WAR GUILT AND POSTWAR JAPANESE EDUCATION

by

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B.A., Sophia University, 1996
Dip. Ed., The University of Western Australia, 1999

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of Educational Studies)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

March 2002

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Date **April 11, 2002**
Abstract

The roots of Japanese patriotic education in the last decade lie in the educational reforms of the American occupation. Some writers see post-war education as a period of officially-prescribed 'mind-control' as American occupiers forced their distorted version of history upon the Japanese, meanwhile undermining patriotic attitudes and practice so that the Japanese might never again pose a threat to the Americans. Others see reform as having freed Japanese from militaristic and ultra-nationalist governments, thus leaving space for the introduction of democratic practices and ideals. Similarly, textbook censorship conducted by the Ministry of Education has been criticized, as a prime example of Japan's inability to accept its past wrongdoings. On the contrary, some view current versions of history approved by the Ministry as masochistic. In both cases, the core issue is the question of war guilt.

On the surface, the Ministry of Education conducted official policies on education and therefore shaped Japanese war guilt. However, other actors such as the American occupiers and the Japan Teachers’ Union also played a major part in the process. I examine the positions and motivations of the various interest groups that influenced Japanese perceptions of war guilt. Further, I argue the importance of the occupation period in the history of education in Japan, and describe the American occupation of Japan with emphasis on educational reform during the period 1945-1960. I present arguments of prominent historians on the questions of war guilt, censorship, and education.
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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Bill Bruneau, my supervisor who encouraged me to pursue this topic and supported me throughout my Master's degree. My Committee members Jean Barman and Peter Seixas have both been an inspiration to me. Courses I took from Bill, Jean, and Peter have widened my perspective and I have done my best to incorporate some of what I learnt from them in my thesis.

Many people whom I cannot begin to list have continually given me moral support. Most have not physically been in the same country as I, but their friendship has meant a great deal to me.

I thank my fiancé Lorenzo for his unreserved support and belief in me.

Without my parents, none of this would have been possible. I dedicate this work to them.

Naoko Kato
Chapter One: Introduction

Central Research Question

This thesis examines Japanese ideas of and experience of war guilt during the years 1945-60. The thesis assesses, in reference to Japanese education, the connection that existed between the American occupation of Japan and the post-occupation period. As well as describing the two most important players, the Ministry of Education and the teachers' union, it explores the positions taken by a variety of groups and individuals toward the central concept of war guilt.

Immediately after the American occupation, American occupying authorities and Japanese educators and politicians took widely various positions on the question of war guilt. These positions can be in part retrieved by studies of public documents and analysis of changes in the curriculum of Japanese elementary and secondary public schools. But a mere description of these several positions begs at least one question: What groupings (of civil servants, teachers, laypeople, politicians), and which social-political forces, lay behind these positions (and in some cases) the policies that were later based on them?

Although the civil service may, on the surface of events, account for much Japanese public policy on “war guilt”—and on public re-education—at least two other groupings were at work pushing civil servants to think as they did: American authorities and the Japan Teachers’ Union. Given this constellation of powers, one is driven to ask a further question: How did the eventually-dominant view of “war guilt” come to be chosen from the options available?
In recent books published in Japan on its history during World War II, there are two major conflicting interpretations. Nationalist “right-wing” writers such as Kanji Nishiho, Nobusaku Fujioka (Morris-Suzuki 2000) claim the Nanjing atrocities never occurred, and further claim that public schools teach an Americanized, “masochistic” version of Japanese history. “Left-wing” writers like Akira Fujiwara, Kiyoshi Inoue, and Goro Hani (Price 2001) protest against those who downplay Japanese wartime atrocities, and blame the Ministry of Education for censoring history textbooks that hide “facts” from children. In both interpretations, education and censorship are key factors in the argument. Moreover, writers’ views on the war itself, the American occupation, and post-war education are interrelated. A further question might be to find out just how far these several things are causally linked.

From 1890 until 1945, state-authored textbooks were supposed to strengthen national unity, if not conformity among Japanese. During the American occupation, the occupational authorities re-introduced the textbook screening system, and this the Japanese Ministry of Education later inherited. Right-wing writers like Eto (1998) describe American policies on educational reform as part of the “censorship operation” that the Americans explicitly carried out. On the other hand, such left-wing writers as Ienaga (1994) write that textbook screening by the post-war Ministry of Education is “censorship” rather than “screening.”

One might gather from these writers and their views that the Japanese thought themselves unique in their post-war experience of textbook selection. But a system of textbook selection has long been in place in many countries. Even so, an energetic group of writers have argued that the Second World War and the American occupation have been “catastrophic” in Japan. Much, if not most Japanese writing on Japanese education freely uses the term “censorship” in describing centralized control over education during the war, during the occupation period, and
in the post-war period. Therefore, I have chosen the term “censorship” in reference to the Japanese textbook screening system.

Jun Eto’s *Contained Realm of Discourse: Censorship Operation by the Occupational Forces and Postwar Japan* (1998, 261-92) describes thoroughly the “War Guilt Information Program.” The U.S. occupational authorities organized this Program to implant war guilt in the minds of Japanese through “education.” The resulting war guilt would, were the program successful, be passed on for generations to come. Because earlier works had mentioned only censorship by the Ministry of Education, Eto’s was a revisionist historical account and a surprise to general readers.

An adequate account of the “War Guilt Information Program” is vital to an understanding of post-war Japanese history of education. Unfortunately, scholarly treatments of the program have been scarce and disappointingly slight. Most commonly, right-wing writers mention the program, but out of context, and to promote anti-American sentiment. Because the program is connected with “right-wing” politics and culture, it is dismissed as of negligible importance and, of course, not taken seriously by writers whose views might be considered in some way or ways “left” of centre in the Japanese spectrum of opinion.

Those who continually accuse the Ministry of Education of censoring textbooks since 1945, do not take into consideration that American occupation authorities also censored information (Economist 1997). On the other hand, those who emphasise American censorship downplay censorship by the current Ministry of Education (Howard 2001). Although both parties refer to censorship, they do not acknowledge historical connections between the occupation period and the post-occupation period.

Despite the availability of archival documents,¹ and partly because writers are necessarily selective in the views they present, research on war guilt has been generally unsatisfying.² I propose to describe in detail the implementation of the War Guilt Information Program, then to establish the connection between the occupation and post-occupation periods to see how successfully the
American scheme was implemented after the American departure. I hope thus to answer my two leading questions: what groupings and which social-political forces, lay behind various positions on war guilt; and how the eventually-dominant view of “war guilt” came to be chosen from the several options available.

Significance of Research Question

My study examines the institutionalization of war guilt in educational policy during the transitional period from occupation to post-occupation. This study is significant because of its emphasis on the question of war guilt, and for the period it covers, 1945-60. Typically, historical treatments of Japanese education divide postwar educational policies into the occupation period, when the Americans implemented educational reform, and the post-occupation period, when the Ministry of Education took control. This leaves readers under the false impression that these two periods were discontinuous, and that there was little interaction between American occupiers and the Ministry of Education. In fact, educational policy was much contested during this period, and as I later show, there was a power struggle between American occupiers, Japanese civil servants, and Japanese collaborators (including teachers, media personnel, historians, politicians, and intellectuals to list a few).

Historians writing on the question of war guilt have too often neglected the complexity of the transitional period, and resort to simpler frameworks that provide them with a more persuasive narrative. For instance, right-wing writers often refer to the first three years of the American occupation because they can argue that the Americans, who sought systematically to eliminate ultranationalism and to transplant war guilt, are responsible for present-day masochistic interpretations of Japanese history. Masochism here refers to anti-Japanese interpretations of history promoted by non-Japanese, which Japanese themselves have now adopted. Similarly, left-
wing writers prefer speaking of the Ienaga lawsuit cases against the Ministry of Education, which highlights the Ministry's strict textbook censorship system. These are not isolated events, and should not be assessed out of context, or in the absence of a comprehensive examination of the relationship between the American occupiers and the Ministry of Education, both of which administered postwar Japanese educational policy.

In collecting documents for my research, I have been able to make full use of English and Japanese materials. Research in this field has too often been affected by language limitations, as monolingual writers may be left with no choice but to rely on sources written in their own respective languages. Not only are they left with a narrower selection of materials, but are also unable to capture the wider range of viewpoints offered by the other parties.

Significance of the Occupation Period

At a time of recession and rising unemployment, educational reform is in 2002 a hotly debated subject in Japan. Japan immediately after the War was rebuilding the country and its economy; and until recently, education had served as a means to achieve this goal. Today, a half-century later, Japan is questioning what sort of education she requires for the immediate and distant futures. That re-assessment should not neglect a formative historical account as central as the American occupation of Japan and its cultural and educational consequences. To say this is not to claim that problems facing Japan can be traced to the American occupation. Educational policies implemented by the Americans have acted as the foundation for post-war education in Japan (Krauss 1995). Even so, the occupation is only one of many contributing factors in these developments. The current debate is partly about deciding what features of educational policy and practice derive from Japanese traditions, and what from American influence (Krauss 1995).

Increasing crime rates among school-aged children, and discipline problems in primary
schools, have stimulated discussions of Moral Education (Gaouette 1998). Some educators argue that Japan should return to moral standards and values derived from the Imperial Rescript of Education, banned by the Americans after the War (Japan Communist Party 2001). Most agree that Moral Education classes of the kind taught since 1958 are no longer useful, as teachers have worked to make the subject as uncontroversial (even boring) as possible, precisely because it played an influential role during the war. In sum, there is a conflict between those who blame Americans for robbing Japanese of their heritage and moral systems and thereby creating discipline problems in schools, and those who fear the resurgence of pre-war militarism.

Further, “knowledge-based” instruction (that is, rote learning and magistrocentric instruction) has come under widespread popular and professional criticism, and the Ministry of Education has proposed to supplement hours for formal instruction with activities that promote creativity, referred to as “education for emotional enhancement.” Concerned educators argue that schemes to decrease children’s workload will merely weaken Japan’s competitiveness in the global economy, and even go as far to argue that the Americans are behind these schemes. Faced with growing pressures to internationalise, the Ministry has increased hours of English language instruction and decreased hours for Japanese. Right-wing nationalists see this as a sign of the invasion of American culture. Thus in times of educational reform, Japanese educators are compelled to re-examine the American occupation and its effects on Japanese education. Yet because the United States has had such a tremendous influence over post-war Japanese education, educators are still unable to separate those practices Japanese initiated and those policies Americans forced upon Japanese. Just as the educational and political facts of 2002 may be explained variously, current Japanese educational practices should not be put down to one “crucial” or “central” contributing factor. I wish to avoid being caught up in right-versus-left-wing debates, partly because I do not intend to study the long-term effects of the occupation.³

Better known as a textbook controversy, problems in the Ministry of Education’s
textbook censorship system resurface frequently in diplomatic relations between governments of China and Korea. Less known is that behind the controversy there was a power struggle between the Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyoso) and the Ministry of Education. Further, right-wing historians believe Nikkyoso to have become a kind of “successor instrument” of the American occupation authorities’ ideals and policies on education. In order to understand such recent events as the textbook controversy, it is necessary to look back to the occupation period, as the legacy of the American occupation continues to affect current educational policies.

This thesis is centrally concerned with educational events during the occupation, and offers only a preliminary assessment of the impact and effects of that occupation. I wish merely to set the stage for a much larger, later research study on impact and effects. In order to do that, I may raise questions about the current argument about the roots of Japan’s educational “problems.” But the larger sociological, political-economic, and historical question of impact I leave for a future, detailed study.

Post-war education was seen as a success, as it helped democratize Japan, produced skilful workers who contributed to the economy, and rebuilt Japan from the ruins of war. Fifty years later, education is under re-examination by schools, the government, and the industrial sector.
Previous Research

English and Japanese scholars have devoted considerable energy to the period after World War II. Many of their accounts show the influence of the Japanese historian Ienaga, a man who played a direct part in events. Much of the writing is limited in sources and purposes.

Buruma’s (1994) *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan* deals with the question of war guilt by comparing Japan with Germany. He observes that Japan has not been able to face up to its wrongdoing in war, whereas Germany has made “progress” in this respect. Buruma unfortunately underplays the role of the American occupation and does not include any discussion of the war guilt program. The war guilt campaign conducted by the American occupation authorities cannot be overlooked if one was to seriously tackle the overall question of Japanese war guilt.

More recently, Hein (2000) in *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States* conducted a comparative study of Germany, Japan, and the United States. Hein’s treatment of war guilt is more balanced than Buruma’s in that she takes into account that all three countries do censor History. However, Hein’s main sources in describing censorship in Japan are from Ienaga, well known for filing a lawsuit against the Ministry of Education in protest of post-war textbook censorship. Ienaga does not take into account American censorship and emphasises the Ministry’s censorship; the detailed administrative history of Hein’s arguments are consequently one-sided and unbalanced.

In general, research published in English has concentrated on whether educational reform during the occupation successfully transformed Japan into a democracy, or on whether the American education system is transplantable to Japan. A typical example is Chapman (1985) who writes, “the big problem which faced the Americans in the occupation of Japan was not only to begin where Perry had left off a hundred years ago and to complete his work, but to achieve what
the Greeks had failed to do in the sixth century B.C. — to persuade an oriental people to accept western civilization.”

More recently at the height of the Japanese economic cycle, a great many Americans assessed Japanese education, a system they themselves had helped to create, to see if the Japanese approach to education helped to account for Japan’s economic success. Here again, the occupation was seen in researchers’ perspective as American policy, not as Japanese history. Because English-language sources are chiefly concerned with the external success or failure of educational reform (that is, in terms of economic ‘externals’), even censorship is accepted as a necessary feature of reform.

Of the books written on the textbook controversy, most emphasize post-occupation textbook screening conducted by the Ministry of Education. Ienaga is among the most prominent Japanese historians to deal with these matters, having filed lawsuits against the Ministry’s censored textbooks, and intending to convince readers of Ministry wrongdoing. In “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,” for instance, Ienaga (1994) argues that the Ministry of Education’s censoring of textbooks has led to generations of teachers seeking to persuade Japanese children that war is glorious. As he largely bases his writings on his own experiences, he underplays the occupation period and emphasizes post-war textbook censorship.

Eto (1998), on the other hand, shows how relentlessly and carefully American censors listed categories of deletion and suppression. He was the first to study the role of censorship in the history of education in Japan, and has done the most extensive study. Contained Realm of Discourse: Censorship Operation by the Occupational Forces and Postwar Japan is written from a point of view that the American occupation itself was a “tragic encounter” between the United States and Japan. Eto, argues that the rhetoric used by the occupiers during the War Guilt Information Program persists in the twenty-first century as the Americans made sure that their ideas would be passed on by educational means. He believes censorship has transformed Japanese collective
memories of the past, and that occupation forces not only successfully achieved their goal of remaking Japanese in their own image, but that Japanese have internalized these images. Eto does not sufficiently consider the presence of Japanese collaborators who supported the Americans and willingly carried their policies through to the post-occupation period. He claims Americans explicitly implemented the war guilt information program through education, so that the war guilt would continue to be passed down from one generation to the next, even after the Americans left Japan. Yet he does not explain the connection between the war guilt information program and the present feelings of war guilt for which Japanese are putatively responsible, as the post-occupation period is left out of his arguments.

Books on Japanese views on the Second World War are often written to negate a view, or to support a particular view of the war. In *Japanese Views of the Pacific War*, Yoshida (1995) gives a thorough overview in ten-year periods since 1945 and follows, in sequence, Japanese views on the Second World War. He uses public survey results, polls on the popularity of war heroes, war-related games, and books on war to judge how war was perceived in Japan during a particular time period. He also lays out major theories academics have advanced in justifying their views on the War. He stresses his position that World War II was a war against Asia, not a war between Japan and the United States. Although Yoshida does cover a wide range of positions in order to define Japanese views on the war in the Pacific, his weakness lies in his dismissal of Eto’s position--by employing Ienaga’s line of argument.

Relatively few books on the history of Japanese education deal with the power struggle between Nikkyoso and the Ministry of Education. Like Tsuchimochi (1998), who has recently tackled this well-known problem, most Japanese sources offer description, but do not offer explanations apart from a power struggle perspective. Among the very few English-language sources, Marshall (1994) and Schoppa (1991) have managed to set the power struggle in a wider perspective by discussing the political history of educational policies in Japan. Marshall (1994)
gives a critical analysis of the struggle between major political players during the 1945-60 period, and also asks questions about power: “where, how, and who is to make the critical decisions about what is taught by whom to whom” (Marshall, 1994). But because he sets out to give an overview of the power struggles and ideological controversies in Japanese education over the past 150 years, his book provides mainly a broad historical survey and is in some cases inaccurate. Schoppa (1991) lists the Liberal Democratic Party, the Ministry of Education, the business community, and the Japan Teachers' Union as the four main players in formulating educational policies and gives a thorough analysis of the interplay between these main players. Unfortunately these books rarely tackle the role of the American occupational authorities, nor do they discuss war guilt.

Most authors of works on educational reform and the American occupation pay minimal attention to the shift of power over Japanese education from the occupation authorities to the Ministry of Education. Tsuchimochi (1993) discusses the significance of Japanese independent reform under the occupation to clarify which reforms were based on Japanese initiatives and which were “forced” by occupation authorities. His study is unfortunately restricted to the First U.S. Education Mission to Japan. Thakur (1995) seeks to fill in the gaps by connecting textbook policies in the pre-war, occupation, and post-occupation periods. She shows how history textbook reform in occupied Japan is linked to the controversy over the textbook certification system in post-occupation Japan. Thakur's article explains only the general flow of events and does not deal specifically with questions of war guilt, or with key players who influenced decision-making in education. I agree with her that the connection between pre-war, occupation, and post-war events has been absent from much of the recent work on Japanese educational history.

Dierkes (2001) shows how the institutionalization of war memories in the early postwar years was much more contested and complex than is generally agreed on either side of the Pacific. He shows that the foundation of the current constellation of powers in Japanese educational policy-making was built in the early postwar period, and provides a thorough analysis on the
formation of administrative structures and collective interest groups. Dierkes provides an excellent framework for institutional history of war memories in educational policy, a neglected area in research on history of Japanese education. Dierkes examines war memories in general terms. By contrast, I have sought to deal with the question of war guilt, a rather more narrow matter of educational politics, policy, and practice.
In examining continuities between the occupation period and post-occupation period, I wish to discuss events only until the years immediately after the occupation. I readily grant that public opinion had a great part in shaping ideas and policies on war, and that a study of public opinion would be helpful in answering my research question about groupings and social-political forces behind various positions on war guilt, and about how the eventually-dominant view of "war guilt" came to be chosen from the several options available. After all, our memories and perceptions of war are not controlled merely by what we are taught at schools or what the media transmits to us, but are broadly influenced by family stories and messages that we indirectly absorb in informal settings. This thesis will nonetheless rely on published public documents, as these are among the first sources to consult in understanding official policy-making. Once again, I suggest the possibility of further historical and sociological research.

I begin the present study with a document from September 1945, issued by the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers' (SCAP) and entitled "Summation of Non-military Activities in Japan and Korea" (drawn from Eto's *What I Forgot and What I was Made to Forget* [1996]) containing explicit descriptions of the War Guilt Campaign. I rely on Eto's translated version of SCAP records in *Contained Realm of Discourse: Censorship Operation by the Occupational Forces and Postwar Japan* (1998) for details of the implementation of the War Guilt Information Program.

I then consider *Historical Articles on the Pacific War* (1946), the first public, printed document of the American War Guilt campaign. This history textbook distributed by the Civil Information and Education Section was later turned into newspaper articles as well as radio programs. I analyse the original text and refer to journal articles that describe the radio program.

Post-war history textbook guidelines published by the Ministry of Education, are primary sources. I also refer to books published on the topic of textbook censorship by the Ministry.
Furthermore, from secondary sources written on the Ministry of Education, I examine the reasons and premises for the selection of post-war Ministers of Education, and the educational policies that each sought to implement. Through a chronological examination of these materials, I observe shifts in the Ministry’s position.

*Nikkyoso Yonjunenshi* (1989) which is a forty-year history of Nikkyoso published by the Japan Teachers’ Union (Nikkyoso) itself, offers evidence of ideas promoted by teachers, as Nikkyoso represented and still represents more than fifty percent of the teachers in Japan, holding by far the most power among various teachers’ unions. Duke (1973) and Thurston (1973) both write on the political history of the Japan Teachers’ Union, and are vital sources in evaluating the Nikkyoso’s influence in forming or promoting the dominant view on the question of war guilt. It is possible to assess Nikkyoso’s influence by comparing its demands and requests made to the Ministry, with the changes made in the History curriculum.

I also use post-war Japanese History of Education books as references to support evidences taken from primary sources, especially in relation to the role of Nikkyoso in post-war Japanese education, and the shift in power from the Americans to various Japanese parties. By combining these sources, I aim to establish firmly the positions that the American Occupiers, the Ministry of Education, and Nikkyoso took on the question of war guilt.
To provide background to the postwar educational reform, I turn to a brief description of Japan’s pre-war education system. The Japanese public education system and the Ministry of Education, as we would think of them now, were founded in 1871. Educational reform was a feature of the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912), in which Japan endeavoured to build a modern state after two centuries of self-imposed isolation and 680 years of a system usually termed feudal (Duus 1993). As the threat of Western influence or colonization grew, the Japanese government sought to unify the country, adopting the slogan, *fukokukyohei*, "enrich the country and strengthen the military." Industrialization was considered necessary for Japan’s survival, and thousands of Japanese were sent abroad to study the strengths of Western science and technology, to be selected for adaptation in the Japanese system.

Under the feudal system before the Meiji Restoration, Japanese were strongly concerned with loyalty to their feudal clans. At a time when the unification of the country was essential, the Meiji government saw education as a means of unifying the people under the nation-state and the Emperor. Henceforth, education became a national government enterprise.

In 1886, a textbook authorization system came into existence to control textbook content. Fundamental views on education were expressed in the Imperial Rescript on Education which was issued in 1890 and retained until 1948, three years into the American occupation. The following is an extract from the Rescript showing its Moral Education aspect while emphasising loyalty to the nation-state:

Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise,
offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth (Meiji Jingu 2001)

A national textbook system in 1903 compelled the distribution of uniformly standardized textbooks to all schools. All textbooks were written under the direct control and authority of the Ministry of Education, and prefectural textbook screening committees were responsible for selection of particular textbooks and publishers. During the Taisho era, between 1912 and 1926, Japan underwent a brief period of liberalism often referred to as Taisho Democracy. Japan experienced then an upsurge in labour union organization and left-wing activism, events that contributed to a general resurgence of left-of-centre political ideas and parties after World War II (Nikkan Rodo Tsushinsha 1954).

In 1930, the Ministry tightened its control over textbooks by permitting only three specific publishing companies to publish textbooks, and assigning each publisher with areas of distribution (Kaigo, 1999). A 1933 textbook shows how the Ministry used textbooks to "unify" the people and to justify the war:

Russia not only refused to pull the troops out of Manchuria, but began occupying the northern part of Korea. If Manchuria and Korea become part of Russia, Japan would be endangered and the peace in Asia would not be maintained. Our government negotiated with Russia in the hope of coming up with a peaceful solution. However, the Russians did not respond with good faith and dragged the negotiation on for days while they prepared their troops on sea and land (Ministry of Education 1933).

The passage continues with a description of Japan's victory, and attributes Japan's victory to the soldiers' courage, and to the support Japanese people gave to the Emperor.

In 1937, the Ministry of Education published the Kokutainobongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan), which asserted the importance of service to the Emperor and the nation.

In 1941 schools were renamed "national schools" and they were to follow the path set out in the
Imperial Rescript. The following is an example of the nationalistic outlook of the uniformly standardised textbooks at the time, taken from the official 1941 Moral Education textbook: "Japan is a good country, a pure country, the only divine country in the world. Japan is a good country, a strong country, a great country" (Harubu Shuppan 1982). A 1942 Moral Education textbook depicts an exemplary Japanese soldier's willingness to fight in the war:

"A wounded brother returning from the war front tells us his innermost thoughts. "I would like to go back to front to work again." Yes, this spirit is important. All of you, including those who do not go to fight at the warfront should develop the same spirit, and work diligently and serve. As expected, the flag that raises high in occupied territories is the Japanese flag (Tsuchimochi and Wunderlich 1998).

Until the Emperor announced Japan's defeat in war on August 15, 1945, Japanese schools were expected to produce patriotic Japanese citizens, who would be willing to fight, die, and serve the nation to liberate Western colonies in Asia, under the slogan, "Great Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere." Defeat meant the end of a lengthy and intensive scheme of indoctrination. In late 1945, the great question was what, if anything should replace that older scheme.
Summary

This chapter has examined the main lines of arguments historians have typically presented on the issue of war guilt, which have primarily resorted to right-wing versus left-wing arguments. I have outlined the significance of studying war guilt during the transitional period: 1945-60 by going over past research that has inadequately covered this topic. I have also shown the kinds of sources I will use in this study, and have given a brief background on Japanese history of education before the American occupation.
Chapter Two: American Occupiers

Educational Reform under Occupational Forces

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

When the occupation forces landed in Japan, of the total population of 72 million, 18 million students were idle, 4,000 schools were destroyed, and no more than twenty percent of necessary textbooks were available (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994). The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers described education at War's end: "military officers occupying responsible educational positions; textbooks impregnated with militaristic propaganda; teachers dispersed; the Ministry of Education a tool of the militarists; liberal educators hiding from the Thought Police" (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 52).

Officially, reform was to be carried out under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, but in reality it became primarily an American occupation. Plans for educational reform of Japan by the United States did not take shape instantly or suddenly in August, 1945. Even before the United States accepted Japan's surrender, systematic planning of the occupation had been under way. It began as early as 1942 (Martin 1948). In August 1945, General Douglas MacArthur was assigned to take command of the occupation as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP, hereafter). Under SCAP, General Headquarters (GHQ, hereafter) was established in order to control the Japanese government.

General MacArthur had absolute authority over the Japanese government. President Truman's instructions were these:

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will
exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope (Beauchamp and Rubinger 1989, 86).

In the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the beginning objective of the American occupation was clearly set: “to insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world” (Martin 1948, 14). This objective was to be achieved through political, economic, and social reform of basic Japanese values, “by means which will best serve to make the results permanent” and “through the education of the individuals to new values, hoping that as he learns he will change the laws and institutions to conform to purposes which we wish to promote” (Beauchamp and Rubinger 1989).

The intent of all SCAP agencies was that the reform of Japanese society should be accomplished mainly by the Japanese themselves (Blumhagen 1957). Hence, the Ministry of Education acted as both the communication channel with SCAP and the main agency for implementing SCAP educational reform policies in schools. The occupation planners deliberately implemented and enforced American values and practices through the indirect mechanism of the Japanese government, since it would be prudent “to ensure maximum response and acceptance by the Japanese” if “the approach to the Japanese were made through their own leaders” (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 79). Some examples of these American values and practices include decentralisation of the educational system, simplification of the Japanese language, and discontinuation of Moral Education. The way to utilize the influence of Japanese leaders in every field is specifically spelled out in “Japanese Policy for Reorientation of the Japanese” issued on 19 July 1945:

There are numerous Japanese who, through prior contacts and earlier education, will be disposed to accept and assist in the development of our ultimate objectives and along lines which will further the interests of the United
States. For this reason a fundamental responsibility of the Allied authorities in Japan should be to seek out such persons, ensure that they are placed in positions that will enable to accomplish these aims, and afford them counsel, guidance and support (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 79).

SCAP not only made use of Japanese leaders sympathetic to their policies, but put the highly centralized Ministry control systems into use in order to implement effectively SCAP educational reforms. To ensure SCAP held the ultimate power over the Ministry, SCAP reduced the Ministry's functions to mere guidance and counselling. The hierarchy of SCAP and Ministry was thus clear: SCAP held the authority to "dictate reforms publicly to the Japanese government and to require that they be carried out" (Martin 1948, 11). However, because educational reforms during the occupation were planned and executed by two parties, it is unclear whether the Ministry voluntarily initiated reforms. As Martin (1948, 12) notes, "how successfully one can conceal the real source in SCAP of the reform program ostensibly sponsored by the Japanese government, and thus avoid future attacks grounded on its alien character, is uncertain."
The Civil Information and Education Section (hereafter, CI&E) was organised as one of the special staff sections of GHQ. The CI&E was given the task to eliminate from the Japanese educational system all elements of militarism and ultranationalism in doctrine, practice, and training, to reconstruct and rehabilitate the educational system, and to insure dissemination through courses of instruction and school curricula of democratic ideals and principles. CI&E's mission was one of the most important missions of the occupation, and included “making clear to all levels of the Japanese public the true facts of their defeat, their war guilt, the responsibility of the militarists for the present and future Japanese suffering and privation and the reasons for and objectives of the military occupation by the Allied Powers” (SCAP CI&E 1947).

CI&E was divided into seven sections: Plans and Operation Section, Education and Religion Section, Press and Publication Section, Radio Section, Motion Picture and Visual Media Section, and Photo and Arts Section (Suzuki 1983). CI&E staffs were mainly recruited from the prewar Bureau of Overseas Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Detachment (Ariyama 1996). Smith, the section chief of Plans and Operation Section listed four campaigns to reform Japanese conscience: war guilt and responsibility, prisoner of war and demobilized troops, progress of occupation, and encouragement of democratic tendencies (Ariyama 1996). Among these, Smith wrote up a most detailed plan for a campaign to assign war guilt and responsibility, and to this we shall return in a moment.
SCAP Directives on War Guilt

In a 22 October 1945 directive describing basic educational policies for the occupation, SCAP instructed the Japanese government immediately to reappoint teachers and educational officials who had been dismissed or forced to resign for liberal or anti-militaristic opinions or activities during the War. A week later, on 30 October, SCAP directed the removal of militaristic and ultranationalistic personnel from the educational system, and prohibited the reinstatement of teachers repatriated from the military service (GHQ SCAP 1990). The right-wing purge was completed only in 1947, with one percent of teachers removed by the committees, and another 21 percent (120,000 teachers) voluntarily resigning from the teaching profession (Thurston 1973).

On 15 December 1945, SCAP issued a directive that explicitly ordered the elimination of practices and ideologies referred to by implication in the 22 October directive. Dissemination of Shinto doctrines through educational institutions was to be forbidden in order to separate religious activities from the state. Terms such as “Greater East Asia War” or “The Whole World under One Roof,” connected with State Shinto, militarism, or ultra-nationalism, were similarly prohibited. SCAP took further measures on 31 December, instructing that all courses in Morals, History, and Geography be suspended. Textbooks in these subjects were collected, and the Ministry of Education was ordered to prepare and submit substitute programs. SCAP gave particular attention to these three subjects, precisely because they were the most commonly used subject areas to inculcate students with militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideologies during the war.

SCAP needed and wanted detailed guidance on the line they should take in approving and disapproving curricula and textbooks, and turned to educators and historians in the United States. From 5 to 30 March 1946, SCAP invited a mission of distinguished American educators to Japan. The United States Education Mission was to advise General Headquarters and the Ministry of Education on the reconstruction of Japanese education. On 10 August the same year, the
Education Reform Committee was formed in response to a request of the Japanese government to form a parallel Japanese Education Committee of outstanding persons in the Japanese educational world. Indeed, most Japanese Reform Committee members were well-reputed liberal scholars who had visited the United States or Europe before the war, among the most prominent being the Minister of Education Yoshishige Abe, and Chairman of the Council, Shigeru Nambara (Tsuchimochi 1993).

The United States Mission Report made a list of recommendations they considered necessary for Japan's democratization. Some of these included decentralising the Ministry of Education into prefectural units, electing rather than appointing the local board of education, simplifying the Japanese language so that the majority could read beyond the simplest level, rewriting history and geography textbooks, and extending compulsory education to nine years (Tsuchimochi 1993). Merely transplanting what had been successful in the United States to the Japanese education system was not always smooth. For instance, SCAP decentralised the Ministry following the American model of state-run educational administration, but in the process confronted resistance from Japanese conservatives. They argued that Japan, a feudal society that was transformed into a modern state through a centralized education system, had a different history from the United States, an amalgamation of many states collectively created by immigrant communities (Yagi 1978). The occupiers hoped to overcome these challenges by working in cooperation with liberal-minded Japanese educators, who would form the Reform Committee to achieve their common goal: to modify the educational system in a "democratic" sense (SCAP 1948).

Although my chief purpose is not to compare the Allied occupation of Germany with Japan, it is helpful to consider the impact of the United States Mission in both countries, if only to clarify the extent of control that the American occupiers had on the Japanese. The aim of the occupation in Germany as the Potsdam Agreement states, was almost identical to that in Japan:
that “German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist
document and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas” (Tsuchimochi 1993, 199). However, according to Taylor’s report to General Clay, in charge of the American occupation of Germany, the situation in Japan was analogous to that of Germany as “Japan is an oriental country, the culture of which never reached a level comparable to that of Germany, the Nazi interregnum notwithstanding” (Tsuchimochi 1993, 180). This is a stark contrast to the Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-education, where the Mission expresses respect for German culture: “no country – unless it be ancient Greece or Rome – has contributed more generously to the common treasures of our civilization. No approach to the German educational problem dare be blind to this achievement or lacking in gratitude for it” (Tsuchimochi 1993, 200).

Because Americans were restricted by their guidelines for the occupation of Germany, according to which “permanent cultural changes can be effected only as they are developed and maintained by the Germans themselves,” the Germans did not take up many of the American recommendations (Tsuchimochi 1993, 204). In contrast, according to Education in New Japan (SCAP 1948), “Japanese educators were urged to make every effort to assist the Mission and to heed its advice” and used the Report from the United States Mission as their guideline for postwar education. During the occupation, the Ministry wrote up the Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law based upon the Mission’s recommendations.

On 5 September 1946, the first official post-war Japanese history textbook appeared under the title Kuni no Ayumi (The Progress of the Country). In advance of production of Kuni no Ayumi, Japanese historians had been ordered to write textbooks that were not propagandistic; not to advocate militarism, ultranationalism or Shinto doctrine; and to avoid descriptions of Emperors simply because they were Emperors (Caiger 1998, 45). Ienaga, who was one of the four historians in charge of writing Kuni no Ayumi, made amendments in response to the following objections made by the occupational forces: “sentences explaining the tradition of the Imperial succession
had to be omitted; no account of matters pertaining to Shinto was permitted; no mention of
religion including Buddhism and Christianity was allowed; and subjective words had to be more
objective, impartial, and scientific" (Caiger 1998, 47).

Prewar history textbooks and *Kuni no Ayumi* differ markedly in their objectives, showing
the influence of their respective censorship committees. The most drastic changes appeared in
Chapter 1, where history textbooks characteristically describe the birth of the nation. Chapter 1 of
the prewar Japanese history textbook, entitled *Divine Nation*, began with a myth: “the female God
and the male God created eight islands with beautiful mountains and rivers...Then the two Gods
created many other Gods. The last of these was Amaterasu [the Emperor] who came down from
heaven as the ruler, to build the foundations of Japan” (Kaigo 1999). In contrast, *Kuni no Ayumi*
started with a geographical explanation: “there are many islands that stretch from north to south in
the eastern oceans of the Asian continent. That is Japan, where we are living” (Kaigo 1999). In
accordance with SCAP's censorship guidelines, the prewar textbook which “contained matters
pertaining to Shinto” was replaced by “more objective, impartial, and scientific” words (Caiger
1998, 47).

Significantly, *Kuni no Ayumi*, published in 1946, was the last of a series of national text-
books published by the Ministry of Education after 1903 (Caiger 1998). In 1947 the Ministry of
Education published *Atarashi Kenpo no Hanashi* (Tales of the New Constitution). The chapter
referring to Japan's renunciation of war, Constitution 9, begins: “many of you must have sent your
fathers and brothers off to the war we have just been fighting. Did they all come back home safely?
Or did some never return?” (Yamazumi 1987, 168). After the explanation that the word
“renunciation” means “giving up,” it continues: “however, you should not feel disheartened. Japan
has done the right thing, before any other country has done. There is nothing stronger than
righteousness in this world” (Yamazumi 1987, 169).

In 1948 SCAP began to plan for the replacement of the national textbook system with a
more decentralised textbook certification system. SCAP granted the Ministry of Education the temporary textbook certification authority (Thakur 1995, 278). The censorship function was gradually transferred to the Ministry until its complete transferral in 1950.
War Guilt Information Program

In order to insure that Japan would never become a menace to the United States again, GHQ had to conduct an extensive censorship operation. The censorship scheme under the Civil Censorship Detachment under the direction of SCAP easily envisaged the following categories of deletion and suppression:

1. Criticisms of SCAP policies
2. Criticisms of the Far Eastern War Tribunal
3. Criticisms of the fact that SCAP drafted the Japanese constitution
4. Reference to censorship
5. Criticisms of the United States
6. Criticisms of Russia
7. Criticisms of the United Kingdom
8. Criticisms of Korea
9. Criticisms of China
10. Criticisms of other Allied Powers
11. Criticisms of the Allied Powers in general
12. Criticisms of the treatment of Japanese in Manchuria
13. Criticisms of pre-war policies of the Allied Powers
14. Reference to a Third World War
15. Reference to the Cold War between Russia and the United States
16. Promotion of a justification of war
17. Promotion of divine Japan
18. Promotion of militarism
19. Promotion of nationalism
20. Promotion of the Great Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere
21. All other types and forms of indoctrinatory promotion
22. Justification or protection of war criminals
23. Relationships between Japanese women and occupation army officers
24. The situation with the Black Market
25. Criticisms of occupational armies
26. Exaggeration of starvation
27. Violence and actions that threaten peace
28. Falsehood in the media
29. Inappropriate reference to SCAP

September to October 1945, SCAP summarised its censorship scheme, including the war guilt campaign, in a document entitled, “Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea” (SCAP 1945, 324). War guilt among Japanese people immediately after the surrender is
described in the following way: "when the occupation Forces entered Tokyo there was little if any consciousness of war guilt among the Japanese people. They did not know the steps which led Japan to war, the causes of her defeat, or the atrocities committed by her soldiers and there was little feeling of moral culpability" (SCAP 1945, 326). "Summation" then offers a point-by-point description of the war guilt campaign.

68. An extensive information and education program has been undertaken to bring the true facts before the people. Documentary material on Japanese atrocities in the Philippines has been released to the press and radio. This includes Photostats of Japanese army orders and diaries, photographs of atrocities and articles. There are numerous indications that the truth of these is now being accepted.

69. A series of twenty articles on the war in the Pacific has been prepared and being distributed to newspapers, magazines and radio. The articles show in detail the steps which led Japan to war and the reasons for her military defeat. These articles have been designated a "must" for all newspapers in Japan. This material will be presented also in motion pictures and on the radio...

....71. A series of radio broadcasts by prominent Japanese liberals has been devoted to war criminals. This has been treated on other programs. Japanese film companies are being stimulated to produce a series of documentary and feature films stressing the war guilt program.

72. Cultural, economic, professional and other groups have been encouraged to hold discussions of the subject and many have passed resolutions calling for punishment of war criminals. A labour advisory group set up by SCAP and consisting of four nationally known labour leaders has instituted a series of talks on the subject of war leaders in local unions. A Committee for the Total Abolition of Oppressive Laws, consisting of representatives of numerous organizations, was formed with the assistance of SCAP. One of its objectives is to explain the importance of punishing war criminals (SCAP 1945, 327).

On 6 February 1948, CI&E sent a letter entitled "War Guilt Information Program" to Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Civil Intelligence Section. According to the letter, the war guilt program was "to be expanded to include procedural measures against Japanese attitudes toward the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as ultra-nationalistic advertising during the Tokyo War Tribunal" (Eto 1998, 262). Smith, CI&E's chief of the Plan and Operation Section
laid out eleven items describing the war guilt campaign:

1. Distribution of a newspaper series on the history of war
2. Provision by the Plan and Operation section on articles concerning abuse of POWs by the Japanese army
3. Distribution in newspapers of reviews by Japanese liberals on Japanese militarists' war guilt and Japan's democratisation
4. Creation of a documentary film on Japanese militarists
5. Revival of anti-war theatres and broadcasting scripts
6. Transformation of the history of war into a radio program
7. News commentary on war criminals
8. Radio series on ordinary soldiers' experiences of war
9. Program based on interviews conducted on the streets on the problem of war criminals
10. Distribution of pamphlets on the history of war comprehensible to elementary school students
11. Promotion of organisations that discuss and educate on war crimes (Ariyama 1996).

Smith's plan incorporates both the direct distribution of material created by the CI&E through Japanese media, as well as more indirect use of media. The former strategy of direct distribution became the main element of the war guilt program. First, the War Guilt Information Program disseminated the occupation authorities' version of World War II under the title, "Historical Articles on the War in the Pacific" ("Historical Articles" hereafter). I select some chapter headings that reveal the direction in which SCAP was trying to lead Japanese belief: Allied forces' fierce attacks on Japan, Leyte losses of 120,000, the fall of Tojo, Manila's massacre of 100,000 civilians, the astounding power of the atomic bomb (Ariyama 1996). The prologue describes the "Historical Articles," asserting that "it is important that the Japanese people should know the full story of the war in order that they may understand how defeat came and why they must endure the suffering engendered by militarism" (SCAP 1946, CIE(B)-00921). The term "Greater East Asia War" is replaced by "War in the Pacific" in the "Historical Articles," and in itself is an indication of the perspective taken by the Americans. The emphasis was on heroic American fighting in the battles fought between Japan and the United States. Wars with China
dating back to the Manchurian Incident of 18 September 1931, were not portrayed as regional or localized wars against China. Rather, these were included as part of the “War in the Pacific,” and the continuity of the war across the fifteen year period was emphasised.

The prologue of the “Historical Articles” opens with the sentence,

The crimes committed by the militarists against the Japanese people are legion. Some have already been made known to the public; others will be released from time to time and documented by unimpeachable sources until the story of Japanese war guilt has been fully bared in all its details without censorship or deference to the persons involved (SCAP 1946, CIE(B)-00921).

The tone advertises that the “truths” the militarists had been hiding from the Japanese would now be revealed by the occupational forces come to save Japan. It is of interest that the word “censorship” here condemn pre-war militarists when in fact, as I show later, the occupational forces were conducting extensive censorship operations, contrary to their claim in the “Historical Articles.” The “Historical Articles” coincides with the objective of the American occupation: to make known to the Japanese people the facts about the war and the guilt of their war-leaders and war criminals (Okamoto 1999).

The “Historical Articles” were published in ten parts in all national Japanese newspapers between 8 December and 17 December 1945. The Japanese translation of the “Historical Articles” was published as a book under the title, The History of the Pacific War. 100,000 copies were sold between March and June of 1946. One reason it sold so well was that schools adopted the book as a required textbook. On 9 April 1946, the Ministry of Education sent orders to each school district enforcing The History of the Pacific War to be bought, and used as the Japanese history textbook. Before publication of The History of the Pacific War, CI&E had issued an order on 31 December 1945 to suspend all textbooks, teachers’ manuals, and courses in Morals and Japanese History until acceptable textbooks became available.

The dramatized version of the “Historical Articles” was transformed into a radio
program, entitled "Now It Can Be Told," which was aired for ten weeks, from 9 December 1945 until 10 February 1946. This radio program was not only targeted at the general public, but was broadcast in schools on a weekly basis. The aim of this radio program was explicitly stated as "to make it clear to the Japanese people the truth about the war, the steps that led to war, and implant into the minds of the Japanese audience, the crimes committed as well as the responsibilities that the militaristic leaders who led Japan to defeat and destruction" (Takeyama 1990, 112). There was to be a question-answer segment where the public could send in questions. It all lasted 41 weeks, ending 4 December 1946. The Japanese response to this program is difficult to know as criticism of American occupiers was censored.

SCAP chose the radio as one of their media for transmitting war guilt because radio had already been used for educational purposes in Japan from the 1930s. In 1935, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, which held a monopoly of radio broadcasting in Japan, began transmitting programs for elementary schools nation-wide. By 1939, more than two-thirds of schools had radio receiving sets and approximately half the schools were using radio broadcasting programs daily in their classrooms (Kodama 1983). After the war, school broadcasting resumed in early October 1945, and radio programs became especially useful because school texts were inadequate or unavailable during the interim period. CI&E proposed radio education for teachers and students, for them to engage in "free and unrestricted discussion of issues involving political, civil, and religious liberties" (Kodama 1983, 84).

In addition to the distribution of the "Historical Articles" through various media channels, documentary materials on Japanese atrocities in the Philippines in the press and radio; a series of radio broadcasts by prominent Japanese liberals devoted to war criminals; and a series of documentary and feature films stressing the war guilt program were all released (SCAP 1945, 327). From December 1945, CI&E began to provide material for potential articles, and ordered each newspaper company to print them. For instance, from the 18th to the 26th January 1946, CI&E
provided 6 pieces of information, 8 photographs, 6 articles for magazines, and 10 press releases to newspaper companies (Ariyama 1996). Taking into account that newspapers were only 2 pages long in 1946, this was a considerable amount of information (Ariyama 1996).

CI&E believed that “news broadcasts, broadcasts dramatizing the history of the war, and other such radio programs designed for the general public are contributing indirectly to the reorientation of teachers” (Kodama 1983, 78). The Ministry of Education issued instructions to incorporate the radio School Hour into the regular course of study, which included the Teachers’ Hour. The program was broadcast after school hours, and was designed for re-education through lectures, discussions, and debates led by liberal educational leadership (Kodama 1983). Specific measures to re-educate teachers were taken by CI&E; one of which was a five-week course given to all teachers and school officials who graduated from normal schools and colleges in September 1945 (Kodama 1983). One of the main objectives for this five-week course was “to inform them of the part Japanese played by militarists in committing the Japanese nation to war, with the accompanying result of defeat” (Kodama 1983, 79).

Another intensive War Guilt campaign began in 1948, before the last speech given by the accused at the Tokyo War Tribunal. The Tokyo War Tribunal was not run and controlled by judges representing countries directly affected by Japan’s war, whether Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Burma. Rather, judges came from countries that had formerly ruled in south-east Asia: England, France, and Holland. Japanese citizens responded to the Tokyo War Tribunal in two ways. There was fairly general acceptance that Japanese leaders were responsible for the war, yet at the same time, a cynical, critical, and one-sided attitude to the Tribunal. General Tojo, who declared full responsibility for the war during the Tribunal, became popular among Japanese who felt the Tribunal was unjust, in that the victors judged the losers. In the letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Civil Intelligence Section, CI&E worry about labelling the use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as “atrocities” and the fact that some Japanese were persuaded by
Tojo's defence in the War Tribunal. In order to counter Japanese justification of the war, SCAP took effect "an intensive campaign that widely publicises Japanese atrocities so that these will compete against criticisms against the dropping of the atomic bomb" (Eto 1998, 280).

The War Guilt Information Program also took into consideration the need to allow Japan to enter into the international community as a peaceful member through democratization. To accomplish this goal, it was necessary to pursue repeatedly the causes of the war, Japanese responsibility and guilt for bringing about war, and war crimes. This was a job for SCAP, and we turn now to a discussion of SCAP's successes and failures.
SCAP and the Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Education under SCAP Control

At least in the first year of the occupation, SCAP distrusted the Japanese Ministry of Education, as it was believed to have been the “central organ of government through which the rulers of Japan have effectuated the indoctrination of the Japanese people with the tenets of militarism, ultranationalism, and State Shintoism” during the war (Wray 1982, 144). The CI&E personnel debated using the highly centralized Ministry of Education to propagate democratic concepts, as this entailed an inherent contradiction. CI&E had to weigh the benefits and dangers of carrying out educational reforms relying on the existing Ministry. Robert King Hall, de facto chief of the Education Subsection of CI&E from October-November 1945, described this dilemma to the members of the U.S. Education Mission in 1946:

There are many phases of the Japanese educational system which during the war have been used with extreme potency for propagandistic purposes which might be used with equal potency to democratic ends. It would therefore be of much interest to you to consider whether it will be possible to reconvert the Japanese educational system rather than do away with it and put in another (quoted in Wray 1982, 146).

In the end, SCAP decided to keep the Ministry and maximally utilise the highly centralized existing system. Ministers of Education had, of course, to follow SCAP directives. In choosing to appoint the Ministers of Education they did, post-war Japanese governments made it easier for SCAP to carry out its education policy. The first Minister of Education with whom SCAP dealt was Tamon Maeda, a well-established bureaucrat known to be a liberal thinker, who
had lived in the United States for a number of years (Marshall 1994). Maeda dealt quickly with structural changes to the Ministry of Education, abolishing ministries such as the Bureau for Thought Supervision, which had been responsible before 1946 for inculcating nationalistic values. He replaced Ministry officials with new personnel who he knew would support his values and his practical outlook.

Among the most important of these appointees was Kotaro Tanaka, whom Maeda appointed as head of the Bureau of School Education. Tanaka was “an outstanding Roman Catholic layman who in 1938 vigorously defended academic freedom and political liberalism when a colleague was indicted and imprisoned on the charge of complicity in a Communist movement” (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 64). The occupiers anticipated that Tanaka would direct Japanese educational reform toward democracy. In the State Department document entitled “Problems Involved in Japanese Educational Reforms” under the heading “Important Personnel in the Education Ministry,” Tanaka is described in the following terms: “a fighter for academic freedom and political liberalism, he may well prove to be of material aid to Education Minster Maeda in eradicating militarism from the Japanese education system” (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 65).

The fact that Tanaka was a Catholic is significant in many respects. Firstly, the number of Christians in Japan amounted to less than 0.05 percent of the total population, with only 11,000 Catholics and twice the number of Protestants between 1943 and 1946 (Gonoi 1990). Moreover, in Japanese history, Christianity has been symbolic of Western culture and ideologies. When Japan wanted to close its doors to Western influence, Christianity was prohibited and crypto-Christians were accused of being traitors, and when Japan was eager to incorporate Western culture, Christians became pioneers. In the 1600s for instance, in preparation for the closed-door policy, the Japanese government prohibited Catholic missionaries from entering Japan, and two hundred years later when Japan decided to open the country, missionaries promoted Christianity as “the religion for civilisation,” and it spread amongst intellectuals who were working toward building
“Modern Japan.” This pattern recurred during World War II when Christians often were accused of being unpatriotic spies, since Christians believed in a religion that had been brought in from the West: Japan’s enemy. Christian schools had to deny its Christian foundation, and Christian students forcefully paid respect to the Yasukuni Shrine to demonstrate their faithfulness to State Shintoism.

When prewar ideologies crumbled with Japan’s defeat in war, postwar religious freedom opened up opportunities for Christians to suggest alternative routes postwar Japan should take. Additionally, Christians had the support of SCAP which made a particular effort to promote Christianity, despite its official policy being separation of politics and religion, and equality of all religions. General MacArthur feared that Japan would become part of the Communist block unless it was Christianised, and expressed his contentment when Katayama, the first Christian Prime Minister, was elected in 1947. MacArthur even suggested that Japan should become a Christian country (Takemae 1983).

In January 1946 Minister of Education Maeda was replaced by another intellectual, Yoshishige Abe. Abe was prepared to admit to his own war guilt as an intellectual, as shown by his subscription to a collective statement in 1949 expressing contrition for the want of courage and effort in preventing war and subsequent feeble resistance to the militaristic regime (Yoshida 1995). He saw Japan’s defeat in war as an opportunity for a brighter future: “we pray that the pressure brought upon us by the U.S. victory will help to make truth and justice permeate all our country, and to serve as a chance for us to eliminate quickly and vigorously all the injustices and defects existing in our society” (Marshall 1994, 147). However, in his speech addressed to the United States Education Mission, after clearly demonstrating his willingness to cooperate with the occupiers, Abe did not hesitate to ask the occupiers to give consideration to Japan’s position:

It is evident that national myths based on extreme nationalistic policies and distorted history and myths based on unscholarly interpretations should be obliterated. However, it is also necessary to respect the unique tradition that lives within the people. In this respect, I ask that the United States does not
see Japan from purely an American perspective. Japan made the mistake in looking upon China and Korea with such an attitude, as you know (Abe 1946).

One of the most influential ministers during the occupation was another Christian, Tatsuo Morito, a member of the Japan Socialist Party. Morito was a professor who had been imprisoned and driven out of the University of Tokyo in the 1920s, accused of advocating anarchism in his publications (Marshall 1994). Morito fell in line with SCAP’s policy on the Rescript, saying that “the Imperial Rescript on Education does not coincide with the democratic spirit that our new constitution is based upon,” and “is outdated because it was instituted by the Meiji Emperor, and carries with it the Meiji era background” and furthermore that “there is no need to create a replacement for the Imperial Rescript on Education” (Hata 2001). With Morito’s support, the Imperial Rescript on Education was officially abolished by SCAP in 1948, while Morito was Minister.
The Ministry of Education after the Occupation

When the Ministry regained autonomous power after seven years of SCAP control, educational policies naturally took a different course from the occupation era. Even before the official end of the occupation period, there were moves in the Ministry of Education to re-evaluate SCAP's educational policies. Historians name the broad shift in position from SCAP's initial policies of demilitarization and democratization to later policies that countered them, "the reverse course." The reverse course began as Japan was led into the Cold War, when SCAP ordered the red purge of left-wing teachers from 1948, completely changing from the purging of rightist teachers until 1947. After SCAP left, the reverse course took form in a different context, as the Ministry of Education began instituting policies to regain its former power over the education system that had been curtailed by the occupation.

In particular, Moral Education in schools became a subject of debate. Japanese conservatives argued that prewar Moral Education based on the Imperial Rescript had provided a spiritual backbone for Japanese, cultivating the Confucian virtues of benevolence, righteousness, filial piety, and loyalty. In 1946, former Minister of Education Kotaro Tanaka for example, defined Moral Education as promoting "universal human ethical principles such as natural law, Confucianism, reason, God's will, and universal justice," and argued for the continuation of moral authority through the Rescript because it "has existed for all historical time as the infallible, inviolable cardinal principle of Japanese ethics" (Khan 1997, 109 and Platzer 1988, 155). However, SCAP viewed Moral Education as the primary instrument for inculcating ideologies of racial supremacy and various justifications of Japanese expansionism, and had completely abolished formal Moral Education classes. In 1946, Geography and Japanese History classes recommenced, but SCAP did not allow for the reintroduction of Moral Education. In 1947, Social Studies was introduced as a new subject, incorporating Moral Education, Citizenship Education, Geography,
In 1950, Minister of Education Teiyu Amano promoted singing the national anthem and raising the national flag in schools on national holidays. Amano believed a nation would not survive without a national "moral system," and was anxious to strengthen the Moral Education aspect of Social Studies education. Amano's speeches and publications stimulated criticism of "Americanized" education but also showed willingness to instil patriotism and specific moral values (Yomiuri Shinbun Sengo Shihan 1982).

On May 6, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida established a committee to re-examine occupational policy on education. In January, 1952, this committee sought to re-construct the Ministry of Education by appointing conservatives and dismissing those who pushed for "new education." Principles of "new education" were introduced by SCAP during the occupation, which encouraged independent thinking, the development of personality, respect for individuality, and the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 88). Promoters of new education, among them Sekiguchi and Tsuchida, who had worked to establish the Fundamental Law of Education 1947, were transferred out of the Ministry of Education. Instead, ex-internal affairs bureaucrat Yoshio Tanaka, who had recently been de-purged, was called to join the Ministry (Yomiuri Shinbun Sengo Shihan 1982).

On 28 April, 1952, the Treaty of San Francisco was signed announcing the end of the occupation, and the General Head Quarters was abolished. In November the same year, Minister Amano made a speech on the importance of patriotism, insisting the Japanese people had not been taught their own History, Geography, and Japanese language so as to build a sense of pride in being Japanese (Yomiuri Shinbun Sengo Shihan 1982).

Amano's successor Okano re-appointed ex-Ministry of Education bureaucrats as Vice-Ministers of Education, in order to restore further the pre-war Ministry. Ministers of Education before Okano were academics with knowledge on educational matters, none of whom had
belonged to any particular political group. However, Okano was a complete novice in the field of education, and made it clear he was chosen to lead the education sector as a member of the Liberal Party (Tsuchimochi 1998). At a press conference, Okano announced he would work toward the reinstitution of the Moral Education curriculum, and would forbid Nikkyoso from taking part in political activities (Yagi 1984). Okano put what he preached into practice by first creating the Central Education Council that would act as an advisory council for the Ministry, and excluding Nikkyoso representatives from all councils. In his speech at the opening of the Central Council on Education, Okano declared: “among educational policies that were decided under unique circumstances of the occupation, there are some that do not coincide with our country’s current situation. Today as we see independence, we must make reforms that are necessary upon careful consideration” (Yagi 1984, 94). In addition, Okano divided the salary system for teachers so that senior high school teachers would be under a separate system from elementary and junior high school teachers. This resulted in many senior high school teachers leaving Nikkyoso to join the newly-formed All Senior High School Teachers’ Union (Yagi 1984).

Educational policy was also intricately connected with the general power struggle between political parties. In the 1953 General election, the Japan Socialist Party gained increasing popularity with its anti-rearmament position under the slogan, “boys do not take your guns, mothers do not send your husbands and children to war.” Since Nikkyoso was largely supported by the Japan Socialist Party, a strong Education Minister was needed to counterbalance Nikkyoso. May 1953, Shigeo Odachi was appointed Minister of Education specifically to deal with Nikkyoso and to recentralize the Ministry. Odachi had been imprisoned as a war criminal, and purged during the American occupation due to his previous appointments as chief of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau in Manchuria and as mayor of occupied Singapore. His view on patriotism was that “one must first know about one’s own country and its people, to be able to feel patriotism, and therefore History education and Geography education are essential” (Yagi 1984, 101).
The structure of Nikkyoso against the Ministry of Education became further evident during Odachi’s time, when a publication by the Yamaguchi prefecture Teachers’ Union came under close scrutiny. The passage in question told the following story: that while Japan had been busy protecting herself from “the thief,” or the Communists, from entering the house, she had let “the gentleman,” or the United States, steal eight hundred and six of her important possessions, referring to the number of U.S. military bases in Japan. In response to this, Odachi decided to limit the political activities of teachers by promulgating a decree of July 1953, under the title “Political Neutrality of Teachers” in the Ministry’s circular, specifically attacking the Yamaguchi prefecture and condemning its actions. Finally in June 1954, the Ministry promulgated the “Two Educational Laws,” aimed at restricting educational civil servants’ involvement in political activities (Ministry of Education, Science and Culture 1980).

The Ministry of Education continued to consolidate its “reverse course” policy, and in 1955, appointed Ichiro Kiyose as Minister of Education. Kiyose was the lawyer during the Tokyo War Tribunal, for Prime Minister Hideo Tojo who was tried and executed for leading Japan into the war. Like previous Ministers of Education after the occupation era, Kiyose called for renewed patriotism in Japan: “Japan is constructed by one nationality that speaks the same language and shares the same history. We cannot allow the obliteration of the tradition of loving one’s country” (Yagi 1984, 125). He viewed the education system in 1955 as missing crucial elements, chiefly because the system was not built by Japanese, but was a foreign-made product from the occupation period. For example, he asserted that “the individual and the world is directly connected, but the country which holds these two together is not intact” in the Fundamental Laws of Education (Yagi 1984, 125). Moreover, Kiyose suggested that additional goals of family morals and loyalty to the country should be added to the Fundamental Laws of Education, and promoted giving the Minister of Education the right to supervise the education committee and private schools. His suggestions were criticized as being “reverse course” and did not pass through the Diet, meeting
strong opposition from the Opposition party (Yagi 1984, 128). It was during Kiyose’s time that Moral Education was finally introduced as a separate subject.

In 1955, the conservative Liberal Party and Japan Democratic Party amalgamated to form a coalition party in order to counteract the Japan Socialist Party, which was gaining popularity. In the general election for 1955 held in February, the Liberal Democratic Party called for the “unification of nationally certified textbooks” (Toyama 1968). In June, Nikkyoso and six other groups met to confirm their common goal for democratizing the textbook certification system. Soon after, a three-week meeting on the textbook problem was held under the direction of the House of Councillors where an ex-member of Nikkyoso, Kazuasa Ishii made the controversial statement that “the current textbooks are full of leftist biases” (Araki 1986). Summer of 1955, Ishii convinced the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to publish a three-part pamphlet entitled *The Grievous Problem of Textbooks*. Ishii himself was responsible for writing up the pamphlets, and Liberal Democratic Party’s Special Committee for Textbooks was the editor. The pamphlet pointed out that there were four types of biases in elementary and junior secondary Social Studies textbooks: those that praise the Teachers’ Union; those that exaggerate the misery of the working class; those which glorify the Soviet Union; and Marxist textbooks that advocate peace (Mainichi Shinbusha Kyoiku Shuzaihan 1981). The following year, the Ministry established a Textbook Examiner System, appointing 40 Ministry employees as full-time internal examiners, and members of the textbook certification committee were increased from 16 to 80, leading to tighter control of the textbook certification system (Marshall 1994, 185).
Changes in Social Studies’ Curriculum Guidelines

We have observed shifts in educational policies in the immediate postwar years, showing the respective positions of SCAP or of the ruling Japanese political party at the time. We have seen, for example, how the Ministry of Education gradually tightened its control after the Americans left. We should be able to find a similar pattern in changes to the Ministry’s curriculum guideline for Social Studies, as these guidelines indicate what the Ministry or SCAP wanted teachers to teach in schools. I choose to analyse the Social Studies guidelines because they touch upon matters tied to war guilt, such as patriotism, war, and peace. I do not examine changes in the History curriculum here, because the new subject launched by SCAP to include what used to be History, Geography, and Moral Education before the war came to be called Social Studies.

Under the heading, “what we need to do in order to rebuild relationships with other countries around the world” there is a summary and a list of suggestions for learning activities in the 1947 Year Ten Social Studies curriculum guideline. The summary stated:

Japan was the main country responsible for the Pacific War, and in the last few decades had extreme nationalistic tendencies. Japan became isolated, and this resulted in the current adverse condition. This fate was due to Japan’s internal social conditions that impeded the development of democracy. Absolutism, monopolistic capital, and militaristic system led Japan to take an aggressive policy (Sengokyōiku kaikaku Shiryōsenta 1980).

Some of the suggested learning activities in the 1947 guideline included creating a table listing the reasons why Japan caused the war, and discussing examples in which extreme nationalists brought misfortune to other country members as well as to Japan. Again, this resonates with the objective of the American occupation: “make known to the Japanese people the facts about the war and the guilt of their war-leaders and war criminals” (Okamoto 1999, 64), so that Japanese people would “know the full story of the war in order that they may understand how
defeat came and why they must endure the suffering engendered by militarism” (SCAP 1946, CIE (B)-00921).

The guideline for 1951 continued along the lines of promoting peace, as can be seen from the heading in the Year Nine curriculum guideline: “how we are to maintain world peace.” Examples of learning activities were: “discuss how war can destroy a country and an individual’s culture, morals, and living through our experiences from the Pacific war” and “debate on how patriotism was misused during the Pacific war.” Examples of evaluation criteria were whether or not students developed a sense of hate for war and a love for peace, and understood how to criticize and reflect upon narrow nationalism (Sengokyoikukaikaku Shiryosenta 1980).

The next revision of curriculum guidelines in 1956 gave evidence of major shifts in the Ministry’s policy. Japanese mythology was re-introduced as a possible means to learn about the beliefs and ways of thinking of the ancient Japanese. Social Studies education explicitly aimed to cultivate patriotism along with love and respect for other nations. Although the 1956 guideline suggested that World War Two should be discussed in relation to the immaturity of democracy in Japan, the tone was much milder compared with the tone employed in the 1947 guideline condemning prewar militaristic Japan. In the 1956 guideline, teachers were recommended to discuss Japan’s activity in war, including analyses of international relations and domestic affairs, describing the sequence by which Japan became a totalitarian state. The reason Japan took this path is to be explained in terms of its international isolation before 1939; the fact that workers’ and farmers’ movements did not develop; and that party politics was oppressed by the militarists who gained power (Sengokyoikukaikaku Shiryosenta 1980).
During the occupation, the Ministry followed SCAP's orders, as the Ministry was closely supervised and controlled by SCAP. After the American occupiers left, the Ministry theoretically regained its independence and sought to decentralise education and to revive patriotism in the curriculum. However, even after the occupiers left, the Ministry was not wholly able to institute its policies without considering the wishes of outsiders, as the Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyoso) was now keeping a close eye on the Ministry's policies to ensure that nationalism and militarism would never resurge into Japanese education. This is why, broadly speaking, Nikkyoso has come ironically to be seen as the successor of the American occupiers, or more exactly, the Civil Information and Education Section, despite its ties to Socialist and Communist Parties. As a matter of fact, Nikkyoso became the major opposition force to the Ministry of Education on all education questions, including war guilt.

Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers' Union) has been by far the largest teachers' organization in post-war Japan, and the only one that can claim to represent the economic, social, and political interests of a majority of teachers. The history of Nikkyoso is important partly because of its large membership and partly because of its differences with the Ministry of Education. Also, Nikkyoso was part of a larger picture of unionization and labour movements in post-war Japan. Nikkyoso followed the development of the national trade organisation, Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), for example, gradually emphasising economic demands (Levine 1969, 170). Nikkyoso's role in postwar Japan is a key to understanding Japan's later position on the question of war guilt. Ienaga's lawsuit case is a prime example of Nikkyoso's struggle against the Ministry. Ienaga filed several lawsuits against the Ministry's textbook censorship system in the 1960s, and Nikkyoso was among the most powerful supporters of Ienaga. Ienaga protested against the Ministry's decision to disapprove his textbook, and accused the Ministry of
"glorifying the past" and "hiding the truth." What began as one historian's lawsuit case developed into a larger political movement that was to continue for decades: Nikkyoso and the Socialist Party against the Ministry and the Liberal Democratic Party.

Initially SCAP and Nikkyoso had similar goals: to weed out elements of ultranationalism from Japanese society, and to promote democratic ideas. Until 1948 when SCAP changed its policies toward Nikkyoso, SCAP encouraged the formation of labour unions, calling them "school for democratization" (Takemae 1983). The Trade Union Law embodied SCAP's principle that "trade unions should be allowed to take part in political activities and to support political parties" (Thurston 1973, 47). SCAP believed labour unions would act as an opposition force if Japan ever followed the 'wrong' path, and that by creating teachers' unions, demand for democratic and peace education would increase (Tsuchimochi 1998, 169). SCAP looked upon the Ministry of Education as the enemy responsible for indoctrinating the Japanese people, and therefore encouraged the rise of Nikkyoso in the hope that Nikkyoso would weaken the Ministry's power.

To begin, SCAP issued a directive on 4 October 1945 to remove all prewar restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties. This included the release of political prisoners, which allowed many of the prewar proletarian leaders return to participate in political activities (Colbert 1952). Then on 11 October, General MacArthur personally handed a directive to Prime Minster Shigehara Kijuro concerning the unionization of Labour (Thurston 1973). This called for "the encouragement of the unionization of Labour...that it may be clothed with such dignity as will permit it an initial voice in safeguarding the working man from exploitation and abuse and raising his living standard to a higher level; with the institution of such measures as may be necessary to correct the evils which now exist in child labour practices" (Thurston 1973, 46). 22 December 1945, Japan's first Trade Union Law was adopted by the Diet, thus granting workers the right to form free and autonomous unions on their own, the right to engage in collective bargaining with employers on an equal footing, and the right to strike (Thurston 1973).
Most historians of the occupation take the view that SCAP policies on Nikkyoso took a sudden turn in 1948, as American policy to the Communist bloc hardened. In the United States, the American Federation of Teachers in the 1950s was suffering from an anticommmunist purge, where members who were proven to be a Communist lost their right to defend themselves and were blacklisted from teaching anywhere in the United States (Braun 1972, 59). Fearing a Communist take-over of Japan, SCAP began a Red Purge in Japan, including the purge of left-wing teachers. SCAP policy was partly an outcome of Soviet-U.S. relations especially after the Korean War broke out in 1950. Occupation forces collaborated with the Japanese conservatives, and restored power to the Ministry in order to fight against Nikkyoso. SCAP's policies in the latter half of the occupation period led to the political struggle between the Ministry of Education and Nikkyoso.
Nikkyoso

It would be tempting to characterize Nikkyoso’s role as a watchdog over the Ministry, taking over CI&E’s work to ensure Japan would never become an ultranationalistic and militaristic country. But it is also important to follow the history of Japan’s teachers’ unions to see why Nikkyoso became an influential power after the war. For this, I turn to prewar teachers’ union movements. It turns out that the Nikkyoso story is a feature, or an element of the whole labour history of Japan after 1920.

Prewar Teachers’ Union Movements

Among those who helped to found postwar teachers’ unions were prewar activist teachers who tried to unify teachers through left-wing organizations. Like the organization of trade unions in general, the prewar teachers’ union movement was influenced by a wave of liberalism and in some degree by Marxist-Leninist views after World War I, especially among intellectuals. From prewar years, Japan’s teachers’ unions were not only interested in the economic betterment of teachers, but also demanded reform in educational policy and administration. However, the absence of a trade union law and political power dominated by the military and bureaucrats made it difficult for teachers to join groups opposed to the Ministry (Thurston 1973, 24-25). Consequently, there were two types of prewar teachers’ unions, neither of which were on equal footing with the Ministry: those officially sanctioned by the Ministry, and independents.

The first independent organization of Japanese teachers, Keimeikai, was founded in 1919, and the first Communist teachers’ association, the Primary School Teachers’ League (Shogakko Kyoin Renmei) was founded in 1929 (Hoshino 1979). Other prewar teachers’ organizations include the Institute for Proletariat Education (Shinko Kyoiku Kenkyujo) and Japan Educational Workers’
Union (Nihon Kyoiku Rodo Kumiai) that were openly anti-government and distinctly proletarian (Duke 1973). For example, some of the duties and functions listed by the Institute for Proletariat Education were: “to struggle against bourgeois and fascist educational principles, to struggle against imperial education, and to protect socialist education” (Duke 1973, 17). Just as the Japan Educational Workers’ Union created the concept of “educational labourer” that was later adopted by Nikkyoso, these prewar teachers’ unions laid down the foundation for postwar teachers’ unions (Duke 1973, 16). Because teachers’ unions called for educational reform and spoke against the government, most were forcibly closed down in the 1930s and the 1940s.

The longest-surviving teachers’ association that supported left-wing activists during the war was Kyokaden (Association for the Scientific Study of Education). Formed in 1939, Kyokaden managed to remain active through until 1944, because it was under the indirect protection of Prince Konoe, a member of the Imperial Family (Duke 1973). Under the guise of improving education through promoting Science, Kyokaden provided a base for left-wing activists to continue their anti-government activities during the war.

The only teachers’ association that survived throughout the prewar and wartime periods was the Ministry-sponsored Teikoku Kyoikukai (Imperial Education Association), an association referred to as a “virtual agent of the Ministry of Education” (Thurston 1973). The only reason Teikoku Kyoikukai survived during the war was because of its close affiliation with the Ministry of Education. Teikoku Kyoikukai was founded in 1883 to unite teachers for improvement of national education, and all teachers were required to belong (Duke 1973), but it was dissolved soon after the end of the war.
Mistrust of Education

Nikkyoso ideology had been influenced by members' prewar experiences as teachers, who subsequently became instruments of the State. One of the most remembered incidents in the immediate post-war years among Japanese was the blackening-out of textbooks. The blackening-out of sections that contained ultranationalist and militarist prose or illustrations was ordered by the Ministry in September 1945, and by SCAP in January 1946. Classroom teachers were responsible for ordering students which sections should be deleted, and diligently carried out their tasks from fear of getting caught by GHQ. (Yomiuri Shimbun 2001). Wada (1978, 205) recalls that he no longer knew how to regard textbooks or teachers after the blackening out of textbooks. The same teacher who had said, “take good care of your textbook, bow before you open it,’ now says ‘there, blacken that section; with darker ink.” It was not only students who had lost faith in education. Many teachers wrote in later memoirs of their sense of being at a loss, not knowing what to teach with their textbooks: “we had to order students to ink out sections that we taught most enthusiastically during the war” (Yomiuri Shimbun 2001).

The sense of disbelief and distrust toward education, symbolized by the textbook blackouts, led teachers radically to change their political direction. From being the keen supporters of the government they moved to become members of the militantly anti-establishmentarian teachers' union, Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyoso hereafter). Kitamura (1962) explains that “teachers had lost confidence in their ideology; they felt that they now required to have an ideology entirely different from that which they had had before the war.”

In understanding the history of postwar teachers' unions, we must keep in mind that the activists' movements were part of a larger political movement to bring about fundamental change in Japanese society. After political restrictions were lifted by SCAP's October 1945 directives, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was formed in November, followed by the Japan Communist Party.
(JCP), a month later. Apart from the 1949 vote in which JCP reached ten percent, JCP only obtained two to three percent of the vote and one to three Diet seats from 1946-1960 (Scalapino and Masumi 1962, 49-50). JSP on the other hand polled between 13 and 28 percent of the vote across the same period (Scalapino and Masumi 1962, 47). Although neither party came close to dominating national political life, they nevertheless became significant minorities, especially in relation to Nikkyoso as I later describe.

Postwar Teachers' Union Movements

From September 1945, several groups of prewar activists began searching for ways to reform Japanese education, and held meetings mainly in Tokyo. Among these were Communist Party members who had been released from prison in October, in compliance with SCAP's directive. One of the most prominent figures was a Marxist historian, Goro Hani, who formed the radical Zenkyo (All Japan Teachers' Union) in December, 1945. A more moderate group, Nikkyo (Union of Japan Educators), was formed one day after Zenkyo, by a Christian socialist, Toyohiko Kagawa. The Socialist group Zenkyo and the Communist group Nikkyo amalgamated into Nikkyoso in June, 1947. Of the 400,000 teachers in Japan, ninety-five percent joined Nikkyoso; 278,500 from the Communist group Zenkyo, and 98,500 from the Socialist group Nikkyo (Duke 1973). Even after the two groups merged to form one teachers' union, the two political strands remained divided within Nikkyoso. Nikkyoso initially supported both the Japan Communist Party and the Japan Socialist Party in the elections, but from 1958, only gave support to the Socialist Party.

Nikkyoso thought politics should play an active part in the reconstruction of education. All Nikkyoso members in the Diet belong to the Association of Political Democratic Education, which relied mostly on Nikkyoso's funds, and spent 70 percent of its income on donation to each
Diet member candidate (Asahishinbun Seijibu 1960). In 1957, there were 13 Nikkyoso members representing 8.3 percent of the Japan Socialist Party in the House of Representatives, and 15 Nikkyoso members accounting for 18.8 percent of the Japan Socialist Party in the House of Councillors (Asahishinbun Seijibu 1960). Nikkyoso's political involvement of educational policies was one of the major sources of conflict with the Ministry of Education, as was the case in the 1949 election when 150 teachers distributed the Japan Communist Party campaign literature to the homes of their students (Swearingen and Langer 1952, 170).

I turn to the list of Nikkyoso's aims from the first national convention, stipulated in its 1947 preamble: “we firmly establish our economic, social and political status to perform our important responsibilities. We will strive for the democratization of education and for academic freedom. We are united to build a democratic nation which will defend peace and freedom” (Kitamura 1962). The first theme is political reform, in Nikkyoso’s case based on Marxist or quasi-Marxist ideologies. Nikkyoso's Marxist stance appears, however sketchily, in its claim that “the one-sided economic policy of the Japanese Government brought about a wide gulf between the rich and poor which inevitably resulted in the struggle between the two parties” (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 123). The document most clearly expressing Nikkyoso’s Marxist-oriented ideology in its widespread use of Marxist-Leninist terminology is the Code of Ethics adopted in 1952. Here, we see code words such as “teachers as labourers” and “teachers shall unite”:

1. Teachers shall work with the youth of the country in fulfilling the tasks of society
2. Teachers shall fight for equal opportunity in education
3. Teachers shall protect peace
4. Teachers shall act on behalf of scientific truth
5. Teachers shall allow no infringements on freedom in education
6. Teachers shall seek after proper government
7. Teachers shall fight side by side with parents against corruption in society and shall create a new culture
8. Teachers are labourers
9. Teachers shall defend their right to maintain a minimum standard of living
10. Teachers shall unite (Thurston 1973, 46)
Despite Nikkyoso's appearance as a Marxist-oriented union, fewer than one percent of the Nikkyoso's Central Executive Committee were members of the Japan Communist Party throughout the 1950s, and Nikkyoso members were predominantly non-Marxist (Duke 1973). There are several reasons why the majority of elementary school teachers had joined Nikkyoso. Some are psychological: the new political freedom occupation-inspired reform, and psychological disillusionment after the total failure of the prewar Emperor-centred ideology and the militaristic government that misled the country into war (Thurston 1973). Others derive from practical matters, including economic difficulties after the war, the initial success of Nikkyoso in winning certain demands such as gaining recognition as an agent for collective bargaining, and the fact that local schools joined as a group, not as individuals to fulfill a new “duty” to the new order (Thurston 1973). The average teacher who joined Nikkyoso did not necessarily feel oppressed by the capitalist class, but supported Nikkyoso because she believed in keeping education free from governmental control, and because of residual fear that the Japanese government might recreate the prewar authoritarian educational system. These facts about Nikkyoso presaged a certain view of the problems of censorship and war guilt.

The second theme of Nikkyoso's preamble was the promotion of democratic education, and the third was peace education. Nikkyoso's position on democratic education in various circumstances appeared earlier, but its definition of peace education deserves clarification. Nikkyoso's annual action policies called for peace, the revision of the pro-American Peace Treaty, the abolition of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, absolute opposition to rearmament and conscription, immediate withdrawal of American troops from Japan, and protection of the “peace” Constitution (Thurston 1973). The peace constitution referred to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution of 1947, forever renouncing war as a sovereign right of the nation.

To Nikkyoso policy makers, prewar Japanese education was bourgeois education that
served only the interests of the ruling class and not the interest of the “people.” This leaves open the question whether a majority of rank-and-file Nikkyoso members entirely agreed with these positions.\textsuperscript{14} Nikkyoso believed that teachers were forced into the logic of subservience in the prewar years because of the political neutralization of teachers. From the fear of recreating prewar-type subservient teachers, Nikkyoso called for teachers’ political involvement in educational policies. Likewise, Nikkyoso denounced textbook curricular control and the authoritarian educational system that supported and sustained this. The “White Paper on Education Prepared by the Japan Teachers’ Union” published in 1950 by CI&E captures Nikkyoso’s position in relation to SCAP and the Ministry of Education.

We have resolved the evils of nationalism and militarism at a very high cost — surrender...when we evaluate those precious things lost in the war, we cannot help renewing our hatred against the past nationalism. Nikkyoso sees that prewar years were “really dark ages of Japan’s education...but the surrender brought about democracy with it” (Beauchamp and Vardaman 1994, 123).

Here, Nikkyoso is negative toward prewar education, and horrified by nationalism, which were represented by the Ministry of Education. One may argue that the Ministry in 2002 continues the prewar Ministry, as it was during the occupation; that it has never been abolished and has thus continuously been in authority over education. Secondly, after the American occupiers left, the Ministry of Education sought to re-instil patriotism, worrisome to Nikkyoso, as nationalism or patriotism of any kind was a reminder of the prewar years. In addition to these points, we see Nikkyoso’s positive evaluation of Japan’s surrender, as it is related to the introduction of democracy. This implies that Nikkyoso, at least initially, saw the Americans saviours from the “dark pre-war ages” of nationalism and militarism.

No official document since the War Guilt Information Program come close to matching it in explicitness, in extensiveness, or in tone. In a less direct manner, nationalism, patriotism, war apologies, democracy, and peace education have been controversial points of debate between the
Ministry and Nikkyoso in the post-occupation years. Nikkyoso condemned the Ministry for not dedicating enough space on wartime Japanese atrocities in textbooks, and for having nationalistic overtones which justified Japan's past actions. On the other hand, the Ministry argued that no other country in the world writes as masochistic a textbook as Japan, and insisted upon the need to instil patriotism in education. War guilt is intricately connected with nationalism, since by promoting one, the other is in practice suppressed. Through the demonstration of the objectives and policies the Ministry of Education, Nikkyoso, and SCAP taken after the war, I have shown how all three parties interplayed in directing the question of war guilt.
Chapter Four: War Guilt in Theory and Practice in Japanese Education

In previous chapters, I left the term "war guilt" undefined, and referred to it only as the American occupiers did in their directives. We now come to the conceptual and empirical question of what "war guilt" meant in theory and in practice during our period 1945-1960. The question of war guilt in postwar Japan may be approached in two principal ways. Most literature on war guilt treats it either in terms of how much Japanese admit to war crimes (including talks of war compensation), or who is to be blamed for the war. In this latter case, discussion often reduces to an evaluation of which party is guiltier than the other. I have chosen to review and to propose an explanatory framework for the ways Japanese people have described and accounted for their sense of war guilt over the 1945-1960 period.

In chapters 2 and 3, I discussed educational policies on war guilt implemented by the three major players: namely, SCAP, the Ministry of Education, and Nikkyoso. In this chapter, I discuss forces and groups not centrally responsible, but influential over Japanese perception of war guilt. These forces and groups include journalists, historians, and war veterans who led discussion on war guilt, inside and outside Japan. Their arguments point to reasons and motivations for official policy decisions, and provide contextual background. My intention here is not to evaluate how far their arguments decided official policies, but rather to consider the kinds of reasoning to be found in those arguments, and to suggest how political and social circumstances pushed the writers of these arguments to take the positions they did. In short, I take the view that the circumstances and the values that motivated commentators and critics (people who wrote about war guilt) were arguably similar to the circumstances and values that policy makers had in mind.

I begin by listing groups of organizations accused of being either directly or indirectly responsible for war: Japanese militarists including war veterans, Ministry of Education and teachers, Americans and ex-colonial rulers, journalists, Japanese educational scholars, the Emperor,
and all Japanese citizens. The very groups said to carry war responsibility all implemented or recommended educational policies to promote their own views of war guilt. I describe their positions on war guilt; educational practices that were recommended or implemented by the respective groups; and circumstances that led them to choose these practices.
Sustainers of the Status Quo

Two major constellations wanted to protect the Emperor from direct accusations of war guilt, Japanese conservatives and SCAP. Unsurprisingly, Japanese conservatives wanted to maintain Japan's prewar national polity, with the Emperor acting as the head of State. This was especially important as postwar Japan was in chaos, and conservatives believed that only maintenance of the Emperor system would bring stability to the country. Toward the end of the war, there were signs of Japanese conservatives’ view on war guilt in Japanese Navy officers wanting to end the war as soon as possible so that Japan could maintain its Emperor System. In opposition to the Japanese Army headed by General Tojo, who wanted to fight the war until the end, Konoe, a representative conservative figure, advised Higashikuni (who became the first postwar Prime Minister) in 1944:

I believe that we should keep Tojo as Prime Minister...Since Tojo is conveniently hated by the world along with Hitler, it is better that he takes all responsibility for the war...The United States may seek for individual responsibility, namely that of the Emperor...but if all responsibility can be held against Tojo, perhaps we can alleviate the Emperor's responsibility (Yoshida 1992).

At the end of the war, Higashikuni's overreaching duty was to remedy the economic and political chaos occasioned by defeat in war, and central to his political task was to find ways of dealing with war guilt. In the end, Higashikuni did not place all responsibility on Tojo's shoulders, but instead chose to speak of “one million, all bearing the guilt,” calling for nationwide collective repentance. Higashikuni declared the first step in the reconstruction and unification of Japan was for all Japanese citizens including the armed forces and the government officials, to repent collectively (Tamura 2001). This call was in line with the Japanese government's policy to retain the fundamental character of the state, with the Emperor as the head of state.

Taking a view remarkably similar to conservative Konoe's position, SCAP held the leaders
of Japan directly responsible for the war and for leading the rest of the population into war. For instance, SCAP's "Historical Articles" dismissed the Emperor, financial circles, and journalists as "moderate" forces in conflict with the militarists. In the prologue of the "Historical Articles," the Emperor was exempt from his responsibility for starting the war: "as the Emperor has mentioned recently, it was not the Emperor's intention to attack Pearl Harbour without warning" (Ariyama 1996).

SCAP's reason for protecting the Emperor was also to facilitate the implementation of occupational policies. SCAP feared the repercussions of trying the Emperor as a war criminal at the Tokyo Tribunal. MacArthur judged that using the Emperor to keep the Japanese people on SCAP's side would make the occupation task easier. In a telegram to Eisenhower in January 1946, MacArthur wrote:

If we put the Emperor to trial, Japanese will hold anger and hatred toward the Allies over a long period of time, for the greatest act of betrayal in Japanese History. This will cause repercussions resulting in centuries of mutual revenge; Japanese will resist; administrative activities will cease; and will bring guerrilla warfare and underground activities. This will make it impossible to perform modern democratic reformation, and when the military activities cease, the only remaining activity will be Communist organisation activities that are already widely spread among the populace. This will require 1,000,000 troops and several 100,000 administrative officials and the establishment of a war-time supply system (Takemae 1983, 164).

SCAP collaborated with Japanese conservatives on this matter, so they could use the Emperor's authority in Japanese society (Yoshida 1995). These two groups worked together at the Tokyo War Tribunal to ensure all war responsibilities and guilt were attributed to Japanese leaders, and not to the Emperor.
Americans in the United States and in Japan (SCAP) took the position that Americans were “good” but that their former Japanese opponents were “evil.” The war that they had won expunged militarism and fascism, and therefore was a just war. SCAP was in the “business” of constructing publicly and politically acceptable memory in the United States and in occupied Japan. This was more difficult to achieve in Japan, as the Japanese public carried memories based on their lived experiences of the period 1930-45, which were different from what SCAP wanted them to believe. For example, those who experienced the atomic bombing in Hiroshima saw themselves as victims rather than aggressors of war. In addition, both accounts of war conflicted with what wartime Japanese media and education had promoted: that the war was being fought for Japan’s survival and for Asia’s independence against Western aggression.

The first History text produced by SCAP, “Historical Articles,” presented the war as a war of Japanese aggression beginning with the Manchurian incident, fought in the Pacific, leading to Pearl Harbour – a war mainly against the United States. SCAP, having had to consult and seek advice from American educators and historians in determining the kind of history they should present to the Japanese audience, wrote history in a tone remarkably similar to that of North-American historians in the United States. The war Japan fought was a fifteen-year event, extending back to what Japanese prewar historians had called the Sino-Japanese War. Reischauer’s (1953) Japan Past and Present described World War Two as starting from the 1931 Manchurian incident, as part of Japanese aggression and expansion that led to Pearl Harbour. Lathourette (1946, 504) described the Manchurian incident in the following terms: “in 1931, pursuing her expansion, Japan embarked upon a course of conquest which for a time made her mistress of Manchuria, much of China Proper, the Philippines, the East Indies, Indo-China, and Burma.” He further elaborated that “it was, when viewed from the vantage of later years, the real opening of the second of the
world wars of the twentieth century” (Lathourette 1946, 567). Buss (1964, 375) went back even further in time and saw “the dynamite hidden by the Japanese Twentieth Engineers Regiment which blasted Chang Tso-lin, the Old Marshal of Manchuria, into eternity on June 4, 1928, propelled Japan on the road to Pearl Harbour.”

SCAP avoided any mention of the Emperor, and instead, revealed truths the militarists hid from the general populace. From “Historical Articles:”

Chief among these crimes have been the misuse of power by the militarists, the abrogation of civil liberties and the consistent failure of government and military officials to adhere to international conventions in the treatment of war prisoners and non-combatant populations. One of the most far reaching of these violations, however, has been their consistent suppression of the truth (SCAP 1946, CIE(B)-00921).

Although emphasising such Japanese wartime atrocities as the Nanjing massacre and the Batan death march, Japanese and American channels of media refrained from exposing the activities of the biological warfare unit, unit 731. Though MacArthur was fully aware of unit 731’s activities, the United States government promised immunity against war crime persecutions in exchange for surviving test results and documents (Gold 2001). Therefore, leaders of unit 731 were exempted from war crime charges in the Tokyo War Tribunal.

According to Yoshida (1995), the key word in understanding war guilt is “double standard.” In the case of unit 731, SCAP was inconsistent with its claim to expose the “truth” that Japanese militarists had been suppressing, as they prioritised their own interests in the test results. In the first few years of the occupation, the double standard was the promotion of democratic education on one hand, and conducting censorship operations on the other. Just as the Ministry of Education during the war censored textbooks to promote nationalism and militarism, SCAP needed to censor textbooks to promote democracy, and to ensure that pre-war “evils” be obliterated. Then entering the Cold War era, the United States began to press for economic and
political restoration and to build an alliance with Japan, partly to make Japan a bulwark of anti-
Communism. Japan's war responsibilities were to be obscured, and war compensations kept to a
minimum. For example, between 1947 and 1948, forty-three war crime suspects were released, and
in the San Francisco Treaty ending the US occupation of Japan, there was no mention of war
responsibility apart from requiring acceptance of the Tokyo War Tribunal's outcomes (Yoshida
1995).
A review of SCAP's educational policies and those of the Ministry of Education shows educational policy-makers decided what gets taught in schools, and thus influenced Japanese perceptions of war guilt. Along with control over the content of school textbooks, manipulation of the media was a means by which war guilt could systematically be shaped. SCAP recognized the use of media as an instrument of "Japanese re-education," thus the incorporation of media control in the War Guilt Information Program.

During the war, Japan's newspaper and broadcasting companies were used by the Japanese government to promote the notion of the "sacred war" to fight against Western aggression for the independence of Asia. Not unlike schools and teachers as instruments of the State, the mass media and journalists played the part of reinforcing State ideas. This phenomenon was no different from how media for wartime propaganda was manipulated across the world. However, unlike Germany's case where all Nazi-related media companies were disassembled completely under Allied occupation, most of Japan's media companies survived the war. Many executives voluntarily resigned to take responsibility for war, and others were forced to leave their posts by GHQ's order. Journalists faced a challenge similar to teachers', in that they had drastically and suddenly to change from promoting the "sacred war" to condemning all war-time activities. Journalists had now to regain trust from the readers, and at last to face their own war guilt.

During the period 1945-60, approximately 75 percent of readership was distributed among three major newspapers: Asahi, Mainichi, and Yomiuri (Nihonshinbunrenmei 1962). Of these three, Asahi had the highest circulation, and was most cunning in swiftly complying with the demands of the powers-that-were. Asahi has been accused of being irresponsible and unreliable; changing from ultranationalistic and militaristic Asahi during the war, to an unpatriotic and masochistic Asahi after the war. For the first month after surrender, newspapers including Asahi
took a similar position to the Japanese conservatives: that of maintaining the Emperor system, and easing the shock of war defeat. On 23 August, only a week after surrender, Asahi newspaper's editorial column acknowledged Asahi's responsibilities for contributing to the war and encouraged journalists to reach beyond the position of the organisations they represented (Arai 1979). Asahi's position on war guilt was similar to Higashikuni's "one million, all bearing the guilt," in that it called individuals to reflect upon their own war guilt and involvement in war, and not to question specific individuals or groups (Ariyama 1996).

With the arrival of the occupation forces media censorship was introduced, censoring all media including newspapers, radio, and television along the same lines as textbook censorship and the war guilt information program. Just how serious GHQ was about media censorship became clear when GHQ ordered the two-day suspension of Asahi newspaper's publication. Asahi newspaper was suspended from 18 to 20 September 1945 for publishing articles that were "untrue" according to the Allied forces; for criticizing the Allied forces; and for making demands of the Allied forces as though Japan were on an equal footing with the Allies (Ariyama 1996). GHQ submitted a "press code" on the 19th and a "radio code" on the 22nd September to the Japanese government, and issued directives such as "separation of newspaper companies from the government" which meant that all control of newspapers shifted from the Japanese government to the hands of GHQ (Asahi Shinbunsha 1994).

On 22 September 1945, Asahi changed its editorial position completely, blaming wartime leaders for the war, and stating that the "responsibilities of Japanese citizens" lay in "overlooking when militarism took over Japan, and having allowed the country to break diplomatic relationships" (Ariyama 1996). Asahi also expressed acceptance of all criticisms directed by the Allied forces, having only spoken previously of "responsibility for war defeat" and "collective repentance," never admitting to Asahi's war guilt for leading the Japanese populace to war.

Until Civil Information and Education Section stepped in to show its power to control
Japanese media, the Japanese authorities were in charge of monitoring the media in Japan. However, after Asahi's compliance to CI&E and the chain of events following Asahi's two-day suspension, the relationship between newspaper publishing companies and Japanese authorities weakened and shifted toward CI&E. For example, Asahi published the September 22 1945 editorial, knowing that General Douglas MacArthur would be reading and evaluating the article. In the December 14 editorial, Asahi wrote that “Japanese people must criticize the previous war, recognizing wrongdoings and be firmly determined to put all effort into eradicating future wars” and praised the Tokyo War Tribunal as contributing to this goal (Kataoka 1998).

War guilt was one of the main topics Asahi dealt with immediately after the war during the American occupation. By the time GHQ left in 1952, war guilt was less explicitly stated, but Asahi's position on war guilt was indirectly implied by its treatment of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Cold War. The underlying argument used throughout the 1950s was: “let us never revert to making the same mistakes we did during the war.”

In 1949, there was a large debate on the kind of Peace Treaty Japan should conclude where the ruling Liberal Democratic Party opted for “separate peace” with “Western countries” such as the United States, Britain, and France and the Japan Socialist Party, supported “overall peace” with all countries including Communist Russia. This choice between “separate peace” versus “overall peace” was the major topic of debate in the media, with 14 papers favouring “overall peace” and 61 supporting “separate peace” (Igarashi 1999). Shintaro Ryu, the editorial writer in chief for Asahi from 1945-62 took the same minority position as the Japan Socialist Party which held maintenance of neutrality, opposition to military bases, and opposition to rearmament as its policy.

In 1960, Asahi expressed its disapproval against the ruling Kishi Cabinet's policy on the Japan-US Security Treaty. Asahi feared that the US military involvement in Japan which was intended to protect Japan's security was in fact becoming a danger as Japan was dragged further
into the Cold War because of its ties with the United States. Kishi pressed for a further extension of the Security Treaty for ten years, while Asahi advocated for three years (Igarashi 1999). Asahi published in an editorial a long article entitled “We Demand a General Election and that Prime Minister Kishi Step Down.” A month later, an ex-classmate Agatsuma, from Tokyo University addressed Kishi directly in a letter format, persuading Kishi to reconsider his policies. Agatsuma’s following words appeared in Asahi:

When I was asked to sign a petition for your release from prison after the Tokyo War Tribunal, I willingly did so because I did not believe that war responsibility should be placed upon individuals. In my mind though, I had an image of you spending the rest of your life fishing, as it was your favourite past time. I was stunned when you went straight back into politics, and became Prime Minister. During the war, you were convinced that Japan should team up with Germany and fight against the United States and England, but that was a big mistake. Today, you seem to be repeating the same mistakes that you made back then, which horrifies me. The only path left for you, is to withdraw from the political scene and spend your days fishing (Igarashi 1999).

After September 1945, Asahi was consistent in discussions of rearmament and peace. Unlike the Ministry of Education, which went through a “reverse course” after the Americans left, Asahi did not try to revert to its prewar stance; on the contrary, Asahi declared against war. Asahi’s articles bear striking resemblance to Nikkyoso’s arguments on war guilt, peace, and rearmament (Chapter 3). Moreover, Asahi’s declaration in 1945 that they will “always stand on the side of the Japanese people” with “people” defined as “those who are clearly separate from the ruling class; in short, people who work in factories, workshops, and rural farms,” resonates with Nikkyoso (Kataoka 1998).

Although I have not closely examined the question of implementation of newspaper censorship in the War Guilt Information Program, newspapers, like textbooks, were extensively censored by SCAP. Similarities between the two types of censorship do not stop there. The administration of war guilt programs and policies became even more complex as newspaper
agencies and the Ministry of Education were allowed to remain in power after August 1945.
Japanese Educational Scholars: Goro Hani

Another group that indirectly had an impact on Japanese perceptions of war guilt was Japanese historians. Historians were responsible for writing textbooks and thereby presenting particular kinds of historical interpretations in the schools. Through their books and articles, historians reached out to Japanese audiences, including intellectuals and politicians who played significant roles in educational policy-making. My intention here is not to evaluate the extent of influence historians had on shaping war guilt, but to merely point to what educational scholars were trying to achieve.

During the war, the majority of Japanese educational scholars, among them Hiraizumi, wrote Japanese History that would be approved by the Japanese government, as all publication material was under strict censorship. Others like Marxist historian Ishimoda, kept a low profile but continued to write during the war, and published their works immediately after the war. After the war, what used to be considered “good” Japanese history during the war suddenly became unacceptable, too militaristic and nationalistic. The climate changed for historians, and their positions moved erratically from advantageous to disadvantageous and back.

The period 1945 to 1950 marked the revival of postwar historiography in which Marxist historians gained influence in popular debate and even in the academy. Barshay (1998) explains that the reason for this renascence of Marxist scholarship and organizations was the occupation’s purge of undesirable academics. At the core of the Marxist History movement was the Historical Science Society of Japan (Rekishigaku Kenkyukai), which historian Whitney Hall evaluated in 1949 as “clearly dominating the historical scene in post-war Japan” (Barshay 1998, 302). The Society was established in 1932, published the journal *Historiographical Research*, which was generally favourable to Marxist historical theory, until the journal was banned in 1944 (Nagai 2001). It drew members
mainly from historians at Tokyo University, who received training in the twenties and thirties at the height of Marxist scholarship.

Goro Hani, an exemplary postwar Marxist historian of the Historical Science Society of Japan, was one of the founders of Nikkyoso, and a member of the Japan Communist Party (Thurston 1973). As I describe later, Hani's work was only to be exposed to the public through the help of publishers that supported Marxist historians such as Hani for their own reasons.

Beginning with 37 articles in 1946, Hani published over 20 articles each year in the 1940s and over 10 articles annually throughout the 1950s, and these articles were published in widely distributed newspapers such as *Tokyo, Mainichi, Asahi*, and *Yomiuri*, as well as in major journals and magazines such as *Sekai, Shiso, Chuokoron* (Hani 1982). The titles of Hani's postwar articles include “War Responsibility,” “Cultural Revolution and Education,” “The Truth about the Emperor System,” “Characteristics of Current-day Wars,” “Contemporary History and the Resistance Movement,” “Freedom in a Socialist Society,” “History Education,” “Crimes against Peace,” and “Foundations of Postwar Japanese Fascism” (Hani 1982). As can be seen from the titles of these articles, Hani tackled controversial issues around the prewar belief system and war guilt urgently requiring to be questioned and answered, and proposed his views on future paths Japan ought to take. For instance, in “The Truth about the Emperor System” published in Mainichi newspaper in 1946, Hani exposed what he considered to be the “heartless nature” of the Emperor-dominated society, and its misuse of authority. Although criticized for “taking away all pride of Japanese people,” Hani replied, “I courageously uncover my own nation's past wrong-doings to rid groundless and half-hearted national pride, in order to seek salvation for my people” (Toyama 1968, 31).

Hani also wrote and proposed ways in which Japanese history should be interpreted. In his book *Nihonjinmin no Rekishi* (History of the Japanese Peoples), he begins by expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of Japanese History written from the viewpoint of the people. Hani
repeatedly uses the word “monopolized financial capitalism” to describe Japan’s wartime imperialism. He argued that based on the law of the jungle, behind the disguise of a “sacred war,” the Japanese feudal ruling class conspired against all Japanese and all the peoples in the world. Hani claimed that even as he wrote (1950), Japan’s financial capitalism monopoly wrongly attacked Communism as its biggest enemy. His anti-capitalist stance, opposed to ruling class monopoly comes from Marxist ideologies, and extends further to his arguments on war guilt. In *Asahi* Hyouron’s March and April publication, Hani and other Marxist historians contributed to a special feature on the symposium on *Kuni no Ayumi* (the first postwar history textbook) in which they argued textbooks should be utilised politically, just as the right-wing historians had done in the 1930s. Hani fiercely criticised that *Kuni no Ayumi* had not fully utilised the opportunity to teach children how evil the ruling class and the militarists were, by for example, clearly stating that the 1931 Manchurian railway bombing was done by the Japanese Army (Takahashi and Wray 1987).

Hani published 24 books between 1945 and 1949, and 17 in the 1950s; approximately half of which were published through *Iwanami* (Hani 1981). As a publishing company, the Iwanami group played a major role in distributing works that represented the “minority opinion” during the Cold War, on issues concerning Japan’s peace treaty, Japan’s rearmament, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The owner of the Iwanami group, Shigco Iwanami, deliberately selected works produced by such writers as Hani, holding the hope that publication of these works would help prevent Japan from making war-time mistakes again (Yoshino 1995). Though Iwanami represents views of the minorities, their record of distribution was impressive. In 1954, the Iwanami group newly published 403 items that on average each sold 120,000 copies, making it one of Japan’s most popular publishers.

Just as Nikkyoso whose ideologies are based on Marxism has led the teachers in Japan to protest against textbook control by the Ministry, historians have followed a similar path. Hence, the power struggle remains deeply embedded between those who control educational policy (Ministry)
and those who write and teach History.
Pressure Groups

All Japanese and Americans who lived through the period 1945-60 have been influenced by their memories of war; including SCAP officials, Japanese politicians, Nikkyoso members, historians, as well as individuals who did not have direct influence on educational policy-making. As I have already suggested, how individuals or a country remember events of World War II is strongly connected with one's sense of war guilt, and helps define and direct one's actions after the war. For instance, Masao Maruyama, an authority on History of Japanese thought, recalls that in the immediate postwar years, "all intellectuals, from their varying standpoints and in their varying spheres of concern, experienced a shared emotion: self-criticism" and formed a "community of contrition" (Barshay 1998, 282). Consequently, some intellectuals devoted their postwar years to exposing evils of the state, in a process of self-condemnation for having used their intellectual energy to build the militarist nation state of prewar years.

Two groups of individuals particularly involved in remembering and commemorating the war are war veterans and war-bereaved families. Just as American war veterans persisted in displaying the Enola Gay and protested against showing articles left by atomic bomb victims for the Smithsonian museum, Japanese war veterans and their families wanted to glorify war in order to feel worthy and justified. Japanese World War II veterans were in a situation similar to American Vietnam War veterans in that their "achievements" were condemned after the war. What is more, Japanese veterans could not shift war responsibility onto another scapegoat, and the only way left to maintain their dignity was to commemorate even those who were the most detested: war criminals. Because war veterans and war-bereaved families were involved in commemorating the war dead including war criminals, these two groups played a significant role in forming Japanese war guilt, which sometimes extended to putting pressure upon educational policy makers.
The largest association representing over fifty percent of the war bereaved is the Association of War Bereaved Families (Nihon Izokukai hereafter). Nihon izokukai was established in November, 1947 to call for state recognition of Japan's war dead as national heroes. It began its political activities in 1949, demanding the establishment of a compensation system, and is the sole association, to which the Ministry of Welfare pays compensation (Hata, Tanaka, and Tanaka 1995). At its inception during the American occupation, members were highly critical of Japanese wartime leaders and their goals were “to prevent war, to establish permanent peace in the world, and to contribute to the welfare of all citizens of the world” (Ou 2001). SCAP accepted the establishment of the Association under three conditions: to include other victims besides war bereaved families; to set mutual aid between the bereaved as their goal; and to exclude members of serving government officials, ex-military officials, and those who had been purged from public service (Ou 2001).

In the early 1950s, members began calling for the inclusion of bereaved families of executed war criminals, the establishment of a national thanksgiving day toward the war dead, and started to emphasize consolation for the spirit of the dead soldiers instead of world peace (Kattoulas 2001). In the 1952 National Memorial Service for the War Dead, Nihon Izokukai publicly demanded national support of the Japanese government for the Yasukuni Shirine (Hata, Tanaka, and Tanaka 1995). Not only did the Association represent one school of thought in postwar Japan, but it has had close ties with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party since 1955. For instance, starting with Nagashima in 1950, representatives of Nihon Izokukai have managed to become members of the House of Councillors, collecting large number of votes (Hata, Tanaka, and Tanaka, 1995). Even if the Party members did not necessarily agree with the Nihon Izokukai's
ideologies, they complied if the Association provided them with votes, in return for financial support.

**War Veterans' Association: Kyoyukai**

Kyoyukai, the largest War veterans' association in the country, was established in 1956, and had 1.5 million members by 1958 (Murakami 1960). Unlike Nihon Izokukai, Kyoyukai does not seek war compensation for the war veterans or for war bereaved families. Instead, its main activities have included erecting monuments for fellow comrades who sacrificed their lives for the country, and organising war memorial services in different parts of Japan. While promoting reciting the national anthem and raising the national flag, based on its goal to succeed and encourage good Japanese tradition, Kyoyukai also placed great importance on the promotion of Moral Education and revision of "biased education." Kyoyukai not only expressed its opposition to Nikkyoso through official statements, but also tried to place Kyoyukai's members in the provincial school boards. The following passage taken out of Kyoyukai's magazine *Sakuraboshi* illustrates Kyoyukai's position on education: "postwar Japanese education came under bad influence of the United States' occupational policies. What has been done toward Shintoism, the Emperor, the Imperial Rescript on Education, and our national education system has been a great pity" (Murakami 1960).

On one side we have seen Nikkyoso which has been central in ensuring that Japanese History is taught so that students and teachers never repeat the same prewar mistakes. To achieve this goal, Nikkyoso has fought against the Ministry to include more Japanese atrocities in textbooks so that Japanese will develop a sense of war guilt. On the opposite side of the political spectrum lie associations such as the Association of War Bereaved Families that glorify the history of World War II. Their motives are different from Nikkyoso's, as their aim is to justify what their families fought for in the war.
Chapter Five: Concluding Considerations

Despite the wide availability of primary documents, and the extensive literature on war guilt, most writers have concentrated either on proving that Japanese education has glorified its past to protect pre-war minded Japanese conservatives, or persuading readers that Japanese education continues to teach a masochistic history inherited from the American occupiers. The shaping of war guilt is much more complex, and I have shown that ideas of war guilt cannot be simplified in such terms.

The roles of SCAP, the Ministry, and Nikkyoso, and forces not directly responsible but seeking to influence Japanese perception of war guilt--all played their parts. SCAP implemented the War Guilt Information Program to ensure that Japanese would never seek to repeat the errors of the war. In conducting educational reform, SCAP made use of the Ministry of Education and its textbook censorship system in order rapidly to achieve efficient, centralized control over education. When full-scale occupation ended, the Ministry inherited a textbook censorship system and continued to act as the central organ for educational control. The Ministry tried to “undo” some educational reforms implemented by SCAP, especially those found “unsuitable” for Japan. These several developments account for the reintroduction of Moral Education and patriotism in the curriculum.

By the time the Ministry regained control over education, Nikkyoso had emerged as a powerful opponent. Nikkyoso supported the peace movement and the Japan Socialist Party; hence saw the acknowledgement of Japan’s war guilt as necessary to prevent resurgence of militarism. Other pressure groups such as the war veterans’ groups supported the Liberal Democratic Party, and called for the recognition of the war dead, including war criminals. I have also shown that other groups such as historians and media newspaper agencies had their own plans and goals,
sometimes hidden, thus contributing to a power struggle between those wishing to promote
Japanese war guilt, and those aiming to suppress it.

I have not studied the long-term impact of American occupation on present-day ideas of
war guilt, nor have I examined in detail the effectiveness of the official programs designed to shape
war guilt. Rather, I have concentrated on events between 1945 and 1960, as this transitional phase
from the occupation to the post-occupation period was crucial in setting the foundation for
Japanese ideas of and experience of war guilt. Many more players have influenced political and
educational scenes since the 1960s, and to complete this research on war guilt, events that have
since taken place deserve study.

In covering so vast a topic, I chose to limit my thesis to Japanese formal education at the
elementary and secondary levels, excluding higher education. SCAP's educational reform also dealt
with higher education, and deserves attention in any further research. Moreover, because my thesis
is not specifically on the history of Nikkyoso, or the Allied occupation of Japan, or an evaluation
of postwar reforms by the Ministry of Education, I have not consulted primary sources as
extensively as I would have done were I dealing with topics such as these.

Nikkyoso constantly emphasized peace education and pacifism in its postwar activity, thus
participating in a larger peace movement that had gained momentum in the immediate postwar
years internationally and in Japan. For example in 1949, 7 million members of labour unions and
organizations promoting democracy, peace, and freedom joined to form a union calling for the
protection of democracy (Kumakura 1961). The American involvement in the Korean War from
Japanese peace movement activists were doing what activists all around the world were doing, but
they also had an extra burden to bear, and this made them exceptional: the problem of war guilt.
For instance, in collecting signatures for the Stockholm Appeal in 1950, teachers from Hiroshima
prefecture were demanded by the American military through the Japanese Board of Education, to
refrain from speaking of their atomic bomb experiences (Yamazumi 1987). In this particular case, the problem was that in appealing for peace, Japanese tried to use the atomic bomb experience, which touched on a sensitive topic that pointed to American war guilt. However, potentially, all wartime activities including those that connect directly to Japanese war guilt can be and have been used for anti-war and pacifist movements. Evidently, there is a connection between war guilt and appealing for peace, the logic that “war was evil in the past, we shall never repeat the same mistakes we made, and therefore we shall seek for peace” at work here. This is why a closer look at the nature of peace movements and peace education would add breadth to my thesis.

Under SCAP, the Civil Censorship Detachment Section censored civilian communications between 1945 and 1949 including mail, telephone, telegraph, film, radio and all publishable documents and these interceptions are preserved at the University of Maryland at College Park as the Gordon Prange Collection. As an indication of the extent of this censorship operation, there are 600,000 censored pages in books, pamphlets, newspapers, periodicals, news agency photos, political posters, and maps in the Prange collection. Although I have briefly noted that censorship through education was an element in a larger censorship scheme, I have not studied in depth the role of media and press censorship in the formation of war guilt.

In dealing with the question of war guilt, I have primarily relied on official documents produced by SCAP, the Ministry of Education, and Nikkyoso. Thus I have described chiefly the voices and opinions of American and Japanese leaders who had power to influence official policies. Moreover, although we know how the actors dealt with war guilt, we do not know enough to be sure why war guilt was dealt in specific ways. To answer this question, we might turn to explanations that the shapers of war guilt provide us, as I have done in this thesis. But in order more fully to understand underlying motives, we ought to analyse the surrounding circumstances of the actors, assessing how food shortages, unemployment, harsh living conditions, and demography affected the general populace and thus policy makers’ concepts of war guilt.
We might incorporate in the discussion of war guilt for the whole of the last half of the twentieth century, the degree of Japanese acceptance of internationalisation and modernization, and elements of admiration for the United States in Japan. As an example, there may be a generation gap between older Japanese who connect everything American to the memories of the war they fought against Americans, and the younger generation that feel no resistance toward American popular culture. This would have influenced the way Japanese accepted or rejected American-initiated reforms, American popular culture, and various interpretations of World War II.

History museums, monuments of war heroes, and war memorials have all served as instruments to promote a certain way of remembering the war. Forms of popular culture such as songs, movies, artwork, magazines, comics, and literature have played a role in shaping war guilt, as various composers, movie directors, artists, and writers projected different images of war. Neither SCAP nor the Ministry controlled these shapers of war memory and war guilt the way they manipulated education. However, the roles of individual and collective memory as well as the role that public opinion played in shaping perceptions of war guilt are too important to dismiss. I have given just two examples of the effects of pressure groups on the way war memories affect political decisions, but the connection between war guilt and war memories is a possible thesis topic in itself. Children who moved to rural areas to avoid city bombings, Okinawan civilians involved in the only land-fought battle on Japanese soil, soldiers who killed and saw their comrades killed, Korean-Japanese hit by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima, POWs captured and sent to Siberia after surrender, and immigrants who repatriated from Manchuria leaving their children behind, all have different experiences of war. Their stories have suggested to some writers that these people see or saw themselves as victims, rather than aggressors. Others may feel anger for having lost family members for a lost cause, and thus see the war as a dark period, preferably never to be repeated. These are only a few examples of the types of Japanese war experience and war memory which contribute indirectly to perceptions of war guilt.
In order to add a more comparative aspect to my thesis, the obvious step would be to conduct a comparative study on war guilt with Germany. The most common comparisons have been on which country more readily admitted to war guilt and regained trust from her neighbouring countries, and why there is a difference between Japan and Germany. For instance, removing the leaders responsible for Japan's involvement in World War Two proved to be more difficult than the German case, as "the identity of the leaders and principal followers was not clear" in contrast with the "sharpness of the split between Nazi and anti-Nazi elements in Germany" (Martin 1948, 53). However, a more useful comparison is to conduct a similar survey on the various shapers of war guilt in Germany, as Dierkes (2001) has done. It is possible to extend this further into a wider cross-cultural examination of war guilt as a universal issue, and include an analysis on the connection between war memories and war guilt. For example, we can apply this to the way the United States has dealt with war guilt surrounding the Vietnam War, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese-American internment by combining Evans and Lunn's (1997) ideas on war and memory in the twentieth century, with Yui (1995) who compares American and Japanese perceptions of World War Two.

The American occupation of Japan did establish the foundations of postwar Japanese education. SCAP systematically implemented the War Guilt Information Program, intending that war guilt be passed onward to generations of Japanese through education. On the other hand, historians should recognize Japanese collaborators who willingly accepted SCAP's version of history.

I have yet to examine long-term effects of policies implemented by SCAP in the immediate postwar years. For this kind of research, one would have to find out what schemes and motives SCAP had, if any, on long-term Japanese war guilt. Detailed evidence of Americans' activities would entail access to CIA documents and to international correspondence regarding foreign policy. On another hand, there remain broader questions of public opinion--its formation,
its links to the formation of collective/sustained memory of the War, and its weight in the political life of the period after 1960. All this remains for future study and investigation.
1 In terms of accessibility to archival documents, SCAP directives on war guilt are available to the public at the National Diet Library in Japan and at the National Archives and Records Administration in the United States. With amendments to the Freedom of Information Act in 1975, Gordon Prange Collection at the University of Maryland at College Park, consisting of the largest selection of SCAP-censored material, also became accessible to the public.

2 Ienaga for example, extensively writes on textbook censorship conducted by the Ministry of Education after the war, while Eto on the other hand concentrates his efforts on textbook censorship of the occupational forces, and neither deal with the other kind of censorship in their writings. The majority of research on war guilt has unfortunately followed this pattern seen in Ienaga and Eto.

3 Writers on war guilt start with a story to tell, taking either a right-wing or a left-wing position, regardless of whether their story is representative of the facts. I avoid defending or accusing Japanese for committing wartime atrocities and will refrain from arguing whether or not the dropping of the atomic bombs was justified. This is because the purpose of my thesis does not lie in defending either position. Rather, it is to point out that war guilt cannot be understood on such one-sided arguments.

4 Although Buruma's narrative style is persuasive, he relies too heavily on anecdotal evidence collected from interviews. Buruma fails to show why he selected the interviewees he interviewed, and how representative their views are. Buruma's sources differ considerably from my own in that he uses anecdotal evidence as his primary source while I rely on officially published documents.

5 By Japanese educational history, I refer particularly to my own topic of war guilt. However, even in Japanese educational history in general, most historians have either written on a specific time period such as the Occupation period, or they do a general overview concentrating on significant events that took place in Japanese educational history.

6 The verb “unify” here carries a different meaning from that of Eugen Weber on unity in France in *The Making of Frenchmen*. Japan's lack of unity before modernisation was due to the Feudal system where the military was more loyal to the local landowners than to the emperor.

7 Textbooks from 1903 had colour printed illustrations as the Ministry attempted to place importance on students' interests from the influence of the Taisho Democracy which brought in child-centered learning (Owara 2002).

8 The Battle of Leyte Gulf was a decisive battle fought over the control of the Philippines between the American and Japanese Navies from 23 to 26 October, 1944.

9 Morito's religious adherence is significant for the same reasons given in page 33 of my thesis.

10 In the prewar years, Moral Education was taught using the Imperial Rescript on Education which rested on three pillars: State Shintoism, Confucianism, and modern political and social ethics (Luhmer 1990, 179). Similarly, after the war, a national moral system, based on principles of pure ethics, Confucianism, Buddhism, or other religions was believed necessary to replace the Rescript.

11 The campaign against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the 1960s including protests against the U.S. military presence in Japan, ignited by student activists union workers is one example of Japan's political history which clearly shows the distinction between Left and Right Japanese politics at the time (Kitamura 2002). The textbook controversy issue over war guilt has been one of the other major conflicts between the two political positions.

12 Here, “left-wing” refers to Marxists, and left-of-center liberals and socialists who support the opposition parties (Japan Communist Party and Japan Socialist Party). Left-wing organisation are characterised by opposition to corporate capitalism, state control, and the imperial system (Katzenstein 2002).
13 The term “radical” refers to communist-supported groups in contrast with “moderate” socialist-oriented groups (Marshall 1994, 171).
14 To answer this question, I turn to Nikkyoso’s voting behaviour in legislative elections, membership, and funding which indicate that Nikkyoso supports the Japan Socialist Party whose ideologies agree with these positions.
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