IDENTITY: FORMED BY ACTS OF ATTENTION

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an investigation of the psycho-social phenomenon of identity. The matter of identity is an important one for contemporary times because of the current fluidity of social customs and institutions that formerly brought a quality of stability to the individual identity project. Because of this social fluidity, identity is less a matter of discovering one's niche but rather more a matter of creating it. Furthermore the thesis suggests that traditional, academic psychology can provide few guidelines for this process of identity creation because its methodological limitations mitigate against the analysis of subjective processes.

Therefore, this thesis relies primarily on a methodology of phenomenological analysis. This approach is used to investigate the process by which psychological structures in general, and the structures of identity in particular, come into being.

Specifically, the position taken is that psychological structures result from the pattern of attention deployment. That is, attention is depicted as the dynamic mechanism through which psychological structures are formed and elaborated. Furthermore, there are two modes of attention and they are:

1. Pre-reflective Attention: in this type there is a fusion between awareness and the content of awareness; there is no clear demarcation or boundary between subject and object; phenomenologically speaking, the subject is completely absorbed in the object attended to ... there is no self awareness. The type of mental attitude that facilitates this type of attention has been characterized as "passive volition" or "active surrender".

2. Reflective Attention: in this type there is an awareness of both
the subject and object pole of the experience. That is, the individual is reflexively aware of their participation in or contribution to the experience. It is experienced as a mental effort or activity.

Furthermore, the exercising of these two modes of attention result in the production of qualitatively different psychological structures. The deployment of pre-reflective awareness results in stable or enduring structures. This thesis suggests that this mode of attention is the only one available to infants thus explaining the enduring quality of psychological structures developed in those early years.

The deployment of reflective attention, on the other hand, results in transient psychological structures of the type used in conceptual thinking. The capacity for this type of attention appears later in the developmental sequence. It is this type of attention that allows individuals to consider logical possibilities without acting them out.

Therefore, this thesis utilizes a dualistic structural framework with which to organize the material. Thus, the relatively stable structures as a whole are referred to as the dynamic unconscious, or right hemispheric content, or the realm of pre-reflective intentionality. Likewise, the relatively transient structures are classed variously as left hemispheric content, or ego structures, or the realm of reflective consciousness.

The construct of identity, in some sense, bridges this structural duality. The bodily felt sense of who we are is contributed by the more enduring structures of the pre-reflective self while our self image or self concept (as a clear and distinct idea of who we are) is contributed by the reflective self. The thesis concludes with the notion that identity change results from
the capacity to volitionally deploy both modes of attention in a systematic way. Thus, we use reflective attention in order to detach our awareness from its habitualized pattern of deployment (deautomization). Once this is accomplished we can utilize pre-reflective attention to fuse with objects of consciousness that mutually implicate and elaborate a new identity.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The primary focus of this thesis will be a discussion of personal identity, the formative processes by which one is developed, and the experiential techniques by which it can be changed. In order for our analysis to be relevant, it must first be placed into a social context. This is in accordance with Edie's (1976) statement that:

Categorical, conceptual thinking takes time...... every new theory and every new idea originates in determinate cultural surroundings as the answer to some determinate question. (p. 98)

The analysis of the social/cultural context will demonstrate some of the reasons why 'identity' has become a critical issue of this time.

Next, I will examine some of the 'answers' that traditional, academic psychology has brought to bear on the issue of identity. Specifically, the analysis will focus on the limitations of the traditional solutions. It will be suggested that the traditional solutions offered by psychology are open to the twin charges of cultural relativism and ideological bias. That is, the model of health proposed by these systems are susceptible to the charge that they are mere reflections of the current elite class (Rank, 1949). Because our society is currently undergoing a profound transition with no clear cut, elite class emerging at this point, it seems advisable to guard against any ideological contamination. Other limitations of traditional theory to be analyzed include epistemological and methodological considerations.

Finally, a methodology will be suggested for studying the issue of identity that is intended to overcome the above mentioned limitations. The
The proposed methodology will be dynamic, phenomenological analysis. It will be shown that the dynamic phenomenological approach lends itself particularly well to the process of translating theory into practice. Therefore, the theoretical analysis will generate concrete, therapeutic techniques that are easily understood and applied. Although the theoretical portion of this thesis will be complex, abstract and perhaps even esoteric, the techniques springing from it are intended to be accessible to individuals with a minimum theoretical, psychological education.

The Cultural Context

Although the decade of the 1970's has been characterized in the popular press as a decade of stagnation, I sense that the changes that are occurring are far more fundamental than realized. Because of the profound nature of these changes, they have not as yet become visible. Whereas the 1960's were marked by obvious social change, based on the assumption that social change would facilitate individual, the situation appears to be reversed in this decade. That is, the pattern beginning to emerge in the 1970's is that change is primarily a personal and individual phenomenon.

Glasser (1975) in *The Identity Society* was one of the first authors to explicitly deal with the human response to the rapid social change western society is undergoing. The essence of his book is that we have moved from a preoccupation with task to a preoccupation with identity. This transition has been noted on other levels as well. For example, during the sixties, the schizoid experience seemed to be the typical psychopathology of the decade (May, 1969). However, during the latter half of the seventies, a new clinical trend has begun to emerge: narcissism. Kohut (1977) is an author who is beginning to document this trend. One
hypothesized feature of the narcissistic condition is a homosexual preference, or a confused, fluid sexual identity. Thus the emergence of a strong homosexual sub-culture in the seventies can be taken as further evidence of the narcissistic trend that is developing in the current decade. The popular press has begun to notice the self preoccupation and has labeled the current generation the 'me generation'. In so doing, it has placed a negative connotation on what it views as an excessive preoccupation with self.

Such a judgmental stance does nothing to further our understanding of the underlying processes that are at work. Perhaps we can get closer to such an understanding by substituting the term personally centered for the term self centered. The former term implies that individuals are relying almost exclusively on primary sources of information - their personal experience - as opposed to secondary sources - custom, ritual, institutionalized education, the media and government. In summary, the individuals who comprise western society trust personal data versus social 'wisdom' (Polanyi, 1975). Individuals engaged in a search for identity are not merely indulging in self centeredness, but rather, they are looking inside themselves for concrete, experientially felt guidelines for their behavior. They are doing so because the traditional, social guidelines have broken down. That is, behavioral guidelines as embodied in custom, ritual and role expectations no longer meet individual needs. The external consensual reality has eroded and adherence to its guidelines no longer produces reliable results (Reich, 1978). Consequently, these individuals look to an alternate, internal source of behavioral guidelines.

A few examples of the breakdown of the traditional social relationships should make this point clear. On an economic level, the conventional
wisdom was that thrift was its own reward. Some individuals now realize that inflation has undermined this homily. On a career level, higher education was supposed to be a guarantee of security, interest and challenge. The current unemployment figures for university graduates reveal that this guideline was relative and not absolute. It only applied to specific, time-bound, socio-economic conditions. On a personal or psychological level, there is the institution of marriage. In the last decade this institution has encountered two powerful challenges or threats: the rise of sexual freedom/permissiveness and the women's liberation movement. The reader has only to recall society's expectations of marriage ten years ago as opposed to the ones currently held. The reader might reflect too on the experiences that led to such changes in expectations. In my experience, many of us are realizing that the roles simply are not adequate to the shifting challenges of contemporary relationships. The demands of current family life seem to require more 'here and now' attention and less codified role performance. Again, we are moving from external, socially defined guidelines to internal, phenomenological guidelines.

The Philosophical Context

There is a philosophical dimension to this discussion, as well. It could be stated that a philosophical crisis anticipated the social crises that have been discussed above. Philosophy began to replace religion as a dominant social influence. That is, the absolute guidelines of religion were replaced by the relative values of philosophy. Polanyi (1975) describes the process succinctly:

The feudal system and the religious sanctions which upheld it were attacked by a radical skepticism which in turn was vulnerable to its own origin; philosophical skepticism. (p. 11)
We are attempting to trace, on a philosophical level, the process by which external behavioral guidelines were replaced, or are being replaced, by internal guidelines. Polanyi's account shows that the beginning of this process was an erosion from absolute, external guidelines of religion to the relative, external guidelines of philosophy. In order to balance the account, it must be acknowledged that replacing religious dogma with rationalism prepared the way for science and technology. This applied knowledge made possible an enormous increase in the material well being of western civilization. However, as Polanyi's quote implies, rationalism cannot supply moral or ethical guidelines. When its premises are followed through to their logical conclusions it must disqualify itself as a source of absolute and eternal values. Again, Polanyi (1975) traces the sequence of reactions:

The great philosophic tumult which started in the second half of the eighteenth century on the continent of Europe and finally led up to the philosophic disasters of our own day represented an incessant preoccupation with the collapse of the philosophic foundations of rationalism. Universal standards of human behavior have fallen into disrepute and various substitutes were put forward in their place: for example, individuality; creative genius; romantic bohemians; humanism.

(p. 11)

It appears as if philosophy merely anticipated what the rest of society lived out much later. That is, philosophy is the first discipline to articulate the 'new' reality. Philosophers don't invent or create this 'new' reality - rather, they respond to it by giving it a voice. In a sense, they make it conscious. This process is repeated on an individual level - first we live the 'new' reality, then we become conscious of it.

"Thus, the breakdown or collapse of rationalism as a philosophical guideline in some way anticipated the breakdown of the social contract in
economics (eg., inflation); politics (eg., the crisis of democracy); and the institution of marriage (eg., the climbing divorce rate). It is, therefore, understandable that individuals will increasingly turn to personal and psychological criteria for guidelines to behavior. This strategy, of course, accelerates the erosion of the social contract with the result that we are labeled the 'me' generation or the identity society.

Psychology's Contribution

How has the discipline of psychology responded to this historical crisis? The implicit promise of psychology was that, as a science, the stringent methodological requirements would ground its knowledge on empirical evidence. Methodology was assumed to be beyond philosophy and metaphysics. However, as Koch (Wann, 1964) and Kuhn (1962) have pointed out, the scientific process is not a strictly rational one. Koch (Warm, 1964) puts the matter quite bluntly:

Scientific process is, in principle and at all stages, undetermined by rule.... A gap between a linguistic 'system' of assertions and the unverbalized processes upon which its interpretation and application (not to mention its formulation) are contingent in acknowledging the dependency of theory construction and use at every phase of individual sensibility, discrimination, insight, judgment and guess. (p. 21)

Behaviorism was intended to be the most scientific of the psychologies. Yet, as Koch's point makes clear, the scientific process is not strictly rational and objective, even for the physical sciences. Thus, the primary goal of behaviorism which was to establish a valid methodology was impossible to achieve. What Polanyi (1975) states about science in general is also true of behavioristic psychology in particular:
As long as science remains the ideal of knowledge, and detachment the ideal of science, ethics cannot be secured from complete destruction by skeptical doubt. (p. 27)

Bringing our discussion back to the issue of identity, we can now see that behaviorism was inadequate to the task of supplying models of health that could serve as a guide in the process of identity formation.

An even more fundamental objection can be raised at this stage. The issue is that of epistemology, the theory of the origin and nature of knowledge. The rapid advances of the physical sciences were based on the epistemological assumption that subject and object were independent. That is, the assumption was that the actions of the scientific observer would not influence the outcome of the experiment - in this way the results obtained could be said to be truly objective. However, Heisenberg's Indeterminacy Principle (Koestler, 1972) refuted this ideal goal once and forever by demonstrating that the act of observation did determine or influence the behavior of the phenomena in question. If this ideal could not be attained in the physical sciences, it is even more removed for the social sciences. This realization should re-orientate our investigation from a focus on the object to a focus on the relationship between the subject and object. My analysis of the identity formative process will, therefore, focus on this dialectical interaction.

The second epistemological objection is related to the first. If the ideal of science was the eradication of subjective influence, then this ideal can only be approached by the social sciences through a reductionistic line of reasoning. For example, psychology could only approach the goal of 'objectivity' by explaining higher, social processes in terms of biology, physiology, chemistry and physics. This would be the underlying rationale
for Freud grounding his theory in the biological life of the instincts. Likewise, the behaviorists sought to explain human behavior in terms of observable, and therefore, objective environmental contingencies. Thus, the search for universal standards of behavior is directed towards an exhaustive knowledge of physical reality, which is held to ultimately determine our behavior. Consequently, any psychological theory which will admit only 'objective' data can only produce a deterministic account of humankind. That is, the choice of the data base predetermines that model's stance regarding the question of volition and determinism. As we shall see later, the phenomenological method uses a subjective data base and is, therefore, appropriate for the study of volitional processes - including that of identity change.

Before I proceed to this phenomenological analysis, I wish to examine an alternate approach that has developed to meet the methodological challenge of the social sciences: structuralism. The main advantage of the structuralist approach is that it overcomes at least some of the reductionistic tendencies that were imported when the social sciences attempted to adopt the methodology of the physical sciences. Two quotes from Edie (1975) should make this deduction more explicit:

Speaking is not a biological but a cultural use of the human body. There is no organ which is used in speech...which does not have a specific physiological function utterly independent of its superordinate and special employment for purposes of speaking. (p. 84; italics mine)

That is, the act of speech, because it is a cultural or social act, cannot be understood in terms of biology. The sound of the sentence may be determined to some extent by anatomical features but the meaning of the sentence is utterly independent of them. A reductionistic explanation, therefore, borders on the absurd. The alternative is to explain speech in structuralist
Linguistics is the newest, the best, and perhaps the ONLY authentic model of what a human science can and should be. This (linguistic) structuralist model may very well serve in the near future to free all the social sciences from their awkward and increasingly indefensible reliance on the Galilean model of scientific explanation used in the physical sciences.... Thus, linguistic structuralism....is more and more being found to have epistemological and even ontological implications for the philosophy of man and the philosophy of science. (Edie, 1975; p. 72)

As physics has been a history of the search for the elementary particle, so the social sciences have begun to look for their fundamental unit and the structural principles which organize these units. Just as the physical sciences of chemistry, biology and physiology were built on the foundations of physics, so the social sciences of psychology, sociology and anthropology are being built on the foundations of linguistics.

Piaget and Levi Strauss are two outstanding examples of theoreticians who have adopted the structuralist approach for their study. Whereas the 'hard' sciences utilize an epistemology that is directed towards physical presence, the social sciences employ an epistemology that is directed towards meaning. The importance of this distinction begins to emerge when we acknowledge that man lives in two realms: the physical and the social, each with its own epistemology. The current search for identity springs not from an inability to deal with our physical environment, but with the rapidly changing social environment. Therefore, structuralism has made a significant contribution by reorientating our focus to that domain with a methodology that is appropriate to it.

However, while the structuralist approach is an improvement over the Galilean model of scientific explanation, it, too, has its limitations. Specifically, it offers virtually no support to the individual in the search
for a viable identity. In fact, certain structuralists seem intent on
destroying the very notion of subjectivity upon which the sense of identity
is to be built. For example, Foucault proclaimed in an interview: "The 'I'
is destroyed... we do not put man in the place of God but we start with
anonymous thinking, knowledge without a subject, a theoretical (entity) with­
out identity." (Schiwy, 1971). As Edie (1975) points out:

> The focus is shifted away from the 'heroic' vision
of man as the source of his own history and of his
institutions to the supposedly infrahuman and
'automatic' rules governing his behavior. (p. 109)

Again we note that structuralism tends to support a psychology that is
deterministic. It does so because it restricts its attention to the object­
ive realm. If the deterministic stance is, in fact, the truth, then all
therapy must be based on an illusion - the illusion that people can actually
change their lives. The only way out of the dilemma is to posit a subject­
ive realm where these laws do not hold and volition is possible. Thus,
structuralism offers no guidelines to individuals involved in existential
choice. It appears that Gendlin (in Corsini, 1973) went through a similar
process of reasoning when he produced the following thought:

> No one set of right actions can be specified for
humans, but the relation between experiencing
and authentic right action can be characterized.
(p. 320)

Before we pursue the interesting implications of this quote, let me
attempt to bring some perspective to the discussion. I am stating that the
central preoccupation of this decade is the search for identity. We have
had a brief look at the history of psychological theory to see what possible
resources it could bring to that search. The thrust of the discussion has
been the limitations of such an approach. The fundamental limitation of
traditional psychology is its adherence to the scientific method which
restricts itself to the objective domain. Because identity is a subjective phenomenon, psychological theory is of limited use in therapeutic intervention. I say limited rather than irrelevant because as Gendlin (in Corsini, 1973) points out:

An experiential therapist uses theory and thoughts to point to what is concretely being lived and felt just then, rather than translating the client into concepts and then attempting to work with the concepts. (p. 321)

Thus, a therapist uses objective theory to confirm what is already being experienced subjectively by the client. In a sense, we could say that theory is most appropriately used to confirm experience, rather than prescribe it. I know from my own experience that I use psychological theory to corroborate what I have already felt. For example, when I read Loevinger's (1976) stage theory of ego development, I realize that I am indeed involved in a process that has been experienced by others before me. On the other hand, her theory cannot predict specifically where my existential project will take me. Only my subjectivity or intentionality can determine that. It does tell me, however, that the issues I have faced have something in common with what others have encountered. That is, the structure of the experience has common features whereas the details vary from individual to individual. This is no small gain as it goes a long way to reducing our alienation one from another. Through establishing a common framework, or abstracting the common features from the unique experience, structuralism helps us to overcome at least some of the existential isolation. However, this attribute has two sides or edges. The relief that accompanies the realization that one is trodding a well worn path is tempered by the realization that this has deterministic consequences. In other words, the burden of 'heroic vision' is lifted, but at the apparent expense of free choice or volition.
Blasi (in Loevinger, 1976) recognizes the problem a strictly structuralist approach presents in seeking to account for subjectivity and identity:

Thus, if subjectivity and consciousness exist in human beings and if the mind's structures can be divorced completely from them, then structures and structuralism give us no help in understanding subjectivity and its development. (p. 47)

Elsewhere, Blasi subsumes self-consciousness and freedom under the term subjectivity. This corroborates my earlier suggestion that volition is only understandable in the realm of the subjective. If we hope to establish a bridge between the subjective and objective, we must look to their interface; that is, the point at which structures are formed. That is, if humankind is to gain some measure of self-determination, it must understand the dynamics of structure formation in order to harness and direct that process. This is particularly true of the structure of personal identity.

Blasi goes on to state that Piaget (the structuralist psychologist par excellence) almost completely ignores the conditions under which the structures develop. Likewise, Loevinger (1976), who is an advocate of the structuralist approach to ego development, devotes only two paragraphs to the origin of ego structures and her account is extremely superficial. Unless we have some idea of the processes by which we create ego structures; unless our theory acknowledges that "consciousness is not simply a reflection of structures but at least partially a creator of them" (Blasi, in Loevinger, 1976), we, as therapists, will unconsciously reinforce our client's fatalistic mentality. Our deterministic theoretical bias will operate as a set that the client soon comes to accept totally. Thus, our theoretical assumptions will operate in much the same way as hypnotic suggestion.
The Thesis' Objective

The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to propose a theory of identity formation and change that will redress the balance between volition and determinism. Specifically, the argument will utilize a dynamic analysis to discover and elucidate the processes by which psychological structures in general and identity structures, in particular, are generated. Attention will be posited as the critical dynamic factor in these processes. That is, attention is the means by which psychological structures come into being. It is through the deployment of attention that some mental phenomena are reified in the form of psychological structures whereas others never pass beyond the ephemeral transient stage.

Specifically, I shall argue that attention can be used in two ways. First, it can be deployed in such a way that it phenomenologically merges with the object it bears on - subject and object become fused. A case will be presented that this is the decisive dynamic in the act of introjection. That is, it is this mode of attention to external stimuli that, simultaneously creates an intra-psychic structure - the means by which our identifications become our identity. Second, attention can be deployed in such a way as to be distinguishable from its object - there is a clear boundary between subject and object. Attention, in this mode, would be perceived as the ground of one's subjectivity. It is perceived as autonomous from its content; that is, its existence continues in spite of the variation in its content. The capacity to utilize attention in such a way permits individuals to take their distance from their mental content. This, in turn, permits an individual to compare various logical possibilities without "acting them out". It is this capacity that allows us to envisage an alternate identity structure; whereas it is the first form of attention that enables us to actualize the logical
possibility of our choice. That is, each form of attention has its place in the process of identity formation and change; the first mode is responsible for actualization and the second, for conceptualization.

A Developmental Framework

I shall suggest that these modes of attention appear at different points on the developmental continuum. That is, the first mode is present at birth, whereas the second mode develops later. The first mode is experienced as involuntary - our attention is 'grabbed', trapped and held. The second mode, on the other hand, obeys our volition. Identity change, however, involves the conscious deployment of both modes. An outline of the process follows:

1) Absence of Self-consciousness: the first form of attention is dominant during childhood and is the dynamic operation responsible for the formation of our 'character' or identity structure.

2) The Self-conscious Phase: the second form of attention is employed to become conscious of one's identity structure. One's sense of subjectivity is separated from its habitualized or automatized structure. One detaches the sense of 'I-ness' from the internal object constellation. One employs the second mode of attention to take one's distance from one's character structure in order to make it visible or conscious.

3) The Identity Project Phase:

a) Envisaging an Alternative: the second mode of attention is used in conjunction with imagination to conceptualize
alternate identity configurations. In a sense, visualization would be a more appropriate term than conceptualization as the mental product is more concrete than abstract. This concrete visualization embodies a new intentionality; a new structural principle.

b) Actualization: once again the first form of attention is employed to become one with this concrete visualization. One's sense of subjectivity fuses with, then dwells in this 'new' mental object. This phase is distinguished from the first phase by the presence of volition - we consciously direct our concrete attention to this embodied symbol. On the basis of this one experience an automatic process is triggered that involves the generation of a whole identity structure. That process is, for the most part, unconscious and guided by the same organizational principle that generated the concrete visualization. That is, the whole is generated from the part.

A Brief Structural Overview

The preceding section anticipates the bulk of the dynamic analysis that will take place in this thesis. It attempts to explain the processes by which structures are formed. While it is my intention to stress a dynamic, functional approach, I have found it necessary to introduce some structural terms to bring some stability to the presentation. At this point I intend to introduce these terms, define them, and touch briefly on the relationship that exists between them.
Thus, an individual's psychic life is characterized by a structural duality: pre-reflective intentionality and reflective consciousness. Both terms in this fundamental duality exhibit further structural organization. For example, pre-reflective intentionality refers to the unconscious, habitual, and automatic ways of processing information. In a sense, this term or construct refers to a stereotype response pattern or collection of patterns. Its structures are formed, elaborated, and accumulated as a result of the operations of the first type of attention - concrete attention which fuses with the object being attended to. The second term in the primary duality, reflective consciousness, refers to the conscious manipulation of clear and distinct ideas in articulate phrasings. Its content would consist of conscious moral, ethical, pragmatic, ideological, and strategic guidelines. This psychic entity shares many of the features attributed to the ego and may be equivalent to it. Its structures are formed, elaborated and accumulated through the operations of the second mode of attention, where attention and its content are perceived as distinguishable phenomena. This type of attention begins by drawing a boundary between subject and object and perceived by delineating clear boundaries between various elements in the mental field. In such a manner are the structures of 'reflective consciousness' built up. One's self image or self concept would be one sub-structure among many within the sphere of reflected consciousness. On the other hand, one's subjectivity, that is, one's affective sense of self would probably be a sub-structure within the sphere of pre-reflective intentionality. The phenomenon of identity, in some sense, bridges the two structural entities. It is the dialectical product of the interaction between them.

The details of this process will be elaborated in the next two chapters. The first of these will attempt to ground this discussion on some
physiological and anatomical research. These research findings are not intended to serve a reductionistic argument. Such an argument would reason that the structural duality of the brain (the two hemispheres) 'causes' the phenomenological duality of pre-reflective intentionality and reflective consciousness. Rather, it is intended to reinforce the argument that form or structure follows function. The third chapter will focus on a detailed analysis of identity formation and its therapeutic implications.

The Phenomenological Reduction

The terms subjective and objective are used in a non-traditional sense throughout this thesis. Because such usage could result in considerable misunderstanding, I believe that it is important to explain the underlying rationale and define these terms from that point of view. Basically, the phenomenological reduction defines the field of study as the contents of consciousness as such. That is, the distinction between inner, subjective experiences and outer, objective experiences is either not made at all or put to one side. All experience, therefore, is considered 'real' or valid. This is in marked contrast to the traditional approach where the connotation of 'realness' seems only to adhere to the objective domain. Once we make this phenomenological reduction, therefore, the terms objective and subjective have to be re-defined. Thus, objectivity can no longer be understood as knowledge that is independent of the subject - the knower is always implicated in the known. Instead of the traditional dichotomy between subject and object, we find the phenomenological dichotomy between consciousness and objects of consciousness. The term 'object' is still used, but now it refers to the discrete content of consciousness rather than to some 'thing' in the environment. Therefore, when I use the term objective I am referring to the
contents of consciousness, the objects being attended to. The term subjective, on the other hand, refers to the attending pole of this dialectic. It is consciousness itself, and cannot be explained by a formal language. Even metaphor is a highly suspect device for communicating subjectivity's nature because metaphor must, of necessity, use a vocabulary derived from the objective domain. Thus, any verbal definition of subjectivity contains a radical distortion embedded within it.

Why spend so much time on this apparently esoteric methodological issue? One of the prime objectives of this thesis is to discover and identify the realm where volition is operative. It is my contention that the arena of subjectivity is that realm. One of the implications of this statement is that volitional identity change is impossible without an experiential, concretely felt grasp of one's subjectivity. Therefore, any theoretical system which purports to guide therapists through the dynamics of such a process must assign a central place to subjectivity. Furthermore, great care must be taken to ensure that the definition of subjectivity is free from distortion, as much as possible. It seems to me that traditional psychology errs in this account in that what passes for subjectivity is, on closer inspection, really introjected identifications. These introjects may go through a number of transformations and consequently exhibit a unique and idiosyncratic character. Uniqueness, then, mistakenly is understood as a defining attribute of subjectivity. The idiosyncratic nature of an individual's psychic life tends to obscure the fact that its origin or source was ultimately the environment. In other words, what is identified as subjectivity is really information that originally came from the environment (the objective domain) and subsequently undergone a number of transformations which
tend to camouflage its essentially objective nature.

True subjectivity is an act and not a fact; closer to a process than to a product; a medium rather than a message. Perhaps the model would be as follows: subjectivity brings operations to bear on objects of consciousness. Ego operations would be the mediating term between the subjective and objective domains. Subjectivity is the source or creator of these operations but is separate or distinct from them. Hence, it is apparent that if an individual truly wishes to engineer an identity change, they must achieve the capacity to return to the source of all psychic structures: subjectivity.

Finally, I have made brief reference to the problems or limitations of language when we attempt to describe and explain this subjective domain. I implied that metaphor was the verbal tool that went the furthest to overcome these limitations. I would like to go one step further and assert that this thesis supports a symbolic rather than a literal interpretation. I have taken some pains to convey the impression that the truth or meaning of this thesis lies behind the words and not in them. I believe that this methodological principle is consistent with the message I wish to convey: the heart of volition lies not in the visible structures (or sentences) but in the invisible source (symbolic interpretation).
CHAPTER TWO
The Physiological Correlates of a Dualistic Consciousness

I. Introduction
In this chapter I will begin the main work of this thesis. The principal thrust of my argument is that human consciousness is present in a twofold or double manner. Each human lives through not one, but two modes or types of consciousness. The first type, pre-reflective intentionality, can only be retrospectively inferred; that is, it is not a direct datum of consciousness. For example, the experience of looking at a flower reveals only the flower and not our participation in that appearance. Contrast this with the appearance of mental objects as produced in a reverie where we know or realize directly that it is our activity that contributes significantly to the appearance of the object.

This second experience is an example of the second type of consciousness, reflective consciousness. In this type of experience, consciousness is experienced as such - we are conscious that we are conscious. It is this type that allows us to stand back from our experience rather than being 'lost' in it. We are directly aware of both the subject and object pole of our experience, whereas with the first type reveals only the object directly to us. These two types of consciousness can be neatly characterized as follows:
1) Intentional consciousness: awareness and its contents merged into one seamless whole.
2) Reflective consciousness: awareness and its contents phenomenologically separate: subject-object boundary.

Sarte (1951), Merleau-Ponty (1962), and Ricouer (1967) are philosophers who have posited a similar dualistic framework.
A. Physiological Dichotomies Paralleling a Dualistic Conception of Consciousness.

Much of the theoretical speculation that takes place in the later sections is based on the assumption that this duality is a pervasive reality on every level. In order to ground my argument, therefore, I will attempt to delineate biological and physiological parallels to this posited duality. Specifically, I will demonstrate the parallels between right hemispheric functioning and the operations of pre-reflective intentionality; as well as the parallels between left hemispheric functioning and the operations of reflective consciousness.

The primary difference between the two hemispheres is the way they are thought to process information (Ornstein, 1977). For instance, the left hemisphere processes information linearly, sequentially and rationally; while the right, adopts a more global approach, processing information holistically, through pattern recognition. Furthermore, these functional differences seem to be manifested anatomically. Ornstein cites several studies that indicate that injuries to specific areas of the left hemisphere impair performance of specific tasks; whereas anatomical localization of ability was not detected in the right hemisphere. Thus, we have the left hemisphere which functions by connecting discrete elements in a linear manner, organized anatomically into discrete task-specific areas. Likewise, the right hemisphere, which functions through synthesis - the apprehending of the whole - is anatomically undifferentiated. And this seems to be an instance of the general rule that form follows function.

B. The Dialectic Between the Hemispheres

Most of what has been written about the two hemispheres gives little indication of the nature of the relationship between the two. The existence
of the corpus callosum, the bundle of nerve fibers that joins them, indicates that a relationship must exist. However, most of the speculation around the research emphasizes the independent nature of their operations (Lee, Ornstein, Galen, Deikman, and Tart; 1976). When independence is not being stressed, the relationship is described in terms of dominance. According to this model, the first hemisphere to solve the presented problem seizes control of the motor pathways and thus, establishes dominance (Lee et al, 1976).

I believe that these accounts are only a beginning to the task of describing this very interesting relationship. I would like, therefore, to suggest a possible line of inquiry and research. The direction I am about to advance is based on the previously established parallels between physiological and anatomical entities (eg. left and right hemispheres) and the philosophical terms (eg. reflective consciousness and pre-reflective intentionality). Having thus established some correspondence, the nature of the relationship between the philosophical/psychological terms might provide us with some clues to the nature of the relationship between the two hemispheres. It is this line of reasoning that produced the following suppositions. First, I shall argue that the relationship between the two hemispheres is an interdependent one and that the nature of this interdependency changes developmentally. Specifically, I shall suggest that the right hemisphere would be the first to develop. Its content would be derived from perceptual experience. These separate elements, which are empirically derived, would be equivalent in nature to what Piaget (1952) has termed the sensori-motor schemes. These separate elements taken as an organized whole are equivalent to a 'body' ego. Our capacity to ride a
bicycle, to eat with a knife and fork, to ice skate, to crawl and to walk is learned through right hemispheric functioning. These skills represent a complex, multi-dimensional body knowledge that is non-verbal and non-rational.

The content of the left hemisphere, in contrast to the right, develops later in the individual's life. Left hemispheric content would be the product of operations performed on the content of the right. The term 'abstraction' refers to both the content of the left hemisphere and the operation that produced that content. The same could be said of the term 'generalization'. In order to understand how this process works, let us recall the earlier discussion regarding attention. It was stated that there were two modes: intentional attention and reflective attention. I shall suggest that the first type is characteristic of right hemispheric functioning, while the second is characteristic of the left. It is this second mode of attention that is the dynamic principle that stands behind conceptual functioning. Thus, left hemispheric content is the result of bringing this type of attention to bear on right hemispheric content. In the example of abstraction, reflective attention isolates a symbolic part from the ground or wholistic pattern of the right. By so doing, the left hemisphere accumulates a number of clear and distinct ideas that can be manipulated according to the laws of logic. We can see, therefore, that the left hemisphere develops later than the right because of the former's radical dependency on the data base of the latter. In the later chapter on identity I shall explore two developmentally later stages of this relationship: left hemispheric functioning alienated from the right; and left hemispheric functioning initiating a re-organization of the right.
C. Volition and Hemispheric Dominance

In the final section of this chapter, I shall propose that hemispheric dominance can be volitionally determined. That is, in any given situation, the subject can process the information wholistically (right hemisphere) or rationally (left hemisphere). It shall be suggested that by exercising such a choice the subject can radically alter the quality of their experience; i.e. the nature of their perceptions will be significantly different, depending on the mode chosen.

II. Physiological Research Supporting a Dualistic Theory of Consciousness.

A. Characteristics of Bi-Modal Functioning

I shall begin by listing the defining functions of each hemisphere as identified by various authors. I will then attempt to compare these descriptors to those notions of consciousness that have been developed in other disciplines (philosophy and psychology). In this manner, it is my intention to establish a theoretical foundation that will provide the basis for further analysis and assist in identifying undiscovered relationships.

Omstein (1972 and 1977) has probably done the most work to publicize and interpret the research conducted on hemispheric functioning and I shall begin by quoting him:

According to esoteric tradition, the 'organ of perception', which can be tutored in the same fashion as is language, is what we term intuition. Although the phrase is often maligned, conventionally used to indicate random guesswork or a mysterious combination of elements, it should be properly understood as knowledge without recourse to inference. It centers around the cultivation of what we might call non-linear immediate understanding, in compliment to the inferential mediated ordered sequence of 'rational' thought. (1972; p. 24)
Ornstein goes on to point out that this type of intuitive knowing is a characteristic of right hemispheric functioning; whereas processing information in an orderly sequence is a characteristic of the left.

Let us attempt to fill in this vague outline with more detail, beginning with the right hemisphere and then moving on to the left. The following descriptors have been applied by Ornstein (1977) to the right hemisphere: holistic relational; able to deal with simultaneous inputs; superior at depth perception and three dimensionality; superior at identifying part-whole relationships; more rapid reaction time; and diffuse anatomical organization. Conversely, the left hemisphere has been described in the literature as analytic; linear; sequential; chronological; superior for memory recall; and more anatomically specialized. Furthermore, as Ornstein (1972) has pointed out, the left hemisphere is involved in logical thinking, "especially in verbal and mathematical functions". (p. 52). The descriptors or characteristics applied to the right, on the other hand, indicate that this hemisphere is primarily responsible for our orientation in space, artistic endeavour, crafts, body image, and recognition of faces. These inferences are borne out in part through research on brain damage:

An injury to the left hemisphere very often interferes with and can...destroy language ability. An injury to the right hemisphere...may cause severe disturbance in spatial awareness, or in awareness of one's own body, in musical ability, and in recognition of other people. Some people with right hemisphere damage cannot dress themselves adequately, although their speech and reason remain unimpaired. (Ornstein, 1972; p. 52)

If we examine the list of characteristics that we have articulated to this point for some underlying factor or some common generating principle, some interesting possibilities suggest themselves. For example, we could say
that the right hemisphere is responsible for 'here and now' interactions with the 'real' world; whereas the left, with its construct of past, present and future, is responsible for operations on our model of the world. That is, the left hemisphere is occupied with the manipulation and transformation of abstract symbols according to the rules of logic.

B. Correspondences with Philosophical Thought

Another way of looking at the essential difference between the two hemispheres is to delineate their realms of applicability. I could, for example, suggest that the left hemisphere deals in the realm of the logically possible; whereas the right deals with what has already occurred or has a high probability of occurring. The realm of the former is constrained only by the laws of logic and need bear no relationship to an actual occurrence in order to be considered valid. On the other hand, the realm of the latter is limited to those events and phenomena that are actualized. The realm of the probable refers to the mundane, everyday world we live in whether we are scientists or deckhands. In colloquial terms it refers to the 'real' world versus what is merely 'theoretically' possible. Different criteria of meaning are applied to both domains and care should be taken not to apply the criteria of one domain to the content of the other. Blasi (in Loevinger, 1976) seems to be referring to these two domains in his discussion regarding the relationship between cognitive structures of an individual and their personality; the former is the realm of the possible; the latter, the realm of the probable.

What is inadequate in the attempts to explain personality development by resorting to formal cognitive structures is that the latter represents 'a system of possibilities. More adequate and developmentally more mature
cognitive structures widen the range of possibilities, without moving from the domain of what is possible to the domain of what is [the realm of the probable], whereas in relation to cognition, personality is factual and determined. (p. 45)

When Blasi uses the term 'formal' to refer to cognitive structures, he is referring to a logical-linguistic system which, earlier we have seen, has been associated with left hemispheric functioning. The implication of Blasi's quote is that the left hemisphere doesn't determine directly the form of the personality. In fact, he goes on to state explicitly that logic and language must be subordinated to more encompassing structures, "those forms of life that constitute human personality". I am suggesting that this latter form is determined by right hemispheric functioning. Perhaps it would be more correct to state that the operations of the personality, the domain of the probable, correspond to right hemispheric functioning. Another parallel that suggests itself is that the realm of the probable, right hemispheric functioning and the psychoanalytic construct of the unconscious are all referring to the same phenomena. It seems to be a basic tenet of the psychoanalytic school that our lives are determined much more by unconscious factors rather than our conscious, logical intentions. The term 'unconscious' has unfortunate connotations of near-death; as in coma or 'being knocked unconscious'. By looking at the parallels between the construct of the unconscious and the characteristics of right hemispheric functioning, we begin to correct this impression. It is not so much a matter of being 'unconscious' as it is a matter of being conscious but not self-conscious. That is, when right hemispheric activity predominates, we are not aware of being conscious...we are our experience as opposed to 'having' an experience. I am, therefore, suggesting that while psychology and physiology utilize
different terminologies, they are referring to the same phenomena - 'unconscious' determinates being, at least partially equivalent to right hemispheric functioning; with the implication that left hemispheric functioning is, in some sense, equivalent to ego operations.

Let me push this discussion one step further to see if this dualistic conception of psychic life appears in philosophical thought. The rationalists, beginning with Descartes, defined thought quite narrowly as the application of the laws of correct logical thinking to fully discrete and perfectly clear ideas. It has been noted by Galin and Deikman (Lee et al; 1974) that left hemisphere activity features logical precision and exhaustive categorization as well as heightened boundary perception. This sense of boundary implies that the elements manipulated in left hemispheric activity are quite separate from one another. Giambattista Vico, an eighteenth century philosopher, argued that these clear and distinct ideas are a rare and late accomplishment of only one of man's most rarified faculties. By implication, therefore, any philosophical account of man must go beyond the Cartesian definition of thought. This definition refers to the manipulation of perfectly defined categorical concepts in full reflexive judgment. It seems to me that the last statement is a good working definition of left hemispheric activity. On the other hand, as Edie (1976) has pointed out, thinking, as it is experienced in individual life, follows laws of meaning, contexture and relevance which have a prelogical, affective, pragmatic morphology that is completely missed by rationalism. This statement, similarly, serves as a good working description of right hemispheric activity. He goes on to discuss the relationship between these two realms:
In short, men begin to think through the most global and generic categories and, through these descend gradually to the clear and distinct ideas of fully reflexive language. (p. 87)

His statement seems to parallel the earlier quote from Blasi in that they both imply that in some important respects left hemispheric content is derived from and subordinate to right hemispheric content when seeking to account for actual behavior as opposed to logical possibilities. Edie's statement also suggests a developmental framework which we shall investigate in greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.

Still another philosopher who documents the two modes of knowing or consciousness is Ricoueur (1965):

...for reflection is essentially dividing, sundering. It is one thing to receive the presence of things, it is another to determine the meaning of things. To receive is to give oneself intuitively to their existence; to think is to dominate this presence in a discourse which discriminates by denomination and connects in articulate phrasing.

All progress in reflection is a progress in scission. (p. 29)

This implies that heightened boundary perception that has been characterized as an attribute of left hemispheric functioning is in the service of separation and division. It is this heightened sense of boundary that produces the clear and distinct ideas that are the hallmark of reflective and analytic thinking. It bears repetition that this distinct boundary phenomena is mirrored in the anatomical organization of the left hemisphere. That is, specific capacities seem to be much more localized in the left hemisphere as opposed to the right.

We can dramatically summarize the parallels in physiological research
and philosophical thought with a quote from a leading practitioner in each field. Sperry (1964) writes of the effect of severing the corpus callosum:

Everything we have seen so far indicated that the surgery has left each of these people with two separate minds, that is, two separate spheres of consciousness.

Sarte (in Lawrence and O'Connor, 1967) makes the following observation regarding the structure of consciousness:

But, if in reflection, it is really true that a consciousness is present to another consciousness, one tends to think that it is a matter of two consciousnesses, each one supported by the other...

When one considers that the above was originally published in 1948, long before the split brain research had even begun, one is struck by the parallel thought processes.

C. A Parallel with Psychological Theory

Moving from the philosophical to the psychological framework division or separation, once again plays an important role in the formation of the ego. The object relations theorists (Klein, Guntrip, and Winnicott) argue that the birth of the ego is marked by both inter- and intra-psychic separation. The child separates from mother - moving from a subject-subject relationship to a true subject-object relationship. A simultaneous and similar split or separation occurs on the intra-psychic level where the unity of the psyche is replaced by the duality of the psyche and ego. We are brought to the startling conclusion that the mode or style of left hemispheric functioning (i.e., to analyze; to separate into component parts) is but a continuing reverberation of the primal separation that occurred at its inception. We are, of course, suggesting an identity between left
hemispheric and ego functioning. There are a number of reasons for es-
tablishing this identity; however, we will refer to only one here. As
mentioned earlier, language is regarded to be the left hemispheric function
par excellence. A number of authors have stated that the ego operates
through the subvocal agency of commands and exhortations. They imply that
the interior monologue is the workings of the ego. Norman O. Brown (1966)
puts the case as follows:

The ego is loquacity, the interior monologue,
the soliloquy which isolates. (p. 264)

Loevinger (1976) in discussing the utility of free association makes the
following remark:

The ego is not immobilized as in hypnosis, but
the basic rule, for the patient to say every-
thing that occurs to him without censorship is
equivalent to a temporary silencing of the
patient's ego. (p. 365)

Thus, we can see that language ability has been associated with both ego
functioning and left hemispheric functioning. This correspondence suggests
a functional identity between the two entities.
III. The Hemispheric Dialectic: A Developmental Approach

To this point in our study of the two hemispheres I have painted a picture of two separate spheres of consciousness. I have pointed out that the main feature that distinguishes these two spheres is the manner in which they process information. The right hemisphere is believed to process information holistically via pattern recognition; while the left functions analytically - through a breaking down into component parts which then can be processed sequentially. Nowhere in the literature is the suggestion made that these two spheres have a developmentally reciprocal relationship.

A. Current Conceptions of the Relationship of the Two Modes:

  Competitive.

The literature suggests that the two spheres alternate with each other in determining the person's behavior. For example, when facial recognition is the task the right hemisphere predominates; when calculation is required the left hemisphere would dominate. The suggestion is put forth that the dominant hemisphere would inhibit the activity of the competing hemisphere. The relationship thus posited would not be dialectical but competitive. One variation of the competitive relationship places the whole matter within a developmental perspective. This theory holds that the left hemisphere comes to dominate overt behavior as one approaches adulthood because our culture rewards or reinforces analytic skill. Galin (in Lee et al; 1974) states this possibility as follows:
As the left hemisphere develops its language capability in the second and third year of life, it gains a great advantage over the right hemisphere in manipulating the environment and securing reinforcements. It seems likely to me that this is the basis for the left hemisphere’s suzerainty in overt behavior in situations of conflict with the right hemisphere.

(p. 44)

B. An Alternative Conception: A Symbiotic Union

1. Elements Used in Left Hemispheric Functioning Originally Derived from Right Hemispheric, Part-Whole Relations.

In order to go beyond the isolation bias that predetermines a competitive relationship between the two hemispheres, I would like to suggest a dialectical, developmental framework. Specifically, I suggest the right hemispheric functioning correlates to our primary form of consciousness - primary in a historical and chronological sense. This type of functioning would, if my theory holds, be characteristic of infant thinking; whereas left hemispheric functioning would be almost non-existent at this stage. This type of functioning would correspond to what some authors refer to as the body ego and to what Piaget refers to as the sensori-motor schemes. The term 'sensori-motor scheme' is a particularly fortunate one for the purposes of this discussion in that it implies that sensating and behavior are one indivisible unit, with no intervening variable or time delay.

Later in this thesis we will refer to this type of consciousness as pre-
reflective intentionality. It is this type of consciousness that allows us to learn to walk; to eat with a spoon; and to ride a bicycle. All these skills certainly do not involve learning in the rational sense of that word. Rather they represent what has been termed a mute body wisdom. Moreover, this is an accumulating empirical body of knowledge that is with us until we die, although traditionally we are less and less in touch with it. We regain our awareness of this mode of functioning when we learn a new skill (for example, learning to dance; to do ceramics; yoga; etc.)

Thus, we are beginning to get an image or feel for right hemispheric functioning as something that develops over time on the basis of here and now interactions with the environment. It is responsible for our activities in the realm of the probable; the world of everyday living that poetry, mythology and religion refer to and codify. In our everyday living we must process many vague and amorphous inputs simultaneously and this is what the right hemisphere is preeminent at doing. If we attempted to deal with the practical and emotional in a linear and rational manner we would soon be immobilized. Now we are beginning to perceive an image of right hemispheric functioning that gets richer over time and this developmental process is quite easy for us to grasp and relate to.

However, when we ask the question as to how the left hemisphere develops the issue becomes quite murky and mysterious. Little is said about this process in the literature, and we are left with the impression that its particular style of processing information is neurologically prewired. This program would then be 'turned on' with the acquisition
of language. Development past this point would, of course, follow the same general pattern that has been postulated for right hemispheric functioning - experience refines the operations and extends the field of applicability. However, this account is strangely unsatisfying because of the unexplained gap between birth and age two or three when language is acquired. Furthermore, this account implies that the functional separation between the two hemispheres that we observe in adults is there from birth. In order to explain these anomalies, I would like to put forward the notion that left hemispheric functioning results from: first, the establishment of part whole relationships and, second, the conscious manipulation of the various symbolic parts without reference to the wholes from which they were originally derived. I am speculating that the left hemisphere is the site of all effortful, self-conscious activity; whereas the right hemisphere is the site of automated, habitualized behavioral patterns. In order to activate these automatized, behavioral wholes, however, the left hemisphere issues a conscious directive. This conscious directive (eg. "I will start writing soon") is itself only a part of a complex, multidimensional behavioral gestalt (eg. "Find a pen, hold it between my thumb, index and second finger, apply it to the paper, write from left to right"...etc.). When such a gestalt can be condensed into one symbol it is much more amenable for manipulation and transformation as in speculation and abstract thinking. However, we shall see that the meaning embedded in this condensed symbol is determined by its relation to the whole. That is, abstract thinking, for all its efficiency and power, is peculiarly subject to loss of meaning. That is, when reflective thinking or left hemispheric functioning becomes the only mode of mental activity, we risk the loss of root meanings. Let us quote Galin, who detects a property in language that is applicable to
abstract concepts and cognitions.

Words serve to establish boundaries. When we name an object (or a person) we separate it from its context, and label it in accord with some of its attributes, of necessity neglecting other attributes. In this sense labelling is a way of excluding aspects or relations which are not wanted.

(p. 29)

It has been noted earlier that the right hemisphere is superior at establishing part whole relationships. We could state this as follows: the right hemisphere always connects the symbol to its referent object or to its gestalt. The left hemisphere, on the other hand, connects one symbol to another symbol through the laws of logic. We could characterize the former as an organic connection, and the latter as a mechanical connection. This is reminiscent of Polanyi (1975):

The difference between a deduction and an integration lies in the fact that deduction connects two focal items, the premises and the consequents, while integration makes subsidiaries bear on a focus. Admittedly there is purposive movement in a deduction - which is its essential tacit coefficient; but the deductive operation can be mechanically performed, while a tacit integration is intentional throughout and, as such, can be carried out only by a conscious act of the mind. Our analysis of tacit knowing...tells us not only that consciousness is intentional, but also that it always has roots from which it attends to its object.

(p. 39)
The process of integration that Polanyi refers to is a part-whole relationship: the part, the focal item, receives its meaning through its relationship to the subsidiaries, the whole in which it is embedded. Nebes (1974) conducted experiments which indicated that the right hemisphere was superior in establishing part-whole relationships. In the experiment he presented arc segments of circles and asked split-brain patients to match these with the completed circle. He found that the right hemisphere was superior at this task.

2. "Loss of Meaning" - Out of Touch with Right Hemisphere

The picture that is beginning to emerge is that the right hemisphere can produce part-whole relationships and that the left hemisphere abstracts out the part, or focal item and relates it to other focal items through formal operations. There are certain very important therapeutic implications in this line of thought, and the concept of 'meaning' is the central one. Quite often the presenting complaint put forward by a client is loss of meaning. Some of them will complain that words don't mean anything anymore; or that no one thing is anymore important than any other. Such a state, of course, engenders severe psychological panic in that it provides no guidelines for response or action. Both words and thoughts have been devalued and as such provide no orientation for the client. Exactly what happens to produce such a state? To answer such a question we have to go back to the developmental origins of the clear and distinct ideas that have currently lost their meaning. Polanyi refers to this stage as tacit
versus explicit knowing. That is, explicit knowing is more or less a rational process dealing with clear and distinct ideas as in the processes of reflection and introspection. Tacit knowing, on the other hand, deals with the production of these clear and distinct ideas. If our clients are complaining about rootlessness or loss of meaning we must return to the rootedness that originally established the meaning. Polanyi gives us an excellent account of this process:

... there are three centers of tacit knowledge; first the subsidiary particulars; second the focal target; and third, the knower who links the first to the second.

(p. 39)

In order to move our discussion down to a more concrete example, let us give an example. When I am driving a nail, I have a subsidiary awareness of the feelings in my hand which is merged into my focal awareness of driving a nail. All three centers are thus embodied in this example. This example clearly illustrates that the act of driving a nail would be impossible without the subsidiary awareness, which guides and corrects my gross motor movements. I am not conscious of these subsidiary feelings in a direct way; my attention is focussed on the nail and the hammer head.

Let us now return our discussion to the matter of loss of meaning. To do so we must leave our example behind as it deals almost exclusively in the physical realm. When we refer to a fact, in our natural way of thinking about these matters, we are referring to only one of the three centers that Polanyi mentions: the focal target. What Polanyi's account
makes clear is that the meaning of this focal target is determined by the two other centers. It is the intentional act of the knower that links the subsidiaries to the focal item in just this particular way. For example, identical twins are raised by an arbitrary and inconsistent mother. Each twin has a different intentionality; one intends to avoid punishment, the other intends to maximize pleasure. In this example the focal item would be mother or the general concept of women. The subsidiary particulars would be the concrete, detailed, lived through experience, first with mother, then with other women. The focal item, women in general, would have quite different meaning for each of these twins. One would avoid testing the environment and as a result would be stuck with the concept of women as aversive stimuli, the other would continue to explore and adapt.

Furthermore, intentionality can change over an individual's lifetime. Religious conversions, mystical and traumatic experiences are various names we give to a dramatic shift in intentionality. If the subject's intentionality changes but he is still dealing with focal items whose meaning was established by an earlier intentionality, he necessarily will be left floundering: his concepts and language will constantly betray him because their meaning has been sedimented in a now alien intentionality. He will constantly be mistaking concepts or constructs for data, and as a result will come to distrust thinking completely. The very stuff of his thoughts, the very elements or tools with which he seeks to escape his dilemma, contain within them assumptions that always lead back to the same point, irrespective of the operation performed on them. Returning to the physiological level, the left hemisphere contains 'givens' of clear and
distinct ideas whose rootedness or part-whole relationship had been established for purposes that now have been transcended. New part-whole relationships that reflect the current intentionality will produce appropriate focal items. These new focal items can then be worked with reflectively and linearly by the left hemisphere with some degree of trust in that process.

The second source of alienation or rootlessness is intimately connected to the first. Whereas the first dealt with a changing intentionality, the second involves a loss of contact with the subsidiaries. In our physiological language, the left hemisphere loses touch with the right; or the left hemisphere is asked to do the work of the right. Remembering that the right hemisphere corresponds to body wisdom and the left to reflective consciousness, let us look at the following quote by Gendlin, (ed. Corsini; 1973).

But if experiencing, as bodily felt, is also the interpretive mass, that is to say, the sense one has of what is going on, and the sense which interprets words, events, and so forth, then in isolation one also loses this capacity to interpret what words and events mean... (p. 332).

In other words, when one loses touch with one's unreflective, spontaneous responses, one ceases to feel the meaning immediately and intuitively. Instead, one attempts to 'work out' the meaning mechanically. One's conscious mental life is almost totally conceptual, totally preoccupied with focal items. There is virtually no attending to sensation and feeling. It is as satisfying a way of living as reading a menu satisfies hunger. How does one lose touch with the 'interpretive mass', the bodily-felt wisdom of the right hemisphere? A phenomenological description will elucidate this
process. Recall that the second form of attention (that which characterizes left hemispheric activity) involves a "standing back" or "taking one's distance" from the changes of appearance. It involves a clear separation between subject and object. All of these descriptive phrases (e.g., standing back, taking one's distance, and clear separation) imply the possibility of a further stage: 'losing touch'. That is, this second form of attention when used exclusively results in the individual being 'out of touch' with his experience. The 'observer' draws further and further back from the content of consciousness, in order to expand the scope, and inadvertently loses touch with that content as a bodily felt experience. As a result, the contents of consciousness comes to be experienced as two-dimensional images on a movie screen rather than as substantial presences.

3. From Concrete Image to Abstract Category

At this point we shall investigate the transition that occurs in our phenomenological life as we move from right to left hemisphere dominance. Earlier it was stated that the left hemisphere functioned through a process of separation. That is, the left hemisphere was somehow capable of lifting a part or element out of its total gestalt. I posited that left hemispheric functioning was analogous with analytic and reflective thinking. This mode of thought is characterized by the connection of clear and distinct focal ideas in a sequential, linear manner based on the laws of logic. This
style of thinking is characterized by separation as well, as it involves
taking one's distance from the world or stepping back from the changes
of appearance. That is, there is heightened boundary perception which
permits a true subject-object relationship. In right hemispheric functioning,
on the other hand, the boundaries are blurred and there is some loss of the
distinction between subject and object.

a. Physiological Changes

The final, and most important, separation that occurs in left
hemispheric activity is the separation between thought and action. In
concrete thinking, thought and action are one indivisible whole. However,
in reflective and abstract thought we note that there is a profound gap
between mental activity and overt behavior. It is as if capacity for overt
behavior has been suspended or severed from the thought processes. When
we consult our own lives for evidence regarding this possibility the most
obvious example we come up with is dreaming. In this experience there is
a profusion of mental activity without corresponding physical activity (the
only exception being rapid eye movement - REM). Recent work by Chase (1978)
has revealed a physiological basis for this cessation of activity.

During REM sleep, there are striking changes
within the neurons that control the muscles;
as soon as this state begins, the interiors
of the neurons become electrically negative.
The change in electrochemical makeup stops
the neurons from discharging: our muscles
cannot contract, and our limbs cannot move.

(p. 104)
One wonders whether the same processes that we observe in REM sleep (or dreaming) also occur in reflective thought or left hemispheric functioning. Perhaps, one way of understanding dreaming would be as a sort of half-way house between right and left hemispheric functioning. As such it would display features of both; a holistic processing of information characteristic of the right; and a separation or suspension of overt, concrete behavior characteristic of the left. Perhaps, dreaming is evidence of our physiological endowment (a biological determinism) that we exploit and transcend in the activity of analytic thinking. (One other implication which would be worth exploring is whether abstract, reflective thought produces the same electrochemical changes in the neurons controlling behavior).

b. Automization: A Precursor to Abstract Thought

We have been discussing the transition from concrete images, which characterize right hemispheric functioning; to dreaming which is a sort of transitional phenomena; to abstract categories, which characterize left hemispheric functioning. We have been attempting to discover at least some of the physiological correlates to this transition. We would now, like to shift our attention to a psychological description of this transition. The constructs that will be used are those of automization (Hartman; 1958) and deautomization (Deikman; 1974). Automization refers to a gradual process through which behavior becomes habituated as opposed to consciously directed. It is through such a process that the concrete image becomes denuded of detail and the resultant sketch is much more amenable for the
complex mental operations of reflective thought. Hartman (1958) outlines the steps involved in such a process.

In well established achievements they [motor apparatuses] function automatically; the integration of the somatic systems involved in the action is automatized, and so is the integration of the individual mental acts involved in it. With increasing exercise of the action its intermediate steps disappear from consciousness... not only motor behavior but perception and thinking, too, show automatization.

(p. 88-91)

Thus automatization makes possible the transfer of attention from a percept of action to abstract thought activity. An example of such a process would be learning to drive a car. At first this experience is an end in itself; requiring all of one's attention. Later, however the immediacy of this experience fades almost completely to the point where one can indulge in highly abstract speculation while driving a car. Furthermore, the act of driving a car, itself, can be abstracted and seen as a means among alternate means (walking, biking, etc.). Of course this automatization becomes, more and more, a feature of adult life to the point where, for most of us, our daily lives lack the immediacy and freshness of our youth.

The process of deautomatization, on the other hand, works to reverse this trend to predominately left hemispheric functioning. The following quote from Deikman (Lee et al; 1976) explains deautomatization:

The percept receives intense attention while the use of attention for abstract categorization
and thought is explicitly prohibited. Attention is reinvested in perception.

(p. 74)

This implies that we have some volitional control over which hemisphere dominates. Furthermore, the usual dominance of left hemispheric functioning in adults is not necessarily preordained. Subjects who were trained in the deautomization process ("Concentrate on a blue vase for thirty minutes over ten trials.") reported experiences that are believed to be characteristic of right hemispheric functioning. Specifically they reported that sense of separateness from the vase began to vanish - i.e., their boundary perception decreased. Secondly, they reported a fusion of perceptual modes; i.e., kinesthetic perceptions began to accompany their visual perceptions. For example, one subject reported "where the vase changes shape, I feel this in my body." (p. 72) This partially confirms our earlier intuition that right hemispheric functioning corresponds to what has been called a body ego. It is the abstracted, reflective ego that sees with its eyes only. Haptic harmony is a term that McLuhan (1964) uses to refer to a state that involves an active, harmonious interplay of all the sense modalities. It is just this interplay, this melding of modalities and loss of subject object boundaries that forms the interpretive mass, the context that endows are experiences with meaning. At the same time, the information available is much too rich and detailed to be handled comfortably in reflective, left hemispheric activity and therefore it is reduced in complexity (abstracted) through the process of habituation and automization.
C. Summary

In review let us attempt to summarize how the content of the left hemisphere evolves out of the content of the right.

1. Thought is separated from action. Dreaming is the first spontaneous expression of this capacity. Furthermore, physiological research indicates that there are electrochemical changes which facilitate the suspension of overt behavioral responses. Without this suspension all reflective, analytical thought would be impossible.

2. The right hemisphere seems to act as the site of the accumulated body wisdom. The process of automization that Hartman refers to, where complex somatic and mental acts are integrated, is the process by which right hemispheric wisdom is built up. There is some empirical evidence for this assumption. Rimland (1978) attempted to train a psychology graduate student to match the amazing computational abilities observed in autistic savants. Despite an enormous amount of practice, as well as the memorization of a one page table to facilitate his calculations, the graduate student was unable to match the
speed of the savants. Quite suddenly, however, he was able to match their speed.

... his brain had somehow automated the complex calculations. It had absorbed the table to be memorized so efficiently that now calendar-calculating had to consciously go through the various operations.

(p. 74)

Rimland goes on to speculate that the site of processing had migrated from the left hemisphere to the right.

3. The part of the behavioral/mental whole that is not habituized or automatized stands for or symbolizes the whole. For example the concept of bicycle riding stands for a whole series of somatic integrations that are involved in the act but no longer require our conscious attention. It is these condensed symbols or 'empty' categories that become the elements in left hemispheric activity.

4. It is the relationship of the part (the abstract elements of the left hemisphere) to the whole (the complex, bodily felt interpretive mass of the right hemisphere) that provides meaning or allows us to make sense of our experience.

5. Attention can either be invested in the percept or in abstract categorization. In the first case, right hemispheric functioning is facilitated. This can be
used to redress the balance between the two modes of functioning; as well as to root or ground the more abstract thoughts of the left hemisphere.

In the second case, left hemispheric functioning comes to dominate all conscious experience and as a result becomes increasingly alienated from the right.

D. Conclusion: Growth Implies A Dialectic Between Hemispheres

We can conclude this section with the notion that healthy functioning involves a balance between the two modes of processing information. In a sense we could suggest that a dialectic between the two hemispheres should be encouraged. This is particularly important when we realize that the elements of the left are not 'givens' or 'absolutes' but rather determined by the subsidiary particulars and the intentionality at their time of formation. Any growth process, therefore, must necessarily entail the formation of new, more appropriate, part-whole relationships. Gill and Brennan (1959) articulate this point nicely:

Deautomization is an undoing of the automatizations of apparatuses - both means and goal structures - directed toward the environment. Deautomization is, as it were, a shakeup which can be followed by an advance or a retreat in the level of organization... Some manipulation of the attention directed toward the functioning of an apparatus is necessary if it is to be deautomatized.

(p. 73)
In more phenomenological language, the process that Gill and Brennon are referring to is the loss of the sense of certainty. The absolutes and 'givens' of yesterday begin to lose their stability and become fluid and relative. The clear and distinct ideas of reflective thought and left hemispheric functioning begin to break down and dissolve. One begins to notice that one's thoughts display a divergent as opposed to convergent pattern. That is, each focal thought triggers off other thoughts that are connected to the focal item like spokes to a hub. Previously focal thought was linked to focal thought in linear fashion like a railway track. In order for one to proceed to more sophisticated structural organization these focal items must be allowed to dissolve. Only then will intentionality be allowed to rearrange the subsidiary particulars of the right hemisphere into a new, more sophisticated gestalt. This gestalt, in turn, will supply the 'raw' information to be utilized for the production of new focal items. It is an epistemological process. These new, focal items will then be incorporated into the left hemisphere where they may be processed sequentially in full reflexive judgement.

As stated earlier, the petrified ideas of the left hemisphere must be allowed to dissolve; and the divergent as opposed to convergent organization to proceed if an advance in the level of organization is to occur. That is, the left hemisphere must relinquish its active mode (its controlling and deliberating mind) and instead adopt an attitude of receptivity. The attitude of surrender or receptivity is necessary if the left hemisphere is to be informed with the content of the right.
1. Physiological Correlates to the Receptive Attitude

There are some interesting experiments that indicate that there are objective correlates to these active and receptive modes that must occur if a dialogue is to take place. Orstein (1977) notes that the presence of an alpha in specific locations of the brain is conventionally interpreted as an indication that, that area is 'idling'.

... when a person is writing, more alpha rhythm appears in the right hemisphere than in the left, and while arranging blocks more alpha is present in the left hemisphere than in the right. This indicates that we turn off the hemisphere not involved in the situation.

(p. 33)

While I find Orstein's observations to be extremely interesting, the interpretation he goes on to make (i.e. alpha rhythm is indicative of 'turning off'.) is questionable. Another author, Deikman (in Lee et al; 1974) links alpha activity with the receptive mode. It is this latter interpretation that fits most consistently with the dialectical orientation of this thesis. That is, we wish to establish that the relationship is not one of dominance and submission (the adversary metaphor) but one of dialogue with active and receptive modes available to both hemispheres. This interpretation or position gets some support from Ornstein in a later section of his book.

The alpha rhythm in the occipital cortex is usually thought to represent a state of decreased visual attention to the external environment.

(p. 174; italics mine)
Ornstein goes on to point out that this conclusion was based on an experiment where bursts of alpha wave activity were observed when subjects closed their eyes, cutting off visual stimulation. Other investigators have characterized alpha frequencies as indicative of scanning or searching activity. We could also interpret such activity as the experience of attention without an object whereas beta waves would be indicative of attention with an object. To return to the latest Ornstein quote, we might speculate that the decreased attentiveness to external stimuli is accompanied by an increased state of receptivity to information crossing the corpus callosum from the other hemisphere.

Much of the foregoing has been an attempt to establish the dialectical nature of the relationship between the two hemispheres. Our reasons for so doing are to offer some objective (physiological) support for our more theoretical speculation that the contents and categories of the left hemisphere evolve out of the amorphous content of the right. Having thus established the radical dependency of the left on the right points to a fundamental therapeutic implication. The client's attention must be re-directed away from the content of the left and towards the formative processes that are occurring on the right. In this way we are training the client to be a conscious participant in the epistemological process. In a later chapter we raise the possibility that identity change involves a process whereby one alternately construes oneself as object, then as subject. That is, we can experience ourselves as a center of subjectivity or as an object of awareness (one's self-image would be an example of this type of construal). This section, therefore, is an attempt to prepare the way for that argument. If the two hemispheres do, in fact,
represent two consciousnesses, then from the point of view of the left, for example, the right hemisphere would be present to it as object, and vice versa. Thus, the phenomenological fact that we experience ourselves dualistically, both as subject and as object, is supported by the physiological and anatomical data.

Now our consideration must turn to the issue of choice and volition. We must ask the question of whether we can decide which hemisphere will be operationalized. Our previous developmental description indicated that dominance was determined by maturational factors. Specifically, during infancy we are predominately right hemispheric beings, while during adulthood the left hemisphere increasingly controls and determines our experience. With the exception of the experience of deautomization, conscious volition has been absent from our account. The next section is intended to correct this deficit.

IV. Volitional Factors in Hemispheric Dominance

One of the prevailing themes of this thesis is that individuals construct their reality. This is in contradistinction to the naturalistic attitude which understands reality as given and independent of the subject. What the naturalistic attitude takes as objective reality is really a disowned (or more correctly, unowned), personally created project. Recasting the nature of the relationship between an individual mind and the reality that mind perceives increases the prospects for successful therapeutic intervention. By comparing the two conceptions of relationship between mind and reality, the truth of the last sentence can be demonstrated.
Individuals holding a naturalistic belief system will 'find' that the 'facts' of the 'objective' world reinforce their belief systems, values, emotions and behavior. When they engage in what they believe to be reality testing they are actually receiving their truncated projections. For these individuals, therefore, the evidence of their senses seems to confirm the plausibility of their belief systems. If the reader believes, as I do, that the need for meaning and mastery is the highest or primary ego need, then it becomes readily apparent that individuals will cling to their current model of reality. When the notion of reinforcement (in the sense that behavior modification uses that term) is introduced, it becomes clear that an individual is reinforced for his prevalent world view every waking moment of his life. It makes little difference whether his world view is pleasurable or painful, appropriate or inappropriate, positive or negative. All these labels apply to the content of the meaning system rather than the meaning system itself - they apply to the message rather than the medium. The establishment of meaning (any meaning) is the cognitive behavior that is being reinforced. We can see, therefore, that in a client's normal week the 'world' reinforces his problematic belief system 111 hours a week, while a therapist reinforces an alternative, more beneficial construal for only 1 hour in that week. Thus, the likelihood of any profound change in the client's unconscious belief system is extremely small. Furthermore, the psychological panic that accompanies the abandonment of the old, problematic belief/meaning system makes it extremely difficult for a new system to be established with any sense of certainty, even if the potential benefits are enormous.
The remaining part of this section will explore a possible way past this dilemma. Essentially, the position put forward is that we all experience a dual way of giving meaning to the world. That is, we don't have to wait to experience an alternative construal - that experience is available to us now. Thus, our ego's need for meaning or mastery can be gratified immediately, albeit in an unusual way. Moreover, this technique or method is at the disposal of our volition and therefore allays our fears of loss of control. The technique I am referring to is to respond to a novel, uncontaminated situation from two different modalities or intention-alities. On the first trial we respond to the situation verbally and rationally; on the second trial we respond non-verbally (gesture, noise, drawing). It is my contention that such a technique will reveal to the client that he can construe the same situation in entirely different ways - that the reality he perceives will be qualitatively different. In this manner he can escape his unidimensionality. The supposition is that when the client chooses to respond with non-verbal, overt behavior, right hemispheric processing of the stimulus input will result. That is, the client will be aware of processing the situation wholistically. On the other hand, when the client chooses to respond to the situation analytically and verbally, left hemispheric processing will result. In this case the client's phenomenological awareness will include only those stimuli that conform to his categorical thought.

In this section, therefore, I will be reviewing the literature on split-brain functioning with the hope of identifying those operations that will allow us to determine which hemisphere will be utilized in any
particular situation.

A. The Motor Theory of Consciousness

We begin this discussion with a definition of consciousness that will prepare the way for our later discussion. Consciousness has been conceptualized in various ways historically. One of the first of these saw consciousness as a kind of blank state upon which experience was imprinted. Thus, consciousness was conceived of in exclusively passive terms. John Locke was probably the most central figure in establishing this view. Later this notion was surplanted by a conception that saw the activity of the subject as crucial to the content of consciousness. Thus, both activity and receptivity had equally important parts to play in the development of intelligence. Piaget was the investigator who did the most to secure this position. A third position can be stated which posits the activity of the subject as being the major determinate of consciousness. It is this position that we will investigate in this section as it bears most directly on the issue of volition. Ornstein (1977) refers to it as the motor theory of consciousness. A concrete example will make its general nature obvious. When we move our head in order to better observe a flower, we don't see the flower moving, even though the retinal image of the flower must move. As Ornstein explains:
...in constructing our awareness we must also take our own movements (motor output of the brain) into account and correlate them with continuous changes in input information. (p. 63)

He goes on to note that some researchers have argued that consciousness depends solely on the output of the brain, no matter what the input that triggers off a given output. This theory would argue that the brain is largely specialized to make motor movements, be they of the tongue, as in speech; of the eye; or the large muscle movements of the body. This position has profound implications for the theory of perception which Sperry (1951) has noted:

The presence or absence of adaptive reaction potentialities...ready to discharge in motor patterns makes the difference between perceiving and not perceiving. (p. 291)

Jaynes (1976) appears to have arrived at the same conclusion when he states:

Concepts are simply classes of behaviorally equivalent things. (p. 31)

His statement confirms my earlier intuition that the clear and distinct ideas (concepts) of the left hemisphere are, in fact, abstracted parts of the behavioral whole that is present in the right hemisphere.
Much of the above discussion suggest the interesting possibility that the nature of what one sees is determined, to a large extent, by the mode with which one is prepared to respond. That is, if one decides to respond behaviorally (bodily movements and non-verbal vocalizations) one will see or perceive the situation far differently than if one were prepared to respond verbally and analytically. Thus, if we wish to experience right hemispheric functioning we merely decide in advance to respond behaviorally versus verbally.

B. Perception: We Perceive Our Preparation-To-Respond

Elsewhere in this thesis we posit the argument that each of us constructs our reality. The construct of intentionality was invoked to emphasize the subjective component in this creative process - we intend our reality. Our current discussion suggests techniques for realizing this fact on an experiential basis. The experiments we are about to study indicate that we don't perceive a stimulus as much as we perceive our response to that stimulus. An experiment by Festinger (1967) indicates that by changing a person's preparation to respond to a given stimulus, perception changed although the stimulus did not. Subjects were asked to view a straight line and convey their impressions of it. Normally a straight line yields preparations-to-respond by moving the eyes in a straight line. These subjects were then fitted with contact lens with wedge prisms. These wedge prisms changed the stimulus (retinal image) from that of a straight to that of a curved line. Initially, the perception changed accordingly. However, because
of the nature of the optics involved, subjects had to move their eyes in a straight line in order to view its whole continuum. After a few trials, the subjects began to report seeing a straight line. That is, they were seeing their preparation to respond, their behavioral response rather than the stimulus object. A little thought will reveal this is a universal condition. We all see straight lines - there is no argument or disagreement about this. And yet the anatomy of our eyes and retinal layer must be unique to each of us. That is, the retinal image of a straight line must have a unique configuration (i.e. bumps, squiggles, and curves). Therefore what we 'see' is not the retinal image but the invariance in the tracking response. In the light of these findings, Jaynes' assertion that concepts are simply classes of behaviorally equivalent things, is not quite as far-fetched as it originally seemed. If our perceptions are, in a sense, predetermined by our preparation to respond then we can radically change the nature of our perceptual experience by changing our response orientation.

Orstein (1977) reports an experiment that demonstrates this quite dramatically.

Another experiment tested the lateral specialization of the two hemispheres, using split visual input. The right half of each eye sends its messages to the right hemisphere, the left half to the left hemisphere. In this experiment, the word 'heart' was flashed before the patient, with the 'he'-portion to the left of the eyes' fixation point, and the '-art' portion to the right. Normally if any person were asked to report this experience, he or she would report having seen heart. But the split brain patients responded differently, depending on which hemisphere was responding. When the patient was asked to name the word just presented, he or she replied, 'art,' since this was the portion
projected to the left hemisphere, which was answering the question. When, however, the patient was shown two cards - one with the word 'he', the other with the word 'art' - and asked to point with the left hand to the word he or she had seen, the left hand pointed to 'he'. The simultaneous experience of each hemisphere seemed unique and independent of each other in these patients.

(p. 25; italics mine)

This experiment demonstrates that the intentionality of the subject determines how the world appears to him. That is, if he intends to respond gesturally, he 'sees' one thing; if he intends to respond verbally he 'sees' another. In a sense these experiments indicate that there are two simultaneous experiences occurring. However, we are only conscious of one of them. The decision as to which experience will be conscious is determined in advance with the decision to grant access to the motor pathways. If the right hemisphere is granted access to the motor pathways the person will perceive the situation holistically and intuitively. On the other hand, if the left hemisphere is granted access to the motor pathways controlling overt behavior, the person will process the situation analytically, sequentially and verbally.

C. Therapeutic Implications

The therapeutic implications of the above are quite interesting. It suggests that greater emphasis be placed on expanding the client's behavioral repertoire. Changing behavioral responses will change the perceptual experience.
Another intriguing possibility is for the therapist to instruct the client to respond in exclusively non-verbal terms. This would give the client the experience of right hemispheric functioning that would probably stand in marked contrast to his more familiar, while problematic, left hemispheric style of functioning. The rapidity of the client's reaction time would indicate the spontaneity of his behavior or whether his overt behavior was being mediated by left hemispheric functioning. Perhaps such training would facilitate the client's ability to move from one mode to another. In that case, they would be able to experiment with alternate modes of functioning in situations that don't yield to their habitual style.

D. Summary and Conclusions

In summary, I have suggested that it is possible to add volition to the list of factors determining which hemisphere will be dominant. Previously identified factor were situational and maturational. For example, if the situation called for orientation in three dimensional space, as in dancing, the right hemisphere would dominate. The maturational factor, on the other hand, indicated that, all other things being equal, the left hemisphere would tend to dominate consciousness as the subject became older. We now are suggesting that the question of dominance can be volitionally determined by deciding in advance whether one's response will be verbal or non-verbal. Through such training clients can learn to become adapt at both intuitive and rational information processing.
In the next two chapters, we shall indicate that it is just this capacity to be at home in both centers that is a precursor to successful identity change. We shall be drawing a parallel between right hemispheric functioning and what philosophy refers to as pre-reflective intentionality. Left hemispheric functioning, on the other hand, will be equated with reflective or self-consciousness. Any discussions regarding self-image; self concept; or identity involve left hemispheric functioning. That is, left hemispheric functioning involves a separation of awareness from the contents of awareness; there is a clear division between subject and object. The right hemisphere does not draw this kind of clear boundary between subject and object. We have also seen that the content of the left hemisphere is radically dependent on the right. That is, we have suggested that the content of the left is a result of a special operation of attention performed on the content of the right. By lifting or abstracting the part from its context in the right hemisphere, the left appropriates it as its own. This prepares the way for our later argument that any authentic identity change involves a re-synthesis or part-whole integration in the right hemisphere before individual elements can be abstracted out for left hemispheric analytic processing. In other words, our prime focus as therapists is the sphere of pre-reflective intentionality. It is through dwelling in this sphere of consciousness that a new, grounded identity will gradually emerge.
CHAPTER THREE
Identity

1. Introduction

The previous chapter lays the groundwork for this one. In it we established that the fundamental feature of man's psychic life was its structural duality. This duality was noted on a number of dimensions. On a physiological level it was manifested in the presence of the right and left hemispheres. According to Ornstein (1977) the left was thought to process information sequentially, and the right, simultaneously via pattern recognition. On a philosophical level these two modes of information processing were thought to correspond to pre-reflective intentionality (right hemisphere) and reflective consciousness (left hemisphere). On the psychological dimension these two realms of consciousness are known as ego operations and the dynamic unconscious. These categories are the result of a primarily structural analysis. Underlying these structural dualities and, in fact, generating them was a dynamic duality: the two modes of attention. The first mode of attention is characterized by a fusion between attention and the object being attended to; between awareness and its contents. It was reasoned that it was this mode of attention that was responsible for the elaborations of the structures of what has been variously labelled the dynamic unconscious, pre-reflective intentionality and the right hemisphere. The second mode of attention is characterized by a separation between attention and its object – the differentiation between subject and object. It was this form of attention that was thought to be responsible for the elaborations of the structures within the ego, the reflective consciousness, and the left hemisphere.
In this chapter I hope to apply this line of analysis to the problem of identity and identity change. First, however, the construct of identity must be located within the dualistic structure that has been posited. I suggest that identity is a synthetic construct that bridges and unifies the two constructs in the structural framework: the pre-reflective, intending self and the reflective, self-conscious self. That is, one's sense of identity is a composite derived from the interaction between these two modes of being. The pre-reflective self is that which organizes behavior spontaneously, without premeditation and without any awareness of its contribution in this process. The reflective self, on the other hand, is responsible for the conscious articulation of a rational description of both the world or environment and of the self as object.

When psychologists refer to self-concept or self-image, they are referring to an individual's reflexive knowledge of their self. For example, the statement "I am a short tempered individual" would only be made by the reflective self and would be a component in that individual's self-concept. On the other hand, the act of losing one's temper would be an erruption of the pre-reflective self and would include no self-conscious premeditation. It is this pre-reflective self that contributes the bodily felt sense of subjectivity to our identity. Thus, our identities are a synthesis of our reflexively derived self-image and our subjectively felt bodily state.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate theoretically that identity can be fundamentally restructured. It is my impression that most therapies intend to do this but most often only accomplish self-acceptance and adjustment. I am not disparaging these results as they most certainly
alleviate suffering. Nevertheless, one wonders if there is a beyond... whether there is not a more fundamental therapeutic approach that would allow us to engineer identity. I believe there is. Moreover, I believe that the limited effectiveness of most therapies can be attributed to their preoccupation with the reflective pole of the self (the domain of ego operations and left hemispheric functioning) and their neglect and ignorance of the pre-reflective, intending pole of the self (the domain of the 'dynamic unconscious' or right hemispheric functioning). In the previous chapter I speculated that the content of the left hemisphere (the reflective ego) was radically dependent on the content of the right in that its discrete elements or focal items were abstracted parts of the wholistic pattern contained within the right. Thus, any attempt to restructure identity must work directly with this wholistic pattern. It is only in this manner that we can change our being as opposed to changing our self-image.

The main contention of this chapter, therefore, is that radical identity change is accomplished through the restructuring of the pre-reflective self. I will demonstrate that this result is accomplished through a process called subjectivizing. This term refers to a process by which we 'own', inhabit or dwell in our experience. It is opposite to the process by which we objectify and take our distance from our experience. The underlying rationale is that we become what we attend to. That is, personality structures come into being as a result of experiences that engross us completely; as a result of experiences where the boundary between subject and object is temporarily dissolved. I believe that this
is the process by which personality structures get established in early childhood before left hemispheric functioning has developed. Therefore, if we are to engineer identity change in adolescence or adulthood, we must develop the capacity to merge with benevolent experiences.

Finally, I will suggest that the prerequisite for identity change is a capacity on the part of the client to alternate between the pre-reflective and the reflective modes of being at will. That is, our client must first develop the ability to merge with or stand back from his experience, whenever he chooses to do so.
A. Identity: a Descriptive Definition.

A well developed sense of identity gives us a sense of belonging in this world, a sense of fitting comfortably, a feeling of not being squeezed or rejected. We have a realistic assessment of our strengths and limitations and the world offers us many niches or roles where these attributes fit comfortably. Looking back over our personal history and forward into our future we see a continuous line of development. That is, our development is experienced linearly, as a spontaneous and relatively unself-conscious unfolding. Because our identity is integrated, our career and relationship choices have been relatively unconflicted and straightforward. "I've always known that I would be a doctor and that I would eventually marry Jane."

One's relationship to the world is marked by unself-conscious trust - little or no existential, ontological questioning about the "meaning of it all".


The above description elicits some feelings of discomfort if it is regarded as a normative statement. One wonders if such a person actually exists - the account seems either to be naively optimistic as a general definition or only applicable to an extremely small minority. Or perhaps it is the time dimension that is 'off'. That is, if the above description had been written in the 1950's or early 60's perhaps it would have applied to enough of the population to be a definition. However, we live in the 1970's and this definition
appears more of the nature of an idealized goal rather than a normative statement. William Glasser (1975) quotes Marshall McLuhan on our times: "We've gone from a goal to a role society." According to these two authors individuals in our culture no longer define their purpose or raison d'être as the accomplishment of a task. Instead their focus has shifted to the realization or actualization of a secure and satisfying role or identity. It is my belief that this shift is more apparent than real. That is, I believe that all societies have been role orientated. The very term 'society' implies interdependence. Role assignment and performance have been the means to execute that interdependence. That is, our role assignment places us securely in the social network. For example, if the assigned role is that of a school teacher it contains within it a whole behavioral repertoire that relates us to the community at large. Now, as Erikson (1968) has pointed out identity is a psycho-social phenomena. That is, society provides us with infinitely large number of roles, with their built-in behavioral expectations, from which we choose one to model ourselves on and identify with. In other words identity is the result of choosing a role that delineates parameters of effective behavior and then personalizing and individualizing it with our particular strengths, aptitudes and limitations. It is this mixture of the personal and the social that leads Erikson (1968) to denote identity as a psycho-social phenomena. Goffman (1959) carries this emphasis on the social or role aspect one step further:

The self does not belong to its possessor. He and his body merely provide the peg on which something of a collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time. The means for producing
and maintaining selves do not reside in the peg.

(p. 252, 3)

I am choosing to emphasize this social component in order to explicate the phenomena which Glasser and McLuhan are referring to. My reasoning is as follows: in stable societies roles are relatively constant and therefore, identities are relatively stable. However, during transitional periods roles cease to be secure havens for one's personal identity. As a result I believe that our age's preoccupation with questions of identity; this shift of focus from task to person; this heightened self-consciousness; is a result of the rapid social change we are currently experiencing.

To illustrate how pervasive the consequences are, let us take the example of a 35 year old male, employed as a junior executive by an oil company; married to a college educated woman in her early thirties and the father of a boy, age 10 and a girl, aged 12. This demographic data immediately conjures up a miriad of images all to do with social roles. If our framework is the late 50's images of "Father Knows Best" are evoked. But consider what happens to this image when we introduce a few of the social phenomena that have occurred in the past ten years: wide spread usage of birth control pills; the advent of the counter culture; a rapid increase in the divorce rate; increased political terrorism; increasing incidence of seemingly random and irrational violence; the extensive usage of illegal drugs; women's liberation; the ecology movement; civil rights; gay liberation; and inflation. All of the above phenomena either touch this man's life directly or have
the potential to do so. Is it any wonder, then, that his concern might begin to shift from his goal to his role.

That is, it is becoming increasingly clear that an adequate sense of identity involves much more a sense of hewing out one's place rather than trying on pre-formed, stable roles. If, as Erikson (1968) asserts, identity is a psycho-social dialectic then as the social pole becomes more vague and diffuse individuals will turn to the psychological pole for their sense of control and autonomy. This chapter is, therefore, a response to that trend. In it we will attempt to investigate both the pitfalls and opportunities presented by a search for identity from within. Hopefully, along the way we will reach the point where we can accept that identity is not a terminal state that once secured leads to early 'retirement'. Instead the whole thrust of this thesis is toward a sense of identity as a perpetual becoming. Although the language may appear exceedingly abstract, the intention is to provide some process guidelines for therapeutic intervention and personal growth. As has been noted above we are living through a time of rapid social change and I hold no claim to predicting where these changes will take us all. For that reason I feel some necessity to stay away from concrete examples as they contain implicit social judgements within them; assumptions and presuppositions that cloud understanding and interfere with apprehending the client's true dilemma. Instead I present here those conclusions that I can pass along with some confidence in their stability over time. The process guidelines that emerge can give both the therapist and the client some broad parameters within which to work without
taking away the existential choice that both must make in each concrete situation.

II. THE TWO POLES OF IDENTITY

A. Methodological Note: Dynamic Versus Structural Analysis

Throughout this thesis we have stressed the dynamic as opposed to the structural. This primacy is based on the assumption that form follows function. That is, psychological structures are the result of dynamic operations. However, this methodological principle is difficult to maintain in the present chapter as we are dealing with a structural entity - identity. In order to partially overcome this difficulty we initially trace the origins of identity to its dynamic roots. Although the bulk of this chapter will be devoted to a structural analysis, hopefully the dynamic orientation presented at the beginning will permeate the whole chapter.

The reader will recall from an earlier chapter, that 'attention' can be used in two different ways. In one manifestation it is not distinguishable from its content. That is, attention and the object attended to were merged or absorbed into one another. For example, I am aware of a tree but not aware that I am aware. In the second manifestation, on the other hand, my attention and the object of my attention are separately distinguishable. For example, in addition to being aware of the tree, I am aware of this awareness. At this point let us introduce the notion that identity is a special object of attention. Its uniqueness is that its
referrent is the self rather than an object in the environment. Other than this special status it can interact with attention in the same two ways as any other object of attention. That is, one's attention can be fused with or absorbed into its object, one's identity. If asked such an individual would report only identity content in his experience - he would not report a detached observer, a distinguishable attentiveness. This person would probably exhibit a fairly stable identity - a sameness over time. On the other hand, there is the individual who experiences a detached observer as well as his identity pattern or self concept. Such a person would probably exhibit a more transitory identity.

In the following section we will equate the attention pole of this unique self referrent dialectic with the subjective aspect of the self. The identity content pole, on the other hand, will be equated to the objective pole of the self. That is, the self is the only psychological phenomenon that can be read two ways: both as subject and object.

B. A Historical Theoretical Perspective

Let us begin on a historical note. As Lapsley (1967) has pointed out the term 'self' originally had a dipolar nature. (Here I am assuming that the concepts of 'self' and 'identity' possess a functional relationship). This dipolar nature implied both 'ownness' and 'sameness'. The 'ownness' pole refers to that fundamental and dynamic, alive-from-within experience of ourselves, that is beyond all doubt; that led to Descartes' "I think, therefore, I am." Merleau-Ponty (1962) is speaking of the same experience
when he states:

The experience of the present is that of being assured of his existence once and for all, whom nothing could prevent from having been ... and perception as knowledge of the present is the central phenomenon which makes possible the unity of the ego and with it the ideas of objectivity and truth.

(p. 30)

The essential point, for our purposes, is that the 'ownness' pole of the self exists only in the present. The 'sameness' pole, on the other hand, occurs over time. Recalling the chapter in hemispheric functioning, the left hemisphere deals with sequential, chronological time (the 'sameness pole) whereas the right hemisphere experiences time simultaneously — the enduring present. Remarks such as, "I am essentially the same person now as I was five years ago" are probably referring to the sameness pole. When pressed to be more specific the speaker would probably refer to a list of easily observable (i.e., objective) attributes: "I work for Montreal Trust; I enjoy outdoor activities; my family and I belong to the Greek Folk Dancing Society; I am relatively short tempered; average intelligence; fairly ill at ease with strangers; etc." He would be in fact reporting what he had observed to be fairly constant (or the 'same') about his behavior over the years. His identity would therefore, consist of a collection or accumulation of these attributes. As Erikson (1968) has pointed out, he would be "a coherent personality with a sameness and continuity both in his self-experience and in his actuality for others." In the above example I would venture to say that his self-experience would be an internalization
of his actuality for others. This would be in line with the earlier Goffman quote; which states essentially that the self is an objective as opposed to subjective phenomena.

Lapsley (1967) synthesizes the objective and subjective components of identity in the following:

... the self is the real 'him' in the sense of what organizes behavior, while the self as object of awareness corresponds closely to the original meaning of identifiable sameness.

(p. 185; italics mine)

The motif of our dualistic nature thus appears once again; this time in relation to our identity. The subjective aspect corresponds to the 'ownness' pole; and the objective aspect to the 'sameness' pole. Often, in experience, these two poles are confused or are perceived as confluent. The polarity is not distinguished or discriminated and we observe the person who believes that his essential self is constituted rather than constituting. This would be the so-called 'natural' attitude. Of course such a person would not be self conscious or reflexively aware of his bias. To my knowledge such an experiential awareness occurs only in unusual circumstances such as drug-induced altered states of consciousness; schizoid experiences; and identity crisis.
C. A Personal Experience

For example, a number of years ago I ingested some LSD. During the ensuing trip my experience of my identity was severely shaken through becoming self-conscious. That is, I became aware of my self as an object of awareness. I felt that everything which up until that time was most indubitably mine; my name, my character, my personality, my identity; really did not belong to me at all. I experienced acute identity confusion when I realized that the self I had identified with was really not alive from within but merely a collection of dead, static, information patterns. I recall feeling outraged, accompanied by the thought, "I did not choose these programs - they've been laid into me without MY participation and permission." That thought was not experienced as a contemplative, theoretical rumination but as a concrete, profound utterance. Implicit within it was the awesome responsibility of perceiving myself as a constituting rather than as a constituted being. That is, the self-consciousness of the identity formative process carried with it the responsibility to act on that knowledge. This all occurred long before I had any passing acquaintance with the academic literature on identity. Since becoming familiar with some aspects of this literature, I find it striking that the vocabulary used is so similar to that which I spontaneously used to come to grips with my experience. There are several examples. First, Lapsley (1967) noted that the concept of self was split historically "with the owness pole being now identified as the true self and the sameness pole identified as the false or phenomenal self." This corresponds to my personal experience in that I detached my
identity (conceived as my essential core) from the contents of my con­
sciousness and relocated it to consciousness itself. That is, I detached
my identity from the sameness pole and relocated it to the owness pole. As
we shall see later, this particular path presents its own dangers and oppor-
tunities.

D. Psychological Constructs Comparable to a Di-Polar Concept of Self.

Let us pursue the concept of 'owness' a bit further through the veh­
icle of other authors.

1. Winnicott's Psyche and Soma

Guntrip (1969) in discussing the genesis of the schizoid personal­
ity type posits an infant who is exposed to an inadequate environment,
particularly an inadequate mother.

He will be what Winnicott calls 'a collection of
reactions to impingement' but somewhere in the
midst of that chaos the psyche, the basic subject
of experience, who is potentially a whole self and
owns these reactions, is unable to grow a secure
sense of his wholeness, but can feel states of
acute fear.

(p. 186; italics mine.)

When Winnicott refers to a 'collection of reactions to impingement', he is
referring to a sustained arousal state; a physiological overload, as well
as to random, undirected body movement. When he asserts that the psyche
'owns these reactions' he is describing the relation of the psyche to the
body. The term 'owns' implies an identity that is not quite an equivalency;
a unity that is becoming dualistic. Thus even at the 'owness' pole we experience nascent dualism and at the 'sameness' pole this duality is fully articulated. For Winnicott the primary psyche is not simply a reflection of somatic experience, for it may be but loosely related to the body in the first months of life. He writes:

The psyche of a normal infant may lose touch with the body, and there may be phases in which it is not easy for the infant to come suddenly back into the body, for instance when waking from a deep sleep.

(The Family and Individual Development, p. 6)

If, as he asserts, the soma and psyche are distinguishable aspects of the whole person, then one would assume that duality of the psyche and identity would be even more pronounced. One would be entitled to make such an assumption within a developmental framework that saw the relationship between the psyche and the body elaborated prior to the development of anything resembling ego structures. This developmental framework is in accordance with Piaget's work that sees sensori-motor schemes develop first as a sort of body knowledge upon which later, more 'intellectual' structures build. This line of reasoning leads us to conclude that the term 'own' is indeed the correct descriptor to apply to the relationship of consciousness to its contents.

2. Klein's 'Ego' and 'ID'

A more psycho-analytic flavour is brought to the discussion by Klein and Riviere (1964):
The ambitions of the Id, while that was the sole governing force, were towards being the thing at the other side of whatever relationship it established. When the Ego takes control of the Id's impulses, it directs them towards having.

The word 'having' implies the same possessive orientation as the term 'own'. There is a latent dualism contained within the term which we have worked hard to uncover and make explicit. The stress has been on the duality because it was latent and my objective was to make it manifest. However, we should not overlook the more overt level of meaning of the term 'own' - one that conveys an intimate affinity.

In summary the self has two aspects, the subjective and the objective. The former exists only in the enduring present; the latter has a past and a future. The 'proof' of the existence of the former is self evident: I experience therefore I am. The 'proof' of the existence of the latter is through an appeal to criteria of consistency, coherency, and integrity.

IDENTITY: ONLY POSSIBLE WITH REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.

A. The Self: the Product of the Interaction Between Two Modes of Being.

In this section of the chapter the objective is to move our level of analysis down to a finer level. That is, I will attempt to investigate and elucidate those pre-conditions in the nature of man that make identity possible. Specifically, it will be asserted that without a dialectic structure of consciousness, identity and self concept would simply not exist as potential experiences. The reader will recall that a
dualistic meta-structure was posited consisting of a pre-reflective intentionality and reflective consciousness. It is this capacity to reflect that allows us to be self conscious. Our consciousness, in this case, is not directed to and absorbed via our precepts into the environment. Rather it is directed back upon the self. This capacity allows us to see our self as separate from the fleeting, transitory sequence of perceptions. It begins with the capacity to distinguish awareness from its contents. It is this distinguishable and somewhat autonomous awareness that becomes the experiential ground for what will later develop into an elaborated identity.

Our discussion is made more difficult by the ambiguity of the terms involved. For example, the term 'self conscious' is not, strictly speaking, a true dialectic opposite to pre-reflective intentionality. Rather, it is a product or result of a second consciousness taking intentional consciousness as its object. Intentional consciousness apprehends perceptions of the environment as its objects whereas this second type of consciousness takes the intentional consciousness as its object. We can concretize the discussion by stating that the right hemisphere takes the immediate environment as its object, whereas the left hemisphere takes the activity of the right as its object. Perhaps a quote from Sarte (1948) will bring clarity to the matter as well as carrying the discussion forward.

Consciousness is a sort of decompression of being. It is a being in which there is a certain crack, and which replaces being in general with being-for-itself which causes a self to be born.

(p. 128; italics mine.)
At first glance the above may appear, as it did to me, to be empty philosophical 'busyness'. However, when one begins to plumb its depths some profound revelations become evident. The first of these is Sartre's idea that consciousness is a mode of being. Thus, the second term in my dialectic is not so much a mirror held up to intentional consciousness but a second being attending to the first. The significance of this insight will be understood by examining an alternative, more popular conception. This conception sees consciousness as immediately reflective - in knowing I am conscious of knowing. Consciousness, then, takes on the quality of a thin film of nothingness. When one attempts to apprehend its substantial nature, one gets caught up in an infinite regress. The more intensely one attempts to define its 'realness', the more it eludes our grasp. Eventually one comes to recognize the process and ceases this struggle to define; settling for a conception of consciousness as an a priori given that is essentially a mystery. However, this abortive experience survives in the associations and connotations that are attached to the term 'consciousness'. The word now carries associations of insubstantiality, spectral, spiritual and even 'unreal'. The ultimate result is a philosophical system that separates being and knowing. Being is real, while knowing is somehow questionable. Synonymous couplings appear in other fields of study that are based on this same philosophical distinction. Thus, Guntrip (1969) and Winnicott (1963) develop the categories of 'being' and 'doing'. 'Being' is self sufficient, requiring no voluntary effort to sustain. That is, if 'doing' does not spring naturally from 'being' then all activity will feel futile and empty. As they put it, 'doing', as a substitute for 'being', is sterile and impotent. This parallels or corresponds to the effete connotations that
adhere to the term consciousness when dialectically paired with the term 'being'. 'Being' seems to be much more unself-consciously robust. The same associations spring to mind for cognating and conating, or thinking and willing. Guntrip (1969) extends this dialectic to the realm of knowing:

... 'feeling' is the female element, a state of being, of being in touch, of knowing by identification: while 'thinking' is a male element, intellectual activity.

(p. 261)

Thus consciousness, thinking, and knowing seem to be more dissociated, distanced, and abstract when compared to the substantial wholeness of being and feeling. Furthermore these two realms seem, on a theoretical level, to be separated by a gulf. For example, although Guntrip insists that both the 'feeling' and 'thinking' ways of knowing are present and available to both sexes, he doesn't inform us of the organic link between the two. The brilliance of Sarte's conceptualization is that he resolves the split by asserting that consciousness is a mode of being. Earlier in my thought I treated libido or the life force as separate and distinct from consciousness. Although this lent a certain intellectual clarity to the process it presented certain theoretical difficulties which Sarte's thought resolves. Consciousness and life force (or being) are one and the same thing - albeit different modes.

Libido and consciousness are only theoretically separable. In the actual living out of our lives, when one is present, the other is also there. The implications of this fusion are far reaching. It makes conscious-
ness robust as opposed to effete. I also implies that self consciousness is simultaneously a reinvestment of object-libido in the self. That is, when one introspects, one is automatically investing the self with the life force or libido that would normally be projected on the environment. One's identity is, therefore, not a mere self-concept or self-image but more a living experience that in some respects uses the libido or life force of the pre-reflective intentional consciousness for its own sustenance -- in Sarte's language, a self is born and nurtured. One's identity is, therefore, a truly autonomous affair and not merely a bare schemata of one's pre-reflective intentionality. This implication is, of course, a developmental one. That is, initially self consciousness merely reflects and informs us of the consistent behavioral patterns of our pre-reflective self. In this sense it is 'self knowledge'. At a later stage of development this reflective consciousness may attempt a more active role. For example, it might attempt to inhibit, control or change the pre-reflective intentional consciousness. This phenomenon can be referred to as ego-will in conflict with primary or natural will. The term 'will' is used to suggest the connotations of being that Sarte's quote has made explicit. I suggest that this second being views itself as a constituting self whereas it apprehends the intentional consciousness as the constituted self.

3. A Phenomenological Description of Consciousness as Being.

Most of the above consists of interesting speculations regarding the implications of Sarte's fresh conception of consciousness as a mode of being. Let us approach this same issue from an experiential point of view. I shall give a phenomenological account of consciousness as a healing
agent. Essentially the process is one of directing one's consciousness to parts of the body that are in a state of disease. From a more mental point of view this same process would be described as allowing one's field of attention to be filled by proprioceptive sensory data as opposed to conceptual data. When one undertakes such an experiment then the libido aspect of consciousness becomes apparent as opposed to latent. Attention therefore has two mutually implicating modes: when we are attending to concepts we experience the consciousness or knowing mode as dominate; when we attend to sensory data we experience the libido or 'being' mode as ascendent. It is important to stress that the other mode is always present as background. For example when we attend to an idea we are consciously aware that we are actively involved in a 'knowing' mode. What we are not aware of is that our attention is giving that idea life and the term 'life' is not being used metaphorically. Consciousness is a decompression of being - a being in which there is a certain crack as Sarte said. Being is therefore the fundamental reality and consciousness merely the result of fission. Duality is, the pre-condition of consciousness. And to bring the whole topic back to the subject of this chapter: duality is the precondition of identity. Being in general, or pre-reflective intentionality, is replaced by being-for-itself "which causes a self to be born." This identity is born in dependency but with development can achieve some limited autonomy. More will be said on this topic in the section devoted to identity change. For now it is suffice to say that the trend in the above speculations is to lay the theoretical ground for the possibility of genuine identity change. By
genuine I mean as opposed to superficial adjustments in one's self image or self-concept, while the self-experience remains basically untouched.

IV. **IDENTITY - AN ACT OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR AN OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS?**

The title of this section introduces the idea that identity formation can proceed in two radically different ways. That is, we can identify with our acts of consciousness and thus see ourselves as the constitutive or organizing agent; or we can identify with objects of consciousness, introjects - our self-concept being one among many internalized objects. We are always conscious of ... We can be conscious of various objects. An object could be either perceptual or conceptual. Examples of conceptual objects would be my internalized image of my father: mathematical formula, the mores of a particular group. These plus many more could all be subsumed under the heading of my model or description of the world. My world view or weltanschung is thus a meta-object of consciousness. I am conscious of, or attend to my description of the world. Included in this world model is a subsection that refers to myself and this is referred to as my self concept. That is, I evoke this self image and attend to it. For example, I would describe myself in objective terms such as instructor, male, athletically inclined etc. In short, I conceive of myself as an object of awareness. I can, however, identify myself with that which organizes experience - that is, I can identify with acts of consciousness. By following this alternative I ground my identity in my constituting nature - I conceive of myself as a process rather than a product. From one point of view it
could be stated that these alternative modes of identification present the existential choice to the subject. If one chooses the former mode, identifying with acts of consciousness, one creates one's life project; if one chooses the latter mode, identifying with objects of consciousness, one accepts one's life project. Alternatively, we could view both modes withing a developmental framework as Isaacs (1956) has done. Identification with acts of consciousness would occur at the 'highest' end of the developmental scale. In either case, developmental or existential, I am assigning a higher value to identification with acts of consciousness. In fact, this has been the primary objective of this thesis. The underlying philosophical assumption that permeates this paper is that reality is dynamic; eternal flux; a perpetual becoming. This is contrasted with a conception of reality that is essentially static - with change being the exception rather than the rule. This assumption has been reflected in the vocabulary that I have chosen for my meta-structure. For example, I use the work ego-will because it overcomes the tendency towards reification that the term ego introduces. In other words, if our conception of the nature of reality this must apply equally to both the 'self' and 'world' pole of reality. The dignity of man insists that we be adequate to the task of coming to terms with our world. This can only be done if identity is both theoretically and practically, as fluid and responsive as the world that it is engaged in. I will begin the discussion with an examination of the process of identification with objects of consciousness; proceed to identification with acts of consciousness; and culminate with a phenomenological description of identity
A. Identity As Objects Of Consciousness

"... thus there is not an act of will that breaks into the future, but rather an attempt to find security in the familiar routines and rituals of the past."

Bourke in Will in Western Thought.

The above quote begins with the end. That is, the lifestyle that Bourke (1964) is describing is the terminal state of the process of identifying with objects of consciousness. Let us attempt to understand this process in detail. We must begin with the basic structure of consciousness to see how the possibility for this alternative is embedded within it. The essential structure is dialectical consisting of 1) the intentional act and 2) its object. In everyday language the intentional act is attention and its object is that which we attend to, be it a thought, a feeling or an environmental stimulus. In any given moment we may be attending to a fantasized romantic relationship; to the task of writing a thesis; to bodily sensations of tension - these are all objects of consciousness.

1. We Become What We Attend To

We now wish to move our analysis from a structural level to a dynamic one. We, therefore, invoke the principle that we become what we behold. That is, our identity is mutually implicated and developed by what we attend to. In every intentional act there is an implicit and reciprocal elaboration
of the self. For example, I intend to build an addition to my house and in this project my identity moves implicitly toward that of 'carpenter'. My principle implies that a process of confluence occurs between subject and object. However, this principle can be experienced in two radically different ways. In the first case, we can use our knowledge of this principle and direct our attention towards those objects that will elicit a positive self-experience - a healthy identity. In the second case, we experience our attention as being trapped by objects. We feel ourselves to be fascinated or obsessed with certain fantasies and situations, against our will. Normally, however, attention is trapped so effectively that there is no awareness of this state. That is, there is no superfluous, unbound attention that can stand back and observe this process. As a result there is almost a complete lack of self consciousness. That is, there is no dissonance between what one attends to and one's self concept. Because conflict is not present the individual is not conscious of his state. He is merely comfortable with 'the way things are'; the secure, familiar routines of the past. Such people have already become what they beheld. For all intents and purposes they have become fused with their intentional objects and the volitional aspect of this act is not accessible to them.

2. Self-Object Fusion

Exactly how is this state of confluence achieved? Freud provides a clue to this mystery with his concept of transference. Although that term has come to mean the emotional overlay that the client brings to the
therapeutic relationship, Freud also used it to refer to a more essential process. That process involved the transference of libido to objects. When a subject attends to an object, there is necessarily a transfer of some of that subject's life force to the object. This conforms to our earlier established principle that consciousness was a mode of being. This principle implies that if we consciously attend to anything we simultaneously invest it with our life energy (be that object one in the environment or our self-concept). Loevinger seems to concur that such a process does occur and states:

Transfer of libido to objects and of infantile object relations to contemporary figures is normal; life draws its vitality from it. Only by such transference does the ego integrate the instinctual life with reality and thus achieve maturity.

(p. 383; italics mine).

The implication is that the libido acts as a bridge linking subject and object; allowing us to overcome our isolation. Heidegger referred to this phenomena as 'falling'. This term referred to the tendency of the 'Dasein' to become absorbed into the subject's immediate world. Heidigger was a phenomenologist and as such restricted his field of investigation to the subject's consciousness and to that subject's objects of consciousness. That is, phenomenologists make little attempt to investigate the relationship between the subject and the 'real', external, environment. Thus, when Heidegger refers to the 'Dasein' falling or being absorbed into the immediate world, he is referring to the phenomenal world of the subject - the world
for that particular subject and not the pure, objective world. On the other hand, Freud and Loevinger's accounts do not make this phenomenological reduction and therefore imply the projection of the life force or libido from the subject onto some object in the environment. Despite these theoretical differences (as to whether it is the environment or the phenomenological world that is being contacted) the experience is essentially the same. That is, before we reflect on our experience, objects of perception appear to be imbued with their own life force. This theoretical supposition receives some empirical support from Deikman's (Lee et al., 1976) work. He asked subjects to concentrate on a blue vase for thirty minutes over ten trials. These subjects reported that the vase seemed to acquire a life of its own, to be animated. It is only through the act of reflection that we come to realize that the luminescence of the object is something that we bring to it. It is our consciousness that lets this object appear to us. This is the work of the primary will or the pre-reflective intentionality that is not conscious of itself.

3. The Resultant World View

For the great majority of the population, the amount of time devoted to reflective consciousness is less than that to intentional consciousness. This fact has profound implications for their conception of reality. Societies and individuals who have not developed the capacity for reflective analysis experience reality as a given. We have to wait until some rudiments of self consciousness and reflective power has developed to get a feel of
what their world must be like. Such an individual might state, "I receive my world - it's just there like it always has been." There is no ontological or existential questioning regarding the nature of life or reality simply because their mode of knowing precludes that possibility. Such questionings are pre-supposed by the development of the reflective mode of knowing. The experience of reflection reveals to us that we not only receive the presence of things but also determine their meaning. As Ricoeur (1965) puts it:

To receive is to give oneself intuitively to their existence; to think is to dominate this presence in a discourse which discriminates by denomination and connects in articulate phrasing.

(p. 29)

That is, once an individual begins to develop the operations of reflection he is led inexorably to the conclusion that he constitutes his world as well as receiving it. This truth applies to the 'primitive', the child, and the arrested adult as well, the difference is that they are not aware of it whereas the reflective individual is. Thus this natural and naive individual constitutes his world without the awareness of his complicity in such an act. For him it is not so much 'my world' as it is 'the world'. For such an individual identification and identity would be a matter of internalizing a disowned and 'objectified' world view. Let us explore the nature of this world view, this individual's conception of reality a bit further. First it is conceived of as 'the world' as opposed to 'my world'. That is, the
phenomenological world is given an objective status. This world's coherence or connectedness is understood as the workings of cause and effect. That is, it is the laws of causality that hold together and organize the world. Event A causes event B and so on. Even in this account some reflection has begun to creep in. Prior to this developmental point, I believe that such individuals would not describe the world as a series of discrete events tied together by scientific laws. Instead the world would present itself to him as a whole, a thing in its own right. Only after reflection has made its appearance on the scene does this individual begin to discriminate and connect the discrete events in articulate phrasings. However, because we are still dealing predominately with intentional consciousness and only peripherally with reflective consciousness this individual still experiences the 'world' as glued together by objective processes, in a linear relationship. Further reflection will show him that what holds these discrete events together is their connection to him, the perceiver. He is the glue that binds this world together. Perhaps the use of television as an analogy will make this point clear. Suppose we change channels randomly finally returning to the original channel. We might begin with Sixty Minutes; switch to Happy Days; then to NFL Football; over to Kojak; and back to Sixty Minutes. Would we say that the contents of the intervening channels are systematically and organically linked to the content of the original channel? If we were the television set, would we try to supply a connecting rational to link these apparently discrete events? Would we, for example, try to establish a coherency between Mike Douglas' last statement and the Fonz's following
statement? Would we then claim that this connecting rational was not our creation at all but an inherent part of the objective flow of stimuli? This is what our 'naive' subject does with his life events: missing the point that it is his intentionality that glues these events together in a meaningful whole. However, because his reflective powers are underdeveloped he attributes the meaningfulness of the world to the world.


If the quality of vitalness is projected upon and attributed to the objects of consciousness, then, quite naturally, one would resist changing one's object constellation as this would entail simultaneously giving up one's life force. A brief review for the purposes of clarity will be useful here. We began by noting the phenomena of transference whereby libido is transferred from the self to the object. This seems to be an a priori aspect of human experience - one that can neither be judged as good or bad. Then we invoke the principle that we become what we attend to. The concepts of attachment and identification are referring to this process. Rather than our libido being transferred to the object (a transient phenomena) it is now attached or adheres to the object (more permanent condition). That is, in some sense the object begins to exhibit the quality of life. We cannot experience the life within us directly, only through projecting it upon the object. That is, when we are operating in the intentional mode, consciousness is represented in its correlate object. Because in this mode we are not self-conscious to any high degree we come to experience the life
force as a quality of the object constellation rather than one's subjectivity. This, of course, sets up an utter dependency. We must cling to our objects because they, not us, are the source of life. We attend to them more and more, unwittingly giving them more life and permanence. And this attention reciprocally forms our identity in the image of these objects. In a sense the relation can be described more aptly as a subject-subject relation as opposed to a self-object fusion. Loevinger (1976) presents the puzzle as to why so few people reach the highest stages of ego development whereas the vast majority attain the highest stages of cognitive development. The solution is implied in the above discussion. We will not be willing to give up our object constellation if we experience it as the life giving source. This trap awaits us long before any encounter with 'bad' parents or an inadequate environment. Our radical dependency on our life force is far more direct than the dependency on our parents. This is, therefore, our radical psychological dependency which makes all other more conventional dependencies possible.

5. The Schizoid Experience: Loss of a Naive World View.

We can therefore, see that the major obstacle to ego growth or identity change is this tendency of the 'Dasein' to be absorbed into the immediate world of the subject. To abandon one's object constellation is synonomous with abandoning one's self to die. This must also be the major source of resistance in therapy - the force that actively opposes any change, even though 'intellectually' any change would be for the better. It should also be noted that this is not the type of obstacle that can be overcome once and for ever. Rather it is a hurdle that must be leaped at every
stage of ego development. (I am using the term 'ego development' as virtually synonymous with identity growth). In this respect it is interesting to note that Guntrip (1969) gives the following sub-heading to a section in his book

"Dissolving Identification: Separation-Anxiety and Psychic-Rebirth"

(p. 40)

The three double terms in this subheading are not sequential events in a developmental process. Rather they are different ways of describing the same event. Dissolving identification is comparable to detachment. Whereas formerly the self and the internal object world were fused into one amorphous meta-object; these two poles now begin to separate. It is important to note that this process is necessary if the person is to develop their own personal, authentic identity (as opposed to being a collection of introjects). However, there are severe emotional responses to such an event. As the self pulls away or detaches from the object constellation it experiences a moment when it feels as if it is part of itself that must be sacrificed. As Sarte noted consciousness is a crack in being, a sort of decompression of being. It is understandable that this separation, which the crack implies, feels like loss or death of what was formerly 'all me'. Guntrip (1969) has reported schizoid clients who have been profoundly and terribly shaken by such an experience. Their words and descriptions are fairly concrete, whereas Guntrip's explication is more abstract.
One cause of anxiety is that separation may be felt to involve, not natural growth and development, but a violent, angry, destructive break-away, as if a baby, in being born, were bound to leave a dying mother behind. But the major cause of separation anxiety is that it feels to involve loss of the ego.

(p. 41)

I wish to avoid the implication that this type of experience only occurs to schizoid individuals. Instead I present the possibility that this experience is characteristic of all transitional stages of ego development. The schizoid experience is one of getting 'stuck' in one of these transitional phases.

The Client's Report: Metaphorical - Using The Past To Express The Present

One implication presented in the last paragraph is that identity change does occur over the whole life span. This possibility has gone somewhat unnoticed because client's experiencing such a process are forced to rely on metaphor to express it. Invariably the content of the metaphor refers to an earlier separation experience. The first sentence in Guntrip's quote above is an example. That is, our hypothetical client, is currently going through a phase of dissolving identifications. These internal objects are quite complex, quite sophisticated, and quite adaptive. In spite of this our client has recognized their insufficiency and inadequacy to grasp the world he has had only a few glimpses of. These identifications begin to dissolve, to lose their power and absolute nature. Our client naturally
becomes fearful at the possibility of losing his present powers before the new have been tested out and proven reliable. Because he has not articulated his dilemma (still being too much in it) he will rely on metaphor, even to himself, in order to express his feeling. He will report himself as a squalling, impotent infant. However he is not referring to the past but using it to refer to his current experience. He is drawing on his repertoire of his previous intense experiences to express his current one. Therapists err when they interpret such content as indicative of regression, that is, when they interpret it literally as opposed to metaphorically. A metaphorical interpretation suggests the idea that there are a number of separation crisis in an individual's developmental history, each crisis producing the symbols that will be used to initially articulate the next. The nature of these crisis is separation - and this separation has both an inner and outer dimension. The outer dimension has been fairly well documented: the resolution of the symbiotic attachment to mother in the first two years; the onset of puberty; and leaving home. At the same time as these outer changes occur there is an intrapsychic separation that occurs: a crack in being develops. The process is analogous to metamorphosis. During the transitional stage identifications begin to dissolve while simultaneously, one's cognitive map of the world starts to blur and become fluid. Both one's self concept and one's world view begin to shift. If the process is a healthy one the current ego framework will be replaced by a more complex and sophisticated one that will allow integration to occur from a deeper level. That is, the new framework will easily assimilate data that the old would
find dissonant. In order for such a development to occur the self must dissolve its identification with its object constellation as a precondition. That is, the self cannot abandon inadequate and restrictive internal objects if it experiences those objects as its essential beingness. I can recall one incident in my own experience which illustrates this point quite lucidly. I was experiencing a great deal of self conflict at the time and resolved one evening to confront the issue until it had been settled. As my struggle climaxed I recall feeling that whatever choice I made I would affirm one side of myself and deny, abandon another. As a result I experienced it as a life and death struggle. Some part of me was going to die with the decision. At the critical point in the process a surprising and relief bringing transformation took place. The metaphor I used to express it was the relationship of a tree to its bark. Just before the turning point I felt as if I was fighting to preserve the vital core of the tree. Immediately after, I realized that what I had construed as the core was really a 'dead' piece of bark. At that moment all the stress left and I disinterestedly watched this piece of bark separate and float away from me - and I was still obviously alive, with no sense of diminishment.

The Stage Process of Dissolving Identification

Through such experiences I have come to the 'theoretical' position that ego development, identity change or meta-morphosis always involves this process of intra-psychic separation. The prototype of course is the resolution of the symbiotic state. This relationship is not a subject-object
relationship but a subject-subject relationship. The process could be described as follows: fused subject; composite subject; subject-object relationship. At the subject-subject stage we have a mother pole and an infant pole of a composite being. In order for the infant to develop some autonomy, in order for him to individuate, he must separate from the mother pole and begin to perceive the mother as a true object - an object that, furthermore, demonstrates autonomy. By granting the mother-object autonomy, the infant is preparing the ground for his own ego or identity development as he begins to take over the functions of the mother pole. Guntrip is referring to the same process in the following:

Later in the first year, brain maturation makes intellectual activity possible, and Winnicott then speaks of 'mind' or the infant's 'thinking capacity' as gradually becoming able to take over care of the child from mother.


As stated earlier this separation is a prototype for all subsequent ones. The features of dissolving identification; death anxiety and re-location of one's subjectivity are present each time one experiences a transitional stage.

This continual referral to the mother-child separation is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it is a process that occurs to us all and therefore is universal. Furthermore the process is easily observable and therefore amenable to empirical study and statistical treatment. On the other hand, the reference to this concrete example, partially obscures the fact that it is but a particular instance of the more general process of dissolving
identification that, in health, occurs for the remainder of our lives.

By abstracting from the concrete example we derive features of the process that are just as 'real' as our concrete example but without their limitations to that particular incident. Our phenomenological description, which is somewhat of an abstraction in that it steps back from the situational factors, allows us to grasp or understand this process at the higher developmental end of the scale. That is, resolution of symbiosis; the onset of puberty and leaving home have been the traditional, situational signposts of dissolving identification. However, after the point of early adulthood has been passed no such statistically frequent situations occur - and we are left without recognizable signposts. This does not mean that the process of dissolving identification ceases to occur. Some work is now underway, Gail Sheehy's *Passages* being the most widely known, that attempts to investigate the various stages of adult development. Neither time nor space permits us to explore this area in any great detail. However, by quoting liberally from Norman O. Brown's *Love's Body* I hope to convey the phenomenological feel of such transitional experience.

Object-loss, world-loss, is the precondition for all creation. Creation is in or out of the void; ex nihilo. Admit the void; accept loss forever. Not to admit the void is the trouble with schizophrenics who treat words as real things. Schizophrenic literalism equates symbol and original object so as to retain the original object, to avoid object loss.

The world annihilated, the destruction of illusion. If this feeling of emptiness, of something 'without form, and void', can be
deliberately accepted, not denied, then the sequel can be an intense richness and fullness of perception, a sense of the world re-born.

(p. 260-263)

When Brown uses the term 'world' I am assuming that his meaning is synonomous with the meaning of 'object constellation' and 'cognitive map of the world'. That is, it is not the world that is annihilated but our representation of the world. Likewise, the 'world re-born' is the emergence of a fresh, rich and fecund weltanschung. In the above quote, Brown refers to the world pole of the ego framework. The same process is implicitly at work on one's self concept or identity. These distinctions that I am making are for theoretical purposes and not to correct Brown for his language is much more immediate to the lived through experience.

B. Self As An Act Not A Fact

Our previous section was titled Self-Object Fusion and was intended to convey the sense that one basis for identity was attachment to objects of consciousness. A reciprocal effect is noticed here: objects are invested with a vitalness that belongs to the self and the self, in turn, becomes 'thing-like', an attribute that belongs to the object. The self is understood to be a substantial entity - a fact. We then proceeded to demonstrate that all ego development or identity change depended on dissolving identification or separating the attachment. The implication was that the process was an eternally recurring one; that the fundamental basis for identity was still
attachment to objects and the process of development implied finding 'better' objects. In this section we ask the question if there is an alternate source for identity that partially escapes the recurrent inclination to cling to one's objects. The possibility that suggests itself is to conceive of the self as an act and not a 'fact'. That is, we will seek to identify our primordial sense of being alive with our Will or attention rather than with any, thing-like, substantial self. To return to the motif of duality we are suggesting that we identify more with our subjective and pre-reflective pole and less with our objective, reflective self image. This manner of linking the self to its acts has been noted by previous authors. James (1917) noted:

... we measure ourselves by many standards (... strength, intelligence, wealth; even good luck). But deeper than all these and able to suffice unto itself without them, is the sense of the **amount of effort** we can put forth.

(p. 82; italics mine).

Bourke (1964) in *Will and Western Thought* reports that Narziss Ach claimed that a component of the willed act was an "immediate awareness of 'self' as the ultimate source initiating the determining action." Bourke goes on to state that "... will name a process of auto-determination on the conscious level." Bourke goes on to quote the following authors:

"A creature is nothing but an act of volition which persists and operates without ceasing."

(Nicholas Malebranch)
"The more willing, the more self-hood. The self is not only a condition for willing, but also its product."

(Kierkegaard)

"There is no absolute being, only an eternal becoming through willing. The existence of a substantial I or ego is denied as a fiction."

(Nietzsche)

"I determine myself to the extent that I determine myself to."

(Ricouer)

1. Volitional versus Bound Attention.

The above quotes begin to gain some practical significance when we recall the functional equivalence between the construct of will and that of attention. Will is the capacity to direct and sustain one's attention. Let us now recall Deikman's (Lee et al; 1976) experiment where subjects were instructed to direct their attention to a blue vase. The experiment is interesting on two levels. First, it duplicates the operations of an earlier developmental stage when pre-reflective intentionality was the dominant form of consciousness. It was during this stage that the groundwork for a 'thing-like' identity was established. Second, the operations differ from the developmentally earlier stage in that the subjects volitionally direct their attention. The subjects reported experiences that support our earlier speculations. Notably, they reported that the object (the blue vase) acquired a life or vitality of its own. Secondly, they reported a merging or absorption with the perceptual object.
I really began to feel, you know, almost as though the blue and I were merging or that the vase and I were. It was as though everything was sort of merging.

(p. 72)

The difference between these subjects and individuals at an earlier developmental stage is that the former were self conscious. That is, they retained enough separateness from their experience for them to observe and report it. These individuals therefore, had enough self-consciousness to be aware of their perceptual experience but not so much self or reflective consciousness so as to substitute a conceptual for a perceptual object. The crucial ingredient producing this ideal state is the special way that attention was being used. That is, attention was being volitionally focussed on the object. A paradox is suggested: the greater the volitional activity in perception the greater the degree of receptivity that results. A going-out on the subject's part, paradoxically, allows the object to come in. Receptivity is, therefore, not merely a passive orientation.

2. Implications For Identity Strength

Thus, several important principles regarding identity emerge from Deikman's experiment. There are two ways for adults to grasp the environment. The first, and I suspect by far the most common way is to grasp the environment approximately through presuppositions, pre-conceptions and unconscious assumptions. In Piagetian language, assimilation would be maximal and accommodation minimal. That is, this method entails grasping external objects
through the intermediary of internal structures and objects. Such a style of perception corresponds to the identity type of self-object fusion. The second method of grasping the environment relies more on the power of the act of attention. Such a method would be utilized by individuals who identified with acts of consciousness rather than objects of consciousness. This person would approach the world with suspended beliefs and focussed concentration. In a complex social exchange they would reserve judgement and engage in perceptual exploratory and investigative behavior. They would direct their attention volitionally rather than allowing it to be trapped in automatized patterns. They would experience themselves as autonomously present. The first style is more or less 'out-of-touch' relative to the second, consequently individual's utilizing it would suffer reduced self-esteem. They would sense that their behavior is somewhat inappropriate to the situational demands and yet be unable to conceive of the alternate approach. That is, they would not be conscious of their basic orientation or intentionality toward internal structures as opposed to external realities.

3. Autonomous Awareness: The Source of Subjectivity, The Ground of Identity

The second major principle to emerge is that of self awareness; an awareness of being aware. Individuals who possess this capacity are cognisant of the fact that 'awareness' is an experiental reality independent of the contents of awareness. For example, I can be aware of the sound of my typewriter; then the wind acting on the tree outside my window; then the
background noise my refrigerator produces. The function of basic awareness remains in spite of incredibly varied changes in its content. Individuals who recognize the autonomous reality of 'awareness' can safely ground their identity on it. That is, they can identify their essential core with an enduring awareness. In this way they achieve stability whereas object-identified individuals achieve rigidity. At this stage in our discussion we are referring to an individual with a formless identity. Just as awareness is formless whereas content exhibits form, so an identity based on pure awareness would lack form. While this might be theoretically elegant there would be very little room in a practical world for such an individual. The task, then, must be to take on transitory, appropriate forms. The self therefore is given a temporarily stable identity that is congruent with its immediate task, purpose or intention. The self would formulate a goal and this would implicitly begin to organize an identity that would be capable of achieving that goal.

a. The Mental Field or Subjective Space

Merleau-Ponty (1962) gives an account of attention/intention that points to its relationship to the self.

The first operation of attention is, then, to create for itself a field, either perceptual or mental, which can be surveyed; in which movements of the exploratory organ or elaborations of thought are possible but in which consciousness does not correspondingly lose what it has gained and, moreover, lose itself in the changes it brings about.

(p. 29)
Merleau-Ponty seems to be introducing an intermediate step into the dialectical process that was earlier posited. Recall that the terms in the dialectic have been variously called: 'awareness' and 'contents of awareness'; and acts of consciousness and objects of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that the first act of consciousness is to establish a field to be surveyed. What exactly does he mean by this field? It suggests the establishment of parameters bounding a domain of intrinsic interest to the individual. In other words, the dimensions of this field are determined by the purposes of the individual. I believe that the process he describes is virtually synonymous with the operations of intentionality. A concrete example should bring some clarity to the matter. Take the case of a person reading a newspaper - reading being a concrete act of attention and the newspaper being the contents of consciousness. This person will create a field to be surveyed depending on his purpose. If that purpose is to find a job he might read or survey only the 'Help Wanted'; the 'Career Opportunities' and any reports on government legislation relating to his job market. In this particular example, the subject consciously delimits his field of attention. However, there is some indication that this process can occur on a preconscious level. For example, in approaching this section of the thesis I had only a sketchy outline on paper and only a vague idea of the 'contents of consciousness'. However, by holding my objective clearly in mind I believe that my attention created a field to be surveyed. The writing of this section is, therefore, the articulation of the contents of this field as the active probing of my attention reveals its features. Furthermore, it is in the establishment of this field that
I found my identity as a volitional being. ('Found', in the sense of foundation). I take responsibility for staking my claim 'here' and not 'there'. The alternative, of course, is to 'forget' this intermediate step. That is, in effect, not to delineate a field of interest. The resultant experience is to be overwhelmed by random incoming stimuli - to be impinged upon. Since no individual can tolerate such an experience for long, they will begin to restrict their experience to the repetition of the safe, familiar routines and rituals of the past. Such an individual strives to maintain a sense of identity through slavery to their objects of consciousness.

The last phrase in Merleau-Ponty's quote points to an alternate way of founding one's identity: "consciousness does not correspondingly lose what it has gained [the field or 'mental space'] and moreover, lose itself in the changes it brings about." The sense one gets is of stability established through an act of will. Let us examine this concept on a perceptual level, then proceed to a psychological level; and finally conclude with some therapeutic implications. Merleau-Ponty's phrase strikes at the heart of epistemology since it deals with consciousness losing itself or not losing itself in the changes it brings about. Consciousness must be somewhat autonomous from its contents in order to distinguish the properties of the observed thing from the qualities attributable to the operations of consciousness. An example: if I move my body in order to see the city hall clock better, the city hall and its clock appear to move. However, because I know that such changes in appearance are not objective I
cancel out this apparent 'conclusion' in all my acts of perception - I don't get lost in the changes that my attention brings about - I can distinguish between subject and object. The process can be likened to the scientific method: I hold all variables constant with the exception of one which I manipulate. The results this manipulation produce approximate objective knowledge. Merleau-Ponty provides the example of identifying that point on our body where we are being touched.

The precise position of the point touched will be the invariable factor among the various feelings that I experience according to the disposition of my limbs and body. The act of attention can localize or objectify this invariable factor because it has stepped back from the changes of appearance.

(p. 29)

As he goes on to assert, the first act of attention is to establish a field or 'mental space.' This field is not the object of attention, but surveying this field will bring the object to light. It seems that this is a promising phenomena to investigate as the source of our subjectivity and, therefore, the foundation of our identity. When we use the term subjectivity we are referring to a private consciousness. Private in the sense that the individual's behavior does not necessarily reveal the contents of his consciousness. He can dissimulate. This experience of subjectivity is necessary to experience one thing and yet report another. It is at the basis of the notion of the homunculous - the man within the men. Merleau-Ponty's notion of the establishment of a mental field explains the mechanics of how
a sense of subjectivity gets established. When, in popular language, we ask, "What space are you in today", we are referring to the same phenomena. Subjectivity is a space that we first create and then dwell in (the terms are, of course, metaphorical). Our identity is, therefore, a function of the stability of this subjective space as well as the articulation of the self-referent objects within that space. The establishment of identity is, therefore, a three part process: the evocation of purpose or intention; the establishment of a corresponding mental space (subjectivity), the articulation and elaboration of that space (identity actualized).

b. Disordered Attention and External Locus of Control

Individuals who have this capacity to establish a mental field process, as a result, intrinsic principles to which all decisions may be referred - they seem to have an inner gyroscope. To understand this phenomena let us describe its opposite - those individuals who lack an inner gyroscope and, therefore, must substitute external guidelines. Some examples of potential external guidelines would include theoretical knowledge, ideological prescriptions, religious standards, tradition, routine and ritual. Individuals who rely on such behavioral guidelines probably feel they have no choice as they have never developed the capacity for establishing a mental field. When they occasionally lapse into a state of experiential awareness they experience overwhelming, amorphous feelings with no sense of how to respond to them. Lacking any internal guidelines, they feel compelled to act according to external guidelines. If the person is from a religious tradition he will act scrupulously moral - and underneath his actions will be the flavour
of invocation and appeal to a 'higher' authority to reward him. His behavior will be ritualistic in the sense that its meaning is not directed toward the environment and his fellow man but toward spiritual approval. Such a person lacks all sense of agency and control in his life and the resort to clinging to religious guidelines is equivalent to a drowning man clinging to a life preserver - for he is truly 'at sea'. This account is not intended as a condemnation of religious life styles per se as empirical studies have indicated that 'religious' individuals appear at both ends of the continuum of mental health.

Let us re-direct our focus to the issue of attention and mental space. We have been implying that people who identify with objects of consciousness; those people who are essentially fused with their contents of consciousness do so because they lack the capacity to establish this mental space. Merleau-Ponty refers to this as a disorder of attention.

The primary condition of the disorder is a disintegration of the sensory field which no longer remains stable while the subject perceives, but moves in response to the exploratory movements and shrinks while it is being probed ... no spatial framework, persists from one perception to another.

(p. 29)

For this person, objects of consciousness remain stable as long as one does not actively attend to them. Active attention causes these objects to change, become fluid, dissolve or expand. There is no intervening establishment of a 'field' with which to bring boundaries and some measure of stability.
Perspective and proportion is lost as any particular object can come to
dominate the total horizon of that person's consciousness. It is a specific
purpose which establishes that field. That is, when I approach my contents
of awareness with a specific purpose in mind a field is established and
proportion/perspective are inherent in the purpose.

Attention first of all presupposes a
transformation of the mental field, a new
way for consciousness to be present to
its objects.

(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 29)

The unfortunate individual who does not have a purpose and therefore an
exceedingly small attention span for he realizes that attention implies the
total domination of his consciousness by any arbitrary object. In a sense
we could say that the only purpose such an individual would have is to
avoid attending to anything. Genelin (in Corsini, 1973) appears to be
referring to this same phenomena in the following quotation:

Therefore in isolation, experiencing must
be much narrower than in interaction. But
if experiencing, as bodily felt, is also
the interpretive mass, that is to say,
the sense one has of what is going on,
and the sense which interprets words,
events and so forth, then in isolation
one also loses this capacity to interpret
what words and events mean. Along with
this is lost one's sense of self and sense
of ownership of one's own body.

With narrowed ongoing experience, any
bit of event which does reach one has
maximized results.

(p. 332; italics mine).
Gendlin believes that healthy human experiencing is an interactional process with the environment. He then goes on to conclude that isolation or withdrawal from the environment produces the above effects - loss of interpretive power and perspective. Our interpretation, on the other hand, suggests that the withdrawal of interest from the environment is just an instance of the more general condition of withdrawing one's attention from all objects of consciousness. Both Gendlin's particular case and the more general condition result from the incapacity to establish a purpose and hence a mental field. Probably the relationship is not a linear cause and effect one but rather reciprocal.

c. Therapeutic Implications

The therapeutic implications of the above are quite immediate. If the client presents himself as easily distracted with a narrow attention span, this behavior indicates the appropriate therapeutic intervention. For example, the therapist might ask the client to articulate his purpose at the beginning of each session. As the session develops the therapist begins to listen to the buried, or implicit intention in each interaction. He would facilitate that intention coming to explicit consciousness. If the client began a particular anecdote with animation and then trailed off or 'got lost', the therapist would remind him of the original purpose. Still another possibility that presents itself is the achievement of a lengthened attention span as an explicit shared goal between therapist and client. The therapist might make use of a formal contract to fully highlight their shared intentionality. During the subsequent sessions the therapist
would act as a feedback loop. That is, he would ask the client to become aware of his experience when he was operating with purpose and when that purpose was absent. The client would soon come to recognize that in the former he experienced some sense of agency and mastery whereas in the latter he felt impinged upon and overwhelmed.

d. Disordered Attention and Negative Thoughts

Let us return for the moment to this individual's fear of being taken over by any arbitrary object. Gendlin (in Corsini; 1973) is referring to this same phenomena in the following quote:

With narrowed ongoing experience, any bit of event which does reach one has maximized results.

(p. 332)

For these individuals the entertainment of a negative thought is a very dangerous event. If, for example, they are considering the possibility of a negative motive for their behavior, that possibility very soon becomes a probability and then a fact. It is as if paying attention to negative thoughts makes them real. There are no boundaries or limits established to ground the person or give him a point of reference outside himself - mental events are autonomous realities. Thus, the only strategy available to the person to limit and control these disturbing thoughts is active avoidance. That is, no one thought or fantasy shall be allowed to remain in consciousness long enough to establish its own momentum. This applies equally to both 'good' and 'bad' thoughts as even good thoughts have the
potential of turning once they have gained a secure foothold. A counter-vailing force that a therapist often uses in such a situation is to ask the client to attend to their feelings rather than their cognitive content. Feelings, as contents of consciousness, are much less likely to move and change in response to the movements of the 'exploratory organ' (i.e. attention). That is, feelings tend to be much more stable and therefore serve to ground the person at such moments and re-establish some minimal sense of mastery. Perhaps this suggests a developmental sequence for therapeutic intervention. First, the therapist teaches the client how to redirect his attention from cognitive to affective content. Once this skill is gained the client will then have some confidence that his attention is a tool rather than an arbitrary oppressor. Second, with his new found mastery the client may begin to approach issues which require cognition for their resolution. The therapist assists the client by ensuring that the client has a purpose in mind ('a new way for consciousness to present itself to its objects').

4. Summary - Identity As Metamorphosis

To return to the issue of identity, it is the purpose or intention which contains within it a clear but implicit reference to the self. Thus the exercise of purposeful activity will automatically reinforce the client's sense of self and 'sense of ownership of one's own body'. Through such experiences the client comes to experience identity as an activity rather than a state; he comes to realize that, as James puts it, we measure ourselves
by the 'amount of effort we can put forth'. Because a purpose, goal or objective disappears dynamically with its achievement the self is not bound to any steady state. The self is organized to achieve a specific goal which once achieved is replaced by another. The self, in this way, comes to be identified with an act of consciousness; as an agent which is actively engaged in the process of becoming through the implementation of intermediate purposes - which in turn produce their own 'mental field'.

C. Parallel Theoretical Formulations

A number of authors have developed similar frameworks with which to understand ego development or identity growth. Tart (Lee et al, 1976) proposes an experiential continuum. At one end attention/awareness and the particular content of awareness are essentially merged, while at the other end of the continuum there is awareness of being aware in addition to the particular content of awareness. I propose that ego development is in fact the movement along this experimental continuum. The higher the stage of ego development, the more self-conscious awareness. Both forms of awareness (fused and separate) occur in all of us, it is the proportion of the two modes which determines the degree of ego development. Isaacs (Isaacs, 1956; Isaacs and Haggard, 1956) has formulated a developmental scale that exhibits some very interesting parallels with this line of thinking. The central term in his formulation is 'relatability'.

The relatability scale is a sequence of levels of increasing differentiation of
the self from others, and the increasing affective appreciation of the delineation of others.

(Isaacs, 1956, p. 12)

The following table shows the various stages that occur in that process. Of particular interest is the column headed 'Object-relation Capacity'. The highest levels of relatability are characterized by 'Disidentification from object' and 'introjects no longer important'. These phrases need to be filled out with some quotes from Isaacs in order for the stages to take on their true significance. For example, Isaacs characterizes the Beta level with the following descriptors:

"The focus at this level is with a final intra-psychic separation of self from others. In the process of attempting to disidentify with and rearrange the various aspects of earlier identifications, there may be a struggling against others who may temporarily personify the forces fighting within the self."

(p. 24)

On the level of interpersonal maturity:

There is not longer the Beta tendency to be trapped by feelings for others, nor the Gamma need to help others, or the Delta need to master others.

(p. 28)

When Isaacs states that for the Alpha level 'introjects are no longer important' one assumes that such individuals have found an alternate source
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approximate ego level</th>
<th>Isaacs level</th>
<th>Basis for self-control</th>
<th>Concern for others</th>
<th>Method of understanding others</th>
<th>Object-relation capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presocial</td>
<td>Zeta</td>
<td>Not internally based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No object relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulsive</td>
<td>Epsilon</td>
<td>Fear of punishment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Part object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-protective</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>Fear of punishment</td>
<td>Fear of others; demand from others</td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Whole object attempted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformist</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>For mutual satisfaction</td>
<td>Reaction-formation, sympathy</td>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>Resolved whole object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientious</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>Appreciation of sensibilities of others</td>
<td>Recognition of freedom</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Disidentification from object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>Respect for individuality in terms of self-concept</td>
<td>Respect for individuality</td>
<td>A capacity superordinate to empathy</td>
<td>Introjects no longer important</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Relatability, a Proposed Construct and an Approach to its Validation (Isaacs, 1956).
for ego or identity strength. These individuals probably identify with acts of consciousness, (i.e., Will), rather than introjected objects of consciousness.

Ausubel (1952) is another author who sees ego development as a process of disidentification and detachment from internalized objects. He notes that the mother is the scaffolding of the first self image. This is in essential agreement with the position stated earlier in the paper. Initially the infant’s experience of the relationship with mother was that of subject-subject. With the intrapsychic separation the relationship becomes one of subject-object and, as Winnicott (1963) states 'the thinking capacity of the infant takes over the function of the mother'.

Ausubel also believes that the empirical distinction between self and environment is reinforced by the sense of volition. Thus, he too establishes an organic link between the self and Will. In a sense, Ausubel is suggesting that both the tendency to identify with objects and actions are present from the beginning. In his developmental framework, Ausubel hypothesizes that with the emergence of the awareness of self is the concomitant realization of its state - utter helplessness. Thus the child is faced with his first crisis of ego devaluation. Perhaps this will serve as a prototype for our understanding of later crisis. The nature of the crisis is this: the child can maintain his illusion of omnipotence and consequently set in motion a process of constant frustration or he may attempt to realistically accept his own profound dependence. This latter alternative implies
a very painful devaluation of self or loss of self esteem. According to Ausubel the child escapes both these alternatives by projecting his former omnipotence onto his parents; while he becomes their satellite

The great advantage inherent in satellitization as a solution to the crisis in ego organization is its capacity for providing the child with intrinsic feelings of security and adequacy. He is relieved of the burden of justifying his adequacy on the basis of actual performance ability, which in fact could be meager at best. Instead, he acquires an indirect status which has nothing to with his own ability to manipulate reality, but is vicariously derived from the fact of his dependent identification with his parents who are omnipotent in this respect.

(Ausubel, 1952; p. 58-58; italics mine).

Ausubel's phrases of 'actual performance ability' and 'ability to manipulate reality' remind us of James' earlier quote to the effect that we measure ourselves by the amount of effort we can put forth. If we can put forth appropriate effort our identity will be imbuded with a sense of 'security and adequacy'. If our own efforts are inadequate, however, we can always resort to 'indirect status' through the process of dependent identification with our parents. Here again we see that identity, with its need for a sense of security, can be found in two radically different ways. It is difficult to imagine the profound feelings of vulnerability that the infant must experience prior to this resolution. Indeed the infant must experience substantial relief when he hits upon the strategy of dependent identification. We could even interpret this experience within the behavior-
istic paradigm. That is, the child is being reinforced for identifying with objects of consciousness. This would be one way of explaining people's continuing predilection for identifying with objects long after their individual power has developed to the point where it is a viable alternative. Thus, we witness adults who identify with their occupational role, their religious tradition, their esoteric philosophy, and their ethnic heritage.

It should be noted that both Issacs and Ausubel explicitly state that object identification is a necessary stage in ego development. Failure to satellize sets limits on the kind of person one can ultimately become. Ultimately, however, successful maturation depends on desatellization. The more desatellization, the more autonomy is demonstrated.

V. Identity Change.

A. Introduction.

In the preceding two sections we discussed the alternative ways of founding identity. The first method, which utilizes attachment to and identification with objects, leads to a self-concept that is essentially static and oriented toward the past. The second method, identifies the self with that which organizes experience. Individuals using this method do not conceive of the self as some substantial entity but as an eternal becoming - and thus are orientated toward the future. These people identify with transitory purposes or goals. They see themselves as the agent of these objectives. The objectives are used to organize experience and behavior.
and not to define and reify the self. Because the self is not identified
with its objectives they are not clung to after achievement. Instead the
self moves on to set higher order more complex objectives. Rogers (1961)
attributes this type of functioning to those individuals in the final stages
of psychotherapy. For these people, "Personal constructs are tentatively
formulated and loosely held". To paraphrase Rogers, these people, are aware
that they constitute reality as well as receive it. Furthermore, they are
aware that all constructs or interpretive frameworks are distortions and
deletions of reality and therefore, subject to constant refinement or even
replacement with more adequate models. In other words these individuals
do not attach to their perceptual/cognitive maps of the world as if they
were the world. I would suspect that any self-referent constructs would
be loosely held as well. These self-concepts would be valued for their
instrumental use rather than as a existential anchor.

B. The Problem: The Ego Cannot Formulate An Authentic Alternative
To Itself

We now wish to investigate the detailed processes of identity change.
Our analysis will be largely phenomenological as our purpose is to understand
such a process from a subjective point of view. We begin with a person
who experiences dissatisfaction and suffering with his current mode of
functioning. He wishes to change but doesn't know how to. Furthermore,
any self-induced efforts at changing have usually produced disastrous
consequences. As a result he doesn't trust his own subjectivity. He feels
that even his efforts at self-improvement are tainted by the very mental
set which he is trying to escape. The very mode of processing information,
the ego operations, are held to be suspect and untrustworthy. Phenomeno-
logically the client has become convinced of the inadequacy of a ration­
alistic approach. The alternative is to proceed from the center of Will
as opposed to reason. In this analysis we will be equating rationalism
with the tendency to identify with 'objects-of-consciousness' and Will, with
the tendency to identify with 'acts-of-consciousness'.

C. The Way Out: Transpropriate Willing

Lapsley (1967) has summed up this mode of identity change with the
concept of 'transpropriate willing'. He states:

The processes of becoming open to a future
which is not fundamentally to be identified
with anything currently in the self are
best summed up by the idea of willing — willing
beyond the self and of moving the person
beyond his current self to a new owness and
sameness. Here willing is a transpropriate
function.

(p. 195)

The term transpropriate refers to the center of the personality that is
not conditioned. As Bourke (1964) puts it, "Will means radical spontaneity
of action or decision. Sometimes it means uncaused and completely uncondit­
ioned activity." What this seems to be implying is that there is a conscious­
ness that escapes seeing things through an empirically derived framework.
This consciousness somehow has access to the pure data before it goes through the usual process of selection, filtering, and transformation.

1. The Technique:

   a) Ego Surrender: Separating the Self from the Ego

   In order for the individual to access the pure data as mentioned above, he must disconnect from his ego. That is, rather than actively participating in ego operations, he detaches from them. They continue to run on their own momentum but no longer are fueled by the deepest sources of intentionality. Loevinger (1976) is referring to the same process she states that the techniques of hypnosis and free association "are equivalent to a temporary silencing of the patient's ego". She equates ego functioning with the censorship, filtering and transformational operations. Lapsley (1967) goes on to say that although transpropriate willing requires the initiative and co-operation of the ego-will, "it is finally, a more total kind of thrust toward the future than the [ego] self is capable of mounting." That is, the role the ego has to play in such a process is one of surrender as opposed to resistance. Or as Suzuki (in Fromm et al, 1963) puts it: "an active surrender of the controlling and deliberating mind." Norman O. Brown (1966) underscores Loevinger's point regarding silence:

   The ego is loquacity, the interior monologue, the soliloquy which isolates. The way of silence leads to the extinction of the ego, mortification.

   (p. 264)
It is just this 'interior monologue' which is preverbal and often preconscious, that acts to reinforce and perpetuate our habitual way of seeing the world and ourselves. It is the method by which we reify our perceptual/conceptual maps. Lapsley continues:

The crucial factor is the willingness of the self, instead of attempting to fulfill itself, as in the romantic tradition... to give itself up, to be lost as an integrated sameness.

(p. 195)

I'm not too sure I understand what this 'romantic tradition' denotes. However, the connotations of this phrase evoke a process of stubbornly clinging to one's self as it is, with the hope and dream that one will be discovered and rewarded some time in the future. I also wonder if the human potential movement and the stress on self actualization are not contemporary versions of this 'romantic tradition'. I am not referring to the original goals of these movements but to the way they have come to be used for the services of narcissistic self-absorption. The willingness 'to be lost as an integrated sameness' is precisely the kind of risk that these individuals actively oppose.

b) Conceiving of Change as a Real Possibility.

Returning to Lapsley:

The [ego] self must will itself out of existence as its negative contribution to willing beyond the self. Positively it can, and must envisage the future toward which the individual is to move, but it must not attempt to blueprint that
future, or it can only reproduce some aspect of itself and its values.

(p. 187; italics mine).

Ricoeur (1965) gets at this delicate balance, this open structure oriented toward the future, with his phrase: "not a vision but an aim." It is not the contact and possession of a detailed and articulate future, but tendency or tension toward an indeterminate future. The aim is imbued with the belief that this future will be positive without detailing exactly how this will occur. This line of thinking corresponds nicely with Farber's (1966) dichotomy of conscious and unconscious will. Referring to unconscious will he states that its presence is retrospectively inferred. Furthermore, he states, that the unconscious will move in a direction rather than toward a specific object. This direction is, therefore, a way whose end cannot be known - a way open to possibility, including the possibility of failure.

c) A Personal Example

Experientially the process is very similar to surrendering to one's fate - to embracing one's destiny. The terms 'fate' and 'destiny' have a quasi-objective feel to them that captures the experience nicely. That is, when I give up my 'romantic' striving for self definition I experience long forgotten aspects of myself emerging. I find myself being drawn to situations that are not congruent with my self-definition; and in other cases avoiding situations that formerly fit like a glove. For example, going out for dinner and spending time in lounges is gradually replaced by physical activities such as walking, jogging, and dancing. Or a preference
for existential, 'authentic', verbal therapy is replaced by a preference for kinesthetic, sensual body therapies. These changes were not anticipated as a kind of master plan but emerged spontaneously as result of stilling the ego's 'loquacity'.

d) Re-Owning The Not-Self

These new personal preferences were not created out of a void. That is, they were present but asleep. They were aspects of myself that weren't congruent with my identity or self concept. Lapsley (1967) makes explicit reference to this process:

The resources drawn on outside the [ego] self must come from the not-self, particularly from its unconscious aspect. Both the energy and the images of the unconscious must be employed.

The term 'not-self' is an interesting one that requires some clarification. As I understand it the 'not-self' refers to those contents that have not been assimilated into one's self concept or identity. That is, it is those aspects of oneself that have been actively denied, dissociated and repressed but continue on in the unconscious. For example, during the era of 'flower power' many of us denied and suppressed our competitive and aggressive natures. Identity change through transpropriate willing might involve a re-owning of this aspect of our personality. One method or technique for re-claiming lost aspects of the self would be art therapy. I suspect that drawing is predominately a right hemispheric activity. That
is, this activity bypasses the rational, logical and verbal mode of functioning that is proper to left hemispheric functioning. Of course, these methods of processing information are proper to the ego. Information processed through the ego framework tend to perpetuate that framework. Art therapy allows relatively fresh information to come to light because it bypasses that conceptual grid. Dreams also allow more direct access to the contents of the 'not-self'. Dream analysis tends to mix right and left hemispheric functioning. For this reason, it may be preferable to use Gestalt techniques for living through or acting out various parts of the dream. The Gestalt technique steps up the right hemispheric mode of data processing. Thus, both art therapy and dream work facilitate the employment of unconscious images.

Lapsley also refers to utilizing the energy of the unconscious. When we recall James' notion that our identity strength is measured by the amount of effort we can exert an alternative source of energy becomes very important. How does one go about tapping the energy of the unconscious? One method of course occurs automatically with the recognition of unconscious images. Thus Whitman and Kaufman (in Corsini, 1973) state:

The archetypes are carriers of energy; the emergence of an archetype brings forth an enormous amount of energy.

(p. 90)

Their theoretical explanation is that archetypes are symbolic representations of our more primitive psychic organization. That is, they represent on a
profound level, our unconscious intentionality or orientation toward life. They represent the very foundations of our ego framework or personal construct. This foundation is our habitualized way of binding and discharging our libido or life force. Through consciously experiencing an archetype one becomes aware of the tremendous amount of vitality at our disposal. That is, when one disrupts the habitualized way of libido seeking its object then one experiences being overwhelmed by affect — a sort of turbulent whirlpool of energy that disrupts all pre-determined ways of experiencing. Thus we can approach the vitality of the unconscious via the route of its images.

The alternative is to access it directly. For example, when I am out jogging I initially push myself with my ego-will. At a certain point, however, this source of motivation begins to deplete. No amount of reasoning or cajoling by my ego ('this is good for you ... your tiredness will soon pass; etc.) will arouse further vitality. At that point I decide to sink into my feelings. It is like giving in to my totality, to my flow as opposed to the ego mode of resistance and control. I then experience tapping some alternative energy center that more or less picks me up and carries me along. I experience it as a rushing upward that emanates from the region of my solar plexus. The other curious phenomena that occurs has to do with the quality of my thinking at such times. Normally when I have some major decision to make I avoid actively thinking about it because I tend to perseverate. That is, my thinking tends to go around in circles — the thought does not develop, but instead merely reoccurs. This is similar in its operation to the
phenomena of attention disorders that we referred to earlier. Recall for a moment that the essential feature of attention disorder was lack of stability in the 'mental space' such that objects of interest (i.e. thoughts) moved and changed in response to the exploratory movement of attention. In other words, thoughts do not remain stable for long enough to be developed and one has to return again and again to the original issue and begins once more. To return to the jogging example, I find that when I sink into my feelings sooner or later I will notice that I am absent-mindedly thinking. The thoughts exhibit stability and a certain opaqueness - they don't shift and dissolve with my attention. Furthermore, they are linked together in some sort of organic progression - that is the thought develops rather than merely re-occurring. And so I discover a reciprocal principle: that I can access the images of my unconscious by giving in to its energy. The thoughts that emerge at such times seem to have an objective and autonomous quality to them. If I may be permitted to make a fine distinction: these thoughts are the products of my imagination rather than my fancy. Imagination reveals the contents of my pre-reflective intentionality whereas fantasy is grounded nowhere and only sustained through my conscious efforts. In the former, I am consciously receptive; in the latter, actively constructing.

e) Individuation - A Parallel Conception

Lapsley's process of transpropriate willing is very similar to Jung's concept of individuation. In fact Lapsley (1967) comments on this:
For Jung the goal of life is individuation or self-actualization. The self is seen as much more than the conscious ego, though it includes the ego... individuation involves the gradual displacement of the ego as the integrator of behavior by the larger self which becomes increasingly more distinct and controlling through the assimilation of material from the personal and collective unconscious. In the process the ego becomes the passive observer as it is enriched from below and the will [equivalent to my term 'ego-will'] as disposable energy, gradually subordinates itself to the stronger factor, namely, the new totality figure I call the self.

(p. 183)

Whitman and Kaufmann (in Corsini, 1973) describe the same process from a slightly different point of view:

At the moment of birth, ego and Self appear as one; the first half of life is devoted to their separation, requiring heroic attitudes and ego-reliance. Then the process reverses itself, as the ego attitude is revealed as incomplete and insufficient, and the striving for the realization of the Self begins.

(p. 96)

Thus we can say that the primary pre-condition for identity change is an attitude of surrender. The ego is asked to stop 'doing' but instead 'watch' and 'listen'. It is the self who is giving this order and the ego, who acquiesces. And this is the first step taken to realign their relationship in our consciousness - with the self as decision maker and the ego as the executive function. The ego does not give up its status as King very easily. The most difficult hurdle is when the ego claims to be the self - "To give up my ego/self means: to die." Once again we encounter separation-anxiety
to face the dilemma that going forward may involve abandoning a part or all of your self. Of course the ego will phrase its arguments in just this manner: you can't amputate part of yourself." In short the ego presents.

f) The Seductive Alternative - Identification with Reflection

The underlying rationale for the above dramatized account is that all previous intra-psychic separations were precursors for the ultimate intra-psychic separation: the separation of self from ego. Whitman and Kaufmann (in Corsini, 1973) indicated above that the first half of life was devoted to their separation which seems contrary to the position that I am seeking to establish. Perhaps one way of resolving this conflict is to distinguish between conscious and unconscious separation. The ultimate separation that I am referring to is a self-conscious act. In some way the person begins to sense that their ego identity is more of less inadequate for task of living and this begins a search for an alternate basis for identity - a basis that transcends that of the ego. Whitman and Kaufmann's account of the process of the first half of life is, retrospectively inferred rather than consciously experienced at the time. That is, in the first half of life individuals tend to engage in willful activity; they consciously set goals and strive to achieve them; they seek to become self-made men. By attending exclusively to the ego mode of functioning they are in fact, albeit not self-consciously, abetting the separation of the self from the ego. Frankenstein (1966) refers to one of the results of such a process:
Were it not for the estrangement and the recession of the ego from its matrix, the total psyche, the abstractive (logical) mode of operation, characteristic of the abstracted ego, would not have emerged as opposed to the symbol methods of the unconscious.

That is, the continual stress or emphasis on ego activity, the rational manipulation of abstract concepts, serves to alienate the ego from the self or psyche. Once this alienation or separation proceeds to a certain point awareness of self disappears from consciousness altogether. Furthermore, one 'forgets' that such an entity ever existed. This is a far different process than the conscious separation that takes place when one realizes that the ego is an inadequate basis for identity. In this latter process we are witnessing the intra-psychic separation of what was formerly a fused subject/object. (An intermingled or confluent self/ego). That is, consciousness has been identified with its contents. If these people could articulate their state they would state: "I am my ego framework rather than "I produce my ego framework." Because the person's self concept is tied, is bound to the ego framework, he will experience any threat to that framework as a threat to his very existence. The matter is a delicate one to express. In an attempt to capture the experiential flavour I earlier used a dramatic form of expression. For example, I implied that the ego was somewhat autonomous; that it felt itself to be King of the court and viewed the self as a dangerous usurper. I also experienced a distinctly biblical tone to the dialogue between the ego and the self. For example, I presented ego as an argumentive temptor presenting the seductive alternative:
'I am the true self and any attempt to depose or abandon me will result in chaos and non-existence.' The use of this dramatic form serves to emphasize that the self and ego are two real, but distinct entities and moves our discussion much closer to the lived through experience.

Perhaps a brief review is in order here to clarify our position. To begin we stated that consciousness was a crack in the mode of being. This crack implied a duality; two forms of the same being. It was this duality that formed the structural pre-condition for self-consciousness to occur. That is, the dualistic mode made reflection possible: one mode of being could reflect the other. We named the one mode, prereflective intentionality and the other reflected self-consciousness. Furthermore, it was implied that reflection was a pre-condition for abstraction. We then concluded that through the operations of reflection and abstraction the structures of the ego were elaborated. To bring this account completely up to date; we suggested that the ego mode of being ultimately takes itself as the only mode of being - it 'forgets' its radical dependency on the prereflective mode, the self or the psyche. Ricouer (in Lawrence and O'Connor, 1967) makes some interesting points in this regard:

It is precisely in the face of the necessity both inside and outside myself that my consciousness tends to recoil upon itself, to make a circle with itself, in order to expel into an empirical subject which is supposed to constitute these limitations of character, unconsciousness and life situation. By this act of expulsion, reflection tends to posit itself as a universal constituting ego, which is supposed to transcend the
Reflection, seems to carry with it the last vestiges of infantile, magical omnipotence. Reflection, because it deals in the currency of abstracted symbols offers us the promise of transcending all the limitations that our upbringing and socio-economic class impose on us. The much vaunted, and now discredited, Victorian Will Power probably sprung from identification with the reflective mode of consciousness. Rationalism as a philosophy was enjoying a robust adolescence; overthrowing the structures and limitations of religious dogmatism; and its powers must have appeared limitless. Thus rationalism not only depended on the reflective approach but also socially reinforced individuals for developing that capacity to the exclusion of all others. Thus, the seductive appeal that the ego prefers to the self is that it is the true agent of free will - 'a universal, constituting ego.' According to Jung's timetable it takes most of us half our lives to realize that such a promise will never be actualized. Only after exhausting this alternative do we realize that:

It is truly necessary that I understand my character as being mine, that I admit the partiality of my choices and motivation; the limited style of my efforts and my concrete action; I will not succeed in opposing it to my real self; it is not to be posited outside as an object; it is truly the constituted partiality of the concrete constituting self which I am.

(Ricoeur in Lawrence and O'Connor, 1967; italics mine).
In a way Ricoeur's quote goes beyond the point I wish to confirm; and points to a resolution: surrender and consent. By consenting to 'the limitations of my character, unconsciousness and life situation' I subjectivize those aspects of myself. On the other hand, when I refuse to acknowledge my concrete, human dimension I automatically posit it outside as an object. This change in orientation from objective to subjective may, at first glance, appear superficial and arbitrary. Such is not the case, however, as such a change in orientation - the subjectivizing of the involuntary - is the preliminary step to authentic identity change. A person must accept where they are at now, completely before any true movement or development is possible. We are presented with the paradox: striving to change produces stasis; accepting stasis permits change. According to Ricoeur we are ultimately a synthesis of the constituted and the constituting. That is, we are both subject and object for ourselves. It is in this double way that we apprehend ourselves (both as an 'awareness' and as an 'object of awareness') that the key to volitional identity change lies hidden. We will pursue this matter in some detail later in the chapter.

D. The Process: A Phenomenological Description

We now wish to consider the matter of identity change as it is experienced by the subject. Such a description may assist us in our own growth as well as assist us in recognizing signposts in our client's process. We shall begin with a quote from Castaneda (1974):
I said to you once that the tonal begins at birth and ends at death; I said that because I know that as soon as the force of life leaves the body all those single awarenesses disintegrate and go back again to where they come from, the nagual. What a warrior does in journeying into the unknown is very much like dying, except that his cluster of feelings do not disintegrate but expand a bit without losing their togetherness. (p. 266)

For those readers not familiar with Castaneda, his terms of 'tonal' and 'nagual' require some explication. 'Tonal' refers to the domain of being/consciousness whose knowledge is structured, arranged sequentially and chronologically. The term can either be applied to the ego and its ways of apprehending itself as well as to the world, in the sense that we understand the world as governed by laws (physical, psychological, social, etc.). 'Nagual' on the other hand, refers to that domain of being that exhibits no organization; where cause and effect are meaningless; where time is simultaneous or eternally present.

1. Loosening the Self Construct: Depersonalization.

According to Castaneda, therefore, our identities would be of the realm of the tonal. That is, our identities would be developed empirically over our lifetime. Our identities would be a cluster of single awarenesses bound together by our life force. For example, a certain individual may bind together the following single awarenesses: a near drowning at age six; a particularly extreme fight with one's father; hours of enjoyment
in the woods; the discovery of the joy of reading; etc. The accumulation of these single awarenesses becomes bound together in an increasingly tighter ball of yarn as one grows older. The tighter the ball or cluster becomes, the more difficult it is to conceive of any alternate arrangement. That is, one's life force/consciousness merely retraces or encounters the same circuits, the same structural patterns over and over again. In different language, one's life force is denied direct access to the outer, autonomous world where the genuine possibility of a life changing event lies waiting. Instead it is destined to experience the same old phenomena in the inner object constellation. Castenda points at a possible line of escape: by journeying into the unknown (the nagual) the cluster of single awarenesses are loosened. The implications of this are enormous. When he states that such an experience is very much like dying he is not being merely theoretical. I have had such experiences and what struck and frightened me the most was the impersonal nature of my experience: that is, it seemed to lack the human dimension that can only be evoked by words like 'home', 'family', 'mom and dad', 'playmates', etc. These experiences had been stripped bare of any feelings of warmth, security and belongingness. For this reason those experiences have been labelled alienation, depersonalization and derealization. All these terms have come to be used in only their perjoritive sense. Later we shall see that there is a positive aspect to this experience. These 'single awarenesses' are equivalent to what has been referred to earlier as objects of consciousness. Before we do this however, I would like to return to Castaneda to see if his quote might give us a clue to the source of this fear. Implied in the
quote is the idea that the force of life binds the single awareness together. The converse is just as true: the single awarenesses bind the life force to them. The life force becomes bound to, attached to, and fused with the single awarenesses.

a) A Basis for the Fear of Depersonalization

When, as Castaneda suggests, the cluster begins to expand; when our ball of yarn begins to loosen and unravel, one experiences the strange sensation of losing one's substantiality. Furthermore, one's substantiality has come to be equated with one's existence - to lose one's solidness is, therefore, to place in jeopardy one's 'realness'.

b) Overcoming the Fear

Let us now consider the potentially positive consequences of such a risk. Castaneda continues:

Thus a warrior can venture into the nagual and let his cluster arrange and rearrange itself in any way possible. I meant that it is up to the individual warrior himself to direct the arrangement and rearrangements of that cluster ... a sorcerer can adopt any form he wants ... can direct the parts of his cluster to join in any conceivable way. The force of life makes all this shuffling possible. (p. 266)

Although the language is different this account exhibits certain parallels to Rogers' (1961) notion of loosening the self-concept as the vital and preliminary step preceding therapeutic growth. However, Castaneda's
account is far more dramatically subjective. Particularly intriguing are the assertions that the individual can direct the rearrangement of his own identity - the individual can adopt any form he wants. On the one hand this smacks of a return to the magical omnipotence of infancy. On the other hand, we could say that the 'realistic' potency of adulthood is a greatly diminished, pale spector of what is possible. That is, the obstacle that stands between us and our full powers is our fear of depersonalization. That is, we would rather be determined (in the behavioristic sense of the word) and personal, than volitional and impersonal. (One is reminded immediately of the Victorian man who is strong willed and often stands accused of being impersonal in his dealings with people).

i) Theoretical rationale for positing the impersonal as primary

Let us examine these twin concepts of 'impersonal' and 'depersonalization' to see if we can take some of the sting out of them. Loevinger (1976) in expounding her dialectical theory of ego development suggests that its root process is "the personification of inner forces". (p. 422) This implies that we are not born as 'personal' beings and that this develops only over time - that, in a sense, it is learned. It is, therefore, conceivable that our 'personal' qualities are a secondary accretion covering our essential impersonal nature. Loevinger also draws support from Freud whose structural theory of id, ego and super-ego is characterized as the most well known version of the personification of inner forces. Just what is the nature of these forces? Norman O. Brown (1966) gives the following answer:
Reality is energy, or instinct; ... One substance, the id or It. The id is instinct; that Dionysian "Cauldron of seething excitement," a sea of energy out of which the ego emerges like an island. The term 'id' - it - taken from Nietzsche (via Groddeck), is based on the intuition that the conduct through life of what we call our ego is essentially passive; it is not so much we who live as that we are lived, by unknown forces. The reality is instinct, and instinct is impersonal energy, an 'it' who lives in us.

(p. 88; italics mine).

The experience of depersonalization, therefore, could be understood as essentially the same as our early infancy experience. The only difference being that, in infancy, there was no sense of personhood being lost as it had yet to develop. The other implication, is that in the 'normal' state of ego-identification it is just this 'impersonal energy' or life force that animates the ego or sense of personal identity. However, in normalcy there is not an experiential awareness of this dependency. The schizoid personality, on the other hand, is directly in touch with the life force which threatens to overwhelm and annihilate his shaky sense of personal self. The individual's overpowering fear naturally prevents both him and us from appreciating the enormous increase in the amount of vitality that has been made available. I am not suggesting some sort of romantic conception of mental illness. I merely wish to point out that schizoid experiences point to an enormous untapped reservoir of vitality and to suggest that the norms that have been developed of 'realistic' adult potency have been arbitrarily bounded by our fear of depersonalization. I would also like to add that I
I am not suggesting destruction of the ego or the sense of personal identity but rather practical ways of harnessing instinctual energy to increase our sense of personal power. The schizoid experience could be construed as an accidental or 'forced' contact with this source without adequate preparation or safeguards. Thus the schizoid individual gets 'stuck' in a transitory state whereas Castaneda's warrior moves through it to a larger more autonomous personal identity.

ii) A practical method - subjectivize the impersonal

Perhaps, I have succeeded in theoretically taking the 'sting' out of depersonalization without making it a pragmatic possibility - appealed to the social scientist and not the person. We are being asked to be 'cosmic warriors'. There must be a more adequate way of experiencing this encounter. And once again the method seems to be that of surrender. By embracing, surrendering and consenting to the impersonal we subjectivize it. Rather than identifying with our ego and consequently experiencing the impersonal as an alien force, we own it - it is, after all, our experience, the only one we have, which, if denied or disowned results in a diminished sense of self. We shall see later, that much of the sense of horror in such experiences is directly attributable to its objective quality; its sense of 'otherness'. Therefore, when we subjectivize it most of the anxiety simply disappears and we bemusedly ask, "What was the panic all about?"
2. The Rearrangement of the Structural Elements of Identity.

We note that "it is up to the individual warrior himself to direct the arrangement of his cluster." This implies that there is some personal entity that is neither the life force nore the sum of the single awarenesses, that can stand back and direct traffic. Is this the mythical homunculi? Or is it an uncontaminated portion of the ego? One can not be sure. However, Castaneda does provide us with some phenomenological signposts that demarcate this experience. They include the following.

a) Limit the Domain of the Ego.

Elsewhere in his writing Castaneda suggests that the technique for accessing the nagual or unconscious is through experiencing a sudden shock to the ego which causes it to shrink without disappearing completely. This would be equivalent to disrupting the habitual and automatized operations of the ego. The ego recoils and perception can then be relatively unconditioned. This might be one experiential referrent historically underlying the construct of the homunculi.

b) Use of Ego-Attention to Assimilate Preconscious Content.

At another point he advises that if our trips into the nagual are to be productive we must learn to see with the "eyes of the tonal". In order to understand what Castaneda means by this, a brief review will be necessary. The nagual refers to the dynamic unconscious, the realm of right hemispheric functioning. The tonal, on the other hand, refers to the ego, or the realm of left hemispheric functioning. The ego can be conceptualized in two ways: as an existent structural framework and as an organizing
principle. It is this first meaning to which we refer when we say it must be shrunk. The second meaning is a dynamic conception. That is, the organizing principle is the means by which the structure is elaborated—it is the cause and the structure is the result. What is this organizing principle? I believe it is the use of attention that takes its distance from appearances. Left hemispheric or ego attention works in such a manner as to separate subject and object. Whereas, right hemispheric attention fuses or becomes one with its object, Castaneda is, therefore, suggesting that the ego's method of attending should be brought to bear on the content of the unconscious. Perhaps a metaphor will make the point clearer: the realm of the tonal can be compared to daytime while that of the nagual, compares to night. During the day we are perceptually aware of multiplicity, profusion of form, intricate structural organization—and so it is with our ego organization, the realm of the tonal. At night, all we see is homogeneous blackness and yet there is content in this blackness: there are objects there; we feel them when we accidently touch them and so it is with our unconscious, the realm of the nagual. Taking a flashlight into the night would be equivalent to examining the nagual with the eyes of the tonal. Frankenstein (1966) makes a similar point when he states that the ego must actively work at assimilating the contents of the unconscious otherwise it will sink into a slough of passivity. One only has to observe the process of art therapy to see these principles at work. One begins by drawing a random, wandering line or series of lines. One then looks at them with an orientation of 'passive volition' and suddenly a gestalt suggests itself—one can see
meaningful form (a face or body, for example) where formerly only empty
lines were present. It is the unconscious or pre-reflective intentionality
that organizes these meanings. One's ego then takes over by adding a line
here, a dot there to make the latent figure manifest. One's ego now has
some explicit sense of the central preoccupations that were formerly pre-
conscious. At least some aspects of one's intentionality stand revealed.

c) Restructuring: By What Criteria?

The next thing we notice in Castaneda's quote is that it is the
structural pattern that is being rearranged. This suggests that therapeutic
growth is a matter of structural re-organization rather than an altering of
the contents or elements of the pattern. This matter deserves some exploration.
One conception of therapy views it as a kind of 'wiping out' or erasing
previous traumatic incidents. I believe that this is the popular or 'lay'
conception of therapy. I also wonder if this conception does not persist
in the form of unconscious assumptions on the part of professionals as well.
They assume that if one goes through primal therapy, for example, and discharges
the bound affect, the original disturbing experience disappears from the
psyche. Somehow, it is implied that, we can begin again with a clean slate.
One balks at these conclusions when one realizes that this involves denial:
denial that all our experiences, both traumatic and ordinary, change us once
and for all. No amount of therapy will ever change the fact that, for example,
a particular client had an arbitrary mother and that this client developed
an incredible sensitivity to non-verbal cues as a result of that experience.
What can change, however, is the way the client interprets these experiences. That is, the meaning that the client imbues these experiences with is subject to change. Every experience has two aspects: a receptivity and an activity. We receive the presence of an event; and we actively invest it with meaning. The meaning we assign is a function of our intentionality. That is, the same event experienced through differing ego frameworks is going to be construed differently. Dramatic religious conversions probably offer the most striking example of the profound results of substituting one framework for another. Where previously all experience was construed through a conflict-ridden, poor self-esteem framework, now this same person demonstrates unity of purpose and the grace of forgiveness. Returning to Castaneda, we note that it is up to the 'individual warrior himself' to direct the rearrangement of his ego framework. We also noted that this again raised the issue of the homunculi. Perhaps we are now in a better position to pursue this issue. We begin by recalling that identity and purpose were mutually implicating. That is, the self establishes the purpose which in turn, automatically, produces a system of values and priorities, necessary for achieving that purpose. That is, the purpose functions as a guiding principle to refer to on all decision making occasions. We now ask the question, 'By what principle do we direct the rearrangement of our cluster of single awarenesses?' The question is a tricky one. We are suspicious of allowing our ego to set the goal as we are aware that this will just perpetuate the very framework we are trying to transcend. Castaneda supplies
an existential answer. He suggests that we let the idea of our imminent death be our advisor. That is, the experiential awareness of our mortality becomes the principle by which we re-organize our ego framework. "If I knew I was going to die in an hour would I be spending my time regretting the past or living the present?" Living with the idea of one's impending death makes it far easier to live without regrets and to act responsibly. By invoking death as our organizing principle we both harness and direct our intentionality. That is, when I ask the question 'what would I do if I knew that I was to die an hour from now', I receive an answer from a deeper zone of myself than the one that routinely structures my day. If I persist in asking this question and on numerous occasions notice a disparity between what I thought I wanted and what I actually needed a new self image or identity would gradually begin to emerge. I could proceed with some confidence that this identity was grounded in my pre-reflective intentionality rather than being an obsolete construction of my ego. The concept of intentionality now begins to take on some experiential reality. Let us take several alternate examples of intentionality to emphasize this concrete aspect. Self pity or the victim mentality is a fairly common one. A person founded on this orientation approaches all experience through this filter. They will demonstrate selective attention, highlighting those aspects of the experience that serve to reinforce their world view. This process is, of course unconscious and all perceptions merely confirm that this is the way the world is and that one's response to it is, therefore, legitimate.

If this same person comes to be aware that they will die soon they
find it very difficult to avoid the knowledge that continued indulgence in self pity will just mean more of the same. They might possibly get an image of laying on their death bed, shouting, "I've been ripped off!"

Already we see the beginnings of a transformation from self pity to the mobilization of their aggression. Once the intentionality begins to change, the ego framework begins to disassociate and reassemble. Thus we can see that intentionality is a dynamic construct whereas the ego framework is a structural construct. The ego framework changes much more slowly in response to one's intentionality.

So far most of our discussion has been orientated to the present and future. However, both our mode of intentionality and our ego framework determines how we construe our past as well. For example, the client who had an arbitrary mother and, in compensation, developed acute sensitivity to non-verbal cues: when the client first considered therapy her intentionality sprang from self pity and her presenting complaint was over sensitivity. This element or 'single awareness' was therefore, accorded a dominant position in her ego framework. After intensive therapy, where self pity was gradually replaced by responsibility as an organizing principle, she began to construe her sensitivity as a gift to be harnessed as a mime artist or a therapist. Or alternately her sensitivity might be removed from its dominant, problematic position in her mental hierarchy to a more background position. Still another example would be that of a person who had experienced loss of ego boundaries. At first he would probably look on the experience as a curse.
Later, he might begin to construe the same experience as a gift that allowed him to expand his personal vision far beyond the boundaries that 'normal' development would permit. William James would be an example of such a man. Thus, a change in intentionality permits a change in our relationship to our past: where formerly we were bound to it, we now harness it.

d) Resolution of a Paradox: Identity Change and Continuity Over Time.

This issue of the relationship of identity to time - past, present, and future - is a critical one. It has been documented that a crucial aspect of identity is the sense of continuity over time. This implies that if we are to have a secure sense of our integrity we must somehow feel that we are essentially the same person as we once were and that we will be. Discontinuity in our conception of our personal history and our anticipated future ominously points to an identity crisis. And yet we ardently wish to change. We are faced with a paradox: we want to change and yet still feel that we are the same person. By closely studying the nature of the act of attention we shall see that the attainment of such a paradoxical goal is quite conceivable. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between two types of attention. Secondary attention functions by recalling knowledge already gained. Primary attention, on the other hand, is an originating act.

To pay attention is not merely further to elucidate pre-existing data, it is to bring about a new articulation of them by taking them as figures. It is precisely
the original structure which they introduce that brings the identity of the object before and after the act of attention.
(1962; p. 30)

Merleau-Ponty uses the development of our colour sense to demonstrate his point.

For example, it has long been known that during the first nine months of life, infants distinguish only globally the coloured from the colourless; thereafter coloured areas form into 'warm' and 'cold' shades, and finally the detailed colours are arrived at.
(1962, p. 30)

He goes on to state that once the quality of colour is acquired, and only by means of it, do the previous data appear as preparations of this quality. In other words, the past is radically transformed by the present. If we import this line of reasoning to the realm of personal identity, we shall see how the paradoxical goals of change and unity (continuity) are achievable. Normally, when we contemplate our personal history we identify various turning points that led us to our current state. We retrospectively infer that somehow the purpose, which our current state actualizes, was buried in these previous stages. Looking back at our past, we infer that, in some ways, our future was predestined - that everything that ever happened was a preparation for the present moment. What we fail to realize is that the unity that we 'witness' is in fact conferred by us rather than being intrinsic to the experiences themselves. Thus the continuity over time, which is so
important to our sense of integrity and identity is a quality of our construal. The brilliance of Merleau-Ponty's contribution is that he locates this unity bringing function in the very nature of consciousness.

The miracle of consciousness consists in its bringing to light through attention, phenomena which re-establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very moment when they destroy it.

(p. 30)

All our objects of consciousness, including our self concept, are figures or gestalts that are formed and given unity by our current ego framework. The transition to a higher ego stage, or from one framework to another, involves the destruction of the current gestalts and the emergence of the new. Both gestalts make use of the same data thus guaranteeing a 'synthesis of transition'. It seems to me that any therapeutic growth can be directly attributable to this process whether the specific technique used is called primal, reality, or gestalt therapy. The client is asked to re-experience an earlier traumatic incident with his or her ego mode of attention - 'the eyes of the tonal'. The client invokes the traumatic experience but this time does not become it. Instead he stands back ever so slightly and reflects on it - a separation occurs between awareness and the content of awareness. In a sense the client is split, for a highly aroused part of his self has become one with the original trauma while another part remains separate and 'records' or observes the unfolding drama. This is the structural pre-condition for construing the incident in an alternate, less debilitating
manner. This account appears feasible and yet we find ourselves objecting to the necessity for a 'split'. We sense that a split state is inherently dangerous. The phenomenological description will make this fear more understandable. In the above example, the client's volitional center (his sense of subjectivity) becomes split between the observer and the traumatized subject. It is as if his dynamic essence is being stretched like toffee between two centers - sooner or later it must snap. When it does snap, the client 'wakes up' in only one center. That is, his subjectivity becomes associated exclusively with that center. Clients, therefore, must actively choose, and endorse a framework in order to animate it. That is, identity change involves dwelling in an alternate construal. It is not a mere conception of an alternate framework but an investment of that framework with one's subjectivity.

Let us look at some currently popular therapies in order to see if their techniques can be understood in terms of these notions. For instance, in primal therapy explicit emphasis is placed on encountering the trauma and 'pain'. Little theoretical attention is paid to the other pole of the dialectic - the ego attention that is construing this 'traumatic experience. There is a difference, therefore, between encountering one's trauma (which implies a dialectic) and abandoning one's self to it. I've had some experience conducting primals and have noticed a marked difference in the two orientations; abandonment versus encounter. In the former, it is as if the client abandons his observing center; becomes one with the pain; which, in turn creates or reinforces a traumatized ego framework - the client abandons himself to being
constituted rather than maintaining his integrity as the constitutor.
In the case of successful primal therapy the client not only re-experiences
his trauma but also re-experiences it with his ego attention. The therapist
assists the client by supporting the integrity of the client's attention;
by modelling alternate healthy construals; and by using suggestions and
assumption to encourage the organization of a positive ego framework. The
same principles apply to reality therapy. The client is asked to step back
from the flow of appearance, to disengage himself from his 'unconscious',
acting out. Finally, the behavior modification technique of desensitization
also operates in conformity to these principles. The client is asked to
articulate disturbing stimulus in a hierarchy of fear. The very act of
doing so, tends to encourage the emergence of the dialectic - a separation
of the feared stimulus object from the subject.

My original point was how to reconcile the desire to change with
the need to be the same; the desire to grow with the fear of disassociation.
My theoretical answer is that unity is a product of the present rather than
a continuity over chronological time. Using this notion as our starting
point we can understand that the client's expressed fears of discontinuity
are pointing to currently experienced incongruity and contradiction. It
is not an anticipated split that bothers him, but instead a currently experienced
one.
e) Animating the New Framework - "Dwelling In".

Let us now turn the discussion to a more concrete example of identity change and the processes involved in it. We begin with another quote from Castaneda.

I held two images in my mind, two dreams...
all I had to do was to change perspective
and rather than watch either scene from
the outside feel it from the point of view
of the subject.

(1974; p. 77)

Essentially this is the first step in the process of re-arranging the cluster of single awarenesses that are involved in identity change. That is, we allow various parts of our self to emerge to consciousness in the form of symbolic images. Earlier I stated that we experience our self both as subject and as object. In the former sense we recognize the self as that which organizes experience. In the latter sense we apprehend the self as as object of awareness. When we speak of self-image and self concept we are referring to this objective mode of grasping our self. The images that Castaneda refers to are 'objective', symbolic representations of himself. Castaneda then describes a very interesting process: a volitional choice to subjectivize that objective image. A concrete example will make this point clearer. Recently I was lying on my bed and I became aware of some tension in a deep muscle band that extended completely around my rib cage. Shortly after this awareness an image emerged to consciousness. This image consisted of an automobile spring filled by liquid gold. The automobile spring was
of the type that are used with shock absorbers to stabilize a car; thick coils that are tightly wound. This of course, was a symbol for my tense muscle band. The image began to change with the coils separating ever so slightly. As soon as this occurred some of the liquid gold (my life force) began to squeeze out. It seemed to be molten when it was inside the core of the spring but as it made contact with the air it began to solidify and take on the appearance of toothpaste being squeezed from a tube. While all this was occurring I was acutely aware of the symbolic nature of the experience. I knew that my tight muscles were a manifestation of my resistance. I also was afraid that my resistance might prevent my life force from emerging ever. I decided to subjectivize the liquid gold - to 'feel it from the point of view of the subject'. The image changed accordingly: the coils began to separate and the gold began to emerge. I suppose I began to feel somewhat apprehensive when I noticed this, (whereas previously I had felt intense pleasure with the experience of securing my own release). I now shifted my focus and my subjectivity to the spring. In some ways I experienced this as a somewhat involuntary shift brought about by the transition of the gold from liquid to semi-solid. I say that the shift was somewhat involuntary as I can recall feeling some curiosity about how it would feel to subjectivize the spring, so some volition was present. In any case shortly after I became the spring I could feel the mounting signs of an anxiety attack. I wondered whether I would be strong enough to contain the force of the gold or whether I would be shattered by it. Needless to say I was not shattered, however, the struggle was intense. Afterwards I
felt somewhat depressed as I felt that I had used my own energy in the services of repression. That is, I felt that by choosing to subjectivize the spring I had actualized that part of my identity at the expense of the liquid gold aspect of my identity. In spite of this slightly depressing note I was quite excited about discovering this method of self-actualization.

When we abstract from this concrete example a very interesting principle begins to emerge: the self can be imagined as a number of different object constellations and the essence of our volitional nature is the choice as to which mode we will inhabit with our subjectivity. This is not a once-and-for-all choice but one that is continually recurring if we are to continue along the path of ego development. Both modes have their function: the objective mode is to present possibilities and potentialities whereas the subjective mode permits actualization; the objective mode permits us to conceive of the possibility and form of an alternate ego framework and the subjective mode breathes life into that framework. The difference between these two modes could also be expressed thusly: the subjective mode is a dwelling in and looking out; whereas the objective mode involves standing outside and looking in. As for the process of how we move from one mode to another there can be no finer unit of analysis - no step by step technique. One merely chooses which mode and then finds oneself already there. It is an instantaneous transition. It is like throwing a switch: one moment you are outside looking in; the next, inside looking out. In this section I have attempted to isolate a phenomenological experience to demonstrate how that experience can be experienced from two points of view; subjective and
objective. In the next section I will attempt to demonstrate how to utilize our dualistic capacity in the service of identity change.


1. The Developmental Sequence: Conscious direction replaces Surrender as the Organizing Principle.

As the heading indicates, I feel that we can use this knowledge of our capacity for double-vision to engineer identity change. To this point in the thesis the main principle to emerge vis a vis identity change is the one of surrender. For instance, it was suggested that through surrendering or giving up the constant willful activity of the ego (the interior dialogue) one was granted access to pre-reflective intentionality. Such a process was held to be essential to unify the selves - permit the ego-will and pre-reflective will to operate in harmony rather than conflict. In this section, however, I am raising the possibility that identity change may be more than a matter of transpropriate willing but in some way amenable to our conscious direction. Perhaps the contradiction that such a statement implies can be resolved by putting the two principles ('surrender' versus 'active direction') on a developmental continuum. In other words, the individual first becomes adept at surrendering. Through such an orientation, the individual comes to know the character of his or her pre-reflective intentionality. The individual would become aware of the incongruities between the content of their pre-reflective intentionality and the content of their self concept. Slowly, over time, they would begin to bring them into alignment. The implication
has been that this alignment would be accomplished mostly by the sacrifice of the ego ideal. That is, the ego is devalued or shrunk. Initially the reflecting ego was construed as the omnipotent, universal, constituting ego and all our personal limitations were expelled onto an empirical subject. Time and life experiences begin to teach us that such a strategy operates in quite the opposite manner; reducing our potency in practical life to the extent that we are ignorant of our true nature. Thus the ego suffers devaluation and the pre-reflective intentionality is exalted.

2. Limitations of 'surrendering': the fallibility of pre-reflective intentionality

A disquieting thought occurs: although our pre-reflective intentionality is more grounded than our abstracted, alienated ego, it too is subject to fallibility and error. One has to only recall the earlier example of the client who had been subjected to a dogmatic and authoritarian father and, as a result, had developed a placating style to deal with all authority figures. This 'compensation' or coping style is certainly not the result of a conscious strategy aimed at subtle factors in the current situation but rather an unconscious reaction triggered by any and every authority figure. Clearly in this case, this person's pre-reflective intentionality is determining this person's behavior in ways that are not in his best interest. An even more simple, and yet dramatic, example involves the orientation of one's libido. It can be stated that the structure of the libido is limited to approach or avoidance. Thus if an individual was traumatized at an early
age all their subsequent behavior would be dictated by an intentionality of withdrawal. Again we note that reliance on one's intentionality is not quite the fail-safe strategy that has been implied earlier. We, therefore, must clarify our notions. It was suggested that one should consent or surrender to one's intentionality. However, this isn't merely a matter of 'blind faith' but instead is guided by a purpose. Consent and surrender are the attitudes necessary to attend to contents of one's pre-reflective intentionality. That is, our strategy is guided by a purpose - and that purpose is to come to understand our archaeology. Furthermore this understanding is not an end in itself but is subordinated to our teleology. Understanding our archaeology bears on our teleology in two ways: by modifying our goals and adapting our implementation procedures. Underlying this discussion is the central idea that our teleology will not be actualized unless our archaeology is acknowledged and come to terms with.

3. Beyond surrender: re-programmed intentionality

We have now come to the point in our dissertation where some synthesis has occurred. That is, we are considering the individual who has developed to the point where he has re-owned his pre-reflective intentionality. I now ask the question: 'Is this as far as anyone can go?' In practical terms, is re-subjectivizing our character a process we engage in for the rest of our lives? Or do the laws of development exhibit a radical change in direction at this point? For example, we have witnessed one previous radical change in orientation: from the manipulative activity of the abstracted
ego to an attitude of 'passive volition' or 'active surrender'. I would like to suggest that such a radical transformation in attitude also occurs in the stage immediately following the 'consent' stage. Before I continue with this line of thinking I would like to point out that the following notions will be much more speculative than those preceding this section. At the time of writing the notions that are about to be presented appeared like vague forms on a distant horizon. These vague forms suggest the mode of operation at the highest level of ego development. I find little reference to them in the literature which adds to their speculative quality. With these cautions in mind let us proceed on.

a) Personal Constructs Consciously Formulated

We get a hint of our direction in Rogers' (1961) notion that toward the terminal end of the psychotherapeutic process, personal constructs are tentatively formulated and loosely held. In other words, the client realizes that his experience of the world and of himself is mediated through a personal construct. He realizes that the world is not simply given but intended or constituted by himself - it is not so much the world, as it is HIS world. The psychotherapeutic process has revealed to him the pre-conscious framework that he had used to construe his world. Now he is at the point of formulating a new, more appropriate, framework - he is about to take responsibility for his intentionality.
b) Relocating Intentionality: From the Pre-reflective to the Conscious Sphere

In a sense, I am suggesting that this individual is now prepared to take on the responsibility for his own creation. It is a momentous possibility. The metaphor of genetic engineering suggests itself. DNA molecules are equivalent to our intentionality; they contain the code or instructions for transforming and connecting simpler amino acids into complex, differentiated cellular and tissue structures. Our intentionality works in much the same way - organizing the 'primitive', sensory data into more complex, meaningful wholes. Genetic engineering allows us to consciously change the program or code. Conscious identity change likewise would involve direct access to our intentionality - our meaning-making program. The successful undertaking of such a task rests on the very practical and personal knowledge that we are dualistic beings. Our duality consists of two forms of consciousness: a pre-reflective intentionality and reflective consciousness. As we pointed out earlier, the initial relationship between these two spheres was such that reflective consciousness was radically dependent on pre-reflective intentionality. There are numerous ways of conceptualizing this dependency: the island of the ego arises out of the sea of the id; the clear and distinct ideas of reflective consciousness are derived by abstracting the part-whole relationships of pre-reflective intentionality. In short, the elements of the left hemisphere are constituted with raw material or data from the right. What is now being suggested is that this dependency can be reversed; that the clear and distinct directives of the left can come to automatically
restructure the content of the right. Our conscious intentions, therefore, are capable of affecting our unconscious intentionality. That is, in order to alter our intentionality we must be prepared to practically utilize the knowledge that we are self-conscious creatures. I stress the word 'practical' as opposed to the theoretical knowledge of our duality which many acknowledge but few integrate and use for their own development.


Sarte's (in Lawrence and O'Connor; 1967) language is of some assistance here:

Consciousness is a sort of decompression of being. It is a being in which there is a certain crack, and which replaces being in general with being for-itself, which causes a self to be born.

(p. 128)

The image that is conjured is that of the two hemispheres of the brain. Rather than having reflected consciousness depicted as a thin film of nothingness, we now have two modes of being communicating with one another. Reflected consciousness is not therefore, the realm of infinite regress with no secure ontological foundation of its own. I've utilized the analogy of the brain because the reality of both hemispheres of the brain is unquestioned, and I wish to associate this same quality of 'realness' to the reflective ego. Let us utilize the brain analogy a bit further. It is conceivable for the left hemisphere to take the right as its object. For example in a previously
cited experiment, subjects were asked to guess which of two possible signals were flashed. Subjects who had their corpus callosum severed were able to correct their answers by attending to their bodies as objects. That is, their bodies, which were controlled by their right hemisphere knew what the correct answer was. The left hemisphere could deduce the correct answer by observing the bodies' gestural responses. That is, from the point of view of the left hemisphere the answer was not known subjectively, but deduced from the objective evidence the right hemisphere produced in the body. This idea of two independent consciousnesses each taking the other as object is carried forward by Sarte:

But, if in reflection, it is really true that a consciousness is present to another consciousness, one tends to think that it is a matter of two consciousness, each one supported by the other... When we say presence to itself, we want to say, at the same time, that there is an outline of duality, since actually there is certainly a sort of game of reflection reflecting, and that at the same time, nevertheless, all this occurs in a unity where the reflected is at the same time the reflecting, and the reflecting the reflected.

in Lawrence & O'Connor; 1967, p. 126)

Likewise, Sperry (1964) commenting on the results of split brain surgery

Everything we have seen so far indicated that the surgery has left each of these people with two separate minds, that is, with two separate spheres of consciousness.

Both of the above quotes convey the distinct impression that we are occupied
by two selves. And yet for the vast majority I would predict that there is no experiential awareness of this duality. How can something so profoundly fundamental escape unnoticed? The only answer I can conceive of is that our subjective awareness can only occupy one center at a time. That is, we cannot be both intuitive and rational simultaneously; we cannot experience and reflect on our experience at the same time - one always follows the other. First our subjective awareness dwells in the experience then in the reflection on the experience. The continuity of our subjectivity disguises or obscures the change in modality of consciousness. For most of us this change of modality is not volitional. That is, we take our subjectivity where we find it. We find ourselves reflecting; we notice, after the fact, that we are introspecting. We don't decide to reflect now and intuit later. We don't assess the task and determine whether right or left hemispheric functioning is the most appropriate. Successful identity change and ego development, on the other hand, require some minimal ability to direct our subjectivity - to choose which center one will dwell in. For example, by subjectivizing the involuntary (as Ricoeur puts it) we allow our pre-reflective intentionality to rise to consciousness. And by subjectivizing our ego ideal we automatically begin the process of restructuring our intentionality.

a) A phenomenological description

Carlos Castaneda (1974) uses the term 'double' to refer to our ego identity. This term conveys the dialectical relationship between the pre-
reflective self and the reflective ego. I shall quote him at some length on this matter as descriptions have great phenomenological power:

No one develops a double ... All of us luminous beings have doubles ... The double is oneself and cannot be faced in any other way ... the double, although it is arrived at through dreaming is as real as it can be.

(p. 61)

First we note that everyone has an ego-identity; that is, a self-concept or self-image. Next, we note that although it is arrived at through reflection ('dreaming') that it is 'real'.

As far as I know, the double is the awareness of our state as luminous beings.

(p. 64)

When Castaneda refers to us as luminous, he is referring to the fact that we are conscious - we are luminous as opposed to a rock which would not be. Thus, our 'double' is our self-consciousness.

The self dreams the double ... Once it has learned to dream the double, the self arrives at this weird crossroad and a moment comes when one realizes that it is the double who dreams the self.

(p. 81)

To understand how this latter process works, let us recall the car spring and liquid gold experience. In a sense my 'double' was visualizing or dreaming
my 'self'. That is, I was using my reflective consciousness to create symbolic representations of alternative selves, one of which I would actualize. The creation of the image was the work of the reflective consciousness, and in a sense, is the objective modality at work. However, once I decide to subjectivize that image (to experience the image from inside looking out) the experience is altered quite dramatically. It cannot be contained within the boundaries of the image - indeed, after the initial moment the experience has very little to do with the precipitating image. The experience is at once, much more vague and yet more substantial, more vital. It is not well formed and structured, as was the image or visualization; rather it is constantly changing, developing and flowing. We can't utilize a metaphor to convey the change in quality from objective to subjective because our metaphor would inadvertently cast an objective gloss over the experience. That is, our metaphor would borrow material from the objective sphere. As a result very little can be said about the pre-reflective self - our sense of subjectivity. This reminds one of the muteness of right hemispheric functioning. The right hemisphere cannot articulate itself verbally and yet, as experiments with split-brain patients indicate, it demonstrates a functional reality. Subjectivity, is likewise mute about itself but present and felt. To return to the issue of controlled and directed identity change, the process can be summarized as follows:

1) the reflective ego imagines an alternate construal of the situation in the form of a concrete image or visualization and
2) the individual decides to imbue that image with his or her subjectivity. This sequence is a reversal of the process posited for the surrender stage of ego development. In that stage, symbolic imagination was used to represent and access the content of the pre-reflective mind. In this stage, however, one is using objective symbols not to represent an existent subjectivity but to create a new, mental space that one's subjectivity may inhabit - the products of imagination are used to restructure one's pre-reflective intentionality.

b) Supporting evidence

These notions gain some support from their coherence with the independent conceptualizations of other authors. For example, Blasi (in Loevinger; 1976) states that the observed unity of the personality is derived from two sources. The first source is structural and is a measure of the coherence and integrity of the mental structures (both cognitive and ego). The second source of unity is consciousness (which Blasi uses interchangably with the term 'subjectivity'):

... provided that consciousness is not simply a reflection of structures but at least partially a creator of them.

(p. 48)
The implication is that 'subjectivity' possesses creative powers; it is the dynamic principle which produces a relatively static, structural framework - or, form following function. Therefore, by allowing our subjectivity to dwell in one concrete visualization, one that embodies our new intentionality, we begin a process whereby our whole pre-reflective mind is re-structured according to that principle. Again, I will refer to other authors to indicate a possible line of support. First, the work of Nebes (1974) indicates that the right hemisphere is superior to the left in establishing part-whole relationships. Specifically, the right hemisphere could generalize from the part to the whole. Perhaps the principle embodied in the part was used to generate the whole. Another source of support is Edie's work (1976) on the acquisition of language. Essentially, Edie's position is that children do not learn language reflexively in a step by step process. Rather, on the basis of exposure to a few (few, relative to the infinite number of combinations available) sentences they intuitively grasp the principles by which the structure of grammar is generated. They cannot articulate these rules or structural principles and yet their use of language indicates that these rules are present.

Let us now attempt to apply these findings to the realm of identity change. Our client visualizes himself acting assertively in a concrete situation, for example. He or she allows their subjectivity to dwell in that 'fantasy'. On the basis of this one example, the right hemisphere (or the pre-reflective sphere of consciousness) generates a structural whole that
can be brought to bear on any situation. The client is not reflexively 
aware of this restructuring just as children are incapable of articulating 
the rules by which they construct their sentences. The crucial factor in 
the experience is that the client allows his subjectivity to dwell in his 
imagined situation. Only then will the results be automatically transferable 
or generalizable to other situations - because the very perceptual/conceptual 
framework has been restructured. This technique is in marked contrast to 
the one of rehearsal. When individuals rehearse, they are normally running 
through an anxiety provoking situation from the point of view of an observer. 
Consequently, no structural re-organization takes place and if the scene 
does not unfold exactly as anticipated they are thrown off and must revert 
back to their earlier problematic reaction. Furthermore, by attending to 
a visualized ego ideal and by allowing our subjectivity to dwell in it we 
automatically begin to invest it with the life force which sooner or later 
will bring it to the level of overt behavior. A subtle alchemist trans­ 
formation is taking place. Let us see if this notion has any explanatory 
power. Flugel (1945) posited that moral progress or development proceeded 
from moral inhibition to spontaneous goodness. For example, initially one's 
pre-reflective intentionality led one to cruel impulses. These impulses 
however, are in conflict with one's ego ideal. Thus, to effectively manage 
such tendencies one utilizes inhibition and repression. This is quite the 
opposite of spontaneous goodness and we must conclude that something of 
profound significance occurs that enables the more mature individual to 
dispense with these strategies of control. The 'natural' or pre-reflective
self must have changed to such a degree that the cruel impulses were no longer present. That is, the pre-reflective intentionality has undergone a change in its essential nature. This possibility is confirmed by studies by Frenkel and Weisskopf (1937) who showed that in middle age, wishes and duties tend to coalesce, thus leading to spontaneous goodness. We can visualize the self as a series of concentric circles emanating from a core and the power of intentionality of each circle being determined by the proximity to the core. Thus, in childhood wishes would belong to an inner circle of intentionality, whereas duty and obligation would be more peripheral. In childhood one's subjectivity would be most closely allied with one's wishes while duties and obligations would be experienced as more objective and external. Through the continual effort of attending to one's ego ideal one gradually subjectivizes it, and it becomes one's pre-reflective intentionality.

5. Summary and Conclusions

In summary the above account has demonstrated:

1) the theoretical possibility of transforming our pre-reflective intentionality; that is, for altering the 'program' by which we perceive and act on the world

2) Described a pragmatic technique for doing so: visualization of a concrete scenario and allowing one's subjectivity to dwell in it.
3) Documented supporting evidence from independent sources.

A cautionary reminder should be inserted at this time. It seems likely that such a procedure could only be enlisted by those individuals who have completed the prior developmental stage. The reader will recall that this stage was marked by the active surrender of the controlling and deliberating mind (i.e., the ego) in order to be receptive to the content of the pre-reflective mind. That is, one has to first come to terms with one's existent pre-conscious 'program' before attempting to transcend it. In fact, many individuals find surrender and acceptance a viable solution without pressing forward to transcendence. These individuals would experience increased efficacy merely by knowing their limitations and allowing for them. This would be a marked improvement over the previous stage where one willfully ignores one's limitations and is consequently, repeatedly sabotaged by them. Thus, individuals move through developmental stages: from ego domination; to self-knowledge through surrender; to transcendence through visualization and subjectification.

The attainment of this last stage of development is conditional on the conscious exploitation of the dualistic nature of our consciousness. It is not enough for the individual to admit the theoretical possibility of his or her duality. Rather they must believe in it as a pragmatic reality. For this reason, I went to some lengths earlier in this chapter to establish the ontological reality of reflective consciousness. Sarte was invoked to
rescue reflective consciousness from its associations of infinite regress and instead posit it as a mode of being. That is, reflective consciousness was recast as a robust mode of being rather than as a "thin film of nothingness". Having established the reality of this mode of consciousness on a philosophical level I then applied it to a psychological construct - that of the self concept. This was accomplished by suggesting that the ego was elaborated through the dynamic operations of reflective consciousness. The ontological reality of the reflective ego was further augmented through a literary source: Carlos Castaneda. His use of concrete, phenomenological language overcomes the limitations of a philosophical or psychological vocabulary. That is, my goal has been to establish the believability or reality of the reflective ego. The technical jargon of philosophy and psychology mitigate against this end. On the other hand, Castaneda's use of concrete, phenomenological language compliments his intended message perfectly. For this reason, his readers can come to believe in the reality of the 'double'. It is just this belief that is the crucial prerequisite for utilizing the techniques for consciously directing one's own identity change. Belief is the crucial ingredient for committing one's subjectivity. Without this whole hearted committal no genuine actualization can take place. The language of much of philosophy undermines this kind of belief and thus much of its wisdom remains in books rather than in lives. The following quote by Castaneda deals with philosophical issues but in a way that has a power to touch our lives as we live them.
"Can an outsider looking at the sorcerer, see that he is in two places at once?"
"Certainly. That would be the only way to know it."
"But can't one logically assume that the sorcerer would also notice that he had been in two places?"
"Aha!" don Juan exclaimed. "For once you've got it right. A sorcerer may certainly notice afterwards that he has been in two places at once. But this is only bookkeeping and has no bearing on the fact that while he's acting he has no notion of his duality."

(p. 53; italics mine).

Castaneda tricks us, in a way, for when we read the phrase "two places at once", we immediately conjure up an image of being in Toronto and Vancouver simultaneously; or in the classroom teaching and at home with some friends. That is, we flesh out Castaneda's intriguing hints with a concrete, objective scenario. It is just this concreteness that makes reading his books an experience rather than an intellectual exercise. As a reader, I commit myself to this apparently objective experience and only later realize, with a start, that he is writing a phenomenological account of subjective processes.

I will attempt to paraphrase his above quote in more philosophical language to illustrate to the reader the qualitative difference in reading the two accounts:
The continuity or duration of subjectivity disguises the transition from the intuitive to the rational mode of information processing. Perhaps 'disguises' is not the appropriate word - obliterates or drowns out are both closer to the experience that I am attempting to describe. That is, we are not aware of the dualistic nature of our consciousness because our subjectivity is monistic. If I read Castaneda correctly, he is claiming that we function in both modes (pre-reflective and reflective) simultaneously although our awareness is confined to only one. Because our awareness is singular we do not notice that our nature is dualistic. If we don't notice it, we find it very hard to believe in.
If we attempt to check out the possibility of our duality by recalling our experience we will be stymied once again because we will automatically impose a sequential order on our recall - we will recall a subjective, pre-reflective moment followed by an 'objective', reflective moment and so on. The truth of the matter, however, is that we were operating in both modes simultaneously. Therefore, memory is an inadequate source of evidence regarding this question of our duality. The sequential order of the events recalled suggests that this operation is a function of the left hemisphere and, if this is the case, then the content thus recalled would miss completely the right hemispheric contribution to the original experience.

The only experiential validation for this notion of our fundamental duality comes from the phenomenon of hypnosis. The following quote from Jaynes (1976) is interesting in this respect.

We, in our normal states, use the spatialized succession of conscious time as a substrate for successions of memories. Asked what we have done since breakfast, we commonly narratize a row of happenings that are, what we call timetagged. But the subject in a hypnotic trance,... has not such a schema of time in which events can be time-tagged. The before and afterness of spatialized time is missing. Such events as can be remembered from the trance by a subject in post-hypnotic amnesia are vague isolated fragments, cuing off the self, rather than spatialized time as in normal remembering. Amnesic subjects can only report if anything, "I clasped my hands, I sat in a chair," with no detail or sequencing.... What is significantly different about the contemporary hypnotic subject, however, is the fact that at the suggestion of the operator, the narratized, sequential memories can often be brought back to the subject, showing that there has been some kind of parallel processing by consciousness outside of the trance. While a subject is doing and saying one thing, his brain is processing his situation in at least two different ways, one more inclusive than the other.

(p. 393)
What Castaneda seems to be implying is that we can develop the capacity for oscillating between these two modes of processing information. In such a manner we would then be capable of re-structuring the self on a profound level. He is suggesting that we can take our narratizing, reflecting 'I' into the realm of pre-reflective intentionality; that we can bring our left hemispheric sequentially organized set to bear on the simultaneous field that the right hemisphere presents. In this manner we can avoid the limitations of left hemispheric functioning (unwarranted pre-suppositions) while taking advantage of its strength which is its ability to impose order (the essential instrument of our volition).

From a historical perspective the advent of depth psychology changed man's conception of himself by removing the construct of the will from its preeminent position in popular thought. Both psychoanalytic and behavioristic theory demonstrated that man was determined rather than determining. As Rollo May (1969) put it, "the unconscious became heir to the power of the will". Behaviorism went even further, putting the causes of man's behavior outside himself. The phenomenological philosophers (for example, Ricoeur) and psychologists (for example, Gendlin and May) have attempted to redress this balance by introducing the concept of intentionality. The essential implication of this concept is that humans create their worlds. It is our intentionality which creates the perceptual/conceptual framework through which we apprehend the world. Little is said, however, about the processes by which we can change that framework. Hopefully, this chapter has gone some way toward that end. Both theoretical explan-
ations of and practical techniques for accessing our intentionality directly and re-programing it have been put forward. Specifically, I have focussed on the issue of identity. Identity has been explicated as one of the major sub-structures within the overall structural framework. Hopefully, I have demonstrated the means by which we can radically alter our self-experience. The mastery of these techniques or skills should remove the need for rigid identity formulations and arrested ego development.
CHAPTER FOUR

Summary and Conclusions

A. The Social Context.

This thesis began by placing the question of identity in a social-historical framework. The basic assumption is that there is a reciprocal relationship between society and its individual members. Erickson (1968) noted this relationship explicitly and defined identity as a psycho-social phenomenon. He reasoned that any society provided its members with a repertoire of roles. Identity was a product of personalizing and incorporating one particular role or a limited combination of roles. This account emphasizes society's contribution while neglecting the individual's contribution to the sense of identity. However, when society is in transition (and this seems to be the current condition) the reciprocal nature of the relationship becomes more obvious. That is, in contemporary times, individuals are attempting to create new roles rather than trying on different ones. In this way the 'inventory' of roles is expanded for subsequent generations.

We can also understand society as a process that, in some important respects, demonstrates the same developmental features as those of the individual's life cycle. In the last chapter it was indicated that as we moved up the developmental scale, introjects or externally-derived definitions of self, became less and less important. Subjectivity and volition replaced role definition, ideological and religious prescriptions as guidelines for behavior, and the resultant sense of personal identity. It was stated that individuals at the higher end of the scale were taking responsibility for their psychological constructs - they were creating them, rather than incorporating existent, externally-derived psychological
structures. For these individuals, consciousness or subjectivity was a creator of structures rather than a reflection of them. Thus, identity growth was a process of returning to the source (consciousness), out of which all structures evolve. We can conceptualize the process as exhibiting three distinct components.

| SUBJECTIVITY (CONSCIOUSNESS) | ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE | PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURES |

As we move from left to right, we move from formlessness to structure; from a dynamic process to a structured product; from potentiality to actuality. At the early stages of development this process is a pre-conscious one. However, to attain the highest stages of ego development, one has to become conscious of the process. This implies a re-owning of the source - a dwelling in one's subjectivity. That is, rather than allowing one's sense of being to be absorbed into the immediate phenomenal world (the product of one's existent mental set), one pulls back and detaches. The process is similar to that which occurs when an individual is prevented from acting out. Only when the impulsive acting out is interrupted can the impulses come to consciousness and insight occur.

Let us now examine if there are parallel processes at work on a societal level, and, if so, how they bear on the issue of identity. Society is understood here as similar to a meta-organism that accumulates wisdom or knowledge over a greater time span than that available, first hand, to individuals. Adrian Van Kaam (Lawrence and O'Connor; 1967) gives a succinct account of the cultural influences on our personal identity project:
To be sure, I assimilate the value-orientations of my culture in a unique and personal way. They become really and solely mine in the current of my development. The existential projects of great cultures and subcultures are ordinarily in tune with the givens of existence in all areas, including that of sex. For they are the fruit of revered traditions, the late bloom of the life experiences of generations. The sober core of such age-old wisdom is normally in harmony with the fundamentals of human existence. This wisdom, however, is incorporated in customs which change with historical situations. It is this embodiment in concrete styles of life which may be at odds with that which we fundamentally are. For these concrete expressions of a culture are dictated not only by the vision of generations but also by the demands of changing situations in which this vision has to be realized. We often tend to confuse the core of the accumulated wisdom of a culture with these historical accretions. (p. 235)

Embedded within Van Kaam's account are three components that demonstrate some affinity with the three that were posited for the process of identity development:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE</th>
<th>VALUE ORIENTATION</th>
<th>CONCRETE CUSTOMS</th>
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Again, as we move from left to right, we move from relative formlessness (as reflected in the vague, amorphous quality of the terms "givens of existence"; and "fundamentals of human existence") to an established direction, an organizing principle ("the value-orientations"); to a concrete, temporal structure ("customs"). Several dichotomies characterize this developmental continuum: from imminent to manifest; from the ideal to the real; from potentiality to actuality; from motive to behavior; and from determining to the determinate. Thus, it is being suggested that a similar
process produces both psychological and social structures: a source posits
an organizing principle which in turn produces relatively stable structures.

The feedback loop is completed when individual members of that
society tap that reservoir of social wisdom (as embodied in custom and
tradition) in the service of building a personal identity. The reader will
recall that individuals who have lost touch with their subjectivity (the
dynamic source of intentionality) develop rigid identity structures. The
same process occurs on a societal level.

If we are not careful, they (customs) take
the place of the values which they were
designed to protect. They take on a life
of their own. Their growth is no longer
rooted in the values of our culture, religion
or subculture. (p. 235)

Thus, an individual constructing an identity with social components that no
longer reflect the intentionality of that culture is indeed in a precarious
position. A concrete example will bring some experiential meaning to the
discussion. A given culture values virginity prior to marriage, and seeks
to safeguard this principle with the custom of chaperoning. Individuals
within that society will assimilate that custom in various ways. The
particular mode of integration will only be revealed when the custom
temporarily breaks down. For example, one woman who had introjected the
custom as a sacred and absolute rule would experience psychological panic
when she finds herself alone with a man. Her ability to respond appropriate­
ly would be severely impaired. Another woman who understands and accepts
the value orientation informing the custom would deal with the same situation
with a personally derived, adaptive response to safeguard that principle.

These two instances reveal in a concrete manner how the social and
the psychological interact to produce the sense of personal identity. These women's reactions to the breakdown of custom are, I believe, typical for many people in today's society: social paralysis followed by a search for personal guidelines. This matter of adjustment reactions to an eroded consensual reality will be explored in greater depth in the next section.

B. ADJUSTMENT REACTIONS

How do we come to terms with the challenge our turbulent time poses? In this section I would like to consider two of the more obvious reactions or strategies that are being attempted. We will first look at a popular individual reaction and then at the response of the social sciences, specifically that of psychology. It will be suggested that both responses are somewhat inadequate and that these inadequacies can be traced to a faulty conception of the epistemological nature of man.

1. The Individualistic Response

The example of the woman who was able to adapt to unforeseen circumstances will be our starting point. The current generation has been termed the 'identity society' and the 'me generation' because it has responded to the dissolving social order by looking inward. Faced with the loss of external stability, we seek an alternate source. While we have given up an external code, we unwittingly import some of the features or attributes of that external standard for our inward quest. That is, we are looking for a thing-like, substantial self. The object of the search is still a sense 'givens'; only the orientation has changed. Introspection is the method and its goal is the discovery of a fully formed, ready made, definable self. In short, we are looking for our constituted self rather than for our constituting nature. We fail to realize that we construe reality as well
as receive it. Thus, we become self absorbed and self preoccupied in our search for a 'given' sense of self and miss the point that the self is an eternal becoming. We may attain a sense of our finite self and miss completely its transcendental activity. In a sense, we are victims of a naturalistic epistemology that sees subject and object as completely separate and independently knowable. While we may have given up our efforts to master the 'objective', social world (it being too fluid and transitory), we act as if the stability and control we seek can be found and discovered inside.

My objective is not to discredit this strategy completely, but to point out its limitations. Thus, there is some value in getting to know one's pre-reflective self; in coming to terms with one's empirically constituted character. With this knowledge one is able to act much more rationally; taking advantage of one's strengths and minimizing one's weaknesses. However, such an approach never allows us to transcend those very attributes. Therefore, in order to go beyond our 'given' identity, we must understand the processes by which it was originally formed and then harness those processes for our current aims or goals. In short, we have to acknowledge that man constitutes both his world and his identity. We have to relinquish our goal of stability and 'givens' if we are to attain our goal of transcendence. Or, at the very least, evolve a synthesis that includes both terms in the dialectic: our constituted character and our constituting nature.

The second common error made by individuals in an attempt to cope with rapidly changing social conditions is intimately related to the first.
That is, even those individuals who are aware that identity is constituted as well as given make a fundamental error when they make identity their primary focus. If, as McLuhan asserts, we have moved from a goal-centered to a role-orientated society, this fundamental error is being repeated on a wide scale. By placing identity at the center of psychological life, we violate what I believe to be a basic psychological axiom: in health, man goes beyond himself. That is, a strong identity can never be achieved by direct means; rather, a strong identity is a by-product of one's project in the world. Ricouer (Lawrence and O'Connor; 1967) gives a clear phenomenological description of the process:

A decision runs toward the future and it is in this intentional aim in the "willed" object or project that the discrete reference to myself is hidden. I determine myself to the extent that I determine myself to... (p. 96; italics mine)

Some concrete examples will make this point clearly. An individual may decide to pursue the identity of an artist. One would predict that the art that such a person would produce would be of a second rate quality. Furthermore, the identity strength gained through such a strategy would be quite fragile. Contrast this with an individual who is enraptured by a vision and wishes to reproduce that vision in an objective art form. The identity of this second individual would not be a self-conscious affair but, rather, a by-product of his continual effort to refine his technique and capture his vision. The same would hold true of individuals who strive after the identity of 'guru' and helper versus those individuals who are client centered.

Finally, by acknowledging that identity is a by-product of our purpose or task, we escape the trap of considering only those experiences that are congruent with our current self concept. In a sense, we come to
realize that our task determines our identity and not vice versa - enabling us to expand our realm of possibilities.

2. The Response of the Social Sciences

There has been one term that permeates the whole discussion of identity and yet remains mysteriously elusive - that term is subjectivity. The possibility of genuine identity change is contingent on the subject's ability to grasp his subjectivity as a distinct phenomenological experience. In our struggle to convey the meaning of this term, we have evoked the phrase 'sense of being'. In this manner we hoped to give the construct an experiential, bodily felt association. At the same time, we attempted to avoid more concrete descriptions because of the danger of importing objective metaphors that would distort rather than clarify my definition. Perhaps the closest I came to achieving that goal was my description of the two modes of attention. The reader will recall that the first mode was characterized by a fusion between awareness and the contents of awareness. The second mode, on the other hand, demonstrated a separation between attention and the object being attended to. That is, a person experiencing the second form of attention would be aware of attending irrespective of the content. In this manner, he would come to 'know', in an experiential sense, the sense of subjectivity. Once having grasped the 'feel' of this experience, he would then be able to direct his subjectivity - to relocate it. It is not enough to detach one's subjectivity from an old identity structure; one must also learn how to imbue an alternative construal with that sense of subjectivity. In this manner, it was demonstrated that the phenomenon of subjectivity was central to the issue of identity formation and change.

Now, we must ask the question as to what part subjectivity can play
in any social science theory. The question is an important one for two reasons. First, the primary function of the social sciences is to serve the larger cultural community. This larger community decides what issues are meaningful or relevant and the social sciences respond with truths or methods for arriving at truths regarding those issues. We've already indicated that the issue of identity is a focal one for our culture and that subjectivity is the central factor in that issue. Therefore, if the social sciences are to be of any help, an adequate account of the role of subjectivity must be included in any theory of identity change. Second, if therapeutic practice is based on and guided by psychological theory, again, subjectivity must have a central role if the therapist is to accomplish his goal of facilitating identity change. Unfortunately, the very methodology of science which the social sciences have imported from the physical sciences mitigates against dealing with subjectivity. A quote from Edie (1976) suggests why this is so:

Since the direct study of consciousness, of historical origins, of functions and processes, of the individual act itself, the existentially real and concrete experience, leads us to the realm of the subjective, the unique, the non-repeatable, the uncontrollable eruptions of free choice, which can neither be predicted nor accounted for in theory, structuralism directs its scientific attention toward the analysis of macroscopic and intersubjective structures, the statistical regularities, the non-temporal and nonparticular synchronic forms to which behavior can be found to conform. (p. 108; italics mine)

Quite simply, when we are truly in our subjectivity, our experience is vivid, fresh, immediate and unique - this moment has never happened before and never will again. It is...non-repeatable; and, for this reason cannot be studied objectively. Subjectivity, as THE activity of the self, is beyond
the methods of science (and even the limits of formal language, according to Wittgenstein, 1921, p. 109). And yet, according to the last chapter it is exactly an embracing and directing of one's subjectivity that is required for identity change. Therapists are referring to this phenomenon when they talk about 'owning one's experience'. It is a palpable sensation rather than a theoretical construct. Imagine a life raft that inflates automatically at the pull of a cord. Imagine this from the point of view of the air.... from a compressed, condensed volume, with a defined shape, that then rushes out to fill a larger, different shape, thereby achieving buoyancy. This is analogous to 'owning our experience' or expanding our subjectivity... our boundaries are expanded and we take on a different shape. We fill our experience rather than being alienated from it. The dilemma is this: mastery of our subjectivity is the essential pre-condition for identity change and yet the social science of psychology cannot say anything about this phenomenon if it wishes to stay within the scientific model. As a result, all psychological theories regarding the nature of man are going to be heavily, if not exclusively, weighted towards an objective account. The therapist can expect no help from theory when it comes to dealing with subjectivity, and yet this factor is the major determinate of ego development. Where theory and practice do merge is in the repeatable - the habits, conditionings, and automatizations of the client. That is, theory will only assist the therapist to deal with what repeats itself in the client's experience and behavior... there is a structural affinity between theory and neurotic behavior. The following quote from Gendlin (Corsini; 1973) brings out the structural aspects of neurotic experience:
One need only ask oneself in what type of situations or relations one becomes tense, engages in certain repetitious scenarios.... One is repeating a thin outline, a "frozen whole" which is the same in all instances and isn't modified by each new situation.... experienced as category rather than as this unique and multiple situation, aspects of one's experiencing are "frozen together" and respond as a whole structure. (p. 333)

Therefore, theory does not indeed conform to experience, but only to a certain class of experience - a developmentally arrested, recurring experience. This correspondence of theory to experience is dangerous if we are unaware of its limitations as it leads to a certain blindness - we cannot see behavior that isn't predicted by theory. As therapists, our perceptions are blinkered by the limits of our theory. Gendlin is working out one of the implications of this thought in the following:

The Freudian and other views want to make the personality into a system of rationally distinct and defined factors. Sartre has given a good critique of the absurdity of the person under the person, that 'censor' who must be conscious of everything in order to decide what the person should not be conscious of. The phenomenological facts that led to positing the unconscious can be accounted for best if a living person is not viewed as so many contents, ideas, wishes, needs, but instead as the bodily felt and preconceptually complex experiencing process.... definite contents arise only after further steps are made from it into words or acts. (p. 333; italics mine)

Or...theory can help explain the structural aspects of the personality without touching the dynamic operations that produced those structures.
C. SUBJECTIVITY: The Source and Creator of Structures.

Underlying much of the preceding discussion has been the question of the essential nature of man. Thus, in the section devoted to the social context this notion was referred to as the 'fundamentals of human existence'. It was suggested that all social and cultural forms must respect and acknowledge this source if they were to be functional. In this way the giveness of existence serves as a guiding principle for complex social interactions. Likewise, psychological theory can only fully respond to the human dilemma by building its system on an adequate definition of our essential nature. Thus, psychological structures will be inadequate to the extent that they are 'out of touch' with this intra-psychic source.

The main thrust of this thesis is to establish the notion that the central feature of human nature is the capacity to create psychological and social structures. In a very important way we create both our world and our identity. The source of this creative activity is our subjectivity. By identifying and re-owning this subjectivity we can begin to reverse the trend to impotence and alienation that the deterministic world view of science (including psychology) reinforces. It is in this context that the following quote from Borgman (1974) gains its power:

The nature of man cannot be known abstractly, but only in re-doing and remaking humanity, that is, on taking again the historical step from what is not yet man to what is man. (p. 75)

That is, the only way we can come to know subjectivity is in the concrete
Subjectivity conforms to different epistemological laws than those derived from the objective domain (for example, the sciences and the logical positivist philosophy). There can be no theoretical knowledge of subjectivity as there can be for objective phenomena such as the nature of helium or the development of cognitive structures.

The epistemology of subjectivity conforms to the following principle laid down by Borgman (1974):

To know is not to have a body of true propositions before one's mind, but to be in possession of (some segment of) reality. (p. 75)

And, "to be in possession of (some segment of) reality" is not to have some abstract claim to it, but to have appropriated it in creating or transforming it. In terms of identity, no component of it can be said to be truly mine unless I have consciously gone through this process. Components of my identity that have not evolved through such a process, are partially assimilated introjects. One way of understanding the construct of introjections is to see them as meaning configurations that have been developed by others and assimilated by the subject in a pre-conscious fashion. Because these configurations were not developed by and for the subject they are more or less inadequate and contain the seed of a later identity crisis. That is, the subject who founds his sense of identity on these introjects or meaning configurations will experience a profound threat to their identity as the value of the introjects are called into question.

The domain of theoretical psychology does include these introjects and therefore, can supply some guidance for therapeutic intervention specific to that concern. That is, there is an affinity between psychological
theory and specific, particular introjects as they are both generated by the same organizational principles. They both conform to the objective dimension of reality - that is, structured according to cause effect relationships and spatial-temporal restraints. Blasi (Loevinger, 1976) makes this same point by pointing to the relationship between Piaget's theoretical results (particularly the features of consistancy and universality) and the extremely limited scope of inquiry (the thin slice of reality that is termed objective).

In Piaget's theory, cognition has the characteristics of generality and openness for two interdependent reasons. The second reason is that Piaget is interested in objects as objects, that is, for their most abstract and general characteristic of being things. He focuses on those action patterns that are common in the handling of all things, and from which the universal characteristics of things, or at least of physical things, derive - for example, extension in space, mobility and reversibility in space and time, and permanence. The explanation for the universality of Piagetian sequences lies here, and not in any genetic-maturational mechanisms. (p. 42, italics mine.)

That is, theoretical psychology can study the relationship between objective reality and psychological structures; pointing out how these structures are constrained by the parameters of objective reality. However, it can not study the other half of the constituent process - the contribution of subjectivity. Each psychological structure has two determinates: the objective and the subjective. This process will be made clearer by comparing it to the evolution of social custom as explicated by Van Kaam (Lawrence and O'Connor, 1967). Each social structure (custom) in order to be viable must respect two conditions. First, it must be consistent with the fundamentals of human existence (subjectivity). Second, it must be appropriate to social/historical conditions, which are the objective determinates. Therefore, the particular form or structure (be it psychological or social) is the interface between the objective and
subjective realms of existence.

The objective constituents can be known theoretically and abstractly, whereas the subjective, can only be known directly in the experiential act. The purpose of this section of the thesis is to endow the phenomenon of subjectivity with equal philosophical and psychological status as that designated to the objective domain. It is an attempt to redress the imbalance that pervades the traditional psychological account of the nature of man. Genlin (Corsini, 1973) is speaking to same notion in the following quote:

The phenomenological facts that led to positing the unconscious can be accounted for best if a living person is not viewed as so many contents, ideas, wishes, needs, but instead as the bodily felt and preconceptually complex experiencing process.... Definite contents arise only after steps are made from it into words or acts. (p. 230, italics mine)

Implied in the above is the notion that "definite contents" are the objective products of an essentially subjective process. This is reminiscent of Plato's notion that "forms are made in the intelligence by virtue of the attention of the will". (Bourke, 1964). Traditional psychology takes these "forms" or structures as the only significant content of the human personality. This thesis attempts to go beyond that account to the very processes that produce these forms. For it is only here, in this formative process, where the possibility of freedom exists. That is, only through understanding the nature of the formative processes can the possibility of genuine identity change be attained.

Toward that end a dualistic meta-structure was posited. The first term in that meta-structure was "pre-reflective intentionality". It was suggested
that this domain was the source of the activity that produced the rationally distinct and defined structures that traditional psychology has appropriated as its field of application. The second term in the meta-structure is "reflective consciousness" which consists of clear and distinct elements organized structurally. Van Kaam (Lawrence and O'Connor, 1967) gives an excellent description of these two terms.

This original dialogue between me and the world is preconscious, it lies on the level of my bodily existence, and it is connected with the structure of my body. Here I do not 'choose', but I 'find' something that is already given before any choice.

(p. 230)

He is, of course, referring to the domain of pre-reflective intentionality. When we become aware of this facet of our existence it has the quality of "giveness" rather than the quality of a created project. The experience could be described as "discovering" one's character rather than "inventing" it.

Likewise, the world or environment is experienced as "the world" rather than "my world". Thus, perceptions are endowed with an objective status - I am seeing things as they are; not just for me, but for everyone. However, the matter is not quite so simple, as Van Kaam goes on to point out:

Below me, therefore, as a conscious subject, is another subject that is preconscious and prepersonal. This subject is my body itself, for all forms of meaning which emerge on this level appear to be connected with the structure of my body. Consequently, I should not identify my rearing giving subjectivity with my conscious and free thought alone. I should realize that my body itself is already a subject.

(p. 230, italics mine)

That is, the sphere of pre-reflective intentionality is already endowing the world with meaning that is over and above its purely objective physical
presence. Thus, when our reflective consciousness attempts to re-work its
clear and distinct content it is already dealing with subjectively tinged
elements. That is, when we begin to engage in introspection the contents
we encounter are thoroughly permeated with pre-conscious assumptions. There­
fore, any therapeutic intervention that does not acknowledge this pre-program­
ing will only achieve superficial results. The question then becomes: how do
we access the program making mechanism directly? This thesis suggests that
deployment of attention is the mechanism by which programs are deveoped. It
suggests that there are two forms of attention and that an individual can
undertake his own re-programing by developing a facility for alternating
at will, between these two modes. The first mode can be described as "con­
crete" attention; and the second, as :abstract: attention. In the first type
attention is re-invested in the percept; in the second, it is diverted to
abstract concepts. If we accept, as a general law of attention, that we be­
come what we attend to, it becomes immediately obvious that if we attend to
our abstract mental life we will develop an abstracted identity. That is,
we will become increasingly 'out of touch' with our environment. The absent
minded professor is a stereotype of this form. Furthermore, if the conceptual
life was based on faulty pre-conscious premises or assumptions this indivi­
dual's conception of reality will be further skewed. To correct such a condi­
tion a program of perceptual re-training would be suggested. (Greenberg and
Safran, 1978). They would be taught to re-invest their attention in the con­
crete percept. In such a way, they would be learning how to achieve and sus­
tain direct, primitive contact with the environment. At first such training
would utilize stimulus objects that have few if any symbolic associations for the subject. Later, symbolically charged stimuli could be introduced. The rational would be that once the client had developed a facility for 'concrete attention' they would be able to discriminate symbolic and conceptual intrusions into the mental field. In this manner they would become conscious of the pre-programming that formerly directed their perceptions while, at the same time, build up a data base of relatively uncontaminated information. That is, by consciously engaging in concrete, attentional activities the client is simultaneously re-structuring his pre-reflective program. At a developmentally later stage, when the client wishes to engage in reflective analysis, he will be dealing not with introjects but with elements that were subjectively and volitionally created.

Finally, it was stated that concrete attention was the dynamic mechanism by which the content of the pre-reflective self was accumulated and elaborated. The reader will recall that this form of attention was characterized by the lack of clear and distinct boundaries between subject and object. Furthermore, the work of Ornstein (1977) indicated that this phenomenon of blurred boundaries was characteristic of the content of the right hemisphere. On the basis of this correspondence it was suggested that the right hemisphere was the site of the pre-reflective self - the body ego. On the other hand, 'abstract attention' was posited as the dynamic mechanism by which the content of the reflective, self-conscious self was accumulated and developed. The defining attribute of this form of attention was the clear distinction between awareness and the contents of awareness - that is, a clear boundary between subject and object.
Again Ornstein's work indicates that this is also the characteristic of left hemispheric functioning. Finally, it was suggested that this phenomenologically distinct awareness corresponded to what has been termed "subjectivity". Identity change, therefore, involves separating one's sense of subjectivity from the content it is 'normally' fused with. That is, one utilizes that form of attention that is capable of standing back or taking distance, in order to come to know the contents and programs of the pre-reflective self. One detaches one's subjectivity from the vessel or structure that it normally inhabits in order to know it in a self-conscious way. The transition is from being to knowing... whereas formerly, one was one's pre-reflective self; now, one knows one's pre-conscious programing. Once this step has occurred, one's subjectivity is volitionally deployable. That is, it is no longer bound to or trapped within its accustomed framework. The way is free now to imagine alternative identity construals and to invest one of them with this sense of subjectivity. This investment is accomplished by bringing one's concrete attention to bear on a visualization that embodies an alternate identity construal. That is, the reflective self generates an objective possibility - an alternate identity configuration from the point of view of the observer. At this stage in the process one is looking at this new self-image. The next step involves dwelling in and looking out from this new configuration. This process has been termed subjectivizing. Whereas, in the immediately preceding step one had a new self-image; now, one has a new identity. The process can summed up neatly with the following self statement: "How would I feel if that was the way I looked?" As soon as the question is asked, the answering experience begins. This new identity is consolidated by the exercise of concrete attention. That is, one's perception of the world will implicitly bear the stamp of this new identity configuration. One's new pre-reflective self will
be projected on and absorbed into one's perceptions of one's environment. Therefore, by concretely attending to one's percepts, one is simultaneously and implicitly reinforcing the new sense of identity. Instead of being undermined by man's proclivity to unwittingly project his pre-reflective self unto the world, we take advantage of it. We, thus, succeed in directly accessing our intentionality. Our intentionality comes under our conscious control and we are no longer destined to live out our childhood programing.

CONCLUSIONS:

In this final section we will look at some of the implications of the above discussion. Specifically, it will be suggested that an alternative model of human functioning (as opposed to the traditional, psychological model) must be developed if the species is to respond to the challenge of the current social crisis.

Let us begin by putting the discussion in context. Blasi (Loevinger, 1976) gives his account of the process by which one model or paradigm is replaced by another:

A paradigm is only given up in favor of an alternative presumably better one. Ultimately, anomalous results and unsolved problems accumulate to the extent that more and more members of the scientific community become uneasy. This pervasive mental tension constitutes a state of crisis. During such a crisis the way is open to new possible paradigms. Characteristic of the crisis is a concern for fundamental assumptions of the paradigm that are simply taken for granted when it is in full bloom. When competing paradigms are offered, however, there is no clear superordinate set of rules by which one can choose.

(italics mine)
The implicit suggestion of much of this thesis is that academic, theoretical psychology is indeed experiencing the type of crisis that Blasi is referring to. I have briefly investigated some of the fundamental assumptions that permeate psychoanalytic, behavioristic, and structuralistic models of psychological functioning. I have demonstrated that none of these models give an adequate account of the process by which psychological structures are formed. More correctly, it has been suggested that these models give an exclusively deterministic account of the formative process. That is, psychological structures are held to be derived from and determined by the objective environment. I went on to state that such a conclusion was unavoidably pre-determined by methodological considerations. That is, each of these theories attempted to validate their work by emulating the model of enquiry established by nineteenth century physics. This model restricted its domain of enquiry to only objective (i.e., observable) data. When the social sciences imported this methodological restriction they radically limited any investigation of the 'nature of man' to only his objective dimension. As a result all psychological experimentation could only demonstrate objective determinates of man's behavior. As this type of evidence accumulated, psychology seemed to support an exclusively deterministic account of man. Although no social scientist of any repute would explicitly defend such a position, nevertheless the status and authority of objective evidence and the almost total neglect of subjectivity tends to promote and reinforce a one sided view of human nature. Therefore, one of my objectives in this thesis is to endow the realm of subjectivity with equal philosophical and psychological status. This goal has been partially attained by describing subjectivity's contribution to the creation of psychological structures. Let us review this process in order to refresh our memories. I will begin with a definition of psychological structure as a
reified representation of reality. That is, a structure is a hypostasized depiction of reality. It exhibits stability and endurance over time. This condition is in marked contrast to being flooded by sensation; a chaotic array of stimuli that exhibits no coherence or stability. Thus, a human being who had not evolved any psychological structures would experience reality as a formless, rush of continual stimulation. I am implying, therefore, that these structures impose order, and meaning on the raw sensation. The question must now be asked: where do these structures come from? Royce (quoted by Bourke, 1964) makes the following observation:

Willing implies the mental initiative required to alter the facts of experience, over and above the manner in which they are passively received by the intellect. (p. 211)

Moreover, willing is the activity of the subject. That is, it is through the dynamic activity of the subject that meaning (pattern or order) is brought to raw sensation... willing creates psychological structures.

James (1917) has made the point that willing refers to the effort to sustain one's undivided attention on a single object. Thus, it is an act of concentrated attention that rescues fleeting impressions from everlasting transience. Without this capacity to focus our attention we would be lost in a continual flux - one sensation gestalt rapidly and imperceptually dissolving into another. By attending to a perceptual object we bring stability and permanence to that object. We can summon up that object even when it is not physically present. This capacity is indicative of the presence of a psychological structure. Attention, therefore, is the dynamic mechanism by which structures are created. It could be said that attention is the phenomenological process of epistemology. That is, it is the process by which knowledge comes into being; the means by
by which phenomena change their state from potentiality to actuality. This is particularly true of our identity: we become what we attend to. For example, if we constantly attend to our neurotic possibilities, we become concrete neurotics. However, I am not merely advocating 'the power of positive thinking' for our attention can be trapped as well as deployed. When attention is trapped (when we are victimized by obsessive thoughts, for example) it will not obey our conscious intentions. In such a condition our attention has been channelized by a previously established pre-conscious intentionality. That is, the primary psychological structures, (that our attention developed early in our developmental history) operate so as to bind our attention to them. The more we attend to and utilize these structures, the more entrenched they become. Our autonomy, as subjects, is deprived by the very structures that were originally designed to serve us. We become servo-mechanisms of our structures rather than vice versa.

This brings up the whole issue of volition and choice. In my model of health subjects would make the choice as to what features in their perceptual field they would attend to. Instead of, 'we become what we behold', it would be, 'we choose what to attend to - we attend to it - we become it'. In other words, our subjectivity (the source of our being) establishes a purpose and this purpose functions as parameters for a field of investigation. Our attention then explores that field, or space. This act of exploration simultaneously articulates the details of that field and creates a psychological structure. That is, the directed perceptual investigation is, at one and the same time, the means by which the psychological structure is built. (Piaget's sensori-motor schemes are the most primitive example of this process.) The permanency or stability of the resultant structure
will depend on the commitment of one's subjectivity to the investigation. That is, a whole hearted involvement in the exploration will result in a much more stable structure than a merely cursory examination will produce.

Turning our attention back to the quote that opened this section, we may ask the question if the processes underlying the creation and succession of paradigms are similar to those involved in the creation and succession of psychological structures. If we substitute the term 'psychological structure' for the term 'paradigm' that appeared in Blasi's original quote the process similarities will be revealed.

A paradigm [psychological structure] is only given up in favor of an alternative presumably better one. Ultimately anomalous results and unsolved problems accumulate to the extent that more and more members of the (scientific) community become uneasy. This pervasive mental tension constitutes a state of crisis. During such a crisis, the way is open to new possible paradigms [psychological structures]. Characteristic of this crisis is a concern for fundamental assumptions of the paradigm [psychological structure] that are simply taken for granted when it is in full bloom. When competing paradigms [psychological structures] are offered, however, there is no clear set of superordinate rules by which one can choose.

(Loevinger, 1976; p. 300-301)

It is my contention that the crisis that Blasi refers to will not be resolved by the discovery of superordinate rules. On the contrary, it is my belief that this is the wrong direction to proceed. These superordinate rules can be viewed as a structure and as such they would conform to the general law of all structures (be they social customs or psychological structures) in that they are created and not discovered - we will make these rules and not in an arbitrary fashion. Therefore, to resolve the crisis we must return to the source or origins of these structures: subjectivity. Van Kaam (Lawrence and O'Connor, 1967) makes this same point on a cultural level:

Only the leading thinkers of a religion or culture are capable
of going back to the sources from which their religion or culture sprang. This return to the sources enables them to distinguish between what is fundamental and what is incidental in their sexual safeguards [social customs]. We may call this procedure 're-sourcing'. When the psychotherapist puts up the danger sign it may be time for a religion or culture not to deny its heritage but to return to its sources. (p. 238)

By origin or source I am not referring to some anthropological fossil but rather an existential state of being. Borgman (1974) makes essentially the same point as follows:

The origin, even as Aristotle and Vico later conceive of it is not the dead shell that is left behind, but the initial and pervasive force of the thing. (p. 238)

Thus, the paradigm that eventually emerges as superior will be the one that probes deepest into the nature of subjectivity before elaborating any rules that apply it to the transient objective work.

The viability of any structure (be it psychological, social, or a theoretical paradigm) is dependent on its appropriateness, its fit or match with two conditions: the subjective and objective realms of existence. That is, the particular form that a structure takes will be determined by both these factors. These factors operate as constraints to which the structures must conform. Thus, when faced with a unique situation one must first get in touch with one's unconditioned subjectivity, one's immutable and non-temporal source, and then, attend to the concrete, temporal, objective aspects of the situation. Such a procedure insures that the resultant structure is a viable one.

I am suggesting that theoretical psychology is confronted with such a situation by contemporary society. Furthermore, the resolution of the struggle between competing paradigms will be accomplished by the emergence of a paradigm that guarantees a central place for subjectivity.
Of course, 'super-ordinate rules' will be articulated that will 'prove' the superiority of this new paradigm. However, it is my belief that these rules are a result of the post hoc analysis of the new gestalt-paradigm and not the generating principles that create it. Thus, it is my belief that the creation of paradigms partakes of the same existential ingredients that constitute the evolution of psychological structures and social customs. Heinz Kohut (1977) gives the most lucid and profound description of such an evolutionary leap in thought that I have come across and I will conclude this thesis with his quote.

No, the phenomena in question, the mutation in human thought I have in mind, is neither a revolutionizing new technique nor a revolutionizing new theory. It is both - and being both, it is more than both. It is an advance on that basic level of man's relationship to reality where we cannot yet differentiate data from theory, where external discovery and internal shift in attitude are still one and the same, where the primary unit between observer and observed is still unobstructed and unobscured by secondary abstracting reflection. On this basic level of experience, the most primitive and the most developed mental functions appear to be at work simultaneously, with the result not only that there is no clear separation between observer and observed, but also thought and action are still one. The greatest steps in the history of science . . . are concretized thought or put more correctly, they are 'action thought', a precursor of thinking. (p. 299; italics mine)
REFERENCE LIST


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