WHEN SHEEPDOGS BECOME WOLVES: RADICALIZATION OF VETERANS

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Abstract

The economic downturn, COVID-19 pandemic, and war contribute to heightened anxiety amongst the public. For some, there is a distrust of authorities and subject matter experts. Individuals are using social media to connect with other like-minded people and amplify their concerns. A portion of the population feels socially alienated due to their grievances against the government, making them vulnerable to radicalization by extremist groups. Therefore, Western societies face an emerging and significant challenge as individuals become isolated from others in mainstream society. The literature indicates that veterans tend to have social alienation, acceptance of violence, and loyalty toward their “ingroup.” Are they at risk?

The purpose of my research is to determine if military veterans are vulnerable to radicalization leading to violence (RTV). This study aims to gather empirical evidence to assess the possible relationship between military service and a vulnerability for RTV. Three hundred participants (150 Canadian veterans and 150 Canadian civilians) responded to a quantitative study measuring social alienation and the acceptance of political violence.

Results from the statistical analysis suggest that Canadian veterans are more vulnerable to RTV, scoring higher in the factors of Social Alienation, Violent Beliefs, and Violent Behaviours. However, more importantly, the relationship between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours is significantly weaker for Canadian veterans than for Canadian civilians (r_{veterans}=.31 vs r_{civilians}=.52). Namely, if both a veteran and a civilian have extreme Violent Beliefs, the veteran is less likely to exhibit Violent Behaviors and commit a politically motivated violent act. I hope this study will benefit future research in radicalization, enable the development of various tactics, techniques, and procedures for intervention, and improve veterans' resiliency.
Lay Summary

This study examines the possible relationship between military service and the propensity for radicalization leading to violence (RTV). I have gathered empirical evidence and conducted a quantitative analysis to compare and contrast Canadian military veterans with Canadian civilians using the following factors: Social Alienation, having Violent Beliefs, and exhibiting politically motivated Violent Behaviours.

In this study, 150 Canadian veterans and 150 Canadian civilians completed a standardized survey. Analysis of the results suggests that veterans scored higher in Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours when compared to civilians. However, if both a veteran and a civilian have extreme Violent Beliefs, the veteran is less likely to exhibit Violent Behaviors and commit a politically motivated violent act. These findings contribute to this study's ultimate goal to provide preliminary information for future researchers to consider when developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to increase veterans' resiliency from RTV.
Preface

This dissertation is an original intellectual product of the author, B. Pong. The fieldwork reported in Chapters 3-4 was covered by UBC Ethics Certificate number H21-03037.
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Glossary

3N Needs Narratives Network
A Alpha Value
$\chi^2$ Chi Square Value
CAF Canadian Armed Forces
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis
CFI Comparative Fit Index
CV Critical Value
DF Degrees of Freedom
EFA Exploratory Factor Analysis
F F-test value
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IVET Institute of Veterans Education Transition
M Mean
MTurk Mechanical Turk
N Number of Samples
NYPD New York Police Department
PIRUS Profiles of Individual Radicalization of the United States
R Correlation
RMSEA Root-mean-square Error of Approximation
RTV Radicalization to Violence
SBW Sheepdogs Become Wolves Study
SD Standard Deviation
SEM Structural Equation Modeling
SIGAR Office of the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction
SRMR Standardized Root-mean-square Residuals
T T-Test value
TLI Tucker-Lewis Index
UBC University of British Columbia
Z Z-Statistical Value
Acknowledgments

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Dedication

To the sheepdogs, the quiet professionals, and particularly the fallen, we remember them.
Charter 1: When Sheepdogs Become Wolves: Radicalization of Veterans

The Government of Canada defines radicalization as violence as: "when a person or group takes on extreme ideas and begins to think they should use violence to support or advance them, either in Canada or abroad" (Public Safety Canada, 2018). Since 9/11, 2001, there have been many attempts to understand the pathway of Radicalization to Violence (RTV), focusing mainly on radical Islam. In contrast, there has been limited research into other forms of radical ideologies, including Canadian domestic groups that advocate using force to advance their political goals.

Since the economic downturn, loss of job opportunities, social isolation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S.-led coalition’s military withdrawal from Afghanistan, and Putin's invasion of Ukraine, many have developed increased anxiety. Also, as enumerated in the literature, the rise of social media as a forum to discuss current events has created an echo chamber effect, distrust of authorities, anti-establishment sentiment and intolerance across ideological lines (Cinelli et al., 2021). Many individuals distrust the authorities, subject matter experts, and people with different views. As segments of Western populations experience mounting Social Alienation (Zhu, et al., 2021) and harbour grievances against their governments, they become vulnerable to the risk of radicalization (Rodrik, 2021).

Empirical studies verified that only a tiny portion of people who have Radical Beliefs exhibit violent behaviours and commit acts of violence (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017). For example, Social Alienation seldom led to individuals joining a violent radical group or executing a “lone-wolf” terrorist attack. Nevertheless, accepting a set of radical ideas is a precondition for committing a violent act. This makes charting a
likely pathway for RTV essential. Throughout the years, theorists have proposed several models of RTV. A quantitative study conducted by Belanger et al. (2019) suggests a relationship between an individual's sense of Social Alienation, acceptance of Political Violence, and desire to join a Radical Group. With Belanger’s framework, researchers can identify a segment of the population that is particularly vulnerable to the narratives of RTV.

1.1. Radicalization of Veterans?

My interest in the topic of radicalization developed while I was deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq as a Psychological Operations and Influence Activities Officer. As a veteran and an academic, I found the literature that identified parallels between military training and RTV methods to be of interest. Notably, psychologist Sophia Moskalenko (2010) argued that military training strips the recruits of their old identity and "radicalizes" them with a strong sense of loyalty toward one another (the ingroup), a great acceptance of the use of violence for a “just cause” and socially alienates them from the general public (the outgroup).

This ingroup/outgroup dynamic is maximized when the soldiers are deployed for combat. Data from a survey in ABC news speaks to the pervasive social alienation experienced by military personnel, with seventy-six percent of Afghanistan veterans reporting that they sometimes feel “like a stranger in [their] own country” (Galston, 2021).

Military personnel are viewed as ideal recruits for extremist groups due to their training, potential access to weapons, and willingness to fight for what they perceive as a "just cause." Due to this perceived "insider threat," both the U.S. and Canada have identified military members' radicalization as a significant concern. In March 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, titled "Extremism in the Armed Forces," states: "DoD is facing a threat from domestic extremists, particularly those who espouse
white supremacy or white nationalist ideologies" (United States House of Representatives, 2021). On January 6, 2021, this issue was highlighted during the U.S. Capitol Riot, in which a mob stormed the Capitol building in Washington, D.C. As many as 20% of those charged with crimes related to the incident had served in the military (Dresibach & Anderson, 2021). As only 7% of adult Americans have served in the military, veterans were three times more likely to be among these rioters than predicted by chance.

In Canada, the so-called "Freedom Convoy" protested COVID-19 government-imposed restrictions in February 2022. Protestors conducted a series of occupations, demonstrations and blockades of public properties, including the Canadian Parliament. More alarmingly, after the repeal of mandates, the protestors called for the overthrow of the elected Canadian government. Police were involved in a massive operation that involved using no violence, and the standoff ended on February 17. This event was the most prominent and prolonged unlawful blockade of Parliament Hill. According to the Ottawa police, 191 arrests were made (Lee & Jones, 2022). Various news (e.g., CTV, Globe, CBC, 2022) and open sources, including a video posted by Odysee.com (2022), indicate that many protestors are serving and former members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

According to the CAF: "Hateful conducts are contrary to Canadian military ethos and erode the reputation of both serving and former members." (CAF, 2020). Thus, one could argue committing an unlawful ideologically based act against Canadian society, for example, being an active participant in the Parliament Hill blockade, is a severe form of hateful conduct.
In the literature examining why some soldiers and veterans are radicalized, there is a tendency to fall back on circular arguments, whereby the radicalization of these individuals is explained by the fact that they are soldiers. Given this context, the main objective of my analysis is to fill an empirical gap in the growing corpus of quantitative studies into the phenomenon of radicalization of Canadian veterans. To conduct this study, I have adopted a broader definition of a veteran as recognized by the Royal Canadian Legion (https://www.legion.ca/support-for-veterans/who-we-serve); in which: “a veteran is any person who is serving or who has honourably served in the Canadian Armed Forces.” Finally, in this study, I aim to understand radicalization by focusing on the interpersonal social processes of radicalization to violence rather than on the different types of radical ideology.

1.2. Thesis Statement

I hypothesize that there are statistically significant differences between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians in the propensity for Social Alienation, having politically Violent Beliefs (opinions), or exhibiting politically Violent Behaviors (actions). Furthermore, the relationships among these three factors, namely, the strength of the pathway, are also statistically significant different between the two groups.

1.3. Research Questions

The main research question of the Sheepdogs Become Wolves (SBW) study is: are Canadian veterans more vulnerable to Radicalization to Violence (RTV) than Canadian civilians? Beyond the main research question, the following supplementary questions are considered: due to the conflicting values between military culture and civilian cultures, do veterans feel Socially Alienated from the rest of society more often? Do veterans have a greater
acceptance of politically motivated Violent Beliefs and, by extension, exhibit Violent Behaviours? Finally, what is the most suitable framework for studying the Radicalization to Violence of Canadian veterans moving forward?
Charter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Part 1: Conceptional Framework Development

This study, which attempts to fill a dearth in the literature relating to the radicalization of Canadian military veterans, will first examine the historical and contemporary views on RTV. The following definitions are used for this study: first, Radicalization is the development of extremist ideologies and beliefs (Borum, 2012). Second, Radicalization leading to Violence is how individuals and groups adopt an ideology or belief system that justifies the use of violence to advance their cause (Public Safety Canada, 2018). Third, as stated previously, I have adopted a broad definition of a Canadian veteran: "any active, released and retired member of the Canadian Forces recognized of good service in the Canadian Forces" (Royal Canadian Legion, 2021).

Next, to examine the propensity of radicalization of Canadian veterans, Part 1 of this literature review scrutinizes various RTV models to determine their construct validity and reliability. Research into RTV has a long history; however, before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the concept of radicalization was not closely linked to terrorism and was of little interest. Following the 9/11 attacks, the study of RTV has become a topic of great interest for many public safety and law enforcement institutions. Throughout the years, many different RTV models have emerged. The more popular frameworks are the conveyor belt, staircase, two-pyramids, counterinsurgency pillars, and preconditioned (including the 3N model) examined in this literature review.

Before the 9/11 attacks in 2001, a great deal of research on terrorism was focused on the modus operandi of various terrorist groups. In the 1980s, political scientist Martha Crenshaw (1981), a pioneer in the study of terrorism, developed a three-component framework. The first
component of her framework assesses an individual’s motivation and ideas; the second component includes the decision-making and strategy within a terrorism movement; the final component evaluates the broader political and social context with which terrorist activities interact. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Crenshaw's framework was used as the foundation of different governmental policies, such as the Prevent section of the U.K. Government's counterterrorism strategy (United Kingdom Home Department, 2011) and the Canadian National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence (Public Safety Canada, 2018).

2.1.1. Conveyer Belt Framework: Automated Radicalization

Several earlier RTV models advocated for a "conveyer belt" theoretical framework. With this construct, an individual vulnerable to RTV inevitably develops radical and violent beliefs that increase in stages. Over time, the individual is conditioned to commit acts of terrorism. Many law enforcement agencies, including the New York Police Department (NYPD), adopted the "conveyer belt" framework to understand, predict, and counter RTV (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

NYPD Senior Intelligence Analysts Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt (2007) used the "conveyer belt" construct to create a model to understand the domestic radicalization process of radical Islamic groups. The goal of the NYPD model was to predict the trajectory of radicalization and disrupt the path of violence. The model has a four-stage construct; in the first stage, "pre-radicalization," the model evaluates an individual's life before entering the radicalization process. In the second stage, "self-identification," the individual turns to a radical belief in response to a personal crisis. In the third stage, "indoctrination," the individual accepts the radical worldview. During the
fourth and final stage, "jihadization," the individual commits violent acts. Under this framework, extremist Islamic groups like Al Qaeda attract individuals to radical Islam, entice them for recruitment, and inspire them to commit violent acts against the West.

As indicated in the model by Silbur & Bhatt (2007), responding to a personal crisis is the first step on the conveyor belt of radicalization. Therefore, identifying the set cause or personal grievance gives a law enforcement agency predictive power. By mapping the linear pathway of an 'at-risk' subject, authorities can intervene and disrupt the conveyor belt trajectory. This rationale helps law enforcement agencies justify interventions for "at-risk" individuals and the broader community (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2015).

Based on various subject matter experts (SMEs), the underlining construct of the "conveyor belt" model is invalid. Journalist, Dilly Hussain (2016), criticized the U.K. conveyer belt approach and argued the framework is a widespread misperception of radicalization. Hussain stated that it fails to consider the grievances, social alienation, and deprivation of radicalized individuals. Similarly, others labelled policies that arise from the "conveyor-belt" model as misguided and entirely misleading representation of reality (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2009). However, Silber and Bhatt's (2007) model is not without merit, as it highlights personal crisis as a possible cause of RTV. Coupled with Hussain's (2016) observation of individual grievances, Social Alienation caused by emotional problems and grievances has emerged as a primary factor for the study of the pathway of RTV.

2.1.2. Staircase Framework: Steps of Social Alienation

Emphasizing personal agency, several theoretical models use a "staircase" metaphor for the process of RTV. Unlike the automatic "convoy belt" model, the individual has control over whether they take the next step towards radicalization. Moghaddam (2005) conceptualized RTV
as a six-step staircase. The model considers grievances individuals experience as a cause. Each step of the model corresponds to an increase in an individual’s sense of Social Alienation. Steps in the model include perceived deprivation of material resources, options to fight this deprivation, displacement of aggression, moral engagement in violence, solidification of categorical thinking (toward violence), and justification of violent acts by sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms. Moghaddam claimed that the higher an individual moves up the staircase, the fewer alternatives to violence that individual will have, ultimately resulting in political violence.

Moghaddam (2005) argued that most people do not feel Socially Alienated even when feeling mistreated by others and remain on the ground floor of the staircase model. However, he explains some individuals who climb the radicalization staircase will eventually join a terrorist organization. These individuals believe they do not have any voice in society, feel alienated, and are encouraged by members of the radical ingroup to blame an outgroup for their grievances. Later, these individuals are socialized to see political violence as legitimate and outgroup members as evil.

Next, Lygre et al. (2011) examined Moghaddam’s staircase model by reviewing 2,564 publications on terrorism, with thirty-eight articles subject to further analysis. While they found most of the steps indicated in Moghaddam's model are supported by empirical evidence, the proposed close relationships between the different steps are not supported by evidence. This result suggests that many factors could create a path for RTV, and there is a lack of empirical data for the steps and processes identified in the model. Lygre et al. concluded that the staircase is not a fitting metaphor for the RTV phenomena.
2.1.3. Two Pyramids Framework: Radical Opinion vs Radical Action

Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) asserted radicalization should be viewed as two separates but connected structures where individuals experience increasing extremist ideologies as they progress toward RTV. The authors observed that ninety-nine percent of those with radical beliefs never act, and conversely, many join in extreme action without radical beliefs. McCauley and Moskalenko used the framework of two connected pyramids, one as opinion and the second as action, as a metaphor to describe RTV. This framework differs from the stairway model as individuals can skip levels moving up and down the pyramid. Furthermore, individuals can move sideways, radicalize to violence, or deradicalize to the other pyramid. Moskalenko and McCauley described the "opinion pyramid," consisting of people who share accelerating levels of extremist ideas, and the "action pyramid," with levels ranging from passivity, legal activism, political violence and terrorism.

2.1.3.1. Opinion Pyramid. Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) described the base of the opinion pyramid as representing individuals who do not care about a political cause (neutral). Higher levels of the pyramid represent individuals who believe in a political cause but do not justify violence (sympathizers). Higher yet are individuals who advocate violence to defend the ideology (justifiers). At the pyramid's summit are those who feel a personal and moral obligation to take up violence in defense of a political cause.

2.1.3.2. Action Pyramid. Moskalenko & McCauley (2009) described the individual at the base of the action pyramid as someone who does not act on behalf of a political group or cause (inert). Higher in the pyramid are those engaged in legal, political action for the ideology (activists). Higher yet are those involved in illegal activities for the cause (radicals), and at the apex of the pyramid are those engaged in unlawful actions that target civilians (terrorists). Again,
unlike a stairway model, individuals can skip levels by moving up and down in the action pyramid.

Suedfeld et al. (2013) examined the relationship between the two pyramids. The authors categorized fifteen extremist groups based on their politically motivated violent acts history. They labelled groups as an activist (action level two), radical (action level three), or terrorist (action level four). Additionally, the authors coded the content of the extremist group websites for the extremity of opinions. These ratings were plotted against groups' level of violent action. The authors discovered almost no difference between activists and radicals but a statistically significant difference between radical and terrorist groups. The authors found a more powerful motive and less cognitive complexity in terrorist groups.

2.1.4. Violent Beliefs vs Violent Behaviours

Borum (2011) highlighted that research in social psychology has long-established beliefs that do not easily translate to behaviours. Borum cited Wicker (1969), who conducted literature reviews on the relationship between attitude (arises out of core values and beliefs) and behaviour. The literature indicated attitudes are unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours.

Next, McCauley (2013) plotted survey respondent responses from least to most radical using levels from the pyramid model. The researcher tracked changes in the radicalization of opinion in a particular group over time or in reaction to a political event. In which, empirical studies using opinion polls of U.S. Muslims demonstrated the validity and utility of the opinion pyramid.
Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) also highlighted that the distinction between attitude and behaviour has long been identified. Psychology textbooks generally explain the relationship between attitude and behaviour as minimally correlated, weakened by the other variables such as norms, habits, and perceptions of control in the case of radicalization. Therefore, radical opinions are neither necessary nor sufficient for terrorist violence.

Over the past three decades, empirical findings consistently emphasized distinguishing between radical beliefs and behaviours (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2020). In a study of college students by Rudd (1989), about 45% of students reported suicidal thoughts, yet only 5% attempted suicide. Similarly, although most people have homicidal fantasies from time to time, as many as 91% of the college students surveyed reported homicidal thoughts (Duntley, 2005). Thankfully, only a tiny minority of students ever act on these thoughts.

Klandermans (1997) also indicated that anger about group discrimination rarely translates into protests in their statistical research. For example, based on surveys, over half of Muslims in the U.S. and the U.K. believe that the "war on terror" is a war on Islam (McCauley, 2013) and have some sympathize with the jihadi causes. Furthermore, at least five percent of Muslims in the U.S and the U.K. see suicide bombing of civilians in defense of Islam as justified. The five percent of Muslim respondents who exhibited violent attitudes correlate to about 50,000 adult Muslims in both countries. However, as McCauley noted, the number of known domestic terrorist acts perpetrated by American or British Muslims has been statically insignificant.

Also, McCauley (2013) highlighted the potential danger of targeting those with extreme opinions, as these individuals will become more socially alienated and are more motivated to accept radical ideologies. Finally, an unmistakable conclusion of these findings is that if the
individual's or the group's grievance is resolved, the people would not feel socially
alienated, and the RTV path would be disrupted. However, is it always possible to
resolve the grievance?

2.1.5. Counterinsurgency Pillars Framework: Addressing Grievances

Between 2001 to 2021, during the U.S.-led "Globe War on Terror," significant
resources were allocated for counter-radicalization and counterinsurgency. Throughout
the conflict, the West's framework for counterinsurgency was based on the model
developed by David Kilcullen (2006), Chief Strategist of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism of the United State Department. As outlined in Kilcullen's three-pillar
counterinsurgency model, the Western Coalition must assist the nation (e.g., the Islam
Republic of Afghanistan and the Republic of Iraq) in stabilization efforts. Western
policymakers believe that the legitimacy of the host government could be achieved by
promoting economic development, political reform, and security upgrades, therefore
eliminating the root causes of violent radicalization and insurgency.

From 2008 to 2018, the indicators used to measure security, political, and
economic pillars trended positively. However, the perception of legitimacy for both
national governments failed to improve, insurgencies were strengthened, and
radicalization of the population continued. Before its military defeat in 2018, the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) maintained a high level of popular support from the
Sunni population in the region. In 2021, the Taliban, with widespread popularity among
the rural population, defeated the military of the Islam Republic of Afghanistan to form
the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
According to the U.S. Office of the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction (USSIGAR, 2021), $60.45 billion was spent in Iraq, more than $100 billion in Afghanistan. These were just the reconstruction costs, and the total cost to the U.S. for Iraq and Afghan wars exceeded $1.4 trillion. Furthermore, all war-related costs for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan over the last two decades were estimated to be $6.4 trillion. However, according to USSIGAR (2021), reconstruction missions usually go poorly.

Seemingly, the trillions of dollars allocated for stabilization should have addressed many of these grievances but instead were lost through waste, corruption, and inefficiency. In particular, "the large sums of stabilization dollars the U.S. devoted to Afghanistan in search of quick gains often exacerbated conflicts, enabled corruption, and bolstered support for insurgents." (USSIGAR, 2018). The population's political, security, and economic grievances (Kilcullen 2008) were not resolved. In particular, people from rural areas felt alienated from the central government and urban Afghans.

The central government's legitimacy was not achieved, resulting in the Taliban's victory in 2021. Thus, if resolving an individual's (perceived) grievance is not always possible, which model provides the best framework for RTV and counter-RTV?

2.1.6. 3N Framework: Social Alienation, Political Violence & Radical Group

Building on previous integrative approaches, RTV can be understood as individuals gradually feeling alienated, accepting extremist beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (Borum, 2011; Schmid, 2012). The American Psychological Association defined behaviour as an action, activity, or process which can be observed and measured. Although there are many distinctive paths, radical beliefs seldom lead to violent actions (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). A necessary “precondition” for a perpetrator to commit a violent extremist act is being socially
alienated and accepting violent extremist ideology. Various models indicate that a group or personal grievance(s) leads to RTV. Therefore, as stated previously, the best way to eliminate RTV is to resolve the grievances of the various individuals who are vulnerable to RTV. However, as demonstrated throughout the "War on Terror," resolving individual grievances was impossible, even with significant resources. Again, identifying a valid and reliable RTV framework is of great value to the various stakeholders.

One of the most cited precondition-based frameworks to examine RTV is the Needs Narratives Network (3N) model (Belanger et al., 2019). The 3N study examines the social cognitive processes underlying ideologically-based violence through the lens of radicalization to violence. In this framework, unresolved grievance(s) create a sense of Social Alienation. Thus, an individual reporting high levels of Social Alienation (Need) will express more significant support for Political Violence (Narrative), which will positively predict their desire to join a radical group (Network). Like previous RTV models, the 3N model accepts that radical ideology is generally a precondition for a perpetrator to commit a violent act supporting those beliefs. To test this construct, the authors created two psychometric instruments to test this framework: Social Alienation and support for Political Violence scales. The validity and reliability of the 3N framework are analyzed in Part 2 of the literature review.

2.2 Part 2: Needs Narratives Network Model: Reliability and Validity

The framework for the current study will be adopted from the Needs Narratives Network (3N) construct; thus, the reliability and validity of the 3N psychometric tools must be determined. First, I assessed the overall reliability of the 3N framework by
identifying the stated purpose of the 3N psychometric scales and the population it is intended to measure. Next, I verified the sensibilities of scoring by examining the 3N operationalization process. Also, I used the methodology by Yong & Pearce (2013) to assess the various factor analyses (Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Factor Analysis) used in the 3N study. Additionally, I identified measurement errors by determining score interpretations and usage.

Finally, I assessed the overall validity of the 3N framework. Based on the various sections of the research by Belanger et al. (2019), the following process was used to evaluate the 3N’s measurement errors: First, I considered the framework based on the introduction and the model description of the 3N study. Secondly, I considered: Operationalization, which is based on the methods and the material sections of the study by Belanger et al.; Score Interpretation- based on the result sections; Score Use- based on the dissuasion, limitations and conclusion sections; and Validity- overall evaluation of the study's validity.

### 2.2.1. Assessment of Reliability and Validity

Belanger et al. (2019) suggested that individuals who feel socially alienated and live on the fringe of society, especially if there is no resolution for their perceived grievances, are at risk of being-recruited by radical groups. Also, the researchers stated these factors are the strongest predictors of politically motivated violence. Furthermore, the 3N model looks at the interconnection between the following three factors:

#### 2.2.1.1. Need.

According to Belanger et al. (2019), one motivational impetus underlying radicalization is a person's need to maintain self-worth (to be respected and to matter to others). This need is essential when a person's sense of significance diminishes due to a perceived sense of failure, personal worth and purpose (Shmotkin and Litwin, 2009). When this occurs, an individual may detach from society, resulting in social alienation. One way to restore relevance
is to seek out new groups of like-minded individuals and retaliate against the source of the threat, such as political institutions that threaten the individual's rights or entitlements.

2.2.1.2. Narrative. Although displaying power through the use of force may restore an individual's sense of significance, the use of violence is prohibited by society. Belanger et al. (2019) postulated that violence becomes permissible when nested within an ideological framework, creating moral justifications for its use against another social outgroup. In cases when entitlements (needs) are restricted or removed, which the individual or group perceives as unjust, an established narrative can provide moral justification, rendering a violent response acceptable and desirable for members of a radical ingroup.

2.2.1.3. Network. Belanger et al. (2019) argued that once individuals adhere to an ideological narrative that justifies using violence to restore significance, they are likely motivated to seek other individuals with similar beliefs. By joining a group where the use of violence is socially condoned, those who defend the group's existence are granted significance, status and self-worth.

2.2.1.4. Model Constructs. The stated purpose of Belanger et al.’s (2019) study was to test 3N constructs using two new psychometric instruments, (1) social alienation and (2) support for political violence scale, developed in collaboration with thirteen subject matter experts (SME) on radicalization. These two scales formed the authors' framework to test the theory's hypotheses in four different cultural groups combined with four other instruments.

In Study 1, the Belanger et al. (2019) predicted the Canadian subjects who reported high levels of social alienation (Need) were also more likely to express support
for political violence (Narrative), which in turn made these individuals more willing to join a radical group (Network). Study 2a and 2b replicated the Canada-based experiment in Pakistan and Spain. Study 3 extended these findings to Americans and demonstrated links between social alienation and political violence support. This paper will only assess the research conducted in Canada.

2.2.2. Assessment of Framework

By highlighting the interconnecting effects of Need, Narrative and Net, the 3N framework provides a sound skeletal structure to the intangible attributes of the phenomenon of violent radicalization (Belanger et al., 2019). The research framework provides the background, context, & skeletal system of the qualities in the phenomenon being measured. Using an inappropriate framework can lead to systematic measurement error, including invalidity, biases, and unfairness.

Upon analysis, I deemed the 3N framework valid since it delineates the abstract concepts of social alienation, political violence, and the desire to join a radical group (Belanger et al. (2019). These concepts generally have no inherent or agreed-upon meaning. In Study 1, the authors theorize that Canadian subjects who reported a high level of (1) social alienation (Need) positively relate with support for (2) political violence (Narrative) as a way to address their grievances, which in turn connect to (3) wanting to join like-minded others (Network) that support violent methods as a mean to achieve their political goals. The authors use questions about (4) people's willingness to self-sacrifice for a cause, (5) collective narcissism, convictions about the superiority of one's ingroup, and (6) the need for cognitive closure as factors for consideration.
Additionally, I assessed the framework by Belanger et al. (2019) and deemed the study reliable based on the following considerations:

a. The study is verified by subject matter experts (SMEs). Then, the authors conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (factors with eigenvalue >=1) to ensure that constructs were not under-represented or too narrow and would fail to include essential dimensions of the framework.

b. The authors deleted construct-irrelevant variances verified by SMEs through EFA (factors with eigenvalue <1). The assessment was not too broad and did not contain any excess variance associated with other distinct constructs.

**2.2.3. Assessment of Operationalization Reliability**

Operationalization considers the mechanism that transforms the framework into the actual scores. The operationalization of the 3N model complied with the current conventions. The following is the analysis of the operationalization of the 3N framework:

**2.2.3.1. Adequate Sample Sizes.** In Study 1, assuming; medium effect sizes, six latent variables, 42 observed variables, and a power set at 0.8, a minimum sample size of four hundred subjects was required (Soper, 2018). Belanger et al. (2019) recruited 470 Canadians via advertisements posted in classified ads, social media, and Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Belanger et al., 2019, p.3).

Next, a social alienation condition was developed using two items from the social alienation scale. Participants (N = 130) recalled times when they did not identify with American culture (Canadian for Study 1). In contrast, participants in the control group (N = 189) answered questions on dental pain (Belanger et al., 2019, p.3).
2.2.3.2. Reliability and Validity of the Scales. In Study 1, the authors developed two scales to prove the hypothesis. First, 56 items were designed for the Social Alienation scale and 54 for the Support for Political Violence scale, using a 6-point Likert scale. Thirteen independent subject matter experts (SMEs) from security studies, intelligence analysts, and law enforcement were consulted to examine the content validity of the potential scale items. SMEs completed standardized content validity by identifying questions that may impact data quality.

2.2.3.3. Additional Factors. As operationalization is the process that produces the scores and labels, each factor in the assessment can introduce random and systematic errors to the data. The following control factors were used in the studies:

2.2.3.3.1. Collective Narcissism. To identify the effect of collective narcissism, three items (1a: $\alpha = .84; M = 2.79, SD = 1.31$, 1b: $\alpha = .79; M = 2.75, SD = 1.17$), two items (2a: $rs = .47; M = 4.13, SD = 1.59$), and three items (2b: $M = 3.28, SD = 1.50, \alpha = .71$) were measured with a 6-point Likert scale (Belanger et al., 2019, p. 4).

2.2.3.3.2. Self-Sacrifice. Readiness to self-sacrifice was measured with the Self-Sacrifice Scale of ten items (1a: $\alpha = .86; M = 3.50, SD = 1.28$, Study 1b: $\alpha = 0.82; M = 2.63, SD = 1.06$), two items (2a: $rs = .47; M = 3.66, SD = 1.64$) and three items (2b: $M = 2.74, SD = 1.47, \alpha = 0.80$) on a 7-point Likert scale (Belanger et al., 2019, p.4).

2.2.3.3.3. Need for Closure. The Need for closure factor was developed with Roets and Van Hiels' (2011) 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Study 1a: $\alpha = .88; M = 3.60, SD = 0.56$, Study 1b: $\alpha = .89; M = 4.11, SD = 0.78$) and two items (2a: $rs = .59; M = 4.28, SD = 1.52$) and three items (2b: $M = 4.47, SD = 1.45, \alpha = .70$) completed on a 6-point Likert scale (Belanger et al., 2019, p.4).
2.2.3.3.4. **Wanting to Join a Radical Group.** Participants' proclivity toward joining a radical group was measured with two items on a Likert scale (Study 1a: $rs = .79; M = 2.89, SD = 1.47$, Study 1b: $rs = 0.82; M = 1.70, SD = 1.05$) completed on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Study 2 used two items (Study 2a: $rs = .23; M = 3.17, SD = 1.53$, Study 2b: $rs = .56; M = 2.28, SD = 1.46$) on a 7-point scale (Belanger et al., 2019, p.4).

2.2.3.3.5. **Moral Disengagement.** A new factor was introduced in Study 3, in which the participants' sense of moral disengagement was measured using a seven-item scale. A factor analysis using oblimin rotation and the maximum likelihood was conducted on these items. The screen test and eigenvalues (4.15 and 1.06) indicated the extraction of two factors, explaining 59% and 15% of the variance, respectively. The first factor was made of items measuring dehumanization ($\alpha = .90, M = 2.06, SD = 1.40$), whereas the second factor measured moral justification ($\alpha = .66, M = 3.51, SD = 1.59$), on a 7-point scale (Belanger et al., 2019, p.6).

2.2.3.4. **Overall Assessment.** The operationalization of Belanger et al.'s (2019) research is in line with currently accepted practices. Since mental phenomena like social alienation are less straightforward, the measurement unit is arbitrary because there is no agreed-upon metric. To address this issue, thirteen SMEs assisted in developing and vetting factors during the operationalized phase. Another important consideration is the three studies' sample sizes were more significant than the amount suggested by statistical convention. Furthermore, the method used for factor analysis, in which only factors with eigenvalues > 1 were used, aligns with current statistical practices. The two scales with
the additional five factors constituted the specification that operationalized the measurements.

2.2.4. Score Interpretation Reliability

2.2.4.1. Factor Analysis of the Social Alienation Scale. The authors conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the social alienation scale. The EFA was performed on 235 participants using maximum likelihood and oblimin solution (Belanger et al., 2019, p.5). Items that loaded on multiple factors or with weak factor loading were eliminated. The authors then selected the six items with the strongest factors' loadings.

A second EFA was performed with those six items, with three being reverse-scored items. Results indicated a two-factor solution with eigenvalues of 3.87 and 1.12, explaining 64% and 18%, respectively. The oblimin rotation revealed that all the positive items loaded on one factor (see Table 1). In contrast, all the reverse-scored items loaded strongly on the second factor (without cross-loadings) (Belanger et al., 2019, p.9). The decision to adopt a two-factor solution (eigenvalues > 1) is in line with the current methodology (Yong and Pearce, 2013).
Table 1

3N Social Alienation Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I avoid social gatherings and activities associated with Canadian society.</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I refuse to be part of Canadian society.</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I strive to be distant from the average Canadian.</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I fit in well with Canadian values and beliefs (R).</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have stable and positive interactions with others in Canadian society (R).</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I identify strongly with Canadian culture and values (R).</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: From “Radicalization Leading to Violence: A Test of the 3N Model,” by Belanger et. al.

Also, it is noteworthy that a CFA was conducted with AMOS (59) using a sample of 235 participants. Results from the CFA yielded a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(df = 4) = 3.88$, $p = .42$, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0, SRMR = .01. Results indicated that the one-factor solution had the best fit to the data compared to the two-factor solution, $\chi^2(df = 4) = 30.72$, $p < 0.001$ (Belanger et al., 2019, p.4).

2.2.4.1.1. Systematic Errors of Social Alienation scale. The result from EFA on the six items indicates a factor loading suited for a two-component solution. The 3N authors argued for a single solution construct, as research conducted by Marsh et al. (2010) had shown that loading patterns like these are an artifact of item wording from reverse coding (e.g., strive to be distant vs fit in well with). Thus, the 3N authors argued that a unique factor structure would fit the data better than a two-factor solution. This approach was in line with the current methodology (Yong and Pearce, 2013).
2.2.4.2. Factor Analysis of the Political Violence Scale. An EFA was performed with 235 participants using maximum likelihood and oblimin solution. Items loaded on multiple factors or with weak factor loading were eliminated (Belanger et al., 2019, p.6). The authors then selected the six items with the strongest factor loadings, with three being reverse-scored items. A second EFA was performed with those six items. Results indicated a two-factor solution with eigenvalues of 3.30 and 1.44, explaining 55% and 24% of the variance. The oblimin rotation revealed all the positive items loaded on one factor (see Table 2).

Table 2

**Political Violence Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe that when using violence to further a just cause, everybody is fair game.</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that violence is necessary for social change.</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that it is acceptable to retaliate against someone who insults their values and beliefs.</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would never consider physical violence to further a just cause. (R).</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that we should never use violence as a way to try to change society. (R).</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that there are effective ways of changing society in Canada other than resorting to violence. (R).</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


P< 0.001, Reverse score item= (R)

In contrast, all the reverse-scored items loaded strongly on the second factor (without cross-loadings). Thus, as with the Social Alienation scale, the authors predicted that a unique factor structure would fit the data better than a two-factor solution (Belanger et al., 2019, p.4).
However, this assessment is not conclusive, as the degree of factor loading largely depends on the wording of the items.

Next, results from the CFA yielded a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(df = 1) = 0.09$, $p = 0.76$, $CFI = 1.00$, $TLI = 1.00$, $SRMR = 0.002$, $RMSEA = 0.00$. The CFA with all six constructs correlated achieved a good fit to the data, $\chi^2 (df = 626) = 1,153.04$, $p < 0.001$, $CFI = .94$, $TLI = .93$, $SRMR = .07$, $RMSEA = .04$. (Belanger et al., 2019, p5). The statistically reliable items loadings provide affirmation that each latent factor is well-defined by its items.

2.2.4.2.1. Possible Systematic Error of the Political Violence scale. The result from EFA on the six items indicates a factor loading suited for two components solution. The 3N authors argued that a one solution construct is less complex, hence more appropriate. However, I assess that these two groups are different, as the three items in the first group denoted beliefs (e.g., never consider physical violence). In contrast, the three items in the second group marked a behaviour (e.g., it is acceptable to retaliate). The 3N authors’ one solution construct may be unreliable with additional data.

2.2.3.3. 3N Study 1 Full Model. The model was tested by specifying a path linking social alienation to support for political violence and one path from the latter variable to wanting to join radical groups (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

3N relationships (Belanger et al., 2019, p4)
Results indicated that the hypothesized model fit the data well: $\chi^2 (df = 627, N = 470) = 1,153.32$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .94$, $TLI = .93$, $RMSEA = .04$, $SRMR = .07$. Results confirmed the hypothesized mediation ($B = 0.25$, $SE = 0.05$; $95\% CI = [0.16, 0.37]$) (Belanger et al., 2019, p.6). Overall, Study 1 demonstrated that the social alienation and support for political violence scales were a psychometrically reliable instrument.

2.2.3.4. Unreliableness of the Join Radical Group Factor. The latent variable of Wanting to Join a Radical Group is measured by only two items (observed variables), whereas a minimum of three items are needed to perform a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Namely, in this case, there are more unknowns in terms of the degree of freedoms than known indicators. More importantly, one of the observed items, "Wanting to Join a Radical Group," is a direct measurement of the stated latent variable, as it was directly observed as an item indicated by the item: “I would join a group that is willing t use all means possible to defend its ideology." This latent variable needed to be eliminated.

2.2.4. Score Interpretation Reliability

All assessment systems were well designed and justified for the intended score interpretation and use. Furthermore, the authors understanding of the results was adequately articulated, such as "strong support for political violence" and "more significant social alienation." The EFAs performed on the Social Alienation Scale and Political Violence Scale, with six variables each, and the results indicated a two-factor solution for each scale. The oblimin (orthogonal) rotation revealed all the positive items loaded on one factor. In contrast, all the reverse-scored items loaded strongly on the second factor (without cross-loadings). The authors thus predicted that a unique factor structure would fit the data better than a two-factor
solution. The process aligns with the factor rotation method that Yong and Pearce (2013) advocated.

Also, the authors’ score interpretations appear to be correct. Study 1 outlined the relationship between social alienation (at $r = .53$), support for political violence (at $r = .48$) and joining a radical social network. Equally as important, these findings were replicated with European and Islamic and Asian subjects, suggesting that the 3N model is relevant to the study of radicalization in different cultural contexts.

2.2.5. 3N Score Use

I concluded that all measurements were correctly designed and justified for the intended score interpretation and use based on the results obtained. To test the theoretical postulates of the 3N model, the authors developed the Social Alienation and the support for Political Violence scales (Belanger et al., 2019, p.5).

Study 1 demonstrated that social alienation (Need) was positively related at $B = 0.53$ to support violence (Narrative). Which, in turn, at $B = 0.48$, was positively associated with wanting to join a radical group (Network), controlling for other predictors related to violence, namely collective narcissism, need for closure, and self-sacrifice (Belanger et al., 2019, p.3).

2.2.6. Assessment of Score Use

I assessed that the relationships between the three factors in Study 1 were statistically significant. In Study 2 and 3, upon closer examination, some of the relationships indicated by the authors were, at best, weak correlations. These are; in Study 2b, socially alienated correlated with political violence at .17, in Study 2a, political violence correlated with knowing like-minded individuals at .23, in Study 3 between
social alienation and support for political violence at .28, and also in Study 3, moral justification correlated with support for political violence at only .08. The results from Study 1 are the most relevant to me, as the current SBW study examines Canadian Veterans and Canadian Civilians.

2.2.7. Evaluation of Validity

Unlike reliability, which is fully quantifiable, validity is conceptual and a subjective evaluation. The validity of the 3N study was evaluated using Messick's (1995) Six Distinct Aspects of Validity Evidence. This assessment ensures content validity, in which contents are representative of the entire domain the test seeks to measure. In general, I found that all methods and processes of the 3N studies are valid.

2.2.7.1. Content: relevance & representativeness. The research examined the social cognitive processes underlying ideologically-based violence through the lens of the 3N model of radicalization. The studies' subjects were from four culturally distinct groups, and the sample sizes for each study were adequate. The empirical evidence was obtained, and the findings were relevant and mostly presentative to the general population. However, a significant concern on the validity of the 3N study is that the participant's opinions on the topics of self-radicalization were tempered and often self-censored, as the participants wanted to fit within the social norm and not be identified as radicalized extremists.

2.2.7.2. theory: substantive theories, process models, & process engagement. The research examined a radicalization trajectory proposed by the 3N theory whereby individuals transition from losing significance (feeling socially alienated), adhering to violence-justifying ideologies and wanting to join radical groups. Furthermore, the model successfully showed that moral justification is one of the mechanisms linking social alienation to political violence support (Belanger et al., 2019). However, the Exploratory Factor Analysis of both the Social
Alienation and Political Violence scales (after recording) yielded two components for each scale, indicating that the items from each scale could be regrouped to measure two latent variables.

2.2.7.3. **scoring: models as reflective of tasks and domain structure.** To test the 3N model, the authors introduced two new psychometric instruments, a social alienation scale and a support for political violence scale, which required engaging the collaboration of thirteen SMEs on radicalization. The two new scales and five additional tools created an operationalized construct reflecting tasks and domain structure.

2.2.7.4. **Generalizability: boundaries of score meaning.** The scores obtained from the studies contributed to a meaningful explanation of radicalization. The data established the pathway whereby individuals lose significance, adhere to violent ideologies, and join radical groups. In addition to this evidence, the scoring showed that moral justification links social alienation to political violence support. However, generalization is a significant issue. As stated by the 3N authors, an important limitation of this study is that a critical group, namely, people who have been radicalized, will likely not volunteer to be subjects in this research. Due to the poor representation of the targeted group, these studies' systemic error is likely statistically significant.

2.2.7.5. **External relationship: convergent and discriminant evidence.** The findings presented are correlational, limiting causal inferences to describe the relationship between Need, Narrative, and Network. Additional external experimental evidence would be needed to provide concurrent or discriminating proof against these claims.

2.2.7.6. **Consequences: social values and implications of score use.** This research extends the knowledge on radicalization and provides additional information for
frontline workers to identify and prevent individuals from engaging in violent extremism. The 3N framework can guide future research and enlighten stakeholders to draw informed conclusions.

**2.2.8. 3N Model Overall Assessment**

I evaluated the design, development, operationalization, interpretation, usage, and evaluation of the 3N study. In general, the 3N model is valid and reliable. Study 1 suggest that Canadians with high levels of Social Alienation (Need) tend to express support for Political Violence (Narrative), which in turn positively predicts wanting to join a Radical Group (Network). However, the reliability of both the Political Violence scales is of concern, as EFA indicates that the two-component solution (after recoding) is better. Also, the latent variables of Wanting to Join a Group can be eliminated, as this construct is directly observed by the item "I would join a group."

In sum, the 3N framework is generally assessed to be reliable and valid. I found that the various Social Alienation and Political Violence items could be regrouped to form up to four latent components. The validity errors of this model are high, as radicalized individuals are likely not surveyed. Moreover, participants may have self-censored their responses not to be identified as vulnerable to RTV. Based on these findings, I will adopt various aspects of the 3N framework as the foundation for the current study of Sheepdogs Become Wolves (SBW), modifying the unreliable and invalid elements of the 3N framework by regrouping the political violence items and changing the questions from first to a third-person perspective.
2.3 Part 3: Analyzing Military Training with RTV Lens

Based on a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Defense, Moskalenko (2010) highlighted the parallels between military training and radical groups' indoctrination methods. Moskalenko stated that through social isolation (alienation), amplified by physical and mental stresses, recruits are reoriented, ensuring their loyalty to the "just cause.” In essence, military training strips the recruits of their old identity and "radicalizes" them towards military values, acceptance of violence and the willingness for self-sacrifice. Individuals with a military background are more susceptible to radicalization due to the dynamic of the military ingroup, the conflict between sheepdog and sheep values, and social alienation in general.

An individual who psychologically identifies as an ingroup member does not identify with the values of individuals in an outgroup. According to Duckitt (1989), the power of the ingroup is collective action and setting norms and values, which can lead to a warrior ethos. Furthermore, to develop a military unit’s cohesion, its members are conditioned to idealize ingroup values, justify ingroup goals, and reject outgroup values.

Studies found that many recruits enter the military to improve adverse life circumstances, increase social status and overcome financial difficulties (Hosek & Totten, 1998); hence, the willingness to embrace their new identity as a member of an ingroup is strong. Also, Moskalenko (2010) argued that soldiers who serve in combat tours, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, are further radicalized because they are far from home, cut off from all civilian groups, and depend on the ingroup for survival. Therefore, it is not surprising that many soldiers and veterans often feel alienated from the general
public. Under these circumstances, group polarization, in which the military ideology clashes with the values of the general population, can occur (Tryon, 2006).

Grossman (2008), a veteran and psychology professor at the U.S. Military Academy, developed a popular expression of military ethos with an analogy. Grossman used sheep to represent the public, wolves to represent the enemy, and sheepdogs to represent soldiers. Grossman explained that most citizens are gentle, like peaceful sheep, and cannot hurt one another except by accident or extreme provocation. However, there are the wolves that feed on the sheep without mercy. The wolves represent individuals who have the capacity for violence and no empathy for sheep. Finally, the sheepdogs protect the flock and confront the wolves. According to Grossman, most soldiers, police, and individuals who work in security services take on the role of sheepdogs.

2.3.1. Acceptance of Violence

Grossman (2008) stated that sheep generally do not like the sheepdog. An authority figure, the sheepdog, restricts the movement and actions of sheep. Also, with the capacity for violence, the sheepdog looks like a wolf. McCauley and Moskalenko (2016) argued that a critical aspect of military training is desensitizing individuals to become more accepting of violence. Hence, coupled with alienation, a desensitized soldier is at risk of committing a violent act against civilians. Grossman disagreed with this assessment. He exclaimed sheepdog must not, cannot, and will not harm sheep. Any sheepdog who intentionally injures a sheep will be punished and removed by the authorities. If I apply Grossman's analogy to a soldier who willfully harms civilians, I argue the sheepdog becomes a wolf. In addition, what happens when a soldier retires and is no longer under the control of a military authority?
2.3.2. Propensity for Social Alienation

The conflict between military (sheepdog) and civilian (sheep) values and the sense of social alienation from the "civilian world" is amplified when soldiers transition from the military back to civilian lives. According to Jensen et al. (2022), veterans face significant risk factors for social alienation, such as failed relationships, unemployment, previous criminal justice encounters, and psychological vulnerabilities tied to their military service, including the higher risk of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Moskalenko (2021) highlighted the research of Ahern et al (2015) and Shepherd et al. (2020). According to Ahern et al. (2015), veterans often feel disconnected from people in their civilian lives. They lack a sense of belonging to society and purpose in their lives. Furthermore, many veterans miss the military lifestyle, particularly the camaraderie with the military ingroup (Shepherd et al., 2020). After transitioning out of the military and without a supportive ingroup, veterans may be swayed to join radical groups and champion a new "just cause."

Timothy McVeigh is a well-known case of an American veteran being swayed toward domestic terrorism. The 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist act in U.S. history, killing 168 and wounding another 684 Americans (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2020). Released from active duty in 1991, McVeigh served three years in the U.S. Army and was deployed to Kuwait during the Gulf War. McVeigh considered himself a patriot in which the Federal Building attack was made in support of a "just cause," which was to overthrow a tyrannical government (Ward & Pilat, 2016). He cited the Turner Diaries, a work of fiction that depicts a violent
civil war between white Americans and the U.S. Federal government, as inspiration for his action.

2.3.3. Empirical Evident of Radicalization

While I did not find open-source information on the radicalization of Canadian soldiers and veterans, hateful conduct, such as the willingness to join a radical hate group, is of great concern to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Currently, all members of CAF must attend training to identify, report, and eliminate hateful conduct (CAF, 2020). Moreover, in the United States, there is significant evidence showing that some soldiers and veterans are being radicalized. (Helmus et al., 2021)

For example, according to the Profiles of Individual Radicalization of the United States (PIRUS, Jensen & Yates, 2022), extremists with U.S. military backgrounds represent 11.5% of the total number of people who committed criminal acts in America. From 1990 to 2010, an average of 6.9 persons with military backgrounds had committed extremist crimes annually. However, from 2011 to 2021, that number quadrupled to 28.7 persons per year (see Figure 2).

Figure 2:

*Extremists with Military Background, adopted from Radicalization in the Ranks, PIRUS, 2022*
In addition to this trend, Jensen & Yates (2022) highlighted that nearly half of extremists with military backgrounds espoused anti-government views or were members of organized militia groups. Also, an additional 33% of the arrested extremists promoted white supremacy and xenophobia views. Furthermore, 10% of the subjects were connected to or inspired by Islamic Jihadist groups, including al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

As cited by Moskalenko (2021) and upon analysis of the primary source materials, there is evidence that members of the U.S. military and veterans are being radicalized. For example, a poll of active-duty soldiers found that 36% reported personally witnessing "ideologically-driven racism" among their peers (Shane, 2019). Furthermore, a data leak on about five hundred members of various radical right-wing groups revealed that some members are active-duty military or veterans (Wilson, 2021). Also, the percentage of attacks and plots committed by active-duty and reserve personnel increased in 2020 to 6.4 percent of all attacks. Furthermore, planned actions (7 of 110 total) were up from 1.5 percent in 2019 (1 of 65 total) from zero in 2018 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022). More importantly, according to the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ, 2016), of the sample of 856 radicalized persons, 4.4% were in active service. Moreover, 14.4% were military veterans.

On January 1, 2021, the issue of veterans' radicalization was highlighted during the U.S. Capitol Riot, in which a mob stormed the Capitol building in Washington, D.C. As many as 20% of those charged with crimes related to the incident have served in the military (Dresibach & Anderson, 2021). As only 7% of all adult Americans have served in the military, veterans were three times more likely to be among these rioters than
expected by chance (Moskalenko, 2021). Moreover, among members of alt-right groups, including Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, indicted for insurrection, 35% had served in the military (Valentino-DeVries et al., 2021).

Finally, in the wake of the chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ABC News' surveyed 775 thousand U.S. war veterans, including many with multiple tours of duty in Afghanistan (Gaston, 2021). Veterans are angry with the withdrawal; 73% feel betrayed, and 67% feel humiliated.

2.4. Summary of Literature Review

In part one, five themes have emerged from the literature review on RTV modelling: first, personal or group grievance can cause Social Alienation, which increases one’s risk of RTV. Second, even with significant resources, such as the amount of effort, time, and money allocated to the "War on Terror," many grievances cannot be resolved. Logically, a portion of the population will always experience some form of Social Alienation. Third, constructs such as the automatic "conveyor belt" and the single path "staircase" models are invalid. Fourth, there is a weak relationship between radical opinions and radical actions; namely, most individuals with politically based Violent Beliefs do not exhibit Violent Behaviours. Fifth, in general, Social Alienation coupled with Radical Beliefs is a precondition for Radical Actions.

In part two, three themes have emerged from the literature review on the radicalization of veterans: first, military training can be viewed as radicalization since individuals are indoctrinated into an ingroup, reject the values of outgroups, and are desensitized to violence. Second, many veterans experience social alienation due to the conflicting values between military ethos (sheepdogs) and civilian values (sheep). Third, there is minimal open-source
quantitative research on Canadian veterans; however, empirical data suggests that many American soldiers and veterans are being radicalized.

Finally, the 3N model by Belanger et al. (2019) is a reliable and valid radicalization model except for the possible measurement errors indicated. However, radical opinions and radical acts are different constructs; hence these factors need to be measured by different psychometric scales (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009).

2.4.1. SBW Conceptional Framework and Approach

Based on the findings of this literature review and using the 3N model as a foundation, my research will begin developing a valid and reliable RTV framework. I will compare and contrast Canadian veterans with Canadian civilians on identified factors and relationships between the components. Ultimately, through factor analyses of the RTV model, I intend to determine the propensity of "when sheepdogs become wolves."
Charter 3: Methodology

3.1. Goals, Hypothesis and Procedure

The vast majority of studies on radicalization have been qualitative. By using a quantitative methodology, the overall goal of the current study was to provide empirical evidence regarding RTV. More specifically, the goal was to understand better the relationship between Social Alienation and willingness to commit Political Violence. In addition, this study aims to quantitatively evaluate whether Canadian military veterans are more vulnerable to RTV.

3.1.1. Test Hypothesis

The following hypotheses compare and contrast the test and control groups: a null hypothesis indicates no statistically significant difference between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians in terms of the propensity for Social Alienation, having politically Violent Beliefs (opinions), and exhibiting politically Violent Behaviors (actions). Additionally, a null hypothesis demonstrates similar relationships between these three factors for both groups. An alternate hypothesis indicates a statistically significant difference between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians in Social Alienation, Violent Beliefs, or Violent Behaviors (actions); the relationships between these three factors are significantly different between the two groups.

3.1.2. Procedure

To test the null and alternate hypotheses, I conducted a statistical analysis in two parts with five steps:

Part 1

1. Conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to confirm the contracts or identify other latent components to improve the original 3N framework by Belanger et al. (2019);
2. Conducted a second EFA to regroup the items into new components;
3. Conducted multiple Confirmatory Factory Analysis (CFA) to identify the reliability of the various frameworks;

Part 2
4. Conducted a $T$-test, $F$-test & Cohen’s $d$ on the test (veterans) and control (civilians) group to identify the difference between the various factors; and
5. Using the best fitted (validity, reliability and minimal complexity) framework, assessed the relationship between factors for the test and control groups.

3.2. Part 1: the SBW Psychometric Framework

The purpose of part 1 of the study (Step 1-3) was to construct the Sheepdogs Become Wolves (SBW) psychological framework, linking Social Alienation with the propensity for committing politically motivated Violent Acts. Two psychometric instruments, the Social Alienation and Political Violence scales, were adopted from Belanger et al.’s (2019) Need Narrative Network (3N) radicalization model. Also, I incorporated McCauley and Moskalenko’s (2017) into the SBW framework. I referred to the "opinion pyramid," consisting of increasing levels of extremist ideas and the "action pyramid," which includes levels ranging from passive legal activism to committing Political Violence.

To begin, using Belanger et al.’s (2019) theoretical framework, I expected Social Alienation to be positively related to support for Political Violence and, in turn, related to Wanting to Join a Radical Group. Next, I accepted the findings of the 3N study. Other latent variables previously associated with Political Violence, such as collective narcissism, need for closure, and self-sacrifice, had minimal to no effect on the path to
radicalization. Therefore, the items for the control variables used in the original 3N study were not adopted for the SBW survey. Only the latent variables of Social Alienation, Support for Political Violence, and the observable variable Join a Radical Group were measured.

I aimed to address the stated limitation of the research by Belanger et al. (2019), which is radicalized people tend not to participate in academic research. The group of interest in the SBW study is Canadian veterans. The current study included Canadian veterans as the test group and Canadian civilians as the control group.

3.2.1. SEM Analysis

Using a Structural Equation Model (SEM) with medium effect sizes of 0.3, three latent variables, fourteen observed variables, and the power set at 0.80, a minimum sample size of 138 veterans and 138 civilians must be recruited to be reliable.

Analyses were conducted using SPSS (version 28) and SPSS AMOS (version 28). The study satisfied the minimum psychometric standards for group-level comparisons following the criteria set forth by Cronbach (1951), Campbell and Fiske (1959), Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), and Ware et al. (1997). Beyond the steps identified earlier, the verification process included examining item internal consistency (item convergent validity), item discriminant validity, internal consistency reliability (Cronbach alpha), and the underlying factor structure of the modified.

Based on the current practices, item internal consistency (convergent validity) is achieved when $r > .28$, indicating that all the items of a particular scale are measuring the same constructs (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). Also, item discriminant validity is verified when $r < .75$, indicating that the two scales measure distinct constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2009). Finally,
adopting Nunnally and Bernstein’s (1994) rule-of-thumb, in which a Cronbach Alpha below 0.70 indicates poor reliability and poor predictive validity.

3.2.2. SBW Items and Scales.

Based on the 3N psychometric survey, the participants were asked to respond to fourteen questions using a six-point Likert scale to measure three main latent variables: Social Alienation, Support for Political Violence, and Willing to Join a Radical Group (Belanger et al., 2019). I adjusted Belanger et al.’s survey from a first-person to a third-person perspective to lower the risk of self-censorship and make the study less confrontational to the participants’ ideology. Participants completed the questionnaire at the University of British Columbia (UBC), locations around the Lower Mainland in British Columbia, or online.

For the test group, I solicited participants from the UBC Institute of Veterans Education Transition (IVET), serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and other veteran associations in the Lower Mainland in B.C. The control group was recruited primarily online through Amazon’s Turk. The data from both groups were collected through in-person and online questionnaires. 150 Canadian veterans (138 from BC; 95 with post-secondary education; 122 males) and 150 Canadian civilians (36 from BC; 119 with post-secondary education; 72 males) were recruited. The ratio of males in my test group is 88%; the percentage of male veterans in CAF is unknown (likely higher than the ratio for CAF), and the ratio of males in CAF is 84% (Canadian Armed Forces, 2020). I assessed that the high percentage of males in the test group and CAF likely contributed to the differences between veterans and civilians in various factors measured using the 3N and SBW frameworks.

As a soldier, veteran, and peer, I relate to veterans more closely than the typical academic. Therefore, the questionnaires within this study use military terminology and
metaphors rather than clinical terms to enhance the creditability of the research to veteran populations. In addition, I minimize self-censorship to create a safe environment for the in-person test group as they complete the questionnaire.

3.2.2.1. Sample Analysis. I had initial concerns about the representativeness of these samples, including whether the demography of participants responding to Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) matched that of the general population. Stewart et al. (2015) demonstrated that Amazon's Turk participants share the same demography as university students. The study suggests that MTurk samples are at least as representative of the U.S. population as traditional subject pools in terms of gender, race, age and education, matching the population more closely than college undergraduate and internet samples. My assumption is also true for the Canadian population. Furthermore, non-response error is more diminutive in MTurk samples than in Internet convenience samples recruited through other sites.

3.2.2.2. SBW Sample Demography. This study assumed no differences between the 58% of participants from British Columbia (B.C.) and the rest of Canada. To test this assumption, I conducted an independent sample T-test with \( \alpha = 0.05 \) comparing the location factor for both the test and control groups. The critical values were significantly greater than the observed values for both the control group (\( CV(148) = 1.98 > t = 0.99 \)) and test group (\( CV(148) = 1.98 > t = 0.01 \)); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. The assumption that there is no difference between B.C. participants and participants from the overall Canadian population remained.

Also, I noted that there was no significant difference in the education of the participants; that is, the majority of the participants had post-secondary education. Finally, there was a significant difference in gender between the veteran (88% male) and civilian (48% male)
participant populations. This distribution differed somewhat from that of the general population, in which 16% of members of the Canadian Armed Forces and 50.37% of Canadians self-identified as female. This gender difference contributed to the cultural differences between the seemingly masculine veteran and the civilian communities. These effects of the cultural difference were captured in the SBW construct in terms of Social Alienation.

3.2.2.3. Item Development. Six items were adopted from the Social Alienation scale, six from the Support for Political Violence scale, and two from the Wanting to Join a Radical Group factor of the 3N study. Whereas the original 3N questions were in the first person, the questions in the SBW study were written in the third-person perspective. The participants were asked about the degree to which they agreed with these statements on a Likert scale with 6 points from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). After the items were identified, I consulted with my supervisors and three independent Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)\(^1\) on radicalization to verify the content validity of the scaled items.

Content validity is the degree to which a subject's response on a test represents their responses to an actual situation, constituting the area of concern for the test interpreters. This form of external validation consistently produces reliable findings.

\(^1\)I would like to thank the following subject matter experts for verifying the validity of the scales: Honourable Chuck Strahl- a member of the Canadian Parliament from 1993 to 2011 and the Security Intelligence Review Committee Chair from 2012 to 2014; the committee provided oversight to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Kevin Tyler- the senior officer in the G9- Influence Activities branch of the 3rd Canadian Division (Western Canada) of the CAF from 2016 to 2019. Segreant (RCMP) & Master Warrant Officer (CAF) Mark Lundie- Counter-terrorism and Influence Activities expert.
These SMEs possessed a breadth and depth of real-world experiences and theoretical knowledge on the radicalization of Canadian veterans. The SMEs completed standardized content validity adopted from DeMaio and Landreth (2004) to identify problematic questions that may impact data quality.

3.2.2.3.1. Social Alienation. To measure social alienation, six items (Part 1: \( \alpha = .803; M = 2.33, SD = 1.15 \)) were adapted from the Social Alienation scale proposed by Belanger et al (2019). The scale includes items such as "My peers avoid social gatherings and activities associated with Canadian society," which participants will respond to based on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). In the test group, peers were defined as other veterans. In the control group, the notion of peers was not specifically defined, so participants had flexibility as to how they defined the term, peers.

3.2.2.3.2. Political Violence. Political Violence was measured with six items (Part 1: \( \alpha = .78; M = 2.45, SD = 1.39 \)) adapted from the Political Violence Scale (Belanger et al., 2019). The scale includes items such as “My peers believe that when using violence to further a just cause, everybody is fair game.” Participants responded to the items by completing a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

3.2.2.3.3. Wanting to Join a Radical Group. Participants’ propensity to Join a Radical Group was measured by two items on a Likert scale (Part 1: \( r = .614; M = 2.64, SD = 1.4 \)). The items "My peers would support a group" and "My peers would join a group" were indicated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). One critique I have of this scale was that only two observed variables measured this latent variable, whereas a minimum of three observed variables were required. More importantly, I did not find the
variable, Joining a Radical Group, to be a latent variable; instead, I measured the variable as an observed variable through item fourteen, “My peers would join a group.”

3.2.3. Factorial Reliability and Validity of the Social Alienation Scale

All samples with missing values were deleted from the sample pool before the SEM analysis. The validity of the Social Alienation scale was tested by randomly dividing the sample into two groups of 150 participants each. The first group was allocated to conduct an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), and the second group was used to run a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The EFA was performed on the 150 participants using maximum likelihood and oblimin solution.

3.2.3.1. Step 1 Alienation: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). With the six items (3 were reverse-coded) from the adopted Social Alienation Scale, I conducted an EFA (maximum likelihood and oblimin rotation, see Table 3).
### Table 3

**Social Alienation Scale Pattern Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My peers avoid social gatherings and activities associated with Canadian society.</td>
<td>.910</td>
<td>-.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers refuse to be part of Canadian society.</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers strive to be distant from the average Canadian.</td>
<td>.825</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers fit in well with Canadian values and beliefs.</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers have stable and positive interactions with others from Canadian society.</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers identify strongly with Canadian culture and values.</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

- Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

Results identified a two-factor solution with eigenvalues of 3.05 and 1.57, explaining 50.74% and 26.21%, respectively (see Figure 3 for scree plot).

### Figure 3

**Social Alienation Scree Plot**
Items that strongly loaded on the first component were "My peers refuse to be part of Canadian society" and "My peers identify strongly with Canadian culture and values" (reverse-scored). The oblimin rotation identified that all the positive items loaded on one factor, whereas all the reverse-scored items loaded on the second factor (after cross-loadings). Again, Marsh et al. (2010) demonstrated that this type of loading pattern is an artifact result of an item’s wording. The 3N study by Belanger et al. (2019) opted for a one-factor solution and predicted the solutions would achieve a satisfactory fit.

3.2.3.2. Step 3 Alienation: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA): Social Alienation Scale. A CFA was conducted with SPSS AMOS (59) using the second random sample of 150 participants to test these predictions. The one-component construct was tested with unstandardized coefficients obtained from the maximum-likelihood estimation method.

A framework with a satisfactory fit should have a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) greater than or equal to 0.93 and a Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) greater than or equal to 0.90. Models with an excellent fit must have values superior to 0.95 (Marsh, 2009) for both indexes. Furthermore, the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and standardized root-mean-square residuals (SRMR) should be equal to or below 0.08 for acceptable and below 0.05 for excellent model fit. Results from the one-component CFA yielded a satisfactory fit to the data, $\chi^2(df = 4) = 5.7$, $p = .222$, CFI = .996, TLI = .984, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .019 (see Figure 4).
In order to ensure the proposed single component solution was the best fitting model, I compared the results to a two-component solution whereby the reversed items loaded on one factor and positive items loaded on a second factor. Results showed that the two-component solution had a less satisfactory fit when compared to the two-component solution above. The results of the two-component analysis were $\chi^2 (df = 8) = 16.4, p = .037$, CFI = .979, TLI = .961, RMSEA = .084, SRMR = .042. See figure 4 for items and factor loadings.

My next step was to assess the internal consistency of the construct. By statistical convention, if the value of Cronbach's alpha coefficient is greater than or equal to .7, the result is acceptable since the coefficient is equal to or exceeds the minimum threshold (Nunnaly, 1978). The result of $\alpha = .8$ revealed a high level of reliability for the one-components constrict for the Social Alienation scale. Therefore, I adopted a single-component loading solution for the Social Alienation scale of the SBW framework.

There was internal consistency (convergent validity) for the items as $r > .28$, indicating that all the items of a particular scale are measuring the same constructs (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). As several items had $r > .75$, discriminant validity was not achieved (Podsakoff et al., 2009) for all items, indicating the possibility of two distinct scale constructs.
However, in a literature review by Marsh et al. (2010), the authors demonstrated that reverse loading patterns are an artifact of item wording from reverse coding (e.g., strive to be distant vs fit in well with). Thus, a unique factor structure would fit the data better than a two-factor solution. This approach was in line with the current methodology (Yong and Pearce, 2013). Therefore, I adopted a single-component loading solution for the Social Alienation scale of the SBW framework.

3.2.4. Factorial Reliability and Validity of the Political Violence Scale

The same process was used to test the factorial validity of the Political Violence scale. An EFA was performed with 150 participants using maximum likelihood and oblimin solution on six items (3 were reverse-coded).

3.2.4.1. Step 1 Violence: First EFA Political Violence. I used an EFA with maximum likelihood and an oblimin rotation to test for a multi-component solution to examine these six items (see Table 4).
Table 4

*Political Violent Pattern Matrix*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that when using violence to further a just cause, everybody is fair game.</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that violence is necessary for social change.</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that it is acceptable to retaliate against someone who insults their values and beliefs.</td>
<td>-.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers would never consider physical violence to further a just cause.</td>
<td>.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that we should never use violence as a way to try to change society.</td>
<td>.916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that there are effective ways of changing society in Canada other than resorting to violence.</td>
<td>.723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.

There were two eigenvalues over 1 (see Figure 5 for scree plot). Examination of the pattern matrix yielded two interpretable factors. The first component, with three items, pertained to beliefs about the use of violence.
These items were worded as "never consider physical violence," "never use violence," and "other than resorting to violence." The second component, also with three items, pertained to behaviours or the propensity to act on beliefs. These items were worded as "using violence to further a just cause, everybody is fair game," "violence is necessary for social change," and "it is acceptable to retaliate against someone."

Results also suggested a two-factor solution with eigenvalues of 2.87 and 1.21, explaining 47.8% and 20.1% of the variance, respectively. Items that loaded on the first factor included "violence is necessary for social change," and items loaded on the second factor included "there are effective ways of changing society in Canada other than resorting to violence" (reversed-scored recoded). The oblimin rotation identified all the positive items loaded on one factor. In contrast, all the reverse-scored items loaded on the second factor (after cross-loadings), and thus the analysis pointed to a two-factor solution.

3.2.4.2. Step 2 Violence_group: Second EFA Political Violence. As indicated in my literature review, the component, Join a Radical Group, from Belanger et al. (2019) study is not a valid latent variable because (at \( r = .93 \)) it can be directly measured by the observed variable, "would join a group." Hence, a second EFA (with maximum
likelihood and oblimin rotation) was performed with the six items from the 3N Violence scale plus two items from the 3N Group scale (see Table 5).

**Table 5**

*Political Violence Group Pattern Matrix*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that when using violence to further a just cause,</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td>.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>everybody is fair game.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that violence is necessary for social change.</td>
<td>.630</td>
<td>.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that it is acceptable to retaliate against someone</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who insults their values and beliefs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers would never consider physical violence to further a just</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that we should never use violence as a way to try</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to change society.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers believe that there are effective ways of changing society</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Canada other than resorting to violence.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers would support a group that is not afraid of defying the</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>-.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law to fight for its principles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My peers would join a group that is willing to use all means</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>-.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possible to defend its ideology.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Rotation converged in 6 iterations.
Again, there were two eigenvalues over 1 (see Figure 6 for scree plot). The result indicated three items from the Violence scale loaded well with the two items from the Group scale. The remaining three items from the Violence scale were loaded as the second component.

**Figure 6**

_Violence & Group Scree Plot_

Based on the wording and the items, the first component was identified as Violent Beliefs (expressed as opinions) with three items. These two items of "support" and "join radical group" had a strong loading with the three remaining items from the original Political Violence scale. Based on the wording of the three remaining items that included two action items, supporting and joining a group, I created a new scale named Violent Behaviors (expressed as actions). I consulted with three subject matter experts (SMEs), who deemed these new scales valid. Thus, the SBW framework departed from Belanger et al.’s (2019) Political Violence model.

**3.2.4.2.1. SBW Violent Beliefs Scale.** The Violent Beliefs scale included three items that corresponded with McCauley and Moskalenko's (2017) Radicalized Opinions Pyramid. These items posted theoretical and absolute statements such as "would never consider physical violence," "should never use violence," and "other effective ways …
other than resorting to violence." Participants rated items on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

3.2.4.2.2. SBW Violent Behaviors Scale. The Violent Behaviors scale included five items measuring the propensity to support or commit Political Violence. The items were taken from Belanger et al.’s (2019) model, including action items from the Political Violence scale and two items from the Join a Radical Group variable. The current scale also incorporates McCauley and Moskalenko's (2017) Radicalized Action Pyramid construct. Unlike the Violent Beliefs scale, these items posted a conditional situation where the subject reacted with an observable action. The items included "My peers believe that it is acceptable to retaliate against someone who insults their values and beliefs" and "My peers would join a group" and were measured on a Likert scale with 6 points from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

3.2.4.3. Step 3 Violence: CFA Political Violence Scales. A CFA was conducted using a second random sample of 150 participants to test these predictions. The Violent Behaviors model was tested with unstandardized coefficients obtained from the maximum-likelihood estimation method. Results from the CFA indicated a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(df = 3) = 3.12$, $p = 0.373$, CFI = 0.999, TLI = 0.998, RMSEA = 0.016, SRMR = 0.023 (see Figure 7).

Figure 7

Violent Behaviours CFA
The result of the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient, where .7 is considered acceptable reliability, pointed to high levels of reliability for the Violent Behavior scale ($\alpha = .75$). Also, the item internal consistency (convergent validity) was achieved with $r > .28$ for all items, indicating the scale measures the same constructs (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007).

Next, the Violence Beliefs model was tested with unstandardized coefficients obtained from the maximum-likelihood estimation method. CFA computation yielded a problematic fit to the data with only three observed variables, $\chi^2 (df = 0) = 0$. I combined Violent Beliefs with Violent Behaviors to conduct a reliable assessment. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient result pointed to high levels of reliability for the Violent Beliefs scale ($\alpha = 0.79$). Results from the CFA identified a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(df = 14) = 43.6$, $p = 0$, CFI = .963, TLI = .926, RMSEA = .084, SRMR = .023 (see Figure 8).

**Figure 8**

*Political Violence CFA*

Overall, results revealed high levels of reliability for the Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviors scale. Hence, I adopted the two-component solution construct.
3.2.5. **SEM: Full Model Measurement**

3.2.5.1. **Step 3N: CFA 3N Framework Rejected.** Using the original 3N construct of Social Alienation, Political Violence, and Joining a Radical Group (Belanger et al., 2019), the chi-square value indicated a lack of good fit, $\chi^2(68) = 193, p = 0$. However, current literature explains the difference between the covariance matrix and model is expected to be statistically significant with a large sample size (Byrne, 2005; Revelle, 2017). Therefore, other indices are more suited to assessing model fit. CFI, TFI, RMSEA, and SRMR are the accepted methods to indicate the goodness of fit. However, results from the 3N CFA yielded $\text{CFI} = 0.853$, $\text{TFI} = .803$, $\text{RMSEA} = .111$ and $\text{SRMR} = .102$ suggested a poor model fit (see Figure 9).

![3N CFA Diagram](image)

Thus, the data collected from my study does not support the 3N framework.

3.2.5.2. **Step 3 SBW: CFA SBW Framework.** The modified 3N inductive approach generated many items, and Study 1 aims to reduce the number of items to a manageable amount.
to create a valid and less complex model. Initially, the first EFA revealed a possible two-factor solution for Social Alienation. After which, I conducted a CFA on the SBW framework yielded two items on the Social Alienation scale with a factor weight below 0.5. Following SEM conventions, these two items: "avoid social gatherings" and "refuse to be part of Canadian Society," were deleted to create a better fit model.

I examined the three-component measurement model with a CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation in AMOS (59). The CFA with all three components correlated and provided a satisfactory fit to the data, \( \chi^2 (df=44, N=150) = 85, p = 0, \) CFI = .939, TLI = .909, RMSEA = .075, SRMR = .075. The statistically reliable item loadings provided assurance that each latent variable is well-defined by its items (see Figure 10).

**Figure 10**

*SBW Framework CFA*

3.2.5.3. Step 3 Full Sample: CFA Full SBW Framework. Finally, to gather additional evidence on the reliability of the new psychometric tools, I examined the three-
component measurement model CFA. Results indicated a good fit: \( \chi^2 (df = 44, N = 300) = 85, p = 0, CFI = .936, TLI = .909, RMSEA = .079, SRMR = .075 \). In sum, the proposed SBW framework specified a path linking Social Alienation (four items) to having Violent Beliefs (three items) and a path from the latter variable to Violent Behaviors (four items). Additionally, the Violent Behaviors latent variable is measurable with the Wanting to Join a Radical Group (one item) observed variable.

### 3.2.6. T-Test for Correlation

To confirm the relationships, I conducted a T-test (without bootstrapping) to compare and contrast the factor correlations. Factors were deemed to be statistically different, when \( t > CV (298) = 1.65 \), CI Upper Lower did not cross zero, and \( p < 0.05 \). In the current study, Social Alienation was moderately related Violent Beliefs \([r = .384, SE = 0.068, t = 2.924, p < .004; 95\% CI = [0.065, 0.33]]\), which in turn was strongly related to Violent Behaviours \([r = .59, SE = 0.05, t = 6.28, p < .001; 95\% CI = [0.23, 0.44]]\). Also, to further develop the framework, I measured the Violent Behaviors latent variable by the Wanting to Join a Radical Group observed variable \( r = .61 \).

Overall, Part 1 of the study demonstrated that the Social Alienation, Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviors scales are psychometrically sound instruments. The current study results provided evidence supporting the SBW model of radicalization by showing that Social Alienation (Need) can lead to radical opinions and actions. Finally, Violent Behaviors could be observed with the Wanting to Join a Radicalized Group (network) item. Using the SBW framework, I examined whether there are empirical differences between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians.
3.3 Assessment of SBW Validity

Unlike reliability, which is fully quantifiable, validity is a conceptual term and a subjective evaluation. The validity of the SBW study was evaluated using Messick’s Six Distinct Aspects of Validity Evidence (Messick, 1995). I also consulted three SMEs, the Honorable Chuck Stahl, Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Kevin Tyler, and Master Warren Officer Mark Lundie. Mr. Stahl is a former chair of Canada’s Security Intelligence Review Committee who oversaw the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police from 2010 to 2014. Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Tyler is the former head of the G9 branch (Psychological Operations and Civilian-Military Cooperation) of the Third Canadian Division (Western Canada) of CAF. Master Warren Officer Lundie is an Influencing Activities expert in CAF and Counter-Terrorism specialist in the RCMP. Upon review, the SMEs and I concluded all methods and processes of SBW were valid.

3.3.1. Content Validity: relevance & representativeness

The SBW study examined the social cognitive processes underlying ideologically-based political violence through the lens of the relationship between Social Alienation, having Violence Beliefs, and radicalized behaviours such as being willing to commit violent acts. The empirical evidence and findings were relevant and most likely representative of the larger population based on the sample size. As stated by Belanger et al. (2019), a limitation of the original 3N study was that people who have been radicalized were not likely to volunteer to be research subjects. The lack of representation of the targeted group made the studies’ systemic error statistically significant. I resolved this issue in the current SBW study using a Canadian veteran population. Also, I
experienced no reluctance from veterans to participate in this study by completing the survey.

3.3.2. **Theory Validity: substantive theories, process models, & process engagement**

The research examined a radicalization trajectory proposed by the 3N theory whereby individuals transition from losing significance, feeling socially alienated, adhering to violence-justifying ideologies and wanting to join radical groups (Belanger et al., 2019). The SBW model built on the ideas proposed by Belanger et al. and the pyramids construct advocated by Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) have successfully demonstrated that support for Political Violence can be measured in terms of Violent Beliefs (expressed as opinions) and Violent Behaviors (the propensity to take action).

3.3.3. **Scoring Validity: models as reflective of tasks and domain structure**

With the collaboration of five SMEs on radicalization, I introduced two new psychometric instruments, the Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviors scale, to test the SBW model. I created an operationalized construct reflecting tasks and domain structure using the two new scales and the adapted Social Alienation scale.

3.3.4. **Generalizability Validity: boundaries of score meaning**

The scores obtained from the study contributed to a meaningful explanation of radicalization. The data established the trajectory whereby individuals with a sense of social alienation, adhere to violent ideologies and are willing to commit violent acts. In addition to this evidence, the scoring also showed that moral justification links social alienation to political violence support. Also, the sample size of both the test and control groups met the minimum requirement for reliability for SEM. Hence, the standard for generalizability was met.
3.3.5. **External Relationship Validity: convergent and discriminant evidence**

The findings presented were correlational without causal inferences to describe the relationship supporting the Social Alienation, Violent Beliefs, and Violent Behaviour framework. Based on the current practices, item internal consistency (convergent validity) was achieved with $r \geq .28$, indicating that the items of a scale are measuring the same constructs (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007). Also, item discriminant validity was verified with $r \leq .75$, indicating that the three scales measure distinct constructs (Podsakoff et al., 2009).

3.3.6. **Consequences Validity: social values and implications of score use**

This research extends the knowledge on radicalization and provides additional information for authorities, stakeholders, and, most importantly, other veterans to identify and prevent individuals from engaging in violent extremism. Reliable data could guide future research and enable stakeholders to draw informed conclusions. I confirmed the validity and reliability of the SBW framework with a test group of Canadian Veterans against a control group of Canadian Civilians.

3.4. **Part 2, Comparing Veterans with Civilians**

3.4.1. **Step 4: SBW T-Test, F-Test & Cohen’s d**

As indicated previously, the primary purpose of this research project was to examine whether veterans are more likely to follow the trajectory of RTV. Specifically, are Canadian veterans more likely to have a high degree of Social Alienation, develop politically violent opinions, and be more willing to commit politically motivated violent acts compared to Canadian Civilians?
With the 3N framework, as shown in Appendix A the results from an independent samples T-Test indicated veterans scored higher than civilians in Violence Beliefs ($M_{\text{difference}} = .92, p < .001$) and marginally higher in Violence Behaviors ($M_{\text{difference}} = .32, p = .002$). Also, there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups in the latent factors of Social Alienation ($M_{\text{difference}} = .102, p = .278$) and the observed variable of Willingness to Join a Radicalized Group. There was no difference between veterans and civilians except for the Political Violence (beliefs and behaviours) factors.

Next, using the SBW framework, Veterans ($N = 150$) were associated with Social Alienation $M = 2.38$ ($SD = .88$), Violent Beliefs $M = 3.07$ ($SD = 1.15$), and Violent Behaviour $M = 2.59$ ($SD = 1.11$). Whereas, civilians ($N = 150$) were associated with Social Alienation $M = 2.28$ ($SD = .75$), Violent Beliefs $M = 2.14$ ($SD = 1$), and Violent Behaviour $M = 2.26$ ($SD = .87$). To test the hypothesis that Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians were associated with a statistically significant different mean for the three measured factors, an independent samples T-Test and F-Test was performed. As shown in Appendix B, the veteran and civilian distributions were sufficiently normal for conducting a T-test (e.g., skew $< |2.0|$ and kurtosis $< |9.0|$; Schmider et al., 2010).

With $\alpha = .01$, factors were deemed to be statistically deferent, when the critical value of $t(298) = 2.59$, CI Upper Lower did not cross zero, and $p < 0.05$. The results of the independent samples T-test (see Appendix C) indicated that two factors were associated with a statistically significant effect, Violent Beliefs at $t(298) = 7.4$, $SE = 0.92$, 95% CI = [0.68, 1.17] and Violent Behaviour at $t(298) = 2.86$, $SE = 0.33$, 95% CI = [0.1, 0.56]. Whereas Social Alienation of $t(298)= 1.09$, $SE = 0.1$, 95% CI = [-0.08, 0.29] denoted no statistically significant effect between veterans and civilians.
Additionally, with two thousand bootstrap samples, the assumption of homogeneity of variances was tested and satisfied via Lenve's $F$-test. Statistically significant differences between veterans and civilians were found on the measurements for Violent Beliefs, $F(298) = 4.73, p = .001, SE = 0.12, 95\% CI = [0.69, 1.17]$ and Violent Behaviour, $F(298) = 12.5, p = .006, SE = 0.12, 95\% CI = [0.09, 0.56]$. Again, Social Alienation, $F(298) = 4.3, p = .278, SE = 0.09, 95\% CI = [-0.09, 0.28]$ indicated no statistically significant effect. Finally, for effect sizes, Cohen's $d$ was estimated for Social Alienation at 0.81, Violent Beliefs at 1.08 and Violent Behaviour at 0.99, indicating a large effect based on Cohen's (1992) guideline of .8. In sum, veterans were associated with a significantly higher degree of Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviour than civilians.

### 3.4.2. Step 5: SBW Framework Comparing Veterans with Civilians

Using the best fitted (validity, reliability and minimal complexity) SBW framework, I assessed the relationships between the three latent variables and one observed variable. My application of the test and control groups to the SBW psychometric framework yielded the following results: When compared to veterans (see Figure 11), civilians (see Figure 12) had a slightly (not statistically significant) stronger correlation between the factors of Social Alienation ($r_{veterans} = 0.4$ vs $r_{civilians} = 0.55$), Violent Beliefs ($r_{veterans} = 0.31$ vs $r_{civilians} = 0.52$) and Violent Behaviours.
When the calculated P value is less than 0.05, the conclusion is that the two coefficients indeed differ significantly. A noteworthy finding was that the difference between the two groups
in the Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours correlation coefficients was statistically
significant at $z = -2.193$, $p = .03$.

Also, veterans had a slightly (not statistically significant) stronger relationship
between the factor of Violence Behaviors and the item of Willing to Join a Radical Group
($r_{\text{veterans}} = 0.69$ vs $r_{\text{civilians}} = 0.64$).

Next, to verify, I conducted a bootstrapped (2000 samples) Pearson's Correlation analysis
between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours. With Bootstrapping depending heavily on
random resampling, therefore the values yielded can be different from other estimation methods,
including CFA analysis.

**Table 6**

*Veterans Correlation between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.274**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrapc</td>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCa 95% Confidence</td>
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<td>.</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behaviour</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.274**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
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<td>BCa 95% Confidence</td>
<td>Lower</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>.434</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
c. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 bootstrap samples
Table 7

*Civilians Correlation between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootstrapc</td>
<td>Bias</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCa 95%</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence Interval</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>.591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Behaviour      | Pearson Correlation | .429**          | 1               |
|                | Sig. (2-tailed)     | <.001           |
| N              | 150               | 150             |
| Bootstrapc     | Bias              | .001            | 0               |
|                | Std. Error        | .083            | 0               |
| BCa 95%        | Lower             | .268            |
| Confidence Interval | Upper       | .591            |

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

c. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 bootstrap samples

As shown in Table 6 and Table 7, the result also indicated a week and moderate relationship with $r = .274$ for Veterans and $r = .429$ for Civilians. Based on the accepted practice, convergent validity can be as low as $r = .28$ (Larraza-Kintana et al., 2007) and discriminant validity as high as $r = .75$ (Podsakoff et al., 2009). The result signalled that there was a weak correlation (.006 from the cut-off) between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours for veterans and a moderate correlation for civilians.
3.5 Summary of Findings

The findings seem to show that the SBW framework applied advances earlier work cited. As suggested by empirical evidence, veterans were associated with a statistically significantly higher degree of Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviour than civilians. Also, there was a low correlation (possibility negative, $r = -0.1$) between expressing Violent Beliefs (opinions) and Wanting to Join a Radicalized Group. However, there is a medium-strength correlation (with consistency and discriminant validity, $r = .70$) between expressing Violent Behaviours (actions) with Wanting to Join a Radicalized Group.

The original research question asks whether there are differences between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians in Radicalization to Violence's factors and trajectory (relations and directions). This study has shown statistically significant differences between the test (veteran) and control (civilian) groups in the factors of Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours. The $T$-Test, $F$-Test and Cohen's $D$-Test results indicated that veterans scored significantly higher in both factors. Furthermore, the trajectory of RTV, namely the strength of the relationships among the three factors (see Figure 13), is different between veterans and civilians, particularly the relationship between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours ($p = .03$).
Hence, I reject the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians.
Charter 4: Discussion and Conclusion

4.1 General Discussion

The primary aim of this study was to examine the pathway of RTV. To which, I replicated the findings of the original 3N framework (Belanger et al., 2019) by linking Social Alienation with the propensity to accept Political Violence and, in turn, wanting to Join a Radical Group. The initial Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Social Alienation scale indeed replicated Belanger et al.'s findings. After recording, at least five of the six items fit well (enough), and the latent variable can be viewed as a one-component construct.

One interesting finding is that the data I collected does not fully support the 3N Political Violence scale construct (Belanger et al., 2019). The initial EFA has a two-component construct. Upon further review of the wording of the six items, the SMEs and I identified a two-component solution. With a new construct, three items are associated with the philosophical view on violence, whereas the other three are associated with the willingness to commit violent acts.

This finding is consistent with that of McCauley and Moskalenko's (2017) concept of the Radical Opinion and Radical Action pyramids. Also, consistent with the literature, the data highlighted the well-supported distinction, between thoughts and actions, speaks to the importance of separating beliefs (expressed as opinions) and behaviours (expressed as actions). The authors’ construct suggested that the 3N's Political Violence scale would serve as a more valid psychometric tool if Violent Beliefs were separated from Violent Behaviours.
As mentioned in the literature review, the 3N's Joining a Radical Group factor is unreliable since only two observed items measure the latent variable. More importantly, one of the items, wanting to Join a Radical Group, directly measures the proposed latent variable. Hence, the factor of Joining a Radical Group was eliminated from the SBW framework. As both supporting and joining a radical group are actions performed by a subject, it is valid to view these two items as part of the Violent Behaviors construct. An EFA on the combined eight items from 3N's Political Violence and Joining Radical Group factors yields a two-component solution. The result is in line with and provides evidence for the three-item grouping of the Violent Beliefs latent variable and the six-item grouping of the Violent Behaviors latent variable.

Therefore, to achieve better factor loading, I modified the Social Alienation scale by deleting two poorly loaded items, as they are redundant with other items in the component. A well-fitted framework (CFI = .939, TLI = .909, RMSEA = .075, SRMR = .075) with the factors of Social Alienation, Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviors emerges. A total sample Confirmatory Factor Analysis suggests that Social Alienation is predictive of radical Violence Beliefs and, in turn, is related to Violence Behaviors, which is directly measured by the subject's wanting to Join a Radical Group.

Then, in Part 1, to develop a reliable and valid (SWB) framework, I assessed that Social Alienation, Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours scales yield the appropriate psychometric properties across the three components of this study. The structure of the scales is separated through the factor analyses with acceptable loadings. The scale structure verifies the well-supported distinction between Beliefs and Behaviours (Moskalenko & McCauley 2009). Additionally, the components' internal consistency is acceptable, with Cronbach's alpha above .7 (at .79) for all scales. Furthermore, convergence validity for all items is above .3 as they are
found to be related to the associated components. Finally, the three components are uniformly associated with the criterion variables, separated by correlations ranging from .41 to .47. Thus, I conclude that the SBW framework is reliable and valid.

Next, in Part 2, with respect to the research question, I investigated whether Radicalization to Violence differs between veterans and civilians. First, veterans are associated with a significantly higher degree of Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours than civilians. Second, the current study’s findings demonstrate that when both a veteran and a civilian hold an extreme political opinion, the veteran is less likely (lower correlation) to commit violent acts ($r_{\text{veterans}} = .31$ vs $r_{\text{civilians}} = .52$, $z = -2.19$, $p = .03$). Among the many causes, it is conceivable this outcome is due to veterans’ better understanding of the consequences of violence. Hence, the correlation between Beliefs (opinions) and Behaviors (acts) is less statistically significant than among civilians. Also, the path to RTV is highly correlated for civilians compared to veterans. The correlation between Social Alienation and Political Violence in the 3N model ($r_{3N} = .53$) is almost identical to the result of the SBW model for civilians ($r_{\text{civilians}} = .52$).

Belanger et al.’s (2019) statement that the collected 3N data likely does not include subjects that have been radicalized is correct, as participants are from the general population. However, the literature indicates that although military training is not the same as being radicalized by an extremist group, soldiers can be viewed as radicalized through the military indoctrination process. The use of Canadian veterans as the test group in the current SBW study provides a suitable contra with the control group of Canadian civilians.
4.2. Implications

Sheepdogs can and do become wolves. Throughout history, soldiers have harmed unarmed civilians. Well-known recent examples include the My Lai Massacre in 1968, in which American soldiers killed hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians (Rowling, Sheets and Jones, 2015). An American domestic example is the Kent State Shooting in 1970, in which National Guardsmen killed four student protesters (Lewis and Thomas R. Hensley, 1998). Again, it is noteworthy that the soldiers' loyalty may not have been towards the state. Throughout history, there has been no shortage of military coups, in which soldiers obeyed the orders from military leadership and overthrew their national government. In such cases, the radical group creates a narrative in which the state, civilian population, and military are wolves.

A possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that a radical group was able to create a narrative in which the state, members of the population (sheep) and even the military are wolves. A radicalized soldier or veteran will see the radical group as a new ingroup of sheepdogs fighting for a "just cause." Furthermore, a veteran can commit a politically motivated violent act against his country, civilians and even other sheepdogs. This phenomenon is exemplified by Timothy McVeigh, an American veteran who became a domestic terrorist.

4.2.1. Limitations and Future Direction

While preliminary, the combination of findings of the current study supports the SBW’s conceptual framework and provides the following research pathway. First, caution must be applied with small sample size, as the current study is conducted with 150 test and 150 control samples. Although the minimum sample size for SEM reliability is met, these findings must not be overgeneralized. One cannot infer the results apply to RTV pathways and the entire Canadian
veteran population. Therefore, additional data with significantly larger sample size is
needed to exstipulate the impact on the Canadian veteran community.

Second, the empirical evidence suggests that American veterans are more
vulnerable to RTV than Canadian veterans. Therefore, future research can use a cross-
cultural approach to assess whether the SBW framework applies across cultures.

Third, future research must examine more than just whether but also why veterans
are vulnerable. The findings from the current study suggest that if both a veteran and a
civilian are willing to commit politically motivated violent acts, the veteran is only
slightly (not statistically significant) more likely to join a radical group. However, the
literature highlights how training, access to weaponry, and the willingness to commit
violence in support of a "just cause" make veterans valuable recruits for radical groups. It
is alarming but not surprising that the recruitment of veterans is of high priority to radical
groups and networks. This finding implies that even if there are no differences between
veterans and civilians in RTV, it is still critical to determine to what degree and how
veterans are being targeted for recruitment by radical groups.

Forth, the SBW framework may help us develop policies to understand, prevent,
and counter RTV. In accordance with the Public Safety Canada directive (2018), with
further development, the SBW framework can be used operationally to predict, prioritize
resources to intervene and strengthen RTV resiliency in general and veterans' resiliency
in particular.

Finally, identifying a means of increasing veterans' resistance to RTV would also
be valuable research. At first glance, radicalization can be viewed as a fight response to
stress, whereas post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, Mayo Clinic, 2018) can be
considered a flight response and radicalization is part of the stress-reaction spectrum. Therefore, I suggest treatments for stress-reaction disorder be further developed to include resiliency to radicalization. A radical policy implication is that radicalization is viewed, countered and treated as a type of stress-related mental health condition.

4.2.1.1. Construct Limitations. In my final analysis, the critical question is not whether veterans are vulnerable to RTV, as veterans are at best only marginally more vulnerable. Instead, a more insightful question is whether radical groups prioritize recruiting veterans. While my research analyzes this issue from the perspective of an academic, a war veteran, and a serving member of the Canadian Armed Forces, there would also be value in exploring the narratives and messaging pathways through which radical group organizers recruit veterans.

4.2.1.2. Future Qualitative Research. Beyond the conflict between military and civilian values, why do many veterans feel politically alienated? Although the aim of this study is not the exploration of various ideologies, a detailed examination of the alt-right and populism culture in Western military populations cannot be avoided. For example, the prevailing political culture in the U.S. military combines conservative, anti-left, and even populist ideas, with increased partisanship during one's time in the military (Tryon, 2006). How do we understand the phenomenon of anti-authority populist ideology in the military?

To fully understand populism, Hochschild (2016) set out to connect with Donald Trump supporters from Louisiana. To gain insight, Hochschild conducted quality research by directly interviewing, mixing, and socializing with forty Tea Party members. She discovered the metaphor-based narrative of the line cutters resonated with her subjects. Hochschild noticed this story served as the basis of her subjects' political beliefs and examined the Trump phenomena.
Hochschild (2016) provided the following metaphor. An individual is standing in the middle of a long line moving towards the American Dream of success. He is in the middle among others who are also white, older, Christian and predominantly male. Some people at the front of the line label him, and others like him as bigoted, uneducated, and ignorant. As a further insult, some people are coming from behind and cutting ahead of him. They are newcomers, racial minorities, and career-driven women, helped by Affirmative Action. The line supervisor, Barack Obama, is waving in the line cutters. A new supervisor, Donald Trump, is willing to stop the line cutters.

Hochschild's (2016) metaphor resonates with many, including Canadian veterans. Veterans have waited in line, completed military service, and some have gone to war. When they transition back to civilian life, many discover that they are no further ahead than when they first enlisted. Some employers view their experiences as positive. However, other employers negatively perceive the military and consider the veterans' experience as irrelevant to particular careers. At worst, some employers hold a negative bias against veterans as potential workers. In response, veterans descend on the emotional roller coaster of unemployment (Amundson & Borgen, 1982). During the current political climate, I assess that if veterans cannot regain a sense of purpose due to unemployment or under-employment, their perception of inequality, resentment, and social alienation will grow. With these considerations, a mixed-method approach with a qualitative component, similar to Hochschild's research, will likely yield the best results for future research in RTV using the SBW framework.
4.3. Conclusion

This study adds to the corpus of quantitative research on radicalization, as I developed a new theoretical framework for the pathway of Radicalization to Violence. The SBW framework differs from the 3N framework (Belanger et al., 2019) in several aspects. First, I modified the 3N survey questions from a first to a third-person perspective to encourage uncensored responses. Second, I refined the 3N construct to suggest Social Alienation is related to Violent Political Beliefs and, in turn, related to Violent Behaviors. Third, I rejected the null hypothesis of no significant difference between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians in the factors of Political Violence (Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours). This investigation shows that the relationships between these factors, particularly between Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviors, differ significantly between Canadian veterans and Canadian civilians.

Secondary from my analysis, I found that Violent Ideas, surprisingly, have only a very weak or perhaps even negative relationship with the observable variable of Joining a Radical Group. This finding supports the idea of not linking the expression of radical opinions to the propensity to commit terrorism. I strongly echo Moskalenko & McCauley's (2009) sentiment that extreme views seldom lead to violent action. They are, however, a necessary condition for a subject to commit violence in the name of radical agenda.

The evidence from this study suggests that Canadian veterans can be vulnerable to RTV, scoring slightly (not statistically significant) higher in Social Alienation and statistically significantly higher in the factors of Violent Beliefs and Violent Behaviours compared to Canadian civilians. My findings suggest that veterans have a greater acceptance of politically motivated Violent Beliefs. However, the most interesting finding was that if both a veteran and a
civilian hold extreme politically violent views, the civilian is statistically (higher correlation) more likely to take violent actions in support of that view. It is plausible that veterans better understand the consequences of violence above civilians, rendering them less likely to take action based on an extreme ideology. As Grossman (2009) explains, according to the warriors’ ethos, the sheepdog must never harm the sheep. Otherwise, the sheepdog becomes a wolf and is shunned by his ingroup of fellow sheepdogs.

Although the current study is based on a small sample, the evidence highlights that the issue of veteran RTV as an ongoing threat. In the wake of the U.S.-led coalition's hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, 775 thousand American war veterans indicated that 73% feel betrayed and 67% feel humiliated (Galston, 2021). As a Canadian veteran that has served in Afghanistan, South Sudan and Iraq, I sense most veterans share this sentiment.

In closing, the primary purpose of my study is to fill an empirical gap in the growing corpus of quantitative studies on the phenomenon of Radicalization to Violence in the veteran population. Since the literature indicates radical groups target veterans, future research must identify ways and means to increase veterans' resiliency against RTV. Finally, it is somewhat comforting that the findings of this study indicate at least in Canada, sheepdogs do not generally become wolves.
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Appendices

Appendix A

3N T-test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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## Appendix B

### SBW Descriptive

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<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maximum: 10.00</td>
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<td>Interquartile Range: 1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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Appendix C

**SBW T-Test, F-Test & Cohen’s d**

**Independent Samples Test**

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<th>df</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>df</td>
<td>Mean Difference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBW_Alienation</td>
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<td>0.039</td>
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<td>1.19</td>
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**Bootstrap for Independent Samples Test**

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* Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results were based on 2000 bootstrap samples

**Independent Samples Effect Sizes**

<table>
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<th>Hedge's g</th>
<th>Glass's delta</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.54</td>
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<td>SBW_Beliefs</td>
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<td>1.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBW_Behavior</td>
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<td>1.865</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes

Cohen’s d used the pooled standard deviation.

Hedges’ correction used the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.

Glass’s delta used the sample standard deviations of the control group.