"INVASION" OF THE "IMMIGRANT HORDES": AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ARGUMENTS IN CANADA AGAINST MULTICULTURALISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the current backlash against immigration and multiculturalism policies. The author looks at current arguments against both policies, and compares them to evidence.

These arguments are drawn from the media; the writings of critics like Richard Gwyn, and William D. Gairdner; and the policies of the Reform Party. It will provide a historical review of the experiences of immigrant groups in adapting to Canadian society. From this review, the author identifies several consistent themes in anti-multiculturalism and anti-immigration literature, which include: multiculturalism is little more than "flash and dance", the policy is unanimously unpopular among the general public, immigrants take jobs from Canadian-born, immigrants are a burden to society, and that immigrants are not needed to offset the ageing of the Canadian population.

The author concludes that these criticisms are based on misconceptions and distortions of facts. In some cases, the criticisms reflect more of an attack on minority groups rather than on these policies, and reveal a movement to reverse the pluralistic nature of Canadian society. This research comes at a time when the debate over these policies is clouded with emotion. The author makes several recommendations as to how the public education system can help counter the use of these themes in the media.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In 1994 I began this study out of concern for the image that was being portrayed of immigrants in the media here in Canada. The previous year was a federal election year, and some of the statements made by politicians seemed to be putting the blame on new Canadians for the economic and political woes the country was experiencing. Perhaps because I myself am an immigrant, I was very sensitive to what was being said, and clearly understood that immigrants were being used as scapegoats for problems they were not necessarily responsible for.

I would like to thank Pradip Sarbadhikari, who pointed me in this direction years ago, and motivated me to follow my heart.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Many Canadians no longer support immigration because, rightly, they consider the immigration policies of the 1990s detrimental. 1

-Daniel Stoffman, 1998

Now, English Canada is being destroyed not only because non-traditional immigrants are failing to assimilate, but because they are encouraged not to do so by the government's ridiculous policies of multiculturalism. 2

-Doug Collins, 1979

In 1993, during a federal election campaign in Canada, Reform candidate for York riding John Beck stated that immigrants were bringing "...death and destruction to the people", and the time for Anglo-Saxons to assert themselves had come. 3 Beck was subsequently expelled from his party for his remarks. While he was condemned by his own party's executive, it became clear that his sentiments were representative of a trend in the nineties of immigrant-bashing that was present not only in Canada, but around the world. The native-born populations of developed countries were growing uneasy in an era of recession and economic instability. With both resources and employment becoming scarce, immigrants and minorities within these nations were becoming the scapegoats for these troubled times.

In Canada, the atmosphere of hostility towards immigrants was reflected in a 1994 poll by the Ekos Research Association which showed that 53% of Canadians thought too many immigrants were coming to Canada. 4 As a result of this attitude towards newcomers, neo-conservative and ultra-conservative forces have been able to capitalize on this public fear of immigrants in order to promote their agendas of immigrant restriction and revocation of rights for minority groups. The Reform Party has stated that its 1996-97 official policy calls for reducing immigration inflows into Canada from its current level of around 215,000 newcomers a year to 150,000. Reform Party policy also calls for eliminating health and welfare benefits for new Canadians until they become citizens,
which takes about three to five years after their arrival, to deny Canadian citizenship to children of immigrants born on Canadian soil unless the parents are landed immigrants, and to use the 'notwithstanding' clause in the Charter of Rights in order to ignore constitutional rights when expelling those considered to be bogus refugees and illegal entrants.  

The purpose of this thesis is to show that, rather than being about good economic and social policy, the contemporary attack on immigration policies is about halting the increase in immigration from non-traditional areas, and is thus implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) an attack on multiculturalism. This argument is based on the following points.

The first theme in this thesis is that recent arguments about restricting immigration repeat anti-immigration themes voiced throughout Canadian history, and are related to, and reflected in, attacks upon Canada's official policy of multiculturalism. I believe the term 'backlash' accurately describes this current anti-immigration movement, as it connotes that the movement has an ebb and flow. That is, anti-immigration movements are not a constant part of Canadian history. However, when they do happen, the same arguments are used by immigration critics over and over again. Present-day criticisms of immigration are based on the belief that current patterns of immigration have either a negligible or negative impact on the quality of life in Canada. Critics such as journalist Daniel Stoffman stated that the era of 'mass immigration' since 1978 had not resulted in increased incomes for individual Canadians, nor had it eased the tax burden of Canadians. Immigration critic Charles Campbell claimed that Canada's open door policy towards newcomers was costly to taxpayers and, as a result, immigration must be reduced to a minimum. Some observers suggested that a moratorium on immigration was necessary to assimilate "last decade's scarcely-restrained human flood". These critics claim that Canada should follow the leads of other nations such as the United States and Australia by reducing inflows
of newcomers.

Critics also state that societal problems such as crime have been made worse because of immigration. The shooting of a white woman in Toronto by a black Canadian of Jamaican origin in 1994 generated this comment from the periodical The Western Report: "High-profile crimes involving immigrants show the chaos of government policy." By allowing for a liberal immigration policy to be coupled with official multiculturalism, critics claim, immigrants come to Canada without feeling the need to integrate with the rest of the population. As a result, Canadian society is fragmenting into different groups. As Richard Gwyn states,

...by treating differences of race, ethnicity, and colour as integral to identity rather than as manifestations of heritage, official multiculturalism encourages apartheid, or, to be a bit less harsh, ghettoism.

Such criticisms are not a product of the modern era. These themes existed in anti-immigration writings of earlier times in Canada. J.S. Woodsworth warned in 1919 that immigrants would exacerbate social problems such as pauperism, illiteracy, and crime. Furthermore, the allowing in of people who were ethnically and racially different from the native population would be dangerous, and cause society to splinter, as the "heterogeneity of these races tends to promote passion, localism, and despotism, and to make impossible free cooperation for the public welfare".

A second theme in this thesis is that the accuracy of the arguments about restricting immigration and the arguments about the negative consequences of Canada's multiculturalism policy to which they are related have not been subjected to close, systematic scrutiny. Claims about immigration and multiculturalism are mentioned in the media and in public policymaking sessions as though they are fact. Recent immigrants are said to damage Canadian society and cause inconvenience for native-born Canadians. Commentators refer to immigrants as "hordes" who stage "floods" and "invasions". With regard to the recent influx of refugees from Somalia, Diane Francis claims to have spoken to a teacher "whose
school has been totally disrupted by these invading hordes". She also says that the Somalis "will contribute very little, if anything, to Canada in the future".

Multiculturalism as a concept is also under more scrutiny than before. Both of the main opposition parties in the House of Commons have stated their opposition to the policy of multiculturalism. As Bloc Quebecois Member of Parliament Suzanne Tremblay (Rimouski-Temiscouata) stated in 1994, drawing on the example of the current policy of interculturalism in Quebec:

It seems to me that we don't need to promote multiculturalism. Instead, we should strive to develop interculturalism and, of course, we should make a major amendment to this act. No, the act shouldn't even be amended, it should probably be repealed and replaced by an act that would recognize the riches cross-cultural contacts and exchange bring to our own communities, in the broader context of being integrated into and respecting one or the other of those majorities.

The Reform Party shares this view, as stated by their former Immigration critic, Art Hanger:

...I don't agree with the multicultural direction this country has taken either. In fact, my personal view and that of our party is that we would like to see that act scrapped completely... and deal with some of the other matters in other areas in other departments.

Multiculturalism policy is also being questioned outside of the House of Commons. Traditional conservative critics such as William D. Gairdner see the policy as a 'top-down imposition on the people'. These critics have been given a redemptive impetus since their ranks have been filled with non-traditional and non-conservative critics such as Neil Bissoondath, himself an immigrant. In his book Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada, Bissoondath writes: "(It) may be time now for the cow of multiculturalism to be stripped of its holiness". This is because newcomers must learn to accommodate society, just as society must learn to accommodate the newcomer. Multiculturalism, he says, has served neither interest. It has
only served to heighten differences, not diminish them.\textsuperscript{20}

A third point this thesis will make is that when the accuracy of the arguments about restricting immigration and the arguments about the negative consequences of Canada's multicultural policy to which they are related are subject to close, systematic scrutiny, they are found to lack evidential support. Instead of cogent arguments supported by evidence, the arguments should be seen as rhetorical attacks on immigrants and immigration. This thesis will identify the various arguments made against multiculturalism and immigration policy, and examine how well they reflect the evidence available on the topic. It will examine the claims such as those mentioned above to see if evidence exists to show multiculturalism to be a 'top-down' imposition on the people, and if multiculturalism has in fact only served to heighten differences. These arguments -- as I plan to show -- often do not take into account the complete range of facts, and the language these critics use suggest a fear that immigration will invariably change the nature of Canadian society, most likely against the interests of the established English/French majority.\textsuperscript{21} This point is accentuated by the fact that, as Appendix A shows, the number of immigrants from non-traditional areas such as the Africa and Asia have between 1977 and 1990 grown to represent 71% of all immigrants who came to Canada.\textsuperscript{22} Incidents such as the exclusion of a veteran of Sikh origin from the Newton Legion Hall in British Columbia in 1993, and the controversy raised over allowing Sikhs in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to wear their turbans are signs of contemporary intolerance towards minority groups.

To make this point, I propose to explore how multiculturalism and immigration are connected, and how critics combine their attacks on both. This will involve an examination of contemporary multiculturalism policy in Canada, as well as criticisms of the policy. I will also review the history of anti-immigration sentiments over the past century that accompanied each successive wave of immigration to Canada.
A fourth theme in this thesis is that Canada's media contribute to a climate hostile to immigration and multiculturalism by failing to critically assess the arguments and evidence mounted in favour of restricting immigration and rescinding Canada's policy of Multiculturalism. Aside from what they learn in school, most Canadians rely on the media to learn about these policies. Thus the media must be held accountable for reporting accurately on these topics. But is this in fact the case? If media coverage of these issues is not accurate, then the press actually serves to foment the backlash. Herman and Chomsky write that the media serves a 'social purpose'. This purpose is not one that enables the public to assert meaningful control over the political process by providing members information needed for the intellectual discharge of political responsibilities, but rather to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and state.  

If immigration and multiculturalism policies require a review, as the critics claim, then the issues should be presented in the mainstream media in a fair and balanced manner. The evidence that will be presented in this thesis will suggest that the debate as seen in the media today is far from a fair one. A greater spectrum of views and evidence needs to be presented, not just those of writers on immigration, such as Charles Campbell, Daniel Stoffman, Diane Francis, and Doug Collins; and on multiculturalism, such as William D. Gairdner, Neil Bissoondath, Richard Gwyn, and Reginald Bibby.

Another point made by this research is that the failure to critically appraise the arguments and evidence mounted in favour of restricting immigration and rescinding Canada's policy of Multiculturalism poses a threat to the maintenance of Canada as a pluralistic and democratic nation. With the debate over these issues causing such emotion, the federal government may feel pressured to act in order to appease those calling for immigration restriction. Also, politicians may choose to implement tough
immigration policies in order to appear in the eyes of constituents to be "doing something" about the supposed immigration problem. Prior to being elected in 1993, the currently incumbent Liberal Party, then in opposition, promised to raise immigrant levels to 1\% of the total population (that is, from the rate of 250,000 new Canadians a year up to about 280,000 per year). Instead, after being elected, then Minister of Employment and Immigration Sergio Marchi announced in September 1994 reductions in immigrant inflows to the current level of around 200,000 per year. Immigration was made an even more difficult process by his additional announcement of a $975 head tax per immigrant. Current Immigration Minister Lucienne Robillard confirmed that the anti-immigrant backlash was based on myths, but that the Liberals were still reluctant to increase immigration levels. "I have to recognize the myth is there (that immigrants cause unemployment among the Canadian-born population). To have more immigration in Canada we need the support of the population". This failure to turn policy promise into policy implementation shows how the pro-immigration restriction movement, of which the Reform Party represents in the House of Commons, has been successful in influencing government decisions. As the Minister stated, the calls for restriction may be based on faulty evidence. Hence, we need to examine the backlash more carefully.

How effective can public education be in dealing with anti-immigrant sentiments in the public? As Cornelius Jaenen stated almost twenty years ago, multicultural education represents a traditional reversal of the role of Canadian schools as tools of assimilation: "...it would seem that the schools are being forced to re-examine their role and to readjust their programs and objectives to fit a new definition of Canadian society". Multicultural education needs to reinforce the cause of fundamental human rights, the development of insights into racism, and group relations, and to strengthen citizen participation. Such would be welcome additions to broader and deeper objectives of literacy,
intelligent citizenship, and respect for excellence.  

The research presented in this thesis will suggest new directions for multicultural education, in particular the continuing need to teach students about multiculturalism and immigration in order to better understand heterogeneity in their society and to counteract the often unfounded claims of various critics in the media and in public office. That is, education in schools must go beyond dealing with just the teaching of culture to dealing with media literacy and socio-political issues involving culture and ethnicity in our society. Teacher education must also be expanded and revised in order to make multicultural education more effective.

Advocacy of immigrant restriction is present not only in Canada, but in other nations as well. The Australian government recently cut the number of immigrants it accepts from 110,000 per year down to 80,000, an example that Canadian critics say their government should follow. In terms of percentages, this would mean that Australia's annual inflow of immigrants would drop from 0.65% to 0.47% of the total population. Canada's current immigration rate is about 0.77%. In Western Europe, anti-immigrant agitation is not solely the domain of right-wing extremists such as The National Front, but also of bodies such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, which stated in a 1993 report that immigrants there "...foster strikes, violence, and crime. They lower the general standard of living." Since the seventies, the governments of Britain, Germany, and France have justified measures restricting immigration of certain types or categories -- such as denying work permits to family relations of immigrants, banning immigrants from settling in certain areas, deliberate bureaucratic delays, and direct payments to encourage immigrants to leave -- as a means to combat racism against newcomers, as though these measures were not a source of racism themselves. The recent police action in Paris during August 1996 against hunger strikers who were protesting France's restrictive immigration laws shows
that this issue continues to be alive and well.\textsuperscript{31} 

Immigration is also a contentious issue in the United States. The recent uproar over the beating of illegal Mexican immigrants by California Highway Patrol officers in April 1996,\textsuperscript{32} plus the passage of federal amendments to welfare legislation that bar legal immigrants from receiving most forms of welfare benefits,\textsuperscript{33} shows how significant the topic of immigration has been for Americans.

To draw upon examples of the immigration backlash around the world is to show, first, that the Canadian situation is not unique. Second, as critics draw examples from other countries as models that Canada should follow, any study on the phenomenon of anti-immigration locally must therefore look at these examples and show how they do or do not apply. For example, in comparing American immigration policy with that of Canada, Richard Gwyn refers to a 1995 American bipartisan federal commission's proposals to cut immigration by almost a half and substantially reduce the number of family-class immigrants, and writes: "An equivalent to the objective analysis of the bipartisan commission's study is overdue to be duplicated here [in Canada]".\textsuperscript{34}

While a number of contemporary studies have focused on current anti-multiculturalism sentiments, and a few have looked at anti-immigration trends,\textsuperscript{35} it is difficult to locate any studies that discuss the two issues together. None has linked the backlashes against multiculturalism and immigration to show how these sentiments might represent an overall trend against heterogeneity and cultural pluralism in our society. The research presented here will show that anti-immigrant/anti-minority group themes evident in the past parallel those of today, thus showing how the contemporary backlash is a reproduction of such trends in history.

This study will be organized in two parts: one part analyzing multiculturalism policy in Canada, and the other examining issues of immigration. The two areas are intimately linked as they represent the diversity of Canadian society: immigration is one means by which we acquire new Canadians, and multiculturalism
represents the way over the past generation that we integrate those new Canadians into our society.

Part One, which deals with multiculturalism, will have several chapters. Chapter Two will define the terms that will be used, such as 'multiculturalism', 'pluralism', and 'ethnicity'. This chapter will also discuss the reasons for the persistence of ethnicity in modern societies, factors that facilitate against conflict in such societies, approaches to dealing with heterogeneous communities, the problem of non-recognition of culture (or specifically, the non-recognition of the culture of non-charter groups) in public policy, and the need to supplement human rights with group rights. This chapter will also discuss the phenomenon of nativism.

Chapters Three and Four will explain the history of the policy of multiculturalism in Canada, and examine the criticisms of the policy. Criticisms of the policy from Quebec nationalists and the First Nations will be mentioned in Chapter Three, but this thesis will not analyze these criticisms in any great detail. Since issues that concern minorities also concern the First Nations, and since multiculturalism policy sometimes deals with issues in the Aboriginal community, I will be drawing examples from the First Nations from time to time. The focus here is on criticism of multiculturalism policy in regards to immigrants. I will examine some academic criticisms, but my focus will be on popular contemporary criticisms made by observers such as Neil Bissoondath, Richard Gwyn, Reginald Bibby, William D. Gairdner, and Diane Francis. The impact on the public of these writers was far more widespread and effective than commentaries made by academics on this issue. Popular critics have access to television and popular media, whereas academics circulate their views largely in academic journals and at academic conferences which are given little attention by the media. Their criticisms include the notions that multiculturalism is little more than a scheme to buy votes in minority communities, that it does nothing to address the real
concerns of minority groups such as racism, that it makes culture an object of exotic display, and it causes ghettoization by encouraging separateness. The purpose of this chapter is to see how well these critiques reflect the reality of multicultural policy in Canada and Canadian society in general.

Chapters Five and Six will continue this analysis of popular critiques of multiculturalism, and it will also examine what these criticisms represent. It will respond to issues such as whether or not these criticisms really reflect concern for the supposed destructive effects of multiculturalism, or if they represent a fear of the increasing presence of non-traditional, ethno-cultural groups in Canada; why members of minority groups, such as Neil Bissoondath and University of Winnipeg professor Rais Khan, are against the policy; how accurately multiculturalism policy is represented in the media; if such criticisms help refine the policy; and what might some of the actual shortcomings of multiculturalism be.

Part Two, which deals with anti-immigration arguments, will be divided into three chapters. Chapter Seven will give a brief historical examination of immigration backlash in Canada, and look at demographic arguments against immigration. From this, I will identify eight themes that persist within the arguments made against immigrants in each of these various backlashes, and how these themes recur today. I will also use this historical appraisal to show how anti-immigration proponents were, or were not, able to influence government policy. Chapter Eight will deal with contemporary economic arguments against immigration. Rather than being a nation-wide phenomenon, immigration-bashing has tended to be a regional reaction towards an influx of specific groups of immigrants into particular regions of the country, especially the big cities like Toronto and Vancouver, where visible minorities now constitute one-third of the total population. The proportion of the population that is considered to be from visible minorities has nearly doubled in the last ten years.36
Chapter Nine will examine how these arguments reflect manifestations of Canadian nativism (that is, a belief system based on a conjunction of nationalism with ethno-cultural, religious, and/or racial prejudice). This chapter will show how such arguments against immigration and multiculturalism can be seen at the public policy-making level, and how they have the potential to shape policy in favour of those supporting a nativist position. The conclusion will explain and analyze some of the most recent criticisms of multiculturalism and immigration policy, and how multicultural education can be improved to deal with intolerance towards cultural pluralism in our society.

A qualification is required here: Quebec immigration and integration policy is somewhat difficult to assess in the Canadian context. While Quebec is part of Canada, and is naturally affected by federal policies, Quebec has largely dictated its own immigration policy with federal concurrence since the federal government handed over its powers over the selection of immigrants to that province through the 1978 Couture-Cullen Agreement. Consequently, I feel it is important to deal with Quebec's policies of immigration and integration in comparison with the rest of Canada, rather than seeing Quebec as part of the whole. I provide one qualification: federal statistics take the whole nation into account. When referring to these statistics, I will indeed include Quebec as part of the whole.

This dissertation does not follow any particular theoretical perspective. This is because I find that no one theory can adequately explain all the different elements in explaining the movement against immigration and multiculturalism policies. As a result, I prefer a more eclectic approach. For example, many aspects of a conflict-oriented theory appear throughout this work. The anti-immigration movement is explained as a reaction by members of the established white, European-origin groups as a means to try and maintain their hegemony in Canadian society. However, conflict theory would suggest that these established ethno-cultural
groups as a whole are trying to maintain their power while minority groups are as a whole attempting to challenge that power base, and I do not believe this to be the case. The range of opinions and views within any one ethno-cultural group are far too diverse to show this to be true. Not all members of the dominant white majority are against immigration, nor are all members of visible minorities in favour of official multiculturalism. I find the most appeal in the theoretical approaches of Will Kymlicka, who advocates the promotion of collective rights such as multicultural rights as a means to promote and support individual freedom, and Charles Taylor, who challenges the western-liberal concept of society as being 'difference-blind'. While these two approaches guide my own exploration of the evidence on this topic, I do not adhere to them strictly.
NOTES


6) Stoffman, 1.


9) Ibid., 6.

10) For a discussion of the term "official multiculturalism", please see chapter two.


13) Ibid., 208.


15) Ibid., 63.

17) Ibid., 23.


20) Ibid., 192.

21) By "English/French majority", I am using the traditional way of describing the Anglo-Celtic/French-Canadian dominant groups in Canada.

22) K.W. Taylor makes a similar point, saying that the number of immigrants from non-traditional areas such as the Third World have between 1962 and 1988 grown to represent two-thirds of all immigrants who come to Canada. "Racism in Canadian Immigration Policy", Canadian Ethnic Studies, 23:1 (1991): 7.


27) Ibid., 94.


30) Ibid., 11.


32) T.V. Show: "Nine News 10:00pm Report; KCAL-TV; Los Angeles", April 10 1996, 10pm PT (obtained from Lexus-Nexus On-Line).


34) Gwyn, 220.


CHAPTER TWO: MULTICULTURALISM AS A CONCEPT

An analysis of multiculturalism and the state of ethno/cultural relations requires a definition of terms and an explanation of the theoretical background. Without this, multiculturalism and its related issues mean different things to different people. For example, Reginald Bibby sees multiculturalism as a form of pluralism which has led to relativism because of its emphasis on excessive individualism. The danger of this individualism, according to Bibby, is that if Canadians are increasingly led to believe that they have "no vision, national goals, and sense of coexistence", then we collapse into a "mosaic madness".¹ According to Neil Bissoondath, multiculturalism is responsible for producing among Canadians a loss of certainty and diminishment in Canadian values which he does not identify specifically. Unlike Bibby, he sees multiculturalism as depending on conformity to preconceived and unchanging notions of ethnicity. It creates stereotypes, based here on ethnicity, which strips the individual of all uniqueness.²

Hence, we have two different interpretations of multiculturalism: one views it as too individualistic, the other sees it as too conformist. Yet both interpretations come to the same conclusion: that this policy has caused a loss of identity among Canadians by advocating cultural relativism (the belief that all cultural practices are of equal value, and therefore members of one culture cannot judge the practices of another). Which interpretation is accurate? Is either of them correct?

The purpose of this chapter is to help provide guidelines to the theory and interpretation of multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, and related concepts. This gives the reader a foundation on which to assess the debate. To do this, definitions of key terms such as multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, ethnicity, assimilation, integration, separation/segregation, and marginalization, will be given. In order to understand the Canadian approach to ethnocultural relations, these terms will be explained in the
As this debate deals with ethno-cultural relations, a discussion of ethnicity is warranted. Observers such as John Porter in the 1970s saw ethnicity as rapidly diminishing due to its increasing irrelevance in modern society in the face of technology which put an emphasis on individuality which made ethnic ties irrelevant. Porter felt the American melting pot was more appropriate than the Canadian mosaic model for pluralistic societies because it allowed for ethno-cultural groups to do what they were prone to do: shed their particularisms and join the mainstream group. Evidence suggests that this presumption is not accurate. What are the reasons for this persistence of ethnicity? How do we deal with it?

The continuing existence of ethnicity in modern society despite Porter's contention leads to the question of how we shape our national political institutions to deal with it. Does the Western-liberal model of government provide adequate recognition of cultural rights? If not, why should it? How do we recognize these rights? How does this shape the role of citizenship in the concept of the western-liberal nation-state? In other words, is the definition of citizenship in western-liberal states such as Canada inclusive enough to incorporate those from minority groups?

Finally, this chapter will explain nativism in the Canadian context. This will include a description of what Canadian nativists believe, and how they try to promote this through populism. This knowledge is required to understand why those who support a more conservative and traditional interpretation of Canadian identity oppose a pluralistic view of Canada.

The Terms of Debate

A) Multiculturalism:

Like culture itself, multiculturalism is an evolving term. How we interpret multiculturalism now may be different from how it was interpreted after its official recognition in 1971. In the early
years, the policy focused primarily on cultural retention. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the policy became more concerned with issues such as social integration, race relations, and heritage language education. Later, issues of economic equality and economic contribution were added to the agenda. To note this evolutionary development is important, as critics of multiculturalism often define their criticisms based on the old definition of the policy without taking into consideration the changes that have occurred since the seventies.

Multiculturalism can be identified as a policy and as an ideology. This has to be kept in mind when reading commentaries on the policy. Is the writer criticizing multiculturalism as a policy, or as an ideology, or both? Often, observers criticize various aspects of multiculturalism ideology that are not necessarily connected to the federal policy, such as hyphenization and minority groups asking for special privileges in order to preserve their culture (a practice which occurs in other countries that do not have an official policy of multiculturalism). However, they make recommendations, such as calling to eliminate official multiculturalism, which are directed at the policy of multiculturalism.

According to Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliot, any definition of multiculturalism should incorporate the following criteria: a unique way of sorting out and evaluating diversity; a set of attitudes among individuals and groups regarding the intrinsic value of cultural diversity; an ideological commitment to diversity as productive and relevant to national or local interests; formal initiatives by the government and institutions to incorporate diversity into a set of policies and programs; and a belief in the practical benefits of multiculturalism for political and minority interests. For these purposes, multiculturalism is defined as "an official doctrine and corresponding set of policies and practices in which ethnoracial differences are formally
promoted and incorporated as an integral component of the political, social, and symbolic order". This definition, however, puts emphasis on the promotion and incorporation of ethnoracial differences. This emphasis could suggest that multiculturalism is for minority groups, rather than for society as a whole, and would not be suitable for those who do not wish to retain their ethnic background. In comparison, Howard Palmer defines multiculturalism as "the means by which to protect and promote diversity within the context of Canadian citizenship and political/economic integration into Canadian society". This definition allows for the aforementioned criteria, while defining diversity within the context of integration into the larger society. This emphasizes more than just cultural retention, but also diversity as a means to unify society. As Philip Resnick writes, multiculturalism would be harmful if it denies Canadians an overall national identity.

Consequently, I feel that Howard Palmer's definition of multiculturalism is the most appropriate. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use his definition when referring to 'multiculturalism'.

B) cultural pluralism:

Horace Kallen first coined this term in the United States in 1924. He related cultural pluralism to the idea of an orchestra: each group compared to a musician playing a different instrument, all making music together. In the Canadian context, Fleras and Elliot define cultural pluralism as:

A term used interchangeably with multiculturalism, the concept of cultural pluralism describes a social arrangement in which racially or ethnically different groups co-exist under a single polity. As with multiculturalism, references to cultural pluralism can take several points of departure, including those of pluralism as a descriptive fact, prescriptive ideal, or political process.

In other words, multiculturalism is based on the concept of cultural pluralism, which sees different ethno/cultural groups as living together with equal or common recognition of their
differences. As cultural pluralism is recognized officially in Canada through the policy of multiculturalism, the term 'multiculturalism' is used to refer to this recognition, whereas the term 'cultural pluralism' is used more often in the United States, where multiculturalism is not officially recognized as in Canada. In the context of this thesis, this point is worth noting as critics such as Reginald Bibby regard pluralism as contributing to collective and personal freedom by legitimating diversity, which in turn justifies relativism. This relativism is deemed to be the cause of Canadians' lack of identity today as "to live by the sword of relativism... may also be to die by it".

The definition of cultural pluralism may not be interchangeable between Canadian and American literature. In the context of American inter-cultural relations, according to David A. Hollinger, multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are not necessarily interchangeable. Cultural pluralism -- in this context -- refers to cultural groups of European origin living together rather than different ethno-racial groups. Multiculturalism, in contrast, recognizes in the United States the Eurocentrism of the political process, and emphasized minority empowerment by recognizing inequalities between European- and non-European-origin groups. This is quite a different way of viewing things than in Canada because it very quietly introduces the notion of Blacks and Hispanics, for example, as victims of Eurocentric society.

C) ethnicity:

Ethnicity, according to Wsevelod Isajiw, is a matter of double boundary: that is, it is defined from within the group, as well as through intergroup relations. To Isajiw, ethnicity...

...refers to a group of people who share the same culture or are descendants of such people who identify themselves as belonging to the same voluntary group.

Palmer and Troper also define an ethnic group by its members'
own identification with each other, as well as how the outer society views them. An ethnic group is so because individuals within the group identify with the group and are generally recognized by non-members as being members of that group. The elements that determine the ethnicity of a certain group, according to Rex and Mason, are a combination of language, religion, race, and ancestral background.

D) Assimilation, integration, separation/segregation, and marginalization:

These terms should be explained in relation to each other, rather than separately. The reasons are that, first, these terms are often seen to be interchangeable. Observers, sometimes use the term 'assimilation' to refer to what others call 'integration', and vice versa. Second, by looking at these terms in regards to each other, the purpose behind multicultural policy becomes apparent.

These four terms represent options for pluralistic societies. Ethno-cultural groups, according to John Berry, confront two main issues within the societies where they exist: 1) cultural maintenance, and 2) participation within the larger society. If a particular group (or individual) relinquishes its own culture and moves into the larger society, it has been "assimilated". Integration occurs when a group or individual can maintain their culture while moving into the larger society.

Segregation/separation represent two versions of the same option. In the case of the former, the minority group is compelled by the larger society to be put at a distance. An example of this would be the discriminatory laws under the former regime of apartheid in South Africa. Separation is when the minority group chooses to eschew mainstream society. An illustration of this would be the formation of Hutterite colonies on the prairies in Canada in the twentieth century. In both cases, the group maintains its culture by not moving, or by not being allowed to
move, into the larger society.²²

Marginalization occurs when the group in question loses its traditional culture and its contact with the larger society. This "ethnocide" can be seen in the case of the treatment of aboriginal people in Canada by the colonizing powers.

Of these four models, official multiculturalism favours the approach of integration. The intended goals and outcomes of multicultural policy, according to John Berry, are to manage intergroup and interpersonal relations; to encourage groups towards integration and away from marginalization; to support both individual and group choice; to emphasize human rights, social participation, equality, group maintenance, and intergroup tolerance; and to act as a balance between collective and individual rights.²³ The policy requires adaptation not only on the immigrants' part, but also on the part of larger society.²⁴

I digress at this point to re-emphasize how these terms can be interpreted differently by others. Consider this statement by John Higham in his book Send Them to Me:

A multiethnic society can avoid tyranny only through a shared culture and a set of universal values which its groups accept. If integration is unacceptable because it does not allow for differences, pluralism fails to answer our need for universals.²⁵

While Berry sees integration as the acceptance of difference of groups that move into the mainstream, Higham defines integration as the removal of differences in order to move into the mainstream ("If integration is unacceptable because it does not allow for difference..."). Hence, Higham's definition of integration resembles Berry's definition of assimilation. This means that Higham is arguing for assimilation. For the purposes of this dissertation, unless stated otherwise, I will use Berry's terminology.

Assimilation takes several forms: Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and -- according to Anderson and Frideres -- cultural
pluralism. The fact that these terms mean different things to different people at particular times in history leads to confusion.

According to Howard Palmer, 'melting pot' suggests that immigrants merge with settled communities to form a new Canadian culture. Yet every idea -- including cultural pluralism -- can be interpreted in a narrow and dogmatic fashion. As Palmer shows below, the Canadian melting pot model often was defined as a form of Anglo-conformity. Again, this shows how confusion over these terms leads to misunderstandings. As a result, contemporary observers often criticize multiculturalism without defining what it means to them.

In the Canadian context, assimilation is recognized primarily in the form of Anglo-conformity. It implies that newcomers should conform to the ideals of a British-Canadian society. Prior to the First World War, assimilationist programs were sponsored by schools, Protestant churches, labour unions, and patriotic and social welfare organizations. These programs combined fears of what would happen if immigrants were not assimilated with humanitarian concerns for the social and personal problems faced by immigrants. After World War One, this concept started giving way to the 'melting pot'. This view envisioned a biological merging of Anglo-Canadians with immigrants along with a blending of cultures into a new 'Canadian' culture. While the melting pot idea became popular in the 1920s due to the rise of autonomous Canadian nationalism, clear distinctions between Anglo-conformity and the melting pot paradigm did not always exist. The melting pot model was in many ways a thinly-veiled conformist model, an Anglo melting pot. As the following quote from former Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in the House of Commons in 1928 shows, the ideals of conformity still thrived:

We earnestly and sincerely believe that the civilization which we call the British civilization is the standard by which we must measure our own civilization; we desire to assimilate those whom we bring to this country to that civilization, that standard of living, that regard for morality and law and the
institutions of the country and to the ordered and required development of this country. That is what we desire, rather than by the introduction of vast and overwhelming numbers of people from other countries to assimilate the British immigrants and the few Canadians who are left to some other civilization.  

Assimilation can take two forms: structural and behavioral. Structural assimilation implies that all groups have large-scale access entrance into cliques, clubs, and political and economic institutions of the host-society at the primary group level. Behavioral (or cultural) assimilation, also known as acculturation, stresses that all groups change their cultural patterns to adhere to those of the host society (or: dominant group) and behave accordingly.

The purpose of assimilation is to develop or maintain a somewhat homogeneous society. But does it actually create a universal society for all groups, as structural assimilation may imply, or does it co-opt minorities into a hierarchy in which they find themselves below the status of established groups? Assimilation can be seen as a means to force ethnic groups to bow to society's standards, as set by the dominant group. Furthermore, assimilation implies that some groups conform to the British ideal more easily than others. Consequently, ethnic groups of European origin were deemed acceptable, since they could conform more easily to the British ideal, while non-European groups were considered unacceptable.

As Derrick Thomas states, complete assimilation demands surrender of ethnic identity. This imposes a painful sacrifice on immigrants (and other minority groups). Hence, assimilation is likely to be resisted by some ethnic groups. This point highlights the paradox of assimilation: segregation (or exclusion) is the only sanction really available to enforce assimilation. This point is borne out in Canadian immigration history, which will be dealt with in Chapter Five. Varying treatment towards different ethnic groups shows why assimilation has not always worked as it was intended to
and why the federal government attempted instead to institute cultural pluralism through multiculturalism in the 1970s. This fact is worth noting: critics of multicultural policy, particularly the conservative right, often advocate a return to the assimilation model which they consider preferable to any other.

**Ethnic Persistence and the Changing Composition of the Population**

Multiculturalism and cultural pluralism would be moot subjects if ethnicity was non-existent, or steadily diminishing in our society. Some have tried to make this point. The idea that ethnicity was irrelevant in a modern industrialized society was made by sociologists in the fifties and sixties. John Porter argued that technology made assimilation inevitable.35 People in North American society, according to Porter, saw themselves as individuals rather than groups. Furthermore, little evidence existed in reality to show that Canada's experience with the 'mosaic' (a model at the time for cultural pluralism) was different from the American melting pot. Also, as Porter showed, the mosaic was "vertical", making it unfair for those on the lower rungs with little prospect to rise. Historically, Canadians' treatment of those of different ethno/cultural groups hardly suggested the building of the foundations for a contemporary mosaic. The only time Canadians referred to their ethnicity, Porter stated, was when they were compelled to by the collection of census data (whether or not they felt their ethnicity).36

Porter used this premise to show that a policy of multiculturalism was irrelevant in a post-industrial world. It was a retrogressive policy in that it encouraged group claims within an increasingly individualistic society.37 Assimilation was a better model to achieve equality in that it discouraged ethnicity,38 and concentrated instead on individual rights and equal access to material success.

Evidence suggests that Porter's view of ethnicity as an artifact
from the past within modern-day individualist society is not entirely correct. While it may have been assumed less than twenty years ago that ethnicity would disappear in an industrialized society, the contrary has in fact happened. An ethnic revival has occurred around the world following upon the end of the cold war. Since 1989, with the collapse of the Eastern bloc as symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new era of globalization has been ushered in. While a global economy has been in place since at least 1776, the post-1989 era is the first time this economy is not ordered by an imperial power. With this new absence of imperial order, large sections of the world's population have won the 'right to self-determination' on the worst of terms: they have been left to fend for themselves. As nation-states such as Somalia and Yugoslavia collapse, ethnic populations have no imperial order to appeal to, and consequently they set upon each other to settle scores long deferred by imperial order. This trend renders nation-states less relevant as political entities. This re-shaping of the role of the nation-state has led to a resurgence of groups who assert their ethnic identities and often create new ethnically-based states such as Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, and Croatia. Some of these ethnic conflicts, however, were not related to the cold war. The demands of Scottish nationalists in The United Kingdom and Basques in Spain and France pre-date the end of the cold war era, and their struggles continue today.

With regards to the North-South factor, the populations of countries in the North are in decline numerically, in spite of these nations' economic strength. Nations of the South are not as strong economically, but their populations are on the rise. As a result, this leads to a migration of people from the South to the North. Such a factor is what reshapes western-industrialized societies: by the mixing of populations within borders. It is this re-shaping to which conservative forces are opposed, and thus
try to prevent by restricting immigration and opposing any official recognition of heterogeneity within their respective nations as only an encouragement for more immigration from these sources.

A number of studies show that ethnicity continues to exist among different cultural groups. Language retention is one measure of ethnic persistence. Edward N. Herberg's study of ethnicity in Canada explains that between 1921 and 1941, the Canadian census showed that ethnic groups had higher rates of heritage language (original language of the group) retention. Between 1941 and 1961, heritage language retention was in decline. However, the 1961 to 1981 period showed a recovery of language retention among all ethnicities except Jews, Natives, Scandinavians, Germans, and Dutch.43

Jerry G. Reitz showed in his study of ethnic retention through historical evidence and social survey techniques that ethnicity declines in most groups, but does not disappear altogether.

Over the long run, there is a progressive trend toward abandonment of ethnic group ties for all groups in which long-term experience can be measured (this trend does not include the Chinese). There is, in fact, an ethnic group life cycle. The finding should not (his emphasis) be construed as equivalent to saying that ethnic groups eventually or inevitably assimilate...

Reitz points out that his 1980 study dealt with ethnic cohesion, not assimilation. An assessment of assimilation would require a clear definition and relevant measurement, and such an assessment was not attempted here. He goes on to say that this decline in ethnic cohesion does not justify the claim that ethnicity disappears altogether:

...the findings show only a decline in cohesion, not its disappearance. In point of fact, in none of the groups have all kinds of ethnic ties disappeared altogether by the third generation. From certain points of view, this may be a most significant fact. Whether the long-term outcome of change is a complete dissolution [of ethnicity] is inevitable, it will take a very long time indeed. Five or six generations after the time of the last wave of immigration translates into more than a
century. If ethnic communities tend to survive for periods of one hundred years or two hundred years, then, from the point of view of contemporary society, they are permanent facts of life, as permanent as most other variable features of social structure.\textsuperscript{45}

One possible shortcoming of Reitz's study is that the only 'visible minority' that he appeared to have included in his study was the Chinese. Consequently, the majority of groups he looked at were of European origin. These groups, with a few exceptions, do not migrate to Canada now in large numbers. Furthermore, the treatment they received historically was quite different from the treatment that visible immigrant groups received. As Appendix A shows, the majority of new Canadians who have come after the Sixties are from non-traditional, Third World countries. As his study noted with the Chinese, these visible ethnic groups (South Asians, Afro-Caribbean groups, and East Asians) may have higher rates or retention. Nevertheless, his study shows that ethnicity does exist within cultural groups even after several generations.

What Herberg and Reitz show through their studies is that while ethnicity may decline (periodically, as Herberg shows in terms of language retention), consequently fooling some observers, it does not disappear so easily. Other cultural traits and identifiers beyond language, such as religion, also seem to persist. Thus, ethnicity remains a factor in the political process, certainly in Canada and in the United States.

Porter's explanation of the management of diversity in the United States and Canada holds merit in that similarities do exist. However, they exist in a way contrary to what he states. Porter believes that ethnicity diminishes within a 'melting pot' in Canada (whether or not Canada recognizes itself as a melting pot) as it does in the United States. Evidence shows the opposite; that ethnicity has survived within American society as it does within Canadian society. Contrary to predictions in the 1950s, ethnicity has not disappeared from the American social landscape. Its
persistence has made itself an important factor in public policy discussions. Furthermore, a 1989 Decima survey which compared attitudes of both Americans and Canadians to the retention of culture found that Americans favour cultural retention more than Canadians. Reitz and Breton showed in their 1994 study that no clear indication existed to show that ethnic origin had more salience for Canadians than it did for Americans.

In spite of its "melting pot" model, ethnicity is alive and well in the United States as it is in Canada. The idea that assimilation necessarily leads to a unified national society does not prove valid in the example of the United States. Ethnic groups in America may enter periods of latency as will those in Canada. Marcus Lee Hansen took note in 1937 of "the almost universal phenomenon of what the son wishes to forget, the grandson wishes to remember". "Hansen's law", as sociologist Will Herberg called it, became a classic formula for the American experience of immigration and acculturation. This 'law' stated while the first generation of newcomers to America remained attached to their country of origins and its traditions, the second generation tried to assimilate and thus rejected the ways of their immigrant parents. Because they were not fully accepted by older Americans, the second generation was marginal to both societies. Robert E. Park coined this plight of the second generation with the term 'marginal man'. The third generation, secure in their identity as acculturated Americans, would revive interest in their ethnic heritage. Hansen's theory provides a useful model to explain, as Eileen Tamura has in the case of Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, the survival of ethnicity in the United States.

In addition to theory, research has shown how ethnicity has survived in American society. As Paul R. Spickard points out, ethnicity can be measured in terms of shared interests, culture, and institutions. Some ethnic groups, Afro-Americans as an example, are high on all these. Others such as Hispanics, are high
in interests and institutions, but low in shared cultures. Still, other groups such as American Jews rate high on culture, yet low on shared institutions and shared interests. Finally, some groups rate low on all three factors. Italian-Americans illustrate this last case. Yet what appears to be a dying ethnic group may actually be a group that is entering a period of latency: a state of low interests, low culture, and low institutions. As with the Basques in Spain, or with native Hawaiians, Italian-Americans may one day develop a cultural revival or a compelling set of interests that bring their ethnicity into relevance again.

This evidence shows that ethnicity is not dying out or becoming less and less relevant. A final point, related to the first one, is that opponents of the official multiculturalism policy in Canada often point to the United States as an exemplar of how assimilation creates a unified and homogenous society. In reality, such is not the case. Evidence shows that many Americans as well as Canadians identify themselves by ethnic origin. Numerous examples of ethnic institutions exist in the United States: The United Farm Workers for Mexican Labourers, the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in San Francisco for Chinese Americans, Hadassah for Jewish women, The Daughters of the American Revolution for Anglo-American women, and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People.

But Canadian critics such as Reginald Bibby often see Americans as more committed to the nation, family, community, and religion than are Canadians as they have no such official policy as multiculturalism.

Why does ethnicity persist in our society? Anderson and Frideres outline a number of reasons for this: the visibility of a particular group may cause the larger society to view it as 'different', continued immigration may keep culture alive in a particular group, and the geographical proximity of individuals of a particular group to each other. That is, groups may stay close together, as the case of the Chinese in Toronto's Chinatown, or the
existence of Finntown on Bay Street in Thunder Bay for Canadians of Finnish origin would illustrate. Ethnicity may also survive due to various demographic factors: the length of time in Canada, the education level, the occupations of members, the degree of upward mobility, the number of senior members, and the number of women (as women often emphasize culture more than men) -- may prolong a group's cultural survival.  

In review, this section has shown how ethnicity continues to exist as a factor in modern post-industrial societies, in spite of earlier beliefs in its lack of relevance. Furthermore, this existence of ethnicity in Canadian society may not be just because it is sanctioned; we see that it also exists in American society which advocates an E Pluribus Unum doctrine of uniformity. A number of reasons explain the persistence of ethnicity. How, then, does a multiethnic society balance the need for a universal culture with the demand by ethnic groups for recognition?

A Question of Nonrecognition?

The aforementioned quote by John Higham (saying that a multiethnic society can avoid tyranny only through a set of universal values which its groups accept) helps to illustrate the dilemma of reconciling universal values with the recognition of minority rights. Is a set of universal values the best way to maintain stability in a liberal society? By imposing a set of 'universals' on a group, is this not another form of tyranny?

Western liberal tradition has tended to favour individual rights over collective rights. This reflects a Rousseauian approach to politics: Rousseau was suspicious of all social differentiation, and was receptive to homogenizing tendencies that would form a common good.  

Lawmakers in the western liberal democracies assumed that a uniform implementation of individual rights would be sufficient to protect minority rights (the recognition of minority groups, and the right for those groups to practice and preserve
their culture, possibly at state expense). A case in point can be seen in the drafting of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights: U.N. lawmakers deleted all references in this legislation to ethnic and national minorities.\textsuperscript{58} Traditionally, liberals feel that cultural identity, like religion, can be expressed in the private affairs of citizens, but have no place in the concerns of state. While some liberals made an exception by sanctioning affirmative action policies in the United States, other liberal lawmakers think that sanctioning minority rights only serves to make citizens think of each other not as individuals but as members of groups.\textsuperscript{59}.

Individualism calls for the autonomy of the individual. That is, it calls for each person to determine for himself/herself the good life.\textsuperscript{60} In regards to the recognition of minority rights, a traditional liberal form of politics is inhospitable toward this kind of rights because the liberal model insists on an equal application of these rights without exception, and second, collective goals are viewed with suspicion in that they emphasize group rights over minority rights.\textsuperscript{61}

In other words, for individual rights to survive, culture and state had to be separated. By giving official recognition to minority rights, governments would appear to be putting communitarian rights before the rights of individuals. Furthermore, any sanctioning of ethnic identity would imply differential treatment, which could lead to different ethno/cultural groups competing for special status. Such a situation, it was argued, would threaten national unity. Therefore, individualism could not be sacrificed for ethno-cultural rights.

This idea puts two models of equality and respect in conflict. One model believes that the principle of equal respect means we have to treat people in a difference-blind fashion. The other model states that we must recognize and even foster the
particularity of different groups. The reproach that the first model makes to the second is that the latter violates the principle of nondiscrimination, while the reproach of the second model to the first one is that the former negates identity by forcing people into a homogenous role that is untrue to them in the name of equality. To add to this second reproach, the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles to which all individuals are to conform in the first model are in fact a reflection of the values of the hegemonic culture. Minorities are thus forced to take on an alien form in order to conform.

The above discussion reflects on a traditional model of liberalism. In reality, some western-liberal democracies have given recognition to cultural and minority rights in different ways. Affirmative action policies in the United States would be one example, as would be the official recognition of multiculturalism in Canada. These measures, however, have not been spared criticisms based on the aforementioned classic view of liberal rights. Robert Fulford directs such a criticism towards official multiculturalism in Canada:

> By emphasizing race, multiculturalism tries to freeze us into ethnic categories that may express only the least important qualities of the individual... Government policy should never for a moment even hint that one choice is more desirable than the other.

This rationale begs a number of questions: how, then, does the liberal model accommodate individuals who identify themselves in collective terms? That is, how does liberalism deal with those who choose (as individuals presumably have a right to) to unite with others of similar traits? In response, liberals reasoned that if immigrants voluntarily came to a western nation such as Canada, they knew what would be expected of them. As we have seen, the ethnicity of minority groups has not disappeared in western societies as some assumed it would. As John Rawls states, the ties of culture are often too strong to expect newcomers to give them
up, even if they come voluntarily. Canadian history is replete with examples that bear out this statement, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. Cultural membership plays a role in self identity of the individual. Margalit and Raz state that ethnic identity is particularly suited to serving as the core of personal identification as it is based on belonging, not accomplishment:

Identification is more secure, less liable to be threatened, if it does not depend on accomplishment. Although accomplishments play their role in people's sense of their own identity, it would seem that at the most fundamental level our sense of our own identity depends on criteria of belonging rather than on those of accomplishment. Secure identification at that level is particularly important to one's being.

This criterion, according to Ignatieff, explains the tenets behind ethnic nationalism: that a nation is composed not of shared rights, but of pre-existing characteristics: language, religion, customs, and traditions. Cultural identity provides an anchor for peoples' self-identity. This means that a people's self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which their national group is held. If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened. Cultural components can give a group a sense of pride and community that modernized societies can leave unfulfilled.

Charles Taylor notes that the problem with the liberal model of universalism is that it leads to nonrecognition. That is, to make all groups and individuals conform to a uniform "difference-blind" code is to eliminate the particulars that give a group a sense of unity and distinctiveness. In the western nations, this homogenizing code is, in fact, a code which reflects the values of North Atlantic civilization. Universalism does not accommodate the pre-existing characteristics (mentioned above) that a group of individuals might take comfort in. Nonrecognition can be harmful; it is a form of oppression that can entrap someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.
How does nonrecognition come to the level of harm? To quote Franz Fanon, the main weapon of the colonizers (or in this case, the established majority) is the imposition of their image of the colonized on the subjugated people (the ethno/cultural minority group). In order to be free, the subjugated people must purge themselves of all deprecating self-images. In other words, the liberal notion of universalism may not in fact be so 'colour-blind' as it appears. It may actually be a subtle form of assimilation. While common citizenship has its advantages, it alone is insufficient to integrate heterogeneous groups into a society. Few nations actually follow a strict common citizenship strategy, as it means that the dominant culture makes its own culture and language the official culture and language of the entire nation. Minorities then become vulnerable to the majority's political and economic decisions. Even in the former communist states of the Eastern bloc, in which the socialist doctrine saw ethnicity as a hindrance to the political struggle, the Soviet government implemented a system of language rights and national autonomy for minorities in the Eastern European satellite nations, to at least give the appearance of tolerance.

Does an answer to this problem require an eradication of liberal thought, or a re-thinking of it? Western-liberal societies need to consider the fact that collective rights already exist in our society in the form of rights for trade unions and corporations, and environmental rights. Kymlicka argues that minority rights are consistent with individual freedom, and can promote it. Minority rights can eliminate inequalities by addressing the fact that some groups are disadvantaged in the cultural and economic marketplace. In the competition for resources, members of some groups may be outbid by those of other groups because of a lack of influence. That is, some groups may lack the skills and influence needed to 'make it' in a society. The 'benign neglect' notion (or the idea of a 'level playing field') ignores the fact
that some groups (such as the aboriginals) are already at a disadvantage.\textsuperscript{77}

Contrary to traditional liberal thought, human rights are unable to resolve the most important questions relating to cultural minorities. For example, should ethnic groups have publicly-funded education in their mother tongue? Can a minority group, such as a First Nations group, control a particular region? In order to deal with these issues, governments can supplement traditional human rights with minority rights.\textsuperscript{78}

This explanation of the dangers of nonrecognition and the need to supplement the traditional liberal paradigm of individual rights is given to explain the rationale and justification behind multicultural policy as practised today in Canada. Multiculturalism is an attempt to expand the list of human, economic, and civil rights to include protection for minority groups. This knowledge is crucial, considering the opposition and misunderstandings that multicultural policy can create not only from conservatives, but from liberals as well. These 'liberal' criticisms of multiculturalism are often consistent with those made by conservatives. For example, both Richard Gwyn and the Reform Party, while ideologically separate, claim that multicultural policy contributes to a breakdown in national cohesion by giving minority groups the idea that they need not assert their loyalty to the nation. Furthermore, conservative sources such as The Western Report often quote non-conservatives such as Neil Bissoondath to support their case against minority rights. Hence, in order to challenge the very basic assumptions which constitute the backlash, one needs to understand how pluralist rights are not inconsistent with individual rights which are the foundations for western-liberal societies and their laws.

A final point to make is that many assume that collective rights inherently conflict with individual rights. This assumption shows the necessity of distinguishing between two kinds of collective
rights: internal restrictions and external protections. Internal restrictions enable a state or province to limit the rights of its members in order to maintain strongly-held cultural goals. The streaming of non-Anglo/non-French (allophone) children in Quebec into French-language schools against their will in the Sixties is an example of such. External protections limit the power exercised by larger society over the group, and are not a threat to individual rights. Section 27 of the Charter of Rights, which recognizes the multicultural nature of Canadian society, is often used in conjunction with section 2, which outlines fundamental freedoms, and section 15, which contains individual protections. These laws have been cited to protect individual rights such as freedom of religion in court cases permitting turbans in the R.C.M.P., Sunday store closings, and the use of prayer in public schools (these will be explained in greater detail in chapter three). A multicultural policy must concentrate on external protections. Kymlicka insists that external protections can assist rather than impede a minority group's integration into the larger society. As cultures become more open (that is, more people can question whether or not their culture is the best life), people share that culture's bonds less and relate more to people from other liberated cultures. That is, in contemporary society people start to relate less to their own culture, and begin to share bonds with individuals from cultures different from their own.

Now, I proceed to discuss Canadian nativism: its background, ideological foundations, and why it is opposed to recognition of other ethno/cultural groups within the larger society.

Nativism and the 'new' conservatism

Nativism, as defined by John Higham, is an "intense opposition to a minority on the grounds of its foreign connection". Richard Hofstader defines nativism as: "a belief system forged out of
conjunction of nationalism with ethno-cultural, religious, and/or racial prejudice". Essentially, what these definitions stress is that nativism is a form of nationalist group identity which defines itself in the form of hostility towards groups unlike itself.

According to Palmer, Canadians have tended to look at nativism as an American malady. But evidence shows that it was also endemic in Canada, albeit less virulent and violent. Just as in the United States, Canadian nativism could be divided into three strands: Anglo-Saxon nativism, anti-Roman Catholic nativism, and anti-radical nativism. All three provided the basis of most anti-immigration sentiment. Each of these strands, however, had a slightly different origin in Canada. In regards to anti-radical nativism, for example, American nativists saw the violence of labour unionists as 'un-American'. American anti-radicalism stemmed from a liberal tradition, whereas in Canada, this form of nativism stemmed from basic conservative values and from politicians who emphasized order before liberty.

Both Canadian and American nativism was not limited to these three strands. During both world wars, nativists rallied against enemy aliens (Germans and Ukrainians in World War One, Germans and Japanese in World War Two), regardless of the race, religion, or political ideology of the targeted group.

Historically, anti-Catholic nativism was somewhat complicated in the Canadian context. Many Catholics were French, and the existence of French Canada (and of the French as one of the founding European groups in Canada) gave these Catholics a greater sense of legitimacy. This, however, did not stop nativists from attacking other Catholics or immigrants. Bishop Lloyd of the Anglican church in Saskatchewan in the 1920s, for example, saw the migration of Scottish Catholics as a Vatican plot to take over western Canada.

Anglo-Saxon nativism took the view that Anglo-Canadian 'stock' was threatened by the increasing number of non-Anglo immigrants.
The nativists saw two ways of dealing with the 'threat' that these immigrants posed: assimilation, exclusion, or both. Such sentiments reflected in the thinking and policies of groups such as the Orange Order, the Canadian Legion, the Native Sons of Canada, the Ku Klux Klan, and the National Association of Canada.

Nativism can also express itself in the form of populism. Populism, as defined by Trevor Harrison, is an attempt to create a mass political movement, mobilized around symbols and traditions congruent with popular culture, which expresses a group's sense of being threatened, arising from presumably powerful 'outside' elements and directed at its perceived 'peoplehood'. Populist political parties, therefore, attempt to create a mass movement by mobilizing around these symbols. This tactic is often used by those preaching an anti-immigration stance. Doug Collins, for example, centred his arguments in 1979 around the idea that the federal government under the Liberals in the sixties and seventies overlooked the wishes of the majority of Canadians by allowing for non-traditional immigrants to come in large numbers,

For if ever a political party sold itself and the future of a country for the sake of ethnic votes, it was the Liberals in the period 1967-'72, and they are still doing it.

The populist element in this idea is that English Canadians are against the influx on non-white immigrants, and they have been betrayed by their government which allows for such immigration. In other words, the central authority is not listening to the people. Collins claims that of dozens of polls taken, not one shows majority support for non-white immigration.

Harrison states that this appeal to populist parties and movements is an appeal to a socially-constructed notion of a 'people' whose survival is threatened by outside forces. To many of Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-Celtic origin within the Canadian population, certain recent events represent the decline of their autonomy as a people: the use of hyphenization by Canadians in referring to
their identity which suggests a dual heritage, the change to a non-sectarian prayer in the House of Commons, and the Quebec referendum in 1995 (in which nationalists hoped that Quebecois would vote to establish a sovereign state). These contemporary events are perceived as just the latest in a series of events over the years that have given Anglo culture a sense of plight: the adoption of a new flag in the sixties, the changes to immigration flows in the same decade that opened the door to migrants from Third World countries, and the rise of Quebec nationalism that led to the 1969 federal Official Languages Act, all of which did not represent elements of Anglo-British culture.\textsuperscript{94}

Consider this statement by the leader of the Reform Party, Preston Manning, on the question of Quebec and Aboriginal issues:

Reformers believe that going down the special status road has led to the creation of two full-blown separatist movements in Quebec and to the proposal of the Quebec Liberals to emasculate the federal government as the price of keeping Quebec in a non-confederation. It has led to desires and claims for "nation-status" on the part of thousands of aboriginal groups, claims which, if based on racial, linguistic, and cultural distinctiveness, are just as valid as those of Quebecois, if not more so. It has led to a hyphenated Canadianism that emphasizes our differences and downplays our common ground by labelling us English-Canadians, French-Canadians, aboriginal-Canadians, or ethnic Canadians -- but never Canadians, period.\textsuperscript{95}

Within this statement lies the rationale behind Canadian nativism. Canada was in crisis because of "special interests". After the Quebec nationalists demanded and received their special rights, other minority groups began to do the same with the hope of achieving the same status. All this was done at the expense of the Anglophone majority, presumably in that these interests supposedly led to a fragmentation in Canadian identity.

Harrison's explanation helps to highlight the rationale for the nativist backlash against multiculturalism. It follows that any policy of cultural pluralism threatens the Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-Celtic hegemony. We have already seen this reasoning used in the writings
of Reginald Bibby. Doug Collins, writing in 1979, also believed that the decline in Anglo-Canadian influence had led to an increasing plethora of social problems in Canada:

Until fifteen years ago it was commonplace that Canada was a peaceful, law-abiding country. Nor, up to that time, did immigrants disturb that reputation; most immigrants came from law-abiding countries, shared a common Anglo-European heritage, were courageous and resourceful enough to come under their own steam, and entered legally.96

Editor Link Byfield of The Western Report and The British Columbia Report, for example, uses the recent problems in Vancouver and Edmonton involving violent crime among non-white youths to point out the problem of allowing in immigrants from non-traditional sources. As he sees it, between 1900 and 1970, people from dozens of cultures who came to Canada were 'Canadianized'. Most of them were European and white, and many brought ethnic hatreds. Yet after one generation in Canada, they were all happy. The problem, states Byfield, came in the seventies with the 'illusory' (my emphasis) notion of 'rights' and 'fairness' (his emphasis). Within one generation, Canadians became foolish and distracted by issues like 'tolerance'.97 To make things worse, immigration portals were opened to other races: "It is a simple fact of history that racial mixing is a dangerous business, even for a strong and self-assertive culture that knows its own mind".98

Byfield's comments illustrate the mentality of seeing Canada in a crisis due to special rights given to minority groups. It also shows the appeal that nativists make to a "glorious past"; a time when Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-Celtic groups claimed Canada, and other European groups who came would assimilate into this culture. In other words, the nation was more homogenous, and therefore more harmonious. On this basis, asserts Byfield, "we built one of the most free and prosperous nations in human history".99

This romanticized view of Canadian history omits some glaring exceptions. The assimilation process in Canadian history hardly
suggests a smooth process. Assimilation often involved legislative and military pressures: the military conquest of aboriginal and Metis in the Red River and Northwest rebellions of 1870 and 1885, the illegal abrogation of rights of the French and Roman Catholic minorities in Manitoba and the Northwest Territories (later known as Saskatchewan and Alberta) between 1890 and 1892, and the expulsion of the Acadians from the east coast in 1755 when they would not pledge an oath of allegiance to the British crown.

Thus, Manning's assertions of the threat to Canada due to the granting of special status to non-Anglo groups are by no means isolated. They are the foundation of Anglo-Canadian nativism.

What makes Anglo-Canadian nativism peculiar in Canada? Historically, Canadian identity was framed within the context of British and American imperialism. After World War Two, Britain's influence on Canadian life began to lessen while that of the United States was on the rise. The 1965 flag debate illustrated the continuing ties that imperial nationalists felt with the British empire. Many, led by Tory leader John Diefenbaker, opposed the new flag as it did not include the Union Jack, the traditional symbol of Britain. In the late Sixties, factors such as the American intervention in Vietnam and the civil rights struggle led to a push in Canada away from the American model. Canadian nationalism began to carve out a distinctive Canadian identity based on economic nationalism. Imperial nationalists, however, opposed this move away from the British model of identity. Their allegiance was with Anglo-Saxon cultural institutions, including a belief in liberal democracy and free enterprise. In other words, nativism in Canada tends to fasten its loyalty to the wider Anglo-culture rather than to the territorial definition of Canada.

This appeal to Anglo culture is evident within the ranks of the Reform Party. For example, Reform Party members Stan Waters, William Gairdner, Ted Byfeld, Arthur Child, and Donovan Carter expressed their discontent over the ending of apartheid in South
Africa. This begs the question: why would Reform Party members show support for apartheid, a system based on racial group affiliation? This contradicts Reform Party policy, which espouses individual rights over group rights. This inconsistency can only be explained adequately by accepting the notion that many Reformers strongly identify with 'Anglo' culture.

This appeal to 'Anglo' culture is repeated throughout Canadian history by those who feared changes to the ethnic composition of the Canadian population. R.B. Bennett's 1928 quote ("We earnestly and sincerely believe that the civilization which we call the British civilization is the standard by which we must measure our own civilization...") is one example. A second example would be from R.E. Gosnell, journalist and secretary to several British Columbia premiers, who wrote this in Westward Ho! magazine in 1908:

...this vast and in some respects still unknown country has possibilities in store for it not yet, perhaps, dreamed of... possibilities in short as a greater Britain on the Pacific, where British arts and institutions will expand under British laws and justice will be respected and enforced, and where British men and women will be bred equal to the best traditions of the race.

The appeal to Anglo culture continues to be used by Canadian nativists today. Doug Collins, who attempted to run for office under the Reform Party banner, justifies the restriction of immigrants from Third World countries to Canada as a defence of Anglo-Canadian culture:

The suicidal passion to flood the country with visible minorities must be stopped -- unless whites themselves are to become a visible minority, that is. For, contrary to what Trudeau said, it does matter where the immigrants come from.

Collins accuses the federal government, particularly under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, of intentionally barring those of European origin from entering Canada. The objective of this anti-European campaign, according to Collins, was: "to cut immigration from Britain and Europe and to replace that traditional source of
immigrants with immigrants from Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and South America".  

If the Reform Party is a reflection of traditional English-speaking nativism, then should the Party's leadership and ranks not predominantly be Anglo-Saxon/Celtic and perhaps Protestant? An anecdotal observation of the names of those involved in the Party's formation would suggest so: Brimelow, Brown, Burns, Byfield, Chapman, Fryers, Gray, Grey, and Manning. As for empirical evidence, a 1991 University of Alberta Population Research Laboratory Survey of Alberta residents asked the question, "What is the religious and ethnic background of Reform Party supporters?" It found supporters to consist of Protestants (63%), people of Anglo-Saxon/Celtic heritage (29%), people of European heritage (if one sees this group as not already assimilated: 32%), and 'Canadians' (34%). The majority of those who identified themselves as 'Canadians' were actually from an Anglo-Saxon/Celtic background: 91% identified English as their first language. While this statistical evidence is somewhat limited, the overall pattern of Reform support from those of Anglo-Saxon/Celtic background is a historically-specific pattern of support that one would expect if Reform was appealing on some level to nativist tendencies.

How is the 'new' conservatism relevant to this? David Frum explains that conservatives want to roll back the state not because they envision human beings as selfish individuals who must be left alone to make as much money as they can (as some people define conservatism to mean), but because they see the functions of real communities being usurped by overweening government. This usurpation ends with the citizens ultimately unable to do anything for themselves without the aid of central authorities, as community responsibilities have been transferred to the government. The modern Canadian government, Frum explains, has abrogated to itself the functions of real communities, and is now attacking the very preconditions of the communities' existence: the moral norms that
the communities enforce on their members. The expansion of
government leads to the decay of the old 'obligation culture'.

Charles Ungerleider identifies the 'new' conservatism as an
obstacle to the practice of multiculturalism. This ideology
advocates that individuals are autonomous, albeit unequal, moral
agents who are responsible for the consequences which befall them.
It accepts inequality and emphasizes an individual's own resources
and resourcefulness. Inequality is seen as a natural condition
among people that should be preserved to ensure social and economic
progress. Inequality stimulates competition among individuals who
seek to better their position and expand their share of
resources. In regards to this, two views of conservatism can be
presented. Frum argues that this 'possessive individualism' is
only part of the conservative ideology:

But contemporary Canadian conservatism is only
incidentally concerned with acquisition, and defends
individualism only within limits. At its core is a doctrine
dedicated to the vindication of a good society - and to the
preservation of that society from the ideologies and
interest groups bent on destroying it.

Another point of view within the conservative fold sees any
government attempt to legislate equality as inhibiting progress in
our society. Writer William D. Gairdner, for example, advocates
that the state should not correct imbalances between people. To
correct imbalances, he argues, is to destroy individual
privileges: "The most unfortunate consequence of the top-down
state... springs from the reliance on the notion of individual
egalitarian rights... . These rights are then used by individuals
and interest groups, with the help of various charters, to destroy
the traditional supra-individual privileges of all societal groups"

This philosophy is related to the liberal notion of allowing the
individual to decide for himself/herself on the good life. While
the traditional liberal philosophy fails to account for the fact
that some members of various groups start from a level of disadvantage, the new conservative philosophy acknowledges and accepts this fact as a natural phenomenon.

This acceptance of inequality can be seen as a defence of privilege, an argument on the part of conservatives for elitism. From here, one can establish a connection to nativism. Contemporary nativists oppose multiculturalism because it reinforces the notion that all Canadians are equal in regards to ethnicity. Immigration reinforces the ability of non-charter groups to demand their rights by strength in numbers. Those who support the new conservatism such as the Reform Party may not see themselves as nativists. However, statements made by individual members, and policies that the Party advocates, suggest nativist elements in their thinking. The Party's official policy, for example, calls for the elimination of official multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{120}

The Party's policy also calls for a reduction of yearly immigration levels to 150,000 from the current rate of about 215,000 in any year where the unemployment rate exceeds 10%,\textsuperscript{121} and to deny immigrants social services and health benefits until they become citizens (about three to five years after their arrival).\textsuperscript{122} Individual members of the Reform Party also display nativist tendencies: member Alice White from Alberta warned that "low blacks and low Hispanics" were taking over that province.\textsuperscript{123} John Beck, a Reform candidate in Toronto, stated: "It seems to be predominantly Jewish people who are running this country".\textsuperscript{124} Beck was expelled from the party following the publicity caused by his remarks. Jack Telfer, a B.C. Reform member, stated: "As George Wallace said, 'I have nothing against blacks, I think everyone should have one'".\textsuperscript{125}

Contemporary Canadian nativism is seen in (but not only in) Reform Party doctrine, and in comments made by individual members. Nativism ties Anglo-Canadians to the Anglo-Saxon/Celtic population worldwide. Its proponents, who may not see themselves as nativists, often refer to a romanticized view of the past in order
to make the case for policies that preserve the "Anglo" hegemony in Canadian society. Such policies include the restriction of immigration, especially from Third World countries, and an abolition of multiculturalism.
NOTES


3) John Porter, The Measure of Canadian Society (Toronto: Gage, 1979): 160. This belief assumes that newcomers would shed their particularisms in order to get ahead financially and to scale the socio-economic ladder. Kogila A. Moodley makes a related point, stating that competence, not culture, is the concern of parents from minorities in the education of their children. Therefore, maintaining cultural heritage uncritically through the education system may prove to be a hindrance to the purposes of integrating immigrants into mainstream Canadian society. Kogila A. Moodley, "Multicultural Education in Canada: Historical Development and Current Status", in James A. Banks and Cherry A. McGee Banks (ed.s), Handbook of Research on Multicultural Education (New York: Macmillan, 1995): 816-817.

4) Gus Mitges, Multiculturalism: Building the Canadian Mosaic (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987): 49


6) Ibid., 22.

7) Howard Palmer in Fleras and Elliot: 21.

8) Philip Resnick, Thinking English Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1994): 76.


10) Fleras and Elliot: 314.


12) Ibid., 13.

13) Hollinger: 100.

15) Ibid., 16.


20) Ibid., 187.

21) Ibid., 187.

22) Ibid., 187.

23) Ibid., 191

24) Ibid., 185.


26) Anderson and Frideres, 275. Clearly, Anderson and Frideres have a different understanding of assimilation, as they consider it synonymous with cultural pluralism. For my purposes, I will define these terms as two very different concepts. I see cultural pluralism as more associated with John Berry's definition of 'integration', as it allows for the existence of other cultural practices within parameters, whereas assimilation demands conformity.


28) Philip Gleason makes a similar statement in discussing the meaning of 'melting pot' in the United States (Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 'Melting pot' suggests that immigrants should will their own assimilation (p.10). Yet many Americans think this model upholds the ideals of cultural pluralism: openness towards immigrants and their cultural values.
and the belief in inclusion of all groups (p. 26). This shows that this confusion over what these terms mean is not only a problem in Canada, but elsewhere as well.


31) Ibid., 31.


35) Porter, 143.

36) Ibid., 158. Porter may have actually been mistaken in suggesting the existence of a vertical mosaic in Canadian society. In a study of Porter's methodology and measures, Richard Ogmundsen found the results to be faulty. Therefore, he suggests, Porter's entire body of thought may be mistaken. Furthermore, a number of studies concerning the trends in ethnic origins of Canadian elites from a disparate group of sociologists, political scientists, and journalists came up with very different conclusions. These studies showed that 'third ethnic group' Canadians had been represented in political, economic, and social elites. Richard Ogmundsen, "At the Top of the Mosaic: Doubts About the Data", The American Review of Canadian Studies, 23:3 (Autumn 1993): 382-383.


38) Ibid., 80.


41) Berry and Laponce, 3.
42) Ibid., 3.


45) Ibid., 232.


48) Ibid., 61. By examining the results of various studies in Canada and The United States regarding ethnic salience through individuals' knowledge of ancestry and the extent to which individuals identified with a particular group, intermarriage, multiple origins of individuals, linguistic retention, and social interaction and activities, Reitz and Breton concluded that for both Canadians and Americans, ethnicity become largely symbolic over several generations of living in their respective nations.


50) Ibid., 20.


52) Ibid.; 168.

53) Ibid., 162.

54) Ibid., 161.
55) Bibby, 93.
59) Ibid., 3-4.
61) Ibid., 60.
64) Kymlicka, 62.
65) Rawls in Kymlicka, 87.
67) Ignatieff, 4.
68) Kymlicka, 89.
72) Ibid., 65.
73) Kymlicka, 183.
74) Ibid., 71-72.
75) Ibid., 35.
77) Ibid., 110.
78) Ibid., 4-5.
79) Ibid., 7.
80) Ibid., 87.
81) Higham in Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, 6.
84) Ibid., 3.
86) Ibid., 2.
88) Palmer, Nativism in Alberta, 11
89) Ibid., 1.
90) Harrison, 5.
93) Harrison, 139.
94) Ibid., 19.
95) Ibid., 163.
96) Collins, Destruction, 63.
98) Ibid., 7.
99) Ibid., 7.
101) Ibid., 82-83, 136.
102) Brendan O'Donnell, Chronicles of Milestones in Canadian Multiculturalism (Ottawa: Department of the Secretary of State, 1987): 5.
104) Ibid., 376, 378. Canada's opposition to America's intervention in the Vietnam war was made clear by former Prime Minister Lester Pearson's Philadelphia speech in which he suggested a halt to American bombing of North Vietnam (p. 378). Granatstein et. al. give the example of economic nationalism in Minister of Finance Walter Gordon's attempt in the sixties to make Canada's economy more independent of the United States by limiting American investment in Canada (p. 376).
105) Harrison, 166.
106) Stan Waters stated his misgivings about the ending of apartheid in this way: "If history has any parallelism, you might find a very serious problem emerging in South Africa which may dwarf the objectionable features of the current administration... . I always ask (former External Affairs Minister) Joe Clark, if South Africa is going to change, what black nation, do you want it to imitate? Most of them are despotic presidents for life in almost every case". Brian Laghi, "Waters Wary of Black Rule in Africa", The Edmonton Journal (October 29 1989): A7. In his book The Trouble With Canada: A Citizen Speaks Out (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Company Ltd., 1990), William Gairdner wrote in a similar
fashion, "I have no problem with anyone disliking apartheid... . But it pales in comparison with the human rights infractions in just about every black nation... . So why the selective morality from Canadians (?)" (p.266-267). Donovan Carter was identified as a paid agent of the South African embassy in a television report ("The Persuaders", The Fifth Estate, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, November 14 1989: in Dobbin). Murray Dobbin also notes the support shown for South Africa by Reform members Arthur Child and Ted Byfeld Murray Dobbin, Preston Manning and the Reform Party (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1991): 93, 103.

107) Harrison, 171.


111) Collins, Destruction, 29.

112) Harrison, 168.

113) Ibid., 168-169.

114) Ibid., 169.


118) Frum, 8.


124) Ibid., 50.

125) Ibid., 50.
Multiculturalism has killed our Canadian culture. Thirty or forty years ago, we had a Canadian culture and everyone knew it. Now immigrants have their own little communities, their own little worlds... when they get here, they try to make Canada into whatever they left.¹

-Don Cherry, hockey commentator

And what I can say, what many of us "ethnics" have been quietly saying for years, is that we are sick of newcomers demanding that Canada adopt their customs and their languages, rather than the other way around.²

-Sonja Sinclair, free-lance writer

The Nineties has become a decade of backlash against the policy of multiculturalism in Canada. This phenomenon is part of a worldwide 'anti-immigrant' trend. The economic recession and the decline of the power of the nation-state in the post-cold war era have led to a general feeling of insecurity among populations of the western-liberal nations. As a result, neo-conservative and ultra-conservative forces have been able to capitalize on this fear of change in order to promote their agenda of immigrant restriction, revocation of legal accommodations for minority groups, and in some cases, such as in France, immigrant expulsion.

The anti-multicultural wave in Canada, however, is not the property solely of the conservative right. Those of a non-conservative nature have joined the call to end multiculturalism as well. Commentator Richard Gwyn has called multiculturalism "a slush fund to buy ethnic votes"³ He has been joined by individual members of minority and immigrant groups, the very people multicultural policy was supposed to benefit (assuming it is only for minorities).

What are the arguments against multiculturalism? Are they representative of the actual state of ethnic relations and ethnic integration in contemporary Canadian society? The purpose of this chapter is to examine and critically analyze the popular claims
both for and against multiculturalism. In spite of ideological differences, critics often make similar arguments against this policy. Thus I will group these arguments and state who their claimants are. This chapter will concentrate primarily on the arguments of Richard Gwyn, Neil Bissoondath, and Margaret Cannon, as well as conservative critics such as Doug Collins, William Gairdner, and other members of the Reform Party.

The outline of this chapter is as follows: Part One will briefly examine the history of multicultural policy in Canada. This examination is essential, as it helps to assess the validity of some of the attacks on multicultural policy. Part Two will identify who the critics are and which areas they represent: the academic sphere, the media, ethno/cultural groups, the conservative right, and various political parties. Part Three will identify and test the various criticisms of this policy.

This chapter will concentrate on the arguments themselves. If I am to prove that these criticisms about multiculturalism are manifestations of nationalism, I have to examine the accuracy of the criticisms being made. For this purpose, the information given in Chapter Two -- the reasons for the persistence of ethnicity in modern society, the need for cultural rights in the liberal framework, and the difficulty in assimilating a group of people -- will help in this analysis.

**History of the Canadian Policy of Multiculturalism**

Most critics consider the birth of multiculturalism as being in 1971. Some make the mistake of saying that the Multiculturalism Act was passed this year. For example, Neil Bissoondath faults former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau for a particular section of the Multiculturalism Act which he cites. This reference is a mistake on Bissoondath's part: Trudeau introduced a multicultural policy in 1971. The Multicultural Act was not passed until seventeen years later under the government of Brian Mulroney.

This error explains the difference in interpretation:
multiculturalism was officially recognized in 1971, but the Multiculturalism Act was not passed into law until 1988. This example highlights the fact that for many critics, 1971 is the initiation point for multiculturalism. By stating that multiculturalism began in this time period is to place the policy in the context of the 1960s and 1970s with that decade's emphasis on human rights and justice. As Reform M.P. Keith Martin (Esquimalt-Jean de Fuca) said: "Multiculturalism has its roots in that 1960s flower-child, socialistic attitude that looks at the past with a sense of shame". This interpretation also allows critics to refer to the "villain" Pierre Trudeau's policies as the source of the multicultural policy. It also helps critics place multiculturalism in the context of the recognition of official biculturalism. This is justified in part due to the fact that the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism recommended multiculturalism within a bilingual framework in Book 4 of its report, The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups. The year 1971 is important for some critics as it justifies the idea that multiculturalism replaced the 'two nations' concept of biculturalism in the Sixties. Consequently, multiculturalism is seen as a policy that was implemented not so much to recognize the plurality of Canadian society, but rather to defeat the two-nation concept in which Quebecois chose to see themselves within the context of Canada. Both of these views help justify critiques of multicultural policy as being a 'top-down' policy created by the elite rather than by the grass-roots of society, and the unnatural concept of 'tolerance' that replaced assimilation as the means to incorporate minorities into Canadian society, and as a cynical policy used to 'buy ethnic votes' and to reduce Quebec to the status of other minority groups.

The announcement of the official policy of multiculturalism in 1971, according to Fleras and Elliot, was given little attention in the media. Key elements of the policy that were included were that there would be no official culture even though French and English
would be the official languages, no ethnic group would take precedence over any other, and that the government would take action to ensure freedom of choice in the overcoming of "cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society". Trudeau listed the four broad objectives of the policy: 1) assistance to cultural groups to retain and foster their identity, 2) to assist cultural groups in overcoming barriers to full participation in society, 3) to promote cultural interchange among all Canadian cultural groups, and 4) to assist immigrants in acquiring at least one official language.

According to Fleras and Elliot, Trudeau's announcement appeared on the surface to encourage the retention and promotion of ethnic groups and communities. Yet a closer reading reveals the opposite: the announcement did not endorse the establishment of separate communities and parallel minority institutions. The policy dissuaded minorities from establishing groups and institutions at variance with French and English structures. Trudeau's policy aimed at the involvement and participation of ethnic minorities in mainstream institutions, without denying them the right to identify with select elements of their cultural past if they so chose. Critics of multiculturalism often interpret the 'cultural retention' aspects of the policy as being synonymous with challenging and diluting Canada's national identity. Their view leads them to conclude that multiculturalism means that minority groups can re-create their 'old world' culture in Canada without having to integrate into the larger society. As Fleras and Elliot state, such provisions did not exist in the policy. In fact, it encouraged the incorporation of minority groups into mainstream society.

The passage of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988 by unanimous vote in the House of Commons made Canada the first country to pass a national multiculturalism law. The Act acknowledged multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society with an integral role in the decision-making process. The
new law sought to assist with cultural and language preservation, to reduce discrimination, to enhance intercultural awareness and understanding, and to promote culturally-sensitive institutional change at federal levels. While the Multiculturalism Directorate of the federal government has existed since 1972, it has merged with other directorates under the Department of Canadian Heritage in the nineties.

Provincial governments have recognized multiculturalism in a variety of ways. As education is a provincial responsibility in Canadian public policy, provincial governments promote multiculturalism through education in one or more of the following ways:

1) English as a Second Language (ESL) programmes for new arrivals
2) Nonofficial language (heritage language) instruction. These classes are designed to teach a specific ethnic language. Requests for these courses often originate from the interested ethnic group.
3) Programmes aimed at discouraging and eradicating racism. An example would be the 'Alternatives to Racism' project in British Columbia.
4) Cultural and historical information transmitted through the social studies curriculum. Some municipalities, such as Ontario, offer separate courses in multiculturalism.

Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta have policies of supporting multiculturalism, and have taken steps to put them into practice. Ontario has promoted multicultural education through its Heritage Languages Programme. The Ministry of Education has also provided courses for teachers, and implemented guidelines for textbook publishers. Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan have all implemented integrated language programmes. Alberta, for example, has at least ten bilingual schools using languages such as Ukrainian and German. British Columbian passed its own Multiculturalism Act in 1993. However, multicultural policies in the province have tended to be remedial 'band-aid' responses, according to one scholar.
Quebec does not recognize multiculturalism per se, but follows a policy of interculturalisme. This programme takes into account the plurality of Quebec society, but also recognizes the perennial 'French fact': that all Quebecois are, and must be, united by the French language. The Quebec government has taken steps to preserve minority cultures by implementing programmes such as P.E.L.O. (Programme for Original Languages) which promotes the teaching of non-official languages.

Provincial policies of multiculturalism are worth noting because provincial policies are often responses to federal initiatives. Historically, provincial governments have in some cases responded against federal provisions for specific minority groups. The response by the British Columbian government towards Doukhobors in the first half of the twentieth century, and the restrictions in Manitoba which disallowed Menonites from educating their children in separate schools in the late nineteenth century, are two such cases. Furthermore, the backlash is present at the provincial level as well. The Mike Harris government, for example, repealed legislation such as the Job Equity Act in Ontario, while the Klein government in Alberta is dismantling its multicultural legislation.

Another area which highlights the importance of understanding federal-provincial differences in regards to the backlash against multicultural policies is in the way some critics of multiculturalism view the management of heterogeneity in Quebec. Critics of federal multicultural policy such as Bissoondath often look to Quebec's policy of management of heterogeneity as an alternative whose example English Canada should follow. This idea of the 'Quebec exemplar' is based on the assumption the interculturalisme model is significantly different from multiculturalism, and that Quebec is more successful in integrating its immigrants. I will discuss and challenge these assumptions later.

As already mentioned, a basic knowledge of the history of
multicultural policy is essential in order to understand and judge the validity of its criticisms. Those criticisms come from several different sources. While the critics themselves make arguments against multiculturalism that overlap and/or are based on similar presumptions, they come from different points of view and do not always share the same intentions. Thus, a review of the different forms of critiques and what they represent follows.

Critiques of Multicultural Policy

Since its official inception in 1971, multiculturalism has come under scrutiny from various sectors: Quebec, the aboriginal community, academic critics, popular critics, conservatives, and various critics from political parties.

Quebec has officially and unofficially rejected the multicultural perspective of Canada. Quebec academics saw multiculturalism as undermining Quebec's claim to statehood. According to Guy Rocher, the policy reduced the status of francophones from a 'founding people' to the status of 'other ethnic groups'.

Kenneth McRoberts explains that Quebecois cling to the two-nations concept of Canada. Because of this interpretation, they see multiculturalism as part of Pierre Trudeau's 'national unity' policy, which defines language policy in individualist terms. That is, this policy expresses support for linguistic minorities rather than for a continuation of the two-nations policy implied in the Official Languages Act.

In other words, multiculturalism is thought to have a detrimental impact on the collective identity of the Quebecois. Since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, provincial policies in Quebec in the fields of immigration, language, and 'cultural communities' reflect the primacy of protecting the cultural and linguistic integrity of Quebec. Themes in writings about Quebec on this issue reflect the idea that multiculturalism relativizes culture, and masks the 'national question' that has otherwise dominated federal politics.
Like the Quebecois, First Nations prefer to negotiate within a bicultural framework that recognizes their special status and acknowledges their collective right to differential treatment. As a result, aboriginal people perceive multiculturalism as responsible for lowering the status of aboriginal groups to the level of 'minority' group. They also criticize the policy for denying the unique relationship between the First Nations and the government based on the principles of aboriginal land title and self-determination.  

**Academic Critiques**

Various critics in the academic world have put multiculturalism under scrutiny. John Porter, whose writings were addressed in Chapter Two, criticized multiculturalism for advocating group claims within an essentially individualistic society. By concentrating on cultural rather than social or political concerns, multiculturalism, according to Porter, reflected and reinforced a system of stratification in which members of charter groups occupied the elite positions in society while ethno-racial minority members were relegated to low-status positions. This 'vertical mosaic' made multiculturalism of questionable value in promoting equality. For Porter, assimilation was a better model to achieve equality as it ignored ethnicity and group rights.

Australian academic Brian Bullivant has criticized multiculturalism from a Marxist perspective. Bullivant argued that multiculturalism, in all its confusion, was a subtle way of appearing to give members of ethnocultural groups what they want in education (Bullivant's study focused on issues in education) while in reality giving them little to enhance their life chances. This contradiction was evident in that a large part of multiculturalism was involved only in the celebration of lifestyles.

Bullivant's study of multicultural education in several nations including Canada saw the pluralist notion that democracy's
interests were best served by developing the uniqueness of the individual as naive. For a society to survive, its culture had to be passed on. Hence, individual freedom could not be allowed to endanger the common good.\textsuperscript{30} In other words, multiculturalism could not be allowed to flourish in its true form, as it would threaten national identity. Within a multicultural context, 'knowledge managers' (the agents of cultural transmission: teachers and administrators) control the way knowledge is made accessible to children. In a culturally pluralist society, knowledge managers can control the life chances of children from 'unworthy' ethnic groups by limiting the knowledge transmitted to those children.\textsuperscript{31} In other words, these managers use multiculturalism to prevent children from minority groups from being allowed to integrate and succeed in society.

Katerina Pizanias argues that multiculturalism is just a symbolic representation of Canadian society. She argues that the practice of existing multiculturalism shows the policy to be unicultural and Anglo-conformist. The policy is actually a means of control used to quell dissent in ethnocultural communities.\textsuperscript{32} For example, she cites how at multicultural events such as the Edmonton Heritage Festival, the Chilean and Polish associations were denied the chance to draw attention to the political situation in their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{33}

The theme of multiculturalism as an attempt to de-politicize ethno-cultural relations is also present in the writings of Kogila A. Moodley. She argues that multiculturalism is based on a depoliticized and static definition of ethnicity. Consequently, the policy ignores the real needs of ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{34} Writing in 1983, she pointed to the rise and fall of Quebec nationalism to show how state policy can co-opt ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{35} This view sees ethnic intellectuals as a coopted group who promote multiculturalism out of personal gain and self-interest.\textsuperscript{36}

Moodley's more recent writings suggest a shift in her position on multicultural policy. In 1992, she wrote that ethnic cohesion
has declined everywhere in Canada except in Quebec (acknowledging that francophone nationalism had not been co-opted) due to socio-economic structural changes such as the existence of the welfare state, improved legal status of immigrants, and the socialization and geographic dispersal of ethnic minorities. The problem with multicultural policy was that it focused on a reified, depoliticized and privatized concept of ethnicity. Consequently, it overemphasized lifestyles and neglected actual ethnic inequalities. In 1996, Moodley wrote that multiculturalism policy is not a question of choice or political strategy to be revived and abandoned at will, but a social reality regardless of policy. It would be a prudent government that recognizes this reality, as multiculturalism results from necessity.

Popular Critics

Recently, multiculturalism policy has received a large amount of attention in the mainstream media. With the recession in the Nineties, the increased presence of visible minorities in urban areas, the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, and the general backlash worldwide towards immigrants, multicultural policy has increasingly become the focus of attention in the popular media. A number of commentators suggest that multiculturalism is responsible for a loss of identity in Canada. Reginald Bibby, as mentioned in chapters one and two, states that:

In this country, there will be no pressure, as there is in some other countries, notably the United States -- to discard one's cultural past and conform to the dominant culture. ... Canada may find itself the world leader in promoting the breakdown of group life and the abandonment of the pursuit of the best.

Columnist Richard Gwyn and reporter Margaret Cannon believe that multiculturalism is responsible for the breakdown of national cohesion in Canada. Both of them cite examples of how minority groups have taken advantage of multiculturalism to try and reproduce their mother culture in Canada.
Mainstream critics have been joined by those of immigrant and minority background for whom multicultural policy is seen as a barrier that prevents minority groups from participating in Canadian society. Neil Bissoondath, a Canadian writer of Trinidadian origin, argues that multiculturalism actually hampers, not encourages, integration of immigrants:

Multiculturalism with all of its festivals and its celebrations has done -- and can do -- nothing to foster a factual and clear-minded vision of our neighbours. Depending on stereotype, ensuring that ethnic groups will preserve their distinctiveness in a gentle and insidious form of cultural apartheid, multiculturalism has done little more than lead an already divided country down the path to further social divisiveness.40

While Bissoondath's writings have been popularized in the contemporary media, he is only one in a line of Canadians who have criticized multiculturalism based on their experiences as members of an ethno/cultural minority. These include Laura Labia, Devo-Jaiikoah Dyette, and Bharati Mukherjee. The latter, a former Canadian, gave this warning about multiculturalism: "by preserving differences, (we) preserve biases".41

Do these 'ethnic' critics validate the notion that multiculturalism does little to foster positive ethno/cultural relations in Canada? As I shall show, especially in the case of Bissoondath, other critics have cited members of this group of critics in order to support their arguments. The ethnicity of these observers from minority groups appears to legitimate their claims.

Conservative Critics

Not surprisingly, members of the conservative right oppose the policy and ideology of multiculturalism. With the rise of the New Right in the Eighties, and the anti-pluralist sentiments now being expressed in the popular media, the conservatives have received a new legitimation for their opposition. British Columbia newspaper Doug Collins has since the 1970s attacked multiculturalism for
being, as he saw it, part of Pierre Trudeau's calculated plan to allow in immigrants who would consequently vote for the Liberal Party. Trudeau's supposed plan was to break the traditional immigration pattern and replace it with multiculturalism. A side effect of this policy was that members of "vismins" (Collins' term for 'visible minorities') are appointed to powerful jobs in race relations "so that the natives can be kept in order". He then goes on to give eight examples of members of ethnic minorities who were appointed to such positions: Tom Sosa (Black) as Employment and Immigration Canada's Advisory Board chair, and Dhiru Patel (Indo-Canadian) as head of the Race Relations Unit of the Multiculturalism Directorate, just to name two.

More recently, Collins has been joined by writer and York University professor William D. Gairdner, who often served as keynote speaker to Reform Party leader Preston Manning prior to the 1993 election. Gairdner claims that multiculturalism is based on a contradiction because the essence of family -- assuming society is like a family -- is natural similarity in aspects of food, language, religion, etc. Therefore, a unicultural policy like that of Japan will work because it promotes natural similarities that existed before policy. The problem with multiculturalism, as Gairdner sees it, is that it promotes difference as a means of equality, yet expects us to subordinate these differences. The result is hostility within society, as the Canadian experience is proving. He gives no specific examples.

Writers for the magazine The Western Report frequently fault multiculturalism for the problems they see in Canadian society. For example, an article titled "The Bitter Poison of Multiculturalism" opens with the line: "Anyone who thinks that Canada's multicultural and immigration policies are working fairly smoothly might take a trip to the South Vancouver suburb of Richmond". The article goes on to describe the changes in Richmond: the fact that 30% of the population is now of Asian origin, and the consequent increase in Chinese retail outlets. The
writer does not actually state how these changes constitute a problem, or how they are related to the multicultural policy, but rather just assumes that the situation is problematic in that traditional residents will no longer monopolize the community: "Families who protested the 'Asian invasion' know they are rapidly becoming a minority". 48

Unlike the popular and academic sceptics of multiculturalism, who primarily but not exclusively questioned the policy for its capacity to create a cohesive society and to combat racism, the conservative camp opposes multiculturalism for the potential and real changes the policy can bring about. The policy reduces the amount of power in the hands of traditional groups for which Judeo-Christian ethics and British political institutions hold special value. They see multiculturalism as re-distributing this power to non-traditional groups who presumably have less respect for these institutions, and bring their own values and traditions to Canada. Nevertheless, the conservatives and other critics share much in common: they see the policy as regressive in that it encourages cultural maintenance rather than assimilation, and it has caused Canadians to be divisive and to have little value or loyalty for their nation.

Political Parties

1) The Reform Party: Since 1989, the abolition of multiculturalism has been on the agenda of the Reform Party. In the 1997 federal election campaign, The Reform Party platform included a promise that four major federal government departments, including the Department of Canadian Heritage, "will be significantly reduced in scope, with remaining activities merged into a smaller number of departments". 49 As their 1993 official election policy stated:

The Reform Party supports the principle that individuals or groups are free to preserve their cultural heritage using their own resources. The Party shall uphold their right to do so.
The Reform Party of Canada opposes the current concept of multiculturalism and hyphenated Canadianism pursued by the Government of Canada. We would end funding of the multiculturalism program and support the abolition of the Department of Multiculturalism.50

Before 1991, the Reform Party's statement of principles included the phrases: immigration should not be "explicitly designed to radically or suddenly alter the ethnic makeup of Canada".51 Also included was a statement referring to the change in the R.C.M.P. dress code which would allow Sikhs to wear their turbans: "...the preservation of the distinctive heritage and tradition of the R.C.M.P. by retaining the uniformity of the dress code". Both statements were removed from Reform Party statements after 1991.52

Until recently, the Reform Party is the only official federal party that has stated its opposition to multiculturalism. The Party's executive denies that this is a racially-motivated platform. Former policy officer Stephen Harper claimed that because the party does not have an ethnic base, it is the only party not being influenced by ethnic groups who want a 'race-oriented' immigration policy.53

2) The Progressive Conservative Party: While in office between 1984 and 1992, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his Progressive Conservative Party passed a number of policies that promoted immigration and multiculturalism. Due to the losses of popular support to The Reform Party in western Canada, however, party members introduced certain resolutions at the August 1991 party convention that suggested the Tory platform was moving in the same direction as Reform policy. The resolutions that were accepted suggested a 'crackdown on immigrants' theme: rigorous application of the removal of immigrants who commit crimes or are a medical problem.54 The Party also passed a resolution which calls for the abandonment of multiculturalism in order to try and foster "a common national identity for one people living together in harmony as equal citizens, loyal to the Canadian ideal".55 The party's
1991 convention resolutions also called for the abolishment of the Department of Multiculturalism. Among the rejected resolutions was one calling for the forced return of refugees after their homelands become safe, a five-year restriction on where new immigrants could live in order to keep them out of major urban centres, and one which proposed that stetsons be the sole choice of headgear in the R.C.M.P.\textsuperscript{56}

Both the New Democratic Party and the Liberals have expressed general support for multicultural policy.

General themes emerge from these criticisms. In spite of the fact that criticism comes from different sectors, similarities exist in the statements of those arguing against multiculturalism. Commentators will often cite each other.

Critics such as Bissoondath say the ineptness of multicultural policy is itself responsible for the current backlash.\textsuperscript{57} Is official multiculturalism actually responsible for what some refer to as the current ethno-cultural conflict in Canada? Is Canadian society in fact in a state of ethno-cultural conflict? If the arguments made against multicultural policy are correct, then perhaps the backlash and its calls to end the policy are justified. If the arguments are not correct, then further enquiry into the causes of the backlash are required.
NOTES


6) McFeely, 8.


11) Fleras and Elliot, 73.


13) Cardozo, 30.

14) Fleras and Elliot, 75.


18) Moodley in Banks and McGee Banks, 806.

19) Moodley in Banks and Lynch, 58.

20) Wilson in Samuda et. al., 70.

21) "Ontario to Repeal Joby Equity Act", Financial Post Daily, Article Online, 8:96 (July 20 1995): 5


23) McRoberts, D5.


25) Ibid., 368.

26) Fleras and Elliot, 120.

27) Ibid., 135.


30) Ibid., 8.

31) Ibid., ix.


33) Ibid., 92.

34) Kogila Moodley, "Canadian Multiculturalism as Ideology",

35) Ibid., 327.


39) Bibby, 7,15.

40) Bissoondath, 89-90.


43) Ibid., 16.

44) Ibid., 16.


48) Ibid., 32.

49) Reform Party of Canada. A Fresh Start for Canadians: A 6-Point Plan to Build a Brighter Future Together. (Election Campaign Material, 1997): 7. In its plan to end over-centralization, the Reform Party wants provincial governments to be recognized as the primary providers and guardians of cultural services, and as the

50) Reform Party of Canada. Blue Sheet: Principles, Policies, and Election Platform (1993): 6. Preston Manning explains his Party's stance on multiculturalism in his book The New Canada (Toronto: Macmillan Press, 1992): 317. "The Reform Party believes that cultural development and preservation ought to be the responsibility of individuals, groups, and if necessary in certain cases... the provincial and local governments. The role of the federal government should be neutral toward culture just as it is toward(s) religion".

51) Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, 373.

52) Ibid., 373.


54) Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, 374.

55) Ibid., 374.

56) Ibid., 374.

57) Bissoondath, 71. He cites the failure of multiculturalism in that it eradicated the centre in Canadian politics. That is, it created uncertainty about what it means to be a Canadian, consequently leading to the rise of the Right.
CHAPTER FOUR: ARGUMENTS AGAINST MULTICULTURALISM POLICY

When examining the arguments of those opposed to multiculturalism, several themes emerge:

1) Multiculturalism is a top-down phenomenon with no grounding in Canadian politics prior to 1971;

2) Multiculturalism is unpopular, and never had base support among the general public;

3) Multiculturalism is little more than a patronage policy designed to "buy ethnic votes" and to co-opt those ethnic groups;

4) Multiculturalism limits individuality by putting emphasis on group solidarity;

5) Multiculturalism does nothing to address real day-by-day problems faced by minority groups;

6) Multiculturalism exoticizes culture by concentrating primarily on folk activities;

7) Minorities themselves do not advocate multiculturalism. They themselves would prefer an assimilationist model;

8) Multiculturalism causes ghettoization of minorities by encouraging separateness; and

9) Other models of integration/assimilation -- particularly the Quebec model -- are more effective and appealing than multiculturalism.

1) Multiculturalism is a top-down and unnatural phenomenon with no grounding before 1971:

In the words of William D. Gairdner, the problem of multiculturalism is that it is a top-down imposition on the people, and has no inherent roots in the life of anyone.\(^1\) Margaret Cannon blames the ineffectiveness of pluralism on the idea that "multiculturalism's roots are shallow".\(^2\) Richard Gwyn also states that multiculturalism is a top-down policy, which only a few Canadians (except the Ukrainians on the prairies) wanted when it was first introduced in 1971.\(^3\)
In other words, multiculturalism is a policy imposed by the elite of Canadian society in an attempt at "social engineering". This social engineering, according to Doug Collins, is an attempt by politicians to solve the problem that they created: large-scale immigration of immigrants from the Third World. This interpretation implies that multiculturalism is an unnatural paradigm for managing of diversity. This is evident in that many critics use this argument when making the case for a return to an assimilation-oriented model of diversity. Link Byfield, in his editorial on immigrant crime, tells readers about the time between 1900 and 1970 when newcomers from dozens of different cultures came and were 'Canadianized'. Only in the seventies, with the rise of notions of 'rights' and 'fairness' (of which multiculturalism is presumably a part), did Canada start to head down the road of societal breakdown. This breakdown is evident in the numerous examples of violent crime caused by immigrants which he cites.

As mentioned in Chapter Three, some evidence does exist to support this view, especially if one views multiculturalism as beginning only in 1971. That is, official multiculturalism was brought in at the last minute as a means to include 'Third Force' Canadians in a bilingual definition of the nation. One could also argue that this claim depends on an incomplete view of history. It assumes that cultural pluralism never existed in Canadian history prior to the seventies. It assumes that all people of other cultures that came to Canada always conformed to Anglo-Canadian standards. This situation supposedly led to a harmonious, safe, and hard-working society.

Contrary to the claims of Gairdner and Cannon, multiculturalism does have roots in Canadian history. Cornelius Jaenen identifies seven historical factors which have contributed to the present multicultural definition of Canada. One, Canada is a product of two colonializing movements: English and French. Two, Canada was originally a British -- not English -- nation. The British themselves are a diverse group. Thus they seek uniformity by
recognizing political institutions such as the Monarchy rather than cultural and linguistic ones. Three, Canada has a long tradition of cooperation, not separation, of church and state. This has led to the tolerance of religious liberty and the enhancement of minority rights. Four, education is a jurisdiction of provincial governments, thus allowing for local particularisms and regional diversity. Five, Quebec's dissatisfaction with federal affairs after World War Two had led to the call for the tolerance of other cultures. Six, the post-World War Two immigration wave has led to the diverse nature (both multiracial and multiethnic) of Canadian society. Finally, the demand for cultural rights (which originated in the United States in the sixties due to the failure of the melting pot paradigm), is only a natural follow-up in the framework of individual rights in the realms of politics and economics.

Jaenen shows that the idea of tolerance between ethnic groups is more than official policy. It is an ethos that is present in the history of this country, albeit not always consistently.

One could make the case that only assimilation policies existed in our history. One could also show how policies of exclusion and assimilation towards Asians, Blacks, Jews, and aboriginals ostracized these groups from mainstream society. However, to say that this is the only way societal heterogeneity was dealt with in Canadian history prior to 1971 is false. A number of examples show how accommodation of minority groups was part of the policy-making process in Canada. While it was restricted largely to European groups, these groups themselves were heterogeneous, and often at odds with each other. These compromises were sometimes made against the will of the majority. The emancipation of Jews in Lower Canada in 1832, against the wishes of the Roman Catholic majority in the assembly, is one such example. Egerton Ryerson, in his attempt to establish a system of public schooling in Canada West (now Ontario) in the nineteenth century, found he could not get his wish of a unitary public education system under non-denominational principles. While the population that this school
system was meant to serve was overwhelmingly Christian, it was divided into many denominations. Even the two main denominations, Catholics and Protestants, were divided into sub-groups. Ryerson had to find common ground with the Roman Catholics, and therefore he conceded to public school rights to Roman Catholics by making provisions for separate schooling. In fact, three kinds of separate schools existed in Canada West at the time of Confederation. These were "public schools of a special nature" which allowed for education in languages such as French, German, Gaelic, and Algonquin; schools for particular racial groups such as blacks who requested separate schools after their children were either rejected or ejected from common schools; and schools for special denominational groups such as Roman Catholics and Protestants.

The lesson here for the contemporary debate on multiculturalism is that the claim that this policy originated only in 1971, and was imposed on the people, is based on a particular view of history. Critics assert that this policy of tolerance was instituted due to the rise of non-traditional immigration from the late sixties onwards as evidenced by Byfield's comment about how most of the immigrants who came at the time of assimilation between 1900 and 1970 were white, and by Collins' claim that multiculturalism is the politicians' attempt to clean up the 'mistake' of the opening of the immigration portals to Third World nations. This suggests a nativist sentiment of a 'unified white people' with a proud history before the arrival of non-white newcomers who endangered the fabric of society. The examples given here show how pluralism was part of Canadian history, particularly among those groups of European origin who were not as unified as contemporary critics would have others believe.

2) Multiculturalism is unpopular among the Canadian public

According to William D. Gairdner, opinion polls in the United States, Canada, and Australia show people to be "officially against
multiculturalism". This theme runs consistently throughout the literature against multiculturalism. Neil Bissoondath quotes a 1993 poll that he says shows that most Canadians (72%) think multiculturalism is not working, "and should be replaced by a melting pot". Doug Collins claims that non-white immigration would not be a problem if people wanted it, but people do not. He claims that of dozens of polls, not one shows a majority of Canadians are for non-white immigration.

Why are these critics trying to show that multiculturalism lacks popular support in Canada? In the case of the conservative right, they are trying to reinforce the notion that by imposing a pluralist policy like multiculturalism on the people rather than a unicural policy like assimilation, the governing elite is ignoring the wishes of the general public. This argument extends from the view of multiculturalism as a 'top-down phenomenon with no roots in Canadian history'. Gairdner, Collins, and Byfield are trying to make a populist argument that the elite ignores the wishes of the 'grass-roots majority'. As Gairdner states, the political elite assumes cultural diversity is bliss, yet the majority is against this. This allows the conservatives to assert their calls for policies supporting a homogenous view of Canada because they sense public support. As Link Byfield states, "It is a simple fact of history that racial mixing is dangerous business". Doug Collins also tries to show that heterogeneity is bad news by quoting Kingsley Amis: "As a result of the displacement and mixing of races, there are more racial problems in the world today than at any time in the past".

Is the Canadian public unanimously and consistently against multiculturalism as the critics claim? A review of various polls show that such is not the case. Polls reveal that Canadians are ambiguous towards multiculturalism at worst, and generally supportive at best. Charles Ungerleider shows that a number of surveys demonstrate that around two-thirds of the Canadian public feel that multiculturalism and immigration make Canada a better
place. A Maclean's/Decima poll in January of 1990 showed 68% of respondents agreed with the statement: "Being made up of people of different backgrounds makes Canada a more interesting and better country".20 A Globe and Mail/Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (C.B.C.) news poll in November/1991 found 63% of respondents to agree with the statement: "The fact that there are people from different races in Canada adds to what is good to [sic] this country".21 A 1991 government Multicultural Attitude Survey found 70% of respondents to support Canada's multiculturalism policy while 77% believed that this policy enriches Canadian culture. Only 18% feared that multiculturalism would destroy the Canadian way of life.22 Many Canadians, furthermore, feel that immigration and multiculturalism provide cultural benefits. One sees this in an August 1991 Leger and Leger poll in Quebec (62% felt immigrants had a positive effect on the culture of the province) and in the 1991 Multicultural Attitude Survey where 77% felt that federal multicultural policy enriches Canadian culture, and 65% agreed that "a society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur".23

The ambiguity comes from polls which suggest an anti-pluralist mood. Kogila A. Moodley refers to a 1994 Angus Reid poll that showed that between two-thirds to three-quarters of Canadians give rhetorical support for multiculturalism. However, the same poll showed that 57% of respondents advocate that minorities should be encouraged "to change to be more like Canadians", while only a minority (34%) wished "to encourage Canadians as a whole to try to accept minority groups and their languages". According to Moodley, this conformist attitude clearly contradicts multiculturalism.24 The 1991 Multicultural Attitude Survey found 46% of respondents agreed that people who came to Canada should change their behaviour to be "more like us". Forty-two per cent felt national unity was weakened by ethnic groups "sticking to their old ways".25 This particular survey showed a minority to favour conformism. However, other surveys show that a majority of respondents would like to see
minority members become "more like Canadians"\textsuperscript{26}, that "immigrants should blend with the larger society"\textsuperscript{27}, that immigrants should integrate into Canadian culture rather than being encouraged to preserve their ethnic culture, and that Canadians considered "too many immigrants feel no obligation to adopt to Canadian values and way of life".\textsuperscript{28} This ambiguity, along with the way these results can be interpreted in secondary sources, gives some credibility to critics who argue that the public is unhappy with the concept of multiculturalism.

Sometimes, the second-hand quotation of research can lead to a survey's findings being distorted. Bissoondath cites a December/1993 Decima Poll from a Globe and Mail article which apparently showed "that 72\% of Canadians were dissatisfied with the country's multiculturalism policy". According to Andrew Cardozo, this assertion is the result of an unusually sensational press release from the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, the organization that commissioned the poll, which read: "Canadians reject multiculturalism mosaic".\textsuperscript{29}

As Cardozo shows, the poll said nothing of the sort. The poll shows that 72\% of Canadians believe that different ethnic and racial groups should try to 'adapt' to Canadian society. This raises two points: one, nowhere in the poll does it show what people feel these groups should do to adapt, nor does it say what "adapting" constitutes, or what is meant by "Canadian society". Does it mean play hockey, and not wear a turban?\textsuperscript{30} Do all respondents define 'adapt' in the same way? Two, as is the case with the aforementioned polls, the demand by Canadians that minority groups adapt to a Canadian lifestyle is to argue that multicultural policy is about opposing adaptation. Clearly, this is not the case. Even Trudeau's statement on multiculturalism in 1971 declared the government's support in assisting members of all cultural groups to "overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society", and to "assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to
become full participants in Canadian society".\textsuperscript{31}

While the Decima poll did not specifically ask its respondents whether or not multiculturalism works, some of the responses give a comprehensive idea. Sixty-seven per cent said that Canadians have an excellent or good ability to "get along", 68\% agreed that "one of the best things about Canada is our acceptance of people from all races and backgrounds", and 52\% believed that "Canada does an excellent or good job in fostering positive racial and ethnic relations". In terms of racism, 61\% believed there is some racism in Canada, and 25\% believed that a great deal of racism exists. Seventy-seven per cent believed that there is less racism in Canada than in the United States.\textsuperscript{32} These details would have challenged Bissoondath's assertion that Canadians are against multiculturalism, yet they are missing from his book.

This examination of Bissoondath's citation leads to several points: one, poor research can allow a writer to reach any conclusion that he/she chooses. Two, the reiteration of misreadings (in this case, of survey research) leads to their reprinting \textit{ad nauseam} as if they were facts.\textsuperscript{33} Bissoondath quoted a misreading from The Globe and Mail, which printed a misreading from the press release of the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews. Now, Bissoondath's misrepresentation is cited by others: John Metcalf wrote in The Ottawa Citizen: "Neil Bissoondath feels, along with 72\% of Canadians polled in 1993, that multiculturalism does not work to Canada's advantage and is not wanted".\textsuperscript{34} Three, Bissoondath is misrepresenting facts. This appears to be the case since he relies heavily on secondary sources for information.

Contrary to what Gairdner, Collins, and Byfield may say, Canadians are becoming more accommodating of heterogeneity. Collins claimed in 1984 that anti-immigration sentiment had grown higher in heavy immigrant areas such as Vancouver and Toronto, "thus proving that the nearer people are to racial realities, the less they like them".\textsuperscript{35} This claim was refuted by Reitz and Breton, who showed that residents of Canadian cities with the
largest number of immigrants were not more likely than other Canadians to oppose cultural retention. The results of the aforementioned Maclean's/Decima poll of January/1994, The Globe and Mail/C.B.C. November 1991 poll, and the 1991 Multicultural Attitude Survey mentioned above show also that this is not the case. Other surveys show that most Canadians have frequent direct experience with ethnic diversity. A 1991 Angus Reid survey showed that 39% of Canadians had family members of a different ethnic background, 73% had close friends of different ethnic backgrounds, and 82% had such people as neighbours. A 1990 poll by Angus Reid found 60% of respondents to agree with a proposition that treating minorities with generosity is a special desirable aspect of the country's character. Three opinion polls (The Globe and Mail/C.B.C. poll of November/1991; the Leger and Leger poll in Quebec in August/1991; and the Maclean's/Decima poll of July, 1989) show that between 70 and 85% of those surveyed said that they would be either pleased or indifferent if one of their children chose to marry a person of another ethnic group. Sixty-eight per cent of The Globe and Mail/C.B.C. respondents felt it would not make a difference if people of a different race lived in the same neighbourhood.

The evidence disproves Byfield, Collins, and Gairdner's claim that "...the government creates racism in the people by restructuring society against its will in a way that generates racial attitudes" (Gairdner). In spite of increases in the number of immigrants and Canadians of colour, fairly high tolerance levels prevail.

My purpose here is not to overwhelm the reader with survey research, nor am I trying to show that the Canadian public is unanimous in its approval of multiculturalism policy and the increasing heterogeneity of society. Rather, what I am doing is deconstructing the claim that the public is against multiculturalism. Conservatives present this idea of a 'popular dislike' as if it is indisputable. While certain polls may show a
particular disenchantment by the public towards minority groups at a particular time, consequently allowing some observers to select and interpret certain polls to suggest that Canadians are fed up with pluralist policies, they are not enough to show a general and permanent discontent. At the worst, the polls show an ambiguity on the part of Canadians towards the policy. Some recent polls may suggest a rising backlash or loss of confidence in the policy although this is not the case in the Ekos Research poll, conducted on January 18/1996, yet many polls exist showing the opposite. For example, the Environics Research group conducted five national surveys regarding the levels of awareness and approval of the federal policy of multiculturalism in the last eight years that showed that Canadians were becoming more aware of the multiculturalism policy, that approval of the policy has risen in the last few years, and that younger Canadians approve of the policy more than older Canadians do.

If Canadians are generally supportive of multicultural policy, why do critics try to show the opposite? In Bissoondath's case, he may be limited by information. In the case of the conservative right, they appear to be trying to legitimate their nativist claims by showing them as 'the voice of the people'. Herein lies the populist elements of their arguments: they attempt to show that the masses' calls for pro-homogeneity policies fall on the deaf ears of elite politicians who are trying to destroy the predominant ethnic base of Canada. Hence, Gairdner refers to multiculturalism as "a divide-and-rule policy of government". Consider this statement by Doug Collins:

What that means is that at the will of this supremely elitist academic (Pierre Trudeau) and his allies, ordinary citizens must lie back and enjoy what is happening to them. If their neighbourhood has suddenly become a suburb of New Delhi, Hong Kong, Kingston, Jamaica, they must like it. If their children are eased aside in schools so that the offspring of alien cultures can be looked after, they must like that, too. They need not look to the politicians for help, and if they make any fuss liberal police forces will see to it that order prevails. That explains the
proliferation of the human rights commissions, Urban Alliances on Race Relations, the large sums poured into "special projects" by the Secretary of State's Department, the punitive control measures being introduced in the school systems (especially in Ontario), and the growing insistence on 'Affirmative Action', which means institutionalized discrimination against whites.\(^4\)

One can see how the nativist elements in this quote (...their neighbourhood has suddenly become a suburb of New Delhi, Hong Kong...", "...so that the offspring of alien cultures can be looked after...", and "'Affirmative action'... means institutionalized racial discrimination against whites") are juxtaposed with populist sentiments ("...this supremely elitist academic and his allies...", "They need not look to the politicians for help...", and "...liberal police forces will see to it that order prevails").

What the conservative right is trying to do is show Canadians that multiculturalism has led to a state of discontent and crisis, and all their neighbours (or at least all the 'traditional' ones) seem to think so. What is then needed, they conclude, is a new assimilationist-oriented policy. To show that multiculturalism has the general support of the population would be to turn the conservative argument on its head: that is, to say that the call for a unicultural policy is an elitist ideal that is not representative of the general public.

3) Patronage thesis: Multiculturalism is a "vote-buying" scheme designed to co-opt ethnic groups

According to Margaret Cannon, multiculturalism is not about consensus between groups, it is about politics and votes. She gives the example of the recent Somali immigrants. She says that when they establish themselves, multiculturalism gives them money for newspapers and festivals. While the policy will not help combat racism, the policy will put Somalis into the multicultural industry. Multiculturalism, in other words, is "meant to buy ethnic votes".\(^4\)
Cannon's statement expresses a popular conception about multiculturalism. It is a policy designed to win ethnic political support. The policy, she says, was officially designed to recognize the contributions of non-charter groups. Its less noble reason for existence was because the Liberals wanted to guarantee the electoral support of ethnic groups, as electoral support from Quebec was too volatile to be relied upon.  

Richard Gwyn refers to multiculturalism as "a slush fund to buy ethnic votes". 

Bissoondath refers to multiculturalism as "sweet talk" on the part of Pierre Trudeau, who implemented the policy to buy ethnic votes. While he was a visionary, he was "really just saving his own". William D. Gairdner claims that the government tried to buy ethnic votes at the price of fragmenting Canadian society: "In buying votes, the government has overlooked that these cultures are in conflict". Doug Collins also sees multiculturalism as patronage: he says that politicians ignore the majority, "but spare no expense on multiculturalism".

The second part of this claim sees multiculturalism as a means to co-opt these minorities. That is, the government, specifically, the Liberals who have been in power most of the past generation, uses the policy to garner support for their policies, and to help maintain power. Kogila A. Moodley, in 1983, pointed to the rise and fall of Quebec nationalism to show how state policy can co-opt ethnic minorities.

In regards to the idea of nationalism as 'vote buying', the onus is on the critics to prove it. However, in all of the sources mentioned, no evidence is cited to actually prove this claim. The closest any of them seem to come is Margaret Cannon who says the Liberals in 1992 used the ethnic vote to make up for the lost Quebec vote. These critics provide no hard evidence, no causal links between multicultural grants and possible vote swings in the ethnic community or for that matter, no evidence of voting patterns in ethnic communities, no statements by politicians or bureaucrats which suggest that multiculturalism grants are used to curry favour
in minority communities, no examples of politicians channelling funds into multicultural projects before elections, and no evidence of policies which would be designed to win the support of non-charter groups. In short, these writers do not try to prove that multiculturalism is a patronage policy. They just state it as though it was true.

Critics might assume that, because government funds are available to ethnic groups, this constitutes "patronage" (recall Cannon's statement: "multiculturalism gives them money for newspapers and festivals"). Leslie Pal examines this issue in his study of state funding through the Secretary of State for advocacy groups. In regards to the patronage theory, he concludes that evidence is either anecdotal or conjectural. Little evidence exists to show how important these funds are to these groups such as the Canadian Ethnocultural Council (C.E.C.), The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (U.C.C.), and the National Association of Canadians of Origins in India (N.A.C.O.I.).

As for the co-optation thesis, Pal concludes:

Evidence shows that the 'co-optation' thesis is simplistic in the extreme, both because of the powers that organizations have over the state as a consequence of these programs, and because of the role that state-funded groups play in contemporary politics.

Pal explains that such a study would require an examination of how important these funds are to these groups, and how these groups would behave in the absence of public funding. These crucial gaps in evidence leave the co-optation thesis unproven. Because the government never gives large grants through multiculturalism (between $5,000 and $20,000 per grant), it becomes hard to credit the state as somehow trying to manage the internal rhythms of ethnic politics.

Also, the Secretary of State is so regionalized that little coordination between the national headquarters and regional offices exists to suggest an organized attempt to use multicultural grants to obtain the compliance and support of these groups.
if multiculturalism is used to win support from ethnic groups, it does not appear to have results. Advocacy groups will sometimes publicly defend government initiatives that they find progressive and helpful. However, they can also be the government's toughest critics. The C.E.C., the U.C.C., and N.A.C.O.I., for example, all lobbied against various aspects of the Meech Lake Accord. In other words, the government may control the funding, but cannot control the discourse of groups, nor the influence those groups have on public policy. These groups may abide by democratic rules, but are not puppets.

As Pal points out, the anecdotal evidence given to show multiculturalism as a patronage policy designed to give visibility to local Members of Parliament (of which no specific examples I could find in the available literature) are more the exception than the rule. Gairdner, Cannon, Bissoondath, and others all claim multiculturalism is vote-buying, yet provide no evidence of it either in how multicultural grants, or how ethno/cultural groups and organizations have tailored their agendas to fit that of the incumbent government.

4) **Multiculturalism limits individuality by emphasizing group solidarity:**

Bissoondath quotes Robert Fulford to state that the problem of multiculturalism is that it puts the rights of a group (race-based, according to Fulford) before the rights of the individual. For Bissoondath, multiculturalism contradicts individualism. To pretend one does not evolve, as multiculturalism does, is to stultify personality, creating stereotype, and "stripping the individual of all uniqueness".

Bissoondath is not the first to make this point. His argument resembles Porter's claim that multiculturalism is anachronistic in that it emphasizes group ties in an individualistic, modern, capitalist society. As Bissoondath states, we must acknowledge the wide variance within cultural groups. Shared ethnicity does not
mean unanimity of vision, according to Bissoondath: "If the individual is not to be betrayed, then humanity must prevail over the narrowness of ethnicity".66

The difficulty in analyzing this claim is that Bissoondath provides no causal examples to show how multicultural policy actually limits individualism. This makes this thesis hard to test. Indirectly, he provides a number of personal examples: of how others tried to silence him when he wrote the story of a refugee, as he himself is not a refugee,67 and how as a student at York University in Toronto in the early seventies, he was encouraged to "stick to his own".68

This view possibly represents a particular view of the policy, which states that multiculturalism compels the citizenry to define themselves by group affiliation. The policy, as seen in Trudeau's statements in 1971, suggests integration such as helping newcomers to overcome barriers, and to guarantee access to official language education. As Kymlicka points out, multiculturalism is an attempt to achieve a balance between individual and group rights.

Kymlicka further notes that pluralist policies must not allow for an ethnic group to place internal restrictions on its members. Thus, to prove that multiculturalism does limit individuality, critics would have to provide evidence of these internal restrictions. The evidence, as seen in the case of Bissoondath, is largely anecdotal. This does not mean that this such evidence is invalid, but it represents only a limited experience. One could challenge these with counter-anecdotes: not all Canadian Sikh males wear turbans, not all Muslim women wear hijabs, and no laws in Canada forbid exogamy.

From a legal standpoint, both individual and collective rights are protected in the Charter of Rights. Individual rights are protected under Section 15, and collective rights are protected under Section 27, which reads: "This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians".69 Could collective rights be
used to limit the minimum standards of respect for individual rights in order to preserve the special characteristics of the group? According to E. Diane Pask, "Whether this is to be done, how and under what circumstances is, as yet, an unconfronted challenge". One qualification might be the case of genital mutilation, to which the Department of Canadian Heritage has attempted to put an end to it by working with the ethnic groups in question and by advocating changes to law to forbid the practice.

5) Multiculturalism does nothing to address the real issues and problems of minority groups. It even exacerbates these problems.

Multiculturalism, according to Toronto poet and writer Nourbese Philip, does little to address issues that ethnocultural groups in Canada are truly concerned with, specifically racism:

Because it pretends to be what it is not -- a mechanism to equalize all cultures in Canada -- it ought not to surprise us that multiculturalism would be silent about issues of race and colour.

In short, multiculturalism, as we know it, has no answers for the problems of racism... unless it is combined with a clearly articulated policy of anti-racism, directed at rooting out the effects of racist and white supremacist thinking... multiculturalism will not disappear. Too many people benefit from it, and it is too far fancy a piece of window-dressing for a government to get rid of.

This statement illustrates what has become a popular critique of multiculturalism: the policy does little to address the actual problems and issues that surround ethno/cultural groups today. In contrast to Philip's claim, Bissoondath suggests that the multicultural budget diverts funding from multicultural halls to anti-racism programs, "stressing not the differences that divide them (children), but the similarities that unite them". The second part of this claim states that multiculturalism actually makes these problems worse even though we think multiculturalism will lead to more openness. Multiculturalism will not, according
to Bissoondath, as it "indulges in stereotypes, and depends on flash and dances".\textsuperscript{73}

Margaret Cannon also argues that multicultural policy contains no anti-racist elements: "Multiculturalism isn't anti-racist. It can, in fact, simply perpetuate racism by keeping old hatreds and old prejudices intact".\textsuperscript{74} Her examples are somewhat dubious: she faults the policy for the fact that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service investigated Canadians of Arab origin during the Gulf War, and for the killing in Somalia of a Somali teenager by two members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. She gives no explanation of how these incidents are tied to multicultural policy. She only says that, in the case of the death in Somalia, that the two perpetrators were of aboriginal origin, and therefore subject to racial taunts.\textsuperscript{75}

This line of argument has given the conservative right a new weapon in their push to eliminate multiculturalism. In the following statement, Reform Party Immigration critic Art Hanger mentions this theme during the proceedings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration:

I know we certainly all strive to have a perfect society but the problems we talk about here when it comes to intolerance and the like are on the rise in spite of the fact that we've had twenty years of multiculturalism and in fact seem to be going the other way. Don't you think it's time to revisit this whole thing and maybe put it out of sight for a period of time to see if in fact it is multiculturalism itself that is the problem?\textsuperscript{76}

In analyzing the accuracy of these statements, I would argue that this claim relies largely on the belief that the multicultural policy only translates into folk activities. This is evident in Bissoondath's claim that multiculturalism depends on 'flash and dances'. This concern will be dealt with later. Here, I want to concentrate on the idea that multiculturalism does nothing to address the real issues facing minorities.

Critics who make this argument give little analysis of the actual application of multicultural policies through the Department
of Canadian Heritage or through other departments. Cannon, in explaining Philip's claim ("...multiculturalism will not disappear. Too many people benefit from it"), says: "...she's talking about, literally tens of thousands of jobs that range from the cheery bureaucrats in federal and provincial offices to the reporters at the local ethnic newspapers." A question that arises in response to this quote is if the federal government is only spending $17 million per year on multiculturalism, down from $27 million prior to 1995, can it support "literally tens of thousands of jobs"? Are the editors of these ethnic newspapers actually being paid by the government? Like Bissoondath, she makes an assumption about how multicultural funds are being spent (for Cannon, this includes "local ethnic newspapers" and "festivals". For Bissoondath, multicultural funds are spent on multicultural "halls".) without evidence to prove it.

To judge the validity of these claims requires an examination of how multicultural policy is applied in practice. Areas include the funding of advocacy groups, how the Multiculturalism Act is adhered to in different select federal responsibilities (Revenue Canada, health care, police activities), the functions of the Department of Heritage, and how multiculturalism is applied in law. The question to ask in examining these activities is whether multiculturalism is really ineffectual in addressing the real concerns of minorities?

**Advocacy groups:** Since its formation in 1970, the advocacy group Canadian Ethnocultural Council (C.E.C.) has been funded almost entirely by the Secretary of State. It appeared before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada (1980). The C.E.C. endorsed the entrenchment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in light of Canada's history of discrimination against groups of non-Anglo origin (aboriginals, Chinese, Ukrainians, and Japanese). The C.E.C. also involved itself in the hearings of two parliamentary committees in 1983 and 1985. It appeared before the House of
Commons Special Committee on Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian society (which issued the Equality Now! report) to suggest that all federal government order-in-council appointments and Senate appointments be made in consultation with national ethnocultural associations, and to suggest a variety of proposals in education to expunge racism in the curriculum as well as to raise understanding and tolerance. It also appeared before the House of Commons Sub-Committee on the Equality of Rights (The Boyer Committee) to urge the committee to pass a separate Multiculturalism Act -- which was successful -- and to institute a separate Department of Multiculturalism. The C.E.C. also outlined principles to guide Multiculturalism policy, which led to Bill C-93 of the proposed Multiculturalism Act in 1987. The C.E.C. also lobbied against certain aspects of the Meech Lake Accord. Members felt it was important to bring Quebec into the constitution, but not at the expense of subordinating section 16 of the Accord (protecting multicultural rights) to Section One, which saw French and English as the 'fundamental characteristics' of Canada.

While the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (U.C.C.) has been in existence since 1940, it is financed only in part by the Secretary of State. In 1980, the U.C.C. appeared before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution to demand the removal of Section One of the proposed constitution, which allowed for the suspension of rights. They based their stance on the experience of the internment of some Ukrainian-Canadians during the First World War. The U.C.C. was also unhappy that the proposed Charter did not mention multiculturalism (which was later added under Section 27), and asked for special education guarantees. In regards to Meech Lake, the U.C.C. also (like the C.E.C.) believed that Section 16 of the Accord was insufficient to guarantee multicultural rights. The U.C.C. suggested amendments to make Ottawa and the provinces responsible for promoting and preserving multiculturalism:

A country that gives greater rights to its citizens
based on their belonging to ethnic groups that came to Canada sooner is not our vision of what Canada is or should be. We are all immigrants or descendants of immigrants. We must all be treated equally and fairly.82

The National Association of Canadians of Origins in India (N.A.C.O.I.) receives around 83 to 88% (between 1987 and 1988) of its funding from the government.83 It is more preoccupied than the U.C.C. is with issues concerning visible minorities. It demanded better participation by government against hate propaganda and racial slurs. In the mid-1980s, N.A.C.O.I. vigorously objected to the way the media covered the Air India crash and the Sikh insurgency in India. N.A.C.O.I. also addressed issues of immigration and Revenue Canada's view of ethnocultural organizations as having 'charitable status'.84 It also represented its views within the C.E.C., as the two groups concurred on some basic issues. For example, N.A.C.O.I. objected to the 'distinct society' clause in the Meech Lake Accord, as it gave special status to Quebec while lumping all other Canadians together.

Federal responsibilities: Operation of the Multiculturalism Act requires federal government departments beyond the Secretary of State to take into account the diversity of Canadian society and to implement measures to manage that diversity. I use random examples of different departments to illustrate this point.

Revenue Canada, for example, maintains contact with various ethnocultural associations to assure that departmental publications reflect Canada's diversity. The department provides cross-cultural training for employees, and trains volunteers from various ethnic communities to help community members with their tax forms.85

Health Canada has provided the use of medical translators in hospitals. In 1993, the federal government reactivated the Federal Interdepartmental Working Group on Female Genital Mutilation. Chaired by the Women's Health Bureau of Health Canada, the purpose of this group was to work with affected communities to inform and educate them on Canadian laws regarding female genital mutilation.
It informed these communities that this practice was condemned in Canada because it violates the basic right to body integrity. The group conducted workshops on this issue, and worked for amendments to the criminal code condemning this practice.\textsuperscript{86}

I digress briefly from describing multicultural policy applications to show how this last point can be used to respond to a claim by Bissoondath. Bissoondath attempts to show through the example of female genital mutilation, also known as female circumcision and/or infibulation, of how multicultural policy has failed to establish limits on diversity.\textsuperscript{87} This resulting "ethical chaos" has led to the rise of female circumcision. Clearly, Bissoondath is unaware that this issue was, in fact, being addressed most aggressively through Health Canada. The federal government currently has five departments working together on this issue, and even Somali-Canadian women's groups have spoken forcefully against the practice.\textsuperscript{88}

Application of the Multiculturalism Act is also seen in the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.). To help develop policies and practices that would enhance relationships between the police and communities, the Mounties set up focus groups to bring visible minorities and aboriginal communities together with the R.C.M.P. Commissioner and senior management. The R.C.M.P. also changed their training to include cultural diversity training, and have instituted various outreach programs for youth.\textsuperscript{89} Pilot projects in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces have been instituted at police academies to recruit and train visible minority candidates for careers in policing.\textsuperscript{90}

The Department of Canadian Heritage engages in projects such as a four-year interdepartmental initiative on family violence. This shows how cultural pluralism is practiced not only by making adjustments in the host society to accommodate immigrant groups, but also by working towards adjustments within the minority groups themselves so they can acculturate to the larger society. The department also formed education partnerships between non-
governmental organizations, educators, and provincial/territorial ministries of education to provide funding and technical assistance for curriculum development, intercultural encounters in classrooms, and educator training and research.\textsuperscript{91} Regional-level projects were also funded by the department, such as a leadership training and community development conference in British Columbia to prevent ultra-right groups from establishing a hold in the Chilliwack region, the distribution of guides for people who lead workshops for new immigrants, a research project by the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society to determine areas of discrimination experienced by Black and Indo-Canadian lawyers, a project to counter the problems of racial violence and intolerance in public schools in Moncton, New Brunswick, sponsorship of the work of Orientation-Travail Committee of Immigrant Workers in Quebec; the organization of cultural camps in Saskatchewan to sensitize provincial judges about discrimination faced by Aboriginal people, the sponsorship of two programs by Society for Educational Visits and Exchanges in Canada aimed at antiracism and ethnocultural equality, and support for an Aboriginal Women's Programme focused on resolving and preventing family violence, to name a few.\textsuperscript{92} Specifically, the Race Relations Unit engaged in activities which included producing twelve situation studies about race relations in Canadian cities, the sponsorship of Symposia on Race Relations and the Law and Policing in multicultural communities, and support for a television training program for visible minorities.\textsuperscript{93}

**Law:** The recognition of Canada's multicultural heritage through section 27 of the Charter has had an impact on the interpretation of various laws in regards to the protection of minority rights in Canada. Section 27 has been cited to shield minority interests from provincial legislation regarding Sunday closing (R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd. in 1985, and R. v. Edwards Books in 1986),\textsuperscript{94} in a case challenging the Ontario Ministry's requirement that all public schools be opened and closed with religious scriptures and similar
readings such as the Lord's Prayer (Zybelberg et. al. v. Sudbury Board of Education in 1988),\textsuperscript{95} and in the allowance of the Sikh religious practice of wearing kirpans in court (ceremonial daggers) (R. v. Hothi et. al. in 1985),\textsuperscript{96} in which case the courts at different levels went both ways.\textsuperscript{97}

In the case of Grant v. Canada (Attorney-General) in which a group of R.C.M.P. veterans challenged the R.C.M.P. Commissioner from allowing the wearing of religious symbols as part of the Mountie uniform, the judge did not find section 27 particularly helpful or necessary. However, in handing down a decision for the defendants (that is, affirming the allowance of the wearing of turbans as part of the uniform code of the R.C.M.P.), the judge did legitimate the multicultural objectives of this allowance: "...the wearing of the turban would operate as a demonstration and an acceptance of the present day multicultural nature of Canada. These are laudable objectives".\textsuperscript{98}

The addition of section 27 to the Charter of Rights is not merely a symbolic recognition of minority rights in Canadian law. Its presence provides legitimacy in challenging potential infringements of minority rights. Often, it is used in conjunction with individual rights cited in sections 2 and 15 of the Charter (usually regarding freedom of religion). This shows that minority rights are not necessarily a challenge, but rather an extension of individual rights. This would support Kymlicka's interpretation of multicultural rights.

**Summary:** In citing these examples of how multiculturalism is practised in terms of support given to advocacy groups, in the practices of various government departments and in law, my purpose is not to give multiculturalism a blind promotion. Rather, I am examining the validity of the often made claim that multiculturalism does little for minority groups, and in fact only exacerbates those problems. This judgement of multiculturalism is often based on superficial evidence that does little to reveal the
actual application of multicultural policy. This review shows that the policy has, in fact, addressed the concerns of minorities in various ways: the lobbying done by ethnocultural organizations such as the C.E.C., the U.C.C., and N.A.C.O.I. for changes to Canadian policy, the efforts made by various government departments to ensure access to ethno-cultural communities through various programs, the organization of forces against hate groups by the Department of Canadian Heritage, and the application of section 27 of the Charter of Rights in various cases in order to defend minority rights.

Furthermore, this review shows that multiculturalism is also used to address the concerns of the larger society: that is, the integration of minority groups. Efforts made to deal with female genital mutilation, spousal abuse, and integration of newcomers demonstrate this integrative aspect of the policy.

Some may argue that in spite of these measures, multiculturalism has done little to improve cohesion among individuals in Canada. However, this is not the argument made by the critics whose claims have been presented here. Their claims are that multiculturalism does little in practice to address minority group needs. They are not questioning the actual effectiveness of these measures, as they make no mention of them.

6) Multiculturalism exoticizes culture by concentrating primarily on folk activities:

Multiculturalism policy is associated primarily with festive events and folkloric activities. As Sonja Sinclair states:

...the multiculturalism pendulum swung out of control when politicians began wooing the ethnic vote with millions of dollars spent on teaching "heritage languages", organizing multicultural conferences, and staging dance-and-song festivals. Having been raised in cosmopolitan Prague, I never wore a national costume until coming to Canada and being enlisted in some cultural extravaganza."

Caterina Pizanias states that multiculturalism "allows only for
festivals". Richard Gwyn states that multiculturalism has not had much effect, as it consists mostly of grants "dished out" to ethnic organizations that were created to receive them. The result, he says, is "lots of festivals and dances". Neil Bissoondath relies heavily on this same view of multiculturalism: "The public face of multiculturalism is flashy and attractive; it emerges with verve and gaiety from the bland stereotype of traditional Canada at 'ethnic' festivals around the country". Multiculturalism, he says, encourages devaluation of that which it claims to promote. That is, it makes culture an object of display, not the heart and soul of its individuals. The multicultural festivals do nothing, he maintains, to help neighbours understand minorities. It only promotes divisiveness.

This particular critique is an extension of the "multiculturalism does nothing to address the concerns of minorities" theme. It assumes that multiculturalism policy translates largely into support for 'the three Ds' (dress, diet, and dance), and that little effort is spent on more relevant issues such as anti-racism, minority empowerment, and integration of newcomers. Consequently, the policy is little more than symbolic nature.

How accurate is this view of multiculturalism policy? While folkloric activities may have been a preoccupation of multiculturalism policy in the seventies, such is not the case today. The museum-oriented approach of seventies multicultural policy may have been a reflection of interests of particular groups. However, in the early eighties, the concentration of visible minorities in large Canadian cities, and the eruption of race riots in Britain affected a change in the spending. Policies of integration, along with anti-racism and equity, now formulated the core of the policy. Moreover, the passage of the Multiculturalism Act in 1988 reflected the change from the folkloric activities of the seventies to the anti-racist agenda of the early 1980s with an emphasis on justice and social equality.
A breakdown of federal multicultural spending would bring the validity of the aforementioned critique into question. Multicultural funding, as seen in Appendix B, is directed at activities such as the elimination of systematic discrimination, equality of access and opportunity, provision of culturally sensitive services, organizational development, the overcoming of integration problems, the changing of attitudes and behaviours, language and cultural development, and the promotion of cultural diversity. The only programme which may allow for spending on folkloric events, as well as other endeavours, is in language and cultural development (or, as it is known in earlier literature, the heritage cultures and languages programme). In this programme, the rules for applications state that federal grants are available for "artistic expression in theatre, music, dance, folkloric arts, and visual arts". A study of approved funding to uni-cultural organizations between 1992-93 and 1994-95, seen in Appendix B, shows that funding in this programme averaged just over 4% of the entire budget, and never exceeded 5%. In other words, Bissoondath and others base this critique of federal multiculturalism on what constitutes 4% of the federal multicultural budget.

In spite of this continuous refinement, critics continue to refer to multiculturalism as 'song and dance' activities. Why do they continue to perpetuate the stereotype in spite of evidence that shows otherwise? A possible explanation would be that these 'three D' activities are the most visible promotion to the public of multiculturalism. Other programs such as anti-racism training and immigrant integration are not as visible, are conducted behind closed doors, and are not always identified as sponsored by the Department of Canadian Heritage. Critics, therefore, assume that 'three D' events are all there is to multiculturalism. Furthermore, when referring to specific multicultural events, certain critics make no mention of whether or not federal multicultural funding even played a part in the sponsorship of that
particular event.

Conclusion

While the history of official Canadian multiculturalism policy can be traced back to the 1971, signs of government acknowledgement of Canada's diverse population were evident much earlier. Consequently, popular criticisms fault the policy as the cause of recent problems in Canadian society, as that time period coincides with changes to immigration policy and to the rise of Quebec nationalism and the introduction of "participatory democracy" in the late sixties. The recent backlash in Canada is a reflection of a general anti-immigrant pattern worldwide. However, critics of the Canadian policy consist not just of members of the New Right, but also of academics and those of liberal inclination as well. In spite of this difference, many of these critics, whether or not they represent a nativist point of view, advocate the termination of the policy and rely on common arguments, multiculturalism is a top-down, unnatural phenomenon with no grounding before 1971; multiculturalism is unpopular with the Canadian public; the policy is little more than 'vote-buying' and cooptation aimed at ethno-cultural groups; it limits individuality by emphasizing group solidarity; it does nothing to address the real concerns of minority groups; and exoticizes culture by concentrating primarily on folk activities.

Chapter Five will continue with this examination of popular critiques of multiculturalism policy. The focus in the next chapter will be critiques based on popular conceptions of Canadian society and history. The analysis will also concentrate on the reasons for misconceptions of multicultural policy, and how this reflects the overall backlash against ethnic groups and immigrants in Canada.
NOTES


4) Ibid., 196.


8) Ibid., 7.

9) Ibid., 8.

10) Ibid., 9.


14) Gairdner, 389.


16) Collins, 8.
17) Gairdner, 394.
18) Byfield, 7.
21) Ibid., 40.
22) Ibid., 40.
23) Ibid., 41.
25) Ungerleider, 45.
26) Angus Reid poll, February 1990, Ibid., 45.
30) Ibid., 30.
32) Cardozo, 30
33) Ibid., 30.
34) John Metcalf in Cardozo, 30.
36) Jerrey G. Reitz and Raymond Breton. The Illusion of Difference: Realities of Ethnicity in Canada and the United States
37) Ungerleider, 40.

38) Ibid., 40.

39) Ibid., 40. Fewer than 20% of those surveyed said they would be unhappy if their children chose to marry a person of another ethnic group.

40) Ibid., 40. Twenty-five per cent said it was a good thing, only 5% said it would be bad.

41) Gairdner, 408. Both Collins (Parliament, 9) and Gairdner (p. 409) quote York University Professor Daniel Cappon in saying that the 'critical mass' proportion of a population that can be of visible minority origin is 10%. Any higher, then the general population feels threatened. Both express concern as the visible minority rate in Vancouver and Toronto is 15%. Currently, racial minorities account for nearly one in three residents of both cities. Alanna Mitchell, "Face of big cities changing", The Globe and Mail (February 18 1998): A1.

42) This poll (in Ungerleider, 39) showed that the percentage of respondents agreed that multiculturalism produced the following effects: enriched Canada's future (72%), provided greater equality for non-charter groups (65%), ensured that people of various cultural backgrounds will have a sense of belonging in Canada (64%), assisted fuller participation by all aspects of Canadian life (50%), and helped to unite Canada (43%).

43) Fernando Mata and Jenna Hennebry, Public Approval of the Federal Policy of Multiculturalism in the 90s: Highlights from the Environics Focus Canada Surveys (Multiculturalism/ Department of Heritage, Internal Document, 1997): 3, 4, and 6. These surveys show that while approval of multiculturalism policy dropped in the mid-nineties, it rebounded dramatically from its lowest point of 50% approval in 1995 to rise to about 63% in 1997 (p.4).

44) Gairdner, 390.


46) Cannon, 240.

47) Ibid., 244.

49) Bissoondath, 41, 40.
50) Ibid., 38-39.
51) Gairdner, 394.
52) Collins, Destruction, 12.
54) Cannon, 250.
56) Ibid., 57.
57) Ibid., 55.
58) Ibid., 54.
59) Ibid., 263.
60) Ibid., 264.
61) Ibid., 207, 211, and 215.
62) Ibid., 263-264.
63) Ibid., 275.
64) Bissoondath, 161.
65) Ibid., 211.
67) Bissoondath, Selling, 170.
68) Bissoondath, 20-21. Cardozo (p.30) points out that his own experience as a South Asian male at York University at about the same time as Bissoondath was completely different: he found the campus to be assimilationist in nature.
70) Ibid., 132.
71) Philip in Cannon, 248-249.
72) Bissoondath, *Selling Illusions*, 223.
73) Ibid., 189-190.
74) Cannon, 258.
75) Ibid., 258, 261.
77) Cannon, 249.
78) Pal, 205-206.
79) Ibid., 207.
80) Ibid., 212.
81) Ibid., 210-211.
82) From the Special Joint Committee Hearings in 1987 on the Meech Lake Accord, in Pal, 211-212.
83) Ibid., 214.
84) Ibid., 214.
86) Ibid., 37.
87) Bissoondath, "Canadian", 12.
88) Cardozo, 32.
89) Annual Report, 57. Examples of outreach include Operation Show and Tell in Nova Scotia, which introduced Black youths to thirty Black R.C.M.P. officers; and The Summer Student Program in British Columbia, which hired sponsored students: sixty participated, including thirty sponsored by a Sikh Temple.

91) Annual Report, 66.

92) Ibid., 67-68.


97) Pask, 126.


101) Gwyn, 184-185.

102) Bissoondath, "Canadian", 17.

103) Bissoondath, Selling Illusions, 86.

104) Ibid., 89-90.

105) Knowles, 188.

106) Ibid., 187-188.


108) Fleras and Elliot, 78.


111) "Multiculturalism Approved Funding", Bar Graph.

112) such as Bissoondath does ("Canadian", 17), as does Pizanias (p. 92).
CHAPTER FIVE: WHAT THE CRITICISMS OF MULTICULTURALISM POLICY REPRESENT

Although the drive to honour diversity through official multiculturalism was originally undertaken in order to promote tolerance, it is accomplishing the opposite. By setting Canadians against one another and emphasizing our differences rather than the many things we have in common, diversity has, in fact, gone too far.\(^1\)

---Gina Mallet, special to The Globe and Mail

It is a mistake to meet immigrants at the boat and offer them a grant to preserve their culture.\(^2\)

---Preston Manning, leader of The Reform Party

The current state of backlash in Canada, as mentioned in Chapter Three, is reflected in political party policies, some polls, the media, and the publicity given to various critics. While not all of these critics hold a nativist standpoint, many of their arguments reflect those made by nativists. Is this a sign of the failure of multiculturalism policy? Do their arguments accurately represent the facts? Or do their claims show a deliberate misinterpretation of the policy?

Chapter Three addressed the policy's critics, and some of the arguments against multiculturalism. In this chapter, I will look primarily at underlying assumptions about Canadian society and history, reflected in the critiques rather than being just about the policy itself: 1) minorities themselves do not favour multiculturalism. They want to assimilate; 2) ghettoization is happening in Canadian communities, and multiculturalism is the cause; 3) Quebec's model for addressing heterogeneity is integrationist while English-Canada's model is not, and consequently is more effective; and 4) Cultural preservation leads to balkanization, which leads to the collapse of national identity.

As multiculturalism is a policy without limits for minorities to do as they choose, it contributes to this balkanization.

In addition to this examination, this chapter will also analyze the reasons behind this backlash. Do these criticisms reflect
failures of the policy, or could they represent an attack on minority groups? Why, then, do some members of minorities themselves speak out against multiculturalism? How does one explain the publicity surrounding minority critics such as Neil Bissoondath? What is the role of the media in this debate? Do these criticisms make multiculturalism better? Does the policy have actual shortcomings? Is a public policy of minority rights necessary? Are assimilation-oriented societies truly assimilationist? These are questions to which I hope to respond.

Themes: 1) Minorities do not want multiculturalism, they want to assimilate.

Kogila Adam-Moodley states that the major concern of minority parents, in educating their children, is competence, not culture. That is, the most successful minority groups are those that take cultural training into their own hands while allowing schools to train their children for the marketplace. This observation hints at a particular assumption about minorities: minorities do not appreciate the policy of multiculturalism, which allows them to maintain their heritage. Rather, they would choose to join and participate in the larger society. While Moodley uses this claim to suggest directions for the multiculturalism policy, others use it to justify the elimination of the policy. As Richard Gwyn claims, the absurdity of the policy is that little evidence shows that "this is what minorities really want". This claim is often justified by opponents who like to draw examples of members of minorities who speak out against multiculturalism. Often, this evidence is anecdotal, as seen is this quote by Gina Mallet:

Most new Canadians didn't emigrate to become hyphenated. In Vancouver, a Chinese student called in to a talk show and said he wants to become a Canadian - but nobody will let him. In Toronto, journalist Julie Reka, who came to Canada from aged seven says, "I have a Hungarian heritage, but I want to be a Canadian. Yet I'm not allowed to by a government that wants me to be a Canadian ethnic."
Richard Gwyn also claims that the solution is to "listen to those 'voices on the other side'", like Devo-Jaikoah Dyette, a "Canadian who happens to be black". He refers to Eastern writers such as those from the Indian subcontinent as those who are "liberated in the west", which seems to emphasize that easterners come to western-liberal nations like Canada to escape the presumed social entrapments of Eastern culture.

Robert Fulford sees minority rejection of multiculturalism in the increased number of intermarriages: "...those born to a culture may find its expressions oppressive, boring, or irrelevant... . Often, intermarriage can be understood as a conscious or unconscious break for freedom". Fulford does not state his proof to this claim, but evidently the idea of two people from different groups who marry out of love is a point beyond his consideration.

Not only is this tactic present in various forms of media, it is now used in parliament in order to try and alter or eradicate multiculturalism policy. Reform Member of Parliament Sharon Hayes states:

I don't necessarily agree with the policy... . There were citizens and non-citizens phoning in to a local TV show I was involved in not that long ago. As far as I know, they were all from minority groups... . As far as I can remember, they said they had come into this country, or whatever. They identified themselves with minority groups.

They unanimously rejected the multicultural policy of funding that now exists. They said it is not necessary, and yet they expressed a true love of this country and their choice of being here.

Reform Party leader Preston Manning also uses this claim. In making the case against multiculturalism in his book The New Canada, he quotes Professor Rais Khan:

People, regardless of their origin, do not emigrate to preserve their culture and nurture their ethnic collectiveness. If they wished to do that, they would stay where they were because the environment is more conducive to the perpetuation of one's culture and ethnicity. Immigrants come here to be productive and contributing
members or their chosen society... Whether or not I preserve my cultural background is my personal choice; whether or not an ethnic group preserves its cultural background is the group's choice. The state has no business in either.\textsuperscript{10}

While the critics' use of minority spokespeople to help show the undesirability of multiculturalism may at first appear convincing, a closer observation would show this to be a case of making judgement, then searching for the evidence to support that claim, rather than making a judgement after collecting and looking at the evidence. Yes, a number of individuals from ethno-cultural minority groups have stated that the policy is unnecessary. Support for the policy is not unanimous among minority groups. However, this says nothing about the validity of the arguments made by these individuals. Are their claims any more reflective of reality, or does their ethnicity automatically validate their claims? Are their claims as individuals representative of the minority group(s) they come from? Is the fact that Canadians of minority heritage are exposed to the same forms of socialization (media, schools, etc) as the rest of the population relevant in that it helps shape their opinions and values of multiculturalism policy in such a way similar to the rest of Canadians? Opponents of the policy ignore these questions and use spokespeople to reinforce their cases.

Thus, the first problem with this argument is that it assumes that these individuals speak for the ethnic groups they originate from. Second, this line of argument suggests that because an individual belongs to a particular minority group, he/she should know more about the policy -- or has more exposure to it -- than do other Canadians. Studies which may test minority attitudes towards multiculturalism are not referred to.\textsuperscript{11} The evidence presented by opponents of the policy is anecdotal, and sweeping in its generalizations. Furthermore, critics often ignore the fact that in addition to those opposed to the policy, many individuals from various ethno-cultural communities favour multiculturalism. Himani
Bannerji, Kogila Moodley, Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Andrew Cardozo, and Tissa Fernando, have all shown support for the policy in some way or another. ¹²

How, then, do the critics respond to these 'ethnic' supporters of multiculturalism? In most cases, they do not address the supporters directly. In some cases, these ethno-cultural minority supporters are explained as being those who benefit directly from the grants and legislation of the policy. Gwyn, for example says the multiculturalism and its supposed notion of 'separateness' is valued by ethnic politicians who want to keep their constituents separate, which is to assume that ethnic politicians are only elected in ridings composed primarily of constituents of the same ethnic origin. For if the constituents integrate, then politicians lose their role as "gatekeepers". ¹³ Moodley also sees ethnic intellectuals as a co-opted group, promoting multiculturalism out of personal gain and self-interest. ¹⁴

Part of the reason why critics such as Gwyn, Cannon, and others speak out against multiculturalism is because they feel the policy gives special treatment to non-charter group Canadians when they should be receiving 'equal' treatment. For example, critics of non-charter group origin such as Khan and Bissoondath say they do not want paternalism, special grants, or affirmative action. Rather, they expect fairness and equality. ¹⁵

The examples presented here show that no proof exists to show a consensus among individuals from minority groups in the rejection of the multicultural model. ¹⁶ Like any other group of people, individuals within an ethno-cultural group will exhibit a wide range of opinions. For multicultural critics from the mainstream to justify their claim that 'minorities want assimilation, not multiculturalism', they either have to ignore statements by members of these groups which show support for the policy, or more importantly, they have to divide these groups into 'good ethnics' and 'bad ethnics'. 'Good ethnics' are those who reject any kind of special treatment and show an eagerness to join mainstream society.
'Bad ethnics' are often those who challenge the status quo, support the policy, and may resort to the rights granted to them under the Charter of Rights in order to change Canadian society on what may be seen as their own terms.

For Gwyn, Bissoondath represents a 'good ethnic' as he is "liberated in the west", and rejects any kind of special treatment granted to him. Meanwhile, Irving Abella -- as head of the Canadian Jewish Congress -- is a 'bad ethnic' because he wants to fight the assimilation of the Jewish community. Gwyn demeans such efforts by defining them not as integrationist (joining the mainstream while preserving one's own culture), but rather, as a kind of monoculturalism: "...determination by many multicultural groups to remain quasi-Canadians on their own terms is striking".17

Bissoondath and Khan have a point worthy of consideration; they and their arguments should stand on their own merit, not on any special treatment given because of their ethnicity. However, other critics of multiculturalism cite them mainly because of their ethnicity.

The foundations of this claim lie in an assumption that the policy is overly concerned with cultural maintenance at the expense of integration. Those who make this claim do not appear to be aware of the difference between assimilation and integration. As explained in Chapter Two, 'assimilation' is when an ethno-cultural group relinquishes its own culture in order to move into the larger society, and 'integration' describes when a group can maintain aspects of its culture while moving into the larger society. As was explained in Chapter Three, the perception of multiculturalism as just activities directed towards cultural maintenance does not reflect the actual applications of the policy. In regards to the second point, when observers say that minority groups want to 'assimilate' or 'integrate', it is not clear which meaning they are actually using. As explained in Chapter Two, the two terms are often used interchangeably, when they actually mean two different things. This begs the question: do immigrants come to new homes
like Canada with the intention of assimilating, or integrating?

Since the evidence presented by critics of multiculturalism about how contemporary immigrants and non-charter citizens oppose multiculturalism is not conclusive, an examination of the experiences of immigrant groups in Canadian history is required to answer the question. Do minority groups actually favour assimilation over integration?

To recall, various critics of multiculturalism attack it by stating how the previous model of Anglo-conformity (assimilation) was a much more effective way of managing societal heterogeneity. Link Byfeld made this point, mentioned earlier, as does William D. Gairdner:

For it was only assimilation to the high moral standards of freedom and responsibility under our English governing institutions that had any hope of dissolving these fractious and bloody differences (among ethnic groups).\(^1\)

To check the validity of this statement, the historical experiences of newcomers to Canada need to be examined. During this period of Anglo-conformity, ethnic groups in fact did try to preserve their own culture in schools and in the homes of their respective families, and were challenged by both individuals and government.

Assimilation was expected of Ruthenians and Galicians (Ukrainians) who settled on the prairies at the turn-of-the-century. Education reformers saw the Ukrainians as anachronistic. The culture of these people interfered with the promotion of universal values based on the British system.\(^1\) Education inspector (and later, premier of Saskatchewan) J.T.M. Anderson stated that while re-educating the parents would be impossible, the assimilation of Ukrainian children was in the vital interests of Canada.\(^2\)

Unless we grind ourselves to this task... the future of our Canadian citizenship will fail to reach that high level of intelligence which has ever characterized Anglo-Saxon civilization throughout the world... We are in danger, perhaps, of being unduly influenced by sentiments of national egotism and a spirit of disdain for all that bears upon it
E.H. Oliver, as Vice-President of the Saskatchewan Public Education League, also felt that preserving the greatness of Canada's Anglo culture was dependent on the assimilation of the new Ruthenian (Ukrainian) immigrants: "Though their children speak with the tongue of Ruthenians... [they] have not been touched with Canadian ideals and have not mastered the English language, our system of education profiteth nothing".\(^{22}\)

In spite of the fact that these newcomers were learning English, the Saskatchewan government had all bilingual teachers removed from the public schools by 1913. In 1916, the Saskatchewan Schools Act was amended to abolish bilingual education\(^{23}\) (as would also be the case in Manitoba and Alberta). Such acts made the demands of the host society clear; new Canadians must shed their old culture and adopt Anglo-Canadian norms in the name of national unity. Assimilation, however, was not to be restricted to the schools. Reformers tried to enforce Anglo-conformity in newcomers' homes as well. Protestant missionaries advocated Galician children "be taken away from the manners and customs..." found in their homes. To this end, fourteen Presbyterian 'school-homes' were established in Ukrainian-Canadian areas between 1902 and 1925.\(^{24}\) Some teachers tried to change what they saw as low standards of hygiene among Galician children. They also objected to the early marriage of Galician girls (between the ages of 13 and 16), which they attributed to a poor view of women in this Eastern European culture.\(^{25}\) In judging the standards of gender equity within this new group, these assimilationists overlooked some of the autonomous acts of Ukrainian women, such as the passing of gender-specific knowledge of medicine and traditional clothing. Furthermore, while some teachers saw the primitive living conditions of rural Ukrainian family homes (sod huts and log cabins) as a reason to suggest the removal of children from these families, they failed to note that other rural homesteaders -- including those of Anglo-Saxon origin -- lived in similar conditions.\(^{26}\)
Contrary to what contemporary critics might suggest, Anglo-conformity was not a smooth process that immigrants wholeheartedly accepted for the purpose of becoming Canadian. The Ukrainian-Canadian experience shows that it was met with resistance. Harold W. Foght, who was commissioned by the Saskatchewan government to inspect the condition of schools in the province, complained in his 1918 report of how trustees of non-English schools were not taking the advice of inspectors in hiring desirable teachers. J.T.M. Anderson also encountered resistance to his assimilationist policies from foreign-born trustees and parents. He attributed this resistance to the parents' ignorance of school law and regulations, and to the (English) illiteracy of various board members. On occasion, he had to use "rather strong measures of persuasion". His response to uncooperative trustees was to ask them to resign, or replace them with officially-appointed trustees.

As Howard Palmer shows, the main tool of assimilation was the schools. Not only was this the case in Saskatchewan, but in Alberta as well. The Alberta Department of Education at this time strongly resisted attempts to introduce other languages, such as Ukrainian and German, into the school system. Although it was possible to teach other languages after school hours, the government made no provisions to train teachers to do this. This led to a confrontation in 1913 between the Department of Education and Ukrainian-Canadian teachers and parents when the government tried to prevent out-of-province Ukrainian-Canadian teachers from teaching in Ukrainian-district schools. This came at a time when there were no teachers of Ukrainian background within Alberta with Alberta teaching certificates. The parents resisted by refusing to pay taxes and temporarily setting up their own schools. Eventually, they did comply with the government's policies.

Did this resistance by the Ukrainian community mean they were not interested in becoming 'Canadian'? In the eyes of education officials, it did. But as Neil Sutherland explains, Canadians
misunderstood the intentions of immigrant parents. Immigrants came to Canada to better their lot; thus they viewed education as very important for their children's future. Immigrants, however, wanted their children to grow up as bilingual and bicultural Canadians. They saw their children as participating fully in Canadian society while retaining their original culture and language. As the Ukrainian-Canadian newspaper The Ukrainian Voice declared during the First World War, "we wish to know and speak our language, but not only our own. English is our first language here".

Stella M. Hryniuk and Neil G. McDonald support this view by explaining the experience of Ukrainian immigrants in Manitoba. There, new Canadians knew that learning English was vital for survival in Canada. Yet they wanted their children to learn in bilingual schools, which were not at all unusual in Europe. The notion of bilingual schools was popular enough among the Ukrainians in Manitoba that the community was united in its opposition to the ending of bilingual education in Manitoba in 1916.

The treatment of Ukrainian newcomers was not an isolated case. Other cases show minority groups did want to preserve aspects of their culture while moving into the mainstream, but were hindered from doing so by the general society. The abolition of bilingual instruction in public schools in Saskatchewan in 1916 also affected Canadians of German origin. In his effort to unite the different ethnic groups into a single British and Christian nation, E.H. Oliver also campaigned against bilingual education in German communities. After a limited investigation, he concluded that the students at a German school (St. Gregory Parochial School) were "crippled for life" due to their parents' decision to put them in a bilingual school.

Francophone minorities in English Canada also tried to practise and preserve their culture through language, only to be opposed by the majority. French language rights were abolished in Manitoba in 1890 after the Riel Rebellion, a decision that was eventually
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1979. French language rights were repealed in the Northwest Territories (now Alberta and Saskatchewan) in the years 1890 and 1892. The Northwest Assembly successfully appealed to the federal government to repeal the language clause in the 1877 Northwest Territories Act. In 1893, the Francophone minority appealed to the federal government to reinstate dual (bilingual) education. The group made some gains, but official attitude was hostile. The Department of Education clearly did not want the bilingual schools of Manitoba, which they saw as spilling over into what is now Saskatchewan.

Ethno-cultural minorities tried to preserve their culture not only within English Canada, but also in Quebec as well. Once again, the majority saw these groups as attempting to break away from the mainstream, rather than trying to join them. Quebec nationalists, who saw their province as the last bastion of Francophone culture on an English-speaking continent, felt that newcomers had to be assimilated in order to preserve the 'perennial French fact'. Jews who fled persecution in Europe to come to Canada in the first half of the twentieth century found that in Quebec, they were treated as Protestants for educational purposes. Yet they did not receive the same privileges as Protestants, even though they paid taxes. Consequently, Jewish families found it difficult to preserve and teach their customs, as their children were subjected to Protestant instruction, and could not stay home on Jewish holidays. In 1930, the government passed a bill that permitted a school commission for the Jewish community in Montreal. As it recognized pluralism, it was condemned by the Catholic Church and by French nationalists, who advocated a two-nations framework. In 1931, a new bill was passed which did away with the Jewish school commission.

Opponents of the current multicultural policy acknowledge that racism was part of Canada's past. However, they assert that the nasty things that happened in Canada are of a time passed. However, relatively recent examples in Quebec show how the majority
can still try to impose its will on a minority in a supposedly more tolerant society. In the post World War Two era, immigrants who came to Quebec had an increasing tendency to put their children in English-language schools. Wary of this trend, Quebec nationalists were by the sixties no longer willing to accept a bilingual division within their education system. A 1967 Quebec government report called for provincial intervention into immigration, and urged the province to adopt an assimilationist approach to education. Acting on such advice, the provincial government and school boards began to stream allophone (non-English or French) students into French-language schools. This led to a revolt in the St. Leonard area of Montreal in 1968, in which allophone students refused to attend the French schools assigned to them by a nationalist school board. In spite of such demonstrations of resistance, and the cautionary warning given by the Glendon Commission in 1972 which stated that coercive language policies would only isolate minority groups even more, the government enacted Bill 101 in 1977, which streamed all immigrant children into French schools.

It is worth noting a consistency in virtually all of these struggles involving the assimilation of minority groups: these minority groups were of European origin. Why was the establishment not forcing visible minority groups to conform? This factor goes to a point I will discuss below because visible minorities were excluded from Canadian society by means such as laws that barred their entry or by forced segregation in public institutions such as schools. To recall what Derrick Thomas said, assimilation's only sanction is exclusion. In Canada, the experience of Anglo-conformity showed that only those groups that most closely resembled Anglo-Saxon/Celtic culture (those of European origin), were permitted entry while others such as Asians and Blacks were turned away.

Another important contribution of these examples of minority resistance is that they call into question the claim made by
contemporary critics such as Link Byfield, Preston Manning, and William D. Gairdner that assimilation was a process that harmonized the nation by enforcing a 'universality' or a 'common ground' for all people. This conformity demanded a high price that newcomers were not willing to pay. Furthermore, these examples show how ethnic disruption occurred even among European groups in their relation to the Canadian mainstream. This directly contradicts the claims of Byfield and Gairdner that it was only when the immigration portals were opened to those of different races did Canadian society experienced any kind of ethnic upheaval. The problems they see with current newcomers from less-developed countries were the same problems Canadians saw of European immigrants who came in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as this 1911 quote by Stephen Leacock shows:

Still more important [than the increased volume of immigration] is the economic and racial character of the immigrants of the Twentieth century. They no longer consist of the strenuous, the enterprising; they are not except in minor degree political or economic refugees... They are, in great measure, mere herds of the proletariat of Europe, the lowest classes of industrial society, without home and work, fit objects indeed for philanthropic pity but indifferent material from which to build the commonwealth of the future.47

Did the fact that individual groups wanted to maintain some of their identity mean they were not interested in becoming part of Canadian society? Only in exceptional cases was this so. While some ethnic groups who tried to participate in society were rejected, others who wanted to live separately were denied this right.48 The Mennonites, Dukhoubors, and Hutterites often encountered hostility in their attempts to live separately and educate their children outside of the public school system. While the federal government granted these groups the right to avoid conscription and public schooling, provincial governments did not always concur regarding public education. In the 1920s, six thousand Mennonites left Canada for Latin America after the provincial governments of Saskatchewan and Manitoba denied them the
right to educate their children in private schools. In 1873 an order-in-council that exempted them from military service, the swearing of oaths, and which assured them the freedom to exercise their religious principles "without any kind of molestation or restriction whatever, and the same privilege extends to the education of their children in schools", evidently was not effective in addressing the provincial decisions considering that education was by law a provincial responsibility.

Hutterites, in comparison, were able to make decent arrangements with the provincial governments in order to educate their children in separate schools. These arrangements, however, were not always secure. Officials in Manitoba sometimes considered putting Hutterite children in public schools.

The attempted assimilation of a people against its will was most prominently illustrated in the case of the Doukhobor community in British Columbia between 1911 and 1935. The Doukhobor community saw state-run education as a threat to its community beliefs, values, and practices. State education, they felt, would undermine the respect of young community members for their elders and ultimately lure them away from their families and villages. In trying to enforce school attendance in Doukhobor villages, parents were charged under the Schools Act, which was amended in 1920 to pressure the Doukhobor community to comply with the law. After a series of nude protests (in which protestors removed their clothing as the sign of their dissention) in the Kootenays in 1932, almost 600 men and women were arrested and placed in a penal facility on Piers Island. Their children (365 of them) were divided up between orphanages, foster homes, industrial homes and schools to be cared for and educated for the three years that their parents were expected to be incarcerated. By placing the children in care without the parents' consent, the government in Victoria was clearly acting beyond its powers in an illegal manner.

Assimilation, however, did not mean that European immigrants would be treated as equals to established Anglo-Canadians. New
immigrants had to take menial labour positions in which they worked under harsh conditions with low wages and irregular employment. Even when workers of European origin joined labour unions in the hope that they could improve their work situation, they found that they were still relegated to the bottom of the hierarchy within the unions.\textsuperscript{55}

How do these historical cases contribute to the contemporary debate on multiculturalism? They show that critics cannot make a credible case that immigrants will their own assimilation into Canadian society. Certainly, immigrants wanted to join and participate in their new country (with the noted exceptions), but not at the expense of their own culture. This suggests that immigrants wanted to integrate, not assimilate. Why were new Canadians reluctant to completely shed their former identities? To recall what Derrick Thomas said in Chapter Two, complete assimilation imposes a painful sacrifice on immigrants, and therefore is likely to be resisted by some ethnic groups. The cases mentioned here confirm John Rawls' earlier statement (Chapter Two) that the ties of culture are often too strong to expect newcomers to give them up completely even if they migrate voluntarily.

Critics of multiculturalism do not state whether they are saying that immigrants do not want to assimilate, or integrate. But by using the above argument to try and show the futility of multiculturalism, they imply that immigrants want to assimilate. The history of immigrant resistance to conformist measures instituted by provincial governments with regards to education demonstrate that this is not the case. As multiculturalism favours an integrative model by allowing for ethno-cultural groups to maintain various aspects of their culture while moving into the larger society, and as psychological studies at the individual level show a clear preference by immigrants for integration,\textsuperscript{56} it is a more realistic model. Not all ethno-cultural groups may have been officially lobbying for multiculturalism prior to 1971, yet
history shows how minority groups would prefer a more pluralist system.

2) Multiculturalism causes ghettoization by encouraging separateness

According to hockey commentator Don Cherry:

Multiculturalism has killed our Canadian culture. Thirty or forty years ago, we had a Canadian culture and everyone knew it. Now immigrants have their own little communities, their own little worlds... when they get here, they try to make Canada into whatever they left.57

The notion that multiculturalism is causing ghettoization is quite popular among critics. Neil Bissoondath writes that people try to erect "'multicultural' apartheid-like walls".58 Richard Gwyn warns that Canada will lose its cohesion, as 'others' will retreat to their ethnic ghettos.59 Ethnic communities are already "retreating into self-constructed ghettos".60 He blames this on multiculturalism, which he says "encourages apartheid".61

Neil Bissoondath also talks of "undeniable ghettoization" in Canada.62 He, like Gwyn, faults this on multiculturalism:

Heritage belongs first and foremost to the individual. It seems to me possible to instruct an individual child in his or her cultural heritage without erecting ghetto walls by engaging in communal endeavour.63

He claims that multiculturalism allows new Canadians to live in ghettos:

People who arrive and find themselves living in their little ethnic community, never engaging with society. That's what I think has to be avoided because a person ends up in a way caged by their cultural baggage. I know too many people from the Caribbean who insist on living here as if they were still back there.64

Doug Collins also talks of ghettoization. Specifically, he refers to visible minorities and their effects on neighbourhoods: "Parts of Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, and other cities have become suburbs of Hong Kong, Islamabad, Calcutta, Kingston,
This treatment of multiculturalism as encouraging ghettoization in popular writing has recently influenced academics. David Delafenêtre, in criticizing the inclusion of a question on the ethnic status of Canadians in the census suggested it would be "...a dangerous step toward an institutionalization of voluntary apartheid. This race classification could in turn lead to the horizontal mosaic of multiracialism as proposed by multicultural extremists".66

Fundamental to this critique is the contention that Canadian society is becoming increasingly fragmented along ethnic lines. How accurate is this? The critics do not define 'ghettoization'. Ghettoization, or separation/segregation, can be measured in a number of ways: residential segregation, the existence of parallel institutions among minority groups, the levels of endogamy among ethnic groups, mother tongue language retention among these groups, and religious practice.67 An examination of ghettoization in Canada requires looking at each of these categories separately to see if Canadians are indeed retreating into ghettos.

In terms of residential separation, Canadian observers may be influenced by the ghettoization they see happening in the United States. Knowledge of residential segregation rests primarily on American social science research.68 Glazer and Moynihan noted increased segregation in American cities in their book Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish in New York City (1970). Research in this field is also coming from Britain, where Husbands (1987) and Rees and Barkin (1984) noted the segregation of Bangladeshis in London, Leeds, and Bradford.69

As neither of these countries, officially recognize multiculturalism, it would be safe to assume from what Gwyn, Bissoondath, and writers for The Western Report write that Canada's problems with residential segregation of minorities vis-a-vis the main population would be exponentially worse. Evidence shows that this is not the case. Historically, some groups such as the
Doukhobors, Hutterites, and Mennonites have historically chosen to eschew the mainstream society. In such cases, government policy cannot be blamed for the decisions made by these groups who are only acting on their freedom of choice where to reside in Canada. Their choice of residence has not been forced on them. More recently, using 1991 census data, Balakrishnan and Hou showed that some residential concentration does exist. However, in most cities, greater ethnic diversity and increased migration from less-developed countries has largely avoided the development of high segregation. Blacks and South Asians, in spite of recent heavy immigration, have not experienced an increase in residential concentration. This would be inconsistent with the views of certain critics, who often refer to ghettoization in regards only to visible minorities.

The possible reasons for this pattern in ethnic concentration may be because, first, of official language proficiency. South Asians, Afro-Caribbeans, and Chinese, especially those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, are often more proficient in English. This knowledge of an official language helps these groups in their integration into Canadian society. Montreal has the highest levels of concentration of all minority groups. This may be due to a lack of proficiency in French among newcomers. Second, the concentrations may be due to higher levels of homogeneity among southern Europeans and Jews compared to visible minorities. Asians and Blacks, for example, come from a variety of backgrounds. Specifically, South Asians are a diverse group, consisting of different languages, religions, and from different regions. For groups that are more homogeneous, members will probably participate more in ethnic activities, as their institutional completeness is higher.

These ethnic enclaves may not necessarily be a bad thing; they may serve as a resource for integration for new immigrant groups. Enclaves help newcomers to adjust. Established ethnic groups or established members of an ethnic group often provide settlement
services. The established groups act as mediators and translators between new arrivals and the wider public (an activity which is funded by the Department of Heritage). Thus immigrants use the resources in the enclave in order to enter mainstream society more smoothly. Within the enclave, individuals are linked by common interest in overcoming the barriers to their participation in larger society. This would be consistent with Balakrishnan and Kralt's findings, which attribute ethnic residential concentration in part to the recency of arrival of members of an ethnic group. A large percentage of those in an area considered to be an Italian neighbourhood, for example, would be first-generation Canadians. The children of these immigrant parents, however, often choose to live elsewhere. Residential concentration of an ethnic group, therefore, will diminish as integration of that group increases, and class differences by ethnicity fall away.

In reality, ethnic enclaves appear to be a first-generation phenomenon. As many visible minority immigrants did not arrive until after the changes to Canadian immigration law in the sixties, and many are therefore first-generation Canadians, it should not be surprising that some ethnic concentrations may be present in cities such as Vancouver. These concentrations, however, may diminish as these groups integrate into society in following generations.

When critics of multiculturalism talk of ghettoization, they may actually be referring to the increased presence of visible minorities in traditionally homogeneous cities. Cities with a large homogeneous majority tend to show higher levels of residential ethnic concentrations than do those with long-standing heterogeneous populations. Western Canadian cities appear devoid of identifiable ethnic concentrations.

In terms of this presence of visible minorities in Canadian cities, is it then fair to categorize their areas of residency as 'ghettoes'? This could hardly be the case, as visible minorities rarely constitute a majority in an area, as John Mercer points out in his study of Asian migrants in Toronto and Vancouver:
Only rarely is the majority of a tract's population in either urban area (Toronto and Vancouver) comprised of Asian migrants. Even if Canadian-born members of a migrant household or others of a similar ethnic background were added, only in a very few instances would two-thirds of a small district's population be represented. Thus, it is scarcely sensible to talk of 'ghettos' in Canadian cities. Yet this term does occasionally appear in the Canadian media and in public discourse. Given its distinctively American racial context and the images it conjures up, this is a serious misrepresentation.

How, then, do observers determine that multiculturalism causes ghettoism? The best evidence people like Gwyn and Bissoondath provide is personal observation and anecdotes. They see a large number of a particular ethnic group residing in an area, and they may interpret this to be ghettoization. Cecille DePass shows that a closer analysis would show that visible minorities have not tended to establish their own neighbourhoods. She uses the example of Calgary's north-east quadrant to show how some suburbs may have a high percentage of visible minorities, yet they also contain immigrants from several European nations (including Poland and Britain), as well as working-class Canadian-born people. Furthermore, some small numbers of visible minorities also reside in affluent areas. To show minorities -- especially visible minorities -- as restricted to only certain areas may be one-sided when in fact they are well integrated in urban centres such as Calgary.

The aforementioned facts show how residential concentration of particular ethnic groups may happen for a number of reasons. However, these can hardly be classified as 'ghettos', especially how we understand them in the context of cities in other countries: areas of poverty and crime in which particular groups find it difficult to break out of generation after generation. To say that multiculturalism causes ghettoization is an oversimplification that does not explain any real links between the policy and the phenomenon of ghettoization.

Another measure of ghettoization and fragmentation would be the
degree to which the ethno-cultural groups in question have developed parallel structures and institutions to perform the economic, social, cultural, and political functions necessary to maintain the community. The more functions an ethnic group can perform by itself, the less contact its members will need to have with the larger society. For example, groups such as the Hutterites or Amish Mennonites in Ontario have their own schools within the public school system.\textsuperscript{79}

Canadian ethno-cultural groups, it would appear, tend not to rely on their own social structures for long periods of time after their arrival, and over generations. As W.W. Isajiw showed in a 1981 study of ethno-cultural communities in Toronto, and their media, vacation facilities, and attendance at functions, members of a group tend to participate less in ethnic group functions from one generation to another. While Italians and Ukrainians showed the highest degree of institutional completeness in the first generation, Jews and Ukrainians held the highest degree in the second generation.\textsuperscript{80} By the third generation, only Jews held a high degree of participation in their own institutions (in fact, they experienced a slight increase), while participation fell for everyone else. Overall, participation by members of an ethnic group within the institutions and functions of that group fell with time, and over generations.\textsuperscript{81}

Similar conclusions can be made about the Chinese and West Indian community. A 1979 survey found that the majority of members within these groups were reluctant to rely on their own communities. They favoured Canadian agencies to protect them from discrimination. In general, this suggests a high rate of participation from members of ethnic groups within mainstream society, and that these groups respect Canadian institutions.\textsuperscript{82} This contradicts the assertions of critics such as Gwyn, who argue that such ethno-cultural communities in Canada are becoming self-centred, and are in fact practising monoculturalism.\textsuperscript{83}

Other factors such as endogamy rates (marriage within one's
ethno-cultural group), mother tongue retention, and religious practice can show signs of fragmentation in Canadian society, but they do not. Ethnic endogamy rates have been generally falling since 1931,\textsuperscript{84} and rates of intermarriage have consistently increased since 1971.\textsuperscript{85} Home use of mother tongue languages clearly declines with time in this country. Two-thirds of those who arrived between 1978 and 1986 in Canada had a non-official language as a mother tongue. In 1986, fewer than 10\% of Canadians spoke a non-official language at home. The groups with the highest rates of mother tongue language retention have more recent arrivals among them.\textsuperscript{86} This would be consistent with Herberg's study, which concluded that ethno-cultural groups in Canada between 1961 and 1981 experienced a recovery of mother tongue retention, probably due in part to the arrival in Canada of new members.\textsuperscript{87}

The practice of religion has been declining in all ethnic groups, and generally throughout Canada.\textsuperscript{88} This would contradict the examples given by Gwyn and Bissoondath, who both cite examples of minority groups trying to assert their religion to show how multiculturalism has allowed groups to become self-centred, and in their opinion, separate from the larger society.\textsuperscript{89} The declining practice of religion in Canada shows that their examples are more the exception than the rule.

Is multiculturalism impeding immigrants from acquiring an official language? Gina Mallet seems to think so: "Heritage language programs in Ontario schools are teaching children Spanish or Hebrew or Hindi long before they are required to study French, one of Canada's two official languages".\textsuperscript{90} She does not explain how learning both official languages is superior to knowing an official language as well as non-official one. In the eighties, 40 to 50\% of new Canadians could not speak a charter language upon arrival in Canada. This percentage has grown over the past decade not due to any changes in the source areas, which have been the same since the sixties, but because of the increase in family and refugee classes after 1978. The 1986 census showed that learning
an official language occurs fairly quickly for over half of those initially unable to speak either one. However, a significant group is still unable to speak either French or English three to eight years after their arrival in Canada.\footnote{91}

Does this mean that multiculturalism policy impedes these newcomers from acquiring an official language? Lack of language proficiency can be attributed to the class of immigrant (family and refugee class), rather than government policy. Furthermore, this lack of language proficiency among some immigrants is not unprecedented in Canada. The level of language ability among immigrants in the forties and fifties, before official recognition of multiculturalism in 1971, resembles the situation in the eighties. In 1951, 21\% of immigrants who came to Canada in the previous two-and-a-half years could not speak an official language. In 1986, 17\% of arrivals in the previous two-and-a-half years could not speak an official language.\footnote{92} Thus, the lack of official language ability among some new Canadians is not due to multiculturalism policy preventing it. One can hardly say the policy encourages immigrants not to learn English or French, when demand for E.S.L. (English as a Second Language) and F.S.L. (French as a Second Language) classes is so high.\footnote{93}

In response to the claim that Canadian society is becoming increasingly ghettoized due to multiculturalism, this foregoing examination of integration of immigrants through residential settlement, the establishment of parallel institutions within minority communities, exogamy rates, retention rates of mother tongue and religion, and official language acquisition shows that such is not the case.

3) Other Models of Integration/Assimilation Are More Effective than Multiculturalism

Critics of multiculturalism like to draw comparisons with other models of integration to show how Canada (or more specifically,
English Canada) could be doing a better job of making society more cohesive. A popular theme in this line of argument is to compare multiculturalism in English Canada with interculturalisme (interculturalism) in Quebec. Quebec's policy of interculturalisme has its roots in the 1970s. According to former Minister of Cultural Communities in 1990, Normand Cherry, the objectives of the Quebec government in dealing with minorities within this province are three-fold: to provide a better knowledge of and understanding of Quebec society amongst the cultural (minority or allophone) communities, to achieve a greater recognition of Quebec's pluralist reality amongst the general public, and to effect a rapprochement between cultural communities and the majority community. Interculturalism, like multiculturalism, is concerned with the acceptance of cultural communities as a reality within Quebec. However, interculturalism is also committed "to uphold the perennial reality of the French Fact...". In other words, diversity in Quebec is limited in that it must recognize French as the official language of that province and the centrality of Quebec culture. This makes this policy similar in practice to anglo-conformity in the time of advocates such as J.T.M. Anderson.

Quebec politicians and critics of multiculturalism make the point that the Quebec approach has been more successful in managing and integrating all the different cultural groups within the society. Suzanne Tremblay, Member of Parliament for the Bloc Quebecois (Rimouski-Temiscouata), made such a point in parliament:

The U.S. has had respect for other cultures; they have chosen an intercultural approach. That is also the approach chosen by Quebec. But the Americans created the melting pot. An American is an American. He isn't half American, or one-third Irish, one-third English, and one-third Canadian. Here, we 've created a mosaic rather than a melting pot. Multiculturalism has not been a good policy for Canada. Personally, I challenge it.

In comparing multiculturalism to other models, opponents often point to Quebec as the exemplar that Canada should follow. These
critics do not specify the difference in that Quebec has a policy of interculturalism. In fact, rarely do these critics even mention this policy difference. Rather, they find appeal with the way Quebec demands conformity from its newcomers. Margaret Cannon, in her critique of multiculturalism, points out that Quebec is a "pluri-ethnic society"; many cultures and races are unified by one language. Richard Gwyn points out that Quebec's 'cultural convergence' model is a better model. It means that newcomers should absorb the values, myths, and traditions of the society they have come to while contributing their particularities to the larger society. According to Gwyn, this "multicultural synergy is better than the multiple monoculturalism provided by official multiculturalism".

Bissoondath also looks at Quebec's approach with admiration. He states that the process of integration of immigrants in Quebec is much better than in English Canada in that Quebec demands newcomers conform to French society. While English Canada defines itself by it diminishing 'Britishness', French Canada defines itself by its increasing 'Frenchness'. The Quebec approach, he points out, is exemplified in the Quebec Superior Council of Education Report of 1993, which "urged Quebec schools to take charge of integrating immigrant children... to the fundamental values of Quebec society." These values included recognizing French as the official language, Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, the legal system of British common law and French civil law, and parliamentary democracy based on freedom and equality.

In analyzing this critique of multiculturalism policy, it is useful to first note some contradictions and inconsistencies made by the critics mentioned above. Bloc Quebecois MP Suzanne Tremblay states that the Quebec model of interculturalism is superior to multiculturalism. However, in giving an example of the failure of
multiculturalism, she points to the case of Chinese-Canadians and Italian-Canadians in Montreal:

...everybody can continue to cling to the old countries, here in this country. Thus, you have the Chinese in Montreal speaking Chinese. There may be a few who speak English and French, but they can live in Chinese. The Italians speak Italian and can live in Italian. With multiculturalism being applied here and there and everywhere throughout Canada, we have created certain ghettos.\(^{105}\)

This example is somewhat contradictory. Montreal is in Quebec, which -- according to Tremblay -- follows interculturalism. It then stands to reason that if Chinese and Italians are speaking their own languages in that city, assuming that this somehow represents a failure of integration, then surely it is a failure of interculturalism, not multiculturalism.

Bissoondath also makes a few notable contradictions. He advocates the assimilation of non-whites into white (Canadian) society, yet he upholds Quebec's view of itself as a distinct society.\(^{106}\) M.V. Naidu notes that whether Bissoondath supports special status for Quebecois for personal reasons of for political opportunism, "this position contradicts his opposition to the 'ghetto mentality' of minorities and his criticism of the non-whites not getting integrated into a single Canadian culture".\(^{107}\)

Bissoondath is also inconsistent in that he faults the existence of racism in English Canada as the product of multiculturalism. That is, the failure of multiculturalism is seen in that it eradicated the centre, evoking uncertainty as to what it means to be a Canadian.\(^{108}\) The result is the rise of nativism, as seen in the popularity of the Reform Party and the rise of the Right.\(^{109}\)

However, racism and its manipulation through nativism also exists in Quebec. Bissoondath acknowledges this to some extent, noting the anti-Semitism of Quebec nationalists such as Groulx, and how newcomers feel left out of manifestations of Quebec nationalism such as St. Baptiste Day Parade".\(^{110}\) Yet he is willing to accept these manifestations as diminishing, and not representative of
Quebecois in general. As he says, "Some see a shift away from racial thinking... . There is undeniable evidence of a movement away from the narrow and simplistic".111 Why is it that in English Canada, racism can be due to multiculturalism, but racism in Quebec is not the product of interculturalism?

These inconsistencies are worth noting in that they point to logical problems within this critique. Why do critics such as Bissoondath and Tremblay cite evidence that contradicts their arguments?

In exemplifying Quebec, critics appear to be in reality showing support for a more assimilationist model while alluding to support for integration. Gwyn calls the situation in Quebec "multicultural synergy", but the aspects of Quebec policy that he likes are those that mean "newcomers should absorb the values, myths, and traditions of the society they have come to".112 Bissoondath, by referring to the recommendations of the Quebec Superior Council of Education, shows that he too likes the Quebec policy for its assimilative aspects. This shows that in the minds of critics such as Gwyn and Bissoondath multiculturalism does not represent integration of newcomers into society, but rather -- as Gwyn says -- a kind of 'monoculturalism'. Furthermore, it shows that they believe the Quebec model to be very different from multiculturalism policy. What these critics are pointing to are the assimilative aspects of the policy in Quebec.

Is interculturalism noticeably different from multiculturalism? According to Marie MacAndrew, the idea that Quebec's approach to the management of funding for minorities is fundamentally different from the rest of Canada is a myth. A number of analysts have pointed out that in the mid-1980s, the Quebec government was practising de facto multiculturalism in that the Ministry of Cultural Communities (in charge of managing grants through interculturalism) largely financed their activities.113 MacAndrew also notes that the phases in the evolution of interculturalism policy in Quebec closely followed and resembled the phases in the
evolution of multiculturalism policy in Canada. For example, federal multiculturalism policy began to focus on issues of equality and anti-racism towards the end of the seventies. Interculturalism in Quebec went through a similar phase in the mid-eighties. As multiculturalism policy began to focus on individual rights at the end of the 1980s, so did interculturalism in the early to mid-1990s.¹¹⁴

Issues such as language preservation, pursued by the federal government through programs such as the teaching of Heritage languages, are often dealt with in Quebec through similar programs like P.E.L.O. (Programme de langues d'origine).

McAndrew states that interculturalism is, in reality, not much different from multiculturalism. Those who claim that Quebec's policies of management of heterogeneity are superior fail to examine the issues in fine detail, and consequently miss this point. Furthermore, Quebec politicians such as Tremblay contribute to this image by promoting Quebec as being different from English Canada in policy.

Does Quebec society actually do a better job of integrating immigrants than English Canada? In spite of the Quebec government's recognition of the pluralist nature of Quebec society and its commitment to assist cultural communities in the preservation of their heritage, a number of incidents suggest that in the realm of Quebec politics, allophones are not always accepted as part of the Quebec nation. This was most recently demonstrated in the wake of the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty in which Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau blamed the loss on "money and the ethnic vote".¹¹⁵ In spite of efforts by the Quebec government to juxtapose its recognition of cultural pluralism alongside the imposition of the French Fact (which is what opponents of multiculturalism say makes the Quebec policy superior to multiculturalism), Quebec nationalism seems in many ways to ostracize non-francophone communities in Quebec. For example, during the campaign leading up to the 1995 referendum in Quebec,
Bloc Quebecois M.P. Philippe Pare said in an address to the roving commission on sovereignty that he wished immigrants would just stay out of the referendum so "old stock" Quebeckers could decide their future for themselves. His comments were later echoed by Bloc M.P. Gilbert Fillion.\textsuperscript{116}

Nationalists in Quebec have long seen immigrants as a threat to the French character of Quebec, and have tried to enforce conformity through acts such as the elimination of the school commission for the Jewish community in 1931, attempts in the sixties to incorporate a unilingual school system,\textsuperscript{117} and the passing of Bill 101 in 1977, which restricted access to English-medium schools for most immigrants.\textsuperscript{118} Such policy implementations contradict the recognition of pluralism within this province.

The success of integration of immigrants in Quebec is brought into question by a number of factors. To recall, Balakrishnan and Hou showed in their study of residential segregation in Canada that Montreal had higher levels of segregation than other metropolitan areas in Canada.\textsuperscript{119} While Montreal does not constitute all of Quebec, it does bring into question the overall integration of immigrants in Quebec, as outside of Montreal the Quebec population is mostly homogeneous.\textsuperscript{120}

Quebec has traditionally had problems retaining immigrants. This situation has improved somewhat recently; ten years after coming to Quebec, 65\% of immigrants still live in Quebec. However, this number is still below the immigrant retention for the rest of Canada which is 75\%.\textsuperscript{121} Whatever the reason for Quebec's retention rate, this fact leads to the question: if the Quebec model is more successful for integrating immigrants, why do so many leave Quebec?

In discussing business immigration to Canada, Roslyn Kunin and Cheryl L. Jones showed in 1994 how Quebec's poor immigrant retention rate may be due to the province's goal of protecting its linguistic and cultural heritage. By legislating French-only linguistic requirements through Bills 101 and 178, the goal of protecting the use of the French language in the marketplace may
have led to the mass exodus of big business (and immigrants in general) in the late 1980s for both business and personal (family) reasons.\textsuperscript{122}

Immigrants in Quebec appear to view themselves as part of the larger entity of Canada before they see themselves as part of the entity of Quebec. The freedom to choose in which official language to educate one's children meant most immigrants in Quebec would prefer to have their children in English-language schools. The majority of second-generation Quebec immigrants assimilated into English rather than French culture.\textsuperscript{123}

At the collegiate level of schooling, where allophones can choose in which language they want to be educated, the percentage of allophones enrolled in French-language institutions has risen from 15\% in 1980 to 41\% in 1990.\textsuperscript{124} However, other factors show a possible accommodation problem of immigrants in Quebec society. The proportion of immigrants with no knowledge of either French nor English increased from 11\% in the 1981-86 period to 42.5\% in the 1986-90 period. The percentage of immigrants with knowledge of French only fell from 29\% (1981-86) to 14.3\% (1986-90).\textsuperscript{125} Furthermore, in terms of readership of the major daily French-language newspapers in Montreal, allophones constituted only 6.6\% of the readers. Anglophones constituted another 6.4\%, and francophones accounted for 87\% of readership.\textsuperscript{126}

Another factor that calls into question Quebec's success with integration of immigrants is the attitude of the dominant society's attitude towards minority groups. Berry and Kalin's 1991 national survey found that while comfort levels of British- and Other-origin Canadians with other ethno-cultural groups were relatively high, results given by French-origin respondents living in Quebec showed them to be less positive towards other groups. As the researchers concluded, it was clear that the transition from an 'ethnic' to a 'civic' meaning of the Quebecois identity has not been completed, and possibly is only just underway.\textsuperscript{127}

This problem of integration of immigrants into the dominant
francophone society may have to do with lack of French proficiency among newcomers. Yet these facts show how difficult it would be to make the case that Quebec is more successful than English Canada at dealing with its diverse population. The presence of residential segregation in Montreal clearly contradicts the claims of Bissoondath, Tremblay, and Gwyn. Ironically, these critics all use the term 'ghettoization' to describe the effects of multiculturalism, when the best evidence of segregation (residential and linguistic) exists in the province they uphold as the best example of ethnic integration! The Quebec government has taken a number of steps to recognize the plurality of Quebec society; yet this recognition still contradicts the critics who exemplify Quebec interculturalism policy for its assimilationist aspects (that is, compelling all newcomers to conform to francophone culture). Francophone nationalists have felt threatened by the increased presence of immigrants, despite the fact that the Quebec population needs immigrants to survive as a society. Consequently, nationalist governments have tried to impose French culture on immigrants through legislation such as Bill 101. Again, this contradicts Bissoondath, who stated that Quebec defines itself by strengthened 'Frenchness'. The aforementioned facts show that the Quebec government is wary of its population decline and the fact that it has one of the lowest birthrates in Canada, and is trying to offset that in part with immigrants whom they hope will conform to francophone culture.

The idea that Canada should consider replacing multiculturalism with another model is not restricted to those who compare English Canada to Quebec. David Delafenêtre suggests that Canada might consider following in Australia's footsteps and adopting the idea of transculturalism, which stands for putting checks on multiculturalism policy by reaffirming principles such as parliamentary democracy and equality of the sexes. He also suggests that Canada may find its own middle ground possibly through a policy of 'intégration pluraliste'. Brian Bullivant
suggests that western nations should pursue a policy of multiethnicity (or 'poly-ethnicity'). Such a paradigm, which he claims is adopted in the United States and Australia, attempts to reconcile the needs of ethnic groups while recognizing that a dominant culture exists which must be preserved. This model upholds the elements of a common culture.\textsuperscript{131}

In considering these alternatives, one might ask: how different are these models from multiculturalism in reality? Quebec adopted interculturalism on the premise that it would integrate ethnocultural minorities into the mainstream society while preserving elements of commonality in French society. This premise makes interculturalism resemble transculturalism and multiethnicity. In application, would transculturalism and multiethnicity truly differ from multiculturalism? As Andrew Cardozo points out, whether or not we change the terminology, the notion that society seeks harmony is unavoidable.\textsuperscript{132} That is, government policy will inevitably pursue a recognition of society's ethnic plurality in certain ways (such as the preservation of heritage languages, anti-racism training, and giving grants to ethno-cultural groups) that make irrelevant the fact the official doctrine of management of diversity is called 'interculturalism', 'multiculturalism', or whatever. It is also important to keep in mind that multiculturalism policy has, as a long-term policy, changed with time. The policy as it is practised in the nineties is quite different from the policy in the seventies. Perhaps if it was an unchanging policy, then Delafenetre and Bullivant might have a strong case. Rather, why end a policy that is adapting in a dynamic fashion in order to deal with issues in society?

In suggesting that federal multiculturalism be replaced with another paradigm such as interculturalism in Quebec, critics are often making a subtle argument for assimilation. This argument is based on the perception that the Quebec model is more successful in integrating immigrants into mainstream society. A closer look shows that the Quebec policy of interculturalism in fact bears a
strong resemblance to the federal policy of multiculturalism. Furthermore, various factors such as residential segregation, lack of official language proficiency, and a relatively low immigrant retention rate show how the integration of immigrants into Quebec society has been problematic in many ways. These factors may be due to Quebec nationalism encumbering the intentions of integrationist policy, or perhaps to a lack of French-language proficiency among newcomers to Quebec. Nevertheless, it calls into question the claim that the Quebec approach to integration is more viable than multiculturalism.

4) Multiculturalism Discourages National Identity

Multiculturalism policy is often seen by opponents as allowing new Canadians to import their own culture wholesale into Canada, thus allowing these groups to eschew mainstream society. Consequently, multiculturalism is bad for societal cohesiveness. Gairdner writes that the problem with allowing immigrants to practise their cultures is that some of these cultures -- he gives the examples of Jews and Arabs, Greeks and Turks, and Sikhs -- are in conflict. By promoting differences, we increase these inter-conflict hostilities.\textsuperscript{133} Reginald Bibby states that because of multiculturalism, one becomes more occupied with one's own ethnic group. This leads to ethnocentrism. He warns about the dangers of multiculturalism, as "we know little of the effects of pluralism in our nation".\textsuperscript{134}

Bissoondath charges multiculturalism for allowing Canadians to have divided loyalties. He shows this in the example of Canadians of Croatian origin who volunteered to return to Croatia to fight in the war there in the early nineties. He states that multiculturalism, by encouraging wholesale retention of the past, has done nothing to address "this serious and violent problem". Furthermore, the policy has failed to emphasize that this is a country with its own traditions that demand respect.\textsuperscript{135}

Diane Francis also sees multiculturalism as harming the national
consensus. She sees this specifically in the existence of alternatives to public schools:

The existence of more than one tax-supported school system has, in my opinion, contributed greatly towards dividing the country linguistically and in other ways. The acceptance of educational apartheid probably led to multiculturalism, a policy that has spawned an industry and done more harm to building consensus or national identity than any other policy... . Now groups are more important than individuals.¹³⁶

Richard Gwyn, as already mentioned, also feels that many multicultural groups practice monoculturalism rather than multiculturalism. The example he gives of how this has led to a lack of patriotism among Canadians is of Greek-Canadian youths at a basketball game in Toronto involving the national teams of Greece and Canada cheering for the Greek team over the Canadian one.¹³⁷ Multiculturalism, in preserving cultures, enhances dual loyalties. Italians and Somalis want to be Canadian when they come to Canada. But according to Gwyn, multiculturalism tells them that they have to stay Italian and Somali.¹³⁸

The central argument running in these claims is that multiculturalism encourages ethno-cultural groups to preserve their own culture in Canada rather than respecting and integrating into Canadian culture. A fact worth noting is that few of these critics actually define 'Canadian culture'. Bissoondath states that Canada is a country with its own traditions and culture, but he fails to mention what those traditions are. Gwyn even points out that no one, in the debate over multiculturalism, defines Canadian identity.¹³⁹ Yet he himself does not define Canadian culture!

Some critics of multiculturalism from the conservative fold have defined Canadian culture. They usually define it in terms of a particular ethno-cultural group: Anglo-Canadians. Tom McFeely of The Western Report, in reaction to former Secretary of State for Multiculturalism and the Status of Women Sheila Finestone's comment that "Canada has no national culture", wrote this: "Such a statement indicates the extent to which Canada's ruling political elite has repudiated the country's Christian and European
This particular definition of Canadian identity emphasizes ethnic nationalism, as opposed to civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalists believe that a nation is not defined by shared rights, but by pre-existing characteristics such as language, religion, customs, and traditions. Civic nationalists believe that a nation is comprised of all people regardless of race, colour, gender, language, and ethnicity who subscribe to a common political creed. The nation is a community of citizens bearing equal rights, united by a shared set of political practices and values. To identify Canadian culture in terms of a particular ethnic group, or a particular religion, or a particular imperial history is to place one ethnic group above all others. Consequently, other cultural groups who do not share these pre-existing characteristics are either excluded from citizenship or asked to integrate or assimilate.

In their 1991 report, the Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future identified seven core values that were essential elements in defining Canadian society. These values are: belief in equality and fairness in a democratic society, belief in consultation and dialogue, importance of accommodation and tolerance, support for diversity, compassion and generosity, attachment to Canada's natural beauty, and a commitment to freedom, peace, and non-violent change. These values, plus a commitment to the Crown, parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law can be what defines Canadian culture and identity. These values then become the basis of a civic nationalism.

Some may find this definition of Canadian identity somewhat ambiguous. Yet it is more conducive to civic nationalism in that it unites people by their commitment to shared political institutions rather than to a particular ethnic creed. This bias towards civic nationalism is not atypical of western nations. Most western-liberal democracies, with the notable exception of Germany, now define their nationhood in terms of common citizenship as a
result of workers, women, minorities, and aboriginal people fighting for civic inclusion throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{145}

Such a definition of society is more inclusive than one that emphasizes ethnic nationalism, as most societies are heterogeneous. As Kogila Moodley points out, the lack of a clearly-defined national identity on ethnic terms in Canada does not allow a dominant group to exercise the same pressure to conform against 'foreigners' as seen in European countries like Germany and France. Canada's definition of its own society as multicultural thwarts the zeal of assimilationists. For cosmopolitan societies, multiculturalism is not a question of choice or political strategy to be revived and abandoned at will, but a social reality. For a prudent political leadership that recognizes this reality, multiculturalism results from necessity.\textsuperscript{146}

Critics often make the assumption that multiculturalism discourages Canadians from forming a collective identity. Few critics give fine details of how multiculturalism discourages a united Canadian identity. David Delafenêtre, for example, states: "...the current policy is definitely going the opposite way by fostering separation and ethnocentrism. Both the Multiculturalism Act (1988) and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) encourage Canadians to think of themselves primarily as members of ethnic categories".\textsuperscript{147} Delafenêtre does not show how these acts do so specifically, but he refers to an article by Allan C. Cairns. Cairns, who makes no mention of the Multiculturalism Act, does state that:

The Charter is more an instrument that hands out abstract rights equally to all Canadians and is indifferent to their various statures defined by gender, ethnicity, official language status, and the presence or absence of disabilities. In fact, it specifically mobilizes Canadians in terms of these categories. \textsuperscript{148}

By recognizing Canadians by the categories mentioned by Cairns, does the Charter foster separation and ethnocentrism as Delafenêtre
says? To argue this is to turn the concept of inclusion on its head. If the Charter of Rights and The Multiculturalism Act did foster separation, then immigrant minorities would be attempting to establish their own governing and social institutions as are the nationalists in Quebec. Instead, ethnic minorities and other groups seek to air their concerns through the governing institutions of the mainstream. These pieces of legislation accord groups that historically had problems being recognized the power to have their voices heard, and even Cairns says so:

The politicization and constitution of diversity redefines groups previously excluded from the franchise on the grounds of their indifference -- construed in the past as evidence of civic incapacity -- as having unique voices, or vantage points, that justify their specific and explicit inclusion in public forums. The formerly excluded see their task as that of challenging a uniformity that is viewed as a mask for the hegemony variously of males, of whites, of non-aboriginals, of the historically privileged, or of those who do not live with disabilities.⁴⁹

Cairns also states that this same supposed fragmentation is also happening in the United States.⁵⁰ This presents a problem for Delafenêtre. How can he claim that multiculturalism is leading to voluntary apartheid in Canada when the source he draws from says that the same phenomenon also happens in the United States, which does not officially recognize multiculturalism?

In another example, Bissoondath states that the Multiculturalism Act is a policy that suggests no limits to the accommodation offered to different cultural practices. As a result, "...we find ourselves in danger of accepting, in its name, a slide into ethical chaos".⁵¹ He uses the example of a protest from a group of women's organizations in Ontario to overturn a policy directing police to always lay charges in wife-assault cases. These organizations felt that the police and courts deal more harshly with minorities than with others in such cases.⁵²

A look at Canadian law shows that limitations do, in fact, exist on multiculturalism. Section one of the Charter of Rights states that all parts of the Charter are subject to 'reasonable limits'.

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¹⁵⁰
¹⁵¹
¹⁵²
Furthermore, the Charter prevails over all other acts of law. So, the Multiculturalism Act cannot override the Charter. These 'reasonable limits' were used in court cases such as R.v. Hothi et al., in which the Manitoba Supreme Court declared that prohibiting the wearing of ceremonial daggers constituted a 'reasonable limit'. This refutes the assertion that such practices have been allowed to flourish in Canada due an uncontrolled policy of multiculturalism. These initiatives demonstrate the integrative aspects of Canadian law and of government policy. They also show that limits do exist to cultural practices in Canada where they violate Canadian law, and that other cultures are not retained wholesale.

Gwyn's example of Greek youths cheering a Greek basketball team over a Canadian one can also be considered questionable evidence of new Canadians refusing to integrate into Canadian society. Can one make a sweeping judgement from one particular incident? Would Canadian hockey fans who cheer for American teams during the Stanley Cup playoffs then also be 'un-Canadian'?

Perhaps a more accurate way of evaluating whether or not the encouragement of the retention of cultural values impedes integration into Canadian society is to test how well Canadians have been socialized for democratic citizenship. This can be done by testing how much they know about the rights and freedoms to which they are entitled. A 1991 British Columbia Charter Survey, while not designed for this purpose, assessed how much young Canadians know about their rights and their willingness to grant these rights to others. In the process of classifying the students, the researchers differentiated between students of Canadian birth and foreign birth, as well as those who did and those who did not speak English as a home language or a first language, and students whose subjective ethno-cultural identification was Canadian and those whose subjective ethno-cultural identification was other than Canadian. Consequently, the test gave evidence of how a person's subjective ethnicity may have
an impact on their knowledge and attitudes toward the rights and freedoms defining democratic citizenship in Canada. The results of the survey showed that students born outside of Canada, for whom English was not a first or home language, and students whose subjective ethno-cultural identification was other than Canadian knew their rights and valued their rights as much as Canadian-born, English-speaking, and Canadian-identifying students did.

Another possible way of evaluating whether or not the encouragement of the retention of cultural values actually impedes the integration of non-charter group Canadians into their host society is to examine how they identify themselves. Do they identify themselves as 'Canadians', or do they identify themselves as 'others'. In a series of national surveys in 1974 and 1991, John Berry and others looked at this very point. Their surveys asked Canadians how they identified themselves. Respondents were classified as those of British Origin, those of French origin, and those of 'Other' origin. The study found that in both years, the most frequent identity given was 'Canadian'. This was more the case among those of British and Other origin than among those of French origin. In fact, those of Other origin who identified themselves as such declined between the two survey periods from 28% of Other respondents in 1974 to 20% in 1991. The patterns revealed in the surveys showed that those with a strong provincial identity, such as Quebecois, tended to score low on identifying themselves as Canadians. As the years that these surveys were taken fall after the implementation of official multiculturalism, it is safe to say that the policy has not discouraged Canadians, particularly Other Canadians, from identifying themselves as such. Low scores on Canadian identity seem to be more a factor of provincialism.

As shown in the discussion of the claim that multiculturalism has led to ghettoization, multiculturalism has not inhibited immigrants from integrating in terms of residential settlement, learning an official language, exogamy, and using mainstream institutions. Reitz and Breton show that immigrant groups
integrate to the point that ethnicity becomes largely symbolic over generations. In other words, claims by critics that multiculturalism policy has only served to divide Canadians by encouraging cultural retention are supported largely by sweeping and often unsubstantiated generalizations. Why does this belief arise? According to Kymlicka, it arises in part because critics of multiculturalism "focus entirely on the fact that they (the aspects of multiculturalism) involve public affirmation and recognition of immigrants' ethnic identity -- a process which is said to be inherently separatist". Gwyn and Bissoondath view multiculturalism policy as being little more than activities of cultural retention (folk activities and heritage languages education). They do not discuss other aspects of the policy such as programmes for anti-racism and immigrant settlement. This view may be due to the possibility that they are unaware that such aspects of the policy exist. Bissoondath certainly shows that he is not aware of the anti-racist aspects of the policy when he asks why multiculturalism is not engaging in anti-racist activities.

According to Kymlicka, this criticism may be more a reflection of a double-standard exercised by multiculturalism's critics rather than an actual problem with the policy. This criticism would be more plausibly levelled at early twentieth-century concessions given to Hutterites, Mennonites, and Doukhobors. One could even argue that an element of racism exists in the way Canadians accept the historical accommodations made for these white, Christian sects -- which were genuinely separatist, while opposing accommodations made for recent non-whites, non-Christian immigrant groups, even though the latter accommodations are more integrationist rather than separatist.

Another reason for this critique being levelled at multiculturalism policy could be that people are looking for scapegoats to blame for Canada's current unity problems. As Kymlicka says, the volatile relationship between the established groups is displaced onto newer immigrants. Multiculturalism and
'diversity' is easier to blame for disunity in Canada rather than confronting the demands of the people of Quebec and the First Nations. This willingness to blame multiculturalism and pluralism for the current unity issues is illustrated by Bibby, who complains about how the policy has silenced majorities in speaking out on issues of national unity:

In Canada, we can't talk. The rules of communication are well understood: minorities who feel disadvantaged are allowed to speak out, but majorities are not. Let's get down to specifics. A major reason Elijah Harper could succeed in stalling the passing of the Meech Lake accord by the Manitoba legislature was that no one could "bad mouth" a Native... One syndicated columnist noted that the Anglo-Canadian majority was reduced to the role of virtual spectators, with even the most rabid Quebec nationalists suddenly left speechless.

This narrow interpretation of multiculturalism policy, plus the need of scapegoats on which to blame Canada's problems, leads to critics using the policy to explain issues that might not have any causal link to multiculturalism. A case-in-point, regarding the belief that the policy discourages a national identity, is the hyphenization issue. Opponents of multiculturalism fault the policy for allowing the use of hyphens in one's dual heritage, for example, 'Indo-Canadians'. Bissoondath writes that the multicultural hyphen is a convenient way to connect people to Canada, and to estrange them as well. Gwyn, in his critique of the policy, complains that hyphens entrap people by implying that they are half of another culture. Hence, hyphens give the image that the people who are being referred to by the hyphened labels are not completely Canadian.

Whether or not hyphens are actually bad, these critics see hyphens as due to multiculturalism. Yet they provide no evidence that the policy has anything to do with the use of hyphens. As Andrew Cardozo says,

It is a tired old tactic to spread lies about multiculturalism, portraying the policy as one bent on stamping a hyphenated identity on every Canadian forehead slotting us all into ethnic pigeon holes. This
would indeed be a "gigantic mistake of recent public policy" -- if there were any truth to it.\textsuperscript{164}

Contrary to what Gwyn and Bissoondath imply, evidence shows that hyphenization existed in Canadian psyche prior to the official recognition of multiculturalism in 1971. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker wrote that, "I began in 1925 my lifelong attack on hyphenated Canadianism. My whole purpose, from my university days, was to bring an end in this country to discrimination on a basis of race, creed, or colour".\textsuperscript{165} Thus, not only did hyphenization pre-date official multiculturalism, it also existed in the time of Anglo-conformity, which rebukes Reform Party leader Preston Manning's assertion that hyphenization is a result of the assertion of the need for rights since the sixties.\textsuperscript{166}

Hyphenization also exists in countries where multiculturalism is not officially recognized. For example, hyphens are used to describe different ethno-cultural groups in the United States such as: Italian-Americans, Anglo-Americans, and Chinese-Americans.\textsuperscript{167} This reinforces the point that hyphenization exists regardless of official multiculturalism in Canada.

Opponents of multiculturalism have attempted to show how the policy discourages the fostering of a national identity by encouraging ethno-cultural groups to preserve their background. This critique fails to point out how precisely a pluri-ethnic state is incompatible with civic nationalism, which is how most western nations are beginning to define themselves. This critique also appears to be based on the understanding that the policy consists of little more than cultural preservation activities.
NOTES


5) Mallet, D2.

6) Gwyn, 275.

7) Ibid., 200.

8) Fulford, A19.


11) In a study, Jeffrey Reitz and Raymond Breton [The Illusion of Difference: Realities of Ethnicity in Canada and the U.S. (Ottawa: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994):125-126] found that minority respondents were as likely as those in the majority (except those of French origin) to support the view that people who come to Canada "should be more like us". This, as noted in Chapter Three, is not necessarily synonymous with a rejection of multiculturalism. None of the opponents of multiculturalism mentioned here make use of any such survey data.

12) In a comparative analysis between Canada and Germany, Kogila Moodley states that compared to assimilationist Germany, Canada's pluralist approach is much better. Kogila Moodley, "State Responses to Immigration in Culturally-Homogeneous and Multicultural Societies: Comparative Perspectives", Occasional Paper in the Robert Harney Programme in Ethnic, Immigration, and Pluralism Studies: University of Toronto, 1996:10. Abu-Laban
concludes in her article with Stasiulus that multiculturalism must be continued. Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Daiva Stasiulus, "Ethnic Pluralism Under Siege: Popular and Partisan Opposition in Multiculturalism", Canadian Public Policy, 18:4 (December 1992): 381. Cardozo writes that multiculturalism is necessary as "whether we change the terminology or not, the notion that society seeks harmony is unavoidable". Andrew Cardozo, "On Guard for Multiculturalism", The Canadian Forum, 522 (April 1994): 19. Fernando sees multiculturalism policy as a symbol of a new Canada Tissa Fernando, "Mosaic Madness or Sensible Policy? Reflections on Multiculturalism", in Neil Guppy and Kenneth Stoddart (eds), Social Insights (University of British Columbia: Anthropology and Sociology Department, 1991): 240. He sees the criticisms as "not a simple critique of a government policy, but the questioning of the pluralistic foundations of contemporary Canada" (p.241).

13) Gwyn, 234.


15) Rais Khan says so in Bissoondath, 22

16) In fact, a 1991 national survey identified that Canadians of origins other than British or French were the most supportive of a multiculturalism ideology. J.W. Berry and Rudolf Kalin, "Ethnic Attitudes and Identities of French, English, and Other Ethnic Respondents Inside and Outside of Quebec", Paper presented at in Symposium: "Attitudes Toward Intercultural Relations in Quebec and Canada: Research Methods and Results", Canadian Ethnic Studies Association Biennial Conference, Montreal, November 20-23, 1997: 9.

17) Gwyn, 194.


20) Ibid., 23.


22) Edmund H. Oliver, The Country School in Non-English Speaking Communities in Saskatchewan (Saskatoon: The Saturday Press
and Prairie Farm, 1915): 17.


24) Ibid., 28.


26) Maciejko, 59.

27) At the time, teachers of Ruthenian origin were seen as less 'desirable' than Anglo-teachers, as it was presumed that they could not give proper English instruction. Harold W. Foght, A Survey of Education in the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada; A Report to the Government of the Province of Saskatchewan (Regina: J.W. Reid, King's Printer, 1918): 23.


29) Ibid., 85.


32) Ibid., 207.


34) Ibid., 166.


39) Ibid., 78-9.

40) Ibid., 85.


42) Ibid., 9-10.

43) Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994): 166. Sonja Sinclair ["Why I've had it with multiculturalism", The Globe and Mail (October 5 1994) A22] also makes this point by saying that Canada is a more tolerant country. But these were changes by osmosis "...by recognition that prejudices and injustices had to be corrected... . It was not an attempt to perpetuate or imitate those cultures, certainly not at taxpayer's expense" (p. A22).

44) Behiels, 18.

45) Ibid., 20.

46) Ibid., 21-22.


49) Ibid., 3.

50) reprinted in J.T.M. Anderson, Appendix B.

51) Janzen, 161.

52) J.S. McLaren, "'New Canadians', or 'Slaves of Satan'? The Law and the Education of Doukhobor Children, 1911-1935", in Jean Barman, Neil Sutherland, and J.D. Wilson (ed.s), Children, Teachers, and Schools in the History of British Columbia (Calgary:
53) Ibid., 149.

54) Ibid., 153.


56) John W. Berry, in "Prejudice, Ethnocentrism, and Racism", Migration, 2 (1996), 9, states that "hundreds of studies" show a clear preference for integration on the part of newcomers into a society.


58) Bissoondath, Selling, 185.

59) Gwyn, 203.

60) Ibid., 59.

61) Ibid., 274.

62) Bissoondath, Selling, 111.

63) Bissoondath, "Canadian", 22.


67) Crime is also a measure, but I want to discuss this in regards to immigration later.


69) Ibid., 192.

71) An article by Robin Brunet ["The Bitter Poison of Multiculturalism", The Western Report, 9:2 (April 18 1994): 32] gives the example of Richmond, B.C., of the failure of multiculturalism due to this city's increasing Asian population.

72) T.R. Balakrishnan and John Kralt, "Segregation of Visible Minorities in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver", in Leo Driedger (ed.), Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987): 156. I use this earlier study as its findings were similar to those made by Balakrishnan and Hou in 1996. Balakrishnan and Hou, 18.

73) Balakrishnan and Hou, 19.


75) Balakrishnan and Kralt in Driedger, 157.


77) Mercer, 198.


81) Keep in mind that Reitz showed in Chapter Two that ethnicity does not disappear altogether. And as Herberg showed, it can revive over time, especially by the third generation.

82) Thomas in Globerman, 241-242.

83) Gwyn, 193-194.

84) Thomas in Globerman, 239.

86) Thomas in Globerman, 236.


88) Thomas in Globerman, 237.

89) Gwyn refers to Abella speaking out against assimilation by discouraging intermarriage among Jews (Gwyn: 194), and Bissoondath talks about a Muslim group in Toronto demanding that they be judged under Islamic law in Canada ("Canadian", p. 16).

90) Mallet, D2.

91) Thomas in Globerman, 224-225.

92) Ibid., 225.

93) Ungerleider, letter to The Globe and Mail.


99) Cannon, 252.

100) Gwyn, 274.

101) Bissoondath, Selling, 197.

102) Ibid., 206.
103) Ibid., 206-207.

104) Ibid., 219.

105) Tremblay in the House of Commons (Sub-Committee on Bill C-35), 22.

106) In regards to Quebec, Bissoondath says: "It is obvious to anyone with a nodding acquaintance to Quebec that it is different. It has obligations -- to its language, to its culture, to its view of life -- that the other provinces do not. And if you have special obligations, then you need special powers to fulfil those obligations. But if Quebeckers are just another ethnic group, their needs can be, politically speaking, safely ignored". (Selling Illusions, 198).


108) Bissoondath, Selling Illusions, 71.

109) Ibid., 64.

110) Ibid., 207. Incidentally, Bissoondath's view that racist thinking in Quebec is diminishing does not correspond with the views of another writer from Quebec, Mordecai Richler. In his book Oh Canada! Oh Quebec! Requiem for a Divided Country (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1992), Richler documents the presence of anti-Semitism in the history of the Quebec nationalist movement. He says, "...I would still insist that Quebec nationalism -- from Groulx, through George Pelletier's Le Devoir, the Bloc Populaire, the Ligue, and, most recently, Peladeau -- has undeniably anti-Semitic roots. And so it follows that when thousands take to the streets, chanting 'Le Quebec aux Quebecois', we (Jews) can readily understand why our children want to leave". (p.255). Richler also takes note of the racism in Quebec society showed towards Blacks in light of the Black community's outrage in Quebec following the failure of Quebec's Justice Minister to file charges against police officers after they accidentally shot two unarmed Black men in two separate incidents in 1991 (p. 216). He also highlights the insensitivity showed towards First Nations people in Quebec. For example, after the members of the Cree nation convinced the government of New York in 1991 not to buy power from Hydro-Quebec due to the potential harm caused by the company's Great Whale river project, Quebec premier Robert Bourassa stated that the "hardest blow in history to Canadian unity" was struck by Elijah Harper, and now Natives were thwarting the $12 billion Great Whale project (p.217). Harper was responsible for defeating the passage of the Meech Lake Accord in the Manitoba Legislature, thus preventing the passage of the Accord into federal law. By associating Elijah Harper with First Nations opposition to the Great Whale Project,
Bourassa was essentially implying that Aboriginals were undermining Quebec's endeavours.

111) Ibid., 200-201.
112) Gwyn, 274.
113) MacAndrew, 8-9.
114) Ibid., 12.

115) John Gray, "Parizeau Not Sorry for Words After Vote", The Globe and Mail (February 19 1997): A3. Recently, Parizeau re-affirmed his feelings about how the referendum was lost to allophones and anglophones when he stated at an international forum of high school students that the problem for the Parti Quebecois was a solid block of votes by anglo Quebeckers and by so-called Allophones who "settled in Montreal, Canada, and not at all in Montreal, Quebec" (p. A3).

116) Julie Barlow, "The Divided Colours of Nationalism: It Seems like Everytime the PQ Touch the Ethnic Issue Something goes terribly wrong: it's latest sensitization ad campaign is no exception", This Magazine, 29:3 (October 1995): 11-13 (on-line article). Pare's exact words were: "Could you (immigrants) accept that the next referendum is for old stock Quebeckers alone for once? I'm sick and tired of feeling guilty; it's old-stock Quebeckers' turn to take charge of their own identity" (p.12). Pare later apologized to his colleagues, but not to the cultural communities that he insulted.

117) Behiels, 10, 16.
118) Fleras and Elliot, 157.
119) Balakrishnan and Hou, 18.

120) Bourne et. al., 27. Bourhis (in Berry and Laponce, 343) shows that 87% of immigrants who go to Quebec settle in Montreal.

121) Vision, 9.


123) Bourhis in Berry and Laponce, 329.
124) Ibid., 341.
125) Ibid., 343.
126) Ibid., 343.
128) Balakrishnan and Kralt (in Driedger, 156) state that residential segregation in Montreal may be due to lack of French proficiency among immigrants.
130) Delafenêtre.
132) Cardozo, 19.
133) Gairdner, 394.
134) Bibby, 10-11.
135) Bissoondath, Selling, 124.
136) Francis, 169.
137) Gwyn, 232.
138) Ibid., 232-3, 234.
139) Ibid., 182, 188.
140) McFeely, 6.
142) Gairdner states as much when he suggests that citizenship requires other ethno-cultural groups to assimilate "to the high moral standards of freedom and responsibility under our English governing institutions" in the hope of "dissolving these fractious and bloody differences" (Gairdner, 395.).
144) Ignatieff, 4.
145) Ibid., 4.

147) Delafenêtre, 22.


149) Ibid., 209.

150) Ibid., 212.

151) Bissoondath, "Canadian", 12.

152) Ibid., 16.


155) Ibid., 63.

156) Berry and Kalin, 9-10.


158) Kymlicka in Ungerleider, Strategic Evaluation, 9.

159) Ibid., 9.


161) Bibby, 169.

162) Bissoondath, Selling, 116.

163) Gwyn, 199.


166) Harrison, 163.

CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS OF THE MULTICULTURALISM BACKLASH

Many of the arguments against multiculturalism presented in the media are based on inaccurate assumptions about the policy. In some cases, these criticisms are essentially subtle attacks on the minority groups themselves. Tissa Fernando makes this point in analyzing Reginald Bibby's use of the example of Elijah Harper stalling the passage of the Meech Lake Accord in the Manitoba Legislature in 1990. Bibby's intent was to show how multiculturalism has led to ethnocentrism and extreme cultural relativism in Canada. He seems to be more concerned with a member of a minority being able to influence a major political decision in the country rather than with how multiculturalism is supposedly eroding the country:

The current attack on multiculturalism seems to me to be of a qualitatively different order. It comes from that segment of society that feels threatened by the minimal empowerment of minorities that has occurred in the last three decades. To them the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Employment Equity Act, the turbaned Sikh in the RCMP, non-White faces on CBC's National, Elijah Harper saying "No", are not the proud achievements of the New Canada, but rather the erosion of the dream of "white Canada for ever".1

Essentially, the contemporary attack on multiculturalism in some ways represents a fear of the increasing proportion of minorities in the Canadian population, and the power that those groups now wield:

Simply put, these new critics are clearly uncomfortable with the increasing cultural diversity of the nation and the growing number of "visible" minorities. Since current social norms make it unacceptable to attack minorities directly, vilification of policies on immigration and multiculturalism have begun to serve as surrogates. The speaker and audience share the code and a sense of political community is achieved... in its recent usage multiculturalism has come to serve as a code word for non-European minorities and their cultural baggage. Thus, multiculturalism-bashing must be seen for what it is: not a simple critique of a government policy, but the questioning of the pluralistic
foundations of contemporary Canada.²

Is Bibby fearful of the empowerment of minorities through multiculturalism, or is he genuinely concerned about the effects of multiculturalism on civic responsibility among Canadians? Inconsistencies in his arguments suggest that he is more concerned with attacking the policy than with the state of unity and civic responsibility in this nation. For example, in his book Mosaic Madness (1990), he upholds the American model of civic responsibility as one Canadians should look to, as Americans are more committed to nation, family, community, and religion.³ On the other hand, multiculturalism was bad in that -- and he quotes Robert Bellah -- it causes Canadians to "put our own good, as individuals... ahead of the common good".⁴ In comparison, he states in a 1997 article in The Globe and Mail that multiculturalism is responsible for undermining Canadian culture by allowing for American influence: "We're so into this mystical thing of celebrating diversity in lieu of having a real culture that we're adopting American culture en masse".⁵ Here, he sees the adoption of American culture as bad because it means endangering Canadian culture. Yet in his book, he states that Canadians lack the civic sense of Americans. The only consistency in both arguments is that multiculturalism is at fault. This contradiction -- upholding it on one hand as a model for Canadians to follow and fearing it on the other as a sign of a lack of Canadian culture -- suggests that he is more concerned with attacking the policy than with how the policy may be realistically threatening Canadians' sense of civic duty.

To go back to Fernando's point, one can see how critics often use their critique of the policy as a subtle way to attack minorities. Gina Mallet, in her article "Has Multiculturalism Gone Too Far?" in The Globe and Mail, uses her critique of the policy to express fears of the allowance of new cultural practices in schools: heritage language funding in Ontario schools, Sikh
children being allowed to wear their ceremonial daggers in Surrey and in Peel (north of Toronto), and fasting by Muslim children during the month of Ramadan.\textsuperscript{6} Mallet's article illustrates how, in the words of Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, the attack on the policy is a thinly-veiled attack on the legitimacy of demands for full membership for minorities in the Canadian political (or in this case, the socio-educational) community.\textsuperscript{7}

Perhaps what these criticisms of multiculturalism show is concern on the part of some critics that minorities are actually exercising their rights as Canadians. In making these criticisms, however, they often point to examples of rights used not only by new immigrant groups, but also by other groups throughout Canadian history. For example, Diane Francis, Sonja Sinclair, and Gina Mallet all express some kind of disdain for public funding of multicultural education, especially for religious purposes.\textsuperscript{8} This critique, based on the idea that Canada should not allow for the interference of religion in schooling, overlooks (except in Mallet's case) the reality that recognition of religion in schooling has existed throughout Canadian history. As Cornelius Jaenen points out, Canada -- like Great Britain -- has never officially subscribed to the republican doctrine of separation of church and state. Until recently, the anglophone Protestant minority in Quebec has enjoyed a dual confessional public system. Catholic minorities in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta have been accorded some recognition of their aspirations (though not always consistently) through a parallel system of separate schools; Newfoundland safeguarded a purely denominational system in its terms of union with Canada; and the Newfoundland government gave full recognition to Pentecostal and Salvation Army schools.\textsuperscript{9} In regards to present-day criticisms of multiculturalism, demands by minority groups for public recognition of religious education for their children is consistent with a long tradition in Canada of publicly-recognized religious education. Yet critics like Sinclair and Francis see the contemporary demands by minority groups for
religious education as harmful to Canadian unity, rather than placing these demands as the latest non-Christian stage in a long tradition of publicly-funded religious education in Canada.

For these particular criticisms of multiculturalism to be accurate, it seems that two points have to be proven. One is that causal links must be made between the policy and the perceived problem with heterogeneity in society. In other words, multiculturalism has to be shown to cause the problems that critics say exist in society. Rarely is this done. As shown, critics often assume that the existence of the policy has caused ghettoization, upheaval in national unity, and prejudice between ethnic groups. In making these arguments, observers rarely examine specifics of the policy to see how it may have caused these problems, or even if these problems -- such as ghettoization -- are as bad as they claim.

The second matter that critics would need in order to make the case that multiculturalism has failed is to show that the problems that they point to are distinctly Canadian problems. That is, they need to show that multiculturalism has led directly to social problems that can only be seen in Canada. Often, opponents draw examples of problems in ethnic relations that are actually present not only in Canada, but also in other western industrialized nations. This shows that these are not problems peculiar to official multiculturalism. Rather, these problems are faced by any heterogeneous modern nation. Ghettoization, for example, is often seen by critics as a product of multiculturalism. But as shown, it is questionable to talk about ghettoes in Canada while ghettoization of minorities is definitely visible in nations that do not officially recognize their own cultural diversity such as the United States, Britain, and Germany. Some critics have tried to show that multiculturalism has gone too far in that religious minorities (specifically, Jews and Muslims) have asked for special rights and for public funding of religious education for their children. A look abroad would show that this situation is not
unique to Canada: Jews and Muslims in Britain have also asked for exemptions from Sunday closing and animal slaughtering practices; Orthodox Jews in the United States have asked for permission for their men to wear kippas (hats) during military service; and Muslim girls in France, another nation that does not officially recognize multiculturalism, want an exemption from school dress codes in order to wear the hijab. Gina Mallet and Doug Collins complain that allowance for the teaching of heritage languages in Canada is a sign that multiculturalism has gone too far. Language policy was also a controversial issue in the United States during the 1980s. It was initiated by Latin American and Asian communities demanding that the government provide education, emergency services, street signs, election ballots, and other information in languages other than English. Just as seen in the case of hyphenization, these issues are not restricted to Canada. Thus, to blame them on multiculturalism is to overlook the fact that these issues occur in societies where multiculturalism is not recognized.

These two elements show weaknesses in popular arguments against the policy. They further suggest that the critics making these claims have failed to look at these issues fairly. This last point speaks to implications for informal and formal education on these issues. Is the public receiving a fair portrayal of multiculturalism policy in schools and elsewhere? Can the public formulate opinions on multiculturalism if the information they receive is based on faulty evidence? As I will explain later, these weaknesses in the arguments of opponents of multiculturalism speak to a role for educators in providing people with critical thinking skills, and to call editors and writers to task in proving the claims they make in their writing.

Why do some members of minorities come out against multiculturalism? By asking this question, I do not mean to imply that it is wrong for members of minority groups to oppose multiculturalism. I am also not trying to polarize the issue by inferring that all minorities favour official multiculturalism and
that all established ethno-cultural groups oppose it. One possible explanation is that multiculturalism is limited in its capacity to respond to historical and contemporary discrimination, as well as to class- and gender-based inequalities experienced by racial minorities and immigrants. As Abu-Laban and Stasiulus point out, current criticisms of the policy by minorities resemble the sense of exclusion articulated by Ukrainian-Canadians and others during the deliberations of the Bilingual and Bicultural Commission in the sixties.  

Another possible explanation for why some members of these groups may oppose multiculturalism is that members of minorities are exposed to the same forms of socialization as the host population. After finishing their formal education, individuals -- unless they make an effort to learn more about multiculturalism policy -- receive their knowledge of multiculturalism from the media. Members of visible minorities are exposed to the same forms of media as the rest of the population, that is, the same newspapers and television and radio shows. Consequently, individuals formulate opinions on an issue or policy based on the information available to them as well as the experiences they encounter. If the information in the media portrays a largely negative or inaccurate view of that issue or policy, or little opposition to the established views on that issue are presented, then it should not be surprising that individuals -- members of minorities or otherwise -- develop negative attitudes towards multiculturalism.

Bissoondath's book provides a case-in-point. In making his case against multiculturalism, he relies heavily on press clippings for information (Cardozo counts 75 in the endnotes) while avoiding primary sources such as interviews, government documents, and court decisions. Consequently, his opinions reflect the anti-multiculturalist attitudes of the columnists that he quotes such as Lise Bissonette (Le Devoir) and Robert Fulford (The Globe and Mail). This should ideally be sufficient research, assuming that
the newspaper reports are themselves accurate. But if they are not, then people like Bissoondath are formulating opinions based on faulty or very selective information.

How does one explain the popularity surrounding Bissoondath? I would argue that he helps redeem those who are opposed to multiculturalism of their image as being narrow-minded. That is, these critics can now claim that they are not 'rednecks' or 'bigots' as they can now use Bissoondath to show that a person of colour makes the same arguments as they. A number of opponents of multiculturalism use Bissoondath and his skin colour to help justify their own claims. Richard Gwyn, who relies heavily on Bissoondath, states that Bissoondath's contribution is that he shows Canadians that since he is non-white, "being concerned about the consequences of multiculturalism is not the same thing as being bigoted". Reform Party member Michael Nicholson, when asked about Bissoondath's book, said that Bissoondath's criticisms of multiculturalism are ones that the Reform Party had talked about for many years, "but it helps to have a non-traditional Canadian say the same thing". In regards to the debate between Secretary of State for Multiculturalism Sheila Finestone and Bissoondath, Tom McFeely of The Western Report suggested that Bissoondath's claims had more legitimacy than the Minister's because he was a non-white immigrant and she was an upper-middle class, white, Jewish and senior-aged female:

The public debate between Ms. Finestone and Mr. Bissoondath has something of an air of comic unreality. Ms. Finestone, 68, the defender of official multiculturalism, is the native-born MP for Montreal's Mount Royal riding, long reviled by Quebec separatists as a bastion of anglophone power and privilege. Mr. Bissoondath, meanwhile, is a Trinidadian immigrant of East Indian descent. These examples highlight the paradox in the attention surrounding Bissoondath. He and other critics of multiculturalism such as Richard Gwyn and Robert Fulford oppose special treatment for anyone on the basis of their skin colour. Yet Bissoondath
seems to be receiving special treatment himself from the media because he is an opponent of multiculturalism who happens to be non-white. If people are not to be judged by their ethnicity, then should Bissoondath's claims not be judged on their evidence, rather than on his skin colour? To assume that critics of colour of multiculturalism like Bharati Mukherjee, Rais Khan, and Bissoondath are correct without analyzing their arguments serves only to reinforce the notion of 'skin colour'. Under such labels, critics of multiculturalism attempt to validate their attacks on the policy simply by using quotes from visible-minority opponents of the policy.¹⁸

As already mentioned, the media are the main source of information on multiculturalism for most Canadians. How well do the Canadian media cover multiculturalism? A quantitative study by Charles Ungerleider of four print sources -- The Globe and Mail, The Vancouver Sun, The Calgary Herald, and Maclean's magazine -- from January of 1992 to August 1995 gives some sense of how good a job the media is doing. Using keyword searches, the study found that coverage of multiculturalism was incomplete and not reflective of the policy. The term 'multiculturalism' was not typically the focus of media coverage, but it was often used as a secondary descriptive or explanatory term in articles focusing on other topics such as immigration, education, program costs, and race relations. The Globe and Mail, for example, mentioned multiculturalism in over 1,000 articles, yet multiculturalism was given primary focus in only 271, or 25% of those articles. This percentage of articles dealing primarily with multiculturalism was consistent across the examined media sources, varying between 20 and 28%.¹⁹ Almost no coverage was given to four organizations that are funded by the Department of Heritage: The Canadian Ethnocultural Council, The Canadian Race Relations Foundation, The Canadian Heritage Languages Institute, and the Canadian Multiculturalism Council. The media also gave little coverage of special multicultural events in this period such as the multi-
phased national project of the Conference Board of Canada and a national initiative with the Asia-Pacific Foundation, and no coverage was given to a panel session on multiculturalism at the Third Trilateral Council of Chambers of Commerce of North America, nor the launch of the multicultural business directory. Increased attention was given to multiculturalism by the end of 1994 due to the publication of Bissoondath's book in October of that year. The Globe and Mail alone printed 102 articles on Bissoondath in this time period. He was cited by editors and columnists as a credible source, and was considered by some to be a national spokesperson while the wealth of academic material on this subject provided by those such as Charles Ungerleider and Kogila Moodley went largely unnoticed in comparison.

Columnists and writers are calling for an honest, open debate on multiculturalism. This is supposedly yet to happen, because people fear being labelled a 'racist' if they speak honestly on this issue. This point has been made by Sonja Sinclair, who says that her friends of Canadian birth are too scared to say that they are sick of newcomers demanding that Canada adopt their customs and languages rather than the other way around for fear of being called a racist. Bissoondath says that attempts to criticize multiculturalism by the Reform Party and Bloc Quebecois have been misconstrued as racist remarks. And Gina Mallet writes: "But to criticize multiculturalism is to risk being called a racist, a word as incendiary as 'witch' was in 17th-century Salem". Ironically, all of the aforementioned commentators are speaking out against multiculturalism. This raises two points: one, to criticize multiculturalism may not necessarily be the same as being a racist. However, the case can be made that their criticisms reflect an ignorance and misunderstanding of the policy. This might explain why others look upon their critiques unfavourably and, sadly and incorrectly, label them 'racist'.

The second point is that since these writers have had their articles printed, this shows that multiculturalism is in fact being
debated freely in Canada. The question is whether or not it is being debated fairly. As Ungerleider's study shows, little attempt is made in the mainstream Canadian newspapers to cover the actual events and groups that are sponsored by the Department of Heritage. Instead, attention is focused on columnists like Gwyn and writers like Bissoondath.

In fairness, others such as Julie Barlow and Andrew Cardozo have presented alternate views on multiculturalism as well as opposition to mainstream views on the policy in low-circulation publications such as This Magazine and The Canadian Forum. But these publications can hardly match the widespread distribution of mainstream sources such as The Globe and Mail and Maclean's magazine. In addition, not all Canadians have the time, inclination, or financial resources required to read and watch all news sources everyday. If the media uphold an image of themselves as presenting facts, then should they not be held to that standard?

Could these criticisms be construed as constructive criticism that helps make multiculturalism better? I argue that these criticisms are not helpful. Rather than focus on the real workings of official multiculturalism, these critics rely on and reiterate stereotypes and cliches. By doing so, they have helped make overgeneralizations accepted facts in the public forum on multiculturalism. This is what Antonio Gramsci calls 'common sense': "the way in which many people perceive the world, their philosophy, is often confused, contradictory, continuing ideas absorbed from a variety of sources and from the past, which tend to make them accept inequality and oppression as natural and unchangeable". By regurgitating beliefs such as the ones that multiculturalism causes ghettoization, that multiculturalism does nothing to address the real concerns of minority groups, and that Canadians unanimously reject the policy, such beliefs become accepted facts rather than the misconceptions they may be. These misconceptions are no longer being challenged, but rather are just assumed to be true by the average Canadian.
Thus, the influence of the media in helping members of the public to formulate opinions on certain issues cannot be ignored. As Bernard Cohen says,

The press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. And it follows from this that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on the personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read. Perhaps the notion of a map is too confining, for it does not suggest the full range of the political phenomena that are conveyed by the press. It is, more properly, an atlas of places, personages, situations, and events, and to the extent that the press even discusses the ideas that (wo)men have for coping with the day's rations of problems, it is an atlas of policy possibilities, alternatives, choices. The editor may believe (s)he is only printing the things that people want to read, but (s)he is thereby putting a claim on their attention, powerfully determining what they will be thinking about, and talking about, until the next wave laps their shore.6

In the case of multiculturalism, the role of the media in educating the public is especially crucial, since the media are the only source of information about multicultural programs for most Canadians.27

As already mentioned, not all critics of multiculturalism identify with the conservative right. But by repeating these selective views of the policy in their writings, they are unwittingly aiding the traditional critics against multiculturalism by using similar arguments. Accordingly, these traditional critics have used the writings of others to reinforce their case. Bissoondath may be critical of the Reform Party, but he shares with it similar views on particular issues. Both believe that multiculturalism divides Canadians on ethnic and racial lines; and both say that individuals and families can celebrate culture, but not at government expense.28 Richard Gwyn shows that he, too, is critical of neo-conservatives when he says they see society not as a collective, but as consumers.29 Nevertheless, when it comes to
multiculturalism, he shares the attitudes of critics like William D. Gairdner by suggesting a pro-assimilationist point-of-view. He highlights a 1994 European policy paper by Swedish diplomat Ingmar Karlsson, Ghettoislam, which calls for using Islamic communities in Europe as bridges to transfer ideals of democracy and liberalism to the communities' home nations. Gwyn says that such an approach should be used by Canada. This approach seems to suggest that new immigrant communities should not contribute to their new host culture, but rather they should acquire western culture, and spread it abroad.

To deconstruct these criticisms of multiculturalism is not to say that the policy is without faults. The policy does have some real shortcomings that need to be addressed. One is that while most ethno-cultural minorities have integrated fairly well into Canadian mainstream society, some have not. A 1991 Economic Council of Canada study showed that in terms of wage parity between immigrants and Canadian-born for similar work, East Asian and Carribbean immigrants have not done so well compared to other immigrants. Derrick Thomas shows that while foreign-born do not represent an underclass in Canada, minorities of Third World origin and visible minorities do earn marginally lower incomes, have higher unemployment rates, and are underrepresented in management-level occupations. As visible minorities have higher levels of education than the Canadian norm, this shows that they still experience discrimination in the labour market. This gives some credence to Porter's idea that a 'vertical mosaic' still exists in Canadian society. While this may not be caused by multiculturalism policy, discrimination continues to exist in spite of the objectives of the multiculturalism policy.

Another possible shortcoming of the policy is that while a majority of Canadians show a measure of support for the policy and some of its aspects, evidence exists to suggest that few Canadians actually know what multiculturalism is. John Edwards shows this through a series of surveys. One of those surveys (Edwards and
Chisholm, 1987) of 400 adults in Nova Scotia found that while the majority of those surveyed supported multiculturalism, few had any notion of what it was. Another survey of students at St. Francis Xavier University (Edwards and Doucette, 1987) found that 87% of the student population knew little or nothing about multiculturalism. While these studies are geographically limited, they do suggest the need to investigate this trend more. If Canadians in general know little about the policy, then this suggests a need to educate them in public schools and elsewhere.

Previously-mentioned studies (Reitz and Breton, Ungerleider) show that while Canadians may give symbolic support to multiculturalism, a majority feel that immigrants need to do more to adapt to life in Canada. This gives pause to those who support multiculturalism. Can a policy be promoted if the majority of a population disagrees with some of its aspects? As J.D. Wilson states, multiculturalism cannot be too far removed from public opinion if it is to serve the public. To outstrip or ignore public opinion in implementing the policy may encourage a backlash. This problem may be due to the general public’s lack of understanding of the policy and of how well immigrants adapt to Canadian society. Nevertheless, it reveals a possible gap between public opinion and public policy that needs to be addressed.

A possible limitation of multiculturalism policy can be seen in its federal funding. With a budget of $17 million per year, can the Department of Heritage realistically be expected to have a significant impact on dealing with issues in Canadian society as a whole such as racial discrimination and educating Canadians, when the budget is so limited? This statement must be qualified by the fact that the federal government does not engage in multiculturalism alone. Provincial governments also fund multicultural activities such as education.

David Delafenêtre’s work on ethnic salience among Canadians of Scandinavian origin highlights another possible shortcoming of the policy. In terms of funding, the policy was designed to support
those ethnic groups whose members expressed a desire to maintain their heritage. But the high pattern of intermarriage in Canadian society has diminished the preservation of ethno-racial purity among ethnic groups.\(^{36}\) As a result, a great many Canadians — as the case of Scandinavian-Canadians shows — may feel estranged from the policy. In other words, the reality of integration of ethnocultural groups challenges some of the assumptions surrounding the study and financing of ethnic preservation through multicultural grants in Canada. This suggests the need for a possible reevaluation of this aspect of multiculturalism policy.

As multiculturalism is a provincial as well as a federal responsibility, the differing levels of commitment by provincial governments to the policy shows that not all Canadians benefit from multiculturalism policy in the same way. As multiculturalism is often applied through education policies, and education is a provincial responsibility, this explains why the variance in application of multiculturalism across Canada as far as education policies go is so great. Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, for example, have sanctioned unofficial integrated language education. Alberta has allowed for at least ten bilingual schools. British Columbia, on the other hand, has no cohesive policy on multicultural education. Consequently, multicultural education activities in B.C. have been largely "knee-jerk" reactive policies like E.S.L. and anti-racist programs.\(^{37}\) In order to ensure that Canadians have equal access to the same multicultural programs regardless of location, coordination of these programs between provinces may be necessary. To date, the federal government has seemed reluctant to do this, perhaps because of the awareness of Quebec's deep reservations about the policy. If the federal government was really serious about this issue, presumably it would give it least as much attention and money as it accords to second language instruction, which too is a provincial matter.

The nature of these shortcomings suggests that multiculturalism policy need not be rescinded, but improved. Like any long-term
policy, it needs to adapt with time. The policy, as already shown, has done that. Evidence shows that steps are being taken to deal with some of these limitations. In order to deal with discrimination against visible minorities, some multicultural grants are targeted at addressing social needs in those areas of the community that are suffering the highest levels of disadvantage. The Department of Heritage has formed educational partnerships with provincial ministries of education in order to promote multicultural education nation-wide. This may indirectly give some uniformity in the provision of multicultural education in Canada. Unlike the perceived problems pointed out by mainstream critics, these limitations do not show the policy to cause problems with heterogeneity in Canadian society, but rather that it is sometimes incapable of addressing issues such as racism completely.

Conclusion

Rather than reflecting on the actual policy, current popular criticisms of official multiculturalism reflect critics' perceptions of the policy. Quite often, these critics do not actually deal with the details of the policy itself. While not all of these critics are from the New Right, non-conservative critics share some of the complaints that conservatives have with the policy. Consequently, whether they want to or not, these non-conservative critics are contributing to the backlash against multiculturalism.

What is the reason for this backlash against multiculturalism? Certainly, part of the reason is due to lack of knowledge. But a more compelling reason is that people feel threatened by the policy. They assume that the recognition of other groups through the teaching of heritage languages in schools, changes in the dress code of the R.C.M.P. and schools to allow for turbans and hijabs, and priority given in government and schools to issues concerning minorities such as racism and employment equity, and changes made to school curriculum materials, come at the expense of traditional
established groups. This fear of the changing face of Canadian society can be seen in the writings of those such as Gina Mallet, who concludes: "Often multicultural policy seems like a pistol pointed at the heads of people of British descent...".40

William D. Gairdner blatantly states that he fears an increasingly non-white society. He does his own calculations, which he admits may not be accurate because of mixed data and methodology, to show a decline of Anglo culture. According to his chart, the percentage of Canadians who say they are of British extraction is steadily declining. In 1986, the percentage of those was around 31%. By the year 2000, that number will drop to 21%. The last Anglo-Canadian, according to Gairdner's chart, will disappear around 2051.41

Richard Gwyn writes that official multiculturalism makes it much harder for the Old Canada and the New Canada to converge. It does this by putting the old one on the defensive while allowing the new one "to claim seemingly limitless entitlements".42 What Gwyn appears to be saying is that 'Old Canada' should continue to dictate the terms of accommodation in society in their own favour. By suggesting that the 'New Canada' can claim limitless entitlements, he shows that he is insecure because the Old Canada is losing its hegemony.

Such fear reflects not only in the beliefs of various writers, it is the rationale which justifies the Reform Party's anti-multiculturalism stance. As Preston Manning says, "Although Canadians need constitutional, institutional, and political safeguards against the tyranny of the majority, Reformers believe that safeguards are also needed to protect against 'the tyranny of the minorities'".43

Herein lies the source of the fear: official multiculturalism is moving from being a non-threatening 'three D' policy to one that actually redistributes power. In economic, political, judicial, and numerical terms, ethnic and racial minorities are coming to demand a piece of the pie, and are doing so unfortunately when
times are tough. Ethno-cultural advocacy groups like the C.E.C. and the U.C.C. lobby for changes to constitutional legislation such as the Meech Lake Accord and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Changes are made to allow for Sikhs to wear turbans in the R.C.M.P. and to disallow the use of school prayer in public schools. School curricula are adapting to a changing population by teaching non-official languages and amending textbooks to eliminate racial biases and Christian religious references. Opponents of multiculturalism say that these changes show Canada to be turning into a balkanized society. It could be argued that what it actually shows is how different ethno-cultural groups are becoming more involved in mainstream institutions and consequently, forcing a redefinition of Canadian identity. Such a redefinition is not new. Rather, Canadian identity has always been in a continuous state of evolution. If Canada never changed as a society after 1763, it would still be the British-run, Franco-colony of Quebec! Contemporary critics of multiculturalism argue that Canada goes too far in accommodating newcomers, yet they fail to mention that accommodation has always been part of Canadian history. Accommodation of the Loyalists who came after the American revolution led to the formation of Upper Canada and Lower Canada and New Brunswick in the Maritimes. Lord Durham's report recommended responsible government in order to be more responsive. Jews were given full emancipation in Lower Canada in 1832. Like the changes made to law and policy through multiculturalism, these changes did not come without opposition from established groups who saw their power being threatened. Until the late nineteenth century, J.D. Wilson states, the majority of Canadians outside of Quebec considered Canada to be a white, Protestant, and British nation. By the turn of the century, due to a begrudging acceptance of Roman Catholics, Canada was seen as a white, Christian and British-Canadian country. At the end of World War Two, thanks to increased secularization, and growing nationalism, Canadians loosened their ties from Britain and Christianity in national
identity. But discriminatory legislation directed at the aboriginal population, Japanese, Chinese, and Indians showed that this was still a "white man's country". With the changes in Canadian legislation since the 1980s, the image of Canada continues to change.

Critics charge that government protection of culture is unnecessary. Such protection, they claim, only serves to ghettoize people, when culture can be preserved by families and individuals.

For example, Bissoondath recalls a quote from a television producer of Indian background who said: "I don't need some bureaucrat in Ottawa to tell me who I am". Bissoondath uses this to show the futility of government attempts to protect cultural rights: "It is time we removed personal culture and ethnicity from the manipulative realm of public policy and returned it to individuals and their families, the only sphere where they have any true and lasting value." Gwyn echoes this sentiment when he asks if the Baptist religion can flourish here without demanding to be known as Baptist-Canadians, why cannot Italian-Canadians survive here "without having to be hived off as Italian-Canadian?". This logic, he concludes, justifies calling for the elimination of the policy:

Ending official multiculturalism is, surely, the way to create a community within which everyone can refer uninhibitedly to "our country" and "our homeland", and above all, can talk about "responsibilities" to each other - even while all those who are multiculutred can retain as much of their cultural distinctiveness as they choose, no differently from Baptists or believers in any other religion or creed. It's the difference between being a community and merely being in it.

This call to end the policy might be logical if one assumes that all ethno-cultural groups were treated the same. But as shown in section 1, chapter four, ("minorities do not want multiculturalism, they want to assimilate"), not all cultural groups were treated the same. Canadians of French, Ukrainian, Mennonite, Italian, and Jewish origin had their rights to preserve their own culture
infringed upon by governments acting on the demands of the host population. The experiences of Ukrainian-Canadians show that families and individuals alone were unable to protect their own culture, as agencies of assimilation such as the Presbyterian church removed Ruthenian children from their homes and put them in school homes.\textsuperscript{51} This refutes Bissoondath's and Gwyn's contention that minority groups can preserve their own culture without government protection. Both of these writers may argue that such acts of forced assimilation are characteristic of a Canada that is no more,\textsuperscript{52} but the St. Leonard's Revolt and the passing of Bill 101 in Quebec, the numerous "violent" conflicts with Aboriginal people such as those at Oka and Guftason Lake, and the attempt by the Ontario Education Ministry to legislate the mandatory recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools show otherwise. Furthermore, the fact that a backlash is occurring now, and many of the complaints against multiculturalism policy are actually attacks on minority groups themselves,\textsuperscript{53} suggests the possibility that a government in power may respond to public pressure by "cracking down" on immigrants and minority groups. Such has been the case in France and Germany. Furthermore, as we have seen, provincial policies sometimes differ from federal policies in the treatment of minority groups. One sees this today: while multiculturalism is officially recognized at the federal level, the Alberta government just recently repealed its Multiculturalism Act.\textsuperscript{54}

The fact that not all Canadian ethno-cultural groups were allowed to preserve their own culture even in the private sphere, that government-sanctioned restrictions on particular groups can be seen today, and that the protection of non-charter cultures was subject to the whims of governments and differences between federal and provincial levels of government, all show the need for an official recognition of cultural pluralism. The inclusion of minority rights through section 27 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and its citation in various court cases regarding the protection of minorities, show how multiculturalism is used today

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to guarantee minority rights. As Pal shows, funding by the Secretary of State for cultural groups has 'normalized' the politics of multiculturalism. That is, state-funded programs help bring issues of multiculturalism to the national agenda. Since a proportion of the Secretary of State funding goes solely to provincial groups, this funding helps project these issues into the provincial arena. Thus Ottawa's policy demands provincial cooperation and helps make the debate more constant in all provinces.

While having an official federal policy of multiculturalism does not guarantee that the provinces will always act in accordance, it does influence the provinces to pass multiculturalism legislation of their own. This is evident in how most of the provinces passed such legislation after -- not before -- the federal government gave official recognition to multiculturalism in 1971. Official recognition has legitimated the role of multiculturalism, and thus allowed non-charter groups a say in national politics. Section 27 of the Charter gives minority groups an ability in the future to challenge possible infringements of their rights in the courts. This shows that a certain level of tolerance has been reached in Canada because of multiculturalism rather than in spite of it.

Multiculturalism, it has been argued, has many advantages in integrating minority groups into the mainstream. It sanctions diversity, which as Danilo Anton states, is necessary:

Diversity provides flexibility. It ensures that even if some roads are blocked here and there, there will be alternative ways for life to continue. Uniformity is anti-life. Uniformity imparts vulnerability by not allowing other options. It can only be sustained with great investment and effort and, in the end leads to extinction. Diversity is life; uniformity is death.

Abu-Laban and Stasiulus argue that multiculturalism allows for ideological space to pursue the demands of affirmative action, a prospect that may lie behind the concerns of many critics, and for more responsive institutions within education, health care, and
policing. It allows for a more inclusionary discourse about membership in the Canadian political community, which increases in importance as Canada becomes more ethnically and racially diverse as a result of immigration through the twenty-first century. In other words, multiculturalism allows for a more inclusive definition of Canadian identity, and provides options for a heterogeneous society rather than forcing different groups to assimilate to (or to be excluded from) a singular definition of society. As Berry points out, there is no appearance in Canada of serious ethnic conflict that is about to break out into sustained violence. Canadian cities have yet to experience the scale of violence involving minorities that can be seen in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in Germany as seen with the firebombing of Turkish homes. The divisions and 'voluntary apartheid' that multiculturalism supposedly causes is yet to be substantiated.

Critics charge that multiculturalism does not do enough to assimilate immigrants. This leads to the question, can a nation be truly assimilationist? Examples show that in spite of claims by some nations to be assimilationist-oriented, these nations must at times take into account the needs of minorities. Otherwise they risk alienating these groups and this leads to conflict. Group differences have not disappeared in assimilation-oriented societies such as the United States (E Pluribus Unum) and France (Unite de l'Hexagon). In dealing with minority groups, these nations have been forced to change their stances. In the United States, bilingual education is offered in several states to accommodate students of Hispanic and Asian origin. The French government has had to accommodate the cultures of the Basque region, Catalan, and Bretagne by posting bilingual signs. Furthermore, nations have experienced significant levels on intergroup conflict resulting from ethnic groups struggling to be recognized within these assimilationist societies, and also from increased levels of societal deviance in struggles over the right to be culturally different within these societies. This is seen in black-white
racial tensions in the United States, and with Basque nationalism in France and Spain.  

Canadians, it can be argued, have adopted official multiculturalism not because they want it, but because they need it. Immigration patterns since the 1960s have made the population more heterogeneous and cosmopolitan than in the past. A melting pot paradigm may have worked in a more homogeneous society, or in a society in which visible minorities were a very small part of the population. Such cannot be said about the Canadian population today. The 1996 census showed that 11.2\% of the Canadian population comes from visible minorities, and that people of colour make up one-third of the populations of Toronto and Vancouver. This is the highest count of visible minorities as part of the Canadian population in history. Some have argued that the different ethno-cultural groups within the population would eventually amalgamate and thus make ethnicity a moot issue. The evidence presented in Chapter Two has shown that such has not been the case so far. Even in the United States, which follows a melting pot paradigm, ethnicity continues to persist and is very much at the centre of many issues such as language education, and affirmative action. Thus, Canadians need a policy which allows them to deal with the issues of ethnicity that a cosmopolitan society will face, and to allow public institutions to be more responsive to the changes that occur due to the interaction of different ethnic groups.

Critics of multiculturalism assume that any recognition of ethnicity is bad, because it implies bias in public policy, and forces people to think of themselves as groups, not individuals. They fail to see that assimilation and its call for 'universality' is itself a recognition of ethnicity: one at the expense of others.

The call for a pluralist strategy as opposed to a universalist one in ethnic relations draws a parallel from the field of gender studies. Feminists make a similar argument for a gender-sensitive approach as opposed to a gender-free approach: the former allows
one to recognize that at different times and in different circumstances one might be required to adopt opposing policies in order to eliminate gender bias. This argument can be applied to the issue of managing ethnic heterogeneity: a cultural pluralist model allows for the possibility that at different times, nonconventional policies might be required to eliminate bias and foster integration of ethno-cultural groups into the host society.

In making the case against multiculturalism, mainstream critics have chosen to view the policy through their own interpretations of it, rather than to view the policy in its reality. In doing so, they have contributed to making an accepted, mainstream view of multiculturalism based on stereotypes. To counter this, various checks or 'watchdogs' need to be put on print media. Spokespeople in the media business often claim that they are the watchdogs for politicians. Then who is watching the media? We need to hold the media accountable for what they say, and hold them to a standard they claim to have set for themselves. Various organizations, such as Newswatch and Fairness and Accuracy in Journalism in the United States, already perform this task. In addition, this issue also speaks to the possibility of additions to multicultural education in schooling. Multicultural education has been traditionally defined as involving the following areas: heritage-language training, E.S.L., the inclusion of multicultural curriculum (such as the teaching of histories of non-charter groups), and anti-racism education. Since the media is doing an incomplete job of informing the public about multiculturalism, could multicultural education be expanded in order to teach children about multiculturalism policy, what it means and what it consists of? This expansion could also reaffirm the need for critical thinking in education in order to provide young Canadians with skills to approach the media critically. Critical thinking could be expanded to specifically address issues of immigration, tolerance, and Canadian identity in order to give society a heightened consciousness (and hopefully, less insecurity) towards an
increasingly diverse society. This could help discourage the tendency for nativism to flourish in times of nationwide economic hardship. I will speak to these possibilities in greater detail after I deal with arguments against immigration policy.

2) Ibid., 240-241.

3) Reginald Bibby, Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potential of Life in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1990): 93. Bibby says that American individualism has coexisted with an intense commitment to church, community, and group life (p. 93). In contrast, "Canadian emphasis on pluralism translates into freedom for individuals. But pluralism does not go on to indicate how individuals are brought back into community. Pluralism breaks the whole into protected parts, but it doesn't put the parts back together again"(p. 96).

4) Ibid., 92.


6) Ibid., D2.


8) Diane Francis, Underground Nation: The Secret Economy and the Future of Canada (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1994):169. Sonja Sinclair responds to a Muslim parent she saw on CBC News who wanted "free-of-charge Muslim instruction at school" for his children by saying: "Well if he was looking for another Syria, perhaps he should not have come to Canada to begin with. It is a basic tenet of our public schools that they should not teach religion..." [Sonja Sinclair, "Why I've Had it With Multiculturalism", The Globe and Mail (October 5 1992): A22]. Gina Mallet also expresses concern over publicly-funded religious education: "Already other religions -- Jews and Muslims -- have petitioned... to have their own schools publicly funded" (Mallet, D2).

9) Cornelius J. Jaenen, "A Multicultural Canada: Historical Roots and Educational Implications", address, Thunder Bay (January 15 1982): 7-8. He also points out that Jewish schools in Quebec have also been given public funding recently.


13) Ibid., 381, 377.


16) Cardozo, 32.


18) Such is the case with Robin Brunet's article, "The Bitter Poison of Multiculturalism" [*The Western Report*, 9:2 (April 18 1994):33]. He quotes Chinese-Canadian Jimmy Wong saying: "Immigrants who don't want to become Canadian should be thrown out". The article specifically states that the example of Wong shows how supposed beneficiaries of the policy are now critics.


20) Ibid., 53.

21) Ibid., 53, 54.

22) Sinclair, A22.


24) Mallet, D2.


28) Brian Bergman, "Pride and Prejudice", *Maclean's*, 107:45

32) Derrick Thomas, "The Social Integration of Immigrants in Canada", in Steven Globerman (ed.), *The Immigration Dilemma* (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1992): 244-245.


36) David G. Delafenêtre, "The Scandinavian Presence in Canada", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 20-21. Delafenêtre's research on the Scandinavian pattern of adaptation shows that a variety of immigrant experiences exist in Canada. The outcome of these different experiences shows that ethnicity has different degrees of relevance for Canadians. For the majority of Canadians of Scandinavian origin, ethnic identity is insignificant. While identity may be more important for other Canadians, no category of degree of ethnic maintenance should be privileged over the other (p.21).


40) Mallet, D2.


48) Gwyn, 273.

49) Ibid., 276.

50) Bissoondath shows that he makes this assumption when he recalls a letter he received in response to an article he wrote in The Montreal Gazette that was written by a man who said that before multiculturalism, he had no sense of self, no sense of what he was... . Multiculturalism, he felt, had rectified all that. Bissoondath says his comments reflect those of Ukrainian-Canadian writer Myrna Kostash, who told Bissoondath that multiculturalism, by officially recognizing the experiences and particularities of 'Ukrainian-Canadians', had validated her own experience in Canada. Bissoondath's response to all this is: "It speaks to a startling dependence on government and public policy.... I wondered, where were his parents and family through all this? Was it the role of the state to provide him with a knowledge of his familial past and his ancestral language? It was, it seemed to me, a question of responsibilities-- and how much easier it is to point the finger at a distant state than at loved ones". Bissoondath, "Canadian", 20.

52) Gwyn, 186. And Bissondath, Selling, 166.

53) Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, 381.


57) Abu-Laban and Stasiulus, 381.


59) Mercer, 201.

60) Berry in Hryniuk, 194.

61) Ibid., 194.


Certainly, immigrants built this country. That job has been done. The story in our fiscal crisis is that, in Canada's interest, immigration must be reduced to a minimum... Diminishing Returns shows that too many immigrants are not paying their way in Canada. We already know... that the policy of rapid population growth is costly to taxpayers and confers no benefit on individual Canadians.1

-Charles Campbell, former Vice Chair of the Immigration Appeal Board, 1995

All immigrants to Canada in the past fifteen years have been a net burden to Canadian society.2

-Herb Grubel, Reform MP (North Vancouver), 1994

The above quotations demonstrate the current immigration backlash happening in Canada. This backlash is not evident only in the comments of those in the media; it is also apparent in the opinions of the Canadian people. A poll published in February 1994 by the Ekos Research Association showed that 53% of Canadians thought that too many immigrants were coming to their country.3 Art Hanger, the former immigration critic for the Reform Party of Canada, stated that his party's agenda includes cuts to immigration from around 215,000 people a year to 150,000. He states that these cuts are necessary: "History shows that (the latter figure) is the maximum we can accommodate without undue strain".4

The incumbent Liberal government has shown that it responds to this anti-immigration sentiment. In spite of a promise by the Party in the 1993 election to increase immigration inflows to reflect 1% of the national population (which would allow for about 300,000 newcomers per year), the Party has cut immigration levels down from the pre-1994 levels (when the Liberals came to power) of 250,000 per year to the current level between 195,000 and 220,000 immigrants per year.5 In February of 1995, the federal government imposed a $975 "landing fee" on each immigrant allowed to enter Canada.6
acknowledging that the backlash was based on faulty assumptions about immigrants, showed that a backlash does exist and that her government was sensitive to it: "I have to recognize the myth is there (that immigrants cause unemployment). To have more immigration in Canada, we need the support of the population".7

As is the case with the backlash against multiculturalism in Canada, the current immigration backlash represents a microcosm of the larger anti-foreigner phenomenon in the western world. This can be seen in the United States with the passing of Act 187 in California, which denies health, welfare, and education benefits to illegal immigrants.8 It can also be seen in the controversy over the beating of suspected illegal immigrants by California highway police officers in April 1996,9 and in the recent changes in federal immigration law which bar legal immigrants from collecting welfare benefits.10 The backlash can also be seen in Europe, where an Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 1993 report stated:

[Immigrants] alter indigenous traditions and settled values. They compete for jobs and displace indigenous workers. They depress wages. They foster strikes, violence, and crime. They lower the general standard of living. They take places in schools, beds in hospitals, and seats on trains, depriving needy nations of them.11

Focusing on France, the August 1996 police raid on the St. Bernard de la Chapelle Church in Paris in order to end a hunger strike by immigrants protesting the tightening of French investigation laws showed how western governments are "getting tough" with immigrants.12 This should not be surprising, considering that French politicians such as former Prime Minister Edith Cresson had promised mass expulsions of illegal immigrants,13 and that National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen has based his election campaigns around anti-immigrant sentiment.

Proponents of immigration restriction, as seen in the example of Art Hanger, justify the rollback in immigrant numbers as necessary in times of economic trouble. Immigrants, it is presumed, take
jobs from the native population, burden the national coffers by using welfare and health care, and are responsible for exacerbating societal problems such as crime.

But how accurate are these criticisms? If immigrants do represent a burden to their host societies, then perhaps the calls for a 'crackdown' on newcomers are justifiable. But if they are not, then it must be asked: why do host populations (or segments of them) react negatively towards new members?

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the validity of contemporary arguments against immigration in Canada. In doing so, this examination establishes a foundation from which to explore the reasons for anti-immigrant phenomena and what causes it. This examination will begin with a brief discussion of immigrant-bashing in Canadian history. From this, several anti-immigrant themes will be identified. These themes will show how the current backlash resembles previous ones, as these same themes are still present in current arguments for immigration restriction.

This chapter will look at contemporary demographic arguments against immigration. Demographic arguments include those that claim that immigrants lower the quality of life of the population and are a greater burden because they have less education and consist of more older people, and that immigrants do nothing to ease the ageing of the population.

The point of this is to examine the backlash and to test the validity of these arguments against immigration. As we have seen in the case of multiculturalism policy, do these criticisms represent a genuine concern for the economic and social well-being of Canada, or do they represent a fear of the increasing heterogeneity of Canadian society? In presenting these emotional issues, how good a job is the media doing of informing the public?

Thus, it again becomes a question of education: how well is Canadian society informed on these issues? Do the published works of noted immigrant critics such as Daniel Stoffman, Charles Campbell, Diane Francis, and Doug Collins serve to inform the
public, or do they misinform the public? What role, if any, is played by proponents of continued levels of immigration?

**Responses to Immigration in Canadian History**

Region and time period have tended to be key factors in the appearance of anti-immigration sentiments. Rather than being a nation-wide phenomenon, anti-immigration has tended to be a reaction against specific ethnic groups settling in certain areas in large numbers at certain points in history. West-coast anti-Orientalism, for example, was a response to the arrival of Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. In another example, deliberate efforts at immigrant assimilation in prairie schools in the first two decades of the twentieth century was a reaction to the arrival of large numbers of Eastern Europeans in rural farming settlements. As a result of this historical trend, most studies of anti-immigration have tended to concentrate on a specific regional reaction towards a particular immigrant cohort. Few studies, if any, have looked at these 'anti-foreigner' movements from a larger perspective.

Historically, masses who migrated between feudal regions in Europe were not considered citizens of any nation. The concept of 'foreign' came with the creation of the nation-state in the nineteenth century. The French and American revolutions helped formulate the nation-states in the western world, but the laws of these nations were extended and enforced only the latter half of the nineteenth century. Onetime 'subjects' now became 'free citizens' of these new liberal states. With the industrial revolutions, the new business class replaced the landed gentry in these nations, and new modes of production created the needs for an educated labour market.\(^{14}\)

The citizens of these nations, however, often defined their national identity as ethnically-homogenous entities,\(^ {15} \) such as Germans in Germany or Italians in Italy. Consequently many groups in Europe, where the nation-state concept originated, such as the
Jews and Gypsies were excluded. Thus, 'foreigners' were an invention that citizens of a nation used in order to define themselves.\textsuperscript{16} Canadian immigration history helps illustrate this point: immigration restriction and assimilation was often justified on the grounds that 'foreigners', meaning non-British immigrants, threatened the Canadian identity.

Immigration has always been a crucial factor in the changing composition of Canadian society. Even the arrival of the aboriginal people 10,000 years ago reflects this: Aboriginal-Canadians are themselves divided by tribal nations. The next population inflow into Canada was the arrival of the French in the seventeenth century, to be followed by the British in the next century. Immigrants from non-charter groups (the British and French constituted the 'charter groups') started arriving in large numbers around one hundred years ago. What changes throughout Canadian history is not immigration, but the places of origin of immigrants.\textsuperscript{17}

Canadian immigration since Confederation can be divided into several phases. The first phase, from 1867 to about the 1890s saw immigration policy encourage immigrants to come in order to populate the nation. The second phase took place from 1896 to 1914, in which time the minister in charge of immigration, Clifford Sifton, encouraged European immigration in order to populate the west.\textsuperscript{18} The third phase, between the two World Wars (1918-1939), saw a continued flow of immigration. The flow was not quite as high as in the pre-war period, and anti-immigration sentiments were by this time strong among the Canadian populace. In this time period, Asian immigration was brought to a virtual halt. The fourth phase began in the post-World War Two era. Refugees poured in from Europe, but non-white immigration was still discouraged.\textsuperscript{19}

Finally, in 1962 and 1967, the federal government enacted more liberal immigration policies that prohibited immigrant selection on the basis of origin.

Immigration policy in Canada has always reflected a conflict
between desired population increase on the one hand, and the concern over the impact of newcomers on traditional Canadian ways and on the racial and ethnocultural composition of the nation. The idea that immigration is part of a state strategy for survival has two collaries: the preoccupation with Canadian society's 'absorptive power', and that migration exists to serve the host nation, not the immigrants. 20

Since the nineteenth century the mining, timber, railway, and agricultural sectors were in great need of skilled and unskilled labour. 21 Observers, however, warned that allowing in the wrong kind of immigrant would spell doom for Canadian culture. A general look at responses to the 'immigration problem' reveals two general trends: 1) exclusion, and 2) assimilation. Both are ways of dealing with immigrants, and rather than being contradictory, they complement each other. Some immigrants are considered unassimilable, and therefore should not be allowed to enter Canada. Those immigrants that do enter despite these restrictions must conform to a particular lifestyle. 22

These trends are embodied in the writings of onetime Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) leader J.S. Woodsworth. In his 1909 book on immigration, Strangers Within Our Gates, he explained his argument for a restrictive immigration policy. Woodsworth viewed immigrants in a hierarchy of desirability, depending on where they came from. The most ideal immigrants were those who embodied the Anglo-Saxon ideal, such as those from England, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia (with a few exceptions within these groups). Those immigrants which best resemble the Anglo-Saxon ideal were preferred. Thus Scandinavians were more desirable than Eastern Europeans. Eastern Europeans, nevertheless, could still be assimilated into the British Canadian lifestyle.

The least desirable of immigrants, according to Woodsworth, were people from the Mediterranean and Middle East region (Levantines), Orientals, and Indians (Hindus). Their undesirability was due to their inability to assimilate because of inherent traits:
The Orientals cannot be assimilated. Whether it is in the best interests of Canada to allow them to enter in large numbers is a most important question, not only for the people of British Columbia, but for all Canadians.\textsuperscript{23}

Negroes and Aboriginal-Canadians (Indians), though not immigrants, fare little better in Woodsworth's eyes. In quoting J.R. Commons, he describes Negroes as "unstable, indifferent to suffering, and easily aroused by the sight of blood".\textsuperscript{24} Clearly, the further a national group was from the geocentre of England and Northern Europe (barring settlers of British descent such as Americans), the less desirable that group was as new citizens for Canada. In other words, non-whites were at the bottom of the hierarchy, and thus had to be excluded.

Woodsworth was a product of his time. His book reflected the popular attitude of Anglo-Saxon superiority which was ubiquitous in the literature of the time: Social Darwinism, eugenics, and Rudyard Kipling's 'White Man's Burden'.\textsuperscript{25} In his 1918 book, The Education of the New Canadian, J.T.M. Anderson quoted Woodsworth at length to support his own views on immigrants.\textsuperscript{26} Such attitudes were echoed in The Lethbridge Herald in 1907 after the anti-Asian riots in Vancouver:

We do not want people without our ideas of civilization, without our ideals of government, without our aspirations of a province and a nation to bear any part in the election of our representatives. We have enough poor stuff in the voting class now.\textsuperscript{27}

For Woodsworth, immigration was fine, provided the right groups were immigrating in limited numbers. He shows his fear of mass immigration in this statement: "Out of the remote and little-known region of northern, eastern, and southern Europe forever marches a vast and endless army... invading the civilized world".\textsuperscript{28}

Exclusion was also justified on the basis of eugenics. Eugenicists (among whose ranks Woodsworth was a member) saw two sources of degeneration in the population: reproduction of feeble-minded, and immigration.\textsuperscript{29} They attributed intellectual, moral, and physical strengths to culture.\textsuperscript{30} The less a cultural group
represented Anglo-Saxon culture, the weaker it was. From the 1890s to the end of the Second World War, eugenicists such as Helen MacMurchy and J.G. Adami campaigned for a more restrictive immigration policy in order to save Canadian society from the problems of degenerating society, such as crime and poverty.\textsuperscript{31}

Exclusionists' tactics surfaced and resurfaced with each immigrant wave to Canada. The arrival of some 3,000 blacks among the Loyalists who travelled to Canada after the American Revolution of 1776 illustrates this point. The blacks, who won their freedom by fighting alongside the British, expected that they would be granted the same terms of settlement as white Loyalists upon arriving in Canada. But when land grants were distributed in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where most of the black Loyalists settled, priority was given to the white Loyalists. Few blacks received land grants at all, and those who did were placed on small allotments in the least desirable regions.\textsuperscript{32}

This experience would become familiar to the blacks who came, or tried to come, to Canada in subsequent years. Thousands of blacks fled the United States for the Maritime provinces during the War of 1812. Bearing the negative status of former slaves, as did their Loyalist predecessors, they were given only manual labour jobs and small allotments of land incapable of providing subsistence. The Nova Scotia Assembly in 1815 voted to ban further black immigration.\textsuperscript{33} With the arrival of the approximately 1,300 blacks from Oklahoma in Alberta and Saskatchewan between 1910 and 1912, Western Canadians began a campaign to end further black immigration and to further segregate those who already arrived. Responding to this pressure, the federal Liberal government took informal measures to restrict black immigration such as rigorous border medical examinations, and dispatching agents to the United States to discourage such immigration.\textsuperscript{34}

Exclusion was also the experience of Asians who crossed the Pacific to settle on the west coast. The Chinese originally left the tumultuous political situation in China in the 1850s to seek
labour positions in Canada. They worked in mines, as servants, in the fish canning industry, and as workers constructing the trans-Canada railway.\textsuperscript{35} Migration of Japanese began in earnest in the 1890s.\textsuperscript{36} The reaction of west coast Canadians toward the Orientals from 1858 until the end of World War Two included: a riot in 1907 against Asian immigration;\textsuperscript{37} frequent condemnation in the press; employers and unions who barred Asians from employment except as cheap labour; disfranchisement; communities that drove out Asian families; the relocation of Japanese families during the Second World War; and politicians who campaigned against them. Discriminatory legislation against the Asian-Canadians included the $10 head tax on all Chinese in 1884 (a substantial sum in those days) which was raised to $500 in 1904,\textsuperscript{38} the segregation of Chinese in schools in Victoria in the twenties,\textsuperscript{39} the restriction of Asian immigration due to the Immigration Act of 1923,\textsuperscript{40} the allotment of relief to unemployed Chinese in Calgary at half the amount of relief given to whites in Calgary during the depression,\textsuperscript{41} and the internment of Japanese-Canadians during the Second World War.

Immigrants from the Indian subcontinent fared little better. East Indians were disfranchised in 1907. In 1908, Canadian Minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver, amended the Immigration Act to bar Indians from coming to Canada by the "Continuous Voyage" clause which permitted entry only for immigrants who came by a non-stop journey (an impossible act at the time for those who came from India).\textsuperscript{42} The British Columbian government extended restrictions that were applied to Chinese and Japanese to South Asians.\textsuperscript{43} In 1914, immigration officials turned back the ship Komagata Maru after its two-month anchoring in Vancouver harbour pending a British Columbia Supreme Court decision which stated that none of the 376 Indians on board would be allowed to step on Canadian soil.\textsuperscript{44}

According to Patricia E. Roy, the insecurity and inferiority that lay behind the native-born anti-Asian sentiments were due to
beliefs that the increasing number of Asian immigrants would eventually overwhelm the white populace, that the threat of the Japanese military was heightened by the presence of Japanese-Canadians (prior to and during World War Two), that the Asians represented "unfair" economic competition, and, especially, were unassimilable. These beliefs, according to W. Peter Ward, were supported by the distorted portrayal of Orientals in school texts, the media, and scientific research:

...Orientals seemed a lesser race. They lacked the Caucasian's physical beauty, his intellectual ability, and his moral fibre. Furthermore, their evolution was stagnant, their technology backward, their religion idolatrous, and their personal and social habits decadent.45

With these images in mind, Canadians tried to bar Asians from their society.

The history of Jewish-Canadian immigration to Canada represents an aberration in the exclusionist tradition. Traditionally, exclusion was directed at non-white newcomers. The Jews were primarily white, yet their entry into Canada was barred in various ways. Jews were fleeing Nazi persecution in Europe between 1933 and 1945, but Canada exercised a closed-door policy towards them. This restriction may have been officially justified as due to the Depression, but it would not explain why other nations also suffering in the Depression accepted substantial numbers of Jewish refugees. The United States, for example, accepted 200,000 Jews between 1933 and 1945, while Canada accepted only 5,000.46 While American president Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to get the leaders of thirty nations to meet in 1938 to deal with the Jewish refugee problem, Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie-King would not attend as he felt his presence at such a meeting would oblige Canada to accept Jewish refugees.47 At this time, director of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, Frederick C. Blair, warned the cabinet that Canada may be stampeded by "a general Jewish drive for admission to other countries".48 Even after the war, Canada still tried to limit the number of Jews
entering the nation while simultaneously allowing in thousands of displaced persons (D.P.s) and, as we later learned, Nazi collaborators and war criminals.

In examining the history of immigrant-bashing in Canada, a number of themes can be identified: One, the fact that immigration was not feared in itself so much as immigration in high numbers. Two, recent immigrants were perceived as being not as competent as previous immigrants. Three, immigrants were thought to bring the social problems of crime, disease, and poverty with them. Four, immigration was seen as a net drain on society, and as a strain on institutions such as welfare, charity, and law enforcement. Five, Canadians believed that they must be selective in the numbers and kinds of immigrants they accepted. Six, critics often used a few examples of deviance among immigrants to make sweeping generalizations of the whole immigrant community. Seven, critics often looked to the United States to make assumptions about similar effects of immigration in Canada. Finally, immigration was seen as changing society and withering institutions that Canadians found sacred, or serving to 'balkanize' (as said in the early twentieth century) or 'fragment' (today) Canadian society.

These themes might strike the contemporary observer as racist, ethnocentric, and based on fear rather than fact. Critics such as Woodsworth and Anderson did not see themselves and their views in this way. Often, what they advocated was in fact an accurate reflection of popular ideals of their time. This pattern continues today. Critics of immigration and multiculturalism stress that they are not racist. However, they continue to use the ethnocentric themes identified here. Reform M.P. Sharon Hayes argued that too many immigrants were coming to Canada, and that "we need a smaller number and better compositions". As for recent immigrants not being as competent as previous ones, writer Elizabeth Aird uses this theme in her thoughts on the contemporary inflow of moneyed investor-class immigrants:
These wealthy belly-achers who hop off planes and buy million-dollar homes make a mockery of immigrants like both my sets of grandparents, who fled subsistence farms in Scotland and worked for years to own their own homes in Vancouver. 59

This attitude is also seen in an article in The Western Report which points out how in 1965, 80% of immigrants to Canada came from Europe and the United States. But in 1993, half of immigrants are from Hong Kong, India, The Philippines, Taiwan, The People's Republic of China, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. 60 The article does not actually state what is wrong with this change, it merely implies that it is bad news for the country. Peter Brimelow also claims that these recent immigrants from less-developed nations are not as competent as previous generations of newcomers as "you do not learn skills in the Third World". 61

The idea that immigrants cause social problems such as crime also has currency in today's immigrant-bashing. Doug Collins devotes a whole chapter in his book Immigration: The Destruction of English Canada to various criminal rackets run by Chinese, Haitians, and Indians. 62 Sweeping generalizations made about the immigrant community can be seen in this quote regarding the recent shooting of a restaurant patron in Toronto by a Jamaican-Canadian male: "High-profile crimes involving immigrants show the chaos of government policy". 63 Contemporary comparisons with American immigration policy are made by those such as Richard Gwyn who, as seen in Chapter One, points to a 1995 bipartisan federal commission in the United States which proposed to cut immigration in that country. 64 Finally, the idea that immigrants fragment a society has already been pointed out in the themes underlying the writings of William D. Gairdner, who writes that by promoting differences, the government serves to expand hostilities between ethno-cultural groups in Canada. 65

This historical examination of the immigration backlash shows that in spite of the changes in society through the years, the arguments against immigration have essentially stayed the same.
Modern critics claim that their arguments against immigration are not based on racism or Eurocentrism, but on honest factual evidence. An examination of contemporary arguments against immigration is required to see how well-founded these claims are.

**Immigration Backlash in the Contemporary Context**

Contemporary critics in favour of curtailing immigration have for the most part dropped the former rhetoric of Anglo-Saxon superiority and eugenics, and have put more emphasis on demographic, economic, and social arguments. The official policy of the Reform Party, for example, subtly states that the Party believes that current immigration does not help Canada economically:

supports an immigration policy that focuses on Canada's economic needs... We remain convinced that immigration has been, and can be again, a positive source of economic growth, cultural diversity, and social renewal.\(^6\)

To this end, the Reform Party -- in addition to its proposed cut to the immigration rate (which former Reform immigration critic Art Hanger justified as the current rate caused a drain on the economy: "All our concerns over immigration have come in the last ten years, when the annual figure got above that total")\(^6\) -- has on its agenda for "economically-sound" immigration a proposal to deny immigrants social services and health benefits until they become citizens (about three to five years after their arrival) as well as a proposal to deny citizenship to children born on Canadian soil whose immigrant parents are without landed immigrant status. Hanger states that this measure reflects the frustration of the ordinary Canadian when they see abuse of the immigration system.\(^6\)

Current opponents of immigration claim that the public has not been exposed to the realities of immigration due to the dearth of any real coverage of the issue. Doug Collins writes that immigration is one of the most important stories in the country, "yet the worse covered".\(^6\) The preface to Charles Campbell's book...
A Time Bomb Ticking: Canadian Immigration in Crisis states that informed debate on the issue is rare: "In part, this may be due to fear of name-calling and, in the case of politicians, anxiety not to offend". This is corroborated by Richard Gwyn, who says that public frustration and anger over this issue may be due to fears that criticism will bring charges of "racism", and by Daniel Stoffman, who says that people fear talking about immigration publicly because of the fear of being labelled a racist, as most immigrants are non-white. Since immigration is an emotional issue, it may trigger a harsh reaction by those who feel that immigrants are under attack by critics who may actually be trying to put forth legitimate reasons for curtailing immigration. Hence, those who criticize immigration policy regularly may feel they are being judged unfairly.

Oddly enough, the language that some of these critics use suggest that they, too, have their own biases. Immigrants are characterized as "invading hordes", "wealthy belly-achers", a "flood", and a "deluge". This "scarcely-restrained human flood" is staging an "Asian invasion", a "mass invasion", or just a plain "invasion" across Canada's "porous border". Consequently, Canada's immigration policy is "a time bomb ticking". These descriptions of today's immigrants resemble the ones that Stephen Leacock used in 1911 when he referred to emigration from Slavic nations and Southern Europe as "portentous", and to immigrants as "mere herds of the Proletariat of Europe". J.S. Woodsworth showed that he too was also not above using such language when he talked about how "Out of the remote and little-known region of Northern, Eastern, and Southern Europe forever marches a vast and endless army... invading the civilized world", and how steps had to be taken to "check this alien invasion".

In spite of their claims to the contrary, the fact that the views of Campbell, Gwyn, Stoffman, and Collins are being published show that the issue is receiving attention. But are they actually presenting informed debate on immigration? It can be argued that
these critics are trying to reveal the truth about immigration to a nation that is too polite to deal with such a reality. On the other hand, it can be said that these anti-immigration arguments are age-old stereotypes that are repeated over and over until they become a self-evident truth. To test the accuracy of these arguments requires an analysis in regards to immigration and its effect on demographics.

Demographic Arguments

A) Immigration levels and the 'carrying capacity' of the population:

According to Daniel Stoffman, Canada is in the midst of an immigrant experiment. In 1984, Canada accepted 88,000 immigrants. By 1993, that number had increased to 250,000.\textsuperscript{85} We are, in other words, in an era of mass immigration. And this number is, according to Stoffman, too high for the Canadian population to absorb. Consequently, we must return to postwar levels of 150,000 immigrants per year.\textsuperscript{86}

Current immigration levels are more than Canada's social infrastructure can bear. The too rapid pace of change causes racial tension. In particular, the sharp increase in demand for English as a Second Language (E.S.L.) instruction places an unfair burden on the public schools in major cities.\textsuperscript{87}

The idea that Canada is now accepting more immigrants than it can handle is echoed by Margaret Cannon -- who quotes Stoffman\textsuperscript{88} -- and by Tom McFeely and Kevin Michael Grace in The Western Report, who suggest that closing Canada's doors entirely may be necessary to assimilate the last decade's "scarcely-restrained human flood".\textsuperscript{89} Canadian immigration levels in the 1990s are among the highest in the world. As Stoffman suggests, the fact that most new immigrants do come from Third World nations has changed the character of some Canadian cities and has imposed some costs on Canadians such as E.S.L. instruction.
To prove that immigration levels are more than the nation can handle, critics would have to show that the immigrants constitute a much larger proportion of the overall population than before, and that Canada is accepting larger numbers of immigrants in proportion to the population than it has before. These claims not borne out by statistics. First, according to a 1994 Statistics Canada study, Canada's Changing Immigrant Population, the actual proportion of the total population that immigrants represent has increased by only one per cent over the past forty years. In 1951, 15% of the population was born outside of Canada. In 1991, 16% of the population was foreign-born.  

Stoffman and others appear to assume that the rate of immigration in the nineties is the highest it has been in Canadian history. This idea also does not hold up to evidence. The immigration level has at different times in history been much higher than it is now, and at times when the national population was much smaller. As Appendix C shows, immigrants as a percentage of the total population was much higher than the current rate between the years 1901 and 1941, when the percentage exceeded 16%. In fact, immigrants represented more than 22% of the population between 1911 and 1931. The highest inflow of immigration was in 1913, when 400,870 newcomers entered Canada. Canada's immigration rate at the beginning of the twentieth century was 3%. Had that been the rate at the end of the 1980s, Canada would be accepting over a million immigrants a year now. In 1957, 282,000 immigrants entered Canada. In 1968, 222,000 people came to Canada. This is higher than the current rate of 200,000 per year.

**B) The Skill Level of Recent Immigrants:**

Opponents of the current immigration policy argue that not only is the Canadian government allowing in too many immigrants, but in fact the wrong kind of immigrants. Meanwhile, able applicants are rejected under the guise of preserving jobs for Canadians. They
blame this on family-class immigration, which has since the mid-eighties up to the mid-nineties constituted the majority of immigrants. This change in the composition of the immigrants has led to a diminishment of the education levels of recent immigrants.

Daniel Stoffman says that while immigration numbers are up, their education level has fallen. In 1971, immigrants were three times as likely to have a higher education than those born in Canada. By 1986, immigrants were three times as likely to be functionally illiterate. While Stoffman cites no source for this data, this point is repeated in the books of both Margaret Cannon and Richard Gwyn.

Charles Campbell makes a similar argument in his book. He argues that educated and skilled immigrants are unable to enter Canada in that the Canadian immigration system rejects skilled immigrants for unskilled ones. Campbell makes his point by citing several individual cases of applicants for Canadian immigration with skills who were rejected. Such results, he says, are inconsistent with the conclusion of the 1985 MacDonald Royal Commission (The Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development of Prospects for Canada) that young and well-educated applicants could be better suited for our economy. He blames this discouragement of highly-qualified immigrants on the 1978 Immigration Act, which allowed new Canadians to sponsor their relatives. Consequently, this allowed for a flood of unskilled newcomers who, according to Campbell, contribute to Canada's education crisis at a time when a skilled workforce is needed to compete against the Japanese.

From these critiques, one might conclude that today's immigrants are less educated than earlier immigrants, and that immigrants are less likely to have a higher education than Canadian-born. Statistical evidence does not bear this out. What Stoffman could be referring to is not a fall in immigrants' absolute amount of education, but to the extent of their education relative to that of native-born Canadians. This apparent decline
is likely due to increased levels of education among Canadian-born, not to a fall in education levels among immigrants.\textsuperscript{101} Data from the 1986 census (the same census that Stoffman uses to show that immigrants are less likely to have a higher education than native-born) actually shows that immigrants were more likely to have a higher education than Canadian-born. In 1986, 11.5\% of immigrants had at least a bachelor's degree, whereas 7.4\% of native-born did. Among recent arrivals (1978-1986), 17.2\% had at least a bachelor's degree. This is almost twice the rate of Canadian-born.\textsuperscript{102} Furthermore, more recent immigrants were more likely to have higher education levels than immigrants in the past. Of the immigrants who arrived between 1981 and 1991, 17\% had at least a university degree. Before 1961, only 9\% had a university degree. For immigrants aged 25 and over who arrived between 1981 and 1991, 21\% had university degrees, whereas only 9\% of previous immigrants in this age category had university degrees.\textsuperscript{103}

While more immigrants have a higher education than Canadian-born, more immigrants also fall into the lower-educated category (the equivalent of grade 9 or less). This is what Stoffman may have been referring to, but he does not specify. Among immigrants in 1991, 19\% have the equivalent of grade 9 or less, whereas 13\% of Canadian-born are at this level. However, many of these are likely to be people who are aged 65 and over, and thus no longer part of the labour force. In 1991, 40\% of immigrants with a grade 9 education or less were aged 65 and over. Among Canadian-born, that number is 39\%. This lack of education among the elderly, according to the Statistics Canada study, may be because many of these seniors finished their formal schooling at a time when educational expectations and opportunities were different from those of today.\textsuperscript{104}

This statistical evidence also helps to test Campbell's claim that post-1978 immigrants are of a lower grade. The changes in the 1978 Immigration Act have not led to a fall in the education level of immigrants. Campbell tries to make his point by giving case
after case of rejected "skilled" applicants without giving the full
details as to why their applications were not accepted. Then he
says no overall statistics are available to prove this.\textsuperscript{105} Campbell
may have thought that the post-1978 immigration policy was
inconsistent with the recommendations of the MacDonald Royal
Commission. Yet the members of the Commission take a view that
contradicts his own. Their recommendations (Campbell claims the
Commission avoided precise recommendations)\textsuperscript{106} included "Given the
uncertainties involved in deciding both on an appropriate
population size or its age composition, Canada should follow the
course which, in the past, has served our country well, that is, a
less restrictive policy than that currently in place".\textsuperscript{107} In other
words, Campbell argues for a more restrictive policy, while the
MacDonald Commission argued for a less restrictive one.

In a study published in 1989, Health and Welfare Canada found
that immigrants made an above-average contribution to the
economy.\textsuperscript{108} The study attributed this economic success in part to
the above average levels of education among immigrants compared to
Canadian-born. Such was the case in the past, as well as now.
This showed that immigrants were therefore continuing to help make
Canada a better-educated, culturally-diverse, and urban society.\textsuperscript{109}
This study contradicts Campbell's assertion that post-1978
immigrants are less well-educated than pre-1978 ones. It also
counters Stoffman's claim that immigrants are now worse off than
Canadian-born thanks to the collapse of selectivity in Canadian
immigration requirements.\textsuperscript{110} Hence, a critical look at the evidence
suggests that the education levels of immigrants have not in fact
fallen in recent years due to supposedly lax immigration
requirements.

C) Recent immigration flows and the presence of elderly and the
young:

Contemporary arguments against immigration can be characterized
by their advocacy of limiting family-class immigration. Daniel Stoffman repeatedly says that Canada must cut family-class immigration, which was "currently 40% of the total." Reducing the family-class is thus for him a priority:

Only by restricting family-class immigration will Canada ever get immigration levels down to 150,000 per year that its social infrastructure can support, while at the same time increasing the proportion of independent immigrants.\footnote{112}

Richard Gwyn, following Stoffman's lead, complains that the independent class of immigrants has shrunk. And now that immigrants can sponsor their spouses, children, parents, and grandparents, immigration has now become a policy for immigrants rather than for Canada.\footnote{113} Margaret Cannon (again, citing Stoffman) also says that Canada needs to let in fewer family-class immigrants.\footnote{114} Charles Campbell writes that the family-class immigrants are really people who are coming to Canada to take advantage of the standard of living here without actually contributing to national prosperity:

Many are here as the family beachhead... Over the next decade these people will come in the hundreds of thousands, without thought to the ability of any to contribute to the development of our country... Too many will not have the ability to contribute to Canada, and take advantage of their opportunity and to achieve their expectations of life in this 'promised land'. At the same time we reject thousands of able applicants under the guise of preserving jobs for Canadians.\footnote{115}

One of the fears surrounding family-class immigration is that too many elderly people are entering Canada and becoming eligible for social assistance without having spent their lifetimes contributing to Canadian social security.\footnote{116} Diane Francis makes this argument in regards to medical costs: she says that between 1991 and 1992, 54,000 sponsored immigrants who came to Canada were 65 or older. She does her own calculations and concludes that accepting this many seniors (assuming that Canada actually accepts the number of seniors that she says it does) would cost Canada $1
billion a year in health care.\textsuperscript{117} She gives no sources for the numbers she uses to make these calculations. Nor does she take into account that immigrants also contribute to health care by way of tax revenue. Nevertheless, she blames this "reckless management" on the family reunification provisions of the Immigration Act.\textsuperscript{118}

Has the expansion of the family-class category actually led to an increase in the number of seniors entering Canada? According to Badets and Chui, the immigrant population is getting older. Prior to 1961, less than one percent of immigrants to Canada were 65 and older. Between 1981 and 1991, 3\% of immigrants were in this age category. Also, the average age median of immigrants in 1961 was 21.1. This number rose until it stood at 26.7 in the eighties. One reason that the immigration population may appear to be older in this data is because the children who are born to immigrants after they settle in Canada are counted as Canadian-born rather than as part of the immigrant population.\textsuperscript{119}

Current data in the Department of Employment and Immigration's yearly document, Immigration Statistics, gives a different story. By calculating the percentages of immigrants in different age categories as far back as about 1970,\textsuperscript{120} the data shows that among immigrants that arrived in 1984, 7.2\% were over 65. By 1991, that number had dropped to 5\%, a percentage similar to that in the mid-1970s, when this was not an issue. At the time the 1978 Immigration Act was passed, 12.9\% of new immigrants were between the ages of 45 and 64. In 1991, that number was 12.3\%.\textsuperscript{121}

Critics also charge that too many young dependants also enter Canada under the family and refugee class. Charles Campbell writes that the education crises in urban centres, assuming an education crisis exists, is exacerbated by a flood of refugee-claimant children who are given the right to schooling.\textsuperscript{122} Stoffman talks about the burden of young family-class dependants on the public school system, stating how in Toronto, E.S.L. classes cost public schools about $90 million each year without citing a source.\textsuperscript{123}
Evidence, however, shows a different story. In 1980, 33% of new Canadians were under the age of 19. By 1991, only 25% of arrivals were in this age group. At the same time, the number of immigrants between the ages 20 and 49 increased sharply from 50% (1980) to 62% (1991), most of them at the younger end. Arguably, Canada should encourage more young immigrants in their late teens to come. While it would put immediate pressure on the education system, it would ensure that new immigrants acquire the skills and education suited for Canadian labour markets. Thus, it would guarantee that they will have the skills required to contribute to the national treasury.

In any case, the Canadian population's dependency ratio, which measures the number of economically dependent persons relative to potentially active persons in the labour force, has been lightened thanks to the higher proportion of immigrants of working age. In 1991, the overall dependency ratio for immigrants was 29.8, while Canadian-born had a dependency ratio of 52.9 for the same year. The combined dependency ratio for 1991 was 48.1.

Critics charge that the enlargement of the family-class category of immigrants in the eighties has led to a surge of young and old newcomers who will be a burden to Canadian society. A look at the actual numbers of immigrants by age category shows that the portions of newcomers in these age groups have in fact shrunk since the eighties, not increased.

D) Immigration and the ageing of the population:

Immigration has been justified in modern times as a way to offset the ageing and the low fertility rate of the populations of western-industrialized nations. The baby boom of the 1950s in these nations was followed by a 'baby bust' that began in the sixties. That is, families started having fewer children and consequently, the bulk of the population ages without having a sufficient number of younger people to replace them in the workforce. Demographers point out that the ageing population will
require care services, but there will be an insufficient number of workers to finance them. By the year 2030, people over 65 will account for 22% of the population of the seven largest western economies (up from 12% today). Without an increase in the workforce, a tax raise and/or cuts in government-provided services will be required to finance the care of the ageing workforce.127

Immigration, it was assumed, would be required to offset the declining fertility rates in Canada and other western nations. However, a number of observers have challenged this perspective. The Reform Party, for example,

...opposes the use of immigration policy to solve the crisis of the welfare state through forced-growth population policy. The problem of the pension costs of an aging population is neither caused nor cured by immigration policy.128

Daniel Stoffman says that "a large body of evidence" shows that immigration cannot ease the tax burden.129 He makes this statement based on the Economic Council of Canada's 1991 study, New Faces in the Crowd: Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration, which concluded that an immigration rate of 0.8% (that is, allowing in newcomers at a number of equivalent to 0.8% of the total population) would moderate the estimated increase in the tax burden only slightly (taking into account immigration settlement costs).130

Stoffman argues that while Canada's fertility rate is below replacement level, it still has the highest rate in the developed world. As a result, a population decline will not happen for another fifty years or so.131 No one, he says, can predict the fertility rate in the future. For example, it might increase from 1.7 to 1.8. If it rises to 1.9, then the number of immigrants needed drops to half the number needed when the fertility rate was 1.7. If fertility rates continue to fall, then Canada needs more immigration. A level of 80,000 per year would be sufficient for the population to grow.132

If the ageing of society leads to a shortage of workers, Stoffman argues that this can be addressed by following the example
of Europe, where the solution is to increase productivity. To do this, Canada will need better training for workers, and to make full use of the talents of women, minorities, handicapped, and people over 65. Immigration, in addition to not being able to replenish an ageing population, requires language and settlement programs that "are already overtaxed". Furthermore, "a small upward shift in the current fertility level... is required" to avert a population decline. Any such decline would not begin for decades, and would take centuries to complete.

Some critics, such as William D. Gairdner, state that immigration cannot be justified as a means to replenish a shrinking population, as such a decline is nothing to fear. Gairdner asks:

My first response to this "problem" is, so what? There is no evidence that a country of 50 million is better off than one of twenty-five. Japan has had zero population growth for the past couple of decades and is doing just fine. Why can't we do the same?

Some sources, such as the Economic Council study cited by Stoffman, do in fact question the ability of immigration to offset the ageing of the population. Thus, it should not be surprising that those analyzing the immigration policy would be skeptical of this justification for high immigration levels. The idea that immigration has a mild effect on the ageing of the population is not new. Nor is the idea that high immigration levels will help solve the problem.

Without any immigration, it should be noted, Canada's population would eventually disappear due to below-replacement fertility levels. Health and Welfare Canada's 1989 study calculated that without immigration, the population would peak at 28 million in the year 2011, and then would go into a continuous decline. At today's fertility rates, the last Canadian would disappear in 2786.

Stoffman makes claims that do not correspond with available data on this issue. He states that no one can predict fertility rates in the future. He implies that they might go up. Perhaps no one can predict for sure if fertility rates will rise, but evidence
shows that these rates are more than likely to continue their fall. Leon F. Bouvier showed in 1984 that since 1973, never have fertility rates been so low in so many nations for so long. These fertility rates fell even more in the eighties, and most developed nations showed no evidence of climbing back, or at least guaranteeing population replacement levels.\textsuperscript{139} This finding was corroborated by the Council of Europe's 1995 demographic study which showed crude birth rates and fertility rates to have fallen substantially in all member nations in the last twenty-four years.\textsuperscript{140} A falling fertility rate in Canada is a more likely prospect considering the experiences of other developed countries.\textsuperscript{141} Canada's fertility rate has been falling since the fifties when it was 3.9, and shows no signs of reversal.\textsuperscript{142} Stoffman may think that fertility rates still might go up, but a large body of evidence shows otherwise.

Stoffman also suggests that the problem of a shrinking population can be solved by a small upward shift in the current fertility rates. In reality, a large upward shift in the Total Fertility Rate (T.F.R.) would be required. To maintain the standard of living that Canadians enjoy, the nation would need a 1% growth in population yearly.\textsuperscript{143} Even if the T.F.R. rose to 2.2 (above the replacement level of 2.1), the nation would still require at least 200,000 immigrants by the year 2000.\textsuperscript{144} If the T.F.R. remains constant at about 1.7, Canada would need 300,000 immigrants per year by the year 2000, 400,000 immigrants a year by 2016, and 700,000 immigrants a year by 2050.\textsuperscript{145} If the T.F.R. drops to 1.4, which is a real possibility considering the consistent fall since the 1950s (Quebec's T.F.R. is already at 1.4),\textsuperscript{146} then even higher immigration intakes would be required in order to maintain the total population level.\textsuperscript{147}

Canada needs to steadily increase its intake of newcomers if it wants to maintain population growth. To maintain a level of 125,000 new Canadians a year would only increase the population size temporarily, to be followed by a population decline after the
year 2021 (assuming a T.F.R. of 1.7). This fact directly contradicts Stoffman's assertion that Canada needs 80,000 immigrants a year for the population to continue to grow.

Stoffman fails to elaborate on how the fertility rate can be raised. Traditionally, attempts to raise the fertility rates in the industrialized nations have been done through natalist policies, that is, attempts to encourage families to have more children through incentives such as subsidies to families, expanded daycare facilities, and tax credits for families. Gairdner encourages this method for population growth instead of immigration:

If we want to grow despite this evidence... why replace or add population through immigration -- especially immigration that threatens social dislocation? ... Rather, why not develop a pro-family, tax-relief-based "made in Canada" incentive to encourage young Canadians to have larger families and provide ways for them to avoid the crippling tax and expense levels that befall large families?

The problem with natalist policies is that they are costly. Furthermore, their effectiveness is not proven. Such policies assume that people can be encouraged through financial incentives to have more children. Yet people have many reasons other than financial ones for not having children. Various European nations have implemented pro-natalist policies, with mixed results at best. Often, the instigation for these natalist policies is xenophobia: nationals try to offset the inflow of foreigners by encouraging the enlargement of their own population. The former Soviet Union, for example, initiated pro-natalist policies in order to increase the proportion of ethnic Russians. This was done at a time when the Soviet government feared the rising numbers of the Muslim population while the ethnic Russian population was in decline.

Gairdner tries to use the example of Japan to suggest that population growth is an unnecessary issue in Canada. His logic is that although Japan's population is not growing, everything is still fine. Therefore, Canada should not be concerned. A closer
look at the evidence shows the opposite: ageing is even more of a concern in Japan than it is in Canada. Japan's population is ageing faster than any other nation on earth.\textsuperscript{155} The Japanese National Council for the Development of an Economic Structure for the Twenty-first Century showed that by the year 2000, Japan would have a labour shortage of 2.7 million job positions.\textsuperscript{156} Japanese prime ministers have regularly referred to ageing as they have set the policy agenda, recognizing that population affects many aspects of society and the economy. The Japanese Economic Planning Agency predicted in its 1985 White Paper on the Economy that as a result of population ageing, the ordinarily high Japanese savings rate would be cut by one-half in the twenty-first century. This would have implications for Japan's investment at home and abroad, as well as for their balance of payments.\textsuperscript{157} With or without ageing, labour shortages are predicted in the United States, Germany, and France.\textsuperscript{158} Thus, the problem of the shrinking population is not unique to Canada, nor is the concern given to it.

Stoffman recommends worker substitution as the solution to population shrinkage. This argument has been made in the United States, Japan, and the European Union. It assumes the workforce is homogenous, and that workers will take any kind of work. It assumes that older workers can replace younger ones, and that employers are willing to tolerate the cost of this substitution.\textsuperscript{159}

This would appear to be a legitimate proposal, as other governments have already tried worker substitution by increasing incentives to work for women, the disabled, and for seniors. The United States, for example, abolished mandatory retirement years for workers to qualify for a federal pension, as well as levying penalties for early retirements. However, such measures accomplished little. The governments of Japan and Singapore gave monetary incentives for older people to remain in the workforce. These measures had no significant effect on the workforce.\textsuperscript{160}

Stoffman's case against the effect of immigration on a shrinking population relies heavily on one source: the 1991 Economic Council
of Canada (E.C.C.) report. He does not cite his other sources in the section of his report that deals with this issue. Yet he fails to account for why, despite this, the E.C.C. recommended a rise in the immigration rate to 1% of the population.\textsuperscript{161} Also unmentioned in Stoffman's critique is that one year after the E.C.C. published its report The Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration, the Council published a second report, The Impact of Immigration on the Costs of Ageing of the Population (1992). Perhaps this study was unavailable when Stoffman was writing his own report. This second report calculated the effects of various immigration levels on the cost structure of social services.\textsuperscript{162} The 1992 study showed that natalist policies are more expensive than immigration policies in dealing with population replacement. The savings from a pro-immigration policy would be greater than those from a pro-natalist policy, and that the nation would break even on expenditures caused by the former policy sooner.\textsuperscript{163} This difference may be explained in that increased fertility means an increase in educational costs, whereas immigrants usually come at a later age, having already completed their formal education at someone else's expense, and therefore can avoid the costs of education.\textsuperscript{164} While immigration may not solve the problem of an ageing population unless we revert to extreme and unrealistic numbers, which is a point Stoffman makes, it helps to alleviate the tax burdens brought on by an ageing population, and immigrants make up for the initial costs they incur in the short-term (such as language-training).\textsuperscript{165} The details of this second E.C.C. study would provide a wider perspective on the discussion on the effects of immigration on Canada's ageing population. Yet it is overlooked by those who quote the previous E.C.C. study.\textsuperscript{166}

A similar conclusion was also pointed out in the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Labour, Employment, and Immigration's 1990 report on the demography and immigration. The Interim report pointed out that immigration could not singlehandedly counteract an ageing population, but it noted that
this ageing could be delayed slightly by higher levels of immigration, giving us a longer time period to adjust to the changes that ageing would bring. It was calculated that with each additional 60,000 immigrants per year, the decline of Canada's population could be delayed by a further eight or nine years.\textsuperscript{167} The committee recommended an immigration level of about 200,000 immigrants per year.\textsuperscript{168}

In any case, one must also consider that immigration has been responsible for population increases in the past. Between 1951 and 1981, 38\% of actual population growth was due to immigrants and their children.\textsuperscript{169} Since World War Two, Canada doubled its population in little more than a quarter of a century due to a combination of immigration and natural increase.\textsuperscript{170} It is estimated that immigration is responsible for 22\% of total population growth in this century.\textsuperscript{171}

A large body of evidence does show immigration to help replenish an ageing population. While it is not a complete solution, it proves to be a more viable and economically-sound solution than the natalist policies that some critics advocate.

In summation, the demographic arguments made against immigration often do not take into account the full body of evidence available on the issue. But how do the critics' economic arguments against immigration stand to evidence? This will be examined in the next chapter.
NOTES


7) Peirol, Al.


9) "9 News 10:00pm Report; KCAL-TV; Los Angeles", April 10 1996, 10pm PT. Obtained from Lexus-Nexus On-Line.


13) Harris, 108.

14) Ibid., 4


16) Harris, 5.


19) Ibid., 12, 14.


21) Ibid., 58.

22) As I have dealt with the history of assimilation policies in Canada in detail in Chapter Three, I will not repeat it here.


24) Ibid., 158.

25) Ibid., xiv.

26) J.T. M. Anderson, *The Education of the New Canadian: A Treatise on Canada's Greatest Educational Problem* (London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1918). Anderson shares Woodsworth's views that Northern European immigrants are the most desired (p. 39-48), while Slavic immigrants are less desirable and must be subject to Anglo-conformity measures (p. 50-57).


30) Ibid., 49.

31) Ibid., 50-51.


33) Ibid., 9.


37) Tan and Roy, 10.

38) Ibid., 8.


40) Tan and Roy, 13.

41) Palmer, 145.


47) Ibid., 16.

48) Ibid., 17.

49) Ibid., 281.

50) Woodsworth says as much when he warned that in 1909, Canada's immigration rates were much higher than that of the United States. Such high rates would be an enormous strain on Canadian institutions (p. 166).

51) Stephen Leacock makes this point when he points to the economic and racial character of twentieth-century immigrants: "They no longer consist of the strenuous, the adventurous, the enterprising... . They are, in great measure, mere herds of the


53) Woodsworth called for immigration legislation at the time to extend its powers to prohibit the entry of polygamists, anarchists, and seditious people (p. 228).

54) For example, west-coast society at the turn-of-the-century felt Chinese men were a threat to white women. The Vancouver Sun in 1921 printed a story about two white parents whose daughter ran off with a Chinese boy that she met at school. The incident was used to justify the segregation of Chinese and white students (Stanley, 290).

55) Woodsworth often asked why the Canadian government was not imposing head taxes on foreigners as was the practice in the United States (p.223).

56) Saskatchewan education official E.H. Oliver, in regards to bilingual education of immigrant children, once asked: were Canadians "to be a homogenous people" or were they "to repeat the tragic sufferings of polyglot Austria?" [Neil Sutherland, Children in English-Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth-Century Consensus (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976): 211].

57) Woodsworth, for example, justified the exclusion of Orientals and Hindus in Canada as common sense because a homogenous population is supposedly more in accordance with democratic institutions and general welfare (p.231).


59) Elizabeth Aird, "You don't like the tax law changes? Then take a hike", The Vancouver Sun (October 5 1996): D6.

60) McFeely and Grace, 7.

61) Jenkinson, 9.

62) see: Doug Collins, Immigration: The Destruction of English Canada (Richmond Hill, BMG Publishers, c.1979), Chapter 6: "Government-Sponsored Illegality".

63) McFeely and Grace, 6.

64) Richard Gwyn, Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,


68) Jenkinson, 10.

69) Collins, 10.


71) Gwyn, 217.


74) Aird, D6.

75) Collins, 28.

76) Francis, 64.

77) McFeely and Grace, 6.


79) Francis, 64.


81) Campbell, "Save Money", All.

82) Campbell, Time Bomb, 34.


84) Woodsworth, 12, 13.
85) Stoffman, 83.
86) Ibid., 2.
87) Ibid., 2.
89) McFeely and Grace, 6.
93) Cannon, 212.
94) Stoffman, 3.
95) Cannon, 208.
96) Gwyn, 214.
98) Ibid., 15.
99) Ibid., 15.
100) Ibid., 7.
102) Ibid., 51. According to Badets and Chui (p.41), 14% of immigrants aged 15 and over had university degrees, whereas 11% of Canadian-born in the same category had university degrees (according to 1991 census data).
103) Badets and Chiu, 43.
104) Ibid., 41.
106) Ibid., 30.


109) Ibid., 37.

110) Stoffman, 14.

111) Ibid., 2. Stoffman's numbers are curious. He says family-class constitute 40%, immigrants chosen through the point system constituted 15%, and that refugees constitute about 14% of the yearly intake (p.2). This leaves 31% of all immigrants unaccounted for.

112) Ibid., 13-14.


115) Campbell, Time Bomb, 26, 27.

116) Akbari, 51.

117) Francis, 71.

118) Ibid., 71.

119) Badets and Chiu, 31-32.

120) Ather Akbari, personal communication (July 22 1997).


122) Campbell, Time Bomb, 8.

123) Stoffman, 4.

124) Akbari, 51.

125) Ibid., 51.
126) Badets and Chiu, 35. Seniors and children are the dependents calculated into the dependency ratio. Immigrants have a lower child-dependency ratio than Canadian-born if one excludes their children that are born on Canadian soil, but also have a higher old-age dependency ratio than Canadian-born.


129) Stoffman, 2. He quotes the E.C.C. study on page 6, and does not mention any other study he may have used.

130) Economic Council, 51.


132) Stoffman, 5.

133) Ibid., 6.

134) Daniel Stoffman in McFeely and Grace, 8.

135) Gairdner, 418.


137) The witnesses who testified before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Labour, Employment, and Immigration that looked at this issue around 1990 felt that Canada could absorb between 150,000 and 200,000 immigrants without social or economic difficulty. None suggested a decrease in the level of the time: between 175,000 and 200,000 a year [Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Labour, Employment, and Immigration, Blackburn, Jean-Pierre, Interim Report on Demography and Immigration Levels, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Parl.34 Sess.2 n.40 (May 31 1990):3]. Most witnesses stated that an ageing population could only be counteracted by an increase in fertility (p. 2).
138) Charting Canada's Future, 2.


140) Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe (Strasbourg Council of Europe Publishing and Documentation Service, 1995: 11. In terms of the Total Fertility Rate, only Turkey and Iceland are at replacement level. All others member nations are below.


143) Profiles, 27.


145) Profiles, 27.

146) Chenard and Serjak, 1.

147) Profiles, 27. According to Statistics Canada's 1984 study, a T.F.R. of 1.4 would require an immigration intake of 325,000 by the year 2000 (Romaniuc, 95).

148) Profiles, 27.

149) Stoffman, 5. Stoffman quotes no source for this number, so it cannot be checked.

150) Chenard and Serjak, 1. Such efforts are being made in Quebec, where the government has provided incentives to promote families to have a third child, and has expanded daycare facilities.

151) Gairdner, 418.
152) Chenard and Serjak, 1.

153) Seward in Green and Beach, 5. Examples of such policies include France's 1985 year-long campaign, *Ouvrons la France aux enfants* ("Let us open France to Children") [Victor Malarek, *Haven's Gate: Canada's Immigration Fiasco* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1987): 30]. The low fertility in most of Europe has been partially offset not due to natalist policies, but to the inflow of migrants (Council of Europe, 18).

154) Malarek, 3.


156) Harris, 180.

157) Martin, 5-6.

158) Clark Reynolds predicted that by the year 2000, it is predicted that the United States will have a labour deficit of 5 million. The Institute of Labour Market and Occupational Research (I.A.B.) of the Federal Employment Agency in Germany predicted that the nation would have 2.5 million unfilled vacancies by the year 2000. The labour deficit in the first decade of the twenty-first century in France is predicted to be 142,000, and will rise to 180,000 by the third decade (Harris, 180).

159) Harris, 180.

160) Ibid., 182.

161) Economic Council, 133.

162) Chenard and Serjak, ix.

163) The report found that with a real interest rate of 5% and an immigration rate of 0.8%, the savings on expenditures would be $1500 per capita taxes. At an immigration rate of 1% (the E.C.C. proposal), the savings would be $1100. The 5% interest rate corresponds to the average rate in the 1980s, but has been less in the last few years. The gains are even higher (0.8% rate: $4500; 1% rate: $3400) if a 2% interest rate is used. The costs of immigration to the government would break even around the years 2006 or 2008. If fertility rates could be raised to 2.1 through natalist policies, the cumulative gains would be much less ($775 at a 5% interest rate, and $3,140 at a 2% interest rate), and a longer time would be required to break even (by 2025 in the 5% interest scenario, or by 2022 in the case of 2% (Chenard and Serjak, 24-25).
164) Chenard and Serjak, 25.

165) Ibid., 16, 2.

166) Stoffman makes no mention of it in any interviews he gave after the publication of his report (such as in McFeely and Grace, 8), nor does Richard Gwyn or Margaret Cannon.

167) Interim Report on Demography, 12.

168) Ibid., 4.

169) Beaufort, 115.

170) Hawkins, xxxv.

171) Beaufort, 313.
CHAPTER EIGHT: ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST IMMIGRATION

Contemporary arguments for immigration restriction fall into several categories. These claims include those that state that immigrants take jobs away from the Canadian-born, immigrants are a net burden on the national treasury, immigration confers no benefit on individual Canadians, immigrants cause wages to fall, modernization is decelerated by immigrants, immigrants come to take advantage of as well as overuse welfare, health care, and other benefits, and that business-class immigration is not needed in Canada. As was the case with the previous chapter, this chapter will examine these arguments to see if those who advocate immigrant restriction are making a valid case.

The benefits of immigration to individual Canadians

Recent critics have attempted to deconstruct the belief that immigration is good for the economy. Peter Brimelow, for example, uses the E.C.C.'s 1991 study to show how immigration does not boost the economy that much. Charles Campbell also quotes this E.C.C. study by saying that even without netting out the costs of bringing immigrants to Canada, plus language training, welfare, and other settlement costs, "the council concluded that the benefits to present residents are small and are dependent on economies of scale, now increasingly negated by the North American free trade agreement". The council, he says, recommended a gradual increase in immigration "not because of advantages to Canada but because of its perception of the benefits to the immigrants without consideration for the environment".

Campbell quotes other studies as well. He claims that Health and Welfare Canada's 1989 report Charting Canada's Future: A Report of the Demographic Review showed that "whatever the population growth, income per person or household will not benefit; it will be skills and their effective development that will affect our economic wellbeing, and the larger the economy, the greater the
stress on the environment". In other words, increasing the population through immigration will not help create economies of scale. Campbell also attempts to use the Diminishing Returns report published by the C.D. Howe and Laurier Institutes in 1995 to show that "too many immigrants are not paying their own way in Canada".

The Reform Party took a very different view of Diminishing Returns. The report, presented in Parliament, showed that Canada's immigrant program continues to have a positive influence on our economy. The Reform Party felt that the report was not valid. In their dissenting opinion published in the report, the Reform Party said the Sub-Committee which presented the report used it to justify the Liberal government's policy on immigration rather than honestly address the issues. The Party took exception to the report's coverage of household earnings over a forty-five year period by stating that such an attempt compares "apples to oranges":

What information do we gain by looking at immigrants who have arrived after World War Two and spent their entire working careers in Canada, and putting them in the same category as immigrants who have arrived four years ago?

After discrediting the findings of Diminishing Returns, Reform tried to use some of its aspects to show that recent immigrants are not as economically productive as previous immigrants. They acknowledge that economically assessed (independent) immigrants contribute to the Canadian economy, but such immigrants represent a small percentage of the total number of annual immigrants that arrive each year. The Party points to Figure One (Appendix C) of the report to show that the overwhelming majority of individuals who immigrated to Canada in 1985 earned less than 75% of the Canadian average. The report gives no suggestion that this situation has changed in the intervening seven years. The Committee supposedly ignored the fact that the majority of immigrants earn significantly less than the Canadian average.
"Thus the Reform Party takes exception to the Committee's firmly-held view that 'immigration continues to be economically beneficial to Canada'".\textsuperscript{10}

More specifically, critics challenge the idea that immigration contributes to a nation's economy by creating economies of scale. Richard Gwyn says that non-immigrant nations such as Japan and Switzerland have done fine without newcomers.\textsuperscript{11} Doug Collins asks: "...if population means prosperity, how come India and China aren't doing that well?"\textsuperscript{12} Stoffman claims that no correlation exists between population size and the well-being of individuals. Otherwise, Indians and Chinese would be the richest people while Norwegians and New Zealanders would be poor.\textsuperscript{13} He again cites the E.C.C.'s 1991 study to say that immigration does not increase the individual incomes of Canadian-born, and that no link exists between population size and the economy.\textsuperscript{14} Like the Reform Party in their retort to \textit{Diminishing Returns}, he tries to show that recent immigrants are not as productive as former immigrants when he quotes Donald DeVoretz to show that immigrants who have arrived after 1978 have not caught up to Canadian-born in earning power.\textsuperscript{15} Margaret Cannon also quotes the E.C.C.'s report to show that immigrants have a negligible effect on the individual incomes of Canadians.\textsuperscript{16}

This argument seems to assume that immigrants are brought here to serve the host population. While immigration is a policy used to serve the national interests, the aforementioned critics seem to overlook the goals of the 1978 policy, such as family reunification, and view immigration purely in terms of how well economically it serves the native population. While it is fair for the host population to expect immigrants not to be a financial burden, is it fair to assume that immigrants are brought here strictly for the purposes of serving the host population? Such a mentality views immigrants as servants rather than newcomers who want to make a new life for themselves.

None of the critics mentioned above do their own primary
research on immigration; instead they rely on studies such as *Diminishing Returns* and the 1991 E.C.C. report. These reports did, in fact, give some indication that immigration was not always as beneficial as pro-immigration advocates may have assumed. However, by the time these critics use this information, it is already secondary, and the possibility of misinterpretation must be explored.

The 1991 E.C.C. report, as shown already in the aforementioned critiques, was widely interpreted to show that the aggregate economic effects of immigration were very small. In reality, the E.C.C. made two findings. The first -- which tends to be the one that critics cite -- is that the overall effect of immigration on Canada's economic efficiency is very small if viewed as so many dollars per Canadian per million immigrants. Ather Akbari points to a serious flaw in the E.C.C.'s methodology. It assessed the impact of 250,000 immigrants (1% of the population) on a population of 26 million. In other words, the E.C.C. assessed the impact of just one year's flow of new Canadians. Not surprisingly, their impact was seen as very small.

The second finding of the E.C.C. study was that the economic effects of immigration were reasonably substantial if viewed as equivalent to a capital sum that each immigrant family would 'donate' to the rest of Canadians. None of the above critics mention this finding. They choose to focus on the gross efficiency of a yearly intake of immigrants.

Contrary to what Stoffman says, the E.C.C. did in fact link population size with the economy. The report stated that "nearly every immigrant pays for himself/herself in scale economies and in lighter future tax burdens". The results of scale economies would benefit both hosts and immigrants. What Stoffman may have been referring to was the report's statement that a historical perspective gives little or no support to the view that immigration is needed for economic prosperity.

The E.C.C.'s finding that immigrants do enhance the economy
would probably explain why they recommended an increase in immigrant intake to 1% of the total population. Contrary to Campbell's claim that the E.C.C. made this recommendation only for perceived benefits to the immigrants, the report gave no indication that they had such good intentions in mind. Furthermore, the study gives no evidence that it did not take into account expenses incurred by immigrants such as language training, welfare, and settlement costs. In fact, the report did make mention of the costs of E.S.L., which shows that language training costs were considered. Curiously, Campbell mentions "the costs of bringing the immigrants to Canada". He does not explain precisely how Canadians come to be burdened with the transportation costs of immigrants.

Campbell tries to use Health and Welfare Canada's study Charting Canada's Future to show that population size is not crucial for Canada's economic well-being, and therefore immigration is unnecessary. An economy relies on skills and their effective development. What Campbell does not mention is that the same study pointed to immigrants as making a positive economic contribution, thanks in part to their above-average level of education compared to Canadian-born.

Campbell tries to use the study Diminishing Returns to show "the decline in many immigrants' individual tax returns to below the value of direct benefits consumed". The study did show that the net returns from immigration are shrinking as the number of family-class immigrants supersede those who qualify for immigration due to their job skills. The researchers, however, proposed a very different solution from the one Campbell gives. While Campbell says immigration must be reduced to a minimum, the researchers suggest a readjustment of immigration quotas so that family-class newcomers represent less than one-half of all immigrants. The government complied with the latter recommendation.

One of the most significant findings of this study was that immigrant households contribute to the Canadian economy (rather

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than drain the economy), do not overuse the social security net, and save more than Canadian-born households. Instead of native-born having to pay for immigrants, Ather H. Akbari's report in the DeVoretz study (Diminishing Returns) shows that the average transfer of public funds goes from the immigrant household to the Canadian-born household.

In asking what information is gained by looking at immigrants who have arrived after World War Two and putting them into the same category as immigrants who arrived four years ago, The Reform Party reveals their misunderstanding of Akbari's research. The purpose of Akbari's study was not to compare recent immigrants with those who arrived in the past. Such a task could not be done with the data that was used because immigrants who arrived after World War Two spent a different time period in the country. Akbari's paper constructs a life cycle performance of a typical immigrant entering Canada in 1990. The data on different entry cohorts represent data for immigrants who have lived in Canada for varying lengths of time. In other words, each cohort represents a point in an individual's life cycle.

Reformers try to use Figure One (Appendix C) to show that immigrants who arrived in 1985 earned significantly less than the Canadian average in 1988, thus proving that recent immigrants are not economically productive. Both Donald DeVoretz (the editor of Diminishing Returns) and Ather Akbari say that this is a misreading of the evidence. All immigrants enter on average with an earnings gap. Those who arrived in 1985 (and whose earnings were estimated in 1988) were no different. This earnings gap disappears after ten to eighteen years, depending on the occupations of individual new Canadians. The reason why those who have arrived in 1985 did not do well in terms of earnings in 1988 is because they have lived in the country for such a short period. To compare the performance of immigrants in a practical manner, one would have to look at earnings of immigrants in the past. For instance, one could compare the performance of those who arrived during the 1977-79
period and are in the 1981 census data (the census collected labour market information for the year 1980) with those who arrived in the 1987-89 period and were reported in the 1991 census (which collected labour market information for the year 1990).\textsuperscript{30} The explanation given for the graph (Figure One) clearly noted that immigrants who arrived in the 1985 cohort group had fewer years of experience in the Canadian labour market than those who arrived in 1981 when both groups' earnings were measured in 1988. The explanation also noted that workers who landed in 1985, irrespective of category, had higher average annual growth in real earnings during the first three years after landing than did workers who arrived in 1981.\textsuperscript{31} The Reform Party went on to take exception to the committee's view that immigration was beneficial to Canada.

Stoffman and Collins, in pointing to India and China to show population size is not linked to economic well-being, have made an oversimplified argument. The reason why nations like India and China are underdeveloped is not because they have a large population to feed, but because of other reasons such as political and distributional systems and extent of natural resources in those countries.\textsuperscript{32}

In assessing the impact of immigration on the economy, some observers suggest that we are looking at this the wrong way. Macro-economic models such as that of the E.C.C. study measure the demand-side impact of immigration. Such models show immigration to lead to an increase in the labour force, but with only slight effects on per capita income. These studies omit significant aspects such as the human capital characteristics of immigrants, revenue from business immigration, the skills of immigrants, and different consumption and savings patterns of immigrants. Therefore, such models should not be used to infer that immigration has not had a positive effect on the economy.\textsuperscript{33}

Peter S. Li argues that such models do not take into account the magnitude of economic shrinkage in the postwar era if not for
immigration. Since 1947, Canada has experienced an exodus of skilled labour to the United States. Between 1954 and 1962, Canada experienced a net loss of skilled people, a so-called 'brain drain'. At the same time immigration, which was largely from Europe due to restrictions that prevented immigrants from elsewhere, consisted largely of unskilled members entering under family reunification allowances. These trends compelled the need for the 1962 Act to facilitate the immigration of skilled workers. Statistics shows that since 1961, immigrants have made up more than 25% of the labour force in natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics. By 1981, the percentage of Canadian-born labour in these job sectors dropped by 28%. Without immigration, Canada's skilled work force would have dropped dramatically.

Proponents of immigration restriction have tried to show recent immigration as not economically beneficial to Canada. A critical look at the evidence they use shows that the research on immigration they use is not always complete. This is done by both members of the media and by those in government. This former point will be brought to light later when the intentions of these immigration critics are brought into question. In addition, such arguments often leave out other ways of viewing the economic benefits of immigration such as how skilled newcomers offset Canada's brain drain.

Immigrants as a Drain:

In their attempts to show immigrants as not economically helpful to Canada, critics portray new Canadians not only as not productive, but also as costly, that is, immigrants cost Canadians more than the immigrants produce. For example, Charles Campbell talks of the cost of immigrants to society: $110 million to the Immigration and Refugee Appeal Board and for its members' salaries, $700 million annually in welfare to sponsored defendants (note: he said annually), probably $600 million in welfare to refugee claimants, $60 million in legal aid charges, and "perhaps" $1
billion in language training annually for immigrants. Campbell also talks of funding of immigrant service organizations plus "unknown criminal justice costs resulting from our porous border".\textsuperscript{36}

Campbell made a similar argument in his 1989 book:

One can only speculate on the total cost of the nature of programs the School Boards consider inadequate to meet the needs of Canadian or of the immigrant children. This all follows from the failure to manage the immigrant/refugee program... The incredible failure of politicians to recognize cost of waste is the basis of our national debt. The annual costs of refugee program mismanagement contributes hundreds of millions of dollars more than its share.\textsuperscript{37}

Campbell blames the large-scale influx of unskilled workers on changes in the immigration laws. It is these workers that are a drain on the Canadian economy.\textsuperscript{38}

Diane Francis makes a similar argument, claiming that "Canada has played host to tens of thousands of bogus 'refugees', giving them welfare plus health, education, and housing benefits from the moment they land".\textsuperscript{39} She uses anonymous sources to offer various anecdotes about the immigrant community: Somalis who staged a "mass invasion of Canada's welfare state", and stay on welfare or work under the table (according to Toronto police), a Vietnamese couple who "live like kings on welfare" (from a Vancouver social worker in 1993), of Chinese 'flight husbands' with families in Canada who do not declare their income abroad but whose families "cost a fortune in school and medical costs" (according to 'Kathleen', a member of the Chinese-Canadian community), and of refugees from the Middle East who reside in West and North Vancouver and send "tonnes of insulin" and other drugs home by using their welfare cards (an open secret according to 'Kathleen').\textsuperscript{40} Basically, Francis is trying to make the case that immigrants come to Canada only to take advantage of Canada's supposedly generous social security net.

Perceptions like these are made to give Canadians the idea they are paying for programmes that newcomers benefit from. As Richard Gwyn writes, English-Canadians are feeling left out, and this is
the message in recent anti-tax protests:

The link here is that taxes paid by one person always benefit other persons who are strangers; the more these really are strangers, or "differentiated citizens", the greater the unwillingness to part with one's money.41

This implies that the host population is paying for the immigrant population. Some new Canadians may in fact be taking advantage of benefits provided by the Canadian health and welfare system. Such abuses should rightly be pointed out. But how accurate is this view? It is difficult to validate some of the costs quoted by Campbell because he does not quote his sources. Some of his numbers, however, arouse suspicion. For instance, he writes in his 1995 article that welfare paid to sponsored dependants cost $700 million annually. However, a 1994 article in Maclean's showed that taxpayers that year paid $700 million in welfare to immigrants whose families failed to meet sponsorship commitments.42 The $700 million figure appears to be unique for that year. However, Campbell tries to make it look like taxpayers pay this amount every year.

Campbell also says that language training costs "perhaps $1 billion". The federal government in 1994 spent $80 million for E.S.L. instruction.43 Perhaps Campbell included provincial costs of E.S.L., but there is still a large gap between $80 million and $1 billion.

What is interesting about Diane Francis' case against immigration is that she avoids any form of empirical evidence. She relies on anecdotes and rumours, rather than checking to see if any measurable form of evidence can show that immigrants are using welfare and cheating the social security net en masse.

Certainly, some of the costs of immigration are cause for concern. However, the solutions do not necessarily lie in drastic cuts to immigration numbers. In the case of the $700 million windfall due to sponsoring families unable to pay for family members in 1994, the federal government accepted for consideration
the possibility of requiring sponsors to post a surety bond. This would mean that if the reunified family member fails in the labour market and uses social assistance, the proceeds of the bond would be defaulted to the government. Such a proposal would reorder the family reunification queue and possibly eliminate the sponsoring of immigrants with the intention of using public programs to support them.\textsuperscript{44} To lower the costs of E.S.L., preference could be given to immigrant applicants who already have official language capability (English or French).\textsuperscript{45}

While some expenses are cause for concern, this does not mean that new Canadians are overall a drain on Canadian wealth. The reality shows otherwise. If we assume for a moment that Campbell's numbers are accurate, they would still not prove immigration to be a burden, because the aforementioned studies (the E.C.C. report, Diminishing Returns, and Charting Canada's Future), all of which Campbell likes to quote, show that immigrants more than pay for themselves in the long-term. To add to this, two studies within the Fraser Institute's immigration study, The Immigration Dilemma, reinforced the conclusion that immigrants are not a drain on the economy. Herb Grubel, who has since become a Reform Party M.P., found that the economic effects of immigrants on the welfare of resident Canadians has been positive, and that newcomers can be expected to earn their marginal product and thus contribute as much to output as they claim through earnings.\textsuperscript{46} Donald J. DeVoretz's work in the same study also found immigration policy between 1967 and 1990 a success in terms of the labour market performance of resulting immigrant flows (but just as he states in Diminishing Returns, the fall in the numbers of independent-class immigrants is cause for some concern).\textsuperscript{47} In light of this evidence, it is not surprising that Diane Francis relies solely on anecdotes and ad hominem evidence to make her case: virtually all of the formal studies on the subject show the exact opposite of what she is trying to prove.

In attempting to show that immigrants are a net burden on
society, critics may help bring to light some potential concerns with immigration trends. But often their solutions to these particular problems do not correspond with the solutions given by those who wrote the original studies that these critics like to cite. The overall conclusion of various studies on the issue shows that new Canadians do not overuse the social security net.

Immigrants and native-born unemployment:

Immigrants are assumed to take jobs that are needed by the Canadian-born in hard times. Consequently, one of the reasons given for the restriction of immigration is to protect a fragile labour market for the native-born population. This is a time-honoured argument that has currency for modern-day immigration critics. William D. Gairdner makes the "immigrants-take-our-jobs" argument in its basic form:

Even though we have a continuing record of unemployment, the government keeps bringing in immigrants who compete with citizens for jobs... . More likely, as time passes, he (the immigrant) becomes a free-floating competitor for other jobs and therefore a threat to the unemployed already here.48

Richard Gwyn also complains that in the 1990s, immigration intakes no longer bear any relationship to the state of the domestic economy. The consequence, he says, is that while Canadians are experiencing the highest unemployment rates since the Depression: "...more newcomers than ever before were being brought in to compete with them".49 Charles Campbell also talks about the need to tie immigration to unemployment: "We know that jobs must be found for 1.3 million unemployed. We know that 50,000 federal civil servants must be relocated. We know that jobs for today's university students are not assured on graduation."50

Doug Collins made a similar argument in the 1980s: "In 1980, when there were already over one million unemployed, [Employment Minister] Axworthy came forth with the glad news that western Canada would need 60,000 immigrants by 1990".51 Collins made a similar argument in the seventies: "...increasing numbers of
illegal immigrants are able to take jobs from Canadians at a time of high unemployment".\textsuperscript{52}

The assumption that immigration exacerbates unemployment is made not only by those in the media, but by politicians as well. The Reform Party justified its proposed cut to the annual immigration level (to 150,000) on Canada's unemployment rate of 10\%.\textsuperscript{53} In January of 1994, when former Minister for Employment and Immigration Sergio Marchi changed visa requirements so that refugee applicants could apply for work permits and not go on welfare, Reform Immigration critic Art Hanger complained that refugees were now taking scarce jobs from Canadians. He was also quite sure that those applicants who could find jobs will work only long enough to qualify and obtain unemployment insurance (U.I.) benefits. \textsuperscript{54}

But what about the benefits of immigration for the job market? Some critics say that such benefits are limited. Daniel Stoffman argues without citation that while immigrants create jobs by making the population larger, they also take jobs. Thus, they have no effect on the unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{55} As for the fact that immigration helps to fill labour shortages in Canada, the Reform Party argues that Canadians should look at the needs of Canadians first. That is, where chronic labour shortages exist, "we must ensure that Canadians have the opportunity to obtain these jobs before we look for immigrants".\textsuperscript{56}

The justification for the restriction of immigration due to its perceived negative effect on native unemployment would at first seem to be a plausible argument. Critics are right to point out that some evidence, as will be shown, does show some job displacement in the Canadian job market due to immigration. Perhaps this is why critics like to use this argument. It gives the idea that particular critics base their criticisms on genuine concern for the economic well-being of Canadians, and not on nativist tendencies. However, a closer look shows that this claim is founded on some faulty assumptions. To assume that immigrants displace native workers is to assume that the labour force is
homogenous, that the number of jobs on offer is fixed, and that economic output is constant. It assumes that demand is a function of supply. Therefore, an increase in the labour supply will drive down wages and employment. Yet these are all doubtful. Unemployment is created not by an increase in worker supply, but in a fall of demand. Demand is not always a function of supply.57

Studies on this issue in Canada show that by and large, immigration does not cause native unemployment. While Ternowetsky gave some concern in 1986 as to the effect of immigration on native unemployment based on theory,58 later studies showed this fear to be largely off base. Samuel and Conyers (1986) found that immigrants generated more employment than they took in Canada, and had higher rates of self-employment.59 Donald DeVoretz's 1989 study, Immigration and Employment Effects, found some evidence of job displacement due to immigration. However, this was limited to sub-sector industries characterized by concentrations of foreign-born labour and female workers, and those industries protected by significant tariffs.60 But overall, he found no evidence of economy-wide displacement due to immigration:

...economy-wide there is no modern evidence as of 1980 that the post-war stock of immigrants significantly displaced workers born in Canada. In addition, this lack of substitution did not vary with the date of arrival of the immigrants. Also, economy-wide, the employment of immigrants did not require a significant amount of physical capital upon entry, while an expansion of the native-born labour force did. This lack of economy-wide capital complementary for immigrants we believe was a result of the high human capital content of immigrants...61

The study went on to confirm the wisdom of capital requirements for business-class immigrants, as native employment required higher amounts of capital than do immigrant labourers.62

The E.C.C.'s 1991 study also addressed the impact of immigration on unemployment. Unlike DeVoretz's study, which used cross-sectional tests of 125 manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries,63 the E.C.C. study used statistical associations
across countries and regression analysis through time, relating the size of population or its growth rate to the rate of unemployment.\textsuperscript{64} The study found that immigration hardly ever has any effect on the unemployment rate. Even temporary effects do not occur.\textsuperscript{65} Rather than having an effect on unemployment, the E.C.C.'s findings showed a relationship of a different kind: that immigration numbers increased in good economic times. In other words, good and bad economic times caused immigration rates to fluctuate, not the other way around.\textsuperscript{66}

A similar conclusion was reached in a separate study by Marr and Siklos (1995), which tested for relationships between unemployment and immigration for the years 1926 and 1992. Their tests found that increases in unemployment were associated with subsequent reductions in immigration levels.\textsuperscript{67} Marr and Siklos concluded their macroeconomic study by saying that the impact of immigration on unemployment is never large enough to justify the alarm that is occasionally expressed about the possible influence of immigration on future unemployment rates.\textsuperscript{68}

Would curtailing immigration in times of recession aid an economic recovery? No Canadian studies address the issue, but a 1991 Australian modelling study did. The study found that cutting immigration sharply by 50% would likely lead to delay in an economic recovery through adverse effects on economic sectors such as the construction industry, while providing no improvement on the unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{69}

Another factor to consider in regards to the belief that an increase in the labour force will result in unemployment is that domestic sources add to the workforce more than immigration does. In the United States, four million extra workers entered the labour force in the sixties and seventies. This exceeded the numbers of immigrants entering the labour force in those years. Furthermore, the number of women joining the labour force between 1960 and 1980 added 8.5 million more workers to the labour force.\textsuperscript{70} In Canada, women represented 22% of the labour force in 1951. By 1981, they
represented 41% of all workers. Yet none of these domestic sources are targeted by critics who assume that immigration adds workers to an already-scarce job market.

A Catch-22 situation seems to be present in some of the arguments of certain immigration critics. As mentioned earlier, Art Hanger justified Reform's policy of denying immigrants health and welfare benefits as a reflection of the frustration of ordinary Canadians when they see abuse of the immigration system. However, when immigrants try to work and pay their own way, Hanger says they are taking jobs away from Canadians. What this suggests is that rather than being genuinely concerned about what the actual causes of economic problems faced by Canadians are, policy-makers at the federal level such as Hanger are content to use immigrants as scapegoats to blame for these problems.

**Immigration and Industrialization:**

Another fear expressed about immigrants is that the influx of unskilled newcomers will slow down technological modernization by keeping alive industries that should be allowed to fade away. Daniel Stoffman makes this argument in the Canadian case. He says that the current immigration policy fails to serve the national interest by allowing in too many illiterate and unskilled people. The economy then tends to expand in a manner that absorbs such workers, and such workers can only work in dying labour-intensive industries, not knowledge-intensive ones.

Stoffman makes this claim with the assumption that current immigrants are largely unskilled. As shown in the demographics section of this chapter, the increase in illiteracy among immigrants has been largely due to the inflow of seniors in the family class, who are no longer part of the workforce. Immigrants in general still have higher education rates than Canadian-born.

This is a belief that has been used to justify policy measures in other nations like Germany and Singapore. The argument behind this belief is that without unskilled immigrants, employers would
be obliged to pay higher wages and to invest in labour-saving innovations. This argument would be plausible only if employers were actually free to determine wages and labour without reference to markets at large. Furthermore, employers are also competing with others in the global market place, not just employers in Canada. Reality shows that employers do not have this freedom, especially in sectors that employ unskilled workers. As Kuhn (1974) demonstrated, no falls in capital investment take place where labour is abundant. In other words, the nature of production is not determined by scarcity and abundance of workers, but by market demand.

Another aspect to add to this issue is the contribution of immigrants to further technological modernization of the economy. As previously mentioned, independent immigrants have been brought in to fill a labour gap in Canada due to skilled workers leaving Canada for the United States. One cannot deal with this issue completely without considering how immigrants have contributed to the economy and how they filled a labour gap, and by the innovations and technology those individuals have developed in their careers in Canada.

The arguments that immigrants slow economic modernization by flooding the market with low-skilled workers does not stand up to evidence. First, in the Canadian case, immigrants have higher education levels than do Canadian-born. Second, this anti-immigrant claim is flawed in that it assumes that the nature of production in an economy is determined by its labour, not by demand for products. Finally, such an argument fails to note the contribution of immigrants to an economy, especially in Canada, where immigrants help fill in a skilled labour need. Unskilled immigrants also fill labour needs such as farmworkers, nannies, and domestic help.

Business- and Investor-Class Immigrants

In the 1980s, the federal government created a business class
for immigrants. To this was added the Investor Category of the Business Immigration Programme in 1985. The objective of this programme was "to promote, encourage, and facilitate the immigration of business persons from abroad who will make a positive contribution to the country's economic development by applying their risk capital and know-how to Canadian business ventures which creates jobs for Canadians".

By 1990, most of those who entered Canada as business-class immigrants were Asian. In this decade, this category of immigrants has come under fire and has been the object of resentment for various reasons. Some, such as Charles Campbell, question the success of the program. He cites the 1991 E.C.C. report, which found no evidence of a shortage of entrepreneurs that immigration is needed to fill. Daniel Stoffman asks if business immigration is necessary, as Canada already produces plenty of native-born entrepreneurs. Ottawa, he writes, should justify the business programme by showing that it actually does some good.

Others seem to resent business immigrants for who they are. These critics suggest that business-class immigrants are those who buy their Canadian citizenship. Elizabeth Aird, writing for The Vancouver Sun, says that such immigrants have zero commitment to their adopted country (Canada), and she labels them "a group of moneyed people who are by definition self-seeking, who obviously have no interest in becoming equal partners in the Canadian community" who are "jumping the queue for the less well-healed behind them". She says that Canadian immigration policy bears more resemblance to corporate recruiting than to nation-building. She also makes the comparison of these immigrants to previous ones, attempting to show how the quality of the older immigrants was much higher, by comparing the new wealthy immigrants to her Scottish grandparents who fled subsistence farms in Scotland and had to work here to buy their own homes.

Doug Collins also opposes the allowing in of immigrants for business purposes. He attacks the former Progressive Conservative
federal government for not opposing the granting of landed immigrant status to Hong Kong "so-called businessmen". He says that no one ever checked to see if these newcomers actually created jobs. Even if they did, Collins claims that they just give these jobs to their relatives.

In some ways, the business class immigrants present a problem for immigration critics in that traditional criticisms cannot apply to this type of immigrant. However, these critics still try to demonize them. And this helps to reveal the anti-immigrant bias of the contemporary backlash. For example, Stoffman and Campbell both warn of the potential socio-economic problems for Canada in the supposed fall of skill levels and economic production of recent immigrants. Immigration policy, they say, has to serve the national interest by bringing in investment capital and producing jobs, and they pass it off as unnecessary.

Elizabeth Aird's article attacks business-class immigrants in regards to their protesting changes to the federal Income Tax Act which would require all Canadian residents to disclose offshore assets in order to prevent people from hiding taxable money in offshore tax havens. She concludes that: "If those elite few who pick and choose their tax regimes turn their backs on Canada, perhaps we're better off without them." While her attack on those who are trying to avoid paying taxes may be laudable, perhaps it would be more appropriate to direct such a critique at all members of Canadian society who avoid paying their share of taxes.

Thousands of profitable Canadian companies, for example, get away each year with paying no tax. Why does she selectively attack foreigners who protest tax changes, and not deal with Canadians who are able to avoid paying taxes? While it may not be Aird's intention, criticizing only those Canadians of foreign birth who are trying to avoid paying taxes gives the impression that she is attacking them because they are foreigners.

The conclusion of the 1991 E.C.C. study (and its subsequent citation by critics) that the business investor program is not
necessary does not hold up to empirical evidence. This was pointed out in the study itself. The commentary by council member Diane Cohen, who as Chair of the Minister's Advisory Committee on the Immigration Investor Programme, stated "that there is no empirical evidence to lead to such a limiting view of this recently-introduced programme". The Business Immigration Program has, in fact, resulted in significant capital investment for Canada. The entry of 20,000 business immigrants between 1986 and 1990 resulted in a total investment of $3 billion (in 1988 constant dollars), of which $2.6 billion was in the business sector (the other $400 million was in liquid assets). As a result, 80,000 new direct jobs were created, $2.6 billion was added to the Canadian G.D.P. (Gross Domestic Product), and the average worker employed by business immigrants produced a G.D.P. of $31,000. In this time period, business immigrant financial investment accounted for 10% of all business sector investment growth, 6.3% of the net increase in full-time employment, and over 3% of the total growth in the G.D.P. The annual increase in absolute levels of immigrant investment making up the 10% of overall growth suggests that the business immigrant contribution to investment growth will continue to be significant. This evidence directly contradicts the E.C.C.'s claim that business immigration is not needed unless, of course, the Economic Council feels that these numbers are not particularly significant.

Contrary to Stoffman's claim, the federal government did in fact show the benefits of business immigration in a study that predates his own study. The Interim Report on the Immigration Investor Programme showed that the programme was successful in, among other things, attracting investment to provinces which traditionally did not receive business immigrant investment. Total business immigrant investment from 1990 represented 31% of total net foreign purchases of Canadian corporate securities in that same year. The report concluded that the program was unquestionably an important vehicle for attracting foreign capital.
Other government-sponsored reports which predated this report also pointed out the benefits of business-class immigration. Samuel and Conyers (1986) pointed out that between 1983 and 1985, business immigrants brought $1,540,000,000 into Canada, and created at least 17,550 jobs (about three per this class of immigrant). DeVoretz (1989) pointed out the wisdom of capital requirements for business-class immigrants, as this capital helped finance Canadian labour. In 1986, business immigrants brought in $1,656,000,000 which equalled the amount spent by the state on labour market programmes, surpassed funding spent on regional industrial expansion, and represented one-quarter of total direct investment in Canada. Thus, Stoffman's questioning of the necessity of the programme, and his claim that the government should justify the programme, show that he overlooks available evidence on the subject.

These facts would add to any discussion on business immigration to Canada, yet they are absent in the writings of Aird, Collins, Campbell, and Stoffman who all choose to view business immigration in a negative light. In some ways, the attacks on business immigration appear as class antagonism wrapped in a racial envelope. This can be seen in Aird's article in the way she labels such newcomers as "moneyed" and "wealthy belly-achers" while comparing them to older generations of immigrants who came to Canada with very little wealth.

This criticism levelled at this particular class of immigrants reveals an interesting contradiction: immigrants in contemporary times and in the past were viewed as harmful to Canada because they were the 'poor, huddled masses' escaping poverty and injustices. Yet they had supposedly little to offer Canada. This can be seen in the contemporary writings of Brimelow, Collins, Campbell, and Stoffman. However, the business-class does not fit this stereotype. Thus, the critics pass off such new Canadians as unnecessary, without presenting the full story. Ironically, in the case of Aird, her resentment of such immigrants represents a class
antagonism. She clearly shows a preference for the "wretched refuse and huddled masses", whom she says Canada should not turn its back on! This contradiction between critics shows that their arguments are more influenced by anti-foreigner feelings than by a genuine concern for Canada's national interest.

Conclusion

Within the critiques presented in this chapter lie some genuine issues of concern regarding immigration. Studies have shown how some limits need to be applied to the proportion of family-class immigrants that are allowed to enter Canada in order for immigration to continue to be a positive economic factor. Not only have Charles Campbell and Daniel Stoffman pointed out the refugee backlog in Canada; others such as Freda Hawkins have shown some concern for this issue. Costs such as E.S.L. and welfare payments in some years to immigrant families whose sponsors could no longer afford or refused to support them are a concern to the system. My purpose here is not to deny that no legitimate arguments exist to justify limits to immigration. Rather, I am trying to expose the weaknesses and fallacies that lie behind some of the current well-publicized arguments for restriction.

This analysis shows that present-day immigration critics use themes similar to those used to justify immigration restriction in the past. Just as Woodsworth, Anderson, and Leacock wrote in their time, contemporary critics such as Stoffman, Campbell, Gairdner, and members of The Reform Party give the impression that today's immigrants are not as competent as immigrants from the past. They state that today's immigration levels, if they continue at the present levels, will spell disaster for Canada. These immigrants will bring social and economic problems with them. Immigrants today, as critics claimed in the past, are said to cause dependency levels to rise in Canadian society due to their inability to adapt.

What makes the immigration critics that I have discussed here unique is that encased within their arguments are not
recommendations for revisions of immigrant policy, which may be appropriate in light of some of the real problems caused by immigration, but a recommendation for immigrant restriction. Rarely, if ever, do these critics carry out their own research on immigration. They rely on the research of others, and often the critics' recommendations bear no resemblance to those made by the authors of the immigration studies that are cited. These critics argue that they are trying to present immigration in an honest and refreshing light, something which is apparently new to the Canadian political landscape. A critical look at their arguments reveals that they overlook information, rely on anecdotes and ad hominem references, and misquote studies. In other words, such evaluations of immigration policy represent the biases of the critics, and do not tell the full story.

But does this mean their critiques are manifestations of nativism? This is a question that will be dealt with in the next chapter. This chapter concentrated on deconstructing various common demographic and economic arguments against immigration. This will continue in the next chapter with regard to environmental and social issues and immigration.
NOTES


3) Ibid., A11.
4) Ibid., A11.
5) Ibid., A11.


7) Ibid., 35.
8) Ibid., 35.
9) Ibid., 36.
10) Ibid., 36.


14) Ibid., 7.
15) Ibid., 8.


19) Economic Council, 133.

20) Ibid., 36.

21) Ibid., 19.

22) Ibid., 138.


26) Ibid., vi.

27) Ibid., 126.

28) Ather Akbari, personal communication (February 4 1997).


30) Akbari, personal communication (February 4 1997).


32) Akbari, personal communication (February 4 1997). Julian Simon argues that even less-developed countries benefit from their large populations in terms of scale economies and additional knowledge contributed by more people [Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981): 271]. This challenges Stoffman's assertion that the idea that population size benefits the economy cannot be taken seriously.


36) Campbell, "Save Money", All.


40) Ibid., 63, 64, 65, 66, and 67.

41) Gwyn, 282.


43) Ibid., 24, and also in DeVoretz, Diminishing, 8.

44) DeVoretz, Diminishing, 7-8.

45) Ibid., 26.


47) DeVoretz in Globerman, 193.


49) Gwyn, 215-216.

50) Campbell, "Save Money", All.


53) Edward Greenspon, "Reform backs immigration cuts", The Globe and Mail (October 31 1994): A2. Even though the unemployment rate was edging downwards, then Reform critic Art Hanger felt his party's number was still justified: "Let's look at it in realistic terms. That's the so-called official record of unemployment (10%). It's substantially higher when you include those on welfare and those in all other categories" (p. A2)
54) Andrew Cardozo, "On Guard for Multiculturalism", The Canadian Forum, 522 (April 1994): 17. Originally, refugees could not work while their applications were being considered. This was changed after municipalities complained about the burden caused by refugees claiming welfare (p. 17).

55) Stoffman, 7.


59) T.J. Samuel and T. Conyers (Employment and Immigration Canada), The Employment Effects of Immigration: A Balance Sheet Approach (Paper presented at the Canadian Population Society Meeting in Winnipeg, June 5-7 1986): 15. The study showed that immigrants represented one-fifth of all self-employed in the 1981 census, as compared to 16% of the total population (p. 15).


61) Ibid., 24.


63) DeVoretz, Immigration Employment Effects, 8, and in Diminishing Returns, 19.

64) Economic Council, 62.

65) Ibid., 62.

66) Ibid., 19.


68) Ibid., 327.

70) Harris, 198.


73) Cardozo, 17.

74) Stoffman, 9.

75) Harris, 200.


79) Campbell, "Save Money", All.

80) Stoffman, 9. Stoffman does not quote any sources for this point. However, his suggestion that business immigration might not be necessary as Canada already produces enough native-born entrepreneurs resembles the findings of the E.C.C. report, which he likes to cite elsewhere. The Economic Council's report stated that "There is no general shortage of Canadian entrepreneurs and self-employed persons that would justify giving them special entry privileges ahead of other independents"(p.40).

81) Elizabeth Aird, "You don't like the tax law changes? Then take a hike", The Vancouver Sun (October 5 1996): D6.

82) Ibid., D6. This quote is first mentioned here in Chapter Seven.

84) Ibid., 7.

85) Aird, D6.

86) Aird, D6.

87) Sandra Sorensen, "Corporate Tax Avoidance", The Canadian Forum, 73:829 (May 1994): 48. In 1992, 93,405 profitable corporations paid no income taxes at all on $27 billion in profits (p.48). Non-immigrant individuals also use tax havens such as the Cayman Islands to avoid taxation.

88) Economic Council, 42.


90) Ibid., 1.


92) Samuel and Conyers, 6.


94) Wong and Nelling in Satzewich, 97.

95) Ibid., 121.

96) Aird, D6.


98) The Immigration Legislative Review report, for example, showed that sponsorship breakdown is a serious concern in many regions. In the Toronto region, the breakdown rate is as high as 14%. As for language education, cities receiving large numbers of immigrants must cope with the strain exerted on public classrooms by the lack of official language skills among immigrant children and the lack of adequately funded language training. Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997): 45.
CHAPTER NINE: GENERAL THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION-BASHING

The contemporary immigration backlash is evident in opinion polls, policies of the Reform Party, the large body of anti-immigration literature available, and the recent cuts by the incumbent Liberal government to immigration levels in spite of its campaign promise to raise immigration levels to match 1% of the total population. Are the concerns raised by immigration critics valid? Are disturbing trends in immigration effects actually visible? Or do these criticisms reflect the biases of the critics rather than the reality of the effects of immigration in Canada?

Chapter Eight dealt with the anti-immigration tradition in Canadian history, and showed how contemporary immigration-bashing contains many of the same themes that were used in the past. These included the beliefs that current immigrants were of a lower grade than previous newcomers, that immigrants were a burden to their host society, and that immigrants brought problems such as crime and disease with them.

Chapter Nine will continue the examination of contemporary arguments against immigration to see if they reveal genuine problems caused by immigration. The focus here will be environmental and social arguments against immigration. Specifically, in regards to social arguments, this chapter will look at the belief that immigrants are responsible for a large amount of crime in our society.

In addition, this chapter will focus on the ideas that various critics try to promulgate in regards to immigration. These include the arguments that Canada is in a state of crisis which in order to alleviate requires dramatic changes to immigration policy, that our immigration system is out of control, that the immigration process is biased against those of European origin, that unqualified immigrants are pouring into Canada through the refugee and family classes, and that other countries are doing a better job than Canada of putting their immigration policy in order. The focus
here shifts away from the criticisms and more towards the critics themselves. The purpose of this shift is to expose the underlying assumptions within the thinking of these immigration critics. Such assumptions may reveal the real motives underlying the current immigration backlash.

**Immigration and Environmental Concerns**

Environmental concerns over the effects of immigration are not new. Such concerns were expressed throughout Canadian history. Concerns over the environmental impacts of immigration translate into two issues. These are the impact of population growth due to immigration on a nation's resources, and the problem of rapid urban growth due to immigrants choosing to live in cities and its consequences in terms of increased waste disposal, air pollution, and increased housing costs.

The increased public concern over environmental issues appear to have given Charles Campbell a new tool in his writings about immigration. In his 1994 article, "Save Money, Close Our Borders", he looks to government studies such as Health and Welfare's Charting Canada's Future to show that "the larger the economy the greater the stress on the environment". He criticizes the Economic Council of Canada's 1991 study New Faces in the Crowd: Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration for recommending an increase in immigration "without consideration for the environment".

As most immigrants settle in the cities, critics have taken issue with urban growth due to immigration. Daniel Stoffman writes that too many immigrants are coming and 'flooding' certain areas. This contributes to stress in these cities such as homelessness, hunger, crime, traffic, and overflowing landfills. Margaret Cannon also talks of overcrowding in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal due to newcomers. "None of these cities need further immigrants. Their resources are already stretched, and continuing population growth means more pressure on housing, roads, schools,
and public assistance". She makes no mention of the possibility that immigrants may be paying tax revenue to help address these urban problems.

Such concerns are not a new trend. They have been expressed in public debate before, usually in regards to population growth in general. In 1973, the Conservation Council of Ontario and Family Planning Federation recommended decreased population growth because it felt Canada was already overpopulated. Other organizations, such as Zero Population Growth, which was formed in the seventies and experienced a resurgence in the nineties, have also called for slower population growth for environmental reasons.

While concerns of natural resource depletion due to population pressures may be a legitimate concern, their use to justify immigration restriction is questionable. As Nigel Harris asks, would one remove (the native-born population), too, if 'carrying capacity' exceeded? In other words, why is the burden of limiting population growth shouldered solely by immigrants? This anti-immigration argument is most popular in countries like the United States and Australia where the population density is low compared to the rest of the world.

Campbell tries to use the 1989 Health and Welfare demographic study to show that an expanded economy (due to an increased population) means more stress on the environment. He leaves out the fact that the same study also mentioned that an expanded economy would provide more resources for dealing with this stress.

The environmental argument against immigration is based on the idea that a nation has a 'carrying capacity'. That is, it has a population limit that the ecosystem can support. However, the actual number that constitutes this carrying capacity is highly contentious. Research in Australia, for example, has placed the carrying capacity of that country as high as 60 million at current consumption levels. The problem, as seen in the case of Australia, is that a single figure cannot indicate a nation's carrying capacity for all time. Consumption, production, and waste
scenarios all change with time. Furthermore, the faster the population grows, the commitment to biodiversity increases.

In any case, the causes for environmental degradation are many and varied. Immigrants, or population growth due to immigration, cannot solely be blamed for pollution and resource depletion. Campbell and Richard Gwyn justify immigration cuts by saying that the economic contribution of immigrants is now negated by international trade. Presumably, they mean that Canada's economy does not require domestic consumption and production to thrive, as Canadian businesses now have access to international markets. Yet they fail to point out that these international markets and their demand for domestically-produced goods and resources also play a role in environmental depletion.

To argue against immigration on the basis that it contributes to a nation's environmental damage by expanding the population and the economy is to admit the existence of scale economies, and to ignore other factors that contribute to environmental harm.

With regard to urbanization, immigration may actually play a role in producing pollution due to urban growth. However, this problem cannot be blamed solely on immigrants. Urban growth is due to the migration of people into urban areas in general, of whom immigrants are only a part of. The Canadian-born are abandoning rural and small towns for the metropolises of Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. While 88.7% of foreign-born in Canada live in urban areas, so do 73.1% of Canadian-born. Hence, to try and limit urban growth by shutting out the immigrants would still leave the problem at large.

It should be noted that immigration restriction is seen as a justifiable measure to deal with urban growth when dealing with immigrants, but virtually no one considers restriction a legitimate measure to address urban growth caused by Canadian-born as such an act would violate the Charter of Rights. In such cases where urban growth was caused by domestic migration, urban planners found solutions other than the undemocratic practice of restricting
people's mobility. This was illustrated in the way rapid urbanization was dealt with in the past. Vancouver's population between 1966 and 1971 grew by 16%, a figure similar to its population growth in the nineties. At this time, immigration was responsible for only 33% of total population growth in metropolitan Vancouver. In response to this, the Greater Vancouver Regional District adopted the Livable Regional Plan in 1976. The authors of this plan intended to decentralize job growth from downtown Vancouver and divert this growth to Burnaby, New Westminster, Surrey, and Coquitlam. This shows that the solutions to immigration into Canada's largest cities in the past were sought in urban planning rather than in invoking restriction. This was seen in the 1980s when Vancouver's east-side Grandview-Woodlands area faced a backlash from locals due to in-migration. The town council, amidst cries of "Keep Yuppies out of East Vancouver", started to preach residential intensification as a solution.

In other words, restriction as a means of dealing with urban growth only seems to be an accepted solution where immigrants are concerned. Few if any think of restriction of mobility as a solution when urbanization is caused by internal migration. Immigration critics try to use rapid urban growth as an excuse to call for the reduction of immigration numbers, yet they do not show an overall concern nor a detailed knowledge of environmental issues. They use the environmental issue only where it can suggest another reason to cut immigration. Problems such as air pollution cannot be explained simply by population size nor by immigrants. For example, how would critics explain the finding in the federal government's 1990 report Canada's Green Plan that the airborne pollutants in Canadian cities show signs of diminishing over the previous fifteen years, except for ground-level ozone? How would they explain that in spite of the increase in immigration between 1986 and 1995, waste from packaging fell 20% in 1991-1992, and that ozone-depleting C.F.C.s in Canada have fallen 58% since 1986? Similar results were found in cities in Australia, where the
National Population Council stated that immigration could be irrelevant to the problem of urban air pollution. If the immigration critics were correct, then theoretically such emissions should be on the rise due to immigrants choosing to live in the cities, thus swelling city populations. As these numbers show, population growth and urbanization can be irrelevant to environmental degradation and its subsequent recovery.

While the ecological implications of population growth and rapid urban growth may be cause for concern, the solutions do not necessarily lie in restricting immigration. Such a solution is too simplistic, and will not by itself solve such problems.

Social Arguments Against Immigration: Immigrants and Crime

One longstanding fear of immigration is the belief that newcomers bring the problem of crime to Canada. This can be seen in the furor that arises in the media in coverage of crimes where the suspected perpetrators are immigrants, especially immigrants from visible minorities. The 1994 shootings in Toronto of a woman and a police officer in separate incidents by two men of Jamaican origin, both of whom were previously ordered deported, gave the Reform Party and other critics impetus to renew their attacks on immigration and to call for a rollback in immigration flows. The incidents were reported in The Western Report as "high-profile crimes involving immigrants" that showed "the chaos of government policy". More recently, The Western Report and The British Columbia Report editor Link Byfield, used cases in Edmonton of crime among youth of colour in July of 1996 to show "that racial mixing is a dangerous busines". Another article in The Western Report claims that an unnamed 1989 Toronto police report showed that blacks accounted for 82% of robberies and muggings in Toronto while they represented only 6% of the total population.

Doug Collins has frequently faulted immigrants for a large degree of crime in Canada. He talks of the presence of Chinese and Vietnamese gangs in Toronto being the result of Canada allowing in
the Boat people,\(^2^4\) of Indians who run "slave rackets" in B.C. and in Toronto, and gangs of Rastafarians committing violent crimes and robberies in Toronto.\(^2^5\) This problem, he says, is because "we let everyone in. Criminals, everybody. Immigration has become a political football and everybody is scared of upsetting the ethnic vote or of being called a racist".\(^2^6\)

Blaming crime on immigrants is not an activity that members of the media alone take part in. Politicians have found it be a helpful platform on which to try and win voters' support. During the 1991 provincial election in B.C., premier Bill Vander Zalm promised to get tough with "imported criminals", and claimed that Vancouver youth gangs consisted largely of "refugees, landed immigrants, stateless students, and visitors".\(^2^7\) Former Reform Party Immigration critic Art Hanger used the example of a German immigrant who killed his wife in Nanaimo, B.C. in 1994 to show that Canadians were "fed up" with immigration policies that allowed (foreign-born) criminals to stay in the country.\(^2^8\) This particular example is an aberration. As in the case of some media spokespeople, anti-immigrant politicians like to concentrate on foreign-born immigrants of colour: Jamaicans, Vietnamese and Chinese gangs, and blacks in general. B.C. Reform candidate Keith Kadatz characterized non-whites in this manner: "They also happen to be very heavy in the drug scene in Toronto".\(^2^9\) While touring Toronto, Art Hanger asked a shopkeeper: "Do you notice that in Toronto there has been increased crime from certain groups, like Jamaicans".\(^3^0\) This comment suggests that Hanger was purposefully targeting visible minority groups for the purpose of inciting public hysteria over 'foreign criminals'.

Some issues of crime and immigration policy do appear to be in need of scrutiny. To their credit, immigration critics did point out that in 1993, only one-third of Ottawa's 25,633 removal orders were actually carried out.\(^3^1\) While it may be possible to make a case against immigration by using anecdotes, sweeping generalizations, and sensationalism over incidents involving
foreign-born criminals, is it fair for all immigrants to be punished by cutting off the inflows of newcomers? Often what is described as a problem with 'foreign criminals' is really a Canadian problem. In the case of the Toronto shootings, both of the perpetrators had been in Canada since childhood.\textsuperscript{32} In the case of the German immigrant who killed his wife, the accused had lived in Canada most of his life.\textsuperscript{33} This calls into question the whole notion of 'foreign criminals'. Can one assume that criminals are entering the country when examples given by critics show that these crimes are essentially home-grown?

Any justification for a 'crackdown' on foreign criminals would require proof that foreign-born Canadians commit crimes at a higher rate than native-born Canadians do. An examination of empirical evidence shows that such is not the case. Samuel and Faustino-Santos (1991) showed that in general, immigrants have a lower level of criminality than do non-immigrants. While immigrants tended to commit more of certain kinds of crimes, such as gambling, they committed less crime overall and also had a lower recidivism rate than did Canadian-born. Consequently, immigrants represented a relatively small cost to the justice system.\textsuperscript{34}

The underrepresentation of foreign-born among Canada's criminal element is also reflected in incarceration rates. Studies in 1989 and 1991 by the Research and Statistics Group at the Correctional Services of Canada found that while foreign-born made up 18.9\% of the total Canadian adult population, they made up only 10.3\% of the prison population (11.9\% in 1991).\textsuperscript{35} Furthermore, 22\% of the foreign-born in prisons in 1991 were neither Canadian citizens nor landed immigrants.\textsuperscript{36} While certain visible minorities such as those from the West Indies and Latin America were overrepresented in prison, the visible minorities were overall underrepresented in prison populations. Such minorities represented 8.5\% of the Canadian population in 1991, but only 6.3\% of the prison population in that same year.\textsuperscript{37}

This last point challenges those who try to implicate visible
minorities by showing how immigrants bring social problems such as crime to Canadian society. Such an attempt can be seen in the July 11 1994 issue of The Western Report, which uses the examples of the two Jamaican-born fugitives involved in the Toronto shootings to show the failure in carrying out the removal of deportees.\textsuperscript{38} From this, one might get the impression that most foreign-born fugitives in Canada were violent members of visible minorities. In reality, many of these fugitives are Americans fleeing justice in the United States. This was seen in the R.C.M.P. roundup of fugitives ordered for deportation, which began in 1994.\textsuperscript{39} Yet when Art Hanger and other critics deal with foreign criminals, they do not mention Americans. Their focus is usually on the aforementioned Jamaicans, Asians, and the like. This shows a clear and mistaken trend to associate crimes with immigrants of colour. Critics stay away from studies of crime, except in the case of the uncited Toronto police study, and choose to make their case against immigration by using specific highly publicized incidents in order to create public fear over immigration in order to justify restrictive measures.

Assumptions and Criticisms

The demographic, economic, environmental, and social arguments made against immigrants are placed within a particular context by critics. That is, immigration critics try to portray modern immigration as bad for Canada by placing their criticisms within certain assumptions. These assumptions illustrate the mentality underlying the arguments against immigrants, and are often based on faulty evidence. The first of these assumptions is that Canada is in a crisis, and unless the nation's immigration policy is put in order, the country will fall apart. Diane Francis states that Canada will not survive thanks to the inefficient government of the past two decades which remained preoccupied with getting elected and placating certain favoured interest groups, which she does not name.\textsuperscript{40} As a result, Canada suffers from an exodus of individuals, business, capital, and spirit\textsuperscript{41} while at the same
time, illegal immigrants flood into the country. She fails to point out, as noted already in chapter five, that Canadians have been leaving Canada since the Second World War. The immigration law was changed in the sixties to offset this brain drain.

Charles Campbell also likes to portray the nation in crisis. The title of his book leaves no uncertainty of this: A Time Bomb Ticking: Canadian Immigration in Crisis. The book made the case that Canada was heading for a crisis because the immigration system was allowing in far too many refugees and family-class immigrants at the expense of independent-class immigrants. Oddly enough, even after the federal government made changes to immigration compositions to favour the independent class in 1994, Campbell continued to think that Canadian immigration was still in crisis. Only now, immigration was just bad, period. In his 1995 article for The Vancouver Sun, he largely avoided his original argument to show instead how immigration in general was bad economically, environmentally, and demographically. His solution was no longer to focus on allowing in more independent-class newcomers, but to reduce all immigration to a minimum.

Doug Collins also is a proponent of the 'crisis' theory. The consequences of Canada's immigration policies, he warned, would include racial animosities, the prospect of violence, huge expenditures on the race relations industry and human rights commissions, the importation of war and conflict from other nations, voting by race, and increased crime rates.

Above all, there is the matter of the loss of identity. A nation that is invaded by a dozen other cultures wonders what it is. Demoralization sets in, a process now aided in the schools as children are told that their patriotic forbears were racists and bigots. All that may suit weak-minded one-worlders, but it is an example not being followed by the non-white countries. China is a case-in-point. Japan is another.  

Why do these critics insist on showing immigration as in a state of crisis? A possible explanation would be that these individuals know that in order to win support for their proposed changes to the
immigration law, they need to scare the public into believing that their proposed measures are the only way for the nation to save itself. Scaremongering is a time-honoured tradition that dates back to the writings of J.S. Woodsworth, Stephen Leacock, and J.T.M. Anderson. Back then, these writers warned of the doom that would follow the new generation of immigrants from Eastern Europe. Today, such apocalyptic scenarios are used to characterize the latest generation of immigrants who are largely from the Third World.

An Immigration System That Serves Immigrants?

Charles Campbell, Daniel Stoffman, Doug Collins, Richard Gwyn, and The Reform Party all claim that immigration policy now serves the immigrants, not the nation. This, according to Daniel Stoffman, is because

Immigration policy in Canada is a response to the demands of a few special interest groups, with little consideration given to the collective interests of Canadians as a whole. These special interest groups include ethnic communities who want easy entry to the country for their relatives, immigration lawyers whose business requires a steady supply of immigrants and refugee advocates who see Canada as a specific haven for any and all refugee claimants.

Stoffman adds that ethnic Canadians are more politically active, and therefore get what they want. Charles Campbell makes a similar argument, in which he faults vote-buying politicians for this trend in immigration policy.

The tragic deterioration of Canada's immigration process results directly and deliberately from political perceptions that voting members of immigrant communities, whose countrymen continue to benefit from the weaknesses in the system, must not be offended... But this understandable lust consciously denies both the long-term interests of our nation and the will (as revealed in polls) of the great majority of the Canadian public.

A question about logic needs to be asked here. First generation immigrants represent only 16% of the population. If one assumes
that Canadians are by-and-large against immigration -- which is the argument made by Campbell, Doug Collins, and The Reform Party\textsuperscript{49} -- and that politicians are merely catering to specific groups in order to buy votes, then why would they pander to such a small minority? Why not cater to the other 84\% of Canadians who were all supposedly against immigration by legislating against immigrants? Surely that would be a much more effective vote-winning strategy.

This belief that new Canadians are lobbying politicians in order to influence immigration law begs the question, what is wrong with immigrants being politically involved with a subject that concerns them? Would these same critics be so surprised if business associations were involved in influencing business legislation, labour unions were involved in formulating Canadian labour policy, and the military was lobbying government in regards to military policy? This discussion uncovers what it is that these critics might actually fear: minority empowerment.\textsuperscript{50} The realization that minorities might actually have a say in the Canadian governing process incites these critics to portray immigration as 'out of control', 'for the immigrants and not for the majority', and manipulated by 'vote-buying politicians'. One sees the populist element in these claims, which as mentioned in chapter two, is characteristic of nativists.

The Immigration System is Biased Against Those of European Origin

A number of immigration critics claim that Canada's immigration system is biased against those of European origin. Doug Collins has two books dedicated to this belief, one of which is aptly named Immigration: The Destruction of English Canada. He spends the first chapter reciting three examples of how immigrants of European origin were initially rejected when they applied for immigration to Canada. Even though two of these applicants were eventually allowed to enter, Collins feels these examples are sufficient evidence to show how European-origin applicants are being discriminated against. Collins asks, "what can the immigrant from

\textsuperscript{49} Campbell, Doug Collins, and The Reform Party.

\textsuperscript{50} The realization that minorities might actually have a say in the Canadian governing process incites these critics to portray immigration as 'out of control', 'for the immigrants and not for the majority', and manipulated by 'vote-buying politicians'. One sees the populist element in these claims, which as mentioned in chapter two, is characteristic of nativists.
Barbados or Islamabad offer that the European cannot, except maybe an abundance of relatives?". 51 Charles Campbell, as seen in chapter six, also uses anecdotal evidence to show how Europeans are unable to get into Canada even though they appear to be qualified.

In denying allegations that his party was racist, then Reform Party policy officer Stephen Harper only seemed to confirm it when he said, "All we are trying to do is state that those policies should not be designed with racial makeup in mind. How that can be construed as racist is beyond me". 52 He also said that while immigration policy was supposed to be based on economics, it was actually the ethnic groups with the most political clout who determined what countries from which Canada would take the largest number of immigrants. "Federal immigration policy has drifted away from economic criteria to a racial element. It is a vote-buying scheme". 53 Considering that most immigrants now come from developing countries, as shown in Chapter Six, one can safely presume he is talking about non-European groups.

If these critics honestly want to show that the Canadian system is biased against applicants of European origin, then why not compare the overall acceptance rate of applicants of European origin with that of applicants of non-European origin? None of them attempt this. Instead, they opt for anecdotes to prove their case. K.W. Taylor's 1991 examination of the selection process between 1969 and 1973 showed that Europeans were approved at about a rate of 12% higher than non-white, non-European applicants. 54 This may be a short period of time to measure, and it deals with a different time period, but contemporary critics provide no empirical evidence to show that such is no longer the case today.

These critics presume that the high number of new Canadians of non-European origin means that the immigration process is manipulated in their favour. However, they provide no evidence to show how these ethnic groups actually influence policymakers to have the immigration laws favour those who come from these particular groups. Harper states that the immigration policy is
ethnically biased as though it is reality. Canada rid its immigration policy of racial bias when it eliminated the quota system in 1962, and that policy was biased against non-Europeans.

The fall in the numbers of skilled Western European immigrants after 1970, according to Donald J. DeVoretz, had little to do with the Canadian policy. It had more to do with the reality of increased economic prosperity in Europe. The supply of immigrants to Canada is based largely on a self-selection process in which individuals in other countries weigh the benefits of moving with staying. Those who come from countries with a standard of living similar or higher to Canada's with lower unemployment rates might not see the point in moving.

The Case Against Unqualified Immigrants

Proponents of immigration restriction advocate tighter controls for the entry of refugee and family-class immigrants. Their assumption is that such newcomers possess no real skills that would enable them to adjust and prosper economically in Canada. As a result, such immigrants would only become a long-term burden to Canadian society. This belief is often juxtapositioned with the belief that the immigration system is biased against those of European origin. That is, qualified immigrants from industrialized nations cannot get into Canada because the immigration portals are flooded with unqualified ones who get in through the refugee and family class provisions of the immigration act.

In regards to refugees, Charles Campbell refers to the case of a Scottish woman whose immigration application was rejected even though she had a job offer in Canada, "had she been a refugee claimant she could have accepted that job. Instead, she has been rejected by Immigration and we lost another promising immigrant".

Daniel Stoffman asserted that the now-defunct Canadian Immigration Refugee Board (I.R.B.) had become a way for those who were trying to get into Canada to bypass the immigration system. His proof is that in 1992, Canada accepted 57% of refugee claimants
while Sweden accepted only 5%, and Denmark accepted 10%. Prior to the I.R.B.'s creation in 1989, Canada accepted 20% of refugee claimants.\textsuperscript{57} To deal with this supposed problem of bogus refugees, The Reform Party's immigration policy calls for the immediate deportation of bogus refugees and other illegal entrants, while subjecting those who promote such activities to severe penalties without exception. Such measures may require the revocation of the rights of those who are not allowed to stay, so the Reform Party calls for an amendment to The Constitution to ensure that "Parliament ultimately controls entry into Canada; in the interim, The Charter's 'notwithstanding' provision should be used to ensure this is the case".\textsuperscript{58}

In making their case, Campbell and Stoffman leave out one crucial point. Canada accepts more independent immigrants than it does refugees. Between 1980 and 1989, the percentage of immigrants who came in as refugees constituted 18% of the total, while independents were 43% of the total for the same time period, more than either the refugee or family classes.\textsuperscript{59} More recently, refugees have constituted only 6% of the total number of immigrants while independents were 43%.\textsuperscript{60} This challenges Campbell's assertion by showing that it is much more likely that Canada will accept an independent immigrant before it accepts a refugee.

Stoffman and Campbell compare Canada's refugee determination system to that of other countries to show how our system is seemingly more inefficient, backlogged, and less well scrutinized.\textsuperscript{61} Again, crucial details that challenge the validity of this claim are not mentioned. The backlog of refugee claims in the eighties was not restricted to Canada. Other countries, including The United States and West Germany, also found themselves swamped with refugee claimants.\textsuperscript{62} As the refugee determination process is not specified by U.N. Convention and Protocol, the responsibility is left to contracting states.\textsuperscript{63} Stoffman does not mention this when he recommends that Canada should rid itself of the responsibility of determining the status of refugees and
relegate this duty to a multilateral body.\textsuperscript{64}

A comparison of Canada's refugee determination process with those of other countries would show that in some ways, Canada's system works quite well. Deciding the average refugee case in Canada in 1994 took between five to eight months, whereas determining refugee cases in the United Kingdom took an average of three years.\textsuperscript{65} While the United Kingdom has more refusals, they also have a difficult time moving the refusals out. So a lot of rejected applicants end up staying. And while Canada has several doors through which immigrants can apply (independent, family, and refugee classes), other nations have fewer doors. Therefore their refugee determination processes are -- according to Marchi -- subject to more abuse by economic migrants.\textsuperscript{66}

In any case, the idea that refugees will prove to be a burden to the Canadian treasury does not stand up to evidence. Canada has hosted over 400,000 refugees since World War Two. These included the Displaced Persons (D.P.s) right after the war, Hungarians, Czechs, Ugandan Asians, Chileans, and Indochinese. Samuel (1984) showed that initially, refugees have high unemployment rates upon arriving in Canada.\textsuperscript{67} This fact may be what fuels critics' beliefs that refugees are a burden to society. However, it is not the entire story. In most cases, the unemployment rate for refugees falls dramatically in the first few years of life in Canada.\textsuperscript{68} Refugees, like other immigrants, are able to earn more than Canadian-born after their initial years of settlement. Because refugees have higher labour force participation rates than do Canadian-born, the difference in their family income between the two groups becomes wider with time.\textsuperscript{69}

To sum up, the vast majority of refugee groups that came to Canada during the last one-quarter century seem to have adjusted well economically as seen from their employment and unemployment experiences and levels of income, despite having had difficulty in entering the occupations they intended to join.\textsuperscript{70}

In regards to family-class newcomers, Campbell, Stoffman and
Gwyn all argue that Canada accepts too many newcomers through this category. Others outside of this anti-immigrant fold have also questioned the wisdom of allowing in large numbers of family-class immigrants. As Campbell points out, the issue was raised in the Auditor General of Canada's 1982 report. The report questioned the ability of family-class immigrants to adjust to life in Canada, and suspected that such immigrants might not be well-prepared for the Canadian labour market. However, the Auditor-General's report showed no actual evidence of these problems. These were speculations on the part of the Auditor-General's office. In response, Employment and Immigration Canada conducted a study in 1988 to see if family-class immigrants who arrived between 1981 and 1984 were able to establish themselves in Canada. The results showed that concerns of these new Canadians becoming a burden to the government or society were unfounded. While this class of immigrants did have a higher unemployment rate than other classes, the unemployed among them were supported, according to Samuel, by their sponsoring relatives rather than by the public treasury. Furthermore, their rate of unemployment fell the longer they stayed in Canada. As a result, they had higher labour-force participation rates than they expected to have upon entering Canada. Campbell dismissed this finding, saying that few working in the system support this conclusion. Aside from his own experience and anecdotes, he did not elaborate.

An important point is overlooked in this debate. Critics claim they want more independent immigrants. However, independent immigrants will not come if they know that they cannot bring their families with them. Furthermore, the most critical element of institutional completeness of resettling persons is the family entity. This system contrasts with the "guest worker" pattern of immigration in some European countries, in which the immigrant workers are expected to return home after their usefulness is realized. The nature of long-term integration is affected by policies of family reunification and sponsorship. As migration
is a difficult process, people do better in their new societies if they immigrate as families.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, in concentrating on the economic output of this particular class, advocates of immigration restriction overlook the important role performed by family-class newcomers in helping independent-class (and each other) settle in to their new country.

One could argue that the demonizing of family-class immigrants is actually a subtle attempt to discourage virtually all immigrants from coming to Canada. That is, immigrant restriction advocates know that independent immigrants would be reluctant to leave behind their families permanently. So, by legislating against family-class newcomers, they effectively discourage migrants from coming while giving the overall appearance that the immigration policy is not restrictive. Advocates of family-class restriction such as Art Hanger and Richard Gwyn avoid any responsibility due to the fact that the measures they advocate would keep families separated by blaming the immigrants themselves. It was the immigrants' decision to move in the first place, therefore they are the ones responsible for splitting the families.\textsuperscript{77} In other words, the attack on family reunification is possibly another in a line of restrictionist Canadian immigration policies that were designed to cut off immigrants without giving the appearance of prejudice or racism\textsuperscript{78}.  

\textbf{Today's Immigrants are Not Loyal to Canada}

According to Richard Gwyn, today's new Canadians are not really serious about becoming dedicated, long-term members of this country. Unlike traditional immigrants, today's immigrants are just 'sojourning'. That is, they move here while maintaining close and continuing connections with their home societies. Later, they move elsewhere.\textsuperscript{79} Charles Campbell agrees. He writes that immigrants who consciously reject citizenship can for their own interests sponsor their parent who in turn will bring the whole family "without regard for the ability of any to adapt to life in Canada".\textsuperscript{80} But even if these newcomers apply for citizenship,
Campbell is still not convinced of their loyalty, as they make "neither commitment to Canada nor to continued residence".81

Are modern immigrants really different from the old ones in that they have no loyalty to Canada and no intention of staying? Neither of these writers define what constitutes a 'dedicated and loyal immigrant'. If immigrants who eventually leave Canada and return to their country of origin or to a new country are being disloyal, then this trend needs to be examined in greater detail. Immigrants who leave Canada do so for a variety of reasons. They may have found life in Canada difficult to adjust to, they may have felt unwelcome, or perhaps better economic opportunities existed elsewhere. 'Return migration' has been a longstanding aspect of migration to Canada. These critics demonstrate their ignorance of Canadian history when they imply that previous generations of immigrants stayed in Canada and tried to establish themselves in spite of the odds. In reality, immigrants from days past also left Canada when conditions were not suitable, as did the native-born. Prior to 1914, immigrants and native-born workers moved frequently across the Canada-U.S. border in large numbers in search of jobs.82

In the early 1960s, one in every three or four immigrants either joined thousands of native-born Canadians in their exodus southward to find better economic opportunities in the United States, or returned to their country of origin.83 New Canadians who leave Canada are neither creating a new trend nor are they engaging in an activity that Canadian-born themselves do not take part in.

Contrary to what these critics say, immigrants tend to complete the naturalization process. Most immigrants, once they become eligible, apply to become citizens.84 The rates at which immigrants become citizens has increased since 1971, and Canadian naturalization rates are higher than those of foreign-born in Britain and the United States.85 If Gwyn and Campbell think that today's newcomers are not serious about becoming Canadians, they must be referring to some form of evidence other than naturalization rates.
The Use of Comparisons with Other Countries

Opponents of immigration like to legitimate their proposed restrictive measures by showing how other nations have implemented similar policies. Daniel Stoffman talks of how Canada needs to cut its immigration levels and restore skill selectivity while pointing out that Australia cut its immigration levels in 1992. Charles Campbell talks of how Canada's E.S.L. costs are crippling, and then points out that Australia makes immigrants pay for their own language training.

While comparing Canadian public policies with those of other countries can be a helpful way of demonstrating new directions for policy discourse, it can only be effective if one presents the overall picture of how successful other nation's immigration policies are in comparison to Canada's. To pick and choose examples from other countries without mentioning if that country has had the same kind of success with its immigration policy and subsequent integration as Canada has had with its own only distorts the picture.

Campbell and Stoffman are not being atypical in comparing Canadian immigration policy with that of Australia, as the two countries share a history of planned immigration. Australia's recent policy shift towards a more restrictive immigration provides immigration restriction advocates in Canada with numerous examples to draw upon. But they leave questions unanswered about how successful Australia's policy has been. For example, if Australia's policy reflects a more common sense approach to immigration, then why do Australian immigrants have higher unemployment rates than native-born while Canadian immigrants have lower rates of unemployment than do native-born in Canada? Why then do Australian immigrants produce tax contributions similar to those of native-born while Canadian immigrants produce higher tax contributions than the native-born? Australian immigrants also save less in household savings than native-born while Canadian
immigrants have a higher life-time propensity to save and thus have more assets and higher net worths than do Canadian-born.91 These facts might reveal why Australia has adopted a more restrictive immigration policy, but they also show that such measures are hardly applicable to Canada as the Canadian immigration programme has had more success in the ways mentioned above. In fact, some observers have suggested that Australia should really be following Canada's example in allowing in a larger number of immigrants in order to create economies of scale.92

Thus, comparing Canada's immigration policy with that of other nations is sometimes an exercise in 'comparing apples and oranges'. Gwyn suggests that Canadian immigration policymakers emulate the bipartisan commission in the United States without considering how successful American policy is in comparison with Canada. While new Canadians often attain average or above-average wage status within two decades, foreign-born in the United States take two or three generations to attain average wage status.93 The American immigration policy after 1965 was based largely on family reunification, and had no point system.94 The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration in its 1995 report attributed the success of the Canadian system in comparison to the American system to Canada's immigration programme being considerably less complex, faster, and providing applicants with greater certainty regarding their residency status.95 Such details would be helpful when comparing policies between countries, yet immigration critics often fail to mention them.

Just like J.S. Woodsworth at the beginning of the century, contemporary immigration critics try to legitimate their arguments by looking at the policies of other nations. But this legitimation is based on a narrow look at other countries. To give the whole picture by comparing the overall success of Canadian policy to that of other nations would, as seen in these cases, create questions about their arguments.
Nativism in Contemporary Immigration Bashing

Clearly, these critics of immigration are not trying to portray immigration in a fair light. Rather, they intentionally try to show current immigration in a negative light. In spite of their insistence that their questions about immigration and multiculturalism are borne out of a concern for maintaining economic and social order, their arguments are in many ways still based on anti-immigration themes of the past. This returns us to the original premise of this dissertation, which is that the current backlash against immigration and multiculturalism is a manifestation of nativism and is really an attempt to seek to reverse the pluralistic nature of Canadian society. If this can be proven, then it calls into question any claim these particular critics make about presenting the facts on immigration in an honest and fair manner.

Charles Campbell is often regarded as an authority on the immigration issue by news sources such as The Vancouver Sun, Maclean's, and The Western Report who all quote him, probably due in part to his experience as a former vice-chair on the now defunct Immigration Appeal Board. He reveals his bias against Canadians from less-developed countries when he tries to argue that "the educated, the skilled, and the talented" are "likely to be members of societies whose development is parallel to that of Canada".96 In other words, those from Europe, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand are the ones who can best adapt to our country; and they are the ones who, according to Campbell, find it increasingly difficult to get into Canada. This, as already shown, is unfounded. Members of the developed nations are not moving to Canada not because the immigration law is biased against them, but because of the prosperity in their own nations. Campbell ignores the fact that the immigration law was changed in 1962 and 1967 to allow in immigrants from other parts of the world because those coming from Europe at the time were largely from the family class. If Campbell thinks that putting greater emphasis on skills,
education, and talent in immigrant selection criteria means more migrants coming to Canada will now be from developed countries, he is going to be seriously disappointed. The major source countries now for independent immigrants are in Asia.  

Campbell also indirectly reveals his dislike of non-white immigrants in his explanation of Canadian immigration history. He says that throughout Canada's past the immigration process was based on selecting immigrants with criteria suited for Canada's economy. This included Clifford Sifton's selection of farmers from Europe to settle on the prairies (Campbell leaves out the fact that many of these farmers actually settled in the cities or did not work in agriculture at all), the selection of labourers to work in the resource industries until World War Two, and the seeking of immigrants suited for our expanding industrial economy after World War Two. Campbell says this system was fair for all.

We know it worked. It worked for immigrants from all parts of the world (my emphasis) and it worked for Canada... It was a good system based on sound principles but, by stages, it was abandoned... not because it was flawed, or because the nation wanted it changed, but because successive governments neglected their duty to make it work.

According to Campbell, the immigration process began to decay in the late sixties when opportunists from abroad found that they could get into Canada as visitors, and then apply for landed immigrant status.

Campbell's view of Canadian immigration history leaves out some crucial details. Contrary to what he says, Canadian immigration regulations did not work for immigrants from all parts of the world. Canadian immigration authorities consistently blocked the entrance of non-white immigrants through exclusionary tactics such as the Chinese Exclusion Act, the head tax for Chinese, the Continuous Voyage Clause for Indians, the granting of special powers and incentives to border officials in order to turn back American Blacks, and the quota system that was in place after World War Two which barred those from non-white countries from coming in
large numbers. Canadian immigration law lost its discriminatory nature only in 1962 with the abandonment of the quota system. Campbell gives the idea that immigrants were throughout Canadian history chosen by their economic skills and willingness to adapt. While immigration officials in Canada's past may have been choosing some immigrants with the hope that they would work in certain job sectors -- in spite of their own racial biases which precluded them from searching worldwide for new Canadians -- economic selection criteria did not become official policy until the point system was implemented in 1967. This date coincides with the time that Campbell says that the Canadian immigration system grew more lenient. Because of these changes in immigration law to emphasize economic skills rather than the origin of applicants, the number of immigrants from the Third World rose in the sixties. It seems to be this increase in non-white immigration that Campbell is actually opposed to.

Campbell's book is dedicated to showing that the 1978 Immigration Act (also referred to as the 1976 Immigration Act as it was constructed in that year and implemented in 1978) led to a fall in the standards for selecting immigrants. But according to others such as Freda Hawkins, this Act can be considered one of the best pieces of immigration legislation to be found anywhere. It helped develop a closer working relationship with the provinces and the federal government by implementing new inter-governmental consultative procedures in immigration and refugee planning. The Act stated for the first time what the objectives of the immigration law were, namely family reunification, non-discrimination, refugee concern, and promotion of Canada's economic, social, and cultural needs. This act was more structured and equitable than previous acts. It made immigration policy open and non-discriminatory. This last point may explain Campbell's dislike of the 1978 Act, as it makes Canada's immigration system more accessible to those "non-traditional" non-white immigrants that he subtly tries to portray as unqualified
newcomers with no real skills, no ability to adapt, and with no commitment to Canada.

Daniel Stoffman is also regarded by news sources and other writers as an expert on immigration. While his writings do not show any direct evidence of nativist tendencies in his thinking, he clearly has an anti-immigrant agenda. He argues that immigration must serve the national interest, and that current immigration does not do so as it consists of largely unskilled and illiterate family-class newcomers and refugees who will not be economically helpful. Yet when he comes across a class of immigrants who clearly are economically beneficial to Canada and are thus serving the national interest, that being the business class, he dismisses it as unnecessary.

Other signs of Stoffman's anti-immigrant agenda show in his emphasis on keeping those from less-developed countries out of Canada. He argues that the west has to get serious about Third World development, and that Canada should help foster better economic conditions in poorer nations through liberalizing trade agreements in order to keep would-be immigrants at home. Swedes and Austrians, he points out, contribute funds for training workers in Rumania and Germany in order to discourage emigration from those countries. Presumably, this is done because some of those who emigrate from Rumania and Germany end up in Sweden and Austria. He makes this recommendation on the assumption that people migrate for economic reasons.

Not only does Stoffman argue to keep immigrants from the Third World out of Canada, he makes characterizations about these immigrants that call into question his knowledge of these people. For example, he writes that because most immigrants today are from patriarchal cultures, excessive immigration turns public opinion against immigration and multiculturalism. As he does not substantiate this claim, it appears as a sweeping generalization of immigrants that characterizes them as possessing inferior and anachronistic cultural practices that the native population would
find disconcerting. It also suggests that, without saying why, immigrants are to blame for the discrimination that they experience. Such claims call into question Stoffman's ability to sit in impartial judgement of immigration policy.

The argument that immigrants are to blame for their own discrimination and for the social upheaval that they supposedly cause just by being present in a society in noticeable numbers is quite popular among immigration critics who are forthright in their fear of an increasingly heterogeneous society. As seen in the multiculturalism section of this thesis, such a claim does not stand up to evidence. If this was true, then both Toronto and Vancouver should have exploded into racial chaos, as the proportion of the population that are from visible minority groups now far exceeds the 'critical mass' of 15% proportion of the population that both Doug Collins and William D. Gairdner say the natives will tolerate as visibly different before they react negatively. Visible minorities now make up one-third of the populations of both of these cities.108

This argument is not found only in Canada. In the seventies, European governments started to argue that immigrant restriction was necessary to combat racism against newcomers, while failing to mention that such measures were sources of racism themselves.109 As Harris points out, blaming the outsider for the current problems of racism as well as other social problems such as crime is an ancient and dishonourable tradition that plays an important role in protecting those who might be held accountable for racism.110 Ironically, immigration critics might be among those held accountable, as they themselves often characterize the foreign-born with negative stereotypes.

Those who fear an increasingly pluralist society argue that discouraging non-white immigration is only common sense. William Gairdner uses this logic to justify a pro-European (or pro-white) immigration policy:

What I call the control policy was designed to ensure
that the bulk of Canada's children grow up among parents and people more or less similar to themselves, who spoke the same language and who were more or less rooted in the same Judeo-Christian religion, Graeco-Roman philosophical and legal tradition, and Anglo-European culture. Was it all that unreasonable to want to provide future generations with the same culture and environment that made the nation strong? And if not, why did we change a system that was working so well?\textsuperscript{111}

The idea that a discriminatory immigration policy is only common sense has been legitimated throughout Canadian history. Compare Gairdner's statement to one made by former Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in 1947:

There will, I am sure, be general agreement with the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of new immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of the population. Large-scale immigration from the Orient would, moreover, be certain to give rise to societal and economic problems of a character that might lead us to serious difficulties in the field of international relations. The government, therefore, has not thought of making any change in immigration requirements which would have consequences of the kind.\textsuperscript{112}

The message was clear. Canada was for those who best represented Anglo-Canadian institutions. This attitude has not disappeared in over ninety years. Just as Woodsworth justified the exclusion of "non-assimilable" people as necessary for nation-building in 1909,\textsuperscript{113} immigrant restriction advocates today are still trying to justify the nativist approach to immigration with the same reasons.

Officially, The Reform Party is committed to a policy of equality. However, Reform's position on immigration -- specifically, to deny social benefits to legally admitted immigrants -- is inconsistent with the Party's belief in equality before the law and legal support for families.\textsuperscript{114}

Unofficially, statements from Reformers show a fear that a multicultural society means the loss of traditional values, security, and order. These include statements by Reform candidate Colyne Gibbons (Thunder Bay-Atikokan) in 1993 that "If you're a
woman, coloured, and a lesbian, you're laughing all the way to the bank". Reform's Defence critic Jack Frazer responded to a video depicting an Airborne soldier in Somalia saying "We ain't killed enough niggers yet" by saying "I did not see what I considered to be racist overtures". Reform campaign manager John Tillman (Halifax West) wrote in a letter after the 1993 federal election to a defeated Tory candidate that "Gone are the days of catering to radical women's groups, minority groups, etc. Gone are the days of protecting these and other parasites of society." A letter to Sheila Copps by a self-described Reform supporter stated that "Canadians are at 80% saying no more to Third World immigrants. As our government lets them (the immigrants), the minority immigrants force their will on the majority. Now we have mop heads in the R.C.M.P. It's the end of Canadian ways". The writer adds that minorities will eventually take over and "murder and torture all the whites". Ontario Reform riding executive Rex Welbourne said that "we are a derivative of white European culture, this is our identity, and immigration should not destroy it with excessive numbers of Asians and blacks". After the House of Commons voted unanimously for a non-sectarian prayer to open Parliament, Reform M.P. Myron Thompson complained to the media:

I still respect and will always believe, probably until the day I die anyway, that this is a Christian nation...
I'm sure that if I went to their country and went into their House of Commons, they wouldn't change their prayers to suit my needs.

When Thompson says "their country", he shows that he does not accept members of minorities as genuine Canadians.

The Reform Party's traditional response to the scandals caused by such statements are to explain them as questions of 'political correctness', to blame the media, or to deny that such statements were ever made. Apologies, it seems, are only made after the people who made the comment in the first place are embarrassed by the media exposure. No apologies are given for statements that either go unnoticed by the press or by the public. As the case
of Reform M.P.s Bob Ringma and David Chatters shows, members of the Party who make inflammatory remarks about identifiable groups are temporarily suspended by Reform leader Preston Manning only to quietly re-surface after the scandal is no longer front-page news in the press.\textsuperscript{123} The Party may point to their newly-elected candidates of Indian origin to demonstrate their new tolerance in order to deny any implication that they are racist. But since even these individuals carry on the tradition of denying the Party has ever had racist overtones, gestures by the Party of tolerance appear to be little more than symbolic.\textsuperscript{124}

These statements show that in spite of the Reform Party's official doctrine, the Party also has an unofficial policy. It is clear that a large number of Reformers view the Party's policies and statements by its leader as possessing an inner code and a meaning which implies a return to a predominantly Anglicized white nation.\textsuperscript{125} Right-wing extremists, as seen in the scandal surrounding the discovery and subsequent expulsion from the Reform Party of members of the neo-Nazi Heritage Front, are drawn to what they see as anti-racial/anti-ethnic overtones in Reform's message.\textsuperscript{126} Intolerance is seen in other parties, too, but Reform seems to have drawn more than its fair share.\textsuperscript{127} For nativists, Reform's policy towards minorities, which has included opposition to the policy whereby Sikhs can wear turbans as members of the R.C.M.P., and a draft proposal in 1991 to deny immigrants and refugees Charter of Rights protection for five years,\textsuperscript{128} holds a special appeal.

This nativist element that is present in criticisms levelled at immigration and multiculturalism policies brings into question the claim by these critics that they are only seeking a truthful look at these policies. Are these critics fearful of 'ethnics'? If so, then the reason to oppose immigration becomes clear: dam the river of immigration, and the lake of multiculturalism will not grow. After some time, the lake evaporates, and multiculturalism policy becomes less and less relevant.
The Reform Party and other critics see themselves as trying to preserve a way of life that is both Christian and European in origin. The growth of new immigrant communities will most certainly change Canada. It always has in the past. Society changes with time. Multiculturalism policy is a phase in this change.

In a more pluralistic society, those of European origin will wield less power as their numbers diminish in size relative to the rest of the population. So by pressing for assimilation, conservatives are pushing for a model that forces other groups to accept their terms. The attack on multiculturalism, according to Andrew Cardozo, is a component in the attack against feminists, aboriginals, etc. This backlash on the 'equity agenda' is, as we have shown, led by the Reform Party in Parliament.129

To expose the arguments of immigrant restriction advocates for what they are is the first step in combatting the backlash. Canadians must be wary of developments in the United States that may find their way into Canadian politics as they have in the past.

The passage of Act 187 in California, proposals in Congress to bar children of illegal immigrants from schools and their parents from citizenship until the child turns twenty-one, and the passage of legislation which requires Americans who sponsor immigrants to have an income 125% above the poverty level (an amendment which discriminates against immigrants from poor nations),130 give incentive for anti-immigration proponents in Canada. Proposals by these proponents in Canada, such as the one made by The Reform Party barring the immigrant parents of children born in Canada from applying for citizenship, resemble the American proposals.

As U.S. Commissioner for the Immigration and Naturalization Service Doris M. Meissner points out in the case of the United States, such proposals are a major change in the social contract.131 That is, immigrants come legally, play by the rules and pay taxes, but they are not entitled to the same rights and benefits as everyone else. These proposals suggest the creation of a second-
class citizenry, that is, immigrants would be a class whose purpose is only to serve the 'national interest', whatever that may be.

Immigration critics justify such measures as necessary in light of the belief that immigrants are a burden to society and that they add to social and environmental problems. As this dissertation shows, such beliefs are based not on hard evidence, but on half-told conclusions from studies, anecdotes, and ad hominem statements. The Reform Party, as seen in their dissenting opinion in The House of Commons' report on Diminishing Returns, and in statements by their former immigration critic Art Hanger regarding foreign criminals and how his party's proposals to bar immigrants for social assistance reflect the frustration of the average Canadian, relies not on hard evidence to make their case against immigration but on incomplete evidence to reinforce misconceptions.

This suggests that they are taking advantage of public ignorance about immigration and multiculturalism by making policy proposals that would pander to their potential voters. The Party seems to have had its intended effect over the past couple of years on the incumbent Liberal government. The head tax for newcomers and the rollback in immigrant inflows in spite of a Liberal campaign promise to raise immigration levels show how the backlash has influenced political discourse.
NOTES


2) Ibid., A11.


5) Roderic Beaujout, Population Change in Canada: The Challenges of Policy Adaptation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991): 22. As Beaujout points out, the Council based its conclusions on questionable assumptions. It said that fossil fuels would not last beyond the year 2000, and that immigration would add 25 million new people by the year 2000. Such an addition would require one million immigrants a year.


8) Ibid., 208.

9) Health and Welfare Canada, Charting Canada's Future: A Report on the Demographic Review (Ottawa: Department of National Health and Welfare Canada, 1989): highlights section. The study stated that "the larger the economy, the more stress we can expect to place on the environment, even though we should also have more resources for dealing with that stress". Campbell uses the first part of the statement to make his case against immigration, but leaves out the second part.

10) Adelman et. al., 496-497.

11) Ibid., 498. This conclusion was reached by the Australia National Population Council (1992).

12) Adelman, 499.


16) Ley, 263.

17) Ibid., 259.


20) Adelman, 503.


22) Link Byfield, "When It Comes to Mayhem Among Minority Groups, We Reap What We Sow", The British Columbia Report, 7:47 (July 22 1996): 7. Byfield specifically refers to three incidents. One involved a youth of Indian origin shooting a black youth; the house of a man of Indian origin being shot supposedly by Asians; and of a youth of Vietnamese origin shooting another.


26) Ibid., 53.

27) Allan Borowski and Derrick Thomas, "Immigrants and Crime", in Adelman et. al., 632.


31) McFeely and Grace, 6.


33) Lunman, A11.


35) Borowski and Thomas, 644.

36) Ibid., 647. Borowski and Thomas do not state what the status of the other 22% of foreign-born convicts were. Presumably, they were foreign-born nationals who were charged and convicted on Canadian soil.

37) Ibid., 645-6.

38) McFeely and Grace, 6.


41) Ibid., 177.


43) Stephen Leacock, for example, warned of the perils of immigration from Eastern Europe in 1911 when he drew the example of the effect of these newcomers on American cities. "Anybody acquainted with the low standard of civilisation of the slum
population of New York, the polyglot denizens of the West Side of Chicago, or the lower ranks of any great American city of to-day, will doubt very much whether the European migration of the last thirty years has brought to the United States any very valuable national asset." Stephen Leacock, "Canada and the Immigration Problem", National and English Review (April 1911): 49.

44) Stoffman says that national interest has been left out of the policy for the last fifteen years. Immigrants now select themselves (p. 13). Richard Gwyn, in his aptly-titled chapter "A Nation of Immigrants, Or For Them?", quotes Stoffman to suggest that Canadian immigration policy turned from being a policy for Canada into a policy for immigrants [Richard Gwyn, Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995): 213]. Former Chief policy officer for the Reform Party, Stephen Harper, claimed that his party is the only major party that does not lobby on behalf of ethnic groups for race-oriented immigration ["Reform Party Denies Allegations of Racism", The Ottawa Citizen (June 24 1991): A3]. He gave no proof of how ethnic groups lobby for race-oriented immigration.

45) Stoffman, 8.

46) Ibid., 8.

47) Campbell, Time, 28-29. Campbell claims this was made clear to him in discussions with "influential members" of both parties. But he would not give details, as it was not appropriate to reveal the details of his private conversations.


49) Charles Campbell makes this claim in the above quote. Doug Collins claimed in 1984 that of dozens of polls, not one shows majority support for non-white immigration (Collins, Parliament, 8). In their dissenting opinion to the House of Commons Report to Diminishing Returns, The Reform Party stated that public support for Canada's immigration policy has dropped in recent years (Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Eleni Bakopanos, Economic Impact of Recent Immigration: First Report of the Subcommittee on Diminishing Returns, Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee of Citizenship and Immigration, Parl. 35 Sess. 1 n.51, 1995: 315).

50) Such is the case in McFeely and Grace (p.8). The article complained about the presence of 'ethnics' at the June 27 Edmonton consultation meeting for the Minister of Employment and Immigration Sergio Marchi. The writers failed to point out what exactly was wrong with having 'ethnics' at such a meeting. They
just implied that the ethnic presence was bad news.

51) Collins, Destruction, 7.
52) "Reform Denies Allegations", A3.
53) Ibid., A3.
56) Campbell, Time, 15.
57) Stoffman, 10.
63) Ibid., 190.
64) Stoffman, 2.
65) Sergio Marchi in Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Parl. 35 Sess. 1 n.1-15 (1994): 27. In the United Kingdom, it took in 1991 around three years to determine a refugee case. While the process has sped up there, it still takes a long
time.

66) Ibid., 27.


68) Ibid., 46.

69) Ibid., 54.

70) Ibid., 54.

71) Campbell, Time, 32-33; Stoffman, 13-14; and Gwyn, 214-215.


74) Campbell, Time, 12.


77) According to Gwyn, the idea of 'rewriting families' (presumably, this means separating the members of immigrant families) by preventing family reunification is just political opportunism. The families only became disunited when one member, voluntarily and to their advantage, chose to emigrate (Gwyn, 220). Art Hanger makes a similar argument. "The immigrants themselves, if they choose to come here, it is they who are splitting up the family. If they are concerned about the family to that degree, then they can choose not to come" [Edward Greenspon, "Reform Backs Immigration Cuts", The Globe and Mail (October 31 1994): A2]. This proves that restrictionists like Hanger are aware of the potential of such a policy to cut off all immigration.

78) These policies include John Oliver's Continous Voyage
Clause of 1908 which was really a measure to prevent migrants from India from coming, and the sending of agents into the United States to discourage blacks from migrating into Canada in the same year.

79) Gwyn, 221.

80) Campbell, Time, 17.

81) Ibid., 17.


84) Statistics Canada, Immigrants in Canada: Selected Highlights (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1990): v(?).


86) Stoffman, 7.

87) Campbell, "Save Money", All.

88) Adelman et. al., v.

89) Ibid., 454.

90) Ibid., 458.

91) Ibid., 458-459.

92) Ibid., 470.


96) Campbell, Time, 13.

97) Statistics Canada, Immigrants in Canada, 28.

98) Campbell, Time, 6.
99) Ibid., 6.

100) Ibid., 6.

101) Hawkins, xix.


104) Stoffman, 12, 2.

105) Ibid., 11.

106) The idea that poverty pushes the poor and unskilled out of the Third World is challenged by the fact that it is not the poor that migrate internationally (Harris, 189, 190). This is true in the case of both European and non-European immigrants to Canada, who tend to be better educate than the average citizen of their countries of origin (K.W. Taylor, 15). Harris points out that if mere income differentials produced migration, then the number of exceptions would be extraordinary. The European Union would have produced a major exodus from the low-income countries of Portugal, southern Spain, Greece, and Italy to the northern European nations. In reality, there was a fall in movement. Southeast Asians would have flooded Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (Harris, 190). Both the United States and European Union have tried to discourage emigration from poorer countries through development aid. The results of these development programs are questionable, as they are based on faulty assumptions (Harris, 191).

107) Stoffman, 14. Stoffman gives no examples of what he refers to as "patriarchal cultures".


109) Harris, 11.

110) Ibid., 188.


115) Gudgeon and Leiren-Young, 36-37.


117) Gudgeon and Leiren-Young, 37.


119) Gudgeon and Leiren-Young, 59.


121) The Dhaliwal Report, 2.

122) Ibid., 2.

123) "Chatters, Ringma Return to Reform Fold", Canadian Press Newswire (July 19 1996) Online Article. Chatters and Ringma were dismissed from the Reform Party in May, 1996, after saying that it might be acceptable to fire gays and minorities under certain circumstances. They were reinstated in July of that year.

124) In response to allegations that the Party he represents is guilty of racism, Reform M.P. of Indian origin Deepak Obrai (Calgary East) said "Preston Manning has never made a racist statement, and there is no racist element in the party's platform." [Raminder Singh, "Poll Paradox", India Today International, 22:12 (June 16 1997): 28c]. Reform M.P. Gurmant Grewal (Surrey Central) said "I found that there was no truth in the rumours about bigoted and racist attitudes in the party," (p. 28c). He said this even though his own nomination as the Reform candidate for the Surrey Central riding was challenged by B.C. Reform Party regional election organizer George Rigaux who said that Sikh leaders were corrupting the federal election process in Surrey Central riding by busing voters into the nomination processes of all political parties, including Reform: "If you went to the Liberal, the Tory, the N.D.P., and the Reform meeting, you'd probably have the same bloody people in many instances... . I've seen similar faces, they're all voting delegates, that's unique. It's a reality". He drew this conclusion even though the Tories were yet to hold their nomination process [Ian Mulgrew and Diane Rinehart, "Reformer's


126) Heritage Front leader Wolfgang Droege, in response to the expulsion of members of his organization including himself from The Reform party, asked how could a party that went on the record opposing immigration policies that 'radically alter' Canada's ethnic make-up turn around and shun a group like the Heritage Front when the Heritage Front supports the very same approach? [Warren Kinsella, Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 1994): 243-244].

127) Harrison, 175.


129) Cardozo, 14.

130) Claudia Dreifus, "The Worst Job in the World?", The New York Times Magazine, 6 (October 27 1996): 53,54. Before, sponsors were required to have an income at the poverty level.

131) Ibid., 53.
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION

How is the information presented in the previous pages helpful to us? How is it relevant to contemporary discussions on immigration and multiculturalism policy? How is this information important to educators? These questions will be addressed in this chapter.

Why are immigration and multiculturalism policy under fire? Often, critics will attack both policies, as they see them as two sides of the same coin. Certain links in their critiques might explain why both policies are targeted by various members of the media and by some politicians.

One such link is that critics see immigration and multiculturalism as policies made only for the benefit of non-English/non-French Canadians. In other words, they are policies that benefit a significant minority of the population at the expense of the majority, who are still seen by many Canadians as the founding peoples despite the ideology of multiculturalism. This can be seen in the insistence of some critics that elected officials will not modify these policies out of fear of losing the 'ethnic vote', that Canadian-born are paying for the welfare and medical benefits of immigrants and their families, or that immigrants take jobs that should by right be made available to Canadians.

Another theme that links critiques of these two policies is that directly because of immigration and multiculturalism, the country is in a weaker socio-economic situation today than it was twenty-five or more years ago. This can be seen in the way critics view such issues of heterogeneity in our society. For example, they see the controversy over the teaching of heritage languages in schools, the recognition of non-Christian religious teachings and practices in schools, the wearing of hijabs by Muslim young women and turbans and kirpans by Sikh young men in public institutions as issues that our society would not have to address if not for the existence of
these policies. They view these conflicts as of recent origin rather than as the latest in a series of tensions between mainstream and immigrant society running throughout Canadian history. They do not mention that similar controversies were caused in the past by immigrant groups from different backgrounds such as the Hutterites, Ukrainians, Jews, and Doukhobors. Rather, they view the contemporary social conflicts as the results of modern-day policies created since 1971.

A third theme seen in these criticisms is the view that heterogeneity in itself is bad. Traditional critics such as William D. Gairdner, Link Byfield, and Doug Collins see 'racial mixing' as a dangerous business. A society, they argue, cannot hope to achieve unity when its component cultural groups are biologically, socially, and culturally different. Such differences would inevitably lead to conflict. Other critics such as Richard Gwyn see assimilation as necessary in order to reduce heterogeneity that would lead to a 'Tower of Babel'. Immigration policy contributes to this trend by allowing people to enter Canada who are culturally different from the people already here, and multiculturalism policy allows these immigrants to live their lives in Canada as they did before coming without regard to the so-called Canadian way of life or Canadian value system.

A fourth critique is that critics see these policies as costly to the nation economically, socially, and environmentally. Immigration allows for the influx of dependents through programmes such as the family class of family reunification who will prove to be a burden on the health and welfare system, and will add to already congested cities. A final theme that unites the attacks on both of these policies is the notion that today's immigrants are not particularly good citizens. They are seen by the critics as less educated than either the local-born or previous generations of immigrants, and they are more prone to crime and dependency on state handouts. Furthermore, official multiculturalism frees them of any responsibility they might feel to the state, and
consequently they can define Canadian citizenship on their own terms.

This critique of both immigration and multiculturalism policy shows a tendency among critics to characterize immigrants and Canadians from ethno-cultural minority groups as the 'other'. That is, in their concern over the economy and the well-being of Canadian society, they construct an image of immigrants as being different and separate from the majority of Canadians. This flies in the face of the original definition of multiculturalism which states that no ethno-cultural group in Canada is superior to any other.

Michael Apple explains that in today's socio-economic climate, the New Right in the United States and in the United Kingdom blames the 'other' in order to explain the economic insecurities felt by the population as a whole. Such an explanation can be applied to the Canadian context as well. The New Right arose out of the economic problems that began in the seventies. At this time, federal state interventionist solutions as well as traditional conservative ideals were seen as ineffectual. The New Right aimed at constructing a majority that would dismantle the welfare state.

How did the New Right appeal to the general populations of the western countries? The conservative restoration, according to Apple, is based on the sense of loss. That is, ordinary people feel a loss of control of economic and personal security, of knowledge and values that they feel should be passed on to their children, of visions of what counts as sacred texts, and of authority. In explaining this loss, the New Right uses a dichotomy to differentiate people. The people of these nations, as they see it, are divided into 'we' and 'they'. 'We' are hardworking, virtuous, decent, and homogeneous. By contrast, 'they' are lazy, immoral, permissive, and heterogeneous. This dichotomy identifies people of colour, immigrants, women, and gays as 'they', and distances them from the worthy individuals seen as 'we'. The subjects of discrimination now are no longer people of colour,
women, and gays, but the "real Canadians". They are undeserving as they are getting something for nothing. In other words, government policies that are supporting them are "sapping our way of life" and creating government control over "we". This process of ideological distancing makes it possible for anti-immigrant sentiments to seem no longer racist because they link so closely with other pressing issues of a non-racial nature. This view enables many Canadians who feel themselves under threat to identify a target for their insecurity, which happens to be other groups of people who are less powerful than themselves.\(^2\) In essence, they see the dismantling and restricting of policies like immigration and multiculturalism as necessary in order to save "we". One could argue that the acceptance of this diagnosis of the problem is a form of nativism, designed to scapegoat immigrants as the cause of Canadian society's current crisis. That is, immigrants become targets of a frustrated society looking for scapegoats to blame for the faltering economy, for the national unity crisis, and for the failure of the Meech Lake accord. Hence, by emphasizing this dichotomy, the neo-conservative movement makes an appeal that many Canadians can relate to, and thus politicians can use it in order to be elected to public office. Often, critics of these policies who are immigrants themselves adopt this 'other' mentality to distance themselves from immigrants whom they see as a barrier to societal cohesion. Neil Bissoondath, for example, takes exception to the practice of female circumcision that has been noted in some immigrant groups in Canada, and also to a request by a Toronto Muslim group which wanted to follow Muslim law only.\(^3\) He blames this all on multiculturalism which he claims allows these practices leeway. Reform M.P. Gurmant Grewal, in a second example, uses a Decima Research poll to show how a majority of Canadians think ethnic minorities should try harder to fit into mainstream society.\(^4\)
Where are We Today?

In 1998, the reaction against immigration and multiculturalism policy is still strong. The themes presented in this paper are still addressed by critics today in their analysis of these policies. The evidence presented in this thesis gives insight into some of the more recent critiques. Two critiques of multiculturalism policy will serve as examples, specifically Reform M.P. Gurmant Grewal's private members' bill to ban hyphenization in reference to being Canadian, and David Delafenètre's scholarly critique of official multiculturalism. I include these in the conclusion to show and summarize what are the most recent criticisms of the policy, to show how official multiculturalism continues to be prominent in today's public policy debates, and in the case of Delafenetre's article, to offer some comparison with Australia and the United States.

In the fall of 1997, Reform M.P. Gurmant Grewal presented Motion 24, a private member's bill which stated that

That a legislative committee of this house be instructed to prepare and bring in a bill, in accordance with standing order 68(4)(B) to prevent reference and designation of any Canadian or group of Canadians in a hyphenated form, based on race, religion, color or place of origin.5

Grewal claims that hyphenization is a:

...practice and policy which unnecessarily fuels divisions in Canada, creating cultural rifts, inequalities, and friction and prevents or discourages integration of various communities. Government policies must work to integrate society.6

He uses a personal example to illustrate the negative impact of hyphenization. During the last federal election, all three candidates for Surrey Central were referred to as Indo-Canadians. By referring to the candidates as such, these people, he charges, were relegated to another class of citizen.7

To make his case, Grewal would have to prove three things. One, hyphenization is an actual federal government policy. Two,
hyphenization has no history in Canada prior to the enactment of multiculturalism policy in 1971. And three, hyphenization is only present in Canada; that is, this is the only country with a hyphenization policy.

Grewal makes no reference to any specific policy. However, in reviewing the newspaper editorials that covered his motion, there was a clear presumption that he was talking about multiculturalism policy. In his statement, Grewal himself does not state how any government policy sanctions hyphenization. If hyphenization is part of multiculturalism policy, it then stands to reason that it has no precedence prior to the policy's enactment in 1971. This, as mentioned in chapter five, is not the case. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, for example, wrote in his memoirs that he began his lifelong campaign against hyphenated Canadianism in 1925. Hyphenization and ethnic labels were also commonly used in an even earlier time by commentators such as J.S. Woodsworth and J.T.M. Anderson, who referred to Canadians by their group of origin.

Hyphenization is also not indigenous to Canada. Hyphens are also used in the United States to describe different ethno-cultural groups, such as Japanese-Americans, and Afro-Americans. Thus, hyphenization exists in immigrant countries regardless of multiculturalism policy.

Second, Grewal claims that eliminating hyphenization is necessary to integrate Canadians, and not make "some Canadians more Canadian than others". In other words, he asserts that the hyphen prevents Canadians from minority groups from integrating. Yet, he refers to a 1993 Decima Research survey that found three out of every four Canadians think that ethnic minorities should try harder to fit into mainstream society and reject the notion of cultural diversity. In other words, Grewal states that hyphenization prevents ethnic minority Canadians from integrating, yet his reference to the Decima poll clearly implicates ethnic minorities in not trying hard enough to 'fit in'. In spite of his
reference to his own ethnic minority background and his belief in equality, Grewal falls into an old tradition of blaming minorities.

In this case, he uses the hyphenization issue to blame them for not trying hard enough to be Canadian.

How, then, should hyphenization be viewed? If hyphenization is used by the majority to characterize members of minorities, then Grewal has a point. The practice fuels divisions. However, this is only one view. What if Canadians, particularly those from minority groups, choose to use hyphens as a way to maintain their distinctiveness while functioning as members of society? Evidence suggests that some Canadians do choose to make reference to their own ethnicity. Individuals from various ethnic groups may actually prefer to identify themselves by their origin, and thus refer to themselves as 'Indo-Canadian', 'Italian-Canadian', and 'Ukrainian-Canadian'. If this is the case, then banning hyphenization becomes a way to force others to assimilate against their will. Like J.T.M. Anderson and J.S. Woodsworth in another time, he disguises assimilation as a means to eliminate discrimination.

This discussion about hyphenization highlights how mainstream critics of multiculturalism uphold other critics of the policy who are from minority groups as a means to justify their own views. The fact that Grewal is a Canadian of Indian origin has been repeatedly highlighted by members of the media who oppose multiculturalism policy. One editorial refers to him as "the Indian-born Sikh", and states that while it is no surprise that The Reform Party wants to end official multiculturalism, "Grewal is one of four visible minority MPs in the official Opposition", and that the fact that the bill would be debated "is just as important as the fact that it is Grewal who will introduce the bill". Writing for The Vancouver Sun, Barbara Yaffe notes that Grewal is "a Sikh born in Punjab".

In the eyes of these writers, Grewal's ethnicity is indeed an important factor in exonerating The Reform Party of its racist
image. For example, Yaffe points out

While Reform's views on multiculturalism at one time
were dismissed because the party's caucus was mostly
made up of white guys, today the party has four (sic.)
visible minority members.\textsuperscript{17}

The editorial points out that:

Reform's elevation from cranky western regional party
to respected official Opposition has as much to do with
who is delivering the message as it does with what is
being said.

A private member's bill to end multiculturalism from
stereotypical caucus redneck Myron Thompson would be met
with the predictable cries of racism and intolerance from
Liberal MPs and from the multicultural groups which have
their dancing lessons subsidized by the taxpayer.\textsuperscript{18}

If these critics believe that it is wrong to judge someone on the
basis of their ethnicity, why do they make references to Grewal's
background? It stands to reason that his bill should stand on its
own merits without reference to who he is. One explanation is the
fact that Grewal's ethnicity helps justify their criticisms of the
policy and dismiss calls that the basis for their critiques might
be biased.

As mentioned in chapter five, this tendency to justify an
argument against multiculturalism policy based on the ethnicity of
the person making it requires that the critic either ignores the
fact that many members of ethnic minorities support the policy of
multiculturalism, or to categorize members of these minorities as
'good ethnics' and 'bad ethnics'. This dichotomy is made in the
quoted editorial which refers to minority groups who support
multiculturalism as "the multicultural groups which have their
dance lessons subsidized by the taxpayer". Grewal, on the other
hand, is a 'good ethnic' as "his bill to end multiculturalism shows
that in six short years in Canada, he is more Canadian than many of
the native-born who would defend an inherently segregationist
policy".\textsuperscript{19}
In his recent article "Interculturalism, Multiracialism, and Transculturalism: Australian and Canadian Experiences in the 1990s", David Delafenêtre argues that multiculturalism encompasses a wide range of ideas that are at conflict with each other. Among the problems that he sees with the policy is that it promotes pluralism, yet it lacks safeguards. In other words, the policy allows new Canadians to practice their culture as they did before, without regard to possible legal and moral limitations in this country. Second, the policy leads to ethnic categorization.

Multiracialism/multiculturalism may be defined as an ideology which considers people primarily as members of racial/ethnic groups and recognizes the social reality of racial/ethnic distinctions. It aims at providing equality on the basis of racial/ethnic criteria, that is, racial/ethnic groups should be treated equally. As a policy, multiracialism/multiculturalism would therefore imply the allocation of resources on a collective basis.

Delafenêtre claims that the ultimate goal of multiracialists and multiculturalists is "the establishment of a horizontal mosaic where racial ethnic groups would be equal but separate". This concept would infringe on the freedoms and privacy of individuals. Present in the advocacy of multiculturalism proponents, he says, is a double standard. That is, these proponents denounce the ethnocentrism of whites, but ethnic group ethnocentrism which is expressed through policies such as affirmative action and racial structuring is quite acceptable.

Delafenêtre argues that demographics show how the multiculturalist assumptions, such as the belief that new Canadians want to maintain their original culture, are based on overgeneralizations and isolated facts. In reality, many visible minorities experience high social mobility and are not homogeneous.

Multiculturalism, Delafenêtre writes, is based on a misunderstanding of Canadian social reality. Canada is indeed multiracial in origin, but historical development has been transcultural. That is, cultural groups mix and form new practices.
over time. Ethno-racial diversity should be managed on an individual and non-racist basis. Multiculturalism, however, has become a dangerous ideology that challenges democracy and makes citizens conform to pre-established ethnic groups whether they want to or not.  

Delafenêtre suggests an alternative in the Australian model of transculturalism. Transculturalists advocate a new paradigm to take account of emerging identities which transcend 'race' and ethnicity. In other words, race and ethnicity are not seen as a way to categorize individuals. Furthermore, transculturalists are committed to Aboriginal issues. This is unlike the Canadian model of multiculturalism, which is leading to racial apartheid, and does not pay sufficient attention to First Nations issues.

On this last point, Delafenêtre contradicts himself. He claims that the policy is leading Canadians down the road to racial apartheid. However, he earlier states that the multiculturalists' assumptions about ethnicity are illusory, as demographics show visible minorities in Canada to experience a high degree of social mobility and heterogeneity. This leads to the question, if visible minorities are integrating into Canadian society, how can that society be travelling the road to apartheid? Delafenêtre unwittingly defeats his own argument.

Delafenêtre's view of multiculturalism policy assumes that it advocates ethnic categorization. To prove this, he would have to provide examples of how, as he says, multiculturalists envision a society of separate but equal ethnic groups living under a system that threatens democracy as we know it. Delafenêtre gives no specific examples of multiculturalism supporters making such claims. He does refer to two sources by Frances Henry, Carol Tator, and others. In one source, Henry, Tator, et al. refer to anti-racism as

...an organizational response requires the formation of new organizational structures; the introduction of new cultural norms and value systems; substantive changes in the services delivered, support for new roles and
relationships at all levels of the organization; new patterns and more inclusive styles of leadership and decision-making; and the reallocation of resources.  

In the other source cited by Delafenêtre, Henry and Tator challenge "democratic racism" and some of its values and myths. One of the notions of democratic racism which they challenge is the idea that 'anti-racism initiatives are racism in reverse'.  

These measures described by Henry and Tator might be seen as challenging democracy as it is known in Canadian society. However, is this the same thing as 'threatening' democracy and leading to categorization as Delafenêtre implies? Perhaps more convincing evidence of that would be signs that ethno-cultural groups want to form their own institutions of governance which are separate from the mainstream. Such is a proposal made by Quebec nationalists who desire Quebec to be independent, and by First Nations groups who advocate self-government for their people. But such advocacy is not evident in the writings that Delafenêtre cites. Rather, what Henry and Tator seem to be arguing is to make Canadian institutions more inclusive and more responsive to all individuals of different ethno-cultural backgrounds. In other words, they advocate not destroying democratic institutions, but making such institutions even more democratic.  

Even more critical to Delafenêtre's case is not what some supporters of multiculturalism advocate, but how the official policy itself encourages racial categorization. Delafenêtre points to the question asking ethnic origin on the national census as evidence that Statistics Canada now encourages the same racialist thinking as the United States. Does the inclusion of an ethnic identity question, known at Statistics Canada as Question 19, on the census mean that government policies categorize Canadians on an ethnic basis in terms of social policies? To prove such would require an examination of how the information obtained from the census is used. Is the data regarding ethnicity provided by the census used simply to offer a clearer picture of the racial/ethnic
composition of Canadian society? Is it used for purposes of affirmative action? Is it used, as it is in the United States, to examine social issues involving deaths, crime, and welfare through the lens of skin colour? On this last point, if it is used to categorize Canadians on a racial basis as is the case in the United States, then Delafenêtre has a point worthy of consideration. In the United States, demographic issues are examined through the filter of skin colour. Consequently, the American public understands issues as being 'Black', 'Latino', or 'White' issues. For example, issues such as teen pregnancy and welfare are seen as 'Black' issues. For the sake of international comparisons, the United States has been known to provide white statistics only, excluding Blacks and Latinos on the grounds that they skew the statistics. It is not known for sure what use the government is likely to make of this information, if any. The information provided by Question 19, according to Audrey Kobayashi, might be a basis for understanding cultural pluralism.32

However, the ethnic question might also be the only way to obtain important data required to measure the integration of minority groups into Canadian society. Other evidence shows why it is on the census. According to Pamela White, the information is needed for the Multiculturalism Act and the Employment Equity Act.33 This information is necessary in order to determine if discrimination against different ethno-cultural groups exists. But to tell how well various groups are being treated by the larger society requires knowing how many are in each group. For years, Statistics Canada has tried to impute skin colour by drawing from census information on ethnic origin, language, place of birth, and religion variables. This process was clumsy and inaccurate. Thus the race question was born, even though it caused controversy within the statistical community itself.34 While this alone does not encourage racial categorization, the warnings given by Delafenêtre and others do shed light on the possible dangers of collecting data.
Aside from the census, Delafenêtre does not explain how multiculturalism policy encourages segregation. He does not make any mention of the measures taken by different federal departments in accordance with The Multiculturalism Act mentioned in chapter four. It can be said that some of these measures, such as Revenue Canada's training of volunteers to help members of certain ethnic communities fill out their tax forms and Health Canada's working with communities involved in female genital mutilation, seem to work towards integration of minority groups into the mainstream. Delafenêtre's views of multiculturalism policy seem to be founded on the notion that multiculturalists believe in ethnic categories as undynamic and unchanging bodies. The only evidence of government consideration of ethnicity that he provides is through the census. A close look at the use of ethnic categories by the census would reveal the opposite to be true. That is, the census has had to take into consideration that the way ethnic groups identify themselves has changed with time. For example, the 1991 census expanded its list of ethnic groups to include data on Canadians of Afghan, Kurdish, and Maghrebin origin, which was not available before.35 This point also shows that some ethno-cultural groups do not see their ethnic identity as a barrier to participating in Canadian society.

Delafenêtre implies that multiculturalism policy has not been sensitive to the needs of Aboriginal people in Canada. The First Nations may not have felt that the policy was created with their needs in mind, but as this thesis shows, the Department of Heritage has been involved in initiatives involving them. These initiatives have included the organization of cultural camps in Saskatchewan to sensitize provincial judges to discrimination faced by Aboriginal people, and support for an Aboriginal Women's Programme focused on resolving and preventing family violence.36

These two recent commentaries on multiculturalism policy show that the assumptions and generalizations made of the policy in the past are still used today. The information provided in this thesis
shows many of these assumptions are mistaken. But how does this research contribute to analyzing current commentaries on immigration policy?

In January 1998, the three-person Immigration Legislative Review made public its report Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration. The report was commissioned by Immigration Minister Lucienne Robillard, and was intended to make recommendations on changes to the current immigration system.

In many ways, the Review affirmed a number of the positive aspects of immigration. It confirmed the need for immigration in order to counteract the ageing of the population and the overall decline of population in the twenty-first century. It recognized that immigration benefits Canadian society in the long-term, and that employment earnings of economic immigrants far exceed the Canadian average.

The Review also challenged some prevailing assumptions about immigrants "that eventually reach the level of myth". A few examples of these false assumptions included that borders could be sealed to keep out undesirables and allow in only those who are pre-selected, that everyone wants to come to Canada, that immigration is bad for the economy, and that immigrants take jobs from other Canadians. The report found "strong support for societal action to promote integration (not assimilation) and combat racism", which is quite contrary to the assimilation-oriented model which immigration restrictionists and anti-multiculturalists claim that Canadians want.

The Review also suggested a family-class immigrant selection system that recognizes that sponsors should be allowed to define family, as the definition evolves over time and differs among cultural and ethnic communities. It also noted that involuntary separation from one's most intimate family members constitutes an emotional hardship for the immigrant. This view speaks to the anti-immigration rhetoric of the 1990s, which focused a great deal of its criticism on family-class immigrants, who were characterized
as an unskilled class who were taking advantage of a supposed loophole in Canadian immigration law in order to gain entry to this country. The Review also suggested placing restrictions on family-class selection, such as requiring a tuition fee reflecting the cost of basic language training in Canada for sponsored immigrants in this class who require language training in one of the official languages.\textsuperscript{43}

At the same time, the Review also identified the need to improve immigration policy in some areas. It recognized the need to streamline the bureaucracy in order to speed up the processing of refugee claims. It discussed the need to make immigrant sponsors more accountable for defaulting on their immigrant sponsorships, and the importance of a previous knowledge of an official language in order for immigrants to integrate.\textsuperscript{44} The committee also reconfirmed that provincial systemic barriers currently prevent skilled immigrants from having their credentials recognized, and result in a personal loss to the individual and to the country.\textsuperscript{45}

In contrast, some recommendations of the report seemed to reflect the current reaction against immigration rather than challenge it. These recommendations lead to questions as to whether or not the members of the review delved deeply enough into the research available on an issue, and if they considered the impacts of their suggestions on various immigrant groups. For example, in regards to immigrant fees, the Review pointed out a need for greater transparency and precision in the fare-setting process, and a closer relationship between fees and actual costs. This change was necessary because the fee structure was complex and often confusing.\textsuperscript{46} What the Review did not consider was the possibility that the immigrant fees themselves are unfair, they put a heavy financial burden on immigrants, and may be designed to discourage certain types of migrants from coming to Canada. The $975 landing fee, which was instituted in 1995, resembled the head tax used in the past to prevent the entry of immigrants from certain countries such as China. For refugees, this surtax adds to
the $500 adult and $100 minor fees already charged for examination of a refugee case. The imposition of such fees is unfair to immigrants from poorer countries. As the Bloc Quebecois pointed out, the fee is unfair to women, especially those from poorer nations. Even the United Nations High Commission on Refugees holds that refugees should be exempt from landing fees.47

The report also recommended that minimum levels of settlement funds be established for economic immigrants to ensure that they are able to support themselves and their families during their first six months in Canada without recourse to social welfare. The Low Income Cut-Off (L.I.C.O.) figures provided by Statistics Canada, which are used to determine whether or not families or individuals fall below the poverty line,48 can be used to determine what these minimum levels of settlement should be. As the L.I.C.O. rates are currently used to determine eligibility of family-class sponsorships, they could provide an objective figure relating to minimum living requirements for various Canadian cities.49 Immigration officials need to consider how such a proposal might discriminate against immigrants from less-developed nations, and therefore may be a subtle attempt to exclude immigrants of a particular background. Immigrants from poorer nations may find that while they may have sufficient funds to live above the poverty level in their country of origin, the conversion of their original currency to Canadian dollars might make it extremely difficult to reach a level of finances sufficient to meet the L.I.C.O. In addition, the Review acknowledged that the earnings of economic immigrants exceed the national average, which means they have more taxable income. Why, then, would they want to impose such a standard on a class of immigrants who will prove themselves to be economically valuable?

A third concern the report raises is in regard to its view of immigrants and citizenship.

We have heard general concern about what is perceived to be the devaluation of Canadian citizenship; the requirements for citizenship are perceived to no longer
reflect any obligations to the country or to promote integration into Canadian society. To achieve greater social cohesion through integration and to place a higher value on citizenship, it is necessary to identify immigration criteria which in fact reflect Canadian core values and principles in more practical terms.\textsuperscript{50}

Aside from their consultations, the Review gives no other evidence of how immigrants no longer value Canadian citizenship. Nevertheless, they make recommendations such as demanding physical residency in Canada. This can be seen as an example of how the backlash has had an effect on influencing government policy to become more restrictive. The Review overlooked more measurable forms of data on immigrant commitment to Canada, such as Berry and Kalin's survey which showed that between 1974 and 1991, the percentage of Third Force Canadians who identified themselves as 'Other Ethnic' declined from 28\% to 20\%.\textsuperscript{51} In addition, the 1991 B.C. Charter Survey showed that foreign-born students knew and valued their rights as much as their Canadian-born counterparts.\textsuperscript{52}

The members of the Review also did not give evidence that they considered the fact that most immigrants, once they become eligible, apply to become citizens.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, the rates at which immigrants become citizens has increased since 1971, and are higher than those of Britain and The United States.\textsuperscript{54} By recommending a physical residency requirement for immigrants that Canadian-born are not subjected to, the committee could be establishing a double standard. As this thesis shows, both immigrants and Canadian-born have tendencies to move across borders for a number of reasons. Should immigration law be amended to include a residency requirement for immigrants, policymakers must make sure that new Canadians are subject to requirements that are no less restrictive than those of Canadian-born. This recommendation seems to be related to the recent attempt to require income disclosure from (Chinese) immigrants with business investments abroad.

The Review recognized the importance of official language
capability in the economic and social integration of new Canadians. Consequently, the committee recommended a mandatory language test to determine prior knowledge of French or English among immigrants. They recommended that for family class immigrants over the age of six who have no official language capability, a tuition fee be required to cover the cost of basic language training.

These recommendations reflect a trend in other nations such as Australia, which make immigrants pay for their own E.S.L. training. Official language education costs have been quite burdensome in the 1990s, and such a recommendation would consequently lighten the financial burden on federal and provincial governments. However, such a policy could also have negative implications as well. Immigration policymakers need to consider that an official language requirement may encumber immigrants from world regions where English or French language training is not readily available. This requirement might discourage immigrants from Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan, while favouring immigrants from India, Pakistan, The Philippines, and Western Europe.

An official language requirement may also discourage increased business- and investor-class immigration. In 1996, 50% of entrepreneurs and 66% of investors had no knowledge of English or French. Yet studies have shown the substantial economic contribution of these classes to Canada. If this language requirement prevents investors and entrepreneurs from coming to Canada, it may have a detrimental effect on the economy, especially on the west coast which has benefitted most from such immigrants.

Policymakers also need to investigate whether or not this requirement would actually improve the integration of immigrants. Immigrants overall have shown that over time they integrate quite well into Canadian society. Quebec already has a standardized language test, but as shown in this thesis, the Quebec model has not guaranteed better integration of newcomers. Quebec has a high degree of residential concentration of immigrants, and has a lower
immigrant retention rate than English Canada.

In summation, the Review raises many good points, and recognizes some of the barriers faced by immigrants. Some recommendations, however, need to be looked at with careful scrutiny, as they may actually be detrimental to a fair immigration process.

The Importance of This Research for Education

In making the case against immigration and multiculturalism, mainstream critics have chosen to view the policy through questionable interpretations. In doing so, they have contributed to creating an accepted, mainstream view of immigration and multiculturalism based on stereotypes. As the 1988 Employment and Immigration study Perspectives on Immigration in Canada showed, the Canadian population on the whole was ill-informed about questions relating to immigration. Opinion leaders such as heads of trade unions, members of the business community, and newspaper editors, often had their views solicited on issues surrounding immigration. The study found that while they attached importance to immigration, they too were not knowledgeable on this topic. This situation poses problems for educators. While educators are teaching young Canadians that they live in a multicultural society, some in the media (another important agent of socialization for young people) are telling them that current immigration policy and multiculturalism are futile and harmful policies? These mixed messages create confusion instead of fostering an acceptance of heterogeneity in Canadian society and in helping counter the harmful effects of nativism. If young Canadians are being told one thing in the schools, and another by the outside world, can we expect multicultural and anti-racist education to have its intended effect? This situation also finds parallels in other areas such as the schools' efforts to reduce sexism, sex stereotyping, and gay bashing while the media often tends to reinforce traditional attitudes and images of gender and homosexuality.

A solution requires a broad definition of education that exceeds
the traditional role of the public school. In other words, teachers have to start thinking of their role as dealing with more than what is going on in schools. Learning is a lifelong process that extends way past the grade-school years. And schooling is only one of several agents that help socialize the individual. Families, peers, friends, religious institutions, and the media all play important roles in developing the attitudes of people. As most Canadians receive their information on immigration and multiculturalism from the media, this calls editors and writers to account in substantiating what they write on these issues. As shown in this thesis, most of the attacks on immigration and multiculturalism were drawn from newspapers, books, and magazines. As shown, these attacks present a largely distorted view of the policy. Hence, the media does not present these policies and their effects in a fair light.

To answer the question of how education can respond to anti-immigrant phenomena requires a look at what the principles of multicultural education are, and how Canadian schools are carrying out these principles. From this discussion we can ask: are multicultural education and anti-racism training effective enough in their current forms to deal with the attitudes and information presented in public discussion that can lead to anti-immigrant/anti-minority sentiments? What else needs to be done through public education in order to combat intolerance? Can teacher training be improved to deal with these issues? How effective can education realistically be in preventing reactionary public sentiments against immigrants?

According to Keith McLeod, the principles of multicultural policy are to guarantee equality of status for all ethnocultural groups, to promote the image of Canada as a diverse society, to provide all people with a greater choice of lifestyles and cultural traits, and to protect civil rights and human rights. Multicultural education has to reflect these principles. It has to aid in building a society in which immigrants and minority groups
feel safe and do not have to worry about reprisals and backlashes from the larger society that are brought out in times of recession and political uncertainty.

Multicultural education has to allow not only for the teaching of cultural practices of minorities, but also for the acceptance of those cultures by mainstream society. In this aspect, multicultural education is different from the previous education paradigm of assimilation, which dealt with cultural diversity by amalgamating all cultures into one. Educators since the sixties have tried to encourage a pluralist approach to education through the promotion of different cultures in schools.

Cornelius Jaenen talks of the function of multicultural education as part of a larger mission of education, which is to foster a sense of national identity. Cultural pluralism is part of this national identity, as it distinguishes Canadian civic identity from America's melting pot paradigm, as well as from other paradigms such as Anglo-conformity and assimilation. In this mission, Jaenen says, Canadian schools have been limited in their effectiveness. Without a national office of education, education continues to be the responsibility of provincial and local authorities. As a result, formulating a national education agenda to promote cultural pluralism is a difficult task.

Currently, multicultural education initiatives tend to take one of the following four forms: 1) programs to assist newcomers to acquire one of the official languages (English or French), 2) heritage language training, 3) programs designed to combat racism (anti-racism), and 4) multicultural education. The final category refers to the study of other cultures in subjects such as social studies, music, art, and home economics. These categories suggest that multicultural education consists of reactive policies designed to respond to specific educational needs. For example, the influx of large numbers of immigrants without knowledge of either official language led to the spread of E.S.L. programs in Canada's schools.
As Jaenen pointed out in 1981, all provincial educational bureaucracies have incorporated some aspects of multicultural awareness into their curriculum. These activities seem to indicate that educational bureaucracies, if not the majority of Canadians, have accepted the premise "that Canada is a multicultural nation and that public schooling should reflect and foster this identity". Others, however, see the varying degree of commitment from schools as a sign of either the general failure of society to truly accept multiculturalism, or that since public education is a provincial concern, the acceptance of multiculturalism varies from province to province.

While some Canadian provincial curricula present little cultural content, others have varying degrees of information about other cultures. The latter group of provinces such as Ontario are usually ones in which over 15% of the population speak a language at home other than French or English. Over the last decade, a clear shift is visible in multicultural curricula from emphasizing folk elements of culture to dealing with issues such as diversity, immigration policy, and assimilation.

How effective, then, is multicultural education in promoting cultural pluralism and in discouraging intolerance towards 'other' ethno-cultural groups? Some have argued that multicultural education is too bland. Advocates of anti-racism theory charge multicultural education with viewing racism at the level of individual conflict and thus looks to individual solutions, whereas a more realistic approach would be to view racism as systemic and historically as an institution used by dominant groups as a means of oppression. The solution, therefore, lies in promoting collective action to deal with structural and systematic problems.

Kogila Moodley warns that maintaining cultural heritage through multicultural education may be counter-productive in a society such as our own, especially if characteristics such as kinship, place of origin, and physical features are falsely seen as having a vitality
of their own. Structural changes in Canadian society, such as the rise of the welfare state, improved legal status for immigrants, socialization, and geographic dispersal have led to a diminishment of ethnic cohesion except in Quebec. The major concern for minority parents, according to Moodley, is for their children to acquire competence rather than culture.\textsuperscript{75}

The information presented in this thesis suggests that several new directions are necessary. These new steps are to ensure that all school students across Canada, not just those in ethnically diverse schools, are exposed to multicultural education; to incorporate multicultural education as part of citizenship training for all young Canadians; and to expand multicultural education to include critical thinking as a means to help young Canadians evaluate with more confidence the information that they receive outside of their schools.

Multicultural education, as the information presented above shows, seems to be a reactive policy focused in areas with significant populations of immigrants, meaning that multicultural education is viewed as education only for immigrants or their immediate descendants. Perhaps this is why provincial bureaucracies have not made this kind of pedagogy widespread. As Jaenen states, by not incorporating multicultural education across all provinces and by not making it compulsory in all education streams, Canadian schools "appear to be pursuing routes which will be marginal in affecting any development of a national identity".\textsuperscript{76}

Such a lack allows people like Premier Lucien Bouchard to charge that Canada (meaning the rest of Canada) is not a nation.

A change of attitude is required if multicultural education is to have a more widespread implementation. As Bhikhu Parekh argues, the case for multicultural education rests on educational grounds, not ethno-political ones. The case does not in any way depend on the presence of ethnic minority children in schools.\textsuperscript{77} Multicultural education is good education, whereas monocultural education -- that is, Eurocentric education -- is not. This is
because multicultural education incorporates a plurality of perspectives that enable learners to cope with diversity in and outside of our society. Monocultural education, on the other hand, stifles the development of critical faculties because students are taught to look at the world from a narrow perspective, namely that of the dominant society; and this tends to breed arrogance, insensitivity, and racism. This is because a student who is not encouraged to study other cultures and societies with sympathy and imagination cannot develop respect for them. This recognition of multicultural education as good education is essential in order to achieve its implementation and to integrate different perspectives into the curriculum. Often, the case today is to teach such perspectives outside of the core curriculum or in specific courses only, such as social studies. This suggests a possible new direction for the federal Department of Heritage in encouraging provincial departments of education to incorporate multicultural education initiatives. This does not mean that provincial governments should surrender their jurisdictional powers over education, or that provincial curriculums should be eliminated. Rather, it suggests that the federal government could help coordinate multicultural education initiatives to ensure that cultural needs are being met in education throughout the country, and that some consistency exists in multicultural education initiatives among the provinces.

The agenda of multicultural education needs to be expanded. Since the media is doing an incomplete job of informing the public about immigration policies and multiculturalism, multicultural education/anti-racism education should be expanded to teach children about these policies. In some ways, anti-racism already achieves this by teaching about historical oppression of people of colour, and how racism is a tool of oppression used by ruling groups. However, this is not enough. Students also need to be taught critical thinking skills in order to process the information they receive from other agents of socialization such as the media,
their families, and their peers. Social studies subjects would provide multiple opportunities for developing critical thinking.80 A law or social studies class, for example, could provide opportunities for students to examine how the media covers a certain issue. As Pat Clarke states, the ability to discern and scrutinize information is essential for individuals as the influence of the media increases. Students can address issues such as how the media can both reflect and create reality. To what extent, on any given controversial issue, is the media either creating the issue or manipulating the arguments?81 Herman and Chomsky have shown that media coverage of issues has often taken on a propagandistic approach, which suggests systematic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on servicability to important domestic power interests. The media defends these interests through the selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping the debate within bounds of acceptable premises.82 On the other hand, media literacy can make students wary of how arguments can be manipulated in the media by strategies like scapegoating; polarized thinking by presenting an 'us versus them' mentality which encourages distrust and suspicion of those who are 'different', ad hominem strategy; presenting caricatures of persons or groups; irrelevant appeals such as appeals to emotion, patriotism, and tradition; the 'either-or' tactic of forcing a choice when in reality there may be others, for example, the perceived notion of the necessity for the U.S. to attack Iraq; leading statements and slogans designed to damage credibility and encourage hostility; false analogies; and the use of extreme examples to support a point or to slant an argument.83 Such training at school could teach learners not to accept uncritically everything they read and see in news sources.

In some ways, this approach does not resemble traditional multicultural education as much as it resembles American academic Henry Giroux's paradigm of border pedagogy. This concept does more
than promote diverse cultures. It involves developing a democratic public philosophy that respects the notion of difference as part of a common struggle to increase the quality of public life. This pedagogy suggests that borders of knowledge can be challenged and re-defined. It speaks to the need to create pedagogical conditions in which students can cross borders while showing the limits and strengths of traditional education borders that we inherit.  

Border pedagogy involves educators analyzing racism not only as a structural and ideological force, but also in diverse and historically-specific ways; the need to fight racism in schools, communities, and the wider society; and to help students identify their role in the wider society and in history.

To improve the effectiveness of multicultural education also requires an examination of teacher education. A few American states and Canadian provinces have education policies to indicate that basic principles and content of multiculturalism are to be included in teacher training. However, teacher educators have tried to provide multicultural education by appealing to voluntarism of staff and students, rather than making it a requirement for employment. While a few boards require teachers to have some knowledge of problems related to a multicultural school population, pre-service teacher education programs in general in both Canada and the United States do little to equip student teachers with skills for working in multicultural classrooms. Where included in student teacher programs, the treatment of multicultural education is often minimal or superficial in contrast to other skills and knowledge expected of student teachers. A case-in-point is the University of British Columbia teacher education program, where the teaching of multicultural education is currently compulsory in only one course, Educational Studies 314: Analysis of Education. Only a small part of this course is set aside for multicultural education, and few guidelines specify what exactly should be taught in regards to this topic.
As Ratna Ghosh states, the goals of multicultural education cannot be achieved if the teachers themselves are not committed to the needs of a multicultural society and the aims and objectives of an education system for that community. Teacher educators must be culturally aware, have knowledge of educational needs and human rights principles, and be up-to-date on the most recent relevant literature.88 Thus, more than a superficial multicultural education must be made a mandatory requirement of teacher training.

Teachers themselves are raised in this society and immersed in its prejudices and biases. Without multicultural training to expose them to cultural pluralism, they may unwittingly pass the biases that they acquired from their own formal and informal education of an earlier era on to their students.

Thus, a multicultural program in teacher training must first involve teaching pre-service teachers what multiculturalism is, as well as what it is not. That is, teachers need to understand that multiculturalism is synonymous with integration, not assimilation or segregation/separation, as they might have been led to believe by the media or their own past education at school or at home. This knowledge may help those in the teaching profession understand why multiculturalism policy is an essential aspect of Canadian identity and citizenship, rather than a 'top-down, social engineering' policy as some have labelled it.

In addition, teachers must learn and practice intrinsic elements of multiculturalism practice. These include teacher modelling of behaviour that they hope their students may acquire; a sense of moral purpose as to why multicultural education is important; an understanding of the norms for a diverse student population; teaching methods which will create the best conditions in which their students can learn; effective communication that may affect their students' self-concept; use of the classroom not just to learn but as a site for resistance, negotiations, and conflicts; and the allowance of different voices and perspectives to be heard in the classroom.89
Related to this, all teachers -- regardless of their discipline -- must learn how to create a multicultural and 'ethno-friendly' classroom. Such practices include ensuring that racist expressions are not tolerated in the classroom or schoolyard, examining all curriculum material for biased and distorted images of ethnic groups, the use of one's own students of different heritages as resources, and continually affirming and reaffirming the legitimate presence and contributions of all ethno-cultural groups.90

This last point is especially relevant to teachers of science and mathematics. Often, science and math courses are dismissed as inappropriate for incorporating multicultural education. Science and math, it is argued, are value-free. Yet knowledge in science is created by scientists who ask questions that are not value-neutral. Furthermore, modern science has failed to acknowledge the extent to which it has borrowed from non-western cultures.91 By affirming the contributions made to science and mathematics by non-western cultures, such as the invention of '0' in India,92 or the first known demonstrations of Pythagorean theorem in Chinese and Indian texts in the first millennium B.C.,93 teachers can in subtle ways challenge the notion that non-western cultures are inferior, and that all important modern knowledge comes from western sources. This may help lessen the emotions of fear that mainstream society feels when they see increasing numbers of people from such cultures in their own society, as well as heighten pride among students of non-western background.

Student teachers must also understand critical thinking and how it can be an applied skill in forms such as media literacy. These skills can not only help their students select and validate the information that is fed them, but can also be used to help teachers themselves in dealing with various controversial issues that they will face throughout their careers.

The elements needed to create a safe classroom environment for multiculturalism might also be used to create a safe learning environment in regards to gender and sexual orientation. For
example, teachers should learn not only to confront racism in schools, but also sexism and harassment of gay/lesbian children. In this sense, multiculturalism becomes a form of human rights education.

In order to foster multicultural education, the teaching population must be representative of the society that it teaches within. Often, this is not the case. As Echols and Fisher showed in 1989 in the case of the Vancouver School district, a clear disparity existed between the racial/ethnic composition of the teaching staff, and that of the students. Why is it important to have an ethnic balance in the teaching population that resembles that of society? According to Christine E. Sleeter, teaching white teachers to be culturally sensitive is not enough. Members of the dominant group tend to believe that ethnicity is a private matter, and is not connected to social structures. Everyone, therefore, is on equal ground. People of colour will incorporate their experiences into their pedagogy, and therefore should be encouraged to enter the teaching profession. By doing so, the student body is exposed to a wider range of perspectives, which can be more conducive to fostering tolerance. Furthermore, teachers of colour can serve as role models not only for children of colour, but also for students from the dominant ethno-cultural group, who might not have the chance to see people from other ethnic groups in positions of power elsewhere. A similar argument is made by feminists regarding the need for female professors as role models for female students at university.

Can these educational measures realistically be expected to counter the other information that learners receive in society? Can these measures foster increased tolerance and acceptance of cultural pluralism? As J.D. Wilson wrote in 1984, not too much should be expected from schools in terms of changing societal attitudes towards multiculturalism, even if schools adopt multicultural initiatives as a whole. This is because of the fact that societal attitudes are shaped by many factors beyond the
Jaenen notes that multicultural programs in schools may not reinforce Canadian unity in the short run, nor may cultural diversity produce all its anticipated benefits. But proper citizenship based on multiculturalism can have a positive long-term effect. Such programs might strengthen the cause of fundamental human rights, the development of critical insights into racism and group relations, and even strengthen citizen participation. These would be welcome additions to broader and deeper objectives of broad literacy, intelligent citizenship, and respect for excellence which underpin all compulsory public schooling. Educators should not give up hope on the ability of public education to change attitudes. The Environics national surveys between 1989 and 1997 show that Canadians are becoming more aware of multiculturalism policy, and that younger Canadians approve of the policy more than older Canadians.

These measures, I feel, are necessary if education is to sanction and protect a way of life that Canadians should maintain as part of their identity. This way of life should emphasize the basic tenets mentioned in this dissertation. That is, it should uphold the seven core values of defining Canadian society that were identified in the 1991 report by the Citizen's Forum on Canada's Future (mentioned in Chapter Five), plus a commitment to the Crown, parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law. It should emphasize civic nationalism and avoid ethnic nationalism or any of its aspects, such as upholding an official state culture. It should combine individual human rights with collective rights, provided those collective rights do not allow for ethno/cultural groups to impose internal restrictions on their individual members, or to impose their practices on other groups. The state must officially sanction cultural pluralism through the policy of multiculturalism, which means that the government recognizes that all cultures are equal and merit protection if members of those cultures so choose to preserve their ways, while integrating these different groups into a single polity. This is what I envision to be the path that
Canada should follow.
NOTES


2) Ibid., 33.


4) Gurmant Grewal, Motion 24 to the House of Commons, "That a legislative committee of this house be instructed to prepare and bring in a bill, in accordance with standing order 68(4)(B), to prevent the reference and designation of any Canadian or group of Canadians in a hyphenated form, based on race, religion, color or place of origin": 1.

5) Ibid., 1.

6) Ibid., 1.

7) Ibid., 1.

8) "MP to gore a sacred cow: Official multiculturalism", editorial from unknown source, originally printed The Edmonton Sun, October 13, 1997.


12) Grewal, 1.
13) Ibid., 1.

14) Pamela White, "Challenge in Measuring Canada's Ethnic Diversity", in Stella Hryniuk (ed.), Twenty Years of Multiculturalism: Successes and Failures (Winnipeg: St. John's College Press, 1992): 170. White explains that in regards to the asking of ethnicity on the census, Blacks tend to identify themselves as Afro-Canadians, Afro-Americans, and Afro-Caribbeans, therefore the term 'Black' may need to be reconsidered. In contrast, Hispanics want to identify themselves as Hispanics rather than Mexicans, Guatemalans, etc.(p. 170).

15) "MP to Gore sacred cow",

16) Barbara Yaffe, "Hyphen interferes with pride", The Vancouver Sun (December 2 1997): A12.

17) Ibid., A12.

18) "MP to Gore sacred cow"

19) Ibid.


21) Ibid., 95.

22) Ibid., 95-96.

23) Ibid., 97.


25) Ibid., 99-100.

26) Ibid., 101.
27) Frances Henry, Carol Tator, Winston Mattis, and Tim Rees, *The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace and Company Limited, 1995): 301. This description, which Delafenetre cites, is in reference not to multiculturalism, but to anti-racism. Tator et al. describe multiculturalism as the "willingness to make limited modifications in the organization or institution but not to alter its structure, mission, and culture... The multicultural organization may seek to remove some discriminatory barriers by providing greater access to racial minorities, but its members are expected to conform to its dominant groups' values and worldview". (p. 300-301).

28) Democratic racism: an ideology which maintains two conflicting values. These are a commitment to democracy motivated by fairness, justice, and equality; and negative feelings about people of colour and the potential for different treatment against them. Francis Henry and Carol Tator, "The Ideology of Racism - 'Democratic Racism'", Canadian Ethnic Studies, 26:2 (1994): 2-3.

29) Henry and Tator, 12. Other values associated with democratic racism include the ideas that to get rid of discrimination, all we have to do is treat everyone equally; and that racism may exist, but the rights of the individual with respect to free speech have primacy. (p.11).

30) Delafenetre, 101. The census was also referred to by Grewal as how hyphenization divides Canadians by racial categories. Yaffe, A12.

31) Alanna Mitchell, "Canadians get first look today at sensitive race data in census", The Globe and Mail (February 17 1998): A1. Question 19 asks: Is this person: White, Chinese, South Asian (eg. East Indian, Pakistani, Punjabi, or Sri Lankan); Black (eg. African, Haitian, Jamaican, Somali); Arab; West Asian (eg. Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, Moroccan); Filipino; Southeast Asian (eg. Cambodian, Indonesian, Laotian, Vietnamese); Latin American; Japanese; Korean; or other (specify)? (p.A2).

32) Ibid., A2.

33) White in Hryniuk, 170.

34) Mitchell, A2.

35) Ibid., 170-171,


37) Immigration Legislative Review, *Not Just Numbers: A*

38) Ibid., 26, 54.

39) Ibid., 9-10.

40) Ibid., 34.

41) Ibid., 44-45.

42) Ibid., 43.

43) Ibid., 45.

44) Ibid., 45-46, 58.

45) Ibid., 36.

46) Ibid., 22.


48) That is, families that fall below the L.I.C.O. rate that has been calculated for the region that they live in are considered to be living in poverty.

49) Immigration Legislative Review, 59.

50) Ibid., 39.


55) Immigration Legislative Review, 36,60.

56) Ibid., 43.


59) Ibid.

60) Immigration Legislative Review, 58.


62) Howard.

63) Immigration Legislative Review, 36.


68) J.D. Wilson, "Multicultural Programmes in Canadian Education", in Samuda et. al., 69.

69) Keith A. McLeod, "Multiculturalism and Multicultural

70) Jaenen in Wilson, 79,92.


74) Barb Thomas, "Antiracist Education: A Response to Manicom" in Young, 105-106.

75) Moodley in Banks and McGee Banks, 817.

76) Jaenen in Wilson, 79.


78) Ibid., 4.

79) Ibid., 5.


83) Clarke, 13.

85) Ibid., 136, 139, and 140.
87) Ghosh, 85.
88) Ibid., 95.
89) Ibid., 93-95.
91) Ghosh, 46.
92) D'Oyley and Stanley, 32.
93) Ghosh, 47.
95) Christene E. Sleeter, "How White Teachers Construct Race", in McCarthy and Chrichlow, 165.
96) Ibid., 168.
97) Wilson in Samuda, 73.
98) Jaenen in Wilson, 94.
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APPENDIX A

Chart 3
Immigrant Flows, by Region of Origin, Canada, 1901-90

1901-14 1915-45

Other European countries

Source: Estimates by the Economic Council, based on data from Statistics Canada.

FIGURE ONE
FIGURE TWO


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FIGURE 2.3 IMMIGRANTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION, CANADA, 1901-1991


FIGURE THREE

APPENDIX D

Figure 1
Average Earnings of Foreign-born Individuals Who Landed in 1981 and 1985 by Immigration Category, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1981 Cohort Group</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>Canadian Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisted Relative</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated Class</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Library of Parliament

FIGURE FOUR