Public Attitudes Towards Immigration in Canada: Evolution and Determinants

by

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Abstract

We use Canadian Election Studies surveys from 1988 to 2019 to investigate the evolution and determinants of attitudes towards immigration. We find that Canadians' opinions about immigration became more positive in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the proportion of Canadians supporting restriction on immigration increased in the 2010s.

We use individual level, provincial level and local level variables to understand factors that shape public attitudes towards immigration in Canada. We find that unemployed, low-income, and less-educated Canadians as well as those who believe that their financial situation or Canada's economy has deteriorated in the previous year are more strongly against immigration. Our results also point to the importance of ethnic and immigration backgrounds. We find that indigenous Canadians followed by white Canadian-borns and visible minority Canadian-borns hold more negative attitudes towards immigration. In contrast, recent immigrants who have been in Canada for less than 10 years are the most supportive of immigration regardless of their country of origin. Our results suggest however that the country of origin determines attitudes of more established immigrants. Our results also illustrate a growing political divide in attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, while the Liberal and NDP supporters are the most supportive, the Conservatives are the least supportive of immigration in Canada. Importantly, this political polarization started to emerge in 2006 and has been growing ever since. Our relative importance analysis also suggests that among different factors studied, political party identification is the most important in explaining differences among individuals in attitudes towards immigration in Canada. As for the provincial-level factors, Canadians respond negatively to increases in immigration. However, we find that an increase in unemployment rate has a weak effect on attitudes towards immigration.

We also explore the role that news media consumption may play in shaping attitudes toward immigration. We find that Canadians who spend more time watching, reading, or listening to the news express a more positive opinion towards immigration. Finally, we examine the impact of contact with visible minorities on attitudes towards immigration. Our results suggest that while direct contact in the form of friendship increases the propensity of supporting immigration among white Canadians, the proportion of visible minorities at the local level has a non-linear impact on attitudes towards immigration.

Lay summary

With around 5.2 million immigrants arriving between 2000 and 2019, Canada is one of the world's most popular immigrant destinations. In 2019, Canada admitted around 341,000 immigrants accounting for 82 percent of its total population growth. In this thesis, we examine the evolution of public attitudes towards immigration in Canada and some of its underlying factors. We find that while Canadians became more welcoming towards immigration between 1988 to 2008, this trend reversed in 2011. Furthermore, our results suggest that ethnic and immigration background as well as economic, cultural and political factors play an important role in shaping attitudes towards immigration. However, we find that political partisanship is the most important determinant of attitudes towards immigration in Canada.

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother, Effat Anoosheh. I will be forever grateful of her support during all the years of my study.

1   Introduction

The demographic of many developed countries including Canada has been transformed through immigration in recent decades. With close to 8 million immigrants, Canada has one of the largest immigrant populations in the world (United Nations 2019). Immigrants also represent a growing percentage of the country's total population. In 2000, 18 percent of the country's total population were immigrants, increasing steadily to 21 percent in 2019 (United Nations 2019). This puts Canada in fourth place among Western countries in terms of number of immigrants per person (United Nations 2019). According to data from Statistics Canada, international migration is responsible for more than 75 percent of the total population growth in Canada since 2016, reaching 85.7 percent in 2019 (Statistics Canada 2020).

Despite (or perhaps because of) Canada's long history of immigration, Canadians have often been split in their views on what constitutes an appropriate level of immigration (Akin 2017; Banting and Soroka 2020; Bilodeau, Turgeon, and Karakoç 2012) . It is well-understood that public attitudes towards immigration, like those in other domains, are an important factor in shaping political agenda and immigration policy. In addition, these public views translate into real world conditions that play an important role in immigrants' experience in their host country and their process of social and economic integration, which also has spillover effects influencing Canadian-borns in various domains.

It is therefore important to understand how public attitudes towards immigration have evolved in Canada over time, and the degree to which they have been influenced by various economic, political, and social factors that operate at different levels. In a world animated by political polarization as well as social and cultural tensions, this informs the design and the

development of policies and practices that could help improve Canada's social climate and cohesion in order to build a more tolerant and equitable society.

Shedding light on these questions becomes even more important when we consider public debates on immigration around the world. In recent years, the issue of immigration has become increasingly politicized in Western countries and political parties are holding divergent views on how to best deal with this issue (Hout and Maggio 2021; Grande, Schwarzbözl, and Fatke 2019; Baker and Edmonds 2021). In the meantime, Canada has built a reputation that parties do not compete over immigration and that Canadians hold great pride in their cultural mosaic (Taylor 2021; Black and Hicks 2008; Hawkins 1991; Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013a). However, there exists growing evidence that suggests Canada might not be so exceptional in this regard. In both 2015 and 2019 federal elections, immigration entered in the political campaigns as a wedge issue. A recent study by Akin (2017) also suggests that Canadians are not more tolerate towards immigration compared to other Western countries where anti-immigration parties have emerged.

This research uses data from the Canadian Election Studies (CES) to provide a more comprehensive look at changes in attitudes towards immigration and some of its underlying factors. To the best of our knowledge, the CES provides the largest and the most comprehensive data on Canadians' attitudes towards immigration (White et al. 2008). Our analysis relies on a question that measures participants' preferred level of immigration to examine their attitudes towards immigration. This question was included in the CES surveys starting in 1988, and has been asked every year when there was a federal election.

Previous literature in Canada indicates that public attitudes towards immigration has gone through significant changes during the last few decades. More specifically, while it was seriously

negative during the 80s, opposition towards immigration gradually decreased during the 1990s and the 2000s (Banting and Soroka 2020; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008). We add to the previous literature by updating these trends and illustrating that the proportion of Canadians who oppose immigration has significantly increased in the 2010s compared to the previous decade.

The richness of the CES data also allows us to contribute to this literature by carefully examining the role of economic, sociopsychological, and political factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration. We confirm the findings of previous studies that the attitudes of Canadians towards immigration are more negative when individuals are faced with challenging personal and social economic conditions. However, our results suggest that their subjective perception of these issues, such as Canada's economic conditions, are more important than objective measures such as unemployment rate in shaping their attitudes towards immigration. Furthermore, the societal economic concerns of immigration are more strongly associated with such negative attitudes relative to personal concerns.

There also exists evidence from other countries that suggests individuals with different ethnic backgrounds may hold different opinions about immigration (e.g. Diamond 1998; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Garza 1984; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Branton 2007). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first study to explore the degree to which ethnic backgrounds impact attitudes towards immigration in Canada. We find clear evidence that conditional on observed characteristics and relative to white Canadian-borns, visible minority and white immigrants who have been in Canada for less than 10 years hold more positive views towards immigrants. However, immigrants who have spent more time in Canada hold views that are similar to white Canadian-borns. To the extent that this is due to a socialization effect, as opposed

to unobserved systematic differences between older and more recent cohorts of immigrants, our results suggest that this socialization impact varies and depends on immigrants' country of origin. We also find that compared to white Canadian-borns, aboriginals hold more negative views towards immigrants.

We also examine whether political party identification influences Canadians' attitudes towards immigration over and above their objective conditions as well as their subjective perceptions regarding social and economic factors. In addition, and to the best of our knowledge, we are the first study to examine how this impact has changed in Canada over the last 40 years, which provides valuable insights into the evolution of the impact of political partisanship and political rhetoric on public attitudes towards immigration.[1]

We find compelling evidence that conditional on other observed characteristics, attitudes towards immigration are closely associated with political parties Canadians identify with. Moreover, the effect of party identification changes significantly during our studied time frame. More specifically, from 1988 to 2004 the supporters of Liberal, NDPs and Green exhibited diverging opinions about the preferred level of immigration. Importantly, during the same period, there were no differences between Liberals, Conservatives and Blocs. However, the 2006 election was the beginning of political polarization among the supporters of Liberals, Conservatives and Bloc with the largest divide in 2019, while attitudes of Liberals, NDPs and Greens started to converge.

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[1] Previous analyses of this issue did not explore how the impact of partisanship on attitudes towards immigration has changed in Canada over time (e.g. Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008; K. Banting and Soroka 2020; Gravelle 2018b).

We find that while having visible minority friends significantly increases the likelihood of supporting more immigration, living in a more diverse local area has a non-linear impact on attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, white Canadians who live in an area where visible minorities comprise 25 to 50 percent of the population hold more positive opinions about immigration relative to those who reside in a local area where less than 25 percent of the population are visible minorities. In contrast, white Canadians who reside in a local area with a majority visible minorities population (i.e. more than 50 percent) hold relatively more negative opinions about immigration.

Finally, we apply a variance decomposition method to explore the relative contribution of different factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration. We find that individual-level differences in political party identification contribute the most to explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration among Canadians. However, this dominant role of political party identification is a relatively more recent phenomenon since prior to 2006 education level contributed the most to explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration. One potential explanation is that immigration has become increasingly politicized in Canada during and after the Conservative incumbency.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the previous literature on attitudes towards immigration. Section 3 describes our data and variables. Section 4 discusses our findings, and Section 5 concludes. Additional details about our variables and results can be found in the appendix.

2   Literature Review

Literature on attitudes towards immigration is considerably rich. Scholars from different disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, and psychology have explored different factors that help explain opposition towards immigration and immigrants. Certainly, these examined factors are not historically constant and may vary over time and across countries depending on their immigration policies, political circumstances and immigration experience and history. Different survey designs and methodological approaches also add another layer of complexity to the study of public attitudes towards immigration. With this in mind, this literature review mainly covers quantitative studies that are central to this thesis and integrates studies of Canadians' attitudes towards immigration where possible.

We categorize the literature on attitudes towards immigration into two broad groups. We label the first group as the economic determinants and the second one as the sociopsychological factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration. It is important however to note that these two groups are often inter-related and share common mechanisms. Therefore, some of the studies reviewed fall into both groups as hypotheses they investigate inform both categories.

The first group of studies focus mainly on economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration. The economic concerns regarding immigration may function at both personal and societal level. At the personal level, the focus is on self-interest theories which suggest individuals oppose immigration because it may reduce their material well-being. More specifically, the basic idea of scholars who empirically investigate self-interest theories is that people compete with immigrants over scarce resources. Accordingly, people may fear that immigrants reduce their standard of living by reducing access to resources such as jobs or

government benefits. At the societal level, studies focus on the impact of macroeconomic conditions including unemployment rate and economic growth on attitudes towards immigration.

There are also (broader) hypotheses that emphasize the role of sociopsychological factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration. These hypothesis are often rooted in either individual or group level theories. While individual-level theories focus on beliefs and values at the individual-level, group-level theories generally examine group-level identity and mechanisms such as in-group favouritism and out-group stereotypes. Religion as well as ethnic and immigration background are among factors that are suggested to make inter-group differences more salient. In what follows, we briefly review these two categories of studies.

2.1 Economic Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigration

We divide the economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration into two groups: economic self-interest factors which operate at the personal level and macroeconomic factors which function at a more aggregate level.

2.1.1 Economic Self-Interest Models

The studies of self-interest economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration generally focus on labor market competition and the potential fiscal burden of immigration. The labor market competition theory relies on the impact of immigration on the earnings of native-borns. According to the factor proportion (FP) model, the highly empirically tested model of the theory, the influx of immigrants raises the supply of labor and consequently negatively impacts the factor price of native-borns (Borjas 1999). Building on the substitutability of labor and factor mobility assumption, the FP model explains that an increase in the number of low-skilled (high-skilled) labour due to immigration decreases the wages for low-skilled (high skilled) native-borns and increases the wages for high-skilled (low-skilled) native-borns. Despite these theoretical

predictions, economists who have empirically examined the labour market impacts of immigration have found negligible effects on wages and job opportunities in the host country (e.g. Dustmann, Glitz, and Frattini 2008; Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston 2005; Card 2005).

However, labor market competition may still impact attitudes towards immigration if native-borns perceive, despite evidence to the contrary, that they compete with immigrants in the labor market. For example, an increase in the number of low-skilled immigrants may raise the perceived threat of competition among native-borns in the labor market and consequently increase the hostility towards immigrants (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Schneider 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). In fact, there exists compelling evidence that suggests less-educated individuals exhibit more strong opposition towards immigration relative to their more-educated counterparts (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Citrin and Wong 1997).

However, there also exists growing evidence that indicates labor market competition theory and the economic threat argument cannot adequately explain differences in attitudes towards immigration by education/skill level (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In the Canadian context, Harell et al. (2012) use an experimental research design where respondents are provided with two short stories that describe an immigrant's socio-demographic status and ask them whether they would grant them work permit or citizenship. They find that both high job status and low job status Canadians do not react differently to immigrants with similar job status levels relative to immigrants whose status are not revealed.

An alternative hypothesis to the labor market competition model is that more-educated people are more supportive of immigration because they are more tolerant of racial diversity, are less ethnocentric, and are more likely to be optimistic about the positive contributions of immigrants (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Javdani 2020; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). This is consistent with Côté and Erickson (2009) who use the 2000 Canadian Election Studies and find that more-educated Canadians develop more tolerance towards visible minorities because they "educate themselves about social issues like tolerance long after their years in school are over" (1684).

Another proposed channel through which economic self-interest may impact attitudes towards immigration is the fiscal burden of immigrants. According to this line of reasoning, native-borns might perceive immigrants as a burden on the public welfare system by receiving more benefits (including public education and public health services) relative to the taxes they pay. This could be perceived as more pressure on public finance instigating either an increase in tax rates or a reduction in per capita transfers. In this case, native-borns are expected to be more supportive of higher-skilled immigrants relative to lower-skilled immigrants.

There exists, however, considerable disagreement among scholars on the fiscal effect of immigrants (Javdani 2020; Hennessey and Hagen-zanker 2020; Karreth, Singh, and Stojek 2015). Several factors including the host country context, the skill level of immigrants, and how easily immigrants can enter the labor market hinder the generalization of the impact of immigrants on public finance (Hennessey and Hagen-zanker 2020; Javdani 2020) . For example, Hennessey and Hagen-zanker (2020) who perform a meta-analysis of 72 studies that quantitively calculate the fiscal effect of immigrants conclude that "the overall net fiscal impact of immigration is minimal; this holds true in both high-, low-, and middle-income countries" (24).

Javdani and Pendakur (2014) also explore the fiscal impact of immigrants in Canada. Using the 2006 census data, they find that the fiscal transfer from Canadian-borns to immigrants is negligible and could be slightly positive or negative depending on different assumptions.

Not only is there a considerable disagreement about the fiscal burden of immigrants on the public finance, there is also relatively weak evidence suggesting that it impacts attitudes towards immigration. For example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) apply an experimental methodology to investigate the validity of the fiscal burden argument. They hypothesize that if opposition by native-borns towards immigration stems from the fiscal burden of immigrants, richer native-borns in higher fiscal exposure states in the US should be more strongly against lower-skilled immigrants than elsewhere. However, they find evidence to the contrary which suggests richer Americans in higher fiscal exposure states are more likely to support immigration than other states.

2.1.2   Societal economic concerns regarding immigration

As discussed above, the reviewed literature suggests that the economic self-interest models provide a weak explanation for opposition towards immigration. However, the economic concerns regarding immigration might operate at the societal level rather than at the individual level. More specifically, the worsening economic condition of some members of a dominant group could generate stronger opposition towards immigration among the members, which is not necessarily limited to those competing directly with immigrants. Accordingly, there are studies that suggest racial prejudice and opposition towards immigration are closely connected to a country's economic conditions (e.g. Citrin et al. 1995; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Ruist 2016; Solodoch 2020; Quillian 1995).

Examining the relative importance of societal versus personal concerns, Quillian (1995) finds that personal economic concerns measured by income level, working class status and changes in the economic situation in the past 12 months play a smaller role in shaping attitudes towards immigration among people in member countries of the European Economic Community.[2] However, his results suggest that societal economic concerns, proxied by unemployment rate, has a larger impact and can explain most of the variation across countries in attitudes towards immigration. In addition, people are also sensitive to changes in the unemployment rate within a given country. Meuleman et al. (2009) study the evolution of the attitudes towards immigration between 2002 and 2007 in 17 European countries and find that as the unemployment rate rises, demand for anti-immigration policies increases.

Despite decades of research, the association between economic concerns and Canadians' attitudes towards immigration continues to be debated among scholars. In a classic study, Tienhaara (1974) compares Canadians' opinions about immigration in two Gallup surveys of 1969 and 1971. She finds that Canadians were more strongly against immigration during the 1971 recession and the opposition was greater among unemployed individuals. Schissel, Wanner, and Fridere (1989) also confirm the finding that unemployed Canadians are more strongly against immigration but find that unemployment rate has a minor impact on Canadians' attitudes towards immigration. In a more recent study, Bilodeau, Turgeon, and Karakoç (2012) explore the changes in Canada's provincial public opinions about immigration between 1988 and 2008 using the Canadian Election Studies surveys. Their results suggest that white Canadians residing in

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[2] European Economic Community countries includes Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal and Spain.

provinces with higher unemployment rates are more likely to ask for a reduction in immigration intake.

2.2   Sociopsychological Approaches and Moderators

Sociopsychological approaches to attitudes towards immigration are more diverse than economic models. Different studies have considered several factors rooted in values and norms, culture, identity, power relations, and social structures to explain why people develop opposition towards immigration. As Fussell (2014) suggests, however, the theoretical core of many of these studies could be traced back to the seminal work of Allport's (1954) and Blumer's (1958) and their views on prejudice.

Blumer (1958) proposes a group-related approach to prejudice and argues that it is "fundamentally a matter of the relationship between racial groups" (3). According to this theory, individuals place themselves and others into two different racial groups. Belonging to a group, then, creates "a sense of social position" which becomes salient when conflicts emerge between groups (Blumer 1958). In this sense, the societal economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration could be considered as rooted in Blumer's group related theory.

Allport (1954), on the other hand, has a psychological and individual level view about prejudice and considers it as "a product of the fears of the imagination" (3) rooted in the beliefs and values of individuals. He explains that grouping others by religion, nationality, or race is a by-product of categorization which the human mind cannot easily avoid. Accordingly, the prejudice emerges because it gives an individual a sense of self-esteem and identity, that is, a person may discriminate against others to boost his/her self-worth.

In this vein, there are also moderating factors, such as framing by media or contact with "others" which could function as moderating factors in strengthening and weakening the

mechanisms discussed above. We will therefore review the potential role of such moderating factors in our review further below.

2.2.1 Ethnic and Immigration Background

Studies that explore the importance of immigration and ethnic backgrounds in shaping attitudes towards immigration mostly focus on the cultural affinity theory and social identity theory. The social identity theory is one of the most prominent theories of inter-group relations developed by Tajfel (1979). According to this theory, individuals have a fundamental need to use social categorization in order to make sense of their environment. Consequently, this process divides individuals into in-group members (us) and out-group members (them). Subsequently, this identification process can strongly affect attitudes towards the outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 2001; Tajfel 1974; 1982). In unfavorable circumstances and when identificaiton with a group becomes salient, in-group members tend to create a positive self-identity and outgroup antagonism. Tajfel and Turner (2001) explain that social identity theory requires group members not to be able to easily switch from one group to another. Therefore, the theory is strongly related to ethnic identity and to a lesser extent to identity based on religious or other beliefs that are possible to change.

One the other hand, the cultural affinity theory maintains that if individuals can relate to immigrants based on various reasons, including having an immigration background or being a member of a visible minority group, they may show a certain cultural affinity with them which could result in a more positive attitude towards immigrants and minorities (Rustenbach 2010). For example, Allport (1954) finds that ethnic groups who experience discrimination develop sympathy towards other groups that have a similar experience. Similarly, Hayes and Dowds (2006) find that individuals in culturally marginalized groups are more likely to have more positive opinions towards immigration.

The cultural affinity theory has been the most common approach to study whether attitudes towards immigration differ between visible minorities and whites in the US (Diamond 1998; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Garza 1984; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Branton 2007). It is well-documented that visible minorities are less likely to support immigration restriction than whites in the US (Diamond 1998; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Garza 1984; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Branton 2007). However, some studies criticize the simple categorization of all minorities into one group. They argue that visible minorities' level of socialization in the US is an important factor that should be taken into account when studying their attitudes (Branton 2007).

For example, Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle (1997) study Mexicans' opinions about immigration in the US and the role of socialization. Their analysis of individuals living in two counties along the US-Mexico border suggests that while Mexicans are more supportive of immigration relative to Anglos, the longer they have been in the US, the more likely they are to adopt Anglo's restrictive immigration preferences.

Although Canada is well-known for its diversity with around 7.7 million visible minorities (Census 2016), research on the relationship between ethnic backgrounds and attitudes towards immigrants remains very thin and largely focused on white Canadians or Canadian-borns as a whole (Palmer 1996; Banting 2010; Schissel, Wanner, and Frideres 1989; Gravelle 2018b; Mulder and Krahn 2005; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011). One exception is a study conducted by Berry and Kalin (1995). Using a representative sample of Canadians over 18 years old, they categorize individuals into three ethnic groups of "British", "French", and "Other" to investigate attitudes towards multiculturalism and out-groups. Their results suggest that there is no difference between the three ethnic backgrounds regarding their views on culturally and

racially different individuals. However, the British and "others" categories who reside outside Quebec express more negative opinions towards multiculturalism than the French. Due to the absence of any controls in their analysis, however, it is not clear whether these differences are driven by differences in socioeconomic characteristics such as education or income, or other factors such as those discussed above.

Few studies also consider visible minorities as a separate group to explore their voting behaviour and opinions in Canada. Blais (2005) finds that ethnic backgrounds have a significant effect on Canadians' voting behaviors. Using the Canadian Election Studies surveys from 1964 to 2004, he finds that visible minorities are 23 percentage points more likely to vote for the Liberal party than individuals with British background. In another study, Hwang (2017) categorizes Canadians into 6 ethnic groups: British, French, other Europeans, indigenous, visible minority, and mixed origins. He finds that political trust among visible minority Canadians is higher than all the other ethnicities and that indigenous people have the most negative view about Canada's political system.

These findings seem to suggests that ethnic background plays an indispensable role in attitude formation and political behaviors. We also contribute to this literature by examining the role of ethnic background on attitudes towards immigration.

2.2.2 Contact with Other Groups

Contact theory is one of the most empirically tested theories in attitudes towards immigration. The theory which was introduced by Allport (1954) states that optimal contacts between groups can reduce inter-group prejudice. It is, however, important to distinguish between different forms of contact. According to Allport (1954), simple contact with the out-group is not necessarily effective as it must meet certain conditions to change attitudes towards

the out-group. He states that "prejudice […] may be reduced by equal-status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals" (Allport 1958, 281). Similarly, Amir (1969) suggests that it is direct intimate contact rather than casual contact that has the potential to reduce prejudice. This is because it "typically involves cooperation and common goals as well as repeated equal-status contact over an extended period and across varied settings" (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 757).

In a meta-analysis of 515 articles that empirically explore contact theory, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) find that any sort of contact with an out-group can reduce intergroup prejudice, though contact under Allport's conditions has a stronger impact. Several other studies also empirically test the impact of direct contact and find that it is the most positive way to reduce prejudice (Ha 2010; McLaren 2003; Pettigrew 1998; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Kehrberg 2007).

In the Canadian context, however, research that explores the impact of direct contact with an out-group on reducing prejudice is limited. One exception is the study conducted by Gravelle (2018a). Using the 2011 and 2015 Canadian Election Studies, he finds that white Canadian-borns who have Muslim friends exhibit more positive feelings towards Muslims. However, the determinants of opposition towards immigrants and Muslims could be different. For Muslims, the security threat is perhaps the dominant perception in shaping attitudes while economic and cultural considerations are more important factors in opinion formation about immigrants (Hellwig and Sinno 2017). Accordingly, direct contact with an out-group may operate differently for immigrants compared to Muslims.

Given the importance of direct contact with the out-group, one of the factors that could influence attitudes towards immigrants is the relative number of immigrants in one's community or at work. However, the proportion of immigrants to native-borns may impose two opposing

forces on attitudes towards an out-group. On the one hand, a higher number of immigrants in a community would increase the likelihood of making direct contact with immigrants. This contact, if evaluated positively, will result in positive changes in attitudes. On the other hand, according to the group threat theory, higher exposure to an out-group may trigger both cultural and economic threats (Blalock 1967; D. Campbell 1965; Sherif and Sherif 1953; Quillian 1995). From the economic perspective, the theory (also known as realistic group threat theory) posits that the perceived economic competition between natives and immigrants over scarce resources is greater in communities with a higher proportion of immigrants to native-borns (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). From the cultural perspective, the perceived threat comes from the perception that a subordinate group might take over or transform the dominant values, collective identities, norms, and privileges (Quillian 1995; Esses et al. 2005; Sherif and Sherif 1953)

Importantly, while the economic threat of immigration could be perceived by both dominant and subordinate groups as they all compete for scarce resources, the cultural threat is more related to the dominant group. Accordingly, the cultural threat may be higher in communities where there is a greater cultural distance between the dominant group and subordinates (Hjerm 2007). In this case, the dominant group could fear that values imported by immigrants become more prevalent than their own traditional values. Therefore, having contact with visible minorities, not necessarily in the form of face-to-face interactions, might trigger the opposition towards immigration. For example, Enos (2014) finds that being in the close proximity of Spanish speaking Mexicans increases the propensity of being against immigration. In an innovative research design, he assigns Spanish-speaking confederates into specific commuter train platforms in homogenous Anglo communities in Boston for two weeks. He finds that Anglo-whites who were in those train platforms developed more negative attitudes towards immigration than individuals in the matched trains in the control group.

The influence of the relative size of visible minorities on inter-group prejudice has been mostly studied in the US and Europe (Hjerm 2007; Weber 2015; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Ha 2010; Rustenbach 2010; Kaufmann and Harris 2015; van Heerden and Ruedin 2019). In Canada, we are only aware of one study that examines the relative size of minorities on public attitudes. Bilodeau, Turgeon, and Karakoç (2012) use the number of visible minorities at the provincial level in their model and find no evidence that it influences attitudes towards minorities.

However, other studies suggest that the association between the relative size of minorities and public attitudes depends on the level of measurement (national, provincial, or local) (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017). At the national and provincial levels, it is conditional on the public discourse around minorities and immigrants which is shaped by several factors including the media, politicians, and election campaigns (Hopkins 2010). At a more local level, however, the relative number of visible minorities measures the chance of having personal contact in daily routines such as at work, in supermarkets, or clubs (Weber 2015). Accordingly, the mechanism that links the percentage of minorities in provincial and local levels to attitudes towards immigration may operate differently. Generally, studies that measure diversity at the local level are more likely to find a positive impact (Eric Oliver and Wong 2003; Putnam 2007; Weber 2015), though studies that use higher levels are more likely to find the opposite (Kaufmann and Harris 2015; van Heerden and Ruedin 2019; Weber 2015).

Another important factor that could explain why the association between public attitudes and relative size of immigrants/minorities could depend on the level of measurement is residential self-selection or sorting. More specifically, individuals who live in communities with different levels of diversity might possess systematically different views and characteristics that are not necessarily shaped by their contact with minorities/immigrants in their current

community. In other words, more diverse neighborhoods might attract (deter) individuals who hold positive (negative) views about minorities/immigrants.

Therefore, the positive effect of the proportion of visible minorities on public attitudes may not be due to the contact theory, but rather due to this self-selection mechanism. Kaufmann and Harris (2015) who examine the importance of self-selection hypothesis find weak evidence to support it. They conclude that contact with minorities might be the explanation for the positive feeling towards immigration in a more diverse area.

However, there is also growing evidence suggesting that indirect casual contact measured by the percentage of visible minorities in the local level does not necessarily make native-borns supportive of immigration. For example, Bowyer (2008) finds that support for the extreme right wing party of British National Party in England increases in districts with larger ethnic diversity. Similar to this study and in the case of French Canadians living in Quebec, Loewen, Heroux-Legault and Miguel (2015) find that the association between voter's policy positions on nationalism and voting for the Bloc Quebecois increases in electoral districts with more English speakers (which they proxy for ethno-cultural threat).

Our study contributes to this literature by examining the impact of contact with visible minorities on attitudes towards immigration through two mechanisms: direct contact in the form of self-reported friendship and casual indirect contact, which is measured using the proportion of minorities in a local area. We expect that direct intimate contact in the form of friendship would reduce the opposition towards immigration. Regarding casual indirect contact, due to considerable variation in the share of visible minorities in different local areas in Canada, we empirically explore the possibility of a non-linear relationship with attitudes towards

immigration. This enables us to test the two opposing theories of contact and group threat theories.

2.2.3   Political Affiliation and The Role of Media

It is also well-documented that attitudes towards immigration can be shaped by political factors such as party identification (Hopkins 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Banting and Soroka 2020). According to Campbell et al. (1960), party identification could be thought of as a sort of psychological attachment that individuals build with parties. These parties, then, function as "suppliers of cues" for "common citizens" to evaluate elements of politics (Campbell et al. 1960, 121). According to this view, even though the mass public faces an enormous amount of information regarding different complex social issues to evaluate, they can still form fairly strong (simplistic) views about complex policies including immigration.   This is because party identification serves as "an information-economizing device, or a heuristic" that simplifies the process of evaluating information (Clarke et al. 2009, 42). Concerning the issue of immigration, individuals apply heuristics, provided by parties and political leaders, as informational shortcuts to shape their attitudes towards immigration.

Partisan cues related to in-group and out-group rhetoric have been prominent in recent years in Canada, especially after the Conservative party's incumbency (2006-2015). Before 2006, parties centered around the liberal immigration discursive orientation which emphasized "incorporation and promotion" of diversity (Frederking 2012, 284). The discourse, which began after the implementation of the policy of Multiculturalism Act in 1971, promoted multiculturalism as a defining Canadian national identity and encouraged immigrants to incorporate into the Canadian society (Bloemraad 2006). However, the policies of the Harper government gradually diverged from the dominant Liberal multicultural and cosmopolitanism frames into a more economic, threat-based depiction of immigration (Fiřtová 2021). Examples

of those policies include situating immigrants as second-class Canadians in Bill C-24 that made citizenship "harder to get and easier to lose," reforming the refugee policies to identify "bogus" claimants, introducing the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices act that promoted the expectation that female Muslim immigrants must abandon their "barbaric" and "backward" practice of niqab-wearing to embrace a more progressive Canadian one. (Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013; Fiřtová 2021; Gaucher 2020; Abu-Laban 2020)

In the 2015 election, Harper lost against Trudeau who campaigned in favor of multiculturalism and inclusion (Gaucher 2020). The Liberal government of Trudeau, then, started to promote the traditional liberal narrative of multiculturalism (Gaucher 2020; Abu-Laban 2020). One of the examples that highlights this was Trudeau's tweet in response to Trump's tough stance on Syrian refugees in 2017: "To those fleeing persecution, terror and war, Canadians will welcome you….#WelcometoCanada". The tweet was hugely criticized by the new Conservative leader, Andrew Scheer, who decided to continue Harper's stance on immigration (Gaucher 2020).

The reviewed literature of partisan cues suggests that in Canada Liberals and Conservatives have taken two different paths from 2006 to articulate immigration. The Liberal party has continued its diversity frame, while the Conservatives have decided to promote inclusion/exclusion frames for immigration. These changes invite a systematic analysis of the association between political partisanship and Canadians' attitudes towards immigration as well as its pattern of change over time. As Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) conclude in their review of the literature, "research on immigration attitudes to date has been surprisingly divorced from research on political partisanship and ideology." They ask researchers to analyze the impact of partisanship across time to uncover how political parties mobilize their supporters.

Parties, however, are not the only institutions with the significant ability to shape certain narratives regarding immigration. Indeed, news media also plays a critical role in building and transforming public discourse around immigrants (Héricourt and Spielvogel 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Correa, and Valenzuela 2012; Coninck et al. 2019; Hong and Sullivan 2013; Atwell Seate and Mastro 2016). News outlets can produce and circulate narratives that characterize immigration as a threat to the well-being and security of our society, which ultimately boosts prejudiced opinions (Héricourt and Spielvogel 2014; Atwell Seate and Mastro 2016). News media is also the only form of interaction that some native-borns build with immigrants. Therefore, if the representation of immigrants through media is positive, it can also contribute positively to opinion formation and the reduction of racial prejudice (Coninck et al. 2019).

Accordingly, the association between news media consumption and attitudes towards immigration depends considerably on the articulation of immigrants by media outlets. To the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that have examined the impact of news consumption on attitudes towards immigration in Canada. However, there exist few studies that focus on the representation of immigrants in Canadian news media. Lawlor (2015) investigates the frequency and the tone of discussions around immigration in Canadian newspapers from 1993 to 2013. Her findings suggest that "Canadian papers appear to be largely event-driven; peaks of interest are reasonably short-lived, with framing dropping off considerably shortly after." While the general frame of immigrants is around the rhetoric of multiculturalism and diversity, the event-oriented content is also apparent when it comes to the tone of media coverage. For example, during the events such as the arrival of 492 Tamils asylum seeker refugees by boats in August 2010, representing immigrants and refugees as illegal increased in media (Lawlor 2015).

3 Data and Sample Characteristics

Our sample is drawn from ten surveys of the Canadian Election Studies (CES) spanning more than three decades (1988 to 2019) to analyze public attitudes towards immigration in Canada.[3] The CES is a randomly administered (mostly over the phone) national survey of eligible Canadian voters which has been primarily conducted during and/or after federal elections. It gathers data on Canadians' voting behavior as well as their attitudes on a wide variety of social, economic, and political issues. As Kanji, Bilodeau and Scotto (2012) suggest, "the CES are considered by many to constitute a major research endeavor in Canadian political science" (11).

In every given year, the CES generally has two waves of surveys. The first wave is a Campaign-Period Survey (CPS) which is conducted during election campaigns. The CPS is representative of Canadian adult citizens (18 years of age or older) who live in one of the ten Canadian provinces (thus excluding the territories), speak either English or French, and reside in private homes. The second wave, a Post-Election Survey (PES), is administered immediately after the federal elections. Depending on the survey year, some respondents who participated in the CPS are re-interviewed in the PES as well. In this study, we use both CPS and PES surveys to study Canadians attitudes towards immigration. See Table A1 in the Appendix for more details.

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[3]Although CES launched in 1965, questions about attitudes towards immigration appeared in the CES starting in 1988. Therefore, we use 1988 ,1993,1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019 surveys. Among these surveys, the 1993, 2006, 2008 and 2011 surveys have two components: a newly added randomly selected component which adds new randomly selected individuals to the survey in each of these years, and a panel component that follows individuals over time. The panel component for the 1993 survey includes those individuals who participated in the CES' 1992 Charlottetown Accord Referendum survey and the panel components of 2006, 2008, and 2011 surveys consist of respondents who participated in the CES's 2004 election survey. To avoid any potential sample selection bias due to non-random attrition over time, we exclude the panel components and only use the newly added randomly selected respondents for these survey years.

Our dependent variable that measures public attitudes towards immigration is based on a question that asks whether respondents think Canada should admit "more immigrants", "about the same immigrants", or "fewer immigrants".[4] We restrict our sample to those respondents who state their opinion about the level of immigration. This restriction drops 6.5 percent of respondents and reduces the total sample size to 68,994 (see Table A1 in the Appendix for more details). [5]

The CES is a considerably rich data set that allows us to use various explanatory variables from different domains in our analysis. We use four variables to examine the relationship between economic conditions and attitudes towards immigration. The first variable measures participants' reported employment status and includes 5 categories of unemployed, employed, student, retired/disabled, and homemaker.[6] The second and third variables are based on questions that ask respondents about their subjective satisfaction with their own personal financial situation as well as Canada's economic situation during the previous year.[7] The CES also asks respondents about their before-tax household income in the previous year. We use answers to this question to

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[4] In 1988 and 1993, the question is "Some people think that the government of Canada should tighten up its immigration policy. Others think that Canada should welcome even more immigrants. How about you? Should Canada admit MORE immigrants or FEWER immigrants than at present?" Starting in 1997, the CES changed the wording of the question and asked "Do you think Canada should admit more immigrants, fewer immigrants or about the same as now?"

[5] To examine the extent to which the excluded individuals (i.e., those who did not indicate their preferred level of immigration) are systemically different from those who remain in our sample, we create an indicator that is equal to one if an individual is excluded from our final sample and zero otherwise. We use this indicator as a dependent variable in a regression with different observed characteristics in our Model 2 in Table 2 as regressors. The OLS results (reported in Table A2 in the Appendix) suggest that those who are unemployed, female, less-educated, low-income, and believe that Canada's economic situation or their personal financial situation got worse during the previous year are more likely not to report their preferred level of immigration and to get excluded from our sample. As reported in Table 2 and discussed later, these characteristics are also associated with more negative attitudes towards immigration. This suggests that our findings regarding negative attitudes towards immigration could be even more pronounced were we able to keep these individuals in our sample.

[6] See Table A3 in the Appendix for the exact wording of the questions and categories in every survey.

[7] The questions are: "Would you say that over the past year the economy of the country has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse" and "Would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?" Answers to these two questions fall into one of the following three categories: got worse, about the same, and got better.

categorize respondents into two categories of high-income and low-income. More specifically, those respondents whose reported household income is less than the median survey income in a given survey fall into the "low income" category, and those whose household income is more than the median survey income are categorized as "high income" (see Table A4 in the Appendix for more details).

Extensive research suggests that ethnic background, immigration status, and re-socialization in the host country are important factors in influencing public attitudes towards immigration (e.g. Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2005; Diamond 1998; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Garza 1984; Branton 2007) Therefore, it is important to distinguish between whites/visible minorities and immigrants/Canadian-borns to capture potential differences that might emerge between these different groups in their attitudes towards immigration. Statistics Canada defines visible minorities as "persons, other than Aboriginal people, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour" (Statistics Canada 2015). Following this definition, we define visible minorities as individuals who report Africa, Asia, or Latin/South America as (one of) their ethnic background(s). Combining the visible minority/indigenous status with immigration status and the length of time spent in Canada as an immigrant (less/more than ten years) results in the following 7 ethnic-immigrant categories: visible minority Canadian-born, white Canadian-born, recent white immigrant, more established white immigrant, recent visible minority immigrant, earlier visible minority immigrant, and indigenous.[8]

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[8] In 1997,1993 and1988 the two questions that measure ethnicity are: "To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestors belong on first coming to this continent?" and "To what ethnic or cultural group do you belong?" (if respondents were born in Canada). After 2000, the questions are: "To what ethnic or cultural group do you belong?" and "In addition to being Canadian to what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestors belong on first coming to this continent?"
It is important to note that ethnic minorities are under-represented in the CES. This is mainly because the interviews are conducted in English and French. Therefore, the sampling excludes those respondents who do not speak in either

We also use participants' self-reported party identification to examine the impact of political affiliation on attitudes towards immigration.[9] Accordingly, the party identification variable includes the following 7 categories: Liberal, Conservative, NDP, Green, Bloc Quebecois, other parties, and independent. The independent category includes those who do not identify themselves with any party, including other parties (see Table A5 in the Appendix for more details).

In terms of observed demographic characteristics, we include the following 7 variables in our analysis: marital status (5 categories), education level (2 categories), religion (5 categories), age (6 categories), province of residence (10 categories), gender (2 categories), language (4 categories).[10] Our analysis also includes two variables that measure immigration intake and unemployment rate in the respondents' reported province of residence in different survey years.[11]

In the second part of our analysis, we focus on the impacts of news media consumption as well as contact with visible minorities in shaping attitudes towards immigration. We measure news consumption using a question that asks respondents about the amount of time spent every day watching, listening, and reading news. We use answers to this question to construct a variable that consists of 4 categories: "none", "less than 1 hour", "between 1 to 2 hour", and "more than 2 hours".[12] We should note that this question was included in the CES starting in 2011.

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of these two languages. Furthermore, a significant number of respondents in the surveys select "Canadian" or "other" as their ethnic background. In these cases, we use a question which asks about respondents' first language to identify ethnic minorities.

[9] This question was asked in both the CPS and the PES surveys. To remain consistent in identifying respondent's political identification, we used their responses in the CPS even in years where we use the PES sample.

[10] Language includes 4 categories of "English", "French", "Other", "Combination". The question that measures the language of respondents is either "What is the first language you learned and still understand?" or "Which language(s) did you learn as a child and still understand today?" In the 2019 survey, respondents could choose more than one language. Therefore, the "combination" category is for respondents who learned more than one language.

[11] The immigration intake measures the number of new immigrants for every one thousand population. We use unemployment rate and immigration intake measured by Statistic Canada in the year preceding the survey year.

[12] See Table A6 in the Appendix for more details.

Therefore, our analysis of the impact of news consumption on attitudes towards immigration relies on 2011, 2015 and 2019 surveys. We also examine how news consumption interacts with the level of political interest in shaping attitudes towards immigrants using a variable that measures the extent to which a respondent is interested in politics. Therefore, political interest is a categorical variable containing two categories of "not interested" and "interested".[13]

To examine the potential effect that contact with visible minorities has on white Canadians in shaping their attitudes towards immigration, we construct two variables that measure the effects of direct and indirect contacts. Our measure of direct contact relies on two successive questions in the 2019 survey that ask how many close friends a respondent has, and how many of them have visibly different ethnic backgrounds.[14] Accordingly, the variable has 5 categories of "no friends", "no minority friends", "1 minority friend", "2 to 5 minority friends" and "more than 5 minority friends". The second variable that measures indirect contact is based on the percentage of visible minorities residents in the respondent electoral district.[15] To account for the effect of rural/urban settings that could be correlated with the ethnic composition of electoral

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[13] The question is "How interested are you in politics generally?" Respondents should use a scale of 0 to 10, where zero means no interest in politics and 10 a great deal of interest, to express their interest in politics. Respondents whose scale is between 0 to 4 are categorized as "not interested" and 5 to 10 as "interested"

[14] The two questions are: "Thinking about people who are NOT family members or relatives, how many close friends do you have?" and "How many of your close friends belong to a visibly different ethnicity than you?". Importantly, we restrict our sample in this part to white Canadians since it is less clear what the responses to these questions measure when asked from visible minorities or indigenous Canadians. For example, it is possible that individuals with Middle Eastern background find both white Canadians as well as East Asians as ethnically different. For white Canadians, however, it is more likely that those identified as ethnically different are those who hold visible minority status.

[15] We use the 2016 Canadian Census to find the number of visible minorities in electoral districts. Overall, there were 338 federal electoral districts in the 2019 election. According to the 2016 Census of Canada, electoral districts had a population ranging from 27,000 to 160,000.

districts and also affect attitudes towards immigration, we also use a variable that includes three categories of "rural", "town" and "city".[16]

Table 1 reports summary statistics for our sample. Overall, 39.4 percent of Canadians in our sample believe that Canada should admit fewer immigrants, 17.4 percent support an increase in immigration intake, and 43 percent support the status quo. Around 70.3 percent of participants in our sample have post secondary education, 45.2 percent are female, and 60 percent report as being employed. Regarding the province of residence, most respondents live in Ontario (33.8 percent), followed by Quebec (22.4 percent), British Columbia (12.5 percent), and Alberta (10.3 percent). Catholics are the largest religious group in our sample (33.3 percent) followed by non-Catholic Christians (27.9 percent) and Atheists (26.8 percent). In term of ethnic-immigration background, 71.5 percent of our sample are white Canadians-born, 4.2 percent are visible minority Canadian-born, 6.9 percent are white immigrant, 4.6 percent are visible minority immigrant, and 3.52 are indigenous.[17] Most Canadians in our sample identifies with the Liberal or Conservative parties (30.5 percent and 24.8 percent, respectively), followed by NDP (12.2 percent).

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[16] We assign" rural" category to respondents who live in a rural area with less than 1000 people, "town" category to respondents who live in a town with 1000 to 50k population and "city" to respondents who live a city with more than 50k population.

[17] The missing category contains respondents who did not answer to at least one of the three questions of ethnic background, immigration background and the year they immigrated to Canada.

4   Findings

We first explore how public attitudes toward immigration have changed in Canada between 1988 and 2019. Next, we examine how different factors may explain public attitudes towards immigration and changes over time.

4.1   Evolution of Attitudes Towards Immigration and Potential Contributors

Figure 1 displays the percentage of Canadians who report different attitudes towards immigration between 1988 and 2019. Overall, our results suggest that between 1993 and 2008 Canadians' attitudes towards immigration became relatively less negative as the percentage of Canadians who favoured fewer immigrants consistently declined from 67% in 1993 to 26% in 2008. It should be noted, however, that this sharp decline is almost entirely due to increase in the percentage of Canadians who took a more neutral position regarding immigration as the percentage of those supporting the status quo (i.e., about the same number of immigrants) increased from 17% in 1993 to 59% in 2008. During the same time period, the percentage of those supporting more immigrants stayed relatively stable (and low) at around 16-17 percent.

This significant decline in anti-immigration sentiments came to a halt, however, in 2008, and abruptly shifted to a steady increase in the proportion of Canadians favouring fewer immigrants. More specifically, Canadians became increasingly less comfortable with the status quo as their share in this category (i.e. the same number of immigrants) dwindled from 59% in 2008 to 42% in 2019. During the same time period, the share of Canadians who supported a reduction in the number of immigrants substantially increased from 26% to 40%. In 2015, the percentage of Canadians who favoured the same number of immigrants almost fell back to its 1997 level of 43%. It is also important to highlight that throughout our examined time period,

there were less significant changes in the share of Canadians who favoured more immigrants. This group remained a minority throughout as its share stayed relatively more stable compared to the other two groups, specially between 1993 and 2011 during which it hovered around 15%.

In terms of explaining the positive shift in attitudes towards immigration between 1988 to 2008, several studies focus on changes in immigration policies in the early 1990s. Importantly, these changes seem to be rooted in the introduction of a race neutral points system in 1967. This system numerically measured the abilities of economic immigrants by giving points to their characteristics, including age, education, expertise, and English or French proficiency levels (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992; Triadafilopoulos 2013; Knowles 2016) . After the implementation of the point system, a consensus seems to have emerged among political parties on the size of immigration and general values of immigrants.

However, the entrance of a right-wing populist party, the Reform Party, and the strong support it received in the 1993 election broke down the consensus among elites (Abu-laban 1998; Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013). The Reform Party openly criticized the number of immigrants coming to Canada and, specifically demanded a reduction in the percentage of the family reunion class and more focus on the economic class of immigrants (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002). Consequently, the party put the Liberal government of Chrétien under pressure to retreat from its balanced position and shifted the Liberal party's approach towards supporting economic immigrants (Li 2002).[18]

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[18] The Liberal party of Canada was the ruling party during the two periods of 1993 to 2006 and 2015 to 2019. Between 1988 and 1993, the Progressive Conservative party and from 2006 to 2015 the Conservative party were in power.

The shift in the immigration policies of the Liberal party during the 1990s is noticeable in Figure 2. The right vertical axis measures annual immigration intake numbers by different immigration classes (i.e., economic, family and refugee classes) between 1980 and 2019. In general, it reveals that Canada began reducing the size of family reunification class in 1992 and continued to increase the number of economic immigrants. More specifically, between 1980 to 1993, Canada on average admitted 62,209 immigrants under the family class and 64,598 immigrants under the economic class. After 1993, however, the economic class started to dominate such that it reached 196,658 immigrants in 2019.

This comparison between the evolution of Canadians' attitudes towards immigration and changes in the number of immigrants admitted to Canada under different classes points to the potential role changes in immigration policy might have played in the positive shift in attitudes towards immigration between 1993 and 2008. Indeed, the reforms were not limited to added focus on the number of economic immigrants as Canada also started to promote immigration as a form of economic stimulus (Abu-laband and Gabriel 2002). In 1994, there was a significant debate around the incorporation of the economic model of "human capital" into Canada's points system (Abu-laband and Gabriel 2002). The model suggests that putting more weight on the immigrants' levels of human capital (such as education and language proficiency) brings skills to the country and contributes to its economy in both short-term and long-term (Picot, Hou, and Qiu 2016).

Changes in the composition of immigrants by different classes however does not seem to be able to explain the sudden negative turn in attitudes towards immigration after 2008. More specifically, as Figure 2 suggests, there are no noticeable changes in the number of immigrants admitted under different classes that would coincide with this negative turn in attitudes towards

immigration around 2008. As Figure 3 suggests, changes in the overall share of immigrants in the population also fails to explain the post-2008 negative shift in attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, the share of immigrants in the total population rose much faster (by more than 23 percent) during the period of 1990 to 2008 when attitudes towards immigration were getting relatively more positive. In contrast, this increase was much smaller (around 9 percent) during the post-2008 period which marks the sudden increase in negative attitudes towards immigration.

Another factor that could explain these changes in attitudes towards immigration in Canada is changes in the ethnic composition of immigrants entering Canada. Figure 4 compares changes in attitudes towards immigration with changes in the share of visible minority Canadians in the total population. There are however no noticeable changes in the consistent pattern of increase in the share of visible minorities Canadians that could explain the negative shift in attitudes towards immigration after 2008. More specifically, the share visible minority Canadians in the total population increased by 157 percent from 1991 to 2006 (the period during which attitudes towards immigration became relatively more positive), and by 38 percent from 2006 to 2015 (the period during which attitudes towards immigration became relatively more negative).

Another potential contributing factor to changes in attitudes towards immigration focuses on Canada's contextual economic environment. Some studies suggest that anti-immigration sentiments among people rise during deteriorating economic circumstances as native-borns compete with immigrants for a shrinking share of the pie (Citrin et al. 1995; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Ruist 2016; Solodoch 2020; Quillian 1995). One of the key variables that captures a country's economic conditions is unemployment rate. Figure 5 shows unemployment rate for Canadians aged 15 years or older between 1980 to 2019. Overall, the figure suggests that the positive shifts in attitudes towards immigration between 1993 and 2008 tracks quite closely

the decline in the unemployment rate over the same time period. In 1993, Canada was suffering from early 1990s recession and had a high unemployment rate of 11.4%. However, the unemployment rate gradually declined to 6.2% in 2008. As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, the unemployment rate increased to 8.1% in 2010 which coincided with an increase in the percentage of Canadians asking for fewer immigrants in 2011.

In sum, the overall trends seem to indicate a close association between relatively positive shifts in Canadians' attitudes towards immigration between 1988 and 2006 and a steady decline in the unemployment rate along with a steady increase in the size of the economic immigration class. Unfortunately, provincial data for the number of immigrants by immigration class and the percentage of immigrants or visible minorities are not publicly available. Therefore, we can only explore in our analysis if province-level attitudes towards immigration are sensitive to changes in the total number of immigrants admitted and unemployment rate. In the next section, we take a more systematic approach to examine potential factors that affect attitudes towards immigration in Canada.

4.2   Regression Results

Given the ordered nature of our dependent variable, we use the ordered logit model for our estimation.[19] We code our dependent variable as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same", and 3 "more immigrants". Table 2 reports regression results from these models to examine the effect of different factors on attitudes toward immigration in Canada.[20] We report two models in

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[19] We also estimated Multinominal logit models for robustness check. Results from these models are very similar to findings reported and discussed here.

[20] It is common in empirical work to report standard errors that are adjusted for clustering of units. In a study like ours, this is usually done at the provincial level. The important work of Abadie et al. (2017) however sheds new light on the use of clustering in estimating standard errors. They argue that not enough attention is usually paid to when these adjustments are appropriate and at what level, which could lead to overly conservative estimated standard errors. They show that, contrary to common wisdom, correlation between residuals within clusters or between regressors within clusters are neither necessary, nor sufficient, to justify clustering. They argue that when dealing

the table. Model 1 examines the association between individual socio-demographic characteristics as well as provincial level variables and attitudes toward immigration. Model 2 also adds political party identification to explore any additional impact it might have on attitudes towards immigration. It also allows us to examine whether controlling for individual's party identification influences the estimated effect of other factors.

For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from our ordered logit model. In the second column, we report the calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring "fewer immigrants." The third column is similar to the second column, but reports the results for the probability of favouring "more immigrants." Moreover, for each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category (omitted category). The remaining rows, however, report the difference in the predicted probability for each given category relative to the reference category.[21]

Our results in Model 1 highlight the importance of economic factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration in Canada. We find that conditional on other variables and relative to low-income Canadians, high-income Canadians are on average 4.2 percentage points less likely to

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with data such as the CES in our study, then clustering becomes a sampling design issue "when the sampling follows a two stage process, where in the first stage, a subset of clusters is sampled randomly from a population of clusters, and in the second stage, units are sampled randomly from the sampled clusters." Accordingly, they suggest that "the researcher should assess whether the sampling process is clustered or not" and if the answer is no, "one should *not* adjust the standard errors for clustering, irrespective of whether such an adjustment would change the standard errors." Following their suggestion and given that our data does not follow such a clustered sampling process and all clusters (provinces) in the population of interest are represented in our sample, we do not adjust for clustering when reporting our standard errors. We should note also that almost all our estimates remain unchanged in terms of statistical significance when clustering standard errors by province.

[21] For most of our explanatory variables, we only report pooled regression results from all survey years because we do not find any systematic trends in the direction or magnitude of our estimated coefficient in different survey years. See Table A7 and Table A8 in the Appendix for the regression results by survey year.

support a reduction in immigration and 2.5 percentage points more likely to support an increase in immigration. As expected, subjective views about Canada's economic condition as well as personal financial situation also significantly impact attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, Individuals who believe their financial situation got worse in the previous year are on average 10.9 percentage points more likely (6.4 percentage points less likely) to favour fewer (more) immigrants compared to observationally-equivalent Canadians who believed their financial situation got better.

Similarly, Canadians who believe Canada's economic situation got worse are on average 8.5 percentage points more likely (6.3 percentage points less likely) to support fewer (more) immigrants compared to observationally-equivalent Canadians who believed the country's economic situation got better. We also find a relationship, although relatively weaker, between employment status and attitudes towards immigration when we control for other factors. Our results suggest that unemployed Canadians are on average 1.7 percentage points more likely (1 percentage point less likely) to support fewer (more) immigrants compared to their employed counterparts. Homemakers and those who do not report their employment status are also 2.5 and 4.3 percentage points more likely to support fewer immigrants relative to employed Canadians. As our results from Model 2 suggest, controlling for political party identification does not change the results discussed above.

Examining the association between identification with different religions and attitudes toward immigration also reveals interesting patterns. More specifically, compared to their Catholic counterparts and conditional on our wide set of observed characteristics, Canadians who self-identify as Muslim and Jewish are on average 19.7 and 10 percentage points less likely (16.7 and 6.9 percentage points more likely) to support fewer (more) immigrants, respectively.

Similarly, Atheists or Agnostics are on average 7.2 percentage points less likely (4.7 percentage points more likely) to favour fewer (more) immigrants. On the contrary, non-Catholic Christians are only slightly more likely (1.5 percentage points) to support fewer immigrants. Interestingly, as results from Model 2 suggest, the difference between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians disappears when we control for political party identification. However, the estimated gaps remain largely unchanged for Muslims, Jews, and Atheists/Agnostics.

Our results also point to regional cleavages in attitudes towards immigration in Canada. More specifically, views about immigration are the most positive in Nova Scotia and the most negative in Alberta and Ontario. On average, 44.5% of individuals who reside in Alberta favour fewer immigrants, and only 14.6% support more immigrants. For Nova Scotia, these numbers are 29.2% and 25%, respectively. It is important to note that these regional differences persist after taking into account systematic differences in socioeconomic characteristics across individuals who live in different provinces, as well as inter-provincial differences in unemployment rate and immigration intake. These differences remain qualitatively similar even after controlling for differences in individuals' political party identification across provinces.[22] One potential implication is that regional differences in attitudes towards immigration are rooted in other regional factors such as composition of immigrants, and their own accumulated historical experience rooted in "differences in colonial background, ethnic sources of population and settlement patterns" (Simeon and Elkins 1974, 433).

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[22] After controlling for political party identification, Ontario moves from the second place to the first place and replaces Alberta as the least supportive province for immigration. Nova Scotia however remains the most supportive of immigration.

Another set of results worth highlighting is the impact of provincial-level variables on attitudes towards immigration in Canada. Our results in Table 2 suggest that Canadians' attitudes towards immigration are sensitive to both province-level unemployment rate as well as immigration intake. On average, adding one more immigrant to every one-thousand residents in a given province increases the probability of supporting fewer immigrants by 2.1 percentage points and decreases the probability of supporting more immigrants by 1.3 percentage point. This is consistent with Bilodeau et al. (2012) who also study changes in attitudes towards immigration in Canada between 1988 and 2008. They use the cumulative size of immigration intake in the past 15 years and find that past immigration significantly impacts the proportion of people demanding restriction on immigration. Consistent with Bilodeau et al. (2012), we also find that on average 1 percentage point increase in unemployment rate at the provincial level increases the probability of supporting fewer immigrants by 0.5 percentage point.

Our findings regarding the effect of education and gender on attitudes towards immigration are consistent with findings from previous studies (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Citrin et al. 1997). We find that those with post-secondary education are significantly more supportive of immigration. More specifically, having post-secondary education on average decreases the probability of supporting fewer immigrants by 14.6 percentage points and increases the probability of supporting more immigrants by 8 percentage points. As for gender, women have more negative attitudes towards immigration and are on average 3.5 percentage points more likely to support fewer immigrants compared to their male counterparts. Palmer (1996) who also finds similar results for women in Canada suggests that this gender difference might be attributed to women's more vulnerable position in the job market. Valentova and Aigul (2014) also provide a possible explanation for gender differences in attitudes towards immigration. They find that crime threat

concerns of immigration among women are higher than men. Therefore, if such concerns are perceived to be related to immigration, they could generate less favourable attitudes towards immigration.

Our results also suggest that the association between age and attitudes towards immigration is non-linear. More specifically, those who are under the age of 30 are less likely to oppose immigration compared to others below the age of 60. However, those over the age of 60 are even more likely to support immigration than those below the age of 30. These results contrast the empirical studies conducted in the US and European counties that find a linear relationship between age and attitudes towards immigration with older people being least supportive of immigration (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2005; Schotte and Winkler 2018; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006).

We also find that conditional on other observed characteristics, ethnicity-immigration status has an important impact on shaping attitudes towards immigration. Figure 6 presents conditional probabilities of supporting different immigration regimes for different groups. Indigenous Canadians have the highest probability of supporting fewer immigrants (45.7%) and the lowest probability of supporting more immigrants (13.8%) followed closely by white Canadian-borns (their numbers are 40.7% and 16.5%, respectively). Interestingly, visible minority Canadian-borns have relatively more positive attitudes towards immigration than the other two groups of Canadian-borns. Compared to indigenous Canadians, visible minority Canadian-borns are on average 10.7 percentage points (31 percent) less likely to support a restriction on immigration intake and 7.2 percentage points (48.6 percent) more likely to favour more immigrants.

In contrast to extensive research that suggests a country's minorities are more supportive towards immigration relative its majority group (Berry and Kalin, 1995; Diamond, 1998; Binder et al., 1997; Buckler et al., 2009; Becker, 2019), our results indicate that the attitudes of these two Canadian-born minority groups (aboriginals and visible-minorities) go in two different directions compared to the majority of white Canadian-borns. One potential factor driving this difference between visible minority Canadian-borns and indigenous Canadians in their attitudes towards immigration could be the relatively better labour market position of the former group. In contrast, challenges faced by both aboriginals and immigrants in the labour market could pit them against each other which could in turn negatively affect aboriginals' attitudes towards immigration.

Another potential explanation could be the fact that indigenous cultures and languages are in danger of extinction (Coles 2018). At the same time, Canadian multiculturalism which is closely tied to its immigration discourse and policies, and its promise of tolerance within western institutions, has been suggested not to adequately recognize the inherent rights of aboriginals as well as their problems (MacDonald 2014).

In addition, many immigrants who might not fully understand the long and complex history of Canada and its aboriginal people, including the damaging and lasting legacies of colonialism, might pick up negative stereotypes about aboriginals and (unwittingly) perpetuate them (Mathur 2011, Canadian Race Relations Foundation 2013). Therefore, aboriginals could perceive immigration as another threat to their cultural preservation and ethnic identity. This highlights the importance of strengthening the relationship between aboriginals and immigrants especially since both groups face many similar challenges. This is also clearly expressed in the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) which suggests "For

new Canadians, many of whom carry their own traumatic memories of colonial violence, racism, and oppression, finding common ground as Treaty people involves learning about the history of Aboriginal peoples and finding ways to build stronger relationships of solidarity with them." The report continues to state that "The commission believes there is an urgent need for more dialogue between Aboriginal peoples and new Canadians."

Another interesting and important pattern to highlight is the difference in attitudes towards immigration between visible minority immigrants and white immigrants. We find that recent white and visible minority immigrants (who have been in Canada for less than 10 years) are the most supportive of more immigrants, and we find no difference between them in their attitudes towards immigration (the estimated differences are small and statistically insignificant). However, as estimated probabilities for more established white and visible minority immigrants suggest, as immigrants stay longer in Canada, both groups adopt more negative attitudes towards immigration relative to more recent cohorts. For white immigrants, the difference between more established and more recent cohorts are larger compared to their visible minority counterparts. More specifically, more established white immigrants are 8.2 percentage points (32 percent) more likely to support fewer immigrants, and are 7.8 percentage points (25.7 percent) less likely to support more immigrants, compared to their more recent counterparts. For visible minority immigrants, these numbers are 4 percentage points (14.2 percent) and 3.6 percentage points (13.8 percent), respectively.

Indeed, it is possible that (part of) the difference between earlier and more recent cohorts of immigrants is driven by unobserved systematic differences between these cohorts that are correlated with their attitudes towards immigration (i.e. a cohort effect rather than a socialization effect). Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011) examine whether the shift in the attitudes of

Canadians toward immigration is the reflection of a cohort versus a period effect. Using Environics national surveys between 1987 and 2008, they find that ideological shifts and macroeconomic conditions have a more significant impact on changes in attitudes towards immigration compared to cohort effects.

The final relationship that we examine in this section is the association between Canadians' attitudes towards immigration and their political party identification. Figure 7 illustrates the conditional probabilities of supporting different immigration regimes for different party identifications estimated in our Model 2 in Table 2. Overall, the estimates suggest that Canadians with different party identifications occupy distinctive positions regarding immigration. More specifically, Canadians who identify with NDP (New Democratic Party), Liberal, or Green parties clearly distinguish themselves as the most welcoming towards immigration, while Conservatives are the least supportive group, with those who identify with the Bloc Quebecois or as independent standing in the middle.

More specifically, conditional on our wide set of control variables, around half of the Conservatives (49.8 percent) support fewer immigrants and only 10 percent of them support an increase in immigration intake. The difference between the Conservatives and those who identify with other parties is striking. On average, relative to observationally-equivalent NDP supporters, Canadians who identify with the Conservative party are 21.6 percentage points (76.6 percent) more likely to support fewer immigrants, and 11.6 percentage points (54.7 percent) less likely to support more immigrants. Similar differences exist between those who identify with the Conservative party and those who identify with the Liberal party or the Green party. Interestingly, those who do not identify with any parties (i.e. independent) have similar attitudes to the Bloc Quebecois supporters as both hold positions almost in the middle of the Liberal and

Conservative divide. On average, 39.8 percent (13.8 percent) of those who do not identify with any party support fewer (more) immigrants.

Political party positions and ideologies attached to them as well as views and preferences of their supporters sometimes go through significant changes over time. It is therefore interesting to examine the extent to which the impact of political party identification on attitudes towards immigration has changed in Canada over time. Our previously discussed results are based on pooled samples across different years and do not reveal these patterns. To further explore these potential changes over time, we first investigate the differences in attitudes towards immigration between Liberals and supporters of other parties over time. To do so, we separately estimate ordered logit models similar to Model 2 for different survey years.[23] Figure 8 reports these differences in the conditional probability of supporting fewer immigrants between those who identify with the Liberal Party versus other parties between 1988 and 2019.

We find that NDP supporters, compared to Liberals, were gradually taking a more positive position towards immigration between 1988 and 2004. However, their attitudes become more similar to Liberals after 2006, with the gap in the conditional probability of supporting fewer immigrants closing almost completely between the two groups after 2011. The Green party supporters, however, went through a more striking attitudinal change since 2004.[24] More specifically, while Greens were on average 16 percentage points less likely than Liberals to support fewer immigrants in 2004, compared to an estimated gap of 10 percentage points

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[23] We remove unemployment rate and immigration intake from model 2 to estimate yearly regressions since the province fixed effects included in our regressions already control for such province-level factors.

[24] The 2004 election was the first time that the Green party started to compete for all the ridings in Canada.

between NDPs and Liberals, they were slightly more likely to support fewer immigrants relative to Liberals after 2011.

Furthermore, Figure 8 offers evidence that 2004 was a turning point in the attitudes of Liberal, Conservative, and Bloc Quebecois supporters towards immigration. Before 2004, the differences between Liberals and Conservatives as well as Bloc Quebecois were gradually decreasing such that they reached a similar level of support for fewer immigrants in 2004. More specifically, the estimated difference between Liberals and Conservatives for supporting fewer immigrants reduced from 6 percentage points in 1988 to 1 percentage point in 2004.

This narrow difference between Liberals and Conservatives in 2004 could be due to the formation of the new Conservative Party from the coalition of the Progressive Conservative Party and the Alliance Party in 2003. The 2006 federal election, however, seems to mark the start of a partisan divide on the issue of immigration between the supporters of Liberal and Conservative parties, and the 2019 election reveals the sharpest partisan divide between the two parties since 1988. More specifically, holding other variables constant, Conservatives were 20 percentage points more likely to support immigration restrictions than Liberals in 2019. Similarly, immigration opinions of Blocs and Liberals appear to have been also diverging over time but at a relatively slower pace. The difference in probability of supporting a reduction in immigration between the two groups increased by 10 percentage points from 2006 and reached 13 percentage points in 2019. The observed pattern is consistent with the narrative that the Conservative party started to diverge from the dominant liberal discourse of immigration from 2006 to a more nationalism exclusion frame (Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013; Fiřtová 2021; Gaucher 2020; Abu-Laban 2020; Kwak 2019).

To sum up, even though the emergence of the Reform party in 1987 brought the immigration issue to the fore of Canada's politics (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002), the supporters of different political parties, particularly Liberals, Conservatives, and Bloc Quebecois, exhibited a converging attitude towards immigration pre-2004, while during the same time period attitudes towards immigration were diverging between Liberals and NDPs. However, the 2006 election marked the beginning of a political polarization between the former three groups on the issue of immigration with the largest divide in 2019. During the same time period, views between Liberals, NDPs, and Greens started to converge.

Figure 9 suggests that the aforementioned divergence/convergence over time in attitudes towards immigration among supporters of different parties is largely due to the rate at which these attitudes became more/less negative over time as opposed to differences in the direction of change in attitudes towards immigration. In other words, Figure 9 clearly reveals that overall, the direction of change in attitudes toward immigration is very similar between supporters of different political parties over time. More specifically, and with some minor exceptions, there exists a pattern of consistent decrease in the probability of supporting fewer immigrants across the board between 1993 and 2004, which reaches somewhat of a plateau between 2004 and 2008, and a consistent increase after 2008.

However, the rate of positive/negative change over time in attitudes towards immigration is different among different groups during some time periods. More specifically, relative to Liberals, the probability of supporting fewer immigrants on average dropped more quickly among both NDPs and Conservatives between 1993 and 2004, which resulted in the convergence (divergence) in attitudes towards immigration between Liberals and Conservatives (NDPs). In contrast, between 2004 and 2008 Liberals exhibited a sharper decline in their negative attitudes

towards immigration relative to NDPs, followed by a somewhat similar increase after 2008.

Together, these resulted in a convergence in attitudes towards immigration after 2004 between

the two groups which is evident in Figure 9.

On the other hand, while anti-immigration sentiments were still decreasing among

Liberals between 2004 and 2015, they started to gradually increase among Conservatives during

the same time period, resulting in a divergence between the two groups as evident in Figure 9.

The sharpest partisan divide between Liberals and Conservatives took place in 2019 with 32

percent of Liberals and 51 percent of Conservatives supporting a reduction in the numbers of

immigrants. This occurred despite the fact that for the first time since 1993, the attitudes of

Liberals toward immigration became significantly more negative over time (from 22 percent in

2015 to 32percent in 2019). However, a larger increase in probability of supporting fewer

immigrants among conservatives (from 38 percent in 2015 to 51 percent in 2019) resulted in an

overall increase in the gap between the two groups from 16 percent in 2015 to 20 percent in 2019.

Our results so far have highlighted the importance of political party identifications in

shaping attitudes towards immigration. However, the degree to which different individuals

identify with a given political party could vary significantly, which could in turn produce

heterogeneity in attitudes towards immigration among supporters of a political party. To further

examine this issue, we create a variable that captures the strength of party identification.[25] We

then re-estimate our Model 2 specification replacing party identification with different levels of

party identification.

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[25] After asking respondents about their party identification, The CES also asks them about their level of identification
with the party. The exact question reads: "How strongly [a party's name] do you feel? Very strongly, fairly strongly,
not very strongly." See Table A9 in the Appendix for summary statistics.

Figure 10 reports the conditional probabilities of supporting different immigration regimes for different levels of party identifications after controlling for observed socio-demographic characteristics. We find that for those who identify with the Liberal, NDP, and Conservative parties there exist quantitative and statistically significant differences in attitudes towards immigration based on their level of party identification. More specifically, and relative to those who report not strongly Liberal or NDP, those who identify strongly with them are 8 and 7 percentage points less likely to support fewer immigrants, respectively. For those who only fairly strongly identify with these parties, the numbers are 3 and 2 percentage points, respectively.

For Conservative supporters, the effect of strong identification with the party is even larger. More specifically, we find that relative to those who report not strongly Conservative, those who report very strongly Conservative are 12 percentage points more likely to support fewer immigrants. For those who only fairly strongly identify with the Conservatives, the number is 4 percentage points. Another point to highlight is that even those who do not strongly identify with the Conservatives still hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants relative to those who report not strongly Liberal, NDP, or Green. More specifically, the estimated gap between not strongly Conservatives and not strongly Liberal (not strongly NDP) is 6 (8) percentage points. For the supporters of the Green party, as well as the Bloc supporters, there are smaller differences in attitudes towards immigration based on their level of party identification. In addition, as it is clear from overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 10, these differences are not statistically significant for the most part.

We also explore how the association between different levels of party identification and attitudes towards immigration changes over time. Figure 11 illustrates the conditional probability

of supporting fewer immigrants for Conservatives and Liberals with different levels of identifications after controlling for observed socio-demographic characteristics. In general, our estimates suggest that between 1993 and 2004, there were relatively small differences between supporters of the Liberal and the Conservative parties, regardless of how strongly they identified with each party.

However, these patterns start to change in 2006 as differences in attitudes between different groups start to become more salient. Between 2006 and 2019, a clear pattern starts to emerge where individuals who identify more strongly with Conservatives (Liberals) exhibit stronger (weaker) opposition towards immigration. More specifically, the difference in the conditional probability of supporting fewer immigrants between those who strongly identified as conservatives and liberals was 2 percentage points in 2004. This gap widened consistently over time, reaching 18 percentage points in 2011 and 30 percentage points in 2019.

Another point worth highlighting is that political identification has had a strong impact on attitudes towards immigration in recent years even when individuals do not identify strongly with Liberals or Conservatives. For example, in 2019, the difference in probability of supporting fewer immigrants between those who reported not strongly Liberal and Conservative was still considerably large at 9 percentage points, while this gap was not existent in 2004 and 2006. Interestingly, those who do not identify with any parties stand almost in the middle of these two groups.

Figure 12 repeats this exercise for NDP and Bloc Quebecois supporters with different degrees of identification. The observed patterns are less systematic and clear for these groups. For example, differences between those with various degrees of identification with Bloc Quebecois are very small and statistically insignificant in 2019, although large differences exist

between those who identify strongly with the Bloc and the other two groups (i.e. fairly strongly Bloc and not strongly Bloc) in 1993. Compared to Bloc supporters, Canadians who identify strongly with NDP exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration than fairly strongly and not strongly NDP supporters in both 2015 and 2019. However, the results are more mixed before 2015 with those not strongly and fairly strongly supporting NDP exhibiting the most positive attitude towards immigration in some time periods.

There is also growing evidence that suggests political leaders and elites impact attitudes towards immigration and racial minorities (Flores 2018; Hellwig and Kweon 2016; Jones and Martin 2017; Czymara 2020). The CES includes information about participants' evaluation of party leaders. We use this information to examine the impact leaders may have on people's opinions about immigration.[26] . Our results are reported in Table A10 in the appendix and are largely consistent with the results reported in Figure 10 discussed above. More specifically, we find that conditional on observed characteristics and party identification, higher evaluations of the Conservative leader are associated with more negative attitudes towards immigration, while higher evaluations of the Liberal, NDP, and Green leaders are associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration. For Bloc supporters, leader evaluations do not seem to matter.

4.3 Relative Importance Analysis

Our regression analysis examines the association between attitudes towards immigration and different demographic, economic, social, and political factors. While this is an informative exercise, it does not provide helpful insights into the relative contribution of these different

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[26] After 1997 the CES asked "how do you feel about [a specific party leader]". In 1993, and 1997 the question was "how would you rate [a specific political leader]". The respondents had to indicate their feeling by a value ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 is very negative and 100 is very positive. Based on these responses, we categorize people into four groups ranging from 1 "very negative" to 4 "very positive".

factors in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration among Canadians. In this Section we take up this issue by using the Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (LMG) method which is one of the most common methods of relative importance calculation (Grömping 2015).

In the LMG method, a predictor has the most explanatory power if it ranks highest among all predictors in explaining the total explained variance of the dependent variable (Grömping 2007). To calculate this, the method estimates multiple linear regressions to decompose the models' R-squared into the proportionate contribution of each predictor. Importantly, the presented contribution of a predictor is a weighted average contribution to R-squared in bivariate model as well as in the presence of other independent variables (Grömping 2015; 2007) .

Figure 13 displays the results from the LMG method which is applied to our Model 2 for all survey years. We find that variables included in our Model 2 explain 14.7 percent of the variation in attitudes towards immigration among individuals in our sample. Furthermore, our results suggest that political party identification, education level, and subjective views about changes in Canada's economic conditions are the three most important factors in explaining differences in attitudes toward immigration among Canadians. More specifically, almost one-fourth of the explanatory power of our model comes from differences in political party identification among Canadians, which is 52 percent higher than the explanatory power of education level (14.7 percent) and 88 percent higher than the explanatory power of the subjective views about changes in Canada's economic conditions (11.9 percent).

Another important point to note is that among the four variables that capture the influence of economic factors, subjective views about changes in Canada's economic situation has significantly higher power in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration. One potential implication is that societal concerns regarding immigrants play a more important role

in shaping attitudes towards immigration relative to personal economic determinants such as income, employment status and subjective views about changes in personal financial situation. These results are in line with those of Kuntz, Davidov, and Semyonov (2017). They study anti-immigration sentiment before 2006 and during the peak of the European economic crisis in 2010. They find that changes in the unemployment rate as an objective measurement of economic conditions play a weaker role in predicting opposition towards immigration than the perception of economic insecurity as a subjective measurement of economic conditions.

As we reported and discussed earlier, supporters of different political parties began to diverge on their support for immigration in 2006. This suggests that the contribution of political identification to changes in attitudes towards immigration might have changed significantly in recent years. To further explore this idea, we conduct our Relative Importance Analysis separately for the two periods of 1988 to 2004 and 2006 to 2019. Panel 1 of Figure 14 reports the results from the earlier period. Interestingly, education, year fixed effects and ethnic/immigration background are the three most important factors in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration.[27]

More specifically, education explains 20.2 percent, while ethnic/immigration background and year fixed effects explain 10.5 percent and 14.8 percent of the explained variations in attitudes towards immigration, respectively. The importance of year fixed effect in the explanatory power of our model suggests that some differences in attitudes of Canadians toward immigration are driven by unobserved factors that affect individuals similarly but vary over time

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[27] Estimated year fixed effects could be interpreted as capturing the systematic effect of unobserved factors that vary over time but affect individuals similarly (e.g. changes in social norms, political discourse, role of media, macroeconomic conditions, etc.)

– e.g., the annual multiculturalism budget in Canada, or the rise of radical right-wing populism. Strikingly, political identification contributes only 5.2 percent to the overall explanatory power of the model, which is only one-fourth of the explanatory power of education (20 percent) during this period.

Panel 2 of Figure 14 illustrates the result of the Relative Importance Analysis for the period of 2006 to 2019. Political party identification now contributes significantly more than any other factors in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, political identification explains 27.8 percent of the explained variation in attitudes towards immigration, while education ranks as the 3rd most important factor by explaining only 11.3 percent of the total explained variation. This significant change in the contribution of political identification in variations in attitudes towards immigration between these two time periods is striking and seems to highlight the rise of political partisanship and political polarization which was also evident in some of our previous results. During this period, subjective views about Canada's economic situation holds the second place of the most important factor explaining variation in attitudes towards immigration (15.5 percent).

4.4　News Media Consumption and Attitudes Towards Immigration

Our analysis so far suggests that political party identification has evolved into the most important factor in shaping public attitudes towards immigration in Canada. Prominent explanations that link partisanship with attitudes formation stress the role of parties as information shortcuts to form views and beliefs regarding complex issues such as immigration (Hopkins 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Banting and Soroka 2020). Indeed, news media is a primary source for political parties and political elites to communicate information (and mis-information) to individuals (Shehata and Strömbäck 2014; Farhall, Gibbons, and Lukamto 2019; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2016). Furthermore, evidence from several studies suggests that news

media can strongly affect the portrayal of immigrants by framing immigration in a positive/negative light (Héricourt and Spielvogel 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Correa, and Valenzuela 2012; De Coninck et al. 2019; Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2017). Therefore, it is of substantial interest to investigate how different levels of exposure to news media may impact attitudes towards immigration in Canada.

To explore the role of news media in shaping public attitudes towards immigration, we add another variable to our Model 2 that measures the amount of time Canadians report watching, reading, or listening to the news. The CES started to ask about the media consumption of Canadians in 2011. Therefore, our analysis in this section relies on data from 2011, 2015 and 2019 surveys. Table 3 reports our results from an ordered logit model that estimates the effect of news media consumption on attitudes towards immigration after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and party identification. In model 4, we control for political interest to explore if it moderates the impact of news consumption on attitudes towards immigration.

Overall, we find compelling evidence that suggests Canadians who spend more hours watching, reading and listening to the news exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, results of Table 3 Model 3 suggest that on average around 48.4 percent of Canadians who do not follow any news everyday are in favour of fewer immigrants, and only 12.3 percent would support more immigrants. In contrast, Canadians who consume up to 1 hour of news everyday are 10.3 percentage points less likely to support fewer immigrants and around 6 percentage points more likely to support more immigrants. Consuming more than 1 hour of news everyday is even more strongly associated with lower probability of supporting fewer immigrants, reducing it by around 15 percentage points, and increases the probability of supporting more immigrants by around 9 percentage points.

Our results also suggest that controlling for political interest does not significantly affect the estimated association between media consumption and attitudes towards immigration as the estimated differences, while slightly smaller relative to Model 3, remain quantitatively large and statistically significant. However, political interest matters in shaping attitudes towards immigration. Conditional on observed characteristics, including party identification and new consumption, Canadians who are interested in politics are 11 percentage points less likely to support immigration restriction than Canadians who are not interested in politics.

Given the importance of news consumption and political interest in shaping attitudes towards immigration, we also examine if the influence of news consumption on attitudes towards immigration depends on individuals' level of political interest. Figure 15 reports estimates from a model that further explores this interaction. Overall, the results suggest that watching, listening or reading more news is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration regardless of individuals' reported level of political interest. However, a more detailed examination of the estimated differences reveals some interesting patterns.

More specifically, focusing on those categorized as not interested in politics, and taking those who report consuming no news as the reference category, consuming less than an hour is associated with lower probability of supporting fewer immigrants by 8 percentage points, a difference that is statistically significant. Those who report consuming between 1 to 2 hours are even less likely to support fewer immigrants relative to the reference group (12 percentage points), but the difference with those who consume less than an hour is not statistically significant. In addition, those who report consuming more than 2 hours of news are also less likely to support fewer immigrants relative to the reference group. However, their conditional probability of supporting fewer immigrants is quantitively similar to those who consume less

than an hour, and larger than those who consume between 1 to 2 hours. Moreover, none of these differences are statistically significant. This suggests that for the group who are categorized as not interested in politics, consuming some news than no news is indeed associated with more positive attitudes towards immigrants. However, the effect of consuming more news is less systematic and clear among those who consume some news.

In contrast, for those who are categorized as interested in politics, these differences are more systematic and clearer. More specifically, those who consume less than an hour are 9 percentage points less likely to support fewer immigrants, a difference that is statistically significant. Those who consume between 1 to 2 hours, and more than 2 hours, while relatively similar in their attitudes towards immigration, are both less likely to support fewer immigrants in comparison to those who consume no news as well as those who consume less than an hour, differences that are statistically significant.

An important question that remains is why more news consumption, particularly among those who self-identify as being relatively more interested in politics, is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration in Canada. Providing a compelling answer to this question requires careful investigation of the issue, which we leave to future research as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, one potential explanation might be rooted in a relatively more positive coverage of immigration in the Canadian news, especially during the recent years (Lawlor 2015). Accordingly, those who are relatively more interested in politics might put less weight on their prior beliefs about immigration and pay more attention to news media discussions of immigration.

Several studies suggest that supporters of different parties select news outlets that are more closely aligned to their ideological views (Gil de Zúñiga, Correa, and Valenzuela 2012;

Facchini, Mayda, and Puglisi 2017). Therefore, we also examine whether our estimated relationship between news consumption and attitudes towards immigration depends on individuals' political party identification. Our results are reported in Figure 16 and suggest that overall, the association between news consumption and attitudes towards immigration is relatively similar among supporters of different parties. For example, Liberals (Conservatives) who spend more than 2 hours watching, reading or listening news are 7 (11) percentage points less likely to support fewer immigrants than Liberals (Conservatives) who report consuming no news.

Perhaps the only exception are Bloc supporters for whom consuming more news is associated with small and statistically insignificant improvements in attitudes towards immigration. Since Bloc supporters are mostly French speakers who are likely to watch or read news in French, this difference might have to do with potential differences between French-speaking versus English-speaking media in their coverage and framing of immigration. To test this hypothesis, we examine the relationship between news consumption and attitudes towards immigration by first language.

Our results are reported in Figure 17 and suggest that the relationship between news consumption and attitudes towards immigration is similar for individuals whose first language is English versus those whose first language is French. Therefore, different patterns found among Bloc supporters in Figure 16 do not seem to be explained by differences in framing and coverage of immigration by English-speaking versus French-speaking media.

Given that we have introduced and used a set of new covariates in this Section, we repeat our Relative Importance Analysis to measure the relative contribution of these new variables. Our results are reported in Figure 18 and suggest that the role of news consumption in explaining

the variations in attitudes towards immigration is relatively small but non-negligible. More specifically, it ranks seventh among all our independent variables and explains 3.8 percent of the total explained variations in attitudes towards immigrants. Political interest, in comparison, explains a larger share of the variation, 5.6 percent. Moreover, the addition of these two new sets of variables increases the total explain variation from 14.7 percent to 18 percent.

4.5   Contact with Visible Minorities and Attitudes Towards Immigration

As discussed before, another important factor that could impact attitudes towards immigration is contact with visible minorities (Hjerm 2007; Weber 2015; Savelkoul et al. 2011; Ha 2010; Rustenbach 2010; Kaufmann and Harris 2015; van Heerden and Ruedin 2019).[28] This is especially important since according to the 2016 Canadian Census, a significant majority of recent immigrants to Canada are visible minorities. For example, around 80 percent of immigrants to Canada between 2006 and 2016 were visible minorities (Statistics Canada 2016). We examine two types of contacts individuals may establish with visible minorities. One is inter-group contact in the form of friendship and the other one is more casual contact depending on the number of visible minorities in a local area.[29]

To do so, we introduce two new independent variables to our analysis. The first variable measures the self-reported number of visible minority friends and the second variable measures the percentage of visible minorities in the respondent's local area. We also limit our sample to data from the 2019 survey since the question that asks participants about their number of visible minority friends started in this year. Furthermore, we focus our analysis on white Canadians.

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[28] According to the 2016 Canadian Census of population, a significant majority of recent immigrants to Canada are visible minorities. For example, around 80 percent of immigrants to Canada between 2006 and 2016 were visible minorities (Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 98-400-X2016191).

[29] We define a local area as the electoral districts where a respondent lives in.

Finally, to make sure that the effect of contact with visible minorities is not picking up the potential effect of living in an urban/rural setting, we include four indicators of rural, town, city and missing to our regression.

Table 4 reports our results from an ordered logit model. First, we find weak evidence for the impact of residential environment on attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, white Canadians who live in a city are only 2.9 percentage points less likely to ask for reduction in immigration. Furthermore, there is no difference between white Canadians who live in a rural area and those who live in a town. These results however should be interpreted with caution since 67 percent of individuals in our sample do not report their type of residential environment, and we find that these individuals on average exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration.

We also find clear evidence that having (more) visible minority friends is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, white Canadians who report having only one close visible minority friend are similar in their attitudes towards immigration with their white Canadian counterparts who report having no close visible minority friends. However, white Canadians with 2 to 5 close visible minority friends, and those with more than 5 visible minority friends are 4 percentage points and 10 percentage points less likely to ask for a reduction in immigration, respectively.

Our results also suggest that the percentage of visible minorities in a local area has a non-linear impact on attitudes towards immigration. More specifically, we find that compared to white Canadians who reside in areas where less than 25 percent of residents are visible minorities, those in areas where between 25 to 50 percent of residents are visible minorities on average exhibit more positive views towards immigrants (2.2 percentage points less likely to favour fewer immigrants). However, in areas where visible minorities become a majority group, white

Canadians exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants. More specifically, white Canadians who live in areas where 50 to 75 percent of residents are visible minorities are 2.8 percentage points more likely to support fewer immigrants. This number increases to 4.6 percentage points when the proportion of visible minorities goes beyond 75 percent.

To more clearly illustrate the non-linear impact of the percentage of visible minorities in a local area on white Canadians' attitudes towards immigration, we substitute our categorical variable with a continuous variable and re-estimate the results in Table 4 by adding our continuous measure of percentage of visible minorities in its quadratic form. Figure 19 shows the conditional predicted probabilities of supporting fewer immigrants by percentage of visible minorities in a local area. It clearly shows the non-linear impact of percentage of visible minorities on attitudes towards immigration.

More specifically, the negative slope of the estimated function in local areas where less than 40 percent are visible minorities suggests that in these areas, individuals who live with a higher percentage of visible minorities exhibit less negative attitudes towards immigration. However, the positive slope when we move to areas where more than 40 percent are visible minorities suggests that when visible minorities get close to the majority group in a given area, then their higher percentage in an area is associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants among white Canadians in those areas.

These results suggest that two potential explanations that link the percentage of visible minorities to attitudes towards immigration could be in play here. On the one hand, having more visible minorities in a local area could increase the opportunity for the dominant group to building meaningful contacts which could reduce negative views towards minorities/immigrants. On the other hand, living in areas with a large percentage of visible minorities could also induce

negative views and attitudes. More specifically and according to the group-threat theory (Quillian 1995), white Canadians may see their cultural and collective identity under threat in the presence of a large group of visible minorities, which could in turn increase their opposition towards immigration (Blalock 1967). Our results are consistent with the presence of both of these forces.

5   Conclusion

In this study, we explore the evolution and determinants of public attitudes towards immigration in Canada between 1988 to 2019 using data from the Canadian Election Studies surveys. We find that Canadians' support for a reduction in immigration intake significantly reduced between 1988 to 2008. However, this trend reversed in the 2010s as more Canadians became uncomfortable with the status quo and supported immigration restriction. Furthermore, the proportion of Canadians supporting immigration expansion has not changed significantly in the past 40 years. In 2019, only 18 percent of Canadians favoured an increase in immigration intake.

We examine the association between attitudes towards immigration and a wide range of demographic, social, economic, and political/ideological factors. Among economic factors studied, we find that subjective views about changes in Canada's economic performance play a significantly more important role in shaping attitudes towards immigration relative to individual economic factors such as income, unemployment status, and subjective views about changes in personal financial situation.

In terms of demographic factors, we find that there are significant differences in attitudes towards immigration across provinces. Views about immigration are the most positive in Nova Scotia and the most negative in Alberta and Ontario. Importantly, these regional differences

persist even after controlling for party identification, socioeconomic characteristics and inter-provincial differences in unemployment rate and immigration intake.

We also find a negative relationship between provincial-level immigration intake and attitudes towards immigration. This finding coupled with the importance of economic factors raises concerns about Canada's current immigration plan. The Liberal government of Canada has announced a plan to admit on average 400,000 immigrants a year between 2021 and 2023 (Harris 2020). This increase of 17.8 percent in immigration over the actual intake of 340,000 in 2019 is the government's response to the economic recession caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (Francis 2021). However, our results suggest that the increase in immigration and Canada's economic downturn may harden the opposition towards immigration. Policies and programs that focus on improving the level of public knowledge about the economic contribution of immigration may prevent the possible rise of negative opinions about immigration (Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal 2018; Facchini, Margalit, and Nakata 2016). News media could also play an important role in raising awareness considering our finding that Canadians who consume more news exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration.

Our results also point to the importance of ethnic and immigration backgrounds in shaping Canadians' attitudes towards immigration. We find that indigenous Canadians followed by white Canadian-borns and visible minority Canadian-borns exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigration relative to white and visible minority immigrants. Interestingly, we find that ethnic background is not a factor in play for recent immigrants coming to Canada as we find no difference between visible minority and white immigrants who have been in Canada for less than 10 years. However, attitudes of immigrants who have been in Canada for more than 10 years

varies between visible minority and white immigrants with white immigrants exhibiting more similar (negative) attitudes to White Canadians relative to visible minority immigrants.

Our results also highlight the importance of identification with different political parties in shaping attitudes towards immigration. We find that overall, Liberal, NDP and Green supporters are the most supportive and Conservatives are the least supportive of immigration, while Bloc supporters as well as those who do not identify themselves with any party are in middle of the spectrum. Importantly, we find that this divide among supporters of different parties was relatively smaller pre-2006 but started to widen after 2006, which also marks the beginning of the conservative government of Stephen Harper which was in power until 2015. Consistent with these results, our Relative Importance Analysis suggests that in the post-2006 era, political party identification was the most important factor in explaining differences in public attitudes towards immigration in Canada, replacing education as the most important factor pre-2006.

It is important that future research provides further insights into factors underlying the increasing partisan divide in Canada on views regarding immigration. One possible explanation is that this observed pattern reflects greater political polarization. For example, Kevins and Soroka (2018) find a similar pattern where party identification explains an increasing amount of variance in differences in redistributive preferences in Canada. Another potential explanation can be built on the narrative that the Conservative party started to diverge from the dominant liberal discourse on immigration after its incumbency in 2006 (Marwah, Triadafilopoulos, and White 2013; Fiřtová 2021; Gaucher 2020; Abu-Laban 2020; Kwak 2019). Abu-Laban (2020) labels this approach "divergence within convergence" (18) as the party publicly and directly embraced multiculturalism to draw the support of immigrants since it could not afford to lose their votes. At the same time, however, it framed the issue of immigration around the rhetoric of national

economic/security threat. This rhetorical shift in the discourse of immigration may explain the widening gap in attitudes towards immigration in Canada by political party identification.

Another interesting question for future research is whether the increasing influence of political party identification on attitudes towards immigration is the reflection of attitudinal changes among their supporters or partisan sorting. One potential scenario is that supporters of different parties did not change their opinions around immigration; but rather those who opposed immigration relatively more strongly switched from the Liberal party or the NDP to the Conservative party and vice versa. In this case, people who opposed (support) immigration were sorted into the conservative (Liberal or NDP) party. Although according to Campbell et al. (1960) party identification is built during one's childhood and not easy to change, survey designs that follow Canadians over time may assist scholars to provide a more systematic answer to this question.

Related to the issue of partisanship, we also investigate the role that news consumption may play, as a major supplier of partisan cues, on attitudes towards immigration. We find that spending more time reading, listening or watching news is associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration. Importantly, this support is not conditional on the party that Canadians support. With the exception of Bloc supporters, those who consume more news exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration. We should emphasize that we explore the role of media consumption at the aggregate level. However, it is possible that different news media outlets such as cable, newspapers, radio, social media, and other online outlets induce different impacts on attitudes towards immigration (Coninck et al. 2019). This also remains an important and interesting question for future research.

Our results also suggest that while Canadians with (more) visible minority friends exhibit relatively more positive attitudes towards immigration, living in a more diverse area does not necessarily make white Canadians more supportive of immigration. The relationship between the proportion of visible minorities in a local area and attitudes towards immigration is interesting as scholars suggest two potential conflicting mechanisms. The inter-group contact theory (Allport 1954) proposes that contact with outgroups could reduce prejudice which results in more positive attitudes towards immigration. However, the group threat theory (Quillian 1995) suggests that exposure to outgroup could foster the perception of ethnic competition which induces a higher level of opposition towards immigration. Our results seem to be consistent with both hypotheses. Relative to areas where visible minorities are less than 25 percent of the population, white Canadians exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration in areas where visible minorities are 25 to 50 percent of the population but exhibit less positive attitudes in areas where visible minorities are more than 50 percent of the population.

Finally, the current study highlights the fact that attitudes towards immigration are complex and not easy to understand. There are no simple explanations as to why some individuals form opposition towards immigration. Our results suggest that various economic, political, social, and personal factors contribute to these patterns. Moreover, these mechanisms are not constant and are likely change over time. This study can help Canadian policy makers to enhance tolerance towards immigration by highlighting the role news media consumption, ethnic and immigration backgrounds, contact with minorities, subjective economic concerns of immigration, and increasingly polarized sociopolitical environments play in shaping attitudes towards immigration. It is increasingly important for policy makers to continuously evaluate Canadians' attitudes towards immigration in order to design immigration and integration policies that promote a culture of acceptance and tolerance.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Changes in attitudes towards immigration in Canada – 1988 to 2019

Figure 2: Changes in attitudes towards immigration (1988 to 2019) and Immigration intake by admission category (1980 to 2019)

Source for annual immigration intake by class of admission: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. Record ID: ad975a26-df23-456a-8ada-756191a23695

Figure 3: Changes in attitudes towards immigration (1988 to 2019) and the number of immigrants as a share of total population in Canada

Source for immigrants as a share of population (2000 to 2017): OECD (2021), Foreign-born population (indicator). doi: 10.1787/5a368e1b-en

Source for immigrants as a share of population (1990, 1995 and 2019): United Nation. International Migrant Stock 2019

Figure 4: Changes in attitudes towards immigration and the number of visible minority Canadians as a share of total population- 1980 to 2019

Source: Census Canada

Figure 5: Changes in attitudes towards immigration (1988 to 2019) and Unemployment rate in Canada (1980 to 2019)

Note: Unemployment rate for Canadians 15 years old or older. Source: Statistics Canada, Table: 14-10-0023-01

Figure 6: Attitudes toward immigration - Conditional predicted probabilities for different groups by ethnic/immigration background – Ordered logit model

Note: Control variables include employment status, religion, province, income, language, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, unemployment rate, and immigration intake. Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed for each estimate. The two horizontal lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.

Figure 7: Attitudes toward immigration - Conditional predicted probabilities for different groups by political party identification – Ordered logit mode

Note: Control variables include employment status, religion, province, income, language, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, ethnic/immigration background, unemployment rate, and immigration intake. Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed for each estimate. The two horizontal lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.

Figure 8: Estimated differences in conditional probability of supporting fewer immigrants – By political party identification (relative to Liberals) – Model 2

Note: Control variables include employment status, religion, province, language, income, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, ethnic/immigration background.

Figure 9: Estimated conditional probabilities of supporting fewer immigrants – By selected political party identifications - Model 2

Note: Control variables include employment status, religion, province, language, income, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, ethnic/immigration background.

Figure 10: Attitudes toward immigration - Conditional predicted probabilities for different groups by different strength of party identification– Ordered logit model

Note: Control variables include employment status, language, religion, province, income, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, ethnic/immigration background, immigration intake, unemployment rate and Language.

Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The two vertical lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.

Figure 11: Estimated conditional probabilities of supporting fewer immigrants – By level of political party identification – Model 2

Note: Control variables include employment status, religion, province, income, language, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, ethnic/immigration background and Language.

Figure 12: Estimated conditional probabilities of supporting fewer immigrants – By level of political party identification – Model 2

Note: Control variables include employment status, religion, province, income, language, marital status, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, ethnic/immigration background and language.

Figure 13: The Relative Importance Analysis of Model 2 – 1988 to 2019

R^2 = 14.74%, metrics are normalized to sum 100%.

Note: The LMG method is used to compute the relative importance of variables. Each histogram bar measures how much of the explained variation in attitudes towards immigration is contributed to different factors.

Figure 14: The Relative Importance Analysis of Model 2 – 1988-2004 and 2006-2019

Panel 1
(1988-2004)

R^2 = 13.12%, metrics are normalized to sum 100%.

Panel 2
(2006-2019)

R^2 = 16.23%, metrics are normalized to sum 100%.

Note: The LMG method is used to compute the relative importance of variables. Each histogram bar measures how much of the explained variation in attitudes towards immigration is contributed to different factors. Panel 1 and Panel 2 show the relative importance results for 1988-2004 and 2006-2019, respectively.

Figure 15: Attitudes toward immigration - Conditional predicted probabilities for different groups by news consumption and level of political interest – Ordered logit model

Note: Control variables include: ethnic/immigration background, employment status, religion, province, income, marital status, language, age, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, party identification, unemployment rate, and immigration intake.

Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The two vertical lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.

Figure 16: Attitudes toward immigration - Conditional predicted probabilities for different groups by news consumption and party identification – Ordered logit model

Note: Control variables include: ethnic/immigration background, employment status, religion, province, income, marital status, language, age, political interest, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, unemployment rate, and immigration intake.

Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The two vertical lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.

Figure 17: Attitudes toward immigration - Conditional predicted probabilities for different groups by news consumption and language – Ordered logit model

Note: Control variables include: ethnic/immigration background, employment status, religion, province, income, political interest, marital status, age, language, gender, education, year, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, party identification, unemployment rate, and immigration intake. Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed. The two vertical lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.

Figure 18: Relative Importance Analysis – Including daily news media consumption

Note: The LMG method is used to compute the relative importance of variables. Each histogram bar measures how much of the explained variation in attitudes towards immigration is contributed to different factors.

Figure 19: Estimated conditional probabilities of supporting fewer immigrants by percentage of visible minorities in a local area – quadratic model

Note: Control variables include: ethnic/immigration background, employment status, religion, province, income, marital status, age, language, political interest, gender, education, subjective view about personal financial situation, subjective view about Canada's economic situation, party identification, media consumption, visible minority friends and region of residence

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variables	Percent	Variables	Percent
Attitude toward immigration	1.78*	**Ethnicity**	
1: Fewer immigrants	39.45	White Canadian-born	71.50
2: About the same immigrants	43.08	Visible minority Canadian-born	4.25
3: More immigrants	17.47	Indigenous	3.62
Province		More established white immigrant	6.48
Alberta	10.38	Recent white immigrant	0.41
British Columbia	12.51	More established visible minority immigrants	3.95
Manitoba	4.68	Recent visible minority immigrants	0.71
New Brunswick	2.94	Missing	9.07
Newfoundland and Labrador	2.37	**Age**	
Nova Scotia	3.01	Less than 30	14.92
Ontario	33.85	Between 30 and 40	18.53
Prince Edward Island	1.62	Between 40 and 50	17.74
Quebec	24.49	Between 50 and 60	18.33
Saskatchewan	4.14	Between 60 and 70	18.05
Income		More than 70	11.92
More than average	39.74	Missing	0.51
Less than average	46.95	**Employment status**	
Missing	13.32	Employed	60.03
Religion		Unemployed	4.26
Atheist/Agnostics	26.81	Student	3.61
Catholics	33.37	Retired/Disable	26.37
Non-Catholic Christians	27.94	Homemaker	3.63
Jewish	1.16	Missing	2.12
Islam	1.30	**Marital status**	
Other	4.75	Married/living with partner	60.80
Missing	4.64	Divorced	10.91
Education		Widowed	5.28
Less than post secondary education	29.17	Never married	20.48
post secondary education	70.33	Missing	2.53
Missing	0.50	**Subjective views about Canada's economic situation**	
Gender		Got better	18.16
Female	45.27	About the same	39.20
Male	54.34	Got worse	38.73
Missing	0.38	Missing	3.91

* Represents calculated mean as opposed to percent.

Table 1: Summary Statistics - Continued

Variables	Percent	Variables	Percent
Subjective views about personal financial situation		**Party Identification**	
Got better	17.43	Liberal	30.57
About the same	52.03	Conservative	24.86
Got worse	29.43	NDP	12.24
Missing	1.12	Green	3.46
Province-level variables		Bloc Québécois	5.75
Immigration intake*	1.96	Other parties	2.90
Unemployment rate*	6.96	Independent	13.54
Language		Missing	6.68
English	59.69	**Friends***	
French	21.47	No friends	1.29
Other	7.90	No minority friends	11.20
Combination	12.34	1 minority friend	6.03
Missing	0.61	2-5 minority friends	6.56
Proportion of visible minorities in the local area**		More than 5 minority friends	1.68
Less than 25 percent	65.92	Missing	73.24
Between 25 to 50 percent	23.25	**Region of residence***	
Between 50 to 75 percent	8.35	Rural	3.90
More than 75 percent	2.48	Town	14.68
Media consumption**		City	14.23
None	2	Missing	67.19
Less than 1 hour	42.49	**Political interest**	
Between 1 to 2 hours	12.92	Not interested	7.64
More than 2 hours	5.46	Interested	37.55
Missing	37.12	Missing	54.81

* Represents calculated mean as opposed to percent. **Limited to the 2011,2015 and 2019 surveys. *** limited to the 2019 survey

Table 2: Attitudes toward immigration - Ordered logit model

Variables	Model 1			Model 2		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
Employment status						
Employed (predicted probability)		0.402***	0.169***		0.401***	0.170***
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Unemployed	-0.076**	0.017**	-0.010**	-0.100**	0.021**	-0.013***
	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Student	0.462***	-0.095***	0.069***	0.447***	-0.090***	0.065***
	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Retired/Disable	0.068***	-0.015***	0.009***	0.050**	-0.010**	0.007**
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Homemaker	-0.116***	0.025***	-0.015***	-0.090*	0.019*	-0.011**
	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.043)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Missing	-0.195***	0.043***	-0.024***	-0.199***	0.042***	-0.024***
	(0.055)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.055)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Income						
Less than Average (predicted probability)		0.422***	0.157***		0.424***	0.156***
		(0.003)	(0.004)		(0.003)	(0.004)
More than Average	0.193***	-0.042***	0.025***	0.211***	-0.044***	0.027***
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Missing	0.178***	-0.038***	0.023***	0.228***	-0.048***	0.030***
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Subjective views about Canada's economic situation						
Got better (predicted probability)		0.302***	0.237***		0.313***	0.229***
		(0.004)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.003)
About the same	-0.711***	0.151***	-0.100***	-0.612***	0.127***	-0.085***
	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Got worse	-0.414***	0.085***	-0.063***	-0.405***	0.082***	-0.059***
	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Missing	-0.329***	0.067***	-0.051***	-0.288***	0.058***	-0.043***
	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Subjective views about personal financial situation						
Got better (predicted probability)		0.354***	0.197***		0.358***	0.195***
		(0.004)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.003)
About the same	-0.087***	0.018***	-0.013***	-0.080***	0.016***	-0.011***
	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Got worse	-0.501***	0.109***	-0.064***	-0.467***	0.099***	-0.059***
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	-0.307***	0.066***	-0.042***	-0.241***	0.051***	-0.033***
	(0.075)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.076)	(0.016)	(0.010)
N		68994			68994	
R-squared		0.066			0.080	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses.

Model 2 includes all variables in Model 1 as well as political party identification. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table 2 – Continued 1

Variables	Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
Religion						
Catholics (predicted probability)		0.418***	0.157***		0.419***	0.157***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)
Atheist/Agnostic	0.337***	-0.072***	0.047***	0.295***	-0.062***	0.039***
	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Non-Catholic Christians	-0.070***	0.015***	-0.009***	-0.002	0.000	-0.000
	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Other	0.269***	-0.058***	0.037***	0.252***	-0.053***	0.033***
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Jewish	0.479***	-0.100***	0.069***	0.484***	-0.099***	0.068***
	(0.070)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.070)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Islam	1.018***	-0.197***	0.167***	0.899***	-0.174***	0.140***
	(0.070)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.070)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Missing	0.004	-0.001	0.000	0.030	-0.006	0.004
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Province						
British Columbia (predicted probability)		0.390***	0.177***		0.393***	0.175***
		(0.005)	(0.003)		(0.006)	(0.003)
Alberta	-0.249***	0.054***	-0.031***	-0.077**	0.016**	-0.010**
	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Manitoba	0.175***	-0.037***	0.025***	0.218***	-0.045***	0.031***
	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.006)
New Brunswick	0.160***	-0.034***	0.023**	0.152**	-0.031**	0.021**
	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.061)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.233**	-0.048**	0.034**	0.152	-0.031	0.021
	(0.097)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.098)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Nova Scotia	0.473***	-0.095***	0.073***	0.449***	-0.089***	0.067***
	(0.057)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.057)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Ontario	-0.154***	0.033***	-0.020***	-0.161***	0.034***	-0.020***
	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Prince Edward Island	0.362***	-0.074***	0.054***	0.341***	-0.069***	0.049***
	(0.072)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.073)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Quebec	0.040	-0.009	0.006	0.023	-0.005	0.003
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Saskatchewan	-0.050	0.011	-0.007	0.012	-0.002	0.002
	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.043)	(0.009)	(0.006)
N		68994			68994	
R-squared		0.066			0.080	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 2 includes all variables in Model 1 as well as political party identification. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table 2 – Continued 2

Variables	Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Education						
Less than post secondary education (predicted probability)		0.500***	0.115***		0.495***	0.116***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)
Post secondary education	0.657***	-0.146***	0.080***	0.644***	-0.140***	0.077***
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Missing	0.302***	-0.069***	0.033**	0.336***	-0.074***	0.037***
	(0.114)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.115)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Gender						
Male (predicted probability)		0.379***	0.184***		0.373***	0.188***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	-0.163***	0.035***	-0.022***	-0.221***	0.046***	-0.029***
	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Missing	0.569***	-0.111***	0.092***	0.468***	-0.090***	0.073***
	(0.121)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.121)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Age						
Less than 30 years old (predicted probability)		0.391***	0.176***		0.394***	0.174***
		(0.005)	(0.003)		(0.005)	(0.003)
Between 30 and 40 years old	-0.116***	0.025***	-0.015***	-0.112***	0.024***	-0.014***
	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Between 40 and 50 years old	-0.146***	0.031***	-0.019***	-0.133***	0.028***	-0.017***
	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.004)
between 50 and 60 years old	-0.145***	0.031***	-0.019***	-0.135***	0.028***	-0.017***
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.004)
between 60 and 70 years old	0.092***	-0.019***	0.013***	0.113***	-0.023***	0.015***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.034)	(0.007)	(0.005)
More than 70 years old	0.258***	-0.053***	0.037***	0.285***	-0.058***	0.041***
	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Missing	-0.012	0.002	-0.002	0.062	-0.013	0.008
	(0.113)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.114)	(0.024)	(0.015)
Marital status						
Married/Partner (predicted probability)		0.401***	0.170***		0.399***	0.172***
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Divorced/separated	-0.088***	0.019***	-0.011***	-0.124***	0.026***	-0.016***
	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Widowed	-0.051	0.011	-0.007	-0.071*	0.015*	-0.009**
	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Never married	0.114***	-0.024***	0.016***	0.078***	-0.016***	0.010***
	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Missing	0.306***	-0.064***	0.044***	0.309***	-0.063***	0.044***
	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.007)
N		68994			68994	
R-squared		0.066			0.080	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 2 includes all variables in Model 1 as well as political party identification. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table 2 – Continued 3

	Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
Language						
English						
(predicted probability)		0.399***	0.171***		0.399***	0.171***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)
French	-0.078**	0.017**	-0.010***	-0.045	0.010	-0.006
	(0.030)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Other	0.194***	-0.041***	0.027***	0.190***	-0.039***	0.026***
	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Combination	0.053**	-0.011**	0.007**	0.029	-0.006	0.004
	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.002	-0.000	0.000	0.011	-0.002	0.001
	(0.101)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.102)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Year						
1988 (predicted probability)		0.513***	0.111***		0.516***	0.109***
		(0.010)	(0.004)		(0.010)	(0.004)
1993	-0.029	0.007	-0.003	-0.033	0.007	-0.003
	(0.063)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.064)	(0.014)	(0.006)
1997	0.264***	-0.060***	0.027***	0.267***	-0.059***	0.027***
	(0.050)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.005)
2000	0.565***	-0.126***	0.065***	0.584***	-0.127***	0.065***
	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.006)
2004	0.941***	-0.204***	0.121***	0.956***	-0.203***	0.120***
	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.006)
2006	0.841***	-0.184***	0.105***	0.858***	-0.184***	0.104***
	(0.062)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.063)	(0.013)	(0.008)
2008	0.915***	-0.198***	0.117***	0.958***	-0.203***	0.120***
	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.062)	(0.013)	(0.008)
2011	0.671***	-0.149***	0.080***	0.738***	-0.159***	0.087***
	(0.057)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.007)
2015	0.969***	-0.209***	0.126***	1.013***	-0.214***	0.129***
	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.006)
2019	0.445***	-0.100***	0.049***	0.476***	-0.104***	0.051***
	(0.053)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.054)	(0.012)	(0.005)
N		68994			68994	
R-squared		0.066			0.080	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 2 includes all variables in Model 1 as well as political party identification. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table 2– Continued 4

	Model 2			Model 3		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
Province-level variables						
Immigration intake	-0.099***	0.021***	-0.013***	-0.097***	0.020***	-0.013***
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Unemployment rate	-0.022***	0.005***	-0.003***	-0.017**	0.004**	-0.002**
	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Ethnicity						
White Canadian-born						
(predicted probability)		0.407***	0.165***		0.407***	0.165***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Visible minority Canadian-born	0.286***	-0.060***	0.040***	0.268***	-0.055***	0.037***
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Indigenous	-0.223***	0.049***	-0.027***	-0.271***	0.058***	-0.032***
	(0.041)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.005)
More established white Immigrant	0.325***	-0.068***	0.046***	0.336***	-0.069***	0.047***
	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Recent white immigrant	0.756***	-0.150***	0.120***	0.809***	-0.156***	0.127***
	(0.116)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.117)	(0.020)	(0.022)
More established visible minority immigrant	0.407***	-0.085***	0.059***	0.403***	-0.082***	0.057***
	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Recent visible minority immigrant	0.620***	-0.125***	0.095***	0.652***	-0.128***	0.099***
	(0.091)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.091)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Missing	0.286***	-0.060***	0.040***	0.268***	-0.055***	0.037***
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Party identification						
Liberal (predicted probability)					0.330***	0.210***
					(0.003)	(0.002)
Conservative				-0.778***	0.168***	-0.097***
				(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.003)
NDP				0.147***	-0.029***	0.024***
				(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Green				-0.003	0.001	-0.000
				(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Bloc Québécois				-0.411***	0.086***	-0.057***
				(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Other parties				-0.702***	0.151***	-0.089***
				(0.049)	(0.011)	(0.005)
Independent				-0.373***	0.078***	-0.052***
				(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing				-0.600***	0.128***	-0.078***
N		68994			68994	
R-squared		0.066			0.080	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 2 includes all variables in Model 1 as well as political party identification. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

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Table 3: The estimated effect of news media consumption on attitudes toward immigration – ordered logit model

	Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
News media consumption						
None (predicted probability)		0.484***	0.123***		0.466***	0.131***
		(0.014)	(0.007)		(0.014)	(0.007)
Less than 1 hour	0.491***	-0.103***	0.057***	0.410***	-0.085***	0.049***
	(0.068)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.068)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Between 1 to 2 hours	0.737***	-0.151***	0.092***	0.611***	-0.125***	0.077***
	(0.071)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.072)	(0.015)	(0.008)
More than 2 hours	0.705***	-0.145***	0.087***	0.576***	-0.118***	0.072***
	(0.077)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.078)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Missing	0.399***	-0.084***	0.045***	0.335***	-0.070***	0.039***
	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.069)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Political interest						
Not interested (predicted probability)					0.450***	0.138***
					(0.007)	(0.004)
Interested				0.541***	-0.110***	0.069***
				(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Missing				0.235***	-0.049***	0.028***
				(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.004)
N	47928			47928		
R-squared	0.093			0.096		

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 4 includes all variables in model 3 as well as political interest. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. The first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Both models control for ethnicity, employment status, religion, province, income, marital status, age, education, year, subjective views about Canada's economic situation, subjective views about personal financial situation, political party identification, unemployment rate, and immigration intake.

Table 4: The effect of contact with visible minorities on attitudes toward immigration – ordered logit model

	Coefficient	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Model 5			
Region of residence			
Rural (predicted probability)		0.510***	0.117***
		(0.026)	(0.011)
Town	0.046	-0.009	0.004
	(0.076)	(0.015)	(0.007)
City	0.141*	-0.029*	0.014*
	(0.078)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Missing	0.512***	-0.103***	0.056***
	(0.164)	(0.033)	(0.017)
Friend			
No visible minority friend (predicted probability)		0.441***	0.149***
		(0.015)	(0.008)
No friend	-0.162	0.033	-0.018
	(0.114)	(0.023)	(0.012)
1 visible minority friend	0.071	-0.014	0.008
	(0.059)	(0.012)	(0.007)
2 to 5 visible minority friends	0.215***	-0.043***	0.026***
	(0.061)	(0.012)	(0.008)
More than 5 visible minority friends	0.510***	-0.100***	0.066***
	(0.114)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Missing	0.038	-0.008	0.004
	(0.099)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Percentage of visible minorities in local area			
Less than 25 percent (predicted probability)		0.434***	0.153***
		(0.003)	(0.002)
Between 25 to 50 percent	0.111***	-0.022***	0.013***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Between 50 to 75 percent	-0.137**	0.028**	-0.015***
	(0.055)	(0.011)	(0.006)
More than 75 percent	-0.228*	0.046*	-0.025**
	(0.121)	(0.025)	(0.012)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. The first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

The model controls for ethnicity, employment status, religion, language, province, income, marital status, age, education, subjective views about Canada's economic situation, subjective views about personal financial situation, political party identification, media consumption and political interest.

Appendix

Table A1: The CES sample size

Year	CPS	PES	Survey used	# observations (before restriction)	# observations (after restriction)
1988	3,609	2,922	CPS	3,609	3,441
1993	3,775	3,340	CPS	2,341	2,211
1997	3,949	3,170	CPS	3,949	3,585
2000	3,651	2,860	CPS	3,651	3,513
2004	4,323	3,138	CPS	4,323	4,101
2006	4,058	3,250	CPS (panel component removed)	2,059	1,920
2008	4,495	3,689	CPS (panel component removed)	3,257	2,295
2011	4,308	3,362	PES (panel component removed)	2,595	2,493
2015 Phone Survey	4202	2,988	PES	2,988	2,868
2015 Online survey	7,575	4,501	PES	4,386	3,974
2019 phone survey	4,021	2,889	CPS	4,021	3,920
2019 online survey	37,822	10,337	CPS	36,394	34,673
Total	85,788	46,446		73,573	68,994

Note: We used the PES surveys in 2011 and 2015 because the PES includes the question asking about immigration preferences. Also, the CES added permanent residents to its sample in the 2015 and 2019 online surveys. We drop those individuals to keep the sample consistent with all the other surveys. 5th column shows the number of observations after removing the panel respondents in 1993, 2006, 2008, 2011 and permanent resident respondents in the 2015 and 2019 online surveys and 6th column indicates the final number of observations after removing the respondents who did not state their opinion about the preferred level of immigration.

Table A2: Exploring differences in characteristics for those excluded from our final sample (OLS)

Variables	Coefficient
Ethnicity Omitted category = White Canadian-born	
Visible minority Canadian-born	-0.005
	(0.004)
Indigenous	-0.000
	(0.005)
More established white Immigrant	0.004
	(0.004)
Recent white immigrant	-0.006
	(0.012)
More established visible minority immigrant	0.001
	(0.005)
Recent visible minority immigrant	0.008
	(0.010)
Missing	0.005*
	(0.003)
Employment status Omitted category= Employed	
Unemployed	0.019***
	(0.004)
Student	-0.005
	(0.005)
Retired/Disable	0.002
	(0.003)
Homemaker	0.015***
	(0.005)
Missing	-0.008
	(0.006)
Religion Omitted Category= Catholics	
Atheist/Agnostic	0.003
	(0.002)
Non-Catholic Christians	0.004*
	(0.002)
Other	0.017***
	(0.004)
Jewish	0.010
	(0.008)
Islam	-0.000
	(0.008)
Missing	0.023***
	(0.004)
	0.004*
N	78480
R-squared	0.5

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A2-continued 1

Variables	Coefficient
Income (Omitted category = less than average)	
More than average income	-0.004**
	(0.002)
Missing	-0.004**
	(0.002)
Martial status (Omitted Category = married/partnered)	
Divorced/separated	-0.001
	(0.003)
Widowed	-0.003
	(0.004)
Never married	0.010***
	(0.002)
Missing	0.644***
	(0.003)
Province (Omitted category = British Columbia)	
Alberta	0.017***
	(0.004)
Manitoba	0.011**
	(0.005)
New Brunswick	-0.009
	(0.007)
Newfoundland and Labrador	-0.012
	(0.011)
Nova Scotia	-0.016**
	(0.006)
Ontario	0.012***
	(0.003)
Prince Edward Island	-0.016*
	(0.008)
Quebec	0.001
	(0.004)
Saskatchewan	0.001
	(0.005)
Gender (Omitted Category = male)	
Female	0.014***
	(0.002)
Missing	0.021
	(0.014)
N	78480
R-squared	0.5

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A2-continued 2

Variables	Coefficient
Education (Omitted Category = less than post secondary education)	
Post secondary education	-0.008***
	(0.002)
Missing	-0.010
	(0.011)
Subjective views about	
Canada's economic situation (Omitted Category = got better)	
About the same	0.001
	(0.003)
Got worse	0.006**
	(0.003)
Missing	0.101***
	(0.004)
Age (Omitted category = less than 30 years old)	
Between 30 and 40 years old	0.006*
	(0.003)
Between 40 and 50 years old	0.008**
	(0.003)
between 50 and 60 years old	0.004
	(0.003)
between 60 and 70 years old	0.007**
	(0.004)
More than 70 years old	0.015***
	(0.004)
Missing	0.014
	(0.010)
Language (Omitted category = English)	
French	-0.004
	(0.003)
Other	0.003
	(0.004)
Combination	0.019***
	(0.003)
Missing	-0.018*
	(0.010)
Provincial level variables	
Immigration intake	-0.007***
	(0.002)
Unemployment rate	0.002*
	(0.001)
N	78480
R-squared	0.5

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A2-continued 3

Variables	Coefficient
Subjective views about	
Personal financial situation (Omitted category = got worse)	
About the same	0.003
	(0.002)
Got worse	0.009***
	(0.003)
Missing	0.109***
	(0.007)
Party Identification (Omitted category = Liberal)	
Conservative	-0.001
	(0.002)
NDP	0.004
	(0.003)
Green	0.003
	(0.005)
Bloc Québécois	0.004
	(0.004)
Other parties	0.003
	(0.005)
Independent	0.011***
	(0.003)
Missing	0.069***
	(0.003)
Year (Omitted category = 1988)	
1993	0.020***
	(0.007)
1997	0.008
	(0.006)
2000	0.005
	(0.006)
2004	0.018***
	(0.006)
2006	0.040***
	(0.007)
2008	0.109***
	(0.007)
2011	0.094***
	(0.006)
2015	0.132***
	(0.005)
2019	-0.011*
	(0.006)
N	78480
R-squared	0.5

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant

Table A3: Employment status questions and categories in the surveys

Year	Question	Categories				
		Employed	Unemployed	Homemaker	Student	Retired/Disable
1988	We'd like to know if you are now working for pay, or are you unemployed, retired, a student, a homemaker, or something else?	Working now	Laid off, unemployed	homemaker	Student	Retired, Disable
1993	Are you presently working for pay, are you unemployed, retired, a student, or a homemaker?	Working now	Laid off, unemployed	homemaker	Student	Retired, Disable
1997	Are you presently self employed, working for pay, are you unemployed, retired, a student, or a homemaker?	Working now, self-employed	Laid off, unemployed	homemaker	Student	Retired, Disable
2000	Are you presently self employed, working for pay, are you unemployed, retired, a student, or a homemaker?	Working for pay full time, working for pay part time self-employed	Unemployed/looking for work	homemaker	Student	Retired, Disable
2004 to 2015 phone survey	Are you currently self employed, working for pay, retired, unemployed or looking for work, a student, caring for a family, or something else?	Working for pay, self-employed, volunteers: work at 2 or more jobs, caring for family and working for pay, retired and working for pay	Unemployed/looking for work	caring for a family	Student other	Retired, Disable

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Table A2– Continued

Year	Question	Categories				
		Employed	Unemployed	Homemaker	Student	Retired/ Disable
2015 online survey	What is your employment status? Are you currently	self employed, working for pay full-time, working for pay part-time, caring for family and working for pay, retired and working for pay, student and working for pay	Unemployed /looking for work	caring for a family	Student other	Retired, Disable
2019 online and phone surveys	What is your employment status? Are you currently	self employed, working for pay full-time, working for pay part-time, caring for family and working for pay, retired and working for pay, student and working for pay	Unemployed /looking for work	caring for a family	Student other	Retired, Disable

Table A4: Income categories

Year										
	Categories of the 1988 survey									
	Under $10,000	$10,000 to $19,000	$20,000 to $29000	$30,000 to 39,000	$40,000 to $49,000	$50,000 to $59,000	$60,000 to $69,000	$70,000 to $79,000	$80,000 or more	
1988	(7.93%)[a]	(17.56%)[a]	(19.6%)[a]	(16.97%)	(12.23%)	(8.39%)	(5.59%)	(3.91%)	(7.83%)	
	Categories of the 1993 to 2008 surveys									
	Under $20,000	$20,000 to $29,000	$30,000 to $39,000	$40,000 to $49,000	$50,000 to $59,000	$60,000 to $69,000	$70,000 to $79,000	$80,000 to $89,000	$90,000 to $100,000	More than $100,000
1993	(6.63%)[a]	(30.19%)[a]	(15.71%)[a]	(13.21%)	(10.11%)	(6.23%)	(6.23%)	(2.95%)	(3.19%)	(5.55%)
1997	(5.56%)[a]	(29.49%)[a]	(14.24%)[a]	(12.11%)	(10.3%)	(7.37%)	(6.36%)	(3.34%)	(3.94%)	(7.31%)
2000	(6.1%)[a]	(30.12%)[a]	(15.22%)[a]	(10.73%)	(11.07%)	(7.78%)	(0.82%)	(3.63%)	(4.56%)	(9.87%)
2004	(14.48%)[a]	(13.72%)[a]	(13.78%)[a]	(10.92%)[a]	(8.98%)	(8.62%)	(6.99%)	(5.05%)	(3.76%)	(13.72%)
2006	(13.14%)[a]	(12.59%)[a]	(12.9%)[a]	(11.8%)[a]	(9.73%)	(8.21%)	(7.6%)	(3.89%)	(3.59%)	(17.09%)
2008	(8.31%)[a]	(9.93%)[a]	(9.47%)[a]	(9.07%)[a]	(8.81%)[a]	(8.26%)	(8.16%)	(8.51%)	(7.65%)	(21.83%)
	Categories of the 2011 and 2015 surveys									
	Under $29,999	$30,000 to $59,999	$60,000 to $89,999	$90,000 to $109,000	More than $110,000					
2011	(18.21%)[a]	(31.47%)[a]	(21.58%)	(10.84%)	(17.9%)					
2015	(18.6%)[a]	(30.47%)[a]	(21.93%)	(9.7%)	(19.3%)					
	Categories of the 2019 survey									
	No income	$1 to $30,000	$30,001 to $60,000	$60,001 to $90,000	$90,001 to $110,000	$110,001 to $150,000	$150,001 to $200,000	More than $200,000		
2019	(1.01%)[a]	(16.24%)[a]	(25.58%)[a]	(23.17%)	(10.88%)	(13.44%)	(5.79%)	(3.9%)		

Note: Numbers in the parentheses are percentage of respondents in the restricted database that fall into the relevant categories. Superscript [a] indicates the category falls into low-income category.

Table A5: Political identification categories in every survey year

Year	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Other	Independent
1988	Liberal	Progressive conservative	NDP	*	*	*	None, No
1993	Liberal	Progressive conservative	NDP	*	Bloc Quebecois	Reform, other	None of these, No
1997	Liberal	Progressive conservative	NDP	*	Bloc Quebecois	Reform, other	None of these, No
2000	Liberal	Progressive conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Alliance, Other	None of these, No, No preference,
2004	Liberal	Progressive conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Alliance, Another party, Marijuana Party	No party, None of these
2006	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Other	No
2008	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Other	No
2011	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Other	None of these
2015	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Other	None of these
2019	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Green	Bloc Quebecois	Other, People party	None of these

Note: before 2004, there are two questions for the party identification. One asks "In federal politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal…" If respondents identify themselves with no party in this question the CES then asks, "Do you generally think of yourself as being a LITTLE closer to one of the federal parties than to the others?". From 2004 survey, however, there is only the former question for the political identification. * Indicates that the category does not exist in that year.

Table A6: Media consumption's question wordings in each survey

Year	Survey	Question	Type of answers
2019	CPS (randomly asked from half of the respondents)	On average, how much time do you usually spend watching, reading, and listening to news each day?	Categorical
2015 online survey	PES	On average, how long each day do you usually spend watching, reading, and listening to news, in total?	Categorical
2015 phone survey	PES	how many minutes or hours a day do you usually spend watching, reading, and listening to news?	Continuous
2011	PES	how many minutes or hours a day do you usually spend watching, reading, and listening to news?	Continuous

Table A7: Ordered logit estimates of Model 1 – By survey year

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Ethnicity	**Omitted category = White Canadian-born**									
Visible minority Canadian-born	0.489	0.531	0.442*	0.698*	0.591**	0.657*	1.021**	0.597*	0.379***	0.214***
	(0.474)	(0.512)	(0.259)	(0.383)	(0.243)	(0.376)	(0.406)	(0.363)	(0.144)	(0.043)
Indigenous	-1.247**	-0.145	-0.644**	-0.967***	0.058	-0.321	-0.620**	-0.416	-0.227	-0.199***
	(0.631)	(0.407)	(0.275)	(0.345)	(0.196)	(0.311)	(0.265)	(0.276)	(0.164)	(0.048)
More established white Immigrant	0.501***	0.247	0.342**	0.594***	0.353***	0.695***	0.322*	0.753***	0.420***	0.247***
	(0.138)	(0.178)	(0.135)	(0.153)	(0.130)	(0.189)	(0.192)	(0.169)	(0.094)	(0.044)
Recent white immigrant	0.978**	-0.450	0.583	1.289***	1.415***	0.283	0.205	1.311	0.283	1.031***
	(0.444)	(0.742)	(0.519)	(0.488)	(0.493)	(0.602)	(0.611)	(0.980)	(0.289)	(0.173)
More established visible minority immigrant	1.247***	0.566*	0.898***	0.840***	1.459***	0.941***	0.986***	1.571***	0.235	0.287***
	(0.333)	(0.332)	(0.210)	(0.269)	(0.219)	(0.278)	(0.311)	(0.288)	(0.145)	(0.051)
Recent visible minority immigrant	0.320	1.242**	1.656***	0.835**	0.578	0.449	0.627	0.850*	0.883***	0.626***
	(0.771)	(0.576)	(0.363)	(0.390)	(0.365)	(0.479)	(0.516)	(0.450)	(0.289)	(0.125)
Missing	-0.031	-0.249	-0.279*	0.083	0.202*	0.244	0.145	0.783***	-0.127	0.082**
	(0.127)	(0.162)	(0.148)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.174)	(0.123)	(0.238)	(0.085)	(0.039)
Employment status	**Omitted category = Employed**									
Unemployed	-0.303*	-0.172	-0.180	0.006	-0.053	-0.155	-0.375	0.109	-0.069	-0.028
	(0.183)	(0.191)	(0.154)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.271)	(0.251)	(0.230)	(0.124)	(0.054)
Student	0.544***	0.470**	0.463***	0.560***	0.177	0.636**	0.109	0.154	0.355**	0.547***
	(0.168)	(0.220)	(0.160)	(0.168)	(0.193)	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.292)	(0.158)	(0.060)
Retired/Disable	0.072	-0.159	-0.085	0.259**	0.090	-0.000	0.088	0.230*	0.029	0.076**
	(0.158)	(0.234)	(0.148)	(0.131)	(0.115)	(0.150)	(0.154)	(0.130)	(0.074)	(0.031)
Homemaker	-0.001	0.185	0.181	-0.049	0.142	-0.562*	0.032	-0.260	-0.258*	-0.213***
	(0.139)	(0.194)	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.315)	(0.252)	(0.264)	(0.146)	(0.067)
Missing	-0.274	1.033	0.024	-0.763*	-0.131	0.844	-0.176	1.470***	-0.280***	-0.040
	(0.621)	(0.906)	(0.438)	(0.432)	(0.264)	(0.642)	(0.408)	(0.511)	(0.101)	(0.076)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.069	0.080	0.071	0.067	0.056	0.072	0.063	0.072	0.060	0.081

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%, ** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A6 – Continued 1

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Religion	**Omitted category = Catholics**									
Atheist/Agnostic	0.447***	0.444***	0.060	0.292**	0.189**	-0.090	0.330**	0.286**	0.162**	0.400***
	(0.129)	(0.149)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.096)	(0.143)	(0.134)	(0.127)	(0.065)	(0.027)
Non-Catholic Christians	-0.344***	0.047	-0.253***	0.255**	-0.103	-0.393***	-0.176	-0.088	-0.218***	0.029
	(0.100)	(0.134)	(0.094)	(0.100)	(0.085)	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.067)	(0.030)
Other	0.328*	0.856***	0.333*	0.532***	-0.044	0.666	-0.154	0.606**	0.430***	0.237***
	(0.176)	(0.237)	(0.186)	(0.152)	(0.296)	(0.407)	(0.501)	(0.242)	(0.139)	(0.048)
Jewish	0.139	1.611***	0.678**	1.569***	0.484	-0.089	-0.160	0.392	0.548**	0.376***
	(0.377)	(0.455)	(0.335)	(0.356)	(0.373)	(0.600)	(0.583)	(0.502)	(0.249)	(0.086)
Islam			1.050**	1.157**	0.289	-0.202	0.724*	0.128	1.479***	1.086***
			(0.412)	(0.465)	(0.409)	(0.461)	(0.436)	(0.447)	(0.232)	(0.084)
Missing	0.547	-0.145	-0.077	0.314	-0.099	-0.098	0.536**	-0.089	-0.178*	0.098**
	(0.394)	(0.416)	(0.269)	(0.254)	(0.158)	(0.235)	(0.240)	(0.251)	(0.107)	(0.049)
Income	**Omitted category = less than average income**									
More than Average income	0.182**	0.343***	0.150*	0.179**	0.105	0.160	0.068	0.256**	0.201***	0.212***
	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.070)	(0.023)
Missing	0.143	-0.086	-0.095	0.006	-0.064	-0.115	-0.369***	-0.238*	0.740***	0.020
	(0.125)	(0.192)	(0.115)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.144)	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.060)	(0.041)
Martial status	**Omitted category = married/ partner**									
Divorced/separated	-0.225*	-0.386**	0.068	-0.188*	-0.138	0.083	0.106	0.015	-0.086	-0.093***
	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.078)	(0.035)
Widowed	-0.071	0.030	-0.136	-0.433***	0.102	0.075	0.334*	0.005	-0.083	-0.060
	(0.171)	(0.240)	(0.157)	(0.148)	(0.137)	(0.206)	(0.180)	(0.164)	(0.101)	(0.055)
Never married	0.011	-0.041	0.340***	0.063	0.073	0.186	0.155	0.217*	0.086	0.160***
	(0.107)	(0.134)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.131)	(0.068)	(0.028)
Missing	-0.033	-0.028	-0.631	-0.792	-0.088	-0.375	-0.375	-0.076	-0.493*	0.397***
	(1.138)	(0.949)	(0.638)	(0.506)	(0.402)	(0.607)	(0.509)	(0.787)	(0.273)	(0.051)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.069	0.080	0.071	0.067	0.056	0.072	0.063	0.072	0.060	0.081

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%, ** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A6– Continued 2

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Province					**Omitted category = British Columbia**					
Alberta	0.463***	-0.177	0.114	-0.204	-0.250*	0.006	0.016	-0.604***	-0.532***	-0.227***
	(0.150)	(0.186)	(0.136)	(0.154)	(0.128)	(0.194)	(0.235)	(0.229)	(0.113)	(0.041)
Manitoba	0.519**	1.065***	0.471***	0.762***	0.710***	0.461*	0.522**	0.052	0.003	-0.040
	(0.203)	(0.222)	(0.173)	(0.210)	(0.159)	(0.237)	(0.230)	(0.221)	(0.127)	(0.054)
New Brunswick	0.452**	-0.002	0.538**	0.207	0.592***	0.794**	0.518*	0.197	-0.233	0.213***
	(0.206)	(0.322)	(0.225)	(0.206)	(0.211)	(0.352)	(0.265)	(0.272)	(0.148)	(0.068)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.344	-0.190	0.846***	0.299	0.290	0.831**	0.250	-0.258	0.246	0.114
	(0.261)	(0.345)	(0.230)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.328)	(0.265)	(0.255)	(0.172)	(0.076)
Nova Scotia	0.552**	0.337	0.985***	0.183	0.758***	0.758**	1.037***	0.970***	0.551***	0.395***
	(0.242)	(0.363)	(0.228)	(0.203)	(0.206)	(0.343)	(0.266)	(0.262)	(0.145)	(0.063)
Ontario	0.703***	-0.086	-0.145	-0.182	-0.337***	-0.093	-0.377***	-0.376**	-0.362***	-0.235***
	(0.132)	(0.160)	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.100)	(0.152)	(0.136)	(0.146)	(0.078)	(0.033)
Prince Edward Island	0.913***	0.035	0.629***	0.485*	0.304	0.244	0.256	0.049	0.261	-0.005
	(0.224)	(0.364)	(0.227)	(0.295)	(0.207)	(0.387)	(0.261)	(0.243)	(0.177)	(0.107)
Quebec	0.700***	0.468**	0.530***	0.364**	0.302**	0.572***	0.020	-0.136	-0.299***	-0.061
	(0.164)	(0.210)	(0.151)	(0.162)	(0.147)	(0.219)	(0.212)	(0.195)	(0.113)	(0.045)
Saskatchewan	0.928***	0.357	0.365**	0.095	0.055	0.410	0.657***	0.016	-0.202	-0.242***
	(0.190)	(0.226)	(0.174)	(0.214)	(0.161)	(0.266)	(0.231)	(0.223)	(0.143)	(0.059)
Gender					**Omitted category = male**					
Female	-0.295***	-0.289***	-0.384***	-0.251***	-0.302***	-0.187*	-0.283***	-0.465***	-0.088*	-0.090***
	(0.081)	(0.102)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Missing									-0.901	0.592***
									(0.657)	(0.124)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.069	0.080	0.071	0.067	0.056	0.072	0.063	0.072	0.060	0.081

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A6– Continued 3

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Language					**Omitted category = English**					
French	-0.226*	0.444**	-0.181	-0.165	-0.065	-0.281	-0.106	-0.142	-0.070	-0.065
	(0.130)	(0.181)	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.198)	(0.185)	(0.165)	(0.098)	(0.042)
Other	0.522***	0.618***	0.209*	0.273**	0.161	0.300*	0.227	-0.135	-0.062	0.135***
	(0.128)	(0.151)	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.123)	(0.177)	(0.184)	(0.167)	(0.093)	(0.049)
Combination			0.700		-0.754	-0.203	1.777*	1.701	0.038	0.037
			(0.696)		(0.489)	(0.887)	(1.010)	(1.426)	(1.033)	(0.028)
Missing	-0.254	0.637	-0.016	-0.524	-0.002	1.079*	0.408	-0.277	0.462	-0.188
	(0.877)	(0.845)	(0.647)	(0.698)	(0.519)	(0.600)	(0.578)	(0.335)	(0.295)	(0.145)
Subjective views about Canada's economic situation					**Omitted category = got better**					
About the same	-0.158*	-0.152	-0.284***	-0.499***	-0.288***	-0.331***	0.122	-0.060	0.212**	-1.275***
	(0.082)	(0.185)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.107)	(0.136)	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.033)
Got worse	-0.351***	-0.433**	-0.597***	-0.778***	-0.680***	-0.887***	0.230*	-0.630***	0.344***	-0.657***
	(0.129)	(0.176)	(0.103)	(0.111)	(0.095)	(0.151)	(0.140)	(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.031)
Missing	-0.121	-0.596	-0.289	-0.482**	-0.384**	-0.459*	0.126	-0.441	0.067	-0.560***
	(0.167)	(0.434)	(0.187)	(0.197)	(0.177)	(0.242)	(0.287)	(0.300)	(0.156)	(0.056)
Subjective views about Personal financial situation					**Omitted category = got better**					
About the same	0.024	0.079	0.111	-0.062	-0.059	-0.048	-0.060	0.243**	-0.022	-0.209***
	(0.087)	(0.141)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.073)	(0.030)
Got worse	-0.050	0.079	-0.006	-0.407***	-0.277***	-0.290*	-0.240*	0.129	-0.280***	-0.652***
	(0.102)	(0.125)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.154)	(0.138)	(0.147)	(0.081)	(0.034)
Missing	-0.529*	0.045	0.203	-0.573*	0.104	0.297	0.298	0.528	-0.225	-0.398***
	(0.280)	(0.477)	(0.466)	(0.327)	(0.319)	(0.663)	(0.474)	(0.571)	(0.228)	(0.103)
Education					**Omitted category = less than post secondary education**					
Post secondary education	0.783***	0.790***	0.707***	0.471***	0.606***	0.704***	0.915***	0.545***	0.730***	0.673***
	(0.079)	(0.101)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.106)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.056)	(0.026)
Missing	-0.277	0.384	0.532	0.674	0.282	0.314	0.927*	0.304	-0.007	0.480**
	(0.595)	(1.256)	(0.426)	(0.468)	(0.313)	(0.475)	(0.518)	(0.945)	(0.291)	(0.220)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.069	0.080	0.071	0.067	0.056	0.072	0.063	0.072	0.060	0.081

Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A8: Ordered logit results Model 2– By survey year

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Ethnicity	**Omitted category = White Canadian-born**									
Visible minority Canadian-born	0.473	0.538	0.421	0.688*	0.583**	0.639*	0.954**	0.596	0.413***	0.198***
	(0.474)	(0.511)	(0.260)	(0.388)	(0.244)	(0.376)	(0.408)	(0.363)	(0.145)	(0.043)
Indigenous	-1.242**	-0.188	-0.691**	-1.030***	0.052	-0.332	-0.677**	-0.513*	-0.324*	-0.243***
	(0.630)	(0.408)	(0.277)	(0.348)	(0.196)	(0.312)	(0.266)	(0.279)	(0.166)	(0.049)
More established white Immigrant	0.504***	0.264	0.309**	0.577***	0.322**	0.691***	0.301	0.765***	0.437***	0.263***
	(0.138)	(0.179)	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.131)	(0.189)	(0.192)	(0.170)	(0.095)	(0.045)
Recent white immigrant	1.091**	-0.317	0.570	1.364***	1.362***	0.192	0.271	1.340	0.276	1.087***
	(0.450)	(0.742)	(0.522)	(0.491)	(0.492)	(0.604)	(0.608)	(0.986)	(0.292)	(0.173)
More established visible minority immigrant	1.193***	0.532	0.835***	0.831***	1.461***	0.925***	0.962***	1.558***	0.246*	0.296***
	(0.335)	(0.334)	(0.210)	(0.270)	(0.220)	(0.279)	(0.312)	(0.290)	(0.147)	(0.051)
Recent visible minority immigrant	0.382	1.346**	1.582***	0.889**	0.606*	0.517	0.547	0.934**	0.965***	0.674***
	(0.774)	(0.580)	(0.364)	(0.391)	(0.367)	(0.483)	(0.523)	(0.455)	(0.293)	(0.126)
Missing	-0.030	-0.239	-0.277*	0.090	0.203*	0.253	0.152	0.755***	-0.113	0.093**
	(0.128)	(0.163)	(0.148)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.175)	(0.124)	(0.240)	(0.086)	(0.039)
Employment status	**Omitted category = Employed**									
Unemployed	-0.327*	-0.182	-0.204	-0.008	-0.064	-0.237	-0.384	0.069	-0.050	-0.058
	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.155)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.274)	(0.252)	(0.232)	(0.125)	(0.055)
Student	0.543***	0.435**	0.446***	0.519***	0.112	0.610**	0.100	0.183	0.336**	0.527***
	(0.169)	(0.221)	(0.160)	(0.168)	(0.195)	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.293)	(0.159)	(0.061)
Retired/Disable	0.063	-0.179	-0.089	0.235*	0.098	-0.013	0.051	0.252*	0.018	0.053*
	(0.158)	(0.235)	(0.148)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.131)	(0.075)	(0.031)
Homemaker	0.005	0.186	0.190	-0.059	0.167	-0.585*	0.069	-0.221	-0.203	-0.194***
	(0.140)	(0.195)	(0.143)	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.317)	(0.253)	(0.267)	(0.148)	(0.067)
Missing	-0.232	1.000	0.016	-0.721*	-0.157	0.836	-0.129	1.411***	-0.295***	-0.042
	(0.623)	(0.910)	(0.440)	(0.432)	(0.265)	(0.644)	(0.406)	(0.515)	(0.101)	(0.077)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.072	0.083	0.076	0.071	0.061	0.078	0.071	0.080	0.078	0.099

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A7– Continued 1

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Religion	**Omitted category = Catholics**									
Atheist/Agnostic	0.431***	0.470***	0.061	0.274**	0.161*	-0.109	0.257*	0.220*	0.140**	0.349***
	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.096)	(0.144)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.065)	(0.027)
Non-Catholic Christians	-0.313***	0.082	-0.211**	0.288***	-0.101	-0.362***	-0.141	-0.066	-0.145**	0.099***
	(0.100)	(0.135)	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.085)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.068)	(0.030)
Other	0.309*	0.901***	0.324*	0.547***	-0.043	0.606	-0.232	0.553**	0.431***	0.214***
	(0.178)	(0.239)	(0.187)	(0.152)	(0.297)	(0.409)	(0.506)	(0.244)	(0.140)	(0.048)
Jewish	0.102	1.592***	0.611*	1.527***	0.460	-0.154	-0.175	0.351	0.553**	0.428***
	(0.377)	(0.457)	(0.337)	(0.357)	(0.376)	(0.598)	(0.574)	(0.499)	(0.250)	(0.087)
Islam			1.007**	1.156**	0.236	-0.241	0.648	0.015	1.347***	0.966***
			(0.412)	(0.467)	(0.410)	(0.463)	(0.439)	(0.449)	(0.234)	(0.084)
Missing	0.518	-0.134	0.021	0.363	-0.114	-0.084	0.464*	-0.113	-0.106	0.111**
	(0.395)	(0.419)	(0.272)	(0.256)	(0.159)	(0.235)	(0.242)	(0.253)	(0.108)	(0.049)
Income	**Omitted category = less than average income**									
More than Average income	0.185**	0.339***	0.145*	0.167**	0.113	0.154	0.070	0.249**	0.210***	0.240***
	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.115)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.070)	(0.024)
Missing	0.169	-0.104	-0.055	0.005	-0.019	-0.091	-0.368**	-0.193	0.771***	0.087**
	(0.125)	(0.194)	(0.116)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.061)	(0.042)
Martial status	**Omitted category = married/ partner**									
Divorced/separated	-0.250*	-0.397**	0.060	-0.224**	-0.146	0.069	0.076	-0.017	-0.101	-0.140***
	(0.133)	(0.174)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.100)	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.138)	(0.079)	(0.035)
Widowed	-0.089	0.036	-0.144	-0.446***	0.111	0.054	0.286	0.020	-0.074	-0.088
	(0.171)	(0.241)	(0.157)	(0.148)	(0.137)	(0.207)	(0.181)	(0.165)	(0.101)	(0.055)
Never married	-0.011	-0.058	0.332***	0.044	0.073	0.161	0.122	0.185	0.046	0.116***
	(0.108)	(0.134)	(0.102)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.069)	(0.028)
Missing	-0.094	-0.089	-0.662	-0.779	-0.058	-0.444	-0.329	-0.136	-0.430	0.395***
	(1.138)	(0.951)	(0.639)	(0.507)	(0.404)	(0.612)	(0.515)	(0.790)	(0.274)	(0.051)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.072	0.083	0.076	0.071	0.061	0.078	0.071	0.080	0.078	0.099

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A7– Continued 2

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Province	**Omitted category = British Columbia**									
Alberta	0.537***	-0.102	0.203	-0.139	-0.180	0.138	0.188	-0.425*	-0.329***	-0.046
	(0.152)	(0.190)	(0.139)	(0.156)	(0.129)	(0.198)	(0.237)	(0.231)	(0.114)	(0.042)
Manitoba	0.581***	1.068***	0.444**	0.744***	0.708***	0.528**	0.554**	0.109	0.038	0.009
	(0.205)	(0.223)	(0.174)	(0.211)	(0.160)	(0.239)	(0.231)	(0.222)	(0.128)	(0.055)
New Brunswick	0.480**	-0.008	0.559**	0.186	0.656***	0.834**	0.495*	0.223	-0.198	0.213***
	(0.208)	(0.323)	(0.227)	(0.208)	(0.212)	(0.354)	(0.267)	(0.273)	(0.150)	(0.069)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.426	-0.216	0.800***	0.256	0.335*	0.993***	0.231	-0.342	0.200	0.023
	(0.262)	(0.346)	(0.233)	(0.206)	(0.204)	(0.332)	(0.266)	(0.257)	(0.174)	(0.077)
Nova Scotia	0.586**	0.341	0.960***	0.120	0.748***	0.807**	1.038***	1.006***	0.544***	0.388***
	(0.243)	(0.364)	(0.229)	(0.205)	(0.206)	(0.347)	(0.268)	(0.264)	(0.147)	(0.064)
Ontario	0.727***	-0.087	-0.170	-0.205	-0.296***	-0.047	-0.370***	-0.390***	-0.353***	-0.235***
	(0.133)	(0.162)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.100)	(0.153)	(0.137)	(0.147)	(0.079)	(0.033)
Prince Edward Island	0.923***	0.010	0.597***	0.450	0.334	0.383	0.273	0.075	0.270	-0.018
	(0.225)	(0.366)	(0.230)	(0.296)	(0.208)	(0.390)	(0.264)	(0.244)	(0.179)	(0.108)
Quebec	0.735***	0.493**	0.527***	0.396**	0.333**	0.629***	0.034	-0.157	-0.330***	-0.056
	(0.165)	(0.215)	(0.157)	(0.165)	(0.152)	(0.223)	(0.218)	(0.198)	(0.115)	(0.046)
Saskatchewan	0.972***	0.366	0.331*	0.067	0.042	0.468*	0.652***	0.076	-0.181	-0.145**
	(0.191)	(0.227)	(0.175)	(0.215)	(0.161)	(0.269)	(0.231)	(0.224)	(0.144)	(0.059)
Gender	**Omitted category = male**									
Female	-0.301***	-0.307***	-0.409***	-0.270***	-0.308***	-0.200**	-0.312***	-0.481***	-0.114**	-0.181***
	(0.081)	(0.103)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Missing									-0.969	0.478***
									(0.663)	(0.124)
Education	**Omitted category = less than post secondary education**									
Post secondary education	0.776***	0.786***	0.712***	0.469***	0.598***	0.680***	0.896***	0.511***	0.718***	0.648***
	(0.079)	(0.101)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.106)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.056)	(0.027)
Missing	-0.247	0.523	0.560	0.707	0.310	0.394	1.091**	0.138	0.081	0.442**
	(0.593)	(1.257)	(0.426)	(0.468)	(0.313)	(0.479)	(0.521)	(0.951)	(0.296)	(0.223)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.072	0.083	0.076	0.071	0.061	0.078	0.071	0.080	0.078	0.099

Note: Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A7– Continued 3

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Subjective views about Canada's economic situation					**Omitted category = Got better**					
About the same	-0.213**	-0.155	-0.276***	-0.498***	-0.298***	-0.295***	0.088	-0.143	0.122	-1.018***
	(0.083)	(0.186)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.137)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.034)
About the same	-0.430***	-0.435**	-0.589***	-0.769***	-0.670***	-0.830***	0.139	-0.723***	0.108	-0.551***
	(0.131)	(0.177)	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.096)	(0.153)	(0.142)	(0.125)	(0.105)	(0.031)
Got worse	-0.159	-0.559	-0.262	-0.467**	-0.367**	-0.412*	0.083	-0.477	-0.016	-0.439***
	(0.168)	(0.434)	(0.188)	(0.198)	(0.177)	(0.243)	(0.288)	(0.302)	(0.157)	(0.056)
Missing	-0.213**	-0.155	-0.276***	-0.498***	-0.298***	-0.295***	0.088	-0.143	0.122	-1.018***
	(0.083)	(0.186)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.137)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.034)
Language					**Omitted category = English**					
French	-0.230*	0.478***	-0.142	-0.114	-0.072	-0.251	-0.099	-0.145	-0.075	-0.002
	(0.130)	(0.184)	(0.131)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.202)	(0.187)	(0.168)	(0.100)	(0.043)
Other	0.511***	0.597***	0.238*	0.292**	0.193	0.307*	0.190	-0.132	-0.058	0.138***
	(0.129)	(0.152)	(0.125)	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.177)	(0.185)	(0.168)	(0.094)	(0.049)
Combination			0.810		-0.827*	-0.212	1.773*	1.600	-0.267	0.017
			(0.701)		(0.485)	(0.887)	(1.033)	(1.407)	(1.038)	(0.028)
Missing	-0.300	0.621	-0.059	-0.518	0.001	0.931	0.399	-0.260	0.514*	-0.196
	(0.876)	(0.856)	(0.649)	(0.696)	(0.523)	(0.611)	(0.576)	(0.338)	(0.298)	(0.147)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.072	0.083	0.076	0.071	0.061	0.078	0.071	0.080	0.078	0.099

Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A7– Continued 4

Variables	1988	1993	1997	2000	2004	2006	2008	2011	2015	2019
Subjective views about Personal financial situation					**Omitted category = Got better**					
About the same	0.004	0.080	0.114	-0.049	-0.050	-0.054	-0.082	0.213*	-0.057	-0.177***
	(0.088)	(0.142)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.074)	(0.030)
Got worse	-0.101	0.083	0.000	-0.393***	-0.276***	-0.261*	-0.275**	0.058	-0.340***	-0.581***
	(0.103)	(0.126)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.099)	(0.155)	(0.139)	(0.148)	(0.082)	(0.034)
Missing	-0.517*	0.055	0.214	-0.553*	0.140	0.279	0.216	0.610	-0.278	-0.293***
	(0.280)	(0.479)	(0.468)	(0.328)	(0.322)	(0.665)	(0.477)	(0.579)	(0.232)	(0.104)
Party Identification					**Omitted category = Liberal**					
Conservative	-0.308***	-0.219	-0.119	-0.016	-0.046	-0.380***	-0.516***	-0.654***	-0.882***	-0.906***
	(0.097)	(0.136)	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.089)	(0.139)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.071)	(0.029)
NDP	0.137	0.110	0.258*	0.496***	0.528***	0.230	0.280*	0.065	0.044	0.137***
	(0.118)	(0.183)	(0.132)	(0.147)	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.077)	(0.033)
Green					0.964**	1.033	0.167	-0.124	-0.022	-0.090*
					(0.472)	(0.702)	(0.262)	(0.270)	(0.140)	(0.048)
Bloc Québécois		-0.154	-0.182	-0.283**	0.066	-0.282	-0.272	-0.304*	-0.385***	-0.622***
		(0.226)	(0.143)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.183)	(0.118)	(0.054)
Other parties		-0.413*	-0.502***	-0.232**	0.001	0.363	-0.521	-0.041	-0.293	-0.988***
		(0.213)	(0.133)	(0.118)	(0.243)	(0.391)	(0.355)	(0.305)	(0.222)	(0.081)
Independent	-0.084	-0.241*	-0.121	-0.205**	-0.148	-0.272*	-0.128	-0.376***	-0.613***	-0.371***
	(0.107)	(0.134)	(0.105)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.143)	(0.139)	(0.130)	(0.080)	(0.037)
Missing	-0.323	-0.149	-0.314**	-0.031	-0.116	-0.280	-0.054	-0.331*	-0.744***	-0.697***
	(0.213)	(0.286)	(0.140)	(0.160)	(0.136)	(0.204)	(0.235)	(0.199)	(0.086)	(0.044)
N	3441	2211	3585	3513	4101	1920	2295	2493	6842	38593
R-squared	0.072	0.083	0.076	0.071	0.061	0.078	0.071	0.080	0.078	0.099

Standard errors are in Parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9: Strength of party identification's summary statistics

strength of party identification	Percentage
Very strongly Liberal	6.79
Fairly strongly Liberal	15.62
Not very strongly Liberal	7.77
Very strongly Conservative	6.85
Fairly strongly Conservative	12.68
Not very strongly Conservative	5.06
Very strongly NDP	3.3
Fairly strongly NDP	6.31
Not very strongly NDP	2.43
Very strongly Green	1.22
Fairly strongly Green	1.78
Not very strongly Green	0.39
Very strongly Green	1.32
Fairly strongly Green	2.96
Not very strongly Green	1.39
Independent	13.54
Other parties	2.90
Missing	7.70

Table A10: Attitudes toward immigration - Ordered logit for leader evaluations

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Liberal leader			
Very negative		0.477***	0.122***
		(0.003)	(0.001)
Negative	0.394***	-0.083***	0.044***
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Positive	0.554***	-0.116***	0.065***
	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Very positive	0.643***	-0.133***	0.077***
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.431***	-0.091***	0.049***
	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Conservative leader			
Very negative		0.336***	0.209***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Negative	-0.287***	0.057***	-0.039***
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Positive	-0.439***	0.088***	-0.058***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Very positive	-0.500***	0.100***	-0.065***
	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Missing	-0.495***	0.099***	-0.064***
	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.003)
NDP leader			
Very negative		0.488***	0.116***
		(0.006)	(0.004)
Negative	0.361***	-0.077***	0.039***
	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Positive	0.597***	-0.125***	0.069***
	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Very positive	0.829***	-0.170***	0.103***
	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Missing	0.272***	-0.058***	0.028***
	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.005)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9-Continued 1

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Green leader			
Very negative		0.429***	0.149***
		(0.006)	(0.004)
Negative	0.125***	-0.026***	0.015***
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Positive	0.249***	-0.051***	0.031***
	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Very positive	0.511***	-0.101***	0.068***
	(0.034)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Missing	0.093*	-0.019*	0.011*
	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Bloc Quebecois leader			
Very negative		0.418***	0.161***
		(0.008)	(0.003)
Negative	-0.033	0.007	-0.004
	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Positive	-0.052	0.010	-0.006
	(0.039)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Very positive	-0.037	0.007	-0.004
	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Missing	0.245***	-0.049***	0.031***
	(0.091)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Party identification			
Liberal (predicted probability)		0.378***	0.182***
		(0.003)	(0.004)
Conservative	-0.177***	0.036***	-0.022***
	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.004)
NDP	0.046	-0.009	0.006
	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Green	-0.034	0.007	-0.005
	(0.071)	(0.014)	(0.009)
Bloc Québécois	-0.140***	0.028***	-0.018***
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Other parties	-0.382***	0.078***	-0.046***
	(0.053)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Independent	-0.117**	0.023**	-0.015**
	(0.045)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Missing	-0.321***	0.065***	-0.039***
	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.006)
N		68994	
R-squared		0.106	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9-Continued 2

Variables	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Employment status			
Employed (predicted probability)		0.402***	0.169***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Unemployed	-0.088**	0.018**	-0.011**
	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Student	0.431***	-0.083***	0.060***
	(0.053)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Retired/Disable	0.060**	-0.012**	0.008**
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Homemaker	-0.032	0.007	-0.004
	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Missing	-0.175***	0.036***	-0.021***
	(0.065)	(0.013)	(0.007)
Income			
Less than Average (predicted probability)		0.423***	0.156***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
More than Average	0.200***	-0.040***	0.025***
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.214***	-0.043***	0.027***
	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Subjective views about Canada's economic situation			
Got better (predicted probability)		0.334***	0.213***
		(0.006)	(0.003)
About the same	-0.433***	0.086***	-0.058***
	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Got worse	-0.362***	0.071***	-0.049***
	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Missing	-0.210**	0.041**	-0.029**
	(0.095)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Subjective views about personal financial situation			
Got better (predicted probability)		0.368***	0.189***
		(0.003)	(0.002)
About the same	-0.069***	0.014***	-0.009***
	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Got worse	-0.374***	0.076***	-0.046***
	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Missing	-0.150**	0.030*	-0.020**
	(0.076)	(0.015)	(0.009)
N		68994	
R-squared		0.106	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9– Continued 3

Variables	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Religion			
Catholics (predicted probability)		0.413***	0.161***
		(0.003)	(0.001)
Atheist/Agnostic	0.216***	-0.043***	0.028***
	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Non-Catholic Christians	-0.024	0.005	-0.003
	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Other	0.196***	-0.039***	0.025***
	(0.043)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Jewish	0.502***	-0.098***	0.069***
	(0.074)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Islam	0.806***	-0.151***	0.119***
	(0.071)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Missing	0.216***	-0.043***	0.028***
	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Province			
British Columbia (predicted probability)		0.397***	0.173***
		(0.008)	(0.003)
Alberta	0.021	-0.004	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Manitoba	0.221***	-0.043***	0.030***
	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.002)
New Brunswick	0.053	-0.010	0.007
	(0.110)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Newfoundland and Labrador	-0.157	0.032	-0.019
	(0.342)	(0.069)	(0.040)
Nova Scotia	0.326***	-0.063***	0.045***
	(0.088)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Ontario	-0.183***	0.037***	-0.022***
	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Prince Edward Island	0.071	-0.014	0.009
	(0.183)	(0.036)	(0.024)
Quebec	0.130*	-0.026*	0.017*
	(0.068)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Saskatchewan	0.065***	-0.013***	0.008***
	(0.023)	(0.004)	(0.003)
N		68994	
R-squared		0.106	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9– Continued 4

Variables	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Education			
Less than post secondary education (predicted probability)		0.480***	0.123***
		(0.007)	(0.005)
Post secondary education	0.567***	-0.117***	0.067***
	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Missing	0.278**	-0.059**	0.030*
	(0.137)	(0.029)	(0.015)
Age			
Less than 30 years old (predicted probability)		0.401***	0.170***
		(0.005)	(0.004)
Between 30 and 40 years old	-0.103***	0.021***	-0.013***
	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Between 40 and 50 years old	-0.097*	0.020*	-0.012*
	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.006)
between 50 and 60 years old	-0.096*	0.019*	-0.012*
	(0.051)	(0.010)	(0.006)
between 60 and 70 years old	0.160***	-0.032***	0.021***
	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.006)
More than 70 years old	0.329***	-0.064***	0.045***
	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Missing	0.061	-0.012	0.008
	(0.119)	(0.024)	(0.016)
Marital status			
Married/Partner (predicted probability)		0.400***	0.171***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Divorced/separated	-0.121***	0.025***	-0.015***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Widowed	-0.074***	0.015***	-0.009***
	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Never married	0.064***	-0.013***	0.008***
	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Missing	0.491***	-0.094***	0.070***
	(0.070)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Immigration intake	-0.077**	0.015**	-0.010**
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Unemployment rate	0.014	-0.003	0.002
	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.005)
N		68994	
R-squared		0.106	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9– Continued 5

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Ethnicity			
White Canadian-born (predicted probability)		0.408***	0.164***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Visible minority Canadian-born	0.260***	-0.052***	0.034***
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Indigenous	-0.276***	0.057***	-0.031***
	(0.058)	(0.012)	(0.006)
More established white Immigrant	0.322***	-0.064***	0.043***
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Recent white immigrant	0.818***	-0.152***	0.123***
	(0.110)	(0.018)	(0.019)
More established visible minority immigrant	0.435***	-0.085***	0.060***
	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Recent visible minority immigrant	0.693***	-0.131***	0.101***
	(0.155)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Missing	0.062	-0.013	0.008
	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Gender			
Male (predicted probability)		0.367***	0.192***
		(0.004)	(0.001)
Female	-0.293***	0.059***	-0.037***
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.382***	-0.071***	0.057***
	(0.100)	(0.018)	(0.016)
N		68994	
R-squared		0.106	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A9– Continued 6

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Language			
English			
(predicted probability)		0.402***	0.169***
		(0.003)	(0.001)
French	-0.005	0.001	-0.001
	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Other	0.217***	-0.043***	0.029***
	(0.034)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Combination	0.025	-0.005	0.003
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Missing	0.019	-0.004	0.002
	(0.076)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Year			
1988		0.538***	0.099***
		(0.033)	(0.014)
1993	-0.058	0.012	-0.005
	(0.223)	(0.047)	(0.018)
1997	0.421**	-0.089**	0.040**
	(0.203)	(0.043)	(0.018)
2000	0.745***	-0.155***	0.079***
	(0.190)	(0.040)	(0.017)
2004	1.111***	-0.226***	0.131***
	(0.246)	(0.049)	(0.027)
2006	0.993***	-0.204***	0.113***
	(0.242)	(0.049)	(0.026)
2008	0.960***	-0.198***	0.108***
	(0.237)	(0.048)	(0.025)
2011	0.726***	-0.151***	0.076***
	(0.167)	(0.035)	(0.015)
2015	1.004***	-0.206***	0.115***
	(0.159)	(0.033)	(0.017)
2019	0.654***	-0.137***	0.067***
	(0.158)	(0.033)	(0.013)
N		68994	
R-squared		0.106	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A11: Attitudes toward immigration - Ordered logit model for media consumption

Variables		Model 3			Model 4	
	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Employment status						
Employed (predicted probability)		0.384***	0.178***		0.384***	0.178***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)
Unemployed	-0.072	0.399***	-0.009	-0.061	0.397***	-0.008
	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.049)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Student	0.463***	0.295***	0.069***	0.460***	0.296***	0.068***
	(0.055)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.055)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Retired/Disable	0.045	0.375***	0.006	0.039	0.376***	0.005
	(0.028)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.028)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Homemaker	-0.218***	0.429***	-0.027***	-0.207***	0.427***	-0.026***
	(0.060)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.060)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Missing	-0.189***	0.423***	-0.024***	-0.184***	0.422***	-0.023***
	(0.060)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.060)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Income						
Less than Average (predicted probability)		0.414***	0.160***		0.412***	0.161***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)
More than Average	0.222***	-0.045***	0.029***	0.214***	-0.043***	0.028***
	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Missing	0.364***	-0.073***	0.049***	0.342***	-0.069***	0.046***
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Subjective views about Canada's economic situation						
Got better (predicted probability)		0.278***	0.253***		0.281***	0.251***
		(0.005)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.004)
About the same	-0.802***	0.161***	-0.113***	-0.793***	0.159***	-0.111***
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Got worse	-0.458***	0.088***	-0.070***	-0.442***	0.085***	-0.068***
	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Missing	-0.342***	0.065***	-0.054***	-0.304***	0.057***	-0.048***
	(0.051)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Subjective views about personal financial situation						
Got better (predicted probability)		0.328***	0.213***		0.330***	0.212***
		(0.005)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.004)
About the same	-0.145***	0.029***	-0.021***	-0.141***	0.028***	-0.021***
	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Got worse	-0.573***	0.118***	-0.075***	-0.561***	0.115***	-0.073***
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Missing	-0.308***	0.062***	-0.043***	-0.311***	0.062***	-0.043***
	(0.093)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.093)	(0.019)	(0.012)
N		47928			47928	
R-squared		0.093			0.096	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 4 includes all variables in Model 3 as well as political interest. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A10– Continued 1

Variables	Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Religion						
Catholics (predicted probability)		0.410***	0.160***		0.409***	0.161***
		(0.004)	(0.002)		(0.004)	(0.002)
Atheist/Agnostic	0.307***	-0.062***	0.041***	0.304***	-0.061***	0.041***
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Non-Catholic Christians	0.046*	-0.010*	0.006*	0.040	-0.008	0.005
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Other	0.217***	-0.044***	0.028***	0.222***	-0.045***	0.029***
	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Jewish	0.428***	-0.085***	0.059***	0.421***	-0.084***	0.058***
	(0.081)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.081)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Islam	0.963***	-0.179***	0.151***	0.967***	-0.178***	0.151***
	(0.078)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.078)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Missing	0.307***	-0.062***	0.041***	0.304***	-0.061***	0.041***
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Province						
British Columbia (predicted probability)		0.369***	0.190***		0.371***	0.188***
		(0.007)	(0.003)		(0.007)	(0.003)
Alberta	-0.008	0.002	-0.001	0.006	-0.001	0.001
	(0.047)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Manitoba	0.170***	-0.033***	0.024***	0.181***	-0.035***	0.026***
	(0.063)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.063)	(0.012)	(0.009)
New Brunswick	0.163*	-0.032*	0.023*	0.179*	-0.035*	0.026*
	(0.093)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.093)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.137	-0.027	0.020	0.178	-0.035	0.025
	(0.176)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.176)	(0.034)	(0.026)
Nova Scotia	0.440***	-0.083***	0.067***	0.446***	-0.084***	0.068***
	(0.085)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.086)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Ontario	-0.190***	0.038***	-0.025***	-0.174***	0.035***	-0.023***
	(0.034)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.034)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Prince Edward Island	0.537***	-0.100***	0.084***	0.564***	-0.104***	0.088***
	(0.137)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.137)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Quebec	-0.147***	0.030***	-0.020***	-0.127**	0.026**	-0.017**
	(0.057)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.057)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Saskatchewan	0.040	-0.008	0.006	0.054	-0.011	0.007
	(0.074)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.074)	(0.015)	(0.010)
N		47928			47928	
R-squared		0.093			0.096	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 4 includes all variables in Model 3 as well as political interest. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A10– Continued 2

Variables	Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Education						
Less than post secondary education (predicted probability)		0.485***	0.121***		0.481***	0.122***
		(0.004)	(0.002)		(0.004)	(0.002)
Post secondary education	0.633***	-0.133***	0.076***	0.615***	-0.128***	0.074***
	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.315*	-0.067*	0.034*	0.300*	-0.064*	0.033*
	(0.165)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.165)	(0.035)	(0.020)
Gender						
Male (predicted probability)		0.362***	0.194***	0.000	0.365***	0.192***
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(.)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	-0.183***	0.037***	-0.025***	-0.160***	0.032***	-0.021***
	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Missing	0.469***	-0.087***	0.073***	0.491***	-0.091***	0.076***
	(0.122)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.122)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age						
Less than 30 years old (predicted probability)		0.349***	0.202***		0.345***	0.205***
		(0.006)	(0.004)		(0.006)	(0.004)
Between 30 and 40 years old	-0.241***	0.048***	-0.033***	-0.251***	0.050***	-0.034***
	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Between 40 and 50 years old	-0.334***	0.067***	-0.044***	-0.347***	0.070***	-0.046***
	(0.036)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.036)	(0.007)	(0.005)
between 50 and 60 years old	-0.370***	0.075***	-0.049***	-0.394***	0.079***	-0.052***
	(0.036)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.005)
between 60 and 70 years old	-0.067*	0.013*	-0.010*	-0.103**	0.020**	-0.015**
	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.040)	(0.008)	(0.006)
More than 70 years old	0.135***	-0.026***	0.020***	0.087*	-0.017*	0.013*
	(0.047)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.047)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Missing	0.070	-0.014	0.010	0.035	-0.007	0.005
	(0.164)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.164)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Marital status						
Married/Partner (predicted probability)		0.384***	0.179***		0.385***	0.179***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Divorced/separated	-0.130***	0.027***	-0.017***	-0.122***	0.025***	-0.016***
	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Widowed	-0.068	0.014	-0.009	-0.071	0.014	-0.009
	(0.046)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.046)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Never married	0.087***	-0.017***	0.012***	0.090***	-0.018***	0.012***
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.306***	-0.060***	0.044***	0.380***	-0.073***	0.055***
	(0.051)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.051)	(0.009)	(0.008)
N		47928			47928	
R-squared		0.093			0.096	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 4 includes all variables in Model 3 as well as political interest. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

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Table A10– Continued 3

	Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
Province-level variables						
Immigration intake	-0.155***	0.031***	-0.021***	-0.163***	0.033***	-0.022***
	(0.054)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.054)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Unemployment rate	-0.041**	0.008**	-0.005**	-0.047***	0.009***	-0.006***
	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Ethnicity						
White Canadian-born						
(predicted probability)		0.390***	0.174***		0.390***	0.174***
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Visible minority Canadian-born	0.204***	-0.041***	0.028***	0.202***	-0.040***	0.028***
	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Indigenous	-0.259***	0.054***	-0.031***	-0.249***	0.051***	-0.030***
	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.046)	(0.010)	(0.005)
More established white Immigrant	0.309***	-0.061***	0.044***	0.308***	-0.061***	0.043***
	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Recent white immigrant	0.853***	-0.156***	0.136***	0.842***	-0.154***	0.133***
	(0.147)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.147)	(0.023)	(0.027)
More established visible minority immigrant	0.314***	-0.062***	0.044***	0.320***	-0.063***	0.045***
	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Recent visible minority immigrant	0.683***	-0.129***	0.105***	0.668***	-0.125***	0.102***
	(0.111)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.112)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Missing	0.033	-0.007	0.004	0.037	-0.008	0.005
	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Party identification						
Liberal (predicted probability)		0.298***	0.228***		0.300***	0.227***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Conservative	-0.952***	0.202***	-0.120***	-0.955***	0.201***	-0.119***
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.003)
NDP	0.094***	-0.017***	0.015***	0.096***	-0.018***	0.016***
	(0.030)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Green	-0.089**	0.017**	-0.014**	-0.078*	0.015*	-0.012*
	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.045)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Bloc Québécois	-0.579***	0.119***	-0.081***	-0.570***	0.116***	-0.079***
	(0.047)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Other parties	-0.888***	0.187***	-0.114***	-0.884***	0.185***	-0.113***
	(0.073)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.073)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Independent	-0.424***	0.085***	-0.062***	-0.406***	0.081***	-0.059***
	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Missing	-0.742***	0.155***	-0.099***	-0.703***	0.145***	-0.094***
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)
N		47928			47928	
R-squared		0.093			0.096	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses.

Model 4 includes all variables in Model 3 as well as political interest. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A10– Continued 4

	Model 3			Model 4		
	Coef	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**	**Coef**	**Pr(fewer)**	**Pr(more)**
Language						
English						
(predicted probability)		0.382***	0.181***		0.383***	0.180***
		(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.003)	(0.002)
French	-0.040	0.008	-0.005	-0.037	0.007	-0.005
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Other	0.091**	-0.018**	0.012**	0.080*	-0.016*	0.011*
	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Combination	0.018	-0.004	0.002	0.030	-0.006	0.004
	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Missing	-0.051	0.010	-0.007	-0.038	0.008	-0.005
	(0.117)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.117)	(0.024)	(0.015)
News media consumption						
None (predicted probability)		0.484***	0.123***		0.466***	0.131***
		(0.014)	(0.007)		(0.014)	(0.007)
Less than 1 hour	0.491***	-0.103***	0.057***	0.410***	-0.085***	0.049***
	(0.068)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.068)	(0.014)	(0.007)
between 1 to 2 hours	0.737***	-0.151***	0.092***	0.611***	-0.125***	0.077***
	(0.071)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.072)	(0.015)	(0.008)
More than 2 hours	0.705***	-0.145***	0.087***	0.576***	-0.118***	0.072***
	(0.077)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.078)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Missing	0.399***	-0.084***	0.045***	0.335***	-0.070***	0.039***
	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.069)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Political interest						
Not interested (predicted						
probability)					0.450***	0.138***
					(0.007)	(0.004)
Interested				0.541***	-0.110***	0.069***
				(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Missing				0.235***	-0.049***	0.028***
				(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Year						
2011 (predicted probability)		0.351***	0.202***		0.366***	0.190***
		(0.010)	(0.007)		(0.010)	(0.007)
2015	0.210***	-0.040***	0.032***	0.210***	-0.041***	0.030***
	(0.051)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.051)	(0.010)	(0.007)
2019	-0.232***	0.047***	-0.031***	-0.133**	0.027**	-0.018**
	(0.055)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.056)	(0.011)	(0.008)
N		47928			47928	
R-squared		0.093			0.096	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants".

Model 4 includes all variables in Model 3 as well as political interest. For each model, the first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each set of variables, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

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Table A12: Attitudes toward immigration - Ordered logit for contact with visible minorities (Model 5)

Variables	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Employment status			
Employed (predicted probability)		0.438***	0.150***
		(0.004)	(0.002)
Unemployed	0.017	-0.003	0.002
	(0.070)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Student	0.522***	-0.102***	0.069***
	(0.083)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Retired/Disable	0.076**	-0.015**	0.009**
	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Homemaker	-0.075	0.015	-0.008
	(0.083)	(0.017)	(0.009)
Missing	-0.111	0.023	-0.012
	(0.102)	(0.021)	(0.011)
Income			
Less than Average (predicted probability)		0.455***	0.140***
		(0.005)	(0.003)
More than Average	0.209***	-0.042***	0.024***
	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Missing	0.103*	-0.021*	0.012*
	(0.054)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Subjective views about Canada's economic situation			
Got better (predicted probability)		0.288***	0.234***
		(0.007)	(0.006)
About the same	-1.191***	0.250***	-0.143***
	(0.045)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Got worse	-0.488***	0.097***	-0.071***
	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Missing	-0.442***	0.087***	-0.065***
	(0.071)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Subjective views about personal financial situation			
Got better (predicted probability)		0.384***	0.178***
		(0.007)	(0.005)
About the same	-0.136***	0.027***	-0.017***
	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Got worse	-0.472***	0.097***	-0.054***
	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Missing	-0.179	0.036	-0.022
	(0.146)	(0.030)	(0.017)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A11– Continued 1

Variables	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Religion			
Catholics (predicted probability)		0.471***	0.131***
		(0.005)	(0.003)
Atheist/Agnostic	0.402***	-0.082***	0.047***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Non-Catholic Christians	0.135***	-0.028***	0.015***
	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Other	0.481***	-0.097***	0.057***
	(0.068)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Jewish	0.405***	-0.082***	0.047***
	(0.109)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Islam	0.902***	-0.176***	0.120***
	(0.178)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Missing	0.084	-0.017	0.009
	(0.067)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Province			
British Columbia (predicted probability)		0.424***	0.159***
		(0.008)	(0.003)
Alberta	0.032	-0.006	0.004
	(0.055)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Manitoba	0.027	-0.005	0.003
	(0.071)	(0.014)	(0.009)
New Brunswick	0.230***	-0.046***	0.029**
	(0.088)	(0.017)	(0.012)
Newfoundland and Labrador	0.112	-0.022	0.014
	(0.105)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Nova Scotia	0.451***	-0.087***	0.060***
	(0.082)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Ontario	-0.145***	0.029***	-0.017***
	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Prince Edward Island	-0.221	0.045	-0.025
	(0.186)	(0.038)	(0.020)
Quebec	-0.024	0.005	-0.003
	(0.059)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Saskatchewan	0.007	-0.001	0.001
	(0.078)	(0.016)	(0.009)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A11– Continued 2

Variables	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Education			
Less than post secondary education (predicted probability)		0.539***	0.099***
		(0.006)	(0.003)
Post secondary education	0.662***	-0.138***	0.068***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Missing	0.459	-0.096	0.044
	(0.314)	(0.065)	(0.035)
Age			
Less than 30 years old (predicted probability)		0.399***	0.172***
		(0.009)	(0.004)
Between 30 and 40 years old	-0.269***	0.055***	-0.032***
	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Between 40 and 50 years old	-0.380***	0.077***	-0.043***
	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.006)
between 50 and 60 years old	-0.377***	0.077***	-0.043***
	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.006)
between 60 and 70 years old	-0.044	0.009	-0.005
	(0.056)	(0.011)	(0.007)
More than 70 years old	0.222***	-0.043***	0.030***
	(0.065)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Missing	-0.269***	0.055***	-0.032***
	(0.050)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Marital status			
Married/Partner (predicted probability)		0.431***	0.154***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Divorced/separated	-0.169***	0.034***	-0.019***
	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Widowed	-0.092	0.019	-0.010
	(0.064)	(0.013)	(0.007)
Never married	0.123***	-0.025***	0.015***
	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Missing	0.066	-0.013	0.008
	(0.136)	(0.027)	(0.016)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%,** indicated statistically significant at 5% and * indicates statistically significant at 10%.

Table A11– Continued 3

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Immigration status			
Native		0.436***	0.151***
		(0.003)	(0.002)
Immigrant	0.301***	-0.060***	0.038***
	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Gender			
Male (predicted probability)		0.415***	0.163***
		(0.004)	(0.003)
Female	-0.144***	0.029***	-0.017***
	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Missing	0.644***	-0.122***	0.092***
	(0.145)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Party identification			
Liberal (predicted probability)		0.351***	0.188***
		(0.005)	(0.003)
Conservative	-0.903***	0.193***	-0.097***
	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.004)
NDP	0.151***	-0.030***	0.022***
	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Green	-0.053	0.011	-0.007
	(0.059)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Bloc Québécois	-0.591***	0.125***	-0.070***
	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.006)
Other parties	-0.999***	0.214***	-0.105***
	(0.101)	(0.022)	(0.008)
Independent	-0.397***	0.083***	-0.050***
	(0.050)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Missing	-0.627***	0.133***	-0.073***
	(0.056)	(0.012)	(0.006)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.

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Table A11– Continued 4

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Language			
English			
(predicted probability)		0.440***	0.149***
		(0.004)	(0.003)
French	0.077	-0.016	0.009
	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Other	-0.027	0.005	-0.003
	(0.085)	(0.017)	(0.009)
Combination	0.145***	-0.029***	0.017***
	(0.036)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Missing	-0.185	0.038	-0.020
	(0.287)	(0.059)	(0.029)
News media consumption			
None (predicted probability)		0.520***	0.110***
		(0.020)	(0.009)
Less than 1 hour	0.407***	-0.083***	0.042***
	(0.102)	(0.021)	(0.009)
between 1 to 2 hours	0.569***	-0.116***	0.061***
	(0.108)	(0.022)	(0.010)
More than 2 hours	0.624***	-0.127***	0.068***
	(0.120)	(0.024)	(0.012)
Missing	0.428***	-0.087***	0.044***
	(0.101)	(0.021)	(0.009)
Political interest			
Not interested (predicted probability)		0.441***	0.148***
		(0.022)	(0.013)
Interested	0.469***	-0.092***	0.061***
	(0.063)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Missing	-0.087	0.018	-0.010
	(0.140)	(0.028)	(0.016)
N		25780	
R-squared		0.111	

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
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Table A11 – Continued 5

	Coef	Pr(fewer)	Pr(more)
Region of residence			
Rural (predicted probability)		0.510***	0.117***
		(0.026)	(0.011)
Town	0.046	-0.009	0.004
	(0.076)	(0.015)	(0.007)
City	0.141*	-0.029*	0.014*
	(0.078)	(0.016)	(0.007)
Missing	0.512***	-0.103***	0.056***
	(0.164)	(0.033)	(0.017)
Friend			
No visible minority friend (predicted probability)		0.441***	0.149***
		(0.015)	(0.008)
No friend	-0.162	0.033	-0.018
	(0.114)	(0.023)	(0.012)
1 visible minority friend	0.071	-0.014	0.008
	(0.059)	(0.012)	(0.007)
2 to 5 visible minority friends	0.215***	-0.043***	0.026***
	(0.061)	(0.012)	(0.008)
More than 5 visible minority friends	0.510***	-0.100***	0.066***
	(0.114)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Missing	0.038	-0.008	0.004
	(0.099)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Percentage of visible minorities in local area			
Less than 25 percent (predicted probability)		0.434***	0.153***
		(0.003)	(0.002)
Between 25 to 50 percent	0.111***	-0.022***	0.013***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Between 50 to 75 percent	-0.137**	0.028**	-0.015***
	(0.055)	(0.011)	(0.006)
More than 75 percent	-0.228*	0.046*	-0.025**
	(0.121)	(0.025)	(0.012)
N	25780		
R-squared	0.111		

Note: Dependent variable measures attitudes toward immigrants and is coded as coded as 1 "fewer immigrants", 2 "about the same immigrants", and 3 "more immigrants". Standard errors are in parentheses. The first column reports the estimated coefficients from ordered logit. The second and third columns reports calculated (marginal) effect of each variable on the probability of favouring fewer and more immigrants, respectively. For each panel, the first row reports the predicted probability (of supporting fewer/more immigrants) for the reference category. The remaining rows report the difference in predicted probabilities for each given category relative to the reference category.
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