

**Epistemic (mis)alignment in discourse:
what Spanish discourse markers reveal**

by

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore how speakers of Peninsular Spanish keep epistemic alignment during a conversation by using two discourse markers: sentence initial *sí* and sentence final *no* (Ortega, 1985; Montolío Durán, 1999; Schwenter, 2000b; Montañez Mesas, 2015; Schwenter, 2016b). I show that these two discourse markers operate at different conversational levels: *sí* keeps an alignment in the set of shared, public propositions, whereas *no* keeps an alignment between the information states of the interlocutors.

First, I focus on *sí* and its distribution. I show that *sí* is an illocutionary operator that marks that a proposition was already known by all interlocutors, hence forcing an alignment within the Common Ground. The sentence in which *sí* occurs is used in the conversation to reject the previous contribution due to a violation of a felicity condition. I use *sí* to show that speakers have two versions of the Common Ground: one representing what they themselves know, and the other representing what they believe the Addressee to know.

I also discuss the distribution of *no*, which is used to align both beliefs and outcomes among interlocutors. It does so by requesting confirmation from the Addressee that the contextual update proposed by the Speaker is shareable and public. The sentence in which *no* occurs is used in the conversation to confirm a bias held by the Speaker, either with respect to a belief or an outcome that is preferred.

Finally, I offer a syntactic analysis of both discourse markers. I adopt an analysis based on proposals to include utterance-level information in the left periphery.

I propose that *sí* is an illocutionary operator situated within the Complementizer Phrase, as high as ForceP, based on prosodic and syntactic evidence. I propose that *no* occupies an even higher position, outside of Complementizer Phrase but still within the same clause. I follow recent analyses in the syntactic literature in calling this higher structure the Grounding layer (Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). Within it, *no* occupies the layer that represents the Addressee's information state (as perceived by the Speaker).

Lay Summary

As language users, one of our conversational aims is to stay aligned—that is, in sync—with our audience. This alignment includes the information we know and the actions that we want to perform. But sometimes this alignment is in danger. In this dissertation, I focus on how speakers of Peninsular Spanish re-establish or maintain alignment by using certain words called discourse markers (DMs), in particular *sí* and *no*. I divide my analysis into two parts: (i) what the whole sentence with the DM does, and (ii) what the DM does to the sentence it appears in. I show that the use of these DMs also depends on the appropriateness of the previous contribution to the conversation (DM *sí*) and the bias of the Speaker in favour of a belief or an outcome (DM *no*). Finally, I show how these insights have their representation in the structure of the sentence.

Preface

The work presented in this thesis is original research conducted by the author, Adriana Osa Gómez del Campo. It builds on work done on interactional language by Dr. Martina Wiltschko's 'Eh Lab' (syntaxofspeechacts.linguistics.ubc.ca) both theoretically and empirically (part of the elicitation methods used were based on storyboards developed in this project, see 1.5).

The elicitations undertaken for this dissertation are covered under ethics approval for the project "Knowledge asymmetries in discourse: what Spanish discourse markers can tell [Spanish DMs]" (H16-03266) granted to the supervisor, Dr. Rose-Marie Déchaine. Elicitations were conducted by the author, who also analyzed the data.

Parts of this dissertation have been presented at different venues, including:

- An earlier version of the analysis of one of the discourse markers (DM *no*) was published in the proceedings of the 21st Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue, which took place in Saarbrücken in June 2017.
- An earlier version of the analysis of one of the discourse markers (DM *sí*) was presented at the Hispanic Linguistics Symposium 2019, which took place at El Paso in October 2019.
- The dialogue model based on three phases was presented as a poster by Dr. Johannes Heim and the author at the Canadian Linguistics Association, which took place in Vancouver in June 2019.

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Abbreviations and definitions

List of abbreviations used:

CG Common Ground

CP Complementizer Phrase

COND Conditional

DIM Diminutive

DC Discourse Commitments

DM Discourse Markers

FORM Formal

FUT Future

IMP Imperative

IMPER (Past) Imperfect

IMPRS Impersonal

IND Indicative

NEG (Sentential) Negation

PST Past

PL Plural

PREP Preposition

PRS Present

REFL Reflexive

SG Singular

SBJV Subjunctive

SUPER Superlative

TDL To-Do-List

List of the definitions of concepts that will be used in this dissertation:

Addressee The person to whom an utterance is directed.

Alignment A state where different elements are in a symmetrical position relative to each other. In this dissertation I focus on *epistemic alignment*: a symmetrical arrangement of the information states of the discourse participants.

Anchor The linguistic unit to which an appended element (tag) attaches.

Commitment A speaker commits to a proposition when they add it to their Discourse Commitments/Common Ground; a speaker commits to an outcome when they add it to their To-Do-List/Common To-Do-List.

Commitment (public) A commitment is public when all interlocutors are aware of it.

Commitment (shared) A commitment is shared when all interlocutors agree with it.

Conversation Type of discourse. Verbal or manual exchange between two language users who take turns being the Speaker/Signer or the Addressee.

Discourse Since conversations are the only type of discourse that I will focus on, I will sometimes use ‘conversation’ and ‘discourse’ interchangeably.

Discourse Move An action (verbal, signed, or gestured) taken by an interlocutor. A discourse move has a purpose and has consequences for future discourse.

Discourse Phase A particular moment in discourse.

Information State Consists of the beliefs and outcome preferences of each interlocutor.

Interlocutor(s) Conversational partners that take turns in a conversation.

Outcome The commitment type of imperatives: a consequence of an action (expressed by the imperative).

Proposition The denotation of declarative sentences; “the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity”(McGrath and Frank, 2018)

Speaker Speech Act participant who holds the floor at a given moment in a conversation and makes a move.

Speech Act A verbal or signed act by which a language user performs an action.

Speech act participant Speaker and Addressee.

Turn “a time during which a single participant speaks, within a typical, orderly arrangement in which participants speak with minimal overlap and gap between them.” (Levinson, 1983)

Utterance The smallest complete communicative unit; a sentence used in a particular context.

Acknowledgments

May this be a warning to the reader: this is the only part of the dissertation that has not been heavily edited, both in terms of grammatical errors and in terms of dramatic flare.

Whenever I felt at a breaking point I would imagine how it would feel to submit the dissertation with excruciating detail, how it would feel to defend, how it would feel to submit the final version of the dissertation. I even imagined what type of perfume I would be wearing. It helped me keep going. Out of all the (imagined) situations I made up, never in a million years could I have predicted that all these steps would happen during a global pandemic. So the following people who I will be thanking not only helped me through a regular tough period, but during an particularly tough period.

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To my parents, Joaquín and Mercedes, for giving me language.

And to my brothers, Luis and Juan, for teaching me how to (mis)use it.

The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we form by being together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space.

— Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*

Chapter 1

Introduction

- *My Dad just came into my room and shouted at me in Klingon. Am I more embarrassed that he did that or that I know he said I was a disappointment to the empire?*
- *You should be most embarrassed that you're a disappointment to the empire.* — an Internet user discovering the different dimensions of a conversation.

Conversations can be exhausting. Anyone who has had a job interview (or a conversation with a parent-in-law they just met) knows that conversations are so much more than an exchange of information conveyed simply by uttering one sentence after another. During a conversation, language users monitor not only propositional information, but sources of information, certainty of information, the emotional state of the interlocutors, even—as the quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates—the form of the message itself as opposed to the information it conveys. Most importantly, interlocutors want to stay “on the same page”: they want to stay *aligned* (Clark and Marshall, 1981; Sacks, 1987; Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Farkas and Bruce, 2010). Alignment between interlocutors can occur at different linguistic levels, including phonetic, phonological, lexical, syntactic, and semantic (Pickering and Garrod, 2004).

In this dissertation, I focus on a linguistic strategy by which interlocutors stay

aligned at the epistemic level, namely by using Discourse Markers (DM).¹ I define *epistemic alignment* as a symmetrical arrangement of the information states of the discourse participants, where the information states comprise their beliefs and their outcome preferences. I explore two Spanish DMs that are licensed in two contexts where a Speaker wants to maintain epistemic alignment:

- i The particle *si* (DM *si* henceforth) is used when the Speaker wants to flag epistemic misalignment between the interlocutors. This arises when interlocutors do not share the same background information as reflected by information conflict in the Common Ground (CG henceforth). An example of DM *si* as it is used in Peninsular Spanish is given in (1).
- ii The particle *no* (DM *no* henceforth) is used when the Speaker is trying to ascertain whether there is epistemic alignment between the interlocutors. This arises when Speaker wants to confirm the Addressee's information state. An example of DM *no* as it is used in Peninsular Spanish is given in (2).²

- (1) Context: A and B are discussing weekend plans. B tells A that they will go to the beach. A says:

Si hace un frío que pela!

si does a cold that peels

'[Si] it's freezing!'

¹I have expanded my definition of epistemic in this dissertation to encompass both beliefs and preferences, although the latter are not typically defined as epistemic.

²For ease of reading, I will not add a question mark after *no* in the body of the text, and I will not use the initial question mark '¿' that is used in Spanish orthography.

(2) Context: A and B are relaxing on a patio, enjoying a drink. A says to B:

Qué bien que se está aquí, no?

what well that IMPRS is here no

‘It is so nice here, [no?]’

I propose that these DMs operate at different *levels* of the conversation: some DMs aim to create *informational* links, and other DMs aim to have an effect on the information state of discourse participants (similar to the *intentional* level in Moore and Pollack (1992))³. I will operationalize these levels to mean that some DMs (like DM *sí*) act at the Common Ground level, other DMs (like a DM *no*) act at the speech act level. The former links the proposition denoted by the sentence it appears in to the previous discourse, while the latter confirms with the Addressee the appropriateness of the use of a speech act.

The fact that different DMs operate at different levels of the conversation is reflected in the syntactic structure. DMs have been assigned positions within the left periphery of the clause structure, more specifically as part of the Complementizer Phrase (CP) (Munaro and Poletto, 2002; Zimmermann, 2009; Paul, 2009; Cardinaletti, 2011). The Complementizer Phrase is the syntactic layer that codes “the interface between a propositional content (expressed by the IP) and the superordinate structure (a higher clause or, possibly, the articulation of discourse, if we consider a root clause)” (Rizzi, 1997, p.283); however, this position only conveys the function of DMs like *sí*, that operate at the informational level. For speech act-level DMs like *no*, recent analyses in the literature have proposed to extend the structure of the clause to include discourse and pragmatic information (Speas and Tenny, 2003; Emonds, 2004; Haegeman and Hill, 2013; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016).

This dissertation contributes to the literature on DMs by proposing a semantico-pragmatic and syntactic analysis of DM *sí* and DM *no*. These two DMs were

³They refer to the mental state of the discourse participants, instead of the information state.

chosen because they seem to encode polar opposites of each other: while DM *sí* is used as a corrective step (as we have seen in (1)) directly challenging the Addressee’s previous contribution, DM *no* requests a contribution from the Addressee, including them in the construction of the dialogue. DM *sí* will be analyzed as an illocutionary operator, marking that the proposition denoted by the sentence it precedes is already part of the CG. Because of its nature as an illocutionary operator, as well as its integration in the clause, I propose that it sits at the highest projection of CP. On the other hand, DM *no*’s contribution is to request from the Addressee to confirm that a conversational update can be made public and can be shared. Since it targets the Addressee’s information state, I position it in a syntactic layer above CP that encodes speech act-level information.

1.1 A tale of two discourse markers

Before I introduce the main protagonists of this dissertation and build up the theoretical setting within which I’ll construct my analysis, let us ask a more general question about DMs: why do we so often use something that is not, strictly speaking, necessary to convey the main message? One of the primary characteristics of DMs is, in fact, that they are *optional*. This brings up what Degand (2019) calls “the paradox of discourse markers”: DMs are highly frequent, and yet they are not strictly required.⁴ And although they might not be obligatory, they are necessary—something that is clear when language users mention that not using DMs makes them sound ‘like robots.’ Let us consider the dialogue in (3), taken from Gras and Sansiñena (2017, p.27; ex. 17):

- (3) *J01: Oye cuéntame lo del Luis (.) lo del beso*
J01: listen tell.me it of Luis (.) it about kiss

‘**Hey**, tell me about Luis, about the kiss’

⁴At least in the languages researched so far. There might be a language in the world where DMs are obligatory.

J02: No

‘No.’

J01: pucha que son malas

J01: damn COMP be.IND.PRS.3PL bad-F.PL

‘**Damn**, how bad you are!’ (taken from Gras and Sansiñena (2017, p.27; ex. 17) (Chilean Spanish)).

If we strip from this dialogue what we can identify as DMs (boldfaced above), the result in (4) is, intuitively, harsher: in the first turn by J01, without the opening DM *oye* ‘hey’, the command to tell a story about Luis seems too forward as the opening turn, and the second turn by the same J01 is less expressive, and in a sense ‘meaner’. The core message is still there, though: J01 orders J02 to tell a story, J02 refuses, and J01 accuses them of being mean.

(4) *J01: cuéntame lo del Luis (.) lo del beso*

J01: tell.me it of Luis (.) it about kiss

‘Tell me about Luis, about the kiss’

J02: No

‘No.’

J01: son malas

J01: be.IND.PRS.3PL bad-F.PL

‘You are bad.’

DMs may not convey the core propositional message of an utterance, but they establish how that core message is linked to other parts of the message (illustrated in (3) by the opening *oye* ‘hey’) and to the interlocutors (illustrated in (3) by the

expressive *pucha* ‘damn’). This linking function is not the essence of the message per se—but it is, in a sense, the essence of communication. This ‘peripheral’ role of DMs has been formalized in different ways—using the distinction between propositional and non-propositional meaning, conceptual and procedural meaning, or at-issue and not-at-issue, for example, with DMs conveying non-propositional or not-at-issue meaning—but the idea is the same: DMs are not needed to convey what is usually conceived of as the most important part of a message: its propositional information. DMs are in this sense similar to information structuring notions such as topic and focus: they are not obligatory, but they help package the information conveyed in a given proposition.

DMs are a notoriously hard category to define (see Crible (2017) for an extensive discussion of the terminology): even the term itself is the source of much debate, since it is sometimes used interchangeably with other (similar) terms like pragmatic markers or discourse particles.⁵ DMs form a heterogeneous group: some examples that have been studied as DMs include interjections (*Oh!*), conjunctions (*and*), adverbs (*frankly*), phrases (*y’know*), verbs (*listen*), and modal particles (Standard German *ja*, *doch*, *wohl*). Much of the literature defines them in negative terms: they do not convey truth-conditional meaning, they lack inflectional endings, and many of them do not seem to display much syntactic movement (Lewis, 2006; Biberauer et al., 2014).⁶ They are usually grouped together because they seem to share a common abstract function: linking propositional content to the context. More abstractly, their main defining role is to establish relationships between units of discourse.

Some analyses give a coherence-based explanation of the use of DMs, accord-

⁵I will assume in this dissertation that DMs are a superset of pragmatic markers and discourse particles.

⁶It is not entirely true that all proposed DMs lack inflectional endings, especially those that mark agreement with the Speaker or the Addressee (*allocutive agreement*), such as Upper Austrian German *goi/goins/goits*, which changes depending on whether the Addressee is addressed formally, informally, or is there is more than one Addressee (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). We will see more examples in Chapter 5.

ing to which they are used by the Speaker to guide the Addressee in assigning the correct coherence relations between units of discourse, which can be as large as paragraphs (Sanders and Noordman, 2000). A framework that has given special attention to the study of DMs is Relevance Theory (Wilson and Sperber, 1990, 1999, 2002). In analyses that follow this framework, DMs are viewed as elements that code instructions that help make inferences about the meaning of the utterance—using their terminology, they encode *procedural* meaning (Blakemore, 2001).⁷ DMs favour the inferential process by pointing explicitly at how coded representations should be connected with information that is already part of the context (Blakemore, 2004). Sometimes this includes the Addressee, and therefore many DMs are said to mark interpersonal contact (Briz, 1998).

DMs have also been analyzed as elements that facilitate *grounding*, a concept developed by Clark and Schaefer (1989); Clark and Brennan (1991): interlocutors want their contributions in a conversation to be understood, and therefore try to connect them to what is already shared—they ground the utterances in the conversation. This in turn is similar to the idea of Common Ground (CG) Management in the sense of Krifka (2008): some DMs concern themselves with the way the shared (CG) content should develop. In other words: they do not encode truth-conditional information, but link the truth-conditional information of the utterances they appear in to the rest of the conversation.

We see therefore that, broadly speaking, there are two types of approaches in the study of DMs: those which look at the relationship between the clause modified by a DM and its relationship with the rest of the discourse, and those which look at the relationship of the DM to the clause it appears in. One of the main take-away messages of this dissertation is that these are two sides of the contribution of DMs to the discourse: (i) relating the clause they appear in to the rest of the discourse, and (ii) their own specific contribution to the clause itself. These two sides are present in the analyses I offer for the DM *si* and DM *no*.⁸

⁷As opposed to conceptual meaning.

⁸The purpose of the analysis presented here is to bring together these two pieces (a speech-act-

1.2 The protagonists: DM *si* and DM *no*

1.2.1 The ‘rebel’ complementizer: the Peninsular Spanish DM *si*

There is growing interest in the Romance literature in general and the Spanish literature in particular about what Corr (2018) calls “illocutionary complementizers”—the use of the complementizers *que* (‘that’) and *si* (‘if, whether’) in root clauses, as in (6). These two complementizers typically head embedded clauses as in (5): in (a), we see the declarative complementizer *que* ‘that’ introducing a declarative embedded clause, whereas in (b) we see *si* introducing an interrogative embedded clause:

(5) a. *Me dijo que el gato de Adriana es negro.*
me said that the cat of Adriana is black.

‘She told me that Adriana’s cat is black.’

b. *No sé si el gato de Adriana es negro.*
NEG know if the cat of Adriana is black

‘[Si] Adriana’s cat is black.’

However, *que* and *si* can also be found in root clauses, as the examples in (6) show. The notable thing in (6) is that we find the complementizers *que* and *si* in root clauses, as opposed to embedded clauses as seen in (5):

driven analysis and a propositional-driven analysis), but it might be the case that only one of those pieces may successfully explain all the data presented here. A discussion of these two options, and a potential simplification of the analysis is a future step in my research program.

- (6) a. Context: For Adriana's birthday, A and B have drawn a fancy birthday card with a drawing of Adriana's cat, which they think is white. A finds out that the cat is, in fact, black, but they already gave the card to Adriana. A says to B:

Tú, que el gato de Adriana es negro.

you that the cat of Adriana is black.

'Hey, Adriana's cat is black.'

- b. Context: B says they will never borrow black clothes from Adriana because she has a cat and his fur will be visible on the black clothes. So A says:

Si el gato de Adriana es negro.

si the cat of Adriana is black

'[Si] Adriana's cat is black.'

Not only do the complementizers *que* and *si* appear in root clauses in (6a) and (6b), but *que* in particular can appear multiple times in the same utterance, in several syntactic positions within the CP (Demonte and Fernández Soriano, 2009; Villa-García, 2015, 2019):

- (7) *Que dice Adriana que su gato que es negro.*

that says Adriana that her cat that is black

'Adriana says that her cat is black.'

On the other hand, *si* does not appear to be as ubiquitous as *que*, and cannot appear in as many positions as *que* in (7). However, *si* can appear in contexts where instead of linking the clause it heads to the main clause (that is, instead of linking a non-root clause to a root clause), it links a root clause to a previous element within the immediate discourse, as we have seen illustrated in (6b). There

are, in fact, two types of constructions where *sí* appears in root clauses: exclamatives, as in (8a), or in constructions that seem to correct something in the previous contribution, as in (8b):

- (8) a. *Si será tonto!*
si be.FUT.3SG dumb
‘He is SO dumb!’

- b. Context: B is surprised to hear that an acquaintance is pregnant. A says:

Si lo sabe todo el mundo.
si it know.PRS.3SG all the world
‘[Si] everybody knows.’

This last type of construction is part of the focus of this dissertation. Most of the literature on this type of clauses highlights their adversative nature (Montolío Durán, 1999; Schwenter, 2000b; Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011) and they are often said to *refute* the previous discourse move. However, as Schwenter (2016b) points out, these utterances can be used in situations where at first glance the Speaker is not correcting the Addressee. This is the case in (9), where the Speaker is in fact agreeing with the previous contribution to the discourse:⁹

- (9) Context: B keeps reminding A to be confident if she wants to succeed.

Sí sí, sí ya lo sé.
yes yes si already it know.PRS.1SG
‘Yes, yes, I know.’

⁹This example includes an instance of the polarity and response particle *sí* ‘yes’. This particle is distinct from the *si* we are discussing in this thesis both in terms of stress (marked here orthographically), possibility of standing alone or having a prosodic break after it (only stressed *sí* can do both), as well as etymological origins.

I will refer to these instances as *sí*-clauses following Schwenter (2016a,b), and to the particle itself as DM *sí* given its discursive function. I will present an analysis of DM *sí* that has two main ingredients: (i) the contribution of the *sí*-clause to the discourse, and (ii) the contribution of the DM *sí* itself to the clause. These two ingredients are, however, linked and not entirely separable: the contribution of DM *sí* to the sentence will constrain the contribution of the clause as a whole to the discourse. Regarding the contribution of DM *sí* to the sentence it appears in, I propose that DM *sí* marks that the proposition denoted by the clause it precedes is already in the CG. By re-asserting a proposition the Speaker brings ‘back’ a proposition from the CG—the effect of this is the ‘you should have known this’ flavour that has been noted in the literature on DM *sí*. Regarding the contribution of the *sí*-clause as a whole, I propose that it is used to reject the previous discourse move based on its not satisfying felicity conditions. Both ingredients will be reflected in the syntactic analysis proposed for DM *sí* in Chapter 5: what I call its *superassertive* nature will come from its syntactic position as the head of the highest Force projection, ForceP; its use to link the clause it heads with the previous contribution comes from the fact that these constructions are *discourse anaphoric*: they need a discourse antecedent in order to be interpreted (Cook, 2008).

1.2.2 The negotiator: Peninsular Spanish DM *no*

The form [ANCHOR + *no*?] (where the anchor is the sentence that precedes DM *no*) in Peninsular Spanish has been referred to in the literature as a “comprobative” (*comprobativo*) marker (Ortega, 1985), an interactive marker (Briz, 1998), a mitigating device (Félix-Brasdefer, 2004b,a), a subjective marker (Móccero, 2010), and as a politeness strategy (García Vizcaíno, 2005; Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009).




Figure 1.1: Anchor and DM *no*.

(10) CONTEXT: B's cat is meowing and waiting next to his bowl. A tells B:

Dale la comida ya, no?
 give.IMP.2SG=him the food already no
 'Give him his food, [no?]'

Researchers sometimes study DM *no* in contrast to other confirmational markers, especially *eh* (García Vizcaíno, 2005; Montañez Mesas, 2015), or in contrast to English tag questions (Gómez González, 2014). Regardless of the framework of study, most studies define this construction as consisting of an anchor, followed by the negative particle *no* with rising intonation. The DM (or tag) is integrated into the intonational contour of the anchor (Cabedo Nebot, 2013), especially in fast speech, although an intonational break between the anchor and the DM is possible.

This dissertation will contribute a systematic description of the possible anchors of DM *no*, which will be crucial for the analysis of the contribution of the DM to the discourse structure. I will offer an analysis that encompasses the meanings attributed to DM *no* as a mitigating, interactive, confirming marker: adding the DM *no* requests confirmation from the Addressee that the conversational update proposed by the Speaker is shareable.

1.3 The setting: conversational updates

Conversations are sometimes modelled as a type of negotiation or a game (Lewis, 1979; Ginzburg, 1996, 2012; Farkas and Bruce, 2010). The players are the interlocutors, and they keep score of what has been said, and who said it. Formal models of conversation have exploited this depiction of dialogue and have referred to their models as a ‘scoreboard’ or ‘gameboard’ (Lewis, 1979; Ginzburg, 1996; Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Ginzburg, 2012; Malamud and Stephenson, 2015). Keeping score of *what* is said is useful in terms of referring back to a piece of information or entity. The importance of keeping score of *who* said what is a more recent update to the traditional scoreboard model, its importance highlighted by research on dialogue that includes perspectival elements like taste predicates (Malamud and Stephenson, 2015) and that focuses on the idea of dialogue as a way to express varying degrees of commitment to a proposition (Gunlogson, 2008; Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Krifka, 2015; Rudin, 2018; Heim, 2019a). All this information (who said what) is registered in a scoreboard—which I will call the *Dialogue Board*—as a way to keep track of the information that sustains the dialogue.

But interlocutors ‘use’ each other for more than tracking and keeping score. They may rely on each other to fully commit to the truth of what they are saying, what Gunlogson (2008) calls ‘contingent commitment’: the Speaker marks that she needs the contribution of the Addressee in order to add the proposition to the CG. There are various linguistic mechanisms that have been analyzed as contributing to this interaction between interlocutors, among others intonation (Gunlogson, 2008; Farkas and Roelofsen, 2017; Rudin, 2018; Schlöder, 2018; Heim, 2019a) and discourse particles and markers (Reese and Asher, 2007; Zimmermann, 2011; Lam, 2014; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Heim, 2019b; Jamieson, 2019).

In this section, I introduce the different components that form the Dialogue Board, divided into whether they are shared between the interlocutors, or whether they are individualized for each discourse participant. Different speech acts will target different components through specific effects on the Dialogue Board (Farkas

and Bruce, 2010): knowing the mechanics of simple (canonical) conversational updates will help us develop what happens during the complex conversational updates that DM *si* and DM *no* propose.

1.3.1 What gets updated in a conversation

One big question when studying any kind of cooperative enterprise (such as a conversation) is whether interlocutors are accessing a mutually shared set of information or, in contrast, whether they are only accessing information that is accessible to themselves. Specifically for conversations, the distinction between shared and individual components of a conversation is central to explaining the effects of different speech acts (Gunlogson, 2008; Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Malamud and Stephenson, 2015; Déchaine et al., 2017): for instance, a speech act like a promise would only affect an individualized component in that it would add the outcome of the promise to the Speaker’s “list” of actions she has committed to.¹⁰ Farkas and Bruce (2010) claim that language users want to expand the beliefs that we have in common. In their model (which I will call the Table Model following Rudin (2018)), they distinguish between a shared set of beliefs (the CG) and two individualized sets of beliefs (Discourse Commitments (DC)): the driving force of conversation is to move propositions from the DCs to the CG (Stalnaker, 2002; Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Rudin, 2018).

Rudin (2018) proposes the same split for commands: he proposes a shared To-Do-List (TDL) together with individual TDLs for each speech act participant. This results in a Split-Table Model, with one doxastic part (including DC/CG) and one teleological part (including TDLs). Each part consists of a shared element (either the CG or the TDL), and two individualized elements ($DC_{A/B}$ or $TDL_{A/B}$). This model, (schematized in Table 1.1), is the basis that I will work with.¹¹

¹⁰One could argue that a promise should be public in order to be a felicitous promise. Note that the fact that something is individualized does not mean that it is not public, only that the commitment to it is individual.

¹¹In Rudin’s model, he defines the contents of the TDL as preferences. Yang and Wiltschko (2016) talk about intentions. I chose outcomes following Beyssade and Marandin (2006), but all

	Doxastic	Teleological
Shared	Common Ground	To-Do-List
Individualized	Discourse Commitments ($DC_{A/B}$)	To-Do-List ($TDL_{A/B}$)

Table 1.1: Shared and individualized components of a conversation.

In the next sections I will describe these shared and individualized components of the conversation, focusing on the Common Ground (section 1.3.1.1), the common To-Do-List (section 1.3.1.2), the individualized Discourse Commitments (section 1.3.1.3) and the individualized To-Do-Lists (section 1.3.1.4). Both the kinds of information they contain, and the fact that they contain either shared or individualized commitments is a key component of the analysis presented in this dissertation.

1.3.1.1 Shared: The Common Ground

Conversations are said to happen against a background of shared information (Schiffer, 1972; Stalnaker, 1978; Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark and Carlson, 1981; Lee, 2001; Farkas and Bruce, 2010). This background is ever-changing: as the conversation moves forward, more information is added to it. We can refer to this shared background of information as the Common Ground (CG). It represents the shared, public commitments of the interlocutors during a conversation. These are the two characteristics of the CG: it is shared, and it is public. It is shared, because every interlocutor in the conversation is committed (at least publicly) to the truth of the propositions contained in CG. It is public, because interlocutors actually work together in order to build the CG. In fact, it is often stated that one of the main driving forces of a conversation is to add propositions to the CG.

The CG can be viewed as an element on its own or as a result of intersecting components depending on the approach taken (Gunlogson (2008); Farkas and Bruce (2010); Thoma (2016); Wiltschko and Heim (2016), a.o.). The two possibilities are sketched out in Figure 1.2.

these terms are meant to describe more or less the same concept.



Figure 1.2: Two possibilities for the nature of CG: as an independent component (left) or as the intersection of the interlocutor’s commitments (right).

Proponents of the intersection possibility claim that the CG is the result of the intersection between the individual commitments of the interlocutors: this is the situation sketched in the rightmost part of Figure 1.2 (Gunlogson, 2004, 2008; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). Whatever proposition is in this intersection, it will be common between all interlocutors (in this figure a dyad is assumed for simplicity), and hence it will be considered shared knowledge. On the other hand, proponents of having a CG that is separate from any other individual components use this distinction to capture the effect of assertions on the conversation: adding the asserted content to the CG (Farkas and Bruce, 2010).

This dissertation will assume that the CG is a separate component from individualized discourse commitments, following Farkas and Bruce (2010) and subsequent work that uses the model they propose (Malamud and Stephenson, 2015; Rudin, 2018). The CG will include “the set of propositions that have been agreed upon by all participants (...) together with the propositions that represent the shared background knowledge of the discourse participants.” (Farkas and Bruce, 2010, p. 85). This assumption (both on the conception of the CG, and the content of the CG) is made based on two pieces of evidence from the DMs discussed in this thesis. Regarding the independent status of the CG, the use of DM *no* shows that some complex discourse moves (like requesting confirmation of an assertion) are used specifically to mark that the Speaker wants to move a proposition from the individual components to the shared CG. Although this move is the default

for (unmodified) assertion according to Farkas and Bruce (2010), it is made *explicit* by the use of this DM. Regarding the content of the CG, the use of DM *si* in contexts where a felicity condition has been violated shows that this type of background information on conversational principles needs to be stored (and accessible), and I will assume that the CG allows us to model this.

1.3.1.2 Shared: Common To-Do-List

Rudin (2018) proposes to have a similar (publicly shared) element to CG, which is a reservoir of outcomes or preferences: a common To-Do-List (TDL). The notion of TDL comes from Portner (2004), which he defines as a set of functions from individuals to sets of properties. He distinguishes, however, two TDLs: one for the Addressee, one for the Speaker.

The role of the shared TDL is the teleological counterpart of the CG: the shared TDL is a publicly shared set of outcomes which includes the outcomes to which each interlocutor (A and B) have publicly committed. I will use this element to account for the fact that DM *no* can be used with imperative anchors to confirm with the Addressee that they are publicly committed to an outcome.

1.3.1.3 Individualized component: discourse commitments

Distinguishing shared from individualized commitments is important for situations where the truth of a proposition depends on a judge (Lasersohn, 2005; Stephenson, 2007). This situation is exemplified in (11a): when A utters (11), she is saying that the party is fun according to her perspective, a reading that can be made explicit by adding *to me*, as in (11b):

- (11) a. *This party is fun.*
b. *This party is fun to me.*

In (11) it is the personal taste predicate that is responsible for this perspective. Note, however, that (11a) might also have a reading where the Speaker is trying to convey that the party has the property of being fun—not only from her perspective,

but from a general perspective. In this case, the Addressee can refuse to accept that the judgement (that the party is fun) is shared, as the dialogue in (12) shows. Speakers can then “agree to disagree”: A thinks the party is fun, while B thinks that the party is not fun.

- (12) A: *This party is fun.*
B: *It isn't, I hate it here!*
A: *Well, I'm having a great time!*

In order to account for this type of example, Farkas and Bruce (2010) propose that a sentence like (11) can propose to add the proposition p = ‘This party is fun’ to either the CG or to A’s particular discourse commitments, DC_A , which include commitments which only one of the interlocutors has committed to. If the Addressee does not accept an update of the CG, the proposition will not be shared, but it will stay in DC_A .

I will refer to this type of sentences as evaluative assertions, as opposed to non-evaluative assertions, which by default propose to add a proposition to the CG. Other terms include subjective versus objective assertions (Rudin and Beltrama, 2019) or subjective versus factual assertions (Beltrama, 2018). Note that in these analyses they are all assumed to have assertive force, that is, that the Speaker is still ultimately trying to update the CG—this falls out from the assumption in Farkas and Bruce (2010) that moving propositions from the discourse commitments to the CG is one of the main forces that drive conversations.¹²

1.3.1.4 Individualized component: To-Do-Lists

When a Speaker puts forward a command like in (13), the Speaker is adding an outcome (taking out the garbage) to the Addressee’s To-Do-List (TDL) (Portner, 2004).

¹²This is not the only way to “cut the pie”: Déchaine et al. (2017) argue for a stronger definition of assertion, and the addition of another illocutionary force, presentation, that would be the illocutionary force of perspective-dependent predicates that do not intend to expand the CG. This will be pertinent to our discussion of a possible paradigm of root complementizers in Chapter 6.

(13) *Take out the garbage.*

Each interlocutor has a To-Do-List that contains the outcomes to which each Speaker commits. Commands such as the one in (13) propose to update the To-Do-List of the Addressee, but promises like (14) update the To-Do-List of the Speaker: they say that the Speaker commits to complying with the action of taking out the garbage (Portner, 2004).

(14) *I promise that I'll take out the garbage.*

We therefore need to distinguish the TDL of the Speaker and another TDL for the Addressee, just as we needed two different sets of discourse commitments.

1.3.2 Canonical conversation updates

The general consensus in recent literature is that speakers propose context updates and the Addressee decides whether the proposed update is carried out or not (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991; Ginzburg, 1996, 2012; Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko, 2016). Figure 1.3 shows a model in which an assertion consists of A uttering the proposition p , and p being automatically accepted by B.




Figure 1.3: The simplest possible model of interaction: A utters p , and p is automatically accepted by B into the CG.

Clark and Schaefer (1989) and Clark and Brennan (1991) criticized a model such as the one illustrated in Figure 1.3 since it does not reflect the collaborative nature of conversations. They highlight the fact that a speaker's contribution to discourse is contingent on the actions of the addressee: the main purpose of a conversation is establishing *mutual knowledge*, and it therefore needs *collective acts*

performed by all interlocutors (Clark and Schaefer, 1989, p.259). They therefore propose that each conversational turn is divided into two phases: the Presentation phase and the Acceptance phase, illustrated in figure 1.4. In the Presentation phase, A presents an utterance u for B to consider. In the Acceptance phase, B accepts u by showing that they have understood what A means by u . If B accepts u , both speakers arrive at a mutual belief that A's contribution is understood (and accepted).




Figure 1.4: Two-step model of a dialogue contribution, based on Clark and Schaefer (1989).

Recent formal conversation models have included the idea of *presenting* an utterance (specifically an assertion) before it is accepted into the CG. This dissertation will continue this trend and offer further evidence from Spanish DMs in favour of this idea, expanding it to include speech acts others than assertions and polar questions (which Clark and Schaefer (1989) mention, but don't formalize specifically). This section presents one such formal model, namely the one proposed by Farkas and Bruce (2010). This model formalizes the proposal nature of assertions.

The model presented in Farkas and Bruce (2010) (F&B henceforth) is meant to formalize the effects that assertions and polar questions have on the conversation, and how the similarities (and differences) between these effects can explain the possible reaction to them. F&B formalize context update proposals by adding a *Table* component to their model—I will refer to their model as the Table Model

henceforth (Rudin, 2018). The Table is specifically conceived to represent the fact that context updates need to be proposed (tabled) before they are accepted into the shared knowledge component—in this case, the CG. Another element F&B incorporate is the *projected set* (PS): it represents the possible ‘future’ CG, that is, what the CG would look like if the proposed update were to be taken. The complete model is represented in Figure 1.5, which includes individualized discourse sets for each discourse participant (here assuming two discourse participants).¹³

A	Table	B
DC_A	S	DC_B
Common Ground cg		Projected set ps

Figure 1.5: The Table Model by Farkas and Bruce (2010).

Different utterances propose different updates. F&B introduce first a simplified initial state K_1 that holds prior to an utterance, as in Figure 1.6: there is nothing on the Table nor in the discourse commitment sets, and the CG and the ps are equal. As we will see in 2.3.3.1, when analyzing the licensing (and effect) of DM *no* and DM *si* we will have to exploit this initial state.

A	Table	B
Common Ground s_1		Projected Set $ps_1 = \{s_1\}$

Figure 1.6: Initial state K_1 .

An assertion such ‘*Sam is home.*’ proposes to update the CG with the proposition $p =$ ‘Sam is home’. When A utters p , however, the CG is not immediately updated: the utterance is put on the Table (both the proposition it denotes, and

¹³This model assumes a separation between the CG and the individualized commitments for each discourse participant; in Figure 1.2, this would be the leftmost representation of the nature of CG.

the sentence itself as a syntactic object with the declarative feature [D]) and the projected set ρS is updated.

A	Table	B
p	$\langle \text{'Sam is home' [D]; } \{p\} \rangle$	
Common Ground $s_2 = s_1$		Projected Set $\rho s_2 = \{s_1 \cup \{p\}\}$

Figure 1.7: State K_2 : A utters an assertion.

If B accepts this proposal, the next state would be the one in Figure 1.8: the Table is empty, as well as the PS, and the proposition is added to the CG.¹⁴

A	Table	B
Common Ground $s_3 = s_2 \cup \{p\}$		Projected Set $\rho s_3 = \emptyset$

Figure 1.8: State K_3 : B accepts the move.

What we have just seen is one possible effect of assertions on the discourse. F&B also discuss the effect that polar questions have: instead of proposing the addition of a proposition to the CG, when A utters “Is Sam home?” she proposes to update the CG with either p or $\neg p$. This is reflected in the context set by updating the projected set ρS , which now contains both possibilities (p or $\neg p$ added to the previous CG s_1). Here, [I] represents the interrogative form of the sentence.

A	Table	B
	$\langle \text{'Sam is home' [I]; } \{p, \neg p\} \rangle$	
Common Ground s_1		Projected Set $\rho s_1 = \{s_1 \cup \{p\}, s_1 \cup \{\neg p\}\}$

Figure 1.9: State K_4 : A asks a polar question.

¹⁴Previous to this, p is added to the DC of both interlocutors, but as it enters the CG it is removed from these individualized commitment lists (Farkas and Bruce, 2010, p.99).

The idea that bare assertions and polar questions are update proposals instead of direct updates is key in the development of analyses of elements that modify assertions and polar questions, such as intonation and, crucially, DMs (Heim et al., 2014; Malamud and Stephenson, 2015; Thoma, 2016; Heim, 2019a; Jamieson, 2019).

1.3.3 Complex conversation updates: two cases

The exchanges we saw modelled in section 1.3.2 are a simplification of what goes on in a conversation. Simplified versions of what happens during a conversation are a useful basis for developing a theory of conversation; however, it is also important to look at more complex interactions. This dissertation focuses on two types of context that call for a more complex type of update of the conversation: (i) situations where not all discourse participants share the same background information; and (ii) situations where the Speaker requests the contribution of the Addressee to confirm the validity of the contextual update. Behind the use of DMs in these situations there seems to be a drive by language users to achieve *maximal alignment*, a concept defined in (15):

- (15) **Maximal alignment:** Interlocutors strive to eliminate any belief or outcome misalignment.

This principle seems to drive language users to either repair a perceived misalignment (the situation with DM *si*), or to confirm that there is, in fact, epistemic alignment between the interlocutors (the situation with DM *no*).

1.3.3.1 Mending epistemic misalignment: Peninsular Spanish DM *si*

Most of the foundational work that has been done on the flow of conversations has focused on its additive nature: how interlocutors build up a conversation together, exchanging information and adding to the shared background information. Farkas and Bruce (2010, p.83) assume that “conversational changes that result in addition to commitments are less marked than those that result in the retraction of such

commitments”, and that “denials are conversationally marked moves because they lead to conversational crisis” (idem, p. 110). However, some circumstances require the use of more marked, less additive conversational changes, as for example (16):

- (16) Context: A and B have been friends for a while, and had long conversations about their families. A never mentioned siblings. One day, B tells A that they can’t wait to meet A’s siblings. A says :

Si soy hija única.

si am child unique

‘[Si] I’m an only child.’

In (16) there is an epistemic conflict: A thinks that it is in the background knowledge that she does not have siblings (since she never mentioned them); however, B has presupposed that A does have siblings, which means that the CG they are working with contains the proposition p =‘A has siblings.’

Something is wrong. The proposition that B tables presupposes a proposition that is in conflict with a proposition that is in the CG (according to A). The participants’ information states are misaligned. Stalnaker (2002) mentions that when a speaker recognizes that not all discourse participants share the same CG, “some kind of corrective action is called for” (Stalnaker, 2002, p.717). This is exactly what DM *si* in (16) does: it is the corrective step after a speaker has recognized a defective context. But how does it do it? And what does it mean for our model of conversation?

In Chapter 3 I claim that *si*-clauses, like the one we just saw in example (16), do not represent assertions but *superassertions*. Unlike assertions, superassertions do not propose to update the CG with a new proposition, but they mark that a proposition is already part of the CG. This proposal also reflects previous analyses of DM *si*. Schwenter (2016a) argues that *si* marks that the proposition it introduces is obviously true to the Speaker: this analysis steers away from previous

ones that relied on the notion of contrast or contradiction (such as Rodríguez Ramalle (2011)), since *sí*-clauses can appear in contexts where there isn't any contradiction.

What the example in (16) highlights, though, is that it seems that there is not just one version of the CG that is accessible to the participants: two interlocutors can have a different idea of what is contained in the shared CG. What is more: the Speaker seems to be able to identify this conflict, which means that she must be tracking what the Addressee thinks that the CG looks like. In Figure 1.10, this is represented by the image on the right, whereas the image on the left represents a model where there is only one CG:



Figure 1.10: One or two CGs?

Gunlogson (2008, p.108) points out that:

Strictly speaking, each agent should have their own version of the overall discourse structure, i.e., there should be one structure [...] per agent. I follow common practice in idealizing away from that level of representation for present purposes, assuming that the agents' individual representations of the context do not differ substantially enough to impede the progress of the discourse.

The contexts of use of *sí*-clauses do not allow us to make that assumption. I propose a model of conversation that includes two versions of the CG. However, both versions of the CG are mediated through the Speaker: no interlocutor has access to the mind of the Addressee and knows exactly what the other person believes to be publicly shared. DM *sí* therefore forces us to reflect the fact that

when we represent in a model what the dialogue looks like at a time t during the conversation, we are seeing it through the eyes of the Speaker, and this includes the mutually shared knowledge. I will propose to formalize this mediation in the model itself. This highlights the Speaker-centred analysis of DM *si* in Schwenter (2016a).

The felicitous use of DM *si* forces us to consider much of what came *before* the utterance marked with the particle: we need to highlight the different states that precede the use of the *si*-marked clause if we want to understand the effect it has on subsequent discourse. In order to fully account for the contexts of use and effect of these constructions, we have to keep track of various phases before the Speaker utters the *si*-marked clause.

1.3.3.2 Confirming epistemic alignment: the Peninsular Spanish DM *no*

Another example of a complex update can be seen in (17), where the utterance made by the Speaker seems to have more than one effect on the conversation:

(17) *This is red, isn't it?*

The example in (17) illustrates an English *tag question*, consisting of an anchor and the *tag*, which here has the form of a negated auxiliary and a subject pronoun.¹⁵ On the one hand, the utterance asserts to some extent the proposition ($p =$ 'This is red'), but it also asks the Addressee to confirm whether this proposition is true. It opens up a negotiation in the sense that it requires the involvement of the Addressee in establishing the shared knowledge (the CG): the proposition 'This is red' will not enter the CG until the Addressee accepts it. The difference between this and a canonical update proposal is that in (17), the Speaker only tentatively commits to the proposition, as Malamud and Stephenson (2015) note. They model this distinction by claiming that there is not only one projected set for the CG, as F&B had included in their Table Model, but that also individual DCs

¹⁵More precisely, it is a reverse polarity tag.

have their own projected set in this account. Tentatively committing to a proposition translates in this account to adding it to the projected DC of the Speaker (in the case of reverse polarity (RP) tags) as Figure 1.11 illustrates.

DC_A	DC^*_A	DC_B	DC^*_B
	p		
TABLE			
p			
CG		CG*	

Figure 1.11: How Malamud and Stephenson (2015) analyze RP-tags. Components with an asterisk (*) represent projected sets.

A request for confirmation can take many forms—and importantly, it can request the confirmation of things beyond propositions. Wiltschko and Heim (2016) show in (18) and (19) how the DM *eh* in Canadian English can be used both to inquire about the truth of a proposition p (in (18)) and to request confirmation of the Speaker’s assumption of the Addressee’s knowledge of p (in (19)). In the latter context, not all confirmational are felicitous, as the non-acceptability of *huh* and *right* shows.

- (18) Context: John knows that Mary would like to have a new dog. He hasn’t seen her in a long time. And he keeps wondering whether she got a new dog. One day he runs into her while she’s walking a new puppy. John utters:

You have a new dog, {eh/huh/right}?
 = Confirm that p is true (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016, 3:5)

- (19) Context: Mary is walking her new dog when she runs into John. She is expecting that he would congratulate her on the new dog, but he’s not mentioning it. She isn’t sure anymore whether he actually realizes that she has

a new dog. So she utters:

*I have a new dog, {eh/*huh/*right}?*

= Confirm that you know that p is true (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016, 3:6)

Wiltschko and Heim (2016) propose that speakers can table not just propositions, but also attitudes towards propositions. In addition, they also propose to model the biased nature of tag questions as in Figure 1.12: the use of the confirmational DM *eh* labels A's bias towards B believing p (marked by boldfaced font) over its polar opposite. This bias is also encoded in the Speaker's commitment set. In this framework, the CG is the intersection between the two individualized grounds of the interlocutors.

Speaker (S)	Table	Addressee (A)
Bel(A, p) \vee Bel (A, $\neg p$)	Bel(A, p) \vee Bel(A, $\neg p$)	

Figure 1.12: Analysis of Canadian *eh* in Wiltschko and Heim (2016).

Two things are especially interesting for analyzing DM *no*: on one hand, the fact that we need to table not only propositions, and on the other hand, the bias that comes with the use of a request for confirmation.

The analyses just presented use F&B's Table Model as a way to represent these complex contexts where interlocutors not only exchange propositional information, but also convey more meta-conversational information. I also use F&B's Table Model as a basis for my own model, and include some modifications to it (section 2.3.3). However, there is another advantage to F&B's Table Model that has not been exploited to its full potential (neither in the more general discussion about dialogue nor in the contribution of DMs), and that is the way it represents the link between speech act types and different types of conversational updates.

This is especially important for the discussion about DM *no*.

DM *no* can accompany a wide variety of anchors, as we will see in both Chapters 2 and 4. This DM does not discriminate in terms of the sentence type it can modify—but it does discriminate in the type of speech act it anchors to. A sneak peek of the types of anchors that DM *no* can attach to is given in Table 1.2:

Table 1.2: Felicity of confirmational *no* with different anchors.

Type of speech act	Confirmational
Assertive (affirmative)	4
Assertive (negative)	4
Assertive (taste)	4
Assertive (internal state)	7
Polar question	7
Wh-question	7
Rhetorical Wh-question	4
Command	4
Expressive	7
Commissive	7
Declaration	7

Malamud and Stephenson (2015) make a point of saying that they focus on declaratives and tags, and Farkas and Bruce (2010) only discuss assertions and polar questions. Wiltschko and Heim (2016) do discuss the possibility of confirmational requesters requesting confirmation of something other than the truth of a proposition, and their framework in itself makes a point in stating that some confirmational requesters might be sensitive to something beyond sentence type (Yang and Wiltschko, 2016; Wiltschko et al., 2018). However, the discussion on declarative sentences has typically centred on assertions, and not on other speech act types that are also (typically) expressed with the declarative sentence type, such as commissives. The infelicity of using DM *no* with this specific speech act type will be a key piece of evidence in the analysis.

1.3.4 The link between speech acts and conversational updates

As I just mentioned, one of the main points in F&B is that different speech act types have an effect on the dialogue that is particular to that speech act. We have seen what happens with assertions and questions, but what about other types of speech acts? And is there any other way in which speech act type impacts the use of DM *si* and DM *no*?

The first important point is to distinguish sentence type and speech act type. I will distinguish four basic sentence types (declaratives, imperatives, interrogatives, and exclamatives), and six basic speech act types, summarized in Table 1.3. Distinguishing between sentence type (the actual syntactic form of the sentence) and speech act type (the performative use of the sentence) is crucial for the analysis of DMs. On the one hand, DM *no* is sensitive to speech act types but not sentence type (a cross-linguistics parameter of variation (Wiltschko et al., 2015)), and the commonalities between the speech act types that can occur with it tell us something about the contribution of *no*. On the other hand, the fact that each speech act type has a number of felicity conditions associated with it explains the licensing of DM *si*, as we will see in Chapter 3.

I will slightly modify the taxonomy in Searle (1979) by making a distinction between commands and questions—for him, these two speech act types form one superset called *directives*. The speech act types that will be discussed in this dissertation are assertions, commands, questions, expressives, commissives, and declarations, and are summarized and described in Table 1.3.

Table 1.3: Speech act types discussed in this dissertation, based on Searle (1979, 1976)

Type	Characteristics	Example
Assertions	Commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition.	<i>There's a pet store on Main.</i>
Commands	Attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.	<i>Give me the keys.</i>
Questions	Attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to provide information.	<i>What's your name?</i>
Expressives	Express the speaker's attitude about objects and facts of the world.	<i>I'm sorry.</i>
Commissives	Commit the speaker to some future course of action.	<i>I promise I'll do it.</i>
Declarations	Change a non-linguistic state of affairs in the world.	<i>You're fired.</i>

There is a 'canonical' link between sentence types and speech act types: assertions are typically conveyed with declarative sentences, questions are typically conveyed with interrogative sentences, etc. This is not a one-to-one mapping: for instance, commissives are typically conveyed by declarative sentences, and some interrogative sentences are said to have the force of an assertion (Han, 2002; Corr, 2016)—this is the case of rhetorical questions. This fact will play an important role in the analysis of DM *no* in Chapter 4.

Different speech act types are also associated with different types of commitments (Portner, 2004; Beyssade and Marandin, 2006): an assertion commits the Speaker to the truth of a proposition, whereas a commissive commits the Speaker to an outcome or action. Another important difference between speech act types is

what can be called the orientation of the commitment: a commissive only requires the commitment of the Speaker, whereas a command requests an action from the Addressee. A summary of these characteristics is shown in Table 1.4.

Table 1.4: Speech acts, commitment types, and the dialogue elements.

Type	Commitment to	Dialogue component targeted
Assertion (non-evaluative)	proposition	CG
Assertion (evaluative)	proposition	DC _{Speaker}
Command	outcome	TDL _{Addressee}
Question	set of propositions	CG
Expressive	N/A	DC _{Speaker}
Commissive	outcome	TDL _{Speaker}
Declaration	proposition	CG

There is another way in which speech act types affect the use of DMs, in particular DM *5*: the felicity conditions associated with them. Speech act types have a particular set of rules, or felicity conditions, that ensure their success in performing the act they are supposed to perform. These felicity conditions are divided into four types: propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and essential conditions (Searle, 1969; Vanderveken, 1990). *Propositional content conditions* make sure that the meaning of the sentence is appropriate: for instance, when making a promise, the act that the Speaker is promising to fulfill has to be in the future. *Preparatory conditions* describe the ‘right’ conditions for the speech act to be felicitous: when making a promise, the Addressee should welcome the action that the Speaker is promising to fulfill (otherwise it seems more like a threat than a promise). Sincerity conditions guarantee that the Speaker has the appropriate thoughts or feelings; for instance, if a Speaker is commanding an Addressee to perform an action, the Speaker should *want* the Addressee to perform that action. *Essential conditions* make sure that

the speech act performed is in fact considered by the interlocutors as performing the appropriate speech act. These conditions are summarized in Table 1.5.

Type	Definition	Example (request)
Propositional content	the meaning of the sentence is appropriate	Future act
Preparatory	contextual conditions that need to hold	Addressee is able to do the act
Sincerity	Speaker's attitude	Speaker wants Addressee to do the act
Essential	Speaker's intention to perform the speech act	Performed act counts as a request

Table 1.5: Searle's felicity condition types (Searle, 1969).

Language users have this type of knowledge—the knowledge of felicity conditions and of the rules of a conversation in general. Failing to satisfy these conditions will also result in epistemic misalignment, and this can trigger the use of DM *si*, as we will see in Chapter 3.

1.4 The road ahead

The protagonists have been presented, and I have just laid out a very abstract setting, introducing a general, dynamic idea of how conversations work and the link between this idea of conversations and speech act types. In the next sections I describe briefly how the DMs fit into this setting, and the structure of the present dissertation.

1.4.1 Where we find *si* and *no* and what they do

Chapter 2 focuses on the two DMs themselves: where we find them and what they do. Both DM *no* and *si* have a wide *functional range* (Thoma, 2016), which

means that they are used in a wide variety of different contexts. I will describe different uses of *si* and *no* other than their use as DMs, although the main focus will be on their use as DMs. I refer to previous analyses of these DMs in the literature, and present the next steps in the analysis: the tools for modelling the contribution of DM *si* and *no*, as well as a first approximation to their analyses.

1.4.2 Analysis of DM *si*: monitoring the CG

Chapter 3 proposes an analysis for the semantic and the pragmatic effects of the DM *si*. One of the main points is that we need to distinguish the contribution of the *si*-clause to the discourse from the contribution of the DM *si* to the clause it introduces. Regarding the contribution of the *si*-clause to the discourse I claim that it is used to reject the previous discourse contribution based on it not observing a felicity condition. This infelicitous discourse contribution makes apparent that there is a mismatch in the CG. In (20), A is rejecting the previous command because it does not meet one of the felicity conditions of commands: namely, that the Addressee should be able to perform the action in the future.

(20) CONTEXT: B orders: Bring me a cookie! A replies:

Si te las acabaste ayer.
si you them finish.PST.2SG yesterday
‘[Si] you finished them yesterday.’

In (20), A’s reply rejects the previous command: A cannot possibly comply with that command (bringing a cookie), since B ate all the cookies the day before. In other words: it is impossible for A to accept the command because she cannot perform the action required by the order. That is, A rejects an order because one of the felicity conditions (the Addressee needs to be able to perform the action required) is not met.

Regarding the contribution of the DM *si*, I claim that it is used to remind the

Addressee that the proposition denoted by the sentence it introduces is *already* in the CG. In other words, it doesn't propose to update the CG, but reminds the Addressee of the content of the CG. I claim that this is a special type of illocutionary force: instead of asserting a proposition p , a *si*-clause *superasserts* p .

The difference between an assertion and a superassertion is that whereas when someone asserts p they propose to update the CG with p , when someone superasserts p they mark that the proposition is already in the CG, and hence, no update of the CG is needed.

1.4.3 Analysis of DM *no*: monitoring the Speaker-Addressee relation

Chapter 4 focuses on DM *no*. Its core function is to monitor the relationship between the Speaker and the Addressee by requesting the involvement of the Addressee in adding a proposition or an outcome from the individual DCs or TDLs to the shared CG or shared TDL.

In the following examples, we see how the Speaker is trying to create alignment with the Addressee: both in terms of future outcomes (21) and in beliefs (22). In (21), the Speaker wants to know whether the outcome described by the imperative ('Let's go somewhere else') is something that the interlocutors are committed to; in (22), the use of DM *no* checks whether the Speaker's opinion (about the movie being boring) is shared with the Addressee:

(21) *Venga, vamos a otro sitio, no?*
come.on go.PRS.1PL to another place no

'Come on, let's go somewhere else, [no?]' (Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009)

(22) Context: A and B just started watching a popular show. After 5 minutes A is bored, and B looks at A and rolls their eyes. A says:

Esta serie es un rollo, no?

this show is a drag no

‘This show is boring, no?’

Whereas DM *sí* takes a proposition as its argument, DM *no* takes a whole speech act, as will be shown in Chapter 4. These different levels at which DM *sí* and DM *no* operate can also be seen in the different positions these DMs occupy in the syntactic structure.

1.4.4 What’s syntax got to do with it?

Chapter 5 proposes a syntactic analysis of the DMs *sí* and *no*, adopting proposals that enrich and expand the left periphery of the clausal architecture. Rizzi (1997) proposes that the CP consists of several projections, including Topic, Focus, and other information structure related phenomena. Using data from Romance languages, especially Italian, Rizzi (1997) proposes that we need to distinguish at least two projections: ForceP, which hosts the complementizer, and FinitenessP, which is a direct link to the finite/non-finite feature of the verb in IP. Between those two projections there are other projections which are landing sites of topics and foci. There have been later additions to this ‘exploded CP’, including an Interrogative Phrase (which would host interrogative complementizers) and Modifier Phrase (which hosts discourse-oriented adverbials), represented in Figure 1.13 (abstracting away from certain projections that are not relevant for current purposes).

The CP is the syntactic layer where a sentence radical (IP) gets linked to another clause or to the rest of the discourse, which is which is how I have characterized the role of DMs in this chapter: it seems intuitive to locate our DMs in this part of the syntactic structure. However, things are a bit more complicated; in Chapter 5 I will propose that only one of the two DMs (DM *sí*) is located in




Figure 1.13: Exploded CP.


the CP layer, and that given its function, its relative order with respect to other elements of the left periphery and its scope it lexicalizes the highest projection of a split phrase encoding Force (Coniglio and Zegrean, 2012).

Previous research has stated that DMs are outside the scope of traditional syntax (Pons Bordería, 2006; Travis, 2006; Roggia, 2012; Montañez Mesas, 2015). However, recent work within generative syntax has proposed ways in which utterance-level phenomena (such as DMs) can be modelled. I refer to these models as *neoperformative analyses* following Wiltschko and Heim (2016), referring back to Ross' Performative Hypothesis (Ross, 1970). He proposed to analyze sentences like (23a) as having a covert performative verb (23b): that is, the idea that every utterance is performative is encoded in the syntax:

- (23) a. I will give you your money back.

b. I promise you that I will give you your money back.

He extends this hypothesis to include declarative clauses. The proposal is therefore that all matrix clauses are in essence bi-clausal in their deep structure, with an element representing the Speaker (the subject in this upper clause), an element representing the addressee (the object), and a verb of saying linking both elements (the predicate). In other words: the utterance “Adriana is writing” is in fact bi-clausal, with the higher clause “I tell you (that)” being deleted. This is exemplified in the following tree:



The Speaker has a central role in assigning meaning to certain linguistic items: indexicals such as first and second person pronouns, demonstratives, and temporal locutions (such as *tomorrow* or *today*) need to have a referent in order for the Addressee to compute the meaning. Ross (1970) proposes that this referent is the Speaker in declarative sentences, and he represents the Speaker in the syntax in order to account for phenomena like antecedent reflexive pronouns in (25), where the reflexive pronoun “myself” would be bound by the covert Speaker element in the higher clause.

(25) (**I**_{*j*} tell you that) This book was written by Fred and **myself**_{*j*}.

Recently, some researchers have re-taken the idea of having a syntactic layer encoding the Speaker-Addressee relationship. These neoperformative analyses,

however, do not use a bi-clausal structure. Instead, they propose a projection of functional categories that encode pragmatic information. This projection has been given different names: DiscourseP (Benincà, 2001), Speech ActP (Speas and Tenny, 2003; Haegeman and Hill, 2013; Haegeman, 2014; Corr, 2016, 2018), AttitudeP (Paul, 2014), or GroundingP (Lam, 2014; Heim et al., 2016; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Wiltschko, 2017; Jamieson, 2019), but they all revolve around the claim that this layer encodes pragmatic information about the speech act participants. For now, I will call this layer UtteranceP; its position is illustrated in Figure 1.14.




Figure 1.14: Proto-neoperformative analysis

Recent analyses of DMs such as Canadian English *eh* (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016), Schwabian German *gell* (Heim, 2019b), and tag questions in Scots varieties (Jamieson, 2019) have proposed to analyze these items as lexicalizations of the utterance-level syntactic layer, based both on functional and syntactic criteria.

I propose a syntactic analysis of the Peninsular Spanish DMs *sí* and *no* in Chapter 5. I will discuss how the data from Spanish DMs contributes to the ongoing discussion of utterance-level syntax. Although DM *no* is relatively inert in terms of its syntactic activity, it displays certain properties regarding scope and interaction with pragmatic roles that have been proposed to be part of the syntax of the utterance (Speas and Tenny, 2003; Giorgi, 2010; Haegeman and Hill, 2013;

Corr, 2016; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Wiltschko, 2017). On the other hand, DM *sí* can be described as an illocutionary complementizer (Corr, 2018), and I will use diagnostics used in the literature for similar complementizers to propose a syntactic position (Corr, 2016) still within CP, but in a much more articulated left periphery.

1.5 On data

Before jumping into the main body of the dissertation, I would like to discuss some points regarding the data used in this dissertation. The data that appears in this dissertation was collected in four different ways: (i) from previous literature; (ii) from elicitations with other native speakers; (iii) based on my own native speaker judgement; and (iv) from open access corpora. Sources have been properly cited when citing data coming from other sources (literature or corpora), and most of my own native speaker judgements have been confirmed by another native speaker.

Many of the contexts used in elicitation, especially regarding DM *no*, come from the Syntax of Speech Act Project at UBC, led by Martina Wiltschko.¹⁶ This project aims to describe, analyze, and model the way language users interact, mainly by focusing on phenomena like DMs and intonation. In addition, this project has developed a repository of contexts which target different parameters of discourse particles. These contexts have been marked with a ^H.

It is important to note that although both DM *no* and DM *sí* are used (as far as I am aware) in all varieties of Spanish, the felicity of these DMs in particular contexts might differ between varieties, as it does for other languages (see, for example, the differences between Canadian English *eh* (Gold, 2005; Gold and Tremblay, 2006; Denis, 2013; Heim et al., 2014; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016) and New Zealand English *eh* (Meyerhoff, 1994; Starks et al., 2008; Schweinberger, 2018)).

¹⁶The elicitation storyboards are available in the following link: <https://syntaxofspeechacts.linguistics.ubc.ca/>

The felicity judgements reported in this dissertation are constrained therefore to the Central Peninsular variety of Spanish, spoken in the centre of the Iberian Peninsula.

As a final note on how the data is represented and talked about, I have decided to use fixed pronouns for Speaker and Addressee: when referring to the Speaker, I will use the pronoun 'she', and when referring to the Addressee, I will use 'they', unless the example states otherwise.

Chapter 2

The Peninsular Spanish DMs *sí* and *no*: where we find them and what they do

DM *sí* and DM *no* seem to be polar opposites in terms of function: whereas DM *sí* rejects the previous contribution of the Addressee, DM *no* actively seeks the contribution of the Addressee. But something that both DMs share is the functional range of their lexical items: besides the use as a DM that we have seen so far, the particle *sí* can be used as the head of complement and adverbial clauses, as well as introducing exclamative sentences. The particle *no* can be used as a (negative) response marker, a marker of sentential negation, and as a phatic particle, in addition to its use as a confirmational DM which is the focus of this dissertation. In this chapter I present these “other jobs” of the DMs, as well as previous observations made in the literature about them. Based on these observations I propose to modify the F&B Table Model discussed in Chapter 1 to account for the distribution and licensing contexts of the DMs, including highlighting speaker mediation in the Dialogue Board and ways to model the effect of felicity conditions on the Dialogue Board.

2.1 Peninsular Spanish *si*: where we find it and previous accounts

The particle *si* in Peninsular Spanish can be found in dependent and independent clauses, always in the left periphery. Figure 2.1 shows that the first big division is between whether *si* appears in a dependent or independent clause. In independent clauses its role is as a complementizer, which is usually considered to be the counterpart of English ‘if’. When it appears in independent clauses, it has two main functions: as an exclamative marker, and as a DM.




Figure 2.1: Schema of the different functions of *si*.

- (26) a. DEPENDENT SI: INTERROGATIVE
Me pregunto si está lloviendo.
 myself ask.PRS.1SG whether is raining
 ‘I wonder whether it’s raining.’
- b. DEPENDENT SI: CONDITIONAL
No voy si está lloviendo.
 NEG go.PRS.1SG if is raining
 ‘I won’t go if it’s raining.’
- c. INDEPENDENT SI: EXCLAMATIVE

Si será tonto!

si be.FUT dumb

‘Isn’t he dumb!’

d. INDEPENDENT SI: DISCOURSE

Context: B tells A that they are going out to catch some sun. A says:

Si está lloviendo!

si is raining

‘[Si] it is raining!’

The question of the relationship between dependent and independent uses of *si* has been framed in the context of *insubordination*: the use of non-root clauses in root environments (Evans and Watanabe, 2016). The evidence is tricky: on the one hand, there is evidence to suggest that independent *si*-clauses are indeed root clauses: in section 2.1.1.3 we will see that there are both prosodic and syntactic reasons to consider them independent clauses (Elvira-García et al., 2017; Schwenker, 2016a); however, they seem to require a previous discourse contribution to be felicitous.

In this dissertation, I focus on the use of DM *si* in contexts such as (27), where it appears in the left periphery of root clauses. I refer to this use as DM *si*. In previous literature it has been described as having a refutational or adversative meaning. This is illustrated in (27): by using a *si*-marked clause, Speaker A conveys why she is against B’s exhortation to bring a raincoat with her (namely, that it is not raining, so it is not helpful):

- (27) Context: A is about to leave the house, but B tells her to bring a raincoat with her. A says:

Si no está lloviendo.

si NEG is raining

‘[Si] it isn’t raining.’

Before zooming in on the contexts of use of DM *si*, let us describe how we can distinguish it from the other uses in dependent and root clauses.

2.1.1 Where we find *si*

In what follows, I illustrate the syntactic contexts in which DM *si* is found, starting with the clause-typing *si* that occurs in dependent CPs (section 2.1.1.1), then looking at the exclamative *si* that occurs with root CPs (section 2.1.1.2), and finally turning my attention to the DM *si* that occurs with root CPs (section 2.1.1.3).

2.1.1.1 *Si* and dependent CPs: interrogative and conditional *si*

The schema in Figure 2.1 shows that the first division of the distribution of *si* is whether it introduces an embedded or a root clause. In the former case, *si* is analyzed as a complementizer heading interrogative clauses (as in (28)) or conditional clauses, as in (29) and (30). Interrogative *si* introduces indirect polar interrogatives, as in (28) and selects a verb in the indicative mood.

(28) a. *Me pregunto si era/es/será verdad.*
REFL ask.1SG if be.IND.PST/PRS/FUT truth

‘I wonder whether it was/is/will be true.’

b. **Me pregunto si fuera/sea/fuere verdad.*
REFL ask.1SG if be.SBJV.PST/PRS/FUT truth

Conditional *si* introduces the protasis or antecedent and can appear with the verb in indicative (29) or subjunctive (30) mood .

(29) *Si hace frío no vamos a la piscina.*
if do.PRS.IND cold NEG go.PRS.IND to the swimming-pool
'If it is cold we won't go to the swimming pool.'

(30) *Si tuviera dinero me compraría un coche.*
if have.PST.SBJV money REFL buy.COND a car
'If I had money, I would buy a car.'

There is the possibility of eliding the consequent, yielding what has been called *oraciones suspendidas* ('suspended clauses'), as in (31):

(31) Context: B asks whether A is joining them in their roadtrip. A replies:

Si tuviera dinero...
if have.PST.SBJV money
'If I had money...'

The omission of the consequent is due to pragmatic reasons or the informational status of the content (given information may be omitted): in the example above, the consequent is easily recoverable from B's question. Crucially, this elision has a prosodic consequence, marked here with "...": a continuation contour at the end of the utterance (which in this case would only consist of the conditional clause). This contrasts with the contour of independent *si*-clauses, which do not possess this contour (Elvira-García et al., 2017).

2.1.1.2 Root CPs: distinguishing exclamative *si* from DM *si*

Exclamative independent *si*-clauses, also called 'C root exclamatives' in Gutiérrez-Rexach (1999), are exclamative root clauses with *si* as their initial element. They are exemplified in (32):

- (32) CONTEXT: B has made the same mistake two times in a row. B makes the same mistake yet again, and A exclaims:

Si serás idiota!

si be.FUT.IND idiot

‘Boy, you are such an idiot!’ (Gutiérrez-Rexach, 1999, p.169:2a; my context)

Hernanz (2012, 2015) identifies certain characteristics that distinguish exclamative independent *si*-clauses: these include tense and mood restrictions, the order of the subject and verb within the clause, and the type of adjective allowed in the predicate. These differences are illustrated below, and summarized in Table 2.1.

Tense and mood are restricted in exclamative *si* clauses: the future indicative is allowed, as we saw in (32), but not the past or the present, as the ungrammaticality of (33) shows.

- (33) **Si fuiste/eres idiota!* EXCLAMATIVE SI

si be.PST.SBJV/PRS.SBJV idiot

(Gutiérrez-Rexach, 1999, p.182:47)

Both exclamative and DM *si* need to appear in a clause that bears indicative mood. But whereas exclamative *si* can only co-occur with the future as shown in examples (32) and (33), DM *si* can appear with any tense (past, present, future).

- (34) *Si tenía/tengo/tendré dinero.* DM SI

si have.PST.IND/PRS.IND/FUT.IND money

‘[Si] I had/have/will have money.’

Another important distinction is the position of the subject. In exclamative *si*-clauses, the verb phrase [*tendrá dinero*] has to move to precede the subject ([*este farsante*]) in the examples below, as (35) shows:

- (35) a. **Si este farsante tendrá dinero!* EXCLAMATIVE SI
 si this phony have.FUT.IND. money
 ‘This phony has so much money!’
 b. *Si tendrá dinero este farsante!*
 (Hernanz, 2012, p.19-21; (60),(65))

DM *si*-clauses do not have this restriction. Note that in (36) I use a different tense to further mark the differences between the two uses of *si*:

- (36) a. *Si este farsante tenía dinero!* DM SI
 si this phony have.PST.IND money
 ‘[si] this phony had so much money!’
 b. ?*Si tenía dinero este farsante!*

The final difference is that exclamative *si* clauses cannot include a non-gradable predicate, such as being a vegetarian in (37), whereas DM *si* accepts such predicates (38):

- (37) #*Si será vegetariana!* EXCLAMATIVE SI
 SI be.FUT.IND dumb
 ‘S/He is so vegetarian!’
 (38) *Si es vegetariana.* DM SI
 SI be.PRS.IND vegetarian
 ‘[Si] she is a vegetarian.’

In addition, independent *si*-clauses cannot be embedded, nor conjoined, nor negated, as opposed to dependent *si*-clauses. These three characteristics will be illustrated and explored further in Chapter 5.

2.1.2 What DM *si* does: previous accounts

The discursive function of *si* was observed in Spanish grammars as early as the 19th century. Schwenter (2016a, p.4) mentions that Bello (1847) “describes the construction in elliptical terms and notes how the context easily supplies the content of the elided material”, using as an example a dialogue from 1791. Its use as a marker of adversativity or contrast has been the main focus of previous literature on this particle.

2.1.2.1 *Si*-utterances are adversative

The function of DM *si* has been defined as adversative, refutational, corrective, contrastive, and mirative just to name a few terms (Schwenter, 1998; Montolío Durán, 1999; Schwenter, 2000b; Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011; Hernanz, 2015; Schwenter, 2016b). What the literature seems to agree on is that DM *si* appears in *reactive* utterances: it needs a previous trigger, to which it reacts, as in (40). In this example, the *si*-clause is reacting to the previous discourse contribution that states that Ottawa is in the United States, and corrects this information introducing the proposition ‘It is in Canada’:

(40) B: Ottawa está en Estados Unidos.

‘Ottawa is in the US.’

A: *Si está en Canadá!*

si is in Canada

‘[Si] it’s in Canada!’

The role of contrast in the core meaning of DM *sí* has been debated: DM *sí* seems to be licensed in contexts where there is an apparent contradiction (as we have seen in most examples until now, but maybe most notably in (40)). For Rodríguez Ramalle (2011), the notion of contrast is encoded in DM *sí*, in a way that links it to the complementizer *si* when it introduces embedded polar interrogative clauses: *si* (both in its role as complementizer and as a DM) contrasts two opposing alternatives. In the case of interrogative *si*, it's two polar alternatives; in the case of DM *sí*, the two contrasting alternatives are at the level of discourse. In (41), discourse *si* contrasts the clause it introduces (*María canta*, 'María sings') with a previous discourse time where Speaker A did not know that María sang (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011, 212).

(41) *Si María canta.*
si María sings

'[Si] María sings' (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011, 212:27a)

However, as Schwenter (2016a) pointed out, independent *si*-clauses can also be used as reactions to utterances where Speaker A is not refuting or contradicting anything Speaker B is saying. This is what happens in example (42)—in fact, Speaker A is agreeing with the previous utterance (marked by the use of *claro* 'of course').

(42) B: A Juana la han aceptado en Stanford.
 'Juana was accepted into Stanford.'

A: *Claro, si es muy inteligente.*
 of.course si is very intelligent

'Of course, [si] she's very intelligent' (Schwenter, 2016a, 26: 10)

The analysis presented in this dissertation will propose a way in which we can bring together these two insights (that there is some sort of correction but that it

is not necessary), and which will rely on the idea of felicity conditions. Before presenting this analysis, I illustrate the contexts of use of independent *si*-clauses that have been identified in the literature.

2.1.2.1.1 Independent *si*-clauses refute implicatures

Example (40a) showed that DM *si* can be used to react to the propositional content of the previous discourse contribution; on the other hand, examples in (43) show that DM *si* can also be used to react to non-propositional content, in this case implicated content. In (43a), Speaker A is reacting to the implicated meaning that C is a good person to ask advice—this conversational implicature is the result of the Maxim of Relevance, since Speaker A assumes that Speaker B is suggesting C given the topic of the conversation. In (43b) we see that conversational implicatures and scalar implicatures can trigger the use of DM *si* (Schwenter, 2000b,a, 2014). Here, Speaker A understands that Speaker B thinks that C is just a ‘bad’ candidate and nothing worse than that, but she “corrects” this by saying that C is not only bad, but the worst candidate:

(43) a. TRIGGER: CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Context: While looking for some advice for their US roadtrip, B suggests to ask C. A replies:

Si no ha salido de España!

si NEG has get.out of Spain

‘[Si] he hasn’t been outside of Spain!’ (adapted from Schwenter (2000b))

b. TRIGGER: SCALAR IMPLICATURE

Context: B says C is a pretty bad candidate for the job. A replies:

Si es el peor!

si is the worst

‘[Si] he is the worst!’

2.1.2.1.2 Independent *si*-clauses refute inferences from context

Another important observation made in the literature is that independent *si*-clauses can react to non-verbal cues. In (44), A infers from the physical act of lowering the bicycle seat to a certain point that the seat cannot be lowered any further. DM *si* is used then followed by the word *incluso* ‘even’ which makes this inference explicit:

- (44) CONTEXT: Looking at a bicycle for a 4-year-old son, B says: ‘Look, you can lower the seat also.’ while lowering the seat. A replies:

Si incluso se puede bajar más.
si even IMPRS can lower more

‘[Si] you can even lower it more.’ (Schwenter, 2000b)

2.1.2.1.3 Independent *si*-clauses refute the form of the previous contribution

Another context in which we find DM *si* is when a Speaker wants to correct her interlocutor’s pronunciation of a word, as in (45):

- (45) Context: B says: *Mañana tengo que dar clase, sobre GENEALOGÍA* ‘Tomorrow I have to teach a class about genealogy.’ A replies:

Si es GENEALOGÍA.
si is genealogy

‘[Si] it’s genealogy’ (Schwenter, 2000a)

In (45), the Addressee has incorrectly pronounced the word *genealogía* ‘genealogy’, and the Speaker uses a *si*-marked clause to introduce the correct form of the word. We therefore find DM *si* in contexts where the *form* of the previous message is not felicitous.

2.1.2.1.4 Independent *si*-clauses refute previously held beliefs

In the above sections, independent *si*-clauses appeared after a previous move from the interlocutor, regardless of what specific thing in the move it actually targeted (the propositional content, an implicature, the form, etc). But DM *si* can also be used when there is no Addressee around. This use, exemplified in (46), is what authors have called the *mirative* use of *si* (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011; Torres Bustamante, 2013; Hernanz, 2015):

- (46) CONTEXT: B has always heard Juan complain about cigarette smoke. One day, she sees him smoking a cigarette, and exclaims:

Si Juan fuma!

SI Juan smokes

‘[Si] Juan smokes!’

In (46), there is no interlocutor to correct, literally speaking: the Speaker is surprised that Juan smokes, given that she thought that he didn’t. I will assume with (Torres Bustamante, 2013) that she is in fact correcting herself—her interlocutor, so to say, is herself in the past.

2.1.2.2 DM *si* marks obvious truth

Schwenter (2016b) remarks that the core meaning of DM *si* is to mark that a piece of information is obviously true to the Speaker—in this analysis, the rejecting flavour of *si*-clauses is a result of the types of contexts in which one may want to mark this obviousness, but not necessarily a part of the core meaning of DM *si* itself. One of the pieces of data that he uses is examples such as (47), repeated from (42), where there is no apparent conflict: Speaker A is agreeing with Speaker B, and is, in fact, just giving more evidence or reasons to believe what A is saying:

(47) Context: B tells A that Juana was accepted into Stanford. A replies:

Claro, si es muy inteligente.

of.course si is very intelligent

‘Of course, [si] she’s very intelligent’ (Schwenter, 2016a, 26: 10)

2.1.3 Summary

This first part has introduced one of our protagonists: DM *si*. *Si*-clauses behave syntactically and prosodically like root clauses, and are used in contexts that refute a previous contribution to discourse. The literature on this DM has typically focused on its adversative flavour; however, Schwenter (2016b) proposes that the core meaning of the DM is to mark an obvious truth to the Speaker, a meaning that yields adversativity when used in certain contexts (such as when the Addressee is wrong). In Chapter 3 I follow this last line of thought and formalize the core meaning of DM *si* with respect to the effect it has on the CG. Before we do that, let us turn to our second protagonist: whereas independent *si*-clauses are used to mark adversativity, *no*-tagged clauses are used to do the opposite: seek alignment with the Addressee.

2.2 Peninsular Spanish *no*: where we find it and previous accounts

The lexical item *no* has several functions in Spanish, summarized in Figure 2.2, and exemplified in (48). It encodes sentential negation, it is used as the negative response marker, and it can also be used as a pragmatic marker with two big functions: (i) requesting confirmation, which we have called *DM no*, and (ii) to keep the interlocutor engaged (*phatic no*). The focus of this dissertation is on the first function (its confirmational use).




Figure 2.2: Schema of the different functions of *no*.

The word *no* is used to negate the sentence in (48a), and as a negative response marker in (48b). The last two examples are the functions of *no* as a discourse marker: in (48c) the Speaker is requesting the Addressee to confirm a proposition (in this case, p ='Adriana's cat is black') whereas in (48d) the Speaker is trying to keep the Addressee's attention:

- (48) a. *El gato de Adriana no es blanco.* SENTENTIAL NEGATION
 the cat of Adriana NEG is white
 'Adriana's cat is not white.'
- b. *No, el gato de Adriana es negro.* RESPONSE MARKER
 no the cat of Adriana is black
 'No, Adriana's cat is black.'
- c. *El gato de Adriana es negro, no?* CONFIRMATIONAL
 the cat of Adriana is black no
 'Adriana's cat is black, [no?].'
- d. *El gato es negro, no? y un poco gordito.* PHATIC
 the cat is black no and a bit fat.DIM
 'Adriana's cat is black, [no], and a little chubby.'

Although the focus of this dissertation is on its role as a confirmational maker, in the next sections I will give a quick overview of the other uses of *no*, starting with its use as a (negative) response marker and as marker of sentential negation.

2.2.1 Where we find *no*

No is found across a broad range of contexts, which I briefly survey. This includes its use as a negative response marker (section 2.2.1.1) and as a pragmatic marker (section 2.2.1.2). Under pragmatic marker I include its function as a phatic marker (section 2.2.1.2.1) and as a confirmational DM (section 2.2.1.2.2). In the latter function, it can anchor to a broad range of sentence types, including declaratives (2.2.1.3), imperatives (2.2.1.4), interrogatives (2.2.1.5) and exclamatives (2.2.1.6).

2.2.1.1 *No* and propositional polarity

The use of *no* as a negative response marker is exemplified in (49)-(52). Different speech act types will allow or disallow the use of the response marker as a reaction; this distribution is summarized in Table 2.2. Here, ‘enriched’ means that the Speaker needs to add more information to a bare response marker for the answer to be felicitous—that is, a mere *yes* or *no* would be too short of an answer, and a more elaborate answer is typically favoured.

Type of speech act	Bare <i>no</i> as a response	Enriched <i>no</i> as a response
Assertion (affirmative)	3	3
Assertion (negative)	3	3
Assertion (evaluative)	#	#
Polar question	3	3
Wh-question	#	#
Command	3	3
Expressive	#	# / 3
Commissive	#	3
Declaration	#	3

Table 2.2: Felicity of responding with *no* to different speech act types.

The response marker *no* can be used to respond to polar questions, assertions (affirmative and negative), and commands.²

- (49) a. A: Mañana es jueves? POLAR QUESTION
‘Is tomorrow Thursday?’
B: **No**.
- b. A: Mañana es jueves. ASSERTION (AFFIRMATIVE)
‘Tomorrow is Thursday.’
B: **No**(, es miércoles).
‘No, (it’s Wednesday).’³
- c. A: Mañana no es jueves. ASSERTION (NEGATIVE)

²In the following discussion about *no* as a response marker, there is not morpheme gloss but directly the translation. In these cases, and since the focus is on the content of the examples and not so much the form, the translation offers sufficient evidence for the point that I am trying to make.

³It seems pragmatically unlikely to only use the response marker and not give the “correct” information, but it is not infelicitous.

‘Tomorrow is not Thursday.’

B: **No.**⁴

d. A: Tráeme un café.

COMMAND

‘Bring me a coffee.’

B: **No.**

It is not felicitous to use the response marker *no* to respond to an expressive speech act such as thanking, or to respond to an evaluative assertion, as shown in (50), where it is also indicated that a fuller response (one that includes a reason for the rejection besides the response particle) is accepted only for utterances that include a predicate of personal taste:

(50) a. A: Muchas gracias!

EXPRESSIVE (THANKING)

‘Thank you so much!’

B1: #**No.**

B2: # No, no me cuesta nada.

B3: No me cuesta nada.

‘(No), it didn’t cost me a thing.’

b. A: Estoy cansada.

INTERNAL STATE

‘I am tired.’

B1: #**No.**

B2: ?**No**, no puedes estar cansada, te acabas de levantar.

B3: No puedes estar cansada, te acabas de levantar.

‘(No), you cannot be tired, you just woke up.’

⁴Continuations could be either agreeing with the proposition that it is not the case that it is Thursday (*No, es cierto, no es jueves. Es miércoles* ‘No, it’s true, it’s not Thursday. It’s Wednesday.’) or disagreeing with it (*No, no es cierto, sí que es jueves.* ‘No, it’s not true, it IS Thursday.’)

- c. A: Este arroz está riquísimo. TASTE
'This rice is delicious.'
B1: ?No.
B2: No, se han pasado con la sal.
'No, they put too much salt.'

It is important to note that there are certain predicates of personal taste that are less infelicitous to respond to with *no*, such as the prototypical example 'to be tasty' (Lasersohn, 2005). Especially if not explicitly perspectivized to express the speaker's opinion, these *tasty* utterances are more flexible in their acceptance of a negative response marker. For example in (51), Speaker A states that they find a rice dish tasty, and Speaker B replies with *no* and a reason why Speaker B does not share this opinion (the dish is too salty). Speaker A acknowledges B's opinion, and settles for an "agree to disagree scenario" where Speaker A thinks that the rice is delicious, and Speaker B thinks that it's too salty. This type of resolution is sometimes referred to as *faultless disagreement* (Kölbel, 2004).⁵

- (51) A: Este arroz está riquísimo.
'This rice is delicious.'

B: No, se han pasado con la sal.
'No, they put too much salt.'

A: Bueno, pues a mí me gusta.
'Well, I like it.'

What is important to note here is that rejecting an assertion with an internal state predicate is not possible (shown in (50b)), whereas rejecting an assertion

⁵The behaviour of predicates of personal taste, and specifically their behaviour with respect to disagreement, has been the focus of much work that is unfortunately outside the scope of this dissertation (among others, Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007); Stojanovic (2007); Lasersohn (2009); Sæbø (2009); Moltmann (2010); Crespo and Fernández (2011); Schlöder (2018)).

with a predicate of personal taste that could be understood as reflecting the taste of all interlocutors (as in (51)) is possible. This difference between a proposition intrinsically Speaker-oriented and one that can have the potential of being shared will be important for the analysis of DM *no* in Chapter 4.

It is also infelicitous to respond to a commissive speech act (such as a promise) with a bare response marker *no*, as well as to a declaration, as is shown in (52):

- (52) a. A: Te lo prometo. COMMISSIVE
‘I promise.’
B1: #No.
B2: No, no puedes prometerlo porque no puedes hacerlo.
‘No, you cannot promise it because you cannot do it.’
- b. A: Os declaro unidos en matrimonio. DECLARATION
‘I declare you joined in matrimony.’
B1:#No.
B2: No, no tienes jurisdicción aquí.
‘No, you have no jurisdiction here.’

To end the section on the relationship between *no* and negation, Spanish uses the same item—*no*—both as a negative response particle, and as sentential negation marker. This is illustrated in (53), where the first instance of *no* is as a response marker (and hence glossed in English as ‘no’) and the second is an instance of the use of *no* as sentential negation—I will gloss this as NEG.

- (53) Context: Addressee asks whether today is Thursday.

No, no es jueves.
no NEG is thursday
‘No, it’s not Thursday.’

Sentential negation is marked pre-verbally with *no*. This negative marker licenses other negative elements such as an n-phrase—*nada, nadie, ningún/ninguno/ninguna*, corresponding to nothing/anything, nobody/anybody, noone/anyone in English.

- (54) a. No salió nadie.
NEG go.out-PST.3SG nobody
'Nobody went out.'
- b. No ocurrió nada.
NEG happen-PST.3SG nothing
'Nothing happened.'
- c. No salió ningún estudiante.
NEG go.out-PST.3SG no student
'No student went out.'
- (Martín-González, 2003)

2.2.1.2 *No* and discourse marking

Beyond its use as a response marker or as a sentential negation marker, *no* also has a discursive role. The literature highlights two main ways in which *no* helps in the organization of discourse: as a *phatic* marker (controlling contact between interlocutors) and as a *confirmational* marker (requesting confirmation of a fact or an opinion).⁶

⁶I follow Montañez Mesas (2008) in assuming that the expletive use of *no* that García Vizcaíno (2005) identifies (that is, when it is used as a filler) is just a lack of function, instead of a function in itself.

(55) PHATIC

Y que suerte tienen ellos de... de... de poder elegir, no?
and that luck have they of... of.. of be.able choose **no**
por la norma... religiosa
because.of the norm... religious

‘and how lucky are they of being able to choose [no], because of the religious norm’ (García Vizcaíno, 2005, p. 95; my translation)

(56) CONFIRMATIONAL

Bueno tú tienes un buen coche, no?
well you have a good car no

‘Well, you do have a good car, [no?].’ (Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009, p. 90; my translation)

The main difference between the phatic and confirmational use is whether or not there is a request for interaction: confirmational *no* asks for a response from the Addressee—regardless of whether this response actually takes place or not. On the other hand, phatic *no* is mainly used to keep or secure contact with the interlocutor, and does not request any form of action from the Addressee. In terms of formal differences, DM (confirmational) *no* occurs at the end of the utterance, whereas phatic *no* occurs utterance-medially. In terms of intonation, the literature claims that DM *no* bears rising intonation (Ortega, 1985; Montañez Mesas, 2008; Gómez González, 2014; Montañez Mesas, 2015), but there is usually little mention of the intonation of the phatic use of *no*. Montañez Mesas (2015, p.223) mentions that for the pragmatic marker *eh* (which can also appear turn medially and turn finally) there are no differences in intonational contour between the different turn positions, although the turn-final one seems to have a higher rise than the medial one. Given the similarities between Spanish DM *eh* and DM *no* I will assume that the same intonational patterns would apply to DM *no* compared

to phatic *no*, marked in Table 2.3 by adding a + sign for DM *no*⁷. This is not crucial for the analysis of DM *no* proposed here, since I will not focus on non-confirmational uses of the DM.⁸ For this dissertation, I assume that the fact that the Speaker is eliciting a response from the Addressee is encoded in the high rising intonation of the DM *no*, an analysis proposed for similar confirmational markers and Addressee-oriented speech acts (Gunlogson, 2004; Heim et al., 2014, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Heim, 2019a).

Table 2.3: Formal differences between phatic and confirmational functions of *no*.

	Wants response?	Position	Intonation
Phatic <i>no</i>	No	Medial	Speculated: rising
Confirmational <i>no</i>	Yes	Final	Rising+

Although the focus of this dissertation will be the confirmational use of *no*, I briefly illustrate the phatic use in 2.2.1.2.1, and then focus on the confirmational uses of DM *no* in 2.2.1.2.2. In the rest of the dissertation I use “DM *no*” to refer exclusively to the confirmational use of the DM.

2.2.1.2.1 Non-confirmational

The non-confirmational or *phatic* function of *no* is used to keep or secure contact with the interlocutor. It does not require an answer from the Addressee. In (57), Speaker A uses *no* in the middle of their turn: speaker A does not use *no* turn-finally to call on the participation of the Addressee, but uses it turn-medially—the fact that they are not done talking can be seen by the quick continuation starting with *y ‘and’*:

(57) A: Porque resulta, sabes? que ha habido problemas, **no?**, y allí y con eso, y todas esas historias, está [un poco]

⁷This is similar to Canadian *eh* (Wiltschko, p.c.).

⁸See Cabedo Nebot (2013) for a different claim, where it is pauses, and not pitch contours, which contribute to the meaning of DM *no*.

‘Because it turns out, you know, that there have been problems, [no?], and with all that, and those stories, he’s a little bit.’

A: [SÍ], si ese es el rollo!

‘Yes, that is the deal!’ (Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009, p.91; my translation)

García Vizcaíno (2005) defines the phatic use of *no* as securing contact with the Addressee and making sure that they are paying attention to the message. It does not want to *elicit* a response from the Addressee, but the speaker in (57) is still making contact with the interlocutor. This type of functions is sometimes referred to as the *narrative* use of certain discourse particles, for example Canadian *eh* (Heim et al., 2014; Denis et al., 2016). The narrative use is also characterized by a lack of rising intonation and a non-peripheral position (Lam et al., 2013; Denis et al., 2016). Crucially, and in contrast to the confirmational use of DM *no*, this phatic use does not elicit the participation of the Addressee (Montañez Mesas, 2015).

2.2.1.2.2 Confirmational

The confirmational use of DM *no* (which from now on will be the function that I will refer to when I refer to DM *no*), which is the focus of this dissertation, typically has the following structure, consisting of an anchor and the rising DM *no* attached to the anchor in final position, as in Figure 2.3 (repeated from Figure 1.1):




Figure 2.3: Anchor and DM *no*.

Utterances of this form are typically called tag questions, and the appended element at the end is referred to as the tag.⁹ The tag can take the form of a clause

⁹This brings up the question of whether the term ‘tag’ only refers to a shortened clause (as in

or, as in our case, a word (Kimps, 2018). In contrast with some tags in other languages, the use of DM *no* is not restricted by the polarity of the host clause. This is the case for English reverse-polarity tags, where a positive anchor will be followed by a negative tag (58a), and vice versa (58b):

- (58) a. Luis lives in Sweden, doesn't he?
b. Luis doesn't live in Sweden, does he?

Similarly, the French tag *non?* is incompatible with negative sentences:

- (59) #*Marie n'est pas partie, non?*
Marie NEG.is NEG left NON
'Marie hasn't left, [non?]' (Beyssade, 2012)

However, Spanish confirmational *no* does not seem to be restricted in this way. In the minimal pair presented in (60) polarity is changed, and the tag is felicitous with both:

- (60) a. *Luis vive en Suecia, no?*
Luis live.PRS.3SG in Sweden *no*
'Luis lives in Sweden, [no?]'
b. *Luis no vive en Suecia, no?*
Luis NEG live.PRS.3SG in Sweden *no*
'Luis does not live in Sweden, [no?]'

But what exactly are we confirming? What can be the anchor of the DM? This is the focus of the next sections, where we will see that DM *no* can appear with any sentence type.

the English tag questions) or whether it can also refer to appended word, as Kimps (2018) suggests. I take an approach closer to Kimps', understanding 'tag' as any appended element that is added to an anchor.

2.2.1.3 Declaratives can be anchors of DM *no*

The co-occurrence of *no* with declaratives is the one that appears most frequently, as reported by Gómez González (2014). Although she doesn't refer to sentence types, García Vizcaíno (2005) also reports that confirmational *no* is used more frequently to confirm "facts". Examples of declaratives (both affirmative and negative) followed by *no* are given in (61):

- (61) a. *Mañana es martes, no?*
tomorrow is Tuesday no
'Tomorrow is Tuesday, [no]?'
b. *Mañana no es martes, no?*
tomorrow is not Tuesday no
'Tomorrow is not Tuesday, [no]?'

In (61), the Speaker wants the Addressee to *confirm* the fact that the next day is Tuesday. Note that this is not the same as wanting the Addressee to answer whether or not the next day is a Tuesday: this would be accomplished by the polar question *Mañana es martes?* ('Is tomorrow Tuesday?'). Instead, what the Speaker is doing in (61) is eliciting a confirmation from the Addressee about a fact.

2.2.1.4 Imperatives can be anchors of DM *no*

DM *no* can appear with an imperative anchor, like the example in (62) illustrates:

- (62) *Échate más, no?*
throw.IMP.2SG=REFL more no
'Help yourself to more, [no]?' (Gómez González, 2014)

Not all imperative anchors are felicitous with DM *no*, however: García Vizcaíno (2005) notes that there is a gradience in the acceptability of the tag with commands

as a whole (illustrated here in Table 2.4). Warnings cannot be hosts of *no*, whereas pieces of advice and suggestions can. I have modified, however, her judgments: although I agree that the tag is “pragmatically invalid” with the more imposing directives (warnings), the rest seem pragmatically valid and not “dubious” as she judges them.¹⁰

Table 2.4: Modified from García Vizcaíno (2005): gradience in the acceptability of *no* and directives.

Imposition	Type of directive	Acceptability
+	Warning (<i>Advertencia</i>)	# <i>Te lo advierto: estudia, no?</i> ‘I warn you: study, [no?] ’</td
	Warning (<i>Aviso</i>)	# <i>Si no estudias no sales, no?</i> ‘If you don’t study you don’t go out, [no?] ’</td
	Order (<i>Mandato</i>)	<i>Estudia más, no?</i> ‘Study more, [no?] ’</td
	Petition (<i>Petición</i>)	<i>Por favor, estudia más, no?</i> ‘Please, study more, [no?] ’</td
-	Advice (<i>Consejo</i>)	<i>Deberías estudiar más, no?</i> ‘You should study more, [no?] ’</td

In Table 2.4 we see that the same command anchor *Estudia más, no?* ‘Study more, [no?]

2.2.1.5 Interrogatives can be anchors of DM *no*

DM *no* can have an interrogative clause as a host (Gómez González, 2014). This is the case in (63):

¹⁰I have also changed the symbol she uses to mark that an utterance is pragmatically invalid from an asterisk (*) to a pound/hashtag (#).

- (63) *De qué está hablando, no?*
of what is talking no
'What is he talking about, [no]?'

However, only a specific type of interrogatives can be hosts of DM *no*, namely rhetorical questions. Rhetorical questions differ from canonical questions in that they are not information seeking.

How do we know that the anchor in (63) is a rhetorical question and not a canonical, information-seeking question? There are two reasons: one is the type of context that this utterance is licensed in, and another is the possibility of adding expressive constructions typically associated with rhetorical questions—both are illustrated in (64), taken from (Bertrand et al., 2015):

- (64) 3 Context 1: A is sitting beside B listening to a TED talk about a topic she despises. She looks at B and asks:H
7 Context 2: A arrives late to a TED talk and has no idea what the speaker is talking about. She asks B:H

De qué está hablando, no?
of what is talking no
'what is he talking about, [no]?'

In Context 1, the Speaker is not really expecting an answer from Speaker B: she is there at the same talk, listening to it. What she is expressing is, in fact, an opinion on the talk itself; specifically, her dislike of the talk. In Context 2, Speaker A is genuinely asking Speaker B about the content of the talk: she wants to know what the speaker has been saying.

Notice that the unmodified anchor is felicitous in both contexts, but crucially it is also felicitous in an information-seeking context—whereas the modified utterance is not.

(65) 3 Context 1: A is sitting beside B listening to a TED talk about a topic she despises. She looks at B and asks:

3 Context 2: A arrives late to a TED talk and has no idea what the speaker is talking about. She asks B:

De qué está hablando?

of what is talking

‘What is he talking about?’

In fact, comments from speakers insisted that the sentence in (64) would greatly improve if it was preceded by *pero* (‘but’), or *pero qué demonios* (‘but what in the hell’) as in *Pero de qué demonios está hablando?* (‘But what in the hell is he talking about?’), further evidencing that it is rhetorical questions, and not information-seeking questions, that can be hosts of DM *no*. I assume, therefore, that the host of the confirmational in (64) is a rhetorical question and not a canonical information seeking question.

2.2.1.6 Exclamatives can be anchors of *no*

DM *no* can modify exclamatives, like in example (66), where the DM follows the wh-exclamative expressing that the Speaker is feeling cold:¹¹

(66) *Oye, qué frío hace aquí!, no?*

hear.IMP what cold makes here no

‘Hey, it’s freezing in here, [no]?’ (Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009, p.90;C2:3)

It is important to note here that not all exclamatives accept the addition of DM *no*. If the exclamative contains an internal state predicate, as in (67), the judgement changes and it is no longer felicitous:

¹¹Although exclamatives are not one of the main sentence types that are found cross-linguistically, I add them here to give a better overview of what type of hosts that DM *no* can anchor to.

- (67) *#Qué cansada que estoy, no?*
 how tired that am no
 ‘I’m so tired, [no]?’

We see that DM *no* does not seem to be sensitive to the sentence type, as it can follow exclamatives like (66). However, it is sensitive to the type of exclamation: it cannot modify exclamatives that denote an internal state of the Speaker like (67).

2.2.2 What DM *no* does: previous accounts

2.2.2.1 DM *no* requests confirmation of facts or opinions

The literature has noted two different functions of DM *no* as a confirmational: when the Speaker is asking for confirmation of a fact, as in (68), or when the Speaker is requesting the Addressee’s opinion on an evaluation, as in (69). I will adopt the terms used in Gómez González (2014) to distinguish these types: factic and opinionative. In (68), the Speaker is asking the Addressee to confirm the fact that they have indeed a common group of friends (the Speaker in this context is a tarot reader); in (69), the Speaker is not requesting the confirmation of a fact but of a personal evaluation, signalled here by the use of the verb *creer* ‘to think/believe’:

- (68) CONFIRMATIONAL (FACTIC)
eh, me sale esto aquí en las cartas, ustedes tienen un
 eh me come.up this here on the cards you.2PL.FORM have a
grupo de amistades en común, no?
 group of friendships in common no
 ‘Eh, this is on the cards, you have a common group of friends, [no]?’
 (Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009, p. 89)

(69) CONFIRMATIONAL (OPINIONATIVE)

Bueno, yo creo que las dos cosas, no?
well I think.PRS.1SG that the two things no

‘Well, I think both, [no]?’ (García Vizcaíno, 2005, p. 93)

2.2.2.2 DM *no* can be Speaker or Addressee-oriented

Gómez González (2014) introduces an even more fined-grained distinction of the functions of tag questions, under which she includes the DM *no*.¹² As we can see in Table 2.5, her main distinction is between Addressee-centered and Speaker-centered functions, which roughly correlate with the factic and opinionative functions identified by García Vizcaíno (2005) and Rodríguez Muñoz (2009). Within those two groups, Addressee-centered functions can seek to confirm information or an action; Speaker-centered functions are used “as stance markers to express either strong positive or negative affect.” (Gómez González, 2014, p.116)¹³

¹²I am setting aside the phatic function, which she analyzes as exchange-centered; I include it in the table for completeness.

¹³Gómez González (2014) claims that the Speaker-oriented function is associated with a falling intonation, but there does not seem to be evidence to suggest it is. Given the several other studies that identify DM *no* as having rising intonation, I set this question aside for further research.

García Vizcaíno (2005) & Rodríguez Muñoz (2009)	Gómez González (2014)
Factic	Addressee-centered Information/Confirmation seeking Action seeking
Opinionative	Speaker-centered Attitudinal Challenging
(Phatic)	(Exchange-centered) (Focusing) (Phatic) (Regulatory/Delaying)

Table 2.5: Previous analyses of the use of DM *no*? (based on Gómez González (2014, p. 114).

However, this does not mean that there are no restrictions on the use of DM *no*: although there is no restriction on the sentence type that can be the anchor, there is a restriction on the speech act type.

2.3 Where to go from here

DMs *sí* and *no* perform complex conversational updates: they seem to have more than one effect on the conversation:

1. Clauses with DM *sí* react to a previous discourse contribution, refuting some part of its meaning, while at the same time marking that the proposition they introduce is uncontroversial. I will take these two characteristics as the two main ingredients in a unified analysis of DM *sí*: (i) the trigger makes apparent that there is an epistemic misalignment between the interlocutors, and (ii) the Speaker assumes that the proposition that DM *sí* introduces is uncontroversial (or, in Schwenter (2016b), obvious). The question of how

we can give a unified account of what counts as an epistemic conflict and what is an uncontroversial proposition will be addressed in section 2.3.1, and how we can formalize these two characteristics will be explained in section 2.3.3. A more fully fleshed-out account of DM *sí* will be provided in Chapter 3.

2. Clauses with DM *no* also propose a complex conversational update: they request the confirmation of a fact or an opinion from the Addressee, so they seem to assert that fact or opinion, and at the same time request the Addressee's input about that fact or opinion. These two functions will be unified as one in section 2.3.2 and in more detail in Chapter 4.

2.3.1 A unifying analysis for DM *sí*

I propose an analysis of DM *sí* with two main components: (i) the role of the *sí*-clause with respect to the previous discourse, and (ii) the role of the DM *sí* with respect to the sentence it appears in. What connects these two sides of the analysis is the concept of felicity conditions and the CG: the *sí*-marked clause will be triggered by a violation of a felicity condition, and the DM *sí* will mark that the proposition it introduces is already in the CG.

Montolío Durán (1999) proposes that independent *sí*-clauses react to the lack of relevance of the previous contribution: for example, in (70), the *sí*-Speaker can react with a *sí*-clause to an imperative ('Give me more cake') that is not relevant in the dialogue context because (a) there is no more cake; (b) the cake is not tasty; (c) the Addressee (the one wanting the cake) is on a diet; and (d) the Addressee has already eaten too much cake:

- (70) *Pásame otro trozo de pastel, por favor.*
 pass.IMP.2SG=me another piece of cake for favour

'Get me another piece of cake, please.'

- a. *Si ya no hay más.*
 si already NEG is more
 ‘[Si] there’s no more left.’
- b. *Si está malísimo.*
 si is bad.SUPER
 ‘[Si] it’s awful.’
- c. *Si estás a régimen.*
 si are PREP diet.
 ‘[Si] you’re on a diet.’
- d. *Si ya has comido mucho.*
 si already have.2SG eaten much.
 ‘[Si] you’ve already had a lot’
 (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011, p. 211; ex. 24; based on Montolío Durán (1999))

These possible independent *si*-clauses show something more specific: I propose that what they are targeting is a felicity condition that has been violated in the previous contribution.¹⁴ I will use Searle (1969, 1976) definition of felicity conditions, in which he distinguishes four types: propositional content conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, and essential conditions.¹⁵ DM *si* can, in fact, react to the non-observance of these conditions for all major types of speech acts, including assertions, commands, questions, commissives, expressives, and declarations. This analysis also generalizes to examples where the *si*-clause is used to react to a failed implicature, a mispronounced word, and also to mirative examples, where there is apparently no Addressee.

An important point of this dissertation, and a major point in Schwenter (2016b),

¹⁴Following the proposal for German *doch* in Egg (2013).

¹⁵See Chapter 1 for definitions of each.

is that we need to distinguish what the role of the *sí*-clause is with respect to the previous discourse (which, as I have just claimed, is to flag that the previous discourse move is infelicitous) from the contribution of the DM *sí* to the clause it heads. I claim that we can unify all uses of DM *sí* by proposing that it marks that the proposition denoted by the sentence it introduces is already in the CG. The notion of the CG will be crucial in the analysis of *sí*-clauses and the DM *sí* because it will help us understand (a) the licensing conditions for the *sí*-clause (that is, what does the discourse context have to look like for an interlocutor to be able to use a *sí*-clause felicitously); and (b) the contribution of the DM *sí* to the sentence it introduces.

The first question that we might want to ask ourselves is *how* do we model why the *sí*-Speaker reacts to a violation of felicity conditions. Even before that, how do we model how such a violation would happen? I will propose that a violation of felicity conditions can be analyzed as what Stalnaker (2002) calls a *defective context*: a context in which it becomes apparent that not all interlocutors share the same CG. If we assume that felicity conditions are ‘stored’ in the CG as general background information (which would also include world knowledge), when an interlocutor perceives another interlocutor’s contribution as infelicitous, what they are identifying is a conflict in the CG. We therefore have to model that there are at least two CGs: one representing what the Speaker thinks how the CG looks like, and one representing what the Speaker thinks the Addressee’s conception of the CG is. This is a rather recursive notion, which is simplified in an image in Figure (2.4). Note that the CG ‘according to the Speaker’ is not marked as such in this model: one can argue that interlocutors tend to think that their conception of what is in the CG is the one that is ‘right’, and therefore their version of what should be in the CG is the one that should prevail.




Figure 2.4: Two CGs.

I propose we also need the CG to give a unified account of the contribution of DM *si* to the clause it introduces. I propose that DM *si* marks that the proposition denoted by the sentence it introduces is *already* in the Common Ground. In Chapter 3 we will see evidence to support this claim, including the impossibility of DM *si* to introduce ‘hot news’ (Schwenter, 2016b) and the infelicity of using DM *si* to introduce propositions that are known not to be shared by the Addressee.

2.3.2 A unifying analysis for DM *no*

We have seen that DM *no* (i) can take any sentence type as its anchor, and (ii) has been mainly analyzed as a marker of contact control (Briz, 1998; Montañez Mesas, 2015). DM *no* has been described as having many functions, the main ones summarized again in Table 2.6. The question is: is there a core abstract function of the DM *no* that can account for these different functions, that also predicts the restrictions in its anchor that have been identified in the literature (its use only with certain types of commands) and in this chapter (its use only with rhetorical questions, but not information-seeking questions)?

García Vizcaíno (2005) & Rodríguez Muñoz (2009)	Gómez González (2014)
Factic	Addressee-centered Information/Confirmation seeking Action seeking
Opinionative	Speaker-centered Attitudinal Challenging
Phatic	Exchange-centered Focusing Phatic Regulatory/Delaying

Table 2.6: Previous analyses of the use of DM *no* (based on Gómez González (2014)).

I propose an analysis of DM *no* where its core meaning is to request confirmation of the conversational update proposed by the anchor. In other words: DM *no* cares about the speech act type of its anchor, but not its sentence type. We just saw evidence for this in section 2.2.1.5: DM *no* can appear with an interrogative anchor only if this interrogative anchor is a rhetorical question. In some analyses, rhetorical questions have interrogative form but assertive illocutionary force (Han, 2002; Corr, 2016). This means that the conversational update that they propose is not that of a question, but of an assertion. In Chapter 1 I mentioned that different speech act types propose different conversational updates (Farkas and Bruce, 2010): an assertion proposes to add a proposition p to the CG; a polar question proposes to resolve whether p or $\neg p$ should be added to the CG; a command proposes to add an outcome to the TDL of the Addressee (Rudin, 2018). I will extend this idea to other speech act types, namely expressives (in Searle’s terms, for instance thanking and apologizing), commissives, and declarations. As we will see in Chapter 4, this correctly predicts where we find DM *no*.

The second part of the analysis to be presented in Chapter 4 will center around the role of the *no*-tagged clause in discourse. Table 2.6 shows, in fact, the roles that *no*-tagged clauses have on discourse: as Denis et al. (2016) mention for Canadian *eh*, this is not a list of the functions of the DM *no* per se but of the *no*-tagged clauses. In Chapter 4 I propose that the unifying role of *no*-tagged clauses is to confirm a positive bias, whether a bias towards a belief or an outcome. We can see the role that bias plays in the licensing of *no*-tagged clauses in (71): in the first context, the Speaker has evidence that the Addressee has the intention of coming to the party since they RSVP'ed—in other words, the Speaker believes that the Addressee has the outcome of going to the party in their TDL (Yang and Wiltschko, 2016). On the other hand, in Context 2 the Speaker has no such evidence, and cannot therefore be biased towards the Addressee having the intention of coming to the party:

(71) 3 Context 1: Speaker has organized a party the next day, and has received an RSVP from the Addressee. She is confirming the guest list, and asks:

7 Context 2: Speaker has organized a party the next day, and has not received an RSVP from the Addressee. She is confirming the guest list, and asks:

Vienes mañana, no?
 come.2SG tomorrow no

‘You’re coming tomorrow, [no]?’

In order to model the licensing conditions for both DMs, we need to make some modifications to the F&B Table Model presented in Chapter 1. These modifications are presented in the next section.

2.3.3 Tools for modelling Peninsular Spanish *si* and *no*

In this section I introduce the modifications to the Table Model proposed by Farkas and Bruce (2010) that I will implement for my analysis of the Spanish DMs. These modifications do not change the nature of the model: they are merely adaptations needed in order to better formalize the data that the Spanish DMs offer.

2.3.3.1 Phases to describe the contexts of use

DMs like *no* and *si* are complex to model because they not only contribute something to the clause they appear with, but they also restrict and are restricted by the previous and following discourse. We therefore need to represent these “before DM” and “after DM” moments in the discourse to capture the contexts in which the DMs are licensed. I will refer to these “before” and “after” moments as *phases*. Farkas and Bruce (2010) do represent different phases of a conversation (which they call *context states*) in order to model the effect of assertions and polar questions on the conversation. However, with the contexts that we have discussed previously (misaligned information states) we need to pay closer attention to the phases before the DM is used. In these phases, which similarly to Farkas and Bruce (2010) represent the context at different points in the conversation, interlocutors need to keep a record of who is committing to what (Thoma, 2016; Heim, 2019a).

Phase 0: Alignment

Certain DMs (such as *si*) refer back to a symmetrical phase where there is no epistemic misalignment and the interlocutors share the same information (that is, they are aligned).

Phase 1: Misalignment

Information states of interlocutors are not maximally aligned.

Phase 2: Negotiation

Speaker A tries to remedy the misalignment.

Phase 3: Alignment

Interlocutors are aligned.

The following exchange in (72) illustrates these phases:

- (72) Context: A and B work together in an office 9-5, Monday to Friday. On Thursday, B tells A how they're looking forward to the next day because it's the weekend and they'll be able to sleep in. But the next day is Friday, not Saturday! A replies:

Si mañana es viernes.

si tomorrow is Friday

'[Si] tomorrow is Friday'

Phase 0: Symmetry

Speaker A and Speaker B both know that tomorrow is Friday (p ='Tomorrow is Friday'). A can make this assumption based on the regularity of their schedule, and the fact that people with a regular schedule tend to know what day of the week it is.

A thinks that ... p is in the CG.

... B thinks that p is in the CG.

Phase 1: Misalignment

Speaker B says something that makes it obvious to A that she does not, in fact, know that tomorrow is Friday. In this case: saying that she will be able to sleep in.

B utters q , where q contradicts p .

A thinks that ... p is in the CG.

... B thinks that q is in the CG.

Phase 2: Negotiation

A superasserts that p is in the CG by using DM *si*.

Speaker A superasserts p ='Tomorrow is Friday'.

A thinks that ... p is in the CG.

... B thinks that q is in the CG.

Phase 3: Alignment

Epistemic states are symmetrical again, with p being in the CG again.

A thinks that ... p is in the CG.

... B thinks that p is in the CG.

This is a simplified version of the analysis that will be presented in Chapter 4, but it serves as an illustration of the different phases.

2.3.3.2 Committing to propositions and outcomes

In Chapter 1 I mentioned that Farkas and Bruce (2010) make a distinction between the speakers' discourse commitments (individualized sets that contain propositions to which each speaker has individually committed) and the (Stalnakerian) CG. These two sets are doxastic: they deal with beliefs, and contain propositions. However, expressing beliefs in propositions and working towards a shared set of beliefs is not the only aim of human interaction and conversation: we also want to act (together and separately). The Table Model and subsequent work has mainly focused on how to model beliefs and propositions, but has not focused on modelling other types of commitments. Rudin (2018) proposes a bifurcation of the Table Model to account for imperatives (both bare and modified via intonation): to the doxastic part of the Table Model, he adds a teleological part, where the Speakers negotiate their public preferences.

I adopt this modification to the Table Model, since we need a way to account for the effect that DM *no* has on anchors that do not denote propositions or negotiate beliefs, as in (73), where the anchor is an imperative:

- (73) *Péinate*, *no?*
 comb.IMP.2SG=REFL no
 ‘Brush your hair, [no]?’

Following Rudin (2018), I mirror the distinction between DCs and CG in the “commanding” realm: we need both an individualized TDL for each discourse participant, and a shared, public TDL. Both components contain outcomes (following Beyssade and Marandin (2006)): for instance, if Speaker A utters an imperative, they would be proposing to add an outcome to Speaker B’s TDL (TDL_B), but if Speaker A utters a promise, they would add an outcome to their own TDL (TDL_A). In both cases, they propose to add these outcomes to a public, shared component. I do not assume that these components form a separate half of the Table Model, however: I include all of them in my own model of discourse, which I will call the Dialogue Board, represented in Figure 2.5. This is an adaptation and further development of F&B’s Table Model.

The last ingredient that we will need for the Dialogue Board is how to represent speaker mediation. I propose to visually mark that the conversations are always mediated by the Speaker holding the floor at each turn. Most models already assume this mediation, since it is impossible to know with absolute certainty what the Addressee knows. This allows for situations where there is an epistemic conflict in the CG (with DM *s/*), and for situations where we want to refer to the overall effect of the discourse move (with DM *no*). Regarding the first situation: it is possible to imagine a context where it becomes obvious to a speaker that their interlocutor does not share the same information, even if this information had been assumed to be shared. As we will see in Chapter 4, this is exactly where DM *s/* is licensed: it encodes a meaning that can sometimes be paraphrased as “you should have known this”. Having two information states for each interlocutor but having both mediated by the speaker holding the floor allows us to capture this type of meaning: the fact that a speaker can make assumptions about what their interlocutor knows. With each utterance the Dialogue Board (K_A) will

change; this change is a representation of the effect of the previous conversational move. I follow F&B's nomenclature, but in this case this K denotes the Dialogue Board without the Table, which encompasses the individual information states of Speaker and Addressee. I will only look at K_A Dialogue Boards, which means that these Dialogue Boards are mediated by Speaker A. This will allow us to explain the complex update that DM *no* makes on the conversation. The Dialogue Board is summarized in Figure 2.5.

A (A's commitments)			B (B's commitments)		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC	propositions	propositions	DC	propositions	propositions
TDL_A	outcomes	outcomes	TDL_B	outcomes	outcomes
CG	propositions	propositions	CG	propositions	propositions
TDL	outcomes	outcomes	TDL	outcomes	outcomes

K_{At} = Speaker A's information state at time t

TABLE

Figure 2.5: The Dialogue Board.

2.4 Summary

This chapter, in addition to introducing the two protagonists (DM *si* and DM *no*) also introduced the friendly amendments that must be made to our formal discourse model in order to analyze the contributions of these two DMs. The most important finding is that each DM makes two types of contributions:

- i the contribution of DM *si* or *no* relative to the clause they introduce, and
- ii the contribution of the *si*-clause or *no*-clause relative to the rest of the discourse.

Chapter 3

Monitoring the Common Ground: Peninsular Spanish *si*

3.1 Ingredients of the analysis

DMs are not obligatory, and this generalization also applies to DM *si*: the dialogue in (74) conveys the same propositional content with or without the use of DM *si*—namely, that contrary to what it seems that B believes, Toronto is in Canada and not in the US:

(74) Context: B is holding a US guide. They then say “I can’t wait to visit Toronto!” A replies:

(Si) Toronto está en Canadá, lo discutimos ayer.

si Toronto is in Canada it discuss.PST.1PL yesterday

‘([Si]) Toronto is in Canada, we talked about it yesterday.’

Why would a speaker, then, choose to use DM *si* in this context? One possible reason, and the one I will propose, is that DM *si* restricts the possible link between the proposition it introduces and the previous discourse. In particular, DM *si* specifies that the proposition it introduces is already in the CG. Without

the particle, this discourse-anaphoric link is left implicit. This can be seen from possible continuations to (74): a bare assertion, as in (75), would merely propose an update of the CG, as we have seen in previous chapters. Therefore (75) could be used to inform the Addressee that Toronto is in Canada, without assuming that they already knew this—and one can add *me temo* “I’m afraid”, as one may do to introduce “unwelcome” new information. However, it would be odd to continue a *sí*-clause with this same expression:

(75) *Toronto está en Canadá, me temo.*
 Toronto is in Canada me fear.PRS.1SG
 ‘Toronto is in Canada, I’m afraid.’

(76) *Si Toronto está en Canadá, ??me temo.*
 si Toronto is in Canada me fear.PRS.1SG
 ‘[Si] Toronto is in Canada, I’m afraid.’

There may be more than one way for a bare assertion to be linked to the previous discourse: (75) may be understood as introducing new information, or as re-introducing old information that is meant to correct a previous discourse move (as in (74)). However, the *sí*-clause in (74) and (76) can only be understood as the latter.

In this chapter I flesh out this proposal, distinguishing two contributions of DM *sí*: (i) the contribution of the *sí*-clause to the conversation, and (ii) the contribution of the particle itself to the sentence. With respect to what *sí*-clauses contribute to a conversational exchange, I propose that what unifies the different contexts of use of *sí*-marked clause is that they are all used to reject a previous infelicitous speech act. With respect to what the particle *sí* contributes to the sentence, DM *sí* marks that the proposition it introduces is already in the CG. I argue that a *sí*-clause is a stronger type of assertion—as I will call it, a *superassertion*, since it

does not propose to add a proposition to the CG but *reminds* the Addressee that a proposition is already in the CG.

- (77) a. THE *sí*-CLAUSE AS A UNIT (REJECTION)
sí-p rejects a previous infelicitous discourse move.
- b. THE PARTICLE *sí* (UNCONTROVERSIALITY):
DM *sí* marks that the proposition *p* is already in the CG.¹

The uncontroversiality part of the meaning of DM *sí* rejects the previous discourse move. This part explains not only the “corrective” flavour of DM *sí*, but also its *reminding* effect: it will depend on the context (whether the Addressee has forgotten as opposed to having “wrong” beliefs) what effect the particle has.

But why would a speaker want to mark that a proposition is already known? I propose that *sí*-clauses are licensed when it becomes apparent that the interlocutors do not share the same information in the CG. More specifically, I claim that this misalignment stems from the violation of a felicity condition in the immediately preceding move. This felicity condition violation makes apparent that there is a misalignment with respect to the content of the CG: while A believes *p*, B believes *q*, and *q* pragmatically contradicts *p*; this is illustrated in Figure 3.1. As I will demonstrate at length, this analysis correctly predicts the use of DM *sí* in contexts where various felicity conditions of different speech acts are violated.

¹The term ‘uncontroversiality’ is taken from Grosz (2010), who uses it to describe the German particle *ja*. This is the same idea behind (Schwenter, 2016b)’s analysis of *sí* as marking that the information is obvious to the Speaker.

K _{A1}	A			B		
		CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
	DC _A			DC _B		
	TDL _A			TDL _B		
	CG	<i>p</i>		CG	<i>q</i>	
	TDL			TDL		

TABLE

Figure 3.1: The licensing context for DM *si*: Two versions of the CG. Crucially, *p* and *q* pragmatically contradict each other.

The fact that the proposition introduced by DM *si* has to be known by the interlocutors was highlighted as one of the main differences between DM *si* and other particles, such as the complementizer *que* (Schwenter, 2016b). In particular, it has been noted that DM *si* cannot be used when the proposition it introduces conveys new information, as the “hot news” scenario in (78) shows:


- (78) *Sabes qué? Que/#si/Ø mi hermana está embarazada!*
 ‘You know what? {QUE/SI} my sister is pregnant!’ (adapted from Schwenter (2016b, p.26; 8a))

In (78), the Speaker is announcing some news (their sister’s pregnancy). Presumably, the Addressee does not know about this information (hence the opening line *Sabes qué?* ‘You know what?’).² DM *si* is not allowed in this type of context.

Si-clauses therefore convey a “you should have known” meaning that is not represented in the misalignment phases illustrated in Figure 3.1. We need a way to reflect that, according to the Speaker, there was a previous stage in the discourse where the Addressee knew *p*. I therefore propose the addition of another phase to

²In this same context the other Spanish complementizer *que* is allowed (see Chapter 6 for a comparison between *si* and *que*), as well as not having any complementizer present.

explain the use of *si*-clauses: a phase that represents an original aligned CG. This is a way to formalize the ‘you should have known’ flavour of DM *si*.³ This phase is illustrated in Figure 3.2, and comes before Phase 1 which depicts the moment the Speaker realizes that the CG is not symmetrical.



TABLE

Figure 3.2: Phase 0: original alignment in the CG.

With these two adjustments we can successfully account for the contexts of use of *si*-marked clauses, as we will see in section 3.3. But as I mentioned, this is only one part of the contribution of DM *si* to the discourse: we still need to account for the contribution of the actual particle to the sentence it appears in. As I have mentioned before, I propose to formalize previous insights in the literature (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011; Schwenter, 2016b) and propose that DM *si* marks that the proposition denoted by the sentence it appears in is already part of the CG.

3.2 How to monitor the CG: reminding the Addressee of its content

In this section I focus on showing *how* language users monitor the alignment of the CG. In section 3.2.1 I show how DM *si* reminds the Addressee about the status

³Since we are dealing with a dialogue between two people, ‘you should have known x’ and ‘everyone should know x’ are the same situation in this case.

of a proposition as being already part of the CG, and what this means for the status of the CG in the interlocutors' information states (in section 3.2.2).

3.2.1 Reminding the Addressee that the proposition is already in the CG

We have just seen that DM *si* cannot be used in a 'hot news' context, that is, it cannot introduce information that is known to be new for the Addressee. Another piece of evidence that shows that DM *si* can only refer to propositions that are already *known* to the Addressee—i.e. in the CG—comes from the infelicity of using a *si*-marked clause as possible response to the question in (79), where the proposition expressed in the sentence introduced by DM *si* cannot be known by the Addressee:⁴

(79) Context: A and B are in a speed dating event. As an ice-breaker, B asks:

B: Prefieres carne o pescado?

'Do you prefer meat or fish?'

A: (#*Si*) soy vegetariana.

(si) am vegetarian

'([Si]) I am vegetarian.'

In (79), B cannot be expected to know that A is vegetarian since they only just met. It is therefore not felicitous to use DM *si* here, since the proposition p ='A is a vegetarian' is not a shared proposition in the CG. Note that a bare assertion would be felicitous: in that case, A would be proposing the update of the CG with the new information that she is vegetarian. I will therefore refer to what DM *si* does with respect to the proposition as *superasserting* it: it does more than just propose a CG update (as an assertion would do), and seems more imposing than assertions.

⁴Always mediated by the Speaker: the Speaker believes that the Addressee knows p , but it might not be the case.

In fact, Schwenter (2016b) mentions that *si*-clauses ‘often act as “blockades” to the topical thread’ (Schwenter, 2016b, p.28): I claim that this is an effect of the super-assertion force that DM *si* brings.

It is important to note that the Speaker may make the wrong assumption that a proposition is in the CG—that is, the Speaker may think her interlocutors share the same propositions. This may not always be the case: in the (pragmatically odd) situation where the same B in example (79) did use DM *si* (in the same context, a speed dating event), A could easily reply that they had no way to have known that fact, as in (228). This reply would not be felicitous if B had merely asserted that she is vegetarian:

(80) B: *Si soy vegetariana.*
si am vegetarian
‘[Si] I am vegetarian.’

A: *Y cómo lo iba a saber?*
and how it go.IMPER.1SG to know
‘And how was I supposed to know?’

Further evidence that DM *si* marks that a proposition is in the CG comes from a frequent reply to *si*-clauses: the use of *ya* (lit. ‘already’, which can often be translated as ‘I know’ or ‘yeah’), as exemplified in (81):

(81) Examples from Schwenter (2016b, p.28, (15) (16)):

a. R: *Ya los echo de menos!*
‘I already miss them!’

A: *Si todavía no se han ido a ninguna parte!*
‘[Si] they haven’t gone anywhere yet!’

R: *Ya, pero no los vamos a ver mucho ahora que se han graduado.*
'Yeah, but we are not going to see them much now that they have graduated.'

- b. G05: *que a Guerri en la fábrica de su padre le llamaban el gordo*
'In your father's factory they called Guerri the fat guy'

G01: *si no está tan gordo*
'[Si] he's not that fat'

G05: *ya* pero antes pesaba más de cien kilos
'true but before he weighed more than one hundred kilos'

In both examples, the Addressee (R and G05) literally marks that the proposition introduces by *si* (p ='they haven't gone anywhere yet' in (a) and p ='he's not that fat' in (b)) is *already* known.

Saying that a proposition is *already* part of the CG is a marked discourse move: under "normal" circumstances, one of the main goals of a conversation is to add new information and to add to the CG. However, there are certain contexts that license this redundant use of information: one such context is when there is an epistemic conflict. This has been formalized in the Principle of Economy by Romero and Han (2004):

- (82) Principle of Economy: (Romero and Han, 2004, p. 629)
Do not use a metaconversational move unless necessary (to resolve epistemic conflict or to ensure Quality).

This Economy constraint states that only certain discourse contexts allow the use of metaconversational moves, i.e., moves that refer to the conversation itself. These are also the contexts where DM *si* is used. As we have seen in the previous

section, when B utters the antecedent utterance there ensues an epistemic conflict: a proposition is being introduced to the CG that is in conflict with previous propositions that are already in the CG.

3.2.2 The status of the Common Ground

An important take-away of the use of DM *s*' is that CG needs to be an independent element in our discourse model that represents public, shared knowledge. In chapter 1 we introduced two ways of modelling the CG: it can either be an independent element, separate from individual discourse commitments by each discourse participant (as I propose), or it can be seen as the intersection of the belief set of the Speaker and the Addressee. These two possibilities are schematized in Figure 3.3, repeated from Figure 1.2:



Figure 3.3: Two possibilities for the nature of CG: as an independent component (left) or as the intersection of the interlocutor's belief sets (right).

The fact that we use DMs like *s*' can be seen as evidence for an independent CG in our model: if we did not have such an element where shared, public knowledge was stored, it would be odd not to tolerate the types of contexts where DM *s*' is used.⁵ Furthermore: the fact that DM *s*' seems to react to general knowledge type of information (felicity conditions, which are known by hypothesis to fluent users of a given language) also indicates that there needs to be a repository of

⁵One could still model such a situation in the rightmost possibility in Figure 3.3, where the intersection between A and B is empty (assuming A and B are sets of possible worlds). However, this possibility does not explain the 'public' part of it, that is, the conflict between propositions should be public.

this type of information in our conversations, that we can refer back to when an interlocutor seems to be violating the rules of the conversation.⁶

3.3 Why monitor the CG: rejecting infelicitous speech acts

We have seen in Chapter 2 that DM *si* can react to (almost) anything that marks a defective context: the propositional content of the previous utterance, the presupposition and implicatures it introduces, and its (violated) felicity conditions. This patterns with the observation in Egg (2013) about the contexts of use of German *doch*, which can also react to defective speech acts. In his analysis, *doch* relates two propositions: the one it introduces, and an antecedent proposition. In the cases where it responds to a non-declarative, this antecedent proposition is a felicity condition of the antecedent utterance, which are modelled as presuppositions (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985; Vanderveken, 1990). Another way in which Spanish DM *si* patterns similarly to German *doch* is in its reminding function: Rojas-Esponda (2014) proposes that German *doch* is used to re-answer an already closed Question-Under-Discussion, which is a similar analysis to the one offered in this dissertation.⁷

The unified schema for the use of DM *si* is given in (83), and will be applied to the contexts of use of DM *si* discussed in Chapter 2.

(83) PHASE 0: (ALIGNMENT)

p is in CG

PHASE 1: (MISALIGNMENT)

B makes move *m*

⁶There is a debate about the cultural and linguistic specificity of felicity conditions; I assume here that even if these are not the specific conditions that are known by language users, there are *some* pragmatic rules that users of a specific language in a specific community know.

⁷Both German *doch* and *ja* share similarities with Spanish DM *si*; a comparison of these particles is unfortunately outside the scope of this dissertation.

m is subject to a felicity condition q
 p pragmatically contradicts q

PHASE 2: (NEGOTIATION)

A utters *si*- p , which super-asserts p

PHASE 3: (ALIGNMENT)⁸

p is in CG

This analysis is reminiscent of the insights in Schwenter (1998) and Rodríguez Ramalle (2011) who paraphrase *si*-clauses as what others have called ‘biscuit conditionals’ (DeRose and Grandy, 1999) or ‘premise conditionals’ (Haegeman, 2003): conditionals that refer to the conditions of the illocutionary act. In this sense, *si*-clauses could be paraphrased as “How can you {assert, command, express, ask ...} u IF p is in the CG.”

Looking at some of the examples of the use of DM *si* in the literature, a general thread is that it seems to be rejecting the previous speech act since a felicity condition has not been met, as in (84):

(84) A: ¿Dónde está tu hermano?
‘Where is your brother?’

B: *Si* *acabo de* *llegar*.
si finishPRS.1SG PREP arrive

‘[si] I just arrived.’ (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011)

In this example, what A is basically conveying is that she cannot possibly know the answer to the question since she has only just arrived. In a way, this could be paraphrased as “Why are you asking where my brother is, if I have only just arrived”.

⁸This is under the assumption that B accepts p .

In the next few sections, we explore whether DM *sí* can in fact react to any type of felicity condition (propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions), and whether it can react to any type of speech act.

3.3.1 *Sí*-clauses reject infelicitous assertions

We start with assertions; their felicity conditions are listed in (85):

- (85) Felicity conditions for assertions (Searle, 1969)
- a. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT: Any proposition p .
 - b. PREPARATORY:
 - (i) S has evidence for p .
 - (ii) It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows p .
 - c. SINCERITY: S believes p .
 - d. ESSENTIAL: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents the actual state of affairs.

Reacting to the violation of the propositional content rule of assertions is relatively hard, since it stipulates that the semantic meaning of the utterance should be any proposition p . I will assume that there cannot be any real violation of this condition, since essentially *any* proposition would satisfy this condition.

In (86), we see that a *sí*-clause can reject a failed preparatory condition (85bi): B asserts that John is Canadian, but there is no way for B to know this since they have never talked with John. B having evidence for the truth of what they are asserting is a preparatory condition that A thinks is not being met, and A uses DM *sí* when she points this out:

- (86) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition for assertion
(Condition: B has evidence for p)

Context: A, B are in a group of international students, and someone has just introduced John by name to the group. While talking to another member of the group, B says:

B: John es canadiense.

‘John is Canadian.’

A: *Si nunca has hablado con él!*
si never have.2SG talked with him

‘[Si] you’ve never talked with him!’

DM *si* can also react to the breach of the second preparatory felicity condition, namely that it should not be obvious to both the Speaker and the Addressee that the Addressee knows p . In (87), both A and B know John well and know that he is Canadian, so B’s utterance is obvious to A:

(87) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition for assertion
(Condition: It is not obvious to both A and B that A knows p)

Context: A, B, and John have been friends for a while. At a party for John, B brings a bunch of Tim Horton’s cups, and B tells A:

B: Es que John es canadiense.

‘It’s just that John is Canadian.’

A: *Si ya lo sé!*
si already it know.PRS.1SG

‘[Si] I already know!’

The sincerity condition of assertions rules that a Speaker who asserts a proposition has to believe in its truth. In (88), B’s reply to A shows that A cannot

possibly believe that John is Canadian because he has just seen his US passport. Again, this utterance can be preceded by DM *si*:

- (88) Epistemic misalignment: violation of sincerity condition for assertion (Condition: B believes p)

Context: A, B, and John have been friends for a while, and have gone out to pubs together. Since John looks pretty young, he has been asked to show his ID many times, and both A and B have seen his US passport. While talking to a mutual friend with A, B says:

B: John es canadiense.

‘John is Canadian’

A: *Si te ha enseñado su pasaporte estadounidense!*

si you has shown his passport American

‘[Si] he has shown you his US passport!’

The final essential condition stipulates that an assertion should count as presenting the actual state of affairs: in (89), we see that a *si*-clause can be used to reject an assertion that does not count as a representation of the actual state of affairs—in this example, B is not giving an accurate representation of the context, according to A:

- (89) Epistemic misalignment: violation of essential condition for assertion (Condition: p does not represent the actual state of affairs)

Context: A and B are waiting at the bus stop after a failed picnic.

B: Hace un día magnífico.

'It's a gorgeous day.'

A: *Si no ha parado de llover!*

si NEG has stopped of raining

'[Si] it hasn't stopped raining!'

We have just seen that a *si*-clause can be used to mark the violation of propositional content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions. But how can we model this step by step in our Dialogue Board? I propose that felicity conditions are stored in the CG as propositions, and that B's discourse move introduces a proposition to the Dialogue Board that conflicts with one of them. The schema for the example (87) is in (90):

(90) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT

p is in CG

(p ='A knows that John is Canadian'.)

PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT

B makes move m

(m ='John is Canadian'.)

m is subject to a felicity condition q (q ='A doesn't know that J is Canadian')

q pragmatically contradicts p

PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION

A utters **si**- p

(p ='A knows that John is Canadian'.)

PHASE 3: ALIGNMENT

p is in CG

(p ='A knows that John is Canadian'.)

Given the context in (87), it is fair to assume that it is obvious that A knows John's nationality. More importantly, given the context it should be obvious to B

that this is the case. Therefore, p ='A knows that John is Canadian' is in the CG. This state of affairs is represented in Figure 3.4:⁹

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p p ='A knows that J is Canadian.'		CG	p p ='A knows that J is Canadian.'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A0}

TABLE

Figure 3.4: Phase 0 (Alignment): both A and B know p according to A.

As soon as B makes move m (when B asserts 'John is Canadian'), it becomes apparent to A that there is a problem: by asserting the proposition 'John is Canadian', B signals that B assumes that A does not know that John is Canadian. As we have seen, this is a violation of one of the preparatory conditions of assertions. This condition is formalized in Figure 3.5 as a proposition q in the Addressee's (B's) information state. Most importantly, since this is a felicity condition, this is assumed to be shared in the CG. The result is that there is a mismatch between the two CGs (the one representing what the Speaker thinks CG looks like, and the one representing what the Speaker thinks that the Addressee's thinks). In fact, B's idea of the CG contains a proposition q that pragmatically contradicts the proposition p in A's CG.

⁹The projected set is represented here with an asterisk (*) due to space issues.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	<i>p</i> p='A knows that J is Canadian'		CG	<i>q</i> q='A doesn't know J is Canadian'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A1}

TABLE
<i>m</i>
(<i>m</i> =ASSERT('John is Canadian.'))

Figure 3.5: Phase 1 (Misalignment).

Note that this points at the need to distinguish between the CG as conceived by the Speaker, and the CG that the Speaker thinks the Addressee has in mind. Since there is a mismatch between the two versions of the CG, A uses DM *si*: in Figure 3.7, she re-introduces into the conversation something that is already in the CG, namely *p*. We therefore find *si-p* on the Table, as well as the previous move *m* since it has not been resolved.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	<i>p</i> p='A knows that J is Canadian'		CG	<i>q</i> q='A doesn't know J is Canadian'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
<i>si-p</i>
<i>m</i>

Figure 3.6: Phase 2 (Negotiation): A uses a *si*-clause.

The desired outcome is to achieve an aligned epistemic configuration like the one in Figure 3.4, repeated in Figure 3.7. The Table is empty now, since all the issues have been resolved. B has revised their CG, and p is again in the CG—without any conflicting proposition.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p p='A knows that J is Canadian'		CG	p p='A knows J is Canadian'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE

Figure 3.7: Phase 3 (Alignment): both A and B know p .

Figure 3.7 represents a symmetrical, harmonious conversation: both interlocutors are aligned.

3.3.2 *Si*-utterances reject infelicitous commands

Moving on to commands, Searle (1969) identifies the following conditions for this type of speech act:

- (91) Felicity conditions for commands (Searle, 1969)
- a. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT: Future act.
 - b. PREPARATORY:
 - (i) H is able to do the action.
 - (ii) It is not obvious to S and H that H will do the action in the normal course of events.
 - c. SINCERITY: S wants H to do the action.

d. ESSENTIAL: Counts as an attempt to get H to do the action.

The first preparatory condition (91bi) is that the Addressee has to be able to do the action that the Speaker wants them to do. In example (92), this is not the case: B is ordering A to translate a bossanova song (which are typically in Portuguese), and B uses a *si*-marked clause to reply that she cannot comply with the command since she does not speak Portuguese:

(92) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition for commands
(Condition: A is able to do the action)

B: Tradúceme esta canción de bossanova.
'Translate for me this bossanova song.'

A: *Si no hablo portugués.*
si NEG speak.PRS.1SG Portuguese

'[Si] I don't speak Portuguese.' (modified from Egg (2013))

A's reply is not correcting any factual information in B's utterance, but is nonetheless repairing the previous speech act by marking that one of the felicity conditions is not met.

In (93) we see that A can in fact reject different felicity conditions of the same utterance. In this case, A is marking that the second preparatory condition is violated (by which the interlocutors don't know whether the Addressee will perform the action in the "normal course of events"):

(93) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition of commands
(Condition: It is not obvious to B that A will perform the action)

B: Tradúceme esta canción de bossanova.

‘Translate for me this bossanova song.’

A: *Si ya lo iba a hacer esta tarde.*

si already it go.IMPER.1SG to do this afternoon

‘[Si] I was going to do it this afternoon.’

In (93) A’s utterance implicates that she has time allotted for the task, and therefore it is obvious that she will do the action she is required to do—translating the bossanova song. Therefore, B’s command is not felicitous: it does not fulfill the felicity condition in (91bii).

The sincerity rule for commands stipulates that the Speaker wants the Addressee to perform the action conveyed by the command. In (94), A says that the action she is being ordered to do—again, translating a song—is not something that B really wants her to do:

- (94) Epistemic misalignment: violation of sincerity condition of commands (Condition: B wants A to perform the action)

B: Tradúceme esta canción de bossanova.

‘Translate for me this bossanova song.’

A: *Si odias la bossanova.*

si hate.PRS.2SG the bossanova

‘[Si] you hate bossanova.’

Let us see in more detail how this works with the example in (92). The overall schema of the conversation is the following:

- (95) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT
 ρ is in CG (p=‘A doesn’t speak Portuguese.’)

PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT

B makes move m (m =‘COMMAND (Translate this bossanova song).’)
 m introduces a felicity condition q (q =‘A speaks Portuguese.’)
 q contradicts p

PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION

A utters **si**- p (p =‘A doesn’t speak Portuguese.’)

PHASE 3: ALIGNMENT

p is in CG (p =‘A does not speak Portuguese.’)

The context in (92) specifies that both A and B know each other. This means that A can make estimates about what B already knows more readily than if they did not know each other.¹⁰ In this case, A and B are both aware of the fact that A does not speak Portuguese, since they know each other well. This is illustrated in figure 3.8, where p =‘A does not speak Portuguese’.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p p =‘A doesn’t speak Port.’		CG	p p =‘A doesn’t speak Port.’	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A0}

TABLE

Figure 3.8: Phase 0 (Alignment): Both interlocutors know that A does not speak Portuguese.

When B utters the command *Tradúceme esta canción de bossanova* (‘Trans-

¹⁰This does not mean that it is true that A knows everything B thinks.

late this bossanova song for me.’), they are assuming that A can perform the action: this is one of the felicity conditions of commands. In this case, being able to perform the action denoted by the command means that A must be able to speak Portuguese. This condition is again represented by q (q =‘A can speak Portuguese’) in Figure 3.9, where q is in B’s version of the CG.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	ρ ρ =‘A doesn’t speak Port.’		CG	q q =‘A speaks Port.’	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A1}

TABLE
m
(m =COMMAND (Translate this bossanova song))

Figure 3.9: Phase 1 (Misalignment): It becomes apparent that A and B do not share the same CG.

Figure 3.10 shows the part of the exchange when A uses the *sí*-clause, marked here again as *sí*- ρ . As the model shows, DM *sí* is re-introducing the proposition ρ , which was already in the CG (in both representations in Phase 0, only in the Speaker’s representation of the CG in Phase 1). The Table is pretty busy: *sí*- ρ is there as it was just introduced by A (hence the boldfaced **A**), and m (m =Tradúceme esta canción de bossanova. ‘Translate this bossanova song for me.’) is still on the Table.¹¹

¹¹Note that I abstract away from the update proposed by the command itself, which would be to add an outcome to the TDL of the Addressee.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p $p = \text{'A doesn't speak Port.'}$		CG	q $q = \text{'A speaks Port.'}$	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
si- p ;
m

Figure 3.10: Phase 2: A utters a *si*-clause.

The desired outcome is to return to an aligned epistemic state—to go back to Phase 0. This is captured in Figure 3.11: everything has been removed from the Table, and B has revised their knowledge (and CG) to the previous state where only p holds.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p $p = \text{'A doesn't speak Port.'}$		CG	p $p = \text{'A doesn't speak Port.'}$	
TDL			TDL		

$K_{A3} = K_{A0}$

TABLE

Figure 3.11: Phase 3: Both interlocutors know that A does not speak Portuguese.

3.3.3 *Si*-clauses reject infelicitous questions

Now we turn to questions:

- (96) Felicity conditions for questions (Searle, 1969):
- a. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT: Any proposition or propositional function.
 - b. PREPARATORY:
 - (i) S does not know the answer.
 - (ii) It is not obvious to both S and H that H will provide the information at that time without being asked.
 - c. SINCERITY: S wants this information.
 - d. ESSENTIAL: Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from H.

The first preparatory condition for the felicity of a question is that the Speaker does not know the answer to the question. This condition is violated in (98). In the context, all the friends have decided who the designated driver is, and the designated driver will not drink during the party. B, therefore, should know that the answer to their question is *no*.¹²

- (97) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition for questions (Condition: B does not know the answer)

Context: A group of friends are partying, and they have nominated A as the designated driver. During the party, B approaches A and asks:

¹²Searle (1969) himself notes that there are certain questions that do not meet this condition such as exam questions. I refer here only to non-exam, non-rhetorical questions (which would also not meet the sincerity condition).

B: Quieres una copa?
'Do you want a drink?'

A: *Si soy el conductor.*
si am the driver
'[Si] I am the designated driver.'

The second preparatory condition says that it shouldn't be obvious to both interlocutors that the Addressee will provide information without being asked.

- (98) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition for questions (Condition: it is not obvious to both A and B that A will provide the information at that time without being asked)

Context: A group of friends are partying, and they have nominated A as the designated driver. During the party, a bartender is going around asking people what they want to drink. When they get to A, B asks:

B: Quieres una copa?
'Do you want a drink?'

A: *Si soy el conductor.*
si am the driver
'[Si] I am the designated driver.'

The sincerity condition for questions stipulates that the Speaker wants to know the truth about what she is asking. Again, this is not the case in (99): A denies the fact that B wants to know the answer to the question they are asking, and uses a *si*-clause to do so:

- (99) Epistemic misalignment: violation of sincerity condition for questions (Condition: B wants this information)

Context: A has been dieting for a month and complaining to A about it. He is eating a chocolate bar when he turns to B and says:

B: Cuántas calorías tiene esta chocolatina?

‘How many calories are in this chocolate bar?’

A: *Si en realidad no lo quieres saber.*

si in reality NEG it want.PRS.2SG know

‘[Si] you don’t really want to know.’

Finally, the essential condition of questions is that they count as an attempt to elicit information from the Addressee. This rule is violated in (100): when someone asks a question, they believe that the Addressee is able to supply the information needed. But in (100) A cannot possibly know where her brother is because she just got home. In a sort of protest, she uses a *si*-clause telling B of the impossibility of her knowing the whereabouts of her brother:

- (100) Epistemic misalignment: violation of essential condition of questions (Condition: Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from the Addressee.)

Context: A has just gotten home from work. Her father (B) asks:

B: ¿Dónde está tu hermano?

‘Where is your brother?’

A: *Si acabo de llegar.*

si finish.PRS.1SG PREP arrive

‘[si] I just arrived.’ (Rodríguez Ramalle, 2011)

Let us see what the exchange in (98) would look like:

(101) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT
 ρ is in CG (ρ =‘B knows that A is the designated driver.’)

PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT
 B makes move m (m =‘Do you want a drink?’)
 m is subject to a felicity condition q (q =‘B doesn’t know if A wants a drink.’)
 q contradicts ρ

PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION
 A utters $\text{si-}\rho$ (ρ =‘A is the designated driver.’)

PHASE 3: ALIGNMENT
 ρ is in CG (ρ =‘A is the designated driver.’)

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	ρ ρ =‘A is the designated driver.’		CG	ρ ρ =‘A is the designated driver.’	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A0}

TABLE

Figure 3.12: Phase 0 (Alignment): A thinks that both interlocutors know that A is the designated driver.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p p ='A is the designated driver.'		CG	q q ='B doesn't know if A wants a drink.'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A1}

TABLE
m (m =Quieres una copa?) 'Do you want a drink?'

Figure 3.13: Phase 1: It becomes apparent that A and B do not share the same CG.

A		B	
DC		DC	
TDL		TDL	
OG		OG	
CG	p (p ='A is the designated driver.')	CG	q (q ='B doesn't know whether A wants a drink.')

K_{A2}

TABLE
si- p ; m

Figure 3.14: Phase 2: A utters a *si*-clause.

The final Phase 3 is a return to epistemic alignment: assuming that B does not object to A's *si*-clause, the conversation would return to a state where both interlocutors believe in p (p ='A is the designated driver.'), and where B's utterance has had no effect on the CG.

A			B		
	CURRENT	*		CURRENT	*
DC			DC		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p p=A is the designated driver		CG	p p=A is the designated driver	
TDL			TDL		

$K_{A3}=K_{A0}$

TABLE

Figure 3.15: Phase 3: A thinks that both interlocutors know that A is the designated driver.

3.3.4 *Si*-clauses reject infelicitous promises

We turn now to promises, a type of commissives. Commissives have a long list of conditions (listed in (102)):

- (102) Conditions for commissives (Searle, 1969)
- a. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT: Future act.
 - b. PREPARATORY:
 - (i) H would prefer S's doing A to their not doing A.
 - (ii) S believes H would prefer S's doing A to not doing A.
 - (iii) It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.
 - c. SINCERITY: S intends to do the action.
 - d. ESSENTIAL: Counts as an undertaking to do the action.

The propositional content rule of commissives says that a promise needs to commit to an act to be performed in the future. In (103), B is promising to do

something that has already taken place in the past, and A brings this up using DM *si*:

- (103) Epistemic misalignment: violation of propositional content condition of commissives (Condition: the promised action should be a future act)

B: Te prometo que te llevo al estreno de Wonder Woman.

‘I promise that I will take you the premiere of Wonder Woman’

A: *Si la estrenaron ayer.*

si it release.PST.3PL yesterday

‘[Si] the premiere was yesterday.’

There are three preparatory conditions for promises, the first one being that the person “receiving” the promise should prefer that the promised action takes place to it not taking place. This is not the case in (104), where B is promising A something that would not be for their benefit, namely taking them skiing, which they do not enjoy.

- (104) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition of commissives (Condition: A would prefer B’s doing the action to not doing the action)

Context: B is talking to A, who hates the snow and all snow-related sports.

B: Te prometo que mañana te llevo a esquiar.

‘I promise that I will take you skiing tomorrow.’

A: *Si a mí no me gusta esquiar.*

si to me NEG me please.PRS.3SG ski

‘[Si] I don’t like skiing.’

The second preparatory condition is similar to the first one: in this case, the Speaker (the one making the promise) has to believe that the first preparatory condition holds. This is not the case in (105), which uses the same context and same promise as (104): A can react with DM *sí* to the B's lack of awareness of the promised act not being preferred by A:

- (105) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition of commissives (Condition: B believes A would prefer B's doing the action to not doing the action)

Context: B is talking to A, who hates the snow and all snow-related sports.

B: Te prometo que mañana te llevo a esquiar.
'I promise that I will take you skiing tomorrow.'

A: *Si sabes que a mí no me gusta esquiar.*
si know.2SG that to me NEG me please.PRS.3SG ski

'[Si] you know that I don't like skiing.'

The third preparatory condition rules that it should not be obvious to both interlocutors that the Speaker will perform the promised action in the normal course of events. In (106) we see that a *sí*-clause can react to the violation of this rule, since it is not obvious to A that B will be able to perform the action in the normal course of events:¹³

- (106) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition of commissives (Condition: It is not obvious to both A and B that B will do the action in the normal course of events)

¹³I thank Lisa Matthewson (p.c.) for providing this context.

B has brought A a cup of tea to every morning for the past 10 years. One morning, B says:

B: Te prometo que te traigo una taza de té.

‘I promise that I will bring you a cup of tea.’

A: *Si lo haces siempre.*

si it do.PRS.2SG always

‘[Si] you always do.’

The sincerity condition states that the speaker who is making a promise needs to intend to do the promised action. This is what (107) shows: given the context, it is probably not true that B will carry out the promise (or, at least, it is not clear that they actually intend to do so), and A reacts to this breach of sincerity using a *si*-clause:

- (107) Epistemic misalignment: violation of sincerity condition of commissives
(Condition: B intends to do the action)

Context: B is passionate about animal welfare and animal shelters. Their mother believes that this is counterproductive for them because they are too sensitive, so B promises that they will stop checking shelter websites:

B: Te prometo que ya no miro más protectoras.

‘I promise that I won’t check out more shelter websites.’

A: *Si sé que no lo dices en serio.*

si know.1SG that NEG it say.2SG in seriousness

‘[Si] I know you don’t mean it.’

Finally, the essential condition states that the utterance needs to count as an undertaking to do the promised action. In (108) we see that a *si*-clause can also

react to a violation of this rule: in this example, the person making the promise is making a gesture that “cancels” the sincerity of their promise:

- (108) Epistemic misalignment: violation of essential condition of commissive
(Condition: Counts as an undertaking to do the action)

Context: B is promising A to tell the whole truth. However, A can see that they have their fingers crossed (a sign that they intend to lie):

B: Te lo prometo.
'I promise.'

A: *Si tienes los dedos cruzados.*
si have.2SG the finger crossed
'[Si] your fingers are crossed.'

Si-clauses are able to react to the propositional, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions of promises. The schema for (104) is given in (109):

- (109) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT
 p is in CG (p =‘A doesn’t like skiing.’)
- PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT
B makes move m (m =‘PROMISE (take A skiing).’)
 m introduces a felicity condition q (q =‘Taking A skiing benefits A.’)
 q contradicts p
- PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION
A utters **si**- p (p =‘A doesn’t like skiing.’)
- PHASE 3: ALIGNMENT
 p is in CG (p =‘A does not like skiing.’)

3.3.5 *Si*-clauses reject infelicitous thank-yous

Next we turn to a type of expressive speech act, namely thanking. In Chapter 1 we saw that expressive speech acts are, according to Searle (1969), speech acts that showcase the mental state or feelings of the Speaker. It should be noted, however, that one can say thank you without truly feeling grateful, and in fact the term *expressive* is also used to refer to utterances like “ouch” that do express the feelings of the Speaker (Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2007); acts like thanking would be more of a social act than an expressive act per se. In fact, Searle mentions that for thanking speech acts, the sincerity rule (which stipulates the mental state of the Speaker) and the essential rule (which stipulates that the utterance should count for all interlocutors as an actual performance of the intended act) overlap:

- (110) Conditions for thanking speech acts (Searle, 1969)
- a. PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT: Past act A done by H.
 - b. PREPARATORY: A benefits S and S believes A benefits S.
 - c. SINCERITY: S feels grateful or appreciative for A.
 - d. ESSENTIAL: Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation.

Si-clauses can be used to react to a violation of the propositional content condition in (110): in (111), B is thanking A for an invitation to a party, but the party has not even been planned yet and it is not certain that it will take place. This is in conflict with the first felicity condition listed above in (110), that states that the action that is being thanked for has to be in the past. A uses DM *si* to react to this:

- (111) Epistemic misalignment: violation of propositional content condition of thanking (Condition: The thanked action must be in the past)

B: Muchas gracias por la invitación!
'Thank you so much for the invitation!'

A: *Si aún no sabemos si vamos a hacer la fiesta!*
si yet NEG know.PRS.1PL if go.PRS.1PL to make the party
'[Si] we don't know yet whether we're throwing the party!'

The preparatory condition for thanking speech acts states that the action that is being thanked for has to have been beneficial for the Speaker. In (112), A has given B a recommendation for a job position that gives B more work in exchange for a little more pay. B thanks A, but A points out that the new job would not necessarily be beneficial for B given the workload. A can bring this up using DM *sí*:

(112) Epistemic misalignment: violation of preparatory condition of thanking
(Condition: Action benefits B and B believes the action benefits B)

Context: A has given B a recommendation for a job position that entails more workload for a little more pay.

B: Muchas gracias por la recomendación!
'Thank you so much for the recommendation!'

A: *Si ahora tendrás más trabajo!*
si now have.FUT.2SG more work
'[Si] now you'll have more work!'

As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the sincerity and the essential condition overlap in this case. Example (113) shows that *sí*-clauses can be used to react to these conditions: B thanks C for flowers that B doesn't really like, and A

knows this. Out of C's earshot, A points out that B cannot really be thankful since they hate this particular type of flower:

- (113) Epistemic misalignment: violation of sincerity/essential condition of thanking (Condition: B feels grateful or appreciative for the action)

B: Muchas gracias por las flores!

'Thank you so much for the flowers!'

A: *Si odias las rosas rojas!*

si hate.PRS.2SG the roses red

'[Si] you hate red roses!'

3.3.6 *Si*-utterances reject infelicitous greetings

Another example of how *si*-marked clauses can flag an infelicitous speech act is their use in canonical adjacency pairs such as greeting-greeting pairs. This is shown in (114), where B can either reply with the same greeting ('Buenos días') or with a *si*-marked clause that marks that the previous greeting is infelicitous since it is not the appropriate time of day to use it:

- (114) Epistemic misalignment: A does not believe that the greeting uttered by B is time-appropriate.

B: Buenos días!

'Good day!' (typically said in the morning)

A: *Si ya son las cinco de la tarde!*

si already are the five of the evening

'[Si] it's already five in the evening!'

The same analysis would explain the use of DM *sí* in (114): A assumes that there is a publicly shared proposition p in the CG, namely the felicity condition that the greeting needs to be appropriate for the time of day. B then says *Buenos días* ('Good day'), a greeting that tends to be used in the morning and not in the afternoon, when this exchange is happening. A then uses a *sí*-marked utterance to flag that the previous speech act is infelicitous, and *reminds* B of the time it is.

3.4 How this analysis explains other observations

The analysis presented here for the licensing of DM *sí* revolved around the idea that it is the violation of a felicity condition that licenses the use of the DM. However, in Chapter 2 we saw that *sí*-clauses can also reject implicatures, inferences drawn from the immediate context (sometimes a gesture), and previously held beliefs by the Speaker. The analysis presented can, in fact, also account for these other observations.

3.4.1 *Sí*-utterances reject failed implicatures and presuppositions

In order to give a unified account of the role of *sí*-clauses, I assume that there is a felicity condition that states all implicatures and presuppositions contained in a sentence have to be true, defined in (115) and (116).

(115) PRESUPPOSITION CONDITION: All presuppositions triggered by the utterance of a sentence S have to be true at time of utterance.

(116) IMPLICATURE CONDITION: All implicatures triggered by the utterance of a sentence S have to be true at time of utterance.

With these added felicity conditions, we can use the same analysis for sentences like (117), where B triggers an implicature with the use of the particle *hasta* 'even': even Adriana, the least knowledgeable, knows about the topic they

are discussing.¹⁴ A then rejects B's contribution given that it triggers an implicature (*Adriana is the least knowledgeable*) that is not true. A then *reminds* B that Adriana wrote a book about the topic, which contradicts the implicature carried by B's sentence:

(117) B: Eso hasta Adriana lo sabe.
 'Even Adriana knows that.'

A: *Si ha escrito un libro sobre ello!*
 si has written a book about it
 '[si] she wrote a book about it.'

(118) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT
 ρ is in CG (= ρ 'Adriana wrote a book about x.')

PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT
 B makes move m (m ='ASSERT (Even Adriana knows x).')
 m is subject to a felicity condition q (q ='All implicatures in m are true.')

m triggers an implicature i (i ='Adriana doesn't know much about x.')

i pragmatically contradicts ρ

PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION
 A utters **si**- ρ (ρ ='Adriana wrote a book about x.')

PHASE 3: ALIGNMENT
 ρ is in CG (= ρ 'Adriana wrote a book about x.')

The definition in (115) covers presuppositions because, as (119) illustrates, DM *si* can also be used to flag an unsuccessful presupposition. In (119), B's

¹⁴Under certain analyses, this type of implicature (conventional) is closer to presuppositions than to a conversational implicature. The same mechanics would apply to an example of a different type of implicature, however.

utterance presupposes that Pedro has a brother, but in this example this presupposition cannot be accommodated: Pedro is an only child. This is something that A thought it was in the CG (since they are at a party, it might be safe to assume that the party guests know the host), but B's utterance signals that the proposition 'Pedro is an only child' is not in B's representation of the CG.

(119) Context: A and B are at a mutual friend's party, Pedro, who is an only child. They are discussing Pedro with another guest, and B says:

B: El hermano de Pedro es arquitecto.
 'Pedro's brother is an architect.'

A: *Si Pedro es hijo único!*
 si Pedro is son unique
 '[Si] Pedro is an only child!'

We can use the same analysis and the general felicity condition introduced in (115) to explain this, as is schematized in (120):

- (120) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT
 p is in CG (p ='Pedro is an only child.')
- PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT
 B makes move m (m ='ASSERT (P's brother is an architect).')
 m is subject to a felicity condition q (q ='All presuppositions in m are true.')
 m triggers a presupposition i (i ='Pedro has a brother.')
 i pragmatically contradicts p
- PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION
 A utters **si**- p (p ='Pedro is an only child'.')

3.4.2 *Si*-clauses do not need to convey contrast

In Chapter 2 I mentioned that although many accounts of DM *si* and *si*-clauses referred to contrast and adversativity, there are examples like (121) where there seems to be no apparent contradiction or opposition with the truth-conditional content of B’s utterance. Under the analysis presented, examples like this would be explained: B is violating one of the preparatory conditions of assertions, namely that it shouldn’t be obvious to both Speaker and Addressee that the Addressee knows the information conveyed by the proposition. In this case, one can argue that A is acting as if they already knew the information, or as if it was not surprising to them to hear the “news”:

(121) B: A Juana la han aceptado en Stanford.

‘Juana got accepted into Stanford.’

A: *Claro, si es muy inteligente.*

of.course si is very intelligent

‘Of course, [si] she’s very intelligent.’ (Schwenter, 2016b, p. 26; 10)

Another example of this can be seen in the following corpus example:

(122) B: Por Navidad regalaron: un Nenuco baby

‘For Christmas they gave her: a Nenuco baby (perfume for children)’

A: *Sí, si ya me lo has contado, cállate, [...]*

yes si already me it has told, shut.up

‘Yes, [si] you’ve already told me, shut up.’ (from CREA Corpus (CREA, 2020))

In (122), A literally says that she already knew the information in the previous move: it does not bring new information, hence the update proposed by B is not successful.

3.4.3 *Si*-clauses reject defective inferences from context

Si-clauses don't need a verbal antecedent: a Speaker can use the interlocutors' actions to infer what they know.

(123) Context: A, B, and C have been friends for a while. During a BBQ, B hands C a beef burger. A reacts:

Si es vegetariana!

SI is vegetarian

'[Si] she is vegetarian!'

In this case, a felicity condition of the action in (123) is that C eats meat. This contradicts the proposition p ='C is vegetarian' that A thought was in the CG (given that they have been friends for a while). This is schematized in (124):

- (124) PHASE 0: ALIGNMENT
 p is in CG (p ='C is vegetarian.')
- PHASE 1: MISALIGNMENT
 B makes move m (m =B hands beef burger to C.)
 m is subject to a felicity condition q (q ='All implicatures in m are true.')
 m implies i (i ='C eats meat.')
 q contradicts p
- PHASE 2: NEGOTIATION
 A utters **si**- p (p ='C is vegetarian.')
- PHASE 3: ALIGNMENT
 p is in CG (p ='C is vegetarian.')

3.4.4 *Si*-clauses reject previously held beliefs by Speaker

A challenge arises when we look at examples where there is no interlocutor as in (125):

(125) Context: A had heard on the weather forecast that it would rain all weekend long. When she wakes up, it is sunny.

A: *Si hace sol!*

si does sun

‘[Si] it’s sunny!’

This context of use is, however, still in line with the proposed meaning of DM *si*. There is still rejection, but in this case of the previous information state of the Speaker, instead of the Addressee’s version of CG. DM *si* still introduces a proposition that is uncontroversial. The proposal that the contradiction is between the current context and a past version of it is not completely new. A similar analysis is given by Torres Bustamante (2013) for Andean Spanish mirative constructions containing the pluperfect; she mentions that the surprise arises “as a consequence of the clash between the Speaker’s previous beliefs and the current state of affairs which is discovered at speech time.” (Torres Bustamante, 2013, p. 39). So (125) still conveys the uncontroversiality ascribed to *si*, but the proposition it contradicts is a belief previously held by the Speaker before the speech time.

We can apply the same analysis to what has been called ‘causative’ *si*, as exemplified in (126), where the sentence introduced by *si* conveys the reason why the previous utterance was made by the same interlocutor.

(126) *Cómo no vas a saber bailar?! Si lo llevas en la*
 how NEG go.PRS.2SG to know dance.INF si it take in the
sangre!
 blood

‘How can you not know how to dance?! [Si] it’s in your blood!’ (from a comic by Moderna de Pueblo (@modernadepueblo), published Dec. 14, 2019 on Instagram)

We can still apply the same analysis proposed to dialogues here: the *si*-marked clause still rejects the previous move due to it not being felicitous, but in this case the previous move was introduced by the same interlocutor. In the example (126) above, the Speaker highlights how absurd their question is with the proposition introduced by DM *si*.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter I have analyzed DM *si* as a marker that indicates that a proposition is already in the CG—in this way, it expresses *superassertive* force. We saw that this explains the contexts in which we find the particle: it cannot be used to convey “hot news”, or in case the Speaker knows for sure that the Addressee cannot already know the information presented.

The contribution of the whole *si*-clause to the dialogue is to reject or object to the conversational update proposed by the interlocutor on the grounds that that contribution violates a felicity condition of the speech act it intends to perform. This shows that interlocutors keep score of the Addressee’s information state, and that resolving an epistemic misalignment is one way in which language users deal with misaligned information states.

In the next chapter, we turn to the DM *no*. I will argue that, rather than resolving epistemic misalignment, DM *no* seeks on the contrary to maintain epistemic alignment with the Addressee, and does so by soliciting the Addressee’s endorsement to proceed to the next step of the conversational exchange.

Chapter 4

Monitoring the Speaker-Addressee relation: Peninsular Spanish *no*

Let us make a special effort to stop communicating with each other, so we can have some conversation. — Mark Twain

DM *no* has been analyzed in the earliest studies that focused on this DM as a marker that manages interaction (Ortega, 1985). In particular, San Martín Núñez (2011) categorizes DM *no* as an ‘interrogative control of contact marker’. One of the effects of this interactional side of *no* is its use as a mitigating device, which has been the focus of much work (Ortega, 1985; García Vizcaíno, 2005; Landone, 2009; Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009; Montañez Mesas, 2015; Uclés Ramada, 2018, 2020). But we should distinguish the core meaning of the DM from the discourse effect of the *no*-tagged clause has on a particular context of use. The first ingredient of my analysis will be the core function of DM *no*, which is to request the Addressee’s confirmation of the conversational update proposed by the anchor. This update involves sharing a public commitment; that is, the Speaker is requesting that the Addressee confirm the validity of making an individual commitment a shared commitment. Different speech act types propose different conversational updates, and it is this difference, and not a difference in sentence type, that allows

us to capture the distribution of DM *no*. The second ingredient of the analysis refers to *why* we may want to monitor the Speaker-Addressee relation: I show that we use *no*-tagged clauses because we want to confirm a bias, be it towards a belief or towards an outcome.

4.1 Ingredients of the analysis

I propose that DM *no* requests confirmation from the Addressee that the contextual update proposed by the anchor is publicly shared. In Chapter 2 we have seen two pieces of evidence to support this proposal: (i) the distribution of the DM with respect to only a subtype of interrogative sentences (rhetorical questions) and a subtype of commands (weak commands or suggestions) hints at the fact that the DM is sensitive to the type of contextual update proposed; and (ii) comments from speakers that paraphrase the effect of the DM as including the Addressee in otherwise Speaker-oriented speech acts (such as exclamations) hint at the fact that the Speaker is trying to call on the Addressee to commit to the contextual update.

A rough schema of the contribution of DM *no* is presented in Figure 4.1. One of the key aspects of this analysis is that DM *no* is requesting confirmation of a *transition* from one information state to another—from one moment where a commitment is private and individualized, to another where a commitment is public and shared.




Figure 4.1: Schema of the effect of DM *no* on the dialogue.

Although this in-a-nutshell analysis is very broad, it predicts that certain speech act types will not accept DM *no*: the types of speech act that cannot be the anchor of this DM are those that do not require the participation of the Addressee in order to be fully performed, namely commissives, declarations, and expressives of the thanking and apologizing type. Such speech acts, I argue, require an immediate context update by the Speaker in order to be felicitous. A declaration like ‘I declare you joined in matrimony’ does not require the participation of the Addressee: a declaration is meant to change a state of affairs in the world as it is spoken by the appropriate Speaker, and therefore if the Speaker were to ask for the Addressee’s cooperation in the acceptance of the speech act the Speaker would be failing at performing the speech act of marrying two people. Table 4.1 summarizes the effects of different speech act types, and their co-occurrence with DM *no*.

Table 4.1: Types of speech act and their predicted co-occurrence with DM *no*.

Speech Act Type	Co-occurrence with DM <i>no</i>
ASSERTION	3
COMMAND (subset)	3
RHETORICAL QUESTION	3
INFORMATION-SEEKING QUESTION	7
EXPRESSIVE	7
COMMISSIVE	7
DECLARATIONS	7

I model this function of DM *no* on the conversation by proposing that it tables the update proposal of its anchor. I formalize this by putting on the Table the Speaker’s information state K_A at the time of utterance of the *no*-tagged clause, which I will referred to as K_{At} . A in this case represents Speaker A (since the pragmatic roles switch).¹ This information state is the representation of the Speaker’s understanding of the conversation at a given time t . In a sense, A ’s information state at a particular time is a snapshot of the conversation: the difference between K_{A1} and K_{A2} will capture the conversational update, that is, it will capture the *transition* from K_{A1} to K_{A2} .

Note that this way of modelling the idea of tabelling a conversational update by tabelling the information state of the Speaker might run into a problem: if the Addressee rejects this labelled information state, how can we know for sure that they are just rejecting the update and not something else in the information state? I tried to avoid this issue by specifying the moment in time that each information state represents, so that for an assertion uttered at t_2 the only difference from K_{A1} to K_{A2} would be the addition of a proposition ρ to the projected CG. Therefore, if

¹This is in a sense similar to the LATEST MOVE component in (Ginzburg, 2012): a component that stores the very last conversational move made by any interlocutor.

we table K_{A2} , we are in essence labelling the addition of p to the projected CG.

There is another part of the proposed analysis that bears discussing: the use of DM *no* is that of a *confirmational*, that is, it requests the Addressee's corroboration of a move, not merely to check whether a move is valid. This means that the Speaker is *biased* towards the Addressee accepting the transition, in the same way that biased questions convey an expectation on the part of the Speaker of what the answer to the question is (Ladd, 1981; Van Rooy and Šafářová, 2003; Han, 2002; Reese and Asher, 2007, 2010; Sudo, 2013; Krifka, 2015; Domaneschi et al., 2017). In fact, utterances modified by DM *no* are usually analyzed as the equivalent (in terms of function) to tag questions (Gómez González, 2014), which are usually analyzed as biased questions. Whereas a standard polar question asks the Speaker to choose between p and $\neg p$, a biased question expresses that the Speaker has some previous belief in favour of (or against) p . This is illustrated for English in (127):

- (127) Context: A and B are good friends, and are catching up at a café. B says that they will order the cheesecake. A knows that B is lactose-intolerant, so she replies:

Aren't you lactose-intolerant?

In (127), Speaker A is biased towards the answer being positive ('Yes, I am lactose intolerant'). The literature on biased questions differentiates between two main types of possible sources of bias: contextual evidence for or against the proposition (contextual bias) and the Speaker's beliefs about the proposition (epistemic bias) (Büring and Gunlogson, 2000; Van Rooy and Šafářová, 2003; Romero and Han, 2004; Reese and Asher, 2007, 2010; Sudo, 2013).

In the same way, when a Speaker uses DM *no* they are biased towards the Addressee accepting the transition from K_{A1} to K_{A2} . We saw this in examples where DM *no* was only allowed in contexts where the Speaker believed that the

Addressee would agree with the anchor, as in (128) (repeated from (71)):

(128) 3 Context 1: The Speaker has organized a party the next day, and has received an RSVP from the Addressee. She is confirming the guest list, and asks:

7 Context 2: The Speaker has organized a party the next day, and has not received an RSVP from the Addressee. She is confirming the guest list, and asks:

Vienes mañana, no?
come.2PRS.2SG tomorrow no

‘You’re coming tomorrow, [no]?’

In section 4.4.1 I will discuss how these biases affect the use of DM *no*, and whether the use of the DM distinguishes between different types of bias. I will use the notion of *outcome bias*: when the Speaker does not express a bias towards the truth of a proposition, but towards a preferred action or outcome (Van Rooy and Šafářová, 2003; Reese and Asher, 2007; Yang and Wiltschko, 2016).² Since DM *no* can modify commands, we need this type of bias to explain the contexts of use in which the tag appears with this type of speech act.

4.2 How to monitor the S-A relation: what speakers can do with DM *no*

In Chapter 2 we saw that DM *no* can follow declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives, and also exclamatives. But we have also gotten a glimpse of certain constraints on the use of DM *no*, for instance although it can modify interrogative

²This is similar to bouletic bias, which is discussed as a type of epistemic bias. According to this, there are three modal flavours when it comes to epistemic bias: expectations based on rules (deontic), based on beliefs (epistemic), and based on desires (bouletic) (Reese and Asher, 2007; Sudo, 2013).

clauses, it can only do so if this interrogative is a rhetorical question and not a canonical information-seeking question.

The analysis presented predicts that only those speech acts whose contextual updates include a publicly shareable commitment will be felicitous anchors of DM *no*. As we will see in the following sections, this prediction is borne out. In sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.4 I will show that DM *no* can modify assertions, exclamations, a subset of commands, and rhetorical questions. In section 4.3 I turn to the types of speech acts that are predicted to not co-occur with DM *no*, namely information-seeking questions, thanking and apologizing, commissives, and declarations. In section 4.4 I describe the role of bias in the licensing of DM *no*.

4.2.1 DM *no* negotiates the update proposed by assertions

DM *no* co-occurs with assertions, both affirmative and negative, as illustrated in (129) and (130) where it is shown that both the positive and negative assertion (*No*) *Está lloviendo* ‘It (isn’t) raining’ can be the anchor of the DM:

- (129) Context: A has checked the forecast: it’ll be raining all week where B is. Later, A and B are talking on the phone long-distance. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?
is raining no
‘It’s raining, [no]?’

- (130) Context : A has checked the forecast: After a week of rain, it has stopped raining where B is. Later, A and B are talking on the phone long-distance. A says:

No está lloviendo, no?

NEG is raining no

'It isn't raining, [no]?'

Let us first illustrate the effects of a bare non-evaluative assertion on the Dialogue Board. For expository purposes, I assume a simplified version of the Dialogue Board where there are no other elements present (that is, no other conversational moves have been made). I will be showing three “snapshots” of the interaction between A and B: K_{A1} , which represents the state of the dialogue just before the target utterance (the focus will be on utterances modified by DM *no*, but I will also show the effects of unmodified (or bare) utterances); K_{A2} , which represents the tabelling of the target utterance and the effect it has on the Dialogue Board; and K_{A3} , which represents the desired outcome (typically involving a resolution).

The (simplified) context prior to the utterance of a bare assertion is modelled in Figure 4.2:³ A has the proposition p (p ='It is raining.') in her discourse commitments (DC_A).⁴

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	p p ='It is raining.'		DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG			CG		
TDL			TDL		

K_{A1}

TABLE

Figure 4.2: Phase 1: Before bare assertion of p ='It is raining'.

³Unlike DM *si*, DM *no* does not convey a previous aligned state (Phase 0).

⁴In Chapter 1 I defined discourse commitments as including both public and private commitments by the interlocutors; the key aspect is that they are not shared, as opposed to the CG.

A wants B to add p to the CG. This is the function of an assertion. A asserts p , thus tabelling the proposition. This has a particular effect on the Dialogue Board: as in Farkas and Bruce (2010), p is added to the projected CG. This is a reflection of the proposal nature of assertions. This update also means that the information state K_A will change: this dynamic change is reflected in the incremental index of K_A (K_{A2}). The effect of the utterance of a bare assertion is modelled in Figure 4.3:

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	p p =‘It is raining.’		DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG		p p =‘It is raining.’	CG		p p =‘It is raining.’
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
p p =‘It is raining.’

Figure 4.3: Phase 2: Bare assertion of p = ‘It is raining’.

After the assertion different outcomes are possible: Figure 4.4 represents the outcome desired by A, where p is accepted by B, and can therefore move from the projected CG to the current CG. This also means that p is removed from individualized discourse commitments (Farkas and Bruce, 2010; Malamud and Stephenson, 2015). It is also removed from the Table, since it has been resolved:

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	ρ ρ ='It is raining.'		CG	ρ ρ ='It is raining.'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A3}

TABLE

Figure 4.4: Phase 3: After bare assertion of ρ = ‘It is raining.’ assuming Speaker B accepts ρ .

Now that we have modelled the effect of a bare assertion on the Dialogue Board, let us turn to modelling the effect of adding DM *no*.

4.2.1.1 How DM *no* modifies non-evaluative assertions

Let us focus first on the effect of DM *no* on non-evaluative assertive anchors. I defined such assertions as being non-judge dependent, that is, all interlocutors can commit to its truth.⁵

Previous analyses of DM *no* agree on its confirmational nature: when a language user adds DM *no* to a clause they are requesting *confirmation* of a fact or an opinion. This means that the use of DM *no* would not be acceptable in contexts where the Speaker knows that the Addressee is not in a position to confirm a fact. This is in fact the case, as the examples in (131) show. In this example, DM *no* is only licensed in the context where the Speaker might expect the Addressee to know whether there is saffron in paella:

- (131) 3 Context 1: Talking to my father, who has been making paellas for ages.
7 Context 2: Talking to Donald Trump.

⁵For this definition, see Chapter 1 section 1.3.1.

La paella lleva azafrán, no?
the paella takes saffron no
'Paella has saffron, [no]?'

We need to represent the fact that one of the licensing conditions of DM *no* that we need to model is that the Speaker thinks that the Addressee can confirm the information conveyed by the anchor. I model this contextual restriction by adding p (in this case, $p = \text{'Paella has saffron.'}$) to the projected DCs of the interlocutors. Note that this is not a misalignment per se, but the interlocutors are nonetheless not maximally aligned: given the assumptions we laid out about how one of the main driving forces of a conversation is to share commitments publicly, this configuration could be improved by trying to add the proposition p to the shared CG.

So how does adding DM *no* to a non-evaluative assertion affect the effect the utterance has on the Dialogue Board? Let us go back to the example used at the beginning of section 4.2.1:

- (132) Context: A has checked the forecast: it'll be raining all week where B is. Later, A and B are talking on the phone long-distance. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?
is raining no
'It's raining, [no]?'

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A		ρ $\rho = \text{'It is raining'}$	DC _B		ρ $\rho = \text{'It is raining'}$
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG			CG		
TDL			TDL		

K_{A1}

TABLE

Figure 4.5: Phase 1: Before a modified assertion with DM *no*.

Phase 2 represents the dialogue immediately after the *no*-tagged non-evaluative assertion is uttered. The update proposed by an assertion is represented in the Dialogue Board by adding a proposition ρ to the projected CG. The difference with a bare assertion is that the Speaker (A, bold-faced in Figure 4.6) puts on the Table the update proposed by the anchor, represented here as K_{A2} , and not the proposition itself. This is a way to model that the Speaker is requesting confirmation of the transition from K_{A1} to K_{A2} .

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	ρ $\rho = \text{'It is raining'}$		DC _B		ρ $\rho = \text{'It is raining'}$
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG		ρ $\rho = \text{'It is raining'}$	CG		ρ $\rho = \text{'It is raining'}$
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
K_{A2}

Figure 4.6: Phase 2: Speaker A utters a modified assertion with DM *no*.

This accounts for the description of DM *no* as a ‘control check marker’ (*marcador de control del contacto* (Briz, 1998)): it makes explicit that the Speaker (A) wants the contribution of the Addressee (B) in updating the conversation.⁶ A ‘canonical’ update proposed by an assertion would not require the active participation of the Addressee—however, here we see that the fulfillment of the update depends on the Addressee. This engagement of the Addressee is marked by the rising intonation of the DM (Montañez Mesas, 2015; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Heim, 2019a).⁷

Assuming that A’s desires come true and B does not reject the update proposed by the anchor, the resulting state will look like Figure 4.7: ρ moves to the CG, and is removed from other sets.

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	ρ ρ =‘It is raining’		CG	ρ ρ =‘It is raining’	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A3}

TABLE

Figure 4.7: Phase 3: Acceptance of modified assertion with DM *no*.

⁶Another way in which this contribution has been formalized is as a tentative attribution to the Addressee of an illocutionary act (Kiss, 2018).

⁷Their sources are recent studies of rising intonation and sentence-final DMs similar to DM *no*. There is a vast literature about rising intonation and engagement of the Addressee (see among others Ward and Hirschberg (1985); Geluykens (1987); Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg (1990); Bartels (1997); Gunlogson (2004); Šafářová (2005); Truckenbrodt and Maienborn (2012); Heim (2019a)).

4.2.1.2 How DM *no* modifies evaluative assertions

Evaluative assertions behave differently with respect to DM *no*. In the case of sentences that contain predicates of personal taste, the felicitous use of the DM depends on whether the Addressee is able to confirm the evaluation or not, as in (133):

(133) 4 Context 1: A and B are eating a paella. A says to B:

7 Context 2 : A and B are at a restaurant. A is tasting a plate of paella, and B is eating pasta:

La paella está riquísima, no?

the paella is tasty.SUPER no

‘The paella is very delicious, [no?]

The sentence *La paella está riquísima* (‘The paella is delicious’) can be understood to mean that the paella is delicious for everyone in the context or that this judgement applies only to the Speaker.⁸ This ambiguity can be modelled in the Dialogue Board by adding the proposition ρ (ρ =‘The paella is delicious’) to different components. If the Speaker wants to state that the paella is tasty as a general attribute of the dish, she would propose to add the proposition ρ =‘The paella is delicious’ to the CG, as in Figure 4.8:

⁸Not all analyses of this type of predicate assume this ambiguity, however. In some analyses, sentences containing predicates of taste are always subject to a specific perspective (Déchaine et al., 2017).

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	p p ='The paella is delicious'		DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG		p p ='The paella is delicious'	CG		p p ='The paella is delicious'
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
p p ='The paella is delicious'

Figure 4.8: A utters a bare evaluative, judge-independent assertion.

If the Speaker wants to state that the paella is tasty *to her*, then the proposition is added to the Speaker's Discourse Commitments, but not to the shared CG as represented in Figure 4.9. This means that only she commits to the truth of p .⁹

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	p p ='The paella is delicious'		DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG			CG		
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
p p ='The paella is delicious'

Figure 4.9: A utters a bare evaluative, judge-dependent assertion.

⁹Note that although p is not added to the CG, the fact that S uttered p will be registered. Another way in which this difference could be modelled is by saying that the difference lies on whether p or $\text{Bel}(p)$ is labelled (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). Another option is to have p in another component, the Origo Ground, the set of propositions that are always perspectivized (Déchaine et al., 2017).

What is the effect of DM *no* on sentences that contain these predicates of personal taste? Under the analysis presented, using DM *no* would in effect disambiguate between the general reading and the *to-me* reading: by using DM *no*, the Speaker (A) is trying to update the CG, and not to make her own DCs public. How do we know this? One piece of evidence comes from the difference in acceptability in various agreeing scenarios. In (134), we see that the sentence *La paella está riquísima* ('The paella is delicious') would be felicitous when the Speaker thinks that the Addressee will agree—but also when she thinks they will not:¹⁰

(134) 4 Context 1: A and B are eating a paella. A likes the paella. B seems to like it too. A says:

4 Context 2: A and B are eating a paella. A likes the paella. B seems disgusted. A says:

La paella está riquísima.
the paella is tasty.SUPER
'The paella is delicious.'

However, when the Speaker uses DM *no*, the second context (when she sees that the Addressee does not share her enthusiasm) is not a licensing context, as illustrated in (135):

(135) 4 Context 1: A and B are eating a paella. A likes the paella. B seems to like it too. A says:

7 Context 2: A and B are eating a paella. A likes the paella. B seems disgusted. A says:

¹⁰It is true that it seems socially odd (or at least confrontational) to utter this sentence in Context 2, but the exchange would improve if the Speaker added *Qué tiquismiquis eres!* ('You are so picky!').

La paella está riquísima, no?

the paella is tasty.SUPER no

‘The paella is delicious, [no]?’

This shows that the use of DM *no* signals that the Speaker is trying to make the commitment shared between the two interlocutors, as the analysis predicts.

The fact that the Speaker needs to think that the Addressee can confirm the truth of the proposition is represented in the Dialogue Board by having the proposition p = ‘The paella is delicious’ in both interlocutors’ DC, but there is a difference with what we saw section 4.2.1.1: in this case, p is in the current DC of the Speaker (A), but in the projected DC of the Addressee (B). This explains why the rejection of a *no*-tagged evaluative would not remove the commitment to p from the DC of Speaker A. In a *no*-tagged non-evaluative the commitment of A is contingent on the contribution of the Addressee (since the proposition was in the projected DC of both interlocutors), so its rejection would also involve the removal of p from A’s DC. However, as we can see in (136), the rejection of a *no*-tagged evaluative by B does not remove A’s commitment: she still thinks that the rice dish is delicious.

(136) A: Este arroz está riquísimo.

‘This rice is delicious.’

B: No, se han pasado con la sal.

‘No, they put too much salt.’

A: Bueno, pues a mí me gusta.

‘Well, I like it.’

Phase 1 is represented in Figure 4.10:

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	ρ ρ ='The paella is delicious'		DC _B		ρ ρ ='The paella is delicious'
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG			CG		
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE

Figure 4.10: Phase 1: Before the *no*-modified assertion of an evaluative proposition.

DM *no* is used to ask whether moving the proposition ρ from the individual to the shared component is felicitous. This is shown in Figure 4.11, again by labelling K_{A2} as a placeholder for the transition from K_{A1} to K_{A2}:

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	ρ ρ ='The paella is deli.'		DC _B	ρ ρ ='The paella is deli.'	
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG		ρ ρ ='The paella is deli.'	CG		ρ ρ ='The paella is deli.'
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
K _{A2}

Figure 4.11: Phase 2: Speaker A puts forward a *no*-modified assertion of an evaluative proposition.

If there is agreement, the Table will be emptied (since all the issues would have been resolved) and the proposition will be part of the CG for both interlocutors A

and B, as Figure 4.12 shows.

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	<i>p</i> <i>p</i> ="The paella is delicious"		CG	<i>p</i> <i>p</i> ="The paella is delicious"	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A3}

TABLE

Figure 4.12: Phase 3: Acceptance of modified assertion of an evaluative assertion.

The analysis proposed for DM *no* accounts for the co-occurrence of the DM with an anchor containing a predicate of personal taste, but it also accounts for the infelicity of having an anchor containing an internal-state predicate in the first person, as (137) shows. This specific type of evaluative assertion can *only* be Speaker-dependent, and the proposition they denote does not enter the CG.

(137) After a day at uni, A comes home and yawns. A says to B:

Estoy cansada, (#no?)

am tired no

‘I am tired, [no?]

Note, however, that there might be a context in which (137) can be uttered: the Speaker (A) has a condition that makes her not be aware of her own exhaustion, yet she still displays all signs of being tired. Since she is not capable of realizing when she is tired, she needs the cooperation of her Addressee to know whether or not she is tired:

- (138) Context: A suffers from a condition that makes her unaware of her own pain and exhaustion. She comes back from work looking visibly tired, and B looks at her with pity and asks if she wants to relax on the couch.

A says:

Estoy cansada, no?

am tired no

‘I am tired, [no?]

In this case, the use of the DM would be felicitous. Although this context is not common, it is a welcome effect that the analysis allows for this type of occurrence, especially since it only allows this if the Addressee can contribute to the acceptance of the conversational update.

4.2.2 DM *no* negotiates the update proposed by exclamations

Given the analysis proposed for the core meaning of DM *no*, we wouldn't expect to find it in co-occurrence with exclamations: exclamations are typically Speaker-oriented, conveying the feelings of the Speaker (Gutiérrez-Rexach, 1996; Beyssade and Marandin, 2006; Castroviejo Miró, 2006; Rett, 2008; Gutiérrez-Rexach, 2008; Rett, 2011). This means that the component of the dialogue that this type of speech act targets is an individual component, in this case the Speaker's DC. Given our analysis, we would expect that this type of speech act would not be an expected anchor to DM *no*. And yet, exclamations can be modified by DM *no*, as we saw in 2.2.1.6 and as illustrated in (139):

- (139) Context: A and B are married, and A has organized a surprise birthday party for B, with the help of a mutual friend C. C lures B into the home, and A and some friends surprise B. A then turns to B and says:^H

Qué sorpresa, no?

what surprise no

‘What a surprise, [no]?’

Part of the analysis proposed for DM *no* was inspired by a comment made by one of the consultants, who judged this sentence infelicitous in the given context. When asked why, the explanation was that “it seems that it is saying ‘*You have to be surprised*’”. The judgement was therefore in terms of a social *faux-pas*: if you organize a surprise party, you shouldn’t impose the success of the party on the birthday person. What is key here, is that the content of the exclamation (that something is surprising) is *not* Speaker-oriented. This reading contrasts with the default reading given to bare exclamationatives as Speaker-oriented, bringing up the Addressee into the conversation. It is the use of DM *no* that calls on the Addressee, as seen in (140): a bare exclamation is not felicitous in the same context.

(140) Context: A and B are married, and A has organized a surprise birthday party for B, with the help of mutual friend C. C lures B into the home, and A and some friends surprise B. A then turns to B and says:^H

#Qué sorpresa!

what surprise

‘What a surprise!’

The Speaker in (139) is essentially asking whether it can be made a shared commitment that the party is a surprise (or that the Addressee feels surprise). In other words: it is asking whether a proposition can make it from the DCs to the CG.

I model the effect of DM *no* on exclamations the same way I analyzed and modelled the effect of DM *no* on sentences containing predicates of personal taste. The addition of the DM would add the proposition (which is assumed to be in

both DCs) to the CG: it is asking to make an individual commitment into a shared commitment (Figure 4.13).

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	p p ='It is a surprise'		DC _B		p p ='It is a surprise'
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG		p p ='It is a surprise'	CG		p p ='It is a surprise'
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
K _{A2}

Figure 4.13: Phase 2: A utters an exclamation with the DM *no*.

The acceptance of this move would add the proposition p ='It's a surprise' to the (current) CG, and remove it from all other components (Figure 4.14):

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG	p p ='It is a surprise'		CG	p p ='It is a surprise'	
TDL			TDL		

K_{A3}

TABLE

Figure 4.14: Phase 3: Acceptance of *no*-tagged exclamation.

Just as with evaluative assertions, if the move is rejected, then the proposition will be removed from all sets except for the Speaker's DC (Figure 4.15):

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	ρ p='It is a surprise'		DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG			CG		
TDL			TDL		

KA3

TABLE

Figure 4.15: Phase 3(b): Rejection of modified exclamation. ρ ='It's a surprise.'

4.2.3 DM *no* negotiates the update proposed by commands

DM *no* can co-occur with imperative anchors; however, we also saw in Chapter 2 that there seems to be a gradience of what type of command is more felicitous with the DM. According to García Vizcaíno (2005), it is only the less imposing commands (like suggestions, or advice) that can take the DM. I claim that it is not the anchor in itself that disallows the use of the particle, but the context of use: in (141), the use of DM *no* is disallowed in a context (Context 2) where there is a power imbalance (that is, the Speaker has institutional authority over the Addressee), where there is no such power imbalance (Context 1):

(141) 4 Context 1: A spouse to another spouse, seeing a full trash bin:

7 Context 2: A superior officer to a private, seeing a full trash bin:

Saca la basura, no?

take-out.IMP.2SG the garbage no

'Take out the garbage, [no]?'

Essentially, using DM *no* with a command as an anchor turns the command into a suggestion. This is in fact an effect of the analysis of DM *no* presented: the Speaker does not unilaterally impose the conversational update, but allows for the participation of the Addressee in its acceptance. In Context 2, this effect is not appropriate: a superior officer does not need the acceptance of the private.

Commands propose to update the To-Do-List of the Addressee with an outcome *o* (Beysade and Marandin, 2006). When Speaker A uses the command in (142) the effect it has on the Dialogue Board is to update the projected TDL of the Addressee, in this case B (TDL_B).

(142) *Estudia más.*
 study.IMP.2SG more
 ‘Study more.’

At the same time, the outcome is added to the shared TDL that includes the publicly shared outcomes that each interlocutor has committed to see through. I mark whose commitment it is (in this case, who is supposed to do the studying) with an index (in this case, *o_B*). This is illustrated in Figure 4.16.

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		<i>o</i> <i>o</i> =‘Study more.’
CG			CG		
TDL		<i>o_B</i> <i>o</i> =‘Study more.’	TDL		<i>o_B</i> <i>o</i> =‘Study more.’

K_{A2}

TABLE
<i>o</i>
<i>o</i> =‘Study more.’

Figure 4.16: Speaker A utters a bare command.

Figure 4.17 represents the desired resolution (desired by Speaker A): Speaker B accepts the update. The Table is emptied.

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _A		
TDL _A			TDL _B	<i>o</i> <i>o</i> ='Study more'	
CG			CG		
TDL	<i>o</i> _B <i>o</i> ='Study more'		TDL	<i>o</i> _B <i>o</i> ='Study more'	

K_{A3}

TABLE

Figure 4.17: Acceptance of a bare command by Speaker B. *o*='Study more.'

What is different, then, when a command is modified with DM *no*? Yang and Wiltschko (2016) in their study of Northern Mandarin *ha* mention that the effect of this confirmational particle on commands is to request confirmation of the *intention* of the Addressee to perform the action requested by the command. Rudin (2018) offers a similar analysis of rising imperatives in English, framing it in terms of *preferences*. This is precisely what DM *no* does: when a Speaker adds the DM to a command, she is requesting confirmation of the Addressee's intention to commit to the outcome *o*. This can be seen in the different acceptability between the contexts in (143): when the Speaker (A) sees that it is possible that the Addressee might perform the action (bringing a beer), the use of the DM is accepted. The use of the DM when there is no such indication is dispreferred (although not entirely infelicitous):

- (143) 3 Context 1: A and B are sitting on the couch. B gets up and goes to the kitchen. A tells B:^H

? Context 2: A and B are sitting on the couch. A tells B:^H

Tráeme una cervecita, no?
bring.IMP.2SG=me a beer.DIM no

‘Bring me a beer, [no?]

This contrasts with the different acceptability of a bare command in this case, illustrated in (144), where both contexts are equally felicitous:¹¹

(144) 3 Context 1: A and B are sitting on the couch. B gets up and goes to the kitchen. A tells B:^H

3 Context 2: A and B are sitting on the couch. A tells B:^H

Tráeme una cervecita.
bring.IMP.2SG=me a beer.DIM

‘Bring me a beer.’

I represent this in the model by adding the outcome o = ‘Bring me a beer’ to the TDL_B in Phase one: that is, even before uttering the *no*-modified command, A thinks that the Addressee might commit to the outcome (Figure 4.18).

¹¹Note that in both cases, Context 2 seems pragmatically odd because it is perceived as rude.

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		<i>o</i> <i>o</i> ='Bring me a beer'
CG			CG		
TDL			TDL		

K_{A1}

TABLE

Figure 4.18: Phase 1: Before a command modified by DM *no*.

When A puts forward a modified command like in (143), what she is doing is requesting confirmation from the Addressee of the conversational update of the commanding anchor. This is represented in Figure 4.19: the outcome *o*='Bring me a beer' is placed in the projected shared TDL. The Speaker (A) requests confirmation of this move by tabelling the conversational update:

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B		<i>o</i> <i>o</i> ='Bring me a beer.'
CG			CG		
TDL		<i>o</i> _B <i>o</i> ='Bring me a beer.'	TDL		<i>o</i> _B <i>o</i> ='Bring me a beer.'

K_{A2}

TABLE
K _{A2}

Figure 4.19: Phase 2: Speaker utters command modified with DM *no*.

The desired outcome is represented in Figure 4.20: if the Addressee accepts

to comply, the outcome is added to the current TDLs.

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B	<i>o</i> <i>o</i> ='Study more'	
CG			CG		
TDL	<i>o</i> _B <i>o</i> ='Study more'		TDL	<i>o</i> _B <i>o</i> ='Study more'	

K_{A3}

TABLE

Figure 4.20: Phase 3: Acceptance of command modified with DM *no*.

In section 4.5 we will come back to the effect of DM *no* on commands in terms of mitigation, an effect that is expected given the analysis proposed here.

4.2.4 DM *no* negotiates the update proposed by (rhetorical) questions

We have seen in section 2.2.1.5 that although DM *no* can co-occur with interrogatives, these interrogatives are not information-seeking questions. In (145) we see this distribution again: in Context 2, the interrogative anchor is an information seeking question (A needs to know the answer in order to prepare a gift), and cannot be followed by DM *no*. However, in Context 1 the anchor is a rhetorical question: B cannot possibly know the answer to it.

- (145) 3 Context 1: A and B are talking about possible names for a friend's baby. This friend is notorious for choosing unexpected names for his children, and he is very secretive about them. A says to B:

7 Context 2: A is talking B about a friend's future child, who is due in a couple of weeks. She wants to know what the name of the child will be so that she can get an embroidered blanket. A says to B:

Cómo se llamará, no?
how REFL call.FUT.3SG no

'What will s/he be called, [no]?'

In Context 1, A is asking B whether they are wondering the same thing (what the baby's name will be). In a sense the meaning could be paraphrased as "I wonder what their name will be". This paraphrase makes sense given the analysis that I will assume for rhetorical questions: that although they have interrogative form, they have assertive illocutionary force (Han, 2002; Corr, 2016).

In Context 1 of (146), the Speaker does not really want to know the answer to "what is he talking about?", but is upset about being stuck in a talk she does not want to hear, and wonders whether the Addressee feels the same way.

(146) 3 Context 1: A is sitting beside B listening to a TED talk about a topic she despises. She looks at B and asks:^H

7 Context 2: A arrives late to a TED talk and has no idea what the speaker is talking about. She asks B:^H

De qué está hablando, no?
of what is talking no

'what is he talking about, [no]?'

Given that I assume that rhetorical questions have assertive illocutionary force, this means that they will propose the same type of conversational update as an assertion: to propose to add a proposition to the CG. The presence of the DM *no* works as follows: in the case of (146), the proposition that is being added to the

projected DC_B, and the projected CG is ρ ='He doesn't know what he is talking about.'

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A	ρ ρ ='He doesn't know what he's talking about'		DC _B		ρ ρ ='He doesn't know what he's talking about'
TDL _A			TDL _B		
CG		ρ ρ ='He doesn't know what he's talking about'	CG		ρ ρ ='He doesn't know what he's talking about'
TDL			TDL		

K_{A2}

TABLE
K _{A2}

Figure 4.21: Phase 2: Speaker A modified rhetorical question with DM *no*.

4.3 What speakers cannot do with DM *no*

Given that DM *no* is here analyzed as requesting from the Addressee the validity of making the update proposed by the anchor public and shared, there are two types of speech act that are predicted not to allow the use of DM *no*:

Prediction 1: Information-seeking questions do not assert any proposition, unlike the anchor of a *no*-modified utterance. There is therefore no belief or outcome to confirm, and hence it will be infelicitous to use DM *no* with this type of questions. This is discussed in section 4.3.1.

Prediction 2: DM *no* invites a contribution from the Addressee, so it is predicted to be incompatible with Speaker-centered Speech Acts such as commissives, expressives, and declarations. This is discussed in sections 4.3.2 through 4.3.4.

In the following sections we see that both predictions are borne out.

4.3.1 DM *no* is infelicitous with (information-seeking) questions

DM *no* can modify rhetorical questions, but it cannot modify information-seeking questions, as (147) illustrates:

(147) (repeated from 64)

3 Context 1: A is sitting beside B listening to a TED talk about a topic she despises. She looks at B and asks:H

7 Context 2: A arrives late to a TED talk and has no idea what the speaker is talking about. She asks B:H

De qué está hablando, no?

of what is talking no

‘What is he talking about, [no]?’

As Yang and Wiltschko (2016) point out, “a question is itself a request for information and hence by using a question as the host clause, [the] S[peaker] has nothing to confirm from [the] A[ddressee]” (Yang and Wiltschko, 2016, p.75). The same logic applies here: using DM *no* in (147) conveys that the Speaker is asking whether the Addressee shares that same question, but not asking about the content of the question directly. This meta-level of asking, in a sense, forces a rhetorical reading of the question when using the DM *no*, which is felicitous.

4.3.2 DM *no* is infelicitous with thanking and apologizing speech acts

Acts like apologizing (148) and thanking (149) cannot be modified with DM *no*:

(148) *#Lo siento, no?*

it feel.PRS.1SG no

‘I’m sorry, [no]?’

(149) Context: B had promised to cook dinner for A. At 8pm, they hand A a plate of pasta:

#Muchas gracias, no?

many thanks no

‘Thank you very much, [no]?’

But again, it is possible in certain contexts to have the utterances in (149) and (148). Specifically, if it is not the person thanking but another discourse participant, as in (150), where it is the mother of the child who utters the thanks followed by *no*:

(150) Context: B had promised to cook dinner for A and C. At 8pm, they hand A and C a plate of pasta. A says to C, pointing at B:

Muchas gracias, no?

many thanks no

‘Thank you very much, [no]?’

In these cases, the utterance *Muchas gracias* (‘Thank you very much’) is not an expressive in the sense that the Speaker is not performing the act, but is putting words into the Addressee’s mouth, so to speak: (150) asks the Addressee to confirm that they are indeed thanking the person who cooked.

4.3.3 DM *no* is infelicitous with commissives

DM *no* cannot follow commissive speech acts, which include promises and oaths. Commissives are, like assertions, usually formally declaratives. But crucially, they introduce a different commitment to the dialogue: while assertions commit the Speaker to the truth of a proposition by proposing the addition of said proposition to the CG, commissives commit the Speaker to an *outcome* by adding this outcome to her To-Do-List (TDL) (Portner, 2004; Beyssade and Marandin, 2006).

- (151) *#Te lo juro, no?*
you it swear.PRS.1SG no
‘I swear, [no]?’

In (151), the Speaker cannot ask the Addressee to confirm whether an oath holds: this would defeat the purpose of making a oath in the first place. Commissives only require the commitment of the Speaker. In fact, if we “invert” the roles (if the utterance is requiring the Addressee to promise something, as opposed to the Speaker) the addition of DM *no* is felicitous. But note: this change also changes the type of speech act of (152): this is no longer a commissive, since it doesn’t follow the felicity conditions for a successful commissive—namely that it is the Speaker who commits to an action.

- (152) *Me lo prometes, no?*
me it promise.PRS.2SG no
‘You promise, [no]?’

Commissives typically require a first person subject, so by changing the person of the subject we are also changing the type of speech act from a commissive to an assertion. This also happens with the declarations, as we will see in the next section.¹²

¹²A reason for this is the fact that both commissives and declarations are declaratives in their

4.3.4 DM *no* is infelicitous with declarations

Declarations are speech acts that effectively change a state of affairs in the world when they are performed; some examples include firing someone, or joining two people in matrimony. The words uttered when an employer says to an employee ‘You are fired’ effectively terminate the employment.

Related to the infelicity of commissives as anchors of DM *no* is its infelicity with declarations, as the example in (153) illustrates:

- (153) 7 Context 1: A boss tells one of the managers to fire an employee. The manager walks up to the employee and says:
3 Context 2: An employee walks out of the boss’ office and starts packing their things. The manager walks over to the employee, and says:

Estás despedido, no?

are fired no

‘You’re fired, [no]?’

The example in (153) shows that there is nothing about the sentence in itself that is infelicitous with the tag—in the right context, it is felicitous to use the tag with the host *Estás despedido* (‘You’re fired’). Importantly, DM *no* cannot follow the declarative when it is used as a *declaration*, that is, when it is used to actually change the world, in this case, fire someone. However, it is felicitous if the declarative is used as an assertion: the Speaker is not firing the Addressee, but wants to confirm their suspicions of them having been fired. This is further evidence that it is the type of speech act, and not the sentence type, that restricts the use of the DM.

One of the main characteristics of both commissives and declarations is that they are not proposals: they do not propose to update the context with a change in sentence type; when they do not fulfill the conditions required for commissives/declarations, they might be understood as assertions by the Addressee.

the world, they effectively perform such a change as they are being uttered. DM *no* is not permitted in these cases, as is illustrated in (154):

- (154) *#Os declaro unidos en matrimonio, no?*
you declare.1SG joined in matrimony no
'I declare you joined in matrimony, [no]?'

This restriction follows from the analysis presented here: it is not possible for a felicitous declaration to request a confirmation from the Addressee, since this would not result in a change in the world like declarations impose.

4.4 Why monitor the S-A relation: confirming a bias

This section focuses on *why* the Speaker uses DM *no*: I claim that the reason is to confirm a bias. The literature on bias has distinguished between at least two types: contextual bias, discussed in section 4.4.1, and epistemic bias, discussed in section 4.4.2. To these two types we also have to add an outcome bias (discussed in section 4.4.3) to describe the instances in which DM *no* modifies a command.

4.4.1 DM *no* conveys a contextual bias

Contextual bias is defined as dependent on the evidence available in the current conversational context.¹³ This is distinct from epistemic bias, which focuses on the previous beliefs held by the Speaker for or against *p*. Contextual bias relies on contextual evidence, defined as in (155).

¹³In the literature, this type of bias is often referred to as *evidential*. However, one could argue that epistemic bias is in itself a sort of evidence. It would be more accurate to refer to evidential bias as “contextual” or “experiential” bias. See Waldie (2012) for a related and more in-depth discussion.

(155) Contextual Evidence (Büring and Gunlogson, 2000):

Evidence that has just become mutually available to the participants in the current discourse situation.

According to Sudo (2013) an evidential context can be [positive] or [negative]: depending on whether the context has positive or negative evidence for p .¹⁴ A neutral contextual setting would be one where there is no evidence mutually available to both participants for or against p (e.g. during a long-distance phone call, as in (159)). Context 1 in (156) is [positive] since there is evidence in favour of p (p = ‘It is raining’), whereas Context 2 is [negative] since there is evidence against p (similar contexts are used in Büring and Gunlogson (2000); Romero and Han (2004); Sudo (2013); Heim (2019a):

(156) 3 Context 1 Contextual bias: [positive]
B enters A’s windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet coat. A says:

7 Context 2 Contextual bias: [negative]
B enters A’s windowless computer room wearing a dry coat and sunglasses. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?
is raining no
‘It’s raining, [no]?’

Restrictions apply, however: the contextual evidence has to be indirect. In Context 1 (158), the Speaker has only indirect evidence for p (p = ‘It is raining’), namely the dripping wet coat: in this context, the use of the DM is felicitous. In

¹⁴In fact, for Sudo (2013) it is possible to have [-positive] and [-negative] contexts. Here I abstract away from these types. These contexts describe questions that are incompatible with positive or negative evidence, respectively.

Context 2, the contextual evidence is direct and the Speaker can actually see the rain: in this context, the use of the DM is not felicitous.¹⁵

(158) 3 Context 1 Contextual bias [positive, indirect]
B enters A's windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet coat. A says:

7 Context 2 Contextual bias [positive, direct]
A enters B's room, looks out of the window and it is raining. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?
is raining no
'It's raining, [no]?'

Given what we have just seen, we could conclude that in order to use DM *no* the Speaker needs positive, indirect contextual evidence for p . However, the use of *no* is licensed in contexts where there is no contextual evidence available, as in (159) where the interlocutors do not share an immediate physical context:

(159) Context Contextual bias: [neutral]
A and B are talking long-distance. A has checked the forecast at B's location, and it said that it would be raining all day. A asks:

¹⁵DM *no* cannot be used when the positive evidence comes from a presupposition in the previous discourse move:

(157) B tells A that their sister is coming to town. A says:
Tienes una hermana, no?
have a sister no
'You have a sister, [no]?'

I thank Floris Roelofsen (p.c.) for this observation. Note that (157) does not improve even with a surprise marker like "Oh", as the same example with DM *huh* would in English (*Oh, so you have a sister, huh?*). (Wiltschko, p.c.), although this "oh" is not needed with the DM *huh* in this context (Matthewson, p.c.).

Está lloviendo, no?

is raining no

'It's raining, [no]?'

The interlocutors in (159) may not share the same context, but the Speaker expects a positive answer not based on what she perceived but on what she knows—the Speaker has an *epistemic bias*. This is the focus of the next section.

4.4.2 DM *no* conveys an epistemic bias

Contextual evidence alone cannot be the only factor licensing the use of DM *no*: the Speaker's previous beliefs are also to be taken into account. If we modify the context in (156), we see that we cannot use DM *no* unless there is a previous epistemic bias in favour of the proposition expressed by the anchor p (p = 'It is raining'). This is shown in the different felicity judgements in (160), where DM *no* can only be felicitously used if there is a positive bias for the truth of the proposition expressed by the anchor (in this case, the fact that it is raining):

(160) 3 Context 1

Contextual bias: [positive]

Epistemic bias: for p (p ='It is raining.')

A has checked the forecast and it said that it'll be raining all week. Later, B enters A's windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet coat. A says:

7 Context 2

Contextual bias: [positive]

Epistemic bias: against p (p ='It is raining.')

A has checked the forecast and it said that it'll be sunny all week. Later, B enters A's windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet coat. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?

is raining no

'It's raining, [no]?'

Example (160) shows that the Speaker cannot have prior epistemic evidence against p .¹⁶ However, an epistemic bias for p alone does not account for the felicitous use of DM *no*: even if the Speaker believes p , if there is direct, negative evidence for p , DM *no* is not felicitous. The example in (161) shows that DM *no* cannot be used if there is contextual evidence against p : in this case, the sunglasses are indirect evidence against the Speaker's belief that it is raining:¹⁷

(161) 3 Context 1

Contextual bias: [positive]

Epistemic bias: for p (p ='It is raining.')

A has checked the forecast and it said that it'll be raining all week. Later, B enters A's windowless computer room wearing a dripping wet coat. A says:

7 Context 2

Contextual bias: [negative]

Epistemic bias: for p (p ='It is raining.')

A has checked the forecast and it said that it'll be raining all week. Later, B enters A's windowless computer room wearing sunglasses. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?

is raining no

'It's raining, [no]?'

¹⁶This includes affirmative and negative anchors: in the case of negative anchors, such as *No está lloviendo* ('It is not raining'), the Speaker will have a previous belief about truth of $\neg p$.

¹⁷According to Sudo (2013), this means that it is [-negative]: it cannot be used when there is negative evidence.

However, it is possible to use the DM if the evidential context is neutral. This is shown in example (162), where the interlocutors do not share the same evidential context. As long as there is an epistemic bias in favour of p and no contradictory evidence, DM *no* is accepted:

(162) (partly repeated from (159))

3 Context 1

Contextual bias: neutral

Epistemic bias: for p (p ='It is raining.')

A and B are talking long-distance. A has checked the forecast at B's location, and it said that it would be raining all day. A says:

7 Context 2

Contextual bias: neutral

Epistemic bias: neutral

A and B are talking long-distance. A says:

Está lloviendo, no?

is raining no

'It's raining, [no]?'

To sum up, in order to felicitously use DM *no* there cannot be a negative bias, neither contextual nor epistemic.

4.4.3 Bias and anchors beyond assertions

The literature on biased questions has mainly focused on the biases derived from expectations regarding the truth of a proposition, given the type of data discussed (polar questions, and in the case of tags, combinations of assertions and polar questions). However, we have discussed in Chapter 2 how DM *no* is used to mitigate the use of commands, turning them into suggestions. If we want to extend the discussion of bias to these examples, we have to go beyond expectations of the truth of a proposition.

- (164) Context: A rather large group of friends are chatting in a small pub. A arrives and greets everyone, and says:

Venga, vamos a otro sitio, no?
come.on go.1pl to another place no

‘Come on, let’s go somewhere else, [no]?’ (modified from Rodríguez Muñoz (2009))

In conclusion, *no*-tagged commands cannot be used when the Speaker does not have a bias towards the outcome. The evidential contexts needs to be either neutral or negative (that is, there has to be some sort of evidence in the context against the outcome).

4.5 How this analysis explains other observations: mitigation

The use of DM *no* has been analyzed in the past as a mitigating device. The analysis presented above is not at odds with analyses that propose that the DM *no* has a mitigating effect: however, it does claim that mitigation is a byproduct of the actual effect of the DM on the anchor.

Mitigation is achieved by decreasing speaker assertiveness and increasing cooperation and negotiation (Félix-Brasdefer, 2004a,b; Czerwionka, 2012; Uclés Ramada, 2020). Mitigation is usually defined as the reduction of unwelcome effects that a speech act may have on the Addressee (Fraser, 1980), which also aligns with the contexts described in Chapter 2 and in the present chapter. Although I agree that DM *no* has the effect of mitigating the illocutionary force of the anchor, I propose that this is a side-effect of a more complicated combination of the contribution of *no* to the utterance—as Yang and Wiltschko (2016) propose, this effect is a byproduct of the analysis. It is a result of the pragmatic effect of DM *no* on its anchor, and its turn-yielding position.

In order to formalize mitigation, Holmes (1984); Sbisà (2001); Thaler (2012)

propose that it is an operation over speech acts (similar to the ones described by Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken (1990)): starting from an unmodified, default illocutionary point strength, certain operators can decrease this strength.¹⁸ I propose that the pragmatic effect of adding confirmational *no* to an anchor utterance is to decrease the degree of strength of the illocutionary point of the anchor, in a similar fashion to the analysis of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua in (Faller, 2002). The baseline is the strength that the canonical speech act type of the anchor would have. Vanderveken (1990) assigns a value of 0 to the unmodified, canonical degree of force of a given speech act type:

- (165) a. *Las arañas son arácnidos.* ASSERTION
 ‘Spiders are arachnids.’
 ILL=ASSERT (Speaker_A, p)
 STRENGTH: 0
- b. *Cállate ya.* DIRECTIVE
 ‘Shut up already.’
 ILL=COMMAND (Speaker_B, p)
 STRENGTH: 0

The clearest example of the mitigating effect of *no* comes from its occurrence with commands as in (166): asking the Addressee to confirm whether they want to update their To-Do-List with an outcome makes the command less imposing, in a way transforming the command into a *suggestion*.

(166) Differences in degree of strength: directives

- a. *Échate más.*
 put.IMP.2SG=you more
 ‘Help yourself to more.’

¹⁸Reinforcement is also possible, in which case, the illocutionary operator would increase the illocutionary strength of the act. This is what I propose confirmational *eh* does, in Chapter 6.

ILL= COMMAND (s_B, p)
STRENGTH: 0

- b. *Échate más, no?*
put.IMP.2SG=you more

‘Help yourself to more, [no?]
ILL= COMMAND (s_B, p) (Gómez González, 2014)
STRENGTH: -1

This decrease in the strength of the illocutionary point can be explained given the analysis offered for DM *no*: a strong command does not require the participation of the Addressee, except for compliance. The decrease in strength is achieved by allowing the Addressee to confirm that they intend to perform the action expressed by the imperative.

4.6 Summary

This chapter presented the analysis of the pragmatics of DM *no*: this DM requests confirmation from the Addressee that the contextual update proposed by the Speaker is shareable and public. It does so by conveying the tabelling of the update, which I modelled as tabelling the information state of the Speaker (which includes the commitment state of the Addressee, as conceived by the Speaker) at that particular time in the conversation. This is meant to capture the transition from one information state (where the commitment to a proposition or an outcome is in the individual components of the Dialogue Board) to another information state (where the commitment is in the shared components).

Chapter 5

Modelling the pragmatics-syntax interface

DMs have been the focus of recent formal syntactic literature that proposes to expand the structure of the clause in the left periphery. The left periphery (specifically, the Complementizer Phrase) is the part of the structure that links a sentence radical with the rest of the discourse, be it within the same sentence or the cross-sentential discourse (Rizzi, 1997). In Chapters 3 and 4 we have seen that this is what Peninsular Spanish DM *sí* and *no* do: DM *sí* establishes a relationship between a proposition and the CG, whereas DM *no* establishes a relationship between a speech act and the speech act participants.

In this chapter I propose a syntactic analysis of DM *sí* and DM *no*, based on recent work by Speas and Tenny (2003), Coniglio and Zegrean (2012), Haegeman and Hill (2013), Corr (2016), Thoma (2016), Wiltschko and Heim (2016) and Wiltschko (2017). DM *sí* gives us evidence for an articulated highest layer in CP. This analysis will be based on the relative order of the DM with respect to other elements in the left periphery, as well as the prosodic integration of the DM in the sentence. Interactional DMs like *no*, which as we have seen in Chapter 4 recruit the participation of the Addressee, have been used as evidence to include the speech act participants (Speaker and Addressee) in the syntactic structure. I

will follow this type of analysis for DM *no*, placing this DM in a syntactic layer above CP (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Jamieson, 2019).

Giorgi (2010) proposes that there is a syntactic layer within the CP in charge of encoding the temporal coordinates of the Speaker. This layer is the left-most position within the CP, and she calls it the C-speaker. She motivates this proposal with cross-linguistic differences in tense ordering: she proposes that different complementizers (with or without this C-speaker projection) introduce indicative and subjunctive clauses. The indicative complementizer encodes the speaker’s temporal location, and the embedded clause is therefore evaluated with respect to the Speaker’s *here* and *now*. This is not the case for subjunctive embedded clauses (Giorgi, 2010, p.43).

The syntactic representation of the Addressee has also been proposed in the past (as we have seen, as early as Ross (1970)) in order to account for vocatives (Moro, 2003; Hill, 2007), imperatives (Zanuttini, 2008) and discourse particles that show *allocutive agreement*. This type of agreement occurs between speech act roles, and not syntactic roles. In Souletin Basque, for example, there are four ways to utter the sentence “Peter worked” depending on who the speaker is talking to: a female friend (168), a male friend (167), to someone higher in status (169) or to a plural addressee (170) (data from Miyagawa (2013), originally from Oyharçabal (1993)):

(167) To a female friend:

Pettek lan egin din.

Peter.ERG work.ABS do.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-2.S.C.SM.ALLOC-3.S.ERG

‘Peter worked.’

(168) To a male friend:

Pettek lan egin dik.

Peter.ERG work.ABS do.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-2.S.C.MSC.ALLOC-3.S.ERG

‘Peter worked.’

(169) To someone higher in status:

Pettek lan egin dizü.

Peter.ERG work.ABS do.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-2.S.F.ALLOC-3.S.ERG

‘Peter worked.’

(170) To plural addressee:

Pettek lan egin du.

Peter.ERG work.ABS do.PRF AUX-3.S.ABS-3.S.ERG

‘Peter worked.’

We see here that there is agreement not with the participants of the event described in the utterance, but with the participants in the utterance (or speech act) itself. In the same way that the auxiliary in Basque agrees with the Addressee, in Upper Austrian German, discourse particles like *goi* agree with the Addressee in the speech act (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). In the following examples, we see that the form of the DM in the right periphery changes depending on whether the speaker is talking to someone informally (171), formally (172) or to a plural audience (173):

(171) *Ea hot an neichn Hund, goi*

he has a new dog CONF.2.INF.

‘You have a new dog, [goi]?’

(172) *Ea hot an neichn Hund, goins*

he has a new dog CONF.2.F.

‘You have a new dog, [goi]?’

- (173) *Ea hot an neichn Hund, goits*
 he has a new dog CONF.2.PL.
 ‘You have a new dog, [goi]?’

The same pattern can be found in Spanish for the DM *sabes?* (‘you know?’), whose form varies depending on who the Addressee is: in (174) the speaker is talking to someone close and uses the second person singular informal *tú*, whereas in (175) the speaker addresses her interlocutor using the formal *usted* form (marked here as 2SG.formal for easy comparison, but formally coincides with the 3SG form):

- (174) To a friend/non-formal interlocutor:
Yo ya no sé qué pensar, sabes?
 me already NEG know what think know.2SG.informal
 ‘I don’t know what to think, you know?’

- (175) To someone higher in status:
Yo ya no sé qué pensar, sabe?
 me already NEG know what think know.2SG.formal
 ‘I don’t know what to think, you know?’

This type of evidence has been used to propose an expansion of the clausal structure in the left periphery to include discourse and speech act-level concepts, mainly the speech act participant roles of the Speaker and the Addressee—in the cases above of allocutive agreement, the sentence final particles would then agree with the Addressee. These type of proposals are ways of modelling the pragmatics-syntax interface. In the next section I introduce the main proposals that I will adopt for the syntactic analysis of DM *sí* and DM *no*.

5.1 Tools for modelling the pragmatics-syntax interface

The left periphery is considered to be the interface between a clause and the rest of the intra-sentential, as well as inter-sentential discourse. Some analyses propose a relatively simple structure in the left periphery: Emonds (2004) proposes an a-categorial projection dominating IP, which he calls ‘Discourse Shell’ to explain the transformations that only happen in root clauses (such as topicalization). On the other hand, other analyses propose to enrich and extend the syntactic structure to explain the same type of phenomena. Much of the literature on DMs has adopted this second tradition, and so will I in this chapter.

5.1.1 Exploded CP: $C_{\text{Force}} > C_{\text{Finite}}$

The Complementizer Phrase is the projection where the sentence connects to the outside. This ‘outside’ can be another clause, or the rest of the discourse. A simple structure of the CP is given in the tree 5.1:




Figure 5.1: The Complementizer Phrase.

Rizzi (1997) proposes that the CP has a highly articulated structure, with several functional projections; of these projections, at least two are obligatory: ForceP, which hosts the complementizer, and FinitenessP, which is a direct link to the finite/non-finite feature of the verb in IP. Between those two there are other projections that act as landing sites of topics and foci. Later additions to this structure,

include an Interrogative Phrase (which would host interrogative complementizers) and Modifier Phrase (which hosts discourse-oriented adverbials, not shown in the following structure) (Rizzi, 2001). This articulated structure is represented in (5.2).




Figure 5.2: Rizzi's split CP.

Originally, ForceP was meant to host the complementizer, but recent studies have argued that this part of the structure is more complex than originally thought (Coniglio and Zegrean, 2012; Lam, 2014; Corr, 2016; Thoma, 2016; Heim, 2019a). Coniglio and Zegrean (2012) propose to divide ForceP into two projections (Force_{ILLOCUTIONARY} and Force_{CLAUSE-TYPE}): the higher projection of Force would encode the illocutionary force of the clause, whereas the lower

projection could encode clause typing information. This proposal was originally meant to explain indirect speech acts such as commands expressed by means of interrogatives. Other analyses, to which we turn now, go even further and split ForceP into syntactic projections representing pragmatic roles.

5.1.2 Beyond CP:

ResponseP > Ground_{Addressee}P > Ground_{Speaker}P

Recent proposals in the syntactic literature extend the CP structure—in particular, there are proposals that extend the structure of the clause beyond the CP, taking inspiration from Ross' Performative Hypothesis (Ross, 1970). These proposals claim that there is syntactic evidence to motivate the inclusion of at least pragmatic roles (Speaker, Addressee) in the syntactic structure (Speas and Tenny, 2003; Haegeman and Hill, 2013; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). In addition, Wiltschko (2016); Wiltschko and Heim (2016); Wiltschko (2017) propose to expand the structure further by adding a layer that encodes what the Speaker wants the Addressee to do with the utterance—this layer instantiates the idea of Call-on-the-Addressee proposed by Beyssade and Marandin (2006). This extended structure is represented in Figure 5.3.




Figure 5.3: The Response and Ground layers (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016).

The crucial idea behind this proposal is that we can incorporate the Speaker and the Addressee in the syntactic structure indirectly via their *grounds*: these grounds represent the belief sets of each interlocutor in the Speaker/Hearer role. As we have seen in Chapter 4, being able to assign a belief or preference is key in the analysis of the contribution of DM *no*.

5.1.2.1 First steps: The Speech Act Phrase

Speas and Tenny (2003) decompose illocutionary force into different syntactic configurations of three elements: the Speaker, the Hearer (in this dissertation: the Addressee), and the Utterance content. The different possible configurations of these three components yield different sentence types. In essence, the structure coding speech act information should mirror the structure of vP. This structure in

called Speech Act Phrase (SAP).

In a declarative sentence, the SAP is arranged as in Figure 5.4, with the SPEAKER at the top of the syntactic structure as the specifier of the SAP. The HEARER is the lower as the complement of the lower SA head.




Figure 5.4: Structure of Speech Act Phrase (SAP) in declarative sentences

In an interrogative sentence the pragmatic roles and the utterance content would be in a different configuration, as shown in Figure 5.5. In this situation, the HEARER role moves from the complement to the specifier position. This configuration mirrors the promotion of the indirect object in a dative shift operation:




Figure 5.5: Structure of Speech Act Phrase (SAP) in interrogative sentences

This account, although inspired by Ross' Performative Hypothesis, differs from it in that the sentence is still mono-clausal (as opposed to bi-clausal).

Based on evidence from West Flemish and Romanian particles and vocatives, Haegeman and Hill (2013) and Haegeman (2014) propose to refine the Speech Act Phrase originally proposed by Speas and Tenny (2003). They propose to articulate it in two projections: SAP_1 and SAP_2 . SAP_1 is the highest projection, which is said to activate the speaker-hearer relation and to establish the discourse set-up. On the other hand, SAP_{low} is speaker-centered and encodes speaker attitude; it does not activate the relationship between the speech participants but instead consolidates and qualifies an already established relationship (Haegeman, 2014; Corr, 2016).

Why these two projections? Haegeman (2014) focuses on two West Flemish DMs, *né* and *wè*. They differ in terms of their position: whereas *né* can occur utterance initially and finally, *wè* can only occur utterance finally. According to

Haegeman, *né* can either focus the attention of the Addressee on the utterance when it is in initial position) or ‘transfer’ the utterance to them (when it is in final position). On the other hand, *wè* “qualifies the speaker-hearer relation, establishing that the speaker has the authority (with respect to the hearer as well as with respect to the content of the utterance) to make the utterance.” (Haegeman, 2014, p. 124). Importantly, *né* and *wè* can co-occur, and when they do, there is a strict order, shown in (176) (where both DMs are modifying the clause *Men artikel is gedoan*, ‘My paper is finished’).

- (176) a. **Né**, men artikel is gedoan **wè**.
 né my paper is done wè
 b. ***Wè**, men artikel is gedoan **né**.
 c. Men artikel is gedoan **wè né**.
 d. *Men artikel is gedoan **né wè**.
 e. ***Né wè**/* **wè né** men artikel is gedoan.

Based on these ordering restrictions and the specific selectional properties of these DMs (see Haegeman (2014) for detailed argumentation), Haegeman proposes that *né* heads the higher projection SA₁ and that *wè* heads the lower projection SA₂. These two projections are higher than, and independent of, the CP structure (whose highest projection is Force, as illustrated in (177)):

(177) [SA₁ *né* [SA₂ *wè* [Force . . .

I will employ several of the diagnostics that Haegeman (2014) and Corr (2016) use in order to develop a syntactic analysis of the Spanish DMs *sí* and *no*. Specifically, I will use the relative ordering of the DMs with respect to other lexical items (such as discourse activating particles) to assign a position to DM *no* within this interactional layer.

5.1.2.2 Adding a Call-on-the-Addressee: The Grounding and Responding Layer

The final framework that I will discuss, and the one that I will adopt to analyze the syntactic position of DM *no*, is the one that follows the Universal Spine Hypothesis (Wiltschko, 2014; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). The extension of this framework also encodes pragmatic information in a functional projection above CP (Thoma, 2016); specifically, it decomposes illocutionary force into two syntactic projections: the grounding layer (GroundP) and the response layer (ResponseP) (Wiltschko, 2017). GroundP is based on the idea of *grounding* (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991), which is the expression of the interlocutors' attitudes towards the proposition. GroundP is divided into two projections: the Speaker Ground and the Addressee Ground. These grounds are meant to syntactically represent the interlocutors via their belief states, which in a way represent the DCs. The Response layer encodes what Beyssade and Marandin (2006) refer to as the 'Call-on-the-Addressee', which in a nutshell tells the Addressee what the Speaker wants them to do with the proposition. This extended syntactic spine is illustrated in Figure 5.6:




Figure 5.6: The Response and Grounding layers (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Wiltschko, 2017)

The Addressee’s Ground projection, and not the Speaker’s, is the highest structurally: evidence for this comes from the relative order of sentence final particles in Cantonese (Lam, 2014). Note that in this framework, rising or falling intonation can be the head of these projections: Heim (2019a) in fact proposes that intonation can encode both commitment (linked to the grounding layer) and engagement (linked to the response layer).¹

The interactional layer presented in Figure 5.6 forms part of a bigger conceptualization of the relationship between syntax and function developed by Wiltschko (2014): the syntactic structure (or *spine*) is made up of abstract functional categories (*k*), which are hierarchically organized. These categories convey different

¹Commitment and engagement are the two building blocks into which Heim decomposes illocutionary force.

abstract grammatical functions, such as grounding, linking, anchoring, introducing a point of view, or classifying an event.




Figure 5.7: The extension of the hierarchy of functional categories (k) in the Universal Spine proposed by Thoma (2016) based on Wiltschko (2014).

What is crucial here (especially for the analysis of DM *no*) is that if we identify the function of a lexical item, we can determine its position within this hierarchically organized spine. What is more: different lexical items (*Units of Language*, or UoLs in Wiltschko (2014); Thoma (2016)) can associate with different categories, allowing us to explain, for instance, the “many jobs” of the particles *sí* and *no* beyond their use as DMs.

5.1.3 Integrating DM *sí* and DM *no* into the clause structure

I adopt a hybrid analysis, keeping the Force projection as part of CP, as well as adopting the extension of the clause structure proposed by Wiltschko and Heim (2016) to include the grounding and response layers above CP.

I analyze DM *sí* as a force operator heading ForceP, as shown in Figure 5.8. As such, it encodes the illocutionary force assigned to the sentence: specifically, it

encodes *superassertive* force. I have distinguished between asserting p (proposal to update the CG with p) from superasserting p (marking that p is already in the CG).²




Figure 5.8: Position of DM *sí* in ForceP.

The difference between a bare declarative (linked to an assertion) and a *sí*-marked declarative (linked to a superassertion) is illustrated in the following examples (178) and (179). The difference between (178) and (179) is that for Context 1, A can just *assert* the proposition p ='Adriana lives in Vancouver' because the proposition introduces new information that the Addressee presumably does not know yet; in this situation, A can propose to update the CG with p (=assert p , shown in (178a)). In Context 2, however, p is assumed to be already known, and

²I will propose in Chapter 6 that the other Spanish complementizer, *que*, can also appear in this position in its reportative function, which also only selects declarative sentences (Demonte and Fernández Soriano, 2014).

hence it would be pragmatically odd to propose to update the CG with it; in this context, what A in (179) is doing is super-asserting p , marking that it is already in the CG (as shown in (179b)). The same utterance would not be felicitous in a context like Context 1, where the Speaker cannot make the assumption that the proposition is already mutually shared:

(178) Context 1: During a conference, A is introducing Adriana to their acquaintance, B, and mentions that she lives in Canada. They talk about the weather, and B mentions concerns about a blizzard in Montreal. A says:

- a. Adriana vive en Vancouver.
'Adriana lives in Vancouver.'
- b. #Si Adriana vive en Vancouver.
'[Si] Adriana lives in Vancouver.'

(179) Context 2: While watching the news, Adriana's family sees that there is a blizzard in Montreal. Adriana's brothers express concern for her, and her father says:

- a. ?Adriana vive en Vancouver.
'Adriana lives in Vancouver.'
- b. Si Adriana vive en Vancouver.
'[Si] Adriana lives in Vancouver.'

As can be seen in the tree in Figure 5.8, I position DM *si* still in the CP layer: at the topmost projection, but still part of the CP. One of the reasons for this comes from prosody, namely the integration of DM *si* in the sentence's intonational contour.³ As opposed to other more peripheral elements that may or may not form an intonational unit with the sentence they modify (such as DM *no*, which I will discuss in section 5.4), DM *si* cannot be prosodically separated from the sentence

³I thank Scott Schwenter and other members at the audience of Hispanic Linguistics Symposium 2019 for bringing this to my attention.

it appears in. The prosodic integration of DM *sí* can be seen in Figure 5.9 (from Elvira García (2016)) for the sentence *Pero sí en Mérida se merienda médula* ‘But [sí] in Mérida one eats bone marrow’. DM *sí* forms one syllable with the following proposition *en* ‘in’, shown by the transcription of this sequence (‘*sí en*’) as [sjien].




Figure 5.9: Figure from Elvira García (2016, 140; 4.11) shows the syntactic integration of DM *sí* in the the clause it introduces.

DM *sí* cannot be separated from the clause it appears in by an intonational break—as it is shown in (180) it is not possible to divide the sentence *Si tengo un gato* (‘[sí] I have a cat’) into two separate intonational phrases (InP). Corr (2016) uses this same diagnostic to distinguish ‘speech-act heads’ (above CP) from ‘evaluative’ heads (which she also positions above ForceP):

- (180) a. (Si tengo un gato)_{InP}
 b. *(Si)_{InP} (tengo un gato)_{InP}

Crucially, the prosody of DM *sí* differs from that of DM *no*: although *no* can be integrated into the intonational contour of the anchor, it is also possible to have a break between the anchor and the DM (Cabedo Nebot, 2013). I take this difference, and specifically the obligatory prosodic integration of DM *sí* with the clause it introduces, to show that DM *sí* is more syntactically integrated into the structure of the clause than DMs like *no*. Thus, while DM *sí* is part of CP, this does not imply that DM *no* is outside of the clause. Rather, DM *no* is still part of the clause, but it sits at an (even) higher projection.

I propose that DM *no* is located at this interactional layer above CP. Specifically, I propose to analyze DM *no* in a similar fashion to Canadian English *eh* (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016): DM *no* takes the whole anchor as its argument, and requests from the Addressee a confirmation of the validity of the anchor. This is shown in the tree in Figure 5.10.




Figure 5.10: Proposed syntactic position for DM *no*.

There is syntactic evidence in favour of this structure, such as allocutive agree-

ment (Oyharçabal, 1993; Miyagawa, 2013), and ordering restrictions (Haegeman and Hill, 2013). As described in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4, an important difference between DMs *sí* and *no* is the role assigned to the Addressee: in the case of *no*-tagged clauses, the Addressee is given a pivotal role in the development of the conversation. As we have seen, *no*-tagged clauses can be used to gauge the information state of the Addressee. This is illustrated with the difference in felicity between (181) and (182):

(181) *Estás cansada, #(no?)*
 are tired no

‘You are tired, [no?]

(182) *Estoy cansada, (#no?)*
 am tired no

‘I am tired, [no?]

The structure in Figure 5.10 allows us to give a syntactic account of the fact that DM *no* modifies (and selects) a full speech act. As we have seen in Chapter 4, DM *no* is not restricted by the type of sentence it modifies (declarative, interrogative, imperative, or exclamative), but by the type of speech act (it can modify assertions, but not commissives, for example).

5.2 (Almost) leftmost and CP-internal: DM *si*

We focus first on DM *si*. In section 5.2.1 I describe the syntactic distribution of *si*-clauses in terms of the diagnostics developed by Corr (2016) for illocutionary operators. In section 5.2.2 I focus on the specific position of *si* within the left periphery, with respect to other elements that precede and follow the DM.

5.2.1 Syntactic distribution: DM *sí* is CP-internal

5.2.1.1 DM *sí* selects for sentence type

In the literature we find claims that DM *sí* can only occur in declarative sentences. This generalization seems to hold true, as illustrated in (183), except for a possible exception: rhetorical questions. The acceptance of DM *sí* followed by a rhetorical question seems to be marginal, and although examples can be found in naturally occurring data, this question will be left for further research. For the rest of this dissertation, I will assume that DM *sí* introduces mostly, if not only, declarative clauses.

- (183) a. DECLARATIVE
Si Pedro es hijo único.
si Pedro is son unique
‘[Si] Pedro is an only child.’
- b. EXCLAMATIVE
**Si qué bonito es!*
si how pretty is
‘[Si] how pretty it is!’
- c. INTERROGATIVE
**Si dónde está?*
si where is
‘[Si] where is it?’
- d. IMPERATIVE
**Si ven!*
si come
‘[Si] come!’

- e. RHETORICAL WH Q
 (?)*Si sinceramente a quién le alcanza con \$301,000?*
 Si sincerely PREP who them reach with \$301,000
 ‘[Si] honestly who can live on \$301,000?’ (Twitter)
- f. RHETORICAL POLAR-Q
 ?*Si qué te crees, que tengo todo el día?*
 si what you think that have all the day
 ‘[Si] what do you think, that I have all day?’

The judgements in (183) are summarized in Table 5.1. A direct link between DM *si* and sentence type is a diagnostic in favour of *si* being a C head, according to Corr (2016).

Table 5.1: Summary of DM *si* clause-typing properties.

Sentence type	DM <i>si</i>
Declarative	3
Polar Interrogative	7
Wh- Interrogative	7
Rhetorical polar Q	?
Rhetorical wh Q	?
Imperative	7
Exclamative	7

5.2.1.2 *Si*-clauses are root CPs

DM *si*-marked clauses are root CPs, and cannot be embedded. This follows from DM *si* being a speech act operator, which are claimed to not be embeddable: although the embedding of full speech acts is a logical possibility, Krifka (2014) argues that it rarely happens. In (184) we see that *si*-clauses cannot be embedded:

- (184) **He dicho que si Pedro es hijo único.*
 have said that si Pedro is son unique
 ‘I said that [si] Pedro is an only child.’

But (184) becomes well-formed if we change the prosody: if the intonational contour is changed to a continuation contour, the sentence is grammatical—this is marked in (186) with suspension dots. This change, however, marks the difference between a *sí*-clause and a suspended conditional (Elvira-García et al., 2017):

- (185) *He dicho que si Pedro es hijo único ...*
 have said that if Pedro is son unique
 ‘I said that if Pedro is an only child ...’

In this case, [_{CP}*si Pedro es hijo único*] can be embedded because it already is a dependent clause with an elided main clause: this *sí* introduces a dependent conditional clause, as illustrated by the following possible continuation:

- (186) *He dicho que si Pedro es hijo único... no tendrá sobrinos*
 have said that if Pedro is son unique... NEG will.have nephews
 ‘I said that if Pedro is an only child... he will never have nephews.’

The impossibility of embedding a *sí*-clause is consistent with treating DM *sí* as an illocutionary operator, sitting high up in the left periphery.⁴

5.2.1.3 *Sí*-clauses cannot be negated

Illocutionary operators cannot be negated. As the literature notes, the idea of a negated speech act is hard to conceive, and as Corr (2016, p.122) summarizes:

⁴In Chapter 6 I mention the possibility of analyzing *sí*-clauses as elliptical clauses, but as elliptical adverbial clauses and not as elliptical complement clauses. It is possible that the difference in prosody could indicate different types of anaphora that support ellipsis (Déchaine, p.c.).

“one may either PERFORM an act (do, or say, something), or fail to PERFORM an act (do, or here, say nothing), but what one cannot do is NOT PERFORM an act”.

In order to see this, let us start with the negation at the propositional level. In (187), the adjunct clause [_{CP} *si* tengo un perro] (*if I have a dog*) is negated:

- (187) Context: I’m applying for a cat-friendly apartment. My mother asks me whether landlords will accept my application if I include that I have a pet, and I say:

Si tengo un gato, no *si* tengo un perro.

if have a cat NEG if have a dog

‘If I have a cat, not if I have a dog.’

DM *si*-clauses, however cannot be negated.

- (188) Context: An acquaintance is asking A about how to take care of their new dog since they have one, but A has a cat, not a dog. A replies:

Si tengo un gato, no (**si*) tengo un perro.

si have a cat NEG si have a dog

‘[Si] I have a cat, not a dog.’

5.2.1.4 *Si*-clauses cannot be conjoined nor disjoined

Although it would not be surprising for an illocutionary operator to be able to appear in conjoined clauses, *si*-clauses cannot appear in such cases, as (189):

- (189) [Context: A and B are talking. B mentions that A cannot know what it’s like to have a dog because she only has a cat (when in reality she has both). A replies:]

Si tengo un gato y (**si*) tengo un perro!

si have a cat and (si) have a dog

‘[Si] I have a cat, not a dog.’

Although some illocutionary operators can be conjoined, typically there is no disjunction at the speech act level.⁵ This is due to the fact that disjunction is an operation on propositions, and not illocutions, since the disjunctive operator would be understood as cancelling the illocutionary force of the sentence (Corr, 2016, p.124). In (190), combining two *sí*-clauses with a disjunctive operator results in an ungrammatical sentence.

(190) [Context: A and B are talking. B mentions how much she will miss A, even though they will meet the next day and, if that is not possible, on Saturday. A replies:]

*Si nos vemos mañana o (*si) nos vemos el finde!*

si REC see tomorrow or ([si]) REC see the weekend

‘[Si] we will see each other tomorrow or the weekend!’

We have just discussed the syntactic distribution of *sí*-CPs, but we have not yet focused on the syntactic position of DM *sí* itself. This is the topic of the next section.

5.2.2 Linearization: DM *sí* is not leftmost

In order to locate DM *sí* within the syntactic structure, I will first describe what are the reasons to suspect that it occupies a very high position within the left periphery. Namely, I will discuss its position with respect to other high elements such as topics (5.2.2.1.1) and speaker-oriented adverbs (5.2.2.1.2), and show that DM *sí* precedes them all. However, in section 5.2.2.2 we will see that there are certain elements that precede DM *sí*: vocatives and discourse activating particles.

⁵In the pragmatic framework introduced in Cohen and Krifka (2014) disjunction, although mechanically possible, does not yield a defined *commitment space* unless the speech acts are two denegations. Krifka (2001) does mention the possibility of disjoined questions, but no other speech act seems to be disjoinable (besides denegations, as previously mentioned).

5.2.2.1 What DM *si* precedes

5.2.2.1.1 Topics

There are certain elements of the left periphery that can be preceded by DM *si*, one of them being topics such as overt subject pronouns (191) and left dislocated elements (192). Typically, topics are considered to be high up in the C domain structure—in a cartographic approach (such as Rizzi's), they occupy a position in the highest TopicP, above Focus but below ForceP. Overt subject pronouns have been analyzed as contrastive topic markers in Spanish (Mayol, 2010). In (191), the overt subject marker *yo* 'I' cannot precede DM *si* in a grammatical sentence:

(191) OVERT SUBJECT PRONOUN

- a. *Si yo ya lo sabía.*
Si I already it knew
'[Si] I already knew it.'
- b. **Yo si ya lo sabía.*

DM *si* also precedes topicalized elements such as *los libros* ('the books') in clitic left dislocation constructions like the one in (192).

(192) TOPICALIZATION: CLITIC LEFT DISLOCATION

- a. *Si los libros ya los he leído.*
si the books already them have read
'[Si] as for the books, I already read them.'
- b. **los libros si ya los he leído.*

Given these distributional facts, we can conclude that DM *si* is positioned above topics in the syntactic structure.




Figure 5.11: Position of DM *si* in ForceP with respect to topics.

5.2.2.1.2 Discourse-oriented adverbs

Other left-peripheral elements that cannot precede DM *si* are discourse-oriented adverbs (using the term in Speas and Tenny (2003), otherwise known as speaker-oriented adverbs). These adverbs are typically subdivided into three types: from the highest to the lowest in terms of hierarchy (shown in (193)), they are speech act adverbials, evaluative adverbials, and evidential adverbials (Jackendoff, 1972; Cinque, 1999; Ernst, 2009; Maienborn and Schäfer, 2011):

- (193) Speech Act > Evaluative > Evidential
 ‘honestly’ > ‘unfortunately’ > ‘evidently’

In Rizzi (1997), these adverbs occupy a position labelled Mod(ifier)P, between ForceP and FiniteP, and below FocusP:

- (194) ForceP > FocusP > **ModP** > FinP > IP

In (195), *evidentemente* ‘evidently’ is an evidential adverb and comments “on the quality of the evidence supporting the truth of the proposition, or on the manner in which the individual has come to learn of that fact or truth” (Speas and Tenny, 2003, p.329). Here again, DM *si* needs to precede *evidentemente*:

(195) EVIDENTIAL ADVERBS⁶

- a. *Si evidentemente está casado.*
 Si evidently is married
 ‘[Si] evidently he is married.’
- b. **Evidentemente si está casado.*




Figure 5.12: Position of DM *si* in Force with respect to evidential discourse adverbs.

In (196), *desafortunadamente* ‘unfortunately’ is an evaluative adverb and ex-

⁶Note that (b) would be fine if there was an intonational break between *evidentemente* and *si*.

presses a judgment (or evaluation) of proposition. DM *si* precedes also this type of speaker-oriented adverb.

(196) EVALUATIVE ADVERBS

- a. *Si desafortunadamente está casado.*
 Si unfortunately is married
 ‘[Si] unfortunately he is married.’
- b. **Desafortunadamente si está casado.*




Figure 5.13: Position of DM *si* in Force_{ILL} with respect to evaluative discourse adverbs.

The last type of speaker-oriented adverb are speech act level adverbs such as ‘honestly’ or ‘sincerely’. They express the speaker’s attitude towards the content or the form of the proposition. In (197), DM *si* is shown to precede *sinceramente* ‘honestly’; the reverse ordering, although dispreferred, is not entirely

ungrammatical. In fact, it is grammatical if the adverb ‘sinceramente’ and the rest of the sentence are separated by an intonational break, as in (197d) :

(197) SPEECH ACT ADVERBS⁷

- a. *Si sinceramente a quien le alcanza con \$301,000?*
Si sincerely PREP who them reach with \$301,000
‘[Si] honestly who can live on \$301,000?’ (Twitter)
- b. *Ushh si sinceramente yo sabía que Duque era un inútil, (...)*
ushh si sincerely I knew that Duque was a useless
‘Ushh [si] honestly I already knew that Duque was useless.’ (Twitter)
- c. *Si sinceramente no tengo ni idea.*
si sincerely NEG have neither idea
‘[Si] honestly I have no clue.’
- d. *?Sinceramente si no tengo ni idea.*
- e. *Sinceramente, si no tengo ni idea.*

The data in (197e) can be explained through the interactional layer proposed by Wiltschko and Heim (2016): the adverb *sinceramente* ‘honestly’ would be positioned in Ground_{Speaker}, as in the tree in (5.14): the adverb can be separated from the sentence by an intonational break, and its meaning fits the function associated with this layer:⁸

⁷It is important to note that in the case of dependent *si*, the si-Adv order is not allowed:

- (197) a. *Sinceramente si yo tuviera un bebé no le pondría nada.*
sincerely if I had a baby NEG him put anything.
‘Honestly, if I had baby I wouldn’t put anything on them.’ (Twitter)
- b. **si sinceramente yo tuviera un bebe no le pondría nada.*

⁸See Emonds (2004) on the structural significance of an intonational break




Figure 5.14: Position of DM *si* and the speech act level adverb *sinceramente* ‘honestly’.

We can assume the same structure for (197a-c) as for the other two types of discourse adverbs, as represented in the tree in (5.15). However, this analysis is suspiciously simple, since one would expect the speech act adverb to scope over the entire speech act, including DM *si*. The data and judgements for this co-occurrence are not particularly clear, and future work will help fine-tune the analysis presented here. For now, the general conclusion is that DM *si* precedes most discourse-oriented adverbs.




Figure 5.15: Position of DM *sí* in Force with respect to speech act discourse adverbs with an intonation break (marked by a comma).

5.2.2.2 What DM *sí* follows

Functionally, the role of DM *sí* seems to match that of elements that have been analyzed as lexicalizing layers above CP that encode utterance-level information (Corr, 2016; Thoma, 2016; Corr, 2018). However, I have argued that based on its obligatory intonational integration within the sentence, and its direct selection of sentence type, DM *sí* is still within the CP domain. We therefore expect interactional discourse particles to precede DM *sí*, and this prediction is borne out. There are three types of elements that are predicted to precede DM *sí*: vocatives, Speaker-oriented discourse particles, and Addressee-oriented discourse particles.

5.2.2.2.1 Addressee-oriented discourse activating particles

Addressee-oriented discourse activating particles such as *oye* ('hey') typically precede vocatives (Corr, 2016), and can be found in utterance initial position to grab the attention of the Addressee (Haegeman and Hill, 2013; Haegeman, 2014).

These particles are analyzed as being the highest heads of a syntactic layer that represents speech act participants, namely in $\text{Ground}_{\text{Addressee}}$.⁹




Figure 5.16: Proposed syntactic positions for DM *si* and the Speaker-oriented discourse activating particle *oye*.

Given that we have proposed to position DM *si* below the interactional layer, we expect it to follow Addressee-oriented discourse activating particles. This prediction is borne out, as exemplified in (199):

- (199) a. *Oye si yo no he dicho nada.*
 listen si I NEG have said anything
 ‘Hey, [si] I didn’t say anything.’
- b. *#Si oye yo no he dicho nada.*

⁹This DM could also be analyzed as instantiating the Response later (Wiltschko, p.c.).

5.2.2.2.2 Speaker-oriented discourse activating particles

We also expect DM *si* to appear below Speaker-oriented discourse activating particles, such as *ay* or *anda* (lit. ‘walk’ in the imperative form, but typically used as an exclamation of surprise). These types of particles sit at the lowest projection beyond CP, and convey the Speaker’s attitude towards the utterance (Haegeman and Hill (2013) and Wiltschko and Heim (2016) on other languages, and Corr (2016) on Spanish and other Ibero-Romance languages). This prediction is also borne out, as we see in the examples in (200). The structure is given in the tree in Figure 5.17.

- (200) a. *Ay si es verdad!*
 ay si is truth
 ‘Oh, [si] it’s true.’
 b. **Si ay es verdad!*




Figure 5.17: Proposed syntactic positions for DM *si* and the Speaker-oriented discourse activating particle *ay*.

5.2.2.2.3 Vocatives

Vocatives in Italian and Romanian have been said to occupy one of the highest positions within the left periphery (Moro, 2003; Hill, 2007, 2013). However, Corr (2016) notes that vocatives in Ibero-Romance languages cannot appear in absolute initial position when multiple DMs are used, as (201) shows:

- (201) a. *Oye, guapo, mira, yo no soy del PP, eh?*
 listen good-looking DM I NEG be.1SG of.the PP DM
 ‘Hey, mate, look, I’m not a Tory, okay?’ (Corr, 2016, p.77; ex.106-7)
- b. *#Guapo oye mira, yo no soy del PP, eh?*

Given this restriction, Corr (2016) proposes that vocatives are merged in the specifier position of what I have analyzed here as Force (her EvalP):




Figure 5.18: Position of vocatives within the left periphery.

We expect therefore to find DM *si* below vocatives, a prediction that is borne out as is shown in (202):

- (202) a. *Adriana, si es jueves.*
 Adriana si is thursday
 ‘Adriana, [si] it’s Thursday.’
- b. **Si Adriana es jueves.*

The (simplified) structure for (202) can be seen in the tree in Figure 5.19:




Figure 5.19: Position of DM *si* and vocatives.

To sum up, I propose that DM *si* is an illocutionary operator that occupies the highest position in the CP domain, which I have labelled as ForceP, below the interactional layer above CP proposed in the recent literature (GroundP). The predicted relative order with respect to high CP elements (such as topicalized elements) and low interactional-level elements (such as vocatives) is borne out.

5.3 Discussion

In the first half of the chapter, I proposed an analysis of *si*-CPs and DM *si*: *si*-CPs are root clauses that link the proposition they denote to the previous intra- and inter-sentential discourse; DM *si* is the head of the highest C projection, Force, and encodes the super-assertive illocutionary force of the sentence. I based this

proposal on diagnostics for illocutionary operators, as well as the relative position of the particle with respect to other elements in the left periphery.

This analysis is able to capture the multifunctionality of the particle *si*: as we saw in Chapter 2, *si* can be used to introduce interrogative (203), and (root) exclamative clauses (204):¹⁰

(203) *No sé si es verdad.* INTERROGATIVE
NEG know whether is truth

‘I don’t know whether it’s true.’

(204) *Si será fácil!* EXCLAMATIVE
si be.FUT easy

‘Isn’t it easy!’

Hernanz (2012) treats the particle *si* in root exclamatives as the head of FocusP, and interrogative *si* as the head of the Interrogative projection proposed by Rizzi (2001).¹¹ She also positions conditional *si* as the head of ForceP, in parallel to the declarative finite complementizer *que* (we will come back to the complementizer paradigm in Chapter 6).

¹⁰We will return to conditionals in Chapter 6.

¹¹The position of the interrogative complementizer in this specific projection was originally proposed by Rizzi (2001). For a discussion on the evidence of exclamative *si* in FocusP, see Hernanz (2012).




Figure 5.20: Position of *si* in different projections of the CP.

A question that remains to be addressed is what the core lexical entry is that is compatible with all these positions.¹² Rodríguez Ramalle (2011) proposes that what DM *si* and interrogative *si* have in common is that they contrast alternatives: interrogative *si* contrasts polar alternatives, whereas DM *si* contrasts evidential alternatives. If we apply this same idea to our analysis, DM *si* seems to contrast two felicity conditions: the one presented by the previous contribution to discourse, and the one it introduces. This would also explain why DM *si* cannot be used in out-of-the-blue contexts—namely, because it needs something to react to. In (205) we see that Speaker A cannot use a *si*-clause in an out-of-the-blue context, but she

¹²Another option is to assume that all these instances of the particle *si* do not share a core common lexical entry.

could use a bare clause:

- (205) Context: A enters a meeting room and sits besides a co-worker, B. A says
to B: (*#Si*) *hace un día precioso!*
si does a day precious
‘[#si] it’s such a nice day!’

DM *si* needs something to contrast with and, therefore, it cannot be used out-of-the-blue.

5.4 Rightmost and CP-external: DM *no*

We turn now to our second protagonist: DM *no*. Recall from section 5.1 that I adopt an analysis of DM *no* that extends the syntactic structure of the clause to include a projection above CP that encodes pragmatic roles syntactically (Haegeman and Hill, 2013; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016; Yang and Wiltschko, 2016; Jamieson, 2019). Specifically, I adopt the Universal Spine Hypothesis structure proposed by Wiltschko (2014) and extended in Lam (2014); Thoma (2016) and Wiltschko and Heim (2016) to account for interactional phenomena. I adopt the structure illustrated in the tree in Figure 5.21, where DM *no* is the head of $\text{Ground}_{\text{Addressee}P}$ given that it is used to confirm the Addressee’s belief or intention. Given the premises of the framework I am using, the function of a given lexical item can be used to know its position in the syntactic structure: since the interpretation of a given lexical item depends on the place of association of that item in the syntactic structure, we can reverse this link and use the interpretation of a lexical item in context *c* to know its syntactic position.¹³

In addition to these theory-based predictions, I will give independent syntactic evidence for DM *no*’s position, namely selectional properties and its po-

¹³This predicts that the same lexical item might have different interpretations depending on where it is associated in the spine. See Thoma (2016) for an analysis of Miesbach Bavarian discourse particles that exploits this characteristic of the framework, as well as Déchaine et al. (2014) on noun class prefixes in Shona, as well as Déchaine and Wiltschko (2017) on reflexives.

sition relative to the rest of the sentence. The final analysis can be seen in Figure 5.21. The final order is the result of moving the CP to the specifier position of $\text{Ground}_{\text{Addressee}}\text{P}$ (Munaro and Poletto, 2002), which will be further discussed in section 5.4.2:




Figure 5.21: Proposed syntactic positions for DM *no*.

As we discussed in section 5.1, it has been noted in the literature that the use of certain tags is sensitive to the relationship between speech act participants. Such effects have been attested for other DMs like Canadian *eh* and (American) English *huh* and *right* (Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). What Wiltschko and Heim’s examples in (206) and (207) show is that whereas *huh* and *right* can only be used to confirm the truth of a proposition p , Canadian *eh* can also be used to ask for the confirmation of the Speaker’s assumption that the Addressee knows that the proposition is true.

- (206) John knows that Mary would like to have a new dog. He has not seen her in a long time. And he keeps wondering whether she got a new dog. One

day he runs into her while she's walking a new puppy. John utters:

You have a new dog, eh/huh/right?

= Confirm that p is true

(Wiltschko and Heim, 2016, (example (6)))

- (207) Mary is walking her new dog when she runs into John. She is expecting that he would congratulate her on the new dog, but he's not mentioning it. She isn't sure anymore whether he actually realizes that she has a new dog. So she utters:

*I have a new dog, eh/*huh/*right?*

= Confirm that you know that p is true

(Wiltschko and Heim, 2016, (example(7)))

We see the effects of speech act participant roles on the licensing of DM *no* especially with predicates of personal taste and internal state predicates, as we saw in Chapter 4. DM *no* is felicitous if added to a taste predicate whose judge is the Addressee (second person), as in (208). Importantly, without the addition of DM *no*, the sentence would be infelicitous or pragmatically invalid.¹⁴

- (208) *Te ha gustado, #(no?)*

you has liked no

'You liked it, [no?]

In (208), it is pragmatically infelicitous to use a *no*-tagged clause with a taste predicate with the Addressee as the judge: the Addressee is the sole judge of whether they like something, and asserting that the Addressee likes something is usually considered face-threatening.

¹⁴Both this and the following point follow from the interrogative nature of the use of DM *no* and other confirmational markers, marked by the rising intonation. Regardless of the reason for this characteristic, it still stands that the use of DM *no* is restricted in these cases.

The opposite happens when we exchange a second person for a first person judge. If the Speaker is expressing her own judgements, it is not accepted to ask the Addressee for confirmation of their commitment, since it is not needed to ground the proposition:

- (209) *Me ha gustado, (#no?)*
me has liked no
'I liked it, [no?]

The same effect is seen when the proposition denotes other perspectival predicates: internal state predicates. An example of an internal state predicate is “to be tired” (in Spanish, *estar cansado*), exemplified in (210):

- (210) *Estás cansado, #(no?)*
are tired no
'You are tired, [no?]

- (211) *Estoy cansada, (#no?)*
am tired no
'I am tired, [no?]

In (210), it would be pragmatically odd not to use the tag when confirming that someone is tired: even if the Speaker in (210) knows the Addressee well and sees that they have huge dark circles underneath their eyes and are yawning constantly, it would be a social faux-pas to dryly assert that the Addressee is tired. The use of the tag, however, allows this conversational move because of what it does: it asks the Addressee whether making the statement ‘You are tired’ is valid.

This is one of the distributional properties that the literature has used to propose a syntactic position for this type of tag and particle (Munaro and Poletto, 2002; Haegeman and Hill, 2013; Thoma, 2016; Wiltschko and Heim, 2016). Other

diagnostics, which will be discussed below in reference to DM *no*, are sentence type restriction (discussed in 5.4.1.2), and scope of the particle (discussed in 5.4.1.1).

5.4.1 Syntactic distribution: DM *no* is CP-external

First, let us focus on the syntactic distribution of DM *no*, applying the diagnostics we used for DM *sí*: what it restricts (section 5.4.1.1) and what it (does not) select (section 5.4.1.2), as well as its link to negation (section 5.4.1.3) and disjunction (section 5.4.1.4).

5.4.1.1 DM *no* restricts root CPs

Analyzing DM *no* as the head of a projection above CP allows us to capture another important characteristic of this DM: it takes scope over the whole sentence with which it occurs; that is, it asks for confirmation of the root CP, and cannot ask for confirmation of an embedded CP within the matrix clause. This is shown in (212) by the felicity of different continuations to the *no*-marked utterance. An answer that addresses the matrix clause (Adriana knowing *p*) is felicitous, whereas an answer that addresses whether the embedded *p* is true or not is not:

(212) *Adriana sabe que Juan viene, no?*

Adriana knows that Juan come no

‘Adriana knows that Juan is coming, [no?]

a. *A: Sí, lo sabe.*

yes it knows

‘Yes, she knows it.’

b. *B: #Sí, Juan viene.*

yes juan comes

‘Yes, Juan is coming.’

Similarly, the speaker in (213) is not asking for confirmation of the proposition denoted by the noun complement clause it follows (*le mintieron* ‘they lied to him’), but of the fact that the person in question has to admit that he had been lied to. This is why the confirmation of p = ‘they lied to him’ is not a felicitous continuation, but the confirmation of p = ‘he has to admit that they lied to him’ is, as illustrated in (213a and b):

(213) *Tiene que reconocer el hecho de que le mintieron, no?*
 has that admit the fact of that him lied [no]

‘He has to admit the fact that they lied to him, [no?].’

a. *A: #Sí, es verdad, le mintieron.*
 yes is truth him lied

‘Yes, it’s true, they lied to him.’

b. *B. Sí, lo tiene que reconocer para pasar página.*
 yes it has that admit for pass page

‘Yes, he has to admit it to be able to move on.’

We can conclude, then, that DM *no* scopes over the entire root CP and cannot scope over dependent clauses. This suggests that it has to be positioned high in the structure in order to be able to c-command the whole matrix CP.

5.4.1.2 DM *no* does not select for clause-type

As we saw in Chapter 2, in terms of selectional properties, DM *no* does not seem to select for any particular sentence type: it can anchor to declaratives, interrogatives, imperatives, and exclamatives (214):

- (214) a. *Hoy es miércoles, no?* DECLARATIVE
 today is wednesday no
 ‘Today is Wednesday, [no?]
- b. *Dónde estará ahora, no?* INTERROGATIVE
 where will.be know no
 ‘Where could he be now, [no?]
- c. *Estudia un ratito más, no?* IMPERATIVE
 study a while.DIM more no
 ‘Study for a little bit longer, [no?]
- d. *Qué alegría lo de tu hermano, no?* EXCLAMATIVE
 what joy it of your brother no
 ‘How great the news about your brother, [no?]

However, as was also discussed in Chapter 2, DM *no* selects a particular type of speech act. Specifically, it does not anchor to three types of speech acts: questions, commissives, or expressives (215). Under the assumption that illocutionary force is encoded in ForceP, this means that DM *no* has to be located in a position where it can select ForceP—such as GroundP.¹⁵

- (215) a. # *Cómo te llamas, no?* QUESTION
 What’s your name, [no?]
- b. # *Te lo juro, no?* COMMISSIVE
 ‘I swear, [no?]

¹⁵This is a simplification of how illocutionary force works. Even if we assume that illocutionary force is a result of a combination of various factors (sentence type, context of use, sometimes the person of the subject (as is the case with promises)), the point is that DM *no* should be able to select the clause at the point where it can perform the intended speech act.

c. # *Muchas gracias, no?*

EXPRESSIVE

'Thank you very much, [no?]

It is important to bear in mind that the judgements in (215) refer to the use of the anchor as a wh-question, a promise, and a thanking act, respectively: as we have seen in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the sequences themselves are felicitous if they do not express these specific acts and are used in a rhetorical way.

5.4.1.3 *No*-tagged utterances are undefined relative to negation

One of the properties of illocutionary operators at the CP-level was that they cannot be negated. This test, however, does not seem to be applicable to *no*-tagged utterances, or at least not as straightforwardly as applied for DM *si* in section 5.2.1.3. If we try to negate DM *no*, as in (216), the resulting utterance is nonsensical:

(216) *Estudia un ratito más, *?no no?*

study a while.DIM more NEG no

'Study for a little bit longer, not [no?]

5.4.1.4 *No*-tagged utterances are undefined relative to conjunction/disjunction

Another one of the properties of illocutionary operators at the CP-level is that they cannot be disjoined. Just as with negation, this test does not seem to be applicable in such a straightforward way as with DM *si*:

(217) *?Estudia un ratito más, no? o vete a dormir, no?*

study a while.DIM more no or go to sleep no

'Study for a little bit longer [no?] or go to bed, [no?]

The issue here is that (217) above is felicitous if we use DM *no* with a non-confirmational function (as described in Chapter 2). But it would be infelicitous,

or at least pragmatically odd, to use confirmational *no* (with a rising intonation) in both positions.

The only way to have disjunction in this case would be to have DM *no* after both assertions, as in (218):

- (218) *Estudia un ratito más o vete a dormir, no?*
study a while.DIM more or go to sleep no
'Study for a little bit longer or go to bed, [no?]'

5.4.2 Linearization: DM *no* is turn-final

DM *no* has an 'inert' syntactic life: it always appears after the anchor.¹⁶ DM *no* cannot appear sentence initially or sentence internally (220), this is true of DM *no* (with rising intonation), but phatic *no* can appear sentence internally.¹⁷

- (219) a. *Adriana tiene un gato, no?*
Adriana has a cat [no]
'Adriana has a cat, [no?]'
b. **No Adriana tiene un gato?*
c. **Adriana no tiene un gato?*

This is expected given the proposed analysis: in principle, we expect DMs that are located in the interactional layer to appear in the peripheries, either the left or

¹⁶Montañez Mesas (2015) identifies a number of co-occurrences of DM *no* and another DM, *eh*, as well as other discourse marking forms like *mm* or *o sea* 'I mean' as the anchor. Regarding the co-occurrence of DM *no* and DM *eh*, in her example DM *eh* follows DM *no*, and she claims that the combination of both reinforces its appellative meaning (similar to the Call-on-the-Addressee). However, both *no* and *eh* can be used as stand-alone utterances: *no* in its negative response marker use, and *eh* to ask for a repetition of the previous utterance (Montañez Mesas, 2015). It is therefore not clear that these are sequences of DMs, as much as an anchor and a DM. The other examples she cites are also ambiguous in this sense.

¹⁷See Chapter 2 for examples of non-confirmational uses of DM *no*.

the right periphery. In this case, we can derive the linear order of (220) following the proposal by Munaro and Poletto (2002) for Italian markers: the anchor (in this case, [Adriana has a cat]) moves to the specifier of the projection headed by DM *no*.¹⁸




Figure 5.22: Movement of the CP to the Specifier of GroundP, following Munaro and Poletto (2002).

This movement is caused by the need to meet a prosodic requirement, namely the high rising intonation on DM *no*. Prosodically-required movement is attested in other syntactic movements in Spanish, for example movement of the subject to sentence final position to receive nuclear stress (which falls on the last element of the clause) (Zubizarreta, 1998; Bonet, 2019).

A potential issue with this proposal is that it does not predict the fact that parentheticals can appear between the anchor CP and the DM:

- (220) *Adriana tiene un gato, que yo sepa, no?*
 Adriana has a cat that I know [no]
 ‘Adriana has a cat, as far as I know, [no?]

This is not expected in a specifier-head configuration: a parenthetical could not intervene between a head and its specifier, but it could intervene between two

¹⁸Again for ease of reading, I conflate both Grounding projections in Figure 5.22.

maximal projections (Munaro and Poletto, 2002). I propose a possible solution for this in the following section.

5.5 Discussion

A possible solution for the challenge of linearization and DM *no* is to appeal to a bi-clausal analysis of *no*-tagged clauses. A bi-clausal analysis of similar constructions (such as English tag questions) has been proposed in the literature: English tag questions are composed of two clauses, an assertion and a question, where the VP of the second clause is elided because it is given (Sailor, 2009):

(221) [CP ...], [CP *isn't it* VP]

Let's compare what these two types of analyses would look like for DM *no*: one where we assume a bi-clausal structure with ellipsis of the given information, and a mono-clausal structure like the one we have proposed until now:

(222) BI-CLAUSAL: [CP ...], [CP *no* CP]
 MONO-CLAUSAL: [CP ANCHOR [GroundP *no* [t]]]

One of the reasons I didn't propose a bi-clausal analysis is that, unlike for English tag questions, it is not as straightforward to assume that there is ellipsis of given information: in (224a) the VP in the second clause is easily recoverable, but not in the Spanish equivalent in (224b).¹⁹

¹⁹García Vizcaíno (2005) notes that in most cases, DM *no* can be swapped for a more “fully fleshed” question. When the anchor is a non-evaluative assertion, the DM can be changed for the longer sequence *no es cierto?* ‘isn't it true?’. When the anchor is an evaluative assertion, on the other hand, the DM can be swapped for either *no es cierto?* or *no crees?* ‘don't you think?’. When the anchor is an imperative, the longer question has to be *no crees?* ‘don't you think?’ (this is illustrated in (223):

(223) a. *Mañana es martes, no es cierto?/#no crees?*
 tomorrow is Tuesday NEG is certain/NEG think.2SG
 ‘Tomorrow is Tuesday, isn't it true?’

- (224) a. George washes his hands before dinner, does he not [~~wash his hands before dinner~~]? (Sailor, 2009)
- b. Jorge se lava las manos, no #[~~se lava las manos~~]?
jorge REFL washes the hands no REFL washes the hands

Another reason is the restriction that the DM imposes on the speech act type of the anchor: although it is not a clause typing restriction, it still can be used as evidence for the DM selecting its anchor.

There are other two additional reasons to propose a mono-clausal analysis: one based on prosody, and another based on scope. I proposed that DM *no* (a) forms a prosodic unit with its anchor, although it is not integrated in the CP (section 2.2.1.2), and (b) sits high up in the left periphery, structurally above its anchor, which explains the scope of the DM (section 5.1.2).

The relationship between DM *no* and prosody is tricky: as Cabedo Nebot (2013) notes, in the past there has been the assumption of a strict correlation between DMs in general and prosodic breaks (in the sense that DMs are delimited by prosodic breaks). Cabedo Nebot (2013, p.204) mentions that orthographic conventions may also impose an expectation of a prosodic break between the anchor and a DM, an expectation that oftentimes is not met in casual conversation. In fact, in his corpus study, DM *no* forms an autonomous intonational unit only in 16.60% of the cases: in other words, in the majority of the cases the DM is included as a peripheral element of the utterance, but does not form a prosodic unit of its own. The DM may not be fully integrated in the anchor itself, but it does

-
- b. *Qué bonito, no crees? / no es cierto?*
what pretty NEG think.2SG / NEG is certain

‘How pretty, don’t you think?’

- c. *Estudia un poco más, no crees?/#no es cierto?*
study a bit more NEG think.2SG/NEG is certain

‘Study a bit longer, don’t you think?’

form a unit with it. Since I have assumed that prosodic integration is evidence of syntactic integration, I take this characteristic of DM *no* to favour a mono-clausal analysis.

This unit is not only prosodic: DM *no* takes scope over the whole anchor. Under the assumption that an expression *a* can only scope over an expression *b* if *a* c-commands *b*, this would mean that the DM *no* c-commands the anchor CP (Hinzen, 2006; Thoma, 2016). A mono-clausal structure like (225) explains this scope relation:

(225) $[_{\text{GroundP}} \textit{no} [_{\text{CP}} \textit{ANCHOR}]]$

A bi-clausal analysis, however, has the advantage of giving the ordering of the anchor and the DM ‘for free’, as well as explaining why we can find parentheticals between the anchor and the DM: since the anchor and the DM form different maximal projections, it is possible for a parenthetical structure to intervene between them.

If we assume that the ellipsis analysis can be applied to the structure like (226), we can still maintain an analysis where the DM *no* lexicalizes $\text{Ground}_{\text{Addressee}}$, but in this case the GroundP of the second (interrogative) clause (see Jamieson (2019) for this analysis for Scots varieties):

(226) *Adriana tiene un gato, no es-cierto?*
 Adriana has a cat [no] is
 ‘Adriana has a cat, isn’t it true?’

(227) BI-CLAUSAL: $[_{\text{GroundP}} \dots], [_{\text{GroundP}} \textit{no} \textit{CP}]$

There are advantages to both types of analysis, as we have just seen. A more in-depth study of this possibility, as well as a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between DM *no*, prosody, and parentheticals remains to be conducted.

Chapter 6

Conclusions and outlook

The truth is an elephant described by three blind men. The first man touches the tail and says it's a rope. The second man feels the rough leg and says it's a tree. The third man feels the trunk and says it's a snake.

— Indian parable, quoted in S2E9 of The X Files.

6.1 Summary

The very broad aim of this dissertation was to study how two Peninsular Spanish DMs (*sí* and *no*) are used, and what that can tell us about the different levels at which conversations operates. These two DMs aim to restore or maximize epistemic alignment between Speaker and Addressee. On the one hand, DM *sí* is analyzed as an illocutionary operator that marks that a proposition is already known by all interlocutors, hence forcing an alignment within the Common Ground. As for DM *no*, it is used to align both beliefs and outcomes among interlocutors. These two DMs show that the Speaker has two versions of the CG in the Dialogue Board (one representing what they know, and the other representing what they believe the Addressee to know), and that they are able to negotiate contextual updates with the Addressee.

I insisted on separating the contribution of the DM per se from the contribution

of the clause it appears with respect to the rest of discourse. *Si*-clauses reject the conversational update proposed by the previous discourse move because a felicity condition is not met. A *no*-tagged clause is used when the Speaker wants to confirm a previous epistemic or outcome bias.

Another aim of this dissertation was to explore recent proposals to encode speech act-level information in the syntactic structure. I proposed that DM *si* is an illocutionary operator situated within the CP domain, but as high as ForceP, based on prosodic and syntactic evidence. I also proposed that DM *no* occupies an even higher position, outside of CP but still within the same clause. I follow recent analyses in the syntactic literature in calling this higher structure the Grounding layer: within it, DM *no* occupies the layer that represents the Addressee's information state (as perceived by the Speaker).

One conclusion of this type of study is the complexity of multiple interactions. For example, in the case of DM *si* we had to account for the contribution of the previous discourse, the *si*-marked clause as a whole within the discourse, and the contribution of the DM *si* itself to the sentence it appears in. In the case of DM *no*, we had to distinguish its pragmatic effect from its semantic contribution on the dialogue (checking whether the Addressee validates the anchor), as well as keeping track of the content of the anchor itself.¹

There are still many questions and further areas of research: in 6.2, I compare DM *si* and DM *no* to similar DMs, and try applying a similar analysis to the one developed in this dissertation. Specifically, I compare two uses of illocutionary operators in Spanish: DM *si* to reportative *que* (6.2.1). In section 6.2.1.1 I contextualize the discussion about root complementizers within a bigger research question, namely that of *insubordination*—the use of sentences marked as subordinates as main clauses (Evans and Watanabe, 2016). I also compare the confirmational DMs *no* and *eh* in 6.2.2: DM *eh* seems to thrive in exactly the contexts of use that DM *no* tries to avoid, and this fact can be explained by the analysis presented in

¹To all this, we have to add the importance of intonation, which I have largely omitted in this dissertation.

this dissertation. I also describe the possibility of cross-dialectal variation in the use of these DMs in section 6.3. Finally, another interesting avenue of further research is the role that DMs may play in showing illocutionary differences between different speech act types: in section 6.4 I discuss recent studies that focus on the different illocutionary effects of evaluative and non-evaluative assertions, a difference that has played a role in the analysis of DM *no* in this dissertation—namely, that the use of the DM disambiguates the possible interpretation of evaluative assertions as objective or subjective interpretations.

6.2 Comparison with other markers

I have alluded to other complementizers and tags that seem to function in similar ways to DM *si* and DM *no*. In this section I propose a way to extend the analysis presented in this dissertation to these other markers.

6.2.1 The complementizers *si* and *que*

In this dissertation I have described DM *si* as expressing *superassertive* force. By this I mean that, contrary to just proposing an update of the CG with *p* (what an assertion would do), a *si*-marked clause conveys that the proposition it denotes is already part of the CG. We see this in (228): DM *si* cannot be used in a situation where it is virtually impossible for *p* (*p*='A is vegetarian.') to be in the CG:

(228) Context: A and B are in a speed dating event. As an ice-breaker, B asks:

B: Prefieres carne o pescado?

'Do you prefer meat or fish?'

A: (#*Si*) soy vegetariana.

si am vegetarian

'([Si]) I am vegetarian.'

Interestingly, *que* ‘that’ can be used with the opposite effect: instead of *superasserting* a proposition, it merely *presents* it (as in Faller (2002); Déchaine et al. (2017))—this is usually referred to as reportative *que*, since this particle, just like *sí*, seems to have many jobs.² The use of *que* as a reportative is illustrated in (229), and its use as a declarative complementizer is illustrated in (230):

- (229) Context: An employee just had a meeting with her boss, who told her she and her co-worker B shouldn’t come to work tomorrow. She goes back to B’s desk and says:

Tú, que no vengamos mañana.

you that NEG come.1SG.SUBJ! tomorrow

‘Hey you, [que] we shouldn’t come tomorrow.’

- (230) *Me ha dicho que es vegetariana.*

me has said that is vegetarian

‘She has told me that she is vegetarian.’

The literature has noted that the reportative use of the complementizer *que* in root clauses seems to introduce presentational force (Etxepare, 2010; Demonte and Fernández Soriano, 2014; Corr, 2016). As such, a proposition introduced by reportative *que* can be followed by a direct negation of the Speaker’s belief in that same proposition, as exemplified in (231):

- (231) Context: A has been told by C that Hermann has had a son, but C is a known liar and has announced the birth many times before. A tells B:

²See, among others, Demonte and Fernández Soriano (2009, 2014); Corr (2016); Villa-García (2019).

Oye, que Hermann ha tenido un hijo, aunque hasta que no me llame no me lo creo.
 hear that Hermann has had a son although until that NEG me
 calls NEG me it believe

‘Hey, [que] Hermann has had a son, although until he calls me I won’t believe it.’

As we saw in Chapter 3, DM *si* contributes almost the opposite meaning, as we can see in (232): the proposition DM *si* introduces cannot be not believed, since as Schwenter (2016b) points out, it is obviously true to the Speaker. Between those two extremes is an unmodified, “default” assertion: a declarative that is not modified by any root complementizer merely proposes an update of the CG (Farkas and Bruce, 2010).

(232) Context: B tells A that now that Hermann is done with his PhD and has no responsibilities he can travel the world and party all night. A tells B:

Oye, si Hermann ha tenido un hijo, #aunque hasta que no me llame no me lo creo.
 listen si Hermann has had a son although until that NEG me
 calls NEG me it believe

‘Hey, [si] Hermann has a son, although until he calls me I won’t believe it.’

I propose that there is a three-way distinction in how a proposition can enter the conversation, and that this is reflected in how ForceP is marked: it can either be empty, in which case the proposition will be asserted; it can be filled by *si*, in which case the proposition will be *superasserted*; or it can be filled by *que*, in which case the proposition will be *presented*. These three possibilities are illustrated in the tree in Figure 6.1:




Figure 6.1: Position of discourse *si* and reportative *que*.

The picture is, of course, much more complicated than this: *si*-clauses in Peninsular Spanish also include exclamative clauses (discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.1.1.2); *que* can also appear in exclamative clauses. Both discourse and exclamative functions of the complementizers are illustrated in (233) and (234) respectively.³

- (233) a. DISCURSIVE FUNCTION
Oye, que el Barça ha ganado la liga.
 hear that the Barça has won the league
 ‘Hey, [que] Barça has won the Liga.’ (Etxepare, 2010, p. 604)
- b. *Si ya lo sé.*
 si already it know
 ‘[Si] I already know.’
- (234) a. EXCLAMATIVE FUNCTION
Que viene el Coco!
 that comes the Boogeyman
 ‘The Boogeyman is coming!’

³ Corr (2016) identifies three different functions of *que* in root clauses; however, Demonte and Fernández Soriano (2014) identify one of these as ‘echoic’, and not truly root clauses.

- b. *Si serás tonto!*
 si be.2SG.FUT dumb
 ‘[Si] aren’t you dumb!’

However, the picture can get even more complicated. Since *que* appears in many positions within the CP structure, there seems to be a parallelism between the uses of these two complementizers in root clauses versus non-root clauses, as presented in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2: Parallelism between the two Spanish complementizers.

Digging deeper into the similarities and differences between *si* and *que*, and the paradigm they could establish with a null complementizer (as in the case of “bare” assertion), remains for future research.

6.2.1.1 Insubordination and DM *si*

The use of what are traditionally viewed as subordinating complementizers in root clauses has been labelled *insubordination* (Evans et al., 2007). Examples from various Indo-European languages are given in (235) (these are examples of the phenomenon of insubordination in general, that is, they include examples of non-finite clauses used as main clauses). This phenomenon describes a clause that is either syntactically or morphologically marked for subordination but appears in root environments. It is not rare cross-linguistically, and as we have seen, *si* is by no means the only complementizer in Spanish that can appear in root clauses.

- (235) a. *Yo ir a la fiesta? Jamás!* SPANISH
 I go.INF to the party never
 ‘Me go to the party? Never!’
- b. *Alzarsi, porci, avete capito?* ITALIAN
 get.up.INF-REFL pigs have understood
 ‘Get up, pigs, understand?’
- c. *Beim Eintritt tief verneigen!* GERMAN
 by entry low bow.INF
 ‘Bow low on entering!’
- d. *John go to the movies? No way man!* ENGLISH

Insubordination is not restricted to Romance and Germanic languages. It has been observed in Farsi (Ghomeshi, 2013), Tlingit (Cable, 2009, 2011), Japanese (Evans and Watanabe, 2016), Yupik (Mithun, 2008), Nisga’a (Tarpent, 1991), Plains Cree (Cook, 2008), and Navajo (Mithun, 2008), to name a few (for more examples see Evans and Watanabe (2016)). In the following examples, matrix clauses bear morphosyntactic markers (boldfaced) that would otherwise have only been observed in subordinate clauses:

- (236) FARSI (Ghomeshi, 2013, p.3)
hæva bæd nist xub-e inja ke xeyli xub-e
 weather bad NEG.be.3SG good-be.3SG here **PRT** very good-be.3SG
 ‘The weather’s not bad; it’s nice; here, it’s really nice.’
- (237) NAVAJO (Mithun, 2008)
T’áh éí áádi sidá léí. T’óó baayániizii-o
 ‘Hont’ah was still sitting back there. I got so embarrassed-SUB.’

When it comes to the relationship between *si*-clauses and insubordination, there is a possible grammaticalization process: *si*-clauses may have originated as adjunct conditional clauses. These conditional clauses could have, in fact, been premise conditionals (following Haegeman (2003)). This type of conditional has been given many other names in the literature, but they essentially put a condition at the level of the speech act as opposed to the propositional level (Haegeman calls this other type of conditionals *event* conditionals). This contrast between different levels of modification was also noted by Sweetser (1990), who distinguishes between content, epistemic, and speech act conditionals (the latter would correspond to the premise conditionals):

- (238) a. If Paris is the capital of France, two is an even number. CONTENT
 b. If she's divorced, she's been married. EPISTEMIC
 c. If I may say so, that's a crazy idea. SPEECH ACT

It is possible that DM *si* introduced at some point a speech act conditional, and that over time the main clause (or CP1 in Figure 6.3) was elided. In fact, a possible paraphrase of *si*-clauses is along the lines of “How can you assert/ask/order that, if *p* is the condition that holds” (cf. Schwenter (1998)).




Figure 6.3: *si*-clause as peripheral adverbial.

Such a construction would target the felicity condition of the previous discourse move (something that I have proposed DM *si* does) while re-asserting the status of *p* as an element of the CG. Since the main clause is easily recoverable

from the context and refers back to it, it would make sense that this part would be elided. This would also account for the fact that *si*-clauses can be analyzed as being *discourse anaphoric* (Cook, 2008): as we have seen in this dissertation, *si*-clauses refer back to something mentioned in the previous discourse. Cook (2008) described a similar type of clauses in Plains Cree, which she calls discourse anaphoric, and proposes to schematize them as in (239).

(239) $XP_{\text{antecedent}} \dots CP_{\text{anaphor}}$

In the case of *si*-clauses this $XP_{\text{antecedent}}$ would be a CP, as we have seen in Figure 6.3. More data, and especially more diachronic data, is needed to flesh out this hypothesis.

6.2.2 The DMs *no* and *eh*

Much of the research done on DMs (in Spanish and in other languages) has compared different DMs in order to define their contribution to the utterance. DM *no* has been mainly compared to another Spanish DM, *eh*, as well as other tags such as '*verdad?*' or '*cierto?*' (both translatable as 'is(n't) it true?') (Zorraquino et al., 1999; Stenström, 2005; García Vizcaíno, 2005; Montañez Mesas, 2007; Rodríguez Muñoz, 2009; Roggia, 2012; Montañez Mesas, 2015).

In general, *eh* seems to thrive in exactly the contexts of use where *no* is infelicitous: commissives (240), directives (241), and expressives (242) (García Vizcaíno, 2005; Montañez Mesas, 2007).

- (240) a. *Te lo prometo, eh?*
 you it promise eh
 'I promise, [eh]?'
 b. *#Te lo prometo, no?*
 you it promise no
 'I promise, [no]?'

- (241) a. *Cállate ya, eh?*
 shut.up already eh
 ‘Shut up already, [eh]?’
- b. *#Cállate ya, no?*
 shut.up already no
 ‘Shut up already, [no]?’
- (242) a. *Muchas gracias, eh?*
 many thanks eh
 ‘Thank you very much, [eh]?’
- b. *#Muchas gracias, no?*
 many thanks no
 ‘Thank you very much, [no]?’

The literature on *eh* mentions that this particle modifies the utterance as opposed to the proposition itself (Cuenca and Castellà (1995), cited in Montañez Mesas (2015)).⁴ This is exactly what I claimed for DM *no*, but whereas *no* tables a proposal for update, *eh* tables the update itself. This is modelled in Figure 6.4 for the sentence in (243) (command + *eh*), where the outcome σ = ‘Study more’ is added directly to the shared TDL:

- (243) a. *Estudia más, eh?*
 study more eh
 ‘Study more, [eh]?’

⁴García Vizcaíno (2005) claims, however, that *eh* serves more often as a propositional strengthener (*refuerzo proposicional*) than as an illocutionary strengthener (*refuerzo ilocutivo*). The data she uses as illustration of the former function can also be analyzed as examples of illocutionary strengthening (García Vizcaíno, 2005, 94: 5).

A			B		
	CURRENT	PROJECTED		CURRENT	PROJECTED
DC _A			DC _B		
TDL _A			TDL _B	<i>o</i> <i>o</i> =‘Study more’	
CG			CG		
TDL	<i>o_B</i> <i>o</i> =‘Study more’		TDL	<i>o_B</i> <i>o</i> =‘Study more’	

KA2

TABLE
KA2

Figure 6.4: Speaker utters a modified command with DM *eh*.

Pragmatically, the effect of *eh* as opposed to *no* is to increase the degree of strength of the illocutionary point (García Vizcaíno, 2005; Montañez Mesas, 2015). I formalize this in the same way I formalized the mitigating effect of *no*: the use of *eh* increases the degree of strength of the command *Estudia más* (‘Study more’) in (244), whereas the use of *no* decreases the strength:

- (244) a. **Estudia más, *eh*?**
 ILL= COMMAND(b, p)
 STRENGTH: +1
- b. **Estudia más.**
 ILL= COMMAND(b, p)
 STRENGTH: 0
- c. **Estudia más, *no*?**
 ILL= COMMAND(b, p)
 STRENGTH: -1

In a sense, what DM *eh* is doing is ‘doubling-down’ on the anchor: not only is the Speaker in (245) making a promise, but she wants the Addressee to really know that that update has taken place.

(245) *Te lo prometo, eh?*
you it promise eh

‘I promise you, [eh]?’

Also with assertions there is a sense of ratification of the update. In (246) the Speaker is talking about going down to hell for love and not regretting it (because she ‘came back with two angels’), but insists that in spite of not regretting it, she still went down to hell:

(246) *Pero bajar bajé, eh? Bajar, bajé.*
but go-down.INF go-down.1SG.PST eh go-down.INF go-down.1SG.PST

‘But I DID go down, [eh]? I did go down.’ (from a monologue by actress Rossy de Palma, used in the song ‘PRESO (Cap. 6: Clausura)’ by singer Rosalía)

In the analysis presented here, where the DM is unmistakably linking the whole speech act in the anchor with the update, this ratifying use is explained: the Speaker deploys DM *eh* to inhibit the non-acceptance of the anchor by the Addressee.

6.3 Cross-dialectal variation

In this dissertation I have focused on Peninsular Spanish *si* and *no*: although both markers appear in, as far as I know, all Spanish varieties, the conditions of use are probably different from variety to variety. This is not surprising, since the use of DMs is sometimes a defining characteristic of certain dialectal varieties of

languages, e.g. the use of the DM *eh* in Canadian English.⁵

In the Spanish literature as a whole, the DM that has been most prominently discussed is *eh* (Montañez Mesas, 2015). Besides the studies focusing on different Peninsular varieties, there are studies on the use of *eh* as a *control de contacto* ‘contact check’ in Chilean Spanish (San Martín Núñez, 2011), as a multifunctional marker in Dominican Spanish (Roggia, 2012), and as a hesitation marker in Sanjuanero Spanish (Graham, 2013). Regarding *no*, it has been most often studied as a mitigating device both in Peninsular Spanish and in Mexican Spanish (Félix-Brasdefer, 2004a), as well as in Puerto Rican, Dominican, and Mexican institutional settings (Flores-Ferrán, 2017). A wide cross-varietal comparison of DM *no* has not been conducted as far as I know, with the exception of Uclés Ramada (2018) which compares the use of mitigating control checks (*‘marcadores de control de contacto’*) in Peninsular Spanish and Mexican Spanish in interview settings. An interesting future research avenue would be to compare Caribbean varieties of Spanish with Peninsular varieties, as these two varieties use very different prosodic contours to mark polar questions (Beckman et al., 2002).

6.4 Illocutionary differences between evaluative and non-evaluative assertions

There is a debate in the literature regarding the differences between what I have called evaluative and non-evaluative predicates at the lexical level, but as Beltrama (2018) notes, much less has been said of differences at the illocutionary level. In his paper, he reports the results of two experiments where participants rated responses to assertions (evaluative and non-evaluative) and polar questions. In the first experiment, they rated how confirmation, denial, and silence were judged. In the second experiment, the participants rated the naturalness of disagreement with a denial of an assertion (evaluative vs non-evaluative) and a polar question. On the basis of these experiments, Beltrama concludes that the illocutionary behaviour of

⁵Of course, *eh* appears in other varieties of English, most notably in New Zealand English (Meyerhoff, 1994; Stubbe and Holmes, 1995; Vine and Marsden, 2016; Schweinberger, 2018).

evaluative assertions is different from that of non-evaluative assertions, and that their effect on discourse falls somewhere between the effect of a non-evaluative assertion and a polar question. Beltrama's experiments show that denials are rated as less disruptive by speakers. Specifically regarding the effect of evaluative assertions, he claims that evaluative assertions do not result in an update of the CG with p in the absence of an overt response.

The work in this dissertation is further evidence that there is indeed an illocutionary difference between evaluative and non-evaluative assertions, shown by the effect of DM *no* on evaluative assertions, and its co-occurrence with only one type of evaluative assertion (namely, those that are ambiguous between a 'general' reading and a 'Speaker-as-judge' reading). In fact, the use of DM *no* can be seen as a way of avoiding this last effect (not updating the CG until a response is given). The use of DMs, in addition to possible replies, can therefore be used to investigate the different illocutionary effects of different types of utterance.

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