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MOURNING THE LOSS OF SELF:

A UNIVERSAL CHANGE PROCESS AND CLASS OF THERAPEUTIC EVENT

by

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ABSTRACT

This study asserts that loss has been primarily focused on in terms of a set of reactions whose goals and content tend to be externally orientated. The thesis presented here states that the consideration of reaction to loss is incomplete without a detailed understanding of how the phenomenological self, on the intrapsychic level, is effected by loss. Consequently, this study takes a comprehensive look at how loss can effect this level of the phenomenological self, as well as the types of losses it can experience. An attempt is made to demonstrate that these losses to the phenomenological self can be identified and defined as a generic set of experiences, or, class of psychological events, which when taken together, this study considers as the loss of self. Given this class of psychological events, it is further claimed that mourning the loss of self, in different forms, is a universal change process. When dealt with in therapy this change process of mourning the loss of self is considered as a class of therapeutic event. An extensive literature review examines the basis for these claims, and provides the foundations for the presentation of a clinical model for mourning the loss of self. In this model, self, types of loss of self, and the process of mourning the loss of self, as relevant to this study, are defined. Utilization of this model for therapeutic purposes is demonstrated in case studies, and implications for research, as well as areas of application, are suggested.

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That which is created between things holds them together.

DTB

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Origins of the Study

The subject of this study is called mourning for the loss of self. Interest in this focus arises out of many personal, theoretical, and clinical encounters with what appears to be different forms of this phenomenon. In lieu of definition at this point I offer the following instance as an initial way of identifying what I am referring to. During an intensive period of therapy as an adult, dealing with the death of my father when I was twelve, I became aware of a whole unit of experience and meaning that I was minimally guided through by my therapist. This was not the set of cognitive-affective images related to my father, it was the set of cognitive-affective images related to myself around that early age. In fact a critical moment occurred for me when I realized that it was not so much mourning for the loss of my father as object, that I needed to do, as it was mourning for states of self related to my father, that I was still subjectively fused with, that I needed to do. However, how best to do this, and what it meant theoretically for mourning and psychological development generally, remained ambiguous to myself and my therapist.

With these questions in mind I turned to both the literature and my own clients. The literature tantalized without satisfying. As will be shown in the literature review to follow, a few authors

state directly and many more indirectly, that something like mourning for the loss of self is an important therapeutic task, perhaps different in its own right from mourning object loss. However, this is done in different terminologies with no consensus as to the processes or techniques specific to mourning for the loss of self.

For example, Ego State therapies such as those of Watkin's (1979), Edelstien (1981), and Horowitz (1988), most closely parallel the therapeutic process experimented with in mourning for the loss of self. Their focus however, is not specifically on mourning particular states, although it is implied in places. The work of Mahrer (1986) is similar, in terms of the experiential approach and quality of the language he uses to describe process instructions, as those given to clients during the course of mourning the loss of self; but again, Mahrer's therapy does not focus exclusively on this task. Theories addressing the visualization and use of mental imagery for therapeutic purposes (Ahsen, 1977; Morrison, 1978) support the significance of identifying, amplifying and transforming concrete self-images which is an important aspect of mourning for the loss of self as dealt with in this study. However, none of these writers develop the implications of this change process, or relate it to a theory of mourning for the loss of self as a distinct class of therapeutic event.

Various schools of psychoanalytic thought (Freud, 1917; Hartmann, 1954; Jacobson, 1971; Pollock, 1960; Kernberg, 1976;

Mahler, 1979; Bowlby, 1985; Kohut, 1977; Stolorow & Atwood, 1982; Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962) provide integrative frameworks for supporting functional distinctions between self and object representations as related to loss, mourning and development. However, despite the richness of these theories there is no distinct statement, or consensus on a specific therapy dealing with mourning for the loss of self.

Cognitive-developmental theories (Guidano, 1987; Kegan, 1982) also support the existence of functionally discrete 'self-schemata' and imply that the necessity of transforming these throughout development involves experiences of loss and mourning that is as much 'self' related, as object related. Again, however, these theories have not focused on the process of mourning for the loss of self in and of itself.

Finally, there is a growing body of literature which takes as its concern the relationship between loss and transcendence (Weenolsen, 1988). Here, the case is put forward for the process of integrating losses on many different levels; physical, cultural, symbolic, etc., as a continual and distinct identity theme across the lifespan. This supports the notion of mourning for the loss of self as a distinct change process and class of therapeutic event, across different situations and issues, at a metapsychological level. This literature implies a therapy specific to mourning the loss of self, based on the integration of existing knowledge about individual and social development and intrapsychic structures and processes, but has not produced one.

While none of these theories and approaches by themselves provided me with a satisfactory conceptual sense or clinical grasp of my experience of what I was understanding as mourning for the loss of self, I saw them taken together as convergent evidence and support for pursuing the idea more fully.

At the same time, in working with my own clients, and having become increasingly sensitive to this dimension of experience, I found repeated instances across clients where, what I call mourning for the loss of self could be seen not only as a relevant therapeutic task, but the critical one. As I experimented with this, a basic process appeared to be emerging which clients seemed to experience as very meaningful and change producing. The form this process took involved myself as therapist helping the client identify a set of cognitive-affective images of self in visualized form relevant to their issues. Of critical importance at this step was agreement between myself and the client that this was once a real and operational sense of self, but that now, as related to the issue, it was out-moded and dysfunctional. This amounted to the client's acknowledgement that they were still subjectively fused in a non-adaptive way with a past state of being. Then, the process variously proceeded with my guiding and instructing the client through inner activities which were aimed at identifying, engaging, processing, and integrating states of self which were blocking movement towards desired goals. This process as a whole, applied in more detail to different issues and client contexts, I came to refer to as mourning for the loss of self.

Thus, over time, both interest and frustration have grown for me, with the repeated observation of what may be aspects of the same therapeutic phenomenon. Interest, because convergent evidence appears to suggest that it may be an identifiably discrete and pervasive phenomenon, perhaps to the extent of qualifying as a universal change process and separate class of therapeutic event (Rice & Greenberg, 1984). And, frustration, because while personal and clinical experience as well as varied literature tend to support the existence of this therapeutic phenomenon, there is no integrated conceptual model of the process of mourning for the loss of self, or, techniques specific to accomplishing it. Without such an integrated conceptual statement of what mourning for the loss of self might consistently mean and refer to then, not only have I often been uncertain about the effective and appropriate treatment of this phenomenon, but also how to talk about it, share it, and test it as a psychological reality and clinical process.

This uncertainty related to the lack of such a conceptual model, coupled with the excitement of positive results in the initial work with the phenomenon I have identified as mourning for the loss of self, has motivated this study.

Objective of the Study

This study will attempt to provide a comprehensive, reliable, and integrated conceptual model of the process of mourning for the loss of self. This will be done through the analysis of what

selected theorists and different psychotherapeutic approaches, such as those mentioned above, have to say about any relationships they acknowledge as important between the three major constructs which form the focus of this study; namely, loss, self, and mourning considered as adaptation to such loss. Consequently, the review of this literature will have a format where each approach considered is looked at in terms of its relevant assumptions about 'self', how that construct of self is impacted by loss, the nature of any views on 'mourning' as related to self and loss, and any specified techniques for accomplishing such a process.

Within this format the approaches considered will be critiqued to the extent to which each can support the concept of mourning for the loss of self, and the adequacy of this support in terms of establishing mourning for the loss of self as a universal change process and distinct class of therapeutic event; as well as the adequacy of any means suggested for accomplishing it. This analysis of the adequacy of convergent approaches will set the stage for the presentation of an integrated conceptual model of mourning for the loss of self in chapter three. The basic question this model will attempt to answer as the objective of this study is: What are the possible generic features of the process of mourning for the loss of self? This model will include formal definitions of the constructs and processes identified as relevant. The formal model presented will then be demonstrated using case studies.

Finally, in chapter four, the study will conclude with a

discussion of the possible areas of application, types of clients that might most benefit, means for empirical validation, implications for psychotherapy theory and research, and possible directions in which the model might develop.

Significance of the Study

Individually and culturally, across the lifespan and throughout history, change in identity is a hallmark of human existence (Erickson, 1959). This is echoed in Sartre's formula of "existence before essence" where the continual process of identity formation is seen as the fundamental existential and psycho-social task of the human being (Sartre, 1956). Individually, in different degrees, this is experienced as a constant developmental demand throughout life, for the process of continual change in identity mirrors the demand for continual adaptation to life (Hartmann, 1950; Guidano & Liotti, 1985). In short, a human identity in its more concrete and specific forms as various states of self can be viewed in many ways, as the psychological correlate and record of an individual's adaptation to life (Jacobson, 1954; Kegan, 1982; Guidano, 1987).

However, an irony of human existence and perhaps the record of human history itself, indicates that in many ways needed adaptation is often thwarted by attachment to states of self born of past circumstances; and the inability to separate from them (Mahler, 1979; Pollock, 1960). This statement considered as a first premise

of this study requires some examples.

Consider Blanche, the southern belle of Tennessee Williams' *A Streetcar Named Desire*, or, Willy Loman of Arthur Miller's *Death Of A Salesman*. In both stories we witness how each is ruined through their continued attachment to states of self that are no longer supported by present circumstances. We see how each approaches their present situation based on the needs of an out-moded self that is no longer adaptive. We see how each escalates their attempts to get others to validate the needs of a self that remains vital only to them. In both cases we can clearly observe a failure to mourn the loss of self as central to their plight. In the case of Blanche, it might be said that it is the **characterological self** that needs to be mourned; in terms of the expectations and values that go with the **being** of a whole lifestyle, namely that of a 'southern belle'. In the case of Willy Loman, it might be said that more specifically, it is the **performance self** that needs to be mourned, in terms of the states of self he valued as related to his profession.

Further, consider three recent motion pictures that portray three other types of mourning for the loss of self, that I have found it useful to differentiate in working with clients. In *The Deer Hunter* we see a figure doomed to compulsively try and master a wartime trauma through the repeated playing of Russian Roulette which results in his death. He is still subjectively fused with what we might call the **traumatized self**; and the inability to distance and separate from that state of self thwarts even the

desire to adapt to other circumstances. In the movie *The Elephant Man*, we see the universal human theme of lost potential and opportunity at the hands of fate; in other words, tragedy. In this movie we see in many respects, a successful mourning for the loss of what we might call the tragic self, where we feel with the elephant man the bittersweet victory of an existential hero in the transcendence of his lot in life. Finally, consider the movie *Full Moon In Blue Water* where we see the protagonist, in the opening scene, viewing over and over again, a home movie of his lost and presumed dead wife. Despite a new woman in his life whom he clearly has feelings for, his continued attachment to, and failure to mourn what we might call his object-related self, the self that was a way of being with his wife, precludes any adaptation to the new situation. We might understand his obsession with his wife's image as functioning in the maintenance of that out-moded state of self. This is characteristic of what Volkan (1981) has called "linking phenomena", a feature of pathological grief that serves to maintain a self-representation in the face of object loss.

I suggest on the basis of these publicly available examples that the potential significance of the phenomena of mourning for the loss of self is widespread. While the 'types' of mourning for the loss of self referred to above are overlapping in some degree, they suggest the possible clinical range that a fully developed theory and technique for mourning the loss of self might have.

In addition to the possible significance for a range of clinical problems, it is appropriate to briefly place the change

mechanisms assumed to be important in this study , in the context of current debates on the relationships between cognitive and affective variables in psychotherapy (Lazarus, 1989; Arkowitz & Hannah, 1989; Greenberg et al, 1989). As Greenberg et al (1989) state:

"Both experiential therapy and cognitive therapies are involved in changing client's perceptions of self and others. Although the different cognitive therapy approaches have identified a variety of different targets, such as irrational beliefs, automatic thoughts, self-statements and attributions, the schema is rapidly becoming seen both in cognitive psychology and cognitive therapy as an important underlying construct in attempting to explain perception, experience, and performance."

In this study the target of change is the out-moded and nonadaptive self-schemata of clients which are in different degrees, still subjectively fused with current functioning. The position this study takes towards these self-schemata in regard to cognition and affect is an integrative one. As Lazarus (1989) states, "I offer the following manifesto for cognitive theorists that sums up the issue: Emotion and cognition are inseparable." And, as Greenberg et al (1989) offer, "...The claim that cognitive therapies deal only with cognition and not affect and the claim that experiential therapies do not deal with cognition because they are emotionally focused has been one of the greater errors of selective attention in current therapy theorizing." However, while an integrative position is taken in regard to the cognitive and affective processes related to the self-schemata that are the focus of change here, they are not considered purely as "information processes", "knowledge structures", or even, "states

of mind". In this study the referents of concern whether designated by these or other terms, are essentially intended to be understood as **states of being**, or as related to the human being, **states of self**.

The position taken here may be seen as one at the intersection of psychoanalytic phenomenology (Stolorow & Atwood, 1982), and Heideggerian metaphysics (Heidegger, 1975). As Stolorow and Atwood write:

"In psychoanalytic phenomenology, personality development refers to the structuralization of personal experience. Efforts to construct a developmental psychology of the subjective world are still in their infancy. They have been significantly hampered by the persistent psychological tradition of artificially dividing human subjectivity into cognitive and affective domains. We have proposed a mending of the rift between cognition and affect, and a focus on the ontogenesis of unitary configurations of experience."

Writing, as they are, from the perspective of Kohut's Self Psychology these "unitary configurations of experience" may be considered as states of self, or states of being. The point is that while terms like 'cognitive-affective schemata', and 'self-schemata' are accepted as signifiers for targets of change in this study, these targets of change are assumed to be in their phenomenal essence entities with definable identity that can be encountered, not only by others, but also by other functional entities within the same individual. For example, while working with a 'possessed' client who was having exorcisms performed on him at a respected church, I asked a colleague 'To which entity do I extend Rogerian respect, empathy, and genuineness'? The answer, of course, was to all of them. The same answer, I suggest, extends

potentially to all states of self; in the same way that the Hindu religion accords respect to a pantheon of gods symbolizing manifest states of being.

This premise, I believe, has important implications for the conduct of therapy and justifies by requiring, the personal, entity to entity tone I have taken in working with the process of mourning for the loss of self. Rather than "force reorganization of schemata" as Greenberg et al (1989) promote, I find it more useful to experience my clients inner being through such terms as encountering and acknowledging, valuing and thanking, welcoming and departing, and so on. Moreover, this personal, entity to entity approach subsumes and accounts for a set of related topics, namely, resistance or attachment to out-moded functioning, and the dynamics of narcissism, which are intimately bound up with the process of mourning for the loss of self.

Attachment to situationally nonadaptive modes cannot be solely accounted for, I believe, with concepts such as 'secondary gain', or the "Briar Patch Syndrome" (Freeman et al, 1989). True, there are often payoffs to what we call symptoms. Equally, there is some obvious reality to the idea that choosing to stay within the bounds of a smaller albeit somewhat pinched state of self may avoid the larger dread of risking unknown states of self. However, given that the concept of narcissism is a recognized way of acknowledging that people can become attached to states of self in the same way and degree that they become attached to other people, would it not serve us well to consider that in principle all states of self

require entity to entity respect and acknowledgment, as at least, the minimum price for their engagement as targets of change?

This position taken as a primary premise of this study lies at the conjunction of psychoanalytic phenomenology and the thought of Heidegger. Just as psychoanalytic phenomenology points in the direction of an entity to entity path, so the thought of Heidegger serves as a foundation for this view. As he reflects (1975):

"Suppose one attempts to make a transition from the representation of beings as such to recalling the truth of Being: Such an attempt, which starts from this representation, will represent in a certain sense, the truth of Being; but also, any such representation must of necessity be heterogeneous and ultimately, insofar as it is a representation, inadequate for that which is thought."

By heterogeneous, Heidegger means in the final analysis, that our representations of being are always different from the Being of beings, where we might just as well substitute the term schemata for representation. He is calling, I believe, for a leap in our disciplined or scientific approach to human nature. He is calling for a shift from 'thinking about' the nature of the human existence, to 'being-with' the phenomenally present entities variously encountered in the "place" that is the human being. As he says (1975): "Being there, names that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place, namely, the location of the truth of being." He further writes:

"What does 'existence' mean? The word designates a mode of Being: Specifically, the Being of those beings who stand open to the openness of Being in which they stand, by standing it. This 'standing it', this enduring, is experienced under the name of "care". The ecstatic essence of being there is approached by way of care, and, conversely, care is experienced adequately only in its ecstatic essence."

I take Heidegger to mean that, not only are the various states of human being, or modes of entity, imbued with a quality of grace, or, care, by their very fact of existence; but that also we can only really contact these entities as they exist by way of care for them in their phenomenal or "ecstatic essence". This is the position this study takes in relation to the targets of change focused on, worked with, or encountered, in the various ways each client mourns the loss of self.

In the chapters to follow an extensive literature review will be presented concerning therapeutic theory and approaches that may be related to, and that will form a context in which to present the conceptual model of mourning for the loss of self. Next, the model itself will be defined and discussed in detail. In the same chapter the model will be demonstrated through the presentation of case studies. The final chapter will discuss implications, areas of application, and directions for research and development.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

An Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to more fully drawout a theoretical context in which to see and understand mourning for the loss of self as a therapeutic process. This will be done by reviewing what different existing approaches have to say about any relationships they acknowledge as important between the three major constructs which form the focus of this study; namely, loss, self, and mourning considered as the process of adapting to loss. Consequently, the following review of the literature will have a general format where each approach is considered in terms of:

- (1) Assumptions about 'self' relevant to this study.
- (2) How that construct of self is impacted by loss.
- (3) The nature of any relevant views on the relationships between self, loss and mourning.
- (4) Any specified techniques for accomplishing such mourning processes.

Theoretical approaches this review will consider in terms of this format include: Psychoanalytic, psychodynamic, cognitive-developmental, experiential, as well as a sample of literature that takes loss and transcendence as its focus. Within each of these approaches the views of individual authors will be considered since no approach claims a homogeneous view shared by all of its adherents; or, an equal interest in topics such as loss, self, and

mourning. Subsequently, it is acknowledged that the choice of various authors within these approaches will be based on the extent to which they reflect and support different facets of mourning for the loss of self, as considered in this study.

More relevant authors will be considered in some depth to establish as secure a base as possible for considering mourning for the loss of self as a distinct and commonly required change process. At the conclusion of dealing with each author, a brief summary of their contribution towards supporting the need for a model of mourning for the loss of self will be suggested.

Also, several themes will be followed through the literature review. Support for the notion of self as a developing system of multiple emergent forms that can be experienced as entities, will be drawn out in the literature review. Related to this, the principle of negentropy, the tendency of self-structures to persist and accrue in complexity, will be similarly developed. In the same way, the concept of the psychic triad of loss, as the mechanism responsible for complicating experiences of the loss of self, and thus requiring a therapeutic mourning process, will be followed through the review. And lastly, the notion of self as basically falling into two knowable forms, self as object and self as agency, will also be a theme followed in the literature review.

This chapter will set the stage for the following one where a formal definition of the constructs and a description of the therapeutic process of mourning for the loss of self as used in this study will be presented.

The Psychoanalytic Approach

The psychoanalytic approaches considered here will be looked at in some depth. This is because each theorist presents not only an attempt at empirical description but also an individual philosophy about self and processes effecting self to a degree in each case. Further, these theorists ideas about self and motivations relating to self build on each other in complex ways making it both useful and necessary to consider similarities and differences in some detail. And finally, it is the case that psychoanalytic theories have been mother to many concepts and processes taken over by non-psychoanalytic theories and techniques.

This fact, plus the point that most psychoanalytic thinkers considered here also provide a developmental view, makes detailed discussion of psychoanalytic theorists useful as a historical framework that addresses many of the commonly considered questions about 'self' and its origins, structure and functioning in the world.

In many ways the development of psychoanalysis from Freud to current thinkers in the field today parallels a progression in conceptualizing the existential relationships between self, loss, and adaptation to reality. Some of this thinking is done in relation to developing an understanding of the psychology of depression. With this intersection of ideas in mind we will first turn to Freud. As well, in this section on Freud, what is referred to in this study as the psychic triad of loss, is identified as a

central theme that will be followed throughout this review of the psychoanalytic approach.

Sigmund Freud

Freud's (1917) *Mourning And Melancholia* was his first formal contribution to the understanding of the psychodynamics of depression, which at that time was still considered under the ancient term of melancholia. As Bemporad (1978) notes, this short essay changed the course of psychoanalysis by suggesting that forces other than sexuality, such as loss, guilt, and aggression could be at the root of pathology. It shifted emphasis from the topographical model to the structural model of the Freudian mind by introducing the concept of the 'ego ideal' and enlarging the role of the conscious ego in psychological problems. As well, it forms the basis of current object-relation theories by acknowledging the impact of human relationships on mental functioning through the medium of mental representations of people.

The initial thrust of the paper is a comparison of the known phenomenon of mourning, considered as a reaction to loss through death, with the symptomology of depression. Freud, on the basis of similar symptomology, infers a cause for depression from the known cause for the grief and mourning reactions. His inference is that intrapsychically, depression is caused by a loss where there is a subsequent inability to separate from the unconscious and ambivalently regarded representation of the lost person. In other

words, he suggests that a psychological cause of depression can be understood as either a failed, complicated, or delayed mourning process persisting past the time of the actual loss. It is this persistence of a complicated mourning process, absorbing the person's energy, past the time of an identifiable loss that has made depression, or melancholia, difficult to understand according to Freud. He (Freud, 1917) writes:

"In mourning we found that the inhibitions and loss of interest are fully accounted for by the work of mourning in which the ego is absorbed. In melancholia, the unknown loss will result in similar internal work and will therefore be responsible for the melancholic inhibition. The difference is that the inhibition of the melancholic seems puzzling to us because we cannot see what it is that is absorbing him so entirely."

After using loss as the connecting basis for understanding the similarity between mourning and depression, Freud follows his own agenda in elaborating on a key difference. This is what he calls, in regard to the melancholic, "...an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale." He is here, essentially focusing on cognitive features of depression, much the same as Beck (1976) does later, noting that the depressive "...represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished." Freud concludes from these cognitive features of depression that:

"It is true that we are faced with a contradiction that presents a problem which is hard to solve. The analogy with mourning led us to conclude that he had suffered a loss in regard to an object; what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego."

Whereas for Freud, successful mourning terminates when through

de-cathexis, the image of the lost object is no longer experienced in an emotionally disorganizing way, the melancholic is seen to still be relating to the memory image of the lost in an intensely dependent and ambivalent way. Desire and positive feelings for the object are in conflict with guilt over helpless rage at the object for abandonment through loss. Therefore, the melancholic according to Freud, despises himself for his helpless predicament and subsequently suffers a loss of self-regard as a feature of the general depression.

However, what Freud does not consider as a phenomenon in its own right is that the intense attachment to the inner object-image, although ambivalent, may serve a more basic psychological function of maintaining a sense of self, or ego-state, that existed in relation to the object. Freud takes the cognitive statements of self-deprecation in the face of conflicted helplessness, to be the whole and final referent of the "...loss in regard to his ego." What is not considered fully enough is the basis for the symbiotic needs that are clearly part of the melancholic's dependent clinging to the object-image. Had Freud considered that there may be a deeper fear about the loss of an actual sense of self related to the object, which in some ways is experientially distinct from it, he might have been able to pursue more directly the difference he begins to make between mourning object loss, and dealing with a loss of self, whether it be in terms of regard at one level, or the existence of an ego-state at another.

Freud's subsequent concern in the paper is devoted to dwelling

"...on the view which the melancholic's disorder affords of the constitution of the human ego." This is where he makes the case for depression as an expression of internal conflict between the ego and the 'pathognomic introject' and then uses that explanation as evidence for his structural view of the mind.

The final result, in terms of the relationships between loss and self, is a description that is still essentially object focused. For while this description details how the ego remains fused with, or bound via psychic energy to a cathected object, it is still primarily the loss of the object and relations with the object on the internal stage that are dealt with. In short, it is largely the set of cognitive-affective processes related to the object representation that attracts most of Freud's attention. The self's need for the object in order to maintain a way of experiencing itself, and, the fear and dread of a lived sense of self following the object into the void is overlooked given Freud's intent on drawing out his drive-structural theory. In fact, we need to be clear that it is largely Freud's desire to keep theory consistent with the drive construct and its functioning that leads to this overemphasis of the object at the expense of the self. As White (1986) notes:

"The importance of the object, as compared with the self, even when Freud used the term 'ego' as presumably meaning the self, can be seen in Freud's recommendation for dealing with the loss of a love object, namely, for the self to take on or identify with some of the characteristics of the lost object, a process that Freud sees as a part of normal mourning."

Although White's subject is not mourning specifically, I am in agreement with the inference of his particular statement that,

perhaps, Freud's emphasis on the object has obscured part of the naturally occurring mourning process.

There is a point however, at which Freud suggests that the relationships between loss and self may be a focus of therapeutic concern in and of themselves. He notes that there are some difficulties for his theory such as depression without identifiable external losses, and leaves open the possibility that:

"These considerations bring up the question whether a loss in the ego irrespective of the object, a purely narcissistic blow to the ego, may not suffice to produce the picture of melancholia."

In fact, in answer to his own query, Freud went on to state in the paper on melancholia that the loss of an "abstraction" can engender the mourning process which he then defined as:

"The reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on."

I take Freud at this point, as laying open the door to the notion that the perception of loss can be purely referential to a sense of self. In other words, a sense of self can be perceived as imminently or actually lost to the person as a whole, that this is a common psychological problem which can generate painful symptoms, and that it begins to require therapeutic consideration in its own right in the form of something like mourning for the loss of self. For once Freud begins to acknowledge 'purely narcissistic' losses, and the loss of 'abstractions' as sufficient causes of depression, he starts to blur the definition of the 'object' which, for the sake of consistency, his drive theory requires be kept fairly distinct in order to distinguish between healthy and regressive

aims; given his stage of theory construction. How, for example, does one neatly put an ideal, a depleted self-image suffering under 'narcissistic blows', a lost expectation of happiness, dream of achievement, or sense of innocence into the category of object-representation? In short, Freud's thinking begins to require the more detailed consideration of a 'self-representation', its dynamics, development and relationship to 'object-representations'.

For Freud however, it was not possible to pursue this direction more fully since he saw taking the self as object of concern as 'narcissistic' and so regressive and pathological. His view of development was a linearly adaptive one where the healthy progression is described as one from infantile self-concern to stoic focus on the outward values of work and object relations. Despite the fact that Freud's whole method was based on an introspective turning inward, the purpose of that was to refocus the person outward based on assumptions about the drives, and their direction of discharge. The idea of the person taking the state of the self as a focus of concern, in a normal and natural, adaptive and cyclically recurring fashion throughout the life-span was foreign to Freud. For while he was beginning to acknowledge the role of object-representations in psychic life, the ego in Freud's term, or the parts of it that would evolve into the construct of the self, would have to wait for similar treatment until it was given more status as an entity in its own right, with functions and structures that were not reducible to drive energy of the Id.

Only then could the dynamics of the self taking itself as the object of its own consciousness be more fully considered.

Finally, for our focus on mourning for the loss of self it is important to note that three related themes are established by Freud which all following theorists of loss and mourning have found it necessary to address in some ways. I suggest that for our purposes these three themes be considered as the psychic triad of loss, which deserves brief discussion in its own right.

The Psychic Triad of Loss

The components of the psychic triad of loss are first, psychic clinging via forms of introjection and identification, and clinging to symbols, both physical and mental, of what is perceived as lost. These clinging processes may be related to clinging behaviours such as those observed by Bowlby (Bowlby, 1961) but are here considered as distinct inner processes which may have a wide range of behavioral expression. Freud highlighted the process of clinging to ambivalently regarded images of the lost, or introjects, as well as identifications in his theory of depression.

Second, the function of psychic clinging seems to be attempts at psychological self-constancy and self-restoration through forms of psychic clinging, such as wishes for and attempts at reunion with, and restitution of what is lost. Again, these wishes for psychological self-constancy through reunion and restitution may be what is underneath the searching behaviour described by other

writers on loss and mourning; but are here considered as distinct inner experiences which may have a wide range of behavioral expression (Parkes, 1972). Also, this urge for self-constancy is not to be confused with Freud's Law of Constancy, which states that the psychic apparatus functions to keep the level of energetic tension at an even level. This urge for psychological self-constancy, is in fact, an opposite negentropic process which tries to maintain a level of experience already attained, even if that means experiencing greater tension.

Freud, while focusing more on the aspect of psychic clinging to the object, nonetheless seems to have observed the negentropic process of self-constancy, and understands it in terms of his existing model when he writes that it is a matter of "...general observation that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position....This opposition may be so intense ...that a turning away from reality takes place and a clinging to the object through the medium of wishful psychosis." Freud was ready to label this apparent need to maintain certain psychological states as an act of narcissistic regression, but not quite ready to value it as also an act of psychical self-preservation since the object, and outer reality, were more central to his theory as targets of the drives; his central motivational construct.

It must be noted that Freud struggled with the notion of self-preservation throughout his thinking. In fact, in 1905 (Freud, 1905) he found it necessary to propose a "self-preservative drive" which was supposed to ensure survival. Clearly, this was meant to

explain instincts towards biological survival, not psychological survival. However, as his thinking evolved, self-preservation like much else, was reassigned to the dominion of the sexual and aggressive drives where, as Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) note, self-preservation then disappeared as an "independent unit in the conceptual schema". However, what took its place was the concept of narcissism as an expression of the instinct of self-preservation, which was now a component of the libidinal drive (Freud, 1914). I would argue here, that while the self-preservative principle disappears in one form which was basically biologically orientated, it reappears in a more important form; namely, that of a basically psychologically orientated form of survival. In short, Freud's narcissism is the conceptual forerunner and bearer of the principle of self-constancy I am referring to here. When Freud is writing of narcissism, he is in the same moment, dealing with the dynamics of self-constancy fitted in terminology to support the drive constructs.

The third aspect of the psychic triad of loss, as I am referring to it, is arrested self-development, or fixation of aspects of the self in terms of the psychological conditions in effect at the time of the loss, where mourning for a variety of reasons is either uninitiated, or incomplete. For Freud, the process of mourning and depressive reactions to loss co-vary. The more successful the mourning is through the "...bit by bit detachment of the libido...the more the work of mourning is completed and the ego becomes free and uninhibited again."

Conversely, the more the 'ego' is involved in the process of clinging to the psychical representations of the lost, the more it is by definition fixated on a past state of affairs with a corresponding sense of self. Add to this the notion of developmental time where earlier losses may be thought to have more global effect on development than later ones, and the nature of arrested self-development becomes clear in general terms, as a feature of the psychic triad of loss.

These three functionally related elements of the psychic triad of loss are observed repeatedly by authors on loss and mourning who come after Freud (Dietrich & Shabad; 1989). They are functionally related in the simple sense that clinging to either the known structure of object-representations or the known structure of self-representations would tend to limit psychic growth over time. More specifically however, the negentropic tendency to self-constancy may be seen as the motivation for the process of psychic clinging which results in a state of arrested development.

Looked at this way, it is easy to see what is essentially at issue here, namely the nature and primacy of the motivation involved. For Freud the need to maintain an external object for the discharge of libidinous and aggressive energies accounts for variations in such things as clinging to introjects, efforts towards forms of self-preservation, and fixated development. Even his suggestion that the loss of an abstraction can have similar effects is based on the reification of the abstraction to the level of a libidinal object functioning the

same as an introject, keeping the object focus of the theory intact. For the theory of mourning for the loss of self an additional motivational construct is acknowledged to at least co-exist with the instinctual one of Freud. This is the motivation of negentropy, the tendency of structure to persist and evolve more complexly. This will be elaborated on in chapter three.

In summary, even though Freud went a long way towards pointing to the necessity and value of considering the dynamics of a loss of self as distinguishable from the dynamics of object loss, Freud's drive-structural theory set limits to how far he could pursue this narcissistic direction. Therefore, we turn to Hartmann, whose theorizing set the stage for a look at a more complex self-structure, and how it may be impacted in its own ways, by such things as loss and mourning and the need to adapt to reality.

Heinz Hartmann

Part of the history of psychoanalytic theory construction since Freud has been the process of magnifying the detail of the 'self' and its relations and reactions to basic parameters of life such as loss. This has resulted in increasingly differentiating the construct of self and its structure and functions; albeit with disparate implications for broader psychoanalytic theory. As Greenberg and Mitchell (1983, p. 246) write:

"When Freud first postulated the concept of narcissism the ego was not viewed as an articulated structure within the mind; rather, the term referred to something like the 'self' or the 'whole person'. Because of its theoretically shadowy status,

it was not clear just where the ego 'got' the aims which it could impose on captured libido, although the aims themselves are organized around the preservation of the integrity of the body and/or the 'self'."

As the idea of 'scientific' inner processes with explanatory power clinically and culturally caught on, which had an 'observable' tip through which they could be manipulated with language and attention, the initial sketchy map of the Freudian ego/I/self continued to be filled in by following writers. While the various directions of this theory development were largely motivated by increasing awareness of conflicts and deficiencies in Freud's original theory the results, when taken together, afford the most highly articulated picture of the structure and function of the psychological self available today.

This psychological self of psychoanalysis is positioned with attempted precision between the biological and social spheres of life. While argument still rages over which interface of the psychological self, (ie., the biological or the social) warrants the most attention in what is currently known as the "drive-structural versus relational-structural debate", the necessity of a self construct has been unequivocally accepted by both camps, although with different emphasis (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).

Hartmann, emphasizing the biological interface of the 'ego' in support of Freud's original drive-structural theory, was the first to introduce a distinct self construct into conservative psychoanalytic theory (Hartmann, 1950). This was done out of necessity forced by his own refinements and interpretations of Freudian theory. Hartmann was responding to the fact that, Freud's

development of the structural model created a particularly difficult problem for that part of the theory that insisted the drives were the basis for all psychological life. Namely, with the ego established as a structure in constant contact with the external world, reality starts to compete with drive for consideration as to its relative impact as motive force shaping the person. This trend towards recognizing and according more powers to the ego, relative to the Id, as the mental structure that must deal with reality was developed by Hartmann into an full theory of ego psychology.

Hartmann (1939) solidly establishes the ego as the agent of active adaptation to reality. The functions relegated to the ego are such things as adaptation, reality testing, defense, and especially stimulus seeking. The means to these ends are supplied by "...built-in ego apparatuses that ensure responsiveness to stimuli and a self-propelled functioning" (Pine, 1990). These built-in apparatuses are such things as perception, memory, language, and the like that are pre-wired capabilities of the human, which ensure a degree of successful adaptation to the environment.

What Hartmann's contribution effectively does is fix the basis for two psychoanalytic psychologies; a drive psychology and an ego psychology. Hartmann's intent was to provide an integrated psychoanalytic theory, but once it is accepted that the person is both tension reducing under the force of drive, and, stimulus seeking due to innate brain mechanisms, the two psychologies can be

described in terms of how they interact, but they remain two psychologies based on different motives, behaviours, and even methods of study (Pine, 1990). Empirical study of ego functions, in infant research for example, has been much more conclusive than research attempted with drive constructs (Stern, 1985). But then, this process of increasing theoretical differentiation is only the expectable result of greater articulation of the detail of the initial "shadowy" inner world Freud had first outlined.

For our focus on mourning for the loss of self, Hartmann is important because his launching of ego psychology also contains in it the seeds of later self psychologies. The fact that he finds it necessary to lay down these seeds is, once again, due to the need to acknowledge the theme of psychological self-constancy by redefining narcissism; the construct in which Freud had finally placed the self-preservative tendency.

For Freud, Hartmann (1950) notes, the meaning of narcissism and what its target of cathexis is as a process, varies in a confusing way for later theoretical developments. Freud sometimes refers to cathexis of the body, the personality, and/or the ego as unclear synonyms for the self as referent of self-directed libidinal concern; the unhealthy opposite of object-directed libido. However, with the ego now established as an independent set of mental functions according to the ego psychology of Hartmann, Freud's definitions no longer support the persistent clinical phenomenon narcissism is supposed to account for. That is, the phenomenon of people turning away from objects and taking

some inner 'sense of self' as a focus of concern; a sense of self as psychic object with identity, as opposed to an impersonal ego function. Moreover, an ego with so many healthy adaptive powers does not make a good candidate for a regressive energy sink.

Two polar distinctions then, govern Hartmann's reformulation of narcissism. The first is set up by drive theory where, if one is not object-related in a healthy way then one is self-related in an unhealthy way. The second, I suggest, is set up by Hartmann's new ego psychology where, ego function and self as object with identity are bifurcated to the point that ego can no longer be synonymous with the seat of personal identity. Therefore, Hartmann (1952) is led to the position that: "The opposite of object cathexis is not ego cathexis, but cathexis of one's own person, that is, self-cathexis.". He goes on to say, "...therefore it will be clarifying if we define narcissism as the libidinal cathexis not of the ego but of the self.".

Here, Hartmann provides a solid basis for distinguishing between two forms of self. Self as agency, in terms of the sense of actively executing ego functions; and self as object, in terms of the "representations" of self.

It is at this point, I suggest, that the beginnings of a self psychology are laid down by Hartmann. For, he does two foundational things. First, he establishes the function of the self-preservative tendency of narcissism as clearly having to do with keeping constant any psychological sense of self via the process of self-cathexis. And second, because his reformulations

had eliminated existing structures as candidates, he introduces a separate self-construct as the referent of this new narcissism, namely the "self-representation". Self-representation is chosen because it most closely supports the sense of being the opposite of objects or object-representations, retaining the Freudian polarity between object-directed and self-directed libido. However, it also clearly is a construct that carries a sense of personal identity as opposed to ego function. As White (1986) has suggested, Hartmann's introduction of the self-representation has had "profound Implications" that he himself did not develop. Not the least of these is the implication that the construct of self-representation and the processes of narcissism associated with it, are to have responsibility for constancy of psychological gestalts associated with a sense of personal identity. The ego functions of perception, cognition, memory, and so on are certainly involved in the creation and maintenance of such psychological gestalts, but they are now component, psycho-physiological processes according to Hartmann, which are different from the emergent psychological forms of self-representation they support.

With its foot in a respectable door the concept of self-representation has permeated subsequent psychoanalytic theory development, with different levels of meaning and importance accorded to it.

In terms of its subsequent importance as a construct representing psychological reality, debate has basically fallen into two positions. One is that the self-representation is simply

a content of the ego, an image at most. This was the position basically intended by Hartmann who only wanted to retain and clarify the concept of narcissistic phenomenon, while preserving drive theory. Subsequently, for him the self-representation is as Greenberg and Mitchell (1986) write:

"...a descriptive concept. In light of Hartmann's definition of psychoanalysis, in which the distinction between descriptive and explanatory concepts plays a critical role, his use of the self keeps it on the theoretical periphery. The explanatory concepts of psychoanalysis are still the drives and the 'classical structures'."

The second position is that taken by theorists who seized hold of the "profound implications" of the construct and tried to extend it to the level of being a separate structure within the mind. This position is exemplified in the extreme by Kohut (1977) and some of his followers who seem to see the ego as a content of a "supraordinate self". Here, the self is seen as a major structure of the mind with a great deal of explanatory power. In this sense, the concept of the self-representation has been a Trojan horse for Hartmann, since it opened the way more widely to the development of object relations theory within mainstream psychoanalytic theory; a direction he had wanted to avoid because of conflicts it created for drive theory.

In summary then, Hartmann is important to the study of mourning for the loss of self as a transitional theorist of the self. He rescues the concept from the murky equivocations of Freud and makes it worthy of further consideration in subsequent theory development. While the ontological status of Hartmann's self is debatable, its theoretical generativity within psychoanalytic

thought is not, for it is the seed from which more complex theories of self have grown. Although Hartmann has nothing specific to tell us about loss and mourning related to the self, he implies by emphasizing adaptation that adjustment to loss is a ubiquitous psychological problem. His basic assumption that a psychological construct is required as opposed to a biological or metaphysical one, to carry the function, within the psychic economy, of psychological self-preservation or self-constancy in the face of such constant change remains as the starting point of following psychoanalytic theorists of the self. Equally important, is the assumption that this psychological self as object is related to, but distinguishable from objects and object-representations. And, of final importance for our focus on mourning for the loss of self is Hartmann's assumption that the ego, no longer identical with identity, is a set of functions whose purpose is adaptive management of not only change and therefore loss in the external environment, but also of change and therefore loss in the internal environment. For, this assumption suggests that it is the self-representation, as newly recognized bearer of the sense of personal identity, which will be putting the most internal demand on the functions of the ego for help in coping with the impact of losses on any sense of self. This highlights the fact that persons experience their 'self' in two basic forms: Self as agency, or ego functions; and self as object, or self-representation. As such losses relating to both forms of self probably exist and have to be acknowledged.

These assumptions begin to imply that mourning any loss is truly a Janus-faced task. As such, these assumptions are also the starting assumptions of the theory of mourning for the loss of self.

We turn now to Mahler and look at how she develops the themes of constancy and loss in relation to states of self in ways that are relative to our focus on mourning for the loss of self.

Margaret Mahler

As Bergman and Ellman (1985) put it, "Mahler's concepts and observations in many ways begin to fulfill the promissory notes that Freud left us in his many brilliant papers.". As we have seen, the same can be said of Hartmann who brought to term many of Freud's promises concerning the construct of the ego. In fact, it is Hartmann's theoretical developments that make Mahler's contribution possible within drive theory. The self-representation is a central construct within Mahler's theory, as are innate ego functions in the service of adaptation to the environment. However, Mahler still tries to limit the explanatory power of object relations in deference to the motivation of the drive construct by resisting as long as she can, the equation of people as equalling the environment. But, she finally acknowledges that Hartmann's "average expectable environment" may in fact be the "ordinary devoted mother" (Greenberg and Mitchell (1983).

For Mahler to have fully acknowledged the motive force of

object relations earlier would have recognized not only the conflict-free motivation of ego psychology, but also the negentropic forms of motivation that underlie contemporary object relations theory and self psychology, before psychoanalysis was capable of surviving such a degree of differentiation (Pine, 1990). These negentropic forms of motivation also underlie the theory of mourning for the loss of self, in terms of providing a principle for explaining the persistence of states of self past their developmental time. The fact that such motivation is dealt with by Mahler, in terms of what she calls, the achievement of self and object constancy is one of the main reasons she is significant to us here.

Mahler's work began with infantile psychosis which led her to focus on the state of symbiotic unity which she saw as the complicated process in this condition. She (1942) writes of a mother and child state "...which is unique and much more exclusive than communication by words or thoughts; it is an interrelationship through the medium of affective responses.". This work led to Mahler's (1952) formulation of autistic and symbiotic types of childhood psychosis.

Out of this beginning concern with pathology developed an interest in the normative process by which infants achieve a first sense of individual self or identity in relationship to their perception of primary caretakers. Interest in this question was great enough to launch a full scale research program in 1959, which Mahler headed. The results of this study have come to be known as

the theory of the "separation-individuation process".

For our focus on mourning for the loss of self, Mahler's establishment of the separation-individuation process as an accepted line of development is important because it portrays the self-representation as being caught up in a recursive process related to attachment and loss, in relationships throughout the lifespan; in order to achieve the continual 'birth' of new levels of self development. In other words, the type of losses Mahler reveals as significant the first time around, in the separation-individuation process, remain recursively significant throughout life. Mahler (1988), late in life, goes so far as to call the separation-individuation process one of "the two great organizing principles of contemporary psychoanalysis" , the other of course, being drive theory. This indicates the extent to which she sees it as a principle from which pervasive effect can be broadly generalized.

This claim of pervasiveness of the separation-individuation process is also important to the theory of mourning for the loss of self because it implies that the operation of the psychic triad of loss with attempts at self-constancy, psychic clinging, and potentials for fixation, will apply to the experience of developmental losses throughout life. This is in addition to catastrophic, or what Pine (1990) calls "adventitious losses", such as those through death which Freud's theory of mourning dealt with.

Mahler (1986) came to see the establishment of what she calls the "first level of individual entity" as based on the mechanism of

the progressive differentiation and consolidation of self and object representations. The "second level of identity formation" or, awareness of "gender-defined self entity" also begins in the second year of life, Mahler maintains, but does not become consolidated until the resolution of the oedipal phase sometime later. The separation-individuation process that leads to the sense of a separate cognitive-affective self and other is divided into the autistic, symbiotic and separation-individuation stages with four subphases in the separation-individuation stage.

While Mahler herself has suggested that 'autistic' does not well describe the first two months of infancy given research findings on the active elicitation of environmental responses by the neonate, she still sees the first task of the infant as one "of finding their own niche in the external world" in terms of establishing physiological homeostasis through rhythmic synchronization with the caregiver (Bergman and Ellman, 1985).

Once this is accomplished in the first two months of life, the symbiotic stage is said to have been entered. This may be best understood as the establishment of a "specific mode of object relationship" which is an experiential precursor of any intense attachment (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). We might say that the symbiotic mode is the doorway to attachment in relationships, and that the quality of the symbiotic experience determines the degree of attachment in any relationship. The first symbiotic experience between mother and infant is characterized as a "dual unity" by Mahler, where there is a sense of exclusive availability and

responsiveness to one another; a sense of blissful oneness where boundaries between self and other are nonexistent for the infant, and temporarily suspended for the mother.

Within this symbiotic shell islands of separate self experiences, based on the assertion of rapidly developing motor and cognitive abilities, are held together in the social-emotional equivalent of an embryonic fluid. It is inferred that for the infant the dominant psycho-affective experience is one of complete power and goodness, as the unconditionally loved, admired, and responded to centre of this dual unity. Out of the quality of this psycho-affective experience of the infant are formed basic affective expectations of security, safety, and inevitability of positive experiences. According to Mahler, it is at the height of the symbiotic stage, based on what she describes in general terms as a sense of "confident expectation", that the stage of separation-individuation begins.

The beginning of the separation-individuation stage (Which becomes a lifelong process) is labelled the subphase of differentiation occurring between four and ten months. This is where Mahler locates "hatching", the dawning expressions of awareness of a world outside of the symbiotic orbit of the caretaker, largely based on motoric accomplishments.

Next comes the subphase of practising, where Mahler locates the first occurrence of "psychological birth". Here the child has an awareness of a possessed autonomy over it's own body and rudimentary self, which does not belong to mother, even though

he/she still treats mother as a "homebase". This phase Mahler sees as a peak of exhilaration for the child, with the sense of pride and omnipotence supported not only by new physical achievements but also by a still present, high level of uncritical admiration from the caretaker. For, from the caretaker a high degree of symbiotic mirroring is still required, where psychological contact is assumed to function as a supportive collusion with the child's sense of omnipotence, countering any anxieties that might interfere with the necessary practising of more complex behaviours and the consequent attainment of greater independence.

The third subphase is that of rapprochement, beginning near the middle of the second year, and is the period of psychic development, in Mahler's theory, of most interest to mourning for the loss of self. At this point the cost of individuation catches up with the child where a developing sense of self starts to require the loss of a previous sense of self. As the child practices more independent behaviours the caretaker cannot be totally available to the child, and, the child starts to have the uncomfortable awareness that she/he is not all powerful but rather, a very small creature in a very large, and, most frightening of all, at times impersonal world. This culminates in a narcissistic crisis, which Mahler has labelled the rapprochement crisis.

The rapprochement crisis represents the first developmental loss that is "...age specific, universal, and intense" (Pine, 1990). This loss of the established ideal self's sense of power and goodness is seen by Mahler as a stormy time occurring between

eighteen and twenty-four months, where she describes ambivalence as the prevalent attitude of the child (Mahler, 1975). This ambivalence related to a developmental loss is similar in terms of the activation of the psychic triad of loss implied by Freud, in reaction to catastrophic loss through death. The child wants it both ways, more exploration of independence and the continued blissful sense of omnipotence in the symbiotic experience, where mother's auxiliary functions are taken for granted by the child. Consequently, there are loud, intense, alternating periods of needy clinging and angry rejection of the mother. As Mahler (1986) writes:

"On the one hand, the toddler wants to fully exercise his new-found feelings of autonomy and independence; on the other hand he painfully feels the loss of his former sense of omnipotence and is distressed by his relative helplessness ...mother cannot restore his former sense of omnipotence, nor is she able to relieve his sense of aloneness and helplessness ...as a result he is negativistic and provocative, or he clings helplessly to mother."

What can be assumed to be under this behavioral picture is the urge toward self-constancy of a preferred state through various attempts, including clinging to the perceived source of the symbiotic state, namely, the mother; and also, to inner representations of the symbiotic state. Fixation, the third feature of the psychic triad of loss is also potentially here, since the rapprochement crisis and the quality of its resolution is critical to future development according to Mahler (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975). In fact, she sees a negative resolution of the rapprochement crisis as a fixation point, which can be replayed in subsequent separations, in the same manner that Freud believed an

unresolved oedipal complex could be repeated. Mahler (1972) writes:

"..in the rapprochement subphase we feel is the mainspring of man's eternal struggle against both fusion and isolation. One could regard the entire life cycle as constituting a more or less successful process of distancing from and introjection of the lost symbiotic mother, an eternal longing for the actual or fantasized "ideal state of self"

What is interesting here is consideration of the extent to which the psychological passage of the child through the rapprochement crisis is a first mourning process; and second, the extent to which it is a mourning process that can be considered as a prototypical case of mourning for the loss of self.

That there is a significant loss, and that it is a loss to the child of a significant sense of self is, as we have seen, unquestioned. Furthermore, successful resolution of the rapprochement crisis, as described by Mahler, sounds remarkably like Freud's definition of the mourning process. The child is viewed as dependent on a process for regained integration where, "Positive identifications with the parents are essential elements in this resolution." (Mahler, 1986). That is, the child deals with the loss of part of the symbiotic experience, that part associated with the parents, the part on the object side, much the same way that Freud believed any object loss was dealt with, through the processes of introjection and identification where part of the self becomes like that which was lost. (After all, at this point, there is basically only one psychoanalytic approach to dealing with any loss.) These processes resolve, according to Mahler (1986):

"...actual and intrapsychic conflicts between his own wishes

and his parent's prohibitions, as well as his feelings of helplessness and his wish to please his parents by selectively identifying with them. If he is successful in these efforts, object constancy, individuation, sound secondary narcissism, and the development of psychic structure progress rapidly."

However, where is recognition of the loss of the sense of the child's side of the symbiotic experience? It is certainly referred to often enough. The fact of symbiosis does not mean the child is blind to self distinctions, quite the contrary, its sense of being an omnipotent entity is a repeated focus of Mahler's concern. Even in relation to early infantile autism Mahler (1952) acknowledges some degree of self-referential awareness to belong only to the child. She describes the "infantile personality" as being "...unable to cope with external stimuli and inner excitations, which threaten from both sides his very existence as an entity." Clearly, she is implying some degree of self-awareness that is distinct to the child despite the dominance of any mode of object relationship or stage of development. Thus, the child is quite capable of being prone to suffering losses of self itself, particularly during the symbiotic stage given the level of cognitive development, but this is not dealt with directly by Mahler.

Here again, White's (1986) statement in regard to Freud's overvaluation of the object at the expense of the self as , perhaps implying a limited view of the mourning process, may also apply to Mahler in her limited explanation of dealing with the loss of self in the rapprochement crisis. Mahler after all, is trying to preserve the basic drive/object constructs of Freud, while

integrating them with ego psychology. As a result, I suggest, what gets overlooked is much of the child's experience of dealing with its loss of self, which all seem to agree is a major part of this universal developmental loss.

Mahler acknowledges that successful resolution of the rapprochement crisis occurs on two main fronts. The first, we have seen is that of successful introjection and identification with "good" aspects of the caretaker leading to more differentiated object-representations and consequently, object constancy, which acts like inner ballast, allowing for more independent functioning over longer periods of separation from the physical mother. This also includes taking into the self-representation itself, "good" aspects of the maternal representation in a manner once again identical with Freud's mourning process. The second front Mahler acknowledges, is that of the caretaker's response to the child, which she sees as critical during this phase. Mahler (1986) writes:

"The mother's optimal emotional availability is extremely important in the third subphase. It reduces ambivalence and interpersonal and intrapsychic conflicts. It is the mother's love of the toddler and acceptance of his ambivalence that enable the toddler to cathect his self-representation with neutralized energy."

Despite being couched in the terminology of Hartmann's ego psychology, we can begin to see the mother's functions evolve here. She is no longer the all-giving symbiotic extension of the child's self, but now, among other things, also a helper in the child's process of mourning for a loss of self.

It should be remembered that Mahler's stated agenda is to

explain the establishment of the "first level of identity", not any subsequent mourning processes encountered along the way. She has therefore, explained the evolution of the psycho-physical symbiotic unit, through the crisis of the rapprochement phase, which generates a separate sense of the other as "object constancy", and the self's complimentary sense of separateness which she calls "self constancy". This parallels the relationships between self and object setup by Hartmann. Moreover, by coining the term "self constancy", it becomes the bearer of Freud's self-preservative drive, now further developed from Hartmann's self-representation, which was his vehicle for narcissism and the self-preservative tendency.

With Mahler's establishment of the terms "self and object constancy" as the fourth subphase of the separation-individuation process, and the mechanisms allowing a first level of relatively independent functioning, her stated goal is more or less accomplished. It should be noted that this first level of independent identity is seen as only the beginning of a lifelong process of the continuing consolidation of the sense of self and other. In this way, the pattern of inner destructuralization and restructuralization of self and object representations during the rapprochement phase is a recursive event allowing for the growth of increasing complexity in the sense of self and other. In fact, Mahler's theory is used in this way, as a model for development and treatment in couples therapy (Bader and Pearson, 1988). The fact of this pattern of continued growth and differentiation of self and

other as being a recursive event, throughout the lifespan, also implies the utility of a therapy focusing on the inevitability of the loss of self occurring in that process.

What becomes interesting at this point is the nature of the possible fixation points Mahler believes can occur before self and object constancy are optimally achieved in the fourth subphase. Mahler (1986) believes that it is "...intense ambivalence and splitting of the object world into 'good' and 'bad' maternal representations.", that leads to an inner world dominated by hostile introjects and negatively cathected self images. Mahler (1986) goes on to write:

"The attainment of object and self constancy is a continuing process. The most important aspect is the capacity to resolve the ambivalence and splitting of the rapprochement crisis. Mental health in preoedipal development depends on this resolution...When...the rapprochement crisis may not be resolved...It may become a fixation point with persistence of ambivalence, splitting, and intrapsychic conflict. As a result, the attainment of object and self constancy and psychic structure are impaired; resolution of oedipal conflicts is difficult, neurotic symptoms of the narcissistic variety may develop, or borderline symptoms may occur in latency and adolescence."

Clearly, there is a lot riding on resolution of ambivalence and splitting for Mahler. At this point, I want to consider another view as to the significance of this splitting. For Mahler, it refers wholly to the splitting of the object world into 'good' and 'bad' introjects which dominate self-images depriving the child of an affectively stable inner environment in which to smoothly consolidate self and object constancy.

But, we remember that this began in the breakup of the symbiotic state, where loss of the ideal object is dealt with via

identification plus the optimal support of the caretaker, with little being said about the processing of the third component involved, the obvious loss of the ideal self of the child. What I want to suggest, is that it is the active splitting of the child's preferred sense of self in relation to its ego, with the help of the caretaker, in concrete and optimal ways, that is the key to mourning the loss of self in the rapprochement crisis. The splitting and resultant ambivalence Mahler observes is not only in reaction to the caretaker being less fulfilling and more frustrating in reality; it may also be the operation of the self-preservative tendency again, in the effort to maintain a preferred and extant sense of self that feels threatened with possible annihilation.

The point is, the threatened sense of self may need to be acknowledged directly, and helped to mourn and so transform its conflicted developmental loss. The negentropic inertia of a functioning self-pattern can be sometimes too great to breakup and transform on its own (Pine, 1990). Moreover, I want to suggest, in keeping with Mahler's view of the continuing relevance of the separation-individuation process throughout the lifespan, that wherever "splitting" is observed to be hampering the process, it is an indication that the task of mourning for the loss of self, as defined in this study, may be beneficial in getting through the impasse.

If we go back to the role of the caretaker in facilitating the resolution of the rapprochement crisis , we see Mahler (1986)

consider their tasks as; survival of the child's affect storms, continued emotional responsiveness and contact with sensitivity to the child's changing comfort zone for closeness, protection from too abrupt or prolonged awareness of helplessness and extreme deflations of self, regulation of the level of cumulative trauma, and help in building a sound base for a new positive self by reinforcing real abilities and healthy self-assertions.

I also want to ask why it should not be a normative task of the rapprochement caretaker to be an active helper in the child's mourning for the loss of the symbiotic self that must be differentiated (split), transformed, and passed on in a less intense and frequent form? Just as Mahler described the mother helping the child bear the pain of ambivalence, which may be seen as a core grief reaction to the loss of symbiosis, by staying in accepting touch with the emerging self, so there may be other ways the mother can help the child mourn this passage (Gut, 1989).

Precedent for this position exists in literature which questions the preoedipal child's ability to mourn (Wolfenstein, 1966; Nagera, 1966; Furman, 1974; Sekaer, 1986). Wolfenstein, for example, believes childhood losses cannot be adequately mourned until adolescence, where full decathexis is possible only in the cognitively developed adolescent. Interestingly, she sees splitting of the ego as frequently occurring, as did Freud, when mourning is not completed. Others, however, believe that childhood mourning is possible in terms of the child's level of development, if, the child receives adult help. Thus Furman (1974) states that

children from age two on could attain a sufficient understanding of death and "...could apply this concept of loss of a loved person when realistic and continuous help in understanding facts and feelings was available from surviving love objects.". Sekaer (1986), also believes that childhood mourning is a normal process which is not "...a deficient version of adult mourning, but rather one unique to the child's capacities" where a "...child needs adult help to understand", and also, "...needs an adult to serve as a focus for his emotional reactions" since a child cannot like an adult, "...withdraw into himself to work through the loss." While these writers are dealing with catastrophic loss there is clearly no reason why an adult cannot also help the child mourn aspects of a developmental loss.

What this suggests is that the rapprochement crisis child could also benefit from the help of the adult in mourning not only the loss of the object side of the symbiotic unit, as Mahler describes, but also help from the adult in mourning the loss of self on the child's side of the differentiating symbiotic unit. I believe this is done when the adult helps the child 'split' the ego into an observing ego with an objectified sense of self as its focus. Here, the self is taken as object through trans-contextual communications from the adult, about experiences the child is still largely subjectively fused with. For example, this may spontaneously occur with statements like, 'Only babies can be with mommy all the time', and 'You are too big for that now', and so on. If so, why not variations of, 'Its sad to say goodbye to your

little self'.

In summary of Mahler then, it can be said first of all that her thoughts are pivotal for the theory of mourning for the loss of self. The dynamics of the rapprochement crisis may in fact, serve as a prototypical case of mourning for the loss of self in distinction to object loss. This also suggests that mourning for the loss of self can be applied to *developmental losses* as well as catastrophic losses. As well, the psychic triad of loss with attempts at self constancy through psychic clinging which can result in fixation is centrally operative in Mahler's theory. The operation of the psychic triad of loss is important here, because it is assumed that it reflects the presence of negentropic motivation, the tendency of established self-patterning to have an inertia towards change because such change may be sensed as disorganization, loss, or even annihilation, rather than transformation, development, or adaptation.

Additionally, Mahler's theory suggests that there may be a recursive pattern in self-growth, within object relationships, where one moves from a position of less differentiated constancy in the sense of self and other, to destructuralized inconstancy, to restructuralization with a new and more differentiated sense of self and other, and so on through the cycle again when appropriate. It as if life is a series of limited selves that bloom and fade and bloom again differently, with the safety of symbiotic experience being the perennial nutrient sustaining such variation. For, what is seen in the transformation of the rapprochement crisis is that

the child, with optimal tension and safety in the symbiotic experience, exchanges it for a new pattern of cognitive-affective functioning which transforms the object relationship itself, into a new sense of self and other.

In this way, the original self-preservative and regressive drive of Freud has evolved through Hartmann's narcissistic self-representation, into the Phoenix like principle of self constancy of Mahler, where one form of self is transformed into another throughout the lifespan. Surely, this is the same basic pattern and experience effected in therapy.

Finally, what is seen in the dynamics of Mahler's rapprochement crisis and its resolution, is the possible necessity of an experience like mourning for the loss of self as integral to the recurrent regeneration of the self. For, if the transformation from one level of self constancy to another is too abrupt, or the tension of the symbiotic experience not optimal enough, anxiety, clinging, and fixation on the existent level of constancy appears to reliably occur; with splitting, perhaps being one marker indicating such fixation. At that point direct acknowledgement and grieving of the aspects of self that need to be given up seems necessary. However, even at optimal levels of symbiotic safety there appears to be some anxiety about what is being given up. Subsequently, Mahler believes that all future separations contain the echo of recapitulated rapprochement anxieties.

That being the case, mourning for the loss of self may be a class of psychological event, that is recursively necessary for the

continued differentiation and growth of the personality throughout the lifespan.

Edith Jacobson

While Mahler focused a great deal of attention on articulating a developmental process, Jacobson (1971) spent more time writing about the pathology of depression and severe psychotic states. She does this, however, from within a theoretical revision of psychoanalytic drive theory, that puts the mental representation of what she calls the self and the object world, at the centre of experience. As Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) contend, Jacobson tries to reconcile drive theory with the "phenomenology of human experience".

The effort to do this rests in large part on the assumption of what Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) have called "the representational world". Originally devised as a construct to facilitate research into psychoanalytic concepts such as the superego, introjects, and the like under the auspices of the Hampstead Index Study, it has become the basis for a psychoanalytic phenomenology in the contemporary literature (Stolorow and Atwood, 1979). This development, as does Jacobson's work, owes a direct debt to Hartmann's introduction of the construct of self-representation, even though the meaning of the self of psychoanalytic phenomenology has evolved past that of Hartmann.

Sandler's (1986) definition best describes this approach as

used by Jacobson:

"...the meaning of the self-representation is the phenomenal or experiential one, in which the self-representation can be considered to be the image and the subjective experience of ourselves that we have at any given moment. Thus if we have a fantasy involving ourselves, the self-representation in that fantasy is, while we are having the fantasy, an experiential representation of ourselves, usually in interaction with others, that is, with object representations that parallel the self-representation. Such a subjective experience may be conscious, but it may be equally unconscious."

From her thinking about the nature of affects, the units of experience composed of associated sensations, images, and thoughts which blend into general feeling tones, Jacobson came to see the complexity of mental life as too great to be usefully dealt with in metapsychological terms alone, where affect might be described as tensions and conflicts between id, ego, and superego. This created a sense of distance from the personal vitality and meaning of individual experience. Consequently, Jacobson (1971) argues:

"In other words, while the basic theoretical value of this classification is that it approximately defines the affective type from the dynamic and structural points of view, it cannot divulge the meaning even of a specific and apparently simple affect...Hence affects can be understood only from the simultaneous study of perceptive experiences and the conscious and unconscious ideational processes."

With this admission, Jacobson takes up the language of the representational world as being phenomenologically closer to the reality of psychic life, while retaining the drives as basic explanatory concepts. This is a welcome promise of clarity in psychoanalytic thinking which is unfortunately obscured in much of Jacobson's writing, with her insistence on framing her descriptions in terms of a very strict Freudian drive psychology. The result is a sometimes awkward attempt at a more phenomenological

psychoanalysis, which nonetheless, gives following theorists a productive direction to develop more fully.

In Jacobson's representational world, the drives are essentially personified in that virtually no resulting affect escapes some form of imagistic representation however vivid or subtle. This gives her descriptions of the inner world of self and object a sense of being spatially dynamic. However, the dynamism tends to be largely restricted to frequent "cathectic shifts" where libido and aggression flipflop between self and object images. Consider, for example, an attempt at regulating self-esteem (Jacobson, 1971):

"He tried to keep the image of this love object hypercathected, by constantly depriving the self-image of its libidinal cathexis and pouring it on the object image. He then had to bolster his self-image again by a reflux of libido from the image of his love object."

While the phenomenological veridicality of Jacobson's descriptions are certainly open to question, what is interesting in her work for the theory of mourning for the loss of self, is the extent to which the construct of self evolves as an entity with structure, function, and effects of its own, distinguishable both experientially and theoretically from the ego and the object. For, what cannot be questioned in Jacobson's thought is that phenomenologically, cognitive-affective imagery involving the self shapes and effects a great deal of experience and behaviour. This has generally been established by a growing history of empirical research in cognitive psychology (Freeman et al, 1989). In this sense, one might see Jacobson as a psychoanalytic Wundtian where

she tries to identify the phenomenal elements, or, what she called the "qualities of felt experience" within the terms of drive theory (Jacobson, 1953).

The result for the construct of the self within psychoanalysis, is to open the door to progressively according it more explanatory power by acknowledging that states of self-consciousness can have, in their phenomenal immediacy, intentions of their own distinct from the general aims of drive theory. These aims function as strategies for either maintaining or avoiding positive or negative experiences of self and object and permutations thereof. Jacobson assumes the infant's earliest drive and object experiences develop into phenomenal affective gestalts. This patterning of early affective imagery in relation to the caregiver, coalesces into images of "...gratifying (good) and frustrating (bad) mother. These images, with their attendant emotional attitudes, constitute the beginnings of internal object relations. From early on, the object-related attitudes acquire their own motivational power, independent of the search for drive satisfaction." (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983).

For Jacobson, these independent 'attitudes' are structured out of basic psychological responses to the physical level of drive expression. For example, she sees the psychological counterpart of frustration as disappointment plus devaluation of the frustrating object. If boundaries are too fused between self and object when disappointment occurs, then the self is also devalued, or cathected with aggression. Gratification is seen as leading to combinations

of narcissistic valuation and idealization of self and other. These psychological reactions develop into the more complex affects experienced in gestalt form as self and object representations; with different degrees of distinctness between what is self and object being a major qualitative dimension. The resulting affective attitudes come to maintain patterns of self and object experience.

With these affective images given independent motive force, the representational world, and the self, or, selves, it might come to configure, becomes an emergent structure within the mind. Jacobson, whether she intended it or not, sets up acknowledgement of a negentropic form of motivation, and allows that emergent forms of self based on sets of cognitive-affective imagery have central significance in life.

A sensitivity to the complex patterning of these variables, within the basic alternation of 'good' and 'bad' feelings about self and object stands out in Jacobson's clinical descriptions. In fact, it seems this sense of pattern is what leads her to suggest revising Freud's Law of Constancy from referring to the entropic tendency of the psychic system to keep tension as low as possible, to meaning the maintenance of a pattern of tension at a constant level. As she concludes (Jacobson, 1971):

"We recognize a law of constancy in the sense of a tendency to maintain an equilibrium and an even distribution of the energetic forces within the psychic organization...The function of this law would be not to reduce tension, but to establish and maintain a constant axis of tension and a certain margin of vacillations around it."

This law of constancy sounds more like a self-organizing

principle that can apply to any functionally patterned, or stable, psychological state.

Because Jacobson puts such an emphasis on experience being shaped by the patterning of affective imagery of self and object, the maintenance of any "psychic organization" has to be considered as the maintenance of a pattern of phenomenal self and object imagery. This, in fact, is what she contends, to the point of insisting that cognitive-affective experience covaries with changes in self and object imagery (Jacobson, 1971):

"To repeat: it appears that an experience causes a change of mood only if it can bring about qualitative changes in the representations of the self and of the object world."

And, further:

"But we must realize that not only in pathological but in any type of mood variations, our self and object representations undergo such qualitative modifications."

Jacobson, when referring to pathology in varying degrees constantly uses terms such as, "distorted", "fragmented", "deformed", "re-fused", and so on, in accordance with her view that emotional problems can be approached through knowledge of the shape of self and object representations. Healthy development is seen as based on progressive differentiation of self and object images, with conscious ego control over changes in libidinal or aggressive cathexis in either set of images increasing through the neutralization of drive energy. As such, the set of phenomenal representations that compose the self in Jacobson's theory, is separate from the ego, but has a reciprocal influence on it.

For example, in Jacobson's terms, self and object images can

be hypercathected to the extent that there is no energy left for the deployment of ego functions, amounting to a fixation on self as object, and a loss of self as agency. And, through the use of ego functions one can reality test and alter aspects of the affective assumptions which comprise the representational world. In this sense healthy development and goals of treatment are similar to those of Bowen (1988) who sees the "differentiation of self" in terms of the separation of facts from feelings, and awareness of differences between emotional process and emotional content as a developmental theme.

Jacobson's views on depression and its treatment follow from her views on the relationships between emotional experience and the representational world. Depression is largely seen as a result of ego functions and ideal self-images being dominated by concrete superego and negative self-images. While loss is acknowledged in different forms by Jacobson, it is seen as basically involving loss of gratification. The greater the degree of gratification lost, the greater the chance of clinging to current self and object representations, in an experience that can amount to a traumatic loss. Jacobson's revised constancy principle then comes into play with this kind of experience, where the maintenance of an affective equilibrium in the "psychic organization" of the representational world becomes the paramount concern of the individual. In such a situation, patterns of affectively charged self and object images become essentially perseverated as outmoded and ineffective means of regulating self-esteem. These can be reactivated when similar

subsequent losses of gratification occur. For example, there may be a pattern of trying to fuse with an ideal object in the face of loss, in the way a child might seek comfort from a parent. If this fails it may activate earlier images of the object as sadistic and depriving and of the self as bad and unworthy. This becomes a dominant state of self, out of which the person may then make decisions to withdraw from the world, preventing reality testing, which ensures further depression and confirmation of the operative self and object representations.

For Jacobson, therapeutic change appears to rely largely on insight (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). This is insight into the consequences and the aims of the patterns of self and object representations which may have been operating automatically, in different relationship situations.

Mourning as a specific process, is treated by Jacobson much the way Freud approached it, as a process of decathexting memories of the lost so that one can recathext new objects, with aggression turned toward the self often complicating the process. She offers that loss often "...fixates a tragically altered picture of the self and the world." (Jacobson, 1971). However, nowhere does she appear to directly deal with the loss of self as an aspect of mourning or of loss generally. This appears to be the case because for Jacobson, loss involves not so much any loss of self, as it involves a generic loss to the self in every case. This is the loss of gratification and positive narcissistic feeling. This is in strict accordance with Freud's (1895) view that "...melancholia

consists in mourning over loss of libido".

With this loyalty to drive theory as the ultimate substance of consideration Jacobson may have missed the implications of some of what she so painstakingly set up.

Clearly the self, as known through the self-representation, has evolved in Jacobson's work to the status of being a distinct intrapsychic structure. Within psychoanalytic theory today the self, as known through self-representations, is recognized as one of five intrapsychic "human regulatory structures" (Settlage, 1990). These self-representations as acknowledged by Jacobson are known in varying degrees to the consciousness of the person. In fact, fluctuations in cognitive-affective experience are said to be related changes in self-representations. The economic constancy principle is revised to the extent that it is the constancy of a pattern of tension, and so by definition a pattern of self-experience with independent "attitudes" of its own, that seeks to persist. Consequently, the psychic triad of loss is seen even more clearly as the clinging to a known state of self which can result in fixation, in the face of loss. Yet, there is no acknowledgement of the need to deal directly with the loss of a sense of self. Once again, this appears to be because all losses are viewed in terms of loss of gratification adhering to the principle of the drives as the basic explanatory constructs.

Despite Jacobson's approach to loss, with her development of the experiential independence of the construct of self, mourning for the loss of self as a distinct therapeutic event becomes a

clear possibility; and perhaps a necessity to growth.

Moreover, Jacobson's views on the self as a set of operative self-representations throws into relief an additional facet of mourning for the loss of self. Namely, where a sense of self is operative but with dysfunctional effect, one might need to choose to separate from such a sense of self; in effect choosing to experience the pain of loss. This would amount to what I have suggested be considered as mourning for the loss of the characterological self.

In summary, Jacobson's use of the representational world of self and object tries to bridge the gap between drive and object relations theory. The importance of Jacobson's work can be seen in the fact that contemporary theorists with widespread influence, such as Kernberg (1989), assume and use the language of a dynamic representational world in their presentations. Despite some difficulties and contradictions, Jacobson's attempt to integrate drive-structural and relational-structural theories is considered by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) to be the most successful. This is largely based on Jacobson allowing to the extent that she does, a motive force in object relations independent of the drives.

In this process Jacobson develops the self as a separate set of cognitive-affective representations distinct from object representations, the ego, the ego ideal, and the superego. As such, the loss of self as a distinct psychological event is implied as an inevitable experience. The loss of self is implied not only in relation to object loss and developmental loss, but also as a

necessary choice at times, in order to separate from any dysfunctionally operative self-representation which may be hampering more optimal growth and adaptation. This might be best described as a therapeutic loss of self. It is suggested that mourning such a therapeutically necessary loss of self be considered as mourning the loss of the characterological self; in order to distinguish it from other forms of mourning for the loss of self.

Heinz Kohut

Whereas Jacobson begins to acknowledge that the self and object relations may have independent motivations different from those of the drives, Kohut goes so far as to develop a Self Psychology which is not only independent of drive theory, but supraordinate to it in the sense that the drives are seen as "constituents" of the self (Kohut, 1980).

Kohut has generated more theoretical ferment than any other psychoanalytic thinker since Freud. This wide ranging debate both within and without psychoanalytic circles is based in large part on Kohut's use and development of the construct of self. Moreover, it should be noted that the ideas that originally stimulated my thinking about a theory of mourning for the loss of self were those of Kohut.

A consistent feature of Kohut's self construct is the implied centrality of particular kinds of loss which effect the self in

critical experiential and structural ways. While Kohut generally focuses on the development of self psychology and not on loss *per se*, his sense of the different facets of human nature that drive psychology and self psychology respectively deal with reveals the role of loss at the core of self psychology. Kohut (1985) describes psychoanalytic drive-structural theory, with its focus on the multitudinous conflicts over impulse discharge, as the psychology of "guilty man". In distinction to the broad facet of human nature that belongs to guilty man, Kohut insists that another dimension of human nature is at the heart of much psychological distress. He offers (Kohut, 1985):

"It is the fateful matter of whether one's nuclear self is able to express its basic patterns within the span of a lifetime. We are dealing here with psychic functions that are not regulated by the pleasure/reality principle but which are subject to forces 'beyond the pleasure principle'. I will...characterize this second outlook on human psychology by saying that it focuses on tragic man".

The subject of self psychology at the metapsychological level is the broad facet of human nature that belongs to tragic man. I suggest that it is much easier to comprehend the significance of Kohut by taking this as the starting premise of self psychology, rather than the various definitions of self and methodology that change throughout the course of his writing. The psychology of tragic man refers to that dimension of human life which is recognized by the poet who observed that of all sad words ever penned, none are sadder than "It might have been". The tragic is the dimension of lost potential and possibility. It is the dimension of the unmet, unrecognized self which despite stony

ground still painfully yearns to grow and actualize core, or, "nuclear" aspects of itself. The intrapsychic result can be, Kohut maintains, not the structural conflicts of guilty man, but structural defects resulting from tragically having missed out on some specific and necessary kinds of experience with others. Generally, this kind of experience refers to that which Kohut calls "selfobject experiences". These are the timely subjective experiences of being confirmed, validated, and supported in terms of one's unique and developing expression of abilities, needs, and ambitions.

By making tragic man and the dimension of human tragedy the domain of his self psychology Kohut accomplishes several things simultaneously. First, he clearly acknowledges a separate set of motivational influences apart from the drives giving full recognition to object relations and relational-structural theories. This is so because for Kohut, individual possibilities, talents, and ambitions, of any self, are only pulled into actuality through the mirroring of such by another. Individual self emergence is seen as dependent on the quality of the empathic responses of the other. The experience of these responses from the other, Kohut labels as "selfobject functions", where the function the selfobject experience performs is sensed as a part of self. For example, the soothing parent performs a self-regulating function for the child, which the child experiences as part of itself. Self functioning is thus embedded in relationships with others; and, in this sense Kohut maintains we normally experience others as parts of ourselves

throughout life, since we are never completely free of needing selfobject functions.

Kohut never questions the existence or impact of the drives and drive-structural theory, but the body of his work does question the priority of drive concerns in human life, and the course of his writing reflects the attempt to discern the correct relationship between the drives and object relationships as separate influences on the self. It should be noted that while Kohut's self psychology supports the relational-structural domain of object relations his theory is not sufficiently accounted for by object relations alone. This is because self psychology is not based on perception and perceptual residues of self and other solely; it is also based on acknowledgement of genetic endowments and potentials, as well as the reality of the existential moment between the other and the timely needs of the self. The whole notion of the term 'object' is based on Freud's original view that one only knows another through perceptual residues or "imagoes" representing degrees of gratification and frustration associated with them; not as a whole person. These affective object schemas are the core constructs of object relations theories, and the mechanisms from which projection and introjection occur. As Jung (1916) writes: "A person whom I perceive mainly through my projections is an imago". The idea that one can sense the reality of another person through, in Mahler's words, "the medium of affective responses" is somewhat more profound. In short, self psychology acknowledges instances of ahistorical contact between self and other.

We could in fact say that Kohut, as does Mahler, points to the existence of fundamental experiential structures, living structures, occurring between people. This is variously hinted at with terms like symbiotic experience, self-selfobject experience, mother-child unit, and so on; but there is no one term in the literature that corresponds to these experiential structures.

I suggest therefore, that the term 'synergistic object' be considered as the general term designating experiential structures which occur only at the nexus of relationships; where synergistic refers to the interaction of two things which creates a third which is not reducible to either. Synergistic objects are the structured moments of psychological contact that occur between memory and yearning. They are entirely present based. In this sense, Kohut's selfobject experience is a specific instance of a psychic 'synergistic object', as would be aspects of Mahler's symbiotic experience. This concept allows us to consider effects related to the loss of synergistic objects generically, in a way that does not bind us to Kohut's theory specifically, at a later place in the discussion.

Second, Kohut continues the development of the construct of the self as an independent psychological configuration within the mind. In this process the concept of narcissism and the related theme of tendencies towards self constancy continue to evolve in the direction of a negentropic view of psychic organization. Here I will discuss some of the implications of this and the general structure and processes that Kohut sees in a self-configuration, in

order to reveal different types of losses that can befall such a self.

The central problem of tragic man is to have the courage to continue to find/create a social-emotional context in which he or she can assert and "...realize the pattern of his most central self." (Kohut, 1985). This most central self, Kohut terms the "nuclear self".

However, Kohut makes it clear that he does not see the nuclear self as the sole or only self configuration. Quite the contrary, speaking from clinical experience he sees multiple self configurations as the norm (Kohut, 1985):

"Instead of a single self of conscious experience...We will see different selves, each experienced as absolute and as the centre of the personality,...We will witness what appears to be an uneasy victory of one self over all the others. But we will also see that some individuals are more capable than others of tolerating the active, creative conflict of inconsistent selves, without having to resort to undue defensive maneuvers or to the achievement of a psychological synthesis at all costs."

In this sense, the successful fulfillment of a nuclear self is the actualization of the best possible self, all things considered.

Kohut makes a critical point for the theory of mourning for the loss of self in relation to the reality of multiple self configurations. He states (Kohut, 1985):

"It may be taken as a basic law that, within the realm of narcissism, the observing psyche tends to experience each mental content as absolute...We experience each of the selves that is at any given moment in the focus of our observation as unique and absolute... We thus tend to believe in the absoluteness of our experiences."

Kohut is acknowledging from the point of view of subjective

immanence that the experience of any mental state is an egocentric proposition. This echoes the views of Piaget (Cowan, 1978) who identifies a psychic tendency towards overvaluation of the positive in terms of the "centration" of functionally established schemas. Here the urge for self constancy is a truly negentropic principle where emergent configurations of self are imbued not so much with libidinous charge as they are with a sense of personal presence which one tends to identify with in an absolute sense, as a self-identification.

With this point of view, Kohut goes unequivocally beyond Hartmann's concept of self-representation as mere image. The selves of self psychology are structured entities in the sense that they can be experienced more or less as having lives of their own. This position is supported in contemporary literature on multiple personalities as well as studies of dissociative processes in hypnosis (Beahrs, 1982). Moreover, the critical change in the meaning and function of narcissism almost slips by here. The emphasis, as suggested above, in Kohut's "basic law" of narcissism shifts unmistakably from that of direction of energetic charge to that of identity of experienced self-configuration. Narcissistic experience is experience that is experienced as self; not the particular direction of energy or libido, as is the case with Jacobson despite her focus on self-representations. Self becomes a three-dimensional entity experiencing from the inside out, and not just an observing ego focused inward on a two-dimensional self-representation. This is the point where self psychology is at the

crossroads of psychoanalytic and Heideggerian phenomenology for all discussion of psychic life in the language of cognitive-affective terminology is in a sense two-dimensional only. We imagine little pictures of people coloured with different emotions with some transactions and movements between them. However, from the point of view of subjective immanence any actual psychic reality corresponding to the two-dimensional map of cognitive-affective terminology must have a spatial and at least three-dimensional sense for we are beings-in-the-world, not beings in the abstractions of different kinds of maps whether they are located in psychology texts or our own abstract processes. This reflects the difference between ego functions and self.

The function of narcissistic concern then becomes not merely avoidance or withdrawal of cathexis from the object world, but awareness, valuation, and the tending to that which is experienced as self. Clearly, a sense of loss in such a self-configuration becomes a much more existentially vital event, where one can imagine the immediacy of the urge towards psychic survival, and thus self constancy, as having the same quality as the instinct towards physical survival. The concept of therapeutic resistance becomes more understandable and dynamically charged in this light.

Kohut (1985), in fact, sets up a direct parallel between the instinct to physical survival and the reaction to threatened psychic survival of self-configurations. He does this through the concept of "narcissistic rage" which refers to the set of angry and aggressive reactions in response to a self-configuration

experiencing a loss of "cohesion" and sense of "fragmentation" in the face of a lack of needed supportive and confirming experiences from others.

"Narcissistic rage belongs to the large psychological field of aggression, anger, and destructiveness...From the point of view of social psychology, furthermore, it is clearly analogous to the fight component of the of the fight-flight reaction with which biological organisms respond to attack. Stated more specifically, it is easily observed that the narcissistically vulnerable individual responds to actual (or anticipated) narcissistic injury either with shamefaced withdrawal (flight) or with narcissistic rage (fight)."

Kohut goes so far as to claim that aggression generally is a "secondary breakdown product" of an unresponded to self. The primacy of a negentropic form of motivation is once again underlined here, where the urge to constancy of psychic self-configurations is a motivation prior to discharge of aggressive energy. This is a fundamental revision of Freudian theory where, again, we see the extent to which Kohut embraces relational-structural views, for the object/other is seen as embedded in the functioning of the self in dysfunction as well as health.

In developing a more phenomenologically correct, or "experience-near" construct of self, Kohut discovers some invariant structures of the self. He first defines psychic configurations with a felt sense of self (Kohut, 1985): "They are experienced as being continuous in time, unitary and cohesive, and as possessing stable spatial relations.". Kohut then goes on to define the structure of the nuclear self:

"The nuclear self, however, is that specific self which fulfills two further conditions: (1) It is the self which is the carrier of the derivatives of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self (i.e., the potential executor of the

goals, purposes, and ambitions which are in genetic-dynamic contact with the original aspirations of the grandiose-exhibitionistic self); and (2) it is the self which has its sights on values and ideals which are the descendants of the idealized parent imago."

In this sense, Kohut's self has been described as a "bi-polar self" made up of the grandiose pole and the ideal objects pole which, when there is optimal tension between them, activates the expression of goals, purposes, and ambitions. Again, it is the quality of experience with people in the present that activates the bi-polar self allowing the fulfillment of any nuclear self. The affective sense of the optimally activated bi-polar self is one of power and goodness. One can imagine a sense of sensual power in the infant as its innate reflexes are asserted, and one can imagine the infant's sense of goodness when world (caretaker) responds. These experiences, Kohut might agree, are the precursors of an adult sense of perceived self-efficacy in relation to living up to a set of values in a life-context. These experiences as seen through the bi-polar self will help us study loss in more detail.

The third accomplishment then, that Kohut achieves with his positioning of self psychology within the domain of tragic man, in addition to acknowledging relational-structural issues and developing the self construct, is to provide the basis for a more detailed study of the nature of loss in life.

Loss is at the core of tragedy and the life of Tragic Man. The metapsychological loss is the loss of possibility in terms of potentials sensed within the nuclear self that are felt to be unsupported by the environment. The generic experiential loss is

the failure and loss of "self cohesion".

Ideally, the unique expression of the individual's genetic makeup is actively recognized as valuable and good. Thus the infant starts to get a positive reflection mirrored back to itself as effectively powerful (The grandiose pole of the bi-polar self) and good (The ideal objects pole of the bi-polar self).

This sense of power and goodness based on the uniqueness of expression of the individual, as it is pulled out by the selfobject experiences with the other is a synergistic object, and the beginnings of an emergent nuclear self. Over time these synergistic object moments cohere, with the development of memory and cognitive processes sometime in the second year of life, Kohut maintains, into a first sense of a "cohesive self". The cohesive self is "...the relatively coherent structure of the normally and healthily functioning self." (Wolff, 1988).

This cohesive feeling of power and goodness is different from the gratification of the drives, Kohut believes, because it is not about satiation but about a personal sense of effectiveness related to the activation of the genetic fund of reflexes and functions that ego psychology is based on. However, the emergent self is not identical with these functions either, the emergent self is the synergistic object one comes to identify with as a personal sense of entity, with a particular kind of configured experience involving self and other, in the expression of these functions. Therefore, with the emergence of patterns of cohesive bi-polar experience felt to be self and selves in this way, distinct types

of loss become identifiable.

Logically then, the first and worst loss to the self of self psychology would occur with the absence of psycho-physical contact, or, selfobject experience, in infancy resulting in the failure to establish a cohesive self. Clearly, there will no pure case in this regard, however the classic observations of Rene Spitz (1946) on the infant reaction to maternal separation can be interpreted as an example of a more or less complete failure in establishing an initially cohesive self. Spitz reported a symptom complex he labelled anaclitic depression, characterized by weight loss, insomnia, unresponsiveness, and frozen expression. He also reported this was reversible in large part, with reunion. An attentive, admiring, and encouraging other seemed necessary in order to pull out the beginnings of a "cohesive nuclear self" based on the experience of adequate synergistic object moments.

For the theory of mourning for the loss of self, a relevantly analogous situation, at any point in development, might be the lack of support in any particular relationship environment for a nascent self that is trying to emerge in place of an established self. If this is a continuous situation to the point that the person gives up hope of actualizing this nascent self, helplessness and depression may naturally occur, and the existing operating self may lack a sense of trueness and consequently vitality. Wolff (1988) labels this condition the "empty self". The earlier and more broad based this lost potential self is, in terms of the combination of genetic abilities and ideals it may have embodied, the more the

person may tend to be dysfunctional and encumbered with symptoms.

Developmentally then, self psychology recognizes a continuum related to the severity and extent of the "loss of cohesion" of the bi-polar self. For example, Kohut uses the degree of self cohesion diagnostically, where he sees borderline disturbances as "...a protracted disturbance of the cohesiveness of the self; and the narcissistic personality disorder as a transient disturbance of the cohesiveness of the self." (Tolpin, 1980). The term "fragmented self" refers to the loss of cohesion generally where it describes (Wolff, 1988):

"...the lessened coherency of the self resulting from faulty selfobject responses or from other regression-producing conditions. Depending on the degree of fragmentation, it can be experienced along a continuum from mildly anxious disconcertedness to the panic of total loss of self structure."

The failure to establish a cohesive self then, and the loss of cohesion of established self configurations is the most central experiential loss of self identified by self psychology.

The loss of self cohesion also demonstrates in new perspective, the operation of the psychic triad of loss, where we have already noted the sense of psychic survival at stake, in the expression of narcissistic rage in the face of failed selfobject support. Kohut (1982) sees the self as invariably resorting to attempts at self-restitution and self-regulation with the failure of any level of self cohesion. In this process he believes symptoms develop, where one might resort to fixation on forms of self-stimulation such as sex, drugs, hypochondriacal concern, eating binges, etc.; in order to stimulate and maintain certain

states of self, in a defensively self-sufficient way, because one has experienced painful disappointments with selfobject responses from others. In short, one tries to generate and maintain their own self-cohesion through the creation of synergistic object moments, contextually irrelevant to the original loss.

Here, the psychic triad of loss is clearly in operation where one can see the tendency towards maintaining self constancy, through forms of psychic clinging to aspects of established self configurations, which may result in developmental fixation.

With loss of self cohesion and fixation of self configurations occurring in degrees, and even in isolation from other self configurations, it becomes possible to look at different experiences of loss within the structure of the bi-polar self itself.

In any given instance of the sense of loss of self cohesion it may be perceived as being related more to one aspect of the bi-polar self than another. In general, the loss of self cohesion brings with it awareness of the source of dysfunction within the bi-polar self. For example, where the ideal objects pole is concerned, the loss one might be most aware of there is the sense of an empathic break with the other. This might range from the everyday anxiousness of moments of awareness where one realizes the other is not listening or understanding, to larger moments of panic and even narcissistic rage over the dawning awareness that the other seems to have no intention of listening to or understanding the felt needs of the self.

In childhood this loss of the responsiveness of the parent or caretaker as selfobject is of course, more potentially damaging in effect. The parent as provider of ideal selfobject responses can be lost through physical absence and emotional unavailability. If this is a gradual process in the course of average expectable developmental disillusionment and loss, a naturalistically adequate mourning process may occur. If however, there are abrupt losses and separations, or too great a loss of the sense of perfection and power of the parent then fixation and self-protective fantasies may occur in order to support a self-image still too fused with the ideal objects pole of the bi-polar self. Shabad (1989) has noted a clinical picture with regressive longings, repetitive acting out, coupled with a vague sense of loss in some adults, that looks like a picture of delayed mourning, but there is no history of object loss. He decides:

"...we might say that the accumulated weight of repeated little deprivations, narcissistic injuries, and "petites" traumata - experienced as loss, but unmourned - weave their way into the fabric of character and its defensive armour. I have chosen to refer to this intangible, subtle sort of loss experience as psychic loss, following Anthony's (1973) use of the term to describe the loss of a parent through psychosis."

Shabad, building on Kohut's work finds it necessary, for reasons similar to those of this thesis, to introduce a term distinguishing a type of intrapsychic loss from object loss *per se*. His point is in reference to the thousands of little traumas that can be experienced in relation to the loss of an ideal pattern of response from the parent as selfobject. Moreover, Shabad suggests that it is difficult to mourn these real psychic losses adequately

because there has been no way to "objectify" the nature of the loss. He (Shabad, 1989) concludes by suggesting that a pattern of restitutional fantasy, with yearning for the ideally responsive parent, tends to develop: "Because mourning is so difficult to bring to some closure, psychic loss is continually reexperienced, like salt rubbed into an open wound...through the development of a recurring cycle of hope and disappointment." Shabad goes on to note a tendency for adults with this process to develop split-off, or, dissociated self configurations, which represent fixated self states defending against further disappointment. Shabad's work supports the theory of mourning for the loss of self in many ways, and demonstrates once again the operation of the psychic triad of loss.

While losses involving empathic breaks with the ideal objects pole of the bi-polar self, can be studied in more detail, so can losses to the pole of the grandiose self.

The grandiose self is the core representation of the healthy pride and positive narcissism of the assertive self; the completely unashamed 'look at me!' experience. It has a sense of personal power and feels imbued with goodness reflected back from the mirroring selfobject. There are three basic ways this can come crashing down.

First, if fused with the ideal selfobject, whether because of an early phase in development or because of a structural need for fusion as an adult with needs for support in stress, personal growth, or creativity; the experience of an empathic break with the

selfobject, as discussed above, will not only set up defensiveness towards the other, it will also negatively impact the grandiose self-image. This will register as a loss and deflation of the grandiose self. The cognitive-affective appraisal may be one of inadequacy, rejection, badness, etc.; but the general thematic appraisal is one involving the unworthiness of the grandiose self. Depending on the context of such a deflation, the grandiose self may not assert itself in a similar direction again, while essentially developing a false self even though the original self may still yearn for actualization; and even develop pathological symptoms as means of coping with such a paralysing blow to the grandiose self. This loss of the proud assertion of a sector of the grandiose self may also be split-off from the rest of the personality. Once again, as in Mahler, this suggests that signs of 'splitting' may be used as a marker for indicating the need to do some form of mourning for the loss of self.

I have noted a frequent occurrence of this type of loss to the grandiose self in latency aged males suffering some degree of father absence; as well as adolescent and later males suffering such a latency aged fixation. There is often a picture of a fear of trying to assert themselves in a direction that feels right, but that is veered away from at all costs. Not uncommonly, I have found under this avoidance a frozen self configuration filled with bitter self condemnations and themes of sour grapes; 'who needs it anyway'. Invariably a representative critical incident surfaces involving crushed pride about an ability felt truly to be something

of a talent. Because the ability has been felt so central to the self, ignoring the wound has been impossible, and risking renewed recognition of it seems too big a gamble, so it is nursed like a tragic flaw. Acknowledging the significance and effect of the original blow allows mourning for what had been lost, and renewed pride in reassertion of the original abilities.

A second way in which loss to the grandiose self can be observed to have significant effect is where an established self configuration fails to perform up to existing levels of functioning. This may be for many reasons, stress, age, real changes in skills, abilities, and ambitions, and so on. However, this is not just the difference between the often compared actual and ideal self-image, this failure of narcissistic performance of the grandiose self has more of an aesthetic quality, in terms of the "experience near" focus of concern in self psychology. It involves, in large degree, the loss of a situationally established synergistic object. There is a sense of losing integrative balance and self-cohesion, leading to compulsive self-doubt of judgement, and shame in front of oneself for daring so much. There is a general crisis of self-confidence which can lead to phobic avoidance.

This loss of the performance self also needs to be directly identified and mourned so that new reality based expectations, and, renewed aesthetic experience can be taken up once again, as a new potential for effective synergistic object moments. Finally, a third loss effecting the grandiose self is useful to acknowledge.

This type of loss relates more to the loss of actual idealized images of self, where there may be comparison with degrees of awareness between ideal and actual images. Moreover, there may be a mixture of superego and ego ideal components in these images of self, which makes it difficult sometimes to identify the loss involved. For example, I have time and again dealt with the guilt of parents who felt that for different reasons they were letting their children down; be it due to divorce, going to work, leaving home, learning of a rape, and so on. In each case the guilt is the prominent affective feature, and attempts to reassure, talk them out of it, reframe, tend to come to nought. However, when I ask them to access the ideal image of themselves as a parent that they feel is lost, and engage in a mourning process for that part of themselves; the effects are often dramatic. Loss of an ideal sense of parental self is accepted and worked through, a more realistic parental self-image is created, energy going into guilt is redirected, and personal growth comes out tragedy.

In summarizing Kohut, then, it must be said that his theory provides major support for the theory of mourning for the loss of self. Not only was it his particular writings that originally shaped my thinking about the concept, but also it must be acknowledged that his theory speaks most loudly for the need for a developed theory of mourning for the loss of self. Although Kohut does not dwell on specific techniques for mourning for the loss of self, with his focus on correcting structural defects through the provision of missing corrective emotional experiences, his theory

suggests that the slow working through of resistances may activate a silent mourning process for the loss of self.

This is based on theoretical developments Kohut puts forward. These include a more experientially based, phenomenologically correct construct of self. Kohut's construct of self is embedded in experience with other people who function synergistically with each other producing different self configurations. Kohut labels these synergistic functions selfobject functions.

Experiential structures created synergistically are "transmuted" into the psychological structure of the bi-polar self. Loss plays a central role in Kohut's self psychology not only because it is part of the tragic nature of life that needed experiences are sometimes unavailable. Equally important, is the fact that loss is the motivation for "transmuting" synergistic object experience into inner self-structure. One internalizes what the other did for us, when they are unavailable to do it. The structure of Kohut's bi-polar self allows us to look at the effects of these different losses in detail.

Most importantly, Kohut postulates that self configurations experience themselves as "absolute", where the concept of entity is more applicable at times than that of psychic structure. The psychic triad of loss is seen to apply in Kohut's theory, where when a self configuration is threatened by a lack of needed selfobject confirmation, there is an urge to maintain self-cohesion, through psychic clinging which can result in developmental fixation. The psychic triad of loss is taken as

evidence of a negentropic form of motivation. Kohut's theory therefore, supports the view of the self configurations of self psychology as negentropic entities motivated by an urge towards either self constancy or closure.

Given such overwhelming support for the existence and therefore the potential for types of loss involving such independent self constructs, distinct from objects and object loss, a theory for mourning for the loss of self seems the necessary and appropriate means to provide the peaceful closure required by these inner 'familiar's'.

Other Relevant Psychoanalytic Approaches

It is useful to briefly mention several other psychoanalytic contributions that support in their individual ways, the utility of mourning for the loss of self.

The observations of numerous authors support the existence of the psychic triad of loss, which is evidence for a negentropic form of motivation, with self constancy as its goal, which then may necessitate mourning for the loss of self as a class of therapeutic event, at some point in the life cycle.

Bender and Schilder (1937) noted the wish for reunion with dead parents in the suicide fantasies of children. Peck (1939) observed the wish for reunion with a dead spouse in suicide attempts of adults. Zilboorg (1937) noted suicides on the anniversary dates of the death of loved ones. Burlingham and Freud

(1943) noted intense wishes and fantasies of reunion related to parental separation. Rochlin (1965) observed attempts at restitution and reunion in children in response to object loss. Wolfenstein (1973) reports fantasies of return in individuals whose parents died in childhood. Bibring (1953) noted the wish for reunion in depression related to loss through death. Colarusso and Nemiroff (1981) note clinging to outworn grandiose images of self and body, as well renewed searching for the idealized spousal image as feature of adult midlife crisis. Kreuger (1989) sees eating disorders as restitutive efforts at maintaining a sense of self with the illusion of the presence of empathic parents (an attempt at self-synergism) when in fact, parents are not emotionally available. Kulish (1989) describes restorational, nostalgic fantasies of remaining a child, in defensive reaction to a childhood filled with multiple losses. She writes:

"...so a childhood which was far from perfect is idealized in such nostalgic fantasies. Clinging to the past, we are afraid to let it go and lose the chance to find happiness. We can bid a happy childhood good-bye without a backward glance; but we cling to our dashed hopes and cover them with nostalgia. Nostalgia is an incomplete form of mourning."

All of these authors can be interpreted as pointing to a negentropic tendency of self configurations towards self constancy and closure in the face of various threats of loss of self. This indicates that mourning processes designed to facilitate the coming to terms with the various losses of self that have occurred, and that at times need to occur, in order to allow development to proceed, may be a necessary class of therapeutic event.

Psychodynamic Approaches

Several relevant psychodynamic writers, who do not pay specific allegiance to psychoanalytic theory, are useful for supporting and suggesting different aspects of the theory of mourning for the loss of self. These will be considered in much briefer form than the psychoanalytic theorists since they are often less philosophically concerned, and more technique driven.

Carl Jung

Jung is an exception to the less philosophically concerned rule. However, his view of what the Self construct is has some important implications for mourning the loss of self.

For Jung (Fordham, 1985) the ego is a component of the transcendent functions of the self. Fordham sees Jung as developing the concept of the self out of this idea of an integrative, psychologically transcendent function. Jung (1916 writes:

"The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living third thing...a movement out of the suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation."

It is interesting to note that this "living third" is a synergistic object, and that as Fordham notes, it is the self in manifest aspect, as some image and symbol of the particular situation of the self at any given time. This leads to the formula

(Fordham, 1985) that "self = ego+archetypes"; where only symbols of the self are knowable through the observing ego, since it is a component of the larger self as transcendent process and function.

Jung makes it clear that the images of the "self" are not the actual self, they are representatives of it. As Fordham (1985) writes:

"They are approximations representing states of relative wholeness which alone are possible, while bits of ego are split off and function as observers."

For the theory of mourning for the loss of self Jung's theory becomes important where he notes that during the first half of life, there is a constant tendency for the ego to try and identify with and possesses the powers and symbols of the self (Weiner, 1989). This struggle can set up effects from over-inflation of the ego where it is too identified with the images of the self; and can also result in the ego feeling cut off from other aspects of the self resulting in depression. In either type of case, an improper relationship with the images of the self can impair ego functioning.

Jung (1939) sees the task of the second half of life as one of moving towards what he calls "individuation" of the personality. This involves the ego giving up its sense dominance in consciousness, and opening oneself more and more to the ordered patterning of the emergent self. Jung saw this process of deepening the human personality in midlife as universal, and the way to a sense spiritual integrity and completeness of the life cycle.

However, in order to do this, ego identifications with earlier images of self may need to be given up; and there may be anxiety and resistance to this process, particularly in cultures that no longer have rituals valuing and recognizing such patterns. At such times, some of the crisis we see in late adolescence and midlife may reflect an urge to deepen the sense of self, yet there is no vision of what one is moving towards internally, so one acts out, or clings more determinedly to an empty role and image of self.

I have several times come across late adolescents who excelled as children and became very identified with the image of themselves as 'the golden child'. Now facing leaving the environments that support that self to such a degree, they are often in a confused sense of panic, knowing they must somehow consolidate a new image of themselves more weather-ready for the demands of college, work, and social-sexual relationships, and so on; but are afraid to give up the sense of self that has become overvalued. At this point, mourning for the loss of the tragic self, the self that fades with its time, often allows letting go, and creates a space in which to practice constructing alternate selves with narcissistic balance; eg., the 'warrior'.

Clearly, Jung's theory of individuation supports the need for a theory for mourning the loss of self.

Eric Berne

Berne, influenced by psychoanalyst Paul Federn's notion of

ego states dropped out of his psychoanalytic training and founded the school of Transactional Analysis. Berne believes that psychological problems and their correction occur within relationships and he developed a model representing the transactions between people that can facilitate and restrain healthy functioning.

The construct of ego state is at the centre of Berne's theory where he defines it as (Weiner, 1989):

"A conscious cohesive system of feelings and thoughts, with a related set of behaviour patterns. Each person's ego states consist of a Child ego state, which represents archaic elements that become fixed in early childhood but remain active through life; an Adult, which objectively appraises reality; and a Parent, an introject of the person's actual parent's values."

Different configurations of these three basic ego states, and transaction between them, Berne sees as determining the quality of interpersonal life. For example, one may be stuck more in one state than another, or, be unable to flexibly alternate between them when needed, due to fixation in early life.

A unique feature of Berne's (1964) theory is the games model he develops to explain how people sometimes dysfunctionally relate to one another, based on past learning, to get their needs met.

A "Transaction" is the stimulus from one person's ego state plus the responding ego state of the other person. In these transactions, "games" can develop as repetitive ways of trying to achieve the hidden agendas of suppressed needs. As well, "scripts" can develop which represent core beliefs about a person's path in life. Berne sees these as based on introjected parental

messages in the child ego state, and believes they can be changed when identified.

Berne's (1961) main method of treatment was based on drawing out the automatic transactions, games, and scripts of people, often in a group setting, which allowed more opportunity for eliciting such. While his theory recognizes the fixation of senses of self in basic ego states, he appears to pay scant attention to more existential reasons for clinging to old states of self, which might illuminate resistances, allowing for deeper more lasting change. As well, his notion of a few basic ego states seems to limit the usefulness of his theory, since it is clear there is a considerable range to the possible complex dynamics of states of self and other.

What is clear though, is that the fixated states of childhood acknowledged by Berne to have so much effect on adulthood, supports once again the utility of developing a technique for mourning for the loss of self as represented in such fixated states.

A currently popular version of ego state therapy similar to that of Berne's, in that it focuses on the continued existence, within the adult, of fixated and damaged child states, is that of Charles Whitfield (1987). His views on "healing the child within" acknowledge the need to finish mourning losses which the child may have been unable to do at the time, much as Shabad (1989) suggests.

Mardi Horowitz

Horowitz (1984, 1987, 1988) has developed over the years a

very sophisticated and comprehensive model of therapy. Ego states, or, "states of mind" remain the central construct in his theory but he goes far beyond Berne in recognizing the complex components of different states of mind, as well as the intricate and dynamic patterning of states of mind.

Originally observing different patterns of stress response and relating this to different personality styles, Horowitz (1987) developed what he calls "configurational analysis" of recurrent states of mind which might be problematic. This analysis begins with large-scale patterns and works down in inclusive fashion to "microanalytic processes".

A "mental state" is composed of three basic levels of organizing structure. First, there is the overt phenomenology of emotional tone, behaviour, and verbal expression visible to the observer. As Horowitz (1987) writes:

"A state...is a recurrent pattern of experience and of behaviour that is both verbal and nonverbal...recognized because of changes in facial expression,...speech, focus and content of verbal report, degree of reflective self-awareness, general arousal,...nature of empathy,...The information that tells the observer, or the subject, that this is a recurrence of a familiar state is not confined to any one system but is a configuration of information in multiple systems."

This configuration corresponds generally, to the conscious aspects of the state as experienced by the person having it. Broad labels such as "crying", "hurt but not working", "competitive", etc.; might be applied to this level of analysis, which also tries to identify the general motivational aim of the state. States at this global level are further described in terms of their stability as either, "undermodulated", "well modulated", or "over modulated".

This resembles Kohut's notion of degrees of "self cohesion".

The next level of analysis of a configured state of mind is that of "role relationship models". Here, Horowitz tries to infer the level of the individual's object relational development by discerning the representations of self and other that are involved in any recurrent state. Role relationship models "...organize the self and object views into models that suggest complementarity in aims and expectations of response."

Horowitz (1987) distinguishes between self-concept, self and object schemas, scripts, agendas, and story lines, and relationship conflicts between them; which are all components of the level of role relationship models. A self-concept is a conscious image of oneself. A self and/or object schema is a view of self and other that is not necessarily conscious, but actively organizes mental states. Scripts, agendas, and story lines are the intentions under the transactions represented by the nature of any role relationship model. Relationship conflicts are any conflicts that might occur because of reality differences between the person's present situation, and the agendas etc. that are holdovers from past states of self.

The third level of analysis of a configured state of mind is that of "information processing styles" and tendencies. This is the level of ego function, cognitive style, thematic idiosyncratic meaning, and core beliefs and attitudes that might help organize a global state of mind; as well as act as triggers for entry and exit from states. Horowitz (1987) writes of this level of analysis:

"Note themes of conflict as constellations of ideas, emotions, and maneuvers of control over modes of representing and communicating thought and feeling. Include wishes, threats, and defenses...Processing, and controlling the processing of this information, will often be the cause of changes from one state to another."

For Horowitz the term "self-organization" refers to the "summation of all a person's self-concepts and schemas at various levels of conscious and unconscious mental processes". While the self-organization represents the potential range of patterning of mental states, it is the self-schema that is critical in generating mental states:

"...we all have multiple views of self, any one of which may be dominant in a situation. When a view, whether positive or negative, is dominant, it serves to organize mental life and to determine how one responds to others."

According to Horowitz personality change is synonymous with the experiencing of new mental states and new patterns of mental states, based on changes in self-schemas, role relationship models, and habits of information processing as their organizing determinants.

In all of this loss is a central agent. As Horowitz (1988) says: "Any loss is a disruption of self-organization...one searches through the repertoire of self-schemas to see which may be the most appropriate organizers for interpreting the new situation.". Moreover, for any change to occur in an existing pattern of mental states some sense of self must be given up, whether completely, or in terms of frequency and context, as a central aspect of a problematic mental state.

While Horowitz accepts the shaping role of loss in effecting

self configurations, and its necessity for change, he does not appear to deal directly with mourning for the loss of particular states of self, as a change mechanism itself. He certainly emphasizes the role of stressful object and developmental losses in forcing the reorganization of self-schemas; but, for Horowitz, awareness is the main change process as one identifies views of self and other in state patterns, and the "triggers", or stimulus features which control them. With this knowledge options increase for actively reducing avoidance and braving new experiences of self and other.

Horowitz's model of configurational analysis is important to the theory of mourning for the loss of self for several reasons. His concept of mental state as a complex self-configuration supports the view put forward here, that one must approach states of self as entities, where the loss of aspects of self is a vital event, that begins to require a mourning process as the price of self change.

Moreover, with Horowitz's detailed articulation of the dynamic components of a state of self, one can see more clearly the interaction of self as agent and self as object. The level of information processing describes acts of self agency, and the level of role relationship models describes views of self as object related to others. As these two aspects of self become clearer it is easier to conceptualize the experience of mourning the loss of self as agency as distinct from mourning the loss of self as object. This illuminates another facet of a model of mourning the

loss of self which will be drawn out in terms of differences between mourning the loss of the performing self and mourning the loss of the object related self.

Moreover, the survival of outmoded states of self and the need to actively respond to stimulus features which control the exit and entry of them, rather than passively or automatically responding to such features, as a means to change, reflects a consistent theme of most ego state theorists. Namely, that there is a close relationship between the experience of the loss of self as agency and the fixation on self as object.

This was implied by Kohut, where the loss of self-cohesion as a descriptor for agency, results in a focus on "breakdown products" such as negative views of self, and regressive attempts at restoring a sense of agency which can produce symptoms such as eating disorders. Also this relationship between the loss of self as agency and the fixation on self as object is supported in the literature on post traumatic stress syndrome, where the failure of ego function under extreme stress causes fixation on negative views of self, and repetitive attempts at undoing (Courtois, 1988). Here we might see the psychic triad of loss functioning in a distinct way under catastrophic conditions.

Horowitz, in fact, identifies several universal themes relating to the reaction to stressful events. These include, fear of repetition, rage over vulnerability, fear of loss of control, and so on. These clearly relate to the loss of agency, which appears to be the aspect of loss Horowitz focuses on in his

original stress response model. Once again, however, he does not deal directly with mourning the loss of self as agency or object, as a change process in and of itself. Perhaps this is because in focusing on the terminology of self-structure and information processing in such detail, Horowitz, as others are prone to do, forgets to imagine the subjective experience of the loss of self, itself.

Finally, Horowitz is important because his configurational analysis offers an empirical method for tracking and verifying change related to the loss of self.

Vamik Volkan

Volkan, while coming from a psychoanalytic perspective, has developed a specific psychodynamic therapy for "established pathological mourners". This is a brief psychotherapy which he calls "Re-grief therapy" (Volkan, 1980). It was designed for people who were observed to be stuck in the stage of mourning referred to as "yearning or searching for the dead" by Bowlby and Parkes (1970); and , the stage of "bargaining" by Kubler-Ross (1969). In the population of cases Volkan addresses this becomes a disorganizing way of life, with the possibility of psychosis and suicide in extreme instances. Volkan (1980) describes the suffering of these people:

"The pathological mourner may experience feelings of guilt, but with him such feelings are transient, since he maintains the unconscious illusion that he can bring the dead to life again (as well as kill him) if he chooses. Intense guilt is

the earmark of depression, which is characterized also by the dominant ego feeling of helplessness. In established pathological grief there is chronic hope - and dread."

Volkan observes an etiological process resulting in pathological mourning. It begins with a form of splitting, different from the good/bad split of childhood. This splitting is a higher level dissociation where "...the ego's denial of the death can coexist with the ego's knowledge that the death has, in fact, occurred." Volkan maintains patients are aware of when such splitting took place. It functions much like the dissociations of post traumatic stress syndromes (Courtois, 1988), in defending against overwhelming anxiety. Second, the introject of the lost remains as a "frozen presence" in the psyche of the bereaved. This perpetuates the yearning/searching thoughts and behaviours of the patient. The final step that Volkan sees in the establishment of pathological mourning is the externalization of the frozen introject, in the form of what Volkan calls "a linking object". This may be any object the patient feels is related to the lost that they can control. Thus "...a locus for the meeting of part of his self-representation with the representation of the dead...an externalization...a projection of self and object-images is crystallized." (Volkan, 1980).

What is interesting here, is the symbolic function of the linking object. It appears to function as a concrete synergistic object representing in external reality, a place where two selves come together, to form a third thing, the sense of symbiotic relationship that existed. When boundaries between self and other

are so blurred, separation will threaten an anxious loss of self.

Volkan's treatment plan goes as follows. First, there are "demarcation exercises", where the patient is helped to distinguish between what is his/hers, and what belongs to the representation of the controlling introject. With some time given to this "affective-dynamic process" of detailing real differences between the self and the lost, and acknowledging reasons why the patient was unable to grieve, the next stage is entered.

At this point, attention is shifted to the linking object, and both therapist and patient discuss reasons it was chosen, meanings condensed onto it, and functions it performs, including the postponement of grieving. Finally, the patient is asked to free associate while looking at or holding the linking object. Invariably, Volkan finds that mourning proceeds properly, in conjunction with the differentiation of self and other, to the point that the linking object is often discarded. In a final phase, any primary process experiences that may have occurred are normalized, avoiding any lingering anxieties about one's sanity.

I have found Volkan's process very useful with adolescents who have suffered losses either through death or separation, where there was a high degree of what Kohut calls "twinship" and "alterego" functioning existing between them. A case dealt with this way will be presented in the next chapter.

Volkan's mourning technique is interesting to the theory of mourning for the loss of self because an essential feature appears to be acknowledgment of the necessity of separating out self-

representations from object-representations in a direct and concrete way. Volkan does not deal with mourning for the loss of self directly; but the activation of such a process is clearly implied as necessary.

Other Relevant Psychodynamic Approaches

While there are innumerable authors who could be considered under the umbrella of psychodynamic and ego state theorists only a few are worth mentioning briefly without becoming redundant.

The Watkin's (1979) developed a therapy which they called 'Ego State Therapy'. Their definition of ego state supports the entity view which takes into account both agency and object aspects of self. An ego state is "...those behaviours, perceptions, and experiences which are bound together by some common principles and separated by a boundary from other such states." For them such ego states dwell like separate personalities within an individual. In this sense they see us all on a continuum in terms of being multiple personalities. When such ego states are in dysfunctional conflict, or outmoded, they must be accessed directly by the therapist and integrated in more positive ways. Again, mourning for the loss of any sense of self in such a process is not acknowledged as a change process in and of itself, but is certainly implied by the degree of resistance such an entity might have to doing away with itself.

Edelstien (1981) has adopted the Watkin's ego state therapy

into a therapy based within a hypnotic framework. His premises are the same as their's but he finds hypnosis greatly facilitates the process of eliciting, engaging, and working with such entities. Edelstien's approach can stand as a generic method of therapists within the influential Ericksonian school, who attempt to work with different discrete states of self.

Finally, Mann (1973) is worth mentioning because his "time-limited therapy" focuses on defining, in an interesting way, a central therapeutic issue. Loss imposed upon the self by the irreversible direction of time is acknowledged with his limiting of therapy to twelve sessions. This he presumes, forces activation of idiosyncratic responses to loss in reference to the clients knowledge that the end of the therapeutic also, is inevitable. Within this framework he identifies a central issue that involves a sense of "chronically endured pain related to a negative image of self". Also, Mann notes of this chronically endured negative self-image, a concomitant sense of victimization, indicating that he is accessing a state where loss of self as agent has fixated an image of self as object. He writes: "Each was continuing to live with something about the self that once was real and, although no longer real, was being sustained as a guiding fiction about the self.".

Clearly, Mann's therapy implies mourning directly for the loss of self as agent and object, but his technique does not acknowledge this as a change process directly.

Cognitive and Developmental Theories

Many cognitive therapies and cognitive-developmental theories focus on changing aspects of self, and acknowledge the impact of loss on shaping self and object schemas. The common target of change in these theories tends to be some form of schema, representing "information processes", "knowledge structures", or even "states of mind", as in Horowitz.

In general, with cognitive and cognitive-developmental theories resting on the notion of change in schema equalling change in personal reality, there is a philosophy of "constructivism" underlying these theories in different forms. The philosophy of constructivism sees reality existing in three levels: The external world, the organisms information processing system, and in knowledge created through human action where there is an active cyclic relationship between knower and known (Dowde and Pace, 1989). As Dowd and Pace say, "To know the world is to act upon it.". In this sense, knowing is a synergistic experience between the organism and the environment which produces knowledge structures or schemas in the popular term.

Here, the dual aspects of self clearly stand out. Self as knowing agency is the experience of being in present creative contact with what is other. Self as object, and the objects of knowledge generally, are the reflexively abstracted products of such experience.

As long as experience and existing objectified structures of knowledge match with little discrepancy the organism will 'assimilate, understand, behave, project', in terms of the range

and limits of these existing structures. If confusion and ineffectiveness become tolerably frustrating because experience is no longer adequately mapped by existing structures, the organism will 'accommodate, reorganize, change, create', new objects of knowledge. If confusion and ineffectiveness are overwhelming, the organism may emit 'perseverated, centrated, fixated', responses as it clings in desperation to familiar objects of knowledge as the only known sources of security. Here again, we can see the operation of the psychic triad of loss where the need for some sense of self-constancy results in clinging to the objects of knowledge which can result in arrested development.

When the constructivist view of self as knowing and known knowledge systems is considered in an interpersonal and developmental context it becomes the central integrating approach for understanding the theory of mourning for the loss of self. This approach supports and integrates Kohut's view of selfobject function, and Mahler's view of the recursive function of symbiotic experience in the separation-individuation process; as well as Jacobson's and Kernberg's notion of self and object representational units, and Horowitz's role relationship models.

The central integrating concept in Guidano's cognitive-developmental approach is that of "attachment models" (Guidano and Liotti, 1983; Guidano, 1987). Guidano's approach is the most comprehensive in differentiating and integrating cognitive and affective themes; and also subsumes the work of Bowlby and other attachment theorists. Therefore, he will be the focus of this

section on cognitive and developmental approaches. The supporting approaches of Kegan (1983) will also be considered. As well, other cognitive and developmental theories be dealt with briefly, including cross-cultural concerns, representing dramatic challenges to the ability of knowledge structures about self and world constructed in one environment, to adapt to a new environment. Finally, supportive studies of mental imagery will also be briefly cited.

Vittorio Guidano

Guidano (1987) has offered a significant cognitive-developmental approach to human nature, psychopathology and therapy. It focuses on the complex structure of the self in a constructivist sense. Guidano sees his approach as based on what he calls "evolutionary epistemology" and the "epistemology of complexity". He makes it clear that these approaches, based on recent developments in natural sciences, are in direct opposition to associationist and behaviourist models of mind. He writes that according to the perspective of the epistemology of complexity:

"The ordering of reality is an inherent principle of the dynamics of life itself and therefore assumes growing forms of complexity as it proceeds along the evolutionary scale...In this context, complexity does not mean "complication"...On the contrary, to consider living organisms in terms of complexity means to emphasize from the very start their self-determination and self-organization."

What Guidano is emphasizing, although he does not use the word, is the primacy of a negentropic principle within the trend of

evolutionary development towards more complex forms of life systems. Complexity, in his sense, is the natural and progressive development of knowing systems towards more self-regulation and degrees of autonomy. What he sees as a newly recognized phylogenetic principle in nature, he wants to apply as an ontogenic principle in individual development. This follows Haeckel's nineteenth century dictum that "ontogeny repeats phylogeny".

Moreover, Guidano finds the notion classical physics holds of the principles of thermodynamics, as they have been applied to psychology, as essentially guilty in having distracted us from the obvious fact of individuals growing more complex through the lifespan. Entropy, and perhaps the spectre of human death, where the belief "...that a physical system left to itself, in time faces growing disorder and disintegration", have perhaps prevented the development of psychological models of negentropic growth.

It is interesting to remember at this point, the struggle within psychoanalysis to account for clearly negentropic observations such as self, self-constancy, relational-structural development, etc., while being based on principles of classical physics. As Guidano writes:

"In the last 15 years, the development of irreversible thermodynamics of self-organizing units has provided support for an alternative conception of physical and biological systems...the key property underlying autonomy of any form of self-organization resides in a systems ability to turn into self-referent order...its own incongruities and contradictions, growth and development."

Self-reflexivity and its produced senses of self become the keystone to understanding human development. The main evolutionary

function of the "self" is to bind time, in the sense that the organism can remove itself from the immediacy of experience, and therefore choose, more effective adaptive responses.

The comprehensiveness of Guidano's model of human development includes consideration of neurophysiological substrates. For our needs, these are considered in terms of how they effect self and its negentropic development. Guidano sees two basic levels of knowing. The "tacit level" is that level which includes wired in physiological schemata which pre-order perception and experience. These pre-wired schemata are preconscious and unconscious and so are largely inaccessible to change (Drug and hypnosis effects etc. are possible exceptions). However, the products of tacit knowing can be conscious. The "explicit level" is that level which includes consciously available representations of experience, such as self-concepts, beliefs, theories, etc. However, neural substrates that make explicit knowing possible may be unconscious.

In effect, Guidano sees differentiation in brain hemispheres as underlying the differences in tacit and explicit knowing. Most important for us in this regard, are different types of conscious experience related to tacit and explicit knowing, based on the different types of neural processing. These Guidano calls "holographic" and "analytical" modes of processing, where the products of tacit knowing are holographic, and, the products of explicit knowing are analytical.

In this sense, mental imagery is the more ancient mode of conscious knowledge, and hypothetico-deductive reasoning the more

recent. Guidano notes a salient feature of holographic knowing:

"Another characteristic quality of information processing by holography is that once an image is reconstructed, it leaps out into a space away from the storage medium...The holographic "stereo effect", besides explaining the powerfulness and vividness of mental images, is also at present the most plausible explanation of the way consciousness of self is typically experienced. For each one of us, the holistic felt identity stands out in a sort of kinaesthetic point of reference, regulating and coordinating our conscious procedures of thought representations."

This is a key point for the theory of mourning for the loss of self because such holographic knowing is clearly the central mode of experience at issue in the problematic ego states, and self and object representations of psychoanalytic theories, that we have looked at as the phenomenal aspects of self that are impacted by loss.

In fact, Guidano and Liotti (1983) designate a particular kind of schemata as the mechanism of encoding this tacit, holographic, or, analogical type of experience. They borrow Leventhal's (1979) concept of "emotional schemata":

"This mechanism would be a relatively concrete memory of an analogical type, made up of images that include "key perceptual features of emotion-eliciting situations", representations of expressive patterns and of the motor and visceral reactions that accompany those situations...these emotional schemata...can be retrieved through imaginative procedures: They make up "real Feeling Memories"."

These emotional schemata may be seen as the specific type of schemata most relevant to the theory of mourning for the loss of self. The several functions of this type of schemata are noted by Guidano and Liotti. First, they provide and limit the range of reactive responses to emotionally meaningful stimuli. Second, they are the basis of directing selective attention and the

encoding of immediate emotional situations. Third, they can be progressively elaborated in terms of new experience, in directions that either confirm or differentiate them. Fourth, they are fundamental in giving emotional experience its "personal singleness", and in shaping the structure of tacit self-knowledge.

In many ways, this construct confirms and repeats the views of relational-structural object relations theory. This is because these emotional schemata are laid down exclusively within attachment relationships, in fact, they are the products of patterns of attachment in childhood. The connecting process between emotional schemata and early interpersonal relations is that one variously known as the "looking-glass self" (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934); the needed "mirroring" by selfobjects of Kohut, and, the symbiotic experience of Mahler. The common process is the one where "...any self-knowledge has its foundation in the presence of, and interaction with, others." (Guidano, 1987). In this way, the critical point becomes the fact that patterns of attachment become patterns of self-perception. Guidano sums up the significance of this process:

"In other words, the gradual attainment of a sense of identity and personal agency requires a stable interpersonal context throughout development. Thus, attachment processes and self-organizing abilities are integrally interwoven; the progressive development of familial patterns of attachment represents the key decoding context that provides focus and direction to the child's unfolding cognitive-emotional abilities."

Thus, early individual patterns of self and other experience become individual emotional schemata, on the tacit level, that organize the perception of self and other, on the explicit level in

subsequent life stages.

What is significant here is that Guidano posits two basic levels of self knowledge with an active relationship between them. The tacit level of self-knowledge develops out of numerous early instances of "nuclear scenes". These are emotionally intense experiences that, with repetition, coalesce into "criterion images" as central features of an emotional schema which set boundaries to senses of self and other. Then, as cognitive abilities develop, explicit self-images are adaptive products of the dynamic interaction between present experience and the templates of emotional perception of self and other laid down in emotional schemata. Clearly, change is implied as necessary on the two levels of self-knowledge, with change on the tacit level being the most important, while effecting lasting change through work with explicit self-images alone, becomes at best surface adjustment. This also implies two levels of mourning for the loss of self. Mourning the loss of the characterological self may need to be seen as dealing with two types of characterological self: The level of tacit character, and the level of explicit character. Dealing with both levels are implied as necessary stages in mourning for the loss of self as a change process.

Another important feature of Guidano's model is the motivational notion of "system coherency" and the light this throws on resistance, self-constancy, and its relation to the necessity of mourning both levels of a problematic sense of self. Again, the premise of evolutionary epistemology is that organisms are

inherently self-regulating and self-maintaining. As such, Guidano labels the dynamic self-system, as a whole, the "personal cognitive system". He makes it clear that this is not the level of "entity", but rather, the level of "integration of disequilibriums". That is, this supraordinate level is the level of the system of dynamic processes whose essential function is to maintain a sense of system coherency. The level of entity is the level of tacit emotional schemata which are the nuclear components around which the larger system tries to maintain a sense of coherency, and the level of explicit ego states that develop in the process of maintaining whole system coherency. All through the line of developmental time, the first goal of system coherency is to stabilize a sense of self as the basis for effective connection with the world. Therefore, Guidano concludes in regard to the relationship between change processes and constancy processes:

"While maintenance processes are continuous, change processes are continuous only as challenges or possibilities, but are discontinuous in their occurrence."

What this amounts to saying is that the system as a whole is designed, at all costs, to make reality adapt to any problematic emotional schemata. The explicit self-images and "scripts" encode reality in the direction of maintaining a sense of coherency with tacit nuclear scenes. This is extremely adaptive assuming 'good enough' attachment patterns; however, it is the bane of daily clinical experience if there have been problematic and dysfunctional attachment patterns.

Given enough developmental time with difficult, or even

traumatic "nuclear attachment scenes", the child may develop an adaptively explicit self-image as say, 'detached victim', 'unloved but productive', 'justified bully', and so on. These explicit self-images, and the "scripts" and other conceptual rules that make up the cognitive processes that go with them, are based on the tacit criterion images of emotional schemata developed out of the nuclear scenes, and may be largely unconscious. The explicit self-images are adaptive and reality based in the sense that they provide predictive patterns within the quality of the real attachment relationships, securing self-constancy at some level of tolerable experience. Because they are tacitly based and explicitly adaptive in this sense, people will tend to maintain the tacit emotional schemata, through accommodation of the explicit self-images only. In this way, when there are challenges to a functional stance, the 'detached victim' might become the 'self-righteous victim', the 'unloved but productive' person might become the 'resentful, isolated workaholic'; and the 'justified bully' might become the 'intolerant father'. There is change and development, but change as variations on the unchanged deep-ordering structures of tacit emotional schemata. As Fritz Perls is famous for saying, 'People come to therapy not to change, but to get better at their problems'. Change on one level occurs in the service of self-constancy on another. This negentropic concept of resistance allows us to understand how a person can dramatically accept loss on the explicit level, through suicide for example, when such an act is seen as functioning to prevent the loss of a

sense of self on a deeper tacit level. In some sense, this is a restatement of the psychoanalytic concept of compromise formation where the shape of symptoms and ego is the product of compromises between impulses of drive, superego sanctions, and the demands of reality. In Guidano's model, the explicit level of self is a compromise formation between the boundaries of tacit experience, the need for system coherency, developmental level of cognitive processes, and the demands of disequilibrating experiences.

Guidano also acknowledges the multiplicity of selves in the term "disunity of consciousness". This process is similar to that of ego state theorists where, with enough stress, tacit and explicit modes of knowing disassociate. One is left with fixated states of analogical self knowledge, separated from the integrating processes of explicit cognitive processes. Both a cause and result of this situation is the sense of loss of self as agency.

For Guidano, change only really becomes possible in adolescence with the maturing of a full set of explicit cognitive processes. The central generic change process past this developmental point is the use of explicit modes of knowing with which to become aware of, and modify tacit knowledge. The therapist's job (Guidano and Liotti, 1983):

"...consists of guiding patients toward a full and explicit acknowledgement of their own previous knowledge and of its internal contradictions, paradoxes, and pitfalls. Emotional and behavioral disorders appear as a manifestation of those contradictions, paradoxes, and pitfalls, revealed by a world that no longer complies with them."

Psychotherapy then becomes much more of a necessarily strategic procedure where, based on the uniqueness of a client's

knowledge structure, tactical changes are implemented step by step, towards the goal of changing the deep-ordering structures of tacit knowing.

For Guidano, self is the central theoretical construct. Loss and mourning applied to the self are implied as central events in development, particularly within the formative patterns of attachment. However, they are not dealt with directly in any sense, as specific change processes leading to the goal of changing tacit knowledge. This seems to be so because Guidano is focused on making the case for the 'systemic process' of self-knowledge, and de-emphasizes phenomenological contact with the experience of entities; even though such existential states are acknowledged as the dynamic core of his model. The conceptual comprehensiveness, and terminological style of Guidano's theory, as with many cognitive theorists, tends to obscure some of the experience which is the very subject he is dealing with.

Clearly, however, Guidano's theory is central to the theory of mourning for the loss of self. He points out two levels and two forms in which mourning the loss of self needs to be dealt with: The tacit and the explicit forms of self as object and self as agency.

Robert Kegan

Kegan (1982) has offered a neo-piagetian "constructive-developmental" model of human personality growth, that takes the

progression of "meaning-making" as its focus. The "zone of mediation", as Kegan calls it, where meaning-making takes place, is the self. The self, in similar fashion as Guidano, is the "meaning-making system".

Kegan, as does Guidano, sees the process of meaning-making as supraordinate to the products. He states, "There is a basic unity to personality, a unity best understood as process rather than an entity.". However, Kegan notes that there are two themes in dialectical interaction in the meaning-making process. The first is the constructive-developmental process viewed and described, in objective, abstract terminology, from the "outside" as in the work of Piaget. However, he writes:

"...this constructive-developmental perspective has taken no interest whatever in the equally important, but quite different, side of the same activity - the way the activity is experienced by a dynamically maintained "self", ...the struggle to make meaning,...to protect meaning,...to lose meaning, and to lose the "self" along the way...From the point of view of the "self", then, what is at stake in preserving any given balance is the ultimate question of whether the "self" shall continue to be, a naturally ontological question."

Here, Kegan is describing the core concept of the theory of mourning for the loss of self. He is directly acknowledging that the awareness of the loss of different psychological selves is a critical experiential event; and that this has been overlooked in cognitive theories.

The second theme Kegan sees as the solution to this oversight is the notion of "subject-object balances" within social development itself; that is development as experienced from an immanent centre within the individual. This is a personal view of

development, where the individual's subjective "struggle to make-meaning" is taken as important as the objectively viewed structure of any meaning made.

In this way, the constant dialectic of constructive-development is in the movement from subjective ways of being to objective views of self and world, which in turn become the basis for a new level of subjectivity. Kegan Writes:

"...a process by which something becomes less subjective, or moves from subject to object,...is just...that process...intrinsically related to adaptation...Growth always involves a process of differentiation, of emergence from embeddedness, thus creating out of the former subject a new object to be taken by the new subjectivity. This movement involves what Piaget calls, "decentration", the loss of an old centre, and what we might call "recentration", the recovery of a new centre." (*Italics mine*).

The notion of "embeddedness" in a subjective way of being can be seen as comparable to Guidano's level of the "explicit" functioning. Here, the shape of a subjectivity is a synergistic object located between the functioning of developmentally appropriate schemata and the points of contact with the world. Moving from being the actions, perceptions, etc., to having them, transforms self as agency to self as object. A new level of self as agency is synergistically created where "...that which "does" the mediating constitutes a new subjectivity".

Most importantly, for the theory of mourning for the loss of self, Kegan sees the "loss of an old centre" as an inevitable experience which, in every developmental step, is subjectively experienced to some degree, as a loss of self. This is emphasized where he relates emotional experience to the constant motion of the

shifting dialectic between subject and object, which constructs self and world:

"...we are this activity and we experience it. Affect is essentially phenomenological, the felt experience of a motion (hence, "e-motion"). In identifying evolutionary activity as the ground of personality I am suggesting that the source of our emotions is the phenomenological experience of evolving - of defending, surrendering, and reconstructing a centre... which from the point of view of the developing organism amounts to the loss of its very organization." (*Italics Mine*).

This powerful statement is made on the basis of Kegan's belief in the existential reality of the constructive-developmental model. He is in effect, putting loss and the affects of loss, anxiety and depression, at the motivational centre of human development. In a real sense, entropy (loss) and negentropy (construction) are bedrock human principles, whose synergistic object is the protean self!

Kegan is clear that object loss must imply self loss, particularly early in life, when self and object differentiation is low, and also, in relationships and transitional phases of relationships, that are in large part symbiotic. This supports and is supported by Kohut's concept of the function of selfobject experience, and the tendency towards anxious narcissistic concern when such experience fails. This also supports the concept of the psychic triad of loss, where psychic clinging to aspects of the extant self in the face of traumatic loss, to preserve a degree of self-constancy, can result in developmental arrest. For, while change and loss are constants in the centre of development, it optimally occurs within the tolerable adaptive range of the person. If not, then perseverated centrations may occur, as

emergency attempts at self-constancy and the dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity may have to operate unevenly around these losses of different types of self. Or in Kegan's words, "subject-object balances" may be difficult to bring together again in future development. In fact, it may be comfortable trust in the sense of the motion of growth itself, that is part of what is lost in traumatic relationships, resulting in the person preferring small, safe, and constant places in parts of their personality development, as suggested in the notion of resistance as the "briar patch syndrome". These safe places in the self then require their own mourning, if the person decides to risk and grow again, as will be discussed in mourning the loss of levels of the traumatic self.

Kegan suggests an interesting possibility in regard to the relationships between loss, anger, and depression. The Freudian formula of anger at the lost being turned against the self out of guilty superego restrictions, as a component of depression related to object loss has been a dominant explanation. What Kegan suggests is that anger at the self is an adaptive, distancing, decentering response, where the task of "...taking the old equilibrium as "object" in the new balance, is often affectively a matter of anger and repudiation". Kegan writes:

"Emergence from embeddedness involves a kind of repudiation, an evolutionary re-cognition that what before was me is not-me...Could (for example) the "terrible twos" with their rampant negativism and declarations of "No!" be a communication to the old self, now gradually becoming object?"

In this constructivist view, anger at the old self comes from adaptive mechanisms which say 'you must go and allow something new

to be, your context is past'; as well as saying no to others who insist on responding to the old self instead of the new self. In this view, mourning for the loss of self is demanded as a continually required change process.

Kegan's model of development directly supports the view of mourning for the loss of self as a class of therapeutic event and necessary change process in specific contexts. Kegan himself constructs a developmental line of stages of the self, based on Piagetian demarcations in cognitive development. These however, are general in terms of each stage being seen as a wide "culture of embeddedness" with a more or less even distribution of attributes specific to each stage. This is not my experience of myself or of my clients. My experience is of varied peaks and valleys, in different areas of personality, reflecting individual patterns of developmental asynchronies. Each asynchrony, I believe, has underneath, its own centralized entity tacitly influencing current development and explicit functioning. In my view, differential development in different "sectors of the personality", in Kohut's phrase, reflects the reality of the potential for multiple selves, and the tendency to "disunity of consciousness", in Guidano's phrase, in reaction to the experience of psychically unmanageable losses. In my view, the functioning of the psychic triad of loss is the mechanism of developmental asynchronies. This will be developed in the next chapter.

For Kegan, change comes about through the "re-cognition" and "re-knowing" of the individual's style of "meaning-making". He

suggests the term "natural therapy" for the many naturally occurring instances in relationships that provide this kind of constructive feedback to individuals as development occurs through life.

While loss is so central to Kegan's model, including the loss of self in the continual dialectic of subject-object balances, he strangely does not focus on mourning the loss of self in any direct detail. This appears to be the case because for Kegan, as for Guidano, the process of meaning-making, the activity of meaning-making, is the emphasized focus. In the words of Kegan, he sees himself as championing a developmental advance in psychological epistemology that is described unequivocally as a shift, "...from entity to process, from static to dynamic, from dichotomous to dialectical.".

I want to suggest that this real contribution to psychological epistemology has functioned in a similar way that early Freudian theory did. Namely, in the same manner in which Freudian theory overfocused on the object and loss of the object, because of its basis in Newtonian physics; cognitive-developmentalism has tended to overfocus on self as agency and loss of the activity of construction itself, because of its basis in the activity of constructivism. The notion of "process" is no less prone to reification than "ego", "self", "object relations unit", and so on. Kegan, as quoted earlier, equates process with unity, "There is a basic unity to personality, a unity best understood as a process rather than an entity." . I suggest there is a unity, in this

sense, in the fluid life of the synergistic object, that explicit shape of a subjectivity located between schemata and current points of contact with the world. But, I also suggest, that there is an even greater sense of experienced unity in the images of self as object, object selves that function as entities in their potential for felt reality and reactivation, object selves that self as agent can be differentially aware of, protective of, and in control of. In short, I believe that while Kegan, perhaps more than any other theorist, acknowledges the central reality of the loss of self, and therefore implies the necessity of the need for mourning the loss of self, this change process is not developed in his theory because of an overemphasis on self as agent.

Clearly, however, Kegan underlines the significance of dealing with the loss of self as agent; and where self as agent is reflected upon as having an explicit identity; the significance of dealing with the loss of self as synergistic object; as a facet of the theory of mourning for the loss of self.

Other Relevant Cognitive and Developmental Approaches

Budman and Gurman (1988) developed a model of brief therapy that includes losses as one of five focal themes that should be assessed in every therapy.

What is significant for the theory of mourning for the loss of self is their categorization of losses into interpersonal and "existential" types. Interpersonal losses refer to those effected

through object and developmental loss where objects and self as object are the referents. Existential losses refer to "...loses regarding ideas or beliefs about oneself or one's world." (Budman and Gurman, 1988). Such losses include assumptions of, invulnerability, meaningfulness, and expectations of positive self-regard and self-efficacy.

The division of interpersonal and existential losses once again allows us to consider the loss of self in terms of both of the self's two most common definitions: Self as sense of executive agency, and self as some form of objectified representation. Clearly, the concept of mental state as defined by Horowitz includes both definitions, as does Kohut's complex self where loss of self-cohesion is synonymous with loss of degrees of agency, as well as the theoretical notions of "system coherence" in Guidano and Kegan.

What stands out in Budman and Gurman's views on cognitions springing from existential losses is the direct relationship between loss of agency and negative views of self as object. This is reflected in their stated therapeutic goal when dealing with losses where the client is helped to go "...through the transformation from being a victim to being a survivor.". The sense of passive, helpless victim, in the face of the loss of agency, is transformed into a sense of active, coping survivor.

In fact it seems to be the implied, if not stated position of all ego state and cognitive-developmental theorists, that where there is a sense of loss of self as agency, there occurs a degree

of fixation on self as object. This is supported by Meichenbaum and Butler (1981) who have suggested that an invariant cognitive response to stress across individuals is "negative self-ideation". This demonstrates that to the extent that stress impairs executive ego functions, and there is a loss of self as agency, an invariant response is some degree of fixation on self as object. Budman and Gurman add to this view.

A particularly practical and dramatic area in which to consider mourning for the loss of self is that of cross-cultural counselling. A self constructed and supported in specific ways in one environment is transposed to a different one where, because of the loss of the 'embeddedness' of the synergistic self in the familiar, there can be a painful "...awareness of self as an object of social attention and evaluation." (Ishiyama, 1989). Ishiyama has developed as "self-validation model" that explains the nature of cross-cultural adjustment difficulties by identifying five sources of validation in which loss can occur.

These are first, "security, comfort, and support". This refers to who and what in a social context contributes to personal nurturance and safety; the way in which dependency needs are supported.

The second is, "self-worth and self-acceptance". This refers to who and what mirrors the valued abilities and uniqueness of an individual in a social context.

Third is, "competence and autonomy". This refers to how unique abilities and aspects of an individual can be fitted to a

social context so that they can generate recognition and validation. For example, if one is a recognized doctor in one social context and is rejected as such in another, a whole array of self aspects as both agency and object in terms of skills and roles, face possible extinction.

Fourth is, "identity and belonging". This refers to the dominant ways in which a person might define themselves. For example, Ishiyama points out that different cultures have differentially valued core motifs as ways of achieving identity and belonging in a society. For Asians a central theme around which earned identity is spun is the familial self, whereas for Canadians, valued identity might be more heavily based on the status associated with roles or lifestyle. These largely, tacit differences in valued identity themes, translate into the type of reference group one explicitly feels a sense of belonging with. Moving across cultures can put the internalized themes of such social identity, which shape views of self as object, in conflict with the new context.

Last is, "love, fulfillment, and meaning in life". This refers to a "holistic dimension" that "concerns the quality of life". This dimension of self-validation appears to be an emergent product of the other four. Therefore, the loss of self-validation in the other four dimensions due to cross-cultural moves, can lead to types of existential depression and isolation. It is interesting to view this level of loss of self-validation in Ishiyama's model, as comparable to the notion of loss of "system

coherency" is Guidano's model.

In summary, what this model of the loss of types of self-validation in cross-cultural moves supports, is the reality of the need to mourn the loss of self both as agent and object, and on explicit and tacit levels.

Finally, in this section on cognitive and developmental views relevant to mourning the loss of self, it is appropriate to briefly include approaches that focus on dealing with mental imagery directly. This relevance stems directly from the notion of self as object, which usually implies some form of imaginal representation. This is the case in Guidano's definition of tacit, holographic knowing as imaginal; the long literature of psychoanalysis that focuses on self and object images; and Horowitz's images of self and other in role relationship models. Clearly, working with the loss of self as object in any sense will involve direct transformation of the mental imagery of self as object.

The literature addressing the visualization and use of mental imagery for therapeutic purposes is quite extensive. Sheikh and Jordan (1983) describe the therapeutic uses of imagery, as does Horowitz (1970) in a work focusing solely on image formation and cognition. Ahsen (1977) reports on "Eidetic Therapy" where concrete mental images are accessed and mentally manipulated to produce psychological change. Morrison (1978) suggests an approach to successful grieving through the use of mental imagery to produce changes in personal constructs from a Kellyian point of view. The technique involves imaginal reconstruction of death related scenes

which allows catharsis, while accessing of neglected information in the images can facilitate changes in personal constructs such as one's role in the family.

Horowitz's work is particularly interesting in that he discusses the formation and dynamics of traumatic images. This supports the view, once again, that where stress results in the traumatic loss of self as agency, fixation on images of self as object naturally occur. These can then function tacitly, as independent units of self, or entities, under activating or eliciting conditions. Based on Bruner's (1964) categorization of information processing systems, Horowitz also designates three modes of representation of thought, the "enactive, imaginal, and lexical". In order of appearance in developmental time the enactive corresponds to the sensorimotor stage of cognitive development in Piaget's model. The imaginal refers to the tacit, holographic way of knowing in Guidano's model; and the lexical to the sequential and analytical ordering of actions and representations of reality. In adult life all three ways of knowing tend to be coordinated in most behaviour. In fact, enactive knowing, or coordinated behavioral performance in adults, may be the expression of the most intense level of integration of the three modes of thought. This would explain the power of role-playing and psychodrama, in making explicit, tacit images, which facilitates new integrations of the three modes of thought.

Approaches involving the direct use of mental imagery support the significance of identifying, amplifying and transforming

concrete self-images, which becomes an important aspect of the technique of mourning for the loss of self.

Experiential Approaches

Experiential psychotherapy designates a group of therapies who share the commonality of putting experience before abstraction, and persons before theories. In this regard they are phenomenological and based in existential-humanistic philosophies.

Several thinkers in this tradition stand out. Whitaker (1969) in family therapy, Perls (1969) in Gestalt therapy, Moreno (1946) in Psychodrama, Rogers (1984) in Client-Centred therapy, Gendlin (1978) and Mahrer (1986) in therapies specifically labelled Experiential. In all of these approaches valuing the phenomenology of self manifestation in the "here and now" tends to be the basic stance towards the client, while the therapist provides conditions, sets the stage, encounters and guides the client within the phenomenal parameters and terms of their own experience.

For purposes relevant to the theory of mourning for the loss of self, Rogers, Mahrer, and Moreno will be considered here. They are chosen because I believe that taken together, they are representative of a range of technique applicable to mourning for the loss of self, corresponding roughly, to lexical, imaginal, and enactive ways of knowing.

Rogers widely known theory is based on a phenomenology of self that acknowledges both self as agent with the central construct of "self-actualization"; and self as object with the equally central construct of "self-concept".

The notion of self-actualization asserts that people have an inherent capacity to unfold their unique abilities in ways best known to themselves. Individuals are seen as the agents of their own best destiny. In this sense, the ideal goal of the individual is to feel free to express the 'true self' with as little distortion as possible. To the degree that this is the case the individual is a "fully functioning person" which Rogers describes as (1963):

"...able to experience all of his feelings, and is afraid of none of his feelings. He is his own sifter of evidence, but is open to evidence from all sources; he is completely engaged in the process of being and becoming himself, and thus discovers that he is soundly and realistically social...He is a fully functioning organism, and because of the awareness of himself which flows freely in and through his experiences, he is a fully functioning person."

Clearly, this process view of self, emphasizes security in ownership of the sense of self as agency, as central to the healthy development of the individual. In fact, it is the loss of this sense of ownership of self as agency, where "conditional acceptance" leads the true self to abandon felt strivings for self-actualization, that the pathology of inauthenticity arises.

As Rogers and Sanford (1989) write:

"Innumerable environmental circumstances can prevent the human organism from moving in actualizing directions. The elements that surround it - physical and psychological - can mean that the actualizing tendency is stunted or stopped altogether."

Clearly, loss of the experience of self as active agent in the processes of actualization is acknowledged by Rogers as a central factor in psychological malaise.

The notion of "self-concept" is also central to Rodgers view of human functioning. He defines it as (Rogers and Sanford, 1989):

"...an organized, consistent conceptual gestalt composed of the perceptions of the "me" or the "I" and the perceptions of the relationship of this "I" to the outside world and to others...It is a fluid changing gestalt, but at any given moment it is an entity...It is available to awareness but not necessarily in awareness. It is a constant referent for the person, who acts in terms of it."

Self as object is clearly acknowledged here. Also, the notion of explicit and tacit self-schemata is implied, in terms of action being shaped by conscious and unconscious self-concepts. As well, the notion of multiple entities is implied, in terms of specific views of self and other, available within the domain of the self-concept.

In fact, Rogers may be seen as offering support for the functioning of the psychic triad of loss. Loss of the necessary conditions for the actualizing tendency seems to result in not only a loss of self as agency, but also in degrees of fixation on self as object, in terms of different self-concepts. Rogers (1989) term "incongruence", which is synonymous for psychological dysfunction, refers to:

"...discrepancy that can arise between the experiencing of the organism and the concept of self...When there is a high degree of incongruence, the actualizing tendency acquires a confused or bifurcated role. The self-concept becomes supported by this tendency as the person struggles to enhance the picture he has of himself, and yet the organism is also

striving to meet its needs, which may be quite at odds with the...self-concept."

The self as object is seen by Rogers as the construct that is most changed by effective therapy, which aims at restoring the necessary conditions for the reactivation of the actualizing principle. In studies on change in the self-concept Rogers and Sanford (1989) report that it is the sense of actual self at the beginning of therapy that is changed the most, while the "ideal self" changes the least. This seems to imply that fixated aspects of the object self are, if you will, dissolved, in the reinstitution of empathy, positive regard, and genuineness; allowing self as agent to resume moving towards its natural goals, symbolized as the ideal self. In fact, the notion of "experiencing" in terms of the "experience of a visceral shift", as the "most important element of change in therapy", might be considered as a shift out of a hindering sense of self as object, into a regained sense of self as agent. This seems to be implied in the observed outcome of successful therapy where "The concept of self becomes both more congruent with immediate experiencings, and also more fluid and changing." (Rogers and Sanford, 1989).

Rogers method does not acknowledge mourning for the loss of self in any way. However, it seems apparent that giving up both explicit and tacit self-concepts, the necessity of doing this for healthy functioning, as well as acknowledging the loss of self as agency, is a central part of Rogers method. In fact, I might suggest that the therapeutic reinstatement of the necessary conditions for the functioning of the actualizing tendency, allows

the spontaneous occurrence of a natural process of mourning for the loss of self. As Rogers (1989) has repeatedly noted, as the process of therapy increasingly gives the client the feelings of safety, being valued, and nonjudgementally supported, the client begins to naturally deal more with the "incongruence between what is immediately in experience and the client's concept of self." And, it is this concept of self as object that is the thing most let go of, in what is perhaps essentially, a grieving process.

It is interesting here, to think of Roger's provision of facilitating conditions, as the reinstitution of a recursively necessary synergistic object; similar to Mahler's symbiosis, Kohut's selfobject experience, and Kegan's natural therapy. The purpose of this recursively necessary synergistic object would be to provide holding and mirroring functions, while the person restructures a limiting sense of self as object, permitting new freedom for self as agent.

In these ways, Rogers client-centred therapy supports the theory of mourning for the loss of self.

Alvin Mahrer

Mahrer (1986) has developed a theory of therapy he specifically calls "experiential therapy". Based in phenomenology and existential-humanistic philosophies, it places "therapeutic experiencing" at the heart of change. The duration of therapy can be both short-term and long-term, with every session seen as an

opportunity for profound change. It can focus on surface adjustments, or, explicit functioning, and it can reach tacit levels and produce the most "deep-seated changes".

In terms of therapeutic method, and tone of therapeutic language, Mahrer's experiential therapy most resembles the way that I work with mourning for the loss of self. However, there are still many differences. Most notably, Mahrer's technique involves both client and patient having their eyes closed and feet up throughout the session. This is not a requirement in mourning for the loss of self. Also, Mahrer does not specifically focus on mourning the loss of self as a therapeutic theme, since he has a four step process which he sees as the structure of effective therapeutic experiencing, regardless of thematic content.

These steps not only encompass a full description of experiential therapy, they also define the tasks of therapist and client on surface/explicit, and deep/tacit, levels; in ways that are significant to working with mourning for the loss of self.

The first step involves "attaining the level of strong feeling" (Mahrer, 1989). This amounts to opening a doorway to therapeutic experiencing, which leads from what Mahrer calls the "operating potential", or current selves; to the "deeper potential", or possible selves. For Mahrer, there are no rules as to content, only a stipulation that one move increasingly toward identifying a "feelinged attentional center", with enough compelling strength to warrant focusing on it as the therapeutic theme of any current session. At this step the therapist practices

"experiential listening" or "subjective indwelling" as advanced states of empathy, where the clients expressions are allowed to resonate within the therapist to the degree that the therapist's experience is as isomorphic with the client's as possible. Based on such resonation the therapist gives the client "guideline instructions" with the sole intention of helping the client attain a focal level of strong feeling.

The second step involves "appreciating the inner experience" as the identified focus is "actualized". Here, the attained level of strong feeling is deepened where the "inner experiencing is welcomed, received, accepted, enjoyed.". And, the inner experiencing is "carried forward", in the sense that a deeper potential is brought into a similar level of awareness as the operating potential. In Mahrer's (1989) words "Appreciating the inner experiencing is a combination of welcoming it (integration) and opening it up (actualization)". In this welcoming and opening up to the "presence" of the "good form" of the deeper potential the focal theme is described more in terms of content. It is named, valued, spoken to, and so on; as means of establishing the theme and direction of the rest of the session.

Step three is the most relevant to the theory of mourning for the loss of self. It involves "being the inner experiencing in earlier scenes". The core of this step may be characterized as accepting the necessity of the loss of the explicit self, or the "operating potential", as the means to change. Mahrer (1989) writes:

"In attaining the level of strong feeling and in appreciating the inner experiencing, the patient is still the same personality. In our terms, the "center of I-ness" is still within the "operating domain". The purpose of the third step is to enable the person to undergo a most radical shift out of the same old personality, the operating personality, and into the inner, deeper experiencing. Each of the patients is to...be it, live it, think and feel and act and behave as and from it."

Mahrer's view of self is apparent here. He directly acknowledges "...multiple "I's" floating in and out of various selves and personalities.". For Mahrer, "...each potential is a home for its own sense of identity and self."; and the job of the therapist is to facilitate the acceptance of the loss of any problematic self in the operating domain, so that the sense of 'I-ness' can engage it's deeper domain, and structure itself differently. Clearly, a difference between self as subject and self as object is utilized here, as a central feature of Mahrer's theory. This difference is underlined where he writes:

"Many therapists address the patient as if the core sense of I-ness and the operating domain are coterminal, but in experiential psychotherapy the chosen option is to distinguish the core sense of I-ness from the potentials for experiencing."

Here, the processes of self as subjectivity, and the distinct configurations of self as entities are fully acknowledged by Mahrer. In fact, the personal tone of the therapeutic language of Mahrer reflects a sense of respect for separate entities within the individual. One 'welcomes, opens up to, encounters, talks to, plays with, learns from', etc.; the different entities within a single human being.

Importantly, in regard to self as agent and self as object, it

seems that Mahrer equates the operating self, or explicit self, at any point in time, with the object self that can be known with reflection. And, he seems to equate self as agency, at any point in time, with the deeper potential for active experiencing, and active re-knowing of alternative ways of being in a situation, beyond the object self that, with reflection, was one way of being in a situation.

With this in mind, an important feature of Mahrer's third step is what he calls "self-encountering". Here, the therapist gives guideline instructions to the client on how to encounter aspects of the operating self in past, present, or future "scenes". Three aspects of this process stand out. First, the client must actually "see an image of herself", as a representation of the operating self. Second, the more this is accomplished, the more the client is separated from the operating self, and being the deeper potentials. Third, there is an active encounter between the new object self, from the position of the new self as agency of deeper potentials.

This process of self-encountering can be extended to any sense of object self in any scene relevant to the client. For example, one can encounter the "primitive self", the senses of self with significant figures from the past. In the same way, one can imagine encountering the traumatized self, the tragic self, or any sense of object self fixated on in the face of intolerable loss through the operation of the psychic triad of loss. This time, however, one is experiencing the scene from a position of empowered

agency where it was the loss of the sense of agency itself, that fixated painful objective awareness of the self in the first place. In this way, tacit and explicit ways of knowing, self as agent and self as object, and various disunities thereof, are allowed reintegration.

The fourth step in Mahrer's theory of therapy deals with new ways of "being-behaving in the extratherapy world". Here, newly integrated senses of self are practiced with the therapist and projected into future scenes. This consolidates integration and generates confidence in the generalization of the sense of self's coping strategies.

It is Mahrer's third step which, in general form, is tailored to mourning for the loss of self, where the themes of loss and mourning, and related senses of self, are the targets of change.

Jacob Moreno

Moreno's (Kipper, 1986) psychotherapy through "Psychodrama" has relevance not only theoretically, but also as a potentially powerful technique in the process of mourning for the loss of self.

An existential philosophy is revealed in several key concepts of Moreno's theory of psychodrama. The most basic appears to be the notion of "spontaneity". Moreno believes that a fundamental essence of being human is the ability to be spontaneous in any present moment. As Kipper (1986), points out, this concept of spontaneity does not imply a lack of control, but rather, sees

spontaneity as inherently containing "an element of control". In this sense, there is a relation between Moreno's "directed spontaneity" and Roger's notion of the "actualizing tendency".

Other features of Moreno's "spontaneity" clearly places the concept within the realm of self as agency. Spontaneity is active "unconservable energy", it occurs in the moment, and is creatively integrative by nature. Most importantly, it can be "trained" (Kipper, 1986). In the same way that various notions of self as agency are essential to well-being in the theories of, for example, Rogers and Kegan; the same is true of Moreno's view of spontaneity (Kipper, 1986):

"To Moreno, there is a positive correlation between spontaneity and mental health. In principle, the more spontaneous a person, the healthier - psychologically - he or she is. Conversely, the less "directed spontaneity" expressed, the sicker - emotionally - is the person. Using this terminology, the essence of psychotherapy may be described as "spontaneity training".

There is also a correlation, once again, between the loss of self as agency, in terms of the ability to express one's "spontaneity", and fixation on self as object, in terms of Moreno's concept of "locus nascendi". In relation to the concept of self, this refers to Moreno's view that "self emerges from roles", in the sense that self as object is coloured by its social "place of birth" and "context of origin" (Kipper, 1986). There is a similarity between this view of self and those of object relations theorists generally, which see the quality of lived relationships in the moment, as effecting views of self through mirroring processes; and, I would add, reactions to losses within object

relations units. This general principle, derived from the observation of the psychic triad of loss, regarding the relationship between the loss of self as agency/spontaneity and the fixation on self as object/roles, may answer Kipper's (1986) question as to why psychodrama is "conducted in the context of scenes depicting real or perceived life situations". Only in these "scenes", as the "locus nascendi" of self as object, lies the best chance of regaining the moment and the ways in which spontaneity and self as agency, may have been lost; and "experiencing" in Mahrer's term, new ways of being, thus confidently re-owning one's "adequacy of the response" in similar situations.

The stated curative processes of psychodrama reflect this view that its change processes target the relationships between self as object and self as agency. First, "catharsis" is believed to allow completion of "a previously restrained or interrupted sequence of self-expression" (Kipper, 1986). We can see this as the reclaiming of self as agency. In fact, this is underlined by distinguishing two types of catharsis: Action catharsis and catharsis of integration. The former is seen as the product of simply becoming the active protagonist in a revisited scene. The latter is seen as the product of actively dealing with the perceptions of roles of self and significant others which may be conflictual and inhibitive of spontaneity.

The second curative element in psychodrama is noted as "training". This refers to "spontaneity training", which can be seen as regaining self as agency in various scenes; and "role

repertoire training", which can be seen as increasing one's behavioral options through the experiencing of multiple object selves; as well as increasing confidence in experiencing integratively, self as agency and self as object, without losing the "cohesiveness" of the two, in Kohut's word.

Clearly, although Moreno does not deal directly with mourning, self, and loss, his views support aspects of the theory of mourning for the loss of self. Moreover, the methods of psychodrama may well facilitate the process of mourning for the loss of self and offer the most powerful way of eliciting and integrating both tacit and explicit ways of knowing about any self's experience of different losses.

In fact, in considering Horowitz's categorization of the modes of thought as lexical, imaginal, and enactive; it is enticing to see Rogers, Mahrer, and Moreno as representing progressively deeper and more potentially integrative techniques for dealing with mourning for the loss of self. In this view they generally represent progressively more powerful means to explicitly dealing with tacit ways of knowing about a person's reactions to loss.

For example, Rogers would generally represent an approach through the lexical mode of thought where symbolic and semantic meanings about self-concepts are clarified in relatively rational and sequential ways. Mahrer would generally represent the imaginal mode of thought, with its emphasis on the encountering and experiencing of figural, iconic, and holographic aspects of self. And, Moreno would generally represent the enactive mode of thought,

where adult behaviour is the most integrated form of all three modes of knowing. Enactive re-knowing in earlier scenes would then be the most potentially powerful way, in terms of depth and number of relevant schemata reactivated, of working through the process of mourning for the loss of self. In fact, Moreno's concept of "warming up" may reflect the time required to move from lexical through imaginal to enactive ways of knowing.

In summary of the experiential approach, chosen theorists not only support the need for a model of mourning the loss of self; but also represent a range of techniques for facilitating the processes of mourning for the loss of self.

Approaches Focusing on the Transcendence of Loss

There is a body of literature that focuses on the cycles of loss and subsequent transcendence of loss throughout the lifecycle. Two representative figures in this approach to loss will be briefly considered here. This approach may be thought of as representing ways of thinking about the outcomes of successful mourning for the loss of self, as a therapeutic change process; in similar fashion to the way that experiential theories can be seen as representing and range of possible techniques for facilitating the change process of mourning for the loss of self.

Pollock (1961, 1987, 1989) writing from a psychoanalytic perspective has developed the notion of the "mourning-liberation process". This process is seen by Pollock as a "universal transformational adaptive process regarding loss and change.". What is interesting is that he sees reactions to loss from death and separation as a "subclass of the mourning-liberation process". In this process it is the creative resolution, as adaptation to any form of loss, that is the core of Pollock's process. He writes (1989):

"My thesis is that the successful completion of the mourning process results in creative outcome. Where the creator has the spark of genius...this result can be a great work of art,...literature...science. Indeed, the creative product may reflect the mourning process in, theme, style, form. content, and it may itself stand as a memorial. In the less gifted...a creative outcome may be manifested in a new relationship,... or newer sublimations that reflect a successful resolution of the mourning process."

In this view loss and creative adaptation to loss is a central theme and task of every life. Pollock has applied this view to understanding the loss of a parent in childhood and adolescence, the loss of a spouse, loss of siblings, loss of a child, and developmental losses. In all cases he sees a relationship between completed mourning and creative production in life as integrative acts of either, "restitution", "reparation", "discharge", or, "sublimation"; in relation to creatively assimilating the loss.

Pollock's (1987) consideration of the central role that the "mourning-liberation process" can play in successful aging includes direct acknowledgement of the need to mourn the loss of "former states of self". This "liberates" otherwise bound energy, for

creative use by self as agent, through dissolution of painful fixations on earlier forms of self as object. Pollock sums this up (1987):

"The consequences of...losses in older adults repeatedly demonstrated the presence of arrested, fixated, or pathological mourning processes without liberation and freedom. In some, earlier life traumas had been exacerbated by the inevitable developmental changes that are an intrinsic part of the aging process...the final common pathway of symptomology, depression, were encountered. yet...once the mourning process could be facilitated, pathological symptoms lifted, and liberation ensued."

Pollock's mourning-liberation process directly supports the need to recognize mourning for the loss of self as a distinct change process, and class of therapeutic event. For Pollock, mourning for the loss of self would, I suspect, be considered as a subclass of his more general mourning-liberation process. Even if so, as we have seen, there appears to be enough distinctness to dealing directly with the set of aspects of the loss of self, to qualify it as a separate change mechanism within the mourning-liberation process.

Finally, in consideration of Pollock's support of the need for a theory of mourning for the loss of self, his work on identifying types of creative transcendence of loss, as outcomes of completed mourning, potentially serve as goals and markers against which the process of mourning for the loss of self can be assessed in terms of effectiveness. And, Pollock points out the specific relevance this technique could have for the sense of life satisfaction and actual productiveness of our aging population.

Patricia Weenolsen

Weenolsen (1988) has presented a comprehensive developmental model focusing on the "transcendence of loss over the life span". For Weenolsen, loss and the styles of transcendence of loss are the omnipresent themes of life. In reflection on this view she calls her model the "loss and transcendence framework" of human life. Her definition of loss is subsequently broadbased:

"I define loss as anything that destroys some aspect, whether macroscopic or microscopic, of life and self. Loss is not change, but change incorporates both loss and its overcoming. Because there is change in our lives from moment to moment, there is loss as well, although we do not recognize the loss until it reaches a certain threshold of significance."

Weenolsen goes on to develop a model of types, or "levels of loss", as related to a model of self, and three general forms of transcendence which are worth considering here.

For Weenolsen all losses imply a loss to the self in some degree. As such, there is no firm boundary between internal and external losses in her five levels of loss; beyond the belief that the more internally disruptive a loss, the harder it is to deal with. Her five designated levels of loss are: "Primary, secondary, holistic, self-conceptual, and metaphorical".

Primary losses refer to the "specific loss incident". This could include loss of face, loss of job, loss of loved one through death, and so on. In effect, Moreno's concept of "locus nascendi" as fitted to refer to the context in which original loss arises nicely captures Weenolsen's meaning of primary loss.

Secondary losses are those that immediately flow from a

primary loss. This may be loss of performance ability, loss of positive public image, loss of other motivations and interests. Depending on the consequences of secondary losses, they may require as much attention as the primary loss, but are often overshadowed by the primary loss. For example, losses related to developing an alcoholic coping style in reaction to death of a spouse may need to be mourned separately.

Holistic losses are more "remote and abstract". They encompass, in Weenolsen's model, future plans, dreams, anticipated roles, etc., which may be altered and lost in relation to primary losses.

Self-conceptual losses refer to the demand to alter self-concept in the wake of any loss.

Metaphorical losses are the idiosyncratic meanings that any loss might imply for an individual's unique way of construing the world.

The value of Weenolsen's classification of levels of loss is that it recognizes and allows treatment of the complexities of loss that may be overlooked with a tendency to focus on primary loss solely.

These levels of loss are seen as effecting a four part model of the self. Weenolsen's model of the self can be seen as acknowledging both explicit and tacit levels of self as agent and self as object. She sees the self as composed of "me's" and "I's". The "me's", of course, refer to the senses of self as object; and the "I's" refer to the "experiencing and executive

part of the self".

Next, Weenolsen designates "transcendent me's" and "transcendent I's" from inactive me's and lost I's. The transcendent me's she defines as "actively engaged in transactions between self and society...(which) are currently involved in transcending loss". In this model, any explicit self seems to be considered as a transcendent 'me' coping with loss, since adaptation to loss is the omnipresent concern of life in Weenolsen's model. The "lost me's" appear to be similar to Guidano's tacit level of a self system, to the extent that they are potential memory images which "still participate in the construction" of the transcendent self.

The "transcendent I" refers to the current style of active coping and integration of the person with the world. It is "responsible for the integration of the total self". While this clearly refers to self as agent, Weenolsen's definition of the "lost I" is somewhat equivocal in terms of overlapping with her definition of "lost me's". She describes it as the storehouse of "...all the transcendence mechanisms, meanings, and self-concepts that previously defined the individual".

This four part model of self is related to the five levels of loss where any transcendent me's and I's reflect the current adaptation to loss on any or all of the levels. And, the lost me's and I's contain the history of the operation of previous transcendent selves, that experienced the loss of their operating contexts, in different ways..

Finally, Weenolsen describes three categories of transcendence she sees as applicable, in degrees, to every experience of loss. They are "situational", "dispositional", and "general" forms of transcendence.

Situational transcendence refers to dealing with a loss actively and directly, in the context in which it occurs. For example, one asserts their position in a rebuff from an employer. Or, one participates actively in funeral arrangements and rituals for grieving and mourning. There is conscious proactive, and largely integrated coping and processing of immediate losses.

Dispositional transcendence refers to the style of inner mechanisms of defense that the person tends to rely on automatically, in order to cope with the different intensities of loss. These may range from appropriate denial and anger to psychotic projection and abrupt dissociations.

General transcendence refers to what Weenolsen calls "situation-irrelevant" responses to loss in life. This type of transcendence is somewhat difficult to differentiate from dispositional forms, because Weenolsen also defines it as transcendence that "...rather than altering the situation by external activities or internal processes, alters the self that experiences the situation". This is difficult to completely separate from defense mechanisms. However, it seems to refer to the set of behaviours that can develop into avoidant lifestyles whose purpose is to escape experiencing the pain of loss itself. For example, Weenolsen includes drinking, drugs, any compulsive

activity that is designed to avoid inner awareness. In this sense, Weenolsen sees general transcendence as leading to more loss. She writes: "Awareness of self is lost, and the self becomes the one who loses awareness". Weenolsen's general transcendence may be related to the model of "adaptive addictions", where anything that serves avoidance of inner conflict is potentially addictive (Alexander, personal communication).

Weenolsen's model of loss is the most comprehensive I have come across. Her work, as does Pollock's, supports the need for a model of mourning for the loss of self as a distinct change process. This is the case because they demonstrate in compelling ways two basic facts. First, is the extent to which loss and adaptation to loss is the persistent core demand for the creative coping of the self throughout the lifecycle. Second, is the necessity of recognizing the complex nature of losses involving the self, and the need to deal with such directly.

Weenolsen's model is comprehensive and useful but somewhat experience removed, in its intendedness as a framework for seeing the thematic activity of loss and transcendence, across the lifecycle. For Weenolsen, all pathology is based in the inability to transcend loss in active situationally relevant ways, yet therapeutic techniques for accessing change points and facilitating changes in dealing with and experiencing loss are not dealt with in depth in her book.

Conclusion

There is a great deal of convergent evidence supporting the need for an integrated model of mourning for the loss of self as a distinct change process.

The theory and model of mourning for the loss of self presented in the next chapter is intended as experience-near. Its focus is on the experiencing and encountering of lost aspects of the self as entities caught up in the phenomenological realities of dealing with loss. While it attempts to be comprehensively based in the convergence of different theories addressing loss, self, and mourning, it is primarily intended as a clinical method, and clinical model for dealing with the psychological effects of loss.

CHAPTER THREE

A CLINICAL MODEL FOR MOURNING THE LOSS OF SELF

I have cast my theoretical net wide and deep in order to provide as comprehensive a framework as possible within which to describe a model of mourning for the loss of self. I believe the extensiveness of support from the many different perspectives serves as evidence of convergent validity for the concept. I also believe that the evidence for the concept speaks of the pervasiveness of critical experiences of the loss of self throughout life. Therefore, I believe the extent of the converging evidence supports the need for an integrated model of mourning for the loss of self. I will attempt to describe such a model here. This chapter will describe:

- (1) Basic underlying principles applicable to the model will be set out. These are the processes that are assumed to imply the necessity of an integrated model of mourning for the loss of self.
- (2) A classification of loss experiences will be suggested. Here, three fundamentally different reasons for the occurrence of loss experiences will be discussed.
- (3) The concept of self as relevant to this study will be defined.
- (4) The nature of mourning as relevant to this study will be defined.
- (5) Different types of loss of self will be described. These will be drawn from types of loss of self identified in the literature review, and related to the definition of self as put forward in this study.
- (6) Approaches to identification and assessment of client need for mourning of the loss of self will be briefly considered. This will include some discussion of

assessing the type of mourning for the loss of self required by different clients, and the sequencing of types of mourning for the loss of self.

- (7) The process of mourning for the loss of self will be discussed in terms of different techniques suggested for facilitating it. These will be related to the different types of loss of self. This section will also include a discussion of the resolution of a mourning process for the loss of self.

Finally, in this chapter, several case studies will be presented in order to demonstrate the model.

Underlying Principles

I want to suggest the principle of negentropy as the most basic assumption of this study. Negentropy is defined as negative entropy. Entropy is defined as a "measure of disorder" where an "initially ordered state is virtually certain to randomize as time proceeds" (Berry, 1977). However, in the field of cybernetics, it is believed that if a system is open to information, "this tendency may be arrested. This is because...information can be defined precisely as negative entropy (or negentropy)" (Beer, 1977).

One of the most painful dualities of human existence is the fact that the physical body is governed by principles of entropy while the psychological self is governed by principles of negentropy. Clearly, the psychological self operates as a negentropic construction growing and developing in complexity as it continues to absorb information throughout life; while the body just as clearly breaks down, often when the self feels at the height of its development. This ultimate human asymmetry may

motivate far more human behaviour and cultural production than Freudian instincts. We attempt to deny the loss of self through physical death by establishing symbols of self-continuance (Becker, 1973). These can range from building pyramids, to the installation of values in our children. The myriad attempts at the denial of death may all be seen as evidence for the fundamental negentropic nature of the self.

The human self is a negentropic production. It is also a negentropic production with two other salient features significant to the theory of mourning the loss of self. First, it is a negentropic production with a sense of subjective immanence. This means that any current level of self tends to perceive itself as an absolute centre of experience (Kohut, 1985). Because of this egocentrism of self-experience it is possible and common to identify with states of self as total self. When this occurs there is an impulse towards maintaining self-constancy of the current state, which can be felt to be as vital as the urge towards forms of self-continuance in the face of physical death.

Any pain of any loss of self is ultimately the fear of psychic death. Moreover, to the extent that the loss of a state of self is anxiously experienced as a possible psychic death, the more there will be a tendency towards the defensive disunity of consciousness (Guidano, 1987). This becomes a potential for multiple centres of consciousness within the same person (Kegan, 1983). These centres of consciousness may be seen as entities. This respects their subjective and phenomenal fullness, and best permits their

engagement for the achievement of therapeutic goals (Mahrer, 1986).

A second salient feature of the human negentropic self, relevant to our study, is that it is self-regulating or "autopoietic" in Varela's (1981) word. While many forms of self-regulation are beyond the focus of this study, one stands out as centrally important for the theory of mourning for the loss of self. It is related to the defensive disunity of consciousness. I suggest this form of self-regulation be considered as the **psychic triad of loss**.

The psychic triad of loss reflects the fact that the human self is a negentropic production. It is one form of self-regulation which specifically deals with maintaining the self-constancy of achieved centres of experience in the face of loss. It operates in response to unmanageable anxiety related to a threatened loss of self before a self is ready to transform and fade naturally in the developmental processes of life. The goal of the psychic triad of loss is self-constancy. The mechanism is psychic clinging to aspects of the threatened state of self. The result can be the persistence of states of self past their developmentally appropriate context because psychic clinging can result in fixation, or, centration, of the threatened state of self. Therefore, defensive self-constancy, psychic clinging, and fixation are the features of the psychic triad of loss.

Where self-regulation through the operation of the psychic triad of loss has occurred the splitting of the self tends to lead to lack of integration within the self-system as a whole. The more

extensive the lack of integration, the more development will tend to be handicapped, which can then lead to secondary symptoms as attempts to cope with developmental failure.

Therefore, the thesis presented here is that the defended and fixated states of self which underlie a poorly integrated self-system, must be accessed, engaged, and mourned in order to allow reintegration of these split-off centres of self. With reintegration development can more optimally resume.

A Classification of Losses

The experience of loss is an omnipresent reality of life. Brenner (1982) has suggested that anxiety and depressive affect are the two basic sources of psychological difficulty. He defines anxiety as the awareness of the possibility of loss, and depressive affect as the reaction to loss already experienced. Loss clearly shapes the human personality from the beginning to the end of life.

However, the nature of loss can influence the experience and effects of loss (Neugarten, 1979; Weenolsen, 1988). For the purposes of this study it is useful to distinguish between three basic sources of the experience of loss. These are classified as: (1) Developmental losses. (2) Adventitious losses. (3) Therapeutic losses.

First, there are losses experienced because of developmental changes. These are commonly referred to as developmental losses. For purposes related to the theory of mourning for the loss of

self, the central consideration in experiencing a developmental loss is the degree of anxiety associated with letting go of an outgrown sense of self in order to move into a new sense of self. Because of the complexity of the human personality and uniqueness of personal histories, idiosyncratic meanings can vary the experience of developmental losses. For example, a fourteen year old adolescent female may have a great deal of anxiety about letting go of latency-aged senses of self even though she is actively dating, because she has construed parental messages about experiencing her sexuality in negative ways. And, an adult may have a great deal of anxiety about letting go of particular images of themselves as a parent when their child separates, because of experiences their own parent's modeled.

In this fashion, developmental loss is acknowledged as a basic source of loss of self; and the degree of anxiety associated with any developmental loss is the feature of central concern to the theory of mourning for the loss of self. In other words, the degree to which one inner entity is afraid to pass on and let another inner entity take its place, is the concern of this study in looking at the relationship between developmental loss and the loss of self. If such anxiety is unmanageable it is assumed that the psychic triad of loss will operate in response to a failed developmental transition; complicating to a greater degree future developmental losses.

Second, there are losses experienced as a result of the variability within the lifosphere of human beings. These losses

may range in form from the sudden death of a family member, to the loss of a job, or the loss of significant personal property or self-perception. The commonality in this source of loss is the general sense that if something had been different, this type of loss could have been prevented. They are not inevitable like developmental losses. Unpredictability and randomness of occurrence are often features of this type of loss. These losses are the one's encountered in the adventure of life rather than its stages of unfolding. As such, I prefer to refer to this class of losses with the term Pine (1990) uses; "adventitious losses".

As far as the theory of mourning for the loss of self is concerned the significance of adventitious losses lies in the degree of self-constancy threatened by their occurrence. Once again, if the degree of anxiety raised in the face of adventitious loss is unmanageable, it is assumed that the psychic triad of loss will come into operation, fixating a centre of self related to such a loss.

For example, a child may unintentionally cause serious injury to a friend. Anxiety about being trustworthy and attentive in relationships may be so great as to render this sense of self, in a secure way, as lost to the child. At the same time, there may be heightened awareness of the state of self at the time of the injury, where the child comes to focus on images of their momentary aggression and callousness as central features of the self. On one hand, the child may psychically cling to senses of self as cautious and caring in following relationships by trying too hard

to please, while, on the other hand, feeling unworthy of having their own needs met because of the vividness of a cruel image of themselves.

For the theory of mourning for the loss of self there are two experiences of self here, that need to be accessed and mourned in order to facilitate more integrative behaviour. One is the set of cognitive-affective images of self related to being trustworthy and attentive in relationships. This is the original loss of the sense of the object-related self that was more or less taken for granted before the adventitious injury to the friend. The other is the set of cognitive-affective images of self that have accrued as a characterological self around the sense of being cruel and callous.

In this way we see that the theory of mourning for the loss of self does not deal with the emotions of the self as labels, i.e., guilty, angry, caring; but as phenomenal experiences from the inside out, in terms of the individual's unique patterning of cognitive-affective imagery and meaning related to emotional experience associated with loss. In the same way that 'low self-esteem' is an abstraction for the approach to the self used here, so are descriptors such as 'guilty conflicts between aggression and love'. The theory of mourning for the loss of self attempts to discover the affective images of self and other, unique to each person's experiences of loss.

Thirdly, in addition to developmental and adventitious sources of loss, the study of mourning for the loss of self is led to suggest another class of losses. These are therapeutic losses.

Therapeutic losses of self are those losses which are necessary to undergo in order to facilitate more integrative and developmentally appropriate behaviour. In the above example, the child's need to acknowledge and give up the characterological self that had been fixated and elaborated upon as an operating self, in reaction to the loss of an object-related self, is an example of a therapeutic loss of self.

I believe that naturalistic therapeutic losses of self occur spontaneously in all relationships. These are the moments of constructive feedback and recognition that make us aware that forgiveness is a possibility, that we are lovable and accepted despite mistakes, and that others can see us as greater than any one image of ourselves. These are moments of feeling that our potential is believed in, in deep and positive ways which allows us to acknowledge and shed more limited and defensive selves. In short, an indication of a healthy relationship is the extent to which it facilitates therapeutic losses of self through the honest mirroring of the quality of the many selves in each of us.

Clearly, counselling and therapy is designed to promote the therapeutic loss of self but it is rarely recognized as such. I suggest that it is useful to do so, and further, that it is useful to consciously acknowledge the need for mourning a therapeutic loss of self. I believe this reduces resistance and facilitates a more open embracing of change by resonating with the person's negentropic nature lessening defensive impulses towards self-constancy. I believe that this shifts the identification from self

as particular object to self as process, which allows the characterological self to step aside if need be.

Therefore, therapeutic losses are regarded as a distinct source of the experience of loss

Assumptions About Self Structures, Functions, and Processes

The construct of self is defined in many different ways (Mischel, 1977). It is not the purpose of this study to provide a comprehensive review of the various dimensions of self. This study is concerned with an approach to the human self that takes clinical utility as its starting point. Basic to this clinical approach is a phenomenological and "experience-near" view of the self. That is, the shifting experience of self and other within the focal awareness of the client is the concern of this study. This phenomenal experience of self and other is considered to be composed of patterns of images, thoughts and feelings. In this study, the theme of loss is pursued as a core dimension of life that shapes the patterns of experiencing self and other.

A summary of assumptions about this view of self will be stated in point form since many of the aspects of self relevant to this study have been covered in the literature review. These assumptions include the following:

- (1) The human self is a negentropic construction.
- (2) The basic unit of personality is an object representation, a self representation, and a cognitive-affective link between the two (Kohut, 1977; Jacobson, 1964; Kernberg, 1976).

- (3) At a phenomenological level this unit is experienced as self (Kohut, 1985).
- (4) The self is therefore, essentially bi-polar and attentional focus tends to alternate between the two poles, rather than maintain a simultaneous awareness of both poles (Kohut, 1985). And, the experience of self is intimately related to the perception of the other (Mead, 1934; Kohut, 1985).
- (5) There has been a tendency to focus more on the object side than the self side of this bi-polar self; culturally, as well as psychologically, since Freud (Laing, 1982; Kohut, 1980). Consequently, ways in which the self is effected by loss may have been overlooked in favour of focusing on the objects lost.
- (6) Self and object representations are not equivalent to 'objective reality' but can influence, in deterministic fashion, interaction with reality, ie., choice of mate, occupation, social style, etc. (Horowitz, 1988).
- (7) As self and object images change the experience of self and behaviour will change. This is the essence of human development (Kohut, 1985; Keagan, 1982). The mechanism of this developmental process is the abstraction of structural and functional principles out of concrete experiences between self and others. This process in the emotional realm is similar to the developmental process of Piaget, in the logical realm. Here, however, we are dealing with the assimilation to, and accommodation of, "emotional schemas" (Leventhal, 1979).
- (8) Within the unit of self and object representations, the self has two basic modes of experiencing itself. One as active, analytical, processing agent; the other as analogical, imaginal, object. (Guidano, 1987).
- (9) These two ways of experiencing the self are based on innate brain mechanisms. However both ways of knowing accrue in complexity based on the experiential funding of "schemata".
- (10) Self as agency may be based on the activity of ego functions such as those described by Hartmann (1939) and those types of schemata studied by Piaget (1937). Self as object may be based on emotional schemata which deal with concrete imagery and emotion such as those suggested by Leventhal (1979).
- (11) Psychologically, emotional schemata are the basis of the object sense of self and the feeling of "personal

singleness" , where the affective imagery embodied in them is responsible for the sense of being entities with identities (Guidano & Liotti, 1983).

- (12) Psychologically, the schemata responsible for the sense of self as agency are the basis of descriptions such as "perceived self-efficacy" (Bandura, 1980), and "flow" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
- (13) Developmentally, the emotional schemata upon which the sense of self as object is based, coalesce into persistent forms within attachment relationships, as "tacit" ways of knowing self and other. Such tacit ways of knowing can shape the deployment of ego functions and information processing unconsciously (Guidano, 1987).
- (14) Developmentally, the schemata upon which the sense of self as agency is based coalesce into information processing styles (Horowitz, 1987). These tend to be the "explicit" products and processes of attention although they have unconscious components. With the onset of adolescence and formal operations it is possible to use explicit processes to rework tacit contents (Guidano, 1987; Kegan, 1983). This is the generic cognitive operation in mourning for the loss of self.
- (15) In optimal functioning there is an integrative and fluid sense of the movement of attention between changing senses of self, awareness of ego function activity, and perceptual contact with the world. Creative contextual processing of experience is the essence of integrative functioning. Here, the object-related self is often taken for granted because of minimal reflection during the flow of experience. It is suggested, that this present based operating self be considered as the 'synergistic object'. It is located between old schemata and current points of contact with the world but is not reducible to either. It is the synergistic product of the two. Kohut's selfobject experience, and Mahler's symbiotic experience are examples of synergistic objects in relationships. Moments of losing oneself in one's work and aesthetic experiences may be examples of synergistic objects outside of relationships.
- (16) With disruption of the synergistic object there is an experience of loss of agency which can vary in intensity depending on the degree of perceptual-cognitive contact lost with the world. For example, loss of a person through death leaves a hole in the world where there were innumerable points of active contact. This may explain the "core grief reaction" to object loss, of helplessness and painful yearning, as a pattern of perceptual-

cognitive contact is torn away from its context. (Gut, 1989).

- (17) With the loss of self as agency, for whatever reason, there is a tendency to focus on self as object. Depending on the state of development of explicit cognitive processes, and the extensiveness of the sense of agency lost, the focus on self as object can range from momentary self-consciousness to traumatized fixation of a sense of self. At this point the psychic triad of loss can come into operation. This can establish tacit senses of self as object with problematic influence over the explicit functioning of information-processing (Horowitz, 1970; Meichenbaum & Butler, 1978; Gut, 1989).
- (18) In this way, developmental arrest can occur where there is fixation, or, centration on senses of self as object, which are inappropriate to an individual's current life context. eg. An adolescent self-image in middle age. (Horowitz, 1988; Guidano, 1987).
- (19) Because of the negentropic nature of the human self where operating entities, or, centres of self tend to be egocentric, whatever their level of functioning, change can be experienced as an anxious loss of self; and resisted (Kohut, 1985; Keagan, 1982).
- (20) One way to facilitate self change and ease such resistance is through the process of mourning for the loss of self.

A Definition of Mourning Relevant to this Study

Mourning is often defined as the complex pattern of adaptation to a major loss or change (Bowlby, 1961; Parkes, 1972; Gut, 1989). As a complex process it is often discussed in terms of stages, with each stage as part of the process of mourning, but not sufficient alone, to its completion. Gut (1989), in integrating the views of several theorists on mourning, has considered these stages in detail, attempting to differentiate critical functions in each. Based within the attachment model of Bowlby, she sees the process

of mourning being comprised of functionally different emotional complexes. While the general direction of movement through these "emotional patterns" is fixed, in terms of going from grief towards integration, Gut does not see a lock-step progression through these experiences. For example, one can be in the midst of integration and something may trigger the vividness of the grief experience again. These emotional patterns are: Grief, anger, anxiety and despair, the urge to search and recover, the onset of a depressed response with the failure to recover, and, depending on the nature of the depressed response, either fixation in response to the loss, or reintegration into a new way of living.

Gut suggests the term "basic grief" as connoting the initial reaction to significant loss. She sees this as referring to the intense yearning, pining, crying, reaching out for what is lost. As well, she notes the vividness of imagery associated with this stage. This she sees as related to the function of basic grief, which is to "...sharpen our vision of the type of interaction we want to attain, retain, recover, or at least replace.". Part of this stage can be seen as related to focusing on self as object as one part of the set of vivid images. As well, one can see the beginnings of psychic clinging at this stage.

Anger, Gut sees as aimed at "...what is experienced as an agent outside the self" which is perceived to be thwarting our goals and attachments. It can be seen as related to the sense of loss of personal agency in obtaining our felt needs.

Anxiety and despair, she sees as also having distinct

functions in relation to loss. "Primary anxiety" Gut believes, is related to our feeling that the loss can still be prevented or reversed. "Secondary anxiety" is a consequence of the basic grief reaction where there is concern about being able to cope with the pain involved. The general function of both anxieties is to "...sharpen our vision of what we want to escape". In both anxieties we can see basic fears about the loss of self, whether as the explicit object-related self associated with whatever is lost; or, as loss of self as agency, in terms of being able to cope. Moreover, primary anxiety can be seen as motivated by defensive self-constancy needs, which activates forms of psychic clinging, in the search and recover phase of the total mourning process. And, despair, as related to the emotional patterns of the anxieties, can be seen as the beginning of the depressive response, due to dawning awareness of hopelessness in escaping the reality of the loss.

The search and recover phase, Gut also sees as a distinct emotional complex within the total mourning process. As a distinct emotional pattern, rather than a lock-stepped stage, this complex can occur, disappear, and occur again; which tends to be the experience related to searching. In fact, it may be the case that the emotional complex of searching never completely disappears in relation to the loss of a significant person. Dreams of the return of the dead, anniversary reactions, and myriad subtle forms of moving psychically closer to the departed may last a lifetime. For example, for the past several years I have had the desire to have contact with an uncle, my deceased father's brother who is in his

seventies. When with him it was clear I was trying to see my father in him, as the closest living relative of my father. Once I allowed myself this awareness I became conscious of a whole range of things I wanted for myself, from my father at this stage in my lifecycle, not my uncle. This reactivated other phases of the total mourning process, including mourning for experiences of self I can imagine, but which tragically, cannot be. Clearly, the search and recover phase is as much about psychic clinging to aspects of self as it is to aspects of the object.

The next emotional complex Gut discusses is the depressed response. This occurs with the awareness that escaping the loss is not possible with repeated "experiences of ineffectiveness". The function of the depressed response Gut sees as one of conserving energy for focused work on restructuring in accordance with the reality of the loss. She writes:

"If we do not suppress depressed reactions by medication, alcohol, other narcotics, or restless activity, or ward them off by mechanisms of defense, they can facilitate more intensive information processing...The aspects, or results, of information processing I have in mind here are the following: Comparison and integration of fresh perception with earlier perceptions stored in our memory; comparison and integration of recently reached conclusions with long-established beliefs; and their revision. This also includes the integration of values and expectations with our evaluation of new events...In addition, depressed reactions make it easier for unconscious responses to make their way into awareness."

In this way, the depressed response as part of a total mourning process, can lead to what Gut calls "productive depression" which results in reintegration with life; as opposed to "unproductive depression" which can result in different degrees of fixation and developmental arrest.

What I want to suggest is that a critical factor that may make the difference between productive and unproductive depression in relation to loss, is the extent to which mourning for the loss of self occurs as one part of the inner focus. Gut, does not use the term, but implies by discussing personality disorders as one reason for unproductive depression, that it is the reactivation of tacit emotional schemata, old fixated senses of self, at the core of the depressive response, which derails productive depression in relation to current losses. This is a manifestation of the common observation that each new loss generates echoes of previous losses. Moreover, literature on the relationships between the depressive self-schema, state-specific memory, and the processing of current losses suggests that it is the reactivation of tacit senses of self that derails productive resolution of ongoing depressive responses (Dobson, 1986; Kuiper, MacDonald, & Derry, 1983; Markus, 1977). What this suggests, in short, is that each new depressive response is an opportunity to complete the mourning process for past losses of self, which can lead to fuller integration of the whole person.

Gut's view of the total mourning process as made up of differentially functioning emotional complexes, provides a compatible view of the mourning process for the theory of mourning for the loss of self. This is because it is relatively easy to see different types and levels of loss of self as underlying each complex or phase: Grief over loss of the synergistic object, anger over loss of agency, anxiety and despair over threatened loss of the explicitly object-related self, and depressive stuckness with

activation of tacit selves that still require completion of mourning processes.

One other view is additionally helpful here, however, as we attempt to define a mourning process relevant to this study. Pine (1990), commenting on the loss of parental ties in adolescence uses the term "renunciation" as an aspect of the mourning process. He writes: "Renunciation, an active intrapsychic process, supplements loss, a passive one.". This is reminiscent of Keagan's (1982) suggestion that part of the anger related to a loss may be a way of distancing and decentering from a no longer adaptive state of self. Clearly, this active renunciation, as applied to outmoded aspects of self, would be a necessary component of a productive depressive response as described by Gut. In fact for the theory of mourning for the loss of self it is a critical part of the process of effectively mourning the loss of self.

With the considerations of Gut and Pine in place it becomes possible to suggest a definition of mourning relevant to this study.

- (1) Mourning as a total process is an adaptive response to the experience of loss.
- (2) Such loss may be due to developmental, adventitious, or therapeutic conditions.
- (3) Because the human self is a negentropic construction synergistically occurring between genetically given information processing systems and points of contact with the world, the perception of loss can be located both in the world and in the self.
- (4) The adaptation to any loss involves restructuring awareness of both the world and the self.
- (5) The function of discrete cognitive-affective phases of

the total mourning process deal with different levels of the restructuring of awareness of world and self.

(6) Initial grief may heighten objective awareness of salient self and world features effected by the loss, which were largely taken for granted, or, experienced subjectively within the synergistic object prior to the loss.

(7) Anger may be a way of testing and challenging the changing boundaries between world and self in the face of loss. This would apply to testing changes in the sense of self as agency as well as self as object.

(8) Anxiety may increase focal awareness of the states of self, as both agency and object, that are critically at stake in relation the relevant loss. Despair may be preparatory for possible renunciation and restructuring of those states of self.

(9) The search and recover phase may be a way of testing active solutions, to either escaping the loss, consequences of the loss, or, possible substitutes for what is lost. The basic aim may be to try and avoid restructuring, or, prevent the threatened loss of self that grief, anxiety, and other forms of testing have indicated as being in danger.

(10) The depressive response may function to create the space in which radical restructuring can occur, given the ineffectiveness of previous forms of testing aimed at maintaining the explicit self as it existed at the time of the loss.

(11) The critical processes within productive restructuring of the depressive response may be interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation. Interpretation draws out the personal meaning of the loss in ways consistent with previous losses, and hopefully creates reasons for moving past the current loss. Differentiation encounters and sorts out senses of self as object that can and cannot be carried forward given the current loss. Renunciation is the active separation from those ways of being which one has become aware of through interpretation and differentiation, as being no longer functional given the loss being dealt with.

(12) Renunciation may be the essence of mourning, and the actual turning point in mourning for the loss of self, where one decides to recommit to other ways of being in the world, and say goodbye to selves that can no longer be as they were. As such, this point may be heavy with affect. This is the moment of tragic courage, and

sorrowful hope. The act of renunciation will be facilitated to the extent that interpretation and differentiation have been adequate through the process of encountering different selves as entities, and acknowledging the possibilities in each for optimal, real world functioning, given the loss being adapted to.

- (13) While renunciation may particularly require outside support from a therapeutic other, all facets of the destructuring phase of the depressive response to loss may require, to some degree, the support of the recursive functions of renewed symbiotic experience and confirming, or, mirroring selfobject responses. This echoes the continued emotional availability of the parent during the rapprochement crisis, and adolescent passage; even while confirming the need to separate.
- (14) The danger in the depressive response to loss lies in the reactivation of tacit senses of self fixated in relation to earlier losses. Once activated these old states of self can influence interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation; insuring that new losses are adapted to in old, ineffective ways. As such, any tacit senses of self activated will need to be identified, and cycled through interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation as needed.
- (15) As these aspects of the total mourning process proceed, the need to psychically cling decreases, and personal integration, as well as reintegration with the world can occur.

In summary, for the theory of mourning for the loss of self, the total mourning process may be defined as the process of restructuring the awareness of world and self in response to a loss. In relation to the different states of self effected by loss, the critical processes mourning provides include: Acknowledgement, testing, interpretation, differentiation, renunciation, recommitment, and reintegration.

Types of Loss of Self

Clearly, from all that has been said above, there are different types of loss of self which, for therapeutic purposes, it is useful to distinguish. It is acknowledged that this is a tentatively suggested typology, with some distinctions more equivocal than others. It is also recognized that there is no pure type. Moreover, it is particularly recognized that there is no pure separation of self as agency and self as object; just as there may be no pure separation of cognition and affect. However, it does appear to be the case that there are instances in the experience of the loss of self which are more of one type than another. As such, there is clinical utility in having organizing constructs which can provide some degree of predictability and reliability in what to expect in different phases of a client's process, as related to mourning the loss of self. The types of loss of self suggested below are meant as fine, experience-near distinctions. That is, more coarse, experience-removed descriptions might not take into account some of these distinctions, or see them as over-lapping to such a degree that they might not be made. It is the view here, that there is clinical usefulness in making these fine distinctions in individual situations. Although it is recognized that some senses of self may contain all of these types of loss of self in them, to some degree, it is believed that, when unpacked, the range of types of loss of self it would be possible to identify, is covered in the typology below.

These beginning suggestions for labelling the types and levels

of loss of self can also be helpful in locating where the client is, in their own efforts at dealing with the loss of self, and, in sequencing interventions in order to facilitate the process. In terms of the approach of this study to states of self as entities, we might think of the types of loss of self as facets of loss, that we can variously focus on, when encountering inner entities. However, we do this with the knowledge that each facet reflects all others to some extent.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that while some types of loss of self suggested, are losses that may have already happened for the client, all are potential types of therapeutic loss which can be undertaken as goals in therapy. For example, loss of the traumatized self may not have occurred to any extent for the client in their life-world, but is the therapeutic goal, once a therapeutic loss is identified as useful for the client.

Towards these ends an initially suggested typology of identifiable forms of loss of self includes:

- (1) Loss of the synergistic object. This may be considered as a disruption of an established operating pattern in a specific context such as a relationship, role, or environment. When operational the experience of self in the synergistic object is a fluid integration of self as object and self as agency. This high level of subjective flow in the functional synergistic object is the reason it is often taken for granted. As such, a main task in mourning this level of self is the acknowledgement, through objectification, of senses of self as agency and object at stake in this disruption. For example, it is often the case in marital separation that both spouses will comment, 'I didn't know what was there till it was gone'. Another comment often heard in response to the loss of a synergistic object is, 'Things use to be so easy'.
- (2) Loss of self as agency. The loss of the sense of self as

agency is often the first loss of self experienced in any disrupted synergistic object. It is related to the failure of existing cognitive-behavioral strategies in continuing to meet felt needs, in relationships, roles, or environments. It usually triggers negative focus on self as object, which can divert attention from identifying the reasons for the loss of agency. As such, a main task in dealing with the loss of agency, is assessing the specific ego functions, expectations, problem-solving strategies, etc., that are disrupted; the reasons, and possible remedies. Lost abilities and ineffective strategies may require active renunciation, before new integrations of self as agency can be recommitted to. Finally, the negative sense of self as object should always be checked for in relation to a loss of agency, in order to provide a therapeutic loss, if necessary. Such object images of self can be distorted and laden with affect, and therefore disruptive of consequent functioning.

- (3) Loss of the performing self. It is often useful to consider the loss of agency in terms of a pattern of activity that is lost in a role or relationship. I have used the term, loss of the performing self, to denote such a case. For example, loss of the complex pattern of activity in a job, or, a pattern of parental activity could fit this type. Clearly, senses of self as object will be closely linked with awareness of a performing self. However, the amount of energy and extent of information processing style bound-up in a performing self, often warrants designating it as a unitary configuration. The main task here, is to identify different activities bundled in a performing self, mourn the dissolution of that particular configuration, and recommit to a new way of putting the same, or similar activities together.
- (4) Loss of the regressively performing self. In a similar way that it is sometimes useful to designate a form of self as agency, as a performing self, it is also useful to denote a pattern of activity that is relied on for coping at a regressive level, as the regressively performing self. This can give the client a clear sense of the particular pattern of information processing and ego functions they need to mourn and separate from. The main task here, is to help the client see the benefit in experiencing a therapeutic loss of self as agency.
- (5) Loss of the tacitly performing self. In the process of revivifying earlier scenes, it may be the case that past senses of self as active agent come into focal awareness. For example, an adult may bring to life memories of

childhood where their active functioning as mediator, or, parent to other family members stands out. Or, there may be memories of lost hope of turning active abilities into adult roles such as, athlete, dancer, etc. Or, there may be painful memories of the loss of the performing self, due to injury, awareness of competitive ability, lack of support, or what have you. The task here, would be to acknowledge not only the associated losses of self as object, but also the loss of agency in the performing self, in those old scenes.

- (6) Loss of self as object. The general form of the loss of the self as object refers to the failure of having images of self maintained in relationships, roles, or, environments. As well, it refers to choosing to separate from images of self one has decided to move past, as a therapeutic, or, developmental loss. In the general case of the loss of self as object, these images can be actual, ideal, abstract, or fantasized. Or, they may be painfully distorted, as is often the case in negative senses of self related to the loss of agency. The main task is to visualize as clearly as possible, the images of self as object, that one is going to separate from, and then cycle through activities of interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation. This allows one to recommit to new images of self.
- (7) Loss of the explicitly object-related self. This is a particular form of the loss of self as object. With the disruption of synergistic experience in an operational relationship, role, or environment, a sense of self as object, often taken for granted, will come into view. These are the images of self that are explicitly related to those current situations. For example, when leaving a job through retirement, or other reasons; one may become aware of images of themselves that the role mirrored, which they are more identified with than they thought. The main task here is to acknowledge the images of self as object as clearly as possible, determine to what extent they are threatened, and cycle through interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation as needed.
- (8) Loss of the tacitly object-related self. While explicit senses of self as object will come to the foreground of attention in the disruption of ongoing relationships, roles, environments, tacit senses of self as related to those contexts may also feel threatened. These are the deeper images of self, that one is perhaps unconscious of, or, in a state of denial of, as having a stake in the current contexts. For example, one may have felt satisfaction at functioning as a 'father figure',

'justified victim', 'star', or, 'prodigal son', etc. The main task here is to acknowledge the tacit images of self as object, as clearly as possible, determine their source, and to what extent they should be mourned or carried forward, as realistic expectations in the present. This may or may not lead into mourning the loss of the more extensive, tacit characterological self, depending on therapeutic goals at the time.

- (9) Loss of the explicit characterological self. This refers to radical challenges to the explicit pattern of self images that represents the conscious range of self as object. For example, a person's life may be highly structured in terms of sense of self at home, at work, and at play. A loss through death may challenge the explicitly and tacitly object-related self to such a depth, that a chronic depression is entered. The sense of self explicitly related to work and play may then also be challenged, leaving very little within the explicit characterological self for the person to fall back on. In short, there is a challenge to the explicit pattern of self as object as a whole. We might see this in situations of multiple losses; combinations of developmental and adventitious losses; as well environmental changes such as cross-cultural moves, or leaving prison. An explicit characterological self may also become outgrown or self-defeating, and require a conscious decision to separate from it, as a therapeutic loss. Also, this type of loss of self is often seen in adolescence.
- (10) Loss of the tacit characterological self. This refers to the need to experience a therapeutic loss in relation to the activation of patterns of tacit senses of self as object, which may have been triggered by other types and levels of loss. These are typically family of origin patterns of self as object, which were not mourned and adequately integrated in their time. They may reflect repeated conflicted attachments, abusive, or, neglectful situations in the past. This is the realm of forms of the lost inner child, where engagement and reintegration into the personality as a whole is needed; This is accomplished through cycles of interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation.
- (11) Loss of the tragic self. I have found it useful to include this as a distinct type of loss of self. It refers to an image of the self as wounded, that is more or less conscious, and constant. It has a life of its own that does not fit neatly in, or derive from, current contexts. It may be classed as a specific form of the explicit characterological self. Mann's (1973) notion of

an image of self in "chronically endured pain" may come closest to supporting the validity of this construct. The main task here, is to acknowledge, and cycle through a mourning process that allows integration of this sense of self, through the facilitation of therapeutic loss. This may lead into dealing with more tacit forms of self.

- (12) Loss of the traumatized self. I have also found it useful to include this as a distinct type of loss of self. It may be considered as a specific form of the tacitly object-related self. It refers to an often unconscious, and compressed image of self; in terms of the intense affect in it. There are often powerful attempts to avoid contacting it. In fact, its existence is often inferred, as the existence of a 'black hole' is, by the motion of the self around it. It is usually associated with specific, object-related incidents of abuse or loss. It may become apparent through symptomatic losses of agency, such as panic attacks. The main task here is to warm-up to engaging the traumatized self, often through indirect means, such as hypnosis, positive connotation of visible coping, etc. There will often be intense experiences of both the loss of self as agency, and the loss of self as object, that have to be acknowledged, and mourned.

This list of types of loss of self is, once again, a tentative beginning. As such, it is open to revision and addition.

Indications, Markers, and Intervention Sequencing

The need for the mourning of a loss of self can be indicated in many different ways. Because of the necessity of loss in order for the self to grow, and the subsequent pervasiveness of the loss of self throughout the lifecycle, it does not seem to be an overstatement to claim that mourning for the loss of self is a distinct change process that is indicated, to some extent, in every course of therapy. This fact reflects the necessity for developing an integrated theory of mourning for the loss of self, as well as

the potential power of such a construct. So much said, however, it immediately becomes necessary, for purposes of clinical utility, to identify as many concrete and reliable indications for mourning for the loss of self as possible. As with the types of loss of self suggested above, an initial and tentative set of such indications will be offered for consideration here.

- (1) Clearly, any client going through a developmental transition may need to deal with how the self is impacted by developmental loss.
- (2) Similarly, any client experiencing object loss, whether in terms of relationships, roles, or, environments, may need to deal with how the self is impacted by any , or, all of those losses.
- (3) Traumatic or stressful events would indicate the possible need to mourn losses of self. Here, attention to the loss of agency may be particularly required.
- (4) Clients with chronic patterns of failure, self-defeat, and non-adaptive involvements may be operating around tacit images of self, that are out-moded, but still clung to. They may require a therapeutic loss of self.

These indications of the necessity for engaging in the change process of mourning for the loss of self follow fairly straightforwardly from the theory preceding them. They relate directly to the types of loss of self that can occur, and the need for loss to occur, in order for the self to grow.

Another, more subtle indication of need for mourning types of loss of self are those patterns of blocked, or reversed therapeutic movement, in the course of counselling and therapy, that are often referred to as resistances. In the practice of short-term therapy it is common to observe clients reach different forms of impasses in progress towards their stated and desired goals. The client may

acknowledge that, rationally, they are well aware that there is no reason why they cannot make the decision or change they have decided they really want. However, 'It does not feel right for the person I am', 'I know it would be best but I've still got my heart set on...', 'I feel like I would be betraying myself', 'I do not have the right', 'I just can't get past...', and so on.

The essence of this type of block appears to be loyalty, not so much to a principle, person, or value; although it may be rationalized as such, as it is defensive loyalty to a sense of self, or image of self. The client will often come to accept that their rationalizations, in fact, are not reason enough to warrant the continued support for the no longer adaptive sense of self. It is almost as if these clients feel a duty to stand-by a misunderstood friend, or a child who had never got a fair break. They can be seen to be protecting a valued state of self that they feel has not found adequate expression, recognition, support, or closure in its time. Often these states of self are sensed as such powerfully charged sources of possibility that they are kept secret from the therapist, in fear that they would once again be unrecognized in terms of the felt significance they have for the client.

Out of this type of resistance, it is possible to define a marker that might reliably signify the need for engaging in the therapeutic event of mourning for the loss of self. This event marker indicates that at this point in the therapeutic process, the client needs to directly deal with mourning for a loss of self, in

order to proceed towards the chosen therapeutic goals. The event marker signalling this need should contain the following elements:

- (1) A block to a chosen goal that revolves around expressed references to some form of loyalty to an image, or, sense of self.
- (2) The client's agreement, that in the form expressed, this image, or, sense of self is now non-adaptive for their chosen goals.
- (3) The rational exclusion of other means to resolving and explaining the block.

For example, an agoraphobic client may have decided to take some risks by gradually exposing themselves to public situations. Repeated commitments to these gradual experiments never seem to get off the ground. The client comes to agree that it is not only fear of losing control (loss of agency), and experiencing the repetition of a state of panic (the traumatized self), but also, a reluctance to risk the new level of coping she has already gained (the performing self), and the proud self-image she now has with herself, her family, and the therapist (the explicitly object-related self). Seen in this fine-grained way, it is easy to understand her reluctance in beginning the process of desensitization.

With the identification of this set of states of self as perhaps comprising the knot of resistance, client and therapist review other possible explanations; the level of anxiety in the beginning steps of desensitization, any self-defeating anger or guilt, beliefs about the change, transference meanings, and so on. The client and therapist may discover in this process, that in fact, it is foremost, the secondary gain of the tragic self, that

is being clung to in the block to agreed upon change. The tragic self has been reliable and stoic; it has been a pained but constant self that has earned respect and dignity as a survivor. The client is afraid of abandoning the integrity in this image of self, and needs this self acknowledged, thanked, and mourned, with the integrity passed on as a legacy to the new self; before she can proceed.

Consequently, the client agrees that other explanations are not responsible for the block at this point in the process, and that the tragic self, once acknowledged, is now out-moded to her desire to grow. At this point, a technique for the mourning of the loss of the tragic self would proceed.

This formal structure of the event marker can be used less formally as a guide for the therapist, in generating hypotheses about the client's need to identify and shed images and senses of self, that might be blocking progress towards stated goals. Used in this way, the therapist keeps perception checking with the client as to the goals desired, but might keep the process of testing and eliminating alternative hypotheses for the block to him/herself, until sure that it is centration on a sense of self that is at issue.

For example, a middle-aged couple wanted marriage counselling. The woman, raised a devout catholic, with a career of her own, asked her husband to leave, saying she was tired of him constantly changing jobs and returning to school. Her goals were for him to decide on a steady form of employment, and for communication to

improve. The husband, prone to intellectualization of emotional issues, nonetheless agreed with the wife's goals and descriptions of him, except he felt she should take a look at herself, also. In checking on this direction with the wife, the therapist observes silent, nonverbal agreement, combined with a glazed and distant look. The therapist notes a possible split here, between an explicit and perhaps a tacit sense of self.

It becomes clear in the following session that the wife is prepared to volunteer little of her own experience towards working on communication, identifying her own issues, or any role she could play in supporting her husband in his career efforts. She seems most comfortable sitting in silent judgement of her husband, and focusing on what he can do to improve things. The therapist becomes more attentive to what might be a split in her self experience, but checks other possibilities: Have her goals changed, are there immediate emotional issues such as guilt or anger shutting her down, does she want time on her own, is she clear about the process of counselling and the therapist's expectations, etc. These things she indicates as non-issues for her, but there seems to be anxiety and resentment in reaction to these probes, indicating perhaps, a need to defend a possible split in her self. With several indications of a split now noted, and a sense of being blocked in progress towards confirmed goals, a decision to take more history is made, in order to identify sources of any such split. The wife went to private Catholic school, and is the only member of her family to achieve a university education.

She says about private school, "I figured out really quick what to say and how to act to get by the best. It was easy". She did not date until she was nineteen, and was attracted to her husband, her second boyfriend, because "he looked sensitive and intellectually superior". She went through high school and most of university within a peer group of four or five constant female companions. She graduated with her BA before her twenty-second birthday.

How did you see yourselves? "We were special, we knew what we wanted and where we were going, not like a lot of other people our age". Do you see your self as different now from what you were then? "Not in a lot of ways. Its something I don't think about. I just like to get things done, although I can't see myself getting a divorce, but things have to change". You must have been very proud of yourself when you graduated. "No". Did you still feel like a kid when you graduated? She bristles with an angry denial.

At this point the therapist now has a working image of an hypothesized tacit characterlogical self, underneath the current functioning of the wife. She seems to have taken a great deal of delight and pride in her real cleverness and intellectual abilities. However, this was a secret and overtly denied pride, possibly as an adaptation to the values of humility and role of females in her religious environment. This proud self-image was supported by evidence of her academic relative standing, and mirrored by a peer group that functioned as a secret society for mutual admiration. This group, itself, may have provided a safe forum in which the psychological functions of adolescent rebellion

and egocentrism could secretly occur, while on the outside appearing to be a model of Catholic humility. The group could sit in self-satisfied and silent judgement, behind their surface adjustment, not only on the ways of the world, but also on the ways of some of the authorities within the inner sanctum. They indeed felt special, and this specialness was protected from challenge by their skill at giving others what they wanted, on the surface. The therapist was beginning to understand some of the husband's depressive complaints, about his wife's sense of smugness, at her own success and his perceived failures. As well, the in-session lack of genuine engagement and sense of judgemental distance towards the therapist was beginning to be clarified.

At this point, a fairly complex hypothesis is now available, about the experience of blocked progress towards the stated goals of the wife, that indicate the possible utility of mourning for the loss of self as a change process. The explicit characterological self of the wife, with its conscious pattern of surface agreement, critical judgement, smugness, need for control of closeness and distance, and self-image of proud self-sufficiency, is seen as the immediate obstacle to progress. Parts of it may need to be given up in order for this woman to meet some of her goals in relationships. It is further hypothesized that in relation to the original marital crisis, some of the husband's experimenting with career at midlife is healthy flexibility, whereas the wife's rigid explicit characterological self is put in conflict with this operating style. She must either change and become less rigid

herself, or protect her style through separation or demands for the husband to change in her direction. Most importantly, the tacit characterological self, as a set of self experiences out of awareness, which may be the source of the problematic, explicitly functioning self, is coming into focus.

These hypotheses about the types and levels of therapeutic loss that it may be useful for this client to undergo, have been generated by the therapist's awareness of a block, the continual checking with the client as to desired goals given the block, and testing and elimination of other reasons for the block.

At this point, the therapist has decisions to make regarding the sequencing of therapeutic losses of self that it might be useful for this client to experience. Generally, it would seem to make sense to work from the most experience-near sense of self that needs to be mourned, towards deeper ones. For example, if a client is currently experiencing a separation or loss, one would deal with acknowledging the vividness of the grief, numbness, confusion, disorientation, etc., in the break-up of a synergistic object. Then, specific losses of agency would be acknowledged and dealt with, since they can be the most immediately painful and disruptive of functioning and decision making. Following this, the loss of self as object, explicitly related to the current crisis might require attention next. This sequence then might lead naturally into tacit levels of object-related and characterological losses of self, as the effects of the current loss ripple through the person's self-structure.

This sequence of working from experience-near to deeper levels of self however, should not be seen as a lock-stepped sequence. Once one is comfortable with 'seeing the self' and its various facets, one can follow the openings the client provides towards the most felicitous engagement of the client in the change process of mourning the loss of self.

For example, in the above case, the wife has not, from her perspective, experienced the collapse of a synergistic object. Her husband has, through his eyes, but for the wife it is largely business as usual based on the functioning of the explicit characterological self. Her pattern of contact with him has not changed that much for her. Therefore, there is no need to acknowledge grief or disorientation in her, as there is in the husband. And, there is no need to acknowledge any, already experienced loss of agency for her, as there is for the husband. It might be useful for her to experience a therapeutic loss in regard to her performing self in the relationship, but she has not experienced any degree of loss of agency as yet, in fact, she may be feeling more effective with her husband's compliance with her view of the problem.

Given these considerations, the explicit levels of object self come to mind as the most experience-near types of loss of self to begin with in this case. These would be experimented with, in order to test the client's receptivity to becoming objective about these senses of self, and evaluating the adaptiveness of their continued functioning. For example, tentative and neutral feedback

on explicit operating styles such as, 'I'm just observing, but are you aware that you ...', 'Would you mind if I pointed out something?'; as well as immediacy, 'I experience you as becoming distant/critical/confused, etc., when I ask about your feelings/thoughts/images of self', etc. If these attempts at acknowledging explicit levels of self experience are successful, then one might go directly to interpreting their meaning with the client; differentiating between existing explicit ways of doing and being, and possible new ways of doing and being; and enact conscious renunciation and separation from old ways of doing and being, with recommitment to the new ways of doing and being.

If however, as there was in this case, a high degree of defensiveness about acknowledging explicit patterns and senses of self, there is utility in a beginning focus on tacit patterns and images of self. This can create a safe distance from perceived threats of change in current explicit levels of functioning, and with gradual insight into the tacit levels of self, make explicit change seem more understandable and less threatening. Consequently, with this client, images of the tacitly object-related self were drawn out of different past relationships, which revealed the pattern of the tacit characterological self: Parents, siblings, teachers, peers, and boyfriend. She was helped in the interpretation and evaluation of the range of adaptiveness, given the limited range of the environments in which the characterological self was created. She was asked to differentiate between those images and senses of self, and ways in which she really was now, in

her adult relationships. This helped her move back toward the explicit level of her functioning, beginning the process of wider integration. Finally, she was asked to visualize as clearly as possible, the old, less adaptive ways of being and new more adaptive ways of being, and make active choices between them; mourning the ones that she decided she would let pass.

In summary of this section, we have suggested some general indications, and a more specific event marker, for indicating the possible need for utilization of the change process of mourning the loss of self. As well, some suggestions on sequencing the types and levels of mourning for the loss of self were given. Next, given identification of the need for mourning the loss of self, assumptions about the basic process involved, and, techniques for facilitating it are presented.

The Basic Process and Facilitating Technique

Assuming the correctness of the claim that every therapy may activate, at some level, the change process of mourning for the loss of self, it may also be correct to say that there are many techniques that could facilitate the process once it is identified as a necessary clinical task. This is recognized here. However, it is also recognized here, that the change process of mourning for the loss of self may be best facilitated by techniques that address specific therapeutic tasks related to moving through the change process, in the most effective way. As such, assumptions about a

generic process will be suggested, which is believed to be the core change process. Next, a set of process instructions which are specifically designed to facilitate the process will be offered. Once again, these suggestions do not claim to be perfect, or, the last word in technique or process. It is assumed that any technique which accomplishes the necessary and sufficient therapeutic tasks related to the change process, are in fact, germane. These initial suggestions towards providing a "task analysis" (Rice & Greenberg, 1984), compatible with an integrated model of the process of mourning for the loss of self, invite revision and fine-tuning, towards making the clinical use of the change process more effective and reliable.

Assumptions about the generic change process of mourning for the loss of self are:

- (1) Clients who exhibit issues with developmental and adventitious losses, and/or the need for therapeutic losses around blocks, splits, and self-defeating behaviours, may be operating around problematic but still clung to states of self.
- (2) This sense of self may initially only be expressed in terms of diffuse values, hopes, expectations, dreams, some combination of such, or, behavioral signs of dissociation. However, it is assumed that at core, a concrete image of self can be identified, from which these attributes emanate. It is assumed that these images can be distinguished to some extent, in terms of the types and levels of loss of self described above.
- (3) It is assumed that the bringing into clear awareness of these concrete images of self, and engaging them in the therapeutic context as 'living entities', will best promote their dissolution and integration as more abstract structural properties of the personality. For example, an adolescent image of self as abandoned and powerless may be transformed into a sense of courage and strength, in relation to the tragic aspects of life.

- (4) It is assumed that once these concrete images of self are found, and engaged, the process necessary to their transformation will be similar to a mourning process. Clinical experience suggests the key process is an intentional and active separating from and grieving for, the image of self in question. This may involve crying for, talking to, saying goodbye, appreciating and thanking, etc., the aspect of self being shed. The types of loss of self, and, the notion of the total mourning process as made up of discrete cognitive-affective patterns, can be used as a guide for ways in which to engage these images of self, for the restructuring of self in relation to loss. eg. acknowledgement, testing, interpretation, differentiation, renunciation, recommitment, reintegration.
- (5) Clinical experience suggests that resolution begins with acts of differentiation and renunciation, where separation from subjective fusion with the old states of self begins to occur and is consciously resolved. Sometimes, there are verbal reports of sensations and feelings of separation, such as, 'I'm drifting away', 'I felt a snap', etc. This is often followed by positive emotionality, eg. Happy crying, sobbing. A working through phase often begins here, characterized by speaking in the past tense, in a more cognitive tone. eg. 'You know I was...', 'It was funny was'nt it', 'I really thought that', etc.

This generic description of the core change process of mourning for the loss of self, is designed to map the general process where one identifies, contacts, and tracks, the targets of change, which are the concrete images of self which need to be acknowledged, shed, and mourned; as well as the various problematic senses of agency related to them. However, this macro level of process description, suggests, but does not clearly describe process instructions; or techniques, at the micro level of individual experience, within the process. A suggested set of such process instructions represent therapeutic tasks, that both client and therapist need to perform in order to effectively complete the change process of mourning for the loss of self. Such a set of

process instructions could conceivably be applied, in turn, to each type and level of loss of self. This represents a powerful potential within this change process. In practice, this tends to involve allowing the client's goals and readiness for change, to set limits to the depth and extent of mourning for the loss of self.

In experimenting with the change process of mourning for the loss of self, various techniques were tried, in order to resolve the psychic clinging to problematic states of self, once it was recognized that they could not be interpreted or reasoned away with purely cognitive means. Two-chair technique (Greenberg, 1984) was thought to be appropriate, given the fact that this was a type of 'split'. However, it was found that once the former state of self was activated, the client's most pressing need seemed to be to speak from that form of entity, to a responding other (the therapist), and not another aspect of self. Two-chair technique, when the client would agree to it, seemed most useful in the final working through phase.

The approach that seemed to have the best sense of flow, for both client and therapist, in terms of moving through the change process, involved giving the client *focusing directives*. Focusing directives target specified inner structures as the goal of the client's attention; and specified ways of interacting with such. Here, the client is asked to engage in an inner search for the most basic sense of self, or, the clearest image of self, that seems to be associated with their immediate sense of a block, which is

An eighteen year old male was referred for counselling, near the end of his final year of high school, because of dropping from honour role to non-attendance, admitted drug use (Cocaine and LSD), and a recent suicide attempt. He presented with clear, and thoughtful determination to kill himself. In order not to spoil the mood of classmates and friends, he had decided to wait until the end of the school year, and then once graduation was over, he would kill himself. He had decided on drug overdose, had signed an organ donor card, and prepared a brief will, which basically instructed people not to feel bad, since no one but himself was to blame. He could not specify why he had sentenced himself to death: "I don't know, I just don't know, but I see no other way". He calmly promised me he would not kill himself before the end of the school year, and that he might as well continue seeing me, since he had given up most other commitments, which he saw as superfluous while waiting for death. He hoped I wouldn't take it personally when he inevitably killed himself.

In taking an initial history, it became apparent that until recently, he had been a "golden boy". Teachers phoned him at home to offer him special opportunities. He felt he could never turn them down without hurting their feelings. People told him how "reliable and responsible" he was. Mother and father were currently in a state of abject confusion. He had never been in trouble before, never defied them, or rebelled in any way. His grandparents always told him how bright he was, how far he would go in life. Other students and friends envied him.

He had enjoyed and bought into this for a long time, but it was getting stressful trying to live up to the ideal image everyone else had of him, as "great and good". However, his sense of selfworth, and his belief about what made people he cared about happy, had become conditional to this performing self. Consequently, he could not let on when his experience of himself did not match the glowing image others seemed to need to see him through. In fact, it seemed clear that a large part of the guilty depression motivating his suicidal intent, was related to not living up to the expectations of loved ones. He felt like a "deceitful imposter", and was condemning himself for it. He was not giving others what they wanted, and felt guilty and depressed about it.

Family and teachers played into this in part, by clinging and responding to the performing self, exhorting him to "be the best he could be", etc. Favorite teachers offered him even more special opportunities; field trips out of the country. He avoided answering by attending school even less, and, doing more drugs to numb the guilt and depression. Anyway, he would "be dead before the departure date".

It seemed clear that Matt's identity had been foreclosed by others approval of a narrow range of behaviour; and that this had attenuated his separation-individuation process. He had never had 'messaging around' valued as creative self-exploration, so a part of him was making up for lost time, in spades. Getting the family and school to lower their expectations, and put out the message that

they could value Matt's social-emotional development, as well as his intellectual development, helped to lessen some of the destructive mirroring that was used by Matt to confirm the validity of his guilty depression.

Matt himself however, needed to undergo a therapeutic loss, and separate from his explicit characterological self. It was easy enough to lead Matt into a useful depressive response to his belated individuation, as opposed to the guilty depression he kept trying to ward off with drugs and avoidance. The split between his authentically felt boredom, resentment, and desire to explore new feelings; and the over-compliant, other-directed "golden boy", was followed as the thread along which out-moded and nascent aspects of self were visualized and engaged. Within each current relationship Matt was directed to objectify as clearly as possible, how he thought he was expected to be, and work through cycles of interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation.

The therapist made it clear that he considered Matt's observing, more authentic self, as the 'real Matt'. This was characterized as the self going through a vital and individuating 'rite of passage'. As forms of the 'golden boy' were differentiated and shed in this transition, Matt easily let go of the guilty depression, as he accepted and integrated the loss of the out-moded, explicit characterological self.

However, a sense of real despair remained, and became more evident within the authentic self. This expressed itself repeatedly, as a fear of being "unable to compete" in an adult male

world. Matt agreed, that rationally, he had more proven intellectual resources than most, however, the feeling of being unable to compete grew in intensity as a block to committing to future goals.

A tacit characterological self was suspected as being underneath this block, which fit the criteria for being considered as a marker, indicating the need for identifying and mourning a loss of self. Additional history taking from Matt provided no significant clues. At this point the parents were interviewed again, with the aim of getting more developmental history. In the course of this, mother revealed that Matt was born with a genital defect, where the urethra is partially laid open down the length of the penis. In grades one and two Matt had undergone a series of painful, and unsuccessful operations attempting to close the urethra, which broke open time and again. Mother, said she was concerned about psychological effects at the time, but that doctors waved these off as unimportant.

In revivifying this time with her son, mother was very emotional, which was clearly related to deep sympathy for her young son's suffering. She was directed to describe concrete scenes which came to mind. She said she went to the hospital everyday, and remembered how brave her son was. After each failed operation, she remembered Matt would grimly say. "I knew it would'nt work". Then, she remembered how she had tried to encourage him to be positive. She would read, and recite with Matt, the story of the 'little deer who could grow horns', if only he believed he could.

It was an 'inspirational book', provided by the hospital to the children's ward.

This story became a symbol of hope that seems to have meant different things for mom than it did for Matt. For mom it was used like a nursery rhyme with which to sooth and reassure her son. For seven-year-old Matt the story itself stood out, as well as his perception of his mom's need for both of them to collude in denying Matt's real feelings about his situation. Seven-year-old Matt came to the conclusion that he needed to protect mom from his real feelings. They seemed to hurt her too much. He genuinely valued her loving and caring intentions however, so he fed back to her the positive attitude she seemed to need from him. But he did not believe it. Mom had unintentionally 'stolen' Matt's emotional reality, and substituted her own, which Matt tried to validate out of love.

The story itself, had an unfortunate emotional and symbolic equivalence with Matt's genital defect, which seems to have functioned in a hypnotically inductive way. The little deer it seemed, felt unable to 'compete' with all the other male deer who sprouted striking antlers, as they came to maturity in 'deer adolescence'. However, when encouraged to 'believe that he could', the little deer miraculously grew horns. Matt secretly knew he could not, but what he did know, was that he felt a great affinity with the initial despair of the little deer. This too, he kept secret, even from himself, as, at the age of eighteen, he stood filled with that despair, on the verge of entering the adult male

world.

Clearly, this convergence of self and symbol in relationships explained a lot. Matt's late adolescent rebellion was understandable in terms of a repressed sexual interest in the opposite sex, due to inferiority feelings related to his penial defect. He compensated by prolonging a state of latency-aged industry, and earned the bulk of his self-esteem through concentrating on school performance, at the cost of his social-emotional development. His lack of discussion of girlfriends now made sense. The depth and confused certainty of his suicidal intent became clear. His tacit and unconscious sense of himself as an eternally, pre-pubescent boy, that could not compete in the adult world with 'fully antlered males' became the target of change.

Matt was directed to focus on and visualize his seven-year-old self in the hospital. He was directed to review meaningful scenes, and choose himself, one's that were related to the 'little deer'. He was directed to describe, from the position of his observing self, any meanings these images had for him. For him, "telling mom what she wanted to here", was identified. His tone was one of disgust, at his own duplicity. He was asked if he could identify any connections with his recent emotional situation. He identified, "anger at myself for not being myself". He was asked if he could remember how he saw himself, related to his penial defect. He could identify "nothing", he said, with a sense of obvious shame. He was asked how the little deer had felt about not

having antler's like the rest of the deer. He started to chuckle, and said in disbelief, "I think I see what you are getting at". Additional meanings and connections were drawn out at his own pace over several sessions.

Consciously connecting the tacit characterlogical self with the explicit characterlogical self, was clearly the major turning point for Matt. His mood and optimism improved, his drug use dropped off, and his parents confirmed the change. Neither Matt nor myself, considered him to be a suicide risk after that.

The seven-year-old sense of self continued to be worked however, to maximize integration of disowned feelings. When asked near the point of renunciation, what he would like to carry forward from the seven-year-old, the reply was, "his sense of reality". When asked what he would like to leave behind, the reply was, "being too nice".

Matt began to clarify goals, and made some short-term commitments to work while he making up his grade twelve credits. He allowed himself to enjoy pursuing his own interests and activities, without guilt or depression. He seemed to have learned that even the darkest experiences of self can be examined in terms of the processes by which they are constructed, and that real hope is best found in identifying more with those processes, rather than any particular image along the way, which, sooner or later will need to be mourned, as out-lived aspects of self.

CHAPTER FOUR

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS AND APPLICATIONS

Much has been covered in the preceding pages. The intent has basically been threefold. First, to establish a theoretical basis for considering mourning the loss of self as a common, but distinct class of therapeutic event and change process. This was attempted through an extensive literature review which discussed and critiqued the extent to which existing theories and approaches provide converging evidence for the concept. To have this point alone given consideration, would, in my mind, qualify the project as a whole as worthwhile.

Second, based on the findings of the literature review, an attempt was made to describe an integrated model of mourning for the loss of self.

Third, based on this initial model, an attempt was made to suggest both therapist and client task and process instructions, that would represent a beginning description of the clinical technique, utilizing the change process of mourning for the loss of self. This was demonstrated with examples and case studies.

These goals, as attempts to establish an initial model of mourning for the loss of self, have been accomplished. It remains for others to evaluate the arguments in favour of the model as sound or lacking. The adequacy of the initial model, and the technical processes suggested for utilizing it, also remain to be subjected to clinical tests.

In fact, this would be the next step in the model of psychotherapeutic research suggested by Rice and Greenberg (1984). In their "discovery orientated approach", clinical models are built from the bottom up. The goal is to start from the phenomenology of clinical experience, and identify and understand the internal operations of the client, and the most effective set of therapist interventions for resolving any specified class of therapeutic event. In this process, a generic "performance model" is abstracted out of a series of actual client performances. This is then tested again, against additional actual client performances.

This results in a progressive cycling between tentative rational maps and models, and increasingly more definitive maps and models, as the evolving performance models either support client change, or, fail to do so, and are therefore revised. The ultimate goal is to refine and build-up models of change mechanisms, for different classes of therapeutic events, which are as valid and reliable as possible. The final step, of this discovery-orientated process, would be to produce a step by step manual, which would enable a therapist unfamiliar with the particular change process to effectively utilize it with a client.

This thesis is intended in the spirit of this discovery-orientated research approach. As such, the step attained here, is that of an initial tentative performance model, describing the change process of mourning for the loss of self as a distinct class of therapeutic event.

From this starting point there are two basic directions research with the model can take. The first involves outcome studies. Here, the initial performance model could be operationalized as a circumscribed set of markers, tasks, and instructions, comprising an experimental treatment, which is compared to another therapeutic treatment, on outcome variables. This would establish some degree of validity to the claim of uniqueness as a change process, and, reliability as a treatment.

The second direction, would be to continue with verification steps aimed at refining and verifying the essential details of the change process itself. This would involve development of observational categories with reliability and construct validity, representing a generic performance model, and then subjecting these to empirical trials, through more cycles of testing against actual client performances, until a final performance model was isolated.

It is hoped that the performance model of mourning for the loss of self presented here, would eventually be subjected to tests in both of these research directions.

Apart from research directions, areas of application are potentially widespread. The adaptive demands upon the self to continually restructure in the face of an unrelenting procession of developmental and adventitious losses, throughout life, is a ubiquitous human reality. The possibility of psychically clinging to out-worn and no longer adaptive states of self are numerous in every life. Therefore, mourning for the loss of self as an inevitably necessary change process, is potentially applicable to

every person, many times throughout their life. This fact supports the significance of this study, as well as the value of its future refinement through continued research.

A potentially significant area of application relates to non-clinical prevention. As the model is refined, and principles and processes verified as reliable, teaching the facilitation of aspects of mourning for the loss of self as a **parenting skill** becomes possible. The basic principle of helping a child to decenter from an out-moded operating self, and helping them to objectify, process, and separate from it, from the position of an observing self, is not that complex: "Its sad to say goodbye to your little self". However, the potential for the prevention of future difficulties related to psychic clinging at fixation points, due to the failure to restructure the self in the face of life's losses, is enormous. It basically amounts to teaching parents the skill of facilitating therapeutic losses, rather than just giving support to their children as they cope with developmental and adventitious losses.

Within the clinical field, potential applications, assuming the validity of the model and change process as unique and reliable, abound. For example, the types and levels of loss of self could be used as a matter of course, to assess the type of self most needing intervention, in relation to any client presenting with concerns related to developmental or adventitious losses. Similarly, the types and levels of loss of self could be used as a guide for giving accurate empathy to clients dealing with

losses of all kinds, since fine distinctions are identified within the phenomenology of self experience, in relation to loss. Most importantly, the model introduces the concept, and makes possible the identification of **therapeutic losses of self**, which it may be useful for clients to undergo, in order to achieve their stated goals.

The model could also be applied to the supplementation of existing therapeutic techniques. For example, psychodrama may have a natural affinity with mourning for the loss of self. The processes of warming-up, selecting a scene, and enacting critical processes; fits naturally with identifying a sense of self, intensifying it, and engaging it as an entity, for the purposes of cycling through interpretation, differentiation, and renunciation of out-moded states of self. Similarly, family therapy has for some time acknowledged the notion of a family mourning process, as a feature of all families coping with inevitable change in life. The model of mourning for the loss of self, with its experience-near detail, could easily be fitted to facilitate the family mourning process with much more percision and acuity. Clearly, in similar ways, most existing therapeutic techniques, could incorporate some aspects of the change process of mourning for the loss of self, whether it be hypnotherapy, or psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and so on.

While the change process identified within the model may be universal enough to apply to all populations in some degree, there are specific populations that the model could tend to benefit more

than others. For example, universal developmental transitions, such as adolescence, may be particularly facilitated by the model, as well as cases of delayed and complicated mourning related to object loss; as the case studies suggest. Also cross-cultural counselling, which acknowledges that many levels of self are forced to undergo restructuring in the face of large-scale, social contextual shifts, may find the model useful. Of particular interest, is the possible application to amelioration of personality disorders, where a person's explicit and tacit characterological patterns of self may usefully be processed through the experience of a series of therapeutic losses.

Finally, there may be a spiritual dimension of applicability here. Non-attachment to states of self is a core principle of the many schools of Buddhism. Buddhism ultimately characterizes human problems as a function of the anxious mind's clinging to states of self which are mistakenly imbued with a sense of ultimate reality. In this process of psychic clinging, people, and perhaps much of humanity, become victims of their own auto-identifications in pervasive ways. The model of mourning for the loss of self presented here is cognizant of this meta-level principle, and has hoped to remain integral to it, in vision and intention, at the psychological level. The idea of extending the concept of mourning for the loss of self to the meditative level, is beyond this study, but certainly compatible with it.

Shanti.

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