DARK MIMESIS:
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE SCALPING PARADIGM

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines the history of scalp bounties, i.e., the payment of money or trade goods in wartime to volunteers, militias, and mercenaries, for the scalps of indigenous North Americans in the British North American colonies and the post-Revolutionary United States, from the mid-1630s to the end of the 19th century. Out of a general Euro-American colonial backdrop of military alliances with indigenous peoples against indigenous third parties and rival European colonies, and the offering of bounties for captives and proofs of death to indigenous and European volunteers, British colonists parted ways with other Europeans by grafting a specific request for scalps, per eastern North American practice, with a broader policy of ethnic cleansing against indigenous peoples, and the outsourcing of this work to frontier populations with a vested interest in seizing indigenous land and resources. Synthesizing and surveying primary and secondary sources, I argue that Euro-American scalp bounties and the pursuit of those bounties, popularly known as scalp-hunting, were informed by 16th-century designations of indigenous Americans as illegitimate combatants, cross-cultural misreadings of indigenous warfare as a primordial or dysfunctional version of Europeans’, and a broader context of genocidal intent towards indigenous peoples collectively. Imagining themselves as the potential victims of Indian uprisings, Anglo-Americans invoked scalping to metonymize nightmare images of indigenous warriors as merciless and cruel; in turn, scalping was invoked to justify vigilante killings, pre-emptive violence, slave trading, and scorched earth campaigns of extirpation. Whites scalping Indians, on the other hand, was imagined as historically inevitable, and portrayed in art and culture as exemplifying their inheritance and supersession of indigenous lands, resources, and ‘American’ identity.

I argue that scalp bounties among Anglo-Americans, and their justification as historically inevitable, is best understood as mimetic re-enactment of the dehumanizing stereotypes which rendered indigenous peoples as illegitimate combatants and the negative mirror image of Euro-American settlers. I refer to this bundle of ideas, truisms, stock images and narratives as “the scalping paradigm.”
Lay Summary

This thesis examines the history of scalp bounties in North America, i.e., the payment of rewards by colonial authorities or private citizens for the scalps of indigenous North Americans; and the cultural history of mercenaries and racist vigilantes, popularly known as ‘scalp hunters.’ I argue that the historic phenomenon of offering scalp bounties against indigenous peoples, from the mid-1630s to the end of the 19th century, was a logical extension of a widely-shared European belief that ‘Indians’ were obstacles to progress if not illegitimate combatants, and that this designation informed disproportionate violence against indigenous peoples by Europeans, including scalping. Further, I outline how the isolated image of the Indian-killing vigilante, as either folk hero or outcast, allowed dissociation from a broader problem of structural racism expressed in casual prejudice and state-run campaigns to conquer and assimilate indigenous peoples—i.e., mass killings and cultural genocide.
Preface

In 2006, while finishing my Master’s degree at Lakehead University, I first conceptualized and articulated the central question of this dissertation as the history and historiography of scalping in colonial North America; the adoption and commercialization of scalping by Europeans; and the resultant double-standard by which scalping among indigenous North Americans was cited as justification for conquest and displacement, including the scalping of indigenous people by Europeans.

My main thesis supervisor, Dr. Coll Thrush, pointed me in the direction of settler-colonial studies, genocide studies, intellectual and cultural history, and postcolonial theory. Other members of my thesis committee steered me towards the literatures of their own areas of study: Dr. Carole Blackburn on anthropology, indigenous ontologies, and the cross-cultural encounter; Dr. Neil Safier (who left the committee in 2015 due to time constraints) on early modern ethnography, European knowledge-creation regarding the Americas, the creation of Euro-American societies and trans-Atlantic empires, and indigenous resistance to and within those empires; the late Dr. Daniel Vickers (who passed away in February 2017) on cross-cultural contact, conflict, and cooperation between indigenous, European, and Euro-American societies, and the comparative study of rival European empires, particularly Spain and Britain; and Dr. Paige Raibmon, who joined on short notice in February 2017, on indigenous modernities, activism, and the “authenticity” trap of early 20th century anthropology and the settler imaginary.

No content from this thesis has hitherto been published. As my research was confined to surveying the primary and secondary literature and contains no interviews with or photographs of living persons, or of human physical or skeletal remains, ethics approval by the UBC Research Ethics Board was unnecessary.
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Of the potential supervisors I approached in the late summer and early autumn of 2007, Dr. Coll Thrush was one of three who saw potential in a methodologically-unsophisticated thesis proposal, and was the first and only potential supervisor who wanted to discuss it over the phone. Coll and I got along from the very beginning, and I couldn’t have asked for a more supportive graduate supervisor, no matter how busy he was. The same is true of all my committee members—Carole Blackburn, Neil Saffer, Paige Raibmon, Daniel Vickers, all of whom took this project seriously from the outset, all of whom were role models of the successful academic’s work-life balance. My broader thanks must be extended to the faculty, staff, and graduate students of the History department during my time there, who offered me constructive and substantive assistance, feedback, critique, moral support, and guidance, whether I asked, or whether I didn’t.

My sincere thanks and appreciation must also go to the staff, students, and faculty of St. John’s College, UBC, where as a Junior Fellow (from September 2008 to August 2016) I had community and good cheer in an often dark and drizzly city, and conversations which challenged and expanded my perceptions of the world and my place in it. Of the words of wisdom I soaked up there, an observation of Principal Henry Yu in a formal dinner address comes to mind, where he noted that the qualities that make for a good scholar—i.e., isolation and introspection—are not necessarily the traits that make one a good human being, “often the opposite.” In this light it’s hard not to think of Herman Melville’s warning, in The Confidence-Man (1857), of one ultimate conclusion of dedicatory obsession and repudiation of the things that make us human: “Ever on the noiseless trail; cool, collected, patient; less seen than felt; snuffing, smelling—a Leather-stocking Nemesis. In the settlements he will not be seen again…”

I would be remiss not to note that my research, writing, and thinking about the difficult and ugly subject of the stereotyping and dispossession of indigenous North Americans, past and present, took place on unceded Musqueam territory on the shores of the Salish Sea, and on lands obtained in the Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 (Crown Treaty No. 60) in Ojibway / Anishinaabeg country, on the shore of Lake Superior / Gichigami.

Last but by no means least, my deepest gratitude to my family east and west, who, to cut a long and sentimental story very short, were always there.

—Tom Peotto

Thunder Bay, 27 July 2017
Dedication

To my parents, who gave life lessons and library cards, and never lost faith;
To my grandparents, who showed that life is a marathon, not a sprint;
To my brothers, who never let me get too full of myself. (“Just because you use a lot of big words doesn’t mean you get to dress like a slob”).
**Introduction: “Who invented scalping?” and why that question matters**

“The Scalping Knife! General Custer and His Command Annihilated.”
—Headline of the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 June 1876

“My people took scalps only to prove their stories that they had met the enemy and overpowered him. It is not different than the doughboys in the world war bringing back German helmets and other souvenirs.”
—Luther Standing Bear (Miniconjou Lakota), 1928

**Thesis Statement**

This thesis examines the cultural history of scalp bounties: the payment of money or trade goods in wartime to volunteers, militias, and mercenaries, for the scalps of indigenous North Americans in the British North American colonies and the post-Revolutionary United States, from the mid-1630s to the end of the 19th century. My approach is both chronological, i.e., when and where scalp bounties were first offered in the North American colonies, and cultural, e.g., how British colonists and their descendants rationalized scalping indigenous enemies as a form of racialized violence, and how their incorporation of scalping into a system of large-scale violence removed it from a secondary importance in such contexts as the eastern North American mourning-war complex or Great Plains coup warfare, and made it part of a distinctly British variation of a Euro-American system of total war centered on commodified indigenous bodies and the conquest of indigenous lands and resources. For Anglo-Americans in particular, the contradictory images, ideas, narratives, and truisms of scalping and scalp bounties both raised the specter of their terror of fighting frontier wars, and were used to justify violence on a much larger, more organized, and impersonal scale.

than anything done by Indian enemies. Scalping became metonymic for the bundle of cultural givens and practices I refer to here as the scalping paradigm.

Prologue: “The first scalp for Custer, boys!”

Preparing to ride into the valley of the Little Bighorn on the morning of 25 June, 1876, the members of the U.S. Army’s 7th Cavalry regiment were in high spirits. Their path to the Little Bighorn had begun in the summer of 1874 when, in defiance of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, their commander Lieutenant-Colonel George Custer had led an expedition into the Great Sioux Reservation which confirmed the rumours of gold deposits in the Black Hills, an oasis of wood, game, and sheltered valleys which held spiritual significance in Lakota and Cheyenne sacred geography. As gold miners and adventurers flooded into the Great Sioux Reservation, the federal government endorsed the violation of the treaty and the de facto annexation of Lakota treaty lands, first offering to purchase the Black Hills then, when the Lakotas inevitably refused payment, opting for conquest. An ultimatum, issued in the boreal chill of midwinter on the northern Plains, ordered all Lakotas to report from their winter camps to their agencies by 31 January, 1876, which could not have been done without considerable injury and loss of life. Inevitably ignored, this ultimatum served as casus belli for a summer 1876 expedition against the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos. Under the command of Major-General Philip Sheridan, the three columns of the U.S. Army mustered out in the early summer of 1876 had two intended goals. In the immediate circumstances of 1875-76, their task was to physically separate northern Plains Indians from the mushrooming Black Hills mining settlements of Deadwood, Custer, Hill City, Sheridan, etc., while their secondary goal was to encircle and defeat the resistance movement which had coalesced
around Sitting Bull and other traditionalist leaders in the Powder and Tongue River country since 1864.³

Trained since childhood to collect wild foods and use wild plants for medicine, to endure the elements without complaint, and to travel long journeys and fight on foot or on horseback with bows, firearms, and hand weapons, the average 19th century Plains Indian was adept, or at least competent, in a set of skills easily transferable from hunting to warfare. Among Europeans of American or Old World birth, this was the exception rather than the rule; thus, in 1876, following an Anglo-American frontier tradition dating back to the early 18th century, private donations among Deadwood pioneers funded $200 bounties for Indian scalps. The psychological role this grassroots form of violence played in shoring up the numerous-yet-individually-outmatched settlers’ courage was observed by General Crook’s adjutant, Captain John Bourke, while passing through the Black Hills that September (see Chapter 6). Bourke calculated that the bodies regularly found that year in ones, pairs and threes “in such and such a gulch” between the beginning of summer to September added up to around four hundred slain by Indians; whites, for their part, only “succeeded in killing an Indian” at “extremely rare intervals.” When they did, a carnival atmosphere broke out:

“Deadwood would go crazy with delight; the skull and scalp were paraded and sold at public auction to the highest bidder.”

The widespread Anglo-American idea that scalping Indians signified victory, and was consistent with a carnival or jubilee atmosphere, also appeared among the 7th Cavalry. Since early May they had been traipsing across the northern Plains on long marches with cold rations and minimal sleep, and now that the Crow and Arikara scouts had found a large village of Lakotas, Cheyennes, and Arapahos in the river valley, it looked like the end was in sight. Custer’s orders were to wait for his commanding officer General Alfred Terry and join forces with General George Crook before marching on the village, but on the morning of 25 June no warriors could be seen through the officers’ binoculars, an observation that tempted Custer’s risk-taking sensibilities. It was decided: as at the Washita in 1868, the 7th would ride down, take the women, children, and elderly of the village hostage, and order the absent warriors, presumably off hunting, to surrender when they returned. The 7th were therefore in a jovial mood that morning, bolstering their confidence with candid jokes about scalping the Indians and, per another longstanding tradition in Anglo-American frontier warfare, looting the village.

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Custer’s orderly, John Burkman, remembered the troopers predicting that they’d be back by lunch, and placing bets on who would collect the most scalps. Private Peter Thompson of E Company overheard one “old soldier” say that all they had to do was “reach old Sitting Bull.” Then another soldier chimed in:

“If that is all, the campaign will soon be over, and Custer will take us with him to the Centennial.” “Of course, said a wag, “we will take Sitting Bull with us.” This created a roar of laughter among those who heard him. The conversation continued, each one telling his neighbour what he would take when Sitting Bull’s camp was captured.

What the 700 men of the 7th did not know was why General Crook had been delayed in their rendezvous: the Indians had already repulsed Crook’s force at the Rosebud on 17 June, and were spoiling for another fight with the soldiers. In the massive village along the banks of the Little Bighorn, the largest collection of Plains Indians that the scouts had ever seen, an estimated 1,500 warriors who had stayed up dancing the night before were stirring in their tipis.6

Riding into battle after breakfast, First Sergeant John Ryan of Company M heard Second Lieutenant Charles Varnum calling out “‘Thirty days furlough to the man who gets the first scalp.’ We were very anxious for the furlough,” remembered Ryan, “but not so particular for the scalp.” Indeed, the soldiers had several reasons to be anxious. First, the 7th’s esprit de corps was sapped: several of Custer’s most experienced officers had been temporarily reassigned for the Centennial, and up to thirty percent of his troops were raw recruits, some of whom were native speakers of German, Italian, and Irish Gaelic with limited English. Due to budget shortcuts, some had never fired their dragoons’ carbines in

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basic training, and the soft copper shells of their standard-issue carbine ammunition could jam during ejection when deformed by gunpowder or verdigris buildup. A third, nonmaterial factor was an omnipresent dread about what victorious Indians did to their white captives, reinforced by images and narratives repeated again and again in the American oral tradition and mass media. “As motivational tool,” writes historian Alan Taylor, “Indian-hating was double-edged.” Invoking scalping, either as a marker of Indian warriors’ putative ferocity or to promise an inevitable, just victory over them, “initially aroused white men to fight, but it ultimately invited them to fear.”

Many of the 7th probably held a mental image of Seth Eastman’s 1850 engraving The Death-Whoop: of a Dakota warrior, holding his knife in his right hand and triumphantly raising his enemy’s scalp in his left, exulting over a slain Indian enemy. The scene, and its vivid and straightforward visual language of victor and vanquished, seems to have struck a chord in the Anglo-American imagination; in 1868, the federal government commissioned Eastman to rework it as an oil painting for display in the White House. Paul Hedren notes that it was regularly copied by 19th-century artists seeking to capture the merciless and savage qualities Europeans attributed to Indians at war—as in an 1873 Harper’s Weekly editorial illustration, “Modocs Scalping and Torturing Prisoners”. Replacing the slain Indian of Eastman’s original with a scalped American soldier and adding a background scene of gaunt, wolfish Indians immolating a naked white prisoner, the artist could capture and

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express widespread public hatred for the Modocs in familiar terms of Indian cruelty and white victimhood which had little or no relevance to actual events in northeastern California.\textsuperscript{8}

*The Death-Whoop*, like other Dakota scenes Seth Eastman engraved for Henry Schoolcraft’s six-volume series on Native Americans (1851-57), reappeared in *The American Aboriginal Portfolio* (1853), an illustrated tract co-authored with his second wife Mary promoting Protestant missions among the Sioux. Having been stationed at Fort Snelling, Minnesota from 1830 to 1849 where he was briefly married to a Dakota woman (1830-32), Lt. Eastman was considered an expert on the Dakotas and, by extension, Indians generally. Yet he and Mary’s ventriloquized Dakota perspectives merely reflected Anglo-American truisms: that scalping was vastly important to Indians, and was emblematic of the individual and cultural pathology the Eastmans attributed to “the warrior, with his ungoverned passions, […] delighting in war and glorious deeds,” and “the woman, with her superstition and degradation.” Mary’s accompanying 1853 text for *The Death-Whoop* declared scalping to express “all the horrible passions of the human heart.” Some authors had found a sort of pagan magnificence in such spectacles, but the Eastmans had only contempt and pity: after fighting like “savage beasts that war unceasingly in the forests of the uncivilized,” one kills the other, and the victor is in “the ecstasy of his triumph.” As “[e]very nerve in his body is thrilling with joy,” the warrior “shouts the appalling death-cry.” If this is the warrior’s first scalp, “the amount of his happiness” is almost “unendurable” since both his mother, “and the

maiden he loves, will glory in his success.” With pious sarcasm, the Eastmans paraphrased *Proverbs* 31:10: “the fame of her son and husband is dear to the Indian woman, and the price of an enemy’s scalp is far above rubies.” The young man, adorning his first scalp with beads, “feast[s] his eyes upon the horrid sight.”

Until age 16 Seth Eastman’s Dakota grandson Ohiyesa, the fifth child of Eastman’s daughter Wakantakawin who, under the baptismal name Dr. Charles Eastman, later became a Boston-College-trained physician, only knew Americans by reputation. In his memoir *Indian Boyhood* (1902) he quoted his uncle’s description of them as a wealthy, but very peculiar people, and as poor fighters not worth counting coup on. The “common warriors,” his uncle said, were “driven forward like a herd of antelopes” by their officers, and fought “from compulsion and not from personal bravery.” His uncle’s belief that individual shows of prowess and fearlessness, the metric of martial success among Plains Indians, were the exception rather than the rule among Americans, is widespread and implicit in testimonials from Indian combatants at Little Bighorn. Thus the Miniconjou chief American Horse could, with no contradiction, praise an officer who sacrificed himself to cover his men’s retreat as “the bravest man [the Sioux] have ever fought” while at the same time mentioning soldiers who “became foolish” with fear and begged to be taken prisoner; “none were left alive for even a few minutes.” Soldier Wolf, a Cheyenne, said Major Reno’s cavalry were so frightened they couldn’t shoot straight and “seemed to be drunk”; chasing them was “like chasing buffalo,” said another Cheyenne also named American Horse, a comparison echoed by the Cheyenne Little Hawk. “[I]t was just like killing sheep,” said an Unkpapa, known as

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Rain-in-the-Face, to the journalist W. Kent Thomas through an interpreter in 1894. “Some of them got on their knees and begged; we spared none.”

Emotions ran high on both sides of the battlefield, and the Indians were both furious and frightened at how close the soldiers had come to attacking their families. A teenage Unkpapa named Iron Hawk later told John Neihardt of putting an arrow through a soldier, knocking him off his horse, and beating him long after he was dead: “I was mad, because I was thinking of the women and little children running down there, all scared and out of breath.” When a fiftysomething Cheyenne woman named White Necklace saw the stripped corpse of a soldier lying nude on the hillside, she remembered that her niece’s body had also been found stripped after Colorado militia had attacked Sand Creek in 1864. Her niece had also been decapitated, so “I jumped off my horse and did the same to him.” As defeat at Indian hands loomed, the soldiers’ morning confidence was replaced by panic, and the Indians began seeing things which made little or no sense to them. An Unkpapa remembered taking part in the pursuit of a cavalryman over a six or seven mile chase, and being the American’s last remaining pursuer as the other four Indians dropped out and turned back to the village. The lone Unkpapa had neither bow nor gun, and was on the verge of giving up when the soldier looked over his shoulder at him, drew his pistol, and shot himself in the head. Kate Bighead, a Cheyenne woman, not only saw soldiers committing individual

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suicide, but also saw “several different pairs” of soldiers “fire their guns at the same time and shoot one another in the breast.” In the post-reservation period, a Cheyenne named Wooden Leg observed, Indians who “tried to tell of the soldiers killing themselves” learned that whites “always became angry and said the Indians were liars [.]” Fearful of reprisals or punishment, Little Bighorn’s Indian veterans stuck to flattering stories of 7th Cavalry heroism or held a discreet silence.11

On 27 June, General Terry and his forces entered the Little Bighorn valley to find a vast, abandoned village site, recently-interred Indians in burial lodges and scaffolds, and 430 survivors of the 7th Cavalry fortified on a blufftop. In the valley, Lt.-Col. George Custer and 268 scouts, soldiers, and civilians of the 7th lay dead. The news from Montana, arriving a week later, soured the afterglow of the double celebration of the Centennial and the 4th of July. Up to this point, the 1876 campaign had been considered as an unnecessary and embarrassing war spawned from the “Indian Ring” scandals of embezzlement and corruption in the Indian Department and the broader Grant administration. Now national attention quickly shifted to the martyrs of the 7th Cavalry, and Little Bighorn became a manifestation of America’s national nightmare: scalping, mutilation, and tortured death at the hands of Indians. “Massacre of Our Troops,” screamed the New York Times, and headlines across America made heavy use of “butcher,” “slaughter,” “annihilated,” and “massacre.”12

Responses to Little Bighorn were informed by the broadly-shared Euro- and Anglo-American belief that Indians were their savage antithesis, defective shadows of civilization whose societies were barbaric and nascently criminal. Internal criticism regarding the 1876 war often stopped at a small group of malcontents within American society that respectable people wished to distance themselves from, such as the Indian-Ring embezzlers and the squatters of the Black Hills, frontier ruffians and crooked public officials who must be “snarling, villainous, immoral, ignorant, gauche”; by contrast, Indians’ normal state was presumed to be deviance, illustrated by such lateral comparisons as the use of the term “banditti” to describe both Plains Indian warriors and Civil War guerrillas. Hence the great evidentiary weight placed on the soldiers’ post-mortem mutilations at Little Bighorn, as when the editor of the St. Louis Dispatch raged that this “proves that the Sioux have learned nothing from civilization,” followed by a statement of explicit dehumanization and genocidal ideation: that “the hostile element of this race” should “be exterminated” like “other vampires of the woods.” Revenge for the 7th Cavalry by the conquest and forcible assimilation of the Indians from what the Montana Missoulian dubbed a “life of vagabondage” were called for in newspapers across America, particularly in the western states, as when the Bismarck Tribune demanded that treaties be torn up and the Indians be assimilated into American society “as they are, criminals and paupers,” which would require the government to “hang or shoot the murderers” and jail others. Whether indigenous peoples could become “modern” or were inexorably doomed by Manifest Destiny was an unresolved controversy of the late 19th century, but the essential benignity of American society, like the

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imagined inevitability of the Indian’s extinction through cultural assimilation or armed counterinsurgency, was not up for debate.¹³

Bogeyman images of Indian war, some dating back 300 years, were swiftly attached in the public mind to Little Bighorn. As late as 1931, an Unkpapa woman, She Walks With Her Shawl, had to point out that “Very few soldiers were mutilated” and “Not a single soldier was burned at the stake” when characterizing Little Bighorn as “not a massacre, but a hotly contested battle between two armed forces.” Though Terry and Crook’s forces did report seeing at least some soldiers’ bodies posthumously mutilated, not even the most hostile witnesses at Little Bighorn—or, for that matter, in the Modoc War—had reported or claimed any evidence of victims burned at the stake. Here, She Walks With Her Shawl was struggling valiantly against the Anglo-American collective unconscious. By the late 18th century, a sense of potential victimhood vis-à-vis Indians had come to define European self-perception in British North America to a greater extent than in their Spanish and French counterpart colonies. Lurid scenarios of European settlers scalped, tortured, immolated, violated and murdered by fiendish, ogre-like Indians circulated in the Anglo-American oral tradition and the gruesome texts and illustrations of newspapers, pamphlets, and early commercial media. The somber Protestant considerations of the captivity narrative genre, of which Mary

¹³ Mueller, Shooting Arrows and Slinging Mud, 146-168, also notes that the by-now archaic term banditti was still being used as a pejorative—in 1875, General Sheridan had asked the secretary of war to set up military tribunals to try white supremacists in Louisiana as “banditti” (Mueller 181). On the legal definition of 19th century Plains Indians as social deviants and criminals, see Stark, “Criminal Empire”; as will be noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the identification of “barbarians” with deviance and criminality to justify imperial violence as a civilizing mission, has a much longer history. “[T]he Indian was marked for gradual extinction by the uneasy coalition of his friends and foes”—Alden Vaughan, cited in Patrick Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race,” 885, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (Jun., 2001), 866-905; on vanishing Indian mythology in the 19th century, see Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (University Press of Kansas, 1982), esp. 3-78. For “snarling, villainous, immoral, gauche”: Ta-Nehisi Coates, “This Town Needs a Better Class of Racist,” in The Atlantic Monthly online, posted 1 May 2014, 11:30 am ET.
Rowlandson’s *The Sovereignty and Goodness of God* (1682) was archetypal, had swiftly given way to a saleable pornography of violence intended to instill pathos, horror, and terror to a degree which overwhelmed the reader’s sensibilities, an effect Peter Silver calls “the anti-Indian sublime.” While the austere early captivity narratives had sidestepped the question of motive by presenting Indians as God’s implements to test the faithful, the later, secular horror stories suggested only that the Indian was both implacably vengeful and innately depraved. By the time of the Seven Years’ War, notes Silver, “Every kind of writing placed immense weight on scalping, which, together with ‘murder,’ in fact became a metonym for Indian war.”

As the first reports filtered back from Montana, events of 25-26 June were simplified and streamlined to confirm, or conform to, pre-existing narratives of frontier war and civilization’s struggle against savagery. A faded Civil War icon’s death in Montana became a mythic “last stand” combining elements of the Charge of the Light Brigade, Roncesvalles, and Thermopylae: following their orders to the bitter end, the 7th Cavalry had gone out swinging against a pitiless barbarian horde. This clash between civilized American order and barbarous Indian chaos, with the former on the defensive against the latter, was clearly delineated in the iconography of “Last Stand” artwork. In such famous examples as John Mulvany’s *Custer’s Last Rally* (1881) and Otto Becker’s *Custer’s Last Fight* (1896), the 7th

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Cavalry, wielding sabers and rifles and buttoned up in their blue uniforms, were invariably encircled by warbonneted, painted Indians wielding a panoply of modern and primitive weapons. Periodically, participants from the Little Bighorn remarked upon the simplified binary of these pictorial conventions: too many warbonnets in Becker’s lithograph, observed Lieutenant Varnum, who also noted that the soldiers had doffed their gauntlets and blue coats in the summer heat. When Rain-in-the-Face, during his 1894 interview by W. Kent Thomas at the Chicago World’s Fair (see Chapter 7), was shown an artist’s impression of the last stand and asked his thoughts, he “studied it a long time, and then burst out laughing,” listing several errors and announcing “This picture is like all the white man’s pictures of Indians, a lie.” In doing so he punctured the stock iconography of Stone Age Indians and high-tech Americans: “This picture gives us bows and arrows. We were better armed than the long swords [i.e., soldiers].” The high-caliber repeating rifles distributed through Indian Department treaties for buffalo hunting, and carried by many Indian combatants at Little Bighorn, were much more reliable than the dragoons’ finicky carbines: “Their guns wouldn’t shoot but once—the thing wouldn’t throw out the empty cartridge shells.”

Additional meaning was added by turning Little Bighorn into a clash of personalities between George Custer, the Union’s dashing “Boy General” of the Civil War, and a Lakota or Dakota leader known to the American public such as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, or even Inkpuduta—despite the fact that Custer was almost unknown among the Sioux, Northern Cheyennes, and Arapahos in the summer of 1876. Though many Southern Cheyennes knew

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and despised George Custer for his surprise attack on the Washita in 1868, calling him Long Hair or Creeping Panther, no Cheyenne archenemy seems to have been proposed; instead a potential nemesis was found in Rain-in-the-Face, who George Custer’s younger brother Tom had once arrested on charges of killing two fossil hunters who wandered too far from the 1874 Black Hills expedition. Rain-in-the-Face, who W. Kent Thomas deemed “utterly heartless and unprincipled,” seemed a fitting antihero: declaring his subject, then 60 years old, as “still a Hercules,” Thomas gave his 1876 measurements as 5'9”, 195 lbs with a forty-six inch chest, praising him as “the most pronounced type of the ideal Fenimore Cooper, dime novel Indian in America.” So, in 1876, the Omaha Daily Herald wrote that Rain-in-the-Face had cut out George Custer’s heart, mounted it on a pole, and held a war dance around it, an allegation Custer’s widow Elizabeth repeated in her memoir Boots and Saddles (1885), writing that Tom Custer’s heart had been excised to satisfy “The vengeance of that incarnate fiend.” The story was probably lifted from the biography of Washakie, a famous chief of the Eastern Shoshones, and Rain-in-the-Face alternately denied and claimed credit for it until the end of his life.16

Two other trends involved dramatically overestimating the number of Indian combatants, and imagining Little Bighorn as a carefully-laid ambush, such as the claim published in the Miner of Butte, Montana that riverbanks had been hollowed out for cover and logs piled as breastworks. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow blended all these legends into a heady broth in his poem “The Revenge of Rain-in-the-Face” (1880). At a council among “the mountains dark and high” the dyarchs of the Sioux, Sitting Bull and Rain-in-the-Face, swear revenge on “the White Chief with yellow hair!” Custer is lured “Into the fatal snare” of the valley of the Little Bighorn where, “Like a bison among the reeds, / In ambush the Sitting Bull / Lay with three thousand braves / Crouched in the clefts and caves, / Savage, unmerciful!” Their work done, the Indians “fled in the night” while Rain-in-the-Face “uplifted high in the air” Custer’s “brave heart” as a “ghastly trophy.”

In his 1894 interview, Rain-in-the-Face subtly cast cold water on the American public’s obsession with the idea that Custer’s foes had scalped the strawberry-blonde curls which, in his iconography, cascaded from beneath his heroically oversized white hat. After boasting of how he had cut out Tom Custer’s heart, “bit a piece out of it and spit it in his face,” and felt “satisfied and sick of fighting; I didn’t scalp him,” he then implied an unmanly end for George Custer: the women, he said, “hunted for Long Yellow Hair [i.e., Custer] to scalp him, but could not find him. He didn’t wear his [uniform], his hair had been cut off, and the Indians didn’t know him.” The outlines of this were true: Custer had gone to battle in a scout’s buckskins, and with his hair cut short against his receding hairline he would have made a poor trophy even if recognized. But the idea that Custer had died anonymously and

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maybe been scalped by women was too much for the reporters to bear. “[I]f you didn’t kill Long Yellow Hair, who did?” pressed W. Kent Thomas. “I don’t know. No one knows,” replied Rain-in-the-Face, to which another reporter persisted, asking why the hero Custer “wasn’t scalped, when everyone else was? Did you consider him too brave to be scalped?” “No, no one is too brave to be scalped, that wouldn’t make any difference,” answered Rain-in-the-Face. Reading between the lines, irritation radiates from his reply: he theorized that Custer’s heroic corpse “must have laid under some other dead bodies” and then threw an undetected jab, noting he didn’t know Custer hadn’t been scalped “till I heard it long afterward from the whites.”^18

The myth of the last stand, with Custer himself as the central figure and icon of Anglo-American heroism, could inspire such relatively tasteful works as Mulvany’s tense, claustrophobic Custer’s Last Rally. Hemmed in by swirling clouds of prairie dust thrown up by the Indians’ horses, Custer and his grim, exhausted survivors prepare for the final battle, in a painting whose predominant tones are dusty greys and light browns with a few splashes of vivid red. However, Mulvany’s painting was gallery art which would of necessity reach a much smaller audience than Otto Becker’s kitschy, full-colour rendition Custer’s Last Fight. Reworked from a lost original by Cassilly Adams on commission from the Anheuser-Busch brewing corporation of St. Louis, Missouri, the former gateway to the West, mass production placed Becker’s lithograph across America on the 20th anniversary of Little Bighorn and for decades afterwards; it was seen by hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, in such formats as beer trays, calendars, and handouts, large-scale reprints for bars and saloons, and smaller

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versions for rec rooms. Replacing Mulvany’s claustrophobic alkali dust clouds for a wide-open backdrop of blue prairie skies and rolling green plains, Becker proffers a collage of 19th-century imperialist imagery of the West against the rest, mixing the Sioux War of 1875-77 with the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879. Custer, in golden buckskins, rages in the painting’s center with saber and spent, clubbed pistol in hand, as a horde of Sioux pour from all sides; while their feathered warbonnets, tomahawks, and knives, are recognizably “Indian,” the knobkerrie-style clubs and broad-bladed spears in their panoply, as well as their chocolate-brown skin and large, oval, Zulu-style leather shields, give the impression of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift. In the foreground of the painting’s lower left quadrant, the Indians wield rifles, pistols, and war clubs, while the mirroring lower right quadrant is decidedly gorier: the Indians here wield mostly edged weapons, and two soldiers—it’s unclear whether they’re dead or merely unconscious—are being scalped, while a third is being stabbed with a knife. In the foregrounded right-hand corner are a heap of three dead, nude soldiers, at least one of whom has been scalped.19

That recent European immigrants such as the Irish-born Mulvany and the German-born Becker had publicly affirmed their American identity by illustrating heroic, gruesome images of Indians scalping whites was no accident. By the time of the Seven Years’ War, notes Peter Silver, the narrative of shared vulnerability to the literal and symbolic violations of Indian war was the common denominator for collective “white” Euro-American identity in

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Britain’s North American colonies, uniting newly-arrived migrants and American-born creoles and cutting across the lines of language, creed, political affiliation and nationality. The “indignant vulnerability” these stories engendered, “what could literally be called their violent self-pity,” was paired with a projective fantasy Richard Slotkin calls “savage war,” in which Europeans imagined indigenous resistance to encroaching settlement as invasion with genocidal intent—as when an 1857 *New-York Daily Times* journalist attributed Sioux attacks on Iowan and Minnesotan settlers to “a war of extermination on our North-Western frontiers.” This reverse-colonial nightmare went hand in hand with portrayals of Indians as dysfunctional, primitive versions of Europeans, whose land ownership was illegitimate, whose lifestyle was nascently criminal, and who had to be destroyed by any means necessary. This, in turn, sanctified warfare on a for-profit basis: Indian scalps redeemed for colonial bounties, captives sold into slavery, plunder of villages freely taken, widowed land opened to speculators and squatters.20

But colonists also killed, scalped and mutilated Indians when no bounty money was offered and when they risked the disapproval of their peers, acting out, projecting, and re-enacting their dark fantasies of Indian warfare upon indigenous victims. Drawing on the historic examples of ranger captains like Benjamin Church and Robert Rogers, and male frontier vigilantes such as Lewis Wetzel of Ohio and Thomas “Tom” Quick of Pennsylvania (Hannah Duston, a woman who slew and scalped her Abenaki captors in 1697, was too

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Amazonian for most mythographers’ tastes), the Anglo-American oral tradition created the myth of the Indian-hunting, Indian-killing vigilante, who had so successfully adopted Indians’ woodcraft and fighting style that he could beat them in wilderness war. An ambivalent figure driven to violent obsession by the horrors of Indian war or a nemesis summoned by Indians’ aggression and hubris, the Indian-killer, who combined European superiority and rustic American virility, served as Anglo-American wish fulfillment as hero, antihero, or villain. He was a compensatory fantasy for settlers’ anxieties of being, almost invariably, outmatched when fighting Indians, and was nakedly white-supremacist: as Watts puts it, the frontiersman “who could out-savage the savage […] assured a white superiority and destiny, even at the atavistic level of individual combat.” But the “fierce, rude settler who drives the savage from the land” was also slated to pass away per Manifest Destiny’s teleology of a three-stage frontier pattern, in which Indian-killing frontiersmen were inevitably absorbed or driven off by urban-agrarian-industrial civilization. The white savage was as inexorably doomed as the Indians he slaughtered, allowing readers to “vicariously tremble” in safety.  

Elevated to American popular culture and literature during the Jacksonian period, the scalp-taking Indian-hunter joined the American popular imagination’s roster of white savages: the “half-horse, half-alligator” western boatman, the Rocky Mountain fur trapper, the scout, and the cowboy. All were the first iterations of the American superhero, who

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operates outside of stifling laws and flawed institutions, wielding unconventional tactics and overwhelming power to successfully wage one-man wars against Indians, bandits, criminals, and other enemies of civilization. He appears as pure fiction as Natty Bumppo of James Fenimore Cooper’s *Leatherstocking Tales* (1823-1841) and as the Indian-killer Colonel John Moredock; the latter, originating in the repetitive writings of “professional Westerner” James Hall between 1828 and 1857, was combined with Natty Bumppo in his enduring form as a “Leather-stocking nemesis” in chapters 26 to 28 of Herman Melville’s *The Confidence-Man* (1857) regarding the “metaphysics of Indian-hating”. He appears as the Quaker antihero Nathan Slaughter in Robert Montgomery Bird’s Gothic novel *Nick of the Woods* (1837), as the ahistorically-chivalrous Seguin of Thomas Mayne Reid’s *The Scalp-Hunters* (1851), and as the central, Satanic figure of Cormac McCarthy’s *Blood Meridian* (1985): the hulking polymath-pedophile-murderer Judge Holden of Texas, who originated in Samuel Chamberlain’s highly embellished Mexican-American War memoir *My Confession*. Other famous Indian-hunters were real people whose lives had been transmuted into legends for their commercial, artistic, and folkloric possibilities: the heroes Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, and Kit Carson, and the villainous scalp-hunter captains James Kirker and John Joel Glanton, versions of whom peep out of Reid’s *The Scalp-Hunters*, Chamberlain’s *My Confession* and McCarthy’s *Meridian*. Through the accident of Little Bighorn, Custer, an undecorated Indian fighter in his lifetime, ascended into that pantheon. While his Civil War peers’ roles in the Indian wars were gradually forgotten, the mythic Custer, the Gilded Age’s
martyr-hero and the 1960s’ Indian-hating génocidaire, “stands forever on that dusty Montana slope.”

“I stood between savagery and civilization most all my early days,” claimed a figure in silk and velvet who, on the morning of 17 July, allegedly took the first scalp for Custer. Fearing retaliations in the wake of Little Bighorn, several hundred Sioux and Cheyennes had fled north from the Spotted Tail and Red Cloud agencies heading for the Powder River. Not far from Red Cloud the 5th Cavalry, assigned to cut off the Cheyennes and drive them back to the agency, set an ambush on the hill overlooking Warbonnet Creek. Only one casualty resulted from the skirmish between the 5th and the Cheyenne scouts: a young warrior named Yellow Hair, distinguished by his American-flag breechcloth and the long blond scalp he wore at his belt. In a 1929 interview Beaver Heart, another of the Cheyenne scouts, recalled that morning’s events: his horse had just been shot beneath him, and Yellow Hair had reminded him “that we had to do some fighting to keep the soldiers away from the women and children, […] then rode down the line of the soldiers away from us.” Yellow Hair tumbled to the ground after his horse was shot, then was felled by a volley; “The bullets were flying all around him, [and] he was not killed by any one man as far as I could see.” A uniformed sergeant was the first to reach the body and hoist Yellow Hair’s warbonnet for the

soldiers. Then another man, not in uniform, “came up to where Yellow Hair laid and sit down [sic] near his head.”

Donald Brown, an enlisted man of the 5th, saw chief of scouts William Cody “ride up to Col. Merritt and hold up the scalp and heard him say “Here is one for Custer!” […] Merritt did not seem to appreciate the scene but apparently deprecated it.” Born on an Iowa farm in 1846, the violence of America’s midcentury frontier shaped the contours of Cody’s life: his father was stabbed in 1854 for giving an abolitionist speech in Kansas, and the lingering wounds killed him a few years later, driving William Cody to work at age 11. In quick succession he served as a teamster, a buffalo hunter for the Kansas Pacific Railroad, a guerrilla in a Union cavalry regiment, a scout for the postwar federal Army, and a hunting guide for eastern millionaires and European royalty. Through these upper-class connections, and his own skills as athlete and raconteur, William Cody in the late 1860s began transforming himself into “Buffalo Bill” Cody, the real-life incarnation of the Indian-slaying frontier hero, who appeared in stage plays and such licensed dime novels as 1872’s *Buffalo Bill’s Last Scalp*. This was a collaboration with several amanuenses: his agent Maj. John Burke, and the writers Ned Buntline, whose 1869 dime novel *Buffalo Bill: King of the Border Men* lifted heavily from tales of Wild Bill Hickock, and Prentiss Ingraham, author of Cody’s “savagery and civilization” credo. Ned Buntline had “created the theatrical Buffalo Bill from dime-novel stereotypes,” notes Sandra Sagala, “but William Frederick Cody took the fabrication and made him real.” At the centre of what Philip Deloria dubs this “deliberate confusion of fiction and action” was the living body of William Cody, in Jefferson Slagle’s

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words “both assert[ing] a version of western history and then claim[ing] that history [as] accurate because he performed it.”

When the United States declared war on the Sioux and Cheyennes in the spring of 1876, Cody closed his show at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition and re-enlisted, “telling the audience his services were needed in the real West.” Events at Warbonnet Creek provided material to refashion into his self-made legend, in which he was aided by another amanuensis: First Lieutenant Charles King of the 5th Cavalry’s K Company. As war correspondent for the New York Herald, King wrote a version of events republished regionally in Wyoming’s Cheyenne Daily Leader, which clarified the heroism of Cody and the 5th by omitting Cody’s scalping of Yellow Hair and demonizing the Cheyennes. Accusing them of fleeing the reservation to prey on white settlers, King smeared them as traitors fattened on government rations: “beggarly, treacherous rascals” whose “ruling passion” was “love of rapine and warfare.” Transforming the 5th Cavalry into potential victims of the Indians, Crook surmised that the Cheyennes were not only trying to waylay two couriers, but fall on the 5th’s unprotected baggage train and “tear” American scalps with their “gleaming knives.” He ventriloquized for the Cheyennes as sadistic, cowardly liars: “Six to one we’ll slay and scalp them without danger to ourselves, and a hundred to one we will brag about it the rest of our natural lives.” Yet the paradoxes of King’s racism also held that Indians, like

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other colonised peoples, responded enthusiastically to force, and repeated a variation of a 400-year-old Euro-American myth: that Indians recognized Europeans as their equals, or superiors (see Chapters 1, 2). When the 5th cut them off and Cody slew their champion, the Cheyennes were “baffled and astounded, for once in a lifetime beaten at their own game.” When Cody appeared at Red Cloud agency the next day, King claimed that the Indians “followed” him “with awe-filled eyes.”

Though eyewitness Donald Brown said he saw Cody kill Yellow Hair, Cheyenne observers, as well as several dissenting American voices, said Yellow Hair was killed in a crossfire of untraceable bullets. A scout named Richard Stirk accused Cody of taking credit for another’s shot, and a counter-claim attributed Yellow Hair’s death to a Corporal Wilkinson. Charles King relocated the scene to make Cody’s killing of Yellow Hair unimpeachable, writing that Bill broke ranks to pursue “a superbly accoutred warrior” a half-mile from the column, where he slew him in a rifle duel. King also effaced the identity of Yellow Hair by misidentifying him as a better-known Cheyenne chief named Yellow Hand, which he blamed in 1932 on mistranslation by the scout Baptiste “Little Bat” Garnier. An excerpt from a letter Cody wrote from Red Cloud agency to his wife Louisa on 18 July, “I killed Yellow Hand a Cheyenne chief in a single-handed fight,” indicates that the single-combat story and the misidentification of Yellow Hair were established as canonical almost immediately. After Cody’s discharge from service in late August these details were further embellished and reworked with Prentiss Ingraham into a new five-act play entitled The Red

“Right Hand; or Buffalo Bill’s First Scalp for Custer,” whose fifth and final act was the “Yellow Hand fight.” Alternated with performances of his previous season’s show, Life on the Border, audiences across America from October 1876 to July 1877 saw Cody and an actor in redface re-enact the “first scalp for Custer.” It also appeared in his 1879 autobiography, with a comfortingly familiar illustration by Mark Twain collaborator Truman “True” Williams—an obvious copy, observes Paul Hedren, of Eastman’s The Death-Whoop.26

On stage and in print, Cody and Prentiss Ingraham’s version of events was a Homeric duel. Under Merritt’s orders to rescue the couriers, Cody and fifteen picked men had slain three Cheyennes already and were fighting their second skirmish of the morning a half-mile from the column when a “handsomely decorated” Cheyenne “war chief” recognized Cody by reputation. As a teenage buffalo hunter in the 1850s, Lakotas at Fort Laramie had known Cody as Pahaska, “Long Hair”; now, supposedly, Cody’s Cheyenne opponent “sang out to me, in his own tongue: “I know you, Pa-he-haska; if you want to fight, come ahead and fight me.’”” Ingraham and Cody’s version of events occurred in three stages. First, both combatants charged at each other and fired their rifles; Cody’s shot killed Yellow Hand’s horse, Yellow Hand’s shot went wide, but Cody’s horse stepped in a hole and spilled him to the ground. Both stood up and fired a second volley; Yellow Hand missed again, while Cody’s bullet “struck him in the breast.” As Yellow Hand “reeled and fell,” Cody drove his knife “to its

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hilt in his heart,” before “I scientifically scalped him in about five seconds.” As the soldiers rode up, he “swung the Indian chieftain’s top-knot and bonnet in the air, and shouted: “The first scalp for Custer.””

To prop up this story, Cody brought Yellow Hair’s scalp, warbonnet, shield, six-shooter, and other personal effects on tour with him. Initially displayed in theatre windows before shows, Cody removed them to a glass case kept stageside during performances after the New England press and clergy denounced (in King’s paraphrase) “the blood-stained trophies of his murderous and cowardly deeds.” Through what Jefferson Slagle calls “circular authentication,” the presence in the theatre of material objects from Warbonnet Creek, including the scalp of a once-living young man and the silk and velvet stage outfit Cody had donned just before the skirmish, served to imbue his retelling with a veneer of authenticity. Yet despite, or because of, the implausibilities, Cody’s legend resonated with such fans as Mark Twain, General Philip Sheridan and Theodore Roosevelt because it reflected what they wanted to believe about their nation’s unique combination of heroic violence and unbesmirched innocence: that three centuries of wars with indigenous peoples, like four years of internecine slaughter in the Civil War, were just bumps in the road of progress and had not negatively impacted the national psyche. The pairing of Buffalo Bill and Yellow Hand was, like the late-19th-century dyadic image of the cowboy and the Indian which Cody helped popularize, a comfortable myth of white savages subduing worse

27 The Life of Hon. William F. Cody, Known as Buffalo Bill, the famous hunter, scout and guide: An Autobiography (Frank E. Bliss: Hartford, Conn., 1879), 343-44, in Chapter 30, “A Return to the Plains,” 340-53; Bobby Bridger, Buffalo Bill and Sitting Bull: Inventing the Wild West (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002) xi, 6, 87-91 (notes that Pahaska was supposedly the Lakotas’ name for Custer, also); Jefferson D. Slagle, “America Unscripted: Performing the Wild West,” 435 (“to both assert… performed it”), in Witschi ed., A Companion to the Literature and Culture of the American West, 427-442.
savages, kitsch images described by Jodi Byrd as “synecdochal trophies of genocide that rewrite mastery into perpetual repetition.”

Borrowing a concept from psychoanalysis, Lorenzo Veracini notes that such self-exculpatory stories function for settler-colonial societies as “screen memories,” proffering simplified versions of events to conceal a more complex and troubling reality. As noted above, the master-narrative justifying Anglo-American violence against Indians, Slotkin’s logic of massacre, held that the only way to save white families from the bereavement of Indians killing, mutilating, scalping and torturing white soldiers and civilians were retaliatory, or preemptive, massacres of Indians; the corollary, that Indians had families too, was unconvincingly explained away or subjected to a discreet silence by such mythologizers as Charles King and Ned Buntline. In 1929, Beaver Heart and Yellow Hair’s sister, Josie Yellowtanglehair, dismissed the story of a single combat and the heroic, lucrative “Buffalo Bill” image constructed atop it. Beaver Heart pointed out that Lakota and Cheyenne were mutually unintelligible languages, ruling out Yellow Hair’s supposed challenge to “Pa-he-haska”: “Buffalo Bill, who ever he was, could not talk Cheyenne and Yellow Hair could not talk English or Sioux, and I do not know how these two people could talk to each other.” Josie Yellowtanglehair concurred that her brother was killed by “one of the bullets fired by the soldiers,” not a single combat. Beneath the prairie chivalry was an ugly truth: a month after Warbonnet Creek, Josie Yellowtanglehair and other family members had collected

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Yellow Hair’s bones from the battlefield, and “we could see by marks on his skull that he had been scalped.” 29

Introduction: “Who scalped who?” Problems, questions, and historiography

More than three centuries before Custer, Cody, Beaver Heart and Yellow Hair, soldiers, missionaries, diplomats and explorers of 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th}-century Europe noted that Indian warriors in North America, from the deserts of northern Mexico to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, brought enemies’ scalps back to their villages as trophies or proofs of victory. While not an exact analogy, the contemporary European practice of publicly displaying the severed heads of traitors, rebels, and bandits offered a familiar cross-cultural parallel (see Chapter 2). As Spain, France, Britain and the Netherlands’ North American colonies formed trading and military alliances with indigenous peoples, Indians and Europeans came to understand that their definitions of warfare and licit violence had broad commensurabilities, but also differences that each party found peculiar or disturbing. In some cases, these differences could be overlooked: joint expeditions of Europeans and Indian allies against indigenous third parties or rival European-Indian coalitions were the norm in North American warfare until well into the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. To this end, early modern Indians and Europeans exchanged captive Indian and European enemies and dismembered enemy body parts, such as hands, feet, heads, and scalps, through what Andrew Lipman describes as “pidgin communications,” which “conveyed simple messages about trust and power” but “obscured many secondary meanings.” 30

The idea that certain enemies could be enslaved under certain circumstances was not new to early modern Europeans or Native Americans, notes Alan Gallay, but the slave trades which arose from the encounter “[were] an entirely new enterprise” to both. Indian warriors continued to seek martial glory through such precontact channels as taking scalps and prisoners, adopting captives into their villages, and gifting their allies with enslaved mutual enemies, while the contact-period arms race necessitated trading other captives to European allies for firearms, horses, and trade goods. In the Spanish, French, and British colonies, these slave trades compensated for chronic labour shortages and offered material and status benefits for Euro-American slaveowners, although colonial laws prohibiting or regulating the enslavement of Indians required disguising slavery as indentured servitude or hard-labour sentences. Similarly, wartime rewards for Indian body parts, as when the governor of Nueva Vizcaya (today’s Mexican states of Chihuahua and Durango) offered trade goods for the heads of Tepehuanes in 1617 in the context of the Tepehuan revolt (1616–20), overlaid new material and commercial considerations onto indigenous warfare’s earlier, non-commercial motives. But 16th- and 17th-century Spanish wars against, and alliances with, indigenous peoples who scalped enemies in northern Mexico and the American Southwest did not automatically produce Hispanic scalp bounties. Until late in the 19th century, authorities in Spanish America and Brazil suppressed revolts by Ibero-Americans, mestizos and Indians by decapitating rebels and displaying their heads; in the case of Indians, bounties on paired ears

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coexisted with Indian slavery across Latin America. In Hispanic North America, scalp bounties only appeared with large-scale American migration in the later 19th century, as Anglo-American mercenaries were hired in Mexico in the 1840s and vigilantes and militias appeared in 1850s California, Arizona, and New Mexico following annexation by the United States (see Chapter 6).31

In his study of New France’s relations with indigenous peoples in the continental interior between the late 17th and early 19th centuries, Richard White proposed that “accommodation and common meaning” were created through “a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings.” As the French “could neither dictate to Indians nor ignore them,” and vice versa, both parties deployed a shared set of protocols, symbols, ritual phrases, and images, reinterpreting them per the needs of the moment and “appealing to what

they perceive[d] to be the values and practices” of the other. When Anglo-American settlers succeeded the French in the continental interior following the Seven Years’ War, a century and a half of negotiated indigenous and European coexistence was replaced by tension and periodic violence. Often in express defiance of British government policy, pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American vigilantes “adopted what they regarded as Indian means – massacre and torture – to keep the boundaries between Algonquian and white societies intact.” Joyce Chaplin concurs, describing “continual” warfare between British colonists and Algonquians in Virginia and New England as the “common mode of interaction” from the end of the 16th century until the Pequot War (1636-38). In White’s “middle ground,” French and Indians “had made an uneasy bargain to suspend some of their cultural differences […] to avoid self-defeating violence.” By contrast, notes Chaplin, British colonists aspired to “be like the enemy but not as him,” and styled themselves as “counterparts of Indians, not so as to express sympathy with them, […] but to fight and kill them.”

As indicated by the appearance of a vaunting Indian warrior lifting his enemy’s scalp on the cartouche of Guillaume Delisle’s 1703 map of Canada, by the turn of the 18th century scalping served as visual and symbolic shorthand for North America’s primitive exoticism in European art, culture, and intellectual life, parallel to 16th-century images of Brazilian cannibalism and Mexican human sacrifice. But what John Grenier identifies as a distinct Anglo-American way of war, centered around the institutions of “extirpative war, ranging,

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and scalp hunting,” had also come into existence by the turn of the century, sprung from Britain’s colonial policies of mass migration and perpetual land wars to annex more indigenous lands and resources. By the turn of the 18th century Britain possessed the most densely-populated, urbanized colonies in North America, which gave commercial and economic strength but military liability: Anglo-American colonists were mostly town-dwelling craftsmen and farmers with little or no military experience beyond militia drill, poorly prepared by training or lifestyle to fight wars with Indian neighbours. In the Pequot War (1636-38), Kieft’s War (1640-45), and King Philip’s War (1675-76), outmatched British (or, in the case of Kieft’s War, Dutch) colonists won by attrition, combining the scorched-earth campaigns of European total war with the mourning-war system of Indian allies by paying rewards for enemies’ heads, hands, feet, scalps, and prisoners. The first true scalp bounty, in which money was offered explicitly and solely for scalps, appeared in July 1689, the first year of King William’s War (1689-97), when Massachusetts authorities declared soldiers would receive £8 from the public treasury for every Indian scalp redeemed, and “whatever Indian plunder falls into their hands.” New France followed suit: according to the September 1688 deposition of an indigenous New England man named Magsigpen or Graypoole, New France’s Governor-General Denonville had already offered bounties to allied Indians for the scalps of British colonists and their Mohawk allies, which his successor Frontenac followed in 1691 with bounties for British prisoners.33

From the dawn of the 18th century until the end of the 19th, Anglo-American colonists prosecuted wars of total destruction against Indians with a fervor that perturbed Spanish, French, and many Anglo-American observers. Both French and British authorities offered scalp bounties in wartime, but British settlers paired these with massacres and acts of ethnic cleansing that aimed to drive indigenous peoples beyond the western horizon. Spanish, French, and British colonies all traded in Indian slaves, but Anglo-Americans rendered even Indian slave labour superfluous by ramping up the scale of the African slave trade following the Yamasee War (1715-17). Anglo-American settlers antagonized allied and enemy Indians alike through squatting, poaching, robbery, assault, and crooked land deals, and genocidal ideation was openly voiced at all levels of public discourse, a phenomenon which increased after the American Revolution and became unofficial state policy in the Jacksonian period.

Henry Knox, U.S. Secretary of War since 1786, made the “melancholy reflection” on retirement in 1794 “that our modes of population have been more destructive to the Indian nations than […] the conquerors of Mexico and Peru.”

How and why it was that Euro-Americans in the late-19th-century United States could vilify Indians for scalping their enemies, while celebrating whites who scalped Indians, could be a touchy subject, particularly if the corollary question, of whether Europeans who scalped Indians had forfeited their presumed moral high ground, was raised. Luther Roby, the editor of an 1831 history of the Seven Years’ War, is typical in blaming the Indians to exonerate

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New England scalp hunters: if New Englanders of the era “sometimes deviated from the usages of civilized warfare, in making use of the scalping knife, the barbarity of the enemy, the law of retaliation, and the emergency of the time must be their apology,” stated Roby’s foreword. “They were compelled to fight the Indians upon their own terms.” Another theory suggested European settlers, in acclimating to the Americas’ natural and human environment, had adopted scalping as inevitably as tobacco, pumpkins, and indigenous loanwords. “The wilderness masters the colonist,” stated Frederick Jackson Turner, drawing an environmental-determinist link between American wilderness and human savagery in his address to the American Historical Association at Chicago’s Columbian Exposition in 1893: “Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion.”

Earlier in the century, travellers and ethnographers on both sides of the Atlantic had been reconsidering scalping, speculating on its changes over time under European influence and per universalizing stadial theories of “primitive” warfare. Inevitably, George Catlin’s description of pre- and post-contact Plains Indian warfare and weaponry in an 1832 letter from the Upper Missouri discussed scalping. With a tinge of the 19th century’s endemic “vanishing Indian” myth, Catlin began by separating “authentic” indigenous weaponry made of wood, stone, and bone, and the mass-produced steel knives and axeheads “carried into the Indian country by thousands and tens of thousands, and sold at an enormous price.” Such were diabolical additions to Plains warfare, as the Indian’s “untutored mind […] has not been

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ingenious enough to design or execute anything so savage or destructive as these civilized refinements on Indian barbarity.” Catlin’s account becomes more interesting as he unravels European claims to moral superiority by outlining the ironies of their involvement and complicity in ‘savage’ warfare. The much-feared “scalping knife,” for instance, was simply a one-edged butcher knife, manufactured for “sixpence” in England, with “the impress of G.R.” [Georgius Rex] on the blade, “and sold to the poor Indian in these wild regions for a horse.” Scalping he assigned a functional purpose as confirming enemy slain in preliterate communities “where it is as lawful and as glorious to slay an enemy in battle, as it is in Christian communities.” He then attempted, inconsistently, to explain away the European nightmare images of scalping by claiming that Indians, by and large, only scalped live enemies after assuming they were dead—undercut by his illustrations of a dying warrior on hand and knees, with an arrow in his side and his scalplock removed, while his victorious enemy looms over him with his scalplock in his hand, adjacent to a drawing of a white man with a massive patch of scar tissue in the middle of his hairline. In passages heavily influenced by Montaigne, Catlin wrote that while he considered scalping “a disgusting custom,” an Indian’s scalping of a slain enemy was a lesser indignity to a corpse than many of those performed by Europeans, while scalping of a living person, who could survive the ordeal, was not necessarily as cruel as killing them. He then fired the last salvo by reminding his readers that the British and American governments, during the War of 1812 and the Revolutionary War, had both offered and paid scalp bounties to “thousands of their “red children” […] for every “scalp” of a “red” or a “blue coat” they could bring in!”

Other authors noted that a surprisingly high number of Europeans in the New World had scalped Indians, or mutilated other Europeans in fashions thought outré, and wondered what this said about European prehistory. “It is generally, but falsely, supposed that only Americans scalp,” declared the Victorian explorer Sir Richard Burton in a short 1864 monograph which made provocative and unverifiable claims; “the practice is Asiatic, European, and African.” He was on safe ground when citing Herodotus on the Scythians, a people of ancient Ukraine and southern Russia described in Greek and Roman ethnography as scalping enemies for trophies; cross-cultural comparisons between indigenous North Americans and the ancient Scythians had been made since the contact period (see Chapter 1).

Burton’s evidence for Africa and Europe was much shakier: he reported that a Scottish traveller had seen Africans carrying dried enemies’ scalps in the 1840s, an assertion attested in no other source but Burton’s 1864 article, and identified scalping in the annals of the Franks and Anglo-Saxons and in the Visigothic law codes of the 7th to 9th centuries, not mainstream consensus among classicists or medievalists. Among Native Americans, said Burton, the “solemn rite of scalping” had declined over time as trade had replaced earlier blades of flint, obsidian, “or other hard stone” with iron and steel; in “the laxity of modern days,” warriors had abandoned the “humane custom” of an earlier period when “men scrupulously awaited the wounded man’s death” before scalping him.37

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37 Richard F. Burton, “Notes on Scalping,” in The Anthropological Review Vol. 2, No. 4 (February 1864), 49-52. In a footnote to his 1885 multi-volume translation of The Arabian Nights he described certain men’s topknot or sidelock haircuts in the Near East as “a precaution lest the decapitated Moslem’s mouth be defiled by an impure hand; and thus it would resemble the chivalry-lock by which the Redskin brave (and even the “cowboy” of better times) facilitated the removal of his own scalp.” Richard F. Burton, The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night, volume 1 (The Burton Club: United States, 1885), 308 n. 3. Scalping in Africa he attributes to a
The idea that European weaponry had eroded earlier moral or cultural restrictions on scalping was the central premise of Georg Friederici’s 1906 doctoral dissertation, *Skalpieren und ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika* (“Scalping and Similar Warfare Customs in America”). From contact-period texts and comparison with Mesoamerican and South American archaeology and ethnography, Friederici theorized that in the precontact period entire heads had been the preferred trophy of war across the Americas, with scalping as a regional variation limited to North America’s Atlantic and Gulf coasts. He proposed that the casualties of indigenous warfare increased as Spanish, French, Dutch and English colonists introduced steel knives, axes, and firearms in the 16th and 17th centuries, replacing less-efficient weapons of stone, shell, and wood; then, when these colonies began offering bounties for scalps and heads to encourage indigenous allies in intercolonial wars, indigenous warparties weighed down by guns and ammunition phased out decapitation for scalping.

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‘Mr Duncan’ [John Duncan] *Travels in Western Africa in 1845 and 1846*; a digitized copy of volume 2 (London: Richard Bentley, 1847) is available, but contains no reference to scalping. Axtell and Sturtevant noted in 1980 that “Georg Friederici reported that his extensive search for Burton's references – other than Herodotus – was fruitless. (*Skalpieren und ähnliche Kriegsgebräuche in Amerika* [Braunschweig, 1906], 134).” –James Axtell and William C. Sturtevant, “The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?” 452 n. 1, in *The William and Mary Quarterly* third series, vol. 37, no. 3 (July 1980), 451-472. Burton’s attribution of scalping to the Germanic tribes in the early middle ages was a citation from Abbé Emmanuel H. D. Domenech, *Seven Years’ Residence in the Great Deserts of North America*, Volume 2 (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1860), 356-58: “It appears also that the decalvare of the ancient Germans is nothing other than the operation of the scalp mentioned in the laws of the Visigoths: Capillos et cutem detrahere. According to the Annals of Flude, the Franks still scalped about the year 879, and the Anglo-Saxons also.” The general consensus of medievalists is that the *decalvatio* of the 7th century Visigothic code, in its conjunction of being meted out with 100 lashes and its explicit intent to humiliate, probably means public shaming by shaving of the head rather than scalping, as long hair was seen among Germanic peoples as a sign of individual free status and high rank for members of a royal family—see Floyd Seyward Lear, “The Public Law of the Visigothic Code,” in *Speculum*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1951), 1-23, 6 n.34, 15-16; E.A. Thompson, *The Goths in Spain* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1969), 41, 104 n. 1; Peter Heather ed., *The Visigoths from the Migration Period to the Seventh Century: An Ethnographic Perspective* (Woodbridge: the Boydell Press, 1999), 378 n. 9, “Discussion” 390-99. Further, the meticulous lists of fines for injuries to specific body parts in other contemporary Germanic law codes do not list the scalp itself as a body part liable to injury, while distinctions were drawn between seizure of the hair, injuries which expose the bone of the head, and injuries which expose the brain—see Lisi Oliver, *The Beginnings of English Law* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 71-73, 82, 99-102, 105; Theodore J. Rivers, trans. and ed., *Laws of the Alamans and Bavarians* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), 47-48, 52, 85-86, 130-39.
Though 20th century archaeology and ethnology indicate that artistic representations and osteological evidence of scalping across continental North America both predate the contact period by centuries, and Friederici overstates the impact of European scalp-bounty declarations on indigenous warfare, he appears to have been the first theorist to seriously consider indigenous North American warfare, and specifically scalping, as adaptive over time both in the contact and pre-contact period. Friederici also observed that European colonists went beyond simply scalping indigenous enemies, and listed documented cases from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812 where British colonists made mementoes of slain indigenous men’s skin, and how New Englanders and French-Canadians in the Seven Years’ War had flayed and scalped each other’s corpses. Why Euro-Americans should have scalped or skinned indigenous enemies in the first place, and why the practice was most prevalent in the British colonies, went unexamined.38

In 1910 George Bird Grinnell, an anthropologist and ethnographer of the Pawnees, Cheyennes and Blackfoot Confederacy, subtly observed in his article “Coup and Scalp Among the Plains Indians” that scalping had been much less important among 19th century Plains Indians than Europeans imagined: “To scalp an enemy was not an important feat and in no sense especially creditable.” Enemy bodies were often unscalped, and the scalp itself

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was merely “a trophy, something to show, something to dance over—a good thing but of no great importance”; neither killing nor scalping an enemy “was regarded as an especially creditable act.” By contrast, counting coup, “to touch the enemy with something held in the hand, with the bare hand, or with any part of the body,” endowed the man or boy responsible with “the greatest credit,” especially to strike or touch an unhurt, living enemy this way “and to leave him alive,” which was “frequently done.” Grinnell noted that the rush for first coup, “the fact that, when an enemy was killed or wounded, brave Indians rushed toward him,” was thus mistaken by white observers as a race for the scalp, though “As a matter of fact they cared little or nothing for the scalp but very much for the credit of touching the fallen man. Most people are untrustworthy observers,” he noted acidly, “and draw inferences from their preconceived notions, rather than from what actually takes place.” 39

Grinnell’s true target in “Coup and Scalp” was his readers’ preconceived notions that Plains Indians were either unimaginative holdovers from the Stone Age or cultureless hordes dedicated to violence. Having neatly sidestepped the tiresome, repetitive arguments about scalping, Grinnell supplanted it with a lively description of the complex rules, regulations, and institutions of coup warfare as practiced by Cheyennes, Arapahos, and other Plains peoples, depicted as human beings seeking personal recognition through a system designed to weed out liars and falsifiers and verify combat achievements. He noted the possibilities for heated arguments on who had struck the first coup, how many coups were permissible on a single enemy, and the mechanisms for adjudicating these disputes by panels of fellow warriors and holy men. Later on, reminding his reader that Indian dances were carefully-

delineated ceremonies, “not merely haphazard jumpings up and down and posturings,” he leads us into a labyrinthine description of how Cheyenne scalp dances quickly turned to courtship: the “sweethearts’ dance,” the “matchmaking dance,” the “slippery dance,” the “galloping buffalo-bull dance.” Wryly, he ostensibly returned to his theme by concluding “These were all scalp dances.”

A counter-narrative, which James Axtell and William Sturtevant place as early as 1820, conflated the European offering of cash for scalps with a European invention, or introduction, of scalping to the continent. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, when the once-militarily-powerful Six Nations had been scattered and restricted to reservations by the United States and abandoned by former allies in France and Britain, Cornplanter, a Seneca chief and the brother of the Longhouse prophet Handsome Lake, publicly burned his British military uniform and destroyed his officers’ regalia and medals; a series of religious visions had informed Cornplanter that war was antithetical to an indigenous way of life. There had been “no wars or fighting” in North America, he announced, before the arrival of Europeans such as the French, who “offered to furnish us with instruments of every kind and sharp knives to take the skins off their [enemies’] heads.” Cornplanter’s proposal that indigenous societies had been, or were, less warlike or violent than Europeans (taken by Cornplanter to an admittedly ahistorical extreme), and the repudiation of Europeans as fair-weather friends who would turn on indigenous allies when convenient, were the core elements of the European-invention-of-scalping counter-narrative, inverting Europeans’ claims to moral superiority. In Chicago in 1879, when Omaha activist Susette La Flesche denounced a recent large-scale killing of Utes in Colorado by federal troops, a journalist

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40 Grinnell, “Coup and Scalp Among the Plains Indians,” 296-310.
interjected “But you are more barbarous in war than we,” citing “acts of atrocity upon captives and the bodies of the dead.” “Scalping, you mean, I suppose,” replied La Flesche, citing a 1755 Massachusetts scalp bounty against the Penobscots in her rebuttal “Don’t you know that the white man taught Indians that?”

Revisionists aimed to directly challenge Euro-Americans’ traditional narratives of heroism and martyrdom at the hands of savages, and drew connections between the stock images of vicious, animal-like Indians and the cash paid out for the pelts of animals and the scalps of human beings. In 1969, the Lakota theologian and activist Vine Deloria Jr. cited the 1755 Penobscot scalp bounty to this effect: once Indians had been downgraded in the colonists’ imagination from pre-Lapsarian children of nature to a “picturesque species of wildlife, […] Scalping, introduced prior to the French and Indian War by the English,” confirmed “that Indians were wild animals to be hunted and skinned.” Deloria also noted the structural limitations of indigenous warfare to challenge the savage-war myth of genocidal Indians: members of war parties had to supply their own food and followed proven leaders as volunteers, rather than being drafted or fighting for wages; furthermore, they fought to protect game populations and for “courageous exploits,” not to take territory “which they could not settle,” which was “inconceivable” to most Indians. “Killing others simply to rid the land of them,” i.e., ethnic cleansing and genocide, “was even more inconceivable,”

meaning Europeans’ and Americans’ ‘civilized’ warfare was “the deadly antithesis of the Indian’s.”

The counternarrative that Europeans had, or could have, invented scalping itself, not just scalp bounties, gained ground in the aftermath of the termination era in the United States and Canada, and as opposition to the Vietnam War reached its zenith. This was not coincidence. By the 1960s, European and North American claims to be the most moral, benevolent societies in history were looking particularly shaky after two world wars; industrialized mass murders in the heart of Europe of such scope that the neologism genocide was required to explain them; the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the annual increase in the world-destroying power of Western and Soviet nuclear arsenals; brutal colonial counterinsurgencies in Algeria, Korea, and Indochina; and the violent suppression of civil rights movements in the United States and Canada. In North America, indigenous peoples had just weathered 20 years of attempts to legally dismantle their hold on

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42 Vine Deloria, Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto* (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1969), 6-7 (scalp bounties), 204-05. Other authors of the late 1960s endorsed the revisionist viewpoint, or at least strongly suggested it. In *The Return of the Vanishing American* (1968), “literary critic and moralist” Leslie Fiedler wrote scalping “seems not to have been an Indian custom at all until the White Man began offering bounties for slain enemies.” In that same year Peter Farb, an environmental writer, singled out New Netherland governor Willem Kieft as the prime suspect for spreading scalp bounties, though waffling on whether he had invented them: “whatever its exact origins, there is no doubt that [the spread of] scalp-taking… was due to the barbarity of White men rather than the barbarity of Red men”—Fiedler and Farb cited in Axtell and Sturtevant, “The Unkindest Cut,” 452. In 1970, Dee Brown (in *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1973 [1970]) very strongly insinuated that the Spanish had introduced scalping to the American Southwest, in passages redolent of the Black Legend of the Spanish as uniquely cruel and medieval: “On August 18 the general decided to “stimulate the zeal” of his troops by posting prize money for captured Navaho livestock. […] As the soldiers’ pay was less than twenty dollars per month, the bounty offer did stimulate them, and some of the men extended it to the few Navahos they were able to kill. To prove their soldierly abilities, they began cutting off the knot of hair fastened by a red string which the Navahos wore on their heads. The Navahos could not believe that Kit Carson [the chief scout] condoned scalping, which they considered a barbaric custom introduced by the Spaniards. (The Europeans may or may not have introduced scalping to the New World, but the Spanish, Dutch, French, and English colonists made the custom popular by offering bounties for scalps of their respective enemies.)” (11) He followed by describing the Apaches as “veterans of 250 years of guerrilla warfare with the Spaniards, who taught them the finer arts of torture and mutilation but never subdued them.” (24-25)
the few lands and resources they had left, and they only had to turn on the nightly news to watch Southeast Asia become collateral damage as an anticolonial faction waged asymmetrical war against the industrial power of the United States – a situation not unlike theirs in the previous century. The overall message indigenous people were trying to send is succinctly expressed by Mi’kmaw historian Daniel Paul’s history of the Mi’kmaq, from Governor Cornwallis’ mid-18th-century scalp bounties against them to residential schools: *We Were Not the Savages.* The revisionists aimed to challenge the self-justifying traditional narratives of savage war: the hubris-nemesis sequence of Indian warriors’ cruelties and Indian-hunters’ revenge; the redrawing of all Indian victories as horrible massacres of whites; and white massacres of Indians as regrettable exceptions or heroic battles—for instance, General Nelson Miles’ description of the Wounded Knee Massacre (29 December, 1890), in which panicked soldiers opened fire upon a crowd of Sioux while disarming them, as a “battle” against “a hungry, wild, mad horde of savages,” for which he handed out eighteen Congressional Medals of Honor. At the center of Indian-war horror stories were the perfect victimhood of colonists and a scenario of reverse-colonialism: that the little Europes that migrants and refugees had created in the New World, even to the level of the nuclear family, would be ripped apart and destroyed by savage Indians. By invoking this nightmare, Europeans, particularly Anglo-Americans, had sanctified the for-profit destruction of indigenous communities and families through scalp bounties, slave trading, and land speculation.43

43 Daniele N. Paul, *We Were Not the Savages: Collision between European and Native American Civilizations, third edition* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2006); Axtell and Sturtevant, “The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?”; General Miles’ “hungry, wild, mad horde of savages” were supposedly planning, via the Ghost Dance, “‘a more comprehensive plot than anything ever inspired by the prophet Tecumseh’”—cited in Hixson, “Policing the Past: Indian Removal and Genocide Studies,” 442.
But the European-invention-of-scalping argument was a weak vessel for this message. Firstly, simply inverting the iconography of savage war by replacing villainous Indian warriors with depraved white scalp-hunters did not challenge the traditional belief that scalping, like cannibalism and human sacrifice, was a cultural or personal mark of Cain for either indigenous warriors, or white criminals and frontier deviants (lumped together in lateral comparisons in traditional Winning-of-the-West narratives). As in post-structuralist revisionist arguments which uncritically conflate human sacrifice and anthropophagy with their polemical, colonial uses to erroneously reduce these entirely to European fictions (cf. William Arens’ 1979 salvo The Man-Eating Myth), the idea that European definitions of violence are the universal moral standard is unintentionally reified, and indigenous peoples’ “entitlement to have minds of their own,” in Reay Tannahill’s words, is rejected. Which brings us to the second problem: mainstream Western discourse on indigeneity, such as the Plains Indian imagery appropriated wholesale by the 1960s counterculture, was and is still dominated by fantasies of Indians as the West’s ultimate outsiders—as primordial, “Stone Age” peoples who lack historical agency. Taken at face value, the European-invention-of-scalping narrative reifies Enlightenment historicism by reducing them to collision victims of a world history driven by Westerners.44

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Westerners’ arguments about whether indigenous people past and present were either victims or villains have very real consequences for the living indigenous people invoked in these solipsistic spats. As Devon Mihesuah observes, appearances in the public arena of ostensibly well-meaning cultural productions, which simply recycle stereotypes, invariably prompt responses by reactionaries who proffer archaic stories of Indian criminality and dysfunction as “the truth”: in response to 1991’s revisionist Western *Dances with Wolves*, for instance, old Lakota horror stories were trotted out *en masse* by those who “feel the need to educate us about the “real” Lakotas.” The challenge for 21st century indigenous politics, note Darren Ranco and Beth Conklin, is to surmount the stereotypes which marginalize or discredit indigenous voices in mainstream discourse and, in so doing, “to expand outsiders’ notions of who native people are and what they want and need.” For Westerners, the terms of the challenge are those Chinua Achebe suggested regarding popular perceptions of Africans: to think of “people – not angels, but not rudimentary souls either – just people, often highly gifted people and often strikingly successful in their enterprise with life and society.”

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Mihesuah asks what value a 1988 history of the Southern Plains, which uses archaic, racialized language to characterize 19th-century Comanches as animal-like deviants, “lurking” Comanche men living in “lairs” with their “squaws,” holds for her Comanche father-in-law—in Devon Mihesuah, “Should American Indian History Remain a Field of Study?” in Devon Abbot Mihesuah and Angela Cavendish Wilson eds., *Indigenizing the Academy: Transforming Scholarship and Empowering Communities* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 143-159. Her point is unintentionally proven by journalist S.C. Gwynne’s incredibly
Dark mimesis: Thesis statement and methodology

European colonists and migrants in the 17th century, as noted above by Joyce Chaplin, Richard White, and Andrew Lipman, attempted to communicate with allied and enemy indigenous peoples through simplified, repeated acts, phrases, and symbols which they believed would convey clear messages. Through their efforts to define, and then approximate, Indian thought and culture as they understood it, Europeans and Euro-Americans also defined themselves through comparison. Among the predominantly French-Canadian and métis labourers of the 18th and 19th century fur trade, Carolyn Podruchny denotes an ethos of trying to “beat all Indians at the race” as the underlying logic in voyageur masculinity: not only to emulate and replicate indigenous men’s labour skills of hunting, fishing, snowshoeing, canoeing, and dogsledding, and their masculine virtues of athleticism, endurance, fortitude, good-humoured stoic ism, and individual freedom, but to surpass them.


norteños (northerners), specifically the serranos (mountaineers) of the Sierra Madre in Chihuahua state, defined their identity as white Hispanics through binary opposition against Apache and Comanche enemies. Far from the central government in the Valley of Mexico and beset by mounted Indian raiders, norteño violence became defined by egalitarianism and charismatic leadership, not unlike warfare in Apachería and Comanchería. At war, norteños, many of whom were of indigenous or mestizo ancestry, raided indigenous enemies’ villages to steal livestock and kidnap women and children, as Apache and Comanche enemies did. Correspondingly, norteños stressed that their Ibero-American culture and Catholicism elevated them as a civilized gente de razón (people of reason) above the unconverted, unconquered Apaches and Comanches, barbarous gentes sin razón (peoples without reason). In the British North American colonies, Philip Deloria has described how the figure of the Indian, reimagined per European carnival traditions, became the icon of the “absolute, anarchic freedom” that Anglo-Americans wished to appropriate for themselves in the New World. Simon Harrison also notes that European customs of making and selling mementoes from the personal possessions, skin, and body parts of famous criminals, which continued in Britain and North America until the end of the 19th century, provides a partial origin point for the scalping and flaying of trophies from slain Indians: such acts gained “new dimensions of meanings” when “re-imagined as acts of war,” becoming “militarized, [...] strongly racialized and, in a certain sense, democratized.”

Neil Whitehead, in his analysis of Sir Walter Raleigh’s 1596 account of his journeys in Guiana, pointed the way towards a succinct theoretical model. Through *mimesis*, Europeans borrowed indigenous words, place-names, ideas, symbols, and material objects to deploy in communication with indigenous peoples and each other, ascribed with what they believed were mutually-identifiable meanings. Indigenous peoples also mimetically engaged with European intellectual and material culture, and Whitehead notes, as per White’s middle ground, “the two-way, _mutualistic_, character of cultural transmission.” The meanings created from and communicated through mimesis were not necessarily accurate, or benign, an observation Whitehead accredits to Michael Taussig: during the Amazon rubber boom of the late 19th and early 20th century, overseers in the Putumayo region of northwestern Amazonia engaged in acts of violent mimesis to brutalize Indians who failed to meet rubber-tapping quotas. Overseers who imagined their lives as perpetually endangered by Indian plots, cannibals, vipers, jaguars, and the jungle itself reacted in a similar way to the violently self-pitying colonists of 1750s Pennsylvania: performing acts of “mimetic savagery” that approximated the savagery they attributed to and projected onto the enslaved rubber-tappers. These fictions of “colonial terror” and their associated panic and anxiety “were a potent political force without which the work of conquest,” i.e., the “killing and torturing” of people imagined as “phantoms of wild disorder,” “could not have been accomplished.” What mimesis looked like from the other side of the frontier is indicated by Castle McLaughlin in her study of ledgerbook art, the pictographic records of coups set down by Plains Indian warriors in accounts books plundered from teamsters. McLaughlin proposes a subcategory of “war books” with a dual purpose: by inscribing their exploits onto an instrument of
knowledge collection and dissemination, preliterate Plains resistance leaders mimetically expressed their dominance over, and laid claim to, an alien form of enemy power.\(^{48}\)

Within this thesis I propose that scalp hunting in British North America, as set of practices and as collection of ideas, comprised an act of colonial mimesis which attempted to exorcise Anglo-American settlers’ nightmarish visions of savage warfare; to express their anger across a cross-cultural divide towards an enemy they believed only understood violent force; and enact their fantasy of Indian war as man-hunting, which explicitly and implicitly dehumanized their targets as quarry, animals to be hunted. Most importantly, the fantasy of the Indian-killing white savage as ersatz Indian articulated Manifest Destiny’s historicist myth of Anglo-Americans as rightful inheritors of the North American continent from peoples they both fetishized and loathed, while the idea of inevitable Indian disappearance sanctified violence—on the grounds that “killing speeds destiny”—from the grassroots to the highest levels of government. Combined with a grand teleology of Anglo-Saxon cultural and biological superiority over other Europeans and colonized peoples, these ideas and shared cultural attitudes, referred to here as the *scalping paradigm*, were omnipresent and ubiquitous, “a set of commonsense notions that [were] rarely examine[d].”\(^{49}\)
That indigenous peoples and Anglo-Americans were scalping each other in eastern North America by the early 18th century suggests a facile symmetry, but upon closer inspection the understanding and enactment of scalps and scalping were profoundly asymmetrical. The “mourning-war complex” of indigenous peoples of the Atlantic seaboard and midcontinental interior aimed to inflict reciprocal injuries on enemy polities, meted out higher honours for captive-taking than for scalping, and did not consider human cultural differences as signs of innate biological difference (see Chapters 2, 3, 4). By contrast, early modern Europeans considered Indians as innately inferior to themselves and inflicted wartime casualties on Indians disproportionate to injuries received; while all European colonies in the New World aimed for conquest of indigenous peoples and annexation of their lands and resources, Anglo-Americans worked towards extirpation through large-scale massacres and acts of ethnic cleansing. Anglo-American soldiers and militias, often unable to find, engage, or defeat Indians in battle, targeted their property instead, torching their villages and fields in campaigns of attrition to destroy stored food and winter shelter. Scalp bounties, offered by colonial officials and state governments during the 18th and early 19th centuries and by private donors in the late 19th century west, offered psychological and financial support to rangers, militiamen, settlers, and frontier vigilantes, incidentally providing source material for stories of heroic or antiheroic Indian-killing folk heroes (see Chapters 4, 5, 6).

body-paint and exposure to the sun (for related early modern ideas of Indians’ essential whiteness, see Chaplin, *Subject Matter*, 157-198, 243-279). Among the themes Wolfe notes “would animate [Anglo-] American racial discourse for centuries to come” – and, as shall be seen later in this thesis, already existed and animated Latin America’s *casta* system—includes “the recruitment of Indians to furnish their usurpers with sovereign rights to the soil” (883-84). As Philip Deloria notes in *Playing Indian*, that recruitment could be entirely symbolic, as in the deployment of the Lenape sachem Tamenund for the Tammany Society fraternal organization of New York, and forego actual intercourse entirely; the same could be said of the apocryphal “Cherokee grandmother” stories that crop up in many family histories in the United States. “Killing speeds destiny”: see Benjamin Madley, “Patterns of frontier genocide, 1803–1910: the aboriginal Tasmanians, the Yuki of California, and the Herero of Namibia,” 168-69, in *Journal of Genocide Research* Vol. 6, No. 2 (2004), 167-92.
“[T]hat the Americas are built on the invasion and destruction of a populated land with hundreds of distinct, complex societies, and a centuries-long slave trade involving millions of Africans,” writes Comanche author and curator Paul Chaat Smith, “is the minimum requirement for making sense of the history of our countries.” Yet Walter Hixon notes that even when a general pattern of racialized violence, overt and institutional, by Europeans against indigenous North Americans is agreed upon, some Western scholars and many members of the public recoil at the concept of genocide, which North Americans largely reserve for others, e.g., “Turks, Nazis, Cambodians, Rwandans, and other truly evil peoples.” Boyd Cothran concurs, observing that the term genocide turns conversations “into a debate over definitions,” diverting attention from “the people for whom this is not merely an academic exercise” but impacts “their everyday lives.” Beyond ethnocentric insistence that “it can’t happen here,” arguments over North American genocide tend to bog down at three points: a) upholding the Third Reich’s centrally-planned, industrialized mass killings as the criterion of true genocide, what Ben Kiernan calls a “colloquial sense of total, state-organized, physical extermination,” and a corresponding difficulty of interpretation re: low-tech mass murders and grassroots mass killings, including those performed in defiance of central authority and/or in the absence of a strong federal state; b) the Sorites paradox of what proportion of a group must be killed to constitute genocide, or whether survival of the group somehow disproves genocide; c) whether every act of violence between indigenous peoples and Europeans from Mexico to the Arctic should be treated collectively as one continuous case, in what Benjamin Madley calls an “all or nothing” approach.  

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50 E.g. dismissing genocide as “popular in academic circles,” followed by “there is no debate that at times the government and the citizens treated the Indians unfairly”—Mueller, Shooting Arrows and Slinging Mud, 195. “the minimum requirement” from “On Romanticism,” 13-27, in Paul Chaat Smith, Everything You Know About Indians is Wrong (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 20; Hixson, “Policing the
Upon closer inspection, a series of North American genocides by different European colonies against specific indigenous groups, expressed through scalp bounties and other means, are readily apparent. Article 2 of the UN’s 1948 genocide convention itemizes, as (a) through (e), five means of attempting to destroy ethnocultural groups, of which only one (a) comprises actual killings and the other four, all of which were inflicted on indigenous groups and individuals in the Americas through deliberate colonial policy and unofficial vigilante actions, involve weakening and indirectly killing groups and their members by (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm; (c) deliberately subjecting members to living conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intending to prevent births; and (e) forcible transfer of children to other groups. All of these can occur in the absence or defiance of a strong central government—the grassroots implications of which, states Mahood Mamdani, are troubling and overlooked by many

genocide theorists. That “most attacks on Indians led to 300 or fewer casualties and were isolated attacks,” as G.C. Anderson points out, does not disprove genocide, but is consistent with sociologist Leo Kuper’s 1981 model of the “genocidal massacre,” in which exemplary violence as “object lesson or warning” is performed against a section of a group, such as a village, a band, or a clan lineage, with intent to intimidate or weaken the broader corporate group. In the case of categories (d) and (e), Margaret Jacobs points out that the killing or removal of indigenous women and children in North American frontier wars, as in the indigenous slave trades and the tiered scalp bounty payments which offered successively lower sums for the scalps of adult men, adult women, and children, should not be considered as incidental, but placed “at the very center of our analysis” of attempts to destroy indigenous peoples “as distinct sovereign entities [...] as long as women bore and raised children within Indian households and communities, tribal affiliation would remain.” Scalp bounties, enslavement, and mass killings are the most extreme consequences of, in Kai Erikson’s words, when “one people manages to neutralize the humanity of another,” and the most overt end of what Nancy Scheper-Hughes calls a “genocidal continuum” in which a larger proportion of bystanders convinced of the morality and necessity of genocide, assist, celebrate, or quietly condone the violent actions of a few—for instance, turning novels of heroic génocidaires, such as Bird’s *Nick of the Woods* (1837) or Mayne Reid’s *The Scalp-Hunters* (1851), into bestsellers (see Chapter 6).

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In observing these patterns across the span of 500 years, specific case studies such as Madley’s comparative analyses of the Pequots in 17th-century New England and the Yuki in 19th-century California are necessary, both to remind us that genocide is not an abstract theoretical phenomenon but a conscious human action, and that beneath broad categories like “indigenous peoples” are several hundred ethnocultural groups whose historic experiences, pre- and post-contact, are idiosyncratic and distinct. Distinction and idiosyncracy also characterize the methodologies and strategies by which Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British colonies in the Americas tried to subdue indigenous societies, to assimilate their members into the lowest rungs of a Euro-American caste system, to exclude them as perpetual outsiders, or to annihilate them. “We do not suffer competitions between different types of cancer as to which is to be celebrated as unique or worst,” writes Israel Charny; “All cases of genocide are similar and different, special and unique, and appropriately subject to comparative analysis.”

Chapter Outlines

My first three chapters discuss how Anglo-American scalping imagery arose out of the first two centuries of trans-Atlantic encounter in North America. Chapter One, “Scalping
in the Iberian Atlantic,” notes how well-established Classical and medieval myths and images of primitivism, particularly skull-cups and anthropophagous feasts, often overwrote early mentions of scalping in Iberian soldiers’ and missionaries’ accounts from Mexico and Florida. Such accounts of American primitivism were informed by two interrelated processes I explain in Chapter 1: the *anthropology of deficiency*, in which other human societies are imagined and described as defective and primitive versions of the observer’s; and Savagism, the identification of members of “deficient” societies with half-human and liminal beings such as demons, ogres, witches, and the primordial humans of the dawn of time. But not all Iberian authors followed suit: the first mestizo historian, Garcilaso de la Vega ‘el Inca,’ was the first to cast scalping as anticolonial resistance. Chapter Two, “A Trophy of Their Victory,” notes the differing textual and visual treatments, ethnographies, and rationalizations of scalping in North America by a dozen 16th and 17th century authors from various European countries. Chapter Three, “Scalping and Settler Colonialism in Early British America,” outlines the formation of Britain’s distinctive land-grabbing colonial pattern in Virginia and New England from the founding of Jamestown (1607) to the Pequot War (1636-38), the development of for-profit Indian war in the form of slave trading and bounties offered to allies for body parts, and the appearance of the central elements of the scalping narrative: of innate Indian treachery and the unique victimhood status of Anglo-American settlers in Indian war.

Chapters Four through Six describe the institutionalization of scalp bounties among colonial authorities and the entrenchment of scalp-hunting as practice and as idea among Anglo-Americans. Chapter Four, “A Pound of Flesh: Slave Hunting and Scalp Bounties in Anglo-American Frontier Warfare,” describes the dual role of enslavement and scalp
bounties as means of extirpation in 18th century Indian wars, the eclipse of the Indian slave trade and decapitation of Indians in Anglo-America, and the burgeoning grassroots-level hatred of Indians as an element of Anglo-American frontier life. Chapter Five, “Dark Mimesis: Scalp-hunting from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812,” analyses the rise of the Indian-killing frontiersman as a template for folk heroes in the Revolutionary era and in the Jacksonian-era United States, while accusations of scalping served as polemic: both British and Americans accused each other of complicity in scalping and war crimes, and of being true “white savages,” from the Revolution to the War of 1812. Counterpoints are raised in the 1833 memoirs of Sauk war leader Black Hawk, and the furor over the memoirs of the “white Indian” John Dunn Hunter. Chapter Six, “Scalping and Manifest Destiny,” looks at the spread of Anglo-American scalp-hunting in the Hispanic Southwest and Great Plains from prior to the Mexican-American War to the Sioux War of 1876, with an interest in four case studies: the scalp hunters James Kirker and John Joel Glanton, contracted in northern Mexico to hunt Apaches; the spread of scalp bounties in 1850s California; scalping in the Sand Creek massacre of 1864 Colorado; and treatment of scalping in the Slim Buttes incident of September 1876.

Chapter Seven, “Scalping Culture at Frontier’s End,” examines how such notable public figures as Geronimo, Sitting Bull, Rain-in-the-Face, and Buffalo Bill Cody, all of whom were associated in the public imagination with larger-than-life stories of scalping, negotiated and renovated their public images at the World’s Fairs of the fin de siècle era. A brief epilogue traces the aftermath of scalp-hunting and scalp bounties in the 21st century, how indigenous artists and activists invoke it to point to past and present dispossession, and
the broader survival of colonial fantasies of a world divided between civilization and barbarian chaos.
Chapter One: Scalping in the Iberian Atlantic

Other animals, in fine, live at peace with those of their own kind […] But with man,—by Hercules! most of his misfortunes are occasioned by man.

—Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis (AD 77-79), Book VII

Odysseus: Who is their leader? Do they have a democratic state?
Silenus: They are nomads; nobody listens to anybody about anything.
—Euripides, Cyclops (ca. 5th century BC)

Prologue: Bring me the hair of Roque de Yelves

In La Florida del Inca, his 1605 account of Hernando de Soto’s expedition to conquer Florida (1539-1542), the Peruvian man of letters Garcilaso de la Vega ‘El Inca’ writes that in March 1540, two conquistadores named Simón Rodríguez and Roque de Yelves ventured beyond the expedition’s winter camp near present-day Tallahassee to gather wild fruit in the forest. Clambering in the branches of a fruit tree, the two conquistadores were surprised by Apalachee warriors armed with their signature weapon, a powerful bow. Yelves leapt to the ground and began to run, but his flight was cut short by a flint-headed arrow in the back, “a quarter of it passing on through his chest.” Rodríguez, still in the tree, was shot at “as if he were some wild beast that had climbed there” and fell to the ground dead with three arrows “piercing him from side to side.” What happened next required some explanation from Garcilaso to his readers:

Hardly had he fallen when they cut off his head, or rather I should say all the scalp in a circle, and carried it away as a testimony of what they had done. (It is not known by what skill the Indians remove the scalp so easily from a person.) Roque de Yelves they left prostrate and did not take his scalp, for a relief of mounted Spaniards who had not been far away was now coming too close to permit them to do so. Nevertheless, after giving his

companions a brief account of what had occurred, this cavalier presently called for confession and expired. (Book II, Chapter XXV)\textsuperscript{55}

As 16\textsuperscript{th}-century Spanish had no precise, succinct words for the hair-bearing skin of the head, like the modern English noun “scalp,” or a verb to describe its removal such as “to scalp,” Garcilaso had to make do with the vague circumlocution \textit{todo el casco en redondo}, literally “all the skull in a circle.” The Inca cited another expedition survivor, Alonso de Carmona, to indicate other members of Soto’s army met a similar fate:

…when our men went into the forest to cut firewood, these Indians rushed up at the sound of the axe and slew them. They removed the chains from the Indians who had been brought along to carry the wood on their backs, and they \textit{took the crown of each Spaniard} (this being the thing they most prized), to decorate the arm of the bow with which they fought.\textsuperscript{56}

Carmona concluded that more than twenty conquistadores were killed this way during their time in Apalachee. “It is our opinion,” wrote John and Jeannette Varner, “that the Inca has used the word \textit{corona} here to mean scalp.”\textsuperscript{57}

In describing the Apalachees’ scalping of conquistadores The Inca, the first Hispanic writer born in the Americas and the first mestizo author in history, broke ranks with his peers in two significant ways. As will be indicated throughout this chapter, even mentioning scalping went against a prevailing trend in 17\textsuperscript{th} century accounts of New World violence,

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\textsuperscript{55}John Grier Varner and Jeannette Johnson Varner eds., trans., \textit{The Florida of the Inca} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), 257, footnote 12, my italics. Original text: “…lo derribaron muerto, y apenas hubo caído, quando le quitaron la cabeza: digo \textit{todo el casco en redondo}, que no se sabe con qué maña lo quitan con grandísima facilidad, y lo llevaron para testimonio de su hecho. A Roque de Yelves dexaron caído sin quitarle el casco, porque el socorro de los Españoles á caballo, por ser la distancia breve, iba tan cerca que no lo dio lugar á los Indios á que se lo quitasen. Este en pocas palabras contó el suceso, y pidiendo confession espiró luego.” In \textit{Historia de la Florida por El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega}, Book 2 of 4 (Madrid: Imprenta de Villalpando, 1803), 204-05.
\textsuperscript{56}Original text: “y quitavan al Español la corona, que era lo que ellos más preciavan, para traerla al brazo del arco con que peleavan.” Varner and Varner, \textit{Florida of the Inca}, 258-59, footnote 13, my italics.
\textsuperscript{57}Varner and Varner, \textit{Florida of the Inca}, 258-59, footnote 13. On the struggle to find succinct, specific words and descriptors for scalping in Western European languages in the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries, Axtell and Sturtevant, “The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?” 462-65.
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where it was overlooked or overwritten in favour of ancient European signs of alterity, barbarism, and wildness: anthropophagous feasts, human sacrifice, and the fashioning of cups and bowls from human skulls. If mentioning scalping in the context of contemporary North America set The Inca decades ahead of his peers, his overall approach put him ahead by centuries. While not opposed to the peaceful incorporation of indigenous peoples into the Spanish Empire through conversion to Christianity, The Inca’s account, which Erin Vaccarella points out is disguised as an adventure narrative to avoid censure by the Inquisition, subversively critiques the morality of armed conquest, particularly in Garcilaso’s scenes where Indian rulers denounce the Iberians as brigands and robbers. The Inca, descended maternally from a long line of Inca warrior-nobility, also refuses the double-standard by which indigenous military traditions automatically prove the morality of European invasion and conquest. Designating the Apalachees and other peoples of the American Southeast as sovereign indigenous polities resisting Soto’s invasion, La Florida del Inca is arguably one of, if not the, first anticolonial works of Atlantic literature.58

This chapter describes how European travellers and geographers in the 16th century Atlantic world, particularly in the context of colonial encounters in the Iberian Americas, created the intellectual and cultural foundations for Euro-American ideas of and attitudes towards scalping in the 17th and 18th centuries (see Chapters 2 and 3). Imagining the Americas as primordial heterotopic spaces and indigenous peoples as fundamentally similar

to the liminal beings and prehistoric humans of European myths, descriptions of American violence focused on acts Europeans considered exotic, primordial, and frightening, meaning Europeans ultimately defined, and stigmatized, indigenous American warfare as irrational and focused on dismemberment. Reading off European myths of human wildness onto actual ethnocultural groups in real geographic spaces, colonial neologisms designated New World peoples as outré and at least half-mythic: *anthropophagi* became *canibales*, *homines sylvestres* became *salvajes*.\(^5^9\) While scalping itself, as a marker of indigenous exoticism, was often sidestepped in 16\(^{th}\)- and early 17\(^{th}\)-century accounts (see Chapter 2) in favour of more traditional European signs of primitivism, the central narratives of Indian war were laid down early. The Indian was an illegitimate combatant; their retaliation or resistance was savage war; European invasion was reimagined as self-defense; and European violence against Indians, always conceived as retaliatory or preemptive and ranging from exemplary massacres, to slavery, to conquest, was justified in circular fashion: with the stigma of the Indian as illegitimate combatant.

**Introduction: Man-eaters, White Gods, and myth in 16\(^{th}\) century America**

Understanding how and why a late-19\(^{th}\)-century audience believed Prentiss Ingraham and William Cody’s story of a duel between Buffalo Bill and Yellow Hand requires investigation of how Europeans imagined the Americas and their place in it. On the surface level of Ingraham and Cody’s story are three fairly obvious themes: Cody’s moral righteousness in avenging, from an Anglo-American viewpoint, a past injustice (“the first

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scalp for Custer!”); the aggression of Yellow Hand in challenging Cody directly; and Cody’s victory through means considered unconventional in European warfare, i.e., the weapons and tactics of “savage war”. Another message lies just beneath the surface when we consider that Yellow Hand specifically challenges Cody by his Indian name of Pahaska, saying “I know you” though they have never met. This implies that Cody is recognized, perhaps renowned, among the Indians—otherwise, why challenge him to a duel? Expressed here in the fiction of Yellow Hand’s recognition of Cody as a famous Indian-slayer, as in other Anglo-American works of art and literature cited throughout this thesis, is a European desire not only to imagine themselves possessing superior qualities—e.g., moral, intellectual, cultural, racial, etc.—which permit them to triumph over the Indians, but to be recognized as such by Indians, who in so doing endorse or reify colonialism. As will be outlined here, the myth of European superiority was paired with two myths of the Americas’ natural and human geography: that the Americas, unlike Europe, were a primordial space outside of, or staggered behind, historic time; and that the peoples of the Americas were accordingly primitive, closer to the primordial humans of Classical and Biblical etiological myths.

In the case of the “duel with Yellow Hand,” Cody and Ingraham were peddling a story which their target audience took as partially or absolutely true—that is, a myth. “There are always multiple narratives of any historical moment,” notes Matthew Restall, “but that does not mean that as interpretations they cannot tell us something true.” Imagining Indians reifying, through conscious or unconscious recognition, Europeans’ putative superiority is to imagine a willing surrender to European master-narratives of colonialism in the Americas: the denial of coevalness between colonizer and colonized, and the overwriting or supersession of indigenous ontologies, geographies, and other forms of presence and
knowledge with European cartographies and ethnographic fantasies of Indians. These self-congratulatory scenes, often attached years or decades afterwards by mythographers, recur in 16th- and 17th-century European accounts.60

Columbus’ persona as a “master of signs,” who could perfectly understand the Indians’ gestures as early as landfall in October 1492, recurs in his later assertion that he overawed the Indians of Jamaica by predicting an eclipse with his almanac in 1504. Supposed Indian uncertainty as to whether Columbus and his crew were deities or demigods from the heavens serves as ancestor or forerunner to the mimetic claims of Hernán Cortés that Moctezuma and other Mesoamericans took them to be gods, followed by the post-1560 myth of Cortés being mistaken for Quetzalcoatl, and conquistadores from Peru to North America’s Great Plains introducing themselves as “hijos del Sol” or “sons of the Sun.” In Brazil, a 1663 account by the Jesuit Simão de Vasconcellos claimed that Diogo Alvares, a 16th-century interpreter and middleman between Portuguese colonial authorities and the Tupinambá, had so terrified the Indians by discharging a matchlock while bird-hunting that they prostrated themselves at his feet. Though the story postdated Alvares’ death by more than a century, it became a standard scene in the history of Brazil until the mid-1800s, and his Tupí name Caramuru (Eel) was fancifully retranslated as “son of thunder,” “man of fire,” “sea dragon,” etc., to express the Indians’ supposed amazement at his firearm. Europeans took these myths seriously: in Virginia in 1607, Columbus’ Jamaica story inspired John

60 Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), xiii-xix, and throughout; On the denial of coevalness (pace Johannes Fabian) and the goal of the decolonizing project as denial of the denial of coevalness, see Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), ix-xvii, 1-25, and throughout; Camilla Townsend, “Burying the White Gods: New Perspectives on the Conquest of Mexico,” in The American Historical Review, Vol. 108, No. 3 (June 2003), 659-687 (660: In that this version of the conquest overwrites real issues of violence and inequality with an unreal fantasy of adoration and gratification, “It is essentially a pornographic vision of events, albeit in a political rather than a sexual sense.”)
Smith’s attempt to overawe his captor Opechancanough with a compass, and informed his perception of the adoption ceremony which birthed the legend of his rescue by Pocahontas (see Chapter 3).61

To point out that stories of Indians recognizing and corroborating Europeans’ right to rule them were infantilizing and, perhaps more importantly, untrue, misunderstands the function and purpose of myth. “In order to exist,” observes Janaína Amado on the myth of Caramuru, “a myth must correspond to profound social needs.” Bruce Lincoln offers a more succinct definition of myth: “ideology in narrative form.” While myth and history, observes Peter Bietenholz, both spring from a desire to render the past and present in understandable terms, and are more intertwined than many historians would like to admit, Paul Cohen and Richard Slotkin draw clear distinctions between the historian and the mythographer: the historian “streamlines the past into post hoc systems of narrative meaning,” notes Cohen, while myth, in Slotkin’s words, “expresses ideology in a narrative, rather than discursive or argumentative, structure.” Through isolating “one strand from a complex picture” and emphasizing it “to the exclusion of all else,” myth offers its audience an “emotional investment in an essentialized understanding of certain individuals and events.” This narrative strand may be drawn from, attached to, or encapsulated within a mythic scene, an action, or object, to “dramatize the world vision in a constellation of powerful metaphors.”62

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Over time, the myth is “increasingly conventionalized and abstracted” until its origin as a work of creative expression has been forgotten, and allusions to the myth via symbols, keywords, icons, or historical clichés—e.g., Columbus’ compass, Caramuru’s matchlock, Custer’s saber, and Cody scalping Yellow Hand—serve as mnemonic devices which invoke a vast subtextual iceberg of meanings. Mythic scenes or myths of historic events can also be re-interpreted and approached from a different angle to offer new or revisionist myths, often as one-sided and factionalist as the myths they replaced (see Introduction pp. 43-44). Paul Cohen makes a particularly important observation when he notes that new myths, to be accepted among the pantheon of older myths, must “possess at least a degree of plausibility” in conforming to pre-existing beliefs: “They must be believable, even if not true.”

The genesis of scalp bounties in North American frontier warfare dates back to the mid-17th century (see Chapter 3), but the ultimate source of late 19th century myths regarding Euro-American violence, particularly the Indian as barbarous illegitimate combatant and the European frontiersman as white savage, draw from much older sources in the European intellectual tradition. My first section in this chapter, “The myth of the man-eating horde: scalping in ancient and medieval thought,” surveys the intellectual history of European perceptions of primitivism, particularly two interrelated processes I describe as *Savagism* and

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anthropology of deficiency, and the ways in which accounts of scalping in ancient Greek and
Roman texts only indirectly influenced 16th-century accounts of New World violence. My
second section, “Sepúlveda’s false dilemma: Savagism and illegitimate combatants from
Columbus to Valladolid,” describes the identification of indigenous peoples with ancient and
medieval European myths of wild or primordial men, the relatively rapid creation of the
ethnographic category of the “Indian,” and the enduring process I refer to as the Sepúlvedan
false dilemma: attacking the European strawman image of the Indian as pure victim to justify
the most hostile, contemptuous stereotypes of Indians and, in so doing, to justify enslavement
and mass killings. My third section, “Skull-cups, cannibal feasts, and the logic of massacre,”
shows how early accounts or references to indigenous violence sidestepped scalping in
favour of older images of primitive violence—e.g., flaying, anthropophagy, skull-cup
trophies and bacchanalian feasts, designated the Indian as barbarian in ways consistent with
ancient European myths and narratives, prefiguring the later uses of scalping in North
American frontier war stories. My epilogue observes how these images from the ancient
world, particularly the barbarian invasions that ended the Roman empire in the West, were
invoked and inverted for anticolonial purposes in Inca Garcilaso’s La Florida del Inca.

The myth of the man-eating horde: scalping in ancient and medieval thought

Through a trans-Atlantic interplay of images, ideas, and self-representations,
European myths of primordialism and heterotopia were attached to the Americas and its
peoples, creating new conceptual categories and colonial neologisms to name them: ‘the
Indies,’ the ‘West Indies,’ the ‘New World,’ and ‘America,’ whose peoples were ‘Indians’
and ‘Cannibals,’ ‘savages’ marked by their ‘red skin.’ Various authors have noted, rightly,
the influences of European geographical and ethnographic writing on early accounts of the
Americas, some dating back to Greek and Roman times, though encounter historiography should not be reduced to Westerners “talking about ourselves talking about ourselves”. “[N]o matter how much discursive construction may be involved in their representations,” warns Zhang Longxi, cultures and histories “are not in themselves entirely and exhaustively discursive.” Neil Whitehead concurs: for all the overstatement of the Americas’ familiarity which can recur in 16th-century accounts, “there yet remains a residual element in European description that can be taken only to refer to some new reality that was encountered,” like the cosmetic annatto paint which reddened Brazilians’ skin, the ethnonym Kalinago misheard and retransmitted as Caribe or Canibal, and Caribbean loanwords which proved useful in conceptualizing the mainland, such as cacique for an Indian headman or leader, canoa for small boats with neither sail nor rudder, Tabaco for the pan-American sacred herb which would benefit British colonialism in Virginia (see Chapter 3). Cultural construction and self-representation were joint projects: as Europeans were defining indigenous peoples as Indians and trying to extend power over them, indigenous peoples were resisting European dominion and, once educated in European literary modes, writing counter-histories of the Conquest like the 16th-century Nahuatl accounts of the conquest, or Inca Garcilaso’s accounts of Florida and Peru. “[C]olonial texts are complex documents,” noted Whitehead, “reflecting not only the desire of the conqueror but the recalcitrance of the conquered.”

As Robert Berkhofer observed, European descriptions of the Americas’ natural and human geography from 1492 onwards, whether positive, negative, or ambivalent, were premised in a myth of binary opposition where the Americas were a primordial mirror of Europe, and its peoples were the primitive antithesis of Europeans. Arising from this widespread belief was the idea that the Americas shared similar or identical conditions to those of a primordial epoch, described in Classical, Biblical, and medieval myths of the Golden Age, Eden, and the Terrestrial Paradise, placing the Americas out of sync with European chronology. If the primordial argument made the New World seem older, the “telluric inferiority” hypothesis posited that the Americas had emerged later from the Biblical floodwaters and were still drying out, which had hindered the development of indigenous American societies. Early modern ethnography conceptualized and expressed these taken-for-granted assumptions of indigenous American primitivism through what Berkhofer calls “description by deficiency”: cataloguing, in pedantic detail, how indigenous societies did not measure up in Europeans’ estimations. Some of this was congruent with European criticisms of internal outsiders. Like Judaism, Islam, or rival sects of Christianity, indigenous religiosity was “superstition” or “idolatry”; indigenous lifeways involving seasonal movements between food sources was imagined as erratic wandering, like the movements of Tatars, Romani “Gypsies,” and other pastoralists; simple or sparse material culture was likened to the poverty

of European peasants, who were often directly or laterally compared to American “savages.”

When the traits of liminal, half-human folkloric beings like the man-eating ogre, the witch or sorcerer, and the wild man were attributed to stereotyped groups, everyday contempt could merge with paranoid, monstrous images. Within Europe, the figure of the sorcerer or witch who harmed others with black magic and offered human sacrifice to the Devil was attached to Jews, heretics, and “Gypsies,” a fantasy with deadly consequences. Against a backdrop of legalized discrimination, European Jews were targeted in periodic massacres and persecutions inspired by rumours of child sacrifice, host desecration, or poisoning; Romanian nobility owned “Gypsies” as slaves until 1848; tens of thousands of Catholics and Protestants were condemned as Satan’s servants, tortured, and executed during the 16th and 17th centuries. As Catholics and Protestants condemned each other as the enemy within, the Ottoman armies marching through southeastern Europe were imagined as the forces of Antichrist.

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65 Antonello Gerbi, Jeremy Moyle trans., The Dispute of the New World: The History of a Polemic, 1750-1900 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973 [1955]), xv-xviii, 3-156; Berkofer, The White Man’s Indian, 3-47; Pagden, European Encounters with the New World, 117-140, where he crucially observes that 17th and 18th century missionaries read incommensurabilities between European and indigenous political and religious language as signifying absences from American societies (e.g., “without law, without king, without faith”), precluding the existence of analogues or functional equivalents; he calls these “anti-lexica”. François Hartog, in his study of Greek perceptions of the Scythians, notes that ancient ethnographers only imagined nomadism as an accumulation of negatives, i.e., things they do which are imagined to be absent from nomads’ lives: plough, eat bread, live in houses, build altars, etc.—in Hartog, Janet Lloyd trans., The Mirror of Herodotus: the Representation of the Other in the Writing of History (Berkeley, LA: University of California Press, 1988), 193-206. Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 10-108: “Even among our own people, we can see many peasants who are little different from brute animals,” wrote Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), and Jesuit missionaries habitually spoke of the “savages” of southern Europe: Asturias, Calabria, Sicily, and the Abruzzi, or “these Indies.” Town-dwellers in France habitually called peasants sauvages until the end of the 19th century, despite this legally constituting slander, with fines or jail sentences if convicted—see Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 3-8.

European images of Turks combined medieval Islamophobia with much older stereotypes of Central Asians as pitiless destroyers, expressed in scenes in art and literature where Turks, Tatars, and Mongols ate their victims. Following what I call the *anthropology of deficiency* to its logical extreme, this portrait of animal-like Central Asians reduced them, like later defamatory images of indigenous peoples of the Americas, though in the general absence of Central Asians or a situation of colonial power over them (quite the opposite) into a monstrous anti-society. Identified in the early medieval Alexander legends with Christian eschatology’s Gog and Magog or, in the medieval Germanies, with the Lost Tribes of Israel, folklore placed these ferocious subhumans behind a great mountain range. Kept in place either by the armies of Prester John or the Iron Gate of Alexander, they lived without law, culture, religion, or cuisine on a raw-food diet of vermin, unclean bodily substances, and human flesh. Like the process of *Orientalism* described by Edward Said and other forms of the much-studied binary-opposition model, this myth of an antisociety reduces real ethnocultural groups to negative mirror-images of the normative self. What is specific about this form of binary opposition is captured by Gananath Obeyesekere in his definition of *Savagism*: the identification of specific peoples as possessing the animal-like, monstrous traits of folkloric liminal beings such as witches, ogres, and wild men, or representing human beings from a presocial primordial era, known in Western discourse as “the state of nature.” Savagism reads etiological human-origin myths and folkloric stories of liminal beings as...
literally, rather than metaphorically, true, and identifies these mythic figures with extant ethnocultural groups. Savagist binary opposition uses anthropology-of-deficiency arguments to deny the most fundamental human traits to their targets, accusing them of ignorance of the use of fire, the incest taboo, language, law, etc., explaining these away with positive, negative, or ambivalent comparisons to children, animals, and liminal beings. Through this mutually-reinforcing process, real human societies are reduced to abstracted stereotypes influenced by myth, which are cited as evidence to confirm those myths. This forms the substratum of the North American scalping paradigm, and the broader horror-image of Indian war as *savage war*. 67

In outlining how indigenous Australians were defined by 18th century jurists and 19th century anthropologists as peoples so primitive they lacked understanding of land rights or conception, Patrick Wolfe crucially observes that such designations are not just “ad hoc rationalization[s]” but have “deep historical anchorage.” Just how deep that anchorage goes is indicated by Brent Shaw in his studies of Near Eastern accounts of pastoralists, in which an “organized and structurally consistent set of ideas,” and an associated “ideology” of nomad savagery as antithesis to civilization, has been repeated from the 2nd millennium B.C. to the Enlightenment. Pastoralists were imagined as “nomads,” which meant cultureless drifters who followed, rather than led, their herds, a mobile lifestyle which easily lent itself to brigandage and was thus nascently criminal. A series of binary oppositions also cast pastoralists as the rough antitheses of civilization who wore hides instead of textiles, had tents instead of houses, ate raw food, were ignorant of law and culture, and promiscuously mated within their wandering hordes without understanding of marriage or incest.68

Greek and Roman theorists added the stock phrase “women held in common” to describe these mixed matings, which allowed a possible positive interpretation (as in Plato) of lack of marriage as a form of autarky or primitive communism. Otherwise the model was unchanged: the shepherd’s life is the “idlest” of all economic modes, wrote Aristotle, as animals impose their will on humans who “are compelled to follow, cultivating, as it were, a living farm.” In theorizing mixed economies Aristotle can only suggest an aristocratic “ploughman-hunter” after “a shepherd and a robber.” Enlightenment social theorists would carry this forward with a four-stage model in which pastoralist “barbarians” were the second-

68 Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, 1-128—he also warns of the dangers of anthropology as “discourse appropriated into state practice” (177); Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” 869-70 (“The point is rather to indicate the deep historical anchorage of settler-colonial discourse, which is much more than some ad hoc rationalization that sprang up spontaneously in the Australian context”).
most-primitive form of economic life, and hunter-gatherer “savages,” with the imaginary Indians of the New World as archetypal, were primitives par excellence. The early modern and Enlightenment category of “savagery” was consistent with the Greek and Roman theorists’ model of the state of nature, which envisioned a period in human history lacking fire, language, law, agriculture, when people had collected the produce of the uncultivated “virgin earth” as Varro put it, “acorns, arbutus berries, mulberries, and other fruits”. Drawing from the Golden Age myth, it captured its ambivalences: depending on the authors’ purpose, the state of nature could be an idyll of autarkic simplicity where, in the absence of personal gain and plunder, theft and murder were absent; a “savage and brutal” prehistory when, in Cicero’s words, “men wandered at random over the fields, after the fashion of beasts, and supported life on the food of beasts”; or a strange era mingling praiseworthy and bizarre qualities. Like the Biblical imagery of human primordialism which sprang from the same well of Near Eastern sources, mythic depictions of the state of nature are long-lived; as archaeologist Clive Gamble notes, “We still await the discovery of the first wooden club and fur wrap from the old Stone Age.”

The dyadic early modern image contrasting textile-clad Europeans with Indians in hides, feathers, or nude, is prefigured by Savagist imagery from the ancient world. The defeat of savages by civilization is metonymized in Mesopotamian and Egyptian imperial art where the king, heroically oversized and armed to the teeth, personally executes nude barbarian leaders while his troops pile up barbarian corpses and tally the dead with severed body parts. The Pylos fresco of the late Bronze Age, in which armed, armoured, and textile-clad Mycenaean warriors kill and rout poorly-armed, sheepskin-clad bandits or hill tribesmen implies that the dyad had gone west to mainland Greece by at least the 12th century B.C. By the 5th century B.C., Classical Greeks were using Savagist and anthropology-of-deficiency arguments to identify distant peoples and exotic geographical spaces with human or other-than-human monstrousness. Within Greece, Thessaly was envisioned as a land of witches and centaurs, while impoverished, rustic Arcadia was supposedly the last region to abandon human sacrifice and adopt agriculture. The peoples north of Greece, known as Thracians, were considered uniquely fierce and stupid, practitioners of both human sacrifice and cannibalism. That Thracians were overrepresented in the Greek slave trade was not

coincidence, and Aristotle may have been thinking of Thracians when formulating his “natural slave” argument: that a certain rare type of human being, more often found among foreigners than Greeks, could be so animal-like that enslaving them was beneficial for both parties. If men “intended by nature for slavery” were unwilling to submit, “such a war is by nature just.”

Exotic geographical spaces and their peoples were also identified with primordialism and liminal beings. Homer’s Cyclopes, giant shepherds who ate travellers, were located by 5th-century Athenian playwright Euripides on Sicily, where Greek colonies coexisted with native Sicels imagined as shepherd-brigands. The mythic Amazons, warrior-women who in legend had invaded Athens, were depicted in 5th-century art as Persians following Xerxes’ burning of Athens, while the lecherous, drunken satyrs sported Thracian shields and staves. In the Hellenistic period, the Greek king Attalus I commemorated a victory over a Celtic

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kingdom in Asia Minor by commissioning a depiction of the Gigantomachy, a mythic battle of the Olympians against giants embodying primordial chaos. Through the presence of Greek colonies in southern Italy, Savagist ideology entered Roman thought. Roman descriptions of pastoralists repeated the nomad “ideology” by rote: on Corsica and Sardinia, in the North African deserts, and in mountain ranges from the Atlas to Anatolia to the Balkans, Roman writers saw nascently-criminal drifters always on the verge of banditry. The true savages of the Roman imagination were to their north: Celts, Germans, and Scythians, warrior tribes who sacrificed their enemies to the gods, or worse. Pliny the Elder’s *Historia Naturalis* (ca. A.D. 79) stated that many tribes of the Scythians beyond the Danube “feed ordinarily on man’s flesh”, all the more believable since, according to Homer’s *Odyssey*, cannibal giants had once existed in Italy itself; on the other side of the Alps, Celtic and Germanic tribes “kill men for sacrifice after the manner of those Scythian people,” which Pliny thought little different than “chewing and eating their flesh.” Julius Caesar’s exaggerated, Savagist portrait of trans-Alpine Europe distinguished the Celts of southern and central Gaul, town-dwelling agriculturalists who traded with Rome and drank wine, from the Belgae of the northwest, who shunned Roman trade and herded cattle for meat and milk, against the feral Germans east of the Rhine, whose young men proved themselves by hunting aurochs, moose, and unicorns. Pomponius Mela wrote (AD 43) that the Germans ate raw meat, and the mind’s eye of Seneca the Younger, in *De Providentia* (ca. 1st century AD), saw Germans living in wagons like Scythians, roaming frigid woods and marshes, hunting wild beasts beneath overcast skies: “Are they unhappy, do you think? There is no unhappiness for those whom habit has brought back to nature…” It could get worse than this: according to Strabo, the
Celts of Ireland lived as a primordial horde who habitually practiced cannibalism and incest (see Chapter 2).⁷¹

Returning to Pliny the Elder: north of the Dnieper, far beyond the Roman empire’s frontiers, he placed the Anthropophagi, his habitual Scythian man-eaters who “use to drinke out of the sculs of mens heads, and to weare the scalpes, haire and all, in steed of mandellions or stomachers before their breasts, according as Isogonus the Nicean witnesseth.” Greek descriptions of Scythians ranged from ethnographies consistent with archaeological findings in Ukraine, southern Russia, and Central Asia, to wild stories in which scalping was merely a footnote to familiar Savagist tropes of barbarism and heterotopia. Beneath the legends, it must be emphasized that the Scythians were an actual historic people, identified by modern archaeologists and ethnohistorians as speakers of an Indo-Iranian language and as early exemplars of the distinct Central Asian cultural and economic pattern of pastoralism, equestrianism, and mounted archery. Elements of Herodotus’ ethnography in Book IV of his Histories have been confirmed by two centuries of archaeology: the Scythians, or at least the ruling class he dubs the “Royal Scythians,” did sport elaborate tattoos, interred their kings and queens in lavish burial mounds with sacrifices of horses and servants, and traded extensively with the Greek port towns of the Black Sea. Osteological discoveries from the Scythian periods of Ukrainian and southern Russian

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archaeology also prove some of Herodotus’ darker tones: cut marks along the hairlines of skulls from southern Russia are consistent with accounts of Scythians scalping their enemies, while the remains of a Scythian town at the archaeological site of Belsk includes a workshop for converting skulls into lacquered drinking cups or bowls, which Herodotus proclaimed a Scythian warrior’s ultimate trophy of victory over his enemy.72

Per his mission statement to record “great and marvellous deeds” of both Greeks and barbarians, Herodotus’ Scythian ethnography was ambivalent. Though cataloguing various Scythian customs the Greeks considered outré—i.e., decapitating, flaying, and scalping enemies; fashioning cloaks and napkins, bowcases, and drinking cups as trophies from enemies’ scalps, skin, and skulls; drinking wine unmixed with water; drinking the blood of their enemies; and offering human sacrifices to Ares—he considered them and a related Central Asian people, the Massagetae, ultimately praiseworthy as, in his estimation, the only peoples besides the Greeks to successfully resist the Persian empire. Hartog notes that Herodotus defies the prevailing derogatory reading of pastoralism in Classical ethnography by elevating it from economic mode to military strategy: by packing their families and wealth onto wagons and driving great herds of livestock for dairy and meat, the Scythians can avoid Persian conquest by retreating into the steppes, harassing and starving out a larger, less mobile foe. While later generations of Classical ethnographers echoed Herodotus’ theme of unconquered Scythians, they were more interested in tropes and icons of Scythians’ monstrousness, some of which Herodotus repeated while professing to disbelieve: stories of Scythian tribes who were cyclopean, had cloven hoofs for feet, fought gryphons for gold,

were werewolves, or dined habitually on human flesh. Herodotus endorsed the existence of one tribe of man-eating Scythians, consistent with the Savagist criminalization of nomads: the Androphagi, “herdsmen without fixed dwellings, […] the most savage of men” with “no notion of either law or justice” and “the only people in this part of the world to eat human flesh” (IV.106-07).

Scythians functioned for ancient Greeks and Romans as indigenous Americans did for early modern Europeans, as a focus on which to project their fantasies and thought experiments on primitivism and exoticism, and many of the same narratives about indigenous Americans are prefigured in the material on Scythians. Like the Greek myth of the Lapiths, a tribe of hardy Thessalian mountaineers, waging war upon and wiping out the Thessalian centaurs, the dyadic image of noble savages at war with savages appears in the Scythian corpus: Diodorus Siculus (ca. 1st century BC) reported that Euphorus of Cyeme (ca. 4th century BC), expanding on an allusion in Homer’s Iliad to two northern peoples, “Hippemólgoi, mare’s-milk drinkers” and “Ábioi” or “distant ones” (Iliad XIII.1-6), had decided the former must be benevolent, autarkic philosophers who ate dairy instead of killing animals for meat, and waged perpetual war against the man-eating Scythians. The uses of indigenous Americans, like Montaigne’s Brazilians or Baron de Lahontan’s Huron character Adario, as outsiders through which their authors ventriloquized European society’s flaws and contradictions, were foreshadowed by Scythian characters who examined the Mediterranean world and found it wanting: the legendary Scythian philosopher Anacharsis, and the characters of Lucian of Samosata’s Scythian romances Toxaris and The Scythian. Scythians, who in stereotype were pale-skinned, green-eyed, and red-haired, personified in the Greek imagination the extreme north just as “Ethiopians,” sub-Saharan Africans, personified the
extreme south; in the Hellenistic period this topos of bookending human geography with North Africa on one end and eastern Europe on the other had spread across the Mediterranean world, as expressed in a pairing of “barbarian” (read: Berber, i.e., North Africa) and “Scythian” by Paul to express the universal relevance of Christianity in Colossians 3:11.73

But as evidenced by Pliny’s repetition of old stories of man-eating Scythians scalping and trepanning their victims, the Scythians functioned in the Classical mind as embodiments of human wildness, as either ferocity or dysfunction. Such references were widespread in Classical Athens, where Scythia was omnipresent: Athens purchased vast amounts of Black Sea grain and fish from Scythia, as well as slaves. Some of these slaves served as an Athenian police force who wore distinct uniforms—perhaps, Balbina Bäbler points out, because the hardy Scythians were seen as incorruptible noble savages, which may explain the negative mirror image of Athenian comic playwrights, particularly Aristophanes, of Scythian police as gibberish-speaking, timid fools. Invoking scalping could be used to add exotic danger to updated versions of traditional myths, as in fragments of Sophocles’ lost play

*Oenomaus*, which mentions a head “shaved [or scalped] to make a napkin in the Scythian manner” and describes the titular legendary tyrant roofing his palace with human skulls “to dramatize his savagery.” A fragment of a painted cup, dated to the 490s BC, which Dyfri Williams interprets as an “unusually vivid Centauromachy,” the battle of the Lapiths and Centaurs, shows a fully-armoured Greek fighter whose helmet has been accessorized with a scalp—clearly not his, since tufts of his own hair peek out from around the edges of his helmet. But many invocations of Scythians, particularly the negative stereotypes of their wandering, drunkenness, and scalping, were comedic, contemptuous, or both. In Classical Athenian slang, “nomad,” a term considered synonymous with “Scythian,” referred to an itinerant craftsman or street prostitute. The verb *skuthizo*, and compound verbs *aposkuthizo* and *periskuthizo*, appear to have literally meant “to scalp” but could be used as figures of speech for shaving the head, for haircuts uncomfortably close to the scalp, or for drunkenness and hangovers; like Gauls and Germans, Scythians were believed to be intemperate drunks.74

Prefiguring Montaigne by millennia, Savagist discussions in antiquity raised the idea that civilized people could behave more cruelly than true savages. Denouncing political opponents he accused of arranging for Roman citizens to be robbed, imprisoned, and executed (*Against Verres*, 2.5.150), Cicero posited that if he were to tell this sad story to Scythians rather than jaded Romans, “I should move the pity of even those barbarous men.” The negative articulation of civilized cruelty as more barbarous than barbarians’ is central to the portrayal of Seleucid emperor Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and his persecutions of Jews

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during his reign in the 2nd century BC, in the stories of martyrdom and torture of the deuterocanonical Books of the Maccabees. In 2 Maccabees 4:47, Antiochus’ death sentences for political opponents are characterized as so unjust that “if they had told their cause, yea, before the Scythians, [they] should have been judged innocent” (King James translation). 3 Maccabees 7:5, as prelude to horrors to come, speaks of Antiochus’ forces rounding up and executing Jews without trial, “girding themselves with a cruelty more savage than that of Scythian custom” (Revised Standard Version). 75

In its interconnections between the destruction of families, torture by fire, and scalping while living as a form of tormented death, the gruesome martyrdom story of 2 Maccabees 7:1-42 strangely and eerily prefigures the American frontier’s horror stories of the mid-18th century. Antiochus orders an exemplary Jewish woman and her seven sons brought before him, commands them to violate the Mosaic laws by tasting pork, and orders them whipped and scourged when they refuse. When one of the seven sons announces their readiness to die rather than break the sacred laws, Antiochus, flying into a fury, proves himself more cruel than the Scythians: ordering that “pans and cauldrons” be made red-hot, Antiochus commands his servants to cut out the young man’s tongue, scalp him—the Greek Septuagint text reads περισκοτισαντας, “periskythisantas”—and cut off his hands and feet, then fry him in a giant skillet (2 Maccabees 7:1-5). A second brother is brought forward, scalped, and asked whether he will eat pork rather than meet a similar fate; he refuses, and is similarly “tormented and mangled” (2 Macc. 7:7-8, King James). One by one the five

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remaining brothers and their mother are killed horribly, while promising Antiochus of their imminent bodily resurrection in Heaven and the impending wrath of God. The King James translation of the early 17th century translated the first martyr’s scalping and dismemberment as “cut off the utmost parts of his body” (2 Macc. 7:4) but when describing the scalping of the second wrote “pulled off the skin of his head with the hair” (2 Macc. 7:7). With a post facto finality similar to those of the captivity narratives, the Biblical author concludes, “Let this be enough now to have spoken concerning the idolatrous feasts, and the extreme tortures” (2 Macc. 7:42).76

Early modern allusions and lateral comparisons between Scythians and indigenous Americans almost always sidestepped scalping itself in favour of ancient topoi of Scythian wildness: nomadism, cruelty, mobile warfare, and cannibalism. In Lafitau’s ethnographic study of the Iroquois, Moeurs des sauvages amériquains (1724), scalping was compared to Scythian headhunting, rather than scalping. Cotton Mather, in Magnalia Christi Americana (1702), invokes the Scythians to castigate American Indians’ general ferocity, calling them “those worse than Scythian Wolves” and lamenting “our Shepherds […] worried unto death by the Scythian Wolves of our Wilderness”. Building on José de Acosta’s 1590 suggestion that some ancient people had migrated to the Americas by an unknown overland route from Asia, Georgius Hornius proposed in 1652 that Scythians, as well as Chinese and Phoenicians, were the Indians’ ancestors, on the grounds that Herodotus’ description of the Scythians scalping their slain enemies “depicts for us precisely the Florida or Huron Scyth, cutting into the head of his dead enemy so that he can take the skin away with the hair.” The

Jesuit Relation of 1642 describes the Iroquois as “these Barbarians” who “carry on war in the fashion of the Scythians and Parthians,” referring not to scalping but to hit-and-run raids with bows and arrows. The fragmented, polyvalent corpus of Scythian knowledge in Classical and medieval geography meant that a one-on-one reading of one people’s relevance to the other was not systematically performed in the contact period; however, accounts of the Scythians prefigure images of American Savagism in intriguing ways.\(^77\)

**Sepúlveda’s false dilemma: Savagism and illegitimate combatants from Columbus to Valladolid**

In March 1493 the Genoese navigator and revisionist geographer Christopher Columbus arrived in triumph in Barcelona, presenting Ferdinand and Isabella forty tropical birds, strange gold jewellery, and six survivors of two dozen captives from, he thought, the Indian ocean. In his journals and his letters Columbus claimed to have understood the Indians’ signs and gestures from the very beginning, allowing his distinction between the Tainos (their word for “good”) and the Caribs. The former had welcomed his sailors with fresh provisions and were described in familiar Golden Age terms: gentle and friendly to the point of naïveté, quick to learn, and culturally blank, having no religion or technology. Columbus wrote in his diary on 14 October that some of the Indians, through the gestures that he somehow understood perfectly, “were asking us if we had come from the sky.”

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Columbus noted also a multitude of hamlets and villages, the seedbed of civilization in European thought, while Columbus’ second son Ferdinand described Indians shuttling between hunting and fishing spots “at fixed seasons, moving from one ground to another.” A traveller on the 1492 voyage, Vicente Yáñez Pinzón, compared them to ancient nomads: “We consider them to be like Scythians, wanderers without fixed habitations living off the fruits of the land.” As these cultureless Taíno Indians were not only gentle but also “lazy to the greatest degree” (“perezosos en grandísima manera”), converting them to Christianity and putting them to work tilling colonists’ fields, tending crops, and mining gold was in everyone’s best interest.78

As Nicolás Wey-Gómez critically observes, a key element in transmitting Old World mythology onto New World peoples was identifying physically-human beings as culturally-monstrous, thus enabling comparison to the Plinian monsters who prowled the tropics in the European imagination. As John Friedman observed in 1981, once European myths of primordialism and monstrousness were attached to real peoples in colonized Atlantic space through such composite colonial categories as The Indian, The Savage, and The Cannibal, European belief in the existence of half-human wild men went into decline. Columbus’ journals stated that he took the Tainos’ first sign-descriptions of the Canima, Caniba, or Caribe for creatures from medieval geography and sailors’ legends: man-eating Cyclopes or

India’s dog-headed Cynocephali. Dismissing these as a mark of the Indians’ superstition, Columbus and Doctor Chança later wrote with horror of encountering the villages of the man-eaters. Though no direct anthropophagy was witnessed, they reported finding human bones hung like ancestral relics—which, Neil Whitehead noted, were often mistaken subsequently as evidence of cannibal feasts; some animal’s neckbone boiling in a pot; and captives from other islands, including three Taíno boys captured and castrated “as we do to capons or pigs which we want to fatten and make tender.” The detail of boys castrated to improve their taste is redolent of both nightmares of gustatory cannibalism and contemporary European sailors’ fears of emasculation in Muslim captivity; it is echoed nowhere else in even the most lurid accounts of man-eating in the Americas. Yet Columbus and Chança were certain that these physically-human yet culturally-monstrous beings were the Caribes or Canibales they had been warned of; in their decision that other peoples who resisted by fleeing into the woods or fighting them with bows and arrows must also be Caribs or Cannibals, they linked Indian resistance with stigmatized violence. But conquering the Caribs should be easy, Columbus wrote in his March 1493 letter of relation to the Sovereigns: the Caribs were not necessary “bold” or “courageous” but only seemed that way because the Taínos were cowards. Tellingly, upon his return in spring 1493 his suggested returns on investment included “as many slaves as Their Majesties order to make,” as well as gold, spices, and cotton.  

From the wreck of the *Santa María* Columbus had fashioned La Navidad, a small fort on Hispáñola, and left a garrison there when he sailed back to Spain in the spring of 1493. Upon his return in November 1493 he found several sailors killed and La Navidad in ruins; evidently, the Taínos were not as helpless or docile as he had assumed. This Second Voyage was marked by Columbus’ first trans-Atlantic shipments of enslaved Indians he labelled as cannibals, “a people very savage and suitable for the purpose” of chattel slavery to pay the colony’s expenses. By the time of the Third Voyage (1498-1500), as the Indians rebelled against a Spanish colonial regime that worked them to death for gold, Columbus griped how misunderstood he was in a letter to the crown prince’s governess Doña Juana: he was no governor of a settled land, like Sicily, but a captain sent to conquer a “warlike and numerous” people “with customs and beliefs very different from ours [.]” Mention of the Indians’ villages and hamlets were absent as Columbus likened them to bandits, rebels, or wandering primitives: “a people, living in highlands and mountains, having no settled dwellings, and apart from us [.]” When the colonists also revoluted against Columbus and his brothers, the Crown stripped them of their authority and put them on trial in 1500 on charges stemming from abuse of power and ignoring Isabella’s “neat legal distinction” between trading in foreign slaves and enslaving the Crown’s subjects. But the designations of suspected cannibals as fit subjects for conquest, and vice versa, was continued by his successors, who met labour shortages by declaring occupants of uncolonized islands as Caribs. Crown jurists concurred, issuing rulings from 1503 to 1506 legitimizing the “ransom” by Spanish colonists of Indians enslaved and owned by other Indians, the enslavement of Indians captured in just wars, and the enslavement of cannibals for their crimes against God and nature. Combined

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with the as-yet burgeoning southern European trade in Muslim and African slaves, this marked the birth of the American caste system, as denounced by Capuchin and abolitionist Epifanio de Moirans in 1782: “[Europeans] seize the lands of the natives of the Indies once they have killed them or enslaved them, and they also expel the Blacks from their own lands and reduce them to the perpetual slavery of someone shipped to America or transported to Europe.”

Binary opposition and savagism are not solely the preserve of Europeans, and early modern and 20th century accounts indicate a mutual or overlapping legibility in Iberians’ and indigenous peoples’ Savagisms. In 16th-century Brazil, Tupí-speaking coastal peoples told Portuguese explorers of the barbarous Tapuya or Tapuia of the interior, who lacked manioc agriculture and hammocks and slept on the ground. An etymology of Tapuia as simply “westerner” or “enemy” suggests that the category is “little more than a negative image of the Tupi,” but gave rise to a persistent, dyadic Brazilian historiographical myth contrasting the coastal Tupí and interior Tapuia as “good” and “bad” Indians; the former were valorous, only ate enemies for revenge, and had vanished after helping the early settlers, while the Tapuya, identified as Brazil’s Amazonian Indian enemy of the moment, were brutal primitives who ate human flesh for food. Such distinctions were also found in 20th-century fieldwork among the Mehinaku, one of ten allied villages in the Xingu headwaters region of Mato Grosso state, where Thomas Gregor describes a shared Xinguano culture which bridges

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a divide of four separate language families through intermarriage, trade, manioc and corn agriculture, and a shared self-definition as possessors of empathy and compassion, imagined as absent among Brazilians and the non-Xinguano indigenous peoples who periodically raided Xinguano villages. Gregor’s informants distinguished between themselves as peaceful people who wear annatto, channel intravillage tensions into wrestling matches, and avoid foods which incite anger and aggression, while non-Xinguanos lack self-control: “He kills his own kin. War for him is a festival.” Mehinaku informants elaborated on how these peoples used rancid lard in place of annatto, ate vermin, slept on the ground, and defecated in their drinking water.

When Iberians interacted with state societies with imperial ideologies, cross-cultural similarities were even greater. Sixteenth-century Spanish authorities readily accepted the Nahuatl ethnonym Chichimeca for the seminomadic peoples of the northern deserts, who the town-dwelling farmers of Central Mexico described as their primitive antitheses: eating raw or vile foods, wearing pelts or nude in lieu of textiles, and warring constantly. In 1970s Columbia Michael Taussig noted how the Spanish infieles (pagans) and the Quechuan word auca, for non-Quechuan-speakers who defied the Incas’ sacred order, could be

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synonymously used by Colombians to invoke a collage of Quechuan and European stereotypes about the wild Putumayo lowlanders: that such people could see in the dark or transform into jaguars, practiced sorcery and cannibalism, did not eat salt, and were still unaware of Christ or the Spanish language. Yet, notes Taussig, shamans in Colombia’s lowlands consider the Afro-Colombians of the Pacific as the true sorcerers. “As my good friend Orfir says, heaving with laughter, wherever you go, the great brujos are elsewhere.”

The Americas of the European imagination at their most ambivalent mixed themes of a land resembling an earthly paradise with weird peoples from a bygone age; as in Amerigo Vespucci’s 1503 description of long-lived Brazilians who went to war for human meat, these themes were easily repackaged within the ancient Savagist myth of the man-eating horde. In the half-century of conquests that followed the Columbian encounter, European fantasies regarding the New World were further embroidered in their idealized and demonized extremes; by the time of the Valladolid debate (1550-51), a written exchange between two experts on matters of Americana, theology, and the law, these fantasies had been elevated to the status of institutionalized knowledge. The Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas, who had lived in the Americas since arriving in the Caribbean in 1502 and had served as bishop of Chiapas in 1545-46, could cite his own experience to authenticate claims which, to many Europeans and most of his fellow colonists, seemed unbelievable: that the indigenous peoples of the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru served as living exemplars of such Christian virtues as communitarianism, gentleness, generosity, asceticism and selflessness. The existence of indigenous civilizations in Mexico and Peru, i.e., hierarchical, sedentary urban-agrarian societies with aristocracies, central government, codes of law and forms of writing,

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clearly indicated that Indians possessed reason, which meant their inevitable conversion to Christianity and transformation into Spanish subjects could be performed by persuasion rather than conquest. His opponent, the theologian and legalist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, had never been to the New World, but could draw on an already broad corpus of conquest, ethnographic, and travel literature to argue the opposite position: that Indians were Europeans’ moral and civilizational inferiors, and reducing them to serfdom was no crime.83

To dismantle the stigmata of the Indian warrior as encountered in the Caribbean, Mexico, and Brazil, Las Casas attempted to reread culturally-idiosyncratic violence in universalist terms of unconscious Christianity, while attacking the right of conquest by infantilizing Indians as unworthy foes. In his Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies, Las Casas had described their warfare in the pre- and post-contact period as “no more deadly than our jousting, or than many European children’s games”; even the weapons of the Inca, who Las Casas and his peers considered the most advanced American civilization, were “a joke.” If comparison to European norms was meant to make Indian warfare nonthreatening

and almost childish, Las Casas’ analysis of cannibalism and human sacrifice was intended to challenge Europeans’ sense of adequacy in their own religious practice. Alluding to Christian exegesis of the Binding of Isaac (Genesis 22) and Greek, Roman, and Biblical myths and accounts of human sacrifice and ritual cannibalism among the Greeks, Romans, Celts, Carthaginians, and other peoples, Las Casas proposed that human sacrifice was typical of a universal, albeit regrettable, stage in human history. Through natural reason, pagans, i.e. those as yet unaware of Christianity, intuitively grasped that human beings were made in the divine image, but had not yet been informed that the Crucifixion and the Eucharist had superseded and supplanted all forms of sacrifice and related ritual meals, especially human. Las Casas pointed to acts of devoted self-abasement found by missionaries in societies across the Iberian Americas as further evidence of the Indians’ religiosity. Acts like fasting, praying and singing, bathing in cold water, and self-flagellation seemed legible per contemporary Christian asceticism and penitence. Such knowledge offered trans-Atlantic benefits: Europeans could reform their Christian practice by taking example from such virtuous pagans, while the Indians’ energies could and should be redirected to true religion by missionaries and conversion.84

Las Casas’ critique of Christianity as practiced in Europe went further in his inversion of colonial victim and aggressor: the Spanish colonists, not the Indians, were the true barbarians, who had illegally invaded American lands and killed thousands by forced labour.

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84 Díaz Balsera, “On Barbarism, Demons, and Natural Reason,” 159-166; Clayton, Bartolomé de las Casas, 43-46, 82-86, 234-38, 342-86; Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, 119-145; On the Indians as unworthy opponents and citations from Las Casas’ Brief History, see Pagden, Letters from Mexico, lxi-lxvi; Pagden, European Encounters with the New World, 69-89; Pagden, “Ius et Factum” in Greenblatt ed., New World Encounters, 85-100; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 72-100; Rubiés review of Daniel Castro, Another Face of Empire; Grisel, “The Beginnings of International Law” and Hanke, “The Theological Significance of the Discovery of America,” Chiapelli ed., First Images of America.
starvation, enslavement, and mass executions. Las Casas damned the conquistadores by comparison to “Mohammedans,” Europeans’ fantasy image of Muslims as a barbarous, schismatic horde: followers of a false prophet who had invented a bogus version of Christianity to gain wealth and power, “Mohammedans” in turn invoked their false religion to cynically justify conquest and self-aggrandizement. Las Casas further damned conquistadores with comparison to fierce beasts: wolves, tigers, lions, bulls, dogs, and dragons. In believing that Muslims were diabolical heretics and that Christians should crusade against them, Las Casas and Sepúlveda shared common ground; where they disagreed was on whether Reconquista arguments could be used to justify conquests in the Americas, as Sepúlveda argued. In Las Casas’ view, Muslims were clear aggressors, “heretics who seize our lands, persecute Christians and work for the destruction of our faith,” while in the Indies, the situation was reversed, and Iberian Catholics were the aggressors. Spreading Christianity by conquest, as Sepúlveda proposed, was to evangelize by the “Mohammedan method,” i.e., “with death and terror,” which made the conquistadores’ actions “worse than the assaults mounted by the Turk in his attempt to destroy Christendom.” To accuse other Europeans of being white savages, or worse than savages, had a certain rhetorical sting, but in reifying the validity of the savage as a category of analysis it proved problematic, as shall be noted later in this thesis.85

Las Casas’ and Sepúlveda also shared a belief that modern humans, in isolation and poverty, could degenerate to a pre-social, primordial state of being. Later in the 1550s, per

Thomas Aquinas’ 12th century definition of the barbarian *simpliciter*, Las Casas wrote in *Apologética Historia* of rare but extant groups of humans who lived without law, justice, commerce, marriage, friendships, or society itself. Scattered in the woods and mountains, such wild men were “savage, ferocious, slow-witted, and alien to all reason” due to a barren environment or “impious or perverse understanding.” Like the natural slave of Aristotelian theory, they had to be forcibly brought to civilization for their own good, or at least to prevent them preying on others. Towards the end of his life, Las Casas proposed a mission to the Chichimecs, who he and other Spanish colonists imagined as New World incarnations of the barbarian *simpliciter*. Las Casas also noted missionizing them would also serve imperial purposes: in 1546 vast silverlodes had been discovered at Zacatecas in the Chichimecs’ country, and converting and settling the Chichimecs “would also facilitate reaching Florida which is very close.” So, while Las Casas certainly critiqued the excesses of Spanish imperialism, he was not a critic of imperialism *per se*.86

As Las Casas attempted to separate at least some Indians from dark fantasies of ogre-like wild men, Sepúlveda derided the idea that Indians were Europeans’ equals in anything: Indians were to the Spaniards, wrote Sepúlveda, as children are to adults, as females are to males, “almost as monkeys are to men.” Sepúlveda also deployed animal comparisons by scoffing that Indian handicrafts proved nothing, since even birds and spiders make nests and webs, and rhetorically asked what the existence of “some manner of community living” proved, “except that they are not bears or monkeys and that they are not completely devoid of reason?” In one of his most damning passages, Sepúlveda vilified the Indians by

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combining the 16th century myth of the conquistadores with the ancient myths of the Golden Age and the cannibal Scythians:

And do not think that before the arrival of the Christians they were living in quiet and the Saturnian peace of the poets. On the contrary they were making war continuously and ferociously against each other with such rage that they considered their victory worthless if they did not satisfy their monstrous hunger with the flesh of their enemies, an inhumanity which in them is so much more monstrous since they are so distant from the unconquered and wild Scythians, who also fed on human flesh, for these Indians are so cowardly and timid, that they scarcely withstand the appearance of our soldiers and many thousands of them have given ground, fleeing like women before a very few Spaniards who did not even number a hundred.87

All the paradoxical imagery of the Indian as illegitimate combatant is present here: ferocious yet cowardly, monstrous yet easily defeated by a much smaller number of Europeans. Here also is a rhetorical device which will recur throughout this thesis, which I call the Sepúlvedan false dilemma: invoking and ridiculing the most idealized European fantasy of Indians to claim that the most depraved nightmare images must therefore be true. If so, victory by any means necessary is putatively justifiable. Richard Slotkin has referred to this as the logic of massacre, “the expectation that a people defined as savage will inevitably commit atrocities: acts of violence so extreme that they seem to violate the laws of nature.”88

Skull-cups, cannibal feasts, and the logic of massacre

88 “To achieve victory in such a war, [the civilized] are entitled and indeed required to use any and all means, including massacre, terrorism, and torture.” Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 112-14.
In 1519, Alonso Álvarez de Pineda sailed up the Pánuco River with 270 men to establish the second Spanish settlement on the Atlantic coast of continental North America, almost 500 miles north of Hernán Cortés’ Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz. In January 1520, Pineda and all but 60 of these colonists were killed in an uprising by the Mayan-speaking indigenes, who the Spanish knew by their Nahuatl name of Huastecas. The Spanish survivors fled to Vera Cruz in a supply ship and were impressed into Cortés’ army, marching to retake Tenochtitlán after La Noche Triste the previous June. In his Second Letter to Charles V (dated 30 October, 1520), Cortés only alluded in passing to the uprising, and in his Third Letter (dated 15 May, 1522) to its aftermath, presenting himself as rescuing Francisco de Garay’s lost colonists from certain death at the hands of the Indians. In 1522 Cortés, his lieutenant Gonzalo de Sandoval, 50 horsemen, 100 crossbowmen and arquebusiers with 4 artillery pieces, and two Mexican lords leading 30,000 warriors left Tenochtitlán to reconquer the Pánuco region; here, in his own words (the Fourth Letter, dated 15 October, 1524), they captured “some four hundred lords and chieftains,” and, after having extracted confessions of involvement or complicity in the killing of conquistadores, had them “burnt in punishment.” As Anthony Pagden notes, Cortés, who founded Villa de Santiesteban del Puerto on the Pánuco by the end of 1522, may have instigated the uprising to deny his rivals’ settlement of the region; two other conquistadores, García de Pilar and Alonso Perez, later reported that the Huastec chieftains had protested on the way to execution that Cortés had ordered them to act thusly.  


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In the *Fourth Letter*, Cortés’ portrayed his predecessors as undisciplined brutes and the Huastecas as rebellious savages. Garay’s colonists had scattered inland “in bands of three and six in several different directions” and preyed on the Huastecs, “taking their women and supplies by force.” The Huastecs, he assured Charles V, were “so turbulent” that in precolonial times they had “never let an occasion for rebellion pass.” In reconquering the region and securing a good port at the mouth of the Pánuco, he had done good work. Furthermore, he had rescued Garay’s colonists from a dreadful fate, in which another piece of cranial skin approximates the role of a scalp:

…our journey was of great benefit, for shortly afterwards a ship with many people and supplies aboard [the Garay expedition of 1523] was forced onto that coast. If the land had not been at peace, the crew would all have perished like those from the previous ship, *the skins of whose faces we found in the native oratories* [temples], preserved in such a fashion that many of them could still be recognized.⁹⁰

The detail of the flayed faces was repeated in the accounts of Francisco López de Gómara (1553), Bernal Díaz del Castillo (written between 1555 and 1584, posthumously published 1632), and Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas (1601), with an added and grisly detail: that the conquistadores’ faces were recognizable as Europeans since their hair and beards were intact. Gómara repeated Cortés’ assertion that Garay’s men “had no discipline,” committed robbery and rape, and “wandered about like vagabonds”; infuriated, the Huastecs rose up, “and within a short time had killed and eaten four hundred Spaniards.” In a deserted town, Cortés’ forces found the weapons and clothing of Garay’s forces hanging as votive trophies in the temples, “and their faces, flayed and tanned and still wearing their beards, fastened to the walls, a mourning sight, for some of them could be recognized. It was evident that the men of Pánuco

were as fierce and cruel as the Mexicans had said [.]” Gómara repeated the allegation of cannibalism, that the Huastecs “ate the Spaniards they had killed, and even hung their skins in the temples as mementoes or votive offerings.” In *Historia General de las Indias* Gómara links the putative ferocity of the Huastecs, who he calls “bravos and butchers” (my translation); their sacrifice and eating of the conquistadores, and making trophies of their skins; and “their cruel religion, or their religious cruelty” (my translation). Bernal Díaz reported that Sandoval’s forces, entering a temple, found “two faces which had been flayed, and the skin tanned like skin for gloves, the beards were left on, and they had been placed as offerings upon one of the altars.” He added, “Sandoval and all his soldiers were moved to pity by all this and it grieved them greatly.” In his *Historia General*, Herrara’s version of the discovery of the clothes, weapons, and preserved skins as trophies in the temples “moved their friends to tears” (my translation) and confirmed that the Huastecs were “so brave, and cruel” even by Mexican standards (my translation).91

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91 Lesley Byrd Simpson trans., ed., *Cortés: The Life of the Conqueror by his Secretary Francisco López de Gómara* (University of California Press, 1964), Chapters 153-156, pp. 305-312; Bernal Díaz, Alfred Percival Maudslay’s translation, cited in Erik Seeman, *Death in the New World: Cross-Cultural Encounters, 1492-1800* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 51-52; Gómara, chapter XLVII: “Pánuco” (my italics): “Quiso rescatar en Panuco, mas no le dejaron los de aquel río, que son valientes y carníceros, antes lo maltrataron en Chila, comiéndose los españoles que mataron, y aun los desollaron y pusieron los cueros, después de bien curtidos, en los templos por memoria y ufania. […] y mataron los indios cuatrocientos españoles de aquéllos, muchos de los cuales fueron sacrificados y comidos, y sus cueros puestos por los templos, curtidos o embutidos; que tal es la cruel religión de aquellos, o la religiosa crueldad.”—in *Historia General de las Indias* (1552); Herrera, Decada III, Libro III, from Capítulo XVIII: “Que Diego Velázquez quiere yr (sic) contra Cortes, y Francisco de Garay armaua (sic) para yr a Pánuco, y Hernando Cortes yr a esta provincia, con exercito, y la pacifico” (my italics): “Durmieron aquella noche en un lugar sin gente, en cuyos templos hallaron colgados los vestidos, y armas de los Castellanos de Garay, y las caras con barbas desolladas, curtidos los cueros, y pegados por las paredes, y algunos fueron conocidos, que movieron a lagrimas a sus amigos; y biése hechó de ver que (q con acento) los Indios de Panuco, eran tan bravos, y cruels, como lo auian (sic) significado los Mexicanos, que los probaban en la guerra, que muy de ordinario tenian con ellos.” Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia General de los hechos de los Castellanos en las Islas, y Tierra firme del mar Oceano*. (Escrita por Antonio de Herrera, Coronista mayor de su Magestad de las indias, y su Coronista de Castilla. Decada Tercera.) en la Emplenta Real, edición de 1601.
Invasion becomes self-defense; Indian resistance becomes savage war; massacre and disproportionate revenge are claimed as justified. In early 1520, conquistadores marching inland from Vera Cruz to relieve the Iberians and their allies besieged within Tenochtitlán were ambushed near Texcoco. According to Cortés’ Third Letter, they later found, inside the temples, the tanned hides of five horses “and much clothing and other things belonging to the Spaniards” hung from the walls as trophies and votive offerings. During the final taking of Tenochtitlán in 1522, Cortés had “climbed that high tower which is close to the market, and there I found, as in other such towers, the heads of Christians as offerings to their idols, and also the heads of our Tascaltecan allies, for between them and the [Aztecs] there is a most ancient and bitter feud.” Díaz wrote with no small amount of outrage and horror, at least 35 years later, of what happened to those conquistadores who had not escaped during La Noche Triste:

…with stone knives they sawed open their chests and drew out their palpitating hearts and offered them to the idols that were there, and they kicked the bodies down the steps, and Indian butchers who were waiting below cut off the arms and feet and flayed the skin off the faces, and prepared it afterwards like glove leather with the beards on, and kept those for the festivals when they celebrated drunken orgies, and the flesh they ate in chilmole. [After the victory, Cuauhtemoc] sent to all the towns of our allies and friends and to their relations, the hands and feet of our soldiers and the flayed faces with the beards, and the heads of the horses that they had killed, and he sent word that more than half of us were dead and he would soon finish us off.92

Earlier in his text, Díaz justified the Cholula Massacre (1519) as a pre-emptive strike: their allies, the people of Cempoala, had assured them that the Cholulans were planning to betray them. Unmentioned is the possibility that the Cholulans manipulated them into massacring

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the Cempoalans; Díaz assures his readers that the Cholulans “had already prepared the pots with salt and peppers and tomatoes.” Furthermore, “prisons of thick wooden beams which we found in the city, which were full of Indians and boys being fattened” for sacrifice and eating, implying that such people are so inhuman that they cannot be trusted.93

After the victory, the spoils. In the case of the Pánuco campaign, Cortés wrote of the conquistadores finding a graffito in charcoal on the wall of a Huastec house, reading “Here the unhappy Juan Yuste was held prisoner.” Cortés called this “Surely a sight fit to break the hearts of all who saw it.” Indian hubris then met Spanish nemesis: Sandoval and the allied Indians who then seized the town “took many women and children as slaves.” Gómara writes that the punitive expedition recouped the losses of 12 horses in the mountains en route to Pánuco by selling 200 Huastecs into slavery; later, when Nuño de Guzmán was made governor of Pánuco in 1527, notes Gómara, he and his eighty men “castigated these Indians for their sins, and made many of them slaves” (my translation).94

In 1549, Las Casas’ reports of successes in the peaceful conversion of Mayans in his bishopric of Chiapa (1543-46) had won over Crown support for a Dominican mission to evangelise La Florida, already ravaged repeatedly by slave-hunters and a graveyard for the expeditions of Juan Ponce de León (1514 and 1521), Pánfilo de Narváez (1528), and

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93 Cortés, Pagden trans., Third Letter, 183-85; Díaz, Carrasco trans., 135-44 (on Cholula), on cannibalism and Mexican religion as synonymous: 6, 7, 81, 91, 103, 135, 140, 144, 171, 178, 181.
Hernando de Soto (1539-43); these conquistadores had, in the later words of Dávila Padilla, “made the name of Christians loathsome with their cruelties, and the law of Christ suspicious for the infidels” (my translation). Even the promulgator of the mission, Luis Cáncer de Barbastro, who was granted 800 ducats of royal funding with which to purchase ten tons of trade goods as incentive for friendly relations with the Indians, could not quite believe his good fortune: “All Seville is surprised at this undertaking,” noted Cáncer in a letter shortly before departure; “those who most fear God approve of it; others think that we are going to the slaughter-house.” Going ashore in the Tampa Bay area in late May or early June 1549, friar Cáncer, along with friar Diego Peñalosa de Tolosa and a Dominican lay brother known only as Fuentes were beaten to death with clubs. According to Gómara (1552), the other expeditionaries were then informed by Johan or Juan Muñoz, a former page of Soto who had been held captive by the Indians for several years, “how the Indians put the skins of the heads of the friars with their crowns in a temple”.¹⁵ The incident was reported in Peter Martyr’s

Decadas anthology, and from here was transmitted into English via Richard Eden’s 1555 translation:

…[the Indians] caryed hym [Cáncer] away with three other of his companyons and dyd eate them, whereby they suffered martyrdom for the fayth of Chryst. […] There came of late from that shyppe, one that had byn the page of Ferdinando de Soto, who declared that the Indians hanged up the skynnes with the heades and crownes of the sayd fryers in one of theyr temples.

The English slave trader John Hawkins’ 1565 account of his travels along coastal North America, reprinted in Hakluyt, repeats a variation of this story as evidence that the as-yet-unconquered Floridians were “of more savage and fierce nature, and more valiant than any of the rest”: “of their cruelty mention is made in the booke of the Decades [Peter Martyr], of a frier [sic], who taking upon them to persuade the people to subjection, was by them taken, and his skin cruelly pulled over his eares, and his flesh eaten.”

Subsequent descriptions of the Tampa Bay martyrdoms by Las Casas’ fellow Dominicans would show two major trends: replacing scalping with images of cannibals drinking from skulls, and offering post facto rationalizations for these actions as rational, if bizarre. P. Alonso Hernandez, in Historia eclesiástica de Nuestros Tiempos (1611), says only that the victorious Indians “danced and made a festival in honour of their gods for delivering them their enemies, the Spaniards” (my translation). Antonio de Remesal, in Historia… de Chyapa y Guatemala (1619), explained that the Indians believed the Dominicans to be spies and so, after slaying them, brought them to their great Cacique, “so that he might look at the form of

96 From Edward Arber ed., The first Three English books on America. [?1511] – 1555 A.D., Being chiefly Translations, Compilations, &c., by RICHARD EDEN, from the Writings, Maps, &c., of Pietro Martire, of Anghiera, Sebastian Munster, the Cosmographer, Sebastian Cabot, of Bristol, With Extracts, &c., from the Works of other Spanish, Italian, and German Writers of the Time (Birmingham, 1885), 346.
their habits and crowns, to understand that they offered him the heads more or less for his pleasure.” The Cacique, on the contrary, was very displeased—Remesal states that he had wanted to converse with the priests personally—and “to commemorate the memory of their deaths ordered them skinned, and their skins to be nailed to the walls of his house, and the heads stuffed with cotton and hung from a tree and they ate the flesh at a great banquet, after much dancing and celebrating.” Remesal added that Soto’s unnamed page had seen the walls of the cacique’s house “decorated with the skins of the priests, by the habits which they displayed, by the crowns which they had made into the stuffed skins of which they made the skulls into vessels for drinking” (my translation, my emphases). Dávila Padilla’s account, a full 70 years after the events it describes, has reworked them further per the hagiographical genre: Muñoz explains that God, in His mercy, has permitted him to live among the Indians completely unmolested, giving him perfect understanding of their language and thus allowing him to explain the fates of the missionaries. Rather than having them scalped, flayed, or cannibalized, “they cut off the heads of the three, and took them to present to the lord the great Cacique, who was in the land, and drank with the skulls in vengeance on their enemies: it was in this exercise that they dealt with the heads” (my translation, my italics). Yet Padilla notes that the Indians, driven from their villages into the hills and forests by conquistadores, had a legitimate grievance—which, unfortunately, fell on the missionaries.98

98 P. Alonzo Fernandez, Historia eclesiástica de Nuestros Tiempos (Impressos del Rey, 1611); Fray Antonio de Remesal, Historia de la provincia de S. Vicente de Chyapa y Guatemala de la orden de nro glorioso padre Sancto Domingo: escriuense juntamente los principios de las demás provincias desda religión de las yndias occidentales, y la secular de la gouernacion de Guatemala… (por Francisco de Angulo, 1619), From Complutense University of Madrid, digitized 21 Nov. 2009. Hubert Howe Bancroft’s translation of Remesal (my italics): the cacique “caused the skins of the victims to be stripped off and stretched upon the walls of his house, while their heads were stuffed with cotton and suspended from a tree.”—in History of the Pacific States of North America vol. II: Central America, vol. II, 1530-1800 (San Francisco: A.L. Bancroft & Company, 1883), 356-57; Fray Augustín Dávila Padilla, Historia de la Fundación y Discurso de la provincia, de Santiago de Mexico de la orden de predicadores: por las vidas de sus varones insignes y casos Notables de Nueva España. Por el Maestro FRAY AUGUSTIN DAVILA PADILLA. Al Príncipe de España DON FELIPE nuestro...
Similar amendments appeared in the martyrdoms of two Jesuits in the Chesapeake Bay in February 1571. In 1570, on the orders of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, governor of Cuba, eight Jesuits led by fathers Juan Bautista de Segura and Luís de Quirós were sent to missionize the Bahía de Santa María (Chesapeake Bay) and the surrounding land of Ajacán, as part of a plan to seize the Strait of Anián, believed by Spanish geographers to be the route to the Pacific. The expedition’s guide, assistant, and interpreter was to be a youth from a high-ranking Virginia Algonquian group, possibly Paspahegh, who had been groomed as an elite intermediary since 1561, but the young man who had left his people as Paquiquineo and returned as Don Luís, godson of the viceroy Luís de Velasco, was not as pliable or undivided in his loyalties as the Jesuits seemed to believe. Sent with two Dominican friars and 37 soldiers from Cuba to colonize Ajacán in 1566, he had scuppered the expedition by pretending not to know the route into the Bay. During the 1570 mission, he scandalized the Jesuits by returning to his brother’s village some 20 miles away, taking multiple wives, and trying to reclaim his hereditary rank, suggesting the attack February 1571 may have been a decisive test of his loyalties. In August 1572, Menéndez’s punitive expedition recovered the catechist, Alonso de Olmos, who had been living among the Indians, and hanged eight or nine Paspahegh men from the yardarm in retribution, but Don Luís was never seen again.99

Erik Seeman notes a tendency towards “increasingly baroque” details of the martyrdoms. The earliest account, by the Jesuit Juan Rogel, describes Don Luís personally killing Father

señor. Edición segunda. EN BRUSSELAS. En casa de IVAN DE MEERBEQUE, MDCXXV [1625]. (Digitized by Google, Ghent University, 9 November 2010), pp. 177-189.
Quirós with an arrow, then the other two Jesuits, then leading “a large group” of Indians into the Jesuit village and killing Father Segura with an axe. But he ordered the Jesuits to be buried without posthumous mutilation, and took no trophies from their bodies. In the 1600 account of Father Carrera, Don Luis had left the priests “all naked and cut to pieces,” but “wept copiously over them” and called them martyrs. In a 1610 account, the Indians ordered the priests to bless themselves before killing them, and then behaved like Scythians:

“Fashioning their skulls into cups, [the Indians] waved them about in their drunken feasts.”

The continued importance of the skull-cup, paired with drunkenness, as a sign of primitive cruelty recurs as late as Andrés Pérez de Ribas’ 1645 account of a martyrdom in the modern Mexican state of Sinaloa, which Ribas pairs with specifically North American imageries of scalping and dismemberment. In 1594, a Chichimec holy man named Nacabeba blamed disease epidemics on Jesuit baptisms and led a raiding party which killed the Jesuit Gonzalo de Tapia. Ribas begins by describing the Chichimecas as “beasts more ferocious than the lions and bears whose jaws David and Sampson had disjointed,” citing as evidence their “scalping their enemies and cutting off their heads,” feet, and arms in ways which “resembled multitudes of demons in Hell”. Ribas describes how Nacabeba and nine Chichimecs ambushed and slew Father Tapia with axes and clubs, and then cut off his head and left arm; because he had used that arm to say Mass, they attempted to roast it on a barbecue, implying, as Jorge Cañizares-Esgurra notes, an intention to mock the Eucharist and principle of transubstantiation. But God stymied the man-eaters: the arm’s flesh did not roast, and they contented themselves by flaying it and stuffing it with straw, then donning the priest’s stolen vestments and “dr[inking] wine from the skull of that holy head” during “a
great victory celebration,” accompanied by “dances, drunkenness, and superstition” (Reff et. al. translation).

**Epilogue: comparative barbarisms**

Worn out from three years of constant war, the adelantado Hernando de Soto died of fever on the west bank of the Mississippi in May 1542. According to the testimony of an anonymous Portuguese knight known as ‘The Gentleman of Elvas,’ the conquistadores feared the consequences if Soto’s claim to be an immortal son of the Sun was disproven. Disinterring his body, they wrapped it in blankets weighed down with sand, and after nightfall sunk his corpse into the middle of the Mississippi. Inca Garcilaso tells a slightly different story. The Indians had already rejected the conquistadores’ pretensions to godhood and had vowed to treat these brigands and “wandering thieves” as European rulers would: to kill them, dismember them, impale their decapitated heads, and use the trees as gibbets to hang their quartered bodies and limbs. For fear of the adelantado’s posthumous dishonour, his men disinterred him by night, placed him in a coffin made from the hollow bole of an oak, and sunk this improvised coffin beneath the Mississippi. This was, writes The Inca, “similar in almost all respects to those which the Goths, who were ancestors of the Spaniards, gave one thousand one hundred and thirty-one years before” to their king Alaric, who died of fever in Calabria following the sack of Rome in 410.

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Garcilaso’s out-of-left-field comparison between the conquistadores and the Visigoths had two potential meanings. On one hand, the Goths were a warrior people who had battled Huns, Romans, and rival German tribes and carved out a kingdom for themselves in southern France and Spain. Many of the noble families of Spain could trace their descent to Gothic landowners, though this was contested; according to the Romanized-Gothic historian Jordanes’ 6th century *Getica*, the Goths had originated in the Baltic before moving south into Poland and Romania, and rediscovery of Jordanes in the 1430s sparked an international debate between Spanish and Swedish historians as to who were more worthy heirs. But the Goths were also barbarian destroyers; antique sources had lumped them together with other trans-Danubian Europeans as “Scythians,” with all the wild opprobrium that that implied.102

To clarify his intentions to his readers, The Inca called Alaric a “famous prince” whose people who had performed “heroic feats,” and in case they weren’t aware of the pagan splendour of Alaric’s funeral as written by Jordanes, he repeated it “that the similarity may be seen more clearly”. After the Gothic king’s death, his weeping followers diverted the Busento River, interred him with the richest spoils of the sack of Rome, and then returned the waters to their natural flow—after killing the slaves, so his burial place would remain secret for all time. On the surface, Inca Garcilaso’s reference to the warlike “Scythian” Goths

102 Varner and Varner, *Florida of the Inca*, 501-06; Franklin Daniel Scott, *Sweden: The Nation’s History* (Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 11, 115; Arne Søby Christiansen, *Cassiodorus Jordanes and the History of the Goths: Studies in a Migration Myth* (Museum Tusculanum Press: University of Copenhagen, 2002), 1-21; In Jordanes’ *Origins and Deeds of the Goths* (AD 551), the burial of Alaric beneath a diverted river (XXX.158) and the burial of Attila on the Hungarian plain (XLIX.258) share the same traits: the graves of both are heaped with the spoils of decades of war, and the diggers are executed so they cannot reveal the burial place. See also Peter Heather, *The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 341-42, 351-60.
reminded his patriotic Iberian readers of their long history of martial glory. Taken from another angle, though, a critique of Spanish imperialism emerges: what difference was there, really, between armed nobodies from Extremadura and other Iberian backwaters who raped, pillaged, mutilated, and enslaved the peoples of the New World, and those ancient freebooters from beyond the Danube who had drunk from their enemies’ skulls, used their scalps as napkins, and burned down the Eternal City?
Chapter Two: “A Trophy of their Victory”: 16th and 17th century accounts of scalping

No one is forced into war by ignorance; nor, if he thinks he will gain from it, is he kept out of it by fear. The fact is that one side thinks that the profits to be won outweigh the risks to be incurred, and the other side is ready to face danger rather than accept an immediate loss. –Thucydides (ca. 404 B.C.), IV.4.59

Introduction: an emerging Indian-war paradigm in early North America

The approaches of a dozen different authors and illustrators towards scalping in the 16th and 17th centuries, namely, Jacques Cartier, Agustín Dávila Padilla, Ulrich Schmiedel, René Goulaine de Laudonnière, Marc Lescarbot, Samuel de Champlain, John Smith, Gabriel Sagard, André Thévet, Jacques le Moyne des Morgues, Theodor de Bry, and Harmen Mayndertsz van den Bogaert, are examined in this survey chapter. A broad consensus sketched the outline of a North American paradigm of warfare, in which scalps were a sign of achieved victory and vengeance. While European warfare held the seizure of land (failing that, movable property like livestock and specie) as its primary goal, North American warfare was aimed at satisfying feuds and taking prisoners; the ability to make war and the right to go to war was widely held among the male population of indigenous communities, and participated in to varying degrees by the women and younger members of the community; indigenous warfare was ‘irregular’ by European definition, preferring ambush, stratagem, and deceit over pitched field battles, and with considerable free agency retained by individual war leaders to recruit for expeditions and by their followers to join or withdraw at will.

That North American indigenous warfare differed in distinct ways from the prevailing norm in Europe required a battery of interpretive strategies Neil Whitehead summarizes as

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mimesis and alterity: stressing the similarities or differences, real and imagined, between European and indigenous North American methods, goals, definitions, etc., which is to say the in-commensurability between the two. Analogy was one tool of similarity, as when medieval Christians assumed that Muslims worshipped Mohammad in the same way that Christians worshipped Christ, as were the paired processes of attachment and detachment: removing a concept from its original context, or physically removing an object from the cultural matrix in which it initially bore meanings, and conceptually or physically likening it to a new set of meanings or an alien cultural context. As Anthony Pagden notes, the ethnographies resulting from this process could reveal little more than what Europeans wanted to believe. Such a process led Oviedo, a Spanish historian particularly bigoted towards Indians, to declare that since the Taínos practiced polygamy as the ancient Greeks described the Thracians, their neighbours northwards in the Balkans, it followed that the repulsive practices Greeks attributed to the Thracians, such as sacrificing foreign visitors to the gods and holding banquets where children were cannibalized, must be practiced by 16th century Taínos. Anthony Pagden notes that such actions render the original indigenous ideas and practices unintelligible to their original actors; as noted in Chapter 1, such Savagist processes would have rendered these Greek conclusions unintelligible to Thracians of the 5th century BC as well. Such acts of decontextualization, notes Peter Mason, create the Exotic, a sign of an opaque Other which is really an illusion or pseudo-Other. But if the similarities created in these processes were not, in fact, real, they could at least provide a bridge to cooperation, in the same way that imagined and real incommensurabilities could exacerbate tensions and mutual suspicions.104

104 On analogy, see Edward Said, Orientalism, 53-59; Whitehead introduction, The Discoverie of the Large, Rich, and Bewtiful Empyre of Guiana by Sir Walter Ralegh, 1-110; Pagden, European Encounters with the New
Prologue: Misinformation and myths-in-formation in the Atlantic world

In the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, European explorers in North America described, in text and illustration, their encounters with the outré customs of the Indians, including the taking and displaying of scalps. While this chapter focuses on dissecting the meanings that early modern Europeans derived from or applied to these encounters, a prefatory comment should be made regarding the ideas that convinced Europeans to venture into unfamiliar Atlantic spaces, particularly the idea of encounter itself. Nervous explorers, and nervous investors in colonial ventures, could take heart from the myths which arose out of the Iberian encounter: the myth of Indians who imagined Europeans to be gods, at least at first glance, and the conquistador myth which promised that wealthy, centralized indigenous empires could be easily conquered by relatively small armies of Europeans. These myths cast a long shadow: Sir Francis Drake, writing of his encounter with indigenous Californians in 1579, described “signifying unto them we were no Gods, but men.” Alas, despite his best efforts, “nothing could persuade them, nor remove that opinion which they had conceived of us, that wee should be gods.”

In 1633 the Jesuit Paul Le Jeune recorded a story of first contact between the French and the Innu, told him by a convert named Pierre Pastedechouan, in which the prevailing tones were not the worshipful awe of the white-god fantasy but monstrousness and dread.


Pierre described a story, often told by his grandmother, of how four canoes of Innu paddled out to welcome the strangers to their village, which fizzled since neither side could understand the other. The French gave them a barrel of biscuit, which the Innu dumped into the ocean upon returning to shore. The all-male European crew wearing cuirasses, eating hardtack and drinking wine gave first impressions of the French as “prodigious and horrible” creatures who “were dressed in iron, ate bones, and drank blood,” or “ate wood and drank blood.” The wooden ship offered the Innu a name for these unprecedented people, which Le Jeune transcribed as ouemichtigouchiou, “a man who works in wood, or who is in a canoe or vessel of wood.” Other stories removed the sting of ontological uncertainty with prophecy narratives that placed Europeans on the previously-unknown edges of an indigenous universe, as when Black Hawk described a mutual first contact between the Sauk and the French in his 1833 autobiography. After his great-grandfather, Thunder, had dreamed for four years that he would meet a white man, the Great Spirit had directed him to take his two brothers and travel east to a designated spot. Here they met a self-identified son of the King of France who took Thunder by the hand, welcomed him into his tent, and told him that he, too, had been guided in his dreams for four years: the Great Spirit had directed him to come to this very spot to meet a nation who had never yet seen a white man.106

Both Europeans and indigenous peoples tried to reconcile the unprecedented other with pre-existing narratives, frameworks, and predictive words, a process Judith Binney referred to as plereomatic history and which John Sutton Lutz notes is well-attested, as

“intertextuality,” in European accounts of first contacts. In the anxiety of these encounters with the unknown, the possibility that these other people were monstrous offered some consolation to both Europeans and indigenous peoples, if only because such categories of analysis would render them familiar, and therefore understandable. These reference points were congruent, but not identical. A legend in Puerto Rico, recorded in Benzoni’s *Historia del Novo Mondo* (1565), that a conquistador named Diego Salcedo was drowned by a Boricua cacique to empirically disprove Spanish claims of divinity, is probably not true—as it reifies the myth that Indians took Europeans for gods in the first place—but points to indisputable historical trends. After initial uncertainty, indigenous North Americans seem to have determined that Europeans were just strange, shaggy humans with useful trade goods, and their ethnonyms for Europeans reflect this: the Mohawks called the Dutch *assirioni* (makers of cloth) or *charistooni* (ironsmiths); the French were called *agnonha* (people of iron) by the Hurons and *mistogoche* (wooden boats) by the Innu. Osage histories of the late 17th century recall the first two French traders as *I’n-Shta-Heh* (heavy eyebrows) whose obsequious attentions to buffalo robes reminded them of camp dogs fawning during butchering and whose whistling unnerved them, “since only ghosts whistled.”

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Europeans, on the other hand, envisioned indigenous peoples as Golden Agers, man-eaters, or wild men, encapsulated in terms like “savage” and “cannibal,” with associated imageries of stigmatized and primordial violence involving cruel dismemberment. The Savagist myths at the heart of the denial of coeval status found new expression and strength in the burgeoning social sciences of the Renaissance, which paired the discovery of the Americas with the rediscovery of the Classical world through widening literacy and the printing press. Reprints of such ancient writers as Herodotus, Livy, Ovid, Pliny, Strabo, Tacitus, and others, in Latin or in modern Spanish, German, Italian, French and English, were paired with fanciful illustrations of the ancient barbarians described within. National ancestors like Britons, Germanic tribes, Gauls, and Celtiberians were increasingly depicted in the same visual language as the peoples of the New World: heroically nude, wearing animal pelts, painted and tattooed. Meanwhile, neoclassical conventions of heroic nudity were being applied to indigenous Americans, reinforcing a simple and lateral comparison between the peoples of contemporary America and the Europeans of centuries past. For some European writers, description of primitive peoples past and present was inseparable from broader questions of human origins and human nature: had human beings declined from the autarkic conditions of the Golden Age to the violent acquisitiveness of the present, a Saturnian myth signalled artistically by happy, physically-idealized people frolicking in lush, blossoming landscapes? Or was the Promethean myth of an incremental climb from a bestial state, visually expressed by placing ragged humans in tattered pelts against rocky and barren landscapes, more accurate? Was exotic American violence to be interpreted as lamentable,

but understandable signs of primordial valour, or evidence of human wretchedness in the absence of the state?  

In Europe, deployment of Golden Age and Savagist myths onto peoples in the Atlantic was by no means new. The myth of the Isles of the Blessed, where Saturn and the conditions of the Golden Age still reigned, were identified by Greek and Roman geographers with the Canary Islands; by reporting spontaneously-generated crops, grapevines, and fruit trees on the Canaries, St. Isidore of Seville’s 8th-century account had continued this tradition into the Christian era. While the peoples of the Canaries, named Guanches during the 14th-century Iberian conquest, were subdivided between stratified agrarian societies and egalitarian hunter-gatherers, the latter prevailed in late medieval accounts and artistic depictions. Alluding to Ovid’s attribution of the decline from the Golden Age to the Iron Age to “destructive iron and harmful gold” in *Metamorphoses* 1.150-57, Boccaccio’s *De Canaria* (1341) described four Guanches taken captive to Lisbon as totally ignorant of precious metals and swords, yet “very intelligent,” egalitarian, “cheerful and lively and quite sociable – more so than many Spaniards are.” Petrarch agreed they were morally superior to civilized Europeans yet declared them “little better than beasts.” Felix Hemmerlin, a canon of Zurich, claimed pirates had described how Guanches “were wrapped in raw hides, howled like dogs, had flat faces like monkeys, and ate raw food,” as well as having sex in public, holding

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women in common, and giving birth like “other brute beasts.” Hemmerlin disapprovingly cited Ovid to draw comparisons to that touchstone of barbarism, Scythia, “where men live in a beastly and cruel fashion, deeply differing from the way of life of all men.” But as a Dominican, he also tried to extemporize for *topoi* of barbarism taken at face value, suggesting that the Guanches’ holding women in common was simply primitive communism taken too far.109

In October 1589, the Spanish sea captain Francisco de Cuéllar wrote an account of his experiences while shipwrecked in the North Atlantic in 1588. There he had found “savages” whose “custom” was “to live as the brute beasts” among “very rugged” mountains:

They live in huts made of straw… They cover themselves with “mantas” [blankets, cloaks] and wear their hair down to their eyes… The chief inclination of these people, is to be robbers, and to plunder each other… They have therefore, no other remedy but to withdraw themselves to the mountains, with their women and cattle; for they possess no other property, nor more moveables nor clothing. They sleep upon the ground, on rushes, newly cut and full

of water and ice… The most of the women are very beautiful, but badly dressed… In short, in this Kingdom there is neither justice nor right, and everybody does what he pleases.110

These pastoral nomads beyond civilization were Gaelic Irish cattleherders and tenant farmers, subjects of a longstanding defamatory trend founded in Strabo’s assertion (1st century AD) that the Irish were more wild than the Britons, habitual practitioners of cannibalism and incest. The 12th century Welsh-Norman Geraldus Cambrensis had described the Irish as wandering pastoralists living “like beasts,” and similar traditions among the English and Scots Lowlanders coloured Gaelic-speaking Scots highlanders in similar terms of pastoralism, brigandage, and degeneracy. During a stay in Dublin and Armagh in 1517, Francesco Chiericati, papal nuncio to England, repeated Strabo’s calumny word-for-word: “I have heard that in places farther north people are more uncivilized, going about nude, living in mountain caves and eating raw meat.”111

In the Elizabethan era, the image of the Scythians was used to depict the Irish both as rootless nomads and unhinged man-eaters. William Harrison, in The Description of Britain (1587), called them “the most Scithian-like and barbarous nation,” identified them with the Anthropophagi, and claimed they “used to feed on the buttocks of [boys] and women’s paps, as delicate dishes.” In A View of the Present State of Ireland (1596), Edmund Spenser proposed that Scythians were the direct ancestors of the people of western Ireland, not Gauls and Britons as in the south and east; hence their “Scythian barbarisme” and “licentious barbarisme.” Fynes Moryson (1617) accused Irish herdsmen of “delighting in this roguish

110 Audrey Horning, Ireland in the Virginian Sea: Colonialism in the Virginian Atlantic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), Cuellar, Moryson, Spencer, and Chiericati cited 31-35, 92 (Cuéllar’s experiences indicate the political disunity of the Irish north: “he was welcomed by O’Rourkes, rejected by the O’Cahans, and alternatively housed and robbed by Irish peasants.”).
life,” “free from the hand of justice” to commit robberies and depredations. These were not new ideas (see Chapter 1) but the lexicon of barbarism was shifting westwards, as indicated by Cuellar’s use of the Ibero-American neologism salvajes (savages) to describe Irish primitivism. Where salvaje went, canibal was not far behind: in 1612 Sir John Davies, the Attorney General of Ireland, disparaged the Irish as “little better than cannibals, who do hunt one another.” By 1649, pro-Commonwealth newspaper editorials were describing Irish rebels not only as “bloud-quaffing cannibals,” but also as “more bruitish than the Indians.”

What were such trans-Atlantic encounters like from the other side of the frontier? In Mexico, a proliferation of Nahuatl accounts a generation after the Conquest describe their ancestors’ initial shocked and awed descriptions of galleons, metal armour, gunpowder, mastiffs and war horses, and their subsequent sufferings at the hands of capricious and cruel conquistadores. Camilla Townsend astutely notes that teotl (plural teteu’), the Nahuatl term which the Spanish glossed as teules or “gods,” is ambivalent, referring literally to an other-than-human being which can, in context, be a deity, a demon, or a god-impersonator who embodies a representation of the deity they’re slated to be sacrificed to. In Townsend’s analysis, calling the conquistadores teteu’ was meant to characterize them as “capricious immortals” and “bizarre sorcerers,” not awe-inspiring objects of worship. Bernal Díaz unwittingly alludes to this in boasting of how the Cholula massacre struck fear into their Indian enemies: “if we had a reputation for valour before, from now on they took us for

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sorcerers.” Nahuatl sources, in addition to describing such massacres as at Cholula or Pedro de Alvarado’s May 1520 “massacre of the dancers” at a festival of Huitzilopochtli at the Great Temple, as unprovoked preemptive strikes, suggest in text and illustration their own Savagist perception of the conquistadores’ exotic, inexplicable behaviour. In text and art, the unprecedented capacity of Spanish swords to lop off heads and limbs recurs, and the Spanish seizure of gold, to pay the soldiers and the king’s royal fifth, becomes obsessive and bestial: “They picked up the gold and fingered it like monkeys; […] they hungered like pigs for that gold.” That the Nahuas called Alvarado Tonatiuh, like Huitzilopochtli one of the divine incarnations of the sun, also suggests the demonic rather than the divine: in Nahua thought the Sun in his various incarnations was a ferocious and implacable warrior.\footnote{“like monkeys…hungered like pigs”: Miguel León-Portilla, English translator Lysander Kemp, Nahuatl translator Ángel María Garibay K., The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006 [1961]), 51; On swords, see John F. Guilmartin, Jr., “The Cutting Edge: An Analysis of the Spanish Invasion and Overthrow of the Inca Empire, 1532-1539,” in Kenneth J. Andrien and Rolena Adorno, eds., Transatlantic Encounters: Europeans and Andeans in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 40-69, and Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest, 142-43; Townsend, “Burying the White Gods”, 659-87; Inga Clendinnen, “‘Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty’: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico,” in Stephen Greenblatt ed., New World Encounters (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 12-47.}

Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, royal treasurer and chief constable for Pánfilo de Narváez’s 1527 expedition to colonize the mainland of La Florida, experienced something of the subjectivities of the other side of the frontier in his nine-year odyssey from shipwreck in coastal Texas to his eventual overland return to Mexico City. Through a series of inversions of the usual Indian-conquistador binaries—“it is the conquistadores who eat each other, undergo a complete loss of material civilization, suffer a political and ethical breakdown, and depend on Indian knowledge for survival,” notes José Rabasa—Cabeza de Vaca’s fortunes shift from slaveowning Spanish hidalgo to owned slave of the Indians, from Indian-slaying...
conquistador to Indian-saving folk healer, and, in his own estimation at least, from a killer to an evangelist. These reversals he attributes to the Indians themselves in a standoff between Diego de Guzmán and his slave-hunting conquistadores, and Cabeza de Vaca and his three remaining companions, in the Río Yaqui region in 1536:

[The Indians said that] we [i.e., Cabeza de Vaca and companions] came from where the sun rose, and they [Guzmán’s slave hunters] from where it set; and that we cured the sick, and that they killed those who were well; and that we came naked and barefoot, and that they went about dressed and on horses and with lances; and that we did not covet anything but rather, everything they gave us we later returned and remained with nothing, and that the others had no objective but to steal everything they found.  

Considering that Guzmán’s forces were the first other Europeans that Cabeza de Vaca and his companions had seen since 1527, a reading of his account in reverse chronological order reveals a Spanish presence that becomes more unreal and monstrous the further in time and space we go. In 1536, in the Río Yaqui region, their meeting with Guzmán followed an encounter with the aftermath of one of his slaving expeditions three years prior: afraid to return to their villages and cornfields, the locals, emaciated and reduced to eating roots and bark, told the four travellers that half their men and all the women and boys had been carried off. In a village in Sonora around Christmas 1535, they saw relics of Spanish weapons of war threaded on an Indian man’s necklace: an iron horseshoe nail and the iron buckle of a swordbelt. Long before any Iberians were seen, Cabeza de Vaca relates hearing many references to them as as *hijos del sol* (sons of the sun) and *gente del cielo* (people of the sky),

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or people of the heavens); as Rolena Adorno notes, this does not necessarily imply endorsement of the “white god” myth, at least on the Indians’ part, but only that such unprecedented and odd people might well have come from another world, like the rampaging extraterrestrials of 20th-century science fiction.115

At the furthest geographical and temporal remove in Cabeza de Vaca’s text, during the winter of 1534-35 on the Texas side of the Río Grande’s “big bend,” Cabeza de Vaca was told by their hosts the Avavares of being visited, or attacked, by what sounds like a demonic personification of Europeans’ contradictory messages and actions: promising eternal life while maiming and killing. The Avavares, related Cabeza de Vaca, simply named this entity *Mala Cosa*, “Evil Thing,” and described it as a short, bearded man who would not accept their food if offered, and identified his point of origin by pointing to the earth “and [saying] his home was there below.” Appearing without warning, sometimes during Indian ceremonies and sometimes dressed as a woman, Mala Cosa’s powers included the ability to send a hut into the air and ride it to the ground, but his attacks on the domestic sanctity of Indian villages were not restricted to property damage. Breaking through the walls of a family’s home, bearing a torch in one hand and a long flint knife in the other, Mala Cosa would select and seize a man and cut open his side with his knife. He then pulled out his victim’s entrails and cut out a piece to throw into the fire, then selected an arm, lacerated it in three places, and severed it at the elbow. He would then pass his hand over the wounded parts and restore all as it was before.116

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Mala Cosa was so frightening, said the Avavares, that he set onlookers to trembling and their hair to stand on end; they had not seen him since 1519 or 1520, but the healers were shown scars on the Indians’ bodies which they attested had come from these attacks. And the Avavares, like other peoples of Texas in Cabeza de Vaca’s account, were quite capable of defending themselves against enemies they understood. While not explicitly mentioning scalping, he points the way towards its treatment in 16th century texts with his descriptions of Indian warfare as both skillful and cruel. Recalling his service in Italy, then a battleground for rival European powers, he says the peoples of the Gulf Coast and Texas “are as astute in guarding themselves from their enemies as if they had been reared in Italy in a time of continuous war.” He adds, with some vagueness, “Whenever any of these people have particular enmity, they snare and kill each other at night, […] and inflict great cruelties on one another.” The image of indigenous North American warfare that emerges from the authors surveyed in this chapter, like Cabeza de Vaca, was perceived as less like licit European warfare, with fanfares and pitched field battles, than the forms of violence the early modern state was attempting to proscribe: feuds and vendettas, brigandage, murders, and kidnappings. Scalping may not have been specifically on Cabeza de Vaca’s mind, but he and other authors surveyed here sketched an intermediate phase in European images of America: between the primordial war imagined in the Iberian Americas (see Chapter 1), and the scalping paradigm that would emerge in British North America.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ José Rabasa, Writing Violence on the Northern Frontier, 31-83, “reversals of the stock images” (33-35), “stock New World images” (52), on cannibalism (“the Indians embody European values” 63, 78-80), “resistance has no place” (80); Adorno, “The Navigation of Fear in Cabeza de Vaca’s Naufragios”; Chipman, entry "Cabeza De Vaca, Alvar Nunez’; Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 119-26; Chapter Twenty-Four (“About the Customs of the Indians of that Land”), 85-86, in Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca (1555 edition), Martin A. Favata and José B. Fernández trans., The Account: Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca’s Relación (Houston, TX: Arte Público Press, 1993), 85-86. “From the time of first European contact with American Indians, Europeans had viewed Native Americans as peculiarly warlike people. Europeans were fascinated and
Accounts of North American scalping and warfare in the 16th and 17th centuries

In the tradition of Herodotus’ express purpose to examine the praiseworthy deeds of both Greeks and barbarians during the Persian Wars, The Inca set out to demonstrate that, just as the Inca lords he claimed descent from matrilineally had had their own glorious military heritage before the Spanish conquest, so too were the Indians of Florida worthy foes and valiant adversaries. Early in his account of the Soto expedition to conquer North America’s Southeast, La Florida del Inca (1605), he banishes the spectre of the cannibal warrior by noting the revulsion Cabeza de Vaca reported when the Indians discovered the shipwrecked conquistadores’ starvation cannibalism. While he couldn’t rule out the possibility that cannibalism occurred somewhere else in North America, “for Florida is so broad and long that there is space within it for anything to happen,” he could safely conclude that the peoples of “the provinces our Governor discovered […] abominate this practice.” Describing the first battles between the Soto expedition and the peoples of Florida, he explained to his readers that he saw no contradiction in describing Florida’s Indian warriors as knights or cavaliers (lit. ‘caballeros’) though they had no horses, “since in Spain this term implies a nobleman and since there is a nobility among the Indians”. To emphasize the Floridians’ martial prowess and pride in terms readily legible to a contemporary Spanish-language audience while also reminding his readers of his mestizaje, The Inca used the Quechua term ‘curaca’ to denote the leaders of Floridian polities, rather than the Caribbean loanword ‘cacique’: both, noted The Inca, signified “lord of vassals,” but “since I am a Peruvian Indian […], I feel it my privilege to introduce into this work certain words of my terrorized by aspects of warfare they associated with Indians, including raids, scalping, torture, giving captives no quarter, and attacking in winter. Europeans associated these forms of warfare with those of their ancestors, as characteristics of “primitive” peoples for whom warfare was sport or the product of feuds.” Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 172.
own language so as to make it clear that I am a native of Peru and not of some other land.”
As with his clear distinctions regarding the inapplicability of cannibal-warrior imagery to Florida, The Inca sets out to remind his readers that considerable difference exists under the umbrella term “Indian.”

With this in mind, The Inca sets out to demonstrate to his readers that the Indians are rational human beings like themselves. His summation of the nature of war in the American Southeast, in its familiar and alien dimensions, comes fairly late in the text, after describing the Soto expedition’s having become involved or enlisted in the wars of one indigenous polity against another in their odyssey from Tampa Bay to the Mississippi. Since “almost all of the provinces that these Spaniards traversed were at war with each other,” notes The Inca, a synthesis of the commonalities that made Southeastern warfare unique “would be appropriate”:

One should know that this was not a conflict of force against force with an organized army or with pitched battles, except in rare instances, or a conflict instigated by the lust and ambition of some lords to seize the estates of others. Their struggle was one of ambush and subtlety in which they attacked each other on fishing or hunting trips and in their fields and along their roads wherever they could find an enemy off guard. And those whom they seized on such occasions, they held as slaves, some in perpetual bondage with one foot maimed, as we have seen them in certain provinces, and some as prisoners to be ransomed and exchanged. But the hostility among these Indians amounted to no more than the harm they inflicted upon their persons with deaths, wounds, or shackles, for they made no attempt to seize estates. If

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sometimes the battle were more heated, they went so far as to burn towns and devastate fields, but as soon as the conquerors had inflicted the desired damage, they regathered in their own lands without attempting to take possession of the lands of others. It appears, therefore, that their enmity and hatred spring primarily from a desire for ostentation, or in other words a wish to show their valor and strength of spirit and to gain experience in military science rather than from a desire to obtain the property and estate of another. The prisoners, they easily ransom simply by a system of exchange, and then all return to their ambushes. This warfare, they now look upon as the natural order of things and, as a result, regardless of where they are found, are always provided with arms, for in no place are they secure from enemies.119

While the Indians did not make war for the land itself as Europeans did, Inca Garcilaso noted another sign of victory besides prisoners: “the scalp is a symbol which among all Indians signifies a great victory and vengeance for injuries.” Considering the implication of “vengeance for injuries,” his description of the Apalachees, already devastated by previous conquistador armies in their lands, can make sense within a chivalric Renaissance framework of a warrior’s universal right to vengeance. And The Inca does remind us, with brutal succinctness, of previous offenses against the Floridians by Soto’s predecessors. A ruler in the Florida peninsula named Hirrihigua, he tells us, whose mother had “been cast to the dogs” by Narváez’s followers, remembered the cruelties of the Narváez expedition “each time that he attempted to blow his nose and failed to find it”.120

For the most part, The Inca renders the violence of the American Southeast transparently legible for a contemporary European audience, and highlights the rationality of the Southeastern Indians in universalist terms. The curacas label the conquistadores as bandits, robbers, and vagabonds, and signify this by ordering their subjects to quarter and

120 Varner and Varner, Florida of the Inca, 437 (“scalp is a symbol”), 68 (“blow his nose”).
dismember the conquistadores’ bodies, hang their limbs from trees in lieu of gibbets, and decapitate them—in other words, to act as rightful lords in Europe would to criminals and rebels. Hearing of the Soto expedition’s approach, Hirrihigua retreats into the forest and tasks his vassals with bringing him the Iberians’ heads in the European fashion—not their scalps. Another Floridian lord’s violence is even more consistent with contemporary European practice: he lets the Spanish know he has ordered his followers “to bring me two Christian heads weekly,” and during the 20 days it took to pass through his territory, “not a single Spaniard who strayed so much as a hundred yards from the camp escaped being shot and beheaded at once,” with other conquistadores suffering posthumous exhumation, dismemberment, and display. The Spanish were warned that the Apalachees, who spent the winter of 1539-40 waylaying, killing, and scalping conquistadores (see Chapter 1), “would shoot them with arrows, quarter, burn and destroy them.”

Several episodes in the Inca’s text erode the certainty of the conquistador myth that a small group of horsemen, bearing modern European arms and armour, can easily defeat and dominate thousands of Indians. For instance, after the curaca of Ocali had submitted to Soto and agreed to have his vassals build a bridge over a river for them, more than five hundred of his subjects fired “a sprinkling of arrows” at the curaca and Soto from the safety of the other side of the river, promising “you thieves, vagabonds and foreign immigrants” that they would not see the bridge built “with our hands”; when asked how he could permit this, the curaca abashedly replied that many of his subjects “no longer looked upon him with respect” for conceding to the Iberians. The Inca describes Indian bows as powerful enough to put arrows

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121 Varner and Varner, Florida of the Inca, 68 (“receive the heads of these Castilians”), 118-20 (“two Christian heads weekly… shot and beheaded”) 175 (“quarter, burn, and destroy them”).
through Spanish chainmail or through a horse’s ribcage; in the heat of battle, Indian archers were able to kill conquistadores by aiming for their unarmoured eyes and faces at Mabila, and for their unarmoured legs at Chicaza. The Indians’ local knowledge also becomes weaponized to nullify the mounted conquistadores’ advantages: ambushes are laid for the conquistadores in the swamps, while Plains peoples at the western extreme of their wanderings use buffalo-hunting techniques against the horsemen. The Tula people skewer Soto’s remaining horses with their lances, while the people of what The Inca calls “the Province of Herdsmen” (provincia de los Vaqueros) crept on hands and knees into the camp at night, as though stalking game, to shoot horses and conquistadores.122

The conquistadores’ invocations of the white god myth, particularly Soto’s claim to be a son of the Sun, receives a similarly dim reception. The curaca of Quigualtanqui replies he would believe that when Soto dried up the Mississippi; another cacique, Vitachuco, declared them “sons of the devil” rather than “our gods, the Sun and the Moon”, noting that if they really were as virtuous as they claimed to be, they would have stayed in their own country in peace “sowing the land and raising cattle” rather than “ma[king] highwaymen, adulterers, and murderers of themselves”. Even the possibility of reverse-colonialism is attributed by The Inca to the survivor Juan Coles, who recalled that during the escape by boat down the Mississippi a gigantic Indian warrior, “tall as a Philistine,” assured the fleeing conquistadores that if his people could build ships like theirs, “we would follow you to your own land and conquer it, for we too are men like yourselves.” Soto concedes that all this may

122 Varner and Varner, Florida of the Inca, 59-60 (arrows through horses), 122-23 (“sprinkling of arrows…respect”), 234-36 (arrows through chainmail), 352-58 (battle of Mauvila / Mobile), 377 (of 47 conquistadores killed in the battle, 18 shot with arrows through their unarmoured eyes or mouths), 415 (arrows and “harpoons” aimed at unarmoured thighs and legs at Chicaza), 454-66 (Tula, buffalo-hunters); swamp ambushes (103-05, 175-81).
fly in the face of his readers’ expectations, “For in general [Indians] are looked upon as a simple folk without reason or understanding who in both peace and war differ very little from beasts.”

Scalps and scalping, when discussed by The Inca, are placed in the context of indigenous warfare at its most vengeful and internecine, where the Spanish win the support of one indigenous polity by offering military assistance against another: marching with the captain Patofa of Cofaqui against the neighbouring polity of Cofachiqui, and siding with the town of Casquin against the town of Capaha. In each case, the Soto expedition’s involvement decides a stalemated contest, and the victors express their pent-up vengeance by sacking their enemies’ towns and temples, which Soto characterizes as “sepulchres,” looting the burial goods of pearls and fine furs, and desecrating the aristocrats’ interred remains. As well as sacking the temples and burial sites, the victors also scalp their enemies: Patofa and his eight thousand warriors, writes The Inca, killed everyone they captured in their attacks on the villages of the Cofachiquis, and “took the scalps from the ears up with admirable skill and dexterity” so that the elderly and infirm curaca of Cofaqui, who had delegated Patofa to act in his stead, “should see with his own eyes the vengeance they had wrought on his enemies for the injuries he had received […] in sum they did everything they could think of that might injure their enemies and satisfy their own thirst for vengeance.” While the Cofaquis had taken no prisoners in their destruction of the Cofachiquis’ towns, the Casquins were more selective in their attack on Capaha: after slaying the town’s male defenders, “more than a hundred and fifty in all,” looting the town, and capturing the women and children, “they

123 Varner and Varner, Florida of the Inca, 134-35 (Vitachuco), 157-61 (“differ very little from beasts”), 495-96 (Quigualtanqui), 595 (“Philistine,” “men like yourselves”).
removed the scalps of these men to take to their land as an evidence of triumph, for the scalp is a symbol which among all Indians signifies a great victory and vengeance for injuries.” While not explicitly stated by El Inca, his readers might have drawn an implicit comparison to the sectarian wars of contemporary Europe in which Protestant and Catholic armies and mobs desecrated and destroyed each other’s sacred sites, tombs, and graveyards. Scalping, however, marked such immoderate vengeance as specifically North American.\(^{124}\)

An early reference to scalping from present-day Canada appears in Jacques Cartier’s account of his second voyage (1535-36). A leader named Donnacona, whose sons Cartier had kidnapped to train as interpreters when returning to France from his first voyage in 1534, showed Cartier Lawrence at their village of Stadacona “the skins of five men's heads, stretched on hoops, like parchment (les peaulx de cinq testes d'hommes, estandues sus des boys, comme peaulx de parchemin)” and explained them to belong to “Toudamans,” enemies from the south “who waged war continually against his people.” Cartier writes that Donnacona explained that the Toudamans had inflicted a great defeat on the Stadaconans two years previously, surprising their fortified camp and slaying 200 men, women and children setting out on a war expedition against the Toudamans. Only five of the Stadaconans had survived, and “they still continued to complain bitterly” about this defeat, “making clear to us that they would have vengeance for the same.” Bruce Trigger has observed that Donnacona was probably asking Cartier for a military alliance, but Cartier was as uninterested in this as he was in the report of the Hochelagans, another Iroquoian people he met further downriver, of their enemies up the Ottawa River whom they called Agojuda, who wore armour of “cords

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\(^{124}\) Varner and Varner, *Florida of the Inca*, 13-14 (“They do have temples but they use them as sepulchres and not as houses of prayer”), 292-96 (war of Cofaqui against Cofachiqui), 437 (“signifies a great victory and vengeance for injuries”).
and wood, laced and plaïted together,” and whose tribes were continually at war with each other. His ethnography was curt and dismissive: the Stadaconans and Hochelagans had “no belief in God that amounts to anything,” “live with almost everything in common, much like the Brazilians,” “go clothed in beasts’ skins, and rather miserably,” ate their meat and fish “quite raw, merely smoking it,” and were “more indifferent to the cold than beasts.” In short, they had so little culture of their own that “they could easily be moulded in the way one would wish.”

Cartier did draw critical distinctions in terms of sociocultural life. Though he considered the Stadaconans and Hochelagans poor, the former so poor that nothing they owned was “above the value of five sous, their canoes and fishing-nets excepted,” he did note that they lived in settled villages and had agriculture, growing tobacco, “melons” (i.e., squash) and “corn like pease, the same as in Brazil, which they eat in place of bread.” This he deemed an improvement over the nomadic, “wild and savage folk” he had met in 1534 on the barren, rocky coastland he dubbed “the land God gave to Cain,” where “I did not see one cart-load of earth”; they were themselves outclassed, in his estimation, by the people he had met at Chaleur Bay, who approached the French in canoes holding pelts on the end of sticks and speaking what 20th-century researchers identify as a Basque trade pidgin. The Hochelagans, further downriver from the Stadaconans, also had more valuable material

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culture in the form of *esnoguy* or wampum made from musselshells, which he believed was procured in a typically bizarre and violent American way: by making incisions in the thighs and buttocks of an executed criminal or prisoner of war, submerging the corpse into a waterway where the shellfish lived, and then extracting the mussels from the wounds. Deciding that the material wealth of the indigenous societies he encountered was correlated to the geographical distance of the journey upriver and into the continent, the sight of worked Great Lakes copper created in Cartier’s mind the idea that a version of Mexico or Peru, as advanced in comparison to the Hochelagans as he believed them to be to the coastal peoples, must exist upriver in the country they called the Saguenay. His visions of a “kingdom of the Saguenay,” who “go clothed and dressed in woollens like ourselves” and live in “many towns and peoples composed of honest folk who possess great store of gold and copper,” were fed by Donnacona, who by this point probably sought to rid themselves of the French, and his sons Taignoagny and Domagaya, whose time in France had stripped them of any illusions about what Europeans expected to find in the Americas.126

The Tristán de Luna y Arellano expedition to colonize the Southeast (1559-60) also witnessed scalping in the context of vengeful indigenous warfare, as reported by the expedition’s chaplain, Fray Domingo de la Anunciación, and as recorded by Fray Agustín Dávila Padilla in *Historia de la Fundación...* (1625). The expedition had planned to establish a colony at Coosa (Coça), partly because of its description in *La Florida del Inca* as agriculturally wealthy and densely populated, and the Coosans, according to Anunciación, placed the price of their allegiance as a request for Spanish assistance against a neighbouring

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polity, the Napochies. Anunciación, according to Padilla, was quite taken by the Coosans’ military discipline, including an equal-arm-cross marching formation which he compared to that of the Biblical Israelites. Once at the abandoned Napochie village, however, he was struck by another display of their martial customs: on a tall wooden pillar in the town square they found many Coosas’ scalps (cabellos, “hair locks”). “It was the custom of the Indians to flay the head of the enemy dead, and to hang the resulting skin and locks (pellejo y cabellos) insultingly on that pole. There were many dead, and the pole was covered with locks.” The Coosans, much angered at “this evidence of affront” and reminder of “all the previous injuries” done to them, cut down the pole, and carried off the scalps (los cabellos) in order to bury them with proper ceremony.” The Coosans, writes Dávila Padilla, were “like raging lions” (leones rabiosos) at this sight, linking the Savagist comparison of purportedly wild men to wild animals with the by-now-rote description of Indian warriors as raging and vengeful.127

“The [Timucuan] kings make wars among themselves, always by surprise attack,” wrote René Goulaine de Laudonnière in his 1586 memoir of the French attempt to colonize Florida (near present-day Jacksonville) in the 1560s:

They kill every male enemy they can. Then they cut the skin off their heads to preserve the hair, and carry this back on their triumphant homeward journeys. They spare the enemy women and children, feed them, and retain them permanently among themselves.

In the scalp dances that commemorated victory, “They even make the old women dance while holding the enemy scalps in their hands” and praising the Sun, to whom “the honour of victory” was attributed. Laudonnière sabotaged the colony’s future by attempting to become trading partners of their neighbour Satouriona’s enemies, the Thimogona, instead of heeding his request for French gunmen to join him in a joint campaign against them. Accordingly, Laudonnière’s account dwells on the purportedly vengeful and implacable nature of the Timucuans. After one of his officers attempted to cover their delegation to Thimogona’s people by claiming it an unsuccessful raid, a vassal of Satouriona’s named Molona showed his displeasure at a victory feast by ordering a cupbearer to inflict a non-fatal knife wound on one of his guests, who turned out to be one of Molona’s sons. Every time an expedition returned from the Thimogona country without “the scalps of their enemies” or “some prisoner,” explained Molona, his ancestors’ injuries at their hands should be “renew[ed]” and “lamented afresh,” and “the best loved of all his children should be struck by the same weapon by which his ancestors had been killed.” A few weeks later, Satouriona set out against the Thimogona; they launched a surprise attack on a Thimogona village and “cut the enemy to pieces, excepting women and little children. […] When it was accomplished, the aggressors took the heads of their slain enemies and cut the hair off, taking a piece of skull with each scalp.” They also returned with 24 prisoners, of whom Satouriona kept 13 for himself and distributed the rest among his 10 chiefs, and bearing “the scalps at the top of their spears” which were set, crowned with magnolia, outside Satouriona’s house. Laudonnière then marched against Satouriona’s house with 20 arquebusiers and demanded
that Satouriona, on whose land Fort Caroline had been built and who supplied food and labour to the colony, turn over his prisoners to the French.\textsuperscript{128}

This was the penultimate insult; the final insult was when the French began lending military assistance to another of Satouriona’s enemies, Outina, in late 1564 and the spring of 1565. Thirty French soldiers under a Captain D’Ottigni marched with an expedition of 300 Timucuan archers accompanied by their bearers (Laudonnière calls them “women, young boys, and hermaphrodites”) against another leader, Potavou. Close to his village, they surprised three men fishing; two of them escaped while the third was shot with arrows “and scalped by our Indians,” who cut off his arms and “preserv[ed] his scalp” for the victory dance. Outina, afraid that the escaped fishermen would alert Potavou to their presence, asked his \textit{jarua} or diviner whether they should continue or retreat; the \textit{jarua} replied that it was best to retreat and that Potavou, was waiting for him with at least 2,000 men. D’Ottigni then demanded a guide so that he and his 30 men could attack the Potavou, and Outina followed. Laudonnière notes that they met the enemy “at the exact place where the magician had said they would be,” and that Outina would have been defeated if not for the advantage of firearms. Having killed a large number of Potavou’s soldiers and routed the rest, Outina “was contented for the time being” and withdrew. This “greatly disgusted” d’Ottigni, “who had wanted nothing more than going on to complete victory.”\textsuperscript{129}


\textsuperscript{129} Laudonnière, \textit{Three Voyages}, 117-120.
The short-lived Huguenot colony, wiped out in a sectarian massacre by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés with the guidance of Satouriona and other Timucuan leaders alienated by Laudonniére’s policies, was also depicted in a now-obscure collection of text and sketches by another expeditionary member, Jacques le Moyne de Morgues. Those illustrations were the basis for a series of engravings, still widely-reprinted in scholarly and popular works on the early Americas, in Theodor de Bry’s 1591 Latin translation of le Moyne’s account. De Bry’s depictions of heroically nude Timucuans recycled themes which were by this point standard Americana: in one engraving, Timucuans worship a monument placed by an earlier explorer in their territory; in another, a newborn baby is sacrificed in honour of a Timucuan chief. Of importance for this chapter are de Bry’s illustrations of war and hunting. De Bry’s depictions of both juxtapose the familiar and praiseworthy with brutal exotica. In Plate XIII Outina, his warriors, and Captain D’Ottigni’s arquebusiers form an orderly square formation against a vast army of Potavou’s followers, and Plate XIV, “Order of March Observed by Outina on a Military Expedition,” presents Indian warfare in a visually-familiar fashion. Plate XV, “How Outina’s Men Treated the Slain of the Enemy”, furthers the connection drawn between scalping, which le Moyne had said was performed “with pieces of reed sharper than any steel blade,” and inventive mutilation: the victorious warriors have already scalped and cut the limbs off of a dead enemy and are inserting an arrow into the corpse’s anus. The depictions of Timucuan hunters follow suit: Plate XXV, “Hunting Deer,” shows hunters dressed in deerskins stalking their unaware prey while drinking at a river, a matter of finesse and wit; the next plate, “Killing Crocodiles”, is a matter of naked force, as six nude
Timucuan hunters shove a sharpened log like a battering ram down a huge alligator’s throat.\textsuperscript{130}

A related reading of North Americans’ lifestyle as equally defined by war and hunting was conveyed in André Thévet’s discussions and illustrations of the peoples of Florida and Canada in \textit{Les Singularitez de la France antarctique} (1557), \textit{La Cosmographie universelle d’André Thévét, cosmographe du roy} (1575), and \textit{Vrais Pourtraicts et vies des hommes illustres...} (1584). Synthesizing the works of other authors on the Americas, Thévet added his own authorial-editorial touches to explain the differences between the already-discovered peoples of the equatorial Americas, such as Brazilians and Mexicans, and the more-recently-encountered North Americans. One way Thévet expressed this was visually, through the civilized-savage juxtaposition of textile clothing versus hides and pelts. In 1584’s \textit{Vrais Pourtraicts}, Thévet depicts Montezuma wearing clothes and accoutrements which are more refined creations of human culture: a Mexican circular shield adorned with featherwork, a robe of woven cotton or linen knotted over his left shoulder in a Classical fashion, and a crown. The Timucuan leader Satouriona, by contrast, sports a full fur coat with sleeves to the wrists, and the skin of a large cat as a hood with its clawed paws knotted around his neck in the fashion of Hercules’ lion pelt, with a perfunctory American feather bonnet tucked on top of his cap. The peoples so far encountered north of Mexico, both the Floridians and the Canadians, wear “the skins of wild animals” to protect themselves against the cold, to which Thévet attributes “the statement of certain ignoramuses that the savages

had fur.” While Thévet considers the people of Canada as having almost no material or religious culture to speak of, besides vague veneration of the heavenly bodies, he makes this anthropology of deficiency a positive thing: while some Canadians are idolatrous, they do not perform the idolatrous human sacrifices of the Floridians and Mexicans, or have dietary “superstitions” like Jews and Muslims. While “these Canadians, who are the fiercest known people and who have no arts or trades whatsoever, are always occupied in warring with some of their neighbours,” they are “rather good people and gracious if you do not irritate them,” certainly more praiseworthy than the Floridians, who he considers cruel and idolatrous. The Canadians are also more advanced than the Brazilians by wearing fur and leather clothing, while the Brazilians go about naked in the manner of “the first condition of the human race”; for reference, Thévet explains that the ancient French were nearly as savage as contemporary Brazilians and went about “almost naked” when “Hercules of Libya” first discovered them. Unlike the Brazilians, Thévet’s Canadians do not eat their defeated enemies—they scalp them instead.131

In his description of Canadian warfare in 1557’s Singularitez, wars begin when “the Agohanna (which means like king or lord)” commands his vassals to ready their fighting men and prepare provisions for an expedition. Marching four-by-four to the tune of drums and deerbone flutes and bearing ensigns made of birch branches and adorned with swans’ and other birds’ feathers, they fight with bows, clubs, spears, shields, and bearskin helmets. That stone and wooden weapons were as legitimate as those of iron and steel Thévet explained by

pointing to precedent of their use in the Old World in ancient texts: the Bible, Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Justinian. Unlike the bloodthirsty peoples of South America, who make war for enjoyment, the Canadians only go to war “to avenge a wrong received”, and Thevet suggests the deep winter snows act as a natural barrier to more expeditions. “True, if they capture some of their enemies or are otherwise victorious, they skin their head and face and lay them out in a circle to dry. Then they carry them to their country, showing them proudly as a symbol of victory to their friends, wives, and old men, who in their weak old age can no longer carry the burden.” In 1575’s *Cosmographie Universelle*, Thévet added an illustration of Canadians at war. Their king, wielding what looks like a sledgehammer, is carried on the shoulders of bearers as a mark of his rank and status. Two musicians carry a drum of hide stretched on an oval wooden hoop the size of a dressing mirror while a third beats a marching rhythm with two deer femurs. Ghoulishly, the drum is echoed visually by a smaller oval wooden hoop on which is stretched the dried face of an enemy; in the background, ten similar hoops of dried faces hang from trees, testament to past victories.\(^{132}\)

Like Theodor de Bry, Thévet also notes a connection between warfare and hunting in the life of indigenous North Americans, explained through humoral and climactic-determinist theory. All northern peoples, wrote Thévet, were made “courageous” to varying degrees by the inclosure of their body heat through thick clothing, “which therefore renders them robust and valiant: for the strength and virtue of all parts of the body depend on this natural warmth.” Southerners, which Lestringant notes could include Iberians and Italians as well as Brazilians in French polemics, were “the contrary,” writes Thévet: hot equatorial air drew out

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\(^{132}\) Schlesinger and Stabler, *Andre Thévet’s North America*, 14-19 (“skin their head and face”), 44 (Thévet’s illustration of Canadians at war).
and “dissipated” their internal body heat, making them morally incontinent and cowardly. Thus Thévet’s engraving of native Canadians, wearing fur robes and toques and with snowshoes on their feet, hunting wild beasts in the winter snow. A deer hunter is in the background, while in the foreground three hunters target a wild boar with spears and a bow, one of the hunters killing the boar by shoving a spear down its throat in the same manner as de Bry’s alligator-hunters. Thévet also attributed such scenes, which he considered endemic to Canada, to climactic determinism: as proven by “the beautiful pelts” brought from perpetually-cold northern regions, fierce wild beasts “abound more in northern regions (except lions, tigers, elephants, rignoseros [sic])” than elsewhere. Wild men were typically depicted in battle with wild animals, like bears and bulls, and strange conflicts between northern savages and wild beasts had been a recurrent subtheme of European geography (see Chapter 1).133

The explanation of indigenous Canadian warfare by analogy to Rome’s enemies across the Alps was continued and extended by the French lawyer Marc Lescarbot in his account of his year in Acadia, Nova Francia (1606). The ‘Acadians’ he describes, probably Mi’kmaq and Maliseet, did not make war for land, but “as Alexander the Great did make it, that they may say I have beaten you, or else for revenge in remembrance of some injury received.” Their unwillingness to forgive or forget past injuries was “the greatest vice that I find in them,” wrote Lescarbot, but also excusable “because they do nothing but that which ourselves do also.” While in attacks on their enemies they slew as many of the male defenders as they could lay hands on, “They also use humanity and mercy towards their

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enemies’ wives and little children” by taking them captive “for to serve them” per the “ancient right of servitude.” In describing the Acadians’ war customs, he took great pains to rule out the possibility of anthropophagy and human sacrifice: their war and victory dances, which he called *Tabagies*, were not cannibal bacchanalias, but a show of joy and thanksgiving, like the Israelites’ songs of praise after the death of King Sisera (*Judges* 4-5) or David’s triumph over Goliath (*I Samuel* 18:6-7), and served an educational purpose for the young, like the civic dances of the ancient Spartans. Cartier’s report of seeing preserved scalps, for instance, didn’t necessarily mean that the Stadaconans had sacrificed those men (a possible allusion to the flayed-face stories of Cortés), but that, like the “ancient Gauls,” they had “set them up in or without their cabins as a trophy, which is usual through all the West Indies.” Lescarbot reminded his readers that the ancient Gauls, who the French then and now considered as national ancestors, had been reported by various Greek and Roman authors, particularly Polybius, Caesar, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus, and Ammianus Marcellinus, to decapitate their enemies and preserve their heads as trophies: “Our ancient Gauls did make no less trophies with the heads of their enemies than our savages.”

Going one step further, Lescarbot invoked the ancient symbol of barbarism, the gilded skull-cup, by reminding his readers that one of the Gallic tribes, the Boii, had been reported in Strabo’s *Geography* (III.3) to gild their enemies’ skulls and use them “in sacred things and holy solemnities. If any man thinketh this strange,” he interjected, as they might find strange the idea that the Acadians bite their enemies’ scalps during victory dances to show their rage, he should consider the report of Blaise de Vigenère, French scholar and

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diplomat, of events on the Hungarian frontier between Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire:

he saith that in the year 1566, being near Jauarin [Győr], they did lick the blood of the Turks’ heads which they brought to the Emperor Maximilian; which goeth beyond the barbarousness that might be objected to our savages.

Yea, I must tell you that they have more humanity than many Christians, who within these hundred years have committed in divers occurrences, upon women and children, cruelties more than brutish, whereof the histories be full; and our savages do extend their mercy to these two sorts of creatures.

The Acadians gain no material benefit from their moral superiority to Europeans, however, and their life is harder than that of soldiers “coming forth out of tents and pavilions”. Their manner of making war, by travelling over great distances to take their enemy by surprise, “keepeth them in perpetual fear,” and “at the least noise in the world,” like a moose passing through the forest, “they take an alarm.”

In *Des Sauvages, ou Voyage de Samuel Champlain de Brouage…* (1604), Samuel de Champlain gave his account of such a victory ceremony which he had attended, as part of a French delegation to their North Atlantic allies in 1603. Prior to the arrival of the French delegation, a combined force of a thousand warriors from the Algonquin, Innu (“Montagnais”) and Maliseet (“Etchemins”) had met an Iroquois expedition at the mouth of the Iroquois River (later, the Richelieu River) and killed about 100 of their enemies, “whose

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135 Lescarbot, *Nova Francia*, 307-15; on ‘Javarin,’ see: Entry “*Gewer, Javarinum*, called by the Inhabitants *Raab*; by the Germans *Javarin, Giavarino*; is a small, but very strong City, the Capital of a County in the Lower Hungary, and a Bishops See, under the Archbishop of *Gran*. It stands five miles from *Comora* to the West, where the *Raab* and the *Rabnitz* fall into the *Danube*. This City is called *Gewer* by the Hungarians.” – in Edmund Bohun, *A Geographical Dictionary, Representing the Present and Ancient Names of all the Countries, Provinces, Remarkable Cities […] of the whole World* (London: Charles Brome, 1688), GE to GH (no pagination). Listed as “Raab, Javarin, Győr, Jaurinum” in Denis Diderot and Fortuné Barthélemy de Félice, *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Universel Raisonné des connoissances humaines*, Volume 36, ‘R’ (Yverdon, Switzerland, 1774), page 2.
scalps they cut off.” Champlain had little faith in the ability of France’s allies to fight the Iroquois—he characterized their wars as “altogether by surprises,” since otherwise they would be “too much in dread” of a numerically-superior foe—and the French, through their interpreter, reiterated the goals of their king: to trade with them, to populate their country with French colonists, “and to make peace with their enemies (who are the Iroquois) or send forces to vanquish them.” After listening with attentive and total silence, the Innu leader Anadabijou carefully and politely replied “that he was well content that His said Majesty should people their country, and make war on their enemies,” sidestepping entirely the proposal that the French king could or should establish peace between them and their longstanding enemies. Following the feast, they began to dance, “taking in their hands ... the scalps [testes, lit. “heads”] of their enemies, which hung behind them”. The Algonquins’ victory ceremony was much the same, except that their women, who danced with the scalps, stripped down to their jewellery, while their leader Tessouat, who “sat between two poles, on which hung the scalps [testes] of their enemies,” periodically stood up to exhort his assembled allies, presumably including the French, “See how we rejoice for the victory which we have obtained over our enemies; ye must do the like, that we may be satisfied.” Champlain’s literary response is to add a long, griping passage on the Indians’ perceived faults—the “one evil quality in them, which is, that they are given to revenge,” and their way of life as godless and lawless, “like brute beasts.”

In 1606, Champlain sailed south as part of a trading expedition to the Wampanoag at Cape Cod. French sailors in the previous year had alienated the Wampanoag with their

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behaviour, and the 1606 expedition followed suit, first attempting to intimidate them, then shooting two Wampanoag for theft. In retaliation, the Wampanoag ambushed and slew some French sailors. The French decided to make a show of punishment by capturing some Wampanoag and taking them back to Acadia to grind grain at Port-Royal; when the capture attempt failed, the French killed six or seven Wampanoag with their swords. They returned to Port Royal with four or five dead, four wounded, but Champlain noted that their Maliseet guide and interpreter Secoudon “was much pleased and well satisfied at having made this voyage with us, and carried off some scalps of the Indians (quelques testes des sauvages) who had been killed at Misfortune harbour.”

Champlain’s later account of joining an Innu-Algonquin-Huron excursion into Iroquoia in the summer of 1609 drew further linkage between scalping, torture, and anthropophagy in the European perception of North American warfare. Champlain described elements of their military customs as sensible and praiseworthy, for instance, the allies’ tripartite division of their forces into scouts, a main body of troops, and hunters scattered behind the advance to provision them; their ability to palisade the landward side of their riverbank campsites “in less than two hours”; the captains drilling their followers on their battle formations in advance of the battle itself; and their use of parched cornmeal as a premade ration for when they entered enemy territory, to be mixed with water and eaten cold to avoid giving away their positions with woodsmoke. On the journey south Champlain had

only two complaints: that the Indians didn’t post sentries at night, and employed Shaking Tent diviners (who he considered charlatans) to obtain any intelligence that escaped their scouts. After the battle with the Iroquois, another point of difference between Champlain and his allies became apparent: of the ten or twelve Iroquois taken prisoner, the allies selected one to execute by torture on the spot. As Bruce Trigger and other commentators have pointed out, Champlain’s objections were not to torture *per se*, as meted out in contemporary Europe for “treason, heresy, or sexual deviancy,” but for the torture of a prisoner of war and the anthropophagous elements of trying to force other prisoners to eat the dead man’s heart.

Champlain also reported scalping as an element of the Iroquois’ execution by torture: “they flayed the top of his head and poured hot gum on his crown,” and after his posthumous dismemberment they retained “the skin of his head (la peau de la teste)” with those of other Iroquois slain in the battle. Bringing these scalps back to Tadoussac for a victory ceremony, Champlain noted that they gifted him with two of the scalps and two sets of Iroquois weapons to bring back to the French king. Describing the aftermath of a battle in 1610, Champlain noted that “These savages scalped the heads of their dead enemies, as they are accustomed to do, as a trophy of their victory, and took them away.” In 1611, Champlain described a scenario consistent with a coalescing European trope of indigenous American warriors as immoderately vengeful. The Huron leadership had been unsuccessful in persuading a small nine-man war party from setting out on an expedition into Iroquoia, since they feared its leader, who had been captured, tortured, and escaped from the Iroquois three times already, would lead them deep into enemy territory to certain death. Champlain was asked to intervene as a final persuading voice, but this Huron Ahab was undeterred: showing Champlain his scars and missing fingers, he said he could not live “without killing his
enemies and having his revenge.” As predicted, none of them ever returned from their doomed mission.\textsuperscript{138}

Gabriel Sagard, a Recollet missionary who travelled up the St. Lawrence to the Huron country in 1623-24, later summarized the war customs and lifestyle of the Huron and Algonquians as revealing “the wretchedness of human nature, tainted at the source, deprived of the training of the faith, destitute of morality”. This portrait was not uniformly damning, and there were elements of Huron and Algonquian society that he considered exemplary and worth consideration for Europeans. He praised their self-control, which granted them more patience than most Frenchmen had, their “very kindly and polite” manner, and their quick wits, being “not so gross and dull as we in France suppose.” They built houses for the homeless, showed reverence for graveyards and the dead which “surpass[ed] the piety of Christians,” and avoided wet-nurses. In regards to warfare, he did think them “kind and merciful in victory towards the wives and little children of their enemies” for saving their lives, “although these remain prisoners and serve them.” He also favourably noted that warparties fed themselves with their own provisions of dried cornmeal, rather than plundering the countryside as European armies did. Like previous authors, he preferred sedentary urban-agrarian life, like that of the Huron, over seasonal movement between campsites and food sources like the Innu: “I consider the Hurons and other sedentary tribes as the aristocracy, the Algonquin peoples the townspeople,” and the Innu and ‘Canadians’ “the villagers and poor people of the country.” This was more or less the end of the list. Some of the faults he found among the Indians were those that a literate, well-educated

European would have found among European peasants, like open belching, breaking wind in canoes, or wiping their hands on their dogs while eating. He faulted their past and present lack of Christianity and certain aspects of their culture: that they did not explicitly compliment each other, hired diviners to ascertain the whereabouts of stolen property, and were in his estimation “addicted” to revenge and “lying.”

What horrified Sagard was the prosecution of warfare, which he considered “properly speaking, nothing but surprise and treachery” intended “to take revenge for some slight wrong or unpleasantness,” and the fate of prisoners. Every year in the spring, and throughout the summer, 500 to 600 Huron men scattered through the Iroquois country in bands of 5 or 6, lying low by day and “prowl[ing] about” by night to seize captives, even from the villages themselves, to bring back to the Huron country “to put them to death over a slow fire”. Those they couldn’t carry off they slew on the spot with arrows or warclubs and “carr[ied] away the head; and if they are too much encumbered with these they are content to take the scalps with the hair on them, which they call Onontsira, tan them, and put them away for trophies, and in time of war set them on the palisades of their town fastened to the end of a long pole.” He did note that women, girls, and children were usually spared from execution in the villages, and children were adopted as “substitutes”; but those not taken prisoner they “[p]ut to death on the spot, and take away the heads or the hairy scalp.” Like Champlain, Sagard mentioned scalping in the context of execution by torture: “and then they strip off all the skin of the

head with the hair, and afterwards apply fire to it and hot ashes, or they drop upon it melted gum of a certain kind.”

Two final references to scalping must be considered before we conclude this chapter. Ulrich Schmiedel, a Bavarian mercenary who served across South America from 1534 to 1554, took exception with Álvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca’s account of his tenure as governor of the Río de la Plata region, from 1540-44. Schmiedel wasn’t the only one to take exception to Cabeza de Vaca—his attempts to regulate the behaviour of other Iberians in the region and curtail labour abuses towards the Guaraní had led to his being expelled from South America in chains in 1545. In this case, Schmiedel disagreed with Cabeza de Vaca’s claim in his 1555 account of his governorship, Comentarios, that the Indians of the region in question decapitated their enemies for trophies. Schmiedel laid out an alternate explanation in his memoir, which appeared in a 1567 German anthology of American voyages:

Mark you, now, what he does further with the man’s head, and to what use he puts it, namely, if he has any opportunity for so doing, after a skirmish. He takes off the skin with all the hair over the ears, then he fills the head out and leaves it to become hard; afterwards he puts this hard and dry skin on a little hoop as a souvenir, in the same way as here in Germany a knight or commander puts a scutcheon in the churches. 

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141 Ulrich Schmiedel, “Voyage of Ulrich Schmidt [sic] To the Rivers La Plata and Paraguai [sic],” 1567, in Luis L. Dominguez ed., trans., The Conquest of the River Plate, 1535-1555 (London: the Hakluyt Society, 1891), 55; Gene Rhea Tucker, “The Discovery of Germany in America: Hans Staden, Ulrich Schmiedel, and the Construction of a German Identity”, in Traversea: Journal of Transatlantic History Vol. 1 (2011), 26-45. Georg Friederici took note of this in his 1906 study of scalping: “In the meantime it was discovered by the German Ulrich Schmiedel that scalping was also a tradition of the South American Indians, while the secretary of Cabeza de Vaca was inadequately informed and in the same or similar circumstances spoke only of cutting off the entire head. This most likely refers to the Guaycurú-Mbayá who, along with all the Chaco tribes, first removed the head and afterwards scalped it.” Georg Friederici, Anastasia M. Griffin, “Georg Friederici’s Scalping and Similar Warfare Customs in America with a Critical Introduction,” M.A. thesis, Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Studies, University of Colorado at Boulder (Proquest: UMI Dissertations Publishing, 2008). 25. On Cabeza de Vaca in South America, see Rabasa, Writing Violence on the Northern Frontier, 31-83; Chipman, “Cabeza de Vaca”. 
Another comparison between American scalping and European chivalry was made in the account of Harmen Mayndertsz van den Bogaert, the surgeon of the Dutch fur trading post of Fort Orange, of his journey into the Mohawk and Oneida country in the winter of 1634-35. At the palisaded Oneida village, which he calls a “castle,” at Oriskany Creek, he saw a single scalp (*lock*) hanging from the smaller east gate, while atop the main village gate “three wooden images carved like men, and with them… three scalps [*locken*] fluttering in the wind, that they had taken from their foes as a token of the truth of their victory.”

**Conclusions: White gods in Virginia**

The Spanish royal historian Oviedo, in relaying the account of Rodrigo Ranjel, Soto’s personal secretary and a survivor of the expedition, makes some pertinent editorial asides castigating Hernando de Soto and his “deluded” soldiers for wandering “from bad to worse” through a land he had never seen before, and where three other adelantados “more expert than he,” Juan Ponce, Garay, and Narváez, had been defeated. Oviedo was no Las Casas—he considered Indians to be congenitally stupid and immoral—but Soto’s excesses drew Oviedo to rebuke him as continuing the bad policies of his teachers. He deemed him “instructed in the school” of Pedrarias de Ávila “in the dissipation and devastation of the Indians of [Panama], graduate in the killing of the natives of Nicaragua and canonized in Peru, according to the Order of the Pizarros.” Returning to Spain from the Indies laden with gold from the conquest of the Incas, Soto had returned to the “hellish” Indies “to spill human blood, not content with that already spilled”. He thought, wrote Oviedo, that the knowledge

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of Panama and Peru “sufficed to know how to govern here on the coast of the North, and he deluded himself, as this history will relate.”

By 1607, notes Audrey Horning, indigenous peoples in the North Atlantic “had amassed a considerable amount of knowledge about Europeans, certainly in comparison with what [European] colonists knew about them.” If Indians in the contact zone had had any doubts about Europeans’ status as humans, they had long been disillusioned, while Europeans were still peddling comforting stories to themselves about animal-like or childlike wild men. Richard Hakluyt, a major British proponent of American colonies and an early investor in the Virginia Company, used his armchair knowledge of the Americas to help draw up the 1606 Instructions for the colonists, which blended sensible observations about former failed ventures with endorsement of myths of savage Indians and white gods. The colonists’ objectives in Virginia, which included prospecting for minerals and looking for the northwest passage to the Pacific, were to be performed while preventing attacks by rival powers by sea—“that you not be surprized [sic] as the French were in Florida by Melindus [Governor Menéndez], and the Spaniard in the same place by the French”—and bracing for the inevitable hostilities that would break out. Surveyors were to be equipped with compasses, for instance, so they could find their way back to the colony if abandoned in “great woods or desert” by Indian guides, as the Coronado expedition (1540-42) had been in the Southwest. The day of disaster should be postponed as much as possible by colonists’

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taking “great care not to offend the naturals, if you can eschew it” and trading for food before the Indians “perceive you mean to plant among them.” Indians were never to be permitted to handle firearms, for instance, and only the keenest marksmen were to fire guns in the Indians’ presence. They were also enjoined to conceal any kind of sickness among the colonists and to hide the bodies of the dead, because “if they perceive that [they] are but common men, […] they will make many adventures upon you.”

As Neil Whitehead observed, “first contact” scenarios “vastly over-privileg[e] the colonisers’ moment of ‘first contact’.” In the case of Virginia, these fantasies of a 1607 first encounter overlooked a history of European incursions into the Chesapeake and along the Atlantic seaboard going back to the early 16th century (see Chapter 3), including the failed Ajacán colony (see Chapter 1) and, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Roanoke colony of the 1580s. How and why the Virginia colony succeeded where its precursors had failed, by the incidental pioneering of a new form of British colonialism which would pave the way towards extirpationist warfare and scalp bounties, is the focus of the next chapter.

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Chapter Three: Towards scalp-hunting: Settler colonialism and extirpationist warfare
in Northeastern North America, 1585 – 1623

Their warres are far less bloudy, and devouring then the cruell Warres of Europe; and seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field […] the Conquerour ventures into the thickest, and brings away the Head of his Enemy.
–Roger Williams, Key Into the Language of America (1643)\textsuperscript{146}

Introduction

This chapter specifically focuses on foundational violent interactions between British colonists and indigenous peoples in eastern North America, from the failed Roanoke colony to the Virginia massacre of 1622, and the distinctively British attitude towards indigenous neighbours and land use which emerges, in Chapter 4, as the scalping paradigm. Following a prologue, my first section, “The mourning-war complex: violence in eastern North America,” summarizes the way in which warfare was defined and prosecuted in eastern North America at the time of the contact period, and the underlying logic by which indigenous polities in the contact zone operated in wartime. My second section, “Mourning-war and total war: regimes of violence in early America, 1585-1676,” notes the incommensurable differences in how Europeans and indigenous North Americans waged war, and how these differences fed British colonists’ belief that Indians were enemies better exterminated. My third section, “From middle ground to settler colonialism,” surveys how a British pattern of colonization, involving mass migration and annexation of indigenous land for farming and cash-cropping, rapidly developed in Virginia and precluded the “middle ground” relations Richard White notes in other times and places in North America. My fourth section, “Virginia, from landfall

to massacre to vengeance, 1607 to 1622,” describes how settler-colonialism and a winner-takes-all approach to indigenous land ownership were answered by the Virginia massacre of 1622, which in turn justified campaigns of unconventional war against indigenous Virginians. My epilogue, “peeces of ther heades,” notes an early expression of this sentiment in what may or may not be an early case of dark mimesis: colonists scalping Indians.

Prologue

On the night of 26 June, 1675, soldiers marching from Boston to fight King Philip’s Wampanoags witnessed a lunar eclipse. While this event was noted in two contemporary chronicles of the war, Cotton Mather’s A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England (Boston, 1676) and William Hubbard’s Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians (Boston, 1677), only Hubbard thought the omens the soldiers noticed were worth reporting: “that in the Centre of the Moon they discerned an unusual black Spot, not a little resembling the Scalp of an Indian: As some others not long before, imagined they saw the Form of an Indian Bow, accounting that likewise ominous.” That the bow and the scalp were metonymic symbols of the Indian warrior for late-17th-century New England colonists is not terribly surprising, but Hubbard had to remind his readers that the bow was already more reflective of myth than historical reality: due to the wide acceptance of early flintlocks among New England’s Algonquian neighbours by the 1670s, “the Mischief following was

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147 My use of ‘Philip’ over ‘Metacom’ follows Jill Lepore’s observation that the latter only became standard in Anglo-American historiography in the mid-19th century “when white playwrights, poets, and novelists sought to make the war sound more authentically, and romantically, Indian” – by contrast, the historical figure signed documents with a ‘P,’ with scribes adding ‘alias Metacom’ “probably to accommodate the colonists, who were meticulous record-keepers.” Per Algonquian naming conventions he would not have returned to the name of his childhood as an adult, and if he took a different name during the war (“one small, uncorroborated bit of evidence suggests that he may have been renamed ‘Wewesawamit’”) his followers, per another Algonquian rule, would not have used the name of a sachem after his death. See Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), xix-xxi.
done by Guns, not by Bows.” As for scalping itself, New Englanders still seemed to require precise explanations, as in William Harris’ convoluted report that

some of the men of Swansy wear kild, And theyr heads (to Say) the Sculpes (that is) the skin & hayre of the top or crowne of the head flead of[f], as they use of all they kill (if they have time) to cut it rounde: & tear it off[f]; & carry away.148

Harris was not the only English commentator to openly liken scalping to flaying; nor was he the only Puritan to draw a very specific Biblical-typological comparison in explaining scalps as “Sure signes of whome they have kild of both cects [sexes]; as formerly foreskins of males.” Given the Puritans’ typological readings of their indigenous neighbours as Canaanites and Philistines, themselves as latter-day Israelites, and Puritan theologians’ relegation of the Books of the Maccabees to apocrypha, they made do with a very loose Biblical precedent for scalping: Saul’s attempt to rid himself of David (1 Samuel 18:25-27) by setting Michal’s dowry at 100 Philistine foreskins. When suggesting, in 1675, that neutral indigenous peoples be offered rewards for the scalps of warriors from King Philip’s coalition, Connecticut’s Lieutenant-Governor William Leete also drew this connection by suggesting the colony “purchase so many foreskins of these Philistines now in hostility.”149

148 Lepore, The Name of War, 21-23, footnote 103; William Hubbard, A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England, from the first Planting thereof to the present Time (Boston, 1677) cited in Samuel G. Drake ed., The History of the Indian Wars in New England, Volume I (Clearfield, 2002 [1865]), 67-68, n.115 on Mather’s citation of the eclipse, minus omens, in Brief History volume I, 55-56. “How the Author could let this Occasion slip for indulging in Remarks upon supernatural Occurrences,” wonders Drake, “it is not easy to imagine.” Earlier, in a dedicatory bit of verse Hubbard places himself in the literature alongside Roger Williams, the missionary and translator of indigenous languages: “Their grand Apostle writes of their Return; William’s their Language; Hubbard how they burn, / Rob, Kill and Roast, Lead Captive, Slay, Blaspheme; / Of English Valour too he makes his Theme” (24).

149 Harris, A Rhode Islander Reports on King Philip’s War (“sure signes… formerly foreskins”) cited in Lepore, The Name of War, n. 103; Leete cited in Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 (University College London Press, 1998), 71.
Early modern colonialism had “no accepted models,” notes Audrey Horning, and given its “often chaotic and haphazard” nature, “disaster was a frequent outcome.” Horning points out how the British colonies of northeastern North America, based on secondhand information regarding the Iberian colonies, vacillated between “an instilled, if naïve, belief” in their ability to reshape indigenous societies through trade and religious conversion, and an exaggerated sense of their capacity to exert power over them, as summarized in Hakluyt’s boasting 1587 prediction for the Roanoke colony: “One hundred men will doe more nowe among the naked and unarmed people in Virginiea, then one thousande were able then to doe in Irelande against that armed and warlike nation.” In addition to Elizabethan Britain’s conquests in Ireland, British proponents of New World colonialism considered the Spanish both as a model to emulate and as a “negative paradigm” to avoid, though a hazy understanding of Spanish colonialism complicated this. In 1612 William Strachey stipulated that “noe Spanish Intention shalbe entertained by us to roote out the Naturalls as the Spaniards have done in Hispaniola and other parts,” while outlining a plan to co-opt the weroances, the hereditary chiefs of Virginia, into the upper echelons of British colonial society “as free burghers and Citizens” and isolating and destroying the indigenous priests – which was precisely what the Spanish had unsuccessfully attempted in the Caribbean and had successfully implemented on the mainland.150

Many early modern rivals of Spain imagined the mass killings of indigenous peoples in Iberian America as the end goal of Spanish colonialism, rather than a failure of its policy.

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of subordination and enserfdom through the deadly synergy of forced labour, warfare, malnutrition, stressed immune systems, and new epidemic diseases. While from a very early period, voices from the British colonies decried this “Black Legend” of Spanish colonialism, those same colonies would soon far outstrip Iberian precedent in destructiveness to indigenous societies, following up mass killings and acts of ethnic cleansing with repopulation by immigration and forced migration. It is in this context that the first ad hoc wartime bounties for indigenous scalps and other body parts, the genesis of Euro-American scalp bounties, appear in eastern North America in the mid-17th century.

In the context of Kieft’s War (1640-45), a five-year series of conflicts between New Netherland and its indigenous neighbours, the hiring of New England mercenaries as Indian fighters reflected a long and close relationship between England and the Netherlands: Protestant, maritime, North Sea peoples who traded, spoke closely related languages, and aided each other militarily against the Habsburg Spanish Empire. Until the late 1630s, the norm of the New Netherland colony (1614-1667) was a fur trade situation of limited European settlement in enclaves; Dutch territorial presence and the freebooting actions of Dutch traders were contested, countered, and hemmed in by such indigenous neighbours as the Pequots, the Lenape-Munsees (or “Delawares”), and the Mohawks. This was upset by a bid for a settler-colonial paradigm by the directors of the West India Company (henceforth WIC) in the late 1630s and early 1640s: as the value of Indians’ wampum, pelts, and corn declined, the WIC directors proposed to imitate the successful British example of stockbreeding, agrarianism, and cash-cropping on annexed Indian land, enabled by mass migration. When the “zero-sum contest” of settler colonialism pushed New Amsterdam’s neighbours and allies to declare war, governor Willem Kieft further imitated British
precedent by offering bounties to allied sachemships for enemy Indians’ heads and scalps, as well as prisoners; by encouraging the actions of Dutch vigilantes; and by hiring, at great expense, a company of New England mercenaries led by Pequot War veteran John Underhill to wage a winter war of attrition. In the shared Euro-American frontier of the Long Island Sound, and the broader trans-Atlantic imbrications of the Dutch and the British colonies, Kieft’s War was a laboratory for the total war and mass migration policies that would become standard in Anglo-America.

The mourning-war complex: violence in eastern North America

Accounts of exotic American violence heavily tinged the Virginia Company’s Instructions penned by Hakluyt and many of the colonists’ operational assumptions (see Chapter 2), and John Smith’s accounts appear to be particularly informed by Mesoamerican details. Moctezuma seems to loom behind his first impressions of Wahunsenecawh, the Powhatan Confederacy’s paramount chief whom the Virginians simply called “Powhatan” per conventions of the peerage; Smith calls him an “emperor” possessing “majestie” who metes out “very terrible and tyrannous” punishments to enemies of the state. Smith also misinterpreted a Powhatan puberty rite, the Huskanaw, as a literal child sacrifice, and took his generous diet of venison and corn while in Powhatan captivity as a sign he was being fattened up for some sacrificial feast. But Smith also described violence less similar to these fantasy composite scenes and more consistent with a style of warfare widely described by Europeans in northeastern and Atlantic North America. In early 1608, Wahunsenecawh ordered a surprise attack against an enemy village, Payankatank, on a night when “divers of his men” were guests in the village. Other Powhatan warriors surrounded Payankatank by night, “and at the houre appointed, they all fell to the spoile, 24 men they slewe, the long
haire of the one side of their heades with the skinne cased off with shells or reeds, they brought away.” The weroance, and the women and children, were brought as captives to Wahunsenecawh, who “became his prisoners, and doe him service.” The scalps were strung on two lines suspended between trees at Wahunsenecawh’s capital, his village of Werewocomoco, he “shewing them to the English men that then came unto them at his appointment, […] supposed to halfe conquer them by this spectacle of his terrible crueltie.” Henry Spelman, a British runaway who lived among the Powhatans, reported seeing criminals executed for such crimes as murder, robbery and infanticide scalped before their deaths: “Then cam the officer to thos that should dye, and with a shell cut of[f] ther long locke, which they weare on the leaft side of ther heade, and hangeth that on a bowe before the Kings house.” Contemporary European artists consistently depicted Powhatan warriors growing their hair long on the left side of their heads and shaving the right side so as not to tangle in their bowstrings, which presented some challenges for the artist when engraving a scene of John Smith seizing a rival, the weroance Opechancanough, by the scalplock and levelling a pistol at his chest to demand he fill a boat with corn. He compromised by drawing a long braid draped over the weroance’s neck and dangling from his right shoulder, so Smith could seize it with his left hand and draw his pistol with his right.151

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The scalplock, a circular patch of hair that the warrior grew long, styled, and adorned amidst a plucked or shaven head, was observed by European explorers from the St. Lawrence corridor to Mesoamerica, indicating an underlying martial philosophy beneath shocked European impressions of American violence as characterized by sacrifice, dismemberment, and anthropophagy (Chapter 1). In the frontispiece illustration of the *Codex Mendoza* (1542), a history of Tenochtitlán from its founding to the conquest, nine seated lords attired as warriors encircle the divine event of the city’s founding, wearing their hair in the *temillotl* (“pillar of stone”) hairstyle signalling prior martial achievement. Below, the artist depicts Tenochtitlán’s foundational victories over Colhuacan and Tenayuca with the standard glyph of triumph: each city’s central temple afire, flames billowing from beneath its collapsing roof. The artist further metonymized these victories by adding, beneath each burning-temple glyph, a victorious Aztec warrior seizing an enemy by the head with his shield hand; behind the shields, suggests David Carrasco, each victor may be seizing his enemy’s temillotl, equivalent in Nahua thought “to capturing the *tonally*, one of the essences or souls of the person.” As the post-conquest missionary-ethnographers would discover, the scalp-lock was a potent sign of the warrior’s prowess in both Nahua and Mayan societies. Before the Spanish conquest, the captor of a sacrificial victim received status and social promotion for his battlefield feat, and afterwards was given the shorn scalplock and femur as trophies to publicly display in his home; among the Aztecs, certain moral crimes were punished by law with a humiliating public beating, then burning the warrior’s *piochtli* (scalplock) down to the skin to prevent its regrowth. Its importance seems to have survived the Conquest: following
riots in 1692, authorities in Mexico City proscribed the wearing of the *piochtli* for its connections to surviving “secret ceremonials.”¹⁵²

The scalplock as a physical token of victory, and more importantly the prestige gained from taking enemies as prisoners, was also present among the Algonquian, Iroquoian, Siouan, and Muskogean societies of the Atlantic contact zone, in what present-day historians, ethnohistorians, and anthropologists refer to as the *mourning-war complex*, summarized by Bret Rushforth as “low-level endemic warfare punctuated by periods of heightened violence.” A set of common rituals, practices, and definitions of war and diplomacy broadly shared from the St. Lawrence corridor to Florida and westwards to the Great Lakes and Mississippian midcontinent, the mourning-war complex’s primary concern was the regulation of grief, vengeance, and violence by the corporate unit of the clan, i.e., an extended family who shared an other-than-human being as a “totem,” a literal or symbolic common ancestor. A family member’s death by homicide, accident, or disease—and the latter two, if attributed to sorcery, also constituted homicide—threatened the equilibrium of village life by disordering relatives’ minds with grief, and weakened the corporate body’s ability to maintain itself in a world of enemies. If an allied clan or broader nation were deemed responsible for the death, the killer’s clan could offer to restore peace by paying an indemnity in trade and luxury goods, known as “covering the dead”; if this was refused, or if the killers were from a clan or nation with which the aggrieved were already at war.

volunteers led a revenge raid to inflict a reciprocal injury on the guilty party by killing or capturing one or more members of his or her clan. Raids against enemies, or former allies turned enemies, could redress a slight to the honour of the clan or broader alliance network; in cases where certain clans or confederations had a noted advantage in strength over others, raids and the threat of further violence could establish or restore vassalage relationships, expressed through kinship metaphors, with the more powerful group as the “elder brother” to an unruly, yet subordinate, “younger brother.” While some collective material or economic benefits could accrue from tribute levied on defeated enemy polities and the unfree labour extracted from captives held in slavery, the greater motivating factor was the nonmaterial desiderata of personal and collective prestige, revenge for past wrongs, and humiliation of the enemy—in Gleach’s summary, “to right a wrong, to correct improper actions; [...] a means of restoring justice and teaching proper behaviour.” As Neil Whitehead and Beth Conklin observe of indigenous Amazonian warfare from the contact period to the 20th century, the stakes in such a system of conflict and captivity were and are intensely personal, and embedded within social relationships, when compared to the impersonal and market-driven violence of the early modern European nation-state—but, as Lestringant, Whitehead, and Conklin point out, are familiar or at least recognizable to early modern Europeans within the contexts of the chivalric tradition, which the state was attempting to co-opt, and feud and vendetta, which the state was trying to stamp out.153

North Carolina Press, 1992), 31-38, 58-74. On totems and kinship networks, see Heidi Bohaker,
“‘Nindoodemag’: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Great Lakes Region, 1600-1701,”
in *The William and Mary Quarterly* Third Series, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan. 2006), 23-52, esp. 31-38. Among the
Arikaras and Pawnees in the 19th century, men who survived scalping were both disgraced and considered
liminal figures neither living nor dead, made to live as hermits outside the village, while in folklore, the
character Scalped Man serves functions of both a trickster figure and a Wild Man who has other-than-human
power, which he can bestow on worthy individuals for success in medicine and war—see Douglas R. Parks,
“An Historical Character Mythologized: The Scalped Man in Arikara and Pawnee Folklore,” in Douglas H.
Ubelaker and Herman J. Viola eds., *Plains Indian Studies: A Collection of Essays in Honor of John C. Ewers
scalplock in warfare in the American Southwest, Southeast, midcontinent and Northeast in the pre- and post-
contact period, see Linda Cordell, “Indigenous Farmers,” 201-266, and Bruce Smith, “Agricultural Chiefdoms
of the Eastern Woodlands,” 267-324, in Bruce Trigger ed., *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the
and Trophy Taking in the Archaic Period,” 110-138, in Olaf H. Prufer, Sara E. Pedde, and Richard S. Meindl
eds., *Archaic Transitions in Ohio & Kentucky Prehistory* (Kent & London: The Kent State University Press,
2001); Richard J. Chacon and Rubén G. Mendoza eds., *North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual
Prehistoric Pueblo Southwest,” 114-128, Thomas E. Emerson, “Cahokia and the Evidence for Late Pre-
the Sacred Ancestor Temples: Chiefly Conflict and Violence in the American Southeast,” 160-181, George R.
M. Lambert, “The Osteological Evidence for Indigenous Warfare in North America,” 202-221, Chacon and
Mendoza’s “Introduction,” 3-10, and conclusion, “Ethical Considerations and Conclusions Regarding
Indigenous Warfare and Violence in North America,” 222-232; Richard J. Chacon and David H. Dye eds., *The
Taking and Displaying of Human Body Parts as Trophies by Amerindians* (New York: Springer Science +
Ancient and Widespread Practice,” 5-31, Polly Schaafsma, “Head Trophies and Scalping: Images in Southwest
Rock Art,” 90-123, Douglas W. Oswley et. al., “Human Finger and Hand Bone Necklaces from the Plaines and
Great Basin,” 124-166, Mark F. Seeman, “Predatory War and Hopewell Trophies,” 167-189, Ron Williamson,
“Otinontsiskij ondaon” (“The House of Cut-Off Heads’): The History and Archaeology of Northern
During the Archaic Period: The Relationship to Warfare and Social Complexity,” 222-277, James Brown and
David H. Dye, “Severed Heads and Sacred Scalplocks: Mississippian Iconographic Trophies,” 278-298, Keith
P. Jacobi, “Disabling the Dead: Human Trophy Taking in the Prehistoric Southeast,” 299-338, Nancy A. Ross-
Stallings, “Trophy Taking in the Central and Lower Mississippi Valley,” 339-370. On the distinctions between
material and nonmaterial desiderata in rationalizing war and conflict, and the distinctions between European
and indigenous American violence in the early modern Atlantic, see Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking
and throughout; Beth A. Conklin, *Consuming Grief: Compassionate Cannibalism in an Amazonian Society*
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 1-24; Neil L. Whitehead, “Hans Staden and the Cultural Politics of
Cannibalism,” in *The Hispanic American Historical Review,* Vol. 80, No. 4 (November 2000), 721-51; Hans
Staden, Neil L. Whitehead and Michael Harbsmeier trans., *Hans Staden’s True History: An Account of
Cannibal Captivity in Brazil* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), xv-civ, esp. lxvii, xc; Jeppe
Büchert Netterstrøm and Bjørn Poulsen, eds., *Feud in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Aarhus, Denmark:
Aarhus University Press, 2007); Richard van Dülmen, Elisabeth Neu trans., *Theatre of Horror: Crime and
39-47; Obeyesekere, *Cannibal Talk,* 235-37, 244, 306 (note 44); Timothy Brook, Jérôme Bourgon, and Gregory
Blue, *Death by a Thousand Cuts* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 17-24; Regina Janes,
2005), 36-70. On cross-cultural reading of indigenous warfare per the European chivalric tradition, see
Lestringant, *Cannibals,* 1-12, 81-93.
As the whole point of mourning-war raids was to redress deaths within the raiders’ community, leaders aimed to avoid deaths or injuries among their warparty. Prefiguring, as Thomas Abler notes, the tactics of stealth and infiltration used by modern commando units, raiders quietly entered enemy territory. An illustration accompanying Jesuit missionary Pierre-Joseph Chaumonot’s 1666 report on the Iroquois succinctly and visually summarizes their goals: two Iroquois warriors return from a raid, the foremost bearing a pole from which two scalps are suspended; the second, with a musket slung over his shoulder, holds the halters of an enemy prisoner. War parties who returned from enemy territory unharmed were praised for bringing back live captives or physical proofs of slain enemies, such as scalps, heads, hands, or feet; those confirmed by their peers to have shown strength, fortitude, skillful leadership, and cleverness earned the right to commemorate their triumphs with new names, tattoos, and etchings on their war clubs.\(^\text{154}\)

Like the theatrical executions of the early modern European state, the performative ferocity of mourning-war violence also expressed and set boundaries on the limits of possible violence: one person, or a few people, were killed horribly to warn that the same could be done to others. Close readings of the mourning-war complex’s symbols and metaphorical language indicates both a system which prioritized the forced incorporation of enemy prisoners into the captor’s body politic, and a cluster of metaphors with which young men

psyched themselves up for war. Before setting out on expedition, eastern North American war leaders feasted their volunteers on dog’s meat, a symbolically-dense meal, since damaging and weakening enemy communities by killing and kidnapping was metaphorized as “eating” the enemy, and enslaved enemies were derogatorily referred to as “dogs” who lived at the whim of their masters; like domestic animals, slaves were personal property of the captor and his immediate family, not collectively-held clan property. Masked beneath faces painted red for war and black for death and mourning, warparties tried to convince the enemy—and, ultimately, themselves—that they were terrifying and merciless. If several prisoners were taken after a battle, skirmish, or ambush, those too weak for the forced march back to their captors’ country would be summarily executed, with perhaps one prisoner theatrically killed as a warning. Among some, but not all, ethnocultural groups who practiced the mourning-war complex, the victors might ritually consume blood or body parts of enemies slain on the battlefield, or after their executions, to show triumph and to make literal their vow to “eat” the enemy. Warriors might publicly boast of the joy of eating a foe, as when Innu converts agitated their Jesuit in 1636 by describing the taste of Iroquois enemies “as they would praise the flesh of a deer or a moose”; but during the Seven Years’ War, some perceptive French and British counterparts noted the sense of distaste and obligation that underlay ritual anthropophagy. Stephen Brumwell writes that a few French officers observed young warriors vomiting after these rites; “It is solely through bravado & to harden their hearts that they sometimes consume such food,” concluded Captain Pierre Pouchot, France’s commandant of Fort Niagara. The fur trader Alexander Henry the Elder, taken under the protection of Ojibway friends during the sack of Michilimackinac in 1763, drew a similar conclusion in sketching scenes from Pontiac’s Rebellion. Wenniway, Henry’s friend and
ostensible captor, ransomed him to another friend, Wawatam, who told Henry to stay in the
sanctuary of his wigwam while he attended an execution of British prisoners; Wawatam
returned resignedly nibbling a roasted British hand. He “did not appear to relish the repast,”
but justified it on the grounds of utility and tradition: such a “war feast” was customary, and
“inspired the warriors with courage in the attack.”

Those taken captive faced a harrowing journey back to their enemy’s country, with
their chances of escape reduced by sleep deprivation, a bare minimum of food and water,
restraint with ropes and halters, and injuries calculated to cause pain yet minimally impede
their ability to walk and run: bruising blows to the torso, knife cuts to the shoulders or face,
and such injuries to the hands as pulling-out of fingernails or the severing of a finger joint, or
entire digit. Just as their captors’ performative ferocity was double-edged, aimed both at their
enemies but also themselves, the expected behaviour of captives was intended both to steel
their resolve and inflame their captors: when threatened with death and reminded of their
people’s past offenses, captives responded with bluff humour, stoicism, and the self-mastery
they had been taught since early childhood, singing and reminding their captors of the
inevitability of revenge. Once in their captors’ villages, enemy prisoners were subjected to
what Europeans likened to a form of military discipline known as “running the gauntlet,”
after which the fates of the individual captives were decided by elders from bereaved

155 “a deer or a moose”: Jesuit Relations 10: 225 (1636) cited in Evan Haefeli, “Kieft’s War and the Cultures of
Violence in Colonial America,” 21, in Michael A. Bellisles ed., Lethal Imagination: Violence and Brutality in
American History (New York and London: New York University Press, 1999), 17-40; red as colour of war:
Williamson, Powhatan Lords, 40-46; “It is solely through bravado” in Brumwell, White Devil, 92-93; “did not
appear to relish” in Alexander Henry the Elder, Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories,
Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (New York: I. Riley, 1809), 85-105; Gleach, Powhatan’s World, 47-50, 130;
Abler, “Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape,” 3-20; Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 3-71; Rushforth,
“Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance”; Rushforth, “ ‘A Little Flesh We Offer You’; Trigger,
Children of Aataentsic, 69-75; Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” 528–59; Richter, The
Ordeal of the Longhouse, 31-38, 58-74; Starna, “Northern Iroquoian Slavery”.

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families, clan mothers, civil chiefs, and other authorities. On the sliding scale of severity determined by age and sex, the fate of older men, especially men known or recognized as veteran war leaders and national enemies, was almost invariably the worst: over the course of several hours, villagers took turns reducing their most hated enemy, with blades and fire, to burnt flesh and charred bones. The fates of children and adolescents, particularly children young enough to adopt a new national identity, were on the opposite end of the spectrum: adoptees given the names of lost relatives were thought in a sense to be their reincarnations, a concept translated by French missionaries with the verb ressusciter, which could mean both revival and resurrection. Captives not hateful enough to be executed or young enough to be adopted were simply living bodies who filled in demographic gaps—they “replaced” the dead, which French translators glossed as remplacer, but were held under perpetual scrutiny. Though they, like real adoptees, were assigned the names of dead relatives, their position in the bonds of fictive kinship were that of the “dogs” mentioned above: slaves given less food or rest than other people, subjected to unpleasant or humiliating physical work, and liable to be physically abused if insubordinate, or killed if caught trying to escape. Enslaved women, assigned as secondary wives and concubines, could face the threat of sexual violence from captors, while young men were often traded further from the borders of their country as gifts to their captors’ allies. Compared to the productive and reproductive labour of adopted or enslaved captives, scalps or other enemy body parts were a decidedly secondary prize.156

156 Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 3-71; Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance”; on ressusciter and remplacer, see Rushforth, “ ‘A Little Flesh We Offer You’”, 784 n. 23, 785; Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 69-75; Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience”; Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, 31-38, 58-74; Abler, “Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism, and Rape”; Starna, “Northern Iroquoian Slavery”; Reséndez, The Other Slavery, 172-95.
Death by torture understandably terrified early modern Europeans, and other worst-case scenarios of the mourning-war complex, particularly what appear to be its two states of exception, were also subjected to polemical treatment from the contact period onwards (see the captivity-narratives discussion in Chapter 5). Euro-Americans, particularly Anglo-Americans, who sought to justify large-scale killings and their deliberate killing of Indian children and women seized on cases where white children or women were killed, or such large-scale killings as the Virginia Uprising of 1622, or the Tuscaroras’ sack of New Bern in 1711, as post facto justification. But the false equivalence posited in this model, often paired with a claim that Indians hated whites as categorically and universally as whites hated Indians, disappears upon closer investigation. In Frederic Gleach’s analysis, given that the purpose of mourning-war violence was to compel enemies to correct their ways, such large-scale attacks as occurred in 1622 or 1711—both of which strained the organizational and manpower possibilities of Powhatan and Tuscarora society to their limits—were last-ditch attempts to force intransigent and bothersome outsiders to accept indigenous terms of engagement; in Rountree and Turner’s words, Powhatan attacks on English trading partners signified “loss of patience with newcomers who did not know how to behave.” In both cases, these attacks followed Indian leaders’ repeated requests, all ignored, that European colonists stop building settlements deep within their territory. In both cases, these exemplary massacres were one-off events not followed by subsequent large-scale attacks; and, in the 1711 case, the Tuscaroras almost immediately tried to negotiate new terms of trade (see Chapter Four). If only to obtain European trade goods and weapons, indigenous leaders
wanted continued coexistence, not the ethnic cleansing or racialized serfdom Europeans intended for Indians.\(^{157}\)

Given the mourning-war complex’s preference for adopting children, and the relative ease of overpowering and transporting children over adults, the killing of children by raiders also constituted a state of exception or exigency: the cries of a child could give away their position while in enemy territory; the same is true of female captives, whose potential as childbearers made them much more preferable candidates for adoption than males. As noted by Richard White and Ian Steele, even in the context of the balkanized Pennsylvania and Ohio frontier of the mid-18th century, indigenous peoples who had been at war with Anglo-Americans for decades and, in the case of refugees like the Shawnees and Lenape-Munsees (or “Delawares”), had been driven to the Ohio Valley by white encroachment, still continued to adopt white captives, including teenage boys and adult men, into their villages. Ian Steele, in his study of Shawnee raids between 1754 and 1765, notes that “the Shawnees’ propensity for taking captives was not eroded by years of war in which their English-speaking enemies took no Shawnee prisoners at all.” This could be a point of pride, as some Lenape-Munsees chastised Moravian ambassador Christian Frederick Post in 1758: “We love you more than you love us; for when we take any prisoners from you, we treat them as our own children.” A broader point must be observed: while Europeans from the beginning of the contact period defined Indians as somehow categorically different, and innately inferior, to themselves, the reverse was very rare—as when Tenskwatawa, brother of Tecumseh, categorically ruled that

while Indians, the French, the Spanish, and the British were fully human, only white Americans were “scum of the great waters” spawned from malicious underwater beings.158

In the conflicts which followed, Indians and Europeans would discover another rift in their cultures’ attitudes towards war: even the most hostile European eyewitnesses noted that indigenous war parties in eastern North America did not rape or sexually abuse female captives in raids or on the road back to the village, and the sexual violence that did happen was both restricted to certain classes of enslaved women and long antedated war parties’ return from the battlefield. Early modern British or French observers, from a cultural tradition which officially disapproved of rape but quietly condoned it as an inevitable evil of war, could only interpret this asymmetry in sexual violence as evidencing some kind of cultural pathology among Indians: unusual discipline, weak libido, or a putative bloodlust. Twentieth-century anthropologists and ethnohistorians have focused on a broad North American pattern of war parties’ ritual abstinence and how, in the context of the mourning-war complex, the later incorporation of female captives into kin networks might turn sexual assault into retroactive incest. As Thomas Abler notes, the question is implicitly Eurocentric: “I am not certain that we should assume it is “natural” to rape [.]”159

159 Abler, “Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape,” 13-15 (13: cites Hugo Grotius, Law of War and Peace (1625): rape of women should not be permitted, though “you may read in many places that the raping of women in time of war is permissible”); Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 3-71. On European theories of male Indians’ or European creoles’ impotence or physical enervation, see Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World, 3-34, 111-22, 275-84, 402-17. In a scorched-earth campaign against the Onondagas during the American Revolution, Colonel Goose van Schaick’s forces apparently committed widespread rape of Iroquois women—despite a prior warning
“[A]lmost no one in eighteenth-century America or England,” writes Peter Silver, “seems to have realized that Indian war was designed by its practitioners to be precisely as terrifying as they found it.” In some cases, Indian warriors did manage to successfully communicate their frustration and contempt for Anglo-Americans through what Gleach calls “the violent application of irony.” In a mourning-war context, this appears in the arch sarcasm, faux-friendliness, and black humour expressed between captives and captors; in the case of frontier war with British colonists, Indians mocked Anglo-Americans’ insatiable desire for Indian land and its resources. During the Jamestown colony’s winter of 1609-10, the “Starving Time” of famine and disease which only 100 of 220 colonists survived, Captain John Smith sent groups of colonists out of the fort to sponge from the Indians’ food supplies. One of these bands, led by Captain John Martin, established winter quarters on an island at the falls of the James River after the Nansemonds had denied them permission to settle there. After a Nansemond counterattack, and after receiving news that two of their messengers had been killed by torture, Captain Martin’s band retaliated by sacking the sepulchers of the Nansemond weroances, stripping the pearls and copper left as burial goods. Shortly thereafter, George Percy wrote that Lt. John Sicklemore “and divers others were found also slain with their mouths stopped full of [corn] bread.” To Percy, this message was partially legible: it was “done as it seemeth in contempt and scorn that others might expect the like when they should come to seek bread and relief amongst them.” In the 1622 Uprising, British colonists were killed with their own hoes, hatchets, and shovels, other hand tools—the same

by General James Clinton to Schaick that “Bad as the savages are, they never violate the chastity of any women, their prisoners” and that “it will be well to take measures to prevent such a stain on our army.” The Onondagas filed angry complaints with the American government immediately after the raid; in 1816 an Onondaga chief, Teyoninhokarawen, wrote that van Schaick’s soldiers had treated their female prisoners “with the most shameful Barbarity.” See Barbara Alice Mann, George Washington’s War on Native America (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 30-33, 90.
ones which they lectured the Indians to adopt while using those same tools to push them off their own land. In the 1670s, during King Philip’s War, land-hungry British farmers buried up to their necks were taunted, “let us now see how you will grow when Planted into the Ground.” In 1791, after a coalition of Ohio peoples inflicted the United States’ largest historic defeat at Indian hands, Arthur St. Clair’s slain soldiers were found to have sod stuffed in their mouths, “satisfying in death their lust for Indian land.” As late as the Dakota Uprising of 1862, such a display of “violent irony” was applied to Andrew Myrick, the trader and storekeeper at Minnesota’s Redwood and Yellow Medicine agencies, who on two occasions publicly refused Dakota requests for food aid by telling them to “eat grass”; on the morning of 18 August, a warparty including his former Dakota brother-in-law riddled him with arrows, finished him off with an old scythe, and stuffed his mouth with grass.160

As with so much else in this thesis, the above discussion of the mourning-war complex has focused on worst-case scenarios, which Bret Rushforth notes served, in their extremity, as a deterrent, “because war councils knew that they risked their own people’s enslavement each time they authorized a raid.” Shared rituals and implements of diplomacy and conflict resolution, such as calumet pipes and wampum belts, offered ways to regulate, mediate, and forestall violence. Rather than coercive force, which the leaders of egalitarian societies did not possess the right to, collective responsibility among clan members offered ways to shame and punish leaders of unauthorized raids: the malefactor’s clan was responsible for “covering the dead,” and he was then indebted to pay back his relatives. To “raise up the dead” by offering a slave from another nation, to replace or requicken a dead

relative as the bereaved saw fit, was also a potent gift, especially if the captive was of a
nation both parties already disliked; returning a prisoner or adoptee to their own people was
the most powerful gesture of goodwill. While Europeans imagined Indians as warlike and
driven by their passions, indigenous people considered themselves as rational, logical, and
peaceable, as a Lenape-Munsee diplomat spelled out at a 1668 peace conference in
Burlington, New Jersey. He observed that wartime was as miserable for Indians as it was for
Europeans: “we are only skin and bones, […] we are always in fear, […] we hide in holes
and corners; we are minded to live at peace.” Addressing the post-1622 Anglo-American
narrative of Indians as sneaks and pre-emptive massacrists, he stated plainly that if “at any
time” his people wanted war with the English, “we will let you know of it, and the reasons
why we make war with you”; if the English “make us satisfaction” for the inciting “injury
done us, […] then we will not make war on you.” All he asked was that the English do the
same: “if you intend at any time to make war on us, we would have you let us know of it and
the reason”; if the Lenape-Munsee did not make satisfaction, “then you may make war on us,
otherwise you ought not to do it”.\footnote{Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 3-71, 103 (“because war councils…”); Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and
the Limits of Alliance”; Rushforth, “’A Little Flesh We Offer You’; Trigger, Children of Aataentsic, 69-75; Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience”;
Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, 31-38, 58-74; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 129-150; Abler, “Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism, and Rape”;
Starna, “Northern Iroquoian Slavery”; Reséndez, The Other Slavery, 172-95; White, The Middle Ground, 77 (“‘to raise up the dead’ […] or ‘to cover the dead’”);
J. Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott eds., Specimen Chapters of the History of Philadelphia (Philadelphia: L.H. Everts & Co., 1882), 33 (“we are only skin and bones…
ought not to do it”, my italics).}

In short, scalps and scalping, while having their own importance as trophies and
tokens of victory, were almost incidental to this to this paradigm of warfare, which makes its
later centrality in Anglo-American thought rather peculiar. A few basic observations could be
made here as to commonalities between indigenous North American and European violence
in the early modern Atlantic. Both drew culturally-specific distinctions between licit and illicit forms of violence, e.g., between execution and murder. Both considered their own forms of violence as normative, even aesthetic in some ways, while considering the other’s as peculiar and immoral in ways that ultimately prolonged and exacerbated conflicts. Both early modern Indians and Europeans deemed some internal and external enemies fit to be relegated to enslavement and other forms of social death, to be subjected to perpetual harrying in states of exception or states of siege, or publicly executed in scenes which Richard van Dülmen has aptly described as “theatres of horror,” acts reflecting Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics as the ultimate expression of sovereignty, “the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die.” Most important for the purposes of this thesis are violence’s function as communicative action, its nature as transgressive act, and its related need for imbued or imputed meanings to elevate an act of violence to a socially-constructive act, or to denigrate it as an action justifying a retributive or recompensatory act of violence in turn. “All human action is both symbolic and technical,” states Bruce Lincoln: “that is, it simultaneously communicates something and accomplishes something.” But what happens when communications are, across a cross-cultural divide, illegible?162

Mourning-war and total war: regimes of violence in early America, 1585-1676

As European and indigenous societies from Virginia to New England came into contact and into conflict in the first quarter of the 17th century, the sort of expedient misunderstandings which Richard White identifies in the interior in the later 17th century pointed the way towards short-lived middle grounds. In Virginia in December 1607, John Smith was imprisoned by a Powhatan Confederacy war party and held in captivity until January 1608. In his account relayed in A True Relacycion (1608) he initially attributed his survival, at least in part, to overawing his counterpart Opechcananough with a compass, a detail Philip Barbour notes he borrowed from Thomas Harriot’s 1588 account of Virginia. But Smith also described how Powhatan, “with a lowd oration,” “proclaimed me a werowances of Powhatan, and that all his subjects should so esteeme us, and no man account us strangers nor Paspaheghans, but Powhatans [.]” Twentieth century scholars interpret this as an act by Wahunsenecawh to subordinate the strangers by either recognizing Smith as an English weroance, a civil chief of a hereditary line, or deeming him the functional equivalent of one.163

Smith seems to have endorsed this, at least tacitly, in 1612’s A Map of Virginia, noting that in times of war, “the Werowances, women and children they put not to death but keepe them Captives.” In The Generall Historie of Virginia (1624), Smith presented a scene of his being threatened with execution, spared, and given a new name and title, in which the

163 Rountree and Turner, Before and After Jamestown; Gleach, Powhatan’s World; Williamson, Powhatan Lords; Barbour, Three Worlds; Barbour, Complete Works of; Fausz, “Opechcananough”; Margaret Holmes Williamson, Powhatan Lords of Life and Death, 47-72; J.A. Leo Lemay, Did Pocahontas Save Captain John Smith? (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1992).
Powhatans’ actions were legible via universalist terms of mercantile self-interest and royal power. In the ruler’s presence a crowd armed with clubs placed Smith’s head against two anvil-stones “to beate out his braines”; Wahunsenecawh’s 11-year-old daughter Matoaka, better known by her nickname or child’s name, Pocahontas, interposed; “whereat the Emperour was contented he should liue to make him hatchets, and her bells, beads, and copper [.]” As instances of adolescents making foreign-policy decisions are as conspicuously absent in the North American ethnographic record as they are in late medieval Europe, this was probably a prearranged scene of ritual mercy, a point Smith drives further when describing an event two days later. Powhatan, wearing black bodypaint, declared in front of a crowd of 200 “as blacke as himselfe” that Smith would be returned to Jamestown in exchange for two cannons and a grindstone, “for which he would give him the Country of Capahowosick,” a village near his capital, Werewocomoco, and “for ever esteeme him as his sonne Nantaquoud.” If Smith’s description of events is accurate, the Powhatans had decided to rerender the English as trading partners, with Smith instated as a middleman—an English weroance.\footnote{Rountree and Turner, \textit{Before and After Jamestown}; Gleach, \textit{Powhatan’s World}; Williamson, \textit{Powhatan Lords}; Barbour, \textit{Three Worlds}; Barbour, \textit{Complete Works of}; Fausz, “Opechancanough”; Margaret Holmes Williamson, \textit{Powhatan Lords of Life and Death}, 47-72; Lemay, \textit{Did Pocahontas Save Captain John Smith}?}

In northeastern North America, various underwater goods such as shell and Great Lakes copper had ritual power and significance, and cross-cultural exchanges of European metalwares could be informed by their categorization as prestige goods. In the case of the stratified Powhatan society of coastal Virginia, shell and copper prestige goods, including the mass-produced tin and copper ornaments and hawk’s-bells that British colonists traded for corn and food, cemented the power of chiefly lineages, a distinction lost on British observers
who imagined the Powhatans as overgrown children fascinated by cheap gewgaws, in Smith’s words “such trash.” In the conflicts that arose as the New Netherland colony was established at New Amsterdam on Manhattan Island and at Fort Nassau on the Hudson River in the 1610s, another marine trade good with ritual significance came to prominence in cross-cultural encounters: wampum, made from certain species of shellfish and used ritually in exchanges between potentially hostile peoples to absorb or dampen anger and other hostile, negative emotions. In diplomacy, strings of wampum sealed peace treaties and alliances and could be used to ransom captives, as the Hontom brothers Willem and Hans, and a trader named Jaques Elekes or Jacob Eelkens, discovered in the spring of 1620 when they received it as ransom for kidnapped Indians. Employees of the Netherlands’ West India Company soon discovered that wampum was widely accepted in the interior, offering a hybrid role as a medium of exchange in the fur trade and a form of ersatz currency for Europeans in the northeast: much lighter than iron and copper kettles and other metalwares, and more valuable than duffel cloth. Having learned that the Pequots controlled the production of wampum on the Long Island Sound, in 1622 Eelkens kidnapped a Pequot sachem to extort a fortune in wampum. Subsequent relations were not uniformly violent, and Dutch-Pequot relations were mutually-profitable from the early 1620s to the mid-1630s: Dutch trade provided iron and steel awls and drills, which allowed the mass production of wampum. The Pequots also extended their tributary network throughout the Connecticut River valley and throughout eastern Long Island, which furnished additional wampum, through its ritual use in vassalage: conquered sachemships gave wampum as a sign of their subordination but also of fealty, as their sovereigns were obligated to protect them. I had initially assumed that firearms would have played a role in this extension of Pequot power, but as Brian Given points out, as late as
1637 the Pequots were estimated by contemporary New Englanders to have no more than 16 guns, and while there are plentiful references to Pequot use of bows and arrows in the Pequot War, there are no references to their using firearms.165

Relations with the Mohawks, focused on Fort Nassau and its successor Fort Orange on the Hudson River, sprang from similarly violent encounters, but the tenuousness of Dutch presence in the interior is less of a “middle ground” than what Kathleen DuVal models as a “native ground” where indigenous peoples dictated terms to Europeans rather than compromising. In 1622, for reasons unknown, Hans Hontom kidnapped a Mohawk chief and, after the ransom had been paid, killed him sadistically by emasculation. In 1626, two years into the Mohawks’ four-year war (1624-28) to subjugate the Mahicans of the Hudson Valley and bar them from trading for guns at Fort Orange, the Dutch attempted to intervene on the Mahicans’ behalf by dispatching the fort’s commander, Daniel Van Kriechenbeeck, and six traders bearing firearms to join a Mahican raid into Mohawk territory. Kriechenbeeck and three traders were killed, a fourth was “well roasted” and ritually eaten, and the triumphant Mohawks brought home a Dutch arm and leg to signify their victory. Fort Orange being only 80 miles from their homeland, the Mohawks were strongly motivated to seal it off from Algonquian enemies like the Mahicans or the French-allied Innu and Algonquin to secure a source of firearms and trade goods for themselves, a state of affairs they managed to impose on the Dutch by 1628. In 1633, when Hans Hontom was appointed as the fort’s commander,

the Mohawks made their displeasure plain by besieging Fort Orange, slaughtering the WIC company director’s cattle on his nearby estate of Rensselaerswyck, and burning the company yacht at anchor.166

In the later 1610s in Virginia and the 1630s in New England and New Amsterdam, British and Dutch colonists began turning their attention away from the products of indigenous land produced through indigenous labour, and towards acquiring indigenous land itself as a saleable commodity, or a source of saleable commodities to be produced by Europeans, free or indentured European labourers, and enslaved Indians and Africans. In this turn towards colonial policies of driving Indians off their lands by force, obtaining land through conquest or questionable legal methods, and repopulation through mass migration, we see a turn towards what a recent branch of scholarship calls settler colonialism: “a winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement.”

Whereas the dominant model of Iberian and French colonialism in the 16th through 18th centuries was the partial assimilation of indigenous peoples via civilizing missions which would Hispanicize or Gallicize Indians into functionally ersatz Europeans within a _casta_ hierarchy obsessed with the intergenerational “breeding-out” of indigeneity among mestizos, the dominant model of colonialism in British North America, and less successfully in New Amsterdam, was a system of expansionist agrarianism which displaced indigenous peoples.

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and, through mass migration, rendered their presence and labour “superfluous.” The cultural implications of settler-colonial theory regarding the construction of European identity in the New World—summarized by Kevin Bruyneel as the dispossession of indigenous people and the subsequent appropriation of their iconography to manufacture an “indigenous” Euro-American identity—will be dealt with in later chapters. For the purposes of this chapter, I would like to note the relevance of Lorenzo Veracini’s observation that settler societies are “traumatised societies par excellence,” insofar as many of those early colonists willing to kill to take possession of a new land, and to stay permanently, have already been driven out of their own homelands for a variety of reasons (e.g., sectarian violence, dispossession, ethnic cleansing, deportation, enslavement) and may reenact the violence inflicted on them onto those they see as existential threats to their future survival.167

In London in 1617, a counsellor and relative of Wahunsenecawh known as Uttamatomakkin or Tocomoco expressed his surprise to John Smith: he had not yet had audience with the King or even been introduced to him, despite having brought him gifts from America. When Smith explained that he had, in fact, already seen James I from across a crowded room, “Then he replied very sadly, You gaue Powhatan a white Dog, which Powhatan fed as himselfe, but your King gaue me nothing, and I am better than your white Dog.” In an insurrectionary 1642 speech calling to drive the land-grabbing

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English out of the Long Island Sound in favour of the mercantilist Dutch, the Narragansett sachem Miantonomo explained the absolute, impersonal, and unreciprocal authority of the British monarch: even “if you would send him 100,000 fathom of wampum, he would not give you a knife for it, nor thank you.” A middle-ground relationship could not exist for long in conjunction with a settler-colonial paradigm of continual immigration and annexation of land for colonists’ exclusive use.168

In July 1585, during the early days of the Roanoke colony (1585-86), Sir Richard Grenville retaliated for the suspected theft of a silver cup by sacking Aquascogoc: “we burnt, and spoyled their corne, and Towne, all the people being fledde.” The friendliness of a local leader, Wingina, had made settlement at Roanoke seem possible, but by 1586 the indigenous people of the region had moved further inland and stopped paying tribute in food to English settlers, while Wingina signalled his changing attitude towards the newcomers by taking a new name, Pemisapan. As relations became mutually hostile, the governor Ralph Lane became convinced of a plot to destroy them which he dubbed “the conspiracy of Pemisapan,” and led a surprise attack on Pemisapan’s village on 1 June 1586. Lane later described the Indians’ deaths in terms which confirmed his certainty of their plot: “Pemisapan’s chief men and himself, had by the mercy of God for our deliverance, that which they had purposed for us.” Severely wounded, Pemisapan fled into the forest with Edward Nugent, “an Irish man serving me,” in hot pursuit; after a lengthy absence, Nugent returned from the woods “with

Pemisapans head in his hand.” Lane, upon returning to Roanoke, impaled Pemisapan’s head on a pole, “the traditional English postmortem mutilation for treason.”

Lane’s sign of mastery was empty: two weeks later, the colony was abandoned save for a 15-man garrison. A successive attempt to colonize Roanoke in 1587 only escaped total disaster through the ministrations of Manteo, a Carolina Algonquian who served as the expedition’s interpreter and negotiator, and John White’s description of events within the first six days of landfall on Roanoke Island invert Hakluyt’s boastful prediction of an easy victory over a “naked and unarmed” people. The fifteen soldiers left behind in 1586 were nowhere to be seen, and human bones were taken to be “one of those fifteen, which the Savages had slaine long before.” A few days later, the body of colonist George Howe was found in a tidal marsh, riddled with arrows and with his head bashed in. White attributed the killing to “divers Savages” who had crossed from the mainland, either to reconnoiter the English or to hunt deer, and had discovered Howe in the water looking for crabs “alone, almost naked, without any weapon, save only a small forked stick [.]” They “shotte at him in the water,” and after having “slaine him with their wooden swordes, beat his head in peeces,” before returning to the mainland. The colonists, including White, launched a surprise attack “so early that it was yet dark” on the village they thought responsible, only to find that they had accidentally attacked their allies the Croatoan.

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In European – indigenous alliances, each party could be unnerved by the other’s actions against mutual enemies. At its 1621 founding the Plymouth colony established good relations and a treaty of mutual defense with its neighbours the Wampanoags, who had been particularly hard-hit by a coastal plague in 1618-19 and needed strong allies to maintain their independence against other, more-intact sachemships in the interior. In 1623, the Wampanoag sachem Massasoit warned Plymouth of a broad Indian conspiracy against them involving several sachemships but orchestrated primarily by the Massachusett, rivals of the Wampanoag who had escaped the epidemic relatively unharmed. They also stated that the Massachusett were about to attack the settlement of Wessagusset, which Bernard Bailyn characterizes as a rough outpost which had antagonized the Massachusett throughout the winter of 1622-23: when, for instance, one of the men stationed there was caught stealing the Massachusetts’ seed corn, his fellows hanged him “to give the Indians content.” Early in 1623 Plymouth dispatched Captain Miles Standish, a 36-year-old veteran of the Netherlands wars, to lead soldiers to Wessagusset, where they lured eight of the chief Massachusett warriors one by one into a blockhouse and stabbed them to death. Standish returned with the head of “the bloody and bold villain” Wituwamat, “the chiefest of them,” and impaled it atop Plymouth’s blockhouse, where it was publicly displayed for almost a year; when Massasoit came to visit Plymouth, Standish greeted him by hanging a linen cloth soaked with Massachusett blood from the fort. An observation by Thomas Morton, an Indian trader banished from New England for his Anglicanism and excessively-friendly relations with the Indians, points interestingly towards the later ethnonym “Big Knives” which would later be bestowed on Anglo-American frontiersmen: after Wessagussett, Morton wrote that
Algonquians began calling the English “Wotowequenage, which in their language signifies stabbers or Cutthroats.”

Collisions between Algonquian and British rituals and definitions of licit violence continued during and after the Pequot War (1636-38) and King Philip’s War (1675-76). In October 1639 in Quinnipiac (later New Haven), “an Indian, called Messatunck, alias Nepaupuck,” was arrested and charged with murder for actions he had supposedly committed during the Pequot War: slaying a Mr. Finch in the attack on Wethersfield, complicity in killing three Englishmen in a shallop on the Connecticut, having “captivated one of Mr. Swain’s daughters,” and showing the Pequot sachem Sassacus the severed hands of Englishmen he had slain. The suspect, who had initially denied that he was Nepaupuck, confessed to be him, and resolved to meet his end in mourning-war fashion: he “boasted that he was a great captain” who had killed Finch “and had his hands in other English blood. He said he knew he must die and was not afraid of it, but laid his neck to the mantle-tree of the chimney,” and expressed a willingness to die by beheading or in any way save immolation, as “fire was God, and God was angry with him, therefore he would not fall into his hands.” He was beheaded on the following day and his severed head impaled in the town square. In July 1676, the Mohegans asked a Narragansett prisoner given them by the English whether he had enjoyed the war, to which he replied that he “found it as sweet, as the English Men did their Sugar.” The prisoner, who Jill Lepore suggests may have been a Narragansett stonemason known as Stonewall John, then boasted that he had killed nineteen Englishmen

during the war and killed a Mohegan to make an even twenty. William Hubbard, who Lepore notes took all this at face value, damned him as an “unsensible and hard-hearted Monster.”\textsuperscript{172}

While the scalp was the visible symbol of a broader mourning-war system, the severed heads British colonists impaled on poles represented a hierarchical European system of warfare aimed at reinforcing the power of the monarchy and, in the early modern period, an increasingly-expanding state. While not all members of European fighting forces were military specialists, and could include a significant proportion of conscripts, peasants pressed into service by their lords, militias, and other volunteers, military campaigns against external and internal enemies were led and directed by a full-time warrior aristocracy. In those campaigns, both lords and commoners fed themselves and recouped their expenses by plundering the enemy, and towns and cities which refused surrender during sieges were subjected to merciless looting as punishment if the walls fell. The torture and public execution of enemies of the state, such as rebel leaders and heretics, were performed by a small group of professional executioners whose wages were supplemented by the sale of mementoes and body parts from the condemned which, notes Beth Conklin, could be treated as market commodities, as in August 1676 following the death of King Philip. After the ranger captain Benjamin Church ordered his “old Indian executioner” to quarter and suspend Philip’s body from trees, he then gifted the ranger who had fired the fatal shot, a Christian convert or “Praying Indian” named John Alderman, with Philip’s head and his scarred right hand, which bore distinctive marks from an exploding pistol. Philip’s wampum belt, bow,

\textsuperscript{172} On Nepaupuck’s trial, see Cave, \textit{Pequot War}, 162-63; Jon C. Blue, \textit{The Case of the Piglet’s Paternity: Trials from the New Haven Colony, 1639-1663} (Wesleyan University Press, 2015), 26-32; Benjamin Trumbull, \textit{A Complete History of Connecticut, Civil and Ecclesiastical}, Volume I (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin, 1797), 112, and Leonard Bacon, \textit{Thirteen Historical Discourses, on the completion of Two Hundred Years, from the beginning of the first church in New Haven} (New York: Gould, Newman & Saxton, 1849), 339-344.
war club, and other personal effects were doled out among prominent New Englanders as
trophies, and his head was purchased from Alderman to be impaled on a pole and displayed
at Plymouth for Thanksgiving. But Alderman retained Philip’s hand, which he reportedly
preserved in a bucket of rum, and earned “many a penny” for showing it to gentlemen. Pre-
existing trends in European warfare suggest, but do not fully explain, the later instatement of
scalp bounties.173

Virginia, from landfall to massacre to vengeance, 1607 to 1622

In May of 1607, the Virginia Company made first landfall at Cape Henry at the
southern mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. Returning to the boats around dusk, Captain
Christopher Newport’s party of 30 men were, in the words of Captain John Smith, “assaulted
by 5 Salvages; who hurt two of the English very dangerously.” On the first night at the
Jamestown settlement site, Paspahegh messengers announced well after midnight that their
weroance, whose village was on the mainland adjacent to the Jamestown peninsula, would
shortly arrive with a “fat deer.” Instead he arrived with one hundred warriors, and a battle
nearly began when an Englishman struck an Indian he accused of stealing a hatchet. After a
few days of attempts to gain access to Jamestown under the guise of delivering venison, two
hundred Paspahegh warriors attacked the as-yet unfortified site on 27 May. A boy and a man
were killed and 10 were wounded with arrows; if not for cannonfire from the three ships
anchored in harbour, wrote Smith, “our men had all beene slaine [.].” While the villages

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closest to Jamestown were waylaying colonists found outside the fort, villages further away like the Arrohattoc and Pamunkey began trading with them. As violence had failed to dislodge this new wave of Europeans, the leaders of the Powhatan Confederacy accepted trade while considering their options.  

British consideration of the Indians was scattered, but fear and contempt were powerful trends from the beginning. William Strachey was an early advocate for contempt, imagining the Indians as a reflection of what the British might still be like if the Romans had never come to Britain:

We might yet have lyved overgrowne Satyrs, rude and untutred, wandring in the woodes, and dwelling in Caves, and hunting for our dynners… prostituting our daughters to straungers, sacrificing our Children to our Idolls.

In place of this Savagist fantasy, the Indians had to be civilized by force, an act Strachey likened to a father beating his child “to bringe him to goodnes.” Gabriel Archer, more apprehensive, summarized their “skirmishes” as “violent, cruel and full of celerity; they use a tree to defend them in fight, and having shot an enemy that he fall, they maul him with a short wooden sword.” In December 1607, Opechancanough’s war party preceded the capture of John Smith by executing a luckless member of John Smith’s foraging expedition named George Cassen. Smith described his death as that of an archetypal “malefactour”: tied to a tree, “his executioner,” using knives of sharpened cane or musselshell, cut off his fingers and toes and threw them into a fire, “then doth he proceed with shels and reeds to case the skinne

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from his head and face” before disemboweling him and setting fire to the tree—“Thus they themselves reported they executed George Cassen.”

The pseudo-conquistador fantasy of the early years of the Jamestown colony, in which the colonists would buy or demand food from the Indians while they searched for minerals in the Piedmont, turned towards forced requisitions as the corn-to-copper exchange rate plummeted from a surfeit of cheap English trade goods. In January 1609, Smith and other Jamestown leaders began raiding and intimidating Powhatan villages, particularly Opechancanough’s village of Pamunkey and even Werewocomoco itself. Governor George Percy, in his “Trewe Relacyon,” wrote of dispatching Captain William West during the famine winter of 1609-10 to obtain corn from the Patawomecks, which he did, through “some harshe and Crewell dealing by Cutteinge of[.] tow[e] of [the] Salvages heads and other extremetyes.” Other colonists were sent out to survive by esconcing themselves in Indian villages or camping alongside shellfish deposits, in defiance of Wahunsenecawh’s instructions that Smith was to limit his people’s presence to Jamestown; Smith even founded a settlement very close to Werewocomoco at the falls of the James River. Other colonists defected: as late as 1612, the Spanish ambassador to England informed Madrid that 40 to 50 men were now living with Indian women outside of Jamestown.

After Smith’s return to England in October 1609, mutual hostility reached a new level after July 1610, when new governor Sir Thomas Gates and his compatriot Sir Thomas West,

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176 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 213-48; Rountree and Turner, Before and After Jamestown; Williamson, Powhatan Lords; Gleach, Powhatan’s World.
the Lord De La Warr, imposed martial law on the colony and inaugurated a campaign of total war against the Powhatans. Alongside the “casual labourers, rural vagrants, and urban drifters” who had travelled with De La Warr from Britain were “a large contingent” of perhaps 150 “old soldiers,” seasoned and hardened in the conquest of Ireland and the wars against Spain in the Netherlands, whom Hakluyt described as “hammerours” sent to “prepare” the Indians for “our preachers’ hands.” While De la Warr, Gates, and Sir Thomas Dale imposed a “draconian” code within the walls of Jamestown and the bounds of English settlement, meting out hanging, burning, staking, shooting, and breaking on the wheel for various criminal and moral offenses, the “hammerours” set out per the Virginia Company’s revised instructions: to obtain the Indians’ corn and labour through force, as “they will never feede you but for feare.” Furthermore, “in case of necessity, or conueniency, we pronounce it not crueltie nor breache of Charity to deale more sharpeley with them.” Gates set out to reinforce the cultural divide by ordering Wahunseneawh to return any fugitives among his people and the various firearms they had reportedly acquired; his response, that “we should depart his country, or confine ourselves to Jamestown only,” was ignored.177

George Percy and a body of 70 troops enacted an exemplary massacre in 1610 against the Paspaheghs, Jamestown’s long-suffering neighbours, when they refused to turn over an English runaway. Percy records that they “put some fifteen or sixteen to the sword”—historian Ian Steele tallies the total dead as over 65—then cut down the cornfields, burned the village, took the “queen and her children” as prisoners, then killed them, a clear violation of Powhatan rules regarding weroance lineages. Four other punitive expeditions, including one...

to Powhatan’s village, were made in 1610 alone. The Powhatan point of view was further expressed in a victory song William Strachey recorded after three or four Englishmen were killed, and a sailor and a boy taken prisoner. This “scornefull song” mocked the British for being so well armed with guns, swords, and axes which now belonged to the Indians, and an aspects of the refrain, “Whe, whe,” onomatopoeically mocked the “lamentation our people made”—or, as Joyce Chaplin suggests, the shrieks of English captives during torture. Either way, the Powhatans appear to have expressed their disgust with a people so free with killing but so lacking in self-control.  

In the context of early modern European warfare, the scope and scale of British violence against the Powhatans followed partly from established practice and partly from recent experience. Many members of the Virginia Company had participated directly or indirectly in the conquest of Ireland, where the western half of the island was subjugated in scorched-earth campaigns which destroyed villages, forts, holy sites, fields, granaries, herds, and houses, then hunted displaced peasants or simply deprived them of food and shelter in the most inclement months; as the Lord Deputy of Ireland put it, “A Million swords will not do them so much harm as one winter’s famine.” This war had a certain xenophobic edge, as noted in Chapter 2: as well as the longstanding belief that the Irish were savages, sectarian and political designations made them thrice-damned as barbarians, rebels, and Papists. But, as Audrey Horning points out, comparison between Ireland and Virginia should not be pushed too far: English and Scottish settlers in Ireland coexisted with Irish neighbours, a

shared legal code and culture facilitated communications, and the Irish nobility could be co-opted into the British ruling class, none of which applied to Anglo-Powhatan relations. And where British colonists and soldiers in Ireland could travel back to England in a very short span of time, the same could not be said of the journey across the Atlantic, which essentially marooned them in a New World.\textsuperscript{179}

The First Anglo-Powhatan War (1609-14 or 1610-14) ended in 1614 when Matoaka, captured by the British, was married to John Rolfe and christened Rebecca. But the seeds for future conflict—no pun intended—were sown by Rolfe’s introduction of “Orinoco tobacco” \textit{(Nicotiana tabacum)}. The old, pseudo-conquistador strategy of English rule over Indian farmers and labourers, who would ultimately extract and refine whatever saleable commodities the colonists eventually discovered, was replaced by a settler-colonial strategy of turning the land itself, particularly the fertile riparian soil which the Indians farmed and fished, into a saleable commodity for the cash-cropping of tobacco by petty criminals and the urban poor who would otherwise, in Hakluyt’s words, “be devoured by the gallows.” But these two incompatible strategies were pursued simultaneously between 1614 and 1622.

While Powhatans were employed in English agricultural and artisanal labour and Protestant missions, including the kidnapping of children, were extended, the colony annexed thousands of acres of Powhatan land—“essentially the entire James River drainage in the coastal plain,” notes Gleach. As Powhatan labourers were steadily pushed off the land with which they fed themselves, legal reforms opened up Virginia to further investment and immigration. The headright system of 1618 pointed the way to Virginia’s future tobacco-planter oligarchy by

\textsuperscript{179} “one winter’s famine”: Kiernan, \textit{Blood and Soil}, 169-212; Horning, \textit{Ireland in the Virginian Sea}, 17-176; Bailyn, \textit{The Barbarous Years}. 
granting 50 acres of Virginian land to every immigrant who paid their own passage and
stayed for at least 3 years, while giving 50 acres to entrepreneurs for each indentured
servant’s passage they paid for.180

In 1618, Wahunsenecawh died and was succeeded by Opechancanough, whose
publicly conciliatory attitude was taken at face value by British colonists. As Fausz observes,
during his tenure the Powhatans were acquiring increasing numbers of firearms and
becoming keen marksmen, as evidenced by the occasional shooting of a colonist; since, to
the English, such one-off killings were not considered warfare, the colonists were blissfully
unaware of the depth of actual Powhatan hostility against them. In 1621, Opechancanough
took a new name, Mangopeesomon, and denied a report by the weroance of Accomac that he
was planning a massive attack against the Virginia Colony, to be signalled by the reinterment
of Wahunsenecawh’s bones. Mangopeesomon also insisted that the shooting of a holy man
known as Jack of the Feathers, who was out of favour in Powhatan politics at that time
anyways, would not imperil the peace. And so, on the early morning of March 22, 1622,
Powhatan hired hands, employees, and neighbours appeared as they did every morning at the
houses, farms, and tobacco plantations of the newly-established western settlements, “with
Deer, Turkies, Fish, Furres, and other provisions, to sell, and trucke with us, for glasse,
beades, and other trifles,” wrote the company secretary, Edward Waterhouse:

yea in some places, [they] sate downe at Breakfast with our people at their tables, whom
immediately with their owne tooles and weapons, eyther laid downe, or standing in their
houses, they basely and barbarously murthered, not sparing eyther age or sexe, man, woman

180 Rountree, *Powhatan Foreign Policy*, 183-87; Bailyn, *The Barbarous Years*, 100; Horning, *Ireland*, 156-176;
Way of War*, 21-52.
or childe: so sodaine in their cruell execution, that few or none discerned the weapon or blow that brought them to destruction.\textsuperscript{181}

The Powhatan Confederacy’s strike against the Virginia colony had been carefully planned and timed for maximum psychological impact to literally unsettle the colonists, particularly their sense of security and their convictions of religious superiority over the Indians. Not only were the colonists’ winter food supplies at their lowest point before spring planting, but 22 March that year fell between Ash Wednesday and Easter, the significance of which in the Christian calendar had long been drummed into the Powhatans by British missionaries. While Gleach notes that the oldest and most easterly settlements “emerged unscathed,” the western settlements recently established deep in Powhatan territory were hit hardest, and some were wiped off the map. Out of a total settler population of 1,240, over 320 were killed, and their bodies mutilated to show the Powhatans’ anger. Analysis of the skeleton of one colonist, found by archaeologists at the Martin’s Hundred plantation, showed he was killed by a blow to the forehead with an iron spade, then had the back of his head crushed by a club, and a portion of his scalp cut off on the left side of his head in the Powhatan fashion.\textsuperscript{182}

After killing a quarter of the colony’s population, the Powhatans stopped, and no further attacks, beyond skirmishes or one-off killings, followed. Despite an apocryphal story which claimed that a loyal Powhatan domestic servant had saved Jamestown by informing his masters of the plot, Jamestown itself was never even approached by war parties. As the Powhatans obtained valuable trade goods and firearms from Jamestown, which they used

\textsuperscript{181} Waterhouse cited in Horning, \textit{Ireland in the Virginian Sea}, 170-71, 285-86 (Opechancanough / Mangopeesomon’s preparations for the attack); Fausz, “Opechancanough”; Rountree and Turner, \textit{Before and After Jamestown};


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against their Siouian Piedmont enemies to the west, containment of the Virginia colony was their purpose, not extirpation. While no mention of scalping appears to have been made in text or images depicting the 1622 attack, all the narratives scalping would later encapsulate were present: colonists’ accounts dwelt at great length on its unexpected and, in their minds, unprovoked nature, on the ingratitude and treachery of the Indians, and on their dismemberment of the colonists’ bodies which evidenced their irrational ferocity. Anglo-American perceptions of the attack as an anarchic, reverse-colonial invasion of their domestic space by the Indians are captured visually in Matthäus Merian’s 1628 engraving Indian Massacre of 1622, derived from an earlier illustration in Theodor de Bry’s America for a Dutch anthology published in Leyden.183

Michael Householder observes that this engraving denotes “an important shift in colonial British-American ideology that occurred between Jamestown and Mystic.” Early descriptions of violent encounters with indigenous people by George Best, Ralph Lane, John Smith, and others, had focused on the material causes for the violence of armed British soldiers and adventurers against Indians, e.g., property theft, exposure of a conspiracy, or general recalcitrance. But by emphasizing the helplessness and unpreparedness of those killed by the Powhatans, the British were encouraged “to imagine themselves as victims first.” In Merian’s foreground, loincloth-clad Indian warriors armed with knives and mace-shaped clubs, many sporting North American-style roached haircuts, a few with Brazilian-style feather bonnets and one wearing an entire bird as headgear, attack unarmed colonists at a set breakfast table and in the streets of what is meant to be Jamestown, while in the

background canoes packed with more warriors arrive from the Chesapeake Bay. The juxtaposition between peaceful English industriousness and warlike Indian savagery is made plain in the far right foreground, where an Indian warrior wielding a butcher knife is about to stab an Englishman in the back; the man, trimming wood with a broadaxe and preoccupied, is totally unaware of the Hell that has swallowed Jamestown. In the mid-left, a weeping mother and her baby lie on the ground pleading for mercy as an Indian warrior readies a two-handed blow with an enormous wooden mace. To the right, another woman and her child are being stabbed by another warrior with a gigantic butcher knife; between them, an Indian warrior drags a man by the arm, perhaps to dismember him.  

Working themselves into a fury over the Indians’ ingratitude towards them, Virginia Company directors and colonists dehumanized their enemy by Savagist comparisons to animals and called for their total annihilation: all Powhatans were now an obstacle to the development of Virginia. “[N]ow they feare we may beat them out of their dens,” wrote John Smith in 1622, “which Lions and Tygers would not admit but by force.” While even fierce beasts, as in the fable of Androcles and the lion, could feel gratitude, the Powhatans were “more fell than Lyons or Dragons,” wrote Edward Waterhouse in *Relation of the Barbarous Massacre* (1622); they had “not only put off humanity, but put on a worse and more then unnatural bruitishnesse” as evidenced by their treatment of the dead colonists. They “fell after againe upon the dead, making as well as they could, a fresh murder, defacing, dragging, and mangling the dead carkasses into many pieces, and carrying some parts away in derision, with base and bruitish triumph.” Waterhouse presented the death of Captain George Thorpe,

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184 Householder, *Inventing Americans in the Age of Discovery*, 177-198, “as victims first” (187), “shared cultural identity” (198); Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbours*. 
a prominent colonist and landowner, as typical of their ingratitude towards their benefactors: his killers were a “viperous brood” who “cruelly and fiercely, out of devilish malice, did so many barbarous despiets and foul scorns after to his dead corpse, as are unbefitting to be heard by any civil ear”. The poet, Christopher Brooke, more succinctly called the Indians “the very dregs, garbage, and spawne of Earth.”

From the level of Company directorship downwards, a perverse joy at no longer having to show any kind of restraint towards the Indians was openly expressed. The colony’s governor and council ruled in 1622 that “wee hold nothinge unjuste, that may tend to their ruine, (except breach of faith).” “Our hands which before were tied with gentlenesse and faire usage,” wrote Waterhouse in *A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia* (1622), “are now set at liberty by the treacherous violence of the Savages, not untying the Knot, but cutting it”; colonists “may now by right of Warre, and law of Nations, invade the Country, and destroy them who sought to destroy us.” Gifted a vast haul of military surplus from the Crown, e.g., swords, halberds, armour, firearms and a few cannons from the Tower of London, the directors of the Virginia Company wrote their deputies in August 1622 to wage “a perpetuall warre without peace or truce” against the Indians. Punitive expeditions set out from Jamestown to harry the Indians per the instructions issued by the Company’s directors in August 1622:

surprisinge them in their habitations, intercepting them in theire hunting, burninge theire Townes, demolishing theire Temples, destroyinge theire Canoes, plucking upp theire weares,

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carying away theire Corne, and depriving them of whatsoever may yeeld them succor or relief.

As in the Irish wars, the Second Anglo-Powhatan War (1622-32) targeted an elusive foe indirectly by destroying food and shelter. Summer attacks were timed to destroy the growing corn when it was too late in the year to replant, while towns and stored food were burned in winter to drive Powhatans into the cold. John Grenier observes that the colony’s military rosters for 1623 denote 80 of the 180 men fit for military service as assigned to “carying corn”: their sole task in these attacks was to destroy cornfields. In a special company of 60 Indian-fighters created by the Virginia Council in 1624, twenty-four were “employed only in the Cutting down of Corn [.]”

The premise that the Indians had intended genocide against the English informed a further Company decree in October 1622, specifying that their “sharp revenge uppon the bloody miscreantes” should extend “even to the measure that they intended against us, the rooting them out from being longer a people uppon the face of the Earth.” Bernard Bailyn has observed that the ferocity of 17th-century European campaigns against Indians only had precedent in the states of exception in European warfare: “the merciless slaughter and devastation reserved for conquered towns and cities that refused to surrender when sieged; domestic rebels who openly challenged established regimes; or heretics whose radical doctrines threatened to destroy the stability of civil society.” Informed by the Iberian precedent of using mastiffs as weapons of terror in the Caribbean, Mesoamerica and Florida, and perhaps following the dehumanization of Indians to its logical conclusion, colonists’

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demands for vengeance began to include explicit calls to hunt the Indians. In *A Declaration*... Waterhouse proposed that in driving the Indians westward into the Piedmont and “animating and abetting their enemies against them,” the colonists should hunt them like animals, riding them down with horses and mastiffs to “seaze” them. The settlers’ “Game,” wrote George Wyatt to his son Francis, the governor of Virginia, “are the fierce and wild Savages haunting the Deserts and woods,” some of whom should be “taken in Nets and Toils alive, reserved to be made tame” and enslaved, while “the most bloody” should “be rendered to due revenge of blood and cruelty”. Captain John Martin’s “The Manner Howe to Bringe the Indians into Subjection” (December 1622) drew similar, slightly less genocidal conclusions: since “holy writt” precluded the total annihilation of the Indians and since their souls could be saved, they should be converted to Christianity and put to work clearing the forest for settlers and hunting bears and wolves.  

**Conclusion: “parte of ther heades”**

In a letter dated 9 June, 1623, an English merchant and Jamestown colonist named Edward Bennett informed his brother Robert, after cataloguing their family business ventures on both sides of the Atlantic, that “Newse I have not anye worthe the wryting but onlye this”. What follows is a violent and, for the purposes of this thesis, infuriatingly cryptic story. On 22 May, 1623, a Captain Daniel Tucker had led 12 men up the Chesapeake River to negotiate terms with the Keskiack Indians regarding peace between them and the Virginia colonists

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and the return of British hostages. Tucker, however, had poisoned the wine with which the Keskiacks would toast their armistice. “yt is thought some tooe hundred weare poisoned,” wrote Edward, and on the way back to the colony Tucker’s men “killed som 50 more and brought hom parte of ther heades.” This, Bennett opined,

wilbe a great desmayinge to the blodye infidelles. We purpose god willinge after we have wedid our Tobaco and cornne with the helpe of Captn Smythe and otheres to goe upon the Waresquokes and Nанsemomes [Nansemonds] to cute downe ther corne and put them to the sorde. God sende us vyctrie, as we macke no question god asistinge.188

Bennett’s letter never elaborates on which “pieces of their heads” Captain Tucker and his men took, and the backers of the Virginia Company condemned Tucker’s betrayal of the Keskiacks and censured the doctor who had provided the captain with the poison.189

Virginia would not be the last Anglo-American frontier where Indians were openly compared to dangerous animals, where poisoned food or drink were used to kill them in the manner of wolves, or where the use of attack dogs to “seaze” them would be at least proposed if not acted upon. In Virginia, whose tobacco economy had made it the prototypical British settler-colonial colony by the 1620s, the first stabs at extirpationist warfare had been taken. As shall be seen in Chapter 4, when combined with the attempted cross-cultural communication of ad hoc body-part bounties in the Pequot War and Kieft’s War, the stage was set for scalp hunting and dark colonial mimesis of Indian warriors’ imagined savagery to metastasize into a new, distinct form of Anglo-American colonial violence.


189 Rountree and Turner, in Before and After Jamestown: “The colony’s governor later denied that it happened. Meanwhile, the colony’s backers, the Virginia Company of London, censured the doctor at Jamestown for having provided the poison” (175, note 2); Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 169-248; Horning, Ireland in the Virginian Sea, 3-176, 271-368.
Chapter Four: “A Pound of Flesh”: Slavery and scalp bounties in Anglo-American frontier warfare, 1636 to 1725

The pound of flesh, which I demand of him,
Is dearly bought: ‘tis mine and I will have it.
–Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (1594), Act 4, Scene 1

Upon the Indian skins they carv’d their name.
–Benjamin Tompson, New-England’s Crisis (1676)\textsuperscript{190}

Prologue: the scalping chaplain

In November 1724 John Lovewell II, the son of a ranger in Captain Benjamin Church’s company during King Philip’s War, petitioned the Massachusetts General Assembly alongside Joshua Farnwell and Jonathan Robbins for funds to lead 40 to 50 volunteers into Maine for an expedition against the Abenakis, “in order to kill and destroy their enemy Indians, provided they can meet with Encouragement suitable.” The Assembly negotiated their asking price of 5 shillings a day downwards to 2s6d per day, but offered piecework: £100 for each male Indian’s scalp they returned to Boston. Their first expedition returned with the scalps of a man and a young boy, for which they received £200 on top of their daily wages. Lovewell and his rangers entered Boston in triumph after their second expedition in February 1725, proudly displaying ten Abenaki scalps hooped and displayed on poles; for this they received £1,000 from the public treasury, plus £7 each for the Abenakis’ French-manufactured guns. New England supporters claimed they must have forestalled some French plot: “some attempt against the Frontiers of New Hampshire was prevented,” eulogized Thomas Symmes in his 1725 sermon “Lovewell Lamented.” By contrast, in the 1780s Ecuadorian encyclopedist Antonio de Alcedo referenced the incident

damningly: “The English boast of this stain on humanity, and they attack the cruelties of the Spaniards in America, which certainly occurred but did not reach that level of barbarism.”

In the spring of 1725, Lovewell and a small party of 47 men, many of whom were Boston town-dwellers unfamiliar with ranging, set out against the Abenaki village of Pequawket. Ambushed by a much larger force of 100 warriors, Lovewell was killed in the first volley, and only 12 of the party returned to Massachusetts. The defeat of Captain Lovewell’s scalp hunters became a borderland ballad, “The Song of Lovewell’s Fight,” hailing the “worthy Captain Lovewell” and “his valiant soldiers,” who served “his country and his King” against the “rebel Indians.” Prefiguring Custer’s last stand, the balladeers rewrote events to transform Lovewell into a canny wilderness fighter who figured out the Indians’ ambush immediately (“This rogue is to decoy us, I very plainly see”). Interestingly, the roll call of heroic scalp-lifters included a priest:

Our worthy Captain Lovewell, among them there did die;  
They killed Lieutenant Robbins, and wounded good young Frye,  
Who was our English chaplain: he many Indians slew,  
And some of them he scalped, while bullets round him flew.

Scalping was so publicly acceptable in frontier society by the 1720s that Lovewell wore a wig fashioned from Indian scalps, and the company chaplain Jonathan Frye, a 1723 graduate of Harvard College, was no less adept than his secular peers: he took his fatal wound after

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192 Older accounts stylize Pequawket as “Pigwacket.” A complete reprint of “The Song of Lovewell’s Fight,” cited as “from the valuable Historical Collections of Farmer and Moore,” is included in the Appendix of Samuel G. Drake’s 1829 reprint (Exeter, NH: J&B Williams, 1829) of Thomas Church, Esq., The History of Philip’s War, commonly called the Great Indian War, of 1675 and 1676. Also, of the French and Indian Wars at the Eastward in 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696, and 1704 (first edition Boston 1716, second edition Newport 1772), 330-335. See also Grenier, First Way of War, 47-52; Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence, 180-222.
scalping two Abenakis. His fiancée elegized him as “that young student, Mr. Frye, / Who in his blooming youth did die, .../ A comely youth and pious too.” Other New Englanders seemed to see no contradiction in a man of the cloth scalping people; the town built on the site of Peqwauket was named ‘Fryeburg.’

My first section, “Extirpationist genesis, 1636 – 1676,” surveys general patterns of European warfare against indigenous North Americans, and how and why the British colonies came to favour extirpation to a much greater degree than Dutch, French, and Spanish competitors, in the Pequot War, Kieft’s War, and King Philip’s War. Where the first section looks at war in the northeastern colonies, my second section, “The rise and fall of the British Indian slave trade, 1660 to 1717,” studies the British colonies of the Southeast from the foundation of the Carolina colony to the Tuscarora War and Yamasee War. In both theatres, British colonists paid allied Indians for prisoners to enslave and offered bounties for body parts, increasingly favouring scalps. My epilogue, “The Ranger tradition and the myth of the Indian hunter,” points to the beginnings of a distinct British North American military tradition which would provide the seedbed for the myth of the Indian hunter and dark mimesis.

Exirpationist genesis, 1636 – 1676

The use of scorched-earth tactics and the commodification of indigenous bodies, live or dead, in frontier warfare were not unique to the British North American colonies but general practice of Europeans following Iberian precedent. On New Spain’s northern borderlands in the present-day American Southwest such a pattern was set during the Chichimec wars (1546-1590): mounted troops salaried by the Crown rode from the presidios, which combined the functions of garrison, fortress, and prison, to join allied Indians to seek and destroy enemy villages. But the viceroyalty could or would not pay wages in full, and the most direct way for presidial soldiers to supplement their income was to sell prisoners of war into slavery, or retain them within the presidio as sweatshop labour under multi-year sentences of hard labour. As J.H. Elliott observes, “self-financing warfare guaranteed its own prolongation”; in 1587 Viceroy Marqués de Villamanrique determined that the slave trade was driving the Chichimec wars, as presidial troops attacked Chichimec bands uninvolved with or at peace with Spain to provoke retaliations and obtain captives. European campaigns of property destruction were also levied by New France in its wars with the Iroquois Confederacy in the second half of the 17th century, with the incursions of the Carignan-Salières regiment into Iroquoia in the 1660s and subsequent campaigns in the late 1680s through 1690s; as will be seen later in this chapter, New France also waged for-profit warfare in the form of its 18th-century slave trade, offered scalp bounties, and in the case of the Natchez Wars fought at least one extirpationist war where agricultural land and settler-colonial considerations were the motivating factors.194

But to a greater extent than either, the British colonies in this period of study instituted a distinct Anglo-American paradigm of warfare. Large-scale wars of extirpation, depopulation, and ethnic cleansing were combined with mass resettlement and large-scale land speculation. In the period of study I outline the process by which the cross-cultural pidgin of a trade in captives and, specifically, *ad hoc* scalp bounties, was pioneered in northeastern North America alongside British and Dutch settler-colonial colonies in the Pequot War (1636-38), Kieft’s War (1640-45), and King Philip’s War (1675-76).

While the **Pequot War (1636-38)** saw joint participation between New England colonists, the Narragansetts, and the Mohegans against the Pequots, only the New Englanders sought to commit genocide against even the name “Pequot.” Through the early 1630s the Pequots’ monopoly over Dutch trade goods was being increasingly challenged by the Narragansetts, the region’s second sachemship in terms of wealth and power; the Mohegans, a restive tributary sachemship; and the Dutch, who sought break the Pequots’ monopoly and instate free trade. Accordingly, Pequot-Dutch relations grew increasingly hostile, culminating in the Dutch kidnapping the Pequots’ grand sachem Tatobem and delivering of his corpse upon payment of ransom; consequently, the Pequots turned towards New England. After neighbouring sachemships blamed the 1633 deaths of two piratical English traders, Captains John Stone and John Norton, on the Pequots, in 1634 the Pequots paid generous indemnities to Massachusetts Bay of wampum, pelts, and land cessions in the Connecticut Valley in exchange for New England’s intervention to re-establish peace with the Mohegans and
Narragansetts. But the prospect of expanding the new Connecticut colony (est. March 1636) at the Pequots’ expense preempted trade and coexistence.195

A casus belli was provided in July 1636 when an unsavory trader, John Oldham, was killed at Block Island by the Niantics, a tributary sachemship of the Narragansetts. The Narragansetts saw an opportunity, and their influential sachem Miantonomo told the New Englanders that the Pequots had put the Niantics up to it and had offered asylum to the killers. From Boston, the Massachusetts Bay colony authorities dispatched Captains John Endecott and John Underhill to obtain vengeance against the Niantics and issue their government’s exorbitant demands to the Pequots. After killing 15 people, burning wigwams, and despoiling granaries and cornfields on Block Island, Captains John Endecott and John Underhill led their Boston troops to the Pequots’ major fortified town, where a “grave senior” heard their demands: an indemnity of a thousand fathoms of wampum, child hostages, and the surrender of the killers of Stone and Norton. How sincere these demands were is an open question. In 1639 the Dutch navigator David de Vries, asking an Indian warrior near the mouth of the Connecticut how he’d come by his flamboyant scarlet mantle, was told “He had some time ago killed one Captain Stone, with his people, in a bark, from whom he had obtained these clothes.”196

At Block Island and at Pequot Town, the heavily-armoured British soldiers proved unsuccessful at engaging an unarmoured, agile foe in combat. While Endecott claimed two

195 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 227-30; Lipman, “Knitt,” 14-15; Cave, The Pequot War, 60-121; Drinnon, Facing West, 33-61; Jennings, The Invasion of America; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Steele, Warpaths, 91-92.
196 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 227-30; Lipman, “Knitt,” 14-15; Cave, The Pequot War, 60-121; Drinnon, Facing West, 33-61; Jennings, The Invasion of America; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Steele, Warpaths, 91-92.
Pequots slain in the fight at Pequot Town, Captain John Mason scoffed at Endecott’s results as “only one Indian slain and some Wigwams burnt,” which “inraged” the Pequots “against the English.” Lieutenant Lion Gardiner, the engineer and commander of Fort Saybrook on the mouth of the Connecticut River, credited allied Indian participation as decisive: “The Bay-men killed not a man, save that one Kichomiquim, an Indian Sachem of the Bay, killed a Pequit; and thus began the war between the Indians and us in these parts.” The disparity in their fighting styles was not lost on the Pequots: according to Massachusetts’ governor William Bradford, they proposed a Pequot-Narragansett alliance against the New Englanders, pointing out that “the English were minded to destroy all Indians” and that the Narragansetts “did but make way for their own overthrow” by helping them. Their counter-proposal was a guerrilla war against the settlers, to “fire their houses, kill their cattle, and lie in ambush for them,” which could be easily done “without any or little danger to themselves”; the British would “either be starved or be forced to forsake the country.”197

Roger Williams, a Puritan exile living among the Narragansetts, persuaded them to ally with the New Englanders, and both parties began working towards a *modus vivendi* between English and Algonquian ways of war. In 1636 Narragansett representatives at Plymouth agreed to the terms of a treaty to deny haven to any Pequots, to put to death or deliver to the English any Indians guilty of killing Englishmen or runaway English servants living among the Narragansetts, and to furnish guides for English expeditions against the Pequots. One of these guides, a Massachusetts warrior named Cutshamakin, then ambushed, slew, and scalped a Pequot man in a swamp; having “flayed off the skin of his head,” he sent

it to Canonicus, the principal Narraganset sachem, who “presently sent it to all the sachems about him” through the Narragansett network of allied and tributary sachemships. When the Pequot scalp finally came to Boston, a sort of ad hoc scalp bounty was granted when Cutshamakin was rewarded with four fathoms of wampum.198

The stark distinctions between European and Algonquian concepts of licit violence were also revealed, to each side’s perturbation. When the Puritans and their Narragansett and Mohegan allies, surrounded Mystic in May 1637, the Narragansetts and Mohegans’ oft-quoted assessment of the Puritans’ actions in setting the fortified town on fire and killing anyone who escaped the flames—“it is too furious, and slays too many men”—reflected not only shock at the scale of killing, but fear for the implications of their complicity in it: in mourning-war terms, as Peter Lipman notes, the massacre could “potentially unleash never-ending cycles of retribution” against them by the Pequot. New Englanders rationalized this as self-defense: Philip Vincent invoked the Powhatans’ 1622 attack on Virginia to warn that Indians only understood force: “long forebearance, and too much leniency of the English” towards the “Virginian Salvages,” had almost destroyed the colony, since “These Barbarians (ever treacherous) abuse the goodnesse of those that condescend to their rudenesse and imperfections.” The New Englanders “are assured of their peace by killing the Barbarians,” i.e., the Pequots, “better than our English Virginians were by being killed by them.”199

199 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 227-30; Lipman, “Knitt,” 14-15; Cave, The Pequot War, 60-121; Drinnon, Facing West, 33-61 (46: Philip Vincent); Jennings, The Invasion of America; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Steele, Warpaths, 91-92.
A similar rift between the limitations of mourning-war and the scope of total war were revealed in an exchange between Sassacus, the Pequot paramount sachem, and Lion Gardiner when a Pequot war party raided Fort Saybrook in February 1637. After they “slew divers men,” they attempted a parley with Gardiner, whose attempt at vague and noncommittal language must have struck the Pequots as cold-blooded and monstrous:

Then they [the Pequots] said, Have you fought enough? We [Gardiner] said we knew not yet. Then they asked if we did use to kill women and children? We said they should see that hereafter. So they were silent a small space, and then they said, We are Pequits, and have killed Englishmen, and can kill them as mosquetoes, and we will go to Conectecott and kill men, women, and children, and we will take away the horses, cows and hogs.  

The Pequots replied to Gardiner’s passive-aggression by showing their keen understanding of the Puritan mind. The raiders, some dressed in clothes taken from soldiers they had killed, taunted the garrison of Fort Saybrook as “like women” and proclaimed that one of their warriors, if he killed one more Englishman, “would be equal with God”—a “blasphemous speech,” noted Gardiner, that “troubled the hearts of the soldiers.” Pequot raids in the Connecticut Valley in April killed thirty settlers but still showed the selectivity and limitations of mourning-war. In the raid on Wethersfield (see Chapter 3), two sisters were taken captive and later returned unharmed, through Dutch intermediaries, to Gardiner at Saybrook for a ransom; their Pequot captors had assumed they would know how to make gunpowder. A Boston merchant named Tilly, who in defiance of Gardiner’s orders went ashore, was a grown man and therefore liable to different treatment: seized by Pequot

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warriors in sight of the fort, Gardiner later learned “by relation” that his captors had “tied him to a stake” and “flayed,” which probably means burned, “his skin off.”

For both the New Englanders and the Mohegans and Narragansetts, the scope of destruction inflicted upon the Pequots at Mystic and the surety of Pequot retaliation informed subsequent events of summer and fall. A steadily-expanding network of sachemships bought allegiance with New England with a harvest of Pequot prisoners and body parts: scalps, heads, hands and feet. Prior to Mystic, both Roger Williams and Uncas, sachem of the Mohegans, had made gestures towards such an exchange. Williams had written letters to other New Englanders explaining the Indians’ customs of reciprocal gifting and the exchange of body parts as tokens of alliance and friendship; during the war, he “dutifully” passed three Pequot hands from the Narragansetts to the Boston authorities; Uncas had shown his friendship by appearing at Saybrook with a captive Pequot named Kiswas and four or five Pequots’ “heads”—which, per the contextual nature of this term in 17th-century English, could mean entire heads or simply the scalps—for which Gardiner gave him 15 yards of trade-cloth. Shortly thereafter, a party of Narragansetts entered Boston with “forty fathom of wampum and a Pequod’s hand,” for which the governor gifted them four coats.

Others engaged in the trade out of fear. Wyandanch, the sachem of the Montauks of Long Island, visited Saybrook three days after Mystic asking whether the English were “angry with all Indians.” When Gardiner set the price of trade and alliance as the heads of

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201 Cave, Pequot War, 43; Lipman, “Knitt”; “Underhill’s Narrative,” in Orr ed., History of the Pequot War, 61, 66-67; “Gardener’s Narrative,” 134-35. Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 227-30; Drinnon, Facing West, 33-61 (46: Philip Vincent); Jennings, The Invasion of America; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Steele, Warpaths, 91-92

202 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 227-30; Lipman, “Knitt”; Cave, The Pequot War, 60-121; Drinnon, Facing West, 33-61 (46: Philip Vincent); Jennings, The Invasion of America; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Steele, Warpaths, 91-92.
Pequot asylum-seekers, and those of any Indians who had killed Englishmen, Wyandanch sent 12 Pequot heads to Saybrook shortly thereafter, for which Gardiner gifted him with trade goods. Subsequently, the Montauks killed so many refugees that Pequots began avoiding Long Island altogether. Sassacus and his followers sought asylum among the Mohawks, offering a generous incentive of wampum, but were outbid by the Narragansetts, and in August, several Connecticut traders brought to Boston “part of the skin and lock of hair of Sassacus and his brother and five other Pequot sachems, who, being fled to the Mohawk for shelter, with their women, were by them surprised and slain, with twenty of their best men.” Some of these “heads” were also taken by New Englanders on at least one occasion: in his “true Relation,” Philip Vincent praised the accomplishment of “Francis Waine-wright,” a “sturdy youth of new Ipswich” and “servant of one Alexander Knight” who, “going forth, somewhat rashly, to pursue the Salvages,” had expended all his powder and shot, then “so bestirred himselfe” with the spent arquebus as a blunt instrument “that hee brought two of their heads to the armie.” At a certain point, New Englanders stopped counting. When Mason crowed that “The Pequots [had] now become a Prey to all Indians,” he noted that their heads “came almost daily to Winsor, or Hartford.” John Winthrop made an offhand remark about “still many Pequods’ heads and hands [coming] from Long Island and other places.”

Surviving Pequots were relentlessly pursued through woods and swamps, some survivors gifted to Narragansett and Mohegan allies, and a larger number sold into slavery in the Caribbean. In June 1638, Israel Stoughton and William Trask’s militiamen collected some 200 Pequot prisoners from the Mohegans and Narragansetts. The latter, perhaps to

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assuage their consciences, suggested to the New Englanders that the Pequot prisoners should “(as they say is their generall Custome) be used kindly, have howses and goods and fields given them”; instead, the New Englanders drowned and decapitated the men and sold the women and children. John Mason, surrounding 200 starving Pequots in a swamp with his 40 New Englanders, wrote that he was “loath to kill Women and Children” and therefore “spared” the 180 women and children while putting 20 old men to the sword. The terms of the Treaty of Hartford (September 1638) went even further: New England’s allies were to render up any Pequots still at large, “or take of[f] their heads,” while these survivors were not only banned from returning to their villages, which had been given to John Mason’s veterans to torch and resettle, but were banned from even using their tribal name. By renaming the Pequot River as the Thames and Pequot Town, their capital, as New London, the name “Pequot” was to be wiped from existence, decrees which were rescinded by 1640.204

By 1642, the Pequots’ prediction that the New Englanders would turn against the Narragansetts came to pass. Miantonomo, now the leading sachem, reportedly gave a speech on Long Island in 1642 calling for a pan-Indian uprising against British colonists. Warning they must be “all Indians as the English are, and say brother to one another; […] otherwise we shall be all gone shortly,” Miantonomo proposed the uprising be signalled in traditional mourning-war fashion: he “would kill an Englishman & send his heade & hands to Longe Iland,” and the Indians of Long Island and neighbouring New Netherland would do the same as “a meanes to knit them togeather.” In 1643, the commissioners of the United Colonies of

204 Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 227-30; Lipman, “Knitt”; Cave, The Pequot War, 60-121; Drinnon, Facing West, 33-61 (46: Philip Vincent); Jennings, The Invasion of America; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Steele, Warpaths, 91-92. On the Pequot War’s intent of physical and cultural genocide, see Madley, “Reexamining the American Genocide Debate,” 120-26.
New England decreed that Uncas had their permission to kill Miantonomo, who was then assassinated by Uncas’ brother.\textsuperscript{205}

In outlining large-scale British settlement’s existential threat to Algonquian economies, Miantonomo included the actions of Old World livestock as well as their owners: while British farmers scythed down the grass and cut down the trees which sheltered and fed deer, turkeys, and black bears, “their cows and horses eat the grass, and their hogs spoil our clam banks, and we shall all be starved.” While indigenous peoples of the northeast certainly did manage their landscapes’ carrying-capacity for game animals through seasonal burnings, Gardiner’s quotation completely elides Algonquian agriculture and the threat British livestock posed it. As noted by Virginia DeJohn Anderson, from the Chesapeake to New England a “penumbra” of untended or feral cattle, horses and swine extended several miles beyond the boundaries of almost every British town and settlement, rampaging through Indians’ unfenced cornfields and gardens. Pigs were the single most numerous animal, and the most dangerous and destructive, accustomed to foraging and fending for themselves; Indians told Roger Williams that two pregnant sows had been observed driving a wolf from a deer carcass. These aggressive, rooting swine raided fields, gardens, and clam-beds and dug into storage pits and granaries; Williams noted that Northeastern Indians considered pigs the “most hatefull” of all English livestock for their depredations and “their filthy disposition, […] and they call them filthy cut-throats &c.”\textsuperscript{206}


\textsuperscript{206} Cronon, \textit{Changes in the Land}, 162-63; Virginia DeJohn Anderson, \textit{Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America} (Oxford University Press, 2004), 210-46 (221: “Beyond the official borders of nearly every New England town or Chesapeake plantation lay a penumbra of land, often several
As the backers of the New Netherland colony increasingly invested in settlement and intensive agriculture in New Amsterdam, settler-colonial wars would erupt along the Dutch frontiers as well. In the 1620s New Amsterdam had enjoyed profitable trade relations with its neighbours on the Long Island Sound, many of whom – Canarsees, Siwanoys, Rockaways, Tappans, and others—were speakers of related languages later known to British colonists as “Delawares,” referred to here as Lenape-Munsee. During the 1630s, the colony’s landholdings were extended under the directorship of Wouter van Twiller (1633-38) through purchases from Lenape-Munsee sachems, sowing seeds of future conflict: Algonquians considered themselves to be selling usufruct rights, not the land itself. In 1638, the ruling ‘Lords Nineteen’ of the Netherlands decided to invest in populating New Netherland and developing its economy, particularly the agricultural sector; under Twiller’s successor, Willem Kieft (1638-47), New Amsterdam’s population of free migrants, indentured servants, and African and Indian slaves doubled in his first five years in office. The garrison also increased, presenting problems of its own: having few opportunities to supplement their incomes legitimately, many of the WIC’s salaried soldiers and mercenaries were punished for contraband trade and theft. In wartime, they also had incentive to plunder pelts and wampum from Indian villages, even in direct violation of their orders.²⁰⁷

As in the British colonies, the transition between the older trade relationship and a new agrarian-annexationist relationship was riddled with contradictions. WIC traders continued to seek corn, pelts, and wampum while New Amsterdam’s farms, ranches, and agricultural estates expanded at the expense of Indians’ fields, woods, and fishing grounds, including the wampum-producing shellfish beds not claimed as spoils of the Pequot War by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The contradictions are captured by two policy decisions of 1639: the WIC company ended its fur trade monopoly, allowing formerly-unlicensed trappers known as *bosch-lopers* to openly, rather than covertly, compete with Indians for the remaining beaver population, while Kieft began demanding New Amsterdam’s neighbours pay tributes of wampum, corn, and pelts. Expansion of the colony had increased the operational costs of fortification and paying wages to its 60-man garrison; Kieft rationalized this tribute as a fee for defending New Amsterdam’s neighbours from their northern enemies, the Mahicans and Mohawks. David de Vries recorded a Tappan sachem’s displeasure with the kind of people who “come to live in this country without being invited by them, and now wish to compel them to give him their corn for nothing.”

The first hostilities in the five years of off-and-on conflict known as **Kieft’s War** (1640-45) began when Cors Pietersen’s WIC yacht approached a village of the Raritans, a Munsee subgroup, to trade. Pietersen had been charged with robbing a Raritan man in 1638, and the signal for a Raritan war party to try to seize the yacht was a Raritan warrior striking Pietersen across the face with a handful of squirrel pelts in a show of violent irony. The attack was broken off when the Dutch readied their firearms; shortly thereafter, it was

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reported that Raritans had killed pigs—for which David de Vries, among other colonists, blamed soldiers of the garrison—and burned down a slave’s house on Staten Island. Kieft dispatched the company secretary Cornelis van Tienhoven with 70 to 100 soldiers and armed sailors; if the Raritans did not provide “satisfaction,” Tienhoven’s orders were to burn their cornfields and loot the village. After killing three or four Raritans, Tienhoven’s men took the sachem’s brother, who owed Tienhoven large outstanding debts, as a hostage; while returning to New Amsterdam, one of the soldiers tortured the sachem’s brother by applying “a piece of split wood” to his genitals, and Kieft hastily returned him to the Raritans with an indemnity in wampum. The Raritans waited to avenge this insult until June 1641, when a raiding party attacked Kieft’s farm on Staten Island, killing four of his servants and torching the property. An Indian WIC employee served as intermediary for their declaration of war, in which they denied responsibility for killing the pigs in 1640 but announced that now, since they had reciprocally killed one colonist for every Raritan killed by Tienhoven’s soldiers, “[the Dutch] would now come to fight them on account of [their] men,” since they “had before come and treated [the Raritans] badly on account of the swine.” What the Raritans found most insulting, suggests Evan Haefeli, was “the message that a pig’s life was as significant as a Raritan’s.”

Offering bounties of ten fathoms of wampum for a Raritan’s head—which, given the ambiguities of 17th century Dutch as well as English, could also mean “scalp”—and twenty

[^209]: Bailyn, in *The Barbarous Years* (218), gives a different version of events: “…when his [Kieft’s] tax collector attempted to seize one village’s corn supplies and load them aboard his yacht, he was attacked by the local sachem and slashed across the face with a hunting knife. His vessel was attacked, and his party barely made it back alive to New Amsterdam.” The numbers of Tienhoven’s expedition are variously given as 70 (Lipman), 80 (Bailyn), “eighty-odd” (Burrows and Wallace) or 100 (Delâge). See Burrows and Wallace, *Gotham*, 14-40; Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Lipman, *Saltwater Frontier*, 85-164; Bailyn, *Barbarous Years*, 215-223; Steele, *Warpaths*, 115-16; Kiernan, *Blood and Soil*, 234-36; Delâge, *Bitter Feast*, 286-90.
fathoms for live captives from “any of the Indians who have most barbarously murdered our people,” Kieft commissioned the Raritans’ neighbours and rivals from other Lenape-Munsee sachemships, or from other Algonquians of the region such as the Wappinger Confederacy, to resolve the conflict using mourning-war tactics: the exemplary killing of a few Raritans, to demonstrate their ability to kill a much larger number. During the summer of 1641, a war party from Long Island “voluntary killed [sic]” some Raritans; in November, Pieter de Vries reports that Pacham, a sachem of the Wappinger subgroup the Tankitekes, entered Fort Amsterdam “in great triumph” bearing a hand on a stick. It purportedly belonged to the leader of the Staten Island raid, and Pacham declared “that he had taken revenge for our sake, because he loved [the Dutch], who were his best friends.” In Evan Haefeli’s analysis, Kieft’s response showed an understanding both of the military limitations of a settler-colonial system, in which a few military specialists were to protect widely-dispersed settlements, and of the importance of indigenous allies in resolving such a conflict: “planters and farmers and other remote settlers,” he wrote in explanation of his decision, “stand in great danger of life and property, which we under the circumstances, on account of the density of the forest and the small number of men, cannot prevent.” After Pacham’s triumph, no further attacks on colonists were reported, and the Raritans made peace with New Netherland later in the year.210

In other cases, New Amsterdam rejected adjudication on mourning-war principles. In August 1641 New Amsterdam and the Wecquaesgeeks, a member of the Wappinger Confederacy, came into conflict when an elderly wheelwright named Claes Smits, who lived

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alone on Manhattan Island, was killed and “decapitated”—either literally beheaded, or scalped—by a Wecquaesgeek man. When told to turn over his killer, the Wecquaesgeeks refused, and the heated language of the negotiations suggests deeper anti-Dutch tension. A Wecquaesgeek sachem justified Smits’ murder on the grounds that his Wecquaesgeek killer had resolved the outstanding, unavenged murder of his uncle by three Dutchmen 21 years prior; he also reportedly said “he was sorry that twenty Christians had not been murdered.” Kieft then proposed to his governing council that they should “ruin the entire village” in retaliation; most agreed to this, so long as they waited until after the harvest and autumn corn trade had been concluded. Kieft waited until March 1642 to dispatch 80 soldiers to attack the Wecquaesgeeks’ village by night, an attack called off when the soldiers got lost in the woods due to an incompetent guide. In the morning, when the Wecquaesgeeks found the soldiers’ tracks in the snow, they promptly sued for peace, but again a refusal or incomprehension of mourning-war principles stymied negotiations: Tienhoven granted peace on the impossible condition that they either deliver the murderer or kill him themselves, which the Wecquaesgeek leaders, whose authority rested on persuasion and not coercion, had no right to do, and could not have done without starting a feud in their own village. Later in the spring of 1642, a colonist thatching a roof was killed with an arrow by a member of the Hackensack (a Lenape-Munsee subgroup). The Hackensacks were the first to respond, asking Peter de Vries to mediate their payment of 100 to 200 fathoms of wampum as compensation to the thatcher’s widow. Kieft again made the impossible, fruitless demand that the sachems turn over the killer to New Netherland. The 1642 killing had happened so soon after Miantonomo’s call for rebellion that Kieft believed it was some part of the conspiracy, and a
broad and increasing paranoia among New Netherland settlers regarding their indigenous neighbours would have deadlier consequences.211

After gun-armed raiders, variously identified as either Mahicans or Mohawks, descended from the north in February 1643, several hundred Lenape-Munsees fled to New Amsterdam seeking refuge. On February 24, three colonists led by Marijn Adriaensen petitioned Kieft for permission to avenge Smits and the thatcher by attacking the refugees encamped at Pavonia and Corlaer’s Hook, whom God had “delivered […] into our hands.” The massacres that followed on the night of February 25 were an act of joint participation by armed citizen volunteers and WIC troops: Adriaensen led a mob to attack the camp at Corlaer’s Hook, while a German mercenary named Sergeant Rodolff led the garrison to attack Pavonia. By morning, 120 Indians were dead, over 80 heads were publicly displayed in the streets of New Amsterdam, and 30 prisoners had been sold into slavery. Other Dutch colonists were emboldened by this: two days after the massacres, Long Island colonists asked permission to “ruin and conquer” the Indians “from time to time,” and when Kieft denied them permission they attacked a Canarsee village anyways, shooting three people while stealing winter stores of corn. Soon, reprisals by Canarsees and other Lenape-Munsee sachemships had driven Dutch settlers behind the walls of New Amsterdam as farms went up in smoke, and public ire turned against Kieft and Adriaensen, who had already led two further expeditions against the Indians.212

211 According to Peter de Vries, he had met the Hackensack before the killing, stumbling home to get his bow and arrows; the Hackensack claimed the Dutchman had plied him with brandy and then stolen his beaver coat. In Jochem Kuyter’s version of events, the Hackensack had been taunted by a colonist before firing off his bow, and “was not considered very sensible by the Indians themselves.” Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, 14-40; Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 85-164; Bailyn, Barbarous Years, 215-223; Steele, Warpaths, 114-18; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 234-36; Delâge, Bitter Feast, 286-90.

212 The northern raiders are variously identified in the literature as Mohawks or Mahicans; given the Mohawks’ monopolization of the gun trade at Fort Orange after 1628, I think the former is more likely, but need additional
What Kieft and Adriaensen had thought they would achieve by massacring refugees who they had offered shelter to, or how they rationalized themselves as having the moral high ground in this situation, is unclear to me, but consistent with a pattern of European cognitive dissonance vis-à-vis frontier war which we will see recur throughout this thesis: indigenous warriors are perceived contradictorily as both bloodthirsty, implacable, and vindictive, but also as cowards who only understand the use of force. When put in dialogue with an unspoken or articulated European awareness of their shortcomings in prosecuting war on the Indians’ terms, the counter-argument that Indians must be defeated by any means necessary gains strength, particularly when bolstered by real or perceived victimhood at Indians’ hands and the need to recover national or personal pride. Haefeli points out that Kieft and other Dutch leaders often wrote of Indians “scoffing” at or mocking them, as when they made impossible demands—which, in early modern Algonquian culture, was a way to chide naughty children or particularly-obtuse adults out of public misbehaviour, but to early modern European sensibilities was an insult little less stinging than the stereotypical glove-to-the-face, which must be answered bloodily.213

Either way, by the spring of 1643 the New Netherland colony, which could count between 200 to 250 male colonists able to bear arms as well as their garrison, faced the majority of the Lenape-Munsee sachemships and an estimated 1,500 warriors. Further, the

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research before I can rule out the Mahicans. The literature also agrees that the Wecquaesgeeks were the asylum-seekers, but adds other peoples against whom the Dutch had grievances: Hackensacks (Burrows and Wallace, Lipman) and Raritans (Delage). Given the Lenapes’ and Munsees’ participation in the anti-Dutch coalition of 1643-45, it seems logical that at least some members of those groups would have been victimized as well in the February killings, but for the moment I have to be noncommittal. See Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, 14-40; Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 85-164; Bailyn, Barbarous Years, 215-223; Steele, Warpaths, 114-18; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 234-36; Delâge, Bitter Feast, 286-90.

213 Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Benjamin Madley observes a pattern in 19th-century settler-colonial wars, where a settler population outmatched at guerrilla warfare decides to opt for a “final solution” which often inflames the situation and sparks further conflict, in “Patterns of Frontier Genocide, 1803–1910.”
training of European soldiers and militia for siege and field battles, and their equipment with armour and cumbersome early firearms, made them particularly ill-suited to fight the sort of hit-and-run raiding warfare Algonquians practiced. Through the mediation of Pieter de Vries, Kieft concluded peace in March with the Canarsee sachem Penhawitz, or “One-Eye,” through whom Kieft negotiated peace in April with the sachems of the Hackensacks, Tappans, and Wecquaesgeeks. But Kieft’s gifts were insufficient for the sachems to buy off their aggrieved subjects by covering the dead, making this peace decidedly fragile, while the greater portion of the Lenapes remained at war. In August, the Wappinger Confederacy joined the anti-Dutch coalition, first plundering WIC ships for beaver pelts and trade goods, then attacking Dutch settlements, killing men and capturing women and children. Through neutral sachemships, New Netherland’s enemies sent a message: there could be no peace until Kieft was removed from power.214

Kieft and his governing council decided to outsource the war to specialists. To fight their enemies on their own terms, the “Long Island savages” would be commissioned “to secure the heads of the [hostile] savages” while Captain John Underhill was commissioned to reprise his role in the Pequot War by a campaign of total destruction. Captain Underhill, who spoke Dutch fluently from his years fighting in the Netherlands and had settled as a landowner in New Amsterdam with his Dutch wife, would command a combined force of 150 Dutch and New England mercenaries whom Kieft had hired for a staggering sum of 25,000 guilders. The scope and scale of the destruction is suggested by an allegation by internal critic Jochem Kuyter that Kieft had, essentially, ordered Underhill to perform home

214 Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, 14-40; Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 85-164; Bailyn, Barbarous Years, 215-223; Steele, Warpaths, 114-18; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 234-36; Delâge, Bitter Feast, 286-90.
invasions in Indian villages: as swords would be too unwieldy inside wigwams, Kieft had equipped them at his own expense with custom-made combat knives, prefiguring the short-sword-sized bowie knives of the later Southeastern frontier. Setting out in October 1643 after the harvest, Underhill’s forces stripped the stored corn from abandoned Tankiteke and Wecquaesgeek villages before razing them. In February 1644, they killed about 120 Canarsees in two separate attacks, suffering only one dead and three wounded, which suggests, notes Haefeli, “that the Indians were not expecting to be attacked”. In March, they surrounded a village in the hills outside Stamford, set it ablaze, and shot and stabbed anyone who escaped, inflicted an estimated 500 to 700 casualties. The Wappingers declared an end to hostilities after this massacre, but the Lenape-Munsee remained at war. In April, seven Long Island Indians, either Rockaways or Canarsees, were accused of killing hogs and taken prisoner, and turned over to Underhill’s men, who killed them in a succession of gruesome ways. Per the early modern British conflation of scalping with flaying, it is worth noting in this context that the mercenaries’ torture of the last of their seven captives included cutting off strips of his skin with their knives—a gruesome act of improvised torture which points towards the posthumous mutilations of the 18th century (see Chapter 5).

In the spring of 1645, a Long Island sachem brought “a head and hands of the enemy” to New Amsterdam. Throughout the spring and summer, the intervention of the Mahicans and Mohawks on the side of the Dutch brought an end to the war by August. “Once again,” states Evan Haefeli, “sachems had brought the peace that Kieft was unable to secure for himself,” though exhaustion through campaigns of attrition and terror obviously played a part.

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215 Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, 14-40; Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 85-164; Bailyn, Barbarous Years, 215-223; Steele, Warpaths, 114-18; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 234-36; Delage, Bitter Feast, 286-90.
as well. If the conclusions drawn from the Pequot War and Kieft’s War were that attrition by mass killings and starvation could end Indian wars, nobody seems to have observed that those wars became inevitable when settler-colonial land annexations, in combination with an overweening and spiteful attitude towards Indians, made such wars a matter of eventuality – or that early massacres intended to forestall future hostilities or intimidate the Indians rarely, if ever, had any effect but the opposite.²¹⁶

During the 40 years that followed the end of the Pequot War and the outbreak of King Philip’s War (1675-76), British colonists steadily encroached on their Algonquian neighbours’ lands, resources, and ways of life. In 1648, a law passed by the Massachusetts government which banned the sale of firearms and powder to Indians also stipulated “no Indian shall at any time powaw, or performe outward worship to their false gods; or to the devil in any part of our Jurisdiction” under penalty of a £5 fine, a ban extended to New York and Long Island in 1664. In 1653, the Narragansetts told Roger Williams that they feared to be “forced from their religion, and for not changing their religion, be invaded by war.” In that same year, a New England woman was charged, found guilty, and executed for worshipping the “gods” of the Indians and having taken as husband an Algonquian other-than-human being or manitous known as Hobbamock, whom the Puritans believed to be Satan himself.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Burrows and Wallace, Gotham, 14-40; Haefeli, “Kieft’s War,” 17-40; Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 85-164; Bailyn, Barbarous Years, 215-223; Steele, Warpaths, 115-16; Kierman, Blood and Soil, 234-36; Delâge, Bitter Feast, 286-90.
²¹⁷ Lepore, The Name of War; Kierman, Blood and Soil, 236-41; on the “Hobbamock” case see Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence, 116-145. The charge of marriage and sexual intercourse between a Puritan woman and the Devil in the form of Hobbamock is consistent with early modern European belief on the nature of the relationship between heretics, witches, and Satan—see Stephens, Demon Lovers, and Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons; on the sense of the conquest of the Americas as a literal war against Satan see Cañizares-Esguerra, Puritan Conquistadores, 1-82. This sense of divine mission was reflected in the seal of the Massachusetts Bay colony in which a stereotypical Indian archer, wearing leaves for clothing, alludes to Paul’s vision of a pagan Macedonian begging for Christianity (Acts 16:9) by saying “Come over and help us.” This allusion was further mirrored in Massachusetts Bay’s relationship with the Wampanoags and the choice of
But most conflicts were comparatively mundane and based around constant tensions with an ever-growing settler population. In the 1660s, New England Algonquians suffered two major blows to their sovereignty. First, they lost previous outside sources of support against the British as the Dutch surrendered New Netherland in 1664 and the Iroquois League, after the Carignan-Salieres incursions, adopted an official position of neutrality vis-à-vis the French and British colonies. Second, the value of wampum, pelts, and corn plummeted as the New England fur trade collapsed, as imported silver currency rendered wampum obsolete, and the New England colonies became self-sufficient in food production through agriculture, fishing, and stockbreeding. Land was now the only commodity Algonquians possessed that New Englanders wanted, and they began taking it through treaties of dubious legality, land claimed in lieu of payment for outstanding debts, and seizure of land from Indians convicted of crimes. Unfenced livestock prowled into lands the Indians still possessed, and in 1675, summoned to Plymouth to answer for the murder of John Sassamon, the Wampanoag sachem Philip described a litany of “intractable problems involving sovereignty, land, and animals.”

Between 1667 and 1671, Philip was summoned to Plymouth three times to answer charges of a conspiracy against the English. In 1671 armed Wampanoags paraded through Swansea, an offshoot settlement of a village “notorious” for trespassing cattle on confiscated land deep in Wampanoag territory, on the doorstep of Philip’s own village on the Mt. Hope peninsula; for this, Philip was made to pay various indemnities, up to and including further land cessions around his own village. When John Sassamon, a Massachusett interpreter and famous Macedonian baptismal names, Alexander and Philip, for Massasoit’s descendants and successors: see Lepore, The Name of War.

minister who had fought under John Underhill in the Pequot War, was found murdered in January 1675, Plymouth unilaterally accused, tried, condemned, and executed three of Philip’s chief advisors for the murder. The Wampanoags raided Swansea a few weeks later on 8 June, and the same soldiers who saw a vision of an Indian warrior’s bow and scalp in the eclipse en route to Philip’s town (see Chapter 3) were greeted with another unexpected spectacle: eight impaled English heads in the abandoned village. For the first time in New England’s history, Algonquians in King Philip’s coalition of Wampanoags, Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and Pocumtucks wedded the theatrical violence of mourning-war to an emulation of European-style total war, inflicting large-scale casualties and widespread property destruction. This was met by a military performance by the United Colonies (Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Connecticut) defined by, in Guy Chet’s words, “inexperience and amateurism.” The previous generation of Elizabethan-era professional soldiers were, by 1675, either moribund from age or dead, and New Englanders’ militia training in volley-fire and line-marching tactics were ill-suited for wilderness warfare. Algonquians, on the other hand, had been familiarizing themselves with the use, maintenance, and repair of firearms since the 1640s, particularly snaphaunces, an early flintlock which offered significant advantages of mobility and ease of use over the matchlock. At the tactical level, James David Drake describes a “coherent and effective military strategy” of keeping the colonists on the defensive with surprise raids by small parties of warriors, which New Englanders pejoratively called “skulking”—“like Wolves, and other Beasts of Prey,” wrote Nathaniel Saltonstall—while focusing on large-scale attacks on towns.219

Daniel Richter observes that of some 90 New England towns, over 50 were attacked and at least 12 destroyed during King Philip’s War, and Jill Lepore gives a figure of 25 towns out of 50 destroyed by the war’s end. The cattle, horses, and swine who had invaded Indians’ fields and granaries were butchered, maimed, or locked in barns and burned alive, while houses and outbuildings were torched. Even the idea of “plantation” was mocked when some warriors buried New England prisoners up to their necks, taunting “let us now see how you will grow when Planted into the Ground.” Graves were dug up and the dead were decapitated and exposed; colonists slain in attacks were posthumously mutilated and their bodies left in the roads to be stumbled upon by their neighbours. In revenge for decades of English belittling of the manitous and Algonquian religious rites, Bibles were torn up and the colonists’ religion insulted. An attack on Rhode Island in June 1675 combined elements of all of the above: English forces found some “newly burned” houses, a torn-up Bible with its pages scattered “in Hatred of our Religion,” and two or three miles up the road “some Heads, Scalps, and Hands […] stuck upon Poles near the Highway, in that barbarous and inhuman Manner bidding us Defiance.”

To win the war, the United Colonies needed Indian allies, but a general fear and loathing for Indians prolonged and exacerbated the conflict. When a Wampanoag sachemship near Dartmouth, a month into the war, offered to surrender to the Plymouth Colony through the negotiation of Benjamin Church, his superiors overrode his promises of good conduct and sold these Wampanoags into Caribbean slavery. Offers by members of Christian convert communities known as “Praying Indians” to scout for and fight alongside the English was

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rejected due to a belief that they were “preying Indians” whose Christianity was a façade to conceal murders and robberies. Over the objections of Thomas Danforth and Daniel Gookin, many Praying Indians were interned on Deer Island and other barren islands in Boston Harbour from autumn 1675 to the late spring of 1676, where at least half of them died from hunger, disease, and exposure, and others were seized by slave traders and sold abroad; Praying Indians not interned were attacked by neighbouring British settlers. As Indian refugees fled north to Abenaki country in 1675, Massachusetts colonists began demanding they relinquish their firearms as a show of good faith. When a boatload of English sailors deliberately drowned the wife and children of a Sokoki Abenaki sachem by ramming their canoe, Abenaki bands went to war with Massachusetts and began migrating northwards towards New France.221

Another step towards prototypical scalp bounties was taken early in the war when the Narragansetts, still the single largest sachemship in New England and able to field 3,500 warriors, sent 100 warriors as allies to Connecticut on the terms

That for every Indians Head-Skin they brought, they should have a Coat, (i.e. two Yards of Trucking Cloth, worth five Shillings per Yard here) and for every one they bring alive two Coats; for King Philips Head, Twenty Coats, and if taken alive, Forty Coats: These went out, and returned in Fourteen Days Time, bringing with them about Eighteen Heads in all.222

222 Narratives of the Indian Wars, 35; Drake, King Philip’s War, 57-167; Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness; Lepore, The Name of War; Seeman, Death in the New World, 175-77; Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 42-98.
Georg Friederici also reports that Connecticut soldiers were offered a bounty of 30 shillings per “head” against the 10-shilling value of the Indians’ bounties. As will be noted here and in Chapter 5, the bounties paid out to Europeans were typically higher than those paid to indigenous allies and were typically paid in cash rather than in equivalent trade goods. In part, this was because scalp bounties were meant to bolster the morale of Europeans, and because indigenous warriors, who supplied themselves and had military experience, were seen as potentially cost-effective mercenaries. Note also that the value offered for a prisoner was double that of a “head-skin” or scalp which suggests, in addition to reflecting mourning-war’s martial philosophy, that a preferred goal for the New Englanders from the outset was selling Indian prisoners into slavery.223

Connecticut fielded indigenous allies earlier in the war than either of its rivals, and in larger numbers. But the Narragansetts were made into enemies in September 1675, after a supply train guarded by United Colonies troops was ambushed and routed by Indians at Muddy Brook outside Deerfield, Massachusetts, the Commissioners of the United Colonies decided that the Narragansetts had sheltered the attackers and were “deeply accessory in the present bloody outrages.” Overturning their prior arrangement to pay the Narragansetts for scalps and prisoners, in November 1675 Massachusetts outsourced the job to a volunteer company, many of whom were convicted pirates; tasked with “destroying the enemy,” they were permitted to reward themselves by selling or enslaving their captives. Their leader, a Jamaican privateer named Captain Samuel Moseley, had already spent the month of October attacking neutral villages and Praying Indians, and been censured by the Massachusetts

General Court for destroying a New Hampshire Indian village in defiance of express orders not to. A sense of Moseley’s attitude is given in his postscript to a self-justifying letter of October 1675, describing his interrogation of an elderly Indian woman who, after she had outlived her usefulness by answering his questions, he had “torn to pieces by Doggs”.  

In the Great Swamp Fight of 19 December, 1675, Connecticut brought 150 Mohegans and Pequots as scouts and infantry for the 1,000-strong United Colonies force that attacked the Narragansetts’ main fortified town, whose defenses had been modernized by the Narragansett stonemason, Stonewall John. As at Mystic and Stamford, New Englanders circled the village, fired the wigwams, and shot anyone who escaped. In addition to inflicting 300 casualties, attrition killed a greater number: Captain Benjamin Church said Narragansetts later told him that “nearly a third” of their population “were killed by the English and by the cold that night.” Andrew Lipman observes that this victory brought the war’s “single biggest haul” of prisoners to be sold into slavery. But it was also a Pyrrhic victory revealing the New Englanders’ amateurism. Having run out of provisions, the United Colonies troops deprived themselves of shelter and food by burning the village, leaving the survivors to eat their horses and endure a frigid night march which killed 20 and left others unable to campaign for the rest of the season. At some point “amateurism” became inseparable from “incompetence.”

As in Kieft’s War, the combination of scorched-earth tactics and destruction of indigenous property, and the intercession of indigenous allies from outside the conflict and former combatants turned reluctant allies, turned the tide against Philip’s coalition. During the winter and spring of 1675-76 United Colonies forces harried Indian villages, with

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224 Drake, King Philip’s War, 57-167; Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness; Lepore, The Name of War; Seeman, Death in the New World, 175-77; Malone, The Skulking Way of War, 42-98.  
225 On the semiotics of the eclipse: Drake, King Philip’s War, 73-74, 93; Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 85-164.
particular attention paid to food stores and their ability to maintain their guns: killing blacksmiths, carrying off tools, and throwing anvils and pigs of lead into swamps and rivers. In January 1676, the intercession of New York’s governor Edmund Andros brought the Mohawks into the fray. The possibilities of allied Indians in conjunction with New Englanders was shown in March of 1676, when Benjamin Church led a joint British-and-Indian ranger force into the Nipmuck country where they inflicted some small victories, which John Grenier credits as having “inaugurated the American ranger tradition.” In the spring of 1676 New England began recruiting Praying Indians, and former combatants seeking amnesty after the winter attrition campaign, placing the price of their freedom as the heads and scalps of those Indians still at war. Alliance was shown through acts of mimesis, or cross-cultural pidgin, like the quartering of King Philip, the trade in heads and scalps, and the exchange of prisoners. When Canonchet, a Narragansett sachem and one of the most successful raiders of New England towns during the spring offensive of 1676, was captured by Connecticut soldiers and Mohegans in April, his execution in Stonington, Connecticut through drawing and quartering provided a way for Connecticut’s allies—Mohegans, Pequots, and a band of Narragansetts led by a sachem named Ninnicroft—to show their commitment. According to one account, “the Pequods shot him, the Mohegans cut off his Head and quartered his Body, and Ninnicrofts Men made the Fire and burned his Quarters”; then Ninnicroft and his followers presented Canonchet’s head to the Council at Hartford, “as a Token of their Love and Fidelity.”

The rise and fall of the British Indian slave trade, 1660 to 1717

When offered as financial incentive for private citizens and proxies among allied indigenous groups to benefit from the targeted destruction of specific Indian third parties, slave hunting served a similar, though not identical, function as scalp bounties. While scalp bounties were only intermittently offered throughout King Philip’s War, particularly by Connecticut and particularly towards the war’s end, all members of the United Colonies aimed from the outset to sell Indian prisoners into slavery at home or abroad into the Caribbean. Thousands of Algonquians, observes Andrew Lipman, were sold into the Atlantic at an average price of 3 pounds sterling each, not all of them prisoners of King Philip’s war: some were Praying Indians scooped up from internment in Boston Harbour, while others were domestic servants kidnapped from colonists’ homes. As Jill Lepore points out, the Puritan claim that Philip’s coalition deserved enslavement as punishment for treason had a flimsy legal basis, since British law punished treason and rebellion with execution, while if the “rebel” Indians were sovereign peoples, they could not be consigned so easily to chattel slavery. As elsewhere in the North American colonies, the niceties of the law rarely impeded the potential profitability of the Indian slave trade.227

While British-indigenous relations were not uniformly hostile at all times and in all places in the Southeast, Neil Salisbury marks two defining, incompatible trends in those relationships from the 1660s to 1715: in peacetime, British traders purchased allied Indians’

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227 Lipman, Saltwater Frontier, 217-222; Seeman, Death in the New World, 175-77; Weaver, The Red Atlantic, 57-62; Lepore, The Name of War, throughout, on slavery, 153-166; Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815, 57-82; Grenier, First Way of War, 16-52; Steele, Warpaths, 103-07; Malone, The Skulking Way of War; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 90-105; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 236-41; Chet, Conquering the American Wilderness, 38-69.
deerskins and captive enemies for trade goods, particularly firearms, while at the same time an increasing settler population extended its reach into indigenous land of both allies and enemies by private purchase, squatting, and trespassing. By the time of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War (1644-46), Ian K. Steele observes that selling Indian captives into slavery was already “routine” in Virginian frontier warfare. In 1666, when Virginia’s governor William Berkeley dispatched Rappahannock County militia to settle disputes between squatters and “northern Indians” such as the Nansemonds and Rappahannocks, he advised “I think it is necessary to Destroy all these Northern Indians,” suggesting to offset the costs of the expedition by selling “the women and children” into slavery. Paul Kelton notes that though indigenous slavery on Chesapeake tobacco plantations is poorly documented prior to its enshrinement in law in 1682, all the evidence indicates that the trade was substantial; nor was it restricted to Indians defeated and captured in war by Virginians. In 1662, Virginians began purchasing prisoners of war from Indian trading partners, technically illegal since they hadn’t been taken directly by the English themselves in war, so their designation in the records as indentured servants served as a legal fiction which benefited the burgeoning industry.228

In Carolina, founded in 1663 but not populated by British settlers until 1670, the Indian slave trade played a foundational role. Early Carolina, particularly the southern part of the colony, was influenced from the beginning by the established Caribbean colonies and their existing systems of racialized, large-scale slavery, particularly by a group of Anglo-Barbadian deerhide merchants known as the “Goose Creek men.” In 1670, the Goose Creek traders offered the Westos, a people of uncertain ethnolinguistic identity who Neil Salisbury


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suggests were Eries displaced from the Great Lakes during the Beaver Wars, up to 15 trade muskets for every captive child or woman of an enemy community they brought in, as well as manufactured goods and rum; they then resold these captives into the Caribbean, to Virginia tobacco plantations, or within Carolina to their own cash-cropping ventures of rice and indigo. Resold for 5 to 10 pounds sterling and sometimes more, the Indian slaves went to Virginia tobacco plantations and to the Goose Creek men’s burgeoning cash-cropping of rice and indigo. Soon, notes David La Vere, Carolina was importing more slaves, both from the American Southeast and the African Atlantic slave trade, than any other British colony, even Virginia. By the end of the 1670s, the fate of the Westos also set a precedent within the Southeastern slave trade, for middlemen who had outlived their usefulness. In 1679, on the grounds that English settlers had been caught in the crossfire during the Westos’ slaving raids against coastal Cusabos, Carolina declared joint war against the Westos with the “Savannahs” or Shawnees, a people of the Savannah River to the south who had formerly been among the Westos’ targets for slave raids. Georg Friederici’s 1906 assertion that “In 1680, scalp bounties were offered in South Carolina” could well have been the case for the last remaining Westos, though my more recent sources make no mention of it. Alongside other Savannah River peoples like the Yuchis and the Yamasees, the latter a heterogeneous coalition of Savannah River peoples and Guale and Apalachee refugees from Spanish Florida, the once-powerful Westos were devoured by the Carolina slave trade, reduced by captivities and killings “to an estimated fifty people.”

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But these grim middle-ground relations of mutual benefit from the slave trade were restricted largely to a wealthy few; the dominant model of Anglo-American and Indian relations in the Southeast, as in New England, remained a settler-colonial model of land annexation or attempts at same, and a broader and collective hatred of Indians. These, and a desire to expand and democratize slaveowner status in Virginia, turned incidents on the Virginia frontier into **Bacon’s Rebellion (1676)**. In 1675, a frontier conflict between a Virginia planter named Thomas Mathew and an Algonquian people, the Doegs, led to a cycle of reprisals which culminated with Virginia militia mistakenly attacking and killing several members of the well-armed and hitherto-uninvolved Susquehannocks. In April of 1676, after nearly 300 colonists had been killed in revenge and after the House of Burgesses had offered a reward of one matchcoat or 20 arms’ lengths of tobacco for each Indian prisoner, Nathaniel Bacon offered to lead volunteers against the Susquehannocks, promising war “against all Indians in generall”—deliberately and systematically targeting the tributaries and allies of Governor Bacon and his cronies. Bacon’s rebels were fighting the Virginia government and planter oligarchy’s reluctance to open up western land and the wealth they gained from the Indian trade, including their illegal sale of weapons to Indians. But this also comprised a genocidal crusade against all Indians. Bacon’s rebels shot Susquehannock and Doeg chiefs when they came to parley and, in one instance, Bacon hired the Occaneechees to capture Susquehannocks for him, executed the prisoners, then killed most of the Occaneechees. The refusal to distinguish between friend and foe indicates the extirpationist spirit that preceded the widespread institutionalization of scalp bounties on the Southeastern frontier.²³⁰

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Governor Berkeley sided with the rebels by legalising widespread Indian slavery. Paul Kelton suggests that the Westos, and not Virginia’s planter gentry, may have been the example that Nathaniel Bacon and his rebels envisioned for themselves in their demands to expand the slaveowning franchise among white Virginians. In Kiernan’s words, Berkeley tried to “ride the rebel tiger” by publicly agreeing in writing in 1676 that Indians “generally conspired against us in all the western parts of America,” and were “now all our enemies.” To placate the rebels he ruled in 1676 that any Indians who left their towns without English permission were considered enemies; that Virginia troops would “have the benefit of all plunder either Indians or otherwise”; and that “all Indians taken in warr” would be automatically enslaved. Though Bacon died of disease in 1676 and Berkeley was recalled to England after the rebels burned Jamestown, legal reforms continued to extend slaveowning among white Virginians, ruling that soldiers could buy and sell slaves among themselves (1679); removing all restrictions on trade (1680, 1691); and declaring all Indians eligible to be sold into slavery, regardless of treaty, political affiliation, or conversion to Christianity before or after enslavement (1682).231

In 1680, following the annihilation of the Westos, the Lords Proprietor of the Carolina colony ruled slaves could only be imported from communities at least 200 miles beyond the limits of British settlement, and Charles Town’s trading network soon criss-crossed the Southeast, spreading what Paul Kelton and others call a “deadly synergy” of warfare, firearms, and disease. Targeted while tending their fields or hunting, communities

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231 Grenier, First Way of War, 16-52; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 59-64; Kiernan, Blood and Soil; Merrell, The Indians’ New World, 8-91; Kiernan, Blood and Soil; Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement.
attacked by slavers retreated into walled settlements, where malnutrition and stressed immune systems left the survivors liable to illnesses, including virgin soil epidemics of Old World diseases. The killing of men and the targeting of children and women for resale hindered the recovery of pre-war populations, while slave-raiding peoples found that they had struck a devil’s bargain: more of them died in battle, captives were sold off rather than adopted, and the fate of those who reneged on their debts to British merchants was an omnipresent fear. Following the Great Southeastern Smallpox Epidemic of 1696, which burned along the Southeastern trade networks of Carolina and Virginia, the slave trade became a source of diminishing returns and a trigger for conflicts. In 1707, the migration of Shawnees to Maryland and Virginia under pressure from Catawba raiders and recently-established Apalachee villages on the Savannah was taken by the South Carolina government as a “Savannah Revolt” instigated by rival traders out of Virginia. After a trader reported that Shawnees had killed “several Christians,” South Carolina sent Catawbas under Carolinian leadership to attack the “Deserted Shawnees”; when these Shawnees retaliated by attacking the “Northwards Indians” or Catawbas and other Siouians of the Piedmont, Carolina loaned the Piedmont peoples fifty muskets with flints, ammunition, and gunpowder, informing them that anyone who delivered a Shawnee scalp could keep his gun.232

In the early 1700s, settler-colonial conflicts brewed between colonists in northern Carolina and their indigenous neighbours: the Tuscaroras, an Iroquoian people who had enjoyed a middleman trading relationship since the decline of the Powhatan Confederacy in the 1650s, and smaller Algonquian vassal polities like the Neuses and Corees, who relied on

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the Tuscaroras for protection against the Iroquois and the English. In 1710, a Tuscarora leader named Hancock who headed their anti-British faction had already appealed to the Iroquois Confederacy and the government of Pennsylvania, sending wampum belts through Seneca and Shawnee intermediaries asking for guarantees of help against Carolina slavers. In the spring of 1711 the Surveyor-General of North Carolina settled 300 refugees from the Germanies and Switzerland at New Bern, dangerously close to Hancock’s Town; in September Hancock led a coalition of Tuscarora and Algonquian warriors which wiped out New Bern in an early-morning attack, killing 120 of the refugees and attacking and killing other white Carolinians outside New Bern. Like the 1622 Virginia massacre, the Tuscaroras’ exemplary 1711 attack was not followed up by others, and Hancock’s subsequent attempts to secure an agreement from the captive Surveyor-General to continue trade but not expand North Carolina landholdings further without “due warning” indicates that the Tuscaroras wanted continued coexistence. As in 1620s Virginia, the response from Carolina was a campaign of total war.233

In the subsequent Tuscarora War (1711-13), Virginia and Carolina offered scalp and prisoner bounties to militiamen and allied Indians. Virginia sent no troops, but Virginia’s Lieutenant-Governor offered £20 per scalp to British colonists, while uninvolved Tuscaroras on Virginia’s frontier were offered a bounty of 6 blankets apiece (a total value of about 40 shillings) for the scalps of Hancock’s warriors, and market prices for enslaved women and children. South Carolina234 dispatched British militias and officers leading larger collections of “warlike Indians” from allied nations, like Colonel John Barnwell and his allies of the

233 Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade, 209-212; La Vere, Tuscarora War, 16, 18-68.
234 North and South Carolina separated in 1712.
1712 campaign, a Catawba named Captain Jack and a Piedmont leader known as Captain Bull. Fighting for scalps and prisoners also offered a way to tally the dead: Barnwell’s forces recorded 52 scalps and 30 captives after victory at Torhunta in 1712, while Col. James Moore Jr.’s victory at Neoheroka in the spring of 1713 was measured in 392 Indian prisoners and 192 scalps. Scalps and prisoners were also exchanged as gifts and tokens of alliance: Tom Blount, the pro-English Tuscarora leader, had “about thirty scalps” delivered to South Carolina, and personally delivered eight captives to North Carolina’s acting-governor Thomas Pollock, who gave Blount £10 for each and resold them into the Caribbean. But for the British colonies, the ultimate goal was extirpation. During the course of the war, at least 1,000 or 1,200 Tuscaroras were sold into slavery, and the number may have been as high as 1,800 or 2,000. In 1712, the North Carolina government chided Barnwell for a negotiated truce with Hancock’s Tuscaroras, urging him instead to exterminate them, per the “laudable custom of South Carolina.”

Scalp and slave bounties were paired again in the Yamasee War (1715-17), the final spasm of the Southeastern slave trade consuming itself. Relations between the Yamasees and Carolina had been declining since the Yamasees had begun trying to restore their population by placing a moratorium on war expeditions and adopting their captives. Various actions by Carolina colonists were readily legible to the Yamasees as ominous and signs of enmity: Anglican missionaries began kidnapping mixed-race Yamasee children for religious instruction; the trader Alexander Long hired Cherokee mercenaries from the interior to wipe out Chestowee, a Yuchi town, to recoup an outstanding debt he claimed against them in May 1714; in early 1715, when total Indian debt to South Carolina was estimated at £50,000, a

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235 Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*; La Vere, *Tuscarora War*, 16, 18-68.
census of Southeastern Indians was interpreted as a literal headcount. On the night of 14 May, 1715, Indian agent Thomas Nairne promised the Yamasee headmen that South Carolina meant them no ill will; as soon as he retired for the evening, his abrasive, arrogant counterpart agent John Wright privately promised, in insulting language and with unmistakeably coarse hand gestures, that South Carolina would hang the Yamasees’ four principal micos (headmen) and sell their women and children into Caribbean slavery. Killing most of the delegates, the Yamasees led a coalition of “virtually every nation in the South,” in what Salisbury calls the most extensive pan-Indian uprising “yet in colonial North America” against South Carolina, in which the most determined fighters were the “Southern Indians” most heavily in debt to the Carolina traders: the Yamasees, Yuchis, Shawnees, Apalachicolas, Apalachees, and Lower Creeks. Within the war’s first few months, most of Carolina’s plantation districts were torched, and several hundred Creek and Apalachee warriors came within a few miles of Charles Town in August 1715.236

As in Bacon’s Rebellion and King Philip’s War, undifferentiated fear and hatred for Indians led the colonists to make counterproductive decisions in the war’s first year. That the colonists dreaded the Yamasees and their allies is indicated by South Carolina governor Charles Craven’s public description of them in the Commons’ House of Assembly as “monsters of man kind” and, privately, a colonist’s letter of that summer which demonstrates

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236 Wright’s insult was transcribed by a captured English boy using watered gunpowder for ink, taking dictation from a Yamasee headman known as the Huspaw King: after Nairne had gone, Wright threatened “that the white men would come and [fetch] [illegible] the Yamasees in one night,” hang the four principal headmen, enslave the rest, and sell all of them into foreign slavery, “for he said that the men of the Yamasees were like women, and shew’d his hands one to the other” – in other words, Wright drove his point across with an obscene vaginal hand gesture, which “vex’d the great Warrier’s [sic].” In Ramsey, The Yamasee War, esp. 1-54, 227-28; Doris B. Fisher, entry “Yamasee War” (811-812) in Alan Gallay ed., Colonial Wars of North America, 1512 – 1763: An Encyclopedia (Routledge: 2015 [1996]); McNeill, Mosquito Empires; La Vere, The Tuscarora War; Ramsey, The Yamasee War, 1-53; Beck, Chiefdoms, Collapse, and Coalescence, 181-202; Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement; Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade.
how scalping had become a metonym for colonists’ anxieties of Indian torture by the early 18th century. Lion Gardiner, in his memoirs 20 years after the Pequot War, had not even mentioned scalping in his prayer to be spared the horrors of Indian torture: “not to have a sharp stake… thrust into my fundament and to have my skin flaid of[f] by piecemeale and cut in pieces and bits and my flesh rosted and thrust down my throat as the[se] people have done.” A colonist’s letter from the summer of 1715, by contrast, uses the “scalped and [x]” formulation standard in Anglo-American horror stories from the 18th century onwards: he wrote how he dreaded not just being “massacred by savages” but “perhaps… being rosted in slow fires, scalp’d and strick with lightwood, and other inexpressible tortures.” In early, critical battles that halted the first Yamasee offensives, Indian warriors from several of the “settlement” nations that lived in the shadow of larger Carolina coastal towns fought alongside white colonists and armed African slaves, but by mid-July had gone over to the Yamasees, “alienated by the growing anti-Indian rhetoric of white Carolinians.”

Walter Hixson describes the Carolina counterattack as “a boomerang of indiscriminate violence replete with massacres fueled by scalp bounties,” while offering no further explication in text or footnotes—perhaps Yamasee scalps were redeemed for outstanding bounties offered in Virginia during the Tuscarora War. As in earlier wars, the intervention of indigenous allies on the side of the colonists, with incentives of scalp and prisoner bounties to appeal to Indian allies and Europeans, turned the tide against the Yamasees’ coalition. In June, South Carolina obtained the assistance of the Mohawks and Senecas against the northerly, less-determined members of the Yamasee coalition: the

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Piedmont Siouians, Catawbas, Upper Creeks, Cheraws, and Choctaws. As the Great Peace of 1701 prevented the Iroquois from warring with France’s allies in the Great Lakes and interior, fighting Carolina’s Siouian and Muskogean enemies would offer the Iroquois captives and war honours, and possible scalp and slave bounties, without jeopardizing diplomatic relations; in conjunction with casualties inflicted on them by Carolina militiamen, these Yamasee allies dropped out of the war by the end of the summer. Military assistance was also offered to Tom Blount’s Tuscaroras, whose incentives included not just scalp and slave bounties but the redemption of captive Tuscaroras in South Carolina and among the Southern Indians. The entry of the remote, numerous Cherokees on the British side in 1716 served to tie up the Creeks for the remainder of the war, while their raids via the Tennessee River intimidated New France and compelled several smaller nations in Louisiana to come to terms with the English. By 1717, the Creeks, Chickasaws, and many Piedmont nations were coming to terms with the British as well; the survivors of the Savannah River nations, on the other hand, had scattered beyond the reach of the Carolina traders, as refugees among the Lower Creeks and into the swamps of southern Georgia, while the remaining Yamasees returned to their homelands in Florida to take asylum in St. Augustine.238

South Carolina land speculators who had been eying the Yamasees’ well-watered lands on the Savannah River since 1707, ideal for rice production and cattle-raising, were now free to snap them up. Alan Gallay describes the conclusion of the Yamasee War as “both an end” to the Indian slave trade “and a beginning” of a new phase of British settler-colonialism in the Southeast, in which the mass importation of West African slaves would

238 Walter Hixson, American Settler Colonialism, 38-41; Ramsey, The Yamasee War, esp. 1-54, 227-28; La Vere, The Tuscarora War; Beck, Chiefdoms, Collapse, and Coalescence, 181-202; Kelton, Epidemics and Enslavement; Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade; Fisher, “Yamasee War”; Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse; Salisbury, “Native People and European Settlers in Eastern North America, 1600 – 1763”.
replace indigenous slave labour on a vastly-expanded plantation system. While the Indian slave trade had been vastly destructive to communities and individuals, it had at least placed a perverse sort of value on living indigenous bodies. The scalp-hunting system, on the other hand, simply paid for dead bodies, and in a way that obscured the verifiability of the victim’s identity; this, in turn, presented no hindrance to the enactment of generalized Indian-hating among Anglo-American frontiersmen.239

**Conclusion: the ranger tradition and the myth of the Indian hunter**

As noted above and in Chapter 3, one of the major problems for British colonists was that their success in replicating a British way of life in the New World, by transforming Indians’ mosaic landscapes of cornfields, managed woodlands, and forests into cleared fields, towns, and widely-dispersed farms, did little to prepare them for prosecuting war as Indians waged it. Scalp and slave bounties went partway towards bolstering the morale of militias and volunteers, but were more important in the contracting of military specialists on a piecework basis. While allied Indians remained a part of the Anglo-American way of war up to the end of the 19th century and beyond, British colonists also began forming specialist units of volunteers who tried to emulate or match Indian warriors’ mobility and woodcraft. Ian K. Steele dates the origin of ranging in Virginia to 1645 when a force of volunteer “rangers,” to be supported by the proceeds of the tobacco economy, were contracted to defend the colony for a year. John Grenier proposes an origin point of a distinctive Southeastern equestrian ranger tradition, which reached its full and bloody flowering with the Kentucky dragoons of the War of 1812 and the Texas Rangers, to Virginia’s war with the

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Susquehannock in 1676. During the conflict, the House of Burgesses enlisted a force of 125 dragoons to “range” between the headwaters of the Piedmont’s major rivers, though Grenier notes that the Mohawks, at Governor Andros’ request, defeated and dispersed the Susquehannocks before the rangers’ mettle could be tested. With the Iroquois Confederacy declaring neutrality during King William’s War (1688-97), Benjamin Church led mixed English and Indian ranger companies into Maine to kill Abenakis and burn their villages on four expeditions (1689, 1690, 1692, 1696), during which time the Abenaki Confederacy, supported by New France, led retaliatory raids into New England. These raids were accompanied by incentives: the plunder of Indian villages, the slave trade in Virginia (mentioned above), and head and scalp bounties in Massachusetts. In 1694, notes Benjamin Madley, Massachusetts offered a £25 reward for women or children “under the age of fourteen years, that shall be killed,” perhaps the first Anglo-American bounty specifically for their deaths; in 1694 and 1695, Massachusetts also “offered equal monetary rewards for dead victims and living prisoners.” In 1697 Massachusetts offered bounty specifically for scalps of men, women, and “every child of the said enemy under the age of ten years.” In 1689, Massachusetts offered rangers “whatever Indian plunder falls into their hands [for] their own” as well as a scalp bounty of 8 pounds from the public treasury, for which Georg Friederici suggests “the successful scalp hunter could just buy himself a horse and a draught animal”. Consider, before we continue to Chapter 5 and pick up these threads again, that ranger is a 14th-century English term for a gamekeeper who patrolled royal estates to protect game populations from poachers and predatory animals. So, in one sense, “ranger” is cognate
with a perception of Indian warriors as nascently criminal, and a darker idea of Indians as beast-men—not just illegitimate combatants, but beyond humanity.²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ Steele, Warpaths, 49; Magsigpen and Virginia bounties cited in Grenier, First Way of War, 39 n. 77 (8 pound scalp bounty, “whatever Indian plunder”); Friederici, “Scalping in America,” 433-36; Friederici, Skalpieren, Griffin trans., 73; Madley, “Reexamining the American Genocide Debate: Meaning, Historiography, and New Methods,” 114-117.
Chapter Five: Dark Mimesis: Scalp-hunting from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812

And comes the sacred spoil from friend or foe
No marks distinguish, and no man can know.
–Joel Barlow, *The Columbiad* (1807), VI.673-74

The general strictly forbids the inhuman practice of scalping, except where the enemy are Indians, or Canadians dressed like Indians. –James Wolfe, 1759.

Introduction

By the time of the Seven Years’ War a powerful and self-reinforcing mythology regarding the horrors of savage war, Anglo-American victimhood, and the need for disproportionate retribution to be taken against Indians had coalesced into the paradigmatic ideas of scalping and scalp-hunting. Yet this mythology of the frontier was Janus-faced, as the essentialized Indian warrior, the center and target of the mimetic savagery of conquest and ethnic cleansing, was paired with his imagined counterpart, the fantasized Indian-slaying frontiersman, whom Herman Melville dyspeptically dubbed the “Leatherstocking nemesis.”

This chapter will sketch the development of the Anglo-American myth of the Indian warrior and the Indian hunter in the first half of the 18th century; the ramifications of its enactment between the American Revolution and the Jacksonian era; and the elevation of these paired myths into American art and literature during the 1820s to 1840s. This chapter will conclude with selections from Black Hawk’s 1833 memoir to demonstrate an indigenous rebuttal to Anglo-American self-representations.

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Britain was not the only colonizing power to experiment with, or implement, a settler-colonial system of colonization in North America; in the context of searching for successful imperial strategies, 18th-century France experimented as the Dutch had (on New Netherland, see Chapter Three) with the scalping paradigm’s system of land annexation, targeted destruction of specific ethnocultural groups, and scalp bounties. Despite its general pattern of negotiated coexistence with indigenous allies and neighbours in the continental interior, 18th-century New France entered into a settler-colonial struggle for land in Louisiana, and a genocidal war against the Mesquakies, or Fox, on the far-flung northwestern frontier of the Pays d’en Haut. In Louisiana, its southern continental frontier, New France obtained land for tobacco plantations and its port of New Orleans by offering its allies payments for scalps and prisoners from the Chitimachas, Alibamons, and Natchez, groups already decimated by war and disease. In the western Great Lakes, the French alternated throughout the first half of the 18th century between large-scale violence against the Mesquakies, in the form of military campaigns and the purchase of Mesquakie captives as slaves, and attempts to bring them into their western alliance network, which met violent opposition by western allies such as the Illinois Confederacy. If the wars in Louisiana and the upper Great Lakes indicate that the French, no less than the Spanish or the British, would not hesitate at ethnic cleansing by scalp bounties or slave trading to achieve imperial goals, it also demonstrates the particularly decentralized and nominal nature of French inland colonialism: the Indian allies who made these campaigns possible also renegotiated the terms of their engagement to an overstretched Gallic empire.

Prologue: “white savages” and the Hairbuyer General
On the night of 19 April 1762, as the Seven Years’ War wound down to its end, persons unknown approached an Indian village in Pennsylvania’s Wyoming Valley, home of the influential Lenape-Munsee leader Teedyuscung, the self-proclaimed “King of the Delawares.” The intruders locked Teedyuscung in his cabin and burned down the town; within two weeks, settlers from the Connecticut-based Susquehanna Company had occupied the town site. More than 700 families had been slated to migrate from Connecticut to the Wyoming Valley, but after Ohio Valley war parties drove out or killed settlers across the northwestern frontier in the next two months, few dared to make the journey. By early October, only “thirty or forty stubborn farmers” remained to harvest their corn, confident that their blockhouse could protect them. On 15 October, a warparty led by Teedyuscung’s son, Captain Bull, proved them wrong, killing 9 men and 1 woman and driving the rest upriver to captivity at Wyalusing. A few days later, Pennsylvania provincial troops arrived to find the corn still standing, the town in ruins, and the bodies of the 10 posthumously and inventively mutilated: not only scalped, but impaled with such metalwares as hinges, awls, and pitchforks as well as spears and arrows. This repudiation of the settlers’ ambitions to build new homes on the ashes of theirs was read, on the other side of the frontier, simply as Indian horror and dubbed the first “Wyoming Massacre.”

On the Pennsylvania frontier, even peaceable interactions had a phobic edge to them; when settlers and Indians drank together in taverns or at gatherings, notes Peter Silver, they often blustered about their supposed bloody deeds, those already performed and those which could be potentially performed. At other times, Indians or settlers dropped in on each other

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unannounced to issue threats or, if they had a numerical advantage, to commit robberies, assaults, or murders. Such was the case on 7 July, 1763, when three Indians declared at a tavern and mill in Paxtang Township that an army of 900 Indians were coming to destroy the nearby fort, then burn Paxtang and other nearby towns on the Susquehanna River. In response, and with the memory of Wyoming and several prior years of conflict on their minds, Samuel Murray and three other local men replied with what they thought was a reciprocal threat: to scalp them to collect a nonexistent £50 bounty from Governor James Hamilton. Two days later, Murray and six other men caught up to the three Indians on the road, shot them, scalped them, and presented the scalps to the governor in Philadelphia. Claiming they had caught the Indians stealing, they demanded a reward, for which he gave them an ad hoc payment of £10 each.244

The locals of Paxtang also held deep suspicions regarding an Indian neighbour named Toshetaquah, also called Will Sock or Bill Soc. Officially a diplomatic envoy for the British government, Pennsylvania settlers were convinced this was a façade to conceal a default Indian malevolence, and that Sock had consorted with their enemies and taken part in the capturing and killing of Pennsylvanians in the Wyoming Valley raid and elsewhere. Sock did not live among these fearful Pennsylvanians, but at a village called Conestoga Manor, made up of twenty or so refugee Susquehannocks, Shawnees, and Senecas who had signed a treaty with Pennsylvania following the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701. In the middle of December, Matthew Smith and dozens of other Paxtonians reported seeing dozens of armed Indians at Conestoga. Deciding that Will Sock’s treachery had finally been proven, around

244 Silver, Our Savage Neighbours, 96-97, 160-65, 178-203; Salisbury, “Native People and European Settlers in Eastern North America, 1600 – 1763,” 422-23, 444-45; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 191-213; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 244-48; White, The Middle Ground.
50 mounted vigilantes surrounded the village before dawn, killed and scalped six people they caught sleeping, and razed Conestoga Manor. According to a Quaker from Lancaster County named David Henderson, the Paxton County vigilantes, referring to themselves as the “Hickory Boys,” justified their attack by claiming Will Sock had “green [i.e., untanned] white scalps in his poss’n since the last breaking out of the Ind’n trouble.” Henderson called this a fabrication “to give a Colour to their enterprise,” and his letter also notes an ominous Biblical allusion: “They say their Name is Legion, & they are Many & will stand by one another.”

The 14 Conestoga survivors, comprising three married couples and their eight children, appealed for government protection, and were placed under guard in a workhouse in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. On 27 December, 1763, a regiment of Royal Highlanders and all other local authorities stood aside as a well-armed mob from Paxtang, Donegal, and Hempfield townships marched into Lancaster, stormed the workhouse, massacred the unarmed Conestogas, and then, in actions which bewildered and revolted many contemporary British and Anglo-American observers, posthumously mutilated their bodies in an approximation of Indian warfare: chopping off their hands and feet, knocking their heads in, and scalping them. When news of the “Workhouse Massacre” circulated, 127 Lenape-Munsee converts to Moravian Christianity already living under government protection in Philadelphia, whose new faith’s values included pacifism, asked to take sanctuary in Britain; colonial authorities shuttled them between New York and New Jersey until returning them to

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Philadelphia by January 1764. Upon receiving this news, the Hickory Boys began collecting volunteers, and in early February 200 armed riders and marchers appeared in Philadelphia, tacitly aided or openly supported by “perhaps three quarters” of the city’s population. The vigilantes were only prevented from reaching the Moravians by Governor John Penn and Benjamin Franklin’s hastily-gathered counter-protest of a thousand residents.246

The Hickory Boys insisted that their only intention had been to march the Moravians out of Pennsylvania, offered to put up a bond of 10,000 pounds as a sign of their sincerity, and agreed to disperse once their statement of grievances was read to the governor and distributed in Philadelphia. Their first demand became reality after 50 Moravians died of an epidemic while in confinement and gradually returned to the Susquehanna Valley. Their second was realized with the publication of “A Declaration and Remonstrance of the Distressed and Bleeding Frontier Inhabitants,” in which the Hickory Boys justified their acts of ethnic cleansing by rhetorically asking “Whoever proclaimed war with part of a nation, and not with the whole?” More alarming to Franklin was the wide support that ungeneralised hostility towards Indians enjoyed among Pennsylvanians. Some contemporaries argued that the existence of “independent Commonwealths” of Indians was itself not only dangerous, but an imposition on the freedoms of “Free-Men and English Subjects.” Others openly defended the killing of children as forestalling future retribution, as an anonymous Pennsylvania pamphleteer did by alluding to Isaiah 59:5: “out of a SERPENT’S EGG, there should come... a fiery flying SERPENT.”247

Franklin’s reply, a 1764 pamphlet entitled *A Narrative of the Late Massacres*, inverted the pieties of the 18th century’s Indian-war narratives—families sundered by massacres, pitiless destroyers and posthumous mutilation of the innocent, etc.—in a way that shocked a contemporary audience. Franklin began by reminding his readers that the Conestogas had done nothing wrong, and that killing them for injuries inflicted by the Lenape-Munsees, Shawnees, and Mingoes was comparable to the Dutch avenging a French assault by attacking the English, “because they too are White People.” While Indians acknowledged European nationalities’ distinctions between themselves, frontiersmen did not reciprocate, and Franklin pointed out their bigotry in stating that the “only Crime of these poor Wretches seems to have been [their] reddish brown Skin, and black Hair.” Invoking the by-now well-established literary conventions of the anti-Indian sublime, in which the details of Indian horrors were, in Peter Silver’s words, described in such “rich, hallucinatory detail” that they could be “mildly traumatic to read,” Franklin described the slaughter of the Conestogas by white frontiersmen as Pennsylvanians were accustomed to thinking of their own victimhood, e.g., “All of them were scalped and otherwise horribly mangled.” Franklin then rhetorically asked whether settlers had come to America “to learn and practise the Manners of Barbarians?” and turned towards his ultimate point: that the frontiersmen had proven themselves morally *worse* than Indians, whose cruelties “they practise against their Enemies only, not against their Friends.” Lest anyone had forgotten, the Indians had received the first settlers “with Kindness and Hospitality. Behold the Return we have made them!” Franklin then listed famous stories of hospitality and gratitude among peoples that

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Enlightenment Europeans considered their cultural and moral inferiors: “ancient Heathens,” Muslims (“cruel Turks” and “Saracens”), “Popish Spaniards” and “Negroes of Africa.” His thundering conclusion was that Anglo-Americans had proven themselves the most brutal and ungrateful people on the face of the earth, and that the scalped and murdered Conestogas “would have been safe in any Part of the known World, – except in the Neighbourhood of the CHRISTIAN WHITE SAVAGES of Peckstang and Donegall!!”

Nearly two decades later, Franklin imputed another sort of white savagery in an anonymous work of Revolutionary propaganda which articulated its audience’s fantasies and nightmares to unreal perfection. Per the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the British government’s diplomatic relations with indigenous polities west of the Appalachians, recognition of an Indian territory, and attempts to fence it off from squatters, hunters, and land-speculators aggrieved Anglo-American westerners, who felt their government was hindering the development of the nation’s economy and the yeoman landowners’ class for the benefit of wandering savages; more darkly, the British government could be imagined as complicit in Indians’ reprisals against squatters and trespassers, or as the guiding hand behind them. Last but not least of the Declaration of Independence’s list of 27 “injuries and usurpations” inflicted by George III against them had been the accusation that he “has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.”

In 1779, when Franklin and the Marquis de Lafayette had compiled a list of British atrocity narratives to be illustrated as prints for a children’s book, which Joyce Chaplin describes as

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248 Benjamin Franklin, A Narrative of the Late Massacres, in Lancaster County, of a Number of Indians, Friends of this Province, By Persons Unknown. With some Observations on the same (Philadelphia, 1764), 12-27; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 244-47; Silver, Our Savage Neighbours, 45-48 (“mildly traumatic to read”), 79-86, 183-203.
“a primer for little patriots,” British complicity in scalping and Indian horrors were featured prominently.249

While Franklin and Lafayette’s primer never got beyond the planning phase, their list of 26 outrages and their instructions to the artists survive, indicating the anxieties of Anglo-American colonial mind. Eight illustrations would depict racialized threats to the safety of white families, two of which involved the British “corrupting Negroes” and encouraging them to violently rebel. Print 8 would articulate the fear of interracial rape in a slave uprising: the “Master & his Sons” of a large house “lying dead” and their black slaves, armed with guns and cudgels, “carrying off” the “Wife & Daughters.” In the remaining six of these eight, the racialized violations of frontier society were the killing and scalping of “the Frontier Farmers and their Families, Women and Children” by Indians, aided and abetted by the British. Print 12 would show General Patrick Tonyn, Governor of East Florida, paying cash to “his Soldiers & Savages” for “Scalps of the Georgia People.” Events in the Wyoming Valley in 1778, when a mixed force of Loyalist rangers and Iroquois defeated a Continental army and conducted a scorched-earth campaign against the rebels, warranted two separate prints: Print 13 would show “the Commanding Officer at Niagara” paying cash for “the Scalps of the Wioming families,” while Print 18 would depict English complicity in a cannibal feast: “Prisonners kill’d and Roasted” for “a great festival” of “the Canadian indians” on “American flesh,” with “Colonel Buttler an english officer Setting at table.” Print

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14 would show the Secretary of War presenting George III “a Schedule intitled Acct. of Scalps. which he receives very graciously.”

The idea of British officers shamelessly documenting their war crimes against white, Christian subjects of the King, utterly fearless of the reaction from the British general public or the Opposition party if such a communiqué were intercepted, became the seed of Franklin’s most grotesque propaganda piece: the anonymously-authored “Supplement to the Boston Independent Chronicle” published in April 1782. Purportedly a reprint of a manifest, written in plain English and unciphered, attached to a shipment of fur bales intercepted by the New England militia en route to Governor Haldimand in Quebec, the foreword by a fictional ‘Capt. Gerrish’ explained that upon examining the bales, “we were struck with horror to find […] 8 large ones containing SCALPS of our unhappy country-folks” of New York, New Jersey, Virginia and Pennsylvania, “taken in the last three years by the Senneka Indians” and sent as a gift to Haldimand for transport to England. The attached message, purportedly from a fictional Seneca chief named “Conejogatchie,” interpreted by “the elder Moore, the trader” and transcribed by a “James Craufurd,” itemized with pedantic detail the age, sex, and manner of death of over 1,000 settlers, supposedly marked on each scalp by a pictographic system of “Indian triumphal marks.” Only 43 belonged to soldiers of the Continental army killed in “skirmishes” (not, you’ll notice, “battles”), the vast majority belonged to civilian farmer families: nearly 400 scalps of young, mature, and old men killed in their houses or fields, 18 denoted by a yellow flame icon as “prisoners burnt alive, after being scalped, their nails torn out by the roots, and other torments”. Eighty-eight were of women killed by

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250 Chaplin, The First Scientific American, 271-72; Silver, Our Savage Neighbours, 244-251; “Franklin and Lafayette’s List of Prints to Illustrate British Cruelties (ca. May 1779),” from the Franklin Papers online (founders.archives.org);
scalping-knife or tomahawk, 17 of those belonging to old women “knocked down dead, [or who] had their brains beat out.” An almost equal number were the scalps of children: 193 scalps of boys, 211 of girls, and 29 scalps of “little infants… rip’t out of their mothers’ bellies” and neatly stowed in a small birchbark box. The whole story was, of course, a hoax, but the sort of hoax that its readers wanted to believe.²⁵¹

“they carved their name”: Scalp bounties and mimetic violence, 1689 to 1763

Guy Chet observes that for colonial administrators, the outsourcing of Indian-fighting by offering scalp bounties sidestepped various financial and political hurdles regarding the raising of troops. As the politically-problematic draft was rarely invoked in Britain’s American colonies, regular troops could only be raised by offering lucrative contracts with fixed terms of service. When their limited time in uniform was added to the financial problems of paying wages and provisions, administrators griped that these colonial troops cost four times as much as full-time soldiers in Britain and Europe. On the other hand, irregular companies recruited by ranger captains who, like privateers at sea, had obtained letters of marque from the government, were not on the colony’s payroll and, at least in theory, were paid only for success. With the average daily wage of a labourer in that era “rarely exceeding” 2 shillings a day, scalp and prisoner bounties were quite competitive. In 1689, Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut offered “eight pounds, per head, for every fighting Indian man,” and Connecticut offered scalp bounties in 1704, writes Benjamin Madley. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire during Queen Anne’s War (1702-13), initially Massachusetts offered £10, or 200 shillings, for “every Scalp of an Indian Enemy

²⁵¹ Silver, Our Savage Neighbours, 244-251; “Supplement to the Boston Independent Chronicle” (1782) in Benjamin Franklin and William Temple Franklin, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Volume I (London: Henry Colburn, 1818), 337-341.
killed in fight, that is, ten Years of age” or higher, with a £10 bounty on the scalp of a woman age 10 or higher, and captured children to be taken to Boston to be sold into slavery. When this failed to yield a suitable number of volunteers, the Massachusetts General Assembly raised the bounty on each “adult” (however defined) male Indian, capable of bearing arms, to £20 per scalp, and eventually to £100.252

New France, which lacked the dense populations of the British colonies, had much better relations with its indigenous neighbours; through them, and its western alliance network, they developed a frontier-war style which relied much more heavily on indigenous allies and the mourning-war system of captive-taking and scalp-lifting. The first confirmed report of this came to British authorities in 1688 with the deposition of Magsigpen, a British-allied Algonquian known to the English as Graypoole and to the Dutch at Albany as Aert. Magsigpen told how he had gone north with a Mohawk war party to raid New France and their allies, and on his return had gone to Schaghticoke, a Mahican village on the Hudson which sheltered refugees from King Philip’s War. He and a dozen Schaghticokes, while hunting, were shadowed on the river by “Eleaven Indians that formerly lived in New England, and now in Canada,” who during a parley explained their purpose to avenge the “greate mischeife” of the Mohawks in Canada. They had been sent by Denonville himself, the Governor-General, and paraphrased his offer: “therefore goe yow revenge the same, either on Christians or Indians; kill all what you cann, bring noe prisoners but their scalps, and I’le give you tenn beavers for every one of them.” Georg Friederici calculated in 1906

252 Chet, *Conquering the American Wilderness*, 89-91, states in footnote 80 that volunteers without pay were to receive £50 per scalp rather than £10; my notes do not indicate whether this was adjusted upwards as the other scalp bounties were during the course of the war. See also Grenier, *First Way of War*, 16-52; Madley, “Reexamining the American Genocide Debate,” 114-117, notes that Massachusetts apparently paid for 208 Indian scalps between 1703-04, and passed additional scalp bounties throughout Queen Anne’s War: in 1706, 1709, and 1710.
that the 1688 value of ten beavers, the fur-trade medium of exchange, would be equivalent to a gun purchased in Montreal with 4 pounds of powder and 40 pounds of lead. In 1691 Denonville’s successor, Frontenac, offered colonists and Indian allies 10 crowns for every scalp, 20 crowns for a white male prisoner, and 10 for a white female prisoner; later, either due to a glut in the market or moral criticism, the government lowered the prices for scalps and prisoners to one crown apiece.253

The English precedent of scalp bounties and large-scale slave trading (see Chapter 4) also influenced French policy in their Louisiana colony and in the Pays d’en Haut in the early 18th century. Facing labour shortages in New France beginning in the 1670s and with a general monetary and credit crisis from 1700-10 due to a collapsing price of beaver, the French purchased thousands of slaves captured in the further west and south in their allies’ wars to bolster their domestic economy. In wars with the Alibamons (1702-12), and the Chitimachas (1706-18), Louisiana’s governor Jean Baptiste le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville offered allied Indians 10 crowns each for the scalps of “Alabamas” (the generic French term for Creeks) and Chitimachas. Elizabeth John, cryptically, noted without explication in 1975 that “one coarse black scalp lock looked much like another, and some grew upon the heads of Frenchmen, particularly some of the métis from Canada.” Being members of the powerful

Creek Confederacy, the Alabamas could negotiate peace with Bienville by 1712; the isolated and unaligned Chitimachas, by contrast, were “decimated” by the war, allowing the Louisiana colony to found New Orleans, its capital and its artery to world markets, in 1722 on land seized from the Chitimachas.254

Scalp bounties were also deployed by the French in one of their few conflicts waged on settler-colonial terms: the Natchez Wars. After Fort Rosalie was erected on Natchez territory in 1716, tobacco plantations worked by African slaves followed, and by the early 1720s French colonists were demanding the Natchez relocate their villages so they could expand tobacco production. When war broke out in 1722-23, Bienville offered Natchez scalp and prisoner bounties to allied Indians, then sent a punitive expedition of 150 French troops to the Natchez capital to extract peace. As the Natchez were one of the few stratified Indian societies left in the 18th century Southeast, whose leaders could wield coercive violence against disobedient followers, Bienville could compel the Natchez ruler, The Great Sun, to accept his peace terms: that several named Natchez rebels were to be executed, and an escaped black slave, known for “seditious speeches” against the French, be brought in dead or alive. Continued French land acquisitions led to a Natchez revolt in 1729 and the burning of Fort Rosalie, while the French were temporarily distracted by a slave revolt in New Orleans. After putting down the New Orleans revolt the French set out to, in Gregory Waselkov’s terms, “methodically exterminate” the Natchez, most of whom were sold through New Orleans into Haitian slavery. Like other southeastern peoples devastated by the

disease epidemics, arms races, and slaving wars of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the remaining Chitimachas and Natchez had a choice: of joining larger refugee confederacies like the Choctaws or Creeks, as the Natchez did, or becoming vassals of French Louisiana known as *les petites nations*, as did the Chitimachas.255

In the continental interior, between the densely-populated agrarian corridor of the St. Lawrence Valley and the Louisiana settlements which offered access to the Caribbean, the French did not have the manpower or institutional strength to impose their will on Indians—or, for that matter, on French settlers and merchants in the interior. Behind France’s claims of vast territorial control was a reality of French islands in an Indian sea: military forts, trading posts, and such enclaves as the Illinois Country, a center of French farming and fur trading settled by *coureurs du bois* without government permission in the early 18th century. Between the Illinois Country and Montreal was the Ohio Country, whose rivers connected Louisiana and Illinois to the St. Lawrence corridor but through which the French could only travel on sufferance of the peoples living there. After first contact in 1660, coordinated military campaigns with indigenous allies were necessary in wars with the Mesquakie of Lake Michigan’s western shore, an Algonquian people known to the French after the name of their military-specialist Fox clan. Colin Calloway observes that the Mesquakie, who controlled the Minnesota and Des Moines trade routes, killed French traders attempting to push past them to the Sioux and upper Mississippi markets. Yet French policy wavered, writes Brett Rushforth, between war with “les Renards” and the desire to bring them into their anti-Iroquois western network of trade and military allies; in 1679, French and

Mesquakie diplomats smoked the calumet, and after the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701 French officials resumed these attempts at glasnost. France’s northwesternmost trade and military allies, namely the Ojibway, Ottawa, Wyandot, Miami, and Illinois, had no intention of being supplanted as middlemen over the eastern trade in firearms and French trade goods; from the 1670s to the 1690s, France’s western allies fought the Mesquakie regardless of French policy. In the early 18th century, as New France’s population expanded following the Great Peace of 1701, New France’s restive allies were joined by a French settler population in the interior who also set their own foreign policy—and, like the people in the towns and cities of the St. Lawrence corridor, had an inexhaustible appetite for Indian slave labour. The “Fox Wars” of 1712-16 and 1728-33, the peoples of the Pays d’en Haut sold thousands of Mesquakies into French slavery, with French colonists in the Illinois, officers, and fur traders as direct beneficiaries or middlemen of the trade; New France’s allies raided Mesquakie villages, but French officers and armies brought total war to the interior, killing men en masse and razing villages, and a people several thousand strong in the 1710s were reduced to a few hundred by the mid-1730s.256

French traders among the Miami and Illinois also acted independently of their government in selling Indian captives into the British Southeastern trade; as late as 1715, notes Colin Calloway, one hundred French coureurs de bois left Michilimackinac to become slaving middlemen on the Missouri River, buying captives from the far west from French-allied Indians and ferrying them to South Carolina for resale. The limits of French power

appeared again when the British-allied Chickasaws refused to turn over their Natchez refugees to the French in the mid-1730s. When Bienville failed to defeat the Chickasaws through conventional European warfare, including building a road to drive artillery to their main village, he accepted a Quapaw counter-offer: they would send war parties of 30 to 50 men, and in return the French would pay them for Chickasaw and Natchez scalps and prisoners. “[E]ver since they observed how weakly the French made war on the Natchez,” Bienville noted wearily in a 1733 letter, “they have held our nation in supreme contempt.”

If scalp and slave bounties were not necessarily synonymous with a settler-colonial system of land acquisition, neither was Euro-American mimesis of Indians at war. As early as Cotton Mather’s denunciation of “half Indianized French, and… half Frenchified Indians” in Decennium Luctuosum (1699), British colonists were perturbed by the number of French militia and volunteers who, thanks to years of living in Indian villages, were competent to join allied Indians in long-distance raids on New England settlements. Like John Butler’s Loyalists during the Wyoming campaign and, reportedly, bandits in the West during the 19th century (see Chapter 6), French militia and volunteers may have disguised themselves in warpaint to commit certain deeds under disguise, or to liberate themselves from the European conventions of warfare, as reflected in recurrent themes in 18th-century British accounts which cannot simply be ascribed to national and sectarian antipathies. In Reverend John Norton’s The Redeemed Captive (1748), his autobiographical account of his capture and

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257 Usner, Jr., American Indians in the Lower Mississippi Valley, 15-32; DuVal, The Native Ground:, 63-102; Corkran, Creek Frontier, 93-115; John, Storms Brewed in Other Men's Worlds:, 199; Waselkov, “Louisiana,” in Alan Gallay ed., Colonial Wars of North America, 1512-1763. On the slave trade, see Marcel Trudel, George Tombs trans., Canada’s Forgotten Slaves: Two Hundred Years of Bondage (Montréal: Véhicule Press, 2009 [1960]); Rushforth, “‘A Little Flesh We Offer You’”; Rushforth, “Slavery, the Fox Wars, and the Limits of Alliance,” 54; Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance, 3-71; Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 316.
captivity by a French-and-indigenous war party in 1746, he states that after French-allied Indians scalped a slain Massachusetts colonist and cut off his head and arms,

A young Frenchman took one of the Arms And flay’d it, roasted the Flesh, and offer’d some of it to Daniel Smeed, one of the Prisoners, to eat; but he refused it. The Frenchman dressed the Skin of the Arm (as we afterwards heard) and made a Tobacco Pouch of it.258

A lieutenant in a Scottish Highland regiment wrote of post-mortem mutilations, “I dare say no human creature but an Indian or [French] Canadian would be guilty of such inhumanity as to insult a dead body.” Hence Wolfe’s retaliatory orders during the siege of Quebec, in July 1759: “The general strictly forbids the inhuman practice of scalping, except where the enemy are Indians, or Canadians dressed like Indians.”259

Broader Anglo-American detestation of the French for their military alliances with Indians informed a persistent Anglo-American myth that Indian campaigns or uprisings against them had to be the product of European guidance and tutelage. At first glance this belief, that an innately-warlike, vindictive people (as Indians were presumed to be) were also unable to plan and execute devastating campaigns against their British enemies, seems paradoxical, until one remembers that the Indians of the European imagination were irrational and easily overwhelmed by such emotions as vengefulness and sadism. As early as Benjamin Tompson’s epic New-Englands Crisis (Boston, 1676), the poet invoked the

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259 Treating this counterpart phenomenon to Anglo-American dark mimesis is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this thesis. “such inhumanity”, see Colin Calloway, White People, Indians, and Highlanders (2008), pg. 100; on warpaint as disguise for Butler’s Loyalists, see B.A. Mann, George Washington’s War on Native America (2005), 9-10, 115; on Wolfe’s order re: scalping, see Wright, The Life of Major-General James Wolfe (1864), 531 – these sources cited in Simon Harrison, Dark Trophies: Hunting and the Enemy Body in Modern War (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), 39-47; Cotton Mather cited in Slotkin, Regeneration, 116-145.
possibility of a French or Spanish conspiracy behind King Philip’s War by rhetorically asking, while outlining possible causes, “Whither some Romish Agent hatcht the plot?” For Tompson, at least, the war’s outbreak was no great mystery, as “Indian spirits need / No grounds but lust to make a Christian bleed.”

In Tompson’s *New-Englands Crisis* and Nathaniel Saltonstall’s “A True But Brief Account of our Losses…” (1676), the anti-Indian sublime springs fully formed from the Anglo-American collective unconscious. Here the foundational fears of Europeans in the Americas, of Indian war as reverse-colonial invasion, the destruction of European domesticity, cannibalism, and dismemberment, are combined with the particular fixations that would fuel Anglo-American nightmares for another 250 years: Indians as child-killers who interracially rape white women, flay settlers’ bodies, and scalp them while still living. Tompson’s prologue to the war is a Savagist burlesque in which King Philip, a “greazy Lout,” addresses his “pagan slaves” in ungrammatical English with pidgin Algonquian words thrown in, mixing legitimate causes for war with venal, criminal ones and thus discrediting the former. Philip complains that British settlers not only “enjoy the best” land in New England and “intend to have the rest” later, but have instituted English codes of law which issue whippings for drunkenness and hanging for rape—linking the Anglo-American fascination with the image of Indian sexual degeneracy with the corollary idea of the indigenous woman as a prisoner of her own society. He promises his barbarian horde that war will not only stop further British immigration, but will provide satisfaction in the form of material goods (“English coats” and “the richest merchants houses”), cannibalism (“wine to

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drink out of their Captains throats,” i.e., blood), and interracial rape (“Wee’l have their silken wives”). This “native swarm,” boiling with “unbridled lust,” rampages through the “border towns,” where settlers’ babies are “Snatcht by a pagan hand to lasting rest,” villages are torched, and Tompson implies Philip’s “bruitish wolves” feed on human flesh: “What the inexorable flames doe spare / More cruel Heathen lug away for fare.” In short: “They strip, they bind, they ravish, flea [flay] and roast.”

Nathaniel Saltonstall, in describing the “exquisite Torments and most inhumane Barbarities” inflicted upon New Englanders, is similarly inventive in describing Indian trophies: human-finger necklaces, belts of human skin. If Tompson implied scalping by “flea,” Saltonstall explicitly links interracial rape, scalping, and dismemberment:

…the Heathen rarely giving Quarter to those that they take, but if they were Women, they first forced them to satisfie their filthy Lusts and then murdered them, either cutting off the Head, ripping open the Belly, or skulping the Head of Skin and Hair, and hanging them up as Trophies; wearing Men’s Fingers as Bracelets about their Necks and Stripes of their Skins which they dresse for Belts. They knowkt one Youth of the Head, and laying him for dead, they flead (or skulp’d) his Head of Skin and Hair. After which the Boy wonderfully revived, and is now recovered, only he hath Nothing but the dry Skull, neither Skin nor Hair on his Head.

As noted in Chapter 3, Tompson and Saltonstall’s prurient fantasies of interracial rape on the battlefield parted ways with reality, though they would remain a central image in savage-war narratives for another two centuries. In describing the New Englanders’ revenge Tompson

also points the way towards the mimetic violence of the 18th century: “Upon the Indian skins they carv’d their name.”

One of the earliest cases of such mimetic violence among British colonists occurred in March 1697, the final year of King William’s War (1688-97). When an Abenaki war party raided Haverhill, Massachusetts, Thomas Duston led seven of his children to shelter at a garrison a few miles away, while his wife Hannah, who had given birth to their eighth child a week before, was taken captive with her nurse Mary Neff. With 150 miles to go, the raiders had no time for two prisoners and a baby on their return trip, and Cotton Mather writes in *Decennium Luctuosum* (1699) that an Abenaki “dashed out the Brains of the Infant, against a Tree” a mile from Haverhill. A few days later, the captives were given to a family of Catholic Abenakis comprising two men, three women, and seven children, including an English boy named Samuel taken in a raid on Massachusetts a year and a half earlier. One night, Hannah Duston, Mary Neff, and Samuel crept up on their captors in the dark with hatchets and wiped out the whole family, all but an old woman who escaped with wounds and a child Duston planned to sell into slavery in Boston, then fled down the Merrimack River, returning to Massachusetts with ten scalps. Though Massachusetts’ bounty of 10

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263 Thompson, “New Englands Crisis,” 14. Sharon Block cites several sources from the 18th century observing the absence of sexual assault of female captives; William Martin, son of Virginia’s agent to the Cherokees, Joseph Martin, recalled a story of a “mighty” Cherokee warrior who had attempted “some rudeness” with a female prisoner of war in the Revolutionary era but was stopped by his comrades—“This, I believe is the only instance I have ever heard of an Indian’s treating a female captive immodestly.” Sharon Block cites multiple 18th-century sources noting Indian nonaggression towards English women in captivity, though observes that as the conceptual category of marital rape did not exist in the 18th century, Anglo-American captives’ forced adoption into Indian villages, including being married off without their consent, was not considered “equivalent to rape” – in Sharon Block, *Rape and Sexual Power in Early America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 210-38.
pounds per scalp had been rescinded in 1696, an exception was made, and Hannah Duston received a reward of 25 or 50 pounds from the governor.264

Events at Norridgewock, an Abenaki village on the Kennebec River, are more indicative of the norms of 18th-century Anglo-American mimetic violence. During the three-year conflict (1722-25) between New England and the Wabanaki Confederacy known variously as Dummer’s or Gray Lock’s War, Massachusetts raised ranger companies by issuing £60 bounties on Abenaki scalps, later raised to £100 for lack of volunteers, and offered an outstanding 1720 bounty of £100 for the death or capture of the Jesuit Sébastien Râle. Overlooking their own steady encroachment into Abenaki territory, New Englanders believed Râle, the resident missionary at Norridgewock, was the instigating force behind Abenaki raids. In the winter of 1721-22 Father Râle narrowly avoided being captured by the rangers, who looted his church and house and pinned a note to the door promising to return next spring “to relieve Father Râle of his scalp.” In a letter to his brother, Râle disdained New Englanders’ abilities at frontier warfare: “[If] they knew there were but twelve men in your dwellings, they dare not approach you with one hundred.” He was proven wrong in the late summer of 1724, when 200 New England rangers and three Indian guides ascended the Kennebec River by boat and sacked Norridgewock in a dawn attack praised by Samuel Penhallow, in History of the Indian Wars (1726), as “the greatest Victory we have obtained in the three or four last Wars.” The number of casualties inflicted is difficult to assess; the rangers returned to Boston with three English boys they found in the village, four Abenaki

prisoners, and 27 scalps, and one of the ranger captains “later lamented that the river’s swift current washed over 50 Indian bodies downstream” before they could be scalped. After inflicting large-scale Abenaki casualties by their surprise attack, the New Englanders, according to Father de la Chasses, the Superior-General of the Missions in New France, apparently singled out the elderly Jesuit’s corpse for particular mistreatment, expressing sectarian hatred through what Anglo-Americans imagined “savages” would do. After looting and desecrating Norridgewock’s Catholic church, the Protestant New Englanders gouged out Rale’s eyes, knocked in his head with hatchets, plugged his eye sockets with mud, and riddled his body with bullets.

Ranger companies in present-day Canada were also launched against the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet in Nova Scotia during the 18th century. The cession of Acadia by France to Britain with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought unprecedented numbers of British settlers and traders into Maine and Nova Scotia, and with them what Salisbury calls a “train of abuses” against French-allied members of the Abenaki Confederacy and Francophone Acadians, through unregulated private trade and British demands for land cessions and formal recognition of their sovereignty. Against this backdrop of hauteur and bigotry, Mi’kmaq historian Daniel Paul notes such cases of vigilante actions by British colonists as the serving of poisoned food to Mi’kmaq at a 1712 gathering and, citing the Catholic missionary Father Pierre Maillard, the killing of 200 indigenous people by distributing “poisoned [i.e., contaminated with disease] woollen goods”. These ongoing tensions meant that the war between Britain and France known as King William’s War, which began in

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1744 and ended elsewhere in 1748, continued in the Maritimes until 1755 as Father Le Loutre’s War, a rebellion against British settlers and administrators. As in previous wars against the Abenaki Confederacy, the British responded with scalp bounties. In November 1744, William Shirley, Captain-General and Commander in Chief of Massachusetts Bay, targeted the “Indians of the Cape Sables and St. John’s Tribes” by offering £100 from the public treasury for the scalp of a male Indian aged 12 years or up, and £50 for the scalp of an adult woman or child under 12. Shirley’s declaration also offered payments for live prisoners, set at £105 for each man and £55 for each child or woman; but a markup of only £5 for guarding and feeding prisoners while retreating under fire raises questions as to whether this was sincere or merely a merciful façade. Shirley’s scalp bounty was answered by Captain John Gorham, leading a mixed company of 50 British and Mohawk mercenaries, whose first victims, according to Father Maillard, were three pregnant women and two small children.266

In 1749, the Mi’kmaq of peninsular Nova Scotia and Île Royale were enraged when Lieutenant-General Edward Cornwallis, the Crown-appointed Governor of Nova Scotia, established Halifax on their land without their consultation or permission. To make their intentions clear, the Mi’kmaq formally declared war against the British; Cornwallis, who in 1745 had starved, terrorized, and laid waste to the Scottish Highlands to punish the Jacobite rebellion, likewise made his intentions plain. Initially requesting more arms for the colonists, he issued a proclamation “to Annoy, distress, take or destroy the Savages commonly called

Mic-macks, wherever they are found”, on the grounds that, their declaration of war notwithstanding, “they ought to be treated as so many Banditti Ruffians, or Rebels, to His Majesty’s Government.” On 1 October he proposed to a governing council, which included John Gorham, to immediately raise a volunteer company “not exceeding fifty men” for immediate counterattacks, followed by a campaign of attrition for the winter of 1749-50; in company with 100 New Englanders, Gorham’s rangers should scour the province for “a reward of ten Guineas for every Indian Micmac taken or killed, to be paid upon producing such Savage taken or his scalp (as in the custom of America) if killed”. Paul lists various acts of “extreme barbarism and cruelty” attributed to Gorham’s rangers, including their reported cashiering of 25 scalps in a single day; on 21 June, 1750, the bounty was raised to £50 sterling per scalp. A heinous 1753 incident described by Daniel Paul illustrates the distinctions between a mourning-war rationale of reciprocal injury and Anglo-American scalp bounties’ potentiality for ghoulish opportunism. After stealing 40 barrels of provisions from a Mi’kmaq storehouse, two British colonists, James Grace and John Connor, were shipwrecked, then rescued and offered food and shelter by a Mi’kmaq family of two men, three women, a child and a newborn; in the night, they murdered their seven hosts to collect their scalps for bounty. Though a 1752 treaty promised prosecution of settlers who committed crimes against Mi’kmaq, British officials did nothing to punish Grace and Connor; in response, a Mi’kmaq war party killed seven British bargemen, sparing one Anthony Casteel because he was French. Eventually ransomed from the Mi’kmaq by a
French trader, Casteel reported his captors’ resolve to “never forgive or forget” Grace and Connor’s crime.267

As the war in the Maritimes continued, the scope and scale of British violence against Indians and Acadians expanded further. In 1755, observes Friederici, a bounty of £100 was placed on the scalp of Father Jean-Louis Le Loutre, who called for an insurrection to restore Acadia to French possession; for his part, Father Le Loutre offered a bounty of 100 livres for English settlers’ scalps. In 1756, as Acadians continued to be deported en masse to Louisiana, Nova Scotia’s Governor Brigadier-General Charles Lawrence issued another anti-Mi’kmaq scalp bounty offering £25 for the scalp of a man aged 16 and up, £30 for every male prisoner 16 and up, and £25 for every female or child prisoner. By authorizing “all Officers, Civil and Military, and all His Majesty’s Subjects, to annoy, distress, take and destroy” not just Indians, but “all such as may be aiding or assisting them,” the 1756 declaration also extended violence to the Acadians. As in French Louisiana and the Spanish colonies (see Chapter 6), French-indigenous intermarriage meant many Acadians’ hair was straight and dark enough to qualify for scalp bounties, and Paul notes that Acadian deputies regularly protested the bounty’s existence to the Governor; on one occasion, writes A.J.B. Johnston, “British soldiers shot twenty-five French and brought in their scalps, claiming they were Mi’kmaq.”268


As Peter Silver observes, “almost no one in eighteenth-century America or England seems to have realized that Indian war,” with surprise attacks and mutilated bodies left in the roads, “was designed by its practitioners to be precisely as terrifying as they found it”; imagining Indians to be unhinged wild men rather than rational actors, panic was as likely a reaction as bravado to the unexpected appearance of Indians in frontier districts. In 1727, when a conclave of Munsees travelled through northern New Jersey celebrating the accession of their new sachem, settlers took them for a war party and fled to New York and Long Island. In 1728, after hearing reports about Indian attacks on charcoal-burners in northern Pennsylvania, the brothers John and Walter Winter were visiting a neighbour when they spotted Indians near the woodpile; believing them to be lurking warriors, they fired their muskets and then finished off the wounded with a gun butt and an axe, by which point they realized they were killing two old women who had lived in the district for years, a “horrible accident” and “wicked murder” they apologized for on the gallows. In other cases, settlers could become paralysed with fear during actual Indian attacks, even when family members were dying. Correspondingly, during the 1740s and 1750s the emotions frontiersmen felt while scalping and posthumously mutilating Indians’ bodies could be “straightforwardly described as satisfaction or happiness.”

269 A parallel present-day phenomenon to colonial frontier panics is the disproportionate shooting of black males by police, security guards, and armed members of the general public, informed by stereotypes of black men as hypermasculine, aggressive, and nearly superhuman in strength. These reactions often occur with such speed that it is clear that subconscious considerations, rather than careful deliberations, inform them. “Unarmed people may be more likely to be judged as physically formidable, and thus subjected to force, if they belong to groups stereotyped as threatening.” See John Paul Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg, and Nicholas O. Rule, “Racial Bias in Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat,” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13 March 2017 (published online); Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 45-48 (“horrible accident”), 56-59 (“almost no one”), 77-79 (“satisfaction or happiness”).
Settlers’ subjective experience during frontier clashes can only be fully understood if we consider the ways in which they articulated their sense of powerlessness and victimization in diabolical, nightmarish terms. The first “communal reading experience” of British North America, the captivity-narrative genre, began with Mary Rowlandson’s *The Soveraignty and Goodness of God* (Boston, 1682); describing her captivity among the Nipmucks during King Philip’s War as a trial from God, the tone of the early captivity narratives was a stark Biblical typology. But this soon gave way to a saleable pornography of violence. By 1758, standards had sunk so low that Robert Eastburn’s captivity narrative was prefaced with an endorsement by the Rev. Gilbert Tennent, reminding the reader that Eastburn is a deacon and thus his testimony “may with safety be depended upon.” While the documentary record shows that the majority of Indian attacks on the mid-18th-century northwestern frontier occurred during broad daylight against men working in the fields, that the majority of casualties were adult men, and that the majority of captives and subsequent adoptees in Indian villages were children and women, captivity narratives inverted the priorities of the mourning-war complex with scenes of children and women scalped and tormented. Eventually, themes of home invasion, infanticide and male powerlessness became the stock scenario of captivity narratives and frontier horror stories: in midnight attacks, Indian warriors burned family cabins, took white men prisoner, and forced them to watch their wives and children being sadistically tortured and murdered. In a typically lurid story, *The Affecting History of the Dreadful Distresses of Frederic Manheim’s Family*, the titular “industrious German” immigrant, his wife, and his three daughters are carried off with 23 neighbours by “hostile Canasadaga Indians” from the New York frontier in October 1779. After the Indians quarrel over “whose property” the 16-year-old Manheim twins Maria and
Christina should become, their chiefs command the “hapless virgins” be burned alive with pinewood splinters and turpentine. Typically for the genre, after describing this scene in gruesome detail the writer then called it “a scene of monstrous misery, beyond the power of speech to describe, or even the imagination to conceive.” The protagonists of these stories often emphasize their inability to articulate the horror and pathos of their scenes of incredible and unbelievable tortures, a strategy to overwhelm the reader which Peter Silver describes as “the anti-Indian sublime.”

Collections of these lurid stories, such as the Manheim Anthology (1793) and A Selection of Some of the Most Interesting Narratives of Outrages Committed by the Indians in Their Wars with the White People (1808), regularly beggar belief. Sufferings of Peter Williamson, the overall credibility of which is questioned strongly by James VanDerBeets, includes multiple scenes of old men being made to watch their wives and small children “inhumanly scalped and murdered”; one of these old men begs his captors for death, who ignore him and load him like a mule with their plunder. Sufferings also describes Indian warriors roasting a merchant alive and “[making] of his head what they called an Indian

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270 Ian Steele’s study of clearly-identified Shawnee attacks between 1754 and 1765 shows very few children under 16 were killed (9 out of 103) though their cries gave away warparties’ locations; four times as many women over 16 were captured than killed (7 out of 28); men were nearly twice as likely as women to be killed in Shawnee attacks, and adult men were more likely than women to be killed—see Steele, “The Shawnees and the English: Captives and War, 1753-1765,” 11-12; Dorothy M.F. Behen, “The Captivity Story in American Literature, 1577-1826” (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1951), 41, 190, “roguery” 133, cited in Richard Drinnon, White Savage: The Case of John Dunn Hunter (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 106, footnote 25; Berkofer, The White Man’s Indian, 85; Richard VanDerBeets, The Indian Captivity Narrative: An American Genre (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), ix-x, 1-50; Archibald Loudon ed., A Selection of Some of the Most Interesting Narratives of Outrages Committed by the Indians in Their Wars with the White People, two volumes (Arno Press and the New York Times 1971 [Harrisburg Publishing Company, 1888 [Carlisle, 1808]]), volume I, iv-v (Introduction), 58-60 (“Affecting History of the Dreadful Distresses of Frederic Manheim’s Family”), 66-69 (“Narrative of the Adventures of Capt. Isaac Stewart; taken from his own mouth, in March, 1782”), 74-87 (“Sufferings of Peter Williamson, one of the Settlers in the Back Parts of Pennsylvaniana. Written by Himself”), 119-251 (“An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Col. James Smith During his Captivity with the Indians, in the years 1755-59”), 252-301 (“A Narrative of the Captivity of John M’Cullough, Esq., written by himself”). Henceforth abbreviated as Loudon Anthology.
pudding” by eating his brains, while another man is buried up to his neck and a small fire placed adjacent until “his brains were boiling in his head.” Symbolic emasculation of Anglo-American men was also performed through stories of the killing of women, which Ann-Marie Weis notes as a departure from the earlier narratives of resilient Puritan women surviving captivity among pagans and Catholics. By contrast, the Gothic or sentimental tendencies of the 18th and early 19th-century accounts changed the stock female character to a “passive mother” who witnessed “a cruel monster-man” slaughtering her infant and abducting her older children, a “frail woman submissively kneeling before her Indian captor.” The disparity between the physical power and cruelty of the Indian warrior and the physical helplessness of the female victim could reach queasy extremes, as this lurid bit of prose, printed in Detroit in 1811:

The tenderest infant, yet imbibing nutrition from the mamilia of maternal love, and the agonized mother herself, alike await the stroke of the relentless tomahawk…Nothing which breathes the breath of life is spared… It is in the dead of the night, in the darkness of the moon, in the howling of the [wolf] that the demoniac deed is done.

The anti-Indian sublime conflated violence with violation.271

Captivity narratives also presented the killing of white women and children as the whole purpose of mourning-war raids rather than a state of exception. “[A] boy, about three years old, being unwilling to leave the house, they took it by the heels, and dashed it against the house, then stabbed and scalped it,” stated the Account of the Sufferings of Massy Herbeson and her Family, adding that when a five-year-old later “began to mourn for his

brother [,] one of the Indians then tomahawked and scalped him.” “My dear and affectionate [sic] wife, with five children, all scalped in less than ten minutes,” laments the account of the Reverend John Corbly, of events of July 1785. In Alexander Tsese’s summary, through these stories “Indians became the bogeymen” of American society, “specters sweeping up children and women in the middle of the night only to scalp them and then whoop it up around a fire afterwards.” In his 1846 memoirs, T.L. McKenney, chief administrator of Indian affairs from 1816-1830, wrote that the greatest single obstacle to the assimilation of Indians as full equals into American society were the “nursery stories” which “told of the Indian and his cruelties”; with “his tall, gaunt form, with the skins of beasts dangling from his limbs, and his eyes like fire,” the Indian warrior “stood for the Moloch of our country.”  

These stories of child-killing, torture, rape, and the scheming of Catholic priests and French administrators behind it all, informed Anglo-American atrocity stories of the Seven Years’ War, the paramount and central tale being the surrender at Fort William Henry. Infuriated that after travelling hundreds of miles to fight for the French and asking only for ammunitions, rations, and whatever gifts Montcalm bestowed, they would be denied the ransoms and loot that they fought for in lieu of wages, Montcalm’s allies were able to impose their will on the French by ransoming at least 200 prisoners at Montreal, each bringing in an average of 130 livres of trade goods and 30 bottles of brandy. French accounts, like that of the missionary Pierre-Joseph-Antoine Roubaud, described a very short burst of violence.

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followed by prisoner-taking, looting, and haggling: Roubaud ransomed a six-month-old English baby, held in the arms of a Wyandot warrior and calmly playing with the warrior’s necklaces, by buying an English scalp from an Abenaki to trade. Penobsrots had also joined Montcalm’s army, and later told Roubaud that they were more than justified to do so, citing Massachusetts’ 1755 scalp bounty against them. Fred Anderson observes that Montcalm angered these allies by only informing them of his generous surrender terms to the British after concluding the capitulation and immediately before it was signed; Ian Steele notes that officers were warned that Indians would have to be gratified from among the baggage, and “if any resistance was made by which a single Indian should be killed, it would not be in the power of M. De Montcalm to save a man from butchery.” David Starbuck dubs Montcalm “exceptionally naïve” in believing a few hundred French soldiers could prevent 1,600 Indian warriors from taking what they wanted. Anglo-American accounts, on the other hand, dealt in all the clichéd images of Indian warfare as dark carnival: prisoners “stripped, killed and skalpt” by the “savage blood hounds” (John Entick’s *General History of the Late War*, 1763), dead bodies “violated with all the wanton mutilations of savage ingenuity” (David Humphreys’ *Essay on the Life of Israel Putnam*, 1778), babies dashed against trees and rocks, and an English prisoner cannibalized “on Montreal plains” (John Maylem’s *Gallic Perfidy: A Poem*, 1758).273

During the American Revolution, the British took the part of the French in colonists’ conspiratorial fantasies. A cycle of Revolutionary propaganda and subsequent American

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folklore grew out of the 1778 Wyoming Valley campaign of Iroquois warriors and Loyalist militia led by Colonel John Butler, “a Connecticut Tory.” One account claimed that “all but the women and children [were] massacred in the most inhuman manner” at a fort along the Susquehanna, while another account reprinted in Loudon’s anthology made Colonel Zebulon Butler, commandant of Fort Kingston, into the cousin of John Butler, and claimed he fled the scene when the Loyalists and Iroquois displayed, “for their contemplation, the bloody scalps of [196] of their late friends and comrades.” It was left to the commanding officer Col. Nathan Dennison to ask the Loyalists’ surrender terms, “to which application Butler answered, with more than savage phlegm, in two short words – the hatchet.” The anonymous author then claimed that after taking Fort Kingston, “the barbarous conquerors, to save the trouble of murder in detail,” locked most of the survivors in the buildings and set the fort on fire. Though the Mohawk chieftain Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant was nowhere near the Wyoming Valley at the time, confused early reports made him Butler’s co-demon, “a half blooded Indian, of desperate courage, ferocious and cruel beyond example.” Brant’s brother-in-law Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, also provided ample ammunition for Revolutionary propagandists, as did other British officers like Henry Hamilton, who offered pre-war feasts in the traditional style – substituting steers for a previous era’s white dog—where warriors metaphorically feasted on their enemies. In December 1775 at the urgings of Congress, a letter from General Philip Schuyler was printed in most American newspapers reporting that at a conference at Montreal, William Johnson’s son had given each British-allied tribe’s delegate “a war belt and a hatchet (…) After which they were invited to FEAST ON A BOSTONIAN AND DRINK HIS BLOOD. An ox being roasted for the purpose, and a pipe of wine being given to drink, the war song was sung…”
That the inroads of Christianity into Iroquois towns had rendered ritual eating of enemies defunct was of no importance to such critics as Jamaican plantation owner Edward Long, who in 1778 called the British army “patrons and abettors of Wanton Homicide […] stretching forth Cannibal Indians to scalp, tomahawk, and torture, with undistinguishing fury.”

A flurry of trans-Atlantic Anglo-American attention focused on the death of Jane McCrea, the fiancée of a young Loyalist lieutenant in the Fort Edward garrison, in 1778. General John Burgoyne’s controversial boast of his “thousands” of Indian warriors standing by to inflict “devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror” on the North American rebels became a public-relations nightmare when Jane McCrea was mistakenly captured, shot, and scalped by Burgoyne’s forces in the Saratoga campaign. Revolutionary propaganda held her Tory fiancée complicit and claimed he and the redcoats had watched the murder, while in Britain an Opposition political cartoon placed Jane McCrea’s scalping in a “diorama of horrors” including an incident from the Quebec campaign where prisoners were stuck full of flaming pine splints and burned alive. The scene was depicted in standard Savagist dichotomy in John Vanderlyn’s 1804 oil painting The Death of Jane McCrea. The Indian warriors both sport multicoloured feathers in their straight black hair and are clad lightly in tradecloth breechcloths and leggings, with only one wearing moccasins, permitting Vanderlyn to show off the clearly-delineated muscles rippling underneath their bronze skin.

The two warriors glower fiercely as they set themselves to their task: the moccasined warrior

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has firmly seized McCrea’s blond hair with his left hand and pulled it taut from her hairline, with his drawn knife in his right hand ready to make the incision, while his barefoot partner pinions McCrea’s right arm with his left hand and has his tomahawk readied to strike.\textsuperscript{275}

In contrast to their physical hardness, power, and cruelty, Vanderlyn’s Jane McCrea embodies aspirational bourgeois feminity. Wearing rich fabrics contrasted against the Indians’ tradecloth and leather, her apparel is both demure and revealing, with short sleeves and generous neckline displaying ivory-white skin undamaged by the sun, including her entire right breast exposed all the way to the nipple. The physical contrast of light and dark is completed by the icy-blue eye shown fixed on the tomahawk, and her blonde hair, which Steven Blakemore notes was given a “fetishistic focus” in contemporary accounts of her death. Vanderlyn’s painting was originally commissioned to accompany Joel Barlow’s depiction of the scene, with Jane McCrea renamed ‘Lucinda’ and her fiancée as ‘Heartly,’ in Book VI of his epic poem \textit{The Columbiad} (1807). Lucinda, watching Heartly from the sidelines during the Battle of Saratoga, is separated from him just as the “kindred cannibals” of Sir William Johnson scatter to “scour the waste for undistinguish’d prey” and “scalp every straggler” they can lay hands on. When two Mohawks seize her, Barlow depicts the scene in lurid terms: “Her kerchief torn betrays the globes of snow, / That heave responsive to her weight of woe.” Barlow then leers, “Does no superior bribe contest her life?”

There does: the scalps by British gold are paid;
A long-hair’d scalp adorns that heavenly head;
And comes the sacred spoil from friend or foe,

No marks distinguish, and no man can know.

“With calculating pause and demon grin,” Barlow’s Indians violently destroy her feminine beauty (“thro her face divine / drive the descending axe”) and scalp her. Heartly, sword in hand, arrives just in time to avenge her by killing “The yelling fiends; who there disputing stood / Her gory scalp, their horrid prize of blood.” “Are these thy trophies, Carleton!” bellows Heartly, denouncing the British commanders who brought these “scalpers and ax-men” to the battlefield.276

General Henry Hamilton wrote Haldimand from Detroit in June 1778 to the effect that “Some Delawares […] who are desirous of showing their intention” for British alliance “have presented me two pieces of dried meat (scalps) one of which I have given the Chippoweyes, another to the Miamis, that they may show in their villages the disposition of the Delawares.” Hamilton accepted enemy body parts while feasting his allies with roasted steers and gifting them with trade goods, while believing he could constrain Indian warriors through orders to “cease to act as Wolves” and placing British officers in command of mixed parties of Indians and French militia. But stories of Hamilton gifting Indian warriors with trade goods, including “scalping knives,” were transformed into tales of Hamilton offering bounties for settlers’ scalps, and Revolutionary propagandists indelibly dubbed him “the Hair Buyer General.” In return, Hamilton smeared his counterpart across the Ohio frontier, Lieutenant-Colonel George Rogers Clark, as the other sort of white savage. One of Hamilton’s French-and-Indian war parties had returned to Vincennes unaware that Clark had

captured it, and were ambushed by the rebels. Two Indians were shot and scalped, two Frenchmen were released, then on Clark’s orders the remaining four Indian warriors were publicly tomahawked, scalped, and their bodies thrown in the river. Loyalist propagandists could embellish as well as the revolutionaries, and retellings claimed Clark personally wielded the hatchet while smearing his face with blood and “yelping as a Savage,” while an Indian victims pulled the axe out of his own head and handed it back to Clark. Francis Maisonville, one of Hamilton’s French militiamen, was also targeted as a partisan and scalped, though accounts differ as to whether he was only partially scalped, as Clark and Hamilton told the story, or fully scalped by the ferocious Americans, as Hamilton’s aide Lieutenant Jacob Schlieffen claimed.277

Such accusations of British perfidy continued throughout the period between the end of the Revolutionary War and the outbreak of the War of 1812. Following the fight at Prophetstown dubbed the Battle of Tippecanoe, the *Chillicothe Scioto Gazette* of Ohio reported on 27 November that 100 newly-manufactured British muskets were found afterwards on the battlefield. Accounts of well-armed Indian fighters using British firearms been reported after St. Clair’s defeat (1791) and after Anthony Wayne’s victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794), and the frontier population and the War Hawks seized on this as confirmation of British collusion in savage war. Felix Grundy of Tennessee stated in November 1811 in support of a House Committee on Foreign Affairs report that the British should no longer be permitted to “setting on the ruthless savage to tomahawk our women and children.” In an open letter published in the *Western Intelligencer* of Worthington, Ohio on

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25 December, 1811, Harrison claimed that “within the last three months, the whole of the Indians on this frontier, have been completely armed and equipped” from the king’s stores at Amherstburg. The breakdown of the votes that decided the War of 1812 show that a desire to wage war was pronounced among inland states and particularly pronounced in the south. Following Madison’s approval of the resolution to wage war against Britain, Jefferson wrote John Adams that America would be “obliged to drive [the Indians], with the beasts of the forest into the Stony [i.e., Rocky] mountains,” while the conquest of Canada “secures our women and children for ever from the tomahawk and the scalping knife, by removing those who excite them.”

A propaganda cartoon printed in Philadelphia in 1812 sums up these attitudes in visual form. Sarcastically entitled *A Scene on the Frontiers as Practiced by the Humane British and Their Worthy Allies*, it depicts a well-fed, sideburned, John-Bullish British officer cheerfully cashiering scalps from two well-plumed Indian warriors. “Bring me the Scalps and the King our master will reward you,” he says pleasantly to one of the warriors, bearing a musket slung over his shoulder helpfully identified by a placard as “Reward for Sixteen Scalps,” while a similar label, “Secret Service Money,” dangles from the officer’s coat pocket. The other Indian is sawing away at a dead American soldier’s hairline with a knife while, in the background, two British soldiers and two Indian warriors hold hands and dance around a campfire. “Arise Columbia’s sons and forward press!” reads the attached verse:

Your country’s wrongs call loudly for redress;  
The Savage Indian with his Scalping knife  
Or Tomahawk may seek to take your life.

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But the author-engraver William Charles assures his titillated readers of a swift resolution: American bravery will drive them back “to the Woods in Flight,” leaving their “British leaders” to “quickly shake” and make restitution. In fact, this bravado was less certain. Revolutionary War hero William Hull, governor of the Michigan Territory, was famously tricked into surrendering Detroit to a much smaller British and Indian force led by Isaac Brock and Tecumseh after a campaign of psychological warfare against him; on 5 August, ten days before Hull’s surrender, Tecumseh and his followers routed an American guard south of Detroit, killed 17 men, staked their bodies to the ground, and showily mounted their scalps on long poles which waved in the breeze. On 29 May, 1813, 115 well-armed Americans surrendered to British naval officer James Richardson, commanding a warship on Lake Ontario, after they had suffered light casualties skirmishing with 36 Indians on the shore. Richardson noted that his American counterpart was “armed to the teeth, with a hanger by his side and pair of pistols on his belt,” yet shook with fear as he told him that the woods were full of Indians and that they preferred British captivity to capture and massacre.279

Actual British policies during the war were meant to forestall American propaganda: no bounties were offered for scalps or dead soldiers, whereas prisoner bounties were highest when the captives were unharmed. The first scalp of the war, Alan Taylor points out, was not lifted by an Indian warrior. During General Hull’s invasion of Upper Canada in July and August 1812, Captain William McCulloch scalped a Menominee warrior, outraging the Menominees, who had honoured a British request not to scalp any of Hull’s men. They carried the corpse back to Amherstburg, confronted the British officers, and vowed to resume scalping their enemies. Ten days later, McCulloch fell into an Indian ambush and lost his

own scalp, to the Menominees’ delight. While the War Hawks accused the British of buying American scalps for $6 apiece, officers in the American army were looking the other way as their troops scalped British-allied Indians. Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, fighting on the Niagara front, bolstered his volunteers’ morale by offering $200 for every horse taken from the British, and $40 “for the arms and spoils of each savage warrior,” a clear allusion to their scalps. American soldiers’ looting and burning of York in 1813, and the theft of the ceremonial mace from the Parliament building, was justified by the claim that Major Benjamin Forsyth had found a white man’s scalp suspended over the speaker’s chair in the Parliament house.  

In January 1813, General James Winchester and his Kentucky volunteers were defeated at Frenchtown, on the River Raisin in the Michigan Territory, by General Henry Procter’s combined force of indigenous fighters, British troops, and Canadian militia. Able-bodied prisoners were taken to Amherstburg, while 80 of those too badly wounded to travel were left under guard at Frenchtown. About 200 of Procter’s allied Indians stayed behind and when the militia who guarded the Kentuckian prisoners fled in fear of the Indians, they fired the two buildings housing the wounded and killed and scalped any who managed to escape the flames. American popular opinion held this to be a latter-day Fort William Henry orchestrated by the British, as indicated by the engraving Massacre of the American Prisoners, at French-Town, on the River Raisin, by the Savages. In July, Congress claimed General Procter had personally masterminded the “Raisin River Massacre,” and “Remember the Raisin” became the battlecry of Kentuckians for the rest of the war.  

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281 Taylor, Civil War of 1812, 209-220.
The Kentuckians force-marched to Canada were subjected to other shows of animosity by Procter’s allies. The Indians stripped them of their coats, pants, and shoes in the middle of winter, and killed any prisoner found to have a scalp in his possession. Then, at Amherstburg, angry Indian women attacked them; Procter noted that the Indians hated Kentuckians “as a band of banditti.” Descended from Virginian and other Anglo-American “long hunters” and trans-Appalachian settlers, Kentuckians took great pride in their history of warring with American Indians, transforming a warning from the militant Cherokee leader Dragging Canoe (that they would find the settlement of his land “dark and bloody”) into a self-congratulatory folk etymology of Kentucky as “the dark and bloody ground.” Kentuckians had inherited the Virginians’ indigenous ethnonym of Big Knives, and they were regular users of the gigantic knives they ported everywhere. In 1813, after a reprimand by British officers for mutilating an American corpse, the Ottawa war chief Black Bird replied that Kentuckians had disinterred Indians’ graves and cut up the bodies: “If the Big Knives, when they kill people of our colour, leave them without hacking them to pieces, we will follow their example. They have themselves to blame.” John Ketcham, a mounted ranger during the war, recalled later in his memoirs that “In my first month’s service, I killed and scalped an Indian—was very proud of it—got leave to go to Kentucky to show it to my Daddy and Mamma, I guess they thought I had done about right.” George McFeely, an officer at Fort Niagara, entertained one of the paroled prisoners of Frenchtown, who had taken two scalps there and, despite the danger of discovery, had managed to conceal them in his waistband on the march to and from Amherstburg:

While in the fort with us he ripped open his waist band, took out the scalps, fleshed them with his knife, salted them, and set them in hoops in true Indian style. He said he had twenty-eight
scalps at home, and these two would make thirty he had taken off with his own hands in his time, and that he would raise fifty scalps before he would die.²⁸²

On at least one occasion, Kentuckians sought out the Indians’ supposed puppetmasters.

Major Peter Chambers of the British army’s 41st Regiment reported in 1814 that Sergeant Collins of the 41st Foot and Private Barto of the Canadian militia were killed on the north shore of Lake Erie by Kentuckians “in the most horrible manner.” Postmortem examination showed that Barto had not been shot before he was “actually butchered,” and both men were “scalped and cut shockingly.”²⁸³

**Conclusion: Black Hawk’s memoirs, or “Sauk Humanity No Paradox”**

Native American stories from the other side of the frontier rarely held frontiersmen in high esteem. The Pequot William Apess, later a famous memoirist and Methodist minister, enlisted in the American army as a drummer during the War of 1812, tried to leave when transferred to the ranks, and was arrested on charges of desertion in 1813. His fellow soldiers, clearly readers of captivity narratives threatened him with the pine-knot torture. Every day during the “dreary march” to Canada, Apess wrote later in his memoir *A Son of the Forest* (1829), “the officers tormented me by telling me that it was their intention to make a fire in the woods, stick my skin full of pine splinters, and after having an Indian powwow over me, burn me to death.” During the Black Hawk War, in May 1832, after scouts under a flag of truce were shot at by American militiamen, Black Hawk’s counterattack of 40 warriors “on the prairie, […] about sundown” provoked a panicked rout of 300 armed men

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²⁸³ On Chambers, see Allen, *His Majesty’s Indian Allies*, 138.
known as Stillwell’s Run. Black Hawk was baffled by this, since his own forces had lacked tree cover and since “the Americans, generally, shoot well.”

Black Hawk’s 1833 memoir, dictated to a French/Potawatomi interpreter named Antoine LeClaire and transcribed by Illinois newspaper editor John B. Patterson, though admittedly a “mediated” text, has a critical advantage over Franklin’s *Narrative of the Late Massacres*: it gives a look at what the experience of being on the other side of Anglo-America’s frontier was like. That the image was doubtless disturbing and troubling for many Anglo-American readers is perhaps reflected in Illinois governor (1842-46) Thomas Ford’s insistence in 1854 that the book was a forgery. Black Hawk describes relatives and neighbours being assaulted by white frontiersmen and robbed of pelts and trade goods, farmland ploughed under after Sauks planted corn to deny them their harvest, and himself given a humiliating beating after three frontiersmen ambushed him alone while hunting and accused him of killing their hogs. Black Hawk relayed a story told him by Gomo, a Potawatomi leader whose band had been contracted to supply the nearby Fort Clark with venison; a hunting party of 9 men and their wives led by Má-ta-táh, a well-respected leader, had met some cattleherders on the prairie, and when he tried to be diplomatic—he surrendered his gun and “endeavoured to explain that he was friendly”—they shot him, then pursued and killed almost all of the hunters. Gomo, said Black Hawk, then blackened his face in mourning and went to Fort Clark to report this to the lieutenant. “His countenance changed; I could see sorrow depicted in it,” Gomo reported; “He tried to persuade me that I was mistaken, as he ‘could not believe that the whites would act so cruelly.’”

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himself, had suffered a great personal loss at their hands: his adopted son had disappeared while deer hunting one winter, and the trackers found he had been taken captive and murdered by settlers. “His face was shot to pieces—his body stabbed in several places—and his head scalped! His arms were tied behind him!”

Well-aware that many members of the American public considered him, like other Indian warriors, a cruel barbarian, Black Hawk’s memoir carefully deploys and rearranges the by-now-familiar images and narratives of scalping and savage war to illustrate the Sauk experience. “I must contradict the story of some of village criers”—i.e., journalists—“who (I have been told,) accuse me of “having murdered women and children among the whites!” This assertion is false!” Responding to an Anglo-American public equally horrified and fascinated by the idea of Indian warriors who scalped and killed women and children, Black Hawk emphasized the mercies that he had shown to his enemies, particularly the unarmed or outnumbered and particularly children and women, ever since his beginning of his military career at 15. In describing the revenge raid he led following his adopted son’s murder, Black Hawk also took pains to delineate something that might have taken many of his readers by surprise: that Indians could find scalping just as disturbing and ugly as white people did. At one point during the raid, Black Hawk and some of his followers surprised two white men riding on one horse, startling them so that they fell off and then both ran in different directions. In Black Hawk’s account, he recognized the man he was pursuing and allowed him to escape: “He had been at Quàsh-quà-me’s village to learn his people how to plow. We

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looked upon him as a good man.” He returned and met one of his followers, who “said he had killed the other man, and had his scalp in his hand!” This turned out to be premature:

We had not proceeded far, before we met the man, supposed to be killed, coming up the road, staggering like a drunken man, all covered with blood! This was the most terrible sight I had ever seen. I told my comrade to kill him, to put him out of his misery! I could not look at him. This mercy-killing was followed by another, less sanguine act of empathy, but also one which doubtless surprised his readers. When he spotted two young boys hiding in the bushes, “I thought of my own children, and passed on without noticing them!”

Black Hawk’s raid was not a rampage, nor did it result in indiscriminate killing. Only two scalps were brought back: that of the unfortunate horseman, and another from an American killed in the ‘Battle of the Sinkhole’ between Black Hawk’s war party and a local militia. Against this carefully-delineated reciprocal justice, Black Hawk contrasts the continual and prevailing unjustness by which the United States had treated him and his people: women and children indiscriminately killed, refugees driven across the Mississippi to be attacked by Sioux on the other side, and that a people who had “fine houses, rich harvests, and every thing desirable” would drive them across the Mississippi, taking “our village and our grave-yards from us” “for which me and my people had never received a dollar.” In the tradition of Inca Garcilaso’s *La Florida del Inca* (1606) and as Geronimo’s memoir would do in 1906 (see Chapter 7), Black Hawk’s *Life* went beyond apologia to become an appeal to the American public that indigenous people were, like themselves, human beings who performed violent acts to defend their homelands from invasion.

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Chapter Six: Heading West: Scalp-hunting and Manifest Destiny, 1837 to 1876

And where is the satisfaction, / And how are we going to get square?  
By giving the Reds more rifles? / Invite them to take more hair?  
--Jack Crawford, “The Death of Custer” (1876)

Introduction

This chapter surveys the gulf between Anglo-American self-perception of themselves as a people between savagery and civilization; the national myth of the Indian-killing frontiersman as folk hero or antihero; and what happened when Anglo-Americans identified with or informed by these myths collided with indigenous societies in the Southwest, California, and the Great Plains, where settler-colonial landholding patterns and the scalping paradigm’s policies regarding Indians supplanted earlier Euro-American systems of violent, yet negotiable, coexistence between Europeans and indigenous peoples: the Hispanic pattern of military alliances, serfdom, and mestizaje, and the fur-trade system commercial cooperation and rivalry over furbearers between indigenous peoples and itinerant male trapping parties. My prologue, “Indian-hating at midcentury,” discusses the genesis of the fantasy of the white frontiersman as ersatz Indian from the end of the Seven Years’ War to the Jacksonian period; while Chapter 6 discussed the actual history of this period, this chapter discusses its apotheosis in Anglo-American national mythology. The first section, “Heroic genocide: the Indian-killer in fiction at midcentury,” discusses the treatment of the scalp-taking Indian-killer in mid-19th-century fiction, in particular the highly-successful novels Nick of the Woods (1837) and The Scalp-Hunters (1851), Samuel Chamberlain’s claims to have been a scalp-hunter in his unpublished Mexican-American War memoir My Confession, and Herman Melville’s warnings of the omnipresence of evil in The Confidence-

Man: His Masquerade (1857). The second section, “Scalping in the Southwest: Kirker, Glanton, and California,” discusses the actual histories of the scalp-hunting mercenaries of the American Southwest, and their vigilante and militia counterparts in post-1849 California, and how and why Anglo-American styles of Indian war supplanted, and worsened, Hispanic precedent. The third and final section, “Scalping on the Great Plains: Sand Creek (1864) and Slim Buttes (1876),” discusses two one-sided mass killings of Plains Indians by American armed forces, both in retaliation for perceived prior outrages. In both cases, participants’ clear-cut sense of moral superiority over a barbarous enemy was replaced by a realization that they bore the stigmata of the savage warrior, complicit in scalplings and killings of children and women. How they, and contemporary observers, tried to escape or explain this stain away by insisting on the Indians’ guilt, expressing remorse, or silencing themselves will be examined.

**Prologue: Indian-hating at midcentury**

Looking back in 1892 at his 1840s Philadelphia childhood, Howard Paul remembered childhood association with two major American literary figures through his uncle, Thomas Cottrell Clarke, editor of the weekly literary journal *The Saturday Museum*. The first was Edgar Allan Poe, who “supplied the book reviews and occasional essays”; in Paul’s recollection his “amiable” uncle often took exception to Poe’s “needless severity in reviewing. His favourite expression was “I have scalped him!” – referring to the author under examination.” Though his Gothic literature focused on such European medievalisms as creaky castles, torture chambers, ghosts, and mad aristocrats, Poe was a member of an Anglo-American popular culture fixated on scalping as an omnipresent, perennial feature of American history. Intriguingly, Paul wrote that Poe had “sketched out the scenario of a
tragedy” with Richard Montgomery Bird, author of the American Gothic frontier novel *Nick of the Woods* (1837). Whether its Gothicism would be European-oriented like Poe’s or American like Bird’s is unknown to Paul, as this “never got beyond outlines and much talk.”

Paul was avuncularly acquainted with another soon-to-be-successful novelist of bloody American frontier tales: the Anglo-Irish traveller and adventurer Thomas Mayne Reid, who departed Philadelphia in 1846 to fight in the Mexican-American War. Sometime after dropping out of the Presbyterian seminary in 1838 Reid had left Ireland for America and claimed to have travelled widely from Canada to Mexico, though Poe, a frequent dining and drinking companion, enjoyed chiding the colourful and unverifiable nature of his stories. “Now, Reid, give us one of your Mexican adventures,” Poe would say, […] “and keep as near the truth as you can.” Poe, in Paul’s recollection, assessed Reid as “a colossal but most picturesque liar. He fibs on a surprising scale, but with the finish of an artist, and that’s why I listen to him attentively.” Reid, on the other hand, described his style as “fact, enamelled by fiction – a mosaic of romance and reality,” an approach he applied to his own life; wounded in the storming of Chapultepec and promoted to first lieutenant, he billed himself as “Captain” Mayne Reid from his discharge in 1848 to his death in 1883. Pointing to his travels and military service to verify himself as an expert on frontier adventure, Reid’s first two novels, *The Rifle Rangers* (1850) and *The Scalp-Hunters* (1851), made him a bestseller. In his foreword to the second, which explicitly drew on his Mexican-American service, he

promised his readers “I have endeavoured to enamel its pages with a thousand facts—the result of my own experience.”

As in *The Scalp-Hunters*, a tale of a young English gentleman-adventurer named Henry Haller joining the motley crew of a Franco-American gentleman, “Seguin, the Scalp-Hunter,” to rescue his daughter Adèle from captivity among barbaric Navajos, Reid helped, in Elizabeth Freeman’s synopsis, to “pioneer fictions of empire” not just for an American readership but a broader British and, through translation, global audience. To do so, Reid applied the well-established clichés of the older frontiers of the Appalachians and the Mississippi to the new, exotic frontier of the Great Plains and American Southwest. Among those most cherished clichés was a long-lasting cultural artifact of the Jacksonian period: the idea of the white, Indian-hunting, Indian-hating frontiersman as the inheritor and supersessor of his morally inferior prey.

In the Revolutionary era, the mythic figure of the Indian-like, Indian-hunting frontiersman reconciled to Anglo-Americans’ satisfaction a trans-Atlantic debate going back to the 16th century: whether the cultural influences of Indians and transplanted Africans, or climate as neoclassical humoral and geographical theory proposed, made American-born Europeans qualitatively different, and specifically worse, than Europeans per se. As


Benjamin Isaac notes, since Greek and Roman times migration had been assumed to cause degeneracy; thus the 16th-century Portuguese term crioulo, used to distinguish Brazilian-born black slaves from African-born, implied insubordinate, licentious, and rebellious behaviour thought to be acquired through American birth. When transferred into Spanish as criollo to differentiate American-born Spaniards from peninsulares, it imputed similar qualities of moral inferiority, crime and vice to American-born whites; these criollos, wrote royal geographer Juan López de Velasco, in Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias (1570), “turn out like the natives even though they are not mixed with them [by] declining to the disposition of the land.” Translations of Acosta’s Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias (1590) spread criollo into French and English, though as early as 1589 a sermon of Cotton Mather’s warned of decline from Puritan ideals into “criolian degeneracy.”

In the British North American colonies, the rambunctious and violent behaviour of the early frontier population was imagined both as some kind of American creolism and, among Scots Highlanders, Gaelic Irish, and “Scots-Irish” Protestant settlers from northern Ireland, as typifying the savagery of the Celtic fringe. Thomas Cradock’s Maryland Eclogues, written in the 1740s but left in manuscript until 1983, conclude with the lovelorn planter-protagonist’s decision to flee the Atlantic lowlands for the interior to live among the “Scotch-Irish, […] Wild as they are, quite good enough for me”; his fictional editor, the

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creole Sly Boots, interjects “tis hard to say whether the Indians or they are greater Savages.” John McDonald, a descendant of Highland immigrants who later scouted with the Kentuckian Simon Kenton, proclaimed in the mid-19th century that “a wild highlander of that day wanted but little training to convert them into genuine frontiersmen”: they “considered no arts of any value except preparing ammunition [sic], fighting, hunting, fishing, raising cabins and a little corn,” and were as unaffected by killing Indians “than a butcher would [be] after killing a bullock. It was their trade.” Colonial authorities saw this in grimmer terms: Sir William Johnson denounced Virginians in a 1772 letter as “a lawless sett of people” defined by “ignorance, prejudice, democratical principles, & their remote situation” while Timothy Pickering, in 1778, described the northwestern frontier’s settlers as “a wild ungovernable race, little less savage than their tawny neighbors; and by similar barbarities have in fact provoked them to revenge.”

Prior to and during the American Revolution, the frontier population’s mimesis of Indian material and cultural life, particularly the approximation of indigenous masculinity as settlers imagined it, was used to signal Anglo-American identity as somewhere between European civilization and American virility, defying colonial authority in acts of “playing Indian.” Dressed in the frontier’s mesclage of European and Indian styles, wearing moccasins and Indian leggings with tradecloth coats and blankets, settlers disguised themselves with feathers and war paint to perform acts of property destruction prefiguring the Boston Tea Party. In February 1765 in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, a group variously known as

the Black Boys, Brave Fellows, or Loyal Volunteers accoutered themselves with charcoal, leggings, and strouds to attack British convoys sending diplomatic gifts to the Ohio Country, firing off their guns and making war-whoops as they burned twenty to thirty thousand pounds of trade goods. One of their leaders, James “Jimmy Boy” Smith, had spent much of the Seven Years’ War as a captive of Indian communities on the Ohio River; later becoming commander of a ranger or “riflemen” company during the Revolutionary War, he wrote in his 1799 captivity-narrative and autobiography that “the Indian discipline in the woods” was key to the United States’ future sovereignty just “as the British discipline in Flanders”; if “only part of our men [were] taught this art, accompanied with our continental discipline, […] no European power […] would venture to show its head in the American woods.” Yet Anglo-Americans should restrict themselves to “what is useful and laudable,” and avoid Indians’ “barbarous proceeding. It is much to be lamented, that some of our frontier rifle-men are too prone to imitate them in their inhumanity.” Smith alluded here to the Gnadenhütten massacre of 1782, when a gang of frontier vigilantes, many of whom had been members of the Hickory Boys, methodically killed and scalped 96 Lenape-Munsee Moravian converts, pacifists who sang hymns while awaiting death: “This was an act of barbarity beyond any thing I ever knew to be committed by the savages themselves.”

The Revolutionary era also saw the rehabilitation of Michael Cresap, an Ohio Valley vigilante who, in the company of Daniel Greathouse and a gang of accomplices, led a series of premeditated ambush killings of Lenape-Munsees, Shawnees, and Mingoes in the spring of 1774, including the murder of a pregnant woman. In retaliation for the deaths of 13 friends

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293 James Smith, “An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Col. James Smith During his Captivity with the Indians, in the years 1755-59” (Lexington, 1799), in Loudon anthology, ; Dowd, _War Under Heaven_, 203-210; Philip Deloria, _Playing Indian_.

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and family members, including his sister and her unborn child, the Mingo chief known as Logan had exacted mourning-war revenge by killing 13 settlers; in return, Virginia’s governor Lord John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore led an army to exact large-scale casualties on the Indians and extract land cessions in a post-war peace treaty. In the summer of 1774, newspapers in Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston had blasted Cresap for his excessive cruelty, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* tellingly denouncing Cresap and his accomplices as a “gang of worse savages.” In early 1775 Logan’s written response to Dunmore was published as “Logan’s Lament” and hailed among American literati as masterful oratory.294

But with the outbreak of war against Britain in 1775, Cresap captured public attention by organizing a Maryland rifle company and marching for Washington’s Continental Army in Massachusetts. Performing rifle exercises at various stops along the way, their most dramatic show of Indian mimesis was performed in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, site of the 1763 workhouse massacre. Here, stripped to the waist and war-painted, they pantomimed Indian war as they understood it: a war dance, a chiefs’ council, an ambush, and subsequent scalping. When Cresap, only in his early 30s, died of exhaustion in New York City in October, he received a hero’s funeral. In 1797, Cresap’s son-in-law Luther Martin, Attorney General of Maryland, accused Thomas Jefferson of maligning Cresap by reprinting “Logan’s Lament” in *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1787) and claimed the famous oratory must be a fabrication. George Rogers Clark, Revolutionary-era hero of the Northwestern frontier, waded in with a strong letter exculpating Cresap of wrongdoing. Dr. Samuel Brown of Lexington, Kentucky, who forwarded Clark’s letter to Jefferson from Indiana Territory,

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added his own commentary reminding Jefferson that of the “two parties on the frontier” only one considered Cresap “as a wanton violator of treaties [and] as a man of cruel and inhuman disposition”; the other held him “an intrepid warrior and a just avenger of savage barbaries.”

Richard Slotkin notes that the captivity genre’s traditional Indian-war narratives of suffering in the wilderness were amended and extended during the Revolutionary era with the myth of the Anglo-American frontiersman as white savage, “the solitary, Indian-like hunter of the deep woods” who was the equal, or superior, of Indians at hunting beasts, rescuing captives, and killing and scalping enemies. As Mary Rowlandson’s account had transformed the captivity-narrative genre, a series of biographies between 1784 and 1833 apotheosized Daniel Boone, a Kentucky fur trapper and long-hunter, into the prototypical Indian-hunter—through excising certain inconvenient details. While the real Daniel Boone did fight in the Seven Years’ War, guide Virginia settlers through the Cumberland Gap, and lose a son at the Battle of Blue Licks in 1782, he also had an economic and political life within the mainstream of American society: he engaged in large-scale land speculation, served several terms in the Virginia legislature, and attained the offices of sheriff and county lieutenant. This included cultivating and promulgating his own myth; in his later years, he wished aloud to a visitor that he could sue Daniel Bryan for slander over The Mountain Muse (1813), a Boone-themed epic poem he detested.

From the 1820s to the 1860s, the United States rapidly industrialized and urbanized while annexing thousands of acres of land obtained by deporting Southeastern Indians, the

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295 Parkinson, “From Indian Killer to Worthy Citizen,” 119-122; Dr. Brown cited in Drinnon, White Savage, 116-117.
296 Slotkin, Regeneration through Violence; Drinnon, Facing West.
Louisiana Purchase, and the Spanish-American war. As Anglo-Americans “yearned […] for what they perceived to be a simpler frontier past” in the Appalachians, the Ohio Valley, and the Mississippi, this nostalgia was partly expressed at the ballot box. Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison, Indian-killing heroes of the War of 1812, ascended to the presidency, and Richard Mentor Johnson, a “second-tier Kentucky politician,” became Martin Van Buren’s vice president through the hideous 1836 campaign slogan “Rumpsey dumpsey, Colonel Johnson killed Tecumseh.” In a decidedly less polished vein, in 1862 an old man beseeched President Lincoln for clemency for his grandsons, held as Union prisoners of war, on the grounds that he was complicit in the heroic killing and flaying of Tecumseh’s body after the Battle of the Thames in 1813: “I hope [helped] Kill Tecumseh and hope Skin him and brot Two pieces of his yellow hide home with me to My Mother & Sweet Hart.”

Any anxiety over treatment of Indians was partially assuaged by an increasingly circular and negative portrait of Indians as eternal savages. The poverty of conquered eastern Indians or the beggars at western forts and stagecoach stations were cited as proof, as in Mark Twain’s bilious descriptions of Shoshones in *Roughing It* (1872), not that Indians’ livelihoods were being destroyed by invasion and colonization but that their deviance was timeless. Archaeological theories projected this back into the pre-Columbian past by proposing that the “Mound Builders” of the Southeast and the “Anasazi” of the Southwest had been higher races wiped out by the genocidal ancestors of modern Indians. Imagined Indians were also becoming more physically contemptuous, if not animal-like, compared to

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frontiersmen. In Horatio Greenough’s statuary group *The Rescue*, commissioned in 1837, carved in the 1840s, and unveiled at the Capitol in 1853, a huge, powerful backwoodsman pinions a reedy Indian warrior in his arms, caught red-handed attempting to tomahawk a white woman and her baby. An 1873 editorial cartoon during the Modoc War, entitled “The Two Vultures” shows a Modoc warrior, as a generic fur-clad Indian with hook nose, askew feathers tangled in his hair, and a curved scalping knife in his hand, seizing a dead soldier’s hair and glowers fiercely at a nearby vulture. The juxtaposition, notes Boyd Cothran, “would have been lost on few readers.” This increasingly animal-like assessment of the Indian was paired with popular justifications of ethnic cleansing and genocide. As early as the *Jesuit Relation* of 1662, Indians’ way of war had been dismissed as “nothing but a manhunt”; in Jacksonian-era fantasies of Indian war, whites turned the tables by making Indians into their prey.298

**Heroic genocide: the Indian-killer in fiction at midcentury**

Andrew Jackson’s unofficial campaign anthem, “The Hunters of Kentucky” (Samuel Woodworth, ca. 1820) struck a chord by describing western frontiersmen as they liked to imagine themselves: strong, tough, keen-eyed sharpshooters who were half-horse and half-alligator, a common Mississippi Valley boast for “great strength and amphibious attributes.” Period literature, dominated by western authors, described such men as skilled at hunting and killing Indians. The Cincinnati journalist Timothy Flint claimed in *Biographical Memoir of

Daniel Boone (1833) that his subject had once shot two Indians with the same bullet; in Indian Wars of the West (1833), he called Boone “More expert at their own arts, than the Indians themselves, to fight them, and foil them [...]” The theme of Indian-killing as manhunting rather than war is explicit in the work of William Gilmore Simms, whose historical romance The Yemmassee (1835) included a bloodhound named Dugdale trained to rip Indians’ throats out. Simms described Boone in “The First Hunter of Kentucky” (1845) as an occasional “hunter of men” who, while not “fond of this sport,” “could take a scalp with the rest, and might feel justified in the adoption of a practice which, when employed by whites, had the very great influence in discouraging the Indian appetite for war.”

Various unsavory frontier characters were elevated alongside Boone to the pantheon. In 1761 Tom Quick of Milford, Pennsylvania began exchanging drunken threats with an Indian named Madlin or Maudlin, who claimed complicity in the killing of Quick’s father in 1755 and imitated the “grimaces of the dying man”; after he left, Quick followed him, shot him in the back, robbed him and hid his corpse in a pit. Silver notes this as Quick’s only recorded killing of an Indian, from which a legend developed of Quick slaying 99 Indians before dying of smallpox; when vengeful Indians dug up his corpse, an epidemic killed even more. Mike Fink, born near Fort Pitt ca. 1770, served as a scout in western Pennsylvania, then worked as a boatman on the Ohio and Mississippi, becoming a folk hero in his own lifetime for his rough practical jokes, marksmanship, and skill at drinking and fighting; two years before his 1823 shooting death in an argument on the Upper Missouri, he appeared as a minor character in a play in St. Louis, The Pedlar (1821). Magazine writers developed Fink’s aspect as an Indian-hunter: Morgan Neville, in “Last of the Boatmen” (1828), told how Fink,

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299 Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence; Drinno, Facing West; Allen, Western Rivermen, 1-26, 214-24.
who like other frontier scouts “thought it as praiseworthy to bring in the scalp of a Shawnee as the skin of a panther,” obtained venison by stalking and shooting an Indian who was stalking and shooting a deer. In T.B. Thorpe’s “The Disgraced Scalp-Lock” (1842), Fink earned the enmity of an exiled Cherokee warrior named “Proud Joe” by shooting off his scalplock at the hairline; when told Proud Joe was still alive, he “seemed perfectly indifferent,” only regretting that he’d missed the Cherokee’s head and calling it his “first bad shot in twenty years.” Daniel Brodhead, an American officer adopted into the Lenape-Munsees’ Turtle clan, was in the middle of negotiating an alliance against the Wolf clan at Coshocton in April 1781 when an Ohio Valley vigilante named Lewis Wetzel, “in many ways the prototypical Indian hater,” tomahawked a chief from behind. A century later Wetzel had been elevated, in Henry Howe’s 1855 account, into “the most indefatigable Indian hunter on the frontiers.”

These stories’ fictive Indian killers not only emulated the fictive Indians they slew, but absorbed the cultural and physical traits of their prey. Like the fictional Indian, they also yielded to Manifest Destiny: after waging one-man wars against entire tribes, they voluntarily banished themselves further West at the approach of urbanization. In “Last of the Boatmen,” Neville’s version of Mike Fink is nearly transformed into an idealized Indian warrior, with fetishized physical and cultural traits of virile power and weaponry: Neville’s Fink was over six feet tall with “a large knife” hanging from his “broad leathern belt,”

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possessing the “symmetry of an Apollo” and the “limbs of a Hercules”; sun and weather had
given him the skin tone of a “complete mulatto” and “but for the fine European cast of his
countenance, he might have passed for the principal warrior of some powerful tribe.
Although at least fifty years of age, his hair was as black as the wing of the raven.” Thorpe’s
Fink, in “The Disgraced Scalp-Lock,” possesses the stereotypical Indian warrior’s bloodlust
and callousness. “Where’s the fun, the frolicking, the fighting?” he asks, agitated to see
development along the Ohio, and fantasizes of waging a one-man war against the Choctaws
from a fortified hilltop cabin “just to have something to keep me from growing dull […]
What a beautiful time I’d have of it!” He rationalizes the slaughter of Native Americans as a
law of the wilderness: “Its natur [sic] that the big fish should eat the little ones.” Henry
Howe’s Lewis Wetzel was “very broad-shouldered and full breasted,” with a complexion
“dark and swarthy as an Indian’s” and face “pitted” with smallpox scars. His hair “reached,
when combed out, to the calves of his legs,” and he had “remarkably black” eyes, which
“would sparkle with such a vindictive glance as almost to curdle the blood of the beholder.”
But since his preferred targets were Indians, he was not a fundamentally bad person; Howe
called him “a true friend, but a dangerous enemy,” and “a social and cheerful companion.”

Wholly invented Indian-killers adhered even more closely to frontier literature’s
Gothic clichés of obsessively-vengeful antiheroes, or Manifest Destiny’s insistence that
Indian slaughter did not impact the benignity of Anglo-American society. The protagonist of
Timothy Flint’s “The Indian Fighter” (1830), “sojourn[ing] on the prairies of Illinois,” hears
the autobiography of the fictional Hermit of Cap au Gris, son of a ruined British aristocratic

301 Howe, *Historical Collections of the Great West*, Volume 1, 136-39; Allen, *Western Rivermen, 1763-1861*, 1-26, 214-24; Blair and Meine eds., *Half Horse Half Alligator*, “The Last of the Boatmen” (Neville, 1828), 43-55,
family who sought their fortune in America. After experiencing the usual Indian-war horrors, family wiped out, fiancée dying in his arms, captivities and near-death, etc., he leads a ranger company to pursue the Indians with such ferocity “that I bore in their language an appellation which means Indian Fighter.” Finally brought to bay at their tribal graveyard, the chief challenges “Indian Fighter” to single combat after his people fulfill Manifest Destiny by committing mass suicide. His vengeance achieved, the Indian Fighter converts to Christianity to await his own death: “That whole race is wasting away about me, like the ice in the vernal brooks. I shall soon be with them.”

James Kirke Paulding’s series of character sketches set in pre-Revolutionary New York, *The Dutchman’s Fireside* (1831), included the fictional Timothy Weasel of Vermont. After Canadian Indians had wiped out Weasel’s family and neighbours, Sir William Johnson told Paulding’s protagonist, he now hunted “those tarnal kritters” with “inconceivable” “avidity,” against which “the keenest sportsman does not feel a hundredth part of the delight in bringing down his game [.]” A fictional Kentucky frontiersman, Ambrose Bushfield, expressed those sentiments unmediated in Paulding’s novel *Westward Ho!* (1832) in a scene employing two clichés in frontier adventure: the education of a greenhorn by a dialect-speaking old veteran, and the frontiersman’s voicing of the Sepúlvedan false dilemma, establishing for the audience the righteousness of killing Indians:

There isn’t a soul in all Kentucky but has lost some one of his kin in the Ingen wars, or had his house burnt over his head by these creturs. When they plough their fields, they every day turn up the bones of their own colour and kin who have been *scalped, and tortured*, and whipped, and starved by these varmints, that are ten thousand times more bloodthirsty than tigers, and as cunning as ‘possums.

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Declaring that he is “the last of my family and name,” Bushfield establishes the stakes of savage war: if not hunted, Indians perform white genocide.\endnote{303}

That these stories peddled fantasies of Anglo-American wish fulfillment and overwrote actual events with simplified narratives of inevitable, guiltless genocide was further exposed in James Fenimore Cooper’s \textit{Leatherstocking Tales} (1823-1841) and James Hall’s oft-repeated Colonel Moredock story. Natty Bumppo, aka “Hawk-Eye,” “Leatherstocking,” or in D.H. Lawrence’s words “a saint with a gun,” slays dozens of Indians but never once scalps them, though his Indian companions do eagerly. His decided asexuality also rules out interracial sex, a possibility constantly banished by proclaiming himself of the purest white blood, “a man without a cross.” Instead, he takes something else from the Indians. In \textit{The Deerslayer} (1841), an old warrior he has bested gives young Natty, and by extension Manifest Destiny, his blessing with his dying breath: “–eye sartain –finger lightning—aim, death—great warrior soon. No Deerslayer—Hawkeye—Hawkeye—Hawkeye. Shake hand.” Natty Bumppo’s Indian companions show “willingness to immolate themselves” by aiding in Manifest Destiny, quite literally in \textit{The Pioneers} (1823) when the elderly Chingachgook, bearing the baptismal name “Indian John,” throws himself into a forest fire. His “bad” Indians conform to Savagist stereotypes perfectly, as in a scene in \textit{The Last of the Mohicans} (1827) where Magua and his Hurons wolf down the raw, still-warm venison of a fawn before deciding to immolate Cora and Alice Munro with the pine-splint torture (see Chapter 5), prevented by the heroes’ nick-of-time arrival. Cooper’s critics who derided the fakeness of his “good” Indians— as when General Lewis Cass, prior to being

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made Jackson’s Secretary of War, called them “beings with feelings and opinions, such as never existed in our forests”—typically had no complaints about his “bad” Indians. In an 1852 essay Francis Parkman, the dean of 19th-century frontier historians, declared Cooper’s novels “a faithful mirror of that rude transatlantic nature.” Denouncing the “good” Indians of Last of the Mohicans, i.e., Uncas, Chingachgook, and the ancient, fatalistic Lenape sachem Tamenund, as the sort of “aboriginal heroes, lovers, and sages, who have long formed a petty nuisance in our literature,” he had nothing but praise for the novel’s villain Magua, a scheming, vindictive alcoholic who plans to avenge himself on Colonel Munro by violating his daughter Cora. This struck Parkman as a simple statement of fact, since “It is well known that Indians, in real life as well as in novels, display a peculiar partiality for white women…”

The themes of inevitable ethnic cleansing, and contradictorily disavowing and celebrating the Indian-killing vigilante, appear in James Hall’s 1834 essay “Brief Account of Colonel Moredock.” Hall began by designating the backwoodsmen as a “peculiar race” within America, a self-contained relic population holding who combined 17th-century total war with 18th-century British Enlightenment belief in free markets: “[he] does not believe that an Indian, or any other man has a right to monopolize the hunting grounds, which he considers free to all.” Raised from the cradle with “horrid tales of savage violence,” Hall

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allowed that the Indian-hating frontiersmen had “heard only one side” of events, but the appearance of even-handedness is illusory. While Black Hawk’s memoir or the writings of William Apess were available in English by 1834, Hall made no effort to suggest what life on the other side of the frontier might look like, while repetitively invoking the Indian as illegitimate combatants (“a midnight prowler, watching to murder the mother as she bends over her helpless children”; “yelling fiends in human shape,” etc.) He then shifted to the “many instances of individuals who, in consequence of some personal wrong, have vowed eternal hatred to the whole Indian race,” as proven by an entirely fictional story: of one John Moredock, who had gone through a succession of stepfathers (his mother “was married several times, and was as often widowed by the tomahawk of the savage”) before his mother “and all her children,” except John, were massacred horribly by an intertribal collection of Indian bandits on the Mississippi. After describing Moredock’s manly vitality, and his systematic hunting of the thirty Indians responsible in a one-man campaign of ethnic cleansing—up to his death from old age he “never in his life failed to embrace an opportunity to kill a savage”—Hall then made his most surprising assertion: that Colonel Moredock, for all this, “was a man of warm feelings, and excellent disposition,” promoted to Colonel as a ranger during the War of 1812, serving in the legislative assembly, and almost becoming governor of Illinois.305

These themes of the Sepúlvedan false dilemma, nostalgia for 18th-century frontiers, the obsessed vigilante compelled to kill Indians, the inevitability and normality of frontiersmen scalping Indians, and Slotkin’s model of regeneration through violence – that

Anglo-America can only advance by civilized whites’ descent into barbarism—all reached their logical extremes in Bird’s *Nick of the Woods; or, the Jibbenainosay: A Tale of Kentucky* (Philadelphia, 1837). The novel begins with the heirs of a wealthy Virginia family, Captain Roland Forrester and his cousin Edith, arriving in 1782 Kentucky in a wagon train resembling a past age of white savagery: “Vandals in quest of some new home to be won with the edge of the sword.” Roland, a decorated hero of the Revolutionary War, is well aware of Virginian and Kentucky virtues: “to fell trees, raise corn, shoot bison and Indians,” but is a stripling in heroic Indian-killing-- whereas the novel’s Kentuckians are all of the mold of Mike Fink and Davy Crockett. Colonel Tom Bruce, chieftain of a fort on the edge of the wilderness, is hypervirile: of “colossal” stature, “at least fifty,” but “as hale as one of thirty, without a single gray hair” in his “raven locks.” Like Daniel Bone, a succession of his sons have been slain in the Indian wars; Tom Jr., renamed after an older brother slain in war, killed and scalped “a full-grown Shawnee before he war fourteen y’ar old.” The brawling horse-thief Ralph Stackpole “killed two Injuns once, single-handed, on Bear-Grass” and, towards the novel’s end, beats an Indian to death with his fists; Stackpole steals other Kentuckians’ horses, is a braggart and a ruffian, but his faults are overlooked as he “fights Injuns like a wolverine.” A dissenting note is struck by “Bloody” Nathan Slaughter, a Quaker and pacifist, despised as “the only man in all Kentucky that won’t fight!” And an unknown presence the Shawnees call the *Jibbenainosay* or “Spirit-that-Walks” stalks the Kentucky wilderness, scalping and mutilating Indian victims, particularly Shawnees, with a cross-shaped mark across the chests of “all the meat of his killing.” Bruce scorns the accounts of “such lying devils as Injuns” (“for the truth ar’nt in ‘em”) but notes that dozens of settlers,
who call the creature Old Nick, have “all had a glimpse of him stalking through the woods, [...] always found in the deepest forests”.

In an unsurprising twist, the true architects of the looming threat of a pan-tribal Indian invasion of Kentucky are white villains: the Forresters’ lawyer Braxley, who has stripped them of their fortune, and the “white Injun” Abel Doe, Braxley’s henchman. In a more unusual development, the Jibbenainosay or “Old Nick” is revealed to be none other than Nathan Slaughter, imbuing his stereotyped Indian-like traits with retrospective meaning: his clothes, “fragments of tanned skins rudely sewed together”; his tall and lanky build; his “long hooked nose” and “black staring eyes.” Nathan explains how ten years ago, he handed over his rifle and knife as a show of good faith to the ghoulish Shawnee chief Wenonga, who then promptly killed and scalped his wife, old mother, and five “little innocent babes.” The memory triggers an epileptic fit, “brought on by overpowering agitation of mind,” and Nathan falls to the ground, revealing beneath his broad-brimmed hat horrible scars left by “the savage scalping knife” on the “mangled head.” Once recovered, Roland agrees to Nathan’s plan to rescue Edith and other captives from Wenonga’s village, a scenario identical to that of Reid’s The Scalp-Hunters (1851) and expressing the reverse-colonial theme: most of Wenonga’s men are with the pan-tribal army invading Kentucky, “scalping and murdering as they come: their villages are left to be guarded by women and children, and old men no longer fit for war.”

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Slaughter’s traits, as well as his physiognomy, are those of the stereotypical Indian warrior: his skills in wilderness survival, stealth, and combat; and his sudden swings from self-controlled placidity to a dissociative state of violent insanity. He scalps every Indian they kill, which Bird rationalizes as “the practice of the border” which “was, and is, essentially a measure of retaliation, compelled, if not justified, by the ferocious example of the red-man.” At the Shawnees’ village, Slaughter doffs his tattered leather for stolen Indian clothes and war paint in “figures of snakes, lizards, skulls, and other savage devices,” consistent with Roland’s description of Shawnees as “crawling reptiles […] in spirit as in movement.” When added to his “lofty stature,” “the metamorphosis was so complete” that Captain Ralph confessed a desire “to be at his top-knot.” The Indians are also fooled until a failed rescue attempt of Edith, then show “unconcealed wonder and awe” when Nathan alarms Wenonga with “a look more hideous than his own” and falls into an epileptic fit. Taking his unknown prisoner to be “great Medicine,” Wenonga orders Nathan to summon the Jibbenainosay so he can avenge the deaths of all his sons and grandsons—not knowing that the painted frontiersman is the killer. Seeing the scalps of his wife, mother, and children hanging from Wenonga’s housepost, Nathan seizes his opportunity, telling Wenonga in perfect Shawnee that if untied, “The chief will see the Jibbenainosay!” Slaughter then brutally kills, scalps, and dismembers Wenonga with his own tomahawk and knife, seizing “the bundle of withered scalps—the locks and ringlets of his own murdered children” in one hand, and “the reeking scalp-lock of the murderer” in the other. Before fleeing the village to summon help he issues a death whoop worthy of the Eastmans: “in the insane fury of the moment, given forth, a
wild, ear-piercing yell, that spoke the triumph, the exulting transport, of long-baffled but never-dying revenge.”

But in the pandemonium of Wenonga’s village, Nathan’s insane screams are “such sounds […] too common to create alarm or uneasiness.” Bird’s depiction of Indians as a vile antisociety is consistent with Lawrence and Jewett’s theme of Tertullian ecstasy: “the enjoyment in seeing the punishment of the wicked,” which “works towards its climactic visceral gratification by a kind of inverted foreplay […] requir[ing] revulsion triggered by negative stereotypes.” From the novel’s early references to the tortured death of Colonel Crawford and Indians’ supposed love of killing women and children, Bird’s Shawnees are loathsome, ruled by their passions for murder and torture. While all of Bird’s Indians are racist caricatures, the most contemptuous is an old Piankeshaw chief, mourning his son’s killing and scalping by “Long-knife man Kentucky” in scenes which reduce the mourning-war complex to irrationality and chaos. Swilling from Braxley’s keg of rotgut, the Piankeshaw alternately promises to adopt Nathan as his son or to torture him horribly, while praising his slain son’s ability to “kill bear, kill buffalo, catch fish” and “take scalp, squaw scalp, papoose scalp, man scalp, all kind scalp,” laterally comparing hunting to war, reducing Indian warfare to scalping and infanticide, and implicitly attributing both to bloodlust and sadism. Bird’s sketch of the Shawnee village, a disordered collection of hovels inhabited by

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308 Bird, Nick of the Woods (1837), Vol. 1, 158 (“crawling reptiles”), Vol. 2, 106 (“practice of the border”), 115-16 (“Then, daubing over his face, arms and breast with streaks of red, black, and green paint, that seemed designed to represent snakes, lizards, and other reptiles; he was, on a sudden, converted into a highly respectable-looking savage, as grim and awe-inspiring as these barbaric ornaments and his attire, added to his lofty stature, could make him. Indeed, the metamorphosis was so complete, that Captain Ralph, as he swore, could scarce look at him without longing, as this worthy personage expressed it, ‘to be at his top-knot.’” My italics), 161-62 (“snakes, lizards, skulls”), 195-207 (“long-baffled but never-dying revenge”); Drinnon, Facing West, 119-129; On Slaughter’s metamorphosis into simulacrum of an Indian warrior, see Shirley Samuels, Facing America: Iconography and the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2004), 36.
“male vagabonds,” “naked children,” and “oppressed and degraded women,” use literal or spiritual intoxication as his master-theme of Indian dysfunction and wickedness. The eye of the “squalid sot” Wenonga gleams with “mingled drunkenness and insanity,” while the Indians, preparing to burn Roland, Edith, and Ralph, are swept away in “the drunkenness of passion,” as though possessed in “the sway of unchained demons, or […] the horrible impulses of lycanthropy.” This Tertullian foreplay reaches its climax when, just before the pyre is lit, Slaughter arrives with Colonel Bruce and an army of Kentuckians itching to avenge the defeat at Blue Licks. Transfixed by their “universal devotion to the Saturnalia of blood,” the Indians are caught by surprise.309

Omitting the sexual abuse of women and killing of children and women which were endemic to frontier war, Bird’s audience is entreated to celebrate sanitized ethnic cleansing. Roland kills Wenonga’s “witch-like” wife, a “hag” more sadistic than her husband, while she tries to light his pyre; the Kentuckians take a harvest of warriors’ scalps; Braxley, who could “pass for an Indian” with his height and “uncommon darkness of skin and hair,” is scalped by mistake by an over-eager Massachusetts greenhorn. But a larger number of Indians are made prisoners, “including all the women and children”—no collateral damage here—as “the surest means of inducing the tribe to beg for peace.” With Nathan in the forefront (“his step was fierce, active, firm, and elastic, like that of a warrior leaping through the measures of the war-dance”), the Kentuckians loot and torch the village and its cornfields to inflict winter hunger on the Shawnees. “[R]estore[d] once more to his wits” by completing his mission of

vengeance, Nathan finds his neighbours’ praise more upsetting than their former taunts and insults. Fearing that his story will “scandalize and disparage” the Society of Friends, Nathan asks Roland not to repeat it and disappears into the wilderness like Natty Bumppo, Mike Fink, and other Indian-killers, “going no man knew whither.”

In his foreword to a revised 1853 edition, Bird insisted on the historical accuracy of his fictional story. Nathan, his antiheroic Daniel Boone, represented a real “class of men” such as “Boone and Kenton, McColloch and Wetzel,” who were “scattered along the extreme frontier” of every state “from New York to Georgia, […] men in whom the terrible barbarities of the savages […] had wrought a change of temper as strange as fearful.” He professed himself innocent of the charges arrayed against him in the foreword of a British edition of *Nick of the Woods*, “of influencing the passions of his countrymen against the remnant of an unfortunate race, with a view of excusing the wrongs done to it by the whites, if not of actually hastening the period of that “final destruction” which it pleases so many men […] to predict.” He unwittingly proved his British critic’s point by invoking the Sepúlvedan false dilemma, contrasting Cooper and Chateaubriand’s dying-Indian characters Uncas and Atala against his “real” Indians: “ignorant, violent, debased, brutal,” whose “miserable” lives were devoted to “the pleasures of the chase and of the scalp-hunt—which we dignify with the name of war.” His 1837 foreword had more explicitly damned the Indian warrior as a habitual child-killer who “wages […] systematic war […] upon women and children […] we look into the woods for the mighty warrior, ‘the feather-cinctured chief,’ rushing to meet his foe, and behold him retiring, laden with the scalps of miserable squaws

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and their babes.” His 1837 text was, in fact, guilty of normalizing genocide, declaring scalping as part of “the mortal feud” which will only end “with the annihilation of the American race” by “the white invader.”

Reid’s *The Scalp-Hunters* (1851) offered a similarly sanitized story with clear-cut heroes and villains in a fantastical version of the Southwest. Knifed by a Mexican bravo at a Santa Fé fandango, Henry Haller, a young British gentleman-adventurer travelling in America, recovers in the home of a French-American creole named Seguin, a Santa Fé gentleman with a sinister reputation as “the Scalp Hunter.” As in *Westward Ho!*, Seguin deploys the Sepúlvedan false dilemma—the demolition of the saccharine Indian stereotype to justify the demonic Indian stereotype—to educate the greenhorn Haller:

> If you knew the history of this land for the last ten years; its massacres and its murders; its tears and its burnings; its rapes and spoliations; whole provinces depopulated; villages given to the flames; men butchered on their own hearths; women, beautiful women, carried into captivity to satisfy the lust of the desert robber.

Merchants from Bent’s Fort have already introduced Haller to Southwestern barbarism: Hispanics are both primitive and decadent, Pueblo Indians are natural serfs, while the Comanches, Apaches, and Navajos are the warrior-races of the Southwest, descendants of the Aztecs who scalp men, kidnap women, commit cannibalism and worship Quetzalcoatl with human sacrifice. As per usual Anglo-American stereotypes, behind the Indians’ depredations is a white mastermind: Governor Manuel Armijo, New Mexico’s governor from the late 1830s throughout the 1840s. Andrés Reséndez notes that Navajos had raided New Mexico with increasing frequency from 1846 until 1849, and Reid’s imagination drew a link: his

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Navajos, the main antagonists of *The Scalp-Hunters*, raid the province at will and serve as Armijo’s bodyguards and private army via his brokered peace treaty which prohibits the army from fighting them. At Armijo’s instigation the Navajos destroyed Seguin’s mines and carried off his daughter Adèle. After years “hunting for my child,” Seguin was offered the command of a ranger unit paid in scalp bounties, and accepted this “strange guerilla […] in the hope that I might yet recover my child, I accepted it—I became a scalp-hunter.”

Seguin enlist Haller as his second-in-command for his long-awaited expedition into “Navajoa,” as circumstances have moved in his favour. According to his informant, a foul-mouthed and leathery trapper named “Old Rube” recently escaped Navajo captivity minus scalp and ears, the Navajos and their allies are on the verge of a great expedition to the gates of Durango. As in *Nick of the Woods*, this will leave their villages unguarded save for women, children, and old men; as in *Nick of the Woods*, perfect chivalry is to be observed from the outset: Seguin forbids the scalping of women and noncombatants, or the mistreatment of women, stipulating that he will only pay for warriors’ scalps (at $50 apiece) and unharmed hostages to extort a prisoner exchange from the Navajos. A recent drop in the price of beaver pelts has brought Anglo-American fur trappers from the eastern plains, who “find ‘red-skin’ pays better”; with no sense of contradiction, he describes these Anglo-American trappers as essentially benign: “bold, but good-humoured and generous.” The company, whose three largest ethnic contingents are Anglo-American trappers, Mexican norteños, and “Delaware” Indians, with a babel of French-Canadians, Southwestern Indians,

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escaped Louisiana slaves, Hawaiians, and others, resembles both the polyethnic fur trappers’ brigades of the intramontane West and the similarly polyethnic scalp-hunter companies of James Kirker and John Joel Glanton, described below. Kirker, “a rough, brutal-looking fellow,” appears briefly as the one bad apple in the bunch. While the other scalp-hunters are content to follow Seguin’s orders, harvesting scalps from the Indian warriors who inevitably show up when the action starts to flag, Kirker threatens mutiny at the Navajo village, where Adèle is found to have become a sort of white goddess: the high priestess of the shrine of Quetzalcoatl. Kirker’s mutiny is swiftly put down—“you are a cowardly brute, for all your bluster”—and in the Indian counterattack he is swept to his death in a flash flood. As in *Nick of the Woods*, white villains are deserving targets of scalping; “They’ll lift his har to a sartinty” eulogizes one of the party.313

Villainous treatment of scalp-hunters, like Reid’s version of Kirker, required their treatment as outsiders self-deported from American society. Samuel Chamberlain, the Mexican-American war veteran, sketched a gallery of grotesques in his unsubstantiable claim that he had ridden with John Joel Glanton’s gang of scalp-hunters in 1848-49 after deserting from the army. Chamberlain claimed to have first laid eyes on Glanton in a saloon in Bexar in 1846, on a night when it was filled with Texas Rangers and “a motley crowd of desperate characters” better suited for “the Infernal regions”; Glanton supposedly picked a fight with another Ranger, killed him with a bowie knife, then resumed drinking and playing cards. This “famous Indian fighter and desperado of the frontier,” Chamberlain wrote, in a

313 Reid, *The Scalp-Hunters* (1851), vol. 1, 236-40 (“find ‘red-skin’ pays better”), 254-60 (“bold, but good-humoured and generous”), Vol. 2, 16-18 (“rough, brutal-looking”), 163-67 (“Fifty dollar a plew!” [Old Rube] muttered, unsheathing his knife and stooping over the body. “It’s more’n I got for my own. It beats beaver all hollow. D—n beaver! say this child.”), 248-54 (the siege of Navajoa; “the gal is what they call Mystery Queen”), 265-88 (Kirker’s mutiny), 308 (“lift his ha’r to a sartainty”).
biography Goetzmann notes is unsubstantiable from extant records but is consistent with the origin stories of Indian-haters, was once a pious and respectable youth from South Carolina, until his fiancée, a 17-year-old Texan orphaned in childhood by Lipan Apaches, was carried off by the Lipans. By the time Glanton and other Texans caught up to them, she and the other captive white women

after suffering horrible outrages […] were tomahawked and scalped while the fight was raging. Glanton rescued the gory locks of his beloved from the death clutch of a painted demon that he slew, and ever afterwards wore the sad memento next his heart. From this tragic scene, Glanton returned a changed man, no longer the happy farmer and kind neighbour, he became a gloomy monomaniac hating all mankind.

Like other literary Indian-killers, Glanton could wage one-man wars against entire tribes. Chamberlain writes that Glanton’s expeditions into the Texas wilderness “invariably” returned with fresh scalps; rather than turn them in for money, he collected a “mule-load,” smoke-dried in a hut on the Guadalupe River.314

Unlike Colonel Moredock, Chamberlain’s Glanton had a “diseased state of mind”: his former piety became “horrid blasphemy,” and he “drank deeply,” seeking the company of “the most hardened desperadoes of the frontier.” Under commission from the Mexican state of Sonora, he led a motley crew of “Senorrians, Cherokee and Delaware Indians, French Canadians, Texians, Irishmen, a Negro and a full blooded Comanche” to hunt Indians for $50 a scalp. Chamberlain’s half-fictionalized Glanton was given a wholly fictional, grotesque second-in-command: “Judge Holden of Texas,” an enormous man whose face was “destitute of hair and all expression” and whose “hoglike eyes” gleamed at the sight of blood. A polymath who gave impromptu lectures on Southwestern botany, archaeology, anthropology,

and geology, Chamberlain’s Judge Holden, “[t]his intellectual beast,” was also guilty of rape and murder, yet “lecture[d] me on the immorality of my […] drinking and gambling!” The real Glanton gang had reputedly begun killing Mexican citizens to pass off their scalps as Apaches’, and Chamberlain paints a Satanic picture of this phase in their careers: disguised as Apaches, the gang began robbing, murdering, and preying upon Mexican civilians in “brutal Saturnalias” and “hellish orgies.” On one hand, this story makes scalp hunters into freaks rejected by both American and Hispanic society, absolving the Mexican state of its role in commissioning them in the first place. On the other, Goetzmann notes that Chamberlain’s story is consistent with the “melodrama” of sin and salvation: “the innocent who becomes hardened, corrupted, a sinner who becomes a murderer and foul scalp-hunter, who then repents but is nonetheless consigned to hell—in this case the Mojave Desert.”

“Hate Indians? Why should he or anybody else hate Indians? I admire Indians,” the cosmopolitan Francis “Frank” Goodman ingenuously tells an Arkansan, Charles “Charlie” Noble, in Herman Melville’s The Confidence-Man (1857): “really, I would like to know something about this Indian-hating. I can hardly believe such a thing to be.” Through intertextual interrogation of James Hall’s oft-repeated story of Colonel Moredock, chapters 25 to 28 of Melville’s dense, deliberately cryptic satire took aim at the clichés of the frontier horror story, particularly the Sepúlvedan false dilemma and the moral righteousness of the obsessive Indian-killing vigilante. James Hall was a friend of his father, replies Noble, and Hall repeated the story so often at dinner parties that he “heard his history again and again” and can recite it from memory—a sly dig at Hall rewriting and republishing the Colonel Moredock or Indian-hater story under varying titles at least five times between 1828 and

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1857. As Richard Drinnon notes, through the “puzzle-box device” of the Arkansan Charlie Noble quoting James Hall on Moredock, i.e., a westerner quoting a westerner “on yet another Westerner,” Melville established that all “shared a doctrinal hate for Native Americans.” Melville then raised questions of confirmation bias and indigenous agency as Noble explained Indians’ crimes, real or imagined, by comparison to famous criminals incarcerated in notorious British and American prisons, while frontiersmen are compared to famous pagans: Alexander the Great, the Roman emperor Julian, and Polynesian surfers. The righteousness of frontiersmen’s hatred of Indians is called into question by Noble’s observation that Indians, “quite unanimously […] protest against the backwoodsman’s view of them,” and that “some think that one cause of their returning his antipathy so sincerely as they do, is their moral indignation at being so libeled”—though whether Indians may testify in their own defense is a question for the Supreme Court (here Melville sarcastically alludes to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), in which the Supreme Court ruled they could not). Frontiersmen, for their part, prefer to believe that whether laying traps for animals or deceiving enemies, deceit is the “general conduct of life” of Indians they think of as snakes and red devils. The risk is too great to believe otherwise:

… scarce a family he knows but some member of it, or connection, has been by Indians maimed or scalped. What avails, then, that some one Indian, or some two or three, treat a backwoodsman friendly-like? He fears me, he thinks. Take my rifle from me, give him motive, and what will come?

If the frontiersman is driven by fear and self-righteousness, the Indian-hater is a more chimerical creature. The Indian hater par excellence never returns from the wilderness; Moredock, having a life within frontier society, is a diluted or apostasizing Indian-hater, though still dysfunctional. In Melville’s version, he turned down the governorship of Illinois
because it would interfere with his quest: “there would be an impropriety in the Governor of Illinois stealing out now and then [...] for a few days’ shooting at human beings.” Noble also remembers visiting Moredock’s house as a child to find a decoy of moss and twigs in his bed; the skittish vigilante had fled at the approach of a small boy and his father.316

Frontiersmen might be suspicious and paranoid, but at least they can recognize human potential for evil among white Americans as well as Indians. The supposedly frank, good man who shares wine and cigars with Charlie Noble is, in fact, the same shapeshifter who has been travelling the steamboat Fidèle (“Faith”) since the novel began at dawn on April Fool’s Day, chiding suspicious travellers for their lack of faith in his goodness while gulling them into signing over money—or a more precious commodity, since “Frank Goodman” is actually Satan at large on the Mississippi. Tellingly, one of the only cases of recognition is when a giant, sickly frontiersman, “an invalid Titan in homespuns” and his child “of alien maternity, perhaps Creole, or even Camanche,” knocks him to the boards with a haymaker for selling painkilling patent medicine: “Profane fiddler on heart-strings! Snake!” But the titan is in the minority on a ship whose passengers are taken by feel-good transcendantalist mysticism, get-rich-quick schemes, and an unwarrantedly sunny view of American history. Melville noted that “where the wolves are killed off, the foxes increase”: Manifest Destiny had driven off the Mississippi’s Indians, bandits, and frontiersmen, but replaced them with rubes who eagerly purchased cheap biographies of famous Mississippi robbers and river pirates—Measan, Murrell, the Harpe brothers—while pickpockets worked the crowd of “farm-hunters and fame-hunters; heiress-hunters, gold-hunters, buffalo-hunters,

316 Drinnon, Facing West; Parker and Niemeyer eds., Norton Critical Edition of The Confidence-Man, 137-165.
bee-hunters, happiness-hunters, truth-hunters, and still keener hunters after all these hunters.”

Melville was disturbed by his fellow Americans’ inability to acknowledge that their actions could have negative consequences, particularly for peoples they deemed savage or primitive, and their refusal to recognize that racism stained the soul of the racist. His observations in Typee (1846) and Omoo (1847) that colonization had brought starvation, disease, and poverty to Polynesia, including a story of a missionary’s wife being taken to church on Sundays in a buggy pulled by Hawaiians, had led to a backlash from American Protestant churches for his defense of “cannibals,” and their successful boycott of Moby-Dick reduced him to borrowing money. Textual violence against Native Americans also perturbed him. He took exception to Francis Parkman’s assertion that acquaintance with Indians should automatically breed contempt in a white observer: “when we are told too, that to such a person, the slaughter of an Indian is indifferent as the slaughter of a buffalo; with all deference, we beg leave to dissent. […] though in many cases this feeling is almost natural, it is not defensible; and it is wholly wrong.” Francis Goodman, in The Confidence-Man, cannot believe Noble’s declaration of Moredock as “to all but Indians juicy as a peach”: “if ever there was such a man as Moredock, he, in my way of thinking, was either misanthrope or nothing; and his misanthropy the more intense from being focused on one race of men.”

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Scalping in the Southwest: Kirker, Glanton, and California

In November 1846 General John Wool’s Chihuahuan expedition, a 3,400-man force comprised of two Illinois volunteer infantry regiments, an Arkansas volunteer cavalry regiment, and a small contingent of the regular U.S. army, occupied Coahuila’s state capital of Saltillo and remained in place during the winter of 1846-47, awaiting further orders from General Zachary Taylor. Wool’s forces chafed at garrison duty, and a widespread Anglo-American contempt for Mexicans which combined British sectarian-national hatred for “Spaniards” with North American prejudice against mestizos and Indians, motivated volunteers from all companies to begin preying upon the civilian population of Saltillo and its environs. In a letter to his parents back in Illinois, Second Lieutenant Adolph Engelmann wrote that “an old gray headed” Mexican shepherd had been shot “because he objected to the shooting of his sheep.” The culprit had not yet been discovered, wrote Engelmann, “though I think he is an Illinois man.” The single worst offenders were the Arkansas Mounted Rifles, whose insubordination and inept leadership by Colonel Archibald Yell earned them Wool’s unfavourable nicknames of “Arkansas Devils” and “Colonel Yell’s Mounted Devils”; among many crimes to their credit, the Devils robbed the Agua Nueva ranch, 17 miles south of Saltillo, around Christmas Day and committed several sexual assaults of Mexican women while doing so. As Engelmann observed, such crimes did not go unpunished: “from time to time” lone Arkansas volunteers caught outside of camp “would be lassoed and dragged by the Mexicans.”


When in early 1847 the Arkansas Volunteers were mustered south to engage Santa Anna’s northward-marching army and encamped at Agua Nueva, a well-liked private of Yell’s regiment was found dead outside the camp on 9 February, “badly mangled from dragging over the brush and rocks.” On the following day, about 100 members of the regiment went looking for the culprits, and they opened fire when the Arkansan private’s carbine sling was found on a Mexican citizen near the village of Catana. By the time the officers arrived to stop them, they had pursued the survivors into a cave. The official investigatory report listed four dead, but most eyewitness accounts, notes Karl Bauer, “speak of 20 or 30” casualties. Engelmann, for instance, writes of a body count “variously placed at from 18 to 30 though it may be more.”

Samuel Chamberlain, then a member of the Illinois volunteers, wrote in his Confession that his company was ordered forward to arrest the rampaging Arkansans. Placing the number of irregulars at 109, his numbers leap upwards again when describing what they saw upon approaching the cave: “a greasser, shot and scalped, laying on the ground yet alive” and twenty other Mexicans “dead and dying in pools of blood.” Out of the darkness of the cave emerged an irregular, “a brutal looking Rackansacker” who “advanced

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towards us brandishing a huge knife, dripping with gore in one hand, and a bunch of reeking scalps in the other.” Chamberlain illustrated this as a watercolour copying Seth Eastman’s iconic *Death-Whoop*, his bearded, buckskinned irregular holding the scalps in his left hand and his bowie knife, or “Arkansas toothpick,” in his right. Chamberlain adds they found an additional thirty Mexicans inside the cave “butcherd [sic] on the floor, most of them scalped.” As in the wars between New England and New France, sectarian anti-Catholic violence and racialized anti-Indian violence had hybridized: “some irreverent wretch had crowned” a roughly-hewn crucifix at the back of the cave “with a bloody scalp, the gore trickling down the pale features of the Saviour.”

American volunteers from other states reportedly scalped Mexicans during the war, citing Mexican collective guilt and past offenses with the violent self-pity usually deployed against Indians. When American occupational authorities established a court in Monterrey to settle disputes between Mexican citizens and American soldiers, claims filed against Texans predominated; Ohio volunteer Luther Giddings acidly noted that Texans’ self-justifications for their abuses and depredations “invariabl[y] began, continued and ended with the Alamo, or Goliad or Mier.” As Texas Ranger Creed Taylor recalled, after the battle of Resaca de la Palma in May 1846, General Taylor was revolted to learn that a Texan scout named John Bate Berry had scalped a Mexican after the battle. When Taylor demanded an explanation, Berry tearfully reiterated his grievances—“I was at Mier where my brother was butchered like a dog,” etc.—and stated “I have sworn by the eternal to kill Mexicans as long as I live.”

In 1847 General Zachary Taylor’s adjutant-general William Bliss commented on the transfer

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of Major Chevallié to General Wool after a series of depredations on Mexican citizens; while Chevallié was “a good partisan officer,” he and his Rangers “have the fault of all Texans i.e. an indifference to human life.” Chevallié, a major in the first Texas Ranger battalion in federal service, resigned his commission after Wool, in Goetzmann’s words, “deplored his assaults on Mexican citizens.” Chevallié and one of his officers, John Joel Glanton, were to find a lucrative trade south of the border.322

By the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the Ibero-American patterns of conquest and assimilation we noted in Chapter 1, including Indian slave trades and body-part bounties, were still well-entrenched. But where the Indian enemies of the Chichimec wars had been pedestrians armed with bows and arrows, Spain now faced equestrians with arsenals of firearms. The introduction of donkeys and Iberian horses, creatures used to hot and dry climates, into the arid Southwest, had given indigenous peoples a superior beast of burden to the dog and a means for escaped mission Indians in California, Apaches and Navajos in the Southwest, and the Comanches in the southern Plains to resist Iberian imperialism. Comanchería’s possession of vast horse herds, the best buffalo territory, and dominance of trade routes in the southern Plains made the Comanches too numerous, powerful, and well-armed for the Spanish government to inflict any lasting defeats on them. In 1786, peace was brokered with Comanchería on the premise of war against mutual enemies: the Osages of Spanish Louisiana and the evasive Apaches of the Southwestern mountains. In the case of the Apaches, the Comanches were promised a bounty of a bridled horse and pair of belduques,

322 Jimmy L. Bryan, Jr., More Zeal Than Discretion: The Westward Adventures of Walter P. Lane (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 61-62 (“began, continued and ended”, “as long as I live”), 59-76; Smith, Borderlander, 218-34, 292-93 n. 7.

This state of affairs was an end result of a series of late 17th century Apache defeats by Comanches who seized rich grassland for their horse herds, bison which provided food and bison products for export, and Apache captives to increase Comanchería’s population through adoption and enslavement. In the time of Coronado, Athabaskan-speaking peoples collectively known as Apaches had occupied a continuous swathe of territory from Arizona to north Texas; now, the western and eastern divisions of the Comanches operated as a federation of autonomous tribes who met annually to determine national policy, while the Apaches were scattered culturally and politically. The Lipan and Plains (or Kiowa) Apaches remained on the plains of Oklahoma and Texas, while the various Apache groups of the mountains of New Mexico and Arizona relied heavily on livestock stolen from Hispanic ranches, partly for war and transportation, but largely for food. The Hispanic public considered Apaches as barbarians lacking the useful economic skills of town-dwelling farmers like the Pueblos or the Nahua of central Mexico, and policies of extirpation were popular. From Mexico City the Viceroy, Bernardo de Gálvez, crowed his approval of the Apaches’ “special ruination” per the 1786 Comanche treaty, as the “happiness” of the north depended on their “voluntary or forced submission,” or “total extermination.” During the
1770s and 1780s, as the northern provinces of New Spain from the Californias to Texas were placed under the direct control of the Crown and the military, strings of dried Indian ears sent by field commanders to confirm their official reports’ kill counts had adorned the doorway to the Governor’s Palace in Santa Fé, a grotesque counterpart to the *ristras* of dried chilies that hung in ordinary New Mexican homes. Ear bounties coexisted quite comfortably with decapitation: in the 1770s the commander of Tucson presidio, Pedro de Allande, boasted of placing Apache heads on the battlements, and Antonio Cordero y Bustamante, commander of Janos, hung severed Apache heads from mesquite trees along the road to the fort. Private bounties could be also be offered to raise the troops’ spirits: in 1780, during Governor Juan Bautista de Anza’s punitive expedition, Commandant-General Teodoro de Croix offered his men cash bounties for live Apache prisoners or for the heads and ears of the dead. The carrot was alternated with the stick: Apaches who turned themselves in received rations, land, and peace in return for military alliance against Apaches still at large. Such regimes of violence also existed in California, where escaped mission Indians stole livestock for food. In January 1834, a few volunteers from Joseph Walker’s beaver-trapping brigade joined a Californian punitive expedition, seeking Indians who had stolen 300 horses from Mission San Juan Bautista. With the Americans’ assistance, the Californians tracked the raiders to their camp where, according to participant Zenas Leonard, most of the horses had already been killed and butchered for meat, and only a few women, children, and “old and feeble” Indians remained. Leonard later recalled that the incensed Californians opened fire on them with an artillery piece and, contrary to Governor Figueroa’s instructions that stock-stealing Indians
be taken to the *presidios* for punishment, killed the survivors and cut off their ears “to show the Priests and Alcaldes, that they had used every effort to regain the stolen property.”

Following the end of their rebellion against Spain in 1821, newly-independent Mexico was “born bankrupt” due to the flight of Spanish capital, no longer able to maintain peace with Apache and Comanche bands in the north by offering trade goods and rations for treaty Apaches. During the thirty years of peace established on the northern frontier between the 1790s and the 1820s, Mexico’s north had been rapidly repopulated and its ranching and mining economies developed, with American merchants and mercenaries flocking around the vast copper mine of Santa Rita del Cobre in the New Mexico Territory, many of them having wandered south from Bent’s Fort in Colorado. Now, throughout the 1820s and 1830s northern Mexico was devastated annually by mass incursions of Apaches, Comanches, and various peoples of the southern Plains seeking horses, cattle, captives, and plunder. In New Mexico, Apache raiders returning from Chihuahua and Sonora sold stolen mules to the copper miners for guns, powder, and lead as well as food and whiskey, in express defiance of Mexican contraband laws. As the state governments of Mexico’s north increasingly devolved

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responsibility for recovering stolen stock and captives onto parties of armed citizens bearing licenses from state authorities, the question of what constituted evidentiary pieces to confirm kills of enemy Indians began lurching towards the Anglo-American style of scalp bounties. In 1837, John Johnson, a Kentucky-born naturalized citizen of Moctezuma, Sonora, turned in four scalps of known Apache leaders, with ears attached to fulfill the technicalities of Mexican ear bounties, and asked for compensation. The incident provoked Apache retaliations across the north, not least because Johnson had obtained these scalps by posing as an unlicensed trader and offering dry goods before opening fire on the crowd with an artillery piece stuffed with scrap metal and glass. Mexican authorities were also uncertain as to whether they should encourage armed American adventurers so soon after the secession of Texas, but ultimately rewarded Johnson and his party.325

In August 1837, having gained the approval of the Chihuahuan War Tribunal, a cabal of private citizens in Chihuahua State, comprised of various high members of government and the American and French naturalized citizens who owned Santa Rita del Cobre, proposed in the state newspaper El noticio the first scalp bounty program in Mexican history. In addition to the pre-existing regulated prices paid by ranchers for animals recovered from Indians, volunteer expeditions against the Apaches would receive fixed prices for scalps: $100 for a man’s, $50 for a woman’s, and $25 for “each Indian [captive] under twelve years old.” The owners of Santa Rita proposed the company be led by a security guard for their mule train to Chihuahua City named James Kirker, the sort of sleazy individual too weird to

make up: born in northern Ireland, he had gained American citizenship as a teenager by fighting as a privateer in the War of 1812, left behind a wife and child in New York City to go west as a beaver trapper in the early 1820s, and was one of the Mexican frontier’s most notorious Apache contrabandists. An eastern Indian variously identified as a Shawnee or “Delaware” named Spie-buck or Spybuck, who Kirker had met working as a hunter and trapper at Bent’s Fort, was chosen for his second-in-command, to lead a polyglot company of mercenaries. The law was struck down by the central government in Mexico City in October 1837, who objected on moral grounds and that it would attract armed “foreigners and adventurers,” so the initial outings of Kirker and Spybuck’s company, like those of civilian volunteer parties, aimed to take captives to sell into slavery and livestock to resell, keep, or return to ranchers for recovery fees. The central problem was that Kirker avoided fighting the Apache bands actually at war with the Mexican state, like those of Pisago Cabezón, as they were his contraband partners; instead, Kirker and Spybuck attacked peaceful or neutral Apaches, embroiling the state in wider conflicts.326

In December 1839 the Chihuahuan state threw misgivings to the wind and renegotiated Kirker’s contract. His 250-man army, including a hiring quota of 50 Mexican citizens, would receive daily wages double those of Mexican soldiers and officers, and were guaranteed $50 for each confirmed kill or capture of an Apache male age 14 or up, and $25 for death or capture of women or children under 14. The authorities would accept scalps, with both ears attached, as a pieza, provided they were confirmed by the inspection of a committee of four esteemed residents of Chihuahua City. On 9 January 1840, while the

326 Smith, Borderlander; Babcock, Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172-249; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 157-184; Sweeney, Cochise, 15-58; Jastrzembski, “Treacherous Towns in Mexico”.
Chihuahuan army was conducting peace negotiations with Pisago Cabezón, Kirker, ordered to stay out of the field during peace talks, attacked Pisago’s village in the Chihuahuan mountains, killing 10 warriors and carrying off 20 prisoners and 70-odd head of livestock; in a further defiant flourish, he captured Pisago’s teenage son Janaso Marcelo from Janos for the $50 bounty for male prisoners. Chihuahua’s new governor Francisco García Conde swiftly cancelled his contract, and when the rates were sharply reduced later that year, to $5 for every scalp or prisoner of any age or sex and $2.50 for every recovered mule, Kirker promptly fled Chihuahua. Leaving Mexican citizens to cope with attacks by Apaches he had armed or antagonized, the company dispersed for five years.327

By 1842, Governor Conde had managed to negotiate an incomplete peace with Pisago Cabezón, Ponce, and some other leaders, whose bands received slim, often late weekly rations of corn, sugar, tobacco, and meat. But other Apache bands remained at war with Chihuahua, and both parties continued to raid Sonora, fencing their stolen stock and loot with friendly Chihuahuan towns and settlements, even Janos presidio. Such bilateral agreements between Hispanic towns and Indian raiders had occurred across the north since the 18th century, but in the 1820s and 1830s the Apaches began to warn each other of the possibility of betrayal in what was known as a mescalería: Mexicans showed generous hospitality to Apache guests, plying them with food and liquor, then attacked them with knives and clubs. In some instances, like the killing of four Apaches by a mob at Santa Rita in 1836, civil authorities were openly defied and threatened with violence by citizen vigilantes, an event which seems eerily similar to the vigilante killings in 1763 Pennsylvania. In December 1845

327 Smith, Borderlander; Babcock, Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172-249; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 157-184; Sweeney, Cochise, 15-58; Jastrzembski, “Treacherous Towns in Mexico”.
the state of Chihuahua had contracted Kirker again for his services while opening the $50 bounty on Apache captives or piezas, including scalps, to the general public to wean themselves from their dependency on Kirker. While Kirker was in the field in the summer of 1846, Chihuahuan authorities began peace negotiations with Chiricahua Apache leaders, and in the later recollection of such Chiricahua notables as Mangas Coloradas, Yrigóllen, and Jason Betzinez, those Chiricahuas who went to trade at the Chihuahuan town of Galeana in early July were assured of the protection of a treaty with state authorities. On this point the British traveller George Frederick Ruxton concurred, writing in 1847 that they had come to Galeana to trade “in good faith.” The Galeaños apparently offered the Chiricahuas copious amounts of mescal or whiskey and the mescalería which followed killed 130 Apaches. Kirker was in the area pursuing Apaches who had stolen cattle at nearby Encinillas, but his actual role in the massacre is disputed. Ruxton described him as a co-conspirator or tactician who planned the massacre with the Galeaños, provided the “several kegs of spirits,” directly participated in the riot with his scalp hunters, and then rode into Chihuahua City in triumph bearing scalps on poles. Edwin Sweeney considers Kirker’s provisioning of the liquor “unlikely” but agrees otherwise with Ruxton and contemporary accounts by Chihuahuan officials which implicated Kirker in the massacre.328

Sweeney notes self-justifying statements made by or attributed to Kirker reprinted in the state newspaper El provisional, proclaiming a “kill or be killed” situation where, unless they struck first, they would all “perish at the hands of the ten [Chiricahua] chiefs with their hordes of warriors,” a surety since “more than one hundred times had the Indians been

328 Smith, Borderlander; Babcock, Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172-249; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 157-184; Sweeney, Cochise, 15-58; Jastrzembski, “Treacherous Towns in Mexico”.
treasonous to us.” Kirker’s biographer Ralph Smith is the lone dissenting voice, arguing that most of the killing was done by Galeaños and that Kirker was unable to stop them; “as part of their job,” Kirker and his men subsequently descended like vultures to scalp the Apache dead. The Chiricahuas always denied that they had stolen the cattle from Encinillas, and Galeana further entrenched mutual suspicion between Mexicans and Apaches while moderate leaders were further discredited or alienated. As Lance Blyth writes, while Mexicans considered Apaches as “barbarians” and “savages” whose lives revolved around war and robbery, Apaches came to believe that “all Mexicans in their hearts simply ‘wanted’ to kill Apaches.” Even among other Apaches, the Chiricahuas became particularly implacable; for the rest of the 1840s, observes Sweeney, “every Chiricahua band went to war with Mexico.”

And then, as in 1840, Kirker promptly abandoned Mexico to deal with the revenge attacks he had provoked. Offered a colonelcy in the Mexican army, Kirker deserted to the Doniphan Expedition and the American army. With a $10,000 reward offered by the state of Chihuahua for his death or capture, Kirker’s army now acted as scouts, foragers, and interpreters for Doniphan’s Missouri volunteers and aided in enforcing the occupation code, flogging and hanging Mexican citizens they had been contracted to protect months before. The Mexican population dreaded as the Missourians as “Texans, Yankees, heretics and pirates,” and a recurrent fear that Kirker was passing off Mexican citizens’ hair as Apache resurfaced. It had first appeared in print in 1841 when George Wilkins Kendall, an editor for the New Orleans Picayune and correspondent with the Texan Santa Fé Expedition, cited a

329 Lance R. Blyth, Chiricahua and Janos: Communities of Violence in the Southwestern Borderlands, 1680 – 1880 (University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 152 (“all Mexicans in their hearts”); Smith, Borderlander; Babcock, Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172-249; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 157-184; Sweeney, Cochise, 15-58; Jastrzembski, “Treacherous Towns in Mexico”.
“half-blood Delaware” named Charley Tirrell to the effect that Mexican officers “jealous” of Kirker’s successes against the Apaches had invented a rumour “that [Kirker] was in the practice of bringing in counterfeit scalps,” taken from the “lower order of Mexicans” to “pass off their topknots for those of true Apaches.” In 1846, Mexican popular opinion held that Kirker’s horde would scalp Mexican men and enslave their wives and daughters, branding them with cattle irons. The reality was less dramatic: at war’s end in 1848, Kirker resumed his trade of guns and powder for stolen livestock. As well-armed Southwestern and Southern Plains raiders under increasing pressure from California-bound American migrants inundated the northern frontier in 1848 and 1849, northern Mexican states began contracting American mercenaries as scalp hunters.330

In early May 1849 two former Texas Rangers en route to the California goldfields, Lt.-Col. Michael Hancock Chevallié and Lt. John Joel Glanton, arrived in Chihuahua City leading an armed company and expressed a willingness to kill Indians for money. Striking while the iron was hot, American and Mexican businessmen in Chihuahua City backed the formation of a new scalp-hunter company to be funded by contributions from wealthy citizens. Over the veto of Chihuahua’s Governor Ángel Trias Álvarez, on 25 May 1849 the state congress ratified a new scalp-contracting policy dubbed “the Fifth Law” or “the Kirker bill.” Article 2 of the bill required the governor to contract with national and foreign volunteers to fight “the barbarous Indians,” while Article 5 offered generous terms: $200 for each slain Indian warrior confirmed by evidentiary piezas, $250 for a warrior taken alive, and $150 for a female captive or child of either sex 14 years old or less. On 30 June, after

330 Smith, Borderlander; Babcock, Apache Adaptation to Hispanic Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172-249; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 157-184; Sweeney, Cochise, 15-58; Jastrzembski, “Treacherous Towns in Mexico”.
promoters in Durango had floated the idea of contracting “some skilled foreign riflemen,” particularly “some hundreds of Americans or Irishmen” to fight Indians, Durango passed its own “Kirker law” on 30 June, instructing its governor to contract with “national or foreign partisans” to fight “the barbarous Indians” and pay them $200 apiece for kills or captives. Denounced in the Mexico City press as “blood contracts,” “the vile industry of selling scalps,” *quirquismo*, and an invitation to another American invasion, the federal government’s declaration of the Chihuahuan law as unconstitutional in late July was ignored in the north.\textsuperscript{331}

As Chevallié’s company brought back scalps, prisoners, and livestock from several 1849 expeditions against the Apaches, the floodgates were opened to imitators. Records indicate that the state of Chihuahua alone paid out $17,896 for scalps in 1849, and the implication that scalp-bounty policies were an effective alternative to funding the military spurred the declaration of scalp bounties in Nuevo Leon and Coahuila, and inspired new scalp-hunter companies to seek contracts in the northern states. These included Anglo-American Forty-Niners, Texas Rangers, and naturalized citizens like James Johnson of Moctezuma, as well as the first Mexican companies of scalp-hunters. In 1851, a Comanche “generaless and prophetess” named Tave Peté and her grandsons Bajo el Sol and Magüe became contracted scalp hunters with Chihuahua, agreeing by treaty to stop raiding the state in exchange for hunting Apaches. The scalp bounties levied in Mexico’s northern states against Apaches, Comanches, and the Seri peoples of southwestern Sonora for the rest of the century were collected by companies of other nations as well: Seminoles and Kickapoos

given reservations in Mexico, black ex-slaves who had fled to Mexico seeking emancipation, and Anglo-Americans from across the border. Scalp bounties also inflected wars between indigenous peoples: Akimel and Tohono O’odham, Pueblos, and Rarámuris (Tarahumaras) targeted by Apache and Comanche raids turned in their defeated enemies’ scalps or ears for bounty, while Apaches and Comanches at war with each other did likewise. 332

Among all of Kirker’s successors, Chevallié and Glanton stood apart for their indiscriminate violence. Alfonso Anderson, a self-declared participant in Chevallié’s second 1849 scalphunting expedition, described seeing “a child no higher than his knee killed in cold blood and scalped.” When Chevallié went west to California, where for reasons unknown he reportedly “blew out his own brains” on the road, Glanton succeeded him, leading a mixed Company of Anglo-American Forty-Niners, Mexican citizens, and Native Americans into the field. In 1850 state troops drove the Glanton gang out of Chihuahua after reports that they were killing agriculturalist Indians and mestizos for their scalps. After contracting with Sonora to hunt Apaches at rates of $150 for warriors dead or alive and $100 for female captives or live children under 14, the Glanton gang were driven out of Sonora after rumours of mestizo-scalping surfaced there as well. Continuing on to California, Glanton and his followers seized a ferry at the Yuma Ford at the intersection of the Colorado River and the Gila Trail, and descended into brigandage against Hispanic and Anglo-American travellers.

On the morning of 23 March, 1850, Quechans (or “Yumas”) who the Glanton gang had violently antagonized swept the Crossing in a dawn attack and wiped out the scalphunters.333

Where Mexican scalp bounties had been offered at the state level, Californian scalp bounties were offered by municipalities or wealthy private individuals. As elsewhere, Anglo-American scalp hunters proudly displayed scalps no matter the circumstances of their taking, as the Sacramento Union reported in December 1852 had happened in Yreka. Led by a Benjamin Wright, a party of 18 volunteers had paraded through the streets of Yreka in triumph, each of them carrying an Indian’s bow and arrows “and the muzzle of his gun decorated with a scalp taken from the enemy.” According to General Ethan Hitchcock, they had invited these Indians to a peace conference and then turned on them, and claimed 30 kills to their credit. In 1855, when municipal officials of Shasta City offered $5 for Indians’ heads, one resident claimed to have seen a mule train enter town with each beast burdened by 8 to 12 heads. One California county, notes Lindsay, “paid 50 cents for every Indian scalp and $5 for every Indian head brought in,” perhaps because the latter were surer proofs of death than scalps. In 1859, a community near Marysville paid bounties, collected by public subscription, “for every scalp or some other satisfactory evidence” of an Indian’s death. In 1861, plans were made in Tehama County to raise a fund “to be disbursed in payment of Indian scalps”, and in 1863 the citizens of Honey Lake paid $0.25 per scalp. While, notes Lindsay, a California gold miner made an average of $3 per day, and thus $0.25 to $5 per scalp was a fair amount of money, these rates paled in comparison to the $200 to $250 that Apache scalps brought in contemporary northern Mexico, or the rates of up to $200 that Indian

children fetched in the California slave trade. Some ranchers also hired individuals to patrol their lands and kill Indians on sight, as the *Daily Alta California* reported in 1853: two ranchers in Colusa county, “Messrs. Thomas & Toombe,” having lost $5,000 worth of stock to Indian rustlers, had hired two men “at $8.00 per month to hunt down and kill the Diggers, like other beasts of prey.” Perhaps these low rates simply speak to Californians’ contempt for “Diggers” as easy prey. The prices Frank and Pierce Asbill offered at their Summit Valley ranch for other threats to their livestock are instructive: $5.00 for the scalps of bears or panthers, $1.50 for those of “wildcats” and eagles, $10 for those of coyotes. In other words, the life of a coyote was considered harder to take than the life of a human being.334

Rather than note the challenges endemic Indian-killing raised for the professed benignity of Anglo-Californian society, contemporaries preferred to attribute such actions to unsavory characters unrepresentative of American society as a whole, distanced from the mainstream with racialized epithets like “thug,” “squaw man,” or “white Indian” and regularly described as worse than Indians, reifying Indians as the yardstick of savagery. An example appears in a *San Francisco Bulletin* article of 1859, telling of a party led by John Breckenridge, one of Toombe’s salaried Indian-killers, who had ambushed and slain a party of five Indians and their white leader. The latter was unknown to them but believed to be a member of the “Butte Creek squaw men,” a gang of “some forty or fifty white brutes” who kept Indian women “in a state of concubinage” and armed and protected the Indians “in all

their depredations.” According to the *Bulletin*, Breckenridge scalped him “[a]s a trophy, or sort of remembrance that there was a man so base as to lead on a band of savages to deeds of butchery and theft”. In an 1860 editorial in the New York *Century*, “Indian Butcheries in California,” denouncing the Eureka volunteers’ Humboldt Bay massacre, the editors thundered that “civilized humanity” could “scarcely believe it possible” for white men to be degraded so far below savages” as the “filthy wretches who infect the frontier settlements.” A letter to the *Sacramento Union* from the Mattole region of Humboldt County in 1862, asking for government assistance to protect settlers, noted that while Indians “hovering around the mountains and on the beach” occasionally killed cattle, “we have some among us claiming to be white men who are worse than Indians. Last Monday night one of them set fire to the school house.” As late as 1870, the appearance of Missouri hide-hunters in the Yolla Bolly mountains prompted derision in the press of the “buckskin gentry,” “squatters” and “squaw men.”

A larger proportion of the population took mental refuge in the cognitive dissonances Manifest Destiny permitted, which proclaimed Anglo-Americans’ God-given destiny to scalp and extirpate Indians but, when Anglo-Americans acted upon these beliefs, proclaimed such events as unfortunate accidents or historical processes that went beyond human agency. Governor Burnett, author of the 1850 Act which made massacre, for-profit Indian hunting, and Indian slave labour the norm in the state of California, declared in 1851 that “the inevitable destiny of the race,” i.e., extinction, “is beyond the power or wisdom of man to avert.” Such self-exculpatory thinking also appears in the 1894 memoirs of John Bidwell, an

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influential Anglo-Californian farmer, philanthropist, temperance activist, and Senator who had settled in California in the 1830s. Looking back, he recalled that the term “Digger,” applied on the other side of the Rockies to pedestrian Great Basin peoples, had been brought to California by “specimens of an abandoned class of the mountaineer type of white men” who “seemed to think no more of killing an Indian than shooting a coyote.” He recalled meeting one of these “degraded” individuals who “boasted of the number of Indians he had killed,” tallied with nearly 100 “notches which he cut on his tomahawk handle.” Bidwell, by contrast, avoided bloodying his own hands: as Brendan Lindsay notes in *Murder State*, on one occasion he issued and paid out a private $500 bounty for the scalp of a known Indian stockthief from Mill Creek.  

An officer stationed in northern California’s Humboldt Bay had a fright one night in 1852 when an owl flew into his cabin and landed on his head in the dark. Fresh out of West Point and having heard constant stories of “the treachery and cruelty of the Indians” since leaving New York, George Crook wrote decades later that his younger self “felt the sensation of my scalp leaving my head” at the prick of the owl’s talons. Such preconceived notions began to erode under the observed realities of life in the Humboldt Bay, where he saw the Wiyots, who he called “my first Indians,” attacked by Eureka volunteers. Crook wrote in his memoirs that another local group, the “Bald Mountain Indians,” were in fact “more or less hostile” and “killed a good many whites,” while the Wiyots were in his words “harmless,” “miserable,” “defenseless beings” who probably thought “their very condition would be their safeguard.” Instead, the Eureka vigilantes who sailed out to attack them on the night of 25-26

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February 1860 targeted them for precisely this reason, while convincing themselves that the Wiyots were in collusion with the Bald Mountain tribe to justify massacring them; nor was this injustice isolated to the killers, as Crook noted that local newspapers “lauded” the massacre. Such injustice was endemic to the state of California, as Crook explicated: it was “no unfrequent occurrence” for indigenous men to be shot “in cold blood” or women raped “by some brute.” And as “Such a thing as a white man being punished for outraging an Indian was unheard of,” wars between Indians and settlers were endemic up and down the Pacific coast. Crook sympathized with the Indians: “the outrages of the whites” prompted Indians to either “take the war path or sink all self respect.”

Scalping on the Great Plains: Sand Creek (1864) and Slim Buttes (1876)

An outsider arriving in or passing through the young state of Colorado in 1867 would have noticed a flurry of public interest regarding scalp bounties. A mass meeting in Denver promised $10 for each Arapaho or Cheyenne scalp remitted, while in Central City a gathering of locals raised $5,000 to pay bounties of $20 per scalp, and took out ads in the regional press. On 4 May, another regional Colorado newspaper promised $10 per Indian “crown.” Since the winter of 1864-65, Coloradans and the federal Army had been at war with Cheyennes, Arapahos, and Lakota, with the advantage held by the Indians: federal troops were spread too thin to achieve substantive victories, while the highly-mobile Plains lifestyle meant that Indian raiders and war parties essentially controlled the countryside. As in 18th century Pennsylvania, two of scalping culture’s central narratives, i.e. that Anglo-Americans were the only real victims of frontier warfare and that Indians only understood violence, had

337 George Crook, Martin F. Schmitt ed., General George Crook: His Autobiography (University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 11-16; Brendan C. Lindsay, Murder State: California’s Native American Genocide, 1846-1873 (University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 70-123, 304-312
in a self-confirming way led firebrands to commit a massacre which guaranteed the all-out war they feared. In the case of 1860s Colorado, the Sand Creek massacre of 1864, in which 900 predominantly-Coloradan militia led by Colonel John Chivington launched a surprise attack against a 500-strong village of the Cheyenne and Arapaho accommodationist factions, created a situation of all-out war between southern Plains Indians and the United States. For decades afterwards, Chivington and his defenders clung to two articles of faith to justify this disastrous and counterproductive massacre: that Sand Creek had achieved its aims of intimidating Indians, and that an exponentially increasing number of white settlers’ scalps had been found in the village, proving the wickedness of the people of Sand Creek.338

The details of Sand Creek have been formidably well-documented in Stan Hoig’s *The Sand Creek Massacre* (1961) and Ari Kelman’s *A Misplaced Massacre* (2013) and are only perfunctorily reiterated here; what I focus on is the way in which the question of who scalped who was used by Chivington’s defenders to assign absolute guilt to the Indians and degrees of innocence to the perpetrators. Chivington’s first official report to General Curtis, dated 29 November, crowed of a victory over “[a] Cheyenne village of 130 lodges and 900 to 1,000 warriors strong.” He and his men had killed several chiefs and “between 400 and 500 other Indians,” seizing an equal number of horses and mules, at a cost of “9 killed, 38 wounded. All died nobly.” Clearly, these Indians had deserved their fate: his forces had “found a white man’s scalp, not more than three days’ [sic] old, in one of the lodges.” As the general public

heard the grotesque details of what had been done to the Indians by Chivington’s troops at Sand Creek and as Chivington and his troops came under three separate federal investigations, one military and two congressional, the number of scalps began climbing steadily upwards. Chivington’s report to General Curtis of 16 December, 1864 changed the “one white man’s scalp” of his initial report into “several scalps of white men and women in the Indian lodges” and “articles of clothing belonging to white persons”; he also castigated the whistleblower Captain Silas Soule as an Indian-lover, “more in sympathy with those Indians than with the whites.”339

On the witness stand in January 1865, Chivington’s scalp count leaped upwards again to 19 scalps of white settlers, “one of them still fresh with gore,” and, perhaps meant to retroactively justify their killing of Indian children, “a child captured at the camp ornamented with six white women’s scalps.” On the stand and in their depositions, Chivington’s supporters also claimed to have seen white settlers’ scalps at Sand Creek: “a number of white person’s scalps—men’s women’s and children’s” (Stephen Decatur); “a good many white scalps” (Thaddeus Bell); “one new scalp, a white man’s, and two old ones” (Luther Wilson). While cross-examining Soule, Chivington pushed the principle of reasonable doubt to its logical extreme, pressing Soule’s admission that while he “saw soldiers with children’s scalps during the day,” he “did not see them cut off.” The Indians’ rifle pits hastily dug in the sandbanks with knives or by hand were transformed into evidence of a preexisting conspiracy: like Little Bighorn, Sand Creek was really an ambush, and the half-Cheyenne eyewitness George Bent was really a Confederate agent orchestrating a vast Plains Indian

plot to destroy a new Union state. Nor did Chivington ever recant this position. In 1883, still
imposing at age 62, he travelled from Cincinnati to Denver to give the keynote address for
the 25th anniversary dinner of the Colorado heritage organization “the Pike’s Peak Pioneers
of ’58,” where he fulminated at length on the Indians’ treachery and wickedness, concluding
with “I stand by Sand Creek!” What proof did he have? The “scalps of white men, women,
and children, several of which they had not had time to dry and tan since taken.” Speaking as
though certain that his audience knew exactly what he was alluding to, he asked, “What of
that Indian blanket that was captured, fringed with white women’s scalps?”

The central paradox was that nobody but Chivington or his partisans ever reported
seeing these phantom scalps, and not one of the alleged several dozen was ever brought back
from Sand Creek to Denver. On the other hand, contemporary accounts indicate that the
volunteers had no compunctions about publicly, proudly, and shamelessly displaying dozens
of Cheyenne and Arapaho scalps and other body parts they took as trophies at Sand Creek—
including the genitalia and pubic hair of both men and women—as they rode in triumph
through the streets of Denver upon their return from Sand Creek, even using them as props in
two Denver theatrical productions re-enacting their version of events, one of which was
entitled The Battle of Sand Creek. Over the decades, the Colorado oral tradition embroidered
the spoils supposedly found in the village, as indicated by William Byers, editor of the Rocky
Mountain News, in a published dispute in the New York Tribune with Helen Hunt Jackson,
Indian-policy reform activist and author of A Century of Dishonor (1881). In early 1880,
after Jackson had criticized Colorado’s collective punishment of the White River Utes by

340 Greene, Washita, 1-60; Hoig, The Sand Creek Massacre; entry “Sand Creek” in Wishart, Encyclopedia of
the Great Plains Indians; Kelman, A Misplaced Massacre; Blackhawk et. al., Report of the John Evans Study
Committee, 37-95.
noting that the same principle of collective punishment could be used to hold all white Coloradans responsible for the Sand Creek Massacre, Byers, who in 1864 had described Chivington and his men as having “covered themselves in glory,” fired back. Byers invoked a standard justification for Sand Creek: the killing of ranch foreman Nathan Hungate, his wife, and two young children, whose bodies had been publicly displayed in Denver as in 1750s Pennsylvania and whose killers, later found to be Arapaho raiders with an outstanding grievance against the ranch’s owner, were assumed in 1864 and thereafter to be the very same Cheyennes who had surrendered themselves to Army custody. While Jackson cited the testimonies recorded in the Joint Commission’s official records, Byers went for alternative facts: “scalps of white men” which “had not yet dried,” “an Indian saddle-blanket fringed entirely around the edges with white women’s scalps, with the long, fair hair attached,” and a story of how a white woman’s skin had been found stretched over the pommel of a Cheyenne’s saddle. Given that several eyewitnesses reported the posthumous trophies made of indigenous women’s private parts by the volunteers, Byers’ unsubstantiable story of the flaying of a white woman by the Indians is testament to denial and projection filtered through a bowdlerizing Victorian imagination.341

For Byers and many other Westerners, it was certain that the people of Sand Creek were the “confessed murderers of the Hungate family,” and if Jackson had seen the “cut, mutilated and scalped” bodies of the Hungate family, “the work of those same red fiends who were so justly punished at Sand Creek,” she would change her mind. Other authors piled on: W.B. Vickers, a Coloradan who wrote a history of the state in 1881, justified the 1879 White

River War and the subsequent deportation of Utes from the state by reference to the “Sand Creek fight” which “some” had “called a massacre”: “If so, it was a massacre of assassins, for fresh scalps of white men, women and children” – again, the scalps whose existence was never verified—“were found in the Indian camp after the battle.” The single-longest chapter of J.P. Dunn’s *Massacres of the Mountains* (1886) cited, as proof of Cheyenne guilt, the murder of the Hungates and the supposed presence of a vast haul of white women’s scalps at Sand Creek; he scoffed at “certain Indian-ring gentlemen,” for promulgating the lie “that the Cheyennes were ever friendly to the whites, […] Many well-meaning but poorly-informed people,” a possible allusion to Jackson, “have been drawn into this delusion.” Claiming that “Scalping and mutilation also strike terror to the Indian heart” Dunn also insisted, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, that Sand Creek had halted further warfare: “The Cheyennes and Arapahoes got over into Kansas and Indian Territory as quickly as possible,” – which was true – “and stayed there,” which was decidedly not true. Theodore Roosevelt repeated this line of argument in one of the many attacks on contemporary Indian policy he inserted into his 1900 biography of Thomas Hart Benton, a Missouri politician and major proponent of Manifest Destiny, declaring “the so-called Chivington or Sandy Creek Massacre” as, “in spite of certain most objectionable details, […] as righteous and beneficial a deed as ever took place on the frontier.”

Similar patterns of mind, where implications of scalping or brigandage were used to inflate Indians’ putative guilt while real or imagined hardships on the Anglo-American side

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were used to obscure Indians’ victimization, including scalping by Anglo-Americans, appear in accounts of Slim Buttes, an inglorious skirmish between General Crook and Lakotas in September 1876. In August, attempting to catch up to retreating Lakotas following Little Bighorn, General Crook and 2,200 men had begun pursuit through the Dakota badlands with minimal provisions and gear in unseasonally cold and rainy weather which turned badlands clay into clinging mud. In what became known as the “Horsemeat March,” Crook’s herd of packmules and horses were gradually reduced by lack of forage, exposure, and exhaustion while the troopers, eating half-raw meat from played-out animals, fared little better. By 5 September Crook decided to bivouac for the winter in the new mining towns in the Black Hills, which the Sioux had not yet ceded legally to the United States (and, at the time of this writing, still have not).  

On 7 September Crook had ordered Captain Anson Mills to take 150 men on the strongest remaining horses and head to the Black Hills’ northernmost mining camps to purchase fresh provisions. Unnoticed in the fog and rain, Captain Mills’ scouts stumbled on the morning of the 8th upon a 37-lodge village led by a Lakota named American Horse the Elder, or Iron Plume, nestled on the eastern side of what the Lakotas called Paha Zizipela, translated by the scouts as Slim Buttes. Though they technically enjoyed a four-to-one numerical advantage over their enemies, Crook’s 2,200 men and their remaining horses were so enervated that in their attack on the morning of 9 September they could do no more than

take about 20 prisoners from the village, and hold their ground against a counterattack of 500 Lakotas and Cheyennes from Crazy Horse’s village 20 miles away in the afternoon. And their attack on the village comprised a victory that none of them seemed keen to remember in later years: while most of the residents had fled, about 28 people, very few of them men of fighting age, had been mercilessly besieged when they took shelter in a brushy ravine. The Lakota chief Moses Flying Hawk later observed that “had [the roles] been reversed, [Slim Buttes] would have been called by the whites a terrible massacre.”

Charles Finerty, correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, noted acts of bravery by various troopers in the siege of the ravine, including the “ingenious” stratagem of the scout, Baptiste “Big Bat” Pourier, of using a woman as a human shield (“a captive squaw as a living barricade”) while he scalped a man he had killed “in a manner that displayed perfect workmanship. Scalping is an artistic process, and, when neatly done, may be termed a satanic accomplishment.” Finerty admitted that “the savages acted purely in self defense” in defending their families, but insisted that, “until their cries were heard above the volume of fire,” Crook and his officers did not think women and children were in the gully—which, given Crook’s long history as an Indian-fighter, seems implausible. Finerty’s feelings were

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344 Lakota veterans interviewed in the early 20th century unanimously disagreed that either the elder or younger American Horse was present or died at Slim Buttes, but differed on the identity of the man in the ravine. According to Has Horns, he was a Sans Arc named Iron Shield, a respected man but not a leader—see Richard G. Hardorff ed., Lakota Recollections of the Custer Fight: New Sources of Indian-Military History (Spokane, Washington: the Arthur H. Clark Company, 1991), 151, 161-62 (footnote 9). According to Short Buffalo, the fatally-wounded leader at Slim Buttes was named Iron Plume, and his brother was Charging Bear—Paul D. Riley, “Oglala Sources on the Life of Crazy Horse: Interview Given to Eleanor H. Hinman,” 205, in R. Eli Paul ed., The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877 (University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 180-215. Greene (Slim Buttes, 49, and 159, footnote 61) names him as “the Minneconjou American Horse, also known as Iron Plume, Iron Shield, and Black Shield.” Charging Bear, one of the captives who remained with Crook during the retreat, helped negotiate the surrender at Slim Buttes and later became a corporal in Crook’s scouting division—Greene, Slim Buttes, 77, 168 (footnote 77). Durwood Ball and Paul Andrew Hutton eds., Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier, second edition (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 189-90; Greene ed., Battles and Skirmishes of the Great Sioux War, 96-115.
decidedly mixed: the scene of Slim Buttes, “if properly put on canvas, would […] give the civilized world a faithful picture of the inevitable diabolism of Indian warfare.”345

The newspaper correspondents and the memoirists preferred to focus on moments that could be inflated or reshaped into clear-cut examples of heroism and villainy. The fatally-wounded Minniconjou leader American Horse, who gripped a stick between his teeth to cope with the pain of his fatal abdominal injury and refused the surgeon’s chloroform, was unanimously praised by Finerty, King, Bourke, and other eyewitnesses for his stoicism and “Spartan courage” – that, perhaps, he feared losing consciousness in the Americans’ custody does not seem to have been voiced in writing. Much attention was given to the death of the scout Charles White, a hanger-on of “Buffalo” Bill Cody who bore the nickname “Buffalo Chips” and was one of the only soldiers killed in the siege of the ravine; Finerty, Bourke, King, and others wrote him heroic, melodramatic death scenes. All attempted to distance themselves from the scalping that took place during and after the battle, which Finerty restricted to “a few – a very few – brutalized soldiers.” He claimed that they drew inspiration from a scout named “Ute John” who “scalped all the dead, unknown to the General or any of the officers.” Ute John functioned as something of a scapegoat figure for Finerty, who attributed to him a desire to scalp the slain baby yet noted that American Horse’s death was so noble, “Even Ute John respected the cold clay of the brave Sioux leader and his corpse was not subjected to the scalping process.” Captain Bourke couldn’t resist getting his own licks in even while defending “the much-disparaged” Ute John: noting that while he had a reputation as a rogue who had “murdered his own grandmother and drunk her blood,” this

was “somewhat exaggerated, and he was harmless except when sober, which wasn’t often.”

Charles King, on the other hand, attributed a hunger for scalps to all the “rabid Indians” they had faced both in and out of American Horse’s village, calling them “the Dick Turpins of the Plains”. In a short few sentences written in an 1880 retrospective, he managed to cast aspersions on the Indians who had had the courage to surrender by portraying them as treacherous, filthy, and sadistic:

Here’s one grinning, hand-shaking vagabond with one of Custer’s corporals [sic] uniforms on his back—doubtless that corporal’s scalp is somewhere in the warrior’s possession, but he has the deep sagacity not to boast of it; and no man in his sound senses wants to search the average Indian. They are our prisoners. Were we theirs, by this time we would be nakedly ornamenting a solid stake and broiling to a juicy death to the accompaniment of their exultant howls.

King also made much of the idea that “the skulking rascals” would “come prowling” as soon as the soldiers left to dig up, scalp, and mutilate the three American dead before leaving them “to their four-footed relatives, the prairie wolves” – again, using traditional Savagist language to criminalize and animalize them.

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In possible imitation of Buffalo Bill, “Captain Jack killed and scalped an Indian a mile from the column,” reported Reuben Davenport of the New York Herald of the battle with Crazy Horse’s relief force on the afternoon of the 9th. Crawford, another friend of Bill Cody’s, had succeeded him as the 5th Cavalry’s chief of scouts when Cody, having taken his “first scalp for Custer,” left the service and returned east in August. In his function as correspondent for the Omaha Daily Bee, he told his readers in passing that he had taken “one top-knot” during a fight in which he “came near losing” his own hair. Crawford’s poetry, in 1876 and afterward, wrote of the need to slay Sioux to avenge Custer and Buffalo Chips, but in real life he found the act more morally-troubling than he let on. “He later regretted this bloody deed,” notes his biographer Darlis Miller, “and never spoke of it in his public performances.” Similarly, Batiste Pourier seemed troubled by his scalping of an old Lakota man in the siege of the ravine, which was no secret: an article in The Saturday Review (12 July, 1890) looking at memoirs of the Sioux Wars had noted Finerty’s account of Slim Buttes in War-Path and Bivouac and noted “Mr. Finerty regrets that some of the soldiers scalped the dead. White men have usually been very prone to adopt savage customs.” Donald Brown, a former member of the 5th Cavalry, told historian Eli Ricker in 1907 that “he thinks Bat brought back a scalp” from the gully, but Pourier was conspicuously silent on this point in his two interviews with Ricker in that same year.348

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Chapter Seven: Scalping Culture at Frontier’s End, 1893-1914

It’s true they’ve killed and scalped a sioux,
But they’ve joined a church or twioux
--A bad bit of poetry on the Sioux in the Washington Post, 17 October, 1888

White men seem to have difficulty in realizing that people who live differently from themselves still might be traveling the upward and progressive road of life.
--Luther Standing Bear, 1933

Prologue: The Triumph of Mythology, and the Myth of Triumph

One morning at the World’s Columbian Exposition, popularly known as the Chicago World’s Fair, in September 1893, a group of visitors began speculating aloud on the ethnicity of a Native American man standing outside of a tent. All secure in their assumption that he did not speak English, the debate raged furiously: was Sioux or Cheyenne? Reaching no consensus, the discussion shifted to whether he was “really very ugly,” all involved agreeing he looked quite “savage”; the debaters then fled in terror when he threw what they took for a harvest of scalps at them. The man in question was Antonio Apache, a self-identified grandson or great-grandson of Cochise and assistant to Professor Frederic Ward Putnam, the director of the Fair’s Department of Ethnology and Archaeology, who had hired him after a meeting at the Peabody Museum in December 1892. Among his other duties at the Fair, Putnam had most recently asked him to organize an Indian pageant, which posed an unexpected problem. Antonio had hired 24 Native American men to perform, but as their modern short haircuts—the sort that were now standard-issue at Indian boarding and residential schools, as well as the height of male fashion—made them look too “civilized”

349 Commemorating a deputation of Sioux chiefs to Washington to negotiate the terms of their landholdings under the threat of further amendments (the General Amendment Act, aka the Dawes Act). Cited in Utley, The Lance and the Shield, 275.
350 In Luther Standing Bear, Land of the Spotted Eagle (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1978 [1933]), xxi.
and therefore inauthentic, he had purchased an assortment of long-haired black wigs for them. Furious at the tourists’ insults and condescension, Antonio turned into his tent and scooped up an armload of long-haired black wigs. Whether he was throwing the wigs away or throwing them deliberately at the tourists is unclear, but the fairgoers shrieked and fled regardless.\footnote{Melissa Rinehart, “To Hell with the Wigs! Native American Representation and Resistance at the World’s Columbian Exposition,” 403, 405-06, 429, in The American Indian Quarterly Volume 36, Number 4 (Fall 2012) 403-442; David L. Browman and Stephen Williams, Anthropology at Harvard: A Biographical History, 1790-1940 (Cambridge: Peabody Museum Press, 2013), 250-53; Nancy J. Parezo and Don D. Fowler, Anthropology Goes to the Fair: The 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 1-163.}

At least, so said Teresa Dean in a Chicago Daily Tribune article, “Antonio Has Fun with a Choice Set of Wigs.” Such an encounter between the traditional horror-imagery of Indian warfare and the smug complacency of jaded dilettantes does sound like the sort of story which captured the spoken and unspoken contradictions and ironies of a World’s Fair, particularly what the Anglo-American public liked to imagine as the collision of America’s frontier past, embodied by the Indians, with its modern and industrial present, while more progressive readers could enjoy a self-satisfactory chuckle at an educated, modernized Apache getting the better of bigots. But questions of wigs and authenticity would come back to haunt Antonio Apache, whose life upon closer inspection contained some contradictions of its own. After acting as a promoter and recruiter for the Carlisle Indian Industrial School throughout the 1890s, in January 1901 the Carlisle school newspaper ran a disclaimer stating “We are credibly informed that the man calling himself Antonio Apache is not Indian; that he wears a wig of straight stiff, black hair; that the real hair when permitted to grow is curly.” Mary Cota Weed, a Native American woman he married in 1919, filed for an annulment on grounds of fraud less than a year later, echoing the 1907 allegations of Western artists.
William Cary and Edwin Deming: Antonio was really Tony Simpson, a Southerner of African and European ancestry. Like Warner McCary and Sylvester Long, also Southerners who had escaped “the stigma of blackness” in the Jim Crow era by passing as Native Americans and entering the entertainment industry as, respectively, the Choctaw chief’s son Okah Tubbee and the Blackfoot chief’s son Chief Buffalo Child Long Lance, Tony Simpson had apparently become an Apache via a shaven head and an assortment of wigs. “He wore a wig of straight black hair plastered close to the scalp,” reads a handwritten note discovered by historian Kathleen Howard in the archives of Los Angeles’ Southwest Museum; the note goes on to state that Deming “once saw him with his wig off.”

That the self-appointed experts of Indian authenticity had been taken in by a confidence man with a shaven scalp is fitting per Melissa Rinehart’s description of the World’s Fairs as “essentially contradictory sites in a colossal heterotopia” where ironies “abounded.” And such ironies as the demand to find “authentic” long-haired indigenous men in the assimilation-focused Allotment era (1886-1933), which stigmatized and all but outlawed such long hair, were products or reflections of the unspoken anxieties regarding the closing of the frontier that freighted the minds of American visitors to the World’s Fairs. To

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352 Rinehart, “To Hell With the Wigs!”; Browman and Williams, Anthropology at Harvard, 250-53. Born in North Carolina, Sylvester Long was of partially indigenous (Croatan) descent; after learning some Cherokee from performers in a Wild West show he enrolled at Carlisle as a Cherokee. After being adopted by the Blood subgroup of the Blackfoot Confederacy in 1922 he identified as a Blackfoot, writing a fictitious autobiography describing his Blackfoot childhood in 1927—see Donald B. Smith, “Long Lance, Buffalo Child” (1991), in William S. Powell ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography (University of North Carolina Press, 1979-1996). Okah Tubbee, aka Warner McCary, a former slave from Natchez, Mississippi, was possibly of partial indigenous ancestry, but in all probability not the son of prominent Choctaw chief and cattleman Mushulatubbee as he claimed in his autobiography, as “It stands to reason that a man of such prominence would have complained, petitioned, or at least alerted someone that his cherished young son had been kidnapped” (22). While McCary / Okah Tubbee’s authenticity was periodically questioned, that of his wife, a white Mormon named Lucy Stanton who presented herself as a Mohawk / Delaware chief’s daughter named Laah Ceil, rarely if ever was—pointing to the ways “in which “white Indians” are more readily accepted than “black Indians,” even among modern scholars.” See Angela Pulley Hudson, Real Native Genius: How an Ex-Slave and a White Mormon Became Famous Indians (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 1-42, 171-75 (172: “stigma of blackness”, 175: “white Indians”).
be clear, when I discuss “the frontier” in this chapter, I don’t mean the historic zones of contested control between expansionist Euro-American empires and colonies and as-yet unconquered indigenous peoples and polities, but the fantasy of benevolent assimilation and benign, unavoidable ethnic cleaning that in Anglo-America frontier culture was known as Manifest Destiny. In the frontiers of actual history, indigenous communities formed friendly and hostile relationships with individual members or groups of polyglot, polyethnic male sojourners, predominantly but not exclusively Euro-American, such as fur traders, garrison troops, explorers, merchants, and missionaries, as well as small communities of religious minorities, fugitives, contrabandists, squatters, and so on. Eventually, a creeping tide of Anglo-American settlers had disrupted these previous relationships, displaced indigenous peoples from their lands and resources, and replaced older forms of racialized violence like scalp hunting and slavery with new forms of racialized legislative violence such as reservation pass certificates and rations, blood quantum, and selectively-applied laws. Yet North American settler societies defined themselves and their local histories by the deployment, borrowing, and appropriation of their versions of indigenous foods, symbols, placenames, and so on. Both at the grassroots and at the governmental level, belief in the mythology of Manifest Destiny meant minimizing or explaining-away ongoing indigenous presence by insisting on a rigid definition of “authenticity” which went beyond ancestry and phenotype. Simply put, “Indians” and “modernity” were incompatible, and Manifest Destiny’s success was supposed to mean that Indians vanished—but to prove Manifest Destiny’s success, one required Indians.353

This essentialized late-19th-century version of the past, which contrasted an Anglo-American society which had always been technologically-advanced and morally superior vis-à-vis Indians who had always been primitive and culturally inferior, served in part as a charter myth of American history, particularly in terms of the frontier violence which, whether implicitly or explicitly, was both omnipresent and sanitized. Through the old reverse-colonial scenarios of the burning cabin and the wagon-train raid staged in Wild West shows, fin-de-siècle Anglo-Americans could remind themselves of their past victories; by seeing their defeated enemies engaged in handicrafts at World’s Fairs, they could reassure themselves of their benevolence in civilizing such benighted folk. There was a precedent in putting figures like Sitting Bull and Geronimo on display, dating back at least to the Removal era of the 1830s. In 1834, Black Hawk, the Sauk leader of 1833’s Black Hawk War, was taken on a tour of the eastern cities, culminating in New York, where a balloonist named Mr. Durant proclaimed, literally from on high, a valedictory ode hailing Black Hawk for having “fought for Independence” and “struck for Freedom” with “a few unconquered souls.” What this was all about was perhaps more plainly illustrated in a photograph of Sitting Bull and Buffalo Bill shaking hands; taken in Montreal during the Lakota celebrity’s tour with Cody’s Wild West show in 1885, it was widely reprinted on posters with the caption “Foes in ’76, Friends in ’85.”

As Patrick Wolfe has observed, the settler-colonial desire to seek some kind of absolution from people they had displaced and killed is inextricable from a desire to nominate themselves as legitimate inheritors of that land. As the actual “frontier” era of

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contested control by unconquered peoples ended, it was assumed that these fictions of the past could go unchallenged. But there was a fly in the ointment: indigenous peoples not only continued to exist, but continued to offer their own interpretations of past and present while exploiting Manifest Destiny for fun and profit. As Gerald Vizenor writes, the “simulations of dominance” with which Anglo-Americans fantasized about indigenous peoples, including the “bankable simulation” of that “occidental invention,” the “Indian,” could be opposed or even “ousted” by alternative narratives of “survivance”: the continuation of indigenous identities and ontologies grounded in culturally- and historically-specific traditions.\footnote{Paige Raibmon, \textit{Authentic Indians: Episodes of Encounter from the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast} (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 1-14, 198-207; Paige Raibmon, “Theatres of Contact: The Kwakẉaḳẉa̱kẉ meet Colonialism in British Columbia and at the Chicago World’s Fair,” in \textit{The Canadian Historical Review} 81:2 (University of Toronto Press, June 2000), 157-190; Slotkin, \textit{Gunfighter Nation}, ; Gerald Vizenor, \textit{Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance} (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999 [1994]), 1-44; Deloria, \textit{Indians in Unexpected Places}, 3-14, 52-108.}

The contrast between such expectations and realities appears in Seattle’s 1909’s Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, as residents of the largest city of the final northwestern frontier trumpeted their status as “Queen City of the Pacific.” A collage of indigenous imagery abstracted from its contexts included Edwin S. Curtis’ photographs of modern Native Americans shepherded into “authenticity” via his trunks of buckskins, headdresses and props; ubiquitous Pacific Northwest woodcarvings, including the amusement strip’s South Gate combination of two totem poles propping up a \textit{Tori} arch as an example of “Jap-Alaskan” architecture; and live human exhibitions including schoolchildren from the Tulalip Reservation north of Seattle, a small number of Inuit and a large number of Siberians performing handicrafts in a plaster “Eskimo Village”; and a Wild West show of stagecoach-fight re-enactments by Lakota, Arapaho, and Cheyenne horsemen. In case the connection
was incomplete, the Government Building’s Dead Letter department was, in perhaps someone’s idea of a sick joke, turned into a display area for dried scalps.356

That the Fair’s organizers and spectators had less absolute claim over indigenous peoples than they imagined is illustrated by the complicated participation of Nancy Columbia, a 16-year-old Labrador Inuit performer who spoke publicly against management’s ignoring of Inuit contributions to Arctic exploration. Nancy, who won the Seattle Exposition’s Queen of the Carnival beauty contest, had been born at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893, educated at a boarding school in Coney Island and apparently her English bore a New York accent. On the other side of the fairground, twenty-three of thirty Ghost Dancers held at Fort Sheridan north of Chicago had been paroled into Buffalo Bill Cody’s custody for his 1893 Rough Riders of the World season, and many of his troupe of almost 200 Indians had signed on to travel, earn wages, and escape the constant scrutiny of Indian agents on Pine Ridge and other reservations. During the 1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis, not only did significant numbers of Native Americans participate in order to sell artwork and handicrafts, but significant numbers paid their entry fees and attended as spectators, meaning that Indians were paying to look at other Indians. Most conspicuous were the Osages from Oklahoma, whose oil money meant that they were both the most well-dressed Indian attendees and the most lavish purchasers of Native American art—leading to more than a few discontented grumblings, prefiguring the casino debate, about Indians with money.357

This chapter will investigate these settler anxieties of past triumphs and an uncertain, post-frontier future with a more granular focus on two specific case studies in eccentric chronological order: the participation of the Apache leader Goyathlay or Goyaalé, better known as Geronimo, in the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of St. Louis, Missouri in 1904, and the participation of Buffalo Bill Cody and Rain-in-the-Face in the World’s Columbian Exposition of Chicago in 1893 – abbreviated at times throughout the text as “St. Louis World’s Fair” or “Chicago World’s Fair.” In all cases, the question of who had scalped who before the closing of the frontier, which was in strict chronological terms not that far distant but in symbolic terms now part of a past epoch, were inseparable from these three old men’s public appearances. Of course, their public reputations, within which the who-scaled-who question was integral, were the whole reason they had been asked to participate in these festivals of curated American history. All three, who were getting on in years, were also engaged in acts of self-representation and management of their reputations, for which participation in the World’s Fairs offered something more than just financial compensation.

“no trouble with the cowboys”: Geronimo, Roosevelt, and St. Louis, 1904-06

News that Geronimo would be at the St. Louis World’s Fair in 1904 doubtless caused the public much nervous excitement and consternation. Geronimo had gained a reputation in Mexico and the United States as the hardest and most vindictive leader of reservation “breakouts” from the San Carlos and Turkey Creek communities of the Fort Apache reservation in 1878-79, 1881-84, and 1885-86, and a grisly mythology had coagulated around him. Rumours had circulated in the American press during the summer of 1900 that the restless old war leader, who the Salt Lake Herald called “one of the most bloodthirsty Indians that ever figured in history,” had gone insane in captivity—though an officer from Fort Sill,
quoted in the New York Herald, suggested “that he is planning to fool his guards and escape.” In 1901, the newspapers again were reprinting rumours about Geronimo, this time regarding his supposedly extensive scalp collection. Stories from the Kansas City Journal reprinted in Pennsylvania and Ohio claimed that Geronimo’s buckskin coat, with “more than forty scalps” “dangling from the shoulders,” had been sold for $500 by “a collector of Indian curios” in San Francisco, or stolen from the collector. The Davenport Daily Republican of Iowa said Geronimo had woven his scalps into a mat upon which he “plant[ed] his feet” every morning. When N.F. Shabert, an Oklahoma businessman who lived near Fort Sill, recommended Geronimo’s participation at the St. Louis Fair to Samuel M. McCowan, superintendent of the Chilocco Academy Indian school in Oklahoma and administrator of the St. Louis Fair’s model-Indian school, he touted Geronimo as having “between eighty-five and one hundred white scalps to the credit of his savagery; also a vest made of the hair of the whites whom he has killed.”

McCowan’s initially considered Geronimo unsavory, and when he insisted on a salary for appearing at the Fair, McCowan called him a “blatant blackguard, living on a false reputation.” But when Geronimo agreed to attend the St. Louis Fair without salary, McCowan began to reconsider his opinion of a man often referred to as a “human tiger” and “the worst Indian who ever lived.” Marshall Everett, author of a popular exposition guidebook, promised the presence of “The Red Devil” Geronimo, “whose presence made every white settler tremble with fear, as his extreme cruelty was dreaded.” Ticketholders

awaiting a terrible brigand chieftain didn’t quite know what to make of the old man who crossed the fairgrounds in a suit. Unstooped from age and still energetic at 75, his skin deeply creased from a lifetime of desert sun and wind, Geronimo appeared every morning at 9 in the Indian School building to carve souvenirs, namely canes and bows and arrows, to sell alongside his portrait photographs and autographs. He refrained from maiming or killing rude tourists who insulted his “feeble” appearance, who asked for war-whoops, or tried to cut off locks of his hair, instead holding a taciturn silence which prompted one reporter to declare that “the wild Indian has always been overestimated” and “those lofty and laconic speeches […] in those Canonicus, Uncas, and Powhatan stories” had to be nothing but lies: “Geronimo never perpetrated an epigram.” Grasping at straws, reporters claimed the Apache songs he sang while playing his violin were war chants, and that his Western clothing was due to government orders forbidding him “to wear his regalia on account of the bad effect it has on his emotions.” 359

Goyaałé’s lack of subversiveness was, in itself, deeply subversive. Now a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, he said “God bless you” when parting ways and publicly took off his hat for “The Star Spangled Banner,” a scene which impressed a New York Times reporter who wrote of “this old warrior, standing in the rays of the setting sun […] in silent salute to the flag he so long defied.” Nor could the national press resist the human-interest element of his public reunion with his teenage daughter Lenna, who he had not seen since her birth in 1886. “[S]aid to be one of the most cruel and heartless of the chiefs who fought the whites, […] tears coursed down his wrinkled cheeks, and the broken old warrior seemed

359 Utley, Geronimo; Clements, Imagining Geronimo; Sweeney, From Cochise to Geronimo; Parezo and Fowler, Anthropology Goes to the Fair, 1-163 (114: “lofty and laconic speeches”).
entirely overcome with [...] joy,” wrote the Arizona Republican: “The long record of his prowess in many wars and the story of his cruelty were all forgotten by those who saw the old soldier weep with joy at the sight of the daughter he had not seen since she was a baby.”

On the surface, there is nothing unusual or surprising about the joy of a 75-year-old man, who had seen many members of his family die violently, at being reunited with one of his children. But in his deliberate and conspicuous shows of his newfound Americanness, Goyaałé had launched his final campaign: the war for his public image.360

At age 14, Goyaałé already went by the name Geronimo, at least among Hispanics, as evidenced by his appearance under that name on the ration rolls of Corralitos, a mining town near Janos presidio, dated 13 August 1843. Warfare between Mexicans and Apachería continued into the first decade of the 20th century, and on 20 January 1851, the Chiricahuas won the largest Apache victory over Mexican forces in history. At Pozo Hediondo in Sonora state, 26 of 100 Sonoran troops, including the state’s military commander, were killed and 46 seriously wounded by 150 Apaches led by a who’s who of Chiricahua leadership: Mangas Coloradas, Cochise, Juh, Miguel Narbona, and Geronimo, then 22 years old and a father of three. A month later, they rode to Janos in Chihuahua state to sound out the local authorities regarding the possibility of peace talks and, in time-honoured fashion, to fence their Sonoran loot to the merchants of Janos. After the commander’s saddle was recognized, his successor Col. José María Carrasco hastily gathered his forces, crossed the state line into Chihuahua, encircled the encamped Apaches near Janos while the men were absent, and attacked. “[M]y

360 Utley, Geronimo; Clements, Imagining Geronimo; Sweeney, From Cochise to Geronimo; Parezo and Fowler, Anthropology Goes to the Fair, 1-163.
aged mother, my young wife, and my three small children were among the slain,” said Geronimo in his autobiography fifty years later; “I had lost all.”

At some point during his period of mourning and the retaliatory raids he led, Geronimo perceived himself, and was perceived by other Chiricahuas, as having become a diyin, a person gifted with other-than-human power. Many diyin were healers, and one manifestation of Geronimo’s personal power was a well-known skill in healing battlefield wounds and extracting bullets and arrowheads. But his unyielding and unforgiving qualities, galvanized by the events of 1851, were also manifested as Enemies-Against Power, whose possessors were exceptional in raiding and war, and shared their gift with others by manufacturing blessed shields and protective amulets for adult warriors, and the sacred objects born by adolescents during their war apprenticeship. Even among diyin with Enemies-Against Power, Geronimo seems to have stood out; during a raid, one of his followers later claimed that he had on one occasion used his Power to hold back the sunrise for two or three hours. Yet the warfare activities of all Apaches, whether possessors of Enemies-Against Power or not, were also hemmed in by a complex array of prohibitions regarding death and the possessions of the dead, which were believed to cause debilitating or fatal illnesses collectively known as “ghost sickness.” Paradoxically, this meant that a people

361 This ordering of events is conspicuously at odds with Geronimo’s sequence of events: that the massacre of his and other Bedonkohes’ families at “Kas-Ki-Yeh” preceded a retaliatory victory at Pozo Hediondo. See below, and S.M. Barrett, Frederick W. Turner III eds., *Geronimo: His Own Story* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971 [1970, 1906]), 87-95. Andrés Reséndez, *The Other Slavery*, 230-37, 395 n. 28: “Geronimo’s own account is demonstrably inaccurate and needs to be used with caution.”; Sweeney, *Cochise*, ; Robert M. Utley, *Geronimo*, 23-29; Sweeney, *Cochise*, notes that in 1863 in Chihuahua Cojinillín, a leader of the Carrizaleño band of the Nednhi Apaches, was killed by Joaquin Terrazas and his volunteers for a 500 peso bounty on his scalp (212) and points out an incident in 1871 where a Tohono O’odham (Papago) war party slew five or six Apaches and turned in their paired ears—not their scalps—for the bounty (323). As late as the aftermath of October 1880’s Tres Castillos Massacre, according to Asa Daklugie, over 90 Apache women and children were marched south by their Mexican captors to be sold into slavery in Chihuahua—see Eve Ball, *Indeh: An Apache Odyssey*, 78-84.
that Mexicans and Anglo-Americans considered a barbarian horde of scalp-takers were the most reluctant scalp-takers in the Southwest, far more so than the mercenaries who hunted Apaches for theirs. As Apaches also believed that anything but total abstinence would make members of war parties sluggish and doom their martial efforts, the endemic rapes of Euro-American women attributed to savage Apaches by Hispanic and Anglo-American writers appear to also have been groundless, as were previous and similar accusations in eastern North America (see Chapters 3 and 4).\textsuperscript{362}

While the Comanches to the east took scalps as secular trophies and agricultural peoples to the west curated enemy scalps for rain-making and warfare purposes, Apache rites regarding scalps and scalping were almost perfunctory in comparison. Two of Grenville Goodwin’s informants in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century drew a connection between scalping and Enemies-Against Power, noting that a warrior looking to cultivate this power might perform the scalping, and that someone already possessing Enemies-Against Power might whisper words to the scalp to weaken the enemy’s people, such as Americans, Mexicans, Navajos, or other foes, before hanging it high in a tree where coyotes couldn’t reach it. This was pointedly restricted to external enemies, as Apaches never scalped each other in feuds between bands. When in hostile territory, one scalp, physically distanced from the warriors by being placed on the end of a pole, was sufficient for a scalp dance and then disposed of immediately afterwards. Major John Cremony, an officer during the 1860s Apache wars,

characterized the scalp dances of the Apaches as “strictly religious” against the “grand rejoicing, a triumphal jubilee” of other western Indians. The same was true for an enemy prisoner back to a village for a slain kinsman’s sister or close maternal cousin to deliver the killing blow; his scalp might be danced with after his death, but only briefly, and disposed of immediately. “No Apache would keep them,” noted Geronimo in 1906, “for they are considered defiling.” Needless to say, Geronimo’s putative overcoat or floormat of scalps were ruled out by the reality of Apache warfare and religious beliefs.

As American settlers, ranchers, miners, and soldiers entered the Arizona and New Mexico Territories in the later 1850s, tensions grew between Anglo-Americans and Apaches. War broke out between the Chiricahuas and the United States two months before the outbreak of the Civil War in the “Bascom Affair” between First Lieutenant George Bascom and Cochise at Apache Pass in February 1861. During the Confederate occupation of Arizona Territory from 1861 to spring 1862, exterminationist sentiments towards Apaches became bipartisan. Lieutenant-Colonel John Robert Baylor, a Confederate Texan of Kentuckian origin, ordered one subordinate, Captain Mastin, to “kill [Apaches] anyway he could; and did not care whether he made them drunk, poisoned them, or shot them on sight.” Three months before Confederate forces retreated from the Territory, in March 1862, Baylor chastised the commander of the Arizona Guards at Pinos Altos for reportedly pursing peace talks with an Apache band. Declaring them “cursed pests who have already murdered over 100 men in this Territory,” he instead ordered him to lure the Apaches “or any tribe” into ambush under the

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guise of peace talks, to “kill all the grown Indians” and sell their children into slavery “to defray the expense of killing the Indians.” The Union forces who retook Arizona after the Confederate retreat in 1862 also thought in extirpationist terms: Brigadier-General James Carleton gave orders in October 1862 to reject all flags of truce and kill all male Apaches capable of bearing arms.\textsuperscript{364}

In January 1863, the 70-year-old Chiricahua leader Mangas Coloradas was taken prisoner during parley with the Army on orders of Brigadier-General Joseph West, who instructed his soldiers to present Mangas Coloradas “dead or alive” the next morning. Tortured with hot bayonets in full view of other Apache captives that night, Mangas Coloradas was shot “while trying to escape.” After his death, one soldier scalped him, perhaps for a rumoured hefty bounty being offered on the Mexican side of the border, while others cut off and boiled his head to send east to the Smithsonian. Asa Daklugie, Juh’s son and Geronimo’s nephew, told oral historian Eve Ball in the 1940s that while the betrayal and murder of Mangas Coloradas was bad enough, the Apaches considered his posthumous decapitation as “much worse,” as it doomed him to be “forever headless” in the next world. Carleton’s plan of spring 1864 “to hunt and destroy all but the women and children” met with popular approval in the territories; Secretary of Arizona Territory Richard McCormick summed up popular opinion as “[in] favour of an utter extermination of the ruthless savages.” An 1864 editorial in the \textit{Arizona Miner} of Prescott stated this explicitly: the only solution to conflict between settlers and Apaches was “to exterminate nearly if not the whole race of savages… and the sooner this is accomplished the better for the whole country.”\textsuperscript{365}

\textsuperscript{364} Sweeney, \textit{Chochise}, 187 (“kill them anyway he could”), 195 (“kill all the grown Indians”), 203-04.
Whether raiding to steal livestock or in revenge for a relative’s death, the whole purpose of Apache raids was to strike and retreat, which precluded lingering to perform the inventive tortures which Arizona and New Mexican territorial newspapers constantly reported. “[I]f an Indian scalps an American soldier, outrages and then burns at the stake an American woman, or brains an American baby,” stated an editorial in the Miner, the government will “give him some beads and a new scalping knife, and let him go.” In 1871 Arizona residents sent a memorial to Congress tallying 178 whites killed by Apaches in Arizona Territory in the past two years. Tellingly, as Clare McKanna notes, of these 178 documented killings only eight were listed as mutilated, though the report tried to compensate for this by dwelling in great detail on the details of the mutilations (e.g., “scalped,” “partially burned,” “all mutilated in a horrible manner”). Daklugie, observing that post-mortem mutilations were regularly confused by American settlers for marks of torture, noted to Eve Ball “And then there are these many stories of torture and mutilation. Well, some of the torture stories are true, but they were done in retaliation for worse crimes.”

Apaches had a long list of grievances of their own to point to. Mixing dry goods with strychnine, a poison used to kill wolves and other animals, was a widespread practice in the West, and in 1864 a prospector named King Woolsey sold some Apaches piñole mixed with strychnine. In 1866, after a proposition for Apache scalp bounties was narrowly defeated in the Arizona Territory’s legislative assembly, a public gathering in Prescott raised a fund by voluntary subscription to hire thirty “Rangers” for ninety days, to take and deliver “bounty pieces.” In 1871, a mob from Tucson of 40 Anglo-American and Hispanic citizens and 100


366 Sweeney, Cochise, 220; Ball, Indeh: An Apache Odyssey, 83; McKanna, Jr., Homicide, Race, and Justice in the American West, 1880-1920, 117-154.
Tohono O’odham descended upon Apaches encamped near Fort Grant and killed and scalped 85 people in a single day—a number equal to almost half of that 1871’s memorandum’s 178 total casualties. Very few of the victims were men of fighting age, and none of the killers were found guilty by an Arizona jury. In an 1883 report to the Adjutant General’s office, General George Crook, then head of the Arizona Department, explained to his superiors that “public sentiment in frontier communities does not consider the malicious killing of an Indian, murder, nor the most unblushing plundering, theft.” The same was true in the territorial press: Arizona newspapers disseminated “all sorts of exaggerations and falsehoods” about Apaches, “while the Indian’s side of the case is rarely ever heard.”

Apache horror stories about Americans expressed their bewilderment regarding these uncanny, “strange people,” who “respected nothing and nobody.” Both Daklugie and Big Mouth, a Mescalero scout for the Army in the 1880s, told of a terrible incident that happened during the Mescaleros’ confinement near Fort Stanton: “a drunken soldier,” in Big Mouth’s words, killed an Apache baby by “dashing its head against a wagon wheel. He said, “Nits make lice”,” said Daklugie. Big Mouth also heard this story, and told another of a Mescalero warrior, who believed he was travelling under protection to Fort Stanton, being betrayed like Mangas Coloradas and killed; the soldiers were butchering hogs, and the Mescalero was thrown into the “big kettle of boiling water” they were using to scald the hog carcasses. He also remembered that Mescalero mothers silenced crying children by warning that the soldiers would overhear, find them, and kill them. “They hunted us through the forests – our own forests – like wild animals,” added Big Mouth. “And they spared nobody.”

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back from the 1940s, Asa Daklugie also connected dehumanization and hunting: “Both in this country and in Mexico, a bounty was offered for Apache scalps, just as there is today for those of some animals. And it was collected, too.”

In the recollections of Charlie Smith, child of a Chiricahua Army scout and a Mescalero mother, Geronimo only recrossed the American border “to get ammunition. I do not think that he wanted to kill, but there were cases where he had no choice.” Smith was four or five years old in 1885 when his mother and some other Mescalero women, gathering piñon nuts in the mountains off-reservation, were impressed into Geronimo’s band, and he had inescapable memories of what happened on these cross-border forays:

If [Geronimo] were seen by a civilian, it meant that he would be reported to the military and they’d be after us. So there was nothing to do but kill the civilian and his entire family. […] I do not like to talk of it. I do not like to think of it. But the soldiers killed our women and children, too. Don’t forget that.

By the 1880s, Geronimo and his small group of followers became automatically responsible in the public mind for any act of homicide that occurred in the Territories if he was off-reservation at the time, particularly those committed or believed to have been committed by Apaches. By the time of his surrender to Lieutenant Charles Gatewood in 1886, the press had laid at his feet responsibility for around 400 murders, with particular weight placed on home invasions like the “Peck Ranch massacre” of late April 1886. Geronimo’s followers had killed a rancher’s hired man, baby, and pregnant wife and taken his 10-year-old niece hostage, but spared his life for unclear reasons. Geronimo had addressed the rancher, who

368 Ball, *Indeh*, 78-84 (Daklugie), 200-01 (Charlie Smith). Asked by Ball sometime after 1944 whether he thought “it was the intention of the white race to inflict genocide upon the Indians?” and being given a definition of genocide as “The intention of one race to exterminate another,” Daklugie replied, “I never heard the word before, but I am thoroughly familiar with its practice.”

sported red rolled-up sleeves from his undershirt, as “Mangas Coloradas” (coloured sleeves), and Clements suggests nostalgia for his slain relative as moving him to uncharacteristic pity. But according to stories reprinted in Maryland, Illinois, and Colorado, Artisan Peck had been tied up and made to watch his wife “outraged and killed” or subjected to “indescribable tortures” by the Apaches, driving him temporarily insane and inducing the superstitious Apaches, who considered his madness as a danger to them or as a sign of divine favour, to spare his life.370

Across the border in Mexico, bounties on Apache scalps were offered until 1891, but a public perception that the government was either unable or unwilling to protect them from the Apaches prompted, within months of Geronimo’s final breakout in May 1885, the reinstatement of scalp bounties in some counties in Arizona. A story reprinted in the New York Times in October 1885 reported that armed bodies of ranchers and cowboys were forming up for “a real old-fashioned Indian hunt” in Cochise, Pima, and Yavapai counties, having “brought to light an old law” offering a $250 reward for each Apache scalp. Tombstone, the center of Cochise county, had offered to double that reward to $500 for every “buck Indian” scalp, which Pima and Yavapai would match; reportedly, the counties of Yuma, Apache, and Maricopa intended to follow suit. “This reward system, while it may seem savage and brutal to the Northern and Eastern sentimentalist,” the writer continued, was considered the Arizona settler’s only means “of ridding Arizona of the murderous Apaches.”

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370 Utley, Geronimo, 196-98; Clements, Imagining Geronimo, 62-67; Sweeney, From Cochise to Geronimo, 537-38.
Benjamin Madley writes that these were probably the last publicly-offered scalp bounties in United States history.\footnote{\textit{Money for Indian Scalps: Arizona and New-Mexico settlers propose to destroy the savages. –Deming, New-Mexico, October 11,” in the \textit{New York Times}, 12 October, 1885; Madley, “Reexamining the American Genocide Debate,” 117.}

By the time he appeared at the 1904 World’s Fair, Goyaale / Geronimo was well aware that many members of the American public viewed him with considerable distaste – as did many Chiricahuas, who were collectively punished after his 1886 surrender with exile, first to Florida and then to Oklahoma. In 1905, after a controversial public appearance riding in Theodore Roosevelt’s inaugural parade alongside five other famous Native American leaders, his personal entreaty to the president to allow himself and his people to return to Arizona was rebuffed. The decision to publish his autobiography came in the summer of 1905, after Geronimo’s return from the Roosevelt inauguration, and required the permission and final approval of the War Department; his nephew Asa Daklugie, now a Carlisle alumnus, served as translator for the passages Geronimo composed ahead of time and recited as monologues to S.M. Barrett, a friend and superintendent of schools in nearby Lawton, Oklahoma. From his first chapter to the last, Geronimo’s ultimate goal was an appeal to allow himself and his people’s return to their homeland in Arizona. Of course, this would require winning over President Roosevelt, a man who once likened indigenous land claims to those of “every white hunter, squatter, horse thief or wandering cattleman” and as having no basis beyond “having butchered the previous inhabitants.”\footnote{Barrett, \textit{Geronimo: His Own Story}; Utley, \textit{Geronimo}, 258-61. On Roosevelt’s views on Native Americans, see Theodore Roosevelt, \textit{Thomas Hart Benton}, 211-12; Thomas G. Dyer, \textit{Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race} (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 79-81, and Roger L. Di Silvestro, \textit{Theodore Roosevelt in the Badlands: A Young Politician’s Quest for Recovery in the American West} (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2011), 190-97, 318 n. 94.}
The version of Geronimo’s life that appeared in *Geronimo: His Own Story* therefore made careful omissions of content regarding his long campaigns of war and his own role as a *diyin*, incompatible with his new image as a convert to Christianity. Only a hint peeps out in his description of traditional Apache medicine as half-herbalism, half-prayer: “Some of the Indians,” he noted, were skilled in extracting “bullets, arrow heads, and other missiles” from injured warriors, and “I myself have done much of this, using a common dirk, or butcher knife.” Of his early life before the massacre of his family, which he dated to 1858, nostalgia for his youth is obvious: of his first marriage he simply states “We followed the traditions of our fathers and were happy.” In his retelling the sequence of events was reshuffled: the great defeat of the Mexicans at Pozo Hediondo was placed *after* Carrasco’s massacre at Janos, not before, to occlude the inciting incident, simply calling them “Mexican troops from some other town” and referring to the site of the massacre as “another Mexican town” called “Kas-ki-yeh.” Given that this version of events was dictated fifty years after the fact, it is possible that he had rearranged these events in his mind over the decades, consistent with his image of Mexicans as “treacherous and malicious.”

By emphasizing his doctrinal hate for the Mexicans, of whom he could not recall how many he had killed (“for frequently I did not count them. Some of them were not worth counting”), Geronimo carefully drew a contrast between Mexicans and Anglo-Americans, the former his preferred foes, the latter minimized as his enemies. Interestingly, Geronimo and his amenuenses Barrett and Daklugie isolated stories of scalping to this early phase of his career. Of the Apache warriors he led to fight the Mexicans in his version of Pozo Hediondo,

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373 Barrett, *Geronimo*, 64 (“Usen gave homes in the land of the West”), 67-68 (“the Apaches and their homes each created for the other”), 70 (“Usen does not care for the petty quarrels of men”), 73-74 (“I myself have done much of this”), 75-84 (laws, customs, marriage), 87-95 (Chapter 6: “Kas-Ki-Yeh”), 125-26 (“treacherous and malicious”)
Barrett’s text states that “their long scalp-locks” were “ready for the hand and knife of the warrior who would overcome them” – something of a Fenimore Cooper touch, as Apache men grew their hair long and not restricted to one tuft or lock. He signalled his victory over the Mexicans by “[giving] orders for scalping the slain.” He floridly sums up another fight, which he dated to 1860, by stating “When the Apache war-cry had died away, and their enemies had been scalped…” While waiting in the mountains to learn of the fate of Mangas Coloradas, he described himself and his followers as stumbling upon four herdsmen and their cattle: “We killed all four, but did not scalp them; they were not warriors.” Of a defeat inflicted upon Mexicans by himself and Juh in what he describes as the Battle of White Hill, dated 1872, he notes “we scalped the slain, carried away our dead, and secured all the arms we needed.” This was the last incident of scalping his enemies he described in his memoir, well aware that it would inflame the sensibilities of many Anglo-American readers against him. In contrast to an unvaried hatred for Mexicans, his perception of Americans was more ambivalent: he spoke favourably of the surveyors who met the Chiricahuas in the late 1850s (“they were good men”) and ambivalently of the soldiers who followed: “At first they were friendly [.]” The soldiers, he told his readers, “never explained to the Government when an Indian was wronged, but always reported the misdeeds of the Indians.” He also played into the settler-colonial desire to project frontier violence onto white undesirables rather than structural racism by stating “Much that was done by mean white men was reported at Washington as the deeds of my people.”374

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374 Barrett, *Geronimo*, 91 (“long scalp-locks”), 95 (“I gave the orders”), 100 (“their enemies had been scalped”), 119 (“we scalped the slain”), 129-142 (“They were good men”; “At first”; “misdeeds of the Indians”); 140-160 (“pure, honest white man”), 134-38 (136: “They were not warriors”).
When presenting his escapes from San Carlos Geronimo described his emotions and motives in universalist terms. The 1881 break he attributed to fears that troops stationed at San Carlos were preparing to arrest them and put them on trial for actions in past wars; this “served to revive the memory of all our past wrongs,” such as the Bascom Affair, the assassination of Mangas Coloradas, and his own arrest at Ojo Caliente in 1877. “We thought it more manly to die on the warpath,” Geronimo summed up, “than to be killed in prison.” Otherwise, he simply mentioned crossing the border while omitting any mention of escape or pursuit by the Army. Of his break from the Fort Bowie Reservation in June 1876: “I took my tribe back to Hot Springs [Ojo Caliente] and rejoined Victorio’s band.” Of the flight from San Carlos: “In 1883 we went into Mexico again,” and a brief return in 1884 was to recruit other Apaches to fight the Mexican army. On the 1885 break, prefaced by a complex plan by Geronimo and which prompted Crook’s replacement by Nelson Miles who afterwards punished the Chiricahuas collectively: “In Arizona we had trouble with the United States soldiers and returned to Mexico.”

Of the violence that occurred during these breakouts, he would only admit to violence against Mexicans, and hedged these confessions with caveats. Saying he believed that the Mexican government had asked American troops to pursue them across the border, “We were reckless of our lives, because we felt that every man’s hand was against us”—an interesting and probably deliberate self-comparison to Ishmael (Genesis 16:12). If he returned to the reservation, “we would be put in prison and killed.” He said he was certain that Crook had planned to get rid of him by “issu[ing] the orders for me to be put in prison, or to be killed in

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375 Barrett, Geronimo, 122 (“we went into Mexico again”), 123 (“returned to Mexico”), 142 (“rejoined Victorio’s band”), 145 (“memory of our past wrongs… killed in prison”).
case I offered resistance,” and Barrett had to add a disclaimer footnote to avoid a libel suit. If they stayed in Mexico, soldiers would be continually sent to fight them, “so we gave no quarter to anyone and asked no favors.” Geronimo fully admitted to his persona as a public menace only when acknowledging killings south of the border: “we attacked every Mexican found, even if for no other reason than to kill.” But conflicts with American citizens who were not members of the armed forces were elided, downplayed, or denied. His skirmishes with Mexican “cowboys” across the border in 1868 and 1869 could be admitted, but the Peck Ranch massacre could not, and therefore he declared that while pursued by Captain Lawton and his scouts, “We passed many cattle ranches, but had no trouble with the cowboys.”

The final element of his rehabilitation strategy was describing his adaptation to American society: conversion to Christianity, learning to farm, and making money. By contrast, the terms of his 1886 surrender had been violated: Nelson Miles had promised him land, hired hands to work it, freedom from arrest while in federal custody, and reunion with his and his followers’ families if they surrendered. Instead he was sent to Pensacola for 2 years’ hard labour, Alabama, and then Oklahoma, where “I have been arrested and placed in the guardhouse twice for drinking whisky.” Yet he praised the essential benignity of American society, which he knew his audience wanted to hear, at the expense of his old enemies the Mexicans:

I saw many interesting things and learned much of the white people. They are a very kind and peaceful people. During all the time I was at the Fair no one tried to harm me in any way. Had this been among the Mexicans I am sure I should have been compelled to defend myself often. I wish all my people could have attended the fair.

376 Barrett, *Geronimo*, 113-16 (Mexican cowboys), 122-23 (“In 1883… In Arizona…”), 141-42 (“back to Hot Springs”), 148-49 (“in case I offered resistance”), 150 (“no trouble with the cowboys”), 150-51 (“every man’s hand… no quarter”).
As the editor of the 1970 reissue of *Geronimo*, Frederick Turner III, noted here, “His statements about white culture often have the appearance of cutting several ways.” Beneath the surface, Geronimo may have been amazed that people who thought him a bloodthirsty monster would line up to purchase tchotchkes and autographs and offer him nothing sharper than the occasional bit of rude language.377

**The first scalp for Custer, redux: the Chicago World’s Fair and Buffalo Bill, 1893-1914**

The only late-19th-century Native American treated with more public opprobrium than Geronimo, notes Clements, was Sitting Bull, and even he was publicly feted. In 1884, the Standing Rock Indian agent James McLaughlin and the St. Paul hotelier Alvaren Allen toured New York and Philadelphia with a troupe called “The Sitting Bull Combination,” witnessed in Philadelphia by a then 16-year-old Luther Standing Bear, attending while on leave from Carlisle. Sitting Bull, who could sign his name for autographs but whose spoken English was limited, was introduced to the crowd as the slayer of Custer and then asked to give a speech. As the only Lakota speaker in the audience, Standing Bear was the only one to perceive its dishonest translation: Sitting Bull’s oration about the need for reconciliation between American settlers and Plains Indians became a confession about the ambush and gory killing of the 7th Cavalry. The translator “told so many lies that I had to smile,” Standing Bear wrote years later, and then things became stranger to him:

Then the white man said that all those who wished to shake hands with Sitting Bull would please line up if they cared to meet the man who had killed Custer. The whole audience got in line, as they really believed what the white man had told them. It made me wonder what sort

of people the whites were, anyway. Perhaps they were glad to have Custer killed, and were really pleased to shake hands with the man who had killed him!\textsuperscript{378}

Three years after Sitting Bull’s death, the curious could do one better and visit Sitting Bull’s home at the Chicago World’s Fair.

Through the largesse of the Indian Office, the managerial board of the 1893 Columbian Exposition obtained Sitting Bull’s log house from Pine Ridge. Purchased from his widows log by log, it was shipped to Chicago and reassembled on the Midway as the “Sitting Bull Cabin Exhibit.” The attraction’s carnival appeal was obvious and ghoulish: as this was the house in which Sitting Bull had been assassinated by tribal police in December 1890, visitors were offered the authentic site of a famous murder and a chance to look for bullet holes. Somewhat cheapening the effect was the fact that two other attractions on the fairgrounds also claimed to be the authentic Sitting Bull cabin. As if proving that the distinction between “highbrow” and “lowbrow” is largely a matter of class, the assemblers of this grisly monument barred Cody’s Wild West show from the fairgrounds, on the pretext that its presence would (in Melissa Rinehart’s paraphrase) “cheapen the progressive theme of the fair.” Directed by P.B. Wickham, the Cabin Exhibit employed Oglala Lakotas and Crows who had fought at Little Bighorn as performers. Just outside the fairgrounds’ southwest gate, Buffalo Bill opened his 1893 iteration of his show, flamboyantly titled “Buffalo Bill’s Wild West and Congress of Rough Riders of the World,” with another material artifact of the life

\textsuperscript{378} Utley, \textit{Geronimo}, 258-61; Clements, \textit{Imagining Geronimo}, 18; Utley, \textit{The Lance and the Shield}, 260-67; Luther Standing Bear, E.A. Brininstool ed., \textit{My People the Sioux} (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2006 [1928]), 177-190; Wishart, \textit{Encyclopedia of the Great Plains Indians}, entry “Standing Bear, Luther (1863/1868 – 1939),” 197-98. Connell notes in \textit{Son of the Morning Star} (227-28) that while Sitting Bull may have understood French and English “better than anyone suspected,” his spoken English appears to have been limited in the latter years of his life to “Hello,” “Sitting Bull” with a heavy accent, the surprisingly-peppy “You bet,” and, for autograph seekers, “How much?” When the artist DeCost Smith identified him in a general store at Standing Rock (“Yes, it’s Sitting Bull”), the old statesman rapidly clasped his hand in a vigorous handshake and replied “Sitting Bull, you bet!”
of Sitting Bull: a light-gray circus horse he had grown fond of and which Cody had gifted to him at the end of the 1885 tour. Purchased from Sitting Bull’s widows, the horse led the procession of Cody’s 500 performers into the arena, carrying a rider bearing an American flag.379

The physical line that separated “highbrow” World’s Fair and “lowbrow” Wild West show was then cris-crossed repeatedly, most notably by Cody’s nearly 200 Native Americans; not formally permitted to perform at the Exposition, they were frequently invited to parade through the fairgrounds, attend dedications, and even stand in for the Taínos, warbonnets and buckskins notwithstanding, to welcome Columbus’ shore party on Italian Day. Early in the season, the Columbian Exposition and the Congress of Rough Riders’ interests intersected when the Midway’s Sitting Bull Cabin was the site of a public reconciliation between the indigenous combatants of the Little Bighorn. Crows and Arikaras shook hands with Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho counterparts, the two most notable figures in this respect being Curly, Custer’s favourite Crow scout, and Rain-in-the-Face, who had inherited from Sitting Bull the role of nemesis of the Custer brothers. When Curly, a performer in the Sitting Bull Cabin Exhibition, demanded to be released from contract to return to North Dakota “in search of the villain who had slain his happiness in this world” upon learning that his wife had eloped with another man, a vacancy was left open and in midsummer, Rain-in-the-Face crossed the fairground. After his petition to the World’s Columbian Exposition Company management for more indigenous control over Indian

379 Reportedly, during Sitting Bull’s assassination, this old circus horse had taken the gunshots as its cue and begun going through its act: “He solemnly sat down in the middle of the bloodbath, and raised his hoof,” which thoroughly unnerved the tribal police. See Bridger, Buffalo Bill and Sitting Bull: Inventing the Wild West, 384-86; Utley, The Lance and the Shield, 260-67, 312; Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 63-87; Connell, Son of the Morning Star, 393-97; Rinehart, “To Hell with the Wigs!,” 410-14.
exhibits and for an honoured Native American day was turned down, he lost interest, and his “spiritless performances” towards the end of the exposition were noted.\footnote{Slotkin, \textit{Gunfighter Nation}, 63-87; Connell, \textit{Son of the Morning Star}, 381-99; Rinehart, “To Hell with the Wigs!”}

Up until the end of his life, Rain-in-the-Face could not escape the legend of his killing of the Custer brothers, and alternated between gruesome, embroidered variations on the legend, and denying it altogether. In 1894, he told journalist W. Kent Thomas that he had killed Tom Custer, “cut out his heart and bit a piece out of it and spit it in his face,” then “rode off shaking it” (see Introduction). When Ohiyesa / Dr. Charles Eastman visited Rain-in-the-Face two months before his death in 1905, he denied it: “Many lies have been told about me.” A missionary named Mary Collins, however, claimed that on his deathbed he had confessed to killing George Custer: “I was so close to him that the powder from my gun blackened his face.” Either way, DeCost Smith, an artist who painted three portraits of Rain-in-the-Face, shared Luther Standing Bear’s appreciation of the ludicrousness involved in a full crowd of Chicago World’s Fair attendees coming to the Sitting Bull Cabin to meet the killer of Custer: “while believing the tales of his horrid deeds were willing to treat him as a friend, shaking his hand and gazing in his face, while marvelling at the mildness of his expression.”\footnote{Connell, \textit{Son of the Morning Star}, 296-98, 381-99; Rinehart, “To Hell with the Wigs!”; Slotkin, \textit{Gunfighter Nation}, 1-122.}

Just outside the fairgrounds proper, Buffalo Bill Cody offered not only a troupe of nearly 200 Native Americans, but three hundred other sharpshooters, trick riders, and entertainers: Anglo-Americans, British, Russians, French, Germans, and Arabs, support staff, a herd of horses and ponies, and a small herd of bison. From 1 May to 30 October Cody’s
show was seen by five million spectators, including Spanish and Italian nobility, outgoing president Benjamin Harrison, and incoming president Grover Cleveland. With a keen sense of the zeitgeist and its anxieties, Cody’s refurbished 1893 show offered both nostalgia for America’s past frontiers and a confident look at a future of new frontiers which would keep America from degenerating into moral and physical decadence. An 1886 editorial reprinted in the densely-packed 64-page programme captured the contradictions in celebrating Manifest Destiny. “And what a history America has, to be sure!” crowed the editor. “From the mouth of the Hudson River to the shores of the Pacific, men, women and children have conquered the wilderness by going to the front and staying there. Not by crowding into cities and living as do worms, by crawling through each other and devouring the leavings.”

The experience of Cody’s British and European tour of 1886-87 provided ways for the Chicago season to balance frontier nostalgia and confident futurism. Through scenarios which placed athletes and performers of different American and European nationalities in friendly competition with each other, Cody offered a vision of reconciliation inside and outside of the United States, as America and its former enemies—i.e., Native Americans, Hispanics, the British Empire—became peers and equals in the European-dominated international system. Fittingly it was in Bismarck’s Germany, a nation as anxious as the United States about its rapid industrialization and its recent place on the world stage which also compensated with a homegrown military tradition and fetishization of its idealized preindustrial past, that the “imperial circus” of the “Congress of the Rough Riders of the World” first appeared, including Arab performers and Georgian horsemen deliberately

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382 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, 10 (“as do worms” – my italics), reprinted from an editorial of the New York Democrat, 5 June, 1886; Blackstone, Buckskins, Bullets, and Business, 81; Robert W. Rydell and Rob Kroes, Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869-1922 (University of Chicago Press, 2005), 105-117; Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 1-122.
misidentified as “Russian Cossacks” who Cody had hired on in Europe. In England, the Wild West show had staged a six-day race between two cowboys and two cyclists (the cowboys won); in Paris, some of Cody’s Indians had climbed the Eiffel Tower. In Chicago in 1893, viewers were promised an assortment of such competitions interspersed throughout the schedule, including a horse race between “a Cowboy, a Cossack, a Mexican, an Arab, and an Indian” on respective breeds of horses, and a ladies’ race between “Prairie, Spanish, and Indian girls” i.e., Anglo-American, Hispanic, and Native American; and a display of military maneuvers by cavalry of the United States, German, French, and British armies. Bookending the 1893 show were the grand entrance and exit by the performers, both mounted and afoot, and both civilized and savage—British, French, and Germans representing civilization, the Arabs, “Cossacks,” and Native Americans representing the primitive, and Buffalo Bill and his Americans as intermediaries. All reconciled into an elite regiment of regiments, Cody offered a vision latter-day chivalry brought into the 20th century.383

The second major change made in Cody’s show was its simplified chronology of American history. In the 1880s tours Cody’s American history had been divided into the two major periods of the popular imagination: the first frontier of the 1820s-1840s familiar from Fenimore Cooper and his imitators, and the more recent prairie frontier or “wild West.” But even then the lines between “forest primeval,” as the 1880s shows labelled it, and the recent

383 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, page 2; On the Georgians’ billing as “Russian Cossacks,” see Blackstone, Buckskins, Bullets, and Business, 81; Rydell and Kroe’s, Buffalo Bill in Bologna, 105-117; Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 1-122. Just as the Georgians acted as stand-ins for Russian Cossacks, the Arab horsemen troupe of “Sheik Hadji Tahar” was made up of town-dwelling entertainers, predominantly from North Africa and some from the Levant, who were performing a role that they considered equally alien and exotic: Bedouin pastoralists. One of the performers, a Lebanese acrobat named George Hamid, later explained that he had never ridden a horse until hired on to perform in Buffalo Bill’s Congress of Rough Riders. See Susan Nance, How the Arabian Nights Inspired the American Dream, 1790-1935 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 111-135.
Western frontiers, were not so clear-cut: Plains Indians in warbonnets had greeted the first settlers on an imaginary Atlantic coast, and a short essay reprinted from the 1886 programme (“The Rifle as an Aid to Civilization”) had anachronistically attributed America’s constant westward movement to a quartet of simple technologies: “the rifle ball,” the axe “that cleared the forest,” and “the family Bible and school book.” No inconvenient mentions were made of the long history of cumbersome pre-rifling firearms like arquebuses and flintlocks, or the absence of organized American public schools until fairly recent times. This essentialized image of an America that had always been technologically and culturally advanced vis-à-vis the Indians was simplified it further in the 1893 show by omitting any of the “forest primeval” segments. For the first time, the western United States from around 1800 to the present stood as synecdoche for all of American history, with the gun-armed representatives of Anglo-American urban-industrial civilization against the bow-and-arrow-wielding Native American warriors as synecdoche for some 400 years of conflict. And the core of the Wild West show’s history was the standard narrative of Manifest Destiny: westering settlers suffered the unprovoked aggression of the Indians, after which the Army’s scouts and soldiers righteously defeated the Indians to clear a path for Anglo-American civilization, morality, and progress.  

Cody, to be clear, was not the sort of unrepentant bigot or cynical profiteer of such latter-day depictions as 1976’s Buffalo Bill and the Indians (dir. Robert Altman). Aside from the simple good business sense of treating indigenous employees well, offering competitive wages and the opportunity to make money in side ventures like selling autographs and

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mementos, his Indian employees remember that he insisted on their equal treatment to his white performers when it came to catering and accommodations. And he seems to have taken the idea of postwar reconciliation seriously. The succinct caption of an illustration of a mounted, warbonneted Plains warrior in the programme tried to convey this sentiment: “The former foe—the present friend, the AMERICAN.”

But calls for reconciliation ended where the need to endlessly commemorate white victimhood at Indian hands began. Three of the four 1880s staples of Cody’s Wild West show, listed in the 1893 programme, involved a formula of Indian aggression and American retaliation: an attack on an emigrant train by “marauding Indians repulsed by “Buffalo Bill” with Scouts and Cowboys”; the capture of the Deadwood stagecoach by Indians and its recapture by Buffalo Bill “and his attendant Cowboys”; and a heroic re-enactment of Custer’s Last Stand billed as historically accurate. Like the Midway’s Sitting Bull cabin exhibit, both the wagon-train scene and the Deadwood stagecoach act attained to authentically titillating edutainment. The programme promised that the wagons were “the same as used 35 years ago” and that the old stagecoach was the same “scarred and weather-beaten veteran” in which a “great number of people […] lost their lives on the road between Deadwood and Cheyenne 18 years ago.” The Little Bighorn battle scene, as heroic as the Anheuser-Busch lithograph of Custer’s Last Stand, was imbued with putative authenticity by inflating Cody’s presence in the 1876 campaign: he and his cowboys arrived at the battlefield just as the smoke was clearing, to gaze on the desolation. Confusing the issue further, Cody

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385 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, 10; Blackstone, Buckskins, Bullets, and Business, 81; Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 1-122.
had appropriated Custer’s iconography for his own since the 1880s: the long, curled hair, buckskin jacket, broad-brimmed white hat and neatly-trimmed moustache and goatee.  

The Indians’ villainy was further embellished, or perhaps buried, in the articles reprinted throughout the 60-odd pages of the programme, which through many curious omissions tried to downplay or elide any possible reasons the Indians might have for making war on the Americans. A reprinted excerpt from General Sheridan’s autobiography repeated the hagiography of Charley “Buffalo Chips” White while presenting a heavily sanitized version of Slim Buttes. The elephant in the room, the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, was never mentioned in the show itself, while the programme described the euphemistic “Indian troubles” of 1890 in self-justifying terms. Reprinted newspaper and magazine articles quoted such Army figures as Colonel Dodge and Cody’s business manager Major John Burke to praise Cody’s indirect aid: his Lakota employees, “improved by travel,” had countered the “unruly Indians” of the Rosebud and Pine Ridge agencies and prevented an “immediate outbreak among the red men.” A reprinted article from Harper’s hailed the role of “that most faithful servant—the only good Indian except a dead one—the Indian scout” in suppressing the Ghost Dance. Six pages of material condensed from Illustrated America magazine held the Ghost Dance as a sinister conspiracy by “medicine men and politicians” whose eagle-feather fans had been wielded like mesmerists’ watches to entrance the participants and transform the ceremony “from a sacred rite to a warlike demonstration”; Wounded Knee was

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called both “an unlooked-for accident” and “one of the best marked triumphs known in the history of Indian campaigns.”

The programme gave the Sioux themselves a flurry of descriptors for irrationality and savagery: “excusably excited,” “unintentionally wronged,” “headstrong and misguided,” and “warlike.” Buried in the middle of a promotional essay on Cody’s 1889-90 tour of Europe was a glimpse of the ugly reality: a forlorn illustration of three Army scouts watching snow cover frozen bodies and burned-out tipis. No mention was made of a little-known incident which cast a further unfavourable light on the whole affair: Peter McFarland, an Army teamster, told oral historian Eli Ricker in 1905 that he had seen “one Indian who was scalped,” “lying in the gulch on his back.” He went from bystander to participant when he spotted an amateur “trying to get a scalp from an Indian without success, not knowing how to do it,” and offered his assistance. Indian agent Valentine McGillycuddy later attributed the discovery of these scalped bodies to what happened in the aftermath of the aftermath: on 30 December, the day after Wounded Knee, the body of Private Domenic Francischetti was abandoned in the soldiers’ retreat from the White Clay Creek Fight or Drexel Mission Fight between the 7th Cavalry and the Lakotas. It was recovered seven days later, scalped and mutilated. This never made the brochure, either.

While Indians’ actual suffering at the hands of American settlers or soldiers was deliberately downplayed or ignored, a fictitious story of Lakota baby-killing from a poem by

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387 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, 32-34 (“improved by travel”, “Indian trouble,” “Sioux troubles”), 38-44 “Ghost-Dances in the West: Origin and Development of the Messiah Craze and the Ghost-Dance,” Illustrated America magazine

388 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, 46-49 (Buffalo Chips), 61 (“excusably excited… unintentionally wronged… headstrong and misguided… warlike”, Wounded Knee engraving “After the Battle. – Field of Wounded Knee. – Campaign 1890-91”); Jensen, Settler and Soldier Interviews 6, 10; retaliation in Jerome A. Greene, American Carnage: Wounded Knee, 1890 (University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 292-94, 503 n. 9.
“Buckskin Sam,” entitled “Cody’s Corral, or The Scouts and the Sioux” was reprinted. In the classic scenario of defensive invasion, it told of Cody and his scouts being ambushed by “a hundred hideous, painted, and fierce” Sioux warriors in a scenic mountain valley. Inevitably emerging the victors, Cody and his men looked upon “their dead and mangled enemies, whose corses [sic] strewed the ground.” This bloodletting was sanctioned by a fictional “Medicine Hill” massacre: “I had sworn I would avenge them,”—were the words of Buffalo Bill— / The mothers and their infants they slew at Medicine Hill. / Our work is done—done nobly .” To complete the fantasy of heroic Indian-killing, the programme trotted out Buffalo Bill’s self-created legend: the scalping of “Yellow Hand.” The programme reminded the audience that the Deadwood stagecoach, in which a fortunate few would be chosen to ride in during the show, had begun its journeys “made famous by the scenes of slaughter and the devilry of the banditti” in 1875, even passing through War Bonnet Creek—“the place where “BUFFALO BILL” killed the Indian Chief, “Yellow Hand,” on July 17, 1876.” Cody himself had ridden in this very coach in August 1876 while returning from scouting for General Crook, “bringing with him several of the scalps of the Indians whom he had met.”389

While none of those “several” Indians were named, the programme offered multiple and contradictory versions of the duel with, and scalping of, Yellow Hand. Captain George Price’s “Across the Continent with the Fifth Cavalry” praised Cody for having “killed in a hand-to-hand combat the Cheyenne Chief, Yellow Hand.” A poem marvelled at Cody’s gentleness with his infant daughter, Irma Cody, with the same hand “that seemed harsh and cruel, / Nerved by a righteous hate / As it cleft the heart of the Yellow Hand, / In revenge of

389 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, 12 (“Cody’s Corral, or The Scouts and the Sioux”), 24 (“Yellow Hand... banditti... scalps of several”).
Custer’s fate.” Another poem, by “an Old Comrade,” William Annin, described a long-range rifle shot: “I saw Bill’s fight with “Yellow Hand,” you bet it was a “mill” / He downed him well at thirty yards, and all the men cheered Bill.” With no contradiction, this was followed by the knife-fight version, reprinted from General Sheridan’s autobiography: “It is now close quarters, knife to knife. After a hand to hand struggle, Cody wins, and the young chief “Yellow Hand” drops lifeless in his tracks after a hot fight.” A passage from Buell’s History also granted Cody the dubious heroism of personally knifing the long-suffering Cheyenne leader Black Kettle as he fled the Washita in 1868. The illustration of the scalping of Yellow Hand which appeared in the 1893 programme was more gruesome than usual, showing his enemy stretching out his hands in a final agony.  

Yet the “Scalping of Yellow Hand” act was not performed in Chicago, and had not been performed by Cody on stage since 1877; Paul Hedren states that Figure 7.4 was “the last “first scalp” image to grace a Wild West program.” Further, Hedren notes that Cody had grown increasingly uncomfortable with this element of his legend, as indicated in a statement Cody made in a 1903 letter to his friend and portraitist Irving Bacon:

Yellow Hand was the only Indian I ever scalped. I did not believe in scalping. But it was only the day before that we heard of Custer and his entire command being wiped out. And I wanted revenge for I loved Custer and many of his brave men. Charley Reynolds his chief of scouts was an old time friend of mine.

Hedren points out some “muddied” details in Cody’s chronology, written almost 30 years after Warbonnet Creek. At odds with Cody’s implication of scalping Yellow Hair in the heat

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390 Buffalo Bill’s Wild West... Programme, 5 (“when he killed Yellow Hand in front of the military command in an open-handed fight”), 8 (“killed in a hand-to-hand combat”), 14-15 (supposed killing of Black Kettle), 19 (“Nerved by a righteous hate”), 37 (“you bet it was a “mill””), 47 (“close quarters now, knife to knife”), 48 (scalping of Yellow Hand, 1893 illustration); Hedren, “First Scalp for Custer”.
of the moment after learning “the day before” of Little Bighorn, Hedren notes that Cody had carried the news of Little Bighorn to the commander, Col. Wesley Merritt, on 6 July; not only was he the first in the company to hear of it, ten days separated Cody and the 5th from the Warbonnet Creek skirmish and the ‘first scalp for Custer’ on 16 July. Further, Cody’s claim that “Yellow Hand” was “the only Indian I ever scalped” contradicted the details of his 1879 autobiography, where he claimed to have killed and scalped Indians and taken weapons and personal possessions as trophies in several other incidents. Hedren suggests that in the intervening years between 30-year-old Cody scalping Yellow Hair and 57-year-old Cody disavowing this to Bacon, the cultivation of good working relationships and personal friendships with his former Lakota and Cheyenne enemies had given him an “evolved disdain” towards scalping. He may have felt remorse and regret for “a legacy he created but then could never shake.”

It was not just Cody’s decision to make. For many members of the general public, the simplified, morally clear-cut stories of barbarous Indians and heroic frontiersmen spoke to a national need to believe that the chaos and genocidal violence of the past 400 years had all had a higher purpose and grand-historical meaning than just one people pushing another people off their land, or that Anglo-American scalping culture signified some sort of creole seasoning process rather than a forfeiture of their imagined moral high ground over the Indians. Whether he took the form of ranger, forester, scout, or cowboy, the idealized frontiersman was a figure in whose historical existence many Anglo-Americans, and a viewing public in Europe and around the world, wanted to place their faith. Cody, for better

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391 Hedren, “The First Scalp for Custer,” 16 (“a legacy he created but then could never shake”), 21-29.
or for worse, had claimed to be the living incarnation of that figure, and was now irrevocably chained to it.

While the dime novel and its successor the paperback would continue to flourish as vehicles for frontier adventure in the 20th century, the Wild West roadshow-circus format was waning by the first decade of the 20th century. In 1894 Cody had glimpsed the future when he and some of his Indian troupe were filmed at Thomas Edison’s studio for the kinetoscope parlours which had first appeared at the 1893 World’s Fair and were now springing up across America, followed by full motion pictures. Silent Westerns on film, most famously 1903’s *The Great Train Robbery*, did not offer all of the three-dimensional sensory thrills—gunsmoke, full-colour sweat, hoofbeats, etc.—of attending an actual Wild West show, but were much cheaper to distribute than traincars full of actors, props, horses and bison. This new market cut into Cody’s profit margin at the same time that rising costs, stiff competition from other cowboy-circus outfits, and poor financial decisions ate away at his earnings. A joint film-company venture formed with Pawnee Bill Lillie in 1909 appears to have been unsuccessful; by 1913, he was so hard-up for cash that he placed the Wild West show property itself as his collateral for a $20,000 loan, which was sold at public auction when he was unable to pay the interest. He and his creditors then decided to recoup their losses and restore Cody to fiscal solvency by forming the Colonel W. F. Cody (Buffalo Bill) Historical Pictures Company, to transpose the scenarios from his Wild West show to the big screen. Like his Wild West shows, their film would have an edutainment angle that reflected favourably on the federal government’s civilizing mission on the Great Plains, and his
longstanding relationships with the Army meant that the Departments of War and the Interior leapt eagerly to assist him.\textsuperscript{392}

In October 1913, filming of \textit{The Indian Wars} began on the Pine Ridge Reservation, with script to be written by Charles King, now a highly-successful writer of frontier romances with much manly action and Indian-killing. Nelson Miles, the interpreter Philip Wells, Cody himself, and others were tapped to appear onscreen and provide authenticity, as well as the 12\textsuperscript{th} Cavalry to play the Army, and a host of Lakotas, many of whom had been in show business since the 1880s; one advertisement promised “1000 Indians, many of whom were leaders in the original battles.” The question of “battles,” and whose definitions were to prevail, were the subject of intense controversy during the film’s production. As well as Little Bighorn and the Battle of Summit Springs, the latter of which Cody had actually taken part in and which had been an element of his show in 1907, the film would stage the Army’s versions of Warbonnet Creek. Most troubling to the Lakotas, the film would include Wounded Knee, which some early reports said had been sanitized in the scripting process to remove the women and children from the scene and present the Indians as the aggressors. Apparently, General Miles and Cody were to be added anachronistically to the site of this “battle,” and Miles had reportedly insisted on filming at the site of the massacre and its mass grave.\textsuperscript{393}

Assessing the accuracy of \textit{The Indian Wars} is a near impossibility, as only two minutes of footage survive in the archives of the Buffalo Bill Historical Center in Cody,


Wyoming. Promotional materials such as posters and still photographs leaned heavily on Cody’s pre-established iconography, including the “First Scalp for Custer.” A promotional illustrated poster from 1913 promised “The Life of Buffalo Bill in Three Reels” with a prominent portrait of an ageless, buckskin-clad Buffalo Bill. About one-third of the poster illustrated Warbonnet Creek with Cody’s familiar vaunting pose, clarifying with the caption “First Scalp for Custer.” A still photograph from filming at Pine Ridge in 1913 shows a re-enactment of the foundational scene of Cody’s career, to tragicomic results. With the ridges of the South Dakota prairie stretching out in the background like those of the Anheuser-Busch corporation’s *Custer’s Last Fight*, an unnamed Lakota performer lies in the grass at Cody’s feet playing dead, with the toes of his moccasins sticking up in the air. As in the poster, the familiar vaunting pose, copied from True Williams’ woodcut, which in turn was copied from Eastman’s *The Death Whoop*, is re-enacted by Cody himself. Yellow Hair’s scalp and war bonnet are raised in his left hand, yet the effect is somewhat undone by the burgeoning paunch held back by Cody’s impressive belt buckle.394

Chauncey Yellow Robe, a Lakota graduate of Carlisle, became the lodestone for criticism of *The Indian Wars* when he lit into it at the third annual meeting of the Society of American Indians in October 1913. Yellow Robe’s speech, reprinted in South Dakota’s *Rapid City Times* and sparking further critiques, accused Cody and Miles of seeking “their own profit and cheap glory” at the expense of the victims of Wounded Knee, and trying to make themselves into “heroes for a moving picture machine.” His concerns regarding representation also extended to the Wild West format more broadly; in 1914 he wrote that

such shows taught young children “that the Indian is only a savage being.” Prefiguring the concerns of late 20th century parents regarding violent media and impressionable children, in 1914 he blamed such shows for the occasional news reports of a child “who is hurt playing savage.” Pointing to an 1894 story of a boy named Charles Benney “burned at the stake” by playfellows after seeing the Wild West show, he warned that such were the “direct consequences” of Wild West shows and movies “that depict lawlessness and hatred” on the part of the Indians. That America had been created by 200 years of scalp-hunting adults “playing Indian” was perhaps left unsaid.395

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“Some violence is the product of psychopathology: paranoia, sadism, wildly displaced rage, and the like. Violence of this sort accounts for a very small portion of the total and holds relatively little theoretical interest. The designation of violence as irrational, however, is attractive to certain theorists and policy-makers since it removes such acts from the realm of the comprehensible and relieves them of the responsibility to have prevented or understood them.”
–Bruce Lincoln (2003)396

From the spring of 1972 until February 1974 the Criminal Investigation Command of the U.S. Army collected evidence for an investigation, shelved in the wake of the Watergate hearings, into the conduct in 1967 of a reconnaissance platoon of the 101st Airborne in Vietnam. Created for counterinsurgency purposes in 1965, the platoon codenamed “Tiger Force” was intended to combine reconnaissance and commando functions—“not just to search, but to destroy,” in Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss’s summary, and were encouraged to behave in a way assumed to terrify the enemy. According to 27 separate witness statements, in 1967 the “Tiger Force” inflated the “kill counts” of their official reports by tallying as Viet Cong several hundred uninvolved villagers in the Central Highlands region, and “were observed in possession of human-ear, scalp, and gold-teeth collections” which were actively condoned and overlooked by their superiors. Such behaviour was not exclusive to the Tiger Force, and military authorities reportedly confiscated Vietnamese scalps, dried ears, and skulls decorated with graffiti from other soldiers returning stateside. That Baby Boomers nurtured on a steady media diet of Westerns in which one-dimensional Indians were gunned down in droves by heroic cowboys drew a connection between the racialized enemies of past and present, both conceived as existential threats within a Manichaean struggle between savagery and civilization—the Plains wars of the 19th century, the Cold

War of the 20th—is unsurprising even in the absence of such nightmarish Indian play by the Tiger Force. 397

Increasingly critical assessments of violence in Westerns on television and at the movies had begun appearing in the 1950s, though such portraits of morally-conflicted violence by characters such as the mercenary, the “gunfighter” who develops killing into an art, and reluctant heroes tormented by guilt, were reserved for Anglo protagonists. Frontier society’s imagined enemies, all of whom stood outside of a presumably-benign American moral order or as corruptions within it, remained uncomplicated and straightforwardly evil: corrupt railroad tycoons, rustlers, Mexican bandits, rampaging Apaches, and so on. And the traditional tropes remained: “good” Indians subordinated themselves to manifest Destiny and assimilated; “bad” Indians were invariably implacable, phlegmatic, or cruel; and interracial sex inevitably led to tragedy. The stabs of revisionism present in John Ford’s The Searchers (1956), where John Wayne appeared as an openly-racist Confederate holdout planning an honour killing of his niece for the crime of interracial sex, were undone by a traditional portrayal of the ‘bad’ Indians, the Comanches, as a barbarian horde, leaving no doubt where the audience’s sympathies should lie when Wayne scalps his Comanche antagonist, ‘Scar,’ at the climax. Outside the Hollywood studio system, Europe’s picaresque ‘Spaghetti Westerns’ went further with full-colour fake blood, nudity, and scenes of cruelty and torture. In the first two minutes of Sergio Corbucci’s Navajo Joe (1966) Mervyn Duncan (Aldo Sambrell), the

leader of an army of scalp hunters, has shot and scalped a woman in cold blood, replicating the *Death Whoop* pose for the camera, as prelude to his gang massacring a village. Contracted to hunt Indians for “a dollar a scalp,” the Duncan brothers and their followers are outraged to learn that a bounty has been placed on them for “attacking peaceful tribes,” and go on the rampage. Against them stands the lone hero, Navajo Joe (Burt Reynolds), husband of the woman killed in the opening scene, who offers the townsfolk of Esperanza a deal: he’ll wipe out the bounty hunters for “a dollar a head” plus the rewards for the Duncan brothers. On top of this laboured irony is a hoary stereotype: Mervyn is a self-hating “half-breed.”

Towards the end of the 1960s, the impacts of the Civil Rights movements, the counterculture, and the dizzying realization that Americans were losing the sort of war they imagined themselves as best at, a battle in the wilderness against a racially-alien and savage foe, became increasingly reflected in revisionist Westerns where the true enemy was not savagery, but white supremacism. In 1968’s *The Scalphunters*, the illiterate fur trapper Joe Bass (Burt Lancaster), robbed of his fur bales by Kiowa warriors who press the erudite, well-educated escaped slave Joseph Lee (Ossie Davis) on him as compensation, find themselves caught up in the clashes between the Kiowas and a gang of mercenaries, perhaps ironically led by the resplendently-bald, malevolent Jim Howie (Telly Savalas). The film runs against traditional racial roles in the Western: the Kiowas are rogues, but have a sense of fair play; Lee, perhaps prefiguring quick-witted Sheriff Bart (Cleavon Little) in Mel Brooks’ Western spoof *Blazing Saddles* (1974), is invariably the smartest man in the room as he evades the white characters’ plans to resell him into slavery and dismantles Bass’s pro-slavery arguments, while Bass is clearly threatened by a black man who is, in matters of taste and education, his superior. The most sinister character is Howie, who brandishes an enormous...
knife and giggles malevolently while threatening to skin Bass alive. Two-thirds of the way through *Little Big Man* (1970), after our sympathies have been securely placed with the Indians, several of whom are played by Asian or Eurasian actors to complete the identification of the Indian Wars with Vietnam, a scalp appears as a teaching tool for perhaps the first (and last) time in film history. The Cheyenne chief Old Lodge Skins (Chief Dan George (Tsleil-Waututh)) holds up a hank of red hair to explain to his adopted son Jack Crabbe / Little Big Man (Dustin Hoffman) that while Anglo-Americans see the world and the people in it as “dead” objects to exploit for profit, to Indians, “ever’ting is alive. Not only man and animals, but also water, earth, stone, and also the things from them—like that hair.” In succinct and folksy language, an acknowledgement of an ontological difference between indigenous American and European societies is made by the use of a white settler or soldier’s scalp, the Western’s traditional sign of moral outrage and frontier chaos. Of course, both of these films’ real subjects are arguably the civil rights and antiwar movements, not the Indian Wars per se.  

These films’ then-groundbreaking upheavals of race in the Western went against the general grain of the revisionist Westerns of the late 1960s and 1970s; beneath a veneer of putative “historical accuracy,” most repackaged old fantasies about Indian disappearance and alternate fetishization and fear of interracial sex while treating violence in an exploitative and myopic fashion. In films like *Duel at Diablo* (1966), *Cry Blood, Apache* (1970), *Chato’s Land* (1972) and *Ulzana’s Raid* (1972), Apaches wreaked the stereotypical Indian warrior’s merciless revenge, usually against white hillbillies and frontier trash the audience were

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expected to detest, through guerrilla warfare and booby traps considered stereotypically Apache: trussing up white victims with rawhide or ropes to dangle head-downwards, throwing rattlesnakes at them, scalping them, etc. In Cry Blood, Apache and Chato’s Land (the latter starring Charles Bronson, whose Lithuanian-Tatar ancestry and Eurasian features guaranteed him the major “Indian” roles habitually reserved for non-Indians), the rape, abuse, and murder of the indigenous hero’s family members, inverting the traditional violation of white women in the anti-Indian sublime, spurs his revenge. This queasy fascination with sexual violence directed against fictitious indigenous women also appeared in another revisionist Western, Soldier Blue (1970), which staged lurid scenes ostensibly based on Sand Creek and the Washita. Given the statistically high rates of sexual violence inflicted against indigenous people in the 20th century, such lurid scenarios, ostensibly to raise a non-indigenous audience’s disgust and outrage, could also function as titillation.399

Meanwhile, the producers of the Richard Harris star vehicle A Man Called Horse (1970), whose central premise was that an English aristocrat captured by Sioux could rise from enslaved captive to village chief in under a year, touted the historical and cultural accuracy of a film whose major indigenous spoken roles were redface performances by Corinna Tsopei (Greek-American), Jean Gascon (French-Canadian), Manu Tupou (Fijian-American), Dame Judith Anderson (Anglo-Australian), and Iron Eyes Cody, a Sicilian-American actor (born Espera Oscar di Corti) whose real-life redface performance was, like Antonio Apache’s, so convincing that he became one of Hollywood’s go-to Indians. Clyde

399 Entry “Apache” (58) in Buscombe ed., BFI Companion to the Western (“though films such as Duel at Diablo or Chato’s Land represent the Apache as more sinned against than sinning, still they go out of their way to depict Apache tortures”); David H. Budd, Culture Meets Culture in the Movies: An Analysis East, West, North and South, with Filmographies (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2002), 176; Wishart, Encyclopedia of the Great Plains Indians, entry “Soldier Blue” (190-91).
Dollar, Horse’s technical director and the resident historian on the Rosebud Reservation who obtained Lakota extras to perform in non-speaking background roles, called it “one of the most researched films about the early Plains Indians” and “hopefully therefore, one of the most authentic dramas about such people.” Yet beneath superficial elements like stretches of dialogue in unsubtitle Lakota, the film reprised traditional stereotypes of Indian societies as defined by cruelty and indifference to suffering, evidenced onscreen by the limping of Harris’ fellow slave (Jean Gascon), hamstrung as punishment for an escape attempt, and a scene, which reportedly infuriated AIM member Russell Means, where fellow villagers abandon an old Lakota woman (Dame Judith Anderson) to die in a snowstorm. The scenes of Harris in a Sun Dance, called the “Sun Vow” and heavily promoted as mark of Horse’s historical-cultural accuracy, sets it in a subterranean earth lodge per the Mandan version of the rite and stages it not in indigenous terms of an act of self-sacrifice on behalf of the community, but in New Age terms of the white hero’s journey of self-discovery. Compare, for instance, Sitting Bull’s historic vision at the Sun Dance before Little Bighorn of a great battle and “soldiers upside down,” against Harris’ character’s cynical, self-gratifying visions of himself as ruler of the Indians with soft-focus, slow-motion shots of Corinna Tsopei topless. How deeply ingrained and unquestioned such Manifest-Destiny narratives of Indian barbarism and white supersession were is indicated by the producers’ baffled, scrambling reaction when Native Americans responded to the film. Singer and activist Buffy Sainte-Marie (Plains Cree) called it “the whitest” movie she had ever seen; AIM picketed a Minneapolis theatre screening Horse, handing out a leaflet accusing the movie of attempting to “Totally humiliate and degrade an entire Indian nation.” Others concurred: in a printed dispute in an archaeological journal, the anthropologist Melburn D. Thurman dismissed
Dollar’s claims of authenticity, stating that if *A Man Called Horse* “is considered in terms of cultural context, the claim of “authenticity” is absurd.” Yet those invested in the success of *Horse* could only reply with other Manifest Destiny narratives of vanishing Indians and “authenticity.” Producer Sandy Howard declared that “Indians themselves do not really know their past” and that AIM members, being Ojibwe, Winnebagos, and ‘urban Indians,’ had no grounds to identify with the Sioux, Mandans, and Crows portrayed in *Horse* (Clyde Dollar)… though, apparently, Anglo-American fantasists had every right to.

Contemporary indigenous artists redeploy imagery of scalps and scalping to illustrate contiguities between the violence of the past and the ongoing violence and dispossession of the present, often challenging more broadly the platitudes of Anglo-American benevolence. Sherman Alexie’s 1996 novel *Indian Killer*, in which a serial killer stalks, scalps, and mutilates white businessmen in contemporary Seattle, subverts the conventional murder mystery by challenging the genre’s foundation in Enlightenment-rationalist positivism: not only is the true killer is never captured, their identity is never confirmed, and a chilling epilogue confirms that a pan-Indian uprising looms over the horizon. The never-identified killer combines two figures of colonial fear: the stealthy, merciless warrior who stalks, murders, mutilates, and evades capture to strike again; and the holy man or woman, the 17th century’s “sorcerer” and the 20th century’s “shaman,” who uses ritual paraphernalia and the power of other-than-human beings, in this case owls, to enhance their stealth and lethality.

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The novel’s indigenous characters all suffer from personal variations of a post-Indian malaise, grappling with American settler society’s appropriations of indigenous identity, bogus and self-serving definitions of “authenticity,” and the gaslighting of indigenous people to believe that they are not “real” Indians. This crisis of identity is the defining trait of the protagonist, ironically named John Smith: adopted as the only child of a wealthy white couple in the Seattle suburbs in Alexie’s deliberate allusion to mid-20th-century policies of adopting-out indigenous children, known in Canada as the “Sixties Scoop,” Smith has no knowledge of his biological parents and his tribal identity, and has tried to cobble together “authentic” Indianness from mainstream American culture. He passes up college scholarships to work high-rise construction in imitation of the famous “Mohawk ironworkers” photos, and tells whites informed by Dances with Wolves that he’s Lakota, which invariably impresses them. Tall, handsome, athletic and long-haired, Smith on the surface is America’s ideal assimilated Indian, but by his early 20s his inner turmoil and self-loathing has manifested as mental illness, spawning a quest to kill a scapegoat figure to punish Anglo-America for stealing his identity.

The novel’s cast of Anglo-American antagonists includes “Truck” Schultz, a racist radio demagogue who encourages vigilante activity against Seattle’s Native American homeless population; in flashbacks, the abusive white father of mixed-race Native American activist Reggie Polatkin, who punctuated his lectures on Indian inferiority and white

supremacy by beating his son; and Clarence Mather, a ponytailed anthropology professor who habitually disdains his indigenous students, who drove Reggie out of graduate school and regularly spars with Reggie’s cousin Mary. But the novel’s most influential promulgator of the false “Indian knowledge” used to dispossess Native Americans is a retired white policeman, Jack Wilson (the baptismal name of Wovoka, the founder of the Ghost Dance) who writes dreadful, bestselling murder-mysteries starring a private detective-slash-medicine man named Aristotle Little Hawk, the last of Alexie’s fictional Shilshomish Indians, who uses Enlightenment positivism and broadly stereotyped shamanism to solve mysteries. Wilson also appropriates Indian identity through a spurious “blood quantum” claim of distant descent from a Shilshomish man who lived in Seattle in the 1880s, and his naïve, phony Indianness is taken as the genuine article by the novel’s white characters—tellingly, both Dr. Mather and John Smith’s mother are big fans—while considered hilarious by the patrons of an “Indian bar” he hangs out in, including a woman known as “Beautiful Mary,” “who was still beautiful, even though a keloid scar ran from the corner of her left eye to her chin.” At *Indian Killer’s* climax, Wilson is involuntarily initiated into the world of deprivation overwritten by his fantasies when Smith selects him as the bearer of his message to settler society to “Let me, let us, have our own pain”—a statement which Helen Hoy describes as “a grimly ironic defense of at least a minimal entitlement.” Bearing an ornately-decorated long knife which both replicates and fetishizes the stereotyped attribute of the Indian warrior, Smith slashes Wilson’s face from eyebrow to neck, scarring him in a way serendipitously mirroring Beautiful Mary. Smith intends this as a mark of Cain to reveal Wilson as a cultural
thief: “No matter where you go… people will know you by that mark. They’ll know what you did.” His work completed, Smith throws himself off the skyscraper he helped build.  

But Smith’s suicide brings no resolution, despite the assumption of the novel’s white characters, Wilson included, that Smith was the Indian Killer. In a bleak conclusion, Mary Polatkin dismisses the idea of reconciliation as too little, too late, and predicts that copycats will take up the Indian Killer’s mantle, a prediction proven right in a chilling epilogue. The still-unidentified Indian Killer, bearing a “beautiful knife” and “carry[ing] a pack filled with a change of clothes, a few books, dozens of owl feathers, a scrapbook, and two bloody scalps in a plastic bag,” recruits followers in graveyards on unnamed reservations into what is implied will be the Ghost Dance fully realized: “Other Indians arrive and quickly learn the song. A dozen Indians, then hundreds, and more…” Alexie’s own feelings on Indian Killer have grown decidedly mixed over the years. Having facetiously called it “a feel-good thriller about interracial murder,” he began stepping away from it after the 9/11 attacks, which he said in a 2008 Guardian interview showed him the “end game of tribalism - when you become so identified with only one thing, one tribe, that other people are just metaphors to you.” Having written Indian Killer at age 30, he reassessed it as “a very fundamentalist, binary book, the product of youthful rage.”

In a more playful vein, a single released in 2014 by the Canadian indigenous-electronica collective A Tribe Called Red also deployed the imageries of scalping to mock the straight-faced pieties of Anglo-American triumphalism. “Burn Your Village To The

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Ground” is an auditory collage mixing electronica beats and war cries with a monologue, from 1993’s Addams Family Values, mocking Anglo-American bourgeois aspirationalism. During a dreary, self-righteous Thanksgiving pageant at a summer camp, disaffected Goths tween Wednesday Addams (Christina Ricci), playing Pocahontas as merciless avenger, leads a “revolt of the repressed”. Dressed as Indians, the camp’s outcast collective of nerds, the physically-disabled, and ethnocultural minorities run riot against the wealthy, conventionally attractive WASP children whose parents own the campground. Wednesday sparks the riot with her self-revised monologue, which concludes with her advancing on her long-haired, bourgeois female antagonist with a raised knife:

> You have taken the land which is rightfully ours.

> Years from now, my people will be forced to live in mobile homes on reservations; your people will wear cardigans, and drink highballs. We will sell our bracelets by the roadsides; you will play golf and enjoy hot hors d’oeuvres. My people will have pain, and degradation; your people will have stick-shifts.

> The gods of my tribe have spoken. They have said, Do not trust the Pilgrims […] And for all these reasons, I have decided to scalp you, and burn your village to the ground.

Released during the quincentennial celebrations of Columbus’ “discovery” in the Caribbean, such content in Addams Family Values could not have been coincidental. Similarly, A Tribe Called Red cheekily timed the release of “Burn Your Village to the Ground” for 2014’s Thanksgiving weekend, which they dubbed “‘celebrating’ in our own way” in a press release.404

404 Further: “In a way, each day is a day of thanksgiving to the Creator for the original people of Turtle Island. This doesn't mean that we don't enjoy turkey, pie and family as much as the next person, but at the same time the Thanksgiving myth largely shared in mainstream culture perpetuates a one sided view of a complicated history surrounding this holiday.” From https://soundcloud.com/a-tribe-called-red/burn-your-village-to-the-ground, 25 November 2014.
Grim realities

The later 20th century has seen a concerted effort by members of indigenous communities to repatriate and rebury relatives and ancestors’ scalps, bones, and physical remains. One case in point is the fate of Little Crow, a leader in the Dakota War, shot by a Minnesota farmer in July 1863 for the state’s outstanding $75 bounty on Indian scalps. After gross mistreatment of his body by the citizens of Hutchinson, Minnesota on the 4th of July, Little Crow’s killer was given a $500 bounty by state authorities; by 1896, his scalp, skull, and forearm bones ended up behind glass in St. Paul as a centerpiece display of the Minnesota Historical Society. By the early 20th century, Minnesotans were increasingly uneasy about such displays and the complicated questions they raised vis-à-vis their supposed moral superiority over Indians, and when Little Crow’s grandson Jesse Wakeman complained in 1918, they were quietly removed from public eyes and shuttered in a storage closet. There they remained until 1971, when Wakeman, then 88 years of age, appealed to the Minnesota Historical Society for their return. Alan Woolworth, an archaeologist and Society member, drove Little Crow’s remains to South Dakota where his descendants had been exiled post-war; here, a reburial ceremony was held in a family plot, and Woolworth hired a cement truck to fill in the grave to pre-empt the grave robbing and vandalism that had befallen Sitting Bull’s grave. “It was not so much that the whites killed Grandfather,” Wakeman told a reporter, “[but] what they did to his body and remains that rankles me and our people.” Following the passage of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in 1990, the process began of reclaiming remains of Cheyennes and Arapahos killed at Sand Creek and reburying them at a cemetery at the massacre site itself. After a few years of arbitration with the Smithsonian to repatriate scalps and skeletal remains, a further obstacle
had to be surpassed: the massacre site was by then privately owned by a Colorado ranching family who, while made sympathetic to Native American perspectives through interactions with Southern Cheyenne chief Laird Comatsevah, were still the ultimate arbiters of access. Larry McMurtry writes that at an unspecified date in the 1990s, a private, ad hoc reburial ceremony was held on the property by an Ojibway woman named Connie Buffalo, who had been given two scalps by an owner of a small motel near the massacre site who remorsefully told her they had been taken at Sand Creek in 1864. As traffic to the massacre site increased, however, the Dawson family began a lengthy legal dispute with the federal government and the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes over the sale of the land, only resolved in 2007.405

But what happens when scalping is passed over in public memory as a part of a nation’s history, as in much of present-day Canada? Just as I was completing this draft, I learned that an indigenous artist in Calgary, Lee Deranger, has just completed an artwork reminding Canadians of the scalp bounties instated against Mi’kmaq people in Nova Scotia by Lord Cornwallis. Already a cause of national embarrassment in 2011 when Cornwallis Junior High was officially renamed, the bounties have never technically been repealed. Her artwork depicts a barn door on which has been nailed a flag of Nova Scotia besmirched by a trickle of fresh red blood (red paint, thankfully). Below the flag are three artificial scalps nailed to the door to dry, which the artist says represent the Crown, the federal government of Canada, and the provincial government of Nova Scotia. In mind of the impending 

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celebrations for the 150 year anniversary of Confederation, the artwork is completed below the scalps with “Reconcile This” painted in vivid red.406

The Future

“White people no longer feared Indians,” Alexie’s John Smith thinks to himself on the streets of late-20th-century Seattle. “Somehow, near the end of the twentieth century, Indians had become invisible, docile.” From the beginning of the 20th century, Indians’ previous role as the bogeyman within America has been applied to other groups given Indian-like traits. The crime fiction genres of film noir, the hard-boiled detective story, and vigilante films like the Death Wish series or Stallone’s Cobra, continue in an urban setting the Western’s central narrative of weak or corrupt institutions and unscrupulous enemies, often depicted as racial or cultural aliens, who must be fought outside the law. The commando protagonists of films such as Chuck Norris’ Missing In Action trilogy, Stallone’s Rambo series, and Schwarzenegger’s Commando and Predator, are visually identified as white savages by their costumes—minimal clothing and war paint, ostensibly for camouflage—and their methods of waging one-man wars against bandits, communists, and other dishonourable antagonists who capture and torment their victims. The racial-alien theme is made literal in Predator, where a savage warrior from space uses lasers and a high-tech spear to kill, then mutilate his victims for trophies.407

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407 Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation; Lawrence and Jewett, The Myth of the American Superhero; Hoppenstand, “Justified Bloodshed.”
The military tactics of America’s overseas wars from the Spanish-American War to the War on Terror have emphasized victory through overwhelming firepower, and popular histories of those wars stress the racially alien and therefore dishonourable nature of the foe, the need for the enemy’s total defeat and unconditional surrender, and may cast the conflict as part of a Manichaean global struggle between good and evil. While these arguments, arguably, exist in any country, what sets the United States apart is a popular belief, per Lawrence and Jewett’s “American monomyth,” that institutions are inherently untrustworthy, weak, and corruptible, and that therefore actions performed outside the law, such as Oliver North’s Iran-Contra scheme and the Bush administration’s unilateral decision to defy the United Nations and go to war with Iraq in 2003, are excusable if not explicitly preferred. Also not unique to the United States, though consistent with the American monomyth’s savage-war mythology, is a conviction that people designated as savages, however defined, best respond to exemplary shows of force.

What arguably sets the United States apart from other countries in the British settler-colonial world is a tendency to justify extralegal action and savage war through a paradoxical celebration of America’s unique power and moral superiority, set against an overwhelming conspiracy of forces arrayed against it—what Richard Hofstadter identified as “the paranoid style in American politics.” In the tradition of the anti-French Jesuit and Indian-trader conspiracies of the Seven Years’ War and the British Indian-trader and Freemason conspiracies of the Jeffersonian period, the current President of the United States, an international businessman with hotels in several Muslim-majority countries worldwide, has spoken at length, as a candidate and as president, of a vast conspiracy by Hillary Clinton, George Soros, and other “globalists” to destroy the Western world from within through
Muslim immigration and free-trade agreements. He punctuated these by suggestions that what the War on Terror needs is increased collateral damage and deliberate, exemplary massacres: citing an apocryphal story of an American general in the Philippines who supposedly put down a Muslim resistance by executing his prisoners with bullets dipped in pigs’ blood, he also declared he would order the Air Force to target and kill the families of ISIS fighters. Perhaps most exemplary of the survival of Indian-war fantasies of violent self-pity was candidate Trump’s claim in a 2015 campaign speech that thousands of Muslim-Americans danced and cheered in New Jersey while watching the 9/11 attacks. As political analyst Matt Taibbi observed, while police were, in fact, dispatched to Muslim-majority neighbourhoods in New Jersey following 9/11, their assignment was to protect Muslim-Americans from reprisals by their neighbours, which “is one of the reasons we know Muslims weren’t dancing en masse in the streets. […] To believe there was a mass demonstration of open, gloating defiance right across the river from Manhattan while the Towers smoldered, speaks to a powerfully crazy fantasy both about American impotence and about a brazen, homogenous evil in Muslim-American communities.” If one were to change “Muslim” or “Muslim-American” to “Native American,” the timelessness of such a fantasy is revealed.408

According to journalist Matthew Cole, “dark mimesis” in a peculiarly retrograde form appeared among SEAL Team 6, the elite of America’s Navy SEALs, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Tasked with taking fingers, skin, or sections of scalp from slain combatants for DNA identification purposes, team members reportedly flayed large pieces of

skin from enemy combatants’ bodies in imitation of a 1971 Vietnam War novel Devil’s Guard, billed as the true account of an S.S. officer who joined the French Foreign Legion postwar to mutilate and terrorize the subhuman Vietnamese. As deaths of Afghan and Iraqi men, regardless of whether or not they bore arms, increased among all divisions, Red Squadron, sporting badges of a stereotypical Indian warrior with crossed stone-headed tomahawks, issued steel tomahawk sidearms to chop up dead and dying enemy combatants.409

The danger, of course, of any study on the exotic or the bizarre is that one looks for it in others rather than oneself, and looks for it abroad rather than at home. As sociologist Thomas Dunk observed in his 1991 ethnography It’s a Working Man’s Town: Male Working-Class Culture in Northwestern Ontario, white Canadians—in this case, in my hometown of Thunder Bay, Ontario—carry on the tradition of defining themselves through definition of indigenous peoples as their negative mirror image. The consequences of this have been spilling into the national media for the past year: among others, the Thunder Bay police department is currently being investigated over whether “systemic racism” has precluded investigation a series of mysterious deaths of indigenous teenagers in the city in the past decade. We are dealing here with a 500-year-old problem in Canadian and, ultimately, Western thought: a tendency to consider indigenous peoples as something other than fellow human beings living in the same historic time that other people are. And once an indifference

to indigenous lives can be cemented in the mind as quotidian “common sense,” the consequences are dire—for indigenous people, and for everyone.410

I tend to agree with the summary of Laura McCloud (Tulalip), describing fish and game wardens trying to provoke Native American activists into arrestable offenses after a judge ruled in their favor over the “fish-in” of 1965: “the history books are wrong when they talk about “the last Indian wars.” They have never stopped!” At root is a need to define oneself by negative definition of others: the master-key which unlocks the dark side of human existence. In this light, the assessment of Herman Melville’s Arkansan con man, Charlie Noble, must also be considered:

“…that Indian-hating was no monopoly of Colonel Moredock's; but a passion, in one form or other, and to a degree, greater or less, largely shared among the class to which he belonged. And Indian-hating still exists; and, no doubt, will continue to exist, so long as Indians do.”411

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