

**From #MeToo to #Prolife: Reviewing Theories of Social Movement Mobilization in the
Digital Age**

by

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the internet impacts social movement mobilization in multiple ways which diverge from the expectations of traditional theories, necessitating the revision of theories to account for these effects. I conduct a comparative case study analysis of gender-based violence and anti-abortion movements over time, as they emerged and resurged in different phases in the United States in the 1970s and 2010s respectively. Drawing on various data sources, from historical news articles to Twitter and Instagram posts, I qualitatively analyze the grievances, resources, political opportunities, and cultural frames which characterize each phase of each movement. The findings demonstrate that in the digital age, the internet may be used as an organizational resource, as a means of circumventing political constraints to mobilize in challenging political contexts, as a way for movements to appeal to broader audiences beyond traditional support bases, and as a tool for audiences to engage in the construction of cultural frames alongside professional movement leaders and organizations. These effects differ across movements, suggesting that future research could investigate under which conditions online tools can lead to particular effects.

Lay Summary

Mainstream social movement theories have shaped our understanding of how movements emerge in terms of collective grievances, available resources, political opportunities, and the cultural framing of issues by movement leaders. Some scholars suggest however that new innovations such as internet technologies have drastically changed the ways in which movements emerge. In order to evaluate whether mainstream theories continue to accurately explain movement mobilization, I analyze the emergence of two phases of gender-based violence and anti-abortion movements in the United States in the 1970s and the 2010s. The findings demonstrate that the internet impacts social movement mobilization in multiple ways which diverge from the expectations of traditional theories. Most strikingly, the internet can be seen in some cases to decentralize the process of cultural framing, devolving control of the construction of frames from movement leaders to online audiences. I therefore argue that the mainstream theories would benefit from revision to account for these effects.

Preface

This thesis is original, unpublished, and independent work by the author, Marianne Mortell.

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Dedication

To my family and friends for their love, support, and patience.

1. Introduction

1.1. Argument

Mainstream social movement theories have emphasized different factors deemed essential for successful movement mobilization. In the early twentieth century, collective behavior theories highlighted the grievances which drive collective action, while resource mobilization theories moved to emphasize the importance of organizational structures, professional movement leaders, and access to resources. The political opportunities model followed, stressing the political conditions which enable or constrain movement formation and mobilization. Finally, in the late twentieth century theories of cultural framing emphasized the role of movement leaders in constructing “ideological packages” which frame a movement in terms which resonate with audiences and mobilize support. According to the mainstream theories, we expect movements to organize successfully when: 1) there are collective grievances; 2) there are adequate resources and organizational structures in place; 3) political conditions are conducive to the movement’s emergence, and 4) movement leaders frame issues in terms which mobilize broad support.

Some scholars have suggested however that modern innovations such as internet technologies and social media have radically altered the ways in which social movements organize and mobilize support, and therefore that traditional theories require revisiting. To evaluate whether mainstream theories continue to accurately explain movement mobilization, I analyze the mobilization of the gender-based violence movement and the anti-abortion movement during key phases of emergence and resurgence in the United States in the 1970s and 2010s. The findings demonstrate that the internet impacts social movement mobilization in multiple ways which diverge from the expectations of traditional theories. The internet may be used as an organizational resource, as a

means of circumventing political constraints to mobilize in challenging political contexts, and as a tool for movements to appeal to broader audiences, beyond traditional support bases. Most strikingly, the internet can be seen in some cases to decentralize the process of cultural framing, enabling audiences to engage in the construction of cultural frames alongside professional movement leaders and organizations. I therefore argue that mainstream social movement theories would benefit from revision to account for these effects. The effects differ across movements, and thus I also suggest that future research could investigate under which conditions online tools can lead to particular effects.

1.2. Outline

In the following section, I review existing literature to identify the main theoretical models of social movement emergence. Section 3 will describe the research methods and data sources used to analyse the emergence and framing of social movements. Section 4 will introduce the progressive case, which traces phases of the movement against gender-based violence. A brief historical overview considering key grievances, resources, and political opportunities will be provided for the battered women's movement and the #MeToo movement, followed by analysis of the use of narrative frames in each period. Section 5 presents the conservative case, which will evaluate the grievances, resources, political opportunities, and use of framing in two phases of the anti-abortion movement. Section 6 will conclude by discussing the implications of the findings for the research question: do the mainstream theories accurately explain the emergence of movements in the digital age, or are there indications that theories would benefit from updating? I will discuss the significance of the findings, as well as the strengths and limitations of the research.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Mainstream Theories

2.1.1. The Collective Behavior Model

Sidney Tarrow distinguishes social movements from other forms of collective action or activism; they are “*collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities*” (2011, 9). Traditional social movements in the early 20th century had focused on issues of labor and class cleavages; the first collective behavior theories to emerge were consequently rooted in Marxist thought, which emphasized class-based grievances as closely linked to the growth and decline of movement activity (della Porta and Diani 2006, 8; McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1212). As the twentieth century progressed, “new social movements” increasingly centered on “post-class identities” such as gender and race (Lee 2007). These new movements could not be explained by traditional collective behavior theories based on class contention, though other kinds of grievances remained important. Therefore, as public support for the American struggle for civil rights and mass protests against the Vietnam war increased, scholars additionally looked to institutional and structural factors to explain the movement mobilization around them (Travaglino 2014, 3).

2.1.2. The Resource Mobilization Model

In response to the limitations of collective behavior theories, resource mobilization theories moved to emphasize the means available to collective actors as an explanation for movement emergence. The theories focused on formal organizations, and stressed that expanded resources, professionalization, and financial support available to movements explained mobilization (Tarrow 2011, 24). McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that the variety of resources available, the

relationship of the movement to media, authorities and other parties, and the interactions with other movement organizations better explained social movement activity than the grievances of actors (1977, 1212). They also emphasized the role of “social entrepreneurs” in accessing resources to found professional social movement organizations (SMOs), and to lead and coordinate collective action (Edwards and Kane 2014, 206). Nevertheless, resource mobilization theories failed to fully explain the emergence of movements in grassroots communities in the mid-20th century, which had often lacked professional organization and resources. Influential scholars characterized resource mobilization as “a narrow and deficient approach useful in analyses of elite-driven, professionalized reform movements or interest group politics, but not for explanations of confrontational, mass protest movements” (Edwards and Kane 2014, 206).

2.1.3. The Political Opportunities Model

A third central approach was the “political opportunities” model, which highlighted the opportunities for mobilization afforded by political contexts. Notably, the degree of openness of a regime and its capacity to implement policies were shown to affect the outcomes of movements (Travaglino 2014, 4). Charles Tilly (1978) first put forward a “polity model”, which emphasized political opportunities and threats as conditions for mobilization (Tarrow 2011, 27). McAdam’s “political process” model built on Tilly’s work, identifying political and organizational changes in the development of the American civil rights movement (Tarrow 2011, 27). Tarrow himself wrote extensively on political opportunities and constraints, which he saw as crucial to the mobilization of social movements (Tarrow 2011; 2005). Resource mobilization and political opportunities models remain dominant approaches in social movements literature, stressing the importance of organizations and political structure for the formation of social movements (Travaglino 2014, 5). Critics point out however that, “in their haste to distance themselves from the collective behavior

paradigm, these approaches threw out the baby with the bathwater by excluding the analysis of values, norms, ideologies, projects, culture and identity” (Travaglino 2014, 5).

2.1.4. The Cultural Turn

Scholarship accordingly shifted to focus on culture in addition to resources and political opportunities (Klandermans 2014, 223). This “cultural turn” emphasized the important role of norms and culture in “shaping, constraining and facilitating individuals’ perception of the social conditions that trigger discontent and, ultimately, mobilization” (Travaglino 2014, 5). Klandermans (1984) argued that individual differences in how people perceive the costs and benefits of participation in collective action, and in their definitions of problems and resources, are socially constructed and thus subject to the persuasion and influence of significant figures such as movement leaders (Travaglino 2014, 5). Scholars thus moved to assess how issues were “framed” in emotion-laden “ideological packages”, capable of convincing actors to invest in a cause (Tarrow 2011, 25). A frame is a “central organizing idea that provides meaning to and generally guides how issues are understood” (McDonald 2019, 79). Klandermans explains that because appraisals and actions are socially constructed, they can be manipulated, and thus “activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented. They must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package” (Klandermans 2014, 223). Influential movement leaders and SMOs are therefore “carriers of meaning” and aim to convey their definitions and perceptions to the broader public (Klandermans 2014, 223). In this view, resources and political opportunities alone cannot explain mobilization; these structural features must first “pass through the filter of cultural, ideological and moral beliefs” (Travaglino 2014, 6).

Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that “the construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of networks’ political strategies” (1998, 17); they construct meaning, organize

experience, and guide collective and individual action. The authors argue that “struggles over meaning and the creation of new frames of meaning occur early in a protest cycle”, but that over time, “a given collective action frame becomes part of the political culture- which is to say, part of the reservoir of symbols from which future movement entrepreneurs can choose” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 17). At the beginning of movements, frames are constructed by movement leaders to portray the goals of the movement in terms which resonate with audiences; these frames become ingrained in the culture of a movement. Nevertheless, activists may seek to frame issues in innovative ways to bring issues to the public, or to help to “transform other actors’ understandings of their identities and their interests” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 17). While allowing for shifts in framing strategies therefore, cultural framing theories continue to emphasize the role of movement leaders in constructing frames.

2.2. Reviewing Theories

Central questions of whether, to what extent, and how new internet-based technologies impact social movement mobilization have been tackled by a vast range of literature within the social movements field. Earl et al. (2014a) point out that there have been three broad approaches in the literature concerning the effects of internet technologies on social movement mobilization.

Scholars adopting the first approach reason that existing social movement theories can be applied to movements in the digital age without adjustment: “since ICTs only provided new methods for outreach, but did not fundamentally change the dynamics of the offline events that were being supported, existing theory could easily accommodate these new cases” (Earl et al. 2014a, 364). These theorists emphasised the crucial role of offline social networks to the emergence and growth of social movements, leaving limited scope for internet technologies to “develop, maintain or extend these deep social ties” (Earl et al. 2014a, 364). Earl et al. point to

earlier works by Tarrow (1998) and Diani (2000). Given the proliferation of digitally-enabled social movements in the 21st century (Hall 2022, 7) and the clearly significant impacts of social media, this approach has largely fallen out of use.

The second “reform” approach argues that existing theories need only minimal adjustments to accommodate the changes brought about for social movements by new technologies; for instance, resource mobilization theories should expand the definition of resources to include internet resources (Earl et al. 2014a, 364), but otherwise remain unchanged.

The third “radical” approach meanwhile suggests that internet technologies have fundamentally changed the ways in which social movements mobilize, necessitating more significant updates or new theoretical models to be devised (Earl et al. 2014a, 365). According to scholars who take this more radical approach, impacts such as the hugely reduced costs of participation and the decentralization of organizing throws basic tenets of traditional theories into question. Considering these approaches, I investigate whether changes in social movement mobilization over time indicate the need to update theories.

3. Research Methods

3.1. Comparative Case Studies

This thesis employs a comparative case study methodology to analyze the grievances, resources, political opportunities, and framing strategies which led to the emergence of two social movements in the United States across time. Given that scholarly writing on social movements largely deals with progressive movements, I analyze both a progressive and a conservative movement to account for possible differences according to political alignment. To compare cases across time, I focus on different “phases” of each movement. I identify movement phases as moments in time when movements have emerged and reemerged with particular strength. I consider the Battered Women’s Movement which emerged in the 1970s, and the #MeToo movement which intensified in 2017, to be two phases of the broader gender-based movement. In comparison, I identify the original backlash to *Roe v. Wade* in 1973, and the recent resurgence of the movement surrounding the overturning of *Roe* in 2022, to be two key phases of the anti-abortion movement.

3.2. Data Sources

To analyze the grievances, resources and political opportunities which characterized the development of each phase of each movement, I draw on scholarly sources to provide historical background. To analyze the cultural framing of the earlier phases of each movement, I draw on scholarly sources and historical news articles. I decided to use news articles because they are a contemporary record of what movement leaders and activists (among others) were saying, providing an insight into which frames were being promoted at the time. I used the database

‘Factiva’ to access historical news articles. Conducting a content analysis, I identified the frames frequently observed in the articles. (See Appendix A for further details.)

In analyzing the framing of the recent iterations of each movement, I primarily analyzed the websites and social media posts of established social movement organizations, as well as news articles and statements by leaders. For the #MeToo movement, I looked at the online platforms of three prominent organizations associated with the movement and women’s issues generally: me too. International, Global Fund for Women (GFW), and UN Women. For the anti-abortion movement, I analyzed the platforms of four influential anti-abortion organizations: Center for Bioethical Reform (CBR), Live Action, March For Life, and Feminists For Life. (See Appendix B for further details.)

4. A Progressive Case: Violence Against Women

4.1. Early Phase: The Battered Women's Movement

4.1.1. Grievances, Resources, and Political Opportunities

Dobash and Dobash (1992) assert that “it is the battered-women’s movement, with the support of the media, who have put the issues of the physical and sexual abuse of women and girls firmly on the social agenda” (1992, 2). The authors explain that for many women, “a sense of shame and responsibility, along with fear of reprisals, keeps them silent, sometimes for years” (Dobash and Dobash 1992, 4). The US National Crime Survey of domestic violence cases from 1978 to 1982 found that 48 percent were not reported to the police “because it was viewed as a private matter or because of fear of reprisal” (Dobash and Dobash 1992, 4). The movement therefore sought not only to provide shelter for victims of domestic violence, but also to make it easier for women to speak up about the abuse they faced. Gender-based domestic violence and the culture of silence around abuse thus constituted the collective grievance around which the movement organized.

The 1960s and 70s saw a wave of “new” social movements centered around issues of identity and human rights. Scholars emphasize the roots of the battered women’s movement in earlier movements for peace, civil rights, women’s liberation, socialism, and the earlier labor movement of the working class (Dobash and Dobash 1992, 16). Feminist movements advocating for women’s rights and liberation had also expanded; “by the late 1960s and early 1970s, feminism had itself developed into two major branches, a woman’s rights feminism, exemplified by organizations like NOW, and a women’s liberation movement, embodied in socialist feminist and radical feminist groups” (Schechter 1982, 31). Women’s rights activism focused on gaining access to equal rights and opportunities, while women’s liberation “encompassed this goal, but went far beyond it,

exploring the unequal gender division of labor and women's lack of control over their bodies, sexuality, and lives. [...] Women's liberation demanded a total, egalitarian restructuring of male/female relationships and society" (Schechter 1982, 31). As well as fighting discrimination, the women's liberation branch of the feminist movement "declared that the private and the social were no longer separable categories. By claiming that what happened between men and women in the privacy of their home was deeply political, the women's liberation movement set the stage for the battered women's movement" (Schechter 1982, 31). These established movements and feminist discourses acted as existing institutional networks through which the Battered Women's Movement could network and mobilize; they therefore provided the organizational resources necessary for movement mobilization.

Political opportunities also allowed for the movement to flourish. Dobash and Dobash assert that feminist movements "flourish during liberal revolutions and decline during conservative periods" (Dobash and Dobash 1992, 17); the wave of progressive movements directly preceding the battered women's movement suggest that it emerged in a political context conducive to its mobilization. In a study of women's movement emergence, Haug identified the conditions which "form the backcloth" of women's movements as "reform, greater opportunities, more security, higher standards of living and more state regulation of the private spheres, usually occupied by women, formed the general backcloth to the emergence of the new women's movement" (Haug 1989, 109). The political context of U.S. in the late 1960s and early 70s was thus conducive to the emergence of the movement.

4.1.2. Framing the Movement

From analyzing scholarly sources and historical news articles, I identified two broad narratives which frame the battered women's movement. The first is the emphasis on vulnerable, innocent

victims. This frame aligns with Keck and Sikkink's description of the issue characteristics around which advocacy has organized most effectively: primarily issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals with a clear causal chain of responsibility (1998, 27). This indicates that movement leaders intentionally constructed the frame, considering what would most effectively mobilize support. The second frame is that the personal is political; this frame draws clearly on the women's liberation branch of feminist thought, which looked to dismantle distinctions between public and private spheres; again, this aligns with the idea that frames are carefully constructed by movement leaders.

Vulnerable, Innocent Victims

Explicit descriptions of the violence suffered by victims, and their physical, social, or economic vulnerability, are presented in news articles. A 1979 *Washington Post* article describes some of the stories told at the first National Conference on Violence Against Women, which emphasize innocent acts by victims which triggered violence: "A woman fixed her husband a casserole for dinner, but he wanted steak. Enraged, he beat her, knocking out two of her teeth"; "Another woman stopped off to say hello to her husband at work. He assumed she was checking up on him and later beat her so brutally that she was hospitalized with a ruptured spleen" (Kalette 1979). Descriptions also emphasize the vulnerability of domestic abuse victims by referring to either their lack of physical strength, or their social and economic vulnerability. One abused wife reportedly stated, "I left my house after 12 years of so-called marriage because my husband tried to kill me. I had lived with physical violence for 10 years and I had no relatives, no place to go. I don't know what would have happened to me if I didn't have friends" (Conway 1977). A 21-year-old woman who stayed at a shelter with her infant daughter said, "I don't have any family. I'm living with my boyfriend and he broke five of my ribs when I was pregnant. I didn't think I had a

place to go” (Chappell 1983). These accounts highlight that victims of abuse are often vulnerable because they depend on male partners for shelter and security. Other articles highlight the physical vulnerability of victims: “she lay wrapped in a sheet on a narrow cot at the shelter, a middle-aged woman with a fractured shoulder and two cracked ribs, her eyes dulled by painkillers and emotional hurt. Two days before, her husband of 21 years--6 feet, 4 inches tall, weighing 370 pounds--had beaten her with a bar of soap in a sock, the gray-haired, 165-pound woman said” (Bonner 1982). Another article emphasized the “brutal beating of a 99-pound mother of six” (Saperstein and Walsh, 1985). Discourse which emphasizes the innocence and vulnerability of victims therefore demonstrates one key frame which characterized the movement.

The Personal is Political

The second frame is that domestic violence is a public and political issue rooted in patriarchal social relations and attitudes, rather than a private, domestic problem. Discourse in scholarly and news articles emphasizes the sociopolitical causes of domestic violence, the social and institutional barriers which prevent women from seeking help, and the “epidemic” scale of the issue.

While “antifeminist groups claim violence against women has nothing to do with patriarchy” (Dragiewicz 2011, 3), the “women’s liberation” approach identified patriarchal social relations as the source of women’s oppression, and of domestic violence. Several articles quote shelter workers and movement activists who emphasise that often, abused women “have seen the abuse of their mothers”, and “many men who beat their wives have also seen their mothers abused” (Valente 1979). According to Geraldine Stahley who worked at Womenshelter in California, “80 percent of the men who batter their wives were battered children or were children who watched their fathers beat their mothers” (Durant 1979). Stahley further asserted that “women who tend to stay longest in these relationships are very traditional women who are strongly attached to the role

of wife and mother and feel it's their responsibility to make their husbands and homes happy. They are embarrassed to seek help because they feel it means that they have failed" (Durant 1979). Elizabeth Farrell, then program director for battered women at a Washington shelter, stated that "women are truly unsure that the beatings are wrong. They are taught they have to please their husbands. Someone has to teach them it is the man's problem, not the woman's" (Conway 1977). Nancy Hall, a psychiatric nurse in the Prince George county Sexual Assault Center in the 1970s, adds, "usually wives come from violent families where they developed a feeling that they are bad and need the punishment they've been given all their lives. They generally seek out husbands or men who will continue in this violent pattern" (Conway 1977). These accounts emphasize the traditional gender roles and generational patterns of abuse and which become ingrained in families, demonstrating the sociopolitical origins of domestic violence.

Other sources emphasize the institutional barriers women face in seeking help. The Washington Post reported that "law enforcement officials and society in general minimize [victims'] problems and tend to view domestic problems as almost extra-legal situations. The women are often given inadequate protection, and are forced to stay in the marriage for economic reasons or because they fear further assaults and death if they seek divorce, according to those who counsel battered wives" (The Washington Post 1977). Margie Heller of the Women's Resource and Survival Center in New Jersey points out the "catch 22" for abused women: "The first or second time a wife seeks help, she's told by law officials, the priest, relatives, you name it, to go home and try to patch things up. So the 14th time, she's called a masochist for staying there. And then when she shoots the guy, everyone's shocked" (The Washington Post 1977). Florynce Kennedy, keynote speaker at the first National Conference on Violence Against Women in 1979,

said that “priests, rabbis and magazine writers who counsel saving the marriage often encourage women to stay in a violent situation” (Kalette 1979).

Reports of courts and police being “insensitive to the needs of abused women and [...] reluctant to take any action against abusive men” (Boodman 1977) are numerous. Attorney Abe Spero of Fairfax was quoted as saying that abusive husbands “often receive suspended sentences” or are told to “go home and make up” (Boodman 1977). Lauren Taylor, a community educator with the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, and one of the founders of ‘My Sister’s Place’, worked with battered women for three years before concluding, “the system fails to protect battered women” (Mann 1981). Taylor claimed that when the police do answer a domestic disturbance complaint, “they say everybody cool out and they tell the guy to walk around the block” (Mann 1981). Schechter’s interviews with former battered women and movement activists revealed that “battered women consistently found that institutions were unwilling to help them [...]. In case after case, women recounted that the police did nothing to help and often made the situation worse by encouraging the man’s violence or by minimizing or trivializing her injuries and fears” (1982, 24-5).

Schechter’s interviews demonstrated that judges also “minimized the problem and frequently intimidated battered women with statements like, “But you wouldn’t want him to go to jail and lose his job”” (1982, 26). A 1978 article discusses the testimony of a battered wife, Ann, in a congressional hearing for federal legislation to aid abused spouses. The article states, “the fact that Ann’s story was challenged by her doctor, counselor and judge points up one of the major obstacles in attacking the problem: much as with rape victims, the abused are often not believed” (Baker 1978). Blandina Cardenas, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s commissioner for children, youth, and families, called Ann’s story “an example of a social problem

that has reached epidemic proportions” (Baker 1978). McCarthy adds, “If the estimated 3 to 6 million wife-abuse cases a year suggest anything, this is not an aberrancy. It is an extension of the tough-guy cult that rules much of the nation's male-run social, political, economic and athletic life” (McCarthy 1985). Schechter, like other activist figures in the movement, points to evidence such as this to show that “battered women are victims of sexist economic, political and social institutions” (1982, 26); that is, domestic violence is an inherently public and political issue.

4.2. Later Phase: #MeToo

4.2.1. Grievances, Resources, and Political Opportunities

Following sexual assault allegations against American film producer Harvey Weinstein, on October 15th 2017 actress Alyssa Milano encouraged her Twitter followers to reply with “me too” if they had ever been sexually harassed or assaulted; the image attached to her tweet read, “if all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem” (Gilbert 2017). In the days following Milano’s tweet, hundreds of thousands had tweeted the hashtag, more than a quarter-million people were discussing #MeToo on Facebook, and almost 350,000 posts were tagged with the phrase on Instagram (D’Zurilla 2017). The roots of ‘Me Too’ go back to Tarana Burke’s coining of the term in 2006 (Hill 2021); Burke began Me Too as a grassroots movement to help sexual assault survivors in underprivileged communities, the term intended as a “catchphrase to be used from survivor to survivor to let folks know that they were not alone and that a movement for radical healing was happening and possible” (Hill 2021). While the movement originated at this earlier stage, it emerged into public consciousness after the hashtag went viral on social media in 2017.

Social media acted as an essential organizational resource for the movement's broader mobilization; "the collection of responses spurred a cultural movement" (McDonald 2019, 79). Peters emphasizes the features of social media which enabled the rise of "hashtag feminism": "social media offer a hybrid space that feels private and anonymous, yet which at the same time is very public" (Peters 2020, 4). Social media "enables interaction with a low inhibition threshold", and "women experience social media as a safe space for women-centered issues and communities in spite of the risk of online vitriol" (Peters 2020, 4). Banet-Weiser et al. agree that "the blogosphere has become an important site for feminists to express passionate defences and celebrations of feminism and exhortations towards feminist and anti-racist activism" (Banet-Weiser et al. 2020, 9). The #MeToo movement thus primarily organized online through social media networks, which enabled audiences to enter into larger discussions and draw attention to the collective grievance of sexual assault.

While scholars have argued that feminist movements largely arise during liberal periods, #MeToo in contrast emerged in the midst of the Trump presidency and associated conservative resurgence. One article suggests that the growing conversation around sexual abuse in 2017 emerged partially in response to Trump's presidency, and the president's own sexual misconduct allegations. The day after Trump's inauguration, the Women's March took place, "an estimated 4 million or so people turned out in more than 600 cities across the US to signal their support of women's rights and a broad array of other progressive concerns — and, perhaps most of all, disgust at the election of Trump (who'd been accused of sexual harassment)" (Prokop 2017). Just months later, a "sexual misconduct reckoning" (Prokop 2017) would begin with the #MeToo movement, forcing high-profile industries to "look more closely at suspected abusers in their own ranks" (Prokop 2017). While historical studies suggest that feminist movements arise in liberal

times, #MeToo appears to have emerged as a backlash to rising conservatism symbolized by Trump's presidency. Arguably, the key resource of the internet enabled the movement to mobilize regardless of a political context which may have constrained more traditional movement organizations from instigating a movement.

4.2.2. Framing the Movement

Analyzing news articles, statements by movement leaders, and the websites and social media posts of key organizations, I observed multiple narratives frames which have emerged to characterize the #MeToo movement. The platforms of professional organizations and activists provide observable indications of the frames which characterize the movement. However, the origin of the 2017 movement as an online hashtag suggests that distinctions between movement leaders and audiences, who interact online to discuss and debate the goals and priorities of the movement, have blurred. As such, frames have likely been constructed in the discourse between activist leaders, professional organizations, and audiences who interact with the movement online. This decentralization of control over the construction of frames may be evidenced by the multiple narratives observed, which simultaneously characterize the movement, sometimes in tension with one another, as actors debate the most important frames amongst themselves. I identify at least four major frames which emerge to characterize the #MeToo movement: 1) exposing abuse among the rich and powerful; 2) abuse as a social justice issue; 3) abuse as a human rights issue; and 4) abuse as a public health crisis. The first two frames in particular coexist in tension with one another as movement participants debate the priorities of the movement.

Rich and Powerful

In 2018, The New York Times announced, “#MeToo brought down 201 powerful men”- their headshots were compiled in an image at the top of the article (Carlsen et al. 2018).

The movement in 2017 had shifted from a local community initiative serving underprivileged communities to one which highlighted the experiences of relatively privileged women exposing powerful male abusers: “incidents involving prominent, high-profile figures in entertainment, the media, and politics have dominated the airwaves and spurred calls for decisive action” (Frye 2018). One article asserts, “it was Hollywood that catapulted the MeToo movement into the headlines, when dozens of actresses accused producer Harvey Weinstein of sexual harassment and even rape”, while “an array of once seemingly untouchable celebrities, from Kevin Spacey to Louis C.K., were called out for similar alleged acts” (Jones 2018). Jones emphasizes that much of the power of the #MeToo movement came from the public outing of high-profile harassers by “equally well-known accusers” (Jones 2018). In contrast, “when you have workers that quite frankly, people don’t care as much about, and you have employers that nobody’s heard of, [...] it just doesn’t have the same appeal for the broader media” (Jones 2018). The ‘rich and powerful’ frame therefore draws mainstream attention to the issue of sexual abuse.

Women’s organizations which became associated with #MeToo regularly reposted celebrity stories on social media from the early stages of the 2017 movement. The Global Fund for Women posted the stories of Anita Hill and Aly Raisman on Twitter in November 2017, while UN Women highlighted the stories of Ane Crabtree, costume designer for *The Handmaid’s Tale*, and of actress Lupita Nyong’o (‘@GlobalFundWomen’ 2023; ‘@UN_Women’ 2023).

Instagram posts by the two organizations highlighted the voices of Oprah and Nicole Kidman in supporting the movement (‘Global Fund for Women’ 2023; ‘UN Women’ 2023). The Global Fund for Women meanwhile reposted an image of TIME magazine’s 2017 Person of the Year cover, which was dedicated to the ‘The Silence Breakers’ of the #MeToo movement. Six women feature on the cover, including abuse survivors and activists alongside celebrities Ashley Judd and

Taylor Swift (Chan 2017). The inclusion of prominent celebrity figures points to the focus of the movement on high-profile cases in the entertainment industry.

UN Women has highlighted the importance of holding powerful men accountable, and of revealing the abuse which occurs in all social spheres; one Twitter post quoted actress Sienna Miller, who argued, “the message is that sexual harassment can happen to anyone, even those who seem untouchable because of their fame or celebrity status” (@UN_Women’ 2023). Another post quoted Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, who stated, “powerful men have been getting away with their actions against women, without having to be accountable” (@UN_Women’ 2023). These statements suggest that the focus on the rich and powerful indeed has merit for the broader goal of the movement to tackle the culture of abuse.

Social Justice Issue

Banet-Weiser argues that “most popular feminisms are typically those that become visible precisely because they do not challenge deep structures of inequities” (Banet-Weiser et al. 2020, 9). Some feminist activists and scholars argue that the movement’s focus on exposing powerful men does not go far enough to tackle the root causes of sexual abuse, and that it obscures the struggles of less visible women. They are “skeptical about the ability of [hashtag] movements to bring about tangible social change” (Peters 2020, 4). Peters argues that “the fact that some of the famous Big Men—like Harvey Weinstein and Kevin Spacey—are basically finished, does not signal a social change” (Peters 2020, 3); rather it illustrates the “self-preservation of a system that [...] makes these men the way they are”, and “only simulates change to keep up with the status quo with minimal sacrifices” (Peters 2020, 3). Tarana Burke, the movement’s founder, asserts that individual cases do not help everyday citizens to “make the connection to the social, political, economic, and community impact of sexual violence” (Burke 2022). Burke argued that Me Too

needs to “show the world that this movement was about reimagining safety, understanding bodily autonomy, and shifting culture” (Burke 2022).

Activists also criticize the movement’s celebrity focus as overlooking the realities of blue-collar workers, and victims of abuse in industries outside of those that are “white and affluent”; “women of color and those in lower-wage jobs have been largely left out of the conversation” (Jones 2018). Activists aim to draw attention back to women in underprivileged communities. Frye asserts that women of color in particular are at greater risk of being harassed due to combined racial, ethnic, and gender prejudice, and that they are more likely to work lower-wage jobs where power imbalances deter victims from coming forward (Frye 2017). This branch of the movement invokes the frame of sexual abuse as a social justice issue, concerning the fair treatment and equal status of all social groups.

In response to social justice discourse within the movement, organizations associated with #MeToo also emphasize the need for broader institutional and cultural change, and for a focus on marginalized groups. Me too. International’s website states that the organization “continues to focus on assisting a growing spectrum of survivors- young people, queer, trans, the disabled, Black women and girls, and all communities of color” in dealing with abuse (‘Get To Know Us | History & Inception’ n.d.). They additionally emphasize that they are “working to disrupt the systems that allow sexual violence to proliferate in our world. This includes insisting upon accountability on the part of perpetrators, along with the implementation of strategies to sustain long term, systemic change” (‘Get To Know Us | History & Inception’ n.d.). Instagram posts by me too. International also demonstrate the focus on challenging institutions and seeking political change; one post states, “institutions and our culture must take responsibility for harassment, rape, and all other forms of sexual violence now” (‘me too. International’ 2023).

One Twitter post by UN Women states that “the everyday women who experienced sexual harassment are often silenced” (@UN_Women’ 2023), while another quotes Burke, who argues that having conversations with boys about boundaries, consent, and sexual violence will “start to make a shift in our culture” (@UN_Women’ 2023). The Global Fund for Women also emphasizes focus on poor and marginalized groups, referencing #MeToo founder Tarana Burke who began the movement with “young Black women and girls from low wealth communities” (‘Get To Know Us | Our Vision & Theory of Change’ n.d.). The organization’s website claims, “we fund those left out of traditional philanthropy”, and “put the decision-making directly into the hands of Black and Indigenous people, LGBTQI+ people, rural women, disabled people, sex workers, and so many more” (‘Gender, Power, and Philanthropy: A Feminist Philanthropy Infographic’ n.d.). Arguably, prominent women’s organizations emphasize the experiences of poor and marginalized sexual abuse survivors in addition to celebrity cases as a response to criticism within the movement.

Human Rights Issue & Public Health Crisis

Other frames observed in the analysis of movement websites and social media posts include the presentation of sexual abuse as a human rights abuse, and as a public health crisis. The Global Fund for Women calls ending sexual gender-based violence “an urgent human rights issue that transcends national and cultural barriers” (“Me Too” Global Movement’ 2021). An Instagram post by UN Women also stated that “sexual and gender-based violence is a pervasive human rights violation” (‘UN Women’ 2023). Several Twitter posts by the organization emphasize the human rights frame, stating that violence against women is “a human rights violation of pandemic proportions”, and that #MeToo is “not a women’s movement; it’s a humanity movement” (@UN_Women’ 2023).

The framing of sexual abuse as a public health crisis is also visible in the language used, and in the presentation of statistics which emphasize the scale of the issue. The Global Fund for Women's webpage displays a bold infographic stating that 1 in 3 women experience intimate partner and/or sexual violence ("Me Too" Global Movement' 2021), while an Instagram post by me too. International directly states, "this is a public health crisis", and that "in the U.S., every 68 seconds, someone is sexually assaulted" ('me too. International' 2023). These additional narratives demonstrate the multiplication of observable frames in the modern phase of the movement. The lack of cohesion between these varied frames, which each characterize the movement in a different light, indicates that the framing of #MeToo occurs in discussion and debate between leaders, activists, and audiences online, and that professional movement leaders have less control over the construction of cohesive ideological packages.

5. A Conservative Case: Anti-Abortion

5.1. Early Phase: Right to Life

5.1.1. Grievances, Resources, and Political Opportunities

In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court decriminalized abortion in its landmark *Roe v. Wade* decision, based largely on the constitutional right to reproductive privacy (Solinger 2005, 185). The decision marked a turning point in women's reproductive autonomy in the U.S. as women gained increased freedom over choices and actions. Abortion "came to represent the image of the "emancipated woman" in her contemporary identity, focused on her education and work more than on marriage or childbearing; sexually active outside marriage and outside the disciplinary boundaries of the parental family; independently supporting herself and her children; and consciously espousing feminist ideas" (Petchesky 1990, 241). These accomplishments of the feminist movement became "key flash points of resistance for those who surveyed the economic and cultural upheaval and longed for the familiar past" (Solinger 2005, 204). Insofar as the right to abortion afforded women more autonomy over their roles in society, *Roe* symbolized a threat to the status quo. Petchesky asserts that "given the powerful scope of this threat to a white capitalist patriarchy, it was to be expected that a movement to reverse legalized abortion and delegitimize its ideology would arm itself" (Petchesky 1990, 241). In light of the legalization of abortion therefore, a new movement emerged to counter "organizations and ideas that have directly confronted patriarchal traditions regarding the place of women in society and the dominant norms of heterosexual love and marriage" (Petchesky 1990, 246). *Roe* therefore formed the basis of the collective grievance of the anti-abortion movement: the departure from traditional gender roles, perceived as a threat to the existing social order.

Access to the resources of the Catholic church enabled the movement's mobilization; as one of the only established institutions explicitly opposed to abortion, it was the first to offer an "organized response against abortion rights" (Haugeberg 2017, 2). Haugeberg asserts that "Catholic authorities were poised to provide organizational strength to an increasingly mobilized anti abortion constituency", as "bishops, priests, and Catholic attorneys and physicians- almost all of them men- drew on the Church's institutional structure, including the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, theologians, activist clergy, and congregants to offer the first organized response against abortion rights" (Haugeberg 2017, 2).

Petchesky highlights the role of "New Right" traditionalists who took up the "crusade" against abortion as a means of not only preserving traditional gender roles, but also achieving power in state elections. By centering the politics of the family, sexuality, and reproduction, this "resurgent conservatism" sought to divert attention from the economic and political crises of the 1970s (Petchesky 1990, 242-3). Solinger points to the economic and political dislocation of the mid-1970s as a context in which the ideas of the right could thrive; runaway inflation, rising interest rates, widespread unemployment, the failed war in Vietnam, President Nixon's resignation, the following rapid succession of presidential changeovers, and the rise of human rights and social justice movements together provided ample cause for a conservative backlash to transpire (Solinger 2005, 204-5). This climate of political and economic insecurity "helps explain popular susceptibility to conservative values and the defensiveness or weakness of left and feminist movements in response" (Petchesky 1990, 243). Political opportunities thus also allowed for the emergence of the conservative movement.

5.1.2. Framing the Movement

From reviewing scholarly sources and contemporary newspaper articles, I identify three major narrative frames used by anti-abortion leaders and activists in the decade following *Roe*: the religious framework, the human rights and violence frame, and the presentation of motherhood as essential to womanhood.

The Religious Framework

Petchesky argues that the “religious framework” provides a system of good and evil, which allows for mobilization against that which is deemed to be evil, and “supplies a language and symbolism through which the right lays claim to the righteousness and purity of its vision” (1990, 245). Abortion represents “all the satanic evils the right seeks [...] to destroy”, while “the fetus symbolized the pristine and the innocent, which must be protected and saved” (Petchesky 1990, 245). Anti-abortion leaders thus drew on religious morals to juxtapose good and evil, and to assert that abortion violates ‘God’s law’. Russell Shaw, a spokesperson for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in 1985, asserted that the church’s anti-abortion position was not merely a matter of canon law, but of “natural, moral laws that have universal validity, the God-given laws of human behavior, not a legislated law” (*The New York Times* 1985). Anti-abortion leaders forwarded the idea that prior to *Roe*, the U.S. was “a virtually abortion-free country and thus, [...] as a country with stronger family values, closer to God” (Solinger 1998, 4). One article describes opponents of abortion who wore ‘Jesus First’ buttons to a hearing on the liberalization of Medicaid funding for abortion in Virginia; these opponents were reportedly “invoking images of genocide and warning of the wrath of God” (Frankel 1980). One opponent at the hearing reportedly said, “it is abhorrent to return a human being to God as readily as we would return an imperfect car to Detroit. [...] It is deserving of God's wrath” (Frankel 1980).

In 1984, a New York Times article reported that there was diversity of opinion among Catholics on the matter of abortion when 97 Catholic nuns and priests signed a memo stating that abortion is not morally wrong in all instances (*The New York Times* 1985). The Vatican, however, “demanded that priests and members of religious orders who signed the statement recant it” (*The New York Times* 1985), and “the American hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church issued a stern warning [...] to Catholics who dissent from the church's opposition to abortion, declaring that they were going against higher moral laws as well as church doctrine” (*The New York Times* 1985). This response demonstrates the tight control by church officials over the religious anti-abortion stance, which constituted a dominant frame of the movement.

Human Rights and Violence

Closely linked to the religious framework is the narrative that abortion constitutes a human rights abuse, and that it is a form of violence, murder, or even genocide. The church had constructed the progressive social changes of the 1960s and 70s as an existential “crisis” of values, and at the heart of the crisis was a failure of the courts and of people to place the right to life as the “substance on which all other human rights are based” (2005, 205). One article which made the case for the anti-abortion position declared, “the right to life, first among the rights listed in our Declaration of Independence, underlies and sustains every other right we have. Without the right to life, the other rights are meaningless, and human society becomes a sort of warfare in which force decides every major issue” (The Washington Post 1979).

Opponents of the *Roe* decision in 1973 had focused on the humanity of the fetus: “their main point was that illegal abortion protected the right to life of the fetus which, they claimed, was a person under the law [...]. simply put, defenders claimed that what was at stake in the legalization of abortion was allowing the child in the womb to be killed” (McBride Stetson 2001, 252). In

prioritizing the rights of the unborn child, “opponents of *Roe* often effaced women’s needs and women’s voices, a frustrating situation for supporters of reproductive rights” (Solinger 2005, 206). A woman who attended congressional hearings on the proposed Human Life Amendment reportedly stated, “We went to the hearings and heard anti-abortionists claim that a zygote is a human life, that a fertilized egg is a citizen; and we grew angrier and angrier. No one ever said the word ‘abortion’ and no one ever mentioned women- our bodies, our decisions, our lives” (Solinger 2005, 206). Discussing the debate surrounding the 1977 Hyde Amendment, which barred the use of Medicaid funds for abortion, McBride Stetson asserts that “proponents of Hyde blanketed the rhetorical space with references to the fetus as human life, the ‘innocently inconvenient’ defenceless human being, tiny human waiting to be born, new and unique genetic package, weak and vulnerable”, while “abortion was portrayed as elimination of people, execution, destroying our young, snuffing out lives, violence, killing the next generation, taking of human life, calculated killing of innocent inconvenient human beings, fetal euthanasia; in short, morally and ethically very wrong” (McBride Stetson 2001, 256). The early pro-life movement thus positioned itself as firmly advocating for the human rights of the unborn.

To frame abortion as a human rights abuse, the movement commonly linked abortion to other violent abuses: “in the United States, conservative Christians deploy the inflated rhetoric of “murder”, “infanticide”, and “genocide” to persuade Americans that the expansion of civil rights they have achieved in the last century has led their country down a path of immorality” (Shrage 2003, vii). During the 1979 March For Life, in which an estimated 60,000 people marched to the Capitol in the sixth annual protest against the Supreme Court's 1973 decision, March For Life president Nellie Gray was documented to have shouted “I do not sit down and negotiate with baby killers” in response to the National Organization for Women’s invitation to start a dialogue (Colen

and Mann 1979; Mann 1979). Catholic leaders meanwhile were reportedly “comparing hospitals and abortion clinics to Auschwitz and Buchenwald and calling advocates of freely available abortion murderers and Nazis” (Lescaze 1979).

Motherhood as Womanhood

Anti-abortion activists mobilized in response to the liberalization of reproductive rights for women, a change which was perceived as a threat to traditional values; “opposition to abortion is seen, in part, as an opposition to a perceived redefinition of gender roles” (Thompson 1998, xvi). Social and legal rules have historically governed women’s fertility, and “these rules have always been linked to traditional assumptions about women’s “natural work” as mothers. They have also always been linked to ideas about women’s “naturally” subordinate role and status” (Solinger 2005, 12). Roy and Thompson assert that women who try to prevent reproduction have historically been deemed “unnatural, frivolous, even depraved creatures”, and perceived to be “denying their destiny as mothers” (Roy and Thompson 2019, 9). As such, the anti-abortion movement associated “a woman’s impulse to manage fertility with murdering her womanhood: if she will not be a mother, she cannot be a woman” (Solinger 2005, 12).

Thompson highlights the narrative of the immorality of the mother who seeks an abortion; “to terminate a pregnancy is [...] repeatedly characterized as an easy decision, a casual response. The *immorality* of such action is compounded by the pain the fetus will suffer” (Thompson 1998, 90). Thompson, in analyzing narratives used by the movement to characterize women who take control of their fertility, writes, “she was associated with selfishness, sexual promiscuity, and distorted notions of the family” (Thompson 1998, 89). Such a woman “eschews the responsibilities of maternity, motherhood and the family. She becomes an almost totemic figure warning of the collapse of values, family and society” (Thompson 1998, 93). Thompson emphasises the

juxtaposition of the “feckless girl” with the “icon of the married mother who represents “True Womanhood”” (Thompson 1998, 93). Indeed, “woman was primarily bearer and rearer of children. This was her real and worthwhile function and role, one ‘she ought to play’. [...] Motherhood, as the primary role for women, therefore becomes an indicator of worth” (Thompson 1998, 92). At the 1979 March for Life, Nellie Gray reportedly said that before abortion became an issue, “the normal relationship for a mother and her child was loving and caring. Suddenly they’re promoting something devastating about pregnancy... and people are making money from that hostility in abortion clinics across the country” (Rosenfeld 1979). As a prominent leader of the movement, Gray’s words reinforced to large audiences that motherhood is the “normal” path for women. Motherhood is constructed as natural and inevitable, and the wish to “eschew child bearing, or a specific pregnancy, as a confusion, a failure of reason- often temporary” (Thompson 1998, 92). Movement leaders thus present “womanhood” as innately linked to motherhood to mobilize opposition against abortion.

5.2. Later Phase: #Prolife

5.2.1. Grievances, Resources, and Political Opportunities

The second phase of the movement analyzed is the period surrounding the overturning of *Roe*, which has seen a spike in movement activity: “anti-abortion organizers [...] say they’ve seen elevated interest in community activism since Dobbs” (Grabenstein 2023). The movement’s goal to overturn *Roe* was finally achieved in 2022, when the decision was overturned by a 5-4 Supreme Court majority in *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization* (Penovic 2022, 254). Nevertheless, the anti-abortion movement continues to push for further limitations on legal abortion. Most abortions are now banned in 14 states following the overturning of *Roe*, yet “in

many states, the fight over abortion access is still taking place in courtrooms, where advocates have sued to block enforcement of laws that restrict the procedure”, while “about half of states are expected to try to enact bans on abortion or gestational limits on the procedure” (The New York Times 2022). Even as the anti-abortion movement has achieved its primary objective in overturning *Roe*, “a new generation of anti-abortion leaders is ascendant—one that is arguably bolder and more uncompromising than its predecessors. This cohort, still high on the fumes of last summer’s victory, is determined to construct its ideal post-*Roe* America”; the ideal being the total elimination of abortion from the country (Godfrey 2023). *Roe* and the legal status of abortion has thus continued to constitute the underlying grievance of the movement.

Professional anti-abortion organizations such as March for Life and Live Action provided the institutional framework around which the recent resurgence of the pro-life movement organized. In addition to existing organizational resources, the internet has bolstered the movement. Saurette and Gordon assert that “the advent of the Internet has transformed and invigorated the anti-abortion cause by creating a host of new types of outreach, advocacy, and networking that have generated new and very promising possibilities for the movement” (Saurette and Gordon 2016, 172). The authors assert that, while the “traditional portrait” of the movement tends to portray it as “a relic of the past, organized in church basements”, “this is a far cry from the realities of the new digitally networked movement” (Saurette and Gordon 2016, 172). Speakers at the 2013 March for Life Youth Conference referred to the online realm as “the lifeblood of the movement”, and while traditional institutions such as schools and churches remained important for financial and logistical support, participants felt that “social media and online resources were key tools that allowed youth to feel connected the larger movement” (Saurette and Gordon 2016, 173). We therefore see the

internet as a key resource which professional movement leaders and organizations have used to mobilize the resurgence of the anti-abortion movement, particularly among young supporters.

Solinger presciently observed that at the end of the twentieth century, the status of abortion in the United States was “more volatile than ever, dependent on a host of variables including presidential elections, [and] the political complexion of the Supreme Court and the fifty state legislatures” (Solinger 1998, 7). The political conditions in the lead up to Trump’s election and during his four-year term reflected and enabled the resurgence of conservative values which re-energized the anti-abortion movement. While Trump stated that he was “very pro-choice” in an interview with NBC in 1999, during the campaign trail in 2016 Trump became a vocal opponent of the right to abortion, saying that women who had illegal abortions should receive “some kind of punishment” (‘Fact Check: Trump’s Views on Abortion Rights’ 2016). Trump reportedly stated, “the justices that I’m going to appoint will be pro-life. They will have a conservative bent” (‘Fact Check: Trump’s Views on Abortion Rights’ 2016). Indeed, Trump went on to nominate three conservative justices to the Supreme Court- Gorsuch in 2017, Kavanaugh in 2018 and Barrett in 2020- resulting in a majority conservative bloc, with six out of nine justices indicating “a willingness to dramatically curtail abortion rights and perhaps outright overturn *Roe*” (Chung, Hurley, and Hurley 2021). The conservative political climate of the period thus presented critical political opportunities for the anti-abortion movement to mobilize broader support as the goal of overturning *Roe* became increasingly attainable.

5.2.2. Framing the Movement

Analyzing scholarly sources, websites, and social media posts of prominent anti-abortion organizations, I identify three frames used by movement leaders to characterize the anti-abortion movement: the ‘human rights and violence’ frame, the ‘secular and scientific’ frame, and the ‘pro-

woman' frame. The anti-abortion movement is generally described as "a campaign that is male-dominated, aggressive and even violent in its tactics, religious in motivation, anti-woman in tone, and fetal-centric in its arguments and rhetoric" (Saurette and Gordon 2016, i). Saurette and Gordon assert that this "traditional portrait" of the movement continues to hold influence (2016, 12-15), however the authors argue that there have been observable shifts in frames presented to the public. I observe prominent organizations promoting secular and pro-woman narratives, suggesting that movement leaders have adopted new frames to match current social and religious views, or to appeal to broader audiences online.

Human Rights and Violence

The framing of abortion as a human rights abuse and a form of violence has continued into the modern phase of the movement. In addition to rhetoric asserting that abortion is a violent act comparable to serious human rights abuses, the sharing of explicit images and videos of abortion as a shock tactic has expanded online. The Center for Bioethical Reform (CBR) uses graphic imagery to advance the narrative of abortion as violence, murder, and even genocide. The top of the home page of the CBR website for instance shows an embedded video of a surgical abortion taking place ('Home' n.d.).

CBR's 'What We Do' page also shows a large image of anti-abortion activists bearing graphic images of aborted fetuses ('What We Do' 2014). The webpage highlights the group's 'Genocide Awareness Project', described as "a mobile display that has reached millions of students on college and university campuses in the US and Canada since 1998. The exhibit juxtaposes images of aborted embryos and fetuses with images of victims of historical and contemporary genocides and other injustices" ('Genocide Awareness Project | Genocide Abortion' 2012). CBR's Instagram and Twitter posts also display images of aborted fetuses, and juxtapose these with

images of genocide victims (‘Center for Bioethical Reform’ 2023;). CBR also associates abortion with historical injustices and rights abuses such as racial segregation. Their webpage explicitly associates the anti-abortion movement with the civil rights movement, stating “just as Dr. Martin Luther King sought to create a “creative tension” to awaken the nation to the horrible injustice of segregation, we too are creating a “creative tension” to awaken the nation to the horrible injustice of abortion” (‘What We Do’ 2014).

Prominent anti-abortion organization Live Action can also be seen to promote the human rights frame; the group’s home page states, “The human rights abuses of the abortion industry must end” (‘Live Action | Pro-Life Advocacy for Dignity and Human Rights’ n.d.). Bold text on the page emphasizes abortion as a violation of “the most basic human right” against “innocent human beings”, the “preborn child” who “is the most vulnerable member of the human family, yet the least protected” (‘Live Action | Pro-Life Advocacy for Dignity and Human Rights’ n.d.). Live Action’s Instagram posts also reinforce the message that abortion is an abuse of human rights; one post displays a quote by an activist, who says, “I’m an advocate for the unheard voices” (‘Live Action’ 2023). The March for Life homepage also states that “abortion is the most significant human rights abuse of our time” (‘Home’ n.d.). In an embedded YouTube video at the bottom of MFL’s homepage, a spokesperson claims “the fight is not over. We must defend our pro-life laws, and ensure more protections for the unborn and their mothers” (*Marching into a Post-Roe America* 2023).

Secular and Scientific

A new frame observed on the platforms of prominent organizations is an emphasis on secular and scientific arguments against abortion. This diverges from the traditional religious framework of the movement. Browne argues that anti-abortion groups increasingly “speak in

secular terms and generally appeal [...] to the ‘humanity’ of the foetus, co-opting human rights discourse in an effort to break the association of ‘pro-life’ values with Christian belief systems” (Browne 2022, 34). Indeed, in 1980 influential figure Jerry Falwell had argued that “the real challenge the Moral Majority has in the years ahead is to prove to the American people that we've got a heart, because it looks like we're coming on like religious crusaders of the dark ages, rule or ruin. [...] I think we have a PR job on our hands to prove that we are human beings who love people but who have convictions about what's right and what's wrong" (Rosenfeld 1980). This suggests that movement leaders have intentionally shifted from the religious to secular frame to improve the reputation of the movement and to better appeal to audiences. Although evidence shows that several organizations continue to be guided by religious beliefs, they tend to speak in secular and scientific terms rather than draw overtly on religious morals.

An Instagram post by Live Action shows a video of the group’s founder, Lila Rose, who states, “Almost all biologists agree, [human life begins] at fertilization. [...] If you’re a human, you have human rights, and the first human right is not to be killed” (‘Live Action’ 2023); Rose draws on scientific rather than religious reasoning for her positioning of abortion as a human rights abuse. The caption calls the video a “biology lesson”, emphasizing the scientific argument (‘Live Action’ 2023). A recent Instagram post by March for Life also states, “scientific facts about unborn children at 12 weeks gestation: from the moment of conception, a new human being contains a complete and unique set of DNA” (‘March For Life’ 2023). The organization thus promotes secular and scientific reasoning for valuing human life from conception.

Embedded YouTube videos on CBR’s website reveal the group’s Christian roots; videos show interviews with young female “interns with CBR”, all of whom center God and Christianity in discussing their positions on abortion. One 18-year-old says, “I know that God convicted me

through this internship to act on behalf of the preborn” (*How Can We Not Do Something?* 2021). Another states, “I haven't been asked to help fight in this war, I have been called by God, who is the creator of children who get slaughtered every day” (*I've Been Called to Use My Life to Save Theirs.* 2021). Despite the religious grounding of CBR’s position, there is almost no mention of God, Christianity, or religion on CBR’s website. A Twitter post by CBR states, “We at CBR believe in science, justice, and healing” (@abortionNO’ 2023), demonstrating their projection of scientific rather than religious reasoning.

The Pro-Woman Approach and ‘Pro-Life Feminism’

Roy and Thompson argue that “the biosocial ideology of *motherhood*- both that women are *naturally meant* to have children and that it is their religious, national, or familial duty to do so- remains strong” (Roy and Thompson 2019, 9). Nevertheless, the framing of the anti-abortion movement has decidedly shifted in tone regarding women. Saurette and Gordon (2016) assert that “today, anti-abortion activism increasingly presents itself as “pro-woman”: using female spokespersons, adopting medical and scientific language to claim that abortion harms women, and employing a wide range of more subtle framing and narrative rhetorical tactics that use traditionally progressive themes to present the anti-abortion position as more feminist than pro-choice feminism” (2016, i). Browne writes that “signs brandished at rallies and outside clinics declare ‘We love them both’ and ‘We value them both’, just as digital activists traffic in hashtags like ‘BothLivesMatter’” (Browne 2022, 27). Recent Instagram posts by March for Life show protesters bearing signs with slogans such as “A guide to women’s rights. Step one: Let them be BORN”, and “A true feminist would fight 4 the rights of unborn women” (‘March for Life’ 2023). Live Action’s donation page shows a large image of three women wearing pro-life t-shirts, one bearing the words “women’s rights begin in the womb”, and another “love them both” (‘Live

Action | Pro-Life Advocacy for Dignity and Human Rights’ n.d.). Twitter posts by March for Life claim, “Our feminist foremothers understood that #prolife is #prowoman”, and “We really like science, women, and children. Must be a #prolife thing” (‘@March_for_Life’ 2023).

The pro-woman approach, rather than demonizing the woman seeking an abortion, seeks to “educate” her on the dangers of abortion to her wellbeing, and blames the economic and social conditions which “force” women to deny their “destined” role of motherhood. Groups such as Feminists for Life have played a “key role in developing the ‘pro-woman’ arguments that [the movement] has increasingly favoured” (Browne 2022, 28). The top of FFL’s homepage shows an embedded video which states that abortion is “a reflection that we have not met the needs of women”, and that they, “believe that Women Deserve Better® than abortion. We seek holistic, woman-centered solutions to address the root causes of abortion” (‘Feminists for Life – Women Deserve Better® than Abortion’ n.d.). Pro-life feminists argue that “legal abortion access reassures us [...] that there is no great need for paid maternity and parental leave, for improved healthcare and welfare provision, or for decent wages, and so it is the ‘false’ or ‘privileged’ solution to gender inequality” (Browne 2022, 32). This positions anti-abortion activists as having women’s best interests at heart, and presents abortion as a symbol of women’s oppression. An Instagram post by Live Action advances this narrative, stating, “abortion itself is really the ultimate form of sexism against women” (‘Live Action’ 2023). A Twitter post by FFL also states that abortion “is the ultimate in the exploitation of women” (‘@Feminists4Life’ 2023).

This frame draws on progressive, feminist, and even leftist notions of economic and social equality for women, yet is underpinned by the traditional, conservative belief that motherhood is essential and inherent to womanhood. Ziegler points out that “pro-life feminism helps to paint abortion opponents as pro-woman and amenable to the needs of women who pursue higher

education or professional careers” (Ziegler 2013, 232), rendering the movement more palatable to women with more progressive sympathies. Browne argues that “rewriting anti-abortion ideology in the language of redistributive economics and social justice”, these “‘softer’, leftist, secular, versions can actually serve to broaden [the movement’s] appeal” (Browne 2022, 30). Arguably, movement leaders have shifted to adopt a pro-woman frame to remedy the “image problem” of abortion opponents as “cold, indifferent or even extremist in their attitudes toward women” (Ziegler 2016).

6. Discussion and Conclusions

6.1. Reviewing the Accuracy of Theories

The case studies demonstrate that collective behavior, resource mobilization, political opportunities and cultural framing theories are still highly relevant in explaining movement emergence. However, there have been some significant changes which indicate a need to review the accuracy of traditional theories in the social media era. I therefore argue that mainstream social movement theories should be reviewed to account for the various impacts of the internet on movement emergence.

The Progressive Case

Both the battered women's movement and #MeToo emerged in response to widespread gender-based violence, in line with collective behavior theories which emphasize the importance of grievances for movement mobilization. The women's liberation movement of the 1960s and 70s provided existing networks and institutional structures from which activists could organize in the early phase of the movement, while social media was the essential resource which allowed #MeToo to emerge. This aligns with resource mobilization theories, though they must be updated to include the internet as a key resource which enables movement emergence.

The liberal context of the 1960s and early 70s provided political opportunities for the battered women's movement to mobilize, in line with the political opportunities model. #MeToo meanwhile emerged as a backlash to Trump in 2017; though feminist movements have historically declined during conservative periods (Dobash and Dobash 1992, 17), arguably social media enabled the movement to mobilize despite political constraints which may have hindered professional organizations prior to the internet. Political opportunities models may therefore

benefit from updating to account for the role of social media, which may enable movements to circumvent political constraints.

The battered women's movement drew on frames which emphasized the bodily harm of vulnerable, innocent victims, and the 'personal is political' narrative which originated in feminist discourse; these frames appear to have been constructed by professional movement leaders, as expected by cultural framing theories. The framing of the #MeToo movement meanwhile appears to be less coordinated, with multiple narrative frames emerging simultaneously. Arguably, the origins of #MeToo as an internet-based movement in 2017 meant that control over the initial framing of the movement was decentralized; rather than being intentionally constructed by movement leaders in carefully planned, cohesive "ideological packages", frames emerged organically from audiences themselves as they discussed and debated the goals of the movement online. We then see professional organizations echoing and promoting the narratives constructed collectively by audiences in conversation with one another. This decentralization resulted in a multiplication of narrative frames which may contradict and criticize one another, yet which coexist online to promote the same movement. In the case of #MeToo, the internet devolved agency from professional organizations and leaders to audiences, resulting in a multiplication of narrative frames which lack cohesion. This effect suggests that cultural framing theories, which emphasize the role of movement leaders in constructing frames, would benefit from updating.

The Conservative Case

The conservative case demonstrates that both phases of the anti-abortion movement emerged in response to the liberalization of gender roles and increasing reproductive freedoms, which have been perceived as a threat to traditional, conservative, and religious values. Following collective behavior theories, this constitutes the shared grievance around which the movement organizes.

Resources such as church groups, religious institutions, and the internet in the later phase, allowed for the movement to network, spread information, and mobilize support. Resource mobilization theories, which must be expanded to include the internet as a resource, therefore also help to explain the movement's emergence. Unstable political and economic contexts meanwhile provided political opportunities for conservative rhetoric to resonate in the 1970s, and again from the beginning of Trump's presidency in 2016- political opportunities models thus apply.

The noticeable shift in the content of frames in the recent phase of the anti-abortion movement- from religious and pro-fetus to secular and pro-woman- suggests that movement leaders have intentionally adopted new narratives to better resonate with modern audiences, whose social and religious views have changed considerably since the 1970s, and to escape the "image problem" (Ziegler 2016) of the earlier movement, whose activists were characterized as misogynists and religious fanatics. Another possibility is that professional movement organizations frame issues in new ways to appeal to broader, more diverse audiences who they can more easily reach online, beyond their traditional religious and conservative constituencies. Cultural framing theories may therefore benefit from further review.

Conclusions

The internet is observed to play a crucial role in the organization of modern social movements. I agree with scholars who suggest that resource mobilization theories should be expanded to include online networking tools as key resources which enable the mobilization of movements in the modern day. The internet may also be a resource which enables movements to organize in spite of challenging political circumstances; political opportunities models may also benefit from updating to account for the internet as a means of circumventing political constraints, therefore. Finally, the internet may have multiple possible effects on the process of cultural framing, for

instance by encouraging movement leaders to shift the content of frames to better resonate with broad and diverse audiences online, or by decentralizing frame construction, resulting in a multiplication of frames.

6.2. Significance and Future Applications

I have argued that the internet impacts mobilization in various ways which diverge from the expectations of traditional theories, and which can differ across movements. Social media may be used as an organizational resource, a means of circumventing political constraints to mobilize in challenging political contexts, as a means of appealing to broader audiences beyond traditional support bases, and as a tool for audiences to engage in the construction of cultural frames alongside professional movement leaders and organizations, resulting in a multiplication of frames.

Future research should therefore reevaluate mainstream theories of movement mobilization. Updating to account for the impacts of the internet can ensure that theories accurately explain and predict movement emerge in the present day. Research might also seek to evaluate and understand under which conditions online tools can lead to the different effects identified, such as the circumvention of political constraints, or the decentralization of the framing process away from movement leaders. Examining cases of other movements beyond the scope of this thesis would also provide additional insight into how the internet and social media enable movements to emerge and mobilize support, in ways not predicted by traditional theories.

6.3. Strengths and Limitations

This paper has utilized comparative case studies to investigate the accuracy of mainstream social movement theories as applied to movements over time. By analyzing both a conservative and a progressive movement, I was able to avoid possible bias in the consideration of how social media has impacted movement mobilization. By comparing different phases of each movement

over time, I was able to assess the ways in which movement mobilization has changed. By consulting a broad range of data sources including news articles and social media posts, I was able to gain an insight into the reoccurring frames which characterize the different movements.

Due to time and word limit constraints, and the restrictions of databases used, this paper was also limited in its methods. Firstly, in utilizing the online database Factiva to access historical news articles, I was limited in the publications and years for which article archives were available. News articles drawn on in this thesis therefore may not present a representative sample. Additionally, comparing the narratives promoted by movement leaders through the lens of news articles leaves open the possibility that documented statements are distorted by journalists. Analyzing movement websites and social media posts for the later phases meanwhile constitutes a more direct source of evidence, yet it obscures the role of audiences in initially constructing narrative frames. It is difficult to conclusively demonstrate who is taking the lead in constructing narrative frames in modern movements, as the distinctions between movement leaders and audiences can become blurred online. Adopting a more rigorous criteria for coding the data would help to reduce the risk of researcher bias and subjectivity in interpreting the main frames which characterize each movement. Furthermore, the relatively small number of sources consulted cannot provide a full picture of the various frames used by each movement. Finally, examining only two movements across time cannot establish that the findings observed will also be observed in other cases; it can only provide a suggestion that broader changes in movement mobilization may be occurring as a result of the internet and social media, and thus theories may need revision.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Analyzing News Articles

Using the online database Factiva, I retrieved historical news articles to get an insight into how contemporary movement leaders and activists (as well as members of the public, political figures, and journalists themselves) spoke about the issues, framing them in specific ideological packages. Conducting a content analysis of the articles, I identified the dominant narrative frames which appear to have characterized the movements.

The Battered Women's Movement

For the battered women's movement, I searched the database for articles organized under the subjects "Domestic Violence" or "Violence Against Women" between January 1st 1970 and December 31st 1985, written in English and published in the United States; the search produced 370 results. Due to the limitations of the database, it wasn't possible to access articles published before 1977; I therefore also drew on historical scholarly sources for further insight into the framing of the movement from the early 1970s.

The database search produced articles from a very limited selection of publications, the vast majority (361) being from The Washington Post. An additional 8 articles were from The New York Times, and 1 was from The Financial Times. Systematically reviewing each article, I recorded the number of articles which demonstrated the use of particular frames to characterize the issue of domestic violence. Articles irrelevant to the subject matter at hand were omitted, such as articles reporting violence unrelated to domestic abuse or the battered women's movement, or articles which objectively reported the facts of criminal cases without any commentary on the issue. The total number of articles observed which provided insight into the framing of the issue was therefore 57. Of the 57, 29 articles emphasized the bodily harm perpetrated against vulnerable

victims, and 46 framed domestic violence as a public, political issue. The two dominant frames which emerge from the newspaper analysis are therefore ‘vulnerable, innocent victims’ and ‘the personal is political’; these frames align with those identified in scholarly sources.




Figure 1. Graph showing the frequency of each frame identified in the articles

The Anti-Abortion Movement

To analyze the framing of the early phase of the anti-abortion movement, I searched Factiva for articles categorized under the subject ‘abortion issue’ between January 1st 1970 and December 31st 1985, published in English in the United States. Searching for articles categorized under one specific term provided a manageable sample of 329 articles (articles available in the database related to the broader term ‘abortion’ numbered in the thousands). Again, articles were not available before 1977, and articles belonged to just two publications, with 213 from The Washington Post and 116 from The New York Times. The distribution of articles by year is shown in Figure 20. below.

Reviewing each article, 101 were found to provide an insight into the framing of the issue. Again, irrelevant articles and articles which did not indicate any particular framing strategies were

omitted. The reoccurring narrative frames observed in the articles were recorded; I thus identified three main narrative frames which characterized the movement: ‘the religious framework’, ‘human rights and violence’, and ‘motherhood as womanhood’. Of the 101 articles analyzed, 60 emphasized the religious frame, 72 referenced the human rights and violence frame, and 101 emphasized the traditional role of women as mothers.




Figure 2. Graph showing the frequency of each frame identified in the articles

(PDF lists of the articles analyzed for each movement are available.)

Appendix B: Analyzing Websites and Social Media Posts

To identify and analyze the frames used to characterize the recent phases of each movement, I looked at a range of sources. These included news articles and statements by movement leaders, but primarily I analyzed the websites and social media posts of prominent movement organizations. As discussed in the case studies, the internet and social media were major organizational resources for both the #MeToo movement and the recent resurgence of the anti-abortion movement. As such, looking to the online messaging of movement organizations gives a useful insight into the frames being constructed (or possibly just reiterated) by professional

movement leaders. Saurette and Gordon assert that the “language used at an organizational level provides an important site of analysis [...], as its discourse is officially vetted by formal organizations whose primary aim is [...] advocacy” (2016, 23). Discursively analyzing these sources therefore provides a useful insight into how movement leaders frame the issue in terms which mobilize support.

The #MeToo Movement

For the #MeToo movement, I looked at the websites and social media posts of three prominent women’s organizations which were created in response to, or became associated with, the movement after its initial online mobilization in October 2017: me too. International., The Global Fund for Women, and UN Women. While these organizations did not create the movement, and thus, I argue, did not have centralized control over its framing, they played an important role in reiterating and promoting various narrative frames alongside activists and online audiences.

Conducting close qualitative readings of each organization’s webpage, I identified common reoccurring discourses observed through text and images. I also looked for these recurring narrative frames in social media posts by conducting a search on Twitter for posts made by each organization, tagged with ‘#metoo’, in the initial six months of the movement (between October 1st 2017 and March 31st 2018), and scanned the groups’ Instagram posts. News and magazine articles, and statements of leaders such as Tarana Burke, further informed the analysis. Through qualitative discourse analysis of various online sources, I identified the four reoccurring narratives discussed in detail above.

The Anti-Abortion Movement

To identify the frames used to characterize the recent phase of the anti-abortion movement, I primarily looked at the websites and social media posts of four prominent organizations: the Center

for Bioethical Reform (CBR), Feminists for Life, Live Action, and March for Life. These organizations adopt a range of different approaches and promote various core values, but can be seen to reiterate similar narrative frames. Again, I conducted a qualitative discourse analysis of reoccurring narratives in the text and images presented by the organization's websites to get an insight into the main frames being employed by the movement. I also conducted a Twitter search of posts by the groups in the six months surrounding the overturning of *Roe* (from April 1st to September 30th 2022) tagged with '#prolife', and reviewed their recent Instagram posts. Three main frames were identified: the 'human rights and violence' frame, the 'secular and scientific' frame, and the 'pro-woman' frame.