Abstract

In contrast to existing geopolitical, diplomatic and financial studies, this dissertation applies the tools of cultural history to investigate the genesis of the 1894 Franco-Russian alliance, from the French perspective. Drawing on a broad range of sources spanning the textual, audiovisual and material domains - many hitherto unexplored - it argues that after France’s humiliating 1871 defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, a significant cadre of extra-governmental actors began to promote and enable the move by the early Third Republic to forge an alliance with Russia, considered by many to be an improbable ally. These actors engineered a radical reframing of attitudes towards Russia between 1871 and 1901, despite the substantial obstacles of diametrically opposed governments, entrenched stereotypes stemming from Napoléon's 1812 invasion of Russia and the Crimean War of 1854-1856, and French Catholic antipathy towards Russian repression of the uprisings in Poland in 1830 and in 1863. To forge an alliance, considerable geopolitical amnesia would be required; a new "politics of imagination" would be necessary, with a politics of persuasion to set it in place.

Spurred by chronic government instability and the lack of directional foreign policy as the new Republic struggled to achieve its political equilibrium, and enabled by the evolving social, cultural and political structures that it unleashed, pro-alliance actors exemplified an engaged polity whose efforts targeted both the government and the public as they disseminated positive representations to present Russia as a worthy partner for France. Operating within the academic, literary, publishing, lobbyist, financial, entertainment, entrepreneurial and religious spheres, they worked either to counter anti-Russian tropes, to facilitate French loans to Russia as an inducement to alliance, to promote an alliance agenda, or to harness alliance popularity to their domestic social agendas. Above all, to enable the goals of "popular diplomacy" and inclusionary politics, pro-alliance elites employed a vast range of traditional and new mass media. Contributing to government decision-making and to wider public opinion, their actions
demonstrated the intersection of domestic politics with foreign policy decisions, while helping to shape the political culture of the early Third Republic.
Lay Summary

This dissertation investigates the establishment of a momentous international military alliance in France, the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894. It argues that after France’s 1871 humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, as the new Third Republic grappled with fears of further war with Germany and with domestic political instability, non-governmental elites in the academic, publishing, lobbyist, financial, entertainment, entrepreneurial and religious sectors worked to promote and enable the alliance with Russia, just as early democratic politics came into play. Unlike existing studies, this study employs the tools of cultural history to explore how these elites worked to reframe traditionally negative images of Russia, a former enemy, between 1871 and 1901. By examining the key social and media mechanisms they employed to reframe and to disseminate positive representations of Russia, the study reveals a public alliance consensus in the lead up to the catastrophe of 1914.
Preface

This dissertation is a completely original, independent work by Mary Carol Matheson
Table of Contents

Abstract........................................................................................................................................... ii
Lay Summary ..................................................................................................................................... iv
Preface.................................................................................................................................................. v
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. vi
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................... ix
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. x
Dedication ............................................................................................................................................. xiii
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1: Conceiving the Alliance: The Quest for National Security in the Aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War ................................................................. 31
  1.1 Reasons against and for the alliance, in Russia and in France .............................................. 35
  1.2 French domestic politics and the fashioning of the alliance .............................................. 52
  1.3 Opposition to the alliance in France ................................................................................. 61

Chapter 2: Promoting an Alliance with Russia: Prominent Elites Initiate a Nascent Civic Consensus ......................................................................................................................... 71
  2.1 Elite public opinion and foreign policy in France ................................................................. 73
  2.2 Elite opinion versus popular support ................................................................................ 78
  2.3 The role of elites in alliance promotion ............................................................................. 88

Chapter 3: Publicizing Russia: Building Widespread Alliance Interest and Support via Print and Press ................................................................................................................................. 114
3.1 Books: rehabilitating vestigial negative stereotypes of Russia by depicting it as a modernizing European and imperial power, a cultural leader, a Christian nation and a guarantor of peace ................................................................. 118

3.2 Periodicals: echoing the depictions of books ................................................................. 135

3.3 Newspapers: disseminating knowledge of Russian affairs, creating/reflecting alliance support and encouraging government action ................................................................. 141

Chapter 4: Describing Russia: Engaging Wider Public Interest and Support via Popular Literature ................................................................. 161

4.1 Fiction: normalizing Russian social groups and emphasizing Russia as a civilizing force of empire ................................................................. 166

4.2 Travel writing: naturalizing Russia's land- and cityscapes, its empire and its social and ethnic groups ................................................................. 179

Chapter 5: Valorizing Russian Imperialism and Strength: Paris Theatrical Productions, Expositions universelles, Exhibits and Events Showcasing Virtual Travel to Russia and its Empire ................................................................. 199

5.1 Theatrical productions: Michel Strogoff (1880), Skobelev (1888) and others........ 207

5.2 Russia at the Expositions universelles: 1878, 1889 and 1900 ......................... 223

5.3 Exhibits and Events: Popular displays at the Musée Grévin (1881-1896) and elite events including the Russian Exposition ethnographique et hippique (1895) ................. 234

Chapter 6: Affirming the Alliance: Production and Consumption of Material Culture ... 242

6.1 Political material culture: contexts, themes and functions ......................... 246

6.2 Pro-alliance bibelots (souvenirs and novelties), domestic products and toys........ 256

6.3 Pro-alliance communicative items: postcards and song sheets ......................... 268
Chapter 7: Extolling Russia as Family: Harnessing the Alliance to Promote Domestic Social Agendas via New and Existing Media ................................................................. 287

7.1 Emerging media and emerging readers .................................................................................. 289

7.2 Winning Catholics over to the alliance with Orthodox Russia during calls for a Catholic "ralliement" to the Republic .................................................................................. 294

7.3 Linking the alliance with the domestic issues of depopulation and Republican education .................................................................................................................. 314

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 338

Figures ....................................................................................................................................... 357

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 366
List of Figures

Figure 1: Notre Petit-Père S.M. le Tzar Nicolas II". *Le Rire*, 28 août 1897................. 357
Figure 2: "L'Équilibre Européen. Un contrepoids suffisant à la triple alliance." *Le Grelot*,
8 octobre 1893........................................................................................................................................... 358
Figure 3: "Allons-nous en gens de la noce (Hymne russe)". *Le Grelot*, 29 octobre 1893.
........................................................................................................................................................................ 359
Figure 4: "Théâtre du Châtelet: *Michel Strogoff". Advertising poster, circa 1891. ........ 360
Figure 5: "Adieux de la France au Tsar". Song sheet, 1894...................................................... 361
Figure 6: “Alliance!”. *Le Petit Journal Supplément Illustré*, 12 septembre 1897.............. 362
Figure 7: "Le retour du Président: À la Chambre de commerce de Dunquerque." *Le Petit
Journal Supplément Illustré*, 12 septembre 1897.............................................................. 363
Figure 8: "L'Empereur de Russie sur son lit de mort". *Le Petit Journal Supplément
Illustré*, 11 novembre 1894................................................................................................................. 364
Figure 9: "La tsarine allaitant la grande-duchesse Olga". *Le Petit Journal Supplément
Illustré*, 8 décembre 1895. .................................................................................................................. 365
Acknowledgements

It must be admitted: a Luddite am I. Yet ironically the present project could not have been achieved without the vast resources of the Internet, which a person of my years may yet call a new technology. My first debt is therefore to the anonymous archivists, technicians and collectors, both institutional and individual, who scanned the documents or photographed the extra-literary materials that I consulted for my research. Credit is particularly due to workers at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France who have hand-ironed and scanned more than five million periodical pages over the past ten years.

Beyond the above, the extensive collections at the University of British Columbia served as a starting point for my journey, while the University Interlibrary Loan staff cheerfully and diligently sought out key materials from afar. In Paris, I benefited from helpful assistance at the Bibliothèque Forney, at the Bibliothèque de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris, and at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. In addition, the Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris offered a warm welcome and proved to be an inspiring venue in which to work. In Rouen, staff at the Musée National de l'Éducation kindly accommodated my arrival on short notice, searching out materials in advance and suggesting new ones when I arrived. In Chicago, the Newberry Library collections motivated key aspects of my research, as did those of the University of Chicago's Regenstein Library and of the Chicago Art Institute. Finally, in Montréal, the McGill University Rare Books collection provided access to several important works.

I am deeply appreciative of the generous funding from several sources which has helped to realize this project. Langley School District first awarded me an Education Leave Grant to pursue my Master's degree, laying the foundation for this dissertation. Subsequently, a four-year S.S.H.R.C. Doctoral Fellowship (2009-2012), as well as U.B.C. PhD Tuition and Fellowship Awards (2009-2012), and Faculty of Arts Graduate Awards (2012-2015), enabled further studies.

On both the professional and personal fronts, I remain indebted to those individuals who have helped me to maintain mind, soul and body for the past ten years and more. In the U.B.C. History Department, two faculty members have been outstanding mentors since I first began my Master’s degree. My deepest debt is to dissertation co-supervisor Anne Gorsuch, for her warmth, generosity of spirit and unstinting encouragement and support. Irreverent and perspicacious, Anne has been an unparalleled mentor since I enrolled in her undergraduate course. I would also like to thank Michel Ducharme, who as second reader of my Master’s thesis encouraged me to plumb the primary sources, and who has remained a constant source of advice and bonhomie throughout the writing of this dissertation. In addition, dissertation co-supervisor Bob Brain has contributed inspired insights and enthusiasm, along with congenial warmth, to guide me through the multiple bi-ways of fin-de-siècle France. In particular, he has always challenged me to consider the larger questions. I am grateful to Chris Friedrichs, the third member of my committee, for his helpful feedback and encouragement, and for the inspiration provided by his love of teaching. Beyond these individuals, several other faculty members have contributed to my project. I would like to thank Tamara Myers for her early support, Eagle Glassheim for his ongoing and positive willingness to assist, and Joy Dixon and Carla Nappi for encouraging me to read and think. And finally in the History Department, my thanks are due to Graduate Program Administrator Jason Wu for his efficient help.

Additionally, I wish to thank my former colleagues Gillian Judson, Rachel Kurrein and Luisa Bertoni, who as the ultimate in collegial role models provided me with inspiration par excellence. Gillian, who has experienced a similar academic journey to mine, provided wise counsel when I needed it the most. The ongoing support of Len Gurski, valued colleague, stalwart cheerleader and friend, is also deeply appreciated. Without his technical assistance too,
I would truly have been lost. A caring and perceptive Estelle Dufresne has spent over a decade patiently listening to my academic enthusiasms, while Stephen Hay, warm-hearted comrade-in-books, has also lent a listening ear. On the health front, I remain immeasurably grateful for the skill and care of doctors Edward Carden, Pamela Squire, David Hunt and William McDonald, as well as that of occupational therapist Clare Lakes and physiotherapist Marlene Noble. I owe a very special debt to Marlene, without whom this project could quite literally not have been completed. A further debt is owed to Dr. Else Larsen for her compassionate care, and to Sarah Knitter of U.B.C. Access and Diversity for her steady and understanding support.

I would also like to thank Maryam Mohammadi and Jessica Sterman for their efficient technical assistance in realizing the final manuscript and my defence presentation. And at the end of this dissertation journey, deep thanks are due to external examiner Dr. Robert Nye, who offered invaluable encouragement as well as perceptive insights and suggestions for improving my work, as well as to Dr. Sima Godfrey and Dr. Merje Kuss. Finally, I would like to express my love and gratitude to my mother, who encouraged my love for learning, and to my sister Shirley, who has been there to cheer me on.

Carol Matheson

March, 2018

Vancouver, British Columbia
Dedication

To my students, who have taught me much.
Introduction

On August 31, 1897, an exuberant tumult of church bells, military music, song and declamation rang out across France, heralding Tsar Nicholas II's first public affirmation that he would honor the 1894 Franco-Russian alliance signed by his father Alexander III. Yet in the lead-up to this momentous military agreement, how had France reversed its traditional enmity towards Russia, evident in the 1812 invasion by Napoléon Bonaparte, in the Crimean War of 1854-1856, and in vehement French Catholic opposition to Russia's repression of the Polish uprisings in 1830 and 1863? My dissertation reveals that after France's 1871 humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, individuals and groups in the non-governmental arena first began to portray Russia, the former enemy "other", as a potential military brother for France. Their actions reflected fears of renewed German aggression, for with the consolidation and growth of the German state, added to an ongoing domestic depopulation crisis, they held the future survival of the nation to be at stake. Significantly, in a "triumph for popular diplomacy",¹ these non-governmental initiatives contributed to official overtures made by the Third Republic towards Russia in the early 1890s, and concomitant with alliance ratification, helped to cement alliance approval among the wider public. Small entrepreneurs produced a significant corpus of pro-alliance material culture at that time, while both non-governmental and governmental figures continued to promote the agreement with Russia by utilizing it as a platform to publicize their key domestic agendas surrounding secularization, depopulation and education. Ultimately the turn towards Russia would serve to reduce France's isolation on the continent, engendering dynamic consequences on the world stage for decades to come. Indeed, its very inception appears to have laid down cultural roots still visible in bilateral relations today.

The early Third Republic was self-consciously engaged in pioneering a new inclusivity of politics during the fin de siècle, and this provides a singular historical reason for exploring the extra-governmental dimensions of its rapprochement with Russia. My study is thus a cultural history of alliance-making that examines the intersection of domestic politics with foreign policy, a focus which provides fresh insights beyond those gained from the existing geopolitical, diplomatic and financial histories of the Franco-Russian alliance which are discussed below. The central argument of my dissertation is that elite actors, primarily in circles which included academics, authors, publishers, financiers, lobbyists, and entertainment entrepreneurs, first promoted the alliance in France from the mid-1870s through to the 1890s. This entailed the dissemination of a consciously-framed series of positive representations of Russia, designed to contribute to a politics of persuasion aimed at both the government and the wider public. To override entrenched negative stereotypes and opinion concerning Russia, and subsequently to promote various domestic agendas by linking these with the alliance once it was signed, pro-alliance actors sought elite support via the book and periodical presses, and popular public support via mass media ranging from newspapers to specialist materials for youth. Efforts by some non-governmental and governmental actors to buttress their domestic social campaigns by invoking popular allusions to the alliance continued even through 1901.

As a shaky Third Republic emerged in the aftermath of the 1871 defeat, a persistent lack of government stability and directional foreign policy created a political vacuum of sorts within which these elite actors could move. Their emphasis on political consensus reflected the basis upon which the Republic had been founded, and their prominence reflected the social, professional and cultural changes unleashed within an early democratic landscape. The emergence of pioneering fin-de-siècle mass media forms coincided with this, generating a mass media culture which in its intersection with a growing and engaged political culture substantially aided their efforts.
Immediately after the Franco-Prussian War, elite individuals and groups began to harness traditional media forms to convey a positive reframing of the qualities which Russia possessed that could be seen to support a partnership with France. Their portrayals focused on several overlapping themes: Russia’s status as a European power, rather than its traditional descriptor as a "barbarian" Asiatic nation, its military strength and imperial might, its cultural production in literature and music, its culte or Christian ideals, including projected leadership for Continental peace, and its potential to be a membre de famille for France. When examining these representations, my dissertation highlights the vectors of information, the modes of mediation, and the themes and the framing devices that pro-alliance actors employed. The study extends from 1871, when interest in Russia first began to emerge, to 1901, when Tsar Nicolas II made a second official visit to France. It draws on media of significant momentum and reach, including the academic, general and Catholic press. In addition, it considers ubiquitous popular representations concerning Russia and/or the alliance conveyed through travel and fiction writing, theatrical productions, expositions and events, plus extra-literary sources in the visual, material and auditory domains. Although an emphasis on Paris appears throughout, the celebration of Russia and the alliance became a national phenomenon, as will be seen.

Why did such widespread promotion of Russia as an ally come about? Within a pan-European cultural context marked by increasing nationalism and imperialism, key social and political factors unique to France contributed to the singular fin-de-siècle landscape that enabled alliance interest. In reaction to the crushing 1871 defeat and perceptions of an ongoing German threat, anxiety among elites concerning France’s relatively low population numbers ballooned, continuing even to post-World War II. The nationalist projects of the Third Republic rested on this persistent hantise, but also on a fragile political foundation, as anti-Republican forces sought to re-establish a more traditional form of government. The latter would play into support for the alliance, as will be described. Also unique to France, subsequent to the relaxation of
press censorship in 1881, multiple newspapers and periodicals reflected a turbulent and engaged domestic political landscape, now reflecting an early democratic culture.

Contributing to the lack of foreign policy direction in the early Republic, the large number of elected representatives in the Chamber of Deputies - ranging from five hundred and thirty-three to five hundred and eighty-five for a population of approximately thirty-eight million - encouraged dissension to fester. Endemic instability marked by cabinet defeats, in addition to crises, anarchist attacks and scandals embroiling military, financial and political actors, absorbed the Republic's leaders during its early years. At times these events deterred Russian interest in an alliance too, as seen in the late 1880s with the rise in popularity of General Georges Boulanger, a high-stakes challenger to Republican government itself. A further significant domestic preoccupation was that of separating Church from State, not accomplished until 1905. All the while there remained France's continuing isolation amidst Continental powers hostile to its republican ethos, as well as demands from revanchistes (a vocal minority seeking to avenge the nation's defeat) to re-annex the territories in Alsace-Lorraine seized by Germany in 1871. Given these many problems and preoccupations, the stage was set for extra-governmental groups to play a major role in facilitating positive attitudes towards an alliance with Russia.

In Russia, meanwhile, unique historical factors were also at play, including the sense of change ushered in by the 1861 emancipation of the serfs, along with other reforms initiated under Tsar Alexander II. Significantly, French actors could point to these as examples of political


progress to validate rapprochement. While the Russian press remained liable to heavy censorship, deepening anti-German sentiment and strident pan-Slav politics preoccupied powerful figures including Mikhail Katkov, the editor of the influential Moscow Gazette who after 1886 campaigned for an alliance with France. Like France, by the late 1880s Russia faced increasing isolation in the European theatre. In particular, decisions taken by German chancellor Otto von Bismarck had halted the trade of Russian bonds on the Berlin stock exchange during the mid-1880s, driving Russia to seek French loans for industrial and commercial expansion central to its modernization. A series of loans from France thus began in 1888. Also key, after Wilhelm II's accession led to Bismarck's resignation in 1890, Germany's foreign policy increasingly de-emphasized Russian ties and the new Kaiser allowed the secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia to lapse. Isolated, facing ongoing Austrian and British hostility to its expansionist agenda, and in continuing need of capital, Russia turned to France as an alliance partner in 1894. Despite the sense of the uncertainty generated by the unexpected death of Alexander III just months later, Nicolas II publicly reaffirmed the alliance in 1897, unleashing national jubilation in France.

The Franco-Russian alliance thus represents a unique relationship born of both time and place. On the French side, a broad political consensus was required to surmount the substantial

4 The perennial idea of Russia as an "apprentice" or "learner" in European civilization is discussed in Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 98, Chapter 3.

5 This was in retaliation against a Russian ukase targeting German landholders in Russia. Burkhard Asmuss, "The German Empire in Europe", Deutsches Historisches Museum, http://www.dhm.de/ENGLISH/ausstellungen/bismarck.162.htm

6 The 1887 Reinsurance Treaty between Russia and Germany was crafted by Bismarck after the collapse of the League of the Three Emperors, i.e. of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Reinsurance Treaty required Russia and Germany to maintain neutrality if either went to war, with the exception of a war between Germany and France or Russia and Austria-Hungary. Patricia Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 111.
political barriers posed by linking a democratic Republic with an autocratic state, as well as to surmount additional entrenched negative stereotypes concerning Russia. To understand the process by which this fin-de-siècle reframing of Russia occurred, I situate my analysis at the crossroads of several fields of scholarship, among them representations of the "other", alliance formation, the role of culture in international relations, the interplay of extra-literary and textual media, the roles of fiction, travel and international expositions in bilateral relations, and the history of religion in domestic politics. I also engage with specific social and cultural currents at play in France, at times linking these with similar developments in Russia and on the pan-European scene. My focus rests on French actors throughout, and while some individual Russian actors do feature in the discussion, I concentrate on those interacting with alliance promoters while sojourning in France. Some limitations to my study do apply: while the analysis considers elite actors ranging from academic go-betweens to Roman Catholic leaders, it reveals little concerning actions by the French military, who strongly supported the alliance but who moved in less public venues than the actors considered here. In addition, it does not focus in depth on the political and diplomatic actors involved in formalizing the alliance, as this information is readily available in existing works.

---

7. Pro-military bias no doubt percolated among all the elites described in Chapter 2, but it is in Juliette Adam's circle that this became most visible, with military figures "omnipresent" in her pro-alliance periodical La Nouvelle Revue. Suggesting a circumstantial relationship between military and financial interests related to the Russian loans, a brother of the army Chief of Staff General Boisdeffre worked in the state Treasury. Yet while the financial underpinnings of the alliance have been studied, little information exists concerning the relationships among financial, military and other elites. Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Juliette Adam 1836-1936: l'instigatrice (Paris: Harmattan, 2002), 191. The classic study of economic matters in the alliance remains René Girault, "Emprunts russes et investissements français en Russie", Le Mouvement Social 80 (juillet-septembre 1972): 49-58; more recently, Jennifer Siegel, For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the Service of Tsars and Commissars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). On Boisdeffre's brother, see "Informations", Le Figaro, 18 juillet 1893, 3. http://gallica.bnf.fr

8. The most important recent works are George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon, 1981); Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Une Alliance franco-russe: la France, la Russie, et l'Europe au tournant du siècle dernier (Brussels: Bruylant,
When considering representations of the "other", my dissertation diverges from existing scholarship which has emphasized invariable European descriptions of Russia as a despotic, backward power.9 Iver Neumann, for example, did not consider the singularity of the Franco-Russian relationship in his otherwise excellent study which highlighted a continued "antagonistic othering" of Russia, an enduring practice also noted by Michael Williams.10 Marshall Poe, meanwhile, when perceptively tracing the genesis and propagation of negative stereotypes concerning Russia across Europe, confined his research to the Early Modern era.11 Beyond this, my dissertation counters arguments that Russia served as France's negative or exotic counterpart, notably in studies by Nanci Christine Brookes and Ezequiel Adamovsky.12 Rather, the analysis here rests on the contention by Daniel-Henri Pageaux that images of the "other" may illustrate a range of attitudes, including philie.13


10 Neumann's study examined European ideas concerning Russia from the sixteenth through to the twentieth century. Neumann, Uses of the Other, Chapter 3. Michael Williams argued that Russia continued to be seen as a "counter-civilizational" force or an "apprentice" after World War II. Michael Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of Security (New York: Routledge, 2007), 3, 5, 63, 78-89.


Added to considerations of the "other", in terms of international relations scholarship I foreground the cultural history of an "asymmetric alliance", i.e. one negotiated between unlikely partners,\textsuperscript{14} in this instance between an early Republic and a dynastic autocracy. Specifically, the dissertation reveals how Russia was re-imagined in a national political moment marked by ongoing fears of war in France. Established in 1870, France's Third Republic - a third attempt since the Revolution of 1789 - would ultimately seek a broad public consensus on foreign policy decisions as its perceived survival depended on containing German power. This consensus was sought particularly after the rise to majority by the so-called Opportunist (center-left) republicans in 1879, whose first goal had been to solidify public support.\textsuperscript{15} During the first decade of the Third Republic, however - the period known as the "Republic of the dukes",\textsuperscript{16} when traditional, monarcho-inclined elites remained in power - I argue that the move towards alliance consensus began in the extra-governmental arena; indeed, actors in this arena continued their involvement through 1901, contributing to the dissemination of pro-alliance media among the wider public. Intriguingly, building consensus around the alliance as a foreign policy initiative might echo the "nation-in-arms" ethos of the French Revolution, and also the citizen

\textsuperscript{14} Benjamin O. Fordham, "Trade and Asymmetric Alliances", \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 47:6 (2010), 685. Naoko Shibusawa has similarly examined how such an apparently contradictory relationship was initiated by the United States towards Japan during the Cold War. Rather than the former barbarian enemy, Japan was now portrayed in racial, gendered and terms, i.e. as a non-white and pliant female entity or as a child-like developing nation requiring American guidance. These new representations were promoted by leaders in the occupying forces, and disseminated among the American public by journalists, film producers and private groups. Naoko Shibusawa, \textit{America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{15} Alan Forrest, \textit{The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 134.

\textsuperscript{16} Mayeur and Reberioux, \textit{The Third Republic}, 3, 5.
subscription in France that helped to pay the massive war indemnity exacted by Prussia in 1871.17

Regarding the formation of alliances in general, while an extensive corpus of international relations studies does exist, rather than considering important domestic influences authors have tended to focus on realist balance of power concerns. Formulaic calculations regarding the rationale for and the probability, strength and longevity of alliances, along with their possible economic dimensions, remain a hallmark of such studies, with the Franco-Russian alliance most often examined as one case among many.18 Additionally, although the Franco-Russian pact has been profiled as the paradigmatic "balancing" alliance negotiated by nations seeking protection against a perceived external threat (in this instance that of the Triple Alliance),19 this theoretical approach does not take into account its complexity and evolution. Indeed, as Chapter 1 explains, although the paramount inducement for France to seek an alliance lay in the ongoing perception of a German threat, a pressing early motivation for Russia was access to French investment capital. Somewhat applicable to the latter, Paul Papayoanou has described alliances as a function of economic interdependence, while Glenn Snyder has argued that alliances may involve changes in relative bargaining power over time.20

17 The five billion franc indemnity, more than twice the national budget, was the "largest transfer in history"; forty percent was paid by public investors. Jean Garrigues, La République des hommes d'affaires, 1870-1900 (France: Aubier, 1997), 115, 117; Rachel Chrastil, Organizing for War: France 1870-1914 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 61; Michael B. Devereux and Gregor W. Smith, "Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian War Indemnity", Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (June, 2007): 2378-2379.


20 Paul Papayoanou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing and War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Snyder, Alliance Politics, 261.
Among scholars who have largely focused on the international dimensions of the Franco-Russian alliance, political scientist Patricia Weitsman has termed it the "first exclusively balancing alliance" of the era.\(^{21}\) Weitsman noted several forms that alliances may take depending on perceived levels of threat: under low threat, specific limited agreements between nations can serve to mediate conflict; under moderate threat, alliances are employed to "tether and contain" enemies; and under high threat, balancing alliances oppose enemy blocks, as in the case of the Franco-Russian pact. Driving the latter, as both Weitsman and Snyder have described, was the threat to Russian interests posed by Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, with Austria-Hungary challenging Russian initiatives in the Balkans and Great Britain countering Russia’s interests in central Asia. France, meanwhile, held that Great Britain threatened its imperial ambitions not only in Asia but in North Africa, evidenced by the British-led Mediterranean Agreements signed by Italy, Spain and Austria, in part to contain Russian power.\(^{22}\)

Beyond these balance of power concerns, some authors have concentrated on the specific military and economic dimensions of the Franco-Russian alliance. Snyder, for example, while assessing the importance of territorial and physical security in alliance politics, pointed to the involvement of French and Russian military leaders and to Bismarck’s "economic bullying" of Russia as key factors leading to the alliance.\(^{23}\) Several important pre-World War II studies also focus on military matters, including those by Georges Michon and Boris Nolde.\(^{24}\) Meanwhile a

\(^{21}\) Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 98, 112.

\(^{22}\) Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 15, 110, 103, 105-107, 111; Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies", 180; Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 111, 114.

\(^{23}\) Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 5, 110, 137.

more contemporary treatment of the financial and economic aspects of the alliance may be found in studies by René Girault, D.N. Collins, D.W. Spring and Alfred Conlin. Among the latter, Girault's work is considered the classic source.

When considering the process of alliance formation itself, historians tend to focus on key individuals and the role of alliances in leading to war. Diplomatic and political history are thus the foci of the two major post-World War II studies of the Franco-Russian alliance: the first by American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, and the second by international relations scholar Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff. Both authors outlined key governmental factors and events leading to the alliance, with Kennan emphasizing political matters and Hogenhuis-

---

Seliverstoff adding a more nuanced portrayal of the various intermediaries and publicists involved.\textsuperscript{26} Kennan’s study was particularly strong on government actors in France, as well as the French loans to Russia, while Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff concentrated on opinions and actions concerning the alliance from the Russian perspective, as well as the many roadblocks to alliance confirmation. Recently, Faith Hillis has added to their work by examining the influence of pan-Slavist Russian aristocrats on pro-alliance circles in France.\textsuperscript{27}

Little scholarship, however, has considered the process of alliance building against the backdrop of a particular national political culture.\textsuperscript{28} Although some studies focus on the cultural production that may be employed by states as an instrument of power,\textsuperscript{29} my dissertation examines non-statist initiatives designed to help forge cultural links between unlikely partners, using Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic’s metaphor of "relationships" as opposed to "relations". Chakrabarti Pasic contended that a European world view may be disseminated and shared between states via cultural values associated with ideas such as imperialism and Christianity,

\textsuperscript{26} Kennan, The Fateful Alliance; Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Une Alliance franco-russe. See also Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order.


\textsuperscript{28} One 1996 study noted that the Franco-Russian alliance had yet to be studied by cultural historians. Jeffrey Hardin, "From Diplomacy to Culture: A Historiography of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894". Master’s Thesis (San Jose, TX: San Jose State University, 1996). A more recent study has examined sources including postcards, souvenirs and domestic objects, as well as illustrated newspapers, to commemorate the alliance in Russia and in France. Catherine Hamel, "La commémoration de l'alliance franco-russe: La création d'une culture matérielle populaire, 1890-1914". Mémoire de Maîtrise (Montréal, Québec: Université Concordia, 2016).

and that non-state institutions often set a contextual stage for these imagined commonalities.\textsuperscript{30} In developing the Franco-Russian relationship, elite French actors indeed emphasized shared values with Russia in the areas of imperialism and Christianity, and they added others; as will be seen, the sociability engendered by groups around voluntary associations, universities and publishing networks served as a potential determinant here.

In choosing to foreground Chakrabarti Pasic's framework of relationships, my analysis broadens the number of actors involved in creating a "politics of imagination" concerning Russia.\textsuperscript{31} A cultural history of the Franco-Russian alliance drawn from the French perspective thus foregrounds the involvement of extra-governmental actors in creating an atmosphere in which the alliance could be envisioned and established, linking my dissertation in a peripheral manner to recent studies of British history that have demonstrated a strong cultural interest in Russia during the era of the 1907 Anglo-Russian accord.\textsuperscript{32} Additionally, it admits the examination of multiple textual and extra-textual sources rich in depicting French cultural imaginings of Russia, ranging from traditional books and newspapers to theatrical and other media. Unique constituencies are also considered within the general public, notably those of the Catholic establishment, of women and of youth. Pro-alliance actors encouraged French children to become intimately involved in this new partnership, as they exchanged poetry, letters and


\textsuperscript{31} As Peter Katzenstein observed when referring to the political manipulation of imagination, "We don't have categories for imagination in International Relations, which is a big mistake". Quoted in P. Schouten, "Theory Talk #15: Peter Katzenstein on anti-Americanism, Analytical Eclecticism and Regional Power". \textit{Theory Talks}, 28-08-2008.

gifts with their Russian amis, and they might constitute a significant public for relations over the long term.

With respect to the pro-alliance actors themselves, extra-governmental debate on national security in France emerged immediately following the 1871 defeat. In 1872, for example, *La Revue politique et littéraire*, a publication destined for university circles, declared that responsibility for the nation's future rested on the development of an informed, judicious public opinion. A turn towards Russia soon began to characterize elite opinion, and prominent scholars have credited this for pushing calls for an alliance through multiple changes in government. Thus their involvement points to a successful process of domestic coalition-making to address an issue of national security. Although international relations specialist Ole Holsti has contended that a correspondence between foreign policy and public attitudes does not imply causality, because leaders may directly influence the public or they may maneuver events to persuade public opinion, Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued for the existence of a dialectic between state and extra-governmental coalitions that helps to shape foreign policy.


The latter applies to elite alliance promotion in fin-de-siècle France, which became evident well before official government overtures were made to Russia.

My dissertation considers the role of this engaged polity, beginning with several academic go-betweens who traveled to Russia and subsequently published influential accounts, and continuing with the other elite individuals and groups involved in alliance promotion. By highlighting academics, I diverge from the studies by Kennan and Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, and from Hillis’s focus on a small circle of Russian pan-Slavist “defenders of the autocracy” who promoted the alliance in France.37 Like Kennan, Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff and Hillis, however, I do discuss the circle of writers, political figures and businessmen in Paris named Les Amis de la Russie, led by Juliette Adam who had launched a pro-alliance periodical, La Nouvelle Revue, in 1879. Moving beyond this, I examine further alliance support among literati, high-profile partisans and revanchistes; as noted, the latter group hoped that Russia might help France to exact revenge against Germany by retaking Alsace and Lorraine. Although this was by no means a unanimous aspiration among alliance proponents, support for revanche was particularly strong by the late 1880s among ultra-nationalists who supported General Georges Boulanger as well as Paul Déroulède’s Ligue des patriotes.38

In terms of chronology, the chapters of my dissertation explore how influential French authors and publishers participated in the early move towards rapprochement during the 1870s, to be followed by a wide variety of cultural entrepreneurs from the 1880s through the 1890s, all of whom created materials that could encourage widespread public support for an alliance with

37 Hillis, “The 'Franco-Russian Marseillaise'”, 44.

Russia. I demonstrate that after the significant academic embrace of Russia in the 1870s, pro-Russian sentiment began to emerge in the book, fiction and newspaper presses and in the theatrical community particularly during the 1880s, contributing to an output that was parlayed throughout France. In Paris, entrepreneurial elites extended this cultural output via exhibits and events showcasing Russia. Subsequently during the 1890s, numerous small producers created an array of material items designed to reflect and to encourage alliance enthusiasm among consumers, while at the same time elite actors continued to promote the alliance by linking it to their campaigns to address the resonant domestic issues of secularization, depopulation and education. Overall, as the number of groups affirming the idea of the alliance grew ever larger, so too did the publics involved, reflecting the intersection of mass and political culture.

Together the pro-alliance constituencies above operated in a unique political, cultural and religious context within which the Franco-Russian alliance emerged. This leads to intriguing questions. What was the significance of creating a widespread popular embrace of Russia? Given the involvement of extra-governmental actors and of an apparently enthusiastic public, might France be seen as a leader in the democratization of its foreign policy? Can the 1894 alliance be viewed as a forerunner of any future alliances in this respect? And what significance might this widespread domestic involvement have held for the long term?

Beyond considering pro-alliance actors, to develop my overall argument concerning the importance of mass media in promoting the alliance cause, I examine multiple sources ranging from textual to material, many of them ephemeral indicators of the early Republic’s mass political culture. When analyzing the various media formats employed, a focus on their specific modes of representation and their target audiences helps to ascertain the importance of qualities attributed to Russia to enable a sense of rapprochement. Chapters 3 through 7 are thus organized by the distinctive media which disseminated alliance promotion and support. This also establishes a comparative timeline to document the movement of alliance promotion
from the elite to the popular arena, and from traditional to emerging forms of culture. It further serves to identify key connections among pro-alliance individuals and groups, to examine whether the representational foci and themes they employed were derivative and/or overlapped, and to assess their potential for influencing the public at large.

One key medium for framing representations was that of visual culture, for as Richard Thomson has demonstrated, imagery served as an important conduit for expressing political and social concerns in late nineteenth-century France. Visual sources in particular offer a rich window for studying the alliance, permitting engagement with new questions and the re-opening of others. As Leora Auslander observed, "... Each form of human expression has its unique attributes and capacities; limiting our evidentiary base to one of them - the linguistic - renders us unable to grasp important dimensions of human experience." Additionally, as Ludmilla Jordanova has noted, messages concerning a particular subject may emerge across multiple

39 Thomson, *The Troubled Republic*. See especially Chapter 4, "Always think about it, never discuss it: Imagery and the idea of revanche".


media where "different styles and visual modes co-exist",\textsuperscript{42} observations which lend themselves well to examining the combined saturation of imagery concerning Russia. Among the many \textit{russophile} representations circulating at the time, those in the non-literary domain are particularly relevant due to their unprecedented mass production during the \textit{fin de siècle}; a vast range of "paraliterary" materials highlights the ubiquity of pro-alliance messaging in intriguing ways.\textsuperscript{43} My emphasis here thus diverges from studies which have concentrated on the spectacular nature of the visual and its role in creating an uncritical viewing public, described as a central component of modernity.\textsuperscript{44} Rather it shares a scholarly focus concerned with the role of the visual in the political rhetoric of the Third Republic, as well as that concerned with images specific to French culture.\textsuperscript{45} The discussion that follows emphasizes the latter categories as they relate to the Franco-Russian alliance.

\textsuperscript{42} Jordanova, \textit{The Look of the Past}, 101.


Pro-alliance images also clearly reveal much that was unique in the cultural landscape of France. Framing the new relationship required both inter- and intra-national translation to render a complex Russian empire intelligible to a varied French citizenry, and probing the techniques employed in this provides a unique opportunity to observe cultural practice.\(^\text{46}\) In addition to its unique literary traditions, specific cognitive and symbolic modes of representation were particular to France, rooted in its Catholic and Enlightenment traditions, and blending in the late nineteenth century with an emergent pan-European modernity. Text was frequently supplemented by images; for the elder, the illiterate, or the child, these conveyed relativity through a compelling, culturally-specific rhetoric.

In particular, the large corpus of constructed illustrations described in Chapter 7 may be distinguished from linguistic, spectacular and material modes. During the late nineteenth century, as editors and illustrators married new print technologies with existing pictorial traditions, this had a significant impact on political culture. Michael Burns’s work on handbills publicizing Boulangism and the Dreyfus affair, for example, revealed how "derivative images" were built using "templates" imbued with rhetorical devices from the political and religious past.\(^\text{47}\) Thus although the Franco-Russian alliance was new, illustrations that referenced it often echoed pre-existing practices, exhibiting a sort of "path dependency" of visual conventions and motifs. Constructed images simultaneously relied on and added to a visual "grammar [or] …culturally produced regularity", one that frequently resulted in shared ways of looking in which


viewers might understand how they were being addressed.\(^{48}\) Attending to the possible interpretations of pro-alliance illustrations clearly demands analytical sophistication; investigating the anatomy of the cultural against a backdrop of political, social and economic contexts remains a challenging task.\(^{49}\) Nonetheless, unearthing that which Michel de Certeau termed unique "systems of figuration" provides rewarding results. The key is a "period eye", or the ability to assess the rhetorics of imagery within its specific historical context.\(^{50}\)

Beyond considering representations of the "other", alliance formation, the role of culture in international relations and the interplay of textual and extra-literary media, my dissertation further posits that the concept of virtual travel, while most often applied to film,\(^ {51}\) may be fruitfully applied to travel works and to the fin-de-siècle Paris theatrical productions, expositions and exhibits which were employed to showcase Russia's imperial might and culture. Such media could present a simplified prospectus concerning Russia for a varied French public,


\(^{50}\) The term "period eye" was coined by Michael Baxandall in his *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). Michel de Certeau, "Travel Narratives of the French to Brazil: Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries", in *America in European Consciousness, 1493-1750*, ed. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, 232-238 (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 1995), 324. Research into visual sources has been strong in France at the Universités Paris 1 and 4 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) and 7 (Didérot). At the former, CREDHESS (a branch focused on law, history, economy and "sociology of the social") includes a group studying "Histoire par l'image" in cinema and television. At the Didérot campus, the CEEI (Center for the Study of Text and Image) is active in the field. Together the museums in France have digitized thousands of images, now available on-line, while the Bibliothèque nationale de France offers the digital collection "Histoire par l'image". Meanwhile in Belgium, the Université Catholique de Louvain houses a group called GRIT (Groupe de Recherche sur l'Image et le Texte) which publishes key articles in an on-line journal. Also on-line, the bilingual e-journal *Image [&] Narrative*, has published numerous studies such as the use of images in the popularization of science and science fiction. Finally, the on-line research forum at Cairn.info.com, with partners in France, Belgium and Luxemburg, features articles on visual culture from journals such as *Réseaux* and *Vingtième Siècle*.

demystifying, informing and mythologizing at the same time. By considering the *expositions universelles* as occasions for virtual travel and for acquaintance with Russia as a potential military partner, my analysis departs from scholarship which considers exhibitions as landscapes of commodity and spectacle, or of competitive nationalism.\(^{52}\) Additionally, examining the representations that Russia attempted to project of itself at the 1878, 1889 and 1900 Paris expositions lends a nuanced understanding to events that supplemented pro-alliance promotion by French elites.

Referring to a final field of scholarship, I probe the positive reframing of the Russian Orthodox religion that enabled Catholic support for the alliance in France, beginning with appeals that twinned Catholicism with support for the Republic, the latter in answer to the so-called *ralliement* urged by the Pope during the 1890s.\(^{53}\) Added to these initiatives, key leaders in France’s Roman Catholic establishment, who from the 1880s onward came under attack by the Republic’s secularization initiatives, promoted the notion of a bilateral *famille chrétienne*, one in which Church and State might work in tandem as they did in Russia. Although a vigorous scholarship on European religious history does exist,\(^ {54}\) little work currently considers the role of

---


religion in late nineteenth-century European relations. Nor does an alliance relationship framed in terms of a shared "family" feature in international relations scholarship, beyond the afore-mentioned suggestion of Chakrabarti-Pasic.

By addressing the specific historiographic foci above, in terms of its broader contributions my dissertation aims to add to existing histories of the early Third Republic in France, many of which have considered the alliance in a peripheral manner. Setting the Franco-Russian alliance amidst the more commonly-cited events of the fin de siècle, including crises such as the Dreyfus affair, permits a deeper understanding of important contexts and complexities in the political, military, social and cultural domains. By registering the momentous change in representations of a former enemy, I explore a profound relational shift whose deep roots and historical currents may be visible in the strong bilateral cultural and economic relations which continue to link France and Russia today.


Additionally, this study builds on works on the Early Modern interplay between the two nations, by identifying a small group of Russian actors who encouraged financial, military and cultural ties with France during the *fin de siècle*, and by highlighting those active in transnational exchange. I also place the alliance within the comparative framework of an emerging pan-European modernity, identifying points in common between France and Russia and other parts of Europe which helped to shape how a change in attitudes might be envisioned and achieved. In doing this, I consider a diverse range of shared practices and issues that range from ethnographic typing to Marianism, from increased literacy to the rise of a mass public, and from associational life to nihilist and anarchist threats.

Finally, as previously noted, my dissertation offers a window into alliance formation, proposing a singular case study within an early democracy to amplify the processes which might be involved. It contributes to the understanding of cultural constructions of national identity in international relations by exploring the specific themes and framing devices employed by French elites to represent Russia in the literary, experiential, aural/oral, material and visual domains. As noted, this distinguishes it from the existing historiography of the Franco-Russian alliance which focuses principally on its diplomatic, political or financial history. By placing the alliance within a domestic cultural and political context, the role of actors in the extra-

---


57 Marianism, or the widespread veneration of the Virgin Mary, became a strong religious current in both late nineteenth-century Russia and France; this was paralleled elsewhere in Europe. See Chapter 7.
governmental sphere and their employment of *fin-de-siècle* media ultimately becomes central to the story of how the alliance was conceived and achieved in France.

No dissertation, however, exists without its building blocks. In the field of cultural history, a scattering of authors has examined the attitudes of specific French periodicals towards the alliance, while two authors have explored popular images of Russia in France between 1853 and 1894. These latter studies are particularly useful for considering bilateral relations in the *longue durée* of the nineteenth century. Moving beyond the above, five key works have set a partial backdrop for my study, each focused on the literary field. Charles Corbet first documented the shift in figuration of Russia in the French literary and academic press, moving from enemy to ally across the nineteenth century. Corbet was followed by Marianna Butenschön, who focused on academic publishing about Russia, and Gianni Cariani, who examined an increasing French appreciation for Russian literature and music during the alliance era. Albeit excellent, these works concentrate almost exclusively on elite culture. Meanwhile, Janine Neboit-Mombet and Charlotte Krauss have clearly demonstrated an increased presence of Russian themes in late nineteenth-century French fiction. The former’s study is of particular


relevance because it is the sole work of the five that is concerned with popular culture; the latter, meanwhile, focused on more esoteric fiction.

In terms of the research methodology employed for my dissertation, when considering the various textual, spectacular and extra-literary sources surveyed, I concentrated on unearthing patterns derived from several key questions outlined below. With respect to pro-alliance books, the status of their authors and publishers was taken into consideration, as well as their intended reading audiences. For the periodical and newspaper press, titles were chosen for their particular applicability, whether due to subject matter, political stature, perceived audience and influence, or popular subscription numbers. Among the latter are sources which targeted academics and other elites, the general public, Roman Catholics, women and youth. Beyond the textual, my analysis of extra-literary sources has offered fruitful rewards. Considering the overlap of literary and non-literary representations of Russia, for example, helped to establish the prominence of certain pro-alliance themes. In addition, examining available quantitative data concerning theatrical performances and the production of souvenirs helped enable a general assessment of their popularity and of their potential influence in promoting the alliance cause. My examination of pioneering colored newspaper illustrations is also at times quantitative as well as qualitative. When concentrating on visual sources, I have followed the lead of Roland Barthes, Peter Burke and Gillian Rose to consider the typology, syntax and rhetorical devices of images. Examining expressions of alliance opposition within the selected political cartoons discussed in Chapter 1, for example, lends a nuanced understanding to the contemporary portrayals of Russia.

With respect to terminology, I use the term "alliance era" to refer to the period from 1871 to 1901, i.e. the time span covered by this dissertation. By contrast, the term "alliance decade"

---

61 Barthes, Image, Music, Text; Burke, Eyewitnessing; Rose, Visual Methodologies.
refers to the decade between the momentous invitation to several French warships to visit the port of Cronstadt, Russia in 1891 and the second official journey to France by Nicholas II in 1901. Beyond this, I employ the term "elites" to denote individuals and groups whose power or prestige during the early Third Republic derived from their social status or from their academic, professional and economic standing. Importantly, this term includes both traditional and "new elites"; for as noted in Chapter 2, the social mobility unleashed by the Third Republic led to the rise of the latter, as described by Christophe Charle and Jean Garrigues.62 The word "elite" is also sufficiently elastic to encompass a wide range of pro-alliance actors, including prominent academics, newspaper editors, members of the grande bourgeoisie and revanchistes. Additionally, it admits a handful of elite actors from Russia, and from the Catholic establishment in France. Finally, the term "elite opinion" refers to that expressed by elite individuals and groups, while the terms "popular/ widespread/ mass support or enthusiasm" refer to that characterizing the greater public.

In terms of its overall focus on media, my dissertation pursues several key questions. Given that Daniel-Henri Pageaux has described a literature of the "other" that demonstrates a theme of philie,63 how might this concept be applied more broadly in the politico-cultural realm, across different media? In the radical reframing of previously negative images of Russia dictated by geopolitical concerns, can one trace the influence of pro-alliance messaging on elite and popular opinion; indeed, can one reliably speak of popular opinion? How did specific media employed by elites contribute to the portrayal of Russia as a partner for France, in both the secular and religious realms? And finally, what did this mean for both domestic politics and Franco-Russian relations? A secondary set of questions, meanwhile, relates to the construction

62 Charle, Social History of France; Jean Garrigues, La République des hommes d'affaires, 1870-1900 (Paris: Aubier, 1997).

63 Pageaux, La littérature générale et comparée, 152.
of literary and paraliterary representations, with an emphasis on the techniques employed to portray a former "other" as "brother". Did media embrace a specific typology and syntax of vulgarisation, featuring important individuals, anecdotes and drama,\textsuperscript{64} or adopt the more somber tones of peace and progress? To what extent might Russia’s own cultural production and actions have contributed to the reframing of its image, as opposed to representations created by actors in France?

Seven chapters address these questions in the dissertation, with the first five focused on the alliance era from 1871 to 1901, and the latter two focused on the alliance decade between 1891 and 1901, i.e., after formal alliance talks began. Significantly, this chapter chronology also reflects the evolving political culture of the Third Republic as it moved from the so-called "Republic of the dukes" to the fledgling practice of early democratic principles, when the quest for consensus could involve a national public in foreign policy questions. A chronological approach also serves to discern the various pro-alliance representations conveyed via traditional and emerging media forms, in a comparative sense. Each chapter thus considers portrayals of the qualities that Russia possessed which could enable a partenariat with France, whether expressed in "civilizational" or in broader terms.

The first five chapters span the alliance era, or thirty years between 1871 and 1901. Chapter 1, "Conceiving the Alliance: The Quest for National Security in the Aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War", outlines the unique constellation of historical factors leading to the alliance, as well as its main official events, with a particular focus on the reasons for and against an alliance in both Russia and France. Additionally, it considers how domestic French politics influenced the fashioning of the alliance by encouraging non-governmental actors to become

\textsuperscript{64} CREDHESS (Centre de recherche et d'étude en droit, histoire, économie, et sociologie du social), \textit{L'Histoire par l'Image} (Paris: Université de Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2005).
involved, and it examines some limited expressions of alliance opposition in French political cartoons. Chapter 2, "Promoting an Alliance with Russia: Prominent Elites Initiate a Nascent Civic Consensus", begins with a brief history of the role of public opinion in foreign policy making in France, followed by the question of elite opinion versus popular support. It then introduces key elite actors who lobbied for alliance negotiations, ranging from academic go-betweens and pro-alliance associations to high-profile partisans. Chapter 3, "Publicizing Russia: Building Widespread Alliance Interest and Support via Print and Press", subsequently explores the influential contributions of academics and other authors, plus publishing and press elites, who participated in efforts to reframe traditionally negative views of Russia. It considers the themes that they emphasized, plus their target constituencies and the means they employed to disseminate pro-alliance messaging in the book, periodical and newspaper presses. Chapter 4, "Describing Russia: Engaging Wider Public Interest and Support via Popular Literature", focuses on French travel works and novels about Russia, while considering their individual publishers and authors and their links with the actors described in Chapter 2. Additionally, the chapter examines the major tropes and themes concerning Russia conveyed in these works. Chapter 5, "Valorizing Russian Imperialism and Strength: Theatrical Productions, Expositions universelles, Exhibits and Events Showcasing Virtual Travel to Russia and its Empire", concentrates on potential virtual travel experiences afforded by the popular Parisian venues which showcased a variety of theatrical productions, exhibitions and exhibits that celebrated Russia’s imperial might. As with most of the sources in Chapters 3 and 4, to date many of these events have remained unexplored in the alliance literature.

The final two chapters focus exclusively on the alliance decade between 1891 and 1901, once again drawing on sources that do not feature in the existing alliance historiography. Chapter 6, "Affirming the Alliance: Production and Consumption of Material Culture", begins with the history of political material culture in France. It then probes the vast range of pro-alliance
objects produced for the public, including a singular array of souvenirs, domestic products, toys, postcards and song sheets. It assesses how these items might serve to re-cast popular images of Russia and to create widespread identification with the alliance, with an emphasis on the varied meanings that they might have for consumers. Finally, Chapter 7, "Extolling Russia as Family: Harnessing the Alliance to Promote Domestic Social Agendas via New and Existing Media", draws on traditional newspapers plus pioneering media forms which targeted Catholics, women and youth. This chapter begins with religion, specifically with diverse campaigns to win French Catholics over to the alliance with Russia and to the Republic. It then considers the identification of compatible values with Russian Orthodoxy made by elites from France's Roman Catholic establishment, who were attempting to demonstrate leadership in the alliance relationship and hence relevance to the Republic. The chapter explores a common and ubiquitous theme throughout, that of Russia as a new member of the French "family", a popular framing device also employed by some elites to support their domestic social agendas concerning religion, depopulation and education. Within all of the above, a consideration of pro-alliance images from the pioneering illustrated press highlights the fin-de-siècle primacy of the visual, a vogue also evident in contemporary French educational materials.

Underlying these seven chapters, the dissertation itself may be read on several registers which frame how individuals, groups and institutions from the academic, publishing, lobbyist, financial, entertainment and entrepreneurial sectors worked within the context from which the alliance emerged. First, it serves as a reflection on the French reaction to the trauma of the Franco-Prussian War, underscored by ongoing fears of a potential future penultimate military blow, exacerbated during the 1880s as the unified German state gathered strength. Second, it highlights the ongoing systemic political tensions and social changes of the early Third

65 "Show and tell" techniques in vogue included la pédagogie par l’image and les leçons des choses, adopted for both Republican and Catholic instruction.
Republic, and how these played into the alliance experience. Third, it provides a case study for understanding how military alliances may be fashioned in an emerging democracy, in this case involving substantial contributions by non-governmental actors as mass politics came into play. Fourth, from the vantage point of social and media mechanisms, it highlights the norms and forms of cultural expression in late nineteenth-century France, many of them rooted in the past. And finally, it explores an emerging fin-de-siècle modernity - roughly defined by the indicators of universal suffrage, press freedoms, rising literacy and mass consumerism - at once exuberant and darkly pessimistic, in the era preceding the catastrophe of 1914.
Chapter 1: Conceiving the Alliance: The Quest for National Security in the Aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War

The story of the Franco-Russian alliance may be framed by two photographs of war: one of the bombed-out Place d'Armes in St. Cloud, just outside Paris in 1871, and a second of the Cour d'Honneur at les Invalides in 1915. The first, from the Franco-Prussian War, records the Prussian artillery destruction of a central square where only one building is left standing: the Café Bière de Munich, in front of which German soldiers lounge as they survey their work.\(^6^6\) This is an iconic image from the "année terrible" (July, 1870 to June, 1871) during which the French army surrendered to Prussia, leading to the collapse of the Second Empire and a civil insurrection by the Paris Commune against capitulation to the enemy by the newly-declared Republican government. Catastrophic losses at Metz and Sedan in August and September, 1870 led to the surrender of Emperor Napoléon III and 220,000 French troops; in just two months, the once preeminent French army had been crushed by the Prussian assault.\(^6^7\) This was followed by the siege of Paris until January, 1871, when the city surrendered due to widespread starvation and protracted shelling.\(^6^8\) While the fledgling Republican government declared in September, 1870 had moved to Versailles, ostensibly acting as a government of "national defense", after signing peace terms with Prussia in early 1871 its first task was to defeat the Communard rebels of Paris during "la semaine sanglante" ("the bloody week").\(^6^9\)


\(^6^9\) The Commune was a radical socialist and revolutionary government which arose in Paris from March to May of 1871, in reaction to the Republic's surrender to Germany. The "bloody week" during
Communards had executed important leaders and destroyed a number of prominent Paris landmarks; this subsequently led to large posters advertising a national lottery of regeneration placed at sites such as the Hôtel de Ville.  

How might national regeneration come about? This was the over-arching question as France pondered its humiliating defeat and the continued threat of German power. Most compellingly, its primordial physical goal must be to secure a foreign policy that ensured the nation's survival, preventing future German aggression like that which had resulted in the "amputation" of Alsace-Lorraine.  

Faced with existential crises on both foreign and domestic fronts, after the debacle of 1871 France was forced to reconfigure its state governance and to grapple with issues of stability, depopulation and national identity. The answer to its territorial and security concerns only materialized twenty years later, taking the form of the unlikely military alliance that linked democratic France with autocratic Russia in 1894.

The second photograph, taken at les Invalides in 1915, illustrates the importance of that alliance by documenting Russia's early World War I contributions of ambulances and first aid tents to the French government. The photo depicts the Russian attaché militaire formally presenting the equipment to the French Minister of War, but as they walk across the Cour d'Honneur an army nurse between them holds her hand inserted into her uniform jacket -

which it was put down by Republican forces began on the 21st of May, 1871. On the historiography surrounding "la semaine sanglante", see Robert Tombs, "How bloody was la semaine sanglante? A revision", H-France Salon, 3:1 (2011): 1-13, www.h-france.net/Salon/Salonvol3no1.pdf. Communards burned the Hôtel de Ville, the Tuileries, the Arsenal, the Palais de Justice, the Ministère des Finances and others.

Baronnet, Regards d'un Parisien sur la Commune, 137-139. The proceeds of this lottery, organized by members of high society, were destined for war victims.

consciously or unconsciously, ironically or not - in the manner of Napoléon Bonaparte. A hundred years previously, Russian troops under Tsar Alexander I had entered Paris as part of a coalition of occupying forces after the battle of Waterloo. How had such a momentous shift in the relationship between France and Russia come about? What of the invasion of Russia in 1812, the Crimean war of 1854-56, and French hostility towards Russian repression of the Polish uprisings in 1830 and 1863? The answer was stark: a radical political amnesia. For France, forging the fin-de-siècle alliance meant, quite simply, survival. A technologically-advanced and united Germany now outstripped a defeated nation, with a population of forty-one to thirty-six million respectively. Threatening speeches by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the late 1880s had put France on high alert.

The alliance began as a letter of understanding after six French warships were invited by Tsar Alexander III to sojourn at Cronstadt, Russia in 1891. Although specific terms were developed for a convention militaire in 1892, ongoing hesitations delayed its ratification by Russian and French leaders until December, 1893 and January, 1894 respectively, shortly after a visit by Russian naval vessels to Toulon, France in October, 1893. Containing the most concrete clauses negotiated in Europe to date, the convention stipulated that if France were to

---

72 A caption beneath the photograph - found today in the cloistered walkway overlooking the Invalides Cour d’Honneur - makes mention of the nurse’s gesture.


75 On January 10, 1887, Bismarck rationalized his demand to the Reichstag for increased military spending by suggesting that instability in the French government could lead to war, which might break out at any time. Charles Corbet, *À l’ère des nationalismes: L’Opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 1799-1894* (Paris: Didier, 1967), 400. See also page 15 of this chapter.

76 Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 110, 114.
be attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would mobilize against
Germany. In return, the French would mobilize if Russia were attacked by Germany, or by
Austria supported by Germany. It further stipulated that the two General Staffs would exchange
intelligence concerning the Austrian, German and Italian armies, that the convention would
remain in place for the duration of the Triple Alliance, and that its clauses would be kept
secret.77

Yet an event in late 1894 generated considerable anxiety for the French: the unexpected
death of Tsar Alexander III. This occurred on the same day that the Ministry of War revealed the
arrest of accused traitor Alfred Dreyfus, and just months after the anarchist assassination of
President Sadi Carnot. Despite fears that Nicholas II might not honor his father's commitment,
the new Tsar's official trip to France in 1896 conveyed his affirmation, although he did not
publicly use the word "allies" until French President Félix Faure's visit to Russia in 1897.78 By
1901, alliance terms were fully strengthened, underscored by a second visit by Nicholas II to
observe military exercises in Compiègne. The seemingly improbable and "fateful"79 alliance was
now in place.

As the only treaty that obligated full mobilization, the Franco-Russian military agreement
was unique in recognizing Germany's new strength among Continental powers, while heralding
a new era of alliances to counterbalance opponents' strength.80 Whether it would delay or

78 This resulted in nation-wide celebrations. For a newspaper dépêche reporting the news from
Russia, see "Le grand mot", Le Figaro, 27 août 1897, 1. http://gallica.bnf.fr
79 George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World
80 Holger H. Herwig, "Military Doomsday Machine”? The Decisions for War, 1914", Journal of
hasten the path to war,\textsuperscript{81} the impact of the alliance resonated in Europe and on the international stage for decades to come. It would remain key to French territorial integrity through World War I until the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution; its subsequent renewal leading up to World War II remained equally crucial, with President Charles de Gaulle proclaiming the importance of the Franco-Russian relationship even after 1945. Indeed, bilateral relations only cooled in the 1960s, in part due to French reluctance to support the United States during the Cold War. Underscoring its significance for France, Charles Corbet observed in 1967 that "L’alliance est morte, mais nous lui devons la vie" ("The alliance is dead, but to it we owe our life").\textsuperscript{82}

1.1 Reasons against and for the alliance, in Russia and in France

To better situate the alliance in its geopolitical context, it is useful to set some background in terms of previous Franco-Russian relations and to discuss the reasons against and for the alliance in both nations. Although sporadic efforts had been made during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to forge bilateral treaties, these remained short-lived.\textsuperscript{83} Despite this, academic and cultural exchange between France and Russia remained strong. Scientists served bilaterally in mutual professional societies, while French doctors practiced in

\textsuperscript{81} Most recently, Christopher Clark argued that it was uncertainty about the sustainability of the alliance that contributed to the readiness to risk war in 1914. Christopher Clark, \textit{The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914} (New York: Harper Collins, 2013), 557.

\textsuperscript{82} Corbet, \textit{L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe}, 12.

\textsuperscript{83} A brief treaty between France and Russia in 1756 stipulated mutual military assistance during war, with the exception of conflicts between Russia and the Turks (when France would provide secret financial assistance) or between France and England (when Russia would remain neutral). This alliance ceased in 1762 upon the death of Elisabeth Petrovna of Russia. In 1807 Napoléon Bonaparte and Tsar Alexander I agreed upon political goals in the Tilsit Treaty, but the invasion of Russia by French troops in 1812 and the Crimean War of 1854-1856 led to decades of antagonism between the two nations. In 1859 Emperor Napoléon III signed a tentative treaty with Russia promising neutrality should either party become involved in a war, but this did not hold. Albert Vandal, \textit{Louis XV et Élisabeth Petrovna de Russie: Étude sur les relations de la France et de la Russie au dix-huitième siècle, d’après les archives du Ministre des affaires étrangères} (Paris: E. Plon et Cie, 1882), 276-278; B.H. Sumner, "The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859", \textit{The English Historical Review} 48:189 (January, 1993): 65-83; John Knox Stevens, "The Franco-Russian Treaty of 1859: New Light and New Thoughts", \textit{The Historian} 28:2 (February, 1966): 203-223.
Russia and vice versa. French was spoken in Russian salons, with French tutors and governesses a fixture in aristocratic families, including those of the Tsars and their entourages. Music, ballet and theater productions were also shared between the nations. This tradition of ongoing academic and cultural exchange would serve as one springboard in forging the alliance of 1894.

Clearly, however, Russia had compelling political reasons to be wary of an alliance with France. Beyond its deep antipathy for revolutions and for Republicanism, Russia believed that France offered a safe haven for Russian anarchists including those from the Land and Liberty group formed in 1877. Demonstrating this, after a failed attempt to bomb Alexander II's train in 1879, Lev Hartmann fled to France; rather than extradite him officials allowed him to leave for England, resulting in the recall of the Russian ambassador. Georgi Plekhanov also sojourned in Paris in 1881, the year of Alexander II's assassination, to be followed by Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre Lavrov. Piotr Kropotkin, another well-known Russian with a significant anarchist following in France, was arrested there in 1883 but released in 1886 when he also moved to England, angering Alexander III. And in 1890 a Polish-born anarchist assassinated a former Russian chief of police, General Nikolaï Seliverstoff, in Paris.

---


In addition to impatience with the lack of action regarding these anarchist threats, the Tsar remained concerned by ongoing government instability in France, highlighted by crises including the Boulanger affair in the late 1880s and the Panama Canal scandal in 1892. General Boulanger did enjoy vocal pan-Slav support in the Russian press and among the Russian military for his vehement opposition to Germany, but the Tsar remained wary of him as a potential leader due to his own concerns about the rise of pan-Slavist influence in domestic politics. Finally, Nicolas de Giers, Russia's Foreign Minister (1882-1894) opposed the alliance and hoped to salvage relations with Germany instead.

The numbers of Russian anarchists sheltering in France finally began to wane in 1890 when Paris police (acting on information from Russia) broke up an expatriate nihilist network, revealing a plot to attack the Tsar; details sent to Russia allowed officials there to make further arrests. This event facilitated cooperation in the lead-up to the alliance. Starting in 1892 France began to experience its own domestic attacks with a series of bombings - one of which occurred in the Chamber of Deputies in 1893 - and the assassination of President Sadi Carnot in 1894, mere months after the alliance had been signed. Anarchism now forged a bilateral

---

89 The Panama Canal scandal revealed that influential political figures had been bribed to remain quiet about the uncertain finances of the company building the canal.


93 Anarchist attacks targeting the "bourgeois Republic" included a series of bombs in Paris in 1892, the bombing in the Chamber of Deputies by Auguste Vaillant in 1893, the bombing of a café by Émile Henry in 1893, and the bombing of a restaurant by Félix Fénéon in 1894.
bond, as France enacted the *lois scélérates* to curtail anarchist publications and actions deemed to incite domestic attacks.

Ultimately, however, larger geopolitical events motivated Russia to negotiate the alliance. These included Emperor Wilhelm II’s 1890 decision not to renew the secret Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia.\(^{95}\) Crafted by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1887 after the collapse of the League of the Three Emperors (formed by Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia in 1881), the Reinsurance Treaty had been undermined by competing Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans. The 1882 Triple Alliance linking Germany with Austria-Hungary and Italy, followed by the 1887 Mediterranean Agreement joining Britain, Italy, Austria and Spain against Russian naval power, had combined to intensify imperial competition.\(^{96}\) The zenith of Bismarck's power-brokering, however, was reached in 1887. Increasing suspicion that Germany backed Austrian interests in the Balkans resulted in anti-German opinion in the Russian press, reflecting agitation by pan-Slavists protesting the weakening of Russia's influence over the Balkan Slavs due to perceived Austrian machinations there.\(^{97}\)

---


\(^{95}\) Jacques Kayser, *De Kronstadt à Khrouchtchev, voyages franco-russes, 1891-1960* (Paris: A. Colin, 1962), 254. The Reinsurance Treaty stipulated that Russia and Germany would remain neutral if either became involved in war; the exception would be if France declared war against Germany, or Austria-Hungary against Russia. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance*, 19.


Added to the above, by the early 1890s a strong suspicion existed that England, Russia's imperial rival in Central Asia and the eastern Mediterranean, secretly adhered to the Triple Alliance because Russian incursions into the former region threatened British power (subsequently borne out by events between 1894 and 1905). Russia now shared two potential enemies with France, i.e. England and Germany, further enhancing the possibility of rapprochement. Some scholars have also speculated that Russia believed France would support its foreign policy goals in the Balkans and the Far East, as evidenced by the fact that France had withdrawn its opposition to Russian expansion of its Black Sea fleet after the Franco-Prussian War.\(^98\) Beyond these reasons, historians point to Tsar Alexander III's growing mistrust of the German leadership and to his Danish wife's anti-German outlook due to Prussia's annexation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in 1863.\(^99\)

For alliance scholar Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, however, the deciding factor in forging the alliance was a reciprocal sense of military defeat. For Russia, this stemmed from its betrayal by Prussia at the Berlin Conference of 1878, while for France, this lay in its 1871 defeat.\(^100\) Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff noted that the Russian and French Army Chiefs of Staff Nikolai Obrutchev and Raoul le Mouton de Boisdeffre worked well together, the former having married a French wife who owned a château near the French garrison in Bergerac where the two chiefs could meet. Obrutchev invited Boisdeffre to attend Russian military maneuvers in August of 1898.


\(^99\) Additionally, some authors have suggested that Russian leaders viewed the fall of the ultranationalist Boulangist movement in 1889 as an important predictor of future political stability in France. Parr, *Théophile Delcassé*, 16; Carroll, *French Public Opinion*, 157, 161. By contrast, as noted, Andreas Dorpalen emphasized that Boulanger enjoyed strong support in the Russian military and the Russian press. Dorpalen, "Tsar Alexander III and the Boulanger Crisis", 122, 124, 129, 130, 132.

\(^100\) The Berlin Conference reversed key Russian gains in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War.
1887, the same year as the Mediterranean Agreement and Bismarck’s speech to the Reichstag emphasizing that war with France could be imminent. Highlighting the burgeoning military cooperation, in 1888 Grand Duke Vladimir, the Tsar’s brother and commander of the Russian Imperial Guard, expressed interest to the French Minister of War concerning a smokeless, magazine-fed rifle being manufactured in Châtellerault. The following year Russia ordered 500,000 of these guns, the so-called fusil Mosin-Nagant.

Yet beyond geopolitical and military rationales, the most common reason given for Russia’s adherence to the alliance was that it needed capital for infrastructure projects. Reversing a long-standing financial relationship, the German Reichstag had begun to enact protective tariffs against Russian exports in 1879, followed by a tightening of financial markets in 1887 when the Reichsbank denied Russian securities as collateral for further loans.

Beginning in 1888 France stepped in to assist with a series of loans to Russia; by 1909 their total exceeded twelve billion gold francs. In a “popular plebiscite” reflecting widespread

---

101 Boisdeffre had served as assistant military attaché to General Antoine Chanzy, who in 1879 became French ambassador to Russia. Obrutchev served as the Russian chief of staff for almost twenty years. Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Alliance franco-russe, 32, 44, 89; Kennan, The Fateful Alliance 12, 14; Corbet, L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 400. Dietrich Geyer also argued that the military’s role in urging an alliance was ultimately more important than the loans to Russia. Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914, trans. Bruce Little (New York: Berg, 1987), 175. See Geyer’s Chapter 8, entitled “Capital Imports and the Alliance”.

102 The Mosin-Nagant magazine-fed rifle was to replace the single-shot rifles which had handicapped the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78. Acknowledging the order’s completion, in 1895 Nicholas II sent a massive church bell decorated with the emblems of Russia and France to Châtellerault, where it remains today. “Châtelerault à l’heure russe, 1891-1897”. http://www.servicehistorique.sga.defense.gouv.fr

103 This was in retaliation against a Russian ukase targeting German landholders in Russia. Burkhard Asmuss, “The German Empire in Europe”, Deutsches Historisches Museum. http://www.dhm.de/ENGLISH/ausstellungen/bismarck/162.htm

anxiety about a future war, large numbers of French citizens subscribed to the loan in 1891, demonstrating appreciation for the invitation of French warships to Cronstadt that year.\textsuperscript{105} Loan subscriptions proceeded apace, punctuated by tariff agreements in 1889 and 1893.\textsuperscript{106} One fact suggesting a possible link between the alliance and the loans is that General Boisdeffre's brother was Controller General of the Treasury and an honorary director of the Finance Ministry.\textsuperscript{107}

The loans to Russia by the banking community coincided with, or perhaps stemmed from, alarm that Bismarck was poised to re-engineer hostilities with France; as noted, this encouraged the unprecedented public subscription,\textsuperscript{108} a matter encouraged by the French press. As Jennifer Siegel noted, the domestic market for French securities remained oversubscribed, and the many investors looking elsewhere belonged to the middle rather than the upper class.\textsuperscript{109} Indeed, prior to 1914 a total of 1,600,000 French investors (from a population of approximately ten million voters) expressed their enthusiasm for an alliance by subscribing to


\textsuperscript{106}The latter reduced tariffs on petroleum products, among others. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,"Documents Diplomatiques: Convention commerciale signée à Saint-Pétersbourg le 17 juin 1893 entre la France et la Russie" (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1893).

\textsuperscript{107}One author has noted that the French government could promise loans and then select the bank which would become involved; he also noted that "Banks... usually cooperated when the national interest was involved". M.B. Hayne, \textit{The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 52. "Informations", \textit{Le Figaro}, 18 juillet 1893, 3. http://gallica.bnf.fr

\textsuperscript{108}Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 424.

the Russian loans.\textsuperscript{110} Although not noted in the alliance literature, this nation-wide action revealingly equates to the earlier public subscription to pay the massive war indemnity exacted by Prussia in 1871.\textsuperscript{111} In both cases security concerns prevailed; with the alliance, monies invested could be felt to secure the national future along with that of the individual at a time when pensions did not exist.

Adding to Siegel’s observations, Alexander Anievas argued that the Russian turn toward French capital demonstrates that relative rates of industrialization contributed to forging the alliance. Reflecting Russia's ongoing need for infrastructure finance, by 1914 the loans represented sixty-one percent of its foreign debt.\textsuperscript{112} Earlier industrialization in France had also led to modestly increased personal incomes and savings,\textsuperscript{113} allowing investors there to support Russian bonds. At times the loans created dissent, however, as when after 1900 French

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{111} The five billion franc war indemnity remains the "largest transfer in history"; it equated to more than twice the annual national budget of France. The indemnity was paid in full almost two years prior to the demanded date, in large measure due to mass public subscription; of the five billion francs, two billion was paid by public investors. Jean Garrigues, \textit{La République des hommes d'affaires, 1870-1900} (France: Aubier, 1997), 115, 117; Rachel Chrastil, \textit{Organizing for War: France 1870-1914} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 61; Michael B. Devereux and Gregor W. Smith, "Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian War Indemnity", \textit{Journal of Monetary Economics} 54 (June, 2007): 2378-2379.


government officials pushed for their use to construct militarily strategic railway lines of little help to Russia’s economic development.114

Yet historically strong political differences appeared to make France an unlikely alliance partner with Russia. As noted, in addition to the clashes of 1812 and the Crimean War, hostility towards Russia persisted due to its harsh repression of Polish uprisings in 1830 and 1863. French Catholics condemned the egregious attacks on Catholicism by an Orthodox nation, and many Polish refugees found their way to Paris, among them the national poet Adam Mickiewiez and the composer Frédéric Chopin, who publicized the Polish cause.115 Testifying to acrimonious public opinion, anti-Russian books and pamphlets circulated widely prior to 1871. No work better exemplifies this than the virulent three-volume *Lettres de Russie*, penned by the Marquis Astolphe de Custine in 1843. Custine warned of a barbarian, "Asiatic" Muscovy intent on absorbing all of Europe, a recurring theme in writings about Russia through the ages, and not just in France.116 Polemical and accusatory, his book circulated widely, drawing commentary as far away as America.117 Its influence only receded after 1871, at which time French support for Catholic Poland generally ceased to be a focus for anti-Russian sentiment.118 Most

---


117 For an examination of the many republications of Custine's *Lettres de Russie* including American editions during the Cold War, see Mary Carol Matheson, "Tartars at Whose Gates? Framing Russian Identity Through Political Adaptations of Nineteenth-Century French Works by Astolphe de Custine and Jules Verne". MA Thesis (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2007).

118 Marianna Butenschön, *Zarenhymne und Marseillaise: Zur Geschichte der Rußland-Ideologie in Frankreich, 1870-71–1893-94* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1978),160-178. This shift was borne out in the preface of a posthumous re-publication of essays by pro-Polish historian Jules Michelet, a vehement opponent of Russia. In the preface to the new edition Michel Bréal of the Institut de France explained that Michelet would undoubtedly understand the need for a pragmatic alliance in 1890s France. Jules
importantly of all, however, as a nascent and secularizing Republic, France could not easily be imagined to betray its pioneering democratic ideals by embracing a tsarist autocracy, or in doing so, by recognizing a state religion. Nor did French leaders wish to be viewed to be endorsing Russian foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. Indeed, during the 1870s and early 1880s many argued that to ally with England, or to reconcile with Germany, would be the better course.\textsuperscript{119}

Ultimately, if on the Russian side economic imperatives facilitated the alliance, national security concerns prevailed in France as the unification of Germany and Italy shifted the continental balance of power. Although leading politicians wavered from the late 1870s onward - with Léon Gambetta and Jules Grévy among those opposed\textsuperscript{120} - by the late 1880s most had become persuaded for an alliance while remaining cautious about its implications for French independence in foreign affairs. Demonstrating this shift, Charles Floquet, who as Senate president in 1874 had shouted "Vive la Pologne, monsieur!" to the future Tsar Alexander III when he visited Paris, became reconciled to the Russian cause by 1887 when serving as president of the Chamber of Deputies.\textsuperscript{121} Also driving support, rumors circulated that Britain would join the Triple Alliance, further isolating France.\textsuperscript{122} Some Republicans believed that an

\begin{itemize}
\item Michelet, \textit{Légendes démocratiques du nord: la France devant l'Europe, étude par Michel Bréal de l'Institut} (Paris: Calman Lévy, 1899).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Noulens, \textit{Les Tsars et la République}, 17; Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 376.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Gambetta felt the alliance would endanger French interests internationally, and Grévy was convinced that Russia would abandon France at the decisive moment. Joseph F. Moss, "French Criticism of the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 (1871-1907)". Master's Thesis (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1967), 10, 21, 55, 60, 63; Raymond Noulens, \textit{Les Tsars et la République: Centenaire d'une Alliance} (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1993), 17.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, \textit{Alliance franco-russe}, 31; Boris Noide, \textit{L'Alliance franco-russe: Les origines du système diplomatique d'avant-guerre} (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1936), 491.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Weitsman, \textit{Dangerous Alliances}, 101.
\end{itemize}
alliance could help cement mercantile goals, securing markets and resources against imperial rivals such as Britain.\textsuperscript{123} Meanwhile nationalist partisans speculated that Russia might assist in the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, a persistent dream of revanchistes desirous of reclaiming French power. As described in Chapter 2, reframing Russia as an ally in anti-German sentiment became an appealing theme, albeit one whose strength decreased by 1900.\textsuperscript{124}

Outside of government, however, interest in an alliance with Russia grew steadily after 1871, as seen in ever widening circles of publication and press. Here one may trace efforts to explain why and how Russia could be a strong ally for France, spurred by fears of German power. Beginning in the mid-1870s prominent academics, whose work is described in Chapters 2 and 3, published a series of influential works on Russian history, society and culture. By placing Russia in the European community of nations - a key departure from centuries-old views - their detailed "scientific" studies led the way in re-calibrating views of Russia to validate it as a potential military partner. And during the mid-1880s French newspapers, among them the conservative dailies \textit{Le Figaro}, \textit{Le Gaulois} and \textit{Le Matin}, began to publish articles portraying Russia as a benefactor of France, as an arbiter of European relations, and as a leader for peace. Authors argued that Russia had stood by France when Germany reacted against legislation increasing France’s mobilization potential in 1875; this had led to the so-called "Is War in Sight?" crisis.\textsuperscript{125} The press later reported that Alexander II and Foreign Minister

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{123} Kevin Passmore, \textit{The Right in France from the Third Republic to Vichy} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 104.
\item\textsuperscript{124} Wolfgang Schivelbusch argued that circa 1890 colonialism began to replace revanche as a national mission. Alan Forrest also noted that political leaders did not openly talk about revanche during the 1890s. Schivelbusch, \textit{The Culture of Defeat}, 182-186; Alan Forrest, \textit{The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 151.
\item\textsuperscript{125} This name was taken from the title of a German newspaper article. See James Stone, \textit{The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Europe in the mid-1870s} (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag, 2010).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Alexander Gorchakov had assured the French ambassador that Russia would not support any
German provocation.

A war scare flared again in 1887 during the Schnaebelé incident, resulting in a flurry of
troop maneuvers after Germany arrested a French commissar for espionage at a border railway
station.\textsuperscript{126} Newspaper commentators predicted a dire future, noting Bismarck's provocative
speech earlier that year when during a Reichstag debate on a new army bill he declared that
although he had "confidence in the present French government" and in "part of the French
population", war could be a possibility if cabinet instability were to change the government's
direction. He went on to say: "I do not know whether that war will break out tomorrow, in ten
years, or later".\textsuperscript{127} Bismarck continued to invoke this danger, as in his 1888 Reichstag address:
"God has placed by our side the most warlike and restless of all nations, the French, and He
has permitted warlike inclinations to grow strong in Russia..." Much attention to this speech
permeated the press, and also when the Reichstag introduced a new army bill in 1893.\textsuperscript{128}

Yet as the backdrop to geopolitical concerns the most pressing reason for an alliance
with Russia related to the demographic crisis in France. It is worth developing this point in some
detail here, as it has not featured in the alliance historiography to date and because it has direct
implications for notions of a Franco-Russian "family" discussed in the dissertation's final

\textsuperscript{126} Carroll, French Public Opinion, 64, 55, 129-133.

\textsuperscript{127} Telegram sent by a special correspondent from Berlin, "M. de Bismarck au Reichstag", Le
Figaro, 12 janvier 1887, 2; Carroll, French Public Opinion, 58, 54, 140; Joseph Vincent Fuller, Bismarck's
Diplomacy at its Zenith (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922), 132. The proposed army bill of
1893 would have reduced conscripts' military service from three to two years; ultimately it did not pass.
Bismarck campaigned against it despite having no formal role in government by that time. "The German

\textsuperscript{128} Otto von Bismarck, "Speech to the Reichstag on Diplomacy" (1888), in The German Classics
of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Kuno Francke, 257-258 (New York: German Publication
Society, 1913-1914), http://www.pitt.edu/~fbrig/bismarck.html; F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the
chapter. Tellingly, the chief demographer of Paris Jacques Bertillon noted in 1880 that "[Depopulation is]…the danger menacing the material power…of France." While population numbers had caused concern since the French Revolution, from 1880 onward the statistical alarm sounded the nation's very survival. A united Germany now outstripped France by several million, and the democratic Republic stood alone in Europe amidst diplomatic isolation.

State, philanthropic and professional groups had identified two goals after the 1871 defeat: to increase France's birthrate and to reduce its youth mortality, but their ultimate futility is revealed in comparative statistics. In 1871 France had more elderly citizens than any other European nation, and it had lost 1.7 million inhabitants in Alsace-Lorraine; in 1871 its population was 36.1 million to Germany's 40.8 million, while by 1910 it was 39.6 million in contrast to Germany's 64.9 million, leading to catastrophic losses in World War I. France also lagged behind other countries in addressing smallpox and tuberculosis at the time. Alarmingly,  

---

131 Kevin Passmore notes also that some elites were advocating for mercantile goals at the time; in addition to achieving control of markets and resources, mercantilism "required organic harmony within the nation and a strong birth rate to ensure the supply of workers, colonists and soldiers". Passmore, *The Right in France*, 104.  
official statistics for 1890, 1891, 1892 and 1895 revealed that deaths had exceeded births in each of these years, reflecting influenza and cholera outbreaks sweeping across Europe. The depopulation dilemma became widely publicized, with the former American ambassador to France commenting on the country's "... symptoms of inherent national degeneracy, not the least alarming being the comparative decrease of her population". Concerns regarding female fertility and male virility became omnipresent in the fin-de-siècle press.

The intensive media coverage of the demographic crisis serves to counter Joshua Cole's observations which downplay the importance of the 1871 defeat in intensifying depopulation anxiety. Indeed, articles on depopulation proliferated in influential daily newspapers such as Le Figaro and Le Petit Journal, in popular science journals including the hegemonic La Nature, and in France's foremost political and academic journal La Revue des deux mondes, as well as its leading Catholic newspaper La Croix. Their very ubiquity reveals, to borrow a phrase from

---

133 McDougall, "Protecting Infants", 81. The year 1900 followed a similar pattern.


Ann Laura Stoler, a "blueprint of distress." During the influenza epidemic of 1890 which killed almost 40,000 people, for example, military anxiety was palpable in *La Croix*:

The epidemic strikes violently everywhere in the country. Rouen has no less than 1,000 cases, while in Brest, the health of the garrison is relatively good, but there are many ill on board the naval ships in the harbour. On the cruiser *Borda*, twenty students and forty-eight sailors are confined to their beds….In Poitiers, numerous and grave cases have been reported among the three regiments of the garrison. There, influenza has been followed by typhoid fever….In Nancy, the garrison is grievously affected…There are 1,000 cases in Algiers….5,000 in Auxerre…

Political instability intensified the difficulty of tackling the demographic problem through government action, as between 1870 and 1914 sixty cabinets were formed, surviving on average just eight months each. Thus the state did not take the lead in addressing depopulation, relying instead on substantial private and professional initiatives to encourage pronatalism and to reduce mortality rates. Leading citizens formed *L’Alliance nationale pour l’accroissement de la population française* (National Alliance for the Growth of the French Population) in 1896, and *La Ligue contre la mortalité infantile* (League against Infant Mortality) in 1902. Meanwhile, professional specialization in the 1880s led to the rise of a new group,

---


141 The ANAPF published monthly bulletins and advocated fiscal incentives to increase the birth rate. Members included physiologist Charles Richet, statistician Jacques Bertillon, Ministry of Interior inspector Émile Javal, and Catholic statistician Émile Cheysson; Émile Zola was also an active member. Zola’s novel *Fécondité* (1899) highlighted low birth rates and the exceptional mortality rate among infants fed by wet-nurses; this book was serialized in prominent periodicals. The League against Infant Mortality was formed by obstetrician Dr. Pierre Budin and politicians Paul Strauss and Théophile Roussel. Émile Zola, *Fécondité* (1899) (Paris: Faquelle, 1957); Catherine Rollet, *La politique à l’égard de la petite enfance sous la Troisième République* (Paris: Institut National d’études démographiques, 1990), 125-130.
that of obstetricians and pediatricians.\textsuperscript{142} Although infant mortality remained close to that in other countries, it held significantly higher political consequence in France. Tellingly, the terms "puériculture", i.e. raising healthy babies, and "pediatrics" were invented in France, and French pediatricians pioneered the first effective infant incubators by 1897, as influential critics deplored the high infant death rate due to untrained wet-nurses.\textsuperscript{143} Periodicals published regular reports concerning milk sanitization \textit{à la Pasteur}, and the efforts by physician-researcher Émile Roux to develop a serum against childhood croup, a deadly disease.\textsuperscript{144} Because the Pasteur Institute lacked funds to begin large-scale immunization against the latter, the patrician daily \textit{Le Figaro} launched a national subscription to support this in 1894.\textsuperscript{145} Ignited by fears concerning the future of the alliance after the unexpected death of Tsar Alexander III,\textsuperscript{146} it also published a lengthy poem entitled "Le Croup", from which one verse reveals a "go-it-alone" military bravado:

\begin{quote}
….Thanks to him [Émile Roux],
you, Land of France,
have recovered your fertility,
And your children
With whom you defend yourself
Will go out in greater numbers into the world
In a furious race
To carry your triumphant flags.\textsuperscript{147}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{144} For example see "Science. Le Croup", \textit{La Croix}, 6 février 1889, 4.


\textsuperscript{146} Alexander III died from kidney disease at age forty-nine, thirteen years into his reign.

\textsuperscript{147} It collected almost 500,000 francs, publishing lists of contributors on its daily front page Jacques Redelsperger, "Le Croup", \textit{Le Figaro}, 22 décembre 1894, 1.
As examples, the tensions accompanying depopulation, the death of Alexander III and national security fears figured compellingly in two contemporary issues of Le Figaro. While the first itemized subscriptions raised by the croup campaign, its lead article "Une Affaire de trahison" reported the arrest of suspected traitor Alfred Dreyfus.\(^{148}\) Of note here is that that early hysteria regarding the Dreyfus trial could have been amplified by fears that the alliance might not survive. The following day's issue increased concern by reporting that Wilhelm II had delivered a speech confirming his amitié for Nicholas II, stating that he wanted "to follow Prussian tradition" to again become "brothers in arms" with Russia.\(^{149}\)

As France waited for almost three years for Nicholas II to publicly affirm his father's foreign policy, a military alliance to address the demographic crisis held its momentous appeal. That the population of European Russia alone (the region west of the Ural Mountains) remained more than double that of France no doubt influenced a doctor who wrote to the periodical Les Annales politiques et littéraires in 1895. Answering an editor's question which asked what readers would do with one billion francs, the (purported) doctor responded:

Monsieur, If I possessed one billion francs of capital, I would work towards the repopulation of France by the following two means: 1. I would build, fund and maintain two large model hospitals, one on the coast and the other in central France, which would admit all sick children with no other formality than a certificate of French or Russian nationality; 2. I would demand a portion of Russia's abandoned children and I would raise them in France, so that they could become French soldiers or French mothers. In doing this I would hope to merit a simple epitaph: "He loved Russia, and he adored France."\(^{150}\)

In conclusion then, Russia and France had very different reasons for establishing a military alliance: while for the former economic considerations remained paramount in order to

\(^{148}\) Dreyfus was arrested fifteen days prior to the announcement by the Ministry of War.

\(^{149}\) "Une affaire de trahison"; "Mort du Tsar", "L' impression en Europe: Nicolas II and Guillaume II", Le Figaro, 1, 2 novembre 1894.

improve its infrastructure and to pay the debts accrued in its great power maneuvers,\textsuperscript{151} for the latter the issues of territorial integrity and a demographic crisis proved to be powerful drivers. Yet as described in the following chapters, because concrete overtures towards \textit{rapprochement} were not made by the French government until after the Republic had stabilized in the early 1890s, it fell to civil society to begin the work of reframing traditionally negative opinions of Russia. Multiple constituencies thus became involved in promoting and enabling the alliance, aided by a scattering of actors from Russia. The overall solidarity in France demonstrated political unity in the face of an existential crisis, a unity prompted by a perceived challenge to \textit{la patrie} (the homeland) rather than \textit{la République}.

\subsection*{1.2 French domestic politics and the fashioning of the alliance}

Why did the government lag behind its citizens in expressing interest in an alliance with Russia? Just as the demographic crisis suffered from a lack of political leadership, so did alliance initiatives, for after the 1871 defeat the political climate of France remained beset by turbulence and instability. Although the Third Republic had been declared to fill a power vacuum after the Second Empire fell, it remained a "desperately insecure regime".\textsuperscript{152} Sitting at Versailles, its first goal was to subdue the insurrection of the Paris Communards; once achieved, the fledgling government fell prey to a politics seething with interest groups intent on demonstrating why the war had been lost and on determining what form of government the nation should take.\textsuperscript{153} Calls to punish the military command resulted in the court martial of the

\textsuperscript{151} Russia’s debts dated from the Crimean War, the repression of the Polish insurrection in 1863, and the Russo-Turkish War in the late 1870s. Kennan, \textit{The Fateful Alliance}, 75.

\textsuperscript{152} Forrest, \textit{The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars}, 133.

army Commander-in-Chief, while subsequent reforms along the Prussian model included conscription laws in 1872 and 1889. Further considerations believed to be causes of the defeat, notably that of "national degeneration", continued to obsess elites.

Although a Republic in name with a constitution drafted in 1875, this early government has been called the "Republic of the dukes", or the final stand of traditional elites, before giving way to the "Republic of the [bourgeois] notables" in 1880. Ensconced at Versailles until 1876, its president from 1875 to 1879 was the Catholic royalist duc de Magenta, General Marshal MacMahon, a fierce opponent of the so-called "Opportunists" or moderate republicans grouped around Léon Gambetta after 1875. A republican majority did not emerge in the Chamber of Deputies until 1876, and in the Senate until 1879; a republican president was elected for the first time in 1879. The Opportunists ultimately succeeded in holding power by forging coalitions in the Chamber of Deputies from 1881 to 1898. Yet the political path was rarely clear. Over the next two decades politics incorporated a mixed brew of royalists (legitimists, Bonapartists, and

---

154 Army service was determined by ballot after 1872, with the majority of men serving only about one year while others were forced to serve long-term. Changes in 1889 meant that seventy percent of young men served three years, with thirty percent serving one year. In addition to conscription laws, the Army was reorganized through changes to troop mobilization and to artillery in 1873, the construction of engineered camps and defensive points in 1874, and the establishment of a new École de Guerre 1875. Mayeur and Rebérioux, The Third Republic, 15; Forrest, Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars, 114, 115, 134, 137-141; Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, 40-41.


156 Mayeur and Rebérioux, The Third Republic, 3, 5.

Orleanists),\textsuperscript{158} Opportunist, centrist, Progressist and Radical republicans, socialists (the latter especially after 1880 when amnesty was granted to exiled Communards), ultra-nationalists and Catholic partisans. This reality often led to fluid coalitions regarding issues confronting the nation.\textsuperscript{159} Cabinets remained anything but stable: parliamentary challenges resulted in sixty ministry shuffles between 1870 and 1914, meaning that at times bureaucrats wielded more power than their ministers.\textsuperscript{160} The presence of over five hundred deputies in the Chamber no doubt also contributed to dissension and instability.\textsuperscript{161} All of these factors, then, influenced the lack of directional foreign policy in the early Third Republic. A tentative move to test Russian interest in an alliance emerged only after the republican majority in the 1885 election, which required compromise between Radical and Opportunist republican camps.\textsuperscript{162}

Throughout the 1870s, the government led by MacMahon exhibited little interest in an alliance with Russia; calls were made for an alliance with England or with Germany instead.\textsuperscript{163} This reflected the long-standing French antipathy towards Russia due in part due to repression

\textsuperscript{158} On royalists see William Irvine, \textit{The Boulanger Affair Re-Considered: Royalism, Boulangism and the Origins of the Radical Right in France} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 21-47. Legitimists were traditional royalists also known as “ultras”, Bonapartists favored rule by a representative of that line, while the more liberal Orleanist faction supported a candidate from the Orleans branch of the House of Bourbon. Wolfgang Schivelbusch suggested that friction among these groups actually prevented any action on their calls to abolish democracy and universal suffrage. Schivelbusch, \textit{The Culture of Defeat}, 134.

\textsuperscript{159} On the complex political landscape of the early Third Republic, see Gildea, \textit{Children of the Revolution}, 246-288.

\textsuperscript{160} McMillan, "Consolidating the Republic", 15; Gildea, \textit{Children of the Revolution}, 252-254; Clark, \textit{The Sleepwalkers}, 191.

\textsuperscript{161} The number of deputies was five hundred and thirty-four in 1889, and five hundred and eighty-one in 1894. Jean Garrigues, \textit{La République des hommes d'affaires, 1870-1900} (Paris: Aubier, 1997), 401-402; Mayer and Rebérioux, \textit{The Third Republic}, 32-35.

\textsuperscript{162} After the 1885 election Opportunists republicans in the Chamber of Deputies numbered 239, radical republicans 144, and conservatives 201. Gildea, \textit{Children of the Revolution}, 257-60.

\textsuperscript{163} Noulens, \textit{Les Tsars et la République}, 17; Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 376.
of Catholics within its empire. In 1870 prominent writer Ernest Renan warned against Russia even as a French statesman visited St. Petersbourg to seek support against Prussia, while in 1871 the historian Jules Michelet characterized the Franco-Prussian War as a Russo-Prussian plot. Many politicians continued to call for an alliance with England or Germany throughout the early 1880s; that Russia had become embroiled in Russo-Turkish wars between 1877 and 1881 and remained a formal ally of Germany distanced any Russian interest.\textsuperscript{164}

Although the early Republic did not make an overt attempt to establish a \textit{rapprochement}, it did appoint Viscount Eugène Melchior de Vogüé as secretary to the French ambassador in Russia (1877-1883) and one source notes that part of his task was to investigate the possibility of an alliance. In 1886 de Vogüé led an unofficial "special mission" to explore this further, but at the time Tsar Alexander III showed little interest.\textsuperscript{165} Formal alliance talks did not begin until 1891, after Bismarck's forced retirement led to the expiration of the Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty. Meanwhile as previously noted, in 1887 Bismarck had put a hold the trade of Russian bonds in the German stock exchange and French bankers stepped in to convert these; by 1890 they would arrange four major loans to Russia.\textsuperscript{166} While equally motivated by economic considerations, bankers furthered the alliance cause.

Added to the geopolitical shift above, alliance scholars have unanimously agreed that - as described in Chapter 2 - strong extra-governmental support played a major role in encouraging French politicians to pursue the military pact. As George Kennan argued, key

\textsuperscript{164} Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 350, 349.

\textsuperscript{165} In contrast to the author of these assertions the principal scholars of the alliance, George F. Kennan and Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, did not credit de Vogüé with any direct role in negotiations. Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 404.

\textsuperscript{166} Bismarck's action against Russian bonds began as a protest against a Russian \textit{ukase} targeting German landholders in Russia. For an explanation of these events, see Burkhard Asmuss, "The German Empire in Europe", Deutsches Historisches Museum. http://www.dhm.de/ENGLISH/ausstellungen/bismarck/162.htm; Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 22, 32.
politicians became "... aware that the French public was strongly in favor of an alliance..."\textsuperscript{167} President Sadi Carnot (1887-1894) also favored an alliance, but he remained behind the scenes due to constitutional limits on presidential initiatives.\textsuperscript{168} Although the direction of Foreign Affairs remained his responsibility,\textsuperscript{169} the 1875 constitution mandated that all presidential acts be signed by the Minister in question, essentially leaving the latter in control. The Chamber of Deputies was limited in debating or challenging the Minister on foreign policy decisions resulting from diplomatic negotiation, although most treaties required its approval, with the exception of those whose clauses might affect the "safety of the state".\textsuperscript{170} Early demands by Russia that the alliance clauses remain secret - i.e. not revealed to the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies - led to the pioneering negotiation of the military convention by the Chiefs of Staff and its signing by the Foreign Affairs ministers, rather than by diplomats.\textsuperscript{171} In France it fell to Carnot ministers Alexandre Ribot and Charles de Freycinet to promote the cause, along with General Raoul le Mouton de Boisdeffre as Chief of Staff. Ribot served as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Carnot, while Freycinet, now the Minister of War, had previously led Foreign Affairs. Significantly, Freycinet reversed his previously negative opinion regarding an alliance - apparently under the

\textsuperscript{167} Kennan, \textit{The Fateful Alliance}, 29, 53, 237.


\textsuperscript{169} Gildea, \textit{France 1870-1914}, 10. Members of the Chamber and the Senate chose the President directly at this time.


\textsuperscript{171} Carroll, \textit{French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs}, 160. The terms of the military agreement were not revealed in Russia until the Bolshevik revolution.
influence of the military elite, who strongly favoured it - and worked with Carnot and Ribot to help achieve their goal.\textsuperscript{172}

An official government embrace of the alliance is therefore visible only circa 1890, yet few studies of \textit{fin-de-siècle} France devote much attention to its antecedents. Rather, scholars tend to focus on two dramatic domestic events involving the French military between 1885 and 1906, each of which revealed vulnerabilities related to national security: the rise to power of General Georges Boulanger in the mid- to late 1880s, generating government fears of a \textit{coup d'état} by a strong military figure who was demonstrably aggressive towards Germany, and the Dreyfus affair, concerning the leaking of military documents to Germany, which began in 1894.\textsuperscript{173} At play in both these crises was the status of the French army in the face of national security concerns, heightened by domestic instability. In the Boulanger affair, the latter included

\begin{itemize}
  \item Unusually, both Alexander Ribot and Charles de Freycinet remained prominent in successive governments, allowing them to support President Sadi Carnot (1887-1894) who championed an alliance with Russia unlike his predecessor Jules Grévy. Emblematic of perennial cabinet instability, Ribot served as Prime Minister five times in addition to holding other ministerial portfolios, while de Freycinet served as Prime Minister three times and Foreign Affairs Minister four times, in addition to his responsibility as Minister of War in the run-up to the alliance. As Foreign Minister, Ribot worked to strengthen bilateral ties after his appointment in 1890. Freycinet, appointed Minister of War in 1888, enjoyed the trust of top Russian leaders, and as an engineering graduate from the École Polytechnique with experience in railways and urban infrastructure, was well-suited to understanding these aspects of Russia's economy in relation to the French loans. Beyond obvious ties in the governmental and financial arenas, the connections of these politicians with other pro-alliance elites remain unclear. Kennan, \textit{Fateful Alliance}, 22-29.
\end{itemize}
an economic recession and disaffection among workers, plus revelations of covert royalist and
conservative financial support for his electoral campaigns, and in the Dreyfus affair, rising
anti-Semitism and the uncertainty generated by the death of Tsar Alexander III.

Boulanger, who became Minister of War in 1886, quickly became known as *Général Revanche* due to his bellicose stand when Bismarck's 1887 bluster put France on high alert. With his popularity building exponentially among workers and peasants, causing an alarmed government to remove his military standing, Boulanger stood for office in several constituencies in 1888. Boulangism had become a rallying point for anti-republicans on both the right and the left, and as noted, the government began to fear a coup. After passing legislation to dismember the electoral circumstances which had allowed him to seek office, it charged him with treason and he fled the country, dying shortly thereafter.

Although not widely discussed by scholars, Boulanger did support an alliance with Russia; in this he shared the ongoing stance of the military command in France. Significantly, however, Boulanger's campaigns would contribute to pro-alliance publicity at the time that the loans to Russia began. In 1889, as he ran for a final election in Paris, his campaign posters trumpeted "With the Tsar for God and France" (reflecting at this point his swing from Radical to

---


175 After the 1885 elections, three groups held equal power in the Chamber of Deputies: Radicals (left republican), Opportunists (moderate republican), and Monarchists. The Opportunists camp allied with the Radicals, and named Boulanger, the latter's preference, as Minister of War. Subsequently, Opportunists and Monarchists became alarmed by Boulanger's bellicosity and popularity during the 1887 Schnaebelé border incident. Passmore, *The Right in France*, 45-46.

conservative camps), and "Long Live Russia, Long Live Boulanger!".177 His fame as the "café-concert General" referenced the fact that social classes mingled within his base, as he drew support from workers to monarchists and beyond.178 This seemingly illogical pattern of allegiance was also visible in the pro-alliance support which pre-dated his rise. One well-known group which strongly supported Boulanger was the Ligue des patriotes founded by Paul Déroulède, who Kevin Passmore has credited with bringing a pro-Russia bias "into Republican circles."179 (Déroulède's pro-Russia agitation is described in Chapters 2 and 7.)

In the second instance, Alfred Dreyfus was falsely accused of passing military documents to Germany in 1894, yet even after proof emerged of the real identity of the spy, the army and government upheld his conviction. Compellingly, although not discussed in the alliance literature, the need for the army and government to be seen to act immediately upon learning of military espionage might well have been related to the treaty with Russia,180 on questionable ground due to the death of the Tsar at the time of Dreyfus's arrest. Ultimately only international pressure led the government to finally "pardon" Dreyfus after he was re-convicted in a second trial in 1899, but he was not fully exonerated until 1906. Significantly, Russia along

177 Dorpalen, "Tsar Alexander III and the Boulanger Crisis ", 133. Alliance historian George Kennan noted that both Boulanger and Déroulède rallied to Juliette Adam's cause in the mid-1880s. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance, 69.

178 Passmore, The Right in France, 51, 47.

179 Passmore, The Right in France, 49, 68. As noted in Chapter 7, in 1881 Paul Déroulède was appointed to oversee military education in Republican schools. A decision by Jules Ferry to abandon the textbooks commissioned by Déroulède and his committee led to the founding of the Ligue des patriotes, which soon had sixty-two regional branches. Carroll, French Public Opinion, 110-111.

180 Clause number four of the treaty stipulated that the two nations' General Staffs should "communicate...all information relative to the armies of the Triple Alliance..." "The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention", http://www.gwpda.org/1914m/franruss.html. The Dreyfus stance also points to the government's need to appear to be in control of the military. This supports David Bell's observation that the French army attempted to position itself "as morally superior to a corrupt Republic" at the time. David A. Bell, "Response Essay" to reviews of David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007) in H-France Forum, 2:3 (Summer, 2007), 74.
with other nations supported a proposed boycott of the 1900 Paris *exposition universelle* due to the retrial result, a matter of considerable influence in the pardoning of Dreyfus. As strife concerning Dreyfus's guilt or innocence split the country during the 1890s, the affair also engendered a brief *coup* attempt by anti-Dreyfusard ultra-nationalists led by Paul Déroulède in 1899, along with attacks on the military once its deception was revealed. General Boisdeffre, negotiator of the alliance with Russia, would ultimately retire in disgrace as an active participant in the cover-up.

Given the above problems and preoccupations, the stage was set for extra-governmental groups to play a major role in facilitating positive attitudes towards an alliance. It is vital to repeat that during the 1870s and 1880s - indeed, starting immediately after the 1871 defeat - as French politicians clashed and dissembled, individuals and groups in the public sphere moved to begin strengthening bilateral ties. Their work, although not an orchestrated effort, proved to be a synthetic one in recasting traditionally negative representations of Russia to promote an emerging *partenariat*. Probing the role of extra-governmental actors in urging and affirming the alliance brings a new understanding to its inception, providing insights beyond those gained from the existing historiography on the Franco-Russian pact. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, elite citizens began to promote an alliance while helping to generate widespread public support, as they employed an unprecedented contemporary proliferation of

---


traditional and new media to accomplish this against the fractured political landscape of the early Third Republic. Ultimately, as part of the evolving Republican project of early mass democracy, public consensus concerning foreign policy decisions became the goal of many. Chapters 2 through 7 thus detail the additional contributions of actors in the cultural, entertainment, civic and religious spheres to encourage alliance support, at its heart driven by national security fears.

1.3 **Opposition to the alliance in France**

Yet what of opposition to an alliance, particularly by those uneasy about linking the continent’s youngest democracy with autocratic, tsarist Russia? Demonstrably, fears of further war with Germany continued to shape the Republic, with only a small amount of pacifism visible in its political ranks. A survey of contemporary sources indicates that alliance opposition remained muted overall, although pacifists and anarchists along with some well-known politicians, feminists, Radical republicans and socialists did agitate against it. Their arguments against militarism frequently twinned with protests against "pronatalist propaganda", with procreation to feed the nation's glory via the military maw proving anathema to some. Satirical and anarchist-leaning publications such as *Le Triboulet, La Révolte, La Caricature, Le Rire* and *L’Assiette au beurre* protested particularly against the latter, while others such as *Le Grelot*

184 Thomson, *Democracy in France*, 149.

185 Politicians against the alliance with Russia included the Radical deputies Ernest Constans, a Minister of the Interior, and Georges Clemenceau, head of the party, who lobbied for an alliance with England instead. Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, *Alliance franco-russe*, 65, 110, 192. See also Moss, "French Criticism".

186 These groups called for a "a strike of wombs" in response to the maxim "Maternity is woman's patriotism". Erin Williams Hyman, "La Grève des Ventres: Anarchist 'Anti-matriotism' and Rachilde’s La Marquise de Sade", in Chaitin, ed., *Culture Wars*, 128, 131, 130.
focused on criticizing Republican leaders. Socialists and Radicals declared that the bourgeois Republic had betrayed the ideals of the French Revolution, as did anarchists who had moved to pariah status after the 1890s domestic attacks.

Published opposition, although minimal in the archival record, is found predominantly in peripheral publications (i.e. those whose circulation reached a few thousand) which provided a sort of "safety valve mechanism" for protest on mainstream issues. Taken together, these publications reflect the turbulent political landscape of the early Third Republic, as well as the impact of 1881 press laws freeing the limits of public debate. Opposition in these sources took several guises: it might be overt, oblique or coded, and ironic or satirical, and it was frequently expressed in visual form. It might target Russia, war, the political regimes involved or the alliance itself.

Individuals fiercely opposed to an alliance often retreated behind a pen-name or anonymity, as in an 1887 pamphlet entitled "La Russie, voilà l'ennemi!" Invoking the dark mid-century prophecies of Astolphe de Custine, it declared that "this alliance... will only result in invasion of all of central Europe by the legions of Muscovy!" Intriguingly, this author used the word "alliance" four years before official negotiations began, possibly suggestive of early machinations in the financial arena. Another anonymous pamphlet featured a "Credo franco-russe", mocking the sub-text of divine aid frequently invoked in publicity for the alliance. Dedicated to Admiral Avellan, head of the Russian fleet visiting Toulon in 1893, it read:

Their publication dates range widely: Le Triboulet (1881-1893), La Révolte (1879-18??), La Caricature (1880-1904), Le Rire (1894-1950), L'Assiette au beurre (1901-1936), and Le Grelot (1871-1903).


This was a play on an anti-clerical rallying cry attributed to Léon Gambetta that year: "Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi!". "La Russie, voilà l'ennemi!", pamphlet anonyme, 1887. http://gallica.bnf.fr
I believe in Alexander III, the All-Powerful, Father of Peoples, and Peacemaker of the Earth. I believe in the All-encompassing Goodness of the Imperial family of Russia. I believe in the Holy Spirit of Peace. I believe in the Immaculate Conception of the Franco-Russian alliance... I believe in the resurrection of France, Russia's ally...

Existing peace leagues, emblematic of pan-European associational life, provided another critical forum, with the addition of twenty-seven new pacifist groups during the early Third Republic. Of note, these leagues often advocated peace through great power negotiations, in contrast to a peace resting on a balance of military strength as a deterrent to war. Particularly in the late 1890s when expressions of alliance enthusiasm declined in France (reflecting in part a shift to the left in national politics), some writers expressed sympathy for the Enlightenment-inspired aspirations of Russia's intelligentsia while condemning repression against them. Pacifist authors often praised Leo Tolstoy, long a critic of Russia's political and religious regimes. In 1894 Tolstoy declared:

... [it is] a stupid lie to assert that the object of these unseemly and silly orgies [celebrations during the 1893 visit to France by the Russian fleet] was to create respect for peace in Europe.... [The alliance stands for] an association of warmongers.... [It will lead to] wholesale murder...

---


192 I thank Dr. Robert Nye for pointing out this distinction.


Another means of expressing oblique disapproval of the alliance was to reproduce negative political cartoons published in other countries, particularly those questioning the Republican embrace of tsarist Russia. Contemporary writer John Grand-Carteret documented a large number of these pan-European anti-alliance cartoons. Remarkable in their scope and diversity, they derided the military agreement between unlikely political partners and criticized the ratcheting-up of the tensions which would ultimately lead to World War I.

Yet mainstream French newspapers expressed relatively little criticism of the alliance, to some degree reflecting the influence of Russian lobbying to promote the loans from France, a topic discussed in Chapter 3. During the late 1880s several newspapers did oppose an alliance with Russia, however, preferring a military agreement with England or with Germany instead. But by the 1890s their arguments shifted as geopolitical imperatives and demographic concerns prevailed. Socialist authors now began to criticize the secrecy of the alliance terms - although not the alliance itself - in papers such as Le Siècle and La Petite République, while some Radicals fretted that the treaty lacked revanchiste teeth. Although in 1895 the press did campaign against the large number of Russian securities held in France, echoing concerns by the Finance Ministry that this weakened domestic securities, this did not signal alliance disapproval. Also despite misgivings concerning whether France could be seen to endorse Russia's foreign policy, prominent editors continued their support.


196 Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 141; Michon, Franco-Russian Alliance, 76, 96.

197 Anan’ich and Bovykin, "Foreign Banks and Foreign Investment in Russia", 260.
It is important to note, however, that while overt opposition to the alliance remained rare in the mainstream press, it is difficult to ascertain to what degree de facto or self-censorship may have played a role. Despite the 1881 laws granting broad press freedoms, articles deemed insulting to the army or to political leaders immediately incurred harsh penalties, with the offending publications banned from posting in street kiosks.\(^{198}\) Censorship did influence the content of songs published during the alliance, as noted by the London *Times*.\(^{199}\)

In contrast to the mainstream press, smaller publications demonstrated their disapproval of the governments involved. *Le Triboulet*, for example, included an 1896 item entitled "The Franco-Russian treaty unveiled" which reported that France and Russia planned to exchange political prisoners held in New Caledonia and Siberia respectively, in order that those incarcerated might enjoy a change of climate.\(^{200}\) Also focusing on political repression, periodicals from the far left - including *La Révolte* - published articles attacking the presence of Russian police in France,\(^{201}\) a matter tolerated by the French government since the assassination of Alexander II had led to a diaspora of revolutionary groups.

Some weeklies adopted an ironical or satirical tone directed at French officials and their obsequiousness to the Tsar, a tone clearly linked to anti-Republican groups. This was frequently conveyed through cartoons. Although Robert Goldstein has argued that by the early 1890s


\(^{201}\) Hogenhuis-Séliverstoff, *Alliance franco-russe*, 102.
political caricature had largely ceded place to cartoons lampooning French social life, a few illustrated publications took political aim. The socialist *La Caricature*, for example, opposed to the "swamp of parliamentary mercantilism" created by powerful bourgeois leaders and capitalists associated with the Republic, criticized those who profited from the visit of Russian naval officers in 1893, and warned against the public's enthusiasm for Russian bonds. Others concentrated on the Russian loans. Fiscal finger-pointing appeared in *La Sociale* in 1896, where Nicolas II was portrayed commenting to Félix Faure: "...these fêtes, these dinners are all very well, but the loan?", with the President reassuring him that it would soon be granted. *Le Rire* went further, mocking public frenzy during Nicholas II's 1896 visit via several cartoons; uniquely, it also hinted that the French police played a role in stimulating this enthusiasm. President Faure's protocol dilemmas during his 1897 journey to Russia earned its particular ridicule.

By 1897 leftist sentiment motivated by government scandals began to increase, leading to some hints of alliance opposition, as in one edition of *Le Rire* which strayed close to forbidden waters by depicting an enormous head of Nicholas II as a token, or game piece, on its cover. Depicting a *coq* crowing as a bare-breasted Marianne kissed the cheek of the Tsar, its accompanying caption read "Our little father, His Majesty Tsar Nicholas II"(Figure 1).


204 In fact no loan was being negotiated that year. *La Sociale*, 18 octobre 1896, as reprinted in Grand-Carteret, *Musée pittoresque*, 234

205 No suggestion of police involvement to encourage public enthusiasm appears in any other source examined for this dissertation.


207 *Le Rire*, 28 août 1897.
cartoon appeared after the new Tsar publicly used the term "allies" for the first time, and it conveyed the sentiment that France had betrayed its democratic ideals.

Another vehemently critical periodical, the anarchist-leaning *L’Assiette au beurre*, subsequently expressed opposition to the tsarist regime with a 1901 cover page depicting a Russian Cossack soldier beating an elderly couple with a knout, accompanied by the caption "Pour Dieu, pour le Tsar, pour la Patrie", a slogan taken from the theatrical production of Jules Verne’s *Michel Strogoff*, discussed in Chapter 4. A subsequent issue contained a cartoon criticizing the repression of Russian intellectuals, among them Leo Tolstoy, as well as anti-war images. By 1905 *L’Assiette au beurre* openly called to abolish the alliance, with a cover image of a blood-splattered Nicholas II in reference to the Bloody Sunday massacre of the first Russian revolution.

In contrast to the negative positions of the publications above, those of the satirical weekly *Le Grelot* demonstrated a seesaw of attitudes between 1891 and 1896; whether this reflected a changing editorial board is unclear. Published shortly after the 1891 French fleet visit to Cronstadt, one derisory cartoon entitled "La France Devenue Cosaque" depicted French citizens queuing to buy candles as they saluted a grinning Cossack perched above the storefront of a "candle merchant", with buyers walking away devouring their candles. This was a reference to the pejorative expression denigrating Russians as "candle eaters", or anti-

---


209 The journal was first published in April, 1901, appearing bi-weekly thereafter. "Pour Dieu, pour le Tsar, pour la Patrie"; "Le Tsar Rouge"; "À bas l'Alliance russe". *L’Assiette au beurre*, 23 mai 1901; février 1905; juillet 1905. http://gallica.bnf.fr

Enlightenment, long a constant in the nineteenth-century European imaginary.\textsuperscript{211} By 1893 Le Grelot's tone had changed, however, as seen in cartoons celebrating the strength of the Franco-Russian military pact against that of the Triple Alliance (Figure 2).\textsuperscript{212} Yet just weeks later, it mocked the domestic pro-alliance coalition by depicting prominent figures "groveling" while saluting departing Russian fleet officers; referencing abuses by the tsarist regime, this cartoon pointedly included the Republican symbol of Marianne holding a shield emblazoned with "Droits de l'homme" (the Rights of Man) (Figure 3).\textsuperscript{213} In 1896 Le Grelot demonstrated further opposition, portraying French officials kneeling before the Tsar and declaring that they were "ripe for the knout"\textsuperscript{214} due to their obsequiousness. But tellingly, subsequent cartoons highlighted France's depopulation concerns: one criticized surgical and other means to prevent births, while another identified the most common groups of women choosing not bear children.\textsuperscript{215}

In summary, then, the opposition above was as much indicative of domestic political divisions and the determination to uphold the political ideals of the French Revolution, as it was

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{211} A similar image appears in a series of anti-Russian drawings created by Gustave Doré during the Crimean War and reproduced in the American magazine \textit{Life} during the Cold War. Gustave Doré, \textit{Histoire pittoresque, dramatique et caricaturale de la Sainte Russie} (Paris: 1854); "Doré’s Comic-Strip History of Russia: War, Gore, Patricide, Turk Trouble", \textit{Life} (March 5, 1951): 110-117; David Kunzle, "Gustave Doré’s History of Holy Russia: Anti-Russian Propaganda from the Crimean War to the Cold War", \textit{Russian Review} 42: 3 (July, 1983): 271-299.

\textsuperscript{212} "L'Ours et la sentinelle"; "L'Équilibre de l'Europe", \textit{Le Grelot}, 24 septembre 1893, 8 octobre 1893, as reprinted in Grand-Carteret, \textit{Caricatures sur l'Alliance franco-russe}, 36, 38.

\textsuperscript{213} "Allons-nous en gens de la noce...(Hymne russe)", \textit{Le Grelot}, 29 octobre 1893, 1. Among those depicted praising the Russian visitors were national and municipal politicians, representatives of the national, socialist and radical republican press, a workers' union, a Catholic bishop and members of the military.

\textsuperscript{214} "Répétition générale"; "Tous plus plats", \textit{Le Grelot}, 13 septembre 1896; 4 octobre 1896, as reprinted in Grand-Carteret, \textit{Musée pittoresque}, 45, 47.

of positions on the military pact itself. As will be seen, the alliance enjoyed strong support in the public sphere, evidence of putting "nation before ideology". Appeals to nationalism and patriotism helped to garner this support, although accusations of collaboration might continue to serve disparate domestic political agendas. Steven Marks, for example, has described how at the height of the Dreyfus affair some anti-Dreyfusards claimed that Jews and Freemasons were collaborating to disrupt alliance initiatives due to repression of these two groups in Russia. By contrast, Édouard Drumont, author of the pernicious book *La France juive*, joined others to claim that the loans made to Russia amounted to a Jewish attempt to dominate Europe.

Although many in democratic France may have had concerns about allying with autocratic Russia, reservations differed from dissent. Even those who might have been expected not to support the alliance did so, as in the case of Karl Marx's daughter and her formerly-exiled Communard husband who attended the 1893 banquet to welcome Russian naval officers to Paris. Patently, domestic political differences had ceded ground to the widespread anxiety concerning German power. When Radical republicans, ultra-right nationalists and Catholics emerged to challenge the Opportunist majority in the mid-1890s, the alliance remained in place. Public fervor did begin to wane during the late 1890s when


evolving bilateral foreign policy objectives resulted in modifications to the alliance terms, but as the photograph described on page two documents, the influence of the alliance in allaying national security concerns would persist for years to come.

In conclusion, the discussion in this chapter reveals a clear overlap of the alliance with existential questions in fin-de-siècle France. On the one hand lay a foreign power that threatened the nation’s survival and exacerbated its continental political isolation; on the other, domestic issues concerning governance and depopulation prevailed. As will be seen in successive chapters, an alliance with Russia could be imagined to address all of these issues, with its promotion facilitated by developments in both the domestic and pan-European cultural spheres. And now for a look at the most prominent extra-governmental figures involved.

---

220 New clauses stipulated mutual military aid if either party went to war against Great Britain, and that the alliance would no longer be tied to the duration of the Triple Alliance. Tombs, France 1814-1914, 474-475; Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers, 259.
Chapter 2: Promoting an Alliance with Russia: Prominent Elites Initiate a Nascent Civic Consensus

Although pockets of opposition and criticism of the alliance did exist, on the whole support in France appears to have been vast. As historian Charles de Larivière observed in 1897,

The government was preceded by public opinion: [from] the high and low of the social ladder, intellectuals, politicians, the masses, all wished for and acclaimed the Franco-Russian accord. [French] diplomacy bowed before this unanimity; it joined to a cause which served the interests of the nation, and it succeeded fully.221

A professor from the École Polytechnique characterized the alliance as "not the result of the schemings of official diplomacy.... [It is]... a triumph for popular diplomacy. Statesmen rejected it. Thinkers dreamed of it. The people have achieved it." How might one trace the influence of extra-governmental elites in building such support?

Sources reveal that almost two decades of elite alliance promotion preceded official government overtures made towards Russia in the early 1890s. The individuals and groups involved worked in the academic, financial, lobbyist and cultural sectors, and their pro-alliance consensus building took place against the backdrop of chronic government instability and fears of a further German attack. This observation adds to existing historiography in interesting ways: although some scholars of trans-nationalism have examined the influence of lobbyists and NGOs on twentieth-century foreign policy in democratic nations, little attention has been paid to the influence of nineteenth-century elite actors on diplomatic initiatives in times of relatively


weak governments and of perceived crisis.\textsuperscript{223} Taken together, the elites identified may be considered representative of Thomas Risse-Kappen's notion of an active civil society characterized by the participation of organized political parties, economic leaders and lobby groups, plus cultural organizations, social welfare groups and voluntary associations.\textsuperscript{224}

For the purposes of this dissertation, as mentioned in the Introduction, elites are understood in the broadest sense to be those who enjoyed power and/or prestige during the early Third Republic, whether due to traditional privilege and social status, to academic, professional or economic advancement, or to other forms of cultural capital such as that of institutionalized religion, as described by Christophe Charle.\textsuperscript{225} Charle particularly emphasized the rise of "new elites" who became powerful in the economic, administrative, cultural and religious domains formerly dominated by traditional "Elites", whose swansong occurred during the first decade of the Republic. Pro-alliance elites could thus include prominent academics, publishers and newspaper or periodical editors, authors, bankers, members of the \textit{grande bourgeoisie}, or Catholic leaders. Most of these individuals were un-elected, although they may have had government connections.


\textsuperscript{224} Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "From the Outside In and From the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy" in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., \textit{The Limits of State Autonomy}, 26 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Setting the Agenda", in \textit{Bringing Transnational Relations Back In}, 29.

2.1 Elite public opinion and foreign policy in France

Significantly, the elite pro-alliance lobby enjoyed a new freedom of expression in print, press and citizens' groups which far exceeded that possible under heavy censorship before 1871. Under Napoléon Bonaparte, for example, prior to 1812 newspapers were prohibited from expressing anti-Russian sentiment because he wanted his invasion preparations kept secret; only a state-directed newspaper contained subtle propaganda to prepare citizens for war.\textsuperscript{226} Heralding more openness during the Second Empire, however, Napoléon III's half-brother the Duke of Morny described "... a new European power with which all governments are forced to deal: that power is opinion". This reflected widening communication channels and the political climate following the 1848 revolutions. Napoléon III thus regularly gauged national opinion via secret reports from \textit{procureurs généraux} (chief prosecutors of the twenty-eight appeals courts, reporting to the Minister of Justice), from departmental prefects (reporting to the Ministry of the Interior), and from the police. Prefect or regional reports in particular played a role in government decisions leading to the Franco-Prussian War; and in times of crisis, the number of reports increased.\textsuperscript{227} Demonstrating the unprecedented \textit{fin-de-siècle} shift into open debate, by the early twentieth century the importance of newspapers had become central: diplomats' files were replete with press reports as European governments attempted to gauge opinion in neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{228}

\textsuperscript{226} This was \textit{Le Moniteur universel}. Nikolai Promyslov and Anton Fedyashin, "The Image of Russia in French Public Opinion, 1811-1812", \textit{Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History} 15:2 (Spring, 2014): 238.

\textsuperscript{227} Lynn M. Case, \textit{French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954), 1, 6-12, 269, 271.

How might one characterize the preoccupations shared by elites in fin-de-siècle France? The 1871 defeat posed many dilemmas, notably the question of whether the Republic should adopt an active or passive foreign policy, with the former implying revanche (revenge) against Germany and the latter preparedness against future threat. Additionally, commentators debated whether the re-establishment of French power should be sought on the European continent or through colonialist action abroad. The defeat also sparked calls for a reorganization of the army along the German model, plus measures to address depopulation. Although army reforms were initiated by the General Staff, depopulation became the province of extra-governmental groups, as described in Chapter 1. Yet despite military reform and attempts to address population decline, the imbalance against Germany could not be made up, spurring urgent calls for an alliance. During the 1870s, elite opinion was mixed whether an alliance should be sought with England, Germany or Russia; by 1891, the die would be cast with the Franco-Russian military pact.

Extra-governmental participation in debate on national security emerged immediately after 1871. The center-left La Revue politique et littéraire, also known as La Revue bleue, a publication for university elites, called for action in 1872:


… moving forward, each one of us is responsible for the future of the State… public opinion must remain removed from violent passions such as those of 1870, and [it must be] capable of choosing the direction in which the country should engage.\(^{231}\)

By the mid-1870s, positive images of Russia increasingly began to characterize opinion among prominent academics. Many elites adopted a pro-Russian bias during the 1880s, and scholars have credited this for pushing calls for an alliance through multiple changes in government.\(^{232}\)

This counters international relations scholarship which has questioned the role of public opinion in driving foreign policy decisions; rather it supports the building of coalitions around an essential objective.\(^{233}\) Although Ole Holsti has contended that a correlation between public attitudes and foreign policy does not imply a causal relationship, noting that publics may be influenced by their leaders rather than vice versa or that governments may maneuver events to persuade opinion, Thomas Risse-Kappen has argued for a dialectic between state institutional structures and coalition-building processes to influence foreign policy.\(^{234}\) The latter resonates well for fin-de-siècle France in its elite enthusiasm for Russia.

No in-depth study has examined the coming together of multiple factions around the alliance,\(^{235}\) although involvement exceeded that identified by Philip Nord in the affirmation of the


\(^{235}\) For existing scholarship on the alliance, see the dissertation’s Introduction.
Third Republic, an event that he called the "Republican moment". According to Nord, the Third Republic represented a political consensus that incorporated peasants and the middle class, Freemasons, Jews, Protestants, professors and commercial entrepreneurs. The post-1871 elite coalition for an alliance with Russia included anti-republicans, however, among them conservatives and royalists, military figures and Roman Catholic clergy. Such agreement was remarkable given the determination of anti-republican groups to defeat the sitting government. Consensus grew around a "fundamental need": that of preserving territorial integrity in the face of the ongoing perceived German threat.

Beyond this primordial issue of national security, a crucial element lay in the fact that alliance partisans could "see" many different things in Russia, allowing radically dissimilar domestic agendas to converge and coalesce to enable a coalition - although not an orchestrated one - to urge an alliance. These agendas might include a desire for revanche against Germany, or relate to domestic political, religious and/or financial concerns. Militant revanchistes, for example, could harbor hopes of re-annexing Alsace-Lorraine, pondering the vast Russian population to be conscripted as comrades-in-arms. Nostalgic traditionalists could re-envision a monarchy lost, while Catholic conservatives such as Eugène Melchior de Vogüé could find in Russian literature a spiritual antidote to French realist and modernist works. Losing ground to Republican secularizers, Catholic clergy could now abandon centuries of animosity towards the Russian Orthodox religion and point to the example of a Tsar who served

---


238 De Vogüé's seminal book on Russian novels is discussed in Chapter 3.
as titular head of a national Church. Still other groups could imagine an investment El Dorado, or new export prospects stemming from a Russian embrace. Widespread consensus for the alliance might well have been at hand, but *rapprochement* with Russia might also serve domestic interests.

Several conditions particular to France enabled intellectual, financial, cultural and nationalist elites to urge a formal alliance with Russia. Two singular practices spurred their involvement, each strongly inflected by the past. Clearly the most important was Republicanism, unique on the continent in a fledgling form. The Republicanism of the 1880s carried with it the ideals of political inclusion and citizen action stemming from the French Revolution, with participation in national life deemed a crucial condition for moving the nation forward after 1871. A second practice, that of traditional Catholicism enmeshed with politics and the state, would also inadvertently serve alliance interests, as outlined in Chapter 7. The enmeshment of these practices with the pan-European trends noted below created the climate for elite lobbying regarding foreign affairs and ultimately, mass alliance support.

A range of *fin-de-siècle* Continental trends facilitated elite involvement as well: academic and professional specialization, transnational investment by commercial societies and banking conglomerates, fledgling press freedoms and voluntary associations. Yet some aspects of these trends remained unique to France. Although academics championed new fields of science after the Franco-Prussian War, the traditional importance of French literature twinned with politics endured, and the valorization of a national literature as a civilizational marker would become one springboard for the positive re-framing of Russia. With respect to transnational economic ties, French investment became irrevocably linked to its national security interests. The most important condition favoring extra-governmental engagement, however, emerged with press

freedoms in 1881, although as noted in Chapter 3 some limited censorship did prevail.
Voluntary associations might also be subject to censorship if they interfered with government initiatives.

2.2 Elite opinion versus popular support

With respect to elite opinion during the early Third Republic, of whom might one confidently speak? The pressure for an alliance illustrates that a variety of groups and individuals both expressed and directed opinion; this corresponds with the observation that "...abundant evidence [suggests] that public [elite] opinion was a fairly constant factor in the conduct of Foreign Affairs". Although one early author identified the "executive, administrative, parliamentary and press" sectors as the leaders of such opinion, another suggested instead a triad incorporating politicians, the press and prominent members of the upper middle class. The latter applies while when considering alliance promotion by "new elites" encouraged by Republican meritocracy.

Two factors characterize the appropriateness of the triad model above for the early Third Republic: first, the unprecedented importance of the press, and second, democratic practices. As will be described in Chapter 3, full press freedoms revolutionized a political culture that became "...centered on the printed word". Discussion concerning foreign affairs - which was rarely anonymous - proliferated in multiple newspapers, both political and popular. Although a


241 Nord, The Republican Moment, 4; Charle, Social History of France, 179-216.


handful served the government, the majority of newspapers remained independent, albeit
subject to substantial lobbying by special interests. Another factor favoring press influence was
that compared to elsewhere in Europe, a larger proportion of former journalists and publicists
held high office in France, bringing with them a knowledge of the currents of elite and non-elite
opinion. The advancement of such individuals may have been due in part to the key role of
newspapers in helping republican deputies defeat the "Moral Order" government of the 1870s
(although nominally Republican, its reactionary leadership represented the traditional ruling
class). Also favoring press efforts to influence foreign policy, the Chamber of Deputies
remained preoccupied by domestic issues. Additionally, because it could be seen as
"unpatriotic" to debate foreign policy in the Chamber, and because the Foreign Affairs minister
was constitutionally protected from extensive interpellation there, as an instrument of elite
opinion the press could and did try to influence the Foreign Office, known colloquially as the
Quai d'Orsay (named after its location in Paris).

Regarding the second factor favoring the role of elites in opinion-making, i.e. democratic
practices, during the 1880s "Republic of the bourgeois notables", the upper middle class began
to "dominate political and foreign policy". This reflected, as Maurice Agulhon has observed, a
"new sociability which the Republic had liberated and politicized" that would ultimately create a
national tapestry of "rich associational life". Significantly, liberalization meant that "... a large part

244 Carroll, French Public Opinion, 13; David Thomson, Democracy in France: The Third Republic

245 Charle, Social History of France, 212.

246 M.B. Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914

247 Thomson, Democracy in France, 64.
of power [lay] outside the parliamentary and state arena". Participatory democracy, taking root at the same time that the state began pioneering a nationalist agenda and multiple new functions, meant a broadening of inclusivity in politics and administration. Indeed, approximately one-third of sitting members of the Chamber of Deputies had served as regional mayors, and another one-third as local counselors. New elites, among them the "intellectuals" described by Charle, now viewed themselves as central to government decision-making; these included the academic figures discussed below.

Promoting the Franco-Russian alliance was not the only example of extra-governmental participation in policy questions at the time, however, as revealed by two further issues related to national security and foreign affairs: i.e., depopulation and colonialism. Chapter 1 demonstrates that depopulation received extensive elite attention; indeed during the 1890s it appeared to be a national preoccupation, with citizen leagues agitating for measures to encourage an increased birthrate and to reduce mortality among children and youth. Involvement by elites was also seen in the "colonialist party", a smattering of lobby groups which despite their relatively limited membership - a "minorité agissante" - pressed the


251 Charle, Birth of the Intellectuals, 61-62, 183, 188.

252 Beyond the references on depopulation cited in Chapter 1, see Karen Offen, "Depopulation, Nationalism and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France", American Historical Review 89:3 (June, 1984): 648-676.
government to expand French influence in the colonial sphere.\textsuperscript{253} Yet demonstrating that participatory democracy had its limits, beyond any depopulation, colonialist or alliance initiatives which enjoyed government approbation (if not always concrete support), lobby groups could be suppressed by the government for excessive political agitation. This was true of two ultranationalist associations whose campaigning for \textit{revanche} interfered with sensitive overtures to Russia: Juliette Adam’s \textit{Association artistique et litteraire franco-russe}, and Paul Déroulède’s \textit{Ligue des patriotes}, the first dissolved in 1888 and the second suppressed in 1889.\textsuperscript{254} This occurred as General Boulanger’s challenge to Republican rule came to the fore, and just as French bankers began to negotiate the first loans to Russia.

Although this chapter is concerned with elite action, as a springboard to Chapters 3 through 7 it is useful here to consider the role of the wider public, or non-elites, in supporting an alliance with Russia. While many scholars consider public opinion to be that solely of elites, some historians have proposed a broader, more inclusive definition for the early Third Republic. Thus Jean-Marie Mayeur described an increasingly widespread critical opinion generated by press freedoms, rising literacy and universal conscription.\textsuperscript{255} Indeed, the identification of non-elite opinion (sometimes referred to as "common opinion"), along with debates concerning its importance, first emerged during the alliance era. In opposition to Gustave Le Bon, for example, 


whose 1895 work entitled *Psychologie des foules* argued for the superiority of elites against the potentially destructive nature of the crowd.\footnote{256} Gabriel Tarde clearly differentiated a thoughtful "Public" or "publics" from "the crowd" in his 1901 book entitled *L'Opinion et la foule*. For Tarde, crowds were defined as those groups acting in immediate physical proximity; by contrast, evolving modern publics embodied more abstract, dispersed groups which grew in reaction to significant events and/or serious issues, with broad discussion and cohesion enabled by the increased circulation of books and newspapers. Tarde cited the rise of the press (which he termed "the Press" to emphasize its importance) as the key factor in stimulating opinion among such groups.\footnote{257} Echoing Tarde's notion of influential publics, Michael Warner subsequently argued in 2002 that a "discursive circularity" builds around "common publics" which are open-ended, inclusive and "performative", i.e. self-conscious in their expression.\footnote{258}

While Tarde and Warner's hypotheses apply well in principle here, the difficulty lies in identifying non-elite opinion, in particular because it is less detectable in the printed record.


Suffrage might be considered a broad but sporadic indicator, after republicans achieved an electoral "synthesis" by capturing the votes of peasants and the middle classes. But as noted in Chapter 1, voters remained embroiled in domestic issues stemming from ongoing cabinet dissolutions and regular crises and scandals. Centered on the six to eight parties in the Chamber of Deputies, where the number of seats reached five hundred and eighty-five for a population of approximately thirty-seven million, (an unusually high number by Canadian standards today), a tumultuous politics prevailed. Given this fact, it is difficult to search for expressions of non-elite opinion regarding the Franco-Russian alliance in the electoral landscape.

A second possible indicator of non-elite opinion, the free French press, may be credited with enabling wider expression, as noted in Chapter 3. Although the political press continued the traditions of the Second Empire when "... power and money talked, instead of the people", the popular press now commented freely on foreign policy. Significantly, newspapers with a mass readership sought to represent popular agreement on key issues such as the alliance, for as Dominique Kalifa has argued, they opted for positions of consensus to attract readers in a

259 Nord, "The Third Republic", 45.

260 Crises included the prorogation of government during the 16 mai crisis of 1877, the crash of the Union Générale bank and the Paris stock market in 1882, the forced resignation of President Jules Grévy due to corruption allegations in 1887, the challenge of General Boulanger to the government in 1889, the Panama Canal corruption scandal in 1892, and the Dreyfus affair from 1894 to 1906. On the 16 mai 1877, the monarchist Catholic President Marshal Patrice de MacMahon, duc de Magenta and leader of the so-called "Moral Order" government, prorogued the Chamber of Deputies in a bid to contain an emerging republican majority. A republican majority was returned. See Gildea, *Children of the Revolution*, 249-270, for a discussion of all these crises.

261 At the time of this writing Canada in 2017 has 338 Members of Parliament for a population of thirty-six million. Between 1871 and 1901 in France, the number of seats increased: 1876 (533 seats), 1877 (521 seats), 1881 (545 seats), 1885 (584 seats), 1889 (576 seats), 1893 (581 seats), and 1898 (585 seats). There were approximately ten million eligible voters at the time. Robert Gildea, *Children of the Revolution: The French, 1799-1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 249-260; Thomson, *Democracy in France*, 40.

singly competitive market, rather than follow the prescriptions of particular political parties.\textsuperscript{263} Without doubt then, the press influenced national discourse on foreign policy in a dialectical manner, but this is difficult to trace.

Beyond suffrage and the press, might new venues for common expression be considered to offer clues to the mood of non-elites? These emerged with new laws permitting freedoms of cafés (1880), of assembly (1881), and from political censorship (1885).\textsuperscript{264} All symbolized the ethos of a Republican government "founded on public opinion" and opposed to any echo of the authoritarianism once wielded by monarchical, aristocratic or religious powers.\textsuperscript{265} Yet beyond the café songs discussed in Chapter 6, common venues provide a paucity of source material regarding foreign policy concerns; they remained overshadowed by options available to elites.\textsuperscript{266}

Given the above, assessing non-elite opinion remains a challenging task. But major alliance scholars have noted widespread popular support for the rapprochement with Russia; George F. Kennan, for example, particularly credited "private stirrings". Observing that "... an alliance with Russia would be regarded by the French public as a signal triumph of French statesmanship", he argued that those negotiating the agreement


\textsuperscript{265} Cossart, \textit{From Deliberation to Demonstration}, 45; Mayeur and Rebérioux, \textit{The Third Republic}, 175.

\textsuperscript{266} Elite opinion was reflected in the elected councils of regional \textit{départements}, in local Chambers of Commerce, in state universities, and in associations following the tradition of the French \textit{salon}. The latter included associations dedicated to particular issues, including Freemasons and Roman Catholic organizations. Mayeur, \textit{La vie politique}, 78-80; Nord, \textit{The Republican Moment}, 8, 32; Thomson, \textit{Democracy in France}, 36, 106; Agulhon, \textit{The French Republic}, 58.
... were acting in accord with the compelling emotional commitment of the great body of the French citizenry, including the overwhelming majority of those who constituted its educated classes....There can be no question but that had the 1894 agreement been submitted at the time to the French parliament, it would have been instantly, and probably unanimously, approved.267

Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstof also emphasized popular alliance enthusiasm, noting spontaneous public ovations for Russian figures visiting Cherbourg, Vichy and Biarritz, and the ubiquity of the Russian national anthem in France. Such support was particularly visible when the French fleet sojourned in Cronstadt, Russia in 1891. The alliance that followed was "...a rapprochement which corresponded to the profound instincts of the public", whatever their rank or interest.268

Widespread alliance enthusiasm was frequently framed by French elites as the natural coming-together of citizens from France and Russia.269 As academic Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu asked in 1888, "Will an alliance between two governments come from this spontaneous rapprochement of two peoples?"270 Another commentator noted that "...to deny...the evident connection between the French and Russian people was to close one's eyes to the light....The friendship that France held for Russia...was the work of the nation as well as of diplomats."271

Russophilia quickly became a hallmark in Paris during the 1890s, a Belgian diplomat wrote:

The public seizes every opportunity to demonstrate its favor towards Russia, becoming ever more enthusiastic....On this point there is no divergence of view among the French, be they of the highly educated classes or those opposed to capitalism and the ruling classes.272


269 There is little evidence to suggest the involvement of Russian citizens in the alliance, other than the Russian elites mentioned here and in Chapter 3.


How might such non-elite enthusiasm be explained? Clearly, the perennial angst concerning the nation's vulnerability lay at its heart. Tony Judt has observed that in the late nineteenth century writers and politicians began to speak of "the political nation as a single being", with the result that "expectations for national cohesion... were set high". Although scholars of the Third Republic including Robert Gildea, James Lehning and Richard Thomson have concentrated on its fractious internal political and social divisions, others such as Alan Forrest have emphasized the French revolutionary legacy in the form of political citizenship. Above all, the Revolution taught that sovereignty rested with the people and that nationalism remained a vital concern. A revealing illustration of this appeared after the 1871 defeat, when as noted in Chapter 1, of the five billion franc war indemnity imposed by Germany, two billion francs were raised by public subscription. And with the establishment of universal conscription in 1872, the citizenry at large would now participate in war, paralleling the "nation-in-arms" ethos of the French Revolution. Also as noted, demonstrating the turn to Russia, 


276 Rachel Chrastil, Organizing for War: France 1870-1914 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 61.

277 The first law governing universal conscription in 1872 established three options, chosen by ballot: one group participated in just six to twelve months of military training, while their confrères spent five years in regimental service, then four in the reserve, or five years in the territorial army, followed by six in reserve; but some thirty percent were exempted overall. In 1889 the law was changed to achieve more equality: thirty percent (including professionals) underwent one year of military training, while seventy percent were required to do three full years of service. In times of war, the call-out could be extended. Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars, 140-142.
during the late 1880s an extraordinary number of small investors began to invest, in plebiscite manner, in the Russian loans. This "popular diplomacy" was both unprecedented and unique to France, eclipsing movements in the United States at the time. Significantly, such citizen participation reflects Nord's observation that the Republic emphasized that it had "the little man's interests at heart". As mass democracy increasingly took root alongside a nationalist ethos during the 1880s, therefore, so too did the common electorate's involvement in expressing opinion regarding the alliance with Russia.

Demonstrably then, a range of elite and non-elite opinion favored the alliance. For the sake of consistency in terminology, however, from here on in the term "elite opinion" will denote that expressed by elite individuals and groups, as defined at the beginning of this chapter. By contrast, in addition to the expression "non-elite opinion", the terms "popular/ broad/ widespread/ mass support or enthusiasm" will refer to pro-alliance sentiment detectable among the greater public. When added to the public subscription to the loans to Russia, the evidence in Chapters 3 through 7 further suggests broad alliance support in the consumer arena. There are also strong indications of elite efforts to involve women and children in national pro-alliance sentiment.

---


279 I am grateful to Dr. Bob Brain for this insight; see also Nord, Republican Moment, 253.

280 Nord, "The Third Republic", 45.
2.3 The role of elites in alliance promotion

Changes in France's professional arena, including an increased number of academic authors,\(^{281}\) first facilitated the re-framing of images and understandings of Russia after the Franco-Prussian War. Although many historians identify the Dreyfus affair as the occasion when modern intellectuals found a public political identity,\(^{282}\) from the early 1870s onward academic voices paved the way for politicians who would negotiate the alliance. Occupational boundaries were more permeable then than today, allowing movement between academic and political spheres. Pierre Bourdieu and others have noted that during the fin de siècle, social scientists - among them political scientists - began to emerge as arbiters of Republican policy.\(^{283}\) Theirs would become a powerful voice. When philosopher Ernest Renan declared in 1871 that Prussia’s victory was "above all intellectual", with France's "lack of faith in science" manifested in its military and political inferiority,\(^ {284}\) one response was to establish the privately-funded Paris center-left École libre des Sciences Politiques in 1872. This offered courses in diplomatic history, politics and economics, subjects key to administrative leadership but not taught at...

---

\(^{281}\) Christophe Charle noted an increase in the number of academic authors between 1876 and 1885, when their number increased to 10.3% of all authors (compared to 6.5% from 1866 to 1875). The percentage of newcomers among academic authors peaked at 44.1% between 1876 and 1885. Charle, Birth of the Intellectuals, 235, 238, 130. Charle distinguished between "Intellectuals" and "intellectuals; the latter group, distinguished by their involvement in causes such as the Dreyfus affair, became more in touch with the people.


\(^{283}\) Tucker, French Revolutionary Syndicalism, 65, 108.

\(^{284}\) Ernest Renan, La Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France, 3ème éd. (Paris: Michel-Lévy Frères, 1872), 55, 53, 36, 95, 100.
existing universities. Significantly for new elites, from the perspective of financial interests involved with this school, "economic and political liberty were [deemed] inseparable".285

During the 1870s academics from the École libre des Sciences Politiques met with François Buloz, the editor of France's most influential periodical La Revue des deux mondes, who proposed to enlarge his readers' knowledge concerning the history, culture and economies of other European nations.286 A "veritable temple of the liberal intelligentsia", the revue enjoyed a prestigious readership within the country and beyond,287 and in its pages a widening knowledge agenda overlapped with commentary on foreign affairs. Among the scholars who met with Buloz were the brothers Leroy-Beaulieu: the social economist Paul and the historian and political scientist Anatole.288 The latter played a quintessential role in encouraging Franco-Russian rapprochement, a point underscored during a speech honoring Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Académie française in 2003, when the speaker reminded him of the influence of Leroy-Beaulieu's work in re-framing French understandings of Russia.289

---

285 The École libre des Sciences Politiques assumed an influential role by training individuals whose goal was to obtain competition-based posts in the Council of State and the Inspection of Finances department. Begun by liberal Protestants and later patronized by influential Catholics, the school was both fiscally and socially conservative and positivist in its outlook, serving as a home for the new "bourgeois elite" who became associated with the Third Republic. Nord, Republican Moment, 248, 55; Mayeur and Rebéroux, The Third Republic, 66; Hayne, The French Foreign Office, 27-28; Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France, circa 1740-1880 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 182.


287 Garrigues, La République des hommes d'affaires, 97.

288 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu became Chair of Political Economy at the Collège de France in 1880; unlike his brother, he believed that the solution to France's vulnerability lay in its empire.

Almost two decades before the French government began to negotiate the alliance, therefore, the move towards a *partenariat* with Russia began in the academic arena, illustrating the role of non-state elements in forging links between unlikely partners.\(^{290}\) The contributions of four key academic "go-betweens" in changing previously negative perceptions about Russia would be subsequently complemented by those of other elite individuals and groups who promoted, enabled and supported the alliance, on both the French and Russian sides. Added to the academic go-betweens, these elites are divided below into four further categories: "instrumental actors", high-profile scientists and nationalist partisans, extra-governmental enablers, and groups emerging within a vital "associational landscape".\(^{291}\)

The idea of influential "go-betweens" has emerged from literary and science and technology studies that describe a "brokered world" wherein mobile actors or go-betweens enabled modern practices of European knowledge-making, while mediating or imposing "shared values" to set up hegemonic boundaries with non-European cultures.\(^{292}\) For the purpose of this discussion, however, academic go-betweens are defined as individuals who worked to dismantle rather than to maintain boundaries with respect to Russia, by emphasizing understanding rather than differences. This representational process began in 1872 when three French scholars traveled separately to Russia to study its history, political institutions, social life and religion, as well as the reforms including serf emancipation initiated under Alexander II.

\(^{290}\) This exemplifies Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic’s argument for the importance of examining "relationships" between states, rather than just relations. Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension", in *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 100 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1996).


These so-called "écrivains-diplomates" subsequenty authored influential works: Louis Léger, *Études slaves: Voyages et littérature* (1875), Alfred Rambaud, *Français et Russes* (1876) and *Histoire de la Russie depuis les origines jusqu’à l’année 1877* (1878), and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *L’Empire des Tsars et les Russes* (1881-1889). Adding to their work was Eugène Melchior de Vogüé’s important study of Russian novels, *Le roman russe* (1886).

These publications demonstrated a prolonged "scientific" study made possible by the authors’ ability to communicate in Russian, and they established the image of Russia as a European power worthy of a partnership with France. Leroy-Beaulieu and de Vogüé first serialized their works in *La Revue des deux mondes*, which also sponsored Leroy-Beaulieu’s investigative trips to Russia. Léger and Rambaud, meanwhile, contributed articles to the aforementioned *La Revue politique et littéraire*, whose readership included university faculties and professional societies. Léger noted the importance of their collective work in setting the alliance

---


stage: "Science works most often in the shadows, but its efforts are well compensated on the
day that politics begins to profit from... its modest labor." 295

The four academics paved the way to override previously negative imaginings of Russia
by pioneering Russian language instruction, by reframing Russia within a framework of
European history, by disseminating detailed knowledge about Russian society, institutions and
religion, and by popularizing Russian literature. Setting the stage for rapprochement, they
emphasized Russian reforms, progress and culture, while simultaneously de-emphasizing the
sensitive issues of tsarist autocracy and of Catholic Poland's autonomy. Rambaud, for example,
having studied Russian under Léger who derided those depicting Poland as "a sort of Christ
among nations, unjustly crucified", presented an apologia if not a justification for Russian
repression of the 1863 Polish insurrection by citing examples of Poland's "errors" and of
Russia's "humanity." 296

The go-betweens' success mirrored an evolving institutional landscape in the early Third
Republic. Léger, for example, taught Russian in Paris while occupying the chair of Slavic
Studies at the Collège de France (first held by the vehement Polish nationalist Adam
Mickiewicz), 297 while Rambaud held the first chair of Modern History at the Sorbonne and Leroy-
Beaulieu served as professor and then director of the École libre des Sciences Politiques. 298
Unlike Léger and de Vogüé, Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu exemplified the movement from

295 Léger, Souvenirs d'un slavophile, 122.
296 Léger, Souvenirs d'un slavophile, 65; Rambaud, Histoire de la Russie, 269, 271-273.
297 Adam Mickiewicz, a leading Polish exile and national poet who resided in Paris from 1832 to
1844, remained a bitter opponent of Russia throughout his four-year tenure at the Collège de France
(1840-1844). Roman Robert Korojeckyj, Adam Mickiewicz: The Life of a Romantic (New York: Cornell
University Press, 2008), 262.
298 Garrigues, La République des hommes d'affaires, 17-18, 89-90.
literature as the canonical French academic domain to social and political science and history, steadily gaining ascendancy in the early Third Republic as elsewhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{299}

How might their importance be measured? Although Louis Léger held no elected role in government he earned the support of individuals in the Ministry of Public Instruction, as well as that of influential Russian expatriate author Ivan Turgenev who served as a cultural linchpin between French and Russian literati.\textsuperscript{300} While Slavic literature and culture remained the focus of Léger’s work, crucially his teaching of Russian - including courses at the École supérieure de guerre and the École Libre des Sciences Politiques - led to the introduction of Russian courses in several schools by his "disciples", supplementing that begun in 1880 at the premier military academy of St. Cyr.\textsuperscript{301} Evidently some government support for communication competence extended beyond this: Russian courses began at the Sorbonne in 1880,\textsuperscript{302} at the Collège de France in 1885 (prior to the Russian loans), at the Université de Lille in 1892 and at the Université de Dijon in 1897. Although other opportunities existed in Paris to learn Russian via courses offered by the Associations polytechnique and philotechnique, and also by the Sociétés pour la propagation d’éducation and la propagation de langues étrangères, fewer courses were available in the provinces despite lobbying by commercial interests. Textile industrialists in Lille

\begin{footnotes}
\item[299] Tucker, French Revolutionary Syndicalism, 114; Charle, Birth of the Intellectuals, 186, 190.
\item[300] Léger, Souvenirs d’un slavophile, 83, 125, 124, 148.
\item[302] The Sorbonne would establish a dedicated professorship in Russian language and literature in 1902.
\end{footnotes}
did succeed in their promotion, however, while in Le Havre Russian courses were well attended through the 1890s,\(^{303}\) reflecting ongoing bilateral naval exchange.

The second academic go-between, Alfred Rambaud, exemplified permeable *fin-de-siècle* professional boundaries by serving as professor at the École Normale Supérieure, as chief advisor in the Ministry of Public Instruction and Fine Arts under Jules Ferry (1879-1883), as chair of Modern History at the Sorbonne (1884-1895), as elected senator (1895-1903), and as Minister of Public Instruction, Culture and the Arts (1896-1898). Additionally, he acted as general editor of *La Revue politique et littéraire* beginning in 1888. Whether Rambaud may have influenced the establishment of the Russian courses above remains unclear. His most important work on Russia, a history that saw several editions, became a textbook in Russian schools.\(^{304}\) Countering traditional characterizations of a "barbarian Muscovy", Rambaud argued that the so-called "Mongol yoke", i.e. the Mongol invasions which kept Russia from the influence of Christian Europe, had not dominated Russian history to the degree that its detractors maintained.\(^{305}\) Taxonomy mattered, in a political way: judging Russia to be "European" rather than "Asiatic" or "barbarian" would naturalize its relationship with France. Thus "... the Russians appear as the soldiers of civilization" in countries that had been "... dishonored by Musulman fanaticism, by wars... and by traffic in slaves."\(^{306}\) As civilizing imperialists, Russian forces might affirm the aspirations of French colonialist groups, a matter discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

\(^{303}\) Butenschön, *Zarenhymne und Marseillaise*, 113, 119; De Larivière, "De l'Enseignment": 277-279.

\(^{304}\) Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism*, 182.


The third academic to counter traditionally negative views of Russia, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, was a professor of Contemporary History and Oriental Affairs at the École libre des Sciences Politiques (1881-1906), becoming its director in 1906. Appointed to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1887, Leroy-Beaulieu held no government post although as previously noted he is credited with having a key influence on the establishment of the alliance. This was due to his three-volume *magnum opus, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes* (first serialized in *La Revue des deux mondes*), which remained unparalleled in its thoroughness and scope. Based on ten years of reading, travel sojourns and correspondence with many in Russia, the first volume examined Russian social groups while the second focused on government and institutions and the third explored the Russian Orthodox religion. Echoing Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu reiterated that Russia belonged in Europe, noting the similarity between some of Russia's institutions and those in France's past,\(^{307}\) in effect arguing that Russia was a developing nation. He remained clear-eyed and judicious regarding the alliance, however, incisively probing its risks but concluding that it was an inevitable response to the *Triplice* (Triple Alliance) to guarantee European peace. Leroy-Beaulieu's Catholic faith was evident throughout his writing, as when he described Tsar Alexander III as peaceful and pious and therefore unlikely to instigate war.\(^{308}\)

To the work of the trio above must be added that of historian, writer and political figure Vicomte Eugène Melchior de Vogüé, who served as secretary to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg (1877-1882) and as a member of the French Chamber of Deputies (1893-1896). As noted in Chapter 1, de Vogüé has been identified as an early individual employed by the French


government to test the ground for a possible alliance with Russia. Some spousal influence may be credited here, as his brother-in-law was Controller General of the Russian empire and director of the Trans-Caspian Railway. Involved in the 1890s ralliement, or the rallying of French Catholic support for the Third Republic described in Chapter 7, de Vogüé’s professional work illustrated his conservative Catholic leanings. His most well-known publication, Le roman russe, examined novels by Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, concentrating on their "spiritual sustenance"; this reflected his concern about the state of Catholic values in the face of positivism and the cult of reason. Previously serialized in La Revue des deux mondes, Le roman russe saw eleven editions between 1886 and 1906; some have credited it with giving a "green light" for the alliance among educated elites, and it resulted in de Vogüé being named to the Académie française.

To reiterate then, the important groundwork in re-framing images of Russia laid by go-betweens Louis Léger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé was rooted in the decade after the Franco-Prussian War, during the "Republic of the dukes" and well before the establishment of a centrist republican government and the 1891 alliance negotiations. Their writing and thoughts would filter throughout academic and political


310 De Vogüé married Alexandra Annenkof, whose father Mikhail reported to the Paris Geographical Society on the progress of the Trans-Caspian line. "The Trans-Caspian Railway", The Scottish Geographical Magazine 2 (1886): 286.

311 De Vogüé, Le roman russe, lii. For a fascinating analysis of Russian authors’ reaction to French literary secularism, see Priscilla Meyer, How the Russians Read the French: Lermontov, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).

312 An ardent Catholic, de Vogüé had accompanied archaeological expeditions to the Holy Land. Noulens, Les Tsars et la République, 19; Judt, French Intellectuals, 309; Corbet, L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 368, 404.
worlds via the books and periodicals described in Chapter 3, leading a prominent Russian journalist to credit them with establishing an "alliance intellectuelle".  

Subsequent to the efforts by these academic go-betweens, beginning in the 1880s a second group of elite individuals served as bilateral "instrumental actors", helping to shape the alliance in the arenas of finance and press. Instrumental actors, following Thomas Risse-Kappen's definition, include those looking to influence policy decisions for economic or other gains, and those wishing to promote particular ideas. In this instance the term applies to individuals involved in arranging the loans to Russia, as well as to key inter-governmental intermediaries and to prominent pro-alliance journalists. 

The first sub-group, financial actors, could be found on both the French and Russian sides; it included Ivan Vyshnegradskii, Sergei Witte, Arthur Raffalovich, Émile Hoskier, Jules Hansen, Mikhail Katkov and Élie de Cyon. After the withdrawal of backing by the German stock exchange engineered under Bismarck, Russian Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradskii (1887-1892) negotiated the first conversion of German-held securities in late 1887 with the aid of bankers in France, securing a lower interest rate and a longer term to restructure Russia's debt. He also lobbied to introduce the gold standard in Russia, earning support from Parisian banks. French investors earned a return of 4.3% for the early loans, exceeding the average 3.3% issue from French bonds, but by 1891 when alliance negotiations began the Russian bond


\[314\] Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, 8, 29.

return declined to about 4%,\textsuperscript{316} on par with other foreign securities. Vyshnegradskii’s successor, Sergei Witte (1892-1903), continued negotiating a series of loans despite a negative press campaign in 1895-96 against the ballooning number of Russian securities held in France.\textsuperscript{317} He also employed internationally-based lobbyists to publicize Russia’s economy, among them Arthur Raffalovich, who authored articles for French periodicals. In keeping with contemporary European norms, Witte also authorized payments to French newspapers for positive portrayals of Russia’s finances, although the extent of this remuneration prior to 1905 remains unclear (see Chapter 3).\textsuperscript{318}

Among the concomitant specialist books on the Russian economy published in France,\textsuperscript{319} key authors included Arthur Raffalovich and Danish-French banker Émile Hoskier. Significantly, Raffalovich published his first book concerning Russia’s finances in 1883, laying the groundwork for negotiations that preceded the first loan in 1888. By quoting Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu in this work, Raffalovich assumed a mantle of credibility while implying the former’s

\textsuperscript{316} Kennan, \textit{Fateful Alliance}, 76.

\textsuperscript{317} Concerns were raised regarding the large capital outflow from France. Anan’ich and Bovykin, "Foreign Banks and Foreign Investment in Russia", 260.


support. The pro-alliance Hoskier, meanwhile, who served as a Danish Consul to France and as a director of the Hoskier Bank, became the most prolific author about Russian finances: sixteen publications appear under his name, authored between 1885 and 1895. Aimed at financial institutions - unlike Raffalovich’s writing for the "petit capitaliste", or small investor who purchased Russian bonds – Hoskier’s works included voluminous tables of statistics and notes related to Russia’s debts and its industrial progress. Underlying these publications was a projected confidence in a stable and growing Russian economy.

How did such confidence manifest itself? Evidence suggests that French business interests began to sense the potential for economic advantage as Russia’s population of one hundred million seemed destined only to increase, promising a future El Dorado. Although French manufacturing interests had begun to invest in the Russian economy after the Crimean War, investors increasingly relinquished concerns about Russian "backwardness" after 1871, and by 1887 several "sociétés anonymes franco-russes" had emerged. Yet while France remained an interested player through the end of the century, substantial investment in Russia also continued by commercial societies from Belgium, the Netherlands and England. Thus it

320 Raffalovich, Les finances de la Russie depuis la dernière guerre d’Orient, 1, 5.
321 As found at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
322 Raffalovich, Les finances de la Russie depuis la dernière guerre d’Orient, 4.
323 These built on the example of the Société générale des Chemins de fers russes formed with French capital and engineering expertise in 1857, and on La Compagnie française de Russie, active in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Anne Kraatz, La Compagnie française de Russie: Histoire du commerce franco-russe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Éditions François Bourin, 1993).
324 One of the most important French groups was the Société de la fabrique d’indiennes d’Albert Hubner. By 1891 this had cotton factories in the largest cities of Russia’s empire, with investors representing textiles families across France. Another group was the Société cotonnière franco-russe, many of whose investors resided in Paris. Over the next two decades numerous Franco-Russian commercial societies operated to produce Kitson lighting, chemicals and explosives, India rubber, paint and varnish, matches, mining, metallurgy, cement, and Siberian industrial products. Other European investors, by contrast, invested primarily in Russian mining and public infrastructure. Davydov et al, Paris-Moscou, 57-89.
is difficult to estimate to what extent the alliance actually encouraged French investment, although one study has noted that investment societies organized by French banks overtook private investment groups by the mid-1890s,\textsuperscript{325} signaling an overlap with the loans to Russia.

One of the first French firms associated with the loans and bond conversions was that of the Rothschilds, who withdrew in 1891 to protest against anti-Semitic measures imposed by Tsar Alexander III.\textsuperscript{326} Numerous other French banks were implicated in subsequent transactions, operating a consortium basis.\textsuperscript{327} Among these, the Hoskier Bank capitalized on the fact that Alexander III had married the daughter of the Danish king and thus spent family summers in Denmark. Spousal relationships helped build connections here: Émile Hoskier had a Russian-born wife while his sister Elinor married General Félix Appert, a former French ambassador to St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{328}

Another key instrumental actor, Danish-French citizen Jules Hansen, acted as an informal intermediary and letter-carrier between Émile Flourens (a former French Foreign Minister, now an adviser) and Charles de Freycinet (the Minister of War) and Alexander III.\textsuperscript{329} He accomplished this in part through a connection with Pyotr Rachkovsky, the director of the

\textsuperscript{325} Anan’ich and Bovykin, “Foreign Banks and Foreign Investment in Russia”, 270.


\textsuperscript{327} Also involved in underwriting Russian loans and selling the bonds were the Crédit Lyonnais and the Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas. Conlin, "The Financial Factor", 42.

\textsuperscript{328} Jules Hansen acted as an intermediary in the agreement which resulted in French smokeless rifles being manufactured for Russia, as noted in Chapter 1. Kennan, \textit{Fateful Alliance}, 76; Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, \textit{Alliance franco-russe}, 29, 117.

Okhrana (Russian secret police) in Paris from 1885 to 1902. Russia had placed agents in European capitals after the 1881 assassination of Alexander II, looking to identify expatriates who might be planning attacks on Russian soil. Hansen, a journalist close to Émile Hoskier, acted as a special counselor for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at times accompanied Rachkovsky to Denmark where the latter handled security during the Tsar’s family vacations.

A second pair of instrumental actors from Russia, Mikhail Katkov and Élie de Cyon, worked most actively in the press. A committed Slavophile, Mikhail Katkov became a strident opponent of German holdings in Russia, an issue which earned ongoing coverage in his influential newspaper Moskovskie Vedomosti (Moscow Gazette). Katkov, whose weekly salon was a "a synapse of power where careers were made", lobbied for an alliance with France before his death in 1887 and earned the support of the Tsar’s confidant, Holy Synod procurator Konstantin Pobedonostsev. Katkov’s pro-alliance views were further publicized in his articles which were translated in France.

Meanwhile Élie de Cyon, a Russian physiologist, championed the alliance in France. After teaching at the St. Petersbourg University and Military Academy, Cyon resided in Paris from the mid-1870s to the early 1890s, first pursuing research and practicing as a doctor for the


332 Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Alliance franco-russe, 59.

Russian Embassy and subsequently serving as a publicist for Russia’s Ministry of Finance during the late 1880s.\textsuperscript{334} Denied an academic post in Paris despite scientific awards,\textsuperscript{335} Cyon also acted as a correspondent for Mikhail Katkov, and he served briefly as the director of \textit{Le Gaulois}, a French newspaper that appears to have been partly financed by Russian funds.\textsuperscript{336} After Cyon published an article asserting that Germany and Italy had assembled troops near France’s borders, he was invited in 1886-87 to be director of Juliette Adams’s pro-alliance publication \textit{La Nouvelle Revue} (discussed later in this chapter).\textsuperscript{337} He also lobbied for the establishment of a telegraph agency for the Russian press; founded in 1891, this agency had access to approximately sixty French newspapers.\textsuperscript{338} The ambitious Cyon exceeded his mandate, however, when he linked the alliance with \textit{revanche} (a subject not countenanced by the Tsar), and when he quarreled with Sergei Witte.\textsuperscript{339} 


\textsuperscript{335} This was reportedly due to French in-fighting and to Cyon's difficult temperament. Moshe Feinsod, "Neurognostic Answer: The Brilliant Science and Shadowy Life of Ilia Fadeyevich Tsion, alias Elias Cyon, alias Élie de Cyon", \textit{Journal of the History of the Neurosciences} 21:3 (2012): 338-340.

\textsuperscript{336} Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, \textit{Alliance franco-russe}, 59.


\textsuperscript{338} According to Dr. Heidi Tworek, the news agency was likely short-lived like many others at the time; I thank her for this observation. In this effort Cyon was assisted by Lucien Millevoye, a former journalist and right-wing Deputy who had traveled to Russia to champion the alliance. Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, \textit{Alliance franco-russe}, 111.

\textsuperscript{339} An excerpt from one Cyon article emphasizing \textit{revanche} may be found in \textit{l' Univers illustré} (3 octobre 1891): 482. http://gallica.bnf.fr; Fedyashin, "Sergei Witte and the Press", 522; Élie de Cyon, \textit{La Russie contemporaine} (Calmann-Lévy, 1891); Élie de Cyon, \textit{Où la dictature de M. Witte conduit la Russie}, trans. Victor Derély (Paris: Librairie Haar et Steinert, Eichler Successeur, 1897). Accused in France of profiting from the Russian loan negotiations and from the Panama Canal scandal - charges which he denied - the end of Cyon’s relationship with French and Russian powerbrokers led him to return to scientific pursuits in Switzerland. Cyon, \textit{Entente franco-russe}, 201, 440, 446.
To summarize then, the role of instrumental actors including Russian finance ministers, French bankers, and Russian and French lobbyists, intermediaries and journalists in enabling and promoting the alliance demonstrates a transnational enmeshment of elites in finance and the press. Although the loans to Russia would likely have been profitable in and of themselves, twinning them with pro-alliance overtures clearly served bilateral foreign policy goals held by influential individuals and groups. Promoting public subscription to the loans in France, particularly via the press,\textsuperscript{340} served to cement these goals.

In addition to the academic go-betweens and instrumental actors described, a third group of informal elite players involved in building Franco-Russian relations and in encouraging widespread alliance support included four high-profile partisans whose public standing and popularity distinguished them from the other actors identified here. Beyond national security, their motivation for re-calibrating the relationship with Russia lay in a desire for \textit{revanche}. One particularly well-known name is that of national icon Louis Pasteur, although lesser-known scientists also expressed pro-alliance opinion.\textsuperscript{341} Additionally, three ultra-nationalist partisans, General Mikhail Skobeleff, General Georges Boulanger and Paul Déroulède of the \textit{Ligue des patriotes}, appealed to mass support; of these, Boulanger in particular enjoyed iconic status nationwide before his fall from grace.

As noted earlier, France’s 1871 defeat had been widely attributed to deficiencies in science, among them measures to combat depopulation. Thus Louis Pasteur, revered \textit{paterfamilias} of microbiology, emerged as a potential national savior with his work in germ

\textsuperscript{340} See Chapter 3 for the press promotion of Russian bonds.

\textsuperscript{341} Some examples of pro-Russia reports written by scientists appeared in the periodical \textit{La Nature}, as noted in Chapter 3.
theory and vaccination and his influence on artificial infant feeding techniques. Pasteur had met his wife in Strasbourg, the leading city of Alsace-Lorraine, and in 1871 he revealed revanchiste leanings by submitting a beverage patent for a "Bièvre de la revanche nationale" ("Beer of National Revenge"). The opening of the Pasteur Institute in 1888 solidified his national profile and generated international acclaim; significantly, this occurred one year after Bismarck’s speech suggesting a possible war with France and less than a month before the first loan to Russia. At his Institute’s inauguration Pasteur thanked its many benefactors but reserved his "deepest homage" for Tsar Alexander III. He also referred to two Russians that he had hired, Ilya Metchnikoff and Nikolai Gamaleia, emphasizing the bilateral relationship. Gerald Geison has commented on the cult of Pasteur in Russia, noting Pasteur’s admiration for the nation and crediting the alliance for this, while calling "Metchnikoff’s section …a virtual Russian colony".

---


343 Pasteur hoped to challenge German dominance in the beer industry and ultimately his work with British and Danish brewers helped to accomplish this aim. See Alan G. Baxter, "Louis Pasteur’s beer of revenge", Nature Reviews Immunology 1 (December, 2001): 229-232.


345 They worked in morphology and comparative microbiology respectively.

Enhanced by the emerging military *rapprochement*, further medical exchange enabled by Pasteur took place, while numerous Russian medical students studied in Paris.\(^{347}\) Having helped to set up animal vaccine stations in Russia, Pasteur subsequently aided in the establishment of the St. Petersburg Imperial Institute of Experimental Medicine in 1890.\(^{348}\) In 1892 as negotiations proceeded towards the military convention, Russian doctors arrived in Paris to present him with "*homages* and a rich gift" for his seventieth birthday.\(^{349}\) Finally, in 1893 when Russian vessels visited Toulon and sixty naval officers travelled to Paris where France’s *presse médicale* hosted a banquet in their honor, fleet doctors visited Pasteur's Institute which he called "one of the places where Russia has the most friends in France". At a second banquet held for Russian and French journalists, notables and diplomats, a message from Pasteur was read citing "these radiant days".\(^{350}\)

---


\(^{349}\) François Bournand, *Le livre d'or franco-russe* (Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1894), 130.

But partisan support was not limited to Louis Pasteur and like-minded scientific elites. Throughout the 1880s a trio of well-known ultra-nationalists championed the benefits of an alliance although their populist appeals for *revanche* quickly became anathema to their respective governments. Like Pasteur, they enjoyed prolific coverage in the press, and their advocacy no doubt contributed to a groundswell of public enthusiasm preceding alliance negotiations. Although none earned lasting political power, Mikhail Skobeleff, Georges Boulanger and Paul Déroulède wielded considerable influence in France.

Russian General Mikhail Skobeleff, raised in France before becoming a hero in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 (his exploits reenacted in the Paris hippodrome production described in Chapter 5), made inflammatory speeches in Paris in 1882, forecasting a penultimate clash between Slavs and Germans. This led to his recall by the Russian government, but popular enthusiasm would later compare him to General Georges Boulanger, known as "Général Revanche". Indeed, Boulanger himself chose the slogan "Gambetta, Skobelev, Boulanger" for his 1889 electoral campaign, in which his posters trumpeted pro-Russia themes, as described in Chapter 1. Also as noted, Boulanger served as Minister of War (1886-1887) at the time of the Schnaebelé war scare, and by 1889 so many had rallied to his militant agenda that the government feared a *coup d'état* and abruptly banished him from the country. Yet his pro-alliance stand would influence prominent right-wing leader 

351 Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, *Juliette Adam (1836-1936): l'Instigatrice* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), 151, 155. A contemporary writer noted that Boulanger "... became a favorite with his men, whom he cared for throughout his career with much of that fatherly interest which distinguished the Russian hero, general Skobelev." Elizabeth Wormeley Latimer, *France in the Nineteenth Century, 1830-1890*, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14194-h/14104-h.htm, 92. The French government dissolved the *Ligue des patriotes* in 1889 due to excessive political agitation at the height of Boulangism and by 1891 Boulanger and Skobeleff had died; Déroulède would be discredited as a political figure in the late 1890s after the alliance had been established.

352 The reference to Léon Gambetta, Minister of the Interior from 1870 to 1871, no doubt referred to his plea for *guerre à l'outrance* (war at all costs) against Prussia. Andreas Dorpalen, "Tsar Alexander III and the Boulanger Crisis in France", *The Journal of Modern History* 23:2 (June, 1951): 133.
Paul Déroulède, a staunch Boulanger supporter who had co-founded the *Ligue des patriotes*.\(^{353}\)

Déroulède remained dedicated to an alliance and drew attention with his poem glorifying Alexander III (*Slavo Rossii*) and with his six-week trip to Russia in 1886, despite the disinclination of French authorities to endorse the latter.\(^{354}\)

Added to the academic go-betweens, instrumental actors and high-profile scientific and ultra-nationalist partisans described above, a fourth group which assisted in establishing alliance contacts consisted of enablers in the spousal, cultural and social arenas. These individuals either helped to encourage transnational cultural and political exchange, or in the case of family interactions - for example, a French individual with a Russian spouse - to facilitate communication between alliance parties. As already mentioned, spousal connections involved de Vogüé, the Hoskier family and General Nikolai Obrutchev. The latter, who had lived briefly in Paris in the late 1850s, married a French woman and their Dordogne *château* served as the setting for some negotiations between the Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, Colonel Moulin, military attaché at the French Embassy in St. Petersburg and colleague of General Boisdeffre, had a Russian wife.\(^{355}\)

Another important intellectual enabler in the French embrace of Russian culture was well-known author Ivan Turgenev; he had moved to France in 1856, promoting his native literature and serving as vice-president of the first International Writers' Congress during the _______

\(^{353}\) Other co-founders of the *Ligue des patriotes* in 1882 were historian Henri Martin and future French President Félix Faure. Dorpalen, “Tsar Alexander III and the Boulanger Crisis”, 127.


\(^{355}\) Kennan, *Fateful Alliance*, 14-16, 147. Further enabling alliance contacts, members of the Russian aristocracy frequently sojourned in Paris or in the south of France and at various thermal stations popular for their "cure". In the summer of 1892 for example, Grand Duke Constantine relaxed in the mineral waters of the town of Contrexéville, allowing for a visit by French president Sadi Carnot. Ernest Daudet, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Alliance franco-russe, 1873-1893* (Paris: Paul Ollendorff, 1894), 325.
1878 Paris exhibition.\textsuperscript{356} Demonstrating the traditional imbrication of politics and literature in France, after 1871 Russian literature had begun to make significant headway with French \textit{literati} as a vogue for newly-translated works of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, etc. emerged.\textsuperscript{357} Turgenev established the Paris Bibliothèque russe in 1875 as a \textit{lieu de rencontre} for visiting and expatriate Russians and \textit{russophiles}, acting as "the pivot for cultural exchange" in his friendship with Louis Léger and with prominent French authors including Gustave Flaubert, Émile Zola, Théophile Gautier and Alexandre Dumas.\textsuperscript{358} Illustrating the strong shift in French attitudes towards Russia, following Turgenev's death in 1883 philosopher Ernest Renan, formerly a \textit{russophobe} but now pro-alliance, delivered a public oration as the author's body departed by train for Russia.\textsuperscript{359}

The most influential enabler was activist and publisher Juliette Adam, the staunchly \textit{revanchiste} widow of Edmond Adam, a former deputy and senator.\textsuperscript{360} Beginning in the 1870s Adam hosted a weekly salon attended by pro-alliance writers, publishers and politicians, along with former diplomats, military figures and industrialists. Key figures included writers Turgenev, Flaubert, Dumas and Guy de Maupassant, as well as publishers Jules Hetzel and Émile de Girardin.\textsuperscript{361} Prominent political attendees included Léon Gambetta and the former Foreign

\textsuperscript{356} Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 407.

\textsuperscript{357} Added to the studies by Louis Léger and Eugène Melchior de Vogüé were two works by Celeste Courrière: \textit{Histoire de la littérature contemporaine en Russie} (Paris: Charpentier et Cie, 1875); \textit{Histoire de la littérature contemporaine chez les Slaves} (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1879). See Chapter 3.


\textsuperscript{359} Corbet, \textit{L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe}, 407.

\textsuperscript{360} See also Hillis, "The 'Franco-Russian Marseillaise'", 45-65. For a detailed account of Adam's politics overall see Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, \textit{Juliette Adam}.

\textsuperscript{361} Jules Hetzel became a prolific publisher of works with Russian themes throughout the 1880s and 1890s, while Émile Girardin had earlier pioneered the penny press in France.
Minister Émile Flourens, along with the former ambassador to Russia General Félix Appert and the widow of another former ambassador, General Antoine Chanzy; military figures included the Commandant of Paris Félix Saussier and high-ranking retired officers from the Franco-Prussian War.\footnote{Léon Gambetta, as president of the Chamber of Deputies in 1881, advocated amnesty for exiled Communards prior to his death in 1882. Adolphe Badin, Madame Edmond Adam: Juliette Lamber (Paris: Charavay Frères, 1882), 4-6. http://www.bmlisieux.com/curiosa/badin01.htm; Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Juliette Adam, 191; Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 70.}

Juliette Adam particularly welcomed those dedicated to the dual causes of the alliance and revanche, but her vehement anti-German stance ultimately led the government to fear the provocative nationalism that she and her circle espoused. Pro-alliance articles dominated her periodical entitled La Nouvelle Revue, founded in 1879 with literary, political and military figures as contributors; notably, this publication was "widely distributed among the military".\footnote{Cyon, Entente franco-russe, 422; Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Juliette Adam, 191.} In 1882 Adam travelled to Russia, meeting with key alliance supporters including Mikhail Katkov, Mikhail Skobeleff and Russian Minister of the Interior Nikolai Ignatieff.\footnote{Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Juliette Adam, 146-147, 151.} Like Katkov, she enjoyed the support of the Tsar’s confidant Konstantin Pobedonostsev.\footnote{Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Alliance franco-russe, 108.} Adam continued her interest in Skobeleff, inviting him to Paris in 1882 and publishing a small book on him in 1886.\footnote{Juliette Adam, Le Général Skobeleff (Paris: La Nouvelle Revue, 1886).}

Significantly, Faith Hillis has noted that Adam’s salon was the most prominent political salon in Paris. It was there that the Opportunist project to unite the national vote was explored by Léon Gambetta, who acted as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs during the early 1880s. Although Gambetta did not favor an alliance with Russia (despite Boulanger’s campaign slogan previously described), others in Adam’s circle did, notably Élie de Cyon, Jules

\footnote{Cyon, Entente franco-russe, 422; Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Juliette Adam, 191.} \footnote{Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Juliette Adam, 146-147, 151.} \footnote{Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Alliance franco-russe, 108.} \footnote{Juliette Adam, Le Général Skobeleff (Paris: La Nouvelle Revue, 1886).}
Hansen and Pyotr Rachkovsky, whose roles were described earlier in this chapter. Adam also funded Paul Déroulède's *Ligue des patriotes* in 1882, and as noted, she invited Skobeleff to Paris that year as part of her ongoing relations with prominent pan-Slavist actors. Although by the mid-1880s she and her group had coalesced around an anti-republican stance, Adam herself remained distant from the enthusiastic support shown for Boulanger by Déroulède and Cyon.\textsuperscript{367}

Typifying a form of elite civic engagement common in late nineteenth-century Europe, that of associational activity,\textsuperscript{368} Adam also helped to found two voluntary associations to promote the alliance. As examples of the fifth group of actors identified here, these were *L'Association artistique et littéraire franco-russe*, established in 1888 but dissolved by the government for vocal pro-alliance agitation, and *Les Amis de Russie*, established in 1890 with members including Émile Flourens and businessman, collector and travel writer Philippe Deschamps.\textsuperscript{369} Promoting commercial ties became the goal of the latter group, for despite the loans French trade with Russia remained less than twenty percent of that enjoyed by England and Germany.\textsuperscript{370} *Les Amis de Russie* thus played an active role in bringing French artistic and


\textsuperscript{369} Kennan, *Fateful Alliance*, 70. Philippe Deschamps collected more than 20,000 items related to the alliance and exhibited these in a museum which he established in Paris; he also sent several thousand items to Russia. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of this. Philippe Deschamps, *Catalogue officiel de la collection franco-russe offerte au Musée historique de Moscou* (Paris: Rue Demours, 1897). http://gallica.bnf.fr

\textsuperscript{370} Kennan, *Fateful Alliance*, 72.
cultural exhibits, along with a war pavilion, to the 1891 Russian Exposition in Moscow.

Conceived to address the fact that Russia had not sponsored an official pavilion at the 1889 Paris exposition universelle - the celebration of the centenary of the French Revolution kept many European governments away - the French exhibits in Moscow were sponsored in part by France’s Ministry of War. Yet the government also dissolved Les Amis de Russie due to its vehement revanchisme, a matter of concern in Russia. Adam's last foray into associational life occurred when she organized a committee to fund and present gifts to the Russian fleet visiting Toulon in 1893.

Furthering this active pro-alliance "associational landscape", other groups concentrated on cultural rapprochement. Baron Paul Gregorovitch Dewies, the first builder of Russia’s railways, hosted charity musical concerts at his French château during the 1870s. From the 1870s onward, La Société franco-russe also sponsored musical concerts, along with the Cercle artistique and a group called Artistes de France et Russie. The small but wealthy Russian expatriate community settled in Paris around the rue Daru also sponsored cultural and philanthropic projects, assisting groups such as the Association d'entre-aide de bienfaisance des artistes russes de Paris, the Cercle des artistes russes (whose events were attended by Élie de Cyon and Baron Mohrenheim, the Russian ambassador) and an 1890s charity group

371 Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Alliance franco-russe, 70-73.

372 Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 61,70; Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Alliance franco-russe, 108. Soon after the alliance was ratified Adam lost her place as a leader for the cause. Criticism of her revue's ultranationalism and a cooling towards her in government circles led her to be excluded from official celebrations in 1896. Ekaterina Khmelnitskaia and Wilfred Zeisler, "L'industrie du souvenir de l'Alliance", in Neptunia. Cadeaux des Tsars: La diplomatie navale dans l'Alliance franco-russe, 1891-1914, 62-63 (Paris: Musée nationale de la Marine, 2010).

373 Vedenina, La France et la Russie, 103.
known as *Pour les pauvres de France et Russie*. Such expatriate ties illustrate a pan-European trend linking elite philanthropy with culture, while helping to foster relations between participating French and Russian military figures. Finally, added to the above, citizen committees organized to celebrate the official Russian visits to France in 1893, 1896 and 1901 played key roles in alliance promotion in Paris and nationwide.

In summary then, the Franco-Russian alliance remains unique not only for its unlikely political partnership, its military negotiators and its concrete terms as outlined in Chapter 1, but also for the pro-alliance mobilization of a range of elites in France well before the formal agreement. Together these actors promoted knowledge of Russia, enabled the loans and negotiations, provided opportunities for cultural rapprochement, and disseminated pro-alliance sentiment. Although they were assisted by key Russian figures, the latter were tied to the tsarist government and could not have acted independently. The commentary in the following chapters therefore continues to focus for the most part on influential French elites, including the academic go-betweens, instrumental actors in the financial and press sectors, ultra-nationalist partisans, and other alliance promoters just described. Collectively, they represented an engaged polity determined to influence foreign policy in the early Third Republic during a time of turbulence and stress. Notably, their actions began in the 1870s during the "Republic of the dukes" - when democracy itself at times appeared to be in peril - and continued well beyond.

Ultimately voices in government would merge with those of the military and of extra-governmental elites. When the alliance finally materialized in 1894, for a moderate republican majority under pressure in the Chamber of Deputies it could answer a prayer on two fronts. A

---

374 The first president of the mutual aid society for Russian artists was the Russian ambassador Nicolas Orlov; its treasurer was St. Petersburg banker Horace Gunzbourg. Vedenina, *La France et la Russie*, 106, 108; Cyon, *Entente franco-russe*, 181.
pact with Russia might promise critical security on the continental front, but it could also cement domestic political support. The greater French public, meanwhile, influenced by the demographic crisis fueling national security fears, appeared to react with enthusiasm to the idea of an alliance. From the evidence, it seems that while elite opinion favoring an alliance grew from the mid-1870s onward - the main focus of this chapter - non-elite enthusiasm emerged by the late 1880s.

To understand how this wider support might have arisen and grown, the discussion now turns to the representations of Russia and the alliance created by cultural entrepreneurs. The sources consulted provide ample evidence of a positive "imagology" of Russia, visible in literary, spectacular and material modes which were widely consumed. The central role of media in framing representations of Russia is evident in the sources described, whether these be books, periodicals and newspapers (Chapter 3), popular travel and fiction writing (Chapter 4), theatrical productions, exhibitions and events (Chapter 5), or material culture (Chapter 6). Finally, as outlined in Chapter 7, after the alliance was signed, elite actors continued to employ both traditional and new media forms to link specific domestic political and social initiatives with popular alliance support. All of these media could capitalize on an established "cult of the public", which Philip Nord has argued had been created to serve Republican political interests. They also reflected a "shadowing" of the elite expression described in this chapter, extended via the mass culture and entertainment industries. For as the political project of Republicanism continued and evolved, the widest possible consensus concerning foreign policy decisions became the goal of many.

375 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 7.


377 I thank Dr. Bob Brain for the observation on shadowing.
Chapter 3: Publicizing Russia: Building Widespread Alliance Interest and Support via Print and Press

As the individuals and groups in the previous chapter worked toward the goal of an alliance, they were joined by elite media entrepreneurs who disseminated affirmative representations of Russia in the publishing arena. These representations served to counter entrenched negative stereotypes dating from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars, and helped to set the stage for alliance support, thereby contributing to a civic consensus concerning foreign policy decisions in the early Third Republic. Although these media actions did not necessarily proceed in concert, they converged at a time when government instability encouraged extra-governmental alliance initiatives. Taken together, the representations described here are emblematic of publishing efforts to promote the alliance by engaging public enthusiasm, and at times to persuade the government itself. Efforts by authors, publishers and press indicate not just pro-alliance leanings, but also an awareness of the marketing potential spurred by an intense reader interest in national security. Changing professional structures under a Republican government, as well as the rise of a mass culture in the fin-de-siècle era, enabled their work.

One key source testifying to the significant role of media is the compte-rendu of speeches from a Paris banquet "... offered by the representatives of the Russian press and literature, to French academics, writers, artists and journalists" during the 1893 Russian naval visit to France. Signaling the pending formal agreement, the Russian hosts including Foreign Minister Nicolas de Giers had organized this to acknowledge those who had promoted the

378 This banquet predated the formal alliance signing by a matter of weeks. Demonstrating that alliance support transcended domestic political divides, the Orleanist monarchical party was represented by a smattering of dukes, barons and counts. At least two prominent industrialists also figured on the list. "Banquet franco-russe du 26 octobre 1893: Discours prononcés" (Paris: Armand Colin et Cie, 1893). http://gallica.bnf.fr.
alliance in publishing and press. Almost two hundred guests were invited; some represented French Académies while others were habitués of Juliette Adam’s salon. Two Republican finance ministers attended: one contemporary (Georges Pallain) and one former, Léon Say, editor of Le Journal des Débats, the most influential liberal newspaper whose readers included academic and government figures. Prominent guest Charles de Freycinet was the Minister of War, while another invitee chaired the Army Commission. Ultra-nationalists including Paul Déroulède were present, along with the founder of the École libre des Sciences Politiques. The academic milieu was represented by go-betweens Louis Léger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Eugène Melchior de Vogüé, accompanied by scientists Ilya Metchnikoff and Louis Pasteur. Artists, too, found their place at the banquet, including war artist Édouard Detaille. Meanwhile pride of place was given to the editors of, or contributors to, nine prominent newspapers, plus two key periodicals, La Revue des deux mondes and La Nouvelle Revue.

Led by M. Souvorine of the St. Petersburg newspaper Novoïe Vrémia (the New Times), Russian speakers praised Rambaud, Leroy-Beaulieu and de Vogüé for contributing to knowledge about Russia in France, and thanked the press for publicizing Russian authors. While other commentators credited academic foresight for initiating the bilateral relationship, Émile Zola lauded "the great fraternal embrace... prepared by years of mutual literary sympathy". Some referred to popular support; one noted "...the spirit of charity, of peace, and of universal fraternity which descended on the two peoples... [who became] the inspiration and guide for poets, academics and researchers", while another called the public the "true muse" of

379 Jean Garrigues, La République des hommes d'affaires (1870-1900) (Paris: Aubier, 1997), 87, 91, 93, 98, 376.

380 Also representing the fine arts were sculptor Auguste Rodin and architect Charles Garnier, plus musicians Jules Massenet and Camille St.-Saëns.

the press. Emphasizing the fundamental reason for widespread French support, a telegram from St. Petersburg acclaimed the alliance as "... the most secure guarantee of European peace."  

As noted previously, the positive reframing of Russia between 1871 and 1901 was facilitated by the emergence of mass media in France, characterized by works emanating from that which William Seawell described as "powerful institutional nodes" around which culture often turns. As he argued, "Authoritative [elite] cultural action, launched from centers of power... [serves] to prescribe core values,... to describe boundaries and norms...". Media actors now began to employ affirmative representations to frame information about Russia, normalizing aspects of its geopolitical identity and culture to help persuade French readers of its suitability as a potential alliance partner.  

National security issues clearly converged with economic interests here, encouraged by the development of inexpensive print technologies for the newspaper press. Meanwhile, rising literacy played a key role as new centers of distribution including libraries and railway kiosks further widened markets. Most significantly, however, readership among an engaged polity expanded rapidly in France after the pioneering legislation which guaranteed full press  


383 Sewell argued that these institutional nodes include the state, financial organizations, and communications media; although as noted in Chapter 2 the French state did not become overtly involved in promoting alliance support until after the first official overtures towards Russia, circa 1890. William H. Sewell, Jr., "The Concept(s) of Culture" in Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, eds. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, 46-47, 48, 55-57 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).  

freedoms in 1881. \(^{385}\) The creation of a newly representative government, plus the nationalist impetus provided by the 1871 defeat, created a motivated public.

Yet although a handful of studies have examined selected aspects of French publishing during the alliance era,\(^{386}\) none has considered the ensemble of the multiple books, periodicals and newspapers which jostled to present knowledge of and commentary about Russia. The amount of positive copy was immense, far outstripping that concerning any other nation. As one 1877 observer noted, "Russia occupies an increasingly large place in the European public's preoccupation, but most of all in France."\(^{387}\) Relinquishing former stereotypes of a "barbarian" enemy, academic authors began by affirming Russia as a modernizing European and imperial power, a cultural leader, a Christian nation and an arbiter of peace - a mirror of France's self-image, therein framing a worthy partner. An explosion of periodical publishing after 1881 enabled these representations to migrate from specialist books into wider markets. As one study has observed, the number of Paris periodicals (including newspapers) quadrupled to reach

---


\(^{387}\) Anonymous, *Bibliothèque universelle et revue Suisse* 59 (1877): 746 (Paris: Charpentier, 1877), Google e-books.com
2,685 by 1890, with 3,600 across the country by 1900.\textsuperscript{388} In addition to books and periodicals, newspapers also helped to further an alliance agenda by disseminating knowledge of Russian affairs, by creating and reflecting popular alliance support, and by encouraging government action. Taken together, these positive representations of Russia circulated first among elites and then the wider public, overcoming concerns about linking a democratic with an autocratic power and coalescing to enable a military \textit{partenariat}.

By emphasizing the democratization of print, the discussion here differs from the aforementioned studies which have concentrated on a chronological staging of academic interest and involvement with Russia, but which have paid little attention to publishing for the broader public. This chapter therefore foregrounds different thematic choices and a considerably broader source field; it also examines the role of individual publishers, the connections among the many elite actors involved, and the movement of representations of Russia from elite to mass markets. Additionally, it explores the specific political and social conditions favoring the latter. Above all, the emphasis is on extra-governmental efforts to encourage national alliance support.

3.1 \textbf{Books: rehabilitating vestigial negative stereotypes of Russia by depicting it as a modernizing European and imperial power, a cultural leader, a Christian nation and a guarantor of peace}

Book publishers began the process of creating a new appreciation for Russia immediately after the Franco-Prussian War. While the predominance of periodicals and newspapers would ultimately eclipse that of books during the \textit{fin-de-siècle} transition from family-owned firms to a mass culture industry in France,\textsuperscript{389} books remained central for elites. Although


\textsuperscript{389} Karine Taveaux-Grandpierre, "Hachette-Lagardère 1826-2006, près de 200 ans au service de l’industrialisation de la culture". Colloque international "Mutations des industries de la culture, de
individual publication runs are difficult to ascertain, from 1871 through 1901 the scope and variety of French books about Russia were significant, as was the range of firms involved. Their messages proved remarkably coherent; just as the authors of fiction and travel works (discussed in Chapter 4) tended to retrace well-worn themes, so too did the books considered here. Whether due to authorial or editorial choice, they constituted a relatively homogenous corpus with respect to themes: emphasizing Russia as a modernizing European and imperial power, a leader in culture, a Christian nation and a guarantor of peace. These are key characteristics which could be seen to synchronize with, to borrow a phrase from Alan Forrest, "the cause and character of France."390

As described in Chapter 2, during the turbulent 1870s the academic go-betweens Louis Léger, Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Eugène Melchior de Vogüé first began to shift views of Russia from "other" to "brother" in France.391 Their writing helped to set the tone for wider publishing and journalistic spheres.392 A knowledge agenda held prominent weight here, reflecting the changing academic landscape and a Republican "useful knowledge" agenda epitomized by school reform laws, the lois Ferry (1881-1882).393 New professional groups now competed for academic recognition in France, and they championed the pioneering sciences of l’information et de la communication", Septembre 2006. http://www.observatoire-omic.org/colloque-icic-atelier13.php


391 As noted in the Introduction, this dissertation diverges from scholarship emphasizing negative views of the national or ethnic "other", as pioneered by Edward Said.

392 Butenschön, Zarenhymne und Marseillaise, 31.

393 These laws were enacted under Minister of Public Instruction Jules Ferry, as part of an ambitious program of Republican education reforms. Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914, trans. J. R. Foster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 86-90.
economic geography, statistics, and social and political science, fields which could be brought to bear when studying Russia. As Madeleine Hurd explained regarding fin-de-siècle European academic trends: "Rational public discussion required open, scientific inquiry, for the public sphere depended on an understanding of the natural laws of modern society and economy." Academic input reflected concerns that Prussia's superior educational system had led to France's defeat, and coincided with the liberal belief that progress could be built on increasing knowledge about other countries.

Demonstrating these concerns, during the 1870s the firms of Hachette, Plon, Charpentier and Savine began to publish important works about Russia. The Hachette maison d'édition, a specialist in mass literature and pedagogical materials, published books by Louis Léger, Alfred Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, while Plon published those by

---

394 The policies of Jules Ferry resulted in new faculties, chairs and lectureships as well as the reorganization of universities. Mayeur and Réberioux, The Third Republic, 88.


398 Hachette pioneered railway sales kiosks in France. In 1853 there were forty-three of these; by 1900 they numbered one thousand, all selling Hachette's "railway library" series whose topics ranged from law to science, and from Russian authors to popular sports. Alfred Fierro, "Les guides de voyages au XIXe siècle", in Chartier et al, Histoire de l'édition française, 193. Louis Léger’s early works, Le Monde
Eugène Melchior de Vogüé. Hachette and Plon had built their power in the early nineteenth century, but in 1867 a new law permitted anonymous investment societies to capitalize publishing firms; when combined with technological innovation and increased readership, this generated great wealth and encouraged emerging firms such as Charpentier and Savine below.\textsuperscript{399} Jean-Yves Mollier has investigated several powerful publishers including the above, notably those who invested in government-supported railways, coal mines and banks. This investment demonstrated enmeshment of lobby groups with government during the so-called "Republic of the bourgeois notables" during the 1880s.\textsuperscript{400} Widespread interest in the Russian loans hints at possible actions by the editorial interests considered here.\textsuperscript{401}

While the alliance stance of Hachette and Plon remains opaque due to the size of their organizations and the rotating editorial boards they employed, a less wealthy editor, Georges Charpentier,\textsuperscript{402} demonstrated overt alliance support while publishing works about Russian slave (1873) and \textit{Nouvelles études slaves: histoire et littérature} (1880), were published by the firms of Didier and of E. Leroux respectively. His subsequent works including \textit{Russes et Slaves: études politiques et littéraires} (1896) and \textit{Le Monde slave: études politiques et littéraires} (1897) were published by Hachette.


\textsuperscript{400} Mollier examined the wills and household inventories of editors including Hachette, Plon, Charpentier and Hetzel. Mollier, \textit{L’Argent et les lettres}, 133, 121, 12, 139, 149. At a time when national interests and the interests of a liberal, center-left government could be claimed to converge, railway, mining and banking interests were awarded significant advantages by the government. Robert Gildea, \textit{Children of the Revolution: The French, 1799-1914} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 11; Mayeur and Rebérioux, \textit{The Third Republic}, 98; Garrigues, \textit{La République des hommes d'affaires}, 17.

\textsuperscript{401} One fact demonstrating the involvement of publishing firms in matters of foreign policy is that the Hachette firm contributed 5,000 francs (from a total of 187,000 francs, 10,000 of which had been contributed by the Rothschild bank) to the influential colonialist lobby group, the \textit{Comité de l'Afrique française}. Hachette also printed works favorable to this committee's cause. James J. Cooke, \textit{New French Imperialism, 1880-1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion} (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973), 35-37.

\textsuperscript{402} While the Hachette firm was worth fifteen million francs in 1884, smaller firms such as that of Charpentier were valued at less than one million francs. Jean-Yves Mollier, \textit{Louis Hachette (1800-1864)}:
literature, music and empire. As a devoted republican who hosted an influential salon, Charpentier mingled with pro-alliance elites including Émile Zola, Ivan Turgenev and Juliette Adam, and with individuals from the Ministries of War and of Commerce and Industry. His wife, meanwhile, participated in associational activity designed to address depopulation concerns.\(^{403}\) Significantly, Charpentier's publication of Zola's best-selling novel *La Débâcle* in 1892, which documented the 1870 humiliation of the French army by Prussia,\(^{404}\) underscored the apprehension spurring alliance negotiations. Also capitalizing on national security issues, another publisher who enjoyed a brief heyday during the 1880s, Alfred Savine, specialized in general books about Russia and in works by Russian authors. Dramatic titles highlighting the vulnerability of France featured on his roster too, including compelling volumes such as *l'Espionnage allemand en France* and *La Marine en danger*.\(^{405}\)

Beyond the firms of Hachette, Plon, Charpentier and Savine, other well-known editorial firms which published works about Russia from the mid-1870s through the 1890s included Félix Alcan, Charles Delagrave, Paul Dupont, Maurice Dreyfous and Calmann-Lévy.\(^{406}\) Many minor firms participated also. Yet to what degree the decision to publish positively about Russia

---


\(^{404}\) This novel immediately sold 120,000 copies. Gildea, *Children of the Revolution*, 403.

\(^{405}\) These titles are listed under the advertisement "En vente à la même librairie", back matter in Guénin, *La Russie*.

\(^{406}\) See the works listed in subsequent footnotes.
reflected the political views of the directors or shareholders of a particular maison d’édition, as opposed to market directions and/or reader interest, is difficult to establish. Whether individual publishers became involved in alliance lobbying leading up to the 1890s is also unknown, but they could mingle with politicians and pro-alliance elites in venues conducive to that goal, as the banquet at the beginning of this chapter attests. Ultimately, however, their collective action contributed to the groundswell of interest in Russia.

How did books promote the alliance cause? Authors first worked to rehabilitate negative stereotypes of Russia by identifying it as a member of the "European" family, and by searching for "civilizational" markers in the areas of empire, religion, politics, culture and economy. Through initiating a process of demystification, their work would ultimately contribute to a politics of persuasion. Although France and Russia had maintained academic ties since the 1700s, French interest in Russia now adopted an emerging specialty: the science of nation and empire. The first shift occurred in the centuries-old debate whether Russia should be considered "European" or "Asiatic". Referring to the latter, descriptors of Russia as "barbarian" or "Tartar"

---

407 On elite sociability see Garrigues, La République des hommes d’affaires, 14, 99-105.

408 A.Z. Manfred, "Quelle fut la cause de l’Alliance franco-russe?", Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 1:1 (mai 1959): 161. Academic exchange between France and Russia began in the eighteenth century when Peter the Great was elected to the French Académie Royale des Sciences. While French scholars belonged to Russian professional associations and traveled to Russia to study, Russian scientists maintained similar professional contacts in France. Demonstrating continued exchange in the run-up to the alliance, the French Academy of Sciences awarded its top prize to Russian mathematician Sophia Vasilievna Kovalevkaja in 1888; additionally, Russian geographer Lev Metchnikoff (brother of Ilya Metchnikoff of the Pasteur Institute) worked with prominent French geographer Élisée Réclus.

dated back to the thirteenth-century Mongol invasions, persisting across centuries and spurred by European "ethnographer-diplomats" whose reports proved unremittingly negative. In the 1870s, however, this view began to shift, spurred by the works of Léger, Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu.

Collateral study led to the valorization of Russia's imperial identity, symbolic of a great European power. Russia's mid-century conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan had been succeeded by that of the North Caucasus and Central Asian borderlands, following State Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov's 1864 circular authorizing Russia as a "civilized state" to suppress all

---


411 As noted in Chapter 2, Alfred Rambaud held posts in the Ministry of Public Instruction and also at the Sorbonne; Louis Léger taught Russian language and literature at the Paris École des Langues orientales and served as chair of Slavic Language and Literature at the Collège de France; Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu was professor of Contemporary History and Eastern Affairs and director of the École libre des Sciences Politiques. Rambaud began by demonstrating the Greek roots of Russian culture, while Léger claimed that the debate whether Russia was European had been furthered by a Polish ethnographer angered by Russian repression of the Polish uprisings in 1831 and 1863. This debate had emerged with the identification of a new language category, the so-called Touranian category which was neither Indo-European nor Semitic. The entanglement of science with politics is clear: ethnographic detractors portrayed Imperial Russia as an inorganic space enmeshing the Touranian peoples, or as a Touranian entity firmly outside of Europe. Léger also accused a Polish activist of trying to disrupt his Russian courses at the École des Langues orientales. Ethnic identity preoccupied Leroy-Beaulieu when he emphasized the "European Russia" display at Moscow's Dashkov Museum (since the era of Peter the Great the area west of the Ural Mountains has been referred to by Russia as European Russia). Alfred Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie depuis les origines jusqu'à l'année 1877* (Paris: Hachette, 1878), 15-39, 277; Louis Léger, *Souvenirs d'un slavophile* (1863-1897) (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1905), 20, 82-84, 122, 136, 206; Louis Léger, *Le Monde slave: études politiques et littéraires*, 2ème éd. (Paris: Hachette, 1897), xix; Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes*, Vol. 1 "Les pays et les habitants", 2ème édition (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1883), 53; Marlène Laruelle, "La question du 'touranisme' des Russes. Contribution à une histoire des échanges intellectuelles. Allemagne-France-Russie au XIX siècle", *Cahiers du monde russe* 45:1 (2004): 243-244.
"turbulent nomads... incursions, pillages... depredations" in its frontier regions.⁴¹² Moscow’s pioneering 1867 Ethnographic Exposition (and its subsequent repository, the Dashkov Museum) recorded knowledge about Russia's imperial subjects,⁴¹³ knowledge that would be soon shared with the French. Russia subsequently annexed Samarkand, followed by Khiva, Turkestan, Bokhara, and Khokand from 1868 to 1875. The empire now encompassed over seventy ethnic groups,⁴¹⁴ with both the British and the French focused warily on its strength. But while Russia remained Britain’s adversary until the 1907 Anglo-Russian accord, French attitudes began to alter after 1871. Underscoring the shift, in 1894 Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu lauded Russia’s imperial success, linking it to technological progress financed in part by French investment:

...the domination of Central Asia and the empire of the steppe, from which Genghis Khan and Tamerlane emerged, are now and forever subject to the imperial eagle of Moscow...[the Trans-Siberian], the real link between Europe and Asia...will be...one of most historic pathways on the planet.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹² Gustave Regelsperger, “Les Russes en Asie” in Louis Delavaud et al, La Russie: géographique, ethnologique, historique, administrative, économique, religieuse, littéraire, artistique, scientifique, pittoresque, etc. 3ème édition (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1900), 127.


⁴¹⁴ Sixty-seven percent of its population was composed of Great Russians, Little Russians (Ukrainians), and White Russians (Belorussians). Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2001), 397-398.

With imperial goals deemed compatible - including competition with Great Britain - playing a role in strengthening relations, the science of Russian imperial ethnography sparked publishing in France. A number of 1880s and 1890s academic publications, along with the popular expositions and displays discussed in Chapter 5, testify to the preoccupation shared by the Paris Geographical and Anthropological Societies which maintained bilateral ties with Russia. Demonstrating government interest, in 1886 the Ministry of Public Instruction sent scientist Charles Rabot to the northern regions of Russia to study "little-known peoples". Outside of government, Russia could now be portrayed as a paradigmatic imperial nation, a model for and/or a supporter of the French colonialist ambitions urged by lobbyist groups. One author, for example, argued that France and Russia were destined together to educate Muslims in the Middle East. By 1900 French academic opinion seemed undeniably positive: "Russia offers the most remarkable example of the extension of European civilization and power towards the Orient".

Yet beyond this confirmation of a European and imperial identity, two problematic issues posed obstacles in presenting positive images of Russia: its religion and its autocracy. French

416 During the nineteenth century France acquired colonies or protectorates in Africa and Asia. In Africa these included Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, French Equatorial and West Africa, Somaliland and Madagascar, and in Asia, Cochin China, Indochina, Laos, Cambodia, Annan and Tonkin. See Chapter 5 for further discussion.


419 Regelsperger, "Les Russes en Asie", 118. Regelsperger's work is illustrative of French ethnographic publications about Russia. See also Arthur Desjardins (de l'Institut de France), "Comment la Russie prit sa place en Europe, d’après une publication récente", La Revue des deux mondes (15 octobre, 1893): 756-799.
Catholic animosity towards Russian Orthodoxy had remained strong throughout the nineteenth century, so how might this be addressed? Ultimately, concerns about Catholic Poland's independence were simply put aside after the 1871 defeat, while Republican secularization after 1880 diminished Catholicism's political influence. A burgeoning knowledge agenda also contributed here, exemplified by Leroy-Beaulieu's volume on the inner workings of Russian Orthodoxy to foster understanding in France. Catholic publishers, meanwhile, concentrated studiously on Russia's military strength.

A second challenge concerned Russian autocracy and its offspring, nihilism. Many authors attempted to bridge these problems by portraying Russia as a developing nation; alternatively, one alliance promoter argued that the multi-ethnic composition of Russia's empire simply negated democratic representation. Ultimately, however, French nationalism trumped any concern for political ideals, in part due to some shared political unrest. Tying into discussions of Russian autocracy - of deep concern in French Radical and socialist camps despite their generally pro-alliance stance - many titles reflected the fact that nihilism and anarchism had become a transnational issue after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881.

420 Leroy-Beaulieu, L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes, Vol. 3: La religion. Leroy-Beaulieu's L'Empire des Tsars et les Russes was republished nine times by 1900. See also the monograph by Celeste Courrière, Russie et Pologne (Paris: Dentu, 1874).

421 As an example, military strength remained uppermost in three books by a single author. One contained forty-nine pages focused on Russia's military and marine capacity. François Bournand, Le livre d'or franco-russe (Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1894), 283; La Russie militaire: Anecdotes historiques (Paris: Tolra, 1895); Chez nos amis les Russes: voyages, description, géographie, moeurs, usages (Paris: Téqui, 1897).

422 Philippe Deschamps asked French readers to imagine a Russian parliament including Tartars and Armenians in traditional dress, along with "...Lapps trailing their reindeer... Kamchatkans... their skin running with grease and oil, alongside the stubborn Finn and the elegant Pole.... Each group's unique spiritual practices and incomprehensible language could only result in a tower of Babel". Philippe Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898: Livre d'or de l'Alliance franco-russe (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1898), 293.

423 Early studies of nihilism include Prince Józef Lubomirski, Le nihilisme en Russie (Paris: E. Dentu, 1879); J.B. Arnaudo, Le nihilisme et les nihilistes (Paris: M. Dreyfous, 1880); M. Pierre Frédé, La
In France, the 1880 amnesty granted to former Communards raised fears of resurgent domestic violence,\(^{424}\) a theme explored in Zola’s novels *Germinial* (1885) and *Paris* (1898), the latter reflecting anarchist attacks in Paris during the 1890s. Political violence thus transcended borders, earning urgent authorial attention after the 1894 assassination of French President Sadi Carnot.\(^{425}\) Interestingly, some French authors focused on female nihilists in Russia,\(^{426}\) perhaps attesting to echoes of the mythical *tricoteuses* (implacable knitters at the foot of the guillotine) and *pétroleuses* (fire-bombers) of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune.

Beyond questions related to Russia’s geopolitical identity, empire, religion and political unrest, another significant "civilizational marker" lay in the fine arts. Gianni Cariani has stressed the growth of "a new mythology of Russia" during the alliance era, with French commentators

---


\(^{424}\) In reality the Communard amnesty spurred further membership in the Radical and socialist camps. Gildea, *Children of the Revolution*, 259-260.

\(^{425}\) Bilateral concerns were in fact long-standing. In 1867 an attacker attempted to assassinate Tsar Alexander II during his visit to Paris for the universal exposition, while during the 1870s Russian fugitives including Georgi Plekhanov (a member of the Russian Land and Liberty group), Mikhail Bakunin and Pyotr Lavrov spent time in France, followed by Bakunin’s "disciple" Pyotr Kropotkin. The latter was imprisoned in France for anarchist activity but released after three years, greatly angering Tsar Alexander II. Several anarchist attacks suspected of being inspired by Kropotkin occurred in Paris during the early 1890s; these led to the *lois scélérates* or laws limiting anarchist publications. Liudmila G. Vedenina, *La France et la Russie: Dialogue de deux cultures* (Moscow: InterDialect, 2003), 93, 106, 108, 121; Davydov et al, *Paris-Moscou, un siècle d’échanges*, 109. Notable studies on nihilism and anarchism published in the 1890s are J. Bourdeau, *Le socialisme allemand et le nihilisme russe* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1892); Élie de Cyon, *Nihilisme et anarchie, études sociales* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1892); Norbert Lallié, *Choses de Russie* (Lyon: Librairie Générale catholique et classique, 1895).

lauding Russia’s place in the cultural evolution of Europe. Interest in Russian literature and music grew, promoted by French and Russian patrons and placing these arts on an equal standing with those of France. This was clearly reflected in the publishing sphere, where the importance of the literary canon ensured that Russian writers received considerable attention.

Celeste Courrière pioneered works on Russian literature in 1875, while de Vogüé’s 1886 study of Russian novels provided a major impetus for recognizing Russia as a cultural leader. Hachette and Plon increasingly employed translators of Russian literary works, and French theaters commissioned Russian plays, particularly from 1888 to 1893 during the high water preceding the formal alliance. These literary studies, translations and theatrical performances,

427 Gianni Cariani, "Une France russophile?", Thèse de Doctorat (Strasbourg: Université Marc Bloch, 1998), 166.


429 Works on Russian literature included Celeste Courrière, Histoire de la littérature contemporaine en Russie (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1875); Histoire contemporaine le la littérature contemporaine chez les Slaves (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1875); Alfred Rambaud, La Russie épique: etudes sur les chansons héroïques de la Russie (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1876); Xavier Marmier, Les drames intimes: Contes russes (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1876); Ernest Dupuy, Les grands maîtres de la littérature russe du dix-neuvième siècle (Paris: Lecène et Oudin, 1885); Eugène Melchior de Vogüé, Le roman russe (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1886); L. Sichler, Histoire de la littérature russe (Paris: Dupret, 1887); Michel Delines (pseudonym of Mikhail Ashkinazi), La Terre dans le roman russe (Paris: Henry du Parc, 1888); Pierre de Corvin (pseudonym of Pierre Newsky), Histoire du théâtre en Russie (Paris: A. Savine, 1890); Guénin, La Russie: histoire, géographie, littérature; Emmanuel de St. Albin, Les poètes russes (Paris: 1893); Le Même, Les grands maîtres de la littérature russe au XIX siècle (Paris: Lecène, Oudin et Cie, 1896); K. Golovine, Le roman russe et la société russe (St. Petersburg: 1897). The most important of these, De Vogüé’s work, was republished five times between 1886 and 1900.

430 Corbet, L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 368, 404,139; Vedenina, La France et la Russie, 116. Publishing houses tended to concentrate on particular Russian authors: Hachette and Flammarion (Gogol, Pushkin, Tolstoy), Plon (Dostoevsky), and Savine (Lermontov, Pisemsky). See the bibliography in Guénin, La Russie, 344-348; Cariani, "Une France russophile?", 105.
along with academic works, helped to lay the groundwork for themes of "knowing" Russia among the wider public: the idealized peasant or *moujik*, and the mysticism of the Russian soul or *l’âme russe*, would prove to be popular storylines in fiction, travel works and expositions as described in Chapters 4 and 5. Interest in the *moujik* may have reflected French imaginings of peasant religiosity or of peasant devotion to military service, or an elite nostalgia for a pre-urban era as French workers’ power increased. Russia, perceived as a land of mysticism, spirituality and religion, enriched by the "primitive exoticism" of its imperial ethnic regions, also exercised considerable fascination for some. Such imagery merged with late nineteenth-century spiritualist and symbolist currents in France, themselves a reaction to "barren" Republican culture.  

Books on "Russian" music frequently that of conquered regions - fed into these currents as well. Recognition of Russian composers began in the 1870s with concerts in Paris where Tchaikovsky enjoyed particular success, and musical exchange continued during the 1876 *Exposition universelle*. Descriptions of the vitality of Russian folk (ethnographic) and classical music permeated published works, including those by César Cui (president of the St. Petersburg Imperial Society of Music and a professor of military fortifications), as well as those by French authors. Demonstrating post-alliance government support, one 1903 book referred to the "official mission" of its author, sent to Russia to study its music by the Ministry of Fine Arts. The rising popularity of Russian cultural forms would culminate in the Diaghilev exhibitions and performances in Paris beginning in 1904.

431 Gilda, *Children of the Revolution*, 393-397. My thanks to Dr. Bob Brain for this information.


Adding to the preceding markers, a further measure of “civilization” lay in perceptions of economic strength. As noted in Chapter 2, Russia’s economy spurred a number of specialist studies, some by instrumental actors Arthur Raffalovich and Émile Hoskier. The earliest book appeared in 1876, just as French elites began to demonstrate an interest in Russia as a possible ally. Raffalovich penned his books for the political economy firm Guillaumin, while Hoskier published with the Imprimerie Chaix, long associated with French railways. At the core of all these works is the theme of Russia’s modernizing economy, yet another civilizational "proof".

Beyond books that emphasized Russia’s European identity, imperial power, cultural output and economic strength, a further sub-set designed to elicit alliance support examined historical relations between France and Russia, with authors describing contacts in the

---


435 Raffalovich, Les Finances de la Russie, 1, 4. As an example of Hoskier’s work see Hoskier, Les Finances de la Russie.

political, cultural or economic realms, thereby naturalizing the present through a conscious reframing of the past. The majority of these works appeared in the 1890s, demonstrating that at times publishing followed foreign policy initiatives rather than preceding them, and that a post-alliance politics of persuasion continued among elites. Most authors emphasized events when Russia could be seen to have taken France's side in leadership for peace, as when Russia purportedly refused to sanction German bellicosity towards France in the late 1880s, notably during the Schnaebelé crisis. Although some books were penned by former ambassadors and diplomats, others appeared as military memoirs, signaling ongoing military involvement in alliance promotion. To overcome memories of past conflicts, writers employed phrases such as "loyal adversaries... never enemies" when referring to Russian soldiers in the Napoleonic and Crimean wars; one such book was dedicated "To the valiant Russian army, today in the vanguard of civilization and progress." Another work, purportedly a soldier's memoir, was in fact authored by a Paris industrialist whose ultra-nationalist leanings are apparent throughout the text.

As adjuncts to the civilizational "typing" of specialist books, publishers also sold general compendia on the history, geography, politics and society of Russia, by both Russian and


While the books described above were directed at elite opinion, general compendia signaled a move to a democratizing mass market. Unlike specialist books, they frequently included illustrations in a bid to satisfy or to create popular interest; this format echoed that of the pioneering illustrated newspapers described in Chapter 7. With scientific assessment as an organizer throughout, reflecting the pan-European vogue for the vulgarisation or popularization of scientific knowledge, some compendia authors outlined knowledge concerning Russia à la Leroy-Beaulieu. Others emphasized modernizing urban centers within Russia’s empire, of interest to the colonialist lobby in France, or focused on Russia’s military and naval forces and the importance of an alliance to maintain European military equilibrium, as an antidote to a German threat.


Color lithography reigned during the last decade of the nineteenth century, before it was replaced by black-and-white photography.


Significantly, several compendia published by lesser-known editors reveal a behind-the-scenes, bilateral effort to influence French opinion between 1886 and 1890, with a clear correspondence between participation by Russian authors and the advent of loans from France. Although it is not clear how these compendia were underwritten by Russian interests, their authors (and editors) were aware of pro-alliance opinion in France. Echoing previous studies, they emphasized Russia's place in Europe, its imperial stature, its cultural strength, its modernizing economy and its leadership for peace, while their sub-text clearly affirmed anti-German sentiment and/or French colonial aspirations. One work, a large and lavishly illustrated folio publication (destined to be a French school prize), was purportedly written by "Count Paul Vasili". This is a pseudonym attributed to two instrumental actors, Élie de Cyon of Russia and Juliette Adam, director of La Nouvelle Revue. 444 "Michel Delines", a pseudonym for Russian author Mikhail Osipovich Ashkinazi, also authored compendia: two in 1887 preceding the first loan, and one large, copiously illustrated volume in 1897. The latter became another school prize, suggesting connections with the French Ministry of Public Instruction, a matter considered in Chapter 7. 445

In summary, then, books conveying positive "civilizational" depictions of Russia emanated first from academic specialists in the 1870s, and then moved into wider circles.

Demonstrating links between foreign affairs and domestic politics, the latter author Vigoureux served as a foreign consul, a municipal counselor in Lyon and a member of the Académie.

444 The book contains over two hundred engravings. Comte Paul Vasili [Juliette Adam et Élie de Cyon], La Sainte Russie (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1890). See also Paul Vasili, La Société de Saint-Pétersbourg (Paris: 1886). Articles by "Paul Vasili" were also found in Adam’s La Nouvelle Revue; see for example "Un Secret d’État" 7 (1887): 5-10, "Le chemin de fer transcaspien" 5 (1888): 984-990. The latter reported on correspondence from the railway’s director, General Annenkoff, who was de Vogüé’s brother-in-law. http://gallica.bnf.fr

445 Michel Delines [pseudonym of Mikhail Osipovich Ashkinazi], La France jugée par la Russie (Paris: Librairie Illustrée, 1887); Nos amis les Russes (Paris: 1887); La Russie: nos alliés chez eux (Paris: Société française d’Éditions d’Art, 1897). Delines (Ashkinazi) also wrote a book on Russian literature and worked as a translator and writer for editor Alfred Rambaud in Les Annales politiques et littéraires. Corbet, L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 405; Guénin, La Russie, 347.
through to the 1890s. National security concerns and domestic political instability remained the principal factors undergirding the pro-alliance efforts by authors and publishers; these factors also contributed to consumer demand and to readership among an increasingly engaged polity. Significantly, the singular momentum engendered by shifting professional boundaries and changes in capitalization corresponded with the alliance era, helping to cement widespread support.

3.2 Periodicals: echoing the depictions of books

As the authors and publishers of specialist books and general compendia created a framework for furthering semi-official relations via a knowledge agenda, periodical editors contributed by serializing important books, by incorporating reviews and publicity for others, and by publishing articles about Russia. Related to the latter, when French cultural exchange with European monarchical nations decreased dramatically after the declaration of the Third Republic, periodicals emerged as significant vectors of information.\(^{446}\) Although too numerous to cite here, a survey of major periodicals - among them political, professional, scientific and popular - reveals multiple articles on Russia after 1871, with an exponential increase during the alliance decade from 1891 to 1901. At play in these periodicals were representations shared with books: Russia as a modernizing European great power, as an imperial civilizer of the barbarian "East", as a cultural leader and as an arbiter of peace. Whether pragmatic (based on a knowledge agenda), optimistic (focused on reforms made under Alexander II), idealized (extolling Russian progress, imperial prowess and leadership for peace), admiring (of Russian cultural output), or romantic (imagining a bilateral relationship in familial terms), their positive

\(^{446}\) Joly, "La Revue des deux mondes", 3. On the variety of revues at this time see Jacqueline Pluet-Despatin, Michel Leymarie et Jean-Yves Mollier, La Belle Époque des revues (Condé-sur-Noireau: IMEC, 2002).
representations served to counter traditionally negative stereotypes of Russia and to buttress rapprochement as the answer to French national security concerns.

Four periodicals are instructive for charting the affirmative representations of Russia which began soon after the Franco-Prussian War. Three began to publish articles concerning Russia during the 1870s, and the fourth (founded in 1883) during the 1880s. Each ultimately supported an alliance, but depending on their readership their tone ranged from sober consideration to enthusiastic affirmation. The first was France's pre-eminent fin-de-siècle periodical, La Revue des deux mondes, which focused on larger geopolitical questions involving Russia, its imperial strength, its political issues and its culture. The scholarly La Revue bleue, also known as the La Revue politique et littéraire, covered similar topics albeit in less depth and with somewhat less prestigious contributors. Meanwhile the revanchiste La Nouvelle Revue, with ties to business interests, to the military and to other influential elites, concentrated on Russian culture and social life. Finally the fourth periodical, the illustrated Les Annales politiques et littéraires, targeted a bourgeois provincial audience rather than a Paris-based elite; it too emphasized Russian culture and social groups, creating familiarity for readers.

The flagship bi-weekly La Revue des deux mondes (1830-extant) acted as the principal elite forum for conveying information about Russia.\(^4\) Despite having fewer than thirty thousand subscribers, this revue is consistently ranked as the most influential among four hundred-plus competitors in fin-de-siècle France. One commentator pithily described it as "an annex of the Académie and a trampoline towards it...", while another stressed its "gravitas". While its readership encompassed the upper establishment of Europe, including Tsar Alexander III,\(^5\) the

\(^4\) Joly, "La Revue des deux mondes", 3.

revue's contributors held prominent posts in academia or politics, and beginning in the mid-
1870s their densely-researched articles on Russia testify to the rise and the creation of interest
among elites. As noted, La Revue des deux mondes sponsored Leroy-Beaulieu's trips to
Russia, serializing his articles prior to their publication in book form; it also emphasized Russian
literature, publishing the 1880s installments of de Vogüé's study of Russian novels.449
Contributing to the rehabilitation of images of a "barbarian" Russia, it also explored the reforms
instituted by Tsar Alexander II. Echoing the preoccupations of books, discussions of the Russian
classical themes proceeded apace in its pages, as did those concerning nihilism, pan-Slavism and
Russian military and naval strength, along with historic Franco-Russian relations.450 Illustrating
politics, the revue's financial bulletin also offered information about the Russian
loans, citing publications by Russia's Ministry of Finance as an inducement to potential
subscribers.451

Tracing similar paths for university and Académie, La Revue bleue, or the weekly La
Revue politique et littéraire (1863-1939), demonstrated the relationship between a new
academic elite and the political interests characterizing the early Republic. As with La Revue
des deux mondes, this periodical considered larger geopolitical, imperial and financial

449 As was common in the late nineteenth century, both authors serialized their works in
periodicals before publishing them in book form.

450 Illustrative examples include: "L'Annexion de Merv à la Russie", La Revue des deux mondes
(1884:2); "Les rivalités coloniales: l'Angleterre et la Russie (janvier 1886); "La Situation intérieure en
Russie: le nihilisme" 3 (1879); "Un article du comte Tolstoï sur la religion" (avril 1894); "L'Empereur
Alexandre III et les réformes politiques" (juin 1881). On nihilism see de Vogüé, "Un regard en arrière: les
terroristes russes". For an annotated bibliography of over one hundred and fifty articles related to Russia,
see Christopher E. Guthrie, "The Revue des deux mondes and Imperial Russia, 1855-1917", Cahiers du

451 Joly, "La Revue des deux mondes", 3. One example is found in the revue's "Bulletin financier"
of 15 janvier 1893.
questions; authors also discussed Russian literature, nihilism and religion.\textsuperscript{452} *La Revue politique et littéraire* was more overtly pro-alliance, however, influenced by Alfred Rambaud and Louis Léger: as the periodical's editor, Rambaud contributed articles on varying topics from 1872 to 1890, with Léger penning articles in 1872 and 1873.\textsuperscript{453} Meanwhile other authors considered topics ranging from Russian-Turkish relations to Russia's public debt. An 1888 article concerning the latter, for example, reflected the loan negotiations underway; its author appealed to anti-German sentiment by arguing that Russia required loans to strengthen its military against a combined German and Austrian threat. Meanwhile Rambaud contended that Russia supported France's imperial goals against those of Great Britain, and lauded the Russian railways, "... which will do more for universal peace than all the war enterprises of the world together".\textsuperscript{454} Here a potential for military mobilization was presented as a prerequisite for peace, normalizing Russia's leadership to achieve it.

The third periodical, extra-governmental enabler Juliette Adam's bi-weekly *La Nouvelle Revue* (1879-1940), concentrated heavily on Russian culture and social life while stressing a "natural" fraternity between Russia and France. Echoing the development theme found in books, a typical *éloge* appeared in 1892: "Russia is the younger sister of European nations, gifted with both the faults and the great qualities of youth: faith, enthusiasm, hope and high


\textsuperscript{453} The high point for the annual number of articles concerning Russia was reached in 1878 (ten articles); this early spike likely reflected the subsequent appearance of specialist books by the academic go-betweens. Rambaud contributed nine articles related to Russia from 1872 to 1878; Léger contributed five articles from 1872 to 1873. See the annual *Table des matières*, available at http://gallica.bnf.fr.

aspirations...”. Most notably, alone among the four examples considered here, La Nouvelle Revue was conceived as a pro-alliance lobby periodical and it remained stridently revanchiste. Appealing to a broader elite audience which included female readers, its contributors emphasized Germany's perfidy and its "Prussianization" efforts to infiltrate Russian financial and military circles. Fanning the fires of revenge, it also publicized anti-German pamphlets and extolled the superiority of the military in France.  

A final influential periodical was not aimed at elites, but rather at the "petit et moyen" bourgeois provincial reader, an audience of mounting interest to those seeking popular alliance support within an increasingly democratic political culture. This occurred as the early Republic looked to the lower middle class as an intermediary group to help stabilize shifting social structures. As with La Revue politique et littéraire, Les Annales politiques et littéraires (1883-1970) was published on Sundays, testifying to a secularizing public; it too targeted female readers. Employing well-known contributors to discuss a variety of topics including political events, its director Jules Brisson was assisted by an investment society, running his operations from Paris. With a circulation of 100,000 by 1905, this revue demonstrates efforts to create national involvement in the alliance question, paralleling the newspapers described later in this

455 Cariani, "Une France russophile?", 165, 166, 116.

456 See for example "La Femme russe: son histoire et sa situation actuelle", La Nouvelle Revue (1880:5); "Une jeune fille russe [l'artiste Marie Baskirtcheff]" (1887:48); "Une voix russe" (1897:107); "La vraie Russie: les Allemands" (1891:73), http://gallica.bnf.fr; Claude Digeon, La crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870-1914 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France, 1959), 388.

457 Charle, Social History of France, 140, 188. For Charle the "petit bourgeois" referred to those working in trades and crafts, urban occupations, and the liberal professions.


459 Charle, Le siècle de la presse, 176.
chapter which enjoyed a significant provincial base. At sixteen pages in length, \footnote{“Les Annales politiques et littéraires - IMEC”} Les Annales politiques et littéraires was remarkable for its emphasis on Russia: starting in the late 1880s as the loans began, ubiquitous articles focused on Russian culture and social groups and on topics ranging from Russian weather to the Russian fleet. \footnote{Articles featuring the key word “Russia” or “Russian” appeared in thirty-nine of fifty-two issues in 1886, and in forty-nine of fifty-two issues in 1887. The next spike occurred in 1896 and 1897: forty-four in each of fifty-two issues. Les Annales politiques et littéraires, http://gallica.bnf.fr} Although not overtly revanchiste, the periodical echoed La Nouvelle Revue concerning the omnipresent danger of further war with Germany and the concomitant need to ally with Russia. Predictions of war surfaced in the 1886 and 1887 editions, for example, fanned by a German book entitled The Next Franco-German War (translated by a professor at the Paris St. Cyr military academy), and by the Schnaebelé border espionage incident which became a “turning point in public opinion”, earning urgent editorial reaction. Headlines of “Vive la Russie!” accompanied statements that Russia had "loyally extended her hand" to France and that her army would be a "guarantor of peace". \footnote{Lt.-Col. C. Koettschau, La prochaine guerre franco-allemande, traduit par Ernest Jaeglé (Paris: W. Hinrichsen, 1887); E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs (1870-1914) (New York: The Century Co., 1931), 132; "Les officiers de l’état-major allemand", Les Annales politiques et littéraires (14 novembre 1886): 13; “Vive la Russie!” (13 novembre, 1887): 5-6.}

Further echoing the role of books, then, periodical editors disseminated affirmative "civilizational" markers concerning Russia's geopolitical identity, empire, culture and economy through ever widening markets. Demonstrating polyvalent media interest, in addition to the four revues above a series of women's, commercial and travel journals featured articles on Russia. \footnote{This is based on my observations. Examples include L’Echo du monde élégant, Le Moniteur des consulats et du commerce international, Le Journal des Voyages and Le Tour du Monde (the latter two are discussed in Chapter 4). http://gallica.bnf.fr} Information about Russian music and theater also appeared in specialist journals
such as *Les Annales du Théâtre* and *La Revue d’art dramatique*.\(^{464}\) Other periodicals, meanwhile, pondered Russian imperial prowess, with one noting that "Civilization advances along with the Russians", and another approving "The conquest...marvellously executed with that perserverance, that ability, that characteristic insouciance of the Muscovites".\(^{465}\) Reflecting both the elite scientific interest mentioned in Chapter 2 and the popularization of science, the pre-eminent *La Nature* described Russian infrastructure, hydro-electric works and mining, the Pasteur Institutes in Russia, and the Russian fleet,\(^{466}\) with Russia’s power as its most prominent theme.

### 3.3 Newspapers: disseminating knowledge of Russian affairs, creating/reflecting alliance support and encouraging government action

The role of book and periodical publishers in reframing vestigial negative stereotypes of Russia was augmented by an explosion of the newspaper press after 1881, a fortuitous development for alliance promoters. Spurred by new press freedoms and by technological change, during the alliance decade from 1891 to 1901 newspaper publication rose to challenge that of books,\(^{467}\) highlighting the former’s importance in information gathering, opinion making and expression regarding Russia. Although the abundance of newspapers after 1881 renders


\(^{467}\) Clark, "The Beginnings of Mass Culture in France", 280.
analysis difficult - many studies focus on the early and mid-century French press - following a single topic such as representations of Russia yields rich results, aided by the recent digitization program of the Bibliothèque de France. Equally, charting foreign policy against the historiography of fin-de-siècle domestic issues situates the Franco-Russian alliance within the winds of change that included the rise of a mass political culture.469

To what degree abundant press coverage concerning Russia directed or reflected widespread public enthusiasm is difficult to assess, but as Chapter 1 argued, French citizens had compelling reasons to support an alliance in light of national security concerns. Benedict Anderson’s emphasis on newspaper reading in nationalist contexts resonates here, as does Eugen Weber’s focus on newspaper reading in fin-de-siècle France. While Anderson emphasized the role of newspapers in creating and reinforcing an imagined national identity or solidarity, Weber concentrated on their role in inculcating a nationalist Republican modernity in rural communities.470 Given the expansion of the press after 1881, added to a politicized and nationalist mass culture and the ongoing government instability characterizing the early Third Republic, the role of newspapers in urging foreign policy direction became substantial. Local


469 Over the past ten years, millions of newspaper pages have been electronically scanned by the BNF.

and national newspapers acted as important foci for public opinion, emblematic of a consumer culture that was "profoundly political".471

How did newspapers attempt to engage widespread alliance support? Along with other publishing modes, the press represented a social structure generated by individual and group action and by professional and entrepreneurial initiatives unique to the place and time.472 Unlike books and periodicals, however, newspapers could combine current events with presentations of key alliance players - often in intimate fashion - to entice a mass public; as predecessors of radio and television they assumed an enormous role in depicting political events. Their temporal and spatial momentum in reporting and creating news made them a particularly powerful medium. Beginning in the 1880s, newspapers increasingly published articles favorable to Russia, albeit with some exceptions including Le Temps, which remained lukewarm regarding an alliance until the 1890s.473 Yet the rise of almost one hundred dailies in Paris guaranteed scrutiny of all matters related to the alliance; thus events such as the coronation of Nicholas II drew journalists from all major French newspapers.474 This saturation of news was reflected in

471 One-third of sitting deputies in the Chamber served as local mayors with an equal number of local councilors. D.L.L. Parry and Pierre Girard, France since 1800: Squaring the Hexagon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 81; Charle, Social History of France, 118-121; Mayeur and Rebérioux, The Third Republic, 86, 118.


473 Caroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 141.

474 Lapauze, De Paris au Volga, 97; Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 295. As noted in Chapter 2, Élie de Cyon employed a news agency to distribute pro-Russia articles in France. This agency, the Correspondance française, was likely short-lived, as it was common for news agencies in this period to fold soon after their inception. I thank Dr. Heidi Tworek for this observation. Caroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 142; Bellanger et al, Histoire de la presse française, 291.
an abundant production of pro-alliance song-sheets, souvenirs and illustrations, as described in Chapters 6 and 7.

The French press could both direct and reflect mass alliance support, proceeding against a backdrop of rising literacy and knowledge reform. Scholars have frequently remarked on these functions of the press in fin-de-siècle mass culture, a culture described as modern and bourgeois.475 Some of their observations concerning the importance of newspapers echo those made by Gabriel Tarde in 1901, as described in Chapter 2.476 Although segmented and fragmented, the multiple newspaper articles concerning Russia exemplified the new knowledge forms of modernity,477 characterized by "sound bites" of information both superficial and repeated.

Some scholars have argued that the press could serve as a representational "fourth estate" at this time, before assuming an informational role by 1900. This contention for a representational function applies well here, reflecting the increasingly inclusive political culture of the early Third Republic that coincided with the alliance era. French newspapers - along with some books and periodicals - not only mirrored mass culture, they were "constitutive" of that culture, true also for other European examples, as demonstrated by Troy Paddock's study which has examined the role of the German press in disseminating negative images of Russia.478 The press could thus function simultaneously to express, to inform and to create

475 De la Motte and Przyblyski, Making the News, 3; Charle, Siècle de la presse, 19.
public opinion regarding the alliance in France; the agency exerted by both consumer and media reflected the intensity of national interest. At times this duality could create tension in editorial decision-making, however, as seen in the seesaw of positions in Le Grelot described in Chapter 1.

In addition to rising literacy and knowledge reform, the potential role of the press in alliance promotion resulted from the intersection of several other factors in France, among them Republicanism, capitalization, social activism, the professionalization of journalism, and the enmeshment of politics and finance. Ultimately, the Republican government believed that a free press would foster political unity; significantly, the ideas that print equated to public, and that press mediation embodied republican ideals, corresponded with the alliance era. Freedom of expression would be limited only twice before 1940: by legislative amendments in 1882 and in 1893/94 respectively, to address the issues of pornography and of anarchist publications deemed likely to influence terrorist acts. Newspapers served Republican goals, as Philip Nord explained: "The press, the publishing industry... they could be, and were, made to serve democratic ends. Republicans proved themselves dexterous... [in] outbidding all rivals for mastery of the new media." Yet extra-governmental pro-alliance agitation also reveals that

cited in Pykett, "Reading the Periodical Press", 103. On the German press, see Troy R.E. Paddock, Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914 (Rochester, New York: Camden House, 2010).


early democratic politics involved both "lobby groups and political print" as Christopher Clark observed:

One thing is beyond doubt: the last decades before the outbreak of the [1914] war saw a dramatic expansion of the [European] political public sphere and broader public discussion of issues linked to international relations ....[Governments] thus had good reason to take the press seriously.\footnote{Christopher Clark, \textit{The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914} (New York: Harper Collins, 2013), 226-227.}

Nowhere was this more true than in France. The growth of an engaged polity, rooted in the uncertainty engendered by the Franco-Prussian War and the establishment of a new Republic, contributed substantially to such discussion.

Further facilitating press expansion, during the 1880s newspaper societies backed by speculative capital from "bourgeois notables" registered on the Paris stock exchange for the first time.\footnote{Charle, \textit{Le siècle de la presse}, 135-137; Garrigues, \textit{L'argent et les lettres}, 139-142.} This reflected an undeniably brisk readership: a contemporary observer noted that "French men and women, even of the lower classes, read at least one paper daily and most often two."\footnote{Henry Bérenger, \textit{La Revue politique et littéraire} (4 décembre 1897): 706, as cited in Roberts, "Subversive Copy", 311; Hampton, \textit{Visions of the Press in Britain}, 308.}

A 1900 photograph of a milliner’s employee reading the popular daily \textit{Le Petit Parisien} as she walked along a sidewalk testifies to this. Indeed, many people learned to read via the penny press at the time,\footnote{As found in a reproduction of a 1900 postcard, personal collection. Mayeur and Rebérioux, \textit{The Third Republic}, 117.} as the average newspaper contained just four pages and media entrepreneurs boosted sales by every means. Jean-Yves Mollier has estimated that in 1899 up to twenty thousand \textit{camelots} sold newspapers on Paris streets, and national consumption echoed this example. These itinerant vendors, accompanied by cartloads of newspapers and books during key events, remained a fixture until World War I. Adding to

\footnote{As found in a reproduction of a 1900 postcard, personal collection. Mayeur and Rebérioux, \textit{The Third Republic}, 117.}
traditional practices of shared reading and provincial *colportage*, the cafés, reading rooms and railway kiosks of urban centers further extended readership. These reflected the pan-European trends of urbanization and of a fledgling mass public whose income levels began to climb with industrialization.\footnote{30} Uniquely, social activism also provided a springboard for newspapers to insert themselves into *fin-de-siècle* nationalist agendas, following the practices of the voluntary associations described in Chapter 2. Tellingly, beyond alliance initiatives, several major French newspapers initiated or participated in other campaigns with foreign policy implications. Addressing depopulation, for example, the aristocratic *Le Figaro* led a national fund-raising drive for infant croup vaccination, while the anarchist-leaning *L’Assiette au Beurre* publicized the problem of tainted infant milk.\footnote{31} To address mortality among young adults, *Le Petit Journal* participated in a smallpox vaccination campaign; it also sponsored paramilitary activities including cycling races and the release of 40,000 pigeons from the Eiffel Tower to demonstrate their potential in military communication.\footnote{32} Newspapers could thus advertise their social and political utility in dramatic form.


\footnote{31} For the croup vaccine fund-raising campaign see the front pages of *Le Figaro* from October through December of 1894. "Les empoisonneurs patentés: les falsificateurs de lait", *L’Assiette au Beurre* (février 1902). http://gallica.bnf.fr

Added to Republicanism, capitalization and social activism, further factors encouraged the role of the press in alliance promotion. The rise of journalism as a new profession, another pan-European phenomenon, acted as a strong spur. Yet although the number of reporters increased during the alliance era, individual authors were often eclipsed by powerful editors. One such individual was Ernest Judet, political editor and director of the most widely-read popular daily, *Le Petit Journal*. A former teacher, Judet was one of the "black hussars" trained to inculcate the new Republican education agenda. Firmly against an alliance with Britain, Judet echoed others who argued that the choice of Russia was natural given a bilateral affinity based on "sentiment and reason". His views traced familiar paths in which these faculties could be envisioned to politically align.

Enhancing the repeated coverage of Russia, politicians also exploited the value of a *fin-de-siècle* press entourage. President Sadi Carnot (1887-1894) pioneered the accompaniment by journalists on official visits, and President Félix Faure (1895-1899) traveled with a coterie of reporters to Russia in 1897. When Nicholas II returned to France in 1901, this time to Compiègne for a military review, dozens of journalists accompanied President Émile Loubet (1899-1906), and a further two hundred received preferential train access during the visit. The

---


latter demonstrates a convergence among press, railway and government sectors in relationship to the alliance.

Such a convergence also illustrates that in a publishing landscape far less nuanced than today, politics and press remained enmeshed. Many French Foreign Ministers had previously pursued journalism or literature as careers, while elastic professional boundaries meant that politicians might work simultaneously as writers, journalists or editors. President Adolphe Thiers (1871-1873) published extensively in *Le Bien Public*, for example, and Georges Clemenceau, a Radical deputy, became editor of the socialist (and famously Dreyfusard) *L’Aurore*; meanwhile senator Adrien Hébrard directed *Le Temps*, and minister and senator Jean Dupuy directed the popular daily *Le Petit Parisien* and oversaw provincial publications as well.  

Funding mechanisms remained similarly elastic in the newspaper arena. In keeping with European norms, domestic and foreign press subsidies became ubiquitous, highlighted by events in France such as the Panama Canal scandal which revealed that newspapers and politicians had received millions of francs for positive coverage of the venture. Some editors also received secret subsidies from the Republican government, ostensibly to depoliticize coverage of domestic events in order to encourage civic consensus. Meanwhile, financial elites who lacked direct political access could easily utilize the press to further their agendas.


Papers such as *Le Journal des débats* (edited by former Finance Minister, Léon Say) and *Le Temps* (whose parliamentary chronicle was deemed particularly influential) have been linked to financial consortia; newspapers also received monies to carry bank and stock exchange reports, matters referenced in Zola's scathing 1891 novel *L'Argent*.495

Tellingly, the enmeshment of finance and press related to Russia reveals a transnational exchange. According to a pre-eminent study by René Girault, from the late 1880s through to 1913, certain sectors of the French press were "abundantly" compensated for promoting the Russian loans.496 Facilitating this, a Paris branch of the Okhrana (Russian secret police) distributed funds to underwrite favorable articles in prominent dailies including *Le Figaro*, *Le Petit Journal*, *Le Petit Parisien* and *Le Gaulois*. This continued a practice begun in the 1830s when Russia employed "financial diplomacy" after the first Polish uprising, to bolster its image in France.497 Suggesting a bilateral web of influence, yet another author noted that French funds flowed to Mikhail Katkov's paper *Le Messager russe* to encourage his pro-alliance stand. Added


to the above, the principal French news agency Havas handled publicity for the sale of the Russian bonds while providing news from Russia and other countries.\textsuperscript{498}

Several important caveats apply here, however: it is difficult to gauge to what extent these financial practices underpinned "disguised publicity"\textsuperscript{499} about Russia between 1871 and 1901, i.e. the era covered by this dissertation. In the case of \textit{L'Economiste français} directed by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, for example, "vigorous" support of the Russian loans continued without any editorial compensation.\textsuperscript{500} Additionally, much of the Russian underwriting in France occurred after 1901, particularly in 1905 with Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the first Russian revolution.\textsuperscript{501} It is also difficult to ascertain whether positive coverage concerning Russia reflected the loans or the alliance, or both. From the Russian perspective, the loans and the alliance would remain intertwined; yet by 1893 at least seventy percent of French foreign investment was held outside of Russia, suggesting "financial diplomacy" by other nations.\textsuperscript{502} Further hindering understanding, increasingly positive coverage of Russia emerged


\textsuperscript{499} "Avertissement de l'éditeur", "L'abominable vénalité de la presse", 1.

\textsuperscript{500} Martin, "Retour sur l'abominable vénalité de la presse", 24-26.

\textsuperscript{501} Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé (1898-1905) was involved in permitting Russian underwriting of French press articles to encourage further investment. Robert Tombs, \textit{France, 1814-1914} (Essex: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1996), 475.

in the British press after the Crimean War and with the 1907 Anglo-Russian accord,\textsuperscript{503} although it is unclear whether Russian lobbying was involved.

As the rise of the French press reflected the influence of politics, capitalization and lobbying to further alliance aspirations, the emphasis on "useful knowledge" found in books and periodicals fed into newspaper accounts as a framework for presenting knowledge and commentary about Russia. This might be termed a sort of "path dependency", rooted in the new knowledge forms seen in books and displaying remarkably little variation. Lauding the result, George Duruy, a professor at the École Polytechnique and a former member of the Hachette editorial board, wrote to \textit{Le Figaro} during the 1893 naval visit, declaiming: "... all honor to our press, which has spread throughout the land a true picture of the great Russian nation."\textsuperscript{504}

Beyond presenting information about Russia, however, how did the French press attempt to influence the wider public and the government to embrace an alliance? Marc Martin has argued that newspapers became more involved in the alliance question than in any other foreign affairs issue prior to World War II.\textsuperscript{505} Although he provided no explicit details, a broad reading of major newspapers demonstrates their significant role. Particularly after the late 1880s, positive representations of Russia circulated repeatedly, whether through booksellers or subscriptions, in libraries or reading rooms - such as that in the \textit{Bon Marché} department store - and at street kiosks or railway stations. During Nicholas II's 1896 visit, for example, \textit{Le Petit}


\textsuperscript{504} Kalifa, \textit{La culture de masse en France}, 83; Georges Duruy, as cited in Georges Michon, \textit{The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891-1917}, trans. Norman Thomas (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 71. Reflecting the thirst for transnational knowledge, by 1900 the Paris School of Journalism included a course on the presses of Russia and America, deemed the most important expansionist nations of the day. Palmer, "Parisian Newsrooms", 481.

\textsuperscript{505} Martin, "Le grand reportage", 142.
Parisien, Le Journal and Gil Blas opened special viewing rooms for displays.\textsuperscript{506} Tellingly, the coverage concerning Russia vastly outweighed that of any other nation at the time. Only in 1903 did regular articles about England and Italy begin to appear, reflecting discussions concerning a possible alliance with these powers in addition to Russia.\textsuperscript{507}

In addition to daily news reports, press editors employed special weekend issues called suppléments to focus on special topics, often twinning political reporting with literature, or linking the alliance with the Russian loans. Exemplifying the former, an 1896 supplement of Le Gaulois featured a banner article entitled "Les grands écrivains russes",\textsuperscript{508} a trend referenced in the 1965 film Dr. Zhivago, when Tonya descended the train from Paris brandishing a Le Figaro supplement about young Russian poets. During the alliance era, Le Figaro's supplement did not confine itself to culture, however: it devoted a full monthly page to financial news, adding information on stock markets and international finance to its usual array of articles, poetry and literary excerpts. Here readers could learn that Russia's economy was "eminently prosperous" and that its credit was "one of the best in Europe" (1889), that Russia enjoyed "undeniable prosperity" (1890), and that its financial situation demonstrated "extreme solidity" (1893).\textsuperscript{509} This parallels the financial publicity found in the equally influential periodical La Revue des deux mondes.

\textsuperscript{506} Most of these reading rooms were found in Paris but some also opened in the provinces. Henri Daragon et Ernest Dolis, Le Tsar à Paris en 1896 (Paris: Henri Jouve, 1896), 53.

\textsuperscript{507} This is based on my observations.


\textsuperscript{509} The monthly financial page was produced by "La Financière: Société d'études financières". "Finances", Le Figaro: Supplément littéraire du dimanche (5 octobre 1889); "Conversion Russe" (27 mars 1890); "Finances Russes" (27 mai 1893).
Within the daily press, three best-selling newspapers are exemplary for examining pro-alliance representations across social strata: *Le Figaro* (aristocratic), *Le Petit Journal* (nationalist and republican) and *La Croix* (Catholic).\(^{510}\) Uniquely, the patrician *Le Figaro* played a singular role by displaying impatience with government caution regarding the alliance. As negotiations proceeded in 1892 concerning the terms of the military convention, for example, its editors published a front-page article on Bastille Day entitled "Alliance ou flirt?", suggesting that Russia might yet renew its cooperative relations with Germany and Austria.\(^{511}\) Of significance here is *Le Figaro*’s voice in foreign affairs; with a circulation of over 100,000 it was the first French newspaper to employ foreign correspondents and it was also read by the Tsar. Domestically, forty percent of its *tirage* was sold in the provinces, and it offered half-price subscriptions to a variety of elites including military officers and clerics.\(^{512}\) Following *Le Figaro*’s example, pressing for an official *affiancement* (engagement) became an oft-employed refrain among commentators,\(^{513}\) strengthening the theme of a Franco-Russian "family" discussed in Chapter 7.

\(^{510}\) *Le Figaro* was the top-selling daily newspaper for the wealthy classes, while *Le Petit Journal* was the top seller of the national penny press, and *La Croix* of the Catholic press. Francine Amaury, *Histoire du plus grand quotidien de la Troisième République: Le Petit Parisien, 1876-1944* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1972), 98.

\(^{511}\) "Alliance ou flirt?", *Le Figaro* (14 juillet 1892), 1. The author of this article is unknown but it raised ire in both French and Russian government circles. A riposte by the French government appeared in *Les Débats* several days later. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance*, 174; Amaury, *Le Petit Parisien*, 98.


\(^{513}\) See the cartoon “Accord de fiançailles”, *La Silhouette* (13 octobre 1893), reprinted in John Grand-Carteret, *Les caricatures sur l’Alliance franco-russe* (Paris: Librairies-Imprimeries Réunies, 1893), 41. http://gallica.bnf.fr. Another reference to romance is found in the text of a speech at the 1893 Paris banquet, when political editor of *Le Temps* Adrien Hébrard declared: “In this delightful and historic engagement between France and Russia, we have seen for the first time that love has entered into politics.” "Banquet franco-russe", 54.
A second prominent daily was notable for promoting the alliance among ordinary citizens, or the *menu peuple*, to elicit national support. As one of the "quatre grands" (four leaders) of the penny press, the republican *Le Petit Journal* competed with rivals *Le Petit Parisien, Le Journal* and *Le Matin* to enjoy a readership across the country.\(^{514}\) *Le Petit Journal* was the first to cost five centimes, the lowest denomination of French coinage; relying on itinerant vendors working from provincial railway stations, it featured small pages (hence its name) and the thinnest newsprint available. With eighteen thousand national "depositories", its circulation exceeded one million by 1890, a remarkable number for a population of thirty-eight million, and representing twenty-five percent of the Paris market alone. No doubt its low price contributed to the trend wherein the vast majority of citizens read newspapers at the time.\(^{515}\) Publicizing Russian matters became the norm in *Le Petit Journal* after the late 1880s loans, lending support to elite and government initiatives while exploiting consumer interest, but also reflecting the newspaper's involvement in stock trading of Russian bonds. This seesaw of roles characterized other dailies such as *Le Figaro, Le Temps* and *Le Matin*.\(^{516}\)

As a final example, France’s most prominent religious daily, *La Croix* (published by the Assumptionist order), guided reluctant readers to overlook long-standing animosity towards the Russian Orthodox Church and towards historic Russian repression in Catholic Poland.

\(^{514}\) Rural population remained the majority in France until 1914. Charle, *Le siècle de la presse*, 157, 13.

\(^{515}\) Whereas in 1882 thirty French newspapers were sold for five *centimes* (compared to four newspapers in 1871), by 1892 fifty-one newspapers could be purchased for this price. Palmer, *Des petits journaux aux grandes agences*, 25, 172, 177; Maria Adamowicz-Hariasz, "From Opinion to Information: The Roman-Feuilleton and the Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century French Press", in De la Motte and Przybyski, eds., *Making the News*, 178; Bellanger et al, *Histoire générale de la presse française*, 234, 174, 347, 348, 194, 196, 297, 300, 303; Palmer, *Des petits journaux aux grandes agences*, 172, 101, 174.

\(^{516}\) A bank called L’Auxiliare controlled these newspapers, which received funding via Arthur Raffalovich to downplay any negative financial news from Russia. Palmer, *Des petits journaux aux grandes agences*, 220-221, 310.
Illustrating its stature, La Croix enjoyed a circulation of 170,000 and spawned multiple regional offshoots including six dailies and seventy-three weeklies.\textsuperscript{517} Ironically, the alliance support expressed by La Croix resulted from the Republic's commitment to secularization; its editors hoped to preserve traditional Catholic influence in government and education by championing a Russian ally for whom religion stood alongside the state. Adding to the extended political posturing which Chapter 7 recounts, La Croix also produced an illustrated supplement which appeared in translation for the Russian sailors visiting Toulon in 1893.\textsuperscript{518}

Added to the initiatives above, prominent newspaper editors facilitated the celebrations marking official Russian visits to France in 1893, 1896 and 1901. Special press committees encouraged mass reporting of these events, particularly when the Russian fleet vessels visited in 1893; prior to this a Comité de la Presse met at the Russian embassy with representatives from the host cities of Toulon, Marseille, Paris and Lyon.\textsuperscript{519} Twenty-nine Paris newspapers organized a municipal events committee, divided into five groups: those responsible for a banquet for 3,600 invitees on the Champ de Mars, for gymnastic displays, races and a torchlight military retreat, for illuminations, fireworks and a fête on the Seine, for individual arrondissement festivities, and for theatrical presentations. "Patriotic" donations funded the events above: almost 144,000 francs collected in Paris, and another 14,000 francs across the country.\textsuperscript{520}


\textsuperscript{519} Newspapers were warned against provocative anti-German commentary during this visit. Jules Hansen, \textit{L'Alliance franco-russe} (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1897), 111, 159.

\textsuperscript{520} Le Petit Journal was represented in four of these organizing groups, Le Figaro in three. Bertol-Graivil et Paul Boyer, \textit{Le livre d'or des fêtees franco-russes} (Paris: Paul Ollendorf, 1894), 122, 195-196. Le Figaro also organized a music and theatrical reception featuring famous names such as Sarah Bernhardt. Marius Vachon, \textit{Les marins russes en France} (Paris: Librairies-Impriméries Réunies, 1895), 115. Jean Dupuy, director of Le Petit Parisien, collected further funds to mount a series of "electronic projections"
Grandiose celebrations took place in other host cities also.\textsuperscript{521} Meanwhile the medical press planned events for the Russian fleet doctors as well.\textsuperscript{522}

Demonstrating significant bilateral press involvement, Russian journalists accompanied the Russian naval officers to Paris, subsequently hosting the banquet described at the beginning of this chapter. Speaking to banquet guests, de Vogüé praised the French press: "...[normally] so divided … [it] was admirably sage, unanimous in accord, and patiently obstinate in pursuit of the same goal. It slowly created the image [of Russia] that has entered into the eyes of our people…"\textsuperscript{523} The Russian journalists were led by Colonel V.V. Komarov, whose brothers were military generals and one of whom served as editor of a nationalist pan-Slav newspaper popular among the military.\textsuperscript{524} Significantly, pan-Slavists at the time were actively lobbying for the removal of traditional German influence on the Russian state. The mingling of press and military here augments observations by Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, who has credited military representatives with building the \textit{rapprochement}.\textsuperscript{525}

In sum, the pro-alliance press fulfilled three key functions overall: it promoted knowledge of Russian affairs, it reflected and created alliance support, and it encouraged government action. Although the world of newspapers could be a byzantine one, with European

\textsuperscript{521} The Toulon celebrations, for example, featured events funded by national contributions. These included military fanfares and parades, a steamboat flotilla to house visiting delegations, receptions, a gala and a ball for 7,000 guests, plus local village visits by French and Russian officers. Marius Vachon, \textit{Les marins russes en France} (Paris: Librairies-Imprimeries Réunies, 1894), 4-55.

\textsuperscript{522} "Les fêtes de Paris", \textit{Le Figaro} (20 octobre 1893), 2.

\textsuperscript{523} "Banquet franco-russe. Discours de M. E.-M. de Vogüé", 15.

\textsuperscript{524} Kennan, \textit{The Fateful Alliance}, 222.

\textsuperscript{525} Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, \textit{Alliance franco-russe}, 32.
governments at times floating trial balloons regarding particular issues, any French government involvement to encourage positive newspaper coverage concerning Russia or the alliance remains oblique. Yet influenced by bilateral lobbying and by consumer interest, the press attention given to Russia remained vast and omnipresent, often predating the formal military pact by a matter of years. Regardless of their political orientation, dailies such as Le Figaro, Le Petit Journal and La Croix trumpeted the alliance, albeit with competing domestic agendas in mind. National security thus transcended domestic political or social orientation, strengthening calls for the alliance as newspapers capitalized on the national security anxieties of readers.

To reiterate then, the positive “civilizational” depictions of Russia found in books and periodicals from the mid-1870s onward were furthered by alliance advocacy in the press, uniquely aided by the motors of domestic and pan-European change. Newspapers acted as a far from impartial “fourth estate” in promoting and calling for the formalization of the alliance, and without doubt amplified relevant events to encourage sales while receiving stipends from Russia to promote the French loans. According to one 1930s critic commenting on the Bolshevik Revolution, "... the French moderate press either ignored evidence of Russia’s military and social weakness, or consistently misrepresented conditions there." It is much more difficult to make claims for subsidies of the book and periodical press, however, as very little is known. While publishing motives might be "entrepreneurial, denominational or


527 Le Figaro did not fully endorse Republicanism until the 1890s.

528 Caroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 161.
ideological” and the stature of publications varied considerably, no clear evidence points to Russian incentives to book or periodical publishers beyond the examples of the bilateral compendia and La Nouvelle Revue described above, nor indeed to the daily La Croix.

In conclusion, a return to the banquet invitees featured at the beginning of this chapter helps to trace the links among publishing elites. While many connections remain opaque due to the employment of editorial boards and of anonymous investment societies, key centers of sociability such as publishing houses and salons clearly played a role. De Vogüé and the military painter Édouard Detaille, for example, had connections with Marius Vachon, a contributor to La Nouvelle Revue and the author of two books on Russia: La Russie au soleil (1886) and Les marins russes en France (1894). De Vogüé penned the preface to the latter book, while Vachon wrote another work about Detaille, the most celebrated military artist of the day and a member of Juliette Adam’s salon. Detaille’s 1884 visit to Russia resulted in a book on the Russian army; he also painted the official government image of the Châlons military review attended by Nicholas II in 1896. The editors of Le Figaro, meanwhile, hired popular author Victor Tissot to direct their weekly Supplément littéraire (1888-1893) which featured the monthly financial reports noted above. Tissot also worked for Hachette and wrote a best-selling


530 Garrigues, La République des hommes d’affaires, 14-15, 99-105.


532 Marius Vachon, Detaille (Paris: A. Lahure, 1898); Édouard Detaille, Les grandes manoeuvres de l’armée russe (Paris: Boussod, 1886). Detaille also served on the Military Education Committee established by the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1882; see Chapter 7.
travelogue for Plon entitled La Russie et les Russes, Kiev et Moscou (1884), discussed in the following chapter.533 The enmeshment of alliance promoters with influential publishing elites is thus clearly revealed. Their actions would help to move affirmative representations of Russia from the elite into the popular sphere, further augmented by the popular fiction and travel writing examined in Chapter 4, the theatrical productions and expositions discussed in Chapter 5, and the material culture described in Chapter 6.

533 Tissot, La Russie et les Russes.
Chapter 4: Describing Russia: Engaging Wider Public Interest and Support via Popular Literature

This chapter focuses on popular fiction and travel works, which like the general compendia and newspapers previously described, served to disseminate positive images of Russia in France. The significance of fiction and travel texts lies in considering the reading of these as one indication of alliance support within a growing *culture de masse* in the early Third Republic, when nascent mass media reflected increased literacy and leisure time, as well as the interest in travel encouraged by expanding railway networks and by the Paris *expositions universelles*.\(^\text{534}\) While a politicization of the reading public reflected the pioneering ethos of a fledgling Republic, the widening pool of readers also affirmed its educational mantra, one increasingly focused on general knowledge as part of its program to fulfill democratic ideals. Fiction and travel texts emerging from a newly “industrial”\(^\text{535}\) publishing landscape offered a blend of learning and diversion, and they became increasingly accessible, often available in different formats for different readers.

Significantly for the arguments in this dissertation, the two decades following the Franco-Prussian War, i.e. before formal alliance negotiations began, saw the most important proliferation of popular French fiction and travel writing set in Russia. This began in the 1870s and reached a high point in the 1880s, demonstrating an extended readership whose interest in Russia paralleled that of the elites discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Agency was expressed not only among authors and publishers, therefore, but also among readers, whose interest encouraged multiple editions. Popular interest in works concerning Russia is borne out by the examples considered below, among them the best-selling novels *Dosia* by Henry Gréville and

\(^{534}\) See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the 1878, 1889 and 1900 Paris *expositions universelles*.

Michel Strogoff by Jules Verne. Pre-dating the alliance by a significant number of years, both novels were penned in 1876, before the republican majority government of the late 1870s and the Russian loans in the late 1880s. In addition to such fiction, examples of travel accounts including Olympe Audouard’s travel account Voyage au pays des boyards published in 1881, along with a best-selling illustrated travelogue by Victor Tissot entitled La Russie et les Russes published in 1884, also pre-dated the Russian loans. Multiple other French fiction and travel works set in Russia would do so as well.

As an indication of their potential influence in disseminating positive representations of Russia, during the fin de siècle a vogue for reading fiction and travel accounts grew exponentially in France as well as elsewhere in Europe. In France the establishment of public libraries, plus reading rooms operated by the Société Franklin and the Ligue de l’Enseignement, encouraged popular reading, and novels and travelogues formed a significant part of their collections. Determining actual readership is difficult, however, as multiple formats of

536 Henry Gréville, Dosia (Paris: E. Plon Nourrit et Cie, 1876); Jules Verne, Michel Strogoff (Paris: J. Hetzel et Cie, 1876).


particular books might include new editions, re-publications, newspaper serializations, and deluxe hard-cover or generic soft-cover editions. A traditional practice of oral reading sessions in homes also extended readership. One further caveat refers to reception: in terms of preferred reading, the public remained omnivorous overall. Attempting to distinguish between "high" and "low" literature, or between the readers of particular genres, does not correspond to the reality of practice, a point noted by scholars. Illustrating the polyvalent reading landscape in France, for example, Verne's novel *Michel Strogoff* would leave a deep impression on a young Jean-Paul Sartre; André Gide, meanwhile, recounted oral family reading sessions of the Bible and the popular newspaper *L'Écho de Paris*.

Among the reasons to consider fiction and travel writing about Russia as distinct media for encouraging pro-alliance sentiment is that like the academic books and general compendia described in Chapter 3, they would be purpose-read. The same cannot be said for periodicals and newspapers whose readers may have simply overlooked Russian coverage; although as explained in Chapter 7, editors employed special newspaper supplements featuring front-cover images related to Russia to appeal to their interest. Unlike academic books and compendia, fiction and travelogues shared a unique blend of didactic and entertainment functions, designed


to engage an emerging "literate but not bookish"\textsuperscript{543} audience. When added to the books, periodicals and newspapers described, such works emerged from that which Edward Said termed a metropolitan "cultural machinery" notable for its "mass, density and referential power"\textsuperscript{544}, an observation that applies well to the saturation of positive representations concerning Russia.

Another reason to consider travel works alongside fiction is their frequent dialectical relation.\textsuperscript{545} Verne, for example, read several travel accounts to prepare for writing \textit{Michel Strogoff}, and their influence is clearly felt. Fiction and travel writing also offer a unique experience that is not replicated by books, periodicals or newspapers: the potential self-identification by a reader with an individual author or his or her characters, encapsulated in the works examined here by a sense of movement across the Russian stage. Additionally, both genres appeal to emotion by focusing on the picturesque and the piquant via descriptive narrative and romanticized storylines.\textsuperscript{546}

Significantly for reframing vestigial negative stereotypes of Russia, \textit{fin-de-siècle} fiction and travel reading might also function as a sort of virtual travel, a mode complemented by the theatrical productions and expositions discussed in Chapter 5. This could engender an imagined familiarity with Russian territories previously isolated from the European community, while an emphasis on social groups might suggest a virtual understanding for readers. With respect to the latter, as the practice of "imagology", or the structuring of representations of the "other"

\textsuperscript{543} Gildea, \textit{Children of the Revolution}, 390, 402.


\textsuperscript{545} Charlotte Krauss, \textit{La Russie et les Russes dans la fiction française du XIXe siècle, 1812-1917: d'une image de l'autre à un univers imaginaire} (New York: Rodopi, 2007), 391.

described by Said and other scholars, remained at play,\textsuperscript{547} inhabitants of Russia’s imperial domains continued to earn negative commentary, but those in Russia proper (the latter rarely defined, but now portrayed as a member of the European community by pro-alliance actors) underwent a remarkable transformation to override formerly-held negative views.

How did the content of fiction and travel writing contribute to this affirmative work? While the academic go-betweens and other authors in Chapter 3 emphasized “civilizational” markers such as Russia’s European identity, imperial strength, economy, cultural production and leadership in peace, novels by Henry Gréville and Jules Verne normalized Russian social groups and emphasized Russia as a civilizing force of empire. Through portrayals of Russia’s minor aristocracy, Gréville normalized their everyday life for readers, while Verne employed the motif of Tartar hordes as the negative “other” to justify Russia’s imperial reach. Travel writers, meanwhile, including Olympe Audouard and Victor Tissot, invited readers to accompany them on journeys that naturalized Russia’s land- and cityscapes, as well as its social and imperial ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{548} Authors of both genres could thus help to condition popular alliance support during the two decades preceding the formal alliance. This support would widen into ever larger circles, clearly evident in the purchase of Russian bonds by small investors nationwide after 1888.


\textsuperscript{548} By “normalize” I mean to create new knowledge of facts; by “naturalize”, I mean to render familiar. “Knowledge” of Russia might be rooted in newly-acquired facts and information, as found in works by the academic go-betweens previously described, while “knowing” often rested on illusory notions based on the reduction of Russia to symbols such as the moujik or peasant, and/or on the persistent mythologizing of Russian strength, or of its tsars, etc. during the alliance era.
4.1 Fiction: normalizing Russian social groups and emphasizing Russia as a civilizing force of empire

While Russia had featured in French literature prior to 1871, fiction set in Russia increased exponentially during the alliance era, building to a high point by 1892:

... the epidemic for all things Russian continues its ravages in our publishing houses. After the voluminous novels, people collect even the smallest novella by the least known author; it seems that the label alone is sufficient...[to satisfy public demand].

One motor for readership and sales was the rapidly expanding penny press, which regularly serialized novels before they were published in book form. New publishers and new markets had also emerged in an industrializing publishing landscape, reflecting a nascent mass culture in France.

Testifying to the importance of French fiction as a cultural backdrop to the alliance, densely-researched studies by Janine Neboit-Mombet and Charlotte Krauss have clearly confirmed the popularity of novels centered on Russian themes. While each chose a unique

______________________________


550 "Les livres", Le Mercure de France (janvier 1892): 87, as cited in Gianni Cariani, "Une France russofille?", Thèse de Doctorat (Strasbourg: Université Marc Bloch), 170.

551 Newspaper serialization of books began in the early 1840s, but in a far narrower press landscape. This followed the tradition of early nineteenth-century roman-feuilletons, variants of which appeared in other European countries including Russia. Dominique Kalifa, La culture de masse en France. Vol. 1: 1860-1930 (Paris: Éditions de la Découverte, 2001), 17, 16.

552 Choosing a different focus, i.e. that of Russian literary output, Gianni Cariani traced the rising popularity of Russian writers in France, crediting this with contributing to a mounting russofille between 1881 and 1914. Cariani particularly credited new mediators in the French political, university and media sectors with popularizing Russian culture as an inducement to prepare the French public for an alliance. He argued that the "new mythology of Russia" emphasized the affinity of the Slavic and Latin characters, and characterized Russian culture and civilization as part of Europe's cultural evolution while re-defining Russia's role as a positive one in European politics. Cariani, "Une France russofille?", 334, 331, 166. While his well-drawn analysis successfully pointed to a "new mythology", Cariani's focus remained Russian literature in translation and the elites involved in popularizing this; for a full list of French studies of Russian literature at the time, see Chapter 3. The focus here, however, remains on works authored in France.

166
analytic base, the strength of their studies lies in the extensive plot summaries that they provide. In contrast to the themes considered here, however, neither Neboit-Mombet nor Krauss emphasized mass culture, domestic politics or imperialism as contextual backdrops for this fiction, nor did they connect authors and publishers of works set in Russia with major pro-alliance figures and groups.

In her seminal study, Neboit-Mombet identified more than two hundred and fifty French novels about Russia published between 1860 and 1900, after eliminating folktales, legends, and works by Russian authors. Upon comparison with other countries, she noted a remarkable difference: over the same period, ninety French novels about England were published, followed by eighty-four about Italy and sixty-four about the United States. Clearly, popular interest in Russia had infiltrated the fin-de-siècle fiction industry in France; although a few earlier novels about Russia were reprinted after the Franco-Prussian War, there was a strong correlation between the publication of many new novels and the alliance era. She also convincingly documented a spike in stories about Russia in popular travel periodicals at the time.

Neboit-Mombet elucidated common themes in the sixty-five novels she surveyed, among them geography, empire, social class, daily life, the "Russian soul" and women. Interestingly, this mirrors some of the 1870s analytical categories employed by academic go-between Alfred Rambaud. Yet when addressing these themes, her lengthy plot descriptions often blur the question as to why French readers might be interested in these. Her analysis centered on nihilism is particularly strong, however, revealing much about French concerns regarding Russian autocracy and transnational violence in a post-Commune era. But somewhat

______________________________


554 Neboit-Mombet, L’image de la Russie dans le roman français, 12.
confusingly, while Neboit-Mombet focused on the notion of *russophilie*, she subsequently appeared to argue against it by evoking Russia as France's negative "other". Her final summation was therefore a qualified one:

- France experienced an attraction to, mixed with fear of Russia....[although overall] Russian power reassured....In this image of Russia, France found her reverse image: Russian despotism is [France’s] liberty...the nihilist is [France’s] reasoned liberal.  

Charlotte Krauss, meanwhile, focused on chronological representations of Russia in numerous minor and forgotten novels across three periods: from 1812 to 1855, from 1855 to 1880, and from 1880 to 1917. By analyzing representations related to character, setting, politics and religion, Krauss attempted to trace the "highs and lows" of Franco-Russian relations over time. She identified key character "types" which predominated during the first period, including those of the Tsar, the Cossack and the female martyr. During the second period, daily life and culture played out against a backdrop of a *isbas* and icons, steppes and wolves, knouts and sleighs. Novels in the third period, Krauss contended, were marked by the addition of nihilism and of the "Russian soul", a point that underscores the themes discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. One idea that she explored particularly well was the change in the classification from Russia as a "barbarian" to a "primitive" nation, although she did not describe this in the "development" terms used by Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and his contemporaries. Yet puzzlingly, when referring only briefly to the alliance in her conclusion, Krauss argued that fiction featuring a stereotypical Russia after 1888 was designed to encourage the French public to invest in the Russian loans, but offered no evidence to support this claim.

In terms of consumption, market exigencies were particularly well illustrated by the two best-selling French novels about Russia: Henry Gréville’s *Dosia* and Jules Verne’s *Michel Strogoff*, each published in 1876, i.e. shortly after the Franco-Prussian War. As noted below, Henry Gréville was closely connected to pro-alliance elites, while Jules Verne’s publisher remained a strong promoter of Russia. Their novels functioned respectively to normalize Russian social groups and to emphasize Russia as a "civilizing" force of empire, thus contributing to a knowledge agenda while offering a diverting read. Each enjoyed a wide readership through to the 1890s, highlighting the *fin-de-siècle* publishing practice of targeting new reading groups, in this instance women and youth.  

*Dosia* was penned by Henry Gréville, the *nom de plume* of Alice Durand (1842-1902) née Fleury, the daughter of a French professor of literature who taught at the Imperial University of St. Petersburg. While in Russia Gréville married a professor of French law and they returned to France in 1872, where as an attendee of Juliette Adam’s salon she kept company with pro-alliance figures. A sought-after contributor to *La Revue des deux mondes*, *La Nouvelle Revue*, *Le Journal des débats* and *Le Temps* - as noted in the previous chapter, all periodicals involved in promoting knowledge of Russia and/or the alliance - Gréville was most well-known for her works set in Russia, which unlike those by other French authors reflected her experience

---


560 "La bibliothèque Henry Gréville", [http://beq.ebooksgratuits.com](http://beq.ebooksgratuits.com)
living there. These novels enjoyed a remarkable popularity: nine published between 1876 and 1880 alone,\(^{561}\) mainly revolving around social groups and romantic relationships.

Although Gréville shared with Eugène Melchior de Vogüé the prestige of being published by the Plon maison d'édition, it is difficult to ascertain whether this firm's motives in publishing about Russia were political or commercial, or both.\(^{562}\) Plon enjoyed considerable success with Gréville, and her novels earned praise from academic go-between Louis Léger and author Guy de Maupassant. Léger called her a "spiritual and impartial witness" who did not attempt to address Russia's political and social problems; nonetheless, he wrote, her authentic and "exquisite" rendering of social groups served both French and Russian interests. Here Léger's pro-alliance leanings were clear. Maupassant, meanwhile, termed her writing "a continuous pleasure", noting that among contemporary female French authors her novels sold the greatest number.\(^{563}\) Indicative of its success, Gréville's first novel *Dosia* earned a Montyon prize from the Académie française.\(^{564}\)

Testifying to its importance as a pro-Russian text, *Dosia* sold seventy-seven editions before 1890, i.e. prior to formal alliance negotiations, and one hundred and two editions by

\(^{561}\) Neboït-Mombet, *L'image de la Russie dans le roman français*, xx. Several of Gréville's other well-known novels set in Russia include: *Les Koumiassine* (1877); *Les épreuves de Raïssa* (1878); *Un violon russe* (1879); *Le vœu de Nadia* (1883); *Nikanor* (1885); *La fille de Dosia* (1887); *Fidelka* (1894). All novels published by Plon.

\(^{562}\) As discussed in Chapter 3, the political orientation of actors behind larger firms remained generally opaque, reflecting editorial boards which acted as "a screen between author and editor", as well as the anonymous financial societies linking publishers with commercial sectors including railways and banks. Kalifa, *La culture de masse*, 83.


Its storyline revolved around two young women: Dosia Zaptine and the widowed Princess Sophie Koutsky. The plot began with Dosia's cousin, Pierre, and Sophie's brother, Count Platon, serving in the Imperial Guard. When Pierre recounted his cousin Dosia's adventurous exploits to Platon, Platon became intrigued and his sister Sophie arranged for him to meet her; Pierre then met Sophie and became equally intrigued.

In stark contrast to contemporary fictional heroines, these women displayed independent characteristics of some depth, highlighting an emerging interest among French elites concerning the education of Russian women, while anticipating the Third Republican school agenda. Gréville, who subsequently authored a long-running manual of civic and moral instruction for young girls in France, clearly believed in the importance of education. Dosia, for example, was multi-lingual, an excellent caricaturist and an accomplished swimmer and horsewoman. Her "revolutionary" French governess had taught her the principles of the French Revolution and had read Les Girondins with her, conveying a Russian interest in liberty and the concomitant

---

565 Seventy-seven editions are noted in an 1890 copy of the novel; one hundred and two editions in a 1900 copy.


568 Henry Gréville, Dosia (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1890), 144-145.
influence of France. Sophie, meanwhile, whose husband had died from an illness contracted when fighting in Turkestan, was wealthy, independent and educated, and her reading included the latest work by French philosopher Hippolyte Taine (De l’Intelligence). Although learned, her brother Platon reassured Pierre that Sophie was "the least bluestocking" that one could imagine. Encouraged, Pierre continued to visit Sophie and they fell in love; Dosia and Platon fell in love also, and both couples married in the dénouement.

Via this sympathetic portrait of social groups ranging from those of a country estate to the salons of St. Petersburg, Gréville’s text normalized Russia’s minor aristocracy through an obvious familiarity with the milieu. In this one senses a somewhat nostalgic echo of France’s pre-Revolutionary past. Meanwhile Gréville’s appealing characterizations, plus the evocation of French cultural references, could function to erase distances and borders for readers, therein overriding negative stereotypes of Russia. Such representations might serve to "create an ideal that is the real" as Susan Stewart described, moving an ideal of Russian life into private reading time and space. Reflecting Russian literary currents as well, Gréville included a gentle needling of the young men’s bumbling ways, conveying a whiff of Russian fiction’s "superfluous man". Additionally, there was a hint of Tolstoy in their way of life that involved gambling, debt

569 Hippolyte Taine, De L'intelligence (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1870). This work probed the origins of personality; Taine, who also wrote about the national origins of literature, was a close friend of Eugène Melchior de Vogüé. Edmond Gosse, Collected Essays: Portraits and Sketches (Bremen: Europaeischer Hochschulverlag, 2010), 255. http://Openlibrary.org.

570 Gréville, Dosia, 104.

571 Stewart argued that fiction is not reflective of a subject, but rather of the ideology of its creator; it serves to "collapse the distinction between the real and the imagined". Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 22, 25-26.

and the prisons of masculine convention. Meanwhile, with a focus on a specific social strata proceeding against a backdrop of imperial might, references to the Russian dominions - such as a regatta for the Tsar featuring races among replica watercraft from across the empire - underscored Russia's civilizing mission and the ethnographic preoccupations described in Chapter 3, both of which could appeal in France.

Demonstrating keen public and publishing interest, more than fifteen subsequent novels by Gréville concentrated on Russian themes including class relations, social customs, family and religious life. In contrast to Dosia, one 1879 novel did attempt to probe the problems of poverty and unrest: Un violon russe, which followed a poor but talented violin player as he traveled from a country village to a monastery, to the poorer quarters of Moscow and the city's music Conservatory, and to Nijni-Novgorod and the Caucasus to play for the aristocracy. This work achieved just thirteen editions between 1879 and 1886, however, likely due to its emphasis on poverty and class, as even a revolutionary university student featured in the plot. But Gréville also now faced competition from other French authors who began increasingly to focus on Russia; nonetheless, she continued to produce material for Plon.

Ultimately far exceeding the popularity of Dosia, Jules Verne's Michel Strogoff was also published in 1876, just as the academic go-betweens began their writing on Russia. Its enduring popularity would cement its place in the pantheon of popular literature, as described below. Highlighting the dialectical relation between fiction and travel writing, the origins of Michel

---


574 Gréville, Dosia, 124-129.

575 Of the seventy-three works written by Gréville, seventeen were set in Russia. For a discussion of these see Neboit-Mombet, L'image de la Russie dans le roman français, 369-375.

Strogoff may be found in the travel works that Verne consulted for his work.\textsuperscript{577} As a member of France’s \textit{Société de géographie} and an assiduous periodical reader, Verne perused travel writing because he had never visited Russia; indeed, upon comparison the storyline of \textit{Michel Strogoff} echoes articles from the eminent periodicals \textit{La Revue des deux mondes} and \textit{Le Tour du monde}. The latter, for example, had translated and published excerpts from the book \textit{Free Russia} by W.H. Dixon in 1872 (also published in book form by Hachette).\textsuperscript{578} Setting the stage for more positive representations of Russia in Republican France, Dixon had emphasized political reforms made under Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881), in addition to sites of interest across the Russian empire and Russian social and cultural life. Verne explored all of these in \textit{Michel Strogoff}, although imperial power remained its theme.

Noted scholar of Russia Martin Malia once compared the influence of \textit{Michel Strogoff} to that of Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu’s \textit{magnum opus}, commenting that:

\ldots\[the latter\] placed [Russia]...firmly within the European family of nations. Just as significant as this learned labour was the novelistic Europeanization of Russia achieved by the most popular writer of the \textit{fin de siècle}, Jules Verne.\textsuperscript{579}

While the novel’s popularity had its roots in the adventure genre, ultimately it was the idea of an alliance that propelled it into multiple editions.\textsuperscript{580} This argument for the novel's political importance in conditioning French public attitudes towards Russia contrasts with literary

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{579} Martin Malia, \textit{Russia under Western Eyes. From the Bronze Horsemen to the Lenin Mausoleum} (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), 181.

\textsuperscript{580} Lucian Boia, \textit{Jules Verne, les paradoxes d'un mythe} (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2005), 129.
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushleft}
scholarship which has analyzed *Michel Strogoff* as an exemplar of anti-modernism, initiation or Christian suffering.\(^{581}\)

Highlighting the novel's domestic political context, in comparison to Henry Gréville's publisher Plon, much more is clear about the political leanings of Verne's publisher Pierre-Jules Hetzel, who served as cabinet head of Foreign Affairs during the Second Republic before being exiled under Napoléon III, returning to France in 1859.\(^{582}\) Hetzel actively promoted writing about Russia from the mid-1870s through the 1890s, one of many cultural entrepreneurs to do so; and along with pro-alliance authors Ivan Turgenev and Alexander Dumas, he attended Julette Adam's salon.\(^{583}\) Publishing works by Turgenev, Gustave Flaubert and Guy de Maupassant, he remained a vehement opponent of traditional French Catholic influence on education and promoted "...authors who were almost all well-known partisans of progressive causes." Among these causes was secular education, and Hetzel worked with Jean Macé, who would later found the secularizing *Ligue de l'Enseignement*.\(^{584}\) Hetzel and Macé also co-directed the influential children's magazine *Le Magasin d'éducation et de récréation* which initially serialized *Michel Strogoff*.

---


Like Édouard Charton, director of the travel journal *Le Tour du monde*, Hetzel championed Republican materials for youth. Reflecting his stature, his library of books for young readers was rivaled only by Hachette's *Bibliothèque rose*, each ultimately profiting from a three-fold increase in the Republic's budget for Public Instruction from 1878 to 1885.

As a friend of Hetzel, author Jules Verne contributed to the "political charge" of *fin-de-siècle* French literature while enjoying recognition by the Académie française. Significantly for the alliance to come, his novel set in Russia enjoyed phenomenal success. Originally conceived as a story for youth, *Michel Strogoff* had exhausted fifty editions in four years before being adapted for the theatre in 1880; as noted in Chapter 5, the lavish theatrical production played over eleven hundred times in Paris between 1880 and 1900. Initially Verne had declined to write a theatrical script to coincide with the 1878 *exposition universelle*, arguing with Hetzel that political feeling favored an alliance with England at the time. Yet shortly afterwards he changed his mind, a decision of demonstrable consequence in setting the stage for pro-Russia enthusiasm among a wider public. The theatrical melodrama further increased reader interest, resulting in re-publication of the novel in formats ranging from modest to deluxe.

---

585 This magazine had ten thousand subscribers by the late 1870s. Dusseau, *Jules Verne*, 21.


589 Personal letter from Verne to Hetzel (Bibliothèque nationale de France, NAF 17-004, f.400), as cited in Bilodeau, *Édition critique, Michel Strogoff*, xxvi.
Focused on Russia's stature as an imperial power, Verne's storyline featured a Muslim revolt originating within its empire, in today's Azerbaijan. Upon learning that the imperial telegraph line had been cut and that Tartar tribes were massing to attack the Russian Siberian stronghold of Irkutsk, the Tsar dispatched a member of his messenger corps, Michel Strogoff, on a perilous journey from Moscow to Irkutsk to warn of the impending assault. Despite being captured and blinded by a Tartar leader (a punishment taken from the Koran), the intrepid Strogoff reached Irkutsk to warn the Russian contingent and to assist in defeating the attack. Strogoff had accomplished his mission "pour Dieu, pour le Tsar, pour la Patrie" ("for God, for the Tsar, for the Homeland"), a moujik (peasant) slogan which became a popular catchphrase in France.

Michel Strogoff had nearly not been published because Hetzel was concerned about its reception among his Russian subscribers. He consulted expatriate author Ivan Turgenev and the Russian ambassador in Paris for feedback, and based on their recommendations forced Verne to reduce some negative imagery related to tsarist autocracy. Turgenev himself, a friend of Louis Léger, assisted in writing the novel's description of Russia. Ironically, although Verne capitalized on emerging popular opinion, it is not clear whether he himself supported an alliance with Russia. Indeed, a number of his works featured Polish heroes; for example, he

---


originally conceived Captain Nemo of *20,000 Leagues under the Sea* as an aristocrat seeking
revenge for the Russian murders of his family members during the 1863 Polish uprising. And
although Russia and/or Russian characters featured in nine of his novels, their tone overall was
not pro-Russian. That Verne destroyed his personal papers prior to his death, however, makes
critical assessment difficult.\(^{594}\)

In summary, then, scrutiny of the two best-selling French novels set in Russia, *Dosia* and
*Michel Strogoff*, allows not just the identification of key representations of Russia made for
the French public, but the focus on social groups and imperialism also demonstrates an overlap
with the themes in the academic studies circulating among elites. Also suggestive, the
publishers of both novels were linked to Juliette Adam's salon. As will be seen in subsequent
chapters, these best-selling novels demonstrated that popular publishing corresponded with
other pro-alliance initiatives, set against the context of an evolving political backdrop and a
nascent mass culture in the early Third Republic.

On a final note here with respect to fiction, numerous other novels set in Russia were
published during the alliance era, as detailed by Neboit-Mombet and Krauss.\(^{595}\) Periodicals, too,
serialized fictional works, including Juliette Adam's *La Nouvelle Revue* which featured short

---

\(^{594}\) Verne also held the Polish rebel leader Kosciuszko, who led a failed revolt against Russia in
Studies* 28:1 (March, 2001). Verne's other novels, set in the Crimea, the Caucasus, the Baltics and
Siberia, include *les Aventures de trois Russes et trois Anglais* (1872), *Hector Servadac* (1877), *Kéraban
le têtu* (1883), *Sans dessus dessous* (1889), *César Cascabel* (1890), *Claudius Bombarnac* (1892), and

\(^{595}\) Examples include Paul Baquet, *Les Polski* (Paris: Jules Lévy, 1886); Augusta Coupey, *Le serf
et la princesse Latone* (Paris: Didier, 1877); Alexandre Dumas, *Jacquot sans oreilles* (Paris: Le Vasseur
et Cie, 1873); Ary Ecilaw, *Une altesses impériale* (Paris: Lemerre, 1886); Paul Haguet, *Boris Trofimoff
* (Paris: Lemerre, 1886); Alexandre de Lamothe, *Foedora la nihiliste*; *Nadiège* (Les Veillées des
chaumières, 1880); Jean Lorrain, *Très russe* (Paris: Giraud, 1886); Étienne Marcel, *Dymitr le Cosaque
novels such as *Kira, une jeune fille russe* (1884), later published by Plon. Other periodicals, meanwhile, serialized novellas that were not published as books. Taken together, these many examples undoubtedly contributed to the saturation of positive imagery concerning Russia circulating in France, often normalizing Russian social groups and emphasizing Russia as a civilizing force of empire, while offering a medium of virtual travel for readers whose imagination might move across an increasingly familiar Russian stage.

### 4.2 Travel writing: naturalizing Russia’s land- and cityscapes, its empire and its social and ethnic groups

Novels, of course, could be superseded by travel texts as a form of virtual travel, and a survey of travel writing published after 1871 reveals a sharp rise in this genre focused on Russia. Despite this, no study of the alliance has heretofore considered these works. Two especially vivid travelogues, *Voyage au pays des boyards: étude sur la Russie actuelle* by Olympe Audouard (1881), and *La Russie et les Russes: Kiev et Moscou, impressions de voyage* by Victor Tissot (1884), serve to illustrate authors’ common preoccupations. In addition, French travelers’ representations of one particular region, the Caucasus, help to place the emerging Franco-Russian relationship into context; so too does travel writing that demonstrated a clear alliance agenda. Beyond these, the articles about Russia published in

---

596 V. Rouslane, *Kira, une jeune fille russe, La Nouvelle Revue* 27 (1883-84); (E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1884). Although authors in *La Nouvelle Revue* sometimes had Russian names, these were likely *noms de plume* employed by French authors.


598 Audouard, *Voyage au pays des boyards*; Tissot, *La Russie et les Russes*.
popular travel journals including *Le Tour du monde* and *Le Journal des voyages* further reveal efforts by authors and editors to familiarize readers with Russia's land- and cityscapes, as well as its empire and social and ethnic groups.

Scholars have written extensively on the influence of travel writing, often stemming from Edward Said's work concerning the "imagology" employed, portraying an imagined familiarity by attributing stereotypical characteristics to particular groups. Overall, this travel scholarship may be divided into four thematic categories: representations, spatiality, practices, and identity and encounters. The first and most important for this dissertation are studies concerning the representation of cultures, with a focus on the media employed. A second category revolves around spatiality and its role in imaginative geography. Derek Gregory, for example, has extended Said's observation that "cultural identity imagines itself in a geographically conceived world", a point particularly important in the French taxonomic reframing of Russia as a European nation. Also applicable here, a third category concentrates on the practices of travel,


including travel writing and the tourist "gaze" which John Urry and others have identified as part of the project of Western modernity. A fourth and final category relates to identity and encounters, especially among historians of science who have examined the framing of knowledge in geographical context, i.e. in "new" versus "European" worlds.

How might travel texts have played a role in altering French perceptions of Russia? While some scholars of travel writing have under-emphasized its political contexts, others have demonstrated strong connections between European travel works and foreign relations. Studies by Larry Wolff, Maria Todorova and Marshall T. Poe are exemplary in this regard. In his sweeping and original study, Wolff argued that travel writing heavily influenced the early modern project of "inventing" Eastern Europe, a construction that infiltrated twentieth-century international relations. Todorova, meanwhile, described how a nexus of "foreign policy, travelers' discourse and public opinion" gained momentum in the nineteenth century, congealing


to frame an essentialist, pejorative image of the Balkans during the twentieth. Finally, analyzing images of Russia, Poe focused on a significant corpus of pan-European travel writing entailing that which he termed "diplomatic ethnography". Beginning in the fifteenth century, Poe contended, ambassadorial works characterized Russia as a nation of perpetual despotism and deception, contributing to an infested imaginary that would prove difficult to clear.

Of these three authors, it is Poe who has best connected travel writing with foreign relations, due to his range of sources, his detailed linking of diplomacy with travel accounts over time, and his methodology combining qualitative and quantitative analysis. Undoubtedly then, there existed a connection between travel texts and perceptions of Russia. Yet while previous studies of Franco-Russian relations have emphasized the negative images of Russia circulating in France, this dissertation explores the strong shift to positive representations as a prelude and a backdrop to the 1894 alliance. This contrasts with works by Ezequiel Adamovsky, Chris Bongie and N. Christine Brookes which have emphasized Russia as France's continuing negative "other".

—

606 Todorova traced portrayals of the Balkans from the time of their early modern "discovery" by British and northern European travelers. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 97.

607 Poe, A People Born to Slavery, 14.

608 On mid-twentieth century realist International Relations theory concerning the ethnographic backdrop to power as well as questions concerning "strategic culture", see Julie Reeves, Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists (London: Routledge, 2004), Chapters 4 and 6.

609 Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France, c. 1740-1880 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 19, 271; Bongie, Exotic Memories, 64; N. Christine Brookes, "Translating Russia for the French Imagination, 1856-1894", PhD dissertation (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University, 2004), abstract, 232, 64. Adamovsky's study extended from 1740-1880; during this time, he described a Euro-Orientalist discourse rooted in liberal bourgeois ideology at work in French depictions of Russia. Bongie further argued that proponents of liberal modernity employed the threat of the "other" to carve out their goals. Brookes, meanwhile, contended that in the lead-up to the alliance, as France "softened its past positions" and "pseudo-colonial discourse" regarding Russia, print media now focused on "its exotic and enchanting aspects", and "...not just a tyrannical vodka-soaked Russia".

182
In terms of travel accounts which illustrate the positive reframing of Russia, before examining \textit{fin-de-siècle} travel works, i.e. those penned after the 1871 defeat, it is helpful to consider those from the early and mid-century.\textsuperscript{610} While previous accounts were often composed in epistolary mode (as personal letters), their purported veracity and themes of "discovery and revelation" belied the fact that, unlike the post-1871 accounts, few of their authors had actually visited Russia.\textsuperscript{611} Yet they routinely incorporated a plethora of negative description, following in the footsteps of sixteenth-century works and adding to entrenched "continuity theories" of Russian history.\textsuperscript{612} No French work better illustrates this than the best-selling \textit{Lettres de Russie} (1843) by Astolphe de Custine.\textsuperscript{613} This work is a palimpsest, and serves as a primer for tracing the negative stereotypes of Russia propagated by previous European authors, as described by Poe.\textsuperscript{614}


Ostensibly the words of an intrepid truth-seeker, Custine’s commentary concerning Russia was histrionic and damning. Warning readers that it was his "...duty to reveal facts both useful and grave", he painted scenes of menace and foreboding while expressing disdain for all things Russian: its climate, religion, government, women and peasantry. A typical summation illustrates his views:

Without the [influence of Europe's] Middle Ages ...without Catholicism, without chivalry...[the Russians are] without respect for their word, always Greeks... polished by a formula like the Chinese...indelicate like the Kalmuks, dirty like the Lapps...ignorant like savages (excepting the women and a few diplomats), fine as Jews,...soft and grave in their manner like Orientals, cruel in sentiment like Barbarians...

All of Russia was Siberia, Custine claimed, and Russia harbored ambitions "...to be the future capital...of the world"; his predictions of Russian aggression towards Europe were characterized as the barbarian invasion of Tartar hordes.  

Despite the entrenchment of such views, French travel accounts much more favorable to Russia began to appear immediately after the Franco-Prussian War. Some written between

615 One of Custine's main motives for traveling to Russia was religious, a fact rarely recognized; while seeking a pardon for an exiled Polish refugee under his protection, he also wanted to expose the weakness of the Russian Orthodox Church while promoting the ultramontane reunification of Europe under Roman Catholicism. Custine, Lettres de Russie, Vol. 1, xv-xviii; Vol. 3, 210, 346; Vol. 4, 363.


617 Examples include Dixon, La Russie libre; Herbert Barry, La Russie contemporaine (Paris: Germer-Bailliére, 1873); J. Lubomirski, Scènes de la vie militaire en Russie (Paris: 1873); O. Sachot, La Sibérie orientale (Paris: Ducrocq, 1875); Olympe Audouard, Les nuits russes; Wilson, Aperçu statistique de l'agriculture, de la sylviculture et des pêcheries en Russie (Paris: 1876); Burnaby, Une visite à Khiva (Paris: Plon, 1877); Legrelle, Le Volga (Paris: Hachette, 1878); Mackenzie Wallace, La Russie: le pays, les institutions, les mœurs, traduit de l'anglais par H. Bellenger (Paris: Dreyfous, 1879); A. Meylan, À travers les Russies (Paris: Fichbacher, 1880); Olympe Audouard, Voyage au pays des boyards; R. Calmon, Trois semaines à Moscou (Paris: C. Lévy, 1883); Hoppé, La Russie inconnue (Paris: Dentu, 1883); Mme Carla Sérena, Voyage aux pays des Kalmouks et des Kirghis (Paris: Dreyfous, 1883); Mme Carla Sérena, Seule dans les steppes (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1883); C. de Furch, Un Parisien en Asie, voyage dans la Mandchourie russe et sur les bords de l'Amour (Paris: 1886); G. Thomas, Du Danube à la Baltique (Paris: Berger-Levraut, 1890); Adolph Badin, Saint-Pétersbourg et Moscou (Paris: 1891); C. Sibille, À travers la Russie: relation d'un excursionniste en caravanne (Paris: Ch. Delagrave, 1892); Armand Silvestre, La Russie: impressions, portraits, paysages (Paris: G. Charpentier et E. Fasquelle, 1892); Anonyme, L'Alliance russe: Souvenirs et impressions d'un français en Russie (Paris: Paul Dupont,
1850 and 1870, but which were considerably less inflammatory than that by Custine, were also republished. Significantly for the arguments here, research has revealed only one post-1871 travel work that clearly demonstrated an anti-alliance stance: S. Roux, *Voyage au pays des barbares: la vérité sur l’alliance franco-russe. Une escroquerie internationale.* Multiple works began instead to reflect a positive shift in perceptions and representations, in tandem with the portrayals penned by academic go-betweens Alfred Rambaud, Louis Léger, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Eugène Melchior de Vogüé. The most important publishers of these new travel texts included the firms of Hachette, Plon, Dentu, Dreyfous and Charpentier, which were also implicated in the academic book publishing described in Chapter 3.

While the popularity of such travel accounts demonstrated a widening popular interest in Russia, plus an increase in publishing by non-academic authors and journalists due to shifting professional boundaries, it also reflected an upswing in travel to Russia. The expansion of the Russian imperial railway network by forty percent between 1881 and 1894 was integral to this. Authors' impressions might reflect a brief sojourn in one part of Russia, or a stay of

---

618 Two of the best-known were Théophile Gautier, *Voyage en Russie* (Paris: Charpentier, 1867), reprinted eight times between 1875 and 1901; Alexandre Dumas, *Le Caucase* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1865), reprinted in 1880 and 1884. Publication numbers are taken from WorldCat. Gautier’s work was a compilation of reports he sent to *Le Moniteur* in Paris; it was originally conceived to accompany a book on Russian art, but the latter did not materialize. Liudmila G. Védénina, *La France et la Russie: dialogue de deux cultures* (Moscow: InterDialect, 2002), 96.


620 De Grève, *Le voyage en Russie: anthologie*, xxvi. One example of extensive travel is found in the 1895 travelogue by Jules Legras, whose ability to speak Russian allowed him to spend considerable time investigating village life, to which he devoted almost one hundred pages; only Leroy-Beaulieu had made such detailed observations. Legras visited not just villages near the main cities of Russia, but also
months or years. Some visits were purpose-driven, for example to investigate new railways or to assess Russia's military strength, while still others reflected a more general interest in physical geography or agricultural regions. The latter foci departed from the stereotypical themes reworked by diplomats, political figures and historians in the past.⁶²¹

Notions of cultural shock which contrasted to "the referential universe of the traveler and the reader" became much less central in these accounts about Russia, although the practices of "appropriation of a geographic space" were clearly visible, along with the "objectifying tourist vision" described by Ellen Strain. The latter is the tendency to concentrate on surface spectacle, comparative aesthetics and the mystification of visited sites, all evident in the travelogue by Tissot discussed below.⁶²² Repetition naturalized travelers' well-trodden pathways, serving to make sights both imagined and remembered by the reader,⁶²³ particularly in the common itineraries employed: from St. Petersburg to Moscow and Nijni-Novgorod, and sometimes to the Caucasus, or an excursion through "European" Russia.⁶²⁴ As mentioned, although "Russia" proper now received favorable coverage concomitant with its re-framing as a European power,

---

⁶²¹ Poe, A People Born to Slavery, 6.

⁶²² Strain argued for the existence of a "constructed gaze" engendered by modernism and capitalist tourism. Strain, Public Places, Private Journeys, 3, 4, 18. See also Duncan and Gregory, eds., Writes of Passage.


⁶²⁴ Exceptions to these itinerary protocols include Ch. E. de Ujfalvy de Mező-Kóvesd, Expédition scientifique française en Russie, en Sibérie et dans le Turkestan (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1879); F. de Lanoye, La Sibérie d’après les voyageurs les plus récents (Paris: Hachette, 1879); Victor Tissot, La vie en Sibérie (Paris: Dentu, 1881); Edmond Cotteau, De Paris au Japon à travers la Sibérie, 2ème édition (Paris: Hachette, 1885) and Joseph Martin, Voyage dans la Sibérie orientale (Paris: La Société de Géographie, 1887).
its imperial periphery tended to retain fully "barbarian" characteristics. This paralleled the colonial mindset at play in both Russia and France, mirroring geopolitical interests.

As examples of the above, the travelogues by Olympe Audouard and Victor Tissot appeared to have been motivated either by curiosity and by the possibility of an alliance and/or market potential. Dating from the 1880s, in some respects their accounts echoed the "civilizational" themes of 1870s academic and specialist books. Publishing with Dentu, the maison d'édition which also published Tissot's early works, Audouard penned Voyage au pays des boyards based on her visit to Russia during the 1870s. This account (which saw eight editions in 1881) was remarkable for its "frank" discussion of Russian life, differentiating it in tone if not subject matter from the more modulated works by academic go-betweens. Overall, it conveyed the impression that Audouard's support for an alliance with Russia would remain a qualified one. Addressing the issue of autocracy, for example, she emphasized the visible and secret police employed by the Russian state while condemning its censorship and political deportations. By contrast, she described Russian literature and peasant life in generally positive terms, thus contributing to the positive reframing of aspects of Russian life.

---

625 Édouard Dentu, an Opportunist republican, died in 1884; after this Tissot published with Plon. Re-editions of Audouard's second travelogue were published by Marpon and Flammarion.


627 Audouard devoted considerable attention to Russian writers, among them minor authors not considered by De Vogüé, and analyzed their influence on the Slavophile and Westerner camps. Audouard, Voyage au pays des boyards, 83-130, 154, 193, 201.
To borrow an argument from Susan Stewart, by incorporating significant detail Audouard's descriptions functioned to naturalize Russian culture and social life for the French reader. The categories of peasant life and literature, for example, echoed the preoccupations of other French works concerning Russia described in Chapter 3. Interestingly, given the works by Audouard plus another travelogue by Carla Séréna and the novels by Gréville circa 1880, there appears to have been an interest in female authors writing about Russia. This may have reflected an upswing in female readers in France.

In contrast to Audouard, well-known author Victor Tissot focused on character, drama and piquancy in his 1884 travel account La Russie et les Russes; prior to this he had written two novels set in Russia. Also previously, Tissot's 1875 and 1877 books based on his travels in Germany had sold twenty-seven and fifty-five editions respectively, earning him considerable recognition; these appealed to some in France as guides for understanding the 1871 defeat. Having made his literary mark with books concerning France's enemy, the Swiss-born Tissot now turned to its potential alliance partner. His travelogue about Russia sold thirty editions in

---

628 Stewart, On Longing, 25-26, 31. Stewart contended that narrative "conventions... organize and interpret....lived experience".


630 Tissot, La Russie et les Russes. Tissot co-wrote the novel La Russie rouge (Paris: É. Dentu, 1880), and a second novel for children, Aventures de trois fugitifs: la vie en Sibérie (Paris: É. Dentu, 1881). He also wrote Contrées mystérieuses et peuples inconnus, a work about central Asia and Siberia. Neboit-Mombet, L'image de la Russie dans le roman français, 81-82.

ten years, a bestseller of the genre, and it remained clearly opposed to those published before 1871. Significantly, it implicitly suggested a *riposte* to Astolphe de Custine’s mid-century diatribe. *Pace* the latter, for example, Tissot remarked on the open nature of Russian customs officials and ordinary Russians with whom he had candid discussions concerning nihilism; he also praised Russia as a “grand and powerful nation”, hospitable and open beyond all others, and clearly not the same Russia of thirty years ago.

The four hundred pages of Tissot’s text were illustrated by more than two hundred and fifty engravings and photographs, which combined to give the work a cinematic quality, propelling the narrative momentum and instilling in the reader the sense of traveling on a train. Although Ellen Strain has dated the constructed “tourist gaze” framed by train windows to the twentieth century, based on the example of Tissot it appears to have been rooted in the nineteenth. Through picturesque descriptions punctuated by tales of encounters and conversations, he attempted to portray “… what is visible, what is surface, reveal a profound interiority through narrative” via his sketches of landscapes, cityscapes and social groups twinned with ongoing praise for Russia. Although he did not travel widely, visiting just Kiev and Moscow, Tissot devoted thoughtful chapters to groups of interest in France, notably Cossacks and nihilists, as well as to religion, focusing on Jewish communities and Russian Orthodox practices. Again, this echoed some of the preoccupations of academic authors, presented as an

632 Figures based on WorldCat.
636 Tissot discussed female nihilists, even visiting a lodging house where several had purportedly lived. Tissot, *La Russie et les Russes*, 200-211.
entertaining read. Small hints of anti-German sentiment were evident in his text, but above all it seemed designed to naturalize Russia and to awaken, or to respond to, public interest concerning a potential alliance partner.637

The pro-alliance potential of travel accounts by Tissot and others is evident in sales that extended across time and media. Tissot's first work on Germany, for example, had been serialized in the newspaper *Le Moniteur universel* before appearing in book form; this was true for his travelogue about Russia as well.638 In 1892, one year following the visit of the French warships to Cronstadt, the weekly *L'Univers illustré* offered a free copy of his *La Russie et les Russes* as an inducement to subscribers. Hinting at the secret alliance negotiations underway, the periodical boasted that "At a time when everything that concerns our great Northern ally creates a passion among the public … [we can offer] a work entirely consecrated to the noble and still very mysterious Russia."639 Another illustrated travel book by the "médecin-major" (doctor and major) C. Sibille was advertised at Christmas the same year, with *La Revue britannique* noting that "… books published for the sales couldn't escape the influence of russophilia [in France]."640

Beyond the travel works by Audouard and Tissot, several concerning a specific region of imperial Russia, i.e. the Caucasus, further confirm changing representations. While in 1874 an

637 Tissot, *La Russie et les Russes*, 190-211, 19, 13-14, 85, 344, 394-410, 420. Suggestive of Tissot's political leanings, his French wife came from German-controlled Alsace.


author in *La Revue des deux mondes* had referred to the peoples of the Caucasus as "primitive" despite Russia’s efforts to "civilize" the region, by the mid-1880s authors’ descriptions demonstrated that the Caucasus had become a destination for French travelers, no longer just an isolated "Sibérie chaude", home to Russian political deportees. Improved railway transportation encouraged increasingly detailed information, with some accounts stemming from scientific expeditions reporting on regional (and potentially commercial) geography. Further travel writing by Alexandre Dumas, Carla Séréna and Jules Joseph Leclercq offered personal reflections on the region, familiarizing readers with its major sites yet illustrating a colonial mindset by emphasizing the exoticism of indigenous inhabitants. Testifying to increasing interest in France, Séréna’s travelogue, *Mon Voyage de la Baltique à la mer Caspienne* (Dreyfous), was reprinted six times alone in 1881, the same year as the eight editions of Audouard’s *Voyage au pays des boyards*. A vogue for traveling to the region also emerged in

---


theatrical form, via a comedic production entitled "Le Voyage au Caucase" which played in Paris and in other cities in 1885.644

Soon, influential elites with financial and military connections began to travel further east across the Russian empire. In 1888, just as the first loan negotiations were underway, a link between travel works and pro-alliance elites becomes visible: two books that year documented the inauguration of the Trans-Caspian railway line to Samarkand, whose construction had been directed by General Annenkoff, the Russian father-in-law of Eugène Melchior de Vogüé. This railway had some support from French investors and suppliers via the Compagnie franco-russe.645 The implication here is that funding from Paris groups enabled these authors to travel to Russia; indeed, their travel accounts speak to important pro-alliance connections among nationalists, revanchistes, the military and railway companies in France. The first of the two accounts, Commandant Napoléon Ney's En Asie centrale à la vapeur - which saw four editions in ten years - was illustrated by Dick de Lonlay, the nom de plume of Georges Hardouin, who had also published accounts of the Franco-Prussian War and who became editor of Paul Déroulède's Le Drapeau, the official journal of the ultra-nationalist Ligue des patriotes.646 Along with Déroulède and Hardouin, Napoléon Ney supported an alliance with Russia. The second


646 Commandant Napoléon Ney, En Asie centrale à la vapeur: la mer Noire, la Crimée, le Caucase, la mer Caspienne, les chemins de fer sibériens et asiatiques, inauguration du chemin de fer transcaspien, l'Asie centrale. Merv, Bokhara, Samarkand (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1888); this book sold three more editions by 1898. Accounts by Dick de Lonlay (Georges Hardouin) concerning the 1878 Turkish-Russian war had emphasized Turkish atrocities and Russian courage; he also reported on the coronation of Alexander II in 1883 for Le Moniteur universel and Le Monde illustré. Védénina, La France et la Russie, 117.
publication, *Voyage à Merv* by Edgar Boulangier, was dedicated to Juliette Adam, thanking her for her "flattering confidence"; notably for infrastructure concerns, Boulangier was an engineer from the Paris Ponts et Chaussées.647

The text of several later travelogues reveals the pro-alliance agenda of authors and publishers and their determination to twin this with warnings of an ongoing German threat. Armand Silvestre's colorful 1892 book *La Russie: impressions, portraits, voyages*, was dedicated to Russian alliance promoter Mikhail Katkov, editor of *Le Messager russe*, whom Silvestre described as "a great friend of our country". Published following the 1891 visit of French warships to Cronstadt when the Chiefs of Staff had begun to draft the convention militaire, this work remained vehemently anti-German, emphasizing the importance of revanche.648 It and other works appear to have been part of a campaign underway to persuade the French public of the potential benefits of an alliance even as negotiations were being finalized. A later travelogue by Henry Lapauze, a reporter for the pro-alliance newspaper *Le Gaulois*, celebrated Franco-Russian relations when reporting on the coronation of Nicholas II in 1895, despite trepidation concerning whether the new Tsar would affirm his father's foreign policy commitments. Like Silvestre's publisher Georges Charpentier (discussed in Chapter 3), Lapauze's editor Arthur Meyer remained an ardent supporter of the cause.649

Beyond books such as those above, travel articles appeared in general and academic periodicals including *La Revue des deux mondes*, with some popular revues devoting their entire content to travel. In France the latter reflected the co-mingled influence of science, the


colonial lobby, commercial geographic societies, travel infrastructure and tourism, plus the knowledge agenda spurred by Republican educational policies. The French Society for Commercial Geography, for example, established in 1873, contributed articles to the periodicals discussed below. While popular travel periodicals were ostensibly modeled on literature for youth, age was of no impediment to readership and illustrated *revues* in particular were widely read. One caveat concerning their influence on popular alliance enthusiasm does apply, however: not all readers may have read their articles about Russia.

Two travel periodicals are of particular importance in examining the movement of positive representations of Russia into mass markets. The most prestigious of these was the weekly *Le Tour du monde* (1860-1913), published by the pedagogical specialist Hachette. This periodical's director, Édouard Charton (1860-1890), who served as a deputy in the National Assembly in 1871 and as a member of the Senate in 1876, illustrated the cross-over of political and professional life common in the early Third Republic. Meanwhile a second weekly journal aimed at families, *Le Journal des voyages* (1877-1929), became the best-selling of all *fin-de-siècle* travel periodicals, notable for its sensational adventure content. Its owner and director, Maurice Dreyfous, worked for Georges Charpentier prior to opening his own firm in 1877, where he published travelogues about Russia such as that by Carla Séréna. Dreyfous was a friend

---


652 Venayre, "La presse de voyage", 477.

653 Venayre, "La presse de voyage", 478.

of pro-alliance authors Théophile Gautier, Émile Zola and Gustave Flaubert, all of whom were also close to Charpentier.  

With respect to articles about Russia, a spike in number may be seen during the alliance era. *Le Tour du monde* serialized works such Dixon’s *La Russie libre* and Séréna’s *Excursion dans le Caucase*, and published additional articles by authors ranging from explorers to aristocrats. Not unsurprisingly given French colonial interests, the periodical’s major topic remained Africa; this merited fifty-eight articles between 1870 and 1900. Taking second place, however, over twenty articles about Russia appeared during the same time: four in the 1870s, eight in the 1880s, and nine in the 1890s. Most were over thirty pages long, featuring densely-researched content and abundant illustrations. As noted, while an indeterminate "Russia" received favorable coverage, its imperial borderlands did not. A traveler to Russian Armenia, for example, described her Russian host as "civilized, because he has only one wife", and her impressions of ethnic Armenians and Tatars remained unrelentingly negative, in large measure due to Islam. Another commentator on Armenia, meanwhile, concentrated on the violence of "Turkish justice". Moving further afield, a third traveler described a warm reception in Russia, but in Siberia he saw only "lazy and indebted people".


656 Dixon, "La Russie libre"; Carla Séréna, "Excursion dans le Caucase", *Le Tour du monde* 40 (1880); 41 (1881); 43, 44 (1882); 47 (1884).

657 Articles are listed at http://francois.free.fr/Le_tour_du_monde/collection_sommaire Despite being a focus of French imperial exploration and ambition, the regions of China and the two Poles received less attention than Russia in *Le Tour du monde*. All based on my observations.

It is in Maurice Dreyfous’s best-selling *Le Journal des voyages* that the clearest correlation may be seen between content and the promotion of the Franco-Russian alliance. This periodical’s articles concerning Russia far exceeded those published in *Le Tour du monde*, perhaps reflecting the fact that the latter’s director, Édouard Charton, also published articles on Russia in his popular journal *Le Magasin pittoresque*. Although the bulk of the copy in *Le Journal des voyages* focused on French colonial regions and départements, articles about Russia began to appear between 1877 and 1888, averaging about ten per year. A sharp spike followed in 1889 with forty-four articles appearing immediately after the first loan to Russia, followed by thirty articles in 1890 and thirty-four in 1891; after this the number began to drop. That the first spike occurred shortly after the first French loan suggests editorial interest in acquainting *rentiers* with the nation in which they might invest, while the decreasing numbers of articles after 1891 corresponded with formal alliance negotiations plus a spate of book and other periodical publishing increasingly focused on Russia.

Added to the two periodicals above, general encyclopedic journals also featured travel writing about Russia, including the afore-mentioned weekly *L’Univers illustré* and the monthly *Le Magasin pittoresque*. Beginning in 1888 and corresponding with the first loan, for example, Charton’s *Le Magasin pittoresque* featured articles by explorers, scientists, aristocrats and general writers describing various regions of the Russian empire. Also popular during the

---

659 See the articles listed under “Russie” in the annual *Table des matières* of *Le Magasin pittoresque*. A http://gallica.bnf.fr


alliance era were accounts of adventure travel; these recounted journeys made between France
and Russia on foot, on horseback, on stilts, and by bicycle or balloon. In summary, then, commencing in the mid-1870s and building to a high point in the
1880s, authors and publishers of popular fiction and travel works contributed to pro-alliance
momentum by normalizing Russia's social groups and its imperial stature, and by naturalizing its
land- and cityscapes and its social and ethnic groups via a form of virtual travel. Although
frequently incorporating themes addressed in academic writing of the same era, fiction and
travel works functioned differently by combining entertainment and didactic functions to instill a
sense of familiarity among readers. Among the many maisons d'édition involved, the firms of
Plon (publisher of Gréville's Dosia and Tissot's La Russie et les Russes), Hetzel (publisher of
Verne's Michel Strogoff), and Dentu (publisher of Audouard's Voyage au pays des boyards),
clearly profited from the success of these works, as did Hachette (publisher of Le Tour du
monde) and Dreyfous (publisher of Le Journal des voyages). Tellingly, several connections may
be drawn between the authors and publishers involved and well-known alliance promoter
Juliette Adam, as well as academic go-between Louis Léger.

The popular fiction and travel writing considered here thus contributed to a widening of
popular interest in Russia and could therefore help to facilitate opinion favorable to an alliance in
France. Of the two genres, however, it is difficult to gauge which might have sparked more
interest. Additionally, whether publishing efforts either created or reflected growing popular
interest and alliance support is difficult to determine; but market exigencies would suggest that

---

662 Neboit-Mombet, L'image de la Russie dans le roman français, 13. Examples in various
periodicals included "Un voyage à cheval", La Nature 2 (1889): 111, cnum.cnam.fr; "Un nouveau sport
[des échasses]", Le Petit Français illustré (14 décembre 1889): 228, "Paris à Moscou", Le Petit Français
illustré (11 avril 1891), http://gallica.bnf.fr; En suivant Terront, as cited in Jean Grand-Carteret, Le Musée
pittoresque du voyage du Tsar: caricatures, chansons, images, bibelots, jouets, prospectus, affiches,
enseignes (Paris: Librairie Charpentier et Fasquelle, 1897), 204. For a subsequent book recounting travel
by balloon, see Comte Henry de la Vaulx, Seize mille kilomètres en ballon (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1903).
positive opinion had become increasingly widespread. Significantly with respect to timelines, the four major works considered here appeared between 1876 and 1884, with the novels by Gréville and Verne preceding the 1880s majority republican government and the travelogues by Audouard and Tissot preceding the Russian loans. Although some later travel writing hinted at oblique connections with those loans, nascent interest in Russia appears to have preceded these, indicative of an engaged polity whose intense concern regarding national security remained driven by France's geopolitical isolation and concomitant fears of future German aggression. The interest in Russia now expressed in the consumer arena confirms Gabriel Tarde's 1901 observation that evolving modern publics had become involved in expressing non-elite opinion in France, facilitated by the drivers of increased literacy, freedom of the press and mass media. It also confirms Christophe Charle's argument for the increasing importance of non-elite opinion in early democratic practice.\textsuperscript{663} As will be seen, this argument for the increased consumption of media incorporating an affirmative reframing of Russia is additionally borne out by the popularity of the pro-alliance spectacles, souvenirs, domestic items, song-sheets and illustrations discussed in the chapters to come.

\textsuperscript{663} As noted in Chapter 2, Gabriel Tarde argued that inclusive modern publics grew in reaction to significant events and serious issues, with broad discussion enabled by the many new books and newspaper available to emerging social groups. Tarde cited press freedoms and increased literacy, along with male suffrage and a mass market, as important factors in this. Gabriel Tarde, \textit{L’Opinion et la foule} (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1901); Pierre Karila-Cohen, "L’Opinion (la généalogie de la notion d’opinion, de l’individu libéral à ses avatars fin de siècle)", 1356, 1364; Géraldine Muhlmann, “La démocratie médiatique”, 1373, in Kalifa et al, eds., \textit{La civilisation du journal}; Christophe Charle, \textit{Social History of France in the Nineteenth Century}, trans. Miriam Kochan (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 140, 188.
Chapter 5: Valorizing Russian Imperialism and Strength: Paris Theatrical Productions, Expositions universelles, Exhibits and Events Showcasing Virtual Travel to Russia and its Empire

Popular legend associates Napoléon Bonaparte's exhortation to his Grande Armée, "Allons en Russie!" ("Let's go to Russia!"), with an 1802 Paris vaudeville entitled Allons en Russie that showcased French actors planning a journey to Russia. This chapter focuses on the facsimile of "travel" to Russia and its empire during the alliance era, as engineered by elites involved in showcasing Russia through the media of a Parisian mass culture industry, including theatrical productions, international expositions, exhibits and events. Distinguishing them from most of the media previously described, these representations of Russia involved both French and Russian actors interested either in publicizing shared imperial goals, or in promoting an alliance or in seeking to capitalize on the momentum towards one. Significantly after 1871, Russia could be portrayed as France's counterpart in imperialism, often in regions where Islam was established and/or in opposition to England. As academic go-between Alfred Rambaud claimed, "In our imperial struggles, we now have support.


665 For a discussion of Tartar imagery in French perceptions of Russia, see Mary Carol Matheson, "Tartars at Whose Gates? Framing Russian Identity through Political Adaptations of Nineteenth-Century French Works by Astolphe de Custine and Jules Verne", Master's thesis (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia, 2006).

Positive representations of imperial Russia occurred as the rise of "new elites" in the early Third Republic - among them the academics and business entrepreneurs described in Chapter 2 - corresponded with the emergence of mass media mechanisms in urban centers across Europe. Entrepreneurial interests in particular played a substantive role in facilitating an affirmative reframing of imperial Russia between 1878 and 1900, via the experiences of simulated or virtual travel offered in prominent public places and spaces of Paris. By valorizing Russia as an imperial power and by showcasing its military reach, elite productions and events might contribute to popular democratic support for the alliance in France. Notably, performances, exhibits and events about Russia also played out in smaller scale in French cities other than Paris, but they tended to follow a Parisian repertoire; for that reason the focus here remains on the capital.

Media events depicting Russia as an imperial powerhouse involved considerable bilateral participation. While some were French-initiated (at times incorporating assistance from cultural actors in Russia regarding music or ethnographic facts, as with the theatrical productions), others were organized by Russian elites, notably the international exposition pavilions and displays. Crucially for alliance promotion, both France and Russia actively participated in exposition circuits at this time. In the case of Russia, however, the government retained a more centralized role in conceiving displays; by contrast, state and non-state interests became involved in creating the exhibits for France. Tellingly for their democratic reach in France, Tony Bennett has argued that exhibitions could serve as part of a regulatory environment and yet symbolize a power that invited people in. As venues for showcasing emerging academic disciplines via "rhetorical effect", their didactic elements could contribute to

---

representations of imperial Russia in Paris, particularly in the geographic and ethnographic domains concerned with French imperial interests. Whether through facsimiles of maps, illustrations, models or displays, the new knowledge agenda concerning Russia, as described in Chapter 2, could be publicly reinforced via a powerfully expressive medium which combined entertainment with information.\textsuperscript{668}

In an era marked by the intersection of mass media with mass political culture, the Paris theatrical productions, \textit{expositions universelles}, exhibits and events could be employed by elites to serve as adjuncts in pro-alliance messaging, despite the fact that fears of the destructive potential of the masses figured prominently in \textit{fin-de-siècle} debates.\textsuperscript{669} But these stagings of Russia remained didactic and patriotic, with an uplifting emotional appeal that served the political interests of elite opinion and ultimately the Republic. Serving as ephemeral vehicles for popular urban entertainment, their messaging would be further extended through popular material culture, as described in Chapter 6.

The pro-Russia productions considered below point to the increasing scale of the culture industry which enabled widespread alliance popularization, but also the "plebiscite"\textsuperscript{670} of consumer response. The role of cultural entrepreneurs in setting a positive stage for the alliance was therefore vast. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, cultural practice emanates from "powerful


\textsuperscript{669} Richard Thomson has outlined these fears well; Dominique Kalifa and Robert Goldstein have also remarked on elite fears of the masses, noting concerns that the "animated, visual or aural" could stir emotions and/or generate mob-like tendencies, unlike "cool print". Richard Thomson, \textit{The Troubled Republic: Visual Culture and Social Debate in France, 1889-1900} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 79-106; Dominique Kalifa, \textit{La culture de masse en France, Vol. 1: 1860-1930} (Paris: Éditions de la découverte, 2001), 41-42, 96-108; Robert Goldstein, ed., \textit{The Frightful Stage: Political Censorship of the Theater in Nineteenth-Century Europe} (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 73.

institutional nodes”, including but not confined to the state. Following international relations scholar Friedrich Kratochwil’s definition of culture, both French and Russian elites developed a system of constructed meanings ostensibly contributing to the ”legibility” of Russia’s empire, proceeding via suggestions of virtual travel. Uniquely, the imaginary experience of virtual travel differed from that derived from reading travel texts in significant ways: productions, expositions, displays and events could employ dynamic, three-dimensional audio-visual effects to simulate the illusion of movement across the Russian empire, with a focus on engaging emotion or awe while echoing the exemplary leçons de choses (teaching via material aids) introduced in Republican pedagogy. “Instruction that amuses, amusement that instructs”, as Jules Verne’s publisher J.-P. Hetzel declared. They also played out in communal rather than in private settings, over extended production runs and with abundant publicity, all key for reaching a mass urban audience.

The analysis in this chapter begins with two theatrical spectacles which reflected and encouraged a mounting russophilie: Jules Verne’s Michel Strogoff (1880), a melodrama that played for over two decades at Paris’s largest theater, the Châtelet, and Skobeleff (1888), a ”military pantomime” which ran for several weeks at the vast Hippodrome d’Alma. Although mentioned only briefly here, further theatrical productions about Russia also played in Paris

---


during the alliance era. Additionally, this chapter considers the Russian exhibits at the 1878, 1889 and 1900 *expositions universelles* on the Champ de Mars, plus a series of popular displays about Russia mounted at the Musée Grévin between 1881 and 1896, and several elite events, among them concerts of Russian music and a Russia-mounted *Exposition ethnographique and hippique* on the Champ de Mars in 1895.

Each of these Parisian venues and sites could bring together a mass public for long production runs that enabled, as Stephen Greenblatt has argued concerning the social role of theater, a "collective dynamic circulation of pleasures, anxieties and interests" regarding Russia as a military ally for France. Ultimately the positive representations disseminated by elites in these productions and events could help to counter the negative stereotypes rooted in France prior to the Franco-Prussian War. Tellingly, they helped to place Russia in the European theater of nations, just as had the academic texts previously described. In a manner of speaking, then, Russia and its empire could now be normalized and domesticated on the soil of France.

How might these media have functioned to influence French perceptions of Russia? Elites could depict the Russian empire as an illusory "knowable" entity by choosing framing devices to portray, as travel scholar Ellen Strain has described, "…distant ends of the earth not just as a collection of curios, but as visible spaces". The liberal use of special effects designed to convey a sense of movement could create the itineraries of imagined realities, imprinted as knowledge through audio-visual and other sensory means. All this proceeded, as

---


676 Strain, *Public Spaces, Private Journeys*, 49.
Roland Barthes described for cinema, via the illusions of representation defined by *tableaux* which advanced selected images "into essence, into light, into view".677

These occasions for virtual travel responded to a key question: how were the French to "know" a potential alliance partner? Few individuals were fluent in Russian, the Cyrillic alphabet posing an insurmountable barrier for most. Travel to Russia remained challenging, although some did make the journey and wrote the accounts outlined in Chapter 4; once there, visitors tended to visit St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Nijni-Novgorod (site of an immense twice-yearly trade fair or *foire*).678 This itinerary was mimicked - and frequently extended - by the spectacles in Paris. From the perspective of the virtual traveler, there remained much to envision concerning Russia and its empire. First, to negate imaginings of a barbarian North that had swallowed Napoléon's *Grande Armée*, the cosmopolitan confirmation of St. Petersburg - Peter the Great's "window on Europe" - contrasted with exotic Moscow, the seat of Russian history. Russia's imperial territories and their ethnic cultures also clearly interested many in France. A further category of knowledge concerned the social, particularly the Tsar's subject and foot-soldier, the Russian peasant or *moujik*. Most critically, however, occasions for simulated travel could emphasize Russia's imperial might, with Cossack troops as an exemplar of its power.

When considering the settings of the Châtelet, the Hippodrome, the Champ de Mars and the Musée Grévin in promoting these imaginings, some key motifs emerge from the spectacles they housed. These frequently paralleled themes emphasized by the authors and publishers discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, illustrating the collateral role of audiovisual media in promoting a positive reframing of Russia. The most important theme emerging from spectacular media was


678 At Nijni-Novgorod, twice-yearly trade fairs involved up to two hundred thousand traders per day, with an estimated yield of sixteen million English pounds (sterling) reported during the 1860s. *Murray’s Handbook for Travellers in Russia, Poland and Finland* (London: John Murray, 1865), 181.
that of Russia as a paradigmatic imperial nation. In this, French productions notably echoed Russia's own self-portrayal at the *expositions universelles*, where Russia further emphasized another European marker of "civilization", i.e. a modernizing economy built on its imperial resources. Employing the fine arts as a form of cultural diplomacy, Russia displayed its picturesque empire too, with music and folk tradition as its exemplars, a focus soon adopted by the French. Above all, the message to be derived was that of a powerful counterpart and ally for France.

How did these spectacular media function? While scholars have analyzed the role of cinema in fostering travel "learning", its nineteenth-century counterparts merit equal attention. Theater and expositions in particular contributed to sociability and participatory engagement in an urban culture, a reminder that, as Ezra Pound observed, "...culture is defined on the street, in public places, in theaters". An urban geography of cultural production can thus be plotted among the venues in Paris which served a variety of symbolic and representational functions for a greater public. Crucially for understanding the historical role of the events considered here, all were ephemeral in nature, part of a "knowledge that remains silent" in the city today, contributing to that which Michel de Certeau described as a "suspended geography of

---


meanings. In an urban landscape swollen by workers arriving from the countryside, both statis-derived sites and commercial venues were employed to host pro-Russian representations soon after the 1871 defeat. All functioned within that which Tony Bennett termed an "exhibitionary complex" of expositions, dioramas, panoramas and museums, to these must be added the ephemera of theater and special events.

It is worth noting here that a focus on the city as a site for virtual travel to Russia and its empire adds to an abundant existing scholarship on Paris. Studies have emphasized the city's role as a setting for revolution and as a locus of modernity and Haussmannization - with concomitant themes of boulevard, flâneur, spectacle and consumption - the latter reflecting the urban re-configuration begun during the 1850s by Napoléon III and continuing past 1900 under the Third Republic. Yet Paris served, and indeed continues to serve, as an organizer for virtual experience and knowledge concerning Russia, although few reminders of the Franco-Russian alliance remain inscribed within the physical city. While a restaurant called Strogooff

---


advertising "tartares" might go un-remarked, one notable construction does survive: the bridge or pont Alexandre III, inaugurated for the 1900 exposition universelle to honor the Tsar who negotiated the alliance with France.685

5.1 Theatrical productions: Michel Strogoff (1880), Skobelev (1888) and others

No better opportunities existed for suggesting virtual travel to imperial Russia than the popular theatrical productions Michel Strogoff and Skobelev, mounted in venues on Paris's Right Bank. While the Left Bank expositions universelles celebrated a technological future, Right Bank entertainment remained rooted in the earlier tradition of theater and equestrian shows. Indeed, the importance of the Parisian theatre industry during the late nineteenth century cannot be overstated: five hundred thousand spectators sat in darkened theater houses once a week, with a million or more attending monthly.686 Abundant advertising, plus numerous reviews in periodicals and newspapers,687 contributed to this. As across Europe, commercially-driven vaudeville and supernatural féeries were now ceding place to fin-de-siècle productions that featured massed ensembles and spectacular audio-visual effects, a format well suited to simulating virtual travel. These techniques could be utilized to showcase Russia's imperial and military stature in a manner reminiscent of the son et lumière shows from France's past.688

685 My thanks to Dr. Bob Brain for noting this restaurant in Paris. The pont Alexandre III is the twin of a similar bridge in Russia: the Troïtsa bridge in St. Petersburg.


687 Major pro-alliance periodicals, including La Revue politique et littéraire edited by Alfred Rambaud and La Nouvelle Revue directed by Juliette Adam, routinely contained reviews of such theatrical productions.

688 Sound and light shows, or son et lumière spectacles, remain part of the French cultural repertoire today; they began under monarchs in the eighteenth century. In the summer of 2011, for example, a son et lumière show in Noeux-les-Mines featured Michel Strogoff. This echoed similar productions held in 1999 and 2000 in Vay. "Spectacle son et lumière de Noeux-les-Mines", https://sites.google.com/site/noeux2011; http://www.vay.fr/son et lumière.
Favorable to a theatrical pro-alliance climate overall, government censors banned select French plays during the 1880s for their negative portrayals of Russia.\textsuperscript{689} The clear enmeshment of pro-alliance initiatives and capitalization is suggested by the two productions that were mounted near Paris's financial center. \textit{Michel Strogoff} and \textit{Skobeleff} implied an imperial authenticity whose military strength could become a "political idea",\textsuperscript{690} one that could mirror the aspirations of both colonialists and pro-alliance actors in France. They might also subtly point to the promise of investment in Russia. Although anonymous capital investment makes direct connections difficult to trace, Marc Martin has noted that the same journalists often reported on both finance and theater between 1870 and 1900.\textsuperscript{691} This is suggestive of a possible connection between promoters of the Russian loans and these theatrical productions.

Emblematic of a mass culture industry, \textit{Michel Strogoff} and \textit{Skobeleff} could convey a strong focus on movement across Russia's empire as a result of their venues' expansive size. The imposing Châtelet Theater, opened in 1862, sits prominently between the Hôtel de Ville and the Louvre; during the alliance era it was Paris's most capacious theater, catering to bourgeois spectators with three and a half thousand seats. As the Châtelet hosted over one thousand performances of \textit{Michel Strogoff} between 1880 and 1900, it quickly became known as the "temple" of \textit{Strogoff}.\textsuperscript{692} Its stage held hundreds of actors and even horses, lending itself to a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item This appears to have occurred during the late 1880s, when the loans to Russia began. Some plays deemed too overtly anti-German were also banned, for fear of inciting German reaction. Goldstein, \textit{The Frightful Stage}, 108.
\item Brain, \textit{Going to the Fair}, 177.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
military spectacle. Also on the Right Bank, directly opposite from the Left Bank’s Champ de Mars, lay the eight-thousand seat Hippodrome de l’Alma (no longer extant), home to animal shows, pantomimes and reenactments of military events, among them the 1888 production Skobelev. The latter celebrated the exploits of Russian General Mikhail Skobelev in the Russo-Turkish war, in a lavish production that ran for several weeks.693

Tellingly, prior to Michel Strogoff’s 1880 debut the directors of other Paris theaters had showcased productions with a positive Russian story,694 demonstrating a mounting interest which reflected national security anxieties stemming from the 1871 defeat. One example of these, Les Danicheff, a highly popular play mounted at the Odéon in 1876, featured a Russian moujik rescuing a Frenchman from a savage bear attack. Its script was co-written by Alexandre Dumas junior, who had married a Russian woman and was a friend of Jules Verne. Significantly, Les Danicheff received approval from academic go-between Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, who as a popularizer of the idea of a "Russian soul" praised its elevation of peasant morality.695 As previously noted, the valorization of the Russian peasant and the devout âme russe would become recurrent themes in French imaginings, perhaps appealing to elites in particular as a throwback to an idealized, pre-modern France to muffle post-Commune workers’ demands. Interest in the moujik also reflected the 1870s socialist and revolutionary "going the people" movement in Russia itself (to celebrate the peasantry’s "simple wisdom and cosmic


694 The opera Dimitri, for example, centered on a seventeenth-century pretender to the Russian throne, played at the Théâtre Lyrique Nationale in 1876. Bilodeau, Édition critique, Michel Strogoff, xxii.

orientation” as an antidote to autocracy), but in France these idealizations of the peasant might be seen to trump rational science and an emerging modernity, preoccupations shared by conservative elites.696

The plot of Les Danicheff may be considered to be an early pro-alliance metaphor, its popularity likely due to the 1875 “Is War In Sight?” crisis which seemed to promise further German aggression towards France.697 Continuing the positive reframing of Russia, one year later two plays portraying Russia were mounted by French entrepreneurs: Les exilés, a production recounting the liberation of Siberian exiles (seemingly to emphasize human rights reforms under Alexander II, for French critics of autocratic rule), and l’Hetman, a historic tale written by revanchiste Paul Déroulède about a Ukrainian Cossack military commander.698 Cossacks, once derided as "mangeurs des chandelles"699 (candle-eaters) and mistrusted due to their role in the Russian-led occupation of parts of France after Waterloo, now became mythologized figures in France. The appellation of Cossack quickly became synonymous with Russian military strength, and Cossack cavalry thus featured prominently in the imperial adventures of Michel Strogoff and Skobeleff. This reflected the myths surrounding Cossacks’ battle prowess and guerrilla tactics, and also the fact that Cossack troops served in the St. Petersburg Guards and as auxiliary police troops in towns across Russia. Importantly, they also

696 Influenced by authors Alexander Herzen and Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, the "going to the people" movement was begun by middle-class Russian intelligentsia; its goal was to free the peasants from tsarist oppression. Cathy A. Frierson, Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late Nineteenth-Century Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 11, 192.


699 Literally, "candle eaters"; a reference both to Russian winters and to a lack of Enlightenment.
guarded the western borders of the Russian empire that might be vulnerable to attack by a united Germany after 1871. All of this augured well for French imaginings of Russian Cossack strength.

Cossacks were but one of several military types appearing in *Michel Strogoff* at the Châtelet (Figure 4), a theater which could house its five acts, sixteen backdrops, four hundred and fifty actors wearing twelve hundred costumes, and up to forty live horses on stage with a full orchestra below. As noted, Verne's 1876 novel had already exhausted fifty editions prior to its theatrical adaptation in 1880. Significantly for bolstering the Third Republic's self-image, the story's imperial appeal accorded well with the intensification of French colonial activity in Polynesia, Asia and Africa, and the declaration of France's "mission civilisatrice" by Prime Minister Jules Ferry in 1885. Russia could now be viewed as France's counterpart in imperial ventures, and a distinction between Christianity and Islam resonated particularly here.

---


702 Jann Pasler, *Composing the Citizen: Music as Public Utility in Third Republic France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 416. Jules Ferry, a prominent Opportunist republican leader, served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1871 to 1889; he was twice Prime Minister (1880-1881, 1883-1885) and also Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts (1883). French colonial activity begun during his time included the establishment of control over Tahiti and other Polynesian islands (1880), of protectorates in Tunisia (1881) and Tonkin and Annam (1885), of a supply colony in Djibouti (1885), of the Indochinese Union incorporating Cochin-china, Tonkin, Annam and Cambodia (1887), and of excursions into Madagascar, Laos and parts of West Africa (1893-1895). The latter would lead to French control of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Guinea, French Sudan, Mauritania and Niger. For an overview of this period, see James J. Cooke, *New French Imperialism 1880-1910: The Third Republic and Colonial Expansion* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1973).

703 Also as noted, while Russia proper enjoyed increasing approbation, its colonies retained the distinction of the barbarian "other". To date some studies have neglected this distinction. These include Ezequiel Adamovsky, *Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France, circa 1740-1880* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006) 19, 271; Chris Bongie, *Exotic Memories: Literature, Colonialism and the Fin de Siècle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 64; N. Christine Brookes, "Translating
Exemplifying this, although Algeria (first conquered between 1833 and 1840) was incorporated into France in 1881, Muslims were denied citizenship and endured a harsh legal code. This anti-Muslim stance accorded well with the message of *Michel Strogoff*.

As outlined in Chapter 4, Verne's *Strogoff* storyline portrayed a revolt originating within Russia's empire, in today's Azerbaijan. Upon learning that Tartar tribes were massing with plans to attack the Siberian stronghold of Irkutsk, the Tsar dispatched a solo messenger, Michel Strogoff, from Moscow to Irkutsk to warn of the planned assault. Despite being captured and blinded by the rebels' leader, the intrepid Strogoff reached Irkutsk to warn the Russian contingent and to assist in defeating the Tartar Islamic horde. The loyal Strogoff had accomplished his mission against the infidel, "pour Dieu, pour le Tsar, pour la Patrie" ("for God, for the Tsar, for the Homeland"), trumpeting the themes of imperial prowess and Christian pacification for readers and audiences alike.

---

Russia for the French Imagination, 1856-1894*, PhD dissertation (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University, 2004), abstract, 232, 64. Adamovksy's study extended from 1740-1880; during this time, he argued that a Euro-Orientalist discourse rooted in liberal bourgeois ideology remained at work in French depictions of Russia. Bongie further argued that proponents of liberal modernity employed the threat of the "other" to carve out their goals. Brooke, meanwhile, contended that in the lead-up to the alliance, as France "softened its past positions" and "pseudo-colonial discourse" regarding Russia, print media now focused on "[its] exotic and enchanting aspects".


Serving to counter an earlier nineteenth-century trope of an imagined invasion of Europe by an army of Russian "Tartars", *Michel Strogoff* depicted Russia as a mighty imperial power putting down an internal revolt, confirming a distinction between European and "Asiatic" Russia and echoing the message of academic works. As a classic melodrama depicting the triumph of good over evil, its didactic elements were considerable. In the manner of epic theatre described by Roland Barthes, each scene contributed to a "summation of perfect instants" to showcase Russian power. Since 1850, Russian troops had advanced twelve hundred kilometers to the south and fifteen hundred kilometers to the south-east, described by one French observer as an "extension of European civilization", and echoing the notion of France's "mission civilisatrice". Verne's rebel leader served as a justification for Russian pacification, with his character reminiscent of Nasrullah, a "barbarous, fanatical" khan of Bokhara during the 1860s who personified Turkestan’s reputation as a "theatre of horrors". By extension, an imperial France engaged in taming peoples abroad could be a worthy partner. By extension too, night after night, audiences could witness Russia defeating massed barbarian tribes, a metaphor for the Prussians who had invaded Paris in 1871.

Contributing to a "knowing" of the Russian empire, the Châtelet's pioneering effects of theatrical reality contrasted a vast and sparsely-populated landscape with urban Paris. From

---


707 Barthes, "Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein", 173.

Moscow the virtual traveler accompanied Michel Strogoff to Nijni-Novgorod via riverboat, across the Urals by carriage, over the steppe on horseback and on foot, and up Lake Baikal and the Angara River by raft to Irkutsk. Movement was suggested by special effects that included moving panoramas, lantern projections and pyrotechnics. Underscoring the simulation of travel, *Le Figaro* noted the "geography lesson" provided by a "gigantesque album" of painted tableaux, ostensibly showcasing a scientific legibility that accorded well with an Enlightenment-inspired organization of knowledge. Meanwhile *Le Petit Journal* lauded Strogoff's "gripping reality" and "exact representation" of ethnic types. Thus the themes emphasized in academic texts and travel literature had moved on to the stage.

The imperial and martial aspects of *Strogoff* provided fodder for particularly dramatic scenes. In 1880, for example, an avid press corps described the opening scene set in Moscow outside the Palais Neuf or New Palace. As the curtain rose to a carillon of Kremlin bells, yellow silk flags adorned with the Russian imperial double eagle fluttered above dancers and actors costumed as White Russians, Moldavians, Hungarian gypsies and Turks. Exoticism appeared as a leitmotiv of empire here, echoing the popular shows at the Paris Jardin d'Acclimatation and contrasting with more sober academic works. Another scene portrayed a Tartar fête at the


emir of Bokhara's camp, with a cortège of whirling dervishes, falconers and bayadères (Oriental dancers). Eclipsing the picturesque exoticism and the dramatic battle scenes, the martial finale of Strogoff was nothing short of sensational. Signaled by a trumpet chorus from forty cavaliers, a retraite aux flambeaux or torchlight retreat began: first the Tsar's regiment, the Preobrajensky, with drums and fifes and torches, followed by the armored guards of the Tsarina, all marching to music sent from Russia by Nikolai Rubinstein of the Moscow Conservatory. A reporter from Gil Blas described it thus:

Then, in the midst of two hundred actors and to the orchestra’s spirited play, they executed the march by Rubinstein, whose stirring effect enjoyed colossal success. The audience demanded three curtain calls.

Demonstrating military cooperation, producers of Strogoff also routinely incorporated French Republican guards dressed as Russian Cossacks, who rode to the Châtelet from their barracks a few blocks away to the "delirium" of the public. The theater's huge doors allowed seven horses to ride through abreast, while a bridge above the stage served to pose mounted cavaliers. Spectacular gala performances featured dozens of horses, along with French and "Russian" soldiers and sailors, military bands and choirs. This military focus lent reality "in the réception des spectacles ethnographiques dans la littérature et les arts visuels européens au temps des conquêtes coloniales". Synergies Canada, http://journal.lib.uouguelph.ca/index.php/synergies/article/view/1365/2305. See also Emmanuelle Sibeud, "La naissance de l'ethnographie africainiste en France avant 1914", Cahiers d'études africaines 34:136 (1994): 639-658.

713 "Michel Strogoff", Le Figaro (18 novembre 1880), 3.

714 Nikolai Rubenstein scored the Preobrajensky guards march for the production. Pasler, Composing the Citizen, 416-417; "Michel Strogoff, par un Monsieur de l’orchestre ", Le Figaro (18 novembre 1880), 2; "Soirée parisienne", Gil Blas (19 novembre 1880), as cited in Bilodeau, Édition critique, Michel Strogoff, 127.

715 Bilodeau, Édition critique, Michel Strogoff, li-lii, xliv, xxix; McCormick, Popular Theaters, 221.
manner of the battle panaoramas currently in vogue”, a focus also emphasized by large Strogoff advertising posters.716

Strogoff remains a key exemplar of the fin-de-siècle theater industry aimed at a mass Parisian public. Demonstrating the turn to Russia, the Châtelet's director who engineered the play, Félix Duquesnel, had recently moved from the state-sponsored Odéon where he had presided over the successful run of Les Danicheff. Illustrating the enmeshment of theater and finance in the commercially-run Châtelet, Strogoff's original production cost 300,000 francs, requiring substantial capital investment.717 Compellingly, although the theatrical production of Verne’s Le tour du monde en 80 jours (1874) eclipsed its scenic grandeur, more productions of Strogoff than of the former played in Paris from 1880 to 1900,718 i.e. during the key alliance years.

Following a remarkable three hundred and eighty-six performances in its first year alone, future Strogoff productions reflected the determination of investment sponsors to capitalize on political events. Demonstrating a pro-alliance stance, all performances involved audiences in singing both national anthems at their finale.719 As political events evolved, producers made production alterations. In 1888, for example, one year after the Schnaebelé espionage scare


717 Four theaters in Paris were state-sponsored at the time: the Odéon, the Comédie Française, the Opéra and the Opéra comique. All others depended on the mobilization of capital and ongoing ticket sales; anonymous speculative societies became increasingly involved. Ticket costs at the Châtelet ranged from 0.75 to 10 francs. Charle, Théâtres en capitales, 12-13, 64, 274; McCormick, Popular Theaters, 193.

718 Over 1,100 performances were given between 1880 and 1900; a minor number of these were held at the Théâtre de la Porte-Saint-Martin. This contrasts with just over 900 performances of Around the World in 80 Days. My calculations, based on figures in Bilodeau, Édition critique, Michel Strogoff, li-lii.

719 Bilodeau, Édition critique, Michel Strogoff, li-lii.
and Otto von Bismarck’s speech concerning a possible future war, plus the appearance of the book by a German officer entitled *The Next Franco-German War* and also the same year as the first loan to Russia and of the *Skobeleff* premiere - the theater director added special new *tableaux*. Subsequently, to celebrate the invitation of French warships to Cronstadt in 1891, two hundred and twenty-eight performances were mounted during the next year; new *tableaux* were also added for these, to be followed by further new backdrops in 1897 to mark President Félix Faure’s triumphant journey to Russia. Meanwhile *Strogoff* costumes, like those from *Skobeleff*, were loaned for other Paris events. At an 1892 charity fund-raising event "for the poor of France and Russia" held at the Place de la Concorde, for example, waiters in *Strogoff* costumes served Russian dishes a mock backdrop featuring Moscow and the Nijni fair. And when proclaiming the alliance to the international community during the 1900 *exposition universelle* organizers featured an evening entertainment on a steamer moored on the Seine, where seven hundred and fifty dancers in *Strogoff* costumes performed a ballet. Clearly Verne’s melodrama and its imperial message had become a touchstone for mass cultural events.

Also contrasting an urban Paris with an imaginary Russian empire was the "military pantomime" *Skobeleff*, a production that premiered in 1888 at the Hippodrome de l’Alma.

---


721 This 1892 fête, held at the Tuileries Gardens from August 13 to 21, was advertised as the "Grandes Fêtes des Tuileries: Pour les pauvres de France et Russie". "La fête de bienfaisance au profit des pauvres de Russie et de France dans le Jardin des Tuileries", *L’Illustration* (août 1892), as cited in *Paris des illusions*, 50.

Although this production has gone largely unremarked by major alliance scholars, its political context is suggestive: produced during the year of the first loan to Russia, Skobeleff also coincided with a government agreement to allow Russia to procure smokeless rifles from the French factory of Châtellerault. It also premiered at the height of Boulangism in France, hinting at connections between pan-Slavists and French groups championing revanche. Most significantly, however, it corresponded with the saber rattling by Otto von Bismarck that ignited fear nation-wide.

Although little known today, Paris housed several hippodromes in the nineteenth century, a reminder of the importance of horses in the city. Showcasing circuses and equestrian maneuvers, these frequently incorporated a stage and at times an ice surface, as in the 8,000-seat Hippodrome d'Alma whose ice arena served as a backdrop for Skobeleff. A lavish production that ran for several weeks, Skobeleff celebrated the exploits of popular general Mikhail Dimitrievitch Skobeleff, a hero of the Russian campaigns in Khiva and Kokand (1874-1875) and of a key battle in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). Skobeleff himself had been invited to Paris in 1882 by extra-governmental enabler Juliette Adams, who also wrote a book about him. In Russia, Skobeleff was an influential figure in pan-Slav circles, causing the


724 These smokeless rifles were meant to obviate infantry problems in future campaigns. George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 32.

725 See Hillis, "The 'Franco-Russian Marseillaise'", 51.

726 Dominique Kalifa noted that hippodromes generally served an elite audience, but became more democratized towards the end of the century. Kalifa, La culture de masse, 40.


Tsar to become wary of his potential power. Earning popular approbation in France, however, Skobelev’s war tactics purportedly resembled those of Napoléon Bonaparte, and in 1882 he gave speeches in Paris predicting a penultimate clash between Slavs and Germans. Tellingly, celebration of his military prowess contrasted with the widespread criticism of French army leadership held responsible for the defeat of 1871. One contemporary author compared his popularity among the French to that of General Georges Boulanger, noting their hunger for a heroic figure in a turbulent early Republic.

The Skobelev storyline featured three winter scenes: a telegraph post on the steppe that acted as a rallying point for Russian forces, the citadel of Plevna in Turkestan which Skobelev’s forces would defeat, and the Neva River in St. Petersburg, the site of Russia’s victory celebration. Themes of military strength and empire prevailed throughout, once again emphasizing Russian power and valorizing its potential as an ally for France. Strongly focused on aural as well as visual elements, Skobelev suggested virtual travel by featuring martial movement across scenic tableaux, with Le Figaro commending its simulation of “real life”. In this the production celebrated the ethos shared by Europe’s great powers, with imperial ideology presented as a laudable reality on the hippodrome floor. In the quest for realism, the production’s artist had travelled to Russia to make detailed drawings of ethnic types, costumes,

---


730 Skobelev spent part of his youth in France. The war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire ended with the Treaty of Stefano (1881); by 1884 Russia controlled all Turcoman territories, building on its earlier conquests of Khokand (1864), Tachkent (1865), Bokhara (1866), Samarkand (1868), and Khiva (1873). It continued to compete with Britain in the Far East, a matter watched with interest in France and discussed in periodicals such as La Revue des deux mondes.


armaments and sleighs (likely at the Dashkov museum mentioned in Chapter 2). Highlighting the abundant capital investment required, he also brought back dozens of peasant dancers to perform, plus a choral ensemble of two hundred and fifty singers.\footnote{As with \textit{Michel Strogoff} the sources of the capital investment in \textit{Skobeleff} are unknown; it would seem likely, however, that Russian pan-Slavists provided some assistance. Félix Fénéon, "Œuvres plus que complètes: Skobelev", \textit{Histoire des idées et critique littéraire, textes réunis et présentés par Joan U. Halperin, Tome II} (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1970), 786; Pasler, \textit{Composing the Citizen}, 668.} The admiring words of a reviewer capture the production's martial appeal, similar to that found in \textit{Strogoff}:

The show opens with a steppe bathed in moonlight, a mournful steppe, desolate and shrouded by snow, real snow – over which numerous sleighs travel in all directions. Then, at the Fort of Plevna, an enemy advance which Skobelev's troops repulse with diabolical zeal. Finally, on the Neva River [in St. Petersburg], hundreds of skaters execute picturesque patterns on the ice…A shiver of enthusiasm traversed the audience with this final tableau. As the chorus sang the national hymn of Russia, thousands of voices – the entire audience – sang it along with them. The final procession, executed to the firing of cannons, a carillon of bells, and the orchestra and military music, elicited tremendous cheering. We French are no less enthusiastic for our soldiers on Bastille Day…\footnote{"Skobelev", \textit{Le Figaro}, 2.}

As with Strogoff, the success of Skobelev would set a positive stage for Russia at the 1889 exhibition.

In addition to Michel Strogoff and Skobelev, further theatrical productions showcasing Russia's empire played in Paris during the alliance era, lending a circularity to representations, and adding to the saturation of pro-alliance messaging. Yet like Skobelev, their ephemeral nature means that they remain little remembered today. In the mid-1880s, for example, a vaudeville-comedy entitled \textit{Le Voyage au Caucase} was mounted at the Théâtre de la Renaissance.\footnote{Advertising poster, “Théâtre de la Renaissance. Le Voyage au Caucase”. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b53127589r} Subsequently in 1891, the year that Russia invited French warships to Cronstadt, \textit{La Sainte Russie} (Holy Russia) played at the Théâtre Historique; its advertising
poster depicted many of the themes celebrated in *Strogoff*. This play differed from others by showcasing the importance of Russia's railway lines (often connected with French investment) for the imperial "great game" in Asia. The plot turned on aborted attempts to blow up a Russian rail line and to burn a key bridge to Central Asia; demonstrating imperial competition, conspirators included the unfaithful British wife of a Russian general charged with the railway's construction. One reviewer gave the production lukewarm praise, but noted that "... obviously it is [French] sympathy for Russia that will... ensure a large number of representations." A more enthusiastic commentator admired the portrayals of the religiosity of Russian soldiers and the final procession to the Russian national hymn.

Meanwhile a vaudeville at Paris’s Cluny Theater, produced in 1891 with the purpose of re-enacting the Cronstadt visit, was entitled *L'année franco-russe*. Advertised as a "grand spectacle with three acts and sixteen scenes", this ran for forty-two days and featured the marketing of all things Russian as posters onstage advertised *Michel Strogoff*, plus sundry Russian domestic products. Subsequently in 1892 a play entitled *Russes et Français* played at the Théâtre Montparnasse, while a ballet *France-Russie* was performed at the Folies-Bergères to honor the Russian naval officers' visit to Paris in 1893, the latter in a prelude to alliance ratification.

---

736 Advertising poster, "La Sainte Russie". http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90161246/f1


740 Pasler, *Composing the Citizen*, 668; "Folies-Bergères", *Le Figaro* (17 octobre 1893), 3.
After the alliance was signed, Parisian entrepreneurs mounted a further spate of pro-Russia productions. A play entitled *Catherine de Russie* featured at the Châtelet in 1896, perhaps to emphasize the empress's interest in prominent French Enlightenment philosophers including Voltaire. Later that year, the Châtelet celebrated the coronation of Tsar Nicolas II with a poetic tribute, marking the event by draping the theater’s vast exterior in French and Russian colors.741 Also in 1896, an operetta entitled *Le petit moujik* played at the Théâtre des Bouffes-Parisiens.742 Finally, corresponding with President Faure’s triumphant trip to Russia in 1897, directors produced a play at the Théâtre Moncey: *Double Alliance! Pièce franco-russe à grand spectacle* reprised the theme of virtual travel by featuring locales including St. Petersburg, Nice, Moscow, Nijni-Novgorod and Madagascar (the latter recently invaded by French forces).743 Pro-alliance celebration thus continued to play out in Parisian productions against the colorful backdrops of a mass culture industry. When added to contemporaneous stage adaptations of works of Russian literature, plus productions mounted in other cities,744 all these theatrical events afforded opportunities for audiences to envision a distant Russia and its empire, now inscribed within an ephemeral urban theatrical landscape.


744 In 1892, for example, one year after the Cronstadt visit, a comedy called *L’Alliance franco-russe* played in Marseille at the Théâtre du Gymnase; also that year, at the Grand Théâtre in Lille, a poetic tribute to the victims of famine in Russia featured in a performance by the Comédie Française. Henry Welschinger, *L’Alliance franco-russe: les origines et les résultats* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1919), bibliography; Butenschön, *Zarenhymne und Marseillaise*, 31. On Russian theater adapted for the French stage see Gianni Cariani, "Une France russophile?", Thèse de Doctorat (Strasbourg: Université Marc Bloch, 1998), 105.
5.2 Russia at the *Expositions universelles*: 1878, 1889 and 1900

Corresponding with alliance initiatives by French actors, further events showcasing opportunities for virtual travel were initiated by Russia itself at the Paris *expositions universelles*. This appears to have been largely fortuitous, as Russia actively engaged in mounting similar displays in pan-European exhibition circuits at the time. Significantly, Russia had its own well-established tradition of domestic expositions celebrating its imperial mastery, wealth and technology, while trumpeting the taming of subject peoples.\textsuperscript{745} This rhetoric of empire and progress,\textsuperscript{746} now displayed in Paris on an international stage - its legibility portrayed within pan-European forms and its pavilion placement determined by the French - could dovetail with French pro-alliance and colonial interests.

The Paris exhibitions were centered on the Left Bank Champ de Mars, once a drill ground for the adjacent École Militaire.\textsuperscript{747} This “field of Mars” had hosted festivals of military glory under the First Republic, and also under Napoléon I and Napoléon III. Between 1878 and 1900, following the example of the 1855 and 1867 exhibitions held under Napoléon III, the Third Republic organized three international expositions here, each lasting several months. Attendance was vast: sixteen million in 1878, thirty-two million in 1889, and forty-eight million in 1900.\textsuperscript{748}

\textsuperscript{745} As previously noted, in 1867 a pioneering Russian imperial ethnographic exposition was held in Moscow. Expositions of Russian industry were held in 1857 (Warsaw), in 1865 (Moscow), and in 1870 (St. Petersburg), while science and industry expositions were held in 1872 (polytechnical, Moscow), in 1881 (15th annual exposition of industry and art, Moscow), in 1887 (science and industry, Ekaterinaberg), and in 1893 (Siberian products, Moscow; machines and agriculture, St. Petersburg). Multiple other domestic expositions were held in 1899-1900. "Expositions universelles et internationales", 13, 14, 16, 26, 42, 43, 51.

\textsuperscript{746} Bennett, "The Exhibitionary Complex", 145.

\textsuperscript{747} Current dimensions of the Champ de Mars are smaller than those of the late nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{748} Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas*, 37.
When focusing a cultural lens on the evolving French perceptions of Russia, these expositions tell part of the story. Conceived by traditional and new elites allied with the Republic, they appealed increasingly to a mass public, allowing Russia among other nations to trumpet its empire, wealth, technological advancement and culture. The 1878 international exposition, organized by a nascent Republic anxious to consolidate its power, was the first to adopt a format of national pavilions and "educative" imperial displays, well suited for Russia to showcase its power. Subsequently the 1889 exhibition, conceived to celebrate the centenary of the French Revolution, as well as a mounting nationalism and the extension of France's colonial empire, was similarly suited for Russia to contribute substantial imperial displays. By 1900, with the Third Republic securely positioned and buttressed by its alliance with Russia, the fin-de-siècle exposition trumpeted France's sense of itself as a resurgent European power, while Russia's focus on Asiatic Russia was prominently displayed. Meanwhile, smaller bilateral exhibitions held in Nice, Boulogne-sur-Mer, and in St. Petersburg further celebrated Franco-Russian rapprochement; to date, however, these latter events remain unexplored in the literature on exhibitions.

By contrast, many scholars have investigated the international expositions and the resulting literature is prolific. In these studies, a pacification of spectators remains a recurring


750 A Russian exposition was held in Nice in 1891, and a Franco-Russian commercial and industrial exposition was held in Boulogne-sur-Mer in 1892. St. Petersburg, Russia, subsequently served as the site for an 1898 French exposition and an 1899 Franco-Russian exposition of industry and arts. "Expositions universelles et internationales (hors les expositions universelles présentées à Paris), 1844-1920", 28-29, 41-42. http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr

theme. While some authors have explored expositions as vehicles for consumer spectacles and as foci for the calibration of standards and perceptions, others have examined them as exemplars of scopic regimes. They have also been analyzed as a framework for the emergence of anthropology and other scientific disciplines, and as exemplars of cultural diplomacy and international competition. Regarding the latter, Wolfram Kaiser described expositions as a tool of international relations in a "global public space", emphasizing the political goals of participants such as inclusion in Western networks of power and the legitimization of domestic and international political, economic or social programs. To this must be added the employment of fine arts including music - commonly found in exhibition repertoires - to enhance diplomatic outreach. All of this could apply to Russian displays at the Paris son patrimoine', dirigée par Béatrice de Andia (Paris: Action Artistique de la Ville de Paris, 2005); Pascal Ory, Les Expositions universelles de Paris: Panorama raisonné, (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1982); Brigitte Schroëder-Gudehus et Anne Rasmussen, Les fastes du progrès: le guide des Expositions universelles, 1851-1992 (Paris: Flammarion, 1992); Florence Pinot de Villechenon, Les Expositions universelles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992).


*expositions universelles.* Yet alliances, too, might be furthered as a result,754 as in the example considered here.

Kaiser’s is the one study of expositions that specifically considered the Franco-Russian alliance, albeit briefly.755 Yet crucially the Paris expositions highlighted the image that Russia wanted to project of itself during the *fin de siècle*, i.e. that of a powerful imperial nation whose dominions guaranteed enormous wealth. The latter in particular may have been emphasized to reassure both French and other investors, as described in Chapter 1. To burnish its standing on the European and international stage, Russia could also portray its cultural uniqueness via a sort of export ethnography featured against this backdrop of imperial and economic standing. In 1878, therefore, the Russian pavilions particularly emphasized empire and culture, in 1889 empire, culture and wealth, and in 1900, empire, culture, wealth and technology.

For the 1878 exposition, concomitant with the publication of academic go-between Alfred Rambaud’s influential history of Russia, his *confrère* Louis Léger co-wrote a book describing the Russian exhibits. In this example of "panoramic literature... [describing that which] makes things legible by putting them on display",756 imperialism was made legible by descriptions of the exhibits that suggested virtual travel. While the Russian section was small due to the nation’s involvement in the Russo-Turkish war, it was placed close to the main French exhibits. The Russian Ministries of War and of Public Instruction sponsored displays showcasing the


755 Note that Kaiser (mistakenly) asserted that “...rapprochement was at least attributed *ex post* to the diplomatic efforts of a world expo, particularly in the case of the Franco-Russian treaty of 1891-1894.” He also inferred that Nicolas II visited Paris in 1900, when in fact the Tsar visited Paris in 1896 and Compiègne in 1901. Kaiser, “The Great Derby Race”, 49, 51.

756 The term “panoramic literature” was used by Walter Benjamin. Clovis Lamarre and Louis Léger, *La Russie et l’Exposition de 1878* (Paris: Charles Delagrave, 1878); Brain, *Going to the Fair*, 12-13. Russia participated actively in scientific congresses throughout Europe during the 1870s, such as those held for the 1878 Paris exposition. Schroëder-Gudehus et Rasmussen, *Les fastes du progrès*, 80, 100.
ethnographic span of their empire, increasingly of interest to colonialists and scientists in France.\textsuperscript{757} Thus a large map of ethnic peoples, accompanied by albums of illustrations, attested to an imperial progress that Léger noted “… does honor to Russia's missionary work to extend our [European] civilization.”\textsuperscript{758} Across the river at the Trocadéro palace, the focus on ethnography continued with a Russian display of wax \textit{mannequins} of Lapps, Samoyeds, Tatars and Turks.\textsuperscript{759} These items subsequently augmented collections at the Paris Musée d'histoire naturelle, echoing the more ephemeral popular images of Russia’s imperial subjects circulating in French periodicals, travelogues, postcards and advertisements,\textsuperscript{760} while setting a semi-permanent public stage for an imagined itinerary across the Russian empire.

\textsuperscript{757} In the early nineteenth century exotic imperial troops were a standard in the Tsar's personal retinue. See for example the painting at Versailles, “Le Tsar Alexandre 1er présenté à Napoléon 1er à Tilsit: les Kalmouks, les Cosaques et les Baskirs de l'armée russe” (1807), by Pierre-Nolasque Bergeret. Beginning with Nicholas 1, coronation ceremonies - frequently attended by French dignitaries - staged a “microcosm of Russia” with subjugated Asiatic peoples marching in \textit{obéissance} to the Tsar. Richard S. Wortman, \textit{Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy}, Vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 280, 380. In Russia, widespread informal ethnographic work corresponded with the reform era begun under the “Tsar-liberator” Alexander II; after serf emancipation in 1861, interest in peasant culture culminated in the “going to the people” by Slavophiles and secular nationalists from 1874 to 1878. Yet as Orlando Figes noted, “Long before the Russians ever knew their colonies as ethnographic facts, they had invented them in their literature and arts”. This was immortalized in Glinka's opera \textit{A Life for the Czar} (1836) showcasing an idealized peasantry loyal to the Tsar, along with powerful ethnic folk choirs. Similar motifs appeared in Russian opera, music and ballet throughout the nineteenth century; many of these productions made their way to France during the alliance years. Indeed ethnic folk dances in ballets set to Tchaikovsky's music remain a staple today, while French clothing designers continue to take inspiration from Russia's imperial past, as in the 2010 exhibition of popular Russian costume by the Fondation Pierre Bergé - Yves St. Laurent, and the Cossack-inspired outfits in the Chanel collection of the same year. Orlando Figes, \textit{Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia} (London: Allen Lane, 2001), 384; Hubertus Jahn, "Us: Russians on Russian-ness" in \textit{National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction}, eds. Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis, 67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); "Exposition: le costume populaire russe", 18 mars au 23 août 2009 (Paris). http://www.fondation-pb-ysl.net/site/Le-costume-populaire-russe438.html

\textsuperscript{758} Lamarre and Léger, \textit{La Russie et l’Exposition de 1878}, 131.

\textsuperscript{759} The Trocadéro, built for the 1878 exposition, was replaced in 1937 by today’s Palais de Chaillot. In keeping with the era’s schemata, four main groups were identified within the Russian \textit{imperium}: Slavs, Finns, Aryans (including Circassian and Armenian) and Tartars/Mongols (including Kirghiz, Bachkir, Tatar, Kalmuck and Turk). Lamarre and Léger, \textit{La Russie et l’Exposition de 1878}, 145, 155, 228-231, 236; Charles Rabot, “Ethnologie”, in Delavaud et al, \textit{La Russie}, 33.

\textsuperscript{760} De Rabot, “Ethnologie”, 32.
In terms of unique cultural expression, the 1878 Russian pavilion’s façade, modeled after the Kolomenskoe palace, was notable for its singular artistic conception, a style of architecture not hitherto seen in Paris. Diplomatic outreach further extended to music, with director Nikolai Rubinstein conducting concerts at the Trocadéro, mainly Tchaikovsky scores. Significantly, the Revue d’art dramatique later credited France with "discovering" Russian composers, the exponents of a Slavic soul; in fact such music frequently derived from conquered regions.

Eleven years later the 1889 exposition universelle, conceived to celebrate French republicanism on the centenary of revolution, initially offended political sensibilities across Europe such that monarchs declined to sponsor national pavilions. Private interests organized pavilions instead, including business groups from Russia. Russia’s growing amitié with France, as demonstrated by the first loan in 1888, had now become cause for celebration. Illustrating this, a gala event twinning traditional elites and culture heralded the exposition: a Fête franco-russe at the Opéra. Organized as a fundraiser to benefit the French colony in St. Petersburg, it had received the approbation of the Russian ambassador and the French government. Signifying the burgeoning military relationship, French and Russian generals acted as honorary co-chairs of its planning committee.

761 Marius Vachon, "L’art russe", in Delavaud et al, La Russie, 333-334. Vachon authored other works on Russia, as noted in Chapter 3.


763 Small enclaves of French, German, and Italian citizens had existed in St. Petersburg since the era of Peter the Great. It is not known to what purpose such funds might be put, but perhaps they were used to further French cultural outreach in the city.

764 Generals Likastcheff and Appert served as co-chairs; this fête preceded the exposition by two months. Parisis, "La vie parisienne: fête franco-russe", Le Figaro (16 mars 1889), 1-2.
This lavish fête offered several simulated vignettes, some featuring the Russian empire. It began in the Opéra foyer with tea served from samovars in isba-type stalls, as well as kummel, an ethnic drink. On the stage inside, two hundred Russian choral singers performed against backdrops of St. Petersburg and Moscow’s Kremlin, while Circassian, Cossack and peasant dancers also performed, their costumes loaned by Skobeleff producers. As one observer remarked, le tout combined to give the sense of being transported to the world of Tsar Alexander III, an image that might appeal particularly to French elites of monarchist persuasion. The evening’s finale was a banquet off-site, a “Tour Eiffel culinaire” that featured dishes from across Russia’s imperial territories.\(^765\) The latter event reflected a strong interest in Russian cuisine in France at the time.\(^766\)

Meanwhile at the 1889 exposition site, Russia was assigned a special section appropriate to the emerging bilateral relationship, while its construction was blessed by the métropolitain (vicar) of Paris’s Russian church and honored by a visit from President Sadi Carnot.\(^767\) Designed to emphasize imperial reach and culture, plus moujik tradition, the Russian exhibits included a main pavilion which featured a seventy-five meter panorama of Moscow, a separate Finnish pavilion, a dwelling on the Rue des Nations, and an isba or peasant cottage

\(^765\) See the two-page illustration in l’Illustration (23 mars 1889), 236-237, http://gallica.bnf.fr. The banquet menu included caviar, salmon and trout à la Néva, bear steak à la Sibérienne, deer meat from Irkutsk, pâté à la Cosaque, and a dessert named Skobeleff. For a discussion of the influence of Russia on French cuisine, along with a description of food phrases such as “à la Neva”, see Alain Drouard, “Les influences de la cuisine russe sur la cuisine française (XIXe-XXe siècles)” in Alexandre Stroev, ed., L’image de l’Étranger, 315-326 (Paris: Institut d’Études Slaves, 2010).

\(^766\) The word bistro is said to derive from Cossacks demanding “bystro”, or faster service, during their 1814 encampment in Paris; the upper classes adopted “service à la russe” (i.e. one dish at a time rather than buffet style) after 1871. Julia Child noted that “all things Russian were very à la mode” during the 1890s. Plokhy, The Cossack Myth, 2; Julia Child, My Life in France (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 138; Drouard, “Les influences de la cuisine russe”.

\(^767\) Corbet, L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 424.
next to the newly-constructed Eiffel Tower.\textsuperscript{768} As in 1878, musical performances augmented the standing displays. For one reviewer, the concerts of works by Rimsky-Korsakov, Glinka, Borodin, Glazunov and Tchaikovsky offered "a revelation" of the Russian soul;\textsuperscript{769} again, more revealing of conquered imperial souls.

For one aristocratic French visitor, the 1889 Russian displays revealed a nation worthy of the appellation "the Colossus of the North". She found the furs, jewelry and religious \textit{tableaux} particularly compelling, describing with awe "an enormous shield of Saint George vanquishing the dragon", a symbol of Russian religiosity that would be employed during the 1890s to celebrate the alliance in France. A display of toys from ethnic groups across the empire, designed to educate Russian children, also earned her attention. The latter would remain in the Trocadéro, as would additional ethnographic items from the exposition. Finally, emphasizing a potential for French investment interests, she noted the Nobel consortium's large painted panorama which compared petroleum deposits in Baku with those of Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{770}

A momentous period followed the 1889 exhibition, marked by the French naval visit to Cronstadt in 1891, the return visit by Russian naval officers to Toulon and Paris in 1893, and the accession of Nicholas II in 1894. By May of 1895, however, eleven months after the assassination of President Sadi Carnot and eight months after the death of Alexander III, French aspirations for a continued alliance with Russia had not yet been confirmed. Yet interest in all

\textsuperscript{768} Inside the \textit{isba}, peasants demonstrated traditional woodcarving while surrounded by icons emphasizing Russian religiosity. In contrast to the 1867 exposition, when typical Russian dwellings were transported from St. Petersburg, the 1889 dwellings were designed with assistance from French architects. "Exposition universelle d'art et d'industrie. Le village russe", 2-3. http://www.expositions-universelles.fr/1867-pavillons-russes.html. Russia's contributions also included large restaurant on the first level of the tower, and an \textit{arc de triomphe} of anthracite in the Palais d'Industrie.


things Russian persisted, as demonstrated by continuing pro-alliance commentary by elites in books, periodicals and newspapers, and in theatrical productions. The official state visit to Paris by Nicholas II in 1896 ultimately augured well, and when he publicly pronounced the word "allies" during President Faure’s visit to Russia in 1897, utter jubilation reigned across France, to a degree that has been little remarked.  

Signaling at last a perceived guarantee of national security, this heralded the triumphant 1900 exposition, to be followed by a second official visit by the Tsar to Compiègne in 1901.

The 1900 exposition universelle provided an occasion to trumpet the alliance on an international stage; yet this occurred only after the French government averted the threatened international boycott due to the Dreyfus affair by granting Dreyfus a pardon. On opening day, President Émile Loubet and the Russian ambassador traveled by boat from the Eiffel Tower to the pont Alexandre III. With their backs to Napoléon’s tomb in the Invalides, and accompanied by French military musicians playing the Russian national anthem (matched by a Russian military contingent playing the Marseillaise), they crossed the new bridge and proceeded along Avenue Nicolas II to formally open the exposition at the Grand Palais. Nicholas II had laid the inaugural stone of this bridge in 1896 and it now opened up new vistas, both literally and figuratively; from its span citizens could view the Russian war pavilion while contemplating allegorical gold-leafed statues entitled "the glory of War" on the Left Bank, and "the joy of

771 Over one hundred and forty nation-wide celebrations took place upon President Faure’s return; church bells tolled while bunting, flags and posters decorated city streets and special military revues and concerts were organized for the public. See the descriptions in Philippe Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898. Livre d’or de l’Alliance franco-russe (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1898), 224-248.

772 Greenhalgh, Ephemeral Vistas, 36.

773 The former Avenue Nicholas II is named Avenue Winston Churchill today; the extant Grand and Petit Palais were constructed on the Right Bank for the 1900 exposition. "Opening of the Paris Exhibition. From our own Correspondent", The Times (London), 16 April 1900. http://infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/382/409/5182492w16/purl
Peace” on the Right Bank. This, then, was travel in the abstract highlighting Franco-Russian relations: moving away from Napoléon’s 1812 invasion of Russia to an imagined bilateral future of peace and prosperity symbolized by the bridge and the Grand Palais. One exhibition photographic postcard suggested the importance of an alliance for France: it featured a child whose parents were directing his attention to the bridge’s plaque dedicated to Alexander III.  

With a focus on Asiatic Russia, 2,400 Russian exhibitors participated in the 1900 exposition, the third highest number among nations. Arthur Raffalovich, the instrumental actor discussed in Chapter 2, served as vice-president of the Russian exhibits, continuing his involvement in rapprochement. In addition to the main Asiatic Russia pavilion (placed on a privileged site adjacent to the Trocadéro and the French colonial section, underscoring bilateral interests), Russia also contributed a Finnish pavilion and a pavilion for the French War Ministry’s display. Demonstrating imperial mastery, Russian artists designed the Asiatic pavilion while Russian peasants constructed it on-site. An exposition guidebook described it thus:

774 As found in the reproduction of a 1900 postcard, personal collection.

775 In comparison to the 2,400 Russian exhibitors in 1900, just five hundred Russian exhibitors had participated in the 1889 exposition. Aubain, "La Russie à l'Exposition universelle de 1889", 353.


…this is an ephemeral kremlin…erected with faith by the artisans of Holy Russia, singing their peasant songs in sonorous rhythm while their heavy axes easily cut wooden pieces from great pine trees brought from the steppe. Inside…the great artist Korovin has decorated all the rooms…[those depicting] Siberia… the Far North, Central Asia. Everywhere there are marvels, furs, gold fabrics. Everywhere there are also painted panoramas which draw immense, pushing crowds.779

The suggestion of virtual travel impressed on all fronts. The foyer, for example, contained a large fresco of an Oriental trading scene followed by the rooms of sumptuous exhibits; meanwhile a separate room sponsored by "des pétroles Nobel" featured a panorama of the Baku oil fields, as in 1889. All emphasized imperial dominions and wealth.780

Most compellingly for illustrating Russia’s geopolitical reach, the ne plus ultra of virtual travel at the 1900 exposition was a mock Trans-Siberian railway imitating the 6,300 kilometer journey from Moscow to Peking.781 After dining in a "Moscow" restaurant featuring folklore concerts, spectators sat in luxury cars on a railway track for a twenty-five minute simulation that involved four painted panorama screens moving at different speeds, all enhanced by a rocking motion and a train whistle, while "traveling" from Moscow to Omsk, Irkutsk, Vladivostok and


780 Of additional note in setting a tone of Russian wealth was a gift commissioned by Nicolas II and presented to the President. This was a large map of the départements or regions of France, assembled from Finnish marble and granite and studded with semi-precious stones from the Ural mountains to mark the location of cities, their names lettered in gold and complemented by rivers figured in platinum relief. Alsace-Lorraine figured in an indeterminate gray. For an image of this map, see Michael Heffeman, "The Politics of the Map in the Early Twentieth Century", Cartography and Geographic Information Service 29:3 (2002): 210. The map was displayed at the Pavillon d’Industrie on the Right Bank, where the accession of Nicolas II also figured prominently in a large coronation painting. The coronation had been much covered in the national press; visitors could now imagine themselves there; Fabergé gold eggs and miniature replicas of the imperial crowns, orb, and scepter completed the latter scene, emphasizing imperial wealth. Robert Timms, ed., Nicholas and Alexandra: The Last Imperial Family of Tsarist Russia, from the State Hermitage Museum and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (New York: Henry N. Abrams, 1998), 142.

781 The Trans-Siberian railway was begun in 1891 and completed in 1916; between 1883 in 1893 Russian scientists studied the projected route and collected specimens of geology, mineralogy and paleontology, which were exhibited alongside the mock railway at the 1900 exhibition. Aimone et Olmo, Les Expositions universelles, 201-202.
Peking. This was, as more than one observer noted, travel in the manner (if not mode) of Michel Strogoff, affirming Russia's status as a mighty power and echoing the audio-visual representations employed in theatrical productions, now augmented by corporeal sensation.

5.3 Exhibits and Events: Popular displays at the Musée Grévin (1881-1896) and elite events including the Russian *Exposition ethnographique et hippique* (1895)

Beyond the Paris theatrical productions and *expositions universelles* lay different urban exhibits and events designed to lure a consuming public, whether mass or elite. Among those targeting the masses, the notion of didactic entertainment held sway, as it had with exhibitions. As Vanessa Schwartz observed when discussing modern spectatorship in 1880s and 1890s Paris, the employment of such displays could help create a new participatory urban culture, one which augmented that of a newspaper-reading public. Indeed, Schwartz has described wax museums in particular as "living" or "plastic" newspapers, noting their three-dimensional techniques employed to this effect. All of this might contribute to France's nascent democratic political culture as well.

The popular Musée Grévin featured wax displays in long runs to extend an "eternal present", keeping Russia front of mind in both time and space. Significantly for the potential influence of these, the Grévin welcomed half a million visitors per year. Opened in 1882 by

---


Arthur Meyer (the pro-alliance director of *Le Gaulois* and *Le Paris-Journal*), it demonstrated a cross-fertilization of media when photography was not yet the norm. Showcasing Russia, and reflecting a bilateral preoccupation after the 1881 assassination of Alexander II, one wax tableau re-created the 1882 arrest of Russian nihilists, complete with icons, a samovar and leaflets in their room. A second tableau depicted the imperial coronation ceremonies for Alexander III, highlighting the interest in the Tsars emerging in French celebrity culture. Moving beyond wax exhibits, in 1892 the Grévin housed a display portraying French naval vessels visiting the port of Cronstadt, and in 1896 a diorama of Nicholas II's coronation which "positioned" the spectator in a Kremlin tower for authentic effect.

In contrast to these popular displays for the masses, prominent pro-alliance cultural events targeted aristocratic elites, for as Jann Pasler has observed, after the 1891 naval visit to Cronstadt the Third Republic looked to engage some of its domestic opponents, i.e. elites who persisted in monarchist inclinations, in pro-alliance support. Cultural promoters thus sought creative ways to further the alliance agenda. Illustrating the *fin-de-siècle* practice of associational charity and echoing the 1889 pre-exposition banquet previously described, a benefit "for the poor in Russia and in France" was held for several days in the Tuileries gardens in 1892; despite government approbation, this ended in financial loss. The event's organizers


also capitalized on the idea of virtual travel, via large three-dimensional mock-ups of the Kremlin, St. Basil's Cathedral and the Nijni foire.\textsuperscript{789}

Aristocratic musical events further trumpeted bilateral rapprochement.\textsuperscript{790} Édouard Colonne, for example, director of the French Concert national (known also as the Association artistique) which performed at the Châtelet theater, undertook seven trips to Russia before 1896 to familiarize himself with Russian music.\textsuperscript{791} To mark the Cronstadt visit, Tchaikovsky himself directed the Châtelet orchestra in 1891 while Colonne conducted in St. Petersburg, leading one reviewer to proclaim "it is the Franco-Russian alliance in music".\textsuperscript{792} One year later the Société des grandes auditions hosted a concert featuring Russian composers at the Trocadéro, co-directed by an impresario from Moscow, while the Eldorado presented Russian choral performances. In 1893 Écouard Colonne directed a Russian music festival in Paris, and after alliance ratification in 1894, the Théâtre de l'Opéra Comique featured Russian composer César Cui's music in a performance underwritten by the French state.\textsuperscript{793}

After alliance ratification, a further unique event organized by Russia itself was held for several weeks from mid-May through July in 1895, in the form of an Exposition ethnographique et hippique on the Champ de Mars.\textsuperscript{794} To date this has also gone unremarked in the scholarly


\textsuperscript{790} Pasler, Composing the Citizen, 621, 67.


\textsuperscript{792} Édouard Noël et Edmond Stoullig, Les Annales du théâtre et de la musique 17 (1892) (Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1892): 404.

\textsuperscript{793} Pasler, Composing the Citizen, 627, 624, 668, 669.

\textsuperscript{794} "Le monde vu par l'image", Le Journal des voyages et des aventures de terre et de mer (1 décembre 1895 - 31 mai 1896): 433.
literature. The French ambassador to St. Petersburg helped to initiate the exhibition, which was conceived after the alliance was signed but before the death of Alexander III. At its martial inauguration ceremony he welcomed the Russian ambassador and the French Minister of Commerce; President Félix Faure visited two days later, along with the Minister of Fine Arts and other French dignitaries. Government planning clearly predominated over business interests here, as Russia appeared to deliberately present itself as an ally in imperial ambition following an era of expansive colonialism in France. While ethnographic displays had become standard in international expositions, this appears to have been the only time that a stand-alone Russian exhibition was staged outside of the country. In contrast to French colonial exhibitions, however, such as the one featuring a conquered Sudan later that summer, the Russian example emphasized the imperial skill and vigor of both man and beast. Advertising posters thus depicted a column of Cossacks charging on horseback, lances raised and battle-ready. Meanwhile the French African display - complete with mock villages and three hundred Sudanese - emphasized the stasis of a subdued people.

The 1895 Russian *Exposition ethnographique et hippique* coincided with Paris's aristocratic horse-racing season and its annual canine exposition. Its highlight took place each afternoon in the Galérie des Machines, where Cossack cavalry standing or lying on horseback

---


799 The French conquest of Sudan was completed in 1895.
performed an "incomparable" mêlée of simulated combat to showcase Russian force. This was preceded by a défilé of dogs and reindeer leading sleighs, the latter over a partial surface of ice. Meanwhile the standing imperial exhibits re-created a Caucasus soldiers' camp, its ambience enlivened by Cossack song and dance and the presence of Djiguites, Ossites, Kirghizes and Tatars, all housed in tents loaned by the French Ministry of War. Animals featured prominently too, among them horses from the Tsar's personal stables. Additionally, Siberian huskies were complemented by greyhounds owned by General Dourassoff, who had arrived in France to participate in joint military maneuvers. Around the camp "une immense kermesse" exhibited art and sold ethnic souvenirs. Ultimately the promise of this exposition, that of a powerful imperial partner for France, would be reaffirmed in 1897 by Nicholas II.

In summary then, the city of Paris served as a singular site for the production and dissemination of elite representations of a powerful imperial Russia between 1878 and 1900, with the potential to enhance widespread alliance interest and support. This might contribute to building a domestic democratic consensus, while establishing a sense of inclusivity for spectators in a national agenda. Whether targeted at wealthy bourgeois, aristocratic elites, or the greater public, ephemeral spectacles and events could enhance positive imaginings of Russia’s imperial stature and its concomitant military strength, against the backdrop of its

www.memoireetactualite.org.PDF.1893

801 This echoed the occasion when horses belonging to Tsar Alexander II had sojourned in Paris in specially-built stables during the 1876 exposition; twice a week the beau monde could watch Cossack officers putting these horses through their paces. "1867 Exposition universelle. Le village russe", 3.

colorful subject cultures. The notion of virtual travel in the late-nineteenth-century city, in whose places and spaces large numbers of spectators could consume and commune, lends understanding to the "immersive engagement" provided by these productions which engendered fertile variations, lending circularity to representations. In the spaces of theaters, expositions, exhibits and events, audience engagement via three-dimensional visual and aural spectacle contributed to that which Greenblatt termed the "circulation of social energy", as the visual cacophony of a *ville-vitrine* became furthered by other senses. Mass media now doubled as *leçons des choses* (show-and-tell lessons), echoing a pedagogical attribute of the Republican education agenda and supplementing the "secondary discourses" concerning Russia circulating in the books, periodicals and newspapers previously described.

Distinguishing them from most other media which promoted the alliance, the spectacles and displays discussed above clearly married bilateral interests. Yet to what extent France may have followed Russia's lead here is not easily discerned. During the 1880s, *Michel Strogoff* and *Skobelev* provided jingoistic opportunities for French entrepreneurs to celebrate Russia's imperial might - and by proxy, that of France - while furthering an alliance agenda against the backdrop of an ethnographic exoticism that echoed Russia's self-display at the 1878 *exposition universelle*. Russia continued to emphasize its imperial strength at the 1889 exposition, showcasing its economic investment potential via backdrops that animated the physical spaces of empire from Finland to Baku. After the alliance was ratified in 1894, the 1895 all-Russia *Exposition ethnographique et hippique* emphasized imperial vigor through displays of military prowess, ethnic diversity and a far-flung animal contingent. Finally, Russia offered the virtual

804 Greenblatt, "The Circulation of Social Energy". *Ville-vitrine* is my expression, literally "the city as shop window".
805 Bennett, "The Exhibitionary Complex", 145.
French traveler a futuristic tour of Asiatic Russia at the 1900 exposition universelle, along with affirmations of its imperial, economic and technological power. Meanwhile French efforts to celebrate both Russian imperialism and the alliance proceeded apace, continuing in theatrical, museum and musical form, contributing to a synergy of representations which first appeared in books.

Although attendance at these events is difficult to ascertain - French visitors to the Paris expositions may have simply chosen not to view the Russian displays - their very density emphasizes a saturation of representations. Michel Strogoff in particular played a key role in suggesting virtual travel to promote "learning" about Russia; debuting in theatrical form fourteen years before the alliance was signed, its producers continued to highlight Russia's imperial prowess and by extension its potential for protecting a vulnerable France. Strogoff's singular dramatic scenes employed metonomy and allusive metaphor to mask the complex realities of a potential military partner. Yet as Charles Corbet remarked: "Not only did Michel Strogoff contribute to popularizing a new image of Russia…it also…registered this image…as an accomplished fact from then on."806 As evidence for this, audience statistics may be reasonably surmised: if one assumes just a fifty percent sales rate at the Châtelet theater, spectators purchased almost two million tickets between 1880 and 1900.807 Considering that there were approximately ten million eligible French voters at the time,808 this is a remarkable number, evidence of a strong level of interest in Russia the consumer arena.

On a final note when considering the potential pro-alliance impact of the productions, expositions displays and events above, it is worth re-emphasizing that many have been hitherto

806 Corbet, L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 361.
808 Thomson, Democracy in France, 40.
unexplored by alliance scholars, despite their general agreement that the alliance enjoyed remarkably widespread popular support in France. One explanation relates to the foci of previous studies, which as noted in the Introduction, have emphasized the diplomatic, political, military and financial history of the alliance. Turning a cultural lens on the fin-de-siècle bilateral relationship permits the examination of a wider range of relevant sources, many readily available for the first time due to the digitization and centralization of collections. Underscoring the value of a cultural history, the consideration of Michel Strogoff, Skobelev and the smaller theatrical productions including Le Voyage au Caucase, La Sainte Russie and Double Alliance!, plus the Russian pavilions at the expositions universelles and the musical programs targeting aristocratic elites, along with Russia's Exposition ethnographique et hippique, point to new understandings of the fin-de-siècle Franco-Russian rapprochement. These clearly reveal the involvement of entrepreneurial and non-state actors in promoting the alliance among both elites and the greater public, with a goal to influence foreign policy during the early Third Republic. Beyond the productions and events described here, further evidence for a sustained consumer engagement appeared throughout the 1890s, as multiple small ateliers and printers encouraged a domestic alliance embrace via an astonishing array of souvenirs, domestic products, toys and song sheets. The dissemination of these often proceeded through the vehicle of a sidewalk consumer culture that facilitated the movement of pro-alliance products into private spaces. It is to this phenomenon that the following chapter turns.
Chapter 6: Affirming the Alliance: Production and Consumption of Material Culture

This chapter considers the production and consumption of pro-alliance *bibelots* (souvenirs and novelties), domestic products, toys, postcards and song sheets during the 1890s as vehicles to express popular alliance enthusiasm in France. The production of a vast numbers of such items created a saturation of positive representations of Russia, with a potential for affirming the alliance as the solution to national security fears. When discussing *fin-de-siècle* tensions, Modris Eksteins noted these fears, relating them to the purchase of souvenirs:

"...[in] the belle époque ... cultural preoccupations were related to political and strategic concerns. In both, vulnerability was the prevailing characteristic. When a Franco-Russian treaty materialized in 1893, ending a quarter-century of diplomatic isolation that had been engineered largely by Otto von Bismarck, Paris erupted in jubilation verging on hysteria. Matchboxes with portraits of the Tsar, Kronstadt pipes, and Neva billfolds became all the rage. Portraits of the Tsar and Tsarina were hung in children's rooms.  

The extraordinary range of alliance objects sold in France buttresses the argument that their production and consumption could signal a widespread democratic integration of, and identification with, the military alliance as a national foreign policy decision, subsequent to the pro-alliance messaging by the groups and media discussed in Chapters 2 through 5.

To understand the experience of French citizens for whom the alliance was of paramount concern, political ephemera may therefore afford unique insights. Their very proliferation suggests that they might have functioned as a sort of abstract promise-note against a perceived existential threat. Evidently pro-alliance objects could signify reassurance, and

---

809 Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Toronto, Canada: Lester and Orpen Dennys Ltd., 1989), 49. Note that based on the Roman calendar, the military agreement was signed by Russia on December 27, 1893 and by France on January 4, 1894. The latter date would be considered December 23, 1893 on Russia's Gregorian calendar; hence in Russia the alliance is dated 1893. George F. Kennan, *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia and the Coming of the First World War* (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 233-234.

consumers were willing to buy. As evidence for the *fin-de-siècle* intersection of mass consumer and political culture, these items provide a singular immediacy for historians’ understanding.\(^{811}\) Indeed, as will be seen, demonstrative material culture had served historically in France as a vehicle for consumers to situate themselves within political contexts, and it was emblematic of a network of extra-textual expression.

Significantly, pro-alliance objects differed from the media described in previous chapters in substantial ways. During the 1870s and 1880s extra-governmental elites employed both books and periodicals to promote an affirmative civilizational typing of Russia as a modernizing European and imperial power, a cultural leader, a Christian nation and an arbiter of peace. Newspaper editors extended the affirmative message by informing the public about Russian affairs and attempting to persuade both the wider public and the government of the value of an alliance. Fiction writers, meanwhile, normalized Russia’s social groups and empire, and travel writers naturalized Russia’s land- and cityscapes and imperial domains. Finally, during the 1890s, the French and Russian producers of Parisian theatrical productions, displays and events valorized Russia as an imperial and military strongman while showcasing Russian culture.

By contrast, pro-alliance material culture remained distinct. As a vehicle to demonstrate consumer agency, it could be employed in public or private spaces to symbolize or to elicit an affective (emotional) response, or it could directly serve a communicative function, as with postcards and song sheets. An emphasis on feeling, rather than knowing, became important here.\(^{812}\) Unlike the more muted textual media described, alliance items could broadcast a strong


nationalist message, further amplifying the themes of the *expositions universelles*. As part of a panoply of disposable consumer items that included the illustrated newspapers described in the next chapter, they could extend the reframing of Russia via a national rhetorical reach. Embodying personal expression via consumption, national purpose could thus be twinned with the self. The examples below illustrate that consumers could proclaim alliance support by adorning the body, by decorating the home, by purchasing products of sustenance, by involving children in play, by sending written messages and by participating in song. Here one may witness not just the involvement of male voters, but also of women and youth.

The scale of alliance ephemera was vast. According to alliance promoter Philippe Deschamps, a Paris collector, businessman, and member of the group *Les amis de Russie*, more than sixteen thousand commercial items were produced between 1891 and 1897 to celebrate the rapprochement with Russia. After canvassing for donations of these, Deschamps began to display his collection under the title *Bojé Tzara Kranienne* (the title of Russia’s national anthem), enjoining the public to visit his home for viewing. Characterized variously as a "dada", as an example of exemplary patriotism, and as a "veritable monument", his collection was described in newspapers ranging from the aristocratic *Le Figaro* to the anti-Semitic *La Libre Parole*.  

---


By 1897, the Deschamps collection included flags, bronze and marble items, statuettes, plates, lanterns, lamps and shades, drawings, watercolors and paintings, scarves, jewelry, toys, postcards, song sheets and poetry, and multiple product labels - the latter representing one hundred and twenty-five manufacturers intent on exploiting the Franco-Russian amitié.

Ultimately he amassed twenty thousand "objets franco-russes et russo-francs", going beyond commercial items to add official documents, invitations, newspaper excerpts, posters, photographs and telegrams. Deschamps subsequently founded a small museum, the Musée Nicholas II (no longer extant), where he installed three rooms: one devoted to the 1891/1893 Cronstadt/Toulon naval visits, another to Tsar Alexander III and to President Sadi Carnot, and a third to the alliance itself. To publicize his museum Deschamps chose an image called "Le baiser de l'alliance" ("the alliance embrace") featuring "two sisters": i.e. a French Marianne and a young Russian woman. He also sent seven thousand duplicate items to Russia, in addition to a large number to the city of Reims and to other French museums.

Who became involved in the production, sale and consumption of these items, and why? Although by the 1890s producers and consumers might have shared a Republican persuasion, patently the Republic did not direct the production of material culture. Intriguingly, extant sources indicate that the majority of the actors involved remained anonymous. While it is impossible to know if this production might have been initiated or encouraged by extra-

---

815 This image appears on a poster advertising the museum. See "L'Alliance intime de la France et de la Russie - L'histoire par image", http://www.histoire-image.org. The museum was located at 28, Boulevard Poissonnière in the ninth arrondissement. Admission was one franc, and opening hours were from 10 a.m. to 11 p.m. See photos of other posters advertising the museum at "Musée Nicolas II", Paris-bise-art.blogspot.com, 14 juillet 2017.

governmental elites, the ubiquity and variety of pro-alliance items does suggest the participation of multiple small manufacturing concerns, following in the tradition of modest family ateliers and printers that characterized fin-de-siècle France. Here a profit motive no doubt prevailed; additionally, firms may have sought to express their own views and to encourage widespread alliance support. Beyond this, the groups who consumed alliance ephemera remain difficult to discern. Far from remaining a phenomenon of Paris alone, however, ephemera flourished across the country.

Ultimately this ensemble of objects which emphasized a centrality of the visual or oral could augment the textual and spectacular cultures described in Chapters 3 through 5, targeting a consuming public born partly from the expositions. Urbanization played a key role here, with streetscapes already serving as "cultural mediators" for the sale of other items which, as Jean-Yves Mollier has argued, might acculturate citizens into a Republican political culture. The changing forms and scale of the culture industry now enabled a "material politics" focused on the alliance. This intersection nourished a nascent mass political culture, which although susceptible to domestic party divides, could provide a sense of belonging and identity and give significance to national dramas. The alliance, as a foreign policy decision which engaged widespread support, became an ideal occasion for the expression of a nationalist consensus.

6.1 Political material culture: contexts, themes and functions

To make sense of the extraordinary range of pro-alliance items it is first helpful to place it into its contemporary context. During the eighteenth century, activist political campaigns had


spurred the production of consumer objects in America and England, when protesters purchased "brooches, badges, ribbons, pins, buttons and jewelry" bearing abolitionist slogans; Wedgwood cameos and china further highlighted the cause. "Political handkerchiefs", meanwhile, marked significant election campaigns.819 Similarly, novelty items and domestic products documenting political events became popular in France. During the French Revolution, for example, lapel pins, handkerchiefs, fans and even wallpaper depicted an iconography of popular politics. The Paris Commune also generated a celebratory material culture, although purchasers of pipes, cigarette papers, medals and coins that celebrated the uprising could be prosecuted under the new Third Republic.820

Not restricted to activist and revolutionary causes, affirmative engagement via material objects emerged with the 1778 French Treaty of Amity with America, when images of Benjamin Franklin (America's representative in Paris) proliferated on aristocratic items including snuff boxes, buttons, necklaces, hats and canes.821 Reflecting more democratic affirmative practice after 1871, images of leading politicians Adolphe Thiers, Léon Gambetta and Jules Ferry featured on tablecloths, tumblers, bottles, pipes and even puppets, while images of French colonial soldiers served on advertising labels.822 Such objects reveal what Martin Daunton and


Matthew Hilton termed "a material culture of politics," important for its production, its potential employment in performative messaging, and/or its potential incorporation into the private sphere. Significantly, consumption now engaged non-elites, permitting widespread citizen expression through means other than text. As Michael Burns observed, by the end of the nineteenth century in France a "... novel mélange of commercialism and propaganda was an important feature of political acculturation".

One study examining the role of popular ephemera in expressing political thought - including objects ranging from folk calendars to handkerchiefs, clothing and china - as evidence for a broadly inclusive political sphere "from below" in the mid-nineteenth-century Rhineland provides further insight here. As its author James Brophy argued, pace Jürgen Habermas, "Consumerism did not corrupt the public sphere, but, rather, constituted it." Further studies have considered material expression "from below" via political banners, and the employment of material culture to deal with deep political change, or to express radical political beliefs. All of


825 James M. Brophy, Popular Culture and the Public Sphere in the Rhineland, 1800-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 304. Brophy was responding to Habermas's definition of the public sphere, a definition that remained rooted in textual and verbal exchange among a bourgeois public with the goal of influencing political change. Habermas argued that the potentially liberating rise of a bourgeois public sphere had been overtaken by the negative impact of increasing consumption, overriding civic interest in political action. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1989).

these indicate that in the hands of consumers, objects may be turned to expressive political purpose.

In France the admixture of bibelots and politics mushroomed particularly during the 1880s and 1890s, reaching what might be termed an industrial scale. An increasingly engaged polity and a burgeoning celebrity culture were at play here, nurtured by the meteoric rise in media production described in previous chapters. Three significant events which unleashed abundant material propaganda clearly document this fin-de-siècle trend: the Republican secularization policies targeting the Roman Catholic Church, the rise of General Georges Boulanger to challenge the state, and the Alfred Dreyfus affair.

In the first example, from 1880 onward a strong market in polemical anti-clerical materials flourished as Republican partisans attacked traditional Roman Catholic influence in schools and hospitals, in a prelude to the 1905 formal separation of State and Church. Following Gambetta's 1877 cry of "Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi!", anti-clerical caricatures, posters, envelopes and postcards were printed in the thousands; stickers proliferated also, affixed on buildings and churches and in the Paris metro. Militant propaganda extended to popular song sheets too, as evident in the "Marseillaise anti-cléricale" and the "Hymn for Free Thinkers" entitled "Écrasons l'infâme", whose cover illustration featured a Republican Marianne crushing a priest beneath her foot.827

In the second example, during the late 1880s General Boulanger's brief rise to prominence led to multiple items for consumers disillusioned with the early Third Republic; these included pipes, cigarette papers, playing cards, stickers, medals, knives and perfumes, as

---

well as portraits and articulating cardboard figures.\textsuperscript{828} His floral symbol, the carnation, also blossomed on men's lapels and on tablecloths in the home. As a militant \textit{revanchiste} and (briefly) Minister of War who appealed to those impatient with the ongoing cabinet defeats and fractious conflicts among the seven parties in the Chamber of Deputies, Boulanger's popularity was attributed to common touch \textit{à la Napoléon} and the Russian general Skobelev.\textsuperscript{829} Hazel Hahn has commented on the fierce competition among billposters during Boulangism's heyday, while Robert Tombs and Jay Lutz have noted up to eight hundred Boulangist songs.\textsuperscript{830} As will be seen with the alliance, the latter reflected an active social practice in late nineteenth-century France, when song-writers took their lead from daily newspapers to propagate information about political events.\textsuperscript{831}

With the single exception of the Franco-Russian alliance, however, no political event generated more material ephemera than the Dreyfus affair. Ongoing fears related to national security explain why by far the greatest amount of commercial propaganda marked both of these events. The conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus for espionage in 1894, followed by the


\textsuperscript{829} Elizabeth W. Latimer, \textit{France in the Nineteenth Century, 1830-1890}, 92, 94. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14194


revelation in 1896 that despite evidence incriminating Major Ferdinand Esterhazy (the actual purveyor of French military information to Germany), the military had refused to act, led to an explosion of condemnation against the French government. This resulted in international threats to boycott the 1900 Paris exposition, which finally moved officials to offer Dreyfus a pardon, although he was not exonerated until 1906. During the era of the Dreyfus trials, handbills, illustrations, postcards, board games and women's fans depicted the incendiary national debate. Materials for children proliferated also, including comic books, paper pull-toys and kaleidoscopes sold at rural fairs.832 Political expression around issues deemed to affect national security, then, extended beyond the male voter.

Among the examples of political material culture above, two overarching themes may explain their production and consumption. The first concerns the perennial nineteenth-century debate concerning "les deux Frances": that is, whether the nation should be governed by a Republican, or by a traditional monarchical government, the latter incorporating Catholic leadership and/or a dynamic leader à la Napoléon. Symbolizing the first vision, Gambetta and Ferry inspired commercial propaganda for having championed republican values following the Franco-Prussian War; Thiers, meanwhile, represented the monarchical vision.833 The second overarching theme was the fear of a domestic or foreign threat to an uncertain Republic and to a vulnerable nation. General Boulanger, as a staunch Catholic and hero to the menu peuple


833 Léon Gambetta promoted anti-clericalism, and Jules Ferry introduced sweeping changes in education designed to remove traditional Roman Catholic influence and to introduce a Republican curriculum. Gambetta and Ferry also spearheaded the major colonial programs outlined in Chapter 5. Adolphe Thiers led the repression of the Commune uprising in 1871, before becoming the first President of the Third Republic.
disillusioned by economic downturns under the early Republic, posed a threat to the state; so
too did a Roman Catholic establishment firmly entrenched in French schools. Yet if Boulanger
and the Church represented a threat to the state, Alfred Dreyfus represented (to his legion of
accusers) a threat to the nation.

Amplifying this latter fear, material propaganda urging or celebrating an alliance with
Russia served nationalist interests in the face of a perceived ongoing German threat.
Significantly for the government’s outreach to Russia, with domestic politics fissured by
questions of identity, government and unity, foreign affairs posed an urgent but far less
polarized agenda around which widespread democratic consensus could be built, ultimately
allowing the Republic to consolidate its status on the continent and at home. Popular alliance
objects might provide a conduit for expressing this consensus.

Given the vast number of objects catalogued by Philippe Deschamps, what potential
information about popular alliance support might be extracted? What might the historian infer? A
brief excursus into the scholarship on material culture will help to set an analytic background
here. This historiography includes an early paradigm concentrating on the semiotic analysis of
objects, i.e. reading things as texts. Roland Barthes, for example, wrote of the myths and
ideologies that permeate consumer items to render them “naturalized” or “purified”, while
observing that meanings may be decoded in a specific cultural context.834 Others have gone on
to analyze “the social life of objects” in the manner of Arjun Appadurai, or following Stuart Hall,
to examine the role of objects in representing power.835 Museum studies have concentrated on

143.

835 Arjun Appadurai, ed., The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Stuart Hall, ed., Representation: Cultural
practices of collecting and display,\(^{836}\) while science and technology scholars have examined the role of objects in empires and in networks, particularly in modern knowledge-making.\(^{837}\)

Scholarship on material culture has also been strongly inflected by a focus on the moral dimensions of consumption,\(^{838}\) notably in its threat to social life and to the environment. Inspired by the Marxist idea of "use-value", studies influenced by authors including Jean Baudrillard, Henri Lefebvre and Guy Debord have concentrated on the "aesthetics of simulation" through kitsch, and on the rise of mass markets and marketing, notably enabled by advertising in creating the "spectacle" of modern life.\(^{839}\) Added to works which address globalization, studies of consumption in national contexts have focused on themes such as monarchy and empire in Great Britain or the evolution of a consumer society in France.\(^{840}\)

---


\(^{840}\) For Great Britain, see Anandi Ramamurthy, *Imperial Persuaders: Images of Africa and Asia in British Advertising* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Tori Smith, "Almost Pathetic...But
Others, however, have challenged the notion that consumers remain passive pawns, and suggest that individuals may become actively involved in the production of meanings for the objects they consume. Authors have thus moved beyond the pernicious sequelae above to consider the question of why material objects may take on importance in human life. This entails the study of phenomenology, or how individuals interpret and experience objects within their social contexts, often with reference to "lived experience". Accordingly, scholars have argued that there exists a dialectical relationship between humans and material culture. Objects are characterized as instrumental agents that "... embody complex intentionalities [i.e. experiences derived from relating to an object] and mediate social agency."
It is this notion of instrumental agency that will serve as a springboard for analyzing the potential functions and meanings of items celebrating the Franco-Russian alliance. The contention here is that exploring political material culture may provide rich insights into how the alliance was viewed and performed, based on the premise that consumers expressed themselves with, and thus conferred agency on, the ephemera described. As Liudmila Jordanova observed, in the hands of consumers objects are "in creative conversation with the contexts in which they are made and used". Ephemeral objects could function - simultaneously or not, varying by actor and subject to change - on several registers including public expression and private use.\textsuperscript{845} Publicly, as a constellation of objects amidst a network of citizens, they could serve communicative functions. They might be employed to proclaim the national self in expressive political citizenship, to enhance an emotional experience and/or social relations, and/or to serve as icons of modernity. The meanings which they could convey also include the conferring of a symbolic promise of protection and/or affirmation by a Russian "brother". While the purchase of celebratory alliance objects might proclaim a democratic consensus, within this they might further affirm the distinction of specific social groups, as with the more expensive items described. Finally, in tandem with the textual and spectacular media discussed in previous chapters, some pro-alliance ephemera could serve to rehabilitate vestigial negative stereotypes of Russia.

When considering the above, it is important to remember, as Bjørnar Olsen cautioned, that "... meanings are produced in relations" and that intertextuality is always at play;\textsuperscript{846} meanings are in flux, making them difficult to discern. Yet although some might dismiss alliance


objects as an illusory flotsam of kitsch, their political context cannot be ignored. Echoing materials produced during Boulangism and the Dreyfus affair, the sheer range of pro-alliance items attests to the importance of foreign policy initiatives in public consciousness, an inverse reflection of France’s vulnerability engendered by the 1871 defeat and by depopulation. Given the public’s apparent enthusiasm for Russia - which began building in the 1880s, as demonstrated by widespread subscription to the Russian loans and by the popular media described in Chapters 4 and 5 - the production of alliance bibelots, domestic items, toys, postcards and song sheets during the 1890s cannot merely be equated to the manipulation of consumers; rather it might be seen as a response to their self-interest.

And now a more in-depth look at the objects themselves.

6.2 Pro-alliance bibelots (souvenirs and novelties), domestic products and toys

From 1891 to 1901, i.e. the decade surrounding the establishment and subsequent elaboration of the alliance, the souvenir industry ballooned in France. During the Russian fleet visit in 1893, for example, when over fifty naval officers visited Toulon, Paris and Nancy, 200,000 spectators from other parts of France poured into the capital, spurring the business of bibelots. One observer described the russophile phenomena against which such souvenirs were sold:

People danced to the ”Russian sleigh mazurka” while on the street vendors called out to buyers, advertising ”Franco-Russian dialogues” and ”Franco-Russian vocabularies”....At the Panorama on the Rue de Berry, spectators could view a panorama of the Tsar’s coronation. The Châtelet organized a Russian festival with orchestra and choirs... [featuring the music of] Rubinstein, Tchaikovsky, Glinka, etc.... [and] a French and Russian concert, with a grand procession of Russian naval personnel.848

848 François Bournand, Le Livre d’or franco-russe (Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1894), 369-370.
How might pro-alliance ephemera be employed to convey messages to and among consumers? Material representations of Russia and the alliance could serve, to borrow a phrase from Luce Giard, as "consumable fictions"; expressed in the idiom of the familiar and the everyday and grounded in resonant themes and images discussed below. As noted, while pro-alliance objects differed from the majority of the previous textual media in significant ways, they were distinguished by their potential for emotional expression and by a nationalist ethos. These latter characteristics also emerged during performances of popular pro-Russia theatrical productions such as *Michel Strogoff*.

Within the panoply catalogued by Deschamps, the themes of military might (wherein "l'union fait la force") and nationalism were at times counterbalanced by that of fraternal regard in a Franco-Russian "twinning" for peace. Reassuring military images abounded, often featuring colorful regimental army uniforms and handshakes between French and Russian soldiers. Such imagery might also burnish the image of the French army in the aftermaths of the 1871 defeat and of Boulangism, signaling their preparedness for war while emphasizing that the alliance had been drafted by military leaders rather than diplomats. The most abundant symbols were the national flags, integral to the "ritual complex" encouraging nationalist cohesion in nineteenth-century Europe. That Russia's flag is also a *tricolore* - with horizontal bands of white, blue and red contrasted to the French vertical bands of blue, white and red - lent to their symmetrical arrangement. Whether on posters, plates or package labels, flags appeared in mirror fashion flanking images of the army and navy, or the President and the Tsar.

---


Beyond imagery related to nationalism, military might and fraternal regard, celebrity profiling of the Tsar and his family remained a constant, along with depictions of Russian "types" including Cossacks and peasants, whose popularity in French imaginings was discussed in Chapter 5. In terms of design, this iconography frequently took on a vaguely Russian style.\textsuperscript{851} Advertising motifs might also suggest virtual tourism by featuring Russian architectural landmarks, among them the Kremlin and the imperial palaces, all aimed at "... reducing the distance between nations by means of simple and strong colored imagery".\textsuperscript{852}

One telling example illustrating the theme of peace all along with those of military might, nationalism, peace and fraternal regard, was an 1893/94 cheese label from the company Pavé Sigaut. This depicted a color cameo of Alexander III surrounded by a half circle of Russian imperial and national flags, with a caption reading "For world peace - God keep him well", and accompanied by references to Cronstadt and Toulon.\textsuperscript{853} Here the Tsar was portrayed not just as the benefactor of France, but of the world; ultimately the invocation referencing his health would be dashed by his death in 1894.

Underscoring the hope engendered by the emerging alliance agreement in 1893, contemporary accounts described a plethora of "Franco-Russian" sartorial and personal items sold by itinerant vendors during the Russian naval visit to France. Such accessories no doubt contributed to what Stephen Greenblatt has termed, when referring to theatrical productions, "the circulation of social energy".\textsuperscript{854} Personal ephemera signaling alliance affirmation ranged

\textsuperscript{851} Khmelnitskaya et Zeisler, "L'Industrie du souvenir", 58.
\textsuperscript{853} See the image at "Pavé Sigaut: Alexandre III", www.delcampe.net.
from lapel pins, armbands, neckties, cuff-buttons, collars, handkerchiefs, ribbons and rosettes and fans, to change purses, cigarette holders and pipes. Novelty items included a "Franco-Russian umbrella" and even a "trombinoscope marin" (apparently a type of periscope for viewing over crowds); enthusiasts could also purchase lanterns or posters featuring Russian peasants or moujiks. Contemporary observer John Grand-Carteret noted the popularity of a poster entitled "Tout le monde mâtelot" ("Everyone is a sailor"), which depicted a Russian sailor with a cutout for the purchaser's face, emblematic of the "national intoxication" sweeping France. He went on to recount Parisian enthusiasm:

In bookstores and music shops, in jewelers' windows and in candy stores, on the walls of photography studios, everything is à la russe: perfume, clothing, and lighting.... in the kiosks on the boulevards [there are] caricatures and illustrated placards.... posters of the Russian fleet [appear] at the Musée Grévin...

An even greater volume of ephemera circulated during the visit by Nicholas II to Paris in 1896. This was matched in scale by the official preparations for the imperial couple's three-day stay in Paris - funded by a combination of state, municipality, businesses and comités patriotiques - which cost more than any ever mounted in France, previously or since. Up to a


857 Costs for the 1896 celebrations were almost 1.5 million francs; security costs were more than double this. The municipality also granted a subsidy of 100,000 francs to encourage celebrations in every arrondissement while allocating 200,000 francs for poor relief, likely to reduce chances of any agitation. Mathieu Marmouget, "La visite du Tsar Nicolas II à Paris, 5-9 octobre, 1896", Mémoire de Maitrise (Paris: Université X Nanterre, 1997), 97-101. Costs for the 1893 visit, by contrast, were funded less by the state and more by municipalities, businesses and patriotic groups. http://marmouget.free.fr/ressources/marmouget_maitrise.pdf. On similarities to traditional processional spectacles, see Matthew Truesdell, Spectacular Politics: Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte and the Fête Impériale, 1849-1870 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 142; Stéphane Gerson, "Town, Nation
million visitors poured into the city on special trains, witnesses to a spectacle involving a massive police presence and participation by colonial chefs-arabes, emphasizing France's civil security and imperial interests. All efforts were employed to ensure security: electricity was installed for the arrival of the Tsar's carriage at a banquet at the Hôtel de Ville, as surrounding bridges and roads were illuminated and the monument itself was framed by a "un grand soleil de lumière" ("a burst of sun"). This reflected security concerns stemming from the 1894 anarchist assassination of President Sadi Carnot, the recent Khodynka field stampede in Russia, and the 1867 assassination attempt against Tsar Alexander II on French soil.

The urban spectacle of the 1896 visit created an ideal environment for the consumption of ephemera to demonstrate "patriotic piety". Indeed, Le Petit Parisien observed that no such range of political products had appeared since the Revolution, and voluminous contemporary accounts document the abundance of souvenirs. Their thematic variety entailed more personalized options than those of 1893, including items to distinguish the consumer's social standing. Attesting to the popularization of science, products included a kaleidoscope, a "Franco-Russian thermometer", and an item listed mysteriously as a "kinéphysiographe, Le


859 The May, 1896 coronation of Nicholas II was held the Khodynka field near Moscow; a stampede there killed over one thousand people. In 1867 Alexander II was in Paris to attend the exposition; he was attacked by a Polish émigré as he was returning from a military review in the Bois de Boulogne. Liudmila Védénina, La France et la Russie: Dialogue de deux cultures (Moscow: InterDialect, 2003), 93.

Word of the bibelots appeared even in England, with the London Times describing plaster busts of Nicholas II, lanterns with images of the imperial couple and of President Félix Faure, plus tambourines and Russian dolls. Large department stores such as the Magasins du Bon Marché also participated by distributing pro-alliance trade cards and images across the country, as well as handkerchiefs featuring portraits of the imperial couple and other Russian motifs. Publishing millions of cards, photographs, and curios annually, department stores were particularly well placed to capitalize on the visit. Some encouraged sartorial nationalism by offering suspenders "richly decorated in yellow silk with embroidered black eagles" (modeled on the Russian imperial flag), and "Franco-Russian corsets" boasting a "constellation of miniature [French and Russian] flags". These items suggest the bodily integration of the alliance among a particular class, the bourgeois consumer.

To distinguish themselves from the bourgeois, wealthier buyers could purchase alliance music boxes, figurines, statues, medals and coffee tables inset with special board games. Social distancing, then, could extend to material culture as it had with elite options in the textual and entertainment realms. Aristocratic patrons might flutter silk fans painted with alliance

---


865 Photographs of many of these items may be found in the catalogue for a 2010 Paris exhibit on alliance naval diplomacy: *Neptunia, cadeaux des Tsars: la diplomatie navale dans l'Alliance franco-russe, 1891-1914* (Paris: Musée national de la Marine, 2010). My thanks to Stephen Hay for kindly acquiring a copy of this for me.
images while attending Parisian performances of Russian music, or admire a miniature theater of nougat and sugar depicting a greeting between the French and Russian fleet admirals displayed in a Choiseul passage store. Creativity abounded: lampshades displayed Russian themes, and apples in select restaurants featured cutouts of imperial Russian eagles. Restaurants featuring Russian cuisine, along with emporia selling luxury goods including *Aux grands marchés de Russie, le Magasin russe* and *Au Prophète russe*, also catered to the wealthy. Meanwhile in Nivelles, customers were urged to buy shoes "à l'alliance"; elsewhere advertisements promoted lifestyle options such as a Franco-Russian countryside hotel.

On the domestic front, soaps, perfumes, and cosmetics featured motifs such as the Russian myosotis (a flower of remembrance) and the family of the Tsar. With over fifty registered trademarks in this category, manufacture oriented towards women exemplified a hallmark of *fin-de-siècle* marketing, that of linking gendered consumer goods with political events. As wives or mothers of soldiers, this might hold particular relevance for female consumers. While the city of Lyon offered 2,500 silk scarves imprinted with a Cyrillic greeting to

---


869 "Chaussez-vous à l'alliance" (advertising poster, Maison A. Carliers). http://gallica.bnf.fr; The hotel in question was the Villa franco-russe des lilas, in Nabinaud par Aubeterre; see a postcard at www.delcampe.net. Le Guévellou, "Blogspot. Franco-russe".

870 Deschamps, *Souvenirs patriotiques*, 24-26. For the 1891 Moscow industrial exposition, for example, the French perfume firm of Pinaud produced a special brand called the "Bouquet du pavillon impérial de l'exposition de Moscou". Davydov et al, *Paris-Moscou*, 52-53, 91.
the Russian fleet in 1893,\textsuperscript{871} no doubt reflecting its long-standing textile manufacturing ties with Russia, French scarves marked the alliance signing in 1894 and Nicholas II's coronation in 1895. Calendars and writing paper could also be purchased, while onlookers could toss "Confettis russes" during official events.\textsuperscript{872}

Upon comparing contemporary sources, it appears that although the 1893 and 1896 Russian visits generated similar types of \textit{bibelots}, the latter generated more domestic items such as plates, figurines, glasses and carafes,\textsuperscript{873} plus card and board games. These and other items including foodstuffs signaled an expanding consumer culture and the politicization of domestic spaces. The first foreign personalities to appear on French "political plates" were Russian; portraits of the Tsarina Alexandra were the most popular, a gendered image of a foreign figure unusual at the time.\textsuperscript{874} Comically (perhaps subversively?), among the figurines was a ceramic bust of Marianne, the Republican symbol of France, sporting a Russian bearskin headpiece in lieu of her traditional Phrygian bonnet.\textsuperscript{875} Meanwhile, contributing to sociability in homes or cafés, political card games and \textit{jeux de l'oie}, or board games, marked the event, and could be played once or many times. Cards depicting Russian soldiers, as well as the games entitled "L'alliance franco-russe" (sold by the newspapers \textit{Le Petit Journal} and \textit{Le Journal}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{871} Deschamps, \textit{Souvenirs patriotiques}, 32.
\textsuperscript{872} Mollier, \textit{Le camelot et la rue}, 176; Deschamps, \textit{Souvenirs patriotiques}, 22, 21, 15; Grand-Carteret, \textit{Musée pittoresque}, 143-151.
\textsuperscript{873} For photographs of these, see Khmelnitskaya et Zeisler, \textit{Chronique céramique de l'Alliance franco-russe}.
\textsuperscript{875} See the figurine at http://www.ivoire-France.com/detail_ventephp?id=13114+ page=8.
\end{footnotesize}
"Jeu de l'Alliance franco-russe: La Duplice contre la Triplice", and "Jeu de l'Oie: La France et la Russie, 1898", celebrated bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{876}

Utilitarian household products further demonstrated advertisers' attempts to exploit alliance enthusiasm; their very ubiquity suggests brisk competition and sales. One study has identified six hundred and thirty-two registered French trademarks incorporating references to or images of Russia between 1858 and 1894 (the vast majority after 1871), with another noting approximately three hundred between 1891 and 1897,\textsuperscript{877} the key alliance years. Products ranged from "La Russeline", a special bicycle oil, to "La Moscovite", a fabric bleach symbolized by a white-aproned Russian peasant girl. As mentioned, trademark imagery frequently implied virtual tourism, a metaphorical means of reducing both physical and political distance.

Some food products attempted to twin the alliance with pleasurable sustenance, including a "Camembert national" featuring French and Russian flags. References to Michel Strogoff also appeared; for example, the Compagnie française des Cafés et Thés decorated their beverage tins with Strogoff scenes.\textsuperscript{878} Other branded products included champagne, anisette and soda, plus food items ranging from mustard to chocolate.\textsuperscript{879} One rare photograph


\textsuperscript{877} Trademarks were required to be registered at this time, a practice which is helpful to researchers. For some examples see Nanci Christine Brookes, "Translating Russia for the French Imagination, 1856-1894", PhD dissertation (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University, 2004), 150-203; Deschamps, Souvenirs patriotes, 38.


\textsuperscript{879} Davydov et al, Paris-Moscou, 91-103.
depicts an itinerant Parisian merchant selling "Franco-Russian buns".880 Alliance marketing extended well beyond Paris: in Chartres, for example, consumers could purchase a bonbon called "Le Mentchikoff", named for a seventeenth-century Russian prince who had directed the building of St. Petersburg.881 Meanwhile images of that city adorned tins for the biscuit called "Néva: biscuit russe", created in Nantes after the Cronstadt visit; one of these depicted a young Russian woman skating on the Neva River, carrying a flag ornamented with the biscuit whose shape replicated that of the fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul.882 That this biscuit first appeared in 1892 suggests manufacturer lobbying for the alliance even as its secret terms were being negotiated.

Intriguingly for targeting the self, manufacturers of several pharmaceutical products attempted to equate the alliance with personal health, including the "Elixir franco-russe, tonique et stimulant" trumpeting its brand name "AMI" ("FRIEND").883 Advertisements for "Pilules Pink pour personnes pâles" featured heart-shaped portraits of the sovereigns, solemnly promising that the pills would energize consumers to fully participate in the 1896 visit.884 Not to be outdone, one manufacturer later papered buildings in Paris with posters advertising "l'aliment complet Groult"; this food product, it claimed, would eliminate any tendency to war in

880 Le Guévellou, "Blogspot. Franco-russe: Résultats d'une rencontre".


883 "Pub AMI, Élixir franco-russe". The elixir was produced in Clermont-Ferrand by the company F. Genestine. http://Secure.delcampe.net

accordance with "the peaceful words of Nicholas II" if consumed on a daily basis. Nicholas, it was widely hoped, would continue in the footsteps of his father, latterly known in France as the "Tsar pacificateur". That the young Tsar proposed the first international peace conference held at the Hague in 1899 served as a backdrop for the Grout producers' claims.

Beyond these souvenirs, novelties and domestic products, one arrives at a category of consumption aimed at future voters: that of toys. The emergence of mass consumerism across Europe played a role here, but the influence of the Republic's pioneering educational strategies and of a pro-natalist agenda are also evident, both responding to national security concerns. Rather than a so-called Belle Époque, this was an era when French boys learned their alphabet with military A-B-C books, while their sisters learned to be (cannon-fodder) mothers with dolls. As Roland Barthes observed:

...the French toy always signifies something, and that something is always entirely socialized, constituted by the myths or techniques of modern adult life: the Army [etc.]...The toy here delivers the catalogue of everything the grown-up does not find surprising: [such as] war...

Bryan Ganaway’s thoughtful study of toys in imperial Germany has fore-grounded how such toys might be linked to nationalism, outlining how middle-class consumers could insert themselves into a political project by purchasing military toys associated with a German ethos of superiority. These "...help us locate the moment in Europe when modern consumer culture,


independent of the state, came to be associated... with a nationalist project. Similarly, pro-alliance toys in France could serve to affirm the nation's strength in its alliance with Russia.

These toys frequently showcased adult themes ranging from bilateral amitié to celebrity figures and national and imperial might. In 1896, one articulating cut-out toy re-enacted a handshake between Nicholas II and President Faure, while another suggested imaginary tourism via a paper façade of Moscow's Kremlin gate. The Tsar remained a popular subject, appearing as a rolling toy, as a "pocket cinematograph" with his hat doffed "to salute the population", as a puppet, or as a doll costumed in the Preobrajensky guard uniform or in the imperial robes. Other figures appeared as dolls, including one of the Tsar's first child Olga with her nurse, and some representing ethnic groups from the Russian empire, who along with soldiers also appeared as figurines or puppets. These competed with more singular toys, among them a mysterious "surprise franco-russe" and a stuffed Siberian bear bearing the greeting Moi aussi, vive la France!

Demonstrating the continued attempts to associate children with the alliance, manufacturers marked the Tsar's 1901 visit to Compiègne:

No sooner had the imperial sovereigns departed than Parisian manufacturers began to prepare a quantity of toys celebrating their visit....The costumes of the officers from the Tsar's entourage served as models for miniature toy soldiers made of rubber, dolls were dressed as the Tsarina's dames de la cour, and all the events of the visit were represented: the imperial train, the arrival at Compiègne, the Château, the city complete with several arcs de triomphe under which Lilliputian carriages passed, escorted by mounted troops; Reims with its great streets and its cathedral, and finally Bétheny [site of the military review], with its...soldiers of every type; boxes of toys both small and

---

891 Deschamps, *Souvenirs patriotiques*, 38, 12, 37, 39, 36.
medium-size were created, as well as square panoramas measuring more than three meters around. A rubber doll depicting the Tsar in a Preobrajensky uniform enjoyed particular success due to its moderate price (one franc, 25 centimes). 892

Again, this illustrates the determination of producers to capitalize on popular alliance enthusiasm, and of consumers to impress its significance on future voters at home.

6.3 Pro-alliance communicative items: postcards and song sheets

Numerous small printers also participated in the manufacture of alliance postcards and song sheets, whose communicative functions set them apart from the materials above. Such objects enabled "social agency", or social exchange, 893 in a manner both unique and direct. With respect to postcards, Naomi Schor has noted that it is often impossible to trace their multiple firms and production runs; according to Saloni Mathur, postcards were "elusive, sketchy, historically scattered…. mass-produced across multiple sites,…and anonymously executed." 894 Although the former might be true of song sheets as well, generally their composers, authors and publishers may be identified. Yet production and consumption figures for these communicative media remain unclear, apart from the general statistics noted below.

Pro-alliance postcards were ubiquitous, either sent via mail or enshrined in personal collections. Serving the consumer culture engendered by expositions, this means of communication had quickly become popular across Europe. In France, postcards might be employed to send a celebratory message after witnessing an official alliance event, and they might further serve as icons of modernity, made possible by the new technologies of mechanical

892 Daragon et Demanne, Le Président Loubet en Russie, 120-121.
893 Janet Hoskins, "Agency, Biography and Objects", 75; Olsen, "Scenes from a Troubled Engagement", 87, 98; Christopher Tilley, "Objectification" 61; Daniel Miller, "Consumption" in Handbook of Material Culture, 349.
reproduction. Modern virtual tourism was patently at play: lending substance to a distant alliance partner, postcards could imply "imaginative mobilities" to connect individuals over distance, or to connect core and periphery, as well as to relate time and space.895

Demonstrating a nationalist potential, the first French postcard was a military one, produced in 1870 to allow soldiers to send messages home; during the 1880s illustrations were added, and by 1889 eight million cards were produced per year.896 As Gérard Silvain and JoëI Kotek have noted concerning the Dreyfus affair, postcards became important for framing public opinion in provincial venues,897 echoing the themes and reach of the national illustrated press. Thus they could help to disseminate and to reflect alliance support, enabling the circulation of citizen affirmation in both city and countryside; in the latter, colporteurs and hundreds of bibliothèques de gare assured their distribution.898

The postcard industry actively promoted the alliance by documenting the official Russian visits and the accompanying French military maneuvers of 1893, 1896 and 1901. Pedagogy and commodity thus became intertwined.899 Generic illustrations from the 1893 cards commonly included Russian and French leaders, the national flags and symbols of peace.900 More specific


897 Silvain et Kotek, La carte postale anti-Sémite,19, 35.

898 Jean-Yves Mollier noted that 1,179 bibliothèques de gare (railway bookstores) operated across the country in 1896. Mollier, "Le parfum de la Belle Époque", 109.

899 Gerson, "Town, Nation or Humanity?", 650.

900 Specialty cards for aristocratic purchasers included hand-colored illustrations, with one boasting "a diamond-like powder" to give a mirrored effect.
images documented the Tsar’s 1896 visit, including those of the imperial cortège, of army troops and colonial chefs-arabes, of the Châlons military review, and of the excursion to Versailles.901 These associations with the army and with France’s monarchical past could resonate with many. When Nicholas II returned in 1901 to attend the Compiègne military review, over two hundred different postcards focused on the fait accompli of bilateral military might. Normalizing the preparedness for war, military themes now represented a distinct postcard subset when depicting infantry, cavalry, cyclists and weapons. Thus the 1901 postcards included a series of fifty photographs of Russian regiments, while another forty-six (described as "the most beautiful collection of postcards thus far about a political subject") highlighted the military review itself. Interestingly, several postcards celebrating the Compiègne visit also referred to the Boer War; in one of these President Kruger of South Africa implored Nicholas II to call for peace as he had done for the Hague conference,902 thereby cross-linking the Franco-Russian alliance with opposition to Britain, a mutual imperial enemy at the time.

A further significant category of pro-alliance communicative materials was that of music and song sheets, testifying to the popular fin-de-siècle practices of oral and aural community. Among all the media considered here, the affective opportunities afforded by song were perhaps the most powerful of all. In France, thousands of songs were composed each year; whether sold in music shops and bookstores, or by newspapers and itinerant vendors,

---

901 Deschamps, Souvenirs patriotiques, 20. For a general discussion of the role of postcards in promoting the alliance, see Catherine Hamel, "La commémoration de l’Alliance franco-russe: La création d’une culture matérielle populaire", Mémoire de maîtrise (Montréal: Université Concordia, 2016).

ubiquitous song sheets reflected the proliferation of steam printing grafted on to French musical tradition. Reflecting this, numerous hawkers worked on city streets in the 1890s, selling song sheets along with newspapers, souvenirs and toys, all part of that which Jean-Yves Mollier has called a "librairie du trottoir", or sidewalk library. Sidewalk culture is recorded in photographs of vendors at kiosks, beside carts, or spreading blankets to demonstrate their wares. Selling to café patrons and to pedestrians, camelots in Paris frequently assembled in groups of two or three, singing and playing music to attract customers, among them workers and seamstresses who purchased lyrics to sing at work. One contributing factor here may have been the 1889 Republican law forbidding newspaper sellers to call out the news, obliging them to sing about important events instead.

Frequently overlooked today, music and participatory song featured prominently in public celebrations, establishing a repetitive cultural touchstone for key political events. Political song might function to engage and to divert, at times testifying to a history of social unrest in France or to an ethos of utopian republicanism, or, as with the alliance, to nationalist celebration. Michel de Certeau and Luce Giard have noted that "orality constitutes the essential

903 Kalifa, La culture de masse, 11, 29, 31; Mollier, Le camelot et la rue, 175, 154; Mollier, "Le parfum de la Belle Époque", 114.


905 Hahn, Scenes of Parisian Modernity, 139.

906 Early modern historians have investigated the "forgotten sound" of bell ringers, bagpipe players, etc. See Hamling and Richardson, eds., Everyday Objects: Medieval and Early Modern Material Culture and its Meanings.

space of community”, and song played a key role in rallying citizens to patriotic purpose. Traditions of popular mobilization and an emphasis on literary modes made this particularly true in France. Translation difficulties and a lack of auditory evidence unfortunately stifle appreciation for the rhythmic and repetitive appeal of song, as well as its ability to harness collective power when sung by large crowds, often on paramilitary occasions. As Jann Pasler argued, fin-de-siècle music served to embody feeling, which was very different from knowing. Serving as a conduit for emotional testimony, song highlighted the drama of political events, placing individuals in history while contributing to sociability, memory and national aspiration. Conjuring conviction while animating hope, the act of singing could breathe life into a reality perceived, as in the belief in a Russian amitié and protection for France.

Song writing to recognize political events in France was a long-standing tradition. Testifying to an overall density of compositions concerning foreign affairs, over one thousand pro- and anti-colonialism songs were published between 1830 and 2000. Multiple songs addressed domestic political issues as well, among them the Communard uprising, revanche, and questions concerning government after the 1871 defeat; the latter engendered both pro-Republican compositions and those which attacked parliamentarianism and ministerial instability. Major crises further absorbed songwriters during the late 1880s and 1890s, including


909 Deniot, "Chanson française, aventure et identité", 2, 7, 10.

910 An interesting discussion of the role of song and music in Belgian masculinity and nationalism may be found in Josephine Hoegaerts, Masculinity and Nationhood, 1830-1910: Constructions of Identity and Citizenship in Belgium (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

911 Pasler, Composing the Citizen, 105, 478-479, xi, xiv.

Boulangism, the Panama Canal scandal, anarchist attacks, the assassination of President Carnot, and the Dreyfus affair.913

Song-writers themselves took their lead from daily newspapers in propagating information about political events; this was not new, as demonstrated by studies of eighteenth-century political life.914 Yet songs as a democratized form of information *cum* entertainment mushroomed particularly after an 1867 law which ended a theater monopoly over providing shows.915 Although lyrics remained subject to censors' review, after 1879 the Republican regime proved much less repressive than its predecessor, the so-called Moral Order government.916 Café-concerts thus became a popular venue for musical culture where theaters didn't exist (or where they were experiencing difficulty), the more so following an 1880 law permitting freedom of café operation and expression.917 By 1900 approximately three hundred café-concerts existed


916 Composers were required to register their works with the Dépôt légal, while songs required authorization from the Sûreté générale pour l’Imprimerie et la Librairie, under the control of the Minister of the Interior. Simone Wallon, "L’Alliance franco-russe dans la chanson française de 1890 à 1901", *Fontes Artis Musicæ* 13:1 (janvier-avril, 1966), 126; Liauzu and Liauzu, *Quand on chantait les colonies*, 478-479.

in Paris alone, and their most popular songs could sell 100,000 to 300,000 copies.\textsuperscript{918} Their musical programs were frequently designed to express nationalist patriotism,\textsuperscript{919} lending them to pro-alliance expression.

As a variant of material culture that might be employed to "...'gather' relations",\textsuperscript{920} the hundreds of song sheets discussed below could give voice to alliance affirmation. Repetitive refrains reinforced pro-alliance themes - some shared with the material items previously discussed, and others new - while lyrics composed to pre-existing music facilitated memorization.\textsuperscript{921} Singing might provide reassurance in the face of vulnerability, and enable political sociability through interaction with others. Pro-alliance songs might be sung in domestic settings, at work to pass the time, or in large crowds during the Russian visits. Again, the personal could become conflated with the social and national self.

Importantly, pro-alliance compositions could be turned to nationalist purpose, bridging mass culture and mass politics to contribute to the aforementioned "ritual complex" by shaping political awareness, citizen expression and rallying to a cause.\textsuperscript{922} The ubiquity of percussive marching music was significant here, speaking to a particularly animated participation. Alliance marches might be musical only, or they might be "aural palimpsests", as with "La Marche

\textsuperscript{918} Mollier, "Le parfum de la Belle Époque", 98; Kalifa, \textit{La culture de masse}, 43; Pasler, \textit{Composing the Citizen}, 480.


\textsuperscript{920} Christopher Witmore, "AHR Conversation", 1360; Darnton, \textit{Poetry and the Police}, 145.

\textsuperscript{921} Darnton, \textit{Poetry and the Police}, 4, 94.

\textsuperscript{922} Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., \textit{The Invention of Tradition}, 6, 9; Pasler, \textit{Composing the Citizen}, 478.
franco-russe” sung to the pre-existing music of "La Marche des commis-voyageurs". Compellingly, music and song could further serve to bolster a French self-image after the humiliation by Prussia; equally they could emphasize the shift away from pre-existing negative attitudes towards Russia. As noted, music might also provide a conduit for national anxiety, as in the song sheets published in reaction to the death of Alexander III.

What of the producers of alliance song sheets? These media proliferated after the 1891 French naval visit to Cronstadt, and all evidence points to their substantial popularity. Examination reveals that some of the 1893 compositions were penned in large cities such as Paris, Marseille, Lyon and Lille, and in small towns in Picardie and Normandie. While both well-known writers and ordinary citizens composed songs, at times borrowing music from existing popular compositions to create so-called chansons de circonstance, numerous small editors published music for public consumption. Multiple ateliers became involved, with up to fifteen hundred printers of song sheets, pamphlets and cartoons in Paris alone, continuing a tradition from the French Revolution. Song sheets whose dimensions corresponded to double pages of regular newspapers might contain the lyrics of twenty songs; these were sold along with individual petit format sheets, common for breaking news events. Their lyrics could be


924 Jean-Yves Mollier noted a similar distribution of large cities for songs about other topics. Mollier, Le camelot et la rue, 176.

925 As examples of pro-alliance songs penned by individuals, see "Sérénade" (1896) by Marie Painot, a song dedicated to “Léon Painot, brigadier, secrétaire, 5e Hussards” [her father?], and C. Labernadière, "À la gloire des armées française et russe". The latter author invited colporteurs to apply directly to him to purchase copies. Bibliothèque Nationale de France, folio 4-WZ-9624; C. Marcel Robillard, "Les chansons illustrées d’actualité", Le Courrier graphique 98 (février-avril 1958): 16.

926 Gildea, Children of the Revolution, 405.

927 Robillard, "Les chansons illustrées d’actualité", 16-17.
offered in arrangements for instrumental accompaniment, including piano, guitar, orchestra and military bands.\textsuperscript{928} Performance could thus range from smaller, more intimate settings such as the home, to the official events at which choral societies performed.

Of the approximately two hundred and fifty pro-alliance songs and musical compositions published between 1891 and 1901 considered for this dissertation, half were \textit{café-concert} compositions, performed at twenty-three different venues in Paris, often by famous interpreters.\textsuperscript{929} Some of these venues are immortalized in paintings by the Impressionist school. The Montmartre cabaret Le Chat Noir, for example, showcased an entire musical program featuring pro-Russian themes.\textsuperscript{930} Military images featured prominently on seventy-five percent of the illustrated song sheets surveyed; as Jean-Yves Mollier has noted, allegorical cover illustrations became popular among consumers who preferred minimal text in their news cycle.\textsuperscript{931} Authors sometimes dedicated their songs to the Tsar or to the President, or to prominent military and naval figures. Combined French and Russian military power dominated the lyrics, along with the characterization of Russia as brother - no longer an enemy "other" - of

\textsuperscript{928} One example is "Slaves et Francs: Marche triomphale franco-russe", whose price ranged from two to five francs for piano, military and orchestral versions. This composition was dedicated to the French fleet which visited Cronstadt in 1891. http://gallica.bnf.fr. Mollier, "Le parfum de la Belle Époque", 111.

\textsuperscript{929} These songs and musical compositions were drawn from four principal sources: a list of seventy song titles from the 1897 catalogue by Deschamps, an annotated bibliography of one hundred and eighty songs found at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, a further fifteen musical scores digitized by the Bibliothèque Nationale, and approximately thirty songs documented in a Russian study. Some overlap appears among these sources. Philippe Deschamps, "Chansons patriotiques, chantées dans les café-concerts de Paris", \textit{Catalogue officiel de la collection franco-russe}, 18-19; Wallon, "L'Alliance franco-russe dans la chanson française de 1890 à 1901"; Irina S. Rybatchenok, \textit{Rossiia i Frantsiia: soiuz serdets, 1891-1897} (Moscow: Rosspen, 2004). Regrettably, time constraints did not allow for examination of any anti-alliance songs which might be held in the archives of the Paris Préfecture de Police. As an example, satirical songs aimed at President Faure were forbidden by censors during the Tsar's 1896 visit. Guillery, "Les 'trois glorieuses'", \textit{Le Grelot} (1 novembre 1896), 2; Wallon, "L'Alliance franco-russe dans la chanson française", 127-130.

\textsuperscript{930} Deschamps, \textit{Souvenirs patriotiques}, 22.

\textsuperscript{931} Mollier, "Le parfum de la Belle Époque", 111.
France. Overall, as outlined below, emotional expression concerning military strength, great power rivalry, revanche, fraternal nationalism, imperialism, peace and familial rapprochement prevailed.

The first pro-alliance songs emerged in 1891, just as secret negotiations began between the Army chiefs of staff. Emphasizing bilateral military strength, these compositions included "À la gloire des armées française et russe" and "Marche des Cosaques", the latter referencing the myth of the Cossack soldier described in Chapter 5. Military aspirations could be linked with international expositions here, the fruit of elite business groups working to improve trade with Russia. Thus another chanson-marche, "À Moscou", featured an image of a French and a Russian soldier shaking hands in front of the main pavilion at the 1891 Moscow exposition.932

Referencing the themes of great power rivalry and revanche, the year 1893, which marked the visit of Russian fleet vessels to France, saw the largest number of triumphant pro-alliance compositions. Two songs featured on a colportage song sheet, "Salut aux marins russes" and "La marche franco-russe", declared that Russian power would make for an indomitable France. The first was performed by Jules Jouy, a noted Montmartre cabaret singer, who mocked the Triple Alliance enemies of France:

To the Prussian Ogre who parades in Alsace,
To the Italian Prince who follows and embraces him,
The Tsar has said "I am going - to punish this audacity -
To choose my place also, it's on the soil of France!"....
Russia and France have cemented their terrible alliance in front of the entire world.
Already, without doubt, in their hearts
our united peoples had barred the route to the three enemies.
What will they say now, the Italian, the Austrian, the German?....
The Tsar gave his hand to France,

932 As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the business groups involved in bringing French exhibits to this exposition was Les Amis de la Russie, whose members included Juliette Adam and Philippe Deschamps. The Cossack march was reproduced in a book describing the French pavilions. "Marche des Cosaques" in Léon Plarr, La France à Moscou, Exposition de 1891 (Paris: De Soye et fils, 1891), 76; "À Moscou", http://gallica.bnf.fr.
For the great day that lies ahead,
When Italians, Austrians and Germans will fall bloodied....
France has re-taken her rank in the universe! 933

Another popular song entitled "Nitchévo" or "Salut à la Russie" (first written for a visit by Russian frigates to Brest in 1891), added the poetry of revanchiste Paul Déroulède for a revised composition performed at La Scala in 1893.934

Subsequent songs fêted Nicholas II's visit to France in 1896, including the "Chant militaire franco-russe" and "Le Triomphe de la Paix". The latter combined the goal of peace with revanche by exulting that (original emphasis):

...[it is] a new dawn, for the Tsar brings the benefits of peace to France ....
On this vibrant day of celebration, we are marching to conquest.
Oh! oh! Let us join our two flags from Cronstadt and Toulon....(refrain:)
In this Holy Alliance, Oh Russia, Oh noble France,
Let us unite our willingness and keep our great hope!
For the Tsar and Tsarina have sounded the divine hour
when the dream will end in Peace....
The union will never perish, It will grow,
And it will return to us sometime soon, Alsace and Lorraine.
Our dream will be realized, without weakening,
to abolish the tyrannical and heavy chain...935

A further occasion to emphasize revanche occurred during the 1896 visit, when choral societies with hundreds of performers sang outside the Hôtel de Ville banquet; pointedly among them was the Union chorale des Alsaciens-Lorrains.936

Beyond military might, great power rivalry and revanche, themes of fraternal nationalism and gendered support also came into play. One enthusiastic writer penned "La Marseillaise

934 Pasler, Composing the Citizen, 666; "Nitchévo" or "Salut à la Russie", in Rybatchenov, Rossiia i Frantsiya, 74.
935 Léo Lelievre et Émile Spencer, "Le Triomphe de la Paix, ou la visite du Tsar", http://forum.alexanderpalace.org
936 Davydov et al, Paris-Moscou, un siècle d'échanges, 181.
franco-russe” in 1893, a tribute to Alexander III’s decision to allow the \textit{Marseillaise} to be played for the first time in Russia at the Cronstadt reception in 1891; the Tsar had removed his hat for this, a matter reported across Europe. The iconic \textit{Marseillaise} inspired several new \textit{chansons de circonstance}; one author changed the famous refrain to read: "Come, children of the Homeland, See the Russians who have arrived! ... All together, citizens, let us run ahead of them [let us run, let us run] and let us launch to the heavens our joyous cries."\textsuperscript{937} Gendered songs, meanwhile, included one describing a message from the Tsarina expressing her hopes for an alliance, sent via pigeon to France (this missive reached the President, despite its carrier being shot down by a Prussian), and another of a Cossack mother who sent her son to defend France, which she described as "sometimes a rival, but never an enemy".\textsuperscript{938} This example of "matriotic"\textsuperscript{939} virtue can be linked to appeals to address the depopulation crisis in France.

Translated Russian songs, meanwhile, further highlighted the themes of nationalism and imperialism. In 1893 \textit{Le Figaro} devoted a full page to Glinka’s "La Vie pour le Tsar", the second most popular song in Russia and now a staple on the French stage; meanwhile the Russian national anthem was widely reproduced.\textsuperscript{940} This hymn, entitled \textit{Bojé Tsara Krani}, was sung in both languages not just during official visits, but also during theatrical productions and civic ceremonies across France throughout the alliance decade. Its translated refrain reads:

\begin{quote}
God save the Emperor,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{937} "Allons, enfants de la Patrie, Voici les Russes arrivés!...En masse, citoyens, courrons au-devant d’eux, Courrons, courrons et vers le ciel poussons des cris joyeux.” Bournand, \textit{Livre d’or franco-russe}, 237-238.

\textsuperscript{938} Bournand, \textit{Livre d’or franco-russe}, 239-240.


\textsuperscript{940} "La Vie pour le Tsar", \textit{Le Figaro} (18 octobre 1893), 8. http://gallica.bnf.fr. For the Russian national anthem lyrics see the song sheet "L’Alliance franco-russe, Cronstadt 1891-Toulon 1893.” http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38935351k
Bless his name and extend his power and grandeur.
Oh Tsar, remain victorious over infidels,
God save the Emperor.

As noted in Chapter 5, this theme of imperial power echoed in other popular media as well, a message welcomed by the colonial lobby in France.

Added to celebratory motifs of military might, great power rivalry, revanche, nationalism and imperialism, a dozen song sheets emphasized the theme of peace upon the unexpected death of Alexander III in 1894. One of these, entitled "Adieux de la France au Tsar", described him as the savior of European peace who had given hope to France. Its cover page featured an illustration of him on his deathbed - an image also found in illustrated newspapers - witnessed by a French soldier holding the hand of a weeping Russian soldier, surrounded by palm fronds as a symbol of peace (Figure 5).\footnote{Songs related to Tsar Alexander’s death are listed in Wallon, "L'Alliance franco-russe dans la chanson française", 131-132; see also "Adieux de la France au Tsar", http://gallica.bnf.fr}

That President Carnot had been assassinated just months before added to the uncertainty here; yet ultimately, the alliance prevailed.

A final subset of songs celebrated the idea of familial rapprochement, an important pro-alliance motif discussed in Chapter 7. Interestingly for considering its ubiquity, such personification might have served as a political device to deflect the distance between autocracy and Republic. Emphasizing the family theme, some piano compositions were devoted exclusively to children, including the "Polka des bébés franco-russes" and a composition entitled "Homage à leurs Altesses impériales, les grandes duchesses Olga et Tatiana: 'L'Alliance', nouvelle danse franco-russe", conceived for a specially-choreographed dance.\footnote{Deschamps, Souvenirs patriotiques, 18-19, 28-29; Grand-Carteret, "L'Actualité en images", 226-227; Le Guévellou, "Franco-russe: Résultat d'une rencontre: nouvelle danse franco-russe". Olga and Tatiana were the Tsar’s first two children.} Overtly frivolous songs also appeared, including the "Lettre de Marianne à Nicolas" and the "Réponse de Nicolas à Marianne", performed at the Molière Theater and at the café-concert Les...
Finally, one of the most popular 1896 songs was "Francillonnette et Nicolas", whose fame reached even to Australia where a newspaper described it as "the most taking ditty" composed for the Tsar’s visit. An excerpt printed in the London Times described how France had chosen its new suitor from two potential lovers, Wilhelm [of Germany] and Nicholas:

The first was named Wilhelm,
He who would possess by dupery,
The second was a proud young man
The handsome Nicholas.

The lover chosen by Francillonnette
Was the handsome Nicholas.
Ah, ah.

She will no longer be alone,
For Nicholas will defend her,
For Nicholas will be there.
Long live Nicholas!  

This song industry centered on England's imperial rival clearly interested the Times, which reported that during the Tsar’s visit over five hundred different songs were published, selling for one to two sous apiece. Drawing attention from European political observers, compositions such as "La France au Tsar", "Chantons la gloire de la Russie" and "La Marche russe" sold in the hundreds of thousands. Meanwhile French newspapers including L’Echo de Paris, L’Illustration, Gil Blas and Le Journal launched competitions for the newest musical text,

---

943 "Lettre de Marianne à Nicolas"; "Réponse de Nicolas à Marianne", in Rybatchenov, Rossiia i Frantziia, 134.


945 “The Tsar's Tour”, Times of London.

946 Marmouget, "La visite du Tsar Nicolas II à Paris", 29.
or reprinted the most popular existing songs.947 "Patriotic" songs included "À la Cosaque", "La tête de la Tripole", "L'Alliance à Marianne", "C'est Strogoff", "Dieu garde l'Empereur", "La russomanie", and "La Fête de la Paix".948 One even lauded a bilateral relationship that began in 1807 with the short-lived treaty between Napoléon Bonaparte and Tsar Alexander I.949

In conclusion then, when considering the pro-alliance bibelots, novelties, domestic products, toys, postcards and song sheets above, several observations may be made regarding their distinctive political nature, their production and consumption, and their potential for the construction of individual meanings. No major study of the alliance has hitherto investigated these objects, nor explored their singular political and cultural contexts. That a cultural history may do so now is due in large measure to the recent digitization and centralization of collections, revealing the extraordinary range of political ephemera which could enable a widespread manifestation of popular alliance consensus. Pro-alliance ephemera could facilitate both producer and consumer expression, and its volume and density clearly contributed to the circularity of representations concerning Russia, moving from public into private spaces.

Although figures for production and consumption are largely unavailable, twenty thousand camelots sold newspapers, bibelots, toys, postcards and song sheets on Paris streets in 1899, added to more than one thousand bibliothèques de gare, plus department stores,


949 "Français et Russes (de Tilsit à Châlons). Grand récit national" in Rybatchenov, Rossiia i Frantziia, 117.
itinerant colporteurs and popular fairs across the country. Yet because ephemeral items disappeared quickly following key events, it is difficult to establish who participated in the mass but generally anonymous production which "converged" on such events. One observation regarding alliance output is clear, however: items celebrating the visit of the Russian fleet officers to Toulon, Paris and Nancy in 1893, and of Nicholas II to Paris in 1896, vastly exceeded the several dozen or so produced for the official visits by King Edward VII and King Victor-Emmanuel in 1903. Patently an alliance with England or Italy was not nearly so vital to France’s national survival once the alliance with Russia had been struck.

The exceptionally broad range of alliance items suggests that an array of small independent ateliers became involved, with entrepreneurs quick to respond to public interest. In this, profit and political expression might proceed hand-in-hand. Pro-alliance materials incorporated a powerful ensemble of modes and styles, with multiple "derivative" images to convey the themes described. Encouraging this cross-pollination, some song sheet printers also produced postcards, as did calendar and poster manufacturers. Department stores could exploit political events as well, capitalizing on à la mode consuming habits and pro-alliance

951 Daragon, Le Président Krüger en France, 2; Gerson, "Town, Nation or Humanity?", 633.
952 This comparison was established through consulting Henri Daragon, S.M. Edouard VII à Paris, 1903. Industrie du bibelot, and S.M. Victor-Emmanuel III à Paris, 1903. Industrie du bibelot (Paris: H. Daragon, 1903). Only a small number of items representing the categories above are described in the latter two books. The visits by British and Italian leaders to Paris were occasioned by their potential interest in joining the Franco-Russian pact.
953 Ceramic items, for example, were produced in small Paris workshops in the Marais and Ménilmontant neighborhoods. Khmelnitskaya et Zeisler, "L’industrie du souvenir", Neptunia, 55.
954 Jordanova, The Look of the Past, 10, 164-165.
enthusiasm. Although not evident from the sources, production may at times have been underwritten by larger, anonymous financial interests anxious to establish the image of a reliable Russia to safeguard investment there; for as seen in Chapters 2 through 5, positive messages concerning Russia could emanate from a variety of extra-governmental actors.

As with production, little is known about consumption. Clearly some items were purchased for performative public display while others served for private use. More costly alliance items, of course, would remain beyond the reach of most. Although the range of alliance objects suggests a keen consumer appetite, extant bibelots reveal few patterns regarding consumption by rural versus city locales, by social class or by gender. Specific objects might be considered gendered, such as pipes and billfolds or perfumes and fans, while others remain less clear. It is difficult to say, for example, who purchased pro-alliance postcards; the primary sources consulted referred exclusively to male collectors here, contradicting contemporary assertions that women were the main consumers of postcards in Europe.

To reiterate concerning the possible reasons driving consumption, a widespread sense of national vulnerability could lend itself to a set of projected imaginings wherein alliance objects might be employed within three potential categories of meaning: those of contributory politico-social citizenship, of symbolic protection, and of positive affirmation by the alliance partner. In the first category, the consumption of alliance objects could symbolize patriotic nationalism, political engagement, allegiance and citizenship, much like the Republican symbols described

---

956 Capitalizing on political lobbying, department stores distributed pro-colonialism items as well.

by Maurice Agulhon.\textsuperscript{958} Objects could signal sought-after solidarity while conferring a sense of group identity, belonging and social cohesion, equally important to the political project of early Third Republic. The public festivities against which alliance items were sold might also contribute to processes of self-construction and self-situation in history.\textsuperscript{959} Choosing pro-alliance ribbons or jewelry to adorn the self could signal consensus to others in mirror-like fashion,\textsuperscript{960} while the exchange of postcards could signal an engaged polity in private settings.

Within the second category of meanings, alliance souvenirs might assume a symbolic protective cast. Susan Stewart has described how souvenirs may be employed to allow distances to be collapsed into the self, replacing actual experience with "fictive domains". At once reassuring - one is reminded of the American flag after the 9/11 attacks - and even talismanic, ubiquitous objects featuring Russian motifs could serve as a sort of promissory note of military aid in a time of threat. Domestic interiors become important here, with objects placed in a home potentially symbolizing a "longing" for highly significant events such as the Russian visits, moving these into extended private time.\textsuperscript{961} While pro-alliance domestic items might bring a promise of protection into the home, products that claimed to improve personal well-being attempted to conflate the health (and survival) of the personal with the national body. Public repetition and imaging only amplified this message. On many levels then, the personal and the national were intertwined.

\textsuperscript{958} Maurice Agulhon, \textit{Marianne au pouvoir: l’imagérie et la symbolique républicaines de 1880 à 1914} (Paris: Flammarion, 1989). Agulhon argued for the importance of image and symbol in establishing the political ethos of the Republic.

\textsuperscript{959} Gerson, "Town, Nation or Humanity?", 651.


Beyond the imaginings of politico-social citizenship and of symbolic protection is a third potential category of meaning, that of a perceived affirmation by Russia. Despite polarizing differences between autocracy and Republic, as implied through alliance ephemera, Russian affirmation could be seen to negate France's political isolation on the continent, as well as to bolster the Third Republic's imperial *mission civilisatrice* and the status of nation and army at home. Now "brother", no longer "other", Russia had extended its hand to France in a military embrace. It is this latter, singular imagining - that of Russia as a member of France's extended family - that among others Chapter 7 will discuss.
Chapter 7: Extolling Russia as Family: Harnessing the Alliance to Promote Domestic Social Agendas via New and Existing Media

As the ongoing consolidation of the Republic proceeded after alliance ratification in 1894, both extra-governmental and governmental elites attempted to harness popular support for the alliance to further their specific domestic religious, political and social causes. While some of these efforts had begun in 1891, corresponding with the visit of French warships to Russia, they intensified upon the formal agreement. The theme of a Franco-Russian family emerged as a common motif in these campaigns, a theme that elite actors extended through key print media, some of which targeted the emerging reading groups of women and youth. Messaging related to religion, depopulation and education took place amidst competing causes, among them pro- and anti-Republicanism, and Enlightenment rationalism versus anticlericalism. In particular, elites sought to link the alliance with the most critical ongoing concerns of the Third Republic: secularization to stem the power of the Roman Catholic Church versus the Church's efforts to retain its power, depopulation initiatives to address national security issues, and education to formalize the centralization of the state.

Elites who promoted the alliance via the family theme included publishers in the secular and the Catholic press, along with prominent revanchistes and government, military and Catholic figures. Related to the latter, as the Republic increasingly sought consensus on foreign policy, this included a bid for Roman Catholic support, buttressed in part by the Pope’s 1890 encyclical urging a Catholic “ralliement” to the Republic, as discussed below. In the secular arena, meanwhile, elite actors sought to extend the groundwork of the Republic and to weaken the Church’s traditional power by reinforcing the dual pillars of the Republic as the army and schools. For some, additional motivations for alliance promotion after the 1894 agreement may have been to safeguard French investments in Russia, or to address the uncertainty resulting from the death of Alexander III.
This chapter differs from the preceding ones not only in its focus on the alliance decade from 1891 to 1901, but also in its examination of a bilateral family motif promoted in both the religious and secular realms. Significantly, this theme might have also set a partial backdrop to the popularity of alliance *bibelots*, domestic items, toys, postcards and song sheets described in Chapter 6. When considering the central motif of a Franco-Russian family, the chapter explores in part the targeting of women and children through pro-alliance messaging, often via emotional appeal. Constructed illustrations served as an important new media tool here, reflecting emerging chromolithographic technology whose inception corresponded with the alliance era. When added to the textual media described in Chapter 3, a plethora of illustrated newspapers, periodicals and other diverse sources permits the examination of the specific representations employed to promote domestic causes through the lens of a family with Russia.

Above all, this final chapter identifies elite interests that might be furthered by extolling the alliance; as noted, these interests ranged from religious and political agendas to the issues of depopulation and the education of youth. This again underscores the value of a cultural history of the 1894 agreement in France, particularly in revealing the role of diverse actors who promoted it both before and after ratification. As one example of this, by the 1890s extragovernmental Catholic elites had become involved in championing the alliance; and although a vigorous scholarship on European religious history exists, no current study focuses on the role of religion in nineteenth-century foreign relations. Yet an emphasis on Russia as an exemplary Christian nation became an important component of appeals to pro-alliance support.

---

How might one trace the agendas above? Multiple forms of media clearly contributed to this pro-alliance messaging; they might be visual or textual in nature, serial or scattershot and fleeting, and experienced by one or by many. The analysis below rests on four main sources: two established daily newspapers, the Roman Catholic *La Croix* and the conservative *Le Figaro* (both discussed in Chapter 3), plus two new media forms which flourished during the alliance decade, i.e. the pioneering illustrated weekly newspaper supplement of *Le Petit Journal*, entitled *Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré*, and a newly-conceived periodical for youth, *Le Petit Français illustré*. Testifying to overlapping messaging to link the alliance to critical domestic issues, further sources will lend additional weight. For religion, these include books, diocese letters, poetry and municipal displays for official visits, while for education, supplementary sources include school materials, correspondence between French and Russian children, and additional periodicals for youth.

7.1 Emerging media and emerging readers

First a word concerning the four main publications above, which served various constituencies in France. Significantly, the inception of three of these coincided with the alliance era, as the product of press freedoms enshrined in 1881: *La Croix* was founded in 1884, *Le Petit Français illustré* in 1889, and *Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré* in 1890. As pro-alliance vehicles, they could be employed to target the reading groups of women or children engendered by rising literacy rates and educational change engineered under the Republic. Demonstrating the cross-pollination of domestic debates, during the 1890s *Le Figaro* (1866), as well as *Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré* (the latter appealing to female readers), incorporated implicit messaging designed to sway Catholic readers to support both the alliance and the Republic.

Although ostensibly secular in nature, their publishers therefore imbued them with substantial religious references. By contrast, their main Catholic competitor, the anti-Republican *La Croix*, attempted to demonstrate the Church's leadership in the alliance for its readers, some of whom remained of monarchist persuasion.

Thus while each of the publications above had a substantial readership, the rationale for their pro-alliance stance differed. The first newspaper, *La Croix*, remained implacably opposed to the Republic, but by the 1890s it supported the alliance, determined to emphasize that state and religion should remain intertwined, as was the case in Russia. Established by the Assumptionist order to campaign against government secularization, *La Croix* had a relatively small circulation of 170,000; significantly, however, its readers included forty percent of the nation's priests, while its parent publishing house, the most important religious firm in France, produced six other dailies and seventy-three regional weeklies. It also published a Sunday newspaper called *La Croix du Dimanche*, selling over 400,000 copies per week.  

Meanwhile the second source, the moderately republican *Le Figaro*, was France's leading conservative daily; it distributed forty percent of its *tirage* outside of Paris and had many aristocratic Catholic readers. *Le Figaro* provided ongoing detailed coverage related to the alliance, reflecting in part its adherence to the Republic. Beyond these two newspapers, a weekly periodical for


youth, entitled *Le Petit Français illustré*, became the most widely-distributed children's periodical in France.965 The editors of *Le Petit Français illustré* targeted male students, affirming in part the educational impetus of the Republic, and in its pages they extolled the alliance as a solution to France's future security.

A fourth publication demonstrated considerably further reach than the above. *Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré* (hereafter the *PJSI*), was the weekly supplement of the "profoundly Republican" newspaper *Le Petit Journal*. Powerful editor Ernest Judet set its political direction; at times this too included mingling pro-alliance messaging with implicit appeals to Catholic readers for a "ralliement" to the Republic.966 Demonstrating its potential influence, its circulation exceeded one million, including twenty-five percent of the Paris market and a significant readership in the provinces.967 Although other newspapers quickly borrowed the format of an illustrated supplement, often featuring the same events, the *PJSI* reached a national base.968 No


966 Candidates advocating *ralliement* were subsequently fielded in national elections. Cholvy, *La Religion en France*, 60.


doubt its low price and illustrations contributed to an overall trend wherein the vast majority of French citizens read newspapers at the time. At eight pages long and costing five centimes, the \textit{PJSI} was the first in France to employ full-page colored images; its editors encouraged readers to clip and collect these, and to display them in their homes.\footnote{Where in 1882 thirty French newspapers sold for five centimes (up from four in 1871), by 1892 fifty-one newspapers could be purchased for this price. Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot, Pierre Guiral and Fernand Terrou, eds., \textit{Histoire générale de la presse française, Tome III: 1871 à 1940} (Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France, 1972), 234, 174, 347, 348, 194, 196, 297, 300, 303; Michael B. Palmer, \textit{Des petits journaux aux grandes agences: Naissance du journalisme moderne, 1863-1914} (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983), 172, 101, 174; Maria Adamowicz-Hariasz, "From Opinion to Information: The roman-feuilleton and the Transformation of the Nineteenth-Century French Press", in Dean de la Motte and Jeannene M. Przyblyski, \textit{Making the News: Modernity and the Mass Press in Nineteenth-Century France} (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 178. The \textit{PJSI} urged its readers to emulate the Russian example of displaying images of their allies in their homes alongside images of saints and of family members. In 1893, for example, it encouraged readers to cut out its front-page image of Grand Duke Alexis, the Grand Admiral of the Russian fleet. "S.A.I. Le Grand-Duc Alexis"; "Nos gravures", \textit{Petit Journal Supplément illustré}, 30 septembre 1893, 1, 8. Personal collection.} As a new mode for targeting both male and female readers, the \textit{PJSI}'s cover illustrations may thus be analyzed comparatively for their rhetorical modes. This enabled the construction of common knowledge, but equally importantly, of common imaginings of Russia and the alliance.

The illustrations published in the \textit{PJSI} merit a particular introduction here. Because illustrated supplements were first marketed during the alliance era, extolling the military pact could become one means to establish this new media form, appealing to readers by inviting personalized projection into pictured scenes.\footnote{H. Hazel Hahn, \textit{Scenes of Parisian Modernity: Culture and Consumption in the Nineteenth Century} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 58.} Significantly, \textit{PJSI} illustrations concerning Russia suggested a deliberate amnesia,\footnote{Peter Burke, \textit{Eyewitnessing}, 173, 187.} with a view to overriding previously-held negative stereotypes in France. Between 1891 and 1901 (i.e. in just over five hundred editions), the...
supplement featured one hundred and fourteen full-page illustrations related to Russia. Yet as with the majority of the media discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, to date this has gone unremarked in the alliance literature. *PJSI* illustrators focused on the Tsars and their families, on Russian military and naval affairs, and on Russian culture. Numbers peaked in key years: fourteen images each in 1893 (to celebrate the Russian naval visit) and in 1894 (to mourn the sudden death of Alexander III), and eighteen each to publicize the state visits in 1896 and 1897. A similar spike occurred in 1901, the year of Nicholas II's second visit to France.972

These illustrations represent a significant source base due to their pioneering status, their symbolic content, their ubiquity, and their deliberate appeal to women.973 While colored front page illustrations did not necessarily drive the purchase of the *PJSI*, they demonstrate one means by which newspaper owners attempted to insert themselves into a pro-alliance dialogue. Because illustrations are constructed suggestively, it is appropriate to talk about intention and signification à la Roland Barthes here, whose framework for analysis will serve to discuss the examples below. Following Barthes's analytic schemata, images may incorporate three forms of messages: the linguistic, the literal or symbolic (known as a signifier, and producing a denoted meaning grounded in symbolism and metonomy), and the cultural or obtuse (known as the signified, and producing a connoted meaning derived from implication, association or

972 All observations concerning the number and format of images are based on my research. This foreign affairs preoccupation with Russia compares to approximately three hundred illustrations in the *PJSI* depicting France's colonial interests during the same period. Fifty-five images illustrating the Russo-Japanese war appeared in 1904-1905, reflecting French concern about Russia's military prowess.

suggestion). It is the two latter types of messages that prevailed in PJSI illustrations, i.e. those exhibiting a rhetoric steeped in national, cultural and aesthetic knowledge.\footnote{Barthes, \textit{Image, Music, Text}, 36-54. Note that the discussion of specific illustrations here does not include any editorial text describing these; if present, the latter appeared as brief, non-substantive notes, often several pages away from the image itself.}

As one example, PJSI illustrations concerning Russia could invite readers to participate in imaginary "family" spectacles, as portrayed in two 1897 images celebrating President Faure's triumphant return to France.\footnote{"Alliance!"; "Le retour du Président: À la Chambre de Commerce de Dunkerque", \textit{Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré}, 12 septembre 1897, 1, 8.} The front cover illustration, captioned "ALLIANCE!" to mark the first public utterance of the word by Nicholas II, was imbued with symbolic, or denoted, religious fervor: personifying the will of God, its central figure was an angel of peace, with citizen onlookers from both France and Russia developing the family motif.\footnote{The suggestion here was that the Russian people shared in alliance enthusiasm, when in fact they had no involvement; the alliance was strictly the decision of the Russian government.} By contrast, the back cover illustration was rife with secular republicanism, with national flags portrayed fluttering amidst a great cheering crowd, all dwarfed by a civic municipal architecture, that of the Dunkirk Chamber of Commerce (Figures 6 and 7). The denoted message was clear: the state has protected the national family. A deeper, connoted message affirmed the triumph of the Republic in the political and economic spheres. Significantly, however, the religious imagery was placed on the front page.

\section*{7.2 Winning Catholics over to the alliance with Orthodox Russia during calls for a Catholic "ralliement" to the Republic}

As seen in the first image above, pro-alliance actors incorporated religious appeals in intriguing ways. Setting a context for the multiple media involved, Chapters 2 and 3 have noted that after the 1871 defeat, revisionist images began to emerge in Catholic circles to counteract long-standing opposition to Russia's "schismatic" Orthodox faith and to its repression in Catholic
Poland. By the 1890s, prominent actors had confirmed Russia as a Christian partner for France, adding religious approbation and the notion of a trans-national extended Christian family to other "civilizational" justifications for rapprochement. Others, meanwhile, sought to demonstrate Catholic leadership by identifying hitherto undiscovered compatible religious ideals, including leadership for peace, as discussed below. These representations illustrate the role of extra-governmental figures and groups who become involved in forging cultural links between unlikely partners - particularly important in a politically-turbulent and crisis-ridden France - while illustrating the metaphor of "relationships" between states, as outlined by Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic.\textsuperscript{977} An argument for the affirmation of Russia as member in a \textit{famille chrétienne} as an important pro-alliance motif also counters a common lacuna, one that assumes a consistent rise of secularization in nineteenth-century France.\textsuperscript{978} Indeed, formal separation of Church and State occurred only in 1905, after a bitter battle between Republicans and an entrenched Catholic establishment.

Three key aspects merged into the changing religious portrayals of Russia: first, during the 1870s and 1880s, the thaw in French academic opinion evident in dispassionate analyses of the relationship between Orthodoxy and Catholicism; second, during the 1890s, secular and Catholic press depictions of the shared values of a Christian family, most notably those related


to Marianism, Holy Russia, divine purpose, savior saints and peace, and finally, during the official Russian visits to France in 1893, 1896 and 1901, a further emphasis on divine purpose, savior saints and peace. Reflecting the latter amidst increasing secularization, the PJSI employed religious imagery to make the case for both Republicanism and ralliement.

Patently, a famille chrétienne could also be a famille républicaine. Thus the PJSI featured an illustration of French flags displayed on the Reims cathedral to greet Nicholas II in 1901, when in fact contemporary photographs reveal no such flags. Through this constructed image, the newspaper attempted to insinuate acceptance of the Pope's call for Catholics to rally to the Republic. The PJSI also highlighted Russian Orthodox festivals in its illustrations; yet by contrast, only rarely did its editors employ religious imagery when depicting countries other than Russia. Indeed, between 1891 and 1905 a mere half-dozen of its illustrations referencing other countries incorporated religious imagery.

979 The first visit, in 1893, involved five Russian battleships; after docking in Toulon, sixty naval officers travelled to Paris for eight days of festivities, and then toured Lyon and Marseille. In 1896 the state visit by Tsar Nicolas II and his wife Alexandra began with a naval revue at Cherbourg, followed by a three-day stay in Paris and a military revue at Châlons. In 1901 Nicolas and Alexandra returned, staying in Compiègne for a military revue and visiting nearby Reims cathedral, the coronation venue of French kings. Academic go-betweens Leroy-Beaulieu and de Vogüé figured prominently in the 1893 Paris banquet honoring the naval officers in Paris (described in Chapter 3), while Rambaud was omnipresent as Minister of Public Instruction during Nicolas II’s visit in 1896.

980 Contrary to the PJSI illustration, a contemporary postcard photograph, "Visite des Souverains russes à la Cathédrale de Reims, 19 septembre 1901", plus the contemporary painting by Russian court painter Pavel Piassetsky indicate that no flags were displayed on the cathedral facade. Un Tsar à Compiègne, 14. In offering this constructed scene PJSI editors perhaps hoped to sway Catholics to display flags on their religious buildings, as Protestants and Jews did on important days such as Bastille Day. Christian Amalvi, "Bastille Day: From Dies Irae to Holiday", in Realms of Memory, Vol. 3: Symbols, ed. Pierre Nora, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 127.

981 As examples, see the following cover illustrations: "Coutumes russes: les oeufs de Pâques"; "La fête de Pâques en Russie". Le Petit Journal supplément illustré, 18 novembre 1894; 8; 9 avril 1894, 1.

982 As an example, one portrayed Mary in 1898, depicting a banner which bore her image in an English religious procession attended by Queen Victoria. Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré, 24 avril 1898, 1.
As evidence that this represented a radical reframing of attitudes, it is helpful to first place these actions within a contemporary timeline. Prior to the 1871 defeat, the course of French Catholicism had not run smoothly. Earlier in the century, friction erupted between Gallicans (liberals), who wanted autonomy for the French church, and ultramontaines, who embraced papal control. Yet while many Gallicans ultimately accepted Republican government, some ultras remained committed to a royalist restoration, even at the century’s end. The fact that state and religion remained firmly intertwined in tsarist Russia could add to the appeal of an alliance for the latter group. Despite repeated waves of anti-clericalism through the century, a mid-century Catholic revival had resulted in thousands of new rural parishes, along with new religious orders, among them the Assumptionists, publishers of La Croix. Before the Franco-Prussian War, many continued to object to Russia’s “heretical” faith, and animosity emerged particularly during Polish uprisings against Russian overlords in 1830 and 1863. Protests

---


984 Polish Catholics were considered by many in France to be natural allies against schismatics and Protestants. News of Russian violence in Poland in 1830, followed by the exile of Poles refusing to convert to the Orthodox faith, caused outraged Parisians to spill into the streets. Crying “death to the Russians!” and singing la Varsovienne, protestors were led by figures such as Victor Hugo and George Sand. Hugo composed a song called Triste Pologne, while Sand declared that Russia should “weep tears of blood for Poland”. Sand’s statement appeared in the Revue des deux mondes (1839:4), as quoted in Pierre Nora, “Introduction”, in Astolphe de Custine, Lettres de Russie: La Russie en 1839, ed. Pierre Nora, 21-22 (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). Charles Montalambert, a politician and historian and a fierce Catholic ultra, thundered in the government Chambre des Pairs (Peers) that only Poland could defend “all of civilization against barbarism…. the shameful idolatry of the schism instead of liberating beliefs of the Occident”. As quoted in Charles Corbet, À l’ère des nationalismes. L’opinion française face à l’inconnu russe, 1799-1894 (Paris: Didier, 1967), 180. Taking his lead, Astolphe de Custine, the nineteenth century’s most virulent commentator on Russia, castigated Russian attempts to subject Polish Catholics to the Tsar’s “political church” as opposed to the Pope’s “universal Church”. Custine, influenced by a substantial expatriate Polish community in France, travelled to Russia in 1839 ostensibly to seek pardon for a young Polish officer living under his protection in Paris. He told terrible tales about Russian religion, including a story about nuns who dismembered their common lover and threw his body parts into a well.

297
subsequently greeted Tsar Alexander II during his visit to Paris for the 1867 exposition universelle, when an assassination attempt against him by a Polish nationalist failed. Enmity persisted in some quarters even after 1871, with Senate president Charles Floquet crying "Vive la Pologne, monsieur!" to the future Tsar Alexander III in 1874.985

Yet while the 1871 defeat spurred renewed Catholic fervor, including national pilgrimages to holy sites across France,986 ultimately it would extinguish mainstream animosity towards Orthodox Russia. A key article illustrating this shift surfaced in the travel journal Le Tour du Monde in 1872;987 with forty pages devoted to Russian religion, Russia's mission as a civilisateur impérial in its Islamic territories earned this author's particular approval. Jules Verne appears to have consulted the article while writing Michel Strogoff, and as described in Chapter 5, the novel's subsequent theatrical adaptation enjoyed phenomenal success with its storyline portraying a Muslim revolt against Christian Russia. The stage was set for Russia's place in a

---


986 Cholvy, La religion en France, 21, 27-29, 50-54, 57. National pilgrimages were organized to La Salette (1872), Lourdes (1873), Rome (1875), and Jerusalem (1882). Popes Pius X and Leo XIII also promoted the ultramontaine cult of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. For an in-depth examination of these phenomena, see Harris, Lourdes; Detmar Klein, "The Virgin with the Sword: Marian Apparitions, Religion and National Identity in Alsace in the 1870s", French History 21:4 (2007): 411-430.

987 This translated article was copiously illustrated, unlike the original English book. William Hepworth Dixon, "La Russie libre" in Le Tour du Monde, trans. Émile Jonveaux, 23-24, 1° et 2° semester (1872). http://gallica.bnf.fr. See also Dixon, Free Russia, 2 vols. (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1870); Dixon, La Russie libre (Paris: Hachette, 1873). Dixon visited major pilgrimage sites including the cathedrals of Saint Petersburg, Moscow's Kremlin, and the Troïtsa monastery near Moscow. These venues were also described in other travel books such as Théophile Gautier, Voyage en Russie (Paris: Charpentier, 1867); Paul Vasili, comte (pseudonym attributed to Juliette Adam and Élie de Cyon), La Sainte Russie (Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1890); Victor Tissot, La Russie et les Russes: Kiev, Moscou, impressions de voyage (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1884). See also French Admiral Gervais's description of Moscow: "the heart of Russia, the holy city, the sanctuary of its power..., as quoted in M. Lindenlaüüs, "Moscou et son Kremlin", Le Magasin pittoresque 2:9 (1891), 245-246. http://gallica.bnf.fr
famille chrétienne coloniale, for over two million Parisian theater-goers between 1880 and 1900. The alliance might help defend French interests in the Holy Land too, La Croix claimed in 1893: "We will draw from our alliance with Russia the force to defend our secular rights in the Holy Land, now threatened in the south by England."

Exemplifying a fin-de-siècle knowledge agenda, in-depth studies of Russian culture by academic go-betweens Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu and Eugène Melchior de Vogüé had first suggested this partnership with Russia in a famille chrétienne. As prominent Catholics, Leroy-Beaulieu and de Vogüé serialized their books in the preeminent La Revue des deux mondes, noted for its "catholicisme modéré". When alluding to a famille chrétienne, they particularly elevated l’âme russe or the Russian soul, a theme popularized in cultural media. While preceding alliance negotiations by some fifteen years, their works contributed to a rising enthusiasm for Russia that scholars have cited as pivotal through multiple changes in government in France.


989 "La Carte", La Croix, 26 octobre, 1893, 1.


992 Corbet, L'opinion française face à l'inconnu russe, 361; Hogenhuis-Seliverstof, Une Alliance franco-russe, 160; Jacques Perot, "Les chemins de l'Alliance franco-russe", Un Tsar à Compiègne,
The *magnum opus* on Russian religion, volume three of Leroy-Beaulieu’s *L’Empire des Tsars et les Russes*, explained that Russia had been cut off from Christian Europe by the 1054 Orthodox schism and by the thirteenth-century Tartar invasions. Appealing to the family theme, he argued that Christian Slavs were France’s “brothers of the Orient”, and that Russia’s Orthodox faith echoed Catholic precepts. These assertions countered the arguments of those advocating an alliance with Protestant England or even Germany at the time. Russian *moujiks*, or peasants, Leroy-Beaulieu continued, exhibited exemplary humility and sacrifice, qualities to be admired by Christian countries. Although strongly condemning the lack of religious freedom in Russia and its anti-Semitic persecutions, Leroy-Beaulieu appealed to Tsar Alexander III to extend his reforms: "Imagine a treaty between Rome and Moscow, the Pope becoming the ally of the Tsar…".

By contrast, de Vogüé’s work, *Le roman russe*, reflected his concern about the state of French Catholicism in the face of positivism, naturalism and the cult of reason. In a paean to Russian literature, he examined novels which demonstrated an exemplary transcendent "moral

---


994 Arguments for an alliance with England or Germany continued through the 1880s; but as noted in Chapter 1, a threatening speech by Bismarck in 1887 plus rumors that England planned to enter an alliance with Germany, turned the tide in Russia’s favor.

995 As auxiliary evidence for the ubiquity of this notion in France, American historian and diplomat Henry Adams, who visited Paris in 1900, remarked on the image of “the Russian peasant, lighting his candle and kissing the ikon [of the] railway Virgin”, and noted that “One Russian peasant kissing an ikon on a Saint's day, in the Kremlin, served for a hundred million”. Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams*, Project Gutenberg ebook, Vol. 2044, 219. My thanks to Dr. Bob Brain for this information.

inspiration... through the evangelical spirit”. Citing Gogol’s affirmation of God, Turgenev’s nihilism as "the first symptom of a moral resurrection", Dostoevsky’s "religion of suffering" and Tolstoy’s plea for a return to moral precepts, de Vogüé argued that this literature - ennobled by its search for pravda (literally justice, or truth) – was a literature to be admired and emulated in France. An alliance, therefore, might serve more than just political ends, as "la Sainte Russie" could be a moral partner for France. This image of Holy Russia, distinguished by its national soul and pious peasantry, would become a popular trope.

Continuing to set a religious context after 1871, the basilica of Sacré-Coeur rose over Paris as a symbol of expiation, reflecting the ultramontaine belief that the Franco-Prussian War had been God’s chastisement of France for losing sight of its religious vocation. Sensitive to the challenge, beginning in 1880 the Third Republic initiated a series of attacks against entrenched Catholic power. Marianne, Republican symbol par excellence, was put forward to replace Mary as the icon of France. Vigorous laws were imposed, les lois Ferry: religious orders were disbanded and crucifixes and religious images removed from schools, and a secular curriculum for obligatory education was delivered by teachers trained as Republican emissaries, or "hussars", to contest powerful parish curés across France. Because education had rested largely in Catholic hands - Jesuit preparatory schools taught many aspiring French civil servants

997 De Vogüé concluded with: “The Slavic race has yet to have its last word in history, and the greatest word of a people is always a religious word.” Eugène Melchior de Vogüé, Le roman russe, 2ème édition (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1916), xlv, 131, 203, 339, 342-343. As an ardent Catholic, de Vogüé had accompanied archeological expeditions to the Holy Land.

998 This idea paralleled the encouragement of "popular piety" in France by the Assumptionists and others who viewed religion as an "antidote to [the] bourgeois rationalism" of Republican leaders. Passmore, The Right in France, 34.

999 The secularization laws were named for Minister of Public Instruction Jules Ferry; the expression "hussars" is attributed to Charles Péguy. Cholvy, La religion en France, 74. On the state’s institutionalization of education, see Grévy, Le Cléricalisme? Voilà l’ennemi!. Other studies include Larkin, Religion, Politics, and Preferment; Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, Chapters 19 and 20.
and military officers\textsuperscript{1000} - aristocratic Catholics, given their propensity to ally with monarchists, might threaten the Republic. Indeed, fears of such a coup persisted through 1900.\textsuperscript{1001}

Demonstrating the anti-clerical stance, one contemporary cartoon depicted Marianne slashing at the octopus tentacles of the "black peril" (Jesuit or clerical power).\textsuperscript{1002} In reply, prominent Catholics denounced the influence of a "the three-headed monster" of Freemasonry, Protestantism and Judaism on the Republic, with \textit{La Croix} declaring "The state is Godless, i.e. Satanic".\textsuperscript{1003} Ultimately, a 1900 decree dissolved more religious orders, among them the Assumptionist publishers of \textit{La Croix}.\textsuperscript{1004}

Meanwhile other prominent Catholics appear to have accepted the idea of \textit{ralliement} as they began to valorize the Orthodox Church working in tandem with its anointed Tsar. By 1896, heralding Nicholas II's state visit, the aristocratic \textit{Le Figaro} remarked that the traditional hatred of Russian Orthodoxy had vanished; if Charles Floquet were to reprise "Vive la Pologne,

\begin{paracol}{2}

\begin{paracolleft}
\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{1001} An abortive attempt to restore monarchical rule occurred in 1873; this rebel group was heavily Catholic. Cholvy, \textit{La religion en France}, 58.

\textsuperscript{1002} This cartoon is found in Doizy and Lalaux, \textit{À bas la calotte!}, 68.

\textsuperscript{1003} \textit{La Croix} accused Freemasons, Jews and Protestants, all of whom were dominant in France's Republican government, of plotting against the Roman Catholic establishment; many Catholics also attempted to paint a Jewish financial conspiracy. Cholvy and Hilaire, \textit{Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine}, 85. On Dreyfus and the Assumptionists see Harris, \textit{The Man on Devil's Island}, 218-229; Georges Weill, \textit{Histoire du Catholicisme libéral en France, 1828-1908} (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909), 261; Grévy, \textit{Le cléricalisme}, 141; "L'État fait peur", \textit{La Croix}, 25 janvier 1890, 1. In 1880 \textit{La Croix} had already begun to distinguish between Polish Catholics and Polish revolutionaries, stating that the latter had received "a repression that was merited". T.R. Père d'Alzon, "La Russie/son passé/Alexander II. Par un ami de la Russie", \textit{La Croix}, 1 mai 1880, 35, 45. In 1883 it reported that Alexander III had re-established relations with the Vatican, and had recalled Polish priests and bishops exiled to Siberia. "L'Étranger à vol d'oiseau: Rome", \textit{La Croix}, 1 février 1883, 719.

\textsuperscript{1004} Some 3,216 religious orders existed in France before 1900. Until 1905, under the terms of the \textit{Concordat} the French government continued to pay salaries to approximately 60,000 Catholic clerics, as well as to some Protestant and Jewish clerics. Larkin, \textit{Religion, Politics, and Preferment}, 43.
\end{paracolleft}

\end{paracol}

302
monsieur!”, he would be massacred and his body parts thrown to the winds. Yet hoping to maintain their traditional status in France while attempting to demonstrate leadership in statecraft, members of the Catholic hierarchy began their overtures even before the Russian visits. In 1891, Cardinal Archbishop Richard sent a symbolic gift from Notre-Dame cathedral to Cronstadt with the French warships: two Russian regimental banners bearing the images of saints, seized by the French during the Crimean War. La Croix subsequently framed the 1893 Russian naval visit as an "incomparable meeting between two grand Christian nations", while Pope Leo XIII exclaimed "Is it not to me that credit for the Russian alliance is due?" In Paris, as thousands assembled at Sacré-Cœur to mark the 1893 visit, the arch-diocese Vicar-General prayed: "Oh Jesus Christ, You have brought peace to the world; conserve the union between Christian nations", and the flags of France and Russia were held aloft while the Cardinal Archbishop pronounced a thanksgiving.

Five days previously, Le Figaro reported, a dog was born in a nearby street: a Saint Bernard, just as the Russian officers arrived in Paris. On the dog’s head - "the undeniable imprint of a miracle" - black markings echoed the shape of the double eagle of the imperial Russian flag. A providential savior had appeared.

Further references to religion appeared upon the unexpected death of Alexander III in 1894, as diocese letters, religious periodicals, daily newspapers and rural gazettes expressed

1005 “Un peuple amoureux”, Le Figaro, 5 octobre 1896, 1.
1006 Bournand, Le livre d’or franco-russe (Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1894), 206.
1007 “Fille ainée de l’Église”, La Croix, 20 octobre 1893, 1; "Te Deum"; "Le Pape", La Croix, 17 octobre 1893, 1; 9 octobre 1896, 1. See also Jacques Piou: "Cronstadt…is… the consequence and the victory of papal policy", as quoted in Bournand, Livre d’or franco-russe, 209 and in Le Figaro, 13 novembre 1893, 1: "...the Franco-Russian agreement is the result of the politics of the pontificate".
1008 “Au Sacré-Coeur”, La Croix, 24 octobre 1893, 1.
1009 The puppy was dispatched to Russia for the wife of Alexander III. Le Figaro, octobre 1893, as quoted in Bournand, Livre d’or franco-russe, 349.
the national grief. The Archbishop of Chartres termed the Tsar's death a "catastrophe", exclaiming that with respect to the alliance, "patriotism and religious interest are in accord". Further demonstrating the involvement of Catholic leaders, Cardinal Archbishop Richard ordered a Te Deum Laudamus to be sung in the nation's churches during the 1896 visit by Nicholas II, along with the thanksgiving services in the holy triumvirate of French churches: Notre-Dame and Sacré-Coeur, and the coronation cathedral in Reims. When Nicholas visited Notre-Dame, the Archbishop presented him with an image of the Virgin Mary on silk, a duplicate of which he pointedly offered to a secular President Faure. Later at the Sainte Chapelle, accompanied by the now-Minister of Public Instruction and academic go-between Alfred Rambaud, the young Tsar viewed a book sent from Reims, the Évangélaire slavon, used during coronation ceremonies since the reign of Henri I. In 1901 he would receive a hand-lettered and illuminated copy of the original, penned by go-between Louis Léger.

---

1010 Letter reprinted in Diocèse de Dijon, "Lettre...préscrivant des prières pour la Russie et pour la France à l'occasion de la mort du Tsar Alexandre III", E2400 (Dijon, 12 novembre 1894), 803-815 (Bibliothèque nationale de la France). See also Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, "Alexandre III", La Revue de Paris 6 (novembre-décembre 1894): 9. Flags flew at half-mast across France; in 1896 the Petit Journal memorialized the loss with a black ribbon of mourning on its cover. "Le message de nos amis de Russie", Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré, 9 avril 1896, 1. As previously noted, a dozen songs mourned the Tsar's death, among them "La mort du Tsar" and "Deux soeurs en deuil, ou la Mort du Tsar". http://gallica.bnf.fr.

1011 The Te Deum Laudamus was sung during coronations, papal elections, and consecrations of a bishop or saint, and to celebrate military victories and peace treaties.

1012 "À Notre-Dame", Le Petit Journal, 8 octobre 1896, 1; "Le Tsar à Paris: À Notre-Dame", Le Petit Parisien, 8 octobre 1896, 1.

1013 The Slavic Évangélaire was a manuscript said to have been composed in the eleventh and fourteenth centuries and given to the Cardinal of Lorraine. Bournand, Livre d'or franco-russe, 215. Russian admiral Avellan also received a photographic reproduction of the book in 1893.

1014 Un Tsar à Compiègne, 142.
Valorizing Russia as a full partner in a *famille chrétienne*, church and media actors alike emphasized points of rapprochement.\textsuperscript{1015} These included transcendent ideology and themes: the cult of the Virgin Mary, the notion of Holy Russia, and the themes of divine purpose, savior saints, and peace. As icons in a culturally-specific rhetoric reflecting embedded Catholic referents, belief in Mary and the saints could encourage communion with Russia. Divine purpose, meanwhile, confirmed France's status as the "eldest daughter" of the Catholic Church,\textsuperscript{1016} and emphasized familial rapprochement. Noting the underlying mix of militarism with Christianity here, one compelling critique appeared in an 1893 article by Leo Tolstoy, itself a form of "auxiliary evidence".\textsuperscript{1017} In his withering denunciation of the alliance as a build-up to war, Tolstoy scorned the celebratory prayers and the rebirth of piety in France:

> I can scarcely believe that, since the time of the Concordat, a similar number of public prayers have been offered. All Frenchmen are becoming pious... they have hung the same religious images in the rooms of visiting Russian sailors which, just a short time ago, they had taken down... from their classroom walls....[for] the clergy of France and Russia had almost the same belief: don't they both honor the Virgin Mary!\textsuperscript{1018}

\textsuperscript{1015} Little is known about the role of the French military in the Roman Catholic embrace of Russia, but as scholars have noted, the upper ranks of the army included many traditional Catholics. Chief of Staff General Boisdeffre, for example, was Jesuit trained; his confessor was director of the École Saint-Geneviève, the premier Jesuit school which trained many entrants to the prestigious Saint-Cyr military academy. Larkin, *Religion, Politics and Preferment*, 14-15; Boniface, *L'Armée, L'Église et la République*, 194-197.


\textsuperscript{1017} I owe the idea of "auxiliary evidence" to Natalie Zemon Davis, who used this term at a seminar for UBC History graduate students in January, 2013.

\textsuperscript{1018} Tolstoy condemned the manipulation of French public opinion by government "instruments" such as civil servants, judges, clergy, teachers and the press. Leo Tolstoy, "L'esprit chrétien et le patriotisme, extrait sur les fêtes franco-russes de 1893", as quoted in Alexandra Viatteau, "France-Russie: La République entre les 'Tsars blancs', les 'Tsars rouges' et les 'Euro-Tsars'", *Classiques de Science politique* 3 (12 avril 2003): 20-23, http://www.diploweb.com/science-politique/tolstoi.htm
Tellingly, while one French Catholic author stressed that “Religion, for our friends, is considered to be an essential element of military discipline,” his books frequently emphasized the size of the Russian army instead.1019

As Tolstoy noted, much was made of Mary as the unifier between the two nations, reflecting the contemporary cult of Marianism popular across Europe and appealing to female parishioners.1020 In 1882, for example, La Croix declared that: "[Mary's] triumph will be the triumph of Jesus Christ...French women... will learn how they share, by divine order, Mary's sublime mission".1021 During the 1893 visit, Lyon’s Catholic University noted that Russians were "Greek schismatics who happily conserve the cult of the sacred Virgin", facilitating a "providential rapprochement". Meanwhile, La Croix extolled "the Virgin... the great unifying link between us and our Russian brothers!"1022

Shortly thereafter, images of a consoling Mary predominated in PJSI coverage of the passing of Alexander III, with three successive cover illustrations incorporating icons of her, increasing in size as the Tsar moved closer to death.

---

1019 Military strength remained uppermost in three books by this author; the first contained forty-nine pages focused on Russia's military and marine capacity. François Bournand, Livre d'or franco-russe, 201, 283; La Russie militaire: anecdotes historiques (Paris: Tolra, 1895); Chez nos amis les Russes: voyages, description, géographie, moeurs, usages (Paris: Téqui, 1897).

1020 In France, sightings of the Virgin Mary were reported at La Salette in 1846, Lourdes in 1858, and Pontmain in 1871, and the Pope recognized the dogma of the "Immaculate Conception" in 1854. Following the Franco-Prussian war, national pilgrimages took place to La Salette (1872) and Lourdes (1873). Saint-Martin, Voir, savoir, croire, 123, 451, 452; Harris, Lourdes; Klein, "The Virgin with the Sword". For a discussion of Marianism in Russia see Vera Shevzov, Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Vera Shevzov, "Mary and Women in Late Imperial Russian Orthodoxy" in Women in Nineteenth-Century Russia, eds. Wendy Rosslyn and Alessandra Tosi, 63-90 (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2012), http://books.openedition.org/obp/1245.

1021 Book review, "Marie Immaculée et la femme chrétienne, d’après le plan divin, l’Évangile et l’Histoire, ou le remède à nos maux", La Croix, 1 août 1882, n.p. In 1890, Catholics formed a “Ligue d’Ave” to fight for suppression of the school lois Ferry; its goal was to "embrace Catholic France which puts its confidence in Mary". "Ligue d’Ave" La Croix, 11 janvier 1890, 3.

1022 "Letter from the Catholic University of Lyon to General Avellan" conveyed by the archbishop of Lyons, as quoted in Bourmand, Livre d’or franco-russe, 174, 354. "La Russie en France"; “ENFIN !”; "Russes à Lourdes"; La Croix, 15 octobre 1893, 1; 22 octobre 1893, 1; 26 octobre 1893, 1.
La Croix also reported visits by prominent Russians to French sites associated with Mary; when grand-duke Alexis (brother of Alexander III and head of the Russian fleet) visited Lourdes, it claimed confirmation of rapprochement. Also in 1896, La Croix asked that Mary's prayer, Ave Maria, be recited across France for the Tsar's infant daughter Olga:

... a noble family mother would like all the children of France to recite three Ave Marias for Russia as a gift to this little princess who has come to visit their country and who has no knowledge of the schism. This is an excellent, delicate and pious thought which we pass on to Christian mothers. All baptized babies belong to the Catholic Church, until the day when, able to understand, they participate in other sacraments in a separate Church.

Significantly for domestic politics in 1890s France, exaltation of Mary by the Assumptionists accompanied their denigration of Jews during the Dreyfus affair. La Croix praised Russia's surveillance of Jews in its territories, while promoting anti-Semitism as a common cause in 1893:

The Jews wanted to attend the concert honoring the Russian fleet visit. Already M. Meyer had been out ahead, preparing the celebrations at the Opera....yesterday the grand rabbi of Paris led prayers for the alliance. That is good: but what if the Tsar [Alexander III] were going to teach us how to rid ourselves of Jewish interference?

Beyond the allusions to Marianism, much was also made of Holy Russia. The bishop of Digne lauded "a nation essentially religious and Christian...morning and evening prayers are...


1024 “Le Czar et Saint Nicolas de Bari”, La Croix, 3 novembre 1894, 1; “Russes à Lourdes”; La Croix, 26 octobre 1893, 1.

1025 Emphasis mine; this exhortation referred to Olga's inability to understand the Orthodox schism which had occurred in 1054. "L’Ave des enfants", La Croix, 11 octobre 1896, 1.

1026 This denigration of Jews stemmed from reports that Jews had crucified Jesus, the son of Mary. Harris, 'The Man on Devil's Island', 227, 223, 217-229; Ruth Harris, "The Assumptionists and the Dreyfus Affair", Past and Present 194 (2007): 175-211; "Sans rancunes", La Croix, 24 octobre 1893, 1.
said not only by families, but in garrisons and military camps...'' The popular periodical 
_Illustration_ featured depictions of prayer services on Russian battleships, while the _PJSI_ documented Orthodox religious festivals. _PJSI_ images also depicted the celebration for the accession of Nicholas II held at the Russian cathedral in Paris, and the blessing of his namesake battleship in Toulon by Russian clerics.  

Holy Russia was equally omnipresent in corollary media. This was true (unusually so, for Jules Verne) in _Michel Strogoff_, with Strogoff's slogan of "Pour Dieu, pour le Tsar, pour la Patrie!". Russian elites twinned this message for international audiences at the time, as the 1889 Paris _exposition universelle_ included a section entitled _La Sainte Russie_, complete with an _isba_, or peasant cottage, adorned with icons.  

_Le Figaro_, meanwhile, commended Russian students studying in Paris, declaring that even student radicals could distinguish between religion and politics, and that they regularly attended the Russian church.  

In addition to the emphasis on Marianism and Holy Russia, an iconography of God’s purpose, national saints, and peace took center stage, all confirming bilateral membership in a _famille chrétienne_. Beginning with the 1893 naval visit, in an unusual pairing French choirs and crowds sang the Russian anthem _Boje, Tsaria Khrani_ ("God Protect the Tsar") alongside the _Marseillaise_. Lyrics from Glinka’s opera _La Vie pour le Tsar_ appeared in _Le Figaro_: "Glory to

---

1027 Bournand, _Livre d’or franco-russe_, 201.


1029 Bilodeau, _Michel Strogoff, édition critique_, 125, Footnote 46.


1031 The Église russe is situated on the rue Daru in Paris. According to _Le Figaro_, Russian students chose "images of the holy saints of pious Russia" to hang in their rooms. "Les étudiants russes", _Le Figaro_, 20 octobre 1893, 1.
God and to the Tsar, His great heart cherishes all of Russia, It is by the will of God that he reigns! Poets glorified Nicholas II too, including revanchiste Paul Déroulède who wrote: "Honor to the Tsar! Honor to the Tsarina! That they may be blessed by God before whom all bow down!..." Another poet prayed: "To holy and mighty Russia....Might France associate, For the great works of God!" Charles Gounod subsequently composed a special version of the Russian anthem in 1901, to be played in churches across France. Visual imagery further evoked religious fraternité in flamboyant municipal décor. A flaming cross of Saint George, the patron saint of Russia, greeted Nicholas II as he descended the train in Paris in 1896, while along the cortege route, planners ensured that the Champs-Élysées evoked a Christian resurrection – if not Potemkin – with one hundred thousand artificial flowers placed on the bare October branches of its trees. Le Figaro reported that strings of lights formed a "luminous vault" and a "rosary" across Paris streets, while the motifs of sun and light were omnipresent, reminiscent of the Biblical phrase "I am the light". During the evening, three hundred thousand spectators assembled at the Eiffel Tower for a fireworks display that repeated the religious theme. Following an opening salvo, a deafening detonation outlined the tower’s frame, running with rivulets of red fire. As these dissipated, a colored image

1032 "La Vie pour le Tsar", Le Figaro, 18 octobre 1893, 8.
1033 Paul Déroulède, “Vivat!”, as quoted in Marmouget, "La visite du Tsar Nicolas II", 32.
1034 “Gazette du jour: La vraie alliance”, La Croix, 9 octobre 1896, 1.
1035 Gounod's composition was entitled "Fantaisie sur l’hymne national russe pour piano-pédalier et orchestre". "God keep the Emperor, Strong and hale/ So that he may march triumphantly in his grandeur! Tsar, remain the terror of your enemies/ All-powerful God, bless our Emperor". A poster entitled "France! Russie!" featured a different version: "God keep the Emperor/ Bless his name/ Spread his power and grandeur/ Tsar, stay the vanquisher of infidels forever!". Imagérie d’Épinal Vol. 1: Imagérie politique (Épinal: Pellerin, 1986), image no. 77.
1036 Marmouget, "La visite du Tsar Nicolas II", 62. The embellishment of desolate villages by Governor General Grigory Potemkin for Catherine the Great's journey to the Crimea echoes here.
1037 A "voûte lumineuse" and a "chapelet". Le Figaro, 4 octobre 1896, 2; 5 octobre 1896, 2.
emanated into the sky, twenty-five meters square: Saint George, mounted on horseback, clothed in flames and spearing a dragon.\footnote{1038} The connoted or signified meaning here implied that the devil incarnate (in the form of a German threat), would fall to religious might.\footnote{1039} Once again, Russia could be incorporated into the iconography of France.

Jeanne d'Arc, the savior saint of France, provided additional inspiration for some to claim rapprochement. Particularly among Catholic traditionalists, Jeanne and Mary remained the proper virginal symbols of salvation, as opposed to the Republic's Marianne.\footnote{1040} In 1892, the \textit{PJSI} reported grand-duke Constantine's visit to Jeanne's home in Lorraine, and during the 1893 visit, Russian Admiral Avellan noted that she was also venerated in Russia.\footnote{1041} Jeanne was invoked for Nicholas II in 1901 at Reims cathedral with a triumphant march from Charles Gounod's \textit{Jeanne d'Arc} that expressed "the glorification of the synthesis of Catholicism, God, and Nation".\footnote{1042} During a banquet that evening, the recitation of a lengthy poem by Edmond Rostand vividly evoked the imperial visit to "Jeanne's" cathedral.\footnote{1043}

\footnote{1038} Saint George, considered the infidel slayer and patron saint of Russia, figured prominently on the Tsar's imperial yellow flag. "Nicolas II à Paris", \textit{Le Petit Journal}, 7 octobre 1896, 2. \textit{Le Figaro} and \textit{Le Petit Parisien} also described these fireworks.

\footnote{1039} These fireworks paralleled those which heralded Louis XIII's triumphant liberation of La Rochelle from the English. Christian Jouhaud, "Printing the Event: From La Rochelle to Paris", in Chartier, ed., 316, \textit{The Culture of Print}.

\footnote{1040} As Michael Winock has pointed out, changes and continuities permitted varying portrayals of Joan of Arc: as a patron saint of France, as the incarnation of patriotism, and as a nationalist symbol. For some republicans, she could also serve as the "virgin-mother of democracy". Anti-Semites claimed that unlike the Jews, Joan was rooted not nomadic, spiritual not materialistic, and that she unified rather than threatened France. Michael Winock, "Joan of Arc", in \textit{Realms of Memory, Vol.3: Symbols}, 449, 457, 463-464. The latter characterization, along with the idea of chasing the enemy from the nation, appeared most recently in the utilization of Joan of Arc imagery in Marine Le Pen’s Front National party propaganda.

\footnote{1041} The grand-duke was depicted outside Jeanne's home, standing next to a banner depicting Mary. "Le grand-duc Constantin de Russie visitant la maison de Jeanne d'Arc", \textit{Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré}, 25 juin 1892, 8; Bournand, \textit{Livre d'or franco-russe}, 365.

\footnote{1042} Bournand, \textit{Livre d'or franco-russe}, 355.
Reflecting fears of a possible further war with Germany, beyond the emphasis on divine purpose and savior saints, elite actors also affirmed a promise of European peace led by the two nations. During Toulon's "fêtes de la paix" ("festival of peace") in 1893, the Catholic establishment emphasized its leadership in Marseille, as church bells tolled while the cortege passed, with a local curé saluting Admiral Avellan as "the angel of Peace". Shortly thereafter, upon the death of Alexander III the anti-Semitic La Libre Parole mourned that "France has just

1042 Charles Gounod mounted the opera Jeanne d'Arc in Paris in 1873, shortly after the Franco-Prussian War. Le Figaro, 20 septembre 1901, 1; Abel Combarieu, Sept Ans à l'Élysée avec le Président Émile Loubet (Paris: Hachette, 1932), 154, as quoted in Un Tsar à Compiègne, 100.

1043 An excerpt from this poem read (translation mine):
... You had, to arrive at this,
To pass before Joan of Arc,
And you entered her home!
In her home, therefore, you know,
In the shadow where the offering burns
Like a golden log, you have
Felt, both of you – Sire and Madame,
The fingers of her flame
Pass upon you, slowly, on your soul!
Thus while the stone walls,
Colored by the stained glass,
Trembled with the organ's song and with Faith,
You felt without fear
Her cold gauntlet
Touch you on the forehead as a blessing,
For it is Her, she has the right,
Who on her shield selects,
And then blesses them with her hand,
The friends of our Homeland!

...Vous avez, pour gagner ce parc, Passé devant Jeanne d'Arc, Et vous êtes entrés chez elle! Chez elle, alors, vous le savez, Dans cette ombre où l'autel s'enflamme, Comme un bûcher d'or, vous avez, Senti tous deux - Sire et Madame - Les franges de son oriflamme Vous passer, lentement, sur l'âme! Alors, tandis que la paroi Que le vitrail empourpre et nacre, Tremblait d'un chant d'orgue et de Foi, Vous avez senti sans effroi Le bout de son gantelet froid Vous toucher le front pour un sacre, Car c'est Elle, elle en a le droit, Qui sur son bouclier les trie, Et puis qui les sacre du doigt, Les amis de notre Patrie! Edmond Rostand, "À sa majesté l'Impératrice de Russie", as quoted in "Extraits de la presse contemporaine: La Dépêche de l'Oise, 20-22 septembre, 1901", 9-12.

1044 Bournand, Livre d'or franco-russe, 150, 371.
lost… her best friend; world Peace, her most reliable supporter..." A long poem subsequently expressed hopes for Nicholas II: "…That the work of God be realized…Imminent justice and eternal peace". Yet another poet dedicated his verses to the new "Tsar pacificateur": "Oh second Redemptor! ….For the peace of Europe and of the Universe: May the world acclaim you and the skies bless you..."

The PJSI continued the motif of divine purpose linked with peace, as did some postcards and further municipal décor for state visits. When Nicholas pronounced the word "allies" during President Faure's 1897 visit to Russia, the PJSI invoked celestial benevolence with its aforementioned cover that depicted an immense angel joining the hands of the Tsar and President; overhead a star blazed with the word PAX (PEACE), surrounded by rays of the sun. Here the notion of peace rested in a military balance of power, whereas in other instances it rested on hopes for negotiated arms limitations. Thus a similar star appeared on a postcard honoring the Tsar's call for the Hague peace conference in 1899: "Honor to Tsar Nicholas II who conceived the idea of universal disarmament, 1898", it proclaimed. On this, his

---

1045 Citation from La Libre Parole, as quoted in "La mort du Czar et la presse", La Croix, 3 novembre 1894, 2.

1046 One assumes that the first "Redemptor" was Alexander III. A. de Verneuil, "Bienvenue", as quoted in Philippe Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898. Livre d'or de l'Alliance franco-russe (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1898), 108; François Coppée, "Hommage au Tsar et à la Tsarine", as quoted in Marmouget, "La visite du Tsar Nicolas", 78. À. Blandignère, "Qu’est ce que la vie? Poésie dédiée à l’humanité du Tzar Nicolas II", as quoted in Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898, 356. A stalwartly republican mayor refused to greet Nicolas II as "sire" or "majesté", he welcomed him instead as "The promoter of the Hague conference." Un Tsar à Compiègne, 14.

1047 "Alliance!", Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré, 12 septembre 1897, 1. Nationwide delirium greeted Faure's return to France: bells tolled and flags flew across the nation, followed by declamations, banquets, prayer services, concerts and retraites aux flambeaux (military torchlight parades). Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898, 224-248. Immense angel wings appeared in just three other PJSI illustrations at this time: in a Christmas nativity scene, in a New Year's wish for peace, and significantly, in an illustration depicting the perils of disarmament for France. One other figure sported similar wings: Father Time, announcing to Bismarck that his death was nigh. Le Petit Journal Supplement illustré, 24 décembre 1892; 3 janvier 1894; 6 décembre 1903; 14 août 1898.

1048 I thank Dr. Robert Nye for pointing out this distinction.
portrait was "surrounded by a halo in which one could read humanitas", identifying him as a "providential man". During his visit to Reims in 1901, a large cartouche announcing PAX (PEACE) towered over the city's Hôtel de Ville, while six arcs de triomphe formed an illuminated vault over the cortege route, reminiscent of the traditional processional decor celebrating French monarchs. The first arc, four stories high and ablaze with electric lights in a somber grey street, bore the greeting "Au Tsar, Apôtre de la Paix" ("To the Tsar, the Apostle of Peace"); the second, scintillating too with light, supported an immense imperial crown surmounted by an Orthodox cross. Et in terra pax hominibus, "let there be peace among men on earth", the Archbishop of Reims prayed that day. Nicholas II also attended a triumphant military revue in Compiègne; just thirteen years later, in answer to the Franco-Russian alliance, German bombs would shatter Reims cathedral.

---

1049 The proposed Hague conference, designed to halt the continental arms race, was announced by Russia's minister of Foreign Affairs in Saint Petersburg on August 24, 1898. Henri Daragon and Ernest Demanne, Le Président Loubet en Russie: Voyage-réception-discours-iconographie de la carte postale franco-russe-bibelots populaires-chansons (Paris: H. Daragon, 1902), 82. The notion of a "providential man" who might serve as the savior of France is discussed in Winock, "Joan of Arc", 478. See also the postcard series (in four languages): "Honneur au Czar Nicolas II qui a eu l'idée du désarmement universel", held at the Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris.


1051 These street decorations were depicted as part of a hundred-meter long, one-half meter high panorama (extant) painted by Russian court artist Pavel Yakovlevitch Piassetsky to commemorate the Tsar's stay in Compiègne. Piassetsky's depiction matches detailed descriptions in local newspapers; his panorama also included an image of Nicolas and Alexandra arriving at the Reims cathedral. Un Tsar à Compiègne, 14, 98, 100.
7.3 Linking the alliance with the domestic issues of depopulation and Republican education

Yet the question of secularization versus religion was not the only domestic issue that elites would attempt to harness to popular alliance support. At times adding to the theme of a *famille chrétienne*, some actors suggested a sort of trans-national extended family with Russia, portraying it as an exemplar of family values, or extolling its role in a bilateral military fraternity for youth, thereby linking the alliance to the issues of depopulation and Republican education. Setting the context here, ongoing elite depopulation initiatives attempted to appeal to responsible citizenship to increase the birth rate in France, while educational measures sought to inculcate the Republic's military ideals. Deemed to have contributed to the 1871 defeat, these key issues now incorporated appeals to women and youth.

Media editors frequently depicted the relationship with Russia through a secular idiom of family, employing terms such as *sœurs* or *fraternité*, and even *amour* or *fiançailles* (sisters, fraternity, love or engagement). This lends further weight to the previously-noted proposal by Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic which argued for an analytical framework of "relationships" among countries. According to her analysis, unity forged under threat may take on the language of family, in which cultural and religious dimensions become important.1052 Notions of family may have also been employed in France in an effort to downplay the political gulf between autocracy and democracy.

Multiple publications emphasized familial themes, whether praising the bilateral relationship or celebrating the Tsarina's *maternité*. The two nations were most often described as "sisters", but "brothers" remained problematic given the *devise* of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*. In semantic parsing, some commentators praised the "brotherly" relationship instead, employing

1052 Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension", 95, 100.
adjectival qualifiers such as "liens fraternals" ("fraternal links"). It is worth noting that even before the alliance was ratified, elites began to suggest such family ties, as in an aristocratic benefit for the poor of Russia and France held in Paris in 1892. Family feeling was also demonstrated by the Lyon press which organized a gala to benefit sailors' families when a Russian cruiser sank in 1893, and later by the PJSI which covered the service for a Russian sailor who had died in Le Havre. As described below, the family theme was further invoked by involving French children in alliance celebrations and by engaging them through school materials and periodicals for youth. When French children communicated with their Russian counterparts, their letters and poems included greetings such as "un bonjour fraternel", or described the nations as "deux familles".

At times, the notion of family invited the metaphor of romance. Beginning in 1891, newspaper articles and cartoons - in urgent anticipation of a formal military pact, spurred by the recent renewal of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy - expressed criticism that while the public waited for a proper "engagement", Russia was merely "flirting" with France. All was resolved: in 1893 during the Russian naval visit, the periodical La Silhouette

1053 The outdoor event was held at the Tuileries Gardens. "La fête de bienfaisance au profit des pauvres de Russie et de France dans le jardin des Tuileries", l'Illustration, août 1892, as quoted in Paris des illusions, 50. Charity was bilateral throughout the alliance decade; for example, in 1896 Nicolas II left 100,000 francs for the poor in Paris, and in 1901, 15,000 francs for the poor of Dunkirk, Compiègne and Reims, plus 100,000 francs for those in Paris. Un Tsar à Compiègne, 92.


1055 For examples of this correspondence see Bournand, Livre d'or franco-russe, 256-259; Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898, 51-53.

depicted Russian Admiral Avellan placing a ring on Marianne’s hand. By contrast, some opposition to the alliance could be detected in another illustration which depicted Marianne huddled in bed with a Russian bear. Yet vociferous calls for Nicholas II to re-affirm the alliance emerged in 1896 as street vendors sold "engagement rings" including a "ring of the new alliance", while Le Figaro greeted the Tsar with a headline trumpeting "Un peuple amoureux " ("A People in Love").

Editors of the *PJSI* went to particular lengths to depict the family theme, and as noted, its illustrations could take on both religious and secular casts. These images were framed around central figures and events, drawn from a repertoire steeped in a Catholic tradition wherein images served three functions: mnemonic (to engrave in memory), didactic (to teach, especially illiterates and youth), and emotional (to encourage devotion). Each could be borrowed for picturing Russia. As Ségolène le Men has noted, images are often associated with the discovery of the new, and are a paradigmatic mode for the identification with heroes. In the *fin-de-siècle* battle between les deux Frances, few common heroes and saints could be found; a Russian Tsar might stand in for both. Illustrations might therefore function as indices of attachment and meaning, similar to family portraits and the images of saints. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 6, a heroic Tsar might serve as a device for warding off threats, with his

---


person possessed in the abstract sense.\(^{1061}\) *PJSI* illustrations could also enable an imagined virtual familiarity, with portraits of Nicholas II and his family functioning as a metaphorical bridge linking the familial to the national and the supra-national self. Generativity could be implied, in the sense of shaping future generations that only France’s national survival could guarantee.

As one example, *PJSI* illustrations of Russian leaders often appeared in portrait form employing "intimate" social distance.\(^{1062}\) One image of Nicholas II depicted him in non-ceremonial dress, as an approachable middle-class male civilian sitting in a neutral space, i.e. in an indeterminate grey haze, shorn of any "Russian-ness". Presenting the Tsar at eye-level for the reader might downplay the distance between autocracy and democracy, a meaning conveyed via connoted suggestion. Alternatively, the *PJSI* could invite readers to "witness" intimate events such as the passing of Alexander III; of several illustrations narrating this event, one pictured him in bed giving instructions to his son, one assumes regarding the alliance.\(^{1063}\)

Beyond direct appeals to the theme of a bilateral family, some elite actors sought to harness the alliance directly to France’s depopulation concerns. As outlined in Chapter 1, demographic angst served as a key motivator for France to seek an alliance, with domestic pronatalist efforts having little effect.\(^{1064}\) Neither an idealized Marianne, as a secular harbinger of fertility, nor pleas including "Maternity is the patriotism of women" by Alexandre Dumas junior,

\[^{1061}\] "Apprehending the face’s image", noted Susan Stewart, "becomes a mode of possession....The face is a type of ‘deep’ text". Susan Stewart, *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (London: Duke University Press, 1993), 90, 125, 127.


\[^{1064}\] See Chapter 1 for a full list of references on depopulation.
commanded influence. Reflecting these concerns, France led Europe with almost two hundred philanthropic infant daycares by 1892, and the science magazine *La Nature* referenced classical Sparta for their rationale:

> We are increasingly preoccupied...by the diminishing number of births in our country. As it is difficult to arrive at an effective remedy for this cause of depopulation and social decline, some are working ingeniously to guarantee, in the greatest possible measure, the life of the little human beings who must one day become citizens and soldiers

Efforts to connect Russia to the issue of infant health emerged soon after the 1871 defeat. In 1874, for example, *La Jeune mère*, a journal focused on child hygiene, feeding and diseases, published a report comparing foundling homes in Russia and France. This claimed an eighty percent survival rate at the Moscow Foundling Institute due to healthy, attentive wet-nurses. Here was an allusion to the 1874 *loi Roussel*, a law which attempted to place the rearing of young children by those other than their mothers under state control, due to the high mortality rate among infants fed by wet-nurses in France. Images of healthy Russian *nourrices* also infiltrated French culture: in 1882 *La Jeune mère* reprinted a *Le Figaro* story implying that

---


318
Russian wet-nurses were so in vogue that aspiring French nourrices donned "Russian" outfits for employment interviews.  

Upon the accession of Nicholas II, therefore, French preoccupations with motherhood would ensure glowing reviews of the Tsarina and her children. While it is a rare thing to connect breast-feeding with international relations, in a truly French leçon des choses ("show and tell"), in 1895 the PJSI featured a full-page cover illustration of the Tsarina breast-feeding her one-month-old daughter Olga (Figure 9). Once again Marianism was employed for Catholic readers. Implicitly criticizing the widespread employment of wet-nurses in France, the caption proclaimed:

The most powerful woman in the world thus offers an example to all the women on earth; she is fulfilling her natural duty, a duty which no mother avoids. The Virgin [Mary] offered her breast to Christ because she knew that it was the duty of she who had given Him life on earth...[the empress] offers an example that I hope will be followed; this is an immense service that she will have given to humanity in following the dictates of her heart.

La Croix joined the éloge to the baby grande-duchesse, reflecting newly-minted support for a devout Tsar and family who might serve as an example to Republican secularizers. Addressing depopulation and appealing to its female constituency, it praised a "noble" mother (of nine) who had asked asked that French children recite Ave Maria for Olga during her visit. Imagining Olga in a secular celebrity culture, by contrast, Le Gaulois reported on a

\footnotesize


1069 Demonstrating their support in celebrating maternity, the French press presented a cradle to the Tsarina, while advertisers exploited Olga's popularity with images of her on soaps, perfumes and even table linens. One novelty chromolithograph for sale depicted her sleeping on one side and awake on the other. Deschamps, Souvenirs patriotiques, 38, 12, 37, 39, 36.

1070 "La Tsarine allaitant la grande-duchesse Olga", Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré, 8 décembre 1895, 1. Breast feeding was interrupted, however, by the Tsar's 1896 official visit; Le Figaro reported that Russian cows accompanied the imperial visitors for bottle-feeding purposes. "La petite grande-duchesse", Le Figaro, 6 octobre 1896, 3.

1071 "L'Ave des enfants", La Croix, 12 octobre 1896, 1.
Guignol puppetry gala for the baby, arranged by the President's wife. Such reporting was supplemented by an abundance of poetry praising Olga in the press. As noted in Chapter 6, song sheets honored other Russian children too: compositions included "Les enfants de Moscou", "Lettre d'un bébé français", and a melody entitled "Berceuse Cosaque" ("Cossack Cradle"). After the 1896 visit, French parents also began to christen their children Olga and other Russian names.

In the PJSI, representation through the lens of fecundity further predominated during President Faure's 1897 visit to Russia, via an illustration of Faure "dans l'intimité" with the Tsar and his family, with Olga on his knee as her younger sister looked on from a nurse's arms. Two dolls lay at the feet of the President and the Tsar, a reference to the dolls Faure presented to Russia's most illustrious "little mothers". Here the illustrator's props once again connected family and religion, via signified, connoted meaning: an icon of Mary presided over a room in which one of the proffered dolls wore the traditional peasant costume of Brittany, perhaps France's most strongly Catholic region. The PJSI subsequently published images of second daughter Tatiana's christening, while over the following years illustrations of the Tsar's children

---

1072 One such poem read "... this little angel, this little doll [Olga]...He is coming, old St. Nicholas...Doucha moïa [little one], it's me, you see...He continues his blessed flight, in the sky sparkling with snow,...Bôjé Tsaria Khrani [God bless the Tsar], Sang the angels of his cortege." Excerpt from the sixteen-stanza poem by C. Ségard, "La nuit de Saint-Nicolas, à la grande-duchesse Olga", as quoted in Deschamps, Livre d'or, 114.


appeared on the front pages of all popular newspapers.\footnote{321} Yet no images of any other royal European offspring appeared in the French press,\footnote{1075} despite the defensive military alliance with Italy negotiated in 1902 and the \textit{Entente cordiale} with England in 1904. Metaphorically, the Russian imperial family served the pronatalist agenda, but it also signalled the provision of what depopulation initiatives would ultimately fail to deliver: military brothers for France.

Meanwhile, key Republican actors sought to involve French children (as future voters and conscripts) in the alliance, against a backdrop of preparedness for a possible future war. Nationalism and militarism escalated between 1880 and 1914, with Germany increasing its armaments budget by four hundred percent, compared to one hundred percent in France;\footnote{1077} the latter would rely on its Russian ally to compensate for the difference. As noted in Chapter 6, rising militarism sparked sales of military toys and "alphabets militaires", as well as a government Military Education Commission.\footnote{1078} Shooting societies for boys also expanded after 1871; organized by nationalist groups including \textit{revanchiste} Paul Déroulède's \textit{Ligue des patriotes}, these supplemented school physical education programs incorporating military preparation.\footnote{1079} \textit{Bataillons scolaires} and gymnastics societies (depicted in posters by the \textit{Épinal}}

\footnotetext[1075]{“En Russie: Baptême de S.A.I. la grande-duchesse Tatiana”; Les grandes-duchesses Olga et Tatiana, filles de S.M. l'Empereur de Russie”; “La famille impériale de la Russie”, \textit{Le Petit Journal Supplément illustré}, Il juillet 1897, 1; 5 février 1899; 15 septembre 1901. Also symbolic of the focus on religion and family, during the Tsar's 1901 visit to Compiègne, France's ambassador to Russia asked Nicolas ll to serve as god-father for his grandson's christening. \textit{Un Tsar à Compiègne}, 85.}

\footnotetext[1076]{This is based on my observations.}


\footnotetext[1078]{Children's toys and books were supplemented by adult military \textit{revues} including \textit{L'Avenir militaire} and \textit{Le Progrès militaire}. "Armée et Marine", \textit{La Presse}, 22 décembre 1897, 4.}

firm, discussed below) trained during extracurricular hours, while bicycles such as the Securitas and Tricycle militaire developed skills for a bicycle corps.\textsuperscript{1080} France had thirty-six gymnastics societies in 1869, but by 1891 their number reached nine hundred, a reflection of Bismarck’s saber-rattling. Making the connection with Russia, when the annual Festival of the Union of Gymnastics Societies was held in Nancy (capital of Lorraine) in 1892, the most prominent foreign attendee was Grand Duke Constantine, cousin of Alexander III.\textsuperscript{1081} And when Nicholas II and Alexandra journeyed to France in 1901, youth gymnastic clubs participated in their welcome to Reims.\textsuperscript{1082}

Highlighting this widespread militarization of youth, art historian Richard Thomson has described a popular painting entitled "Devant Le Rêve de Detaille" by Paul Legrand, exhibited at the Paris Salon of 1897. The painting depicts young French boys gazing at a lithograph of a battle scene, affixed to a Paris kiosk alongside illustrated newspapers portraying the Tsar’s

\textsuperscript{1080} "Le bataillon scolaire", Estampe 951 in Receuil - Images de la Maison Pellerin 10 (1881-1889); "Fête de gymnastique", Estampe 306 in Receuil - Images de la Maison Pellerin 12 (fin 1891-1893). Posters advertising Securitas products appeared in shops and in popular periodicals. See for example l’Homéopathie populaire: Journal international de propagande 4:78 (15 juillet 1891): 169, http://gallica.bnf.fr. Military socialization of children also featured in advertising, as in a poster distributed by the Magasins du Pont Neuf entitled "Enfants français et russes". This depicted an embrace between a French and a Russian girl, fore-grounded by French and Russian boys dressed in sailor and soldier outfits; a toy cannon accompanied nationalist symbols of flag and fleet. As found in François le Guévellou, "Blogspot. Franco-russe: Résultats d’une rencontre". http://francoisleguevellou.blogspot.com. Meanwhile a company called Guillout marketed its "Nouveau dessert exquis Guillout" via a poster featuring a French boy in military clothing - complete with saber - kissing the cheek of Russian girl in traditional Ukrainian dress. See the poster at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b90158835


\textsuperscript{1082} Un Tsar à Compiègne, 99.
1896 visit. This lithograph was a "ubiquitously circulated" copy of celebrated military painter Édouard Detaillé's canvas, *Le Rêve* (1888), a massive *salon* painting exhibited at the 1889 *exposition universelle*, which portrayed soldiers on a battlefield dreaming of Napoleonic glory. Tellingly, Detaillé had served along with Paul Déroulède on the Military Education Commission initiated by the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1881; he also produced an illustrated book on the Russian army in 1886. Another popular lithograph, "Nous les aurons!" ("We will have them!"), depicted boys in "martial play" complete with flag, kepi and weapons; the slogan here was Jeanne d'Arc's purported exhortation to expel the enemy from France.

Young people themselves might connect war preparedness with the alliance upon seeing mass-printed army conscription ballots featuring illustrations of Russian and French soldiers. In 1892, the year following the French warship visit to Cronstadt, the printing firm Épinal began to include the phrase "Alliance franco-russe" on its large, colorful ballots for the annual conscription lottery, thereby telegraphing secret negotiations between military chiefs

---


1088 The 1889 conscription law required seventy percent of males to complete three full years of service, while the remaining thirty percent completed one year of military training. Conscription draws were an important event in villages across France, with ballots often worn publicly on conscripts' hats. Forrest, *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars*, 141-142. For more on the public nature of the conscription process, see Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 294-298; Thomson, *Troubled Republic*, 172. "Alliance franco-russe: Espoir! Tirage au sort, classe 189 [billet de conscription]" (Épinal: Pellerin et Cie,
of staff. These ballots were paraded in villages across France, often on potential conscripts' hats.\footnote{Ballots were printed in sufficient quantity to last ten years, therefore these images would be seen repeatedly. Thomson, \textit{Troubled Republic}, 201. Although it suffers in translation, one illustrated ballot featured a poem that read: "Your flags that bear the same colors/, Of this friendship which links you together/, Were the symbolic precursors/- Mysterious prophecy/- France-Russia! Better yet, your names affianced/- Mysterious harmony/- Say, otherwise in rhyme/, Exactly: "Races united", France and Russia! "- France-Russie, Races réunies", in Grand-Carteret, \textit{Le Musée pittoresque}, 215.} Children would also have observed pro-alliance posters appealing to passers-by, as vast numbers of posters, a key \textit{fin-de-siècle} medium to "nourish opinion and fix political representations", were affixed in public spaces.\footnote{Kalifa, \textit{La culture de masse en France}, 63.; Jordanova, \textit{The Look of the Past}, 165, 174-175. For the practice of mass posting during this era, see Hazel H. Hahn, \textit{Scenes of Parisian Modernity: Culture and Consumption in the Nineteenth Century} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 139-174.} These included images by Épinal, whose posters frequently commanded print runs of 300,000 to 500,000.\footnote{The Épinal firm manufactured multiple posters, paper games and cut-outs, popular media in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Denis Martin et Bernard Huin, \textit{Images d'Épinal} (Paris: Éditions de la Réunion des musées nationaux, 1995), 59.} Similar to the media described in Chapters 3 through 6, Épinal illustrations emphasized Russia as a great power and a worthy partner for France, along with the themes of fraternity and peace, as seen in a poster entitled "La Fraternité: La paix par l'union". Others depicted Russian regiments, the Cronstadt and Toulon visits, the death of Alexander III, the marriage of Nicolas II, and his 1896 visit to France.\footnote{Imagérie d'Épinal: Imagérie politique (Épinal, France: 1986); Philippe Deschamps, \textit{Souvenirs patriotiques des fêtes franco-russes. Supplément au catalogue officiel de la collection franco-russe} (Paris: 1898), 13, 36, 41, http://gallica.bnf.fr; Neptunia. Cadeaux des Tsars: La diplomatie navale dans l'Alliance franco-russe, 1891-1914. \textit{La revue des Amis du Musée national de la Marine}, numéro hors-série. Exhibition catalogue (Paris: Musée national de la Marine, 2010), 15, 6.} All of these could be viewed in streetscapes across the nation.

Beyond Épinal ballots and posters, multiple "feuilles volantes" or miscellaneous handbills extolled the alliance on town and city walls, part of the \textit{fin-de-siècle} practice of mass
wallpapering with ephemeral notices.\textsuperscript{1093} One anonymous handbill featured a black-bordered invitation to passers-by, young and old, to attend the "Funerailles de la Triple Alliance" occasioned by the Franco-Russian pact; such "funeral notices" could be published in runs of 100,000 and more.\textsuperscript{1094} Other notices advertised public festivities, including special activities for youth, during official Russian visits.

French children also participated in the embrace of Russia via alliance celebrations, school materials, communicative exchange, and periodical reading. Indeed, the linking of children with the alliance began immediately after 1891. When reporting on the 1892 centennial celebrations commemorating the annexation of Savoie, for example, L'Univers illustré depicted a French youth dressed in Russian costume greeting the delegates with \textit{Vive la France! Vive la Russie!}\textsuperscript{1095} During the 1893 Russian naval visit, children's delegations greeted naval officers and participated in receptions at Toulon schools; at one venue three hundred choristers sang the Russian national anthem while their \textit{confrères} presented gifts. In Paris the Russian officers visited other schools, among them the \textit{lycée} Buffon, which had begun to offer courses in

\textsuperscript{1093} Political, police and advertising posters had been posted since the eighteenth century, but their numbers ballooned with urbanization. After 1884 advertising companies were permitted to bid for wall space on Paris buildings, in addition to space on kiosks, columns, sandwich signs and omnibuses. One contemporary Parisian denounced the "hallucinatory...brutality" of the unlimited numbers of posters in public spaces, resulting in a daily "triumph of paper over stone". This mass posting was not outlawed until the twentieth century. Michael Buhrs, ed., \textit{Jules Chéret, Artist of the Belle Époque and Pioneer of Poster Art} (Munich: Arnoldsche Art Publishers, 2011), 53-54; Maurice Talmeyr, "L'Âge de l'affiche", \textit{Revue des deux mondes} (1 septembre 1896): 201, 209, 215; Max Gallo, \textit{The Poster in History} (Seacaucus, NJ: The Wellfleet Press, 1989), 9-35; Bevis Hillier, \textit{Histoire de l'affiche} (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1970), 49; Miriam R. Levin, "Democratic Vistas-Democratic Media: Defining a Role for Printed Images in Industrializing France", \textit{French Historical Studies} 18:1 (Spring, 1993): 82-108.


Russian in 1892. Musical compositions also lauded amitié, with children singing "Vive la Russie" and the "Marche russe" in 1893, while in 1896, youth choirs celebrated the Tsar's visit.

In Republican schools, meanwhile, children absorbed the importance of militarization as part of a program of reforms and indoctrination deemed necessary to address the inferiority of French education, labeled as a major cause of the 1871 defeat. Beginning in 1881 the Republic mandated primary school education, and by 1883 public school students outnumbered those in private schools by four to one. Arguing for a largely invisible simmering mentalité of revanche, Richard Thomson has described the importance of patriotic education in Republican curricula. With schools and the army now envisioned as the dual pillars of the nation, the state attempted to enshrine a "national vision of democracy", emphasizing the duty of military service and aimed at producing enlightened voters who were educated by teachers as

---

1096 Marius Vachon, Les marins russes en France (Paris: Librairies-Imprimeries Réunies, 1894), 5, 54-55, 91-93, 97; Michel Kanner, "Au jour le jour: Le russe dans les lycées", Le Figaro, 21 août 1892, 1. In Paris, the Société pour la propagation des langues étrangères oriented its courses in Russian language instruction to students aged twelve to thirteen years; by 1897, students were able to perform a Russian comedy in its original text. Marianna Butenschön, Zarenhymne und Marseillaise: Zur Geschichte der Rußland-Ideologie in Frankreich, 1870/71-1893/94 (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1978), 119.


1098 For a discussion of the militarization of school instruction, including the 1882 provision of more than half a million rifles for schools, see Alain Vergnioux, "Les petits soldats de la République", Le Télémaque 42:2 (2012): 9-17. https://www.cairn.info

1099 School reforms were begun under Minister of Public Instruction Jules Ferry. Education was henceforth to be obligatory (until age thirteen), secular and free. As crucifixes and holy images were removed from schools, Catholics reacted strongly. The Republic also began the phase-out of nuns and priests in primary schools in 1886. See "À bas les iconoclastes!", La Croix, 1 juillet 1881, 1. Janine Neboit-Mombet, L'image de la Russie dans le roman français, 1859-1900 (Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2005), 14.

1100 Thomson, Troubled Republic, 197-201.
"hussars" of the new Republic. One dictation exercise, for example, characterized schools as "la petite patrie" ("the little homeland"), while the nation was "LA GRANDE PATRIE". To encourage "soldier-citizens", the national civic instruction textbook began with chapters on military service and the importance of taxes needed to support the army. Students also recited the poem Chants du soldat by Paul Déroulède, and studied maps of France with Alsace and Lorraine portrayed in a gray wash.

The evidence reveals that with respect to Russia, both governmental and extra-governmental actors contributed to the initiatives above. Academic go-between Alfred Rambaud was likely influential; in 1879 he became cabinet head in the Ministry of Public Instruction, and served as Minister himself from 1896 to 1898. Revanchiste Paul Déroulède and other members of the Military Education Committee were also active in these initiatives. Although further elite actors are difficult to identify, publishers were certainly involved; according to Christian Amalvi primary school manuals revealed an enthusiastic echo of the alliance "euphoria" sweeping France, while secondary manuals demonstrated a shift to more positive portrayals of Russia.

---


1103 Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-1871 in French Memory (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 30. The idea of homeland permeated the most popular children's text in France: Le Tour de France par deux enfants (1877), a tale of two orphaned brothers whose father had dreamed of escape from German-occupied Lorraine. With six million copies sold by 1901, Le Tour remained the most popular of Republican works. Another popular textbook was the three-volume Petit Lavisse, written by historian and educator Ernest Lavisse; between 1884 and 1895 this ran through seventy-five editions. His book was accompanied by two small "readers" describing the exploits of military heroes and giving "instruction in military matters". Lavisse's brother also contributed an 1888 pamphlet entitled Tu seras soldat. Jacques and Mona Ozouf, "Le Tour de France par deux enfants: The Little Red Book of the Republic"; Pierre Nora, "Lavisse, The Nation's Teacher" in Realms of Memory, Vol. 2, 125-148, 150-184.
beginning in 1888, i.e., corresponding to the first loan. Current events, too, could play an important role in valorizing the alliance: Paris schools closed for the Russian naval visit in 1893, while the Tsar's 1896 visit led to a national school holiday, with teachers officially invited to Paris for the celebrations. Along with their students, teachers unable to travel to the capital could attend festivities honoring the event held in over one hundred French cities. Meanwhile other educational initiatives spurred some bilateral exchange with Russian elites.

Illustrated color notebook covers and ink blotters (some distributed free of charge by manufacturers and others by municipalities, and some with no obvious attribution) also ensured that Russian leaders and military "types" became well known in schools. Both students and teachers were encouraged to collect such images, with teachers to use them in instruction.

---

1104 Christian Amalvi, "L'histoire de la Russie au miroir de l'enseignement secondaire français, 1870-1940", Revue des études slaves 57:4 (1985): 622, 630. This positive emphasis on Russia contrasted with the negative portrayals of Russian autocracy, imperialism, culture, religion, pan-Slavism and corruption found in German school textbooks at the time. Troy Paddock has investigated these portrayals, as found in over one hundred history and geography textbooks. Troy Paddock, Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914 (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2010), 26-32, 40, 47-48.


1106 In a French exhibit mounted as part of Moscow's 1891 industrial and agricultural exposition, handmade items from Parisian primary schools and kindergartens were exhibited as examples of pedagogical interest, later donated to the future Museum of Education in St. Petersburg. An educational society patronized by Grand Duchess Elisabeth Feodorovna and Princess Galitzine also requested to keep the albums from professional schools for young French girls. Among the five thousand aristocratic Russian women who signed an album of watercolors to be offered to France, some had raised money for a scholarship at a French girls' lycée. Meanwhile, aristocratic French elites further encouraged educational exchange. The count of Montebello, for example, sent twenty-seven illustrated books to primary school children in Russia on behalf of their comrades in France; this gift was acknowledged by Russia's Minister of Public Instruction. Andréi Davydov et al, Paris-Moscou, un siècle d'échanges, 1820-1920 (Paris: Paris Musées, Archives de Paris, 1999), 51, 55; Bournand, Livre d'or, 367, 378.

Pro-alliance notebooks hailing the Russian naval visit first appeared in 1893, to be followed by those with illustrations of Russian soldiers in 1895 and 1896. Others depicted the 1895 coronation of Nicholas II, followed by a series which portrayed key moments of his 1896 visit and another series depicting President Faure's visit to Russia in 1897. These latter examples of indoctrination demonstrated involvement by commercial actors, with the coronation notebook distributed by the "Mission française de Moscou", and the 1897 example was produced by the Lyon "Société Économique d'Alimentation".

Educational firms also published a range of children's books related to Russia. While at times their themes echoed those of the adult books described in Chapter 3, some extolled a familial relationship with titles such as *Deux soeurs, France et Russie*. Additional works could appeal to intimate imaginings, including the stories *Le Moujik* and *Marfa: Les épreuves du devoir*, and the novel *Histoire d'une petite princesse russe*. School book prizes, an important feature of Republican curricula, celebrated Russia too. Several of these remain in the collections of France's Musée National de l'Éducation (MNE), with their titles ranging from *La...

---

1108 See these surviving examples: "Place de l'Opéra pendant les fêtes russes, octobre 1893 (Paris: Godchaux et Cie); "L'Armée russe: officier général; Régiment Pavlovski; Première brigade d'artillerie de la Garde; Soldat des gardes à cheval; Les cuirassés de la Garde; Colonel du régiment des Grenadiers; Sergent-Major du 4ème bataillon des Tirailleurs; Officier des Cosaques du convoi de S.M. l'Empereur; Officier des Cosaques de l'Oural; Officier supérieur du 5ème régiment d'infanterie de Kalouga (Paris: Ch. Delagrave, 1895). Musée National de l'Éducation (MNE), Rouen, inventory numbers 1986.1222.1-10.

1109 Deschamps, *Supplément*, 27; "Les Souverains russes en France; À Paris; À l'Hôtel-de-Ville; Le départ"; "Les Fêtes du couronnement du Tsar Nicolas II"; "Le Voyage de M. Félix Faure en Russie", as found in Le Guévellou, "Blogspot. Franco-russe".


1111 Kalifa, *La culture de masse*, 32.
Russie en images to La Russie: nos alliés chez eux. The first example appeared on an official list of awards for high-achieving students, while the second, no doubt extraordinarily expensive judging by its quality and voluminous illustrations, featured a bilateral effort with three hundred pages contributed by Russian scholars.  

Added to the fraternal messaging visible in posters and school materials, French lycée administrators sent telegrams of greeting to Russian schools, and they encouraged students to exchange poetry and messages, a practice noted in the influential Les Annales politiques et littéraires directed by Alfred Rambaud. Surviving Russian poems held at the MNE, some exquisitely illustrated, arrived from Odessa, Smolensk, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Sebastopol and beyond. Gifts circulated too; in 1897 for example, the Municipal Council of Paris received a doll in ethnic dress from a Russian civil servant, ostensibly from the functionary’s daughter who specified that it be presented to a French girl of the same name and age. A city-wide school lottery was organized for an appropriate recipient, and a local merchant donated a French doll to be sent in return; the press subsequently published illustrations of the dolls and of their


1114 For examples of poetry, see “La jeunesse russe à la jeunesse française”, Bournand, Livre d’or, 256-270; “Correspondance scolaire franco-russe, 1893”; MNE, Rouen: Inventory nos. 1979.5322 (1-22).
recipients. In this the themes of imperial ethnography, maternity and family might be intermingled for youth.

In a final form of pro-alliance media, specialist periodicals targeted young readers with articles concerning Russia. Reflecting rising literacy and a new "scientific" interest in childhood, between 1857 and 1904 more than forty periodicals for youth were published in France, representing approximately twenty-five percent of all periodicals published between 1857 and 1904. Many concentrated on nationalist themes; according to Alain Fourment, they routinely contained articles on foreign affairs, and Franco-Russian relations remained the topic most frequently discussed. Editors publicized stories and novels about Russia such as Le Prince Serge, the latter advertised in Le Journal des enfants, or they encouraged the notion of family. Thus Mon journal featured letters from readers expressing friendship towards their "comrades" in Russia, and Hachette’s Le Journal de la jeunesse mourned the death of Tsar Alexander III. Although most periodicals concentrated on the Tsars and the alliance, Le Journal des écoliers


1116 Children’s periodicals published during the alliance era included Le Journal des enfants (monthly from 1832 to 1897), Le Magasin d’éducation et de récréation (bi-weekly from 1864 to 1915), Le Journal de la jeunesse (illustrated weekly from 1872 to 1914), Le Saint-Nicolas (weekly from 1880 to 1915), Mon journal (monthly from 1881 to 1925), La Jeune Fille (weekly from 1888 to 1898), Le Petit Français illustré (weekly from 1889 to 1905), L’Écolier illustré (weekly from 1890 to 1915), La Gazette des enfants (weekly from 1890 to 1891), Le Journal des écoliers et des écolières (weekly from 1895 to 1899), L’Écho de la jeunesse (monthly from 1898 to 1910). Louis Guéry, Visages de la presse: histoire de la présentation de la presse française du XVII au XXe siècles (Paris: Victoires Éditions, 2006), 134-137; Alain Fourment, Histoire de la presse des jeunes et des journaux d’enfants, 1768-1988 (Paris: Éditions Éole, 1987), 417-420, 88, 125, 127. See also François Marcoin, "La presse enfantine" in La Civilisation du journal, 565-572. A full list of digitized children’s periodicals is available at http://gallica.bnf.fr/


et des écolières and Le Saint Nicolas differed by underscoring revanche, linking the goal to re-annex Alsace-Lorraine with the alliance.  

Some publications appealed directly to children's emotions, including Le Saint Nicolas. As an example, its Christmas 1896 issue opened with a full-page portrait of Saint Nicholas, hands raised in delight as he was offered a bouquet by a young Russian boy in thanks for the recent "tender welcome shown to ... the grand-duchess Olga". This article declared that under the saint's "protective mantle", French and Russian children would learn to love one another, so that upon adulthood they might honor both nations. In 1897, during President Faure's visit to Russia, "Saint Nicholas" encouraged readers to send him cards and letters for Russian children, which he would forward on their behalf.

Of all these periodicals for youth, however, one stands out as a clear alliance champion: the influential weekly Le Petit Français illustré established in 1889. It boasted the largest readership, with more than 265,000 readers. Targeted at male students by revanchiste director Arthur Meyer, the journal's debut issue tellingly opened with a story about the lost province of Alsace, followed immediately by a story about Russia.  

1119 This observation is based on my reading.


1122 "La 10e année du Petit Français illustré", 2-3. This weekly periodical cost ten centimes, twice the cost of a popular daily newspaper and signaling a well-heeled reading audience. Regrettably, large lacunae at the BNF mean that many weeks from the PFI's 1892 to 1896 editions are not available in digitized format; nor are they available in the collections of La Cité internationale de la bande dessinée et de l'image, at http://collections.citebd.org.

1123 The firm of its editor, Armand Colin, published primary school manuals and employed Republican university savants to write its texts on history, geography and science, among other subjects.
(hereafter the *PFI*) marked the 1893 Russian fleet visit by offering thousands of pre-printed postcards for its readers to send to Russian schoolchildren, noting later that these had spurred many "durable friendships" and that they had been "very often imitated".\(^{1124}\) The postcards, addressed to "nos petits camarades russes", bore a long greeting in both French and Russian which incorporated emotional and martial appeal.\(^{1125}\) Demonstrating their reach, Russia's


\[^{1125}\] Each postcard read (translation mine):

Like the faithful dove,
Over sea and mountain,
Despite rampart and citadel
Fly towards those we love.

Hopefully this card
Will finally land under your skies
And it will be the messenger
Of our fraternal greeting.

Schoolchildren of Russia,
Our eyes are turned towards you
And our hearts connect you to
The celebrations now greeting your [naval fleet].

*Salut*, far-away comrades,
Because today the same waters
With our vessels, in our harbors,
Cradle your triumphant ships.

We, children who obey our teachers,
Work while dreaming of tomorrow.
And the day approaches, perhaps,
When we will shake your hand!

sent by: __________________________
age: __________________________
address: __________________________

"Comme la colombe fidèle,/Là-bas, par-delà flots et monts,/Malgré rempart et citadelle/Vole vers ceux que nous aimons./Puisse cette feuille légère/S'abattre enfin sous votre ciel,/Et qu'elle soit la messagère/De notre bonjour fraternel./Petits écoliers de Russie,/Vers vous nos regards sont tournés,/Et notre coeur vous associe/Aux fêtes où sont vos aînés./Salut, ô lointains camarades,"
Minister of Public Instruction welcomed the postcards with a telegram: "We pray ardently to God that the friendship and love of peace which unite the French and Russian governments will grow deep roots in the hearts of the young generation of both nations." Further appealing to familial themes, the PFI offered its readers a portrait of the Tsar in 1896; one subscriber reported that images of Nicholas II and Alexandra had routinely hung in his home, where it was also de rigueur to celebrate the Russian peasant. In 1900 the PFI offered another free portrait of the Tsar, while one of its illustrations fêted the bilateral relationship: "At the foot of a figure representing peace...two schoolboys sit next to one another in an affectionate pose....enveloped in the flags of the two countries". Readers were asked to send copies of this image to children in Russia to memorialize the 1896 visit.

The PFI also published multiple news articles pertaining to Russia, contributing to the process wherein distance and differences could be imagined to recede as Russia became normalized as a partner for France. Russian military strength remained an ongoing theme, accompanying complex information on Russia's society, culture and economy, no doubt aiming to prepare future soldiers and investors for ongoing ties with Russia. Exemplifying the military ethos, the journal's 1899 Christmas supplement entitled "Soldats français et soldats


1126 "Dernières nouvelles: les Russes à Paris", La Croix, 19 octobre 1893, 1.

1127 "La 10ème année du Petit Français illustré"; Fourment, Histoire de la presse des jeunes et des journaux,117-118; "Bon à détacher", Le Petit Français illustré 12: 52 (24 novembre 1900), back pages. For information on how pro-Russian views changed after 1917, see Fourment, 181-185.

1128 In 1897 PFI articles discussed Russia's railway links, its population, Polish resistance to Russian rule, and Russian moujiks, echoing adult themes. 1898 saw further articles related to Russia's economy, ranging over topics including the Russian-American company and the forest and petrol industries near the Don River. See the Table des matières for each of these years.

334
russes” (a studiously secular choice given the season), was composed by well-known author Commander Émile Manceau. Citing a steady exchange of correspondence and gifts between French and Russian regiments, Manceau offered a comparative graphic claiming that the Russian army could provide sixteen million soldiers in time of war, to add to five million from France. This same illustration had appeared two years prior in *Le Gaulois des enfants*, also published by Arthur Meyer. Russia’s army was distinguished by its homogeneity of class, religion and education, Manceau wrote, and by its exceptional spirit. Significantly, Russian soldiers remained unique due to their "loving" Slavic nature and their resignation to sacrifice. The implication was clear: by nature and by temperament they could be counted on by the youth of France.

In conclusion then, the singularity of the Franco-Russian alliance as a national event was further encouraged by elites who attempted to harness the popularity of the alliance to overlapping domestic issues of religion versus secularization, depopulation, and Republican

\[\text{1129} \text{ Commandant E. Manceau, “Soldats français et soldats russes”, } \text{Le Petit Français illusré, Supplément spécial en couleur } 11:18 \text{ (Noël 1899). In addition to editing the } \text{La Revue d'art militaire } \text{and publishing works on officer, infantry and artillery instruction, Émile Manceau authored texts on civic and military education, including the "Code-manuel du Soldat citoyen". Émile Manceau, Armées étrangères: Essais de psychologie militaire (Paris: Bibliothèque Charpentier, 1900); "Du même auteur", 2. http://gallica.bnf.fr}

\[\text{1130} \text{ Le Gaulois des enfants was a charming, small-format periodical offered free of charge to subscribers to Arthur Meyer’s newspaper, Le Gaulois. His version of the graph contrasted with that published in Le Petit Français illusré, by claiming five million Russian soldiers and 3.4 million French soldiers (as opposed to sixteen and five million); the difference may be attributed to the number of potential conscripts. "Les Armées d’Europe comparées", Le Gaulois des Enfants, 15 août 1897, 7. http://gallica.bnf.fr}

\[\text{1131} \text{ Manceau, “Soldats français et soldats russes”, 1, 5, 8. Reflecting this widespread coverage of the Russian military, in 1905 when the periodical La Jeunesse asked which European uniform (other than French) its young male readers would prefer to wear or which officers (other than French) its young female readers would like most to marry, Russia achieved first place standing, followed by Britain - no doubt reflecting the recently-signed Entente Cordiale. Interestingly, Germany stood in third place. Fourment, Histoire de la presse, 174.} \]
education, all by exploiting the theme of a family relationship with Russia, in both the religious and secular realms. After building on fears regarding a potential German threat, key members of the press and of the Roman Catholic establishment, along with prominent *revanchistes* and academic, government and military figures, continued to promote the alliance after its ratification, albeit with frequently differing agendas. Their actions were substantially enabled by the *fin-de-siècle* pioneering diversification of media forms, due in part to the relaxation of censorship laws and to new reading audiences of women and youth encouraged by Republican educational change. Intriguingly, elite efforts to link the alliance to domestic agendas, when added to the reframing of Russia described in previous chapters, appear to have contributed to the long-term embedment of Russian referents in French cultural repertoires, as described in the dissertation’s Conclusion.

Why such widespread involvement in attempts to exploit the alliance? Patently, the *fait accompli* of the military pact during the 1890s could be seen to continually overlap with nationalist and Republican concerns. A civic ethos of fidelity to the nation and/or to the government could further be twinned with the elite posturing for leadership which distinguished the early Third Republic, engendered by the social and economic change described in Chapters 2 and 3. The latter lent itself particularly to initiatives by so-called “new elites”¹¹³², many of them publishers, whose rise coincided with that of a mass democratic culture. Some well-known actors became active in promoting the alliance by linking it with domestic issues, notably Alfred Rambaud as academic go-between and Minister of Public Instruction, and *revanchistes* Paul Déroulède and Arthur Meyer. No doubt many more worked behind the scenes. Thus the Franco-Russian alliance became a very public alliance during the 1890s, one not confined to

the hallowed halls of diplomacy, but rather trumpeted throughout multiple and influential media in France.
Conclusion

Turning a cultural lens on the genesis of the Franco-Russian alliance in France, one arrives at findings to complement those of existing geopolitical, diplomatic and financial studies. By foregrounding the *hantise* in France engendered by its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, this study highlights the backdrop of widespread tension related to national security that led many to look to Russia during the turbulent years of the early Third Republic. A significant cadre of elites, most of them extra-governmental, substantially promoted and/or enabled the alliance with Russia, considered by many to be a singularly improbable ally at the time, and they did so by employing a variety of social and media mechanisms whose formats ranged from elite to mass. They used multiple media to reframe entrenched negative representations of Russia, replacing these with a series of positive tropes that could be seen to support a military *partenariat*, despite significant bilateral political and religious divides. Remarkably, during the era from 1871 to 1901, this elite politics of persuasion helped to generate wide cohesion in France around the alliance issue, demonstrating the influence of domestic politics and contexts on foreign policy decision-making, and countering international relations scholarship that may minimize the potential import of this.

By emphasizing demographic angst and fears of German power as fundamental drivers for the alliance in France, this study explains the intense lobbying for an alliance to address national security concerns, the latter exacerbated by pronouncements from Germany’s Chancellor Otto von Bismarck during the 1880s which seemed to suggest the possibility of further war. As alliance scholar Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff has observed, "France was haunted by the idea of war, and this increased at the smallest indication....the French press
reacted to the smallest sign of aggression from the Germans”.1133 Adding to the protracted nature of negotiations, uncertainty was fanned by the unexpected death of Alexander III just months after the agreement was signed. Testifying to the jubilation of relief which greeted the first public utterance of the word "allies" by Nicolas II in 1897, when Russia's Foreign Minister arrived in Paris that year, a crowd of fifty thousand greeted him at the Gare de Lyon.1134

With reference to this dissertation’s first key finding, that the alliance in France was promoted and/or enabled by the "popular diplomacy" of elite individuals and groups who aimed to influence both government and wider public opinion, this demonstrates an ethos of citizen inclusion emerging under the early Republic. Fledgling democratic practice clearly influenced the elaboration of foreign policy decisions, as various elites, entrepreneurs and consumers became involved. Additionally, the findings of this study reflect the new political and social mobility unleashed by the Republic, encouraging non-governmental elites to become involved in significant political questions as they operated within a variety of social and institutional nodes.1135 The pro-alliance individuals and groups considered here were many and varied: beginning in the mid-1870s and continuing through the 1890s, they included academic and literary elites, lobbyists, financial actors, and publishers, plus elites in the popular publishing, mass culture and entertainment industries. During the alliance decade from 1891 to 1901, members of the Roman Catholic establishment also supported the alliance, while special interest groups sought to harness it to their domestic social agendas once the agreement was

1133 Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Une Alliance franco-russe: la France, la Russie et l’Europe au tournant du siècle dernier (Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 1997), 141.


1135 As noted in Chapter 2, elite lobby groups also formed around the national security issue of depopulation, and around the Foreign Affairs issue of colonialism, each considered by some to be essential components in re-establishing French power after 1871.
signed. Ultimately, all of these elites contributed to what would become a synthetic effort to recalibrate traditionally negative views of Russia rooted in conflicts from the past.

To reiterate from previous chapters, a variety of conditions and developments helped to facilitate alliance promotion and support. Domestically, the Republic remained beset by chronic instability and crises. Conceived in 1870 as “the government that divides us least”, its political vulnerability left a vacuum of sorts within which alliance promoters could move, enabled particularly by the new press freedoms granted in 1881. In addition, government secularization measures beginning in the early 1880s contributed to the broadening of Roman Catholic support for an alliance with Orthodox Russia. Meanwhile, on a larger scale, pan-European trends also facilitated pro-alliance efforts. These included changes in professional (academic, scientific, journalistic) and associational life, the rise of literacy, new media and new markets, the strengthening of transnational capital flows and anonymous investment societies, improvements in transportation networks, the intensification of urbanization marked by consumption and increased leisure time, and the emergence of a mass public and the mass culture industry, the latter exemplified by the *expositions universelles*. Adding to all these phenomena was the tidal wave of *fin-de-siècle* nationalism sweeping across Europe.

The study also reveals that alliance promoters might be spurred by a combination of motivations and goals. Indeed, it was the intersection and interplay of all of these that appears to have led to the intensification of alliance support. Reflecting the overwhelming national security question, all alliance adherents shared the primordial physical goal of territorial survival and military security, and for many, the political goal of reclaiming France’s traditional identity as a leader in Europe. As a subset of these, the alliance might also be purported to advance the

---

cause of revanchisme by those who trumpeted the tradition of the nation-in-arms or the sacred history of la patrie.\footnote{On the nation in arms, see Alan Forrest, \textit{The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars. The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); on the sacred history of la patrie see Pierre Nora, \textit{Rethinking France (Les Lieux de mémoire)}, Vol. 1: The State, trans. David P. Jordan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), xiv.} Added to geopolitical goals, a significant number of pro-alliance elites shared the goal of national political consensus around the alliance issue, for a majority of voters had supported the new Republic after the disaster of Napoléon III's defeat. Alliance proponents might further link the military pact to the idea of national regeneration to overcome perceptions of an oft-decried "degeneration" in France.\footnote{See Chapter 1 for more on the idea of national degeneration.} Beyond these motivations and goals, rapprochement with Russia might be envisaged to advance the specific interests of the French military, of financial elites, or of the Roman Catholic Church. And finally, alliance promoters might invoke the alliance to buttress their domestic campaigns concerning the issues of religion, depopulation and education.

Also important for considering the intensification of pro-alliance agitation, the call to ally with Russia was fuelled by critical events, particularly by the 1887 Schnaebelé border crisis and subsequent sabre-rattling by Bismarck, fuelling support for Boulangism and the vociferous campaigns of revanchards and other ultra-nationalist groups. General Georges Boulanger and Paul Déroulède were prominent among the revanchards, while Émile Flourens, a former French Foreign Minister and an adviser to the government during alliance negotiations, was also a member of Juliette Adam's revanchiste circle. According to Faith Hillis, during the late 1880s Flourens, Déroulède and others journeyed several times to Russia to lobby for an alliance there.\footnote{Faith Hillis, "The 'Franco-Russian Marseillaise': International Exchange and the Making of Antiliberal Politics in Fin de Siècle France", \textit{The Journal of Modern History} 89 (March, 2017): 62-63.} And yet, as previously noted, most elected government figures did not share a
revanchiste outlook. 1140 This was evident when the Republic dissolved Juliette Adam’s associations and disbanded Déroulède’s Ligue des patriotes during the late 1880s, when Boulangerism and calls for revenge against Germany threatened national stability, but equally critically, when the early negotiations with Russia would soon be on the horizon.

Secondary to geopolitical and domestic political goals, pro-alliance actors may also have had personal motivations. During the 1880s, they may have wished to demonstrate leadership and influence with government figures, and/or with the public, in order to persuade politicians to begin alliance negotiations. Certainly this was true of General Raoul Mouton de Boisdeffre, the army Chief of Staff responsible for negotiating alliance terms. Patently, military prestige remained at play after the humiliation of 1871, when along with Republic’s new schools the Army would be considered one of the "two pillars" of France. Another possible motivation lay in the potential financial gain to be made from the alliance: while investors might profit from economic cooperation with Russia, newspaper editors could enjoy Russian financial incentives to promote the French loans, and producers of pro-alliance material ephemera could capitalize on enthusiastic consumers.

The dissertation’s second key finding is that social and media mechanisms were key to lobbying for pro-alliance support. In the social field, influential groups included those surrounding salons, voluntary associations, university circles, and publishing and press houses, as well as expositions. As Jean Garrigues has observed, these and other lieux de sociabilité substantially enabled elite politics in fin-de-siècle France. 1141 With respect to salons, a venerable...

1140 Thomson, The Troubled Republic, 170, 184, 172. One notable figure here was the powerful Radical Georges Clemenceau, who although firmly opposed to the alliance, briefly hoped that it might serve as an instrument for revanche; shortly afterward he abandoned this hope as an illusion. Edgar Holt, The Tiger: The Life of Georges Clemenceau, 1841-1929 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), 99-100, 146, 81.

French political and literary tradition, Juliette Adam’s salon is undoubtedly the most well known. But other venues, including publisher Georges Charpentier’s salon, no doubt played a role, as did Russian author Ivan Turgenev’s *Bibliothèque russe* and Louis Pasteur’s *Institut*, plus a variety of voluntary associations. Some groups were connected with specific publications also, including Juliette Adam’s *revanchiste* periodical *La Nouvelle Revue*, and *La Revue politique et littéraire*, edited for university circles by Alfred Rambaud.

Beyond the social mechanisms involved, elites employed a vast array of media to promote the alliance nationwide. These media could serve multiple purposes, whether to recalibrate traditional anti-Russian stereotypes, to introduce an alliance agenda, to publicize the Russian loans, to act as informal platforms of exchange, to disseminate knowledge about Russia, or to link domestic religious and social issues to alliance support. Illustrating the intersection of mass media and mass political culture, communication channels went well beyond traditional textual media to include audiovisual and material formats, all of which might enhance the alliance’s popular appeal.

With respect to these media, a number of observations point to their significance when examining the genesis of the alliance through a cultural lens. Demonstrably, the flourishing of media after the Republic granted full press freedoms substantially enabled alliance promotion. Of particular note here, the recent availability of relevant digital materials has substantially enabled the scope of this study. Consulting a wide range of sources has permitted the identification of pro-alliance links among various textual media and their producers, whether this concerned thematic content or connections among important individuals and firms. It has also enabled the perusal and comparison of influential newspapers, an important mode for tracing
late nineteenth-century political expression and public opinion. Indeed, the strength of the press was unique to France; and as Gabriel Tarde observed, the *fin de siècle* was an era of publics animated by the press. Research has also highlighted the role of special interest periodicals including *La Croix*, *Le Petit Journal illustré*, and *Le Petit Français illustré*, as examples of materials through which elite actors might champion the alliance for Catholics, women and youth.

Additionally, the examination of materials related to exhibitions and events, plus the material culture celebrating the alliance, has revealed important *loci* for the reframing of Russia among the wider public. The ensemble of productions including *Michel Strogoff*, *Skobeleff*, expositions and events described in Chapter 5 helped to intensify the alliance focus in the urban setting of Paris, with the idea of virtual travel contributing to a "knowing" of imperial Russia. Meanwhile a vast array of pro-alliance material culture, ranging from domestic products and souvenirs, to postcards and song sheets, and to toys and conscription ballots, testifies to a powerful reach among consumers nationwide.

Thus the flood of new media including general interest periodicals and daily and weekly illustrated newspapers aimed at the wider public, plus the changing forms and scale of the culture industry, clearly facilitated the popularization and personalization of the alliance. Mass

\[1142\] This is despite concerns recently expressed by Lara Putnam, who cautioned that digital research practices may result in "radically more de-contextualized" studies, as transnational historians increasingly rely on keyword searches within documents. By contrast, she noted, "Paging through a newspaper in print... makes the competing concerns of that time and place inescapable, from popular culture to crises...." Because daily newspapers were generally four pages long during the alliance era, contextualization is readily evident as digitized editions may now be read fully on the screen. Putnam also noted that text-searchable frameworks allow historians to peruse diverse "quotidian" sources, among them pamphlets and song sheets, which may help to identify political processes such as those discussed in this study. Lara Putnam, "The Transnational and the Text-Searchable: Digitized Sources and the Shadows They Cast", *American Historical Review* 121:2 (April, 2016): 378, 392, 386.

publics, mass politics and mass consumerism intersected in the cultural arena in critical ways, apparent not only in alliance initiatives but also in domestic political crises including Boulangism and the Dreyfus affair. In terms of pro-alliance representations framed in visual, aural and/or material forms across multiple venues, repetitive positive imagery served to contribute to, and to reflect, the cementing of public support. The extraordinary array of media employed, along with the extended alliance decade due in part to the unexpected death of Alexander III, appears to have left deep roots in French culture as described below.

The third key finding of this study is that the alliance functioned to bring diverse political groups into a broad consensus at a time when the fault lines between "les deux Frances" remained deep, with repeated challenges to the Republic by revanchistes, monarchical and Catholic groups. Yet France's third attempt at Republicanism prevailed, despite vociferous opponents with competing political and religious goals. Ultimately, the emergence of widespread consensus around the alliance appears to have been related to the fact that Russia could be reframed as an acceptable ally through the identification of a broad range of positive "civilizational" and other markers related to its geopolitical identity and culture. Beginning in the mid-1870s and continuing through 1901, Russia could be framed as a European great power whose imperial goals echoed those of France's "mission civilisatrice", proclaimed in 1885 by Prime Minister Jules Ferry. Most vitally, however, it could be conceived as a protective military strongman. For those seeking revanche, this might nourish illusions that Russia might act as a pan-Slavist ally in combating German power, i.e. that it would support, or even lead, a

French re-annexation of territories in Alsace-Lorraine. Yet conversely, many alliance proponents would frame Russia as a military leader for peace, or they would emphasize its cultural stature. Contributing to a broad "politics of imagination", still others exploited purported bilateral commonalities, among them the issues of nihilism and anarchism, or the trait d'union of Marianism, the latter to bridge the divide between Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox traditions.

With respect to calibrating these various representations of Russia, beyond the early cerebral "civilizational" themes identified by elites, cultural actors emphasized more popular tropes. Particularly during the alliance decade from 1891 to 1901, their representations were framed around notions of nationalism, great power status, imperialism, peace and fraternal regard, most evident in the material culture described. In this, small producers mirrored the messaging of the expositions universelles, building on the public interest and consumption patterns that they sparked. Additionally, cultural entrepreneurs celebrated popular and mythologized symbols for "knowing" Russia, including those of the moujik and the Cossack, who served as metaphors for religious devotion and military strength. Finally, elite groups invoked purportedly shared "family" values deemed to link France with Russia; in this they attempted to capitalize on the alliance as a sort of cement for national unanimity, further intensifying pro-alliance appeals.

Although the main contributions of this dissertation are apparent as outlined above, there inevitably remain substantial unanswered questions. As one example, the study only obliquely addresses the question of the official channels through which "popular diplomacy" might


influence government figures. Notably, however, the discussion of elite and popular opinion in relation to foreign affairs, as found in Chapter 2, lends some understanding here, as does the identification of channels of influence employed by the academic go-betweens and key individuals described. Alfred Rambaud, as an academic go-between in the mid-1870s and Cabinet Head and Minister in the Ministry of Public Instruction in the 1880s, is a case in point. But generally speaking, many elite connections remain opaque, for example those with the Foreign Office at the Quai d'Orsay, although the relations between publishing and politics may be readily observed. Related to the latter, many elected officials, among them Alexandre Ribot, the Minister of Foreign Affairs when alliance negotiations were launched, no doubt read important publications including *La Revue des deux mondes* and *Le Figaro*, both scions of educated and aristocratic culture, as well as *La Revue politique et littéraire*, a key periodical targeting university circles, and the *revanchiste* *La Nouvelle Revue*. As an indication of direct relations with the press, Minister of War Charles de Freycinet (formerly Foreign Minister) attended the 1893 banquet hosted by Russia for representatives from the publishing and press sectors, as described in Chapter 3. In this he was accompanied by the Chair of the Army Commission, the Minister of Finance, and the government war artist Édouard Detaille.¹¹⁴⁷

Yet perhaps the most opaque channel for tracking alliance advocacy among elites was that emanating from the military, although alliance scholar George F. Kennan noted that the army command ultimately influenced Charles de Freycinet to support the alliance despite his earlier reservations. The fact that the military remained strongly in favor of a pact with Russia, and that General Boisdeffre's brother worked for the French Treasury, also hints at overlapping

concerns. During the early 1880s, Paul Déroulède and the short-lived Military Education Committee had links with the military, as did members of Juliette Adam’s salon and contributors to her La Nouvelle Revue. Suggestive of army influence as well, several authors published works concerning Russia’s military strength: Édouard Detaille wrote a book on the Russian army, and one Catholic author, François Bournand, wrote extensively of its strength and mobilization potential. Additional individuals who publicized Russia’s military power included collector Philippe Deschamps and revanchiste editor Arthur Meyer, who published statistics concerning Russia’s armed forces. To sum up then, alliance advocacy by the military, intersecting with that by revanchistes and by publishers and the press, remained part of a tangled web whose strands may be glimpsed in the media considered above.

In conclusion, beyond a summary of the central findings of this study, some comments on the dénouements and legacy of the Franco-Russian alliance from the French perspective seem à propos. It is important to repeat that the historical significance of the alliance lay in its singular uniqueness, for as Patricia Weitsman noted, by setting out specific conditions for mobilization by both powers, the 1894 convention militaire became more binding than any of its predecessors and it set a pattern for other alliances to come. Additionally, the Franco-Russian pact encouraged mutual hostility towards its signatories’ enemies, notably resulting in increased

\[1148\] Kennan, Fateful Alliance, 22-29; "Informations", Le Figaro, 18 juillet 1893, 3.

\[1149\] Édouard Detaille, Les grandes manoeuvres de l’armée russe (Paris: Boussod, 1886); François Bournand, La Russie militaire: anecdotes historiques (Paris: Tolra, 1895); François Bournand, Le livre d’or franco-russe (Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1894); Philippe Deschamps, France-Russie, 1891-1898. Livre d’or de l’Alliance franco-russe (Paris: A. Lemerre, 1898). Arthur Meyer, the editor discussed in Chapter 7, promoted the Russian military, as did the publishers of Le Petit Français illustré.
hostility by France towards Austria, and by Russia towards Germany.1150 Whether such tensions hastened or delayed the onset of World War I remains a matter of debate.

Although diminished in its import for France by the Franco-British *entente cordiale* of 1904, by Russia's calamitous defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and by its withdrawal from World War I in 1917, French relations with Russia after 1901 nonetheless continued to reflect ongoing preoccupations with German power. Despite the challenges posed to the bilateral relationship before, during, or after the World Wars, the memory of the alliance is suggested in the agreements signed in 1912 (*Convention navale*), in 1935 (*Traité franco-soviétique*), in 1944 (*Pacte d'alliance et assistance franco-soviétique*), and in 1966 (*Déclaration franco-soviétique*). Clearly echoing late nineteenth-century themes when forging the latter agreement, President Charles de Gaulle observed to the National Assembly that "...in some measure a historic sympathy" for Russia, rooted in a "...popular instinct for the national interest", would continue to contribute to positive relations.1151 Yet Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe would erode this, providing some context for Charles Corbet's 1967 observation that "the alliance is dead, but to it we owe our life".1152


What of the legacy of the Franco-Russian relationship today? Over a century later, the 1894 military pact appears to have largely receded from public consciousness, as memories of World War I and World War II predominate in France. Yet organizations and events which celebrate the relationship continue to flourish, some bearing the imprint of past events and others reflecting the diaspora of Russian émigrés who fled either the Bolshevik revolution or the period leading up to World War II. The formative memory of the alliance may help to explain the strong interest that some in the French government continue to demonstrate towards Russia, exemplified by state-sponsored programs of cultural, economic, scientific and educational exchange. Indeed, in a telling reminder that a relationship that transcended differences in a time of crisis has laid down roots that continue to engage, state-sponsored events have showcased Russian themes on multiple occasions. In 2003, for example, Paris hosted a bilateral exposition to celebrate three hundred years of exchange between Paris and St. Petersburg. That year also saw the animated film version of Michel Strogoff take first prize in

1153 I thank Pierre-Yves Lambert of the CNRS (Centre nationale de la recherche scientifique) and the École pratique des hautes études for this observation.

1154 Serving the expatriate community, for example, a dozen Russian churches are found across France. Over one hundred associations exist to promote bilateral relations; their work proceeds via cultural centers, displays and performances, language teaching and émigré support. These associations are found nationwide, from Paris to Nancy to the Côte d'Azur to Finistère, and while some are cooperative ventures, others have been initiated by Russian interests. One of the most active is Le Centre de Russie pour la science et la culture à Paris, formed in 1995 via an accord between the French and Russian governments; it sponsors dozens of political and cultural events per year, attended by luminaries from both countries. Other examples in Paris include Artcorusse (Club franco-russe de la culture et des arts) and L'Association France-Oural. Meanwhile Villefranche-sur-mer hosts La Fondation franco-russe, while Rennes hosts L'Association Bretagne-Russie. Bilateral relations are also furthered online via internet sites such as Tête à tête: le magazine franco-russe en ligne, and mutual cooperation is evident in the Radio et Académie du cinéma franco-russe established in 2011. "Tous les événements russes et russophones à travers la France". http://infos-russes.com/associations; "Le Centre de Russie pour la science et la culture à Paris". http://www.russiefrance.org; "Artcorusse: Club franco-russe de la culture et des arts", http://artcorusse.org; "Association France-Oural". http://afr-russe.fr; "Création de la Fondation franco-russe". http://www.lepeticnicois.fr; "Association Bretagne-Russie". http://clubcabaret.nsknet.ru; "Tête à tête: le magazine franco-russe en ligne". http://www.tete-a-tete-magazine.fr/fr/culture; "Création d'une Radio et une Académie du cinéma communes franco-russes". http://artcorusse.org.

1155 On Franco-Russian relations today, see http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
the children's category of the Paris film awards, an award presented in the Senate.\textsuperscript{1156}

Significantly, while both nations now contemplate their much-diminished empires, they confront their imperial past in Islamic populations; this may explain the continued exploitation of a storyline which involves a Tartar horde.\textsuperscript{1157}

Also reflecting in large measure the persistence of nineteenth-century themes, Russian cultural output continues to be foregrounded in France. In 2005, Russia was chosen as the official theme of the annual Paris literary salon, with a special issue of the extant \textit{La Revue des deux mondes} arguing that the time for appreciating Russian literature had re-emerged; its editors declared they would neither succumb to the demonization of Russia nor to the trope of a "univers biface", i.e. an Asia versus Europe debate.\textsuperscript{1158} Making the literary connection, in 2010 a train filled with French authors made its way from Moscow to Vladivostok; this occurred just as Paris officials celebrated Russia's national holiday at the Grand Palais, in a prelude to a four-


\textsuperscript{1157} Intriguingly for considering geopolitical strength, film adaptations of \textit{Michel Strogoff} appeared with regularity during the twentieth century, particularly in years when questions of continental security re-emerged. \textit{Strogoff} lived on in six film adaptations between 1926 and 1971. As one example, the 1936 film evoked strong geopolitical overtones; it was immediately banned by the Nazis, perhaps in rejection of the filmic display of disciplined Russian military forces. Subsequently, the 1956 blockbuster film premiered during a series of crises including the Algerian war of independence from 1954 to 1962, the Suez Canal crisis and ensuing threats by Khrushchev against Britain and France in 1956, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary that same year. \textit{Michel Strogoff} was the highest-grossing French film of 1956; once again, the viewing public might ponder Russian power. Jean-Julien Verne, \textit{Jules Verne: a biography}, trans. Roger Greaves (New York: Taplinger, 1976), 116. For a full discussion of \textit{Strogoff}'s many lives, see Mary Carol Matheson, "Tartars at Whose Gates? Framing Russian Identity through Political Adaptations of Nineteenth-Century French Works by Astolphe de Custine and Jules Verne". Master's Thesis (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia, 2007).

\textsuperscript{1158} "Édition spéciale, La Russie". \textit{La Revue des deux mondes} (mars 2005), Introduction.
day exposition of Russian research and innovation. Meanwhile an interest in historic travel to Russia and in Russian fine arts continues apace. Further emphasizing rapprochement, 2010 was the official "year of Russia" in France, organized by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Approximately three hundred exhibits, festivals and events were held nationwide, as cultural performance shared the landscape with seminars that explored bilateral commercial, scientific and educational progress. Security, infrastructure and economic cooperation were also on offer, evidenced by the French contract to sell Mistral helicopter warships to Russia (later cancelled under pressure from NATO), and by bilateral train manufacture and oil pipeline agreements. Meanwhile, in an echo of late nineteenth-century themes, Paris hosted an extensive calendar of events ranging from the expansive Louvre exhibit entitled "Sainte Russie" (with GazProm as a prominent sponsor) to Russian music and cinema presentations. A further event memorialized a persistent preoccupation with


1160 In 2008, for example, an exhibit at the Château de Monte-Cristo commemorated the 1858 voyage to Russia by the château’s défunt owner, Alexandre Dumas. (1 April to 1 November, 2008). In 2009, a century following the debut of les Ballets russes in Paris, the Théâtre des Champs-Élysées mounted four Russian ballets, while the Châtelet theater featured music by Tchaikovsky, Rimski-Korsakov, Prokofiev and Stravinsky, echoing programs from the 1876, 1889 and 1900 expositions universelles. http://www.russie.net/Le-Voyage-en-Russie-d-Alexandre-Dumas; "Les Saisons Russes au Théâtre des Champs-Élysées"; "Une belle Saison russe au Théâtre du Châtelet". http://www.art-russe.com/


1163 Other major sponsors were la Fondation Total and GDF Suez. Sainte Russie. L’Art russe des origines à Pierre le Grand (Paris: Musée du Louvre Éditions, 2010), Introduction.
ethnography: in partnership with the Russian Museum of Ethnography, the Fondation Pierre Bergé et Yves St. Laurent presented a five-month exhibition entitled "Le costume populaire russe", featuring costumes and photographs of nineteenth-century ethnic dress.1164

Of the events honoring Russia since 2010, to what degree either Russian or French government funding has been involved remains unclear. In all of these, however, themes which echo those of the alliance era continue to be suggested. A sampling includes the 2012 Salons du livre in Paris and Nice (devoted to the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg respectively), the 2013 celebration at the Toulon Opéra commemorating the one hundred and twentieth anniversary of the visit by Russian warships in 1893, and in 2014, the festival in Nantes entitled "Le Tour de la Russie en dix-neuf jours". The latter included concerts, exhibits, theatrical performances, conferences and animations for children; its organizers’ stated goal was to contribute to an "understanding" of l’âme russe, or the Russian soul. Finally in 2015 in Paris, a private collector displayed some one thousand objects celebrating the 1894 military pact.1165

What is the significance of the apparent warmth by some towards Russia suggested by the events above? Do "vieux reflexes"1166 play a role in perpetuating deeply-rooted patterns and themes of cultural exchange? Is the above propensity to celebration limited to a small minority of state and other elites, and how do they inspire such events? As Vincent Dubois observed

__________________________________________________________________________
1164 The Yves St. Laurent exposition was held from March 18 to August 23, 2010 in Paris. The revue Connaissance des Arts also produced a special edition dedicated to popular Russian ethnic costumes from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. http://jd.mestimbres.blogspot.com/2010/13/coiffes-de-la-russie-tsariste.html


1166 Mongrenier, "'De l'Atlantique à l'Oural'", 3.
during the most recent high water of bilateral relations under President Nicolas Sarkozy, the centralization of culture by the French state has historically linked political and literary power. Does the strong role that literature plays in today's relations serve as a "cultural justification" for rapprochement? Moreover, are these celebrations of Russia due fundamentally to a nostalgia for the past, or to a "nostalgia for grandeur", as Jean-Sylvestre Mongrenier suggested when he argued that France has demonstrated a "great indulgence towards a power inclined to brutality"? Further to the latter, Claude Imbert has noted the persistence of a state-based aristocracy in France, a "caste" from which the President emerges as a sort of "Republican monarch". This might explain the apparent tolerance by some towards Russian leaders. Yet it may also be that memories of the World War I Russian expeditionary force sent to fight in France, and the role of Soviet troops on the continent during World War II, continue to infiltrate relations.

Intriguingly, the saga of a Franco-Russian partenariat continues to evolve in ever more interesting ways. In one example, anti-liberal outreach was furthered when the French justiciary affirmed Russia's legal title to the Orthodox Cathedral in Nice in 2013; Moscow has since sent


1169 Approximately 20,000 Russian troops were sent to France; they fought mainly in Champagne. Monuments honoring the corps expéditionnaire russe have been erected in Paris and Reims. "Corps expéditionnaire russe", monument à Paris". http://artcorusse.org/?p=1934
its own priests to lead that congregation. And in late 2017, the Russian Federation inaugurated its sumptuous "religious and cultural center" at the quai Branly in Paris, not far from the Eiffel Tower and the Avenue Franco-Russe. The imposing compound features a golden-domed cathedral, an auditorium, offices, apartments, a primary school and a venue for exhibits. President Sarkozy arranged to sell the land to the Russian government for this "symbol of friendship"; although purportedly built to serve the tens of thousands of Russian Orthodox followers in France (i.e. the non-White Russian community), more direct political motives are suspected, given the center's location near sensitive French government sites.

Overall, however, public opinion towards Russia in France appears to be substantially negative, in some measure due to the legacy of the 1917 Bolsheviks’ denial of the tsarist debts owed to France and other countries. Today, a century after the Bolshevik revolution, French groups continue to lobby for a return from their investments in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century loans to Russia. Meanwhile on the international stage, bilateral relations remain complex. Although Presidents Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterand moved away from Charles de Gaulle's rapprochement with Russia, Jacques Chirac aimed to resurrect

---


1172 Although in 1986 British groups were awarded approximately ten percent of the amounts they had claimed, the payment of French claims did not begin until 1996. The latter settlement, considered by many in France to be only a first installment, was far less generous: four hundred million dollars, instead of the twenty-seven to thirty-one billion dollars claimed. As Jennifer Siegel has noted, the loans to Russia continue to be invoked in French popular culture, as in a 1996 vaudeville performance entitled L'Emprunt russe and the 2004 novel, Laisser dormir les emprunts russes. The number of French claimants overall is estimated to be 400,000. De Kochko, “Emprunts russes: vers une relance de l'affaire?”; Jennifer Siegel, For Peace and Money: French and British Finance in the Service of Tsars and Commissars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 210-212.
the relationship after the reunification of Germany that followed the fall of the Berlin wall, while Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to echo Chirac's orientation. But the question of bilateral cooperation continues to exhibit an uneven pattern, as seen most recently in the run-up to the 2017 French election, when both ultra-nationalist leader Marine Le Pen and right-wing candidate François Fillon appeared poised to renew strong relations with Russia. Yet the victor, newly-elected President Emmanuel Macron, has publicly challenged President Vladimir Putin regarding Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria, and with alleged Russian attempts to interfere in France’s election. The relationship between France and Russia thus remains an ever-evolving story, generating reflection on the dénouements and legacy of the late nineteenth-century reframing of a former enemy in the political and cultural life of France.

1173 Max Fischer, “French Election Hints at a European Shift towards Russia”, New York Times (November 30, 2016). http://nyti.ms/2giWJvp. Fillon's fall from grace was precipitated by allegations of political wrongdoing; interestingly, the periodical for which his wife was accused of receiving extravagant compensation for very little work was the extant La revue des deux mondes.

Figure 1: Notre Petit-Père S.M. le Tzar Nicolas II". *Le Rire*, 28 août 1897.
Figure 2: "L’Équilibre Européen. Un contrepoids suffisant à la triple alliance." *Le Grelot*, 8 octobre 1893.
Figure 3: "Allons-nous en gens de la noce (Hymne russe)". *Le Grelot*, 29 octobre 1893.
Figure 4: "Théâtre du Châtelet: *Michel Strogoff*. Advertising poster, circa 1891.
Figure 5: "Adieux de la France au Tsar". Song sheet, 1894.
Figure 6: “Alliance!”. Le Petit Journal Supplément Illustré, 12 septembre 1897.
Figure 7: "Le retour du Président: À la Chambre de commerce de Dunquerque." *Le Petit Journal Supplément Illustré*, 12 septembre 1897.
Figure 8: "L'Empereur de Russie sur son lit de mort". *Le Petit Journal Supplément Illustré*, 11 novembre 1894.
Figure 9: "La tsarine allaitant la grande-duchesse Olga". *Le Petit Journal Supplément Illustré*, 8 décembre 1895.
Bibliography

Primary Sources: Periodicals

Les Annales du théâtre et de la musique
Les Annales politiques et littéraires
L’Assiette au beurre
La Caricature
La Croix
Le Figaro
Le Gaulois des enfants
Le Grelot
La Jeune mère, ou L’éducation du premier âge
Le Journal des enfants
Le Journal des voyages et des aventures de terre et de mer
Le Journal de la jeunesse
Le Magasin pittoresque
La Nature
La Nouvelle Revue
Le Pèlerin (supplément illustré de La Croix)
Le Petit Français illustré, journal des écoliers et des écolières
Le Petit Journal
Le Petit Parisien
La Revue d’art dramatique
La Revue des deux mondes: recueil de la politque, de l'administration et des moeurs
La Revue politique et littéraire
Le Rire

Le Saint Nicolas, journal illustré pour garçons et filles

Le Tour du monde: nouveau journal des voyageurs

L'Univers illustré

Primary Sources: Books and Other


"L’Alliance franco-russe, par 'Lucifer". Poitiers: Librairie Druinaud, 1886.


Baedeker, Karl. La Russie, manuel du voyageur. 3ème édition. Liepzig: Karl Baedeker, 1902.


Bournand, François. *Le livre d’or franco-russe.* Tours: Alfred Cattier, 1894.


De Pauly, T. *Description ethnographique des peuples de la Russie*. St. Pétersbourg: Société Géographique Impériale, 1862.


Dondel de Faouédic, Mme N. *Voyages loin de ma chambre, tome 2*. Paris: Téqui, 1898.


*Loterie franco-russe*. Épinal: Pellerin et Cie, 1890.


Secondary Sources


Boardman, Kay. "'Charting the Golden Stream': Recent Work on Victorian Periodicals." Victorian Studies 48, no. 3 (Spring, 2006): 505-517.


Hamel, Catherine. "La commémoration de l'Alliance franco-russe: La création d'une culture matérielle populaire." Mémoire de maîtrise (Montréal: Université Concordia, 2016).


Hardin, Jeffrey. "From Diplomacy to Culture: A Historiography of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894". Master’s thesis. San Jose, TX: San Jose State University, 1996.


Harrison, Carol. "The Bourgeois after the Bourgeois Revolution: Recent Approaches to the Middle Class in European Cities". *Journal of Urban History* 31, no. 3 (March, 2005): 382-392.


Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. _The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory._ London: Lynne Reinner, 1996.


_La Revue des deux mondes. Édition spéciale: Russie._ (mars, 2005)


Nye, Robert A. "Degeneration, Neurasthenia and the Culture of Sport in Belle Époque France". *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 1 (January, 1982).


Offen, Karen. "Depopulation, Nationalism and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France". *American Historical Review* 89, no. 3 (June, 1984).


Palmer, Michael B. "Parisian newsrooms in the late nineteenth century: How to enter the agency from the back office, or inventing news journalism in France". *Journalism Studies* 4, no. 4 (2003): 479-487.


Schor, Naomi. "*Cartes postales: Representing Paris 1900"*. *Critical Inquiry* 18, no. 2 (Winter, 1992): 188-244.


