

**CIVIC *INTEGRATION* POLICY?
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN CIVIC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS ON IMMIGRANT
WELL-BEING, PERCEPTIONS OF BELONGING, AND VALUE ADOPTION**

by

Clara Louisa Brinkmeyer

B.A., The University of British Columbia, 2020

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies

(Political Science)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Vancouver)

July 2022

© Clara Louisa Brinkmeyer, 2022

The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled:

Civic *Integration* Policy? The Impact of European Civic Integration Programs on Immigrant Well-Being, Perceptions of Belonging, and Value Adoption

submitted by Clara Louisa Brinkmeyer in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

in Political Science

Examining Committee:

Dr. Matthew Wright, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, UBC
Supervisor

Dr. Antje Ellermann, Professor, Department of Political Science, UBC
Supervisory Committee Member

Abstract

Civic integration policies have emerged across a variety of Western European states as a strategy to improve the integration outcomes of non-European immigrants through obligatory programs of language instruction, employment counselling, and civic education. While these programs may facilitate integration through the promotion of ‘citizen-like’ skills, such as language and country knowledge, scholars caution that civic integration policies may also have exclusionary effects and separate some immigrants from membership in the national community by restricting their entry into the country and evoking the notion that certain immigrants are fundamentally different from natives. This study examines how the paradoxical entanglement of inclusion and exclusion in civic integration policy affects the subjective integration perceptions of participating immigrants. Using a difference-in-difference approach and data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2017), it investigates how civic integration requirements impact the life satisfaction, perceptions of belonging, and value adoption of third-country nationals across fifteen countries in Western Europe. I find that programs of language instruction, employment counselling, and civic education increase immigrant well-being but do not exert any effect on immigrants’ sense of belonging or attitudes. The results of this study suggest that civic integration programs overall benefit immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country. Notions of exclusion within the programs do not appear to play a significant role in predicting feelings of belonging among participating immigrants.

Lay Summary

Mandatory civic integration programs for non-European immigrants have become increasingly popular across Western Europe. While these programs promote the acquisition of country knowledge, language competency, and values and may, therefore, facilitate immigrant settlement in the host country, some scholars argue that civic integration also constitutes an instrument of exclusion that constructs some immigrants as fundamentally different from natives. This study examines how mandatory civic integration requirements influence immigrants' subjective perceptions of the integration process across fifteen states in Western Europe. I find that the programs exert a positive effect on immigrants' subjective well-being, but do not seem to play a significant role in shaping their sense of belonging or attitudes. The findings suggest that notions of exclusions within the program do not significantly affect immigrants. Therefore, this thesis makes the case that civic integration requirements are overall beneficial to participating immigrants.

Preface

This thesis is the original, unpublished work of the author, Clara Louisa Brinkmeyer.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Lay Summary	iv
Preface.....	v
Table of Contents	vi
List of Tables	vii
List of Abbreviations	viii
Acknowledgements	ix
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Characteristics and Policy Developments.....	4
3. Assessing the Impact of Civic Integration Policy	7
3.1 The Impact of Civic Integration Policy on Immigrant Perceptions of Integration	13
4. Data and Measures	19
5. Analytical Approach.....	26
6. Results	30
7. Discussion and Conclusion.....	39
References	44
Appendix.....	50
A 1. Robustness Tests.....	54

List of Tables

Table 1. Determinants of self-reported life satisfaction.....	31
Table 2. Determinants of ethnic, racial, national, religious, and linguistic discrimination.	33
Table 3. Determinants of attitudes toward homosexuality.	35
Table A 1. Breakdown of observations by country and ESS round.	50
Table A 2. Foreign-born population by country - ESS vs. Eurostat.	50
Table A 3. Demographics of foreign-born residents in the EU –ESS vs. Eurostat.	51
Table A 4. Descriptive Statistics.....	52
Table A 5. Correlation tests for potential macrolevel confounds.	53
Table A 6. Robustness Test: Intra-EU migrants.	54
Table A 7. Robustness Test: TCNs with five or fewer years of residence.	54
Table A 8. Robustness Test: TCNs with more than 20 years of residence.....	55
Table A 9. Robustness Test: TCNs, excluding ESS round 8.....	55
Table A 10. Robustness Test: TCNs, excluding interview years post-2014.	56
Table A 11. Robustness Test: Quadratic time trends.....	56

List of Abbreviations

CIVIX	Civic Integration Policy Index
DID	Difference-in-differences
ERW	Extreme right-wing
ESS	European Social Survey
MCP	Multicultural Policy Index
MIPEX	Migrant Integration Policy Index
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
SWB	Subjective well-being
TCN	Third-country national

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Matthew Wright, for his guidance, patience, and invaluable feedback. I also thank Professor Antje Ellermann for serving on my thesis committee and for her consistent support. Thank you to the Department of Political Science at UBC for the kind help and assistance throughout my studies. I would also like to extend a special thanks to Sara Wallace Goodman and to Michael Neureiter for sharing insights and research data with me.

Most of all, I thank my family. To my parents, who have always been my moral compass, who love me selflessly, and who support me even when that means being apart from one another. To my sister, my best friend and biggest supporter, who interrupted me countless times while writing this but still somehow made it all better. And to my partner Jesús, who is my home and just the most wonderful person – thank you for your unwavering encouragement every single day.

1. Introduction

The interactions between immigrants and host society members are structured by a set of integration policies that determine the legal rights and obligations of newcomers. While the alleged objective of these policies is to promote integration, they are also a key site of membership construction and reflect the imagined identities of the national majority and the immigrants in relation to one another (Onasch 2017; Williams 2018). As such, integration policies define key elements of national belonging and influence the extent to which immigrants perceive themselves as legitimate members or insiders of the host society (Klarenbeek 2021; Williams 2018).

One class of integration policy that has gained increasing popularity among European policymakers is civic integration. The term ‘civic integration’ derives from the Dutch term *inburgering*, which can be roughly translated as ‘becoming citizen-like’ or ‘citizenization’¹ (Goodman 2014:3). As the name suggests, civic integration fosters the acquisition of ‘citizen-like’ skills, such as, for example, language competency, knowledge of the host country’s history, culture, customs, and geography, as well as a commitment to liberal-democratic values (Goodman 2014). The programs are mandatory for non-European immigrants, meaning that failure to comply with integration courses, tests, and contracts may result in the denial of a particular legal status, cuts in welfare benefits or other sanctions (Goodman 2014; Neureiter 2019a).

While programs of language instruction, country knowledge training, and employment counselling may facilitate immigrant settlement in the country of residence, civic integration’s focus on ‘citizen-like’ values and skills is, to some degree, based on the perception that many non-European migrants are culturally incompatible with the norms of modern European democracies

¹ Goodman (2014:3) translates *inburgering* as “becoming citizen-like”. The translation as “citizenization” was first proposed by Marie-Claire Foblets (see Foblets 2006).

(Onasch 2017; Triadafilopoulos 2011). More specifically, several studies argue that civic integration programs represent immigrant identities based on notions of hierarchical and essentialized difference that are not reconcilable with liberal-democratic values and, consequently, separate some immigrants from the bounds of host country membership (e.g., Fozdar and Low 2015; Larin 2020; Onasch 2017; Suvarierol 2012). As a result, the empirical integration scholarship remains largely divided in its assessment of civic integration policies. While some studies focus on the instrumental benefits of language and country knowledge training (e.g., Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Goodman and Wright 2015; Koopmans 2010; Neureiter 2019a), others critically examine the nationalist underpinnings in civic integration requirements and argue that the programs construct hierarchical conceptions of belonging that may hinder rather than facilitate integration (e.g., FitzGerald et al. 2018; Larin 2020; Onasch 2017).

This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing the following research question: Do civic integration policies exert any effect on the extent to which immigrants perceive themselves as legitimate members or insiders of the host society, that is, are they overall beneficial to immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country? To approach the research question, I focus on immigrant perceptions of the integration process and examine how civic integration as a site of membership construction influences immigrant subjective well-being, perceptions of belonging, and value adoption. I estimate the causal effect of integration by employing an extension of the standard difference-in-differences approach, which incorporates multiple cross-sectional units and multiple time periods (see Angrist and Pischke 2015). In doing so, I follow the research design developed by Neureiter (2019a) and take advantage of the fact that some countries have significantly increased their mandatory integration requirements since the early 2000s while other countries have not (Neureiter 2019a:2781).

Building upon the state of the literature, this paper makes three central contributions to the existing scholarly research on mandatory integration requirements. First, this study interprets civic integration through a lens of membership construction and develops a theoretical framework that focuses on immigrant perceptions of the integration process. Second, I identify different mechanisms through which civic integration policy influences immigrants' subjective integration perceptions and develop testable hypotheses that capture the paradoxical entanglement of exclusion and inclusion in integration policies. The theoretical framework developed in this study can inform future integration research on how to interpret policy design and analyze the impact of integration programs. Third, this study draws new conclusions about whether civic integration programs benefit participating immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country. My findings suggest that programs of language instruction, country knowledge training, and employment counselling overall contribute to immigrant well-being. Notions of exclusion within the programs do not appear to play a significant role in predicting feelings of belonging among participating immigrants. This is a possible direction for future empirical research to expand upon.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: First, I provide a brief overview of the characteristics and policy developments of civic integration in Western Europe. I then review the state of the literature and develop a conceptual framework from which I derive testable hypotheses for this study. In the sections that follow, I discuss the data and empirical models. In section 8, I report the results before offering concluding remarks and a discussion of policy implications in section 10.

2. Characteristics and Policy Developments

Civic integration emerged in the context of growing concerns over minority separatism and migration-related threats to national security in the early 2000s in Western Europe (Meer et al. 2015).² As a response to the alleged failure of multiculturalism, civic integration operates as a difference-blind approach and places the obligation to integrate exclusively on the individual immigrant (Joppke 2007). The measures are sanction-oriented, making immigrant autonomy, secure status, and socio-economic rights contingent upon ‘successful integration’ rather than a mechanism for its achievement (Permoser 2012). Civic integration, therefore, reflects a shift toward a more conditional understanding of socio-political membership that emphasizes the preservation of universal liberal-democratic values as the basis for social cohesion in the wake of internal heterogeneity (Joppke 2007).

The first three countries to adopt significant civic integration requirements were the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria (Neureiter 2019a). The measures then gained increasing popularity with the 2004 European Council agreement on *The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration in the EU*.³ Between 2003 and 2007, as many as 13 EU Member States⁴ adopted mandatory integration requirements as a prerequisite for long-term residence permits (International Organization for Migration 2008). However, despite an overall shift toward civic integration, there is considerable empirical variation in policy design across Western Europe. More

² The politicization of the topic of immigration was elicited by events like, for example, the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the 2001 race riots in the United Kingdom, the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and bombings in the cities of Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively (see Meer et al. 2015).

³ Adopted by the justice and home ministers, the ‘common basic principles’ outline best practices for the successful integration of immigrants across Europe (see Council of the European Union 2004).

⁴ The full list of countries includes Austria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom (see International Organization for Migration 2008; see also Permoser 2012).

specifically, civic orientation programs vary cross-nationally in their intensity, in the legal stages that they are tethered to, and in the sanctions imposed in case of noncompliance (Borevi, Jensen, and Mouritsen 2017; Goodman 2014; Jacobs and Rea 2007).

Civic integration generally operates through integration courses, tests, and contracts that vary cross-nationally in their intensity (Goodman 2014; Larin 2020). Intended to foster the acquisition of ‘citizen-like’ skills and a commitment to ‘shared’ liberal-democratic values, integration courses differ in their length and thematic focus. Some states only include classes for the purpose of language proficiency, while others also have lessons on employability skills, values, the host country’s history, culture, customs and geography, or a combination of these subjects. Participation in language and civic education courses may be voluntary, recommended, or obligatory. Some integration courses must be paid for by the immigrants themselves; however, most states that require course participation offer courses free of charge (Goodman 2014:43-5; Larin 2020:128-9).

Requirements of successful test, course, or contract completion may apply to different stages during the immigration process and are often mandatory for the acquisition of a particular legal status, like permanent residence or citizenship. In some cases, immigrants must also pass requirements as a condition for entry into the country, work permits, or even family reunification. To illustrate, Spain requires proof of language competency for naturalization only, while Denmark requires language certification as a condition for entry, settlement, and citizenship (Goodman 2014:42,50-1; Larin 2020:129). Should immigrants be unwilling or unable to pass mandatory integration requirements, the severity of sanctions also varies: In many cases, noncompliance with integration courses, tests, and contracts, prevents immigrants from obtaining a particular legal

status. In addition, states may also fine immigrants or cut down their welfare benefits (Neureiter 2019a:2781).

Civic integration policies do not target all classes of immigrants equally. Applicants from some Western and wealthy states or with specific qualifications and a high-income level are exempt. In contrast, low-skilled family migrants are generally required to complete all elements of most states' integration programs, making them the effective target population of civic integration (Larin 2020; Schotlen et al. 2012). Because civic integration requirements apply to select categories of immigrants, some scholars argue that the policies indicate preferences about the desired characteristics of prospective members that are unrelated to individual merit or to a person's ability to integrate and question whether mandatory integration requirements with their focus on obligations and sanctions (as opposed to rights) can be reconciled with liberalism (e.g., Ellermann and Goenaga 2019; Guild, Groenendijk, and Carrera 2009; Joppke 2007; Triadafilopoulos 2011).⁵

⁵ See Ellermann and Goenaga (2019:99) for a discussion on how civic integration policy not only discriminates among non-citizens, but also disregards the basic obligation of liberal states to treat citizens with equal respect.

3. Assessing the Impact of Civic Integration Policy

The proliferation of civic integration policies in Western Europe has generated a large body of scholarly research, most of which focuses either on a normative assessment of the role of the state in the accommodation of immigration-related diversity or on the study of the so-called ‘civic turn’⁶ and the cross-national range of variation in mandatory integration requirements in Europe (see, e.g., Goodman 2014; Jacobs and Rea 2007; Joppke 2004, 2007; Meer et al. 2015; Mouritsen 2008; Triadafilopoulos 2011). In contrast, studies that empirically examine the relationship between civic integration policy and integration outcomes have only recently begun to emerge and thus far do not provide conclusive results about the effects of mandatory integration requirements on integration outcomes (Neureiter 2019a).

Because programs of language instruction, country knowledge training, and employment counselling promote the development of specific competencies, many empirical studies investigate how skill acquisition through civic education programs affects immigrant performance across a variety of social-cultural, political, and economic indicators. For example, to improve immigrant labour market outcomes, civic orientation programs promote language proficiency and educate immigrants on how to navigate job applications or prepare for a job interview (Goodman and Wright 2015; Joppke 2007). Because existing research shows that particularly language skills exert positive effects on labour market outcomes (e.g., Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Rooth and Saarela 2007), several studies investigate whether civic integration policies foster immigrant socio-economic outcomes, such as employment status or income level (e.g., Böcker and Strik 2011;

⁶ Term coined by Per Mouritsen (2008).

Goodman and Wright 2015; Koopmans 2010; Neureiter 2019a).⁷ Further, civic integration policies are, at least in theory, intended to familiarize immigrants with the political system and institutions of the host society and may, therefore, enhance immigrants' political information, interest, and efficacy. As a result, some scholars examine whether civic education programs have an impact on immigrant political activity (e.g., Goodman and Wright 2015; Neureiter 2019a).⁸ Finally, various studies focus on the effect of civic integration on social integration outcomes (e.g., Böcker and Strik 2011; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Goodman and Wright 2015; Koopmans 2010; Neureiter 2019a; Van Oers 2013).⁹ While some of the scholarship highlights that requirements of host country language competency and familiarity with certain values and norms may facilitate social interactions among natives and immigrants and, as a result, may increase social trust (e.g., Neureiter 2019a), others point out that the sanction-oriented measures may decrease identification with the host country, particularly when the participants in civic integration courses are aware that these programs deliberately delay or prevent status acquisition (e.g., Guild et al. 2009).

⁷ In a qualitative study based on interviews of immigrants and service providers in eight European countries, Böcker and Strik (2011) find that mandatory language and knowledge requirements generally do not improve immigrant labour market positions or language competency. Similarly, in a quantitative analysis of 15 EU member states, Goodman and Wright (2015) find no significant impact of mandatory integration requirements on employment status and financial well-being. In contrast, Neureiter (2019a) concludes that civic integration policies exert a strong and positive effect on employment status and financial well-being using the same cross-national survey and outcome measures as Goodman and Wright (2015) but a different analytical approach. Further, in an analysis of immigrant labour market participation in eight EU member states, Koopmans (2010) finds a positive effect of restrictive integration policies on socio-economic participation and equality when compared to multicultural policies.

⁸ Goodman and Wright's (2015) analysis concludes that civic integration policies positively affect immigrant political interest and subjective political efficacy. In comparison, Neureiter (2019a) finds that mandatory integration requirements have no impact on political interest or institutional trust.

⁹ In a quantitative study of 1,000 Turkish immigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010) find a positive relationship between naturalization and host-country identification when access to citizenship is tied to some integration requirements. Further, when compared to multiculturalism, Koopmans (2010) finds that communal segregation of immigrants is lower in countries with more restrictive integration policies. In contrast, several qualitative studies based on interviews and focus groups with immigrants and stakeholders suggest that civic integration policies, in fact, hinder socio-cultural integration: Van Oers (2013) finds that citizenship tests in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom hinder rather than foster integration by excluding and stigmatizing the immigrant community. To this conclusion come also Böcker and Strik (2011) who find that integration tests reduce immigrant identification with the host society by alienating the immigrants taking the test. Finally, the studies of Goodman and Wright (2015) as well as Neureiter (2019a) find no impact on social integration.

Regardless of whether the thematic focus is on economic, political, or socio-cultural indicators, existing empirical studies on the effect of civic integration requirements thus far do not provide conclusive results on the relationship between integration policy and integration outcomes. This is partly due to data limitations but also the result of different analytical approaches, sampling methods, survey questions, and the use of different metrics to measure integration (see Neureiter 2019b). Hence, further research on the topic is needed. More importantly, while making important contributions through their comparative approach, existing cross-national studies on the effect of mandatory integration generally focus on the instrumental benefits of civic integration programs and outcomes concerned with inclusion. However, in doing so, they often fail to consider that civic integration policies may also have exclusionary effects and separate some immigrants from membership in the national community by restricting their entry into the country or evoking the notion that certain immigrants are fundamentally different from natives. More specifically, given that a variety of studies on policy design argue that civic integration requirements may be best understood as projects of nationalism (e.g., Fozdar and Low 2015; Larin 2020; Suvarierol 2012) or as instruments of (discriminatory) immigration control (e.g., Ellermann and Goenaga 2019; FitzGerald et al. 2018; Joppke 2007), it remains unclear whether civic integration programs contribute to desired integration outcomes at all:

First, pre-admission civic integration tests, in many instances, serve as a form of immigration control that limits the entry of certain immigrants into the host society (FitzGerald et al. 2018; Joppke 2007; Schotlen et al. 2012). While ‘integration from abroad’ requirements, in principle, apply to all third-country nationals (immigrants from non-EU countries)¹⁰, several

¹⁰ EU freedom of movement provisions allow EU nationals to reside in any other EU country without any pre-arrival procedure, which is why they are exempt from pre-entry civic integration requirements (Goodman and Wright 2015).

countries exempt citizens from predominantly white, wealthy, and Western states as well as applicants with certain academic qualifications, income levels or skillsets. In contrast, low-skilled family migrants are generally required to complete all elements of most states' integration programs, making them the effective target population of civic integration (FitzGerald et al. 2018; Schotlen et al. 2012). Cross-national studies show that pre-entry civic integration measures disproportionately affect immigrants from the Global South and are associated with a decrease in Muslim immigration in particular (Ellermann and Goenaga 2019; FitzGerald et al. 2018; Schotlen et al. 2012). For example, a Human Rights Watch report (2008) concludes that the primary effect of Dutch pre-entry measures is the deterrence of immigration from Turkey and Morocco, two of the three largest immigrant-sending countries from the Global South to the Netherlands (see also Schotlen et al. 2012). Similarly, the United Kingdom exempts nationals from several anglophone countries from pre-arrival requirements based on language ties; yet India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Ghana – major English-speaking source countries of Muslim immigration – are not exempt (FitzGerald et al. 2018). Hence, pre-arrival civic integration tests are a clear articulation of membership politics that selectively targets certain groups of immigrants and, thereby, reproduces stigmas that limit the possibilities of these immigrants to become members of the host nation. Not only do pre-arrival tests prevent some immigrants from physically crossing the territorial borders of the state, but they also signal to a subset of residents who share certain attributes of 'undesired' immigrants that they are fundamentally different from 'legitimate' members of society and, thereby, create hierarchical conceptions of belonging (see Ellermann and Goenaga 2019; FitzGerald et al. 2018).

Second, several studies on the content of civic integration argue that the programs represent immigrant identities based on notions of hierarchical and essentialized cultural difference that

construct some immigrants as outsiders rather than as prospective new members of the host society (e.g., Onasch 2017; Suvarierol 2012; Williams 2018). Cross-national research focusing on course materials finds that civic integration programs often depict ‘the nation’ as a unified cultural entity tied together by a shared commitment to democracy, liberalism, tolerance, secularism, and the rule of law, while immigrant identities are portrayed based on static, stereotypical and narrowly defined criteria, with a particular focus on illiberal cultural and religious practices that extend into the public sphere (Suvarierol 2012; see also Fozdar and Low 2015; Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos 2013; Mouritsen 2006; Onasch 2017). For example, Mouritsen (2006) finds that civic integration programs in Denmark portray liberal-democratic values as an integral part of the Danish way of life and seemingly suggest that, when socialized abroad, the exposure to illiberal, un-civic, and intolerant religious and cultural practices prevents a full understanding of the secular, liberal, democratic Danish nation-state. Similarly, Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos (2013) demonstrate that policymakers in the Netherlands focused exclusively on Muslim women as the target population of their civic integration programs and, thereby, reduced a diverse immigrant population into distinct identity categories portrayed as fundamentally different from Dutch norms. Civic integration programs, thus, evoke the notion that some immigrants are inherently incompatible with the ‘shared’ liberal-democratic values that tie the host nation together and frame certain immigrants as a threat to social cohesion, not because of their biological origins but because their supposedly “un-civic” culture impedes integration into a liberal collective (Mouritsen 2006:83; see also Suvarierol 2012).

Particularly gender and family norms often serve as the basis for constructing immigrant identities as problematically different from the ostensible norms of the host society (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Uitermark 2014; Larin 2020; Onasch 2017). A variety of countries explicitly

reference gender and family norms as part of their integration objectives and include examples of acceptable and prohibited gendered practices in their course materials (Larin 2020; Onasch 2017; Suvarierol 2012). Cross-nationally recurring themes include the affirmation of female emancipation, gender equality, and sexual tolerance on the one side, and an emphasis on the prohibition of practices such as genital mutilation, domestic violence, forced marriages, polygamy, honour killings, and child abuse on the other side (Michalowski 2011; Onasch 2017; Suvarierol 2012). For instance, the Dutch integration-from-abroad program represents Dutch norms and values through video clips that depict two men kissing and topless women walking on the beach (Goodman 2014). In mobilizing emancipatory and progressive politics, civic integration policies augment the self-image of the national majority and define immigrants against it (Larin 2020:135). In other words, the narratives conveyed in civic integration programs draw upon progressive politics to represent European identities as modern, tolerant, and open-minded, while immigrants are portrayed based on gendered and essentialist images suggesting that they are not (Mepschen et al. 2014; Larin 2020). Civic integration programs thus construct hierarchical conceptions of belonging that place certain immigrants outside the bounds of membership by evoking the notion that they are problematically different from natives.

Considered together, the findings of the empirical literature on civic integration policy remain deeply divided in their assessment of mandatory integration programs for third-country nationals. On the one side, civic integration policy provides immigrants with “civic hardware” (Goodman 2010:754), such as, for example, language and employability skills, both of which are shown to benefit immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country (see Amit and Bar-Lev 2014; Kogan, Shen, and Siegert 2017). Yet, on the other side, civic integration programs draw upon narratives with an exclusionary undertone and represent immigrant identities as inherently

different from natives, thereby constructing hierarchical conceptions of belonging that may hinder rather than facilitate integration. As a result, some critical work on civic integration questions whether it is even within reach of these policy measures to contribute to desired integration outcomes (e.g., Böcker and Strik 2011; Kostakopoulou 2010; Van Oers 2013). Overall, it seems difficult to reconcile the conflicting notions of exclusion and inclusion that emerge within civic integration programs, particularly when conducting a systematic analysis of policy effects. In modelling the specific impact of civic integration policy on selected outcome variables, it is, therefore, important to account for unique elements in policy design and take into consideration how the literature has interpreted them (see Goodman and Wright 2015). In other words, it requires scholars to be explicit in how civic integration affects selected outcome measures, taking into account the conflicting research findings on civic integration.

3.1 The Impact of Civic Integration Policy on Immigrant Perceptions of Integration

Against this backdrop, this study focuses on immigrant perceptions of the integration process and examines how civic integration as a site of membership construction influences immigrant subjective well-being, perceptions of belonging, and value adoption. In doing so, this study not only takes into account how civic integration programs provide immigrants with access to valuable resources and skills that may increase proximity between immigrants and natives but also considers notions of exclusion within the programs that may lead to alienation rather than to sentiments of belonging. To estimate the causal effect of mandatory integration requirements, I make use of three dependent variables – life satisfaction, perceptions of belonging, and value adoption – that measure immigrant perspectives and capture their subjective assessment and opinions on the integration process.

The focus on immigrant perspectives allows me to draw new conclusions about whether civic integration programs overall benefit participating immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country, leaving aside theoretical debates and implicitly shared assumptions that come with the concept of integration (see Klarenbeek 2021; Schinkel 2018). The framework employed in this study follows a variety of recent contributions to the empirical integration literature that explore how exclusion and inclusion in discourses, policies, and public opinion shape the perceptions, opportunities, and experiences of immigrants within the country of residence (e.g., Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Paparusso 2019, 2020; Simonsen 2016). Given that civic integration policies construct certain immigrant identities as distinct and different from natives, do they have any impact on the extent to which immigrants perceive themselves as legitimate members or insiders of the host society? How do civic integration programs shape the overall experiences of immigrants within the country of residence?

The first dependent variable, immigrant self-reported life satisfaction, is one of the most used measures of immigrant subjective well-being (SWB) and has recently received increasing attention in the context of policy surroundings (e.g., Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Paparusso 2019).¹¹ Theory and empirical findings suggest that aside from individual demographic factors (i.e., income, health etc.), country-level conditions like exclusionary policies, socio-economic and institutional inequality, or attitudes toward immigration influence immigrants' assessment of well-being in their country of residence (e.g., Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Knabe, Rätzkel, and Thomsen

¹¹ I use self-reported life satisfaction rather than happiness as a measure of well-being because existing research shows that happiness and life satisfaction capture different dimensions of well-being. While happiness is regarded as a social norm and concerns an affective dimension of well-being that is not influenced by integration policies, a question about life satisfaction allows respondents to make cognitive judgements about their life (See Campbell 1976; Safi 2010).

2013; Paparusso 2019; Safi 2010; Verkuyten 2008).¹² Immigrants' sense of belonging and identity perception, in particular, seem to play a significant role in predicting immigrants' overall satisfaction with life (Amit 2010). Given that civic integration programs construct hierarchical conceptions of belonging and portray some immigrants as fundamentally different from natives, this suggests that civic integration programs may decrease immigrants' assessment of well-being. However, civic integration programs also provide immigrants with "civic hardware" (Goodman 2010:754), such as language and employability skills, both of which are shown to increase immigrant life satisfaction (see Amit and Bar-Lev 2014; Kogan et al. 2017). Further, immigrants who successfully complete the integration requirements may experience greater satisfaction with life due to their secure legal status (see Paparusso 2019). As an outcome variable, self-reported life satisfaction is, thus, subject to both the instrumental benefits of civic integration as well as the more implicit narratives of (non-)belonging that the programs construct. Therefore, it allows me to draw conclusions about whether mandatory integration programs overall benefit participating immigrants.

Second, I investigate the effect of civic integration policy on immigrant perceptions of discrimination. In contrast to life satisfaction, which is subject to a variety of factors, including the more material consequences of participation in civic integration programs, this outcome variable exclusively captures the effect of civic integration policy on sentiments of belonging. Belonging

¹² For example, Verkuyten (2008) and Safi (2010) show that self-reported life satisfaction is lower among immigrants that perceive themselves to be discriminated against. Further, Knabe, Rätzl, and Thomsen (2013) demonstrate that increases of right-wing extremism in the host society are associated with lower assessment of life satisfaction among immigrants in Germany. In terms of policies and conditions of economic and institutional equality, Heizmann and Böhnke (2019) show that inclusive integration policies are positively associated with self-reported life satisfaction of third-country nationals in Europe. Finally, Paparusso (2019) identifies legal status as an important determinant of immigrants' integration experiences and subjective well-being in the country of residence. Holding citizenship of the country of residence, in particular, seems to play a significant role in defining subjective life satisfaction, thus demonstrating that equality in status and rights strengthens immigrant well-being (Paparusso 2019).

involves the feelings and emotions associated with national membership and is typically operationalized in terms of immigrants' emotional attachment to or identification with the host nation (Kannabiran, Vieten, and Yuval-Davis 2006; Simonsen 2017). However, due to data limitations, I resort to immigrants' discrimination perceptions as a proxy for immigrants' sentiments of belonging, which comes with some limitations: While research shows that an increase in discrimination and prejudice decreases feelings of belonging (see Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999; Wu and Finnsdottir 2021), a decrease in discrimination does not necessarily equate to sentiments of attachment or identification with the host society (i.e., belonging). Therefore, should civic integration requirements decrease immigrant perceptions of discrimination, this effect may not necessarily be indicative of a greater attachment to the national community. However, while discrimination perceptions cannot speak to the extent to which civic integration requirements foster immigrants' emotional attachment to the national community, they do capture the effects of stigmatization and, therefore, allow me to draw conclusions about whether civic integration requirements yield exclusionary effects that negatively impact sentiments of belonging. In other words, if notions of exclusion in civic integration programs exert any impact on immigrants' sense of belonging, I expect the levels of perceived discrimination to be higher among immigrants in countries with more extensive civic integration requirements. That is because existing research shows that (1) immigrants' perceptions of discrimination are stronger in countries with exclusionary attitudes toward immigrants (see Simonsen 2016); and (2) an increase in discrimination perceptions, by implication, leads to a decrease in sentiments of belonging (see Branscombe et al. 1999; Wu and Finnsdottir 2021). In contrast, if civic integration programs do not exert any exclusionary effects on immigrants, I should either find a decrease in immigrants' discrimination perceptions or no change at all. While studies on the effects of political institutions

on immigrant perceptions of (non-)belonging thus far remain scarce, a recent contribution by Goodman and Wright (2015) finds no effect of civic integration policy on immigrant perceived discrimination, albeit under a different theoretical framework and analytical approach than employed in this study. The null findings by Goodman and Wright (2015) may indicate that feelings of belonging are less susceptible to notions of exclusion within institutional regulations or policies but rather subject to ‘deep-seated’ forms of exclusion that stem from, for example, the overall climate of immigrant reception or social (in-)tolerance in the host country (see, e.g., Simonson 2016; Kogan et al. 2017). To test whether civic integration yields any exclusionary effects, I investigate the impact of civic integration policy on immigrant perceived discrimination.

Finally, I examine the effect of civic integration policy on value adoption. Value adoption as an outcome variable differs from perceived discrimination and self-reported life satisfaction because it doesn’t directly concern issues of membership construction or the extent to which immigrants perceive themselves as legitimate members of the host society. Yet, as my review of the literature on civic integration shows, civic value adoption is a key component of how civic integration policy constructs hierarchical conceptions of belonging. Several studies argue that the focus on a liberal value commitment in contemporary European politics primarily serves the purpose of advancing exclusionary positions toward immigrants by portraying them as illiberal and intolerant while re-imagining the host nation as progressive, modern, and open-minded (Halikiopoulou, Mock, and Vasilopoulou 2013; Larin 2020; Mepschen et al. 2014). In addition, Larin (2020) reasons that ‘shared values’ are the outcome of a shared identity and do not arise as the result of civic education programs. Yet, civic integration policy portrays education on ‘shared liberal-democratic “Western” values’ as an essential part of the integration process and the basis for social cohesion (Joppke 2007). To test whether there is any empirical backing for the education

on liberal-democratic values, I estimate the effect of civic integration on immigrant value adoption. Since particularly the domain of progressive and emancipatory sexual politics often serves as the basis for constructing immigrant identities as different from the ostensible norms of the host society, I specifically examine how civic integration programs affect attitudes toward homosexuality among third-country nationals.

4. Data and Measures

To carry out my analysis, I make use of eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-national opinion survey that collects data from representative samples in 33 participating countries since 2002. The target population of the ESS is the national population aged 15 and older, regardless of citizenship, nationality, and language skills. As an academically driven research endeavour, the ESS uses strict random probability methods to select sampled participants. The survey has a minimum target response rate of 70%, and interviewers make a minimum of four contact attempts to minimize nonresponse bias. These efforts are to ensure a balanced response rate across different subgroups in each participating country.¹³

Even though the ESS, as a general-purpose survey, was not designed to target immigrants specifically, it includes questions about the respondents' birthplace, which allows me to generate a sufficiently large sample of respondents identifying as foreign-born from each country.¹⁴ While there are some deviations between the proportion of immigrants sampled by the ESS and officially reported statistics on Europe's foreign-born population provided by Eurostat¹⁵, the differences should not affect my analysis so long as mechanisms for selection into the sample are not systematically correlated with integration policy. Further, as Goodman and Wright (2015:1893) point out, even if countries with high civic integration requirements have a systematically lower non-response rate - due to civic integration targeting skills, such as, for example, language competency, that increase the ability and willingness to participate in opinion surveys - it doesn't impede causal inference here, because civic integration requirements increased the proportion of

¹³ For more information on sampling procedures of the ESS, see https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/ess_methodology/sampling.html; https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/ess_methodology/data_collection.html

¹⁴ See Appendix Table A1 for an overview of the number of observations by country and ESS round.

¹⁵ See Appendix Table A2 for a comparison of ESS and Eurostat data on the EU's foreign-born population by country.

immigrants willing and able to participate in surveys in the first place. Finally, because the ESS is conducted in the host country's official language, there may be some limitations to the generalizability of the results of my analysis. More specifically, if the ESS overrepresents immigrants with better language skills, higher educational attainment, and/or overall higher human capital, then the results of this study apply to these immigrants only rather than to the general foreign-born population in participating states. A comparison of my ESS sample with data retrieved from Eurostat, however, shows that a lack of representativeness should not be a major concern as the demographic composition of immigrants is quite similar in both data sources.¹⁶ While acknowledging the unique challenges that come with using the ESS as a data source, given the breadth of cross-national and temporal data on Europe's immigrant population made available by ESS, I believe that it serves as a good basis for my analysis.

I use Goodman's (2010, 2014) Civic Integration Policy Index (CIVIX) as my main explanatory variable to measure the extent of integration requirements cross-nationally. CIVIX measures the intensity of civic integration requirements for entry, settlement, and citizenship on an additive scale from zero to nine, with higher values representing more severe requirements along the path to citizenship (Goodman 2014; Neureiter 2019a). CIVIX allocates one point per integration requirement at the stages of entry, settlement, and citizenship. In a second step, CIVIX then assesses the severity of each criterion, deducting or adding quarter-points for factors such as

¹⁶ When restricting my ESS sample to the same age group and year ranges as the data retrieved from Eurostat and comparing several indicators including (un)employment rates, educational attainment, and region of origin, I find that the demographics of ESS respondents are quite similar to Europe's overall immigrant population. While the employment rate and the educational attainment of survey respondents are slightly higher than those measured by Eurostat, they don't vary by much. Similarly, there are some slight variations in the immigrants' region of origin, but the overall share of TCNs in the ESS matches the statistics provided by Eurostat. Aside from language skills, ESS respondents, on average, don't display higher human capital outcomes than the EU's overall immigrant population. Regardless, one might proceed with caution and argue that the results of this study apply to immigrants who are able to speak the host country's language rather than to immigrants in general. For a detailed overview of the demographic characteristics of foreign-born residents in the EU, please see Table A3 in the appendix.

financial costs, language level, the punitive nature of the requirements and potential ‘double counts’ for permanent residence and citizenship (Goodman 2014; Goodman and Wright 2015:1892). The policy index is available for 15 European states for the years 1997, 2004, 2009 and 2013.¹⁷

To conduct my analysis, I restrict my ESS dataset to respondents identifying as foreign-born, third-country nationals (TCNs) residing in one of 15 European states assessed by CIVIX. Civic integration requirements almost exclusively target TCNs as intra-EU immigrants are not required to complete integration requirements when relocating to another EU state other than (in some cases) for the purpose of citizenship acquisition (Goodman and Wright 2015). By restricting my sample to TCNs, I thus ensure that the immigrants assessed in my analysis have been exposed to civic integration requirements. For the same reason, I exclude all immigrants from states that have acceded to the Schengen Agreement as well as all immigrants from countries whose citizens do not require a visa to enter Europe for employment purposes.¹⁸ To further maximize the chances of treatment exposure, I only include immigrants with ten or fewer years of residence in my ESS dataset. As suggested by Goodman and Wright (2015), this cut-off point ensures that the sample only includes immigrants who have been affected by civic integration requirements. My final ESS dataset consists of 3221 TCNs with ten or fewer years of residence in one of the original EU-15 countries assessed by CIVIX. To combine the ESS sample with CIVIX data, I match CIVIX scores

¹⁷ Data on civic integration policies are available for the original EU-15 area countries, which include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁸ For a full list of TCNs included in my sample please see appendix.

to the closest ESS survey year. This process leads to a total of 174 discrete country-years as the basis for my analysis.¹⁹

To examine relevant outcome variables in the domain of subjective well-being, perceptions of discrimination and value adoption, I employ straightforward questions from the ESS. First, to assess whether civic integration policy affects subjective well-being, I use immigrants' ratings of their overall life satisfaction on a scale from 1-10, with higher values representing greater life satisfaction. Second, to examine the effects of civic integration policy on perceptions of discrimination, I use a dummy variable coded as 1 if respondents perceive themselves as being discriminated against based on ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, and/or linguistic background. While the ESS also includes other dimensions of discrimination (i.e., along the lines of age, disability, sexuality, and gender), I focus on discrimination as it relates to the respondent's status as an immigrant to determine whether the exclusionary narratives within civic integration policy increase perceived discrimination. Lastly, to test whether the focus on sexual tolerance in civic integration programs has any consequences on value adoption, I examine their effect on attitudes toward homosexuality. The questionnaire item captures respondents' ratings of how much they agree with the statement that "gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish" (European Social Survey Cumulative File 2020) on a scale from 1-5, with 1 representing strong disagreement and 5 indicating strong agreement.

To account for potential confounding factors, I include a variety of individual-level and country-level controls in my analysis. I control for basic demographic factors such as age, gender, family status, religiosity, religious affiliation, region of origin, and place of residence (city size/

¹⁹ My analysis does not include 240 discrete country-years (15 countries times 16 survey years), because the ESS was not conducted every year in every country. Austria, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg did not participate in some of the ESS rounds. See <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/>.

rurality). Also, I include socio-economic variables that control for the highest educational attainment, subjective financial well-being, and main occupational activity. My decision to include these measures is based on several relevant academic studies that analyze the factors determining both subjective well-being and belonging (Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Olgiati, Calvo, and Berkman 2013; Paparusso 2019; Simonsen 2016) as well as attitudes toward homosexuality (Jäckle and Wenzelburger 2015; Röder 2015).

Because my dependent variables measure conceptually distinct effects of civic integration policy, some caution is warranted regarding the choice of control variables included in each of the models. For my analysis of attitudes toward homosexuality, I do not include any additional individual-level variables. This is in the interest of parsimony but also follows the relevant literature on this topic (Jäckle and Wenzelburger 2015; Röder 2015). However, in my models for perceived discrimination, I further control for citizenship status and ethnic minority status, as suggested by existing empirical studies on this topic (see Goodman and Wright 2015; Simonsen 2016). Previous research shows that identification with a minority group may enhance perceptions of discrimination, especially in countries with an exclusionary national self-image (Paparusso 2019; Simonsen 2016). On the other hand, legal status, and particularly holding the citizenship of the country of residence, plays a pivotal role in increasing foreign-born citizens' sense of belonging (Paparusso 2019). Thus, I expect citizenship status to be negatively correlated with perceptions of discrimination and minority group status to be positively associated with perceptions of discrimination.

Finally, for my life satisfaction models, I additionally include measures of perceived health and engagement in social activities because research shows that life satisfaction is subject to a set of factors in the domain of mental and physical health (Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Safi 2010).

Just like in my models of perceived discrimination, I control for citizenship status; however, instead of controlling for minority status, I use perceived discrimination as a control variable in my life satisfaction models. Existing studies find that discrimination perceptions are negatively correlated with subjective well-being, while citizenship as a legal status positively impacts overall life satisfaction (Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Kirmanoğlu and Başlevent 2014; Paparusso 2019). I control for discrimination rather than for ethnic minority status in my life satisfaction models because this measure encompasses discrimination in all of its forms rather than exclusively along the lines of ethnicity and race. In the interest of parsimony and to avoid potential multicollinearity, I do not include both variables in any of the same models.

As for country-level controls, I use data provided by the World Bank and Eurostat to account for the influence of macro-political and economic factors on integration outcomes (Neureiter 2019a). Specifically, I control for GDP per capita (measured in constant 2010 US\$), the national unemployment rate, and the percentage share of foreign-born residents as a proportion of the overall population.

Despite the comprehensive set of control variables included in my analysis, omitted variables bias is a concern, particularly with regard to country-level confounders, such as policy indices and/or macro-political and economic factors (Goodman and Wright 2015). In response to this issue, Goodman and Wright (2015:1895) point out that CIVIX covers an analytically distinct policy field and is neither correlated to other significant policy indices (see Helbling 2013) nor to potential macroeconomic and political confounders commonly identified in the academic literature. Building upon the work of Goodman and Wright (2015), I run a series of correlation

tests with potential macrolevel confounds²⁰ to address potential concerns of spuriousness. Like Goodman and Wright (2015), I find that CIVIX is negatively correlated with the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ($r_{xy} = -0.597, p = 0.001$), and positively correlated with extreme right-wing (ERW) party share ($r_{xy} = 0.314, p = 0.014$). Due to the availability of additional data from the Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index (Wallace, Tolley, and Vonk 2021), I also find a positive correlation between CIVIX and the MCP index ($r_{xy} = -0.369, p = 0.016$). However, neither of those correlations pose a problem to causal inference in the context of my analysis: In contrast to CIVIX, which exclusively targets TCNs, MIPEX, ERW party share, and the MCP index affect intra-European immigrants and TCNs alike. Therefore, to verify that CIVIX, rather than any of the correlated policy indices, drives the results of my study, I run a ‘placebo test’ with intra-EU migrants instead of TCNs. Since there is no theoretical reason that CIVIX should impact intra-EU outcome measures, the absence of an effect for intra-EU migrants supports the claim that the results found for TCNs are indeed driven by CIVIX rather than by any of the correlated policy indices. In contrast, if any of the correlated policy indices drives the results of my analysis, I should find similar results for both TCNs and intra-EU migrants.²¹ Even though concerns about spuriousness can never be ruled out entirely, the robustness test (which performs according to my expectations), in addition to the comprehensive set of control variables employed in my models, leave me confident in the validity of the results of this study.

²⁰ See Appendix Table A5 for the correlation tests performed.

²¹ Please also see Goodman and Wright (2015:1895-1895) for additional theoretical explanations as to why MIPEX and ERW party share do not impede causal inference in the case of this analysis.

5. Analytical Approach

I follow Neureiter (2019a:2786-2788) in estimating the effect of civic integration requirements using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. DID designs are often applied to estimate the effect of the exposure of a set of units to a policy or program in the absence of a randomized controlled trial (Angrist and Pischke 2015). In the classic ‘two-group, two-time-period’ DID setting, units of one group are exposed to the treatment in the second time period, while units in the other group don’t receive the treatment in either time period (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). The DID estimate subtracts the average change over time in the control group from the average change over time in the treatment group. The focus on *changes* rather than *levels* eliminates potential biases resulting from pre-treatment differences in the control and treatment groups (Angrist and Pischke 2015). In the context of civic integration policies, a DID design allows me to take advantage of the fact that some countries in my ESS sample significantly increased their mandatory integration requirements since the early 2000s, while others did not (Neureiter 2019a:2786).

I employ an extension of the standard DID model that takes advantage of the data structure of my ESS sample and incorporates multiple cross-sectional units and multiple time periods, expressed in the equation below (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; Neureiter 2019a). As outlined by Angrist and Pischke (2015:194-195), I replace the single time dummy used in a standard DID (dummy for whether the individual was measured before/after policy implementation) for a set of year dummies to account for multiple time periods. Further, I swap the single treatment dummy (dummy for whether the individual was in the treatment group) with a set of country dummies to reflect the fact that 15 countries are driving the comparison. In doing so, I control for fixed differences between time units common to all countries, represented by the coefficient γ_t , as well

as time-invariant fixed differences between countries, accounted for through the coefficient δ_g . I use the full range of CIVIX scores, matched to the closest survey year, as an indicator for whether individual i is in a country and time period exposed to the treatment (high integration requirements) (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; Neureiter 2019b). The regression equation attributes changes in the outcome variable, Y , to changes in the CIVIX variable, whose coefficient, β_{DID} , represents the DID causal effect (Angrist and Pischke 2015:195).

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_{DID} CIVIX_i + \sum_{t=2002}^{2017} \gamma_t * 1[T_i = t] + \sum_{g=Austria}^{UK} \delta_g * 1[G_i = g] + \sum_{g=Austria}^{UK} \theta_g * 1[(G_i = g) * t] + \varepsilon_i$$

To infer causality, DID models presume common trends in pre-treatment outcomes between the treatment- and control groups (Angrist and Pischke 2015). Specifically, the common trends assumption states that the evolution in outcome variables between groups should run on parallel trajectories in the absence of treatment (Angrist and Pischke 2015). If the assumption is violated, the DID estimates will be biased. Because there is no definite statistical test to determine whether the common trends assumption holds, researchers generally rely on theoretical justifications or visualization of pre-treatment data points to determine model specifications (Angrist and Pischke 2015). In the context of my analysis, I lack sufficient data points to visualize the pre-treatment outcome trends of my variables. However, Neureiter (2019b) provides evidence that immigrant integration in Europe does not follow a common trend prior to the introduction of civic integration policies. To avoid bias in my estimates, I follow Neureiter's (2019a) approach and relax the common trends assumption by including country-specific linear trends captured by

the coefficient θ_g .²² The inclusion of country-specific linear trends means that evidence for the effect of civic integration policies will be driven by deviations from country-specific time trends, even where the trends are not common (Angrist and Pischke 2015:198). My regression estimates, thus, capture the effect of civic integration policies on “immigrants’ attitudes and behavior in a typical country” (Neureiter 2019b:10) while allowing for pre-treatment differences in outcome trajectories through country-specific trends (see also Angrist and Pischke:198).

I estimate three models for each outcome variable. The baseline model includes time dummies, year dummies and state-specific linear trends. In subsequent model specifications, I introduce individual-level controls and country-level controls. I include standard errors clustered by country-years to correct for any heteroskedasticity resulting from correlations within defined country-year clusters. Further, I include ESS post-stratification and population size weights to account for differences in population size and sampling design in participating countries. These analytical weights correct for potential cross-national imbalances and increase the representativeness of my ESS sample.

DID methods crucially depend on the feasibility to time policy/program implementation and treatment exposure. Even after restricting my sample to relevant cases (i.e., TCNs with less than ten years of residence), it is challenging to time treatment receipt with my data. Respondents in countries that never significantly increased their civic integration requirements will consistently be matched to low CIVIX scores. However, it is not possible to precisely measure and time

²² The inclusion of country-specific linear trends changes the assumption from ‘common trends’ (same slope of evolution in outcomes between countries in the absence of treatment) to ‘common growths’ which imposes the assumption of linearity of outcome evolution in the absence of treatment (Neureiter 2019a). Due to the absence of visual data and theoretical justifications for model specifications, I follow Neureiter (2019a) and perform a robustness check whereby I rerun my models with quadratic time trends to investigate whether the results hold across different model specifications.

treatment exposure in countries that significantly altered their approach to immigrant integration over the fifteen years of my analysis. Since high civic integration countries gradually increased their civic integration policies over several years, I cannot guarantee that the CIVIX score matched to the corresponding survey year precisely captures the exact level of integration requirements completed by a survey respondent. To illustrate, rather than being required to fulfill the most recent increases in integration requirements, a hypothetical migrant may have been exposed to earlier versions of integration policy, depending on whether there were changes in the requirements for entry, settlement, or citizenship.

I offer two arguments in response to this issue: First, European states have altered their approach to immigrant integration in one direction only, meaning they either did not undertake significant changes or increased their requirements. Therefore, if anything, survey respondents will be matched to CIVIX scores higher than their actual treatment exposure leading to conservative estimates that potentially underestimate the effect of civic integration policies. Second, to increase the precision of the timing of treatment exposure, I undertake robustness checks, whereby I vary the length of residency of the TCNs in my sample. While this approach does not entirely eliminate the aforementioned concerns regarding treatment timing, it increases the precision of treatment receipt and verifies that my results hold across different model specifications.

6. Results

Tables 3-5 depict the effects of CIVIX on self-reported life satisfaction, perceived discrimination, and attitudes toward homosexuality. The results indicate that civic integration policy exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on immigrant self-reported life satisfaction ($p < 0.01$). For every unit increase in civic integration as per Goodman's CIVIX, immigrant self-reported life satisfaction increases by 0.387-unit points. Immigrants in high CIVIX countries, thus, do better in terms of subjective well-being and seem to be more satisfied with their life as a whole than immigrants in low CIVIX countries. The presumed mechanism behind these findings is that civic integration policies enhance language competency, promote employability skills, and acquaint immigrants with their adoptive nation's institutions, norms, and values, which facilitates settlement in the country of residence. Consistent with studies that highlight the importance of host-country language competency and employment for immigrant SWB (e.g., Amit and Bar-Lev 2014; Kogan et al. 2017), the results of this study suggest that civic integration enhances the access to resources that lead to life satisfaction by promoting certain skills. Further, TCNs who successfully completed the integration requirements may experience greater satisfaction with life due to their secure legal status (see Paparusso 2019). In contrast, the restrictive narratives that emerge in civic integration programs do not seem to significantly impact immigrant SWB. In other words, if civic integration policies have exclusionary effects, they do not manifest in immigrants' assessment of their quality of life. Overall, the findings of my life satisfaction models, therefore, suggest that programs of language instruction, country knowledge training, and employment counselling are beneficial for immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the country of residence. Civic integration programs seem to improve immigrants' perceptions of the integration process and positively shape their experiences in the country of residence.

Table 1. Determinants of self-reported life satisfaction.

Life Satisfaction (OLS)			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	<i>No controls</i>	<i>Individual-level controls</i>	<i>Individual- + country-level controls</i>
CIVIX	0.357 (0.072) ***	0.332 (0.070) ***	0.387 (0.088) ***
Age		-0.012 (0.006) **	-0.012 (0.006) **
Female		0.183 (0.124)	0.184 (0.123)
Citizen of country		0.325 (0.150) **	0.328 (0.150) **
Family		0.394 (0.164)	0.397 (0.163)
Domicile		0.003 (0.050)	0.003 (0.050)
Main activity (ref: paid work)			
Education		0.490 (0.156) ***	0.496 (0.156) ***
Unemployed		-0.414 (0.162) **	-0.409 (0.162) **
Retired		0.906 (0.401) **	0.915 (0.401) **
Childcare		0.010 (0.202)	0.011 (0.202)
Other		-0.544 (0.467)	-0.531 (0.467)
Level of education		-0.108 (0.048) **	-0.109 (0.048) **
Subjective income assessment		0.764 (0.105)	0.762 (0.105)
Subjective health		0.394 (0.067) ***	0.391 (0.067) ***
Social contacts		0.096 (0.053) *	0.097 (0.053) *
Perceived discrimination		-0.614 (0.168) ***	-0.614 (0.168) ***
Religiosity		0.040 (0.024)	0.039 (0.024)
Denomination (ref: Christian)			
Jewish		0.804 (0.566)	0.795 (0.568)
Islamic		0.332 (0.223)	0.323 (0.224)
Other		0.343 (0.255)	0.336 (0.257)
None		0.080 (0.139)	0.075 (0.139)
Region of origin (ref: Eastern Europe)			
Latin America		0.107 (0.192)	0.106 (0.193)
Middle East		-0.063 (0.212)	-0.056 (0.212)
Sub-Saharan Africa		-0.386 (0.217) *	-0.382 (0.218) *
Asia		-0.297 (0.200)	-0.298 (0.200)
GDP per capita			2.22e-05 (3.38e-05)
Unemployment rate			-0.011 (0.022)
% Foreign-born population			0.071 (0.063)
Constant (not reported)			
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,186	2,809	2,809
R-squared	0.069	0.253	0.253

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Second, and somewhat surprisingly, CIVIX has no impact on perceived discrimination. TCNs in high CIVIX countries are no more likely to perceive themselves as being discriminated against than immigrants in countries without strict requirements. Notions of exclusion within civic

integration programs, therefore, do not seem to detrimentally impact immigrants' sense of belonging or cause alienation between immigrants and natives. The absence of exclusionary effects is somewhat surprising given that empirical studies show that immigrants in countries with an exclusionary national self-image and bright boundaries between immigrants and natives report higher levels of discrimination (see Simonsen 2016). However, my results confirm the null findings of Goodman and Wright (2015), who also investigate the effect of civic integration on perceived discrimination, albeit under a different theoretical framework and analytical approach. While one can only speculate about the mechanisms behind these findings, two possible explanations come to mind. First, the lack of an effect may indicate that policies and institutional regulations play a less significant role in shaping perceptions of discrimination, meaning that in contrast to deep-seated socio-cultural factors such as social tolerance or a migrant-friendly climate, notions exclusion in policies may not significantly impact feelings of belonging among first-generation TCNs.²³ Second, the null findings could also mean that notions of exclusion in civic integration programs are not as pronounced as they are sometimes made out to be. For example, ethnographic studies on civic integration courses in Germany and France provide suggestive evidence that service providers, in many instances, challenge the representation of immigrants as inherently different and emphasize the possibility of multiple group memberships, which may diminish the significance of any exclusionary notions in the actual course content (Williams 2018; see also Onasch 2017). Further, on an entirely different note, some studies argue that civic integration policies are primarily a matter of symbolic politics and, by design, intended to appease the public opinion in the host countries rather than to exert any material effects on immigrants (see

²³ See, e.g., Simonsen (2016) and Kogan et al. (2017) for studies on the effect of socio-cultural factors on immigrant perceptions of belonging.

Larin 2020; Permoser 2012). In that sense, the framing of civic integration policy may be restrictive without bearing any exclusionary effects on the immigrants partaking in the programs (Permoser 2012). However, since these pieces of evidence are circumstantial at best, I cannot draw any definite conclusions about the mechanisms that drive the results of my analysis. Regardless, the important takeaway of this analysis is that civic integration programs do not impact immigrants' sense of belonging, meaning that the implicit narratives conveyed in the programs do not negatively influence immigrants' subjective integration perceptions.

Table 2. Determinants of ethnic, racial, national, religious, and linguistic discrimination.

	Perceived discrimination (Ordered probit)					
	Model 1 <i>No controls</i>		Model 2 <i>Individual-level controls</i>		Model 3 <i>Individual- + country-level controls</i>	
CIVIX	-0.062	(0.032) *	-0.057	(0.040)	-0.004	(0.051)
Age			-0.011	(0.005) **	-0.011	(0.005) **
Female			0.039	(0.074)	0.037	(0.074)
Citizen of country			-0.047	(0.109)	-0.043	(0.109)
Member of ethnic minority			0.744	(0.076) ***	0.746	(0.077) ***
Family			0.048	(0.083)	0.049	(0.083)
Domicile			-0.054	(0.033)	-0.053	(0.033)
Main activity (ref: paid work)						
Education			-0.482	(0.106) ***	-0.483	(0.107) ***
Unemployed			-0.218	(0.144)	-0.210	(0.146)
Retired			-0.007	(0.347)	-0.019	(0.349)
Childcare			-0.243	(0.104) **	-0.238	(0.104) **
Other			-0.576	(0.290) **	-0.562	(0.290) *
Level of education			-0.018	(0.029)	-0.016	(0.029)
Subjective income assessment			-0.223	(0.039) ***	-0.225	(0.039) ***
Religiosity			-0.017	(0.017)	-0.016	(0.017)
Denomination (ref: Christian)						
Jewish			1.478	(0.808) *	1.475	(0.808) *
Islamic			0.288	(0.152) *	0.279	(0.153) *
Other			-0.039	(0.182)	-0.049	(0.182)
None			-0.027	(0.120)	-0.028	(0.120)
Region of origin (ref: Eastern Europe)						
Latin America			0.315	(0.171) *	0.320	(0.172) *
Middle East			0.039	(0.181)	0.048	(0.181)
Sub-Saharan Africa			0.231	(0.165)	0.241	(0.166)
Asia			-0.322	(0.166) *	-0.311	(0.165) *
GDP per capita					-6.47e-05	(3.83e-05) *
Unemployment rate					-0.008	(0.017)
% Foreign-born population					0.063	(0.046)
Constant (not reported)						
Year dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	

Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,213	2,775	2,775
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.039	0.139	0.140

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, as expected, programs of civic value commitment do not affect TCN value adoption. More specifically, strict civic integration requirements do not cause immigrants to commit to so-called ‘shared values’ and alter their attitudes toward homosexuality. My findings are consistent with Neureiter’s (2019a) empirical analysis of civic integration, which also finds that immigrants in high CIVIX countries are not more likely to hold more favourable opinions toward homosexuality compared to immigrants in low CIVIX countries. The fact that the mobilization of gay politics through civic integration does not lead to a change in immigrant attitudes is not surprising. On the contrary, it affirms theoretical work suggesting that ‘shared values’ are the outcome of a shared identity and do not arise as the result of civic education programs (see Larin 2020). To some extent, the null findings of this study also support critical work on civic integration, suggesting that the focus on a liberal-democratic value commitment primarily serves the purpose of augmenting the self-image of the national majority as progressive, modern, and open-minded (see Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Mepschen et al. 2014; Larin 2020). However, it should be noted that while the focus on a liberal value commitment in civic education programs is empirically unfounded and does not cause a change in immigrant attitudes, the exposure to the gendered and essentialist images that emerge in civic integration programs also does not detrimentally impact immigrants. In other words, the education on liberal-democratic values and the implicit narratives that come with it do not influence the extent to which immigrants perceive themselves as being discriminated against or their life satisfaction. Overall, the focus on

liberal-democratic values in civic integration programs does not impact immigrants' subjective integration perceptions.

Table 3. Determinants of attitudes toward homosexuality.

Attitudes toward homosexuality (OLS)						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<i>No controls</i>		<i>Individual-level controls</i>		<i>Individual- + country-level controls</i>	
CIVIX	0.135	(0.055) **	0.081	(0.052)	0.016	(0.066)
Age			-0.007	(0.003) *	-0.007	(0.003) *
Female			0.190	(0.091) **	0.192	(0.092) **
Family			0.051	(0.083)	0.050	(0.083)
Domicile			0.008	(0.030)	0.006	(0.030)
Main activity (ref: paid work)						
Education			0.052	(0.104)	0.050	(0.105)
Unemployed			0.056	(0.102)	0.056	(0.102)
Retired			0.056	(0.299)	0.041	(0.300)
Childcare			-0.307	(0.143) **	-0.308	(0.143) **
Other			0.069	(0.230)	0.063	(0.230)
Level of education			0.070	(0.026) ***	0.067	(0.026) **
Subjective income assessment			0.044	(0.039)	0.045	(0.039)
Religiosity			-0.046	(0.018) **	-0.047	(0.018) **
Denomination (ref: Christian)						
Jewish			0.037	(0.486)	0.051	(0.485)
Islamic			-0.048	(0.116)	-0.042	(0.117)
Other			-0.072	(0.148)	-0.072	(0.148)
None			0.225	(0.116) *	0.226	(0.116) *
Region of origin (ref: Eastern Europe)						
Latin America			0.368	(0.120) ***	0.367	(0.121) ***
Middle East			-0.205	(0.111) *	-0.207	(0.111) *
Sub-Saharan Africa			-0.180	(0.158)	-0.180	(0.158)
Asia			0.216	(0.111)	0.219	(0.111)
GDP per capita					-4.74e-05	(2.71e-05) *
Unemployment rate					-0.022	(0.016)
% Foreign-born population					-0.080	(0.041) **
Constant (not reported)						
Year dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Linear time trends	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Observations	3,015		2,736		2,736	
R-squared	0.072		0.170		0.171	

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To verify my results, I conduct a variety of robustness checks.²⁴ First, despite efforts to control for individual and macro-level confounds, it is difficult to account for broader socio-economic factors and policy indicators, leaving my analytical approach open to the possibility of omitted variables bias. To verify that my results are indeed driven by CIVIX, I re-run all models with immigrants from other European Union member states (intra-EU migrants) instead of TCNs. Intra-EU migrants are, just like TCNs, susceptible to host-country characteristics (see Heizmann and Böhnke 2019); however, in contrast to TCNs, they are exempt from partaking in civic integration programs other than, in some cases, for the purpose of citizenship (Goodman and Wright 2015). For this reason, there is no theoretical reason that CIVIX should exert any impact on intra-EU migrant outcome measures. Therefore, no effect of CIVIX for intra-EU migrants supports the claim that the results found for TCNs are indeed driven by CIVIX and not by omitted variables. As expected, the robustness test confirms that there is no relationship between civic integration and any of the outcome variables when the sample is restricted to intra-EU migrants.

Second, I confirm my results by varying the length of residence of the TCNs in my sample. In my main analysis, I restrict my sample to immigrants with ten or fewer years of residence. As a robustness test, I re-run the models with (1) immigrants with five or fewer years of residence and (2) immigrants with more than 20 years of residence. The models with TCNs with more than 20 years of residence serve as another ‘placebo’ test. I expect immigrants with more than 20 years of residence not to be impacted by CIVIX because civic integration measures are “recent requirements for recent immigrants” (Goodman and Wright 2015:1892). No effect of CIVIX on immigrants with more than 20 years of residence supports the claim that the results found for

²⁴ Please find the results for all robustness checks in the appendix.

immigrants with less than ten years of residence are driven by CIVIX and not by omitted variables. In contrast, the models with TCNs with five or fewer years of residence should support the results found in my main analysis. As already outlined in the previous section, this robustness test is intended to increase the precision of the timing of treatment exposure. Both robustness tests meet my expectations, thereby bolstering my confidence in the validity of the results.

Third, in the interest of maximizing the size of my sample, I include survey respondents from eight rounds of the ESS spanning over a time period from 2002 to 2017 in my main models. CIVIX scores, however, are only available until 2014. To verify that the results of my analysis are not driven by the last couple of survey rounds, I re-run all models, excluding data from respondents who participated in the ESS post-2014. Again, the tests confirm the results of my main models. Even without the last survey rounds, I find a positive and statistically significant effect of CIVIX on self-reported life satisfaction, while CIVIX does not impact perceptions of discrimination and attitudes toward homosexuality.

Finally, Neureiter (2019b) suggests that integration outcomes in Europe may not follow a common trend, which is why I followed his approach and relaxed the common trends assumption by including country-specific linear trends in my main models. The inclusion of country-specific linear trends, however, changes the assumption from ‘common trends’ (same slope of evolution in outcomes between countries in the absence of treatment) to ‘common growths’, which imposes the assumption of linearity of outcome evolution in the absence of treatment (Neureiter 2019a:2792). While evidence provided by Neureiter (2019a, 2019b) seems to support the linearity assumption for integration outcomes, I follow Neureiter (2019a, 2019b) and additionally estimate models with quadratic time trends to examine whether the effect of CIVIX treatment holds across alternative model specifications. Again, the robustness tests support the results of my main

analysis. Overall, the robustness tests thus confirm that the results of my analysis hold across different model specifications, providing confidence in the validity of the findings of this study.

7. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper advances two primary arguments. First, programs of language instruction, country knowledge training, employment counselling, and familiarization with host country values exert a positive effect on immigrant well-being and enhance immigrants' subjective perceptions of their integration process. In other words, civic integration programs are overall beneficial to participating immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country. The results suggest that civic integration programs, by promoting the development of certain skills, increase access to valuable goods, resources, and benefits that lead to life satisfaction (see, e.g., Amit and Bar-Lev 2014; Kogan et al. 2017; Paparusso 2019). In that sense, the findings of this paper support other empirical studies in concluding that civic integration programs positively impact some integration outcomes (see Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Goodman and Wright 2015; Koopmans 2010; Neureiter 2019a).

Second, civic integration programs do not impact immigrants' sense of belonging or their attitudes. More specifically, the null findings for perceived discrimination suggest that the exclusionary narratives that emerge in civic integration programs do not detrimentally impact immigrants or hurt their sense of belonging. This means that even when civic integration programs may portray immigrant identities as different from natives and construct hierarchical conceptions of belonging that ostensibly situate certain immigrants outside the bounds of membership, they do not alienate immigrants. Even though the representations of immigrant identities within civic integration may reproduce stigmas and, therefore, be deemed problematic in and of themselves (see, e.g., Larin 2020; Onasch 2017; Suvarierol 2012), empirically speaking, they do not exert any exclusionary effects on immigrants. In contrast to the more material consequences of civic

integration policy, it thus seems that the implicit narratives conveyed in the programs play no significant role in predicting immigrants' subjective integration perceptions.

This also holds true for the mobilization of so-called 'shared' liberal values through civic integration programs. The focus on liberal-democratic values in civic integration programs does not have any empirical consequences, meaning that education on gender equality and sexual tolerance neither causes immigrants to hold more favourable opinions toward homosexuality nor detrimentally impacts their sense of belonging. This does not entirely invalidate the arguments put forward by several critical studies on civic integration: The appropriation of civil liberties and progressive politics to represent European identities as modern, tolerant, and open-minded has been widely criticized, not only because it implies that immigrants are illiberal and homophobic, but also because it erases historic and ongoing racism and homophobia in Western Europe from the national imaginary of the host society (see Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Larin 2020; Mepschen et al. 2014). However, since this kind of narrative seems to not play any role in the context of civic integration policy, a fruitful direction for future research may be to further explore this topic outside the context of integration policies and examine whether exclusionary or nationalist discourses in the name of civil liberties have any impact on the relations between natives and immigrants.

This study makes several important contributions to the empirical integration scholarship. First, it develops a theoretical framework that interprets policy design through a lens of membership construction and focuses on immigrant perceptions of the integration process. In doing so, this study not only takes into account how civic integration programs provide immigrants with access to valuable resources and skills that may increase proximity between immigrants and natives but also considers notions of exclusion within the programs that may lead to alienation

rather than to sentiments of belonging. The theoretical framework developed in this study can inform future integration research on how to interpret policy design and analyze the impact of integration programs. Second, the results of this work add to the findings of a variety of recent studies that explore how exclusion and inclusion in discourses, policies, and public opinion shape the perceptions, opportunities, and experiences of immigrants within the country of residence (see Heizmann and Böhnke 2019; Paparusso 2019, 2020; Simonsen 2016) and draws new conclusions about policies in this context. More specifically, while the instrumental benefits of integration policies seem to play an important role in shaping the experiences of immigrants within the country of residence, implicit narratives and notions of exclusion through the way in which immigrants are represented in integration programs do not seem to play a significant role in predicting feelings of (non-)belonging among first-generation third-country nationals. Given that empirical studies on immigrant perceptions of discrimination and belonging find that attitudes towards immigrants as expressed in public discourses and opinion generally play an important role in shaping immigrant feelings of inclusion and exclusion (see Simonsen 2016; Kogan et al. 2017), these findings constitute an important contribution to the literature that future empirical research may want to expand upon.

A significant limitation of my research design is that it methodologically cannot identify the mechanisms through which civic integration affects the outcome variables of my analysis. This means that if civic integration policy conditions the type and number of arriving migrants, then the results of this study may be driven by mechanisms of immigrant selection rather than by actual exposure to the treatment – the participation in civic orientation programs (Goodman and Wright 2015; Neureiter 2019a). There are thus two possible explanations as to why civic integration programs do not impact immigrants' sense of belonging or their attitudes. First, the null findings

could be the result of the gate-keeping role of civic integration, meaning that immigrants who are unable or unwilling to pass the requirements may self-select into countries with fewer integration obligations or avoid immigration altogether (FitzGerald et al. 2018; Goodman and Wright 2015). This is particularly a concern with regard to pre-arrival civic integration conditions, which construct membership based on formal and institutionalized boundaries that reduce the admission of low-skilled family migrants from certain countries (FitzGerald et al. 2018). The null findings may, therefore, not be indicative of a lack of exclusionary effects through civic integration policy but rather the result of discriminatory migration control. In other words, those immigrants affected by the gendered and essentialist images that emerge in civic integration programs do not get admitted into the country in the first place. Alternatively, the null findings could also mean that the hierarchical constructions of belonging and the focus on ‘shared values’ truly bear no effects on immigrants. In light of this interpretation, immigrants appear to be less susceptible to the implicit narratives constructed within civic integration programs, possibly because these policies were, in many instances, designed to appease the predominantly negative public opinion toward immigration in the host countries rather than to actually bear any effects on immigrants (see Larin 2020; Permoser 2012). Since it is outside the scope of my research design to distinguish between different explanations for the results of this study, one can only speculate about the presumed mechanisms that drive my findings. Importantly, none of these interpretations of civic integration policy are mutually exclusive, and they, in many ways, complement each other (Neureiter 2019a).

While I cannot directly verify the mechanisms that drive the results of this study, it seems unlikely that the positive effect of civic integration on immigrant life satisfaction is (solely) the result of selection processes. That is because the ability and willingness to pass civic integration requirements do not (primarily) depend on the immigrants’ subjective well-being. However, in

order to derive precise policy implications from the results of this study, further research on the mechanisms behind the relation between mandatory integration requirements and life satisfaction is required. More specifically, future qualitative work may want to examine whether and how civic integration requirements affect individual skills and conditions that lead to satisfaction with life.

Overall, programs of language instruction, country knowledge training, employment counselling, and familiarization with host country norms, values, and institutions contribute to immigrant subjective well-being. Notions of exclusion within civic integration do not detrimentally impact immigrants' sense of belonging or yield exclusionary effects among immigrants partaking in the programs. Instead, some elements of civic integration seem to be truly beneficial to the subjective integration perceptions of immigrants and facilitate their settlement in the host country. Hence, it seems premature to discard civic integration policy as an approach to integration altogether.

References

- Amit, Karin. 2010. "Determinants of Life Satisfaction among Immigrants from Western Countries and from the FSU in Israel." *Social Indicators Research* 96(3):515-534. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-009-9490-1>
- Amit, Karin, and Shirly Bar-Lev. 2014. "Immigrants' Sense of Belonging to the Host Country: The Role of Life Satisfaction, Language Proficiency, and Religious Motives." *Social Indicators Research* 124(3):947-961. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0823-3>
- Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2015. *Mastering 'Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Böcker, Anita, and Tineke Strik. 2011. "Language and Knowledge Tests for Permanent Residence Rights: Help or Hindrance for Integration?" *European Journal of Migration and Law* 13(2):157-184. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157181611X571268>
- Borevi, Karin, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, and Per Mouritsen. 2017. "The Civic Turn of Immigrant Integration Policies in the Scandinavian Welfare States." *Comparative Migration Studies* 5(9):1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-017-0052-4>
- Branscombe, Nyla R., Michael T. Schmitt, and Richard D. Harvey. 1999. "Perceiving Pervasive Discrimination among African Americans: Implications for Group Identification and Well-being." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77(1):135-149. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.1.135>
- Campbell, Angus. 1976. "Subjective Measures of Well-being." *The American Psychologist* 31(2):117-124. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.31.2.117>
- Council of the European Union. 2004. "Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union." *Council of the European Union: 14615/04 (Presse 321)*. Retrieved May 17, 2022 (https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/common-basic-principles-immigrant-integration-policy-eu_en).
- Dustmann, Christian, and Francesca Fabbri. 2003. "Language Proficiency and Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK." *The Economic Journal (London)* 113(489):695-717. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00151>
- Ellermann, Antje, and Agustín Goenaga. 2019. "Discrimination and Policies of Immigrant Selection in Liberal States." *Politics & Society* 47(1):87-116. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218820870>
- Ersanilli, Evelyn, and Ruud Koopmans. 2010. "Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5):773-791. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691831003764318>
- European Social Survey Cumulative File. 2020. "European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-8. Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway - Data

- Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC." Retrieved Aug. 21, 2021 ([doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS-CUMULATIVE](https://doi.org/10.21338/NSD-ESS-CUMULATIVE)).
- FitzGerald, David S., David Cook-Martín, Angela S. García, and Rawan Arar. 2018. "Can You Become One of Us? A Historical Comparison of Legal Selection of 'Assimilable' Immigrants in Europe and the Americas." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(1):27-47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1313106>
- Foblets, Marie-Claire. 2006. "Legal Aspects of the Multicultural society. Tensions and Challenges for Policy Making." Pp. 89-104 in *New Citizens, New Policies? Developments in Diversity Policy in Canada and Flanders*, edited by L. d'Haenens, M. Hooghe, D. Vanheule and H. Gezduci. Gent: Academia Press.
- Fozdar, Farida, and Mitchell Low. 2015. "They have to Abide by our Laws...and Stuff: Ethnonationalism Masquerading as Civic Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 21(3):524-543. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12128>
- Goodman, Sara Wallace. 2010. "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5):753-772. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691831003764300>
- Goodman, Sara Wallace. 2014. *Immigration and Membership Politics in Western Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107477865>
- Goodman, Sara Wallace, and Matthew Wright. 2015. "Does Mandatory Integration Matter? Effects of Civic Requirements on Immigrant Socio-Economic and Political Outcomes." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41(12):1885-1908. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1042434>
- Guild, Elspeth, Kees Groenendijk, and Sergio Carrera. 2009. *Illiberal Liberal States. Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU*. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315587813>
- Halikiopoulou, Daphne, Steven Mock, and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2013. "The Civic Zeitgeist: Nationalism and Liberal Values in the European Radical Right." *Nations and Nationalism* 19(1):107-127. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00550.x>
- Heizmann, Boris, and Petra Böhnke. 2019. "Immigrant Life Satisfaction in Europe: The Role of Social and Symbolic Boundaries." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(7):1027-1050. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1438252>
- Helbling, Marc. 2013. "Validating Integration and Citizenship Policy Indices." *Comparative European Politics* 11(5):555-576. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2013.11>
- Human Rights Watch. 2008. "The Netherlands - Discrimination in the Name of Integration: Migrants' Rights under the Integration Abroad Act." *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved May 17, 2022 (<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/netherlands0508.pdf>).
- Imbens, Guido W., and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 2009. "Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation." *Journal of Economic Literature* 47(1):5-86. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.1.5>

- International Organization for Migration. 2008. "Comparative Study of the Laws in the 27 EU Member States for Legal Immigration, Including an Assessment of the Conditions and Formalities Imposed by each Member State for Newcomers." *International Organization for Migration (IOM)*. Retrieved May 17, 2022 (https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/sites/default/files/2011-09/doc1_22833_939713912.pdf).
- Jäckle, Sebastian, and Georg Wenzelburger. 2015. "Religion, Religiosity, and the Attitudes Toward Homosexuality - A Multilevel Analysis of 79 Countries." *Journal of Homosexuality* 62(2):207-241. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2014.969071>
- Jacobs, Dirk, and Andrea Rea. 2007. "The End of National Models? Integration Courses and Citizenship Trajectories in Europe." *International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS)* 9(2):264-283. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-65212>
- Joppke, Christian. 2004. "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy." *The British Journal of Sociology* 55(2):237-257. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2004.00017.x>
- Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 30(1):1-22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019613>
- Kannabiran, Kalpana, Ulrike M. Vieten, and Nira Yuval-Davis. 2006. "Introduction to Special Issue. Boundaries, Identities and Borders: Exploring the Cultural Production of Belonging." *Patterns of Prejudice* 40(3):189-279. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220600769307>
- Kirmanoglu, Hasan, and Cem Başlevent. 2014. "Life Satisfaction of Ethnic Minority Members: An Examination of Interactions with Immigration, Discrimination, and Citizenship." *Social Indicators Research* 116(1):173-184. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-013-0276-0>
- Klarenbeek, Lea M. 2021. "Reconceptualising 'Integration as a Two-Way Process'." *Migration Studies* 9(3):902-921. <https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnz033>
- Knabe, Andreas, Steffen Rätzl, and Stephan L. Thomsen. 2013. "Right-Wing Extremism and the Well-being of Immigrants." *Kyklos* 66(4):567-590. <https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12037>
- Kogan, Irena, Jing Shen, and Manuel Siegert. 2017. "What Makes a Satisfied Immigrant? Host-Country Characteristics and Immigrants' Life Satisfaction in Eighteen European Countries." *Journal of Happiness Studies* 19(6):1783-1809. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-017-9896-4>
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2010. "Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(1):1-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903250881>
- Korteweg, Anna C., and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos. 2013. "Gender, Religion, and Ethnicity: Intersections and Boundaries in Immigrant Integration Policy Making." *Social Politics* 20(1):109-136. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxs027>

- Kostakopoulou, Dora. 2010. "Introduction." Pp. 1-23 in *A Re-Definition of Belonging? Language and integration tests in Europe*, edited by R. Van Oers, E. Ersbøll and D. Kostakopoulou. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004175068.i-332.6>
- Larin, Stephen J. 2020. "Is it really about Values? Civic Nationalism and Migrant Integration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46(1):127-141. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1591943>
- Meer, Nasar, Per Mouritsen, Daniel Faas, and Nynke de Witte. 2015. "Examining 'Postmulticultural' and Civic Turns in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and Denmark." *The American Behavioral Scientist* 59(6):702-726. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764214566496>
- Mepschen, Paul, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Justus Uitermark. 2014. "Progressive Politics of Exclusion: Dutch Populism, Immigration, and Sexuality." *Migration and Citizenship: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship* 2(1):8-12.
- Michalowski, Ines. 2011. "Required to Assimilate? The Content of Citizenship Tests in Five Countries." *Citizenship Studies* 15(6-7):749-768. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2011.600116>
- Mouritsen, Per. 2006. "The Particular Universalism of a Nordic Civic Nation: Common Values, State Religion and Islam in Danish Political Culture." Pp. 70-93 in *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship*, edited by T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou and R. Zapata-Barrero. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203001820-11>
- Mouritsen, Per. 2008. "Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn." Pp. 1-30 in *Constituting Communities Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict*, edited by P. Mouritsen and K. E. Jørgensen. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Neureiter, Michael. 2019a. "Evaluating the Effects of Immigrant Integration Policies in Western Europe using a Difference-in-Differences Approach." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(15):2779-2800. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1505485>
- Neureiter, Michael. 2019b. "Appendix for 'Evaluating the Effects of Immigrant Integration Policies in Western Europe Using a Difference-in-Differences Approach.'" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(15):2779-2800. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1505485>
- Olgati, Analia, Rocio Calvo, and Lisa Berkman. 2013. "Are Migrants Going Up a Blind Alley? Economic Migration and Life Satisfaction Around the World: Cross-National Evidence from Europe, North America and Australia." *Social Indicators Research* 114(2):383-404. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-012-0151-4>
- Onasch, Elizabeth A. 2017. "Lessons on the Boundaries of Belonging: Racialization and Symbolic Boundary Drawing in the French Civic Integration Program." *Social Problems* 64(4):577-593. <https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spw037>

- Paparusso, Angela. 2019. "Studying Immigrant Integration through Self-Reported Life Satisfaction in the Country of Residence." *Applied Research in Quality of Life* 14(2):479-505. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11482-018-9624-1>
- Paparusso, Angela. 2020. "Subjective Well-Being of Immigrants in Europe." In *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*, edited by F. Maggino. Rome: Springer Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69909-7_104657-1
- Permoser, Julia Mourão. 2012. "Civic Integration as Symbolic Politics: Insights from Austria." *European Journal of Migration and Law* 14(2):173-198. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157181612X642367>
- Röder, Antje. 2015. "Immigrants' Attitudes Toward Homosexuality: Socialization, Religion, and Acculturation in European Host Societies." *The International Migration Review* 49(4):1042-1070. <https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12113>
- Rooth, Dan-Olof, and Jan Saarela. 2007. "Native Language and Immigrant Labour Market Outcomes: An Alternative Approach to Measuring the Returns for Language Skills." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 8(2):207-221. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-007-0014-z>
- Safi, Mirna. 2010. "Immigrants' Life Satisfaction in Europe: Between Assimilation and Discrimination." *European Sociological Review* 26(2):159-176. <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcp013>
- Schinkel, Willem. 2018. "Against 'Immigrant Integration': For an End to Neocolonial Knowledge Production." *Comparative Migration Studies* 6(1):31-31. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0095-1>
- Schotlen, P.W.A, Han Entzinger, Eleonore Kofman, Christina Hollomey, and Claudia Lechner. 2012. "Integration from Abroad? Perception and Impacts of Pre-entry Tests for Third-country Nationals." In *Promoting Sustainable Policies for Integration (PROSINT) Comparative Reports WP4*. Retrieved May 17, 2022 (https://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project_material/PROSINT/Reports/WP4_CompRep_Final_submitted.pdf).
- Simonsen, Kristina Bakkær. 2016. "Ripple Effects: An Exclusive Host National Context Produces More Perceived Discrimination among Immigrants." *European Journal of Political Research* 55(2):374-390. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12131>
- Simonsen, Kristina Bakkær. 2017. "Does Citizenship always further Immigrants' Feeling of Belonging to the Host Nation? A Study of Policies and Public Attitudes in 14 Western Democracies." *Comparative Migration Studies* 5(3):1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-017-0050-6>
- Suvarierol, Semin. 2012. "Nation-Freezing: Images of the Nation and the Migrant in Citizenship Packages." *Nations and Nationalism* 18(2):210-229. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00485.x>

- Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. 2011. "Illiberal Means to Liberal Ends? Understanding Recent Immigrant Integration Policies in Europe." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(6):861-880. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.576189>
- Van Oers, Ricky. 2013. *Deserving Citizenship: Citizenship Tests in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Verkuyten, Maykel. 2008. "Life Satisfaction among Ethnic Minorities: The Role of Discrimination and Group Identification." *Social Indicators Research* 89(3):391-404. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-008-9239-2>
- Wallace, Rebecca, Erin Tolley, and Madison Vonk. 2021. "Multiculturalism Policy Index: Immigrant Minority Policies." *School of Policy Studies, Queen's University* 1-202. Retrieved May 17, 2022
(https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/sites/mcpwww/files/uploaded_files/immigrantminorities/evidence/Immigrant%20Minorities%20Index%20Evidence%202021-Web0122.pdf).
- Williams, Daniel. 2018. "Suspect Outsiders or Prospective Citizens? Constructing the Immigrant/German Boundary in Germany's Integration Courses." *Social Sciences* 7(4):61. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7040061>
- Wu, Zheng, and Maria Finnsdottir. 2021. "Perceived Racial and Cultural Discrimination and Sense of Belonging in Canadian Society." *The Canadian Review of Sociology* 58(2):229-249. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cars.12339>

Appendix

Table A 1. Breakdown of observations by country and ESS round.

Country	ESS rounds	Years with available data	<i>N</i> Third-country nationals ²⁵	
			<= 10 years of residence	Total
Austria	1-3; 7-8	2003; 2005; 2007; 2014-16	98	379
Belgium	1-8	2002; 2004-12; 2014-17	220	740
Denmark	1-7	2002-08; 2010-11; 2013-14	78	328
Germany	1-8	2002-17	343	1,205
Spain	1-8	2002-08; 2011; 2013; 2015; 2017	543	922
Finland	1-8	2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010; 2012-16	113	222
France	1-8	2003-11; 2013-17	183	934
Greece	1-2; 4-5	2003; 2005; 2009; 2011	245	592
Ireland	1-8	2003; 2005-07; 2009-17	321	445
Italy	1; 6; 8	2003; 2013; 2017	46	146
Luxembourg	1-2	2003-04	91	175
Netherlands	1-8	2002-14; 2016-17	128	814
Portugal	1-8	2002-13; 2015-17	271	725
Sweden	1-8	2002; 2004-06; 2008-14; 2016-17	217	818
United Kingdom	1-8	2002-06; 2008-17	324	936
Total			3,221	9,381

Table A 2. Foreign-born population²⁶ by country - ESS vs. Eurostat.

Country	ESS rounds	ESS		Eurostat ²⁷	
		Foreign-born (%)	Total	Foreign-born (%)	Total
Austria	1-3; 7-8	932 (8.7)	10,681	1,423,792 (16.69)	8,509,701
Belgium	1-8	1,544 (10.8)	14,304	1,723,399 (15.46)	11,128,299
Denmark	1-7	658 (6.1)	10,797	571,023 (10.14)	5,623,109
Germany	1-8	2,071 (8.9)	23,307	10,045,494 (12.36)	81,191,538
Spain	1-8	1,324 (8.6)	15,457	6,103,065 (13.10)	46,597,175
Finland	1-8	482 (3.0)	16,130	287,896 (5.29)	5,428,074
France	1-8	1,431 (9.5)	15,040	7,680,315 (11.66)	65,732,728
Greece	1-2; 4-5	852 (8.8)	9,715	1,277,223 (11.65)	10,973,064
Ireland	1-8	2,238 (12.4)	18,099	760,691 (16.38)	4,638,271
Italy	1; 6; 8	246 (5.2)	4,706	5,803,559 (9.66)	59,953,133
Luxembourg	1-2	947 (29.9)	3,163	223,800 (40.87)	541,771
Netherlands	1-8	1,279 (8.4)	15,171	1,959,837 (11.65)	16,804,375
Portugal	1-8	899 (6.0)	14,924	840,491 (8.04)	10,464,870
Sweden	1-8	1,646 (11.4)	14,376	1,526,683 (15.83)	9,612,291
United Kingdom	1-8	1,620 (9.4)	17,281	8,073,603 (12.57)	64,072,507
Total	1-8	18,169 (8.9)	203,151	40,227,266 (11.93)	337,198,399

²⁵ To ensure exposure to civic integration policy, my sample does not include TCNs from states that have acceded to the Schengen Agreement as well as all immigrants from countries whose citizens do not require a visa to enter Europe for employment purposes. See codebook for coding.

²⁶ The foreign-born population includes anyone born outside the country of residence (TCNs and intra-EU migrants).

²⁷ Data based on 2010-2017 Eurostat values. Online data codes: [migr_pop3ctb](#) (foreign-born population); [demo_gind](#) (total population).

Table A 3. Demographics of foreign-born residents in the EU –ESS vs. Eurostat.

	Age	Years	Third-country nationals (%)	
			Eurostat ²⁸	ESS ²⁹
Employment rate³⁰	15-64	2006-2017	59.05	62.92
Unemployment rate	15-64	2006-2017	16.38	14.27
Educational attainment				
Level 1: Primary/ Lower Secondary	15-64	2006-2017	40.98	34.37
Level 2: Upper/Post-secondary	15-64	2006-2017	33.75	29.20
Level 3: Tertiary	15-64	2006-2017	25.24	36.43
Average level (1-3)			1.84/3	2.02/3
Skills in host country language				
Mother tongue/ proficient	all ages	2014	47.90	
Moderate/basic skills	all ages	2014	49.80	
Origin³¹				
Sub-Saharan Africa	all ages	2009-2017	14.67	17.38
Middle East & North Africa	all ages	2009-2017	28.79	25.94
Eastern Europe	all ages	2009-2017	23.30	19.64
Asia & Oceania	all ages	2009-2017	17.38	15.31
Latin America & Caribbean	all ages	2009-2017	7.89	12.54
Other Western	all ages	2009-2017	5.62	9.19

²⁸ Data based on Eurostat. Online data codes: [lfsa_ergacob](#) (employment rate); [lfsa_urgacob](#) (unemployment rate); [edat_lfs_9912](#) (educational attainment); [lfsa_14blang](#) (language competency); [migr_pop1ctz](#) (origin).

²⁹ Data based on ESS responses to: *mnactic* (main activity in the last 7 days); *edulvla* (highest level of education); *cntbrth* (country in which the respondent was born). For coding see <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>.

³⁰ To calculate the employment & unemployment rates of ESS respondents, I exclude respondents who indicate that they are (a) in education, (b) sick/permanently disabled or (c) retired, because those respondents do not classify as part of the economically active population according to Eurostat definitions. For Eurostat definitions of employed, unemployed and inactive persons, see <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/methodology/main-concepts>.

³¹ For data availability reasons, I compare the proportion of non- citizens (Eurostat) to the proportion of foreign-born residents (ESS). Further, because Eurostat doesn't hold detailed records on the country of citizenship of the migrant stock in France, Greece, Spain and the UK, these countries are omitted from the comparison.

Table A 4. Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	N Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variables					
Life Satisfaction	3193	6.754	2.281	0	10
Ethnic/religious/linguistic discrimination	3221	0.257	0.437	0	1
Attitudes toward homosexuality	3018	3.561	1.273	1	5
Individual-level predictors					
Age	3186	33.098	10.650	15	93
Female	3214	0.521	0.500	0	1
Citizen of country	3216	0.254	0.435	0	1
Member of ethnic minority	3071	0.433	0.496	0	1
Family status	3199	0.629	0.483	0	1
Domicile	3200	3.673	1.126	1	5
Occupation
Paid work	3198	0.500	0.500	0	1
Education	3198	0.173	0.379	0	1
Unemployed	3198	0.147	0.354	0	1
Retired	3198	0.012	0.110	0	1
Childcare	3198	0.130	0.337	0	1
Other	3198	0.037	0.189	0	1
Level of education	3167	3.157	1.486	1	5
Subjective income assessment	3130	2.667	0.891	1	4
Subjective health	3220	4.135	0.781	1	5
Social contacts	3215	4.948	1.636	1	7
Discriminated against (yes/no)	3135	0.271	0.445	0	1
Religiosity	3194	6.213	2.877	0	10
Religious denomination
Christian	3080	0.439	0.496	0	1
Jewish	3080	0.002	0.048	0	1
Islamic	3080	0.268	0.443	0	1
Other	3080	0.055	0.228	0	1
None	3080	0.236	0.425	0	1
Region of origin
Eastern Europe	3221	0.232	0.422	0	1
Latin America	3221	0.206	0.405	0	1
Middle East	3221	0.240	0.427	0	1
Sub-Saharan Africa	3221	0.176	0.381	0	1
Asia	3221	0.146	0.353	0	1
Country-level predictors					
CIVIX	3213	2.5	1.9	0	8.25
GDP per capita	3213	41400.4	14240.6	21256.8	99778.5
% unemployment	3213	9.6	4.8	2.8	26.1
% foreign-born population	3213	12.3	4.5	2.6	32.4

Table A 5. Correlation tests for potential macrolevel confounds.³²

	Correlation with CIVIX	N	Data access
GDP per capita	0.124 (<i>P</i> = 0.925)	60	World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?end=2017&start=1997
% unemployed	-0.032 (<i>P</i> = 0.808)	60	Eurostat online data code: une_rta_h
% foreign-born	-0.095 (<i>P</i> = 0.536)	45	Eurostat online data code: migr_pop4ctb
% ERW party share	0.314 (<i>P</i> = 0.014)	60	ThePopList - database on vote shares of populist & far-right parties See Rooduijn, M., Van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., De Lange, S., Halikiopoulou, D., Lewis, P., Mudde, C. & Taggart, P. (2019). <i>The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe</i> . www.popu-list.org ParlGov - database on elections, parties and cabinets See Döring, H. & Manow, P. (2021). <i>Parliament and government database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies</i> . Development version https://parlgov.org
Anti-immigrant attitudes	-0.041 (<i>P</i> = 0.766)	54	European Social Survey (ESS) Aggregate (native) immigration attitudes are assessed through an index score based on 6 ESS immigration items (<i>imsmetn</i> , <i>imdfetn</i> , <i>impcntr</i> , <i>imbgeco</i> , <i>imueclt</i> , <i>imwbcnt</i>); Cronbach's alpha = 0.89. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/
MIPEX	-0.597 (<i>P</i> = 0.001)	29	Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) https://www.mipex.eu/
MCP index	-0.369 (<i>P</i> = 0.016)	42	Multiculturalism Policy (MCP) Index http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/

³² Coding: Data for correlation tests are matched to CIVIX data by country and year, if available. Data limitations: (1) % foreign-born population: data available to match with 2004, 2009 & 2013 CIVIX scores only; (2) MIPEX: data available to match with 2009 & 2013 CIVIX scores only; (3) MCP index: newly available data by Wallace, Tolley and Vonk (2021) allow me to match MCP scores to CIVIX scores of 1997, 2009 & 2013.

A 1. Robustness Tests

Table A 6. Robustness Test: Intra-EU migrants.

	Life Satisfaction		Perceived discrimination		Attitudes toward homosexuality	
	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>
CIVIX	-0.111 (0.214)	-0.191 (0.227)	-0.153 (0.133)	-0.233 (0.176)	0.084 (0.090)	0.002 (0.073)
Control Variables	(not reported)					
Constant	(not reported)					
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,002	1,819	2,005	1,807	1,954	1,806
(Pseudo) R ²	0.063	0.310	0.098	0.259	0.096	0.217

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 7. Robustness Test: TCNs with five or fewer years of residence.

	Life Satisfaction		Perceived discrimination		Attitudes toward homosexuality	
	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>
CIVIX	0.608*** (0.093)	0.567*** (0.118)	0.071 (0.068)	0.162 (0.101)	0.050 (0.078)	-0.067 (0.111)
Control Variables	(not reported)					
Constant	(not reported)					
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,530	1,314	1,544	1,295	1,436	1,276
(Pseudo) R ²	0.093	0.329	0.058	0.196	0.091	0.209

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 8. Robustness Test: TCNs with more than 20 years of residence.

	Life Satisfaction		Perceived discrimination		Attitudes toward homosexuality	
	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>
CIVIX	0.129 (0.142)	0.007 (0.172)	-0.009 (0.112)	0.128 (0.126)	0.160** (0.072)	0.049 (0.054)
Control Variables	(not reported)					
Constant	(not reported)					
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,484	3,148	3,498	3,136	3,398	3,132
(Pseudo) R ²	0.075	0.288	0.025	0.158	0.078	0.264

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 9. Robustness Test: TCNs, excluding ESS round 8.

	Life Satisfaction		Perceived discrimination		Attitudes toward homosexuality	
	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>
CIVIX	0.371*** (0.077)	0.394*** (0.094)	0.070* (0.041)	-0.015 (0.059)	0.108* (0.057)	-0.002 (0.076)
Control Variables	(not reported)					
Constant	(not reported)					
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,871	2,516	2,894	2,487	2,716	2,451
(Pseudo) R ²	0.061	0.252	0.041	0.142	0.069	0.168

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 10. Robustness Test: TCNs, excluding interview years post-2014.

	Life Satisfaction		Perceived discrimination		Attitudes toward homosexuality	
	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>
CIVIX	0.387*** (0.080)	0.376*** (0.104)	-0.040 (0.042)	0.028 (0.054)	0.110* (0.062)	-0.026 (0.077)
Control Variables	(not reported)					
Constant	(not reported)					
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,752	2,406	2,775	2,382	2,605	2,345
(Pseudo) R ²	0.062	0.252	0.041	0.154	0.068	0.176

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A 11. Robustness Test: Quadratic time trends.

	Life Satisfaction		Perceived discrimination		Attitudes toward homosexuality	
	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Full Model</i>
CIVIX	0.295*** (0.069)	0.369*** (0.085)	-0.036 (0.031)	-0.033 (0.050)	0.118** (0.049)	0.023 (0.060)
Control Variables	(not reported)					
Constant	(not reported)					
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quadratic time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,186	2,809	3,213	2,775	3,015	2,736
(Pseudo) R ²	0.071	0.254	0.038	0.140	0.074	0.172

Robust standard errors clustered by country-year in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1