CULTURAL WEALTH FOR ALL:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE AESTHETIC VALUES

IN THE GETTY'S DISCIPLINE-BASED ART EDUCATION PROGRAM

by

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ABSTRACT

The Getty Center for Education in the Arts has issued a set
of documents containing descriptions of its discipline-based
art education program (DBAE). This program has been
criticized as promoting a set of aesthetic values based
solely in the Western fine art tradition, and hence may be
insensitive to the educational needs of a modern democratic
pluralistic society. Aesthetic value in this study refers to
any criteria by which one visual experience is considered to
be of greater import or value than another. Although the
documents describing these values have been both attacked by
critics and defended by the Getty, no sustained and in-depth
analysis has been conducted to determine the nature and
larger context of the aesthetic values they promote.

This study analyzes the body of documents issued by the
Getty in order to discover the nature of the aesthetic
values and their larger context and purpose. Content
analysis was performed on the publicly available Getty
documents and all statements containing references to the
nature, function, value, appreciation, criteria, standards,
and judgment of art were extracted, analyzed and then
classified and explicated insofar as they pertained to the
criteria for determining superiority in a visual experience.

Six criteria for aesthetic value were identified and characterized. These criteria defined the standard for superiority in terms of the art work, the fine art tradition, the visual code, literacy, and intellectual, cultural, and formal values. It was discovered that these criteria were part of a larger body of values which is based in the humanities tradition.

After a discussion concerning the impact these values have in a modern democracy and the implications for Canadian art education, the study concludes that the kinds of aesthetic values promoted by the Getty's DBAE program are monocultural in that they exalt and promote only the values of the Western fine art tradition, and hence, may not be appropriate as the sole basis for art education in a pluralistic society. Curriculum frameworks for discipline-based art education which allow a more culturally democratic approach to the treatment of aesthetic values are available and these, rather than the Getty formulations should be utilized when designing discipline-based art education curricula.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO A PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM

It is natural to assume that human beings seek out and
cultivate those experiences which provide some kind of
benefit for themselves. This endeavour relies on the
assessment of what is of most worth. The basis of the
judgment may be cerebral, biological, social, or sensual,
but without the belief that the endeavour is worthwhile, it
is unlikely to be voluntarily selected as an objective
worthy of attention.

The determination of value is a continuing and dominant
human activity and in probably no other area more pervasive
and consuming than in that of visual experience. In the act
of selecting our clothing, buying a new automobile, or
responding to the painted images on a wall, we are concerned
with judging the visual worth of the encounter. But what are
the guides and standards we use for our evaluations? What
makes us select one experience and reject another?

Certainly in much of our interaction with the visual world
we rely on subjective value preferences. Our personal taste

guides our actions of choice. We choose one visual
phenomenon because the color excites us, or the content
relates to a favorite activity. On one level, the problem of
worth is determined by what pleases us, and many people use
this subjective indicator as the sole guide for determining
aesthetic worth in their lives. But is subjective preference
the only, or even the best way to determine aesthetic worth?
Are there standards or criteria that somehow indicate what
some may feel is a more objective form of *excellence* in the
various visual encounters we have with our world or are
aesthetic evaluations of excellence based on standards
relative to time, place and culture?

Aesthetic value [1] consists of the means advanced to
distinguish or to determine visual excellence. In this study
the term is employed to identify the *criteria by which one
visual experience is considered to be superior to another*.
Those criteria constitute a *standard* for determining worth
in our visual encounters. Questions concerning the
definition of standards in the differentiation of value in
images have been paramount in the field of art and in art
education, and have constituted the basis for many reform
movements in the field.

Art education in America is currently undergoing such a

reform. The agent of this reform [2] is the J. Paul Getty
Trust which has enlisted leading figures in the field of
North American art education to design and develop a
discipline-based curriculum structure (DBAE) [3] in order to
raise the status and quality of art education in the
schools. Knowledge of the ideas involved in this endeavour
has been transmitted primarily through a set of public
documents referred to in this study as the *Getty literature*
(See Appendix A). These documents state the fundamental
goals, aims, and ideas behind DBAE which attempt to provide
a basis whereby art education may become a serious study. By
making art "academic, rigorous, and structured," the Getty [4]
seeks to give *all* American students the opportunity to
participate in the *artistic wealth their culture possesses*
(Eisner, 1985).

The assumed benefits of this *wealth*, however, raise a number
of questions concerning the values upon which it is based.
Since the Getty states that the most important decision in
the implementation of its program is in the selection of the
works of art used (Getty Center, 1987a), it seems essential
to examine the aesthetic values comprising the criteria by
which that selection is made.

Aesthetic value comprises one standard for the evaluation of

excellence, and in an art education program, it ultimately determines what kind of art will be granted status. No art education program can exist without believing that some values are better than others. If awareness concerning the standards of excellence employed in the Getty's Discipline-based Art Education program is to occur, an understanding must first be provided concerning the nature, purpose, and larger context of the aesthetic values it promotes.

The documents which describe the DBAE program have been criticized by a number of writers on the grounds that the values represented in them are based solely in the Western cultural tradition [5] (Chalmers, 1987a; 1987b; Hamblen, 1987a, 1988b; Lanier, 1987; Lederman, 1988; Lidstone, 1988; London, 1988; McFee, 1988). [6] Since they believe that a *monocultural* approach may be detrimental to the concept of education in a pluralistic society, they call for a re-evaluation of the criteria and standards used for the assessment of worth in DBAE, and the adoption of an approach more consistent with the aims and goals of cultural pluralism within a democracy. The Getty has responded by suggesting that the critics have *misinterpreted* the documents and that in fact, DBAE is not obsessed with western cultural values, but is open to the use of a variety

of cultural forms (Getty Center, 1988b, 1988c).

Since there seems to be some contradiction between the claims of the critics and those of the Getty, there is an obvious need for a concentrated analysis of the aesthetic values promoted in the DBAE program to determine whether the critics have a basis in fact for their claims, or whether the Getty is correct in stating that a misinterpretation of the documents has occurred. At present, there are no analyses of the fundamental premises and assumptions of its aesthetic values, and programs based solely on its viewpoint are now being implemented in American schools (Getty Center, 1987a).

To provide a needed analysis of the aesthetic values underlying the Getty reform, this study seeks a resolution for the following questions:

1. What is the nature of the aesthetic values being promoted by the Getty organization through its public documents?

2. What is the larger context and purpose of these values?

The first question specifically analyzes the documents in order to identify and characterize the kind of aesthetic values found therein, while the second expands the

characterization of the identified values to include their
antecedents and possible influence in the educational arena.
Answers to these two questions will provide descriptions
concerning the kinds of aesthetic values promoted through
the Getty documents, and a resolution to the current debate
between the Getty and its critics. The focus of this study
will be on providing answers to *what* and *who* questions,
i.e., *what* are the values, *what* is their context, and *who* is
promoting them. Questions concerning *how* and *why* these
values have come to be dominant within the Getty are foci
for further research, although certain factors to do with
the latter cannot be entirely eliminated from this study.

PERSPECTIVE

A problem exists in the confusion surrounding the precise
nature of the aesthetic values in DBAE. At the heart of the
controversy is the question concerning the most adequate
method of introducing aesthetic values in a culturally
diverse society. This study will proceed on the assumption
that aesthetic values are primarily socially determined and
that the criteria and standards of judgment governing
aesthetic worth are valid only insofar as they are regarded
in their cultural and social contexts.

Also assumed are certain conditions concerning human society

and culture. A society like the United States is seen by

some to be pluralistic in that it contains many cohesive

groups which have their "own system of accounting for values

and beliefs that relates to the world as they experience it"

(McFee & Degge, 1977, p. 291). [7] Each of these groups can be

considered a subculture in terms of ethnic or class

interests (or both). Although there are exchanges and

influences between subcultures, each basically creates its

own modes of artistic creation and its own standards of

evaluation. "Each of the arts develops a value system which

differentiates it in some degree from the others in terms of

purposes, aesthetic values and criteria for criticism"

(McFee, 1988, p. 106). In this sense there exist different

classes of visual phenomena. [8] The standards that each

subculture develops may apply only to the subculture that

uses them and may not always be used to evaluate aesthetic

objects of another culture "for members of different

cultures react differently to the same object" (Chalmers,

1981). [9]

By adopting the assumptions that art knowledge is socially

created and that objectivity and value neutrality are

unattainable, this study takes a definite value stance,

namely that if art is a socially determined affair, then

attention must be directed to its educational role in a
society perceived by some to be pluralistic in nature. It
will be this point of view that will guide the inquiry
surrounding explication of the argument, i.e., that the
Getty documents outline a discipline-based program which
promotes specific aesthetic values. These particular
aesthetic values, it will be demonstrated, are derived from
a larger body of classical thought which constitutes what is
known as the *Western fine art tradition*. As such, certain
aspects of these values may not be entirely conducive to a
pluralistic viewpoint within the field of education in North
America.

METHOD

Organization

This study is specifically concerned with an analysis of the
aesthetic values constituting Getty's *ideal* curriculum and
their larger context and purpose in the field of art
education. The study involves an analysis of the publicly
available documents which illustrate DBAE's aesthetic
values, so as to characterize their nature, place them in a
larger context, and determine their purpose.

Chapter 2 is primarily expository, setting in context a

brief historical and descriptive overview of the development
of the main tenets of the DBAE program.

Chapter 3 explains the use of terminology, definitions,
analytic categories, and the research design of the study.

Chapter 4 constitutes a discussion of the results of the
content analysis performed on the Getty literature. Six
criteria for aesthetic value are identified and discussed.

Chapter 5 places the identified values in their larger
context through a survey of the art education literature. It
does this by (1) tracing the antecedent history and
development of the identified criteria within the field of
art education and (2) touches briefly on the Getty writers
who utilize this tradition in the exposition of aesthetic
values in DBAE documents.

Chapter 6 - extends the context by placing the identified
values in the midst of the controversy concerning the role
of education and values in a multicultural and democratic
society. Implications for Canada of adopting the values in
this program are discussed.

Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings and comments on the

implementation of programs in aesthetic value in contemporary democracies. Implications for further research are discussed.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is an effective technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically analyzing the characteristics of written documents. It is both a method of collecting data and of analyzing it (Manheim, 1977). It asks specific questions of the written messages produced by people and employs a certain method involving objectivity, system, and generality (Budd, Thorp, & Donohew, 1967; Holsti, 1969).

In this particular study, content analysis serves as the central method whereby aesthetic values are identified in the Getty literature. Recognizing that interpretive judgments concerning the analyses are perhaps more meaningful than mere enumeration of their frequency, the approach taken in the content analysis emphasizes a qualitative rather than a quantitative methodology (Williamson, Karp, Dalphin, & Gray, 1982). Content analysis is a supplement to, and not a substitute for, the subjective examination of the documents in this study (Holsti, 1969). Because the effectiveness of content analysis for defining

the values expressed in institutional writings has been
documented (Rokeach, 1979), it can provide the means for
testing the validity of the argument that DBAE promotes a
specific set of aesthetic values which have their basis in
the Western fine art tradition.

Design

Categories and Units of Analysis

The category of analysis into which the content units are
classified is "aesthetic value." The study seeks to
determine what aesthetic values are revealed in the body of
documents examined. For the purpose of this study, aesthetic
value means *any criteria by which one visual experience is
considered to be superior to another.* [10] The size of the
unit studied will consist of the theme, or the smallest
syntactical unit needed to characterize an aesthetic value.
It is the individual statement about a specific value that
is the unit analyzed.

Sample

The data used to support the argument come from publicly
available documents consisting of journal articles, research
reports, conference papers, bibliographies, curriculum
guides, seminar reports, policy statements, and books. One

basic set of documents called the Getty literature is analyzed.

The Getty Literature – This refers to documents discussing the Getty organization and DBAE which are produced and/or sanctioned by the Getty Trust (See Appendix A). These documents support the aesthetic value system in DBAE and are the main source of information for analysis of the aesthetic values. Although the number of writers working for the Getty is large and their personal views and interpretations varied and diverse, there is enough common agreement concerning the criteria for aesthetic value to discuss it collectively. Where individual writers diverge conspicuously from the common viewpoint, their ideas will be discussed separately. Since the complete body of literature produced by the Getty concerning DBAE is available and fairly small, analysis will be performed on its entire corpus. This body of literature represents secondary sources. The primary literature, i.e., internal memoranda and documents concerning policy decisions, have not been publicly dispersed, and hence do not constitute any part of the consciousness forming the documentation.

The concept of documentation is important for this study. Dorothy Smith (1974) says that our knowledge of contemporary

society rarely takes place within the context of immediate experience. Our knowledge of it is mediated by documents of various kinds. Our primary mode of action within educational research depends upon a *reality constituted in documentary form*. This study bases its justification for analyzing only the public documents on the fact that knowledge of DBAE has been primarily mediated to the public by Getty documents. It is this documentation that constitutes our understanding of what DBAE means, and is also what constitutes the present controversy in that it is the focus of both the critics' attacks and the Getty's defense. Although the Getty documents chosen for this analysis are fixed, the documentation coming from the Getty is continually being developed. The intention of this study is to examine and analyze the fixed documentation in order to determine whether its critics are justified in their assessments and whether Getty is correct in suggesting that it has been misinterpreted. To the extent that this study is successful, curriculum developers and potential curriculum implementors derive values useful in their professional roles.

Limitations

Fairness in the gathering and analysis of *all* documents and statements was a principle strictly adhered to. A search was conducted to uncover not only statements which supported the

critics' claims, but also statements which refuted their perceptions. This does not mean, however, that certain limitations in the study may not influence its final form.

One limitation may be evident in the fact that the perspective adopted by this study presupposes a certain value stance. This perspective assumes that knowledge has a strong social and cultural determinant and that objectivity and value neutrality are unobtainable (Cronbach, 1980). These assumptions, however, are balanced in the actual content analysis by close regard to the factors of analysis objectivity, system, and generality (Holsti, 1969). The value stance, unavoidable in any research (Hesse, 1980; Lather, 1985), merely provides a framework of interpretation for the results of the analysis.

Another limitation concerns access to the primary Getty literature. Since the Getty organization is a private operating foundation, it neither has public archives, nor is it required to make any of its internal documents public. The Getty Center for Education in the Arts is also not considered to be a physical entity (Duke, 1983; Getty Center, 1985; Getty Trust, 1985). This means that the focus of this study centers on the analysis of those documents and writings that the Getty organization has chosen to make

public. A suggestion concerning the rationale for analyzing only the public documents has been touched on and will be explicated in more detail in Chapter 3.

Another limitation concerns the sole use of content analysis to discover the values promoted by Getty. Analysis of the aesthetic values contained in the Getty literature may reflect the personal values of the authors as well as those of the institution. The literature itself may be selective in describing only the institution's most important values, or may even omit mentioning certain values because they are taken for granted (Rokeach, 1979). In response to this limitation, it may be argued that the Getty organization both understands and believes in the values it promotes. Its publications are produced with care and insight and are fairly clear and accurate proclamations of its vision. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to do so, other methods of analyzing the authors' own personal values may be considered in other studies whose research aim is to discover the mechanisms whereby these values have come to be adopted by the Getty.

A limitation which may be on-going concerns the topicality of this study and the evolution of the Getty's concept of DBAE. Pressure is being put on the Getty by critics and

other concerned art educators to account for its supposed
focus on western exemplars and values. The Getty is already
aware of the problem and is attempting to placate those who
accuse it of cultural narrowness. [11] Although its position
is still extremely vague concerning this issue, it seems
that certain events (The *Issues* seminar) are forcing the
Getty into a position where it may have to take a definite
stand and announce its position more clearly. This may mean
that the Getty will either alter or defend the value
position explicated in this study.

With respect for these limitations, an attempt is made to
illuminate the critics' claim that DBAE articulates a set of
aesthetic values which are based firmly in the Western
European fine art standards for the selection of superior
visual images.

NOTES

[1] For now, aesthetic value means any criteria by which one
     visual experience is considered to be superior to
     another. An addition will be made to this definition
     later.

[2] The concept of reform needs some explaining. Although
     the Getty is using theories and ideas which have been
     extant for more than twenty years, it insists on
     referring to itself as a *reform* movement. In essence, it
     is structuring an art education program on *structure of
     the disciplines* theories and ideas, and implementing
     them as a *reform* for the non-disciplinary ideas which
     now pervade the field.

3   Discipline-Based Art Education (DBAE) is an art
     education curriculum program that bases its activities
     on the content found in the four disciplines of:
     1. Aesthetics
     2. Production
     3. Art History
     4. Art Criticism
     Students are to learn and practise the skills,
     abilities, and knowledge used by adult professionals in
     each of these disciplines. The main intent of DBAE is to
     teach the student to *understand* the *meaning* transmitted
     by certain art exemplars (Getty Center, 1985, 1987a).

4   The term *the Getty* refers to the entire organizational
     structure sponsored and supported by the Getty Trust.
     This includes the Getty Trust, the Board of Trustees,
     all the operating programs and activities, and all the
     individuals who work for or are sponsored by the Trust
     (See Appendix C). The documents analyzed in this study
     come primarily from the operating program called the
     Getty Center for Education in the Arts. It is stressed
     that the Center is not to be considered a physical
     entity, but rather a locus for coordinating programs and
     curricula (Duke, 1983; Getty Center, 1985; Getty Trust,
     1985).

5   By Western cultural tradition is meant a body of
     customary, approved ways of thinking and acting based on
     Western European values.

6   The literature involving documents not sponsored or
     supported by the Getty is not large (See Appendix B).

7   Many different definitions of pluralism and
     multiculturalism exist. Perhaps the clearest is given by
     McIntosh (1978) who states that pluralism is the concept
     of creating and preserving boundaries between cultural
     subgroups whereas multiculturalism encourages
     interaction between groups. This philosophical
     distinction between the terms however, does not reflect
     their common usage in the general literature. The terms
     are often used interchangeably, but many times with a
     slight distinction. This study will reflect that common
     distinction by defining pluralism as a condition of
     society in which members of diverse religious, racial,
     social, interest, and ethnic groups maintain an
     involvement in their own culture or special interest
     (Gove, 1966). Multiculturalism, as it is most commonly
     used, seems to be a narrower concept, referring only to
     cultural differences associated with ethnic groups

(Crittenden, 1982).

[8]   This concept of different classes of visual phenomena
will later provide the basis for the expansion of the
definition of aesthetic value.

[9]   In a sense, this appears to be a viewpoint supporting
the concept of relativism.

> Relativists assume that each form of life is a
> closed system, and that the normative questions
> of truth, validity, and rationality cannot be
> settled except by reference to standards that
> are particular to each system. On their view, if
> there can be any criticism of the standards, it
> must also be wholly within the system itself
> (Crittenden, 1982, p. 40).

A purely relativist viewpoint, however, cannot be the
basis for pluralism since if holders of this viewpoint
are strictly consistent they cannot seriously argue with
anyone outside their own group, nor can they claim that
everyone should acknowledge the validity of their
position (or adopt a non-relativist principle of
toleration towards the beliefs of other groups) (1982).

The problem of relativism is complex and it is not
within the scope of this study to engage in its
explication. Various viewpoints have been schematized as
occupying a continuum between absolutist and relativist
positions. Most pluralists, however, argue not a
relativist position, but rather a modified or
intermediary approach. This approach recognizes that
there are some universal agreements about truth and
rationality and that there are some beliefs and values
that are supposed to be (or should) be true for the
society as a whole. What is advocated, however, is that
truth, rationality, and fact, differ from meaning and
value. Aesthetic values are primarily culturally
determined and it is the meaning attributed to fact that
is more complex than absolutist viewpoints can
encompass. It is value and meaning that in a sense may
be more relative to the groups involved. The holders of
this viewpoint suggest that the beliefs that diverse
groups use to attribute value to the meanings of the
aesthetic must be respected in a pluralistic society.
This can best be done by acknowledging the uniqueness of
the group's aesthetic viewpoint.

[10]   Because this study wishes to employ definitions
       consistent with the Getty literature, this definition of
       aesthetic value will be used. As will be shown later, a
       broader definition of aesthetic value *should* be used by
       the Getty.

[11]   The Getty held the *Issues* seminar (Getty Center, 1988a)
       where they invited 37 participants to air their concerns
       about the main issues surrounding DBAE. It responded to
       these concerns by issuing two explanations (Getty
       Center, 1988b, 1988c).

CHAPTER 2

GETTY AND DBAE: DOCUMENTATION 1982 - 1988

CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW

One of the most significant art education movements in
contemporary history is the discipline-based art education
concept (DBAE) developed by the Getty organization. This
organization consists of the J. Paul Getty Trust and the
various operating entities it has created (See Appendix C).
Knowledge of this movement in art education has come
primarily through published documents from the Getty (Muth,
1988). These documents, usually lavishly illustrated and
professionally produced, have created an interesting picture
concerning the development of the DBAE program. It is the
reality produced by these documents that has created a
certain controversy in the field. At the present time, the
Getty is defending the writings in these documents against
critics who have interpreted them in a negative way.

The documentation which comprises DBAE can be seen as a
socio-historical phenomenon growing out of current
educational reform theories and the Getty's desire to enter
the educational arena. It is in the coincidence of the
Getty's aesthetic mission with the prevalent development of

a humanities approach within aesthetics and art education
that the DBAE program was conceived and born. In order to
understand the philosophy and theory behind this program, it
may be helpful to understand something of the history
whereby the program and its documents came into being. (See
Appendix D).

The DBAE program is sponsored by the J. Paul Getty Trust.
This Trust consists of a financial and visionary legacy left
by J. Paul Getty [1] for the maintenance and transmission of
the aesthetic wealth embodied in his fine art museum
collection. The Trust has the mandate to promote Paul
Getty's vision for the development of an educated,
appreciative, and informed American art public (Getty Trust,
1985).

After Paul Getty's death in 1976, the Trustees decided that
his wishes could better be met by expanding the activities
of the Trust beyond the narrow scope served by the museum
alone. In preparation for this work, the Trust conducted
investigations during 1981 and 1982 in order to identify and
assess the needs and important issues related to the visual
arts (Duke, 1983; Getty Center, 1985). The Trust's president
and chief executive officer, Harold Williams, assisted by a
small program staff, [2] met with hundreds of individuals to

identify important issues related to the visual arts. These individuals consisted of "groups of professionals from the fields of art history and scholarship, museums, and arts education" (Duke, 1983, p. 5). Their findings revealed that most adults receive little or no exposure to the visual arts during their school years.

> In grade school, if art education exists at all, it usually takes the form of production activities such as painting at an easel or shaping lumps of clay. Art programs, as generally taught, do not have the substance or require the intellectual rigor that would make them part of the standard curriculum... As a result, large numbers of students never develop an *appreciation and understanding of art* (italics added). (Getty Trust, 1985, p. 31).

In a sense, these investigations were crucial. It was here that the decisions were made concerning how to enlarge the Trust's activities while remaining true to Paul Getty's vision. As a result of these investigations, certain themes were identified and translated into a set of programs designed to deal with critical needs in the visual arts. These programs took the form of seven operating activities (expanded to eight in 1984) dealing with museums, art history, conservation, and education (See Appendix C). [3]

The activity that most concerns this study is the Getty
Center for Education in the Arts, created in 1982. "The
Center for Education in the Arts is not envisioned as a
physical entity, but rather as a locus for coordinating
activities in other places and drawing widely on the
expertise of consultants and experienced practitioners"
(Duke, 1983, p.5). From the beginning the Center adopted
discipline-based art education (DBAE) as the best approach
for ensuring a serious place for art in the public schools
(Duke, 1988), convinced that the status and quality of art
education could best be raised by systematic and sequential
instruction through the disciplines of aesthetics,
criticism, history, and production. The concept of
discipline-based art education is the vehicle for the
Getty's mission and purpose. The Center has created several
programs to help in the realization of this vision.

The first of the Center's programs, conducted in
collaboration with the Rand Corporation, focused on a
research project designed to identify and study a series of
art education programs in the United States that provided
regular instruction in a discipline-based approach (Duke,
1983, 1984; Getty Center, 1985). The results were reported
in the Getty's first public report, *Beyond creating: The
place for art in America's schools.* [4] This study attempted

to identify and characterize the components necessary for the identification of discipline-based art education in the schools. The results of the study were followed by four regional roundtable discussions held in late 1985 and early 1986 in Boston, Seattle, New Orleans, and Chicago. The intention of these roundtable discussions was to monitor opinions and comments from art education specialists concerning the recommendations proposed in *Beyond creating* (Duke, 1988).

The second of the Center's programs involved the establishment of The Institute for Educators on the Visual Arts, designed "to provide teachers, administrators, and school policy makers with the information and skills necessary to develop and implement a visual arts program in their districts" (Duke, 1983, p. 6). The Institute consists of three interrelated components, a four week program for elementary school teachers and principals, a seminar for superintendents, and a seminar for school board members (Duke, 1983). Institutes have been held in 1983 and 1984 in Los Angeles. The Institute is engaged in a five-year pilot program for the implementation of DBAE programs in the elementary grades in nine Los Angeles school districts.

The Center's activity increased during 1987. In January it

hosted a National Invitational Conference in Los Angeles
called "Discipline-based art education: What forms will it
take?" This conference brought together over four-hundred
art educators, administrators, and artists, to discuss the
many complex issues involved in DBAE. The focus of the
conference was the forms DBAE would take in implementation
(Getty Center, 1987a). During the summer, the *Journal of
Aesthetic Education* devoted its entire issue to ten papers
commissioned by the Getty Center concerning the antecedents
of the discipline-based concept. These so-called *antecedent*
papers represent solid documentary material which explicates
the aesthetic values upon which DBAE rests. These ten
documents provided the basis for the Getty's first venture
into voluntary public criticism.

In May, 1987, 37 participants were invited to a
Center-sponsored seminar entitled "Issues in
discipline-based art education: Strengthening the stance,
extending the horizons," held in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Participants were expected to familiarize themselves with
the ten antecedents papers and then respond to keynote talks
addressing four controversial issues in DBAE. The Getty's
role was to sit back and listen to the discussion concerning
the issues. At this seminar, the problem of the Getty's
emphasis on western cultural values was addressed (McFee,

1988) and the seminar respondents documented their concern that the Getty be more dtailed in explaining the criteria they use for selecting art exemplars in the program (Getty Center, 1988a).

In the late summer of 1987, the Center hosted a seminar called, "The preservice challenge: Discipline-based art education and recent reports on higher education," in Snowbird, Utah, for faculty teams from 15 American universities. This seminar explored how teacher-training programs might include the principles of discipline-based art education (Duke, 1988; Getty Center, 1987b).

Perhaps in response to the recommendations made by the participants at the *Issues* seminar, the Getty has responded with two publications in 1988, both of which have as their theme, the public misperception of DBAE [5] (Getty Center, 1988b, 1988c). They say that the perception of the Getty's aesthetic values as Western-oriented is not true. The DBAE approach can encompass art from all cultures and periods, including folk, industrial or applied arts (Getty Center, 1988c). These two publications attempt to clear up what the Getty believes are a series of misconceptions about the DBAE program.

The impact that the Getty's DBAE has had on the field of art education is phenomenal. The Center and Institute boast a faculty and group of consultants that include some of the most prominent art educators in the U.S. [6] and the field's major publications have given over entire issues to the discussion of DBAE. [7] The Getty is confident that the DBAE program is experiencing success.

> Today, we believe it is demonstrably evident that the discipline-based approach is becoming accepted nationwide as the new standard for art education. Support has come from prestigious national organizations including The College Board, Council of Chief State School Officers, National Endowment for the Arts, National Art Education Association, National School Boards Association, and U.S. Department of Education. State departments of education, art education scholars and practitioners, teachers, school administrators, school boards, and parents have become enthusiastic partisans of DBAE. Significantly, the goals of the Center for DBAE are virtually identical to the aims stated by the National Art Education Association for achieving "Quality Art Education" (Duke, 1988, p. 12).

The role of this study will be to analyze the body of ideas,

beliefs, and values which constitute that so-called *quality* in DBAE. But first, it is necessary to become acquainted with the theoretical concepts which comprise DBAE.

DISCIPLINE-BASED ART EDUCATION

The Getty has expended much effort in determining the antecedents of the discipline-based concept (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987; Efland, 1987; Kern, 1987; Smith, 1987), and believes it is merely resurrecting an idea which has long been cherished by leading art educators. The ruling metaphor of DBAE is that of the restoration of an art reality that has become fragmented. DBAE seeks to unite the strands that have become unravelled. The discipline-based concept, involving the integration of the four art disciplines of aesthetics, production, history, and criticism, is felt to provide this restorative process.

General Premises

The Getty holds as its central vision the idea that art is one of the primary repositories of human culture and that the study of art is a principal means of understanding human experience and transmitting cultural values. "Art education enhances our ability to fully experience art and beauty, while deepening our understanding of culture and history"

(Getty Center, 1985, p. 4). The focus of this vision resides in the importance of art as *cultural wealth*. A strong central concern in DBAE is to produce literate consumers of that wealth, and to help students acquire skills that will give them access to cultural capital (Eisner, 1987a).

In order to bring about the kind of visual literacy that the Getty desires, a serious and academically oriented program of education is necessary. Since art education has nearly always been treated as an unimportant and peripheral school study, the Getty has adopted a concept based on "substantive content and intellectual rigor" (Duke, 1984). It has revitalized an approach to art education utilizing structure of the discipline concepts and called it discipline-based art education (DBAE). This model has synthesized and extended the discipline-based concepts that had been latent in the field since the 1960's (Lovano-Kerr, 1985). DBAE then, fulfills two basic needs. First, it supports the idea that a rigorous education is necessary for the understanding of art, and secondly, because of this, it is able to elevate the status of art education in the schools.

Theoretical Foundations

The content of DBAE is drawn from the four disciplines of aesthetics, art production, art history, and art criticism (Eisner, 1987a; Greer, 1984). The concept of *understanding*, so important in DBAE, is believed to be enhanced by the use of this disciplinary approach.

> We increase our understanding of the meaning of an
> artwork if we have worked with materials and
> processes that artists use to create art. We also
> broaden our understanding if we know when and where
> a work was made, something about its creator, the
> function it served in society, and what art experts
> have said about it (Getty Center, 1985, p. 13).

It is essential that one examine and understand the ideas and beliefs that constitute these four *parent disciplines*.

Aesthetics

Aesthetics is that branch of philosophy that is concerned with "understanding what qualities in art contribute to aesthetic responses (Getty Center, 1985, p. 19). Aestheticians are those professionals who possess a sophistication concerning the bases for making judgments about art and about questions dealing with its status as a form of knowledge (Eisner, 1987a). They are concerned with

questions about what art is, on what basis judgments about the quality of art works can be made, and whether there are certain standards that all good works of art must meet (Eisner, 1987a). The Getty's stated interest is not in producing professional aestheticians, but in encouraging students to engage in conversation and dialogue about the meaning of art. "By talking about and reading what aestheticians have written about art and aesthetic responses to it, students can learn different ways to appreciate and value art" (Getty Center, 1985, p. 19).

Art Production

The producers of art are those who use visual symbols to embody important human meanings (Greer, 1984). The discipline of art production is viewed by Getty as a cognitive and not primarily as an expressive act (DiBlasio, 1985; Eisner, 1987a). The main reason students involve themselves in production activities is so that by working with art materials and processes, they may increase their *understanding* of art (Getty Center, 1985). Children's own creative symbol-making activities are to be subordinated to the examination of sophisticated exemplars that embody adult understandings of art (Greer, 1984).

Art History

Art history requires the kind of understanding that results from placing art works in their historical and cultural circumstances (Greer, 1984). Art historians understand the place of art in time and culture (Eisner, 1987a). Art history helps students to understand art works by giving them the knowledge concerning who created the works, what purposes they served, and the contexts in which they were created and how they changed (Getty Center, 1985).

Art Criticism

Art criticism involves explaining an art work and judging it. Critics know how to perceive art works and to describe and interpret their features (Eisner, 1987a). By studying criticism, students acquire a basis for making their own judgments about art. They come to understand that in order to obtain meaning from art, knowledge and objective criteria are necessary (Getty Center, 1985).

These are the four disciplines from which the content of DBAE is drawn. In order to be successful they are to be integrated into a curricular whole and interpenetrate "for mutual reinforcement in the course of adult artistic endeavour" (DiBlasio, 1985b, p. 203).

Curriculum

The idea of a structured curriculum is paramount in DBAE.
Without a systematic and sequentially structured curriculum,
there is no access to the understanding of art (Eisner,
1987a). The activities must be ordered in such a way so as
to move from a naive to a sophisticated understanding
(Greer, 1984; DiBlasio, 1985b). Learner outcomes are
specified (DiBlasio, 1985b), and student progress is to be
assessed (McFee, 1984). Student learning must constantly be
guided towards achieving the kind of sophistication
represented in adult exemplars. Attention is to be given to
the developmental level of students and the presentation of
materials and skills is to be ordered from simple to complex
(Greer, 1984).

In summary then, the theoretical concepts which comprise
DBAE are concerned first with the extraction of *meaning* from
art works. Participants in its program must come to
understand and not merely appreciate art. The Getty believes
that this can best occur by studying the four disciplines
involving aesthetics, production, history, and criticism.
Students must come to understand art according to the way
professional and sophisticated adults in those disciplines
have determined. Because discipline-based art education is
concerned with meaning and understanding it can qualify as

an academic concern and hence be accorded more status in the

public school system.

NOTES

[1]   John Paul Getty was an American businessman who amassed
       an enormous fortune in the oil business. During the
       1950s he was reputed to be one of the richest men in the
       world. His primary avocation was collecting art and in
       1954 he created a trust called the J. Paul Getty Museum
       to administer and maintain his art collection. After his
       death in 1976, the trust changed its name to the J. Paul
       Getty Trust (Getty, 1964, 1976; Getty Museum, 1986).
       Following a precedent set in the literature, J. Paul
       Getty will hereafter be referred to simply as Paul
       Getty.

[2]   The two persons who assisted Harold Williams were
       Leilani Lattin Duke and Nancy Englander. Both had held
       executive positions in organizations that supported a
       humanities approach to art and art education (Getty
       Trust, 1985).

[3]   What is interesting to note is the preponderance of
       museum and fine art activity. Out of 8 operating
       programs, 5 are concerned directly with the fine art
       museum culture.

[4]   The respect that the Getty would pay to the visual
       aspect of its documentary reality was evident from its
       first publication.

            The published report is handsome! It's well
            designed; the quality of the printing is
            exemplary. It's easily among the most impressive
            looking publication advocating serious attention
            to the teaching of art in our schools. It's the
            kind of report that would be quite at home with
            elegantly designed efforts that adorn the tables
            of corporate board rooms. By its appearance, it
            testifies to the importance being given to its
            content (Hausman, 1985, p. 52).

       This high regard for the *aesthetic* quality of their
       documents has been maintained.

5   Apparently the working draft for the 1988b publication
    began by conceptualizing the misperception as a *myth*,
    then changed the word to *misperception*, then finally to
    perception.

6   The Institute faculty, consultants and advisory
    committee have included: Warren Anderson, Harry Broudy,
    Laura Chapman, Gilbert Clark, Howard Conant, Michael
    Day, Margaret DiBlasio, Phillip Dunn, Elliot Eisner,
    Mary Erickson, Hermine Feinstein, Edmund Feldman, Grace
    Hampton, Lee Herlihy, Madeline Hunter, Vincent Lanier,
    Jessie Lovano-Kerr, Bruce and Karen Newlin, Becky Novy,
    John Outtenbridge, Jean Rush, Pamela Sharp, Ralph Smith,
    Harvey Stahl, Mary-Ann Stankiewicz, and Joyce Wright,

7   These publications are:
    Studies in Art Education, 25(4), 1984.
    Studies in Art Education, 28(4), 1987.
    Journal of Aesthetic Education, 19(2), 1985.
    Journal of Aesthetic Education, 21(2), 1987.
    Art Education, 40(5), 1987.
    Art Education, 41(2), 1988.

CHAPTER 3

FINDING AESTHETIC VALUES IN DBAE

AESTHETIC VALUES

The determination of what comprises aesthetic value depends
on how aesthetic value is defined. For the purpose of this
study, aesthetic value will refer only to experiences which
are visual. Definitions used will employ concepts from
aesthetic and value theory supported by statements from the
Getty literature which are consistent with DBAE's expressed
viewpoints.

Value

The term "value" has been used in many ways. It has been
used to refer to interests, preferences, likes, goals,
desires, and attractions (Williams, 1979). The common
feature, however, is that it represents a desirable state.
Value theorists, in attempting to eliminate much of the
ambiguity of the term, have identified the core phenomenon
of value as criteria or standards of preference [1] (Pepper,
1958; Williams, 1968; 1970; 1979).

Values serve as standards that we learn to employ
transcendentally across subjects and situations in

various ways: to guide action; to guide us to the

positions that we take on various social,

ideological, political, and religious issues... We

employ values as standards, moreover, to decide what

is worth and not worth arguing about, worth and not

worth persuading and influencing others to believe

in and to do (Rokeach, 1979, p. 48).

This basic definition is supported by the Getty literature

which says that values are ideals or standards against which

choices are measured (Broudy, 1987). Values then, refer to

the criteria by which preference for one thing over another

is determined.

But values are usually associated with some domain of human

activity. This union results in various value domains such

as economic value, political value, religious value, and

others, each of which possess its own unique characteristics

(Broudy, 1987). We will try to establish that the way worth

or value is bestowed on visual experience represents the

domain of *aesthetic* value.

Aesthetic Value

The Getty states that aesthetics concerns itself with

judgments about the quality, value, status, and significance

of art (Eisner, 1987a, 1987b; Crawford, 1987; Greer, 1987;

Smith, 1987). One of its central concerns is in elucidating
the criteria or standards used in the process (DiBlasio,
1985b). Questions involved in this endeavour ask whether
there are objective standards or criteria for determining if
an art work is good (Crawford, 1987), which works of art are
judged better than others and how we decide (Greer, 1987),
whether judgments can be backed by objective standards or
criteria (Getty Center, 1987a), and whether there are
certain criteria that all good works of art must meet
(Eisner, 1987b). The relationship between aesthetics and
value is extremely close (Broudy, 1972; Efland, 1987). The
concern of this study is to take the aspect of aesthetics as
inquiry into the criteria for attribution of value and use
it as a category for determining the aesthetic values
employed in DBAE. But our understanding of the term
aesthetic value is still incomplete.

Traditionally, the *aesthetic* referred to a particular
involvement with an object that was described as intrinsic,
i.e., the involvement referred to nothing beyond the formal
properties and qualities of the work itself. [2] Anything
instrumental or extrinsic to this kind of involvement was
called extra-aesthetic. Many criticize DBAE because they
feel it focuses on this formal aesthetic model (Chalmers,
1987a, 1987b) and hence, it devalues or excludes concerns

which are extra-aesthetic (Bersson, 1987). Their concern is
that aesthetics in DBAE is limited to formal and stuctural
qualities only. These critics, however, appear to be
mistaken in attributing a purely formal concern to the
Getty.

There is an indication in DBAE that the term *aesthetic*
involves instrumental or extrinsic factors as well as
intrinsic ones. There is a widespread rejection of the idea
that worth or value can *only* be attributed on formal
grounds. In addition to the formal properties, aesthetic
response includes "understanding of the work's historical
context, the ability to apprehend imaginatively what the
artist expressed, and the ability to estimate the value of
the work using certain criteria" (Efland, 1987, p. 83).

DBAE theorists question whether aesthetic judgment should be
confined to formal excellence or whether other factors
should not also be considered (Greer, 1987). The literature
raises the question as to whether value is due to the formal
experience of intrinsic gratification or for the ways it
contributes to understanding, or both (Smith, 1987b). It is
stated that other areas such as the cultural, interact to
enlarge the scope and definition of aesthetic inquiry (Getty
Center, 1987a). Since a focus on the formal concepts alone

loses sight of the larger meanings imparted by the work, it is suggested that DBAE should treat other goals as well (Efland, 1987). According to the concerns expressed in the Getty literature, the meaning of *aesthetic* can be extended to embrace elements other than the traditional one of formal intrinsic involvement. The term *aesthetic* then, will refer to *any* intrinsic or extrinsic factor used in attributing worth to visual experience.

It is important at this point to build a linkage between the terms value and aesthetics and provide a working definition for *aesthetic value*. Since the primary purpose of this study is to discover what aesthetic values are being articulated by DBAE, the central category of analysis will be aesthetic value. Its nature is intimately bound up with those visual experiences wherein things are regarded as correct or incorrect, good or bad, beautiful or ugly. In making choices about art, some kinds of things are generally preferred over others. Out of a range of many aesthetic possibilities, attention is bestowed on one kind of visual experience rather than another. This preference in pursuing one selective orientation over another constitutes the making of a value judgment. Aesthetic values, however defined, serve as criteria for selection, judgment, choice and preference in action. For the purposes of this study, the term

aesthetic value will mean *any criteria by which one visual experience is considered to be preferable or superior to another.*

FINDING AESTHETIC VALUES IN THE LITERATURE

It might be objected that the definitions given so far apply to individual values rather than to their institutional counterparts. The aesthetic values embodied in the Getty documents are certainly representative of institutional rather than individual expressions of value. Milton Rokeach (1979) however, claims it is possible to study institutional values using definitions of individual values. He assumes that institutional values are basically the same as those manifested at the individual level and that institutional values are major determinants of individual values. Related to this, Rokeach states that since social institutions leave value "traces," it is possible to study them in a methodical way.

> The idea of value trace is perhaps most similar to the traces left by an ancient civilization - artifacts from which archaeologists reconstruct or infer what life must have been like in an ancient civilization. Analogously, social institutions can be imagined to leave traces of their distinctive

value pattern in institutional documents (Rokeach, 1979, p. 53).

One of the methods Rokeach suggests to recover these institutional value traces is content analysis of institutional documents.

Content Analysis

In this study, content analysis of documents serves as the primary method whereby aesthetic values are identified. The analysis is meant to support the subjective examination of the documents. Since the nature of the documents and the questions asked are such that enumeration of the frequency of answers serves little purpose, a more qualitative approach to content analysis is stressed.

The Literature

The sources used to discover the values consist of the documents referred to as the Getty literature (See Appendix A). This body of work is produced by the Getty or by writers working for the Getty. This distinction must be made clear. Rokeach (1979) mentions several sources wherein values can be identified. The first is the institutional documents or publications which exhort certain values. In this study, this refers to the official documents actually published by the Getty Trust and which can be seen to represent the

official position of the Getty organization itself.

The justification for concentrating only on the documentary
evidence has already been mentioned in Chapter 1. The
knowledge of DBAE for most art educators is a documentary
knowledge. Muth (1988) speaks for many when she says "what I
have come to understand about DBAE is based primarily on
what has been made available in secondary sources, mostly
written reports from the Getty. I imagine this is true of
the majority of *Art Education* readers" (p. 19). Most of the
critical controversies surrounding DBAE arise in relation to
analyses of the Getty documents. [3]

Dorothy Smith (1974) has expanded the concept of
documentation and its social significance.

> Our knowledge of contemporary society is to a large
> extent mediated to us by documents of various kinds.
> Very little of our knowledge of people, events,
> social relations and powers arises directly in our
> immediate experience. Factual statements in
> documentary form, whether as news, data, information
> or the like, stand in for an actuality which is not
> directly accessible. Socially organized practices of
> reporting and recording work upon what actually
> happens or has happened to create a reality in

documentary form, and though they are decisive to
its character, their traces are not visible in it
(p. 257).

This study bases its justification for analyzing the
documents on the fact that:

1. the knowledge of DBAE has been primarily mediated to the
    public by Getty documents,

2. DBAE is identified by the majority of art educators as
    identical to this documentation.

3. it is this documentation that has been the target for
    critics and which has been described as representing a
    viewpoint inconsistent with cultural pluralism.

4. it is this documentation that Getty claims has been
    misinterpreted and is now defending.

5. it is this documentation which exists as a body of
    knowledge most likely to influence art education
    curriculum designers and planners.

Although there is a definite need for ethnographic and
investigative work to expand knowledge concerning the
mechanism whereby the values represented in the documents
have come into being, this study focuses on the
identification and characterization of the aesthetic values
contained in the existing body of documentary knowledge.

Another method of recovering institutional value traces
consists of an analysis of the statements made by the
advocates of an institution. Advocates here refer to people
employed by Getty and who through their own written
statements advocate and support Getty's vision for
educational reform through DBAE. Their values are expressed
through their writings but not published by the Trust
itself. This study will consider the second set of documents
as being fairly reliable guides to Getty policy since the
advocates' values are likely to reflect those of the
institution for whom they work (Rokeach, 1979). The Getty
literature then, has two aspects. The first involves
documents actually published by the Getty, and the second
involves documents published by the advocates.

Both aspects of the literature are in agreement concerning
their support for DBAE programs and the values embodied in
them. Although there are minor procedural differences
expressed in terms of translating theory into practise,
there is no apparent disagreement concerning the centrality
of a certain visual experience and the viewpoint concerning
the standard for the assessment of its excellence.

As was stated before, little benefit results from by
enumerating exact counts of the occurrences of a reference

to a particular aesthetic value. The Getty writings are broad and discuss many concerns and problems existing in DBAE. Some give no mention of aesthetic value, while others focus on it as their main topic. What was sought from the literature were statements which revealed the kinds of aesthetic values thought important for the assessment of the superior art work in DBAE.

Value Statements and Categories

In order to discover the criteria for aesthetic value in DBAE, the literature was analyzed and all value statements were extracted. The following criteria were used to detect relevant value statements (Clark, 1975).

1. Statements in the literature which discuss the nature and function of art. For example, the author may state "art is..." or "art does..."

2. Statements in the literature which refer to the value of art and its appreciation. For example, the author may state "the value of art is..."

3. Statements in the literature which refer to criteria or standards for judging works of art. For example, the author may state "this work is deemed superior because..."

The literature was read and 438 statements (comprising 105

pages) were extracted. These statements were then analyzed
and classified according to 17 key value concepts (See
Appendix E). The key concepts were classified under six
categories and explicated insofar as they pertained to the
criteria for determining superiority in a visual experience.
The six categories included:

1. The art work

2. The fine art tradition

3. The code

4. Intellectual value

5. Cultural value

6. Formal value

These categories should not be considered exclusive since
they are mutually interdependent, each tending to support
and influence the other. Their isolation as part of a schema
is to assist in understanding rather than to suggest that
they exist as separate entities. The categories were
expanded into criteria which are based on the enlarged
concept of aesthetic worth in visual experience found in the
Getty's claim that formal criteria are no longer the sole
means for identifying a work's superiority. This
classification of aesthetic value is both appropriate and
supportive of Getty's broader conception of artistic
excellence.

The identified criteria move beyond formal criteria to include two general criteria (art work and the fine art tradition) which place the superior visual image in a context, and four visual criteria (the code and its intellectual, cultural, and formal values) based on the symbolic components of the superior visual image itself. The fusion of these criteria constitutes the basis for establishing merit in an art work. In order to qualify for superior status in DBAE, an experience should possess, in some degree, all of these component values.

NOTES

[1]   Although there may be a distinction between the terms *criteria* and *standards*, no real distinction seems to be observed in the literature. The way they *seem* to be differentiated is that criteria refer to the components which constitute a standard. In other words, a standard is a finished and completed model (exemplar) constructed by means of the criteria. The standard is more than the sum of its parts, for criteria by themselves do not constitute a standard.

[2]   The terms *formal* and *formalism* refer to the theory that appreciation is to be directed only to the elements (lines, colors, shapes, and forms) and principles (balance, harmony, and unity) which comprise a visual image. These *formal* qualities are the only qualities relevant to aesthetic value (Carlson, 1979).

[3]   The importance of the concept of documentation as an indicator of interest is acknowledged by the Getty. A running tally on the number of copies of its first public document, *Beyond creating: The place for art in America's schools* (1985), has been carefully kept and reported. In 1987, the Getty reported that "55,000 copies of the publication have been disseminated, providing one indication that DBAE has struck a receptive chord among educators and others" (Getty

Center, 1987a, p. 2).

In 1988 it was reported that "more than 60,000 copies of the report have been distributed, and additional requests arrive almost daily" (Duke, 1988, p. 445).

CHAPTER 4

THE AESTHETIC VALUES OF DBAE

The analysis reveals that the Getty seems to have a
consistent program of aesthetic values it wishes to
encourage. This study's assumption is that aesthetic values
are the *most* important facet of an art education curriculum
program. Aesthetic value has been defined as *any* criteria by
which one visual experience is judged to be superior to
another. It has already been determined that the criteria
can involve intrinsic as well as extrinsic concerns, and
this is demonstrated in the six fundamental criteria which
were revealed after an examination of the Getty literature.

The first two criteria, which will be called general
criteria, identify superiority as part of a specific
context, in this case, the *work of art* within the *fine art*
tradition. The two criteria can be expressed as follows:

1. the visual experience embodied in an *art work* created by
    an artist is better than the visual experience which is
    not.

2. The art work which can claim membership in the *fine art*
    tradition is better than the art work which cannot.

The next set of criteria, identified as *visual* criteria, are

based on an assessment of the symbolic components of the visual image itself. In a sense, the values which comprise the visual criteria directly sponsor the general ones. Very simply, an art object contains visual symbols which comprise a *code*. The concept of code here merely means an aggregation of visual elements requiring a certain literacy for its understanding. The viewer [1] should have certain knowledge in order to decipher this code. The code and its forms of literacy must embody certain specified values in order to be assessed as superior by DBAE standards. These criteria can be expressed as follows:

1. The art work which embodies a sophisticated and complex *code* demanding *literacy* for its decipherment is better than the art work which does not.

2. The code which contains certain *intellectual* values accessible through an *intellectual* literacy is better than the code which does not.

3. The code which contains certain *cultural* values requiring a sophisticated *cultural* literacy to decipher it is superior to the code which does not.

4. The code which contains certain *formal* values requiring a special *formal* literacy to decipher it is better than the code which does not.

THE WORK OF ART

Aesthetic Criterion No. 1 - The visual experience which is embodied in an art work created by an artist is better than the visual experience which is not.

Many kinds of human visual experiences have been exalted as vehicles for aesthetic value. Circus sideshows, breath taking sunsets, rock videos, prairie storms, and works of art created both by fringe and recognized artists all compete for this role. The Getty does acknowledge that all these forms may be acceptable objects for the attribution of value. The literature broadly describes art as those "images and events whose structural properties elicit aesthetic forms of feeling" (Eisner, 1987a), and in several places mentions that all visual forms, i.e., the visual world as well as created art, are important (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987; Eisner, 1987b; Rush, 1987).

Although the literature does acknowledge that *all* visual experiences are worthy of attention, it is unanimous in identifying one superior form of visual experience as the primary focus of DBAE. This superior form is the *work of art created by an artist*. By art work in this sense is meant a visual image created by humans for the specific purpose of eliciting an intentionally meaningful experience.

Aesthetic experiences can be had through perception of the natural world as well the world of created objects. It is to the arts, however, that we turn when we wish to be assured of aesthetic experience. In large numbers we pay money for entry to concerts, plays, movies, pageants, and festivals because we have learned that through the arts we are most likely to gain significance, even profound aesthetic experiences. This is because art objects are created with the express purpose of providing vivid, intense experiences uncluttered by the contingencies of daily concerns (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987, p. 140).

The Getty indicates that the superior form of visual experience resides in the body of physical art works created by human artists. At the heart of the DBAE experience is the art work itself. Although many kinds of events and objects attract us, we are particularly attracted to works of art (Greer, 1987). Works created by artists *rightfully* hold our attention (Getty Center, 1987a). Works of art are satisfying and for some are the primary reason for the existence of art (Crawford, 1987). Since works of art are "central to the organization of curricula and to the integration of content from the disciplines" (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987, p. 169), students must study art using actual works of art in the

classroom, museums, and elsewhere (Getty Center, 1987a).
What is to be learned from and about art must employ
specific *created* works (Kleinbauer, 1987). Students must
form their ideas concerning what is or is not art from their
experiences with concrete examples (Getty Center, 1987a).

One of the main reasons given for this focus on the art work
is that the skills and abilities deemed important in DBAE
are best brought about when studying specific works of art
which can embody them (Greer, 1984; Eisner, 1985; Getty
Center, 1985; Kleinbauer, 1987). Another reason is that the
created work of art embodies human ideas and achievements
not available in other kinds of visual events. Works of art
are examples of the beliefs and ideas that human beings
value (Bennett, 1987). Not only are value and significance
embodied in created works of art (Crawford, 1987), but they
represent "a confluence of high human abilities. Nowhere
else can the bringing together of craft, technique, meaning,
and vision, be attained" (Spratt, 1987, p. 201).

The work of art then, created by the artist, stands as the
superior example of aesthetic value in DBAE. Even the
briefest examination of the Getty literature reveals the
importance that the work of art holds both for the Getty and
its DBAE program. The fundamental repository of aesthetic

value and the primary sensory referent for worth in DBAE
then, is the humanly created work of art. Although this
certainly narrows down the huge field of visual experience
in our search for the superior object, it is still extremely
large. Since the range of humanly created art objects is
vast, one cannot certainly attribute superiority to them
all. What is the method whereby DBAE narrows the search for
the superior work of art?

The judgment of worth which occurs within the body of
humanly created art works is in accordance with a *standard*.
The work must possess certain select criteria and be judged
superior according to an objective standard of excellence
(Hodsoll, 1987). The concept of a standard is firmly
established in the DBAE program and is used to sort art
works into those which are superior and those which are
inferior.

The first expression of a standard of merit is indicated in
that students must be given a "stipulated and approximate
definition of art" (DiBlasio, 1985b, p. 200). The
foundations of a standard determine a rough approximation of
what is to be considered art and what is not.

> From the time of first exposure to art, student
> learning needs to be guided by at least an

approximation that will eventually be replaced by a reasoned determination of the parameters of art as the student approaches adult sophistication. As students move from general aesthetic perception... they will have formed a template or perceptual lens that will guide their exploration for years to come. According to this admittedly rough template, a broad range of objects is recognized manifestly as non-art (DiBlasio, 1985b, p. 199).

The standard by which some objects may be sorted into art and non-art, of course, is only the beginning. Students should learn how to judge the importance of particular works (Greer, 1984). By using the standard, these works can be placed on a scale "from the trivial to the important or great" (Greer, 1987, p. 230), and can be rated as more or less significant or important as students learn to use the criteria for the attribution of worth (Greer, 1987).

Works must be evaluated against a clear standard (Rush, 1987) which is common and objective (Bennett, 1987). This standard determines excellence, significance, and meaning in particular works, and what works are worthy of pursuit (Crawford, 1987).

Students who learn to perceive all aspects of an art

object begin to gain access to the powerful meanings

in works of art. Art experts understand very subtle

distinctions within a work of art and can

distinguish the finest example of art. On the basis

of highly developed discrimination, artists,

critics, historians, and aestheticians make

distinctions that determine standards of excellence

(Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987, p. 144).

The standard seems to be determined by the kinds of distinctions made by professionals in the areas of aesthetics, production, history, and criticism, those disciplines recognized as important in DBAE. The application of this standard allows its users "to discriminate between simplistic or insincere manifestations of the visual arts and those that are credited with high standards, pursuit of perfection, and lasting value" (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987, p. 182). The standard is used to separate work which is considered superior from that which is inferior. The former is considered to represent "the apotheosis of human achievement" (Eisner, 1985, p. 65).

Many writers state that the standard for superiority embodies aesthetic values representing humankind's highest achievements (Getty Center, 1985; Bennett, 1987; Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987; Eisner, 1985). Art works based on this

standard express inexpressible thoughts, inspire exalted inspiration (Getty Center, 1985), and are the best that western civilization has to offer (Bennett, 1987). The existence of this standard seems central in DBAE. With its use, one can determine what is to be considered art, and what is to be considered non-art (DiBlasio, 1985b). Within those things designated as art, certain works deserve to be admired and to be designated as masterpieces according to this objective standard (Greer, 1987).

Within the class of objects defined as human art works then, there appears to be a definite hierarchy wherein some work is superior to others. The standard by which this superiority is assessed is supposed to be objective and is used by DBAE for the selection of classroom exemplars. The works judged by this standard are said to represent the highest achievements of human endeavour, and provide the basis for the selection of classroom exemplars.

> The most critical decision in the implementation of a discipline-based program is the selection of the works of art we will use. Once teachers of art choose to study a work because of the important ideas it contains, then they are in a position to make art education truly important (Getty Center, 1987a, p. 75).

DBAE states that the work of art created by the artist is superior to other things in visual experience and that a clear standard of judgment must be applied to those works so as to separate the more worthy from the less worthy work.

THE FINE ART TRADITION

Aesthetic Criterion No. 2 - the art work which can claim membership in the fine art tradition is better than the art work which cannot.

The particular work of art judged to be superior in DBAE resides in that tradition called fine art. The tradition itself may not be considered a value so much as a means of articulating value. It may seem premature to talk about this tradition before first isolating the values which comprise it, but its importance to the understanding and explication of the subsequent values and criteria is such that its introduction at this time is paramount. The importance of this select body of work to the aesthetic values of DBAE cannot be overemphasized. That is why, although its explication properly belongs later, its details must be introduced now. It is important to examine first what is meant by the fine art tradition, and then explicate the aesthetic values embodied in it.

Fine arts are those arts which have traditionally been thought of as having a purely non-practical purpose. The fine art tradition refers to a body of work considered to be superior in that it has been judged by certain experts to possess a greater degree of aesthetic quality than other kinds of art work. It represents a body of customary approved ways of thinking based on values usually associated with the Western European classical tradition. The work maintains the cultural heritage and preserves values of the past. Works of the fine art tradition are those usually found in art museums and galleries (Hobbs, 1984).

The fine art tradition finds its easiest definition when compared with its opposite, popular art, which is usually defined as

> Mass-produced, mass distributed, and mass consumed artifacts; typically involving content that is relatively clear and simple; and produced by a small group of professionals for the consumption of others. Usually, popular culture presents a safe and secure world of conventional ideas, feelings, and attitudes, though the vehicle is often escapist. Dallas is a paradigm, as are comic books, teen magazines, cute animal posters, and breakfast cereal cards (Duncum, 1987, p. 6).

The Getty's support of the fine art tradition can be
discerned through its rejection of the popular arts.
Although it is stated that "content for study is derived
from a broad range of the visual arts, including folk,
applied, and fine arts from Western and non-Western
cultures" (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987, p. 135), there are
clear distinctions made about the worth and value of those
other arts (Broudy, 1987).

The popular arts comprise a significant portion of those
others. They are recognized by the Getty as one of the most
potent forms of art that presently shape students' values.
The popular arts present models of heroes, villains, and
lifestyles. Since education shapes students' values, the
source of those values must be identified. "Because these
life styles are easily stereotyped and repeated, they become
potent value models. They influence value commitments on a
massive scale by affecting the aesthetic experience of large
portions of the population almost simultaneously" (Broudy,
1987, p. 40). The pervasiveness and effectiveness of the
popular arts is acknowledged, but their educational
influence is considered inferior to those of the fine arts.
The popular arts are referred to as the *uneducated* or
untutored arts (Broudy, 1987).

DBAE writers speak about the lack of depth and sophistication in the popular arts and attribute this to the simplicity of their forms. The popular arts require no education for their understanding and therefore do not embody the most sophisticated expressions of human import and emotion. The arts which appear on T.V., magazines, and the radio are dismissed as mediocre (Bennett, 1987). The popular arts portray ideas and values of the day and therefore do not require any form of education (Broudy, 1987). Television is dismissed as providing experience of little consequence (Eisner, 1985).

There must be more to life than the pleasures of "Miami Vice" or "Loveboat." Children require no assistance gaining access to the programs on television ... These programs are designed to capture and hold our children's attention for as long as possible. They succeed remarkably well. These programs make few demands our children cannot meet and offer little they do not already have. Their intellectual substance is thin and their stimulation high... But there are alternatives, challenging alternatives that provide satisfactions qualitatively different from those secured through the mass media, pop culture, and the one-eyed monsters we have in our homes. The arts provide such

alternatives (Eisner, 1987b, p. 35).

By the *arts* here, of course, are meant those arts defined by standards of excellence which reside in the fine art tradition, images which are thought to be superior exemplars of skill and human achievement.

The images in popular art however, are considered to be inferior and in need of improvement. The popular and folk arts which consist of music, dance, motion pictures, birthday card poetry, cartoons, decorations of buildings, the design of clothing are common, everyday, untutored art experiences that need to be refined (Broudy, 1987). Comparisons are constantly made in the literature which extoll the virtues of the fine art experience as compared with *other* art experiences. The museum and the amusement park, for example, are both described as being in the business of providing stimulation for people. The Getty states, however, that the museums utilize a superior set of stimuli (Getty Center, 1987a).

Getty writers generally seem appalled that the pleasures resulting from an involvement with superior works could be forgone for that of the popular experience. "Sixty-one percent of adult Americans in 1982 failed to ... visit a single art museum or gallery. This means that for a majority

of our people, art is principally that of the popular culture, particularly that of television" (Hodsoll, 1987, p. 106). The particular requirements demanded by DBAE's standards of excellence eliminates the popular arts as a candidate for serious study. The assumption that the popular arts employ uneducated and untutored images (Broudy, 1987), requiring no education for their understanding is the keystone in its rejection of this tradition. If the purpose of DBAE is to make art in the schools more rigorous and structured (Getty Center, 1985, 1987a; Hodsoll, 1987), then the popular arts default through their inability to provide the proper educational experience.

There is a place where DBAE's sophisticated demands can be met. A focus on the created art work and the objective standards whereby these art works can be evaluated, must result in a collection of art works which are considered superior. This body of work has been variously referred to as Fine Art, High Art, The Great Masters, Good Art, and the Classics. Here, "properties can be found that evoke aesthetic experience in its purest form" (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987, p. 140).

Although the Getty supports this tradition as having been selected by experts and as having stood the test of time, it

is extremely vague on the exact criteria by which
determination for entry into this tradition is to take
place. The Getty writers illustrate its expansive, but
unclear, powers of influence. The body of great works
"exemplify the spirit of an age, its great triumphs and
defeats. They integrate and vividly express the mood and
character of successive epochs in history. These exemplars
have been referred to as *classics*, not only for the prestige
they enjoy but also for their role as models" (Broudy, 1987,
p. 39). These great works exist as an historical entity and
are directly tied to our culture, forming a record of our
past and reflecting our civilization and its achievements
(Bennett, 1987). They are "among the finest expressions of
the values we cherish as a people" (Bennett, 1987, p. 37).
In helping us see what we may have so often missed, "they
capture a slice of the world, stabilize it, and present it
to us for our contemplation and reflection" (Eisner, 1987b,
p. 35).

Although DBAE is not clear in classifying and categorizing
the precise values which this tradition embodies, some
notion of their identity can be gleaned from statements in
the literature. Order, harmony, compassion, forgiveness,
power of expression, and sacredness of freedom are some of
the values found within it.

In the lines of the Parthenon we find a respect for order and harmony. We learn something about a love for knowledge and rational inquiry in Holbein's Erasmus of Rotterdam, about compassion and forgiveness in Rembrandt's Return of the Prodigal Son. We learn something about the power of expression in a Picasso, a Van Gogh, or in Beethoven's music. And we learn about the sacredness of our freedom in the Statue of Liberty (Bennett, 1987, p. 37).

The power of light, religious belief, social concern in urban affairs and corruption, are other values communicated by this tradition.

Who has shown the visual world of light more vividly than the impressionists? Who has informed us about the character of religious belief more movingly than the great Italian painters of the 14th century? Who has helped us see the teeming character of the urban landscape more acutely than the likes of a John Sloan, a Paul Cadmus, and a Raphael Soyer? Who has penetrated the corruption of the German bourgeois more convincingly than George Grosz? (Eisner, 1987b, p. 35).

DBAE extolls certain virtues and values which will be
analyzed more closely later in this chapter. But within the
program itself, there is no effort made to question the
assumptions underlying the acceptance of these particular
values (Hamblen, 1988b). The fine art tradition is a body of
work that is considered superior because it embodies certain
values *culturally* determined to be worthwhile. Although some
critics make the claim that the values of order, compassion,
freedom, religious belief, and social concern, can be more
vividly and relevantly discovered in the popular arts, the
Getty seems convinced that the values most worthy of
attention are communicated best by the fine art tradition. A
somewhat circular process of justification is created by
asserting that the standard of assessment consists of the
values resident in this tradition and that this tradition is
valuable because the values it embodies represents standards
of excellence. But it will be seen that the fine art
tradition becomes the primary referent for most aesthetic
values in DBAE. Instead of listing the criteria which
determine excellence, their embodiment in certain works and
artists is explained.

The Getty literature provides a list of some of the works
considered superior: Praxiteles, Michelangelo, Velasquez,
and Georgia O'Keefe (Hodsoll, 1987), The Birth of Venus,

American Gothic, Mona Lisa, The Last Supper, the Pyramids,

the Eiffel Tower, the Washington monument, Matisse,

Alexander Calder, Picasso, Frank Lloyd Wright, Rembrandt,

Andrew Wyeth (Bennett, 1987). The best place to see the

exemplars themselves, or at least a fair sample of the

tradition, is in museums. Getty's position then, seems to

support the western fine art tradition as embodying a

superior form of visual experience.

The focus on the Western fine art tradition in DBAE has been

a fairly frequent item of criticism (Chalmers, 1987a, 1987b;

Hamblen, 1987a, 1988b; Lanier, 1987; Lederman, 1988;

Lidstone, 1988; London, 1988; McFee, 1988). At the latest

Center seminar called "Issues in Discipline-Based Art

Education: Strengthening the Stance, Extending the

Horizons," held in Cincinatti, Ohio, a recommendation of the

seminar participants was for clarification of Getty's

approach and attitude towards popular and other cultural

exemplars. "On the question of what kinds of art to include

in a DBAE curriculum, the group agreed that the examples

should not be restricted to museum-quality works from the

Western fine art tradition" (Getty Center, 1988a, p. 33).

Getty's response to this criticism has been to admit that a

study of popular and ethnic arts is beneficial and that the

framework of DBAE can allow for their study (Getty Center, 1988b, 1988c). This statement, however, seems to be based on two vague conditions. First, the study of other arts will occur in a framework which emphasizes the *contrast* between fine and popular art, and which reveals the deficiencies in popular and the excellence in fine (Getty Center, 1988a).

Secondly, the study of popular art will employ the evaluative criteria of the fine arts as applied to the popular arts. This approach has been termed *liberal humanism* (Duncum, 1987), and basically allows the study of popular art only as a means of revealing its shallowness.

> Liberal humanists who draw on the high culture
> critique argue in favor of studying popular culture
> as part of a moral agenda in the cause of humanist
> social reform. Culture is viewed as an especially
> refined sensibility and the works of such
> sensibility. Culture is a moral force and a rallying
> cry against a society characterized by popularist
> impulses and mass reproduction. Desirable social
> change is held to be possible only by recognizing
> the alleged indisputably human qualities offered by
> high culture (Williams, 1958). Studying popular
> culture is a way of demonstrating what is wrong with
> popular culture (Duncum, 1987, p. 7).

Edmund Feldman argues that the only way to "resist the
noxious, hateful and repellant features of our culture is to
study their artistic manifestations seriously and to
encounter models of excellence" (Duncum, 1987, p. 7).
Liberal humanists ask "what can serve as an educational
prophylactic, a defense against the corruptions of mind and
distortions of feeling that inevitably creep into
contemporary cultural production" (Feldman, 1982, p. 43).
The answer, which the Getty supports, is an art education
which employs high aesthetic exemplars drawn from the fine
art tradition.

Howard Risatti, a frequent spokesman of Getty, speaking at
the 1987 *Issues* seminar, admitted that it makes sense to
study a wide range of cultural sources. The reason for
studying popular art, however, is because

> exposure to kitsch can provide tools with which to
> distinguish fake from authentic art. Students should
> be taught to discern the values promoted by their
> visual environment, so that they can both appreciate
> the highest form of visual communication - art - and
> understand the messages of lower forms (Getty
> Center, 1988, p. 29).

The Getty then, seems willing to include the study of

popular art, but only as a means leading to the appreciation and apprehension of the fine arts.

Another approach implied in the DBAE documents is the use of judgmental criteria developed within the fine arts to assess the value of popular art. The popular arts, however, serve different purposes and functions from those of the fine arts and it may not be fair to use the same evaluative criteria for both. Popular art has its own criteria of judgment which should not be confused with the criteria used by fine art.

A similar approach is used concerning the issue of ethnic art from other cultures. Getty has acknowledged that art from other cultures is acceptable, but what is being selected and given value is the *fine art* tradition from these cultures. Within the western culture, two broad worlds of art are usually recognized, the fine and the popular (Ulanov, 1965). But this classification also holds true for other cultures, which also have a popular as well as a high tradition. Getty's select choices for ethnic art seem to fall on the high tradition of other cultures which bears a striking similarity to the formal elements in western art (Dufrenne, 1979). [2]

It has been stated that a modern pluralistic society

consists of a number of subcultures, each of which possesses
its own standards and criteria for the determination of
aesthetic value (McFee & Degge, 1977). Although these
subcultures essentially represent different classes of
visual phenomena, the Getty seems not to take account of
this in its DBAE program. The Getty seems to be defining
aesthetic value as *any criteria by which one visual
experience is considered to be superior to another*, as if
one set of criteria can be used to judge *all* forms of art.
Although this issue is extremely complex, the Getty
literature gives the impression that it is not. A
recognition that different forms of art require different
criteria for evaluation would expand the definition of
aesthetic value to read, any criteria by which one visual
experience is considered to be superior to another *according
to classes of visual phenomena*.

These issues surrounding the fine and popular arts are of
immediate importance to the Getty and its observers. The
resolution of the question concerning the sole use of
western high art as exemplars in the DBAE program will
determine whether its approach will accommodate pluralistic
concerns. This important issue will be explicated more fully
in Chapter 6, but for now it can be said that as the present
documentary reality stands, the western fine art exemplars

are accorded a status superior to those forms of art
ineligible for membership. It now remains to analyze the
literature further to see if a determination can be made
about the constituent values and criteria of the images
within this tradition.

THE CODE AND ITS FUNCTIONS

> *Aesthetic Criterion No. 3 - The art work which
> embodies a sophisticated and complex code demanding
> literacy for its decipherment is better than the one
> which does not.*

Conditions imposed on an art work by the canons of the fine
art tradition concern the profundity, sophistication, and
complexity of the image (Getty Center, 1985, 1987a), and the
demand that its comprehension requires a specialized
education (Broudy, 1987; Eisner, 1985, 1987a; Getty Center,
1985; Greer & Rush, 1985; Kleinbauer, 1987; Smith, 1987;
Spratt, 1987). This educational requirement is what some
believe keeps the fine arts distinct from the popular arts.
This is extremely important, for it focuses our attention on
both the nature and quality of the content of the image
itself and the nature of the knowledge brought to the
evaluative process by the viewer. The qualities resident in
the art work's image and the abilities of the viewer,
illustrate the nature of the criteria necessary for the

attribution of value. But in order to progress in the

explication of the aesthetic values promoted in DBAE,

acknowledgment must be given to (1) the importance of the

art work, i.e., the criteria by which profundity,

complexity, and sophistication are attributed to the image,

and (2) the importance of the viewer, i.e., the kind of

knowledge required to interpret its meaning.

The Getty literature describes a scheme whereby the elements

of art work and viewer are given prime importance in the

assessment of worth. The work of art embodies a meaning

which the viewer must try to understand. The meaning

embodied in a work of art will be referred to as its *code*,

whereas the ability necessary for its understanding will be

called *literacy*. It is in the relationship between the code

and the understanding achieved through literacy that the

criteria for aesthetic value are revealed.

The art work consists of a certain content which is composed

of visual symbols and their referents. This content

signifies meaning and is that which is judged superior or

inferior according to the standard. This content and meaning

will be referred to as the visual *code*. A code is a "system

of rules which make certain entities (sounds, designs, etc.)

count as, that is, mean something (Kjorup, 1977, p. 38). It

is any system of visual symbols used for the expression of
meaning. The dynamics governing the creating and deciphering
of visual codes have been explored by theorists such as
Bourdieu (1968) and Goodman (1968) and relate directly to
DBAE's conceptualization of understanding in art as the
decipherment of a coded message. The concept of a code
emphasizes that the art involvement is a perceptual act,
that perception is cognitive, that the codified content is a
body of knowledge, and that understanding requires skills of
decipherment (Bourdieu, 1968). Contemporary theorists in the
sociology of art are finding the concept of code useful in
their attempt to study the forms in which the arts reproduce
ideology (Wolff, 1983). By employing the schema suggested by
the term, the impact specific codes have on human cultures
is more readily conceptualized (Williams, 1977, 1981). The
concept of codification discussed above seems to be
supported in the Getty literature.

It is a dominant belief in DBAE that art works convey
meaning (Getty Center, 1985; Boyer, 1987; Clark, Day, &
Greer, 1987; Crawford, 1987; Getty Center, 1987a; Eisner,
1987a, 1987b; Greer, 1987; Kleinbauer, 1987; Risatti, 1987;
Rush, 1987; Spratt, 1987), which is put into the art work by
the artist (Getty Center, 1985). The internal components of
the concept *meaning* are complex and involve many criteria

which will be discussed later. But for now it is important to understand that the quality of this meaning is absolutely essential in the attribution of worth in art.

Although meaning exists in all works of art, the best meaning is embodied in the fine art tradition. Meaning in this tradition is complex and sophisticated. The adult professional in the four disciplines is the role model for the concept of meaning which has to reflect adult standards and "understanding at the level of the artistically sophisticated adult" (DiBlasio, 1985b, p. 199). Meaning can be understood only with a sophisticated and educated adult approach (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987; Greer, 1987; Rush, 1987). It is noteworthy that it is only *adult* art work which is considered worthy of study (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987). The works used must have been created by "sophisticated adult professionals" (Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987; DiBlasio, 1985b; Efland, 1987; Greer, 1984; Rush, 1987).

What is important to understand, however, is that the meaning of a superior adult exemplar is not available to one who does not possess the method to "read" it. "The messages in these works are not there simply for the taking. They must, so to speak, be recovered. They must be read. Art works themselves must be "unwrapped to be experienced"

(Eisner, 1985, p. 65). Although all artistic works, from the Great Masters to comic books, embody their meaning in a code (DiMaggio & Useem, 1980), there are different approaches to the valuation of the codes. DBAE asserts that its standards identify superior codes, and hence, result in superior visual experiences and exemplars. A major concern then, is to determine the qualities embodied in the code that grant it superior status.

A metaphor used by DBAE to conceptualize the dynamics of codification is that of art as a language. The meaning in a superior work consists of a language complex enough to require the viewer to decode its message. It is "comparable to reading a text where the text is an image or a set of images" (Broudy, 1987, p. 49). When the viewer is unable to read the language, the content cannot be known (Getty Center, 1985; Kleinbauer, 1987; Risatti, 1987; Spratt, 1987).

The ability to read these works requires formal instruction (Rush, Greer, & Feinstein, 1986). The ability to decode the meaning present in an art work is sometimes called aesthetic or visual literacy (Boyer, 1985; Broudy, 1987; Getty Center, 1987a; Rush, Greer, & Feinstein, 1986; Smith, 1987; Spratt, 1987). Literacy then, is the key to unlock meaning in works

of art. Illiteracy, or lack of knowledge and understanding, means that the meaning of an art work will forever remain hidden to the viewer (Getty Center, 1987a; Risatti, 1987). Another very important concern then, is to determine what criteria must be evident in the viewer's knowledge in order that he or she may identify superiority in the code.

Attention so far has been focused on the actual work of art itself. But this is not enough, for the code itself requires decipherment in order to acquire meaning. The complementary aspect to the work of art is the viewer since the knowledge the viewer brings to the image determines the meaning obtained. The grasp of meaning is understanding. The meaning in an art work is transmitted, communicated, or conveyed to the viewer (Boyer, 1985, 1987; Bennett, 1987; (Getty Center, 1987a; Eisner, 1987a; Risatti, 1987; Spratt, 1987). This comprises the act of making art public, and without the viewer's ability to decipher, the meaning is silent.

> If what we create in our mental life is to be made
> social, we must find some means to make it public.
> It is in this realm, the realm through which the
> private is made public, that we come to the visible
> and sharable products of our culture. These products
> are made public in the forms through which we
> represent what we have conceived (Eisner, 1987b, p.

4).

The viewer must try to understand this meaning, the quality of which determines the quality of the art work itself.

Perhaps the most emphasized general value of DBAE concerns the concept "understanding" in art experience. (Getty Center, 1985; Clark, Day & Greer, 1987; Eisner, 1987a; Greer, 1987; Kleinbauer, 1987; Risatti, 1987; Rush, 1987; Smith, 1987). Appreciation is only one component of that understanding and not its sole basis. Therefore, the best works of art are not those that produce an appreciative response alone, but which produce the opportunity for growth in understanding. A unanimously shared belief in the literature, is that an art work conveys meaning which the viewer must try to understand. It is in the relationship between meaning and understanding that the central aesthetic values of DBAE emerge, for both meaning and understanding are conditional on skill and ability, which is referred to as *literacy* [3] in DBAE.

The judgment of merit in an art work in the fine art tradition depends on two factors, the object and its viewer. Qualification of the viewer to understand the art work depends on the concept of literacy. In other words, the criteria for superiority in an art work depend on the degree

to which the viewer needs a set of skills to understand it. This set of skills is called literacy. In order to understand the importance of this value concept in DBAE, the dynamic interaction between the concepts *meaning*, and *understanding* needs to be dealt with. The most widely discussed and prevalent value expressed in DBAE is that of *literacy*, "the ability to secure meaning from the various cultural forms [in which art] is expressed" (Eisner, 1987b, p. 35).

An important function of art in DBAE is to convey meaning which is embodied in a sophisticated and complex code. This code can best be understood by a viewer who has had specialized training to decipher it. Meaning, significance, worth, and merit, are attributed to art works in accordance with an analysis of the symbolic code in which meaning is embodied. If the code of the work matches the code (or deciphering abilities) of the viewer, it can be understood.

The kind of meaning provided by the visual code determines the criteria of merit. If the work of art provides, through its code, the ability to experience a sophisticated and complex meaning, then the conditions wherein excellence can be attributed to the work of art are in place. Various kinds of meaning, both intrinsic and extrinsic are considered

necessary for understanding the ideal code in DBAE. These various kinds of meaning involve different symbolic components in the code and different literacies to interpret them. Within the code advocated as superior by DBAE are three internal and highly interrelated values that can be called (a) the intellectual (b) the cultural, and (c) the formal. [4] Aesthetic value then, comprises the integration of the intellectual, cultural, and formal values. These values can exist in any degree in any work of art, but the Getty would assign the highest value to the one which combined and integrated all three.

INTELLECTUAL VALUE

> *Aesthetic Criterion No. 4 - The code which contains certain intellectual values accessible through an intellectual literacy is superior to the one which does not.*

The Getty states that DBAE is an academic enterprise. Its aim is to make art education intellectually rigorous, structured, and scholarly and thereby elevate its status in the public schools. It seems logical, therefore, that in DBAE, most interactions with art as well as the component criteria for aesthetic value, are thought of as cognitively or intellectually based. [5] The act of judgment itself, i.e., the determination of worth and meaning in art works, is an

intellectual exercise. The idea of a code which embodies
meaning demanding a form of literacy to decipher is itself
an intellectual or cognitive activity. The first and central
aspect of the code then, is an intellectual one, and all the
other values and components directly relate to it. An art
work, to be superior, must communicate certain intellectual
values to the viewer, and, conversely, the viewer must
possess intellectual literacy in order to apprehend or
decipher these values. But what is meant by *intellectual* or
cognitive value in DBAE?

DBAE subscribes to a broadened view of intelligence, one
which believes that the making and responding to visual
images is a matter of mind, "a matter that requires
inventive problem-solving capacities, analytic and synthetic
forms of thinking, and the exercise of judgment" (Eisner,
1987b, p. 11).

> Some educational analysts (notably Eisner) argued
> forcefully that no hard and fast distinction could
> be made between knowing and feeling, between what is
> cognitive and what is affective. All of our
> affective activity involves cognition because when
> we have feelings, we know that we are having them...
> Cognition and affect readily fuse to form a simple
> reality in our experience, and nowhere is this

fusion more evident than in the arts (DiBlasio,

1985a, p. 30).

This theme is elaborated by one of Getty's chief spokesmen,

Elliot Eisner. He rejects the idea that there is an

intellectual hierarchy with the abstract abilities at the

top and the expressive and sensory at the bottom, that

emotion and feeling are somehow antithetical to true knowing

(Eisner, 1985b). DBAE believes that feeling and emotion are

special forms of human intelligence, cognitive in nature,

and as important as the abstract forms. In order to

understand art, intelligences of many kinds are actively

used. So the basis whereby meaning is extracted from visual

codes becomes an intellectual activity.

It has been established that the concept of a code involves

a body of knowledge (content) and skills and abilities

(literacy). It is interesting to note that these two ideas -

knowledge, and skills and abilities - constitute the two

areas of the cognitive domain in Bloom's Taxonomy (Wheeler,

1970). Although the body of knowledge or the content of the

code must contain certain intellectual values that represent

criteria for the assessment of superiority in the image,

these values are not directly accessible. In other words,

the Getty does not directly isolate and identify them.

Rather, it relates them to the literacy required for their decipherment. Intellectual values are processes more than end-states. They are particular cognitive processes called into being when the viewer is faced with a code complex and sophisticated enough to allow their exercise.

Intellectual values have no content of their own, but must rely on the cultural and formal values to supply entities upon which the cognitive skills can be applied. A work whose code allows the full range of these skills to be exercised will be considered superior to the one which does not. It may be easier to describe the form of literacy required to read the code, and from this create a composite of the intellectual values which must be embodied in the code itself.

When one comes into contact with a work of art, the kind of literacy required in order to extract intellectual meaning from its code involves a critical first step. Broudy (1987) says that the viewer must be able to make the distinction between the signal and its referent. Once this is done, "the possibility of cognition is born. The relation of signals, symbols, and signs to their referents and their separability from them are the subject matters of thinking and judging" (p. 17). When this first cognitive act occurs, one can then

engage in the intellectual skills of observation, discrimination, comparison, and contrast, all of which allow meaning to be derived from art (Getty Center, 1985).

The superior image makes some severe demands on the viewer who must possess the intellectual ability to cope with ambiguity, to experience nuance, and to determine the kinds of tradeoffs that have taken place between alternative courses of action (Eisner, 1985). It requires the understanding that images require inventive problem-solving capacities, analytic and synthetic forms of thinking and the exercise of judgment (Eisner, 1987b). It needs the kind of thinking "required to see what is subtle and complex, to learn how to attend to forms so that their expressive structure engages our emotion and imagination, to tolerate, indeed pursue the enigmatic ambiguities of art" (Eisner, 1987a, p. 21). The superior image demands innovative thinking and problem-solving skills not only for its creation, but also for its understanding (Getty Center, 1985).

In order for real comprehension to occur, the viewer must be able to analyze and interpret (Kleinbauer, 1987), make inferences, envision possibilities, and explore alternate courses of action (Eisner, 1987b), and be able to reflect,

contemplate, and speculate (Rush, Greer, & Feinstein, 1986).
"To be able to think visually, to tolerate ambiguity, to
exercise our imagination, to notice nuance, to perceive
relationships between part and whole, to experience the
expressiveness of form are *required mental skills*" (italics
added) (Eisner, 1987b, p. 36). The Getty has made no attempt
to elucidate or classify the many intellectual or cognitive
skills required, but the kinds of intellectual demands
required of the superior image are easily discerned.

As far as can be gathered from the literature then, the
abilities needed for intellectual literacy consist of
observation, discrimination, comparison, contrast, analysis,
synthesis, identification, interpretation, reflection,
contemplation, and speculation skills. It also requires the
ability to distinguish signal from referent, to recognize
innovative thinking and problem-solving, to draw facts and
inferences, to pursue relationships, to envision
possibilities, and to explore alternate courses of action.

The ability to use these skills to extract meaning from a
work of art is called *intellectual literacy*. To the degree
the skills are used, the work qualifies as possessing
intellectual merit. The circular interaction between the
work and viewer, the code and literacy, is emphasized in

that the visual code must embody content intellectually
complex enough in its symbolism to require a certain
intellectual literacy to decipher it. The code itself cannot
possess these intellectual values, but only a content
serious enough to allow the intellectual values implied in
these skills to be exercised. By suggesting that the image
must embody intellectual content, the Getty means that it
must allow for a vigorous exercise of the intellectual
skills. The image whose symbolism permits these skills to be
used will be considered superior to the one which does not.

The superior image seems to involve a *complexity* that
requires the appropriate degree of intellectual literacy in
order to decipher it (Getty Center, 1985, 1987a). Although
this complexity is directly linked to the cultural and
formal values, its form of literacy is uniquely fundamental
to the others. This intellectual complexity requires
education, and this is one of the major points used by the
Getty for the advocacy of the fine arts, which it identifies
as embodying a subtle and sophisticated intellectual
complexity, and its rejection of the popular arts, whose
symbols, it believes, are simple and easily read. A work is
judged superior to the degree it is able to accomplish this.

The intellectual component or value is foundational to the

entire enterprise of DBAE. Not only does it provide the basis for the determination of aesthetic value, but also every other form of value, from pedagogical to political. DBAE is a structure designed to raise the status of art education by putting it on par with other academic subjects (Getty Center, 1985, 1987a). It believes it can do this by stressing its intellectual capacity, and has adopted a cognitive theory which dissolves the dichotomy between intellect and affect, between mind and emotion (Eisner, 1987b; DiBlasio, 1985a).

As was mentioned earlier, the intellectual values have no content of their own, but rely on other areas to provide forms for their exercise. The first of these content areas has been identified as *cultural* value.

CULTURAL VALUE

> *Aesthetic Criterion No. 5 - The code which contains certain cultural values needing a sophisticated cultural literacy to decipher it is superior to the one which does not.*

It may be arguable whether any work can ever be created independently of cultural values, but it seems apparent that cultural values differ significantly from one cultural context to another. [6] By cultural is included the social,

historical, and traditional forces that operate on and within a culture. Traditionally, these have been called the extra-aesthetic functions of a work of art, but in DBAE's expanded concept of aesthetics, they are necessary for understanding.

The Getty literature supports the concept that cultural values are embodied in works of art. The importance of art to culture and culture to art is one of the most commonly repeated themes. The documents emphasize that the arts are one of the highest forms of human achievement in our culture (Bennett, 1987; Getty Center, 1985; Clark, Day, & Greer, 1987; Eisner, 1985a; Hodsoll, 1987).

> As a culture we regard the arts as among the highest
> of human achievements: we build palaces we call
> museums to display the fruits of artistic inquiry
> and construct concert halls to experience the
> heights we can reach through music. In effect, we
> recognize as a culture that the arts represent the
> apotheosis of human achievement (Eisner, 1985a, p.
> 65).

Art is seen as a repository of culture and the principal means of transmitting cultural values (Getty Center, 1985; Boyer, 1987; Broudy, 1987; Duke, 1983, 1984b; Risatti,

1987). In its cultural aspect, art is referred to as wealth,
jewels, capital, and riches (Broudy, 1987; Eisner, 1987b).
This value is not regarded lightly in DBAE. It is stated
that unless children are educated in the arts they will be
denied their cultural legacy (Eisner, 1985a) and, as a
result, will lose their culture and civility as well as
their humanity (Boyer, 1987).

The Getty literature supports the idea of art as a
repository and transmitter of cultural value. In terms of
this study it suggests that the criterion for excellence
depends to some degree on the art work's embodiment of
certain cultural properties. The superior work's code then,
must embody cultural value and must be attainable through
cultural literacy.

The Getty literature, although enthusiastic about the
cultural aspect, is not entirely clear about the precise
cultural values which should be embodied in the code of a
work. It can be discerned, however, that the image is a
repository of culture and also a means of transmitting it.
This means that the image content must (1) contain a
symbolism which embodies cherished values (what the Getty
calls the social aspect), and (2) be an active part of the
historical development of the culture (what is called the

historical aspect). The superior image not only embodies certain cultural values, but is part of an historical tradition within the culture (Hodsoll, 1987). Cultural value then, has a social and an historical aspect.

The first aspect involves imagery which employs symbolism depicting those values thought to be important to the society. Symbolism which depicts order and harmony, a love for knowledge and rational inquiry, compassion and forgiveness, and the sacredness of freedom is thought to promote the proper cultural values (Bennett, 1987). Symbolism which depicts the character of religious belief and the import of corruption in a society are also important (Eisner, 1987b). Above all, symbolism which depicts the striving for human excellence is to be valued (Eisner, 1985; Getty Center, 1985; Smith, 1987). These social values "empower us to understand civic obligation and human fulfillment and social redemption" (Getty Center, 1987a, p. 53).

But these values are not found in isolation. They are part of the broader historical development of a society, and the visual image which embodies this aspect acquires an additional value.

Art does not emerge in the proverbial vacuum. All

art is part of a culture. All cultures give
direction to art, sometimes by rejecting what
artists have made and at other times by rewarding
them for it. To understand culture, one needs to
understand its manifestations in art, and to
understand art, one needs to understand how culture
is expressed through its content and forms (Eisner,
1987b, p. 20).

This is the importance of the historical aspect of the art
work.

When children have the opportunity to study artworks
from the past and the present, they begin to
understand how art reflects the values of a society;
how art has been influenced by social, political,
and economic beliefs of a society; and how art has
made distinctive contributions to that society. Such
understanding gives children a greater appreciation
of how cultures have communicated through visual
forms and helps children gain insights into
relationships between the past and the present
(Getty Center, 1985, p. 16).

There is a vivid relationship of art to the development of
the history of a culture and the image can reveal the

interaction between the "technology and ideology of a period and the form that artists create" (Eisner, 1987b, p. 16).

> Artworks reflect the times and cultures of the people who produced them. Because they are a record of how people, places, and things looked, artworks help bring us more immediately and vividly into contact with past civilizations as well as with present societies (Getty Center, 1985, p. 16).

This historical aspect of cultural value places some definite restrictions on what superiority can include.

Broudy (1987), in discussing the historical aspect of cultural values says that exemplary images must

> (1) portray the values of a particular period with unusual clarity, (2) mark a transition between periods, or (3) presage developments of a future period. These features give an exemplar great educational leverage, which justifies the considerable time required for its understanding and appreciation (p. 41).

This historical aspect is necessary for understanding. Those who created the masterpieces always used the forms which constituted their culture.

However fresh and original the vision of the old
masters, they never entirely broke free from their
own age. Their works were not conceived ex nihilo,
the masters extended and transformed visual models,
they inherited from the past ... These painters saw
significant form in what they copied; they copied
their sources with emphasis - not by measure but by
the selective, interpretive power of their trained
eyes and insight ... For in these masterpieces,
students realize how one great artist can utilize
the work of another great artist or even adapt from
a photograph, billboard or soup can, in order to
create a new masterwork significant in its own right
(Kleinbauer, 1987, p. 208).

According to the Getty, one of the most important ways works
of art convey meaning is through the "adaption of and
departure from art-historically established forms" (Risatti,
1987, p. 224).

The content of a code consists of a body of knowledge
symbolically represented. The content that is important in
terms of cultural values consists of a social and historical
aspect which is represented in a tradition consisting of a
collected body of works reflecting these values, called the
fine art tradition. This tradition basically supports one

set of cultural values. The fine art tradition, accurately

speaking, is not so much a value as a means of articulating

value. This particular tradition expresses the cultural

values deemed to be most important. The fine art tradition

consists of classic exemplars (Broudy, 1987) which provide

the best examples of cultural value.

The kinds of work that constitute this tradition have

already been discussed. Within DBAE, however, is the belief

that this tradition and what it contains represents the

common American culture. By common culture is meant "the

values, achievements, historical events, customs,

principles, and beliefs that all Americans share that make

us one people despite our adversity" (Bennett, 1987, p. 36).

> The content of arts education must start with the
>
> core of American culture. That core belongs to all
>
> of us - whether we are white or black or Cuban
>
> Americans or Mexican Americans or Asian Americans or
>
> Italian Americans or Polish Americans or anything
>
> American. We must know what the core is and how it
>
> came to be before we can understand how it is
>
> changing or can be changed. We need to make the core
>
> a part of the knowledge and experience of all
>
> Americans before all Americans, in an age of
>
> television, can have a sense of their place called

America - e pluribus unum (Hodsoll, 1987, p. 110).

The values inherent in this so-called common culture are to be experienced by *all* American students. It is expressed that "socioeconomic background does not determine one's ability to understand, appreciate, and love the great works of our culture (Bennett, 1987, p. 39). It is also stated that the great exemplars of western culture *should* be made accessible to *all* students (Eisner, 1985, 1987b; Hodsoll, 1987). Entry to the enjoyment of values in this tradition is not "barred by race, creed, color, or economic status. Such bars, when they exist, are not erected by scholarship but rather by those who limit access to the scholarship" (Broudy, 1987, p. 39). DBAE defends its support of this tradition by stating that its *wealth* is available to everybody, the advantaged plus the disadvantged.

> Some will say that teaching disadvantaged children
> Michelangelo and Beethoven is, at best, idealistic
> and, at worst, forcing middle and upper class values
> on poor minority students. My response is this:
> these works do not belong to any one race or class.
> They are simply the best that we have, the best
> western civilization has to offer, and everyone
> should get a shot at them (Bennett, 1987, p. 39).

It may now be interesting to determine the form of literacy required by *all* American students in order to be able to decipher these cultural values symbolized in the superior work's code.

In DBAE the primary aim of art involvement is to achieve an understanding of the work's meaning. This understanding cannot come about without a certain cultural literacy. By cultural literacy, the Getty means a familiarity with the common culture, i.e., the values and beliefs that all Americans are believed to share (Bennett, 1987). Presumably, familiarity with this body of specialized knowledge will allow one to "read" the cultural elements embodied in an art work's code. The first step in literacy then, is to acquire this knowledge. Broudy (1987) refers to the images necessary to give meaning to art as the *allusionary base*.

> Among educated readers one would expect the
> allusionary store to include some Greek and Roman
> mythology... When attending to discourse that
> includes references (explicit or implicit) to these
> concepts and images, the reader or listener raids
> the allusionary base for relevant words, facts, and
> images. If the allusionary base is meager and
> disorganized, the reader or listener has to let much
> of what is heard and read go by as just so many

words (Broudy, 1987, p. 18).

The acquisition of an allusionary base that is rich and organized and relates to the tradition and culture of the viewer is necessary. In this way, the student will be able to identify elements that lead to meaning. This allusionary base is primarily historical. It demands historical knowledge and skills from viewers, in order to understand certain symbolic meanings which exist in historical works. "To look at many paintings of the Madonna without knowing that colors like the blue of her robe or symbols like the lily have particular meanings is to have a limited historical understanding of the works" (Greer, 1984, p. 215).

Cultural literacy then, is the acquisition of a body of cultural, social, and historical knowledge necessary to be able to "read" the work and thus gain an understanding of its meaning. The knowledge must include the values of a period, the allusionary base, and the ability to recognize purposeful achievement

The cultural values in DBAE are many. There is the belief that students must learn the past in order to understand the present (Kleinbauer, 1987; Risatti, 1987). There is the belief that art derives meaning from society's values and

should communicate them (Getty Center, 1985, 1987a). There is also the belief that cultural conditions establish the standard for evaluation. (Crawford, 1987; Getty Center, 1987a). This however, leads to a minor conflict in the literature. If what is considered art is culturally determined, then there can be no universal standards. This conflicts with some DBAE writers who believe art is universal (Boyer, 1985, 1987). [7] There is also the belief that the best of the culture should be shared with all people (Bennett, 1987). In this sense, a relativist hypothesis is rejected. [8]

It is sometimes difficult to separate cultural values from intellectual values. The identification of cultural aspects in a code necessitates the use of the intellectual skills discussed earlier. In a sense then, the intellectual and cultural components are highly interrelated. The intellectual values that must be realized within the superior work cannot be exercised without the body of content called cultural knowledge and conversely, the requirements for assessing and determining the cultural content of a work cannot come about without exercise of the intellectual abilities. But there is one more area to consider in this relationship and that is the area of formal value.

FORMAL VALUE

> *Aesthetic Criterion No. 6 - The code which contains*
> *certain formal values requiring a special literacy*
> *to decipher it is better than the one which does*
> *not.*

Formal value comprises the area traditionally thought of as

being responsible for aesthetic experience. Concentration on

formal value, or formalism, holds that attention is to be

directed towards the elements of line, color, shape, and

form which constitute the form of the image. The formal

qualities are to be the only qualities used in the

assessment of aesthetic value. A work is judged good in

virtue of possessing formal values such as unity, balance,

and harmony, and judged poor for not possessing them

(Carlson, 1979). This is the true aesthetic or so-called

intrinsic experience. But it has been shown that DBAE

emphasizes a more holistic understanding of art, rather than

just so-called aesthetic or, as we will henceforth refer to

it, *formal* experience. Based on the attribution of value,

the formal is now only one component of that understanding,

but it still exists as an area in which certain values must

exist in order for a work to be classified as superior.

The formal elements of the code involve intrinsic factors

(Kleinbauer, 1987), which include the so-called elements and

principles of design and their relationships. In DBAE, these

are referred to as sensory and formal properties (Rush,

1987, p. 207). In essence, it concerns those strictly formal

matters dealing with the visual composition and organization

of works of art. The formal elements are described in DBAE

as consisting of color, space, line, scale, shape, surface,

texture (Rush, 1987; Getty Center, 1985, 1987a). These

elements must be present in order for a visual image to

exist, but what determines formal value in an art work, is

the manner in which these elements are arranged. These

elements are combined by means of the formal principles

recognized by DBAE, balance, rhythm, contrast, emphasis,

composition, and other compositional devices (Rush, 1987;

Getty Center, 1985; Kleinbauer, 1987). Studying these

elements is vital for understanding art "and though we may

tend to treat each of these elements separately, their

perception and use is highly conditioned by their

relationships" (Getty Center, 1987a, p. 23).

What is important here for the determination of value, is

that these elements and principles display relationships.

> These relationships may consist of the quality of
> line and how line defines length and width and
> delineates shape or form and movement; of shapes or
> forms in two or three dimensions - hence how shapes

come to possess volume or mass; of light and how the
diffusion of light can create or dissolve forms; of
color and how color contributes to, or detracts
from, qualities of line, form, light, and even
effects of emotion; of space and how it encourages
limits, or directs existence or motion; of surface
and its salient properties, such as material and
texture; the various combinations of these elements
to form pattern; and finally the selection or
interlocking of some or all of these elements to
create compositions (Kleinbauer, 1987, p. 207).

The formal elements of visual art and their relationships
are likened in DBAE "to the use of words and phrases in
language or the elements and structure of music" (Spratt,
1987, p. 200). The formal elements are referred to as a
vocabulary and the rules governing the relationships to a
structural syntax (Kleinbauer, 1987, p. 209). The work of
art should display formal relationships which reveal
coherent structure on the purely visual level or, that
reveal a certain unity in that the image is "held together
and ordered by the use of similar shapes, forms, and colors"
(Risatti, 1987, p. 221). The manner in which the
relationships display unity, harmony, and balance will
determine the value of the work.

Although the interplay of these relationships between the elements and principles of design are complex, and only the very best relationships result in superior works of art, DBAE says that a set of rules cannot be used in determining what the relationships should be. "The organization of the forms must work in accordance with the standards the child holds for himself, all without formulas or rules" (Eisner, 1987b, p. 17). Although the choices made in determining the best relationships are not to be subjected to a set of rules, the choice is not left to chance.

> In creating each work of art, artists make an
> amazing number of choices: they consider what
> materials... best convey their ideas: what visual
> elements - line, colors, shapes - best depict their
> subjects; what visual principles - composition,
> balance, contrast - best communicate their
> intentions. The choices and thought processes
> artists use to make decisions may be flexible, but
> they are not capricious. They are deliberate,
> qualitative decisions based on the artist's
> knowledge, practise, and capabilities (Getty Center,
> 1985, p. 15).

Part of the formal literacy is not only to be able to identify the relationships which exist in the formal

properties, but also to be able to identify technical
properties.

> Technical properties are the characteristics of
> material (such as clay, watercolor, chalk, paper)
> and tools (such as brushes, pencils, burins,
> potter's wheels) and ways in which the artist has
> used them to produce the artwork (such as carving,
> printing, painting, drawing), things that are often
> called art media and techniques (Hewett & Rush,
> 1987, p. 41-42).

The technical aspect of formal value concerns how the
material is used in the creation of art works. Technical
knowledge is the identification of the technique which
results in "well-made and beautiful objects" (Greer, 1987,
p. 232). Work which is displayed in museums is usually well
made and beautiful, revealing abilities of conception and
execution, "imagination and skill, art and artisanry,
mastery of craft, proficiency with materials and tools"
(Spratt, 1987, p. 202). DBAE mentions that some of the
finest of crafted objects are to be found in museums.

> One need only look closely at the works displayed in
> art museums everywhere to realize there is a special
> kind of intelligence in the sensitive application of
> tool to material in the production of well-made and

beautiful objects... These objects of art represent a confluence of high human abilities: conception and execution, imagination and skill, art and artisanry. They bespeak a mastery of craft in its finest sense. When the work reveals both the character of its maker and the materials and tradition from which it derives, it transcends mere functionality and moves us with the silent power we term aesthetic (Spratt, 1987, p. 201).

Although the elements of the formal dimension are spelled out (color, space, line, scale, shape, surface, form, movement, volume, mass, balance, emphasis, focal point, composition, contrast, texture, rhythm - in fact the traditional elements and principles of design) and it is made clear that the best work results from the sophisticated use of the relationships of these elements, no real criteria for the assessment of worth is given. How are sophisticated or significant relationships, subtlely divergent qualities, inflection of execution, or an ordered use of the elements identified? How is excellence in the use of technique and craft identified? It is stated that there are no rules (Eisner, 1987b), and yet also stated that the use of the principles is not capricious (Getty Center, 1987a). What are the formal criteria by which we can identify the superior

work?

Although the literature is silent on this most important question, a solid clue is given.

> Line, shape, light, and surface cannot be described
> merely through verbal discourse, without reference
> to specific works of the visual arts. They must be
> demonstrated visually. Art instructors can actually
> try to create these elements before the class, or
> they can resort to the art of the past through the
> physical presence of actual works of art in the
> classroom or museum or through slides or other
> reproductions of them. Even if an art instructor is
> a gifted artist, the full range of potentialities of
> all the basic elements can't be demonstrated
> (Kleinbauer, 1987, p. 207).

In order to provide students with examples about the appropriate ordering of the elements within an image, works in the fine art tradition are cited. Within these works are the best use of the elements and principles. Works of the past must be employed, and to avoid naivete and error, they must be understood in their historical complexity. This connects the formal sphere firmly with the cultural one. The fine art tradition not only articulates the intellectual and

cultural values, it also articulates an approved usage of the formal values. The fine art exemplars reveal the accepted use of the formal properties. It is through immersion in this tradition that students "absorb" the techniques and practices considered *effective*.

The formal area also has an intimate connection with the intellectual area. The skills needed for intelligent recognition and understanding of formal relationships are those which are valued in the intellectual realm: discrimination, analysis, relationships, and others. The formal judgment is truly a cognitive act. This is best observed in the structural method devised in DBAE for the discovery and identification of formal values.

That which is used to find formal values in DBAE is a system adopted from Harry Broudy (1972, 1981b). DBAE teachers use Broudy's system of *aesthetic scanning* in order to identify the formal elements (DiBlasio, 1985b; Greer, 1984; Rush, 1987). In other words, aesthetic scanning is the method of formal literacy. It is a method whereby a viewer identifies the aesthetic properties and values in a work of art. "Scanning is a classroom application of the perceptual activity that artists use when making art, and that connoisseurs use when contemplating it" (Hewett & Rush,

1987, p. 41).

> Using the curriculum designer's selected images, the
> teacher is to direct student aesthetic perception
> experiences through scanning methods, in order to
> increase student's sensitivity to perception of the
> sensory, formal, expressive, and technical
> properties, and the extra-aesthetic function of
> works of art (Zimmerman, 1982, p. 42).

This particular method, however, merely allows students to
develop their ability to identify the formal elements. It
does not give the criteria for formal value, but, as has
been indicated, the formal values are best displayed in the
work which comprises the fine art tradition.

This tradition comprises the teaching tool for the great
values of excellence, and intellectual, cultural, and formal
values. The criteria by which work is judged superior
consists of intellectual, cultural, and formal components.
But one can wonder whether these values were selected
because the great art tradition embodies and reveals them,
or the great art tradition was selected because it supports
the values. Cultural wealth for all consists of the
understanding of meaning resident in the western fine art
tradition. All Getty's aesthetic values point to this body

of work as the reference for value.

NOTES

[1] The term *viewer* is used in reference to one who is engaged in perceiving the image constituting the art work. This refers to the artist as well as to an observer.

[2] Dufrenne (1979) discusses research which shows that the formal values in the *high* art traditions in many world cultures are extremely similar.

[3] The Getty defines literacy as the ability to secure meaning from various forms in which art is expressed (Eisner, 1987b). This ability relies on (1) knowledge and (2) skills. This basic framework seems to be the same for intellectual, cultural, and formal literacy discussed in the literature.

[4] These are obviously the three criteria used in the selection of work for museum purposes. In the literature, museum excellence is noted often.

[5] It is hard to discern in the Getty literature that any distinction is made between the terms *cognitive* and *intellectual*. The terms seem to be used interchangeably.

[6] Roger Cardinal (1972) examines a form of primitive art he believes has no cultural influence. He examines artists he believes have turned away from habitual cultural patterns to which they have been trained to respond. He believes authentic art is that which has broken totally from tradition and cultural conditioning.

> For the function of art when it is genuinely effective, is to give us a chance to break with old habits, and loose the shackles of reasonable social behavior, the better to retreat down dark passageways and rejoin that part of ourselves which moves towards us with a savage laugh (p. 11).

Needless to say, this rather irrational approach is not a conception of art that would be supported by Getty.

7   The idea of universality in art is being questioned by
     many writers.

         High culture is also becoming less influential
         because of the declining credibility of its
         claim that its cultural standards are universal.
         Today's upper middle and other publics do not
         stand in quite the same awe of high culture as
         did earlier generations. Nor do they seem to
         seek the kind of prestige that high culture can
         offer, or could offer in the past (Gans, 1985,
         p. 50).

8   The relativist position is opposed to the absolutist
     one.

         The relativist hypothesis is, however, rejected
         by adherents of high culture, who argue that
         their culture is inherently different from all
         others. They believe that high culture's
         aesthetic standards are universal, and must be
         met by everyone. Resembling in many ways the
         practitioners of orthodox religions, they
         conclude therefore that all other taste cultures
         and standards are aesthetically and otherwise
         invalid, harmful to both individuals and society
         (Gans, 1985, p. 42)

CHAPTER 5

ANTECEDENTS OF THE AESTHETIC VALUES IN DBAE

The second question this study seeks to answer involves the placing of the identified values in a larger context. The aesthetic values present in DBAE are only one narrow selection out of the vast possible range of values which could have been selected. In order to place the values in some sort of meaningful context, it is necessary to extend the characterization of the criteria and portray the tradition from which they have come. This will will be done by (1) tracing the antecedent history and development of the criteria within the field of art education, and (2) identifying the individual writers who have used this tradition in explicating the Getty's DBAE program.

The aesthetic values that have been identified did not come into existence with the formulation of DBAE. Their origin and development have a very long and sometimes stormy history. The value of understanding the antecedent traditions and thoughts that sponsor DBAE theory has been recognized by the Getty. It sponsored a series of reports which describe the antecedents of the discipline-based concept (Efland, 1987; Kern, 1987; Smith, 1987). These investigations are excellent descriptions of the theoretical

and philosophical antecedents of the disciplinary approach
and they provide a pedigree of legitimacy for the basic
curriculum structures used by Getty. While the *theoretical*
structures of the reform were explicated admirably, they
fail to account for the origin of the aesthetic value and
belief system which underlies their theory of evaluation and
judgment.

This belief and value system is essentially a reflection of
the *humanities* approach to visual art. Its motivating spark
and subsequent growth consists of an interplay between the
historical movements represented by the humanities and the
so-called populists. DBAE's essential value beliefs spring
from and represent a position supporting the traditional
humanities approach to education (Smith, 1987a).

THE HUMANITIES

It is well recognized that the meaning of the terms
humanities and *humanism* are incredibly diverse (Hadas, 1968;
Khatchadourian, 1980; Shuman, 1980; Smith, 1969). In
addition to the various meanings attributed to the terms,
there are some philosophical distinctions between terms such
as humanities and humanism. Within the art education
literature, however, the terms seem to be used
interchangeably. This study will use the terms in the

following way:

1. Humanism - is the belief and value system which
    emphasizes intellectual and academic rigor through the
    study of the Western cultural and classical tradition
    (Broudy, 1973).

2. The Humanities - is the study of that classical
    tradition, i.e., the study of humanism.

3. A Humanist - is one who supports the above sense of
    humanism and the humanities (Flexner, 1987).

Within the diversity of meanings surrounding the terms,
there appears to be a central core of consensus around the
so-called *traditional* conception of the humanities. These
shared beliefs are concerned with the intellectual
experience of classical antiquity, ideals of excellence,
superiority, individuality, style in expression and life
(Hadas, 1968), and a concern with the expression of certain
human values within our cultural and intellectual heritage
(Anderson, 1971; Hoffa, 1971; Smith, 1969).

It has been best summarized by Harry Broudy (1973) who says
that traditional humanism in education seeks to induct
students into the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic
heritage in order that the emotions and impulses can be
controlled by reason.

The life of feeling and action, to qualify as human,

had to be ordered by thought. Through the power of

the intellect man could discern the order of the

universe and of the moral life that could make life

itself orderly and intelligible ... The goal of

humanistic education, was to discipline the mind and

feelings by study of the best that had been thought

and wrought (Broudy, 1973, p. 70).

The consensus of belief about the humanities tradition then,

is that it consists of an attitude towards a body of

traditional (usually classical) knowledge which can enhance

the ideals of excellence, intelligence, and rationality in

human life. The primary agreement consists of the belief in

forms of intelligence and rationality that will result from

the study of the cultural tradition.

Regardless of time and circumstances, the schools at

all levels can induct the young into this consensus

with the confidence that it is about as near as we

can get to an abiding, if not absolute, truth about

the good life (Broudy, 1981a, p. 142).

The humanities have always had an impact in Western

education (Levi, 1983), but it was in the 1960s when the

link between the humanities and art began to be stressed. In

the past, art had been excluded from the humanities because

it was believed that the making of art was a *technical* rather than a liberal subject (Lansing, 1978). Where art was included in departments of humanities, it dealt only with the history and theory of art, not its practise. "The history, criticism, and theory of art fall within the definition of the humanities whereas their practise does not" (Levi, 1983).

In the late 1960's, however, there was a major swing in art education theory away from a studio or creative orientation to a discipline-centered approach stressing history, criticism, and aesthetics (Efland, 1971; Forman, 1968a). This allowed the concept of art to be included under the aegis of the humanities. In 1964, the same year as Barkan's plea to expand the concept of art education to include more than production, a Commission on the Humanities met to discuss the issue of the Arts and the Humanities. It recommended the creation of two National Endowments, the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) (Commission on the Humanities, 1980).

Between 1964 and 1967, the Arts and Humanities Program of the U.S.O.E. sponsored 17 developmental seminars and conferences in art education (Rush & Conant, 1979). In 1968

the NAEA issued its first official position statement in 19 years stating that art is a body of knowledge (Efland, 1971). This identification of art content as *knowledge* was necessary for its development as an educational form acceptable to the humanities.

By 1969, it was acknowledged that the topic of the humanities and art was generating considerable enthusiasm. Both educators and students were apparently demanding that more attention be paid to the humanities (Smith, 1969). During this year, the *Journal of Aesthetic Education* sponsored a special edition dealing with the humanities. In this issue, Ralph Smith (1969), expressing concern that there were so many diverse interpretations of the term *humanities*, decided to provide a definition for its use in art education. He stated that aesthetic education is a subdomain of the humanities and that a humanities approach in art education stresses an inquiring mind, a method and set of procedures, and *an object so constructed that procedural probing can extract facts and values from it.* This latter statement is directly relevant to the method of art judgment that has been explicated as a feature of DBAE. The humanities approach is directed toward cultural objects with high value potential (Smith, 1969). In other words, this approach helps determine what objects contain the

highest aesthetic values and upon what exemplars one should concentrate.

Smith's statement was more than just a definition. It was also an indication of the defensive role that would be assumed by humanities-oriented art educators throughout the next decade. Smith's definition was a response to the counter-culture movement that was occurring at this time. This so-called counter-culture severely criticized the western intellectual and cultural tradition, and, as a result, the humanities became politically suspect (Mulcahy, 1983). Smith's rallying call to the banner of the humanities was meant to restore "the sanity which prevailing fads are destroying, and in order to assert countervailing power against present trends, we should return to tradition" (Smith, 1969). This battle between the advocates and the critics of the humanities tradition continues to the present day.

In 1971, the NAEA held its 11th Biennial conference where the theme was Art and Humanism. It was based on the premise that a humanities approach to art could "offer the only viable alternative to art education's current single-minded pursuit of the studio ideal" (Hoffa, 1971, p. 8). The conference recognized that the concept of the arts and the

humanities was one of the top priorities in the 1970's
(Anderson, 1971). New York State Education Commissioner,
Ewald B. Nyquist stated that his primary goal was to make
the educational enterprise of New York more
humanities-oriented, while the New York State Board of
Regents designated the Arts and Humanities as a Department
priority (Anderson, 1971). One of the major objectives of
the new Higher Education Division of NAEA was to introduce
the humanities into higher education (Heussenstamm, 1971).
There was a definite feeling of optimism about the
humanities direction that art education was taking
(Anderson, 1972).

During this time, there were many different approaches to
the concept of the humanities in art education. Some
educators were interpreting the humanities approach to mean
a kind of openness, the focus on *humane* values, and an
acceptance of the new and radical art forms of the 1970's
(Beymer, 1971; Cassidy, 1971; Stewart, 1971, 1972). This
particular interpretation rejected a focus on past cultural
exemplars and instead concentrated on the new art forms of
the present. It was the rise and proliferation of these
non-traditional interpretations of the humanities that led
Broudy (1973) to draw a distinction between (1) *new
humanism*, which meant an emphasis on emotional health,

social relationships, and a diminution of stress on formal study of academic disciplines, and (2) *traditional humanism*, which emphasized intellectual and academic rigor through study of the western cultural tradition (Broudy, 1973). This study will assume a reference to Broudy's *traditional* humanism when employing the term humanities or humanism.

By the mid 1970's there was a belief that art was a solid part of the humanities tradition (Mutchler, 1975), and that it functioned best as an adjunct of humanism (Levi, 1974). In 1976, the NYU Seminar on Education in the Visual Arts recommended that a humanities approach be adopted in art education (Rush & Conant, 1979), and a year later the NAEA formed a commission which issued a report which supported the kind of traditional humanism defined by Broudy and Smith and indicated that this concept was the best approach to art education (Lanier, 1979).

The 1980's have seen a revived and powerful move towards a humanities approach to art education, beginning with the Rockefeller Report and ending with the firm exposition of the humanities position which occurs in the Getty's DBAE program. In 1980, the Commission on the Humanities published a report entitled *The humanities in American life*. This report, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, proposed

that the humanities comprised the proper education for the American citizen. It stressed the idea of a *common* educational experience based on the high culture of the western tradition and the values represented therein (Smith, 1982). It emphasized the preservation of traditional cultural resources and the ideas of tradition, continuity, judgment, and competence (Mulcahy, 1983; Smith, 1982).

This theme was picked up in the report of the Presidential Commission on Excellence in Education, *A nation at risk: The imperative for educational reform* (1983). This report expressed concern about what it believed was a trend to mediocrity and called for more academic rigor in the schools. Emphasis was to be given to more academic and intellectual skills based on a solid grounding in the traditional heritage. Its zealous demand for human achievement was carried over into a special issue of *Art Education, 37*(4), (1984), which used as its theme one of the highest of humanities ideals, *excellence.*

In 1984, the Secretary of Education, William Bennett, [1] former chairman of the NEH, wrote a book, *To reclaim a legacy* (1984), which attacked American education for its deplorable approach to the humanities. The legacy that Bennett says needs reclaiming, of course, is nothing less

than the intellectual tradition which represents the ideals
and practises of the Western cultural heritage. In order to
avoid disaster, American education must return to a
humanities approach to education (Mulcahy, 1986).

These traditional ideas, stressing humanly achieved
excellence through involvement in the classical tradition,
were beginning to be seriously considered by leading art
educators. Ralph Smith, a vigorous supporter of the
humanities, designed an aesthetic education program that
relied heavily on a humanities approach (Smith, 1984b). But
nowhere was this approach being more seriously considered
than by the Getty Trust.

In the early 1980's the Trust was considering its extension
into the field of education. As has been shown, the
humanities ideas were dominant at this time. In determining
its educational approach, the Trust began an intensive
investigation of the directions it could move in the field
of art education. In order to determine this direction,
Harold Williams, president and chief executive officer of
the Trust, hired Leilani Lattin Duke and Nancy Englander to
conduct the research. It is interesting to note that Duke
was the former program director for the National Endowment
for the Arts, a humanities organization, while Englander was

former director of museum programs at the National Endowment for the Humanities (Getty Trust, 1985). It was with a planning team whose roots were based in the humanities tradition that DBAE began.

It is through the writers who create the Getty literature, however, writers who strongly support the humanities tradition, that the basic philosophical and theoretical thrust behind DBAE can be seen. Getty writers themselves have observed this humanities focus.

> Art education is beginning to look more and more like one of the humanities. Consider, for example, that DBAE in effect asks students to walk proudly with their cultural heritage, to appreciate the special character of aesthetic communication, and to reflect critically about the role of art in personal and social life. These are all traditional objectives of humanistic education. It follows that teacher preparation programs will have to require substantially more work in the humanities than they do now (Smith, 1987a, p. xviii).

More pertinent to the theme of this study is the fact that the aesthetic values which dominate DBAE are the same as those which dominate the humanities tradition.

EXTENDED AESTHETICS

As we have seen, the humanities approach to art education
broadens its concerns from the strictly productive to the
historical, critical, and aesthetic areas. Sole
concentration on the productive aspects of art and all that
implies cannot theoretically be considered a traditional
concern of the humanities. But with the extension of the
domain of art, new and broader parameters of aesthetic value
must be determined. The first indications of the grappling
with this idea can be detected in the struggle to define the
concept of aesthetics and its rightful boundaries.

It has been shown that DBAE writers generally employ an
expanded conception of aesthetics in the attribution of
value, i.e., one which sees aesthetic value as comprising
intrinsic as well as extrinsic factors (Crawford, 1987;
Efland, 1987; Getty Center, 1987a; Greer, 1987; Smith,
1987). This is an expansion of the long-held idea that
aesthetic value can be determined only by intrinsic
considerations. According to this latter view, worth, merit,
and excellence are only attributed for intrinsic factors
(Smith, 1983a; Kern, 1970). This concept of intrinsic value,
however, is of relatively recent origin. Before the 19th
century, extrinsic and instrumental value were both accepted
as valid indicators of aesthetic value (Redfern, 1986). It

was only with the 19th century romantic-idealist conception
of art according to which it was considered to be
non-functional and non-utilitarian, that the criteria for
worth was limited only to intrinsic concerns (Feldman,
1982). The idea of aesthetic value being solely resident in
the work itself, a formalistic concern, however, is
difficult to maintain in light of the concerns of a
humanities approach which seeks to emphasize *meaning,
understanding* and *human values* rather than just
appreciation, and which needs to broaden art knowledge to
include more than mere art production.

Although the dominant aesthetic position since the 19th
century has emphasized formal and intrinsic value, there has
been a tendency, with the development of a humanities
approach to art education, for aestheticians and theorists
to seek to expand this concept. In a sense, this is not so
much a broadening of the concept as it is a return to its
origins. In comparing art to a text, the humanist Rabkin
(1978) says that

> We can divide our ways of knowing into two great
> camps: those that rely on intra-textual examination
> and those that rely on extra-textual examination. Of
> course, no text can be really closed and also
> perceived, so intra-textual examination is an

analytic ideal; no text is the mere reflex of the

conditions surrounding its production, since it

lives only in the current perceptions of an

audience, so extra-textual examination is an

analytic ideal (Rabkin, 1978, p. 105).

In practise, therefore, the humanities-oriented aesthetician

will "move in and out of his texts" (p. 105). The humanities

approach to art then embraces the idea that intrinsic and

extrinsic concerns are of equal value.

Within the field of art education there has been a slow

tendency to admit this expanded approach. "The issue of

whether the arts are the carriers of extra-aesthetic

meanings ... has been much debated" (Serafine, 1979, p. 9).

Broudy (1976) reluctantly concedes and permits the broadened

approach.

Pedagogically, one might defend selecting works of

art for study that have great extra-aesthetic import

as well as artistic merit, but I doubt that we would

wish to exclude from study those works that do not

have such obvious extra-aesthetic import nor would

we wish the aesthetic response to be judged solely

in terms of extra-aesthetic effects (Broudy, 1976,

p. 35).

In effect, this validates the humanities conception stated by Rabkin. "Broudy further remarks that the degree of interest occasioned by works of art will be a function not only of their formal complexity, but also of the nerves of life they touch (Smith, 1981b, p. 15). Ralph Smith agreed with Broudy when he too admitted that worth and value could consist of intrinsic *and* extrinsic features (Smith, 1981b).

It is within the programs that stress a discipline-based approach that the expanded concepts of aesthetic value find their best expression. If the discipline of art admits to the sub-disciplines of aesthetics, criticism, history, as well as production, then each must offer a special value concern (ultimately all values must unite in a larger value). It is only within this expanded concept of aesthetic value that the discussion concerning the criteria for merit in DBAE can be extended.

THE WORK OF ART

The idea of an expanded concept of aesthetic value which embraces extrinsic as well as intrinsic criteria opens the act of evaluation to a multitude of new concerns. If the act of evaluation, i.e., the attribution of value, is to be managable, a narrowing of those concerns to select and identifiable criteria is required. The criteria for worth

will necessarily be larger than those of the formal but
still fixed and finite. The first of the concerns deals with
what is to be the object of attention in evaluation.

Theoretically, worth can be attributed to any visual
experience, from a patch of weeds to so-called museum
masterpieces. During the *expansionist* and *liberationist*
attitudes of the 1960's and 1970's (Smith, 1985), many
theorists began asserting that natural and environmental
objects as well as created works of art could be the focus
of aesthetic attention (Hepburn, 1968; Shields, 1973; Smith
& Smith, 1970b). Although the ideas expressed by these
writers have made traditional aestheticians more accountable
for their viewpoints, the traditional humanities approach
has remained firm. Works of art created by humans are more
worthy than objects not created by humans. This of course,
is a direct extension of the humanities attitude and
embraces two points: (1) The proper study for humans is that
which is human, and (2) human values cannot be intentionally
built into natural objects. It has always been a primary
tenet of the humanities that the focus of attention is on
things human. Visual products or events created by humans
are therefore more important as humanities subjects than are
naturally created visual experiences. The logic of this is
evident. Since both the humanities and aesthetics are a

study of human values, a humanities approach to aesthetics in art must elevate those objects which contain the highest concentration of human values.

It has been stated that the three primary criteria for value in visual experience in DBAE are intellectual, cultural, and formal values. It is obvious that unless an object or experience is created by a human it is not likely to possess a high concentration of intellectual and cultural value. Proponents of non-humanly created visual experiences have attempted to display the formal properties evident in the natural environment, but, as it has been cleverly argued, the natural environment or natural objects only possess formal qualities when an arbitrary frame is imposed on them by a human viewer who is then responsible for the resulting image. In such a case, it is the humanly framed view which has the qualities, not the object itself (Carlson, 1979). As some writers have shown, natural environments and objects cannot possess intellectual, cultural, and formal qualities, but must be valued and appreciated according to a different set of criteria (Carlson, 1979).

Monroe Beardsley, a champion in the cause of aligning the humanities with aesthetics says that "there are certain kinds of things we can know about works of art that are not

there to be known in the case of rocks and stones and trees"
(Beardsley, 1971, p. 74). Without intellectual, cultural, or
formal values, a visual experience cannot be attributed a
high degree of aesthetic worth in the humanities approach.
It is therefore to the humanly created object that
humanities-oriented art educators turn.

Since the early 1970's, these educators have been careful to
indicate that although the full range of visual experience
can be appreciated aesthetically, it is the humanly created
work of art that is the proper object of study. Nature can
be regarded aesthetically but "it is in the fine arts that
we usually find the greatest concentration of aesthetic
values" (Smith, 1973b, p. 17). The humanities tradition does
admit that natural events can occasion aesthetic
appreciation and hence, have some aesthetic value, but they
have historically refused to yield their belief that humanly
created art works are the proper and highest repository of
aesthetic value.

As early as 1968, theorists were discovering the need to
have to account for definitions and distinctions that
ultimately gave support for this viewpoint. Ralph Smith
(1968) presented a humanities distinction when he divided
the visual world into two classes, aesthetic objects and

works of art. Aesthetic objects consisted of any object, natural or man-made, which were perceptually interesting. Works of art, on the other hand, were "artifacts" specially designed to serve only as aesthetic objects.

> As is often the case in distinguishing the entities of human experience the difference between an aesthetic object and a work of art may not always be obvious, cannot be measured, and while there are clear-cut there are also border-line cases. Let it suffice to say that if a seashell, for example, is interesting to perception, then it is an aesthetic object. *Hamlet, The Rites of Spring,* and *Guernica,* however, are aesthetic objects which are also works of art since they have a far greater capacity to reward perception. Another way of putting the distinction is to say that a (good) work of art is a specially designed high-grade aesthetic object (Smith, 1968, p. 16).

The assumption that works of art had a special significance not possessed by aesthetic objects was a vigorous point of debate in the 1960's (Arnstine, 1966), but essentially, the humanists justified their elevation of the work of art on the grounds that it was an intentional gathering of the human intellectual, cultural, and formal values. Traditional

aestheticians developed the idea of a continuum whereon
visual experiences could be located and hence evaluated.

In asserting that works of art have the capacity to
induce better, richer, more sustained aesthetic
experience than anything else, it is not being
denied that aesthetic experience of some duration
and magnitude can be occasioned by other objects,
actions and events. Thus to gain a clearer
conception of the nature of aesthetic experience, a
continuum may be imagined with the perception of the
simple and fleeting qualities of things at one end
and at the other the perception of works of art
involving prolonged and intense concentration
(Smith, 1981b, p. 12).

The aesthetic value ranges from zero to "utter absorption"
such as is likely to occur only in the presence of great
works of art (Beardsley, 1973, p. 49). "The degree of value
depends on the human factor and the determined intention of
the artist who purposely decides to transform the object
into an art work" (Beardsley, 1973).

The greatest proponents of this particular viewpoint are
members of the humanities tradition: Monroe Beardsley, Harry
Broudy, Elliot Eisner, Edmund Feldman, and Ralph Smith, who

are also prominent members of the Getty Institute faculty.
The kind of viewpoint they advocate received official
sanction in the 1977 NAEA Commission Report.

> Although such experiences can be secured in some
>
> degree in virtually every form of intercourse humans
>
> have with the world, it is intercourse with those
>
> forms, events, objects, and ideas typically regarded
>
> as art that has the capacity to provide such
>
> experience in its deepest, most moving form (p. 36).

The traditional humanities approach then, from which DBAE
has drawn its viewpoint concerning the object of aesthetic
attention, recognizes that the greatest value is resident in
the art work which is defined as humanly created to
intentionally elicit an aesthetic response.

Although this primary distinction is helpful in clarifying
the class of objects (works of art) worthy of consideration,
it does not help in determining how to assign various
degrees of worth to that class (or those objects). The
process of assigning degrees of worth to art works is called
evaluation. "An evaluation is a judgment about the presence
or the quantity of value of any sort in an object (Pepper,
1958, p.272). It is an "intellectual weighing and measuring
of particular things brought under a common descriptive

class and by means of a common standard" (Osborne, 1971, p. 23). Evaluation and judgment therefore, are the means whereby good works of art are distinguished from poor ones (Machotka, 1970, p. 117). In order for judgment to occur, a set of criteria or standards must be appealed to. The humanities tradition is very secure in its belief concerning the importance of the "right" standards by which to judge the worth of an aesthetic object. The concept of evaluation or judgment and standards are irretrievably intertwined.

In Western aesthetics the importance of standards of excellence was emphasized with the division of art into fine and popular arts which took place in the 17th century. American artistic standards for excellence were derived from the European aristocratic models (Forman, 1968a), and the idea of the importance of standards of excellence in art and art education began to be emphasized.

In the 1960s humanities-oriented art educators began advocating disciplined capacities for making aesthetic value judgments (Smith 1966, 1968). This came about in response to a perceived movement away from traditionally conceived standards in art education. What was occurring at this time was that a viewpoint opposed to the traditional one was calling into question the idea of objective standards and

their validity in the field of art education. Essentially,
the debate was between the fixed objective standard, and the
concept of personal preference.

For much of its history, the field of aesthetics has been
troubled by the problem resulting from the apparent division
between objectivity in aesthetic judgment and personal
preference or taste (Osborne, 1971). Traditional
humanities-oriented art educators have accepted Kant's
assertion concerning the objectivity of aesthetic judgments.
In the field of art education

> a tacit assumption that aesthetic judgments are
> objectively right or wrong underlies and bolsters
> all the social apparatus of art education,
> amelioration of public taste, selection of objects
> for public purchase and display in museums and
> galleries, and is the justification for criticism as
> it is practised (Osborne, 1971, p. 13).

Before *standards* can either be justified or appealed to, an
accounting has to be made between objectivity and
subjectivity in evaluation. The subjective position states
that judgments are expressions of taste or preference
(Geahigan, 1975). Preferences are likes, values, or
attitudes which are attributed to a work (Sharer, 1980).

They involve subjective likings and dislikings which are usually beyond the agent's control. No practise or particular training is considered necessary if one is simply going to express one's subjective preferences or likings. "The uninitiated in this respect can function as well as the expert" (Geahigan, 1975, p. 32). Taste is relative and relies on a wide variety of diverse and subjective standards (Mann, 1979).

The opposing position, held by humanities-oriented aestheticians, affirms the objectivity of standards in evaluation. The determination of value is "essentially the matching of the aesthetic object to predetermined criteria or standards" (Geahigan, 1975, p. 31). There are objective techniques for determining the worth and value of art objects.

> Some works of art are undoubtedly superior to
> others. In spite of all social and cultural
> differences, these works endure and achieve the
> status of exemplars and function as standards
> against which other works are judged (Mann, 1979).

With the movement towards discipline-centered orientations in art education in the 1960s (Efland, 1971), much more emphasis was placed on objective standards and the denial of

personal preference or relative standards as a means of
identifying value in art. Ralph Smith (1968) says that there
was confusion because society was not providing the young
with fixed and stable standards for judgment. The result of
this confusion was a move by the youth towards the principle
of personal preference and taste (Smith, 1968).

Throughout the 1970's and the 1980's the humanists have
maintained a belief in the existence of objective standards
and have been reluctant to admit the principle of relativity
or taste as a method of identifying value in the work of
art. Again, Beardsley (1970) states the humanities viewpoint
regarding standards.

> One is the way of the love of beauty which is
> limited in its range of enjoyment, but is reformist
> by implication, since it seeks a world that conforms
> to its ideal. The other is the way of aestheticizing
> everything - of taking the aesthetic point of view
> wherever possible - and this widens enjoyment, but
> it is defeatist, since instead of eliminating the
> junkyard and the slum it tries to see them as
> expressive and symbolic (Beardsley, 1970, p. 234).

Subjective criteria seem to be rejected by most humanists
since this form of criteria needs no education. The

humanities-oriented art educator generally believes there
are objective standards by which to measure the aesthetic
value of any work of art. But before the criteria of those
standards can be determined, it is necessary to examine the
tradition which embodies them.

FINE ART TRADITION

Before discussing the exact criteria which determine a good
work of art from a bad work of art, it is useful to explain
the context within which the standards are found. The work
of art which is considered superior in the traditional
humanities is that which has been admitted into the ranks of
the fine art tradition. Acquaintance with this tradition
will provide a solid reference point when discussing the
particulars which comprise it.

The term *fine arts* refers to a finite traditional body of
art works which are considered *superior* or more worthy of
study than other works of art (Mann, 1979) in that they are
capable of yielding the largest amounts of higher order
aesthetic value (Smith, 1973b, 1984b, 1981b). This body of
work, of "indisputable aesthetic merit" has gained its
status through "certification of professional experts who
select them from the body of works comprising our aesthetic
heritage" (Geahigan, 1985). "They have repeatedly been

judged to possess a greater degree of aesthetic quality than other artworks and objects - in other words, their artistic merit has been certified" (Smith, 1981a). This body of work has been historically validated as superior and its corpus can be identified through the use of any standard history of western art.

> The most viable way of locating the concept of fine art is to look at things recognized as such by authorities. In other words, it is what you see in art museums or art galleries or what you read about and see pictured in art books, magazines, and monographs (Hobbs, 1984).

These works are constantly referred to as the *best* that have been achieved by human beings (Parrott, 1986), and are said to be valuable because they convey dramatic images about the import of human life, maintain the aesthetic tradition, reveal exemplars for human behavior, and preserve the values of the past. In order to understand the present, says the humanist, we must know the past. The fine art tradition carries these values admirably (Smith, 1970).

This body of work combines artistic value with human significance.

The works we choose should certainly include images
of how persons in other times and places perceived
the human condition, but above all they should
exemplify aesthetic excellence and challenge the
mind as well as stretch the imagination sufficiently
to aid a student's progress toward self-knowledge
(Smith, 1985, p. 171).

This latter point is crucial. This body of work educates,
and as such, needs education for its understanding. For the
full appreciation and understanding of fine art, a certain
knowledge, sensitivity, and formal schooling are needed
(Smith, 1981a).

This body of art work, called fine art, is said to be the
"best that has been thought and said on all the matters that
concern us and the best that has been created" (Smith,
1981a). These so-called classics "continue to move, delight,
and instruct generation after generation" (Smith, 1985, p.
172). Because these works remain secure in their
reputations, they can be used with confidence in art
education programs. In fact, according to the humanities
tradition, "the proper goal of aesthetic education is to get
students into a study of these 'great' masterpieces" (Kelly,
1983).

The idea of the fine arts cannot exist without the distinction of things which are *not* fine arts. The concept of the fine arts emerged in the late 17th century (Evans, 1973). That from which the fine arts were separated were those arts which were merely useful, utilitarian, or decorative (Aiken, 1968). With the birth of this distinction arose advocates for the validity of each of the separated points of view.

With the advent of the 20th century, came a great interest in the fine art masterpiece as a school subject. The name given to this subject was *picture study* (Jones, 1974). The picture study movement lasted from the late 1890's to the 1920's and generally sought to develop appreciation of the masterpieces of fine art amongst students (Stankiewicz, 1984). But even then there were advocates for both kinds of art. There were those within the picture study movement who advocated *great art* such as Godkin (1870), and Poore (1903), while others like Parton (1869) argued that popular art should be used.

Suprisingly enough, the issue of popular and fine arts was subdued throughout the decades following the 1920's even though the emphasis on the creative aspect of art forbade teachers to "show children works of art by adult masters for

fear that their creativity would be jeopardized" (Efland, 1971, p. 18).

During the mid 1950's however, because of the rise of modern media, the issue gained new prominence as the *battle of the brows*. There was a fear amongst humanities advocates that "lowbrow tastes catered to by mass-media would overthrow the tradition of high culture" (Cawelti, 1976). Except for the injunction of the progressivists, the idea of the fine arts in the curriculum remained relatively unchallenged, but during the 1960's, a provocative position was prescribed by Vincent Lanier recommending that the popular arts be accepted as part of the curriculum in art education (Rosenblum, 1981). This challenge, of course, forced humanities-oriented art educators to defend the use of fine art as the sole exemplars in education.

Macdonald (1963) argued from the point of view of Gresham's Law of cultural pollution, according to which, inferior popular art would eliminate fine art and leave only visual trash and kitsch in its place (Rosenblum, 1981). Ianni (1968) stated that the popular arts lack proper understanding of the fundamental culture that produced them. Art must somehow re-create the concept of life. Only the fine arts have the capability of doing this (Rosenblum,

1981). Smith (1968) vigorously supported the concept of fine art, stating that stable and defensible models were needed which could be emulated and also serve as standards against which behavior could be unambiguously judged. He attacked the popular art movement.

> The forms of human behavior presented in the movies
> and on television are gross distortions, usually
> over-simplifications, of actuality, and thus may be
> injurious to growth. Serious art, on the other hand,
> is said to portray things more as they are, or to
> present convincing and sometimes radical
> possibilities (Smith, 1968, p. 15).

Smith was to remain one of the most articulate advocates for the fine art tradition and he initiated many attacks against the incursion of popular art into the field of art education. His phrase *a right to the best* would be challenged by many populists (Hobbs, 1985) and would result in a series of debates on fine and popular arts (Geahigan, 1985; Hobbs, 1985; Smith, 1985).

The idea that popular art could not meet the complex challenge posed by fine art was a continuing one. It was argued by humanities-oriented aestheticians that "the picture of life one encounters in popular films and dramas

is in many cases idealized, intensified, and distorted so as
to appeal to the prejudices and psychological needs of
audiences" (Kelly, 1983). It was believed necessary to
maintain the distinctions and hierarchies within art.

> To distinguish the cheap from the fine, the
> sophisticated from the commonplace, the vulgar from
> the excellent ... Such distinctions are crucial for
> the preservation of excellence in taste and
> aesthetic judgment, and any criticism which flattens
> their dialectic or abolishes their oppositional
> character is an exercise in philistinism and
> vulgarity (Levi, 1974, p. 22).

The idea of lowbrow culture and popular art was said to
include such items as comic books, mud-slinging,
pie-throwing comedies, zany movie antics, Keystone Cops,
penny arcades, boardwalk shows and entertainment,
sensational stunts, burlesque and girlie shows, beer-hall
and basement-tavern entertainment, hillbilly music,
hootenany melodies, the pulps, rock and roll, and television
teenage dances (Winthrop, 1974).

In 1975, Abraham Kaplan wrote an essay on the aesthetics of
popular culture in which he argued against the validity of
popular art as an art form. He claimed that popular art was

the result of the public's inability to understand fine art
(Rosenblum, 1981). Popular art was thought to be an immature
form of fine art created for those unable to understand the
sophistication of great art and who wanted the same values
in an undeveloped and less sophisticated form (Cawelti,
1976).

Humanities-oriented aestheticians at this time were not only
defending the principles of fine art against those of
popular art, but also attempting to discourage the incursion
of avant garde and modern art. Popular and avant garde art
was thought to represent "chaos and absurdity of the worst
kind. "Whim and fashion form no legitimate substitute for
rational aesthetic judgment" (Levi, 1974).

> Whoever views the portraits of Franz Hals or the
> landscapes of Hobbema or Van Goyen at once feels
> himself in the presence of a *friendly* art,
> expressive of the cheerfulness and good humor,
> indeed, the essential hospitality of man and nature.
> But whoever concerns himself with the landscapes or
> portraits of Maurice de Vlaminck or Chaim Soutine
> senses a repressed resentment translated into the
> angry images of natural and human hostility and
> aggression. It is the elementary distinction between
> an art of affirmation, acceptance and high culture

and one of opposition, protest and counterculture
(Levi, 1974).

All this occurred in support of a body of art works which
apparently embodied the values advocated by
humanities-oriented aestheticians.

In 1977 two major reports gave sanction to the legitimacy of
the fine art tradition within art education. The NAEA
Commission Report (1977) stated that the greatest aesthetic
experience is brought about by involvement with fine art.
Fine art was worthy of educational support because its codes
were sophisticated and complex. "Unlike the messages of the
mass media whose codes are easily decipherable - "All in The
Family," "Maude," or *Jaws*, after all require no special
tuition - the messages of works of art are not as easily
read" (NAEA, 1977, p. 36). The report stressed a rigid
classification of the fine arts on one hand, and the
vernacular arts which consist of folk, popular, and mass
arts. Also highly stressed was the fact that the
understanding of fine art is contingent upon education.

This theme was duplicated in the report *Coming To Our Senses*
(1977), where a belief in the value of the fine arts was
firmly stated. The report equated aesthetic value with the
arts found in museums and galleries, where the superior

works were those inherited from the 18th and 19th century European aristocracy (Johnson & Ciganko, 1978). The debate concerning the validity of fine art over popular art continued during the late 1970's. A sense of the bitterness of this argument can be felt in Conant's (1977) review of Jack Hobbs book, *Art in Context*, where he criticized its use of popular art. Conant exclaims,

> I am a royalist, an elitist, an artist, one who refuses to cheapen art's magnificent and supreme excellence by comparing it to ... comic strips and other essentially vulgar commodities ... How dare you dignify John Wayne and Milton Caniff by even mentioning their incredibly mundane works in a chapter devoted to the hero theme in Greek and Renaissance art (Conant, 1977, p. 352).

The leaders in the field, Broudy, Feldman, Eisner, and Smith, all emphasized the use of the fine art tradition for exemplars in the classroom and claimed that the experiences provided by the popular arts were trivial (Broudy, 1970; Feldman, 1978).

By 1984, this issue was revived and called "heated and divisive" by Hobbs (1984). "It has to do with the choice of art exemplars to use in the classroom, specifically, whether

they should be restricted to recognized works of fine art or allowed to include popular, folk, and vernacular art" (p. 11). He says that the issue has been mostly latent until now because the practises of art education have not forced the issue. "If classrooms around the country, however, should adopt programs in aesthetic education, teachers would have to consider the obvious question: what kind of art shall we use?" (p. 11).

This is exactly the question of importance in the Getty DBAE program when it is stated that "the most critical decision in the implementation of a discipline-based program is the selection of the works of art we will use" (Getty Center, 1987a, p. 75). The designers of the program however, seem to answer the question by showing that the art that should be used is that of the fine art tradition. It is this art that "transforms our expectations and standards, and enables us to take the first steps toward connoisseurship" (Broudy, 1978). It is now necessary to examine the antecedents of the specific criteria by which a work of art in the fine art tradition can be identified.

THE CODE

The humanities tradition believes that the work of art embodies a meaning that the viewer must try to understand. This viewpoint is identical to the one used in the DBAE program. The content of a work of art has been referred to as the *code*, an aggregate of visual symbols which possess features capable of providing knowledge which (1) exercises certain skills, i.e., demands a specialized literacy for its decipherment and (2) validates certain cherished values. Conceptualizing art in this way brings it into alignment with a humanities approach.

Since the humanities are an academic enterprise, traditionally *affective* activities such as the arts need to be able to redefine themselves in academic terms. One of the most fundamental ways to give visual art this kind of respectability is to remove it from the studio or manual function and to stress its academic nature. This has most effectively been done by claiming its status as a language. When art is said to be a language, it means that its symbolism has to be encoded and decoded. This means that its meaning and its understanding is achieved through intellectual and scholarly functions. Although there are early references to art as a language, its real advocacy came as a response to the counter culture position of the

early 1970's. If art could be considered a language, with the concomitant accessories of syntax, decipherment, and forms of literacy, then the apparent lawlessness of the new adversary movements in art education might be countered and overcome.

Although earlier writers mention art as a language, it was Eisner who first began to specifically elaborate the concept. In an article (1971), he sketches out a theory which was to receive much articulation in later years. The artist, says Eisner, transforms ideas, images, and feelings and encodes them in symbols. A work of art is a repository of these symbols. In order to understand the language represented by art, one must have the ability to read or decode the symbols. This process of encoding visual symbols, Eisner believes, has parallels to other language forms. According to this theory then, a work of art contains a code which consists of visual symbols which need a special form of literacy in order to be deciphered.

This concept was further elaborated by Martin Feldman (1976), who restated Eisner's idea that art is a language and that knowledge (literacy) is needed in order to understand visual codes. It is employed much as verbal language was before there were dictionaries with rules of

orthography and grammar (Feldman, 1976). Feldman admits that reading images correctly provides sensuous, cognitive, and formal knowledge (p. 198). Due to the influence of this conceptualization of the art process, the term *literacy* began to be used frequently in the mid 1970's (Broudy, 1976; Holden, 1978).

In 1978, the back-to-basics movement invaded American education (Feldman, 1978; Holden, 1978) and with it, a need for art educators to try and provide some sort of rationale for the necessity of art education. Humanities-oriented art educators responded by trying to ally art education with the humanities, and the best way to do this, it was felt, was to stress the language capacity of art within general education.

> General educational needs are addressed by what we
> call the humanities. Art education has to
> reconstitute itself as one of the humanities ... It
> is not enough for art educators to knock at the door
> of the humanities and ask for admission. We have to
> demonstrate genuinely humanistic concerns and
> competencies. I believe we can do this when we claim
> - and it is certainly a truthful claim - that art
> is, among other things, a very important language.
> Today the idea of studying art as a language is

receiving increased support from those concerned

with the revival of general education (Feldman,

1978, p. 11).

The connection between the arts and literacy received

official support in the 1977 NAEA Commission report, which

stated that "works of art are complex structures whose

contributions to experience are secured only if one brings

to them some form of intelligent perception" (p. 36). The

report stressed the cognitive and intellectual function of

this conception and its relationship to fine art by saying

that works of art possess complex codes which, in the best

examples, are more difficult to decipher than in poor

examples (NAEA, 1977). This understanding of complex codes

requires a form of tuition and education which is academic

and scholarly. This academic interpretation of art was

contrasted to the creative or productive approach. Feldman

(1978) says "if art education is presently experiencing

difficulties, it may be due to our over-emphasis on the

values of self-expression and our relative indifference to

art as a visual-symbolic system that can be studied like any

other language (1978, p. 11).

The early 1980's saw the term aesthetic literacy in wide

currency (Lanier, 1980), along with the idea that the visual

arts were a language involving a decoding process for the retrieval of meaning (Douglas, Schwartz, & Taylor, 1981; Feinstein, 1982, 1983).

It can be seen that the idea of art as a language with its accompanying concepts of code and literacy were given encouragement because of historical concerns to root art education in a discipline-based approach and to ally itself with the humanities movement. For the purposes of determining aesthetic value, however, it is important to realize what this means.

If the art work is a code consisting of symbols which demand literacy to read them, the criteria for worth will be based on the nature of the code. The superior code must possess intellectual, cultural, and formal values which reside in the fine art tradition. Although the origin and development of ideas concerning these values in aesthetic judgment have a diverse history, they are brought together in the humanities tradition and united in Getty's DBAE program.

INTELLECTUAL VALUES

The humanities are first and foremost an intellectual activity. The basis of their activity is located in academic scholarship and in the kinds of cognitive skills needed for

its precise execution. In order for traditionally conceived *affective* activities, such as art, to fully participate in academic areas, it is necessary for them to be able to justify their existence as cognitive or intellectual enterprises. In a sense, the provision of a cognitive perspective allows entry into the humanities and in doing so also provides a more acceptable rationale for its acceptance as a school subject.

It has been determined that the humanities approach conceptualizes art as a language with its meaning symbolized in a code. This code communicates *knowledge* to the viewer. The quality of this knowledge is influential in determining the object's aesthetic worth (Smith, 1968). In order to acquire meaning from symbolic codes, certain literacies corresponding to the type of symbolism used in the work are necessary. The manipulation of the form of literacy is an act of intellect (Eisner, 1971).

> Cognition ... is a generic term encompassing the
> range of means by which human beings understand and
> relate to the world ... The generic nature of
> cognition may be conceived as a cognitive umbrella
> that subsumes various modes of knowing - conceptual,
> perceptual, affective, metaphoric, intuitive, and
> kinesthetic (Hamblen, 1983, p. 177).

Art educators have been vague when talking about cognition. A more detailed explanation that tries to indicate precisely what cognition in art means was provided by Wheeler (1970) when he used Bloom's Taxonomy (1956) to explain the cognitive role of art. According to this view, the cognitive domain is divided into two areas: knowledge, and abilities and skills. Knowledge or information is concerned with bodies of remembered phenomena, whereas intellectual skills and abilities deal with comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. This taxonomy of cognitive abilities shows that the act of creating and responding to art can be thought of as a cognitive act. This view of cognition has been called intellectual and is identified for use in art education (Wheeler, 1970; Winthrop, 1972).

The use of intellectual values for the identification of superiority in art work is an immediate consequence of art's alliance with the humanities and can best be seen as a development of a rationale for the understanding of art as a cognitive activity. Within the field of art, there has been an accepted body of belief which conceptualizes a dichotomy between intellect and feelings, cognition and affect. Art has traditionally been conceived of as an affective area and so beyond or outside of the area of intellect or cognition.

One of the most ardent critics of this view has been Elliot
Eisner who has repeatedly emphasized that there is no
separation between thought and feeling.

> The faulty distinction between the cognitive and the
> affective has caused much mischief in both education
> and psychology. The idea that so-called affective
> subjects are noncognitive reflects the same bias
> held by those who believe that the arts are
> nonintellectual (Eisner, 1982, p. 74).

This assumed division has resulted in an educational world
view which intellectual and abstract knowledge are given the
highest priority (Hamblen, 1983, p. 178). The history of the
concept of cognition in art education seems to be that of
attempting to bring this dichotomy together.

In addition to providing a legitimate status for art
education, a cognitive stance embraces an expanded sense of
aesthetics, for when aesthetic value is admitted as a
consequence of cognitive activity, i.e., knowledge *about* the
arts, understandings cannot be merely restricted to formal
concerns (Efland, 1971).

During the early 1950's and through the early 1960's, art
education was committed to the development of human

creativity. This commitment did not apprehend nor utilize

the value of conceptualizing art in its cognitive aspect.

Since the 1960's, the validity of the creative and

productive aspect of art has been questioned and some art

educators, influenced by the discipline-oriented approach,

began to emphasize the benefits of conceiving art as

cognition (Eisner, 1976). In 1965, Irvin Child stated that

> good esthetic judgment is in large measure an
>
> outcome of a general cognitive approach to the
>
> world, an approach involving search for complex and
>
> novel experience which is then understood and
>
> evaluated through relatively autonomous interactions
>
> of the individual with objects providing such
>
> experience (Child, 1965, p. 510).

Child conducted research projects which showed that certain

refined cognitive abilities such as independence of judgment

and tolerance of complexity meant that research subjects

scored high in aesthetic sensitivity. His work revealed the

correlation between aesthetic judgment and cognitive ability

(Anderson, 1971; Child, 1965).

Barkan's work in the 1960s carried over into the development

of the CEMREL Aesthetic Education Program. Here, the primary

way aesthetic experiences are realized is through the

cognitive activities: analysis, appraisal, apprehension, argumentation, characterization, discovery, and evaluation (Efland, 1971), a list which seems similar to Bloom's Taxonomy. In the CEMREL program, "one finds that the preponderant activity pertains to a cognitive understanding of aesthetic phenomena as distinct from a focus on the feelings" (Efland, 1971).

Elliot Eisner has been a champion of the cognitive aspects of art. He states (1971) that artistic expression is a consequence of intelligence. "Expression requires the transformation of idea, image or feeling into a material that will give it public form" (p. 5). Intelligence is a major force in achieving expression. Eisner was one of the first art educators to utilize the brain research which was occurring in the mid 1970's. The basis of this research was that the human brain consisted of two hemispheres. The right one made contributions to spatial analogical, holistic and synthetic thought while the left one was concerned with logical, linear, temporal, and sequential thought (Eisner, 1976). Although the discovery of the two hemispheres was made early in the 1950's, it began to be utilized by art educators in the 1970's as a rationale for justifying the place of art in education. This new model of mind allowed art to be thought of as an intellectual activity and

justified art's place in the curriculum as a way of
balancing the whole brain's activities (Eisner, 1976;
Foster, 1977; Gainer & Gainer, 1977).

The Rockefeller report, *Coming to our Senses* (1977), stated
that the arts are to be conceived as essentially cognitive,
but it does not elaborate much on the concept. The report is
criticized by Smith (1978a) as being typical of the current
rage for basics and as exploiting this movement by trying to
construe art as cognitive (Smith, 1978a).

The NAEA Commission Report (1977) however, is much more
detailed. It states that "works of art are typically complex
structures whose contributions to experience are secured
only if one brings to them some form of intelligent
perception" (NAEA, 1977, p. 36). Some forms have greater
complexity and are valuable in so far as they act on or
reorganize our intellectual abilities (p. 37) The concept of
the intellectual value in identifying superiority in a work
can be directly linked to this idea. The degree to which a
code's complexity allows the viewer to exercise certain
intellectual skills, is the degree to which superiority can
be claimed.

Various art educators through the late 1970's and early

1980's continued to push for the acceptance of a cognitive view of art (Acuff, 1978; Douglas, Schwartz, & Taylor, 1981; Rush, 1979; Stroh, 1974). Feinstein (1982) reiterates the idea that the ability to decipher aesthetic values is a cognitive activity that requires both knowledge and skills. The idea of knowledge and skills as the basis of cognition is discussed in the so-called Green Book, *Academic Preparation for College* (APC) prepared by the College Board (1983). This study recognizes the arts as an area of academic study and states that students will need the following knowledge and skills:

1. The ability to identify and describe various visual art forms from different historical periods.

2. The ability to analyze the structures of a work of art.

3. The ability to evaluate a work of visual art.

4. To know how to express themselves in one or more of the visual art forms

This report introduces the idea of academic competencies into art education (Dorn, 1984b).

In 1983, the NAEA devoted the whole of their March 1983 issue of *Art Education* to the theme "Art and Mind" while the Report *A Nation at Risk* (1983) recommended the adoption of more rigorous academic standards, stress on subject matter content, and greater emphasis on higher order thinking. The

report states that arts curricula should emphasize cognitive learning (Zeller, 1984). Nelson Goodman (1983) stated that

> Developing sensory discrimination is as cognitive as inventing complex numerical concepts or proving theorems. Coming to understand a painting or a symphony in an unfamiliar style, to recognize the work of an artist or school, to see or hear in new ways, is as cognitive an achievement as learning to read or write (p, 34).

During the early part of the 1980's then, when Getty was beginning to formulate its DBAE program, the air was charged with ideas supporting the concept of cognition and art. Although no mention can be found concerning the precise relationship of intellectual value to visual superiority, it is stated that in the process of *understanding* art, intellectual rigor must be exercised. But intellectual skills need bodies of content upon which to act. In the elucidation of the cultural and formal values, the exact working of the intellectual skills will be seen. As stated before, the intellectual aspect, knowledge and skills underlie the other two value criteria, cultural and formal.

CULTURAL VALUES

One of the most important aspects of the arts to the humanities is its ability to embody and communicate meaning and especially the aspect of the meaning which derives from the cultural heritage (Gluck, 1984; Lanier, 1979). The cultural heritage or tradition, known in its reference to art as the aesthetic heritage, includes a so-called "myth system which unifies a culture's beliefs and gives it shape and direction" (Ihde, 1972, p. 194).

> All of us members of civilized societies are, individually and collectively, the legatees of a vast and complex cultural heritage in which a great variety of strands - scientific, technological, religious, moral, political, artistic, and so on - are interwoven. A central component of this cultural heritage is a great body of customary, approved ways of thinking and acting ... This body we commonly call "tradition." The customary ways of thought and action comprising it operate as norms or standards for these activities, which, having been received, followed, preserved, and altered in varying degrees by each generation, are passed on more or less successfully to succeeding ones (Will, 1983, p. 91-92).

This body of thought then, is considered as having begun at
the beginning of our civilization and to have been passed
down and added to from generation to generation.

In the context of this study, this body of thought has some
particular and specific characteristics. It is based on the
so-called western tradition which promotes art and ideas
primarily from the Greco-Roman and western European cultures
(McIntosh, 1978; Serafine, 1979). The humanities definition
of this tradition characterizes it as the kind of liberal
humanism found in "the tradition of Erasmus and Montaigne,
of Lessing and John Locke, of Jefferson and John Stuart Mill
- as this arose in the late Renaissance and reached its
apogee in the mid-nineteenth century" (Levi, 1973, p. 28).
The superior code then, should derive its symbolism from
this tradition and express the cultural values which give
the tradition meaning.

Although humanities-oriented art educators extoll the
virtues of the cultural tradition, they are negligent in
firmly isolating the cultural values considered important in
the assessment of worth. The primary values honored are
those of order and rationality.

Human seriousness and value are inseparably wedded
to order; that the object of a proper society is to

instruct its members how to transform instinctive
needs into aesthetic experiences; and that the
commandment of decorum and a code of manners is not
an empty gesture but the instrument for instilling
something better than the stupidities of the merely
appetitive or acquisitive life (Levi, 1973, p. 24).

Among cultural values considered desirable are tolerance,
orderliness, rationality, meritocracy of ability and
accomplishment, excellence, sobriety, responsible creation,
discipline, order in art, responsibility, loyalty and
commitment, the claims of past and future, care, concern,
rational judgment (Bell, 1972; Levi, 1973), long-range life
goals, postponed satisfaction, hope, organized institutions,
bureaucracy, hierarchy, controlled acts, organizational
ethic, rational linear consciousness, distinctions, and
logicism (Ihde, 1972).

The Western cultural tradition implies "commitment to human
freedom, belief in the indefinite perfectibility of man, and
ideal of objective understanding, and a rational and gradual
(rather than revolutionary) approach to institutional reform
(Smith, 1985). The supporters of this tradition say that the
works "offer content that stresses the good, the noble, and
the dignified achievements of mankind" (Lansing, 1978, p.
26), the good, the noble, and the dignified, being

expressions of the aforementioned values. Visual codes which
contain a symbolism which expresses these beliefs and values
will necessarily be superior to those which do not.
Humanities-oriented aestheticians, who naturally support
this cultural tradition, believe that it is the common
American heritage containing the *best* knowledge, ideas, and
values, and that *all* Americans should come to know and
experience it (Commission on the Humanities, 1980;
Rockefeller, 1977; Smith, 1982).

The western artistic heritage then, consists of works whose
visual symbols embody and transmit certain cultural beliefs
and values. The precise nature of these expressed values are
extremely vague and open to many different interpretations
if they are not grounded in a lived-out experience called
"tradition." It is in reference to this body of past
happenings that these values can be given a more concrete
and identifiable form.

Proponents of the cultural tradition found themselves having
to defend its value in the 1970s against the so-called
counter culture, which in word and action attacked and
attempted to overthrow traditional forms of culture. The
counter or adversary culture, while rejecting Western
cultural values such as rationality and linear thinking

(Ihde, 1972), found itself sharply criticized by humanities
thinkers.

> They are made to support the new economics of
> consuming against the older ideals of responsible
> making; the faith in abundance against the facts of
> scarcity; ultra-permissiveness against discipline;
> formlessness against order in art, sexuality, and
> general life-style; pleasure against loyalty and
> commitment; an eternal present against the claims of
> past and future; and finally, drugs, Dionysian
> sidepaths, mysticism, and intuition against care,
> concern, and rational judgment (Levi, 1973, p. 20).

The traditionalists felt that society was in the process of
breaking down and that sanity could only be restored through
a rediscovery of the values in the traditional cultural
heritage (Broudy, 1981a). Barzun (1974) felt that modern
forms of art were revolutionary and consisted of a form of
social criticism that expressed anger, hostility, and
societal condemnation that had unsettling results. The
humanists believed that modern man suffered so much because
he was cut off from his cultural heritage (Burke, 1983).
They felt that an involvement with the traditional heritage
would restore order and that fine art "would counter the
growing trend toward the stereotype, the violent, the

obvious, and the vulgar" (Holden, 1978, p. 25).

The values of the past were thought to be better than those of the present, and the values communicated by works in the fine art tradition were better than contemporary ones (Smith, 1976). The humanists called for the creation of a culture whose aesthetic quality was more serious and satisfying and built on values more eternal and lasting than the ones expressed in the present. It was believed that the great works of art were starting places for the re-creation of order in society (Lanier, 1979). No compromise was possible. "There are no other refuges, no other agencies of survival, than the liberal and humanistic values that have animated Western civilization since the Renaissance" (Levi, 1973, p. 33).

The works of art which are to be assessed as valuable, must employ a code which transmits a specific cultural knowledge and values through its symbolism. The essence of this knowledge and value is found in the traditional body of beliefs passed on through the western heritage. But this cultural knowledge is not available without tuition. The heritage is coded and cultural literacy is required for its decipherment. The cultural importance of the work of art is (1) that it transmits knowledge of the past and (2)

reinforces and re-creates ideal value beliefs in the recipient.

The method whereby the first of these requirements may be met is through the study of the history of western civilization. One cannot understand much of the symbolism contained in the aesthetic heritage without understanding its historical context.

> To grasp fully the iconological meaning of a
> painting, the student may have to study social and
> religious history ... to grasp the richness and
> complexity of some works of art, he will have to
> learn the symbol systems ... involved in their
> referential dimension or in their production
> (Beardsley, 1973, p. 59).

Understanding of the cultural values in an art work may not occur unless one possesses a certain historical knowledge (Mutchler, 1976). One must understand the genesis and development of Western civilization and its expression through art as it has been recorded in the aesthetic heritage.

The humanists believe that one cannot function in a civilized and productive way without full knowledge of the

cultural values inherent in this tradition (Smith, 1970).
New painting and art forms are unintelligible without
knowledge of the tradition.

> One cannot, for example, appreciate the temper of
> modernity, including the major thrusts of a great
> deal of contemporary painting and sculpture, without
> a knowledge of the aesthetic heritage or of the
> traditions and aesthetic values that moderns are
> reacting against or trying to transcend (Smith,
> 1970).

Eisner believes we should help students understand the arts
as a primary part of human culture. He believes we should
possess an awareness of both the ways in which the culture
within which an artist works affects his production, and the
influence his works have upon the culture (Mutchler, 1976).

But the cultural values are silent to one who is illiterate.
They can be understood only if one has the correct knowledge
with which to unlock the code.

> Because visual artists are products of their
> culture, they will inevitably imbue their work with
> the values of their culture. And their work usually
> will reinforce the directives represented in a
> culture's power structures. Art history texts bear

witness to this. The values in visual forms often appear as articles of faith which both veil and support the status quo. Although Jacques Louis David lived in the 18th century, his painting, *The oath of the Horatii*, a scene from the ancient world, exemplifies articles of faith that only recently have been challenged ... In the *Potato Eaters*, Van Gogh shows us the poverty of peasants, a result of the abuse of political and economic power. Similar abuse is condemned in man of the work of Rivera, Orozco, and Siqueiro. The abuse of political and economic power resulting in the agony and destruction of war is powerfully depicted in Picasso's *Guernica*. The corruption of power resulting in the inhuman treatment of emotionally disturbed patients is vividly portrayed in Kenholtz's *The State Hospital* (Feinstein, 1982, p. 14).

A work of art then, that possesses a code whose symbolism embodies the beliefs and values resident in the Western cultural tradition and whose meaning can be deciphered only through historical knowledge of that tradition, has been the central focus of the humanities tradition since the Renaissance. Its exposition in Getty's DBAE program is simply a continuation of that tradition.

FORMAL VALUES

In order for the work of art to be considered superior, its code must embody visual symbols which communicate certain formal values through their organization and relationships. This assumes that the code will possess certain formal values and that the viewer will possess the ability to identify and evaluate them. The component parts of the formal area consist of *elements* and *principles* of design.

The elements of design, sometimes called the sensuous properties (Carlson, 1979), or the grammar (Feldman, 1981), are variously described as color, line, mass, volume (Pepper, 1949), line, shape, light and dark, color, texture (Feldman, 1981). However classified, they are the visually apparent sensory qualities in a visual image without whose presence the image would not exist. What gives that existence worth, however, is the manner in which the elements are organized and arranged. It is the relationships between the elements that provide formal excellence.

The rules describing these relationships are called principles of design or formal qualities and, like the elements, have been classified in many ways: unity, balance, rhythm and proportion (Feldman, 1981), unity complexity, and intensity (Beardsley, 1968), unity, balance, harmony

(Carlson, 1979). The labels for these elements and principles tend to vary according to the user, but what they refer to is fairly consistent. "It does not matter greatly if one authority uses "form" another "contour," and a third "shape." What is important is that the viewer understand the properties of art which the words designate" (Feldman, 1981).

Writers in philosophical aesthetics have identified and classified the aesthetic qualities of objects in various ways. Two groupings of qualities about which there is some agreement, however, are sensory or sensuous qualities and formal or design qualities. The former are qualities of textures, colors, and lines of objects ... Sensory qualities are worth noting here in that their specification aids in the clarification of formal qualities. This is so in part because textures, lines, and colors combine in relations to create the shapes, patterns, and designs which constitute the perceived form of an object. It is the qualities of such forms, such as their being unified or chaotic, balanced or unbalanced, harmonious or confused, which I will call formal qualities. It follows that formal qualities are qualities which objects or combinations of objects have in virtue of that which

constitutes their form. This includes not only their

shapes, patterns, and designs, but also their

textures, lines and colors (Carlson, 1979, p. 99).

The ability to decipher the formal aspects of a work of art

requires the ability to identify and evaluate the basic

concepts used in the visual organization of materials

(Feinstein, 1982). Although one must recognize the elements,

it is the nature of the principles of organization which

determine superiority.

The point of view which holds that the evaluation of worth

based on the presence and correct use of formal properties

is paramount, is called formalism.

> Formalism holds that such appreciation is to be
>
> directed toward those aspects - textures, lines,
>
> colors, and resultant shapes, patterns, and designs
>
> - which constitute the form of the object. In regard
>
> to the aesthetic value, formalism holds that the
>
> formal qualities of an object, which it has in
>
> virtue of these aspects, are the only qualities
>
> relevant to the aesthetic value of that object. An
>
> object is aesthetically good in virtue of having
>
> formal qualities such as unity and balance - or more
>
> sophisticated variations such as "organic unity" or

"variety in unity" - and aesthetically bad in virtue
of having formal qualities such as disharmony or
lack of integration (Carlson, 1979, p. 100).

One of the great advocates of formalism for art education
has been Feldman (1970, 1981). He indicates the way the
formalist determines value and excellence in works of art.
Formalism, says Feldman, "locates excellence in formal
organization - in the relationships among the visual
elements of the work, independent of labels, associations,
or conventional meanings these elements may have in life
(1981, p. 462). Successful relationships come about through
conscious planning by the artist. Although the formalist may
find some value in other non-formal aspects of an image, "he
is willing to judge a work excellent only insofar as its
form, its underlying organization, is responsible for his
perception of meaning or sensuous quality (p. 462).

The formalist has a theory of communication which underlies
his idea of excellence. This theory is Platonic in that he
believes "there is an ideal or perfect embodiment of all
things, and that art, when it is successful, reveals,
represents, or *communicates* that ideal (Feldman, 1981, p.
464). Formalism then, attributes value in accordance with
the relationships among the visual elements of the work -

unity, balance, rhythm, proportion, and others.

The most interesting aspect of formalism for our study is the shift in its importance as the sole means of determining excellence. At one time, it was believed that excellence was determined on formalist and intrinsic grounds only. But, as we have seen, there has been a growing tendency to enlarge this concept so that now in DBAE, the formal assessment is only one of several ways of assessing worth. It must be that the superior work in DBAE is that one which possesses a high degree of intellectual, cultural, and formal knowledge.

Formalism has occupied an interesting place in the history of art and has had to meet and face interesting challenges. From its beginning, the notion of the fine arts was linked to traditional conceptions of beauty, such as "harmony and symmetry, order and decorum, which are the principles of organization" (Aiken, 1968). "Formalism as a theory of art and art criticism was promoted early in this century by Clive Bell, Roger Fry and other critics" (Carlson, 1979, p. 102). It was Roger Fry's introduction of the formalist vocabulary that helped artists, critics, and the general public first begin to understand and then appreciate modern art (Blocker, 1975). The concept was originally subjected to great criticism by aestheticians and critics but survived to

exert an influence on the development of abstract forms of art. Formalism influenced both critics and the public and in time was accepted as a valid way of responding to art (Carlson, 1979).

In discussions of evaluation determined by principles of formal organization, various writers give different emphases to different formal properties. Beardsley (1968), states that the three primary criteria of formal judgment are unity, complexity, and intensity of regional quality. Aesthetic value depends on the degree of aesthetic experience elicited by these principles. Smith (1984a) summarizes Beardsley:

> Aesthetic capacity resides in a work's elements, relations, qualities and meanings ... and in the peculiar unity, complexity, and intensity that manifolds of such components project. In general, the greater the unity, complexity, and intensity of the work, the greater the unity, complexity, and intensity of aesthetic experience (p. 142).

Beardsley believes that of all the principles, unity is the most important. A work of art possesses unity if all the elements "hang together." It is based on a gestalt perception, or the ability of the viewer to take in the

regional qualities and dominant pattern of the whole image. Unity is objectively determined and can be checked by analyzing the parts of the work and their relationships with one another (Beardsley, 1968). Unity is an intrinsic concern and involves the work of art itself.

> In explaining why excessive detail and
> over-decoration are objectionable, the critic
> appeals to other features of the work itself which
> these features either increase or diminish. But what
> makes unity desirable is not what it does to other
> features of the work; thus as far as the work itself
> is concerned, unity is a basic criterion. The fine
> arts critic could reasonably say that a particular
> group of shapes and colors in a painting is good
> because it creates a very subtle balance, and he
> could also say that balance is good because it is
> one way of unifying the painting; but he could not
> say that unity in a painting is a good thing because
> it makes the painting contain these particular
> shapes and colors (Beardsley, 1968, p. 58).

Feldman (1981) agrees with Beardsley when he says that "perhaps unity is the only principle of visual organization and the others merely different ways of achieving it" (p. 252).

Beardsley's ideas have had an enormous impact on formalist art educators. Edmund Feldman and Harry Broudy constantly reveal their debt to his ideas. But Beardsley's ideas have permeated art education primarily through the writings of Ralph Smith. Art educators and traditional aestheticians were compelled to promote and defend formalist principles during the 1970's when they felt they were being most challenged (Levi, 1974). There was a belief among humanities-oriented art educators at this time that adversary or counter culture art attempted to destroy reason, congruence, integrity, and continuity. Formalists, like Smith, promoted a humanities return to the cultural heritage as a place wherein one could find the best exemplification of formal values and principles (Levi, 1974).

In advocating the formalist approach for education, there must be not only a provision for the categories, principles, and criteria which govern excellence, but also a structural sequence whereby one can apply and identify the categories, principles and criteria in evaluation (Johansen, 1979). This has resulted in a plethora of critical models which provide the means whereby formal qualities can be identified and assessed. Again, the prototype for the critical model was developed by Beardsley (1958) who stated that "description,"

"interpretation," and "evaluation" were the most adequate
basis for developing a method of criticism (Johansen, 1979).

Feldman (1981) expands the evaluative or critical process
into four stages: description, formal analysis,
interpretation, and evaluation. What is important in this
sequence are those stages which deal with the observation
and evaluation of formal qualities. The descriptive stage
involves the process of observing and describing the surface
details, usually a description of the sensory visual
elements. The analytical stage usually involves an analysis
of the relationships and organization of the elements. The
interpretive stage determines the meaning of the former and
the evaluative assesses its success. This model is believed
to be the most effective for the formalist in that it
provides a way to observe, describe, relate, and evaluate
success in the use of the formal elements and principles.

Ralph Smith developed a model based on Feldman's (Smith,
1968; 1973c), and similar models have appeared (Johanson,
1979; Zeller, 1983). This four-stage model was refined by
Harry Broudy (1981b; 1982), renamed aesthetic scanning, and
is the device used in Getty's DBAE program to evaluate and
assess formal principles in works of art.

Although the formalist believes that his principles of assessment are objective and universal (Meyer, 1967), the entire formalist approach is rather vague. There is some degree of difficulty in establishing just what its idea of excellence is, that is, how do we know which formal relationships are pleasing or significant? (Feldman, 1981 p. 462). The formalist critics Roger Fry and Clive Bell apparently never succeeded in defining the criteria of formal excellence, but rather merely associated it with the capacity to generate disinterested, aesthetic emotion (Feldman, 1981). "How do we know that each part has been perfectly adjusted to every other part?" (Geahigan, 1975).

The difficulty in describing the way the relationships should function is solved through reference to visual exemplars. The Western fine art tradition stands as the repository of standards of excellence in the proper use of formal principles. Once again a kind of circular reasoning leads to those works which make up our so-called cultural heritage. It is here that the work which best displays the criteria necessary for the superior image can be found.

GETTYS VOICES

It has been shown that there are some specific aesthetic values being promoted in the DBAE program which appear to have their origin and development in the humanities tradition. But the similarity of the values in DBAE and those expressed in the humanities tradition can be logically deduced since those who have actively supported and promoted the humanities approach and values in the years prior to the formation of the Getty Center, are the same individuals who are pre-eminent advocates for the DBAE program today. Although this study does not address the issue concerning how these values came to be part of the Getty's mandate, it is illuminating to illustrate the close connection that exists between the humanities-oriented aesthetic tradition and the present DBAE writers.

Several art educators are acknowledged to be the primary advocates of the Getty's DBAE program. They are Harry Broudy, Elliot Eisner, and more indirectly, Ralph Smith.

Harry Broudy has been acknowledged as the grandfather of the aesthetic ideas in DBAE (DiBlasio, 1985b; Greer, 1984; Lanier, 1987; Zimmerman, 1988). He is a firm believer in the ideas and ideals of the traditional humanities approach and has written voluminously on the idea of humanities-based art

education. His writings are clear and articulate
proclamations of the value within the Western cultural
tradition and his firm belief is that the classical
exemplars which exist in the fine art tradition contain the
standards of excellence towards which all art education must
move. Broudy has been employed by the Getty Center as a
member of the Getty Institute's faculty since its beginning
and has written an entire work under the sponsorship of the
Getty (Broudy, 1987b).

Elliot Eisner has been identified as the leading
spokesperson [2] for DBAE (Brigham, 1988; Ewens, 1988). His
writings have been dominant throughout this study. His
concepts of coding, symbolism, and cognition are clear
expositions of humanities principles and he has done much to
place humanities ideas in contemporary contexts. Throughout
his academic career he has maintained a belief in and an
allegiance to the standards of excellence as embodied in the
Western fine art tradition. He has delivered important
keynote addresses at Getty Center seminars (1985; 1987a),
has written a report for the Getty Center (1987b), and has
worked on the faculty of the Getty Institute.

Ralph Smith, although acknowledged as a figure whose
aesthetic ideas have influenced DBAE theory (Greer, 1984),

has had a more indirect influence. Smith controls the highly
influential and humanities-oriented *Journal of Aesthetic
Education* which has produced two entire theme issues
sponsored by the Getty. [3] Smith has perhaps been one of the
most prolific writers in support of a humanities-based art
education (see the reference section of this study!). He
acknowledges the fact that he has been highly influenced by
the humanities theories of Monroe Beardsley, and does not
disguise the fact in his own promotion of Beardsley's ideas
(Smith, 1984a). Smith is a staunch and unabashed supporter
of the western values and standards which comprise the
Getty's DBAE. He believes that the Western fine art
tradition contains the best examples of art that humans have
achieved and that *all* Americans should be exposed to them.
He too has worked on the faculty of the Getty Institute and
has written one of the antecedent papers sponsored by the
Getty (Smith, 1987). He has been one of the greatest
articulators of the humanities values in the field of art
education.

Broudy, Eisner, and Smith have been acknowledged as the
primary formulators of the traditional humanities approach
in art education (Beyer, 1979), as well as the primary
forces behind the Getty's DBAE documents (Brigham, 1988;
DiBlasio, 1985b; Ewens, 1988; Greer, 1984; Lanier, 1987;

Zimmerman, 1988). This has been observed and criticized by some who question the catholicity and fairness of the Getty inquiry.

> Its Center for Education in the Arts, for example,
> does not represent a cross-section of the best
> thinking in arts education. Its members constitute
> an almost cloistered group of like-thinkers who go
> about what they think is reforming arts education in
> a true zealot fashion - with blinkers on (Lidstone,
> 1988, p. 140).

It may be difficult to believe that with this central core of people defining DBAE aesthetic value theory, much change can occur. Obviously there are others who work for the Getty, but again, most of those producing documents have indicated support for the humanities approach in their writings. [4]

NOTES

[1]   Bennett has contributed to the documents comprising the Getty literature. He delivered a keynote speech at a Getty Center Conference on Art Education which later became part of the documentary reality (See Bennett, 1987).

[2]   By spokesperson is meant an employee of the Getty who has been officially designated to speak on its behalf.

[3]   See *Journal of Aesthetic Education* (1985), 19(2), "Art museums and education, and *Journal of Aesthetic Education* (1987), 21(2), "Discipline-based art

education."

[4] There are art educators who have been employed by the Getty Institute (Mary Erickson and Laura Chapman), who have in their personal writings indicated a leaning toward multicultural concerns, but have not made any impact on the Getty documents at all.

CHAPTER 6

AESTHETIC VALUES IN A DEMOCRACY

AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

The questions motivating this study concern the
identification and characterization of DBAE's aesthetic
values, as well as their placement in a larger context.
Although the identified aesthetic values have been
characterized and placed in a larger humanities tradition,
their immediate connection with contemporary issues has only
been suggested. This relates to the concern expressed in
Chapter 1, that one of the reasons for analyzing the
aesthetic values was to "detect their scope for embracing
the concept of educational fairness within a democratic
setting." As a conclusion both to the second research
question and the adopted perspective of the study, this
chapter extends the contextual investigation in order to
identify the potential impact these humanities-oriented
values may have on a modern pluralistic society.

AESTHETIC VALUES IN A DEMOCRACY

It has been demonstrated that the criteria for the
determination of aesthetic superiority in DBAE are fairly
specific and take place within the cultural context of the
Western fine art tradition. The intellectual, cultural, and

formal values which must be embodied in the art work's code are all specific to the western European model of culture.

The important aesthetic values in DBAE, i.e. intellectual, cultural, and formal, as expressed in the Western fine art tradition, find their rationale and development within the western humanities tradition. This tradition or approach believes that

1. it has access to and has preserved the *best* produced by humans. In the field of art, the *best* is contained in the fine art tradition.
2. it is the standard for *excellence* in all intellectual, cultural, and formal judgments in western societies,
3. it contains values *common* to American life and culture and *all* Americans should be exposed to them.

These assumptions, rather than the values themselves, should be the basis for the criticism of this tradition.

In the past, the humanities approach to the imposition of common values may have been more easily accomplished in terms of American cultural policy, whose primary goal was to assimilate or absorb all new cultural groups into a *melting pot*. The melting pot, or assimilative approach, has been likened to a large pot wherein people of different cultural backgrounds melt and form a new cultural type called the

American.

> This is saying that the various different groups all
> come together and dispense their own uniqueness
> throughout the mass, adding their own color to the
> mass. The various groups amalgamate into something
> entirely new which is uniquely American and always
> changing as new groups or individuals enter the pool
> (McIntosh, 1978, p. 17).

The melting pot idea was thought to be an expression of
democracy and freedom in the United States in that each
ethnic type had a chance to contribute its character to the
whole. [1] In practise, however, the incoming groups were
expected to mold themselves after a certain cultural ideal
and pattern.

> The "melting pot" was a grand illusion. Those
> Americans who came from Ireland and from eastern and
> southern Europe did not find a place where all
> "races and nations" could contribute ways of
> feeling, believing, and behaving to a new, eclectic
> culture. The new land was not a melting pot, it was
> a mold - a bed of Procrustes built by the Northern
> Europeans who preceded the Southerners to this
> country, who held its power, who demanded that

newcomers succumb to their mold, and who, in the
end, had their way (Exoo & Draper, 1987, p. 190).

The concept of a *molding* pot replaced that of a *melting* pot
when it was realized that there was *one* particular set of
beliefs and values that best characterized what it was to be
an American. When the selection, identification, and
nourishment of one *ideal* cultural type occurs, the concept
of a melting pot disappears.

The set of values constituting the template to be imposed on
American ethnic groups was that of the dominant "upper class
Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture" (Exoo & Draper, 1987;
McIntosh 1978). These values were based in the western
European and classical tradition. They constituted a
standard by which the ideal American could be judged and it
was used by the *Americanization* movement to eliminate ethnic
groups and cultural ways not in conformity with this
standard.

> The Americanization movement was a massive
> marshaling of the "means of intellectual production"
> on behalf of one unabashed, oft stated goal: [the
> foreign-born] must be induced to give up the
> languages, customs and methods of life which they
> have brought with them across the ocean, and adopt

instead the language, habits, and customs of this
country ... the standards and ways of American
living (National Americanization Committee pamphlet,
in Gordon, 1964, p. 101 - in Exoo & Draper, 1987, p.
197).

Recent studies have indicated that the work of
Americanization is still an ongoing concern in the schools
(Bowles & Gintis, 1976).

During the 1970's, there was much talk about the end of
ethnicity in America and many studies were written to show
that differences between cultural groups were declining. It
was claimed that there was a distinct diminishing of
differences between Protestants and Catholics (Holloway &
George, 1979; McCready & Greeley, 1972), and that Italians
and Poles possessed political attitudes that were not much
different from English, German, and Scandinavian attitudes
(Glazer, 1984). These kinds of claims obviously aroused
concern in those who believed that cultural differences
should be preserved in the U.S.

These same concerns were also felt in the field of art
education, since humanistically-oriented art educators were
rigorously promoting art exemplars, theories, values, and
beliefs based on the Western high art culture. The late

1960's and 1970's were an incredibly fertile period in which
criticism of cultural value imposition resulted in questions

> as to whether governments could be justified in
> going against the grain of life as it is plainly
> lived by the majority of their citizens, or in
> promoting one set of values rather than others which
> were perfectly legitimate; and as to what hope of
> success there could be for cultural democratization
> if policies and programmes did not take account of
> the intimate connection between a man's forms of
> cultural expression and activity, and his
> socio-economic situation, his role and scope in his
> community at home and in the factory, and, of
> course, the kind of educational background with
> which he was equipped for life and the extent to
> which he continued to have educational needs and
> opportunities (Simpson, 1976, p. 21).

Democracy and Art Education

Since 1968, questions have been troubling art educators who
perceived that there was a cultural monopoly in the field
(Forman, 1968a). The specific criticisms levelled at art
education programs which supported traditional humanistic
values, concerned their attempt to impose *one common* set of
Western aesthetic values on a culturally diverse population.

[2] Critics recognized that the American nation was a multi-racial, multi-ethnic society made up of a mixture of peoples, not only newly arrived, but also those Americans whose cultural and aesthetic backgrounds varied widely (Feldman, 1980). The critics were quick to condemn both the melting pot theory and the idea that it had worked to eliminate cultural differences.

> The description of America as a melting pot society
> has proven over the past twenty years to be quite
> inaccurate. While the slow and often arduous trek
> from Ellis Island to suburbia diluted specific
> ethnic characteristics and customs, it did not erase
> them. America has remained a pluralistic society
> and, in fact, has become more so with the increase
> in ethnic pride and, the interest in family
> background (Mann, 1979, p. 15).

There was a sense of optimism in the new belief that democracy could become real enough so that the individual wishes and desires of every American would be respected. The critics felt there was no room for educational policies which focused on only a small fraction of the population (Simpson, 1976).

The rejection of educational theories which were designed to

illustrate only one cultural interpretation of the arts
resulted in the development of pluralistic approaches to art
education. The concept of pluralism most accurately
describes a state in society where subgroups create and
preserve boundaries between cultural subgroups. "Pluralism
sees the various subgroups as being complete unto themselves
with their own defined boundaries with no overlap, at least
conceptually, but all of the groups together composing the
American culture" (McIntosh, 1978, p. 18). Multiculturalism,
on the other hand, has been described as differing from
pluralism in that "more interaction is encouraged among
different groups" (p. 18). This distinction, however, does
not reflect the way the terms are commonly used in the
literature. The use most often encountered (in the
literature regarding this study) either equates pluralism
with multiculturalism or differentiates them in terms of
their content. Pluralism concerns itself with religious,
racial, class, social, interest, and ethnic diversity in
society, whereas multiculturalism seems to be concerned
primarily with ethnic diversity.

Cultural pluralism embraces more than the cultural

differences associated with ethnic groups. It

includes, for example, diverse pedagogies or world

views (which need not involve a clearly defined

group identity or institutional form), and the

difference in values by which urban and rural
communities or the various social classes may be
distinguished. Among ethnic cultures the role that
different elements of cultural identity (such as
language, nationality, religion, moral beliefs) play
varies substantially. Of course, ethnic or racial
differences do not necessarily involve cultural
differences. The word "multicultural" is now
commonly used in describing a society characterized
by cultural differences associated with ethnic
groups... It follows that even when the word
"pluralist" refers to cultural differences in a
society, it includes a broader range than
"multicultural", and that the degree to which a
society is multicultural is not simply a function of
its ethnic diversity (Crittenden, 1982, p. 11).

It is this distinction between pluralism and
multiculturalism that will be employed in this study.

The humanities-oriented aesthetic approaches based their
premises on the idea that there was a common American
culture, that this common culture was based in the Western
fine art tradition, and that all Americans should be exposed
to it. The pluralistic approach on the other hand, stated
that society was made up of many cultural groups based on

ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, language, gender,
and income, and that each group's cultural values and
standards should be respected.

> Our democratic ideals are based on a multicultural
> concept, inclusive of all peoples, the minority and
> the majority. Unfortunately, these democratic ideals
> have been violated for many people. Ethnic and
> cultural values and backgrounds of subcultures have
> been ignored in favor of a monocultural,
> ethnocentric system of values. (Lovano-Kerr &
> Zimmerman, 1977, p. 34).

In a diversified society, aesthetic pluralism rather than
aesthetic monism should be typical since "in a pluralistic
society, no one group can claim to have tastes that are
'better' than any other group" (Mann, 1979, p. 17). [3]

For the pluralists, society was perceived to consist of many
subcultures, each with its own aesthetic objects, standards,
and purposes. These objects expressed or fulfilled the
emotional and psychological needs of the subcultures they
served (Cawelti, 1976). Although each influences and is
influenced by others, fairly distinct criteria of excellence
are developed within each subculture. The standards of one
subculture therefore, may not be appropriate in judging the

products of another.

The consensus at this time was that the major problem facing education in the 1970's concerned the handling of cultural differences in the schools. The art education community polarized into those who supported a common culture, represented by advocates for the fine arts, and those who advocated a pluralistic culture, represented by supporters of the popular and ethnic arts. McIntosh (1978) represented the conditions of the time by showing how the different approaches to the problem could be illustrated. She developed a continuum with the polarities represented by two major thoughts (1) the discourage differences approach, of which the humanities-oriented aesthetic approach was the primary representative, and (2) the encourage differences approach, represented by the "new egalitarians," or the cultural pluralists. [4]

The pluralists accused the humanities-oriented art educators of being cultural missionaries (Taylor, 1975) who, in using terms like *culturally deprived* and *disadvantaged*, seemed to indicate that "the referents were lacking a proper appreciation of the aesthetic values of the dominant middle class" (Forman, 1968a). Ianni (1968) stated that there were not many programs in the arts

which do not attempt to take the best of what "we" have to offer in order to help "them" fit better into our world. The motivation here is commendable, but it is the same old story of the colonial administration ... At its best this means an attempt to reproduce the art forms of middle-class, white America in a form that is both acceptable and comprehensible to individuals who are not a part of this cultural heritage. At its worst it means a patronizing attempt to uplift the art consciousness of a people who are again, "culturally disadvantaged" (p. 18). [5]

By contrast, the pluralists suggested the concept of cultural pluralism which stressed the uniqueness that each subcultural group had to offer to society (Lovano-Kerr & Zimmerman, 1977). Every work of art emanating from these subcultures (popular, folk, ethnic, and vernacular) has meaning because "it is a product of a particular culture and it is only in that context that its relational meaning can be discovered and understood" (Glaeser, 1973, p. 35). The literature of this time is filled with the records of debate between these two viewpoints.

In March, 1972, the NAEA sponsored the Pacific Regional Conference where the theme was "The Celebration of Peoples"

which dealt mainly with the issue of subcultural diversity
in the U.S.A. In November 1973, the NAEA held a
miniconference in Taos, New Mexico on culture and art
education (Taylor, 1975). The conference pointed out the
need for art educators to be aware of the variabilities of a
pluralistic society. "It is useless to keep pushing Columbus
and the Pilgrims in an area that had been long and richly
established milleniums before Columbus set foot in America"
(Taylor, 1975, p. 9).

Toward the end of the 1970's, the debate subsided somewhat,
and the question concerning how cultural differences in the
U.S.A. would be handled was left unresolved. No central
agreement was reached on whether use would be made of
various cultural motifs in the lives of *all* people or
whether art educators, convinced they knew the standards for
the assessment of excellence, would continue to assert a
cultural dominance (Ianni, 1968).

Of course, during this debate, the humanities-oriented art
educators were far from silent. They argued their points
precisely and doggedly. In fact, they suggested that their
method of inculcating value was entirely in harmony with
democratic ideals since what they were doing was making the
best human values available instead of keeping them only to

themselves. This argument involves a subtle distinction between the concepts of *democratization of culture* and *cultural democracy*.

> Democratization [of culture] implies that intellectual values are the property or privilege of a minority ... to be transferred - in a patronizing manner - to the majority, who ... are uneducated and ignorant. By contrast, cultural democracy expresses the principle that there is no minority and majority ... that everybody is part of the public ... that everybody has an equal right to the values of culture ... old and new ... to the classics and to the experimental values, to the easily digestible offerings of art as much as to more condensed mental nutriment (*Cultural Policy*, 1975, p. 15).

The humanities-oriented art educators, of course, were involved in the democratization of culture, that specific form of Western high culture considered to be the appropriate one for all Americans.

The question concerning what would be the ideal form of art education for modern America is difficult to resolve (Forman, 1968a). Some educators believe there is a common historical cultural heritage, while others do not. For the

pluralists, any such imposition of a large-scale policy that
employs monocultural values would "constitute a cultural
imperialism threatening various minority subcultures"
(Mulcahy, 1980, p. 52).

Democracy and DBAE

The year 1984 saw the Getty's DBAE program, a large-scale
curriculum project promoting common Western aesthetic and
cultural values, come into being. In view of the kinds of
rigorous criticism of cultural values done in the 1970's, it
is rather surprising that there does not exist one lengthy
sustained criticism of DBAE's cultural monism. There do
exist scattered accounts here and there in the literature
and some critics do raise penetrating questions. Karen
Hamblen (1987a), for example, has raised the kinds of
questions that educators in a democracy should certainly be
asking. In answer to the question concerning "whose
aesthetic values are being given validity" in DBAE (p.68),
she replied that it is those who value the dominant western
world view of culture and art (p. 72).

> DBAE could be preparing students to be primarily
> museum-goers, to be able to appreciate a certain
> type of art in a certain way, and, in essence, to be
> appreciators of upper middle-class values. Although
> these might be considered legitimate goals, such a

focus needs to be assessed as to whether it should
be accorded nationwide application in a
multicultural society in which there is a stated
respect for divergent views (Hamblen, 1987a, p. 72).

In another place, Hamblen criticizes DBAE for its refusal to
analyze the assumptions upon which its monocultural view is
built.

In a DBAE curriculum, a selected tradition of
western art and fine art exemplars is presented as
value neutral inasmuch as the human authorship of
such curricular choices is not made explicit or
examined within the curriculum itself ... students
are not examining the assumptions of the program
they are studying (Hamblen, 1988b, p. 33).

Chalmers (1987a) identifies DBAE with a Western historical
bias and questions its identification with the values of the
dominant art world.

Contemporary artists, art historians,
philosophically oriented aestheticians, museum
curators, and directors of art galleries define
those cultural artifacts which qualify as "work of
art." Why do photographs in Getty Center
publications only show Institute participants

discussing art in *gallery* and *museum* settings or
contemplating *fine art* reproductions? Surely there
are other art worlds also worthy of consideration
(p. 60).

Chalmers carries this theme into a paper (1987b) which
appears in a book by Blandy & Congdon (1987) entitled *Art in
a democracy*. Although only a few references to the Getty and
DBAE appear in this book, its general statements and
arguments are directly applicable to any educational
movement involved in accounting for cultural diversity in a
pluralistic society.

A work of collected critical articles against DBAE called
Beyond DBAE: The case for multiple visions of art education
(1988) is disappointing in that most of the criticism deals
with issues apart from aesthetic value. A few of the
writers, however, do mention the problem as it is perceived
to exist in DBAE. London (1988) criticizes the selection of
exemplars that appear in Getty publications as having been
created by male, white, Europeans, who strive for
picturesque beauty. These choices as exemplars reveal
Getty's indifference to the social content of art. Lederman
(1988) is a critic who actually discusses some of the
aesthetic values in DBAE in some detail. She is critical of
what she calls a *masterpiece* approach. This kind of approach

denies that we cross multiple cultures daily.

> With a multicultural society as a given, an approach
> to art that focuses only on the last four hundred
> years of humankind's artistic production, and within
> that looks only at a small part of the Western world
> for its artistic paradigms, and within that selects
> only that art made for a small strata (sic) of
> intellectuals and wealthy connoisseurs, is to make
> art and art education irrelevant to the great
> majority in our society and particularly to the
> young (Lederman, 1988, p. 80).

Another isolated criticism by Lidstone (1988) again points
to the problem, but offers no exhaustive direction. He calls
DBAE

> a blueprint for art education that appears to have
> more in common with the salon art of another century
> and the aesthetics of past cultures than the
> educational needs of today's children and youth. It
> takes an enormous stretch of the imagination to
> relate the "rigorous academic study" of 17th century
> Dutch landscape painting to the image world of a
> nine-year old latchkey child who spends hour after
> hour alone with a television set as his only

companion (Lidstone, 1988, p. 141).

It would be quite misleading to suggest that the critics are always fair, objective, or even correct in their assessments of the values underlying DBAE. As has been suggested before, the critics have not based their claims on any sustained or in-depth analysis of the DBAE program. Many critics seem to focus on the Getty's primary use of the *Western* cultural tradition and seem to imply that this tradition is somehow detrimental to education. The critics may be overly rigid in assuming that the Western tradition has not absorbed values and beliefs from other sources. The tradition they criticize is not monolithic and exclusive. But the most misleading impression is that the values of the fine art tradition should somehow be dispensed with. Some critics do object to its values as representing aristocratic and patrician attitudes and as maintaining an unjust status quo. The perspective of this study, however, does not suggest that the values in the fine art tradition are somehow worthless. These values, it has been suggested, exist as *one* set of values out of many in our society. What must be questioned in an educational sense, however, is not the values, but rather several assumptions held by advocates of this tradition. The two major assumptions questioned concern the belief that the tradition's values

1.   represent the best, and

2. are the common values of society and should be given to
    all students.

These two assumptions prevent an equal or shared involvement

with the arts of other groups in society and naturally set

up a hierarchy wherein arts other than the fine arts are

considered to be of lesser value. The critics are not always

clear about their objections to the Western tradition.

The minor critical attacks attacks on DBAE's aesthetic

values have not gone unnoticed by the Getty. To their credit

they sponsored an invitational Seminar in May of 1987 in

Cincinnati, Ohio, called "Issues in Discipline-Based Art

Education: Strengthening the Stance, Extending the

Horizons," where they invited 37 participants to listen and

respond to four major issues surrounding the DBAE program.

The Getty's supposed role in this was invisible. [6] It would

invite the art educators to talk about the problems and it

would merely listen. Although there were points of

discussion concerning aesthetic values throughout all

discussions, the second issue, *Art and Society*, criticized

the Getty for its exclusive use of Western aesthetic values

in a pluralistic society.

This position was explicated by June King McFee and was

offered as a direct challenge to its stance regarding

Western aesthetic values in a democracy. To date, this seems to be the most comprehensive sustained criticism of the aesthetic values held by the Getty. In this challenge, McFee stated that the study of the Western fine art tradition is not inclusive enough for students in a multicultural democracy. [7] The way that DBAE has structured the disciplines reveals their culture-boundness and that "they have not addressed all the arts within western culture nor are they adequate for studying the art of other cultures" (p. 104). She criticizes DBAE for their belief that "the melting pot ideal has worked and is still working, and that the traditional hierarchy of art with studio-fine arts at the top still meets with the needs of art learning for all students in our society" (p. 104). McFee's assumptions about art all have a socio-cultural basis [8] and she reminds the Getty that the notion that art is affected by its own time in a given cultural context is important when considering our role in a multicultural society. A multicultural society, she says, consists of a number of subcultures each of which has its own art world.

> Each of the arts develops a value system which
> differentiates it in some degree from the others in
> terms of purposes, aesthetic values, and criteria
> for criticism. Each has a distinguishing cultural
> history. For example, potters, weavers, quilters,

jewelers, and fine, folk, and ethnic artists all

belong to different subcultures within the broad

category of art (p. 106).

Although it has happened that *one* particular form of art,

Western fine art, has risen to the top of the hierarchy and

dominates the evaluative process, the role that other forms

of art play in our society must be recognized. We can no

longer say with certainty that the common culture is based

on the Western European value system. Presently in our

society, there is a developing consciousness of concern for

"ethnic, racial, and gender identity" (p. 107). There also

appears to be a decline in the size of the middle class

around which "the melting pot ideal and our educational

system was developed" (p. 108). In light of these facts,

McFee seems to suggest that DBAE must reconsider its

position in regards to the dominant form of aesthetic values

it seems to be committed to supporting and promoting.

McFee offers some direct challenges to the way aesthetic

value has been defined in the Getty's DBAE program. Since

this is an issue that touches directly on the Getty's

support and maintenance of a huge museum program, the

responses to McFee from DBAE supporters were extremely

tentative.

Stephen Dobbs (1988b) agreed that DBAE focuses on Western

cultural exemplars and that perhaps there is room for the

study of other forms of art. His response, however, focused

on the forms of the media rather than on the value context

of the media. "What conceivable grounds are there for

excluding such art categories, from discipline-based art

education, as television, video, film, advertising, computer

art, product design, crafts, and folk art?" (Dobbs, 1988, p.

114). Art forms here are given validity in terms of their

media, but what about the validity of the values they may

communicate? All media may be acceptable to the Getty as

long as they transmit the proper values. But what about

revolutionary or anti-Western values that may subvert the

fine art tradition? After all, DBAE can and has condemned

work done in *traditional* media that do not embody the

correct values.

What is at question here is not the form of the media, but

the values expressed in and through the form. Dobbs seems to

avoid the issue by saying that DBAE can accept other forms

of art. But embracing *forms* does not indicate a position

towards the values the forms can be permitted to express. He

becomes a little clearer when he mentions qualities.

    The selection ought not to depend upon the

    designation of one object as fine art and another as

popular culture, but upon which object presents for

perception and aesthetic attending the qualities

which it is our purpose to help students notice

(Dobbs, 1988, p. 115).

But this implies ?g that it is acceptable to study popular

or fine arts as long as the objects in it meet the criteria

for quality that has been established by DBAE. Dobbs seems

to allude to this.

The ultimate arbiter of selection in both instances

- sources in "fine art" and sources in "popular

culture" - must be quality. We are not endorsing

"anything goes." Curriculum developers and teachers

must select to high standards, whether they choose

to use a painting, a ceramic, a household object, or

a media advertisment (p. 116).

Howard Risatti, another frequent Getty spokesman, also

responded to McFee's statement. He addressed the value

content a little more thoroughly and suggested that it is

not inaccurate to view the DBAE disciplines as bounded

within the Western culture. He agreed with Dobbs and McFee

that there should be a broadened concept of aesthetic value,

and that it should not just be focused on the formal aspect

of an image. [9] He stated that DBAE can encompass all the

forms that McFee talks about but, and here is the important point, the hierarchy must remain. Other cultural forms can be admitted but they must be arranged in a hierarchy so that fine art retains the top rung.

> It makes sense ... to include the widest range
> possible of images, media, and cultural sources in
> the study of visual art, not least because exposure
> to kitsch can provide the critical tools with which
> to distinguish fake from authentic art. Students
> should be taught to discern the values promoted by
> their visual environment, so that they can both
> appreciate the highest form of visual communication
> - art - and understand the messages of lesser forms
> (Getty Center, 1988a, p. 29).

Of course, for Risatti, the highest form of visual communication resides in the fine art tradition. This particular approach taken by DBAE was discussed more fully in Chapter 4 and seems to constitute the only concession DBAE theorists are prepared to take.

Participants in the *Issues* seminar arrived at some recommendations for the Getty regarding aesthetic value. The first is a direct statement to the Getty concerning its need to strongly address which arts and exemplars are to be

included in DBAE, how the selection process is to occur, and who is responsible for developing the criteria. There was general agreement amongst the participants that some real confusion exists concerning Getty's position regarding the inclusion of non-Western fine arts exemplars, and they felt that DBAE proponents must take the lead in clarifying this point.

Since the time of this seminar and the recommendations, the Getty has released two publications which deal with this issue. The first, a document released in April, 1988 from the Getty Center, *Perceptions of discipline-based art education and the Getty Center for Education in the Arts*, addressed a supposed number of misperceptions that it feels have arisen about DBAE.

One of the misperceptions concerns the belief that DBAE is limited to fine art from western cultures. The Getty replies by saying that

>   DBAE includes a broad base of art exemplars from
>   Western and non-Western cultures, ranging from most
>   ancient to most contemporary. The important criteria
>   for selection of all art works for instruction is
>   that they be of *high quality* (italics added), and
>   that they be outstanding examples of features or

characteristics which the work displays or embodies
(p. 7).

The other release, *First impressions* (1988c), also tries to
correct misperceptions that the Getty feels has arisen about
DBAE. It states that

> the DBAE approach can encompass a broad range of
> art, not just art in the western tradition, but art
> from all cultures and periods. Content may include
> folk art, industrial or applied arts, and electronic
> media in addition to painting, sculpture,
> print-making, and architecture (p. 5).

Both these releases are extremely vague in qualifying what
the inclusion of other arts really entails in terms of
judgment and evaluation. The important questions are left
unanswered. What is to be the *status* of the other arts in a
DBAE program? The important element is not whether DBAE *will*
include other arts, but *how* they will include them. Will all
the arts have equal status or will they be subject to a
hierarchy with the fine arts at the top? The Getty needs to
be much clearer on these questions if an understanding of
its position regarding the place of aesthetic value in a
democracy is to occur.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

The attempt to implement a curriculum project which emphasizes *one* cultural set of values can be understood within a country that has as its traditionally accepted cultural policy, an approach which emphasizes the blending and integrating of *all* cultural differences. The United States, after all, has no official policy which gives legitimacy to pluralistic viewpoints. But what are the implications for Canada, a country with an official multicultural policy, of accepting without question the Western cultural values underlying the present form of DBAE?

Contemporary Canadian art education is strongly influenced by American ideas (MacGregor, 1984). "What you find in United States art education you find in Canada" (Gray, 1984, p. 6). Gray (1984) speaks of certain "coaxial connections" maintained by Canadian art teachers that provide a steady flow of art education images and ideas between the two countries.

> These connections run north and south, east and west, and span the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Moreover, they often intersect. The value of any coaxial connection lies in its capacity to carry many and varied transmissions simultaneously; it provides the opportunity to learn something about

common concerns and underlying differences (Gray,
1984, p. 6).

Gray suggests that art education relationships have
strengthened between Canada and the U.S. through
developments of mutual understanding. This relationship
favors American influence on Canadian art educators because
the Canadian has easier access to American research than the
American does to Canadian work. It is certainly no
exaggeration to suggest that the bulk of art education ideas
existent in Canada today comes from art educators resident
in the U.S.A. Connections are kept alive by National
organizations such as CSEA and publications such as the
Canadian Review of Art Education Research and the *CSEA
Annual Journal* which includes American as well as Canadian
contributors. Although only a few Canadian art educators
have been actively involved in the debate concerning the
formulation of DBAE [10] it still seems only a matter of time
before the ideas and theories within the program become part
of the Canadian educational landscape.

But what are the implications that Canadian art educators
should be aware of in adopting DBAE programs for use in
Canadian schools? The first implication concerns the fact
That DBAE is based on aesthetic values that are considered
to be part of the American and European cultural heritage.

This is made quite clear by DBAE writers, as this study has shown. Canadian art educators who feel no qualms about basing their programs on American values, or who perhaps feel there is no difference between American and Canadian values may find the DBAE program suitable for their purposes.

The second implication is that DBAE is based on the idea of the provision of one particular set of cultural values for the whole American population. For Americans who believe that their country is based on a melting pot and who support the idea of a common culture for all, this concept may be acceptable. But Canadians have an entirely different cultural and political context to consider. This difference has been most vividly exemplified by the difference in attitudes towards cultural diversity that exists between the two countries. The Americans have stressed the melting pot concept, whereas the Canadians have emphasized the cultural mosaic.

> Speakers and writers indefatigably praised the
> situation in which ethnic groups could retain their
> distinctiveness and yet be Canadian, in contrast to
> the American melting pot as they conceived it. They
> vied with each other in proposing visual and
> gustatory metaphors such as "flower garden,"

"salad," and "stew" for the Canadian situation. In
1965, John Porter (1965) could say that the mosaic
was the country's most cherished value (Burnet,
1984, p. 19).

Although indications certainly exist that Canada does not
treat its minority groups equitably (D'Oyley, 1983), it has
at least always theoretically claimed to have been concerned
with the preservation of cultural diversity, Canada has
always been culturally and ethnically pluralistic, but this
diversity was not always recognized.

The policy of the government has been assimilation,
or Anglo-conformity (Gordon, 1964). It is true that
politicians and after-dinner speakers have delighted
in contrasting the Canadian Mosaic with the American
melting pot, but there has been little governmental
support for the mosaic (Burnet, 1983).

This support however, changed in 1971 when the Federal
Government announced a policy of multiculturalism. This
policy emphasized the retention of specific cultural
characteristics by any group that desired to maintain them,
and the sharing of these cultural views with the Canadian
society in general (Samuda, Berry, & LaFerriere, 1984).
Pierre Trudeau, then Prime Minister of Canda, stated (1971)

> Although there are two official languages, *there is
> no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take
> precedence over any other* (italics added) ... A
> policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual
> framework commends itself to the government as the
> suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of
> Canadians ... Canadian identity will not be
> undermined by multiculturalism. Indeed, we believe
> that cultural pluralism is the very essence of
> Canadian identity. Every ethnic group has the right
> to preserve and develop its own culture and values
> within the Canadian context ... a policy of
> multiculturalism must be a policy for all Canadians
> (Trudeau, 1971). [11]

Although this document may have some philosophical and
conceptual problems, the set of rights is also supported by
the Constitution - the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, section 27.

In a very real sense, then, the obligations of educators in
Canada are radically different from those in the U.S.A. This
obligation, based on an *official* multicultural ideal for
Canadian society, means that each Canadian educator must be
concerned with how to accommodate ethnic and cultural
minorities within schools primarily designed for Anglo- and

French-Canadian students (Samuda, Berry, & LaFerriere, 1984).

> Canada is a multicultural society and this fact
> raises critical questions about the goals of
> Canadian education. Should the aim of education be
> the assimilation, integration or segregation of
> minority groups? Is equality of educational
> opportunity achieved by educating all children in
> the same way regardless of differences in their
> cultural and linguistic backgrounds? (Wyatt, 1984,
> p. 93).

Of course, there are many educators who do not agree with this policy nor with pluralism in general. For them, the issues concerning the sole promotion of Western aesthetic values will not be a problem.

Questions raised by multicultural concerns are not easily answered. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to do more than merely suggest the framework of concerns surrounding multicultural curriculum policy for Canada. Cummins (1984) provides a broad suggestion.

> The aims of the multiculturalism policy for
> education are to find effective ways of realizing
> the educational potential of culturally and

linguistically diverse children and to develop
social cohesion by promoting appreciation among all
children of the varied contributions of different
ethnic groups to the Canadian mosaic (p. 71).

Chalmers (1984) provides another viewpoint when he states
that educators should base art education programs on three
premises:

(1) that cultural pluralism is a reality and that
grudging or tacit recognition must be replaced by
genuine acceptance (2) that no racial or cultural
group is superior to another, and (3) that equality
of opportunity is a right that must be enjoyed by
every student regardless of ethnic or cultural
background (p. 23).

These premises, of course, are entirely consistent with the
federal multicultural policy, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, and the cultural concerns expressed by
educators during the last twenty years.

With these kinds of injunctions on the development of
Canadian art education within the federal multicultural
policy, the DBAE program, as it presently stands, must be
rejected. As we have indicated, the two implications concern

the claim that DBAE contains Western and American values, and that *one* set of common aesthetic values should be transmitted to the nation. These are entirely dissonant with the recognition and extension of rights of cultural plurality in Canada. In order for Canadians to accept DBAE as it is formulated by the Getty, it would have to address the issue of multicultural concerns more forcefully and democratically than it is presently doing. Canadian art educators should reject the Getty's version of DBAE on the same grounds that many American art educators are rejecting it, i.e., on the grounds that as it is presently formulated, it does not address the diverse cultural populations resident within the country.

NOTES

[1]   This enthusiasm for the assimilation of all cultural
     beliefs can be caught from the literature of the early
     20th century. For example, Zangwill (1909) states it
     firmly:

          America is God's crucible, the great Melting Pot
          where all the races of Europe are melting and
          re-forming! Here you stand, good folk, think I,
          when I see them at Ellis Island, here you stand
          in your fifty groups, with your fifty languages
          and histories, and your fifty blood hatreds and
          rivalries. But you won't be long like that,
          brothers, for these are the fires of God you've
          come to - these are the fires of God ... Germans
          and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and
          Russians - into the crucible with you all! God
          is making the American. Yes, East and West, and
          North and South, the palm and the pine, the pole
          and the equator, the crescent and the cross -

> how the great Alchemist melts and fuses them
> with his purging flame! Here shall they all
> unite to build the Republic of Man and the
> Kingdom of God (Zangwill, 1909).

This kind of religious zeal for the unity of the ideal
American carries over into the 1980's. We see this in a
description of the graduation ceremony of the Ford
English School:

> a pageant in the form of a melting pot, where
> all the men descend from a boat scene
> representing the vessel on which they came over;
> down the gangway ... into a pot 15 feet in
> diameter and 7 feet high, which represents the
> Ford English School. Six teachers, three on
> either side, stir the pot with ten foot ladles
> representing nine months of teaching in the
> school. Into the pot 52 nationalities with their
> foreign clothes and baggage go ... Presently the
> pot [begins] to boil over and out [come] the men
> dressed in their best American clothes and
> waving American flags (descriptions by Dewitt &
> Marquis, in Meyer, 1981, pp. 60-61).

[2] It is not so much the values themselves the critics
object to, as it is the attempt to use the values as
the *sole* basis for art education.

[3] The issue is certainly not as simple as some may
suggest. The two positions should be conceptualized
as occupying a continuum with a multiplicity of
intervening viewpoints.

[4] McIntosh (1978) develops quite a useful continuum
which represents the major facets of dealing with
cultural plurality within a society.
Discourage Differences Approach
1. Anglo-conformity
2. Deficit model
3. Melting pot
Encourage Differences Approach
1. Separatist
2. Ethnic Studies
3. Pluralism
4. Multiculturalism

[5] Ianni (1968) goes on to develop this idea of

cultural deprivation in more graphic details.

> If I were a Negro in Bedford-Stuyvesant or a
> Puerto-Rican in East Harlem, I would not for
> one moment consider giving up my rich - if
> disadvantaged culture for the lonely general
> culture any more than I have been personally
> willing to give up the marginality of being
> Italian-American, despite the fact that most
> of my colleagues tell me it is
> tension-producing and anxiety-ridden to be
> in such cultural conflict. Oscar Lewis has
> done a brilliant job of showing how rich and
> comforting the culture of poverty can be and
> repeatedly illustrates that what causes the
> disjunctures and the disharmonies is our
> attempt to tell them that they don't know
> what they are missing (Ianni, 1968, p. 18 -
> 3).

[6] The invisibility was hard to detect at times. In *Art
and Society* seminar, the respondents to McFee were
Dobbs, and Risatti.

[7] McFee here uses the term *multicultural* in its
broader sense to mean more than mere ethnic
diversity.

[8] McFee (1988) states 7 generalizations and then
states a position based on them. The seven
generalizations are:
1. Art is universal in that it is found to some
    degree in all cultures, but the variations of
    art are related to the different socio-cultural
    contexts in which they develop.
2. A socio-cultural system motivates, molds,
    modifies, and rewards the production and use of
    art.
3. Their art is a mirror for the members of a
    cultural group.
4. Most art is made for some social purpose.
5. The different visual arts have subcultures of
    their own. They include the artists and the
    social networks of individuals who share their
    values and support their work.
6. The new video and computer technologies are such
    pervasive communication art forms that we need

to consider them as social factors of their own.
7. American society today continues in a churning
    state of flux.
(McFee, 1988 - Issues - p. 105-107).

[9]   But of course, this has already been discussed as an
       assumption of the DBAE program.

[10]   It appears that only three Canadian art educators
       have taken an active role in documenting their
       interpretations of the Getty's DBAE: Graeme Chalmers
       (1987a,1987b); Jim Gray (1987a, 1987b); and Ron
       MacGregor (1985, 1988 - also co-assistant editor of
       Research readings for Discipline-Based Art Education
       (1988). (See Dobbs, 1988a).

[11]   The focus of this policy seems to be concerned with
       ethnic diversity rather than on pluralism as defined
       in this study. The terms pluralism and
       multiculturalism also appear to be used
       synonymously.

              We believe that cultural pluralism is the
              very essence of Canadian identity. Every
              ethnic group has the right to preserve and
              develop its own culture and values within
              the Canadian context. No particular culture
              is more official than another. A policy of
              multiculturalism must be a policy for all
              Canadians (*First Annual Report*, 1975, p. 7).

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

The Getty's DBAE is one of the most highly publicized and
funded of contemporary art education reforms. Its advocates
believe it is making a serious impact in American education
and that it has received official support from most of the
major educational associations. Although there are many
critics of the DBAE program, the criticism seems to have
centered mainly on its structural design while only a small
portion has been directed towards a criticism of the
aesthetic values it promotes.

For this study, aesthetic value was defined as any criteria
by which one visual experience is considered to be superior
to another according to classes of visual phenomena. The
study was conducted in order to determine the nature,
context and purpose of the aesthetic values expressed in the
Getty's DBAE documents. Content analysis was performed on
all of Getty's public documents and statements. It was
discovered that the criteria for judgment take place within
an extended concept of aesthetics. The DBAE program extends
aesthetic worth to include extrinsic non-formal properties

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as well as intrinsic and formal ones. This is logical since DBAE takes place within an academic context and seeks *understanding* of art, rather than its mere *appreciation*. In order for this understanding to occur, a concept of worth must be developed that is wider than that encompassed by mere formalism. Within this extended aesthetic concept are located six criteria for the attribution of worth to a superior visual experience.

Aesthetic Criterion No. 1 - the visual experience which is embodied in an art work created by an artist is better than the visual experience which is not.
Although many things are available to human sight, it is the work of art created by an artist which is considered most valuable in DBAE. These works of art can be judged and evaluated in accordance with objective standards of excellence and usually form a strict hierarchy.

Aesthetic Criterion No. 2 - the art work which can claim membership in the fine art tradition is better than the art work which cannot.
The Western fine art tradition is used as the standard for the judgment of all other works and classroom exemplars are usually chosen from its ranks. A work is admitted into the ranks of the fine art tradition by the sophistication and quality of its visual symbolism.

Aesthetic Criterion No. 3 - the art work which embodies a sophisticated and complex code demanding literacy for its decipherment is better than the one which does not.
The visual symbolism constituting the image in a work of art is called its code. The code embodies and transmits meaning to a viewer who must be in possession of a specific kind of literacy in order to decipher the meaning. Art education is necessary in order to provide those forms of literacy. In order to be considered superior in DBAE, a code must embody and transmit specific intellectual, cultural, and formal values.

Aesthetic Criterion No. 4 - the code which contains sophisticated intellectual values accessible through an intellectual literacy is superior to the one which does not.
The code constitutes a body of knowledge, and a set of skills to decipher it. Since DBAE is based on an academic and scholarly endeavour, the visual code must justify and support a set of intellectual values. Skills such as discrimination, analysis, observation, synthesis, comparison, etc, must not only be used to undergo any evaluative process, but must also be promoted and reinforced when in contact with the image. An image which demands no cognitive or intellectual commitment is not considered worthy of exemplar status in DBAE.

Aesthetic Criterion No. 5 - the code which contains and transmits certain cultural values needing a sophisticated cultural literacy to decipher it is superior to the one which does not.

DBAE is firmly based in western culture. A superior visual code not only contains, transmits, and demands intellectual commitments, but also cultural ones. DBAE promotes certain western values like social order, personal commitment, rationality, and sobriety. Works which contain these rather than their opposites are accorded higher status in DBAE. Cultural values of the past must also be understood in order to decipher works in the fine art tradition.

Aesthetic Criterion No. 6 - the code which contains formal values requiring a special literacy to decipher it is better than the one which does not.

In the past, aesthetic worth was attributed to an object only on the basis of the formal relationships it displayed. The elements in a visual image can be arranged in a variety of ways. DBAE supports those arrangements of elements which emphasize unity, harmony, complexity, and balance. and that are specified and described by the fine art tradition. This requires that the artist put them there and that the viewer possess the literacy to identify them.

These values comprise aesthetic worth in DBAE and are part
of a larger tradition in Western human thought which has
been supported and developed within the humanities approach
in Western European history. Basically this approach states
that the highest and best educational experiences come about
through the study of the western cultural fine art
tradition. Its influence on the development of art education
theory is easily discerned and it is clear that the major
influence in DBAE, both on the Getty's mandate and on the
writers comprising DBAE personnel, is the value system of
the humanities tradition.

CONCLUSIONS

Because of this humanities component, the values expressed
and supported in DBAE are those of the Western European
tradition. This tradition believes its values are common to
all Americans and should constitute the educational fare of
all students. This approach has brought DBAE into conflict
with those who advocate cultural pluralism in the U.S.A.
With the recognition that America consists of very diverse
cultural populations has come a concern for the promotion of
common and dominant values. Critics of DBAE are wary of any
curriculum program which seems to ignore cultural diversity
and which promotes one dominant culturally-bound set of
values as *better* than all others.

The Getty has not responded fully to the critics who demand

that it make its position known regarding education for a

diverse and pluralistic population. Basically, the Getty has

said that all art forms can be employed within the DBAE

structure, but there is the unresolved implication that all

arts would be subject to the same *fine art* criteria and

would be placed within a hierarchy with the *fine arts*

occupying the top place.

McFee (1988) has challenged the Getty and others to become

conscious of our approach in the use of aesthetic values in

art education. Since it has been stated that the Getty

documents exist as a public reality with the potential to

influence curriculum developers and planners, some direction

must be given to those who wish to avoid the cultural monism

of the Getty's approach and design curricula which address

pluralism in a democracy.

A variety of frameworks employing strategies for the

development of pluralistic and multicultural curricula

exist.

> Approaches to multicultural curriculum range from
>
> those which give token recognition of holidays to
>
> integrated approaches where most subject matter
>
> areas take multicultural materials and issues into

account. Some programs take a heritage/museum

approach where the focus is on a group's past and

the primary objects of study are artifacts or

material culture. Other programs take an issues

approach, or focus on themes like cultural change

taking a dynamic view of ethnicity and culture

(Wyatt, 1984, p. 99).

Discipline-based art education exists as a concept for

enlarging the scope of an art program to include aesthetic,

critical, and historical concerns in addition to

studio/production work. Theoretically, the visual exemplars

in this type of a program can embrace both mono- and

multi-cultural examples. The idea of discipline-based art

education has been gaining legitimacy since the 1960's and

today exists in a variety of different forms. (Kern, 1987).

Discipline-based models such as those that exist in

Australia and Canada are certainly viable alternatives to

the model offered by the Getty.

The State of Victoria in Australia has some fairly detailed

curriculum guides which use the discipline-based model for

art education. The essential difference between it and the

Getty model, however, is that the Victorian model rejects

the traditional western fine art approach. It presents a

view that embraces all those aspects that have been omitted

from the "traditional closed and linear models." This program states that the usual approach in art education has been traditional.

> Art history courses are divided into periods of
> Western history, such as Prehistory, Egyptian,
> Classical, Medieval, Renaissance, Baroque,
> Neo-Classical, Romantic, and Modern. Most major
> history of art books follow this traditional
> chronological approach when surveying Western art
> from cave painting to modern times (*Artworks*, 1987,
> p. 5).

The program suggests that what is needed is a view that embraces all those aspects that have been omitted from this traditional and closed linear model. Stereotyped attitudes towards what is included and excluded from art history are challenged and a broad-based approach adopted. This broad-based approach recognizes as valid content for study, all visual arts dealing with all world cultures throughout time. Emphasis is given to modern and contemporary approaches including fringe and women's art as well as the art of lesser known artists. There is a strong focus on art of the present. Also strongly emphasized are areas other than the traditional fine arts, i.e., popular, advertising, commercial, and media arts. A healthy appreciation and

understanding of Australian and aboriginal art is advocated.

The program gives an indication of the method of assessment
or evaluation that should be used when judging or examining
other kinds of art. The inability to suspend assumed
criteria leads to difficulties.

> A Western perception frequently imposed on
> other-than-western art results in a lack of
> understanding, and assumptions are made which strips
> the art works of their true meaning. For this
> reason, so-called "primitive art" has sometimes been
> described as having child-like simplicity,
> suggesting that results are unintentional or
> accidental (*Artworks*, 1987, p. 50).

Each visual subculture is to be assessed on its own
standards and criteria, rather than by using standards from
the fine art tradition. *All* forms of art are to be
appreciated with no stigma attached to the kind of art one
prefers. "This approach allows for the appreciation of the
work of, say Mozart or Mantegna, but perhaps a preference
for the works of Mick Jagger or Norman Rockwell" (*Curriculum
Frameworks*, 1985, p.23).

The expansion of an art program to include more than the

Western fine art tradition is believed to be beneficial.
"Developing an appreciation for a range of art/craft works
from different people, times and places provides students
with important clues to the formation of the cultural and
artistic heritage" (*Arts Framework*, 1987, p. 27). The
program has a major section on the popular arts.

> Art/craft experience introduced to students also
> needs to be broader than the traditional areas
> usually considered as "fine arts" ... television,
> film, newspapers, magazines, post-cards,
> advertising, fashion, interior design, comics,
> cartoons, and computer-generated images should be
> recognized as significant outlets for artistic
> expression (*Arts Framework*, 1987, p. 29).

This program is important in that it challenges the major
assumptions of the Western fine art and Humanities
tradition. It does not reject study of the fine arts
tradition, but rather, includes it as one of many
expressions of human visual culture.

For Canadian curriculum planners, there also exist
provincial documents which use a discipline-based model and
a more pluralistic approach. The Ontario Ministry of
Education is currently producing curriculum materials which

take account of multicultural concerns (Wyatt, 1984).
Although described in far less detail than the Australian
materials, its art education curriculum guide specifies that
instruction is to occur in fine arts, crafts, practical
arts, popular arts, and folk arts, as well as experimental
art and technology. A respect for multicultural concerns is
indicated in the belief that "a critical and sensitive
examination of the art forms of the various ethnic and
cultural groups in today's pluralistic society will lead
students to a better understanding of and respect for both
past and present cultures" (*Curriculum guideline*, 1986, p.
13). This program continually emphasizes its goal of
"developing esteem for the customs, cultures, and beliefs of
a wide variety of societal groups' (p. 3).

An obvious implication for further research would be to
conduct an investigation into the existence of
discipline-based curricula which embody more culturally
pluralistic values than that offered by the Getty.
Curriculum frameworks for discipline-based art education
which allow a more culturally democratic approach to the
treatment of aesthetic value are available and these, rather
than the program espoused by the Getty should be used as
models when designing discipline-based art education
programs.

It is evident that in a pluralistic society, the present form of DBAE is an anachronism. But the Getty is in a very difficult position. It has based its program on a set of humanities-oriented aesthetic values which give support and validity to the Western fine art tradition. Further research is needed in order to determine whether the Getty Trust itself has a mandate to continue to develop the humanities-based fine art values of its founder, John Paul Getty. It is in this kind of research that the *how* and *why* questions surrounding the mechanisms whereby these values were adopted may be answered. The *primary* purpose of the Trust, after all, is to maintain and develop the huge fine art legacy within its museum (Getty Museum, 1978, 1986). In order to give priority to this commitment, it must continue to promote Paul Getty's vision of the *fine arts* as containing *superior* exemplars of human excellence. Any admission by the Getty that the popular arts are equal to the fine arts might seriously damage its primary claim concerning the superiority of museum exemplars. With additional research in this area it may be discovered that the Getty is in the unenviable position of maintaining its support of a Western culturally-based humanistic aesthetic tradition because of its mandate to support a Western fine arts museum program.

This study sought explication of the argument that the Getty documents outline a discipline-based program based on specific aesthetic values which are derived from a larger body of classical thought which constitutes the Western fine art tradition. It has been adequately shown that this is so. What is now needed from the Getty and other humanities-oriented educators is a definite and coherent response to the critics' claims that this approach to education does not meet the contemporary needs of a pluralistic North American society. Can those who advocate the traditional humanities approach continue regarding their values as the only correct and viable values for Americans, or do they have the ability to respond more creatively and comprehensively than they have been doing, to the challenges of a culturally pluralistic society?

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and/or sanctioned by the Getty Trust. These documents are
supportive of the aesthetic values expressed in DBAE and act
as the main source of information for the study. The study
is primarily concerned with an analysis of the "ideal"
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APPENDIX B

THE DBAE LITERATURE

This list contains documents concerned with DBAE but not
necessarily produced or sanctioned by the Getty Trust. These
documents may either be supportive or critical of the Getty
and DBAE.

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APPENDIX C

THE GETTY TRUST AND THE OPERATING PROGRAMS

THE
GETTY TRUST

OPERATING PROGRAMS

1. The J. Paul Getty Museum

2. The Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities

3. The Getty Conservation Institute

4. The Getty Art History Information Program

5. **Getty Center for Education in the Arts**
   This includes the Institute for Educators on the Visual Arts.

6. Program for Art on Film

7. Museum Management Institute

These activities were later expanded to eight in 1984 with the addition of

1. The Getty Grant Program

* The operating activity which most concerns this study is the Getty Center for Education in the Arts.

APPENDIX D

CHRONOLOGY OF GETTY, DBAE, AND THE DOCUMENTS

1953 - Trust formed. Called the J. Paul Getty Museum.

1976 - (June) J. Paul Getty dies at the age of 83. Leaves huge financial endowment to the Trust.

1981 - (May) Harold Williams becomes chief executive officer and president of the Trust.

1981 - Trust begins investigations into the problems and issues in the visual arts.

1982 - (April) J. Paul Getty's estate finally settled.

1982 - Center for Education in the Arts formed.

1983 - Trust's name changed from the J. Paul Getty Museum to the J. Paul Getty Trust.

1983 - Research project with Rand Corporation. Investigation of discipline-based art programs.

1983 - (Summer) First Institute for Educators on the Visual Arts.

1984 - (Summer) Second Institute for Educators on the Visual Arts.

1985 - <u>Publication</u> - *Beyond creating: The place for art in America's schools*

1985 - (Oct) Roundtable Discussion 1 - Boston.

1985 - (Dec) Roundtable Discussion 2 - Seattle.

1986 - (Apr) Roundtable Discussion 3 - New Orleans.

1986 - (May) Roundtable Discussion 4 - Chicago.

1986 - Publication - *Beyond creating: Roundtable series.*

1987 - (Jan) First National Invitational Conference, Los
Angeles. "Discipline-based art education: What forms
will it take?

1987 - Publication (Summer) 10 papers commissioned by the
Getty Center appeared in the *Journal of Aesthetic
Education, 21*(2).

1987 - (May) Invitational Seminar, Cincinnati, Ohio. "Issues
in Discipline-Based Art Education: Strengthening the
stance, extending the horizons."

1987 - (Aug) Seminar, Snowbird, Utah. "The Preservice
Challenge: Discipline-Based Art Education and Recent
Reports on Higher Education.

1987 - Publication - *Discipline-Based Art Education: What
forms will it take?*

1987 - Publication - Broudy, H. *The role of imagery in
learning.*

1987 - Publication - Eisner, E.W. *The role of
Discipline-Based Art Education in America's schools.*

1988 - Publication - *Issues in Discipline-Based Art
Education: Strengthening the stance, extending the
horizons.*

1988 - Publication - A book of readings sponsored by the
Getty. Dobbs, (Ed.). *Research readings for*

Discipline-Based Art Education: A journey beyond creating.

1988 - <u>Publication</u> - *Perceptions of Discipline-Based Art Education and the Getty Center for Education in the Arts.*

1988 - <u>Publication</u> - Getty Center *Newsletter, 1,* Summer.

APPENDIX E

KEY VALUE CONCEPTS

The Getty literature was analyzed according to three questions (see p. 40). 438 statements were extracted and classified according to the following concepts.

CONCEPT	TIMES MENTIONED
1. Aesthetics	98
2. Culture	96
3. Fine Art	94
4. The Art Work	71
5. Mind/Intellect	64
6. Code/Literacy	56
7. Understanding	49
8. Meaning	45
9. Values	38
10. Formal/Structural	36
11. Criteria/Standards	34
12. Judgment/Appraisal	26
13. Museums	23
14. Popular Art	16
15. Beauty	13
16. Adult Standards	12
17. Access	9