

**WHAT HINDERS OR FACILITATES SUCCESSFUL CRISIS NEGOTIATION**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**In**

**THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology  
And Special Education**

We accept this thesis *as* conforming to the required standard

**THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA**

**September, 2001**

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## ABSTRACT

Referred to as "law enforcement's most effective non-lethal weapon," crisis negotiation is used successfully around the world but the elements that lead to success have been presented based on anecdote and impression. The present study attempts to analyze the critical incidents within law enforcement responses to barricaded subjects and suicidal persons and determine what facilitates or hinders success in crisis negotiation. Flanagan's (1954) Critical Incident Analysis methodology was used to investigate how police crisis negotiators "build bridges out of barricades." A total of 717 critical incidents were collected. Fourteen categories emerged from an inductive study of the incidents reported by the 22 participants. The results indicate that the following factors can contribute to either success or failure: Teamwork, active listening, relationship building, logistics, building a bridge, leadership, learning and development, using intuition, negotiator's personal resources, providing information and direction, support, and time.

The results also indicate that success in crisis negotiation can be hindered by the subject's orientation and the subject's behaviour. These are elements that can clearly be influenced by the negotiator but are outside of his/her direct control.

There was a strong emphasis on teamwork and the need to strive toward synchronizing the effort of command, tactical, and negotiation units to form a unified crisis response team. The dominance of this category seems to emanate from the continued presence of tension between these units and the desire of negotiators to present a unified presence so that a bridge can be built from chaos to a calm, safe environment.

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## FOREWORD

My experience as a police officer in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police over the past 21 years and my involvement as a hostage negotiator have drawn me to this research. My interest in helping people in crisis brought me into the police profession and over the past 12 years has moved me into counselling psychology.

In 1988, while working in an investigative unit dealing with crimes against persons (sexual offences and homicide), I recognized a need to help those in trauma and crisis situations. This was a call to be in a position to help those who were in crisis and those who were dealing with the traumatic effects of past experience. During the next four years I worked full time and studied part time earning my Masters degree in counselling psychology. The experience of going from classes of advanced empathy skills to interrogating an individual who had just butchered an innocent victim was incredible. I recall many times going from work to class or class to work and hearing the "grinding of the gears" as I shifted from one world to the other. I remember using active listening with suspects and interrogating clients. The counselling skills worked well for getting confessions from suspects but I think my professors lost some sleep thinking about my initial work with clients!

Since 1993 a number of events (ie. Waco and Gustafson Lake) have taken place that caused law enforcement to take a more proactive look at how we respond to crisis. In 1997 the RCMP set up a task force to study major case management and response to major criminal (extremist) conflict. I was given the opportunity to pursue a PhD in counselling psychology at the University of British Columbia with a view to developing an operational psychologist position. The aim is to study the process of crisis negotiation and then to serve as a consultant within policing.



## Glossary of Terms

**Barricaded Person** - one who has isolated him/herself in a protected position, usually with a weapon, and is threatening harm to self and others.

**Containment** - forming a tactical perimeter to assure safety of citizens by limiting the movements of an individual with a weapon.

**Crisis Negotiation** - managing a temporary period of disorganization and high emotion through discussion with a goal of peaceful resolution (McMains & Mullins, 1996).

**Crisis Negotiator** - a person (usually a police officer) designated to do crisis negotiation.

**Crisis Intervention** - a set of active listening skills designed to slow incidents down, engage subjects in problem-solving and defuse the crises of the barricaded person (McMains & Mullins, 1996).

**Critical Incident** - an observable human activity that permits inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the act and where its consequences are sufficiently definite so as to leave little doubt about its effects (Flanagan, 1954).

**Critical Incident Technique** - "an outline of procedures for collecting observed incidents of human behavior in such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and developing broad psychological principles (Flanagan, 1954, p. 327).

**Hostage** - a living person held against his/her will and used as currency or security for certain terms or demands (McMains & Mullins, 1996).

**Hostage Negotiation** - a communication process where the negotiator uses the contrast of being able to hurt the hostage taker with a genuine desire to help. This powerful tool of influence underlies skillful listening and analysis of motives (Cialdini, 1984).

**Incident Commander** - a law enforcement officer designated to oversee all tactical and negotiational responses at a crisis incident.

**Intelligence Gathering** - the collection of information relevant to the person(s) and the environment that enables responders to make informed decisions.

**“Ninja”** - a colloquial term given to members of the tactical team who are dressed in camouflage.

**Psychological Consultant** - a psychologist or psychiatrist whose primary responsibility is to assess the mental and emotional health of the person in crisis and to provide advice to the negotiators and incident commander. A secondary role can be to monitor the stress reactions of the responders.

**Successful Negotiation** - a conclusion to a negotiated incident where negotiation was used to preserve life and minimize human casualty.

**Tactical Team** - a team of law enforcement officers highly trained in special weapons and tactics.

**Tactical Rescue** - the retrieval of a person(s) from the other side of the barricade on the part of the tactical team through the use of stealth or dynamic entry.

**Third Party Intermediary** - a person, usually a civilian, who is used to communicate to the barricaded person in hopes of facilitating a peaceful resolution. Often the intermediary is a person who has a positive relationship with the barricaded person.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Whether a hostage taking or a barricaded subject incident, negotiators are faced with a multi-faceted scenario where emotional volatility is often combined with determination and commitment to a tragic ending:

On February 6, 1996 at 0700 hours, John Miranda, a 6'5", 260 lb. Hawaiian male with a record for violence and under the influence of "ice" and cocaine, walked into his former work site with a 12 gauge Winchester pump shotgun loaded with eight slugs. He took five hostages and then when Honolulu police showed up he fired two rounds at them and a third into the leg of Guy George, the owner of the store. Miranda then phoned a local radio station and told them that someone was going to die. He then taped the shotgun to the head of one of the hostages and walked outside to look for Guy George who had managed to escape. The police were then able to talk to Miranda for several hours who demanded that \$20,000 be taken to a location and thrown into the air in support of the Hawaiian Movement for Solidarity. After eight hours of negotiation, Miranda began a countdown from "60". At about "18", the hostage ducked and spun, at which time Miranda was shot by police snipers. The hostage had one scratch and Miranda was D.O.A. Two weeks after the incident, Miranda's girlfriend's body was found; he had killed her before the siege.

On January 16, 1996, a series of robberies ended in a high speed chase with police following the suspect vehicle for 120 miles on Interstate 5 in California. The suspects, Qin Duk, a 38 year old Vietnamese Army Veteran and John Colandro, a 21 year old Filipino,

fired on and hit several police vehicles. The chase ended with a collision in downtown Los Angeles at 1630 hours and the gunfight continued as suspects ran into the Hall of Records building and took a female security guard hostage. Duk made initial demands of \$500,000 and an armoured truck. Much later in the negotiations he demanded Coca-Cola which was delivered to the suspects. Negotiations took a turn when Colandro accidentally shot himself in the foot. The negotiators suggested that he come out with the hostage and get medical aid but Duk refused to allow it. Negotiations continued with Duk and he was talked into "saving face" so he could surrender. At 0100 hours, the suspects surrendered. Duk later said that the negotiators confused him into surrendering and he wished he could have died in the Hall of Records building; he later hanged himself in jail.

Despite the violence exhibited in some of these scenarios, the fact that so many hostage/barricade incidents end peacefully is directly attributed to relationship building and communication with the hostage-taker/barricaded person.

#### Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to develop a set of categories that describes what facilitates or hinders successful negotiation with hostage-takers and barricaded persons. This area represents a novel adaptation for counselling psychology but it is all about people in crisis, relationship building, and communication. According to Feldman & Johnson (1995), the application of psychotherapeutic principles to hostage negotiation will facilitate better understanding of the complex dynamics involved in hostage situations.

The study will address the present deficits in research and in practice by (a) reviewing the types of incidents and types of perpetrators, (b) identifying theory within practice, and (c) developing purposeful themes of interaction with hostage takers and barricaded

persons.

### Rationale and relevance of the study

The area of mediation/negotiation has really never been embedded in any discipline. The legal field has more or less laid claim to it because it touches on issues of law, rights of individuals, and outcomes. Although mediation/negotiation is adversarial in its beginning, it must be process-based and solution-focussed. It is all about people adjusting to problematic events, seeing how they surmount obstacles, and overcome personal tragedy. There is a need for information from both fields and I believe this area of crisis negotiation is a prime area for counselling psychology research.

Listed below are four reasons for conducting a study of crisis negotiation as it relates specifically to crisis negotiations and communication with barricaded persons:

1. There is a high incidence of hostage taking and barricaded persons in North America (Hammer, Van Zandt, & Rogan, 1994).
2. The potential for conflict continues to grow. Psychologist and police consultant, Mike Webster (1997a), describes this potential by saying that:

As our world and the distance between us become smaller, the chances for us to collide with one another, either physically or philosophically, increase. Conflict seems more like a growth industry than a transient aberration. However, it is a conscious act...and if we apply our moral strength and intellectual faculties to the topic, we can only improve our ability to deal with it (p.24).

The pressure is mounting in the relatively new conflict areas of environmental issues, land claims, and moral dilemmas (e.g., abortion and euthanasia). The more traditional conflicts created by political and philosophical differences, international and domestic

terrorism, criminal activity, and the broad range of mental and emotional eruptions, are also contributing to this growth industry.

3. There is a lack of systematic research. The present universe of knowledge is anecdotal and impression-focussed, with a few exceptions (Donohue and Roberto, 1993; Richardson, 1983; Rogan & Hammer, 1995). The largest volume of literature is written by police and for police and is valuable in recommending best practices that inform the crisis responders. There is a need for a research base. Thus far, the research has come mainly from sociology (Richardson, 1983) and communication (Donohue and Roberto, 1993; Rogan & Hammer 1995). It has been useful in recognizing the need to build strategies for creating relationship and developing purposeful communication.

4. Models of hostage negotiation are largely outcome-based and the "do it or die" mentality lurking under the surface is limiting process-based negotiation (Webster, 1997). Research into attitudes of negotiators might reveal a lack of understanding of process. Since the vast majority of negotiators are police officers with considerable police experience and observed skill in communication, there may be few deficits in the actual conversation across the barricade. The question arises around intentionality and purpose. If the models are not specific, the communication will follow the same pattern.

#### A Tale of Two Paradigms

There are two paradigms that exist in the field of crisis management today and many that are in this field find themselves caught between an old modus operandi of what I will term "surround and exterminate", and the newer concept of "contain and negotiate". Given the fact that negotiation in hostage/barricaded subject incidents is a relatively new phenomenon and the paradoxical nature of community policing/law enforcement in

general, it is not surprising to find two perspectives. The two paradigms become evident as we look at the two parties involved in the hostage/barricaded subject situations.

It would not come as a great surprise to know that police are likely to be more aggressive with a known criminal than a citizen with no criminal background (Calhoun & Brooks, 1997). There is no need to cover up this predisposition but there is a need to address this issue with those whose mandate is to "serve and protect". There is a need to sort through the biases and look at the barricade and hostage situations through a wide lens. Both from the "Peace Officer" status and the value of human life perspective, police officers must be willing to first seek non-lethal methods of action. However, there are times when the use of deadly force is inevitable and often this is initiated by a subject's impulsive act. The need for police officers to understand their biases is further emphasized for their own protection. Media reports, public inquiries, and coroner's jury reports have put the decision-making processes of crisis commanders, negotiators, and tactical team members on centre stage.

The policing response to hostage/barricaded subject situations is to send in a team of specialists. Unfortunately, in many cases it is two teams that may be under the same label but represent two paradigms of thought. The success of the response is often dictated by how well the tactical team and the negotiation team work together.

Some tactical teams believe the primary goal of the negotiator is to prolong the incident while they maintain the perimeter. Friction can surface especially given the fact that the tactical units are often lying in the dirt or mud waiting for the negotiators who are usually seated in a warm environment with a hot cup of coffee. In reality, the negotiators can provide the tactical team with valuable intelligence on weapons, subject location, and

potential for violence. This can allow the tactical team to develop a strategy. Some negotiation teams may see the tactical unit as a bunch of macho "ninjas" wanting to solve everything by force. Again, this is a misperception; tactical teams understand the need to allow negotiators the opportunity to deal with the subject. Implementing an assault plan without gathering information could be disastrous (Hannah & Liddicote, 1992).

Other differences between the units are methods of training and stressors. Tactical units are trained for technical efficiency and are constantly practising techniques of entry, diversion, movement, take down and accuracy in shooting. Negotiators are trained in verbal communication and relationship-building techniques. Both units need each other and the goal of peaceful resolution to high-risk incidents is shared. Although the source of job-related stress emanates from the same source, the frustrations are different.

Anticipatory stress is especially high among tactical members who must prepare for a potential violent confrontation at any time. Cumulative stress is a factor for the negotiator who is spending hours talking to an agitated and often psychotic subject who may harm innocent hostages at any time. Both teams are affected by being in a situation where the subject seems to be in control of police action, a situation quite different than the norm in policing.

The gap that often exists between tactical and negotiation teams is a factor that clearly hindered negotiations at Waco on February 28, 1993 (Sage, 1998). It will continue to hinder successful negotiations until remediated by a sound selection process and effective training.

#### Selection and training process

In an informal survey taken at both the Canadian Police College course in February,



1998 and the FBI course in June, 1998, I determined that there were still many departments both in Canada and the United States without any formal negotiator selection policy. Of those departments most are relying on personal characteristics similar to those detailed by Fuselier (1981). Neither the FBI nor the RCMP, at that time, had a formal screening process.

Following this up in a Fax Survey of seven major American police departments and seven major Canadian police departments the trend was further substantiated with all of the respondents (71%) confirming a selection process. Some of the selection and training practices are described in Appendix A.

#### Approach to the study

A research method that clearly embraces the question of what facilitates or hinders successful crisis negotiation is Flanagan's (1954) Critical Incident Technique. This methodological approach will be used in this study because it will allow police negotiators, trainers, and psychological consultants an opportunity to (a) produce a list of components critical for task performance; (b) develop a selection criteria for negotiators, and; (c) re-define training needs. We will see how the negotiation process is viewed and how we can better build bridges out of barricades.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Most of the professional literature on barricaded and hostage negotiations is written by mental health professionals or police with the purpose of making police tactics more effective. It is oriented to practical issues such as (a) selection of negotiators (Allen, Fraser, & Inwald, 1989; Fuselier, 1988; Getty & Elam, 1988; Strentz, 1984) (b) training (Davis, 1992; Feldmann, 1998; Mirabella & Trudeau, 1981; Miron & Goldstein, 1979) (c) roles for psychologists (Butler & Leitenberg, & Fuselier, 1993; Wardlaw, 1984; Webster, 1997) (d) typology (Borum & Strentz, 1992; Goldaber, 1979; Lanceley, 1981; Strentz, 1986) (e) strategies (Feldmann, 1998; McGowan, 2000).

The communication (negotiation) approach to hostage/barricade situations began with detectives Frank Bolz and Harvey Schlossberg being assigned by New York Police Commissioner, Patrick Murphy to the first hostage negotiation training program (Bolz, 1979). Since that time it has become standard procedure and is co-ordinated by specially trained police professionals. The "negotiate first" policy led to the development of specialized hostage negotiation teams with negotiators, tactical assault (TAC) team, and a command structure. The first phase of response was, and still is, to contain the perpetrator, evacuate the area, and gather intelligence. Negotiation begins as soon as is practicable and continues for days in some cases (Bolz, 1979; Fuselier, 1981). Mirabella and Trudeau (1981), in their study of 29 hostage incidents, found the longest duration to be forty hours and the shortest to last one hour with an average duration of twelve hours. Recent HOBAS (Hostage Barricade Database System) statistics (FBI, 2001) reveal the

following in regard to incident duration (n=2117):

**Incident Duration (FBI, 2001)**

Incid. Duration	Percentage
< 1 hr.	9.3%
1 - 2 hr.	18.8%
2 - 4 hr.	36.0%
4 - 6 hr.	17.9%
6 - 9 hr.	9.0%
9 - 12 hr.	2.6%
12 - 18 hr.	2.6%
18 - 36 hr.	2.7%
> 36 hr.	1.0%

Selection and training of hostage negotiators

The impact of today's litigious society has placed police selection and training in the spotlight and the reaction must be much more swift than the proverbial "deer caught in the headlight." A recent Coroner's Jury Recommendation in the province of Ontario is an example of society's concern for the way crisis incidents are handled by the police. These recommendations were made on December 23, 1997 and pertain to a barricaded subject case where negotiations failed and the 21 year old male subject shot himself: (Note: This is not the complete list of recommendations)

- (1) Criteria be developed to test, interview, and select only the most appropriate persons who will be trained to act as negotiators in hostage/barricaded persons situations (Crisis Situation Negotiators).
- (2) Crisis Situation Negotiators should, after initial training at the Canadian Police College or such other recognized police training agency, be exposed to further training on a regular basis to refresh their skills. This training should be both

internal (simulation exercises, exercises with other agencies) and external (refresher courses, conferences, written materials).

(3) Crisis Situation Negotiators should be exposed to the training referred to in paragraph 2 at a minimum of once a year but preferably semi-annually and be required to re-qualify for this status bi-annually.

(4) All Tactical Response Teams include a trained Crisis Situation Negotiator who will be present at all call-outs. Where physically possible, the Crisis Situation Negotiators should be located on-site to ensure good communications between the Crisis Situation Negotiator, the Tactical Response Team, and the Incident Commander.

(5) All Crisis Situation Negotiators be relieved every six hours wherever this is possible.

(6) A Crisis Response System should develop linkages and protocols with community agencies to assist one another in dealing with individuals with an emotional disturbance.

(7) Cross-training between police services and personnel from the Crisis Response System take place in order to deal with future critical incidents.

(8) The Crisis Response System should include counselling services to victims family or referrals to agencies capable of offering these services.

These recommendations encapsulate most of the recommendations made over the years by police psychologists and trainers and certainly go much further. The call for more team development and joint training has been made consistently (Davis, 1992; Feldmann, 1998; Logan, 1999; Mirabella & Trudeau, 1981; Webster, 1997b).

### Selection of negotiators

The earliest guidelines for selection were proposed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 1975. They suggested that the negotiator should possess the following characteristics:

- (1) Be ambitious, viewing the confrontation as a chance for success rather than a possible failure. He should be a veteran winner. Age, however, should be considered only in that people of the same age seem more compatible, especially if the abductor is emotionally disturbed.
- (2) Must be capable of developing a game plan and then putting it to use. He must know as much as possible about his opponent. He must be able to translate this knowledge quickly into arguments that appear logical and irrefutable.
- (3) Must be able to avoid emotional involvement with the victim of abductor. He must understand himself well enough to know when anger, fear or frustration are taking hold and reducing his effectiveness.
- (4) Must have the killer instinct - the ability to look the opponent in the eye, demand concession and sense a willingness to concede and compromise. Having done so, he must be able to state the solution in terms understood by and acceptable to his opponent (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 1975).

These criteria were revised by Fuselier (1981) and the negotiator, a volunteer experienced police officer, was described in the following desirable personality traits:

- (1) He [or She] must possess emotional maturity. He should accept abuse, ridicule, and insulting statements without responding emotionally. When those

around him are anxious, frightened, or confused, he should be able to maintain a clear head.

(2) He should be a good listener and have excellent interviewing skills.

(3) He should be a person who easily establishes credibility with others.

(4) He should have the ability to use logical arguments to convince others that his viewpoint is rational and reasonable.

(5) He should be able to communicate with persons from the lowest to the highest socio-economic class.

(6) He should have "practical intelligence," common sense, and be "street wise."

(7) He should have the ability to cope with uncertainty and be willing to accept responsibility with no authority.

(8) He should have total commitment to the negotiation approach.

(9) He should understand that if negotiations are not progressing and lives are in imminent danger, he will have to assist in planning an assault to rescue the hostages (pp. 14-15).

Miron (1979) was the first to suggest a screening process for negotiators. He recommended a battery of tests that included a Personality Factors Questionnaire, a Belief Alternatives Test, a Motivational Analysis Test, and a Personal Opinion Test. Goldaber (1984) proposed an evaluation process similar to the Clinical Comprehensive Examination in Counselling Psychology. His recommendation was to use an unstructured interview format and a three-member board to evaluate candidates on knowledge and skill in communication. McMains (1986) reported another process used by the San Antonio Police Department. It was similar to an assessment centre in which candidates were given

a scenario and asked a set series of questions about the scenario. Ratings were based on personal characteristics displayed. The characteristics examined were derived from the ratings of 250 SAPD officers as being the most important in dealing with the general public.

Perhaps the study most directed at the subject of selection is that reported by Getty & Elam (1986) who surveyed law enforcement administrators for personality characteristics that they believed important in selecting negotiators. They then selected 39 negotiators and obtained personality profiles through the use of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). A scoring key was developed from the test results and the key was tested against the 39 negotiators and 31 entry level police officers in a control group. Although there was a large overlap between the groups they were able to describe a hostage negotiator as being verbally fluent, having a good "self-image", having reasoning ability, and being sensitive to others. A major limitation of this study was the inability to determine whether the sample of negotiators represented a sample of successful negotiators or just persons designated as negotiator with a poor record or none at all.

Davis (1987) clearly stated the importance of selecting negotiators carefully and then training them diligently. His considerations are maximizing negotiator performance and minimizing legal ramifications. Establishing a clear definition of task should precede a list of requirements and qualifications. Davis recommended a psychological evaluation with standardized testing and an interview with a mental health professional. He further specifies identifying general characteristics (ie. maturity, intelligence, mental agility, empathy, interest in people, and cool-headedness). These characteristics can be assessed

by looking at past performance, talking with supervisors, and by personal interview.

Davis, a psychologist, posited that the negotiator must be one with "intuition, savvy, and automatic instant decision-making reflexes of an experienced street wise cop" (p.55).

There appears to be gaps in the literature on this subject and the largest gap is between 1987 and 1994. The gaps may be linked to world events. Certainly the Olympic Village incident in Munich in 1972 appears to have been the catalyst for the earlier writings on this subject and, more recently, the Waco incident in 1993 has ignited interest. Hammer, Van Zandt, & Rogan (1994) surveyed 100 hostage negotiation team leaders from Federal, State, and Local law enforcement agencies in the United States in order to focus on issues such as selection and training, incident response, use of mental health professionals, and establishing a national clearinghouse. It is important to note that the survey took place one year prior to Waco and it may be difficult to generalize the findings to today's more heightened awareness of the issues and the needs in the area of negotiation. The response rate on the survey was 76% and the following results relate to the subject of selection:

- (1) Women comprised between 0-20% of hostage negotiation teams.
- (2) Teams consisted of 81-100% Caucasian members.
- (3) Teams were comprised of members whose police duties were either patrol (40%), investigations (40%), or administrative (20%).
- (4) Fewer than half (45%) of the teams had any written selection policy (P.9).

The latest research in selection is a study in progress at Nova Southeastern University. In an unpublished document, Vakili, Gonzalez, Allen, & Westwell (1998) studied fifteen negotiators, eleven men and four women, from a southeastern metropolitan police department. Subjects were ranked independently by two police psychologists on skill



ability, emotional management, listening ability, and consistency of negotiation performance. They were also assessed using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2), the California Psychological Inventory-Revised (CPI-R), the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), and the Shipley. Successful negotiators were found to be reliable, dependable, more reserved and socially withdrawn. They have a higher base level of arousal and awareness, confidence, resourcefulness, efficiency, and have a dutiful sense of morality. They show an above average ability to function as a team member and are more likely to emphasize co-operation over manipulation. Although research was hindered by sample size, trends were found and a measure has been developed that will be evaluated in future research for its psychometric properties.

#### Training of negotiators

The past ten years has seen an increased interest in the training of crisis negotiators. This may be due to a number of factors. Predominant in these factors is increased public interest and media attention to hostage/barricaded person incidents. While our prime motivation is increased public safety through improved performance we are also aware of liability issues. Scuro (1984) noted that an issue in the validity of the negotiator training is the frequency of awarded liability suits in the case of negligent training. The recommendations of a Coroner's Jury should be enough to motivate police departments to rethink their commitment to provide valuable training to crisis management teams.

The literature on negotiator training is less diverse than selection. There is overwhelming agreement in a number of areas: The need for a comprehensive introductory course that focuses on communication but that also includes roles, strategies, and resources (Allen, S. W., Fraser, S. L., & Inwald, R., 1988; Fuselier, 1988; Strentz,

1984); and the need for ongoing training after the initial course (Davis, 1992; Mirabella & Trudeau, 1981; Miron & Goldstein, 1979; Webster, 2000). In more recent research the need for joint training with tactical teams and incident commanders has been voiced (Fuselier, 1986; Fuselier, Van Zandt, & Lanceley, 1991; Logan, 1997; McGowan, 2000; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Webster, 1997); as well as the validity in experiential learning with an emphasis on role-play exercises (Davis, 1992; Gentz, 1986; McMains, 1986); and the advantage of active listening and advanced empathy skills (Noesner & Webster, 1997; Maxwell, 1997; Slatkin, 1996; Webster, 2000).

The survey conducted in Baltimore, Maryland (Hammer, Van Zandt, & Rogan, 1994) reported that 74% of respondents stated that their negotiation teams received ten days or less of initial training; forty-four percent of team leaders indicated that their initial negotiator training lasted five days or less. In continuous training, 82% of all teams received ten days or less each year. Continuous training was provided in house (44%) or by the FBI (24%). There was little joint training with SWAT; forty-four percent of negotiation team trained with their SWAT teams three days or less each year and 39% had no joint training. This survey included a training needs assessment and the top five training needs were assessing hostage-taker's emotional stability, resolution strategies, negotiator communication skills and strategies, suicide indicators, and when to employ tactical strategies.

Training has recently begun to meet some of those needs. Most law enforcement departments realize the importance of active listening and good communication skills. The mentality referred to by Mirabella & Trudeau (1981) where negotiating skills are confused with the natural abilities of a "good cop" is diminishing but unfortunately we are still

battling the assumption that negotiation skills will remain proficient as a result of everyday police work. There may be pockets of the country where negotiator training is still lagging behind.

Slatkin (1996) reported that hostage training was still instruction on abnormal behaviour, theory, terminology of major disorders, and techniques and strategies of containment, negotiation and assault. He states that "within this broad array of instruction, little if any, training focuses on basic interpersonal communication skills" (p.1). I would respectfully submit that this is a statement that may have been reasonable in 1986 but not in 1996 and certainly not today. The focus of Slatkin's article is to recommend "therapeutic communication" as a replacement for "gift of gab." Personally I would recommend neither. Slatkin states further that "during a hostage taking or barricade situation, negotiators assume a quasi-therapeutic role in relation to that subject."

This again is a statement that, although well-intentioned, can undermine negotiator training and practice. As a therapist I understand the need to use active listening, empathy, and good interpersonal communication in crisis negotiation and that this communication must be purposeful and focused. I do not, however, want to be doing therapy in a hostage negotiation. Further, as a police officer, I do not want to train my fellow negotiators to "assume a quasi-therapeutic role in relation to the subject" (Slatkin, 1996, p.2).

A selection process for crisis response teams (tactical and negotiator) that was recommended by Miron and Goldstein (1979) has been emphasized by authors and researchers since that time (Allen, Fraser, & Inwald, 1989; Fuselier, 1988; Strentz, 1984).

### Crisis communication / Negotiation

Early research focussed on the psychological characteristics of the hostage taker while recent research explores context and interactional patterns. Language is the vehicle through which negotiators build relationship and language behaviour within a crisis negotiation is an area requiring much more attention (Rogan & Hammer, 1995).

Donohue, Ramesh, & Borchgrevink (1991) conceptualize hostage negotiation as “crisis bargaining” where the aim is coercing the other to comply with a course of action. The key for police is to turn “crisis bargaining” into “normative bargaining” and thereby remove all parties from potential harm. Through strategies of de-escalating, de-mystifying and diffusion there is a goal of cooperation. Conceding control early in negotiation avoids showing resistance that might escalate destructive responses. Increasing affiliation encourages conversation which aids intelligence-gathering and as the interaction evolves the negotiator makes a transition to normative bargaining by increasing interdependence, improving leverage, and upgrading affiliation (Holmes & Sykes, 1991).

In their study on assessing message affect in crisis negotiations, Rogan & Hammer (1995) view crisis negotiation as determined more by the relationship created by dynamic interaction than the psychological make-up of the perpetrator. This study is exploratory and lacks a theoretical framework. It examines the affect patterns of perpetrator and negotiator during phases of negotiation in three crisis situations. The researchers attempt to produce a composite message affect score by coding message valence (the general positive or negative quality of message content) and weighting it with intensity (“the degree to which a speaker’s attitude toward a concept deviates from neutrality”) (Bowers, 1963, p.345).

Although there are no clear conclusions to this study and the results cannot be generalized, the study does point out the need to pay attention to the relationship, relational message content, and relational goal behaviours. The authors conducted a thematic analysis of the interactions, which added context and interpretation to the quantitative findings. I am not sure that there is a need to code transcripts and proceed quantitatively with analysis that lends itself so well to a qualitative approach.

The area of communication must be the focus of continued study. It is the place where I would expect to find most of the factors that facilitate or hinder the impact of crisis negotiation and any resultant success.

#### Relationship and rapport building

Time is on the side of the police once the subject is contained. Dr. Harvey Schlossberg, former police officer and director of psychological services for the New York City Police Department, made the following statements about time: "Time is always on the side of the negotiator. Sometimes doing nothing is better than doing something" (Schlossberg, 1977, p. 1). He called his approach "dynamic inactivity" and predicted that "given enough time, the criminal will eventually fall asleep, or the hostage may escape, or the criminal's anxiety level will drop to the point that he can be talked to rationally, or, more probably, having ventilated his problems in the negotiation process, he will surrender" (p. 1).

Time being on the side of the police facilitates the purposeful development of rapport between perpetrator and negotiator and, to a lesser extent, between perpetrator and hostages (Fuselier, 1981). The term, hostage negotiation does not immediately conjure up a vision of relationship or alliance. That is primarily due to the violence and non-

compliance usually associated with stand-off and hostage-taking incidents. Although there have been a number of studies on hostage negotiation and police negotiators and psychologists stress the importance of the relationship with the hostage taker, there is little understanding of how an alliance is formed. The use of the Third Party Intermediary (TPI) is a prime example of the value of having a bridge of relationship with the subject. As police officers we may shy away from the thought of forming a relationship with a perpetrator, but those experienced in interviewing and interrogation recognize it as the key to obtaining a confession. Successful negotiation is dependent on the negotiator's ability to form a relationship or working alliance with the subject (Logan, 1997). This is paramount whether the situation is a hostage taking, a barricaded subject, or a suicidal person. The use of active listening and skills of advanced empathy are the tools we use to build the bridge. Relationship building with a deranged person or one seriously affected by drugs is difficult but this is where we realize the advantage of time being on our side. It is not until a relationship is formed that we can go across that bridge offering acceptable non-violent alternatives.

Relational development with hostage taking is central in working toward the release of the hostages (Fuselier, 1981; Strenz, 1986). Police emphasize establishing trust and demonstrating respect for the hostage taker in order to diffuse anger and prevent violence; however, police treatments of the relational issue provide little understanding about how and why relationships evolved. Affiliation, relationship, and working alliance are key topics in psychotherapy and much research has been done on the client/counsellor relationship (Hatcher & Barends, 1996; Horvath & Greenburg; Horvath & Symonds, 1991). In contrast, much has been mentioned anecdotally in policing journals (Fuselier,

1986; Fuselier, Van Zandt, & Lanceley, 1991; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Webster, 1997), but there is a paucity of research on this topic in hostage negotiation.

Donohue and Roberto (1993), in one of a very few studies in this area, take negotiated order theory and view relational development as a negotiation within a negotiation. They assert that:

As parties interact, they implicitly make, accept, and reject proposals that define the relational limits of the interaction. These implicitly created limits become the relational structures that function as a subtext to the explicit negotiations centering around the release of hostages (p. 176).

Negotiated order theory posits that limits (social order) serve as conditions that define relationship, topics, strategy, and level of formality. These limits are worked out through interaction and implicit negotiation that is subtextual. These limits are negotiated between people continuously where social order is being tested and stretched. This continuous evolution of limits is seldom discussed overtly but can be tracked to determine which limits are relevant and how they are being negotiated (Strauss, 1978). This is valuable in depicting the way relationship limits influence bargaining context. Donohue and Roberto (1993) note that relationship is critical in hostage negotiation because of the short period of time and the need to define relational limits quickly and use them in high stakes bargaining. They define relational context as "the reciprocated use of similar levels of affiliation and interdependence" (p. 180). Donohue and Roberto, in their analysis of ten crisis negotiation incidents, found that negotiators had a difficult time achieving a pattern of relational consensus when they engaged in low affiliation messages. They further hypothesized that the negotiators' use of immediacy cues can impact their ability to

control the emotional arousal of the perpetrators. Perhaps the most interesting observation in their study is the differences in the relational rhythm as seen in phase mapping. In one map, affiliation stayed high and interdependence issues were being negotiated. This was the case of a domestic dispute. In contrast was a criminal case where the relational rhythm was exactly opposite and the perpetrators committed suicide. The authors make a sad but true observation that police negotiators often treat criminal incidents more aggressively because the subjects' motives are more ill-intentioned.

#### The psychological consultant

In the late 1970s the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recommended that a mental health professional be added to the negotiation team to act as a consultant regarding the appropriate negotiation strategies given the mental status of the perpetrator (Fuselier, 1981). In a survey of 100 negotiating teams (US), 56% of the teams reported using a mental health professional as a consultant (Hammer, Van Zandt, & Rogan, 1994).

This figure must be tempered by the fact that many teams use the mental health professional for post-incident debriefing and counselling only. A more comprehensive study of 300 law enforcement agencies in the United States responded to a survey with 39% of the agencies using a mental health professional as consultant to the negotiation team (Butler, Leitenberg, & Fuselier, 1993). Recent HOBAS statistics (FBI, 2001) report that a mental health consultant is used in only 13.2% of reported cases (n=2117).



### CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

To study the process of how two or more people interact in diffusing hostility and negotiating a peaceful resolution to a highly volatile situation one may have to deploy a wide range of methods in the pursuit of better understanding. Qualitative research is multi-method in focus and allows researchers to study things in a natural setting while determining how people bring meaning to the phenomenon in question (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Qualitative researchers investigate and attempt to make sense of events and, in this case, problematic moments in the lives of both hostage takers/barricaded persons and the crisis negotiators. The choice of research practices depends on what the researcher can do in the context and what questions can be asked within that context. The nature of qualitative research is that it embraces both the broad interpretive postmodern sensibilities and the more narrowly defined positivist and postpositivist conceptions of human experience (Nelson et al., 1992).

#### Situating the researcher

I am a typical "cop" in that I have a realist view of the world. This view allows me to appreciate the positivist paradigm within a realist ontology and fairly objective epistemologies. Within this paradigm I gravitate toward more rigorously defined qualitative methodology. Perhaps there is a piece of constructivism here because I want to study crisis negotiation in a naturalistic setting, looking for trustworthiness, confirmability, credibility, and transferability.

In formulating a research question around why some negotiations end peacefully and

others do not, I went back to a tragic incident on February 14, 1988. One of the most critical of incidents I have encountered, it was a horrendous February night with high winds and low temperature. My partner and I were shuttled in a small boat to a cargo vessel where a psychotic crew member had taken a hostage, locked and barricaded himself in a room, and was threatening to kill the hostage. Boarding the ship was itself an experience but the incident that followed an hour of attempted negotiation was indeed traumatic. Negotiating through a metal door I suddenly heard the screams of the hostage as he was being killed. As I looked under the door the hostage's white socks turned red and he was silent. While working on the door with sledge hammer and crowbar, smoke began to fill the corridor and my partner and I took turns hammering the door while the other ran out to the deck for air. Going into the cabin, guns drawn and fighting smoke from the extinguished fire we found both the hostage and the perpetrator dead. The hostage, his head nearly severed, had been stabbed 16 times and the perpetrator had amazingly stabbed himself 14 times severing both carotid arteries. This was my induction into the world of negotiation. The haunting question "what if" still resonates but now in a way that seeks an informed answer rather than a way that screams for restitution. Now, armed with proper training and somewhat more experience, I want to discover the elements that are present during peaceful resolution to a negotiation and those that are present during incidents that end in injury and death. Focussing on elements that help or hinder successful crisis negotiation, the next questions are what information will assist in answering the question and what strategies do I use to access that information (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993).

### Searching for a methodology

Perhaps the simplest and most straightforward way of answering the question is to study the reports of police negotiators and command personnel. It is these reports that to date have informed the practice of crisis negotiation. These reports are valuable but they are based on a very operational point of view and seldom speak to the communication process. The FBI now has the Hostage Barricade Data System (HOBAS) and as of May, 2001 had recorded over 2300 incidents. While this will be an invaluable tool for tracking the nature of incidents and offender/victim composition, it does not seek to determine the process factors that help or hinder successful negotiation. It would seem almost obvious that the information required to answer the question should come from the participants in the negotiation. As a starting point, I will deal solely with the police negotiator or "this side of the barricade". It is hoped that a further study can be pursued to capture the perspective of the "other side of the barricade". There is no doubt about the value of looking at both perspectives and there are a number of potential reasons for that omission in past research: (a) most people on the inside of the barricade are perpetrators and are not seen as capable or worthy of being approached for their point of view; (b) there is a perception that this group of people would be unwilling to give their perspective or would be hostile witnesses who would sabotage the process by being untruthful; (c) the judicial process makes this a risk; often there are criminal charges arising from the stand-off and interviewing the perpetrator is impossible until the charges have been cleared through the courts; (d) nobody has ever thought about asking the people who walk out the door backwards with their hands held high what were the factors that brought them to that decision. Interviewing the negotiators is a reasonable part of the picture and may be a

simpler task for someone who is himself a police negotiator. Other information could come from those involved in the crisis but not as participants in the negotiation. This might include hostages, tactical team members, psychologists, and operational commanders.

The research design connects theory to strategies and methods for collecting material. It situates the researchers and connects them to relevant material, people, groups, and institutions. Strategies of inquiry connect researchers to specific methods of collection and analysis. Each strategy has exemplary works and has preferred ways of instituting the strategy (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In choosing a methodology, I am aware of a few factors. First is my constituency, which is policing and specifically crisis managers. Having been in policing for 21 years I am aware how police officers benefit from research. I have often stated that "police officers are all from Missouri" (the "show me" state) meaning that we all ask "show me" how this will work in my world or how this will benefit me. Secondly, there is a strong interest on my part in using qualitative methodology which takes a holistic approach and emphasizes the significance of context, and takes the emic perspective of eliciting meaning, experience, and perception from the participant's point of view (Morse, 1992). Finally, there is a need to make sense of the "dance" referred to as negotiation.

As researcher, and on behalf of my constituents, I want to have an inventory of items that are productive or destructive to peaceful resolution of a crisis situation. I want to build this out of reflections given me by participants in a variety of crisis experiences where negotiation took place. The Critical Incident Technique has been developed and used for this purpose. It is also useful in the early stages of research because of the ability

to generate exploratory information that can be used for model-building (Rice & Greenberg, 1984).

### Critical Incident Technique

Flanagan's (1954) Critical Incident Technique was initially used to analyse combat leadership and disorientation in pilots during World War II. Selection of subjects is based on these people having been in a position to observe or experience whatever is the focus of the study, and to be able to articulate their experiences. Once the interview process is completed, critical incidents are extracted from the accounts and thematically grouped in categories. A critical incident is a thing that actually happened and was observed and which significantly affects the outcome. These categories then provide a conceptual map of what facilitates or hinders the condition or phenomenon being investigated. This method has been chosen because it (a) obtains a record of specific behaviours from people who experienced them or observed them, (b) creates categories that can be examined to build theory, construct tests, or used as a practical map to train hostage negotiators, and (c) the categories may be converted to a communication matrix (Flanagan, 1954). This technique has been useful in a number of studies and in a variety of contexts. Herzberg, Manseur, and Snyderman (1959) studied motivation at work. Weiner, Russell, and Lerman (1979) used the technique to study emotions and cognitions in the context of achievement. Rimon (1979) is one of many who have used the Critical Incident method in nursing. Borgen and Amundson (1984) used a modified critical incident methodology in their investigation of the experience of unemployment. Rice and Greenberg (1984) studied change in the process of psychotherapy. More recent work has looked at facilitation of healing for the First Nations People of British Columbia (McCormick,

1994), dealing with depression after an HIV+ diagnosis (Alfonso, 1997), and resiliency in survivors of the holocaust (Baum, 1999).

There are five main steps in the Critical Incident procedure: (1) determining the aim of the activity to be studied, (2) setting plans and criteria for the information to be observed, (3) collecting the data, (4) analysing the categories derived from the data, and (5) reporting the findings (Flanagan, 1954).

The first step is to clearly define the aim of the study. This was accomplished by consulting the empirical literature and by speaking to experts/colleagues in the field of crisis negotiation. In February of 1998 I was sent by the RCMP to Canadian Police College to attend the 8 day Hostage Negotiation/Barricaded Subject course. Looking for a complete North American experience, I was then invited to the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia where I completed their Crisis (Hostage) Negotiation School. These experiences allowed me to view negotiation from the position of negotiator, to interact with the professional actors who were quite entrenched in their "other side of the barricade" roles, and to spend hours with the experts in the field of crisis negotiation. We have much to learn from crisis events with a successful outcome as well as those that did not end with successful negotiation. Ultimately the decision on outcome is made by the individual(s) on "the other side of the barricade". One of the highlights of the last three years has been the opportunity of meeting and working with the agents who were on site at Waco. Both ATF agents who were at the Branch Davidian compound and FBI agents who negotiated directly with David Koresh have been candid in sharing their experiences. The hostage negotiation literature, is predominantly the experience and expertise shared by law enforcement officers and psychologists and it is valuable in its case study

presentation.

Setting plans entailed (a) deciding on suitable hostage/barricaded person incidents, (b) determining the participants (hostage negotiators) to be interviewed, (c) determining the suitability, willingness, and accessibility of the subjects, and (d) writing an interview guide.

#### Description of participants

Following Woolsey's (1986) lead, I attempted to get a wide range of participants so there was broad coverage of the content domain. Participants were recruited in both Canada and the United States by attending a few key hostage negotiator conferences that are held annually in both countries. At these conferences a letter (Appendix B) was attached to each attendee's conference notes requesting their participation and encouraging them to contact the researcher either at the conference or by phone at a later time. Locating and interviewing participants at conferences in Calgary, Alberta and Baltimore, Maryland formed the first pool of participants. Using a network of contacts, a trip to California completed the pool of participants. Twenty-two police negotiators representing 5 states and 4 provinces were interviewed. Each of these negotiators met the following inclusion criteria:

- (1) active participant in negotiation with a hostage-taker, barricaded subject, or suicidal person.
- (2) willingness to be recorded with audio equipment.
- (3) willingness and ability to provide informed consent (See Appendix C)
- (4) willingness and ability to provide two interviews of up to two hours within a six month period.

Table 1 summarizes participants' gender, education, years of police service, years of

experience as a negotiator, number of incidents (real and mock), and in-service training.

Training is noted as: (a) Basic Training - usually 40 hrs.; (b) Advanced Training - usually 40 hrs.; and, (c) Hours of training per year. In addition, 17 of the participants (77%) attend at least one conference on crisis negotiation each year.



**TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF THE PARTICIPANTS**

Participant	Gender	Education	Years as	Years as	Incidents	Training:
			Police	Negotiator		
1	M	BA	20	20	50/250	B/A/>240
2	M	BA	20	8	45/30	*B/A/>240
3	M	College	12	3	50/10	B/A/>240
4	M	BA	24	6	24/10	B/A/<80
5	M	MPA	31	27	80/20	*B/A/>80
6	M	U/K	31	15	40/20	B/A/>80
7	M	MPA	30	16	150/50	*B/A/<80
8	M	BA	19	9	4/0	B/<20
9	M	U/K	21	6	12/8	B/<40
10	M	U/K	21	13	44/6	B/<40
11	M	College	18	5	4/100	B/<80
12	M	U/K	28	7	5/20	B/<40
13	F	BA	28	17	150/50	*B/A/>240
14	M	BA	28	10	200/300	*B/A/>120
15	F	U/K	12	5	20/80	B/A/>80
16	M	U/K	10	1	1/15	B/A/<80
17	M	College	31	27	20/70	B/A/<80
18	M	College	13	4	3/10	B/<80
19	M	College	12	4	5/6	B/A/<80
20	M	U/K	22	14	40/60	B/A/<80
21	M	U/K	22	13	60/50	B/A/<80
22	M	BA	32	23	100/20	B/A/<80

Note: \* denotes that the participant is a trainer in Crisis Negotiation.

### Critical Incident interview

The Critical Incident interview was comprised of an orientation phase and an elicitation of incidents phase. Relationship building or establishing rapport at the onset of the interview was an integral part of the process. The orientation phase of the interview conveyed the aim of the study, the confidentiality, and the participant's role within the study. This phase began with a clear understanding of informed consent and the presentation of the form (Appendix C) which is signed by researcher and participant. The following questions were used by the researcher in order to establish the aim and purpose of crisis negotiation and to elicit critical incidents:

L:     *" \_\_\_\_\_, I'm making a study of crisis negotiation. You having been a crisis negotiator who was involved in an incident last year, you are well qualified to discuss this subject. I am meeting with crisis negotiators to find out what worked well, or what caused things to get worse. First of all I have two questions. What would you say is the primary purpose of crisis negotiation?"*

L:     *"And in a few words, how would you summarize the general aim of crisis negotiation?"*

L:     *"Okay. Now \_\_\_\_\_, think back to your incident from last year, the year 2000 incident. What happened in that incident that helped or hindered resolution the situation?"*

The second part of the interview elicited the events that facilitated or hindered successful negotiation. My main role in the second part of the interview was to use active listening skills to encourage clear description of the events and to clarify occasionally using probes (ie. What exactly happened that was helpful? / a hindrance? and How did

you know that this was helping? / hindering? )

All interviews were audiotaped and number coded. The average interview lasted one hour and none exceeded 90 minutes. Incidents were typed out in the words used by the research participants. Critical events were examined ensuring that:

- (a) The research participant's account was stated.
- (b) The event was identified.
- (c) The outcome of the critical incident was related to the purpose of the study.

A second interview was not required but in order to check categories for further validation, a package containing each participant's extracted incidents and was sent to them along with a draft list of categories. A letter (Appendix D) was also attached with the following instructions:

*"Please find two documents attached. One which represents the "critical incidents" within your own negotiation; the other, a set of categories formed from the analysis of all interviews. I would ask each of you to review your incidents and ensure the accuracy of these statements. Secondly, I am asking you to review the categories and determine whether your incidents could all be represented within these categories and sub categories. Finally, I am requesting that you write the title of the category and/or sub category that best describes each of your incidents."*

Anderson and Nilsson (1964) found that the critical incident method was valid and reliable (1964, p. 398) in research. They also found that collecting data through questionnaires vs. interviews did not affect the structure of categorization to a notable extent.

There was an attempt to collect data from recent crisis incidents. Flanagan (1954) notes that the critical incident technique is often used to collect data based on memory. He emphasizes the importance of obtaining recent incidents to maintain accuracy and concludes that "on the whole, it seems reasonable to assume that, if suitable precautions are taken, recalled incidents can be relied on to provide adequate data" (p. 340). There is an acknowledgement that even recent events can be compromised by memory distortion. However, the sample is comprised of police officers who are trained to observe and to recall incidents for testimony in court. Moreover their training stresses taking detailed notes as an aide memoire. Most of the observations made by participants have been shared previously in law courts.

Sample size is not determined on the basis of number of participants, but on the number of critical incidents. The general rule is that the researcher continues interviewing participants until redundancy or saturation appears. It may require 100 incidents or 3,000 incidents depending on the complexity of the data. The number of participants in a critical incident study varies from ten to fifty. When there are only two or three critical behaviours (categories) being added for every additional 100 incidents then it can be considered that adequate coverage has been achieved (Flanagan, 1954).

#### Analysis of the incidents

Analysing the data consists of extracting the incidents within each scenario and sorting them into clusters or categories that appear to be similar. The next step is labelling them with descriptive titles. Following that the categories are formed and reformed until all items are allocated (Flanagan, 1954).

Following the lead of others (Alfonso, 1996; Baum, 1999; Borgen & Amundson,

1984; McCormick, 1994), incidents were extracted from transcripts and audio tape and then recorded in the words of the participants. Each transcript and statement was carefully studied by the researcher in order that the full meaning was understood before the incident was extracted. Each incident was coded with the participant's number and saved in a computer file folder with the transcript of the participant's interview. After this process of extracting incidents from 20 interviews, 652 incidents were obtained.

### Forming the categories

The next step was to divide the incidents into groups to form categories. Forming, reforming, naming, and renaming categories so as to fit in the greatest number of incidents is an inductive process. It is a cumbersome event (Baum, 1999; McCormick, 1994) and in the present study was even more difficult as there are no similar studies to draw on for categories and themes. After the first three interviews were analyzed, 120 incidents had been extracted and 26 themes had been formed. After ten interviews had been analyzed, 308 incidents had been extracted and seven more themes had been added.

Over the next ten interviews, eight more themes had surfaced. Pausing after the 13<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> interview and constructing categories was helpful and a clustering process was used. This was accomplished by printing the themes, cutting them out and arranging them in clusters. After the analysis of the sixteenth interview, 13 categories had been formed with 36 sub-categories. After the analysis of the 20<sup>th</sup> interview, there were 14 categories, 44 sub-categories, and 652 incidents. The process of forming and combining categories to yield sub-categories was simplified by using a technique that we have found helpful in crisis negotiation. I was able to secure a white board measuring 4'x16' and, using coloured markers, set up an "idea board". On this board was written every thought that

came up over a period of five weeks of data analysis. On one half were process thoughts and deadline dates and on the other half were categories and sub-categories. In crisis negotiation these boards are used to record various things about the subject (i.e. Emotional hooks).

In past studies, this categorization process was done by writing each incident on a card and sorting the cards into the categories. In this study the researcher used computer for the process. Split screens were used to extract the incidents from the transcripts and then each participant's incidents were coded and filed. When categories were formed. Each category was given a file name and these files (14) were displayed simultaneously on the monitor. One by one, each participant's file of incidents was also displayed and incidents were sorted by dragging them into the appropriate category. Some incidents could belong to several categories, but only one was selected. The category chosen depended on the greater context from which it was taken. Once all of the incidents had been placed in a category, they were then arranged according to sub-category. During this process some of the incidents were dropped because of a lack of clarity. It was not that they didn't fit in a category, but that it wasn't clear whether the incident hindered or facilitated a successful outcome. During this process there were some minor changes to some of the sub-categories and the name of the category "Training" was changed to "Learning and Developing".

Flanagan (1954) states that the categorization process is "more subjective than objective and requires insight, experience and judgement on the part of the researcher (p.344).

### Validation procedures

A number of assessments were made to ensure reliability and validity of this study. The categories must be judged in their comprehensiveness, consistency of use, and soundness. Alfonso (1997) summarizes the procedures used as "(a) independent rater - unbiased researcher trained to extract the incidents; (b) research participants cross-checking the critical incidents and categories; (c) exhaustiveness - saturation of categories; (d) participation rate - how many times participants used the categories; (e) expert rater; and (f) theoretical agreement according to research literature (a matching of themes)" (p.69).

An interrater check is a reliability measure based on the percentage of agreement. It answers the question of can different people use the categories in a consistent manner? Two independent judges were provided a brief description of the categories and were asked to place a sample of 60 incidents into the appropriate categories. The correct vs. incorrect placements could be summarized statistically as a percentage of agreement. There was a random selection of incidents. Flanagan (1954) recommends at least a 75% level of agreement to consider a category sufficiently reliable to be used.

The category system is comprehensive when other incidents not previously categorized can be reasonably placed within existing categories. Andersson and Nilsson (1964) withheld ten percent of their incidents (50) until categories were formed and then examined the ten percent against the categories. If the withheld incidents cannot be placed within the existing category system, then other categories must be formed. In this study, incidents (65) from two interviews (#21 and #22) were withheld and not examined until the categories were formed.

Participation ratios consisted of the percentage of the number of participants in the study and how many reported events there were in any one category. This was calculated by taking percentage of participants reporting an incident in a category. According to Flanagan (1954), the higher the participation rate the higher the level of validation of categorization. Categories are not considered valid if there were too few responses from participants in any one category. Frequency relates to the total number of critical incidents in a category.

Commonality of experience is another cross-validation method suggested by Cochran (1998). It looks at many independent events experienced in terms of - thought, feeling, and action. "It reveals how broadly a category is supported by participants" (Cochran, 1998).

Soundness of the categories can be assessed by asking if the category is at odds with previous research in the area. Agreement with research will give me more confidence that the category is sound; conversely, disagreement with research may give me reason to question its validity. Given the lack of good empirical research in this area, I will be relying on anecdotal reports and I would not invalidate a category, but I would recommend it for future research and validation.

Finally the categories were reviewed by asking experts in the field (negotiators and psychologists) if the 14 categories were relevant and useful in their work with hostage takers, barricaded subjects, and suicidal persons? (Appendix F).



## CHAPTER IV

### RESULTS

Through interviews with 22 Police Negotiators in the United States (17) and Canada (5), 717 critical incidents were identified and extracted. Through a thorough examination of these incidents, themes of crisis negotiation were elicited. Critical incidents that facilitated success in negotiation and critical incidents that reported a hindrance to the negotiation process are represented within 14 categories.

This chapter will present each of the 14 categories and subsumed subcategories by providing a brief description and examples of incidents that comprise the category. A summary of the results and an outline of methods used to establish the reliability and validity of the categories are reported.

#### Description of categories

The categories are given in order of frequency from most to least frequent. Examples under each category are in numerical order; each participant's name has been changed to a number. The Table 2 contains a list of all categories and sub categories. The Table 3 lists the categories and the frequency with which they were used. Appendix F also provides the list of the 14 categories and the revised 42 subcategories.

**TABLE 2: FINAL CATEGORIES****Teamwork**

Briefing  
 Communicating as a Team  
 Gathering Intelligence  
 Understanding Roles  
 Synchronizing Effort

**Active Listening**

Using Empathy  
 Finding Emotional Hooks  
 Reducing Fear and Paranoia  
 Diffusing Tension

**Relationship Building**

Finding Affinity  
 Cultural Understanding  
 Building Credibility and Trust  
 Using Intelligence (Information)  
 Using Third Party Intermediaries (TPI)

**Logistics**

Accessing Equipment  
 Adapting to Environmental Factors  
 Establishing Contact

**Building A Bridge**

Offering an Out  
 Empowering  
 Making Promises  
 Maximizing Reciprocity  
 Minimizing Risk and Damage

**Leadership**

Decision-making  
 Assessment

**Learning & Development**

Gaining from Experience  
 Integrating the Training

**Using Intuition**

Understanding Personality  
 Reading Behaviour  
 Providing a Distraction  
 Tactical Awareness

**Subject's Orientation**

Criminal History  
 Mental/Emotional State  
 Preceding Events

**Subject's Behaviour**

Subject's Planning  
 Presence of Weapon  
 Presence of Hostages  
 Access to Destabilizers

**Providing Information & Direction**

Demystifying the Process  
 Clarifying Instructions

**Negotiator's Personal Resources**

Knowing Yourself  
 Focusing  
 Caring

**Time**

Buying Time  
 Using Time Wisely

**Support**

Feeling Support from Agency  
 Receiving Feedback  
 Caring for Team Members  
 Debriefing

**TABLE 3: PARTICIPATION RATE IN EACH CATEGORY**

<b>Categories</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Participation Rate</b>
Teamwork	22	100%
Active listening	22	100%
Relationship building	21	95%
Logistics	21	95%
Building a bridge	18	81%
Leadership	17	77%
Learning and development	17	77%
Using intuition	15	68%
Subject's orientation	15	68%
Subject's behaviour	14	63%
Providing information /direction	13	59%
Negotiator's personal resources	13	59%
Time	8	36%
Support	7	31%

n=22

Note: Frequency indicates the number of participants reporting an incident in a category, while participation rate indicates the percentage of the participants who reported an incident in that category.

## **Teamwork**

Having solidarity and mutual purpose is foundational to creating an environment of cohesiveness where roles are clearly defined and understood. This is paramount for the emotional state of each participant on this side of the barricade, particularly for the negotiator who must transmit that state of calmness to the other side. A disjointed team approach where efforts are not synchronized and roles are poorly defined translates as a sense of chaos and is magnified, as though through an amplifier, to the other side of the barricade. The subject is already in a state of chaos and has a fear of what awaits on the other side of the barricade, which can be legitimized by disarray in the team.

Teamwork implies a "pulling together" which is only accomplished by communication between groups and between individuals in each group. The triangle of "command, negotiation, and tactical" must be well constructed so that intelligence can flow freely to all involved. The lessons learned at Waco still resound in the minds of negotiators. Strong leadership is not just a "command" function but must permeate the response team at all levels.

In order to build bridges across barricades, there must be solid bridges built between the functions of command, negotiators and tactical personnel. This entails relationship building which can be accomplished through cross training in a way that roles are understood and valued. There was strong support expressed for this cross-pollination of experience and those that had experience as tactical officers prior to being negotiators seemed to be more understanding. Synchronizing effort through briefings and radio communication, where intelligence gathering and strategy was discussed, seemed to foster mutual respect.

Communication between negotiators and an understanding of the roles of primary, secondary, and intel officer noted as key to successful negotiation. The fact that the negotiation team trained, worked together on a unit (i.e. patrol, traffic, or detective), or were friends outside of work seemed to correlate positively to the harmony of effort and ultimately to success in negotiation. The ability of the secondary and intel officer to provide good information and feedback to the primary negotiator and to the commander and tactical leader was paramount to team building.

The use of a mental health professional was helpful to decision making around ways of approaching the subject and the selection of a primary negotiator. There was a need for the role of the psychologist or psychiatrist to be clearly defined and again there is a need for a previous relationship with this individual that gives them credibility with the negotiators.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Briefing**

Briefing is the act of giving necessary information to someone in order to better equip them for a task. This differs from debriefing which is the process of gathering information after the task. Properly equipping the negotiator on his/her arrival on scene was facilitative and proceeding with a lack of information was seen as a hindrance to successful negotiation. Briefing is not limited to the initial phase of a negotiation and participants noted the need for ongoing briefings, which update each member of the crisis response team. Especially important were the organized briefings that took place periodically and specifically at a shift change.

#3

*We've developed a strong communication between all our resources whether it be negotiators, tactical, incident command, outside resources - everybody's involved in our command post and there is a figurehead from each present and each has their teams feeding them information. My secondary can hear my conversation and he would write something like 'suicidal?' on a piece of paper and I'd be able to answer and confirm things. That information would then go through our liaison to the command post to our member who would brief our incident commander.*

#9

*I realized that I knew nothing about the incident, nothing at all and I was not debriefed and the phone and some of the personnel from the detachment came over and pointed for me to pick up the phone. So I picked up the phone and introduced myself, told her where I was from and what I was doing there and that I wanted to bring this to a successful conclusion and to work with her and make sure that nobody got hurt. The exchange was rather frightening because she advised that our members had shot at her and that she was scared.*

#14

*I didn't get to the command post and sit down with my Lieutenant and get briefed. He briefed me on the run. We ran from a command post that was a quarter of a mile away*

*to the hot zone, and he briefed me as we were en route with the tactical team.*

#### □ **Communicating as a Team**

Team communication can be divided into two parts: Intra-team communication and inter-team communication. The intra-team communication represents the interaction between the primary, secondary, and intel officer. Participants highlighted the roles of the secondary negotiator and intel officer as supplying intelligence as well as suggesting things to say that would maximize active listening and thereby facilitate success. The inter-team communication was noted often, primarily the exchange, or lack of exchange, between the negotiator team and the tactical team. The friction between the teams was not present in cases where there was a relationship or friendship between members of the units.

#2

*I would have loved to have had more input from the officers on the inner perimeter, actually his physical actions - what he was doing while he was saying what he was saying. Four hours into the conversation I find out that he's talking to me with a shotgun in his mouth. Had I had that input from the body language behaviour while I was talking to him, I think it would have helped me.*

#8

*I had an Inuit person with me who was an ex-RCMP member and he basically talked in Inuktitut to this person through me and so I would talk about ideas with him about what we should be saying to the person barricaded inside the house and he would*

*suggest things to me so the two of us sort of threw things onto each other as we went.*

*#11*

*Tactical people were very good, all the information they gave - all that helped.*

*Whatever they saw they relayed and it was relayed to us. Immediately. So that helped us out tremendous, they were very good with that.*

*#15*

*We had very good communication. We knew that when he didn't pick the phone up, we would let them know - the tactical sergeant, and he would say 'okay this is what we're going to do' and then he would go and have it done. I think we had great communication with them. We could hear them on the radio. A couple of us still had our radios on where we could hear what was going on with them. So no, the communication was really good, that was one of the things that I think really worked well for us*

*#16*

*The flip side to this is that you have other negotiators with you who don't understand Spanish and you can't stop and tell them what you're saying. That would be a hindrance.*



#22

*We kept having updates between the SWAT guys and the hostage guys. We'd get together with the incident commander and brief her up and she would tell SWAT to continue an entry plan. The communication was very good but there's a competing friction between the SWAT guys who want to do their thing and the negotiators who want to do theirs. If you're not personal friends and can tell them to "piss off" in a friendly way, you could be their enemy for the rest of your career. We had the relationship because I was a former SWAT guy in my youth so there was some credibility.*

#### **□ Gathering Intelligence**

Gathering intelligence is an important task of the negotiator and in order to perform this task the negotiator must maintain a tactical awareness as some of this intelligence is crucial to the tactical team and must be imparted to them. Much of the intelligence is being gathered by the negotiator designated as the intel officer and he/she may have a number of investigators working on finding records and interviewing people who know the subject. This intelligence allows the primary negotiator to develop hooks and look for ways of developing affinity.

#7

*There should be 3 -way communication. We need to be feeding constant information to the incident commander and they need to be on site immediately. We need to be aware of some things that are significant to SWAT folks. "What weapon do they have, how*

*many rounds do they have, do they have a high powered weapon?" If they have a high powered weapon as opposed to a low-velocity weapon that will have a tremendous impact on how a SWAT team will approach the situation. With high velocity weapons, they'll go through most body armour and so the information that I have will impact them directly and I want them to hear that immediately.*

#7

*I'm a firm believer in protecting the law enforcement people that are there to resolve the situation and we can only do that with communication. That's a concept I learned in Vietnam; you lose your radio, you lose the whole team.*

#11

*You've got to have Intel, you've got to have good recon information that you can get back. (inaudible) information that they can foresee that you may not, you didn't even see from command post. You've got to be able to use all your eyes and ears. And in this particular case we used ears.*

#14

*It was an apartment building, the Intel that we had was that we had was that the individual was armed with an AK47, the tactical team was precluded from all sorts of tactics that they usually used. The windows were casement windows, they couldn't gain entry through the windows, there was no fire escapes, and he stood by the front, sat by*

*the front door right inside the apartment for the majority of the time, with a weapon - so entry was very tricky.*

#15

*The other thing she started charting was how many times he kept hanging up on us, and all the charts she did were big enough that all I had to do was look over and I was able to see everything. It was right there, it was wonderful, she did an excellent job. We had all the data on him, we had all the data on the family members on the wall.*

#17

*When we work this we have a backup and an Intel person and they were doing the phoning and the rap sheet so I knew where he was from and stuff.*

#### □ **Understanding Roles**

A clear understanding of role is a key to success, not only the intra-team roles but the mandate of the command and tactical teams. The interdependence, or mutual dependence on each other was heralded over a sense of independence which results in barriers forming. The role of the psychological consultant must be clearly defined and that person must resist the impulse to take on a dual role.

#1

*Well it has, and we've been, we've been fortunate because we have two SWAT teams, full time SWAT teams and each one of them is led by a Sergeant and they have five team members. Both SWAT team leaders, both SWAT Sergeants are prior negotiators,*

*so they've been on the phone.*

#3

*Our negotiation cell is comprised of a primary negotiator, a secondary, and a liaison who helps brief us and feed information from the outside to us and then from the inside out. The secondary is very important, in my opinion, equally as the primary. That person is there not only as an objective ear to catch fine points that you're missing such as tonal inflections or note when the person is getting agitated or calming down. If I start on something that's going in the wrong direction from our plan, they can steer me back. They keep notes on things like names of family members so that we can use them to keep things personal.*

#3

*The support of the entire team was important on this one as well as all of them. I think that having a strong team is a necessity. One is having each individual know what their role is for that day. You don't want everybody to try to be the quarterback - you have to have a division of the team. Knowing that and staying within your role is important.*

#5

*If by policy or organizational culture there is a recognition that the TAC role is integrated with the negotiations and vice versa, as long as that's the perspective of leadership at an incident, but if they don't understand it or have a bias one way or the other, that also can be a hindrance.*

#12

*I don't think I'd probably have the health care person right next to us. Nothing against him personally but he tried to be a little more, control the situation and actually interject himself into our negotiations, too much so. Although a lot of his situations or his recommendations and suggestions were well taken and well thought out, I wouldn't necessarily have him in the negotiator's room itself because he - and maybe this is just the personality, and I'm sure his best interests were in the situation but ,it was not only distracting but it was hindering our negotiations at time because he would be handing us notes what to say and this sort of thing.*

*ML: So the hindrance part of the psychological consultant was taking too much control, taking away from some of the freedom, and opportunity of using your own skills?*

*SD: Exactly.*

#15

*I thought what was really helpful too was that our tactical sergeant used to be on our team so he had hostage negotiations training. And what helped us was that the tactical sergeant plus the commander who is also very tactical minded, was listening to the sergeant and they were both coming in to where we were and asking us what we thought, and they really listened to what we were saying to them.*

#19

*What we try to do is wire the guy that's not talking, so I'm right on her hip. The problem that they left us with was I'm the one with the wire, and as a coach my job is to monitor feedback that I'm getting from the command post. Well I can't do that and talk to him at the same time so I had to keep shutting my radio off because I've got people - not only people trying to talk to me, but I've got cross talk of people talking in my ear, so that caused a problem - flipping or changing roles in midstream like that.*

#20

*So you know the contain and control works, the perimeter by tactical officers which was fantastic; I wouldn't even try to do my job without them, they're so critical. So that worked very good.*

#22

*We eventually called Dr. \_\_\_\_\_ who was a civilian consultant to the hostage team. He was helpful in getting some medical records opened and we determined the agoraphobia.*

#### ☐ **Synchronizing Effort**

The synchronization of effort must be both intra-team and inter-team. The frustration of having to work at odds with members of your own team while communicating with an oppositional person creates unnecessary stress. Having to take down walls built up by

members of our team that are working at cross purposes is a difficult task, as is trying to build a bridge over to a place where there are people who have shown themselves to be unsafe.

#3

*They could then get a clear view of him; he was holding a red gasoline one or two-gallon container and a lighter that was lit in the other hand. They immediately backed out which was the wisest thing they could have done and set up a little perimeter around the house and then called for the cavalry to show up.*

#7

*At the point that SWAT took the little girl and I wanted him to do a 360 so we could see his belt line. SWAT did not want that, they were going to take him the way he was. We were both talking at the same time to him and that's not good.*

#9

*My team comes in at the beginning. I had a secondary and an Intel. Officer show up. Numerous times she would hang up the phone to do something and that would give us time to discuss how things are going. The Intel passes everything to the Incident Commander and the Secondary is making notes. I do a lot of paraphrasing from [HT] so that he has access to what she is saying.*

#10

*Usually we work primary/secondary. This is the first time we actually did this together. ----- would say something and instead of me prompting him, you know I would sort of add on to it. It seemed to be drawing out more information from the perpetrator rather than whispering, flashing notes, and we seemed to get a very open communication quickly. When we looked at the tape afterward, it looked scripted - we never deviated from the direction where the other one was going.*

#10

*We've got a 'guts and glory' ERT coordinator and he thinks that the resolution for everything is forcible entry. In fact, he'll come up and say "we're going in after 10 minutes". The ERT doesn't like us much because we resolve about 90% of incidents and they don't get to gas guys and kick the shit out of them. That's a hindrance for sure and will continue to be until we can get some kind of cohesiveness or some kind of maturity.*

#12

*We had some break down between the negotiators and the tactical group. They had gone, it wouldn't have been the first night but the second night, and cut the power. Which really, really disturbed them and it also affected our credibility because we, like we weren't given a heads up on what they were going to do. So they, in conjunction with that, I think probably the second night the tactical group were trying to do an exercise in trying to keep the people with minimal sleep, throwing rocks at the house,*



*helicopter with the sunlamp nightlight down on the house at various times. It really, really upset them and of course we were, we weren't in sync with the tactical group on that way and then of course we, for whatever reason, then we had to do some make up in the morning and then some.*

*#18*

*He agreed to come out if we pulled the cameras back. While he's in there and he's trying to cut his way out and we're thinking this is going to be resolved very soon, the cameras get inserted back in and he sees that and that sets him off again and so we have to bring him down and say "we didn't know about this, they shouldn't be there".*

*#19*

*So in any event to make a long story longer, our first units get there and of course the first guys that arrive on the scene, they're not negotiators so you know, they're saying 'hey' you know 'go ahead and jump, you're not going to kill yourself'.*

*L: That might have been a hindrance?*

*G: That was definitely a hindrance. That's something that obviously we would frown upon.*

*L: These are first response officers?*

*G: These are first response officers. And again, I've got to preface that or qualify that by*

*saying that we did not know that this was being said prior to our arrival.*

#22

*The SWAT guys showed up and they were all for dynamic entry and all this good macho dynamic horseshit to go and get this guy. There is a dynamic tension between the forces of good, being the hostage negotiators, and the forces of the dark side, being the SWAT guys and all their camouflage makeup and everything else wanting to go and pop through windows and he's just a diagnosed agoraphobic with a gun who hasn't hurt anybody.*

### **Active Listening**

The message that active listening skills are the building blocks of crisis negotiation seems to have taken root among negotiators. There is an awareness of the skill set and a knowledge of how to use the skills of reflecting, paraphrasing, probing etc. but there is still a stated chasm to cross between knowing and doing. Participants related that they still have a lot to learn in applying good active listening skills.

Understanding the need to let the expressive subject vent his anger and thereby diffuse some of the tension is a skill that is recognized and well used. However, the ability to use empathy to absorb some of that tension is a skill that many negotiators are struggling with and may be attached to the perception of the subject as "the bad guy".

Finding emotional hooks is another skill that participants found helpful and the ability of the participants to locate these hooks and use them advantageously is a credit to their

profession. Their ability to use children as an emotional hook and build relationship through self disclosure was evident. Other hooks used ranged from pastimes or hobbies to pets.

Tone of voice and ability to remain calm, or at least display a sense of calm, seemed to be helpful in reducing fear and paranoia. This was likely helpful in transmitting an empathic response to the subject. The researcher was able to easily detect this ability to soften the voice and demonstrate empathy and caring in the tone of voice used in the interview to recall the negotiation.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Using Empathy**

Empathy is defined by Rogers (1980) as a process as opposed to a state and it is "perceiving the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the 'as if' condition" (p.140). This "as if" quality is the ability to perceive and sense the subject's condition as if that were me. Participants who could identify at that "as if" level had more success in relationship building.

#1

*Just basically be a listener for him and be empathetic that 'hey you have suffered a lot, but there is another side to this. I mean people do recover from these types of situations'. I tried to point out several people in public life that we could all say well this happened and these people have recovered, as opposed to some person that I may*

*know of but that he has no recollection of.*

#13

*And to, to tell you the truth, I think we all have - I have been depressed. And I remember one thing about feeling so down, I remember my joints hurting. I remember everything hurt, and you want to lay down. And I was very careful about this, I said "Aren't you exhausted?", and she said 'yeah'. I said "I know what it is to feel like this." I said "I bet your body hurts at times, you're so depressed your body hurts". And she looked at me, and that was like another breakthrough.*

#16

*I was telling him "I understand your concern and I understand how precious a thing your child is to you and I understand how much this must hurt you but no way can I say that I understand the situation cause I've never been there.*

#### □ **Finding Emotional Hooks**

Emotional hooks can serve to distract the subject from his destructive plans and allow a glimpse of hope and meaning. Reminding the subject that he has others that care for him and that his actions can adversely affect the lives of those individuals can sometimes be the catalyst to rational thought processes. These hooks also serve to instigate communication with the negotiator so active listening and relationship building can be applied. Although these hooks are often family and, in particular, children, they can range from spiritual beliefs to pets.

#1

*We had turned some intelligence and found out that his wife was a very religious woman and he was not as religious as she, but he did respect her desires in terms of her religious beliefs et cetera..... So then we kind of had a hook there with him and we discussed that in great detail.*

#1

*I mentioned there was a pet in the house as well, a cat or a dog I don't recall, um that we spoke about quite a bit because that was something that he really cared about, \_\_\_\_\_ cared about the animal and so we talked about it in great terms, talked about in great length about who was going to care for the animal while he was getting this mental health treatment and going through the process and we had agreed who was going to care for it and what kind of feeding they were going to give him.*

#4

*We discussed her family, I believe she was from St. Louis and had some family back there. She had mentioned how her family cared about her so we knew we were beginning to connect with her in her crisis and we continually mentioned her family and their love for her.*

#7

*I ascertained by the way that he totally adores his own children and that's one of the hooks that I used. I said what are their names and he said -----and ----- . I said "Doug, we've come too far for this to fail right now. I want you to say their names -----and ----- . I want you to keep saying their names all the way to the front door and it helped resolve the situation because he was able to look past me, look past the cops, look past the situation and see your children.*

#10

*We brought up her daughter regularly and casually, just kind of planted "what about your daughter" and I think getting her to think about her daughter was very helpful to us.*

*ML: In what way was that helpful?*

*BB: I think that it was sort of a reality check. Sort of "hey I've got a daughter that , if I had been good, I could have seen in about 9 months; now what? If this goes bad, I may never see her again" There were the pauses and it was almost like somebody hit her in the head with a frying pan and like "wow".*

#11

*You look for hooks, anything you can that you know - the key things that they key in on, key words. They may make reference to certain things and if they make it more than*

*one time, although it may be slight if you pick up on it, you know, circumvent it back around and bring it back to them, and see if they'll bite on it.*

#18

*L: You found something about the military that was helpful.*

*S: It seemed in our view, that was the hook. That was what he responded to. He didn't respond to anything else. You know, nothing else. There was some topic that we knew not to talk about, but that's one of the things you know, we look for the hook, we look for the common thing that's going to bring 'em, bring 'em around.*

#21

*I used the daughter - if you don't work this out you won't be able to hug or hold her. She doesn't want to have to see all this. It helped to pull on the heartstrings and be there to ensure that she didn't have the same life that he had lived.*

#### □ **Reducing Fear and Paranoia**

Allaying the subject's fears was accomplished through being able to detect the fears through active listening and to empathize which absorbed some of the tension. Sometimes the paranoia was reduced by explanation and sometimes by a soft, soothing, gentle voice that reduced the fear by engendering trust in the negotiator.

#5

*It was basically a matter of the police are involved and they're here on his block so it*

*became a sort of paranoia. The cops are outside and they've heard that I have a gun and they may be looking for an opportunity to hurt me. We spend a fair bit of time trying to allay those fears.*

#6

*She did a wonderful job, she was very soothing and calming to him. He told her that he had shot somebody and then she heard him talking to someone and determined through him that he had a hostage even though he never used that term.*

#7

*If we diffuse this person who is beyond the normal operating level and will not resolve anything while in that state. Allowing him to tell his story and also gaining bits of intelligence information, he is diffusing himself and knows that someone is listening. I'm passing that test of credibility with him and he's now openly telling me things he may never have talked about before.*

#9

*Now about 1 o'clock she's ready to come out but she's scared we're going to beat her up. I think she mentions a couple of times that she knows when she comes out the [police] are going to drive her head into the pavement and she's very fearful of that and*



*I reassure her that this would not happen. It took me another 15-20 minutes to convince her that this was not going to happen.*

#### □ **Diffusing Tension**

Tension was reduced through empathy and the negotiator understanding a need to vent. Often the process of reducing tension was just slowing everything down and remaining calm throughout the venting process.

#3

*I just let him vent for awhile and let him know that I couldn't help him until he talked to me. Basically I started getting to the point that I could finally talk to him and get his story out.*

#3

*Our conversation lasted about 4 1/2 hours and during that time he was on an emotional rollercoaster. During the times where he became very angry or very upset, I just had to let him vent and that helped that he knew if he needed to vent or yell and he knew that I wasn't going to interrupt or challenge him on it.*

#22

*I think the most obvious help was slowing the freight train down and reducing the tension.*

## **Relationship Building**

The need to connect with the subject at a deeper level than casual conversation was realized and there was a recognition that credibility and trust were built through "establishing a rapport" with the person on the other side of the barricade. Participants found that they were able to connect at that deeper level when they had common traits or interests. Affinity, whether it was being a mother, coming from a hard background, riding motorcycles, listening to rock music, or disliking the government, was a building block to forming the relationship and developing trust and credibility. Another key ingredient to establishing a rapport was an understanding of culture. It was extremely helpful to have the same cultural background and to be able to draw from the experience of growing up in a large Afro-American family or to be able to communicate in their maternal language.

The ability to connect at this level was often facilitated by intelligence gathering as the subject was not always verbal or cooperative in the initial stages. This information was often gathered by the Intel Officer and others who were contacting the family of the subject as well as accessing medical or prison records. This information, when passed to the primary negotiator, could be integrated into conversation or used to distract the subject from their violent intent.

Using the family members, clergy, lawyer, or another person of significance to communicate with the subject is still a controversial subject. Ten years ago it was considered to be on the list of "absolutely not to be done" but participants are now aware that there are adaptations of use and also situations where direct contact with a third party can facilitate

success. The biggest hindrance surfaced in the use of third party intermediaries (TPI's) is the inability to control what they say and how they say it. As a result, many negotiators modify the process by having the TPI make an audio tape that is scripted by the negotiation team and then played to the subject. The advantage of using TPI's seems to relate directly to relationship building in that these are the people who have already gained trust and credibility in the subject's life and have the potential of persuasion.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Finding Affinity**

The connection that initiates relationship building is often as simple as having watched the same movie, listened to the same band, or knowing the same people. This can be discovered by listening or by self disclosure. Being able to share from your own experience was found to be very effective in building relationship. Sharing the experience of having the same type of pain through an injury or the same joy in the experience of being a mother sends the message that "we're alike and I can only imagine how that must feel for you right now." It does not allow the negotiator to say "I understand" because that is a place that must be earned through active listening and is decided solely by the subject. The relationship seems to become more solid based on the depth of the affinity. The spiritual connection between the negotiator and the subject allows a greater affinity and connects them at a deeper place.

#2

*I think the biggest helps were the commonalties of our backgrounds. I could speak his language. I do speak his language. The commonality of the history with the rock and*

*roll music. I could articulately discuss the various bands, the CD's, the records that they have put out, the various songs they've done, concerts I've gone to - things like that, so he knew that was real. I knew some people he knew, and that helped. I talked about, to some length, with at least one individual - some of my encounters with that individual.*

#3

*Some of the things that helped were relating the surgery and personal injuries that I've had with him. I myself had been injured doing this job and was off for about 3 months and so we talked about that and about rehab and getting back into physical shape to start working again. We talked a little bit about how none of the programs for pain can be of help until we got him off some of the medications he's on and keep him sober during these medications and let him see how he's hindering these things. At least these conversations seemed to draw him out.*

#7

*I said "we have similar backgrounds. We both like computers, we both have a military background." What really helped I think was my role as a parent. I said "I had an opportunity to talk to your folks - good people, productive people who show honour in their lives and that's what you're doing here by resolving this".*

#13

*ML: To feel that, to feel that sense of spiritual connection - how was that helpful to you?*

*RV: It's helpful to me because at the same time I'm trying to convince her of this, I'm trying to convince myself. And to me there is a connection that you can't see, it's an invisible thing but that bond is so strong that if it's there you can pull it out and attach it on to yours and then it's a winning team. You know?*

*ML: Tapped into the spiritual part.*

*RV: Mmhm, that was - mmhm.*

*ML: So, how was that helpful? How did you see that as being helpful?*

*RV: It was, it was something that we both believed in.*

*ML: And a very core belief, at that.*

*RV: Yeah. Yes, that's the word. That's what it was. Mmhm.*

#13

*ML: Yeah. I'm interested also in the photo of the two year old son and the conversation that you got out of that. Helpful or hindrance?*

*RV: Very helpful. Yeah, very helpful.*

*ML: And you mentioned also 'I bonded' or 'we bonded because we were both mothers'.*

*RV: Yeah. Mmhm., and a lot of times it's these type of things, these props or whatever*

*that are placed in your way, placed there for you, it also gives you something to hold onto.*

*ML: And you did that with the affinity of having a son also.*

*RV: Yes. Mmhm.*

#15

*It was like there was a wall, and I was having a very hard time trying to think of things that I could talk to him about. We didn't have anything in common. He was very knowledgeable about hunting and guns and things like that, and I just felt at a loss because I had never hunted, I had never - you know - done any of those things and I just thought there was a wall there.*

#20

*He was angry at the system 'cause he couldn't get in the HMO for treatment and I'm like "it sucks, it's bad" and I tried to get angry with him you know "let's go, me and you, let's go after the HMO". "I can relate to that man, I've got Kaiser Permanent myself, sometimes they're jackasses". I think that warmed him up to me but you know, he was just determined.*

#### ☐ **Cultural Understanding**

Like the spiritual connection, the cultural connection seems to be very powerful.

Whether it is the ability to speak the same language or having grown up with similar family ties and traditions, there is that "pulling together" that decreases hostility and reduces the

"us" and "them". Team leaders are becoming aware of the power to build relationship through cultural ties and are making attempts to match culture, language, gender, and age between the negotiator and subject. Using intelligence gathered allows for the choice of a negotiator who most resembles a significant person in the subject's life (i.e. mother or brother figure).

#2

*So I have a good instinctive rapport and am quite capable of using verbiage that is on their level. "Now brother listen to this, you know, it's not like that" all that kind of stuff. The word 'brother' is very important in their culture. 'Brother' or 'bro' to them is a familiarity type term, and it does a great job of building the rapport with that type of an individual. So my verbiage to him was on point, and that helped quite a bit. Had I used the, you know, what I think of as the English model, Mr. super professional, detached, clinical, discussing type of individual - this guy would not have been willing to talk to me.*

#4

*I basically just brought it down to an ethnic thing and explained to her 'you're Afro-American, I'm Afro-American. You come from a good family, I came from a good family. We don't do this, not that it's more pronounced in any other race but this isn't how we deal with our problems. I kind of went back and just what we call 'old school'*

*you know when we grew up everybody took care of everybody and when you had a problem then other people pulled your coat tail, told your parents, put you in line and you know 'I'm here to help you as a brother' and I extended my hand to her and she almost came out to get it but she retreated so I knew that I could still play on that theme to connect with her.*

#7

*Never using the word "surrender" 'cause in his cultural context the word means failure and in many cultural contexts that's true.*

#8

*Another thing that hindered was that I was not an Inuit person and even though the man could speak English very well and was fluent in English, when he was under the influence of the alcohol his deep rooted hatred for the white culture came out and was reflected in his behaviour toward me and that really hindered the negotiation with him.*

#16

*I think when I would switch and speak his own language he was like " Oh, I can talk to this person" and it put him at ease a little bit. When he was thinking for words because of his stress, I would say "just tell me in Spanish".*

#### □ **Building Credibility and Trust**

Participants found that telling the truth and keeping their promises built trust and



credibility better than anything else they could have done. The perception that the negotiator was not acting in good faith clearly hindered negotiation.

#2

*I think he accepted me, I think he believed that I was being honest with him and I think that he, he knew I had his good intentions at heart and wasn't simply trying to scam him. I think he believed a lot of the stuff that I had to say.*

#3

*ML: How do you know you achieved a measure of success from rapport building?*

*MJ: I think the level of aggression from the initial contact with him to an hour later you could feel the tension drop and you could hear him coming out of the shell and start to disclose things and start talking about why things were going this way as opposed to 'I want, I want, I want'. I think that was a success meter and I think talking about similar incidents and bringing myself to the same level as him and letting him know that I've been through this too and having him come back with 'thanks for talking to me, you're a great guy' is another success scale.*

#7

*If I have his trust, he'll tell me why he's there. In this case he had a dog that was running loose and barking during the whole negotiation. He would only stop barking*

*when someone was in the house. When his dog stopped barking he turned on me and said "you're in my house, you violated what you said you would do". I assured him that we weren't and advised him to check it out for himself. He came back and apologized and more trust was built.*

#8

*By this time the TAC team arrived at the house and we were dealing with this person and they kind of took him down hard which is not what I wanted and not what I needed at the time and it's one of the things...I was trying to talk to him and thank him for working with us and not shooting us or taking his own life and to ensure that we would continue with out commitment that we would talk about what would happen once he threw out the gun. If you take the person down hard when the negotiator has worked to have him come out that destroys the trust, not only in the negotiating but in the law enforcement community in general.*

#8

*For me it comes right down to building trust with the person, building a rapport with a person and which is what I was trying to do anyway. Anybody we deal with, it comes right down to relationships, if we don't build the trust with people in our daily lives so really can we say that a crisis negotiation is any different than any ordinary negotiation with people that we meet everyday.*

#9

*I'm being truthful, I'm not playing games. I'm telling her that she will be handcuffed. That truth helped build trust. I think that was key to her coming out, that she trusted me to tell the truth.*

#12

*For tactical group because they were doing their own thing and we were just here as negotiators and basically trying to make up to them some lost ground, because we lost credibility a couple of nights there.*

*ML: Now, so that would have been a hindrance to the negotiations?*

*SD: Absolutely.*

*ML: How would it have been a hindrance? You mentioned some things, but in a nutshell how did that hinder your successful negotiation?*

*SD: Well I think they thought we weren't acting in good faith. They probably didn't believe us and I think it just affected our credibility.*

#18

*Like I said, we look at it [keeping promises] as a lot of credibility. We didn't feel that it was anything that compromised any SWAT member or any person's safety.*

#### **□ Using Intelligence (Information)**

Gathering intelligence is a twofold asset. First, intelligence is gathered that assists the negotiator in developing hooks to use in building relationship. Secondly, once the

relationship is underway the negotiator can then develop intelligence for the tactical team through conversation with the subject.

#2

*I was fresher to my jail time then and I had known a lot of Hells Angels in custody and so I'd bring their names up, you know, "Hey man, you know Billy-Bob - yeah?" and we'd chat that guy for awhile, you know. "You know what dude? I had to arrest Billy-Ray's girlfriend once because she brought a bunch of dope into the branch man and he was pretty pissed but you know, he's pretty cool" and the guy would just start talking to me because we had almost a mutual friend.*

#4

*We like to use 2 negotiators and that secondary can really help, like here our Intel person got some information about someone she really respected. She had a boss that she really liked and she was concerned what that boss would think.*

#9

*To establish a rapport we have to be able to listen and as you do that and as they find out that you're listening to what they're saying they become more comfortable and more at ease telling you more about themselves, who they have with them and what their surroundings are like. Of course, we're listening but we're gathering intelligence at the*

*same time. So we're trying to find her interests and it takes time; although in this situation it worked really well as she changed very quickly.*

#11

*Again in this particular case I think it helped that I had a past relationship with these guys. They at the time were unaware of it, they didn't realize who I was at the time. And I think that particularly - I mean if you know where somebody's from, if you know their background and if you know the environment, you know a little bit about their character, you know a little bit something about their criminal history - that's good Intel.*

#18

*The theme was veterans and veteran service, and persons that served in the military. We know that Purple Heart is obtained because you're injured, you know, you - there's a reason why you get a Purple Heart so we thanked him for his service to his country, that he was a proud veteran.*

#21

*Through intelligence we knew he had a girlfriend with whom he had a long standing relationship and they had a young daughter. He seemed to care about his girlfriend and daughter.*

### □ Using Third Party Intermediaries (TPI)

There is still hesitancy on the part of some negotiators to use a third party to talk to the subject. Although few negotiators have had a disastrous outcome as a result of using a TPI, they have heard "war stories" about someone taking their life while on the phone with a TPI. Most of the negotiators who oppose their use are going back to their initial training where they were taught that control over the situation is paramount and TPI's are not controllable. Some of the participants have used a modification that ranges from having the TPI make a tape to coaching and monitoring the conversation. The majority of participants would use a TPI as a last resort but would not see the need to use a TPI when they have good communication with the individual. Often the promise of meeting with a family member after the incident resolution is used as a successful incentive. Discretion is always advisable but it seems like the successes outnumber the disasters. Courts and Coroners' Juries are now asking why a family member on scene was not allowed to speak with the subject and I would suggest that the rationale would have to be stronger than "I don't do that."

#7

*He wanted his wife there to take care of the kids and we brought her to the scene. We had a hard time convincing him that she was there and I won't put a third party on the phone because I can't control them. They may do well for 2 minutes and then turn hope to despair. I had her tape a plea to cooperate with the police. I told him it was a tape and he didn't believe she was there so I described a pendant that she was wearing and*

*he was happy with that. I told him that he would be able to speak to her when this is resolved.*

#9

*I think it hindered for them to let her aunt talk to her because she asked me a couple of times if she could talk to her aunt again and I wasn't prepared to do that because of the fact that we were able to communicate and things were moving along half decently.*

#11

*In our particular case because in certain circumstances we use a third party. We used third party intervention, we used some family members. But we initiated the use of the third party. What we did was we questioned him about certain people, we also used the Intel that we had to find out what family members we knew he had close relations to and during the course of us talking to him we interjected them in real slow without his knowledge.*

*L: Okay and how was that helpful, how was it helpful to have a family member talking to him?*

*B: It can't be just any family member, it's got to be someone that he feels (inaudible) somebody he is very close to, he feels somewhat compatible with. And that will help because you get him to open up to whether he uh, (inaudible) it would be 'yes ma'am, no ma'am, yes ma'am I understand'. He won't keep that violent attitude towards them and then you can see his attitude start to change and also it'll break the tone. At first*

*when he was there - loud, boisterous, belligerent, a lot of that changed because he's not gonna use that language with them. He's not going to stay with that attitude with them, and also it'll bring him down. A familiar voice may calm him down, so that's going to help.*

*L: Yeah. So in this case you had, you had his grandmother talk to him and there was enough respect that . . .*

*B: Oh yes.*

*L: And that helped?*

*B: Yes.*

*#14*

*He made a 'I want to talk to Jeff'. Well "who's Jeff?" and this goes on and on and on. "Jeff's a cop, he's a detective at Homicide" And we bring him to the scene, we bring Jeff to the scene and we're going to have Jeff talk as a third party intermediary - unusual, he's a cop. So I brief him and I end up actually asking as his coach as he talks to Tim so it's sort of a three- way conversation, but I let Jeff talk to him.*

*#19*

*We went to a modified version using the TPI, we had her record a brief statement into a recorder and we played that for him, and he started to cry. So again, I thought I had him and we started to try and coax him back on, on to the deck piecemeal.*



## **Logistics**

Proper equipment is the conduit for communication for the negotiator and without it the negotiator is seriously hindered in making and keeping contact with the hostage taker, barricaded subject, or suicidal person. Fortunately, negotiators are extremely versatile and can move from phone contact to bullhorn or voice to voice in a matter of minutes. The phone is obviously a key piece of equipment and securing the phone so that the subject cannot make calls to anyone else is one of the crucial steps to establishing contact. Two hindrances that surfaced in the phone equipment were that cellular and portable phone batteries drain and a fixed phone has a cord that prevents a subject from exiting while maintaining that sustained contact with the negotiator. A "throw phone" is a specially designed phone that eliminates these problems as well as having other advantages that assist the negotiator as well as the tactical unit. One of the advantages is its durability in that it can be thrown through a window without risk of damage. The difficulty is often in getting the throw phone into the subject without risking harm to the tactical officer.

Adapting to and controlling environmental factors is an ever-present obstacle both to negotiations and tactical intervention. Although most often a hindrance, weather can facilitate success as evidenced by the suicidal subject on the bridge who became cold and tired and came down to safety. Other environmental factors in this study included the terrain, the noise of traffic, the presence of the media, and the presence of an audience or constituency.

### Examples

#### □ Accessing Equipment

Getting the subject on a phone that has everlasting batteries and no cord to limit their movement toward the door at a point of resolution is an age-old hindrance. Another is getting a throw phone to the subject. Getting control over the phone line or "ringing down the phone" is getting easier with increasing technology and cooperation from the phone companies.

#1

*what we tried to do was keep him on the phone throughout coming through the door.*

*And unfortunately the phone system was not going to allow that,*

#3

*I thought about if this guy had only been on a cell phone I could have talked him all the way through. I also thought perhaps we could have switched to a voice to voice once there was no threat to the neighbourhood anymore.*

#7

*He's stuck in that room on a "hard" line, it's not a cordless phone so when he sets the phone down, he made 3 attempts to surrender before he actually surrendered, he has to be consistently reinforced that he's doing the right thing and that's hard to do when you can't have communications.*

#10

*We were able to isolate the telephone and one of our radios that they had grabbed so they had no way of contacting anyone other than us.*

#11

*And once we lost communication because we initially started on the cell phone, the cell phone went dead.*

#12

*We ended up having RMI on sight, remote unit there to deliver food. And so we had all the technical expertise by the second day, that you'd ever need on a situation - a helicopter. So we had no problem with equipment and this sort of thing.*

#22

*One of the problems, a hindrance, in that I didn't have the equipment and all of our vans were tasked at another event so we were using a cell phone. The terrain was a hindrance because we couldn't get a robot in the yard to check to see if he had actually thrown out the gun.*

#### ☐ **Adapting to Environmental Factors**

Environmental factors can be a help or a hindrance. In the case of the subjects on the bridges, it came into play with the cold weather and wind being an asset but the traffic and

noise being a detriment. Terrain can often prevent the use of a robot and location can limit the control negotiators have over distractions such as crowds and media.

#4

*Initially she was resistive to anyone talking to her and she had made up her mind that this is what she wanted to do and a number of times we thought that she was going to jump. She continued to look and play to the crowd a number of stories below.*

#4

*In dealing with this situation there are variables that we have no control over, the crowd downstairs, the photojournalist and everything going on.*

#11

*All things are a factor, the elements you have to consider. The elements, the environment, your terrain. I mean we were on asphalt and you know at 9 o'clock in the morning it had already got almost to 80 degrees at that time so you know it was beginning to cook outside on some of those guys. And you think, they're wearing black (inaudible), fatigues, I mean you're going to get hot.*

#12

*The fact that they saw how big this media event was, and it was certainly for the area,*

*probably didn't help the situation in that it basically reinforced their worst fears and that this was a national event and it was on national TV. I think basically it just, it just created, it just reinforced their own worst fears and that what they'd done was that bad that it's created this big a media event. That it was basically, gave them a lose / lose ending to the whole darn thing. I think they were just forestalling the inevitable.*

#14

*Because of the nature of the location the individual was in, in an apartment, he wouldn't pick up the telephone so I had to do voice to voice negotiations for the entire time which I have done on many occasions, but because he wouldn't pick up the phone and talk to our negotiation team in the mobile command bus, it required the voice to voice.*

#17

*Towards the end, I think the weather was on my side. He was cold and it was getting dark and colder.*

#17

*The distance and difficulty in communicating as a result, as well as the noise of traffic, was a hindrance.*

#17

*The media was the audience and he played to them. They were a hindrance and they left after they realized that they didn't get the shot of him diving for the 11 o'clock news.*

#19

*But when we originally got there we shut down south bound which is the way you came, which is the side that he was on and we allowed north bound to continue for a little bit. And of course you've got everybody hanging out the window, 'jump', 'do it', 'go ahead, you're screwing up traffic', 'get off the bridge', so I'm dealing with them, I'm dealing with their vehicles noise, and if you notice the bridge is right in the flight path to Reagan. So I'm dealing with that every two or three minutes. And when we went back and listened to the tapes, you hear me "huh, what, you're going to have to say it again", because of the airline traffic.*

*L: So these were all hindrances?*

*G: Right. And what I tried to impress upon people when I did this presentation after the fact, was that I tried to control as much of - or we tried to control as much of the environment as we could. We weren't going to stop the traffic, the airline traffic, and I couldn't do anything about the wind. The only thing that we had direct control over was the traffic*

#21

*The audience was a hindrance because he had to come across as the tough guy and they were boosting him and there was nothing we could do about it. I liked the media cameras there and I see it as good protection. We have a good relationship with the media and they could say that we handled everything appropriately.*

□ **Establishing Contact**

Establishing contact with the subject was predicated upon logistics; being able to have functional equipment and using whatever was available to make the connection. Participants found that this initial contact or the transition from first responder to negotiator or first negotiator to second negotiator was crucial and the more seamless the process, the less tension ensued.

#6

*He did not want to talk to us so he phoned \_\_\_\_\_ police in \_\_\_\_\_ and talked to a dispatcher who would then talk to our dispatcher who would then radio me at the scene with what he said and then I would radio back so it was a hindrance to get things done in a timely manner and it slowed things way down and made it more stressful not to talk to him directly.*

#7

*He was doing countdowns to kill the remaining children with the first responders. We manipulated his number so he couldn't make outside phone calls and then I put a call in*

*to him and the first thing I asked him was Doug, are you okay?*

#9

*We wanted the exchange of personnel to go smoothly and to get the officer speaking with the hostage taker to introduce me so I wrote down my name and where I was from and asked him to tell the hostage taker that I was going to be talking to them. He told her that he had to go see his boss and introduced me as the person who would be talking to her and hung up the phone*

#11

*I would say the first thing that helped was establishing some kind of communication. In our case it was getting him to pick up the actual throw phone. Because that's a sign of trust, if you can get him to do it.*

#18

*He had cut our phone line, our throw phone line and he had dismantled the phone so we had absolutely no contact with him so we were forced to the up front element to contact him by bull horn.*

### **Building A Bridge**

This is the ability of the negotiator, along with the subject, to co-construct a bridge that will enable the person on the other side of the barricade to walk across to a place of safety.



Ury (1991) suggests drawing them in the direction you would like them to go. He adds that we can "build them a golden bridge from their position to a mutually satisfactory solution...you need to help them save face and make the outcome look like a victory for them" (p.101).

Offering an alternative to their proposed solution is often accomplished by giving them back the power that they feel they have lost. We do not empower other people but as negotiators the role is to create an environment where the individual can exercise their power to make sound decisions. The reinforcement that the subject is doing the right thing seems to have been very helpful in these accounts.

Participants stressed that making and then keeping promises helped in building credibility and that using reciprocity also bought them "small wins" in co-operation. The offer of a cigarette in exchange for bringing one's feet on this side of a ledge was not only seen for its safety value but also for a move toward compliance.

One of the most powerful tools used by negotiators was their ability to "downplay" the consequences of the subject's actions and minimize the damage done. Being able to dialogue with an individual who had not hurt anyone enabled the negotiator to remind them that the bridge was without obstacle. For those whose actions demanded consequences, negotiators were able to promise a favourable comment to the courts in return for compliance in ending the stand-off. It was interesting to note that honesty in advising the subject that he or she would be arrested did not serve as a hindrance to negotiation.

Negotiators found it helpful to downplay their role to that of helper vs. police officer and, in order to do that, paid close attention to their vocabulary eliminating words such as "surrender".

### **Example**

#### **□ Offering an Out**

Offering an out can be as simple as presenting an idea that will allow everyone to go home with a face. One of the obstacles for the subject to overcome is losing face or being seen by constituents as having lost. With an inadequate personality this may be another loss in a perceived lifetime of being a loser.

#2

*The other thing that worked fairly well with him and I work on all types of suicides is 'why today?'. "You know what dude? You can go to jail and if that happens, and three days from now you decide okay I'm sober, I've thought this over and I want to be dead, you can kill yourself in jail and you know you can, there's nothing we can do to stop you. Why today? Why when you're drunk, why when you're emotional? Why not take a day or two to think it over? If you want to kill yourself there's nothing we can do to stop you and you know that". And that theme has been very successful with suicides throughout my career and it worked well with him, in the latter half of the conversation.*

#4

*This new negotiator who was training with us and who was also Afro-American said "that's a simple solution, you just put on my jacket" and she said "really?" and she walked over and took his jacket and as she took his jacket I grabbed her by the wrist and held on and said "everything's going to be okay".*

#4

*In her mind we had to leave out the front and we said 'no we don't have to go out the front, we'll just go out the back and nobody will know'.*

#11

*Unless it's suicide by cop, and you can generally tell. And if that is then you go into another scenario and you find another way out. But if that person has an intention that (inaudible) then you give him a way out and nine times out of ten if you give someone a way out, they'll take it.*

#16

*I felt that he had no idea what he was going to do but that he needed to protect his child and get some vindication for my child. I feel like I gave him a solution to his not knowing what to do.*

#22

*The second negotiator gave his name and said "Come on down, I can see you now, that's okay, nobody's going to hurt you". He'd go back to the phone and say "there's people out there with guns" and our other negotiator told him "yes there are, that's reality my friend because they're not sure that you've thrown your gun out" and so we talked him through the surrender ritual 3 or 4 times*

### □ **Empowering**

Creating the environment of empowerment and mutual problem solving makes it easier for the subject to say "yes" because he has been a participant in constructing the idea. It is not difficult to understand that a person in crisis would benefit from accessing an internal locus of control as opposed to feeling manipulated externally. Continual encouragement and positive feedback were cited as elements that moved the process toward success.

#4

*There are a number of things that she was dealing with that we don't have answers for and we can just ask her to brainstorm possible solutions that she may not have thought of.*

#7

*I never use the term "surrender". I'll tell them that they're not surrendering but they're helping us resolve this situation and they feel like part of a problem resolution team; otherwise it's external, we're doing it to him. It's better that he does it with us and he's*

*more likely to go along with a decision he helped make.*

#7

*So what we do is we transition from a phone to a speaker because the first time he agreed to resolve the situation, he couldn't get past the girl he had shot and killed. I could hear him walking past her, crying and then starting to vomit and then he came back and apologized. Then he tried again and came back because he thought we were in his house. I told him "this is your time, you do this on your schedule". He says "okay, I can do it now". I said "okay set the phone down and start toward the door and you'll hear me on the loudspeaker". This allows continual reinforcement that he's doing the right thing.*

#17

*I wouldn't give him a reaction. I think me not getting upset with him, not demanding him to do things and letting him make the decisions and think he was solving the problems.*

#21

*When I talked to him I really downplayed his situation. I talked to him about real things and letting him know that him and I were going to work things out and I was asking him to help me help him.*

*ML: The "help me help him". Did you get a sense that helped or hindered?*

*M: That was something that helped. It gave him some power over the situation. I guess it gave him a sense of control in that he could help me. He took that as respect rather than looking down on him as a criminal or street kid.*

#### **□ Making Promises**

Making promises seemed to give the subjects a reassurance that if they did the right thing they would be rewarded. It allows a goal to be set up and the negotiator can refer to the reward during the problem solving process. The promises of personal safety and meeting with family are also gifts that initiate the process of reciprocity.

#7

*I guaranteed him two things right away. I said Doug, I will guarantee your safety and protect your dignity. "I know you want to resolve this and I know you don't want cameras flashing in your face and people violating your personal privacy. I will guarantee that this will not occur".*

#7

*I will make promises about testifying in court to say that they resolved this, and I did that in this case, and I testified and told the truth. I'll even promise to write it in my report that they helped. Some people say "I want to see that report in advance". Well I'll write it in advance I mean we're there for hours anyway, it's just a pad and paper.*

#9

*I guarantee her that she will be able to see her lawyer, her daughter, and her aunt after this is over.*

#10

*We kept our promises and the deal was that we as negotiators said that we would make their phone calls to their boyfriends for them if they would release the hostage and come out. So we made the phone calls.*

#12

*We really tried to work on that theme, that they were cooperative and that we reassured them that we would, although they knew they'd have to be dealt with in court, that we would make sure that we told their side of the story and that they were in terms of certainly the victim, tried to do their best.*

#### ☐ **Maximizing Reciprocity**

Doing a favour of allowing the subject to do something or have something that they do not expect results in a sense of obligation to repay at some time. This can be as simple as a cigarette or a cup of coffee or as complex as the negotiator "cutting a deal" or promising to speak on the subject's behalf. Although some negotiators have been trained never to give something for nothing, there can be merit in being perceived as doing a favour and letting reciprocity create some dissonance or feeling of indebtedness.

#4

*We had to set our goal in increments. The first goal was to get her other leg on the building side of the ledge and then continue talking to her and then she would go back and then she would ask for another cigarette.*

#4

*My focus was to keep offering her cigarettes 'cause every time I'd ask her she'd want one. In this case those cigarettes became something she wanted so we said 'okay, we're going to give you a cigarette but you need to bring your leg back over the edge'.*

#11

*We tried to explain to him, 'hey look he's not going to hurt you because you is his friend, you in there with him. He's already got the same deal that you have, you know, he doesn't know that you may get a little bit more so you need to' you know, 'impress upon him'. And he did and eventually got him to walk out.*

#### □ **Minimizing Risk and Damage**

Although the enormity of consequences were a hindrance, participants were successful in being able to minimize the damage that the subject had caused and allowing them to see some light at the end of the tunnel. Helping the subject to do some reframing and reducing the panic of having "really screwed up" reduced the negative pattern of thinking. Contrasting what they have done against something much more horrible and serious is a key strategy of minimization.



#2

*I constantly built a case against suicide built mostly on logic and white boy savvy. 'You know you'll never ride a bike again dude', stuff like that. 'Cause I've been arresting people for eighteen years, I can tell you right now, you're not going to jail for life, that's bullshit, you know you're not. You're just psyched up about it right now, but you know that you're not truly do that much time'. You know. 'You been in and out a couple of times before and you're strong enough to do it again and then you've got all your life, you can do whatever you want to do, ride with the (inaudible) that kind of stuff'. So during those times that he would listen to me I would constantly build that case against suicide.*

#9

*As we keep talking and down playing the incident, the thing that seems to be working is that nobody's been hurt to this stage and we're happy with this and we want to keep it this way, that we don't want anyone to get hurt. She knows that there's going to be some incidents that will have to be investigated but if nobody gets injured from shots being fired then the incident is not that serious.*

#10

*We tried to get her to buy into the process "you don't want to do that, you've got a lot to lose here, you have a daughter, you're only doing 2 years and if anything happens here*

*you could be looking at a lot more time.*

#11

*Now that's depending that you still know that the person that he particularly shot at this time, is not a fatal wound. If it is shot the way you know the person is injured but it's not fatal, then you know you can try to downplay it. And that's just one tactic that we try to use.*

#12

*But getting it through to them that they had to give up, minimizing the shooting of the policeman and the shooting at the policeman the previous day, we reassured them that the policeman was okay, he'd had his soft body armour on so that although he did end up in the hospital with some minor surgery he survived that.*

#12

*Enormous obstacles to get over, and huge issues for them in terms of what they were looking at down the road. Basically they were just forestalling the inevitable in terms of the, I'm sure they knew that they were going to be arrested. We weren't going to let them out. There was no, no demands for money, car, this sort of thing. They didn't really, we tried to put it on their shoulders, you know, give them some options. They really couldn't come up with anything.*

*ML: Yeah. So the enormity of their consequences became a hindrance.*

*SD: They did, even though we tried to minimize them and down play them in the fact that no one was really, no one had been killed. Yes we had a wounded officer but he was going to be okay.*

#21

*Downplaying actually helped a lot. When the subject of why he was being arrested came up I told him that it was about this shooting and he said that he knew nothing about it. I said "well this is your chance to tell your side of the story".*

## **Leadership**

Having a supportive, understanding and knowledgeable person as Incident Commander was helpful to the participants. There was a sense that many people in this role are there because of rank and not knowledge or experience with crisis situations. Leadership is not limited to the command personnel at an incident. In fact, every officer is a leader and is challenged to demonstrate leadership qualities on a daily basis. Leadership is an influence process that strives toward achievement of a common purpose; it is not a position or a title but a human process that transcends organizational control systems (Durham & Logan, 1997).

Some of the favourable command structure and leadership noted by participants was to have had (a) an Incident Commander who was a former negotiator, (b) a tactical sergeant who was a former negotiator, (c) a tactical coordinator who was a personal friend or

colleague, (d) a coordinator who was able to assess the negotiation progress and (e) a commander who was willing to listen. Hindrances to negotiation resulted from leadership that (a) was unfamiliar with crisis negotiation, (b) not open to input from all sides, and (c) not willing to assist and were content to let one person make all of the decision.

The ability to assess the situation demanded that commanders, tactical, and negotiators ask the following questions:

- 1/ Why are we here?
- 2/ Do we need to stay here?

Most participants are now aware of the need to constantly assess the situation and not only to look for ways of building a bridge but to decide whether a bridge could be built at another time by some different people (i.e. mental health). The "walk away" option is a viable option but, like many other options, was subject to an unwritten rule of "never do's". In the scenarios studied, two (10%) participants made the decision to "walk away" and did so successfully with police and/or mental health following up the next day. Another two participants assessed the opportunity to leave but made the decision to stay based on (a) outstanding warrants, and (b) volatility of the subject. The other scenarios presented by the participants were those in which leaving the scene was not an option.

Another participant was involved in assessment and decision making around a hostage exchange which is still a "never do" in the books of many negotiators and commanders (Fuselier, 1986). The hostage exchange clearly facilitated the peaceful outcome and was obviously a sound, and a safe, decision in that case.

The ability to make these types of decisions, and others around the use of TPI's, is a credit to the risk management ability of decision makers and is obviously something that must be done after a thorough risk assessment. That risk assessment might include the professional input of lawyers and psychologists.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Decision-making**

Systems thinking facilitates good decision making but it is often derailed by people with scarcity mentalities who have difficulty building trust with others. Those who have a difficulty sharing power and are threatened by others' competencies will not create a leadership environment (Covey, 1991).

Good decision making in this study was predicated upon: (a) an ability to listen, (b) an advanced knowledge of the negotiation process, (c) an openness to seeing the big picture, (d) a courage to ask the tough questions, and (e) a willingness to step out of the circle of safety and break new ground. Obviously the decision to pack up and leave without surrender is a hard decision for a police officer to make but, in retrospect, it was a wise move in each case.

#2

*In any case, our options having narrowed to go kill him or perhaps back off and arrest him on a warrant. The incident commander after a long discussion with the negotiators and the tactical people both - decided to back off. We left four officers, two of them armed with AR15 rifles as a loose perimeter on the house should he wake up and run 'em up again, and they simply backed out of the situation.*

#6

*Much to my frustration our chief and two captains never stepped in and took charge. They just stood back and watched.*

#7

*What hindered us is what hinders a lot of people across the United States and Canada and that is having incident commanders who are unfamiliar with crisis intervention and crisis negotiation. Incident Commanders are the only non-permanent part of the problem resolution team. I call it the triad: the incident commander, the tactical team, and the crisis negotiators. We understand that we're subordinated to them but at the same time they're coming from such places as finance or audit and other areas and they're new to the business. We're having to explain things at a very inappropriate time; time is of the essence in the resolution of these situations. It is not a time to educate Incident Commanders and we had to continually do that in this case.*

#11

*You're always going to have too many department heads wanting to make a decision and most of those people have not been a negotiator before, nor have they had the proper training but because of rank structure and because of the tension, they feel that they should be able to step in and give input when that is the worst thing you can do. They, they can cause you more harm than good. I think.*

#15

*I think what helped right away was that the team leaders recognized that it was going to be a prolonged negotiations. It wasn't something that was going to be able to be resolved right away so they were able to break down our team into two teams and send one part of the team home to rest, and the other team to go ahead and start the negotiation process.*

#18

*So we had sort of examined the incident and realized there was virtually nothing going on for twelve hours. We had decided that, you know, we're going to get a response, even if it's a bad response or an angry response, it's something and we can work through that. And it's always our mind set that you know, even a bad response it's workable because that's what we're trained to do. So we figured if he got angry at us and started yelling or screaming, hey at least we were establishing contact. So we did, we started the alarm and we started really ringing the phone intensely and started trying to make contact. We had deployed an up front element with a bull horn, bull horning the house trying to get a response.*

#19

*Early in the negotiations I'm not really sure who made the decision but the decision was made to reverse our roles. He's a black male, I'm a black male, he's got kids, I got*

*kids. He's about my age so they thought that there was more for us to click on than there were with him and [the other negotiator].*

#20

*I wanted \_\_\_\_\_ to be the primary on this one but she was on patrol and they refused to pull her, the patrol supervisor wouldn't let her give up her position on patrol - that was a hindrance. This put us a negotiator down at the onset when it's so important to have as many people as possible; the initial stage is so critical.*

#### ☐ **Assessment**

The scenarios discussed in this study involved some extraordinary facets that demanded keen assessments followed by courageous decisions. Not only the assessments of scenarios where the teams walked away and dealt with the subject in a different manner but assessments of doing a hostage exchange and matching negotiators with the subjects for maximum effectiveness.

#2

*So those two things, he's going to fall asleep and the odds are on our side, helped with that issue. The other issue they had was what if he comes out and guns down the neighbourhood? Well that's why we left with the AR15's - to stop that. And then there was the 'well we've created a special relationship here, we own this situation and we have to take care of it'. Well, that is true. In the court definition we had evacuated the neighbourhood, we had denied access to mom - 'you can't go in there and talk to him',*



*we had taken it over and we had that special relationship and untested to this point in case law, but it seems rational to me is if you can give that relationship back. And in effect that's what we did. Mom wanted to take him to [mental health] in the morning, mom was totally convinced for her thirty-one years of dealing with him that it would be okay to do so. Mom was a fairly rational individual, seemed relatively intelligent so I had to believe that she had a pretty decent idea of what the case was. We know we're going to have to kill him - this is a way to try and avoid that. Yeah we may have to kill him five hours from now if he stumbles out that door with the shotgun in his hand and into the fire of AR15's, but we don't have to kill him right now - we can give this soul another chance. And that's what we ultimately decided to do. We did our best analysis of it and decided it was safe to do so and did it. Would most departments do it? Probably not. Probably not.*

#3

*The end result was that we walked away from him, after a total of 8 hours of dealing with the subject down there, we vented his house and I warned him that we were doing that. We broke out some of the windows of his house to allow the gas fumes to escape and the air circulation to dry out the carpets. That was probably about 3 hours into the negotiation that the SWAT guys did that. He didn't disapprove of it but he didn't care. We warned him and told him it was to protect the neighbours. After about, I'd say toward the end of the evening our Fire Department Gas Meters, they had air samplers outside of the house and they read it as a relatively safe environment. At that time he*

*was in there, by himself, and he was no longer expressing suicidal concerns but was unwilling to come out. We weren't willing to go in and risk injury to anyone on this and we couldn't really see why we'd need to force a rescue on him so we just continued to talk for a while to see if we could get him to volunteer to exit. At about 1:30 in the morning we decided as a team that there was no reason to stay anymore so as a department we decide to pack up. We left 2 units outside to monitor it for the next few hours and they reported that he went to sleep. The next day we went down with Mental Health and got him to volunteer to go down to the Sacramento Health Centre. It was a successful response to the situation.*

*ML: Wisdom being the better part of valour, would you do it again that way?*

*J: Would we walk away again? I think so, I don't see a problem with walking away from a number of situations nowadays. Sometimes I think 'why are we here now' right at the beginning and I really have taken that approach to a lot of our call-outs - why are we here and should we be here? And just because we get started doesn't mean we can't stop.*

#5

*Based on what we know now we could have walked away but that's hindsight. At the time, you know we had allegations that this person had a gun and it was more a matter of the combination of firearm and suicide and the way it progressed. Other sorts of intelligence might have brought us to that point.*

#11

*They initially started talking to a female which was Lt. \_\_\_\_\_. I think that they felt that they didn't want to talk to a female whatsoever, they didn't feel comfortable even dealing with her. And talking with a man, I think it kind of - they related to me after a little bit.*

*L: So it facilitated success in switching negotiators and getting someone that they were more comfortable with?*

*B: Yeah. I think they felt a leg up because they had shut the first one down and I think they used that, wanted us to believe that they were in charge and they were serious about what they were doing. But at the same time, we already understood that that was going to take place, so we already knew some of the game playing.*

#12

*Not so much as a third part intermediary, but volunteered services to hostage swap.*

*That situation was ran by the command people, she was interviewed by [the psychologist], she was interviewed by other investigators, or one of the other investigators with our unit, and felt that she was probably a suitable candidate for this and given the situation was maybe a likely scenario that we might have to play out.*

*Eventually that, that was given approval and she, I'm not sure of the exact hour but at the start of Wednesday afternoon so it would've been Thursday night we actually did a successful, she was inserted in and we got [the hostage] out.*

#15

*So if they could see him in a window they were going to shoot gas from all sides, into the bathroom especially because they didn't want him going in there and barricading himself in there. Because during one of the times that we weren't on, the other team and the police department SWAT team heard water running. So they were thinking that maybe he had a bathtub full of water that he was going to use and make sure that the gas wasn't going to be effective.*

#17

*A lot of these situations are made; they could go through the closet door but because it's closed, the button gets pushed and we've got everybody there in a stand-off. So we make it a situation when it doesn't need to be made. The other thing is "why don't we leave and why are we here?"*

### **Learning & Development**

The category of "Training" did not adequately cover the way the participants have acquired their craft. Much of what they use and who they are as negotiators has been harvested from personal experience and gleaned from learning from the experiences of others. This does not discount the opportunity of learning within a classroom or seminar situation, or even a psychopathology lecture.

The opportunity to integrate the learning seems to facilitate success in negotiation. The

opportunity to work in "mock situations" or scenarios and then learn through feedback and debriefings is invaluable. This type of training is found at academies such as the Canadian Police College in Ottawa, Ontario and the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. There are other schools across the country that are offering basic, advanced, and refresher programs that allow negotiators to stay current in their practice. Crisis Negotiation Associations such as the California Association of Hostage Negotiators (CAHN) and cooperative alliances between forces such as the Calgary Police Service and the RCMP are doing an admirable job in hosting annual conferences. The Baltimore County/FBI Hostage Negotiation Seminar has been in existence for 22 years.

Although many participants extolled the amount of training hours allotted each year for negotiation and/or joint training with tactical teams, the reality of most is that they are receiving very little ongoing training. Appendix A details the results of a negotiation selection and training survey taken from seven Canadian and seven American police forces (Logan, 1999). Experience is something highly valued by the participants and those with this experience seem to have credibility with command and tactical personnel; they certainly have credibility with other negotiators. Accessing this experience is essential to the development of more junior negotiators. A program of training and mentoring is in place at the Sacramento County Sheriff Department that offers a 40-hour basic training school followed by two 3-month mentoring rotations with two different senior negotiators. After three years with the team, each negotiator attends a 40-hour advanced training school. Their training allotment is 240 hours per year plus attendance at the CAHN conference.

## **Examples**

### **□ Gaining from Experience**

The assessments made during the negotiations were most often made based on the negotiator's own past experience or the experience of others; knowledge that had been acquired through training courses, conferences, and networking.

Participants shared what they had gained from the experience of the scenarios that they discussed and other scenarios over the years. It is a credit to the negotiators that they review their cases and look for opportunities to learn and sharpen their craft.

Participants noted the following elements as things that they had gained from their experience that they would apply in the future: (a) question old rules to check current validity, (b) use precise communication in the transfer of the subject over to the tactical team, (c) train with the tactical team, (d) learn more active listening skills, (e) develop more precise methods of intelligence gathering, and (f) recognize your limitations.

#7

*The green light was put out on this guy 'cause he'd killed one, wounded another and still had 2 kids in there. I've had other incidents where I got people out under the green light. We used to have a rule that if the green light came on, it never came off. That's a foolish rule.*

#7

*We've learned now that I would say "we are now going to transition to a young man named Mike and Mike will talk to you now". Mike will then start to talk and they'll do the takedown.*

#7

*There was a necessity surfaced for First Responders training. First responders are often confronted by the suspect and most officers don't know how to at least not make the situation worse and at least contain it. Sometimes what they say or don't say can make the situation worse. We trained 35 sessions for our officers and our 911 operators. We knew this was helpful because they asked for this training and we knew because of the questions they asked. A couple of 911 operators employed the tactics that we taught and that was proof that this helped.*

#9

*I would have changed the way I did that because I would say "Okay now I really want to know what happened" and let her talk and tell me what happened and then I could defend our members or their actions later if I needed to.*

#12

*They wanted to talk to her and we let her into our negotiation van and, and let the, let*

*her talk. Probably, in - in the debriefing later there was a potential there, she could have jeopardized some of our techniques, some of the audio stuff that we had in there. I think she probably had mentioned to them so they might've been clued in a little bit on that. I don't think we'd do that again. We'd certainly have to tell them who was coming in and one thing and another, but a bit of a tactical error on our behalf.*

#17

*I think experience helps a lot - you've done it before, so you have more confidence.*

#18

*And I wasn't in charge of gathering intelligence or debriefing the wife or the family, and what we've learned since then is that we don't have a standard intelligence form or an intelligence questionnaire or witnesses or victims, so we have now formulated one.*

#20

*The scene command was great, support was great, tactical was great. When I go back and assess what I did. I didn't do enough of the practical active listening. I tried to do that but it's tough to get people to do it. We try to get books on Active Listening to the negotiators and in front of them. I wish I had that in front of me at the time and I felt like I was grasping too much.*



#21

*When I talked to him I really downplayed his situation. I talked to him about real things and letting him know that him and I were going to work things out and I was asking him to help me help him.*

*ML: The "help me help him". Did you get a sense that helped or hindered?*

*M: That was something that helped. It gave him some power over the situation. I guess it gave him a sense of control in that he could help me. He took that as respect rather than looking down on him as a criminal or street kid.*

#21

*I tried to be very mindful of what I said but I did make a mistake. It was one of those things where when you say it you just want to reach out and grab it before it goes anywhere. He was giving some rhetoric about us beating the shit out of him and I was explaining how we don't mistreat people and then I said "you don't know how the game's played". Bad, bad mistake and I knew it. He blew a gasket "you think this is a game, you think it's a game" and he went off on a tirade of going out in a blaze of glory. I hindered for a while but I got him back after about 5 minutes.*

#### **□ Integrating the Training**

Participants value the training that they receive and the opportunity to attend conferences where they can glean from others' experiences and add to their repertoire of ideas. The call for more training hours each year and cross training with tactical is universal among participants.

#1

*They're cross-trained. And then two of the negotiators - or excuse me, two of the SWAT'ers, are ex-negotiators. So you know, there's not that 'what are those guys doing? Let's get this over with', you know, and we find them very, very helpful in situations. So much so that we've been on tacticals where the SWAT Sergeant and myself or another team leader are sitting there embroiled in negotiation strategy and he brings as much to the table as any of us.*

#3

*Active listening skills - they've been around forever and I don't think they're utilized enough and I keep a set of notes of them with me because if I don't look at it you'll find yourself wanting to talk versus simply use something to persuade the person out. It's so much easier and it makes you look like a pro when you're still a rank amateur, it really does. So not only being exposed to training but taking it back and using it.*

#3

*Walking away - it was a tough move for me. It's really hard to be on the phone with someone for 5 hours, have them 4 times standing at the front door and knowing "that's my job, I'm supposed to get that guy from there to here - that's the negotiator world. And to try to remember that it's not always the negotiator world, sometimes we're just there to calm things down to diffuse a potential crisis situation.*

*ML: Do you think ego gets in the way of walking away from situations that we should walk away from as negotiators sometimes?*

*MJ: I think so. As a department and as a negotiator once you've taken a hold of something, it's very hard for a police mentality to just say 'okay, not today'. I think we're used to being the man in charge and I think we're used to saying 'it's going to be this way' and it's going to happen. I think that this is a skill that needs to be taught and I was never truly taught to walk away. Since then I've attended a couple of courses and seminars especially with suicidal suspects - are they truly suicidal and can you intervene immediately or can you just come back again the next day. So now I think it's a wise choice and one that you should keep in the toolbag but it's tough to sell.*

*#5*

*We do joint training but we don't do enough. Unless you're in an agency which is big enough for full-time people who can dedicate all or a significant time to joint training. It's always a challenge to do enough and we do it about half as often as we would like and with about half as many people as we would like meaning that when we do an exercise, because of the length of time, we might only have half our negotiators there.*

*#6*

*The police department was not well trained to handle this incident at the time. I was a patrol sergeant and I'd been to the Basic Negotiation Course just months prior to that and there was one other person who was a trained negotiator so I guess you could say*

*we had a team of 2 persons and the other guy wasn't available.*

#10

*The training, the seminars are great. Hearing what other people did and what I might do in the future and these things race through your head and you're able to remember it. I would argue with people that say these are lost. They're never lost, it's like riding a bike.*

#19

*He's got four, four or five different voices now coming at him and telling him "do this, do that, do this, do that" and I think that comes from a lot of people could taste that the end was near, or see that the end was near, and there was no malicious intent behind it but they wanted to do their part in facilitating it instead of sticking to their training. So that was one of the bigger hindrances, because we had worked so hard for so long with this guy and in a blink of an eye we were about to blow it because we deviated from how we were trained.*

#20

*I called and the bad guy answered and lied about who he was and told me to call back. He finally told me that he was in there with some people but there was no other guy involved. I immediately recognized that as one bad guy trying to cover for the other. It does pay to go to conferences because I've learned throughout the years by going to Baltimore and such that this stuff does happen. You learn these things from others.*

#20

*The basic negotiation training says ask for hostage release early and often and that's what I did.*

### **Using Intuition**

Although intuition is often discussed as a "sixth sense" it is likely an understanding that is at least partially achieved through the integration of past experience with present stimuli. Understanding personality may be from experience and/or education. The education may be book learning or learning from the stated experience of another person. Whichever way the negotiator achieved this understanding, he or she was able to use it in assessing what they should do or say at a given time in the negotiation process.

The ability to read behaviour is another skill that is likely linked to experience and education. The knowledge of human personality and the understanding that human behaviour is not as unpredictable as once considered to be aided the participants in the following scenarios: (a) knowing when to negotiate with the focus of gathering intelligence for tactical intervention, (b) knowing when to allow venting and when to break into the tirade, (c) recognizing manipulative behaviour, (d) ascertaining which of two subjects was the most receptive to communication, (e) recognizing the need to give more power or control to an individual, (f) assessing the true intent of a subject, and (g) anticipating the reaction to particular stimuli.

Knowing when and how to provide a distraction that would sidetrack the subject from a

violent intent is another intuitive skill that was used positively by some of the participants. Sidetracking seems to allow for the anger to diffuse as the focus of the subject is not being fueled by negative stimulus, at least for the distracted period of time.

There is also merit in learning techniques of distracting in order for tactical movement and intervention to take place. The negotiator awareness of when this tactical intervention is inevitable should be clear to the negotiator, not by notification from the tactical team, but through the tactical awareness maintained by the negotiator. Another attribute of a good negotiator is to maintain this tactical awareness, both for personal safety and the safety of everyone engaged in the incident.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Understanding Personality**

There has been a shift in the last few years from viewing the subject in terms of pathology to gauging behaviour of the subject. This was introduced by Miron and Goldstein (1979) who discussed the subject behaviour continuum from instrumental to expressive. Recently, Webster (1997, 2000) has revived this approach and has also focussed on a third category of "high risk". Although this is a valuable change of focus, I would caution that the understanding of personality disorder is not discarded as it provides information that serves as yet another tool for the negotiator.

#2

*I think so if you truly diagnosed him but like a lot of them they seem to obsessively*

*attach to an individual and at least for this short period of their time this individual is considerably more important than they should be in the big picture of their life, because they just simply has no balance. They just put all their eggs in that basket, and he was convinced that she was going to get him arrested and his, all his eggs were broken, he felt like he had nothing left.*

#3

*ML: What kept him in, what kept him from coming out?*

*MJ: He saw himself as a failure. He was not providing for his wife, he can't work, he was addicted to the pain medication and was an alcoholic. He saw himself as a failure and I think him giving up on this big thing that he started was one more failure and that's what ultimately kept him in.*

#20

*I tried to beat him to calling the girlfriend and I told her what was going on and that she should not talk with him and that I was sending someone over to get her and bring her to the scene. I felt like she was key and she was leverage. I felt I could stretch out the time if I had her and he didn't.*

#21

*He wanted to be taken seriously you know he was a gang leader and was very colourful and he wanted to be respected.*

#22

*Dr. \_\_\_\_\_ kept reassuring me. That was one of the better things, having him on the scene. He was a good friend, a psychologist, and he liked my choice of a black female to replace the mother figure.*

### □ **Reading Behaviour**

Participants spoke of "getting a feel" for the subject and "reading" the subject. This ability must be nurtured and can be done by validating the intuition present in most negotiators. The experience gained through years of police work and through continual learning has developed this intuition.

#10

*We'd ignore her as much as possible. She'd walk around with the knife, striving for recognition and we were really conscious about not identifying with her at all. I think it was helpful to ignore [hostage taker #1]. If we had drawn her into it, we would still be here today. She didn't want to listen to reason and you could hear her in the back saying "I've already killed 2 people, fuck, a third one isn't going to matter".*

#11

*And that's just good interview skills, that's all it is. Negotiating is mostly being an interviewer and all you're doing is getting a feel for people. You have to have an idea on how to read people that's verbally as well as visually.*



#17

*I was just kind of reading this guy and his behaviour or something told me that I could ask the question "Are you going to jump?"*

#22

*The negotiator could hear cartoons on TV and his mother confirmed that he watches TV all day. We wanted his attention so we cut his cable. He was angry for about an hour but that was one of the better things we did because it forced him to focus on us.*

#### □ **Providing a Distraction**

Although not discussed in the literature, the art of distracting seemed to be a valuable tool for many of the participants. It is perhaps used often without recognizing its true value. In fact, many of the useful techniques that facilitated success were forms of distracting the subject away from a destructive intent. The distracting technique seemed to invoke some minimal compliance that ultimately led to resolution.

#2

*During the initial excited times when he was truly amped, it was difficult sometimes to break his chain of thought or to insert a word because he would be yelling non-stop into the phone. During those times even though the classic teaching is to use your voice lower and slower to try and bring him down to your level, at times I would almost have to shout into the phone to get a break in his monologue so that I could distract him for*

*a second with just noise - "Hey! Mike, listen man! Do you ever listen to Aerosmith, do you have some of them? I've been listening to this other band all night with you, put Aerosmith on for me will you?"*

*L: So a real good distraction technique of getting him to focus on putting another CD on.*

*B: Mhmm.*

*L: Did he slow down, did you notice a different while he was doing that?*

*B: Um no, actually he hung up when he did that. I knew he did that because when he came back on Aerosmith was on, instead of Megadeath. I don't know, I tried thanking him for it but I don't remember how it played out, how the thanking played out. But I know that I was able at least to get that minimal compliance out of him at that point, and that was during the super-excited point. And that was one of the things that made us truly hopeful early on, because early on it was so volatile we were thinking this is going to be a shooting. We weren't sure we were going to win this one. But that was one of the first good signs that we had, that we were perhaps on the right track.*

*#7*

*Sometimes talking to a person right away will distract them enough so that the tactical people can get in place without him observing every move they make.*

#14

*I gotta. I just - well then I, how do I make him stop? The tactical can't go in, I can't crawl under the door. He's not going to come out. So I just started talking a mile a minute, 'Tim, Tim, Tim', I don't even know what it was but finally I get him distracted and he stops with that.*

#### □ **Tactical Awareness**

Participants discussed the need to maintain a tactical awareness at all times. One participant referred to it as "rotating his hat" from negotiation to tactical. The imagery is that of the ball cap with 2 brims and the ability to rotate the hat as opposed to changing hats. For personal safety and tactical intelligence gathering there is a necessity to maintain this dual presence.

#12

*ML: Now the whole point about substituting the, the hostage, making the trade, was the helpful or a hindrance to the success of your negotiation?*

*SD: Well it was certainly helpful to, to us in that it took the pressure off us in terms of [the hostage] situation. Because it really was a, a tenuous situation right from, right from the start of the hostage taking itself right the way through. And we knew from talking with medical people that as time went on that her condition would be, would be degrading, and she did, they were really concerned that she was not only going to go into false labour but full labour and these folks would have no medical training. You know. The baby would be, you don't know just the, the complications that should arise*

*and so we were looking at different tactical situations where if she went into actual labour, having to breach the house, entry, it just created a huge problem for us. And we, and of course without really articulating that to them I'm sure they were bright enough to realize that if that situation arose that there was probably going to be an entry.*

#13

*But I'll tell you this too, the blocking out is also - it was good for me but it was a hindrance for me too because I was not thinking at the time. A lot of times when we deal with police officers we forget that they're DP's. They're people in crisis. They're no longer cops. But it takes everybody else around you to remember that.*

#14

*My goal at that point because of his volatility was just to get him out of there and separate him from a) the viable life b) the weapon and c) to have him apprehended or neutralized, killed if need be if he posed a threat to the tactical team. That's an advantage.*

#16

*The tactical thing is that we don't have a confined anything while he's moving and one thing is we now know where he is and he's somewhat confined and as long as he's moving we don't have containment.*

### **Subject's Orientation**

Although the mental status of the subjects that the participants negotiated with was not assessed, there was lucidity present in each case as described by the participants. There was obviously a heightened state of arousal present in each case and the subjects' emotions could be described as highly labile. Common elements fueling the emotional lability were (a) feelings of hopelessness, (b) obsession with a woman, (c) hatred of police, (d) feelings of failure, (e) loss of loved one, (f) overwhelmed with stress created by life events, and (g) irrationality related to a medical condition. The criminal history of some of the subjects could indicate the presence of personality disorder (i.e. Antisocial Personality) and the attention seeking could possibly indicate a Borderline Personality.

There was a positive correlation between criminal history and the death of the subject either by suicide or by tactical intervention. Six (22%) of the subjects negotiated with in this study discussed "suicide by cop", also known as victim precipitated suicide. Of this group, two were shot and killed by police and one committed suicide.

The magnitude of the consequences of a precipitating event were strong inhibitors to surrender. Participants negotiated with ten (45%) subjects who were facing criminal charges as a result of preceding events. Of these 10 subjects, four were facing murder charges, four were facing robbery charges, and two were facing more minor weapons charges. Of this group of ten subjects, four either committed suicide or were shot by police.

## Examples

### □ **Criminal History**

Although recent statistics are not clear, it appears that up to 88% of subjects encountered in crisis response have a criminal history. That figure is consistent with the present study where 20 (91%) of the 22 subjects had a criminal history. Most participants observed that even though they may have been charged by police in the past, it did not seem to be a deterrent to be speaking with a negotiator who was a law enforcement officer.

#2

*Mike was an on and off again parolee, at this current time he was no longer on parole. He was convinced that his girlfriend whom he had beat up was going to have him arrested so he got extremely drunk and went on a rampage basically, temper tantrum - shooting the shotgun in the front yard.*

#6

*The suspect in this case had a history with our police department and from his point of view, he felt that the \_\_\_\_\_ police were against him and he was afraid of the police.*

#15

*He felt that the police, or the deputies, had wronged him by 1) taking away his guns, confiscating his guns on a previous run in that he had, and I think it might have been a*

*domestic violence run in with the girlfriend, so he had that already in his mind that we already were bad guys and we were the ones that took his guns away.*

#20

*What I knew about him by then was that he was a three-time loser. He was the wheel man in a robbery murder in DC, did time for that when he was 14 or 15. He was on bond for robbing a pawn shop in the next county. He had not much to live for.*

#### ☐ **Mental/Emotional State**

If the subject was in an emotional state such that he could see absolutely no reason to live, the task was monumental. The two subjects that could just not see a reason to live took their own lives. It was not simply a matter of not wanting to face consequences because others that were facing worse consequences surrendered to the tactical team. Negotiators work hard and do their best to influence the will to live but ultimately it is the subject's decision.

#1

*he just couldn't bring himself to come to the door. But again we would try and try and try and then we would work through the issues as to why he couldn't, and they all came down to the fact that he didn't have anything to walk out that door for. I mean there was nothing on the other side of that door that was going to give him any relief.*

#5

*It connects with riding on the notoriety and he may have been saying some of those things to the counsellor for effect, you know there was something going on there that he felt he needed extra strokes so maybe he figured if he started suggesting self destruction that he'd get more sympathy.*

#7

*He then was in there with a dead girl with 2 tiny children sleeping between her legs on top of the bed and this is where he's communicating from so he's very, very volatile.*

#14

*So windows of lucidity were very limited and that was a very big hindrance to negotiating with this individual. I tried to capitalize on those windows of lucidity but they were infrequent and it made for what appeared to be someone monitoring or listening to a very repetitive negotiation, with minimal responses by the suspect.*

#18

*It wasn't a mental deficiency, it was more of a medical condition that caused him significant pain and discomfort and irritability and it caused his thinking to not be rational. But it was able to be handled with medication but he was not compliant to get medication, and he had not been taking it.*



## □ Preceding Events

Preceding events bring people to the edge and life in prison can seem very hopeless but it is an obstacle that can be moved. In this study, six (27%) of subjects who were facing charges of murder or attempted murder surrendered at the end of negotiation.

#1

*He had been terminated by his employer, his house was in foreclosure, his finances were upside down and in, in his opinion, in his words, there was really no reason to live.*

#12

they complicated it in that they were looking at a string of, of violent crime. Such that it was an armed robbery, they tied up the person, took her car, shot at the police fleeing from the scene or down the road so to speak. Two days later shot their way into a house, took a hostage, shot at the police arriving at the scene - the response to a call. So those things were in their minds.

## Subject's Behaviour

Although there is a clear recognition that negotiators have an ability to influence the decisions of the subject, it is understood that ultimately the subject will behave in the manner he or she chooses. These decisions seem to be highly affected by the subject's

planning or lack of planning. The behaviour is clearly linked to the subject's orientation and is highly affected by the enormity of consequences prescribed by preceding events.

Other factors that participants included was the access to drugs and alcohol, during and preceding the incident. These substances were found to have a destabilizing effect on the subject and, in many cases, it was the decreased effect of the destabilizer over time that increased rationality and facilitated a peaceful conclusion.

The presence of hostages was a factor in nine (41%) of the participants' scenarios. In only two (10%) of the scenarios were the hostages ever used as a bargaining chip in exchange for any demands to be met. Obviously the presence of people held against their will by a person with a weapon puts additional pressure on the negotiators. Hostages were shot and killed or wounded in two of the scenarios. In two other scenarios, participants indicated that it was the hostage(s) that kept the subject alive.

The presence of a weapon seemed to exacerbate the conflict by reducing the tactical options, increasing the potential of serious harm to those on both sides of the barricade, and reinforcing a hostile attitude and sense of omnipotence in the subject.

### **Examples**

#### **☐ Subject's Planning**

There seems to be a positive correlation between the subject's lack of planning and expressive behaviour in communicating. This is a reasonable assumption given that the other end of the behavioural continuum is instrumental or goal directed. The point to be made is that the impulsive, or at least non-instrumental, behaviour is already at a point to be more

influenced by virtue of the lack of direction. It is perhaps fortunate then that 65% of police crisis negotiation situations involve a subject who has no specific plans (FBI, 2001).

#1

*Well he had mentioned that he was armed with a 9 millimetre handgun and um, I asked him if that's how he planned on taking his life and he said 'well I think I am, that's what my plan is', and we talked about how much of a plan he really had. It became very apparent that he really didn't have much of a plan, this was just kind of all free wheeling and he was kind of struggling through this.*

#10

*It definitely helped that they didn't have any clear direction. They didn't get the hostage they wanted and "now what the hell do we do."*

#18

*He was prepared for us to assault him or insert gas. But he had a gas mask and we knew this from the cameras that had been inserted, because we could view him and he was wearing a gas mask. He was pretty uh, cognisant of - I don't want to say tactics - but he knew what the police might or might not be doing.*

#### ☐ **Presence of Weapon**

Not only does the presence of a weapon, particularly a firearm, limit the tactical options

but it also can have a destabilizing effect on the subject. The feeling of power and often omnipotence while in possession of a gun has often been described by perpetrators of violent crime. HOBAS statistics reveal that a gun is used by the subject 72% of the time. A handgun is the choice of weapon on 46% of reported crisis response incidents (FBI, 2001).

#2

*He continued to yell taunts at the officers, he wanted the officers to come in and have a shoot out with him and go out in a blaze or glory kind of a thing.*

#19

*we were concerned about the suicide by cop thing. But we were able to establish early on that there was no weapons on the balcony. In fact he actually took off his coat and threw it to us and let us search the coat, and you know, he did the arms up and spin to assure us that there weren't any weapons on him.*

#21

*He would come to the window and the sniper advised us that he could see something under a blanket that resembled a rifle and he had the clip in his hand. This was an individual responsible for 2 drive-by shootings.*

#22

*We confirmed the gun by the mother's description and the holes in the neighbour's walls  
- a revolver.*

#### □ **Presence of Hostages**

The term "hostage" is used in this study because it is the word used by participants. In fact, the term "victim" may be more appropriate in describing the people unlawfully detained by the subjects in this study.

Strangely, the discussion around hostages usually is absorbed by the "Stockholm Syndrome". It is always amazing that something so seldom observed gets so much attention. The fact that the hostage negotiation literature has been more focussed on this than the skills of active listening reveals the anecdotal nature of the literature. Participants in this study made no mention of it and the recent HOBAS (FBI, 2001) summary notes that the Stockholm Syndrome was not a factor in over 90% of cases where victims were involved (n=585).

#6

*When we got to the surrender phase, he would discuss with the hostage "well what do you think about that?"*

#11

*L: Okay. What about, what about the presence of other hostages held? Was that a help or a hindrance?*

*B: Well any time you've got more than one it's going to be a hindrance. I mean you've got to think the more hostages they got then the more tools they have to use. The more bargaining chips he has and that's not going to help us at all.*

#20

*I felt that the hostages were the only thing keeping him alive. Like, I didn't say "hey keep them as long as you want " or anything but I had a sense that if he released them, he'd kill himself.*

#### ☐ **Access to Destabilizers**

Destabilizers is a general term that can refer to anything that might create more hazardous conditions (i.e. weapons and substances), but it could also refer to antisocial peers or a particular victim group (Webster, et al., 1997). In this study, destabilizers refer specifically to consumption of drugs and alcohol.

#2

*After the first three or four hours he began to sober up. He was never truly sober during this entire thing but it's my belief that he probably ran out of stuff to drink, he was no longer at least progressively getting more intoxicated.*

#8

*The first thing that hindered the negotiation was that the person was highly intoxicated and was also using hashish so there was a combination of both and the alcohol he was*

*drinking was home-made alcohol so that really increased his state of agitation.*

#14

*Using drugs either prior to the event immediately, or during the event using narcotics.*

*And that eliminated or restricted my ability to do a lot of active listening. I had to stimulate the individual almost constantly and active listening was very, very negligible and that was a real problem.*

#19

*While, while he was on, so as we're going at him and we're starting to chip away, we can see that we're starting to chip away and reality is starting to sink in, he takes a blast of this alcohol and then he's right back up again.*

### **Providing Information & Direction**

The other side of active listening in the communication process is providing direction and doing so with clarity. Participants found that this was particularly helpful in the final minutes or during what some call the "surrender stage". They found that repetition was helpful and that direction from only one source was paramount to a peaceful ending.

Providing information and "demystifying" the crisis negotiation process was found to be very helpful in resolving situations. Participants found that often the subject was afraid to come out because they did not know what to expect or that expectations were that they would be hurt or killed by police. Assuring the subjects that they would be safe, and taking

the mystique out of the presence of armed tactical officers dressed in army fatigues or camouflage, was helpful in allaying fear. Explaining the need for containment and the need to keep everyone safe does not take away from the tactical positioning but it explains its presence.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Demystifying the Process**

It is apparent from this study that one of the obstacles to those on the other side of the barricade in coming out peacefully is the fear of the unknown. Participants found that taking the mystique out of the police presence made it easier to build a bridge out of the barricade. Explaining the surrender procedure by detailing what the subject would see and what the tactical team would do seemed to "demystify" the process and build some trust between the subject and the negotiator. If the subject believes that the "others" out there are as professional and caring as the negotiator, then the walk out there becomes safe and feasible.

#1

*M: Was it helpful for him for you to talk about why they were there?*

*B: Yeah it took the mystique out of it to some degree. You know, I was not - I certainly wasn't going to compromise any of the officers positions or the integrity of the scene but did let him know, and this is usually my custom when I'm the primary, to let people know potentially what is out there. Because sometimes the fear of the unknown can be, can be pretty strong. And depending on the situation I'm not opposed to letting people*



*know what's out there and why they are out there. I think a lot of people see SWAT as the big watch dog, the big Rottweiler but the way I describe our guys is that they are highly trained individuals and they're there to preserve the peace and to preserve your life as well as their own. So I think once you take some of that out of it they potentially view those people differently unless you've got a scenario that is completely different and you are trying to use those people to your advantage as a threat. Because sometimes with a situation you need a threat or a stick to get people to resolve things peacefully.*

#5

*Dealing with the typical kinds of trust-building issues or barriers to trust-building like coming-out, not coming out, being afraid of the police, knowing where the police are, what are the police going to do, what's going to happen to him.*

#7

*We were replacing our inner perimeter of patrol officers with SWAT members, while this is going on our subject is running through the house screaming thinking that the house is going to be assaulted at any time now. My feeling is that , when we see that take place, we should put a phone call into them to relieve those anxieties, that we're there to resolve the situation peaceably and what you see outside isn't what it looks to be, it is not an assault on your place and I explain to them that we are doing this to help resolve this and to contain it so it doesn't spread to the rest of the neighbourhood.*

*Sometimes that explanation will allow a person to say "I understand that now".*

#7

*I explained that we were here to contain things " we don't want people wandering in here to make the situation worse". He accepted that answer. You don't give the tactical positions away but that automatically does another thing to him. It takes out of his mind that he can run out the door and escape, he knows he's surrounded and we don't pull any punches on that one. "Yes, we do have a lot of guns, but we're here to protect you and everyone else in there".*

#11

*They're sitting there and they know they got no way out. They see the inner perimeter corps, they see the SWAT team. You verbally tell them this is what we're going to do and this is how we're going to get you out of there without you getting hurt, because most people don't really want to get hurt.*

#### **□ Clarifying Instructions**

Clear instructions reduce ambiguity and can reduce the subject's apprehension about his safety. Clarifying instructions prevents a breach of trust which would exacerbate an already stressful situation. Negotiators learn to use redundancy in the directions because the subject's attention span is tenuous. Sometimes direction is used to distract the subject and sometimes to focus the subject on his task. The downside of instruction is that it can be overused to the detriment of good listening.

#7

*Sometimes if we do too much talking and too much directing of that individual we're not listening to key points that he might feed us that will help resolve the situation. If we're shouting commands at him and making him do other things, we're not finding out why he's there.*

#7

*I prepare them for what will happen and tell them that they will be handcuffed and it will be by people with guns.*

#9

*It took 3 or 4 times for me to tell her what to do for her to turn around and tell me what she was going to do because at first she wasn't really listening. She would hear me but she would only hear a few things so the directions would not be as were told. I had her repeat my directions back to me and that's how I knew she wasn't listening. See she still has a firearm and I don't want her to come out to a confrontation.*

#10

*We were very specific in our directions because we wanted to ensure the safety of [the hostage]. We said to [one of the hostage takers], "what has [the hostage] done to you to deserve having a knife flashed around in front of her face." Next thing we knew, the knife was down on the counter.*

#13

*I had to bring her back. And one of the things that I kept telling her was that I did see her flinch, and yes at one point I did see her flinch. Somebody did something and she flinched and I said "You've got to pay attention to my voice. I don't know where - if you can hear it if it sounds clear to you or if it sounds like an echo", I said "but you have got to pay attention to my voice". Because it was like me leading her out of a cloud or something.*

#16

*We called the local sheriff and highway patrol down there and I started talking about what he needed to do when the police get there because I'm sending them to help you. "You can put the phone down and keep your hands up and don't get out of the car". He described a car that pulled in and said "but they don't have uniforms" and I told him "they're probably plain clothes police".*

#18

*You know, we always talk to the target and tell him "this is what you're going to see, this is how it's going to look, this is what we want you to do", we have a scenario that, you know, we want to stay consistent so that SOT doesn't get surprised with anything, they know that we're telling this guy what's going to happen. We've trained them how to designate one person to be a point person and bring him out to a secure position.*

### **Negotiator's Personal Resources**

One of the key pieces that became evident to the researcher during the review of taped interviews and incident extraction was that much of the process that facilitated success was due to the resources and personalities of the negotiators. What draws them to negotiation is not the number of tools they can carry in a toolbox but that they are the toolboxes and they handcraft the tools that they use through caring for other people and having the desire that "everyone goes home safe tonight".

Whether this desire is expressed as spiritual, intellectually challenging, humanistic or a combination of reasons, it is abundantly clear that helping others is the primary motivation for doing this job. It is this motivation that is heard as the underlying message of care and concern by the subject on the other side of the barricade. It is this motivation that keeps the negotiators striving for the goal of peaceful resolution and allows them to focus their attention on the subject for 12 hours and explain that it felt like an hour or two.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Knowing Yourself**

Knowing yourself sounds so transcendental but it is foundational to the success of every negotiator. The ability to be self reflective and to see ourselves as others see us would move us to our greater potential and a constant process of self renewal. This ability also draws us to others who enrich our lives and to a belief system that keeps our feet on the ground. Participants noted elements that ground them such as spiritual beliefs, family, friends, sports, and a sense of humour.

#1

*And then I have, you know, I mean we encourage all of our team members to have their own release valves, whatever it happens to be. For me it happens to be sports, I do a lot of sports and I go out there and bang a handball around or run or something like that and blow off some steam. And we all know who we can go to to talk these things out, and we do... I get a lot of relief and resources from \_\_\_\_\_, we're very good friends, so he and I bounce these things off each other every once in a while.*

#2

*the reason that I do what I do is - one, that it is competitive and intellectual - I enjoy it like a chess game. And the other one is just a Christian based, I want to save a life. So that empathy is pretty strong there from the religious aspect.*

#4

*Everybody's got their own way of dealing with it and internalize it. I kind of keep an objective view on life and try not to do anything too serious but I know that there are some serious things I have to undertake but I don't have problems sleeping at night you know whether it was successful or not, I gave it my best shot and in any negotiation you don't have any control over it. If someone wants to hurt themselves they're going to do it and you could be blue in the face assisting them to the point they make a decision....you'd take it personal, you'd have to take it personal . I had already*

*formulated that if this doesn't go the way that I want it to go I've got to have a plan to take care of me and my plan was not to look, just to walk away and then debrief later.*

#13

*What was helpful was I saw the reaction of the people that work with her, and it wasn't just 'oh', it wasn't just pity for her, it was a genuine concern for her. And that told me what type of person she was. That told me that I could probably appeal to her in some way on a very warm level. You know? I mean some people can, some people you can't. You try to but - and I know what it was - but when I appealed to her, when I talked to her, I saw that I could appeal on a spiritual level. That's what it was. That's not just warm but I could tell by the way, the looks in their voices, their voices almost had a tear in it, and these are her co-workers.*

*ML: Yeah. One thing I've noticed in everything you've said, it was a lot about who you were. The spiritual,*

*RV: Mmhm.*

*ML: The level of confidence you had. It was a lot about who you are as a person, that seemed to help in this incident.*

*RV: Yeah. I think so. I really do*

#14

*I just want to - by saying that I want it clear that I never thought that I didn't do*

*everything in the world that I could do to try to make this right. And I said, not to be melodramatic but I will tell you, if that was my daughter inside I would have done nothing differently. I would do the same exact thing. So you know, did I feel guilt? No. Overwhelming sadness at the human tragedy that this bastard allowed to happen.*

#15

*I was frustrated and I kept trying to not run out of ideas. So I think that was, that's been the only time when I really felt the frustration, because nothing was working and I just didn't know what else to use.*

#17

*He'd seem to get worked up when my backup said something to me. He'd say "hey, you've got to listen to that punk behind you, you don't know what to say?" I would just shine that on like I didn't hear it.*

#19

*A hindrance for me at that point was my patience level. Now my patience had gotten in the way of resolving this because I found myself yelling at him. I told him that "you promised me, you promised me that you would get in the car, yet this is another promise - how many promises is this, this is the tenth of eleventh promise in this five and a half hour period - you haven't kept your word one time for me!"*



## □ Focusing

The ability to focus attention on the subject and what he/she is saying is the skill of attending. Participants related that their sense of time passing during the negotiations was lost as were many of the incidental happenings around them. This focus and skill of attending sends a message that allows people to feel valued and a relationship can be initiated. The role of the secondary negotiator becomes even more important in paying attention to issues of safety and peripheral concerns as the primary negotiator attends to the subject.

#13

*RV: I'm not going to see it, because saying "I'm not going to see that" mean that she won't do this. That was my, that was my thing. I said whatever it took for me to prevent that, I am not going to see that happen today, she is not going to do it.*

*ML: So that was helpful actually,*

*RV: It was very helpful to me.*

#14

*When I found out I was there 12 ½ hours I, and it was dark, I couldn't believe it. The weather was extremely cold, I have no recollection of ever being cold. I have no recollection of ever being tired, and I have no recollection of ever being hungry and thirsty, and I never went to the bathroom. It was like I was there for about an hour and a half, and that's when I found - the only reason I realized the time frame was that they*

*rotated the tactical team, and that's standard after 12 hours.*

#15

*So it was almost like listening to him die almost, because of his gurgling. It was really weird. Having to talk to somebody that you know wasn't going to talk to you back, but they needed you to talk to him. So I did.*

#17

*I used his name and I wouldn't turn away from him and I kept my focus on him.*

#19

*It didn't effect me too much as a negotiator because I'm there to deal with what I got in front of me and everything else that's going on around me wasn't really my concern.*

#### ☐ **Caring**

There are times that it is difficult for a police officer to talk about building relationship and caring, after all this is a perpetrator. It is especially difficult when the subject has just killed an innocent victim. Keeping the sense of purpose and having everyone safe is the resounding message that drowns out the grim realities. This is not about stuffing the emotion and being uncaring; in fact, it is the opposite. It is the caring for people and the sense of purpose that continues to drive the negotiator. It is this caring, not techniques, not models with steps to follow, not charismatic super negotiators, not Ph.D's that will be the secret of success.

#4

*I wanted to let her know that this is not just the police you're talking to this is a human being that cares that you don't harm yourself*

#10

*There's a sense of purpose, this is something that you want to do. You want to help people and you don't want harm to come to anyone; whether it's a perpetrator or, I mean they are human beings.*

#14

*You know why do we become cops? We become cops to help people. I don't know, some guys maybe they want to lock up everybody in the world. I just want to, you know, I want to be a cop and I love it but I don't want to hurt anybody. I want, I want to help them out. I want the bad guy locked up. If I have to kill the bad guy, I will kill him. I assure you I will kill him if I have to do that. But if I don't have to do that, then I'm going to do it another way. I want to help out, and that's why I like the negotiations.*

## **Time**

Participants all agree that "time is on their side" and that it is a valuable tool. The advantages noted are (a) forestalling someone's thoughts of self-harm, (b) reducing tension and emotional volatility, (c) inducing physical exhaustion of the subject, (d) gathering more intelligence, (e) implanting more audio-visual aids, (f) increasing containment, (g) reducing

the effects of drugs and alcohol, (h) increasing rational thought, (i) building relationship, (j) recognition that the negotiators are not going away, and (k) reduced expectations of escape. These advantages of time are consistent with the research as summarized by McMains & Mullins (1996).

### **Examples**

#### **□ Buying Time**

Buying time or "slowing down the train" allows the negotiator to "bring them to their senses and not to their knees" (Ury, 1991). It is time that works behind the scene, often unnoticed to bring natural processes such as fatigue and hunger and, above all, to bring rationality to a senseless situation.

#4

*Time is always on our side simply because if we can forestall someone's thoughts of harming themselves we've been successful and if we hit the wall in talking to them then we can bring in another negotiator.*

#7

*We set delay in place, delay is the nature of our business, delay helps resolve situations because most hostage takers or suicidal persons or barricaded subjects will eventually allow us to resolve situations when we come down to a normal operating level. They're operating at a fever pitch, they're operating on a basis of emotions and anxiety and it is*

*our job to slow things down. Delay is one reason why operational commanders don't negotiate directly. If they do then the demands made upon that person will be expected directly. We are the delay factor in the resolution of these problems, we are the mechanism that slows these things down and helps the person slow down thereby diffusing themselves in the process.*

#12

*Just to refocus on the situation. Okay we've got another person in there who's a friend, we knew she wasn't going to hurt her either but it just gave us, bought us some more time in terms of what we could do. We knew the bottom line, whether - because it looked like it was obviously protracted to that point in time that the longer it went they were going to eventually get tired and give up.*

#### □ Using Time Wisely

Schlossberg (1977) referred to time as "dynamic inactivity" and the term coincides with the adage of "good things happen to those who hustle while they wait." Maximizing success through all of these other elements is accentuated by the element of time.

#14

*I have no expectation that this is going to be viable at all, I'm just building more time. We're getting more equipment, we're getting more fibre optics, listening devices, our tactical team - yada yada.*

#16

*I think time is always on your side and he'd had 2 hours and I bet you he'd slowed down some because time was passing but I felt that when I got him on the phone that time was critical again because he's close to where he wants to go and what happens there is anybody's guess. If I can get him stopped than time is going to be on my side but if he keeps going he's getting closer to where he's going.*

#18

*I always think that time is helpful. I think that time is an indicator of progress, and we're prepared that as long as it takes is as long as it takes. And especially in a barricade situation. There's absolutely no need to for- rush a barricade situation. As long as you have forward indicators of progress that we look for, you know 'is he actively engaged in communication, has he calmed down, has his thinking become more rational' all the basic crisis negotiator things.*

## **Support**

Having an agency that fully supports the negotiators and values their contribution in diffusing the most volatile incidents that demand police presence is meaningful to the participants and gives them latitude to perform their task without undue pressure or scrutiny. This same support is also validating when it comes from command and tactical personnel as

well as from patrol. Some of this support is in the form of positive feedback or what is commonly referred to in police circles as an "attaboy". The thumbs up from peers is something that gives the negotiators confidence and criticism can have a deleterious effect. Support from peers and agency is often in the form of caring for the negotiators when they are part of a scenario that ends in tragedy. Many participants discussed the value of talking to someone and understanding that they were not alone in their feelings. The opportunity of attending a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) was one indicator of agency support. Unfortunately the negotiator is still overlooked in receiving the psychological assistance afforded to the tactical team member who pulls the trigger. One can only imagine the feelings associated with communicating with an individual for hours only for it to end in that individual's death. Other tragedies noted by the participants included the murder of an infant, the murder of a spouse or former girlfriend, the torture of a hostage, and the wounding of an officer. While there is a much better understanding today of the need for psychological intervention for all emergency response personnel involved, it is still being ignored or not understood by many agencies.

### **Examples**

#### **□ Feeling Support from Agency**

Response from the participants revealed that either they felt fully supported or not supported at all. In any occupation there is a desire on the part of an employee to feel supported and valued. There is a positive correlation between high stress and lack of agency support in policing (Logan, 1995). Support was felt by participants when the administrators

were there to ensure that they got everything they needed to do the job and when they followed up by ensuring everybody's emotional health by supplying debriefings and psychological help when necessary.

#1

*I mean our agency, you know, knows this is what goes on and so the support what we do so we don't really get any external pressure from our administration. We have nothing more than support and they make sure that they know that they support us. I mean they're out there at these scenes saying 'hey whatever it is that you guys need, you will get, let's get this thing done'.*

#1

*And we get the same support from our patrol people who are trying to have to support these operations, secure the outside perimeter and they're usually holding some outer perimeter in the middle of the rain and they just, they don't sit there and you know.*

#6

*Our department had gone through a number of incidents which were potentially critical incidents just by the seat of our pants and by the grace of God we had gotten the bad guy and people would come and say "we're pretty damn good - no need for us to change anything, we don't need training, look it worked out okay". I'm saying "holy crap, it's*



*just a damn miracle". Then the next time it would come and , just having that dumb cop's luck, we'd get through it again which would just confirm it more with the powers that be. This incident drove it home and we had a death in it that drives it home. Al l of a sudden we had a negotiation team.*

#7

*The CISD was helpful because it showed the support from the department.*

#14

*Which inevitably everybody from the team goes down there for debriefing with Homicide and the Chief of Police came and thanked us for our efforts, you know, and that was that.*

#### □ **Receiving Feedback**

Feedback from peers was deemed to be extremely helpful and comments from the tactical team members was valuable. When the resolution was not entirely peaceful, it was paramount to receive positive feedback to counter the doubt and "what if's" that can arise. It was particularly difficult to hear feedback about "losing" or "being unsuccessful" if a subject took his own life.

#1

*we consider our tactical counterparts our brothers, and our relationship is very, very strong between the two of us. Every time we have a successful negotiation, and I mean*

*they're almost all successful for us, they're right there at the end of it with thumbs up, 'you guys are awesome', and we're there for them. You know, 'cause we know we couldn't do our job if they weren't out there, and they know what we do. So it's really been a great relationship with us. That's one that didn't come overnight.*

#6

*At the debriefing I talked about it a bit and I said how I felt and I told him "I still feel bad" and the SWAT Sergeant said "look the state of the art in police response to critical incidents are to do what you exactly what you did".*

#6

*We had an operational debriefing with everyone there and we talked about some things that frustrated us and it was somewhat helpful to me to hear people tell me that I had done the right thing even though I was still bothered by not going in there to help the wounded person who had died.*

#20

*I felt real crappy about it and he did it over the phone. The unfortunate thing is that people in your business say "well it was successful 'cause you got the people out and then you've got the Tactical Officers saying "you lost- so what, you released 49 hostages, 3 of which were my brothers and sisters but the guy still shot himself so you lost." It's terrible but that's the kind of crap you get.*

### □ Caring for Team Members

Having an awareness that everyone is affected in a different way during an incident that ends in tragedy and that, even with a peaceful ending, there can exist a great amount of cumulative stress is important for all response team members. It is especially important for team leaders who should be assessing the emotional health of their team members and taking remedial measures. Valuing team members increases their performance and "the attitude that expresses 'you are important to me' and 'I care about you' is the one held by leaders whose people will go to the wall to support them" (Logan, 1996).

#1

*And so we have now kind of modified things and they've given us some latitude as team leaders that if we see somebody that we think is potentially affected, then we can give them the same courtesy's we would one of our SWAT'ers that was involved in a shooting.*

#6

*It really was too much -this whole thing lasted 3 hours and I'll tell you, I had to be to work the next day at 7 AM and I was emotionally, psychologically, and physically whipped for 2 weeks. It was all on my shoulders and I had too much to do it well and I didn't do it well.*

#6

*It's critical to take care of your people because I don't think people for years, and I think the cop culture has to do with this, don't want to admit the dreams and things and I never asked for help and I was afraid people would think I'd gone crazy and needed to be retired psychologically because of this. And so I think our culture and lack of knowledge or willingness to look into it, I'm sure I wasn't the only one in this situation, and even still today I hear people at officer-involved shootings say "I'm okay - no problem". But today I'm confident that for the last few years I would have gotten the help that I needed at that time. I think we've turned around and cops as a whole are not afraid of asking for help like they used to be, not that we've come full circle but don't think I'd be afraid to do it now.*

#6

*Knowing the police culture for getting help is, I think critical. When I see people in the police field getting into the psychological field with police backgrounds I think that's just invaluable. I think it's more accepted as a department culture. If somebody from our department now came forward and said "I need help" I don't think any of us would look down on that officer as weak in any way.*

#14

*The shooters, who I know well - I've been involved with both of them who have shot people before on the scene - they have to go to counseling. And we were sort of left with 'if you want to go you can'. Of course being the bad ass cop that I am, I never went. And the most stupidest move that I made of this entire matter, was not going, and I think that a lot of other people that were there didn't go, I know they didn't go and I know they should have gone. But we didn't go.*

#15

*And the other thing that was really difficult for me was that we really went on like the next day, like we just went on as normal. There was no talking, no talking it out. With the SWAT team all the guys that were involved were given five days off administrative leave. They were sent to go see [the psychologist] who is the person that they send people involved in officer involved shootings, they send them to him to talk with him about what happened and to make sure they're okay, after the incident. Our team - we finished up, we put all our equipment away, told each other we did a great job and debriefed with everybody else about how everybody had done a great job and went on and that was it. We weren't given any time off. We just went on the next day to work and acted like nothing had happened.*

#15

*L: Mmhm. Mmhm, very difficult to have to talk to someone for that length of time,*

*bring him out in front of the window to basically have him shot, and then listen to him die and then go home like nothing had happened.*

*R: Right. Go home and go to sleep and get up and go to work the next day.*

*L: Yeah.*

*R: That's what happened. That's exactly what happened. Yeah I felt that was very unfair.*

*L: And maybe even a lack of recognition to the fact that you had, had to go through all the trauma and the work to get him to the place that they got him.*

*R: Yeah but I also felt too that I had kind of been useless, so maybe it would have helped I think if I had talked with somebody. Because I felt like I wasn't a big help at all, even though I had talked with him for so long. So I think that also might have maybe been a help, someone telling me 'it wasn't what you didn't do, it wasn't what you did, it was just him' - telling me, that would have probably helped me too. At that point.*

*L: Right. Mmhm. And maybe even trying to deal, as I have in the past, with what-ifs, what if I had said something different, what if I had done something different, would it have mattered?*

*R: Yes. What if they had changed me out like I wanted them to?*

*L: Mmhm.*

*R: Yes. All those.*

*L: Yeah.*

*R: It was a very, very tiring incident.*

## □ Debriefing

Even the participants who did not receive a debriefing after the incidents are now aware that these are useful in many situations and that talking to peers after every situation either in a formal or informal debriefing is essential to facilitating success in future negotiations. Participants agreed that a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing brings closure to a traumatic event, demonstrates agency and peer support, and sets them on their feet to be involved in other potentially traumatic situations.

#4

*The best therapy for me was to talk about it and to better understand that I wasn't alone in my feelings.*

*ML: So the debriefing is something that you would access?*

*LL: Oh yeah I know what works for me and what pushes my buttons and I'm not afraid or ashamed to say 'I need to talk about it'.*

#6

*We had an operational debriefing with everyone there and we talked about some things that frustrated us and it was somewhat helpful to me to hear people tell me that I had done the right thing even though I was still bothered by not going in there to help the wounded person who had died.*

#6

*There was never any stress debriefing no psychological offer of help but now we have psych services for free and a county-wide chaplaincy service trained in stress debriefing. I think I would have benefited from that. I was in no emotional shape to work after that but I had to and I was fearful of another incident occurring just like this one until the department came together and got the training that we needed and updating things that needed updating to where I felt more comfortable that the next situation would be handled in a tactically more sound way.*

#7

*It's the first time our department, even though they'd heard of it, know they have to take care of people in traumatic incidents. These officers heard the shots that killed the girl and they were blaming themselves for not being able to make an entry. They made the correct decision by not going in. The difficult thing is how do you convince them of that. In roll call the next day I addressed roll call and advised them what could have happened if they had not made that correct decision; the possible death of the 2 remaining hostages and death of law enforcement officers. There was Critical Incident Stress Debriefing for the people involved; there were shattered people over this, even breaking down at the trial months later.*

#15

*No psychological debriefing process, none at all. Our team leaders recognized that*



*that was an error on their part, that they should have also given us some time off after the fact. And they have been better about stuff like that since this last incident and have recognized that we too might need some time off after an incident like this one.*

### Validation procedures

The validity and reliability of the categories were ensured by five procedures: (a) independent rater, (b) research participants cross-checking the critical incidents and categories, (c) exhaustiveness, (d) participation rate, and (e) expert rater. These procedures will be examined in this section.

### Independent rater

Two independent raters were chosen to sort the critical incidents into the assigned categories. This inter-rater reliability check measures the percentage of agreement. One rater had a Ph.D. in Counselling Psychology and the other is a Ph.D. student in Psychology. A sample size of 54 incidents was drawn from the incident pool of 717. This sample size represented 4 incidents from each of the 14 categories.

The judges were provided a one-page description of each category and were asked to place the sample of 54 incidents into the appropriate category. This validation procedure was first attempted on computer where the multiple screens were set up, each screen with a category title and description, and an additional screen with the 54 randomly selected incidents to be categorized. The judges were instructed to place the incidents in categories that they felt were most appropriate. After a few minutes it became obvious that it would be

too difficult to do this with the multiple screen approach and the back-up plan was initiated. Judges were given all of the above information on paper and the 14 category descriptions were laid out on a large table for them. Armed with the 54 incidents and the 14 categories, they worked separately to categorize each incident. The exercise took each judge between 60 and 90 minutes to complete.

Although both raters were within the 75% level of agreement suggested by Flanagan (1954), the first rater found nine incidents (16%) that needed clarification as more than one category fit; the second rater found ten incidents (19%) that could have fit more than one category. In all but one incident, judges could see how the greater context of the critical incident resulted in its placement. The one incident was:

#5

*If by policy or organizational culture there is a recognition that the TAC role is integrated with the negotiations and vice versa, as long as that's the perspective of leadership at an incident, but if they don't understand it or have a bias one way or the other, that also can be a hindrance.*

That one incident had been categorized as "leadership" and in reviewing it, the researcher was in agreement with the judges that it was more an issue of "teamwork" as it dealt with the roles of tactical and negotiation. The incident was moved and re-classified under "teamwork". At the end of clarifying these items and moving the one incident to a new category, there was 100% agreement.

The discussion between the judges and the researcher surfaced a sense of amazement on the part of the judges on the difference in culture of the negotiators' world and of policing in general. There was a degree of shock expressed at the circumstances and the pressure under which the negotiators function and a respect for their intuitive sense in being able to "read behaviour" and "understand personality".

#### Participant cross-checking

This is a process of having the participants validate and verify the comprehensiveness of the categories. Participants were sent a letter (Appendix E), a list of their incidents, and a listing of the categories and sub-categories. They were asked to review their incidents and ensure the accuracy of their statements. Secondly, they were asked to review the categories and determine whether their incidents could all be represented within the categories and sub categories. Finally, they were requested to write the title of the category and/or sub category that best describes their incidents.

Participants were able to classify their incidents into the 14 categories and they found that this exercise was useful in clarifying how they contributed to this research study. One participant noted the therapeutic value of seeing his words in print and realizing that he did everything he could to minimize damage and resolve an extremely difficult situation. The participant also requested the transcript of his interview so he could share it with a family member.

### Exhaustiveness

One of the ways of determining soundness of a category scheme is to determine if it is complete and comprehensive (Anderson & Nilsson, 1964). One check used for comprehensiveness, or exhaustiveness, in this study was to withhold approximately 10% of the incidents until the categories had been formed. When no new categories were being formed by adding more incidents, it was deemed that a saturation point had been reached and categorization was complete. The withheld incidents, 65 incidents extracted from the interviews of participants #21 and #22, were then classified. All withheld incidents were easily placed within the 14 formed categories. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the categories are provisionally exhaustive.

### Participation rate

Another method of determining the soundness of categories is to examine the level of agreement among participants who were involved in a similar situation. In order to form a category, the researcher must identify these similarities and view them as significant when many participants report the same category of events. Agreement is gauged by the participation rate of each category (the number of participants reporting a category of events). The categories with the highest participation rate are therefore those with the highest level of agreement. Table 2 reveals the total number of incidents in each category and the participation rate in percentages.

### Expert validation

Another means of ensuring soundness in this study was to verify the categories with experts in the field. This puts research in the context of the field by asking the experts to determine whether the categories (that represent "what facilitates or hinders successful crisis negotiation") are relevant and useful in their work with hostage takers, barricaded subjects, and suicidal persons. A letter was sent to each expert (Appendix E) asking them to review the formed categories and provide a response to their relevancy and usefulness.

Expert validation is an important test for soundness because the experts are able to provide collaborative evidence and content validity to the results of an investigation. This is especially important in this study as there is a dearth of research in this area.

In this study the researcher contacted two individuals who have provided expert evidence in court and advice to negotiators on scene. Dr. Mike Webster is a Registered Psychologist (BC) and is regarded as an international expert and educator on the subject of Crisis Negotiation. Supervisory Special Agent Stephen Romano is part of the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) and is a trainer at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Va.

The results confirmed that each of the 14 categories were useful and relevant in the craft of crisis negotiation. Experts needed to know more about the categories of "Using Intuition" and "Negotiator's Personal Resources" as these are terms that are not used commonly in negotiation literature.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION

#### Summary of results

Through interviews with 22 police crisis negotiators, 717 critical incidents were elicited which created a framework of 14 categories reporting what facilitated or hindered successful crisis negotiation. The categories are: (a) leadership, (b) teamwork, (c) logistics, (d) support, (e) negotiator's personal resources, (f) learning and development, (g) using intuition, (h) providing information and direction, (i) active listening, (j) relationship building, (k) building a bridge, (l) subject's orientation, (m) subject's behaviour, and (n) time. Forty-two sub-categories (listed in Appendix D) were formed that serve to define the 14 main categories.

Five validation procedures: (a) independent rater, (b) research participants cross-checking the critical incidents and categories, (c) exhaustiveness, (d) participation rate, and (e) expert rater were used to ensure reasonable reliability and validity.

#### Limitations of the study

There are factors that limit this investigation and decrease its generalizability. Although care was taken to maximize generalizability in a geographic sense and to sample different genres of crisis incidents, the sample size does not allow a substantial review of all types of incidents and in all environments. This was a qualitative study, exploratory in nature, and

generalizability is not the primary focus as is an in-depth view of the communication process.

The genres, or types, of incidents in which the communication process was studied included: (a) barricaded subject in a residence with antecedent crime, weapon, and threat of suicide, (b) barricaded subject in a residence without antecedent crime, weapon, and threat of suicide, (c) barricaded subject in a residence with antecedent murder, weapon, and hostage, (d) barricaded subject(s) in a residence with antecedent robbery, weapon, and hostage, (e) barricaded subject(s) in a business with antecedent robbery, weapon, and hostages, (f) barricaded subjects in a prison with antecedent murder, weapon, and hostage, (g) suicidal person with threats to jump off building or bridge, (h) suicidal person in a residence with weapon, (i) suicidal person with weapon in a public place, and (j) barricaded subject in a moving vehicle with hostage. A type of incident that was clearly missing was that of a hostage taking. Although the researcher refers to those individuals who were forcibly confined as "hostages" that is simply a term used by the participants and a term that is easily understood by the general population. The formal definition of a "hostage incident" used in negotiation circles is "any incident in which people are being held by another person or persons against their will, usually by force or coercion, and demands are being made by the hostage taker (McMains & Mullins, 1996, p. 23). Hostages are used to gain compliance or attention in several kinds of incidents and are often used as insurance against a police assault.

Other types of incidents not included in this study were those that involved terrorist activity and those where the subject was psychotic and/or incoherent.

Another limitation of the study is that the categories were derived from self-report rather than by observation. Self-reporting is limited to the events that people remember during the interview. Although the major, impactful pieces of the participants' scenarios are not easily forgotten, other portions of the event may be missed.

Although the term "crisis negotiation" is being used in this study and people who do "crisis intervention" are using some of the same techniques, processes, and skill set, this study cannot be generalized to crisis intervention. Although many of the same categories would likely surface in a similar study of crisis intervention, the police content of this study limits that generalizability. It is worthy of note that much of what is done under the umbrella of "crisis negotiation" is in fact, "crisis intervention" and perhaps the move in terminology from "hostage negotiation" to "crisis negotiation" will continue to the most accurate title of "crisis intervention". This may in itself "demystify" the actions of police response in crisis situations.

Perhaps the greatest limitation in this study was that the story from "the other side of the barricade" was not told. Although the report from the negotiators is a valid report based on observation, there remains supposition regarding the emotional state and cognitive processes of the subjects who were in crisis.

#### Implications for theory and research

The results of this study confirm what is being taught in negotiation courses and what is being published in police journals. There is a clear correspondence between what was found in this study and what has been written in these journals and in negotiator publications. This study provides an empirical basis for what has been previously described by SSA (ret'd)



Frederick Lanceley as "journal articles on hostage/crisis negotiation that, rather than advancing the field of negotiation, recount 'war stories' or restate what most of us learned in our basic negotiation course" (McMains & Mullins, 1996, p.v). This empirical base is paramount but does not discount the value of the journal articles that are written by seasoned negotiators. The correlation between the results of this study and the publications by negotiators validates their message.

As we move away from the focus of psychopathology, I would caution that we do not follow the pendulum completely away from this area. We can learn much about subject behaviour by understanding personality disorder and mental illness. There is also a body of research on psychopathy and the prediction of violence (Hart & Hare, 1996; Webster 'et al', 1997) that is worthy of attention. With the statistics being gathered through the FBI HOBAS system and with an expansion of that system I can foresee developing an instrument similar to the HCR-20 (Webster 'et al') for assessing risk of forcible confinement. This measure could be used with an incarcerated population and then could be accessed by law enforcement outside of corrections when a parolee is entering the community. This study would not only target those at high risk of involvement in a barricade situation but would also assist in developing a profile(s) that would enable a better understanding of the barricaded subject.

This study is part of a growing trend of hostage negotiation research toward a theoretical approach that utilizes the theory behind conflict management. After all, hostage negotiation was always the management of conflict. Educators in this field have been tapping into theories of influence, persuasion, and social learning. The research performed by the Harvard

Negotiation Project that resulted in such rich and informative writing by Ury (1981), Fisher & Brown (1988), and Ury (1991) has become an integral part of the negotiator training. The work of Miron & Goldstein (1979), as it relates to the instrumental and expressive behaviour of hostage takers, has moved the research past the study of psychopathology. The recent works of McMains & Mullins (1996), and Webster (1997 and 2000) have integrated theory and research with practice and have enriched the field. Empirical research, most of which is directed to examining statistics related to typology and logistics, is still helpful and these very legitimate areas of research dovetail very well with the more qualitative research that examines constructs of communication and relationship building.

There are some subject areas that emerged from this research that require further exploration. The two categories of Using Intuition and Negotiator's Personal Resources are relatively new to this literature and must be examined for value related to selection and training of crisis negotiators. The elements within categories that emerged as relatively new to this body of literature were (a) distracting, (b) demystifying, and (c) disengaging (walking away). This element of "disengaging" or leaving the conflict after engaging is especially germane in its implications for litigation and media spotlight. The consideration of disengaging is a topic that is overdue and most negotiators can recall a scenario where the question of "why are we here right now?" should have been asked. It is indeed a credit to those who have asked the question, assessed the situation, and made the decision to disengage. It is hoped that its presence in this study will highlight it as a consideration to be applied and to be researched for effectiveness and legal ramifications.

There is a piece of research that has not yet been accessed. This study represents the first part and the second piece is waiting to be done. It is the same study of "what facilitates or hinders successful crisis negotiation" but the research sample is "the other side of the barricade". Perhaps this has never been studied because nobody thought of asking the "perpetrator" why he decided to surrender to police. Maybe there is a feeling that we can't trust the "bad guy" to give us a reliable answer. Could it be that the perception of the subject on "the other side of the barricade" is that he is a "bad guy" and we can't be learning from the perpetrators? Further research from the other perspective is recommended.

#### Implications for negotiation practice

The field of crisis management is on centre stage. The orchestra is comprised of incident commanders, crisis negotiators, tactical personnel, first responders, telecom operators, technical support, translators, educators, researchers, and consulting mental health professionals. It is no longer acceptable to "wing ding some nice little ditty" and hope that we sound okay. The world is watching and the media ensures that what we do is broadcast in full colour and sound. Death Review Boards and Coroner's Jury are seated and ready to hear how we have been selected for the orchestra, how we have trained, and what theories and pieces of empirical research do we use for composition of the music?

When the concert begins do we have a conductor and does the conductor know the music or does a member of the orchestra have to enlighten him between stanzas? Have we all practised together so we know what this will sound like and do we all have the same piece of music or are we playing different versions of the same tune?

As we play, why does the percussion section sound so loud and why are they playing a march when the clarinets are playing a lullaby?

The category system derived from this study calls for the need to work as a team, to communicate as a team, to train as a team, and to synchronize the effort of tactical and negotiation. It calls for negotiators to develop attributes that allow them to be good listeners, empathetic, caring, calm, intuitive, willing to integrate their training and to learn from experience. It calls for them to use time to build relationships through affinity, cultural understanding, and communication that reduces fear by explaining and demystifying the process. It calls for negotiators to use intelligence and third parties to co-construct a bridge out of the barricade by minimizing risk and damage and to create an environment of empowerment so the subject can walk across the bridge without losing face.

It calls for leadership, not by rank, but by being a person with experience, credibility, and possessing the attributes of a good negotiator. It calls for an ability to assess a situation by asking "why are we here?" and making the decision to walk away if the assessment answer is "we can deal with this in a more effective manner by leaving right now".

It calls for a pursuit of knowledge and a thirst to not only acquire the tools of active listening and relationship building, but to develop personally so that these tools will be more than skills but will be personal attributes. The attribute of being empathic and being an empathic listener is a stretch for negotiators, but a necessary stretch. McMains and Mullins (1996), in the introduction of their Crisis Negotiations book raise a valid point and a hurdle for most negotiators in stating that "the approach negotiators take with hostage takers is

diametrically opposed to the approach police are supposed to use. Instead of asserting the authority and power of the badge...negotiators become the ally of the criminal and talk him into deciding to peacefully surrender."

Being "soft" with the "bad guy" does not come naturally for police officers but those that are successful investigators, interviewers, and source developers understand the value of an empathic approach. The character quality that I refer to as "tendertoughness" is a key quality for the police officer, and especially the crisis negotiator, to develop. It is a quality that I see in many of this nation's law enforcement officers who are called upon to be both tender and tough.

Empathy involves sensitively and accurately trying to understand another from the other's own point of view. Developing empathy nurtures the tender side; the tough side is usually already present, as many spouses can confirm. The good news is that the ability to be accurately empathic is something that can be developed by training and can be learned most rapidly in an empathic climate from empathic teachers or supervisors. Empathic listening and understanding is a requisite ability to crisis negotiation for these reasons: (a) it dissolves alienation, (b) it absorbs tension, (c) the recipient feels valued and cared for, and (d) it is the most potent element in bringing mental health patients, specifically schizophrenics, out of their estrangement (Rogers, 1980).

It calls for an openness to learn from others, including the subject in our negotiations. The rule of "we don't talk to them after the incident" may have to be abolished or modified when we see rationale for the change. Perhaps someone else could debrief the subject but we

must be open to learn what made them react or respond during our negotiations. A few participants make a point of debriefing the subject while other participants use third party intermediaries and others would consider a hostage exchange. These are three factors that would never have been considered in the past, but today, with due diligence, these are considerations and have been used in a manner that has facilitated success. The word "success" is used subjectively. A "successful negotiation" is defined in this study as a conclusion to a negotiated incident where negotiation was used to preserve life and minimize human casualty. The "success" is also in the process which moves the subject away from an evil intent, even if only temporarily. The "talks failed and we were forced to go tactical" is erroneous. Negotiations didn't fail, the subject made a decision to act in a different manner. The fact that communication existed at all in some of these cases is a success. Unfortunately, as related by participant #14 and #20, there is a "ballscore mentality" that says that if you don't win, you lose. This mentality can have an adverse effect on a negotiator who did everything humanly possible but the subject decided to end his life. For a negotiator to get up in front of hundreds of negotiators and boast about how many "successful" negotiations his or her department has had over the years without a single casualty is foolish and presumptuous. This mentality can be very devastating to the negotiator who "lost" and the "what if's" that seem to visit that negotiator can be a serious hindrance to their effectiveness as a negotiator, if not to their own mental health. On the lighter side, may I suggest the fact that the jumper didn't land on anyone is a measure of success!

### Implication for counselling

The implications for counselling psychology are twofold. First, the field of conflict management and crisis negotiation is an area within the purview of counselling psychology. We have, for too long, been content to see everyone from lawyers to psychiatrists providing this expertise. The tools of the trade are active listening and relationship building skills and who better to provide this expertise than counsellors. The opportunity for counsellors to provide training to conflict managers and crisis negotiators in areas of active listening, relationship enhancement, and advanced empathy is available and should be accessed.

Secondly, from the results of this study one can see the need for psychological support for the negotiator both in the arena of negotiation and in a quiet place after the incident. It was evident to the researcher in this study that there are still negotiators suffering the effects of post-incident trauma. Police Officers have come a long way in the last 20 years in their understanding of self-care but there is yet a need for counsellors with credibility to step forward and encourage this action. Credibility can be gained by involvement in their world and it must be earned one negotiator at a time. Often this credibility is initiated by the counsellor's role in Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) and is gained as one or more negotiators form a therapeutic alliance with that professional. The "fit" of counsellor/client is similar to the "fit" that commanders seek to achieve in selecting the "right negotiator" to work with the barricaded subject, hostage taker, or suicidal person. Having a pool of counselling psychologists to draw from both as psychological consultant, educator, and as therapist is yet another way of facilitating successful negotiations.

## Conclusion

This study explored the factors that facilitated or hindered successful crisis negotiation. The goal of the study was to develop a reasonably comprehensive scheme of categories that would describe, from the perspective of police negotiators in North America, what seemed to hinder or facilitate a peaceful resolution to a crisis situation.

The research method involved interviews with 22 police crisis negotiators from four Canadian provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Northwest Territories, and British Columbia) and five US states (S. Carolina, Virginia, Washington, DC, New York, and California).

Flanagan's (1954) Critical Incident Technique was chosen as the research method because it provided a structure to the information gathering and allows for a rigorous validation process. The validity and reliability of the categories were ensured through: (a) independent rater, (b) research participants cross-checking the critical incidents and categories, (c) exhaustiveness, (d) participation rate, and (e) expert rater.

A wide range of factors that facilitated or hindered success in crisis negotiation were identified and these were represented in 42 sub-categories that emanated from the 717 critical incidents. A critical incident is defined as an observable human activity that permits inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the act and where its consequences are sufficiently definite so as to leave little doubt about its effects (Flanagan, 1954). These critical incidents created a framework of 14 categories that reported what facilitated or hindered successful crisis negotiation.



The results indicate that success in crisis negotiation can be facilitated by:

Leadership, teamwork, logistics, support, negotiator's personal resources, learning and development, using intuition, providing information and direction, active listening, relationship building, building a bridge, subject's orientation, subject's behaviour, and time.

They also indicate that success in crisis negotiation can be hindered by a lack of: leadership, teamwork, proper equipment (logistics), support, negotiator's personal resources, learning and development, intuition, information and direction, active listening, relationship building, building a bridge, and time. Further, there were three other categories that hindered the success of crisis negotiation. Each of these three categories could be influenced by the participants but they had little control over these factors. They are: environmental factors (logistics), subject's orientation, and subject's behaviour.

There was a strong emphasis on teamwork and the need to strive toward synchronizing the effort of command, tactical, and negotiation units to form a unified crisis response team.

The findings of this study contribute to the field of counselling psychology by providing a category system with descriptions of what facilitates or hinders successful crisis negotiation.

The findings contribute to the practice of crisis negotiation by confirming the necessity of teamwork and reinforcing the value of integrated training. They confirm active listening as the vehicle for effective communication across the barricade. They illuminate the value of a selection criteria that will capture the personal resources that a candidate can bring to negotiation and his/her ability to integrate learning and experience in a self renewal process. The findings reinforce the value of relationship building that creates trust that serves as the foundation for the bridge that is co-constructed out of the barricades.

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**APPENDIX A**

## **Training and Selection of Crisis Negotiators**

### **- Results of informal fax survey -**

The Vancouver Police Department accepts application to their negotiation team from police officers with at least five years of experience. The applicants submit a resume and feedback from their supervisor is solicited. Selection is made via a selection board comprised of the tactical team leader, the negotiation coordinator, and the officer in charge (OIC) of the Emergency Response Team (ERT). Initial training is a ten day course taken at the Justice Institute of British Columbia (JIBC). Refresher training is also available through the JIBC. The Vancouver negotiators average four training days a year and have at least two full-scale exercises with their tactical units each year.

The program is very similar in Regina Police Service where there is quarterly training for the team and two joint training sessions (Negotiation/Tactical) each year. Selection differs slightly with a minimum service requirement of seven years. A structured interview process is used with the board comprised of two negotiation team members and a representative from Human Resources section. Additionally, Regina requires psychological testing using the MMPI-2 and to ensure good selection they have instituted an articling year for each successful candidate. This year follows the initial negotiator course at CPC and allows the team to see the candidate in action prior to making a decision.

The most comprehensive process of selection discovered is the one used by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP). They have done a Job Analysis resulting in a list of role demands and core competencies for crisis negotiators. The OPP has evaluated the measures they use

for selection based on their research and have arrived at the following test battery: (1) Behaviour Style Analysis; (2) 16 Personality Factor; (3) WAIS-III; (4) The Baron EQI. This test battery will be continually evaluated for validity and reliability. There is a need to perform a Job Task Analysis on a larger and more experienced subject pool. This could be accomplished by a consortium of police agencies or by one agency with a large number of experienced negotiators. Training in the OPP is also more progressive than most. This might be attributed to having a full-time coordinator for the Crisis Negotiator Team. After the initial eight day course at the Canadian Police College (CPC), the coordinator ensures four mandatory training days each year. These four days involve scenario and equipment training as well as seminars for professional development. Training is facilitated by the Coordinator, other negotiators, and professionals from specific disciplines (ie. psychologists, technology experts, and experts in cultural awareness). The OPP is hoping to standardize the mandatory training and to provide mandatory refresher courses in the near future.

New York Police Department (NYPD) selects the Hostage Negotiation Team from applicants who have a minimum of three years in the Detective Bureau. They must be recommended by their unit commander and be above standard on their last three performance evaluations. NYPD hosts their own initial ten day negotiation course. Three of these days are devoted to tactics with the goal of gaining an appreciation of the tactical task and being able to assist as necessary being within the inner perimeter. Emergency Psychological Training is a course attended, with tactical officers, after being on the team for a year. This course is offered at John Jay College. This training and a biannual refresher seminar is

mandatory for NYPD members. It is also open to team members from jurisdictions outside of New York City.

Portland Police Bureau requires their candidates to be Investigative Sergeants. The candidates must submit a CV and successfully pass an interview with questions specific to their skill and experience with crisis situations. Portland does their initial training (40 hours) at San Diego State University. The three teams train periodically by having one team train the other two in three hour training blocks. Once each year all members participate in a three day training exercise. Other training seminars are available subject to funding.

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has no selection criteria but requires most of the negotiators to be members of SWAT. The initial training is provided in a 40 hour in-house school where negotiators receive experiential training (multiple scenarios) culminating in an 8 hour exercise complete with tactical units. LAPD has mandatory quarterly training which includes professional development and debriefings of recent incidents. This department could provide researchers an opportunity to compare negotiators with no tactical training, those with some tactical training (ie. joint training), and those that are fully trained/active tactical members. Two US departments with very similar processes are the Pennsylvania State Police and the Las Vegas Metro Police Department. Both conduct their own forty hour Basic Negotiator Course and have their own set of evaluation criteria for assessing course candidates. Selection to the team is a decision made by existing team members with special skills and language capabilities as a consideration. There are no special requirements for ongoing training but joint training with Tactical Teams is an objective.

**APPENDIX B**



**APPENDIX C**

**APPENDIX D**

**APPENDIX E**

**APPENDIX F**

**FINAL CATEGORIES****Leadership**

- ☐ Decision-making
- ☐ Assessment

**Teamwork**

- ☐ Briefing
- ☐ Communicating as a Team
- ☐ Gathering Intelligence
- ☐ Understanding Roles
- ☐ Synchronizing Effort

**Logistics**

- ☐ Accessing Equipment
- ☐ Adapting to Environmental Factors
- ☐ Establishing Contact

**Support**

- ☐ Feeling Support from Agency
- ☐ Receiving Feedback
- ☐ Caring for Team Members
- ☐ Debriefing

**Negotiator's Personal Resources**

- ☐ Knowing Yourself
- ☐ Focusing
- ☐ Caring

**Learning & Development**

- ☐ Gaining from Experience
- ☐ Integrating the Training

**Using Intuition**

- ☐ Understanding Personality
- ☐ Reading Behaviour
- ☐ Providing a Distraction
- ☐ Tactical Awareness

**Providing Information & Direction**

- ☐ Demystifying the Process
- ☐ Clarifying Instructions

**Active Listening**

- ☐ Using Empathy
- ☐ Finding Emotional Hooks
- ☐ Reducing Fear and Paranoia
- ☐ Diffusing Tension

**Relationship Building**

- ☐ Finding Affinity
- ☐ Cultural Understanding
- ☐ Building Credibility and Trust
- ☐ Using Intelligence (Information)
- ☐ Using Third Party Intermediaries (TPI)

**Building A Bridge**

- ☐ Offering an Out
- ☐ Empowering
- ☐ Making Promises
- ☐ Maximizing Reciprocity
- ☐ Minimizing Risk and Damage

**Subject's Orientation**

- ☐ Criminal History
- ☐ Mental/Emotional State
- ☐ Preceding Events

**Subject's Behaviour**

- ☐ Subject's Planning
- ☐ Presence of Weapon
- ☐ Presence of Hostages
- ☐ Access to Destabilizers

**Time**

- ☐ Buying Time
- ☐ Using Time Wisely