TAKING BACK OUR CHILDREN: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING SELF-RESPECT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS

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ABSTRACT

The present study identifies some particular concepts in moral education, namely self-respect and respect for persons, clarifies the meaning of these concepts through the analysis of philosophical literature and synthesizes the characteristics of persons that are said to possess the virtues or values in question. The second major objective of the study was to pursue the argument that just as it is the case with science concepts, for example, moral concepts must be clearly understood and the components that bear upon them clearly identified before they are implemented in the curriculum. The second objective was facilitated by examining educational literature on the subjects of self-respect and respect for persons, comparing the philosophical and the educational usages of the constructs and pointing out problems of curricular implementation which could be attributed to lapses between them.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0   BACKGROUND

> Echoing the desperate cry of threatening women,
> "to take back the night", one parent vehemently declared
> "Adults--teachers and parents--must take back our children".
> Ryan, K. (1994). Foreword. In T. Lasley (Ed).
> <u>Teaching peace: Towards cultural selflessness.</u>
> (p.xiii). London: Bergin and Harvey.

All of us--teachers, parents, and private citizens have a fresh awareness of the deep disorder in the lives of so many of our children. The disorder is not new. According to Ryan (1994), the Director of the Center for the Advancement of Ethics and Character, Boston University, there has been an epidemic of pathological behavior among the young people of America for over thirty years. During this period, youth suicides and homicides have increased by more than fourfold. Out of wedlock births among teenagers, or what the Reverend Jesse Jackson calls "babies having babies" have increased over sixfold. But these are only some of the many problems our society has to face in the 90s. Kirschenbaum (1992) reports that in the United States, the concern to have values and morality come back is spurred by a national panic over the seeming inability of the country to gain control over its drug problem; the continuing dismay over crime, the disintegration of the family, teen suicide, and of course teen pregnancy. According to him the concern is further fueled by a belated and reluctant recognition that the unprecedented number of political scandals throughout the past decade were symptomatic of a virtual ethical vacuum in government.

Research concerning the nature and extent of youth violence in Canada is limited; much of what is known about youth violence in schools is based on research reports from the United States. In Canada, there is evidence that youth violence may be much greater than is currently

recognized due to the problem of under reporting. However, there is enough youth violence in Canada to warrant a public concern (Bala, Weiler, Copple, Smith, and Paetsch, 1994). Bala *et al* reported that "while schools in this country are generally considered to be safe places to learn..., many students, parents and teachers have expressed deep concerns about school violence" (p. 93).

Many researchers believe that violence in schools reflects violence in society, and some educators allude to the proposition that the levels of crime, violence, and injustice that exist in a society is a direct reflection of the low level of self-esteem (McAllindon, 1981) and morality that exists in that society (Lasley, 1994; Taylor, 1986).

Attempts of educators to stem violence and address the moral needs of children are certainly not new. The great Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, were all concerned with moral education and devoted much attention to it (Horsely, 1982). Thomas Jefferson spoke of an educational plan that would have raised the mass of people to the high level of moral responsibility necessary to their own safety and to effective government. Some of the more recent educational reformers, such as Horace Mann, and John Dewey, saw teachers and schools as crucial to the moral education of youth and the moral health of the society (Ryan, 1981).

Many of today's educators and learning theorists recommend that schools should foster moral education (Elias, 1989) and that moral education should be used to eliminate the vices of our society. Taylor (1986), for example, in response to Great Britain's Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups (Swann Report), emphasized the need to take cognizance of the important role of moral education:

> Although the Swann Report stresses its concern to change attitudes and behaviors. . . it does not recognize in any coherent way the pre-eminent potential of moral education to address the questions of values, dispositions and understanding in a culturally plural society. Moral education in schools is concerned with getting pupils to hold right attitudes and act rightly for good reasons. Morality requires that people should be treated equally, unless there are relevant differences which require different treatment . . . . Moreover, in so far as moral education, specifically and fundamentally, is also concerned with developing an understanding of the concepts of "person", "justice", "equality" and the disposition to bring these to bear in action this should have an enhanced role in a multicultural society where

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additional questions arise about how cultural pluralism is to operate, how people from various cultural backgrounds are to be treated and how conflicts about cultural matters are to be resolved (p. 73).

The opinion of this renowned British educator, is corroborated by Donald Vandenberg (1990), an American educator, who construes the development of moral agents as one important way to respond to moral crisis in society. In his view, the duty of the moral agent is to respect the dignity of all human beings in the sense that Kant's categorical imperative suggests--to treat people not simply as means to an end, but rather, as ends in themselves. Vandenberg argues that the development of such moral agents can be done in the classroom setting by establishing the rules of equality and freedom as they are necessary to maximize learning.

Indeed, educators are in the middle of the debates about how moral growth should be accommodated, and what values should be espoused. The cultural debates continue to rage, with some right-wingers demanding that schools and parents teach specific values and those with more libertarian views arguing that any imposition of adult values is wrong and an infringement on the rights of the young people. However, as Lasley (1994) points out, regardless of what political stance an individual takes, the ultimate responsibility falls to parents, schools and communities to actually inculcate value dispositions in children.

In the Canadian context, William Belanger (1993) claimed that "the teaching and learning of values in elementary and secondary classrooms has been a continuing issue in education. However, an adequate conceptual framework for studying the imparting of values in educational settings is lacking" (p. 111). This study purports to analyze the prospects of teaching morals in public schools. Hence, some of the major foci of the present study are (a) to examine issues that surround the development of a conceptual framework that could be useful in impartating moral values in the classroom, and (b) to attempt to develop one. Specifically, the study would be concerned with questions about what kind of morality is considered appropriate to foster, what is its content, and how it might be taught.

I proceed by speculating three main reasons for the the lack of adequate conceptual framework for imparting values in Canadian schools. The first reason has to do with the fact that most teachers and educators seem to be in agreement about the idea that values are imparted in a

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variety of ways and that the impartation of values permeates all aspects of education. As such, value consciousness can be left to the vagaries of self discovery by the child. The "Value Clarification" approach which has been used in Canadian schools, for example, presents an indirect method of moral education and character formation. The work of the teacher is to help students "clarify their values", not to come to know the teacher's values or the moral ideas which the human race has uncovered over the centuries, but simply to have a clearer, more vivid sense of their own values. This approach demands a morally neutral role for the teacher, lest he or she indoctrinate or impose values and moral principles on the child (Lasley 1994). It ignores classical ideas, such as having the young study virtues such as responsibility, courage, kindness or the all encompassing virtue of respect for human dignity in oneself or in others. In other words, the value clarification approach underestimates the importance of parents and educators in establishing pupils moral priorities (Wynne and Ryan, 1993). However, with such value/moral education programs in place, educators are oblivious to the need of more rigorous moral education programs.

The second reason is related to a cardinal problem which was pointed out by Boyd (1988), that "It is difficult to synthesize what moral education looks like in Canada today as it is difficult to formulate a sense of Canadian identity transcending its cultural mosaic" (p. 153). Most Canadians are familiar with the mosaic metaphor that is commonly used to express a peculiarly Canadian social ideal. That is, the official line that we should not follow, and are not following the experience of United States, in terms of how society deals with ethnic differences. In the United States, at least in the formative years of the country, differences are to be submerged and blended in the "melting pot". In Canada, however, since 1971, these differences are to be acknowledged, and even celebrated as unique, and indispensable pieces of the overall, coherent picture of Canadian society (Troper, 1978). Since it is not clear what moral education we should teach, it is not clear how to develop a conceptual framework to impart it.

The third reason is attributed to the confusion associated with the use of the term "moral education". The moral sphere is complex precisely in that various people, including professional philosophers, have such different accounts to give of it. There is not only sharp disagreement as to what kind of behavior is morally acceptable, and what kind of actions are good; there is an equally great divergence of opinion as to what it means to call something 'good' (Barrow, 1975).

Suppose we assume that the objective of moral education is to enable our children acquire good character. Of what does good character consist?

Let us now attempt to address the aforementioned issues systematically. It is apparent that the indirect method of moral education has not achieved much in getting our children to acquire the desired moral character necessary for coping with the complexities of the Canadian society. Today, from all sides, schools are being urged to return to a more traditional, more vigorous direct teaching of moral values (Starratt, 1994; Ryan, 1994). Similar situations exist in the United States and Canada where there are complaints and pleadings for the schools to take a clearer, stronger role in teaching the young the enduring habits of good character. However, in order to pursue such an objective in any democratic, multicultural society, there is a need for a strong value consensus; one that is too important to leave to the vagaries of self discovery by the child. Moreover, to fit the Canadian context, such values should be those which are likely to be upheld as important by all cultural sectors which make up the Canadian mosaic. In a society made up of diverse religious and cultural traditions, getting people to agree on the proper ethical response to a situation is difficult, and in some cases impossible. The situation is compounded in the Canadian society, where there is a strong tradition of separation between secular governments and religious bodies. This separation tends to bring an added fear that teaching moral and ethical values in state supported schools will necessarily involve the state in supporting a form of religious orthodoxy. The situation becomes so sensitive, such that even though, as Ryan (1994) and Todd (1996) claimed, almost everyone thinks we should teach ethics in schools, someone always punctures the proposal by asking "whose ethics would we teach?" Fearing the controversy and the animosity which might result in attempting to promote an explicit ethical stand, school administrators and teachers tacitly and tactfully avoid ethical discussions (Starratt, 1994).

In order to address this controversy, let us suppose that we are sufficiently concerned about the problem of children and youth growing up with weak ethical foundations. Granted that we live in a pluralistic society and that we value the diversity such pluralism lends to public life, we can nonetheless agree upon very basic values which schools should teach. Lickona (1991) argues for the teaching of two basic values of respect and responsibility. Let us consider respect for the purpose of this discussion. Few people would argue that every person is entitled to a basic respect

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for his or her person. No one has the right to deny a person that basic respect. Likewise one should respect himself or herself. No one should heedlessly endanger her or his own life. Lickona (1991) extends this basic virtue of respect to the environment, that whole web of life that sustains us. Respect is the root principle behind many ethical "don'ts". For instance, if we respect ourselves, other people and the environment we would not do X, Y and Z. Kidder (cited in Todd, 1996), the author of *Shared Values for a Troubled World*, considers respect for the dignity of all people to be the highest universal moral value. Respect for human dignity is not only considered to be universal; it is also considered to be the highest compared to other moral values. In philosophical literature, respect for dignity of humanity in oneself and in other people are given the specific terms "self-respect" and "respect for persons." Self-respect and respect for persons transcend cultural beliefs and religious boundaries. Kidder summarized his opinion poll of religious leaders and some policy making individuals in society with regards to respect for human dignity:

> Jesus taught we should treat others the way we'd like to be treated. The Jewish Talmud said: "That which you hold as detestable, do not do to your neighbor. That is the whole law: the rest is but commentary." Islam says "none of you is a believer if he does not desire for his brother that which he desires for himself." Confucius said: "Here certainly is the golden maxim: do not do to others that which we do not want them to do to us." Similar teachings exist in Hinduism and Buddhism.
>
> The former president of Harvard University, Derek Bok, says you must never demean people. Reuben Snake, president of the National Congress of American Indians, said respect means seeing that the same spirit that is in you is in the other person (Kidder, Cited in Todd, 1996, p. D20).

Furthermore, most philosophers and some educators construe self-respect and respect for persons to be of fundamental importance in ethical theory. Downey and Telfer (1969) opined that self-respect and respect for persons are the regulative moral principles. According to Rawls (1971), self-respect is a primary good. Strike (1979) explicates the concept of "primary good" to be "something a rational person wants whatever his or her conception of the good, because it turns out to be a prerequisite to the achievement of other goods" (p. 42). McAlindon (1981), shares his

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ideas on how society as a whole, and education in particular, can help to make a better match-up between the needs of our society and the needs of the people who make it up. He suggests seven educational shifts that have to be made in order to realize this objective. The first on his list of the educational shifts is that we must teach self-esteem and self-respect:

> There is nothing that is more fundamental to effective living than a sound base of self-worth. Developing a belief in ourselves should be a fundamental end result for all educational activities. The more we build our self esteem, the more we build our capacity to contribute to our society. The level of crime, violence, vice, business disharmony and social injustice is a direct reflection of the low level of self-esteem that exists in society. The ability to respect ourselves determines the degree to which we can respect others. The person who learns to 'split the atom' but has no self-esteem or respect for human individuality is a potential monster (p. 87).

Another reason for teaching self-respect and respect for persons in Canadian schools is that self-respect and respect for persons are acclaimed at the level of general policy of education. For example, Ontario's explicit guidelines on moral education, the normative core of all suggestions in the document *Personal and Societal Values* states:

> In general, Canadians consider some values to be essential to the well-being of their society. These values reinforce the democratic rights and responsibilities of individuals and are based on the belief in the fundamental worth of all persons regardless of race, creed, color or background. . . .Respect for self and respect for others provide the cornerstone of school programs. . .(p. 6).

However, it is not apparent that the theoretical claims in this document has been translated into practice. Cochrane and Williams (1977; 1978) reported their findings on the the extent to which provincial ministries of education in Canada had developed official public policy concerning moral/values education for public schools and to appraise the extent to which such policies were reflected in practice. They concluded that ministry policies and practices were "generally disappointing" and speculated that:

> among the more obvious reasons for the dismal situation in Canada were confused notions of the field, ignorance of recent theory and literature, fear of controversy, including

religious and denominational friction, and public apathy and disagreement about the role of schools in influencing student values, moral thought, and conduct (Cochrane and Williams, 1978 p. 10).

They also suspected that success or failure in publicly supported enterprises in values and moral education is related to the presence or absence of several factors: "a clear conception of the endeavour; awareness of the relevant literature and theory; policy that legitimates the activity; a strong sympathetic minister or ministry of education; resources for teacher training; and a secure link among university, field personnel, and ministry" (Cochrane and Williams, 1978, p.12-13).

There are a number of factors that may mitigate against a successful development of a coherent public policy concerning values and moral education for public schools. I intend to focus on two of the issues hilighted--ignorance of theory and literature, and fear of controversy.

I had already argued that the terminal values of self-respect and respect for persons transcend specific cultural as well religious traditions. They are values that are upheld by Judeo-Christian, Islamic, Eastern and other religions, as such, teaching them will not necessarily suggest a notion of supporting one particular religious belief and the question of the fear of controversy should not arise.

As Cochrane and Williams (1978) suggested, in order to develop a proper policy concerning values and moral education in public schools there is a need to have a clear conception of the endeavor; awareness of the relevant literature and theory. As a major part of this study, I intend to analyze philosophical literature on the subjects of self-respect and respect for persons to determine if there is a fit between their meaning in theoretical literature and how they are used in studies which have endeavored to implement them into a curricular enterprise.

1.1   RESEARCH FOCUS

Few will argue that in order to teach any concept, be it science or value concept, a teacher needs to understand the meaning of the concept. To say it in a more specific way, the clearer the understanding a teacher has about a concept, the more effectively he or she is able to transform the concept into curricular activities. In the domain of moral education, increased interest has been

shown in methodological and curricular questions, albeit, with a linguistic, conceptual shift away from "moral" and towards "personal and social" education. "Helping the pupil to get in touch with his or her own values" is the theme for the *Values Clarification* program, for example. The present study advocates the identification of definite moral concepts to be imparted, clarify the assumptions surrounding their meaning from philosophical persepective, and then attempt to transform the concepts into curricular activities.

This study works towards developing a conceptual framework for teaching self-respect and respect for persons in the classroom. Hence its main focus is to analyze the meaning of self-respect and respect for persons as articulated in philosophical literature and to examine the relationship between their theoretical meaning and their use in empirical investigations in curricular settings.

A secondary purpose of the study is to synthesize through review of philosophical literature the attributes of someone who possesses self-respect and/or respect for persons, to determine how the attributes have been measured. This is followed by some innovations for the of teaching self-respect and respect for persons in the classroom.

1.1.1   Research Questions

Based on the research focus, the following research questions are addressed:

- What is self-respect?

- What is respect for persons?

- What are the attributes of someone who possesses self-respect and respect for persons?

- How have these attributes been measured in empirical studies?

- What has been most successfully accomplished by these measures?

- What has been least successfully accomplished by these measures? Why?

-What are some of the innovations for teaching self-respect and respect for persons in the classroom?

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1.2   RESEARCH RESOURCES

- Philosophical Index on CD is used to compile literature on the subjects of self-respect and respect for persons.

- The Mental Measurement Yearbook in print and on CD, and the Psycho social Instruments on CD, were used to cite instruments designed and used for the measurement of self-respect and respect for persons.

- The Dissertation Abstract International on CD was used to cite some studies done in this area.

- The UBC Psychoeducational Research and Training Center was used to locate any instruments which are considered appropriate for the measurement of self-respect and respect for persons constructs.

- The Inter-Library Loan scheme was employed for accessing some instruments and Dissertations which are pertinent to the study.

1.3   JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY

This study is a conceptual analysis. It presents the philosophical theorists concepts of self-respect and respect for persons and the researcher's use of the concepts in curricular investigations.

- Theoretically, respect for self and respect for others should provide the cornerstones of school programs in Canada. Yet, no studies were found in Canadian literature on self-respect and respect for persons.

- Self-respect and respect for persons are indispensable virtues for any citizen of a democratic government and a knowledge of relevant literature on these subjects should be accessible to all educators.

-The study will compare the theoretical meaning of self-respect and respect for persons, and their use in empirical studies thereby attempting to close the gap between the theoretical

and the practical (or theory and research). Not many studies of this nature are found in the literature.

-This study will attempt to provide a conceptual framework for imparting respect self-respect and respect for persons, for investigative purposes or for actual classroom situations.

1.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

- Many educators have suggested the use of moral education to stem societal problems. One way to start is by exploring the implications of returning moral values to our classrooms.

- This study will throw some light on the concepts and the usages of the terms "self-respect" and "respect for persons".

- The study will also reveal some existing instruments designed to measure the concepts of self-respect and respect for persons.

- Since educators are beginning to talk about ethical values again, it is hoped that this study may serve as a catalyst.

- The study may highlight the significance of the relationship between levels of crime in society and the possession of self-respect and respect for persons by members of that society.

1.5 DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following terms are defined for clarity, and the specification of the procedures of the study.

1.5.1 Moral Education

Moral education is what the school does, directly or indirectly, to affect both the students' ethical behavior and their capacity to think about issues of right and wrong (Horsley, 1982). More specifically, moral education aims to develop in people the capacity and inclination to adopt the moral point of view i.e., to develop an understanding of and inclination to use higher order principles, themselves defensible in terms of logic and human interests to determine what ought to be in particular cases and in recurring situations (University of British Columbia Moral Education Research Center, 1972).

1.5.2 Values

A value is an idea, a concept about what someone thinks is important in life (Fraenkel, 1977). Values are key to the survival of the species, homo sapiens (Horsley, 1982). Values are determiners that tend to indicate man's choices in life and thus his behavior.

1.5.3 Attributes

The Canadian Dictionary for Schools defines 'attribute' as "something that is thought of as belonging to a person or thing, such as a quality or characteristic". For example: darkness is an attribute of the night.

1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

This study is a conceptual analysis of the prospects of teaching self-respect and respect for persons in public schools. It consists of four chapters:

Chapter One is an introduction to the study. Chapter Two is comprised of fairly detailed reviews on the concepts of self-respect and respect for persons from philosophical literature.

Chapter Three is a review of literature of empirical studies involving the concepts of self-respect and respect for persons. Here, a comparison is made between the meaning of the concepts of self-respect and respect for persons in the philosophical context and the use of the concepts in empirical studies. Chapter Four is a discussion on the innovations of teaching self-respect and respect for persons in the public schools, followed by recommendations for further research studies in this area.

CHAPTER TWO

SELF-RESPECT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS
A PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Bringing children to have respect for themselves and for others is generally regarded as a central task of moral and social education. This task is realized through the various social educational aims such as "getting children to care", "to be compassionate", "to have empathy", and to have a valuing attitude towards oneself and towards other people. These are usually not regarded as educational goods the way solving mathematics problems or writing compositions are. They belong to the domain of moral education and are part of the "hidden" curriculum. The values that teachers are concerned with here, are moral values, for it is these that are involved in our view of what is acceptable and just, and that govern our behavior. In the classroom situation, teachers assume that the need for children to respect themselves, their peers and their teachers is an important need, without at all asking from what considerations these needs arise.

The present review sets out to examine the contingencies upon which the need to respect oneself as well as other persons are grounded; that is, what justification is there for the call to have self-respect and respect for persons? Undoubtedly, if moral values are to be examined at all, they have to be examined in a philosophical manner rather than by any empirical science. That is to say, one has to rely on applying critical thought to arguments that may be put forward in favor of valuing one thing rather than another. In this case, for instance, one has to probe such arguments as deeply as one can for more detailed account of what precisely is meant by having respect for oneself and for others and why this "respect" argument is a plausible one. The reason for this exercise, as I mentioned in chapter one, is to provide an adequate understanding of the reason behind the need for such behavior or attitude. This information should be made accessible to teachers and other educators who may employ the use of the terms "self-respect" and "respect for persons" in everyday language without taking the time or pains to consult philosophical literature themselves on these subjects. Secondly, I have proposed that the concepts of self-respect and

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respect for others can be taught in the classroom just like any other concept if only teachers have a clear understanding of these concepts as well as the logistics of their implementation.

2.1 SELF-RESPECT

A person who doubts himself is like a
man who would enlist in the ranks of
his enemies and bear arms against himself.
He makes his failure certain by himself being
the first person to be convinced of it
Alexandre Dumas [(cited in Purkey, 1970, p. 20)
(See Purkey in reference section)].

In recent decades, the notion of self-respect has gained prominence in moral and political philosophy. While some philosophers have attempted to understand what exactly self-respect is or what it may consist in (e.g. Dillon, 1992; Hill, 1973; Massey, 1983; Meyers, 1989; Rawls, 1971; Sachs, 1981; Telfer, 1968), others have appealed to self-respect in order to justify or support certain further claims with regards to the infringement of the rights of persons, often without providing much of an account of its nature (see Boxill, 1973; Held, 1976; Postow 1979; Strike, 1979). Both those who appeal to self-respect as a means of justifying the aforementioned claims, and those who focus their efforts on determining what self-respect is assume that self-respect is an important moral good. All persons, they assume, ought to respect themselves or ought to have self-respect. Conspicuously absent from discussions on self-respect are reasons supporting the claim that all persons ought to respect themselves.

Most contemporary discussions on self-respect contain, either explicitly or implicitly, Kantian sentiments and themes. Stark (1993) opined, and I concur, that the absence of support in recent accounts for the idea that all persons ought to have respect for themselves may simply reflect the extent to which these discussions find their roots in Kant, for Kant provides an argument for the claim that persons ought to respect themselves. In Kant's argument, persons *necessarily* regard themselves as having a special worth. Hence the duty of self-respect, is not a duty to acquire and sustain a sense of one's own worth, but rather to preserve or refrain from disavowing the worth that one, on full reflection, knows oneself to have. Recent commentators on self-respect

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may be assuming that the Kantian argument is fundamentally sound and that consequently there is little need to provide support for the notion that persons ought to respect themselves.

Those whose interest in self-respect may have been stimulated by Rawls' (1971) account of the relationship between self-respect and justice, and therefore have views that are less related to Kant's view, may have neglected to concern themselves with supporting the idea that persons ought to have self-respect because they find Rawls' remarks about the value and importance of self-respect compelling. Postow (1979), for example, from the eloquent argument put forward by Rawls " ...Without it [self-respect] nothing may seem worth doing , or if some things have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them" derives a conclusion that "Undermining a person's self-respect harms her or him in a fundamental way by attacking at its source the possibility of that person's flourishing" without furnishing any supporting argument for Rawls' line of reasoning.

This review consists primarily in a systematic examination of the views of self-respect advanced both by Kantian and Rawlsian accounts in order to establish the moral benefits of self-respect, and subsequently the need to teach self-respect in public schools. The justification for the value of self-respect therefore becomes an important aspect of this review. For any argument supporting the impartating of self-respect in the classroom to be worthwhile, it has first to show why persons do possess or need to possess a proper sense of self-worth, for indeed, it is generally believed that a person's self-respect is dependent on her sense of self-worth. But first, let us look at the nature of self-respect.

2.1.1   The Nature and Complexity of Self-respect

Before one can consider the plausibility and adequacy of various arguments for the the value of self-respect, one must have a clear grasp of the nature of self respect as well as its complexity.

Many of us have an intuitive idea of what it means to have or to lack self-respect. We have some ideas about how a self-respecting person acts or ought to act, the grounds on which people have or ought to have self-respect, and the ways in which people lose their self-respect. Yet when one is pressed to characterize self-respect, one realizes that it has many features, some of which are

in tension with others; that it has a variety of grounds, both subjective and objective (Massey, 1983); that it is connected with other aspects of our self-conceptions such as self-esteem, self-regard and self-confidence, and that it is related to certain emotions such as pride, shame and doubt (Dillon, 1992).

The difficulty in pinning down the notion of self-respect reflects its tremendous complexity. Self-respect is not a simple concept that can be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, it is a multifaceted notion that involves a constellation of attitudes, beliefs, desires, dispositions, actions and emotions.

In an attempt to bring the concept of self-respect into focus, I cite some philosophical theorists and their definition of self-respect, as well as ways in which the notion of self-respect could be used.

It is notable how often the concepts of "self-respect" and "self-esteem" have been used interchangeably among philosophers. In defining self-respect, it might be worthwhile to distinguish the two concepts. Rawls (1971) used the terms interchangeably throughout his discourse on the subject. He conceives self-respect (or self-esteem) to include (a) the "secure conviction that one's conception of one's good, one's plan of life, is worth carrying out and (b) "a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfil one's intentions" (p. 440). Telfer (1968) offered two definitions of self-respect, following her argument that there are two kinds of self-respect. In her opinion, "A man who has [conative] self-respect merely thinks he comes up to scratch" and to have "Some kind of favourable opinion of oneself" is to possess "estimative" self-respect (p. 114). Larry Thomas (1978) defines "self-respect" as a "sense of worth which we are justified in having in virtue of the fact that we are persons" (p. 308). White (1987) distinguished between self-respect and self-esteem by defining them separately. She stated: People with positive self-esteem have a favorable opinion of themselves. They see themselves, for instance, as having worthwhile ends in view and the necessary dispositions and the capacities to pursue them; or as having achieved something worthwhile; or as the possessor of some desirable attribute, like good looks, talents, or as coming from a "good family"... To have self-respect, by contrast, is to have a sense of one's dignity as a person. It is adversely affected when one's moral or political rights are impugned--if people treat one merely as a means to their own ends, for

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instance, willfully break their promises to one, subject one to degradation, humiliate one, patronize one. People can have a lively sense of self-respect, their antennae quivering at any possible infringements of their rights, yet suffer from low self esteem, believing for instance that nothing which they set out to accomplish could ever turn out well owing to their own inadequacies. Alternatively, I may be bursting with self-esteem, but have little self-respect (p. 87).

Meyers (1986) renders her own conception of self-respect by objecting to Rawls' definition. She argued that a person could have a worthwhile life plan, pursue it assiduously, and yet fail to exhibit self-respect. Her argument is contingent upon the fact that one can have a life plan which may not originate from herself, in which case her fulfilling it does not evidence respect for herself.

The above definitions suggest that self-respect is distinct from self-esteem, and that there may be more than one kind of self-respect. What seems to be consistent about the definitions of self-respect is the fact that self-respect has to do primarily with the recognition of one's personhood. Since being a person does not vary with any empirical property, everyone is entitled to equal respect and self-respect regardless of any characteristics which he or she may possess or lack (Strike, 1979). Thus, to have positive self-respect is to have a good conception of one's personhood and certain contingencies that come with being a person, such as being in a moral community, possessing certain moral rights, etc. In Shoben's (1983) terms, we can only develop self-respect relative to the context of our human experience:

To feel secure and to perceive a reasonable order in the world, we are dependent on the culture in which we hold membership, on the social arrangements that willy-nilly define our human context. Only in that context can we find the freedom to create and to assert our distinctive selfhood, and despite the struggle and the conflict that the process requires, to evaluate ourselves positively (p. 90).

There are several ways in which the notion of self-respect is used. The present study purports to categorize self-respect along two different dimensions. The first dimension examines the two kinds of self-respect, "recognition" and "evaluative" according to its appropriate grounds and objects and the second dimension is to consider the subjective and objective views of self-respect.

The terms "recognition" and "evaluative" were used by Dillon (1992) to describe two categories of self-respect and they bear some similarity in content with Darwall's (1977) "recognition" and "appraisal" respect, and.Telfer's (1968) "Conative" and "estimative" self-respect. Sachs (1981) used the terms "self-respect " and self-esteem" to characterize this distinction, albeit, in a more subtle way.

It is worthwhile to note that this categorization does not exhaust the phenomenon of self-respect. Dillon (992) and Stark (1993), identified other kinds of self-respect: "agentic" self-respect and "particularity" self-respect respectively, which do not neatly fall into the two categories mentioned above, although Stark (1993) views particularity self-respect as a variety of recognition self-respect.

The distinction of self-respect into two main categories serve several useful purposes. First, it helps us to understand the puzzle relating to our ordinary use of the term "self-respect". Second, it seems that, in fact, many of the ways that we tend to respect ourselves fall into one of these two categories. Finally, as we shall see, the distinction between these two kinds of self-respect is the key to untangling some problems in certain writers accounts of self-respect (e.g. Massey, 1983; Sachs, 1981).

The second dimension is that each of these two kinds of self-respect can be regarded in either subjective or objective ways. A thorough discussion on this notion was presented by Massey (1983) in his article "*Is self-respect a Moral or Psychological Concept?* Most philosophers are in agreement that self-respect can either be viewed objectively or subjectively. The overlooking of this distinction, like the overlooking of the distinction between recognition and evaluative self-respect is sometimes a source of confusion.

2.1.2 Kinds of Self-respect: Recognition and Evaluative

Let us consider the definition of self-respect offered by Telfer (1968) "Some kind of favourable opinion of oneself " (p.114). This favorable opinion may come about as a result of certain merits contingent upon one's performances or dispositions. Someone, for example, may have a favorable opinion about herself because she is a successful movie star or because of

qualities such as good looks or a disposition to some exceptional abilities. This implies that she views herself to possess certain qualities worthy of admiration and hence has a good opinion of herself. When we say "someone has lost their self-respect", we do not merely mean that the person ceases to think well of herself, but that she thinks badly of herself, regards herself as inadequate, below par and so on. The emotional aspect of the loss of self-respect is not merely the absence of pride in or the inability to take pleasure in one's accomplishments, it involves feelings of disgust, contempt and even despair. In this sense, self-respect seems to be a person's belief that she attains at least a minimum standard, and the emotional state, if any, that comes with this belief is that of peace of mind. Loss of self-respect then, is the loss of this belief, either as a result of conduct judged to fall short of a minimum standard, or because for some other reason one sees herself in a new and unfavorable light. Clearly, there are two distinct notions of self-respect embedded in the above moral discourse.

2.1.2.1   Recognition Self-respect

Recognition self-respect is the kind of self-respect that we tend to think all persons ought to possess and strive to preserve. Unworthy behavior, such as allowing one's legitimate interests to be ignored for no good reason, is viewed as evidence of, or as constitutive of its absence, or to put the point slightly differently, its absence is often evidenced by a person's unworthy conduct. If one claims for instance that a person did X or tend to do X (where X is something judged to be unworthy of him) because he lacks self-respect or because he has a diminished self-respect, she is referring to recognition self-respect. The label "recognition self-respect" derives from the fact that the view of oneself to which it refers consists primarily in recognizing that one is a person and weighing or taking into account this fact in deliberation and action towards oneself (Darwall, 1977). Specifically, it includes recognizing that one is a person; appreciating that persons as such have intrinsic moral value and therefore appreciating this fundamental worth. This demands that one act or be disposed to act only in fitting ways out of this recognition, appreciation and understanding (Dillon, 1992). Recognition self-respect then, is responding appropriately to one's personhood.

Recognition self-respect is alternatively characterized as an attitude, disposition, a motive, and a set of beliefs and desires (Boxill, 1977; Darwall, 1977; Hill, 1973; Massey, 1983; Strike, 1979; Telfer, 1968). A consideration of the variety of arguments presented by various philosophical theorists of ways in which one might be lacking in recognition self-respect suggests that each of these characterizations has some significance for self-respect, but that none of its own is sufficient. To illustrate, suppose one were to claim that recognition self-respect is primarily a disposition to act in certain ways. And suppose furthermore, that someone was well trained to act in a self-respecting fashion. On the dispositional account, such a person would be self-respecting in the recognition sense. Yet something seems to be missing. Despite the fact that this person acts as if she has self-respect, it is still an open question as to whether or not she actually respects herself. This suggests that recognition self-respect involves not only acting or being disposed to act in a particular fashion, but also requires certain beliefs about one's worth or status. Of course, it can be argued that one's beliefs are good predictors of her actions, but there is no guarantee that this is always the case. Hence, one must not only act in a self-respecting fashion in order to have self-respect; one must act in that way out of a belief in her value or worth. The converse is also true. That is, a display of an inappropriate conduct, does not necessarily suggest a lack of self-respect; one needs to know that this inappropriate conduct stems from certain beliefs that a person has about her own worth (see Hill, 1973).

Furthermore, imagine a person who both believes in her worth and is disposed to act in a way that expresses this belief. She asserts her rights when appropriate, refrains from allowing others to take advantage of her and so on. Yet, she never resents others mistreatment of her, does not feel angry or indignant when her rights are ignored. The absence of emotional engagement, might suggest that this person, though she believes in her worth in an intellectual sense, and is disposed to act in a self-respecting fashion, does not properly appreciate her worth (unless, of course one makes a decisive choice to forgive; see Holmgren's account of forgveness in section 2.2.2 below). She does not possess an attitude of valuing herself, and so, one might be prone to hold that she does not fully or adequately respect herself in the recognition sense. Strike's (1979) argument clearly supports this view: "A person who lacks self-respect may feel less entitled ... to

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fair treatment than others. Such a person may experience oppression or unfair treatment as fitting. 'People such as I deserve no better', will be the reasoning" (p. 42).

At the same time, we can imagine someone who seems to have an appreciation of her worth, as evidenced by her emotional response to mistreatment and shown perhaps by certain features of her conduct, who, nonetheless tends to allow others to mistreat her. She may for example, see with resentment when her legitimate interests are ignored, but refrain from asserting those interests or from expressing her judgment, to whom it may concern, that such conduct is inconsiderate. We ought to conclude of such a person, if she consistently and continually, over a long period of time, fails to act in accordance with a conduct depicted to be self-respecting, as outlined above, that she is lacking in recognition self-respect. Despite the fact that she has some appreciation of her worth, as shown by her emotional response to mistreatment, we cannot say of her that she fully possesses recognition self-respect, if she tends to allow others to treat her improperly. This aspect of self-respect was emphasized by Boxill (1977), in "Self-respect and Protest". He stated: "...persons have reason to protest their wrongs not only to stop injustice but also to show self-respect and to know themselves as self-respecting" (p. 59).

Two important considerations arise from the above analysis: Most philosophers' accounts of self-respect seem to place emphasis on acknowledging, asserting and valuing ones rights as an important way to respect oneself (Boxill, 1977; Hill, 1973; Howard, 1985; Meyers, 1986; Postow, 1978; Thomas, 1978; Shue 1975; Strike, 1979; White, 1987). Hill (1973) for example, argues that a servile person manifests the absence of recognition self-respect because such a person disavows her moral rights either because she does not know that she has these rights or lacks a proper understanding of what having these rights signify in the moral community, or because she does not properly value these rights (p. 97). Hill's (1973) claim implies that an individual respects herself in so far as she acknowledges that she has certain basic rights, such as the rights to fair treatment and insofar as she values those rights. But we might wonder why rights have anything to do with self-respect. The answer is that it is what those rights represent and protect that makes them relevant to self-respect (Dillon, 1992).

Another important consideration is whether or not one can have too much self-respect. How much self-respect is considered good or enough? Dillon argued that *servility* is not the only

failure of recognition self-respect. She opined that the *Arrogant,* is related to the *Servile.* The *Arrogant* has an exaggerated sense of her worth and what she is due, and so like the *Servile*, has a distorted view of the shape of the moral community. We might say that she credits herself with too much fundamental interpersonal worth. In this way her sense of worth is as deformed as the *Servile.* We can thus identify a continuum of attitudes or beliefs about one's interpersonal worth, with servility lying towards one end and arrogance towards the other. There are a range of other possible attitudes and beliefs between these extreme ends of the continuum.

The above may not necessarily represent an exhaustive account of the intricacies and subtleties of recognition self-respect. However, these illustrations, hopefully have served to show the complexity of recognition self-respect. It involves attitudes, beliefs, dispositions, desires and so on, some of which would be more relevant or salient depending on the context. Furthermore, the relative importance of these various features is often a matter of controversy. For instance, is a person who allow others to harm him without retaliating, because of commitment to pacifism, failing to respect himself? Some would say that because willingness to endure pain in certain instances is principled, he is fully self-respecting, while others might conclude that because pacifism sometimes encourages people to endure mistreatment and thereby to sacrifice some of their self-respect it is flawed doctrine. Those who draw the former conclusion place emphasis on a person's attitude towards himself in determining whether or not he has self-respect, while those who draw the later conclusion place more emphasis on a person's actions or disposition to act.

However, since it is quite cumbersome to infer all these implications in every discourse involving recognition self-respect, I will mostly refer to it as either an attitude or belief. Such usages admittedly do not do justice to its complexity and should not be interpreted as a commitment to a too narrow view of its nature.

From the analysis of recognition self-respect above, it is clear that although one can lack recognition self-respect, it would seem that one cannot lose it unless it is possible to forget both what one is and that one ever knew what one is. On the other hand, evaluative self-respect is the kind of self-respect that we sometimes lose. While the presence of recognition self-respect prompts us to engage in a worthy conduct or refrain from engaging in an unworthy conduct, the presence (or absence) of evaluative self-respect depends upon conduct already undertaken. Moreover, evaluative self-respect, unlike recognition self-respect is merited. It is something that persons earn by conforming their conduct, emotional responses, etc. to certain standards of worthiness. For example, one who believes that to commit adultery is improper behavior, might lose respect for herself after succumbing to an adulterous encounter. Consequently, not everyone is entitled to evaluative self-respect, and some instances of evaluative self-respect are unwarranted; instances where one estimates her achievements or conduct more highly than she ought to. Likewise, some instances of diminished evaluative self-respect are also unwarranted; when one persists in viewing oneself in a negative light as a consequence of expecting too much of oneself.

The *Self-Unforgiving* lacks evaluative self-respect in virtue of her abiding negative judgement of herself, but she also fails to respect an important aspect of herself--her fallibility. The self-respecting person is committed to living in accordance with her standards; but it is a fact about us as human agents that each of us is bound to fail in various ways and to varying degrees. For self-respect to respect our human reality, it must include the ability to accept oneself despite failure, even when there isn't much to feel good about oneself.

However, the *Indiscriminately Self-Accepting* is not a model of self-respect. The ability to accept one's imperfection because one knows that perfection is impossible, and to let go of one's failures because what is done is done, is essential to being able to live with oneself. But self-acceptance can also involve refusing to accept responsibility for one's avoidable failures and lapses, and such refusal is another form of not respecting one's fallibility. The *Self-Contemptuous* and *Self-Unforgiving* utterly disapprove of themselves; yet evaluative self-respect is not simply thoroughgoing self-approval or unconditional self-acceptance. Rather, evaluative self-respect would seem to require both humility and a healthy and honest sense of where and how we fail--a

deep and abiding acceptance of ourselves, not to be confused with self-approval, which merely endures through the negative judgements that generate shame and self-contempt (Dillon, 1992). As Shoben (1983) says "the test of self-respect lies largely in the grace with which we pay the tab for our chosen satisfaction and our style of negotiating with life's often troubling conditions. That state of secular grace depends heavily on actively claiming responsibility for our actions, particularly those actions that impinge significantly on others" (p. 91).

However, something further is required, as the *Self-Doubter* illustrates. For someone might judge correctly that he is living congruently with his standards and yet have no confidence in his ability to continue to do so. Or he might come to doubt that his values are really worthy of his commitment, or to have serious qualms about his self-judgements or even his ability to evaluate himself. Such self-doubt confounds self-respect. Thus, evaluative-self-respect requires not only positive self-appraisal but also confidence in it: Confidence that one will continue to be capable of living according to one's commitments, confidence that one has got one's commitments right, and confidence in one's evaluations and evaluative skills.

2.1.2.3   Connections Between Recognition and Evaluative Self-Respect

Although recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect are distinct attitudes, they are related to one another in several ways. First, we can think of one's evaluative self-respect as depending upon and fluctuating with, to some extent, one's preservation of her recognition self-respect. One has and expresses recognition respect for oneself by committing oneself to certain standards that are construed of persons as such (Stark, 1993). Were one to fail to meet these standards, her evaluative respect for herself would be lowered; she would negatively appraise herself in light of this failure (assuming that she is not inclined to unjustifiably approve of herself). One may lose evaluative respect for oneself in light of a wide variety of failures or perceived failures, which are not necessarily related to the preservation of one's recognition self-respect. However, a certain subset of instances of losses or reclaimation of one's evaluative self-respect relate to the maintenance of one's recognition self-respect.

A second connection between evaluative self-respect and recognition self-respect concerns unwarranted approval or disapproval of oneself. Imagine a person who is rarely disappointed in himself. Though he purports to have ideals, he forgives himself for almost any instances of failure to conform to them. He tends to re-interpret events so that he appears in a more favorable light or he makes excuses for his conduct. This person's failure to experience evaluative self-respect may indicate that he possesses inadequate recognition self-respect. His tendency to excuse himself when he acts inappropriately suggests that he is not sufficiently committed to acting in a worthy fashion or that he does not have the proper regard for the requirements placed on him by the status of being a person (Stark, 1993). We can also imagine a person with the opposite tendency--one who can never forgive himself for failures to live up to his ideals. He constantly berates himself for anything less than perfection. Arguably, this person is also deficient in recognition self-respect, albeit in a rather unusual way. A proper understanding of the requirements and responsibilities of being a person includes both an ability to devise standards for oneself that are realistic and attainable and a capacity to come to terms with one's failures to achieve one's ideals. One must be able to recognize, in other words, that one is flawed and imperfect and that there will always be room for improvement (Shoben, 1983). So, while we are bound to strive for our ideals and to suffer our own negative appraisals of ourselves when setbacks occur, we should not be obsessed with our failures, nor should we adopt ideas that make failure inevitable. The tendency to hold ourselves to standards that are too high and to berate ourselves unnecessarily for failing to meet them may be an expression of diminished recognition self-respect.

A final connection between recognition and evaluative self-respect concerns a particular manner in which one may come to regard oneself as having less fundamental worth than others. An individual who fails to achieve even the most minimum of standards may view herself as so loathsome that she believes that she is not entitled to the same basic decent treatment as others. Or a person whose standards are so difficult to comply with that he fails miserably and has, consequently, devastingly low evaluative self-respect may regard himself as deserving of mistreatment. These individuals come to see themselves as having less fundamental worth or dignity than other persons as a result of a particularly devastating loss of evaluative self-respect. In essence, these individuals misunderstand the ground of recognition self-respect. They neglect

to realize that they have a fundamental worth, based on their being persons, that is not affected by any sort of failure of character or achievement.

2.1.2.4 <u>Evaluative Self-respect and Self-esteem</u>

Some writers use the terms "self-respect " and "self-esteem" interchangeably. However, these terms seem to refer to two different notions. Moreover, once we distinguish between evaluative self-respect and recognition self-respect we can see that it is probably only evaluative self-respect which is similar to self-esteem. Both types of regard consist in a favorable opinion of oneself that is a product of an assessment of certain aspects of oneself. Moreover, both self-esteem and evaluative self-respect can be present where they are undeserved, as well as absent where they are deserved; one can unjustifiably esteem oneself just as one can lack self-esteem when by objective standards and criteria one ought to have it. People usually esteem themselves on bases of talents, skills, achievements, accomplishments, appearance, social status, to mention a few. In general, we do not attribute a lack of self-respect to someone who is ashamed of his mis-shaped hand or skin problem. Nor do we attribute a lack of self-respect to a student who persistently fails to grasp a certain mathematics concept. Rather, we assume that such an individual lacks self-esteem. A favorable regard for oneself based upon other features of oneself which are not directly relevant to one's character, should be understood as self-esteem. On the other hand, we can think of evaluative self-respect as confined to the positive regard one has for one's character.

2.1.3 <u>Toward a Justification of Self-respect</u>

The Kantian approach seeks to establish a duty of self-respect grounded in the nature of persons. Persons, as autonomous rational agents possessed of dignity, owe themselves and other persons this special moral status. For Kant, the moral worth of persons is not derived from the rational necessity of persons' regarding one another as having absolute worth. Persons, *qua* rational, on Kant's view, have absolute worth because, and to the extent that, they view,

themselves and others as having it. The worth of persons is a precept of practical reason and not a property of or fact about persons that is rooted in the mere possession of a metaphysical property or capacity.

The social contract approach represented by Rawls (1971) seeks to establish the value of self-respect on the basis that it is prudentially rational for persons situated in circumstances that are fair and impartial to choose a system of justice that guarantees self-respect for all citizens. It is arguable that both of these approaches are inadequate, for each presupposes that persons, either by stipulation or as a consequence of their rationality, regard themselves as having a special moral status and that this self-regard comprises, in large measures, the very notion of self-respect, the value of which is to be justified.

The idea that something about the nature of human beings bestows upon them a special moral status (which may in turn serve to ground their entitlement or duty to respect themselves) enjoys a distinguished place in the history of Western philosophy and is still widespread. Typically the feature of humans that is said to confer on them this special status is their capacity for rational thought. Halberstam (1994) opines that in America both philosophical influence of rationalism and romanticism are responsible for the great value which is placed on the rights of each person. In recent times certain other (mental) capacities have been offered as grounds for the special worth of humans (Downey and Telfer, 1969). Some of the alternatives to capacity for rationality offered by recent philosophers have been suggested in the context of clarifying or elucidating the idea that persons as such are owed a certain kind of treatment or respect, ought to be treated or regarded equally, or are entitled to respect themselves, and some have been presented as modifications of the Kantian principle that persons have intrinsic worth as rational agents (see MacLagan,1960). In virtually all cases, however, the discussion tends to *assume* rather than *establish* that the capacity proposed grounds the intrinsic worth of persons (see a more elaborate discussion of this under *Toward a Justification For Respect for Persons in Ethical Theory* later in this chapter).

2.1.4   Subjective vs. Objective Views of Self-respect

Both evaluative and recognition self-respect can be regarded either objectively or subjectively. According to the objective account, a person who respects himself believes that he acts in accordance with a standard conception of worthy behavior and has confidence that he will continue to do so. On the objective view, standards expressing which dispositions, attitudes, responses and conduct are appropriate and standards for evaluating a person's character are said to exist or to be appropriately invoked independent of the agent's own beliefs concerning what is fitting, proper or good. To put it in a different way, the objectively self-respecting person must not simply value himself, but properly value himself however the notion of properly valuing himself is defined (Massey, 1983). For instance, suppose that someone possesses a high estimate of himself on the basis of the fact that he is extraordinarily emotionally independent. He prides himself in the fact that he does not need comfort, affirmation or emotional support, that he never feels the need to share his emotions. Now, some may want to say that this person's favorable view of himself on this count is unjustified. He is mistaken in believing, they might say, that extreme emotional independence is a good character trait.

In order to make the claim that a person's evaluative respect for himself is based upon a mistaken view of what kind of traits are good, one must appeal to criteria for making judgements of character that are independent of the criteria applied by the agent in question. Hence, someone who thinks it fitting to judge the rightness of a person's evaluative self-respect by evaluating his standards holds what is referred to as an objective view of evaluative self-respect. Those who regard evaluative self-respect subjectively would refrain from assessing the standards concerning character to which others hold themselves. This tendency to refrain from measuring the appropriateness of person's standards might stem from a commitment to the liberal idea that we should remain agnostic about individuals ways of life, as long as those individuals comply with the basic rules of justice. In other words, persons are entitled to devise ideals for themselves and those ideals should not be judged by others who may have a differing set of commitments.

There are two distinct ways in which persons' evaluative self-respect may be said to be unwarranted. On the one hand, one may be said to have unjustified evaluative self-respect on the

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ground that his favorable view of himself is based upon an objectionable ideal. On the other hand, one may be said to have unjustified evaluative self-respect on the ground that he mistakenly believes that he has conformed his conduct and attitudes to his standard. The person in the example described above, for instance, may believe that he does not rely on others for emotional support, when in fact he does. Or he may believe that he controls his emotions, when in fact they are perfectly transparent to the average bystander. Insofar as his positive view of himself is based upon the mistaken belief that he has conformed his conduct to standards, it is unjustified.

We can also utilize the example of the emotionally independent individual described above in order to illustrate the difference between an objective and a subjective view of recognition self-respect. Recall that the person described in the example views being emotionally expressive and relying on others for emotional support or for affirmation of one's feelings as unworthy of him. One who holds an objective view of recognition self-respect would regard it as appropriate to evaluate this person's standards of worthy behavior, just as one who holds an objective view of evaluative self-respect regards it as appropriate to judge the standards by which this person measures his merit. One who holds an objective view of self-respect might claim that emotional independence does not express or is not constitutive of self-respect. She may hold that expressing one's emotions or relying on others for emotional support (when done with sensitivity and in appropriate contexts) is not unworthy conduct nor is the need to rely on others in this fashion illegitimate or cause for reproach. Hence, she may conclude that the individual in this example does not respect himself insofar as he requires of himself that he mask his feelings, deal with emotional crisis alone, and so on. Indeed, she may conclude that such conduct expresses a lack of self-respect since it represents a failure to attend adequately to a significant aspect of oneself, namely one's emotional needs.

According to the subjective view of recognition self-respect, the person in the example has recognition self-respect as long as he believes emotional independence is worthy of him and is correct in his belief that he has achieved emotional independence. As long as he does what he believes to be worthy of him, he has recognition self-respect. Subjective recognition self-respect, then, consists exclusively in the fit between the requirements one places upon himself and one's conduct, attitude desire, and so on. Whereas a person who views recognition self-respect

objectively would claim that one whose standards are objectionable fails to respect herself, a person who regards self-respect subjectively would claim that a person respects herself as long as she believes that the standards by which she abides are unobjectionable. Or, to put the point slightly differently, a person fails to respect herself on a subjective view, only if she acts or responds in a way that she regards as unworthy. On the objective view, a person may fail to respect herself by acting in a way that she regards as unworthy, but she also fails to respect herself if she acts in a fashion that is unworthy, even if she regards it as worthy. Indeed regarding lowly conduct as worthy of oneself is, for the objectivist, a manner of failing to respect oneself.

The claim that all persons have to respect themselves is usually understood in the objective sense. The intuition it expresses is that individuals ought to conform their actions, dispositions, preference, desires and so on to standards appropriate for persons considered as such (Diggs, 1990; Frued, 1962). Persons ought for example to value their rights, assert their needs when appropriate, formulate ideas and goals for themselves, abstain from self-destructive behavior, and take responsibility for their actions. We shall call this "objective recognition self-respect". A subjectivist would endorse a notion that all persons ought to respect themselves, but he would not, in so doing, be advocating any particular attitudes, disposition or action. Instead he would be endorsing the notion that individuals ought to comply with their own conceptions of worthy or laudatory behavior.

2.1.5   Conclusion

We have identified two kinds of self-respect--"recognition self-respect" and "evaluative self-respect". We have also identified four distinct ways of looking at self-respect: "Subjective evaluative self-respect", "objective evaluative self-respect", "subjective recognition self-respect" and "objective recognition self-respect". I will now attempt to suggest certain attributes that ought to be present in a person or persons considered to possess recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect.

2.1.5.1   Attributes of Someone Who Possesses Recognition Self-respect

To possess recognition self-respect is a duty an agent owes herself by the virtue of the fact that she is a person. As already stated, persons, as autonomous rational agents possessed of dignity owe themselves self-respect. This kind of self-respect is grounded in the agent's fundamental moral rights. As such, an agent who is considered to possess recognition self-respect is one who adequately values and protects her rights as a person through the manifestation of certain actions, beliefs, attitudes etc:

1. Appreciates the special status she has as a person.

2. Always acts, or has a disposition to act in ways that are befitting to her moral status as a person.

3. All actions or dispositions to act must sustain a positive conception of one's moral worth.

4. Agent must be assertive of herself and her rights when appropriate.

5. Must take seriously any events in which her interests are overlooked or her rights violated.

6. Protests her injustices except where there are moral reasons to refrain.

7. Not servile or arrogant in attitude

2.1.5.2   Attributes of Someone Who Possesses Evaluative Self-respect

Evaluative self-respect is the kind of self-respect one gains or loses depending on one's sense of accomplishments or merits. It is to be enjoyed by conforming to one's conduct , emotional responses, attitudes etc. to certain standards of worthiness:

1. The agent must have some kind of favorable opinion about herself.

2. Accepts personal responsibility associated with the standard of worthiness which the agent perceives herself to have attained as well as those associated with standards of worthiness perceived by others

3. Feels that her projects are worth pursuing and actually pursues them.

4. Is not controlled by censure or praise from others.

5. Not self-contemptuous or indiscriminately self-accepting.

6. Is able to acknowledge her limitations with out engaging in self-doubt.

2.2   **RESPECT FOR PERSONS**

> Let People realize clearly that every time they threaten
> someone or humiliate or hurt unnecessarily or dominate or reject
> another human being, they become forces for the creation of
> psychopathology, even if these be small forces. Let them recognize
> that every man who is kind, helpful, decent, psychologically democratic,
> affectionate and warm, is a psychotherapeutic force even though a
> small one. Maslow, A. H. [(cited in Purkey, 1970, p. 43)
> (See Purkey in reference section)].

     The notion of respect for persons has been or can be used to justify a wide range of ethical and political positions [(e.g., laissez-faire and welfare state economics, the right to life and to abortion, patient autonomy and informed consent; the right to rebel and the denial of such a right) (Porto, 1986)]. We cannot judge the merits of these defenses until we evaluate the concept of respect on which they are based (Atwell, 1982). The central issues or problems which I address are related to the question of respect for persons, i.e., what constitutes this respect? Why are persons to be respected? And is respect for persons a basic moral consideration?

     The concept of respect for persons as we find in these defenses arises out of a certain historical context (namely, the rise of bourgeois capitalism and the French revolution) and receives its most crystallized expression in the writings of Kant. His second statement of the categorical imperative is most succinct: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only" (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1959, p. 47). This principle is conspicuous in recent moral philosophy and some of its adherents believe it to be the regulative principle of all morality: "The attitude of respect for persons" write Downey and Telfer (1969), "is the paramount moral attitude, and all other moral principles are to be explained in terms of it" (p. 33). Alan Donagan (1977) states: "It is impermissible not to respect any human being--oneself or any other, as a rational creature" (p. 66). According to Charles Fried (1978), "Right and wrong are expressions of respect for persons--respect for others and self-respect" (p. 9), which is tantamount to Brody's (1982) argument: "...there are actions which are the wrong thing to do precisely because doing them shows a lack of respect for persons" (p. 61).

As Kant's work clearly demonstrates, the original generation and subsequent evolution of the notion of respect is parasitic upon a historically developing understanding of the nature of persons i.e. the need to answer the practical/political question of how do autonomous, sovereign individuals, each a law unto themselves act together in a community--how should each monarch treat another monarch? Hence, a concomitant problem worthy of consideration is the idea of "persons". From what need and with what understanding does the notion of "respect for persons" arise?

Porto (1986), uncovered the origin of, ideological reasons for, and the legitimation of the theories of respect for persons by examining the works of Marx, Camus, and Foucault. She also demonstrated the consequences of reductive theories of persons through examining the writings of Kant and Heidegger). She demonstrated how the very question of persons (as autonomous, individual agents or as objects of social science) assume certain identity criteria, i. e., certain categorization of persons as objects of a certain sort, hence a categorization of what their relations, including that of respect must be.

A discussion of the reductive theories of persons is not intended here. I do not intend to answer the question "what are persons?" For one thing, it is almost impossible to focus our discussion at the level of persons as abstract individuals because to do so is to leave unexamined the social conditions from which this discourse arose, a social context that allows only for an abstract and inadequate sense of respect. Additionally, the question "What are persons?" is a complex question that assumes a number of false dichotomies and certain material conditions which are considered beyond the scope of the present discussion. However, in considering the nature of respect, it is inevitable to touch on, even though superficially, the entity of a person which accords him the moral status to be deserving of respect.

2.2.1 Toward a Justification of Respect for Persons in EthicalTheory

In this section, I intend to determine the place of respect for persons in ethical theory by attempting to answer three closely related questions: (1) "What is it to respect persons?" (2) "Why are persons to be respected?" And (3) "is respect for persons a basic moral consideration?"

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Different answers to these questions are developed by different philosophical theorists and examined by others. However, what is meant precisely by the term "respect for persons", whether in Kantian or other terms, is still a matter of controversy among philosophers (Darwall, 1977); and the logic, the justification, the implications of this moral claim in normative ethics are presented from different perspectives by different philosophers (Cranor, 1975, 1982; Darwall, 1977; Diggs, 1990; Downey and Telfer, 1969; MacLagan, 1960; Brody, 1982; Dillon, 1991; see also Johnson, 1982; Landesman, 1982; and Gruzalski, 1982). These perspectives form the major theoretical alternatives on the moral content and status of respect for persons in the philosophical literature. My task here, is to weave a logical structure of argument for the need to respect persons by examining the analyses of "respect" suggested in the main theories on respect for persons articulated to date.

2.2.1.1   <u>What is Respect for Persons?</u>

There is no dialectic method of approach to tackle the question of what it is to respect persons. Just like "self-respect", "respect for persons" is a difficult concept to pin down owing to its complexity. Similar to self-respect, it can not be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, it is a multifaceted notion that involves a constellations of attitudes, beliefs, dispositions, emotions and actions. Different definitions for "respect for person" given by various leading philosophical theorists show that no single definition addresses all these facets, but together they form an ideology that can aid us in understanding the concept. Gauthier (1963), defines "respect" as a "willingness to consider the wants of others as reasons for acting, and hence a willingness to accept the practical judgements of others, in so far as they are based on the consideration of all wants" (P. 119). This is similar to Rawls's (1971) expression: "Respect is the willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view, from the perspective of their conception of their good; and in our being prepared to give reasons for our actions whenever the interest of others are materially affected" (p. 337).

Whereas Gauthier and Rawls, place emphasis on the action (or a disposition to act) aspect of respect of persons, Diggs (1990) conceives respect for persons as a kind of belief or an ideal

way of viewing the other person's opinions as if it were one's own opinion. Implicit in this consideration is the idea that one should conceive others as having the same moral status that one accords oneself. Moreover, to respect other persons is not optional in the way to "like" other persons is. It is incumbent on any member of the moral community to respect persons, not merely because it is a morally good thing to do, rather, it is something we must render, something that is called for, commanded, elicited, due, claimed from us (Dillon, 1991). Respect, is a normative dimension of persons as such, for as Kant explicates, persons have worth which has no price, no equivalent for which the object of evaluation could be exchanged. To respect a person, therefore, is simply to acknowledge that worth. Hence, we respect someone by paying full attention to her and taking her seriously, considering her point of view in our decision making due to the immense worth we attach to her. To ignore, neglect, or disregard someone, or to take her lightly is to *not* respect her.

2.2.1.2   Why Should Persons be Respected?

Before considering the question of why persons ought to be respected, it is appropriate to mention that there is more than one kind of "respect" involved in the notion of respect for persons. Compare the views of Kant (In Doctrine of Virtue, 1964) and Freud (1962) regarding who deserves to be respected. Kant stated: " I cannot deny all respect to even the immoral man as a man; I cannot withdraw at the least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a man even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of that quality" (p. 463). Freud (1962) on the other hand argued that in order to be justifiably loved or respected, a person must deserve it in some way. In his opinion, love or respect presuppose merit. "I would be doing injustice to those who deserve my respect" he says, "if I were to show respect to those who do not deserve it" (pp. 56-57). These statements, although both referring to the subject of "respect" seem to express differing notions. This may be explicated by suggestions put forward by some philosophers that there is more than one kind of respect.

Darwall (1977) and later, Cranor, (1975) suggested that there are two kinds of respect involved in the respect for persons principle. Darwall devised the terms "recognition respect" and "appraisal respect". Dillon (1991) suggested four kinds of respect namely: obstacle respect,

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directive respect, institutional respect and evaluative respect. However, she claims that they fall neatly within the two categories of the two kinds of respect suggested by Darwall.

Downie and Telfer claimed that a "person" having the ability to follow rules is an appropriate object of respect (p. 28). For Kant (Doctrine of Virtue, 1964) "a 'person' seems to be a living entity capable of understanding, formulating and applying categorical imperatives to oneself and for Rawls (1971), a "person" is a human being with a conception of his/her own good and a sense of justice (pp. 337, 405). This kind of respect is due to a person who possesses the features that "qualify some living entities to be regarded as persons; not because they earn it through some good behavior or certain excellent performance. According to Darwall (1977), recognition respect has any of a number of different sorts of things as its object and consists, most generally, in a disposition "to weigh appropriately in one's deliberations some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly" (p.183). Since this kind of respect consists in giving appropriate consideration or recognition to some feature of its object in deliberating about what to do "recognition respect" seem appropriate.

Cranor (1975) construes Darwall's (1977) recognition respect to be the respect that is due all members of the moral community in having valuable traits that distinguishes them from animals and inanimate objects. He explicates the concept as follows: "This claim [that persons ought to be respected] is ordinarily understood to mean that all who are persons ought to be respected; hence the principle requiring such conduct "respect-for-persons". He later refers to this kind of respect as "consideration respect" (Cranor, 1982, p. 46). Moreover, we think of persons as having the "potential to perform a wide variety of actions whose performance we value greatly. According to Brody, (1982) there are, conditions that are necessary for (or at least facilitate) a person's being able to fulfill these potentials. To show respect for persons, therefore is "to value these actions by refraining from acting so as to eliminate these conditions and by acting so as to promote the abilities of persons to perform these valuable actions" (p. 66).

Embedded in the notion of recognition respect for persons is the consideration that persons have rights. Obviously, respect for persons need not be based on or reduced to observing the requirements of rights for as Landesman (1982) and Cranor (1982) pointed out, if it is held that persons are to be respected just because they have rights or that respecting persons is simply

having a proper regard for their rights the notion of respect for persons tends to lose an independent interest. In other words, respecting the rights of persons is necessary but not a sufficient condition to show respect for persons since there are cases in which rights are not relevant but morality requires that we should not behave in certain ways just because behaving in those ways is disrespectful of the persons involved. As Brody (1982) argued, it would be wrong to accept the freely made offer of another person to be your slave or to let you maim him in return for money, not because of any rights violations since relevant rights have been waived, but because of the disrespectful impediment to his personal capacities to perform valued acts if this offer were to be accepted.

However, since it is generally agreed that respecting persons involves at least not violating their rights, the relationship of respect for persons and regards for their rights is an important one and deserves consideration. The Kantian position as explicated by Atwell (1982) and the position developed by Brody (1982) suggest that persons are to be respected because of certain morally relevant features they possess. For Brody it is the capacity to perform certain valued acts; on the Kantian position it is that as well as other morally practical reasons. On both accounts, persons have rights to be regarded because persons are to be respected. Atwell (1982) dealt significantly on the observance of duties to oneself which, on the Kantian position, respect for persons requires. "For the most part," Atwell says, "I submit, when an individual disrespects humanity in his own person, it is not the case that he is (in any sense of the term) violating his own rights." (p. 27). Atwell (1982) by this comment is corroborating Kant's notion of "duties to oneself" as explicated in Doctrine of Virtues (pp. 417-8). Contrary to what one might suppose, duties to oneself are not duties to do that which might lead to the fulfillment of one's desires, that is there are not duties to act so as to benefit oneself; instead, they are duties to humanity in one's own person. And like duties to others they may be very unwelcome and extremely difficult to observe. Moreover, they are not duties from which we can release ourselves.

Another implication of the respect for person theories in normative ethics is that their interpretation is often given in utilitarian terms. For example, Downie and Telfer (1969) suggested that utilitarianism as a theory of public or social morality hardly makes sense at all unless we presuppose that persons are to be respected. In public morality, a particular action may relieve the

suffering of some and yet cause the suffering of others. The principle that is adopted in such situations is the utilitarian greatest happiness principle. But there is a problem with the utilitarian principle with regard to the call for respect for persons. The following scenario illustrates the orthodox objection to utilitarianism raised by Rawls (cited in Gruzalski, 1982)

Imagine a very large number of sadists who would enjoy watching an innocent person be tortured to death. The torturous killing will be obligatory on utilitarian grounds since it will likely maximize expected desirabilities i.e., the pleasures experienced by the large number of sadists would compensate for the pain and terror of the victim. Since torturing an innocent person to death shows absolute disrespect for that person the example illustrates dramatically the general objection that respect for persons plays no central role in the utilitarian program (p. 87).

Other arguments against utility with regard to respect for persons are that it does not take seriously the distinction between persons (Rawls, 1971), and it treats the principle of social choice as though it were merely an extension of the principle of rational choice for an individual (Johnson, 1982). The above example would in theory satisfy the conditions for utility since the greatest happiness principle is upheld. However, on the respect for person principle, this would create a lapse in the treatment of persons as separate and distinct as well as having fundamental moral importance. As Johnson rightly pointed out, "The problem with utilitarianism is that, in pursuit of universal impartiality, it ends up loosing individuals and replacing them with more or less interchangeable bundles of ideas" (p. 93). In the case of non-human animals, the implication that the individual is in principle replaceable by another is often accepted, but in the case of humans this is typically considered morally repugnant. Hence, Robert Nozick's (1974) declaration "Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people" (p. 39).

Gruzalski (1982), in his defence of utility rejects the use of the above as an appropriate example of the implication of the utilitarian program and replaces it with a more plausible example. He argued that according to utilitarianism we should help persons when calamities befall them as long as our helping them will not cause as much or more suffering than it is preventing. This he says is a prescription within the utilitarian program which has to do with the law of diminishing marginal utility. For instance, the last hundred dollars of a wealthy person is not likely to produce as much pleasure or happiness for that wealthy person as it would for a person who needed the

hundred dollars to prevent suffering from lack of food, shelter or medical aid. Thus, this observation shows that we should help a person who is suffering from the lack of food, clothing or shelter unless our helping will cause us to suffer from the same (or worse) calamities. Gruzalski's arguments are sound in terms of maximizing expected desirabilities, and respect for persons, especially if the rich person whose hundred dollars is to be given to the person lacking food gives it away voluntarily and not under coercion. However, I doubt that the other example he gives is based on the notion of respect for persons:

It follows, on utilitarian grounds, that we should not interfere with the liberty of others, since to interfere with others is a good way of causing frustration, discontent , anxiety and other modes of suffering. Within the utilitarian program, along with secondary rules like those not to kill, steal, and break promises, we must include a secondary rule to respect the liberty of persons because failing to do so is an effective way of preventing persons from obtaining the satisfaction in life they could otherwise obtain (p. 48).

Most philosophical theorists interested in the subject of respect for persons maintain that they are relying on and developing a central feature of Kant's moral philosophy and are *ipso facto* advocates of his claims. Some are serious critics of Kant, however, and they refute the whole ideology of the ethical implications of respect for persons (e.g. Landesman, 1982; Johnson, 1982). It is obvious that Kant implicitly regards every rational being as an important end in itself and hence deserves to be respected. However, Atwell (1982) argued that Kant very infrequently used the expression "respect for persons" (*Achtung fur personen*), *per se;* rather Kant emphasizes respect for the moral law. Kant holds that we human beings have no obligations to non-persons, such as animals or physical objects. His views on this is clearly expressed in *The Doctrine of Virtue,* (1964): "man can have no duty to beings other than man... his alleged duty to other beings is really a duty to himself" (p. 99). One can deduce that since Kant believes moral relations to hold exclusively between persons, and never between persons and things including animals, respect for the moral law would mean respect for persons. Moreover, in *Critique of Practical Reason* (1956), he argues that only a person would arouse respect in us, albeit, a moral person; thus, only in virtue of moral goodness, will a person awaken respect in us:

... to a humble and plain man, in whom I perceive righteousness

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in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head that he not forget my superior position. And why does my mind bow before this plain, humble yet righteous man? Do I really feel respect for him? Is my feeling of respect directly aimed at him? I bow to him, Kant writes, because his example holds a law before me which strikes down my self-conceit when I compare my own conduct with it; that it is a law which can be obeyed, and consequently is one that can actually be put into practice, is proved to my eyes by the act of that man (pp. 76-77).

After saying all of this, which suggests that at least one proper object of respect is an individual person, albeit a virtuous one and not all persons, Kant reiterates the familiar thesis that "this respect which we have for a person is really for the law..."(Critique of Practical Reason, 1956, p. 78). Thus, the sole object of respect is the moral law, although a person, yet only a virtuous person, can make us fully and explicitly conscious of that law.

The other kind of respect referred to as "appraisal" respect consists of an attitude of positive appraisal of a person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit. Accordingly, the appropriate ground for such respect is that the person has manifested characteristics which makes him deserving of such positive appraisal. This of course is not a mere admiration of someone for certain excellent performance. It is a complex relationship holding between a number of elements. If R respects P because R believes that P has characteristics F, then R must believe that P's having F is a good thing. By this logic, the reason for respecting someone must be some believed characteristic about the person respected because one cannot have an appraisal respect for another person for no reason at all or for any old reason (Cranor, 1975; Dillon 1991).

These characteristics, Darwall argues are, or are based on features of a person which we attribute to his character. Dillon (1991) perceives her "evaluative respect" to belong in this category, and she distinguishes between institutional and directive-respect (sorts of recognition respect) and an evaluative respect (a sort of appraisal respect) in the following way:
One can show institutional respect for a judge without thinking that he is a particularly good judge, or directive-respect the terms of agreement without regards to it's merits or demerits; but to have

evaluative respect for a person for her honesty is both to think that honesty is an excellence of persons and to evaluate her as more excellent than most (p. 111).

Dillon realized, however, that sometimes it is difficult to draw a line between the two kinds of respect. For example, institutional respect for a country's flag (which belongs to the recognition respect category), may involve viewing the flag as a symbol of a great country (which is a kind of appraisal respect). Similarly, it is hard to distinguish the respect we might have for a person as a rational being, and the respect we might have for her due to a consideration of her moral worth. For example, I might respect an astronaut for performing an outstanding experiment on the moon (appraisal respect), and at the same time respecting his moral worth (recognition respect) since rationality is an important characteristic of a human being and one that qualifies him to be in the moral community.

Cranor (1982) identified another kind of respect which does not fit in any of these two categories. He claims that there are cases where the notion of respect may apply to someone neither for his technical excellence (appraisal respect) or moral worth (recognition respect), but rather because of his taking a particular role. We speak, for example of respecting Smith merely because he is a doctor, not because he is a good doctor, when compared with all others. In doing so, we implicitly attribute to him a certain good-making qualities which we infer he has because of the role he is in. We may for instance, believe that he has a certain level of knowledge and expertise because he has graduated from medical school and passed certain examinations. Similarly, in primitive culture one might respect all who have passed through certain age set rites. This kind of respect is the attitude of identifying with the person, and Cranor term it "to identify with" respect.

2.2.1.3   Is Respect for Persons a Basic Moral Consideration?

Most philosophers allude to the idea that the theories of respect for persons are of fundamental importance in ethics. Some argue that respect for persons can be used to justify moral rights (Benn, 1971; Downie and Telfer, 1969) and duties (Gauthier, 1963; Rawls 1971) an agent

might have; as well as to enhance the principles of justice (MacLagan, 1960), and equality (Williams, 1970). Others have suggested that the principle of respect for persons may guide us in matters such as abortion (Benn, 1973) and doctors' treatment of patients (Ramsey, 1970). The constructs of "justice", "rights", "equality" obviously find their origin from, and are grounded in, the theory of normative ethics, and how these constructs relate to the respect for persons principle constitutes our main interest here.

Let us recall "appraisal respect" discussed earlier. Normally, the qualities for which a person receives appraisal respect must be effort-related in the sense that a person must do something through her voluntary efforts to bring them into existence, maintain them etc. However, for recognition respect a person's respectworthy features are non-effort-related natural abilities or capacities such as rationality or self-consciousness. Persons conceive themselves as possessing a special status which qualifies them to be worthy of respect. Therefore, to respect someone as a person in this sense, is to record, register or notice the fact that he or she is a person and to treat him or her accordingly (Cranor, 1982). Recognition respect for persons then, is identical to recognition respect for the moral requirements that are placed on one by the existence of other persons. Diggs (1981), in his article "A Contractarian View of Respect for Persons" devised a phrase "moral social morality" to explicate the phenomenon for reconciling the two rather conflicting ideals of our moral heritage--the ideal of moral freedom and autonomy and the other equally important ideal of social order and social morality. He states "...in view of human beings' extreme dependence on one another, and the social character of so much of human life, it is not surprising to perceive the reasonableness of an individual's views about how he should live to be partly a function of what is reasonable to others"(p. 219). He outlines what he calls the "imperative of a moral social morality" to be that each person who seeks to act morally is told to join others whenever feasible: (1) in acting in ways that each person together with others can reasonably and freely subscribe to as a common morality and (2) in treating each person in ways consistent with the person's developing and freely exercising his capacity as a rational being to govern himself.

Hence in moral social morality, the extent to which one may seek to exercise her rights of moral autonomy is the extent to which she must observe the moral social rights of others in the

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moral community. Rawls (1967) opined that even before we are in the position of considering the moral right of others we need to have a sense that our own dignity is protected by our moral community. He says:

> . . .the sense of justice is a necessary part of the dignity of a person, and ... it is this dignity which puts a value upon the person distinct from and logically prior to his capacity for enjoyment and his ability to contribute to the enjoyment of others (p.139).

2.2.1.3.1 Persons as moral agents

Let's take a look at Kant's second statement of the categorical imperative again "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only". Here he supposes that persons are ends in themselves, i.e.. beings that possess an absolute value which he calls dignity and then explains that on this ground they ought not to be treated merely as means to some other end, but always be treated as ends. Earlier, in *Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals* (1959), Kant argues that persons have the capacity for good will. This is the element of human nature that gives persons the status of moral agents and makes them responsible for their actions and attitudes. According to Kant this is also the element of human nature that imparts to them their intrinsic value. All human beings who have the capacity for a good will are equally possessed of intrinsic value; an intrinsic worth which is not defeated even by the character of our moral choices and attitudes.

2.2.1.3.2 Connections between respect and moral worth of persons

Charles Bailey (1975), in his article "Knowledge of others and concern for others", claimed that "respect" and "person" have a relationship whereby the latter implies the former. Thus if one possesses the proper concept of a person, one must, logically have respect for others: "Once something is conceived as a person, says Bailey, "most of the respect is already granted." (p. 97). Of course, we could question the plausibility of Bailey's claim here, but it is highly undesirable to completely reject it. Whereas the term "person" is not synonymous with "respect", it certainly

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elicits the idea of respect in our minds. Perhaps it may be more acceptable to say that respect is profoundly moral because it is tightly bound up with such morally important things as personhood, rights, agency, autonomy, integrity, responsibility. Let us consider some of the ways respect matters morally. First, respect is inextricably connected with what is constitutive of human worth. Recognition respect is respect of things with great moral significance--our personhood and standing in the moral community; our moral agency and capacity to be critically self-appraising, self-defining and self-directing (Dillon, (1992). The categorical imperative implies that :

(a) Each of us recognizes that the humanity in others confers an absolute value on them and requires that they always be treated as ends and never merely as means.

(b) Therefore the humanity in persons exists as an objective end or an end in itself.

(c) The fact that persons are ends in themselves, or beings that possess an absolute worth , requires that they be respected by others and by themselves.

(d) To respect persons is to take into account the fact of such possession of absolute worth by persons with a concomitant responsibility to reflect that fact in one's deliberations and actions towards other persons.

I would argue here, though, that the respect for persons principle as a basic moral consideration has more far-reaching implications than what is usually understood by the moral requirements of rights, equality and Justice. It is possible to observe people's rights, treat them as equals, and be just in our dealing with them and yet fail to respect them as persons. For instance, it may be considered "just" for a lender to demand the payment of his money even if that means that the debtor sells off the only pair of shoes he owns in order to pay back the debt. However, if the lender truly respects the debtor as a person who has dignity, he may be more inclined to consider writing off the debt to save the debtor from going without shoes than to insist on the settlement of his claim upon the debtor. Justice does not demand this consideration, but respect for persons does. As MacLagan (1960) points out, the principle of justice is implied by but cannot be equated with the principle of respect for persons The principle of respect of persons involves more than to be just. "What is involved in the principle of respect for persons is a valuation of persons that is absolute as opposed to relative or relational. We are required to regard each person as mattering absolutely, in the sense that in no circumstances can he cease to matter" (p. 289).

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From the foregoing discussions it is clear that the notion of respect for persons is a basic

moral consideration. In certain circumstances it involves the highest kind of consideration that is

possible to attain in morality. This is because the object of respect in this case is avowed the

highest possible status of moral worth. As Cranor (1982) points out, if the notion of a person is

not a morally normative one, then it will be difficult to show that the property of being a person is a

good-making feature of human or sentient beings or that respect for such persons is morally

required.

2.2.2   Relationship Between Respect for Persons and Self-respect

> A person who has been educated for living freely in community will
> be self-directed without being self-centered. He will be other-centered
> without being other-directed. He will be free from the domination of
> others' wills, but able to give himself fully in terms of insight,
> sympathy, and talents to fill others' needs.
> Paul Nash, Authority and freedom in education[(cited in Bellanca, 1975, p. 53)
> (see Bellanca in reference section)].

In section 67 of *A Theory of Justice,* where he tells us that self-respect is a primary good,

Rawls (1971) maintains that citizens' self-respect is promoted through the respect of other

individuals who share their values. The particular values that citizens have are affirmed by their

peers (i.e., those with whom they tend to associate) and they come to hold their values in high

regard. In this way their sense of worth of their endeavors is secured. Recalling the discussion

on self-respect earlier in this chapter, the notion of self-respect expressed in this reasoning is an

evaluative one and the kind of respect shown by others that encourages this evaluative self-respect

is appraisal respect (earlier referred to in this discussion). The story told by Lowry (cited in

Purkey, 1970) of a high school boy called Henry may illustrate and support Rawls' position.

Henry was an average high-school student who was unsure of himself and his abilities. The story

goes:

> There was a computer mouse error in computing his [Henry's] marks in one exam and his
>
> scores were amazing - 800's in both of the areas he was tested.
>
> When the scores reached Henry's school, the word of his giftedness spread like
>
> wildfire. Teachers began to reevaluate their gross underestimation of this fine lad,

counselors trembled at the thought of neglecting such talent, and even college admission officers began to recruit Henry for their schools.

New worlds opened for Henry, and as they opened he started to grow as a person and a student. Once he became aware of his potential and was treated differently by the significant people in his life, a form of self-fulfilling prophecy took place. Henry gained in confidence and began to put his mind in the way of great things (p.1).

Notably, Henry's self-esteem has been enhanced as a result of other persons' esteem for him, even though this esteem was gained as a result of an error. Self-esteem and evaluative self-respect are closely related in the sense that in both cases one has a favorable opinion of oneself as a result of a certain achievement. The point here is that if Henry earns some respect due to his good moral conduct (evaluative self-respect), for example, he would similarly feel good about himself.

There are also some claims that when an individual respects himself, he finds it easier to respect other people. Some studies have reported, for example, that there is a marked relationship between the way an individual sees himself and the way he sees others. Those who feel good about themselves tend to be more accepting of others (Trent, 1957), and perceive others as more accepting (Omwake, 1954). Further, according to Omwake, those who reject themselves hold a correspondingly low opinion of others and perceive others as being self-rejecting.

Elsewhere in *A Theory of justice*, Rawls also emphasizes the need for the respect of other individuals in order for persons to have self-respect. In these contexts, the respect of others that he describes is partly a variety of recognition respect. Let us consider the following passage:

[S]elf-respect normally depends on the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing (Sec. 67). Hence for this reason the parties would accept the natural duty of mutual respect which asks them to treat one another civilly and to be willing to explain the grounds of their actions (pp. 178-179).

Here Rawls seems to invoke two different notions of respect. On the one hand, to respect others is to honor their endeavors, which encourages them to believe in the worth of undertaking those endeavors, and on the other hand, it is to treat them civilly, attempt to see things from their point of view, and provide reasons for one's actions that affect them. We have reason to believe

from Rawls account of the respect of others in Section 67 that the first of these, honoring another's endeavors, is a variety of appraisal respect. The kind of respect shown through observance of the duty of mutual respect, however, is a kind of recognition respect. Providing reasons for one's actions, treating others civilly and so forth are ways of showing a type of regard that is owed to persons as such. Rawls later explicates the duty of mutual respect to be "...the duty to show a person the respect which is due him as a moral being, that is, as being with a sense of justice and a conception of the good" (p.337). Persons are owed respect, Rawls claims, on the ground that they are persons, where persons are understood as beings that are capable of conceiving and pursuing a life plan and understanding and abiding by the rules of justice. Hence, we have every reason to believe that the kind of respect exhibited through the duty of mutual respect is recognition respect.

My interpretation of Rawls' claims in the first passage then is that a person needs the recognition respect of the other members of the moral community in order for her to build up her evaluative self-respect. This would mean that the term "honor" in the first statement of the above passage is open to both an evaluative and non-evaluative interpretation. Robin Dillon (1992) explicates this distinction very clearly. She states:

> [W]e honor evaluatively worthy persons with admiration and appreciation, as we honor war heroes with medals. But the other meaning of honoring something is to accept it as legitimate as when a store honors one's check or credit card. In this sense, to honor or affirm a person's endeavors and conception of the good is to treat them as legitimate: To acknowledge that she has an equal right to pursue her plans (p. 215).

There are reasons to interpret the notion of honoring as it is utilized in Rawls quote above in the second of these two ways. There is some evidence, that Rawls might be expressing the idea that in order to have recognition respect for our endeavors, we need the recognition respect of others, which can be shown through the duty of mutual respect.

Of course, it is not an unreasonable psychological assumption to suppose that in order to sustain the belief that one's plans are worthy of pursuit one must experience certain kinds of ongoing public support of one's projects. So even though we are assumed to have recognition self-respect at the start, the parties in the original position, on this assumption about human psychology might rationally be concerned about sustaining self-respect. The interplay of self-

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respect and respect for persons as discussed above can be said to form the basis of the "moral social morality" proposed by Diggs (1990) and mentioned earlier in this discussion.

Sachs (1982) in his article "Self-respect and Respect for Others: Are they independent?" attempted to answer three closely related questions regarding self-respect and respect for others:

(1) Can a person notably lack self-respect and unqualifiedly respect others?

(2) Can a person who is not at all lacking in self-respect notably lack respect for others?

(3) Can a person not at all lacking in self-respect completely lack respect for others?

He responds to the first question by making a clear distinction between failings in self-respect and losses of self-respect. In his opinion, to allow cases that range from enforced surrenders to voluntary sacrifices of some of one's self-respect--is to allow for losses, diminutions of self-respect that are not instances of failings in self-respect. he states:

> [T]here is no reason why some people cannot truly say that for the sake of minimally tolerable existence for themselves and others for whom they are responsible, they have to surrender some of their self-respect , surrender it in that they have had to subject themselves to being abased. An enforced surrender of some of one's self-respect is not , however a sacrifice of self-respect; for the notion of a sacrifice strongly suggests, if it does not imply, a voluntary undertaking. There are, however, voluntary undertakings that may appropriately be termed sacrifice of some of one's self-respect. Thus in some cases a benevolent concern for the betterment of those dependant upon one or allegiance to the advancement of a cause one supports can prompt one to accept exploitative conditions or to engage in morally repugnant conduct. In such cases, in so far as one's objections or conduct does not waver, one will not to that extent abase oneself; moreover, one's very motivation may be to remove or ameliorate practices or circumstances that threaten abasement for those who depend upon one or those whose cause one has joined. Even so, insofar as the undertaking is voluntary, one will be abasing *oneself* and, consequently, sacrificing some of one's self-respect (p. 124).

Thus in Sachs' opinion, even if someone surrenders her self-respect voluntarily (sacrifice) or by enforced surrender for the betterment of those dependent upon one, there is some kind of loss of self-respect involved. So then it can be said that persons can be sorely lacking in self-

respect but unfailing in their respect for others. However, this is not a common occurrence, and although it can be true, it is not a truism. There are more occurrences in which we see persons who are scarcely deficient in self-respect, and yet sorely lacking in respect for others.

In considering our moral duty of self-respect on one hand and respect for others, on the other hand, I refer briefly to Holmgren's (1993) article "Forgiveness and the Intrinsic value of Persons". She maintains that even though most philosophers argue that the victim of wrongdoing is morally required to respect herself and must therefore resent a responsible agent, who wrongfully harms her, genuine forgiveness is compatible with self-respect of the victim, respect for the wrongdoer as a moral agent, and respect for morality. She outlines certain logical steps that the victim must take to come to the point where the genuine forgiveness will be appropriate. Some of the steps to be taken include the victim's recovering her self-esteem, she must recognize that the perpetration against her was wrong, and she must also understand why it was wrong. She needs to acknowledge her feelings, and allow herself to experience them in full. After the victim has gone through the appropriate stages, the victim can reach a state where she is willing to extend the attitude of goodwill towards the offender. Holmgren (1993) claims that " the victim who reaches a state of genuine forgiveness exhibits a strong level of self-respect. She is secure in her knowledge of her own worth and she does not allow herself to be held in the grip of the wrongdoers opinion" (p. 346).

This genuine forgiveness to me represents the optimum level of balance of the interplay between one's self-respect and the respect of others as moral agents. For, in order to respect ourselves, we must work towards developing the most appropriate attitudes. To respect ourselves we will also want to free ourselves of resentment and move to all the joy and happiness we can experience. And finally, in order to fully respect the wrongdoer as a moral agent we must recognize his intrinsic worth as a person. On Kant's position, each person has an equal amount of intrinsic value regardless of his moral track record. It follows then, that forgiveness is the appropriate attitude to adopt towards offenders in light of their intrinsic value as persons.

2.2.3   Implications of Respect for Persons for Moral Problems

The general argument of most theoretical moralists is that the more traditional moral positions--from utilitarianism to adherence to the Golden rule to prohibitions against killing, lying, stealing etc.--are in some sense subordinate to, and must be evaluated in the light of the attitude of respect for persons. Practical moralists are apparently in agreement with this argument and as if to corroborate this notion, practical moralists have made appeal to respect for persons for the sake of supporting almost every imaginable policy in regards to moral rights and duties--the rights to which a person is entitled out of respect and the duties we owe to others out of respect for them (Cranor, 1975; Atwell, 1982). Some of these moral rights and duties include capital punishment and its abolition, abortion on demand and the "right to life" policy, rigid restrictions on human subjects research and so on.

One major alternative account of respect for persons which has serious implications for moral problems is the rights-account. The main theses of the rights-account can be summarized in the following statements:

(1) The way to show respect for persons as persons is to honor the rights which they and all other people have.

(2) People have those rights just because the honoring of those rights constitutes showing respect for persons. In this way, the concept of respect for persons underlies an important aspect of morality.

Too often, the rights-account is employed in situations where decisions have to be made with regards to the aforementioned issues-- issues which tend to raise subtle problems for private conscience, public policy and constitutional law. Most of these problems are essentially philosophical, requiring a degree of clarity about basic moral concepts that is seldom achieved in legislative debates. I will discuss one of these issues in some detail just to illustrate the complexities of these kinds of arguments.

Let us take the abortion issue. Whether or not we hold abortion at a given stage of fetal life will depend on how we conceive of the unborn being at that stage of it's development ; on what characteristics we take it to possess, and on the moral significance we ascribe to those

characteristics. Thus, if we hold, as some groups of religious people (especially Roman Catholics) do that every unborn child must be regarded as a human person, with all the rights of a human person, from the moment of conception, then we will find it at least plausible that the direct and deliberate killing of an unborn child is an act of murder, never to be permitted. On the other hand, if we agree with Szasz (1966) that abortion during the first three months of gestation is similar in all morally relevant respects to the removal of a piece of tissue from the woman's body then we will find it at least plausible that the removal of an embryo under normal circumstances is no more reprehensible than an appendectomy or a voluntary sterilization. And of course, there are a range of middle positions between these two extreme ends of the continuum. However, the common assumption that the problem of abortion must be argued in terms of the conflict of rights between the unborn fetus and its mother, has always posed problems for all but the most uncompromising anti-abortionist as well as the pro-abortionist. The compromising anti-abortionist who wants to make exceptions in favor, for instance of the victims of rape, or of mothers whose lives are endangered by pregnancy is faced with the difficult task of finding some ground for preferring the rights of the mother to those of the fetus. Besides, there are some pro-abortionists who believe in the rights of the fetus as a person, yet prefer the rights of the mother over the rights of the fetus in certain circumstances, and others, who do not claim any moral rights for the unborn fetus but are decidedly anti-abortionists. Thomson (1973), for example agreed that "the fetus has already become a human person well before birth" and therefore has the right to live, yet argued that it is justifiable for a woman to defend her life against a threat posed to it by the unborn child. On the other hand, Benn (1973) argues for certain preconditions of the right to life that a child would not satisfy until many months after birth, which would mean that the fetus is not a person and thus has no such moral right as are associated with persons. Yet, he goes on to offer an account against abortion in the following words:

. . . Person that *will* be (provided he grows up)will be emotionally stunted or impaired if he is deprived of love and tender care as an infant, it is for the sake of those that *will* grow into persons that we take *care* (italics mine) of all babies now. For not to do so for some--those that we regard as expendable or dispensable--might well lead us in to a callous unconcern for others too (p. 102).

The word *care* in the above quotation signifies what Gilligan (1987 refers to as "the mercy that tempers justice; or connotes the special obligations or supererogatory duties that arise in personal relationships" (p. 24). Thus, in a situation where a woman is mothering an unwanted pregnancy, for example, the care perspective might serve as a good reason to endure the pregnancy and give birth to the baby.

To explicate Benn's opinion then, and in fact many others (e.g. English, 1984; Thomson, 1973) it is not the right of the individual fetus or infant in question that is relevant to the anti-abortionist position. Rather it is our capacity for purposeful behavior to the criterion of personhood. This idea seems to be commensurate with the notion of respect for persons. To summarise, even though it is not inconsequential that the most uncompromising of the anti-abortionists may have their argument grounded in the right of the unborn child to live, and the pro-abortionists in the presumption that the unborn child is nothing but a mass of tissue in a woman's body, we have a constellation of other permutations of arguments that do seem to leave the question of the moral status of the unborn child aside. Thus, it is clear that the anti-abortionist does not always support the right to life of the unborn child; nor does a defense of abortion necessarily preclude the possibility that the fetus possesses certain moral rights. As English (1984) in her article, "Abortion and the Concept of a Person", declares "if a fetus is a person, abortion is still justifiable in many cases; and if a fetus is not a person, killing it is still wrong in many cases"(p. 151).

I do not wish to suggest that the "status of the unborn" problem is insoluble, but only that it is a problem, and a difficult one for liberals and conservatives alike, insofar as they seek principled, and not merely arbitrary solutions to line-drawing problems. Judith Thomson (1973), admits, in fact, that there can be reasons against abortion, even in the case of unwanted babies for whose conception the mother cannot be held responsible; but she distinguishes these as considerations of "moral decency" rather than of duty. But I suspect that the distinction between moral decency and moral duty arises only on account of the tacit assumption that the relevant duties must correspond to someone's rights. I maintain that the distinction need not be insisted upon, since within the principle of respect for persons there are better ways of stating the issues to be resolved, which recognize that rights are only one among a variety of types of moral consideration. As Benn (1973) says " a moral reason that invokes a right is a special sort of moral

reason that can apply only in respect of a particular kind of being--a moral agent or " a person".
Hence only persons are considered to have rights, but where rights are not relevant, persons are to
be respected for other moral reasons. From all indications, Kant's notion of respecting humanity
is not identical or reducible to the rights-recognition model of respect for persons even though
rights are central to it.

2.2.4 Conclusion

The attitude of respect for persons constitutes two necessary components; an attitude of
active sympathy and a readiness at least to consider the interests of other persons. These two
components are independently necessary and jointly sufficient to constitute the attitude of respect
which is fitting to direct at persons, conceived as rational wills (Downey and Telfer, 1969).
According to Donagan, one of the acceptable formulations of the principle of respect for persons is
to be found in Aquinas when he says that " human beings are to love one another as they love
themselves" (Donagan, 1977, p. 65).

2.2.4.1 Attributes of Someone Who Possesses Recognition Respect for Persons

A. A person who has respect for persons is one who:

1. Observes the moral rights of others

2. Values persons absolutely as opposed to relatively

3. Is willing to see situations of others from their own point of view, from the persepective of their
own conception of their good

4. Determines what is reasonable by considering others' point of view as seriously as she
considers her own

5. Is prepared to give reasons for actions whenever the interest of others are materially affected

6. Considers how the interprise of other people may be affected by one's decisions

7. Has the attitude of active sympathy towards other people

8. Gives undivided attention to the person she is dealing with

9. Sees a person to be of such supreme worth that there is no equivalent object for which a person can be exchanged.

2.2.4.2   Attributes of Someone Who Possesses Appraisal Respect for Persons

1. Values other people's projects

2. Gives honor to whom honor is due

3. Acknowledges the good in people.

2.3   **SUMMARY**

In this chapter, two interrelated bodies of philosophical literature were reviewed and analyzed. The first body of literature is on the subject of self-respect and the second on respect for persons. It is assumed that every person ought to have self-respect because persons conceive of themselves as having this special status. However, a person is urged to respect others because it is a duty of every member of the moral community to respect others just the same way she respects herself. These two bodies of literature relate to each other in some significant ways and a section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of this relationship. The two kinds of self-respect--"recognition self-respect" and" evaluation self-respect" were discussed and their connection pointed out. Also, the two views of self-respect--Objective and subjective views were analyzed. A detailed discussion of what it means for someone to have self-respect is given. In the section *Toward a Justification for Respect for Persons in Ethical Theory,* issues such as what it means to respect a person, what brings about the need to respect persons and whether or not it is a moral consideration to respect persons are discussed; then, the implications of respect for persons for moral problems are briefly considered. The next chapter analyzes empirical studies in which the notions of self-respect and respect for persons are central research focus.

CHAPTER THREE

EDUCATIONAL LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0   INTRODUCTION

Two factors pose serious impediments to research and development in moral education. One is the lack of a clear understanding of what the moral concepts are (Cochrane, Hamm & Kazepeids, 1975) and how they can be taught in schools (Horsley, 1982). The other is the lack of reliable and valid measures of the moral components (AVER, Canada Council Proposal, 1975; Williams, 1975). Of course the second factor could be construed as dependent on the first in the sense that one cannot design an instrument to measure something unless one has a clear understanding of what "it" is.

The present study identifies some particular concepts in moral education, namely self-respect and respect for persons, clarifies the meaning of these concepts through the analysis of philosophical literature and synthesizes the characteristics of persons that are said to possess the virtues or values in question. The second major objective of the study is to pursue the argument that just as it is the case with science concepts, for example, moral concepts must be clearly understood and the components that bear upon them clearly identified before they are implemented in the curriculum. One mode by which values are imparted is as content of a lesson as determined by the teacher. In the context of teaching science, for example, content may be defined as knowledge and skills. However, in the context of teaching self-respect and respect for persons, content should include knowledge, skills, attitudes, dispositions, actions and beliefs. The effective domain in which much of the learning of these components takes place is of particular import in designing the learning activities (Belanger, 1993). The teacher draws upon his or her knowledge

In recent years, a number of psychological, philosophical, and educational researchers have been working toward an approach to moral education that is open, responsible and sensitive to the ethnic and ethical diversity of society (Wilson, 1975; Coombs, 1975; Horsley, 1982; Ryan, 1994). The work of the Association for Values Education and Research (AVER) is a clear example of this kind of endeavor and has been directed toward identifying the requirements of rational and responsible moral judgment and action and the means of promoting the acquisition of these moral components in school settings (AVER, Final Report, 1975). The needs of research and theory in moral education have been advanced by the AVER project, for example, as it endeavored to identify the components that a morally autonomous, or morally educated individual must bring to any moral problem--such as attainments, abilities and dispositions.

The AVER final report (1974) reveals that the project has advanced knowledge in the areas of development, modification, and identification of tests suitable to assessing some of the effects of programs in moral and values education. Over the two years of the project, normative reasoning and facts-value tests possessing a moderately high degree of internal consistency have been developed. Tests of dispositions relevant to particular moral education programs (e.g. the Prejudice Test and the Social Desirability Scale) have been identified, modified and utilized. The AVER project is similar to the present study in a significant way. Both studies seek to clarify moral concepts and the essential components that the morally inclined or morally educated bring to bear upon moral problems. The two studies differ in the sense that the present study deals with some particular moral concepts--self-respect and respect for persons whereas the AVER project is concerned with moral and values education in general. Another way the two studies differ is that whereas the AVER project is an actual comparative study of the effectiveness of the AVER approach and the Kohlbergian approach of imparting moral reasoning competence, the present study is a conceptual analysis and documentation of how the clear understanding of moral concepts, or the lack of them affect the quality of moral curriculum as well as the design and/or the choice of instruments to evaluate it.

Borrowing the terminology of AVER, "the complex set of components" that are brought to bear on the notions of self-respect and respect for persons include actions, dispositions, attitudes, and beliefs (see chapter 2). The strategy to promote the development of such components and the

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of the concept under discussion to plan activities that meet the requirements of the content of the curriculum. This knowledge is not merely intuitive. Moral concepts are based on certain philosophical assumptions which are underlaid by some definite logical proceedings. The argument here is that: (1) the lack of knowledge of these philosophical assumptions interferes with the advancement of policies and practices in the domain of moral education (Cochrane & Williams, 1978), and (2) where the moral curriculum is in effect, the lack of the knowledge of philosophical literature creates some limitations and gaps in the areas of moral curriculum content and evaluation procedures. This review is primarily concerned with the second part of the argument, and its main function is to analyze empirical studies in which the development of the attitudes of self-respect and respect for persons constitute the main focus in order to study the aforementioned limitations and gaps. The scope of this review encompasses a number of different kinds of literature including theoretical discussions, empirical studies, and research reports which deal with self-respect and/or respect for persons in curricular contexts. The primary purpose of the review is to study and analyze how the terms "self-respect" and "respect for persons" are used in educational contexts and whether or not the components that bear on the understanding of these notions are clearly defined. This is followed by a critique of the instruments that are used for the "measurement" of these components or attributes. As already stated, the justification for this exercise is the argument that there is a need to understand clearly what the moral concepts mean in their philosophical contexts before we can develop a reasonable strategy to study these components in the classroom situation. This is in agreement with the concerns identified by the Asociation for Values Education and Research (AVER) Surrey project:

A person who deals rationally with problems brings to bear on these problems a complex set of components--capacities, abilities, skills and inclinations. This is as true in dealing with value issues as with scientific issues. In fact, we believe that the components brought to bear on moral issues are more complex than those needed in science. AVER seeks to discover what components are essential if one is to deal rationally with value, particularly moral issues. We seek to find ways to enable teachers and others to promote the development of these components in young people (AVER, Report #5, 1974, p. 1).

techniques to measure them are not as easily identifiable as the strategies that are associated with the development of scientific concepts, for example. This is due to the fact that whereas scientific concepts belong mainly in the cognitive realm, moral concepts belong to the cognitive as well as other domains. However, the more we clarify the concepts themselves, the closer we are to getting to the solutions of the problems associated with the curricular strategies of imparting them.

In this review, the discussions and studies are classified, compared and contrasted in terms of the way they contribute, or fail to contribute, to knowledge in the area of teaching self-respect and respect for persons in the classroom. Criticisms of research designs and methodology are also included. In addition, the review seeks to investigate the relationship between the philosophical assumptions surrounding concepts of self-respect and respect for persons and the curricular methods that are employed for developing the components that bear upon them.

The review of the literature is organized in two ways: First, the general literature is considered. The ideal kinds of studies sought in this case are research studies in which a program for the development of self-respect and respect for persons constitute the central focus of and are actually implemented in curricular settings. Another requirement is that the study should also include a definite scheme by which the program is evaluated. Second, the review is organized by research designs and methods. Since an important aspect of the implementation of the curriculum is measurement of the effectiveness of the program, a quantitative research design involving a fair amount of instrumentation for evaluating the program would be desirable. In other words, descriptive or qualitative research studies which suit the above description may not be considered as useful in this analysis as one that is done quantitatively since the level of objectivity in the evaluation process is considered to be important. The only study that suits this description is a doctoral dissertation by Horsley (1982) in which she attempted to develop the attitudes of self-respect and respect for peers, and respect for adult members of the school community. This study is critically reviewed.

3.1 CRITICISM OF LITERATURE

It appears that not many previous researchers in moral education have studied the development of self-respect and respect for persons in educational settings. However, despite the apparent lack of empirical inquiry on the subject of respect, the professional literature is replete with exhortations on the importance of fostering the attitudes of self-respect and respect for others as an important educational objective (e.g., McAllindon, 1981; Wassermann, 1987).

The prescriptive literature rests on at least three reasonably cogent foundations: informed professional opinion, philosophical assumptions associated with humanistic psychology, and the growing body of research and theory on the importance of developing the attitude of self-respect and respect for persons in children. The general assumption underlying these theories and research studies is that the development of the attitude of respect should be a desirable aspect of education and the socialization of children in the school situation; a way of preparing them to be responsible citizens of society. Many of the research studies are intervention studies designed to address an existing situation. Some of these research studies are construed as pertinent and particularly germane to the present study because they provide empirical support to the proposition that much of the seeming lack of success in implementing the moral curriculum is due to the lack of a proper knowledge and understanding of the moral concepts. The lack of proper knowledge of moral concepts in turn creates a scarcity of instruments suited for the measurements of the moral components. In most cases, the source of literature is primary, although a few secondary sources are also cited.

The first body of literature to be analyzed is opinion papers. These contain the opinions of experts in the field of education, and whose professional opinions should be listened to. Selma Wassermann (1987), a Professor of Education at Simon Fraser University, opines that besides the promotion of children's higher order thinking capabilities, the other important way for teachers to empower children is to build their self-respect. She added that teachers can build children's self-respect by behaving respectfully with them. McAllindon (1981) in his article "Education for Self Actualization" stated that while the education system of the past has made incalculable contributions to the world in material ways, the education of the future must broaden its contribution to include a

more creative and humanistic orientation. He proposes seven "Educational Shifts" in order to make this happen. Educational shift number one is that we must teach self-esteem and self-respect. He says, "without respect for human life, knowledge only leads to destruction and misery" (p. 88). In an opinion paper entitled *A Reawakening: Character Education and the Role of the School Board Member*, the California School Board Association (1982) reported that it established a task force to define the term "character education" and to clarify the needs of the public schools for curricular and instructional materials supporting character education. The report describes the concept of character education as "education in several virtues that are required to maintain a democratic and humane society, altruism, compassion, courage, courtesy, generosity, honesty, industriousness, integrity, loyalty, obedience, punctuality, respect for authority, responsibility, self-discipline, self-respect and tolerance" (p. 2). One could argue that tolerance of differences in other people is a manifestation of respect for other people. If this is acceptable, then the concept of character in this definition includes self-respect and respect for persons. Hicks (1986) clarifies the debate about studying peace in schools and classrooms. He recommends that the curriculum for peace education should sharpen awareness about the existence of conflict between people and nations. According to him, the curriculum should develop skills of critical thinking, conflict resolution, and political literacy. Specific attitudes to be developed include self-respect, respect for others, ecological concerns and commitment to justice. This body of literature relates to the present study in that it helps to verify the opinions of professional educators about the important place of self-respect and respect for others in the development of responsible citizens. However, although the opinions of these professional educators strengthen the argument for the need to teach self-respect and respect for persons, it is not clear what each of these professionals mean by these terms. To this end, such opinions have failed to provide impetus for action in any particular direction.

The second body of knowledge is more directly related to the present study. It includes teacher guides and curricular models in which the development of self-respect and respect for others are part of the educational endeavor. These are in the form of descriptive reports, information analysis or classroom guides. Excerpts of some of the curriculum guides which have direct relevance to the subject under discussion are presented in this review.

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Miller (1989) designed a curriculum framework to serve as a guide for Junior and Senior High Child Abuse Prevention Programs. One of the sections in the curriculum guide is devoted to prevention skills mainly featuring activities and role plays. The activities are intended to build skills in the following areas: Trusting your feelings, being aware of your behavior, asserting your rights, developing self-respect, and respect for others. The area of interest in this review is developing self-respect and respect for others. Excerpt 1 is a portion of Miller's (1989) curriculum framework for developing self-respect and respect for others.

EXCERPT 1

Developing Self-respect and Respect for Others

Instructional Goal   To Understand the Tie Between Lack of Respect

for People and Abusive Behavior.

Activity 1   Working Together.

Objective 1   Students will identify their role when interacting

with other students on a project.

1.   Divide students in a group of 5
2.   Give each group a set of colored markers, a ruler and a piece of newsprint
3.   Have a picture drawn. Put the picture apart from the students so no one can see it.
4.   **How to play:**

- Send one student at a time to look at the picture

- That student is allowed to tell the other students what he/she saw

- One student is allowed to draw what was reported. Only one person can draw at a time

- The winner is the team with the most points. The team that finishes first gets 100 points....

5.   **After the groups are done, discuss the following questions:**

- Who looked at the original picture?

- How was that decided?

- Who did the drawing?

- Did everyone participate?

- Was anyone left out? How did that feel?

- Who dominated? How did that feel?

Activity 2: Finding Uniqueness in others.

Objective 2: Students will discover something new about another student they wouldn't normally get to know.

1.   Introduce this exercise by reminding the students that we live in a world with many kinds of people. It is important for that reason to learn to appreciate others. When we recognize each other as being essentially the same we are inclined to treat each other better.

2.   **Read Welcome to the Club!**

My pain hurts as yours does. Each of us have the same amount to lose--all we have. My tears are as bitter, my scars as permanent. My loneliness is an aching in my chest, much like yours. Who are you to feel that your losses mean more than mine. What arrogance !...I feel angry at your ignoring my feelings. I live in the same imperfect world in which you struggle, a world in which, like you, I must make do with less than I would wish for myself....And too, you seem to feel that you should be able to succeed without failure, to love without loss, to reach out without risk of disappointment, never to appear vulnerable or even foolish...? While the rest of us must sometimes fall, be hurt, feel inadequate, but rise again and go on. Why do you feel that you alone must be spared all this? How did you become so special? In what way have you been chosen?...You say you had a bad time of it, an unhappy childhood? Me too. You say that you didn't get all you needed and wanted, weren't always understood or cared for? Welcome to the club!

3.   Have the students make a list of people in their class who they don't know well.

4.   Remind your students that every one is unique. Have them choose one of the people on their list and find

out   four things you didn't about them or that you have in common.   **pp. 81 and 83).**

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The activities in excerpt 1 have the tendency to encourage self-identity and identity with other people as members of the same group with oneself. *Activity 1* has the face validity to enhance the particularity of each student among other students. This phenomenon tends to enhance recognition self-respect. *Activity 2* would enhance what I will call "identity and solidarity" which are important ingredients for the development of self-respect and respect for persons. The ability to acknowledge that all individuals share similar characteristics provides a ground for empathy and respect for others (see section 2.1.5.1).

The Ohio State University Columbus Center for Sex Equity (1986) developed a curriculum to provide students with specific techniques for communicating more assertively. The curriculum outlines five 40-minute sessions each including student worksheets and transparencies. Excerpt 2

is from Unit 1 entitled "The Road to Self-respect". It might be recalled that one of the attributes of someone who possesses "recognition self-respect" is that they are assertive of themselves and their rights when appropriate.

EXCERPT 2.

Unit 1   The Road to self-respect. Definitions.

Objectives

Help students to

- Assess their personal need for assertiveness training

- Distinguish among assertive, aggressive, and submissive behaviors

- Define and understand the concept of living assertively

Resources and materials

Student Worksheets

Transparencies

Instructional Activities :

1.   Explain to students that this course is designed to help them learn to live assertively; then write "Living Assertively" on the chalkboard.

2.   Ask students to define the word "assertive" and write their response on the chalkboard.

3.   Read the following definition of assertive: Characterized by confidence; to assist upon one's rights

4.   On the chalkboard next to living assertively, write the following words: is to take responsible action on your needs and desires while respecting the needs and desires of others.

        Student Worksheet Assertiveness Inventory (sample items) to be answered "Yes" or "No" include:

1.   Do you agree to do favors for your friends even when you do not want to or when it is not convenient?

2.   Do you find it difficult getting off the phone because you think it is rude to hang up or to end a conversation?

3.   Have you ever been shortchanged by your employer and been afraid to mention it?...

        Student Worksheet-- Responding to the situation (sample items). Circle the word that best describes the type of communication exhibited.

1   **Situation**:   A friend asks to borrow your car.

        Response: Are you crazy? I don't lend my car to anyone.

        Aggressive   Assertive   Submissive

2.   **Situation**:   Your sister wants you to do the dishes for her--again.

        Response: Well, I guess so, but I do have homework.

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	Aggressive	Assertive	Submissive	
3	**Situation:**	A good friend calls and asks you to go shopping.		
	Response:	Gee, Karen, I just know Mom won't let me. She says I have been running around too much lately. You know what an old biddy she is.		
	Aggressive	Assertive	Submissive	**(pp. 2,3,6,7).**

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It is my opinion that the activities in excerpt 2 will help students understand clearly the meaning of "living assertively" and the *Assertiveness Inventory* is a suitable instrument for assessing student's assertive, aggressive or submissive behaviors.

Papadopoulos (1988) describes a visit to the Fajans School, in Falkenberg, Sweden. The school aims to create a homelike, realistic and natural atmosphere in which children will be happy, be self-confident, acquire self-respect, be able to collaborate, undertake responsible activities, have their strong points developed, and feel that they are at the center of attention. The school is a single stream elementary school with an integrated nursery and day care center. There are 220 children. Fajans School does not grade according to age or ability. Children are grouped according to color units, each of which has a nursery department, junior class, and intermediate class. Papadopoulos (1988) concluded that the school has achieved its basic aim. The school building is very modern one. It has been designed and equipped so as to facilitate to the maximum degree the achievements of the set objectives. The rooms, the corridors the corners, the location of every single room, and generally every single square meter of the area help in the creation of the pursued atmosphere and possibilities. The key concepts in the working methods of both teachers and pupils are collaboration and responsibility. Teachers collaborate in regular planning meetings in assigning responsibility in practical subjects according to interests, and in arranging the direct teacher-pupil contact with small groups of pupils, while the remainder of the class works under the supervision of other personnel. Pupils collaborate across "school borders" working on practical themes. Teachers and pupils undertake various responsibilities in the school. It is not a matter of imposition but a matter of undertaking the various responsibilities through the freewill of each individual. Papadopoulos (1988) quoted the school as stating: "Our aim is that at Fajans we can create a school where people and not regulations are at the core. Where the needs and development of the children

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are seen as essential" (p. 2). The warmth, openness, friendliness, politeness, acceptance and hospitality at Fajans school are something which impress the visitors from the very first moment. The relaxed atmosphere allows for freedom of movement, and freedom of exchange of ideas. Everybody can be himself/herself without fear, pressure or pretending. Everybody tries to help each other. The positive thinking, the positive attitude, the maximization of potential are some of the main characteristics of Fajans school climate. Recalling Shoben's (1983), comment in his article "On Self-respect" (see section 2.1.1 paragraph 7), I will argue that this arrangement and the school climate would be supportive of the child in developing his or her self-respect. Although Shoben's (1983) comment refers to society, the school is a microcosm of society, and therefore it can be set up in ways that could maximize its potential to enhance children's self-respect.

Browne (1983) designed a handbook to assist teachers in helping junior high school special education students develop the skills needed to manage their behavior and build the socialization skills necessary for mainstreaming and a return to general education classes. Activities are presented in the theme areas of self-esteem and self-respect, communication and personal relationships, self-control and effective behavior. Each activity description includes information on appropriate grade levels (e.g., students will understand that positive self-esteem and self-respect will enhance their lives). Under the theme of *Self-esteem and Self-respect* authors propose that "developing a stronger concept of self-esteem will enable special education students to enhance their self-respect" (p. 5). (See section 2.1.2.3 for distinction between recognition and evaluative self-respect and section 2.1.2.4 for distinction between evaluative self-respect and self-esteem). This theme is composed of several activities which will help students think about themselves and their future. Excerpt 3 is a skeletal outline of theme 1:

EXCERPT 3

Theme 1   Self-esteem and respect (Grade 6)

Annual Goal   Students will understand that positive self-esteem and self-respect will enhance their lives.

Short Term Instructional Objectives

   - Students will describe their attributes.

   - Students will demonstrate that they are individuals with their own special abilities and talents.

<div align="center"><u>Motivation</u></div>

Ask students to describe themselves in three words.

Problem: Who am I?

Vocabulary: Identity, self-esteem, difference, personality, unique, individuals, special.

Materials: Xeroxed copies of poem " I am Glad I'm Me"

I am Glad I'm Me - Author Unknown

No one looks the way I do,

I have noticed that it's true,

No one walks the way I walk,

No one talks the way I talk,

No one plays the way I play,

No one says the things I say,

I am special. I am me!

There is no other one I

Than Me.

Teacher or student should read the poem to the class

Have students discuss the meanings of the vocabulary words within the poem.

Evaluation Have the class write compositions entitled, "The Best Thing About Me". (Teacher will help those unable to think of subject matter by putting key words on the board.)

Extenders Draw self portraits. Have students form three groups to compare similarities and differences.

Draw self portraits. Then choose a partner and have partners draw portraits of each other. Compare similarities and differences.

Have class select and cut out pictures of famous people from magazines with qualities similar to themselves and discuss reasons for this selection (group discussion). **(pp. 7-8).**

The activities in excerpt 3 have the face validity to develop student's self-respect and self-esteem. The Poem "I am Glad I'm Me" and the composition on "The Best Thing About Me" would tend to enhance one's sense of self worth, and the activities in the *Extenders* section would tend to enhance one's self-esteem. Drawing one's portrait has a connotation of an individual's importance among other students.

A curricular model entitled *Self-esteem and Elementary School Art Activities: An Operational Approach to Acquiring and Using Self-esteem and Art Skills (Working Module One)* was developed by Demery (1984). It contains a rationale that outlines the interrelationship between self-esteem and constructive creativity. High self-esteem is defined as " a private overall good feeling about the self" (p. 2). Compare Telfer's (1971) definition of *estimative self-respect --* "Some kind of favorable opinion of oneself " (p. 114). The author claims that the construct of

self-esteem can be observed in children by what they do and how they do it. She asserts that every one has the need to feel good about himself or herself. According to her, high self-esteem is a primary prerequisite to successful learning. It is also a major key to successful meaningful living: inner peace, happiness and good mental health. Characteristics of a child with high self-esteem or low self-esteem, as well as conditions that promote high or low self-esteem, are outlined in excerpt 4.

EXCERPT 4

A child with high self-esteem will:
- be proud of accomplishments
- act independently
- assume responsibility
- tolerate frustration
- approach new challenge with enthusiasm
- feel capable of influencing others
- Exhibit a broad range of emotions and feelings

A child with low self-esteem will:
- avoid situations that provoke anxiety
- demean own talents
- feel that others don't value him (her)
- blame others for own failings
- be easily influenced by others
- become defensive and easily frustrated
- feel powerless
- exhibit a narrow range of emotions and feelings.

In the field of education, there are specific components/conditions that promote high and low self-esteem in children....Individuals learn who they are and what they are from the way they are treated by the important people in their lives....The following questions help a teacher self-evaluate his or her interpersonal classroom behavior:

1. Do I encourage students to express their opinions and ideas?
2. Do I convey to students my concern and interest for their needs?
3. Do I exhibit a "business-like and systematic" approach to the learning task?
4. Do I interject humor into the classroom?
5. Do I make a concerted effort to interact with all of my students?
6. Do I encourage my students to praise their peers?
7. Do I set realistic and challenging expectations for my students?

(pp. 3-4)

It should be mentioned here that Demery (1984) was primarily concerned with students' acquiring self-esteem not self-respect as such. However, this curriculum guide has been included in the discussion for three reasons: (1) many authors use self-respect and self esteem interchangeably, and it seems that Demery (1984) is doing precisely that. This is because some of the characteristics she listed for a child with low self-esteem can be characteristics of a person with lack of self-respect. For example "feel that others don't value him" and "feel powerless" could be attributed to someone with low sense of self worth; (2) "evaluative" or "estimative" self-respect and self-esteem are so closely related that their distinction is not always obvious; (3) Demery's (1984) model is a good example of how moral concepts should be clarified in order to teach them.

A historical analysis of Homer T. Lane's legacy of self-government is given by James Clatworthy (1982). Clatworthy traces Homer Lane's work with institutionalized problem boys in the Spring of 1907 when he became superintendent of the Boys Home and d'Arcambal Association in Farmington Hills, Michigan. The program Lane developed was geared towards building the boys' self-respect and self-reliance, and toward giving them an opportunity of self-restraint through self-government. Lane's primary interest was in play. This is because Lane believed that the child's instinct was to excel individually in some activity. It was around this concept that Lane began building the foundation for self-respect and self-reliance. Lane's (1904) approach of building the foundation for self-respect through play has the potential to prove successful because as he stated: "Boys are not able to appreciate the abstractions of moral and social development, unless the advantages of progress were presented in a concrete form" (p. 25). Lane's "play" can be equated with "role-play" a term which is used a lot in development of attitudes.

Teaching peer Helping Skills is a program developed by Bayonne Public School, Bayonne, New Jersey. Kealy, McDermott & Wasser (1982) opened their descriptive report with the following comment: "Bayonne's peer helping program provides a way to tap student energies and make the school a more caring institution" (p. 515). The goal of the Peer Helping Curriculum is to develop in students a high degree of self-respect, respect for each other, and respect for their school environment. The curriculum model does not dictate what students must do to reduce alienation and anti-social behavior. Rather, it gives students the skills and the staff support necessary to address school problems in their own way. However, students are expected to take

responsibility for behavioral change during the program. The model introduces students to a process to develop their own activities by asking them (1) to identify the symptom of alienation they wish to address; (2) to access the degree to which the symptom exists within themselves; and (3) to reduce the symptoms within themselves.

The curriculum consists of 20 skills grouped into 5 clusters:

Attending-   listening, paraphrasing, reading non-verbal messages;

Clarifying-   by questions, hunches, emphasis, sharing similar experiences;

Facilitating-   group task completion, team building, showing concern for group members;

Confronting- criticizing without judging;

Activating-   defining the problem, defining the objective, and organizing the action plan and alternatives.

The authors concluded:

The peer helping Curriculum is one way to tap into student self-help energy, to build student self-respect, and to create a sharing and caring school environment. But it can only help educators expand their educational horizons beyond the "basics" and see students as participants in the educational process, not just as objects of disciplinary rules. In an age of declining resources, educators cannot afford to overlook the one resource they will always have--students (p. 517).

In my opinion, the activities of the *Teaching peer Helping Skills* program would be effective in developing the students self-respect and respect for peers in the following way:

Attending: When someone listens to another person so intently that she reads his body language, she is paying full attention to him as it is demanded by the attitude of respecting someone (see section 2.2.1.1).

Clarifying: When peers ask questions among themselves, emphasizing important issues, and sharing similar experiences, they would tend to identify with each other as related in some ways and similar in some ways and that will enhance self-respect and respect for others.

Facilitating: These would tend to develop the attitude of respect for others. This is because "facilitating" here is concerned with group task completion, team building, and showing concern

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for group members. A proper engagement with such activities would enhance one's sense of responsibility and the importance of other group members.

Confronting: It takes someone who respects herself to be able to criticize herself or someone else without judging. It would also take someone who respects himself to take a criticism without feeling judged.

Activating: Activating includes defining the problem, defining the objective, and organizing the action plan. These activities would tend to develop the attitudes of responsibility and self-respect. Generally speaking, when one is given the responsibility to "define the problem" and to "organize the action plan" etc., there is the feeling that one's opinion is being considered by others; that is, one is given the status of an expert in the situation.

The last in this series is Hoffman's (1978) pre-service training tool for teacher educators so that when teachers enter the classroom they will be confident to establish a positive learning climate. It is a graduate course developed to assist teachers to develop assertive communication and to use assertive beliefs and behaviors to enhance the learning environment. Assertiveness training concentrates on rights-oriented communication, and attempts to develop respect for students, school staff and administrators while emphasizing the need for self-respect. This training is desirable for teachers since according to Wassermann (1987), we build children's self-respect by treating them with respect.

These different curricular models illustrate the variety of ways that the respect curriculum can be constructed. However, the focus of this review is on the extent of clarity of the components that bear on the moral concepts to be developed. In this regard, Demery's (1984) curriculum model seems to represent a more thorough articulation of a curriculum designed to develop self-esteem. She states a definition of "self-esteem", the characteristics of a student that has high self-esteem, and conditions that are necessary for the enhancement of self-esteem. Since the constructs are clearly defined, it becomes easier to select the curriculum activities as well as the instrument to evaluate the program. Demery's (1984) is a proper example of how moral concepts should be clarified before attempting to teach such concepts in the classroom. This is not to preclude the fact that all the curriculum guides cited above have in one way or another contributed to knowledge in the area of the development of self-respect and respect for others.

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The third body of literature comprises research reports in which self-respect and/or respect for persons are not the main focus, however, self-respect and/or respect for persons are found to be linked with another variable either on a cause and effect basis or in a simple correlation manner during the investigation. These are descriptive research reports of a qualitative nature or quantitative research reports. The qualitative research reports are examined first. One qualitative research was conducted by Isabel and Lauren (1990) in which they attempted to investigate the relationship between eating disorder and decreased parental attention during adolescence to female academic achievement. Three hundred and one women attending the State University of New York, Stony Brook were surveyed about their eating and the attitudes and behaviors of their parents. Frequent bingers reported a greater decrease in parental concern with their academic achievement during adolescence than did other women. The authors stated:

> We believe that the result of this study and earlier ones are best explained by the theory that disordered eating is produced among those women who attempt to gain self-respect and the respect of others through achieving intellectually and professionally, and who come to feel that in our society being female puts them at a disadvantage in these areas (p. 13).

The authors submitted that reactions to other areas of accomplishment that are highly esteemed by society and in which women are thought to be less capable than men may also have similar effects. However, since academic achievement during childhood and professional achievement during adulthood are so widely esteemed, reactions to women achievements in these areas probably affect many more women than do reactions to achievements in other areas. Isabel and Lauren's (1990) hypothesis is quite logical: "We hypothesize that these women came to feel ambivalently about the femaleness that appears to place limitations on them. As female status is assigned based on physical attributes, the ambivalence might become focused on their female bodies. And one way to minimize or disguise these female body characteristics, such as curves and menstruation, is through disordered eating" (p. 14). One can assess the frequent bingers' estimation of the value of self-respect through their behavior. They are apparently prepared to disown their female making characteristics which are considered admirable by some, in order to gain their self-respect. The next is also a descriptive research report done by John and Loyde (1989). They investigated the instrumental and terminal life values of faculty by community

college location, age, experience, highest degree, and other employment. A stratified random sample of 984 Oregon Community College instructors were asked to identify " guiding principles" in their lives from Rokeah's list of 18 terminal values, which represented idealizing end-status of existence (e.g., à comfortable life, a world at peace). The five first ranked terminal values were health, self-respect, family security, freedom, inner harmony. In my opinion, this study shows that self-respect is ranked highly (second among Rokeah's list of 18 terminal values, which represented idealizing end-status of existence). This further supports the principal argument in this study; to consider the development of self-respect in students as a good-making educational objective.

Kalliopuska's (1989) study entitled "Empathy, self-respect and creativity among Junior Ballet Dancers" examined the effect of the active pursuit of ballet as a hobby. The study group consisted of 62 members of the junior ballet of the Finnish National Opera, ranging in age from 9 to 17 with majority under 14. The dancers were given four self-esteem questionnaires which measured empathy, creativity and other personality factors. A list of interest factors was also used to measure the dancers' inclinations. Compared with the control group, the ballet dancers had a significantly higher interest in music, singing, acting, writing, drawing and handwork, and less interest in technology. His conclusion is that ballet mainly develops self-expression, improves self-esteem and self-respect, creates self-confidence, and develops sensitivity and empathy. The point here is that, besides actual classroom situations, there are many different methods of developing self-respect in the educational arena . Ballet for example, can be engaged in as part of physical education and some schools may have ballet as part of their curriculum without realizing its potential to develop self-respect. In my opinion, the realization of this potential would cause teachers to look for the development of self-respect as an outcome of ballet activities and hence increase the possibility of the development of self-respect.

The last in this series is a quantitative research report in which Ruiz (1982) attempted to modify the racial attitudes of second graders in a multicultural setting. The target group was a class of 27 second grade students representing nine countries: The United States, Haiti, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Mexico, Ecuador Pakistan and China. Classroom problems include name calling, fighting, segregated seating, and refusal to share materials across races. Goals of the units

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were to help the students to learn respect for themselves and others, and to teach about other cultures represented by the students in the class, to modify negative racial attitude and to foster positive attitudes towards other cultures represented by the students in the class. The program consisted of 12 weeks of intervention. The first week related the concept of self-respect and respect for others. The next ten weeks involved multilevel studies of each of the cultures represented in the class. Evaluation of the program was done by the use of pretest/post-test adaptation of the Borgadus Social Distance Scale. This program was found to be effective in reducing racial prejudice.

Although the focus of these studies is not on self-respect and/or respect for persons, they are found to be related. For example, John and Loyde's (1989) finding that self-respect ranks second among the five first ranked terminal values among Oregon Community College Instructors substantiates most of the theoretical discussions about the importance of self-respect, and especially Rawls' (1971) declaration that self-respect is a primary good. As well, Isabel and Lauren's (1990) finding that disordered eating is produced among women who attempt to gain self-respect and respect for others tells us much about ways in which the lack of self-respect in a person can be manifested. We see lack of self-respect manifest itself in a servile attitude in Hill's (1971) article "Servility and Self-respect" (mentioned in chapter two). *Uncle Tom*, one of the characters depicted in the article, apparently has not demonstrated a resentment towards his oppressors. Furthermore, Boxill (1977) argues that when one finds oneself in a position where her self-respect is threatened by an oppression, one should protest her wrongs to show that one has self-respect and to know herself as self-respecting. The frequent bingers in Isabel and Lauren's (1990) study feel that their self-respect is being threatened by the fact that society puts them at a disadvantage in intellectual and professional areas. Hence, they attempt to fight back to regain their self-respect by, supposedly, minimizing their female characteristics through disordered eating.

Kalliopuska's (1989) and Ruiz's (1982) studies are more directly related to the present study in that they each used a curriculum that was supposed to enhance self-esteem, and self-respect respectively. They used instruments to evaluate the programs. Kalliopuska (1989) used Battle's (1981) Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI) and Ruiz (1982) used Borgadus' Social Distance Scale. However, the methodologies differ in some significant ways. Ruiz used a pretest/post-test

method, whereas Kalliopuska (1989) used a post-test only method. For purposes of evaluation of programs, pretest/post-test are more appropriate methods to use since it precludes any possibility that differences between scores of experimental and control groups could be attributed to any other major factor besides the intervention program or training. It is not certain that the ballet dancers in Kalliopuska's (1989) study were not by nature more self-assertive than their counterparts. On the other hand, Kalliopuska (1989) defined self-esteem and that is helpful in understanding the attributes that were sought in the study. Similarly, Ruiz's (1982) introductory week of the program was dealing with the concept of self-respect including a presentation by a school counselor. However, there is no mention of what the content of the discussion entails and as such it is not clear what the concept of self-respect represents in the study. One of the arguments of the present study is that the moral concepts need to be clearly understood before they can be implemented in the classroom.

The fourth body of literature, consists of two studies closely related yet different in significant ways. They are related in the sense that both of them have self-respect and/or respect for persons as their main focus and both have curricular implications. The study most suited for the present conceptual analysis will be discussed last and in more detail. The first study, however, has an interesting design whereby an empirical investigation was conducted to determine what residents' and nursing-assistants' concepts of respect are; then a curriculum for the development of the attitude of respect for others was to be designed using the information collected. Heiselman and Noelker (1991) undertook this study with three purposes in mind:

1. To clarify the concept of respect in the resident-nursing assistant relationship and to explore residents' and nursing assistants' personal experiences of respect, disrespect, attachment and distancing.

2. To uncover the effects that nursing assistants thought their experiences had on their feelings about themselves and their jobs.

3. To use the research findings to design an in-service education on the topic of respect in the nursing assistant-resident relationship. (p.552).

The study's conceptualization of respect was developed from the kind of care nursing assistants provide and areas of resident's psycho-social well-being. Six domains in which staff

could manifest respect for residents were identified: respect for residents' social needs, care needs, personal preference, possessions, individuality, and feelings and thoughts. Four themes and examples expressed by nursing assistants about how they can be shown respect are also developed as follows:

EXCERPT 5

Be polite Smile and greet me when you enter the floor or pass me in the hall. Address me by
the title or name I prefer, not as girl, waitress or maid. Make requests and ask
questions politely; excuse yourself and say please and thank you. Don't swear, yell or take your
frustrations out on me.

Respect my Speak to me and treat me like an adult. Trust my judgment and knowledge of
competence my job, involve me in decision making about residents' care.
and position Understand I take care of 8-10 residents and try to cooperate instead of making
unrealistic demands. Do not assume I have done something wrong or have
neglected a resident.

Respect my Understand I care about the residents and enjoy what I do. Speak to me, ask how I am, find out
Individuality who I am as an individual. Understand I have my own problems
to cope with as well as the residents' problems.

Respect my Understand how much time I spend with residents, and that we develop
Relationship relationships. I am an extension of your family, and residents seek me out
With Residents to do things that you cannot be here to do. Understand that with relationships
come risks; if a resident asks me to give her a back-rub, I never know if it will
be the last time.   **(p. 554)**

    Heiselman and Noelker (1991) opined that,"the study's exploratory nature and in depth interviews provide insights valuable for developing education and training materials for staff, residents and families and for guiding future research" (p. 555). Of course this study provides us with the insight into what the concept of "respect" in terms of residents-nursing assistants relationships are. It also provides the impetus for further research in this area.

Horsley (1982) undertook a study to implement the development of the attitudes of respect. Precisely, the program is designed to improve the attitudes of self-respect, respect for peers, and respect for adult members of the community. The program was implemented in the school setting and evaluated by the three dimensional measures of the attitudes of respect. The author believed that the attitudes of respect would be improved through participation in a program of activities designed for that purpose. She also believed that the improvements in the attitudes of respect could be measured.

The present study works toward providing a conceptual framework for the teaching of self-respect and respect for persons. As such, the analysis of previous empirical studies which have as their central focus the implementation of a program for the development of self-respect and respect for persons constitute an important part. Horsley's (1982) study is considered appropriate for such an analysis. This analysis is not concerned with the general conduct of the study. Rather it focuses on some aspect of Horsley's (1982) empirical work which is considered germane to the present study. These include the program (treatment), the research design, and instrument used in the evaluation of the program.

3.1.1   The Program (Treatment)

The program for the development of respect designed by Horsley (1982) consists of 15 activities. The program is designed to improve students attitudes of self-respect, respect for peers, and respect for the adult members of the school community. Horsley's observed that the attitudes of children are affected by the activities in which they engaged. This is in agreement with Kohlberg's observation that the greater the opportunity for role-taking, the greater was the probability that moral development would occur (Biskin & Hoskisson, 1977). Hence, by integrating this 15-activity program in the curriculum for six months, Horsley (1982) expected to observe a measurable attitude change in students in the areas of self-respect, respect for peers, and respect for the adult members of the community. Excerpt 6 shows the curriculum activities:

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EXCERPT 6

1. The Hero Award	The Hero Award was presented daily to one or two children who demonstrated superior achievements or thoughtful acts which are worthy of special recognition. At the end of the day the heroes were acknowledged in front of the class and received their award.
2. The Audition and Presentation Board	An audition and presentation board allowed students to voluntarily have a positive experience sharing with their peers. The audition with the teacher prior to the presentation guaranteed the students rewarding peer reaction.
3. Handwriting	Handwriting assignments were developed which created an atmosphere of awareness and respect of students for others.
4. Partner Reading	As a part of the daily program, children read orally to a student-selected partner.
5. Spelling Pretests	Partners gave each other sentence dictation pretests weekly. Both this activity and the handwriting activity were an integral part of the program and provided opportunity for student interaction.
6. Individual Conference	Weekly individual conferences between students and teachers were held to discuss accomplishments and goals. Personalized badges were awarded to successful students. Contracts were made if necessary.
7. About Me Board	Two volunteers weekly prepared bulletin boards about themselves which demonstrated students' similarities to each other as well as differences.
8. Story Writing	Children wrote stories regularly from teacher-designed topics which provided opportunities for students to express their views of themselves and their values.
9. Student record Keeping	Student record keeping consisted of a duplicated form on which students made self-reports of acts of thoughtfulness and helpfulness which they performed during the day.
10. Student Diary	students recorded courteous, helpful acts demonstrated by their peers in individual student diaries.
11. Role Playing	Children where invited to role-play specific situations and to practice appropriate, courteous responses to common occurrences in the school setting.
12. The Thank You Board	At the end of each day, students written thank you notes were distributed which recognized the thoughtful acts of others within the classroom and school community.
13. Music Volunteer	Music was an integral part of the day and music volunteers were given the opportunity to perform before the class on an individual or small group basis.

| 14. **Secret Friend** | Secret friends were selected and opportunities to make someone else feel special were presented. |
| 15. **Appreciation** | Appreciation Day was a special time planned to say thank you to the school support personnel. Students recognized individuals with a variety of expressions of appreciation. |

<div align="right">(pp. 101-103)</div>

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3.1.1.1   Strengths and Weaknesses of the Program

Although intuitively, one might appreciate how these activities could enhance students' attitude of respect, it is not clear from the study why these activities are chosen as opposed any other set of activities for the development of self-respect and respect for others. For research purposes it is desirable that the author demonstrates the relationships between the respect constructs and the activities chosen to enhance the components that bear upon them. One of the arguments advanced in the present study is that the philosophical assumptions underlying the moral concepts need to be clearly understood by practitioners who engage themselves in the implementation of the moral curriculum. Keeping the objectives of the present study in mind, I proceed to suggest some steps to increase the strengths of Horsley's (1982) study:

1. State what is meant by the terms "self-respect" and "respect for others"

2. State characteristics of a student who demonstrates an attitude of self-respect and/or respect for others.

3. Detail conditions that would enhance the development of the attitudes of self-respect and respect for others and why.

4. Then, select activities which the author believes have the potential to create these conditions.

It is commonly agreed that moral concepts are complex and hard to pin down. However, any efforts to clarify them would enhance the usefulness and authenticity of studies in the moral domain. As it is, most of the activities designed for this program have the face validity to enhance self-esteem, and evaluative self-respect. Most activities seem to invoke or reinforce a student's

good conduct and outstanding performances. However, this is not what self-respect is about. Self-respect is about the moral status that one possesses by simply being a person.

Let us refer to sections 2.1.5.1 and 2.1.5.2 for attributes of someone who possesses recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect, respectively. It can be noted that an agent who possesses recognition self-respect protests her moral status by asserting her rights and avoids situations which tend to be demeaning to her. None of the activities listed in excerpt 7 seem to help the students to be assertive of their rights. Similarly, there are no activities that seem to teach the students to respect a person just for being a person as the characteristics of the person with recognition respect for others would suggest (see section 2.2.4.1). Philosophical literature establishes that a person is to be respected on the basis of his or her moral status for being a person. As Strike (1979) asserts, being a person does not vary with any empirical property.. Thus, anyone is entitled to equal respect and to self-respect regardless of any characteristics he or she may possess or lack. One's competence, social status, or personal appearance are logically and should be psychologically unrelated to one's respectability and self-respect. On the other hand, some of the activities would definitely enhance a student's evaluative self-respect. Let us take the "hero award" for example. After the school dismissal, "the teachers discussed the activities of the day and choose one or two students whose behaviors could serve as superior models for the other children" (p. 48). This is a recognition of a student's conformation to a worthy standard of behavior, and it is a kind of appraisal respect, which would in turn enhance his or her evaluative self-respect. However, most of the activities would tend to enhance student's self-esteem rather than self-respect. Of course the two concepts are very much related, and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, as Strike (1979) noted, the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem, is an important one for individuals in the school system to master, "for the failure to master it [this distinction] may result in a loss of self-respect where only self-esteem should be at stake" (p. 47).

3.1.2   Instruments and Research Design

The evaluation of the program was based solely upon the three dimensional measures of the attitudes of respect--self-respect, respect for peers, and respect for adult members of the school community. The research design is the Solomon Four Group Design, a strong design for controlling internal invalidity. The test consists of 90 items; 30 for each of the constructs. Each item on the test was a simple declarative sentence referring to (1) self-respect , (2) respect for peers, and (3) respect for adult members of the school community. Each item was to be answered "yes" or "no" and students were told that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions. Excerpt 8 shows the list of questions on the instrument.

EXCERPT 7

1. My teacher listens to me
2. I am one of the best singers in my class
3. The adults think I am an important person
4. Lots of bad things happen to me
5. Sometimes it's funny when people get hurt
6. I like the people who work in the school office
7. I need more friends to play with at recess and lunch
8. The grown-ups at school choose other kids for special jobs more than they choose me
9. I get in trouble for fighting in school
10. I hate my teacher
11. I do too many bad things
12. The adults at school think I am good-looking
13. Our principal is mean
14. I try to help when someone gets hurt
15. I like to help my friends solve their problems
16. The teacher picks on me
17. Kids bother my things
18. Our principal cares about my school work
19. Some of the kids in my class hate me
20. My class needs me
21. A lot of kids in our class steal things from me
22. I pick on some kids in my class
23. The teacher gets mad at me when I haven't done anything wrong
24. I have a good time with the kids at school

25. I get embarrassed easily

26. My teacher calls on other kids more than me

27. I am special

28. Kids are nice to me when I get hurt

29. I like being me

30. When I am absent the other kids miss me

31. Other kids like me to work with them

32. Most people like me

33. The kids in my room would like me to be team captain

34. My friends tell me secrets

35. My teacher yells at me

36. I like my teacher

37. I like the kids in my class

38. The adults at school are too busy to help me

39. The other boys and girls in my class call me names

40. I make a lot of mistakes

41. Our principal is too busy to talk to me

42. The grown-ups at school smile at me a lot

43. Lots of times I feel sad

44. The principal wants to help me

45. My friends notice me when I have something new

46. It's hard to know what to talk about to some of the kids in my class

47. It's hard to find grown-ups on the yard when I need them.

48. My teacher wants to know me better.

49. I can do a good job of sharing in front of the class

50. I get mad when I don't get my own say

51. The kids in my class like me

52. I like it when the teachers call on me

53. People like my ideas

54. The adults in my school get mad at me a lot

55. I have a nice smile

56. My teacher likes me

57. I am good in art

58. My teacher thinks I do good work

59. I only like to be on a team with my best friend

60. Sometimes I hit kids who do bad things

61. The adults at school help me do better work in school

62. I would rather be someone else

63. At school the grown-ups on the yard help me if I have any problems

64. I get into lots of trouble at school

65. I like to play by my self more than I like to play with other kids

66. I can answer lots of questions in school

67. Sometimes I say mean things to other kids

68. I have a lot of friends

69. The other kids tease me

70. It's hard to make friends

71. My teacher talks to me

72. The teacher helps me when I have problems with my work

73. I work too slowly at school

74. Grown-ups are the most important people in my school

75. Tests are hard for me

76. I am smart in school

77. I am a good friend

78. It's scary to go into the school office

79. Lots of kids in my room do nice things for me

80. New things are hard for me to do

81. The grown-ups at school want me to be happy

82. The adults at school think I ask too many questions

83. I can usually solve my own problems

84. I am good looking

85. I hate lots of kids in my class

86. If I didn't have a lunch, kids would share with me

87. I am happy most of the time

88. I do good work at school

89. The kids listen to me when I talk

90. I like the way the kids in my room act   **(pp. 165-169)**

3.1.2.1   Strengths and Weaknesses of Instrument and Research Design

There are two experimental groups and two control groups. Control group 1 and experimental group 1 took pretests and control group 2 and experimental group 2 did not take pretests. All four groups took the post-test. It was possible to determine that taking the pretest did

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not have any effect on students post-test scores. It was also possible to determine whether the experimental and the control groups come from essentially the same population with regards to their initial levels of development of the attitude of respect. The program was found to be effective in developing attitudes of self-respect, respect for peers, and respect for adult members of the community as clearly evidenced by the significant mean differences between pretest and post-test scores of the experimental group.

The source of the instrument was an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Hasenstab, 1982). The instrument was certified by a panel of judges as suitable for the measurement of the attitudes of respect. However, being an unpublished instrument, it is arguable that its use could have been limited and hence its authenticity is questionable. The second issue is related to it's sole use. Being a written response instrument, much is lost in the gap. Let us recall that the components that bear upon the concepts of self-respect and respect for persons include, actions, dispositions, beliefs, and attitudes. Of the four components, only beliefs could be expressed fully in written responses. This instrument, therefore is helpful, but not adequate for the evaluation of the program. Only one or two items on the instruments refer to recognition self-respect: Items 27 " I am special" and 29 "I like being me" are the only items that probe one's feeling of moral self-worth. One could appreciate why Horsley (1982) would conceive the instrument as appropriate for the evaluation of the program. The program activities are geared towards enhancing self-esteem and so is the instrument geared towards evaluating the characteristics of self-esteem. However, the study attempted to develop self-respect and respect for others. .To that end, both the program and the instrument for evaluating it have fallen short of accomplishing that purpose.

3.2   SUMMARY

This review of the literature reveals that there are very few empirical studies which focus on self-respect and respect for persons. However, educational literature is replete with professional concerns about the need for education to foster self-respect and respect for persons in students. Eminent also, is the apparent link between self-respect and other psychological factors that control manifested behavior in human beings.

One of the issues that need further clarification in education is the distinction between "self-respect" and "self-esteem." In section 2.1.1, I pointed out that a number of philosophers, including Rawls (1971) use the terms interchangeably. This review shows that these terms have continued to be used interchangeably by educators even when the concepts are being implemented into the curriculum. Most educational practitioners talk about "self-respect" when they actually mean "self-esteem". "Self-esteem" is often a function of what turns out to be one's market value. For students this status is attached to educational attainments or achievements. Schools and curricular can be hard on children who are not academically successful. A student should not be made to doubt their basic worth when he or she fail at reading or math. Most of the curricular guides that were said to develop self-respect, present activities that tend to reinforce self-esteem in students. Strike (1979) opines, that the distinction between "self-respect" and "self-esteem" might be something the schools want to teach.

This review also reveals some few activities that have the face validity to develop self-respect and respect for persons, however, there is a paucity of suitable and published instruments to measure the self-respect construct.

In Chapter four some innovative ways of developing program(s) to enhance students' attitudes of self-respect and respect for persons are discussed and recommendations for the kinds of further work needed in this area are made.

CHAPTER FOUR

INNOVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0   INTRODUCTION

       This study provides a conceptual framework for teaching self-respect and respect for persons. First, the concepts of self-respect and respect for persons were clarified by describing the essential or generic meaning of the concepts and by citing the usages of the concepts in a variety of instances. This was done through the review of philosophical literature. Philosophy takes the existing intuitions and beliefs about self-respect and respect for persons and exposes them to a particular kind of testing. The tests that philosophers use are designed to probe the language in which our intuitions and beliefs are expressed, and to point out possible confusions, ambiguities, inconsistencies and blurred distinctions--to clarify the concepts we use in formulating statements and arguments and to examine the justification offered for them (Straughan, 1988). Educational literature on the other hand, centers on practices that influence instruction and learning such as curriculum development, curriculum implementation and curriculum evaluation on the subjects of self-respect and respect for persons. The relationship between the analytical and empirical use of the concepts were then examined by comparing the philosophical and the educational literature. This exercise, in a limited sense, portrays this study as a construction of a research-based conceptual knowledge that reflects the duality of education as a field of both theory and practice (Schumacher & McMillan, 1993). In chapter three, the gaps that exist between philosophical and educational knowledge on the subjects of self-respect and respect for persons were examined after a careful review of a number of empirical studies on the subjects by taking note of how the terms "self-respect " and "respect for persons" are used. Chapter four describes some educational innovations to develop self-respect and respect for persons in the school setting. It consists of theoretical suggestions which supplement the empirical knowledge claims found in chapter three. Recommendations for further research in this area are also made.

4.1 INNOVATIONS

In proposing the teaching of self-respect and respect for persons there are certain factors that have to be considered; factors which hold obvious educational implications and hence need clarification for the purpose of understanding the possible ways of implementing the development of self-respect and respect for persons. Factors to be considered are (1) Can self-respect and respect for persons be taught? (2) What sort of curriculum can we use? (3) What is the role of the teacher? (4) How can the program be evaluated? (5) What age is appropriate?

4.1.1 Can We Teach Self-respect and Respect for Persons?

In his book entitled, *Education for Character: How Our Schools Can Teach Respect and Responsibility* Thomas Lickona (1991) advocates the teaching of "respect" and "responsibility" in schools. He also gives some ideas of how it can be accomplished. First, he defines "respect" as "showing regard for someone or something" (p. 67). His idea of respect includes respect for self, respect for rights and dignity of all persons, and respect for the environment that sustains all life. He claims that respect is the restraining side of morality; it keeps us from hurting what we ought to value. Then he states that responsibility is the active side of morality: "It includes taking care of self and others, fulfilling our obligations, contributing to our communities, alleviating suffering, and building a better world" (p. 68). My view of respect in the context of this study differs from his somewhat in that it is philosophical and Kantian-based, and hence does not take into consideration respect for non-human objects (see section 2.2.1.2 for Kantian position on respect to beings other than man). Another significant way my view of respect differs from that of Lickona (1991) is that while he sees responsibility as separate from respect, I see responsibility towards self and others as the active side of respect for self and for others. If one respects someone she would not only keep from hurting it, she should be willing to do what is within her power to eliminate possible conditions that might interfere with the person's flourishing. Downey and Telfer (1969) explicate Kant's notion of respecting persons as "ends" in their book *Respect for Persons*:

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. . . respecting a person as an end means regarding him and treating him as something which is not merely useful but also valuable in itself. The task which remains is that of trying to explain what is meant by a thing's or a person's being valuable in itself. . . roughly, a situation which is desirable in itself is one which should be *brought about* because of what it is, while a thing which is valuable in itself is one which should be *cherished* because of what it is. The expression "because of what it is" suggests not only why it is valuable but also what cherishing it amounts to; to cherish a thing is to care about its essential features--those which, as we say "makes it what it is"--and to consider important not only that it should continue to exist, but also that it should flourish. Hence to respect a person as an end is to respect him for those features which make him what he is as a person which, when developed, constitute his flourishing (p. 15).

Kant's notion then, of treating persons as ends imply that we should treat the ends of others, their ends of inclination, or what they pursue in the exercise of their self-determination as if they are our own. If respecting persons as self-determining agents involves positive concern for them of this nature, then one can argue that our respect for persons and our responsibility towards them are inseparable. Moreover, to educate for respect for persons--to make respect for persons an operative value in the lives of students is to educate for *character*. According to Lickona (1991) character consists of:

-*moral knowing* (moral awareness, knowing moral values, perspective-taking, moral reasoning, decision-making, and self-knowledge);

-*moral feeling* (conscience, self-esteem, empathy, loving the good, self-control, and humility);

-*moral action* (competence, will, and habit). (p. 68).

This would mean that any educational endeavor aimed at character development in the school setting would require a curriculum that is capable of fostering the above components. Moreover, within a deteriorating social fabric, schools that hope to build character may find it useful to take a comprehensive, all-embracing approach to value education that uses all phases of school life to foster character development. In the context of the present study, this comprehensive approach should include classroom and schoolwide strategies aimed at making respect for persons

a value in the character of the young. For example, Schools should take a comprehensive approach to:

- Foster caring beyond the classroom, using inspiring role models and opportunities for school and community service to help students learn to care by giving care. A good example of this endeavor is seen in the *Teaching Peer Helping Skills* program developed by Bayonne Public School Bayonne, New Jersey. [Kealy, McDermott & Wasser's (1982) descriptive report of the program had already been cited in section 3.1 of this study.]

- Create a positive moral culture in the school, developing a total school environment (through the leadership of the principal, schoolwide discipline, a schoolwide sense of community, democratic student government, a moral community among adults, and time for addressing moral concerns) that purports and amplifies the values taught in the classroom. Some of these strategies can be found in schools and curricula discussed in chapter three. For example, a schoolwide sense of community is obvious in the Fajans School, which Papadopoulos (1988) describes (see full description of the Fajans School in section 3.1). The Fajans School aims at developing students' self-respect. Also "democratic student government" is a good phrase to describe the Homer Lane's *Legacy of Self-government* the analysis of which is given by James Clatworthy (1982). The program Lane developed was geared towards building the boys' self-respect. (See Full details in section 3.1 also). An example of a moral community among adults, and time for addressing moral concerns can be seen in a school with a strong emphasis on being a fair and a caring community which was described by Shaheen (1986). This was a program she personally implemented, being a principal of a large elementary school in New York State. There are four parts to the program. One of the parts of the program is that each Fall classes view a videotape that Shaheen (1986) made. It tells the children about the United States Constitution Bill of Rights and states that their school is like their country in that they have freedom and rules. When they think that there is something happening in the school which is not fair they have a Due Process Board that can help. Each classroom teacher is asked to choose a child to be a member of the board, a child who seems to care about fairness for others as well as for her/himself, who has the cognitive skills to think through an issue, and who is fluent. Another part of Shaheen's program is a classroom made at the beginning of the school term to help make school democracy explicit. Following discussions,

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the children complete the charts. The most important aspect of the charts is the children's

understanding of them and their investment in them so a new set must be created by each class each

year. One chart on "Justice" for grades one to three reads as follows:

A. Most people obey laws or rules.

B. Sometimes people break the rules.

C. How can we act fairly and justly towards them.

   1. We listen to all sides of the story.

   2. We ask questions to help us understand.

   3. We listen to evaluate the evidence.

   4. We make suggestions that show we care and respect each other (Shaheen, 1986, p. 15).

- Role -taking is an important activity to foster moral development. Children can role-play in a

variety of situations which help them experience issues from more than one perspective. Social

Studies easily lends itself to role-play. Moreover, role-play is an excellent activity to use in helping

students to develop other skills such as in a Conflict Resolution program. In Social Studies,

Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, can be used for the children to discuss

and make charts similar to those described in Shaheen's (1986) program (discussed above).

   Shaftel & Shaftel (1982) give strong emphasis to moral development in their book *Role*

Playing in the Curiculum. In addition, they discussed the essential steps in the process of role-

playing and devote a chapter to preparing teachers to lead role-playing. Howden & Allan (1992)

observe that role-playing is a complex technique to use. Teachers need adequate training before

leading role-play sessions. Inservice workshops and ongoing consultations are important. Due to

the importance of these inservice workshops, schools concerned with the development of students'

moral skills should be prepared to invest in them in order to train teachers to better fulfill their

leadership roles in role-playing activities. Role-playing is highly involving, enjoyable for students

of all ages and is a particularly effective at fostering perspective-taking. When one has to play a

certain role in a moral situation, one really enters into that person's view, thinks and feels as that

person does. Lickona (1991) reiterates that teachers who have role-played moral dilemmas

themselves in a workshop often comment on how they "really saw the situation differently" when

they had to take a particular character's part. One research study conducted by Grimes (cited in

Howden & Allan, 1992) reported that role-playing was the most effective method of stimulating student interest and involvement in curricular activities.

4.1.2   What Sort of Curriculum Can We Use?

> The best and the deepest moral training is that which one gets
> by having to enter into proper render it difficult or impossible
> to get any genuine, regular moral training. John Dewey, The
> Need for a Philosophy of Education.
> The New Era in Home and School, 15 (1934), pp. 211-41.

Few will disagree that education has always been thought to contain an essential "moral" component. The pronouncements of great thinkers on the subject, ranging from Plato nearly 2,500 years ago to more recent educators like Dewey corroborate this notion. However, recent approaches and developments within the area of moral education serve to illustrate the complexities associated with the impartation of moral values in the classroom. A more recent American writer observes:

> The American educator has always been a moral educator. Whether from the austere puritan
> or the indulgent romantic, children have traditionally received moral training. What is new
> about current perspectives on moral education "is not their implicit concern for morality, but
> their awareness of moral complexity" (Hersh, Miller & Fielding 1980, p. 25).

The best way to examine this complexity is therefore to review what approaches to moral education have been most influential in recent years. Straughan (1988) gives a comprehensive account of recent approaches to moral education in his book entitled *Can We Teach Children to be Good?* A summary of each of these approaches is presented here and a suggestion of which method or methods would be suitable for developing the attitudes of self-respect and respect for persons are made with reasons as to why such method or methods are appropriate.

1.   One method of teaching moral education is the "value transmission" method. This label is intended to cover the many everyday procedures which teachers adopt, often perhaps without a great deal of reflection, in order to influence children's beliefs and behavior, and which underlie the frequently voiced claim that "all teachers are really teachers of moral education." Thus, one

teacher may, by what she says and does, what she rewards and punishes, what she smiles and frowns at, indicate the importance she places upon the values of say, truthfulness. More formally, the school, as an institution will, again inevitably, underline certain values rather than others as a result of the particular kind of discipline it maintains and the rules which it enforces. Some recent theorists refer to this notion as "hidden curriculum." A curriculum refers by definition to an *intentional* program of educational activities, and the term "hidden curriculum" points to the realization that teachers and schools can exert a powerful, unintended influence upon people's beliefs, attitudes and behavior as they interact with students in the classroom situation. The problem with the value transmission method is apparent when no particular value is prescribed. For instance, some teachers may deliberately and consistently attempt to transmit values A, B, C, while others may in fact be transmitting those values much more effectively but without being aware of it, possibly imagining that they are really transmitting values X, Y, Z. However, in a situation where there is a prescribed value to be transmitted, such as the value of respect for human dignity, this problem would be much more minimized.

2.	The "values clarification" approach (already mentioned in section 1. 0) made a considerable impact in America and Canada in the 1960s and 1970s. The teacher is called upon to avoid "moralizing, criticizing, giving values or evaluating" (Rath, Harmin & Simon 1966, p. 53). The aim is for the individual pupil to "get in touch with his own values", "to bring them to the surface, and to reflect upon them" (Purpel & Ryan, 1976, p.73). By focusing on the process of valuing, it is claimed, confusion about values will be reduced and a clearer direction given to life. This process of valuing involves the following stages:

Choosing	(1) freely;
	(2) from alternatives;
	(3) after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative.
Prizing	(4) cherishing, being happy with the choice;
	(5) enough to be willing to affirm the choice to others.
Acting	(6) or doing something with the choice;
	(7) repeatedly in some pattern of life

(Raths et al, 1966, p. 28).

A typical example of a value-clarification activity would be for the teacher to say:

Take out three things from your wallet (or purse) that show three different things you value. These three items can be any thing at all; the mere fact that you carry them says something. Place the three items on your desk and begin thinking about what you will tell us about what any or all of them mean to you and your value system (Simon, Howe & Kirschenbaum, 1972, p. 329).

But is it enough morally or educationally just to clarify what one values? Or as Fraenkel (1977) puts it, "to teach that self-awareness is an end in itself is to teach that all values are the same; that no value is better than the other, only different" (p. 45). My inclination, however, is that if the values clarification approach is used in conjunction with other approaches, it has a great potential to help students to develop personal valuing skills and to convert in student's minds the classroom acquired valuing skills into personal valuing skills with much ease. For instance, let's suppose that a student learns from "personal and social education" class that one should not violate another person's freedom. Let us suppose that this student does not know what it takes to violate another person's freedom and he gets his parent to write something about "The Charter of Freedoms and Rights" so he can understand what it means to keep from violating anyone's freedom. If he carries such a paper to class and gets engaged in a "value-clarification " activity, the paper with notes on "The Charter of Freedoms and Rights" would reflect a part of his personal value system, and hence would tend to induce him to adhere to it.

3. The next approach called "the development of consideration" declares its aim to be to encourage boys and girls to "live well" and to adopt a "considerate lifestyle of life". This was the approach developed by the Schools Council Moral Education Project under the leadership of Peter McPhail (cited in Straughan, 1988) which produced a variety of teaching materials under the title of "Lifeline". These materials present situations of varying degrees of complexity, ranging from problems of interpersonal relationships at home, school or in the local neighborhood ("In Other People's Shoes"), to more complex issues of groups interests and authority ("Proving the Rule"), and finally to broader social dilemmas involving such matters as pacifism, racial discrimination and drug addiction ("What Would You Have Done?"). By using role play, socio-drama, playwriting and painting, it is claimed that adolescents will learn to become more sensitive to other people's

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needs and interests, to predict the consequences of actions, and to develop greater overall social awareness.

Despite its interesting materials, the Project's underlying theoretical basis has been criticized on a number of grounds. Can considerateness, for example, be set up as the sole aim of moral education, or as the sole principle of morality? Furthermore, the Project claims to have discovered this principle from a pilot study which questioned a sample of teenagers about what they consider to be examples of "good" and "bad" behavior; but it's critics challenge the justification in the use of the opinions of a few hundred schoolchildren to erect a whole theory of morality and moral education. These arguments from critics are counteracted by foregoing discussions in the present study (see section 1.0) which suggest that respect for human dignity in oneself and in others is upheld as a universal moral value by people from all walks of life; consideration for others is at the very center of the idea of respect for human dignity.

4. The most detailed and influential work on moral development in recent years has undoubtedly been that of the American psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg, and his associates.

Kohlberg claims that in any culture, individuals progress through set patterns of stages in their moral development. Our reasoning about moral situations gradually becomes more complex and sophisticated as we move from the preconventional level (where one might judge the rightness or wrongness of an action in terms of the reward or punishment it attracts) to the conventional level (where the demands of rules and authority becomes the overriding moral criterion), and finally (though not for everybody) to the postconventional level where principles concerning justice and individual rights come into play. So what determines the level of moral development a person is at is not the particular *action* the person judges to be right or wrong, but the *reasons* for so judging (Kohlberg 1984, Part One).

Kohlberg(1984) has elucidated these different stages of reasoning by analyzing people's responses to a variety of hypothetical moral dilemmas, the best known of which is the "Heinz dilemma" which poses the question of whether it could ever be morally right to steal a drug in order to save a life. These dilemmas can also be used as materials for moral education in schools as well as for psychological research and testing, for one of Kohlberg's most interesting claims is that it is possible to "accelerate" people's moral development by engaging them in discussions of

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such dilemmas in which they encounter reasoning of a higher level than their own. Another context in which Kohlberg believes that "acceleration" can take place is that of the "just community " or the "school within a school," where the educational institution itself is modified in order to involve pupils directly in democratic, decision-making procedures (pp. 263-270). The development of moral reasoning method can be adopted in teaching self-respect and respect for persons. The optimum level of moral reasoning, the "postconventional" stage which concerns justice and individual rights lie at the center of the principle of respect for persons. It is arguable that the "second categorical imperative" (already stated in section 2.2) is hardly understood without the employment of high level moral reasoning skills as found at the Kohlberg's postconventional stage. However, a deliberate, consistent effort can be made to "accelerate" the student's rate of moral growth by engaging them in discussions about the moral status of all persons and their rights to be respected. It is also arguable that such efforts by schools could result in more people reaching the postconventional level of moral judgment--and faster too.

5.   The "values across the curriculum" approach to moral education is probably the one which most teachers would be most prepared to accept and support. The previous four approaches (with the possible exception of the first) all imply that moral education can be seen in some respect as a distinct, educational enterprise which teachers, perhaps with some specific expertise, are to undertake *in addition to* their other curricular concerns. But just as it can be argued that "language" permeates the teaching of all subject areas, and hence should be taught "across the curriculum", so can a similar policy be advocated for "morals." The rationale for this approach rests upon the claim that all (or most) school subjects already possess a "moral dimension" of some kind and that a thorough subject-teaching will accordingly offer a more natural and appropriate medium for moral education than a separate, timetable course on the subject (if indeed such a subject can be distinguished and taught). English, in particular literature and drama, is often claimed to have an important function in the development of empathy and moral sensitivity. The Bullock Report, *A Language for life* (1975), summed up these claims as follows:

> In Britain the tradition of literature teaching is one which aims at personal and moral
> growth, and in the last two decades this emphasis has grown. It is a soundly based
> tradition, and properly is a powerful force in English teaching. Literature brings the child

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into an encounter with language in its most complex and varied forms. Through these complexities are presented the thoughts, experiences, and feelings of people who exist outside and beyond the reader's daily awareness. This process of bringing them within that circle of consciousness is where the greatest value of literature lies. It provides imaginative insight into what another person is feeling; it allows the contemplation of possible human experiences which the reader himself has not met. It has the capacity to develop that empathy of which Shelley was speaking when he said: "man to be greatly good, must put himself in the place of another and many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own" (p. 125).

Science is another curriculum area which can readily be given a "moral dimension", for it is undeniable that scientific discoveries and technology developments can and do raise serious moral problems. Can atomic physics, for example, be taught without due attention being paid to the moral issues concerning the use of nuclear power? Can biology teachers avoid discussion of the morality of genetic engineering? The answer in both cases is, of course, "yes", for many science teachers would argue that science is strictly "value-free", and that it is the use to which scientific knowledge is put which creates the moral issues, not the activity of science itself. Yet, if we can imagine a school in which the development of the value of respect for human dignity is viewed as an important goal, teachers would reject this sharp distinction; instead, they would feel under some educational obligation to deal with the moral implications of the subject they are teaching. [See section 1.0 for a quote from McAllindon (1981) on this].

6.   The "Personal and social education" which is a fashionable addition the curriculum of many schools is probably best viewed not so much as a possible *approach* to moral education but as a synonym for it. Personal and social education can be viewed as a special unit of moral education. In practice it can include any or all of the six approaches already described above. According to critics, the main problem with "personal and social education" is that it is at once too broad and too narrow a notion to do the job for which it is intended. It is too broad in that all education, if it is really to qualify for that title, must be both "personal" and "social"; it is personal in the sense that education must change persons--in particular their personal attitudes, beliefs and perspectives, and social in the sense that it takes place within a social context and is designed to fulfil various social

purposes. However, the label is also too narrow in that it fails to make specific reference to the *moral* element which must be central to it. In my view, the problems cited above can be solved by replacing the terms "personal and social education" with "education for the development of respect for human dignity" Education for the development of respect for human dignity will include personal and social education and more. It is not too broad in that we are not referring to any type of education; rather a specific kind of education which is geared towards the development of a certain value--respect for human dignity. It is not too narrow in that self-respect and respect for persons would be its central focus. In other words, I am suggesting that the existing "personal and social education" could be changed to "education for the development of respect for human dignity" and still meet the objectives of personal and social education. The practical methods by which the goal of this curriculum would be realized could include any or all of the other five approaches discussed above. These five approaches could be used simultaneously to impart a certain object lesson, or each approach can be viewed as more suitable to impart a certain object lesson than another approach. For example, take the issue of respecting the rights of the individual. The "value transmission" approach is at once in effect as the teacher goes about her everyday procedures with students, expecting students to take turns at play and allowing every student the freedom to express their opinion about issues. Similarly, "values clarification" can be used by just letting students express what kind of choices they would make in certain circumstances, and if they would be prepare to recommend the same choice to others. "The development of consideration" approach can also be employed by allowing students to respond to the choices of the next person, hence fostering the attitude of respect for rights of individuals. This can be done by bringing to class scenarios about some interpersonal problems involving individuals rights such as racism, and asking students what their responses would be when some one of a different race displays a prejudiced attitude towards them, for example. ("The development of moral reasoning" approach can be utilized by allowing students to deliberate on issues such as the right to life: the sick pregnant woman or the unborn baby.) "The values across the curriculum" approach can be employed by presenting, say a math problem like: Todd bought a box of 12 apples from a near-by farm at the cost of three dollars. He comes to his retail shop and sells each apple at 80 cents each. What profit does Todd make on the 12 apples? Do you think

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Todd's profit is too high? Is Todd fair to his neighbors by making such a profit? For how much should Todd sell each apple in order for you to consider his profit a moderate one?

Besides the different approaches of teaching values in schools, there is another aspect to teaching morals which is considered appropriate to mention here. Philosophical attempts to define the moral area have tended to fall into one or other of two broad categories concerned with what is usually labelled either the *form* or the *content* of morality. Let us first consider an analogy which should help to make the distinction clear.

Suppose one is asked, "What is science all about?" One might give two different sorts of answers to this question. One might say something like, "science is about the physical structure of the world and universe; it deals basically with how matter behaves." Or, one might say, "science is a particular type of inquiry which proceeds by setting up theories and hypotheses, and then testing them by particular experiments". What the first answer is doing is to define "science" in terms of *content* of science, that is, the subject matter with which it typically deals, and which differs from the subject matter of, say, mathematics, which is concerned with such things as numbers and equations. But the second answer says nothing about content, for it offers a definition of "scientific" in terms of the forms of science--that is, the methods, procedures and reasoning it employs, which are again different from those of mathematics, to take the same example, because the methods of mathematics do not involve doing practical experiments to test hypotheses, but manipulating abstract symbols and making deduction from axioms. Incidentally, it is significant that these two definitions of science will produce differing interpretations of science education. Those who define science in terms of its content will see the function of science education to be mainly one of passing on a particular subject matter and corpus of "hard facts" comprising the discoveries and conclusion of scientists, whereas those who define science in terms of its form will have a conception of science education as the initiation of children into the scientific methods and ways of thinking.

This distinction between form and content is equally applicable to the areas of morality. Some might say, on the one hand, that morality is to be defined in terms of its content, and that moral issues and questions are accordingly those which deal with a particular subject-matter, for example, the pursuit of justice, or the promotion of human happiness and welfare. One would

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then be operating morally only when one is dealing with those issues and taking those factors into account in one's decisions and actions. But others might, on the other hand, try to define morality in terms of its form, which it might be claimed is reflected in the way in which moral judgements are made and moral conclusion reached,for example, in justifying one's particular action by appealing to general, universal principles. In this case one would qualify as "being moral" only when reasoning in that way.

I suggest that in teaching respect for human dignity, the distinction between the content and the form is hardly a clear-cut one. Suppose we take the issue of "pursuit of justice" as our moral content. Implicit in this phrase is the combination of the features of "prescriptivity" and "universality" (Hare, 1964). One must first decide what actions one is prepared both to commit oneself to, which support the notion of the pursuit of justice, and at the same time to accept as exemplifying a principle of action binding on anyone in like circumstances who might purport to uphold the principle of justice. If we take a close look at the second statement of categorical imperatives: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only" (Foundations of the metaphysics of morals, 1959, p. 47). In one sense this statement implies content in that to fulfil the moral requirement called "categorical imperative", one has to act in a certain way--treat humanity as ends and not means only. But there is a general level of action or disposition to act, which one can acquire and which tends to help one to treat humanity as ends and not means only--Kohlberg's postconventional level of moral judgment (stage six). When one is reasoning at this moral level, one is free, so to say, to forget the contents of the categorical imperative. This is due to the fact that one has acquired a certain *form* of reasoning that would take care of the *content* of the categorical imperative. This implies that in some cases of moral deliberations, form and content are inseparable. Even where form and content are separable, I believe they are both necessary in acquiring balanced moral skills. Therefore I recommend that both the categories of *content* and *form* should be employed in developing the attitude of respect for human dignity.

4.1.3   The Role of the Teacher

> Rules imposed by external constraint remain external to the child's spirit.
> Rules due to mutual respect and cooperation take root inside the child's mind.
> *Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child* (New York:
> The Free Press, 1965), p. 362.

Howden & Allan (1992) opined that equality and attachment are threads woven throughout the fabrics of the developmental years, and that power in relationship is a key issue. The power in relationships become even more crucial when the attitude to be developed is that of respect. Gordon (1989) clearly indicates how non-power ways of influencing children are more effective than the traditional, authoritarian ways. The teacher's relationship with each child is crucial with respect to attachment. A democratic classroom with a warm and nurturing teacher will provide an optimal environment for children's moral growth. Democratic methods best facilitate autonomy which is central in the respect for persons principle. In respecting persons, we must acknowledge their right of moral autonomy.

Empathy and role-taking should be regarded as key components for the development of the attitude of self-respect and respect for persons. As well as promoting bonding, the teacher's use of empathy provides a model for the child. Empathy training and role-playing are easily integrated into classroom activities. The child's active participation is required if adults are to influence the child's reconstruction of his or her moral reasoning system. In our pluralistic society of today, which does not have the religious focus of the past, we need moral eduction that is neither indoctrinative nor relativistic. Nucci (1987) states that research indicates that morality which is centered on a set of universal concerns for justice, fairness and human welfare provides a basis for moral education that is both non-indoctrinative and non-relativistic. Respect for human dignity is highly associated with the concerns of justice and fairness. As well, the scientific studies and observations of children's moral development should set the stage for a comprehensive approach to children's moral education. Damon (1988) states: "If they are to contribute positively to children's moral growth, both parents and schools must operate with an awareness of the child's developmental needs" (p. 119). In teaching self-respect and respect for persons, a socio-moral

model is emphasized, a model which Howden and Allan (1992) recommend as an ideal model for fostering moral development.

In a regular classroom situation, the teacher is the sole responsible person to bring about the desired moral climate of the classroom. Lickona (1991) outlines nine classroom strategies a teacher would need to employ in order to create such a climate. I hereby adopt some of Lickona's (1991) strategies. I consider the following five strategies (see pp. 68, 70) to fit in with development of self-respect and respect for persons. I added some appropriate comments and examples where possible. Within the classroom, the teacher is to:

1. <u>Act as caregiver, model, and mentor, treating students with love and respect, setting a good example, supporting prosocial behavior, and correcting hurtful actions.</u> Purkey (1970) observes that the key to building positive and realistic self-images in students lies largely in what the teacher believes about himself and his students. Purkey believes that the teacher strongly influences students by (a) the attitude he conveys and, (b) the atmosphere he develops. If the teacher conveys the attitude that student's are worthy of respect, students would see themselves as deserving of respect (see also Wassermann, 1987). The most common ways to convey the attitude of respect is by speaking the language of respect in interacting with students and by taking children's thoughts and feelings seriously.

2. <u>Create a moral community in the classroom, helping students know each other, respect and care about each other, and feel valued membership in the group</u>. To succeed in teaching respect, teachers must make the development of a classroom community a central educational objective. Children need to be a community--to interact, form relationships, work out problems, grow as a group , and learn directly, from their first-hand social experience, lessons about fair play, cooperation, forgiveness, and respect for the worth and dignity of every individual. The need for this positive social interaction in school is greater than ever because so many children aren't getting it outside of school. A school teacher, Phyllis Smith-Hansen observes: "A lot of kids we are seeing now aren't immoral; they are just amoral. They just haven't learned. Their biggest source of interaction has been with something you plug in and turn on" (cited in Lickona, 1991, P. 90).

3. <u>Practice moral discipline, using the creation and enforcement of rule as opportunities to foster moral reasoning, self-control, and a generalized respect for others</u>. Children need boundaries.

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Adults do too. The difference is that adults can set it for themselves and children can't. Consider the following comment by an elementary school teacher who has taught for 17 years and is now regarded as a master teacher: "My first year of teaching was a total shock to me. I was too open in the beginning. I had to come to terms with the fact that there has to be a central authority in the classroom and that structure is something that kids need" (cited in Lickona, 1991, p. 111). Emile Durkheim (1973) gives a theoretical perspective to the elementary school teacher's practical observation above:

Discipline is not a simple device for securing superficial peace in the classroom... It is the morality of the classroom, just as the discipline of the social body is morality properly speaking. Each social group, each type of society, has and could not fail to have it's own morality, which expresses its own make-up (p. 148).

The teacher, of course, is the central moral authority in the classroom. The authority, is based, first of all, on the fact that the school has given the teacher the responsibility of creating a good moral and learning environment and of looking after student's safety and general welfare. This responsibility gives the teacher the right to tell students to follow directions, do their work, obey the classroom rules, and stop any behavior the teacher considers contrary to the best interests of an individual or the group. However, a common part of discipline which may not be considered by some theorists and educational practitioners to be in congruence with moral education is punishment. The Canadian Dictionary for Schools definies the word "punish" as "To cause someone to suffer for a crime, offence or fault". Marshall (1984) argues that it is inconsistent to both morally educate children and to punish them. This is because the aims of punishment, according to the traditional theories, are, in the case of children, incompatible with the aims of moral education. Marshall (1984) also suggests that there is no general justification for the punishment of children. Gordon (1989) provides strong support for non-punitive discipline. He draws on published research findings as well as his own experience as a clinical psychologist and makes a strong case against punitive, power-based methods of discipline. My personal opinion on this is that whereas punishment should rarely be used, it may be helpful to have "punishment" on the list of a school's disciplinary measures. For one thing, it should be considered appropriate that children should learn from the school community about what obtains in the larger community. As

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long as we still have the law, law enforcement agents, and the penalty codes in operation in the larger community, we might be sending the wrong message to students by refraining to punish them at school. Besides, just as the mere presence of the law enforcement agency may tend to curb crime, so also the student's knowledge of the possibility of punishment may curb a tendency towards bad behavior. For these reasons, I would suggest that the teacher be trusted to use his /her judgement to use punishment on cases where punishment is the ideal thing to use.

4. <u>Create a democratic classroom environment, involving students in decision-making and shared responsibility for making the classroom a good place to be and learn.</u> *The peer helping curriculum* (already mentioned in this section) is a good example of this.

5. <u>Teach conflict resolution</u> so that students have the capacity and commitments to solve conflicts. Most teachers are especially concerned to promote peer acceptance of children who are different. One way to resolve conflicts is to develop students' empathy which in turn may involve providing certain information about the similarities and differences between people. It is generally accepted that the more students know about each other, the easier it is to accept each other. Ruiz's (1982) study (see details in section 3.1) confirms this assertion.

4.1.4   Evaluating the Program: What Are We Looking for?

First, let me take the popular argument in moral circles that moral behavior cannot be simply that which conforms to the dictates of some moral authority, because being moral cannot be equated with doing as one is told (Cochrane, Hamm & Kazepides 1979; Straughan, 1988). This is not to say that people have to be disobedient and rebellious in order to qualify as moral agents, for it is of course, possible to accord respect to an authority because one has judged that authority to be a source of reliable and wise instructions. However, that is something different from blind conformity or obedience. We cannot say that a person is engaged in the area of moral operations if he does what he does merely because he has been told to do it, without exercising some degree of independent judgement himself. Precisely what form or what extent of independent judgement is required here is highly debatable, but making such a judgement at all seems to bring in other characteristics of moral behavior--freedom and choice. Straughan (1988) claims that if one has no

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freedom to choose between alternative courses of action that are open to one, one surely cannot claim to be acting as a moral agent in doing whatever one does. Even if the consequences of ones behavior are universally agreed to be good, that behavior cannot qualify as (descriptively) moral if it was forced upon one and was thus unavoidable. For example, a fanatical supporter of a famine relief organization might compel me by means of drugs or hypnosis to write out a cheque to the charity of $1,000 (which could have the good effect of alleviating much suffering), but my behavior cannot hold within the "moral" category, because it was not voluntarily undertaken. Or again, I cannot be acting as a moral agent if when crossing the road, I accidently bump into a blind man and happen to knock him out of the way of an oncoming bus, even though a life may have been saved as a result of my clumsiness. If we accept that voluntary choice and independent judgement, though difficult to define at times, seem to be two necessary features of morality, it follow that we cannot look merely at a person's outward behavior to determine whether or not he is moral. This is because those features are not easily captured through observing someone's behavior. In chapter 2, I suggested that in order to assess if someone is self-respecting or possesses the attribute of respect for persons, one needs to know in addition to this person's behavior, her belief (which in effect is the reason behind her behavior), and attitude (which can be seen as her motive). The last example showed that my behavior in writing a cheque to the charitable organization, and in pushing a blind man out of danger, is not necessarily moral behavior; it all depends on the circumstances in which I move my pen over the cheque, or cause the blind man to change direction. Particularly relevant, then, to whether my behavior counts as "moral" or "non-moral" will be my intentions, reasons and motives (which is why unintentional behavior must be classified as non-moral). The same outward behavior may be interpreted in a wide variety of ways, because of the wide variety of different reasons and motives which may lie behind it. A schoolgirl who offers to give up some of her free time to help tidy up the art room, for example, may be doing this for all sorts of reasons, some "moral" and some "non-moral": she may be feeling guilty for having left the room in a mess, or she may have a crush on that art teacher, or she may be looking for an opportunity to steal some art materials. We cannot tell whether her actions fall within the "moral" category without knowing something of the reasons why she is acting in that way.

Philosophers may generally agree that certain reasons and intentions must lie behind moral behavior, but they are by no means agreed as to what type of reasons and intentions they must be. This is an important area of controversy among philosophers. Rather less controversial is the claim (which most non-philosophers would readily accept) that, while having certain intention and motives is a necessary part of being a moral agent, this is not sufficient in itself to constitute moral agency, for those intentions and motives must also lead one actually to perform the appropriate action. Morality is, by definition, a practical business in that it is basically concerned with what ought to be done, and what it is right to do. Working out answers to moral problems and dilemmas in a purely theoretical way, as one would solve crossword clues, is not alone enough to qualify as "being moral'", if there is no consequent attempt made to act in accordance with ones conclusions. The precise relationship between moral judgement and moral action is a complex one, but it seems clear that morality must refer to how a person actually behaves, as well as to how they think.

The brief outline of some of the general features of morality which most philosophers would agree upon does not take us very far, largely because the features are so general, and as a consequence do not pick out anything very distinctive about the moral area. A more specific description of the moral area is needed. This problem is addressed in this study by the fact that we have some specific constructs of morality under consideration--self-respect and respect for persons. Moreover to evaluate a program for the development of the attitudes of self-respect and respect for persons, a teacher needs to constantly assess where her students are at present and where they might be heading.

The general principle of taking account of students' present beliefs and attitudes, the tendencies apply as much in moral education as in other areas of learning. Also the principles of having regard for individual differences is as relevant in moral education as elsewhere. One practical problem, then, is to find adequate ways of assessing where particular students are at present, and where they might be heading. Of course, there are some published and unpublished instruments to measure certain aspects of the respect construct. Horsley (1982), for example used a 90-item paper and pencil unpublished instrument to evaluate a program in which she attempted to develop the attitude of respect in students (see section 3.1 for a more detailed account). I believe that the instrument she used was effective mainly in the area of the students' feelings and beliefs.

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The instrument was not very effective in the area of moral action. I tend to believe that to actually assess peoples moral actions or their disposition to act we need to use an instrument that is capable of assessing role-plays.

Sometimes when systems for assessing the moral characteristics of students are advocated, people object that it is not the role of the teacher (or anyone else) to judge students morally. To such an objection my reply would be, on the other hand, the teachers should be attempting to assess students morally so that they can be of more assistance to them both in their moral development and in other aspects of their education. Indeed, we might extend this point and say that people in general should learn how to assess morally those around them so that they will know better how to get along with them and, where possible, help them.

Having said this, I would add that the assessment should not be carried on in an unduly critical or moralistic spirit. While it is impossible to eliminate all elements of praise and blame, and while one's general aim is to help students develop in morally desirable ways, one should exercise the utmost respect and understanding in making assessments and providing help.

4.1.5 What Age is Appropriate?

The need for structured decision making knows no age limits. Although children are given fewer opportunities than adults to make decisions, they are nevertheless faced with several choices every day:

How shall I act?

With whom shall I be friendly?

What shall I do with my time?

What game shall I play?

Whom shall I emulate?

When it comes to actual instruction, however, schools need to make sure that the curriculum is pitched at a level appropriate for students. The term "instruction" is used here very broadly to include free-wheeling classroom discussion, and even the student's self instruction insofar as the teacher has some influence upon it. In moral education, the level of instruction

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appropriate for a particular student depends upon three main factors: where the student is at present, where he should be headed, and what is the best way for him to get to where he should be headed (Beck, 1971).

Where the student is present can be determined in the manner briefly outlined below: Assess as accurately as possible the student's predominant stage of moral development, his stage on various types of issue, and his individual differences in terms of moral virtues and more general moral components. Where the student should be heading depends partly on one's point of view. But it seems plausible to me that normally it is best for everyone concerned, particularly for the student himself, that he keep moving through Kohlberg's stages toward stages 5 and 6. It may sometimes happen that, because of peculiarities in temperament and circumstance, a student may remain at a particular stage for a longer time than it is usual. This is because logical development is necessary for moral development and sets a limit to it. However, all things being equal, one's moral developmental stage can be accelarated by engaging in moral discourse one stage above their substantive moral developmental stage. From the point of view of society as a whole, stage 5 and 6 citizens are preferable, since they can make a fuller contribution to the wisdom and decision-making of their era.

But what is the best way for the student to get to where he should be headed? In Kohlberg's view, it is important not to try to move a low-stage student immediately to the highest stage, as has so often been the approach in moral education. The student cannot understand instruction that is pitched more than one or two stages above his present stage. Accordingly, such instruction will at best have little influence in him and may have serious harmful effects.

If one were to consider Kohlberg's (1978) theory of moral development as a sole authority, it would be considered inappropriate to teach respect for persons in elementary schools, for the simple reason that Kohlberg (1978) considers the second categorical imperative from which the principle of respect for persons evolves, as a postconventional stage six moral reasoning. I however believe that the second categorical imperative is an abstract, and therefore hard to understand, concept. But actual lessons and activities which can be developed from it can be made easy enough for an elementary school child to understand. Horsley (1982), for example, used elementary school children to develop the attitude of self-respect, respect for peers, and respect for

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adult members of the school community. She found the program to be effective in developing all three constructs. However, it might be useful to start with a pilot study involving three different age groups first, in order to determine the appropriate age group to which we can most successfully teach self-respect and respect for persons.

4.2   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This conceptual framework aims at generating, and has so far generated, certain information that could help bring closer together philosophical theory and educational practice in the areas of self-respect and respect for persons. As a result of certain important information gathered in the course of the study, I hereby make recommendations for further research in this area:

1. A study should be conducted in the area of developing the attitude of self-respect and respect for persons taking the following points into consideration:

(a) Attempt should be made to be as precise as possible about the meaning of the terms "self-respect " and "respect for persons" before conducting the study. Care should be taken to distinguish between self-respect and self-esteem for example.

(b) Activities for the program should reflect these definitions.

(c) Instruments for evaluating the program must be effective in measuring attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. For valid measurements, more than one kind of instrument should be used.

2. Studies using the above strategy, and working with different age groups, should be informative in determining if the stage of moral development of the child is an important determinant in acquiring the attitude of respect.

3. There is a need for research in the development of appropriate instruments for the measurement of the respect construct. These are scarce to date.

4. Research to investigate how the attitude of respect, once developed, might help an individual to successfully cope with practical fundamental societal problems such as racism would be desirable.

4.2   <u>**SUMMARY**</u>

In this chapter, some innovations to develop self-respect and respect for persons in the school setting are described and recommendations for further research studies in these areas are made. The important innovations include whether or not we can teach children to respect, the kinds of curricular approaches considered appropriate, the teacher's role, and how to evaluate the program. A very important resource here is Lickona's (1991) volume, *Education for Character: How Our Schools Can Teach Respect and Responsibility,* in which he suggested practical strategies to go about teaching respect and responsibility. According to him, we can teach children to respect themselves and others, not by the "fact dispensing" approach, which we might use to teach mathematics, but rather by largely modelling the characteristics we want to cultivate in students.

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