

Articulating The Female Subject: The Example of Marian Engel's *Bear*

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ABSTRACT

The article proposes to use fiction about women by women writers to investigate the nature of the contemporary female subject. Lou, the heroine of Marian Engel's *Bear*, confronts the difficulties that she has with male domination in an intense relationship with a tame bear. She imports the categories of the patriarchy into this relationship, and, although she succeeds in solving some of her personal problems, ultimately she cannot resolve her problems with male domination in isolation because the female subjectivity is socially constructed. Thus the resolution of the novel is deformed by contradictions.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet essai propose d'utiliser les romans par des femmes au sujet des femmes pour interroger le sujet féminin contemporain. Lou, l'héroïne de Marian Engel's *Bear* fait face aux ses difficultés avec la domination masculine dans un rapport intense avec un ours apprivoisé. Elle introduit des catégories patriarcales dans ce rapport, et, bien qu'elle réussisse à résoudre bien des ses problèmes. À la fin, elle ne peut pas résoudre ses problèmes avec la domination patriarcale en isolation, parce que le sujet féminin est socialement construit. Ainsi, le dénouement du roman est déformé par des contradictions.

Marian Engel's *Bear*, 1976, mocks some Canadian literary concerns usually handled with an excess of high seriousness, for example, the Canadian encounter with the wilderness. The importance granted to this encounter results from a belated Romanticism, which, according to Eli Mandel, transforms Canadian literature into a Gothic novel (148-149). In this model, Engel's rather torpid bear plays Gothic lover in a double parody of the Great Canadian Novel and the Gothic romance. The analogy works because both Gothic and Canadian novels revert obsessively to questions of identity.¹ Lou senses a rebirth (12), but as what? Into what? Just as Canadian writers must distinguish their work from that of writers in other countries more dominant and powerful, so must the woman seeking a new identity define herself against dominant and powerful man. The Canadian woman writer must deal with a colonial mentality, a male, literary tradition, and the patriarchy, all at once. In all three confrontations, the issue, finally, is how to deal with the powerful Other, an Other that is not individual, but institutional, with a

long past and all the glamorous trappings of money, power, and respectability.² In *Bear*, Engel manages to debunk the colonial mentality, the male, literary tradition, and even that representative of the wilderness, Noble Savage, Demon Lover and fairy tale Prince, the bear, but she cannot, finally, debunk the patriarchy. At the level of female identity, then, the novel becomes serious, deformed by irreconcilable tensions. Faced with articulating her own subjectivity, Lou fails, because no one woman can succeed at this: subjectivity is constituted collectively, and from a position of power.

We are already familiar with the puzzle facing those who attempt to constitute an identity in a language in which they figure as Other, rather than as Self. Jacques Derrida has taught us to be wary of oppositions like Self/Other which privilege one side over the other. The terms "self" and "subject" are dangerous in themselves, Luce Irigaray insists, as they imply an ultimately phallic unity:

Thus a woman's (re)discovery of herself can only signify the possibility of not sacrificing any of her pleasures to another, of not identifying with anyone in particular, of never being simply one.³

Teresa De Lauretis, in *Alice Doesn't*, reveals some of the difficulties faced by feminists trying to define the female subject in a patriarchal language:⁴

Either they have assumed that 'subject,' like the 'man,' is a generic term, and as such can designate equally and at once the female and the male subjects, with the result of erasing sexuality and sexual difference from subjectivity. Or else they have been obliged to resort to an oppositional notion of 'feminine' subject defined by silence, negativity, a natural sexuality, or a closeness to nature not compromised by patriarchal culture. But such a notion—which simply reverts woman to the body and to sexuality as an immediacy of the biological, as nature—has no autonomous theoretical grounding and is moreover quite compatible with the conceptual framework of the sciences of man ... (184).

The central question—How can the female subject be characterized—is troubled by the realization that such a subjectivity exists in a society and within a discourse dominated by masculine subjectivity. In order to avoid the risk that theorizing about the female subject turns into the mere manipulation of suspect linguistic counters, it seems wise to follow De Lauretis' suggestion that we attempt to constitute the female subject by looking at female experience. She suggests we follow a "political, theoretical, self-analyzing practice by which the relations of the subject in social reality can be rearticulated from the historical experience of women" (186). Theory must not be privileged over practice, nor should women be abstracted from their particular social experience.

One source of this experience is novels written by women with women as the central characters. The text is a record of the woman writer's experience as she tries to resolve the contradictions faced by the central character at the level of fictional experience (Spacks 5). Thus a study of *Bear*, a novel where the issue of sexuality is central, can provide insight into the difficulties faced by women. The text supports the formation of a female subject based on neither of the two common approaches discussed by De Lauretis: Lou rejects the option of androgyny, which obliterates sexual difference, nor does she, despite her love for the bear, feel a privileged relationship with nature. *Bear* attempts to establish the argument that the sole necessary

foundation for the female subject is female eroticism. This eroticism includes those elements—dream, fantasy, play, and "perversion" that Freud used to undermine the previously impervious nineteenth-century male bourgeois subject. But the novel, finally, cannot solve the contradictions that come with the attempt to split eroticism from sexuality and (hetero)sexuality from (male) power, and thus, in De Lauretis' terms, becomes "oppositional." Power is male. These cannot, at least in twentieth-century Canada, be split, except in social isolation. Many novels solve the problem by finding the perfect man for the heroine. Engel is not so sanguine: how can men be perfect in a patriarchal culture? Hence the bear.

In *Bear*, Lou participates, as do all women, in contradictory discourses, the majority borrowed from or designed for men, just as most visual images of women are. One is the discourse of the liberal humanist, of the individual who apparently constitutes himself freely, rationally, and by himself. This discourse of the dominant male subject is of necessity borrowed by any woman who wishes to reason. It is the voice Lou uses to combat "the awful, anarchic inner voice" (also, I suspect, an interiorized male voice), that asks "who the hell do you think you are, attempting to be alive?" (92). It is the "practical voice" which reminds her "you are here simply to carry out the instructions of the Director" (94). It is the voice which uses reason as its sole justification for existence and this logocentric male voice is the only one which seems to have been heard by the critics.

Most of the critical articles written about *Bear* have a similar thesis: Elspeth Cameron concludes that "*Bear* shows the integration of an alienated personality through contacts with a vital natural world" (93); for Donald S. Hair, *Bear* is about "the achievement of an integrated personality" (34); and S. A. Cowan writes that Lou "finds her identity and learns how to live her life through an encounter with reality in the form of the wilderness" (73). I am not going to insist that these critics are completely mistaken. The text sets up the identity quest quite clearly, and even forges a resolution of the conflicts laid out at the beginning. The resolution is incomplete, as indeed, it must be, given that Lou's problems, like all identity problems, are not simply personal, but also social. The critics' assumption that the contact with "vital" nature itself is what bestows an identity on Lou and seems to be based on the belief that nature and women, like nature and Canadians, have some special affinity. This facile conclusion is faced with Lou's complete incompetence at gardening and fishing, and her realization that she only thinks she

understands the bear, because she has been anthropomorphizing him (78-79). As Gaile McGregor points out:

exactly the same thing holds true for the landscape as a whole. . . what we take from the landscape . . . is nothing proper to its own being . . . but simply a facsimile we have abstracted for our own purposes (332).

The solutions, if any, to Lou's problems are with their source, in society, and she comes to terms with them in the wilderness only to the extent that she projects a society on to it. Finally, of course, the idea that an identity is somehow "out there" or even "in here" just waiting to be found, is idealist. Identity is a social fiction, constantly and painfully produced and reproduced in individuals. Certainly, Lou's encounter with the bear can be seen in Jungian terms as a step toward individuation, or wholeness.⁵ Simply to close off the process, to see Lou's identity as complete, "found," and "integrated" once and for all is to miss much of the novels interest for women.

After all, Lou's experience is as much one of disorder and fragmentation, of violating norms, as of fulfilling the social expectation that she will finally get her act together, find herself a good man, and tidy up her mind, messy as her basement office. Her discourse is certainly far from the unified language that produces a subject oblivious to social contradictions. Lou abandons her quest because the only social models she can discover or imagine for identity are male. Although she aspires to the condition of the dominant male subject, she cannot finally adopt it, because it requires that she become dominant, a repudiation, for her, of her female experience.

The terms I have just used—"quest," "repudiate," "aspire," "adopt"—imply that subjectivity is a matter of individual and conscious choice, which is a misconception. Lou is struggling at varying levels of consciousness with a problem of subjectivity common to many well-educated and independent modern Western women. Acculturated into a feminine subjectivity and educated formally into a masculine subjectivity, she is comfortable with neither.

Identity in *Bear* is closely connected with language, and seen as male, violent, powerful, irreconcilable with domesticity and actively misogynist. The Romantic intellectual legacy, which at one point Lou imagines she could inherit (60), is symbolized by the octagonal house itself: the library presents Lou "with a sharp and perhaps typical early nineteenth-century [male] mind" (36). Significantly, the

bear lives in an outhouse, and "the darkness of the kitchen seemed to indicate that whichever of the Carys had built the house had not consulted his woman" (57). This Romantic tradition is the basis for the language Lou is using to comprehend her world; it leaves the feminine and the sexual in shadow, but it is all she has.

Her quest for self, at first, is based on the romantic preoccupation with the hero and the individual genius. Lou reads about Beau Brummell, and thinks:

The Beau was dominating duchesses. The Beau was on the make. How she disapproved of him, how she admired him. His egg-like perfect sense of himself never faltered. . . Lucky for him he never married . . . he would have found domesticity squalid (59).

Similarly, Lou admires Trelawny's voice in his memoirs of Byron and Shelly: "Trelawny's good. He speaks in his own voice. He is unfair, but, *He speaks in his own voice*" (103). Ironically, Trelawny was notorious as a liar, about himself especially. He never married; Lou imagines him thinking of women as "useful articles" (112). Lou also admires Homer's story of the Carys, equating it with the truth (although a reader who checks will discover that he gets facts and dates wrong). Both Trelawny and Homer talk about their subjects to aggrandize themselves: Lou chose her job as archivist because it seemed "the least parasitic of the narrative historical occupations" (101). As is expected of women, she wants to reveal Cary's voice, a male voice, not to assert her own. But nonetheless, she admires the men because they have a power she feels she lacks: to dominate their subject, to create their version of the "truth." To be voiceless is to be powerless, and so she aspires to a voice.

When Lou begins her work, it is described as "the imperious business of *imposing* numerical order on a structure devised internally and personally by a mind her numbers would teach her to discover" (my italics; 40). She, too, wants to dominate. However, Homer's story, which she describes as "revealing" and "relevant" reduces her to depression. One of her ways of justifying her existence is to say "that she ordered the fragments of other lives" (93). In ordering other lives, she justifies and orders her own. This could be a description of the work of a wife and mother, who produces, nurtures, and orders the lives of others in order to "fulfill" herself. Her husband's and children's failures are hers, as are their successes. After Homer talks, Lou concludes "Colonel Cary was surely one of the great irrelevancies of Canadian history, and she was another. Neither of them was connected to anything" (93). Clearly,

she has been hoping to gain an identity for herself by discovering that of her male subject.

Lou fails to find either Cary's voice or her own; indeed, she finally abandons the search. At the beginning of the novel, in conversation or in correspondence with men, she suits her tone to theirs, and this has not changed at the end. She deliberately writes in a formal tone to the Director, although they are lovers. This formality, of course, is partly necessitated because he is her superior, and could demand that she return to the city. But her formality also closes the option that he write back asserting his power as her lover: the power, it seems, she really fears. Tempted as she is to write him "Go screw a book," she realizes that this might, by bringing the hostility implicit in their sexual relationship to the surface, arouse him to impose his authority over her. So she turns his formal language against him. Similarly, in most of her conversations with Homer, she uses his short, slangy sentences. Near the end of the work, when Homer turns up apparently to satisfy both his lust and his curiosity about Lou's relationship with the bear, she gets rid of him by either echoing him, or appearing to agree with him, "I guess I do," (150) and, "I guess it was" (151). He leaves unsatisfied. She does the same thing at the end of the novel when he presses her to visit, saying "Thanks," but not committing herself. Similarly, she replies to Joe King using his grammar, saying she "got on good" with the bear (163). One might explain the last example as politeness, but it fits neatly into a pattern where Lou adapts her language to the man who speaks to her. She does not reply to Lucy Leroy in Lucy's broken English. In fact, Lou feels a sense of identity with Lucy: "I will be like that, she thought" (49), and the similarity of their names reinforces this insight. Unlike the men, Lucy is trying to help Lou, not to dominate her, and resembles the fairy tale helper, or even Jung's Wise Old Woman. Lou recognizes her as Self, not Other, and does not shift her speech. Lou's adaptation of her speech to a male listener reveals more than mere passive powerlessness, however; it provides a kind of protective colouring, is a kind of defensive retreat, and helps her to get her way without risking a confrontation where she might lose. She is insisting on equality, but not on superiority. She will not dominate, but neither will she give in.

Only with Homer, whom she likes, she thinks, does she begin to let her defenses down. After Homer drags some trunks up from the basement for her, he suggests she dust them (he refuses to do "women's work"). He says she doesn't seem to be the kind of woman who puts house-keeping first, and she replies "Hell, no, Homer" (121). Though she does dust the trunk, "Not too well in case she

should appear to be giving in to him," but of course she already has. She is not only better educated and from a higher social class than he, but is also his employer. By drinking with him, swearing, and taking his orders, she has, in fact, demonstrated to him that she is even more his inferior than his belief in the natural inferiority of women would have indicated. Normally, Homer would excuse his own profanity ("pardon my French," 39) with a woman, and be surprised to hear it from one. By saying "hell," Lou is affirming her belief that she and Homer are equals (124). In fact, the only "equality" Homer sees in it is sexual:

You like to drink, I thought, well, she probably likes to screw and what's all that wrong with it? Your a modern woman after all (126).

During the scene where Homer helps Lou open the trunks some of the power relationships implicit in language are made plain. Homer, speaking of the aristocracy's treatment of servants, says:

Ah you and me, what would we do with a butler, eh? Tip him and call him 'my man'? When I was guiding there was an old Yankee gent I liked, he was real generous, sometimes he called me 'my boy'. I told him I'd quit if he didn't call me Homer (123).

In the next breath, when Lou takes his advice in handling some kerosene lamps, his comment is, "Good girl." Lou doesn't seem to notice. Then Homer makes advances to her and she resists. Her reason for refusal is simple: "it went against some grain in her." She does not seem to be able simply to say, "I don't want to," however, and she tries desperately in the spoken exchange with Homer to excuse herself without offending him. She touches him, she apologizes, and finally calls him 'my man' (125).

Ironically, when a woman utters these words to a man, their effect is completely different from that when they are used by a man to or about a man. Used by a woman, they imply that she is exclusively the man's, sexually. Used by a man, they imply that the other man is a servant or employee. Analyzed in detail the scene, a battle between an unregenerate male chauvinist and a naive feminist, reveals Homer's power; Lou does everything *but* submit to him sexually. The language is on his side. Even if Lou had been able to convince Homer that she was his social superior (he acknowledges the social superiority of the Carys, after all) it would not have helped her dominate him. Homer sees himself as superior to all women, even the last (female) Colonel Cary, whom he admires, and certainly he feels the equal of all men, even his employers. His story of

the Carys ends with his put-down of the last Colonel Cary; when Lou falters "She was a great lady," he responds condescendingly, "Nah . . . she wasn't a great lady. She was an imitation man, but a damned good one" (90).

The last Colonel Cary, mistaken for a man by both Lou and the reader for half the novel, embodies the option of androgyny. Homer reveals that she is a woman, competent at both "male" and "female" activities, fearless and big: "Did all those things women are supposed to do and she kept herself with a trap line" (88). Homer's conclusions about her demonstrate the fate of the women who opt for androgyny. Men simply regard them as unnatural exceptions to the rule. She inherits by a trick that forces a male name on her, a useful image for what would happen to Lou if she really were to try to inherit Cary's or Trelawny's intellectual legacy. Lou never seriously takes the last Colonel Cary as a role model, except in one or two feeble attempts to impress Homer. Lou also realizes that the option of androgyny is closed to her, as she is a confirmed, one might even say, addicted heterosexual. Of the other options open to her, Lou rejects only one sex without love—decisively: she will not "lie back on a desk, again, ever" (126). She will not act like Homer's "modern woman"—that is, like a man without male power. No feminine role—wife, mother, single working woman, celibate or not, is completely ruled out.

When she leaves the Cary house, it is without regrets: "It was a fine building, but it had no secrets" (164). It seems she has decided that she will not find an identity through intellectual or sexual relationships with men, since she abandons the first colonel Cary, the Director, Homer and the house, symbolic of the nineteenth-century male mind. Her relationship with the bear is what frees her to make these decisions, decisions which free her to some extent from male domination. The bear, it seems, allows her to give her eroticism free play. He does not dominate her. She frees and nurtures him. Outside the power struggles implicit in all human relationships, she can discover what heterosexual love might be like if it were reciprocal and equal, and more important, that she herself possesses the ability to project this "ideal" love. She knows most of the time, that the bear does not possess human emotions, and that she is the source of all the passion in the relationship: "she had discovered that she could paint any face on him that she wanted, while his actual range of expression was a mystery" (78-79). She learns that erotic love is more important than genital sexuality: she says to the bear, "I don't care if I can't turn you on, I just love you" (130). She proves to herself that sexuality and eroticism are distinct, and do not necessarily go together, by having sex with

Homer. She concludes that, although it was good "to have that enormous emptiness filled . . . she felt nothing with him, nothing" (149). Erotic love without sex may be frustrating, but equating sexual desire with erotic love (as she has done in the past with several men) is far more dangerous and self-destructive.

When the bear claws Lou it ends their intense relationship. Lou only temporarily regards the act as a punishment for allowing her eroticism free play; rather, she regards it as a punishment for contaminating eroticism with sexuality. For her, the act ultimately draws a line between the two. She has gone "too far" and that is "aggressive" and "extreme" (143-156), because she has introduced a dominant "male" sexuality into a relationship that should remain erotic only. The clawing also draws a line between the animal and the human: he "scuttles" out the door on all fours, while she walks "as erectly as possible" to the door and bolts it (156). The scar is not a "mark of Cain," finally, she rationalizes, because she and the bear are not really equals; since he is an animal, she has not exploited him, although she has used him as the kind of mirror that women have conventionally provided men: a surface on which to project fantasy. Thus she can convince herself that this relationship is free of domination and that eroticism and sexuality can be separate.

These convictions seem deluded, because even with the bear her sexual desire consistently makes her feel guilty of taking a male role. His brief erection and temporary wildness quickly disappear: he "scuttles" and she takes the male role, standing "erectly." Earlier, when she attempts to dance with him, and he does not know what to do, he reminds her of "herself as a half child in a school gym, being held to a man's body for the first time, flushed, confused, and guilty" (133). She cannot fantasize a sexual encounter without one partner dominating. Sex without love, as with the Director, means she submits to male power. Sex with love, as attempted with the bear, means she dominates. She is caught in a paradox that excludes equality. Power relations are first acculturated through the learning that male dominates, and female submits. Even in the apparently unconstrained eroticism of her relationship with the bear, the categories of human sexual relations determine her feelings. She, herself, has internalized the distinctions implicit in patriarchy, and reproduces them faithfully, however inappropriately, all alone in the wilderness. Patricia Monk has effectively analyzed the novel from a Jungian perspective, and comments on this episode:

the blow falls when she is 'offering herself' to him, in the posture of a female animal. Since this kind of

passive self-offering seems to have characterized her earlier [disastrous] human sexual relationships, it becomes clear that the punishment is for the relapse into passive behaviour (33).

Monk sees the clawing (and its scar) as a permanent reminder to Lou of what she has been gradually learning from the bear: to enter into relationships with men as an equal. My argument, however, is that although Lou may be able to learn this theoretically with a bear, who, with one momentary exception, is completely tame, she cannot do it with a real man in a patriarchal society. When Lou seduces Homer, they are described as equals, but their encounter, one-time and passionless, can hardly be termed a relationship. This experiment is little different from lying back on a desk under the Director. Why then, does the clawing so dramatically end Lou's absorption with the bear? Like Monk, I would argue that it marks progress on the personal level for Lou; unlike Monk, I would argue that it marks a dead end on the social level. Engel cannot imagine her way past the problems of contemporary male-female relations. The clawing jerks Lou back to that reality. That the bear takes a male role during the clawing, however briefly, means Lou no longer can project her fantasies on him: "something was gone between them . . . the high whistling communion that had bound them during the summer" (159). His "male" violence also means she is free of any guilt resulting from her "male" domination. They may not be equals, but accounts have been squared.

The problem of how she can ever achieve a satisfactory relationship with a man, after what her experiences have revealed about the ubiquity of patriarchal power, is left undealt with. Women won't do for Lou: "Women left her hungry for men" (139). Thus lesbianism is not, for her, a solution, and even if it was, the difficulties with power that she has even with the bear would presumably recur.

The impossibility, at least in the here and now, of splitting a loving eroticism from sexuality and sexuality from domination, marks the text with devices designed to force an artistic resolution where no social one seems possible. These devices are familiar to readers of women's popular genres, which also attempt to reconcile contradictions in male-female relationships.⁶ For example, both the bear and Lou are magically transformed, he from lump, she from frump: "She seemed to have the body of a much younger woman. The sedentary fat had gone, leaving the shape of ribs showing" (157-158). Magical fat loss is straight from popular romance, implying at the level of mass fantasy a potential for a "satisfactory" sexual relationship that is denied at other levels of the text. The

sentimentality of another closing passage again reveals unresolved tension:

That night, lying clothed and tenderly beside him by the fire, she was a babe, a child, an innocent. . . . The breath of kind beasts was upon her. She felt pain, but it was a dear sweet pain that belonged not to mental suffering, but to the earth . . . she felt . . . that she was at last clean. Clean and simple and proud (161-162).

The stress on infantile innocence is a retreat Lou has attempted elsewhere, but she knows better, having read Freud on "infantile sexuality" (62). Lou also manages another achievement straight from romance: she leaves the house tidy. The final clue that the conclusion is forced comes in the transcendence of the novel's last lines: "It was a brilliant night, all star-shine, and overhead the Great Bear and his thirty-seven thousand virgins kept her company."

This passage is a complex of allusions, several, to texts which reveal dubious, artificial and idealized resolutions of male-female conflict. Saint Ursula of the thousands of virgins was martyred for resisting one man's sexual advances while on a pilgrimage to avoid the unwelcome marriage proposal of another. That a woman so clearly in need of protection from men herself became the traditional protectress of women is clearly a fishy resolution. In myth, the Great Bear was the raped nymph Callisto, transformed into star by Zeus. In Pope's, *The Rape of the Lock*, Belinda's lock was also transformed into a star at the end of another parodic battle of the sexes. But the stars are as Lou discovers, "always out of reach" (143).

Traditional representational art where there is a superior point of view provided by an omniscient narrator, or a superior discourse which over-rules all others, gives pleasure by allowing the reader or viewer to experience the sense of power and harmony, of being a unified subject living without contradiction. The experience of feeling at home in the world, peaceful, and content, is what Lou craves, demands and in part gets from the bear. Because he provides her with a mirror, he reflects her back as whole, just as with the infant in Lucan's "mirror stage," but this wholeness is ultimately narcissistic and delusive. Similarly, *Bear* only seems to offer harmony to its readers. To find the organic harmony in it that many critics do, one must ignore the many tone shifts, the forced resolutions, and finally, the improbability of the whole situation. At one level it is still the "pornographic" spoof that turns the bear into a female wish-fulfillment fantasy: a tame phallus.⁷ At another it echoes the Gothic, with Lou playing

unprotected heroine, the bear, demon lover. And then there are other echoes: "Snow White and Rose Red," and "Beauty and the Beast." Miranda, the heroine of Sir Charles G. D. Roberts' *The Heart of the Ancient Wood*, has an intimate relationship with a bear: her name links the bear to Caliban, with Lou a guilty because powerful Prospero. The novel's uneasy power relations are hinted at in a reference to Robinson Crusoe, that archetypal imperialist (41). And so forth. In fact, Engel writes parodically, in the sense Linda Hutcheon gives to parody as "ironic playing with multiple conventions . . . extended repetition with critical difference" (7).

What this text has to say to feminist theory is that power is a central issue. What ultimately prohibits the text's attempts at resolution is not just male power, but the equation of sexuality, voice, and power, and the rejection of them all as male. This reluctance to take power is perhaps sensible: power seems to corrupt women by first turning them into men. To reject power is to be forced into Lou's untenable position, cut off from both sexuality and a voice.

NOTES

1. Canadian literature's obsession with identity, especially national identity, is commonplace. Tania Modleski relates the terror of the Gothic to female identity conflicts, as do most feminist writers.
2. Part of the debunking of the colonial mentality is the debunking of the British class system imported with immigrants like the Carys; an analysis of the novel from this perspective would be rewarding.
3. Irigaray, (104); see Pamela McCallum and Barbara Godard in the "Feminism Now" issue of the *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, 9, Numbers 1-2 (Winter/Spring 1985), and Toril Moi *Sexual/Textual Politics* (London: Methuen, 1985) for useful discussion of Irigaray and of the traps of the self/other opposition.

4. Because the subject is produced by culture, rather than nature, an argument exists against using "female," with its implications of the biological, to modify it. However, because "feminine" has negative connotations, and to be consistent with Teresa De Lauretis' practice, I generally use the expression "female subject."
5. Patricia Monk examines these Jungian implications, but leaves the conclusion far more open than do the studies I cite above.
6. *Bear* was originally written for a never-published "pornographic anthology," the Writers' Union had planned to sell to raise money, according to Sandra Martin, "Saturday Night Literary Gazette," *Saturday Night*, November 1977: 29.
7. See Tania Modleski.

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