THE FULLEST DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN POTENTIAL: 
THE CANADIAN UNION OF STUDENTS, 1963-1969

by

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to the required standard

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The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date July 31, 2002
ABSTRACT

The Canadian Union of Students (CUS) was Canada's national postsecondary student organisation from its founding in September 1963 as the successor to the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS), until its dissolution in October 1969. This thesis recounts the political history of CUS by tracing the development of CUS policies on access to higher education and on student involvement in the governance of postsecondary institutions. The central argument of this thesis is that over time CUS policies and activities became increasingly "left wing," causing CUS to become ever more isolated from the mainstream students who constituted its membership. The loss of confidence by the members resulted in campus student associations withdrawing support from the organisation, leading to the dissolution of CUS in October 1969.

This thesis is not strictly an historical policy analysis, although such an analysis appears throughout. This thesis also offers comparative discussions, recounting developments in the Québec student movement, in the Canadian anti-nuclear and social justice movements, and in the American civil rights and student movements. To a lesser extent, this thesis also contains elements of social history, collective biography and organisational history. This variety of approaches helps in more fully explaining CUS's changing politics.

As demonstrated by the developments in policies on access to higher education and institutional governance, CUS was not content with merely treating the symptoms of educational inequity, but increasingly sought to identify the causes of such inequity and eliminate them. This put the organisation in conflict with prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and divided the CUS leadership from its membership. Although a significant minority of disaffected youth and students challenged the norms of the day, they were unable to bring large numbers of people to their cause and thus unable to sustain pressure for change. The CUS leadership's attempt to reverse the course of the organisation to save it from collapse was unsuccessful and CUS folded under the weight of a rapidly declining membership.
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<tr>
<td>ACULF</td>
<td>Association canadienne des universitaires de langue francaise</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGEUM</td>
<td>Association générale des étudiants de l'Université de Montréal</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUCC</td>
<td>Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAUT</td>
<td>Canadian Association of University Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRH</td>
<td>Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)</td>
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<td>CCND</td>
<td>Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Congress of Racial Equality</td>
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<td>CPUO</td>
<td>Committee of Presidents of the Universities of Ontario</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Canadian Student Assembly</td>
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<td>CSLP</td>
<td>Canada Student Loan Program</td>
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<td>CUP</td>
<td>Canadian University Press</td>
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<td>CUS</td>
<td>Canadian Union of Students</td>
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<td>CUCND</td>
<td>Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYC</td>
<td>Company of Young Canadians</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERAP</td>
<td>Economic Research and Action Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>Free Speech Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISC</td>
<td>International Student Conference</td>
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<td>IUS</td>
<td>International Union of Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>LID</td>
<td>League for Industrial Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
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<td>NCCU</td>
<td>National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges</td>
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<td>NFCUS</td>
<td>National Federation of Canadian University Students</td>
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<td>NLF</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Student Association</td>
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<td>ORCUS</td>
<td>Ontario Region of the Canadian Union of Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEN</td>
<td>Presse étudiante nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUQ</td>
<td>Présidents des universités du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCLC</td>
<td>Southern Christian Leadership Conference</td>
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<td>SCM</td>
<td>Student Christian Movement</td>
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<td>SDS</td>
<td>Students for a Democratic Society</td>
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<td>Students for a Democratic University</td>
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<td>Student League for Industrial Democracy</td>
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Student Means Survey</td>
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<td>SNCC</td>
<td>Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>SUPA</td>
<td>Student Union for Peace Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>UBC AMS</td>
<td>University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society</td>
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<td>UGEQ</td>
<td>Union générale des étudiants du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men's Christian Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women's Christian Association</td>
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Introduction

Recent historiography of Canadian postsecondary education has led to new understandings of the collective lives of students and of their organisations. The field of inquiry is comparatively small, though, and publications so far concentrate on the period 1930-1950. Although there are perhaps thousands of articles and books on the 1960s worldwide, examination of the period in Canada has been left to journalists, or has been tangential to studies of youth sub-culture, or of the so-called baby boomers. These accounts are useful in understanding the cultural context of the period, but their strength lies in describing lifestyle and not in offering explanation for actions. The exception to this is Doug Owram's Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation, in which Owram combines social history and collective biography to describe the forces acting on the post-war generation and to explain the consequences of those forces.

Although student experiences are canvassed in these accounts, and offered full chapters in Owram and Myrna Kostash's Long Way from Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada, they offer little systematic examination of Canadian postsecondary student organisations in the 1960s. Those examinations that do exist are few, limited in scope, and offer little comprehensive explanation. The one exception to this is Pat Armstrong’s 1971 unpublished paper “The Canadian Union of Students,” in which she examines CUS policy on international affairs as the means to explain the rise and fall of the organisation. The paper concentrates on the practical problems of policy development and dissemination, though, and fails to consider the gulf between the political goals of the CUS leadership and those of the membership.

The only published work to deal in any substantive way with Canadian student organisations in the 1960s was Cyril Levitt’s 1984 work Children of Privilege. Levitt’s purpose,
however, was to advance a sociological explanation for the behaviour of student radicals, relying for the most part on an analysis of the so-called "new class" of disaffected university students. In 1969, Lewis Feuer similarly advanced a theory of student activism, describing the American New Left as a chaotic and egotistical movement at odds with left and liberal traditions, and purposefully generating generational conflict. Of the two, Feuer is more engaging and thorough in his account of events, but both publications suffer from the authors’ attempts to "prove" a particular theory of 1960s student activism. Consequently, it is difficult to judge if the conclusions arise from an honest evaluation of the historical evidence, or the historical evidence is selected to justify the theory.

These theorists acknowledge the role of student organisations, but the organisations are secondary to the theorists’ attempts to explain overall student and youth movements as mass, generation-based movements. Yet it is the actions of formal and informal student organisations that define public perceptions of students. The organisations possess legitimacy — derived from campus representative democracy for formal organisations, and from moral imperative for informal organisations — that permit them to speak with authority and to convey definitive images of students through the media. These student organisations were not mere manufacturers of images, though, they also played a substantial part in changes to institutional and government policy. Two significant policy artifacts of the 1960s are the idea that postsecondary education ought to be universally accessible, and that students have a role in the governance of the institution. Although these ideas are now taken for granted, there were few signs of them before the Second World War. They became features of Canadian postsecondary policy in the 1960s largely because of the Canadian Union of Students (CUS). The irony was that CUS’s activities explain both its early success in advocating these policies, and its final demise.

This study is about why and how CUS, whose members were largely the beneficiaries of post-war middle class and upper class privilege, became leaders in educational reform for social and economic justice. This study is also about how “progress,” as defined by the CUS leadership, along this leftist tendency ultimately led to the organisation’s collapse. It is thus a study about the political life of the organisation; about the context that gave rise to particular policy debates; about why certain policies were adopted and actions were taken; about the reaction of the membership, the postsecondary community, government and the public to these policies and actions; and about how the CUS leadership managed it all.

One could write the political history of CUS in any number of ways. For present purposes, that history is presented through a close study of two areas of action and policy that ran through the life of the organisation: access to higher education, and the democratisation of postsecondary institutional governance. One alternative would have been to study the changes in CUS policy on national and international affairs, also a consistent theme in the life of the organisation. This area has been explored, though, and does not illustrate the political life of the organisation so well as accessibility and democratisation. Another alternative would have been to conduct a study of why women and visible minorities were largely ignored in the debates on access. The available evidence is sparse, and such a study would not adequately explain the

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6 Levitt’s data came from Canadian, U.S. and West German student organisations and activists.
9 Armstrong, “The Canadian Union of Students.”
larger political debates within CUS. These, and other, lines of inquiry are interesting and deserving of further work, but are not central to the goals of this study.

CUS's policy changes were generally toward the political left, that is, toward reforms that were expected to maximise collective social good through state intervention. This stands in contrast to the prevailing capitalist ethos of maximising individual economic benefit through personal action. The definition of the political left used in this study is purposely vague in part because it is difficult to confine CUS narrowly to any particular tendency in socialist thought—although Levitt and Feuer tried to do so for student movements of the 1960s generally—and in part because this vague conception is indicative of the times, where a great deal of liberal and socialist thought was swirling about and was being picked over as students and their leaders sought to explain society and social change. It is worth noting that the CUS leadership from 1965 onwards considered movement towards the political left as “progress” or “evolution.” Accordingly, this study uses these and similar terms to denote such leftward movement, and not to judge the merits of such developments.

The account of CUS offered in this study is not strictly an historical policy analysis, although such an analysis appears throughout. This study also offers comparative discussions, recounting developments in the Québec student movement, in the Canadian anti-nuclear and social justice movements, and in the American civil rights and student movements. To a lesser extent, this study also contains elements of social history, collective biography and organisational history. This variety of approaches helps in explaining CUS's political changes.

Since CUS was a political organisation, an examination of its political life offers the most reliable point of departure in explaining the organisation's development and dissolution. Although little has been written about CUS, this study is revisionist in challenging the simplified version of events of the 1960s offered by today's student organisations, and the theory-laden explanations offered by Levitt, Feuer and others. ¹⁰

**Organisation**

This study falls into four segments, or periods—December 1926 to August 1963, September 1963 to August 1965, September 1965 to August 1967, and September 1967 to December 1969. These periods demarcated significant changes in accessibility and academic governance polices and the end points coincide with the annual CUS Congress, where policy decisions were made and the CUS officers elected at the previous year's Congress took office. The exception is in the final period, since CUS folded shortly after the 1969 Congress. For the sake of explanatory clarity and completeness, certain events are dealt with in chapters other than those their chronology would dictate.

The chapter dealing with the years from 1926 to 1963 includes the founding of the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS) in 1926, the rise of student organisations through the Second World War, the post-War re-birth and growth of NFCUS, the founding of the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND), and the founding of

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the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the United States. Although this chapter is a general account of events prior to the founding of CUS, three explanatory themes arose in the course of research for this chapter that persist throughout the study: the influence of Québec students on the political development of students in English Canada, the desire of student associations to ameliorate the problems faced by their members, and the propensity for students to turn to protest to resolve their grievances.

The chapter covering September 1963 to August 1965 comprises the transformation of NFCUS to CUS, the departure of the Québec student associations from CUS, the founding of Union générale des étudiants du Québec (UGEQ), the lobby to establish the Canada Student Loan Program, the fight against large tuition fee increases, the Bladen Commission on university financing, American developments in civil rights, organising the poor, and expanding the rights of students on campus, and the transformation of the CUCND into the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA).

The chapter describing the period September 1965 to August 1967 deals with the creation and expansion of CUS’s universal accessibility policy, the results of the Student Means Survey, the evolution of the CUS academic democracy policy, the results of and reaction to the report of the Duff/Berdahl commission, the beginnings of discontent over the leftward movement in CUS policies and actions, the decline of SUPA, and the transformation of American student politics from a protest movement to a movement actively resisting the Vietnam War and the capitalist organisation of society.

The chapter comprising September 1967 to December 1969 encompasses CUS’s leftward movement into social unionism, the transformation of academic democracy into student power, CUS bypassing local student associations to advance a radical political agenda, the mass demonstrations in Europe and the United States in the spring and summer of 1968, the increasing radicalism in CUS policies and actions, the attempt to rebuild CUS after a backlash from conservative and liberal student leaders, and the dissolution of the organisation in the face irreconcilable political differences and a rapid drop in membership.

The concluding chapter synthesises the previous four, suggests possibilities for further research, and makes observations of what the events of the 1960s have to offer today’s student leaders and campus administrators.

Sources

This study is based on three types of material: primary NFCUS, CUS and related personal documents and correspondence held by McMaster University, the National Archives of Canada, and UBC Special Collections and in the author’s personal collection; secondary analyses and accounts in books, essay collections and media accounts; and personal interviews with seven former CUS presidents and activists. All of this material was subject to the usual tests of insuring credibility of sources (internal criticism) and comparing material to other sources (external criticism). Only a small amount of material was excluded for lack of verification or unresolved inconsistencies.
As the result of an interview it was determined that some documents were removed from the CUS office files prior to the documents being deposited in the McMaster University Archives. There was no indication of the content of these documents, although it was likely personal correspondence between activists and members of the CUS secretariat. The absence of these documents does not detract from the description or argument contained in this study, although their inclusion may have provided interesting details.
In Search of a Movement:
December 1926 to August 1963

Part of the myth of the 1960s is that it was a time like no other — that youth were in control of the destiny of society, and that any outcome seemed possible, if only one possessed the proper analysis, worked on the right project, and attended enough marches. Certainly the young people of the 1960s, the product of the post-Second World War baby boom, were unique in their numbers. Between 1952, the first year the children of the baby boom entered school, and 1966, the number of people in school doubled to five million. Fully 25 per cent of the Canadian population consisted of school-aged children in 1966.¹

Moreover, youth and students have long had central roles in societal change. From the creation of universities in medieval times, to the Russian students back-to-the-people movement of 1860s and 1870s, to the Chinese internal conflict and civil war from 1919 through 1949, to the independence movement in India of the 1940s, to the Cuban revolution of the 1950s, to the anti-apartheid movement of the 1970s and 1980s, to the anti-globalisation movement of today, students and young people have played important roles in the shaping of their societies.² To the leadership of the Canadian Union of Students (CUS) in the 1960s, it seemed that Canada, and western society generally, was on the brink of fundamental change and that students would be the primary force behind that change.

Before examining how CUS came to be at the leading edge of this social change, and the consequences of that position, it is necessary to consider briefly the history of Canadian student organisations prior to the founding of CUS in 1963. This chapter will start with an overview of Canadian student organisations from 1921 to 1940, then move on to an examination of the post-Second World War activities of the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS) with respect to relations with Québec students, student financial assistance, and international relations. Next will be an overview of the history of the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND), the predecessor to the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA). The chapter will conclude with an overview of the founding the U.S.-based Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), two organisations that would influence Canadian student politics.

Beginnings

The Canadian student movement of the 1960s, and the CUS in particular, has its formal beginnings in the establishment of NFCUS in 1926. The creation of this national organisation for student governments is but one manifestation, albeit an important one, of 20th century student

² For fuller accounts of these and other student and youth movements, see Feuer, The Conflict of Generations and Mark Edelman Boren, Student Resistance: A History of an Unruly Subject (New York: Routledge, 2001).
collective action, which originated in Christian service organisations and later, found expression in moralistic campaigns for peace and civil rights.\(^3\) It is not surprising then that the Student Christian Movement (SCM), founded in 1921, remained an important feature of national campus culture through the 1960s. The creation of labour, farmer, socialist, and progressive political parties after the First World War gave secular expression to religious social reform, and in turn influenced the founders the Canadian Student Assembly (CSA) in 1937. The establishment of the CUCND and other peace groups in the late 1950s again filled the need to express moral outrage at events of the day.

Despite the declared good intentions and good works of these reformist and moralising organisations, Canadian students could not be agents for large-scale social change without a mechanism for sustained political pressure and circumstances that would allow them to use their political power effectively. The demise of the CSA in 1940 left NFCUS the primary means to obtain this power. With the reinvigoration of NFCUS after the Second World War, it was not surprising to find that student leaders were openly involved in partisan politics in an attempt to use student politics as a springboard to "adult" politics.\(^4\) These partisan student leaders had little interest in upsetting the political status quo to any great extent—only enough to provide them with experience and to get noticed by the formal political parties.

These ambitious students may well have persisted in using NFCUS as little more than their training ground were it not for a resurgence of Québec nationalism in the 1950s. The demands of Québec students for a national student organisation based on articulated principles, rather than personal whim, and committed to activism challenged NFCUS's limited view of student politics. The NFCUS leadership had difficulty in understanding why students might want to be active participants in the world outside the universities, and why student government might be used as a means to this end. When this cultural gap was overlaid with the desire for a strong and distinct Québec, the stage was set for a persistent struggle between students in Québec and the rest of Canada. This struggle proved to be the impetus for the NFCUS leadership to re-examine the purpose of the organisation, forcing them to contemplate the idea of student as social actor.

As student leaders reconsidered the role of students in society, they were also confronted with examples of students in revolt in other countries, the grim prospect of nuclear annihilation, and cracks in the North American political economy of the 1950s. Discontent had acquired a foothold on campus, and students turned to voluntary organisations and student government to find satisfaction. CUCND and similar groups were outlets for those students interested in international issues, and charitable and religious organisations were available for students interested in community service and reform, but what would be the domain of the national student organisation? NFCUS found its place by broadening its perspective on matters of financial accessibility to higher education. By working on lowering financial barriers, the NFCUS leaders were able to satisfy their constituents that they were more than social conveners, but did not so much disturb the status quo as to deny these aspiring politicians and businessmen their future place in political economy.


\(^4\) Moses, "All That Was Left," 227-245.
Events in the United States overtook Canadian student leaders and Canadian students learned of the civil strife in the United States along with their American counterparts on the evening news and through the daily paper. Moreover, the documents of the discontented American youth found their way into Canada through geographic, intellectual and social points of contact. The new student leaders searched for a new role for NFCUS—a movement to parallel the excitement in Québec, the United States and elsewhere, but first they had to make their peace with their Francophone colleagues.

National Federation of Canadian University Students

Prior to 1926, student associations at Canadian universities were largely isolated from one another except for the organisation of the occasional debating or sporting competition with a nearby institution. This changed in December 1926 when representatives from ten student associations met in Montréal at McGill University to establish the National Federation of Canadian University Students. Encouraged by Ralph Nunn May, a former president of the National Union of Students in the England who was in Canada touring as a member of the Imperial Debating Team, NFCUS was established to organise debating competitions and provide services to students such as athletic programs, university exchanges, and discounts on travel and merchandise. Although NFCUS was founded, in part, on a post-First World War desire to promote international harmony and peace, this did not include engagement in any of the pressing social issues of the day. As a consequence, NFCUS sat on the sidelines as other student organisations took the lead during the Depression.

Chief amongst these other organisations was the SCM, a social gospel organisation born in 1921 out of the joining of forces of the youth wings of the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), and young Christian activists. Inspired by reformist theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr and J. King Gordon, SCM had chapters on most Canadian campuses, where they sponsored talks, raised relief funds and campaigned for peace and social justice. Although the left-wing tendencies of the SCM occasionally raised concerns amongst university authorities, its Christian foundation afforded it a protected status and provided a haven for students seeking social change. Engaged with the world outside of the universities, the SCM did not pose much of a threat to NFCUS.

The CSA first challenged NFCUS’s position as the representative voice of Canadian students. Founded in 1937, the CSA opposed militarism, wanted greater educational opportunity, desired closer ties between English and French Canada, and sought to preserve civil liberties. Although the CSA stated that it was not a rival to NFCUS, it was the CSA that managed to secure $225,000 in student bursaries from the federal government as part of the

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5 National Federation of Canadian University Students, “Brief Outlines” (National Federation of Canadian University Students, Ottawa, Summer 1962, mimeographed), 1, ACUS [Archives of the National Federation of Canadian University Students/Canadian Union of Students, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada], NFCUS Box 23; Axelrod, Making a Middle Class, 129; Canadian Union of Students, “Submission of the Canadian Union of Students to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, September 14, 1965, mimeographed), 3, ACUS, CUS 88; Armstrong, “The Canadian Union of Students,” 6.

Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Plan, and made Canadians more aware of the difficulties facing Canadian youth in access to higher education, employment and other matters.7

Despite these successes, the CSA fell victim to the patriotic fervor sweeping the country at the outset of Second World War. The December 1939 conference in Ste Anne de Bellevue, Québec adopted a resolution, backed by a substantial contingent of Québec students, opposing conscription and a Canadian military commitment to the European war. The resolution was opposed by significant number of Anglophone delegates and led the Mount Allison University delegation to walk out of the conference claiming that forces opposed to Canada’s ties with British Empire were manipulating the conference. Enemies of the CSA used the resolution and a subsequent survey of student opinion on the war and other matters to engineer withdrawals from the organisation.8 The CSA position on conscription also led to charges the organisation was Communist-dominated.9 It was likely that members of the Communist Party Canada and the Young Communist League were also members of the CSA, but the RCMP’s anti-Communist unit was unable to find any ties between the CSA and the Communist Party. A small number of activists tried to keep the CSA alive, but it was effectively dead by April 1940.10

Conscription was also burdensome for NFCUS. In 1940, the National Secretariat requested all member student associations to poll their members on attitudes towards conscription. Despite the strong feelings in Québec about the issue, no advance consultation was made with the members in that province, leading the Francophone student associations to charge that NFCUS was attempting to obtain an outcome in favour of conscription from the English-speaking majority. This resulted in the Université de Montréal and Université Laval withdrawing from the organisation later that year.11 Conscription also took another toll on the organisation as students left the campuses to join in the war effort. As a consequence it was decided to suspend the operations of the organisation for the duration of the war.12

After false starts in 1944 and 1945, NFCUS resumed operations with a conference held at the University of Toronto in 1946, where Maurice Sauvé of Université de Montréal was elected National President. Sauvé reinvigorated NFCUS with a cross-Canada tour in 1947 to promote the organisation, finally persuading 21 student associations, representing 65,000 students, to attend the NFCUS conference later that year in Winnipeg.13 NFCUS considered adopting a more expansive view of the role of the student in society after the war, inspired by the growing student syndicalist movement in Europe. As articulated in 1946 in the “Charte de Grenoble,” the guiding principle of student syndicalism is that the student is an intellectual worker and therefore entitled to the rights due other workers; but the student also has a responsibility to define, propagate and defend the truth in furtherance of societal progress.14 These principles

7 Axelrod, Making a Middle Class, 130-131; NFCUS, “Brief Outlines,” 2; CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 3.
8 Axelrod, Making a Middle Class, 143-144.
10 Axelrod, Making a Middle Class, 131-133, 145.
11 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 4-5.
12 NFCUS, “Brief Outlines,” 2.
motivated Sauvé to declare in 1947 that the most pressing task facing the organisation was “to promote these particular rights of a student and to awaken their consciousness of the correlative duties.”

Although Sauvé’s comments found a positive reception amongst the membership in Québec, they had little effect on the majority of member student associations. Influenced by their French colleagues, Québec associations desired a national organisation that, if not syndicalist, was at least a strong pressure group for students’ interests; whereas members from the rest of Canada seemed content with the pre-war mandate of intellectual, athletic and cultural pursuits. Proposals to increase fees and to establish a permanent secretariat, supported by the Québec associations, were postponed year after year. NFCUS further aggravated its Québec members in 1949 by proposing in a brief, supported by the first ever study on student costs, that the federal government provide direct aid to higher education, an area of provincial jurisdiction. Although no Québec member challenged this position immediately, it was to set the stage for future debate as the organisation limped into the 1950s with little political program and no sustainable mechanism to achieve its political goals.

In 1950, the students of the Université de Montréal finally voiced their opposition to federal aid for education in a presentation to the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (the Massey Commission). Rather than confront their NFCUS colleagues, with whom they had originally cooperated on the Massey Commission submission, they chose instead to distance themselves from the position on federal aid and abstain from debates for the sake organisational unity.

In 1951, a permanent secretariat for NFCUS was finally established at Carleton College (now University), and a travel department was added in 1952. By this time, Québec member associations had progressed beyond the desire for a permanent secretariat, and wanted a well-financed organisation capable of advancing students’ interests. At the 1952 Congress, the delegates from the Université de Montréal demanded a five-fold increase in dues from $0.20 per student to $1.00, and when they did not achieve it, they withdrew from NFCUS promising to return when students elsewhere recognised the value of a dynamic student movement.

The rift between the Québec student associations and those in the rest of the country continued to grow in 1953 when McGill, Sir George Williams (now Concordia), Laval and Bishop’s abstained at the Congress on questions of federal aid to the provinces, instead opting

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16 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 8-9. I am indebted to the authors of “Bilingualism and Biculturalism” for their extensive treatment of the relations between student associations in Québec and the rest of Canada. I have relied extensively on their observations and analysis.
18 Paul Becker, memorandum to Barbara Findlay, 17 September 1961, 1, APB [Archives of Paul Becker, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada], Box 1, Fond 23; CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 12-13.
21 NFCUS, “Brief Outlines,” 3. The travel department was the precursor to Travel CUTS, the travel company owned by the Canadian Federation of Students.
to mount their own provincial campaign for increased support of higher education. This coincided with the decision of Duplessis’ Union Nationale government to decline federal aid to Québec universities. When NFCUS resolved at the 1954 Congress to campaign in support of the recommendations of the Massey Commission for federal aid to higher education, it became clear to the Québec members that the organisation had little interest in the flexible funding arrangements desired by the Québec student associations.

NFCUS was also facing difficulties in the rest of the country as local student associations struggled to maintain their budgets in the face of declining enrollment. From a post-war high of 79,000 in 1947, full-time university enrollment dropped to 60,000 in 1952. The fees paid to NFCUS were too high for many associations and caused cyclical disaffiliation and reaffiliation, reducing the membership to less than 50% of the total national student enrolment by 1956. Despite suggestions that the organisation might fold because of a lack of money and a lack of support, it survived, buoyed by the return of 7,000 members when the University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society discovered their disaffiliation had not been properly conducted.

In 1956, Québec member associations continued to press for changes to NFCUS to allow them to express their aspirations for the Québec postsecondary education system within the national organisation. The student association at Université Laval proposed to create regions within the national framework with an appropriate division of responsibility, but the plan was unacceptable to the NFCUS members outside of Québec. Undeterred, the Québec associations mounted a joint action outside of NFCUS calling for the provincial government to increasing funding for universities and to increase accessibility for students from lower socio-economic backgrounds, representing their belief of the importance of mass education for "la nation québécoise."

NFCUS’s fortunes improved in 1957. The number of members had bounced back from the 1956 low of 40,000 to match the 1947 level of 65,000. The organisation was making alliances with university faculty through the Canadian Association of University Teachers, and with university presidents through the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU, now the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada). Perhaps most importantly, the stabilising of membership allowed a renewed concentration on activities other than threats of disaffiliation, and the 1957 Congress at Sir George Williams College adopted an ambitious program of activities. The resolutions included the adoption of the principle of financial aid for any “needy and worthy” student meeting the requirements for university admission. In

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24 Moses, “All That Was Left,” 282.
support of this principle, the delegates authorised an extensive brief and plan of action, beginning with a study on the revenue and expenses of university students.34

The 1957 Congress did not resolve the Québec question. In February that year the French-language associations explored another option for political expression, forming the Association canadienne des universitaires de langue française (ACULF). ACULF was limited by the lack of full support from Laval University, which insisted on Université de Montréal rejoining NFCUS as a condition of Laval’s participation. The ACULF was also constrained by the continuing belief amongst Québec’s student leaders that important national and international issues should only be dealt with through NFCUS. The fledgling organisation quickly folded and the Québec student associations that had left NFCUS reaffiliated.35 In 1958, Québec student leaders succeeded in organising a coalition representing 21,000 students under the banner Présidents des universités du Québec (PUQ).36 PUQ attempted to meet with Premier Maurice Duplessis to present their demands, but when he refused to meet with them, they staged a student strike in March and supported a subsequent three-month sit-in in the antechamber to his Québec City office.37

Relations between Québec student associations and NFCUS took an unexpected turn in 1958 when the Québec associations, in response to the Duplessis’ intransigence, supported the national program for increased federal aid.38 The 1958 brief to the federal government proposed a system of 10,000 awards of $550 each to be distributed along the lines of the existing veterans’ programs and Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Program, thereby attempting to avoid the problems in Québec. This brief was the most sophisticated lobbying document produced to date by NFCUS. It used information from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, the Industrial Foundation of Canada, and university presidents to argue for increased numbers of graduates to serve the needs of industry, and for the removal of financial barriers to higher education as a means to equalise opportunity.39 The success of the brief did not forestall policy disagreements among member associations at the fall Congress. After the raucous meeting in Québec City, the NFCUS leadership believed the various organisational divisions, including those with the Québec members, had been healed.40

The old wounds reopened in 1959, nevertheless, as the relations between Québec students and the provincial government began to normalise. Francophone students in Québec subsequently abandoned their support for national funding and returned to their position favouring education as an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. Despite this change in the political landscape, NFCUS continued to press for increased support in its annual briefs to the federal government, while the Québec associations, under the banner of the “Québec Region of NFCUS” made separate submissions to the provincial government.41

Students’ economic conditions continued to be of major interest to the organisation through 1959. Although there were few resolutions dealing with tuition and student aid at the Congress,

34 Moses, “All That Was Left,” 493-494.
the leadership of the organisation was contemplating longer-term plans to improve the condition of students. Executive Secretary André L'Heureux devoted an issue of the summer bulletin to articulate the need to move beyond discussions of principles and to establish a procedure to educate successive “generations” of student leaders (as measured by their length of time in student politics) on the means to improve the economic conditions for students. L'Heureux mused that the students of the day may well have university-aged children before the objectives were achieved.

This thinking beyond the immediate problems of student associations was also evident in NFCUS’s participation in the International Student Conference (ISC). Founded in 1950 as a Cold War alternative to the Soviet-influenced International Union of Students (IUS), ISC concerned itself with cooperation between national student organisations in such matters as guaranteed education, academic freedom, a free student press, freedom of movement, and support for students struggling against oppression. NFCUS was a founding member of ISC and routinely adopted motions of support or condemnation on international issues at their own congresses, but these international struggles were, at least for the English-speaking member associations, disconnected from their deliberations on domestic matters. This changed a little at the 1960 NFCUS Congress when delegates, faced with the armed struggle by students in Algeria and the murder of students in South Africa, adopted a resolution declaring that students should involve themselves with human rights, academic freedom and the economic conditions of people if they are to carry out their duties as citizens of the world.

The Québec associations continued to press for structural change in 1960, renewing their campaign for NFCUS membership for the collèges classiques, the university-affiliated Catholic institutions that combined secondary education with lower division university studies. After many years of studying and postponing the decision, the 1960 Congress finally allowed the collèges classiques to join NFCUS as affiliate members. The Québec members were also successful in modifying a resolution calling for a federal bursary plan of 10,000 bursaries of $600 each to include requirements for provincial cooperation and approval.

The successes of the Québec associations came at a price. Despite the election of French Canadians to NFCUS executive positions for many years, there remained a gulf in understanding between French-speaking and English-speaking member associations. Whereas the Québec associations wanted to establish principles and policies for action and strong structures necessary to support the actions, the other member associations were content with

42 Moses, “All That Was Left,” 495.
establishing campaigns and carrying them out within the existing structure. The continued insistence by Québec associations that NFCUS respect the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments was leading to resentment in the rest of the country. The NFCUS leadership believed it was promoting understanding and unity between the French and English Canadians and that the dissenter in Québec were troublemakers intent on splitting the organisation along linguistic lines. Yet it was NFCUS’s own inability to follow congress resolutions that would prove their undoing in Québec.

The February 1961 publication of The National Bursary Plan was the climax to the years of submissions advocating federal aid for higher education. Arising from the 1960 Congress resolution, the brief surveyed the nation’s current need for university-educated people, it articulated the economic and “psychological” factors inhibiting participation in university education, it detailed the revenues and expenses of university students, it advocated a role for the federal government, and it offered a solution through federal government intervention. Five thousand copies were distributed across the country to student, voluntary and service organisations and it caused an immense furor among Québec member associations. Despite a Congress resolution calling for substantial provincial involvement in the design and delivery of a national bursary plan, the 1961 brief argued that the federal government could assist students directly without violating provincial jurisdiction. The Québec associations rejected this argument when NFCUS lobbied in support of the Massey Commission recommendations in 1954, and they were no more inclined to accept it in 1961.

The response from the Québec associations was to request a fundamental restructuring of NFCUS by ensuring a number of secretariat staff were of Francophone origin and that an adequate number of executive members were representative of French-speaking associations. The Québec associations no longer trusted the organisation to represent their perspectives and were seeking to create a parallel French-language association within NFCUS. In response to the complaints from Québec, the 1961 Congress established a committee to recommend changes to the NFCUS structure, and to deal with the question of admitting non-degree granting institutions to membership (the student association at Ryerson Institute of Technology was admitted on a provisional basis pending the committee report).

Also in response to the Québec grievances, the 1961 Congress adopted what would become known as Standing Resolution 10. This resolution, proposed by the student associations of the Université de Montréal and Université de Sherbrooke, reiterated the right of students to receive education necessary to achieve their “fullest personal development” for the benefit of the individual and of society. Since education was a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, though, the resolution constrained NFCUS to lobby only provincial governments except when

49 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 11-12.
51 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 22.
53 Paul Becker, memorandum to Barbara Findlay, 1-2; CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 22.
56 See Appendix B.1 for the full text of the resolution.
there was unanimous agreement amongst the regions that specific representations will be made to the federal government.\textsuperscript{57}

The Québec associations were also busy in provincial matters. In 1961, the student associations at Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and Université de Sherbrooke commissioned the first study of the social origins of students in Québec universities. The Association générale des étudiants de l'Université de Montréal (AGEUM) also played a leading role in formalising student syndicalism in Québec. In 1961, AGEUM adopted its “Charte de l'étudiant universitaire,” a manifesto modeled on the “Charte de Grenoble,” which defined students as young intellectual workers and agents of social change.\textsuperscript{58} Although these actions were a natural consequence of increasingly active student organisations inspired by their French colleagues, they also stemmed from the new found freedom to question the assumptions of Québec society unleashed by the election of Jean Lesage’s Liberal government in June 1960. The so-called “Quiet Revolution” challenged the conservative values of Maurice Duplessis’ Union Nationale governments (1936-39 and 1944-1959), wrested control of education from the Catholic church, and carved out a substantially larger role for government in the economic, social and cultural life of the province.\textsuperscript{59}

The changes in Québec were noticed in NFCUS. Former NFCUS President Jacques Gérin wrote to Paul Becker, NFCUS Vice President for International Affairs, in November 1961 expressing his deep frustration with those people in his home province intent on building the new Québec on the ruins of Canada. Gerin observed that the feeling in Québec reminded him of AGEUM trying to push through amendments to the NFCUS constitution without trying “to use the present set-up to their advantage.”\textsuperscript{60} While Gerin was taking the Québec situation seriously, a member of the NFCUS secretariat staff was less concerned, flippantly telling a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation producer in early 1962 that separatism was “a wonderful bandwagon on which to climb the french (sic) students of the universities.”\textsuperscript{61}

The 1962 NFCUS Congress received the report of the structures committee established the year before under the chairmanship of Robert Carswell of McGill University. The so-called Carswell Commission sought unity amongst the Québec student associations and the rest of the country by reminding delegates that as student leaders, the search for knowledge and the desire to help fellow students united them and “must not be impeded by racial or national divisions, nor on the other hand by attempts to impose an artificial and on-sided concept of ‘unity’ upon minority groups.”\textsuperscript{62} Despite this sincere attempt at reconciliation, the Commission’s recommendations were all but ignored, and the delegates instead opted to hire a Francophone associate secretary responsible for carrying out projects for French Canadian students.\textsuperscript{63} Although this might have been a positive step, the individual was not hired until the summer of 1963, and all relations with Francophone student associations were subsequently handled.

\textsuperscript{58} Alexander, “Student Movement,” 2.
\textsuperscript{60} Jacques Gerin, letter to Paul Becker, 18 November 1961, 3, APB, 1, 17.
\textsuperscript{61} Michael Phillips, letter to Paul Becker, 15 February 1962, APB, 1, 17.
\textsuperscript{62} As quoted in CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 24-25.
\textsuperscript{63} CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 25.
through this position, thus distancing French Canada from the day-to-day operations of the Federation.\textsuperscript{64}

The 1962 Congress also expanded NFCUS's position on the role of students in society, both domestically and internationally. On the domestic front, the Congress initiated a process of consultation on a draft charter for Canadian students; a document that essentially restated the principles of student syndicalism as outlined in the "Charte de Grenoble." Although this might have been an opportunity for reconciliation between French-speaking and English-speaking student associations, the draft charter was rejected by all of NFCUS's regional groups, except the Québec region and only then after heated debate and amendments led by the English-speaking associations in Québec.\textsuperscript{65} Paradoxically, delegates adopted an amendment to their standing resolution on international human rights declaring that "students have a primary responsibility for leading efforts towards the solution of the worlds' pressing problems including education, the maintenance of student rights and the fight against all forms of oppression and the achievement of world peace."\textsuperscript{66} As in previous years, there remained a disconnection between international affairs, which were deemed 'political', and domestic affairs, which were not.

From November 1962 through May 1963, activists organised Québec students into associations throughout the postsecondary sector—technical schools, collèges classiques, écoles d'infirmières, and écoles normales—and student newspapers federated in the Presse étudiante nationale (PEN) agreeing on the need for structures to permit students to collectively participate in the intellectual, social and political life of Québec. This activity culminated in a "journée syndicale" in March 1963 at Université de Montréal, where student leaders from Université Laval, and Université de Sherbrooke joined their Montréal colleagues in announcing a provisional committee for the formation of the new Union générale des étudiants du Québec (UGEQ).\textsuperscript{67} The establishment of UGEQ sent shock waves through NFCUS and there was speculation about who was pulling the strings and for what end; even members of the NFCUS secretariat were suspected of assisting the new organisation.\textsuperscript{68} There were divisions within NFCUS about how much of a threat UGEQ actually posed, with one side believing that UGEQ would founder like previous attempts at a Québec student association and the other believing that not only would UGEQ succeed, but that it might be a significant force in favour of separatism.\textsuperscript{69} Despite these steps towards an independent Québec organisation, the student associations in that province continued to press for restructuring of NFCUS, thus setting the stage for a showdown at the congress in Edmonton.\textsuperscript{70}

**Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament**

Student activism and politics were not confined to student associations; students were also involved in issue-specific organisations of many types. The organisation to have the largest effect on CUS, through its transformation into SUPA, was an outgrowth of the Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards (CCRH) called the Combined Universities Campaign for

\textsuperscript{64} CUS, "Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 26.
\textsuperscript{65} CUS, "Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 26.
\textsuperscript{66} As quoted in Armstrong, "The Canadian Union of Students," 15-16.
\textsuperscript{67} Alexander, "Student Movement," 3; CUS, "Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 27.
\textsuperscript{68} AL [Andrée Lefebvre?], letter to Paul Becker, 25 February 1963, APB, 7, 15.
\textsuperscript{69} Paul Becker, letter to Stewart Goodings, 1 April 1963, APB, 1, 20.
\textsuperscript{70} CUS, "Bilingualism and Biculturalism," 29.
Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND). The CCRH was founded in 1958 by Mary Van Stolk of Edmonton to protest the dangers of nuclear fallout.\(^{71}\) Inspired by the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the U.S. Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, she traveled across Canada meeting with businesspeople, clergy, academics, politicians and others and formed a consensus for the need for a national committee to address nuclear weapons and peace issues. The organisation was formally established in 1959, and shortly thereafter campus affiliates were formed in Montréal and Toronto under the CUCND name.\(^{72}\)

Taking its cue from the CND, the Canadian groups brought together people from all walks of life to express moral indignation towards nuclear weapons.\(^{73}\) Spurred on by the Diefenbaker government’s decision to accept placement of U.S. BOMARC missiles on Canadian soil in the fall of the 1958, the CCRH and CUCND found their key issue when it was revealed in 1960 that the missiles would be armed with nuclear warheads.\(^{74}\) For the politically active and aware, peace was the hot issue and the CUCND was “the movement.” In Montréal, the CUCND organised marches at Christmas in 1959 and again in 1960, and in between circulated petitions, held vigils and sang for peace. Humanity House in Saskatoon and Peace House in Toronto brought CUCND members together to meet, mail out information, strategise and organise.\(^{75}\) In 1961, the Montréal CUCND branch began publishing “Our Generation Against Nuclear War,” a journal that soon garnered an international reputation and influenced the peace and nuclear disarmament movement worldwide.\(^{76}\)

In 1961, CCRH set up a national office in Toronto and commenced its petition against nuclear weapons in Canada.\(^{77}\) The Diefenbaker government was susceptible to pressure on nuclear weapons due to internal cabinet divisions over the matter that had existed since 1960.\(^{78}\) The June 1962 general election left Diefenbaker with a minority government, in part due to his perceived anti-Americanism, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 saw Diefenbaker’s own Minister of Defence bypass the Prime Minister and put Canadian aircraft on alert in support of the United States. Liberal opposition leader Lester Pearson subsequently reversed his party’s position against nuclear weapons and said that if he formed government, Canada would fulfill its commitments to the Americans and then negotiate the removal of the missiles. The Canadian military, U.S. military and U.S. government actively worked to turn public opinion against Diefenbaker’s position, and when the government lost a confidence vote on February 3, 1963, the stage was set for the so-called “nuclear election.” Diefenbaker mounted a spirited one-man campaign on a blatant anti-American platform and succeeded, against the odds, to hold


\(^{72}\) Levitt, \textit{Children of Privilege}, 40; Tony Hyde, “The Student Union for Peace Action: An Analysis” ([Canadian Union of Students], [Ottawa], [1968], mimeographed), 3, RC.

\(^{73}\) Hyde, “Student Union,” 3.


\(^{75}\) Kostash, \textit{Long Way from Home}, XXII.

\(^{76}\) Levitt, \textit{Children of Privilege}, 40.

\(^{77}\) “Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: Fonds Description”

the Liberals to a minority government. Nonetheless, within a few months the Liberals fulfilled their campaign promise and nuclear weapons were on Canadian soil.\textsuperscript{79}

There was a belief within the CUCND that the loss of the “Nuclear Election” was due to the inability of the anti-nuclear movement to place nuclear weapons into a larger political discussion about the concentration and use of political and economic power. Attempts were made to introduce a “radical” analysis into the nuclear debate by questioning who benefited from the build-up of nuclear arms. Although this resulted in some broader discussions of Canada’s role on the world stage, the CUCND membership ultimately reverted to the usual discussions and strategies. After the 1963 federal election, CUCND might well have disbanded, but a core group of perhaps fifty people had achieved some political consciousness through the organisation and wanted to continue to use the organisation for their own political development and activities.\textsuperscript{80} Their inspiration for that development would come from events and organisations South of the border, and their subsequent activity would radically affect Canadian student politics.

\textit{The American Connection – SNCC and SDS}

On February 1, 1960, four black college students sat down at the segregated Woolworth’s lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, and refused to leave when they were denied service. Initially ignored by the store management, the students gathered their friends and escalated the action, taking over all sixty-six seats by the end of the week. Word of the sit-ins spread, and by the end of February, sit-ins had taken place in more than 30 communities in seven states. By the end of April, sit-ins had taken place in every Southern state involving as many as 50,000 students. On April 16, 1960, sit-in protestors came together in Raleigh, North Carolina to share their experiences and establish the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to coordinate, support and publicise the sit-ins.\textsuperscript{81}

The timing of the sit-ins was fortunate for the fledging Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In January 1960, the leadership of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) chose to change the name of the organisation, arguing that “industrial democracy” was too narrow an idea, that the organisation sounded too labour-oriented, and that the name made it difficult to recruit on campus. The paramount reason for the change was that SLID wanted to distance itself from its parent organisation, the League for Industrial Democracy (LID); a vaguely social-democratic organisation with ties to organised labour and a firm belief in anti-Communist liberalism. After losing one of its student departments to a Communist-influenced youth group in the 1930s, LID insisted that its student affiliate keep itself free of Communist influence, confine its campus activities to seminars and speakers, and devote itself to educating younger generations about LID’s brand of Fabianism.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{80} Hyde, “Student Union,” 4-5.
\textsuperscript{82} Sale, \textit{SDS}, 16-17, 30; Fabianism is pragmatic socialist philosophy that concentrates on specific reform rather than grand theories; rejecting laissez faire capitalism in favour of state intervention to
The first conference under the SDS banner took place in May 1960, in Ann Arbor, Michigan on the topic of “Human Rights in the North.” It looked as if the conference would be yet another series of speeches to earnest students, concerned with the social problems of the day. The lunch counter sit-ins and the formation of SNCC changed all that. The conference was well attended by civil rights leaders, including those from the newly formed SNCC, and resulted in new friendships and a sense of commitment among SDS members to civil rights action. In the fall of 1960, new student groups were springing up around the country and Robert Alan Haber, elected SDS President in June of that year, was convinced that the SDS should be the means of coordination for student civil rights campaigns. He made contacts with student civil rights groups at several hundred colleges, attended civil-rights meetings to promote the SDS name and cause, and founded a newsletter to disseminate news about the civil rights movement. In August of 1961, Haber used the convention of the National Student Association (NSA), the organisation of student governments, to extol the SDS and in doing so managed to attract a number of serious-minded political types who previously had no outlet for political expression except the NSA.83

A 1961 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court forced desegregation in bus terminal facilities, building on a 1946 decision outlawing discrimination in interstate travel. Seizing upon the tactic first used in 1947 by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), SNCC, CORE and others organised “freedom rides” to secure the rights granted by the courts. The first riders set out from Washington, D.C. on May 4, 1961, and were attacked by mobs and had their buses burned. Nevertheless, other riders followed them and over the next few months they succeeded in desegregating bus terminals in the Upper South, but the Deep South remained unaffected. Meanwhile, SNCC started its first voter registration project in McComb, Mississippi in July 1961, but eventually abandoned McComb after arrests, beatings and the murder of a local man who had helped the SNCC workers.84

In the fall of 1961, Thomas Hayden was hired as SDS Field Secretary and worked out of Atlanta in support of the SNCC voter-registration campaign. Hayden’s graphic reports were virtually the only record coming out of the South on the SNCC campaign, and found an eager audience in the membership of SDS and in the recipients of the SDS newsletter and other student publications. Hayden further enlivened campus debates with the publication late in 1961 in The Activist of his essay “A Letter to the New (Young) Left.” The essay was disjointed and not particularly profound, but it expressed the matters weighing on the minds of students of the time and thus found a receptive audience.85 Furthermore, his attack on the failed Liberalism of LID and the Democratic Party and his proposal for a “radical style” of searching for and dealing with root causes of social problems, rather than merely ameliorating the symptoms, resonated with his peers. His prescription was to disengage from existing social structures in order to shed their influence and then to build new structures to counter the old,

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83 Sale, SDS, 22-24, 29, 34.
85 Sale, SDS, 35-37.
whether it be in "the concrete formation of a national student organisation to the conceptual—
for the time being—formation of a different society." 86

At the end of December 1961, Haber organised a conference at the University of Michigan to
identify a national political program and to unite the various interest groups within SDS. The
conference participants were unable to unite behind a single program, so Haber persuaded
them that SDS should create a manifesto to articulate their shared view of the world from which
a program of action might be developed. The preparation of the draft fell primarily to Hayden,
who worked six months on it. He incorporated various strains of contemporary and classical
leftist thought; he looked at himself and his generation; he considered his experiences in the
South and the people he met and learned from during his time at university; and he met with
people and defended his ideas against the "Old Left." Hayden eventually produced a draft that
was sent out across the country in preparation for the mid-June 1962 SDS convention in Port
Huron, Michigan. The Port Huron convention ended up working as a large drafting committee.
Small groups worked on various aspects of the manifesto, which were then brought back to
convention as a whole for debate. It was left to Hayden, who had been elected SDS President,
and a small group of others to stitch the document together after the convention. Somewhat
derivative of the authors Hayden had been reading in the spring, particularly C. Wright Mills,
and middle-class in its perspective, The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic
Society nonetheless captured the spirit of the time with a rare power and persuasiveness of
argument such that it provided the "New Left" with its ideology. 87

The effect of The Port Huron Statement was quickly felt. The final mimeographed version was
handed out at the summer NSA meeting, causing heated discussions and gaining converts to
the SDS. The document was in huge demand once it started circulating around campuses that
fall and the national office could not keep up with requests; more than 60,000 copies had been
printed and distributed by 1966, making it perhaps the "most widely distributed document of
the American left in the sixties." 88

In April 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC) colleagues went to Birmingham, Alabama to assist the local black community in efforts
to desegregate their city. King succeeded in gaining national media attention for the events in
Birmingham and Americans were shocked by the televised attacks by police against child
demonstrators in early May. The events of Birmingham motivated President John F. Kennedy to
introduce a new civil rights bill, and King, SCLC, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), SNCC and many other groups worked through the summer to
organise a civil rights march on Washington, D.C. On August 28, more than 250,000 people
converged on the Washington Monument and listened to performers and speakers, including
King delivering his "I Have a Dream" speech. 89

87 Sale, SDS, 38, 40-45, 49-51.
88 Sale, SDS, 69.
<http://www.watson.org/~lisa/blackhistory/civilrights-55-65/birmingham.html>; Lisa Cozzens, "Civil
Meanwhile, the SDS met at its June 1963 convention to formulate a set of principles to guide the organisation for the coming year, and for that purpose Dick Flacks, who headed the SDS's Peace Research and Education Project, prepared a paper with help from Haber, Hayden and other SDS intellectuals. *America and the New Era*, dubbed "Son of Port Huron," was narrower in focus than *The Port Huron Statement* but distinguished itself by observing that the United States had reached a point of crisis that could not be resolved by the current political economy, and that popular discontent seemed to be leading towards a politics of "insurgent protest." 90

These events and ideas would affect Canadian student politics, although it was not apparent in the period immediately prior to the founding of CUS. Students and young people would learn about the contradictions within Western democracies from the media reports of the American events. Voluntary organisations like CUCND would seize on the ideas of the American civil rights movement and the New Left as they tried to come to grips with the failure of moralising protest as a tool for change. CUS itself would learn about activism from its Québec and American counterparts. All the while, the baby boomers were advancing towards campus.

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NFCUS's transformation from a largely service-oriented organisation into a more political organisation was a consequence of the pressure from Québec student associations for NFCUS to adopt an activist approach in advocating student interests. The nature of those interests was also changing as the baby boom generation was edging towards the doors of academe. The immediate problem was creating enough space to accommodate the approaching enrollment bulge. Nevertheless, student leaders remained anxious that qualified potential students were already being dissuaded from higher education due to cost and that the problem might be exacerbated by the coming space crunch.

In addition to the difficulties on campus, small, but growing, numbers of Canadian students were seeking means by which to express their dissatisfaction about global affairs and turned to student governments and voluntary associations like CUCND to do so. The response of the student associations in Québec was, like their counterparts in France, to give these students the freedom to express themselves as full participants in society through their student associations. This was not the case in the rest of Canada, and NFCUS only expressed itself on so-called “non-student issues” in either the most ordinary or most horrific of international cases involving students. As a consequence, it was CUCND and similar organisations in English Canada that first experienced the vitality of the young people questioning the post-Second World War complacency of society. Although the American civil rights movement had been around for many years, it too was given new energy by the new young activists of the South, aided by eager students from the North. It was this restlessness and energy that SDS helped to release through publication of *The Port Huron Statement*. The NFCUS leadership was slow to see the potential in this student energy, and probably a little bit alarmed by it too given that many of them aspired to positions in the Canadian business and government elite. This aversion to activism coupled with a faith in a powerful federal government was sending NFCUS on a collision course with its Québec members.

This chapter will examine the transformation of NFCUS to CUS, the separation of the Québec student associations, and the effects of that separation on CUS. Additionally, this chapter will look at the CUS lobby for the Canada Student Loan Program, the “freeze the fees” protests and the Bladen Commission on university financing and how these events set the stage for the later CUS universal accessibility policy. Finally, this chapter will also recount the SDS’s move into organising the poor and disenfranchised, the events surrounding the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, the Selma demonstrations for black voter registration, and how these events influenced the development of SUPA, Canada’s leading New Left organisation.

*The Québec Question*

The lead-up to the October 1963 NFCUS Congress in Edmonton was acrimonious. As they had in 1961, French Canadian student leaders pressed their case for a total restructuring of NFCUS that would, in effect, create two national organisations—one English and one French—that would work together in a unified superstructure when consensus was possible. This
Proposal was unacceptable to English Canadian student associations, and the Francophone delegates met with their English counterparts to find a solution. Intensive, closed-door debates resulted in a compromise to suspend the bylaws of the organisation so that new structures could be adopted to establish “two equal groups, with internal sovereignty on questions within their exclusive jurisdiction, within the new Canadian union of students.” The adoption of the name “Canadian Union of Students” symbolised this unity and recognised that non-university students had a place in the revitalised organisation.1

Unfortunately, the compromise was short-lived. Although the Québec student associations thought they had achieved their goal of a bi-national student organisation, the student associations in the rest of the country thought they had achieved a single unified organisation with two language-based caucuses. Student associations in English Canada were unwilling to give up on their version of unity in which all Canadian students spoke with a single voice through CUS. In their minds, to accept the Québec interpretation was to admit the unity fight was lost. Whereas the Québec student associations were seeking a national organisation in which they would be the majority, thereby avoiding the recurring indifference and unpleasantness that had characterised relationships with NFCUS for the previous four decades. In retrospect, CUS officials realised that their Québec colleagues were not so much interested in breaking up the national organisation as they wanted to be in a position that demanded respect from their English Canadian counterparts.2

Even if the misunderstandings could have been resolved, the compromises of the Congress were likely too little, too late. The Québec student associations were more interested in the dynamic politics of their province and saw little benefit for fighting for further reform of CUS.3 The slow progress of the structures commission established at the Congress to work out the details of the new arrangements, coupled with the increasing absence of the Francophone members of the commission meant that little was likely to be accomplished. Furthermore, other than changing the name, the day-to-day operations of CUS had changed very little in response to the Congress decisions. Nonetheless, the structures commission continued its deliberations, and crafted a report acknowledging Canadian dualism and calling on English Canadians to “give not grudging respect to this principle, but must accord to it the fullest respect.” The commission conceded that their work was based on the assumption of goodwill between the parties and a “healthy community of interest.”4 That the student associations at the Université de Montréal and Université de Sherbrooke indicated their intention to withdraw from CUS before the report could be discussed at the September 1964 Congress was sufficient proof that the community of interest no longer existed.5

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1 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 24, 29-30; NFCUS, “Resolutions 1963,” 25, 27, 33; Non-university student organisations had been members of NFCUS since 1960, when the collèges classiques were admitted to membership.


4 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 32-34.

The reasons given by the student associations at Université de Montréal and Université de Sherbrooke for disaffiliation from CUS were familiar. They complained that although CUS policy recognised education as a provincial responsibility (Standing Resolution 10), that CUS, by its actions, continued to promote federal intervention and in doing so refused to recognise the realities of Canada. In particular, the 1961 National Bursary Plan remained a point of contention, even though CUS had more recently intruded on provincial domain by endorsing the Canada Student Loan Program in 1964. CUS was aware of the trouble brewing in Québec, and a summer 1964 campaign was mounted to have student associations outside of Québec communicate directly with their Francophone counterparts in an attempt to build understanding and demonstrate that the rest of Canada wanted a national student organisation including Québec. Unfortunately, the campaign had little effect because the minds of Québec students had been made up. Nevertheless, the student association at Université Laval made one last attempt at national cooperation by proposing to the 1964 Congress at York University that CUS be dissolved and replaced by a national office whose sole purpose would be to facilitate cooperation between equal provincial student associations. This would have meant fragmenting the voice of students and destroying the unity in a national organisation desired by the associations outside of Québec. Predictably, the proposal failed and Laval announced its disaffiliation from CUS on the last day of the Congress.

In November 1964, UGEQ was formally established on the basis that students constituted a cohesive force in society and possessed an ideology based on the proposition that a student is an intellectual worker, and therefore student issues are merely aspects of national issues. UGEQ aligned itself with Lesage’s Quiet Revolution, supporting the political modernisation of Québec. Where Duplessis only offered students his indifference, the Lesage government welcomed student involvement in the remaking of Québec, particularly in the reform of education. The UGEQ leadership saw this association to be in the interests of students both in their lives as students, and in their future role as fully qualified members of Québec society. The UGEQ leadership portrayed this founding meeting as an expression of solidarity amongst all Québec students—that to be a student in Québec had a certain meaning, and that was to be a syndicalist working towards a national identity for Québec. The CUS observer to this meeting saw things in a different light.

Jean Bazin, CUS President, characterised the meeting as a clash of personalities and ideologies, with delegates from Université Laval and Université de Montréal battling over whether power would be vested in a general assembly of the members (Laval) or in an elite executive committee (Montréal). The Université de Montréal delegation backed down thus avoiding the collapse of the founding conference. The adoption of the student charter formally enshrining syndicalism as the philosophy of UGEQ was viewed as a radical move by Bazin, who observed that many of the delegates were young and did not appreciate the implications of

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6 Michel Vaillancourt et al., “Document – Canadian Union of Students” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [September 10, 1964], mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 2.
7 CUS, “Bilingualism and Biculturalism,” 33-34.
8 Roger McAfee, letter to Pat Kenniff, 20 July 1964, ACUS, CUS 1.
11 La Touche, “The Québec Student Movement,” 121.
12 Alexander, “Student Movement,” 3-5.
13 La Touche, “The Québec Student Movement,” 117-120.
student syndicalism as a principle for guiding their actions. Nonetheless, UGEQ was established as a “nationalist, left-leaning, syndicalist” organisation of Québec student associations, who were not permitted to share allegiances, and therefore had to renounce membership in CUS before they could be admitted to UGEQ. Despite this provocation, and the latent hostility towards Québec students in the CUS membership, Bazin counseled patience in dealing with UGEQ. Certainly this was an attempt to retain a working relationship with his Québec counterparts, but it may have also been a manifestation of guilt that CUS was unable to accommodate its Francophone colleagues, just as the organisation was contemplating projects to celebrate the centennial of Canada’s confederation.

The Canada Student Loan Program

Despite the cessation of the federal lobby for a national system of student financial aid in 1961 with the adoption of Standing Resolution 10, efforts were still being made, albeit indirectly, to fulfill NFCUS’s long-held dream of a national bursary program. As far back as 1956, NFCUS had captured the attention of Walter Gordon, a businessman and key Liberal who chaired the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects. Gordon took a keen interest in the NFCUS proposal for a national bursary program, and although the proposal never made it into the 1957 report of the commission, Gordon subsequently became a strong supporter within the federal Liberals for a national student financial assistance policy. Eventually, as Minister of Finance, Gordon introduced the legislation establishing the Canada Student Loan Program (CSLP). Members of the Canadian University Liberal Federation, the youth wing of the federal Liberals, also lobbied for a financial aid program and were rewarded with a January 1961 announcement that not only would a Liberal government create 10,000 scholarships worth $1,000 each, but it would also establish a student aid fund from which students could borrow funds interest free for the duration of their studies. Thus, even before the strictures on federal lobbying came into effect, the NFCUS proposal was well on its way to becoming Liberal Party policy.

Once the Liberals formed the federal government in 1963, CUS lobbying continued in the form of individual student associations making representations to federal politicians. There is little doubt that these individual efforts were part of a coordinated CUS effort, since during the debate on the bill (July 14 – 23, 1964) several politicians remarked on the interventions they had received from CUS officers. Although these CUS officials were acting in an individual capacity, the nuance was lost on the federal politicians, just as it was on student leaders in Québec who were making their own representations against the legislation. Several Québec MPs tapped into Québec student opposition to this federal intervention in order to advance arguments that the solution should be found by transferring taxation powers to the provinces, rather than setting up unconstitutional programs. The federal government response to charges of unconstitutionality was found in clause 12 of the bill, which allowed any province to opt out of the program and receive a compensating transfer payment. This was not the first time the federal government had used such a tactic to avoid provincial opposition. It was again successful in this case because on July 20, 1964, Québec Premier Maurice Duplessis announced the Québec government would opt out of the CSLP and take the compensating payment.

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Without opposition from the Québec government, there was little standing in the way of the new program and the Canada Student Loans Act was adopted.

Even though the CSLP was less than the full bursary program English Canadian students wanted, it was a victory, and was progress towards the goal of eliminating financial barriers for qualified students as articulated by NFCUS in 1957 and reaffirmed in subsequent years. This was a curious goal for an organisation where the largest proportion of the membership had no need for bursaries or loans. A 1956 Dominion Bureau of Statistics survey found that university students came from families with a median income of $4,908, whereas the median family income in the general population was less than $3,000. Similarly, just over 50% of university students reported that their father was a proprietor, manager or professional, compared to just over 15% of the population as a whole. The survey was repeated in 1961 and found that little had changed — 70% of university arts and science students reported family income in excess of $5,000, whereas only 31% of the general population reported family income this high. About 47% of 1961 university students’ fathers were in proprietary, managerial or professional occupations, compared to about 22% of the overall population. Nonetheless, there remained a significant minority of students, measured in the tens of thousands, who came from families of modest means and who may have needed, or at least benefited greatly from, some form of student financial assistance. Moreover, statistics on family income and father’s occupation likely masked individual financial difficulties that may have been ameliorated by financial assistance.

NFCUS and CUS also advanced the cause of student financial assistance on the more general principle that it was in the nation’s interests to provide educational opportunity for all of those young people qualified to attend university. Citing a federal government report on employee shortages in professional fields, NFCUS argued in its 1961 brief that failure to increase the supply of well-trained people would constrain economic growth. A point reinforced by the 1957 final report of the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects — “We are concerned with the contribution made by the universities to the increase in national productivity and wealth of the country. ...They are the source of the most highly-skilled workers whose knowledge is essential in all branches of industry.” Furthermore, NFCUS contended, the intellectual talents of almost half of the 18-21 age cohort was being lost for lack of spaces at universities and the assistance to pay tuition fees and living expenses. Admitting the difficulty in distinguishing economic from social forces influencing the decision to attend university, NFCUS nevertheless drew on the example of the financial support granted veterans after the Second World War to demonstrate the effect of proper funding. A University of Toronto study found that 32% of students who were veterans came from homes were the fathers were industrial workers, compared to 20% of the non-veteran student population. This, NFCUS argued, established both that intellectual ability was not constrained by social background and that government financial assistance could induce students from these backgrounds to attend university.

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19 For a fuller discussion of how these type of statistics mask the individual circumstances of university students in the 1930s, see Axelrod, Making a Middle Class, 21-29.
20 NFCUS, The National Bursary Plan, 3-4
22 NFCUS, The National Bursary Plan, 4-5.
CUS was not satisfied with its success in obtaining the CSLP and continued to press for the bursary program promised by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson during the 1963 election campaign. Pearson acknowledged in an October 1964 speech to the NCCU that the CSLP did not completely meet students’ financial needs, and that it might never be possible to obtain “perfect equality of opportunity,” but that society cannot “indefinitely tolerate the financial impediments which now exist.” His vision was that “no young man or woman of talent ought to be shut off from university” by the lack of financial means, and that his personal belief was that “education at all levels should be free to those qualified to take advantage of it,” but that his government was not going to move towards that goal “overnight.”

Freeze the Fees

Flush with the success of the establishment of the CSLP, and resigned to the loss of Francophone members in Québec, delegates to the September 1964 CUS Congress at York University decided that CUS should again take an active role on the national stage. Although the Congress reaffirmed that education was an area of provincial responsibility, it nonetheless authorized the secretariat to approach the federal government to implement further legislation on scholarships, bursaries and similar programs. This was not so much out of frustration about inaction by provincial governments, as it was an expression of faith in the federal government and its power to correct many of the nation’s problems. Furthermore, for the first time in many years, delegates directly tackled the matter of rising tuition fees by calling for a tuition fee freeze pending the outcome of the commission on university financing set up by the NCCU earlier that year, and the outcome of CUS’s own Student Means Survey (SMS).

Inspired by growing tuition bills and surveys conducted at the University of British Columbia and University of Victoria in the spring of 1964, the SMS was extensive project to “determine the social and financial characteristics of the Canadian Student.” It was to go beyond the studies on student income and expenditure conducted by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in 1956 and 1961 to include detailed information on student income and expenditures, the income, occupations and education of the students’ parents, the effect of income shortfall on students’ educational plans, and students’ post graduation plans. Armed with this information, CUS planned to press “for the development of satisfactory student aid.”

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23 Lester B. Pearson, “Notes for Prime Minister’s Address – National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges - Dinner, Chateau Laurier, October 27, 1964,” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, mimeographed), 1-2, NAC, 1, October 1964.
24 “Policy Declaration/5/64” and “Domestic Affairs/11/64” in CUS, “Resolutions 1964 - XXVIIIth Congress” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, 1964, mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 4.
26 “Policy Declaration/4/64” in CUS, “Resolutions 1964.”
29 Kenniff and Good, foreword to An Analysis.
While the SMS was being prepared, local student associations were encouraged to determine campus opinion on rising fees and to publicise those opinions.\textsuperscript{30} Local activities varied widely and included seminars, and rallies. At the University of Western Ontario, law students held a moot court on the constitutionality of the \textit{Canada Student Loan Act}—which was held to be within federal jurisdiction by a two to one decision.\textsuperscript{31} Protests against tuition increases stepped up in March 1965 as university administrators brought forward proposed tuition hikes for the 1965/66 academic year. Student leaders felt betrayed by the administrators who had made a tacit commitment, by establishing the commission on university finances, to await the results before raising fees. For administrators to “indiscriminately raise fees before even seeing the Report’s recommendations” was “unpardonable.”\textsuperscript{32} Protests against a $100 tuition fee increase at McGill in mid-March were quickly followed by protests in the Atlantic Provinces on the heels of announced tuition boost by the Association of Atlantic Universities.\textsuperscript{33}

These incidents sparked questions in the House of Commons, with official opposition leader John Diefenbaker commenting, “if our Canadian university students have to pay these increased fees, ultimately it will be this nation that will suffer.”\textsuperscript{34} Seizing on this opportunity, CUS wrote to Diefenbaker, New Democratic Party Leader Tommy Douglas, and Social Credit Party Leader Robert Thompson to press the case for removal of financial barriers and greater government support for institutions and for students. In these letters, CUS called for a tuition fee freeze pending the outcome of the SMS, but they also advanced the case for student financial aid that fully paid basic living costs for students, and recognised that students already made a significant contribution to their education through foregone earnings while attending university.\textsuperscript{35}

The campaign to freeze tuition fees took on a decidedly more class-conscious edge at the University of Victoria, where Alma Mater Society president Paul Williamson persuaded the trade union representative on the university’s fund-raising campaign for capital construction that the new buildings would cause tuition fees would increase at a greater rate than they would have otherwise.\textsuperscript{36} This individual resigned from the campaign, saying that he could not ask union members to contribute to a university “their children will be prevented from attending because of exorbitant tuition fees.”\textsuperscript{37} Williamson observed that this was the first time University of Victoria students had received support from the general public for their fight against tuition fee increases, and moreover, the support came from an influential segment of society that were “traditionally less than enthusiastic supporters of university students.”\textsuperscript{38}

Some students had observed that to freeze the fees was merely to preserve the status quo. In a letter to the CUS office, Tim Broadhead of the CUS Committee at McGill University indicated that students on his campus were unwilling to rally behind a proposal for free education, but to

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  \item \textsuperscript{30} Jean Bazin, “Bulletin to Council Presidents and CUS Chairman” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [October 1, 1964], mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Ronald G. Atkey, letter to Wm. J. Curry, 21 December 1964, ACUS, CUS 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Patrick J. Kenniff, letter to Sue Hogarth, 24 September 1965, ACUS, CUS 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Saeed Mirza, telegram to Jean Bazin, 15 March 1965, ACUS, CUS 3; Clyde McElamn, letter to CUS Secretariat, 18 March 1965, ACUS, CUS 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} As quoted in Jean Bazin, letter to Rt. Hon. J.G. Diefenbaker, 26 March 1965, ACUS, CUS 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Bazin, “Letter to Diefenbaker”; Jean Bazin, letter to Tommy Douglas, 26 March 1965, ACUS, CUS 3; Jean Bazin, letter to Robert Thompson, 26 March 1965, ACUS, CUS 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Paul Williamson, letter to Jean Bazin, 5 April 1965, ACUS, CUS 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} As quoted in Williamson, “Letter to Jean Bazin.”
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Williamson, “Letter to Jean Bazin.”
\end{itemize}
focus on fees was to accept that the current level of accessibility was adequate. He noted that with only 7% of Québec youth going on to university, compared to approximately 40% of U.S. youth, the current level of access was clearly inadequate and that government and the public needed to understand this. “The real fight is free education,” he said, and that while the skirmishing over fees was effective “within its limits,” CUS needed to go further and put the responsibility on both university administrations and government to improve the situation.39

The Bladen Commission

In the summer of 1964, the NCCU (which became the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada in 1965) commissioned Vincent Bladen, Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Toronto, to head up the Commission on the Financing of Higher Education in Canada (the Bladen Commission). The mandate of the commission was to inquire into the financial requirements of universities and colleges to the year 1975, with particular attention to: the proportion of revenues to come from student fees, government contributions, and the private sector; policies for the allocation of funds to institutions and students; how the financing of higher education should be organised; and other related matters. In the final report, completed in June 1965 and released in October of that year, Bladen recommended that: the federal and provincial governments prepare to expand the higher education system in keeping with projected enrollment increases; the federal government discuss its funding contributions with the provincial governments on an annual basis and that the funding not be provided in a manner that would impinge on provincial rights; the federal government consolidate all of its support for higher education into a single ministry; the federal government appoint a committee of professors to advise on funding matters; and that these actions be taken without delay.40

CUS intended for the results of the SMS to constitute the largest part of its submission to the Bladen Commission, but due to funding difficulties, it was unable to complete the project in time to be included in the Bladen report.41 Instead CUS prepared a lengthy submission advancing economic arguments for further government investment in Canada’s young people. Drawing from the literature in the recently established field of human capital theory, the CUS submission contended that society benefitted greatly through the enhanced productivity resulting from higher education and that although the individual also benefitted, that students contributed a great deal to their education through foregone earnings.42

The CUS submission also advanced the idea that parents, who had traditionally been considered the third partner in funding higher education along with students and government, be removed from the funding equation since the expectation that they may have to substantially contribute to a child’s post-high school education may cause them to negatively influence the child’s decision to attend university. Moreover, CUS took the position that means testing to determine who would receive financial aid was an inequitable and inefficient redistribution of

39 Tim [Broadhead], letter to Doug Ward (Associate Secretary, CUS), 25 March 1965, ACUS, CUS 9.
41 Kenniff and Good, foreword to An Analysis.
income, particularly in the form of loans, and ran counter to proposition that a society gains from having educated people, regardless of their social or economic background. The CUS solution was to reduce or eliminate tuition fees in the short term, and to carry out a fundamental reassessment of the problems facing Canadian higher education motivated by a philosophy of “equality of opportunity for all qualified individuals regardless of their financial situation.”

Although acknowledging the CUS submission and recounting its arguments in his final report, Bladen noted that the topic of student aid garnered the greatest range of opinion. Among the other suggestions included proposals for free education by way of free tuition and a grant for living expenses, and for substantial increases in tuition fees to be funded by a government program to match student summer employment earnings with $1.50 for every dollar the student earned. Despite the creative suggestions, Bladen chose the conservative course and recommended minor changes to the Canada Student Loan Program, establishment of provincial assistance programs, and appointment of institutional student aid officers to assist students in obtaining public and private financial aid.

Bladen explicitly rejected the CUS proposal to eliminate tuition fees, arguing that Canadian universities needed large sums of money in the years to come to deal with the increased demand for higher education and that to demand additional funds to compensate for the elimination of tuition fees would risk government funding for the necessary expansion. Moreover, Bladen argued that the elimination of tuition fees in this situation would be a blow against social justice on two fronts. First, if the necessary expansion was not carried out then higher education would become further rationed, thus likely denying access to those people the CUS proposal would seek to help. Second, free tuition benefits most those people who already have the ability to pay, at the expense of the majority of taxpayers who will never attend a university, thus risking the resentment of the former by the latter and threatening “social cohesion.” Bladen, nonetheless, strongly endorsed the principle that intellectual ability should be the only criteria for admission to university, and believed that student financial aid programs could overcome financial barriers, providing that assistance was not too heavily weighted towards loans.

Taking It to Main Street, USA – ERAP, Free Speech and Selma

The “new insurgency” articulated in SDS’s America and the New Era captured the mood of American youth in 1963. There was restlessness amongst students and thousands were leaving campuses to register black voters in the South, organise unemployed workers in the inner city, tutor black high school students, join poverty centres, and just live among the working people. At the same time, an economic forecast predicting a massive recession resulting in “an army of discontented unemployed” was gaining currency with the New Left and with it the prospect of legions of foot soldiers in the fight for fundamental change to the economic and political system. It was clear to the leaders and thinkers of the SDS that their role in the “new insurgency” should be to use students to organise the poor and unemployed towards structural change in society, similar to how SNCC was working in the South to achieve civil rights. In August 1963, the SDS National Council adopted a proposal to establish the Economic Research

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45 Bladen et al, Financing Higher Education in Canada, 60-64, 66, 70.
and Action Project (ERAP) with a central office in Ann Arbor, Michigan (headed by Robert Alan Haber), and its first project in Chicago.\textsuperscript{46}

Despite a rocky start, ERAP received a strong endorsement from the December 1963 National Council meeting and was given a new mandate as an “insurgent action” designed to put SDS on a “revolutionary trajectory.” ERAP became the primary focus for SDS, propelling SDS from an intellectual research centre to “an aggressive expanding political organization.” The ERAP people forged ahead, with 125 people working on projects in Baltimore, Boston, Chester, Chicago, Cleveland, Hazard (Kentucky), Louisville, Newark, Philadelphia, and Trenton. They were involved in activities ranging from organising the unemployed, to working for better housing, to assisting unemployed miners, to civil rights projects, to high school tutoring. Even though there were numerous small successes, many of the projects struggled for reasons as diverse as burnout, cultural divides between organisers and community members, Byzantine civic bureaucracies, harassment by authorities, and most importantly, an upswing in the economy. Although none of the projects had resulted in a “movement of the poor,” enough had been accomplished to encourage a handful of people at each project to stay on during the winter. By the ERAP meeting in January 1965, the project workers were struggling with how to build a movement without resorting to “leading” the poor and thereby violating their principles about how democracies should operate. In the end, they decided, as SNCC had done before them, to continue what they were doing for its own sake, without reference to a program or a theory.\textsuperscript{47}

While the ERAP people struggled in the fall of 1964 to create a poor people’s movement on the U.S. East Coast, on the West Coast, students were creating The Free Speech Movement at the University of California at Berkeley. On September 14, 1964, the Berkeley administration announced that organising and soliciting funds for off-campus political action would be banned from the so-called Bancroft Strip frequented by such groups. Subsequent meetings between campus groups (under the banner “United Front”) and the administration resulted in some clarification, but no relaxation of the rules. The October 1\textsuperscript{st} arrest of Jack Weinberg, organiser for the CORE, who had set up a table in defiance of the ban resulted in students staging a spontaneous sit-in around the police car in which Weinberg had been placed, trapping the car for 33 hours.\textsuperscript{48}

During the sit-in, Mario Savio, a member of the campus SNCC group and one of the students earlier suspended for protesting the ban, climbed on the roof of the police car and proceeded to address the crowd about the rights being denied them by the Berkeley administration.\textsuperscript{49} Savio was subsequently elected by the crowd to negotiate with the administration and worked with the existing United Front group, campus conservative groups and campus religious organisations to form The Free Speech Movement (FSM) to advance their common concerns about free expression.\textsuperscript{50} On October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, students agreed to a moratorium on illegal protests in exchange for administration agreement to submit the case of the suspended students earlier suspended for protesting the ban.
students to the Academic Senate, and to appoint a committee of faculty, administrators and students to investigate campus problems and recommend solutions. The moratorium held until November 5th, when the FSM resumed picketing of the administration building in response to a deadlock within the committee investigating campus problems. In response, the administration disbanded the committee, charging that the FSM had violated the truce.  

On November 20th, the governing board of the university modified the previous policy to allow groups advocating “lawful off-campus action” to recruit and raise funds in designated areas on campus. The FSM maintained that the administration had no right to limit political activity, on or off campus, and called for a rally on December 2nd, where 6,000 gathered and heard Savio call for civil disobedience in the face of an intransigent administration. “There’s a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes your heart so sick, that you can’t take part,” Savio said. “…you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears…you’ve got to indicate to the people who run the machine...that unless you’re free, the machine will be prevented from working at all.” He then led nearly 1,000 students into the administration building for a massive sit in. California Governor Edmund G. Brown ordered the demonstrators removed and in a 12-hour operation, 814 people were arrested. The campus community was shocked by the police action, resulting in a campus-wide strike of graduate students, spontaneous faculty meetings and support for the arrested students, and pressure from departmental chairmen on University of California President Clark Kerr to resolve the situation.

A resolution worked out between the departmental chairmen and Kerr on December 7th was branded as inadequate, but picketing was suspended pending a meeting of the Academic Senate on December 8th. The Senate voted 824 to 115 to grant amnesty to the student protestors and to regulate the location of student political activity so as not to interfere with campus operations, but otherwise not restrict the content or nature of the activity—the resolution was immediately embraced by the FSM. At their meeting on December 17th and 18th, the Regents refused to accept the Academic Senate proposal, instead appointing its own committee to review university policy to develop recommendations for “maximum freedom on campus consistent with individual and group responsibility.” The FSM rejected the Regent’s action, although representatives of the Academic Senate were more reserved, calling it a “step forward,” but noting it was still not a satisfactory settlement. On January 2nd, 1965, the Regents appointed Martin Meyerson as the new Chancellor for the Berkeley campus, and on January 3rd, Meyerson, in consultation with representatives of the Academic Senate, announced new rules allowing open discussion and political activity within minimal restraints.

Although the events of Berkeley were popularly characterised as being about political speech and activity, the leadership of the SDS saw something much deeper. Berkeley signaled that the university, like all other institutions in society, served the dominant interests in society and could not be relied upon when those interests were threatened. If Berkeley, one of the finest public universities in the nation, could not be trusted, then it called into question the entire nature of the educational enterprise. The public spectacle at Berkeley provoked administrations across the country to redress long-standing grievances, promote more freedoms for students,

Students sensed a new fragility in the institution, giving them license to press for causes, whether actual or frivolous, while the politically active students and the SDS saw Berkeley as opening up new possibilities for "radicalisation."  

New opportunities also presented themselves in the South after Martin Luther King Jr. was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1964. King's SCLC decided to turn its attention to Selma, Alabama, a town of 30,000 people where only 1% of the black population was eligible to vote. Potential voters were required to pass a test before they could be registered, and election and civic officials did all they could to dissuade black citizens from registering. SCLC marches and demonstrations in January 1965 brought national attention to Selma, and at the February 17th march from Selma to nearby Marion, police and state troopers attacked the crowd shooting Jimmie Lee Jackson, who was protecting his mother from police attack. Jackson subsequently died and at his funeral it was decided to commemorate his death and bring more attention to the problems in Alabama by marching from Selma to the capital in Montgomery, 54 miles away. The marchers started out on Sunday, March 7th and as they crossed the bridge leaving Selma police and state troopers met them with orders from Governor George Wallace to stop the march. After being warned to turn back, the police fired tear gas and waded into the confusion beating the marchers, even as they fled into churchyards for sanctuary. TV stations around the country interrupted their evening programs to show the violence in Selma.

King, who had been preaching in Atlanta, Georgia on "Bloody Sunday," immediately made plans for another march on Tuesday, and called upon people all over the country to come to Selma. After witnessing the TV images, hundreds of people dropped everything to join him. The event was delayed by court proceedings to prevent police from stopping the march, and King asked anyone who could, to stay in town to participate in the march when they received the court order against police. One of those who stayed, James Reeb, a white minister from Boston, was clubbed at a hangout for local whites after making a wrong turn down a street. Reeb subsequently died after he was refused admission to the Selma hospital. Reeb's death attracted the national attention to Alabama that Jackson's death could not, and a week later the court ruled that the state could not stop the march. President Lyndon Johnson took control of the Alabama National Guard to protect the marchers, and on March 21st, 14 days after Bloody Sunday, the Selma marchers crossed the bridge leaving town and five days later, 25,000 marchers arrived in Montgomery.

The Student Union for Peace Action

After the "loss" of the Nuclear Election in April 1963, the CUCND engaged in a protracted analysis of Canadian foreign policy and discussion about whether Positive Neutralism was a viable position for Canada. After adopting the position that Canada should withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, discussion turned to the theory and practice of non-

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violence, leading to a commitment to non-violent direct action. These decisions were manifested in the demonstration at La Macaza, Québec in 1964 against the BOMARC missiles located there. Discussions were also taking place within the CUCND on how decisions should be made. From the founding of the organisation, decision-making had been centralised in the National Secretariat, first located in Montréal and then Toronto. This left the members in the outlying regions, especially Western Canada, feeling isolated and led to calls for decentralisation of decision-making. These themes of Positive Neutralism, non-violence and decentralised decision-making set the stage for the December 1964 conference in Regina, where the CUCND was dissolved, and the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) was formed.

Entitled “The Student and Social Issues in the Nuclear Age,” the Regina Conference marked the culmination of debate about the future the CUCND. There was increasing recognition amongst the core of CUCND activists that the single-issue moralism that had characterised the Canadian peace movement until the 1963 federal election was limiting their ability to effect change because it dealt with the symptoms of an ailing social and political system and not the system itself. Nonetheless, there was still a strong desire in the membership to maintain the emphasis on peace, but to trade petitions and conferences for more direct action along the lines of the La Macaza demonstrations. Rather than choosing one tendency, the delegates attempted to combine the two in order to hold the organisation together. This compromise resulted in a five-point statement of values for SUPA: challenging the nation-state system, promoting non-alignment with the superpowers, practicing student syndicalism as the basis of organising, relating social issues to problems of war and peace, and committing to non-violence. These values were not so much the result of analysis and debate, as they were merely “the best summation of concepts distinguishing SUPA from CUCND.” Consequently, without a clear direction the organisation was left to develop “at the whim of personal initiative and opportune events.”

One of those opportune events was the demonstration in Toronto in March 1965 in support of the civil rights marchers in Selma, Alabama. The SUPA chapter in Toronto, some of whose members had been in the Southern States with SNCC, put out the word for people to go to the American Consulate for a sit-in—and they did so for a week, with scant press attention. When the Globe and Mail ran a photograph of young protestors being ejected from the Consulate grounds as they attempted to deliver a petition, hundreds more protestors converged on the site. Many were high school students, university students, or dropouts and this was their first experience protesting. As the protestors sat, listened to civil rights workers who had been in the American South, and discussed the issues with one another, they became seized with the need for social change. At the end of the protest, many of the newly politicised youth formed a Canadian “Friends of SNCC” to publicise the work of the American civil rights movement and raise money for the cause, while others turned to SUPA looking to create the Canadian version of ERAP.

60 Harding, “Ethical Movement,” 336-337.
Propelled by the growing SUPA “myth,” the summer of 1965 saw a burst of activity with 87 fieldworkers fanning out across the country to work with Indians, Métis, Doukhobors, Blacks, and inner city Whites on local needs and in doing so, developing a Canadian theory for social change. In keeping with the compromises of Regina, the community organising projects were left to the fieldworkers to develop and carry out, with only the SUPA name, a bit of cash and moral support contributed from the national office. In the Kootenays Project, students attempted to get the Doukhobors, “the quintessential pacifists,” to see themselves “as agents of social change.” In Saskatchewan, the Student Neestow Partnership Program (not formally affiliated with SUPA) wanted to “do something about” poverty and demoralisation in Indian and Métis communities. The Nova Scotia Project (conceived in the summer but not mounted until the fall) put an organiser amongst Halifax Blacks to work on community issues. The Kingston Community Project drew upon the experience of ERAP’s Newark Community Union Project to apply the techniques of ghetto organising to the Ontario city’s poor north end.

Like their U.S. colleagues the year before, the SUPA and SUPA-inspired community action project workers found that political consciousness and political activity was not easily found amongst the Canadian dispossessed. In the Kootenays, while the students shared the life of the old Doukhobors, they learned that the young Doukhobors were more interested in their mill jobs, their new cars, and going to the bar every second night. In Saskatchewan, dreams of building “Red Power” were bogged down in the problems of day-to-day survival of the Indians and Métis and community suspicion of the white workers. In Kingston, students found themselves taking the lead in the community projects rather than assisting the community in articulating and achieving their own goals.

Despite these setbacks, the worn-out workers came to SUPA’s Fall Institute on September 5th to 10th in St. Calixte, Québec with their stories of frustration, but also flush with feelings that they had made connections and made a difference. They had experienced the realities of Canadian power structure, analysed it, and concluded that they were at the forefront of the Canadian New Left movement for social change. Although there was a strong commitment to participatory democracy as the means of change and to the utter rejection of electoral politics, there was little concrete analysis of what this meant. Thus inflated with positive feelings about the summer, and a belief that they had found the means for revolutionary change (but no program to do so), many of the SUPA workers headed back to campus with the intent on making use of the lessons of the summer.

The events in the United States thus had a direct influence on SUPA, resulting in it becoming the leading New Left organisation in Canada. The American protests were also having an affect on Canadians more generally as they watched the same television images and read the same newspaper accounts of racial and campus discord as their American neighbours. University administrators were keenly aware of the events at Berkeley and the consequences for the American counterparts. CUS remained connected to the events in the United States through

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their formal contacts in the NSA and SDS, and their informal contact with American activists and Canadian activists taking part in the American protests. The spirit of protest had a tentative foothold on Canadian campuses as witnessed by the "freeze the fees" demonstrations, and student leaders were willing to be more active in pursuit of their goals. The vitality of the American movements, the New Left social analysis propagated by SUPA, and the demographic pressure from the leading edge of the baby boom were combining to put a very different face on Canadian student politics.
Opportunity, Community and Dissent: September 1965 to August 1967

The Canadian tuition fee protests of fall 1964 and spring 1965 were largely about the affordability of higher education for current students. Although there were some efforts to link these protests to the general barriers to university access, CUS members had taken a “hands off” approach to those questions pending the results of the Bladen Commission and their own Student Means Survey. Nevertheless, the March 1965 protests had persuaded the CUS leadership to take a strong position in the April 1965 brief to the Bladen Commission for liberalising the student loan criteria and increasing government investment in higher education as a means to reduce the cost for current students and encourage more young people to pursue higher education. Some elements of the CUS leadership were satisfied with this position, while others wanted to press for free education, inspired by the social justice and New Left movements in Canada and the United States.

Meanwhile, as a result of the fall 1964 Berkeley conflict, CUS chose to devote its September 1965 seminar to the topic of academic democracy. Already primed by the example! of student syndicalism in Québec, the incidents at Berkeley fuelled a discussion about the relationship between the student and the university, and the student and society. The perceived betrayal of Canadian students that spring by administrators violating the tacit understanding that fees would stay frozen pending the outcome of the Bladen report also generated new interest in the student role in university governance.

In all of this, CUS was not immune to the influence of the New Left movement in the United States and Canada. The community organising of ERAP in the United States and SUPA in Canada was giving students new insight into the lives of the disenfranchised and marginalised. Furthermore, the increased incidence of marches, rallies and civil disobedience in the United States was influencing the way Canadian students and young people raised their grievances.

This chapter will examine the origin of CUS’s universal accessibility policy, how that policy was acted upon, and how the Student Means Survey and other events altered the policy. Academic democracy, or academocracy, will be explored in this chapter from its origins in the 1965 seminar through its expression in student demands for reform of institutional governance. This chapter will also look at the beginnings of discontent within the organisation over its perceived shift towards the political left. The chapter concludes with the decline of SUPA and the transformation of SDS from a protest organisation to a group actively resisting the policies of the American government, and the effects of all of this on CUS.

Universal Accessibility

Riding the wave of successful spring protests against tuition fee increases, delegates to the 29th Congress at Bishop’s University in Lennoxville, Québec (August 29th to September 4th) were primed to debate the questions of access to postsecondary education. Incoming CUS President Patrick Kenniff voiced students’ discontent and desire for a better world in his opening address to the Congress:
We the student[s] of today, even though we are obviously members of that privileged class, can no longer - will not forsake our peers who for financial, sociological and other reasons have been denied the opportunity to partake in what we are fortunate to have. Many university administrators and university professors have refused to defend or develop universal accessibility to higher education. It is up to us, the student leaders of this country, to see that this inequality ceases to exist. We must be willing to fight this injustice to the maximum of our ability.

The result was a series of resolutions about access, CUS proposals to increase access, and suggested means to implement those proposals. The cornerstone was UA-8, by which CUS adopted the principle of “universal accessibility,” defined as “the abolition of all social and financial barriers to post-secondary education.” Although this policy statement was a natural progression from the “freeze the fees” campaign and positions taken in the submission to the Bladen Commission, the universal accessibility campaign gave CUS a new direction.

The 1965 Congress was the crossroads between the remnants of the NFCUS’s conservative, low-key lobbying embodied by outgoing president Jean Bazin’s work, a dynamic-but-centrist orientation under president Patrick Kenniff, and the activist leftist tendency of president-elect Doug Ward. As a consequence, the universal accessibility policy was an amalgam of these views. Although it rhetorically echoed years of NFCUS efforts to ease the financial burden on students, it leapt ahead by calling for the “fullest development ... of human potential.” That leap would be possible through the elimination of all social and financial barriers. The first step would be to eliminate tuition fees.

To work towards universal accessibility, the Congress authorised a substantial research component to uncover financial and social barriers, and planned for local activities organised around a National Student Day. This universal accessibility policy and activities contained the seeds for a substantial, if not radical, change in CUS’s political direction, yet acquired overwhelming support from Congress delegates. The delegates found the ideas of the universal accessibility program appealing and liked the flexibility to interpret they program as they wished.

After the Congress, a steady stream of material promoting universal accessibility went from the national secretariat to member associations. This background information was selected to assure members that universal accessibility was based on sound principles of economic utility and social justice and was a logical progression from past efforts to ameliorate financial barriers. Among these items were two pieces from 1958 on the elimination of fees: a presentation to the 1958 NFCUS Seminar by Eugene Forsey, then Director of Research for the Canadian Labour Congress, and an article from the October 1958 edition of Canadian Home and School, the magazine of the Canadian Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federation.

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2 CUS, “Resolutions 1965 - XXIXth Congress” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, 1965, mimeographed), 4-5, ACUS, NFCUS 3A; See Appendix B.2 for the full text of the resolution.
3 Patrick Kenniff, telephone conversation.
4 UA-8 in CUS, “Resolutions 1965,” 4-5.
In his presentation, Forsey argued four points in favour of free higher education: that it provides equality of opportunity, that Canadian democracy needs a well-educated leadership, that without free higher education Canada is losing valuable human resources, and that as part of the Western world, Canada has a responsibility to develop intellectual and economic resources to keep ahead of the Soviet Bloc. Forsey was clear that free higher education was not an entitlement; it had to be earned:

There is no reason at all why the taxpayers should provide even a partly free education for numskulls or lazybones. Nobody who can't meet stiff entrance requirements, stiffer than a good many places require now, has any right to get into a university or any other post-secondary school.

Nor was free higher education a matter of only economic utility:

Without [free higher education], again because incomes are unequal, we shall fail to get what we ought from our natural resources, human and material. We shall lose potential painters, sculptors, poets, playwrights, novelists, musicians, and our national intellectual and spiritual life will be correspondingly, and unnecessarily, impoverished.

There was no doubt in Forsey's mind that equality of opportunity did not yet exist and that Canada was “undernourishing the nation's body economic, as well as its mind and soul.”

The reprinted article by Jean Legasse, President of the Manitoba Home and School Association in 1958, directly tackled the opposition to free tuition for academically-qualified students. In response to the primary argument that students would not appreciate a free education, Legasse observed that this opposition arose from the belief that “a good life must be a hard life,” and is countered by the opposing belief that humans place value on the goal itself and not on just the difficulties in achieving the goal. Moreover, he argued, many students already received generous bursaries, scholarships and allowances that effectively provided them with free education. Yet there was no evidence these students appreciated their education any less than those students who paid fees.

The ideas advocated by Forsey, Legasse and others had a rich history. Thomas Jefferson put public education second only to the abolition of entails (the perpetual succession of property to a specified class of descendents) and primogeniture (the succession of property to the eldest son) in the work of the American Congress after the Declaration of Independence in 1776. From these free schools, Jefferson proposed, a select number of promising students would be offered university education. By this means the “best geniuses” would be “raked from the rubbish” and thus,

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7 Jean Legasse, “Free University Education” (Ottawa, Canadian Union of Students, October 14, 1965, mimeographed), 4, NAC, 4, October 1965.
8 In particular, he was referring to provincial government support programs for Manitoba students who wanted to become dentists, agrologists, or teachers.
those persons, who nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and that they should be called to that charge without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental condition or circumstance.

Combined with the elimination of entails and primogeniture, this would lay "the axe to the foot of pseudo-aristocracy." ⑨

By the beginning of the 20th century, the content of public education was perceived as ill suited to the adult lives of the vast majority of students, and this combined with demand from business for capable workers resulted in business and vocational education becoming a formal part of North American schooling. ⑩ This increase in "practical" education extended into the universities between the wars and through the Second World War to satisfy the demand for professionals by industry and the war effort. ⑪ Demand for professional education combined with the need for liberal education to secure a healthy democracy was led to the belief in Canada that higher education should be an entitlement for those able to benefit from it. As the Massey Commission put it in 1951:

It is, we believe, our duty to consider how the Canadian Government can best provide financial assistance to a great number of young Canadians who, although qualified, without such help would be unable to acquire the intellectual development needed for their own good as well as for the good of their country. Our interest in scholarships, therefore, does not stem from a desire to improve educational institutions or their programmes, though naturally we are interested in these matters. Our care is rather for the Canadian citizen and for his right to the opportunity to develop fully his intellectual possibilities. ⑫

Nonetheless, the CUS national secretariat also had to assure local student associations that universal accessibility was the right and proper concern of students. They reprinted articles appealing to the injustice perpetrated by the current system:

The fact is that most children of the poor drop out of education before completing high school. With inadequate education most of them will be condemned to low earnings even if automation does not put them in the ranks of the chronically unemployed. ⑬

They also reprinted articles attributing students with a great power for social change:

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[Students] have come full circle from the pessimistic retreat of the early nineteen-fifties. They are no longer completely frustrated by the fact social change cannot be realized at once. They have defined their goal and they are willing to dedicate themselves to chipping away at the barriers to its implementation.\textsuperscript{14}

Presidents of local student associations were asked to provide to the CUS secretariat their associations' interpretation of the universal accessibility motion by the end of September in preparation for National Student Day on October 27, 1965. Many associations adopted the complete text of UA-8 unaltered, and committed themselves to various actions in support of the universal accessibility campaign. At University of Guelph, the student association produced a radio program; at University of Alberta a brief was presented to the provincial education minister; at University of British Columbia and University of Victoria, students planned to hold a referendum on whether to pay their second term fees; Nova Scotia student associations presented a joint brief to the provincial government; at University of Manitoba professors were asked to have in-class discussions of universal accessibility; at Memorial University, students were dealing with the implementation of new provincial government policy of eliminating fees for and paying and stipends to first year students. As the result of a high school outreach project by students at Laurentian University, 137 students in Grade 9 through 13 in the small town of Gore Bay on Manitoulin Island near Sudbury, Ontario, signed a petition representing their "whole-hearted and earnest support" for the universal accessibility campaign and the elimination of tuition fees.\textsuperscript{15} There was remarkable agreement across the country that universal accessibility was necessary and students were the ones to bring it about.

Nevertheless, the support for universal accessibility was not unanimous. A number of student associations, including those at University of Western Ontario, Eastern Ontario Institute of Technology, University of Windsor, and University of Saskatchewan at Regina, adopted UA-8, but omitted the section dealing with the elimination of tuition fees. In the case of the student association at the University of Western Ontario, opposition to the elimination of tuition fees arose for two reasons. First, the adoption of UA-8 contravened the understanding reached at the 1964 Congress that CUS would not act until all the facts were in on affordability of higher education—including the reports of the Bladen Commission and CUS's own SMS. Second, although UA-8 was portrayed as a compromise between an extreme right wing position of no financial aid and an extreme left wing position of free tuition and living allowances, the generally conservative students of Western viewed UA-8 itself as the extreme left wing position and therefore were looking for a compromise position to fall between it and the abolition of financial aid.\textsuperscript{16}

Another collection of student associations, primarily in the Maritime Provinces, strongly objected to the universal accessibility policy. The student association at Saint Thomas University in New Brunswick likened the student to an unproductive "leech on society," and although supported financial assistance for needy students, the association equated universal accessibility "with the dole."\textsuperscript{17} The student association at Mount St. Vincent University in Nova Scotia was the most articulate in its rejection of universal accessibility, arguing that universal accessibility could threaten academic autonomy since it would necessitate increased

\textsuperscript{14} Paul Williamson, "Universal Accessibility" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, September 27, 1965, mimeographed), NAC, 4, September 1965.
\textsuperscript{15} J.A. Holtby, Letter to CUS Secretariat, 16 November 1965, ACUS, CUS 9.
\textsuperscript{16} Sue Hogarth, Letter to Patrick Kenniff.
\textsuperscript{17} Mark McAuliffe, "Saint Thomas University & Universal Accessibility" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, October 14, 1965, mimeographed), 2, NAC, 4, October 1965.
governmental support, lead to socialism since it was another step towards government supporting the country, lead to communism since “equality of opportunity” seemed equivalent to communistic idea of everyone being equal, lead to greater taxation and therefore greater burdens on individuals, and create more elitism in education due to the necessity of rationing this, now expensive, commodity.\(^{18}\) Underlying this rejection of universal accessibility were an honest anxiety about institutional autonomy and a rejection of democratisation of higher education. It was no surprise that students at this Catholic institution were raising concerns about institutional autonomy. Church-run schools and universities had already been the victim of government takeover in Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, and early in 1965 Nova Scotia Premier Robert Stanfield commented that, “academic freedom cannot mean freedom to use public money for objectives which the legislature does not accept.”\(^{19}\) These institutions also feared that the democratisation of higher education by increasing accessibility would devalue the currency of degrees—that a university degree would no longer be a symbol of distinction and a passport into the Canadian elite supported by and supporting the Catholic Church.\(^{20}\)

**Bladen Revisited**

On October 6, 1965, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) released the final report of the Bladen Commission (the Commission on the Financing of Higher Education in Canada). Although recognising the value of increased access to postsecondary education, the report recommended that institutions be free to set their own fee levels, subject to the government providing sufficient student financial aid. CUS immediately criticised the report as unresponsive to the financial needs of students and offering no measurable progress towards the goal of universal accessibility.\(^{21}\)

Robert Rabinovitch, who was writing the CUS SMS report, observed in his response to Bladen that someone reading the Bladen report without the benefit of other knowledge of the Canadian postsecondary system would have no idea there were sociological, psychological, or even financial barriers to higher education in the country. Although Rabinovitch complimented Bladen for concluding that free market, full cost pricing would result in under-investment in education, he criticised Bladen for failing to extend the analysis to its logical conclusion. Instead, Bladen developed the case for free education at the graduate level—an analysis that

\(^{18}\) Rosemary Saville, “Statement by the Mount St. Vincent Students’ Council” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, October 8, 1965, mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 9. There is evidence that the student councils at the Maritime Catholic universities may have been encouraged towards these positions by the clerical administrations; for example: “The way that administrations in the small Catholic Colleges in the Maritimes control their Students’ Councils is sometimes just about unbelievable.” Robbie Shaw, letter to Richard Good, 28 September 1965, 1-2, ACUS, CUS 9.

\(^{19}\) Kenneth Drushka, “University Autonomy and Student Fees” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, January 27, 1965, mimeographed), NCA, 2, January 1965. Ironically, in 1966, Mount St. Vincent University was granted a new charter that reduced the role of the Church and installed a lay board and senate to operate alongside the Sisters of Charity, founders of the institution. St. Mary’s University followed suit in 1970.

\(^{20}\) Patrick Kenniff, telephone conversation.

Rabinovitch contended was equally applicable at the undergraduate level. He condemned Bladen for ignoring the “full development of the individual to his ultimate capacity.”

In December 1965, unmoved by CUS criticisms, Bladen remarked that the only mistake he made in his report was to call for status quo tuition. Rather, he said he should have called for the doubling of tuition fees in order to fund the rising costs of higher education. He maintained the position that needy students could gain access to higher education through increases in student financial aid.

Student Means Survey

In February 1966, the long awaited report on CUS's Student Means Survey was released. The report, authored by former CUS Associate Secretary Robert Rabinovitch, was the most sophisticated analysis of the socio-economic conditions of Canadian undergraduates ever done, and was produced with the advice and assistance of survey analysts, sociologists, economists and government bureaucrats. The survey was constructed and conducted with the assistance of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (now Statistics Canada), and provided a snapshot of all universities outside of Québec and English universities inside of Québec at February 1965.

The analysis revealed what had been implied by other reports and suspected by the CUS leadership—that the typical Canadian undergraduate student at the time was a single (93%) male (69%), 18 to 22 years old, was an arts student, was studying at the major university in the province, was from a home community with a population of 100,000 or greater, was living in the parental home, worked during the summer (82%), and did not work during the academic year (49% did not look for work, and 22% did not work for academic reasons). His parents made more than the Canadian average pre-tax family income of $6,539, his father was employed in a managerial or professional position, and his father had at least completed high school (19% had one or more university degrees).

The survey also found that the average student spent 26% of his income on tuition fees, 25% on room and board, 8% on recreation, 7% on clothing and 5% on textbooks. He derived 25% of his income from summer earnings, 21% from family support, 17% from loans (9% from Canada Student Loans and 5% from family loans), and 9% from various grants (4% from scholarships, 3% from government bursaries). The report cautioned that there was a great deal of variability in these numbers resulting from a group of students with disproportionately high expenditures and a different group with disproportionately low income.

This bifurcation is apparent on examination of students' parental income statistics, which show the lowest quartile of incomes were at least 24% below the average Canadian family income, and the highest quartile were at least 53% higher than the average. Rabinovitch presented the results in a straightforward manner, noting the distinction by social class in

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25 Rabinovitch, An Analysis, 66-73. All figures rounded.

26 See Appendix C.6 for details.
several of the categories and suggesting where further analysis of the existing data and the collection of new data might reveal further nuances in the over-representation of middle and upper class individuals in the nation’s universities.

Although this was the most detailed survey of Canadian university students ever conducted, the resulting findings about socio-economic status were not unexpected. American sociologist C. Wright Mills observed in 1956 that only 20% of fifth grade students intellectually capable of college education actually made it to college, and in any event, a father’s income was a better predictor of college attendance than the son’s intellectual ability.²⁷ In Canada, Carleton University Sociologist John Porter had been working on an analysis of social class since the mid 1950s, publishing his results in 1965. Using census information, Dominion Bureau of Statistics reports, and other studies, Porter found that the top social class had ten times the representation in universities than their numbers would otherwise warrant, whereas the lowest social class had about one-third the representation.²⁸

For the supporters of universal accessibility, this was the clearest indication yet that the basis of the policy was sound and that the campaign ought to press ahead. Copies of the Rabinovitch report were distributed to the federal and provincial governments, Members of Parliament, student organisations at home and abroad, libraries, and to campus and commercial media. A June 1966 CUS brief to Prime Minister Pearson summarised the survey results and pressed the case for greater federal government involvement in alleviating the disparities in educational opportunity. The brief went as far as to suggest that “if the university is to serve society as an agency for creativity and reform” then it must find means to accommodate “the poor and disaffected members of society,” whom have the capacity to challenge the status quo and therefore are the catalyst for change.²⁹ Thus by this time the universal accessibility policy was no longer just about equalising social and economic opportunity. The CUS leadership, echoing the SDS position, also saw universal accessibility as a means for the disaffected to gain entry into society’s power structures and then draw upon the injustice done to them to change those structures.

The Forgotten Issue?

Despite the considerable success in bringing universal accessibility to attention of students, politicians and the public, a growing minority in CUS believed the campaign was losing its momentum. A discussion paper prepared by the University of Victoria Alma Mater Society for the September 1966 Congress at Dalhousie University called universal accessibility “The Forgotten Issue” and lamented that “the concept, which had seemed so invulnerable in the electric atmosphere of the Congress, was over simplified and misrepresented until students forgot what they were demonstrating to achieve.”³⁰ The problem, they argued, was that some student associations had settled for freezing of fees without proceeding to the next step of removing the barriers, and that other associations fixated on the eliminating fees as the goal.

²⁸ Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 186. The difference between Porter’s findings and the CUS survey is explained by the use of different categories to represent socio-economic status.
forgotten it was only the first step in a larger plan to eliminate sociological barriers to higher education.

Outgoing CUS President Patrick Kenniff also considered the difficulties of the universal accessibility program in his final report to Congress. He noted there were practical difficulties in sustaining complex political programs over what may be considered “generations” of student politicians. Moreover, many student leaders had exhibited the tendency “to relax in the face of stiff opposition from those who have been looked upon to speak on behalf of the university community in the past.”

Incoming CUS President Doug Ward acknowledged these points and emphasised the need to move beyond the economic aspects of universal accessibility to work more intently on the sociological and psychological barriers to higher education. He noted the example of Poland, where there was no tuition and students received a stipend, but where authorities had just as much difficulty as Canada had done in encouraging rural youth to attend university. In a discussion paper for Congress Ward wrote:

There are serious sociological and psychological barriers to universal accessibility which have their roots not in grade twelve or thirteen and not even in grade nine but in primary school and pre-primary school experiences and the whole structure of Canadian society. If CUS is to be thorough in its quest for universal accessibility, then it must delve into those areas too.

The response to the results of the SMS and the observations of Kenniff and Ward was Congress resolution EA-4, which reconfirmed CUS support for universal accessibility, and better articulated the nature of social barriers to higher education and what action was to be taken by CUS and member associations to lower those barriers. Where UA-8 had committed CUS to eliminating financial barriers and advocated the elimination of tuition fees, EA-4 advocated the complete rejection of all forms of student loans or means-tested financial aid, the total elimination of tuition fees, and the establishment of student stipends.

Despite the renewed commitment at Congress, much prevented the implementation of the universal accessibility program at member campuses. For many student leaders, universal accessibility remained a catch phrase imbued with little underlying meaning. CUS fieldworker Martha Tracey described this problem in a letter to the CUS office: “These people need well-thought-out position papers on UNAC etc. outlining arguments for & against so they can discuss policies intelligently with people on their campuses. They go to Congress and get snowed by a few Upper Canadian professionals. On their local campuses they just aren’t qualified to present UNAC or anything else.”

A paper distributed by the national secretariat in January 1967 again laid out the principles of, and arguments for universal accessibility, challenging students to confront the problems of Canadian society if they were to make any headway on universal accessibility. It provided a brief analysis of the role of private and corporate interests in shaping society and the universities, and the consequences for people without money or power. These ideas were not new and had long been the fodder for Canadian populist and leftist movements, and their

33 Martha Tracey, Letter to CUS Office, 26 November 1966, ACUS, CUS 22.
34 CUS, “Universal Accessibility: Some Present Considerations” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [January 1967], mimeographed), NAC, 8, January 1967.
propagation by CUS was further indication of the leftward shift in the organisation. CUS was now fully engaged in a campaign not only to equalise economic opportunity, but also to seek change in the structures perpetuating economic inequality and drawing Canada into despicable acts, like supporting the American war in Vietnam.

Academocracy

Encouraged by the success of their lobby for the Canada Student Loan Program, their ability to organise mass actions in support of their demands, and the example of their American and Québec counterparts, the CUS leadership directly broached the question of student involvement in the administration and governance of universities and colleges by way of their 1965 seminar. The CUS seminars brought together students, faculty, administrators, and others from inside and outside postsecondary education to discuss issues of the day of import to the Canadian postsecondary community. Part tutorial, part think tank, the seminars engaged participants months in advance of the face-to-face meeting through distribution of reading material and the requirement to submit essays on the topics to be covered, some of which would become working papers for the seminar.35

The eighth such seminar was held September 6-11, 1965, at the Fredericton campus of the University of New Brunswick on the topic “Democracy in the University Community.” Participants prepared by poring over background documents on the form and function of the university by French philosopher Georges Gusdorf, Peruvian literary critic Luis Alberto Sanchez, Canadian historian Ramsay Cook, and Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva, amongst others. Invited presenters included A.J. Corry, President of the AUCC, Howard Adelman, founder of Rochdale College, Dimitrios Roussopoulos, Editor of Our Generation Against Nuclear War, Robert Berdahl, Member of the Duff Commission on university government, and Jacques St. Pierre, President of the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT).36

The directors of the seminar were Pierre Dansereau, Assistant Director of the New York Botanical Garden (formerly Dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of Montréal), and Donald C. Rowat, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. Both had contributed articles to the 1964 book A Place of Liberty, a CAUT-sponsored collection of essays on the governance of Canadian universities.37 That book was primary concerned with the role of faculty in the administration and governance of the universities. At the time, faculty were not represented generally on boards of governors of Canadian universities, and only in the case of Queen’s University did elected faculty members form a majority of the membership on the academic senate.38 A Place of Liberty was part of an on-going campaign, starting with the 1960 report of a CAUT committee chaired by Rowat, to make the case for greater, if not majority, faculty representation in university governance. Although students may have viewed faculty as unsympathetic to their demands, some faculty members, like Rowat, viewed the student pressure for academic democracy (“academocracy”) as an important contribution to the

35 Pierre Dansereau and Donald C. Rowat (Eds.), Democracy and the University Community (Ottawa: Canadian Union of Students, 1966), 5, 10.
36 Dansereau and Rowat, Democracy and the University Community, 5.
37 George Whalley (Editor), A Place of Liberty (Toronto: Clarke, Irvin & Company Limited, 1964).
faculty efforts. This feeling was not shared by University of Toronto President Claude Bissell, who allowed student participation on President's Council as an experiment in the spring of 1965, only to have it blow up when the student representatives published an account of the meeting in The Varsity with their views of who were the villains and heroes of the meeting.

Student opinion at the seminar was divided between those who emphasised the role of students as citizens (the "public issue boys"), and those who believed students should limit themselves to matters directly concerning them (derisively called the "sand-box boys"). The "public issue boys" believed students not only had the right, but the responsibility as well-educated members of society, to express themselves on all matters and to try to influence public policy. The "sand box boys" believed students were not yet experienced or intellectually developed enough to engage in matters of public policy and thus ought to restrict themselves to matters on campus and possibly those off-campus factors directly affecting higher education. Rowat could see the means for reconciliation between these camps in making common cause for the advancement of academocracy, but he lamented that "extremists" would be disinclined to make the necessary small steps and compromises necessary first to establish, and then to expand the role of students in institutional governance, and therefore would undermine the efforts of the "sand box boys" to achieve this goal.

Although there was no resolution of the differences between the factions, the seminar still served three purposes. First, it provoked a discussion of the possibility of student involvement in institutional governance amongst student leaders. Second, it provided a "testing ground" in which arguments for student involvement could be developed and tested. Third, the publication of the proceedings provided a document CUS could use to educate those students who did not participate in the seminar. The 1966 Congress would confirm the seminar was successful on all these counts.

The Duff/Berdahl Report

In June 1962, the NCCU (later AUCC) endorsed a recommendation from the CAUT for a joint study of Canadian university governance. After securing funding from the Ford Foundation, a commission was established in November 1963 consisting of Sir James Mountford, vice chancellor of the University of Liverpool, and American political scientist Robert Berdahl. In July 1964, Sir James Duff, former vice-chancellor of the University of Durham replaced Mountford on the commission, who resigned due to ill health. The commission began its work in earnest in November 1964, touring the country from January to April 1965 to solicit commentary from the Canadian university community, and delivering its report to the sponsors in August 1965.

The CUS presentation to the commission on February 17, 1965, emphasised a conception of the university of as a community of scholars and students, and the reform of university governance to that end. What this intellectual community would look like was not articulated, except to the extent that faculty and students would have predominant control. This community

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40 Claude Bissell, Halfway up Parnassus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 125.
could be achieved, according to CUS, through formalised communication between senates and boards of governors, students and faculty forming independent "professional associations" to advance the welfare of their members, and representation of students and faculty on the governing bodies of the universities. This prescription would provide "the material conditions and the intellectual atmosphere" necessary to realise "a community of scholars and pupils engaged in the pursuit of truth and knowledge."  

On March 18, 1966 the final report of the Duff/Berdahl Commission was released, in which the authors recommended the universal adoption of bi-cameral governance with a board of governors responsible for financial and administrative matters and a senate responsible for academic matters. Although many Canadian universities had both a board and a senate, Duff and Berdahl observed that the functions of the senate were often frustrated by significant numbers of external appointees, no election of faculty representatives, administration treating senate as a "rubber stamp," and the board overriding academic decisions requiring expenditures. Their solution was to make Canadian senates more like those in Britain—largely composed of elected academics and charged with the primary responsibility for academic matters. The authors also recommended significantly increased communication between the board and the senate to be achieved by faculty members on the board, external members on the senate, and dispute resolution through joint board/senate committees.

With respect to student representation in university governance, Duff and Berdahl emphasised satisfying students as "customers" of the university for fear that the Canadian students might take the path of Berkeley students to resolve their grievances. The authors recommended means to channel student sentiment constructively, including joint faculty/student committees in departments and faculties, and student representation on senate and appropriate senate subcommittees. On the matter of board representation, Duff & Berdahl recommended the practice of Scottish universities (and Queen's University) to elect a non-student rector to represent the students at the board. Even though Duff and Berdahl appreciated the role students could play in university governance, they were anxious that students exercise any new power in a responsible fashion; warning students, for example, against seeking the dismissal of "reactionary" professors and of airing "the university's dirt linen" in public. Duff and Berdahl did not believe these proposals would satisfy hard-line demands for a significant student role in governance, but they did hope that their proposals might satisfy a sufficient number of students to rob the hardliners of their support.

Although impressed by the commission and its report, CUS found the outcome flawed. They objected to the premise that faculty and student involvement in governance was necessary only to avoid the problems of Berkeley. Rather, they argued faculty and student involvement was necessary to realise the ideal of the university as intellectual community, and that Berkeley was the result of an administration failing to act on this principle, instead treating student protestors as recalcitrant children, or upset consumers of the educational product. Consequently, CUS rejected the recommendation that students be indirectly represented on university boards of governors and argued for a more definite and expanded role for students.

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43 CUS, "CUS Brief to the Duff Commission" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, February 17, 1965, mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 4.
44 Duff and Berdahl, University Government in Canada, 7-11, 23-26, 28-37.
on senates. This, CUS argued, would embody “the vital relationship of faculty to student, of two individuals seeking after truth from different planes of knowledge.”

Where CUS was measured, but insistent, in its criticism of the Duff/Berdahl report, activist Howard Adelman was aggressive. Adelman, the driving force behind Rochdale College and a panelist at the previous summer’s CUS Seminar on governance, attacked the report as offering students tokenism for the sake of campus peace: “Consider the demands of students because if you don’t their tactics will become even worse. ...Give in fear. Give not because of the benefit that giving will provide for the community as a whole by creating a greater community for all, but in the interest of a peaceful if totally unjust settlement of those grievances.” Underlying this attitude, Adelman contended, was the assumption that the university is merely an educational public service organisation and not a community engaged in discovering and propagating “truth.” Were it otherwise, then the authors would have approached the matter by asking why and how the external community should be involved in university governance, rather than asking about the role of students and faculty.

Reform - Difficult but not Impossible

Under the political and intellectual framework established at the 1965 seminar (distributed to member associations in July 1966) and the political impetus provided by the unfavourable Duff/Berdahl report, students were primed at the 1966 Congress at Dalhousie University to press for substantive student representation in university governance. In a discussion paper prepared for the Congress, UBC AMS Vice President Charlie Baylon started from Patrick Kenniff’s commentary on the Duff/Berdahl report and expanded the analysis to detail the relationship between the University of British Columbia and the business elite who dominated the board of governors. This relationship was not accidental, Baylon argued, noting the comments from an official of the Algoma Steel Corporation about the need of the business world to concern itself with all aspects of the university in order to prepare the employees it needed and, more generally, to assure the quality of universities, including monitoring the “moral fibre” of those who teach young people. With examples of how this corporate attention had negatively manifested itself at several North American universities, Baylon asserted that students should give this matter their instant attention. He proposed a full program of activity, starting with a study of governance structures on each campus, leading to actions to realise the ideal of the university of community of scholars and students. The task, he stated, “will be difficult, but it is not impossible. If we address ourselves with Kenniff’s proposals to the situation as it really is, we can begin the long process of leading our constituency towards a reorganization of university government.”

Kenniff himself encouraged delegates, in his final report to the Congress, to make university government and higher education funding the top two priorities for the coming year. He noted that university administrations were taking action on the “patently unsatisfactory” Duff/Berdahl report and thus students had only a short time to make any significant changes to

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The response from Congress delegates was to adopt resolution EA-8 “Democracy within the University Community,” which reaffirmed the CUS position that students were full and equal members of the university community and that student participation was a necessary condition for the proper educational functioning of the institution. The resolution also implemented Baylon’s proposal for individual student associations to assess the state of governance on their campuses and consider how students could fully participate through modification or reform of campus governance. The Congress also adopted related resolutions dealing with open decision-making and academic freedom, thus staking out their territory as full participants in the university community.

After the Congress, a program outline was distributed to member associations detailing how the studies of governance should proceed, and how associations could compel university administrations to make the necessary changes to governance. Key to this campaign to publicly make the case for accountability of the board of governors for expenditure of public funds, to point out how the current governance was failing students (for example in the matters of student transfer from technical institutions to universities), and to publicise breaches of academic freedom perpetrated or perpetuated by current governance structures. The program outline went beyond the Congress resolution to propose an action plan for reform of university governance to make a “real academic community.” Suggested activities included joint faculty-student projects such as planning a student union building, collaboration on CUS campaigns, cooperation on anti-calendars and academic guidebooks, debates on curriculum and academic procedures, mock university governments (similar to mock parliaments) to serve as models of ideal university governance, and co-hosting orientation seminars for new students. In this manner, governance could move beyond the mere securing of seats on governing bodies to embrace the total involvement of students in the university community.

The theme of university community was central to the speech made by new CUS President Doug Ward to the annual meeting of the AUCC on October 27, 1966. He started provocatively by supposing that if students were not part of a scholarly community, then they might be better described as “higher manpower units,” to be delivered to employers upon completion of “processing” at university. The loss of community, Ward argued, was largely attributed to the success of the university in preparing young people for professional employment. Consequently, students flocked to the universities to earn their “meal-tickets” and in doing so gave up the development of critical facilities for personal and social freedom in favour of “the comfortable silk nooses of control by sagacious and benign technocrats.” He went on to articulate a vision of the university, to a gathering of university administrators, where the administrators are truly subservient to the academic community and that the goal of efficiency is only relevant to the extent it contributes to “sustain[ing] and encourag[ing] intellectual growth and excellence.” Ward’s presentation also suggested to administrators several “outs” by which they might try to placate students along the lines suggested by the Duff/Berdahl report, but his prescription was for fundamental restructuring of the relationship amongst students, faculty and administrators to “allow the community of scholars to thrive, both as a place of liberty and a place of relevance.” Ward conceded the universities were not yet ready for

49 Kenniff, “President’s Report - 1965-66.”
50 CUS, “Resolutions 1966 - 30th Congress” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, 1966, mimeographed), 6-7, ACUS, NFCUS 3A. See Appendix B.4 for the full text of the resolution.
51 CUS, “Resolutions 1966,” 7-8. See Appendices B.5 and B.6 for the full text of these resolutions.
52 John Cleveland, “Program Outline - Democracy in the University Community” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [September 1966], mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 28.
primary restructuring but that there were opportunities to make progress towards the idealised community, which might well include placing students on governing bodies. Such actions were only interim measures, though, to improve communications towards the goal of educating “a generation which will have a passion to take hold of life and of the potential of the intellect.”

Ward had put the administrators and the public, through news reporting on the event, on notice that students had expectations for institutional change in the coming year.

Throughout the fall of 1966 and spring of 1967, student associations across the country prepared their analyses of campus governance and advocated change. For some, the desired changes were small: University of New Brunswick students wanted representation on some committees and an observer at senate meetings; Kings’ College students achieved a joint curriculum committee in the school of divinity, a joint committee on admission to university residences, and joint meetings on relations between faculty and students; University of Saskatchewan students sought open-decision making and representation on committees of direct interest to students. Many associations pressed for direct representation on boards of governors and senates (for example, Carleton, Manitoba, Toronto, Calgary, Acadia, UBC). The student association at the University of Victoria went even further, calling for an overhaul of governance along the lines proposed by Ward by placing student representatives on all decision-making bodies of the university.

The first major victory in this campaign came at the University of Calgary, where on January 27, 1967, students were given three voting positions on the General Faculties Council, the senior academic decision-making body, for a one-year trial. Students at the University of Alberta in Edmonton had earlier achieved a seat on the university senate, but in Alberta the senate was a large advisory body and exercised no real power. The next success was at the University of British Columbia where on May 24, 1967 the UBC Senate agreed to add four voting student senator positions as the result of a November 1966 brief and subsequent lobbying by the student association.

Despite these successes, there remained much distrust of student participation in university governance. The views expressed in Duff/Berdahl about student unreliability, immaturity and general lack of suitability to the task persisted on campus. Moreover, there was general unease amongst the more conservative elements in society that permitting students any role in institutional governance was akin to letting the inmates run the asylum. The editor of the London Free Press devoted a substantial amount of space on April 1, 1967 to rebutting the arguments for student representation and to arguing that student participation would open the doors to radical organisations infiltrating the university power structures.

The impetus for this broadside from the press was the initial success of University of Western Ontario students in securing legislative change for student participation in governance.

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53 Doug Ward, “The Student and the University” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, October 27, 1966, mimeographed), 1-6, NAC, 6, October 1966.
54 David McLean, “Brief to the President’s Committee Submitted by the Students’ Council” (University of Victoria Alma Mater Society, Victoria, July 21, 1967, mimeographed), 1, ACUS, CUS 61.
56 University of British Columbia, “The Senate of the University of B.C. has decided to open its membership to students” (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, May 29, 1967, mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 61.
although they would ultimately fail in June 1967. Attempts to convince the university to request the legislature to include a voting student position on the board of governors failed, but the students persevered and succeeded in convincing the private bills committee of the Ontario legislature of their position. A.B.R. Lawrence, Conservative chairman of the committee, said, "that to deny the students direct representation would be to practice apartheid, 'where the white man represents the Negroes.'" Alarmed by this turn of events, Ontario university presidents argued that for a legislative committee to substitute its judgment for the original request made by the university amounted to government interference in institutional autonomy. After much argument, the students sensed defeat and asked the minister responsible for universities to withdraw the bill and deal with it in the next session. Although the minister agreed to do so, the government caucus decided to go ahead with the bill in the original form requested by the university. Some dubious manipulations of legislature rules outraged a number of Conservative backbenchers, who were prepared, as a result, to side with the students and vote against the bill. A last minute intervention by the premier in favour of the university version of the bill left only Lawrence standing with the opposition members in support of the students.58

Seeds of Discontent

CUS's political shift, evidenced by revision of the universal accessibility policy in 1966 and the rhetoric leading up to and following the adoption of the academocracy motions that year, did not sit well with all the member associations. The latent suspicion of and low-key opposition to the 1965 universal accessibility resolution was given new life in the summer of 1966. Formerly a strong supporter of CUS programs, the University of Alberta Students' Union went on the offensive against those same programs when Branny Schepanovich was elected president of the union in 1966. The offensive began in May when, at the urging of the University of Alberta Students' Union, the Western Regional CUS Conference adopted a resolution calling for a "thorough examination and evaluation of CUS, its objectives and operations," ostensibly for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of the organisation.59 Marilyn Pilkington, Schepanovich's Vice-President, initiated discussion of the matter in a July 18, 1966 letter to CUS President-Elect Doug Ward where she criticised CUS for imposing policy from above without regard to what students need and desire. She illustrated her argument with the example of the 1965 universal accessibility resolution endorsed by the Students' Union, claiming that no attempt had been made to canvass local student opinion prior to endorsing the CUS position and that "a considerable proportion of U. of A. students do not favor free tuition at the university level." She further criticised CUS policy as representing "the aspirations and concerns of a small, and to some extent, self-perpetuating, group of student leaders."60

Schepanovich adopted Pilkington's position as his own and in August wrote to all student associations across the country urging adoption at the upcoming Dalhousie Congress of the proposal to evaluate CUS, using the opportunity to unleash a barrage of charges against the organisation. In his letter, Schepanovich argued that CUS over extended itself by adopting positions on international and national political affairs, CUS had done an inadequate job of communicating with students, CUS had adopted positions and lobbying techniques "beyond the comprehension of students," CUS was unrepresentative of all Canadian students, and the

59 Branny Schepanovich, Letter to Peter Braund, 24 August 1966, 1, CUSUBC, 17, 2.
CUS national secretariat was free to choose what Congress resolutions they would implement. There were grains of truth in Schepanovich's arguments. Many member student associations had expressed misgivings about CUS taking positions on general political issues, but NFCUS also had suffered from this problem. CUS did not communicate extensively with individual students because it relied upon local student associations to represent campus views to CUS and, in turn, represent CUS programs to the campus. CUS was becoming more sophisticated in its policy development and its lobbying techniques, but since university students initiated these approaches, the approaches were within the capabilities of students generally. Although CUS did not represent most of the students in Québec, this was in part because its programs were not radical enough, and if the programs were more radical they would have lost members elsewhere. The national secretariat did have a fair amount of latitude in how to implement resolutions, but secretariat staff members were accountable to a president and executive committee elected by the Congress.

Underlying Schepanovich's missive was a desire to restrict CUS activity by requiring the organisation to "show how a problem is a student problem before it has a right to deal with it." This proposal was first advanced by Pilkington at the CUS Seminar in Waterloo, Ontario, August 27th through September 3rd. Even after linking up with Colin Gravenor, a law student at McGill University who had worked to keep McGill out of UGEQ, Pilkington was unsuccessful in winning converts or provoking confrontation. Schepanovich was much more successful at the Congress the following week where he succeeded in generating so much hatred towards himself and his Students' Union that authors of a story about the meeting in the University of Alberta student paper, The Gateway, confessed to not being able to print comments by Congress delegates about Schepanovich for fear of violating public decency. Schepanovich's assault on CUS was capped off by comments to The Gateway and the Edmonton Journal claiming CUS was Communist influenced. The subsequent disaffiliation of the University of Alberta Students' Union from CUS came as little surprise.

Although Schepanovich was the most outspoken opponent to CUS's new direction, his was not the only dissent. The McGill delegation to the 1966 Congress reported on their failed efforts to make CUS "non-political" by limiting its role to providing services and serving as means of contact between student associations. The Congress delegates from Bishops' University wrote in their report that "student activists gained control and decided it was right, and indeed the duty of student councils to articulate and lead student opinion on everything from parking rules to the war in Viet Nam." J.W. Coombs, CUS Chairman at Acadia University resigned his post November 21, 1966 echoing in his final report the criticisms raised by Schepanovich. Coombs went as far to claim financial barriers to higher education had largely been removed and CUS should not even contemplate continued work on social barriers.

The CUS response to these criticisms and the subsequent disaffiliations by Alberta, Bishops, Loyola, Marianopolis, Mount St. Vincent, St. Dunstan's and Memorial was to minimise the

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63 Campbell, "The Weird and Wacky."
65 Andrew Sancton, Nick Busing, and Maida de Stein, "Report of the Bishop's University Delegation to the Thirtieth Congress of the Canadian Union of Students" (Students' Representative Council of Bishop's University, Lennoxville, Québec, September 19, 1966, mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 20.
characterisation of a “left-right split.” Although admitting this depiction might be accurate for Alberta and Bishop’s, CUS Vice President David Young said in a letter to a St. Catherine’s Standard reporter the division might be better explained by “the ‘sandbox’ or ‘service station’ theory of student government” held by those associations. In the case of the other associations, Young advanced explanations particular to each campus and not attributable to a general political division. Young said CUS’s weaknesses were explained by a lack of profile on campus, but that the problem was being rectified by the production of a national newsletter, concrete guides for implementation of CUS programs, and the Associate Secretaries visiting campuses in order to provide a stronger link between CUS and local associations and activists. Moreover, in a March 1967 CUS newsletter article, Ward pushed back against the dissidents indicating the main problem was the “great discrepancy between what student council delegates advocate at CUS congresses and they do back on their campuses,” using CUS as “a ceremonial or ‘front’ organization for the aspirations of student leaders who have one set of priorities for ‘national’ work ... and another set for their local work.” Although this was true, it was equally true the CUS leadership was moving further down the road of dealing with higher education “within the whole context of society” and making calculations “about the extent to which [they were] prepared to or want to arouse the ire of [their] constituency” to do so.

The Decline of SUPA

Despite the problems encountered in the 1965 summer projects, many participants at SUPA’s Fall Institute believed the organisation was becoming the dominant force in New Left social change in Canada. Squabbling over participatory democracy and decentralisation within the organisation left SUPA with only two programs—the School for Social Theory and the Research, Information and Publications Project—mainly carried out by people around Toronto. The other activists returned to their campuses to organise around Vietnam, relevant curriculum, free universities and the like. The absence of a central program, administration and money left a vacuum into which stepped the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), a federal government project established in 1965 on the model of the Peace Corps in the United States to put young people to work for community-based social change. The SUPA Fall Institute had been funded by the CYC and CYC observers attended the meeting to gather ideas for their own projects. The allure of salaries, offices and publicity proved too great for some SUPA stalwarts and they were lured away that fall to work for the CYC.

Defections to the CYC coupled with a lack of success in the fall community and campus projects cast a gloom over the December 1965 SUPA conference in Saskatoon. The myth of SUPA “taking the country by storm” had been shattered and delegates questioned whether community organising was really the means to revolutionary change. Rather than dealing with the practical problems, project organisers took the criticisms as personal defeats and other delegates lamented the failings of “the vanguard of the new system.” All went home.

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demoralised and stuck in old patterns of thought and action. The only new program to arise out of the conference was a Canada/Vietnam Week to protest Canada’s complicity in the Vietnam War. The program was to serve three purposes, to reinvigorate the membership with a project they knew how to carry out, to shift the organisation away from community organising, and to give the organisation a new political edge. Work on the protest was plagued by infighting between those SUPA members who wanted a traditional, well-planned action reminiscent of the glory days of the CUCND, and those who favoured an on-going, open-ended discussion by participants about how the action should proceed like the Selma protests of the previous spring. The two camps could not be reconciled and Canada/Vietnam Week failed for lack of interest from the old peace movement, and lack of support from the new movement because of the perception it was an elite, top-down action. For many SUPA members this was the last straw and they left the organisation.74

By spring 1966, SUPA was hardly an organisation at all. The spring membership conference was postponed in favour of a modest study conference held with the assistance of another organisation, the Committee for Seminars on Canada. This conference was successful in developing a radical political analysis of Canada, but the capacity for SUPA to act on that analysis was fading quickly and several of the old leaders left for the CYC, CUS, other organisations and their own projects. With no summer activities planned and only aspirations for campus activity in the fall, the remnants of SUPA worked on holding together the remaining members by exchanging information through the newsletter and duplicated papers and articles. The December 1966 Waterloo Conference marked a minor resurgence with 100 people coming together for low-key discussions of youth, the university, poverty, Canada’s colonialism and the like. These discussions renewed the desire for political analysis on which to base activities, and the Draft Manifesto Committee was created to articulate a new left ideology for youth of the country, but the document was never written.75

About forty SUPA members, including a few of the older leaders, came together September 5th to 10th, 1967 in Goderich, Ontario for a federal membership conference. As factions split over the details of Marxist analysis, it became clear SUPA was a spent force and the decision was made to formally dissolve the organisation. A self-appointed successor group, the New Left Committee, picked up the pieces and attempted to coalesce the Canadian New Left around itself, but it only managed to produce a few newsletters and then evaporate.76 With the demise of SUPA, CUS became the only campus-based organisation for the remnants of Canada’s New Left to advance its ideas.

SDS – From Protest to Resistance

Despite a successful protest against the Vietnam War in Washington, D.C. in April 1965 (including student contingents from Ontario and British Columbia), the SDS was at a loss as how to respond to the growing popular movement against the Vietnam War. The September National Council meeting entertained a full range of positions from calling for negotiations with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) to an outright withdrawal of American forces. Suggested SDS tactics ranged from an international student strike, to sending work

crews to rebuild schools destroyed by American attacks, to blockading troop trains, to sending American "hostages" to North Vietnam to deter attacks, to resisting the draft. There was no strong conclusion to the debate, but a program was adopted consisting of a mobilisation for a mid-October march in Washington, D.C., campus-based education activities on Vietnam and the antiwar movement, and a membership vote on a draft plan to mobilise draft-age young people against the war. This latter element became the most contentious.  

In the days leading up to the October 15th and 16th marches, politicians and the media seized upon the proposal for various legal means to oppose the draft and portrayed it as an illegal attempt to undermine American policy and "sabotage the war effort." The public attention contributed to what was the most successful antiwar march to date as 80,000 to 100,000 people took part in protests in more than 90 cities. Unsure of how to handle the attention, SDS National Secretary Paul Booth made a press statement outlining a plan to encourage young men to file for conscientious objector status, a position too moderate for many SDS members and announced without any organisational approval to do so. Nonetheless, the attention propelled SDS into the forefront of the antiwar movement and was capitalised upon by SDS President Carl Oglesby in a speech to the Thanksgiving march in Washington organised by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Oglesby dissected American liberalism, laying bare its contradictions, and articulated the "humanist" reformation that the radicals were seeking. The passionate and skillful presentation drew the only standing ovation of the afternoon and garnered attention as a "declaration of independence" from traditional liberalism and a "call to arms" for social, political and economic change.

Antiwar activity heated up again in the spring of 1966 due to the U.S. federal government decision to start drafting lower-performing male students by way of institutional rankings and a national examination to assess intelligence and achievement. The SDS, anxious for an activity that would affirm its leading position in the antiwar movement, created their own version of the exam designed to educate about the Vietnam War. With an effort rivaling the organisation of the April 1965 march, 500,000 copies of the exam were distributed at 850 of the 1200 testing centres across the country, yet the action failed to garner significant media coverage and SDS was criticised by other organisations for "copping out" on the opportunity for a militant anti-draft program.

The melancholy of that spring was swept away at the August 1966 annual convention in Clear Lake, Iowa where delegates were captivated by a paper written by University of Nebraska student Carl Davidson entitled *A Student Syndicalist Movement: University Reform Revisited*, in which Davidson proposed SDS return to its campus roots for the purpose of radically transforming the university by putting students in charge. This student syndicalist movement would then have a mass base from which to carry out radical societal change. Disenchanted by narrow antiwar organising, pushed out of civil rights and anti-poverty movements by Stokeley Carmichael's spring announcement that SNCC was going to be organised by blacks for blacks, and believing that working with the labour movement was old-fashioned, delegates latched on to "student power" as the means towards creating radicals.

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77 Sale, SDS, 185-186, 225-228.
78 Sale, SDS, 231-235, 241-245.
79 Sale, SDS, 253-255.
Fall 1966 marked the beginning of active student resistance as SDS organisers arrived on campuses looking for individuals to organise around local grievances. Although there were many such complaints, student protests tended to be directed at non-campus issues, mainly the Vietnam War and the complicity of the universities in the war by conducting research and allowing military and corporate recruiters on campus. SDS-provoked confrontations at Berkeley with Navy recruiters and at Harvard with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara underscored the continued refusal of administrations to engage student grievances, despite the lessons of Berkeley in late 1964 and early 1965. Meanwhile, a spontaneous anti-draft movement was building across the country, in some cases aided by local SDS chapters. The national SDS responded at the December 1966 National Council by adopting a plan for draft resistance. The core of this plan was to organise draft resisters unions for the purposes of supporting the decision of young men not to be drafted and educating the public about the “immoral, illegal and genocidal war” in Vietnam. The principle behind the program was the same as that articulated in Davidson’s syndicalism paper, working with students on student problems as a means of educating towards revolutionary consciousness. By the end of 1966, SDS has truly moved “from protest to resistance.”

While draft-resistance activities continued through the spring (including the organising of more than 60 anti-draft unions, a group draft card burning in New York City in mid April, and ongoing campus protests against university complicity in the war), the leadership debated the need for an SDS “ideology” to consolidate its current position and point the way to the future. Despite the chaotic nature of the organisation, it never lacked for principles and proto-ideologies to guide its actions. By this point, it was seeking a broader perspective to encompass the war, the military, university governance, complicity, corporate liberalism and the like in order to develop a revolutionary consciousness. The answer came in the concept of “the new working class” articulated by Bob Gottlieb, Gerry Tenny and Dave Gilbert, (students at the New School for Social Research) in a paper for the Radical Education Project in the spring of 1967. The concept revolved around the idea that the growth in professional and para-professional employment after the Second World War had created a new class of worker who, despite greater education and prestige of employment, still fulfilled the role the workers always had in a capitalist economy. Therefore, the route to revolutionary reform was to be found in organising and radicalising this new class of workers, and what better place to start than in their training centres—the universities. Although the idea of the new working class had been around for some time—developed by C. Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse and others—SDS popularised the concept with the North American left by adopting it as their official ideology.

CUS also was seeking a set of principles to guide its policy development. Unlike the SDS, these principles would not come from the crucible of ideological debate, but would evolve as the CUS leadership tested the limits of what the membership would accept. As campus leaders took an increasingly activist approach to campus grievances and political programs, the tentative steps towards a critique of society found in the early universal accessibility and academocracy policies were replaced by pointed criticism of administrative and corporate control of the education enterprise. CUS policies and actions were progressively taking on the language and stance of the New Left. Although this resulted in some student associations leaving the organisation, CUS’s leaders continued to enjoy the support of the majority of student associations and were unapologetic. With the collapse of SUPA, a new level of political analysis would be brought to CUS.

81 Sale, SDS, 298-305, 312-316.
Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Dissolution: September 1967 to December 1969

The transition in CUS’s universal accessibility policy from ameliorating economic and social barriers to questioning the sources of those barriers represented a substantial shift in political thought. Although fundamentally still an equality of opportunity position, the 1966 policy, bolstered by Student Means Survey report, raised questions about why certain types of people were better able to take advantage of education opportunities. The majority of member associations accepted the need for CUS to be more critical of the effectiveness of student financial assistance programs, but the extent of that criticism remained a source of anxiety for many associations. Moreover, a significant minority of member associations viewed any form of assistance beyond student loans as the thin end of a socialist wedge.

The situation was similar in the evolution of CUS’s academic democracy policy. Even though most member associations saw the value in student perspectives in institutional governance, the idea that the university was an intellectual community to which they, as students, were demanding their full participation was somewhat foreign. The dissident student associations probably were not too far removed from general student opinion when they said they had no interest in governing the institution, only in being treated as adults while living in residence and in having a better selection of food in campus cafeterias. Nonetheless, the universal accessibility program and the Student Means Survey had garnered CUS a great deal of attention and respect, and that social and political capital was to be used to press for a greater student role in the governance of the universities.

The leaders of CUS and of local student associations and were becoming more sophisticated in analysing educational and social problems. The baby boomers who had cut their teeth on the “ban the bomb” and social justice movements were turning to student organisations to continue their search for alternatives to the present organisation of society and the economy. Students and young people were encouraged by the examples of activists in the United States. CUS and the campuses were ripe for change.

This chapter will examine the transformation of CUS into a “social union,” its effect on the universal accessibility and academocracy policies, and the consequences for relations with member associations. The rise of “student power” both on Canadian campuses and internationally will also be explored. Finally, this chapter will recount the backlash against CUS, the attempts to rebuild the organisation, and the ultimate slide in dissolution.

Social Unionism

CUS, and NFCUS before it, had long been involved in “non-student” matters, primarily in the realm of international affairs, but these policies seldom played a significant role in day-to-day operations. Growing resistance to the Vietnam War in the United States had its effect in Canada as SUPA and ad hoc campus groups took active roles protesting the war and helping American draft dodgers. CUS was pulled into the Vietnam debate in the fall of 1966 by false rumours it was providing housing for draft dodgers. Although Vietnam had been discussed
within CUS since late 1965, it was not until the summer of 1967 that student associations were requesting CUS action on the “dirty war.” Other student associations were opposed to such action, some because of conflicting political views, and others because they believed such matters diverted CUS from its core responsibilities. “CUS is not an organization designed to fight everybody’s battles,” wrote University of British Columbia CUS Chairman Steve Beckow in an August 1967 letter to the CUS Secretariat. “Students started the CUS game going to win some of their battles. You know yourself, from hearing it many times, if CUS doesn’t fight for the student, and for higher education, very few others will.”

Since its creation in 1963, CUS had progressively expanded its policy domain to include political and social matters unrelated to students’ educational needs (such as the plight of Canadian Indians and Blacks, and the right of postal workers to strike). This expansion was a consequence of the early debates about Québec and student syndicalism, and of the expansion of universal accessibility to include criticism of social and economic inequity. It was also the result of student desire to use student associations, SUPA and religious and political groups to question why their society was the way it was. With SUPA’s imminent demise, a number of their members turned to CUS as their outlet for activism. Peter Warrian, for example, had spent time as a SUPA activist and worker in the American civil rights movement and brought to CUS the conviction that the organisation had to be a “social union”; a view shared by CUS President-elect Hugh Armstrong and Associate Secretary John Cleveland.

Social unionism is the theory and practice of associations reaching beyond the immediate interests of their members to involve themselves in ameliorating the conditions of marginalised persons. By doing so, the social unionists hope to indirectly improve the quality of life for the members and their members’ families. Warrian, Armstrong, Cleveland and others thought that CUS should adopt this perspective. Discussion of CUS’s role in society generally had been soft peddled since the fight with Branny Schepanovich at the 1966 Congress, but would return in earnest at the 1967 Congress.

Papers prepared for the 31st Congress at the University of Western Ontario, September 2nd to 9th, 1967, included not only discussions of the usual practical matters — student union buildings, student counseling services, course transferability between institutions, student housing — but also sharp political criticism of capitalist society and of CUS’s middling positions on universal accessibility and academic democracy. One author criticised academic democracy as merely appealing to the myth of the “intellectual purity” of a “community of scholars,” whereas the real purpose of student control of the university should be to develop a syndicalist mindset so that once they graduate these newly minted workers would demand control of production. The solution, according to another author, was for CUS to develop an ideology — defined as “a coherent set of beliefs about the nature of society and the social values and goals that are desirable” — on which to base subsequent criticism and action. Associate Secretary John Cleveland applied this argument about ideology in his response to the CUS Board of Directors.

2 Steve Beckow, Letter to Carol Wilson, 16 August 1967, ACUS, CUS 33.
3 John Bordo, “Situation of the New Left” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, August 1967, mimeographed), 12, NAC, 9, August 1967.
4 Grant Amyot, “Strategies for Academic Reform” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, August 1967, mimeographed), 1, NAC, 9, August 1967.
discussion paper on the structure of the organisation by analysing how the proposed structure failed to advance "the theory and practice of social unionism." 5

The challenge to take up social unionism was also put to delegates by UGEQ President Pierre LeFrançois, who asked in his speech to delegates: "Are Canadian students prepared to place themselves in the midst of a struggle for their national independence and their national re-orientation? Are Canadian students prepared to see themselves as active, productive members of their society, capable of effecting fundamental social change?" 6 The answer from delegates was in the election of Peter Warrian as CUS President for 1968-69, and an extension of the universal accessibility and academocracy policies to include action on more barriers to higher education and to bring the community into the governance of the university.

The revised policy on universal accessibility called for the complete abolition of tuition fees (rather than the "progressive abolition" of the year before), expanded the concept of student stipends by mandating a study of a national guaranteed minimum income, and further refined implementation activities to solicit community support for the policy. 7 The biggest change was the expansion of universal accessibility to include as a barrier the failure of the education system to relate learning to life experience, to stimulate the natural desire to learn, and to encourage individual and creative expression. By proposing that education be more relevant to students' life experiences, CUS was seeking to improve participation from those underrepresented groups dissuaded by the alien nature of academe. This call for curricular reform was also a means to integrate universal accessibility with the emerging critique of the "service station" approach to educating students to fill the needs of the business. This criticism had three objectives: to increase Canadian content, to incorporate a critique of western capitalist society, and to meet the individual needs and desires of students. 8 As incoming President Hugh Armstrong said in his introductory comments to Congress:

CUS should continue to focus on the related questions of who gets at education and what kind of education there is to get at. There is no sense dealing with one question and not with the other. Equality of opportunity to a poor education system is fruitless, while a good educational system which is reserved for an economic elite is not worth fighting for. 9

The revised academocracy policy went far beyond the 1966 policy by demanding that institutions be governed by representatives of students, faculty, support staff and administration, by proposing the creation of advisory committees of "representatives of the various socio-economic groups within the wider community", and by advocating

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6 Pierre LeFrançois, "Text of speech of M. Pierre Francois, President, Union générale des etudiants du Quebec, delivered, September 6, 1967, to Congress of CUS" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, September 1967, mimeographed), 3-4, NAC, 9, August 1967
7 CUS, "Resolutions 1967 - XXXIst Congress" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, 1967, mimeographed), 11-15, ACUS, NFCUS 3A. See Appendix B.7 for the full text of the resolution.
8 For a full discussion of 1960's student critique of curriculum see Jasen, "In Pursuit of Human Values."
9 Hugh Armstrong, "Opening remarks by Hugh Armstrong, President-elect of CUS at the opening plenary of the CUS Congress, September 2, 1967" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, September 1967, mimeographed), 2, NAC, 9, August 1967.
"confrontation or cooperation" as necessary to achieve these ends. Similarly, the revised policy on open decision making more closely proscribed the use of secret decision making than did the 1966 policy and required that the participants in closed deliberations be accountable to their constituents for their actions. With these changes, CUS’s policy now matched the rhetorical position forcefully advocated over the previous year by Doug Ward of moving beyond mere representation in campus decision making to become a driving force in institutional governance.

Despite these significant policy changes, delegates thought the Congress was a failure. Writing shortly after the Congress, Associate Secretary Carol Wilson described the policies resulting from the Congress as mushy compromises designed to “hold the union together” and to suppress ideological differences. An assessment a few months later characterised the problem not so much as an attempt to mask ideological differences, but to bridge the gulf between the politically sophisticated minority of delegates and the relatively uninformed majority. The “somewhat mystified” majority frustrated those delegates who came “prepared to make major policy advances” and in the end neither was satisfied. Nonetheless, the activists had obtained the necessary mandates to move ahead on universal accessibility and academocracy and in doing so had moved CUS closer to being a social union.

Student Power

Although many student associations approached academocracy in a non-confrontational fashion, the reports of conflicts on American campuses coupled with the occasional flare-up at Canadian institutions created public unease. An April 1967 article in the Calgary Herald questioned the motivation for academocracy, raising the possibility of “far left or far right” external forces determining CUS’s activities. A disagreement over the role of students in university governance at the University of Saskatchewan spilled into the press in May 1967 with charges by the institution’s president that the officers of the Students’ Representative Council were unrepresentative of the student body and pursuing their own interests at the expense of the university. CUS President Doug Ward attributed such outbursts to paranoia on the part of newspaper editors and university presidents, but acknowledged later that summer that growing public anxiety about students was the probable reason student grievances were getting much more media attention. Moreover, he suspected “that this interest will continue in the coming year, especially as I look at the people who are going to be presidents of the student governments!”

Although the revised academocracy policy statement adopted at the 1967 Congress more forcefully put the case for governance reform, the academocracy campaign, like the universal accessibility campaign, suffered from the incomprehension and indifference of student

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13 Brian Hutchison, “XXXIst Congress: An Assessment” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [November 1967], mimeographed), 1, NAC, 10, November 1967.
14 “External Pressures ‘May Dictate’ Militant Campus Groups’ Motives,” Calgary Herald, [April 1?
1967], ACUS, CUS 20.
17 Ward, Letter to Morrisette, 1.
association councils. CUS Associate Secretary Bob Baldwin wrote a short paper in October 1967 to explain deeper meaning of academocracy. He argued that the campaign for academocracy had been overly concerned with the mechanics of governance and student representation and neglectful of the function of the university's constituent parts (for instance, students, faculty, administrators, and support staff). Without such understanding students would simply push the institution to "move from one inappropriate governing structure to another equally inappropriate one." Students should come to see how education was depriving them of their "potential to cope with a free and democratic society," he argued, and therefore any meaningful reform of governance must start in the classroom.18

The route to governance reform was not always through student associations. On November 4, 1967 the McGill University administration charged an editor and two student journalists at the McGill Daily with "obscene libel" in response to the publication in the November 3rd edition of the paper a satirical article from The Realist containing a description of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson performing an act of necrophilia on the corpse of John F. Kennedy. Although student opinion was initially against the students charged, a campaign by McGill's Students for a Democratic University (SDU) quickly turned opinion in favour of the student journalists.

SDU printed a four-page paper in which it reprinted the offending article along with quotations about obscenity and satire from English literature and their own position against administration interference in student affairs. The publication listed 31 students and faculty members as the editorial board and challenged the administration to charge these people for repeating the original offense. The Students' Society of McGill University refused to take a position on the matter at its November 6th meeting, and November 7th attempts by the SDU to negotiate a withdrawal of the charges failed. When news of the failed negotiations reached protestors, about 400 students forced their way into and occupied the administration building, thus delaying the disciplinary proceedings. The next day, the senate made a number of concessions, including putting two voting student representatives on the disciplinary committee, removing two administration representatives, and setting up a commission on university government. As a result the SDU ceased its sit in, but a small group of students unaffiliated with SDU stayed on. That group subsequently broke into the President's Office on November 9th, resulting in the administration calling the police to remove the occupiers. Protestors outside the building became agitated upon learning the police had been called in and refused to disperse, leading to the arrest of SDU leader Stanley Gray on trumped-up charges of assaulting an officer. Gray was subsequently acquitted when a photograph was published clearly contradicting the administration's story that Gray had started the incident by striking a police officer. The administration's credibility had almost disappeared. The following week the previously quiescent Students' Society called for the administration to cease proceedings against the student journalists.19

Although CUS did not participate in the McGill protest, it publicised the event and circulated a subsequent report by David Ticoll, a student member of the Tripartitie Commission on the Nature of the University established by the senate in response to the SDU protests. Ticoll (much as Baldwin had done earlier) argued that the university cannot be separated from its

18 Bob Baldwin, "Academocracy" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [October 1967], mimeographed), RC.
social context, and that McGill, in particular, was a product of Montréal’s English elite, who urged the university to serve government (in the First and Second World Wars) and industry. He argued this service sacrificed the creativity and intellectual development of students for the sake of creating pliant employees and therein was the fundamental challenge in redefining the nature and governance of the institution. Ticoll argued the university must turn away from corporate and governmental service and toward “meaningful and viable alternatives to the values, structures and priorities of the North American corporate system.”

A January 1968 report from a subcommittee of Committee of Presidents of the Universities of Ontario (CPUO) contested the idea the universities were servants to government and industry. Although acknowledging the universities’ role in “supplying expertise to governments and other agencies,” the report’s authors claimed this would produce “solutions for all the problems of man’s environment, enmity, enjoyment and aspirations.” The fundamental mission of the universities, according to the report, remained “the preservation, transmission and increase and knowledge,” and administrators served the “community of scholars” however imperfectly. Democracy, the authors argued, was desirable only when government limits the rights of individuals for the sake of societal security and order. Universities are not about maintaining order, but rather about promoting intellectual excellence, they argued. Therefore, a political democracy, constituting inexpert opinion, is an inappropriate model. Although acknowledging the valuable contributions of students at the early stages of policy formation, the reports authors contended, as did Duff and Berdahl the year before, that the responsibilities of board of governors membership was too complex, too sensitive, and too time consuming to be carried out well by students on a consistent basis. Moreover, the report charged that students on governing boards might be subverted by “well-organized national and provincial student associations ... geared for political action and hungry for power” and persuaded to sacrifice the good of the institution “in order to increase student solidarity and power” — a position the authors justified by reference to directives from and statements by CUS officers.

The CPUO definition of democracy was fundamentally at odds with the CUS definition. For the CPUO, democracy was about the functional mechanisms of governance. Majority rule by universal suffrage of the university “community” could only be a “right” to the extent the governors of the university constrained individual rights for the sake of community order and security. As voluntary participants in an organisation lacking the coercive power of the state, students had no natural “right” to democratic governance. Moreover, the CPUO document argued, democracy requires compromise between competing rights, and compromise in intellectual matters was antithetical to the academic excellence. Therefore, democratic governance was inappropriate for universities. For CUS, democracy was about maximising individual autonomy. Wherever there was restraint on individual desires, the individual had a “right” to question that restraint and consent to or deny it limited only to the extent that individual desires infringed on the autonomy of another member of the community. A community of scholars and students, in the CUS view, could engage in this democratic give and

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20 David Ticoll, “Society and University” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [1968], mimeographed), 10, RC.

21 Committee of Presidents of Universities of Ontario, Student Participation in University Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 1-2, 7-8, 11-12, 14-20. Although the introduction to the report claims it is a discussion document, not a declaration of policy, it so clearly argues for a limited role for students that I have no difficulty in portraying it as representative of the majority opinion of Ontario university presidents.
take as a matter of lifestyle and appeal only to formal modes of governance when there were irreconcilable differences over competing rights. Therefore, academic excellence was a matter of individual initiative and unaffected. In practice, both definitions were inadequate. The CUS definition failed to acknowledge that majority rule does not always result in the best allocation of resources to promote academic excellence, and the CPUO definition failed to account for the various forms of coercion other than detention exercised by university administrators.

It was little wonder then that the assurances of Ontario university presidents gave little comfort to students and faculty of the Ontario College of Art who felt it necessary to conduct a sit-in in February 1968 to protest the unfettered and arbitrary power of institutional administrators. Nor were the students of St. Dunstan’s University (now the University of Prince Edward Island) content in March 1968 that their administrators acted reliably for the good of students. A student boycott of classes resulted in the senate creating a student seat, allowing for “responsible freedom of the press” for the student paper, establishing student committees to deal with behaviour in residences, ending compulsory attendance and dress codes, and establishing a mid-term break. Unresolved student grievances about the “in loco parentis” principle and the free choice of classes were referred to a joint senate-student committee for study. Despite the Ontario university presidents report, a April 1968 AUCC survey found student representation on senates was quickly becoming the norm across the country, and open meetings and student representation on boards of governors were on the increase.

Drawing on American nomenclature, the media increasingly referred to the campaign for governance reform as the part of the “student power” movement—a practice the CUS secretariat happily encouraged. Unlike the American movement organised by the SDS, CUS was not advocating using the universities as a base from which to launch radical societal change—although some people within CUS might have favoured such a position. To lay claim to “student power” was useful in creating instant recognition of the issue amongst those students following the developments in the United States, and in creating unease in university administrators and public officials, which might translate into greater compliance with student demands. Identifying with student power also had its drawbacks, because to some students it was “symbolic of an immature, blind thirst” and a poor advertisement for the fair and just aims of students. Moreover, the media was inclined to sensationalise student protests, charging organisers with advocating “any and all means of achieving their ends — including strikes and riots.” Nonetheless, CUS continued to use the term to promote its notion of academocracy.

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22 Hugh Armstrong, Telegram to Students and Faculty of Ontario College of Art, February 23, 1968, ACUS, CUS 39.
24 “Students secure Senate seats, start drive for open sessions,” University Affairs, April 1968.
25 “You will be pleased to know that in the recent student union elections in Canada, most reactionaries were soundly defeated. Canadian students are not likely to start the revolution tomorrow, but the spirit of radicalism is growing. University administrators in Canada, who are lackie[s] of the corporate elite, are scared. ... The CUS Board of Officers now seems prepared to condemn American imperialism, particularly in Vietnam, Canada and Québec.” Bob Baldwin, Letter to Jef Williams, 18 April 1968, ACUS, CUS 39.
26 Barry Sadler, Letter to Pat Hembruff, 19 March 1968, ACUS, CUS 33.
Inarticulate and Unimaginative

The gulf between the politically sophisticated and the uninformed student leaders identified at the 1967 Congress plagued CUS throughout the year. CUS fieldworkers regularly expressed frustration with the lack of knowledge of CUS programs on campuses, much less any political understanding. Although executive members of local student associations were occasionally knowledgeable about CUS policies and programs, student association councils tended to have little knowledge, and on many campuses outside of large cities the student population was almost completely ignorant of the fights for universal accessibility and governance reform. In some cases these “inarticulate and unimaginative” councils were the result of a campus culture deferential to the student association executive or to the campus administration. In other cases, the lack of information was the result of conflicting political philosophies between the student association executive and CUS. In most instances though, uninformed student leaders were part of a “well-established pattern” of first-time Congress delegates gaining only superficial understanding of CUS policies and programs and thus unable to explain the matters to their student councils, much less the general student population.

One solution for bridging this gulf was “an intensive and continuing program of education directed towards students’ council members and through them to their constituents.” Frustrated fieldworkers found meaningful communication “a virtual impossibility” given the inability of many student council members to conceive of a role for student government beyond dances and debating competitions. In some cases, the campus CUS committee was “looked upon in the same light as the camera club.” As a consequence of this and their experience with wilful campus ignorance due to political conflicts, CUS fieldworkers were more inclined look outside of student associations for support. Although this may have been an acceptable strategy to build CUS support on non-member campuses, it was a dicey proposition where the local student association was a member of CUS. Nonetheless, some fieldworkers advised student activists to organise SDU chapters for the purpose of radicalising the student body and forcing the student association to take action on matters of interest to the activists.

The decision of secretariat staff to assist campus activists and radicals, bypassing elected student governments, revived the arguments made in 1966 by Schepanovich about the CUS secretariat and leadership pursuing plans independent of the wishes of the membership. On this occasion it was Janis Johnson of the University of Manitoba Students’ Union who distributed a paper across the country calling into question CUS’s democratic practices. She charged that the gap between the “activities, theories and rhetoric of the ‘leadership’ group and the real situations” facing student associations was the result of a CUS “aristocracy that is self-perpetuating, quite closed and highly unrepresentative of the concerns” of the majority of students. As a delegate to the 1967 Congress, she too observed the apparent dichotomy between the politically aware student leaders and those more inclined towards providing services for students. She came to see a “far more real dichotomy” between the leadership of local student...
associations and those CUS secretariat members “more concerned with the formulation of societal analysis calculated to explain, justify, and unfortunately, define areas of student concern across the nation.” Commenting directly on fieldworkers bypassing student associations, she wrote: “The objective of the students of Canada cannot be to exchange the tutelage of the faculties and administrations of their various institutions for the tutelage of the CUS fieldworker.”

A partial response to the criticism was found in minutes of the May 1968 meeting of the CUS Board of Directors:

A fieldworker is not responsible to the student council although he does have a responsibility to first try working with the student council on campus. If, however, the council is not acting on the programs and priorities of CUS, the fieldworker should encourage others to act in such a way to realize the aims and objectives of the Union.

Johnson was not alone in her perceptions of CUS. Students at Queen’s University also raised questions about CUS’s political aspirations. A letter to the editor of the campus paper charged the CUS publication Issue “leans so left it almost falls over,” and complained Peter Warrian’s election as CUS President for 1968-69 was indicative of the narrow views of the organisation. “[CUS] is neither representative nor responsible—it doesn’t represent majority opinion and it couldn’t care less.” At Carleton University, the student association leadership explicitly rejected social unionism, accusing the CUS leadership of having lost touch with the views of students on campus as evidenced by the “minority-extremist views” in CUS publications. Carleton argued that the situation was sufficiently dire that CUS could “in no legitimate way take stands on issues in the name of Canadian students.”

The Whole World is Watching

CUS’s internal battles were overshadowed in the spring and summer of 1968 by a wave of “student power” events in Europe and the United States that would affect the way Canadian students viewed themselves and CUS.

In January 1968, moderate reformer Alexander Dubček replaced Atonín Novotný as first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in part due to pressure from students and writers for relief from censorship and for more individual freedoms. After replacing the Novotný Presidium with his supporters on April 4th, Dubček started a massive program of reforms designed to remove the Communist Party as the binding force in society and to allow more personal freedoms. The subsequent “blossoming” of critical commentary of Czechoslovak society encouraged writers and students to demand greater freedoms and full political


36 William Houston, Letter to the Editor, The Other Journal, 1 April 1968, ACUS, CUS 32.

37 Jerry Lampert and George Hunter, Memo to All Students’ Council Presidents and CUS Chairmen, August 1968, ACUS, CUS 46.
democracy. The “Prague Spring” ended when Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20-21, 1968.38

On the heels of Prague Spring, SDS carried out its Ten Days of Resistance; “a period of action [which] would extend over a ten-day period in April to allow chapters to carry out a schedule of education programs, joint actions and demonstrations aimed at a variety of institutions.” At least 50 colleges and universities across the country staged local activities between April 16th and 26th, culminating in a one-day student strike on April 26th, when an estimated one million students stayed away from classes. The first mass strike since the 1930s, and the largest student strike in the history of the country, was overshadowed by the events at Columbia University.39

On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee, resulting in more than three weeks of civil disturbance in Black ghettos around the country. Columbia University SDS chapter chairman Mark Rudd seized the microphone during a campus memorial service to the slain civil rights leader to call the university administration hypocrites for holding a memorial for King while it was fighting the unionisation of its own Black workers, taking over land in Harlem for the gymnasium, and punishing its students for taking part in non-violent demonstrations. A subsequent demonstration led to protestors taking over Hamilton Hall on April 23rd, followed by the SDS taking over the office of the University President Grayson Kirk in Low Library on April 24th. Other campus buildings were subsequently taken over by students unaffiliated with the SDS. On April 26th, university Vice-President David Truman announced that the university would suspend plans to develop the gymnasium. When the occupiers refused to move, the administration called in the police on April 30th to clear out the five buildings controlled by students. The methodic beating of students by police witnessed by print, radio and television reporters stunned academe and the public. It would be an example for the SDS and radicals everywhere.40

On Thursday, May 3, 1968, a protest at the Sorbonne became violent when Paul Roche, Rector of the University of Paris, called in police. Roche closed the Sorbonne and police arrested all the student leaders they could identify. News of the arrests spread and students came from everywhere to support the protestors, virtually sealing off the Latin Quarter. That night, The Union des Etudiants Français (the national student union) and the Syndicate Nationale de l’Enseignement Supérieur (representing junior faculty) called their members out on strike. The two groups were joined by the March 22 Movement (an ad hoc group of radicals named for the protests earlier in the year at the Nanterre campus), and jointly demanded the reopening of the Sorbonne, withdrawal of the police and the release of the arrested students. The authorities refused to concede and protests continued throughout the weekend.41

Police battled students on Monday and Tuesday, and by Wednesday, public opinion had shifted against the government in response to police brutality against the protestors. Trade unionists also took up the fight of the students and solidarity meetings were held across the

39 Sale, SDS, 400-403, 428-430.
country. A march on the evening of Friday, May 10th led to students, reinforced by sympathetic citizens, erecting barricades against police. The administration agreed to reopen the Sorbonne and withdraw the police, but would not release the arrested students, and as a result the protest leaders would not give up the fight. The acting Prime Minister then ordered the barricades cleared and police attacked with tear gas, mace and hi-explosive grenades. The Prime Minister returned from a trip on Saturday and reversed government policy, ordering police and troops out of the Sorbonne and the Latin Quarter, and releasing the detained students. At the conclusion of a 200,000-person march on Monday, May 13th, students occupied the Sorbonne where they launched a "cultural revolution" calling for reform of the universities and of society. The revolt spread to other faculties and campuses, to schools, and to factories throughout the country. In late May, leaders of the major trade unions reached a deal with the government for wage increases and reductions in the work week and encouraged their members back to work. Despite widespread condemnation of the deal, cracks began to appear in the worker solidarity and police began to break through picket lines and clear out occupied factories. The occupation of the Sorbonne ended on June 16th when police finally managed to eject the students, and most of the remaining industrial strikes and occupations ended by July 12th.

The events in Europe inspired delegates to the SDS summer convention in Lansing, Michigan, June 9th to 15th. The meeting had taken on an atmosphere of revolution as delegates greeted each other with raised fists, debated which resolutions were more revolutionary, and sang from the International Workers of the World songbook. Leftist organisations of all stripes sent delegates, recruiters and booksellers to the convention filled with the sense that the SDS was the cutting edge of the coming revolution.

While the "new" SDS was trying to determine how to become a revolutionary organisation, SDS veterans worked with the National Mobilization Committee to plan an all-out demonstration against the Vietnam War at the August Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The event brought together antiwar activists, New Left factions, and counterculture "freaks" to keep pressure on the government and to educate disenchanted Democrats about other forms of political change. Problems started when the Youth International Party (Yippies) decided to occupy Lincoln Park after being refused permission for their cultural festival. Late on August 27th, police attacked the contingent of some 3,000 Yippies, SDS and Mobilization Committee members, clergy and other concerned citizens at the park with tear gas and truncheons. Protestors fought with police in the streets, breaking shop windows, overturning police cars and setting trashcans on fire. The violence subsided early in the morning of August 28th, but returned that evening when protestors pushed through police cordons to march to the Democratic Convention at the Hilton Hotel. Police set up roadblocks to stop the marchers and retaliated with tear gas, mace and truncheons. Police attacked anyone not wearing a uniform, including tourists and reporters, while the protestors chanted, "The Whole World is Watching." Some reporters compared the scene to Paris and Prague.

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43 Sale, SDS, 455-456.

The topic of the June CUS seminar—"Education - Rhetoric vs. Reality"—was set well in advance of events at Columbia University and the Sorbonne and was intended to provoke a discussion about education as portrayed by administrators versus students' actual educational experience. CUS material for the Winnipeg seminar included articles by former University of California President Clark Kerr, American social critic Paul Goodman, The Student As Nigger author Jerry Farber, SDS ideologue Carl Davidson, and excerpts from a recent Canadian collection of essays The University Game. Rather than the usual structure of sessions, classes, seminars and panels, the seminar was organised on free school principles, allowing discussions to develop as participants saw fit. For the first few days, discussion centered on the publicised topic, with most delegates agreeing there was a contradiction between the rhetoric and the reality of education. On the third day a split began to emerge between the "Hippy 'feelie' element," which advocated educational change to serve personal exploration and development, and the social activists, who sought educational change for social and economic justice.\footnote{Andrew Wernick, "Blowin' in the wind—CUS In Winnipeg," The Canadian Forum 48 (September 1968), 132.}

At this point, both Progressive Conservative leader Robert Stanfield and Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau arrived in Winnipeg for political rallies leading up to the June 25th general election. CUS held demonstrations at both events "to pressure for redress of obvious student grievances—in particular the lack of federal grants to Universities and federal loans to students," but the demonstrations instead resulted in attacks on the platforms of both parties for failing to raise domestic and international issues students thought important. To the public, the demonstrations—which included placards bearing the slogan "One, Two, Three more Sorbonnes!"—appeared to be an attack on the political system itself, and the disruption of the party rallies caused outrage. Most upset was the University of Manitoba delegation to the seminar, whose student council was steering a bill through the Manitoba legislature to implement part of CUS's academocracy program by putting student representatives on the governing bodies of the university.\footnote{Wernick, "CUS in Winnipeg," 132-133.}

The seminar moved into a third phase where opinion split over the legitimacy of the University of Manitoba approach to university reform. A small group from the Prairies and the Maritimes vigorously supported the Manitoba approach, while another group, led by students from the University of Toronto, Simon Fraser University and the University of British Columbia, were "particularly hostile" towards the University of Manitoba delegation and their supporters. After a plenary session on the Manitoba situation, delegates returned to the informal small group discussions. In the midst of discussions ranging from "Technocracy" to "Education for the Physically Handicapped" a small group of former SUPA members and recent converts to the New Left discussed the possibilities arising from the events in Paris. This group, mainly from Ontario and British Columbia, articulated the growing radical spirit of the seminar, calling for a study of the university as the training centre for the "new working class." Delegates agreed on the need for more thought and study before they could come to a unified theoretical perspective, but believed that generational revolt and the changing nature of the university were the foundations for unrest leading to new social and economic relationships.\footnote{Wernick, "CUS in Winnipeg," 133; Kostash, Long Way from Home, 88.}
The radicalism of the seminar may have been driven by events in New York and Paris, but the foundation was laid by secretariat activities over the previous year and the secretariat’s selection of background material for the seminar. Similarly, papers prepared for the August 28th to September 4th Congress at University of Guelph sought to build upon the experiences in Czechoslovakia, New York and Paris. In his speech to Congress delegates on August 28th, incoming CUS President Peter Warrian seemed to temper the mood of the seminar by calling CUS a consensus organisation that had to work towards position statements not based on ideology or anti-ideology, but based on the authentic experiences of students, and representing a point in between the lowest common denominator and the revolutionary vanguard. Having said this, Warrian went on to indicate that if students discovered “a social institution which is destructive of human potential then we may symbolically or physically burn it down or so what seems necessary” for the democratisation of education and of society. Moreover, he invoked student power as the means to democratisation, telling delegates, “this must not only be the year for socking it to the administrators or their buildings, it must be the year also of taking it to the students; we do this knowing that democratization and liberation will not come through the manipulation of a few, but only through the struggle of all.” That night the delegates watched the riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago on television.

On the second day of the Congress, Simon Fraser University Master’s student Martin Loney—one of five teaching assistants fired and re-instated in the spring of 1967 for supporting the freedom of expression of a Vancouver high school student—filed into the meeting room with supporters to the tune of “Solidarity Forever” bearing a red flag for socialism and a black flag of anarchism. They proceeded to the front of the room and hung a portrait of Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese Communist leader, over that of Queen Elizabeth. “We’ve come four thousand miles to this congress to discuss what is happening in the world,” said Loney. “We want to discuss how this affects students. Just look at Czechoslovakia and Chicago and tell me you can’t be concerned. ... CUS exists as a national voice, a place for discussion, a forum, a place to mobilize students.”

The Congress, in the days following, voted to condemn the war in Vietnam and support the NLF, to denounce capitalism, to call for institutional governance by parallel committees of faculty and students who could veto each others decisions, and to condemn the tenure policy of the CAUT as “a guild professionalist concept of status and power which subordinates teaching to research and intellectual exchange to competition [between] professors and students in the classroom and departmental politics.”

These resolutions did not mean that leftists had seized control of student councils across the country. Simon Fraser University delegate Bill Fletcher observed that perhaps only five or six delegations were predominantly socialist and that another 20 or so had no set ideology, but that in the face of the worldwide events of the months before and the criticism of the Canadian situation, “they could no longer defend the system.” There was no agreement on the alternative and debates went on for hours in plenary sessions, workshops and small groups. Liberal and conservative student association leaders found themselves using the terminology of the leftists,

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49 Peter Warrian, “‘The State of the Union’ or ‘Brothers and Sisters This is Our Thing, So Let it All Hang Out’” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, August 28, 1968, mimeographed), 2-3, 5, CUSUBC, 4, 2.

50 Bill Fletcher, “As one person saw it,” The Peak, 11 September 1968.

51 Kostash, Long Way from Home, 90.

52 Fletcher, “As one person saw it”; Canadian University Press, “And that was CUS...,” The Peak, 11 September 1968.
and leftist factions fought with each other over the "correct" analysis. 53 Midway through the meeting, the University of Saskatchewan Student Union delegation charged that some elements were trying to manipulate the Congress into a consensus by, among other things, delivering the working papers late such that "virtually no other intelligent well thought-out points of views can be put forward on these topics." The delegation further charged Warrian of "economic and political analysis which is both dogmatic and unrepresentative of the mass of Canadian students." 54 In response, Warrian offered his resignation to the Congress, if they want it, and "half an hour later Warrian had secured a unanimous vote of confidence and drawn a standing ovation from the plenary." 55

The Unified Theory - Universal Accessibility and Academocracy

CUS continued to insist publicly that universal accessibility was equal in importance to academocracy. Nonetheless, other than a few newsletter articles and fieldworkers explaining the concept to local student councils very little work had been done on universal accessibility since the 1967 Congress. This was in part due to the spontaneous "student power" activities springing up across the country drawing away the secretariat's attention, but was also due to belief amongst the secretariat members that social unionism perspective adopted at the 1967 Congress was at odds with the universal accessibility policy. They thought they required an integrated policy and a plan for improving access and making the curriculum more "relevant." All of this was to be linked to underlying social conditions and economic structures, with proposed solutions to deal with the root causes of inequity. 56 As a consequence, Associate Secretary Richard Thompson prepared a discussion paper for the Guelph Congress in which he proposed a "unified theory" of education that would not only embrace universal accessibility, but link it to academocracy, and tie them conceptually to the private and corporate interests controlling the universities and pulling the political and economic levers of society. 57

The 1968 Congress subsequently adopted substantial new polices regarding universal accessibility and academocracy. Gone were the free standing policies, and in their place were extensive critiques of capitalist society of which the specific programs of universal accessibility and academocracy were only small parts. In the case of universal accessibility, questions of financing of higher education, which had been the core of the old policy, occupied only two of the ten pages devoted to the omnibus "Education" policy. 58 The remainder of the policy was devoted to extended arguments on: education as unresponsive to the needs of individuals; the university as an agent for imperialism; the university as an agent for socialisation for ruling class interests; the university as a tool of private interests and of warmongers; regressive taxation; and administrative authoritarianism.

Academocracy, as previously conceived, was largely abandoned in favour of a general policy on "Student Power." 59 Gone was the demand for representation on governing bodies and

53 Fletcher, "As one person saw it."
54 University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon) Student Union, "U.S.S.U. (Saskatoon) Statement" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, September 1968, mimeographed), 1, CUSUBC, 4, 3.
55 Canadian University Press, "And that was CUS..."
56 Bob Baldwin, Memorandum to the Secretariat, 28 June 1968, ACUS, CUS 35.
57 Richard Thompson, "Universal Accessibility" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, August 1968, mimeographed), RC.
58 CUS, "Resolutions 1968 - XXXII Congress" (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, 1968, mimeographed), 15-25, ACUS, NFCUS 3A. See Appendix B.10 for the full text of the resolution.
student involvement at the departmental and faculty level, and in its place was a proposed structure by which faculty and students would share power through their respective unions and through a senate comprised of an equal number of faculty and students. Campus decision making would no longer be a process of deliberation amongst administrators, faculty and students, but instead an exercise in confrontation and mobilisation by students in support of their demands. Those demands included an end to grading, the hiring, review and firing of faculty in conjunction with the faculty union, and control of the methods of learning in the classroom.

Thus universal accessibility and academocracy were submerged in a larger confrontation about the future of the university and of society. This confrontation was illustrated for Canadians in a feature article in the November 1968 edition of Maclean’s magazine in which Maclean’s brought together University of Toronto President Claude Bissell and University of Toronto Student Administrative Council President Steve Langdon to talk about student power. In the discussion, Bissell struggled to understand student objections to the ongoing democratisation of the university through student involvement, both formal and informal, in most aspects of university governance.

Langdon responded by indicating the problem was that the reforms Bissell spoke of did not consider the underlying structure of the university. Thus all Bissell offered students was the opportunity to run an institution that reinforced the values of society’s elite and conducted military research. To Bissell, this type of radical reform appeared to be a type of egalitarianism where intellectual excellence would be lost for the sake of elevating all ideas to the same level of importance. He believed that intellectual and economic competition was healthy, and although he had sympathy for those people blocked from higher education due to financial circumstances, he was unprepared to discard a system he thought served society pretty well.

Langdon, in contrast, could not see how continued economic inequity, supported by the current education system and by the university as a corporate citizen, could lead to a healthy society.60

Rebuilding

Despite the overwhelming support of Congress delegates, the adoption of a radical perspective on reforming the university and society did not sit well with a number of students and student associations. In the month following the Congress, the secretariat chased down overly critical reports in the student and commercial press and tried to quell perceptions that CUS was a Marxist organisation.61 Student associations were also holding or considering referendums on continued membership in CUS. A referendum at the University of Windsor in late September resulted in the association leaving CUS. A referendum to join CUS was lost at the University Lethbridge on October 24th. Toward the end of October, the SFU student council put the question of CUS membership to referendum, resulting in a November 4th vote of 1,123 in favour of staying in CUS, and 685 against.62

60 “Student Power,” Maclean’s, November 1968; In his memoir, Bissell recanted his position to an extent indicating that although these were vexatious times, that the result was a changed and “more vital” university. Bissell, Halfway up Parnassus, 191-192.

61 Ted Richmond (CUS Fieldworker), “State of the Union and All That - Some Questions” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [November? 1968], mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 47; Martin Loney, Letter to the Editor-Carleton University, 3 October 1968, ACUS, CUS 46; “Loney on the role of CUS,” The Peak, 9 October 1968.

62 “SFU keeping CUS,” The Peak, 6 November 1968.
"turn the tide of CUS withdrawals," but the University of Western Ontario decided to withdraw on November 13th, followed by the University of Calgary on November 26th.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, plans for CUS referendums were being considered at the University of British Columbia, Selkirk College, Notre Dame University and the University of Victoria.\textsuperscript{64}

The CUS secretariat did all it could to stop the withdrawals. Attributing much of their problem to "bourgeois press" perpetuation of stereotypes, the secretariat initiated a counter propaganda campaign of contacting individual papers, of writing new pamphlets to be used in referendums, of writing a magazine article and news release denying charges that the student movement was violent, and by organising campus SDUs and other student groups to promote the CUS perspective during referendums.\textsuperscript{65} Secretariat members acknowledged the possibility that there was "too great a contradiction between a radical political perspective and a mainstream political organization." They questioned whether their first allegiance was to social change or to the organisation, and considered the possibility of a mass resignation of the secretariat and National Council members.\textsuperscript{66}

The student association at Waterloo Lutheran University, which was considering its own referendum to withdraw from CUS, held a meeting of "moderate" student associations December 28th to 30th, 1968 to discuss CUS and national student unionism. Delegates from 25 universities discussed a variety options including creating a services organisation separate from the political organisation, replacing the resolution-making congress with workshops to assist campus leaders in working out local problems, and decentralisation with more power for regional associations.\textsuperscript{67} Although a number of participating associations thought a reorganisation of CUS was impossible, there was little appetite for the work necessary to create another national student union and so the consensus was to try and work to reform CUS. There was considerable doubt that this group could effect any significant change, in part because a great many of them would have finished their terms and would not be at the 1969 Congress, but also because they appeared to lack the organisational skills and leadership to make it happen. Whether there would even be a Congress to attend was an open question. John Conway, an SFU delegate to the conference and a CUS National Council member, suggested that the "red-baiting anti-CUS campaigns" might have done too much damage to save the organisation.\textsuperscript{68}

Between January 1 and February 12, 1969, one school joined CUS (Mount St. Vincent), two voted to stay in (King's College and Glendon College), four voted to stay out (Southern Alberta Institute of Technology, University of Victoria, University of Alberta, and University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon)), and four voted to leave (St. Mary's, University of Winnipeg, Waterloo, and Queens).\textsuperscript{69} On March 12th, the University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society (UBC AMS) held the last CUS referendum of the academic year, and by a vote of 2946 to 1701, withdrew its membership—21 student associations remained in CUS, and 25 were outside. Incoming UBC student council president Fraser Hodge believed their referendum was the death of CUS, and indicated that the UBC AMS would take the initiative to form a union of dissident

\textsuperscript{63} Gordon Hardy, "Reaction strong towards CUS," \textit{The Peak}, 13 November 1968.
\textsuperscript{64} Terry Devlin, "That's a CUS word," \textit{The Peak}, 23 October 1968.
\textsuperscript{66} Ted Richmond, "State of the Union."
\textsuperscript{67} Rod Mackenzie, "Conference on National Student Unionism" (University of Calgary Student Union, Calgary, [January 1969], mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 46.
\textsuperscript{68} Canadian University Press, "Moderates will work from within Congress," \textit{The Peak}, 15 January 1969.
\textsuperscript{69} Canadian University Press, "CUS wins one but loses two," \textit{The Peak}, 12 February 1969.
schools and formulate “policy that is acceptable to at least a majority of Canadian students.” CUS President Peter Warrian disagreed with Hodge’s conclusion, instead calling it an opportunity to make a choice about the direction of the national student organisation.\(^70\)

In an attempt to hold the organisation together and make choices about its future direction, CUS held a rebuilding conference May 23-25, 1969 at Laurentian University in Sudbury, Ontario. Unlike the fall Congress, there were no displays of socialist paraphernalia and no chanting of “Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh.” Nevertheless, on the second day of the conference many of the conservative student leaders walked out “either outraged or confused by a debate on the propensity for Marxian analysis to creep into CUS working papers.” They eventually returned with a motion defining the aims of the national union that, with substantial amendments, was adopted. The motion committed CUS to working on issues directly affecting students and to “majoritarian political action for social change affecting students,” while explicitly rejecting CUS acting as the “vanguard of any minority.”\(^71\) CUS president-elect Martin Loney seemed supportive of the new, majoritarian union, and pledged a more pragmatic approach than his theatrics at the 1968 Congress would have suggested. The Canadian University Press report of the meeting concluded, “it would appear that the August conference will be as subdued as this Sudbury meeting and the conservative sheep, under the guidance of Loney’s pragmatism, will be led back to the CUS fold.”\(^72\)

It was not that simple. In mid-June UBC AMS President Fraser Hodge requested a second rebuilding conference, which was held July 11-13, 1969 at Carleton University in Ottawa. Hodge argued that the second conference was necessary because the Sudbury conference had only started to answer questions plaguing the union. Despite the resolution adopted in Sudbury, Hodge contended that CUS was fundamentally unchanged and still primarily a vehicle for socialist thought.\(^73\) There was some resentment from other student associations towards Hodge for insisting on a second conference, but most associations showed up in Ottawa.\(^74\) The result was agreement that radical and moderate students alike could come together in support of a program of creating a “critical university” — the moderates because a “critical university is desirable and possible within the existing society,” and the radicals because striving for a critical university was an implicit rebuke to the status quo. Meanwhile, CUS would concentrate on the day-to-day problems of students in the context of working towards a critical university — housing, employment, course content, course unionism, and the like — student associations and individual students could be more activist as their political mandates and interests suited them.\(^75\) The compromise was tenuous and the politics were subtle, but it appeared this was a basis for rebuilding CUS.

\textit{This is the End}

The majoritarian compromises reached in Sudbury and Ottawa collapsed, nevertheless, at the August 27\textsuperscript{th} to September 3\textsuperscript{rd}, Congress in Port Arthur, Ontario. Part way through the

\(^71\) CUS, “Minutes of Rebuilding Conference 23-25 May 1969” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [June 1969], mimeographed), 7, ACUS, CUS 54. See Appendix B.12 for the full text of the resolution.
\(^73\) Fraser Hodge, Letter to Martin Loney, 26 June 1969, ACUS, CUS 54.
\(^74\) Ken Sundquist, Letter to Martin Loney, 20 June 1969, ACUS, CUS 54.
\(^75\) “An Introduction to the Minutes of the Second Rebuilding Conference” (Canadian Union of Students, Ottawa, [August? 1968], mimeographed), ACUS, CUS 47.
meeting, the University of Calgary delegation proposed a resolution to disband CUS and create a new organisation, the Canadian Students Federation. Although delegates from the University of Toronto, Dalhousie, University of British Columbia, and McGill engineered the move, the resolution failed for the lack of seconder. The Toronto and Dalhousie delegations subsequently dissociated themselves from their respective presidents, both of whom had been involved in the maneuver. A running battle between “structure-changing radicals and structure clinging moderates” continued throughout the meeting. Barry McPeake, former CUS Atlantic fieldworker and chair of the Congress, called for the destruction of student councils “so they will serve the people.” John Gallagher, a Loney supporter, bitterly denounced McPeake and called for the organizing of students around student issues, rather than a radical analysis of society.76

In the midst of this, the finance committee worked with the budget, trying to find a way to accommodate the revenue lost from the referendum defeats. The committee managed to cut the proposed expenses from $148,600 to $94,500, but the plan depended on victories at upcoming referenda at Carleton University and the University of Toronto—revenues from the two institutions totalled $35,000. The committee concluded that if CUS lost those campuses, the union would have to fold by Christmas. An alternate “belly-up by Christmas” budget was also created, premised on losing the Toronto referendum and closing down the organisation in December.77

The Congress broke off early on the morning of September 3rd, with “more than a third of the items on still remain[ing] to be debated... but the meeting could not go on in the face of the increasingly bitter antagonisms” between the radicals and the moderates.78 The final motion of the Congress was “to ratify the proceedings and resolutions herein before adopted,” which passed with ten members in favour and one abstaining. The record of the meeting noted that “only committed members were permitted to vote” on this motion. From a committed membership of 34 a year earlier, CUS was down to 11.79

The student council at SFU again put the question of CUS membership to referendum in late September, and Loney put the best face on the events. He told the council that the student councils at the University of Alberta, Trent University, University of Saskatchewan at Saskatoon, Carleton University, Queens University and the University of Western Ontario favoured membership in CUS, and thus it was too early to sound the death knell.80 But a month later it was for naught. On October 22nd, students at the University of Toronto voted 5,434 to 2,222 against membership in CUS and on October 27th the CUS National Council decided to dissolve the organisation.81

CUS wasn’t alone in its fate. UGEQ was splitting up under the pressure of left-wing ideological factionalism and would effectively cease to exist by the end of 1969.82 Throughout the spring of 1969, the SDS was rapidly losing cohesion as the National Office stopped

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77 Canadian University Press, “CUS Crippled?”
78 Canadian University Press, “CUS Crippled?”
providing services and direction for the chapters and became a political collective bent on fomenting revolution. Moreover, the student protests and incidents of violence had succeeded in shaking the “silent majority” of Americans out of their complacency and they demanded something be done about the troubles on campuses. The result was more than 400 pieces of legislation at the federal and state levels designed to curtail and punish campus conflict (in the most extreme instance, police in West Virginia were relieved of any legal culpability if they killed someone on campus). At the June 1969 National Convention the SDS split between the supporters of the National Office and the supporters of the Progressive Labor faction. The two SDS factions held separate conventions, elected their officers and each proclaimed to the public that they were the “real SDS”, with the National Office group taking over the Chicago office and the Progressive Labor group setting up a new national office in Boston. The National Office group became known as the “Weathermen,” naming themselves after a revolutionary analysis they had worked on prior to the convention known as the “Weatherman” statement. The statement was named after the Bob Dylan lyric—“You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.” Attempts by the Weathermen to mount a summer program of revolutionary organising were largely unsuccessful and were characterised by infighting and open confrontation with the Progressive Labor faction. By the end of the summer the SDS was hopelessly broken into various factions and the Weathermen group had left any pretense of the student life behind as they took up arms in revolution against American imperialism.

The CUS leadership was not content with band-aid solutions to financial and social barriers to higher education. If there was to be any hope of removing the systemic barriers to education, there had to be a reorganisation of society. In time, CUS’s goal of educational equity was subsumed by a desire to free human potential for its fullest development. However laudable such sentiments, CUS was a political organisation and had to accept that its membership was neither homogeneous nor shared a single view on the desirability of or means to social reform. Moreover, CUS faced significant external pressure from governments, administrations, and self-interested elites, all of whom had the capacity to shape public, and therefore student, opinion through commercial media and other means. Consequently, as CUS policy and analysis became more radical, students became more discontented and expressed that discontent indirectly through campus elections and directly through referendums on CUS membership. The attempts to save CUS were too little, too late, and despite clever semantics failed to bridge the fundamental divide between activists who wanted to make over society, and the majority of the student population who merely wanted amelioration of their conditions and solutions to their grievances.

83 Sale, SDS, 527-531, 546-547, 574-576, 558-560, 580-589, 593-599.
Conclusion

The Canadian Union of Students was born out of the hope for a new relationship with Québec students, and died from an inability to forge a lasting relationship within the rest of the country. In the intervening six years, the organisation evolved from a docile conservative organisation whose most ambitious project was a national system of scholarships, to an activist leftist organisation advocating a complete makeover of the universities and of society in the service of human potential rather than of economic interest. The purpose of this study was to determine why and how that happened by following the developments in CUS policy on access to higher education and on student participation in academic governance.

The currently accepted explanation for the creation of CUS is only partially sustainable. Although some student leaders wanted the organisation to be more inclusive of colleges and technical schools, the transformation of NFCUS to CUS was primarily an attempt to reconcile the differences between Québec students and the students in the rest of Canada. By adopting a new bi-national structure and the name, “Canadian Union of Students” student leaders hoped to establish a new unity in student politics. This new unity was never realised due to a lack of understanding by students in English Canada of the needs of Québec. The persistent desire by the students in the rest of Canada for intervention by the federal government in postsecondary funding — no matter how tactfully it was approached — was intolerable to Québec students as an unwarranted intrusion into provincial domain.

This had been the case since the Second World War, but it was not until the late 1950s that Québec students more forcefully pressed for exclusive provincial jurisdiction in educational matters. Québec students were taking a more activist approach in their demands for improved educational funding. Drawing upon the example of their colleagues in France, Québec students were more inclined than students in the rest of Canada to turn to protest to support their demands. Moreover, Québec students also embraced the syndicalist approach to student politics adopted by their French counterparts after the Second World War. Student syndicalism defined the student as an intellectual worker with responsibilities for societal progress and the same rights as other workers to organise and to press for their demands. It was on this basis that Québec students formed UGEQ in spring 1963, leading to the departure of almost all Québec student associations from CUS in the fall of 1964.

The departure of the Québec student associations and the creation of UGEQ gave new life to CUS in two ways. First, CUS was freed from incessant squabbling about the structure of the organisation that characterised the latter days of NFCUS and the founding of CUS. This enabled CUS to devote more energy to policy development and lobbying, and to advocate a larger role for the federal government in postsecondary education than would have been possible prior to the departure of the Québec student associations. Second, the example of UGEQ as a Canadian student organisation that successfully pressed its demands by mass protest and by full political engagement with the government and society provided proof that sometimes lobbying was not enough to achieve desired outcomes. The CUCND, although less successful than UGEQ.

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1 Society of Graduate Students, “Students and the History of Post-Secondary Education in Canada.”
provided a similar example by its contribution to putting nuclear weapons on the public agenda by lobbying, public education and protest. The subsequent transformation of the CUCND to SUPA expanded the scope of student activity to include matters of economic justice and civil rights and in doing so provided a beachhead in Canada for the New Left analysis that had been first articulated by the SDS in their 1962 *Port Huron Statement*.

Signs of CUS activism included the "freeze the fees" position taken at the 1964 Congress and the subsequent campus protests that winter and into the spring of 1965. In this instance, individual student associations led CUS by organising demonstrations against substantial fee hikes and administrations who broke the tacit deal to hold off any fee hikes pending the outcome of the Bladen Commission on university financing. CUS activity still concentrated on lobbying, although that effort had taken a more sophisticated approach with the Student Means Survey. Through the survey, CUS hoped to bolster its lobby for better student financial assistance with a comprehensive picture of English Canadian student finances. The protests, the preliminary analysis of the Student Means Survey, the American civil rights movement, and SDS-style organising of the poor and disenfranchised by SUPA all contributed to a new perspective on the work of CUS. As a consequence, the August 1965 Congress adopted the "universal accessibility" resolution, which expanded the access problem beyond the mere cost of education to include social and psychological barriers.

Although these barriers had long been acknowledged, and even tackled in a desultory way by NFCUS, the 1965 resolution more sharply defined the matter and committed CUS to action. The subsequent release of the Student Means Survey results in October 1965 gave fuel to the campaign by revealing what everyone knew, but seldom talked about—that the typical Canadian undergraduate student at the time was a 18-22 year old single male living in the parental home, whose parents had an higher than average income, and whose father was a manager or professional who had completed at least high school (and 19% of the time had one or more university degrees). Despite the fact it had been long known the primary function of the education system was to sort children into their "probable destinies," the myth persisted—aided by educators, hopeful parents, and liberal reformers—that education was a social equaliser. Thus the revelation that universities tended to reproduce the existing social structure was a rallying point for student activists.

This discussion of the limitations on social mobility also marked the beginning of a divide between the local student associations and the CUS leadership. In most instances, activities organised by local student associations were limited to dealing with the problems of existing students, whereas the CUS leadership viewed the universal accessibility program as having the greatest effect for subsequent generations of students. Attempts to reinvigorate the campaign at the 1966 Congress by spelling out the activities for student associations and by calling for an end to student loans in favour of student stipends were little help. Many of the campus leaders who had initiated the universal accessibility campaign and understood the program best had moved on and insufficient attention was placed on educating the new "generation" of student leaders as to the meaning of the program. The CUS leadership pressed forward, nonetheless,

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2 In 1908, Charles W. Eliot, the president of Harvard University, told a meeting of the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education that "we must give up on this notion... that a Yankee can turn his hand to anything. He cannot in this modern world; he positively cannot." Perkinson, *The Imperfect Panacea*, 145-146.

and incorporated into the 1967 universal accessibility policy a critique of structural barriers to higher education in Canada.

While the movement for universal accessibility languished, student associations were occupied throughout 1966 with the campaign for academic democracy (academocracy). Based on the premise that students were equal members of the university community, the 1966 academocracy resolution urged student associations to assess their members' circumstances and devise appropriate demands for governance reform. Student associations did so, and many advocated for representation on the senate and the board of governors, others were happy with an advisory role, and still others trusted the administration to act in the best interests of students. Meanwhile, the CUS leadership pushed the stronger message it was students and faculty who were the university and the role of administrators should be limited to serving the collective will of these groups. This made no sense to many student leaders. Students wanted a say in the policies affecting them, but it was the faculty who had the academic expertise and the administrators who knew how to run things. If students were members of an academic community, they were transient members at best and not committed to the long-term growth of that community. Nonetheless, the pressure for "student power" was considerable with CUS on one side, and on the other local students eagerly watching the campus conflict in the United States. Campus leaders were often caught in the middle.

The divide between CUS and local student associations became more readily apparent in 1966 when the University of Alberta Students' Union withdrew from CUS. Its president, Branny Schepanovich, charged that CUS was straying from its core work in favour of general politics, sophisticated theory, and action beyond the comprehension, or at least the interest, of typical students. It was easy for CUS to discount Schepanovich because he was viewed as an extremist, and so little was done in response to his criticisms. Nonetheless, he represented the leading edge of disaffection. Student leaders were either tired of defending their conservative politics or mystified by what CUS was doing. Content that it still had the support of the majority of students, CUS let the University of Alberta and some other associations fall away from the fold.

Discontent in local associations was to be a recurring problem as anxiety about CUS policy and action increased and new student leaders, unfamiliar with recent history, came on the scene. CUS attempted to rectify the problems by putting secretariat staff into the field to educate local student associations, but these fieldworkers soon discovered there was a profound gap between what delegates would say at Congress and what they would do back at home. CUS assumed that as leaders of student associations, Congress delegates would take responsibility for informing local students about CUS policies and carry out activities to implement those policies. Although this occurred regularly, it was far more common for CUS activities to be set aside because Congress delegates actually had little knowledge of CUS policies and local matters took precedence. Although CUS tried to solve the problem by sending out more fieldworkers, there was far too much to be done and too few people to do it. Moreover, by the fall of 1967, fieldworkers were less inclined to do the hard work with stubborn student associations and instead sought out campus activists whose politics were more amenable to the CUS position, further separating CUS from local student associations.

The CUS critique of the university and society became more pointed in 1967 as a number of former SUPA activists came into the organisation and persuaded delegates to adopt a more explicit "social union" perspective, thus enabling CUS to link the problems of students to larger societal problems and to involve itself in larger political matters. The universal accessibility policy expanded the definition of barriers to include curriculum irrelevant to the experiences
The academocracy policy advocated confrontation to achieve its ends, and CUS adopted the "student power" label from the American movement. At the 1968 Congress, individual policies on universal accessibility and academocracy were replaced with a unified policy encompassing a wide-ranging critique of the capitalist system and its failure to serve the full development of human potential.

The gap between the CUS leadership and local student associations further widened over political differences, leading to withdrawals and referendums on CUS membership through the fall of 1968. CUS fieldwork was almost entirely focussed on membership referendums and very little work was being done on member education or CUS policy activities. The dissident student associations made attempts to organise an alternative to CUS without success, and CUS finally responded with a rebuilding conference, pledging to moderate its positions. By this point, the CUS membership had split into a radical activist faction and a liberal/conservative faction—the former upset because CUS was giving in to the latter, and the latter upset because despite the compromises the leftist rhetoric was still more than they could bear. An uneasy truce was established over the summer of 1969, but it fell apart at the 1969 Congress. Faced with significant referendum losses that fall, the CUS National Council decided to shut down the organisation.

The life and death of CUS was thus an ongoing political struggle—a struggle over relations with Québec, a struggle over the policies and actions of the organisation, and a struggle with the practical problems of maintaining a political organisation. As the central policies throughout the life of the organisation, universal accessibility and academocracy draw a picture of CUS as an organisation not content to merely treat the symptoms of inequity, but increasingly committed to identifying the causes and remedying inequity at its roots. This inevitably put it in conflict with the prevailing social, political and economic structure and in doing so created a divide between the CUS leadership, certain of its criticism and vision, and a membership benefiting from the current social structure. Although there was a significant minority of disaffected youth and students who challenged the norms, they were unable to bring large numbers of people to their cause and thus were unable to sustain the pressure for change. The CUS leadership's compromises for the sake of sustaining the organisation were too little too late, and it all came crashing down.

Further Research

This study establishes the first "big picture" view of the Canadian Union of Students and national student politics during the 1960s. Since the picture was painted in broad strokes, there remains a great deal of scope for further research and publication. Among the topics worthy of further development are:

CUS and International Affairs – CUS and NFCUS before it had extensive programs of international affairs including both involvement in international student organisations and traveling commissioners who reported back on their international experiences, recommending policy and activity for CUS. That these programs were not central to the function of the organisation gives rise to the question how far Canadian students truly accepted the language, the theory and the methods of their American and European counterparts.

The Leaders of CUS – This study has just touched the surface of the ideas, aspirations and personalities of those people who led CUS directly through elected positions and indirectly as advisors and members of the national secretariat. Many of these people have gone on to assume
significant positions in academe, government, business and the judiciary and it would be
intriguing to study further where they came from, what they thought and did and what became
of them.

Student Activists – Although Doug Owram has developed an extensive profile of the sixties
generation in Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation, and Myrna Kostash
has fleshed out the profile in Long Way from Home, there yet remains work to be done to build a
better profile of who was politically active in Canada during the 1960s and why. This profile
would not be just of the leaders of formal student organisations, but those who held lesser
positions, took part in ad hoc organisations or actions, or who showed up at rallies and
demonstrations. Much of this work would take the form of careful and detailed regional studies
and could include studies of role of women and visible minorities.

The Reaction of the Elite – The most difficult task, but perhaps the most intriguing, would
be to study the reaction of Canada’s academic, economic and political elite to the activities of
CUS and students in general during the 1960s. Steve Hewitt has started this work in his
forthcoming Spying 101: The RCMP’s Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997, in
which he examines RCMP activities on Canadian campuses, but there remains much work to be
done in determining how “ruling Canada” reacted at the time.

NCFUS, NUS and CFS – CUS was not Canada’s first, nor its last national student
organisation, and more work should be done to document and explain the workings of these
other organisations. Starting with the founding of the NFCUS in 1926 then came CUS from 1963
to 1969, followed by the founding of the National Union of Students (NUS) in 1972, which
became the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS) in 1982. The various competing national
student groups, the Canadian Student Assembly (1930s), the Association of Student Councils
(1970s), the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (1990s) and others are also worthy of
further study.

Québec Student Movement – Although there has been work done on the Québec student
movement, precious little has made it into English translation and there remains a huge gulf in
understanding in English Canada of the Québec student movement. Some progress was made
in this study to cover that ground, but it was only a surface treatment and is deserving of more
detailed study.

Final Thoughts

It is hard to resist questioning what can be learned from the past. In the case of student
organisations there is at least something. The span of a “generation” of student leaders is only
approximately two years, consequently student political events of four years past seem antique
and eight years past prehistoric and beyond memory. Thus this study reveals for today’s
student politicians ancient wisdom about the pitfalls of organisational leadership getting too far
ahead of its members in challenging dominant ideas. Without extensive education and support
of the membership, youthful curiosity and exuberance will take one only so far. It may be that
rapid turnover in leadership and membership is too great for any student organisation to
sustain a campaign for social change without support from external forces. The baby boom and
the youth disaffection originating in the sterile fifties certainly helped CUS, as perhaps will the
baby boom echo and the dissatisfaction with consumerism and global capitalism help another
generation’s activists.
Finally, for faculty, administrators and governments, the lesson may be to try to confront your own rhetoric. One of the hallmarks of the student activists of the 1960s was their ability to dissect the prevailing educational and governmental rhetoric and lay bare its contradictions and failed implementation. Although social critics have long performed this function, in the right place and at the right time it is a very powerful force. This leads to a corollary observation, anytime can be the right time. This is not strictly true, but the lessons of the 1960s and subsequently suggest that those people in positions of authority become too disconnected from changing youth culture to understand when campus events might be part of a bigger movement. As former University of Toronto President Claude Bissell observed, although change may be vexatious, it is not always a bad thing.⁴

Appendix A

Charte de Grenoble

Préambule

Les représentants des étudiants français légalement réunis au Congrès national à Grenoble le 24 avril 1946, conscients de la valeur historique de l'époque;

Où l'Union française élabore la nouvelle déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen;

Où s'édifie le statut pacifique des Nations;

Où le monde du travail et de la jeunesse dégage des bases d'une révolution économique et sociale au service de l'homme;

Affirment leur volonté de participer à l'effort unanime de reconstruction, fidèles aux buts traditionnels poursuivis par la jeunesse étudiante française lorsqu'elle était à la plus conscience de sa mission.

Fidèles à l'exemple des meilleurs d'entre eux, morts dans la lutte du peuple français pour sa liberté,

Constatant le caractère périmé des institutions qui les régissent,

Déclarent vouloir se placer, comme ils l'ont fait si souvent au cours de notre Histoire, à l'avant-garde de la jeunesse française, en définissant librement comme bases de leurs tâches et de leurs revendications les principes suivants.

Art.1 L'étudiant est un jeune travailleur intellectuel.

Droits et devoirs de l'étudiant en tant que jeune

Art. 2 En tant que jeune, l'étudiant a droit à une prévoyance sociale particulière, dans les domaines physique, intellectuel et moral.

Art. 3 En tant que jeune, l'étudiant a le devoir de s'intégrer à l'ensemble de la jeunesse mondiale et nationale.

Droits et devoirs de l'étudiant en tant que travailleur.

Art. 4 En tant que travailleur, l'étudiant a droit au travail et au repos dans les meilleures conditions et dans l'indépendance matérielle, tant personnelle que sociale, garanties par le libre exercice des droits syndicaux.

Art. 5 En tant que travailleur, l'étudiant a le devoir d'acquérir la meilleure compétence technique.
Droits et devoirs de l'étudiant en tant qu'intellectuel.

Art. 6 En tant qu'intellectuel, l'étudiant a droit à la recherche de la vérité et à la liberté qui en est la condition première.

Art. 7 En tant qu'intellectuel, l'étudiant a le devoir :
  • De définir, propager et défendre la vérité, ce qui implique le devoir de faire partager et progresser la culture et de dégager le sens de l'Histoire.
  • De défendre la liberté contre toute oppression, ce qui, pour l'intellectuel, constitue la mission la plus sacrée.

Resolution B.1

Standing Resolution 10 (1961)

Education is of major concern to the students of Canada and their representative associations, who have repeatedly affirmed that every individual has the right to receive the education that will assure his fullest personal development, and that it is the responsibility of society to guarantee this right to education of the individual, regardless of race, creed, and geographic or economic circumstances, since the development of the individual is essential to the development of society. In Canada, by virtue of Articles 92 and 93 of the British North America Act, the field of education is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. Therefore, in light of these facts and these principles, the Federation declares that:

1. NFCUS, in the implementation of its programs in matters concerning education, shall observe the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial governments.

2. In all matters concerning education, representations by NFCUS shall be made only to the provincial governments, unless there is a unanimous agreement of the regions, determined by a two-thirds majority weighted vote of the member universities within each region, that for some specific reason representations must be made to the federal government.

3. Representations to provincial governments shall be made by the universities of the provinces concerned, in the first instance, and in the second instance, if it be so agreed, by the Federation or part of it.

Resolution B.2

Universal Accessibility (1965)

WHEREAS equality of opportunity is a fundamental principle of our society;

WHEREAS the sole determinant of the undertaking of post-secondary education should be academic qualification;

WHEREAS there exist today social and financial barriers to post-secondary education;

WHEREAS the elimination of financial barriers would represent a major step forward in the democratization of post-secondary education;

WHEREAS the decision to pursue post-secondary education is often obscured by financial obstacles;

WHEREAS earnings foregone represent a real and most serious cost;
WHEREAS the fullest development of human potential is an economic necessity for Canada.

Be it resolved that this Congress adopt the principle of universal accessibility to post-secondary education. Universal accessibility means the abolition of all social and financial barriers to post-secondary education.

Further be it resolved that the Canadian Union of Students adopt as the first priority of the Canadian Union of Students, the abolition of all these social and financial barriers, and that as a first step, this Union seek the elimination of tuition fees.

Resolution B.3

Universal Accessibility (1966)

WHEREAS the Canadian Union of Students regards education as a fundamental human right;

AND WHEREAS equality of educational opportunity is a necessary prerequisite for the maximum development of the individual;

AND WHEREAS such equality requires the elimination of all financial and social barriers to education;

AND WHEREAS the Canadian Union of Students is deeply concerned with the elimination of such barriers;

AND WHEREAS the Canadian Union of Students recognizes its responsibility to advocate and implement policies and programs that will contribute to the elimination of these barriers.

A) Long-Range Financial Policies:

Be it therefore resolved that CUS notes that sufficient financial support is not being provided in the field of post-secondary education; the Canadian Union of Students:

1) rejects in principle all systems of financial aid to students which involve loans, means tests, or conditions implying mandatory parental support;

2) advocates the abolition of all tuition fees;

3) declares that a system of student stipends is required to achieve equality of educational opportunity.

B) Long-Range Social Policies

Be it further resolved that the Canadian Union of Students recognizes the necessity of programs designed to overcome social barriers to education.

C) Implementation of Financial Policies

Recognizing that education is a provincial responsibility, be it resolved that the Canadian Union of Students mandate regional and provincial organizations and
member institutions to develop immediate programs to achieve the aforementioned long-range goals.

That these programs may involve efforts aimed at achieving;

1) public recognition that the scholarships are awards based solely on academic achievement and can in no way be considered as a form of student aid.
2) expansion and improvement of existing bursary schemes;
3) conversion of bursary schemes to a system of student stipends;
4) conversion of existing loan schemes to bursary schemes based solely on student need;
5) reduction and elimination of all requirements or assumptions of parental support.
6) simplification and elimination of means tests.
7) progressive abolition of tuition fees, beginning at the first year level.
8) the making public of all information pertinent to the financing of education.

D) Implementation of Social Policies

Be it further resolved that this Congress:

1) mandates the Secretariat to initiate, promote, and coordinate research into the social conditions relevant to educational opportunity;
2) recommends that studies and action programs be evolved at the local and regional level, to include such measures as summer and post-graduate voluntary service, community action programs, and implementation of tutorial and academic enrichment program.
3) recommends that local and regional organizations and members institutions encourage secondary school students to both continue their education and actively seek improvement in the quality of secondary education;
4) calls for: i) the improvement of teaching standards and attitudes,
   ii) vastly increase support for adult education,
   iii) the universal provision of pre-primary education,
   iv) the provision of free medical, recreational, and eating facilities for all school children,

and recommends that provincial and regional organizations and member institutions develop programs to achieve those ends.

5) recommends that member institutions and organizations carry out a program of increasing public awareness of the problems of education in Canada and of the possible solutions to such problems.

That this resolution replace standing resolution UA-8/65 as a standing resolution of the Canadian Union of Students made by an organization representing post-secondary Canadian students in the interests of these potential students presently denied equality of educational opportunity.
Resolution B.4

Democracy within the Academic Community (1966)

WHEREAS a guiding principle of CUS is democracy within the academic community, and

WHEREAS the CUS recognizes the rights and responsibilities of the student as a full an equal member of his institutions, and

WHEREAS such full and equal membership is a necessary prerequisite for the specific educational function of the institution, and

WHEREAS there presently exists a lack of realistic awareness of student concerns within the educational institution,

BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

Member institutions assess the problems and needs of students within their own academic community, that

Member institutions analyse the existing power structures within their own academic community and assess how their needs may be best fulfilled by direct representation and full involvement within the existing structure or, where necessary, recommend a revised structure.

A report outlining this analysis and resulting recommendation be submitted by each institution to the Secretariat for distribution to other member associations.

Resolution B.5

Open Decision-making (1966)

WHEREAS the essence of higher education is open and free discussion, and

WHEREAS this ideal is not realized when the government of institutions of higher learning is conducted in secrecy, and

WHEREAS in such situations students and faculty are unable to exercise their rights and responsibilities as members of the institution, and

WHEREAS such lack of free flow of information reduced unnecessary and harmful tensions within the institution. [N.B. should probably read “WHEREAS such free flow of information...”]

The Canadian Union of Students affirms that:

1. All decisions made in the government of an institution of post-secondary education should be made in a democratically open manner, and
2. That in all instances in which exceptions to the principle of open decision making arise, it be mandatory that the person or persons making the exception openly justify their action.

Resolution B.6

_Academic Freedom (1966)_

WHEREAS the quality of education in institutions of higher learning is dependent on free and open discussion within the academic community;

WHEREAS the student has a responsibility to himself and the academic community to assist in the protection and preservation of such academic freedom;

AND WHEREAS student government is a recognized structure of authority to ensure this protection and preservation.

BE IT RESOLVED:

1. that Student governments of member institutions of the CUS undertake investigations when questions of possible infringements of academic freedom arise.

2. That member institutions formulate a definite policy of due process for both investigation and subsequent courses of action in such cases.

3. That this Congress mandates the national secretariat to establish a set of principles on academic freedom, in cooperation with the CAUT, to be presented to the 31st Congress.

Resolution B.7

_Universal Accessibility (1967)_

The Canadian Union of Students defines education as a contributive social process, the essence of which is an expanding awareness of man's social and natural environment, through experience, dialogue and co-operative intellectual effort.

Education is a fundamental human right.

The student is a productive member of society.

The principal goal of education is to serve society by developing the full potential of all citizens as free, creative, thinking and acting human beings and to help achieve equality of the essential conditions of human living.

The student, as a citizen, has the duty to assure that education can be pursued by every individual without any material, economic, social or psychological barriers, created by the absence of real equality of essential condition.
Basic policies on Universal Accessibility

Recognizing that:

There are numerous factors in our society which result in the individual’s lack of motivation to exercise his right to develop himself to his full potential through education,

The present educational and social systems, and the values accruing to them, militate against the liberation of the full potential of every citizen, and equality of essential condition,

The social and educational systems, not being characterized by democracy, accessibility, and equality of essential condition, perpetuate cultural, social, psychological, material and financial barriers, from which stem economic and ethnic discrimination, lack of motivation, alienation, anomie and social immobility,

The present educational system, in failing to adequately relate to the experience of each individual, in failing to stimulate the natural desire to learn, in suppressing individual and creative expression, discourages the student from continuing his education,

The academic costs and living costs of education render it totally or partially inaccessible for many individuals and discourage many others from taking advantage of existing opportunities,

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

The Canadian Union of Students undertake programs to create alternatives at every level of education: pre-school, elementary, secondary, post-secondary, and adult education. These programs shall be designed to provide opportunities for learning, for individual and creative expression where the present system is inadequate, and shall encourage dialogue among all citizens on the value and quality of education, and the existing opportunities.

In conjunction with these programmes, pressure should be applied to governments and educational institutes to achieve equality of essential conditions and democratic and accessible systems.

CUS undertake programmes to improve the quality of education, pressing for the reform of the educational system, rendering it more attractive, motivating, and with greater emphasis on the individual.

Recognizing that sufficient financial support is not being provided in the field of education,

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Canadian Union of Students

a) reject in principle all systems of financial aid which involve loans, means tests, or conditions implying mandatory parental support, and

b) declares that a system of student stipends must be adopted to help achieve equality of educational opportunity,

c) the Canadian Union of Students lobby for increased financial support from the federal and provincial governments and boards of education to provide adequate educational facilities
and student housing to fulfill the needs of every individual pursuing an education.

Recommendations for Co-ordination of Research and Programs

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT:

a) individual campuses be encouraged to undertake research and projects concerning accessibility,

b) the Secretariat provide assistance when required for research and action projects,

c) accessibility to education be considered as a topic of the 11th Annual CUS National Seminar,

d) a general member be mandated to sponsor a national teach-in on accessibility to education in the 1968-68 [sic] academic year,

e) a national co-ordinating committee should be established to co-ordinate research and action projects, to investigate other sources of information and financial resources. The CUS Congress mandates the Secretariat to establish this committee.

Recommendations for the Implementation of Social Policy

a) provincial associations hold conferences on barriers to education,

b) encouraging the appropriate departments of the universities to research areas of concern relevant to barriers to education,

c) emphasis on the problems of universal accessibility and the quality of education during freshman orientation,

d) encouraging increased involvement of high school students in the social and educational systems, through visitation programs, joint seminars, and secondary school student unions,

e) workshops for secondary school editors on student newspapers, co-operating with the Canadian University Press,

f) tutorial programs for high school students, discussing the elimination of barriers to education,

g) creation of free high schools,

h) programs to eliminate barriers to education peculiar to ethnic minority groups; these should make use of existing organizations specifically concerned with these groups, e.g. CIYC for the Indians,

i) organization of co-op housing on the local campus,

j) extension of co-op philosophy to community organizing programs, resulting in the development of intentional communities,
k) seminars for practicing teachers on the use of free learning situations within the existing educational structure,

l) programs to further increase the awareness of the members of teachers' federations and P.T.A.'s in regard to barriers to education,

m) stimulating programs of adult education incorporating the free learning situation,

n) summer projects with high school and post-secondary student volunteers furthering community awareness of barriers to education,

o) general educational programs within the community to create an awareness of existing barriers to education,

p) close liaison with the Company of Young Canadians in order to avoid duplication,

q) encourage other community organizations to initiate programs for change in the educational system.

r) communication and co-ordination with educational authorities, e.g. school boards, provincial departments of education, inter-provincial associations, etc. involved in programs for eliminating barriers to education, and improving the quality of education,

s) progress reports on all projects to be sent regularly to the Student Government Research Service to provide resource material and motivation for interested parties.

Implementation of Financial Policies

Recognizing that it is the Federal Government which provides equalization payments to the Provincial Governments in order that they may use this money for education, it is recommended that the Canadian Union of Students continue to lobby with the Federal Government for further aid and co-operate with regional and provincial organizations in lobbying with provincial governments.

It is recommended that these programs involve attempts to achieve:

a) public recognition that scholarships are awards based solely on academic achievement and can in no way be considered as a form of student aid,

b) conversion of existing loan schemes to bursary schemes based solely on student need,

c) expansion and modification of existing bursary schemes,

d) abolition of tuition fees and/or conversion of bursary schemes to a system of universal and comprehensive student subsidies,

e) reduction and elimination of all requirements of parental support,

f) simplification and elimination of means tests,
g) wide publicity of all information pertinent to the financing of education.

It is recommended that:

a) the CUS undertake a study on the establishment of a guaranteed minimum income for all.

b) the Secretariat keep members informed on the progress of Federal-Provincial negotiations for the financing of education.

Resolution B.8

Structural Reform (1967)

The individual in any human community has the right and responsibility of active participation in the decision-making of that community. It is good in itself that the individual be so engaged since only in this way may he become a fully-developed human being. The academic community is a community within the larger community, and the same principles apply and must be realized within its government as in the wider community.

The academic community exists for the purpose of the educational process, the goal of which is to develop the potential of all persons as free, creative thinking and acting human beings. Therefore the governmental process of an academic community cannot be inconsistent with the educational process without detriment to both.

The members of the academic community are those involved in the educational process. Direct participation by the members of the academic community in the decision-making process of that community is the ideal means of application of the principle when possible. When this is impossible, decisions must be made by representatives of the whole community who are accountable and responsible to that community.

Significant and effective change of the academic community towards these ends may occur only with a widespread critical awareness in the student body of the right and duty of the student to be actively involved in the governing of his academic community. Students comprise one participating group in the academic community with many common goals in the community and the right to organize to achieve these ends.

BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

(1) student government, acting for the student body, should work to create widespread awareness in the student body of the right and duty of the student to participate in the government of his institution,

(2) student governments with the support of the student body, should by confrontation or cooperation with other groups seek reform of academic community structures towards those more consistent with full participation by all the academic community,

(3) the academic community must be governed by representatives of the component sectors of the community: (a) student (b) faculty (c) administration and employees, which as contributive forces must control the process of education,
representatives of the various socio-economic groups within the wider community which
the academic community serves should have advisory roles in the government of the
academic community so as to facilitate a constant critical dialogue between society and the
academic community,

the government representing society has ultimate responsibility to act in society’s interest by
means of laws and financial arrangements with the academic community,

the Canadian Union of Students mandate the CUS Secretariat and each general member to
conduct studies of models of governmental structures of post-secondary institutions based
upon the principle of the individual’s right and responsibility to participate in such
governing bodies, and resolutions three to five above.

Resolution B.9

Open Decision-making (1967)

WHEREAS open and free discussion is an essential element of education;

WHEREAS the public which post-secondary institutions serve is legitimately concerned with
the functioning, development, and decision-making processes of educational institutions;

WHEREAS the realization of the above principles is jeopardized when the government of the
community within which the educational process takes place is conducted in an atmosphere of
secrecy;

WHEREAS in such situations students and faculty are unable to exercise their right to hold their
representatives fully accountable and responsible to them;

WHEREAS the lack of a free flow of information has contributed to unnecessary tension and
distrust within the community;

the Canadian Union of Students AFFIRMS:

(1) that all decisions made within or in relation to an institution of post-secondary education
should be made in a democratically open manner, and

(2) that in all instances in which exceptions to the principle of open decision-making arise, the
person or persons advocating the exception openly justify their action, and that the decision-
making body involved openly vote on the question of moving in camera and, further, that
each representative who participates in closed deliberations be held accountable and
responsible to his constituents for his action, and

(3) that students should refuse to serve on decision-making bodies within the institution which
routinely follow a policy of secret decision-making.
Resolution B.10

Education (1968)

Introduction

Societies educate in order to transfer skills and knowledge (to the younger generation) which are deemed necessary for the continuance and the development of the society. Increasingly, the skills considered important by those who dictate social and economic policy are the ones taught in schools. The relationship between education (in schools) and productivity is a phenomenon peculiar to this century. The usual explanations centre around such phrases as “technological development” and “increasing complexity of modern industry”. There is, however, another factor of almost equal importance: the socializing effect of schools. The result of this is the use of the schools as a means of social control to shape the attitudes, beliefs, and world views of the students who are subjected to a particular type of education in a particular kind of school.

This is directly opposed to the education needs of a society that is truly democratic. In such a society the goals of education must be to help students to become individuals:

i) who are able to take self-initiated action and be self-disciplined and responsible for that action,

ii) who are critical learners able to evaluate the contributions of others and make intelligent choices, free of social or intellectual coercion,

iii) who are aware of their social responsibilities and are able to co-operate effectively with others, but who think and act independently and not just in terms of what others think,

iv) who have acquired knowledge relevant to the solution of personal and social problems, and can use that knowledge creatively.

However, that knowledge that is acquired cannot be divorced from the social system which it exists. It is not politically neutral: it can be used both to liberate and repress. Only if we examine the ways in which knowledge is used in our society can we fully understand the kinds of socialization that occur and the role of education in our society.

War research and counterinsurgency studies, which occur on Canadian campuses, are only the more blatant expressions of our ties with an imperialistic form of society centered south of the border. Canada, as sometime junior partner, sometimes the exploited, has been greatly influenced by American education which occurs in the framework of imperialism. Imperialism takes social, political, and economic knowledge as the means of repression and domination. It is in this area that our universities increasingly serve the North American continental elite. Structural underdevelopment in Canada and the repression of U.S. blacks are two of the internal expressions of this imperialist system.

Not only does the imperialist framework determine the use to which knowledge will be put, it also subtly selects what is to be taught. Implicit in each bundle of knowledge are certain orientations, certain values, and certain assumptions. Two things occur simultaneously: knowledge is moulded to fit the needs of the corporate elite, and the possibility of questioning and challenging this use of knowledge (and therefore this society) is suppressed. Knowledge
becomes authoritarian, an agent of social control.

Control of knowledge in the university extends to other areas of the student’s life: residence life, off-campus activity, and the projected “good life” for the university graduate are all very much a part of this system of repression. In this situation it is the duty of the Canadian student, for himself and his society, to actively confront his situation, the university, as an imperialist institution. The Canadian student must organize to challenge both the content and method of his education and to strive for alternatives. This can be done by effecting, within the university, reforms which are anti-imperialist in both structure and content.

The following resolutions are presented as a unit. The division into sections is arbitrary and inadequate in that areas overlap in many ways. All aspects of “education” are influenced by the kind of society in which we live. That society is both repressive and exploitative. Our struggle for a humanitarian society, and therefore our confrontation with imperialism, must occur at all levels of the university. Nothing less is sufficient.

PART I

The University and Society

The University is not presently open to all groups in society. University students are predominantly middle and upper-middle class in Canada. Their socialization has been such that they fit more smoothly into the University environment than others might. Their status expectations and personal goals have been molded to suppress questioning of the alienating environment of the university. Other groups in society do not have easy access to the university. They are uninterested because the university is not geared to serving their immediate needs and because of the barriers they face which prevent their participation in present universities. Even given all this, these groups share several common concerns with students. Both groups are presently politically powerless; both are held in check by the authoritarian structures of monopoly capitalism; and, conversely, neither group can significantly advance their position without organizing and confronting the structures that suppress them.

Education is at present almost totally irrelevant to the day-to-day lives of students. Only those who have been trained to accept this fact have access to the university which is publicly financed “for the benefit of society as a whole”. It is necessary to ‘turn knowledge on its head’ and make it relevant to the immediate needs of students: it is necessary to socialize knowledge. As this happens the ‘uses of the university’ will change and so will the university as we know it. Those who at present are not, do not wish to be, or cannot be students will have free access to all the resources of the university.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:

i) That member unions ensure that the employees at their universities are unionized. Unionization of office staff of member unions is equally necessary. University employees, powerless as members of the institution of the University, should be included in the educational campaigns of the member unions. Similarly, member unions should inform and mobilize students in support of demands and grievances of university staff. The right of university employees to participate in the governing structures of the university should be recognized and implemented.
ii) That CUS and all member unions thoroughly condemn the practice of student scabbing.

iii) That member unions, whose universities have the power of expropriation over lands surrounding the university, act to abolish this power. In many cases such power may infringe upon the lives of people who reside on such lands. Member unions should ensure that their university's development plans are formulated within the context of general urban planning. Students and members of the local community should agitate for the power to veto, to be placed in hands of the residents affected, over development plans of the university, where such plans would displace residents or drastically affect the local environment. Members of University Boards of Governors should be required to declare their interests in all lands surrounding the university campus.

iv) That member unions actively support groups of people in the non-university community who are consciously struggling to improve their working and/or living conditions. Alliances should be formed on the basis of mutual respect, a sharing of decision-making power, and a pooling of resources.

v) That all efforts be made to open the university and its resources to “non-students”. Universal accessibility can thus be seen as much more than access to the university and its facilities. In attempting to encourage such use of the university, it must be recognized that social, psychological, and structural factors have divorced the community from the university. Only change of the university’s goals and structures can make the university a true institution of the people. University development plans must take this broader goal into account.

PART II

Since education is a process of free contribution whereby an individual member of society is made privy to all forms of knowledge and to all methods of intellectual rigor known to his society, the role of research within an education-oriented community is necessarily to give the greatest public exposure to the methods and results of this research.

As the university has become increasingly integrated into the total social structure, reflecting and reinforcing prevalent norms, it has increasingly involved itself in a system of private contraction and co-option. This co-option is a direct result of the norm of individual competition and the structure of monopoly capitalism by which elements of the society seek a comparative advantage over one another. In the university structure, it is seen most clearly in the control of the governing bodies by representatives of a corporate and social elite, and by the tendency of universities to allow their facilities or personnel to participate in research for external organizations on a ‘secret’ or covert basis.

An outstanding example is seen in military research. Since the Second World War there has been a steady increase in the amount of war research being done at Canadian universities. The rapid deteriorization of Canadian sovereignty and our absorption into the American empire has virtually ended the possibility of an independent foreign policy. Within the framework of organizations such as NATO and NORAD Canadian foreign policy is subordinated to that of the United States. The Defense Sharing Agreement, involving Canada, the U.S., and Britain, is the logical consequence of these developments. It is this agreement which is of most immediate concern to Canadian Universities. The agreement involves both sharing of information and a
division of labour among participating countries. Much of the Canadian research, by itself, may be harmless but when integrated into other programs being carried out in the U.S. becomes much of the basic research necessary for chemical and biological warfare. Canadian University involvement in this research is extensive. The Defense Research Board (DRB) gave grants in excess of three million dollars to academics for research purposes last year. Forty-eight percent of this money went to students to work on these programs. Most recently, a program has been announced to establish professorships in military and strategic studies at five universities (to be financed by the Dept. of National Defense and administered by the DRB). In addition to this, an unspecified amount of money is poured into what can only be called counter-insurgency studies in the Commonwealth. The absence of official policy, either by government or the university, has allowed Canadian campuses to become an integral part of the system of military suppression which has become the dominant feature of the “free world”.

This covert research is conducted for both the government and private interests for the purpose of suppressing those areas of knowledge which could give them what they might view as an essential advantage in military or economic terms. This research, in addition to consolidating the position of the contributors, rapes the essential educational nature of the university, socializing the members of the community, both ‘faculty’ and ‘students’ hired as research assistants, to an acceptance of our repressive social norms.

Since CUS is an organization principally dedicated to providing a true education,

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT

CUS declare itself unalterably opposed to any use of university facilities or personnel for any research or study which is covert in nature or which suppresses any segment of its educational value, either in the methods employed or in the results of the work.

AND FURTHER THAT

CUS declare itself unalterably opposed to genocidal research, such as germ warfare.

Each member union must expose the extent and nature of such research at its University and take whatever action necessary to end war research and counterinsurgency studies. We must act to force both the universities and government to define policy in this area and consciously seek public support to end university involvement in military research.

AND FURTHER THAT

CUS declare itself adamantly opposed to military research of any kind of the university campus; and that the criterion for determining what constitutes “military research” be the source of funds - e.g. NATO, NORAD, DRB, Canadian military, Rand Corporation, etc, (as well as exposed institutions and corporations).

AND THAT THE

CUS Secretariat be mandated to prepare a comprehensive report on the nature, extent and sources of funds for military research and counterinsurgency studies in Canadian universities.
PART III

Financing of the University

Canadian Universities are financed in a variety of ways from coast to coast. The factor common to all these modes of financing, with the exception of tuition fees, is that they are dependent on sources which have vested interests in maintaining the university as a "knowledge industry". Fund raising from corporations and business, as well as grants, bursaries and scholarships from this sector, influence not only structure and content but also become a factor in the structure of the university. Government is generally sympathetic to corporate interests and their most direct source of control, the Board of Governors, is heavily overrepresented by businessmen, corporation directors, and the like. This structuring of financial control has meant that it is very easy for the government to move in and take over direct control of academic priorities, via financing, such as in Saskatchewan. The resistance that developed in this case had no adequate organizational vehicle for expression because the Board of Governors and the President were too thoroughly tied to the same business interests that were at the core of the Liberal Party. No Canadian University, as presently structured, would be able to develop effective resistance to this form of encroachment. The effects of corporation vested interests have permeated through the various levels of the university and together with other military and government interests have helped to separate knowledge from the student. Knowledge is kept irrelevant to the students' needs; it serves him only indirectly by making him useful to external interests.

The sane external interests, both Canadian and U.S. based, perpetuate the social stratification and class structure in Canadian society that mitigates against equal opportunity in education. Lower and working class people not only have more difficulty in entering post-secondary educational institutions but also face both financial and non-financial difficulties once they are registered.

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

i) Member unions aim at the abolition of tuition fees and that CUS aid them, through fieldwork, research, lobbying and communications. The new sources of funds should be specified and not lead to an increased tax burden on low income groups. Either a higher tax on high income groups or an elimination of economic waste (status symbols, administrative costs, duplication of facilities) in the university could provide the necessary revenue.

ii) That all present funds that come, in various forms, from corporations and business be obtained through a capital gains tax or similar corporation tax.

iii) That academic freedom and university autonomy, being both inseparable and essential, be thoroughly incorporated into the other goals of all participating member unions. In the present context government interference in determining the universities' priorities would, in most cases, reinforce the status quo.

iv) That member unions urge their universities to accept conditional gifts only if they

   a) in no way contradict CUS policy,

   b) if they in no way are in opposition to the wishes of the faculty and students on the
campus concerned,

c) they do not affect the ability of the faculty and students on the campus concerned to set their own priorities.

BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

The Canadian Union of Students, in its effort to democratize the university, assert that:

i) Students must have effective control over all decision-making bodies in the university and that faculty and university employees should have adequate representation,

ii) other members of the above mentioned bodies must be representative of all socio-economic strata,

iii) department chairman must be elected by all member of the department concerned, including students, who should be eligible for this office as well,

iv) all decision-making within the university must be open and that any closed decision must be publicly justified.

PART IV

Course Content and Control

The socializing effect of our repressive culture is seen clearly in the curriculum of our schools and in the authoritarian style of our instruction, designed to develop the “followership” demanded by late capitalist society. Entire disciplines are shaped by their functional usefulness to ‘problem solving’ and social control as defined by the needs of external interests. Applied anthropology smooths over the contradictions of a semi-colonial Indian reserve system: applied engineering aids the building of today’s clumsy, alienating metropolises. Knowledge is wrested from its context. It has lost its humanitarian base. This is the form in which knowledge can be quantified, measured by the grade system, and bundled into degrees. This is the knowledge that can be horded and privatized. It is no mere coincidence that some professors are more interested in publishing, specializing, and becoming ‘professionals’ than in teaching.

The present systematized education is counter-productive of the full human development of the individual student. The mode of instruction and decision-making militates against the development of critical learning, that is the ability of the students to deal with the expertise and information which he confronts.

THEREFORE:

With the goal of making education democratic, as defined in the introduction,

BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

i) control of curriculum must rest exclusively with the students and faculty concerned,
ii) a program aimed at the reform of the classroom situation must be undertaken. The goal of such a program should be to create a situation in which the professor acts as a resource person, honestly presenting alternatives at the outset of the course and leaving avenues open for the students to determine, in conjunction with him, the form of the course, its content, the method of instruction, and, if necessary, the method of evaluation to be employed,

iii) course unions be established to provide critical evaluation of course content,

iv) members of the Union should establish experimental courses incorporating interdisciplinary and participatory approaches (with or without the co-operation of faculty and administration),

v) member unions should support the establishment of free schools at the elementary and secondary school levels, and should encourage high school students to challenge the authoritarian nature of their education,

vi) critical discussion of the present system of postsecondary instruction should be initiated on campus by means of open forums, student newspapers, student/faculty committees, wall posters, etc.

vii) member universities condemn the use of television as a stop-gap measure to provide lectures but would seek to use television as a medium of communications rather than as a manpower source.

PART V

Students Outside the Classroom

Just as learning for the student does not cease when he finishes his last class neither does the authoritarian repression of his creative social and intellectual potential. If he remains on campus he is continually reminded of his third-class status in the university. Both symbols and structures differentiate him from others on the campus. If he lives in residence he is subject to an arbitrary list of regulations concerning his social behavior: often some of these regulations extend to him even if he lives off-campus. Campus facilities are generally not geared to his social, and psychological well being. If he wishes to rent a room or apartment he quite often faces a shortage of places in a market whose prices soar under the pressure of supply and demand. This is thoroughly consistent with his ‘learning’ environment for it is, in many cases, an extension of that environment.

In some cases, however, it is not authoritarian repression which isolates the student from society. Many ‘benevolent’ parental administrators seek to shield their students and faculty from laws as they exist for those outside the university. In either case, the student perceives a society different from that which exists outside the university. He loses his ability to deal with that society.

THEREFORE, to further the full well being of all students, BE IT RESOLVED:

i) that residences be run by those living in them and that no outside power be allowed to supersede the decisions of the members,
ii) that member unions give high priority to the housing question with a view to expanding available facilities and bringing them under control of the students who will be using them. (The recommendations on co-op housing in another paper are consistent with this view.)

iii) that member unions aim to eliminate symbols which differentiate students from other members of the university. (e.g., separate faculty lounges, washrooms, parking facilities, etc.).

iv) that university disciplinary codes deal only with academic crimes, e.g. plagiarism. These codes should be defined and applied by bodies composed of students and faculty.

Resolution B.11

_Student Power (1968)_

The fundamental demand of student unions must be for control over the learning process and the University decision-making process at all levels. The basis for this control is not a belief that students constitute an elite, but the principle that control over one's material environment is a fundamental democratic right. We therefore must support the exercise of that right by other groups, be they workers in industry, urban residents, or citizens of the Third World.

The University is not an autonomous community but a multiversity with a corporate structure and ideology training students according to the imperatives of the corporate business world. Thus the various disciplines and departments are becoming increasingly compartmentalized from one another and are more and more functionally related as training laboratories in technique to the narrow demands of the labour market. Stratification exists within both the faculty (lecturer, associate professor etc.) and the student body (honors versus majors etc.) and between them. The demand for control cannot be a request for participation in this corporate structure. It must seek to counter the power of the University as a corporation with the autonomous power of the students.

1. Department and classroom: organizing around places of intellectual work.

The most crucial arenas where the struggle for control must take place are the classroom and departmental decision-making bodies. Student demands in the classroom and department will mean conflict not only with the administration, but also with those faculty whose narrow academic interests, or whose real powers based on status or grading, are threatened by student power. Functionally, the faculty may normally be divided into three groups: upper administrators and deans, whose interests often coincide with those of the administration; middle-level academics, who are threatened by administrative interference but also by student demands; and the bloc of lower faculty and poorly-paid teaching assistants whose interests are closer to the students'. Students must, in connection with minority faculty unions and teaching assistant unions, fight for the following:

1. The CAUT policy of apprenticeship and tenure must be vigorously opposed as a guild professionalist concept of status and power in the University which subordinates teaching to research and intellectual exchange to competition between professors and
students in the classroom and departmental politics. We must fight for automatic due process in hiring and firing with regular review of contract by parallel student and faculty committees with mutual veto.

2. Students must have control in the classroom: methods to that end could be an adoption of the pass/fail system of grading, constant evaluation based on assignments, class participation, evaluation by fellow students in the class, and negotiation between the individual student and the teacher.

We recognize that this interim step (towards the end of abolition of exams and grades) does not fundamentally alter the power relationship between faculty and students insofar as it does not abolish grading per se. However, it is a system of grading which is capable of being more flexible in its application to individual students, and might serve to clarify the whole issue of grading.

There must also be continuous joint student/faculty control over curricula and teaching-learning processes.

Students must be organized to confront faculty-administration opposition to these reforms by boycotting exams, setting up student-run tutorials and seminars using resource personnel, challenging the bias of course outlines and the context of lectures, etc.

3. Autonomous student power must be built by establishing departmental union locals including all students in each department. Student committees, parallel to all departmental faculty committees, should be created to demand recognition of students' right to equal access to information and bargaining power. The department union, in the event of conflict, must work for final veto over departmental or faculty decision, and must have the right to initiate new policies for faculty ratification.*

4. Students will actively support the demands of university employees for control over their working environment.

2. University level: Bargaining from power

Any gains made by forcing concessions from faculty at the departmental level can be smashed by the actions of the Senate, Board, Faculty Council or other university and faculty bodies. Students must build autonomous power at this level by demanding:

1. An end to all advisory committees of students without direct decision-making power, and student participation as a minority of any decision-making group. Students must form their own committees, articulate their demands and engage in bargaining with the administration and/or faculty controlled bodies. The alternative is to allow things to be "buried in a committee" and permit student demands for action to be co-opted into various types of non-action. A refusal to bargain in good faith can be met by mobilizing students to act to confront the power structure by demonstrations, strikes and boycotts.

2. Openness of all meetings and equal access to information.

3. Abolition of the Board of Governors as presently constituted. The fiscal and other
"academic" powers of current Boards of Governors (ultimate veto of hiring and firing etc.) should be transferred to parallel student-faculty university level decision-making bodies (i.e. the student union or an executive committee of it called the student plenum and the faculty council respectively) which will meet separately. Legislation will have to be ratified by both bodies before it goes into effect.

An alternate model which might be employed would be to transfer all Board powers to a reconstituted Senate with an equal number of students and faculty, i.e. the demand would be for parity on a joint body. The student senators must be directly accountable to the autonomous university wide student union at whose meetings the student policy towards the Senate decisions would be finally decided. Preliminary meetings which would involve more students directly in debate could be held in the departmental levels but the final student position would be decided by the student union. This is the only way to guarantee that the students have a veto and autonomous power and that the Senate and other bodies in which students participate would be subordinated to the student union as one instrument of exercising student power. The university is not divisible into three "equal groups" (the idea of tripartite university community), for the management part of the administration and the current Boards are allied with the (senior) faculty in maintaining their control over a corporate structure. The faculty as a whole must decide for itself whether it wishes to continue this alliance by including administration representatives, appointed department heads and deans in their half of the Senate and other decision-making bodies or in their parallel structures.

4. The question of staff or university employee participation in decision-making can be resolved by granting non-management people organized into autonomous labour unions bargaining rights in relation to decision-making bodies at all levels of the university. Management level administrators must be regarded as civil servants.

The parallel decision-making or joint-parity approaches should be followed with respect to all university or faculty level bodies (arts, engineering etc.). Power will continue to be vested in the autonomous student union and its locals in departments who must act to confront the corporate structure by bargaining and mobilizing students to act to confront it when demands are not met. The operating principles of our approach to bargaining must be those of parity, mass participation (instead of representative models of democratization) in open structures and parallel decision-making with a veto vested in autonomous student unions, although in certain cases parity on joint bodies will be sought.

* For detailing structural information see report of Student Power Research Sub Committee - PSA-SFU.

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Resolution B.12

Motion from the Rebuilding Conference (May 1969)

"C.U.S. is primarily a Union of Canadian students and not a political party. If it is to act as a spokesman for Canadian students, it is imperative that the executive and the policies reflect not only the needs and interests of Canadian students, but of all Canadians. C.U.S. must not be used as a tool to propagate the political views of any particular student minority. It must concern itself with issues that directly affect the student on campus. Its primary concern must be with the problems and opportunities for education of the Canadian student. C.U.S. cannot be the vanguard of any minority—it is a student union committed to majoritarian political action for social change affecting students, recognizing that students are an integral part of society. Its primary function should be to deal with the problems directly related to students of this country."
Appendix C

Selected Results from the Student Means Survey

Table C.1
Age Distribution of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 and under</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 - 24</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 and above</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table C.2
Distribution of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities by Faculty - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, Commerce &amp; Administration</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. There is wide variation in the “Education” category. For example: British Columbia 22%, Alberta 33%, Saskatchewan 26%, Newfoundland 48%. The remaining provinces are in the single digits. Adapted from Rabinovitch, An Analysis, 9.
Table C.3
Proportion of Provincial Post-Secondary Student Population Studying at Institutions - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>University of British Columbia</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>University of Alberta (Edmonton)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>University of Saskatchewan (Saskatoon)</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>University of Manitoba</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>University of Toronto</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Western Ontario</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québec</td>
<td>McGill University</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sir George Williams University</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>St. Dunstan’s University</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>University of New Brunswick</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mt. Allison University</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Thomas University</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Dalhousie University</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acadia University</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Mary’s University</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>Memorial University</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Adapted from Rabinovitch, An Analysis, 17-20.

Table C.4
Distribution of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities by Size of Community of Origin with Comparison to Total Population - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Community of Origin</th>
<th>Undergraduate Students</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 999 and Under</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 9,999</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 - 29,999</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000 - 99,999</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 and Over</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Adapted from Rabinovitch, An Analysis, 21.
Table C.5
Place of Residence During Academic Year of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Undergraduate Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with Parents</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting - Living Alone</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting - Sharing</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding House</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Residence</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renting</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own home</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Adapted from Rabinovitch, *An Analysis*, 24.

Table C.6
Combined Parental Income Prior to Taxes of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities with Comparison to Total Population - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parents' Combined Income</th>
<th>Undergraduate Students</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $3,000</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 - $4,999</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000 - $5,999</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$6,000 - $6,999</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7,000 - $7,999</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,000 - $9,999</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 or More</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The average family income in 1965 was $6,539 (adapted from Statistics Canada, *Income Distribution by Size in Canada* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994), 19). Table adapted from Rabinovitch, *An Analysis*, 37.
Table C.7
Occupation of Father of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities - Canada
with Comparison to Total Population - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation of Father</th>
<th>Undergraduate Students</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary and Managerial (Non-Farm)</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial and Financial</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Mechanical</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Communication</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming, Mining, Logging, Fishing</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. There is wide variation in “Farming, Mining, Logging, Fishing” category depending on the province. For example: Alberta 27%, Saskatchewan 37%, Manitoba 21%, Prince Edward Island 35%, Ontario 9%, Québec (English-speaking) 6%. Adapted from Rabinovitch, *An Analysis*, 44.

Table C.8
Level of Schooling of Father of Undergraduate Students at English-speaking Universities - Canada - February 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Schooling of Father</th>
<th>Undergraduate Students</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One or More University Degrees</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduation</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The level of schooling of mothers shows a similar distribution, though mothers tend to cluster around “Some High School” and “High School Graduation”. Adapted from Rabinovitch, *An Analysis*, 47.
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A.1 Archival Collections

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