THE STRUCTURE OF MORAL REASONING IN HEARING IMPAIRED
STUDENTS

by

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Abstract

This study examined the structure of moral reasoning in the hearing impaired and its relationship with reading comprehension. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral development provided the conceptual framework for assessing the moral reasoning of fifteen subjects who ranged in age from twelve to fifteen years. These students, in a provincial school for the deaf, were not multiply handicapped and had an average hearing loss of greater than 100dB in the better ear.

Four modified dilemmas from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument were administered to each subject in a separate interview. Each subject read a dilemma and were then shown a corresponding videotaped dilemma in American Sign Language (ASL). The interview which followed was videotaped and utilized each subject's preferred mode of communication.

Analysis of the transcriptions from the videotapes indicated that the hearing impaired were reasoning at Stage 1 and Stage 2 while their hearing peers of similar age are reasoning at Stage 2, Stage 3 and Stage 4. The subjects' weighted average scores (for moral reasoning)

were correlated with their Reading Comprehension (scaled) scores from school administered Stanford Achievement Tests for the Hearing Impaired and a significant positive correlation ($r=.6161$; $p<.01$) was found.

On the basis of these pilot findings it was suggested that moral reasoning may be related to language development. Implications of these findings were examined and areas for future research were suggested.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Deafness is a profound and exceedingly complex disability. There are linguistic, audiological, physical, psychological, and sociological factors that affect the developmental process of deaf children. All these factors alter and colour life's experience for the deaf child.

Deafness is a disability that is not always a handicap. The two terms disability and handicap are not really synonymous or interchangeable yet many dictionary definitions seem to indicate that they are. For example, The American Heritage Dictionary defines handicap as "A deficiency, especially an anatomical, physiological, or mental deficiency, that prevents or restricts normal achievement" and disability as "A handicap". The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (unabr.ed.) defines handicap as "A physical disability" and disability as "A permanent physical flaw, weakness, or handicap, which prevents one from living a full normal life or from performing any specific job." Webster's New International Dictionary (3rd ed.) adds to the confusion

by defining handicap as "A disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult, especially: a physical disability that limits the capacity to work "and disability as "The inability to pursue an occupation or perform services ... because of physical or mental impairment". According to Bruck (1978) a disability is a physical, mental, or sensory impairment which may interfere with the major tasks of living. Deafness is such a disability. But a handicap, on the other hand, is an interaction between a disability and an environment in which the design or nature of the environment creates obstacles or barriers to disabled people. A disability, then, is in the person and a handicap is outside the person. For deaf persons therefore, the disability is deafness, and the handicap is being unable to communicate with others in the English language.

In the West we have a habit of defining the individual in terms of social productivity and usefulness which makes it difficult to persuade the general public to regard the person with a disability as a "person". There is some residue of religious mythology at work here also - of man made in the image of God who is perfect. Is a person who is less than whole, strong, and perfect (which literally means "finished" i.e.,

"complete") a person with both a disability and a handicap? Not necessarily.

"You haven't an arm, you haven't a leg,
You're an eyeless, boneless, chickenless egg.
You'll have to be put with the bowl to beg,
Why Johnny we hardly knew ye."
(Old Irish Folk Song)

Johnny came home from the war maimed and mutilated. He could not work and so was put to the bowl to beg. Johnny and the blind beggars had a handicap because they could not work and they could not work because their society valued productive activity. They were outcasts or at least they lived on the fringes of society. When would their condition not be a handicap? Presumably when their society no longer places an overriding emphasis on productive activity or when they can compete with others who are like them. An exceptionally intelligent child has a handicap that is significant when he is competing with less intelligent children. The handicap ceases to exist when he is competing with equally intelligent children and it is of no importance when he is skiing or playing the piano. The same is true of the person who is blind when compared with other blind people. His disability (lack of vision) impedes him only when he competes with the sighted in activities involving sight. By the same token the cripple when compared with other

cripples has no handicap but if his disability (lack of mobility) impedes him when he competes with the physically sound in physical pursuits then a handicap exists. The deaf in the English speaking world face a fundamental language handicap in that English is not their "native" or first language. Lack of English creates a formidable communication barrier. It is now established that American Sign Language (ASL or Ameslan) is the native sign language used by three quarters of the deaf adults in the United States (Rainer, Altshuler, Kallmann, 1969). Ameslan is an unspoken language that is used in the deaf community. Studies have shown ASL to have all the characteristics of a language though there are fundamental differences due to the crossing of modalities - from sound and voice to sign and movement (Klima & Bellugi, 1979; Stokoe, 1980). The English language handicap ceases to exist in the deaf community where the prelingually deaf form the bulk of the deaf community and use ASL to communicate with one another, Jacobs (1980) says of the deaf community:

... [it] is the natural result of a people who seek their own kind for mutual pleasure and benefit, as witness the Chinatowns in the large cities, the Latin Quarters, the Bohemian sectors, the art colonies, the Nob Hill and Park Avenue colonies of the wealthy, the Haight-Ashbury hippie colony, and so on

... although free and easy communication is the prime reason for the deaf adult's gravitation toward other deaf people, their other mutual problems and interests hold them together as well. They feel at ease with each other. Approximately 95 percent of deaf adults marry deaf partners (p. 92).

It is important to distinguish between prelingual and postlingual deafness for if a person loses his hearing after he has learned the English language he is very likely to use an established linguistic structure but if he loses his hearing prior to the acquisition of the English language the acquisition of a language becomes a problem of great magnitude. Furth (1973) expressed the difference well:

You can simulate how it feels to be an adventitiously deaf person by watching television with the sound turned off; your problem is to read lips, but if you want to simulate how it feels to be a prelingual deaf person you must watch the screen of a foreign television station. Your problem now is not merely to read lips; even if you could, you would still be faced with the task of comprehending language (p. 7).

Deaf children's language capabilities in English are not monolithic but are, instead, fragmented (Kretschmer & Kretschmer, 1978). There are varying kinds of hearing losses (conductive, sensory-neural, mixed, progressive) and degrees of deafness (profound, severe,

moderate, hard of hearing) which, along with other variables such as ethnic background, social class, family support, and so on affect the way the English language is absorbed, processed, and assimilated. Although generalizations are suspect in an area that is as broad and diverse as deafness, it is appropriate to say that the greater the degree of hearing loss the greater the difficulty in the acquisition of a language (Kretschmer & Kretschmer, 1978). It is also appropriate to say that many of the deaf, then, are handicapped with respect to the learning of the English language.

If language development, social growth, and the educational process are closely interdependent in the deaf child (Mindel & Vernon, 1971), might it not be that many of the deaf suffer from educational and social handicaps when compared with their hearing counterparts? Research seems to indicate that this is so.

In a study on the educational achievement of deaf children by Wrightstone, Aronow, and Moskowitz (1963) it was found that from the 73 schools for the deaf throughout the U.S.A. and Canada representing 54 percent of deaf school children, ages ten to sixteen, (1) the average gain in reading from age ten to age sixteen was less than one year (10.8 months), (2) the average

reading achievement of sixteen year olds was at a grade level of 3.4, and (3) eighty percent of sixteen year olds were below a grade level of 4.9 in reading. More recent studies by Di Francesca (1972) and Jensema (1975) show similar results to those obtained in the representative Wrightstone, Aronow, and Moskowitz study.

If language development is retarded then opportunities for social interaction both within and outside of the family will be few. When attempts at communication break down there is a great deal of frustration which leads deaf children to withdraw from social interactions and isolate themselves. According to Meadow (1980):

Appropriate and satisfying social interaction is based, at least to some degree, on the ability of an individual to "take the role of the other". The response of the other member of the dyad to one's actions and reactions, and the correct interpretation of that response, is necessary if a child can modify his or her actions to accommodate successfully to a particular situation (p. 82).

With a considerable communication barrier opportunities seem few for deaf children to receive interpretations and explanations of the emotions of others. The communication barrier might account for the following traits that have been found in the deaf: egocentricity, easy irritability, impulsiveness, immaturity in caring

for others, a lack of understanding of and empathy for others, a lack of awareness of the effect of their behaviour on others (Levine, 1956; Myklebust, 1960; Rainer & Altshuler, 1966, 1971). Lewis (1968) noted that as well as lacking in self-confidence and initiative, the deaf tend to be rigid rather than flexible. Mindel and Vernon (1971) added that the rigidity may be attributed to deaf children being restricted to visual cues which cause them to enter fewer group settings.

Though the deaf are handicapped communicatively, educationally, and socially, they are not handicapped intellectually. Moores (1978) said that Rosenstein reviewed several studies conducted with deaf subjects and found no differences between deaf and hearing subjects in conceptual performance. Rosenstein concluded that the deaf were intellectually normal and that abstract thought was not closed to them. It has been demonstrated by more than fifty independent studies that deaf and hard of hearing children have the same distribution of intelligence as the general population (Mindel & Vernon, 1971).

The Problem

Today the focus in schools is not only on the child's intellectual development but his social, personal, and moral development - his development in toto. Moral development, though, has often been confused with social development. Young children participate in social groups and social organizations therefore developing "a sociological orientation through which they form concepts of culture and social organization" (Turiel, 1980). Through interaction in social systems a child develops a sense of conventionally shared behaviours therefore acquiring a concept of social conventions. Turiel (1980) added that children develop their abilities to make moral judgments through their social interactions. He claimed also (1975) that though moral judgments are social in nature, not all social judgments are moral in nature. Jean Piaget (1932) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1968, 1969) both studied moral development in children and though their theories regarding moral development in children are not entirely similar both agree that "moral development progresses from judgments on which morality and convention are undifferentiated to judgments in which the two are

differentiated with convention subordinate to morality" (Turiel, 1980, p. 74).

Turiel (1980) reported that research by Brown and Ford and Slobin, Miller, and Porter found that social-conventional acts such as modes of dress, modes of greeting, forms of address, traditional sex roles, sexual mores, national and religious rituals or customs are "based on accepted usage and are regulated by social organization" (p. 71). Damon (1980) and Rothman (1980) maintained that moral development is not a process whereby socially acceptable behaviours or cultural values are internalized; rather, it is the construction of concepts of right or wrong, or of justice. The moral domain deals not only with those concepts but also with the concepts of the value of life, trust, deception, honesty, physical and psychological harm to others, responsibility, and individual rights (Turiel, 1975).

In contrast to convention, moral considerations stem from factors intrinsic to actions, such as their consequences (e.g., physical and psychological harm to others, violation of rights, effects on the general welfare, etc.). On this basis we can distinguish between (1) convention, which is part of social systems, as structured by an underlying concept realization of social organization: and (2) morality which is structured by an underlying conceptualization of justice (Turiel, 1980, p. 72).

If the deaf are handicapped communicatively, socially, and educationally, but not intellectually, how do they compare with their hearing peers with respect to moral development? Are the deaf handicapped when it comes to moral development? As Dewey (1966) claimed that formal schooling should teach people how to live with people and Rusk (1957) said that Herbart, another great educator, regarded morality as the ultimate aim of education itself, the question is worth investigating.

This study investigated the question of a relationship between the structure of moral reasoning in a hearing impaired person and his language capabilities in English as measured by his reading comprehension scores. The study also compared the structure(s) of moral reasoning in the hearing impaired with the structure(s) of moral reasoning in their hearing peers.

Definitions

Functional

Moral: That which a person considers to be good or bad, right or wrong, and that which a person considers he ought or ought not to do. Morality is concerned with the question of how the needs,

interests, and feelings of people should be considered and how conflicts between people should be resolved.

Moral Judgment: A choice made between two or more courses of action based on a criterion (or criteria) for right action.

Deaf: A condition where residual hearing, if any, is not usable. Sounds perceived, if at all, by the individual have no meaning with or without amplification.

Prelingually Deaf: A condition that is present at birth or occurs before the acquisition of language.

Postlingually Deaf: A condition that occurs after the acquisition of language and speech through normal channels of hearing.

Hard of Hearing: A condition where residual hearing is utilized (with or without amplification) to such an extent that an individual is able to communicate orally with little difficulty.

Hearing Impaired: A condition brought on by an impairment in hearing from mild to profound. It is a generic term that includes both deaf and hard of hearing.

Operational

Moral and Moral Judgment: The score obtained from analyses of subjects' responses to the probe questions asked of hypothetical dilemmas in the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument (MJI).

Reading Comprehension: The scaled scores obtained on the Stanford Achievement Test for the Hearing Impaired (SAT-HI), 1973 edition.

Hearing Loss: The loss of hearing in the better ear (unaided or without amplification) in decibels.

CHAPTER TWO

SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LITERATURE

Since the time of Socrates whose famous dictum was gnothi seauton (know thyself) the question, "What is morality?" has been grappled with by many philosophers, psychologists, and educators. Moral education is therefore not some new mandate handed down to educators. It has been the terrain of the educator since the time of Greek philosophy and today interest in moral education can be attested to by the fact that something on the order of thirty-five books and two hundred articles are published annually according to the bibliography printed in Moral Education Forum (Rest, 1980a).

There have been three major educational ideologies in the West. There is the ideology based on the naturalistic philosophy expounded by Rousseau and later by Freud and Gesell and their followers. This ideology is individual-centred in that development is seen to come from within the individual and is the unfolding of an innate pattern that exists in him. The pedagogical environment is one that allows the individual's "inner good" to unfold in the company of peers and adults and

only with his active participation. Because education is connected with the natural development of the individual, it is something that occurs as he grows. Naturalism looks at an individual as he is rather than as he should be. Morality is then the spontaneous unfolding of the individual's impulses and emotions (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972).

Another major educational ideology deals with the transmission of culture. The educator is responsible for transmitting knowledge, skills, and the social and moral rules of the individual's culture. This ideology is society-centred and the individual is "socialized" through direct instruction, indoctrination, modelling, and group reinforcement to acquire and accept attitudes and moral values that conform to the norms of his society or culture. The individual's mind is like the tabula rasa (clean slate) of John Locke, passively shaped by stimulation in the form of guided learning and teaching from the surrounding world. The individual's behaviour is shaped by repetition and elaboration of the correct response and by positive reinforcement in the form of feedback or reward (Kohlberg & Meyer, 1972). Proponents of this ideology include John Locke, E.L. Thorndike, B.F. Skinner, and E. Durkheim. Morality for

this school of thought is the internalization of established societal or cultural values.

A third major educational ideology is that of progressivism in which an individual's development is seen to be a progression from a lower stage to a higher stage both cognitively and emotionally. The stages are invariant, sequential, and ordered. Development is stimulated by cognitive conflicts that are experienced and solved by the individual. Exposure to such conflicts encourages changes in the individual's pattern of thinking and the goal of education becomes attainment of a higher stage of individual development. For the progressivists who range from Plato to Hegel to Dewey to Piaget "Morality is the active change in patterns of response to problematic social situations rather than the learning of culturally accepted rules" (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 45).

It was the progressive view of education that led Lawrence Kohlberg to his cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. Influenced by John Dewey's theory about moral stages and Jean Piaget's research on the moral reasoning of children, Kohlberg formulated his theory of moral development.

Piaget

Piaget was the first to define stages of moral reasoning in children (Kohlberg, 1975). In 1932 Piaget wrote The Moral Judgment of the Child and noted that there were three levels in children's moral reasoning. Briefly the three stages are:

1. The premoral stage - where there is no sense of obligation to rules.
2. The heteronomous stage - where the right is literal obedience to the rules and an equation of obligation with submission to power and punishment (roughly ages four - eight).
3. The autonomous stage - where the purpose and consequences of following rules are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange (roughly ages eight - twelve) (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 670).

and they follow the rules of cognitive-developmental theory in that they:

1. Imply distinct or qualitative differences in a child's mode of thinking.
2. ... form an invariant sequence ... While cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.
3. ... are hierarchical integrations ... (in which) each structure is increasingly differentiated and integrated (Piaget, 1960, p. 3).

According to Wright, "Piaget's theory has been empirically tested by many researchers and a basic

developmental pattern has, in the main, been substantiated" (Wright, 1975, pp. 21-22).

Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg redefined, extended, and validated (from longitudinal and cross cultural studies in England, the U.S.A., Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, and Yucatan) Piaget's study in the stages of moral development in children (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Kohlberg's and Piaget's theories are not entirely similar. Whereas Piaget's theory has three stages, Kohlberg's theory contains six stages (Appendix A). For Piaget a major factor in facilitating development is peer-group participation (Kohlberg, 1968a) and for Kohlberg and Mayer (1972):

... facilitating the child's movement to the next step of development involves exposure to the next higher level of thought and conflict requiring the active application of the current level of thought to problematic situations. This implies: (1) attention to the child's mode or styles of thought, i.e., stage; (2) match of stimulation to that stage, e.g., exposure to modes of reasoning one stage above the child's own; (3) arousal, among children, of genuine cognitive and social conflict and disagreement about problematic situations (in contrast to traditional education which has stressed adult "right answers" and has reinforced "behaving well"); and (4) exposure to stimuli toward which the child can be active, in which assimilatory

response to the stimulus - situation is associated with "natural" feedback (p. 459).

But for both Piaget and Kohlberg there is a progressive concern for the needs and feelings of others and more refined notions of equality and reciprocity; in short, a sense of justice (Kohlberg, 1968).

Kohlberg and Piaget do not concentrate on moral behaviour. Kohlberg especially does not concentrate on what an individual is doing as behaviour does not reveal much about moral maturity. An adult and a child may both resist stealing but for very different reasons. If there is a difference in their moral maturity their behaviour will not reflect it but the reasons they give for not stealing will. Further, Kohlberg does not concern himself with statements made by an individual as to whether an action is right or wrong. For example, an adult and a child may both say that stealing is wrong showing no apparent difference between them. It is when they give reasons why stealing is wrong that differences in their moral maturity surface. These reasons indicate stages of moral maturity.

The moral stages are structures of moral judgment or moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1975). The six moral stages are divided into three levels: The

Table 1

Kohlberg's Moral Stages

Content of stage		
What is right	Reasons for doing right	Social perspective of stage
LEVEL I - PRECONVENTIONAL		
<u>Stage 1</u> - Heteronomous morality		
To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	<u>Egocentric point of view.</u> Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
<u>Stage 2</u> - Individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange		
Following rules only when it is someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too.	<u>Concrete individualistic perspective.</u> Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).

LEVEL II - CONVENTIONAL

Stage 3 - Mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and interpersonal conformity

Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	<u>Perspective of the individual in realtionships with other individuals.</u> Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.
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Stage 4 - Social system and conscience

Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everybody did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations.	<u>Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.</u> Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
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LEVEL III - POST-CONVENTIONAL or PRINCIPLED

Stage 5 - Social contract or utility and individual rights

Being aware that people	A sense of obligation	<u>Prior-to-society perspective.</u>
hold a variety of values	to law because of one's	Perspective of a rational
and opinions, that most	social contract to make	individual aware of values
values and rules are	and abide by the laws	and rights prior to social
relative to your group.	for the welfare of all	attachments and contracts.
These relative rules		Integrates perspectives
should usually be		by formal mechanisms of
upheld, however, in the		agreement, contract,
interest of impartiality		objective impartiality,
and because they are the		and due process. Considers
social contract. Some		moral and legal points of
nonrelative values		view; recognizes that they
and rights like <u>life</u>		sometimes conflict and
and <u>liberty</u> , however,		finds it difficult to
must be upheld in any		integrate them.
society and regardless		
of majority opinion.		

Stage 6 - Universal ethical principles

Following self-chosen ethical principles.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	<u>Perspective of a moral point of view</u> from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.
Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.		

Note. From Kohlberg, 1976a, pp. 34-35.

preconventional level (comprising Stage 1 and Stage 2), the conventional level (Stage 3 and Stage 4), and the post-conventional or principled level (Stage 5 and Stage 6). The preconventiona1 level is a sort of "unprincipled" level in which reasons for doing right are governed by avoidance of punishment and the superior power of authorities (Table 1). The conventional level is one in which reasons for doing right include the desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behaviour (Table 1). Here "one takes rules and laws so seriously that one honours them to the letter even when doing so means to an individual at a higher moral stage violating their spirit" (Gliedman & Roth, 1980, p. 89). The post conventional level is a principled one. Reasons for doing right include a sense of obligation to the law because of a social contract to abide by the laws for the welfare of all and the protection of people's rights (Table 1). This is the level where "one seeks to honour one's moral principles by obeying their spirit even if this sometimes means an apparent conflict with the letter of the law" (Gliedman & Roth, 1980, p. 89).

An individual progresses from following the law of the jungle to following rules set down by an authority

figure or a community to learning to make exceptions to the norms of his society or culture. In short, he progresses from raw opportunism, to rigid justice, to a full understanding of the concept of justice.

Characateristics of Kohlberg's Moral Stages

There are six progressively different stages of moral development. The stages reflect how human thinking develops as people grow to maturity. The stages are natural steps in moral (and logical) development and are "not something artificial or invented" (Cochrane, 1981, p. 2). Their development is invariant; that is, one must go through the stages in sequence. One cannot get to a higher stage without passing the stage preceding it. One cannot, then, get to Stage 3 without passing through first Stage 1 and then Stage 2. "Under all conditions except trauma, movement is always forward, never backward. Individuals never skip stages; movement is always the next stage up" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 670). Support for sequential development can be found in the early longitudinal studies of Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) and Colby, Kohlberg, and Gibbs (1979). In these studies the same children were assessed regularly and it was discovered they moved through the stages one at a time

in predicated sequence.

According to Kohlberg's theory, people cannot comprehend moral reasoning that is more than one stage beyond their own. For an individual who is at Stage 2 and for whom good and bad is based on his own pleasure, Stage 4 reasoning would not be comprehensible because it appeals to fixed duties the performance of which does not necessarily offer pleasure or rewards. The golden rule, "It is better to give than to receive" is reflective of high moral maturity and development but it is quite incomprehensible to someone at a low level of moral development. The reason is that this individual cannot comprehend thinking that is more than one stage above his own and for him "better" means "better for him". Studies by Turiel (1966) and Rest, Turiel, and Kohlberg (1969) indicated that subjects comprehended reasoning up to and sometimes one stage beyond their own stage but not two stages beyond this. Subjects were also attracted to reasoning that was one level above their own predominant level. That is, a person at Stage 1 was attracted to Stage 2 reasoning, a person at Stage 3 was attracted to Stage 4 reasoning, and so on. Reasoning at higher stages is more adequate than reasoning at lower stages because it handles more moral problems or

conflicts or points of view in a more stable, self-consistent, or satisfactory way (Kohlberg, 1971). At the higher stages, the moral structures are more complex, differentiated, integrated, and adaptive and the movement from the lower stages to the higher stages is a progression from "a less adequate psychological state to a more adequate psychological stage" (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972, p. 483). In support of this contention, Rest (1973) conducted a study which seemed to show that children preferred thinking at a higher moral stage than their own stage and that they progressed in this direction when stimulated under normal conditions. According to Rest (1976):

Higher stages are said to be "better" than lower stages in the sense that the higher structural organizations can do a better job in analyzing problems, tracing out implications, and integrating diverse considerations (p. 255).

Higher stages are later stages in that they occur later in the maturation of the individual. The later stages, then, are mature stages because they reflect more sophisticated ways of thought. There is a qualitative structural change between the earlier and the later stages. However, there is controversy as to whether the change is transformational or additive (Colby, Kohlberg

& Kauffman, 1984). According to Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman (1984) for some researchers lower stages are no longer accessible to the individual once he has advanced beyond those stages. It is like undergoing a paradigmatic shift or a gestalt switch where what were once seen to be ducks were now seen to be rabbits. For example, authority figures are no longer seen as people who are obeyed just because they are authorities but as persons who are granted certain powers by a legitimate or illegitimate source, and who ought or ought not to be obeyed on the basis of moral principles. Through the stages, an individual's cognition of his life experience becomes "re-cognized". Other researchers (cf. Rest, 1980b) favour the additive or "layer cake" theory in which higher stages are added to the lower stages with no loss of availability of the lower stages. Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman (1984) prefer not to "characterize the development of moral judgment comprehension as conforming to a transformational model" (p. 19) because research by Rest (1973) and Walker (1983) had shown that subjects comprehended all stages below their own stage as well as sometimes one or two stages beyond this level. An individual's preference for judgments based on his evaluations does not seem to

conform to the transformational model because "due to hierarchical integration, lower stage judgments often retain their validity when seen from a higher stage perspective" (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1984). An individual at a higher stage may interpret a statement in a different way than an individual at a lower stage but he would still be able to endorse as valid the ideas that were available at the lower stages. The transformational model seems appropriate for "describing the development of spontaneous production of moral judgments but not of comprehension and preference" (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1984, p. 19).

The higher moral stages are "better" than the lower stages in terms of the quality of reasoning which has little to do with the content of moral judgment. To distinguish between the content of moral judgment consider the dilemma of the tailor faced with the issue of punishing an escaped convict by reporting him (Appendix B). The escaped convict had made good by building a factory and giving his workers good wages and by using his profits to build a hospital for people who could not afford good medical care. The tailor knew the police were still looking for the escaped convict. Should he report the escaped convict to the police or

Table 2

The Norms (Also Moral Issues)

1. Life	4. Affiliation	(9. Civil Rights)
a) preservation	(5. Erotic love and sex)	(10. Religion)
b) quality/quantity	6. Authority	11. Conscience
2. Property	7. Law	12. Punishment
3. Truth	8. Contract	

(Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman, 1984, p. 76)

not? The choice he makes (report to the police, or not to report to the police) is the content of his moral judgment in that particular context and the reason he gives for his choice is the structure of his moral judgment. According to Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman (1984) reasoning about choices centres on nine universal issues (see Table 2) or moral values which are also called norms in Standard Issue Scoring (see Chapter Three). "A moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of these values as they conflict in concrete situations of choice" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 672). An individual's stage or structure of moral judgment defines what is important to him in each of these moral issues and why he finds it important. Kohlberg (1975) gives an example in choosing between life and law:

... at Stage 1 life is valued in terms of the power or possessions of the person involved; at Stage 2, for its usefulness in satisfying the needs of the individual in question, or others; at Stage 3, in terms of the individual's relations with others and their valuation of him; at Stage 4, in terms of social or religious law. Only at Stages 5 and 6 is each life seen as inherently worthwhile, aside from other considerations (p. 672).

Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman (1984) stated that issues are empirically based and grounded in philosophic considerations. They are moral issues because they (1)

regulate human claims and conflicts in that they resolve conflicts between individuals, their rights, interests, and claims which is one of the functions of morality; (2) define basic human rights including the right to life, the protection of law, freedom of conscience and affiliation, the right to speak in a political system, the right to property, the right not to be subject to arbitrary punishment and the right to enter contractual agreements; (3) are universal and regulate universal human conflicts which arise because all humans have needs and rights relating to life, law, and so on; (4) are subject to social sanctions. Moral issues, norms or values are different from non-moral issues, norms or values, in that their violation not only induces moral self-blame and guilt but is an offense and subject to punishment; and (5) are non-reducible and therefore intrinsic. The issues are not reducible to one another and are each valuable in their own right.

Kohlberg (1971) stated that it is possible to move from a description of what moral stage development is to what it ought to be. He also stated that "because of the prescriptive nature of morality, lower level responses can never be said to be more morally appropriate than higher level response" (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman,

1984, p. 20). Therefore later moral stages are morally better or more desirable which is not to say an individual at a later stage has less personal worth than an individual at a higher stage. Kohlberg (1971) claims that the higher stages of reasoning are philosophically more adequate because it is at the higher stages - specifically Stage 6 - that the principle of justice (to maximize human welfare) is at its most mature in the developmental sense, in a universal, logically consistent, comprehensive and consistent way. What this means is that it is not until Stage 5 or Stage 6 that concerns about human welfare and justice become genuine moral principles instead of the rules, sentiments, or stereotypes which characterize the lower stages.

At the higher stages, at the postconventional level, an individual adheres to principles rather than the rules of society. His principles precede his taking society's perspective or accepting society's laws. He is then free of society's laws until he decides it is rational and therefore subjects himself to it. Jesus exhibited a post-conventional type of thinking when he reminded the legalistic Pharisees that "the Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath" (Duska & Whelan, 1975). The reason for the law and its justification was

to aid man. So a post conventional individual's perspective, then, is prior to society and:

... it is the perspective of an individual who has made the moral commitments or holds the standards on which a good or just society must be based. This is a perspective by which (1) a particular society or set of social practices may be judged and (2) a person may rationally commit himself to a society (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 36).

Although various ethical theories give rise to different principles, most philosophers agree that moral evaluations must be inherent in and be justified by reference to a realm of principles. A principle is abstract and universalizable. It is an impartial way of judging and deciding which makes it different from a concrete societal or cultural rule. An example of a rule is the commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery" which is the rule for specific behaviour in specific situations in a monogamous society. An example of a principle is Kant's categorical imperative - "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). The term "maxim" means both 'principle' and 'motive' and a principle is in a sense 'formal' in that it commands nothing specific. Principles are prescriptions rather than proscriptions. They differ

from rules also in that they cannot be broken. They hold in all circumstances and there are no exceptions. "Principles are invariant and do not vary with changes in circumstances or conditions ... and it is impossible for moral principles to conflict with one another" (Sanger, 1958, p. 192). Moral principles and moral rules are dissimilar, then, in that the former are more general, pervasive, and fundamental. Moral judgment is principled and it is a mode of choosing that is universal and is what one would want people to adopt in all situations (Kohlberg, 1971). Moral judgments have properties that make them moral:

They are, first, judgments of value, not of fact ... Second, they are social judgments, judgments involving people. Third, they are prescriptive or normative judgments, judgments of ought, of rights and responsibilities, rather than value judgments of liking and preference. (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1984, p. 24).

Kohlberg's conception of principled morality can be considered a modern day version of Kant's categorical imperative which also stated the Golden Rule, i.e., that one should do as he would be done by and that he must so act as to treat humanity, whether in his own self or in that of another, always as an end, and never as only a means (Kant, 1985/1969). The categorical imperative

enjoins action without any ifs (cf. the hypothetical imperative) or without regard to the effect such an action may have. One is to act without qualification. If one contributes to charity for a tax deduction, that action may be prudent, but it would not be considered morally virtuous. If one gives to charity because one wishes to aid the less fortunate then according to Kant one is behaving morally. Man, then, is an end-in-himself but his human worth and dignity become degraded if he is treated as a means. According to Colby, Kohlberg and Kauffman (1984) there are validity checks on high stage moral judgment or reasoning that are derived from concerns for making one's judgment reversible (e.g., using the Golden Rule) and universalizable (e.g., using the categorical imperative). The reversibility check asks, "Would you judge this action as fair if you were in the other person's shoes?" and the universalizability check asks, "Would you judge this action right if everyone were to do it for the reason advanced?" The universalizability check is applied to the reason given for the conclusion - i.e., if everyone disobeyed the speed limit because he felt like it (reason), the consequences would be disastrous. If everyone broke a speed limit because they had to save a life, then it

would not be disastrous. For Kant, the supreme principle of morality is moral autonomy which he claimed is attainable by human beings by virtue of their capacity for reason and freedom. People can act on the moral laws they give themselves and not on the external laws of society or nature; in fact, when they are slaves to things outside themselves when in pursuit of their desires, they are not really free (Kant, 1785/1969). The condition of non-autonomy is heteronomy. Kohlberg's theory of moral development and Piaget's conception of moral development in children deal with progression from heteronomy to autonomy, from unilateral respect to mutual respect, and from physical satisfaction to psychological satisfaction. For Kohlberg, especially, the movement up the ladder of moral development is from the desired to the desirable. Mature principles "reduce all moral obligations to the interests and claims of concrete individuals in concrete situations; they tell us how to resolve claims which compete in a situation, when it is one man's life against another" (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1984, p. 219). Morality is defined as justice because the principle of justice has an "ultimate claim" to being universal and prescriptive. The principle of justice gives each man his due when

used to decide between competing claims of individuals. If each individual's claims are to be considered equally then the ability to role- take is necessary to ensure fairness. There are procedures to ensure fairness or reversibility in role-taking. One such procedure is Rawls' (1971) veil of ignorance position where a person, in choosing principles of justice does not know:

... his place in society, his class position or social status, (and he does not know) his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like ... this ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances (p. 12).

If the stages in Kohlberg's theory of moral development represent more refined and more adequate conceptions of justice and if the stages also represent a greater capacity for role-taking then "the two are the same because the most just solution is the one which takes into account the claims of all individuals" (Gilligan, 1980, p. 502). Other than Rawls (1971), philosophers such as Hare (1981) and Frankena (1963) have written about the relationship between universality and reversibility in justice reasoning.

Like all theories Kohlberg's theory is not without

its critics. Alston (1971) and Peters (1975) have accused Kohlberg of committing the naturalistic fallacy of describing how morality ought to be from what it is i.e., reasoning about what ought to be on the basis of what is. Stage 6 reasoning ought to be fostered because it is the highest moral stage. Kohlberg explains his position by saying "The scientific theory as to why people factually do move upward from stage to stage, and why they factually do prefer a higher stage to a lower, is broadly the same as a moral theory as to why people should prefer a higher stage to a lower" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 223). Kohlberg (1971) stated that since the highest stage includes features of the lower stages a normative ethical theory containing all these features is the only one that can inform an individual how he ought to make moral judgments. Kohlberg also stated that though normative ethical theory and psychological theory are not reducible to each other they are parallel "on the ground that the formal psychological developmental criteria of differentiation and integration, of structural equilibrium, map into the formal moral criteria of prescriptiveness and universality" (p. 224). Although there are critics of Kohlberg's the ethical position taken by him has an honourable tradition of

acceptable theory and modern proponents include Kant (1785/1969), Hare (1952), Singer (1958), Frankena (1963), and Rawls (1971).

Kohlberg explains how movement is possible in his theory of moral development. Movement is effected with the creation of cognitive disequilibrium or dissonance or when an individual's cognitive structure is inadequate to deal with a given moral dilemma. If one's cognitive structure cannot resolve a problem then the cognitive organism, in keeping with the interactional - environmental theory, seeks and adjusts to a structure which does. Children do not give the same answer to moral dilemmas as adults because the quality of their thinking is distinctively different. The child is a moral philosopher according to Kohlberg (1968b) and his differing moral philosophies, as he undergoes experience which leads to a restructuring of his cognitive framework, are the stages of his moral development (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971). As a child matures he undergoes experiences which his cognitive structure cannot accommodate causing him to revamp his way of thinking to make sense of new experiences. When he finds a more adequate cognitive structure to deal with the new experiences his way of thinking about the world is

accordingly changed. An important component for the cognitive development of the child is the opportunity to participate in a variety of experiences that will induce him to try to reorder his present way of thinking and try to adapt to a more adequate way of organizing and interpreting data (Fraenkel, 1976). If the child's cognitive structure or orientation is not disturbed, that is, if there is no cognitive disequilibrium, there will be no further development. Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) stated that stimulating development stepwise through the moral stages is: (1) constitutional as it violates no civil rights and is independent of religious doctrines. It is the way of reasoning and not particular beliefs that is changed; (2) philosophically justified as almost all moral philosophers have an ethic based on an advanced stage of moral development that is not biased and is universal; (3) socially useful as individuals at the higher stages not only reason better but act in accordance with their judgments. "Moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behaviour, is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behaviour" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 672).

In terms of moral education, if a child's thinking is to be stimulated via moral discussions in the

classroom important conditions appear to be:

1. Exposure to the next higher stage of reasoning.
2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradictions for the child's current moral structure, leading to dissatisfaction with his current level.
3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue combining the first two conditions, in which conflicting views are compared in an open manner (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 675).

For most children under the age of nine, some adolescents, and many adolescent and adult criminal offenders, the level attained is the preconventional one comprising Stages 1 and 2. For most adolescents and adults in American society the level attained is the conventional level comprising Stages 3 and 4. The post-conventional level comprising Stages 5 and 6 is attained by a minority of adults and usually after the age of twenty to twenty-five (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984). A large percentage of individuals - approximately fifteen percent - do not progress beyond the preconventional stages. Most Americans - approximately sixty-five percent - attain the conventional stages but do not progress beyond them (Hogan, 1973; Arbuthnot & Faust, 1981). Colby, Kohlberg & Gibbs (1979) showed the relationship between age and stage of reasoning (Figure 1). The proportions of each of the five stages depicted

Figure 1. Stage of reasoning as a function of age. (from Colby, Kohlberg, & Gibbs, 1979)

changes with increasing age. Stage 5 reasoning appears in the early twenties, increases slightly, and then levels off. Stimulation of moral development via discussion of moral issues in the classroom might pose a problem if a teacher is not at the higher stages since only ten percent of the population reaches the postconventional level (Fraenkel, 1976). Stage 6 is generally not included in current applications in the classroom because of questions concerning its relevance for school populations (Rosenzweig, 1978).

Some societies do not attain the postconventional level because they are not complex. Role-taking opportunities and education are limited. Development is likely to be more advanced in modern societies because of greater exposure to and changes in norms/issues and therefore reference to what is right by means of principles. In all cases, however, development should always be the same. Since Kohlberg's initial study (Kohlberg, 1958) of over twenty-five years ago when he interviewed fifty middle-and working-class older children and adolescents (all boys) from the Chicago area in three year intervals over a span of twenty years, many other studies have been carried out that indicated cross-cultural invariability. These include

studies in New Zealand (Moir, 1974), Turkey (Turiel, Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1977), and Kenya (Edwards, 1975).

Factors Influencing Moral Development

Intelligence

There is evidence that moral development is related to intelligence. Studies by Porteus and Johnson (1965), Loughran (1967), Lydiat (1973), Taylor and Achenbach (1975), and Faust and Arbuthnot (1978) all found a moderate to significant positive correlation between I.Q. scores (based from a variety of tests) and moral maturity. As I.Q. scores increase, moral maturity scores increase. Moral maturity and I.Q. however, are not perfectly correlated because more than I.Q. is involved in moral judgment. Kohlberg (1975) stated:

Maturity of moral judgment is not highly correlated with verbal intelligence (correlations are only in the 30s, accounting for 10 percent of the variance). Cognitive development, in the stage sense, is more important for moral development than such correlations suggest. Piaget has found that after a child learns to speak there are three major stages of reasoning: the intuitive, the concrete operational, and the formal operational. At around age seven, the child enters the stage of concrete logical thought: He can make logical inferences, classify, and handle quantitative relations about concrete

things. In adolescence individuals usually enter the stage of formal operations. At this stage they can reason abstractly, i.e., consider all possibilities, form hypotheses, deduce implications from hypotheses, and test them against reality (p. 671).

Moral reasoning "depends upon advanced logical reasoning" (ibid.). An individual at the concrete operational stage will be at the preconventional level of Stages 1 and 2. An individual at the partially formal operational stage will be at the conventional level of Stages 3 and 4. Not all individuals who show formal operational thinking, however, reach the postconventional level of Stages 5 and 6. According to Kohlberg (1975) "... over fifty percent of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but only ten percent of these adults (all formal operational) display principled (Stages 5 and 6) moral reasoning" (p. 671). Studies by Selman (1971) and Tomlinson-Keasey, and Keasey (1972) showed that formal operational thinking was necessary for principled reasoning. If an individual shows principled reasoning he is likely to be at the formal operational stage. If an individual is at this stage it does not necessarily mean that he is at the principled stage. Piagetian logical stages, then, are necessary but not sufficient

for moral development. For relationships between the logical stages and moral stages see Table 3.

Age Norms

According to Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) there is no strict relationship between a person's age and his moral judgment stage. Individuals develop at different rates and, depending on various factors, will reach different stages at different ages. There is, however, a general curvilinear relationship between age and stage as shown in Figure 2 which depicts expected scores derived from American and Canadian data. The data came from studies by Arbuthnot (1973), Sullivan (1975), Faust and Arbuthnot (1978), and Sparling, Arbuthnot, Faust, and Key (1978). Arbuthnot and Faust (1981) caution that in using the above figure "one should keep in mind that these norms represent a summary for all social classes, sex, education levels, and so forth" (p. 86). Individual variation is likely to be seen at the upper stages and rates of development will be more advanced with higher education, intelligence, social class, and so on.

Role-Taking

Social stimulation is another necessary but not

Table 3

Relations Between Piaget's Logical Stages and Kohlberg's Moral Stages

Logical stage	Moral stage
Symbolic, intuitive thought.	Stage 0. The good is what I want and like.
Concrete operations. Substage 1. Categorical classification.	Stage 1. Punishment-obedience orientation.
Concrete operations. Substage 2. Reversible concrete thought.	Stage 2. Instrumental hedonism and concrete reciprocity.
Formal operations. Substage 1. Relations involving inverse of the reciprocal.	Stage 3. Orientation to interpersonal relations of mutuality.
Formal operations. Substage 2. Capacity to order triads of propositions or relations.	Stage 4. Maintenance of social order, fixed rules, and authority.
Formal operations. Substage 3. True formal thought. Construction of all possible combinations of relations, systematic isolation of variables and deductive hypothesis-testing.	Stage 5. Social contract, utilitarian law making perspective. Stage 6. Universal ethical principle orientation.

Note. From Kohlberg, 1973, p. 63.

Figure 2. Age norms of moral reasoning stages. (From Arbuthnot & Faust, 1981, p. 87)

sufficient factor in moral development. Such stimulation results when an individual interacts with others, engages in direct moral debate with them, and makes moral decisions, all of which provide opportunities for the individual to develop decentration and role-play skills. The term "role-taking" was devised by Mead (1934) and is preferable to "empathy" or "sympathy" because:

1. it emphasizes the cognitive as well as the affective emotional side
2. it involves an organized structural relationship between the self and others
3. it emphasizes that the process involves understanding and relating to all the roles in the society of which one is a part, and
4. it emphasizes that role-taking goes on in all social interactions and communication situations, not merely in ones that arouse emotions of sympathy or empathy (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 49).

The ability to role-take means the ability to take in other people's perspectives and the more one is able to consider the perspectives of others, which is central to justice, the more mature one's moral judgment is. Kohlberg (1976) called role-taking level, or one's level of social cognition, a bridge between logical or cognitive level and moral level.

Studies by Feffer and Gourevitch (1960) and Flavel

et al. (1968) indicated that role-taking ability and social perception increased with age. Research by DeVries (1970) showed a correlation between role-taking ability and intelligence. Research by Taft (1955) and Timm (1980) showed a correlation between emotional stability and role-taking ability. Stuart (1967) showed that high decentraters were more mature in their moral judgments than low decentraters thus showing a correlation between decentering ability and moral maturity. More recently, Walker's study (1980) showed necessary but not sufficient relationships between logical operations and social perspective taking levels, and social perspective taking levels and moral stages. It seems, then, that role-taking ability is an important consideration in moral development though the relationship is a "necessary but not sufficient" one.

Moral Atmosphere

Role-taking opportunities depend on the social environment. The individual's experiences with society, his family, his school, his peer groups, and the like affect his role-taking skills. A study by Holstein (1969) indicated that children who were encouraged to

participate in discussions relating to values and be part of the decision making process by their families were more advanced in moral stage than those who received no such encouragement. Communication was two-way in that not only did the children learn to take their families' points of view but their families heeded the children's viewpoints as well. Kohlberg (1976a) reported that children who were active in peer participation were more advanced than those who were not. He also claimed that socioeconomic status correlated with moral development in various cultures and that middle-class children were at higher moral stages than lower-class children (Kohlberg, 1976a). This is attributed to:

... the fact that middle-class children have more opportunity to take the point of view of the more distant, impersonal, and influential roles in society's basic institutions (law, economy, government, social stratification, family) than do lower-class children (Kohlberg, 1976a, p. 50).

The more an individual participates in a group or institution the more opportunities he has to interact with others. Participation alone is not important, however, as there has to be mutuality of role taking for moral development.

If an individual's social experience is consonant

with his moral understanding there will be no disequilibrium or development. Gilligan (1980) stated that if a child does not experience a trustworthy relationship nor see himself as a member of a coherent society or group he cannot as a result understand the shared norms and values underlying conventional moral thought. "Social institutions can impede or foster moral development by the concept of justice they embody, which either creates a stimulus for growth or retards the individual's development" (Gilligan, 1980, p. 505). A study by Bar-Yam et al. (1980) examined the effects of a Youth Aliyah programme in Israel. Adolescents at the preconventional level who were disadvantaged were placed in a kibbutz, a tight social organization that emphasized moral discussion, mutual concern among members, and democratic decision making. After some time the disadvantaged adolescents attained the same level of moral maturity as the kibbutz-born adolescents. Kohlberg (1976a) stated that of all the environments studied, children in American orphanages had the lowest level of moral maturity - the preconventional level - even at adolescence and he attributed this to lack of parental interaction and little communication and role-taking among the staff and children. Even the children did not

interact among themselves and received no encouragement for peer interaction from the staff. A study by Kohlberg, Scharf, and Hickey (1972) tried to create a just community in a women's reformatory. The study discovered that the inmates viewed the institutional system, with its rules and behaviour of the staff, as at Stage 1 - the punishment and obedience orientation - whereas the staff perceived the institution as being at Stage 4 - the law and order orientation. It was postulated that to bring about a change in moral development in the reformatory where the inmates reasoned at the pre-conventional level it was necessary to create a community within the prison that would allow the inmates to perceive themselves as participants rather than victims.

What then is the moral atmosphere of a group or institution? According to Kohlberg (1976a) the core of moral judgment is a sense of justice:

The core of the moral atmosphere of an institution or environment, then, is its justice structure, "the way in which social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the distribution of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls, 1971, p. 7, p. 50).

Sex Differences

If maturity in moral reasoning or judgment is influenced by the socialization history of the individual and if males and females undergo different experiences socially as Gilligan (1977, 1980, 1982) claimed, might there not be two paths of development, one for women and one for men? Gilligan (1977) argued that justice is the central concern in Kohlberg's theory of moral development a concern that figures more predominantly in males than females as the latter spend a large part of their lives in activities of care. Females are more concerned with an ethic of responsibility, care, and relationships. Gilligan (1980) stated that the cognitive developmental theories of moral development "have been derived largely or exclusively from studies of males" (p. 499). She therefore urged for a distinction between a "care and response orientation" and a "justice orientation".

Generally sex differences are found in the distribution of individuals over the six moral stages (Arbuthnot and Faust, 1981). Holstein (1976) in her sample of parents found four times as many women as men at Stage 3, the stage that is concerned with whatever

pleases or helps others and with what others approve of; in short, interpersonal relationships. Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) found twice as many women as men at Stage 3 in their study of college students. According to Arbuthnot and Faust (1980):

Many theorists argue that the greater proportion of females at Stage 3 is consistent with the propositions of the Kohlberg approach in that Stage 3 morality ... is a functional morality for mothers and housewives. Until middle and late adolescence, females may develop at the same or even faster rate than males, but the demands of certain rules in their lives may cause an arrest or fixation in their development at Stage 3, while males continue to progress (p. 88).

Arbuthnot (1975) has shown that females need not be fixated at Stage 3. In his study he separated individuals according to their biological sex and their sex role identity. A sex role identity refers to a person's attitude towards traditional roles of his sex. A female with a female sex role identity has therefore a traditional attitude toward women while a female with a male sex role identity has a non-traditional attitude toward women. Nontraditional females showed a more advanced rate of moral development than their traditional counterparts and the difference was a full stage (4.42 vs 3.42). Interestingly, in this study, the nontraditional females were rated in terms of moral

reasoning above the males who in turn were rated above the traditional females.

Studies by Turiel (1966), Keasey (1972), and Snarey, Kohlberg, and Reimer (1984) found no sex differences in stage when education and occupation are controlled. Colby, Kohlberg and Kauffman (1984) stated that if there are differences then they "appear to be differences in mode or style rather than structure" (p. 22). They also stated that concerns of care are concerns about the welfare of other persons or not hurting them thus preserving relationships with others. The concerns of care, then, fall "within the domain of justice as the orientations of social utilitarian concern for the welfare of others or the perfectionistic orientation of promoting harmonious social relations, Plato's concept of justice" (p. 45). The longitudinal study by Snarey, Kohlberg, and Reimer (1984) not only indicated that there are no sex differences in moral judgment but that males and females go through the same sequence.

More research is needed in this area and moral educators who devise their own instruments to measure moral development must take care to ensure that they use both male and female oriented norms.

Deaf Populations

To this researcher's knowledge little has been written about the moral judgment of the hearing impaired. Nass (1964) compared deaf and hearing children using as a conceptual framework Piaget's theory that very young children up to the age of seven do not differentiate between the subjective and the objective and as a result judge actions in terms of observable physical aspects and consequences rather than intentions. After the age of seven young children are increasingly aware of the subjective in which intentions become more important than consequences. Nass studied aspects of conscience development in deaf and hearing children by presenting four stories modeled after Piaget to thirty middle class congenitally deaf children six at each age level from eight to twelve years and of average to slightly superior intelligence as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence Test for Children, Performance Scale. (The hearing children were comparable to the deaf in terms of age, sex, social status, and intelligence). Two of the stories were concerned with peer reciprocity versus dependence on adult authority. The children were asked questions about each story and their responses

were scored according to Piaget's three stages of morality. The responses were scored by three raters and all ratings were in complete agreement. The deaf children's responses were not as verbally complete as their hearing counterparts but nonetheless it was possible to classify their responses in one of Piaget's three categories of moral development. The results indicated that the deaf scored significantly higher on one story and showed no significant difference on another. Both stories dealt with choice between peer and authority. If the deaf children achieved independence from adult authority and stressed peer relations sooner than hearing children it could be the result of peer solidarity that comes from a common bond of hearing loss; in Nass's words, "peer is equated with deaf and teacher with hearing, making for a closer allegiance to peer regardless of the situation" (1964, p. 1079). The deaf scored significantly lower on the two remaining stories which dealt with motivation or intent and outcome of a given situation. It was found that the responses of the deaf, however, with increase in age, approached those of their hearing counterparts reflecting, perhaps, a time lag rather than a different nature in moral development. The time lag of two years

may be due to reduced verbal communication. Odom, Blanton, and Laukhuf (1973) stated that deaf children do not interpret emotions reflected in facial expressions as well as hearing children probably because of fewer opportunities to receive interpretations and explanations of the emotions of others. Heider and Heider (1940) stated that the deaf were handicapped in being restricted to the here and now - a limitation likely to stem from inability to receive assurance about the outcome of events.

Nass (1964) did not say how the stories were presented to the deaf children (written or orally) nor did he say how they were questioned. If they were questioned verbally, what did he mean by 'verbally' and how were their responses recorded? Was sign language used with the deaf children? The question of which sign system is best for comprehension in the hearing impaired is a vital one and is being investigated by Clarke (1984) and Stewart (1984). A difference in Piaget's theory and Kohlberg's theory of moral development is that Piaget stresses the importance of peer-group participation to facilitate development. While Kohlberg, too, believes that peer group facilitates development if there is moral discussion in a just community for

example, he also stresses that development depends on cognitive dissonance from organism - environmental interaction that leads to a change in psychological or mental structures.

... basic mental structure is the product of the patterning of the interaction between the organism and the environment rather than directly reflecting either innate patterns in the organism or patterns of events (stimulus contingencies) in the environment (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 350).

There is a dearth of literature on the moral development of the deaf. There has been only one study using Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory on a deaf sample. The study was done by De Caro and Emerton (1978) who administered Porter and Taylor's (1974) written version of the Kohlberg moral reasoning questionnaire to 252 students entering the National Technical Institute of the Deaf. One hundred and ninety-eight students who made up the bulk of that entering class were 'tested' in 1975. Forty-four students, randomly chosen from the entering class of 1976, were similarly tested to verify the findings of the previous year and ten students, randomly selected from the entering class of 1977, were not only given the same written protocol as the classes of 1975 and 1976 but

were also interviewed in depth.

The NTID students were given five of Kohlberg's hypothetical moral dilemmas that were first signed to them in simultaneous communication and which they afterwards read. Simultaneous communication refers to "the combined manual-oral system of total communication which includes the use of oralism as only one part of the total communication effort with the deaf child. In total communication, the language of signs and fingerspelling are added. This gives the critical language information absent from the oral only method" (Vernon, 1971, p. 57). After hearing/watching a dilemma and after reading it from their test paper the students answered questions about the dilemma in written form. According to the investigators only vocabulary questions were answered by the test administrators. The students were tested in group situations. The entering class of 1977 followed the procedures described above but they were later given three of the five dilemmas to review and summarize for the investigator who then proceeded to ask probing questions designed to elicit the reasons for their responses. The investigator interviewed students one at a time and all interviews were videotaped. Transcripts of the interviews were made and their

accuracy checked by two external raters skilled in all modes of communication with the deaf.

According to De Caro and Emerton (1978) the written and interview protocols were scored blindly and independently and both sets of scores were very similar indicating consistency and giving a measure of construct validity to the results. The investigators noted no significant differences between the maturity scores of the interview and written protocols ($t = -.024$). They felt that either method could be used to assess moral reasoning level because "the students' answers were the same in spite of the greatly increased ease of communication found in the interview situations" (p. 11).

Results were scored using the "structural issue rating" method in the Porter and Taylor manual and it was discovered that more than eighty percent of the subjects scored at the preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2) which is lower than the average hearing college entrant who can be expected to reason at the conventional level. The investigators concluded that the students were at the preconventional level possibly because their:

... experiential bases are not sufficient to

permit considerations of a wide array of different viewpoints ... role-taking abilities are not fully developed ... language deprivation has precluded assimilation of certain values desired by the larger society ...(and perhaps because they) do not have the cognitive abilities required for conventional and postconventional levels of reasoning (De Caro & Emerton, 1978, p. 19).

Testing a deaf population is not without its problems. One of the problems deaf students face has to do with language difficulties especially when it comes to reading stories, answering questions about the stories and giving their own viewpoints in written form. Though De Caro and Emerton (1978) stated that Porter and Taylor's written protocol "was modified slightly by substituting equivalent words or phrases where language problems might occur for deaf students (and that) outside evaluators confirmed that neither content nor tone was changed" (p. 9), one wonders to what grade level the protocol was modified. The Wrightstone, Aronow, and Moskowitz (1962) study mentioned earlier found that eighty percent of sixteen year olds were below grade 4.9 in reading. For entering college students the grade level may not be that much higher. Testing for the De Caro and Emerton (1978) study was done in a group situation and only vocabulary questions

were answered by test administrators. The students might have had questions other than vocabulary questions pertaining to the stories and such questions might have been difficult to attend to in group situations. Also, written responses tend to be less well elaborated than responses to oral interviews thus making it possible to misscore. Perhaps a larger sample should have been interviewed than the ten out of two hundred and fifty-two students.

The structural issue rating method used in the Porter and Taylor manual is the second of three structural methods for the analysis of moral judgment interview developed by Kohlberg and his staff at the Center for Moral Education (Kuhmerker, 1980). Since Kohlberg began studying the development of moral judgment in 1958 there has been an evolution in definitions of moral judgment stages and in the methodologies or stage scoring procedures (Colby, Kohlberg, Kauffman, 1984). According to Kuhmerker (1980) the earliest method was the "Ideal Type Rating" which was based on examining the content of responses and attitudes in each dilemma and matching the patterns of responses and attitudes to each stage.

The stages were defined as:

"composite photographs" of response to the dilemmas. Any one choice or statement of value would not be adequate to classify an individual as to stage, but the overall fit of the individual's choices and modes of defining value to the composite picture or ideal type determined his/her stage. Particular responses, then, were "signs" of a stage, signs with a greater or lesser probability of being indicators of that stage (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 69).

Identification of an individual's stage from the interview protocol was based on sentence scoring and story rating. There was a manual containing prototypical sentences for sentence scoring for each dilemma. Each sentence was scored by stage and scores were changed to percentages to give an overall picture of stage level. In story rating the subject's total response to a dilemma was assigned a stage. Stage mixtures were then intuitively scored. This method did not work with longitudinal studies in which Kohlberg discovered some discrepancies in invariant sequence. Kohlberg interpreted this to an incorrect conceptualization of the stages and redefined the stages which led to the structural issue scoring method.

The second scoring technique was devised in 1972 (Kuhmerker, 1980) and "analyzed response units that were smaller than the story of the moral dilemma but larger

than single sentences" (p. 77). This method looked beyond responses that were considered globally and for which stages were based on the concerns an individual focused on. The concerns were broken down into units of content for stage analysis. In other words, the structural issue scoring "represents an attempt to resolve the basic content-structure confusion of the earlier systems by redefining as content that which had been considered structure" (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 72). Structural issue rating was guided by a manual which although it described at an abstract level each of the nine moral issues at the six stages made it difficult for scorers to match responses to statements in the manual. The structural issue rating method took a year or even longer to learn. The scorer had to familiarise himself with Kohlberg's theory as well as the concept of level of sociomoral perspective. This method made it difficult for independent scorers to reach agreement so that:

... scoring decisions were subjective and often unreliable ... the reliance of this scoring system on very general features of stage structure meant that findings of invariant longitudinal sequence and stage consistency across issues could be attributed to consistency in or a universal sequence of the general features rather than providing evidence for consistency or sequentiality of

the detailed conceptual differentiations included in more specific moral stage definitions (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 73).

Standard Issue Scoring

The Standardized Scoring Manual was recently completed and in press at the time of this writing. Standard issue scoring is an improvement over structural issue scoring in that objectivity and reliability are greater because of clear and concrete specifications of the stage criteria. Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman (1984) said that the change was from an intuitive scoring method to a standardized scoring method which still maintains hermeneutic and phenomenological orientations. Phenomenalism refers to a kind of understanding one gets of another person by adopting his point of view and seeing how arguments are presented to him. Hermeneutics refers to the interpretation of an individual's responses or, in standard issue scoring, his moral reasoning or judgments. In standard issue scoring, however, there is "a change from a view of interpretation as an 'art' to a view of interpretation as a 'science', i.e., as a research activity employing an objective and reliable method of observation. This method, however, still rests on the communicative stance

of an interpreter, not on a positivistic stance of someone trying to classify and predict "behaviour" as distinct from meaning" (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 73).

The standard issue scoring is used in Kohlberg's moral judgment interview (MJII) which comprises nine hypothetical moral dilemmas each of which is followed by probe questions to elicit in Socratic fashion "justifications, elaborations, and clarifications of the subject's moral judgments" (Ibid, p. 75). The new method limits self to the scoring of two issues per dilemma. For example, in the Heinz dilemma - should Heinz steal a drug to save his dying wife if the man who invented the only medicine that would save her life insists on a price for it that Heinz cannot afford - the two standard issues are life and law. The probing questions gauge the subjects' conceptions of the two issues and make a distinction between issues and norms. For example, in the Heinz story, the subject may advocate stealing the drug which has to do with the issue of life. When asked why he would steal the drug the subject might say he loves his wife in which case affiliation is the norm. If he were to respond he would steal the drug because he would feel guilty if he did not try to save his wife

then conscience becomes the norm. If he would steal because he felt that the man who invented the medicine was misusing his invention then property becomes the norm. Moral norms are also moral values that the individual cites to justify his choice between two issues. Issues are outside the individual in the form of social objects, institutions, or events while norms as values are in the individual.

The standard issue moral judgment interview not only deals with issues and norms but also with elements of morality making it more refined than the other two previous methods. The elements described how subjects "construe the importance or meaning of [a] norm" (Kohlberg, 1978, p. 11). They represent the significance of a norm and endow norms with value. They are "internalized psychological value dispositions [whereas] norms need not be. [They] are general across situations and types of action, norms are not" (Kuhmerker, 1980, p. 82). For example, Heinz might want to save his wife's life (life issue) because of his love for her (affiliation norm). He might say also that it is his role (duty element) to save her or that he feels grateful toward her for all that she has done for him and that she may do the same for him (reciprocity

Table 4

The Elements of Moral Reasoning

I Modal Elements

1. Obeying (consulting) persons or deity
2. Blaming (approving)
3. Retributing (exonerating)
4. Having a right (having no right)
5. Having a duty (having no duty).

II Value Elements

A. Egoistic Consequences:

6. Good (bad) reputation
7. Seeking reward (avoiding punishment)

B. Utilitarian Consequences:

8. Good (bad) individual consequences
9. Good (bad) group consequences

C. Ideal or Harmony-serving Consequences:

10. Upholding character
11. Upholding self-respect
12. Serving social ideal or harmony
13. Serving human dignity and autonomy

D. Fairness:

14. Balancing perspectives or role taking
15. Reciprocity or positive desert
16. Maintaining equity and procedural fairness
17. Maintaining social contract or freely agreeing.

(Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman, 1984, p. 76)

element). The seventeen different elements are listed in Table 4. Note that from issues to norms to elements the concerns become more abstract and general. In standard issue scoring each of the concerns become more abstract and general. In standard issue scoring each of the reasons a subject gives:

is treated ... as a discrete moral idea, and each represents a separate unit of material. The procedural complications of subdivision by norm and element were found to be necessary in order to define a unit that was narrow enough to be homogeneous, to capture what seems to be a single, discrete moral concept or idea, yet broad enough to represent the idea's full conceptual or structural significance for the subject ... the system provides a way for the scorer to categorize interview material in a non-arbitrary way into manageable, conceptually coherent units (interview judgments) which can then be stage scored by matching them to very specific and concrete criteria in the scoring manual (criterion judgments) (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 77).

Since the 1950's the dilemmas have undergone changes. The dilemmas selected for the standard issue moral judgment interview were chosen because they (1) sharpened the need for choice between two alternative values; (2) represented moral conflicts that concern pre-adolescents, adolescents, and adults in every culture; and (3) tapped issues that are significant to persons at higher stages of moral development

(Kuhmerker, 1980). For those reasons and because the standard issue scoring method is designed to yield more accurate data than the structural issue scoring method in the Porter and Taylor manual it was decided to use the standard issue moral judgment interview in this study with a sample of hearing impaired students ranging in age from twelve to fifteen - a critical transitional period as Kohlberg and Turiel (1971) discovered from their longitudinal studies which showed that while the level of morality at age ten does not indicate the level that will be attained in adulthood, those who do not reach Stage 3 or Stage 4 in moral reasoning by age thirteen are not likely to develop principled morality in adulthood.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Alternative Modes for Assessing Moral Judgment

There are several instruments and techniques to assess moral reasoning but "only Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument and James Rest's Defining Issues Test have been extensively validated" (Kuhmerker, Mentkowski, & Erickson, 1980, p. viii). The other instruments still in various stages of development and field testing include the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure and the Ethical Reasoning Inventory both of which purport to combine the best features of Kohlberg's MJI and Rest's DIT. (Ibid., p. ix). There is also an Environmental Issues Test (EIT) which is similar to the DIT but different in that the dilemma stories are changed to deal with environmental issues such as the population explosion, pollution, nuclear power, chemical and germ warfare, genetic engineering, and so on, that are so prevalent in today's technological society (Iozzi & Paradise-Maul, 1980). Iozzi and Paradise-Maul (1980) felt that these "real world" dilemmas should be incorporated into the science curriculum to prepare

students to "effectively deal with the social and moral responsibilities as politicians or as scientists or as citizens of the future" (p. 132). All these tests are worth looking into as they affect the moral fibre of our society. Most of the tests mentioned above are similar to Rest's Defining Issues Test which this researcher felt would not be appropriate for the hearing impaired because it is basically a paper and pencil test. The DIT's value lies in its objectivity making for ease in administration especially for groups and scoring which can be done by scoring keys or even a computer (Rest, 1980c). The DIT is a multiple-choice measure of moral judgment. There are six moral dilemmas and after a subject reads a dilemma he must read twelve issue statements listed after the dilemma. He must then indicate on a 5-point rating scale from 'no importance' to 'great importance' how important each statement is in deciding what should be done in the dilemma. When the statements are rated the subject is then asked to rank the four most important statements from the set of twelve statements. This method "taps an individual's preference for a particular mode of reasoning on moral issues" (Iozzi & Paradise-Maul, 1980, p. 132).

The DIT assumes that people at different

developmental stages perceive moral dilemmas differently - particularly in what they see as the crux of a moral problem and in what considerations they regard as the most important ones. The DIT is concerned with how people define the issues in a moral dilemma. Presumably if people are presented with different statements about the crucial issue of a moral dilemma, people at different developmental stages will choose different statements as representing the most important issue (Rest, 1980c, p. 113).

The language in the dilemmas and especially in the statements following the dilemmas is quite complex and too difficult to modify for the hearing impaired without changing the contents. Then, too, the DIT is also most suitable for obtaining a principled level score (Stages 5 - 6). There are very few statements at Stages 1 and 2 on the DIT. As the subjects are adolescents, it is unlikely that Stages 5 - 6 would be found. Rest (1980c) has stated that the DIT can not be used with young subjects with a reading level lower than that of an average twelve-year-old. In 1959 the reading performance of deaf children was comprehensively surveyed. The results were published as Special Deaf Norms of the Metropolitan Elementary Reading Test by Furth (1966b). Over five thousand pupils in schools for deaf children participated and it was discovered that the mean score for the youngest group (ages ten and a half to eleven

and a half), when compared with norms published for a large national sample, corresponded to a mean grade equivalent of 2.7 and the mean score for the oldest group (ages fifteen and a half to sixteen and a half) corresponded to an equivalent of Grade 3.5. The hearing impaired "have difficulty in acquiring fluency in other modes of English language understanding and expression such as reading, self-generated written language, and varieties of pencil and paper tasks" (Kretschmer & Kretschmer, 1978, p. 114). It was felt by the researcher that the hearing impaired would have difficulty not only with understanding the language in the DIT but with the concept of ranking or assessing. The dilemma in Kohlberg's MJI can be modified without changing the tone and content much and instead of written responses, a subject can give his responses verbally in the mode of communication he is most comfortable with in the form of an interview.

The Sample

The sample was drawn from the Junior Department of a provincial school for the deaf in Vancouver, British Columbia. It was hoped that the entire student

population in the Junior Department numbering twenty-two in all could participate but parental permission was obtained only from fifteen students. The school has both day students and residential students. The residential students come from outside the city of Vancouver and its environs and some live close enough to the city to be able to commute home on the weekends. The school also has classes both on-campus and off-campus. The sample for this study was limited to the on-campus classes. The on-campus classes in the Junior Department were classified as academic and non-academic. There were no multihandicapped classes in the department. The fifteen subjects in the sample - seven males and eight females - ranged in age from 12.4 to 15.10 years. Of the fifteen subjects, five were residential. The subjects all came from different socioeconomic backgrounds and had varied hearing losses making for a heterogeneous mix.

Table 5 outlines the classification of students by age, sex, day/resident status, and hearing loss.

Instrumentation

The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument (MJI) consists of nine moral dilemmas with questions designed to penetrate beyond the subjects' opinions of what should or should not be done. The questions seek to determine the reasons for the choices made as the purpose of the MJI is to determine the stage(s) of reasoning displayed by a subject. The dilemmas focus on the nine norms or issues listed in Table 2. For this study four dilemmas each dealing with different conflicting issues were selected as Kohlberg has indicated that the "level of moral judgment can be reliably scored from a series of four dilemmas" (Tracy & Cross, 1973, p. 239). The dilemmas for this study were 'Heinz' with the issues of life versus law (and punishment); 'Joe and his Father' with the issues of affiliative role versus property; 'Judy and Louise' with the issues of affiliative role versus truth; and 'Valjean' with the issues of morality or conscience versus law.

Table 5

Subjects by Age as of June 30, 1984, Sex, Day/Resident Student Status, and
Hearing Loss in the Better Ear (Unaided)

Subject	Age Yrs.Mos.	Sex	Day/ Resident	Hearing Loss 500 Hz-2000 Hz	Hearing Threshold
			Student	Unaided (Better Ear)	Level (HTL)
1	13.10	F	Resident	85dB-100dB-110dB	98dB
2	15.8	M	Day	100dB-110dB-+115dB	108+dB
3	13.9	M	Day	+110dB-+115dB-+115dB	113+dB
4	13.11	F	Day	100dB-115dB-+115dB	110+dB
5	15.8	F	Day	95dB-110dB-115dB	107dB
6	15.10	F	Day	+110dB-+115dB-+115dB	113+dB
7	12.4	F	Day	100dB-110dB-115dB	108dB
8	15.7	F	Day	75dB-90dB-95dB	87dB
9	14.4	F	Resident	90dB-95dB-100dB	95dB
10	15.6	M	Resident	100dB-110dB-100dB	103dB
11	15.2	M	Day	75dB-90dB-85dB	83dB
12	14.3	M	Resident	90dB-105dB-+115dB	103+dB
13	15.6	M	Day	95dB-100dB-+115dB	103+dB
14	14.9	F	Resident	70dB-90dB-+115dB	92+dB
15	13.9	M	Day	90dB-110dB-110dB	103dB
$\bar{X}$	14.58				101.7+dB

The original four Kohlberg dilemmas that were used in this study were tested for reading level. The Fry grade levels for the Heinz, Joe, Judy and Valjean dilemmas were respectively grades 6, 6, 7, and 7 for a Fry grade level average of 7 which was deemed much too difficult for the hearing impaired subjects to read and comprehend. The dilemmas were therefore modified by changing the sentence structure to simple sentences of the subject-verb-object pattern as much as possible. Kretschmer and Kretschmer (1978) stated that deaf children depended highly on surface structure organization for both comprehension and production of English written sentences and that they mastered best the simple active declarative subject-verb-object syntactic arrangement. Research by Wilbur and Quigley (1972) also suggested that the deaf tended to read the surface order of sentences. They found in their study that eighty percent of their subjects interpreted the sentence, "The girl who hit the boy went home" to mean the boy, rather than the girl, went home. Tervoot (1970) showed that the deaf did not understand the use of passive voice and Moores (1978) said that in Power's study the deaf interpreted the sentence "The girl was pushed by the boy" to mean the girl pushed the boy.

Passive voice and relative clause sentences were hardly used in the modified dilemmas then because of the deaf's dependency on surface structure for meaning.

Vocabulary in the modified dilemmas was reduced and simplified. It appears that deaf children lack the lexical flexibility shown by their hearing peers (Simmons, 1962; Silverman-Dresner & Guilfoyle, 1972). The Silverman-Dresner & Guilfoyle (1972) study confirmed that this restriction in vocabulary knowledge applied to deaf children from all parts of the country and that compared to results obtained in 1936 there has been relatively little change in this restriction. For this study the word 'druggist' in the Heinz story was changed to simply 'the man' but connection was made to medicine as in "A man made this medicine". In the Joe story the phrase 'paper route' was dropped and the sentence changed to "Joe delivered newspapers". In the Judy story the phrase 'out-of-town rock concert' and the word 'performance' were changed simply to 'concert'.

Idioms posed another language problem. For example, in the Heinz story Heinz broke into the man's store to steal the medicine for his wife. In the modified dilemma this was changed to "Heinz stole the medicine to give to his wife". In the Joe story, Joe's father changed his

mind. This was changed to the father saying Joe could not go to camp.

All the modified dilemmas were tested for reading levels and the revised Heinz, Joe, Judy, and Valjean stories tested at the Fry grade levels of 1, 2, 3, and 2 respectively averaging a Fry grade level of 2. Outside evaluators read the modified dilemmas and agreed that the important concepts in the original dilemmas were intact (for modified dilemmas see Appendix B).

Administration

The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument was administered to one subject per day. Each subject met with the researcher three times for a period of 20-40 minutes spent in each session per day. The subjects were interviewed separately and the researcher was able to complete all interview sessions with the fifteen subjects within one month. The interview sessions were all videotaped.

Before an interview began the subject was informed by the researcher that he/she would be given stories to read, one at a time. The experimenter communicated in one of three ways:-

Signed English A sign system that follows the English language in exact word order and expresses other aspects of English including bound morphemes and the copula (Moore, 1978).

American Sign Language A sign language that does not follow the word order of the English language but which is a linguistic system with its own rules (Stokoe, Casterline, & Croneberg, 1965; Bellugi & Klima, 1975; Klima & Bellugi, 1979), or

Pidgin Sign English (A sign system that is intermediate between ASL and SE (Woodward & Markowicz, 1980).

The subjects were also informed that after a story was read he/she would then be shown the same story on videotape in ASL signed by a deaf person highly skilled in that sign language. The researcher felt that for the purpose of comprehension a signed dilemma would be appropriate because deaf children being essentially visual learners depend heavily upon visual communication (Tervoort, 1975).

ASL was chosen for the videotaped stories because it presents much information through context, facial expression, and body posture and is generally the "native" or first language of the deaf. It differs from other languages only in that it is not speech (Furth,

1973) and it has been considered by some (Furth, 1974; Klima & Bellugi, 1979) to be the natural language of the deaf. After the subject read and then viewed the same dilemma on videotape, he was told to recapitulate the story as best he could in whichever mode of communication he preferred so that the researcher could check for comprehension. The subject was then told that he would be interviewed and would be asked questions about the story for which, it was strongly emphasized, there were no right or wrong answers. The researcher informed the subject that she was interested in hearing the student's opinions, thoughts, and reasons about things in the story. She also informed each subject that different people think in different ways and that she was interested in finding out how each one thought. The questions asked were modified as well (Appendix B) and the researcher deviated from the questions only if she felt the subject mis-comprehended the story or needed to have the questions broken down even more for clarification. The researcher repeated the questions if she thought the subject did not actually answer them but stopped if after three tries the subject still gave the same answer. At the end of the interview (after the third and last session) the subject was asked not to

inform the other students about the stories and questions. All the subjects were presented with the four dilemmas in the same manner and in the same sequence.

The Interview

The purpose of the interview was to elicit from each subject responses to questions pertaining to the hypothetical dilemmas. The responses must be stage scoreable so each subject was encouraged to answer prescriptively rather than descriptively, e.g., "Do you think the judge should send Valjean back to jail or let him go free?" To probe the subject's underlying thinking on moral dilemmas the researcher asked 'Why' questions rather than 'What' questions. Sometimes a subject gave an answer that was not scoreable because it did not answer the question. For example, to the question, "Should a person keep a promise?" Subject 13 answered, "Yes, keep a promise" and when asked why, the subject responded with "Because I must be honest". Probe questions then became necessary. The subject was then asked why he must be honest to which he replied, "Because it's very important". He was then asked why it was important. He responded, "Because you must follow

the true story. People must not give different stories. I like to be honest". The subject was then asked, "Why?" and responded with, "Because it's important". Again the researcher asked the subject why it was important and told the subject she was interested in his reasons. This time the subject thought for a long time before saying it was a hard question but he eventually elaborated,

... because people don't like breaking promises. If they break promises they'll feel inside that they'll be in trouble and they'll worry that people will be mad at them and beat them up. People will call them a liar. They'll lose friends. Most people like to be honest and not lie because they like to be friends and nice to each other. If you break promises you'll lose friends and won't have good friends. (Transliteration into English by the researcher).

A promise should be kept because if it is broken the person who breaks it, it seems, will be in trouble and people will be mad, beat him up, and call him a liar. This is an egocentric perspective from a Stage 1 stance. At Stage 1 physical consequences determine what is right and here the subject reasoned that if a promise were broken then the person who broke the promise would be beaten up. A promise, then, should be kept. The same subject later went on to say that "most people like to be honest and not lie because they like to be friends and nice to each other". The subject also said if

promises were broken, friends would be lost, and there would be no good friends. There are traces of Stage 2 and Stage 3 reasoning. It seems if one were to lose friends and have no good friends if he breaks a promise he is a Stage 2 instrumental relativist concerned with actions that would satisfy his own needs. Stage 3 reasoning is slightly detected in the statement that people "like to be friends and nice to each other". It is the stage of interpersonal sharing where good behaviour is equated with whatever pleases or helps others. People earn approval by being "nice". A person can be at more than one stage as in a major stage and a minor stage or a transitional stage (Colby, Kohlber, & Kauffman, 1984). Sometimes, but rarely, responses were given by a subject that were not scoreable regardless of the number of times probing questions were asked. As an example, when asked if a person should keep a promise, Subject 9 responded by saying, "Yes". When asked why, she responded by saying it was important to save money. When told the interview was not about saving or keeping money but about keeping promises, the Subject responded by saying, "keep promises because can go camping". The question was then changed by the researcher to, "if you break promises, what happens?" which elicited the

following response, "Father promised ..." when told the interview was not about the (Joe) story, the Subject was then asked again the original question, "Should a person keep a promise?" Again the subject responded, "Should keep promise". When asked why, she gave the following response, "Because if I keep promise I can go someplace - camping, or fishing, or ..." When asked why it was important to keep promises, the subject responded, "Need it for camping or fishing or flying or exercising", which was almost similar to a prior response and which indicated to the researcher that she was unable to answer those questions so no stage score could be assigned to her responses.

The interview was administered in a non-formal manner and the subjects were encouraged to take their time if they wanted to think about the questions before responding to them. They were also encouraged to inform the researcher if they did not understand her - either her signing or the story or both. Most indicated they understood all the dilemmas both written and videotaped quite clearly. It was the 'why' questions during the interview that many found difficult and they took their time to think about such questions before answering them.

Each subject was thanked at the end of the third interview session for the day for volunteering so willingly to participate in the study. They seemed to enjoy the interviews and did not begrudge the meeting times which were quite early in the morning before classes began, again after lunch, before afternoon classes, and finally after school. The researcher made sure the meeting times did not inconvenience the subjects and the teaching staff.

Validity

The words 'moral' and 'morality' are open to many interpretations as they are used in a great variety of contexts; indeed, Warnock (1967) claims that there is no commonly accepted definition of the term 'moral'. An important question, then, is to what extent does Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument assess moral reasoning (i.e., content validity)? Another important question is, are Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning valid?

The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument is a research tool designed to validate his moral judgment theory. It is "designed to elicit responses concerning a

subject's conceptions of right and wrong with regard to dilemmas which pose conflicts between authoritative decree or moral law and the welfare of individuals" (Wright, 1975, p. 73). The issues (in Table 2) involved in the dilemmas are within the moral domain according to philosophers like Sidgwick (1887), Ross (1930), Hare (1953), Raphael (1955), Frankena (1963), and Rawls (1971). Like these philosophers Kohlberg believes that "moral judgement must be principled, that is, [it relies] on moral principle, on a mode of choosing which is universal [and] which we want all people to adopt in all situations" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 218). This reflects Kant's categorical imperative which also claims to be absolutely definitive of right action in any situation. Kohlberg (1971) believes, however, that:

... a person may consistently hold more than a single principle of moral judgment, and these principles may not be definitive of a choice in all situations (that is, alternative choices may be derived from them) (p. 219).

He also states (Ibid.) that in his and his colleagues' empirical work they considered the term "principles" to refer to "considerations in moral choice, or to reasons justifying moral action" (p. 219). They have found that, empirically, those reasons justifying moral action fell into categories outlined by principled intuitionist

philosophers like Sidgwick and Ross.

Kohlberg's (1971) categories of principles - similar to Sidgwick's except for the added psychological category of "respect for persons" are present in one form or another in all the stages except that at Stage 6 prudence and authority have dropped out as reasons. The categories are:

- a) prudence (and self-realization)
 - b) welfare of others
 - c) respect for authority, society, or persons
 - d) justice
- (p. 219).

For Kohlberg (1971) mature principles are not rules or values but "guides to perceiving and integrating all the morally relevant elements in concrete situations" (p. 219). Moral obligation is reduced to the interests and claims of concrete individuals in concrete situations so that situational competing claims can be resolved "when it is one man's life against another's" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 219). Moral obligation of this kind is embodied in the principles of justice which are universal and prescriptive.

By definition, principles of justice are principles for deciding between competing claims of individuals, for "giving each man his due". When principles, including

considerations of human welfare, are reduced to guides for considering such claims, they become expressions of the single principle of justice (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 220).

This is the principle of justice in a humanistic framework, unlike the early Homeric view of justice as a supramundane idea, and it is reflected in Protagorus' famous statement "that man is the measure of all things".

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument does have validity in assessing moral reasoning because (1) the issues dealt with in the instrument are moral issues; (2) the principle of justice and benevolence are found in some form in each stage of reasoning; and (3) morality is concerned with people's welfare and principles of justice (Wright, 1975, p. 74).

Construct Validity

According to Colby (1984), "the appropriate validity concept for a developmental measure such as the Standard Issue System is construct validity, not prediction to an external criterion" (p. 10). Two critical empirical criteria of construct validity are invariance of sequence and "structural wholeness" or

internal consistency. The longitudinal studies some of which are mentioned in Chapter Two confirm the two criteria mentioned above. The term "construct validity" means "the fit of the data obtained by means of the test of primary components of its theoretical definition [and the] primary theoretical definition of structural moral development is that of an organization passing through an invariant developmental sequence" (Colby, 1984, p. 10). Results from longitudinal and cross-cultural studies (see Chapter Two) support both the theoretical assumptions and the validity of the measure.

Wright (1975) reported that support for the stages of moral development was substantial and that researchers have identified and labelled such stages (Table 6). Kohlberg and his colleagues have probably devised the most extensive and inclusive theory of moral development that takes into account developmental social psychology and moral philosophy.

Reliability

The validity of an instrument is established when its reliability is known. The Kohlberg Standard Issue Moral Judgment Interview has been proven to be highly reliable in terms of both test-retest reliability and interrater reliability (Colby, 1984).

Test-Retest Reliability

Table 7 shows that correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 for Forms A and B are both in the high 90's (The MJI is divided into three dilemmas per Form).

The table was based on a study with volunteer subjects ranging in age from eight to twenty-eight years, from elementary and high schools, colleges and graduate schools in the Boston area. Approximately half the subjects were male and half female and the interviews were scored blindly and independently by two raters. Agreement figures were presented in the Table as it was felt by Kohlberg (Kuhmerker, 1980) that correlation could be very high without much absolute agreement between the scores at the two times. Kohlberg states, "For almost all subjects, the scores of Time 1 and Time 2 were within one-third of a stage of each

Table 6

The Pattern of Moral Sanctions

McKnight	Swainson	Morris	Willaims	Kay	Bull	Piaget	Kohlberg
Prudential	Self-Regard	Self-Interest	Purdential	Pre-Moral	Egocentric		
Authoritarian	Law	Authority	Obedience	Authoritarian	Heteronomy	Obedience	
		Reciprocity	Reciprocity	Instrumental			
			Irrational	Conscience	Egoism and		
					Exchange		
Social	Conformity	Group-	Social	Socionomy	Social		
	to Friends	Oriented			Order		
					Oriented		
	Love	Empathy					
		Ego-Ideal	Self-Concept				
Personal	Independence	Rationality	Personal	Autonomy	Autonomy	Moral	
						Principle	
						Orientation	
	Religion	Religion					

Note. From Wright, 1975, p. 75.

Table 7

Reliability of Standard Form Scoring Test-Retest Reliability

Correlation $T_1 - T_2$: Form A: .96 (Rater 1); .99 (Rater 2)

Form B: .97 (Rater 2)

Percent agreement within one-third stage: Form A 93%

Form B 94%

Form A and B 100%

Percent agreement using pure stage and mixed stage scores

(9 categories: 1, 1/2, 2, 2/3, 3, 3/4, 4, 4/5, 5)

Form A 70% (Rater 1), 77% (Rater 2)

(N = 43)

Form B 75% (Rater 2)

(N = 31)

Forms A and B 80% (Rater 2)

(N = 10)

Percent agreement using major/minor stage differentiations

(13 categories: 1, 1(2), 2(1), 2, 2(3), 3(2), 3, 3(4), 4(3),

4, 4(5), 5(4), 5)

Form A 59% (Rater 1), 70% (Rater 2)

Form B 62% (Rater 2)

Forms A and B 70% (Rater 2)

Note. From Kuhmerker, 1980, p. 96.

other. If we look at global scores based on a nine-point scale - the five stages and the four transition point between stages - we find 70 and 80 percent complete agreement" (Kuhmerker, 1980, p. 95). As can be seen in the same table percent agreement was also calculated for a different system (major/minor stages) of global scores with thirteen categories. For Forms A and B agreement level was in the sixties and for both Forms combined the agreement level was 70 percent. Kohlberg said that overall "the subjects received scores within one-third stage of each other on two interviews conducted about a month apart" (Kuhmerker, 1980). Identical scores were obtained by approximately three-quarters of the subjects on the two interviews on the nine point scale and identical scores were obtained by between one-half and two-thirds of the subjects on the thirteen point scale.

Interrater Reliability

The test-retest interviews referred to earlier were used to assess inter-rater reliability as well. The figures are represented in Table 8. The correlation between raters 1 and 2 was .98. Overall the figures for interrater reliability look similar to the test-retest figures lending credence to the reliability of standard

issue scoring. There is, however, a need for further research on construct validity "in order to establish even more completely the validity of the system" (Colby, 1984, p. 21). It was felt that the availability of Standard Issue Scoring would facilitate such a needed systematic investigation.

Scoring

Scoring for the standard issue method was different from scoring for the other two previous methods mentioned earlier in Chapter Two in that there were further subdivisions of the standard issues into norms (see Table 2) and elements (see Table 4) before stage scoring began. This was an attempt to resolve the content - structural confusion of the earlier methods and to achieve greater objectivity and reliability by specifying clear and concrete stage criteria. The strategy in scoring was to start globally in approaching interview data and then becoming more and more refined. This resulted in smaller scoring units for analysis the purpose of which was to determine the intersection of issue X norm X element. For scoring, the "interview judgments" must match corresponding "criterion

Table 8

Reliability of Standard Form Scoring Interrater Reliability

Correlation - Raters 1 and 2, Form A test-retest interviews = .98
percent agreement:

			Complete agreement (9 categories)	Complete agreement (13 categories)
Within 1/3 stage				
Form A	1	100	88	53
Rater Pair	2	100	88	63
	3	100	75	63
	4	88	88	63
	5	88	88	63
Form B	6	100	78	78
Rater Pair				

Note. From Kuhmerker, 1980, p. 97.

judgments" defined in the scoring manual by the intersection of dilemma X issue X norm X element.

At the beginning of each dilemma the subject was faced with two standard issues and had to make a choice which constituted the first functional division. For example, in the Heinz dilemma where Heinz had to choose between letting his wife die or stealing medicine which he could not afford and which might save her life, the two standard issues were life and law with a conflict between the value of preserving life and the value of upholding the law. Probe questions then followed to elicit information on the subject's conceptions of the two issues. In making a choice between issues the subject often revealed a particular value or object of concern for that choice and that value or object of concern is called a norm. "The norm represents the moral value or object of concern that is used by the individual to justify his or her choice in the dilemma" (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1984, p. 77). As stated in Chapter Two, a subject may say that Heinz should steal the drug (pro-life issue) because he loves his wife (affiliation norm) or because he must obey his conscience (morality norm) or because he thinks the inventor of the medicine is misusing his invention the

purpose of which is, after all, to save life (property norm). The choice of issue revealed what the subject thought should be done and the norm revealed why he thought it should be done.

The difference between an issue and a norm is basically functional in that the issues are pre-determined by the interviewer and the norms, reflecting the subject's values and beliefs, are introduced by the subject himself. A subject may reveal in his thinking only one norm but as many as three or four are possible.

While, in theory, any of the nine norms could be used in discussing a particular issue, in practice only three or four norms are used for each issue (e.g., the life, affiliation, conscience, and property norms for the life issue in the Heinz dilemma). This reflects the fact that relevant values, even when used as norm, are to a large extent determined by the nature of the moral dilemma in question. It is in this sense we say that the issues represent clusters of norms or values (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 86).

For standard issue scoring classifications by issues and norms is not enough and further division must be made.

A complete moral judgment goes beyond [issues and norms] giving a reason, principle, or concern for which the norm serves as object. These ultimate reasons or principles are designated 'elements' (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 89).

It appears issues must be justified by norms which in turn must be justified by elements. The elements are based on two different philosophic categories in ethics: deontological ethics and teleological ethics. Within deontological ethics there are two orientations: The normative order orientation and the fairness orientation. The normative order orientation is concerned with duty or rightness in maintaining the normative order, i.e., "maintaining regularity of a system whether of conscience or of social order" (Ibid., p. 90). For deontologists like Kant and Ross morality is closely bound up with one's duties and obligations. Duty is therefore a categorical imperative or of first consideration in morality. For Kant one has a duty not to lie even if it is expedient because if lying were a universal law to which people ought to conform, morality would be impossible and, as well, lying would contradict the universality of the norm of truth. On these grounds it would be wrong, then, to lie to a maniac, armed with a revolver, who comes looking for his victim in order to kill him.

However, according to the principle of justice or fairness, it would not be wrong to lie to the armed maniac to protect his victim. Yet the justice

orientation is still deontological because "it is not reducible to a concern about utilitarian positive and negative consequences of the act" (Ibid., p. 91). Justice is "the first virtue of society and of moral action" (Ibid., p. 91). Rawl's veil of ignorance position explained in Chapter Two ensures justice and decisions made within that position "would give primacy first to the element of liberty, then to that of equity-equality, both elements within the justice orientation" (Ibid., p. 91).

As with deontological ethics, there are two orientations within teleological ethics: utilitarianism and perfectionism. Utilitarianism, in its most general form, states that individuals always ought to do what will produce the greatest good. The idea of utilitarianism is best exemplified in Bentham's (1789/1948) greatest happiness principle which says that one should pursue the greatest good or greatest happiness, of the greatest number. Actions are morally right if they maximize the welfare or happiness of all the individuals affected. The utilitarian orientation is subdivided into egoistic utilitarianism which is concerned with consequences to oneself and social utilitarianism which is concerned with consequences to

the group (Colby, Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1984).

Perfectionistic ethics is derived from the classical Greek ethics of Plato and Aristotle. In perfectionistic ethics,

... the moral value of actions comes from their expression or realization of a moral self and the perfection of that self and the social group (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 92).

All the orientations mentioned above yield the elements because it is important how an individual defines concepts like "fairness" or "perfection" and the like. For example, the concept of fairness as equality is different from the concept of fairness as reward for merit. These distinctions are important in moral philosophy and moral judgment assessment.

The elements listed in Table 4 are labelled modal elements and value elements. The normative order elements are modal elements and all other elements are value elements.

A fully elaborated moral judgment uses both a modal element and a value element in addition to an issue and norm. If a value element is present, then a modal element is, too, though usually implicitly. The reverse is not necessarily true, however. Especially at lower stages, a moral judgment often involves only a modal element. If both are present, the material is classified by value element, ignoring the modal element. If only the modal element is present, it serves as the basis for

classification (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984, p. 93).

The modal element is like the modal in grammar. Modals in grammar are words like "can", "must", "should", "would", and "could". The modal elements are key moral words and they express the mood or modality of moral language (Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman, 1984, p. 93). If a subject made reference to rights or duty or the like then his judgment was moral. For example, Subject 2's response,

Heinz should try to steal the medicine to help his best friend. He is Heinz's best friend more than anyone and Heinz should be kind and try to help.

showed moral judgment when he stated Heinz should (has a duty) to steal the medicine for his best friend. Subject 4 showed moral judgment when she said:

[Heinz] has the right to save his wife's life.
It's very important to save people's lives.

Modalities can also be non-moral and judgments or statements of value can be stated using such modalities, e.g., "Most people would steal the drug." Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman (1984) say that a statement would not be prescriptive and thereby not a moral judgment if it did not use one of the five moral modals. They also state:

The distinctions among modal elements only become fully clarified at the higher stages. An individual reasoning at Stage 1, for example, does not recognize the difference between having a right and having a duty or between having a right and being right. (p. 94)

From the above, then, a person at Stage 1 would not be able to understand Voltaire's well-known statement: "I disagree with what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it." A person at Stage 5 would be able to differentiate the judgment that Heinz has the right to steal the medicine from the judgment that Heinz has a duty to steal it. A characteristic of higher stage reasoning, in fact, is the capacity to differentiate among the modal elements.

A modal element can be used with a value element. It can also be used alone. When used with a value element, the modal element serves to place the judgment in the moral domain.

Used in this way, modal elements do not represent reasons or values in themselves. They are "empty" in the sense that they do not bring a value per se to bear on the moral norm at hand. That is why moral judgments are not classified by modal element when a value element is used as well (Ibid, p. 94).

Very often with the deaf subjects the modal elements were used as terminal values or justifications. About one-quarter of the criterion judgments in standard issue scoring take this form. They are somehow incomplete as they do not inform us why, for example, if it was thought a wife had a right to life why that right exists. This is where a value element comes in.

Value elements go beyond norm and modality and are "the ultimate ends, values, or reasons held by the subject himself" (Ibid., p. 95). At the higher stages they are synonymous with principles. To help differentiate between a judgment using only a modal element and a judgment using both an implicit modal element and a value element two criterion judgments from the scoring manual are listed below:

CJ# : 13
 Dilemma : III
 Issue : Life
 Norm : Affiliation
 Modal Element : Having a duty
 Stage : 3

Criterion

Judgment : Heinz should (has a duty to) steal the
 drug even if he doesn't love his wife
 because ... he is still her husband.

CJ# : 15
 Dilemma : III
 Issue : Life
 Norm : Affiliation
 Modal Element : Having a duty
 Value Element : Reciprocity or positive desert
 Stage : 3

Criterion

Judgment : Heinz should (has a duty to) steal the
 drug even if he doesn't love his wife
 because ... she has shared her life with
 him and the least he can do is save her.
 (Ibid., p. 98)

Both judgments are similar in all respects except for
 the element. In the first example Heinz is seen as
 having a duty to save his wife. It is in the second
 example that a reason is given for that duty. At the
 preconventional level a person may not use a value
 element in addition to a modal element even when pressed
 to give a reason. For example, Subject 1's responses to
 questions asked in the Judy story were as follows:

SHOULD A PERSON KEEP A PROMISE?

Umm, no. Yes, Yes

WHY?

Sister and mother should be friends, mother and father should be friends. All must promise to listen to each other. It is necessary.

WHY IS IT NECESSARY?

A promise is a promise. It's more important than anything else because promise to keep money, to see movie, that's very important.

WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?

Because a promise is a promise.

At the postconventional level there is always a value element as well as a modal element. A person at that level would not rest content with "a husband has a duty" and would supply a principle or underlying reason for that duty.

The difference between issues, norms, and elements to put it briefly is that issues and norms are sociological and correspond to rules and institutions in society while elements are philosophical and psychological and endow norms or institutions with value. Elements can provide reasons for action. "The norms define kinds of moral action (e.g., law breaking, life saving), the elements provide the ethical reasons for those actions" (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman, 1984).

In standard issue scoring, elements are needed because the norms reveal what an individual values

(e.g., authority, contract; life, law) but not why. If the elements are identified is it necessary to be concerned with norms and issues? According to Colby, Kohlberg, and Kauffman (1984) the answer is yes as the purpose of standard issue scoring is not to measure an individual's philosophical conceptions but how he makes moral judgments when confronted with conflicting values.

Morality is a matter of choice and decision. It is not just a matter of using abstract concepts like "justice". It concerns the use of such concepts to guide moral choice. It is through the issues and norms that we define the choice. For example, someone can believe that human dignity is important in morality but s/he will not be able to resolve the Heinz dilemma unless s/he is able to decide whether protecting the law or saving the life is more consistent with human dignity. This is why the moral judgment interview asks subjects to resolve moral dilemmas rather than to state their philosophy in the abstract. It is also the purpose of classifying judgments by issue, norm, and element (Ibid., p. 103).

Scoring began when dilemma X, issue X, norm X, elements were identified for each scorable interview response in each dilemma. The identification of such "interview judgments" were then matched with "criterion judgments" in the scoring manual to determine the stage(s) of the responses. Because of procedures such as standardization of content, matching with criterion judgments, and explicit rules for computing total

scores, subjectivity in standard issue scoring was at a minimum.

Scoring Procedure

Before scoring began transcriptions were made of the videotaped interviews. The transcriptions were in proper English and two external raters, familiar with the linguistic constructions of the deaf, agreed that the concepts were thoroughly recorded. One rater was hearing and had deaf parents who communicated via the language of signs. This same rater taught some of the subjects interviewed by the researcher so was familiar with their sign systems. The rater had also taught many sign language classes in night schools. The second rater was deaf. Her parents were oral and knew limited signs. This rater had taught at a deaf school for over thirty years and was very active in the deaf community. Though highly knowledgeable about ASL the rater also had a very good understanding of Sign English and Pidgin Sign English.

1. The scorer familiarized herself with the stages by reading several publications on Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach to moral education

and the most recent (1984) revised scoring manual which was in press at this time of writing.

2. The scorer read through the subject's responses to all four dilemmas to try to ascertain the subject's chosen issue in each dilemma and his overall (global) stage.
3. The scorer then proceeded to break down the interview material into interview judgments. This involved,
 - (a) identification of the chosen issue in each dilemma,
 - (b) classification by issue in which all responses to the dilemma questions were classified according to which of the two standard issues they represented,
 - (c) making a tentative evaluation of the stage of reasoning reflected in the responses from the chosen issue,
 - (d) classification of the chosen issue by norm reflected in the response and then classification by element if possible reflected in the norm,
 - (e) checking the interview judgment (IJ) for scorability by matching it with a criterion

judgment (CJ) in the scoring manual. Below is an example of Subject 1's responses to the first questions in the Heinz dilemma:

WAS HEINZ RIGHT OR WRONG TO STEAL THE MEDICINE?

Wrong

WHY WAS HEINZ WRONG TO STEAL THE MEDICINE?

He was wrong because the police could catch him and send him to jail.

The above matched criterion judgment #3 below:

Criterion Judgment : #3
Dilemma : III
Issue : Law
Norm : Law
Element : Seeking reward (avoiding punishment
(element #7)
Stage : 1

Criterion Judgment

Heinz or anyone should not steal because if he does he will be caught, locked up, or put in jail.

Stage Structure

Punishment is perceived as an inevitable physicalistic consequence which automatically defines the punishment act as bad. In general, wrong acts are equated with punished acts; wrong acts cause punishment and punishability defines an act as wrong.

Critical Indicators

Required for a match are all three of the following: (a) punishment as something concrete or physical (being caught, locked up, put in jail, etc.); (b) an implication that punishment makes Heinz's

stealing wrong or something he definitely should not do, not just that it makes it inadvisable or something he wouldn't do (it's wrong because ...); (c) in addition, this Criterion Judgment should be match-scored only if law is the subject's chosen issue (Colby et al., 1984, p. 100).

Subject 1's responses were then scored as Stage 1. Subject 1's other responses on the chosen issue (law) were matched accordingly.

- (f) noting on a score sheet the IJ-CJ matches that were accepted,
 - (g) entering a guess score for the issue if no match scores were assigned but moral judgment material was available. If no match or guess scores were assigned, a note of "no material" was entered for the issue,
 - (h) scoring the remainder of the interview by proceeding with the second issue on the first dilemma and then with both issues on the second, third, and fourth dilemmas.
4. The scorer then assigned stage scores at the issue and global levels by:

- (a) calculating stage scores for each of the issues on an interview to yield issue scores,
- (b) calculating a stage score for the entire interview to yield a global stage score,
- (c) calculating a weighted average score (WAS) for the entire interview.

Below is an example of the classification by issues and stage scores for Subject 1's interviews on the four dilemmas:

Life Issue	Law Issue
2 (chosen)	2
Contract Issue	Authority Issue
2/3	2 (chosen)
Contract Issue	Authority Issue
2 (1)(3) (chosen)	no material
Morality & Conscience	Punishment
2 (3) chosen	1

Using the table of weights below:

	Pure	Transitional	Major/Minor
Chosen		1 1/2 points	2 points major
Issue	3 points	each issue	1 point minor
Non-chosen		1 point	1 1/3 points major
Issue	2 points	each issue	2/3 points minor
Guess		1/2 point	1/2 point
Score	1 point	each issue	each issue

In the case of a major stage and two minor stages [(e.g., 3(2)(4)], two points are assigned to the major stage and one-half point to each of the minor stages. (Colby & Kauffman, 1984, p. 52).

Weighted points were assigned to all stages represented in the issue scores.

Stage	Weighted Points	
1	2 1/2	2.5/18 = 14%
2	13	13/18 = 72%
3	2 1/2	2.5/18 = 14%

Total 18

Global Score = 2

The global score was 2 because it exceeded 25% of the total number of weighted points. If two or more stages were represented each by 25% or more of the points assigned, a mixed score was given which included all stages at or above the 25% level.

To calculate the WAS, the scorer:

1. multiplied each stage represented in the interview by the weighted points for that stage.
2. Summed the products for all the stages.
3. Divided the sum of the products by the total number of weighted points.
4. Multiplied by 100.

Calculation of the WAS for Subject 11's example was as follows:

Stage.Weighted Points.Product of Stage X Weighted Points

1	X	2 1/2	=	2.5
2	X	13	=	26.0
3	X	2 1/2	=	7.5
Total		18		36.0

The sum of the products divided by the total number of weighted points

$$36 - 18 = 2$$

was then multiplied by 100

$$2 \times 100 = 200$$

to yield a weighted average score (WAS) of 200.

Stanford Achievement Test for the Hearing Impaired (SAT-HI)

Basically the Stanford Achievement Test is a series of comprehensive tests developed to provide measurement and assessment of learning at various levels of the educational process. Various revised editions of the Stanford have been in use in the schools since 1923. The revisions were made to insure that the:

1. content of the tests is closely related to what is actually being taught in the schools
2. normative data accurately reflect the current accomplishments of pupils of varying grades and ages
3. tests keep abreast of those improvements in measurement theory and technique that permit more reliable appraisal and more convenient use
4. dangers arising from overfamiliarity with test content as a result of repeated use are avoided (Madden et al., 1971, p. 4).

In 1973 the Office of Demographic Studies at the Gallaudet College developed the Stanford Achievement

Test for the Hearing Impaired (SAT-HI) to accommodate the special requirements of testing hearing impaired students. It was field tested and normed in 1974 with a national sample of 6,873 hearing impaired students receiving special education services and the result was an achievement test battery at six different levels of difficulty with a full range of content areas (Allen, White, & Kerchmer, 1983). The norms of the SAT-HI made it possible to compare a hearing impaired subject's performance to both hearing and hearing impaired distributions of students in North America.

For this study the hearing impaired subjects' SAT-HI Reading Comprehension scaled scores were used for correlation with their weighted average scores from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument to determine if there was a relationship between reading comprehension and structure of moral reasoning. The Reading Comprehension scaled scores were taken from school conducted SAT-HIs administered in the spring of 1984. Scaled scores rather than grade equivalent scores were used because it was deemed scaled scores were comparable regardless of the level of the test that subjects wrote. Scaled scores represent equal interval units at any point on the scale; for example, in reading comprehension scaled

scores are directly comparable from grade to grade, and from battery to battery of the SAT-HI.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH FINDINGS

The purpose of this exploratory study was to administer Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument to a sample of fifteen hearing impaired subjects ranging in age from twelve to fifteen years to determine the structure (stages) of their moral reasoning. According to Figure 1, 45% of the reasoning of thirteen to fourteen year olds with normal hearing is at Stage 2. Forty-three percent of their reasoning is at Stage 3, 8% at Stage 1, and 4% at Stage 4. Kohlberg and Turiel (1979) indicated from longitudinal studies that those who did not reach Stages 3 or 4 by age thirteen were unlikely to develop principled thinking in adulthood.

Five of the fifteen interview transcriptions were randomly selected and then scored blindly and independently by two external judges who had received training in scoring at the Centre for Moral Education at Harvard University. The judges' scores were compared to those of the researcher who was thoroughly familiar with the scoring manual in press at the time of this writing.

Results shown in Table 9 indicate that interjudge reliabilities were relatively high for both global stage

Table 9

Comparison of Global Scores and Weighted Average Scores for Inter-Judge Reliability

	Judge 1		Judge 2		Judge 3	
Subject	Global score	WAS	Global score	WAS	Global score	WAS
5	2	207	2(3)	215	3(7)	264
9	1(2)	137.5	1(2)	133	1	100
11	2	200	2	200	2	188
13	1/2	154	1(2)	161	1	125
14	2(3)	217	2(3)	218	3	246

Pearson product-moment correlations for global stage scores:

Between Judge 1 and Judge 2 = 1.00**

Between Judge 2 and Judge 3 = .9129

Between Judge 1 and Judge 3 = .9129

Pearson product-moment correlations for weighted average scores (WAS):

Between Judge 1 and Judge 2 = .9906*

Between Judge 2 and Judge 3 = .9510

Between Judge 1 and Judge 3 = .9627*

**p < .001

*p < .01

scores and weighted average scores. There was a perfect relationship or correlation between Judge 1's global stage scores and Judge 2's global stage scores. Weighted average scores (WAS) between Judge 1 and Judge 2 and between Judge 1 and Judge 3 were found to be significant ($p < .01$). The correlations were made by using the SPSS:Statistical Package for the Social Sciences: Version 9:00 (Under MTS) (Lai, 1983). The distribution of weighted average scores across three judges and five interview transcriptions is shown in Figure 3 to indicate level of moral maturity.

The global stage scores and weighted average scores for all the fifteen subjects scored by the researcher in this study are shown in Table 10. One big problem with the scoring of the interview transcriptions was time. Each interview transcription comprising four dilemmas took a minimum of one hour to score using the 1984 scoring manual. The procedure followed was to score each response, if scorable, by matching it to a criterion judgment in the scoring manual and then calculate for all the scored responses global stage scores and weighted average scores. Each interview itself was rather long and, as stated in Chapter Three, lasted from 20 to 40 minutes per session. As there were three

sessions for each subject this meant that an entire interview was at least one hour long. The interviews were all video-taped making it a rather expensive undertaking but this method seemed the most efficient way to ask questions, especially probe questions, of hearing impaired subjects who might not always understand the questions and therefore not appropriately answer them. A problem encountered during the interview sessions was that students did not always give reasons for their answers. Responses that did not contain reasons were not scorable. At times some of the students had difficulty in expressing reasons and merely retold what happened in the story. It seemed they had trouble answering 'Why' questions and arriving at generalizations. One of the questions in the MJI was "Why should a promise be kept?" For this study the question was modified to "Should a person keep a promise?" and "Why?" This was the most difficult question for almost all the subjects to understand. The researcher felt that perhaps the responses to that particular question should have been queried to test the question for its validity. It was suggested by one of the judges that the question, "Should a person keep a

Figure 3. Distribution of weighted average scores across three judges and five interview transcriptions.

Table 10

Scoring on the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument

Subject	Global stage score	Weighted average score (WAS)
1	1	133
2	2(3)	237
3	1(2)	150
4	2(3)	229
5	2	207
6	1(2)	159
7	2(1)	189
8	1(2)	150
9	1(2)	137.5
10	1/2	166
11	2	200
12	2(1)	171
13	1/2	154
14	2(3)	217
15	1	100

promise?" was perhaps sort of a cart before the horse question and that another question, "Would you make a promise?" might be asked before asking whether or not a person should keep a promise. The researcher felt that even the question, "Would you make a promise?" might be as troublesome for the hearing impaired because it also contains an idiomatic expression. Perhaps the question, "Would you promise?" might have been better after checking if the subject knew what a promise was. (For this study all the students indicated they knew what a promise was by signing the word 'promise' and/or crossing their heart although this was no absolute guarantee they understood the concept of a promise). Overall the subjects experienced only moderate difficulty in understanding the questions in the MJJ. The problems that arose were related specifically to comprehension of words like 'citizen', 'promise', 'worse', 'reason', and 'relationship' but they were solved by clarifications with further definitions by the interviewer. The subjects were generally able to respond to the MJJ and although only very few of the responses were not scoreable the fifteen transcriptions containing all the four dilemmas were scoreable and scored.

Judging from Table 10, it appears that all the

subjects showed a Stage 1 or Stage 2 orientation with only a very few showing any Stage 3 reasoning. This is the preconventional level (see Figure 3) in which the power of authority figures or the physical or hedonistic consequences of actions, such as punishment, reward, or exchange of favours are considered. At Stage 1 the physical consequences of doing something determine whether it is good or bad. People who reason at this stage think about avoiding punishment or earning rewards. They also defer to authority figures with power over them. At Stage 2 right is that which satisfies one's own needs and sometimes meets the needs of others. People reasoning at this stage conceive of justice as an equal exchange of favours ("You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours") or of blows ("An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth"). There is an element of fairness at this stage but always for pragmatic reasons than from a strong sense of justice.

The following additional observations were made regarding the subjects' transcriptions:

1. To the question "Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking a promise to his father" all but one of the subjects responded by saying that a father breaking his promise to a son was worse. This indicated the subjects were unable to fully handle reciprocity and equality in a contractual relationship.

2. Many of the subjects were rigidly egocentric in their thinking. They showed no inclination to compromise, to suggest a deal, to take another perspective, or to argue that his/her position is fair.
3. For many of the subjects self-preservation was of primary importance and they appeared to know the necessary social rules - that love for family and friends and relationships with them were important but this was not carried over to the general population or to society at large.
4. Fifty three percent of the subjects in this study displayed Stage 1 reasoning, and forty-seven percent Stage 2 reasoning. The stages of this sample as a whole were lower than those of their hearing peers (see Figures 1 and 2).

To explore the relationship, if any, between moral reasoning and reading comprehension, the subjects' Reading Comprehension scaled scores from school administered SAT-HIs were correlated using the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation procedure. The subjects' Reading Comprehension Scaled scores are listed in Table 11. A reading comprehension score was not obtained from Subject 7 as she did not write the SAT-HI. The Pearson Product-Moment Correlation procedure (using the SPSS) was applied to correlate the subjects' Reading Comprehension SAT-HI scores and their weighted average scores from the MJII. A significant positive correlation ($r = .6161$; $p < .01$) was found between the two sets of

scores. This indicated that the subjects who were better readers scored higher on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument.

The Pearson Product-Moment Correlation procedure was also used to correlate the subjects' age, hearing threshold level (HTL), and status of parents (deaf or hearing) with their weighted average scores but none of the variables were significantly related.

Table 11

Stanford Achievement Tests for the Hearing Impaired: Reading
Comprehension (Scaled Scores) Results

Reading comprehension		Reading comprehension	
Subject	(scaled scores)	Subject	(scaled scores)
1	132	9	127
2	184	10	134
3	126	11	157
4	205	12	136
5	176	13	129
6	178	14	131
7	-	15	131
8	144		

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Discussion

Deafness is a disability that impedes the development of knowledge of the English language for many hearing impaired persons. This lack of linguistic knowledge creates a communication barrier leading to a communication handicap. Deafness is an exceedingly complex disability not only because it is invisible but also because:

It incorporates elements of medical, audiological, linguistic, sociological, and psychological factors that influence the developmental process and that contribute to some of the experiences that deaf children often share (Meadow, 1976, p. 68).

It was hypothesized that the communication barrier brought on by the disability might cause the deaf to lag behind their hearing peers in another area of development other than language development and social development thus putting them at a disadvantage. This study was undertaken to compare the stages of moral reasoning between the hearing impaired (in this study) and those with normal hearing (from other studies) and to explore the relationship between moral reasoning and

English language ability. The study was done by administering four dilemmas from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument to a sample of fifteen hearing impaired subjects from the Junior Department of a provincial school for the deaf in Vancouver, B.C. and then correlating (using the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation procedure) the subjects' weighted average scores in moral reasoning with their Reading Comprehension scaled scores on the Stanford Achievement Test for the Hearing Impaired. It was found that the hearing impaired subjects in this study reasoned at Stages 1 and 2 - the preconventional level - whereas most of their hearing peers are at Stage 3 and are beginning to show traces of Stage 4 reasoning - the conventional level. A significant positive correlation ($r = .6161$; $p < .01$) was found between the subjects' weighted average moral reasoning scores and reading comprehension scores.

Since the better readers scored higher on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Instrument it might be useful to hypothesize on the reasons for this. Interpreting reading scores of the hearing impaired is never easy. Reading comprehension tests assume the presence of a common English usage and have been standardized for

children who have internalized the structure of the English language. For the hearing impaired mastery of the English language cannot be assumed and low reading scores may reflect inadequate proficiency in English or inadequately developed skills involved in the reading process. Smith (1975) stated that low reading skills for the hearing impaired do not always indicate a reading problem and that the problem is, in fact, really language based. The importance of a child's linguistic competence in learning to read cannot be undermined. It is his linguistic abilities that helps organize visual perceptions into meaningful units such as words, phrases, and larger units that influence his capacity to learn to read and progress in reading (Goodman, 1973). It appears that lack of linguistic knowledge influences reading scores. Low reading scores do not necessarily mean the deaf are without language (langage) and a language (langue). Humans have the faculty of language which exists in them as a form of neurophysiological programming which endows them with language sense that enables them to develop a language. For the deaf it has been said that their own 'native' or first language is Ameslan, not Standard English. Because of their disability the deaf lack linguistic knowledge of the

English language and if, as Wittgenstein (1921) posited, the limits of a person's language mean the limits of his world then in this sense the deaf are handicapped. It is often through reading that a person gains a greater understanding of himself and the world. Without linguistic knowledge of English it might be said that the deaf do not have as great an understanding of themselves and their relation to the world as their hearing peers do. It would be worthwhile to investigate the moral reasoning of the hearing impaired who belong to the deaf community and use ASL as a means of communication. Perhaps the level of moral reasoning is higher when testing a sample of hearing impaired persons from the deaf community where there is a strong sense of community and communication. Studies on kibbutzes (Bar-Yam et al., 1980; Snarey, Kohlberg & Reimer, 1984) and on just community schools (Muson, 1979) showed that moral reasoning was higher in an atmosphere of respect and equality. Much research is needed in the area of testing a deaf community for moral reasoning.

The subjects in this study were reasoning at Stage 1 and Stage 2 when their hearing peers are reasoning at Stages 2, 3, and 4. This lag can be attributed to a disability which precludes the effortless assimilation

of the English language thus restricting opportunities for social interaction. Because social interaction is limited the hearing impaired have few opportunities to receive interpretations and explanations of the feelings and perspectives of others. Limited experiential bases preclude exposure to differing viewpoints thereby minimising role-taking ability which is one of the necessary but not sufficient factors in the development of moral reasoning (Selman, 1971).

It was found that many of the sample in this study knew the necessary social rules especially when it came to relationships with family and friends. Yet they seemed to have learned the rules by rote with no real understanding of the explanations for rules or principles behind them. It seems rules must be followed because an authority figure said so. Rules, then, are applied indiscriminately and the reasoning on which they are based is not understood because of the communication handicap. Indiscriminate application of rules is termed rigidity. It is this rigidity that prevented many of the subjects from making generalizations and extending the social rules to the general population. And it is the language or a communication handicap that makes it difficult for the hearing impaired to attain higher

stages of moral reasoning.

Some of the subjects were seen to be rigidly egocentric in their thinking. Egocentricity is the term applied to a person whose world revolves around himself. When a person is disabled and suffers a communication handicap others may scale down their expectations of him and do things for him. This is especially true of over-protective parents who tend to do things for rather than with their hearing impaired children. This may also be true of institutions where supervisors make decisions for hearing impaired and maintenance personnel do things for them. It is by being an active participant in decision-making and rule-making that a person becomes aware that others have their own perspectives, needs, and desires. Communication is of paramount importance if one is to take into consideration the opinions and desires of others as well as one's own and thus advance in moral reasoning.

This study does not claim that all hearing impaired people reason at the preconventional level. There are variations among the hearing impaired just as there are differences among the hearing. There are various factors that go into the makeup of a deaf person such as age at onset of the hearing loss, the degree of hearing loss,

type of education, family support and understanding, life experiences, and so on that make him a unique deaf person. The hearing impaired, however, have a disability in common, and the greatest handicapping effect of this disability is the cutting off of 'normal' communication which very often can lead to a type of psychological isolation.

Educational Implications

Implications for Teachers of the Hearing Impaired

As hearing impaired students seem to lag behind their hearing peers in terms of moral development it might be appropriate to try to stimulate their moral reasoning by creating cognitive dissonance through exposure to multiple viewpoints - especially those viewpoints that are one stage above the students' own stage. To do this communication must be effective (it does not matter which communication mode is used as long as two-way or more communication takes place). To effect this, teachers should be cognizant of Kohlberg's theory. This does not mean that teachers must thoroughly comprehend the theory and then interview students on moral dilemmas and score their responses. It does mean,

however, that teachers should be sufficiently aware of the theory to implement moral discussions in the classroom. One danger is that teachers may label the students as being Stage 1 types or Stage 2 types. According to Wright (1975):

... the label becomes an evaluative stereotype. The reason for understanding the theory is not to praise or blame but to understand the child better so that moral development can be stimulated (p. 148).

This study indicated that the students rather enjoyed the discussions on moral dilemmas and some called them 'interesting'. Some said the discussions were not easy and made them think hard. Perhaps in the classroom teachers need to be more concerned with development than with achievement or at the very least with development than with envelopment. The term 'development' implies that something is unfolding or emerging that was hitherto hidden or latent. This is opposed to the term 'envelopment' which implies covering something or surrounding something entirely. It seems that in many classrooms for the hearing impaired teachers envelop students by giving them information to be learned. What is learned is sometimes learned by rote and is not always understood. A study by Craig and

Collins (1970) found that classroom conversations in schools for the deaf tended to be teacher-dominated with few, if any, student-initiated attempts at communication. Communication in many classrooms for the hearing impaired appears to be from teacher to student rather than from student to teacher and, very importantly, from student to student. Hearing impaired students do have the potential to acquire communication competence but perhaps they rarely get the opportunity to practise communication or initiate interactions in the classroom. If communication competence were allowed to be developed (Clarke, 1983, advocates the conversational approach), then perhaps the learning of a language might meet with some success. The learning and understanding of a language might then influence the learning and understanding of what Hare (1952) calls the "the language of morals".

Implications for Curriculum

In educational literature much has been written about moral education, especially Kohlberg's theory of moral development. For moral educators the field of moral education is still an active one in terms of research and development. Studies cited in Chapter Two

found that moral reasoning can be promoted and while the ability to think critically about right and wrong, obligations and rights, is not the whole of morality it plays a very important part. Moral education can be moral education in the same sense that it is not physical education, art education, and so on and/or it can be moral education in the sense that students are being educated to be rational, autonomous human beings and are not trained, conditioned, or indoctrinated in the schools. Moral thought can be stimulated via discussions of moral issues across the curriculum: in English, law, history, social studies, science, current events, environmental studies, and family life to give a few examples.

In order for moral education to be effective, the school should be a just social community operating on the principles of fairness and justice. The school's rules and regulations must be seen to be reasonable by the students. Wright (1975) stated that the classroom climate should be conducive to moral development so that the students are encouraged to reason about moral issues and to act in morally mature ways. Teachers can help make the classroom climate conducive to moral development by acknowledging their mistakes, modifying

their views in the face of sound counter-arguments by the students, and not claiming to be infallible sources of knowledge. Teachers must make use of the expertise of students so that a true spirit of a cooperative search for knowledge and wisdom is developed in the schools.

The trend in schools for the deaf today is not to focus just on the hearing impaired student's speech mechanism, auditory system, or even his signs. The focus is on educating the whole student - his interests, concerns, physical self, social development, affective stage, and cognitive level. To the list we can add moral development because it follows from the above concept of education that the purpose of education is not only to impart the kinds of knowledge contained in subject areas in school (mathematics, science, history, and so on), but also to produce persons who make rationally defensible moral judgments.

Implications for Further Research

The findings of this study and the questions that arose in light of this study suggest the need for further research.

These include:

1. The formal testing on a larger population of the hypothesis that moral reasoning is related to reading comprehension (language development) in the hearing impaired.
2. An investigation into the moral reasoning of hearing impaired persons who are members of the deaf community and communicate in their own 'native' or first language, ASL.
3. A study which explores the effect of applying the modified Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument (in this study) to a hearing sample in the same age range as the subjects in this study to allow direct comparison.
4. An examination of the effect of moral education programmes or discussions of moral issues across the curriculum on the moral reasoning of hearing impaired students.
5. An examination of the effect of reasoning at a hearing impaired student's own stage of reasoning

and at one stage above this through a pre-test-intervention-post-test procedure.

6. An investigation of hearing impaired students' perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the moral climate of their schools or classrooms.
7. A longitudinal study which explores the development of moral reasoning in the hearing impaired.

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Appendix A

Definition of Moral Stages

(Kohlberg, 1971, pp 164-165)

I Preconventional level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention - "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

Appendix B

The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Instrument (Modified)

Instrument I

Heinz and the Medicine

Heinz and his wife lived in Europe. Heinz's wife was dying. She needed one kind of medicine to make her well. The medicine was made from radium. A man made this medicine. He paid \$200 for the radium. He wanted \$2000 for his medicine. Heinz did not have \$2000. He asked his friends for some money. He could get only \$1000. Heinz went to see the man. Heinz asked the man to sell the medicine cheaper. The man said, "No." Heinz asked the man if he could pay more money later. The man said, "No." The man wanted to be rich. Heinz did not know what to do. He stole the medicine to give to his wife.

1.1 Was it right or wrong for Heinz to steal the medicine? Why?

1.2 Is it a husband's duty to steal the medicine for his wife? Would
Would a good husband steal? Why?

1.3 Did the man have the right to charge a lot of money when there's
no law to limit the price? Why?

If the subject thought Heinz should steal the medicine, the following questions will be asked:

1.4 (a) If the husband did not love his wife, should he steal the
medicine? Why?

1.5 (a) Suppose Heinz's wife wasn't dying. Suppose Heinz's best

friend was dying. His friend had no money. His friend had no one in his family who would steal the medicine. Should Heinz steal the medicine for his friend? Why?

If the subject thought Heinz should not steal the drug, the following questions will be asked:

- 1.4 (a) Would you steal the medicine to save your wife's life? Why?
- 1.5 (b) Suppose you were dying but were strong enough to save your own life. Would you steal the medicine to save your own life?
- 1.6 Heinz stole the medicine for his wife but was caught by the police. They took him to court. Should the judge send Heinz to jail? Should the judge let him go free? Why?

Instrument II

Joe and his Father

Joe was fourteen years old. Joe wanted to go to camp. The camp cost \$40. Joe's father said Joe could go to camp if he saved enough money. Joe delivered newspapers. Joe worked hard at his job. Joe saved more than \$40. Joe was ready to go to camp. But his father said Joe could not go to camp. Joe's father wanted to go on a fishing trip with his friends. But he did not have enough money. He told Joe to give him the money. Joe really wanted to go to camp. He thought he would not give his money to his father.

- 2.1 Should Joe give his money to his father or should Joe not give his money to his father? Why?

- 2.2 Does Joe's father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money? Why?
- 2.3 If you give money, does this mean you are a good son? Why?
- 2.4 Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking his promise to his father? Why?
- 2.5 Should a person keep a promise? Why? Why should people keep promises? If you did not know someone very well or were not close to him would you keep your promise to him? Why or why not?

Instrument III

Judy and her Mother

Judy was twelve years old. She wanted to go to a concert. The ticket cost \$5. Judy's mother said Judy could go to the concert. But Judy must save the money for the ticket. Judy saved her babysitting money. She saved her lunch money, too. She saved money for a long time. She saved \$8. Then Judy's mother said Judy could not go to the concert. Her mother wanted Judy to buy some new clothes for school. Judy was upset. She decided to go to the concert. She did not listen to her mother. She bought her ticket. Judy lied to her mother. She said she saved only \$3. On Saturday Judy told her mother she was going to visit a friend. She went to the concert. Her mother did not know she went. The next week Judy told her older sister the truth. She

told her she went to the concert. She told her she lied to their mother.

3.1 Should the older sister tell their mother that Judy lied about the money or should she not tell their mother? Why?

3.2 What would be the best reason not to tell the mother? Why?

3.3 What's the most important thing in a mother-daughter relationship?

3.4 The older sister has to think about what would happen to Judy in the future if she told their mother. What things about Judy's future should the older sister think about?

3.5 Should a person keep a promise? Why?
Why should people keep their promises?

Instrument IV

Valjean

Valjean lived in Europe. He was a poor man. He could find no work. His brother and sister could not find work. He had no money. He stole food and medicine. The police caught him. They put him in jail for six years. Two years later he escaped from jail. He went to live in another part of Europe. He changed his name. He saved his money. He slowly built a big factory. He paid his workers a lot of money. He used his money to build a hospital for poor people. Twelve years later a man saw Valjean. The man knew the police were still looking for Valjean.

- 4.1 Should the man tell the police about Valjean? Would it be right or wrong not to tell the police? Why?
- 4.2 Is it a citizen's duty to tell the police about Valjean? Would a good citizen tell the police? Why?
- 4.3 If Valjean and the man were good friends, should the man tell the police or not tell the police? Why?
- 4.4 Should a judge send Valjean back to jail? Why?