DISSONANCE:
CONFLICT AND TENSION IN
POST-SECONDARY CURRICULUM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

by

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Abstract

Curriculum makers in post-secondary education are influenced by a number of factors. Government educational policies, the economy, the job market for graduates, an institution's mission, educational resources, and changes in technology are but a few agents which impact curriculum planning and design. Although one may not ignore external or organisational pressures on the curriculum, too little attention has been paid to how educational beliefs and values influence academic plans. Tacit beliefs and underlying assumptions about educational purpose, content, teaching strategies, students, and evaluations schemes are strong agents in academic planning. Unfortunately, faculty seldom notice how their educational beliefs and values affect curricular decisions. To make matters worse, educators are equally unaware of the wide spectrum of educational opinion within their field. Curricular decisions thus produce much misunderstanding, frustration, tension, and conflict.

This study has three goals. The first is to identify and analyse the different educational orientations—here limited to music—and how they affect academic plans. Second, I wish to explore the components of curriculum design and the underlying tensions that exist amongst various conceptions of education. And third, I mean to see if and how different educational orientations can co-exist in academic plans.

With a better understanding of the spectrum of educational orientations and the elements of academic plans, faculty and administrators can make informed curricular decisions.
This work is comprised of five chapters. Chapter one surveys different educational orientations of music education, how they affect curriculum planning and design, and the relationship these may have. The second chapter is a conceptual analysis of purpose, content, students, teaching strategies, and evaluation, to see how these forces impact on curriculum decision-making. The third chapter examines how even a universally accepted educational ideal, liberal education, can be the centre of debate because of conflicting prior educational beliefs. It briefly probes what relationship, if any, different understandings of liberal education have with each other. Chapter four considers the appeal and problems of integrating sharply different educational theories in a single curriculum. Finally, chapter five briefly explores what role social psychology may play in reducing conflict between faculty members whose beliefs and values differ. In all of these, the example of music plays a part.
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The educational philosopher John Brubacher wrote, “learning to know oneself is not just an affair of private introspection. It is also an affair of seeing how others behave and of recognising and identifying feelings of theirs with feelings of one’s own. Each is indispensable to the other.”

It is most humbling to realise one’s personal success is a result of the support and efforts of so many people. “If I seem tall, it is because I stand on the shoulders of others.” To all those who have encouraged and supported me in this project, my deepest gratitude and heartfelt thanks.
Introduction

How do prospective students, in an era of accelerated change, make informed choices faced with conflicting economic information and uncertain personal goals? Educators, as guides, have the same dilemma when making curricular decisions. Not surprisingly, Aristotle and his contemporaries dealt with these very matters:

As things are . . . men are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to excellence or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or moral excellence. The existing practice is perplexing: no one knows on what principle we should proceed—should the useful in life, or should excellence, or should the higher knowledge be the aim of our training?—all three opinions have been entertained. Again about the means there is no agreement: for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of excellence, naturally disagree about the practice of it. (Aristotle, Politics, Book VIII, Chapter 2, 1237a36-1337b3)

Educational “experts,” despite or because of intellectual and technological “advances,” are still at odds as to what kind of education is most fitting. And as Geneva Gay notes, “curriculum development is far from being a purely objective or scientific enterprise that follows a universal, predetermined planning process; curriculum development is more of an ‘artistic’ endeavour that is often chaotic, political, and emergent” (1980, p. 120).

The contrariety of responses to central questions in curriculum planning and development has created much confusion and frustration in post-secondary education. Educational theories that take into account the needs, wants, and interests of society rise and fall in popularity as quickly as political winds shift. Even educational “experts” cannot agree in their responses to the conflicting but legitimate demands placed on students, teachers, and administrators of higher education. The “conflicting goals, combined with endemic
uncertainty about how to achieve desired outcomes can lead to 'knots' in teachers' thinking” (Clark & Lambert, 1986).

The search, selection, arrangement, and delivery of knowledge is affected by external, intra-organisational, and internal forces. External pressures include government educational policies, professional or vocational requirements, prospective employment opportunities, and the availability of funding. Other constraints are organisational—an institution's mission and tradition, leadership and governance systems, and institutional resources. Yet other influences are individual and internal; that is, decisions about curriculum are driven by instructors' beliefs about educational purpose, their academic and professional experience, as well as their own moral, aesthetic, and political values.

To complicate matters even more, the university must also respond to conflicting demands. As a research institution, teachers and students are to produce new knowledge in circumstances of open debate. As a centre of teaching, it encourages actively tolerant attitudes to all other citizens. Meanwhile, as an organisation in public service, it is expected to be an agent of large-scale social change in an increasingly multicultural world (as, for example, the reduction of power differentials that keep people apart). While satisfying these sharply diverse expectations, its financial resources are diminishing.

These several responsibilities raise questions. The first is whether education should be general (that is, broad in scope) or specialised. This question often surfaces in the “liberal-vocational” debate. A similar query asks whether curriculum should present a wide variety of perspectives, understandings, and beliefs, or embody a common understanding of the human condition. At the hub of all these questions is the tension between the fragmentation of knowledge and the oversimplification of understanding.
If we put aside purpose and consider the “content” of education, we face the dilemma whether curriculum should be prescribed by discipline or profession (that is, subject-based), or whether students should be free to make course selection based on their interests and pursuits. Similarly, we must ask if curriculum will follow the tradition and values of one social group or community, or be intellectually and culturally pluralist.

In the background or the foreground of arguments about purpose and content, curriculum planners worry about “students” and access to higher education. Another problem—our third—is whether advanced education should be open to the masses (that is, egalitarian) or reserved for the academically and/or intellectually elite. A closely similar controversial point is whether a learner’s education should be directed towards advanced studies and the production of new knowledge or if their education should be “terminal” and oriented towards the transmission or application of knowledge.

Fourth, Stark and Lattuca (1997) raise the question of divergent “instructional processes”—ways of effectively delivering or transferring knowledge to the learner. Educational objectives, subject organisation and tradition, available resources, student characteristics and goals, and teaching style are all factors that influence instructional strategies. Given increased awareness among learners, teachers, and administrators of learning theories, and widespread recognition of different “types” of intelligences, traditional educational goals and teaching methods are increasingly being questioned if not outright challenged.

Finally, there are the questions of evaluation and accountability, and the importance of “standards.” With funding increasingly scarce, there is increased pressure to do more with
less. The question remains, if we are to realise a greater return from investment, what kind of returns are sought or expected and how do we measure them?

In short, at least five imperatives—all interrelated—are at play in curricular choices in post-secondary education. It is disturbing to think faculty in higher education may prefer “only those course designs and teaching methods which [they] had encountered as a student.” (Powell & Shanker, 1982, p. 297). If teaching practices continue to be bound by beliefs and assumptions that have not been critically examined, instructors and administrators will fail to make informed decisions that formulate an effective curriculum.

Statement of Questions

This study seeks to answer two questions:

1. What educational theories guide or characterise post-secondary music education?

1. How do prior educational beliefs and values affect decision-making in curriculum planning and development?

Two other questions considered are:

1. Can conflicting educational theories be integrated in curriculum in order to meet inconsistent demands and expectations?

1. What curricular and philosophical problems does the idea of integration introduce to curriculum development and planning?

Finally,

1. How can faculty reduce or minimise curricular conflicts?
Background to the Problem

Situation #1

I teach music at Kwantlen University College. Even though I have several students who are registered in the guitar program, they all have different reasons for being there and thus motivated differently. Some are there just to have fun. Others are interested in learning more about music theory and history. Some are wanting to prepare for a career in music while others are using music as a means to explore who they are and the world around them. None of them has the same learning or thinking style. At the same time, the music department expects that all of them will cover certain material. As an instructor, I must design a course in such a way that it addresses the different interests and skill level of each student, the requirements set down by the department, and the demands of the profession. Often, the different expectations are in conflict with each other.

Situation #2

The Music Department at Kwantlen University College is developing a degree program. Strong differences of opinion exist about this new program. Some feel it should be a performance program that builds up the skills a professional player will need. Some argue that employment opportunities are limited in music and we should be more “practical” or “realistic” by preparing students for other careers in music or music-related businesses. Others feel that a strong liberal component should be part of the program so as to foster an appreciation of music as an art. Some believe that the “classics” should be the focus of the program, others feel that the contemporary music scene should be taught, yet others think a
broader approach encompassing world would be best. Most of the opinions and different perspectives are rooted in individual educational and professional experiences.

Situation #3

In 1995 Kwantlen became a university college. Since the provincial government did not define what a university college is, there has been much internal debate as to what it should be. Some departments are wanting to develop academic degree programs. They believe the institute should defend the principle of “academic freedom” and allow disciplines to pursue knowledge for knowledge sake. Other fields believe funds should be directed towards developing professional or vocational programs. The different viewpoints show each discipline’s preference for the way knowledge is organised and how it is taught. There is also a hearty debate as to what role the university college should take in research. Some believe the university college should remain a teaching institution while others believe Kwantlen should become more involved in research. The question is whether Kwantlen should be engaged in the production of new knowledge or if its central mission should simply be the delivery of it.

Each scenario is very much affected by the others.

The Problem

Educational beliefs and values about curriculum (that is, purpose, content, teaching strategies, students, and evaluation schemes) are often adopted without a full rationale (Stark,
There are underlying tensions—if not heated exchanges—as unspoken educational beliefs or values conflict. Elliot Eisner and Elizabeth Vance observe:

the debates and conflicts generated . . . derive necessarily from the degree of incompatibility between the values and goals underlying each side of the issue being debated. Controversy in educational discourse most often reflects a basic conflict in priorities concerning the form and content of curriculum and the goals toward which schools should strive; the intensity of the conflict and the apparent difficulty in resolving it can most often be traced to a failure to recognise conflicting conceptions of curriculum. (1974, pp. 1-2)

Behind external forces shaping curriculum, such as economic and technological changes, and beyond the formal education, the skill in teaching, and the professional experience of faculty members, deeply-held personal beliefs, assumptions, and inclinations about education affect decision-making in curriculum planning (Snow, 1959; Gamson, 1966; Stark & Morstain, 1978; Clark & Yinger, 1979; Freyberg, 1980; Stark, 1988 & 1997). Unfortunately, faculty members are unaware of their own paradigms, beliefs, and perceptions, thus making curricular decisions less informed than they might be. As Geneva Gay observes,

One of the major difficulties in reaching a decision in the academic world is that faculty members by virtue of experience, have convictions about what ought to be done and how it should be done, but, in many cases, these convictions are based largely on experience and an orientation growing out of their disciplinary emphases rather than on a recognition of the underlying assumptions and values. Thus program issues are often resolved by compromise, but the basic differences that generated the need for compromise are not clarified. (as quoted in Stark, 1996, p. 8)

Research on how teachers' educational beliefs affect curriculum development is scarcer than one might reasonably expect (Clark & Peterson, 1986). Clark and Yinger contend “the thinking and behaviour of teachers are guided by a set of organised beliefs, often operating unconsciously” (1979, p. 259) and that curricular decisions are based on implicit values or conceptual ideas about teaching and learning.
Anthony Biglan’s research in the similarities and differences in subject matter (1973a) suggests practitioners of each field of knowledge have their own particular ways of reasoning, experimenting, and seeing defined and evaluated by a specific frame of reference unique to the discipline (Biglan, 1973b). Thus, different perspectives lead to different conclusions about course objectives, content, and so on. Since individual or disciplinary perspectives are not universally shared, curriculum decisions produce much tension.

Individual convictions are strong influences in shaping responses to questions that arise in designing an effective and efficient curriculum. Like a lens through which we peer at the world, these hidden values bend the light in such a way that they change our perceptions of what is and how things ought to be. Sometimes the lens brings clarity by bringing issues into focus; other times, however, it blurs our vision and obscures the problems that are before us. In addition, we often assume others possess the same beliefs as we do, or at the very least, we believe other people ought to “see” and “think” the same way. This assumption often leads to friction between individuals, departments, and administrative circles and usually results in either heated exchanges, bad compromises, or an avoidance of tackling difficult problems.

**Rationale for Research**

Debates about how best to resolve contradictions in educational aims and practices of education, and to retain the best possible instruction and learning, may be better dealt with if faculty and administrators—regardless of field—were familiar with the various beliefs and assumptions from which curriculum design or revision is approached. Practitioners of a discipline—especially those involved in interdisciplinary pursuits—and institutional leaders,
would surely be better off if they know more about the reconciliation of disciplinary misunderstandings and disagreements over educational aims. On an individual level, if an instructor is aware of their own beliefs and values and how they influence their choices in planning, they will be able to recognise and respond more effectively to students, colleagues, and employers who are pursuing education from different angles or with other aims. Explicit recognition of curricular beliefs is useful to educators since they can identify theories which coincide or conflict with their own (Connelly, & Elbaz, 1980). Thus, “academics with different perspectives would meld the complementary aspects of their scholarship to create new syntheses, and live respectfully with irreconcilable elements” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 52).

The assumption in this investigation is that everyone has tacit beliefs about what role education should play. Music educators at the post-secondary level, in general, have not critically examined different orientations of music education. This has led to misunderstandings and conflicts when making curriculum.

**Purpose and Practical Implications of the Study**

This study identifies and analyses the major educational conceptual orientations of post-secondary music education. It lays out the range of beliefs and values that lie beneath curricular discourse and the inevitable conflicts and tensions that result in curriculum planning. The purpose of the investigation is not to invent, support, or dismiss particular educational orientations but discover and explore different ideas and beliefs regarding the central issues of purpose, content, teaching strategies, students, accountability and evaluation in order to make more sense of the tensions and conflicts.
Since music can be regarded as a field both "liberal" or "humanistic," and "vocational" or "professional," it is a discipline in which faculty must consider widely different positions on the purposes of music education. In effect, the field of music can be construed as a microcosm of contentious curricular debates. The particular attention to music education is also explained by the fact that it is the author’s professional background and personal concern.

My belief is that by describing carefully the widely variant beliefs and values of people who do music education, enough commonality may yet be found to encourage collaboration, and thus a more effective curriculum. Similarly, by exploring types of outcomes in various educational orientations—here mostly limited to the field of music education—and by considering the range of activities used to accomplish different educational objectives, faculty and administrators may be in a better position not only to understand the importance of each perspective, but their advantages and disadvantages. Faculty may then be willing to engage in discussions and activities that influence curriculum in an informed way, ultimately benefiting students professionally, personally, and socially.
Chapter 1 – Educational Theories and Music

Educational researchers say music faculty too rarely show signs of knowing about the many possible aims and rationales for music education. Practising musicians, on the other hand, often argue this kind of discussion is a waste of time because the topic seems abstract, aloof, or other-worldly kind of thinking, and has little relevance or impact. However, as Bowman argues, “the practical implications of what may at first seem largely theoretical can be . . . direct and far-reaching” (1998, p. 1). Ignorance of philosophical or theoretical perspectives on music education has led to misunderstandings, frustration, and confusion amongst music faculty trying to solve curricular problems. Swanwick even contends that “[u]nexamined assumptions run very close to prejudice and are liable to be responsible for constricted views, unchanging attitudes, and bad professional practice” (1979, p. 7). All too often, decisions affecting music curriculum are guided by political agendas, founded on particular beliefs and assumptions, than by pedagogical ones.

Since underlying assumptions and tacit beliefs affect how we respond to curricular questions, we should consider the wide spectrum of theory and practice in curriculum, especially in fields such as music where aesthetic beliefs and values are so fragmented. This chapter will survey educational theories in music education to see how they affect educational aims, content, teaching strategies, attitudes to students, and evaluation schemes.

The Importance of Philosophy in Music Education

If philosophy is the means by which we discover how we determine what is important as well as why, it is, then, “the art not merely of having beliefs regarding life, or even of
articulating them, but of deliberately inquiring into the nature of beliefs and thus of judging them in order to determine whether they are worth holding” (italics original) (Brameld, 1955, p. 24). Educators would profit greatly by clarifying the underlying criteria or principles which guide their curricular decisions. Traditionally, educational philosophy concerns itself with how we determine what is real (ontology), what is true (epistemology), and what is good (axiology). Since motives also play a role, they must be considered as well.

**Practicality and Reality**

Suppose we are asked to describe a piece of music. One person might describe the melody, rhythms, harmony (if any), instrumentation, style or genre. Another may describe the musical form or harmonic structure. Yet another might explain the physics of music, that is, map out the sound waves moving at different amplitudes and rate of pulse. Still another might describe the music in terms of the emotions it evokes or the images it suggests.

Thus, the same composition may be understood on three levels (the musical elements, the physical construction, and the psycho-physiological responses to the sounds), each having its own kind of “reality.” In addition to the physical world, ontology may explore the “realities” of metaphysical claims, if any (that is, the world beyond physics, or, put another way, references that pass beyond our physical senses).

So when someone argues educators should prepare students for the “real” world, we must first ask to what world they are referring. Each response will have surface legitimacy, thus it is imperative educators not only be aware of their own ideas, they must be conscious of the other possible responses or reasons why people are drawn towards music. It is one way
we determine or understand what motivates people in their pursuits as well as guide us in our own.

Deep rifts occur when people reduce their differences to simple polar opposites. A classic educational debate was the conflict between monism and dualism. Monists believe there is one primary reality, an “all-inclusive criterion” (Brameld, 1966, p. 36) or principle by which we can understand an object or belief. Dualists, on the other hand, believe “reality is composed of two basically different kinds of fundamental substance that cannot be reduced to one another” (Bigge, 1982, p. 16). One is unified in its outlook (for example, the musical or physical elements are seen as inseparable from the emotional responses) while the other is divisive (that is, they perceive the material and emotional elements of music as completely separate entities).

Educational Truth

What gives us confidence that what we know or believe is educationally desirable, right or true? How shall we determine, verify, or justify what knowledge is correct, reliable, authentic, or legitimate? Some of us rely on intuition or “common sense.” How often do teachers meet a new student and immediately know how well they are going to do in their studies? Others use direct observation. They listen to a student play and know what heights the student will reach. Some may place their confidence in authority or status. They know a student is good because they studied at a reputable school. Still others believe personal “experience” validates their convictions. They know how good or talented a student is because they worked with him or her.
Behind these differences lurks an old educational debate between empiricism and rationalism. Rationalists argue abstract reason leads to understanding while empiricists claim experiment and observation does. But empiricists may be deceived by what they observe. A stick appears to bend when it is placed in a pool of water or a sound appears to get louder as it approaches. On the other hand, a rationalist’s chain of thoughts leading to a particular conclusion may be faulty. For example, if we consider the statement, “If a student wants to become a performer, she will work hard,” we cannot assume all students practice hard because they want to become a performer. Some students may work hard because they enjoy music as a form of self-expression or crave the stress relief it provides. An awareness of how we think uncovers the strengths and weaknesses of what we think.

Not only should we know the logic of the legitimate, we must understand how language affects our thoughts. For example, the term “liberal arts” means different things to different people. An appeal to or reliance on an educational concept constantly redefined may undermine an appeal to return to a particular kind of education when there are so many different understandings of the concept. (Chapter 3 considers the term “liberal” education.)

Goodness

When we examine the criteria we use to determine what is good or desirable, we are exploring how we reach decisions regarding value. But defending why we think something is beautiful, or what kind human conduct is good or right is not so easy. We may like a particular piece of music because it brings us pleasure (hedonism). We like how rhythms make our bodies move, or we enjoy the pleasure new insights of ourselves or the world around us, or the feelings music introduces, reveals, or exposes us to. We might think it good
because it is a “classic” or “standard” (thus appealing to an authority to justify our opinion). Similarly, we might argue a composition is good because it has attributes that meet criteria set by music theorists. If the music has a particular function or achieves a desired end, as when it “soothes our soul,” lifts our spirits, or makes us want to dance, it may be considered good. We might say a song is good because we think it is beautiful—it serves no particular function but appeals to our aesthetic taste. Finally, we may argue a song is good because it serves a social need, such as uniting people during the singing of a national anthem, or because it appeals to a mass audience.

**Human Motivation**

Bigges (1966) also argues our ideas about human motivation strongly influence how educators view students. By innate, he means acquired but unlearned moral attitudes and behaviours. Motivation is the inner drive, or as Bigges describes, the “mainsprings or instigators of behaviour” (1966, p. 19). If educators regard students basic moral nature as innately bad, they assume the worst in people, and the role of education is to “whip people into shape.” If educators see students as innately good, we expect good things, and education enhances these qualities. Finally, if educators think students’ moral nature is neither bad or good, we expect neither goodness or badness. Education, then, is a tool students use as they see fit.

Disagreements about practicality and reality, educational truth, goodness, and human motivation in music are occasionally organised and aligned with organised educational theories.
Formal Philosophical Classifications of Music Education

Philosophies of music education are sometimes—and revealingly—drawn from the general history of ideas: naturalism, idealism, realism, and pragmatism. Since music "assumes too many forms, serves too many diverse functions, and is too deeply embedded in the dynamic flux and mutation of sociocultural life to be exhaustively explained" (Bowman, 1998, p. 9), none of the perspectives is wholly adequate. But neither are they devoid of insight. Music curriculum drawn from each of these intellectual starting points implies a distinct program and educational aims, content, teaching strategies, students, and evaluation schemes.

Naturalism

Naturalists believe the physical realm is the whole of reality and humankind is simply part of the system. Although naturalists deny supernatural or spiritual forces, they think nature behaves in a particular manner. By observing, tabulating, and reflecting on natural phenomena, patterns can be identified and events therefore predicted. For example, a tapered wax candle has a certain shape, size, texture, odour, and colour. When it is placed near heat, the wax melts. There is a particular reaction, a predictable cause and effect. Similarly, naturalists argue, humankind, like most highly developed organisms, follow an evolutionary path. Musical development, then, moves through consistently predictable "stages." For example, naturalists would argue the average teenager cannot fully appreciate complex works, such as Brahms' late compositions, for they can only be adequately understood and performed by those in their final stage of musical-aesthetic development, demonstrating an evolutionary kind of thinking.
Henry Boettcher (1966) notes some strains of naturalism connote the idea that preconceived opinions and judgements are deliberately set aside in order to free the mind to observe, detached. Their objectivity, it is argued, allows them to arrive at true interpretations and conclusions. Thoughts can be distracting, preventing us from “seeing” the world as it is. Beliefs, then, are simply mental noise preventing the observer from fully experiencing nature at its purest.

Naturalists argue the best life follows a “natural” or physically-given, predictable desires or instincts. The best education, then, is realised when learning is “in tune” with the innate, but detectable, abilities and interests of the student. From the naturalist perspective, the purpose of music education is to help learners recognise and develop their natural talents, ambitions, and capabilities. Thus, most educational content is determined by student interests. Students should be primarily self-directed, and teachers should act as “enablers” or “helpers” rather than as sources of information. External goals (such as those set by a professional organisation) are seen as an infringement on individuality; thus, evaluation assumes student realisation of innate abilities.

The main appeal and strength of naturalism is its simplicity. It seems to discard and reduce the complexities and artificialities of life and get down to “basics,” those things that really matter. It accepts what is found naturally in the world as good, and in that sense provides a certain feeling of harmony with the world. (Abeles, Hoffer, & Koltman, 1984, p. 39)

The weakness of naturalism is it is not always easy to identify what “natural” is. For instance, music students often claim a new skill or technique feels uncomfortable or “unnatural.” They mistake habit for nature. In other words, our observation does not prevent us from arriving at false conclusions. Our eyes can also deceive us: paintings are two-dimensional but images on the canvas may appear three-dimensional. In addition, students,
left to develop on their own, will not "naturally" become outstanding musicians. Skills, such as playing a musical instrument or scholarly research, require training.

There is also little agreement as to what kind of scientific inquiry uncovers someone's true character or inborn skills. The claim that scientific inquiry, such as sociology or psychology, is objective can hardly be defended since the parameters set by researchers must ultimately be determined by individual biases. And not all natural phenomena are observable. Although psychological processes are a result of molecular changes, the effects of specific emotions on mind patterns has yet to be mapped (Goleman, 2003). In addition, not everything in its natural state is desirable. Nature can be quite destructive or, on some criteria, dangerous. For example, arsenic is a "natural" substance but it is certainly not fit for human consumption. Similarly, people often develop traits that lead to their own destruction. Do we encourage the development of these characteristics because they are "natural?"

Idealism

Idealists argue the observations of the physical world are inadequate and untrustworthy in explaining the essence of existence. For example, since the same piece of music can elicit different responses, idealists consider the senses unreliable. "An ideal represents an 'idealised' view of things—a vision of sorts, a mind's eye picture of a utopian condition of affairs in which the realisation of certain values is fulfilled and perfected" (Rescher, p. 291). Because ideas are immaterial and therefore immutable, permanent, and perfect, they are regarded as more real than physical things, and consequently, granted primacy over nature and experience. To return to the illustration of the wax candle, since the physical properties of a candle change once it is placed near heat, the memory or image of
the candle, in its original form, still remains in our minds. Since the mental image is constant
and thus eternal, idealists argue it is the image of the candle within the mind—that is, a
“universal truth”—that is reality. “By looking for the universal meaning instead of only a
particular meaning, man is able to transcend a situation and come to know Truth and Beauty”
(Mannis, 1971, p. 32).

Because music is an aesthetic experience, it is not only a gateway to come to know
and appreciate the beauty around us, it is an avenue to become aware of the beauty within
each of us. From a music education standpoint, the idealist’s goal is not only to understand
all the elements that make a work of art great, but to see the underlying “eternal truths” music
contains, or to which it points. Content not only includes the “classics” or “standards” of
music, but exercises designed to develop discriminating listening skills, good judgement, and
ideas. Teachers not only have the responsibility of disseminating facts, but, more
importantly, mentor knowledge of principles and conceptions of outstanding musicianship
and/or academic life. Music students are viewed as potential members of the music
community, each learning their role in the larger scheme, like individual players in an
orchestra. Individual expression is most valued when it serves a universal idea. Evaluation,
then, looks for comprehensive understanding of knowledge of principles, rather than mere
facts.

The attraction of idealism is its supposed stability. Since values are universal and
unchanging, idealism is not easily swayed by the fashionable thoughts of the day. It is also
valuable in guiding and motivating individual effort toward productive goals, as well as a
plumb line for critical evaluation. Finally, it challenges our ideas of what is possible or
practical by making us look beyond what we think or believe is doable.
A number of elements make idealism less than persuasive. For example, people’s beliefs and values may be based upon arbitrary assumptions and thus invite defence of the unobtainable. Their ideals do not save them from error. Indeed, they may be the cause of error. And if there are ever-lasting fundamental truths, why is it that over the course of human history consensus has not been reached as to what these truths are? If truth is omniscient and omnipotent, why are there so many different truths reflecting so many different realities? Furthermore, if the one constant in life is change, how do idealists accommodate a reality that is always shifting? The problem or tension between change and permanence is illustrated by Abeles, Hoffer, and Koltman:

has all the great music now been written? Should no new music be accepted? Is so, on what basis? Are there universal criteria that can be used to evaluate music from all places and ages? If there are, musicologists, theorists, and aestheticians have had a difficult time agreeing on what those criteria are. (1984, p. 41)

Although ideals can guide us, if taken to extreme, they may impede our progress. For example,

in matters of practical action, idealisation can prove counterproductive when we allow the better to become the enemy of the good. In life we have to choose between the available alternatives (the ideal house or the ideal candidate just may not be on offer). And theoretical idealisation does not help us to effect the necessary interoptimisations. (Knowing what an idea bridge hand is like does not help us to bid the one we are actually dealt.) Overcommitment to idealisations does actual damage. (Rescher, 1996, p. 293)

Although divorcing ourselves from circumstances may provide perspective, it may also lead us into a false sense of security and, in turn, result in complacency or passivity. Finally, an ideal may not be all that it is cracked up to be. How often have we obtained exactly what we thought we wanted only to be disappointed? An idea maybe useful in motivating us to action but, if stubbornly held on to, may prevent us from realising something better than our imagination.
Realism

Realists ask how “reality” can only be a product of the mind since we have to have an object to create an image. Realists argue material objects are not only images of some invisible reality, “they [also] exist in themselves, apart from the mind’s consciousness of them” (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1994, p. 1118). For example, since it is possible to conceive of a world without humans, objects are a reality independent of thought. In other words, there are both physical and mental realities: a mind-independent three-dimensional reality and a fourth-dimensional reality based on ideas, thoughts, or experiences. Thus, “in addition to particular objects—each of which exists in a single place at any particular time—there exist universals, general entities that can occur in different places at the same time, or whose reality is non-spatial altogether” (Arrington, 1996, p. 529). If we return to our illustration of a tapered wax candle, realists argue the candle possesses both a spatial reality, which can take on many different forms, as well as a non-spatial universal idea or mental image of a “candle.” The candle is real because it not only melts, thereby exhibiting the physical properties of wax, but it is also real because, even after it melts, it still possesses a universal reality because we retain in our minds the idea of “candleness.”

From an educational perspective, the realists’ major goal is to transfer essential knowledge to the music student. Content, that is, essential knowledge, is prescribed by musical “experts,” and teaching strategies emphasis hands-on experience. Thus, students learn to play an instrument or attend a concert rather than simply talk or read about music. Students are suppose to be moulded to fulfil their role in society, and evaluation is based on how well prescribed content is learned.
As a philosophy, the appeal of realism is its practical quality. "Realists take whatever information they have and work with it as best they can, even though they realise their knowledge is not perfect or complete" (Abeles, Hoffer, & Koltman, 1984, p. 41). The acknowledgement of both physical realities and the importance of ideas and creativity encourage balanced respect for practicality and imagination. But the "take it at face value" attitude of realism also has its weaknesses. To accept things "as is" or because "that's the way things are" may be more an attitude of complacency and resignation than practicality. Mediocrity can hardly be defended on the grounds it is practical. Theories, for example, may be abandoned prematurely or not allowed to fully develop because they are not perceived as being "practical." The insistence that the reality of ideas and the physical world be closely bound may prevent concepts from becoming fully realised. Similarly, just because practicality or usefulness of something is not immediately apparent, we should not dismiss ideas prematurely. Application may not always be obvious at first. Furthermore, one group of experts may exclude opposing perspectives because they challenge the opinions and understandings of the "in" group (this attitude, however, is not restricted to realists.) Decades of refusal by classical music programs to recognise and incorporate different musical styles into the curriculum, such as jazz, is just but one example; this maybe a matter of philosophical difference.

Also, like the naturalists, realist's perceptions of physical "reality" may be misleading. Conflicting conclusions are often drawn by different "experts" even though all may be observing the same facts. And even though there is a consensus that the "essentials" of a subject should be taught, there is no agreement as to what the essentials are or how or when they should be taught.
Pragmatism

Pragmatists maintain Truth and Beauty are not discovered through the senses or the mind. “It equates truth with success: a proposition is true if it ‘works in practice’, if it has a practical utility or usefulness” (Car, 1988, p. 87). Knowledge, then, is not an accumulation of facts, introspection, or other-worldly explorations but action-oriented, that is, activities tempered by the experience of everyday life. If we return once more to the illustration of the wax candle, pragmatics are not really interested in how we perceive the candle, they want to know whether the candle’s flame provides enough light or heat. Pragmatics further argue since life is characterised by process and change rather than fixity, resolutions are never final since answers gives rise to new questions and problems. Thus, pragmatics are not as interested in subject matter as in the transactions that lead to learning. Growth, not completion, is the main goal. Meanings, beliefs, and truth are determined by the practical consequences of personal experience.

The principle aim of pragmatic music education is the acquisition of skills and understanding the interrelationship between theory and practice. Learning is not about collecting facts or memorising concepts but solving problems by the careful analysis of the relationship between cause and effect. Students are not simply viewed as individuals with unique gifts, interests and problems, they are individuals who must be prepared to adapt as circumstances dictate. Thus, teaching strategies favour hands-on activities, such as the art of practising, composing, or music research. Evaluation regards development, growth, or innovation just as significant as achievement of some ultimate goal. Thus, pragmatic music
educators may consider non-musical outcomes, such as learning how to learn, just as important as completing a given task.

Pragmatism’s strength lies in its emphasis on action-orientated activities fostering first-hand experience. It provides an on-field perspective of the game. At the same time, it fails to acknowledge that a perspective from the stands—because of its distance—provides a different but equally enlightening perspective, which is also very “practical.” Also, individual experience may be the exception to the rule and not an expression of a universal truth. To form a generalisation from such a small sample is committing the fallacy of a hasty generalisation.

Theodore Brameld argues the emphasis on continuous change is pragmatism’s greatest weakness since it “is a transitional philosophy, standing between cultural patterns that are increasingly obsolescent and cultural patterns that still await an opportunity to prove their desirability and practicality” (1955, p. 91). Pragmatism is a mindset more than it is a system of fixed principles. Thus, “truth” becomes a subjective matter bound by situational circumstances. Feeling happy because we learned to play a favourite composition is far different from the elation of giving an entire concert. Can we consider the “success” of each person equal because they both feel good about their individual accomplishments? Furthermore, if “success” can later become a disappointment, for example, because we regret only learning one piece or gave only one concert, “truth” simply becomes a time-dependent attribute which provides little guidance in measuring progress towards objective external goals.

Pragmatism also fails to qualify what purposeful activity is. Having to learn to swim because one is drowning is purposeful but certainly leads to different kinds of knowledge and
meaning than learning to swim in an aquatic centre with a swimming instructor. Furthermore, purposeful activities must be organised or based on some kind of tacit assumptions. Otherwise, how would we know they are purposeful? The nature of “real problems” is also cryptic. Just because an issue is not particularly or immediately meaningful to students, especially to those individuals who are self-centred, do these “problems” cease to be meaningful? If we are educating students to be a member of society, certainly they must be able to empathise with issues they themselves are not directly affected by or concerned with.

Also, many endeavours require highly trained skill with drill. Complex practices, such as playing a musical instrument, require habits developed over a period of time. Is not repetitious exercise valuable in acquiring skill? Another weakness of pragmatism is its complete devotion to experiment and practical inquiry as the only means of finding truth. If pragmatic education is supposedly objective or impartial, should not there be a tolerance for different or alternative ways of knowing—including theoretical? Many of life’s important questions are far too complex to be adequately answered by simple solutions that experimental examination provides.

**Relationship Between Musical Thought and Practice**

To cite but one example of how educational theory shaped musical thought and practice, the following discussion traces one sequence of development of musical thought from a mechanistic view to an evolutionary one.

During the late Renaissance, the Italian astronomer, mathematician, and physicist Galileo Galilei challenged the prevailing idealistic ideas about the universe. Thomas Hobbes’ commentary on man and illustrates the new view of nature:
For seeing that life is but motion of limbs. . . . For what is the heart but a spring; and the nerves but so many strings; and the joints but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the artificer? Man is a natural machine and the state an artificial one. (as quoted in Opper, 1974, p. 56)

The human body and society were seen as systems that work like a machine. For some artists, artistic endeavours were also founded on natural law. The 18th century English portrait painter Sir Joshua Reynolds thought the foundation of art was governed by precise mathematical relationships:

> It is the very same taste which relishes a demonstration in geometry, that is pleased with the resemblance of a picture to an original, and touched with the harmony of musick.

> All these have unalterable and fixed foundations in nature, and are therefore equally investigated by reason. (1975, p. 122)

Indeed, the common denominator in almost all fields during this era was the use of mathematical or mechanistic principles to explain the essence of nature.

The impact of eighteenth-century ideas about the nature of nature spilled over into musical practice. In addition to the emotional properties attributed to music (for example, the codification of the expressions or representations of ideas and feelings), music was also seen as a "mathematico-physical" phenomenon" (Opper, 1973, p.73) that echoed a Cartesian rational and mechanistic view of man and nature. The extent to which Cartesian, but then Newtonian theories permeate musical thought can best be seen in the explanation of the tonal system. Bukofzer observes, "It is no mere metaphor if tonality is explained in terms of gravitation. Both tonality and gravitation were discoveries of the baroque period made at exactly the same time" (1947, p. 12). Opper further explains:

> The essence of this system is a tonal centre (key) with neighbouring "satellite" tonalities which "gravitate" toward the centre. The degree of attraction between the tonal centre and the neighbouring tonalities may be said to be directly proportional to the distance between the two, figured by the circle of fifths. Thus, the degree of attraction between the tonal centre C and its nearest neighbour G (one fifth apart) is
fivefold greater than the attraction between C and its more distant neighbour B (five fifths apart). There is a clear analogy between this description of tonality and the Newtonian operation of the solar system with its inverse square law of gravitational attraction between the sun and the planets. (1973, p. 78)

In *Génération Harmonique* (1737), composer Jean Philippe Rameau states, “Music is a Science, established on fixed principles, and which, while it pleases the ear, appeals also to the reason” (As quoted in Opper, 1973, p. 81). The free-flowing textual rhythms of Renaissance music had also been reformulated by Baroque composers into a constant uniformly accented rhythmic structure. As mentioned above, even basic emotions (the affections or states of the soul) were categorised and portrayed by specific musical motifs that could be inserted or exchanged like parts of a machine. Thus, in the mindset of eighteenth-century composers, music was something more than sound, it was a philosophical ideal of order.

Some approaches to music theory in the 20th century show this intellectual patrimony. Alban Berg and Anton Webern’s twelve-tone rows, or Olivier Messiaen and Milton Babbitt’s use of serialism, are obvious examples of arithmetical or mechanical approaches to music composition. The question remains, how can one become aware of our own philosophical underpinnings and how can—or even should one—escape a particular basis for understanding music?

Although there were significant stylistic changes with the rise of Viennese Classicism, music was still governed by a rational view of nature. The contrapuntal complexity of Baroque composition, however, was replaced by a simpler concise expression. Thus, Classical music exhibit balance, unity, clear-cut forms, symmetrical phrases, regular rhythms, steady tempos, and a strong diatonic tonal centre.
However, the second half of the eighteenth century also witnessed several independent streams of thought that took a formative role in reshaping the thinking towards music. In the early nineteenth century, ideas stemming from the life sciences began to take root in the consciousness of society. The humanities began to borrow terms from biology, such as “progress,” “development,” and “evolution,” to explain the nature of their domains. Bertrand Russell observes:

"The prestige of biology caused men whose thinking was influenced by science to apply biological rather than mechanistic categories to the world. Everything was supposed to be evolving, and it was easy to imagine an immanent goal. . . . The conception of organism came to be thought the key to both scientific and philosophical explanation of natural laws, and the atomic thinking of the eighteenth century came to be regarded as out of date. This point of view has at last influenced even theoretical physics." (quoted in Opper, 1974, pp. 146-147)

The Romantic movement represented the assertion that living principles, rather than mathematics or astronomy, governed thought. The biological metaphor profoundly shaped musical thought and practice in the nineteenth century.

Music of the Romantic era is frequently described in terms of organic and developmental metaphors. For example, we read that “every measure” in Beethoven’s “Hammerklavier [Sonata] is a sprout growing from a few germinal motifs,” while Franck’s Sonata for Violin and Piano discloses the “application of the sonata form, in the sense of strictly organic development.” The cyclical unity of Schumann’s Fourth Symphony is, in Alfred Einstein’s words, “not merely an external feature, for all the movements are developed from melodic seeds that are given in the Introduction; they are blossoms of various colours springing from the same bush.” (as quoted in Opper, 1973, p. 181)

Biology, particularly the idea of evolution, became the paradigm from which scholars believed many composers worked from.

The impact of non-musical beliefs on musical practice throughout the history of music is undeniable. Evan was right to say:

Though musical history is first and foremost a record strung together from pieces of music, this can remain puzzling or even uninformative if our view is so blinkered as
to ignore the parallel streams of Western culture, and the changing background of social and political developments. (1969, p. 8)

Educational impact lies not so much in what is openly advocated but in the tacit assumptions on which musical practice is based. Familiarity with the strengths and weaknesses of different musical practices leads not only to a better understanding of the music, but a greater appreciation of the differences that shape it.

Aesthetic Theories of Music Education

Rather than draw from general philosophy of ideas, music educators may call upon principled arguments for music education to justify or defend curricular decisions. Generally, aesthetic arguments reflect “liberal” ideals, that is, the enrichment of individual and social character. Proponents sometimes argue these are very pragmatic. For example, developing self-discipline, emotional awareness, conscientiousness, and achievement drive are very practical in developing skills of any kind. Traditionally, there are four theoretical justifications for studying music: referentialism, expressionism, formalism, and hedonism.

Referentialism

Referentialism “holds that the value of music lies in its ‘references’ to things beyond the music itself” (Abeles, Hoffer, Klotman, 1984, p. 57). Music represents non-musical ideas, events, or objects. It is a vehicle for non-musical ends. The “primary function of music is to tell stories or carry messages” (Reese, 1976, p. 86). Referentialists are not so much interested in the music per se as they are in what the music refers to or symbolises. The “message” of music can be social, political, intellectual, or emotional. Program music, such as Berlioz’s
Symphonie fantastique or Franz Liszt’s symphonic poems, are particularly suited to referentialist interpretation.

Referentialists argue music can influence people in non-artistic ways and there lies the benefit of music education. From the standpoint of making curricular decisions, referentialists regard the understanding of major ideas or discoveries as a major educational objective. For example, referentialists see music as a means for developing character, thus helping people become better citizens. This maybe true, but athletic training also develops character, and studying politics or history probably provides better preparation for citizenship than musical training. Referentialists further claim music arouses emotions. Then again, so can sporting events, a good book, or a passionate kiss. And if music can influence us in non-artistic ways, are these influences always beneficial? As Aristotle and Plato argue, music can just as easily have a negative effect on people as a positive one. For example, music can incite anger or further plunge a person into depression just as easily as it can give hope or remind us of humankind’s better qualities.

The challenge referentialists face is teaching the “correct association between musical stimulus and nonmusical referent” (Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman, 1984, p. 76). Although this is much easier done when text is involved, such as in vocal music or programmatic works, it is extremely difficult to do in instrumental music, where there is no common language or agreement as to what the music is referring to. This might, on the one hand, be seen as an advantage since it gives the listener freedom to explore their emotional world with complete freedom. The weakness, on the other hand, is there is no standard or reference as to the effectiveness or predictability of the effects the music may have on individuals. Two people can listen to the same piece of music but respond completely differently.
From the referentialist perspective, the value of music is justified by non-musical outcomes. Yet, faculty members in biology or business do not feel the need to justify their existence with benefits that exist outside the field. Why do referentialists feel they have to justify music education with non-musical outcomes? Is not music in itself a worthy pursuit?

**Expressionism**

Artistic expression is often centred around describing or representing emotions, feelings, or moods. Expressionists argue some aspects of life cannot be described by words—in fact, they are an impediment to experiencing the non-verbal, non-intellectual ways of knowing and enjoying life. As Irwin Edman observes:

> The very fact that there is nothing definitive or exclusive in the emotional atmosphere of a given composition will make it all the more accessible as a means of catharsis or relief of the listener. Words are too brittle and chiselled, life too rigid and conventional to exhaust all the infinity of human emotional response. The infinite sinuosusness, nuance, and complexity of music enable it to speak in a thousand different accents to a thousand different listeners, and to say with noncommittal and moving intimacy what no language would acknowledge or express and what no situations in life could completely exhaust or make possible. (as quoted in Abeles, Hoffer, & Koltman, 1984, p. 59).

Expressionism has two components: one arouses feeling, the other is the release of feelings. In the former sense, "[i]t is not because an art work tends to make us feel sad, for instance, that we call it sad; rather, we react as we do because sadness is present in it" (Davis, 1998, p. 493). Thus, expressionists think music provides "rich, significant, feelingful experiences without referring to something outside the music" (Hanley, 1989, p. 102). The main purpose of music education, then, is to develop perception of both the musical elements of music and what feelings are evoked. It is all about the sensual experience of music and the awakening
of the subjective reality within the listener. Expressionism insists meaning and value are 
found within music, not outside of it.

Bennett Reimer (1970, 1989) contends expressionism is another avenue to explore 
human existence or experience. The “art of music is a basic way of ‘knowing’ about reality” 
(Reimer, 1970. p. 7). He further explains his reasoning:

We know the world through the mode of conceptual rationality, indeed, but we also 
know it through the aesthetic mode and several other cognitive modes now being 
recognised, such as the interpersonal, the intuitive, the narrative/paradigmatic, the 
formal, the practical, and the spiritual. (Reimer, 1989, pp. 11-12)

Expressionists do not deny music may have referents, but they are merely coincidental: the 
experience of music is connected with feeling and a legitimate avenue for exploring reality.

Two qualifications should be stated about expressionism. It is not believed that the 
composer or painter vents his or her own personal feelings in the artwork, although 
that has happened on occasion. Rather, it is the listener or observer whose feelings are 
aroused. Also, the expressive quality is culture-bound in that ‘happy’ music in an 
unfamiliar style to us might not strike us as happy; probably we would not have much 
reaction to it. (Abeles, Hoffer, Klotman, 1984, p. 59).

Thus, Karl Jung concludes “the essence of a work of art is not to be found in the personal 
idiosyncrasies that creep into it—indeed, the more there are, the less it is a work of art—but 
in its rising above the personal and speaking from the heart of the artist to the mind and heart 
of humankind.”

The appeal of expressionism is it teaches individuals to be more sensitive to music, 
and the learner’s detailed emotional response makes listening meaningful and pleasant. In 
terms of curriculum development, expressionists favour a design that provides music students 
a personally enriching experience. Some expressionists even claim music educates feelings. 
This argument, however, is questionable. First, how do we know the source of feelings? 
Feelings may be adopted out of empathy or learned from outside ourselves rather than an
expression of our own. Second, it is a contradiction to claim, on the one hand, that music allows humans to express unidentifiable emotions, while on the other hand, claim that we can identify and train them. Thirdly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify the connection between music and a person's "inner life." How accurately music portraits specific emotions, as opposed to, for example, imposing a particular mood, is difficult to analyse. Fourthly, life is full of experiences that arouse feelings—music does not have exclusive rights to this capability. Finally, "supposing that we do gain knowledge from musical experience, how profound is that knowledge?" (Alperson, 1991, p. 229). What information or insights do we gain?

Formalism

Formalists are concerned with the structure or components of music. Their primary interest is not so much in what is communicated as in how things are said. Formalism "regards music as an autonomous play of sounds or as sonorous 'architecture,' and not as an art capable of expressing anything extramusical" (Supicic, 1987, p. 346). The value and excitement are in the technique or intellectual challenge of creation. The subjective or referential elements of music are only modestly interesting to the formalist. Formalists believe "that in order to find an art work's meaning, you must go to the work itself and attend to the qualities which make the work a created thing. In music, you would go to the sounds themselves, and attend to what those sounds do" (Reimer, 1970, pp. 14-15). Formalists, then, argue meaning is found in the work itself, "and can only be uncovered by that enlightened analysis in which all its features, melodic, harmonic, dynamic, colouristic and temporal (a term with which I embrace rhythm and the greater rhythm which is structure), are seen to
interact in creating a unique artistic form” (Evans, 1969, p. 11). The Formalist may concede references to non-musical ideas or things may exist, but argues these references are inconsequential, and the real appeal of music is purely intellectual. Thus, music is disfunctionalized not only on a social level, but, up to a certain point, on a purely human level, because it is no longer considered as an expression of man, but more or less as a construction, a structure (a word sometimes à la mode), a sonorous arabesque, as Hanslick said, an architecture of sounds, in sum as a universe apart, entirely autonomous and specific, whose total value resides in being harmoniously ordered according to formal principles which are variable and in evolution, but of a strictly technical nature. (Supicic, 1987, p. 179)

Music, then, is not to serve the public per se, but is to be pursued for its own sake. In terms of curriculum development, the main objective is to develop intellectual skills enabling students to think effectively, thus leading to intellectual autonomy.

Although formalism directs our attention to the structural components of music, is it possible to separate feeling and intellect to the point where we can ignore the feelings music arouses? Furthermore, those consumed with the construction of music fail to be understood by audiences because the intellectual precepts on which music is composed is almost audibly imperceptible. Music theorists may argue “precepts” are not sounds and therefore listeners do not perceive the connection between sound and form. Yet, surely, most would claim music is more than the basic music elements from which it is constructed. As Bell claims, “the ultimate worth of the beautiful is always based on the immediate manifestness of feeling” (as quoted in Alperson, 1991, p. 224).

Hedonism

A fourth justification defending the importance of music is hedonism. The hedonic type believes the most important value of music is the pleasure it provides. The sense of fun
may come from the sensations derived from our senses, the admiration or wonderment of sheer technical skill of playing, or the wizardry of creation or imagination. Furthermore, hedonism is often used as a kind of bait to motivate learning, or a form of socialisation in order to create community, or simply provide distraction from the drudgeries, pains, or tragedies of life.

Supicic (1987) describes four different types of play. The first is that of competition: the rivalry between different musical ideas (or voices) within a musical work. There is also the inspiration of competitive challenge, the wanting to outdo another. Second is the idea of chance. The unpredictable nature of improvisation, accidental happenings, or results realised or discovered without prior design can be exhilarating for some. The third type of play Supicic describes as imitation: the act of reproducing or mimicking an idea or pattern. Imitating a melody introduced by one voice or instrument and restated by another (that is, a canon) is a popular contrapuntal compositional device. Finally, there is the pleasure of virtuosity or brilliance. These pleasures reflect those of a performer. Pleasures listeners may experience include movement such as dance, the physical sensation of the beat or pulse, physical relaxation (such as the physical release of stress), amusement, and escape or fantasy.

The appeal of hedonism is the recognition of music’s earthy or physical nature, as well as temporary escape from the drudgery of daily living. Also, there is the encouragement to “live in the moment” or “on the edge.” Educators justify a less rigid structure in a course or assignments on the grounds the excitement, pleasure—and creativity—discovering or making new connections through serendipitous circumstances would be missed in a prescribed curriculum. The fun students have pursuing personal interests becomes a strong motivation for learning.
The immediate gratification hedonism advertises is also its weakness. Some “greater” pleasures are realised when smaller ones are sacrificed. For example, young musicians often believe discipline is restricting—a barrier to creativity. But is discipline restricting or freeing? There certainly is pleasure in amusing ourselves “fiddling” about on an instrument or browsing through book stacks; however, acquiring skills through disciplined study on an instrument grants the performer a greater freedom to express themselves, or gain a thorough understand of ideas via careful and methodical research, provides another kind of freedom which, perhaps, provides other kinds of pleasure.

Finally, exploring different realms of pleasure require us to work outside our comfort zone. Challenge often means uncertainty which leads to a different kind of excitement and pleasure. Ironically, then, elements of play maybe unpleasant. For example, the unpredictability of chance maybe unsettling for one performer as it is exciting to another, and the recreation or imitation of an musical idea or composition may be uninteresting to some as it is a challenge to others.

**Philosophical Conflicts**

Moments of conflict between faculty members during curricular decision-making arise when educators—although looking at the same problem—describe the problem from entirely different angles. The differences between the above aesthetic theories can be seen in how proponents of each might describe the same musical work. The formalist might say, “The music has the qualities of order and symmetry.” The expressionist might say, “The music arouses feelings that can be described as order and symmetry.” The referentialist might say, “The music presents the message of order and symmetry.” (Abeles, Hoffer, Klotman, 1984, p. 60)
The hedonist might say, "The music's order and symmetry are pleasing." Each perspective reflects different beliefs as to what is real, true, and good. Thus, when designing curriculum each educator has a different foundation on which they base decisions.

Abeles and company (1984) claim it is not necessary to label individuals as one type or another, nor a matter of choosing the "best" philosophy but simply understanding the different values each subscribes to. In fact, an educator, in an attempt to justify a particular decision or position, may appeal to one or more of the above theories or ideologies in a short span of time. Furthermore, educators undoubtedly share numerous beliefs regarding the purpose of education but, perhaps, emphasise one more so than the others. For example, I doubt a referentialist, expressionist, pragmatic, or hedonist will deny the importance of making this world a better place to live. Pragmatists may not design or organise assignments and activities in order to examine contemporary social issues and our place in society. Rather, they may argue the best way to produce desired social change is by ensuring students have practical skills. Similarly, none would argue against the idea music education should be or is a personal enriching experience. However, an expressionist may organise courses and assignments that emphasise personally enriching experiences rather than professional skills demanded by the music industry.

Faculty must surely try to understand that the "position a teacher takes on the value of music will . . . significantly affect the nature of his or her teaching" (Abeles, Hoffer, & Koltman, 1984, p. 62). During discussions about the design and development of music curriculum, conflicts amongst music educators arise when they unknowingly bring philosophical bias that prevent them from discussing contentious issues fully and openly. Often, it is an instructor's experience which is the basis for such deeply held convictions.
And as Friedrich Nietzsche observes, “convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.” Furthermore, since music faculty are often unaware of different philosophical perspectives and values, they are unable to observe and reflect upon problems from different perspectives. It is ironic when music educators endeavour to assist students understand and appreciate different musical styles, yet are unable to, themselves, appreciate different philosophical and theoretical perspectives when discussing contentious curricular issues, such as different educational aims.

Some may argue it is impossible for educators, as curriculum makers, to be ever fully aware of all theories that affect their educational outlook and practice. But design, development, implementation, and evaluation of curriculum will prove inadequate if educators fail to see they are making choices. Educators cannot do this without understanding the alternatives. Furthermore, no approach answers all of life’s questions and it is the ability to move from one to another that allows educators to address the needs of students, professions, society, and disciplines. All too often educators, when unaware of different philosophies of curriculum design, have a “one tool fixes all” mentality that may undermine learning as much as it may help.
Chapter 2 – Elements of Curriculum Planning

This chapter examines the tensions inherent in discussions of educational purpose, content, teaching methods, students, and evaluation. The purpose here is not to provide final “answers”—impossible anyway—but highlight advantages and disadvantages of different curriculum theories.

Purpose

What considerations affect educational purpose? According to the educational philosopher J.S. Brubacher (1969), educational aims become aims when we take into account the possible consequences of our endeavours. On the one hand, an unswerving purpose enables learners to “focus” on a fixed target. Discipline, then, is the soil in which creativity takes root. However, educational outcomes may not always be those anticipated or aimed at. Specific aims or goals, then, may stifle learning because they are too restrictive. Some even question if educational aims should be set at all. The argument is, knowledge should be pursued for its own sake (then again, is this not another kind of aim?). Nevertheless, if we concede that aims have merit, to what extent should educational purpose be flexible, and what role, if any, should personal experience play in affecting the rigidity or flexibility of educational aims?

Educational objectives play three important roles in curriculum planning: (1) they provide direction; (2) they motivate; and, (3) they are the benchmark for evaluating the effectiveness of a chosen course of action (Brubacher, 1969). Where do aims or purposes
come from? Some argue that since we work in a social setting, society shapes our responses to these questions. Others maintain that the purpose of education is to help individuals determine or establish their own values and aims. Thus, we are confronted with the question, does the individual make up society or is individualism a result of citizenship? We must then decide if formal education should meet the needs of the individual or of the social order.

Our ideas about what self-realisation is and who determines when this has been achieved also affect our beliefs regarding educational purpose. We must first inquire whether self-realisation refers to intellectual development, practical abilities, spiritual enlightenment, or some combination thereof. We must also decide if individuals know themselves well enough to determine who they are or should become. As Brubacher warns, expression of one's personality must not be confused with becoming aware of and realising the full development or fulfilment of one's capabilities and talents. Conversely, we may decide if society, because of its objective perspective, is better able to ascertain an individual's potential. However, neither society or the individual—on their own—have the foresight to determine potential? It is also difficult to achieve self-realisation in a constantly changing world. Some even argue self-realisation is the capacity and ability to change. These concepts, of course, reflect Western ideals. Eastern philosophy argues we already are what we must become. Change implies imperfection and impermanence. From the Eastern perspective, then, self-realisation means discovering within us that which is timeless. Thus, the ultimate goal is to realise those qualities that are immortal.

Our personal preference for either individualism or communitarianism will affect our choice of educational aims. "The decisive contrast between Individualism and
Communitarianism, then, is the extent to which the individual is self-made and the extent to
which the wider social system is responsible for personal success" (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000, p. 69). If we prefer an intellectual culture that fosters individualism, we encourage multiple perspectives, competition, self-reliance, and personal fulfilment. Taken to the extreme, however, individualism leads away from co-operation, and toward aggression, selfishness, and greed. Conversely, someone whose intellectual culture is community minded may encourage the sharing of burdens, contribute to group goals, instil industry and efficiency, as well as promote equal access to public services such as health and education. But, taken too far, communitarianism may perpetuate archaic ways, lead to exclusion or abuse, especially of those at the bottom of the social order, and undermine individual initiative (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2000).

Edward Power (1982) classifies educational aims in two categories, education for discipline and education for knowledge. Education for discipline sees the objective of schooling as to form, discipline, or strengthen the mind. Those who pursue education for knowledge seek useful information and skills that will prepare them for the predictable demands of life. Power further divides these aims into five categories: education for character, life, growth, personal fulfilment, and aesthetic refinement. In analysing the groupings, it becomes apparent they are simply traditional educational philosophies whose aims have been updated, reclassified, repackaged, and relabelled.

*Education for character* seeks to develop personal or social competencies, such as self-discipline, goal-setting, empathy, and leadership. Yet, how educators define “virtue” affects curricular decisions. Some educators appeal to idealism, where good character is “based on a conception of things as they should be or as one would wish them to be” (*Webster’s New World Dictionary*, 1994, p. 669). Others believe realism is the plumb line for
moral excellence. Pragmatics turn to actual practice or experience as the standard, while existentialists believe the act of self-actualisation ought to be the guiding rule. Finally, some educators rely on analytic philosophy (a variant of psychoanalysis) as the measure for good citizen.

*Education for life* aims to prepare students “to live effectively in society when they attain maturity” (Power, 1982, p. 241). Essentially, the aim of education is to make the world a better place by making students aware they play a key role in the social matrix. Students are thus exposed to contemporary social issues and learn to intervene however appropriate. This preparation has two aspects which may divide people. On the one hand, there is the interest in preserving culture; on the other hand, there is the interest in practical skills that must disregard heritage in order to provide a better life.

*Education for growth* addresses life skills but also teaches principles that will permit individuals to adapt skills and understandings to changing circumstances or new conditions. Essentially then, education develops students’ intellectual skills, such as observing, classifying, analysing, and synthesising, in order to think effectively, and thus cultivate personal growth and independence.

*Education for personal fulfilment* has personal happiness or enrichment as its main objective. Happiness, this objective argues, is “achieved by meeting the world on its own terms and developing both knowledge and skill to function effectively in it” (Power, 1982, p. 245). Education serves to provide personally enriching experiences enabling students to not only discover who they are as unique individuals but become, according to the plan, purpose, and will of nature, who they ought to become, thus, achieving personal autonomy. The pace or timing of personal development, however, is determined by the learner rather than society.
Finally, *education for aesthetic refinement* strives to enable individuals to “recognise and understand the beauty of the world, of life, and of creative art to make life more fully and culturally human” (Power, 1982, p. 246). But again, different measures can be applied when judging beauty. For example, idealists believe the standard of beauty is a product of the mind; realists believe nature is the ultimate reference point; existentialists believe the evaluation of beauty can only be measured by personal taste.

When educators choose widely divergent outcomes, without making explicit their educational orientation, we have the first domino in a chain reaction of conflicts and tensions between educators. Divergent educational aims often demand distinctive and particular content, complete with peculiar teaching strategies, and widely different attitudes to students. Evaluation across whole programs may prove difficult, especially since measures must now account and adjust for different educational aims.

Because of developments in knowledge and understanding, there is growing demand for teaching and learning past the traditional years of schooling. Faculty members are thus forced to reconsider the traditional aims of education. In an article titled “The Life Cycle,” Arthur Chickering and Robert Havighurst examine how aims of education change at different stages of life. If aims change as time passes, then purpose must be flexible in order to address social and individual interests and differences. For example,

> most engineers out of school less than five or six years will say they wish they had had a more in-depth technically oriented education. After a few more years, they typically feel that they would have benefited from more management training. After twenty years, they often feel they should have had more exposure to the humanities. (Stewart, 1988, p. 62)

Divisions between stages of life also occur at different times for different people. In addition, new experiences or a change in circumstances may challenge or undermine previous
understandings, causing major shifts in attitudes. Career options may be limited or unavailable for a variety of reasons forcing compromises in career decisions. For example, a young music student may initially be consumed by the ideals of a performing career but upon or near graduation, they discover professional opportunities are extremely limited and they must look elsewhere to make a living.

As to purpose, curriculum theorists rarely agree if curriculum should meet students’ immediate needs or long-term interests. Some argue that since we only live in the moment, we cannot change the future without changing the present. Yet, decisions in the moment are based on consequences (real or imagined) we wish to achieve or avoid. Thus, decisions are based on values formed outside the present moment. In this sense, the past and future are very much part of the present. Although we may consider all three, different attitudes to past/present/future may raise tensions, whether between students and instructors, amongst faculty members, or between faculty and administration. The instructor who feels that music history begins and ends with Bach may put a claim on the present and the future of her college curriculum, as if they were all her territory.

Our beliefs’ views of work and occupational skills in education add to all the other “theoretical” differences at play. It is difficult to determine what economic motivations—if any—should influence educational practice. Vocational or professional skills can be construed as either a means for assuring individual livelihood or a contribution to the welfare of society. But can an education system that purports equalising educational opportunities for all also encourage personal profit as a pillar of educational purpose? An educational ideal that insists that everyone must succeed while, at the same time, promote individual profit is inherently contradictory (Brubacher, 1969).
Although the etymological meaning of the word “school” is “leisure” (Brubacher, 1969, p. 28), the word refers not to a period of repose but the opportunity to consider the demands made outside the realm of work. Thus, skills required for an occupation were not the primary focus of education in ancient Greece. Brubacher elaborates:

The immediate consequences of earning a living can be learned on the job. To learn the more remote ones, however, the child must have more time and freedom than steady employment yields. So it has come to be accepted in a complex civilisation that education requires a period of social as well as biological infancy, when the young will live off the labour of others and be released from self-support. (1969, p. 29)

The implication is that job-oriented training can often be limited if not short-sighted because it does not deal with forces traditionally outside of work that still impact employment (Goleman, 1998). For instance, an unhealthy personal life can undermine job performance. Although formal education may compartmentalise subjects, specialisation discourages us from seeing how extra-educational factors affect teaching and learning.

In a knowledge-based economy, there is an increasing demand to develop a short list of mental abilities and powers (Goleman, 1998). Unfortunately, investment in intellectual and emotional development is constantly squeezed out of the curriculum in order to satisfy demands for occupational skills—even though one of the hallmarks of a professional is the ability to evaluate the effects of the profession on society. Nevertheless, gainful employment is pertinent to individual fulfilment and social order—aims at the very heart of liberal education. Yet, others maintain that the value of job skills in education is not economic but simply a tool in which we educate and develop the person.

With each field’s knowledge base ever expanding, there is a corresponding demand for specialised education. Yet, “[c]ollege students face the contradictory demands of gaining more specialised knowledge and learning how to retrieve and interpret a broader knowledge
base that extends beyond their own expertise” (Stark, 1997, xiii). In his book, *Values in Conflict*, Axelrod neatly illustrates the positions and conflict between general education and specialisation. Those who seek educational breadth mourn “the erosion of a unified curriculum” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 42) while those who advocate specialised training favour “intensive research and more academic choice for students” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 42). Thus, on the one hand, “[i]f one goal of liberal education is to encourage students to think contextually and to be aware of connections among subjects and disciplines, then exclusive focus on one issue is scarcely advisable” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 44). On the other hand, “the search for ‘knowledge’—a mission that has ‘intrinsic value’—is the fundamental goal of liberal education and specialised study can play an important role in this activity” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 43).

Even if we agree all of the different aims of education are worthy of pursuit, educators cannot possibly achieve them all. Our general purposes help decide short- and medium-term goals. Different premises, that is, different beliefs, understandings, values, and assumptions on educational purpose lead to different responses.

Since educational aims are closely tied to—if not determined by—subject matter, we must now consider “content.”

**Content**

In Latin, “curriculum” means “a running course” or “race” (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1994, p. 340). Thus, different kinds of content lead to different outcomes. “In fact, so close is the relation between aim and curriculum that . . . one may well say that the curriculum is nothing more than aims or values writ large in expanded form” (Brubacher,
The selection and arrangement of course content is heavily influenced, if not decided by faculty members. Even so, faculty must ask how curriculum can satisfy the needs of the learner as well as the requirements of the discipline. Should content be determined by our social environment, or do needs evolve from within each individual? Put another way, is the source of our motivation to learn external or internal? We are thus confronted with what Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars label “inner direction versus outer direction.”

Inner direction conceives of virtue as inside each of us—in our souls, wills, convictions, principles, and core beliefs—in the triumph of conscious purpose [while] outer direction conceives of virtue as outside each of us in natural rhythms, in the beauties and power of nature, in aesthetic environments and relationships.” [italics original] (Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 2000, p. 234)

We feel the tension between self-determination and the environment, or, self-control versus luck, fate, or circumstance.

If we contend that “content” is organised by the field or discipline rather than the needs of the learner, we imply that truth or knowledge is enduring or constant. The content’s organisation is based on ideas or skills defined by the subject. To help understand a subject, we categorise similar or related material into groups. For example, the study of music is usually broken down into various subjects: history, theory, arranging, composition, aural skills, performance, and so on. Even within these broad divisions, analysis breaks them down yet again. Thus, the history of music is categorised into divisions or styles including Renaissance, Baroque, Romantic, Popular, Jazz and so on. When these categorisations are adopted from past practice, the curriculum is considered “traditional.” So, on the one hand, knowledge can be seen as something static. Ideas, beliefs or observations that are reliable, constant, in accordance with fact, and conform to a pattern, eventually lead to a standard or rule we call “truth.” These truths are “off the rack” or “ready-to-wear” as it were. It is
something we find. It is objective in the sense that it exists even if we have not discovered it as of yet. It is omnipresent and immutable.

If, on the other hand, we conceive “content” with the learner in mind, subject matter is closely tied to student interests. Thus, content is not “fixed [or] ready-made in advance” (Brubacher, 1969, p. 156) but a folding or blending of ideas and information with personal experience. Thus, a student enticed by Romantic music will learn the characteristics of that era by selecting to perform a work by Schumann or Chopin. Consequently, content is not simply subject matter in the traditional sense but a series of activities or exercises. Instead of the curriculum being static, in which the subject matter is stored for use at a later time, skills and facts are considered through experience which, it is argued, makes the curriculum dynamic. In this sense, knowledge is viewed as something “custom-” or “tailor-made” to fit a particular individual. Knowledge, then, does not pre-exist per se but is constantly evolving.

To the pragmatist, truth is constantly moving. It is, in fact, doing. New experiences, new perspectives, new understandings constantly reshape subject matter. Knowledge, in this sense, is like the idea reflected in the adage, “One can never step into the same river twice.”

In summary, we have two views of knowledge: static and dynamic. Brubacher summarises the opposing perspectives:

Is the curriculum studied in a world in which ultimate reality is already complete, in which change is insignificant, in which there is no genuine novelty, and in which time is but a vestibule to eternity? If so, then the conditions of truth are already preexistent so that naturally any hypothesis would work because it is already true. But if the opposite metaphysic holds, if genuine novelties are still emerging, then some conditions of truth are yet to be determined by the way man’s decisions work out, and the pragmatist has the horse and the cart in the right order. Nevertheless, this idea that truth may change is very uncongenial to many. If truth is not a fixed star in the educational firmament, they cannot steer a steady course of study. (1969, p. 167)
Knowledge, then, can be conceived as a revival and reaffirmation of an existing or previous order, and an identification and preservation of truth or social behaviour; or, it can be construed as information and skills necessary to promote personal excellence, the ability to teach ourselves and solve practical problems, as well as the skill to recognise the need to change social institutions or behaviour.

If an instructor decides that knowledge or "content" is static, how does he or she decide what subjects, skills, and values are passed on from generation to generation? The term "core curriculum" is not self-defining. Furthermore, the idea of what the essential subjects are keeps changing. For example, the classical subjects of Latin and Greek, once thought of as "core" courses, have been replaced by modern languages. How permanent are essential subjects and again, who defines what is essential, the individual or the collective? Furthermore, with the rapidly expanding volume of information, the essential core is not only being redefined, it is becoming unmanageable. How do we squeeze an ever increasing amount of knowledge and skill into the minds and hands of individuals in a limited—if not diminishing—amount of time? The debate about core curriculum has also taken yet another form: the conflict between humanistic and scientific studies. Cannot the physical, biological and social sciences have as profound an effect on us as literature, philosophy, and language? Which subjects best promote key abilities? Thus, we are faced with multiple tensions within the "content" of curriculum: inner- versus outer-directed, individual and social, prescribed and elective, static and dynamic, liberal and conservative, old versus new, and traditional versus innovative.

The tension between the universal and the particular is often interwoven with the debate between theory and practice. That is to say, we are confronted with the conflict of
whether knowledge is about things, or about knowing how to do things. To use Brubacher’s words, “‘Knowing that’ does not necessarily imply ‘knowing how’” (1969, p. 160). For example, I may know how to interpret a piece of music but it does not necessarily follow that I can compose. By the same token, composers often write for instruments they themselves do not know how to play.

The debate between theory and practice is always contentious. The theoretical approach removes an individual from the confines of a specific situation in order to see the rule or standard which governs practice. Individual experience can be limited in meaning and outlook since the learner “will be deprived of both the broad- and long-range view of his situation which theory would provide him” (Brubacher, 1969, pp. 161-162). Furthermore, it is impossible for an institution of education to anticipate every problem that an individual will face in his or her lifetime. However, in a constantly changing and unpredictable world, it is naive and narrow-minded to assume that the next problem will be the same as the previous one. At best, the understanding of previous problems will only be a resource for solving later problems. Theory cannot be taught without specificity because examples verify the principles taught by theory. If this is the case, we must then ask if principles or truths are satisfactory ends in themselves, or are they simply an alternate perspective from which to gaze upon new experience? Again, the problem of whether to start with the rule and work towards the specific or to begin with the specific in order to discover the rule arises.

Finally, Stark and Lattuca point out there are different opinions regarding the effectiveness or essentialness of “content.” In fact, “content” may have little effect on what aims or goals are realised.

According to one view, reading the great works is assumed inherently to promote effective thinking. But, a second view holds that important outcomes like effective
thinking are generic; the content chosen is distinctly secondary to the end itself. In still a third view, no content promotes effective thinking unless it is linked with explicit pedagogical attention to developing the ability. (1997, p. 27)

If “content” is closely linked to pedagogy, we must now ask how instructional strategies play their part.

**Instructional Strategies**

Those who are discipline-based, drawn to internal matters, things or tasks, may think they teach subjects. Outgoing, socially-minded teachers would say we teach students. Educators may then ask whether students are taught, or if students educate themselves? If learning is to “fix in the mind” or “acquire as a habit” *(Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1994, p. 769)*, it implies teaching follows a methodology. If method is “a way of doing” *(Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1994, p. 854)* then teaching is finally concerned with finding the most effective method of imparting knowledge, whether it be knowing what or knowing how. Again, when we ask what is most efficient, we should ask what ends we shall pursue.

The question next arises if teaching is about concepts and principles (that is, theory) or about skills (that is, practice). This inquiry is very much entwined with the question of whether knowledge is static or dynamic, and whether learning is passive or active. If learning is passive, that is, submissive or yielding in the sense that material is absorbed without question, students will be able to imbibe a lot of material quickly. However, not only will they absorb good information and skills, they may also unknowingly adopt bad information and skills. Furthermore, the analytical skills needed to assess new information are lacking. If learning is active, that is, requires an ability to interact with the skills and knowledge
introduced (for example, analyse, test, question, adapt, dispute), students are much more informed as to what it is they are learning. But, learners cannot possibly question everything if they wish to function. They could spend a lot of time “reinventing the wheel” as it were, when they could be making new discoveries. But how do students assess what is good or bad without adopting some kind of beliefs?

Choice of method (lecture, reciting, formal discussion, informal conversation, question and answer, storytelling, debating, experimenting [laboratory work], demonstrating, observation, and engaging in activities) is influenced by a number of factors: disciplinary objectives; professional requirements; faculty educational, professional, pedagogical, and personal background of faculty; beliefs regarding the purposes of education; resources (such as textbook availability); and teaching style (Stark & Lattuca, 1997). Other factors that can modify these instructional strategies include: student characteristics (such as, abilities and needs); student goals; institutional or program goals; practical matters (such as, class size and faculty workload); and information on pedagogy (Stark & Lattuca, 1997). Although each of the main factors and “contextual filters,” as Stark identifies them, affect teaching methods, some do so more than others. However, “for most faculty, scholarly training is the strongest influence, followed by teaching experience and educational beliefs” (Stark & Lattuca, 1997, p. 151).

A study sponsored by the National Center for Research to Improve Postsecondary Teaching and Learning also supports the notion that “educational beliefs and discipline socialisation are strongly associated with specific teaching styles and instructional practices” (Stark, 1997, p. 217). Methods of instruction are unconsciously adopted from disciplinary traditions and personal educational experience in those academic fields (Dressel & Marcus,
1982). For example, symbolic disciplines, such as language and mathematics, are interested, broadly speaking, in symbols constructed to communicate cognitive thought and understanding, while aesthetic disciplines, such as music, art, dance, and literature, while also concerned with expression, focus on feeling or emotion rather than intellectual understanding.

Instruction is impossible or difficult without an idea of the sequence in which knowledge is introduced. Teachers have to decide if students should begin assessing parts in order to understand the whole or should they understand the overall concept first and then break it down into components? Depending upon the subject, beginning with individual parts maybe more confusing or complicated than surveying the field, while at other times the reverse is true. For example, music theory instructors may introduce the concept of chord progressions and musical forms before explaining chord construction and scales. Other instructors, however, may choose to introduce intervals, scale and chord construction before introduction chord progressions and musical forms. Again, different subjects may prefer one over the other which raises tension between departments or individual faculty when designing curriculum.

There are two types of learning: “learning by discovery, without the aid of others in respect of the matters being learned, [and] learning by instruction, with the aid of others in respect of the matters being learned” (Alder, 1942, p. 213). In a sense, teaching strategies (for discovery or for instruction) ask how far an instructor guides or intercedes in learning. This dictates how courses or programs are structured. Preference for one particular style of teaching in a subject or discipline may find opposition in a subject matter or field with a
different history of instructional strategies. In other words, even if educators agree on the purpose of education, they may still differ on how to reach those goals.

Instructional strategies may be classified as traditional or progressive (O’Neill, 1981). Traditional classroom procedures (such as, lecture, recitation, controlled study), predominately use drill as a means of establishing skill and understanding, favour teacher-determined and -directed learning, use examinations to measure specific skills and information learned, encourage healthy competition, stress the development of personal skills, as well as emphasise the restoration, preservation and adherence to educational principles and practices. Progressive teaching strategies cultivate practical and meaningful problems to develop problem-solving skills. Learning is simply an epilogue to purposeful and significant activities; learning is predominantly student-directed and evaluation is based on student’s behaviour in simulated real-life situations. Progressive teaching strategies encourage co-operation, give special attention to developing social competencies, and introduces new educational principles and practices that challenge conventional thought.

In an article titled “Interfaculty Differences in Classroom Teaching Behaviours and their Relationship to Student Instructional Ratings,” Erdle and Murray (1986) view all teaching strategies as being on a single continuum, from task-orientated styles at one end to people-orientated at the other. In general, instructors in the hard sciences were task orientated while those in the arts were interpersonal. Paul Axelrod (1973) also divides teaching strategies into two categories but labels them didactic and evocative. The didactic instructor is prone to tell students the information that is known (i.e., passive) while evocative teachers set up situations that allow students to “discover” information (i.e., active).
Weston and Cranton (1986) group instructional strategies into four categories depending on the kind and amount of student involvement. An instructor-centred approach, usually in the form of lecture, places much of the obligation for student learning on the teacher. Interactive methods distribute learning responsibility equally between the instructor and students through promoting discussion amongst students and between students and teacher. Individualised teaching methods provide a more intense involvement of both student and teacher as these allow the instructor to accommodate the different learning rates and styles of students. Finally, experiential instructional methods (the use activity to teach concepts or skills) places most of the responsibility for learning on students.

Dressel and Marcus (1982) also classify teaching styles into four categories, but use different criteria: discipline-centred teaching uses traditional methods such as lecture and text to cover concepts, principles, theories, and methods; instructor-centred teaching also uses traditional teaching strategies but the material introduced reflects the instructors interests and personality; student-centred cognitive teaching tends to use material that is of interest to the students in order to develop or train the mind; and student-centred affective teaching emphasises student participation as a means of cultivating the development of the whole person. Thus, teaching strategies are very much influenced by the educational outcomes sought. Again, preferences of the instructor may be modified due to changing circumstances or new insights or information encountered throughout their career. Dressel and Marcus also propose five elements that modify a teaching style. Instruction may emphasise or focus on: the major elements of a subject; the language of a discipline; the learning skills needed to understand a field; what is worth exploring and how it should be examined; or, the value and service of a field to society.
Unfamiliarity with different teaching strategies may put instructors or departments and administration at odds with each other. For example, administrators may force specific instructional guidelines on departments because they are cost efficient (such as large classes) which may conflict with disciplinary or professional requirements which call for smaller classes or individualised instruction. Likewise, instructors whose training and experience is limited to one or two different teaching methodologies, may not be as effective in reaching students who are conditioned by previous learning experiences. Although it may not be prudent for teachers to switch instructional strategies, an awareness and understanding of different modes of teaching may help teachers persuade students to adapt to new ways of thinking and learning.

Educators may not appreciate differences in teaching style if they are unaware of their colleague’s educational goals and the distinct content required to support those ends. The result is misunderstandings. Unfortunately, “faculty members do not seem able to respond favourably to curricular conceptions held by the academic culture to which they do not belong” (Stark, 1997, p. 162). Thus, Dressel and Marcus (1982) conclude that the real problem in teaching has little to do with a subject or discipline, but “rather that teachers, having become so immersed in the disciplines, no longer view themselves in relationship to the basic problems and concerns of mankind” (1982, p. xii).

Finally, “[o]nly a few faculty report pedagogical training” (Stark & Lattuca, 1997, p. 151). Instructors in higher education typically have little training in the art of pedagogy. (It is also ironic that a liberal education outcome is communication skills, yet training in communicating knowledge to learners is absent.) It is one thing to possess knowledge but another to pass it on in a form that will be readily absorbed by future generations. Of course,
both knowledge and the transmission of it are mutually co-dependent, just as teaching and learning are reciprocal.

Apart from general questions of theory, faculty members may be divided in their estimates of cognitive abilities and/or skills of students. If learning is the goal of teaching, we must next consider the influence of learners on academic planning.

Students

The fourth element that influences curriculum planning is faculty members' attitudes towards students. Because of limited resources, faculty in higher education must decide who should be admitted into programs. Underlying the problem of “access” is the debate between “nature versus nurture.”

One of the oldest controversies . . . has been between those who believe that nurture outstrips nature in determining what a child becomes and those who take the opposite view. Those who stress nurture believe that a baby can be moulded into any type of adult, if the appropriate conditions are provided. Those who stress the influence of nature through genetic endowment think that the type of environment in which a child is reared makes little difference because of the limits and influences of inborn characteristics. (Adeles, Hoffer, Klotman, 1984, pp. 98-99)

Faculty must somehow assess potential as well as ability. Furthermore, faculty must also, at best, speculate if student potential or ability will evolve into something constructive or worthwhile. For example, a student may demonstrate great skill but have little ambition or will to use their talent. Consequently, do educators support those who demonstrate attainments already realised or choose to groom individuals who may not possess the best skills but have potential in serving the community well? Closely related is the problem of whether individuals believe in themselves, leading others to have confidence in them, or do others believe in them first, allowing them to build confidence in themselves? What makes
these decisions particularly difficult is faculty perceptions and opinions of students are not infallible.

The conflict between achievement and ascription leads us to question how much influence faculty really have on student learning. Pace (1979), on the one hand, argues quality of student effort is the single most important factor in determining student progress and success. Learners ultimately determine their achievement. On the other hand, educational environmentalists argue compatibility between teaching styles and student learning and thinking styles have a greater importance if the learning is to be profitable, efficient, and effective. Nonetheless,

[a]fter much heat and little light on the question of nature versus nurture, it now seems evident that no clear answer is possible. The way humans act cannot be ascribed to single cause, even significant ones like nurture and heredity. Heredity interacts with the environment; both are present, and both are important. (Abeles, Hoffer, & Klotman, 1984, p. 101).

Perhaps genetic endowment indicates potential, but student attitude and educational environment determines the realisation of innate talent. For example, a student may possess an abundance of raw musical talent, but self-discipline, commitment, and expert assistance available to them, will determine how much talent will be realised.

If education is to promote intellectual development, faculty must be aware of the different stages of intellectual maturity. Instructors, especially in higher education, often assume students have reached a certain level of thinking. But what students ought to have achieved compared to where they are actually at is two different things. Similarly, students may be highly developed in one area, but loathsomely inadequate in another. "Stage theory" (Stark, 1997) describes the different levels of intellectual development. Perry's scheme (1970), for example, has four levels of intellectual development. Dualistic thinking is the first
level, which sees the world in absolutes. Issues are black or white, right or wrong. The second level of intellectual development is *multiplicity*, which sees issues from multiple perspectives. Issues are complex and seen as grey: right and wrong are not easily defined or determined. *Relativism* is the third level, where complexities of problems are acknowledged but some solutions are considered better than others. The final stage is *commitment*, in which decisions are made to follow a certain course of action.

If course content aims at mastery of the discipline or field, students are supposed to acquire the knowledge whether or not they are interested. But if faculty believe that knowledge is constantly expanding and acquiring new and unpredictable uses, the content chosen will take into account student interests. As an illustration, history instructors may sequence course material chronologically so students understand the development of musical thought, or they may introduce concepts from history students will identify most readily with before exploring new or different ideas on musical expression.

At the outset, faculty may not expect to deal with student interests and educational goals since learners are supposedly choosing institutions or programs that appeal to their educational interests. However, students are often naive about what is all involved in their pursuits. Furthermore, when personal needs and interests are discovered or re-examined and academic or professional demands are better understood, their interests often change.

To complicate matters, the growing North American emphasis on administering education like a business, where customer—that is, student—satisfaction is a criterion or standard of excellence, the confrontation between student interests and faculty beliefs about educational purpose and content is escalating. How do faculty members appease student interests and government guidelines when they conflict with disciplinary requirements or
professional expectations? The response, again, depends on faculty beliefs regarding educational aims: whether educators believe they serve learner needs, disciplinary interests, or occupational demands.

Instructors' beliefs about "learning" also affect perceptions of students. Belenky and associates (1986) describe two different kinds of learning: "separate knowing" and "connected knowing." Separate learning implies the learner detaches him- or herself from the ideas being learned. In other words, there is a separation of the self from the subject.

Knowledge is independent of application and important regardless of application, that is, objective. Connected learning relies on the relationship between the self and the subject. In this case, knowledge is defined by its application or usefulness. In this sense, knowledge is subjective since value is determined by its usefulness.

The motivations students have—or don't have—affect performance, thus influencing educators' attitudes toward students. Instructors often assume students are drawn to a subject for the same reasons they are. When students are not meeting the expectations instructors have for them, it is often assumed students lack motivation.

"Motivation is a tendency to initiate and persist in a certain activity" (Stark, 1997, p. 194). It can be external or internal. Again, there is an objective and a subjective element. On the one hand, there is ability; on the other, interest. Regardless, the "value of a task to an individual lies in its ability to fulfil the individual's intrinsic needs or to achieve desired extrinsic incentives" (Stark, 1997, p. 194). Harter (1985) proposes five interrelated elements that affect student motivation in the classroom: challenge, curiosity, mastery, independent judgement, and internal evaluative criteria. Challenge refers to an individual's preference for easy or demanding work. Curiosity refers to whether a student is satisfying his or her own
interests or trying to please others. *Mastery* refers to a student’s preference for either working alone or relying on others for assistance. *Independent judgement* refers to a student’s preference for making their own decisions or relying on the judgement of others. And *internal evaluative criteria* refers to how learners assess their performance. Thus, “motivation can influence students’ performance by modifying the effects of the learning strategies they select” (Stark, 1997, p. 193). But it is difficult for faculty to assess student motivation. It is unlikely they are aware, for example, of the economic, social or cultural motivations outside the classroom that affected a particular student’s educational decisions.

Educators may also assume students acquire, process, and store information the same way as themselves. Learners who do not demonstrate the same learning style might be assumed ignorant or less capable. However, individuals have different learning styles for imbibing knowledge and skills. For example, the “experiential learning theory” conceives four learning styles: the *Converger*, the *Diverger*, the *Assimilator*, and the *Accommodator*. *Convergers* are interested in “the practical application of ideas” (Kolb, 1981, p. 238) to specific problems. *Divergers* utilise an “imaginative ability” (Kolb, 1981, p. 238) in generating ideas. *Assimilators* create theoretical models while *Accommodators* are doers and risk takers, and excel in adapting to new situations. Kolb emphasises that no one falls into one category and we may not have the same preferences when we undertake different tasks or are in different situations.

In Kolb’s model, learning is broken down into four stages: concrete experience (CE), reflective observation (RO), abstract conceptualisation (AC), and active experimentation (AE). Thus, learners

must be able to involve themselves fully, openly, and without bias in new experiences (CE); they must be able to observe and reflect on these experiences from many
perspectives (RO); they must be able to create concepts that integrate their observations into logically sound theories (AC); and they must be able to use these theories to make decisions and solve problems (AE). (Kolb, 1981, 236)

It is difficult to be concrete and abstract or reflective and active at the same time. Instead, there is a constant shifting back and forth from one to another. Each end of the spectrum, then, possesses an “opposing definition of competence and strategies for achieving” (Kolb, 1981, p. 237).

Kolb’s research (1981) reveals different academic disciplines favour or foster certain learning styles. For example, business tends to be accommodative, engineering is convergent, math and physics favour an assimilative style, while history and English have divergent tendencies. Biglan’s research (1973a) also reveals certain learning styles are often associated with particular fields and educational background. Different music subjects may favour different learning experiences. For example, composers may tend to utilise imaginative abilities (divergers), performers with practical applications (convergers), theorists with theoretical models (assimilators), and artist managers with risk (accommodators). These categories are not pure or mutually exclusive. However, conflicts between faculty and students arise when educators assume everyone learns the same way.

Anthony Gregorc examines learning styles using a distinctive psychological theory. Gregorc contends that, some learners prefer information that is acquired through the senses. They are most comfortable with concrete or tangible information. But other learners are suspicious of the apparent solidity of the tangible and the abstract is considered more reliable. Similarly, the manner in which learners process information, that is, the ordering of it will also be different. Sequential learners will tend to order things in a linear, step-by-step fashion. Random learners will arrange information in groups with no apparent organisation.
Thus, Gregorc's model distinguishes four different types of learners: the Concrete Sequentialists, the Concrete Random Learners, the Abstract Sequentialists, and the Abstract Random Learners. Again, no learner fit exclusively into one category; in fact, depending on which area in our life, learners utilise different preferences in different situations as a means to understanding.

Similarly, faculty often assume students think or, at the very least, should think the same way as they do. But should instructors train students to think about problems in the tradition the discipline has, or should students be allowed to think in a different style? In *Thinking Styles* (1997), Robert Sternberg argues that the way people use their abilities may have more of an impact on their endeavours than on what abilities they possess. "A *style* is a way of thinking. It is not an ability, but rather, a preferred way of using the abilities one has. The distinction between style and ability is a crucial one. An ability refers to how well someone can do something. A style refers to how someone likes to do something" [italics original] (Sternberg, 1997, p. 8). In other words, it is not so much what abilities students have that determines "success," but how they use what they have.

Sternberg uses the model of "mental self-government" to illustrate different styles of thinking. The *legislative* mind creates laws or guidelines to deal with new or unusual problems. The *executive* thinker prefers to address problems where solutions are already developed or known. The *judicial* mind likes to evaluate the effectiveness of solutions that have been used to solve problems. For example, a composer writes a composition (legislative); a performer ponders how to interpret this new work (executive); the critic judges if the composition and/or interpretation is satisfying (judicial). Sternberg emphasises that all of us possess all of the above styles but depending on the circumstance, we tend to
rely on certain ways of thinking. A field, such as music, attracts all types of thinkers: legislative, executive, and judicial. Indeed, many tasks require all three types of thinking at different stages. For example, a composer will constantly evaluate his own work while composing, and will think about how an instrumentalist will interpret his work.

In the end, faculty must decide whether it is better to encourage students to develop different thinking styles, or teach in such a way as to match a student’s preferred thinking style.

When faculty are assessing student progress, how often are students considered unfit or mismatched because their thinking or learning style does not match those associated with a particular discipline or teacher? Differences in teaching and learning styles does not necessarily mean a student in the wrong field. Indeed, if educators endeavoured to understand differences in thinking and learning styles, they may gain a fresh perspective of their own field. Some of the best opportunities to learn are when students—and faculty—are forced to think differently. If “learning is about how people change concepts” (Stark, 1997, p. 189), we cannot think the same way as when the problem was created. It is equally disturbing to see faculty reject their peers and colleagues because they think differently.

With different ideas as to what educational goals are to be pursued, what content should be covered, what teaching strategies may be used, and different ways of regarding students, we must now examine what problems arise in evaluating different academic plans and results.
Evaluation

Evaluation is everywhere, and just as likely to produce disputes among teachers as theoretical differences. Without discussion of underlying theory, debate on evaluation will be unwieldy. If we evaluate a course or program in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, or relevancy, we must ask, effective, efficient, or relevant according to what ends? Different purposes imply various kinds of measurement.

According to Stark (1997), there are traditionally three kinds of evaluations: those used by the instructor to evaluate course and programs, those used to evaluate the overall curriculum of an institution by both faculty and administration, and finally, evaluations administered by outside the educational environment. In recent years, alternative evaluation models have been introduced, such as student-centred evaluation, which has added fuel to an hot political debate.

Although there is agreement as to what evaluation is, there is little consensus as to what evaluation measures. David Nevo notes there have been “many attempts . . . in recent years to clarify the meaning of evaluation” (1983, p. 117), but it is difficult to define since different kinds of evaluation are based on different kinds of assumptions and seek different kinds of information. For example, evaluations may be sought in order to seek improvement, justify a course or program, motivate desired behaviour, or wield authority (Nevo, 1983). Nevertheless, Gardner argues the “most prominent evaluation models, methodologies, or techniques can be generally classified within five major frameworks corresponding to five different basic definitions of evaluation” (1977, p. 572). The five general categories are: professional judgement; measurement; assessment of congruence between performance and objectives; decision-oriented; and goal-free/responsive evaluation.
Evaluation as professional judgement refers to the use of a qualified professional to assess information. For example, music critics are considered "experts" in assessing the artistic merit of recorded or live performances. Expert opinions are sought because it is easy to implement and an efficient way to evaluate since in-depth knowledge and insight should lead to sound judgement. However, the measures by which faculty evaluate students and courses vary considerably from one discipline to another. For instance, structured fields, such as science or math, "tend to emphasise acquisition of content rather than student development" (Stark, 1997, p. 270), while less structured fields, such as the humanities, "often resist . . . measures that seem not to elicit the types of learning they try to cultivate in students, such as critical thinking and value awareness" (Stark, 1997, p. 270). The assumption in professional evaluations is professionals are objective and possess the same values. However, their interpretation of the "facts" will undoubtedly reflect what the expert believes is or is not important in assessing the data. Thus, experts can arrive at totally different conclusions even though they are reviewing the same information. For example, two music critics may review a concert or recording and yet have two very different opinions of the performance. In other words, the results of the evaluation may not be easily reproduced.

Evaluation as measurement means to "measure results, effects, or performance using some type of formalised instrument which produces data that can be compared to some sort of standardised scale" (Gardner, 1977, p. 575). This kind of assessment focuses on the data collected and provides meaningful comparison. The validity of this type of evaluation is high since results can be easily replicated. However, it assumes that data provides the best information for making decisions, and that the standard to which results are being compared
to is appropriate. Furthermore, the data collected may not shed much light on the decisions being made. For instance, a result from a music entrance exam may evaluate academic aptitude but not reflect musical ability or talent. Finally, "variables that are not easily measured, such as the personal enrichment a person may receive from going to college, continue to be treated by measurement experts as intangibles and/or relatively unimportant" (Gardner, 1977, p. 589).

The assessment of congruence between performance and objectives defines evaluation as "the comparison of performance or product with previously stated standards or performance, goals, or objectives" (Gardner, 1977, p. 586). Essentially, this kind of evaluation is an assessment of competency and thus end-product orientated. It assumes the best evaluations are examinations of achievement, the objectives are identifiable and worthy pursuits, and the criteria for assessing performance are clear or apparent. Technique juries required of music majors is but one example of this kind of evaluation. The drawback with competency based evaluations is that not all worthy goals are simple or easily defined in a complex society. Learning how to learn, for example, is not easily assessed. Finally, unexpected outcomes may not match objectives and end-product orientation ignores intermediary results.

Decision-oriented evaluation is defined as "delineating, obtaining and providing useful information [on an ongoing basis] for judging decision alternatives" (Gardner, 1977, p. 586). Thus, evaluation and decision making are cyclical or continuous rather than final. This kind of assessment requires an information system that identifies the kind of information needed, a scheme to procure the information, and a means of making the information available. The assumption is decision making is logical or rational, but as we
often witness, "the application of rational analysis in public decision making appears to be rather limited" (Gardner, 1977, p. 590). Similarly, not all relevant information is quantifiable, so decisions are not always calculable.

Goal-free or responsive evaluation is defined as the "identification and judgement of actual outcomes, irrespective of goals, standards, etc., and/or the concerns of constituents (Gardner, 1977, p. 586). Assessments, then, are not based on results compared with predetermined ideals, nor are any particular outcomes regarded as more important than others. Thus, endeavours may lead to different ends because they are not encumbered by predetermined objectives. The assessment of original music compositions or artwork would fit into this category. The assessment is qualitative since it draws "conclusions and descriptive information out of the observations and reactions of the persons involved" (Gardner, 1977, p. 585). However, a basic assumption in this type of evaluation is true or genuine results can easily be identified. For example, it is difficult to determine whether a new composition is good. The lack of formal measurements also places much responsibility on the evaluator to glean and interpret information. The emphasis, then, is on the collection of information rather than on the results. This approach undermines the validity of the results, since the relative lack of structure may be difficult to replicate. There has been more than one instance where artistic works were not well received in their day but were recognised by later generations for its artistic merit. Ultimately, this type of evaluation implies a comparison, so a standard must be referred to at some point when assessing worth. Finally, unintended outcomes might be evaluated as being negative, and it may take "several years after commencement for graduates to recognise positive and negative unintended consequences" (Stark, 1997, p. 296).
In summary, different evaluations have different purposes. Program evaluations seek accountability of resources in order to justify program or course existence. Formative evaluations are used to improve planning and help with decision making while illuminative evaluations help increase understanding (Stark, 1997). The purposes of these different methods are very much interrelated and often overlap but different information dictates a different focus and/or means of inquiry. Tensions occur between, for example, faculty and administrators, when different groups appeal to different evaluation schemes to justify their position.

Evaluation affects some components of curriculum planning and development more than others. For example, "[c]ourse purposes and objectives are quite stable and are least often adjusted but the specific discipline content used to achieve the objectives may be adjusted" (Stark, 1997, p. 273). In addition, with increasing awareness of different learning, thinking and teaching styles, as well as rapid changes in technology, teaching methods are also changing much more rapidly. As purpose and content expand, new evaluation methods are also being introduced. As a result, quantitative methods, such as evaluations as measurement, are being supplemented or replaced by qualitative methods, such as goal-free or responsive evaluations, that focus on educational experience rather than results (Stark, 1997).

Up to this point, we have considered evaluation from the instructor’s perspective, but student opinions have come to play an important part in evaluation. Since instructor input does not necessarily translate into student output, student-centred evaluation is crucial in planning the curriculum. Student-centred evaluation “attempts to determine whether, from the students’ perspective, an academic plan turns out to be useful, beneficial, and satisfying
(Stark, 1997, p. 291). Students perspectives and opinions are important because they can shed light on the appropriateness and effectiveness of teaching. “By understanding students’ expectations, professors can better help them understand the academic field and connect principles and theories they are teaching with personal dilemmas that people, in general, face during life and work” (Stark, 1997, p. 291).

On the surface, “asking students what they want from a course or program may seem like opening Pandora’s box, but it can provide useful information for adjusting courses and programs” (Stark, 1997, p. 291). Also, encouraging student involvement may lead to better effort as well as greater personal responsibility for learning. For instance, since music students have input in setting criteria for evaluation, such as selecting compositions to be performed in a recital, they take greater responsibility because they have set the goals to be pursued. But what happens when student interests and course expectations differ? When objectives of the individual are different than those of society, it is difficult to decide which evaluation scheme to use. If evaluation standards are set at the discretion of faculty, consistency in professional standards between instructors, programs, and institutions is difficult to maintain. With no consistency, how do schools or professions maintain educational standards? Similarly, student failure does not mean the instructor has failed or the curriculum is inadequate. Students also must take some responsibility for learning. However, how or can we evaluate student effort? If students work hard at doing the wrong thing, effort or personal achievement cannot be an adequate evaluation of the work done.

One final aspect of student-centred evaluations that has not been addressed very much is self assessments. “Of all the judgements we pass in life, none is as important as the one we pass on ourselves” (Branden, 1994, xv). Self evaluations can often override external
perspectives and impede learning. It is extremely difficult for faculty to deal with internal
evaluations since there are so many factors outside the walls of formal education which affect
student self-esteem.

Since there are a variety of programs and post-secondary institutions, each having
different mandates, evaluations of educational programs and institutions must consider the
educational aims they seek; otherwise, fair assessment may prove impossible. For example,
with community colleges in British Columbia being transformed or converted into university
colleges, the question arises as to whether these institutions are for teaching or research? As
the responsibilities for these institutions are being redefined, evaluating their effectiveness is
increasingly problematic. The evaluation is further complicated when financial instability
requires institutions to enter the marketplace, a position from which many educational
institutions have traditionally been removed. Conflict of interest issues are a concern when
publicly funded educational institutions begin competing with private business in the market
place. Are institutions (and programs and courses) to be evaluated on the basis of how much
money they make, or by their role in educating citizens?

In summary, evaluations are influenced by a number of factors including: how we
define evaluation; what purpose evaluation serves (improvement, accountability, motivation,
authority); what we evaluate (students, programs, instructional materials); what information
we collect (outcomes, descriptions, judgements); what criteria we use to determine what
should be evaluated; what methods we use to evaluate; who benefits from the evaluation;
who does the evaluation; and how we assess the evaluation itself (Nevo, 1983). As a result,
how we assess educational outcomes and the validity or worth of an evaluation will be
affected by faculty’s beliefs and values regarding educational purpose, content, learners, and instructional methods.

Conclusions

Educational aims, content, methods of teaching, students, and methods of evaluation are not exclusive of one another. The overlap and interplay between the different areas is evident. Faculty aims will affect content and methods of teaching; content and ability and perception of learners will influence teaching strategies; teaching methods will determine the kinds of evaluations we use; evaluation will cause us to re-think educational purpose; and so on. The interdependence of each element is unquestionable. The potential for conflict between faculty—even within the same discipline—is huge.

If faculty, administrators, government representatives, and students are to have meaningful and productive dialogue, all must understand the other’s beliefs, values, and interests. If undergraduate students are “expected to explain and define [a] concept, including competing versions of it, research its origins, probe its theoretical strengths and weaknesses, examine it in practice, and, finally, assess its virtues” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 36), shouldn’t those concerned with planning the curriculum be required to do the same? Must not faculty possess the “ability to assess the legitimacy of competing ideas” (Axelrod, 2002, p. 39) in curriculum planning or development? Without this awareness, we cannot develop a balanced curriculum that will meet the short- or long-term needs of society or the individual. How can faculty expect students to be critical thinkers when they themselves, in making curriculum, do not practice what they preach? Furthermore, if faculty are unwilling to learn how different educational beliefs contribute to their own beliefs and understandings, they are
truly ignorant since it is, in part, different beliefs that help define their own position. As Axelrod writes:

Playing devil’s advocate by arguing a position in opposition to one’s own perspective is a useful exercise for professors and students. Doing so enables one to grasp how “practice developed historically out of a process of deliberate, evolutionary effort to resolve the puzzles and paradoxes, the limitations, of earlier usages and understandings.” (2002, p. 40)

Or, as Mark Kingwell argues, “we must examine our beliefs, not merely hold them” (qtd. in Axelrod, 2002, p. 40). Otherwise, “people talk at one another but never have a genuine dialogue” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 19).

This discussion has been predominantly a theoretical one. In order to understand the enormity of the problem of single vision lenses in curriculum design and development, it would be best to now look at an example of how these issues play out in a specific educational debate. The next chapter examines how different beliefs as to what “liberal education” is has led to much confusion and conflict amongst music educators.
Chapter 3 - Conflicting Beliefs about Liberal Education

Heated exchanges occur between people with distinct educational interests and outlooks. But what about amongst faculty within the same discipline who supposedly share the same views? For example, music faculty often argue the importance of music education on the grounds it is a component of a good “liberal” education. On the surface, there is a superficial agreement with this argument, but once instructors are forced to explain their understanding of “liberal” education, deep seated beliefs begin to surface. Silent conflicts and the resulting tensions often undermine constructive and meaningful talk in higher education. A survey of literature on liberal education helps to make this point. This chapter explores conflicting conceptions of liberal education and probes the relationship among them, if any.

Liberal Education - Nebulous but Necessary

There is an assumption, broadly speaking, that the concept of “liberal” education is universally understood and agreed upon. Yet, the term is inconsistently used and seldom defined. In fact, “[t]here are almost as many characterisations of the meaning of the liberal arts as there have been writers upon the theme” (Kimball, 1986, p. 204). The multiple definitions have been both the cause and the effect of much confusion. In his book, Orators and Philosophers, Bruce Kimball surveys the different concepts of liberal education. He observes that understandings of the term, although “implicitly non-vocational and non-technical, . . . can range from ‘pragmatist-progressivist’ to ‘humanist-traditionalist.’” (Kimball, 1986, p. 7). He concludes that the definitions yield much “contradiction and
confusion; and the more that is written, the more confounded things become” (Kimball, 1986, p. 9). Ahlgren and Boyer illustrate the point:

Sometimes “liberal” seems to mean only that students must choose courses from many different departments. Sometimes it means that students must take a certain set of subjects—for example, Latin, algebra, or philosophy. Sometimes there are special courses with integrated or interdisciplinary content explicitly contrived to be liberal. Sometimes liberal seems to imply that some methods of instruction are intrinsically liberalising, regardless of subject matter (e.g., when courses are conducted in ways that will develop liberal perspectives and skills). Sometimes liberal seems to be simply a label for whatever it is that the faculty value and think students should learn. And sometimes the claim of liberal seems to mean no more than the faith of the faculty that whatever they do will be liberalising. (1981, p. 174)

One writer even suggests liberal education cannot be taught or learnt but, rather, is a by-product of education (Moulakis, 1994). Since the concept of liberal education has changed so frequently throughout history, Rosemary Parks concludes, “it would be difficult indeed to define with any exactitude ... what is included in and what is excluded from liberal education” (1986, p. 106).

Usually, each definition of liberal education makes a justificatory appeal to history. It usually follows one of three lines of thinking (Kimball, 1986). The first strain is the “liberal education” associated with the kind of education bestowed upon the young, male, privileged, free citizens of Greece. Two veins of thought enter into this tradition: the liberal-free idea and the artes liberalis. The liberal-free rationale is usually characterised as the concept of “pursuing knowledge for its own sake,” and is sometimes associated, whether appropriately or not, with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. This is the idea of education as a course of study with no particular end in mind. The mind is not limited in its musings to a particular outcome but may “transcend one’s ordinary ends-in-view and contemplate unseen ends” (Kimball, 1981, p. 289). The artes liberalis, on the other hand, is associated with the adoption of
traditional values and beliefs; that is, the identification, revival, affirmation, preservation, and perpetuation of long-established customs.

The second strain rests on a particular historical etymology of the word *liberalis*. Although it is possible to trace the word “liberal” back to ancient Greece, agreement as to what constituted its content and character was not reached until much later in history.

Kimball explains:

Origins of the education or arts called “liberal” lie in the *artes liberales*, a curriculum known to the Middle Ages as the normative program that an educated person would have studied. The formation of this normative program can best be attributed to Latin antiquity, despite the popular modern appeal to ancient Athens, because in Greek antiquity there existed a variety of approaches out of which relative consensus was achieved only in Roman times. Although etymological, curricular, and theoretical antecedents of the *artes liberales* existed in Athens, the normative program appeared only in the later period; and its rationale in Rome owed more to orators like Cicero than to philosophers like Socrates. In fact, even if the argument about Latin versus Greek consensus is denied, the lineage of the normative approach toward *artes liberales* can better be traced to Isocrates than to Plato and Aristotle, as is often done by the schoolmen of the modern academy. (Kimball, 1986, p. 206)

If Kimball is correct, we can only conclude that when defining liberal education, appeals to Greek antiquity are based on assumptions rather than fact. These historically based definitions are really tacit personal beliefs, cleverly disguised by an appeal to history, about what liberal education ought to be.

The third strain derives from the Greek term *enkuklios paideia*, often translated “general” education. If the use and meaning of the term “liberal education” seems elusive, the search is further complicated when the term “general education” is used as a substitute for “liberal education” (Kimball, 1986). To make matters worse, the concept of “general education” is subject to as many definitions as “liberal education.” B.L. summarises the wide variety of perspectives that also plague the term “general” education:
General education has been described as “that education which leads to an understanding of the major fields of knowledge and the interrelationships between them.” It has been referred to as simply “the nonspecialized and nonvocational education which should be the heritage of all.” It has been defined as “education for the common life,” as an “education educating a man’s humanity rather than indulging his individuality,” and as “that form of education which prepares people for their common activities as citizens in a free society.” Some definitions stress fields of learning and their relationships. Some see it as a core of absolutes to be found in the “Great Books.” Some emphasise the common needs and activities of students—some the needs of society and the demands it places on all citizens. Others recognise both the characteristics of students and of society. Some regard general education as a process of learning, others as a combination of content and process. Some think of it as a means of developing the whole personality and conditioning its behaviour. From the diversity of these and other descriptions and definitions emerges, however, a search for unity, for synthesis, a recognition of common needs and opportunities.” (1952, p. 19)

Thus, the third strain of thinking about liberal education is confused. On the one hand, the terms “liberal” and “general” appear to be the same or similar in meaning (for example, both approaches emphasise studying standard works and preparing a person for citizenship). On the other hand, the terms are often treated as two separate concepts. The “persistent mushiness in the distinctions between general education and liberal education” (Kimball, 1986, p. 192) has added much confusion when we try to define the concept of liberal education.

Despite the differences between these three strains of thought, they are not wholly distinct; the “theoretical, etymological, and curricular” (Kimball, 1986, p. 16) arguments certainly do overlap.

The Appeal to History Questioned

The appeal to history in defending and defining liberal education is open to question. Why is the original meaning, whatever it may be, assumed to be better than a contemporary redefining of the term? Although it is certainly important to recognise that “[o]ur thoughts
are not necessarily the thoughts of our ancestors, and integrity of context must be respected" (Kimball, 1986, p. 3), must we not also recognise previous limitations of past understandings as well as reflect present circumstances? In fact, a current understanding of the term is a result of redefinition. Martha Nussbaum explains how the evolution of the idea of liberal education began to be reshaped early on in history:

The word *liberalis* in the traditional phrase meant "suited for the freeborn gentleman." Seneca begins his letter by announcing that he will call that understanding of the term into question. For the only kind of education that really deserves the name *liberalis*, or, as we might literally render it, "freelike," is one that makes its pupils free, able to take charge of their own thought and to conduct a critical examination of their society's norms and traditions. (1997, p. 30)

Kimball notes that spite of its early introduction, the idea did not solidify in Europeanised societies until the eighteenth century:

[The] distinction between meanings of the term "free" is reflected in the etymological development of "liberal" in the vernaculars, as evident, for example, in English. In sixteenth-century England, the word was applied to the activities of gentlemen who were free by virtue of having leisure, in line with the historical tradition of *liberalis*. "Liberal" also meant "free from restraint, free in speech or action"; but this was usually intended in a pejorative sense of "unrestrained by prejudice or decorum, licentious." Only in the eighteenth century did this latter meaning take on the positive connotations of "free from narrow prejudice, open-minded." (1986, p. 115)

Whatever the case, I do not think appeals to the earliest understandings of liberality are unbiased or objective just because they are historicised. The arguments simply have a bias towards a particular belief about what education should be. History is used simply to masquerade a particular educational philosophy. Historical precedent should not and cannot always serve as justification for a particular idea. Similarly, different philosophies of education, as found in history, are by no means perfect in the eyes of modern society. So, if we do redefine the term, what parameters—if any—should be placed on its new meaning? How far do we go in respecting history, and to what extent do we reflect modern thought?
The Effect of Values on Perception

The concept of liberal education is widely acknowledged, yet, as previously noted, it generates confusion. “Indeed, scholars themselves have always disagreed about what liberal education is and how it ought to be pursued, and those debates still carry on” (Axelrod, 2002. p. 4). The absence of agreement and precision in defining “liberal” is frustrating and confining. Without a universally agreed definition, systematic investigation, interpretation, and application are difficult. Yet, confusion may not be such a bad thing, since the diversity of understandings may allow us to explore the concept to its fullest extent. It could be argued each definition—or perspective—is but one facet of the overall concept, with each reflecting a different value of what education ought to be. Perhaps each person looks at the same elements, the same concepts, but fuses the historical facts in a slightly different manner in order to defend a particular educational theory.

Each definition, then, embodies values and beliefs about education. Indeed, much of the discourse on liberal education is written not to analyse but to persuade. There is an assumed definition which educators wish to justify rather than explore the entire body of evidence. Still, one cannot help but wonder or question why such diverse understandings of liberal education persist. The different understandings of the term make discussions difficult and the heated exchanges between the various camps are usually a result of failing to spell out clearly the assumptions, influences, and educational values that define a particular position. The question that still remains is, what are the influences that shape the various positions?
What we value—that is, the relative worth or importance something has to other alternatives—affects what information we choose to consider, how we interpret and communicate it. There are many things we may personally value. "Our values don’t determine whether something will appeal to us nearly as much as they determine how that thing will appeal to us" (Cathcart, 1998, p. 43, Italics in the original). How personal values affect perception is a major problem that has practically been ignored in the writings on liberal education.

Writers appealing to the concept of liberal education do so for a wide range of political motives. For example, Martha Nussbaum, in her book, Cultivating Humanity, repeatedly makes reference to the importance of education in preparing students for citizenship. Her concern for and interest in “building a curriculum for world citizenship” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 70) reflects the value she places on community and social matters. Peter Emberley, on the other hand, defends quite vigorously his concern for the university as “an institution formed to cultivate intellectual and spiritual passion, discerning moral judgement, imagination and the methodic discipline” (Emberley, 1996, p. 14). His writing reflects the value he places on knowledge, understanding, and discovery. In addition, his strong reaction to the business approach in the Canadian education system reflects the lesser importance of wealth in his hierarchy of values regarding education.

However, the belief that the aim of liberal education is to develop the rational mind has not escaped criticism. The contention centres around the premise that meaning or understanding is limited to the realm of logic. Charles Bailey (1984), for example, points out that the emphasis on one type of understanding, that is, the rational, is conducive to certain fields of knowledge (such as the sciences), but not to the creative arts and other fields in
which the primary means or ways of knowing are neither analytical or sequential. Recalling Philip Phenix’s *Realms of Meaning*, Bailey says knowledge is “narrowly construed” (1984, p. 83) if it is only conceived as a product of reason and logic.

The life of feeling, conscience, imagination, and other processes that are not rational in the strict sense are excluded by such a construction, and the idea of man as a rational animal in the strict sense is accordingly rejected for being too one-sided. (1984, p. 83)

If we tried to understand dance, painting, or music solely in terms of rational processes, our appreciation and perception of these fields would be severely limited. Can there not be an unconscious understanding, and ways of knowing, that are liberal rather than analytical and rational? As Bennett Reimer contends, there are many ways for humans to “‘know’ about reality” (1970, p. 9). Phenix is thus challenging those who give logic supremacy in the hierarchy of values.

John White also extends the idea of different ways of knowing even further when he argues that “practical matters” or “skills” that enable a person to negotiate obstacles must be addressed if liberal education is truly to be liberal (Bailey, 1984). Obviously, the importance of control and recognition, and perhaps, to a lesser extent, physical experience, is the underlying value in this proposal.

The idea of choice in terms of different ways of knowing and learning underscores the unavoidable presence of beliefs and values. Decisions and resulting actions are ultimately based on what is regarded as most important. However, sometimes these choices are based on conditions rather than ideals. Awareness of these different influences that affect are values and beliefs is paramount if faculty are to make informed decisions when planning curriculum.
The Problem of Bias

In his book, *The Seven Sins of Memory*, Daniel Schacter describes four types of biases that should be considered in understanding how the lens through which we look refracts our perceptions: *consistency and change biases*, *hindsight biases*, *egocentric biases*, and *stereotypical biases*. The first, *consistency and change bias*, describes how our present ideas and beliefs about concepts can lead us to reconstruct our view in such a way as to align with or differentiate from a previously held position. For example, we may refer to a historical figure or idea as proof that our own ideas are still the same, or, as the argument warrants, that they are different. This type of bias is often reflected in arguments that use historical appeals to justify a particular position. Schacter notes that it is very difficult—if not impossible—to determine how ideas took form in the mind of a historical figure, or how they came to think they way they did. The context and thus the understanding will undoubtedly be different.

The second bias, *hindsight*, describes how perception is filtered by information we already hold. In other words, we build a perspective that aligns with knowledge we already possess. Schacter demonstrates that a part of this process is the problem of selective recall in which we choose only the information that is consistent with our current beliefs. The drawback is that it can severely limit us from experiencing and embracing new bits of information that could broaden as well as sharpen our perspective. The hindsight bias prevents us from embracing or fully participating in new ideas or understandings.

In exploring the problems of tracing the idea of liberal education through history, Bruce Kimball marks this particular problem of hindsight bias:

Another variant of the approach assuming historical continuity in liberal education might be termed the a priori definition. Here, one largely ignores how, when or by whom the words “liberal education” or “liberal arts” were used and begins with an a
priori idea of what “liberal education” ought to mean. Then one follows the
development of that idea and calls it the history of liberal education. (1986, p. 8)

In hindsight one uses history to justify a particular understanding of liberal education.

Historical appeals are often selective in facts referred to or ignored. Kimball illustrates the
hindsight bias:

The *artes liberales* accommodation, then, accounts for one of the conflicting
interpretations of the historical origins of liberal education. . . . To this
accommodation must be attributed the widespread tendency to assert that “the notion
of a liberal education was introduced by the Greeks,” meaning Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle. . . . [T]his contention is difficult to defend; it has little or no historical basis.
It stems rather from the circular reasoning of its advocates, who begin with the
presumption that liberal education ought to mean, most fundamentally, training in
analytical and critical thinking. Since the origins of such training can rightfully be
attributed to Greek philosophers, it is inferred that these philosophers introduced
liberal education. But what such statements actually mean is that a kind of training
introduced by Greek philosophers was introduced by Greek philosophers. Or, the
statements tell about the origins of what some people think liberal education *ought* to
be. In either case, they do not necessarily give information about the origins of liberal
education because the question of what liberal education might have been or meant is
not considered. (1986, p. 222)

An appeal to specific historical facts should give one pause.

Kimball expounds the problem of change and consistency bias as well as hindsight
bias (what Kimball labels “a priori definition”) when he discusses the term “liberal
education” and the idea of freedom. As discussed earlier, originally the term “liberal” was
conceived and used by the Greeks to reflect the social and political position of an Athenian;
that is, a person who was a “free” citizen and not a slave. Later “the Socratic principle of
self-control transferred the contrast between freedom and slavery to the inner moral world. It
implied a new freedom: a spiritual freedom from the irrational drives of the baser self”
(Ahlgren & Boyer, 1981, p. 173). Thus, the Socratics redefined the term to better reflect their
own philosophical position, which promoted the “liberating or a freeing of the mind to
pursue truth” (Kimball, 1986, p. 8).
A third type of bias, *egocentric bias*, refers to our inclination to program new knowledge in such a way that we overstate or disparage information in order to enhance or inflate our own position. We are not neutral observers and it is not uncommon for us to slightly alter information in order to better position ourselves in a way that bolsters our own image. In an educational environment in which the demands for funding is exceedingly high but the resources are extremely scarce, faculty are constantly trying to position themselves in the best light possible.

Finally, there is the problem of *stereotyping*. This bias involves relying on convention to process and categorise information. Since it takes considerable effort to analyse new material, it is easier to fall back on “generic descriptions of past experiences” (Schacter, 2001, p. 153). Difficult analysis lends itself to a reliance on assumptions or previous understandings, but when these general descriptions deviate from the actual thing, situation, event, or idea, our perspective will be distorted. Charles Bailey hints at the potential problem of stereotyping when he discusses ideas that are simply accepted but not understood:

Persons enter into a world already perceived through the understandings, meanings and practices shaped and modified by countless generations of persons before them, and these understandings have themselves to be understood by young persons, not merely received as passed on to them. (1984, p. 107)

The key point is that information that is not linked to understanding insulates the person from seeing and/or experiencing the world. Beliefs of this nature become limiting because they can be a substitution for what is fact, regardless of whether this fact be intellectual, emotional, spiritual or physical.

It is important to realise each of us brings certain assumptions or biases into our perspective. This cannot be avoided. However, it is imperative educators not only analyse the forces that shape their understanding, but also be explicit about the assumptions and beliefs
from which they are operating. This is particularly important when faculty are defending
music education on the grounds that it is an important part of a liberal education. Appealing
to the importance of music because it is a means to global understanding, or helps students
think effectively, or emphasises the learning of great ideas, or simply is personally enriching,
are conflicting educational aims, which leads to further disagreements regarding choice of
content, teaching strategies, attitudes towards students, and types of evaluation.

Thinking and Learning Styles

The way we think and learn also affects the way we communicate ideas and concepts.
We seldom recognise that, in spite of our very best intentions, we usually communicate in a
way that reflects our approach to understanding liberal education—the way things makes
sense to us. Cynthia Ulrich Tobias illustrates:

If I spoke to you in Russian but you didn’t know the Russian language, you wouldn’t
understand me. If I noticed your bewildered expression, I might slow down and
repeat my Russian phrase more clearly and in a louder tone. But despite my best
efforts, no matter how many times I repeated it, how well I articulated it, or how
loudly I spoke, as long as I continued to speak Russian, the chances are pretty remote
that you would understand what I was saying. (1994, p. 13)

As we approach liberal education with our particular our values and beliefs, it is risky to
assume those with whom we communicate share our view. Even those who speak the same
language will not see the subject in quite the same way, because of the way they process
information. Yet we all are gazing at the same subject—the same picture.

If we concede that each individual has her own thinking and learning style,
understandings of liberal education may be better explained as different ways of seeing. Like
two colours painted side-by-side on a canvas, the “facts” are seen separately when we are
close, but when viewed from a distance, our eyes optically fuse the colours together creating
another colour. Depending on how the light hits the canvas, slightly different shades will be seen. Similarly, the “facts” of liberal education are interpreted will ultimately depend on how we perceive them.

With so many perspectives and understandings of liberal education, all of which can be further distorted to reflect personal positions, it is tempting to conclude that any attempt to fully understand the topic would be futile. However, there may be some commonality between the different understandings of liberal education. Perhaps the tensions between different ideas of liberal education support and enhance each other.

The Inter-relationship of Ideas and Understandings

Ahlgren and Boyer propose that “‘educators’ ideas about liberal education, their ways of thinking and talking about it, really are rooted in one or another different preferred aspects of education” (1981, p. 176). They argue that each position of liberal education can ultimately be categorised into one of three areas of interest: intent, content, and consequence. Their illustration of a person discharging a gun and seriously harming another graphically illustrates the inter-relationship between intent, content, and consequence:

Most people would agree that some evil lies in the very act of shooting in someone’s direction (content), some lies in the seriousness of injury (consequence), and some lies in the hunter’s state of mind at the time he fired his rifle (intent). In judging the hunter, however, many people would choose to dwell mainly on only one of the three aspects—the one they value most highly. (1981, p. 176)

Thus, those interested in intent will focus on the “aims” or “purposes” of liberal education and are what Algren and Boyer label “intentionalists”. At the same time, those interested in content will be concerned with subject matter and method of delivery. Algren and Boyer divide the “content enthusiasts” into three subgroups: “particularists” are interested in a
specific subject; “distributionists” are interested in a variety of subjects; and “methodists” interests lie in teaching methods. Finally, those interested in consequences are labelled “consequentialists.” They are primarily concerned with expertise, whether it be artistry, technical brilliance, or personal character. The final product and how we evaluate it are the main concern.

Each element finally affects the others; therefore, the understanding of the other factors also helps us better understand our own interest. To isolate one component leads to a misunderstanding of that very element. Ideally then, any definition or understanding of liberal education should show the interdependence of all elements.

The Tension of Opposites in Historical Perspective

In Orators and Philosophers, Bruce Kimball argues the history of “liberal education” is really the debate between two views of education: the pursuit of knowledge or inquiry (the philosophers), and the expression or dissemination of knowledge (the orators). Although labels change, the main beliefs and values of each side remain the same. The two positions are summarised:

In the liberal-free ideal, skeptical doubt undermines all certainty, casting individuals entirely upon their own intellect for judgments that can never finally be proven true. Consequently, the views of others must be tolerated and respected equally, while all beliefs must change and develop over time. Logic and mathematics, which hone the intellect, and experimental science, which teaches the honed intellect to turn old truths into new hypotheses for further testing, form the core of the curriculum designed to graduate the scientist and researcher who loves knowledge and therefore pursues it without end. (Kimball, 1986, p. 219)

In the artes liberales ideal, a presumption of certitude underlies the identification of virtues and standards reposed in classical texts; and the commitment is thereby demanded, identifying an elite who embrace the virtues and preserve them as leaders of society. The foundation of the curriculum lies in the study of language and letters, required in order for the student to fathom the texts and then to express their lessons
in public forums as advocates, statesmen, preachers, or professors. (Kimball, 1986, pp. 218-219)

There are allegiances to one or the other perspectives because of a subject field's tradition and nature but either position can be defended in any discipline.

The fundamental premise of the liberal-free perspective is "knowledge is not fixed or final" (Kimball, 1986, p. 161). The philosopher, according to the liberal-free idea, essentially contends that "[a]n education is . . . never a mere acquisition, be it of tools or of objects of knowledge, but the maturation of an understanding and the heightening and refining of the desire to know" (Moulakis, 1994, p. 2). In other words, it is the journey and not the destination that is the primary concern of the philosophical position. There is distrust and scepticism of tradition. Blind acceptance of thoughts and ideas is discouraged through critical thinking. In simpler terms, the authority of tradition is often challenged.

However, scepticism of the past is a double edged sword. The liberal-free idea's strong inclination to challenge tradition disregards the fact that there is a history of thought and understanding that has contributed to the critic's present position. The philosopher's current understandings are often realised because they are a consequence or an outgrowth of previous knowledge and perceptions. There are standards regarding research methods, thus establishing a protocol, and new understandings lead to the formation of a new canon of knowledge which can hardly be separated from the research just undertaken. In other words, we are able to explore new truths because previous wisdom has been the catalyst and gateway for new thoughts. After all, intellectual discovery requires techniques of reasoning as well as imagination.

However, the philosopher's blind faith in formal reasoning is risky. We might think that drawing general conclusions from particular incidents is free of prior assumptions; but,
for example, the multitude of different conclusions that can be drawn from empirical data undermines this argument. If we take the philosopher’s distrust of inherited knowledge one step further, is not the tradition of reason and intellect an impediment? Are there not other kinds and ways of knowing and understanding that may be outside the realm of reason and intellect? The paramount importance given to intellectual pursuits as a path to enlightenment reflects a Western philosophical value; however, other cultures consider other ways of knowing (for example, intuition) to be of equal importance. Besides, if liberal education is truly liberal in the sense of freeing our beings, must we not acknowledge ways of knowing other than through the intellect? Are there not paths to understanding that are not revealed through rational or intellectual pursuits? As the mathematician Henri Poincaré claims, “It is by logic you prove, but by intuition that you discover.”

The orator’s objective (the artes liberalis perspective) is to identify and relay truth. The essential premise is that truth is permanent and omniscient. “[T]he oratorical mind and artes liberales ideal emphasise the investigation of the best of tradition and the public expression of what is good and true, rather than the discovery of new knowledge” (Kimball, 1986, p. 237). According to this perspective, the task of the instructor is to present concepts, principles, theories and methods for learners to imbibe. Martha Nussbaum further explains the value of understanding past thoughts and beliefs:

Books, including some of the great texts from the past of one’s own culture, can indeed tone up the slack mind, giving it both the information it needs to think well and examples of excellent argument. Literacy, including cultural literacy, confers both strength and independence, if viewed as a kind of essential training and nourishment, not as itself the goal. (1997, p. 35)
The assumption underlying the *artes liberales* position is that "classical" texts are fundamental and lasting, and the reading of these texts will develop critical thinking, value judgement making, and problem solving.

The orators' weakness, however, is their blind faith that moral righteousness or excellence dwells in past findings and understandings. As Nussbaum also points out, "Books are not 'alive.' At best, they are reminders of what excellent thinking is like, but they certainly cannot think" (1997, p. 34). She adds that "books, though valuable as reminders of arguing, can be harmful if used as authorities" (1997, p. 34). Books, in other words, are a means and not an end to critical thought. Allan Bloom further observes, "it is foolish to believe that book learning is anything like the whole of education" (1987, p. 21). And as Bailey warns, truth that "gets cut off from its justificatory base . . . becomes dead dogma" (1984, p. 62). Thus educators, even if they "know" something is true, cannot simply be consumed with the transmission of facts since the understanding of how those facts came to be understood is absent.

The problem . . . is not that the major has failed to deliver certain kinds of knowledge, but that it often has delivered knowledge without exposing students to the methods and modes of inquiry that created that knowledge, the presuppositions that inform it, and the consequences of its particular ways of knowing. (Lattuca and Stark, 1994, p. 406)

Bailey further elaborates:

To involve pupils in knowledge is to involve them in the evidence, the reasons for believing, and this can only be done if the atmosphere is one of questioning, discussion and critical examination of the kind that initially accompanied the discovery of the 'truth' in question. (1984, pp. 61-62)

In other words, knowledge is not simply knowing truths, having information, or the possession of skills, but also comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of knowledge (Abeles, Hoffer, Klotman, 1984). This requires that the evidence and
justification be understood. Asserting an opinion and developing and justifying it are entirely
different endeavours. A blind commitment to the past, ironically, circumnavigates critical
thought. Reciting a philosophical position is much different than understanding both the
philosophy and what it meant in the historical arena in which it was created.

The orator's position also fails to realise that, in part, the value of knowledge is what
we, as a modern society, do with the information. "[W]e want people to exercise the virtues
and not just to know about them" (Bailey, 1984, p. 103). This is particularly important in
understanding historical context in light of current debate. If a recurring problem throughout
history is re-examined in the light of present-day experience, new evidence is inevitably
introduced. It is imperative people have the ability to revisit the problem with the proper
tools in order to re-examine the issues. Without these skills, it is almost impossible to
maintain an open mind, or be nourished by the explorations of this world.

Whether intellect is in fact developed through the study of classical texts is also
debatable, if not outright contentious.

This debate . . . centres on the best ways to achieve the educational purpose. . . .
According to one view, reading the great works is assumed inherently to promote
effective thinking. But, a second view holds that important outcomes like effective
thinking are generic; the content chosen is distinctly secondary to the end itself. In
still a third view, no content promotes effective thinking unless it is linked with
explicit pedagogical attention to developing the ability. (Stark, 1997, p. 27)

The debate, then, centres on "whether the purpose [of education] is to transmit information to
students (lecture) or to engage students in active problem-solving behaviour (discussion)"
(Stark, 1997, p. 30). Within the artes liberalis position, there may be a tendency to rely too
much on past understandings for answers to current problems, especially when that problem
must be redefined in light of current circumstances. The best assistance from the great texts
may be guidance in finding creative new answers to present-day conundrums. Ironically, if
critical-thinking and value-judgement skills are properly developed, they will lead to the
ability to challenge the authority or tradition of the texts studied.

Optical Tensions

The debate between the orators’ and philosophers’ positions is endless. Peter
Emberley observes that “the modern university is comprised of the healthy and often creative
tension between universitas and civitas, between certain outcomes as one goal and
adventures as another” (1996, p. 29). If creativity is a source of knowledge born out of
tension, then perhaps the simultaneous attraction and repulsion happening between two poles
is essential to discovery and deeper understanding. The two liberal ideals, though
independent, are very much complementary:

Each of these abstracted types for “liberal education” stands on its own, is an ideal in
that sense, and therefore is something of a caricature of reality. Accordingly, one
must not expect to find many arguments about liberal education that can be
circumscribed by either type. Neither is it surprising that the artes liberales and
liberal-free interpretations are caricatured by opponents or qualified by proponents.
Nor is it startling that, because the ideals are “pure” and the contemporary era is
especially agonised, relatively fewer arguments about liberal education can be
associated with either ideal. (Kimball, 1986, p. 219)

The constant oscillation between the two different perspectives throughout history
demonstrates that as soon as one understanding is realised, it becomes obvious that the
perspective is, in certain respects, lacking and unsatisfying, and a swing back to the other
position becomes inevitable, necessary, and desirable.

Throughout the various discourses on liberal education, there are frequent allusions to
other underlying tensions hinted at or alluded to. A prime example is the question of whether
education should have as its principle concern the interests of the individual, or the collective
interest of society.
[O]n the one hand, that liberal or general education "must be something which gives
the mind freedom" and that prescription of courses is incompatible both with that
freedom and with appreciating the individual differences of students. On the other
hand, . . . education must have "universal validity" and "a quality of permanence"
because "a liberal education consists in the acquisition and the refinement of
standards of values." This acquisition and refinement is accomplished, . . . through
the discipline of "reflective synthesis," which is derived from "the validity of the
intellectual experience itself." (Kimball, 1986, p. 200)

We all have the need and desire to be independent as well as the need and desire to belong to
a community. Simultaneously, each complements and conflicts with the other. On the one
hand, individuals are responsibility for their well-being, which ultimately requires
independent thinking and reflection. On the other hand, a person is a member of society and
is therefore required to contribute to the welfare of others. Obviously, life, as Nussbaum puts
it, is "inescapably plural" (1997, p. 6) and multidimensional thought is required if humanity
is to experience life to its fullest. The question remains, how do we maintain equilibrium in
understanding liberal education that respects each perspective when they appear to be
incompatible?

The Appeal and Problems of Integration

The constant oscillation between opposing ideas of liberal education reveals that
neither position on its own can provide adequate training. Peace is not the absence of tension
but rather the equilibrium of opposing forces. The necessity of acknowledging both types of
thinking is paramount, as the one not only affects the other but also helps define it. For
example, the theory of music and performance studies are usually construed as antithetical.
Yet, the interdependence between theory and applied studies is easily defended. For example,
improvisation requires an in-depth knowledge of scale-chord relationships. The discussion of
polar opposites inevitably leads to the exploration of the idea of integration.
The idea of integrating the orator and philosophical ideologies is certainly not a new one. The constant clash and interdependence between the two often leads to a line of reasoning in which one side tries to absorb elements of the other. Even though the attempt to bridge the two ideologies does lead to a more comprehensive definition, problems or deficiencies are not eliminated. In fact, bridging the two ideals gives birth to new problems. The comprehensive solution "sacrifice[s] integrity—internal consistency—and so inevitably incorporate contradictions and conflicts of which the purer, and hence more confining, types are innocent" (Kimball, 1986, p. 219). The wholeness and purity of the two ideals is compromised because each definition of liberal education loses its clarity, even though neither position can ignore the other in understanding itself. Like combining two colours of paint, the mixing of ideas results in the loss or change of individual qualities.

The independence and interdependence of the two ideologies becomes paramount in defining what they are. As Kimball argues, "the integrity of the two educational ideals must be reemphasised: each is systematic, and their individual characteristics are integrally part of a whole" (1986, p. 218) and that "egalitarian motives cannot allay the dialectical tension, the contradiction even, in the former concept. In attempting to bridge the two ideals, the accommodation again sacrifices systematic integrity for the sake of comprehensiveness" (Kimball, 1986, pp. 223-224). When working with complex ideas, no one perspective is adequate. What is seldom realised or understood is that opposing perspectives are elements of each other. Different perspectives on liberal education are fully understood only if they are considered in the larger context of each understanding. Indeed, the overemphasis of one particular perspective, especially over a long period of time, leads to a limited understanding and, ultimately, academic impairment or intellectual disability. Understanding the inter-
relationship and balance between the different perspectives and the differences of values each represents is more valuable to a person’s long-term development than any one perspective.

On the other hand, the broad perspective can detract from the potency and importance of each perspective. For example, music theory’s importance extends far beyond the relationship it has with improvisation. Details of a philosophical position can easily be lost when viewed from a distance. Consequently, the perspective’s place in the balance of tensions can easily be dismissed. The mixing of compounds inevitably changes each perspective.

The contemporary problem, then, of liberal education lies in the paradox that the strengths of its ideal are also the source of its greatest liabilities. . . . One cannot eliminate the liabilities of the ideal without sacrificing its strengths. . . . The efforts by many academicians to deny the paradox and to recover the strengths of either ideal without the attendant liabilities contribute to the confusion in current discussion about liberal education. (Kimball, 1986, p. 239)

Amalgamation leads to the dilution of each perspective. Comprehensive solutions, then, solves some problems but also creates others.

Ref raming the Picture

The tradition of Chinese painting requires an artist to study three fields: poetry, calligraphy and painting. The title “Master of the Three Perfections” is bestowed upon an artist who has the ability to weave the three basic elements together in such a way that they all have equal importance in the finished product. In other words, the hallmark of a master is not simply the ability to perfect each skill, but the ability to interlace or twist about the three areas in such a fashion that none of the elements can be identified as the dominant form or value. Interestingly, two key components crucial in the training of a true artist are the ability to imitate the masters and the ability to then transform the ancient models into personal
expression. To achieve a balance of skill, understanding, and expression is the pinnacle of both personal and professional success.

The weakness of liberal education, from an ideological perspective, has been its inability to weave the various perspectives and understandings of those who seek to define it into a fabric that recognises diverse values and educational beliefs. As in the success of a Chinese artist, the health—and survival—of liberal education depends on the ability to learn from different sources simultaneously. However, in order to fully understand each perspective—including one’s own—it is imperative to understand the underlying beliefs, values, and assumptions that undergird each idea. As Kimball explains,

problems have arisen whenever one ideal of liberal education has become preeminent and the dialectical balance between the two ideals has been lost. The balance is to be preserved because it lies in the nature of things, so to speak—it arises from the distinction between reason and speech, between ratio and oratio. The balance between the two ideals is difficult to maintain because the distinction between reason and speech, though apparently sharp and clear, becomes obscure when analysed closely, as shown by the fact that for the Greeks both capacities were denoted by the term logos. What, after all, really is the relationship between the thought and the word? (Kimball, 1986, p. 239)

Understanding the different definitions of liberal education is what leads to complete comprehension of the concept. No one perspective is adequate on its own because each particular definition or understanding defines the opposite view. Furthermore, when one perspective is taken to its extreme, it inevitably requires the opposite perspective to define itself. For instance, the belief that knowledge is acquired by studying classical texts requires an investigation into what texts make up the canon. This in turn necessitates an understanding of the reasons behind the inclusion of specific texts. The formulation of a set of rules or guidelines leads to a standard. Works are measured by comparing them to this standard. A list of standard works is inevitably created, and we have thus come full circle.
Ultimately, the value and place of each perspective will be understood not when the pendulum swings, but when the threads of various understandings tightly knit to acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of each. I surmise that as each perspective matures in thought and understanding, the congruency and harmony of the different viewpoints will be better realised and understood. Developing an understanding of liberal education, however, must not be a simple compromise of the various perspectives, since it is the open tension between them that is crucial to understanding the complexity of the concept.

Until the various writers on liberal education begin to acknowledge the different values, beliefs and assumptions that underscore the various definitions of liberal education, meaningful discussion will be impossible. Stakeholders in education should learn to think critically about themselves, their differences, and their similarities with others; to evaluate their attitudes about people who are different from themselves; and to know how gender, race, ethnicity, culture, and class affect all human perspectives and experiences. (Lattuca & Stark, 1994a, p. 412)

Here is the key: instructors must be willing to seek out and be open to new ideas, especially those that differ from their own. Understanding the framework from which each of the various concepts has been developed would allow us to properly identify the various components of liberal education, the interrelationship they have, and their affect on each other. Without this acknowledgement, the value of liberal education will certainly continue to be degraded and criticised rather than enhanced and uplifted.
Chapter 4 - Eclecticism, Integration, and Interdisciplinarity

When tensions between antagonistic ideas become tiresome, and solutions are as divergent as the demands, it is tempting to take the best characteristics from each position and fuse them, especially when making curricular plans. But is weaving together divergent perspectives really the panacea it leads us to believe? This chapter surveys different ways educators may combine theories and examine if combining conflicting ideas really works.

Eclecticism

The root meaning of the word *eclecticism* is, “to pick out,” “to select,” or “to choose” (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1994, p. 429). An eclectic thinker selectively borrows or adopts knowledge or skills from different disciplines to solve problems.

Educational eclecticism has advantages and drawbacks. Since not all educational problems invite simple solutions, eclecticism summons innovation solutions by use of apparently unrelated fields or skills. For instance, Kaufman (1963) demonstrates the compatibility of two areas in music often perceived as antagonistic towards each other. On the one hand, artists are concerned with the practical aspects of performance techniques and composition, while on the other hand, musicologists are primarily concerned with history. Yet, a historical perspective on musical thought and style directly affects the interpretation of repertoire and one’s corresponding choice of technical skills. Thus, “the most fruitful musical education is one in which the insights of the scholar, the theorist, the composer and the interpreter are shared, finding their common focus in an enriched understanding of the nature of the musical experience” (Evans, 1969, p. 1). Granted, many may not regard the scholar,
the composer, and the interpreter as antagonistic but, rather, mutually interdependent.

Thompson, for example, insists music

must be presented in its full conception, theoretical, historical and practical, as a vital living art. . . . Music, if adequately presented, cannot be divided into self-contained compartments but must be presented in its full and splendid vitality as a living art. . . . To be fully effective, music must be experienced in its completeness. (1935, pp. 104-105)

But performing artists face problems not found in other areas of music. For instance, music educators may defend the value of music education on the basis it develops critical thinking skills, self-discipline, communication skills, self-motivation, and positive self-esteem, as well as encourage the exploration, analysis and interpretation of different cultures. Yet, exercises which specifically develop character (that is, personal and social competencies) is usually considered the domain of psychology and inappropriate for an applied music instructor to delve into. Nevertheless, if performers are unaware of their emotions and the effects on their ability to function, such as the self-discipline to practice, he or she will not be able to manage themselves in order to learn and develop the skills to perform.

Eclecticism encourages exploration of connections between fields, and since the act of correlation is largely arbitrary, it can be quite creative. By the same token, a person's inability to solve a problem using a well-defined, singular methodology may also be seen as "undisciplined." Besides, discipline-based learning has led to vast discoveries. Instrumental performance techniques, for example, are refined because technical problems are isolated, examined, strains identified, and superfluous movements eliminated, allowing a player to play effortlessly.
Thus, we have two attitudes to problem-solving and creativity: one emphasizes new relationships between disciplines, and other the discovery of new relationships within a discipline. Parameters in an investigation can be freeing as much as they can be restrictive. If creative thinking is non-habitual thought, both forms of creative thinking (that is, thinking inside “the box” and outside “the box”) have a place. Problems, questions, or interests can—and should—be pursued from both perspectives since each will reveal different perspectives on the problem and yield different insights. As Goran Hermerén writes, “a good evaluation cannot be limited to the study of only one kind of effects” (1985, p. 25). Most importantly, there must be curiosity—an unrelenting inquisitiveness that can operate within specified boundaries as well as venture outside them if required to do so.

At the centre of the confrontation between tradition and innovation is the question who determines what fields are appropriate in solving the problem? This can be as much a personal or political debate as an academic or curricular one. The cafeteria style or salad-bar approach to problem solving may not be as open-minded or objective as it may first appear. Eclecticism excludes as much as it units. What one person values or regards as important may be insignificant or inconsequential to another. Decisions as to what is practical or impractical, right or wrong, truth or error, are necessarily founded on deeper assumptions as to what is important or valued. The great danger of eclecticism is it masks deeper convictions and these hidden beliefs impair our ability to think and, ironically, to act freely. Moreover, what is described as “practical” is often merely a euphemism for what we think is possible or what we find appealing. In seeking “practical” solutions we may dismiss ideas because we consider them impossible or dislike them.
We must also be cautious of eclecticism because a lack of understanding of the foundations of action may prove more harmful than beneficial. One thinks of the volatile mix of diametrically opposed fields. It is common for artists who create music for the sake of creating to be at odds with recording labels interested in promoting only what the marketplace demands. We also cannot assume combining the best or most attractive ideas will result in a faultless, satisfactory, or useful philosophical system. In fact, the results may be confusing or even humorous. As Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman remark, the “combination of the best features of the music of Bach, Mozart, [Chopin, Wagner, Debussy, and Villa Lobos] would probably be more comical than impressive” (1969, p. 43).

Similarly, in seeking to reconcile conflicting ideas of curriculum, educators may also ignore or quickly dismiss the different values or principles upon which decisions are made, producing confusion and frustration. For instance, a music student and teacher may agree developing playing abilities is important, but one may assume it is in preparation for a solo career while the other assumes it is in order to participate in an ensemble.

There is also the question of when skills are necessary. The demands of present experience require immediate attention and force us to take one step at a time. However, the neglect to develop skills that take time to mature will undermine future opportunities, and management by crisis is not an efficient or effective way of living. For example, many techniques music performance demands require years to develop. Not to build them at an early stage undermines a performer’s ability when they are finally necessary. We cannot say a skill or knowledge is unnecessary because its usefulness is not immediately understood or needed. Otherwise, immediacy would imply that what is “practical” one moment may be
impractical the next. Eclecticism is inclined to short-term thinking, thus neglecting long-term consequences.

Integration, Syncretism, & Interdisciplinarity

Educators may also try to integrate opposing theories. However, the word describes two distinct things: *bridge-building* attempts to find links between independent fields, assuming a grounding in traditional disciplines; *restructuring* involves changing components of more than one discipline leading to the development of new disciplines. The latter sense, sometimes referred to as *syncretism*, strives to select what appears to be the best elements from different theories and graft or blend them together. The term *syncretism*, literally, "joining two parties against a third" (*Webster's New World Dictionary*, 1994, p. 1358), derives from the idea of hostile cities uniting together to fight a common enemy. In the political arena, dissension between hostile parties would be put aside in order to confront a common problem, or, as in theological circles, to harmonise hostile factions. In a philosophical sense, syncretism aims to reconcile different views of a particular problem, or seeks to unite or weave together conflicting principles into a conglomerate whole in spite of internal inconsistencies.

In recent years, curriculum theorists have expanded and relabelled the concepts of integration and syncretism. Under the broad heading of Interdisciplinarity, several technical terms now differentiate subtleties or clarify grades of integration. Jacobs (1989) summarises them as follows:

*Crossdisciplinary:* Viewing one discipline from the perspective of another; for example, the physics of music and the history of math.
**Multidisciplinary:** The juxtaposition of several disciplines focused on one problem with no direct attempt to integrate.

**Pluridisciplinary:** The juxtaposition of disciplines assumed to be more or less related: e.g., math and physics, French and Latin.

**Transdisciplinary:** Beyond the scope of the disciplines; that is, to start with a problem and bring to bear knowledge from the disciplines.

**Interdisciplinary:** A knowledge view and curriculum approach that consciously applies methodology and language from more than one discipline to examine a central theme, issue, problem, topic, or experience. (p. 8)

Interdisciplinarity does not provide guidelines as to which approach to use when tackling problems. It would be interesting to compare, for instance, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary responses to the same problem. The flexibility, on the one hand, would provide opportunity for experimentation and innovation; on the other hand, the ability to reproduce results may prove difficult since different groups, for a variety of reasons, may utilise a different response.

**Disciplines and Integration**

The division of the university into schools or faculties is ancient. For teaching purposes, academic disciplines are used to organise knowledge (Schutze, 1985). The subdivision of fields became necessary because the expansion of knowledge made the discipline too large to treat effectively, or the nature of the phenomena required a specialised background as well as its own set of methodologies for inquiry. Guilds and the state also demanded a differentiated curriculum in order to ensure professionals were adequately trained in specific areas. For example, diplomats need to be competent in both law and history if they are to perform their duties well. In Medieval times movement between fields was much easier, perhaps because there was a belief in the universality and unity of
knowledge (CERI, 1970). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the scientific academy replaced the Medieval university as protector of European intellectual tradition, deepening the divisions between disciplines. The opinion was real scientific work ploughed deep rather than wide. The rationale was, “[s]ince it is quite impossible for one mind to grasp more than a fraction of the total acquired knowledge, the university should recognise distinguished performance in a single subject” (Flexner, 1979, p. 106). In the nineteenth century, competition for funding widened the gulf even further (Hausman, 1979).

The wish to link fields has an equally long history. Whether the idea is called integration, syncretism, or some facet of interdisciplinarity, the concept of reconciliation endeavours to offset the progressive differentiation of knowledge. If education’s aims are not only to train individuals in a specific profession but also prepare them to cope with modern life; foster not only intellectual development but harmonise a person’s emotional, social, moral, and intellectual life; as well as balance contemplation with action, unifying realms of knowledge provides the broader context which specialisation operates within. Otherwise, “[t]rained capacity in one connection ‘entailed trained incapacity in another respect’” (Flexner, 1979, p. 108). Proponents of integration further argue, “[s]ince the problems encountered by undergraduates can seldom if ever be investigated let alone solved by a single discipline, the interdisciplinary approach constitutes an important element of general education” (Flexner, 1979, p. 117).

The Centre for Educational Research and Innovation asserts that the “impact of knowledge on action . . . forces interaction between the disciplines” (CERI, 1970, p. 9). Kockelmans (1979) insists integration is not a matter of choice but a necessity if a field is to achieve not only depth, but breadth by understanding its place in the larger context of general
knowledge. Kockelmans also argues the perspectives of other disciplines on the same problem provides a check and balance to solutions arrived at. For instance Kockelmans argues, the "best means available for checking the validity of findings and generalisations in social science . . . is to measure them against the findings and generalisations established on the same or related problems by another social science" (1979, p. 136).

In the same way, a discipline can be defined by identifying what lies outside its boundaries as within. As an illustration, the circles below are identified by adding fill within the circle or by marking the space outside it.

In other words, a field is not a self-enclosed, non-communicating, self-justifying practice, but is intricately entwined with a web of other fields. Indeed, faculty members gain a better understanding of their fields when they realise how others see their discipline, and how massively it is possible for principles and methodologies to differ, even among the disciplines contributing to education in a single department, as Music, for instance. The difficulty is, educators are usually nearsighted or, in extreme examples, intellectually ethnocentric. That is, educational beliefs generally flow from a specialist and/or disciplinary position. There is an assumption one’s own intellectual position is superior to the beliefs or standards of another "intellectual culture." Integration or interdisciplinary attempt to establish cross-cultural communication between different orientations. A prime example is the integration of professional and liberal educational aims.
Challenging the Division Between Liberal and Professional Education

Liberal and professional education are often seen as antagonistic. However, many educators (Stark & Lattuca, 1997; Armour & Fuhrmann, 1989; Stark & Lowther, 1988; Marsh, 1988; Dressel, Mayhew, & McGrath, 1959; McGrath, 1959; Dressel, 1958; Thompson, 1935; Whitehead, 1929) feel this is unfortunate. Greene, for example, writes:

It is an everlasting pity that so sharp a dichotomy has established itself in our minds between liberal education and vocational training, with the false implication that the former is somehow higher, though useless and the latter, useful but somehow crass and demeaning. If these two equally essential preparations for life are thus divorced, a *merely* liberal education will indeed tend to be useless, and a *merely* vocational training, crass. [Italics original] (1955, p. 119)

Professionals must not only acquire knowledge and technical skills in a specialised field, they must also make technical decisions within a particular human or environmental context. Liberal education brings to light contextual factors that penetrate and disturb disciplinary or professional considerations. Whitehead writes, the “antithesis between a technical and a liberal education is fallacious. There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal education which is not technical” (1929, p. 74). If professional and liberal education are essential preparations for life, are they really at odds with one another or is the “conflict” an upshot of a dispute over values?

The integration of liberal and vocational educational aims provides greater meaning, depth, and breadth to both sides. Unfortunately, the division of liberal and professional education has led to both an inadequate liberal education and deficient professional training. Peter Marsh comments on the arbitrary separation and necessity to unite liberal and vocational education in curricula:

In practice the distinction between liberal and professional education is by now little more than a tautology denoting the different subject matter that liberal arts and professional colleges teach. That reality is obscured by lingering evaluative
connotations that associate liberal education grandly with thought and professional education crudely with skills. It is time to discard those connotations. Where they are not misleading, they are harmful. They weaken the natural penchant of the liberal arts for self-reflection, and they have a self-fulfilling impact in professional schools. We have reached the point at which the liberal and the professional need to be appreciated as dimensions present in every field of higher education. (1988, pp. 12-13)

However, the requirement insisting professional programs include liberal studies because “it is good for you” without explaining the rationale only deepens the division. Since young professionals usually do not immediately understand the interdependency, educators need to highlight the impact professional and liberal education have on each other. This is not to argue liberal and professional education cannot address concerns which are independent of the other, it is just that the interrelationship between the two have been ignored too much.

If the relevance of seemingly conflicting educational outcomes is not well understood, the demand for attention and time puts both at odds with one another. The following excerpt from an interview recounting a music student’s struggles with managing her use of time illustrates the conflict:

Unfortunately, they’re were a lot of extra courses that you have to take because music is part of the arts faculty, so you have to take English and I had to take three languages and you know all that stuff.

_That sounds like a reasonable thing for a singer to do?_

Well Language is fine, I enjoy that, but I sometimes felt like spending all that time on an academic subject was taking away from the practice because really as a performance major you’re expected to be doing four or five hours a day, practice, personal practice time and that was really hard to find that time you know. (Roberts, 1991, pp.124-125)

Because the interdependence of both educational aims was not understood, the above student was torn. “So long as we think of the liberal and the professional as different categories of higher education rather than as dimensions present in every field of learning, the old dichotomy will reassert itself and continue to blind us” (Marsh, 1988, p. 14). Liberal and
professional education’s success “depends on the student’s freedom to bring to the subject of his concentration his [or her] discoveries in other fields” (Thompson, 1935, p. 127).

Similarly, liberal educators must not only develop thinking abilities and communication skills, they must realise students need opportunities to practice the art of applying principles in specific circumstances that are meaningful and real. For example, music students must not only master oral and listening skills, such as identifying intervals or tap out rhythms found in an ear-training manual, instrumentalists should also be able to sing the melody or tap out rhythms from the compositions they are learning to perform. Instructors cannot assume, especially in the early stages of training, students will apply what they are learning in one subject to another. It is one thing to understand a principle, it is another skill to apply it.

Combining Liberal and Professional Educational Aims

There have been a few thoughtful attempts to integrate disciplines by identifying principles common to both fields. For example, in the late fifties and early sixties, the Institute of Higher Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, did several studies investigating the relationship between liberal and professional education. Earl McGrath’s monograph (1959) argues the major educational objectives of liberal education overlap those of professional education.

McGrath identifies three major aims of liberal education: (1) to instil general knowledge, (2) cultivate intellectual skills, and (3) nurture character development. (1) By general knowledge he means understanding the major truths of foundational aspects of society, such as literature, philosophy, history, art, business, and economics. McGrath has argued, the “acquisition of broad knowledge beyond one’s field of specialisation does not
necessarily imply superficial learning” (1955, p. 19); but signifies thorough knowledge of major principles, forgoing the intricacies specialisation explores. (2) Intellectual competence means fundamental mental skills such as communication and thinking abilities. (3) Character refers to the internal qualities which allow us to manage ourselves, such as self-awareness, self-regulation, and motivation, as well as how we handle relationships.

McGrath then outlines four major aims of professional education: (1) introduce students to their chosen professional, (2) cover its basic principles, (3) provide professional flexibility, and (4) cultivate professional attitudes and motivations. (1) Since the store of knowledge is expanding exponentially in each profession, McGrath argues the best professional education can hope to do is “stress broad principles, key ideas, and overarching generalisations rather than detailed facts or techniques” (1959, p. 39). (2) Although specialised training may provide an easy transition into the workplace, the narrow technical training will undermine advancement and future usefulness since formal education cannot possibly prepare anyone for the variety of demands and unseen events that will inevitably be encountered. (3) With advances in technology and expansion of knowledge, professionals must continue to learn if they are to remain current in their profession. Also, major career changes are much more common than fifty years ago, and, unfortunately, many students, for a variety of reasons (including technological changes, economical downturns, or personal choice), end up working in an entirely different field they were schooled in. The ability to adapt to new circumstances, especially in today’s climate, is highly advisable if not imperative. (4) The final requirement of professional education is the cultivation of professional attitudes and motivation. As Ruth Jacobs observes,

In hundreds of rigorous studies we’ve done comparing star performers with merely average ones in companies around the world, expertise just never made the
difference. . . . Expertise is a baseline competence. You need it to get the job and get it done, but how you do the job—the other competencies you bring to your expertise—determines performance. (as quoted in Goleman, 1998, p. 21)

Deficiencies in character undermines technical expertise by limiting our ability to tap that expertise, either by oneself or by others. Finally, since formal education is only the base from which life-long learning originates, motivation to learn becomes an essential outcome of professional education.

The overlap of liberal and professional education outcomes, as McGrath has described them, is striking. For example, the importance of basic intellectual skills, especially the mental flexibility to apply general principles to new situations, is essential to both liberal and professional education. Likewise, the importance of general knowledge is also indispensable to both since it provides an understanding of how to function in a social environment, whether it be for professional or personal reasons. By identifying common educational aims, the interrelationship between different purposes may be better understood allowing for less overlap or redundancy in the design of curriculum.

More recently, the Professional Preparation Network, including faculty from liberal and professional fields, identified ten outcomes considered important to both professional and liberal programs. The report, Strengthening the Ties That Bind: Integrating Liberal and Professional Study (1988), argues identifying common goals would assist professional programs to “link technical knowledge with appropriate values and attitudes when making complex judgements” (1988, p.1). The table below lists the common purposes, definitions, as well as comments explaining the rationale for inclusion.
Outcomes Important to Educators in Both Liberal Arts and Undergraduate Professional Programs

Communication Competence

The graduate can read, write, speak, and listen and use these processes effectively to acquire, develop, and convey ideas and information.

Comment:
Reading, writing, speaking, and listening are skills essential to professional practice and to continued professional growth as well as to informed citizenry and continued personal growth.

Critical Thinking

The graduate examines issues rationally, logically, and coherently.

Comment:
Although critical thinking is a universally desired educational outcome, professionals particularly need a repertoire of thinking strategies that will enable them to acquire, evaluate, and synthesise information and knowledge. Since much professional practice is problematical, students need to develop analytical skills to make decisions in both familiar and unfamiliar circumstances.

Contextual Competence

The graduate has an understanding of the societal context (environment) in which the profession is practised.

Comment:
The capability to adopt multiple perspectives allows the graduate to comprehend the complex interdependence between the profession and society. An enlarged understanding of the world and the ability to make judgements in light of historical, social, economic, scientific, and political realities is demanded of the professional as well as the citizen.

Aesthetic Sensibility

The graduate will have an enhanced aesthetic awareness of arts and human behaviour for both personal enrichment and application in enhancement of the profession.

Comment:
Sensitivity to relationships among the arts, the natural environment, and human concerns epitomises aesthetic awareness. Through learning to approach life as an aesthetic experience and by viewing work as an act of aesthetic judgement, professionals can more effectively assess and understand the world and their roles within it.
Professional Identity

The graduate acknowledges and is concerned for improving the knowledge, skills, and values of the profession.

Comment:
Professional identity both parallels and supplements the liberal education goal of developing a sense of personal identity. The sense of personal worth and self-confidence that develops from experiencing success in professional practice, often including a contributing or altruistic relationship with clients, is an effective vehicle for gaining a sense of one’s place in the world as an individual and citizen.

Professional Ethics

The graduate understands and accepts the ethics of the profession as standards that guide professional behaviour.

Comment:
Liberally educated individuals are expected to have developed value systems and ethical standards that guide their behaviour. Since in every field professionals face choice and responsibility in the profession of making decisions with full understanding of their consequences, the student of ethics provides a context for development of professional ethics.

Adaptive Competence

The graduate anticipates, adapts to, and promotes changes important to the profession’s societal purpose and the professional’s role.

Comment:
A liberally educated person has an enhanced capacity to adapt to and anticipate changes in society. Since professional practice is not static, adaptability can be fostered by promoting the need to detect and respond to changes and make innovations in professional practice.

Leadership Capacity

The graduate exhibits the capacity to contribute as a productive member of the profession and to assume leadership roles as appropriate in the profession and society.

Comment:
All education carries with it the responsibility of developing leadership capacity. This is particularly true for professional education where the problem-decision-action cycle may have broad environmental, social, and individual ramifications. Not only does leadership imply both functional and status obligations, it requires the intelligent humane application of knowledge and skills.
Scholarly Concern for Improvement

The graduate recognises the need to increase knowledge and advance the profession through systematic, cumulative research on problems of theory and practice.

Comment:
The heart of the intellectual process is attention to a spirit of inquiry, critical analysis of logical thinking. Although many critical analysis skills are developed as theory and practice are integrated, the professional curriculum can be specifically designed to foster among graduates an obligation to participate in inquiry, research, and improvement of the profession.

Motivation for Continued Learning

The graduate continues to explore and expand personal, civic, and professional knowledge and skills throughout a lifetime.

Comment:
A truly educated person will wish to continue learning throughout life. In professional education, substantial emphasis can be placed on fostering individual responsibility for continued professional growth.


Stark and Lowther point out context plays a major role in how knowledge is viewed. They emphasise,

a key difference between the same goal espoused by liberal arts faculty and those in professional fields was one of perspective. The professional program educator often related the outcome to a problem in professional context, whereas liberal arts educators related it to a problem in personal development or to broad societal issues. (1988, p. 28)

Thus, even though educational aims are shared by both liberal and professional fields, the motivation for learning is different, and the situation which these skills are applied may require different content or teaching strategies. In other words, just because educational aims are shared, other elements of curriculum (that is, content, teaching strategies, attitudes towards students, and evaluation schemes) may still differ, inciting battles. For example, a student may wish to develop critical thinking skills through the study of applied arts, such as
music performance, writing, or painting, while another may find history, philosophy or psychology more appealing. Or to use another illustration, just because there is agreement on a travel destination, there may be disagreement on how we travel: one may prefer to fly, another by train, while yet another by car.

Dressel, Mayhew, and McGrath (1959) note professional educators' interest in the liberal arts is too often limited by narrowly practical interpretations of liberal or vocationalist schemas. "Professional or vocational programs favour those liberal art subjects which relate closely to, or reinforce, their own professional activities. Ironically, "the liberal arts which most professional groups would like to see required are those subjects which emphasise general intellectual skills of use to all without regard to occupation" (1959, p. 41). On the other hand, although liberal educators feel liberal art courses should definitely be apart of professional curricula, they also believe a liberal education cannot be realised in the context of a professional education. In fact, "[t]hose who would reserve the liberal arts for the intellectually elite resent bitterly the elevation of professional education to a level where comparable degrees are granted to students who complete these curricula" (Dressel & Lorimer, 1960, p. 39). Yet, liberal educators fail to explain or support this fear in light of the educational outcomes shared by both sides. The difference may be explained in the liberal educator's belief that the purpose of education is to develop the whole person, outside the context of work. However, if liberal or general education should be broad in scope, and the demand requires students to understand the major principles in a wide range of subjects, why do liberal educators exclude the subject of professional education from its curriculum? The omission is glaring since the breadth of education is not as wide as it could—or should—be. If liberal educators are concerned about the ability to apply principles in various contexts, the
professional environment is a part of the social fabric which citizens function and should not be ignored. Present day society is considerably different than two thousand years ago and the luxury of ignoring work demands is impractical if not unrealistic for most in society, especially since it is mostly the lower and middle class who attend the modern day post-secondary institutions. Liberally educated individuals need to understand the basic principles of a profession just as much as they do English, History, or Philosophy.

Liberal educators who cringe at the thought of introducing liberal concepts in a vocational context should keep in mind young adults are, in general, are more concerned with practical skills than social change or personal enrichment. As Chickering and Havighurst (1981) has noted, the social or personal educational goals, generally speaking, become more important in later years. Yet, students “committed to study in a professional field readily embrace liberalising subjects once they recognise the relation of these studies to their lives and careers” (Stark & Lowther, 1988, p. 19). If the thinking abilities have been properly developed, students should be able to adapt principles as required by circumstances which arise later in life.

Stark and Lattuca (1997) claim the “idea of learning multiple perspectives and the ability to critique one’s own field may appeal more to faculty in humanities, artistic fields, and human service fields than to science or engineering faculty” (p. 174). However, professional fields are also beginning to seriously investigate the benefits of integrating liberal subjects into their programs. For example, in discussing the challenges faced by architects, J. William Rudd points out architects

must respond to . . . dual forces: to the cultural forces by seeking understanding and meaning, and to the environmental forces by acting through experience to find direction and purpose. And the result of the response must be buildings that embrace
the laws of society (cultural forces) and the laws of nature (environmental forces). (1989, p.22).

Thus, architects must understand the purpose of a structure (that is, the human element), as well as the technical elements (that is, the materials to construct a building) if an edifice is to fulfil its purpose. The act of conceiving and the act of construction “do not have a hierarchical relationship but an interactive one” (Rudd, 1989, p. 24). The interrelationship between theory and practice is recognised as essential. However, “if education and the profession are to effectively complement each other, these differences have to be acknowledged and accepted so that each can contribute constructively from their respective strengths rather than dilute their effectiveness through an inappropriate duplication of roles” (Rudd, 1989, p. 28). Thus, Rudd concludes “professional education must be encompassing. And it must prepare the [professional] to be both productive and informed; for action without understanding has no meaning, while understanding without action has no consequence.” (1989, p. 29).

Similarly, the field of pharmacy faces conflicting yet inter-related difficulties. The proliferation of new drugs and the complexity of their effects and interactions requires ever-expanding technical knowledge. At the same time, the use of pharmaceuticals affects the emotional and cognitive quality of patients’ lives. In other words, the focus of health care is people not medicine and “mechanism without meaning, value, and purpose, grounded in humanistic reasoning, will not further the future interests of the pharmacy profession or the people it serves” (Strand & Winston, 1989, pp. 78-79). To focus entirely on the mechanics of medicine inevitably leads to a loss of the larger perspective, the people it serves.
Comprehensive Musicianship

To prepare students to face competing demands in the music profession, music educators have also tried to integrate various elements of music into a more inclusive program. A prime example is the Comprehensive Music movement beginning in the 1960s. Advocates of comprehensive musicianship think the traditional Western music curriculum is inadequate in preparing music students, particularly aspiring public school music instructors, for the array of musical and educational experiences they are likely to encounter. Since music is more than composing or performing or listening, supporters of comprehensive musicianship argue music students cannot afford to specialise: students should be exposed to a full range of musical cultures and experiences, especially new music.

The movement argues traditional music curricula do not give students opportunities to synthesise different elements of music nor develop a comprehensive view of different musical cultures. “Apparently students . . . conceived music theory and literature/history as two mutually exclusive courses of study, and the result was fragmentation of the basic musicianship concept” (Taylor & Urquhart, 1974, p. 77).

The integrative approach stipulates that curriculum revision “is not simply a matter of adding yet another theory or history course in contemporary music to the already over-burdened and over-compartmentalised curriculum, but rather a question of restructuring the existing required courses in basic musicianship” (Beglarian, 1967, pp. 31-32). Course content would be revitalised, they argue, “by means of intensified cross-pollination” (Mitchell, 1967, p. 75). Thus, for example, musical forms of several music genres and cultures is analysed, not just those of the Western tradition. The “primary objective of Comprehensive Musicianship is to teach students to deal intelligently with all kinds of music” (Ward-
Students must examine, think, understand, and create solutions to all problems and musical experiences, whether past, present, or future. Proponents are adamant integrating new music into the school and college curriculum is not a rejection of the past but an essential component "on which one can build for the future" (Music Educators National Conference, 1973, p. 34). As Fitzgerald writes, "[c]oncepts and procedures of contemporary music are best understood in terms of their relationship with and departure from those of former times" (1965, p. 56). Thus, music education should not just preserve traditions but begin and build new ones.

Despite its appeal, comprehensive musicianship supporters are divided. "Who is best suited for a comprehensive program?" some ask. The comprehensive music program at San Diego State was implemented to assist able but less prepared students to tackle advance studies (Ward-Steinman, 1987), yet Florida State University required students to have a foundation of musical skills and knowledge (Taylor & Urquhart, 1974). Then there is the question who should do the integrating. Programs or courses that encourage synthesis may discourage students wanting to make or see their own connections or relationships. As Sulliman observes, "[t]oo many attempts at synthesis at the level of undergraduate course content are limiting, impeding the students' opportunities for selection and synthesis for their own individual needs, and lessening the degree of mastery of some of the elements of music" (1980, p. 127).

Ironically, comprehensive studies inevitably leads to the subdivision of studies. For example,

The non-Western, or world music, component of the [San Diego State Comprehensive Musicianship] program proved to be so intriguing and seductive of time that a full-semester course was spun off as an 'Introduction to Ethnic Musics' to allow more time for exploration. . . . So the world music component of
[Comprehensive Musicianship] is now back to ‘square one’ or less—still an important reference but no longer the tail that was beginning to way the Western European musical dog.” (Ward-Steinman, 1987, p. 141)

Similar to the spiral curriculum in Bruner or Mursell’s cyclical sequence, comprehensive studies—regardless of subject—is but one stage in the learning of a subject. Indeed, the understanding of a subject requires constant oscillation from specialisation to generalisation back to specialisation, continually.

At the centre of the controversy regarding comprehensive musicianship is the long-standing debate of whether music education should transmit classic or standard works of past ages or hone analytical skills forming the basis of critical judgements of new music. In addition, choice of teaching strategies and differences in attitude towards the appropriateness and timing of comprehensive studies in the training of musicians plague the discussion.

Problems of Interdisciplinarity

The concept of integration or interdisciplinary studies does pose several problems. To begin with, integration has different meanings in different contexts. Used in a psychological context, integration is a generic term describing an educator’s concern for developing the total personality of a student, whereas in a pedagogical sense, the term designates a teaching strategy which attempts to show the relation of different subject-matter to a specific topic or problem-solving situation. Yet, sociologically, integration can be thought of as the interacting of individual personalities, the relationship between an individual and a social institution, or relationships between different social institutions (Attias, 2003). When educators speak of integration, we must ask what kind of integration are they referring to. For example, naturalists relying on the scientific method see integration as a way of doing. They view the
gathering and addition of new information as the main element of integration. Idealists use the term to denote a concept as an universal reality. Integration is a state of “oneness” or an eternal state that simply must be realised or discovered. Realists use the term to describe the connection between perception and ideas, while pragmatics view the concept as an impossibility since the never-ceasing application of new ideas to problems inevitably leads to an awareness of new problems.

When a field speaks of integration, it is often used in a limited sense, usually thinking of integration just in relation to a specific realm of knowledge. As Tyler notes,

> The several fields of knowledge, of thought, of creative expression, and of practical action are not developed into a single view of the world and of life, or a single mode of reacting to them. Each field is a special and partial one dealing with some but not all kinds of phenomena, with some but not all kinds of human experience. Each field has developed modes of attack which have been effective in examining and reacting to the special aspects of life on which the field has concentrated its attention. Each field has developed its own picture of the phenomena with which it is concerned, using its own concepts and generalisations to describe them. (1958, p. 110)

Thus, for example, the natural sciences seek to understand the physical world, the arts are concerned with humankind’s desire and need for expression, while the social sciences focus on the structure of society and the activities of its members. This researcher doubts the main educational objective of the natural sciences, art, or social sciences is to unify knowledge from all fields. The question then arises, when and where does a discipline decide integration stops?

The concept of “wholeness” or “completeness” is terribly cryptic. Brubacher (1969) outlines three different ways unity may be conceived. First, there are those who believe in an “inherent logical unity of knowledge” (1969, p. 171) and although knowledge must be broken down into different divisions of subject matter, there is an underlying belief that there is an essential relatedness of all disciplines. The second position understands unity as a
pragmatic procedure. Integration is formed by gathering together a unique combination of information or knowledge around centres of interest or specific problems. Last, unity is understood neither as an object or as a process but a combination of the two. Thus, unity is perceived as the relationship between ready-made knowledge and the selection and organisation of subject matter.

Some argue integration is the final outcome and crowning effort of an educational program while others claim wholeness or completeness is a primary fact that simply must be discovered. In the first case, the rationale is integration is most appropriate or useful to those advanced in their field. As Hausman contends, “the only respectable and realistic way to engage in interdisciplinary efforts is from within established disciplines, letting each specialist break out of his boundaries as necessity leads him to do so” (1979, p. 6). The second position argues beginning undergraduates must have a broad base in order to specialise. The intellectual milieu is necessary if the impact of specialisation is to understood and directed. Thus, some believe we must understand the whole before investigating the parts while others prefer to understand the parts and work towards combining them to understand the whole. Yet, a third position claims that interdisciplinary work should be present throughout the entire time of university studies.

We also cannot determine how much integration is by design and how much a result of happenstance. Formal education is but a small part of a person’s upbringing. There are numerous experiences outside the formal educational system that affect learning which cannot be anticipated or even understood let alone accounted for. Educators are often not aware of, leave alone control, informal but important learning experiences outside the classroom. Unquestionably, not everything that is learned is taught. As Thompson observes,
“[n]o amount of skill on the teacher’s part, no ingenuity of the department’s in planning ‘correlations,’ can replace the integration which a student performs for himself. There is no substitute for sudden discovery” (1935, p. 128). It is also not clear or consistent as to who is supposed to do the integration: the faculty, the curriculum, the educator, or the student?

The “universal” principles that define a discipline keep changing, making it impossible to achieve full integration. For example, music in the twenty-first century is dramatically different in content, compositional devices, and performance practices from music in the Renaissance or Romantic eras. Another example is physics. The principles from which Isaac Newton operated are dramatically different than those now understood in the 21st century. It is dangerous to assume a relationship between disciplines because of some ties in the past since the methodologies and assumptions that define fields have changed dramatically. Attributes that bound two fields in the past may not apply any longer in the current context. As Paul Dressel notes, “the integration achieved in one era is outmoded in the next. The individual dare not even assume that his own integration is permanent, for any new knowledge then becomes a threat to established habits” (1958, p. 12). A classic example is the constant reinterpretation of history in light of new information. Another problem with the constant evolving of a field is determining whether new concepts and methods establish a new field or, once the changes have been readily accepted and adopted, are simply modifications of the tried and true?

Essentially, integration endeavours to redefine the boundaries of disciplines. Although it may reshape the field, it does not mean it is necessarily better. Undoubtedly, the new parameters will also be challenged because they ultimately will ignore or dismiss concerns of some perspective that feels slighted, or the existing problem requires exploration
of yet other connections. The constant change of perception and understanding is
problematic—there is always another perspective or a new piece of information that alters
the idea or situation. As Hugh Prather observes,

Most people think they know the pieces that make up the puzzle of their life. They believe that they already have a few of them resting quietly in place, and all they have to do is get the rest of them to fit. However, even the ones that momentarily fit are changing shape and soon will not fit, and to those that float just out of reach, new ones are forever being added. . . . One of the numerous reasons we never reach the place where everything is the way we want it is that all attainments fluctuate in contrast to other attainments” (2000, p. 205)

Thus, full integration is an impossibility. There is no “final” integration because the continued “increase in knowledge and consequent fragmentation and specialisation force a re-examination of the interrelationships of knowledge” (Dressel, 1958, p. 254). Or as Wheeler observes, “[a] whole . . . is always in turn a part, and a part is always in turn a whole, depending on one’s frame of reference. There is no smallest part or largest whole, so every part is in a whole and every whole has parts” (1937, pp. 41-42).

The Relationship Between Integration and Liberal Education

Although full integration is impossible, the ability to integrate is the hallmark of a professional and educated citizen. Stark and Lowther’s (1988) rationale for including contextual competence as an educational outcome is it provides “an understanding of the societal context (environment) in which [a] profession is practised” (1988, p. 23). They argue the skill gives individuals the “capability to adopt multiple perspectives . . . [and] comprehend the complex interdependence between the profession and society” (1988, p. 23). They concluded the “enlarged understanding of the world and the ability to make judgements in light of historical, social, economic, scientific, and political realities is demanded of the
professional as well as the citizen” (1988, p. 23). If critical thinking means the examination of issues “rationally, logically, and coherently” (Stark & Lowther, 1988, p. 23), both are abilities indispensable to integrators. Indeed, contextual competence and critical thinking are the essence of interdisciplinary studies. In fact, if thinking abilities means “interpreting, organising and evaluating the ideas of others, creating new ideas, solving problems and making decisions” (Simon Fraser University, 2002), and “breadth involves learning, comparing and integrating the basic ideas, forms of knowledge and modes of inquiry from several fields” (Simon Fraser University, 2002), interdisciplinarity and integration are really an expanded discourse on two characteristics of liberal education—they are modern terms which have repackaged old ideas.

The importance of critical thinking and contextual understanding in interdisciplinary or integrative work is they become the basis for adaptability, another educational outcome shared by both liberal and professional education. An adaptive competence gives individuals a “capacity to adapt to and anticipate changes in society” (Stark & Lowther, 1988, p.24). The necessity to detect and respond to change and make innovations in an ever-expanding and changing environment is the prime motivation for being an integrator.

The Absent Borders of Interdisciplinarity

Interdisciplinarity is not an independent or free-standing discipline but a skill that enables exchange of information between different cultures. An integrated curriculum is wholly dependant on understanding realms of knowledge—even if the boundaries which define fields are arbitrary or superficial. Ironically, eclecticism, integration, and
interdisciplinarity exists only because the traditional classifications it wishes to erase exist. In fact, integration is dependant on them. As Suzanne Gearhart notes,

"Boundaries are established to separate and distinguish entities one from the other, but by the very same process, they link the delimited entities to one another. . . . It is not just open, in the sense that it permits passage over it—all boundaries do this. It is open in a more radical sense, for the very domains it is supposed to separate and delimit continually cross over it also." (as quoted in Melville, 1988, p. 220)

It is discipline-based study that provides the framework to investigate relationships.

Still, integration must be used with caution. To assume we can adapt knowledge or mould ideas as we see fit is intellectually ethnocentric. Reshaping fields is based upon underlying assumptions or tacit beliefs as to what knowledge should mean or how it should be applied. But as Parker Palmer observes,

". . . we must know and revere the nature of the other if our action is to be fruitful. This means giving up one of the most cherished but destructive myths of our technological society—the myth that all things are plastic, malleable, capable of being moulded into any shape we require or desire. . . . Right action requires knowledge of the other’s nature, which means knowledge of its potentials and limits, of what it can and cannot do. . . . With such knowledge we can help the other fulfil its potentials, which respecting its limits, distorting neither the other nor ourselves as we act." (1991, pp. 69-70)

It is impossible to integrate a culture one does not first understand, political, economic, artistic, intellectual, or otherwise. As Charles Bailey writes, "truths stay living . . . by virtue of not being dissociated from the evidence and justification that gave them life: hence the emphasis on justifiable belief rather than ‘truth’ which gets cut off from its justificatory base and becomes dead dogma" (1984, p. 62). The constant blurring of distinctions between disciplines has resulted in a basket of many ideas without understanding the context in which they arose or have been defined. "[M]eaning can only come by the grasping of the interdependent body of relationships in which the idea, etc., has its being" (Bailey, 1984, p. 62).
The dilemma is similar to the problem described by Kimball when discussing two different concepts of liberal education:

The balance between . . . two ideals is difficult to maintain because the distinction between reason and speech, though apparently sharp and clear, becomes obscure when analysed closely, as shown by the fact that for the Greeks both capacities were denoted by the term logos. What, after all, really is the relationship between the thought and word? (1986, p. 239)

Likewise, an independent discipline is not the antithesis of integration but an integral component of interdisciplinarity.

**Magnetism**

There is an inherent tension between bipolar concepts such as diversity and unity, or depth and breadth, but like the polar opposites of a magnet, the two must remain in open tension for them to work—the elements are both antagonistic and interdependent. As Brubacher observes:

many ingredients of the education process stand in opposition to each other. They are described as free and authoritative, logical and psychological, empirical and intellectual, progressive and conservative, ideal and real, to mention but a few. The bipolar view of these opposites, however, does not consider them in either-or fashion. Being bipolar, they are reciprocal, complementary; both are necessary to an organic whole. (1969, p. 366)

He further explains:

it hardly needs saying that our objective is not a community of complete agreement. That is probably as undesirable as it is impossible. If all differences were to be eliminated, there could be no growing edge to our agreements. What we seek is simply an orderly basis of agreement in order that we may reap the creative product of our differences and disagreements. And of course we would prefer that the orderly basis of any underlying unity should well up from the voluntary consent of these involved rather than be thrust on us from without by liquidating dissenters. (Brubacher, 1969, p. 367)
To summarise, disciplines and integration are polar opposites which, at the same time, are mutually interdependent.

What is extremely toxic and wearing on the education system, whether at the micro or macro level, is the constant oscillation between polarities. Crisis in education is often a result of neglecting important but less urgent aspects in the development of people or the discovery of new knowledge. Stakeholders in education must find and maintain balance and coherence when addressing the variety of educational interests and demands, otherwise, crisis and pressing problems dictate educational policy rather than those things that give and maintain richness and meaning to life. Of course, educators disagree as to what elements provide or develop richness and meaning, but that gives education its vitality.
Chapter 5 – Dissonant Educational Theories

It is one thing to argue educators should “be aware of their own strongly socialised views and accept the challenge . . . to free themselves a bit from the discipline’s predominating mode of thought” (Stark & Lattuca, 1997, p. 174), but it is another thing to do it. Neither eclecticism, integration, nor interdisciplinarity provide a theory, a methodology, or even solid advice as to how educators can transcend their own conceptual frameworks or entertain conflicting philosophies and theories of curriculum in “open tension.” Stark and Lowther suggest faculty members and administrators should learn to

compare discourse about curriculum integration with discussions about multiculturalism. Both involve learning how to build mutual understanding, choose common or overlapping goals, and mesh the varying styles of disparate groups. Just as when adopting multicultural perspectives, educators must examine existing traditions and ask why they continue. (1997, p. 175).

Since each conceptual orientation in education has advantages and disadvantages, favours certain values, and pursues different purposes, I think conflicts in curriculum planning are primarily sociological rather than logical origins or merit. This chapter briefly explores the relationship between social psychology and conflicts in curriculum-making. I believe a crossdisciplinary approach (that is, viewing curricular conflicts from a sociological perspective) may help change the politics of curriculum planning. The results here are preliminary or suggestive rather than definitive. The chapter also raises questions further research may wish to answer.
Disciplines as Intellectual Cultures

Because the term “culture” is used in so many ways, it is difficult to grasp all that it may imply. The Latin term “cultura” means “to till” (as in preparing soil to grow crops). This first facet of meaning underscores the idea of production, growth, or improvement. Hence, like biology where micro-organisms are grown in a well-controlled environment, culture is a protected environment in which its members are nurtured. Yet, growth and improvement also suggest the intention to disturb, implying an active process rather than a static environment.

A second facet of the term “culture” is the maintenance of ideas, customs, skills, arts, et cetera by passing them down from generation to generation. New members learn about long-standing social conventions and aesthetic sensibilities subscribed to by the group. The third facet is the “development, improvement, or refinement of the intellect, emotions, interests, manners, and taste” (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1994, p. 337). Refining means to purify or purge impurities. It also implies polishing, clarifying, or precision. When the different facets of the term are considered together, there is built-in tension: on the one hand, culture implies an environment that provides security, comfort, and nourishment; on the other, an activity that agitates.

Bernardo Attias (2003) surveys several different definitions of culture. From an anthropological perspective, culture is a “historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge and attitudes” (Clifford Geertz). In a psychological sense, culture is seen as “a programming of the mind” (Geert Hofstede). In ethnographic terms, culture is “a socially constructed and historically transmitted pattern of symbols, meanings, premises, and rules” (Gerry Philipsen). And
finally, the field of Intercultural Communication defines culture as "a negotiated set of shared symbolic systems that guide individuals' behaviours and incline them to function as a group" (Guo-Ming Chen and William Starosta). I here adopt the concept of history, a specialised language, and a learned set of beliefs and behaviours from this list in order to make my own case about future lines of research and argument on the possible meanings of "disciplines," as well as "profession," "liberality," and "education" in the arts. I argue disciplines or faculties are a type of intellectual culture. They have "taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings" (Schein, 1992, p. 17) about their discipline, an idea of membership or group, a significant history or stable tradition, a common language or shared set of symbols, and a specific kind of training. A discipline, like culture, provides security, comfort, and nourishment to its members, as well as till the soil of knowledge in a specialised area.

One of the founding fathers of organisational psychology and a pioneer in researching organisational culture in business, Edgar Schein (1992) argues organisations develop "cultures" directly affecting the ways people work. He thinks an organisation's culture is crucial in maintaining a healthy and vital business. Although we can observe a culture's products (books published) or interests (areas of research), and learn its rules of behaviour (such as research methodology) or values (whether higher education should be available to all or a select few), he argues it is hard to detect values, assumptions, or tacit beliefs. Schein therefore defines culture as:

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (1992, p. 12).

Schein warns managers who "do not become conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them" (1992, p. 15). To this I would add, like business
leaders, educators who are unaware of their own beliefs, values, and assumptions become “addicted” to those beliefs, values and behaviours—they become dependent on one solution or response to curricular problems, which, in the end, will inevitably be unsatisfactory in many cases. It is like the adage, “when all you have is a hammer, everything is a nail.” Because eclecticism, integration, and interdisciplinarity are pragmatic based, the student centred approach does not lend itself well to a “one size fits all” approach to education since each student has different aims and needs. Faculty cannot make wise choices if they are unaware of—or refuse to understand—the available approaches, and the advantages and disadvantages each possess.

I suspect music educators usually do not see or “register” the spectrum of educational orientations. Further research would uncover the educational views of music faculty in post-secondary institutions. Specifically, how familiar are music faculty with the major aesthetic arguments or philosophies of music? Did they consciously choose a particular orientation? Do certain subjects within music favour specific educational purposes? The results to these questions may provide insights helpful in changing the politics of curriculum development.

**Interacting with Other Intellectual Cultures**

Academics constantly face ideas other than their own, yet may well be unsure how to respond to alien history, knowledge, language, standards, rules, norms, and modes of inquiry. Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie, and Yong (1986) describe the agitation people experience when they encounter an unfamiliar culture:

People are socialised, in their own culture, to accept as “proper and good” a relatively narrow range of behaviours. Those behaviours not labelled as good are perceived as less desirable and, in extreme cases, as absolutely wrong. Further, others who engage in those less desirable behaviours are seen as backward, ignorant, or ill-mannered. In
everyday words, people become accustomed to doing things . . . in certain ways, and
the behaviours surrounding these activities are seen as proper. But when they interact
with people from other cultures, those proper behaviours are not always forthcoming
from the others. In addition, behaviours that people consider 'improper' are practised
on a routine basis by those from other cultures. Common responses to this
confrontation of past learning with present experiences are intense dislike of
culturally different others (leading to prejudice), negative labels (stereotypes), and a
refusal to interact with the others (discrimination). (1986, p. 16)

Because there has been an enormous amount of time, energy, and financial resources
invested to gain competency and membership in a field, there is a reluctance to reinvest or
diversify. Furthermore, there is an assumption other fields think and do things basically the
same way. Thus, when educators encounter another culture whose norms and behaviours are
different, there are intense feelings that arise unexpectedly.

Cultural Contact at the Individual Level

When individuals encounter new ideas, there are four possible psychological
responses they may have: passing, chauvinistic, marginal, and mediating (Bochner, 1982).
Passing describes those individuals who reject their cultural origin and embrace the new one.
Chauvinism differentiates those who engage a new culture but reject it outright, becoming
staunch supporters of their place of origin. Marginality identify people who wish to belong to
two groups but are unable to gain full membership with either because knowledge, values, or
membership requirements are incompatible. Finally, mediating combines or blends elements
from different systems without destroying the individual characteristics that distinguish each
culture.

Research needs to investigate how faculty members respond to orientations different
than their own. For example, how do music educators react to aesthetic theories which
conflict with their own beliefs, and how are these attitudes reflected in their course designs. It
would also be valuable to determine what perceptions faculty members have of other subjects within their discipline. For example, what views, assumptions, and beliefs do applied, history, and theory instructors have of each other's subjects and the instructors who teach them?

*Cultural Contact at the Group Level*

When conflict arises between groups, group members unite and become adamant about standards and customs cherished by the group. At the same time, relationships between circles worsen as each side promotes negative stereotyping and suspicion (Brown, 1984). Differences rooted in academic tradition are extremely difficult to negotiate. Strong feelings and entrenched opinions erect fortified walls which are difficult to penetrate. Bochner (1982) outlines four general responses when different cultures interact at the group level: *genocide*, *assimilation*, *segregation*, and *integration*.

In academia, *genocide* occurs when a discipline becomes obsolete on account of intellectual or technological advances in another field. For example, music was once used by ancient Greeks to explain the workings of the cosmos; however, advances in astronomy, physics, and mathematics have usurped that role.

*Assimilation* occurs when a discipline is forced to adopt the ways of another more dominant culture. With professional programs having increasing authority in shaping the university or college curriculum, many liberal arts programs are taking on a more business or "practical" approach in order to survive (for example, the psychology of business, or arts management).
Segregation denotes separate activity and development of disciplines. The tradition of universities divided into schools or faculties is a prime example. As another example, music is divided into several subdivisions such as theory, history, and applied studies, each demanding separate treatment in order to give full attention to its content. However, Bochner, writing about individuals, not ideas or disciplines, observes that

[i]n practice, segregation usually does not work very well, whether the enforced or the self-imposed kind. The main reason is that the world is an interdependent place, particularly for people who live in close physical proximity to each other. . . . Groups and individuals who have been segregated by a dominant or powerful culture do not find the process psychologically satisfying, because they perceive their freedom to be curtailed . . . ; self-segregated groups may find their status initially exhilarating, with a new-found sense of pride, identity and worth. It remains an empirical question whether such enthusiasm can be sustained, in the face of the self-imposed but nevertheless real shrinkage in the economic, social and cultural opportunities available. In any case the undercurrent of hostility and the siege mentality, implicit in a self-segregated situation, are unlikely to be psychologically healthy for the group or individuals adopting such a lifestyle as a permanent arrangement. (1982, p. 26)

Since it is difficult to separate thought from the whole of humanity, I argue prolonged isolation or exile may also do more harm to disciplines than good.

In cultural contact, integration may be defined as the merging of societies into a superior organisation while each group maintains some cultural identity. Often referred to as cultural pluralism, it implies the co-existence of differences while sharing broad values, rules and goals. The integration or shared educational outcomes of professional and liberal education, as outlined by Stark and Lowther (1988), is an example of integration in curriculum design.

Research also needs to investigate how faculties interact with different cultures. For example, how do business and music faculty view each other? What are the differences and similarities in the educational orientations each group subscribes to? What are the
assumptions and prejudices they hold of other disciplines. Another helpful study would be how different music programs view each other. For example, do classical, jazz, and commercial music schools perceive one another similarly? What stereotypes are resorted to when speaking of different kinds of music programs? Also, what similarities and differences exist between music educators who teach the same subject in music but in a different style? For example, do musicologists who teach classical music history have the same educational aims as those who teach the history of jazz or pop music?

Supporters of integration and interdisciplinarity assume contact between different disciplines will foster mutual respect and co-operation. However, not all intercultural contacts are fruitful. There have been several large-scale studies which suggest, contrary to popular belief, inter-group contact does not necessarily reduce inter-group tension, prejudice, hostility and discriminatory behaviour. Yet one hears politicians, church leaders and other public figures saying that if only people of diverse cultural backgrounds could be brought into contact with each other, they would surely develop a mutual appreciation of their points of view and grow to understand, respect and like one another... Unfortunately, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. (Bochner, 1982, p. 16)

Indeed, Bochner notes some intercultural relations may lead to an increased tension, hostility and suspicion. If not all intercultural contact in academia are beneficial, what are the factors that lead to a less harmonious relationship?

Because there is a strong correlation between the interrelationship of ideas and the cultural contact of people, research should explore ways of integrating ideas or concepts on the one hand, and the social problem of working with other individuals or groups who subscribe to different educational theories on the other. Knowledge or objects do not cause friction between fields so much as people’s choices of information. In the end, I suspect
nearly all good questions resolve into empirical problems/questions a careful social surveyor or observer could discern and answer.

**Cultural Contact and Interdisciplinarity**

The terms used by Bochner (1982) to describe individual responses (passing, chauvinistic, marginal, and mediating) and group reactions (genocide, assimilation, segregation, and integration) to different cultures are similar to the concepts found in the field of interdisciplinarity (crossdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, pluridisciplinary, transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and integration). For example, "marginality," as Bochner defines it (wanting to belong to two groups whose values and knowledge are incompatible), is synonymous with the term "multidisciplinary" (the juxtaposition of inharmonious disciplines). "Mediating" (blending elements) is similar to "integration" (restructuring elements to form a new discipline). "Pluridisciplinary" (juxtaposition of related disciplines) and "assimilation" (adopting views from another field) are also similar concepts. Granted, there are some sociological concepts that do not translate directly to the specific terms found in interdisciplinarity, but the former is dealing with human reaction while the later is dealing with the relationship of ideas. The sociological classifications account for much broader human responses to different cultures than interdisciplinarity has yet to consider regarding the relationship of ideas.

**Conflict**

perceived incompatibility of goals, values, expectations, process, or outcomes between two or more interdependent individuals or groups." The latter definition implies one of the reasons why individuals or groups argue is they rely or need each other—they recognise, unconsciously perhaps, the other side brings something of value to the table. Otherwise, one side would simply walk away.

Although it is clear too much conflict can be destructive (because it produces "strong negative feelings, blindness to interdependencies, and uncontrolled escalation of aggressive action and counteraction" [Brown, 1984, p. 226]), it is not as evident too little conflict can also be detrimental. To ignore differences or act as if they don’t exist means interests, perceptions, and preferences are not being heard, thus ignoring important information which may undermine decision-making.

Managing Conflict

Two individual and two group responses to cultural contact described by Bochner (marginality, mediating, segregation, and integration) are a multidisciplinary approach to handling conflict. That is, they propose a juxtaposition of ideas without changing the individual elements. Thus, they require the ability to accept paradox or maintain tension between opposing ideas. Bochner explains the advantages of viewing problems from a variety of angles:

from an adaptive point of view, the more skills persons have the greater the range of contingencies with which they can cope. It follows that multicultural people are going to be more effective than monocultural individuals in dealing with the ever-growing number of cross-cultural encounters facing human beings in the future, as the world continues to shrink. (1982, p. 36)
The refusal to recognise conflicting orientations or find common ground undermines the ability of educators to help students who have other motivations for learning, or design an efficient and effective curriculum. But how does one manage conflict or tension?

Rather than eliminate conflict, it is better to maintain an appropriate level of conflict which recognises the differences and similarities of opposing ideas. In assessing whether there is an appropriate degree of conflict at the individual, interpersonal, or inter-group levels, Brown (1984) argues an equilibrium of forces must be maintained on three levels: attitudes, behaviour, and structure.

**Attitude** refers to a person’s manner of thinking or feeling towards specific problems. “Too much conflict is characterised by blindness to interdependencies, naivété about the dynamics and costs of conflict, and strong negative feelings and stereotypes. Too little conflict, in contrast, is marked by blindness to conflicts of interests, naivété about the dynamics of collusion, and little awareness of group differences” (Brown, 1984, p. 230).

**Behaviour** refers to the cohesion, conformity, and co-operation within a group. Too much conflict leads to fragmentation, warlike competition, and exploitation. Blind conformity, overly co-operative behaviour, and appeasement indicate too little conflict. **Structure** refers to the makeup of an organisation. An example would be types of post-secondary institutions with different mandates, history, and clientele, such as research universities versus community colleges. When there is too much conflict, differences are emphasised or exaggerated, territories are overly defended, and few rules exist to moderate conflict. Too little conflict stems from differences being suppressed, territories allowing uncontested access, and excessive rules that stifle opposition.
The degree of conflict is not determined by those around us but by our own understanding of the problems at hand. We cannot control how others think or act but we can control how we think and act. There is an over-tendency for educators to blame “others” for the conflicts that arise when making academic plans. However, if faculty wish to reduce conflict educators do so by expanding their perspectives. In other words, the way we view problems is the first problem faculty members must address when engaging with different intellectual cultures.

Conditions that Promote Intercultural Communication

The question still remains, how do educators move beyond their own educational beliefs? Put another way, what conditions would encourage educators to inquire and evaluate different educational beliefs and values? Bocher (1982), Jaspars and Hewstone (1982) cite numerous sources claiming it is the conditions under which contact takes place that determines the degree of success or failure of intercultural interactions. Pre-judgement of beliefs and values is less likely when

1. participants having the same rights and privileges;
1. close rather than casual or superficial associations;
1. favourable social environment (such as support by authority);
1. useful activities requiring co-operation and mutual dependence; and,
1. common goals ranked high in importance by both groups.

Conditions that encourage pre-judging are:

1. situations which creates competition between groups;
1. associations that are forced, strained, disagreeable;
1. when the power and/or reputation of one group is diminished;
1. when one group is deprived, rendered useless, or feel blocked from moving forward;
1. when moral or cultural standards of one group are disagreeable or offensive to another.
I am not arguing seeing curricular problems from multiple perspectives will solve or reduce curricular conflicts on its own; however, I am arguing multiplicity is an essential step in making informed decisions regarding curriculum making. When faculty make curricular plans based solely on their own educational beliefs and values, they lack *contextual competence*, that is, the ability to see the interdependence of different educational orientations. Furthermore, to make light of different educational beliefs and values lacks *critical thinking*. Educators must understand the complexity of curricular planning. They cannot do so if they unaware of or are pre-judging different curricular orientations. In addition, although educators adhere to beliefs and values because they have proven to be successful in dealing with many problems in the past, educators must still be *adaptable* since inevitably there will be circumstances which require a different approach. Finally, educators ought to have a *concern for scholarly improvement* in making curricular plans. If academics are obligated to advance their profession, certainly the professional requirement spills over into making curricular plans.
Coda

"To know one thing you must know the opposite."

*Henry Moore – sculptor*

"The material of music is sound and silence, integrating these is composing."

*John Cage - composer*

In chapter one I argued educational orientations—while separate entities—were still interdependent because they viewed and defined educational problems from different perspectives. In chapter two, I asserted different educational beliefs and values demanded distinct responses to questions of curricular aims, content teaching strategies, students, and evaluation schemes; yet, each competing idea could not address all educational interests. In chapter three, I claimed the two facets of “liberal” education were also reciprocally dependent. In chapter four, I discussed the advantages and disadvantages of integrating different educational beliefs and values in academic plans. I argued that although each educational orientation had specific interests which are exclusive, there is much overlap between them that ought to be explored when making curriculum. Finally, in chapter five, I suggested the conflicts in curriculum design and development may be traced to sociological problems between academic cultures—educators need to explore the relationships between different educational beliefs and values. This researcher suspects educational theories will have different relationships with each other. As Marsh writes, “[s]ometimes they will display much in common. Sometimes they will prove complementary. Sometimes they will be locked in dialectic conflict. They will seldom prove irrelevant to each other. Yet the unique features of each will continue to require exploration” (1988, p. 32).
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