

**THE IMPACT OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM ON SECURITY:  
THE CASE OF THE PHILIPPINES**

by

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## **Abstract**

With populism becoming a political buzzword after the recent elections of Right-Wing Populist leaders, discussion over the impacts the rhetoric has on security decisions becomes vital. This work aims to explore a correlational connection between Right-Wing Populism and security decisions made by populist leaders by use of a single case study analysis, focusing on the political history of the Philippines and their current President, Rodrigo Duterte. By stating working definitions for both Right-Wing Populism and security, a frame for analysing security issues and subsequent decisions made by Duterte is set, which can then be further projected into generalisations that can be carried into further research. While certain decisions by leaders may be viewed as being impulsive, this work looks to illustrate that these decisions are in fact strategic under a specific Right-Wing Populist agenda.

## **Lay Summary**

Populism has become a political buzzword after the recent elections of self-identified Populist leaders worldwide. However, most of these leaders fall into a specific category of Populism; that of Right-Wing Populism. This work aims to explore how Right-Wing Populism can inform security decisions made by leaders using a single case study analysis. This analysis will focus on the political history of the Philippines, and their current Right-Wing Populist leader, Rodrigo Duterte. Firstly, definitions are provided for both Right-Wing Populism, and what is covered by the term “security”. Then the case study is presented, followed by further explanation of specific policy decisions with generalisations that apply to Right-Wing Populism as a whole. Overall, this work looks at illustrating how some seemingly impulsive political decisions may actually be highly strategic under a Right-Wing Populist agenda.

## **Preface**

This thesis is original, independent intellectual product of the author, E. M. Brookes.

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## **Dedication**

To my late father,

I owe you the world for showing me my potential

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

With the recent spike in the election of populist leadership promoting an academic discussion of what Populism entails, it becomes necessary to understand the ways in which populist rhetoric and ideology may affect governmental policy decisions. One such aspect which is considered vital to a nation's survival is that of security. However, simply focusing on how Populism may affect security policymaking is overwhelming, therefore it becomes necessary to limit the research subject. The topic of Right-Wing Populism, as a separate subject from the umbrella of Populism, creates an interesting and contrasting lens through which to view security decisions. On one hand, it allows for more specific research to be performed; while on the other, it frames security in such a way that shows, while certain decisions made by leaders may be viewed as being impulsive, it can be illustrated that these decisions are in fact strategic under a specific Populist agenda.

This work aims to explore a correlational connection between Right-Wing Populism and security decisions made by populist leaders in two parts. The first part, comprising of Chapters 2 and Chapter 3, looks at providing working definitions for both Right-Wing Populism and security. These chapters give the context for how the second part will then be evaluated. The second part to this work begins with a brief methodology, applying to the case study further provided in Chapter 4. This case study looks at the political history of the Philippines leading to the rise of their current populist leader, and aims to divulge information about how Populism has affected the nation and their relationships with other countries, with a focus on security. Chapter 5 then works to provide a synthesis of all prior information, analysing the case study to provide examples that illustrate generalisations that

can be made, not only for the country involved, but for Right-Wing Populist security decisions in total. This will then be expanded upon to include notes from other recent populist leaders that can illustrate these generalisations further. Overall, this work aims to provide information that could create the possibility for further research into the impact Right-Wing Populism has on international security as a whole. To begin, however, it is best to start small with a discussion of what Populism is.

## Chapter 2: A Working Definition of Populism

There have been numerous attempts to synthesise a working definition of Populism since its conception. This issue is that Populism does not fit into a neatly pre-defined category like so many other political phenomena. Populism has evolved throughout its history, with each manifestation being significantly different from those prior, with alternative priorities and focuses that have made it difficult to discern whether there are simple base assumptions.

The first wave of Populism can be traced back to an agrarian movement in the southern United States in the 1880s<sup>1</sup>, focusing on landed citizens and the supply and movement of economic goods and services. Later movements in 1960s Russia looked to be less focused on land and the supply of goods, and more focused on economic services, such as banking and loans<sup>2</sup>. These previous movements both look to be more about creating a more *laissez faire* market approach. In contrast, while the most recent manifestation of Populism does have a slight economic focus in that it actively highlights social stratification, especially that based on income, this movement is more sociologically minded, focusing on aspects of identity politics and sensationalism<sup>3</sup>. If anything, this movement could be viewed as being more economically conservative than those previous as there is a growing push for economic protectionism and promoting financially unviable industries in exchange for political power; reimagining the *laissez faire* ideology in favour

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<sup>1</sup>Goodwyn, *The Populist Moment*.

<sup>2</sup>Berlet and Lyons, *Right-Wing Populism in America*.

<sup>3</sup>Gherghina, Mişcoiu, and Soare, *Contemporary Populism*.

of active government involvement in the market schema. Aside from economic issues, this “wave” deals with other hard-hitting sociological features of society and policy, such as racial distinctions, the role of religion in government, and historical revisionism, among others which will be addressed later in this work. However, all of these movements do have other aspects in common, and it is these commonalities that help to form a basis for a definition of Populism.

It is important to note that there is a direct relationship between Populism and democracy<sup>4</sup>. It is said that the need for more “pure” and idealistic forms of democracy drove people towards Populism. People wanted direct involvement in political decisions over who would govern, and how they were to be governed. To meet this growing sentiment, free and fair elections were put in place. This allowed anyone who met a minimum set of requirements, which have changed with the times, to be allowed to run for the leadership position. People wanted those who would best represent their ideals and morals, those who would have the interests of the people at heart. While this is a direct understanding of democratic elections, this has changed, as after one too many mismanaged affairs, the people began to view politicians as being elites, separated from the general public by an ivory tower, and therefore not truly understanding the issues which they are making decisions about<sup>5</sup>. The people want to elect those who understand their hardships, as these people would know the best course of action to alleviate the sufferings of the

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<sup>4</sup>Panizza, *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, 1-31.

<sup>5</sup>Akkerman, Lange, and Rooduijn, *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe*, pp 125.

“everyday man”. It is this aspect of democracy, where a high level of distrust for the elite within society is fostered, and Populism comes to exist.

Cas Mudde, author of the article *The Populist Zeitgeist*, understands this problematic view of Populism, whereby it has numerous differing factors with each resurgence, and thus has created this working base definition of Populism as a whole:

*“[Populism is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté Générale (general will) of the people”<sup>6</sup>*

It is this definition that I hope to expand upon throughout the course of this chapter, however it will need to be altered in order to fit a slightly more specific set of parameters. This work aims to look closely at Right-Wing Populism, as specific brand of Populism which focuses on more conservative moral and social policies, and therefore this definition will need to be made more specific to take into account the differences between Right and Left-Wing Populism. After reading the Introduction of Sergiu Gherghina, Sergiu Mişcoiu, and Sorina Soare’s *Contemporary Populism*<sup>7</sup>, it can be understood that Populism, especially of the Right-Wing variety, contains several external additions which Mudde omitted from his definition in order to create a blanket term that works with both Right and Left-Wing varieties. Such additions that could be made to this definition to make it more specified to Right-Wing Populism, would be that of the idea of the cult of personality, a

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<sup>6</sup>Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist.”, pp 543.

<sup>7</sup>Gherghina, Mişcoiu, and Soare, *Contemporary Populism*.

retrospective view of goals, and the threat of an external crises or instability, although even these additions can be associated with both varieties to an extent<sup>8</sup>. While Left-Wing Populist groups can elect leaders who may have a charismatic personality and not be part of the standard elite, it does not have the same views on what events are sensationalised<sup>9</sup>; they view factual information and historical revisionism drastically differently to their right-wing counterparts, preferring to use emotive language for the statement of fact and the revision of history towards a more accurate narrative<sup>10</sup>, unlike most modern right-wing populist leaders; they do not prioritise a return to a former time<sup>11</sup>, preferring to have a more future focused outlook; nor do they promote the exercise of emergency powers or calling for a state of emergency in times that are anything short of a state of war<sup>12</sup>, thus promoting accountability to keep power in check<sup>13</sup>. These large differences in application of rhetoric between the two, where the same issues are prioritised, but for opposite outcomes, creates the bases of the working definition of Right-Wing Populism, as opposed to its Left-Wing counterpart.

By contrast, Right-Wing Populism looks at attempting to return to a former glory, or to bring back a time of assumed prosperity, more so than their Left-Wing counterparts<sup>14</sup>. Where Left-Wing populists may instead paint the future as being much more liberal and brighter than previous times, Daniel Şandru remarks that Right-Wing populists will create

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid, 11.

<sup>9</sup>Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism*, pp 125.

<sup>10</sup>Gherghina, Mişcoiu, and Soare, *Contemporary Populism*, 10-12.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, pp 74.

<sup>12</sup>Ropp, *The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in Europe and South America*, pp 2.

<sup>13</sup>Ruth, "Populism and the Erosion of Horizontal Accountability in Latin America."

<sup>14</sup>Gherghina, Mişcoiu, and Soare, *Contemporary Populism*, pp 74.

and often distorted view of the past as an ideal that can be achieved with revision of policy<sup>15</sup>. By making this comparison to “the good old days”, candidates who run with this platform can prey on the ideals held by voters who agree that “were it not for a specific event”, life may be better. This event is usually blamed on some form of external factor, such as immigrants or trade, and a candidate can then promise to bring about this return to former glory by “fixing” the external factor with policy, thus neutralising the imagined threat<sup>16</sup>. It is a commonly held belief by citizens that the group blamed is a threat to the ‘native’ way of life, thus creating ample amounts of animosity and negative sentiment towards the ideal<sup>17</sup>. By removing this “threat”, some people believe that the issue itself will dissipate; itself a very basic understanding of how politics works, as a single causal factor is often not the sole cause of domestic issues. Those who believe that a single factor could remove an apparent threat have often been conditioned by media and remain without the motivation to further pursue research on the topic. Others may not buy into the rhetoric, but may have supposed gains by appearing as though they do. An example of this could be a business that would profit from sales of home security goods by repeating information about speculation that immigrants are the perpetrators of local crime in communities that have recently had an influx of foreign residents<sup>18</sup>. Regardless of who agrees with this “blast from the past” rhetoric for whichever reason, the fact remains that it is damaging to the groups who are targeted. For the most part, these are usually minority groups, who do not

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid, pp 73-76.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, pp 124, 130, 277.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, pp. 124, 277.

<sup>18</sup>Ewing, Martinez, and Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States.”



always have the ability to defend themselves in the court of public opinion, meaning that it is almost certain that these groups will be taken advantage of if the ideal is pursued. This makes for easy targets, and, through the lens of politics, easy party wins.

The most recent wave of Populism appears to be driven by anger over forms of social stratification, whether this be religious, economic, educational, racial, or any mixture of the above<sup>19</sup>. People feel disconnected from governmental elites and thus feel that they have no direct involvement in the political process as they feel they cannot elect people whom truly represent ‘them’<sup>20</sup>. Large groups of societies have been left to fall between the cracks after numerous government transitions, allowing for this resentment to fester. In party democracies, these transitions would relate directly to changes in leadership or a change in ruling party. This phenomenon of being wary of elites is true of both liberal-minded and conservative voters. However, for Right-Wing Populists, it appears that not all elites are created equal. While political elites are viewed as those which should not be trusted, housing magnates, billionaires, celebrities, business tycoons, and others of their ilk, are often contradictorily viewed not as elites, but as “everyday men” despite their ability to influence political decisions<sup>21</sup>. This often leads to these people being placed as figureheads to run for office, especially those with already large followings, such as celebrities. In contrast, scientists, academics, the media, and information professionals are viewed as not being trustworthy, despite their career paths requiring them to be incredibly knowledgeable

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<sup>19</sup>Inglehart and Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism.”

<sup>20</sup>Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy.”

<sup>21</sup>Case, *Populist Threats and Democracy’s Fate in Southeast Asia*, pp 27.

on the aspects of their jobs. It is claimed that they are being bought off by “big business”, or by other political elites, in order to “brainwash” the population<sup>22</sup>. People assume that they are making political decisions for personal gain, despite the fact that the heads of these “big businesses” are in position to gain substantially and being viewed as more trustworthy than politicians who have been thoroughly educated in policy. This observation gives life to passionate public discourse between a side that is viewed as primarily untrustworthy by the public and a for-profit operation whose best interests reside in marketing ideas to the public, creating a situation in which it is difficult to come to a suitable compromise.

Aside from the apparent “idol-worship”, stratification, and return to greatness, Right-Wing Populism also tends to have a certain degree and type of sensationalism abundant within its political discourse. While “sensational” news sells, regardless of Populism, Right-Wing Populist leaders appear to overemphasise and inflate issues that are not necessarily as urgent as they are portrayed<sup>23</sup>. Crises are often over exaggerated, being utilised by political parties to exploit the “shock factor” and in turn push a political agenda, cementing authority either in elections or in future policymaking. There are numerous theories as to why specific issues are overinflated, one such theory being that it is a diversionary tactic to distract the public from information that could paint their government in a less-than-favourable light. Returning to a previous example, immigration politics is often over-exaggerated as a campaign issue, despite large numbers of reports proving the exact opposite of what it being openly stated in discourse. This can often be a way to

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<sup>22</sup>Rydgren, *Movements of Exclusion*, pp 93.

<sup>23</sup>Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism*, pp 125.

distract the public from issues such as government corruption, environmental degradation, taxation hikes, and other issues that politicians and parties may not necessarily wish to answer for in public<sup>24</sup>. This leads to another problem; that of Right-Wing Populist leaders engaging in revisionism over what they themselves have openly stated<sup>25</sup>. As mentioned previously, the current wave of Right-Wing populism has a strong focus on historical revisionism, even short-term memory, to fit a more palatable narrative. The goal of this is create a narrative in which the current leader, party, or country, look much more grandiose than in reality. In order to further disseminate this view, leaders may continually re-state factually incorrect information despite contrary evidence, and may then attempt to discredit the sources<sup>26</sup>. Given that Right-Wing populist leaders now hold a gross amount of power, even in democracies that have certain safeguards against the abuse of said power, it is hard to ascertain that these people, who are “non-elites” by their own admission, have the knowledge to prevent them from performing tasks that could be considered unlawful in their current position.

This then raises the question of accountability within Right-Wing Populist rhetoric. If the people agree to place those who have no prior knowledge or experience in governance as their leader, are they then accountable for all mistakes this new leader has the potential to make? Leaders elected by the people should be held accountable to the people<sup>27</sup>, however, this new type of leader is not on the same level as previous leaders. A

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<sup>24</sup>Fenton and Freedman, “Fake Democracy, Bad News.”, pp 11

<sup>25</sup>Rozman and Lee, “Unraveling the Japan-South Korea “Virtual Alliance.””

<sup>26</sup>Scherer, “Can President Trump Handle the Truth?”

<sup>27</sup>Ruth, “Populism and the Erosion of Horizontal Accountability in Latin America.”

traditional, governmentally-versed candidate would understand that they would and should be accountable for all things they say and do. It would make logical sense for a non-elite in politics to be held to these same standards, given they will be performing the same tasks regardless of personal contexts. However, Right-Wing Populism appears to have a penchant for contradictory beliefs, with leaders often being shifting blame, denying involvement, or refusing to answer for mistakes, while taking no substantial damage politically. It is not true to say that leaders take absolutely no political damage, as preference polls dictate that public preferences do shift after major negative events, which can affect their re-electability. It is more accurate to say that after major issues occur leaders can face no obvious immediate leadership-threatening repercussions. This does not only include political events, as Right-Wing Populist candidates have boasted about the possibility of them physically killing someone during their time in office and the fact that they would face virtually no consequence in this possibility<sup>28</sup>. It leads to the conclusion that although populist leaders are meant to represent the people that elected them, they often take advantage of their “idol-like” status and power to get away with wrongdoings that would have “regular” politicians facing harsh consequences. In contrast, when Left-Wing populist groups have an issue with accountability, the leaders tend to be more forward with apologies and discussions of reparations<sup>29</sup>.

Continuing with the discussion of repercussions and political power, there is an almost frightening tendency of Right-Wing populist leaders towards granting themselves

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<sup>28</sup>Reuters, “Donald Trump: ‘I Could Shoot Somebody and I Wouldn’t Lose Any Voters.’”

<sup>29</sup>Agustín and Briziarelli, *Podemos and the New Political Cycle*, pp 271.

“special” or “emergency” political powers<sup>30</sup>. These powers can elevate tensions towards a dictatorial-style political arrangement without the general populous’ involvement or even knowledge. Smaller and/or younger nations appear to have fewer protections in place against such abuses of power, while larger nations have the ability to make it substantially more difficult for leaders to take advantage<sup>31</sup>. This does not mean that leaders cannot exploit political ignorance to make some potentially damaging policies. Even if these policies are later revoked, the process of rescinding and revising can create some legal avenues that can be exploited by majority groups against minorities<sup>32</sup>. Without ample supervision, leaders have the ability to exploit whatever power they have for conservative means, hence why democratic checks and balances are necessary at all levels of governance. Removal of or challenge to these principles can create a perfect breeding ground for dictatorial sentiment, which is again why accountability is such an important political tool. Unlike their Left-Wing counterparts, Right-Wing populist groups prefer to make decisions unilaterally, without external involvement, as is often the case with invoking a state of emergency<sup>33</sup>.

If one were to revisit Mudde’s definition of Populism, and update the information to account for the more specific aspects of Right-Wing Populism expressed above, the definition may resemble the one given below (with additions added in bold):

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<sup>30</sup>Ropp, *The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in Europe and South America*, pp 2.

<sup>31</sup>Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

<sup>32</sup>Guardian panel, “A Rollercoaster Ride.”

<sup>33</sup>Gidron and Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda.”, pp 11.

*“[Right-Wing Populism is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté Générale (general will) of the people, by means of electing leaders who sensationalise politics and events, prioritise a return to a time of former prosperity, have a charismatic personality that is not publicly viewed as being part of the elite party, and are partial to the exercise of emergency democratic powers”*

This accounts for the fact that while Left-Wing Populism does have a slight focus on similar aspects as above, by electing leaders who may have a charismatic personality and not be part of the standard elite, there are still large discrepancies between the two. These differences in application of rhetoric between the two, where the same issues are prioritised, but for opposite outcomes, creates the bases of the working definition of Right-Wing Populism, as opposed to its Left-Wing counterpart.

In summary, Populism can be split into two very different groupings of the Left-Wing and Right-Wing variety. Each type does have minor overlap, however there are relatively significant differences in how these overlapping sections manifest, meaning that separate definitions are able to be reached. Within the following chapters, it is the definition of the Right-Wing variety of Populism that will be further explored and expounded upon, in regards to the aspect of security. In the next chapter, I will explore my working definition of security, and what aspects of this definition will be used to engage this topic further with this understanding of Right-Wing Populism.

### Chapter 3: Understanding Security

The relationship of security policy decisions to Right-Wing Populist rhetoric is a rather interesting one, given that security is a known area of contention among scholars and practitioners alike, due to differing ideas of what constitutes a threat, and which ways are appropriate to securitise them<sup>34</sup>. There are two “fundamental” ways of thinking about security; one which is considered more military focused and “traditional”, and that which sees security as a wider complex involving areas that cannot simply be solved with militarisation or single-state involvement<sup>35</sup>. While the overall aim for this work is not to prove the existence of a single causational relationship between Right-Wing Populism and the outcomes of specific security policy decisions, the goal is to understand how each sector is dealt with by Right-Wing Populist leaders and how the different threats are manufactured, framed, and then utilised to politically mobilise society. Thus, it is necessary to understand what exactly “non-traditional” security comprises of.

By using the security framework put forth by the Copenhagen School of thought, one can see that there are five security sectors that often have overlaps due to the interconnectedness of perceived threats<sup>36</sup>. These five sectors are military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security, and each has separate criterion for defining threats and how they are to be dealt with. These areas form the “new security complex”, which synthesises these distinct areas to give a more rounded explanation of threats and

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<sup>34</sup> Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Security*, pp 5.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, pp 2-5.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, pp 1-2.

possible courses of action. Each sector is also noted as observing different referent objects, or objects that are to be securitised, and actors who perform the securitising measures. However, as the world has become more globalised, linking countries and their issues more so than ever before, so too have threats become connected. No single sector discussed within this complex is completely isolated from the others, with their threats often overlapping more than two sectors. Issues faced by Right-Wing Populism also are not completely solitary, therefore it becomes necessary to understand how each sector would be dealt with under Right-Wing populist leadership. In order to better understand exactly how these sectors are defined, and where there are high chances of overlap, it helps to breakdown the components of the new security complex, and then further relate these to the overarching issue of Right-Wing Populism and strategic discussion.

### **3.1 The Military Sector**

The non-traditional security complex does include a branch for military security. This area looks at ways in which security problems are defined and solved using physical military means. Out of the five sectors, it is the most straightforward, with issues being securitised by direct military involvement<sup>37</sup>. By dealing with more physical threats than the other sectors, this sector looks at solving issues quickly with force. Elements of military tactical planning, involving surgical strikes, deployment of troops and weaponry, and making financial arrangements for the upkeep of overseas military tours, are all considered

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, pp 49-70.



within traditional military security. Copious amounts of statistical analyses are performed on military performance and spending, with the statistics often being produced to incur public support. This support is useful, as the military cannot officially intervene in affairs without a level of public support being met, as most people do not wish to risk the lives of others through violence without belief in a cause. From the public support often comes financial support, which is the second deciding factor on intervention. This is where other areas of the security complex come into play, as political security can aid in garnering support for military intervention; societal security can aim to portray issues as immediate threats to current lifestyles; and economic security looks at making people aware of military spending as proportionate to the work of eliminating the threat and aid in funding interventions. In lieu of the rise in terrorist activities, it is also unthinkable that the military itself can be the only measure in place to defeat the ever-present domestic and international threat, given that the military cannot simply use violence against the funding of extremist groups, or wage war against an entire religion<sup>38</sup>. Deeper analysis reveals that there are more layers than a military response alone can solve. While the military understanding of security would work for the physical extermination or removal of an aspect of a threat, such as disarming a bomb or launching a raid on a suspect terrorist headquarters, it could not adequately provide information or solutions for other related problems that stem from physical violence and terror. Utilising the military works when threats can be confined physically, but terrorism is a grey area, with terrorists not representing specific countries,

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<sup>38</sup> Takeyh and Gvosdev, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?", pp 104-105.

existing beyond physical borders, and even existing domestically. Hence, the military sector is useful, but should not be the only sector covered when considering large-scale issues. It follows that by examining the above statements that a more liberal understanding of security, which allows for more information to be discussed, can be beneficial for understanding the relationship between threats and the courses of action undertaken to neutralise them.

In regards to the Right-Wing populist understanding of security, given their conservative and traditionalist nature, the military sector is given the most emphasis when it comes to discourse on national security. However, in comparison to more left-leaning groups, Right-Wing populists tend towards more drastic calls for action when a threat is exposed<sup>39</sup>. To meet the expectation that the threat is abolished, the leaders will often grant themselves emergency powers, placing themselves at the helm of all political decisions for the nation, effectively removing most democratic checks and balances that are in place to counterbalance abuses of power<sup>40</sup>. In turn, leaders may overemphasize issues, such as drugs or crime, sensationalizing them to a point where citizens feel threatened in their everyday life, thus justifying calling for a state of emergency, or putting emergency powers in place. This tendency to exaggerate issues that could possibly be met with force also extends to international diplomacy, with Right-Wing populist leaders at times misspeaking in international forum in regards to security decisions<sup>41</sup>, putting other nations on edge, or

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<sup>39</sup> Steinert, "Unspeakable September 11th."

<sup>40</sup> Government of Canada, "Address by the Honourable Stéphane Dion."

<sup>41</sup> Reuters, "Donald Trump Threatens North Korea with 'Fire and Fury', Prompting Threat to Attack Guam."

forcing them to reassess relationships despite their peaceful relations<sup>42</sup>. This can be especially frustrating when the Right-Wing populist leader may change their nation's ideal relationship with other nations seemingly without warning<sup>43</sup>. Rifts between traditional allies can be formed, and other nations have to be constantly vigilant in regards to security discussions undertaken by their Right-Wing populist ally that may have follow-on effects for their own national and international security policies. This is not to say that nations should never be aware of discussions their allies are involved in, but it creates a highly tense atmosphere for a nation to be forced to constantly scrutinise their ally due to their changing ideals. Without a strong basis of continuity and reliability over decisions, it can become increasingly difficult for nations to continue to support decisions made by leaders whose ideals change so rapidly, which is fast becoming a distinguishing feature of Right-Wing populist security decisions.

### **3.2 The Political Sector**

The start of the truly non-traditional security sectors begins with the Political sector. The more traditional camp would see politics as being a tool of military security, which would be utilised to create public support for the elimination of threats. However, political security also works in other ways that do not always directly link solutions with the implementation of martial law. Political threats look more to destabilise the internal organisation of the state, discrediting internal institutions and creating the conditions for

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<sup>42</sup> Burke, "Julie Bishop Says Donald Trump Is 'speaking Kim Jong-Un's Language' with Fire and Fury Threats."

<sup>43</sup> Abu-Nasr and Follain, "World Leaders Condemn Trump Jerusalem Move, Warn of Violence."

public unrest. These treats can be enabled through the media, often leading to the production or removal of laws protecting ones right to speak freely. Another issue is tampering by foreign governments in domestic affairs, compromising a nation's sovereignty. The issue of intervention of others into a state's affairs has limited military abilities to intervene in civil conflicts around the world. However, when these civil conflicts are politicised, especially when using words such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, popular support is rallied, and military intervention on humanitarian grounds may be approved by governing bodies involved. It is this interaction between the two sectors that promotes the idea that political security is not a separate sector from that of the military, but political security is also used to protect internal institutions that are not related to the military. Political securitisation is useful in discourse on environmental degradation. By publicising institutions that promote environmental protection, people are mobilised to secure the environment and raise awareness of the issue, which is not inherently military-related.

Other issues in this sector that are closely linked to Right-Wing Populism are those involving discrediting the media and fact checking, sensationalising events to create political unrest, and promoting the continuity of unreliable sources for personal gain<sup>44</sup>. Within international discourse, Right-Wing Populism is noted for its often blatant disregard for factual information, with many leaders threatening to persecute media personnel who

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<sup>44</sup> Bakir and McStay, "Fake News and The Economy of Emotions."

release information contrary to what they themselves have stated publicly<sup>45</sup>. Others have slowly harboured resentment for the media, or at least those that are not endorsed by the leader or party, by sensationalising media scandals where information has been incorrect or misleading, despite the numerous other instances of reliable news<sup>46</sup>. Fact checking or redirecting focus back to an issue that is more pressing than that which the government or leader is attempting to push instead has more repercussions for the media personnel attempting to do their job, rather than those who may be purposefully trying to distort the truth. This includes the historical revisionism that is becoming more prominent within Right-Wing populist circles<sup>47</sup>. Finally, Right-Wing populist movements at present have a tendency towards publicly endorsing specific media platforms. While some push a heavily censored government news source, other leaders may be receiving a type of personal gain from private sector sources. Either way, by endorsing these types of media, or even claiming that other types of media may be false when compared to these specific branches, can violate a right to freedom of speech for those nations that have it, but can also violate a leaders' own responsibility to be impartial and not actively promote businesses for personal gain<sup>48</sup>. Providing a platform on which previously unheard media can be given attention may not necessarily be a terrible thing, however if a leader is gaining from this free advertising, and this media is promoting ideals contrary to what the leader of a nation should be promoting, it does become a form of abuse of power, and a misguided attempt at the

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<sup>45</sup> Reuters, "Philippine Media Groups Cry Foul over Duterte's Diatribes."

<sup>46</sup> Colasimone, "Donald Trump's 'Misinformation Ecosystem': Q&A on Fake News and the Role of the Media."

<sup>47</sup> Hohmann, "The Daily 202: Trump's Pendant for Revisionist History on Display during Arizona Rally."

<sup>48</sup> Graber and Dunaway, *Mass Media and American Politics*, pp 200.

political securitisation of information<sup>49</sup>. This can cause further issues within other sectors too, as information that would otherwise be acted upon quickly may have to be continuously re-evaluated and face newer forms of bureaucratic red-tape in order for action to commence.

### 3.3 The Economic Sector

The next sector focuses on the economy, and this is where interconnectedness starts to become an issue, rather than a way for more informed decision-making. A state's economy is largely based on their standing within the global economy. If the global economy were to collapse, or trading partners renege on deals, states could easily be placed in difficult situations. Economic security is considered vital to the livelihood of a state, and has become increasingly difficult to secure due to globalisation. Money changes hands and crosses borders faster than a click of a button in this modern age, meaning that policy surrounding monetary security needs to be able to work at increasingly faster speeds and cover larger areas<sup>50</sup>. The economy is something that everyone relies upon, and should it be placed in a form of peril, the public will react negatively. However, states try, they cannot secure their own economy completely, based on international debt, trading, and migration<sup>51</sup>; as these factors cause money to move faster and further than ever before. States can use tariffs and non-tariff barriers to try to reclaim some lost economic value

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<sup>49</sup> Mayes, "Ex-Fox News Employee Says She Was Blocked From Investigating Trump-Russia Ties"; Grynbaum, "Trump Strategist Stephen Bannon Says Media Should 'Keep Its Mouth Shut.'"

<sup>50</sup> Viterbo, *International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement*.

<sup>51</sup> Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Security*, pp 95-117.

should a trade fall through, but most international trade agreements do not allow such tools to be used<sup>52</sup>. Since it would be ridiculous to assume that a military alone could be used to force a country to pay back international loans, there needs to be other forms of protections, as well as punishments for those who break agreements. International economic authorities have been formed for these specific purposes, to protect countries from economic crises, and advise those who have fallen upon hard times<sup>53</sup>. They use inflation, decreased public spending, interest rates, and taxation as means to alleviate economic pressure within countries, as well as aiding in attempts to securitise currency exchange rates internationally.

In regards to the economic security policies of Right-Wing populist leaders, these tend towards more internal protectionism, securitising against globalisation and the loss of jobs that may come with it<sup>54</sup>. There is a mobilisation of rhetoric involving inequality and economic disadvantage, as taxation and other policies are framed to help those who are poor achieve economic stability. However, these policies, often tax breaks for specific industries, may not actually aid those in the lowest income areas, and instead benefits the most affluent<sup>55</sup>. In this case, the poor get poorer, but believe that they are getting a better deal, while the gap between the rich and those in relative poverty increases. Most issues faced by Right-Wing populist governments have two solutions, the first of which is to take a short-term, localised view of how to proceed. This may at times involve prioritising flow of capital over morally just outcomes, or indeed even more explicitly corrupt behaviours

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<sup>52</sup> Subramanian and Wei, "The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly."

<sup>53</sup> Kumar, *World Bank Literature*.

<sup>54</sup> Swank and Betz, "Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe1."

<sup>55</sup> Oakley and O'Connor, *The Routledge Companion to the Cultural Industries*, pp 435.

such as buying political power, or funding the continued existence of economic unviable industries<sup>56</sup>. The second solution is often to throw money at the problem, without consideration as to what exact course of action may be most appropriate, although this behaviour has been mirrored by many governments in recent years, not just those with Right-Wing populist leanings<sup>57</sup>.

### **3.4 The Societal Sector**

Another security sector which deals with rapid movement is that of Societal security. This sector looks at the physical movement of people across borders, but can also include a focus on that which could be brought with them. The most common area of focus within societal security is that of health, where not only is the health of the current population necessary to be monitored, but the health of immigrants hoping to enter the borders. Immigrants carrying communicable diseases pose threats to the safety of the current population, and thereby need to be vetted before they enter the country. Another “carry on” item that immigrants bring with them, that has also been a cause of upset in certain nations as of late, is that of religion. After the terrorist attack on 9/11, people have become wary of immigrants from countries that are considered predominantly Muslim<sup>58</sup>. While it is a fundamental mistake to blame an entire religion for the acts of a few, Right-Wing Populism often perpetuates this fear within the public, fuelling their outrage, and influencing security

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<sup>56</sup> Martínez Guillem, “Podemos’ Performative Power: Space Struggles and/as Political Transformation.” pp 79.

<sup>57</sup> Chorafas, *Public Debt Dynamics of Europe and the US*.

<sup>58</sup> Peek, *Behind the Backlash: Muslim Americans after 9/11*, pp 67.



decisions to keep specific religion at bay. Societal Security also includes human rights, with most governments writing human security clauses into constitutions to guarantee rights to citizens, and, to a lesser extent, migrants and visitors. Yet some countries are now trying to deny rights to certain citizens due to heritage, race, or the aforementioned religious element, making this sector one that is rapidly gaining attention as a security issue<sup>59</sup>. The fact that this wave of populism is geared towards issues of social stratification along lines of income, religion, race and education, the societal sector is a security sector that is one of the most heavily debated by current Right-Wing populist groups<sup>60</sup>. Most issues put forth are those dealing with societal constructs that seek to further divide the population, placing these groups into an “us” and a “them”. When it comes to income, those who are less affluent are in a prime position to feel frustration towards affluent political elites, although this frustration does not extend to elites of other backgrounds<sup>61</sup>. In regards to race and/or heritage, people are being made to feel guilty about migrating or having negative views about how they have been historically treated by those in positions of power. Religious minorities are being made to feel as though their religion does not deserve the religious freedom that many countries offer due to harm caused by a few, despite the fact that most developed nations have declared that religion holds no place in politics<sup>62</sup>. Those more

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<sup>59</sup> Nebehay, “Trump Is New Breed of ‘Authoritarian Populist’: Rights Watchdog.”

<sup>60</sup> Mudde, *The Populist Radical Right*, pp 345; Schmuck and Matthes, “How Anti-Immigrant Right-Wing Populist Advertisements Affect Young Voters: Symbolic Threats, Economic Threats and the Moderating Role of Education.”

<sup>61</sup> Oesch, “Explaining Worker’s Support for Right-Wing Populism Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland.”

<sup>62</sup> Dolezal, Helbling, and Hutter, “Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland: Ethnic Citizenship, Church–State Relations and Right-Wing Populism.”

educated are being made to question their status as elites, while those less educated are being taken for granted. Each group has a valid reason to be frustrated with how they are governed, however rather than attempting to open up constructive dialogue, as is associated with Left-Wing populist practices, instead Right-Wing populist groups exploit this anger, use it as a tool to rise to power and turn groups against each other. Instead of listening, there is a tendency to exacerbate problems, and at times address completely the wrong issue in times of crises<sup>63</sup>. Right-Wing populism does have a large focus on societal securitisation, however at times it may appear to be making problems larger, defining threats as those which endanger nationalist or nativist sentiment, or may destabilise the political base of the leader.

### **3.5 The Environmental Sector**

The final sector is that of Environmental security, which looks at attempting to securitise environmental problems. This sector looks at both natural disasters and man-made issues. However, this sector is the most controversial for two reasons; the first being the fact that scientists, unlike business magnates, are viewed as elites and therefore are somewhat distrusted by members of society<sup>64</sup>; and the second being that for most environmental issues, there is no single causational factor, and no single entity on which to place blame. The environmental sector is the area that requires the most cooperation between states in order to create effective and lasting solutions. These solutions cannot be

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<sup>63</sup> Bump, "It's Not Complicated: Trump Is More Interested in NFL Protests than the Storm in Puerto Rico."

<sup>64</sup> Grove, "Populism and Polarisation 'Threaten Science', Nobel Laureates Say."

implemented by one country alone, as to make any lasting difference to the damage caused, there needs to be high level of compliance. Most environmental issues affect more than country, and issues such as desertification have numerous causal factors, making solving these issues very dependent on each country's cooperation to undertake research and propose adequate solutions. The solutions will vary with each region, and thus it needs to be understood that the solutions that worked in one country may not work for all. Some countries have provided a military-like aspect to their environmental security policies, such as Singapore decreeing a hefty monetary punishment to those who litter<sup>65</sup>, but for larger issues military involvement appears unnecessary. Politicisation of environmental issues, scientific funding, and societal awareness create a massive issue over which almost the entire complex can converge, allowing for more information to be gathered to find the most appropriate form of action.

Most issues that fall under environmental security under Right-Wing populist policy are given a short-term solution that focuses on local application. If the solution cannot be found or applied locally, money is placed towards the problem, but it seems that solutions are rarely found this way. Most often, economic interests are prioritised over environmental issues, meaning that energy companies using “dirty” materials are able to continue their costly extractive practices as the money that is put into circulation through the process benefits the government or specific leaders by creating jobs and national revenue that can

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<sup>65</sup> Avakian, “16 Odd Things That Are Illegal in Singapore.”

then help them to be re-elected<sup>66</sup>. This is not to mention the corrupt nations, where government members may receive a physical pay-out from providing funding to financially unviable industries at the expense of the environment<sup>67</sup>. Given that Right-Wing Populism is mainly to do with distrust of elites, there is also a heavy focus on the distrust of scientific elites and scientific fact, despite the fact that the owners of businesses referenced above may be seen as completely trustworthy although their best interests involve environmental degradation<sup>68</sup>. Right-Wing populists tend to favour actions and actors that will advance their political power, although this is true for almost any leader. These leaders specifically, however, tend to sacrifice moral judgement more readily for immediate gain. Their short-term mindset on gain often leaves long-term repercussions that the next leader may have to deal with. Given that Left-Wing populist groups are associated with being environmental parties<sup>69</sup>, by extension parties that care about environmental security; Right-Wing populist groups are more like to care about the environment so long as it supports their proposed status quo and requires a relatively small amount of resources to support<sup>70</sup>. Therefore, it is often to see Right-Wing populist leaders either throw money at environmental problems or groups, or completely ignore them, possibly even removing environmental agencies to

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<sup>66</sup> Kaltwasser et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* pp 229, 299; Brauch et al., *Handbook on Sustainability Transition and Sustainable Peace*, pp 493-497.

<sup>67</sup> Steven, *Trump's Populist America*, pp 83.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, pp 85.

<sup>69</sup> Gherghina, Mişcoiu, and Soare, *Contemporary Populism*, pp 240.

<sup>70</sup> Panitch and Albo, *The Politics of the Right*, pp 308.

further remove any “threat”, where the threat would be the attempt to prove that global warming is occurring<sup>71</sup>.

Overall, security decisions made by Right-Wing populist groups or leaders appear to have a few similarities across the sectors; all policies appear to be made with short-term gain and local application in mind. While this may be an appropriate approach for some security matters, this is not an affective one-size-fits-all solution to security threats. If security is dealt with in such a matter, issues will constantly reoccur, as no final solution would be met, and the situations would constantly need to be monitored rather than reaching a resolution. These policies also disguise vast support for the current global status quo, thereby creating possibilities for problematic relationships with nations experiencing vast growth or decline in numerous sectors. Right-Wing populist nations have tendency to create policies that may spend a large amount of resources on unnecessary issues, forcing the nations to remain vigilant in areas that, if the problem had previously been met with more a long-term viable solution, may have already been resolved<sup>72</sup>. This is not to mention the habit of returning to prior issues, questioning previous decisions made, and thereby provoking an old issue that was considered resolved, or at the very least on the path towards resolution<sup>73</sup>. This behaviour can agitate other states, making peaceful relations

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<sup>71</sup> Brauch et al., *Handbook on Sustainability Transition and Sustainable Peace*, pp 493-497.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, pp 489-490.

<sup>73</sup> The New York Times (Editorial Board), “Does President Trump Want Peace in the Middle East?”

difficult, even among those who are supposedly allies. Right-Wing Populism emphasises conservative behaviours that could place allies at odds with each other.

This chapter dealt with the idea of breaking from the more traditionalist notion of security as solely military security, and breaking this up into separate sectors of a larger complex. The use of multiple sectors provides easily generalised behaviours of Right-Wing populist groups when making security decisions, as well as providing a basic understanding of why threats may be securitised differently within each sector. Each sector defines their threats and actors separately, and have the ability to further synthesise to provide a more accurate and efficient explanation of security threats. This chapter, as well as that previous, aimed to provide exposition for the case study in the second part of this work. The case study should aid in illustrating the relationship between Right-Wing Populism and security decisions, by showcasing certain decisions made in The Philippines throughout their historical experiences with populism. Chapter 4 begins the second part of this work, and will introduce the topic of the case study and apply the information presented within part one.

## Chapter 4: Case Study –A Political History of Populism and Security in the Philippines

### 4.1 Methodology

For the second part of this work, the aim is to analyse the interaction between Right-Wing Populism and security decisions by means of a single case study. While there are numerous limitations to performing a single case study, the benefits at this point in time outweigh the possible detractions. A single case study is valuable for initial theoretical exploration and to provide insight into a particular situation, although this can be limiting when discussing further generalisations to be made on the issue. Part One of this work has provided a working definition of Right-Wing Populism and explained the scope of security that will be addressed within the case study.

The Philippines has been selected as the most ideal case within the scope of the recent resurgences for Right-Wing Populism. Given that the Philippines has historical experience with populist leaders, both Left- and Right-Wing, and currently has a self-identifying Right-Wing Populist leader who has also held a public office for a number of years, the case was found to be ideal in that there is a long history of evidence to illustrate political trends for analyses. The Philippines also has a colourful history within the international sphere, having close relationships with two of the world's current powers, China and the United States of America, as well as experiencing colonisation<sup>74</sup>, that has arguably affected the political attitudes towards Populism. This history and how the course of the relationships has changed over time, allowing for the

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<sup>74</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 61.

Philippines to be somewhat vulnerable to Populist leadership, will be discussed within the following section, while the policy decisions of current Right-Wing Populist leader and any generalisations that could be applied to further research will be discussed in Chapter 5.

## **4.2 Right-Wing Populism and Security in the Philippines**

The Philippines is a state comprised of over 7,000 islands and islets that are considered to have been first officially recorded in 1521<sup>75</sup>. This official record of the islands was made by the Portuguese-born Spanish explorer, Ferdinand Magellan. The “discovery” led to the Spanish colonisation of the islands from 1565 until the state was annexed by the United States of America in 1898, as reparations paid for Spain’s defeat in the Spanish-American War<sup>76</sup>. There are many remnants of the colonial past evident in the Philippine society, as well as attitudes and institutions that were created during the annexation period. It is believed that these attitudes, such as those which prioritised effective leadership and representation in governance, have prevailed and can account for such passionate reactions by the people of the Philippines when threatened. The U.S. allowed for insular government during the annexation of the Philippines, giving the Philippine people the chance to explore self-governance and establish closer control over the way in which they were governed<sup>77</sup>. This ability of the people to take charge of their own nation provided them a level of independence and a medium for representation that established a norm. After the U.S. granted them their independence in 1946, many of the institutions put in place by the U.S., such as a democratic ideal, remained steadfast.

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
<sup>75</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 12-13, 66.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, pp 61, 81, 91.

<sup>77</sup> Foreman, *The Philippine Islands; A Political, Geographical, Ethnographical, Social and Commercial History of the Philippine Archipelago, Embracing the Whole Period of Spanish Rule, with an Account of the Succeeding American Insular Government*, pp 560-564.



Figure 4.1 A brief timeline of Philippine political history



However, removing historical colonial masters did not suddenly remove all of the previous international security issues that were faced by the Philippines; many of which have only been exacerbated since the 1980's. Before colonisation, there are numerous accounts of trade relationships that the Philippines had with surrounding nations<sup>78</sup>. One such arrangement was with China, which did not originate as a trade relationship, but eventually evolved to incorporate this aspect. The arrangement in its original form took that of a tributary arrangement, where the Philippines would pay tribute to China, in exchange for goods and protection<sup>79</sup>. However, it becomes clear that China did not necessarily fulfil their side of the bargain when the Philippines were colonised by the Spanish. Since the 16<sup>th</sup> Century, the Philippines has had an interesting relationship with China, at times becoming close allies within the region, and then suddenly becoming distant. At the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, when the Philippines had been annexed by the United States of America, the relationship with China became almost non-existent in discourse. The United States were seen as progressive and modern, especially with their promises of independence for the nation, and therefore the Philippines appeared less inclined to damage the relationship with the U.S. resulting in societal attitudes changing<sup>80</sup>. Rather than continuing to view themselves as a small nation within Southeast Asia, the public of the Philippines began to push for becoming more successful and to follow the example of the United States. The U.S. pushed for insular government within the Philippines, allowing for the local people to exercise more citizenship and directly contribute to the governance of their land.

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<sup>78</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*.

<sup>79</sup> Junker, *Raiding, Trading, and Feasting*, pp 216.

<sup>80</sup> Stanley, *A Nation in the Making*.

This promise, coupled with the 1916 Jones' Act and the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, aimed to grant complete independence to the Philippines after a ten-year interim period<sup>81</sup>. This promise was slightly derailed due to the War in the Pacific, where the Philippines were occupied by Japanese forces, but the war ended with enough time to complete the agreement. On July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1946, the U.S. ceded its sovereignty over the islands on schedule, under the Treaty of Manila<sup>82</sup>.

This independence naturally led to the implementation of the U.S. security strategy; a wheel theory, involving the hub and spoke security net<sup>83</sup>. To explain this method of securitisation simply, the U.S. presented itself as a hub, the centre of a security wheel, while it created numerous bilateral security agreements with other nations, thus connecting the hub to its spokes and making the wheel functional. As a newly sovereign nation, the Philippines became an immediate candidate for alliance, given their strategic geographical location and previous history<sup>84</sup>. The geographical location was advantageous to the United States, as during the late 1940's there were stirrings of unrest within Southeast and Central Asia<sup>85</sup>. By placing a U.S. base in the region, there was hope that they would aim to create and maintain a security balance in the region. This security pact, and many others conducted by the U.S. has been seen to be unequal in their requirements exchanged, which has in turn led to political debate over whether or not such reliance is healthy, or whether autarky ought to be promoted more fiercely<sup>86</sup>. To put this security reliance and the effects of the pact into modern perspective, the Philippines has relied upon the

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<sup>81</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 96-102.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, pp 101.

<sup>83</sup> Ayres and Mohan, *Power Realignment in Asia*, pp 138.

<sup>84</sup> Vaughn, "U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia - Pacific Region Note."

<sup>85</sup> Sugita, *Pitfall Or Panacea*, pp 89.

<sup>86</sup> Thompson, *Unequal Partners*.

U.S. for military aid for decades, especially when territorial issues came to the forefront. However, with the election of President Rodrigo Duterte as President on June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016, attitudes have been severely altered. With the South China Sea issue becoming more provocative, and U.S. support for involvement in the region waning, the Philippine government appears to be rethinking their longstanding alliance.

The Bandung Conference in 1955 shifted the Southeast Asian nations more domestically minded focus towards that of integration, regionalisation and security. Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967<sup>87</sup>. Considered as a product of the Cold War, ASEANs main goal was to restore peaceful relations in the region, by means of the nations' themselves. This meant that ASEAN was looking to promote self-reliance for security issues, rather than allying itself to one of the major bipolar players during the time period. This Conference placed great stress on the U.S., as many nations in the region were considered their allies and had provided the U.S. with military outposts. The U.S. had strived for a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region on the subject of security<sup>88</sup>. If the allied nations suddenly withdrew their support of U.S. involvement in their affairs, not only would U.S. be unable to continue their form of military expansion, but they would lose their strategic positioning. Luckily for the United States any concrete decision on the matter was postponed, and by the outbreak of the Vietnam War, the conversation was assumed postponed indefinitely. The United States of America continues to be involved in the conflicts in the Southeast Asian region, some of which have escalated far beyond the interests of the U.S.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Acharya, "Studying the Bandung Conference from a Global IR Perspective.", pp 343, 349.

<sup>88</sup> Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, pp 50.

In the years after their formal independence, the Philippines struggled to maintain stable democracy. This was not aided by the long periods of being under martial law, which removed the possibility of free and fair elections<sup>90</sup>. The military essentially gained control of the nation by force, and the government controlled the military. This behaviour in turn greatly decreased the public opinion of political elites and the military that was meant to protect them. From 1965 to 1986 the Philippines had their first experience with a Populist leader, specifically of the Right-Wing variety. In 1965 Ferdinand Marcos was elected for his first term as President of the Republic of the Philippines<sup>91</sup>. He was then re-elected in 1969 for a second term. Towards the end of his second term, in 1972, Marcos was facing backlash from the public, in the form of student riots<sup>92</sup>. In response to these riots, Marcos deployed the military, and the riots, which were viewed as peaceful protests, descended into violence. Martial law was then declared, blaming these students for inciting rebellion that was threatening the stability of the nation. This is seen as the beginning of the decay of civil-military relations. In a tactical move, Marcos suspended elections, effectively placing himself as the figurehead of the country for an indefinite period<sup>93</sup>. As the president during a time of martial law, he had bestowed upon himself emergency powers that gave him the right to arrest those who would incite violence. This led to the attempted arrest of his largest political rival, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino<sup>94</sup>. Ninoy Aquino was alerted to his impending arrest, and sought political asylum in the United States after having life-saving heart surgery in order to escape the death penalty. However, he was not forgotten by Marcos, and upon his return to the Philippines ten years later, Aquino was assassinated under Marcos’ orders. His

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<sup>90</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 103-104.

<sup>91</sup> Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle*.

<sup>92</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 104.

<sup>93</sup> Katsiaficas, *Asia’s Unknown Uprisings*, pp 41.

<sup>94</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 104.

wife, Corazon “Cory” Aquino, and national religious groups, worked together to paint Ninoy Aquino as a martyr, who died fighting for democracy<sup>95</sup>. Cory reinstate free elections, forming a social movement titled “The National Citizens Movement for Free Elections” (NAMFREL)<sup>96</sup>. Cory Aquino quickly gained large-scale support from the public and began campaigning for the Presidential seat. After arduous discussion, which provided ample time for NAMFREL to gain traction, Marcos conceded to allow elections to be held.

On February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1986, the first election since 1969 took place, but things were far from being completely free and fair. Corazon Aquino had previously accused the President of corruption of the military and other high-ranking officials, especially given his penchant for nepotism<sup>97</sup>. He would grant high-level contracts and positions to friends and family, in return for continued support. However, this corruption went above and beyond at the 1986 election. Halfway through the voting, it became clear that Corazon Aquino would win the presidency, however after the counting of the votes, the government proclaimed a landslide win for Marcos<sup>98</sup>. People knew that the number of votes secured for Marcos was an impossible feat, and quickly those who recorded the votes stepped forward to announce that many of them had left the official tallying due to outrage at their tallies being tampered with. The result was disputed by the religious organisations present within the Philippines as well as by international democratic election agencies. The following day, Cory Aquino called for civil disobedience from the public, to express the discontentment they should feel at having their democracy manipulated. Six days later, on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, a military coup was staged at Camp

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, pp 104-105.

<sup>96</sup> Katsiaficas, *Asia’s Unknown Uprisings*, pp 46.

<sup>97</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 104-105.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, pp 105.

Aguinaldo<sup>99</sup>. Cardinal Sin, a Christian religious leader who worked closely with Corazon Aquino, called for supporters to aid the rebel soldiers, in order to oust the corrupt elitist government<sup>100</sup>. Instead of assisting with the violence, however, groups of students, nuns, and children were mobilised to stand in front of tanks deployed by Marcos to neutralise the rebel threat. Cory Aquino's supporters brought food and water to the soldiers, the nuns sat and prayed on the front line, and children played schoolyard games with officers. These tactics are commonly utilised by Left-Wing populist leaders, as rather than inciting direct violence with their words, the leaders rouse the passionate emotions of their constituents and put them to work doing things that can be viewed as being beneficial to all, while having the side-effect of delaying violent reactions. The soldiers that were still answering to Marcos were continuously ordered to remove the rebels, regardless of what stood in their way<sup>101</sup>. This meant that the soldiers were being ordered to take down their own countrymen, the people they were sworn to protect, including women and children. Over 80% of Marcos loyal force defected once they realised that they were expected to perform unspeakable acts of violence against innocent civilians. They refused, left their posts in droves, and Marcos was defeated. In conclusion, Marcos fled to Hawaii on February 25<sup>th</sup>, as Corazon Aquino took office<sup>102</sup>. This political movement, from February 22<sup>nd</sup> to February 25<sup>th</sup>, is known as The Yellow Revolution, the People Power Revolution, or EDSA I<sup>103</sup>.

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<sup>99</sup> Anderson and Herr, *Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice*, pp 1116.

<sup>100</sup> Katsiaficas, *Asia's Unknown Uprisings*, pp 46-58.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Anderson and Herr, *Encyclopedia of Activism and Social Justice*, pp 1116.

<sup>103</sup> EDSA II occurred from January 17<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup>, 2001, peacefully overthrowing the government of Joseph Estrada. EDSA III, or the May 1<sup>st</sup> Riots, was held to protest the arrest of Joseph Estrada, aiming to reinstate him to the presidency.

Marcos' reign was essentially Right-Wing Populism at work, although it has never been directly stated. These previous experiences provide ample information about how Populism has affected the political history of the Philippines, as well as the nation's attitudes towards politics. The Philippine people view Populism as being more directly associated with Aquino's activities, which under a more specific definition would fall under Left-Wing Populism<sup>104</sup>. The nation views Populism as being an inherently positive thing, given that the Left-Wing variety aided in reinstating a stronger and more effective form of democracy. However, it is important to remember the defining differences between Right- and Left-Wing Populism, as it now can be said that both Marcos and Aquino were populist leaders, despite being on different ends of the spectrum. By continuing without the distinction, having a leader promote themselves on a public platform as being a populist may arouse feelings of pride within the populous, and can make a candidate appear more appealing, even though said leader may be more inclined towards Right-Wing Populist tendencies.

This favourable view of populism without the distinction means that people may become more inclined to vote for a leader that markets themselves as being a populist should societal conditions reflect a similar amount of public outrage when compared to Marcos' tyranny. However, this is not to assume that this was the only military coup to occur in the Philippines, as there have been a handful more, many of which occurring during Aquino's Presidency as the public readjusted to democracy<sup>105</sup>. There are academics that believe that these coups, and other political scandals, are allowed because of the fact the Philippine revolution was not fully

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<sup>104</sup> Salvosa and Tenebrancia, *Politics of Unfinished Revolutions*, pp 126.

<sup>105</sup> International Business Publications, *Philippines Business Law Handbook*, pp 22.



completed, although this is simply speculation<sup>106</sup>. People are striving for constitutional change that will make committing acts that abuse positions of power difficult, if not impossible, with successive leaders promising to push for constitutional change as part of their campaigns. To further illustrate how important constitutional change has been viewed by the public, after 1992, when Cory Aquino refused to run for another term in office, Fidel V. Ramos came into power<sup>107</sup>. His platform was mainly focused on strengthening the economy, and revisiting talks on further revising the post-Marcos constitution. In contrast, his successor, Joseph Estrada, refused to look at constitutional reform<sup>108</sup>. The irony in this is that his term in office was ended by impeachment for a constitutional violation. In the following elections, both Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno Aquino III secured their positions in power by campaigning with focus on constitutional revision, although their positions on the subject differed<sup>109</sup>. Even the current President has made remarks about making the constitution more effective during his campaign<sup>110</sup>.

Moving into the present, the Philippine government is currently headed by a Right-Wing populist leader. However, the political attitudes of the people have changed. Unlike physically protesting unfair policy, people have become more “demobilized”<sup>111</sup>, participating via means of less direct methods such as utilising social media to attract the attention of representatives. This shift from physical involvement in governance towards more indirect involvement, or “demobilization”, has led to the public becoming less aware of their political climate and their

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<sup>106</sup> Severino and Salazar, *Whither the Philippines in the 21st Century?* pp 3-5.

<sup>107</sup> Bernardo and Tang, “The Political Economy of Reform during the Ramos Administration (1992-98).” pp 43.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, pp 44.

<sup>109</sup> Dayley, *Southeast Asia in the New International Era*, pp 89.

<sup>110</sup> Kurlantzick, “Philippines: Duterte’s Policies Take Shape.”

<sup>111</sup> Severino and Salazar, *Whither the Philippines in the 21st Century?* pp 29.

own candidates<sup>112</sup>. Thus “celebrity politicians” have come into power, as people wanted to be able to connect with those that were governing them, and traditional politicians were unable to offer that degree of connection<sup>113</sup>. People felt more connected to those they could watch through a television screen as they became more and more withdrawn from the public sphere, and more integrated into the internet. Thus began the push to find leaders they could trust. It has been stated that the current President, Rodrigo Duterte, used this aspect of society to his advantage when he ran for Presidential office in 2016. During his campaign he was the highly-publicised mayor of Davao City, and ran on a platform that emphasised his connection to island and people of Mindanao<sup>114</sup>. He is the first Mindanaoan President in the history of the Philippines, and this fact has been considered highly useful in his dealings with the Philippine people<sup>115</sup>. While not a direct link, it is highly possible that using his contextual knowledge of the people of Mindanao, and rallying them behind his cause to fight for them and their struggles, aided in his election.

In total, the political history of the Philippines is rich with aspects of democracy, corruption, security issues, and Populism of both Left and Right-Wing varieties. In the following chapter, the current Presidency of Duterte will be further examined in regards to security, using the political context discussed in this chapter as a basis, as well as returning to the definition of Right-Wing Populism. The analysis will address non-traditional security threats that cross-cut a number of individual sectors, looking at the complex as a whole. Generalisations should then be generated about the relationship between Right-Wing Populism and specific security decisions that could then be carried forwards in further research.

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Street, “Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation.” pp 437.

<sup>114</sup> Bohane, “Rodrigo Duterte: How the Philippines’ New President Plans to Solve Decades Worth of Problems.”

<sup>115</sup> Curato, “Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the New Terms of Philippine Populism.” pp 151.

## **Chapter 5: Analysis and Generalisations**

Given the information outlined in the previous chapter, it is obvious that the current situation in the Philippines relies heavily upon the historical context of the country. However, this is not to say that conditions that result in the election of populist leaders cannot be mirrored, or even equivocated, elsewhere. While not all aspects may exist simultaneously, or to the same degree, it is certain that specific aspects remain constant in observations of Right-Wing Populism and security decisions. This chapter looks to examine Duterte's policy decisions since taking office, as well as a few decisions that occurred during his time as Mayor of Mindanao, to create a generalisation of Right-Wing Populist security policy. The policies fall under the non-traditional security complex, cross-cutting through most, if not all, sectors. Security issues Duterte faces and has made decisions on are as follows: The Domestic vs. International Security dilemma; targeting domestic crime; engagement with emergency powers; tackling terrorism; immigration policy concerns; relationships with allies; managing economic crises; sensationalism in the media; political corruption; and environmental issues. The main argument is that Duterte strategizes in his threat creation in order to maintain popular support, while tackling issues that are prioritised by the public – and how these strategies can be generalised to be symptomatic of Right-Wing Populism as a whole.

By analysing Duterte's responses to these issues by providing further relevant information about the current political climate, generalisations can be made, which can then be further investigated and applied to further research. In order to make these generalisations apply to more than just this single case study, brief supporting evidence from other populist leaders has also been included. This work is primarily a single case study, however, so this extra evidence is

minute, as further research would be necessary to illustrate how these behaviours and policies are truly symptomatic of Right-Wing Populist leaders.

Before jumping straight into the analysis, it is useful to restate and examine the working definition of Right-Wing Populism that has been used throughout this work:

*“[Right-Wing Populism is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté Générale* (general will) of the people, by means of electing leaders who sensationalise politics and events, prioritise a return to a time of former prosperity, have a charismatic personality that is not publicly viewed as being part of the elite party, and are partial to the exercise of emergency democratic powers”*

This definition is part of the criteria by which each of the security issues has been chosen. It will also act as a lens to view these issues from, framing the context in which a threat has been strategically manufactured within the security complex, and informing the generalisations generated.

## 5.1 Domestic Security vs. International Security

Robert Putnam is famous for his theory on the two levels on which governments must “play”<sup>116</sup>. This two-level game theory contrasts the differences between how governments must behave in order to secure their domestic interests, and the behaviours that fulfil international interests. Most governments attempt to walk a fine line between activities that promote

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<sup>116</sup> Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

fulfillment of domestic demands, and those which promote international cooperation<sup>117</sup>. While the domestic interests could be fulfilled to ensure re-election in a democratic society; fulfillment of international activities can promote levels of prestige, which have been noted as being the “currency” of international relations<sup>118</sup>. In the Philippines, there is historical involvement in the international sphere, as well as promotion of domestic interests when dealing internationally. However, under Right-Wing Populist rule, involvement in the international sphere has somewhat decreased<sup>119</sup>. Traditional ties with allies, which will be discussed in greater depth in a later subsection, have been pushed aside, while the President attempts to deal with domestic security issues. While leaders are meant to prioritise issues that affect their constituents, Right-Wing populist leaders place a greater amount of importance over issues that immediately affect the public, giving them a short-term, domestic focus, as discussed in previous sections. However, this type of view is limited, and can lead to hasty decisions being made at times where emotion is running high. In the case of Duterte, he has continuously threatened to leave the United Nations should they continue to denounce his methods of securitising domestic issues<sup>120</sup>. This issue in particular is the invocation of martial law in Mindanao in May 2017 as a response to narcotic-related violence and alleged ISIS involvement in the region<sup>121</sup>. Duterte is accused internationally of heavy handed tactics, including authorising the vigilante killings of more than 7,000 civilians<sup>122</sup>, as well as reinstating the death penalty for drug related crimes. Being accused has done nothing to stop Duterte’s spree, but has rather made him denounce the international

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid, pp 435-436.

<sup>118</sup> Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, pp 31.

<sup>119</sup> Murphy, “Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages.”

<sup>120</sup> BBC News, “Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte Threatens to Leave UN.”

<sup>121</sup> Santos, Lacorte, and Quiros, “Duterte to Use Death Penalty, Militias in War vs Drugs, Major Crimes.”

<sup>122</sup> Lamb, “Thousands Dead: The Philippine President, the Death Squad Allegations and a Brutal Drugs War.”

organisations criticising him, as this type of media attention would go against his carefully constructed narrative. By using emotive language, Duterte has made the decision to threaten international organisations, using this to play on his narrative of making the Philippines stronger in the international community, but not appearing to acknowledge the longer-term consequences of these actions. This observation could be basis for further research into the psychology of how leaders prioritise issues and whether leaders from specific contexts are more likely to prioritise certain issues above others. Overall, Right-Wing Populism favours an internal-focus on security issues, rather than a more outwards-focused and international security discourse, as this increases their ability to gain domestically. For these leaders, this is what matters most, as it is the votes of the domestic population that will keep a leader in power in a democratic society.

## **5.2 Domestic Crime**

As has been mentioned previously, Right-Wing Populist leaders have a more domestically focused policy plan. Often, this plan includes domestic crime and attempts to lower the average crime rates. However, the ways in which crime has been tackled, while varying among different nations, has appeared to be equally harsh in nations with Right-Wing Populist leaders. As mentioned above, Duterte has implemented martial law in Mindanao as an effective safeguard against narcotics and related crimes. In addition to the martial law, Duterte has passed a bill that re-established the use of the death penalty in cases that relate to drugs<sup>123</sup>. However, it appears that both the people who supply the drugs, and those who have simply become addicted to using the drugs, will face the same penalty. There has been public outcry at this

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<sup>123</sup> Cayabyab, "Duterte Calls for Death Penalty: 'An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth.'"

announcement, arguing that the poorest in society are vulnerable to drugs and therefore will be the most at risk of these reforms. Duterte himself is quoted as saying that the “rich do not sell drugs”, implying that this policy was specifically made to target the lower income classes<sup>124</sup>.

It appears that Right-Wing Populist leaders promote a harsh attitude in regards to securitising against domestic crime<sup>125</sup>; however, this instead can promote another type of crime or violence to be committed. In the case of the Philippines, society’s poorest are being targeted by anti-drug policy under misguided pretences. Stratification among the income classes is being exacerbated, creating tensions between groups that have the ability to become physical. If this were to happen, Duterte could then grant himself more emergency powers to stop the rise in violence, placing himself as the hero in a narrative that was completely manufactured.

### **5.3 Emergency Powers**

Governments have in place emergency powers to be granted to their leaders in times of crises<sup>126</sup>. However, at times these powers can be used inappropriately, and rather than ensuring the protection of the state, can put the safety of citizens into question and may actually hinder further progress. In the Philippines, the implementation of martial law to “solve” the recent drug crisis, is one such issue<sup>127</sup>. The poorest of society are more at risk of exploitation by drug cartels, and thus become highly vulnerable victims of the system, which is now seeking to punish them with the same sentence that those that exploit them receive – death. This fact has the Philippine people relatively worried, especially given that the President has even stated that he is “sorry” if

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<sup>124</sup> Jerusalem, “Duterte to Poor: ‘If You Die, I’m Sorry.’”

<sup>125</sup> Paul Chevigny, “The Populism of Fear: Politics of Crime in the Americas.”, pp 78.

<sup>126</sup> For more information, see Gross and Aoláin, *Law in Times of Crisis*.

<sup>127</sup> Lamb, “Rodrigo Duterte: The President Warlord of the Philippines.”

civilians are killed<sup>128</sup>. Duterte's methods place drug users as equally responsible as the cartels and dealers. Those who are exploited should be helped, not killed for their involvement in a skewed system. Instead, Duterte passed a bill reinstating the death penalty<sup>129</sup>, but only in specific circumstances. The circumstances involve those who are convicted of a crime related to narcotics, yet do not include those convicted of other, more violent crimes, such as rape or child abuse<sup>130</sup>. Regardless of how many times Duterte's scheme has been denounced, the vigilante killings of poor civilians continues with approximately 12,000 deaths since Duterte's implementation of his plan in 1998, while he was Mayor of Mindanao<sup>131</sup>. The number of deaths has only escalated since Duterte took office, with at least 7,000 deaths due to extra judicial killings being recorded within a year<sup>132</sup>. The Mindanaoan people could be living in a state of fear, given that armed soldiers are patrolling their streets, however there is little international media coverage on this development as decreed by Duterte. Martial law is meant to be applied in times of direct threat to the direct survival of a state, leaving some to believe that this power has been incorrectly used, as was the case for former President Marcos, and the reason why Duterte has been referred to as being "Marcosian"<sup>133</sup>. Overall, this shows that Right-Wing Populist leaders tend to engage emergency powers to fulfil campaign promises, however this can often backfire and instead has the likelihood of creating more instability than it does provide security for the nation. The abuse of emergency powers can lead towards a dictatorial style of

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<sup>128</sup> Jerusalem, "Duterte to Poor: 'If You Die, I'm Sorry.'"

<sup>129</sup> Morallo, "House Passes Death Penalty Bill on Third Reading."

<sup>130</sup> Cepeda, "Rape, Plunder, Treason to Be Removed from Death Penalty Bill."

<sup>131</sup> Killalea, "Rodrigo Duterte Drug War: Police Reactivated after Hiatus"; Kine, "Rodrigo Duterte."

<sup>132</sup> Lamb, "Thousands Dead: The Philippine President, the Death Squad Allegations and a Brutal Drugs War."

<sup>133</sup> Abinales, "Duterte at 365 Days: It's Hip to Be Marcosian Again."



government, a type of governance that the Philippines has previously fought against<sup>134</sup>. Checks and balances remain necessary, especially under Right-Wing Populist leadership given the tendencies towards overuse. A related research area that would provide further insights into this generalisation, would be that exploring all emergency powers granted to leaders, further explaining the circumstances under which these powers are historically meant to be used and noting the circumstances under which they have been used.

## 5.4 Terrorism

Terrorism is a huge issue, both domestically and internationally. It is also a moral “grey area”<sup>135</sup>, as terrorists do not represent a single country or, contrary to popular belief, a single religion<sup>136</sup>. It is difficult to understand the causes of terrorism in each individual case, but it does become clear that terrorism is not a type of violence with which one can simply solve by use of military action. Duterte has spoken on his unwillingness to cooperate with terrorism, claiming that he would be capable of being “50 times” more brutal to religious extremists than they are themselves<sup>137</sup>, taking a hard-line position against terrorism. It must be noted that the extremists Duterte refers to are those of Islamic faith specifically. While there have been acts of violence perpetrated by those of other faiths, like Christianity, they have not been publicised as “terror” in the same way as acts of violence by Muslim people<sup>138</sup>. This statement is relatively dangerous to make, as it can easily be misconstrued into promoting violence against those associated with the religion. While this outcome has not come to pass, it is still a very real possibility when

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<sup>134</sup> Mogato and Ng, “Thousands Rally in Philippines, Warn of Duterte ‘Dictatorship.’”

<sup>135</sup> Bellamy, *Fighting Terror*.

<sup>136</sup> Martin, *The New Era of Terrorism*, pp 64.

<sup>137</sup> Bloomberg News, “Duterte Says He Can Be 50 Times More Brutal Than Terrorists.”

<sup>138</sup> England, “News Media Do under Report Some Terror Attacks - Just Not Those Involving Islamist Extremists.”

statements of a similar nature are made. Duterte has also publicly spoken in agreement with Donald Trump's anti-terrorist measures that seek to keep citizens from specific countries out of the U.S.<sup>139</sup>. Trump's ban excludes people from various middle-eastern nations, even those with a visa, from entering the U.S., and has been hailed by conservatives as a way of decreasing terror related issues in the U.S. However, many acts involving extremists have actually been perpetrated by what is known as "home-grown extremists"<sup>140</sup>. Despite being in a position of power when the Moro Islamic Front signed a peace agreement<sup>141</sup>, Duterte seems unwilling to part with the past. The fact he has lived through the entirety of the conflict between the state and a terrorist organisation, taking place predominantly in Mindanao, and agreed to implement all signed peace agreements<sup>142</sup>, has most likely altered his rationality on how to deal with terrorists. Given the alleged ISIS connection in Mindanao at current, he has decided to fight fire with fire, implementing martial law in Mindanao to fulfil the purpose of not only eradicating domestic crime, but removing terrorist threats. Both the Chinese and Russian governments, which are both highly conservative, have issued statements showing their willingness to provide soft loans to aid Duterte's fight against terrorism, regardless of the legality of the methods<sup>143</sup>.

This feeds into the generalisation that Right-Wing Populist leaders are hard line on terrorism, yet most politicians are to a point. This point is usually when methods to combat the threat may be seen as disturbing to the public, such as a constant military presence in the country, or the use of torture, for example. There is also a tendency by Right-Wing Populist

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<sup>139</sup> "Duterte Reciprocates Trump's Support for Drug War by Backing Travel Ban."

<sup>140</sup> Bergen, "Analysis | Trump's Travel Ban Is Useless. Terrorists Mostly Come from Our Own Back Yard."

<sup>141</sup> AP, "Philippines Signs Long-Awaited Peace Deal with Muslim Rebels."

<sup>142</sup> de Santos, "Duterte: We Will Implement All Signed Peace Agreements."

<sup>143</sup> Ranada, "Duterte: PH to Buy Defense Assets from Russia, China."

groups to misinform the public about the identity of terrorists<sup>144</sup>. This means perpetuating stereotypes that all terrorists are immigrants, or that they all follow a single religion, or are all confined to a single area, which is very harmful to specific societal groups. Therefore, rather than securitising the population against terrorism, there may instead be a spike in systemic violence towards minorities that may identify with similar aspects that are being assigned to terrorists<sup>145</sup>. There is no indication from Right-Wing Populist leaders that religion may in fact be an excuse for terrorism, not a cause; rather the opposite is promoted. Further study on the topic of the interaction between Populism and terrorism would be useful to answer further questions about the relevance of Populism on security.

## 5.5 Immigration Policy

The movement of people around the world is an area of security to be concerned about. Border protection agencies exist in order to regulate the inflow and outflow of people. However, there are still undocumented, or “illegal”, immigrants living abroad. Recent Right-Wing Populist campaigns have painted immigrants as the reason for high crime rates, terrorism, human trafficking, sex crimes, the movement of narcotics, high unemployment rates, and a “failing” economy<sup>146</sup>. While the Philippines has an issue with labour export<sup>147</sup>, the most interesting policy on immigration is not their own, but rather Duterte’s vocal support of another Populist leader’s plan. The immigration policies put forth by Donald Trump aim at reducing illegal and undocumented immigration, thus improving job prospects for American workers, and reducing

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<sup>144</sup> Bergen, “Analysis | Trump’s Travel Ban Is Useless. Terrorists Mostly Come from Our Own Back Yard.”

<sup>145</sup> Peek, *Behind the Backlash: Muslim Americans after 9/11*.

<sup>146</sup> W., “Blame Mexico!”

<sup>147</sup> Kaur, “Rethinking Philippine Labour Export.”

crime rates<sup>148</sup>. Trump perpetuates the false notion that immigrants commit violent crimes in high numbers; one of his most famous quotes calling Mexican immigrants rapists and drug dealers, and accusing them of taking jobs from the American people<sup>149</sup>. Despite the fact that this information has been proven false using statistical analysis, Duterte has still publicly come forth and praised Trump for his hard line on immigration. Duterte continued to discuss how great the plan was even after it was discovered that Trump's policy would leave any undocumented Philippine workers in the U.S. struggling<sup>150</sup>.

This in addition to Duterte's support of Trump's travel ban as a means to combat terrorism, it would appear that Duterte should have a very hard-line approach to immigration. However, when it comes to exploitation of children, sex trafficking and sex tourism, Duterte has put forth no policy<sup>151</sup>. Instead of protecting the current populous through means of human security policy, Duterte has placed his efforts into cracking down on driving whilst intoxicated, smoking tobacco products, the use of firecrackers, and speeding, in the past<sup>152</sup>. Although these efforts are necessary to improve public safety, there is no solid policy towards the aforementioned larger issues that are arguably more damaging.

The generalisations for this section are that Right-Wing Populist immigration policies tend to focus on protecting their citizens from an abstract threat, which takes the form of immigrants<sup>153</sup>. This threat is exaggerated and the fear of the population is exploited, while the leader once again paints themselves as the only candidate capable of protecting the public. A

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<sup>148</sup> Chen, "What Trump Sees in Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte."

<sup>149</sup> Lee, "Analysis | Donald Trump's False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime."

<sup>150</sup> Chen, "What Trump Sees in Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte."

<sup>151</sup> Cullen, "The Scourge of HIV, the Internet and Sex Tourism."

<sup>152</sup> Tordecilla, "Davao City Ordinances That May Be Implemented Nationwide under a Duterte Presidency."

<sup>153</sup> Friedersdorf, "What Right-Wing Populist Movements Share: Blaming Immigrants."

closer study of populist immigration policies may find that this is not necessarily a defining feature of Populism alone, however the degree of sensationalism behind the politicisation of immigration issues and exploitation of fear found in Right-Wing Populist rhetoric can be proven to be higher than average.

## **5.6 Allied Relationships**

On the international stage, nations have tended to form strong relationships with other countries, from which they receive some sort of benefit in return for goods or services. In security relationships, also known as alliances, these benefits can come in the form of military aid in times of emergency. However, while most alliances hold historical significance, there is usually no written document to say that these alliances should be adhered to and remain stable in perpetuity. In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte has worked to undermine the alliance of the Philippines with the United States. The Philippines have a shared history with the U.S. after their territory was annexed from the Spanish in 1898<sup>154</sup>. This annexation led to the independence of the Philippines, and overall should cement a relatively positive relationship between the two nations<sup>155</sup>. Under Duterte, this has not been the case. Instead, Duterte has proposed that rather than continuing a strong alliance with the U.S., the Philippines work towards aligning themselves more closely with China<sup>156</sup>, with which they have had an active dispute for numerous years thanks to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea<sup>157</sup>.

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<sup>154</sup> Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago*, pp 91.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid*, pp 81, 91.

<sup>156</sup> Blanchard, "Duterte Aligns Philippines with China, Says U.S. Has Lost."

<sup>157</sup> Boston Global Forum, "Recent Trends in the South China Sea Disputes."

The South China Sea issue has been continuously monitored since 1986 when the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) proposed changes to the “Limits of Oceans and Seas”<sup>158</sup>. There are territorial claims in the region made by China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Given that all Southeast Asian countries exist within a limited space, they are all noted as having valid claims, given specific boundaries and borders that are afforded to all nations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)<sup>159</sup>. ASEAN has made ensuring that these claims do not escalate into armed conflict part of its job as a regionalising institution. However, there has been a high level of rebellion against the rule of non-escalation in recent years. Military exercises, comprising both nations that have made claims in the region, and allied nations, have been ongoing in the region<sup>160</sup>. This type of signalling, especially surrounding disputed islands, has led to provocative responses from nations that also hold claims. Even incidents where those involved have not been military personnel have been met with the threat of violence. There are numerous accounts of fishing boats crossing disputed lines and being captured or set upon by “enemy” military vessels<sup>161</sup>. While this is not the norm, it is still very concerning to the international community. The Philippines has been involved in two disputes over islands; that of the Scarborough Shoal, and the Spratly Islands. In January, 2013, the Philippines, seconded by the Japanese government, initiated arbitration proceedings against China, for their unlawful claim on the Spratly Islands<sup>162</sup>. Under UNCLOS, the Nine-Dash Line that outlines the area within which

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<sup>158</sup> Rothwell and Stephens, *The International Law of the Sea*.

<sup>159</sup> Rothwell and Stephens.

<sup>160</sup> Song and Keyuan, “Maritime Legislation of Mainland China and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges for the United States.”

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid*, pp 322.

<sup>162</sup> Japan Times Editorial Staff, “Ruling on South China Sea Disputes.”

China believes it has claim, is considered unlawful, and thus any attacks on vessels traversing through the area were considered threats to regional security. On July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016, the arbitration committee came to a decision; they would back the Philippines<sup>163</sup>. They argued that China did not have adequate evidence that China alone had exercised historical sovereignty over the region, and therefore could not claim historic rights to the area. China was also criticised for their creation of islands in the region, as this was viewed as an attempt to circumvent legal proceedings to work in their favour<sup>164</sup>. While this has not changed Chinese attitudes in the region, it did work towards promoting unified positive domestic reactions in the Philippines<sup>165</sup>. Having legal documentation to their claim of sovereignty, even if not sole sovereignty, provided a morale boost to the region.

However, this did not alleviate all feelings. Right-Wing politicians claimed that the United States of America, as their ally, should have supported them in their arbitration, rather than leaving it to others<sup>166</sup>. While the Japanese and Philippine governments have repaired their relationship after the Second World War, this was still seen as a slight by the U.S., who appeared to be more interested in their own domestic affairs that dictated not to get involved with affairs concerning China. This platform was perfect for President Rodrigo Duterte to propose the severance of ties to the U.S., and instead navigate their focus back towards regional and domestic issues<sup>167</sup>. Duterte has claimed that U.S. were no longer supplying the necessary arms for the Philippine military to defend their claims to sovereignty, and that he personally was “not a fan”

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<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Palatino, “How the Philippines Reacted to the South China Sea Ruling.”

<sup>166</sup> Wu and Zou, *Arbitration Concerning the South China Sea*, pp 232.

<sup>167</sup> Clover and Peel, “Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte Announces ‘separation’ from US.”

of their meddling in Philippine politics<sup>168</sup>. He proposed a “separation” from the U.S., which was later found to be taken somewhat out of context, as Duterte never directly stated severing diplomatic ties with the U.S., but merely insinuated less reliance between the two, causing rampant misunderstanding<sup>169</sup>. However, this proposal was taken somewhat to heart, as many of Duterte’s later decisions reflect his departure from reliance on the U.S. Instead of being close with the U.S., the Philippines has drifted towards another emerging super power; China. Given that the Philippines had, until recently, been at political warfare with the country, it seemed relatively odd to suddenly propose making amends. Duterte’s reasoning, however, was aimed at drawing out nativist responses, by using the age-old rhetoric of promoting self-reliance in the region<sup>170</sup>. The reasoning that only a nation situated in the region could understand the threats and act accordingly resonated with the people, as they too wanted a government that would truly understand the lives of the people and act accordingly.

Overall, this change in attitude appears to be an odd decision for the leader to make, however it has been viewed favourably by the people, as aside from the South China Sea issue, China has meant no harm, although this alliance also undermines U.S. interests, as China is considered an emerging superpower.

The generalisation for this section is that Right-Wing Populist leaders look to alter traditional security relationships, and then re-define these relationships in terms of their own perceived power. This is regardless of any form of “turning point” or occurrence of an unfavourable event; rather, these decisions may have no discernible stimuli. Undermining a

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<sup>168</sup> Wen, “Philippine Public Sentiment Remains Uncertain.”

<sup>169</sup> Peel, “Duterte’s ‘separation’ from the US: How Real Is the Split?”

<sup>170</sup> Salaverria, “Duterte Defuses Separation ‘Bomb’: Ties with US Remain.”



security relationship should be a very strategic move, not one performed off-the-cuff, and the Philippines have valid concerns about their relationship with the U.S, and Duterte has successfully capitalised on these fears. However, consequences must be planned for, even those that come from merely suggesting altering allegiances. Non-populist and Left-Wing Populist leaders have a tendency to want to re-define relationships with other nations, but not completely disregard historical ties, even after crises, meaning that this observation is one that can be seen almost exclusively from Right-Wing populist leaders.

## **5.7 Economic Crises**

The economy is the driving force of a nation. It is an indication of whether a government can fulfil its promises, and when in doubt, can lead to disastrous outcomes for governments. Economic downturns, or negative financial ratings, affect the general public, as well as the government. Exchange rates become unfavourable, frugality in public spending ensues, and institutions suffer. From the case-study it can be shown that Rodrigo Duterte campaigned on a platform that looked to promote a level of economic reform, despite it not being a major focus<sup>171</sup>. He argued that public money was being hijacked, and sectors in dire need of funding were receiving very little<sup>172</sup>, while workers were leaving the Philippines to find employment elsewhere, as businesses were not being adequately funded<sup>173</sup>.

Duterte has highlighted a few economic issues with which the Philippines has been dealing with during his time as Mayor. The first is that of labour export; while there are a large

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<sup>171</sup> Sicat, "The First Duterte Budget Proposal, Priorities, and Economic Reforms."

<sup>172</sup> Lacorte, "Argument for Federalism: Manila Steals Funds."

<sup>173</sup> Jimenez, "What Is President Duterte's Labor Agenda."

number of families living in poverty who rely on remittances from a family member who is working overseas, these remittances are something which the Philippine economy has become reliant upon<sup>174</sup>. While less workers means that there is less competition to get a job, it can also mean that businesses will hire people that do not meet standards, simply because they need the numbers. Fixing domestic economic policy and providing further safeguards should eliminate the incentive for the Philippine people to export their services; which is why Duterte has pushed to reduce domestic poverty rates by 25% in 3 years<sup>175</sup>. However, it appears that his pledge will still leave a large number of the population in poverty, according to Forbes<sup>176</sup>. The general population are aware of class differences, and they want a leader who can help alleviate some, if not all, of the struggling of the lower classes. While class identity awareness is not always present within Populism, social stratification platforms tend to be considered political selling points for leaders to explore<sup>177</sup>. The rich/poor social divide is one that many people can rally behind, especially for leaders who have a lot of money, but distance themselves as being political elite, which Duterte has capitalised on, although there appears to be a false notion that a leader that has wealth is equivalent to having knowledge to be able to generate a flow of income for their country<sup>178</sup>.

The generalisation to take forward from this analysis is that Right-Wing Populist leaders tend to focus heavily on economic crises, painting themselves as the only person able to fix the problems. They will talk the talk on fiscal policy and eliminating corruption, but may then struggle to implement adequate policy reforms. At times the level of internal corruption and economic crisis will be over-exaggerated in order to sensationalise the issue; then when

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<sup>174</sup> Kaur, "Rethinking Philippine Labour Export."

<sup>175</sup> Gamil, "Duterte Wants Poverty Cut 25% in 3 Years."

<sup>176</sup> Jennings, "Most Filipinos Will Stay Poor Despite Duterte's Anti-Poverty Pledge."

<sup>177</sup> Busby, *Marketing the Populist Politician*, pp 4-5.

<sup>178</sup> Krugman, *A Country Is Not a Company*.

“suddenly” the economy becomes more regulated and “normal” under leadership rule the leader can be praised for having the foresight to deal with the issue<sup>179</sup>.

## 5.8 Media Sensationalism

Social media has made the President much more available to the public, meaning that people may feel a real connection to him, as they would with friends and family that they connect with on the same platform<sup>180</sup>. However, there are positive and negative aspects to getting information directly from the President, especially when the issues being reported may contradict information already in circulation. These words by the President against the media have the power to harm a right to freedom of speech, and place the mainstream public in a difficult position<sup>181</sup>. One would want to believe that their leader would not lie to them, but when the President and the media are at odds over a topic, it can be difficult to discern which side is to be believed. Duterte, while not physically harming the media, has made statements that appear to be threats against reporting on sensitive matters. These matters have the added feature that they can position the President unfavourably. While there may not be a causal connection between this and the comments that the media should exercise “prudence” in their reporting of governmental issues<sup>182</sup>, such as martial law, it appears too coincidental for it to be ignored.

Continuing on the vein of social media, Duterte most likely also has other reasons for being so available to the public. The largest reason is that he, or his advisors, can conduct discreet information gathering about how popular a specific policy area or stance may be among

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<sup>179</sup> Pajnik and Sauer, *Populism and the Web*.

<sup>180</sup> Buenaobra, “Social Media: A Game Changer in Philippine Elections.”

<sup>181</sup> Agence France-press, “Philippine President-Elect Says ‘corrupt’ Journalists Will Be Killed.”

<sup>182</sup> Corrales, “Duterte Urges Media ‘to Exercise Prudence’ in Reporting Martial Law.”

the populous, as many other politicians around the globe have been known to do<sup>183</sup>. One such example of where this has been beneficial is when Duterte published his plans regarding environmental protectionism. Duterte is reported as seeking to find a “middle-ground” and a “happy compromise” between environmental protection policy and mining activities<sup>184</sup>. Unlike the governments before him, which focused mainly on boosting economic activities, Duterte is more aware of the changing attitudes of the Philippine people through his social media activities, and thus able to adjust his policy plans and stances accordingly. The President no longer has to wait for an official political poll to discern the level of support for a plan, which saves both time and sociological “face”<sup>185</sup>. If a leader could accurately predict which stances would be publicly accepted, theoretically speaking the leader should be able to stay in power for the foreseeable future, and if politics is to be reduced to merely a matter of “staying in power”, this leader would be successful.

Regular political polls are still performed, however the results have been thrown into doubt, given the large discrepancies between them despite being performed in the same time period. Both Pulse Asia and the Social Weather Station gathered data that measured the level of trust and approval ratings for Duterte, where trust looked at personality, and approval looked at performance<sup>186</sup>. The Social Weather Station report, released on Monday, October 9<sup>th</sup>, sees Duterte’s position slipping 15% and 18% respectively, while Pulse Asia’s report, released Friday, October 13<sup>th</sup>, illustrates on a slight decrease in Duterte’s ratings, leaving him at an 82% approval rating. The reason for the discrepancy has been theorised with no single cause given,

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<sup>183</sup> Schoenfeld, “How Social Media Is Changing the Way Politicians Gather Information.”

<sup>184</sup> Serapio, “Philippines’ Duterte Seeks ‘happy Compromise’ between Environment and Mining.”

<sup>185</sup> Schoenfeld, “How Social Media Is Changing the Way Politicians Gather Information.”

<sup>186</sup> Morales, “Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte Still Has a High Approval Rating.”

despite both sets of data being gathered in late September, 2017. Overall, the conclusion that Duterte is still popular remains, yet the polls have shown themselves to be unreliable, meaning that Duterte would strategically fair better by focusing on social media.

The charismatic nature of Right-Wing Populist leaders can lead to stellar amounts of publicity<sup>187</sup>. However, this means that the leader is on constant show, and any negative behaviour can immediately be reported to the public. This can lead to leaders having a negative view of the media, and given their popularity they can use alternative forms of media to provoke reactions from traditional media, and possibly engage in an open dispute. Duterte has publicly denounced the national media of the Philippines, openly threatening them with “karma” should they use “twisted” methods to report on the implementation of martial law in Mindanao<sup>188</sup>. The media has fought back, claiming their right to free speech, and exposing the negative connotations with claiming the media is corrupt<sup>189</sup>. The current President of the United States, Donald Trump, has a similar on-going battle with international media groups, claiming that his “alternative facts” are the truth, and that specific news agencies, which have built entire empires on providing fact, are spreading “fake news”<sup>190</sup>. This attitude of leaders causes larger-scale problems, as people begin to worry about who and what they can trust. One would hope that a leader would not lie to their people, but at the same time, one would wish to gain factual information from publicly endorsed media sources. This can create high levels of distrust within society, which can lead to volatile behaviours being performed. Misinformation or miscommunication of information can, and has, lead to violent altercations, with some people

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<sup>187</sup> For more information, see Wouter van der Brug and Anthony Mughan, “Charisma, Leader Effects and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties.”

<sup>188</sup> Morallo, “Duterte Blasts Media Organizations for ‘unfair, Twisted’ Coverage.”

<sup>189</sup> Friedman, “The Real-World Consequences of ‘Fake News.’”

<sup>190</sup> For more information, see McNair, *Fake News*.

being unclear of exactly what a new law has entailed<sup>191</sup>. It is dangerous to demonise the media, but it is also dangerous to feel that one cannot trust their government.

It can be assumed that Right-Wing Populist leaders have a love-hate relationship with the media. When their policies are being praised, the media is viewed favourably. As soon as sensitive matters are disclosed, and the leader may be viewed unfavourably, the media becomes another threat to the stability of a regime. The leaders react in such a way to securitise their leadership against the media, but in doing so they may instead create more instability, as the public attempt to discern who is telling the truth. Further research into the relationship between the media and populist leaders can shed light on exactly how damaging demonising the media can be to a society.

## 5.9 Political Corruption

Political corruption is an issue that all countries around the world deal with to some extent. Whether it be embezzlement, bribery, nepotism, or other forms of corruption, it can create a high level of distrust for the government, and, depending on how severe the situation, can endanger a society<sup>192</sup>. President Duterte has sought to remove corrupt officials from office, starting a purge within national government departments<sup>193</sup>, as well as politicised the issue of funds being diverted from sectors that require them<sup>194</sup>. He has publicised his view on the inherent corruption of the system, and aims to work towards eliminating the problem entirely. This is considered one of the major reasons why his election campaign succeeded, as rather than

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<sup>191</sup> Walters, "Trump's Travel Ban: Stories of Those Who Were Detained This Weekend."

<sup>192</sup> Gong and Ma, *Preventing Corruption in Asia*, pp xiv.

<sup>193</sup> Jenkins, "Philippines' Duterte Fires 'Thousands' of Officials."

<sup>194</sup> Lacorte, "Argument for Federalism: Manila Steals Funds."

promoting a military coup, which has previously occurred in prior elections, Duterte put forth a non-violent alternative, simply stating that he promised to remove them from office, with “no second chances”<sup>195</sup>. The people agreed that government needs to be highly regulated, and checks and balances must be performed to ensure legitimacy. They must be held accountable for their actions and there must be the promise of transparency. When government spending is high, taxation is likely to be high, as well as the possibility of the country seeking foreign loans rising<sup>196</sup>. By promoting a more self-reliant nation to the public, by means of tackling corruption, Duterte made himself an attractive candidate. This enforces acts of political security, whereby Duterte looks to securitise the public political sector against corruption, although he has yet to construct an effective fiscal policy that does not involve vigilante justice towards those who abuse the system<sup>197</sup>

A generally applicable statement to be made about this aspect is that Right-Wing Populist leaders tend to use the existence political corruption as a tool to promote themselves, or undermine their opponents, through statements that imply that the current system may be corrupt<sup>198</sup>. However, this may only be the narrative so long as it benefits the leader, because as soon as the lens turns to their own allegations of corruption, suddenly everything may change. To effectively securitise this issue, leaders will promote themselves as those who can end the corruption in public office. They will also attempt to frame their undertakings as a way to securitise the population from uncertain threats. To further support this general statement,

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<sup>195</sup> ABS-CBN News, “Duterte Tells Gov’t Execs: Be First to Report to Work, Last to Leave.”

<sup>196</sup> Rossana, *Macroeconomics*, pp 179.

<sup>197</sup> Jerusalem, “Duterte to Poor: ‘If You Die, I’m Sorry.’”

<sup>198</sup> Gherghina, Mişcoiu, and Soare, *Contemporary Populism*, pp 171.

research into levels of corruption in countries supporting populist leaders may reveal more information.

## 5.10 Environmental Issues

The final security aspect to be analysed is that of environmental issues. The environment is a valuable resource, and governments either often promote the use of sustainable practices or will seek to expand their knowledge of the uses of the resources of their land. However, one thing is scientifically certain, and that is that humans are contributing to the destruction of the environment. Populist leaders, however, are unsure about how to tackle this issue. Given that the environment is a sector that cannot be effectively tackled by a single government, dialogues on the issue mostly occur internationally. With Right-Wing Populist leaders favouring domestic interactions and solutions, international participation in these conferences may be limited or minimal<sup>199</sup>. In the Philippines, Duterte is shown as being unsure on how to find a “happy compromise” between environmental activists and mining corporations<sup>200</sup>. As mining is an economic activity, it is seen as a necessity to maintain. In some countries, mining is considered a primary source of gross domestic product (GDP), meaning that its upkeep is vital for the state’s economy<sup>201</sup>. Duterte argues that while he does not wish to hurt the economy of the Philippines, he wants to find an acceptable middle-ground that will allow for the environment to flourish, but also provide economic incentive<sup>202</sup>. This has led to very little headway being made in the

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<sup>199</sup> Light, “The Climate Threat Posed by Right-Wing Populism’s Rising Tide.”

<sup>200</sup> Serapio, “Philippines’ Duterte Seeks ‘happy Compromise’ between Environment and Mining.”

<sup>201</sup> For more information, see Slack, “The Role of Mining in the Economies of Developing Countries: Time for a New Approach.”

<sup>202</sup> Magno, “Beyond Responsible Mining in the Philippines.”



implementation of environmental studies or policy, leaving the sector almost completely stagnant, despite the pomp and fanfare Duterte made prior.

The main point to take away from these observations is that Right-Wing Populist leaders tend to have a lot to say about the environment to appease voters, but when it comes to time to put their words into action, the response can be lacking. With these leaders often threatening to remove themselves from specific international organisations that include environmental policy among their agenda, it appears that the most common way for Right-Wing Populist leaders to cope with environmental issues is to actively ignore the problem, with few even going out of their way to denounce these issues as hoaxes<sup>203</sup>. In regards to domestic policy, there is no singular pattern for actively dealing with the problems, but once again their policy approaches appear to be very short-term and locally-focused. Right-Wing Populist leaders appear primarily focused with economic incentives, usually given their business backgrounds<sup>204</sup>, and thus since environmental security can take away from traditional economic activities, such as mining, any policy that undermines these activities is usually blocked. This statement can be held true for all politicians, regardless of whether they adhere to Populism or not, but it is more evident and direct in the cases of Right-Wing Populist leaders. Further discourse into the securitisation of the environment under populist leadership should be implemented in order to garner more statistics and useful information that could allow for more direct generalisations to be made.

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<sup>203</sup> Lockwood, "Right Wing Populism and Climate Change: Exploring the Linkages."

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, pp 16.

## 5.11 Additional Notes

It should be noted that all of the above sectors as faced by the Philippines can, and do, have parallels in other countries that are currently under Right-Wing Populist leadership. By far, the most apparent and visible example is that of the current President of the United States, Donald J. Trump. Each section has issues and generalisations that can be applied to the current U.S. situation which need to be noted. The inward progression of U.S. policy focus, the attempt to destabilise longstanding alliances and memberships; the less than favourable relationship with the media; the public attacks on immigrants and other minority groups; the talk of abusing emergency powers; the attitude towards political corruption so long as it is beneficial to the cause; and the “do-nothing” approach to environmental issues, appear eerily similar to Duterte’s stance on security issues<sup>205</sup>. The comparison does not end here, with further similarities and direct parallels existing in the political histories of Latin America in the 1960’s<sup>206</sup>, and other nations that have had self-proclaimed populist leadership for any length of time<sup>207</sup>. Most large differences in the way Right-Wing Populism manifests may rely on differences in the size of a nation and their “usual” style of governance, but the similarities appear to severely outweigh the contrasting evidence.

In conclusion, Right-Wing Populist rhetoric has affected security decisions that have been made. While some decisions have also been strategic, others have been made purely to promote the leadership abilities of populist candidates. In total, there are ten security issues that

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<sup>205</sup> See Winberg, “Insult Politics.” for further discussion of modern Right-Wing Populist rhetoric.

<sup>206</sup> Luna and Kaltwasser, *The Resilience of the Latin American Right*.

<sup>207</sup> Greven, “The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective.”

have been explored through the lens of Right-Wing Populism to create some generalisations that could be carried forward to look more closely at policy-decisions made by these leaders in the future. By raising the possibility that Right-Wing Populism does have relevance to the context out of which security decisions are made, the ways in which Right-Wing Populism can be understood have been expanded and advanced. To create a more watertight set of generalisations, however, further research, involving more than a single case study, will be necessary. Going forward, these generalisations that have been explored throughout this chapter, create a valid starting point for further discussion.

## Chapter 6: Conclusion

Right-Wing Populism has been shown to affect security decisions in multiple ways. By examining recently elected Populist leaders, it is easy to illustrate the ways in which security policies and attitudes have been altered through use of rhetoric and ideology. By using a case-study of the political history of the Philippines, correlations between the behaviour and the rhetoric can be made. This work did not aim to prove a causal relationship between Right-Wing Populism and the specific security decisions mentioned, however there is enough evidence to relate certain behaviours to populist rhetoric. With continued discourse into the application of Populism into political theory, research may soon be completed that will be more thorough and provide definitive answers. For the time being, it can without a doubt be agreed that P. J. O'Rourke said it best in his quote stating that “[s]imply because something is a populist movement doesn't make it either good or bad”<sup>208</sup>, it simply makes things different, and the goal of a researcher is to understand why.

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<sup>208</sup>“P.J. O'Rourke's Advice?”

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