needs through the
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general post secondary system. When the Justice Institute was formed, however, the entire organization by legislation was directly connected to the Ministry of Education; the connection to the Ministry of Attorney-General was indirect.

This problematic situation was well recognized from the earliest days of the organization's establishment. Various methods were found to address it, and were based mainly on the establishment of myriad committees and consultative processes to ensure the needs of both ministries were met. The Principal and Academy Directors found it necessary to maintain a delicate balance between serving client groups within the Ministry of Attorney-General and the Ministry of Education.

The Stonecrest study (1980) pointed out significant problems with the structure, particularly in relation to jurisdictional issues. The authors cited concerns in the Ministry of Attorney-General in relation to potential loss of control of the training aspects, including manpower planning and policy issues, that statutorily and administratively fell under the Ministry's jurisdiction. The study identified the unclear relationship among the two ministries and the Justice Institute, and recommended that clear agreements be established to clarify this situation.

This and other studies initiated to examine the Justice Institute model were unable to recommend a better solution in the resolution of jurisdictional issues. The Inter-Ministerial study team (1983) examined several alternatives. Dispersal of the Institute function throughout the post secondary system, centralization of training in an Attorney-General-run training centre, or dispersal of the function among the individual branches--were found to be seriously flawed. Dispersal throughout the post secondary system would only exacerbate the problem of control:
instead of one organization, the Attorney-General Ministry under this model would have to deal with many. Centralization of training within the Ministry of Attorney-General, either in one section or distributed among the Branches, would reduce training flexibility and general educational components, and in effect would cause a reversion to the problems experienced in the early 1970s that the Justice Institute was originally intended to redress. Cooperation and cross-fertilization would be replaced by internal jurisdictional problems. The image of the Justice Institute as an organization providing independent, integrated training would be lost, and in all likelihood duplication of services within the ministry would increase. In essence, many of the advantages originally envisioned in the concept of the Justice Training Centre would be forfeited.

Therefore jurisdiction remained a perplexing issue. For instance, when the court and corrections staff were located at the Justice Institute, a tug-of-war ensued between the parent branches in the Ministry of Attorney-General and the Board and administration. Whose employees were these? If they were on the ministry payroll, and their training budget flowed directly from the ministry to the Academies, how could the Justice Institute oversee their training endeavors? This ambiguity was even more clearly illustrated when, in the interests of the Justice Institute as a whole, the Principal intervened directly in the affairs of the Fire Academy, something which by both legislation and administrative prerogative he was entitled to do. The political fallout was extensive, and called into question the very basic issue of how the Justice Institute was to manage its affairs.

Even as the Institute reverted to the direct control of the Ministry of Attorney-General in 1984, the existence of the Board of Directors in effect kept the Justice Institute at arm's length from the ministry. The Institute was returned to the Ministry of Advanced
Education and Job Training in 1989. Throughout these changes, the issue of reporting relationships and jurisdictions remained.

The question of jurisdiction was particularly manifest in the lack of consensus on the Justice Institute's broader goals in training and education. The official mandate of the Justice Institute was spelled out in the Order-in-Council that established the Institute. The Justice Institute was to provide training the identified needs of, but not limited to, police, corrections, courts and sheriffs. Further aspects of the mandate included educational and training needs for all components of the justice system, including fire services; development of a cooperative system of coordination with other institutes, colleges, universities, schools and community-based organizations; and provision of a provincial forum for discussion and examination of justice and socially related issues.

The early concept of the Justice Training Centre envisioned a brokerage concept, involving (a) coordination of educational needs with the province's existing adult education institutions, and (b) specialized training unique to the various services to be provided directly by the Centre (Justice Development Commission Training Task Force, 1974).

The training and education mandate was elaborated in various mission and goal statements and encapsulated by the Justice Institute into four roles: (1) the training role in justice and public safety; (2) the educational role in justice and public safety; (3) the service role in justice and public safety; and (4) the leadership and advisory role in justice and public safety (Justice Institute, 1982[a]).

The training role was perhaps seemingly the most straightforward. Members of the
various services and agencies in justice and public safety would attend the Justice Institute to obtain training in their respective areas. However, several significant questions remained unanswered. Was this training intended to be funded strictly by the provincial government? Or should the municipal employers—as in the case of fire and police training—fund a portion of or, for that matter, all the costs of the training? Was the training intended to be post-employment only? Or did the Justice Institute have a role in providing pre-employment training funded by the provincial government, by tuition fees on a cost-recovery basis, or by a combination of the two? Who would foot the bill for capital costs of specialized training facilities such as an indoor firearms range or a live burn fire training facility?

These questions are particularly germane in the context of current trends in the national, provincial and local political system in Canada, including increased transfer of educational costs to the provincial governments by means of reduced transfer payments; increased shifting of costs from the provincial to the local levels; increased chargebacks for government services on a user-pay system; and privatization of functions formerly provided by governments. In this broad context, the issue of who pays for what has been and will continue to be a political football with no clear answers on the horizon. There are very few certainties left in public sector funding arrangements.

The educational role was even less readily defined. For one thing, what in fact was the perceived difference between training and education? The Stonecrest report (1978) indicated that education was to provide courses that extended beyond the basic competencies required in training for adequate job performance by client sponsors. Education would include courses requiring more critical thinking and analysis than that required in job training programs. There was no question as to the need for educational advancement in the ranks of the justice and
public safety services. Front-line staff in police, fire, courts, corrections and other areas required increasing abilities and knowledge in human relations including psychology, sociology and criminology, as well as advanced skills in analysis, problem solving, management and leadership as they advanced up the career ladder.

Potential was seen for the educational role to work in conjunction with other college and institute programs and involve a fair degree of program complementarity and credit transferability (Kilcup, 1983). Again the question of costs arose. Was not education the responsibility of the Ministry of Education rather than the Attorney-General? Who would decide what was training and what was education? Should the Justice Institute provide education as well as training? Or should it provide specialized technical training in the client-required skills and leave the rest to the general college and institute system? Particularly in view of open learning trends in the province, in which the Justice Institute has participated extensively, could the Justice Institute offer a contribution to the educational system as a whole?

The service role in justice and public safety presented yet more questions. To whom should the Justice Institute provide services such as library and audiovisual support; facilities for community and client group use; program development; psychological and physical education services, and the like? Should the services be funded by fee-for-service, pro-rated to each Academy, or included as part of the core infrastructure budget?

Finally, in its leadership and advisory role, the Justice Institute has a great deal of expertise to offer the justice and public safety community. However, particularly in the municipal services such as police and fire, the system is largely made up of special interest groups ranging from unions, regional interests (e.g. the Greater Vancouver Regional District; the
Vancouver Island Volunteer Fire Fighters' Association) and industry to national and international standards-setting and accrediting associations (e.g. National Fire Protection Association; Canadian Association of Police Chiefs; Canadian Medical Association). Whom does the Justice Institute represent and serve in its leadership and advisory role? How free in reality is the Justice Institute to take a leadership role in view of its close ties with its client sponsors as well as its need to address the many pressures, claims and demands from special-interest groups?

Although the Justice Institute has often requested clarification of its various roles and responsibilities, they remained ambiguous and ill-defined. In the 1989 Justice Institute Strategic Plan, strategic issues were addressed in the areas of the Justice Institute's policy and operational roles, mission and goals, pursuit of applied research funds, the requirement to meet the needs of client groups and to establish clearer contractual and financial relationships with the various clients groups and ministries. The Plan further identified the need for increased communication and contact with client sponsor representatives, not only on an Academy-client basis, but also on an Institute-client basis. Thus the Justice Institute explicitly identified a proactive approach to clarifying its roles.

Internal Organization

From its earliest beginnings, the concept of the Justice Training Centre involved an organization whose identity would be more than the sum of its parts. The Centre would rise beyond the individual functions and interests of the components of the justice administration system to represent a holistic, integrated and planned approach to training. Parochialism within training branches would be replaced by cooperation and cross-communication. Administration of justice would have a new face in British Columbia.
Implementation of the concept was not as straightforward as it originally might have appeared. The Justice Institute was set up as an integral organization at one location. Yet although all funding flowed through the central Finance and Administration Division, the moneys were earmarked by the client sponsor for each Academy. In effect each Academy continued to be funded directly by its client sponsor rather than by a central body through the Justice Institute corporation. Only the Finance and Administration and Educational Services Divisions were directly funded by the parent ministry (which shifted over a period of years from Education to Attorney-General to Solicitor-General and then back to Education).

Although the Educational Services Division was intended, among other things, to promote the integration of training and to provide a common core of programming support to the Justice Institute, individual Academies largely went their own way in deciding how they would develop and deliver programs. Further, because each Academy was funded through its client sponsor, the parent ministry would tend to avoid supporting a central division since training budgets were already supplied to Academies. Conversely, no client sponsor was ready to relinquish direct control of its training budget to a central Division, preferring to keep the funds in the control of the contracted Academy instead. Thus the central divisions were underfunded and unable to provide the strong infrastructure that was to form a vital part of the Justice Institute core. In addition, the Academies had divided lines of accountability, toward their client sponsor on the one hand and toward the Justice Institute Principal and Board on the other. Although the Principal and Board were legally empowered to manage the affairs of the Justice Institute and by extension the Academies, spending control in effect stayed largely in the hands of the Academy Directors and client sponsors.
Integration of training was intended to be a central aspect of the Justice Institute identity. With each Academy to a significant extent free to pursue its own destiny, there was limited incentive and even less coercive power within the Justice Institute to achieve integrated training. There is little evidence that integrated training was actively resisted, although a degree of territorialism within the various uniformed services was noted in the studies. Particularly in the uniformed services, there is a strong degree of pride and tradition that can present an obstacle to the integration of training. However, in the face of budgetary limitations and the immediate, pressing goal of providing training to meet the direct needs of the client sponsor, there was no strong incentive on the part of Academies to take initiatives in this area. Under such circumstances building a strong corporate structure and identity based on the concept of integrated training would prove to be an uphill battle.

From the earliest days of the organization, internal organization was a problem. How could the Board and Principal manage an organization when a number of key administrative staff were on the direct payroll of an external organization, as in the case of Courts and Corrections personnel? The Stonecrest report (1980) recommendations included direct employment of all staff by the Justice Institute, which eventually did occur. However, the recommendation that the Justice Institute adopt an integrated management structure was rejected by the Board and Principal as an unnecessary layer in the hierarchy. Thus the administrative structure was based on an Executive Committee consisting of the Directors of each Academy.

This structure appeared to work reasonably well for the Justice Institute in that, at minimum, the organization was strong enough to survive several powerful challenges to its existence. However, both the Touche Ross report (1986) and the 1989 Strategic Plan noted the need for action in the area of corporate identity, including overall building and promotion of a
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corporate identity, development of a comprehensive marketing plan, increased integration of
training programs and sharing of resources, and establishing a consistent organizational
structure. Clearly, corporate identity was an issue that existed throughout the history of the
Justice Institute and would continue to be a challenge in the future.

Summary

Two main issues emerge in the study of the history of the Justice Institute: jurisdiction and internal organization. Each of these issues is linked with the other and appears to have been integral to the Justice Institute from its earliest days. In the threads described in Chapter 2 which became intertwined to form the Justice Institute fabric, as well as in the growth of the organization, several jurisdictions became involved in the concept. In fact, the inter-jurisdictional issue was a fundamental issue in the earliest concept of a Justice Training Centre. The issue of internal organization existed from the beginning of the establishment of the Justice Institute, and was rooted in events before this time.

The nature of these dilemmas appears to be rooted in the internal structure of the Justice Institute and its relation to the external jurisdictions under which it operates. Therefore, the examination of the emergent issues needs to take into account three factors: the characteristics of an organization's environment, the manner in which organizations are structured, and the relation between an organization's environment and its structure. Of the four conceptual frameworks presented by Bolman and Deal, the "structural" approach appears to present the most promising avenue for analysis of these relationships. Therefore the next chapter examines these issues through a structural frame.
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE INSTITUTE STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS

Each of the previous studies of the Justice Institute focused largely on structural relationships and agreements among government ministries, various government branches, the Justice Institute and its internal divisions. Therefore, the present chapter outlines a conceptual framework or structural approach to describing organizations that forms the basis for the further analysis of the emergent issues in Chapter 6.

The conceptual framework is taken from Henry Mintzberg's *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations* (1983). The book is part of a series in progress on aspects of management policy based on volumes on managerial work, organizational structure, and organizational power. The *Structure in Fives* volume is an integrative study of the field of organizational structure and provides a coherent conceptual framework for the analysis of structural matters.

*Structure in Fives* is a refinement of Mintzberg's earlier volume, *The Structuring of Organizations* (1979), which was based on a "substantial underpinning of empirical research, with which Henry Mintzberg is most highly conversant" (Grinyer, 1984:152). The use of empirical research is particularly appropriate for a case study, in that grounded theory is a basic element of such an approach (Borg and Gall, 1989). Grinyer finds that Mintzberg's structural approach "makes a useful contribution by reporting a number of the key results of research on the structure of organizations...synthesizing them into a coherent and intuitively reasonable pattern" (1984:152). Berniker (1984) similarly finds that *Structure in Fives* "succeeds in synthesizing a
framework with which to understand organizational structure and in developing a terminology to communicate its synthesis. Blake and Mouton (1982) agree that synthesizing "the results of more than two hundred empirical studies, and correlating them with the operating requirement of particular situations certainly is a useful contribution" (1982:9).

The first issue to be addressed is, naturally, What is meant by the structure of an organization? Mintzberg notes that organized human activity involves two basic requirements: the division of labour into tasks and the coordination of these tasks. Therefore:

The structure of an organization can be defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which its labour is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks.

(Mintzberg, 1983:2)

Mintzberg's study covers four general areas, dealing with (1) basic or foundational concepts of organizational design; (2) a set of four design parameters; (3) methods of fitting designs to situations; and (4) a synthesis of the preceding concepts into a set of five basic organizational configurations, along with suggestions for a possible sixth configuration. A description of each of these areas follows.

**Foundational Concepts of Organization Design**

Mintzberg begins with three sets of foundational concepts. The first is that of coordinating mechanisms. Although division of labour is a fairly straightforward matter, determined mainly by the nature of the task and the means available to accomplish it, coordinating mechanisms are somewhat more complex. Mintzberg describes five coordinating mechanisms: (1) mutual adjustment, involving mainly informal communication; (2) direct supervision, characterized by one person instructing and directing others on the task to be done;
(3) standardization of work processes, whereby those doing the work follow established procedures to accomplish the required tasks; (4) standardized outputs, involving producing a product or service to an established set of specifications; and (5) standardization of skills and knowledge, which occurs when those doing the work have been trained to perform in a prescribed manner and little further coordination of their labour is required. In general, the more complex the work becomes, the more coordinating mechanisms move from the first coordinating mechanism to the second, third, fourth, fifth and, finally, back to the first. Most organizations use a mix of coordinating mechanisms in their operation.

In addition to coordinating mechanisms, Mintzberg discusses five parts of the organization as a foundational concept in the study of an organization's structure. (1) The operating core consists of those who do the primary work of the organization. They are the front-line producers of the organization's products and services. (2) At the opposite end of the organization, the strategic apex is composed of people who have overall responsibility for the organization:

The strategic apex is charged with ensuring that the organization serve its mission in an effective way, and also that it serve the needs of those who control or otherwise have power over the organization (such as its owners, government agencies, unions of the employees, pressure groups).

(Mintzberg, 1983:13)

Three main duties of the strategic apex are to provide direct supervision to ensure the work of the organization gets done, to manage the organization's boundary conditions or relation to its environment, and to develop the organization's strategy. The strategic apex usually coordinates its own internal workings by means of mutual adjustment (informal communication). (3) The middle line is located between the strategic apex and the operating core. This component is usually known as middle management, and works within the flow of information and decisions between the strategic apex and the operating core, translating some into direct supervision and
formulating strategy within the smaller context of a defined unit in the organization. Boundary management also takes place at this level, but on a smaller scale than at the strategic apex. (4) The technostructure comprises those who "serve the organization by affecting the work of others" (1983:15). This involves mainly those who design various forms of standardization in the organization, such as planners, quality control engineers, production schedulers, accountants, and trainers. The technostructure may operate at any or every level of the organization. These analysts operate among themselves mainly by means of mutual adjustment and, because they are usually highly trained professionals, standardized skills. (5) Finally the support staff provide support to the organization outside of its operating flow. They are distinct from the technostructure in that they are not primarily responsible for standardization. This part of the organization may include lawyers, personnel officers, receptionists and various other types of staff.

The third foundational concept is that of five organizational functions. These are (1) the flow of formal authority in an organization (usually as depicted on the organization chart or "organigram"); (2) the flow of regulated activity, which involves the standardized network of processes and information systems with the primary function of regulating the operating core; (3) the flow of informal communication, more or less the social system of the organization mainly effecting coordination by mutual adjustment; (4) the system of work constellations, the work groups working in general among peers in various levels of the organization; and (5) the system of ad hoc decision processes, comprising any and all discretionary decisions made at all levels of the organization.

These three concepts—coordinating mechanisms, parts of the organization and organizational functions—represent the cornerstones of the structure of an organization. Next,
Mintzberg discusses design parameters, the controls that can be used to effect the division of labour and the coordination of tasks.

**Design Parameters**

Four design parameters are discussed in relation to the methods whereby the organization is enabled to function. The parameters are individual positions; the grouping of individual positions, or superstructure; the linkages among groups in the superstructure; and centralization and decentralization.

The issue of individual positions involves three concepts. The first is job specialization on both the vertical and horizontal levels—horizontal involving the division of labour for increased efficiency, and vertical involving the division between administration and operation. Specialization increases efficiency but can cause problems of communication and coordination. These problems are caused because workers are involved in one small aspect of the operation and therefore have a minimum of information about the operation, and morale and motivation can decline because of a sense of alienation and purposelessness.

The second concept is behaviour formalization, which can take place by means of the position description, the work flow, and rules and regulations. The purpose of formalizing behaviour is to "reduce its variability, ultimately to predict and control it" (1983:34). The extent to which an organization formalizes behaviour is a measure of the extent to which it represents a bureaucracy. The extreme opposite of a highly formalized or bureaucratic organization is the organic organization, characterized mainly by mutual adjustment or direct supervision. Mintzberg cites a study which found that "rules and central authority could not
regulate quite everything. A few areas of uncertainty had to remain, and it was around these that informal power relationships developed. People who could deal with uncertainties achieved great influence" (1983:37). As might be suspected, more bureaucratization occurs at the operating core of the organization than at the strategic apex, where the work is generally highly organic. Formalized behaviour may be appropriate for simple and repetitive tasks, but is not conducive to innovation and flexibility.

The third concept in the design of individual positions involves training and indoctrination. Training involves complex and rationalized work generally known as professional. Training requires an extensive period of learning--often off site at a college or university, followed by an on-the-job supervised training period or apprenticeship. Indoctrination, on the other hand, "is the label used for the design parameter by which the organization formally socializes its members for its own benefit" (1983:41). A certain amount of indoctrination may occur during the training, as in law or medical school. A great deal of training is not required at the middle line and strategic apex; however, indoctrination is usually achieved by the organization by various means including job rotation. Training is therefore not considered a major design parameter at the managerial level, but is critical at the technocratic level and among the support staff and, of course, in the operating core. In general, it can be said that formalization of behaviour is more appropriate for unskilled work, and training for skilled work. One implication for the organization or component that relies on professionals is that:

...the professional organization surrenders a good deal of control over its choice of workers as well as their methods of work to the outside institutions that train and certify them and thereafter set standards that guide them in the conduct of their work. With control passes allegiance; professionals tend to identify more with their profession than with the organization wherein they happen to practice it.

(1983:44)
Thus the first design parameter, individual positions, has implications for the extent to which work is divided and controlled by means of specialization, formalization of behaviour, and training and indoctrination.

The second design parameter, the superstructure, concerns grouping individual positions into units and determining the size of each group. Grouping is described as a fundamental means to coordinate work in the organization, and can proceed either from the top down, when the mission and goals of the organization change, or from the bottom up, when technical changes originate in the operating core. Grouping is described as one of the more powerful design parameters, and can be manipulated for various effects. For example, grouping establishes a system of formal authority and direct supervision by means of a structured hierarchy in the organization; it requires group members to work together and share resources; it creates common measures of performance in that the group’s performance can be measured as a whole; and it encourages mutual adjustment in that groups tend to establish internal systems of informal communication. Thus:

...grouping can stimulate to an important degree two important coordinating mechanisms—direct supervision and mutual adjustment—and can form the basis for a third—standardization of outputs—by providing common measures of performance....A prime characteristic of the two other coordinating mechanisms—standardization of work processes and of skills—is that they provide for the automatic coordination of the work of individuals; as a result, they can be used independently of the ways in which positions are grouped.

(1983:47)

The problem with grouping is that it creates problems of coordination among units:

The result...is that each unit develops a propensity to focus ever more narrowly on its own problems while separating itself ever more sharply from the problems of the rest of the organization. Unit grouping encourages intragroup coordination at the expense of intergroup coordination.

(1983:47)

This problem can also be used to the advantage of the organization in a given
situation; that is, where each unit needs to address specific problems unique to it, or where pockets of innovation are encouraged in an otherwise bureaucratic structure.

Grouping is structured by a variety of criteria, including knowledge and skill; work processes and functions; output; client; and place. Because several of these criteria can come into play at various times, Mintzberg clusters the bases for grouping into two basic types: market grouping, comprising output, client and place; and functional grouping, comprising knowledge and skills, processes and functions.

Functional grouping has the advantage of improved efficiency and specialization, but the disadvantage of narrowness of scope and understanding of the goals of the unit and the organization. In response, functional grouping tends to be characterized by increased bureaucratization in order to maintain quality of output and accountability: "In seeking...to rationalize their structures, such bureaucracies prefer to group according to the work processes used and then to coordinate by the formalization of work, involving the proliferation of rules. This way, on paper at least, all relationships are rationalized and coherent" (1983:60).

Market-based groupings are relatively self-contained units. They perform all the important required functions of the work to be done, drawing resources from and returning profits to the common structure. The disadvantage is less process specialization, and an inability to build a strong core of professionals within the organization. It is also more wasteful of resources in that duplication of personnel and equipment tends to occur. The advantage is a strong identification with the needs of the client:

...because each [market-based group] unit performs all the functions for a given set of products, services, clients, or places, it tends to identify directly with them, and so its performance can easily be measured in those terms. Markets, not processes, get the employees' undivided attention. And, of course, with the necessary mutual
adjustment and direct supervision contained right inside the unit, the organization need rely less on formalization for coordination, and so tends to emerge as less bureaucratic.

(1983:60)

The third design parameter is linkages among groups that constitute the superstructure. Linkages in this sense are lateral rather than vertical, and comprise "planning and control systems that standardize outputs, and liaison devices that grease the wheels of mutual adjustment" (1983:73).

Planning and control systems can apply to outputs, which type Mintzberg terms performance control, and work processes or activities, termed action planning. Performance control sets objectives, budgets, operating plans and other standards for monitoring and measuring outputs and performance over a given time period. Performance control systems occur mainly in market-based groupings:

...the major concern is that the unit perform adequately, that it make an appropriate contribution to the central organization without squandering its resources. In other words, because there is little interdependence between units, coordination requires the regulation of performance, not actions. And this is facilitated in the market-based structure by the fact that each unit has its own distinct outputs. Thus, its overall behaviour is regulated by performance controls; otherwise, it is left alone to do its own action planning.

(1983:75)

Action planning occurs mainly in functionally based groups. Because such groupings are specialized rather than generalized in their functions, it is difficult to assign distinct organizational goals to these units. Action planning is a counterpart to behaviour formalization, since it deals more with nonroutine activities than with the regular work processes. It focuses on changes and improvements, as opposed to the routine processes regulated by routinization of behaviour.
Performance control systems are based on overall objectives which are established at the strategic apex. These are broken down into sub-objectives, budgets and other standards. To some extent the systems develop in two directions; one from the top down, and one from the bottom up. The action planning system, on the other hand, is essentially top down, beginning with strategic planning and ending in detailed schedules and operating specifications.

In addition to planning and control systems, liaison devices are required where mutual adjustment is required as a means of coordination within and among work groups: "When a considerable amount of contact is necessary to coordinate the work of two units, a 'liaison' position may be established formally to route the communication directly, bypassing the vertical channels" (1983:82). Although the liaison position does not have formal power within the organization, it becomes a communication centre and therefore becomes important in the organization. Other liaison devices are task forces and standing committees; integrating managers, who control certain aspects within units across several units; and matrix structures. Liaison devices can encourage informal communication in bureaucratic organizations, but are tools primarily of organic structures:

They are flexible mechanisms to encourage loose, informal relationships. No doubt the milder liaison devices--liaison positions, task forces, and standing committees...are sometimes superimposed on bureaucratic structures to reduce their inflexibility in places. But the use of the stronger liaison devices--integrating managers and matrix structure--so upset the traditional patterns of formalized behaviour that the resulting structure can no longer be thought of as bureaucratic. The liaison devices are generally used where work is, at the same time, (1) horizontally specialized, (2) complex, and (3) highly interdependent.

(1983:93)

Together, planning and control systems and liaison devices are powerful tools in the design of an organization, providing a means for control and goal-achievement alongside the formal superstructure.
The fourth and final design parameter discussed has to do with centralization and decentralization. Centralization is defined as a situation whereby power for decision making is centred in one point in the organization; decentralization, conversely, is characterized by dispersal of decision-making power throughout the organization. There is no absolute centralization or decentralization; rather, they exist in varying degrees on a continuum.

There are several main reasons for some degree of decentralization in an organization. For one thing, it is difficult for one or a small core of persons at the strategic apex of the organization to obtain the necessary information to make all the decisions. For another, decentralization permits the organization to adjust quickly to local conditions. Finally, a certain amount of decision making power at the lower levels of the organization is a motivating factor for employees.

Decentralization can be vertical, down the chain of authority; or horizontal, across the middle line, technostructure and support staff. It can also be selective, at various places both vertically and horizontally in the organization; and in parallel, centered in middle line division managers. In reality, organizations tend to fall under one of five categories of decentralization based on a blend of vertical, horizontal, selective and parallel decentralization. Mintzberg presents five typical models of decentralization: type A, vertical and horizontal, whereby "The chief executive retains both formal and informal power" (1983:114) and coordination is achieved by direct supervision; type B, limited horizontal decentralization (selective), occurring mainly in a bureaucratized, unskilled work place wherein analysts formalize behaviour by standardizing work processes; type C, limited vertical decentralization, whereby the organization is divisionalized into market units, usually controlled by standardization of outputs; type D, selective vertical and horizontal decentralization, whereby decision making power is
distributed in various places throughout the organization and coordinated by mutual adjustment; and type E, vertical and horizontal decentralization, whereby the organization is controlled mainly by trained and skilled professionals who learned their skills outside the work place in a training institution.

In discussing the design parameter of centralization and decentralization, Mintzberg notes:

...it should be evident by now that all this logic--beginning with the mission, determining the positions, their specialization, formalization, and requirements for training and indoctrination, then grouping the positions to build the superstructure, after that determining the distribution of decisional power within it, and finally fleshing the whole thing out with lateral linkages--has little to do with the practice of organizational design. The relationships among the design parameters are clearly reciprocal, not sequential. The design parameters form an integrated system in which each is linked to all the others: change any one and all the others must be changed as well.

(1983:95)

Thus it is necessary to observe the relation between the main design parameters outlined in the preceding discussion: individual positions, the superstructure, the linkages, and centralization and decentralization. Mintzberg next describes contingency factors that tend to impact on selection of an appropriate mix of design parameters.

Relation between Organizational Design and Environment

What is the relation, if any, between structure and performance of an organization? Mintzberg notes two key hypotheses that have emerged from recent research in organizational effectiveness: (1) the "congruence" hypothesis, whereby "effective structuring requires a close fit between the situational factors and the design parameters" (1983:122); and (2) the "configuration" hypothesis, whereby "effective structuring requires an internal consistency among the design
parameters" (1983:122). Because to some extent an organization can influence both design parameters and its external situation or environment, Mintzberg offers a third hypothesis, in effect an extension of the first two: the "extension" hypothesis, whereby "effective structuring requires a consistency among the design parameters and contingency factors" (1983:136).

In addition to intrinsic organizational factors, the organizational situation or environment warrants further consideration. Key dimensions of the organization's environment are stability (or predictability), complexity (characterized by the degree to which environmental demands are non-rationalizable); market diversity (integrated to diversified) and hostility.

The significance of the environment lies in the organization's ability to respond to it. Five hypotheses are proposed concerning the relation between the environment and the organization: (a) "The more dynamic the environment, the more organic the structure" (1983:137); (b) "The more complex the environment, the more decentralized the structure" (1983:138); (c) "The more diversified the organization's markets, the greater the propensity for it to split into market-based units (given favorable economies of scale)" (1983:140); (d) "Extreme hostility in its environment drives any organization to centralize its structure temporarily (1983:141); and (e) "Disparities in the environment encourage the organization to decentralize selectively to differentiated work constellations" (1983:142).

Throughout his study, Mintzberg has presented a large number of organizational design variables. In viewing the relation between environment and the organization, however, he observes that it generally takes place in a limited number of configurations, or permutations of designs and environments. Thus he presents the concept of configurations.
Organizational Configurations

Coordinating mechanisms, design parameters and environment fall into what Mintzberg terms "clusters" (1983:151). In addition to the "congruence" hypothesis discussed earlier, then, the "configuration" hypothesis comes into play. Configurations are caused by a set of five "pulls" on an organization. (1) The strategic apex pulls toward centralization, toward a configuration that is called "simple structure." (2) The technostructure pulls in the direction of standardization, leading to a "machine bureaucracy." (3) The operating core exerts a pull toward horizontal and vertical decentralization, resulting in a "professional bureaucracy." (4) The middle line managers tend to pull toward divisionalization or balkanization, leading to the "divisionalized form." (5) When the support staff pulls for collaboration in a selectively decentralized organization characterized by work constellations, mutual adjustment predominates and leads to the "adhocracy" configuration.

The simple structure is characterized by direct supervision emanating from a strong strategic apex. Little if any control is exerted by the technostructure or the support staff. This configuration is most common with small, young organizations in a simple, dynamic environment. There is little formalization of behaviour, and decisions tend to be made centrally, usually by one person at the head of the organization. Because such an organization is able to respond quickly to changes in technology or environmental conditions, the structure is described as "lean, flexible, and organic" (1983:161). The simple structure can vary from being autocratic and highly restrictive to exciting and innovative, depending largely on the nature of the person at the helm. Examples of this could include a small manufacturing firm, an aggressive entrepreneurship or a new government department.
The machine bureaucracy is coordinated primarily through standardization of work processes by the technostructure. Behaviour is formalized in the operating core, communication is formalized, and tasks are grouped on a functional basis. This configuration can be described as "bureaucratic," with many rules and regulations and a clearly defined flow of authority through a formally structured chain of authority. There is a strong element of control throughout the organization, with the goal of reducing or eliminating uncertainty or disturbances. Power tends to reside in the strategic apex, but is also shared with the technostructure, the analysts who devise processes and rules in order to standardize and regulate the work that is done by the operating core. This configuration occurs mainly in simple and stable environments, where large amounts of consistent and predictable products and services are required. The operating core is generally marked by discontent in that the work performed is routine, with very little if any allowance for creativity or individual decision making. This type of organization is generally inflexible, designed for a limited purpose; however, "As long as we demand standardized, inexpensive goods and services, and as long as people remain more efficient than automated machines at providing them--and remain willing to do so--the machine bureaucracy, with all its problems, will remain with us" (1983:187). Examples of this type of organization can include a national post office, an airline or a giant automobile company.

The professional bureaucracy exhibits a highly trained and skilled professional operating core. As in a hospital or university, coordination is achieved by standardization of skills resulting in the output of standardized products and services. The operating core works in a relatively independent manner and exerts a great deal of control over the way in which the work is done. As compared to a machine bureaucracy, in which rules and regulations generated by the technostructure proliferate to control work processes, in the professional bureaucracy the operating core is self-regulated by virtue of its training acquired outside the organization.
Work processes are too complex and sophisticated to be standardized by analysts in the superstructure. Further, the outputs produced by the professionals in the operating core are generally difficult to measure. This configuration is highly decentralized, both vertically and horizontally. Much of the power in this system exists in the operating core, which also tends to seek control of the administrative structure. At the same time, a certain amount of dependence is required on an administrative structure to manage the organization's boundaries and resolve trouble spots in the organization. The professional bureaucracy requires a stable and complex environment—stable in that it must exert a sufficiently consistent demand to enable the standardization of skills; complex in that a sophisticated set of skills is required to meet the demand. The professional bureaucracy exhibits both a democratized operating core and a great deal of autonomy, controlled mainly by professional standards. Problems can occur in the areas of coordination and innovation, in that the operating core may tend to focus on its self-interests above those of the organization. However, attempts to remedy such problems by increased direct supervision or control are met with great hostility, and are viewed as antithetical to professional autonomy and responsibility.

The divisionalized form features a prominent middle line in charge of a number of divisions based on market groupings. In fact, this configuration in its more extreme form can be viewed as a group of smaller organizations existing under the umbrella under one larger one. In addition to market groupings, other design parameters are performance control systems and limited vertical decentralization. The main coordinating mechanism is the standardization of outputs rather than processes or direct supervision. Divisions are largely in control of the operating decisions required to meet their market needs. Each of the divisions is virtually self-contained, incorporating its own middle line, technostructure, support staff and operating core and functioning as a "quasi-autonomous" entity. The managers of each division are "mini-
general managers' who run their own operations" (1983:218). Without some means of control at the strategic apex (headquarters), naturally, the divisions would spin off as completely independent organizations. The main means of control is the standardization of outputs. Thus the divisionalized form is more suited for the private sector where, in general, profit-oriented outputs are more quantifiable than in the public sector, whose social goals are much more difficult to measure:

So the choices facing the government—and unions, multiversities, and other federated institutions that try to use the divisionalized form in the face of nonquantifiable goals—are to forget control beyond the appointment of socialized managers, to control machine bureaucratically, or to force in divisionalized control by the imposition of artificial performance standards.

(1983:251)

There are six specific measures that can be used by headquarters to exert further control to ensure the goals of the organization as a whole are met: (1) control of the overall organizational product/market strategy and divisional structure; (2) allocation of overall financial resources; (3) implementation of performance control systems; (4) appointment and replacement of divisional managers; (5) monitoring to some extent of divisional behaviour; and (6) provision of certain common support services to the divisions. The main conditions leading to the divisionalized form are market diversity, and the feasibility of separating technical systems into segments within each division.

The adhocracy is a configuration coordinated by mutual adjustment and dominated by support staff (e.g. public relations, legal counsel, research and development, pricing, personnel). This configuration is exhibited mainly by organizations requiring sophisticated innovation, such as space agencies, avant-garde theatre companies, or a company designing sophisticated high-technology products. The adhocracy occurs in a complex, dynamic environment. The structure is highly organic, informal, with little formalization of behaviour, and reliance on liaison devices
to enhance communication and mutual adjustment. It strenuously tries to avoid bureaucracy, rules and regulations, preferring instead to remain flexible. Although the operating core, like that of the professional bureaucracy, consists of experts or professionals, there is less standardization of skills owing to the need for innovation as opposed to a fairly standard product or service. The organization is often characterized by a matrix structure, with a preponderance of managers be they in charge of functional, integrating or project management operations. There is no clear locus of control in the adhocracy. Control shifts from one manager, group or another from day to day depending on the issue at hand and who has the best answer. The top managers at the strategic apex spend much time resolving disputes, monitoring projects and liaising with the external environment. Because of the fluid structures and the lack of bureaucracy, the organization becomes highly politicized because of the internal competitiveness required to maintain support for individual projects. Conflict and aggressiveness are common in this configuration. The adhocracy is not good at performing routine functions, nor is it characterized by clear lines of communication and understanding. However, it can excel at innovation, but at a certain cost.

Mintzberg suggests the possibility of a sixth configuration, the missionary, characterized by standardization of norms. The main design parameter is indoctrination is indoctrination, and a key part of the organization is ideology. The members of this configuration are dedicated to, or inspired by, a sense of mission that permeates the organization. The required standardization of norms results in an unwritten bureaucracy that becomes rigid and nonadaptive. Examples are a kibbutz, volunteer organizations, sects and revolutionary organizations.
Change in Configurations

If configurations are viewed as pure types or ideal models, subject to pulls and seeking internal consistency among design parameters, "the organization is often driven toward one of the configurations in its search for harmony in its structure" (1983:288). An organization that is inappropriately configured for its environment or technology will be drawn in the direction of a new configuration. Thus emerges the hybrid, a configuration in a state of tension, largely dysfunctional until the transition is complete.

Although Mintzberg finds that a few hybrids can exist, he argues that organizations are in search of their ideal type, where design parameters are internally consistent, working in a harmonious whole, and fitted precisely to their environment.

The key concept from Mintzberg's structural approach employed in the analysis of the emergent issues is that of configurations, which includes key coordinating mechanisms, key part of the organization, major design parameters and situational factors. Next, the concept is used to analyze structural characteristics of the Justice Institute, the nature of the Justice Institute's environment, and the relation between the organization and the environment.
Chapter 6

ANALYSIS

The present chapter analyzes the case study of the Justice Institute presented in Chapters 2 and 3, as well as the emergent issues discussed in Chapter 4. The analysis is performed through the lens of the structural conceptual framework as outlined in Chapter 5. The purpose is to address the second research question posed in Chapter 1: What light can a conceptual model borrowed from the field of organization theory shed on the sources and possible resolutions of the organizational dilemmas?

The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section revisits the case study in order to determine which of Mintzberg's proposed configurations, if any, provides an accurate description of the Justice Institute organization. The second section analyzes and explains the emergent issues in the context of the configuration thus identified.

The Justice Institute Configuration

Mintzberg proposes five and possibly six organizational configurations: the simple structure, the machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy, the divisionalized form, the adhocracy, and, tentatively, the missionary configuration. Which of these configurations best describes the Justice Institute?

Before answering these questions, some caveats are necessary. If the Justice Institute is viewed in the context of Mintzberg's design parameters, and if it is assumed that
Mintzberg's framework provides a valid and consistent description of organizations, it should follow that a configuration should emerge to explain the Justice Institute. However, even if a configuration does emerge and appear to fit well with the description of the Justice Institute provided in the case study, such a fit does not necessarily confirm a causal relationship between the variables proposed by Mintzberg and the actual organization under discussion, in that other, independent variables may also be at work. Further, if one assumes that no two organizations are the same, that each organization exists in a different environment, and that the structural approach excludes many variables from consideration, it may prove difficult if not impossible to test the causal relationships in any conclusive way.

Three responses are proposed for the aforementioned questions. First, as stated earlier and confirmed by reviewers, Mintzberg's models are based on an extensive survey of empirical research, which fact increases the likelihood that they are reasonable descriptions of organizational design parameters in their representation of real-life organizations; in this context causality need not be proved in order to obtain valuable insights from the relationships observed. If Morgan's concept of organizational metaphors is taken into account, it is less important that causality be proven than that a theoretical framework assist the researcher and practitioner to obtain an enriched understanding of the dynamics of the organization. Second, Mintzberg's conceptual framework will itself be discussed as part of the conclusions and recommendations, and therefore is a part of the analysis. Finally, it needs to be recalled that the present study is a case study, a qualitative analysis involving holistic inquiry carried out in a natural setting. As was demonstrated in Chapter 1, inductive analyses and intuitive insights are among the generally accepted characteristics of qualitative research. Therefore, the nature of the methodology as well as of the study design must be considered in the analysis. In summary, if a configuration appears to provide a reasonably accurate description of the Justice
Institute, its value if any will lie in the extent to which it provides an enriched understanding of the emergent issues and of the research questions, and, to some extent, avenues for seeking new answers for some old problems.

Which Configuration?

In this section, Mintzberg's design considerations will be discussed in relation to the Justice Institute as described in the case study, with the objective of determining which, if any, design configuration will emerge to describe the organization. Each consideration is discussed in turn. To avoid unnecessary detail, the analysis focuses on the relation between Academies and the central Administration, rather than on internal Academy factors. Further, owing to the relatively small size of the Justice Institute and the consequent difficulty of drawing valid generalizations, functioning and flow of work processes are not discussed. Rather, the analysis focuses on major design parameters and situational factors.

Key Coordinating Mechanism. The primary coordinating mechanism is the unit known as Student Training Days (STDs). Taken one step further, the primary measure of efficiency of each component is the STD cost expressed as a ratio. Assuming that each client agency is satisfied with the quality of student that emerges from an Academy course—which satisfaction is implicitly affirmed by continuation of a course, an Academy's funding or a Director's tenure—little further account will be taken by the Justice Institute strategic apex of the Academy's work processes or level of skills standardization (no mechanism is currently in place to assess either) at the operating core. Although different coordinating mechanisms may be used in different parts of the organization, the key mechanism, STDs, can be categorized as a standardization of outputs, consistent with the divisionalized form.
Key Part of Organization. As discussed in the case study of the Justice Institute, the Academy and Divisional Directors as an Executive Committee became the primary means for policy setting and strategic management of the Justice Institute. Although the Justice Institute Principal is located on organization charts at the strategic apex of the organization, and funding nominally flows through the central administrative offices, the Academies are funded by contract with client agencies and must satisfy them, as well as the President, for the training conducted and the moneys spent. Because of their strong link with client ministries, the Academy Directors are in fact engaged in organizational boundary management and serving "the needs of those who control or otherwise have power over the organization (such as its owners, government agencies,...[and] pressure groups)" (1983:13). These characteristics place the Directors directly between the middle line (division head) and the strategic apex (Executive Committee members). If the key part of the Justice Institute were the strategic apex personified in a Principal who exerted direct supervision over the organization, a simple structure would best describe this parameter. However, it has been shown throughout the case study that the Principal is expected by client agencies to be more a partner than a sole player in the relation between the Divisions and the various funding government ministries. Obviously an autocratic Principal would not be effective in this situation, owing to the fact that Divisional Directors are important factors in the organization's boundary management at the government interface. Thus the simple structure does not provide an adequate description of the most important part of the organization, and the divisionalized form emerges as the best description in specifying the senior level middle line as the most important part, provided that the senior middle line is viewed as blending with the strategic apex, i.e. the Executive Committee headed by the Principal and coordinated internally by mutual adjustment.
Design Parameters. There is some degree of vertical and horizontal job specialization, in that the support staff are classified by a subgroup of the British Columbia Government Employees Union, and instructional and administrative staff predominantly by the Fair Comparison method using the Hay points system. As can be seen in various organization charts, vertical specialization is characterized by the administrative structure both overall and in each division, with an administrative hierarchy of Principal, Directors, Deputy/Program Directors, Coordinators/Managers to Instructors. Instructors and to a lesser extent Program Coordinators/Managers form the operating core with generally minimal administrative responsibilities. Some degree of horizontal specialization is characterized by the broad range of duties assumed at the operating core, ranging from program planning, development, direct instruction and distance education design to video production and technical operations. This factor fits with the description of the divisionalized form.

Some training and indoctrination are required at the Divisional Director level, in that both educational administration expertise and operational background are generally required at this level. The training is neither fully on the job nor necessarily by extensive formal skills training outside the organization. Although there is no formal indoctrination, the Justice Institute mission and goals are manifest throughout the organization and form the spearhead of the strategic planning process, requiring some degree of socialization to the mission and goals. Further, those who came to the Justice Institute from a uniformed service will naturally retain a strong orientation to the social values of that service, in turn compatible with the Justice Institute's mission in the area of justice and public safety. In this respect the Justice Institute is consistent with the divisionalized form.

A much higher degree of formalization of behaviour exists within each Academy than
at the strategic apex or the senior middle line which, as an Executive Committee, coordinates by means of mutual adjustment or informal communication. With each Academy being a relatively self-contained unit, and each Director part of the key component of the organization (senior middle line/strategic apex), a fair degree of bureaucratization can be implemented internally in the execution of training plans. This characteristic is typical of the divisionalized form.

In terms of grouping, the Justice Institute clearly falls within the market grouping design category, a consideration that Mintzberg describes as one of the two key design parameters in the definition (1983:280-81) of a divisionalized form. As consistently demonstrated throughout the case study, in its operational capacity each Academy is a relatively self-contained unit existing under the administrative umbrella of the Justice Institute corporate identity and funded by a client ministry or branch. Each Academy is named for the client group it serves (e.g. Police, Emergency Health Services, Corrections) and each Director must satisfy the government counterpart of that client group as well as the Principal and Board of the Justice Institute. As described by Mintzberg, "market-based grouping is used to set up relatively self-contained units to deal with particular work flows....Markets, not processes, get the employees' undivided attention" (1983:62).

Some planning and control systems are in place. Although a performance planning and review system is used throughout the organization, it is conducted primarily at the individual employee level rather than through a central administrative or personnel office. Each Academy operates its own planning and control systems, although each Director develops a performance plan in conjunction with the Principal, and the Principal in turn with the Board. The central Finance and Administration Division provides monthly financial status reports to each Academy and in this manner exerts a degree of control, but primarily by advising as to
potential problems as opposed to wielding a club, as this Division is not likely to withhold or redirect funds that have been earmarked by government for the Academy at hand. The nearest description to this situation in Mintzberg's terms is **limited planning and control**, characteristic of the divisionalized form.

As described in the case study, the Justice Institute over the years has used several different liaison devices to lubricate the interactions among Justice Institute Divisions and clients. These have included various advisory groups and committees designed to find consensual solutions to problems. At present several committees exist to resolve inter-Divisional issues such as media and classroom allocations, library acquisitions and development of information systems. Apart from committees, however, there are no integrating managers, nor is there any degree of a matrix structure at the inter-divisional level. Thus the Justice Institute could be described as having **few liaison devices throughout**. In this respect the Justice Institute is consistent with the divisionalized form.

In the area of decentralization, the Justice Institute is primarily vertically decentralized to a limited extent. The primary level of vertical decentralization, as outlined in the case study, is to the level of Academy or Divisional Director. Beyond this level each Academy or Division may structure differently, depending on its own set of design parameters and micro-environment. Formally, decision-making power clearly resides at the Director and Principal levels; all other power is selectively delegated within each Academy or Division by Directors. Thus this parameter could be classified as **limited vertical decentralization**, the second key ingredient of the divisionalized form.

**Situational Factors.** The Justice Institute is a young and small organization. This is typical of the simple structure and, to some extent, the adhocracy. Its technical systems,
instructional development and delivery, are easily divisible and thus, other than in technostructure and support staff functions, are not highly susceptible to inefficiencies associated with duplication of effort or economies of scale. In these respects the Justice Institute falls into the divisionalized form.

The environment of the Justice Institute could be described as relatively dynamic or unpredictable:

A variety of factors can make an environment dynamic, including unstable government, unpredictable shifts in the economy, unexpected changes in customer demand or competitor supply, client demands for creativity or frequent novelty...

(1983:136)

The plethora of studies into the Justice Institute, the numerous changes from one ministry to the next, the lack of solid support for the core structure, and the repeated efforts to disband, relocate or restructure the Justice Institute, make it clear that the environment is indeed unpredictable.

A significant complicating factor is that the Justice Institute has multiple funding bases, each of which may change and go in its own direction. In terms of complexity, the changes and demands in the various services are technically demanding in that the Justice Institute must innovate in order to prepare new students for the future as well as for the present. Technologies in emergency health services and fire services are constantly undergoing improvement, and research and social trends strongly affect police training, emergency planning and correctional and court services. Training at the Justice Institute is anything but rote, and program development resembles more a think tank than it does a typical training environment. Thus the required products and services are subject to frequent change, particularly in view of the fact that pressure groups exist outside the funding clients and have their own set of
demands or expectations that must be dealt with. The complex and dynamic environment is representative of the adhocracy configuration. However, the existence of diversified markets brings in an aspect of the divisionalized form in this respect.

Summary Finding

The divisionalized form appears to provide a fairly accurate description of the Justice Institute, with the exception of some of the situational factors, which tend to be associated more toward the adhocracy. Apart from the item-by-item comparison conducted in the preceding analysis, Mintzberg's description of the divisionalized form appears to be an accurate portrayal of the Justice Institute as described in the case study:

In the divisionalized form, the divisions are given the power to run their own businesses. They control the operations and determine the strategies for the markets that fall under their responsibility.

(1983:216)

The question now can be addressed: what light can the characteristics of the divisionalized form shed on the emergent issues that arose from the case study of the Justice Institute?

The Emergent Issues: A Second Look

Chapter 5 identified two major issues that emerged in the case study of the Justice Institute: (1) jurisdiction and (2) internal organization. If jurisdiction is a characteristic of the environment, and internal organization is a set of coordinating mechanisms and design parameters configured to that environment, then the two issues are in fact inextricably linked. As discussed earlier, Mintzberg proposes an "extended configuration" hypothesis: "Effective structuring requires a consistency among the design parameters and contingency factors"
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(1983:122). This hypothesis raises two questions: In the case of the Justice Institute, was there a consistency among the design parameters and contingency factors, and was the structure effective?

The dynamic or unpredictable nature of the Justice Institute environment is due in no small part to the fact that the Justice Institute serves a number of key clients. Each ministry has its own needs and priorities. From the earliest days, a natural division was created when the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act placed the Justice Institute under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, even though the very concept had been the "child" of the Ministry of Attorney-General. Any differences, either overt or due to lack of communication, that arose between the two ministries had powerful ripple effects on the Justice Institute and have had an impact on determining the role of the Justice Institute in training, education, public education and research. To use a simile, the Justice Institute is like a floating rig with many legs, each standing on a different float. During calm times, the structure is stable. When the weather changes, however, each float may be pulled by a different current or ride the waves in a different pattern from the others. The extended configuration would suggest that an organization structure will need to adopt a compensatory mechanism in order to keep from sinking.

If the congruence hypothesis is considered, the existence of such a dynamic environment should have a significant effect on the organization structure that emerges. Indeed, Mintzberg hypothesizes, "The more dynamic the environment, the more organic the structure" (1983:137). Organic is defined by "the absence of standardization in the organization" (1983:36). The organization must of necessity be flexible, in order to adjust quickly to changes in the environment:
In a highly stable environment, the whole organization takes on the form of a protected, or undisturbed system, which can standardize its procedures from top to bottom. Alternatively, faced with uncertain sources of supply, unpredictable customer demand, frequent product change, high labour turnover, unstable political conditions, or rapidly changing technology (knowledge), the organization cannot easily predict its future, and so it cannot rely on standardization for coordination.

(1983:139)

It becomes readily apparent, then, why numerous attempts to formalize and bureaucratize the relationship between the Justice Institute and the clients had little if any effects on stabilizing the relationship. It might be asked why the Justice Institute environment appears to have stabilized somewhat after 1984. Part of the answer may lie in the existence of the Policy Advisory Committee, an external "liaison device" consisting of a senior member from each of the client ministries who are advisory to the Principal (Figure 6.1):

Often, neither direct supervision nor all three forms of standardization are sufficient to achieve the coordination an organization requires. In other words, important interdependencies remain after all the individual positions have been designed, the superstructure built, and the planning and control systems set in place. The organization must then turn to mutual adjustment for coordination.

(1983:82)

It appears that the use of relatively informal devices in the relationship among the various client ministries and the Justice Institute, while undoubtedly unsettling at the time, prevented a great deal of further strain from being placed on the organization as each client would otherwise have to wrestle through red tape to accommodate changes in its own dynamic environment. Although the Policy Advisory Committee has no statutory standing under the College and Institutes Act, it performs an important liaison function among the ministries, effecting mutual adjustment among clients in an effort to counterbalance the instability in the environment. Both the adoption of an organic structure and the use of liaison devices were natural responses to the jurisdictional conflicts in the Justice Institute's environment.
The Policy Advisory Committee
The complexity of the environment, which has been described earlier, suggests another of Mintzberg's hypotheses: "The more complex the environment, the more decentralized the structure" (1983:138). A complex environment introduces problems of comprehensibility:

What about the organization faced with a complex environment? This introduces problems of comprehensibility....One brain can no longer cope with the information needed to make all the decisions. It becomes overloaded. So the organization must decentralize: The top manager must give up a good deal of his power to others--other managers, staff specialists, sometimes operators as well.

(1983:140)

The training needs in justice and public safety are vast and amorphous. Each of the client groups has its own set of specialized requirements that must be addressed in a timely manner. It is logical that the organization adopted a decentralized structure to remain flexible and close to the needs of the clients who were funding programs.

Closely related to the issue of complexity is Mintzberg's hypothesis related to market diversity: "The more diversified the organization's markets, the greater the propensity for it to split into market-based units..." (1983:140). Market based units are in a better position to respond to rapid change at the more local level than is a central bureaucracy or administration. Some client groups wished to retain control to the extent that, for several years, their staff who were transferred to the Justice Institute remained on the clients' payroll. The reason for market grouping is:

...the organization that can identify distinctly different markets--products or services, geographical regions, or clients--will be predisposed to split itself into high-level units on this basis, and to give each control of a wide range of the decisions affecting its own markets. This amounts to...limited vertical decentralization, a good deal of the decision-making power being delegated to the managers of the market units. In simple terms, diversification breeds divisionalization.

(1983:140)
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Why does this occur?

The organization that must comprehend information about many different aspects of its market environment eventually finds it convenient to segment that environment into distinct markets if it can and give individual control over each. In this way it minimizes the coordination of decision making that must take place across units.

(1983:141)

Thus a dynamic, complex and diversified environment leads to an organic, decentralized and divisionalized organization. In this way the organization remains informal, flexible and market oriented. These parameters appear to provide a reasonable response to the environment in which the Justice Institute came into being. However, another hypothesis on the relation between the organization and the environment adds a new wrinkle: "Extreme hostility in its environment drives any organization to centralize its structure temporarily" (1983:141).

In times of environmental crisis, as when the Justice Institute was having its very existence questioned from several different quarters and at a number of different times, the Board and Principal became key players in negotiating with government for the Institute's survival. The needs of each individual Academy at these times became secondary, and the strategic apex went to work:

Again, we can explain this in terms of our coordinating mechanisms. Direct supervision is the fastest and tightest means of coordination--only one brain is involved. All members of the organization know exactly where to send information; no time is wasted in debate; authority for action is clearly defined; one leader makes and coordinates all the decisions....When an organization faces extreme hostility--the sudden loss of its key client or source of supply, severe attack by government, or whatever--its very survival is threatened. Since it must respond quickly in an integrated fashion, it turns to its leader for direction.

(1983:141)

It becomes apparent that when the environment is benign, the organic, decentralized and divisionalized organization is a reasonable model to follow. However, when the environment turns hostile, the organization goes into a different mode. When the organization exists in a
hostile environment that is also characterized by jurisdictional ambiguity leading to unpredictability, complexity and market diversity, a recipe for disaster is in the making:

The complexity requires it to decentralize in order to comprehend the environment, yet the hostility demands the speed and coordination of a centralized response. Forced to choose, the organization presumably centralizes power temporarily, in order to survive. This enables it to respond to the crisis, even if without due regard for its complexity. With some luck, it may be able to ride it out. But should the crisis persist, the organization may simply be incapable of reconciling the two opposing forces. It may simply expire.

(1983:142)

Thus, in spite of its strengths, the divisionalized form has its weaknesses, depending on the type of environment in which it exists. Internal organizational questions as to the roles of the Justice Institute and the relation between the central Divisions and the Academies, for instance as described in the Touche Ross report (1986), arose largely because of the divisionalized response to a dynamic, complex and divisionalized environment on the one hand, and a periodically hostile environment on the other.

From the perspective of each Academy, the funding agency is the client. The client service becomes paramount in the survival, let alone the successful operation, of the Academy. In turbulent times, that orientation is bound only to strengthen, particularly if the organization as a whole is threatened while the Academy could theoretically be reabsorbed by the client. At the same time, any threats to Academies or to the Justice Institute as a whole will, as shown, create in increased pull toward centralization at the strategic apex in order to present a united front to the challenger. It is these conflicting pulls that may lie at the heart of the structural tensions and the amoeba-like changes to the organization chart during its turbulent years.
Summary Finding

The divisionalized configuration appears to have been a necessary organizational structure in view of many of the internal and external environmental variables at work. The divisionalized form is described by Mintzberg as having the narrowest range of all configurations:

The pure (conglomerate) divisionalized form emerges as a configuration symbolically perched on the edge of a cliff, at the end of a long path. Ahead, it is one step away from disintegration--breaking up into separate organizations on the rocks below. Behind it is the way back to a more stable integration, perhaps a hybrid structure with machine bureaucracy at some intermediate spot along the path. And ever hovering above is the eagle, attracted by its position on the edge of the cliff and waiting for the chance to pull the divisionalized form up to more centralized social control on another, perhaps more dangerous, cliff. The edge of the cliff is an uncomfortable place to be--maybe even a temporary one that must inevitably lead to disintegration on the rocks below, a trip to that cliff above, or a return to a safer resting place on the path behind.

(1983:252)

The divisionalized configuration is also one of the most fragile of all the configurations, particularly when the organization as a whole is under attack from a significant sector of its environment. It is this balancing act--satisfying clients while maintaining an integral organization sufficiently strong to weather the storm--that has piloted the Justice Institute through its history--both through tough times and calmer seas. In view of the environment--and if Mintzberg's extended configuration hypothesis is accepted--the internal tensions that existed were a necessary by-product of the adjustments that had to be made in order for the organization to survive.
Chapter 7

THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED:
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Following the Introduction, Chapters 2 and 3 presented a detailed case history of the Justice Institute. The case history identified five threads that wove together to form the tapestry of the Justice Institute: the establishment of the Justice Development Commission in 1974; the passing of the Police Act, which required mandatory training for municipal police forces in British Columbia; the increased need for professionalization of court and corrections officers; the growth of the colleges and institutes and the introduction of the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act in 1977; and the growth of the public safety dimension in the areas of Fire and Emergency Health Services.

Although the concept of the proposed Justice Training Centre was developed to meet the training needs of the Ministry of Attorney-General, shortly before its formal establishment the Centre was captured by the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act and came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Several studies of the Justice Institute identified a number of structural and other problems that needed to be resolved. In 1984, the Ministry of Education withdrew funding for the Justice Institute, which responsibility was then assumed by the Ministry of Attorney-General. The Justice Institute focused its mandate, demonstrated innovative and cost-effective training, and underwent a comprehensive strategic planning process to direct the Institute into the 1990s. In 1989 the Justice Institute returned to the jurisdiction
Examination of the case history suggests two key recurring issues that emerged during the existence of the Justice Institute. These are jurisdiction, involving the relation between the Justice Institute and the Ministries of Education and Attorney-General; and internal organization, involving the relation between the Academies and the Justice Institute administrative structure. It was proposed that a structural analysis would be the most appropriate for the analysis of these two issues.

The structural approach utilized in Chapter 5 was based on Mintzberg's "extended configuration hypothesis," which suggests that there are fundamental relationships among organizational design parameters and the characteristics of the environment in which the organization exists. In Chapter 6 the conceptual framework was applied to the case study, which process identified the Justice Institute's configuration as a divisionalized form.

The emergent issues were then analyzed in relation to the characteristics of the divisionalized form, in particular the strengths and weaknesses of this configuration. The main strengths lay in the flexibility of the structure, enabling the adjustments required to survive in an unpredictable, complex, divided and sometimes hostile environment. The main weakness lay in the need to have a more centralized structure to serve the needs of the Justice Institute as a whole, particularly at times when the Institute experienced environmental threats to its very existence. The main cause of the turbulence evident in the early years of the Justice Institute was identified as the conflicting simultaneous needs to centralize and to decentralize in response to the conflicting demands of the divisional design parameters and the nature of the environment.
Conclusions

In response to the research questions posed in Chapter 1, several conclusions may be drawn from the study and analysis of case of the Justice Institute. Further, the conclusions broadly address two of the three research questions: the nature of the organizational dilemmas, and the insights provided by a conceptual model from the field of organization theory applied to these dilemmas.

Conclusion 1 The Justice Institute is an appropriate model for providing training and education in justice and public safety. The Justice Institute of British Columbia was established to provide an integrated approach to training and education in the field of justice and public safety. A unique approach was taken in the establishment of an organization that would bring together a number of services that traditionally were trained in isolation from one another: emergency health, court, corrections, police, emergency program and fire personnel, as well as other professionals and members of the public. The concept captured the imagination of the key client groups in various provincial government ministries, branches and divisions, and in April, 1978, this unique, experimental organization was born. The organization grew out of a period of idealism that prevailed not only in British Columbia, but also across the country and North America in the 1960s and early 1970s. It emerged in a time when many of the forces pushing for social change were sufficiently strong to initiate change in governmental and social systems. Even a bastion of tradition, the legal profession, was an important factor in proposing wide-ranging changes to the system of justice administration in British Columbia, an initiative that sowed the seeds for the creation of the Justice Institute the better part of a decade later. A series of studies consistently returned with the conclusion that, compared with
Conclusion 2 The Justice Institute exists in a challenging environment. Once the initial excitement ebbed, those responsible for building the organization were faced with a formidable array of challenges. They had to create a structure that would achieve the organization's mission and goals while providing evidence of greater efficiency than could be accomplished by other means. They had to negotiate with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Attorney-General for a workable funding arrangement while creating an internal organization that would allow the Academies to meet the needs of their clients and simultaneously serve the mission of the Justice Institute as a whole. It was necessary to satisfy the demands of the many groups, committees and agencies, both within government and outside, that believed they had a say in the affairs of the Justice Institute. In addition, they had to deal with and respond to a plethora of studies and analyses, some helpful, some confusing and some hostile, while fighting to survive in a period of harsh recession and government restraint. All the while, they continued to seek clarification and a deeper understanding of its educational, training, public education and advisory roles; and, in general, were asked to justify its existence more often than might reasonably be expected of any organization.

Conclusion 3 The basic dilemmas faced by the Justice Institute are structural in nature. Mintzberg defines structure as the method of division of labour and the means to coordinate tasks. In relation to both aspects of structure, the Justice Institute existed in an environment of jurisdictional ambiguity and internal organizational difficulties. Structural problems suggest issues of a remediable nature--amenable to adjustment for a more precise fit with the environment and with the internal design parameters. If one considers all the things
that can go wrong with an organization, structural issues may be those that are most readily addressed. Other than for occasional problems, there is little evidence of intense political struggles; had the political aspect gained the upper hand, the Justice Institute would in all likelihood have been torn apart in its early years. In terms of the human resources viewpoint, disillusionment or embitterment could have set in, creating a malaise that could have drowned the organization in conflict, disenfranchisement or indifference. Again, there is little evidence of a negative organizational climate in spite of the many difficulties; quite the opposite, apart from the usual high and low periods, the organization's history is characterized by excitement and commitment among those who worked in and around the organization. It may be concluded that, beyond the structural problems, the Justice Institute was born, and survived its turmoil, because of the many who believed in, and fought for, its vision of justice and public safety.

Conclusion 4 A structural approach has proved helpful in understanding the organization and its dilemmas. The study has supported the hypothesis that the nature of both the environment and the design parameters of the internal organization interact to produce an organizational configuration. Because of the different jurisdictions within which the organization operated, the Justice Institute, particularly in its formative years, had to reconcile its structural design with the demands of the environment. The model showed how the very flexibility of the divisionalized structure—whether or not this was an intentionally designed characteristic—enabled it to adjust and survive while achieving increasing efficiencies and effectiveness in meeting its mission and goals.

Conclusion 5 The Justice Institute must recognize the necessity of the divisionalized form and build upon its strengths. The divisionalized form was shown to be a logical response to the Justice Institute environment. If this form is not considered acceptable, the most
obvious, if simplistic, option of a major restructuring, apart from being extremely unlikely, would only be to another configuration that would carry with it an entirely new set of dilemmas. A simple structure does not account for the dynamic nature of the environment and the need for a market orientation to satisfy clients. The machine bureaucracy is unable to change to accommodate rapid changes in the political and training environment. The professional bureaucracy requires control by the operating core of professionals, the general autonomy of which could not begin to meet the immediate needs of paying clients. The adhocracy would probably be unable to provide the disciplined training and support processes required to implement a sophisticated and, in some areas, high-risk training program. The 1989 Justice Institute Strategic Plan bore the subtitle, "Strong Academies—Strong Institute." This concept is critical to the continued success of the organization. It suggests an interdependence between the divisions and the umbrella structure, with the implication that in a relationship of mutual dependence each party benefits from the good health of the other. If the divisionalized form is accepted as a natural configuration for the Justice Institute, both the Institute as a whole and the individual Academies can proceed to identify and build upon the strengths of this organizational form. Furthermore, the inherent weaknesses of the divisionalized form may also be recognized and dealt with in a constructive manner. Conversely, if the concept is rejected by any or all components, a deliberate effort must be made to define the type of structure that is desired, taking into account the various design parameters as well as the nature of the environment in which the Justice Institute exists.

Recommendations

The recommendations arising from the study are divided into three sections. First, however, the final research question is addressed: Once the dilemmas are identified and
analyzed through the lens of a conceptual framework, what particular avenues are there to resolve the dilemmas? Second, areas for additional research are identified and, finally, recommendations are presented in relation to the theoretical framework used in the analysis.

**Recommendations for the Justice Institute**

Five conclusions were drawn from the study and analysis: the Justice Institute is an appropriate model for training and education in justice and public safety; the Justice Institute exists in a challenging environment; the basic dilemmas faced by the Justice Institute are structural in nature; a structural approach has proved helpful in understanding the organization and its dilemmas; and the Justice Institute must recognize the necessity of the divisionalized form and build upon its strengths. If these are accepted as valid conclusions, a number of recommendations are suggested.

**Recommendation 1** The Justice Institute should continue to seek ways to set the overall organizational strategy via strategic planning. Although each individual Academy's academic plan is worked out between the Academy and the client, the Justice Institute has the prerogative and, in fact, the statutory requirement to develop a five-year plan. The overall strategy incorporated in the plan can assist in leading the different Academies in a general direction toward the goals of the Justice Institute as a whole while allowing enough space in the plan for each Academy to fulfill its obligations to the client. Obviously the Justice Institute cannot add or drop Academies or Divisions at will, but through the Executive Committee of the Justice Institute a degree of standardization can be required and in fact has been incorporated into the Justice Institute Strategic Plan (Justice Institute, 1989). As it was, the development of the strategic plan was a highly collaborative and consensual process, receiving input from all
parts of the organization, the Policy Advisory Committee, the Executive Committee, students, and the Board. Having received the endorsement of the Board as well as the involvement of the Policy Advisory Committee representing client groups, the Plan has the potential to strengthen both the Justice Institute and the Academies. The Strategic Plan sets out a comprehensive marketing plan, endorses the establishment of a new site plan, requires a regular review of the mission and goals statement, restates the need to meet the requirements of client groups as part of its corporate mission and proposes pursuit of funds to conduct applied research. All these considerations fit within the concept of managing the Justice Institute corporate strategy.

Recommendation 2 The Justice Institute should recognize, and adjust to, the requirements of a divisionalized organization. It appears that in the past the divisionalized form has served the Academies well, certainly to the extent that their well-being can be isolated from that of the Justice Institute as a whole. Academies must be encouraged and supported in their efforts to remain flexible, market-oriented and close to the needs of clients. Efforts to impose undue regulation on the relationship between the Academies and the Justice Institute umbrella structure will have an unavoidable negative effect on the Academies' ability to meet the needs of their clients, which effect in turn will weaken the Justice Institute as a whole.

Recommendation 3 The Justice Institute should explore the possibility of the use of performance measurement systems. Performance measurement systems have the function of measuring the overall results of divisions or units. Although program profiles are decided mainly by the client in discussion with the individual Academy, the methods by which the plan is achieved as well as the quality of the outputs (products and services) are more open for discussion. One approach, naturally, can be, "If the client is happy, the Justice Institute is happy." If, however, the Justice Institute is to exercise educational leadership, this approach
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does not suffice. Mintzberg notes:

...performance control systems are most relied upon where the interdependencies between units are primarily of a pooled nature--namely, where the units are grouped on the basis of market. Here, the major concern is that the unit perform adequately, that it make an appropriate contribution to the central organization... In other words, because there is little interdependence between units, coordination requires the regulation of performance, not actions. And this is facilitated in the market-based structure by the fact that each unit has its own distinct outputs.

(1983:75)

The danger is that cost analysis or control, program development, delivery and evaluation systems become subjected to a bureaucratic set of rules and regulations, a state of affairs that is antithetical to the creativity, innovation and flexibility required to make the Justice Institute concept work successfully. However, if creative and consensual ways are found to share methods and systems--perhaps by the increased use of informal liaison devices in this area--the performance and goal-accomplishment of the Justice Institute are bound to be strengthened without stifling the ability of the Academies to serve their clients. In this area, the Strategic Plan addresses establishing bases for common program evaluation, and proposes an increase in student involvement. Further, there is no reason why the Justice Institute, perhaps through a consensus of its Executive Committee, Board and client groups, should not develop a performance monitoring system relating beyond student training day costs to such qualitative outputs as specific client satisfaction indices; evidence of integration of training and effective utilization or sharing of resources where possible; validity of curricula and quality of delivery methods; professional development undertaken by Academy staff; use of educational technologies; quality of client-Academy communication; and similar criteria derived from the Justice Institute's mission and goal statement as well as the Strategic Plan and shared in common by all Academies.

Recommendation 4 The Justice Institute should seek ways to increase the provision of common support services to the Academies. By the provision of support in areas ranging from
personnel and media resources to grounds-keeping and janitorial services, the Justice Institute provides an inducement for the organization to stay together. Because of weak core funding, however, it becomes increasingly natural to provide "core" services on a chargeback basis to the Academies. As much as possible this trend must be resisted if the Justice Institute is to retain a strong corporate identity and ability to unite the Academies. If such funds are not forthcoming into the core Administration Division, perhaps each Academy can make a concerted effort to encourage its client to fund certain aspects on a pro-rated basis (e.g. projected or actual use). Special projects that may be considered for this type of funding could be such items as a central mainframe computer networked to the Academies, or an improved room booking system. To counterbalance this method, however, it is not in the Justice Institute's interests to build a large infrastructure that will become an easy target in times of restraint. A reasonable balance must be maintained.

**Recommendation 5** The Justice Institute should continue to diversify its markets as much as possible. Although it would be a serious error to venture in areas outside of the field of justice and public safety, within the field new markets can be sought. Such action has the effect of distributing the support base more widely, potentially making the Justice Institute less vulnerable to fluctuations in individual markets.

**Recommendation 6** The Justice Institute must hold to its mission and identity. The uniqueness of the Justice Institute and its mission may well be the glue that has held the organization together over its existence. In spite of the numerous challenges faced, the Institute has maintained a clearly defined mission and identity, which are readily explained and easily understood. If the identity and mission of the Justice Institute are radically altered or diluted, any number of cases could be made for the dissolution of the organization. If there is
any issue on which all members of the Justice Institute must be united, it is this: the day the
Justice Institute loses its sense of mission or identity is the day that the organization is lost.
This is not to say that the mission and identity will not undergo adjustments. Quite to the
contrary, they must constantly be reviewed and reinterpreted to ensure the organization is not
drifting. However, the mission and identity must remain in line with the roots of the
organization, which are found in the mandate to improve the quality of justice and public safety.

Recommendations for Further Research

The study and analysis suggest a number of areas for further research. Following are
some issues that may be worthy of additional investigation.

It has been shown that an important feature of the Justice Institute is the presence
of a number of different disciplines comprising police, fire, emergency health services,
emergency program, court and correctional programs. The intention behind combining the
training for these disciplines at one location is twofold: (1) to improve communication and
understanding among the different services, and thereby overcome "fragmentation" of service to
the public; and (2) to effect cost savings and other efficiencies in the sharing of common
resources. A question for further research may be, What are the most promising areas for a
core of courses or subjects for interdisciplinary studies in justice and public safety? Although
some work has been done in this area (British Columbia Provincial Coordinating Committee on
Justice Education, 1980), the topic is ripe for a fresh analysis.

The case study identified four main roles of the Justice Institute: training, education,
research and public service. Although the training role is unquestionably a primary focus of the
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Justice Institute, how can the other roles be further pursued? In education, what is the relation between the Justice Institute and other colleges, institutes and universities, particularly in distance education and open learning, and cooperative granting of diplomas and degrees? Although Kilcup (1983) and Goble (1984) opened up new discussion in this area, there appears to be little further work on the subject. How can the Justice Institute increase its research role in justice and public safety, and in what areas? A number of significant research projects have been undertaken in the past, but generally on an ad hoc basis. What public service role can the Justice Institute further pursue? The Educational Services Division provides a substantial array of programs and services to professionals and the public. How can the Academies contribute to this service?

Recommendations Concerning Mintzberg's Structural Framework

Chapter 1 discussed four different approaches to organization analysis: structural, political, human resources and cultural/symbolic. Without doubt a political analysis would add another dimension, identifying power struggles and coalitions. A human resources approach would further identify employees' feelings of belonging or disenfranchisement, depending on where their divided loyalties were pulled in the early days of the organization as well as today. As well, the human resources approach could potentially address methods to build team effort and improve communication. Perhaps Mintzberg's proposed sixth configuration, the missionary organization, requires a closer look in particular. Rather than being viewed as a configuration, the mission-focused nature of an organization may be seen as an underlying force in any type of organization, whether it be a highly disciplined simple structure such as an army unit or an adhocracy such as an exciting new research agency. Certainly the Justice Institute was formed
around a strong mission, and throughout the history of the organization the mission to improve the quality of justice and public safety has remained strong (Appendix 1).

The approach used by Mintzberg falls primarily within the structural or rational systems frame, dealing with organizational structures, roles and technologies. Mintzberg's extended configuration hypothesis suggests that his approach is contingency-based, viewing organizations as complex, interconnected systems and subsystems. In relation to the provincial post secondary system, further applications of the hypothesis may assist in addressing the roles of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer in the different types of organizational configurations. Provincial legislation gives the Board and CEO of a college or institute a clear set of legal mandates and prerogatives, yet each of the different configurations requires a different style of management and administrative approaches.

Further insights may be gained by a study of the relation between organizational configurations and organization life cycles. Mintzberg begins to address this issue in Structure in Fives (1983) and Mintzberg on Management (1989). A rich body of literature exists on organizational life cycles; the application of some of the concepts in this literature to colleges and institutes, especially in relation to organizational configurations, may provide powerful new instruments to deepen one's understanding of organizations and their change over time.

The structural approach, based on an extensive body of empirical research and explicated in terms of interactions between the environment and organizational design parameter, has addressed the key issues identified in the case study. Further, it has presented several realistic and achievable avenues for further exploration without calling for disruptive or unattainable changes. Most of all, it has assisted in understanding the natural responses of the
Therefore Mintzberg's extended configuration hypothesis has proven to be an effective instrument in undertaking a structural organizational analysis, assisting one to make sense of a complex and somewhat tortuous organizational history. It has addressed all three research questions by exposing basic organizational dilemmas, explaining the cause of these dilemmas, and pointing ways for their resolution. As long as one is dealing with primarily structural issues, Mintzberg's framework is recommended as an effective instrument in the toolbox of organizational analysts, as well of managers and administrators who are charged with the challenging task of making sense of organizations—no small feat at the best of times.
APPENDIX 1 JUSTICE INSTITUTE MISSION STATEMENTS (1979, 1989)

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Mission Statement

The Justice Institute of British Columbia, as a post-secondary educational institution, provides leadership and coordination to support, develop and deliver a wide range of training and educational programs and services for people working within the field of justice and public safety in the community. These programs and services are designed to improve the quality of justice and public safety for all citizens of British Columbia.

Goals

To develop and provide programs, courses of instruction and services consistent with the identified needs of,
A) the Corrections Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney-General,
B) the Court Services Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney-General,
C) the Fire Services Commissioner of British Columbia and
D) the Police Commission of the Province of British Columbia.

To identify and deliver courses of instruction and services consistent with the identified needs of,
A) other components of the Ministry of the Attorney-General,
B) other Ministries of the government in justice and public safety related areas and
C) private agencies and community groups engaged in justice or public safety activities.

To develop a cooperative system of coordination between the Institute's own programs and those of other institutes, colleges, universities, public schools and community based organizations.

To provide educational opportunities for people to participate in training and educational programs that promote an examination of criminal, civil and social justice issues.

(Justice Institute, 1979:3–4)
Mission Statement

The Justice Institute of B.C. is dedicated to improving the quality of justice and public safety by developing and delivering training programs and educational services to professionals and the public.

Goals

1. To develop and deliver programs and services in the area of justice and public safety consistent with the identified needs of the Ministries of the Solicitor General, Attorney General, Health and Municipal Affairs.

2. To develop and deliver programs and services consistent with the identified needs of other government ministries, private agencies, community groups and others engaged in justice and public safety.

3. To engage in partnerships with other organizations in pursuit of the Justice Institute mission.

4. To share services, resources and expertise among Academies/Divisions to achieve more effective delivery of programs.

5. To heighten awareness of the unique nature and structure of the Justice Institute and its services.

(Justice Institute, 1989:3)
APPENDIX 2 PARTICIPANTS IN CASE STUDY VALIDATION

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7. Paul C. Smith  
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8. Robert J. Stewart  
Chief Constable  
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9. Anthony Williams  
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10. P. Dean Winram  
Bursar  
Justice Institute of British Columbia


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Justice Institute of British Columbia, 1982[a]. "Report to the Minister of Education: Sunset Clause, Section 66, College and Institutes Act." Vancouver, B.C.


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Purgavie, R.D., June 1, 1988. Letter to Steve Howell, Justice Institute of B.C.


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