TRUST IN CIVIL WARS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT CHARACTER AND THREAT ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRUST

by

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Abstract

My research investigates the repercussions of protracted civil wars on bystanders’ political and social trust. The literature is fraught with inconsistent findings on how violence impacts trust. I argue that civil wars have distinct effects on trust primarily because wartime trust formations vary by the character of the conflict (ethnic vs. ideological) and the macro historical dynamics of the country, which together shape collective threat framing. Ethnic wars should induce a higher political trust for politically represented ethnic group via the state discourse’s emphasis on collective threat, even in the presence of personal threat. In ideological wars, a similar discourse on collective threat forwarded by the state is less likely, and in the absence of a higher national threat framing, personal insecurities extending from the war should diminish people’s trust in governing political institutions. Regarding social trust, ethnic violence renders in- and out-group distinctions visible and decreases out-group trust. Alternatively, ideological violence diminishes general trust (trust in unknown others).

I deploy mixed-methods, combining case studies and cross-national quantitative data analysis. The two cases are the territorial Kurdish insurgency in Turkey (1984-) and the Maoist insurgency in Peru (1980-1992). I spent six months in each country and conducted archival work, comparative historical analysis, and numerous interviews and focus groups in 2013–2014. To see whether the theoretical predictions and empirical findings from Turkey and Peru can travel beyond their boundaries, I analyzed a pooled time-series cross sectional dataset (1981-2015), using multi-level models.

As well as being one of the first qualitative studies of trust in conflict settings, my work is also original in distinguishing between the effects of different types of civil wars on trust,
disentangling the impact of collective and personal threat, and showing that the effects vary in the society along ethnic and political lines. My empirical findings also shed light on the generation of collective threat framing using a macro historical lens, and suggest that state-building conditions both the nature of the insurgency, national and ethnic identities, and how the conflict will be framed by the state via the official discourse.
Lay Summary

Civil war, which may involve ethnic or civil conflict, is the dominant form of violence in today’s world. Violence challenges government authority, induces insecurity, and bears strong implications for individuals’ trust in government (political trust) and trust towards one another (social trust). Despite the importance of political and social trust for better functioning of institutions and societies, the effect of civil wars on trust has not been studied much. The existing studies usually focus on victims while this study focuses on bystanders—nonvictimized people—who often constitute the majority of any country undergoing conflict. This dissertation, examining the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and the Maoist conflict in Peru, finds that ethnic territorial wars and ideological wars have distinct effects on bystanders. While territorial wars increase political and ethnic out-group trust, ideological wars decrease political and generalized social trust. These findings shed light onto post-conflict challenges of re-establishing order and peace.
Preface

I identified and designed this research program in consultation with my supervisory committee. The research conducted this dissertation was approved by the UBC Behavioural Ethics Board, Certificate Number H12-00452, Certificate Number H12-03711 (and the renewal Certificate Number H1-03711-A001).
Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................................. ii
Lay Summary........................................................................................................................................ iv
Preface...................................................................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... xiii
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................... xiv
List of Symbols ....................................................................................................................................... xv
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ xvi
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... xvii
Dedication ................................................................................................................................................ xix

Chapter 1: Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
  1.1  Focus, Distinctive Features and Contributions of the Dissertation .............................................. 2
  1.2  Relevance and Significance of the Research ................................................................................... 5
  1.3  The Literature: Contradictory Findings and Gaps ......................................................................... 6
  1.4  Research Design ............................................................................................................................... 8
  1.5  Preview of the Argument .................................................................................................................. 9
  1.6  Structure of the Dissertation ........................................................................................................ 12

Chapter 2: Theory of Trust in Wartime .................................................................................................13
  2.1  Armed Intrastate Conflict ................................................................................................................ 17
    2.1.1  Typology of Civil Wars ............................................................................................................ 20
  2.2  Political Trust: Definition and Registers ......................................................................................... 23
# 2.3 Impact of Political Violence on Political Trust

- 2.3.1 Theory of Political Trust in Wartime
  - 2.3.1.1 Conflict Character, Threat and Micro-Level Repercussions on Trust
  - 2.3.1.2 Generation of Discourses and Collective Threat Framing
  - 2.3.1.2.1 Clash of Discourses
  - 2.3.1.3 On Personal Threat
  - 2.3.1.3.1 Determinants of Personal Threat
  - 2.3.1.4 Implications of Threat on Political Legitimacy
  - 2.3.1.5 Identities, Group Influence, and Political Opinions
    - 2.3.1.5.1 Identities in the Face of Armed Conflict

# 2.4 Armed Conflict and Social Trust

- 2.4.1 Theory of Social Trust in Wartime
  - 2.4.1.1 The Role of Context

# 2.5 The Link Between Political and Social Trust

# 2.6 Observable Implications of Political and Social Trust

# 2.7 Conclusion

---

# Chapter 3: Research Design

- 3.1 Case Selection: Why Turkey and Peru?
- 3.2 Focus of Analysis
- 3.3 Fieldwork and Data Collection
  - 3.3.1 Selecting Subnational Sites
  - 3.3.2 Data Collection
    - 3.3.2.1 Sampling and Data
3.3.2.2 Conducting the Interviews and Focus Groups ................................................................. 71

Chapter 4: Causal Antecedents of the Theory: Comparative Historical Dynamics behind the Onset of the Insurgencies in Turkey and Peru ........................................................................ 76

4.1 Foundations of Turkey: Modernization, Nationalism And One Nation ..................................... 78
  4.1.1 Kurds in a Turkish Nation-State ...................................................................................... 81
  4.1.2 Suppression of Kurdish Identity and Initial Kurdish Uprisings ...................................... 84

4.2 Foundations of Peru: Colonial heritage and Nation-Building Efforts ........................................ 87
  4.2.1 Brief History of Indigenous People in the Social and Political Structure ......................... 94

4.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 100

Chapter 5: Causal Mechanisms: Insurgency Dynamics, Collective Threat Configurations and Discourses .................................................................................................................. 102

5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 102

5.2 PKK and Sendero: The Characters of, the Threats Posed by, and the Military Responses to the Insurgencies ................................................................................................................. 102

5.3 Discourses ............................................................................................................................... 106

5.4 Conflict in Turkey ....................................................................................................................... 107
  5.4.1 Pillars of the Official Discourse .......................................................................................... 107
    5.4.1.1 Nation, State, Army, and Territory .............................................................................. 108
    5.4.1.2 Martydom and Religious Rituals .................................................................................. 112
    5.4.1.3 Denial of the Kurdish Issue in the Official Discourse ............................................... 113
  5.4.2 The Official Discourse Embellished with Hegemonic Tools ............................................. 114
  5.4.3 Media Representations ....................................................................................................... 115
  5.4.4 PKK discourse ................................................................................................................... 118
5.5 The Conflict in Peru: Discourses

5.5.1 The Underlying Pillars of the Peruvian official discourse

5.5.1.1 The Country of Two Republics: The Inferior Position of the Indians

5.5.1.2 Caudillismo and the Military Culture in the Formation of Discourse

5.5.2 The Official Narrative

5.5.3 Media Representations

5.5.4 Sendero Discourse

5.6 Conclusion

Chapter 6: Prelude to Empirical Chapters: Data Collection and Analysis

6.1 Recruitment of Participants for Interviews and Focus Groups

6.2 Conducting the Interviews and Focus Groups

6.3 Coding

6.4 Analysis and Inferences

6.5 On Retrospective Accounts

Chapter 7: Hypotheses Testing: Effects of Civil Wars on Political Trust

7.1 Configurations of Personal Threat in the Conflicts in Turkey and Peru

7.2 The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey

7.2.1 The Collective Threat Framing

7.2.2 Personal Threat for Mainstream Turkish Bystander

7.2.3 The Other Side of the Story: Ethnic Kurds, Personal and Ontological Security, Spread of Counterhegemonic Discourse, and Changing Popular Perception of the State

7.2.3.1 Heterogeneous Baseline Priors of Kurds
### Chapter 7: Personal Security Threat Posed by the State and Its Consequences on Political Trust of Kurds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.2.3.2 Personal Security Threat Posed by the State and Its Consequences on Political Trust of Kurds</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.3.3 The Foundations of the Counterhegemonic Discourse</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.4 Implications of Threat on Legitimacy</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 7.3: The Maoist Conflict in Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1 Collective Threat Framing or Rather Lack Thereof</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2 Personal Threat</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.3 Physical and Ontological Security, and the Ethnic Bond of the Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.3.1 Meaning (lessness) of Death</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 7.4: Conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 8: Hypotheses-Testing: Effects of Civil Wars on Social Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Social Trust in Turkey in the face of the Kurdish Insurgency</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.1 A Sketch of Pre-War and Wartime Dynamics</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.2 Declining Out-Group Trust in the form of Discrimination</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.2.1 Personal Experiences in Wartime as an Aggravating Factor Diminishing Out-Group Trust</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.3 Contextual Effects</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.4 Displacement, Politicization, and Social Trust</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.4.1 In-Group Trust of Kurds</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Social Trust in Peru in the face of the Maoist Insurgency</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1 A Sketch of Pre-War Dynamics</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2 Declining Generalized Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2.2.1 Displacement, Context-Dependency, and Declining Out-Group Trust .......... 239

8.2.3 In-Group Trust of Indigenous Groups ......................................................... 244

8.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 247

Chapter 9: Quantitative Hypothesis-Testing: Gauging the Generalizability of the Theory 250

9.1 Data and Method ............................................................................................... 251

9.1.1 Dependent Variables ..................................................................................... 252

9.1.2 Independent Variables ................................................................................... 253

9.1.2.1 Country-level Control Variables ................................................................. 255

9.1.2.2 Individual-level Control Variables ............................................................... 258

9.2 Model and Estimation Strategy .......................................................................... 260

9.3 Findings .............................................................................................................. 261

9.4 Controls and Robustness ................................................................................... 267

9.5 Discussion .......................................................................................................... 267

9.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 270

Chapter 10: Conclusion .......................................................................................... 271

10.1 Review of Findings .......................................................................................... 272

10.2 Contributions ................................................................................................... 276

10.2.1 Implications for Democracy ........................................................................ 280

10.3 Limitations of the Study .................................................................................. 281

10.3.1 Future Research .......................................................................................... 284

References ............................................................................................................. 286

Appendices ............................................................................................................. 307

Appendix A Extra Material for Chapter 1 ............................................................... 307
List of Tables

Table 1. Empirical Strategies for Different Parts of the Theory .................................................. 59
Table 2. Hypotheses for Political Trust, Corresponding Observable Implications, and Empirical Evidence Employed for Testing ........................................................................................................ 147
Table 3. Total Number of Deaths in the Civil Wars of Turkey and Peru ......................................... 151
Table 4. Variations in Subnational Sites as Leverage for Testing the Effects of Personal vs. Collective-level Threat on Trust ........................................................................................................... 155
Table 5. Variations in Subnational Sites in Peru as Leverage for Testing the Effects of Personal vs. Collective-Level Threat on Trust ........................................................................................................ 190
Table 6. Summary List of Hypotheses for Social Trust, Corresponding Observable Implications, and Empirical Evidence for Testing ........................................................................................................ 211
Table 7. Distribution of Country-Year Observations on the DV and IVs ........................................... 254
Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Variables .................................................................................... 259
Table 9. Civil Violence and Trust_Country-Year Cluster Models ....................................................... 262
Table 10. Three-Level Random Intercept Models ............................................................................ 265
List of Figures

Figure 1. Summary Diagram of the Theory_Ethnic Territorial Wars and Trust .................. 15
Figure 2. Summary Diagram of the Theory_Ideological Wars and Trust .............................. 16
Figure 3. Conflict and Political Trust: Crude Mechanisms ............................................... 29
Figure 4. Selected Subnational Sites in Turkey .................................................................. 67
Figure 5. Selected Subnational Sites in Peru ..................................................................... 68
Figure 6. Distribution of Terror and Presidential Popularity in Peru (1985-1993) ............. 197
Figure 7. Attitudes of Kurds and Turks Towards Each Other ......................................... 223
Figure 8. Summary Diagram of the Expected Average Effects in the Theory .................... 251
Figure 9. Predicted Probabilities of Political Trust for Different Values of Ethnic and Ideological Violence ........................................................................................................... 266
Figure 10. Predicted Probabilities of Interpersonal Trust for Different Values of Ethnic and Ideological Violence ........................................................................................................ 267
List of Symbols

Interview Citation:

#: Sign preceding the number of in-depth individual interview

E#: Sign preceding the number of expert interview

R: Respondent (usually in an interview)

P: Participant of a focus group
List of Abbreviations

CPO: Causal-Process Observations
EPR: Ethnic Power Relations
EVS: European Values Survey
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IEP: Institute of Peruvian Studies (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos)
JITEM: Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Organization (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele Teşkilatı)
MHP: Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MRTA: Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru)
PKK: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkêren Kurdistanê)
PCP: Communist Party of Peru (Partido Comunista del Perú)
PUCP: Pontificial Catholic University of Peru (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
Sendero: Shining Path—Sendero Luminoso del Partido Comunista del Perú
TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación).
WVS: World Values Survey
WWI: The World War I
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Dedication

To Will, my family, and all the women who inspired me
Chapter 1: Introduction

“War has an immediate effect upon the attitude of mind of everyone who is brought into connection with it. The end to be attained supersedes the motives of ordinary life.” Abraham Lowell.¹

On November 19th, 2011, yet another clash between soldiers and Kurdish PKK insurgents dominated the headlines of Turkey’s mainstream papers: “26 martyrs and 22 injured soldiers in an attack by about 200 terrorists” screamed one.² As always, state funerals were organized for the deceased soldiers, and attendees (most of them strangers to the victims) chanted “martyrs do not die; motherland does not divide.” Young Turkish men with flags flooded Kurdish neighbourhoods in some provinces, marching through the streets in an attempt to intimidate the residents.

In Peru, in contrast, where the war was between Maoist insurgents and the Peruvian state, neither were soldier fatalities heeded as much nor the official funerals generated a similar kind of rallying effect on general public.

These are snapshots of the story that motivates my research questions. Why do people rally around a state that has failed to provide security in some contexts? Are the rallying reactions exclusive to secessionist wars or would we observe similar dynamics in revolutionary guerilla wars? More broadly, how do civil wars affect the attitudes of individuals, especially those who are not victimized (whom I call bystanders)?³ These fundamental questions are often

¹ Lowell (1923, 222).
³ Civil wars are defined as militarized disputes between two or more parties within a bounded sovereign territory.
overlooked by scholars of civil wars and political behaviour, despite their indisputable relevance to the respective literatures, as well as to the policy implications for reconciliation processes.

1.1 Focus, Distinctive Features and Contributions of the Dissertation

My dissertation seeks to examine the impact of protracted civil wars, or intrastate armed conflicts, on trust. On four grounds my dissertation is distinctive: 1) My focus is on bystanders (non-victimized citizens) as the main group of interest instead of victims, based on the idea that bystanders are the main audience for the theatre of conflict, and it is their trust that dictates the popular trust levels. 2) I distinguish between political and social trust, as trust in institutions and individuals are qualitatively different, notwithstanding their possibly mutual effect on each other. 3) Similarly, I distinguish between two types of civil wars, ethnic territorial and ideological/revolutionary types civil wars. 4) This is a comparative study employing a mixed-method design. The strategy combines intensive case-study analysis with statistical work where large-N quantitative study tests for the generalizability of the argument.

Intrastate political violence, as with all forms of violence, certainly speaks to more than the immediate victims;\(^4\) it targets the whole population, instilling seeds of insecurity, challenging the authority of government, and shaking the grounds of trust. In fact, victims have very little intrinsic value for the purposes of political violence (Crenshaw 2002). Nonetheless, research on violence tends to focus on the victims (e.g. Becchetti, Conzo, and Romeo 2014; Blattman 2009; Colletta and Cullen 2000). Bystanders, who surely have a large impact on the political culture of the country, have not been systematically studied in conflict settings. My research extends the focus of such explorations to a broader level by including both direct targets of violence and

\(^4\)According to White their deaths and injuries are important for the symbolic expression of danger to random and ordinary citizens (2002).
bystanders, focusing primarily on the latter. I define victims as *people who suffered physical pain personally, who lost their first degree family members to war, who had to relocate due to an imminent threat to life of a family member, and who faced serious financial challenges due to physical damages to property during an armed conflict.* And I define bystanders as *all the non-victimized citizens residing in a particular country at the time of a violent act who either witness the act in person, or become cognizant of it through media or social environment.*\(^5\) For the most part, bystanders constitute the majority of any democracy’s population.

Secondly, trust as a dependent variable is dissected into two separate, though interlinked, forms: political trust, referring to trust in political actors, institutions of the state as well as state apparatus, and social trust, referring to trust for other individuals in the society. Based on the premise that different types of conflict may affect forms of trust differently, this dissertation examines how conflict character impinges on political and social trust, and why the repercussions on trust are different.

Thirdly, research shows that ethnic and nonethnic ideological civil wars have different causes (Sambanis 2001). I argue that when there is causal heterogeneity, we should expect consequential heterogeneity. The war’s attributes – including the motives for conflict and social cleavages – may impact citizens’ attitudes. Building on that and deducing from extant distinctions between ethnic and ideological types of conflict in the literature, I propose that the consequences of civil wars are, in large part, contingent on the character of conflict. I theorize how conflict character may be instrumental in defining the nature of threat by specifying the

\(^5\) This definition draws on the approach of Staub (2003) and Vetlesen (2000). Vetlesen (2000) also distinguishes between internal i.e. within defined boundaries of a country and external bystanders i.e. outside the borders of a country where the violent act occurred. Internal bystanders can be individuals, organizations, institutions or the state itself while external bystanders, in addition to these, include countries. I only focus on internal bystanders.
necessary social and political processes, and how conflict character may have different consequences on political trust.

This distinction between ethnic territorial and ideological wars does not refute the possibility that ideological wars have an ethnic dimension or vice versa. Indeed, most civil wars have crosscutting ethnic and class dimensions. What may appear as an ethno-nationalist conflict may, at its roots, be a manifestation of social and economic grievances. Take the example of the Maoist insurgency in Peru: The insurgency featured itself as a Maoist insurgency, and in most datasets that involve a typology the civil war in Peru is coded as a non-ethnic, ideological, revolutionary war. However, the insurgent discourse was tied to and intended to speak to the grievances of the indigenous groups. The leadership mobilized and recruited predominantly from the indigenous people, and it waged its war, for the most part, in the indigenous-populated areas of Peru. Hence, the adjectives “ethnic” and “ideological” assigned in the names to two separate kinds of conflicts does not mean that they do not have any other dimension. The names are intended to reflect the main motivation of the insurgency and the master cleavages in the conflict. My analysis considers the identity dimension and explains how it played out in both types of conflict.

Finally, this study combines the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods to develop and test a new theory on trust formation in civil war. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study combining in-depth qualitative research on conflict and trust and the largest scale of quantitative data available to test the generalizability of the argument.

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6 In the same vein, the conflict between The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government of Angola (dominated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)) was at first sight an ideological conflict. The UNITA branded itself as an anti-communist movement, and did not officially represent any ethnic group. Yet, UNITA was comprised primarily of Ovimbundu group members, while the government was comprised primarily of Mbundu group members (Collelo 1991).
1.2 Relevance and Significance of the Research

Civil wars, defined as militarized disputes between two or more parties within a bounded sovereign territory, have afflicted states since the first formation of a nation-state. Virtually all nations have experienced a form of civil war (see Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1985). Even the most peaceful and established countries in the modern world have gone through episodes of internal conflict (e.g. the American Civil War [1861-1865], the Boshin War in Japan [1868-1869], and the Sonderburg War in Switzerland [1847]). In today’s world, civil wars are so common that they have supplanted interstate wars as the dominant form of political violence (Human Security Report Project 2013). As of 2017, there are 17 ongoing civil wars, including the protracted Kurdish-Turkish conflict and rather new Syrian Civil War, consuming democratic and nondemocratic regimes alike.  

Wars shape politics and society. Civil wars puncture the political and social order, realign the society along new lines of identity, and carry broad social and political implications for the aftermath. Anthony Smith contends that “societies’ — that is to say, given ethnic or other communities — owe much of their form and solidarity to the exigencies of war” (1981, 377).

Not only the regimes, institutions, formal and informal structures, but also micro-level values, beliefs and attitudes are subject to change in the face of such transforming experiences with violence. The question is how these beliefs and attitudes change in the face of violence?

It is important to understand the repercussions of political violence on attitudes and values because they loom large for legitimate survival, especially of a democratic regime, given

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7 Some notable examples of civil wars in democracies are: PKK: Partiya Karkêren Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey; IRA: Irish Republican Army in the UK; LTTT: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka; PCP-SL: Sendero Luminoso Partido Comunista del Perú (Communist Party of Peru) also known as Shining Path in Peru; ULFA: United Liberation Front of Asom (Asamese Separatist Movement) in India.
the importance of civic culture as a precondition for stable and functioning democratic institutions (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1993; Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). The social and political consequences of a civil war then could have significant implications for long-term stability and societal peace in a country even after the war has long ended (Dyrstad 2012).

1.3 The Literature: Contradictory Findings and Gaps

Although the causes of civil wars receive much scholarly attention in both international relations and comparative politics literature, study of the consequences of civil wars is a relatively incipient though burgeoning field. The economic damages of civil wars are easier to quantify, and hence we know more about such effects.\(^8\) Political and social implications are, however, harder to gauge. Wars permeate all layers of life—politics, family, individual and collective psychology, memory, attitudes, behaviours, mental health—as well as culture and institutions. Despite these challenges, there is a growing literature on social and political consequences of conflict, albeit fraught with contradictory findings and predominantly focused on victims.

Many empirical findings show that wartime trauma is found to be associated with lower generalized trust in others (Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013), and that war-torn countries suffer from distrust (e.g. Colletta and Cullen 2000; Collier 2003; Widner 2004). Other studies, in contrast show that violence of higher intensity, counter intuitively perhaps, leads to greater levels of generalized trust, explained by post-traumatic growth theory—a theory positing that positive changes may follow trauma (e.g. Blattman 2009;\(^8\) Economic effects are often associated with growth regressions by hampering savings, investment, and income (e.g. Alesina et al. 1996, Barro 1991). For other economic effects, see (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, and Kelegama 2001, Collier 1999, Grobar and Gnanaselvam 1993). Some suggest that negative socioeconomic legacies spill over to the post-conflict years (Blattman and Annan 2010, Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh 2009); while others contend that wars do not leave lasting impacts on household socioeconomic status measures (Bellows and Miguel 2009).
Another study suggests that the effects may be contingent on the type of the war. Distinguishing between different identity wars, the authors argue that civil wars reduce trust though religious wars more so than ethnic wars (Traunmüller, Born, and Freitag 2015). The same study also suggests that generalized trust is affected more than particularized trust (trust in family) except for trust within the neighbourhood (Traunmüller, Born, and Freitag 2015). Yet other works fail to find a general pattern between wartime trauma and social trust (Shewfelt 2009).

With respect to implications of civil wars on political trust, findings are also mixed. A number of studies find a negative effect. Hutchison and Johnson (2011), in their aggregate cross-national study on 16 African countries, find internal political violence to be deleterious to political trust (measured as generalized trust in government). Similarly, attacks by Tuaregs against the Malian state had detrimental effects on people’s trust in the national president (Gates and Justesen 2013). More evidence of a negative effect comes from the Nepalese Civil War in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, where exposure to violence has been found to reduce trust in the national government (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). Other scholars argue that the effect of violence on political trust is contingent on the ideology of the governing party, and that voters evaluate hard- and soft-line governments differently (Arce 2003; Chowanietz 2010).

Most of these studies focus on single cases or short-run impacts, and many contradictory findings exist, pointing to the importance of contextual effects. Cross-national studies are helpful to see a broader pattern, and they show divergent effects of war on the society (Dyrstad 2012) but fail to capture causal mechanisms. We can infer from these studies that popular reactions to civil war violence could be heterogeneous. My dissertation draws on this inference, seeking to explain the reasons behind heterogeneous effects, and thus represents an effort to give a more
nuanced interpretation of the impacts of conflict on wartime transformations of trust in the society.

1.4 Research Design

My design is mixed-method where I combine rich qualitative case studies and individual-level data with cross-national time-series quantitative data analysis. Guided by my theory that argues ethnic territorial and ideological revolutionary wars have different consequences on trust, I selected the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey as a case of ethnic war (fought between Partiya Karkêren Kurdistanê [Kurdistan Workers’ Party—the PKK hereafter] and the Turkish state since 1984), and the Maoist insurgency in Peru as a case of ideological war (fought between the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso del Partido Communista del Perú — Sendero hereafter) and the Peruvian state (1980-2000). Turkey and Peru, despite their diverse historical origins—Turkey being a post-imperial country descending from the Ottoman Empire and Peru being a postcolonial country—they still host enough equivalence that renders their contemporary legacies similar, which helped the choice of cases. Both countries suffered from organized intrastate political violence for over two decades and yet democracy survived in both countries. Both Turkey and Peru experienced elite-driven democratic revolutions and multiple military interventions, and both countries share institutional features, yet differ in many others. Turkey and Peru are both multi-ethnic, low trust societies, especially in terms of social trust (they are two of the lowest ranking countries according to World Values Survey data (See Figure A 1 and Figure A 2 in Appendix A). For the purposes of this dissertation, the most preeminent feature of these two countries is that they both underwent long-running violent insurgencies, which were culminations of the preexisting social issues and horizontal inequalities across groups. In Turkey, violence is mainly ethnic territorial in nature; in Peru, the conflict was mainly ideological and
revolutionary, notwithstanding the fact that ethnic and ideological cleavages existed in both.

I spent six months in each country (in 2013-2014) doing semi-ethnographic fieldwork. I conducted gathered in-depth qualitative data through numerous interviews and focus groups from cities varying in their distance to battlefields from both cases. I focus on the period between 1980 and 2000. 1980 was the year Shining Path commenced its armed operations, and the PKK was already active and preparing its base for an organized guerilla war.

To test the major hypotheses of the theory quantitatively and to see whether the theoretical predictions and empirical findings from Turkey and Peru can travel beyond their boundaries, I analyzed a pooled time-series cross sectional dataset (1981-2015), using multi-level models.

1.5 Preview of the Argument

I argue that protracted civil wars change both the political and social trust of individuals, and conflict character (i.e. whether the conflict is ethnic territorial or ideological revolutionary in character) is a primary factor affecting the way conflict impinges on trust. Political trust is likely to increase on average as a result of ethnic territorial wars while ideological wars lead to decrease wartime political trust. This difference is because of the collective threat framing of the state discourse in two types of conflicts. Ethnic territorial conflicts usually threaten the identity of the nation as the territorial integrity is at stake, which is a defining feature of a nation-state, while ideological conflicts, often targeting the government, only pose a kindred collective threat when they emerge in a country that identifies itself with a particular governmental regime. In the case of ethnic territorial conflicts, the state produces a discourse of existential threat (threat against the national unity, territorial integrity and nationhood) and capitalizes on agitation to galvanize people to support itself. Through this discourse, the insurgents who are perceived to
be posing the collective threat (and personal threat) become enemies, and the state, its institutions and actors are glorified in their eyes. In ideological wars, a similar kind of collective threat framing is less likely, and personal security threats usually guide the changes in people’s trust.

For social trust, I distinguish between generalized interpersonal trust (trust in unknown others), and category/identity-based trust. I argue that ethnic violence should induce category-based social trust, wherein in and out-group distinctions become clear and out-group trust dwindles; while ideological violence should diminish general trust because identity markers are not as clear.

The effect of political violence on trust is not homogenous across the society. The aforementioned general arguments, especially those of political trust, apply to the politically represented groups. Politically underrepresented groups, who are also more likely to be victimized, undergo different experiences. Identity is quite essential to how the war affects people’s attitudes, and ethnic territorial wars and ideological wars are quite different in terms of salience of primordial identities.

In the case of Turkey’s Kurdish conflict, I find that political trust increased after the onset of the conflict for bystanders who identify themselves with the nation because of the collective threat framing. In the face of an existential threat, the state incorporated the notion of the non-negotiability of borders into public discourse. Nationalist tools were at the disposal of the state, being well ingrained in the nation-building of the state. The Turkish state propagated the idea that it was doing its best to counter the insurgency, and the trust in the army and by association the state and the government skyrocketed. For the ethnic Kurds who developed sympathy for the PKK over the course of the conflict, trust in the Turkish political institutions and actors decline
precipitously. Ethnic bonds among co-ethnics enabled cultivation of collective identity and spread of counterhegemonic discourse of the insurgency and generated heightened salience of ethnic identity.

In Peru, due to a lack of collective threat framing, the conflict did not have much effect on the bystanders as long as it did not pose a tangible personal threat despite the more widespread civilian targeting during the war. For those who felt personal threat, political trust declined because there was not a strong collective threat framing to offset the negative effect of personal threat on political trust. The relative failure of the Peruvian state in nation-building and the ideological character of the war explain the lower magnitude and effect of collective threat. Welfare concerns were serious at the same time in Peru due to the heavy economic crisis the country was undergoing, and the economic evaluations proved to be a stronger factor in remote bystanders’ trust calculations. Even though the state’s relative weakness vis-à-vis Sendero was glaring at times, which may have diminished the public’s perception of economic performance, economic threat was more real and immediate. Victimized indigenous people lost their trust in the state as both their physical and ontological security was endangered, and they did not feel any promise or intention of protection by the state. However, unlike Kurds, they did not have a strong ethnic bond or collective consciousness. The sufferings of Kurds in the Eastern provinces due to state violence affected the attitudes of their unharmed co-ethnics. Kurds also had a new alternative power to turn to who claimed to represent their interest: the PKK, while in Peru Shining Path never branded itself as a representative of indigenous groups.

This dissertation displays the nuances in political and societal consequences of civil wars. The conflict character, guerrilla warfare, and the type of threat, and identities are important in explaining the variations. I suggest my theory and findings are generalizable particularly to
protracted ethnic-territorial wars and ideological-governmental wars that emerge in countries where one group dominates over the other(s).

This dissertation also suggests that the structure of civil conflicts is itself endogenous to features of state formation. Grievances that led to the onset of insurgencies extend from nation-building (See Chapter 4 for inductive comparative historical case studies) also shapes the discursive framework employed by the state to respond to the conflict. Ideology and strategies of nation-building mould societal forces, political groups, and shape the political landscape of the country for many years to come. Both the character of the conflict, the framing of the threat by the state, and the consequences of the war are embedded in the dynamics of nation-building.

1.6 Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the reader with clarification of the essential concepts and the logic of the theory. Chapter 3 describes the research design used to examine the effects of civil war on trust. Chapter 4 presents nation-building in Turkey and Peru and dynamics of state-society relations as a causal antecedent to the insurgencies. The goal of the chapter is to clarify a potential causal confusion engendered by the fact that the pattern of any given civil wars is not “as-if random.” Conflict character as the independent variable is embedded in the nation-building and history of state-society relations. Chapter 5 discusses the insurgency dynamics, configurations of threat and discourses. Chapter 6 describes the data collection and analysis. Chapter 7 and 8 are hypothesis-testing chapters for political and social trust respectively. Both chapters use in-depth interviews and qualitative evidence to describe the implications of war on individual’s trust registers. Chapter 9 tests major hypotheses of the theory using pooled time series cross sectional data. Chapter 10 concludes by summarizing the dissertation’s contributions and providing a guideline for future research.
Chapter 2: Theory of Trust in Wartime

This chapter theorizes the links between civil war and trust. My theory distinguishes between the kinds of civil wars and types of trust, suggesting that ethnic territorial wars and ideological revolutionary type of civil wars have distinct effects on political and social trust. Ethnic territorial wars on average increase political trust, particularly for the politically represented ethnic group, while ideological wars decrease political trust. For social trust, I look at generalized interpersonal trust (trust in unknown others), and category-based/identity-based trust and expect that effects of wars on the two types of social trust will differ. My theory suggests that ethnic violence should induce category-based social trust, wherein in and out-group distinctions become clear and out-group trust dwindles; while ideological violence should diminish general trust because identity markers are not as clear (see Figure 1 and 2). I presume that the difference we observe in the trust implications of civil wars stems from collective threat framing and that we should disentangle the effects of collective and personal threat, as shown in Figure 1 and 2). Collective identity threat refers to a situation where the motivations of the conflict challenge the identity of the state/nationhood, as in the case of ethnic territorial wars. Ethnic territorial wars attack the territorial integrity of a nation and existence of the politically powerful ethnic collective. States under attack, in response, frame the threat as a collective threat to nation via discourse, and rally the politically represented ethnic group around its symbols and leaders. Through this discourse, the insurgents who are perceived to be posing the collective threat (and personal threat) become enemies, and the state, its institutions and 

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9 Inasmuch as I consider the possibility that social and political trust may be empirically correlated (see section 2.5), my view is that political and social trust are theoretically distinct. Being so, institutional trust may be fundamental for legitimacy while interpersonal trust is necessary for a better functioning society.
actors are glorified in their eyes, which should increase political trust. Even when faced with a personal threat, because of the overarching collective threat people feel to the nation, their allegiance to the state should not swerve, and collective threat framing of the conflict should moderate the negative effect of the personal security threats on political trust. The meaning attributed to the nation via state discourse should supersede the value of human life. Politically weak ethnic groups should not subscribe to the discourse emphasizing collective threat for the nation and thus be more sympathetic to the counterhegemonic discourse of the insurgency, which in turn should lead to plummeting political trust.

To the extent that ethnic territorial conflict is geographically confined and the perpetrators easy to identify, it should not affect generalized interpersonal trust. However, both through the polarizing effect of state discourse emphasizing ethnic divisions, and through the personal security threats groups feel from influx of internally displaced populations, category-based out-group trust should diminish.

Ideological wars attack the government and the regime. The institutions and the actors are often targeted, crippling the state. Because ideological conflicts often do not feature a strong collective identity threat (as the threat is to the government, not to a defining feature of the nation), collective threat framing will be weak and personal security threat should determine trust. Threat to individual securities cast shadow on the capacity of the state and the government to protect and it decreases trust. Because the perpetrators are hard to distinguish, generalized interpersonal trust is undermined. Identity and context-contingencies, which are subject to change in the course of the war, further condition the individual responses to these threats.

The theory explains the mechanisms connecting armed conflict to each type of trust and elaborates on the nuanced effects of conflict on politically underrepresented groups.
Figure 1. Summary Diagram of the Theory _Ethnic Territorial Wars and Trust_

Note: The main mechanism between ethnic territorial wars and increasing political trust is the collective identity threat framing, whereas the main mechanism between ethnic territorial wars and decreasing out-group trust is the personal security threat. Yet, it is essential to emphasize that personal security threat is never independent of the overarching collective threat. They operate together to shape the perceptions of out-group members. The black dotted line extending from ethnic territorial wars means that the impact of these wars on personal securities will be less as compared to their impact on collective level threat. Out-group trust on the bottom right indicates that the category of social trust ethnic territorial wars have a significant effect on identity-based out-group trust.
Forms of Civil Violence | Mechanisms | Forms of Trust
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**Figure 2. Summary Diagram of the Theory_Ideological Wars and Trust**

Note: The main mechanism between nonethnic ideological wars and decreasing political trust and decreasing generalized interpersonal trust is the personal security threat. The theory presumes that because ideological wars feature less of a collective identity threat, framing of such threat will be weak. The thick line extending to generalized interpersonal trust indicates the most significant and strong effect of ideological wars will be on generalized trust over category_based trust. Out-group trust could also be affected if group distinctions are feasible.
This chapter starts with defining armed state conflict, clarifying the distinctions between ethnic and ideological wars, and delineating the scope conditions. Then, it lays out the theory of political trust in wartime, followed by the theory of social trust in wartime. The former theory pivots on the mechanism of threat, and after explaining the main parts of the theory; the section discusses implications of armed conflict for political legitimacy. The theory of social trust in wartime distinguishes between interpersonal and category-based trust and is centered on identities and context-contingency. In the last section, reciprocity of political and social trust is discussed.

2.1 Armed Intrastate Conflict

The scope of this work is protracted (more than 5 years) armed intrastate conflict/civil wars that emerged in context where one group dominates over the other(s). I define armed intrastate conflict as the intentional use of sustained violence, including armed force, between a government and a politically and militarily organized non-state entity for political goals within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign state. My definition of civil war follows Stathis Kalyvas who suggests that “when domestic political conflict takes the form of military confrontation or armed combat we speak of civil war” (2007, 416). Defined this broadly, civil wars are interchangeable with armed intrastate conflict, yet civil war definition varies substantially and is usually subject to many restrictions. Most definitions of civil war impose a fatality threshold to distinguish it from street crime or riots in terms of scale of violence.\footnote{An oft-used definition dates to the Correlates of War Project, which requires a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths in a single year for an internal conflict to be considered as a civil war. (Singer and Small 1972). Later, scholars relaxed this requirement because many cases that have the nature of a civil war were excluded due to arbitrarily high threshold of casualties, and it caused problems in coding the duration of the war, as even though the war is on, the number of battle-deaths does not always meet the threshold. To overcome such issues, some used the 1000 battle-deaths threshold for the whole duration of the war instead of one-year (Gleditsch et al. 2002); some combined both}
not employ any cumulative death threshold in my definition,\textsuperscript{11} as my goal is in part to theorize the effect of political violence graded by the intensity of violence.\textsuperscript{12}

I refer to non-state entities fighting with a government as \textit{insurgents}. Insurgents are non-state, armed factions that coercively challenge state authority, seek to redefine the political structure, and fight for sovereignty. Insurgents are often called rebels or depending on the time when they were active and the conjuncture of political order then, they may take politically charged names such as “revolutionaries,” “terrorists,” “freedom fighters” (Metelits 2010; Turk 2004). Semantics are part of the legitimacy game for political actors, and in my dissertation I use insurgents and rebels interchangeably while eschewing the use of politically charged terms.

I use the terms civil war, intrastate war, armed intrastate conflict interchangeably. An event that depicts an armed intrastate conflict may also be denoted as a case of internal conflict, rebellion, or domestic terrorism, so some conceptual clarification is in order. Armed intrastate conflict is subsumed under a broader category of internal conflicts, which encompasses any form of conflict ranging from hostility or dispute to violent fight over divisible or indivisible resources criteria by imposing at least 1000 war-related deaths in both at least a single year of the war and overall (Sambanis 2004), and others made it a bit stricter by imposing another threshold of 100 deaths every year on average (Fearon and Laitin 2003). See Sambanis (2004) for further examination of conceptual and empirical complexities of defining civil war.

\textsuperscript{11} The fact that arms are employed and used against the fighting parties for political reasons within a territory in a sustained fashion suffices to classify a case as intrastate political violence. Death every year is not a necessary requirement. Most cases of prolonged armed conflicts generate battle deaths, and number of deaths not being in a systematic fashion does not change the fact that the conflict is ongoing. Finally, because the violence exerted needs to be sustained, anomic or one-time events are outside of the scope of this project.

\textsuperscript{12} Other attempts at categorizing cases of violence by intensity also exist: Communal violence in Africa, for instance, is divided into four types by intensity and duration of the violence and the goal. Ethnic violence: “an event of short duration [...] in which two identifiable communal groups are antagonists in violence to secure some short-term goal”; irredentism, “an event in which an identifiable communal group seeks to change its political allegiance from the government of the territorial unit in which it resides to a political system, in which the authorities share the communal identification of the irredentist group concerned”; rebellion, “an event in which an identifiable communal group seeks by violence to gain increased autonomy from the national political authorities”; and civil war, “an event in which an identifiable communal group [...] seeks by violence to form a new political system based on boundaries of ethnic community” (Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden 1989, Fearon and Laitin 1996).
based on ethnic, religious, class, ideology or other material and immaterial factors within the boundaries of a recognized state territory.\textsuperscript{13} The nonviolent conflict (a dispute between parties which does not involve coercion or threat) may culminate into a violent one. My work focuses on the phase where the conflict is militarized (i.e. the phase of armed conflict).\textsuperscript{14}

Insurgent groups are often proscribed as terrorist.\textsuperscript{15} Conceptually, terrorism is a form of political violence with certain characteristics, most of which overlap with the definition of insurgency such as the use of purposive violence for political goals.\textsuperscript{16} The analytic distinction between terrorism and civil war then lies in distinguishing the strategy from the broader definition. I conceive of terrorism as one warfare strategy or tactic among others.\textsuperscript{17} Some cases of civil war may involve acts of terrorism, while others may not (Kalyvas 2004).\textsuperscript{18} Here I define insurgent terrorism as acts of violence perpetrated by nonstate actors for political goals, inflicted on a vulnerable group(s) to create a sense of threat, and to intimidate a wider target audience (it

\textsuperscript{13} It is important to distinguish violence from conflict as studying them may require separate theoretical frameworks (Brubaker and Laitin 1998).

\textsuperscript{14} Others scholars categorize the events according to the goal, intensity or duration of the violence. One example identifies four types of communal violence in Africa varying in these parameters: ethnic violence, irredentism, rebellion and civil war (Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden 1989).

\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, many insurgent groups cited in the civil war literature such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, Shining Path (PCP-SL) in Peru, Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the UK, the National Liberation Army (ELN) or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC_EP) in Colombia, and Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka are proscribed as terrorist groups by the EU and the US as well as the respective governments they are fighting with. Often it is in the interest of the state to denote a rebel group as terrorist, and sometimes international system dictates these norms. For instance, protracted secessionist conflicts, which were called ethnic conflicts in the 1990s, were renamed as terrorism following 9/11 (Murer 2012).

\textsuperscript{16} See Boyle (2012) for a thorough discussion of the study of terrorism as separate from the other kinds of political violence.

\textsuperscript{17} See Fortna (2015) for effectiveness of terrorism as a military tactic.

\textsuperscript{18} For instance, one study argues secessionist groups are more likely to employ terrorism (Pape 2005), although empirical evidence fails to support this argument (Fortna 2015). Similarly, religious conflicts, the geography of the terrain and gross domestic product per capita are argued to be linked to the likelihood of terrorism (Laitin and Shapiro 2008, Stanton 2013, Pape 2005). Jessica Stanton (2013) also shows that rebel groups challenging democratic governments are more likely to use terrorism as the sensitivity to civilian losses is expected to be higher in democracies, which increases the chances of concessions.
may be a national government, a rival group, a political party, civilians). The extent to which terrorist tactics are employed is relevant to personal threat, which will be explained in section 2.3.1.3.

### 2.1.1 Typology of Civil Wars

Disaggregating civil wars, though critical, is problematic as there are many layers to the character of a conflict. All attempts at classification must choose select criteria to achieve workable categories, and usually the research question drives criteria selection. I formulate my distinctions along the lines of master-cleavage: ethnic vs. ideological wars—a common way to disaggregate civil wars. Robinson (2001), for instance, identifies two cleavages: class and ethnicity – the two major organizing principles of most conflicts – and posits that ethnic conflict is qualitatively distinct from class conflict. Along the same lines, Nicholas Sambanis (2001) produced a seminal work distinguishing identity wars (ethnic and religious) from nonidentity wars (revolutionary and others). He finds that ethnic and nonethnic wars have different causes; ethnic heterogeneity and lack of democracy, which other scholars found to be insignificant for the onset of civil war, increase the likelihood of identity wars while it does not play a significant

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19 See Kalyvas (2007) and Newman (2014) for a thorough discussion of civil war types and difficulties facing attempts to categorize civil wars.

20 James Fearon (2004) identifies five types of civil wars where three of them are short, stemming from anti-colonial struggles, coups, revolutions, and collapse of regimes, notably the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and two of them are long, emerging from peripheral insurgencies—“civil wars involving rural guerilla bands typically operating near the state’s borders”— involving land or natural resource conflict or conflicts where the rebel group is financed through contraband (opium, diamonds or coca) (Fearon 2004, 277).

Others classify civil wars by the kind of warfare. One classical distinction is between conventional and irregular wars. In conventional wars, parties that are roughly symmetric in military power fight across defined frontlines. By contrast, irregular wars – also known as guerilla wars – are characterized by power asymmetries between the parties and nonstate combatants, and may involve active involvement of civilians (e.g. popular guerilla warfare). In most cases of civil wars these two are mixed; indeed it is quite rare to encounter employment of conventional warfare alone in civil wars – rare examples are Spanish and American Civil wars – even though it is the dominant form of warfare in interstate wars (Kalyvas 2005). Nearly half of civil wars since World War II were indeed fought as irregular wars (Balcells and Kalyvas 2007).
role in the onset of nonethnic wars (also see Besançon 2005; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Licklider 1995; Reynal-Querol 2002).

I define *ethnic wars*, following Brubaker and Laitin (1998), as armed intrastate conflicts where the insurgents brand themselves with an ethnic identity, and where the putative ethnic difference is fundamental to the conflict. I define *ideological wars* as armed intrastate conflicts over class or ideology.

Cleavage, however, is only one major aspect of a conflict that determines its character. What may appear as an ethno-nationalist conflict may, at its roots, be a manifestation of social and economic grievances. It is thus worthwhile to underscore that ethnic wars may have an ideological dimension, and non-ethnic wars may have an ethnic character. Take the example of Sendero in Peru: Sendero featured itself as a Maoist insurgency, and in most datasets that involve a typology the civil war in Peru is coded as a non-ethnic, ideological, revolutionary war. However, Sendero’s discourse was tied to the grievances of the indigenous groups even though the motive of the insurgency could not be defined around ethnic claims. The leadership mobilized and recruited from the indigenous people, and it waged its war, for the most part, in the indigenous-populated areas of Peru even though at no point it was possible to distinguish the two parties to the war by ethnic affiliation. That’s why we should heed Brubaker and Laitin.

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21 Worse yet, a simplistic categorization of a conflict may have strong policy implications and lead to wrong decisions as in the case of the Bosnian conflict where the label of “ethnic” civil war discouraged intervention (Newman 2014).

22 In the same vein, the conflict between The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government of Angola (dominated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – MPLA) was at first sight an ideological conflict. The UNITA branded itself as an anti-communist movement, and did not officially represent any ethnic group. Yet, UNITA was comprised primarily of Ovimbundu group members, while the government was comprised primarily of Mbundu group members (Collelo 1991). Conversely, the PKK in Turkey is an ethnic insurgency although they embrace Marxist principles. The PKK movement grew out of political as well as economic and social grievances, so class, ideology and ethnicity are inextricable components of the movement. Similarly, some quintessential examples of ethnic wars – such as Burundi’s Hutu-Tutsi conflict, or former-
(1998, 427) who advise to pay careful attention “to the forms and dynamics of ethnicization, to the many and subtle ways in which violence—and conditions, processes, activities, and narratives linked to violence—can take on ethnic hues” (see Murer 2012 for what is "ethnic" in ethnic conflicts). In my empirical analysis, I discuss the crosscutting dimensions essential to the warfare as they continue to be at play throughout conflict to eventually shape the outcomes of the war.

The motive of the insurgency also taps into the conflict character. Insurgencies may seek territorial control (various levels of self-determination) or a change in the government or political system at large. The motive is so integral to the character of the war that civil wars can be disaggregated along the lines of demand as governmental and territorial (Gleditsch et al. 2002). For definitions, I rely on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts project, where Governmental conflicts concern “the type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition while Territorial conflicts involve demands for secession or autonomy” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 619).

It is commonplace to hear that ethnic conflicts break out over territorial demands while class conflicts often seek governmental demands i.e. are more concerned with an overhaul of the system governing the country. Indeed, most separatist insurgencies are initiated by distinct ethnic minority groups (Bartusevičius 2016; Horowitz 1985). The temptation to think ethnic conflicts are tantamount to territorial conflicts, and ideological conflicts are the same as government

Yugoslavia’s conflict – had economic motivations (Bartusevičius 2016).

23 Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflicts dataset shows that since the WWII virtually two-thirds of all intrastate conflicts since 1946 have been challenges to the central government, the remaining being classified as territorial disputes (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Findings attest to the importance of this categorization: Buhaug (2006), for instance, shows that country size and ethnic fractionalization increase the likelihood of territorial conflicts, but not the likelihood of governmental conflicts.
conflicts is natural. Nevertheless, cases contrary to this logic abounds. Indeed, nearly half of all ethnic conflicts since World War II sought government control (Buhaug 2006, Table 1). Ethnic wars indeed diversify much more in terms of territorial vs. governmental aims (see Bartusevičius 2016; Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Here, I am concerned with ethnic territorial wars.

Why conflicts take on the character they do is an important question for the reasons behind the character of conflict continue to exert their impact to wartime and post-war dynamics. I call these reasons “causal antecedents of conflict.” My theory elaborates on the question of how civil wars lead to changes in trust, so the type of civil war or the conflict character is my independent variable. Nevertheless, the reasons behind the emergence of conflict i.e. the grievances that pave the way for conflict and the macro historical dynamics are as important factors in conflict character as the leadership of the insurgency, which eventually determine the type of war to be fought. The causal antecedents of conflict character are discussed in Chapter 4. Here, I focus on the link between civil war after its inception and trust.

2.2 Political Trust: Definition and Registers

Political trust entails a belief that political institutions and actors therein will keep their promises and protect the interest of the citizenry even in the absence of scrutiny (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). Political trust has strong theoretical relevance to legitimacy concerns (Easton 1975), and is integral to the day-to-day functioning of democratic governments (Uslaner 2002), such as securing citizen compliance with tax-paying (Fjeldstad 2004; Scholz and Lubell 1998).
governmental demands and regulations (Levi 1997). Trust is also instrumental in entrenching regime norms and maintaining political stability (Hutchison 2011).

From a culturalist standpoint, political trust is politically exogenous; it extends from general trust orientations (principally interpersonal trust), which are embedded in cultural norms and acquired through political socialization (cf. Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997). From an institutionalist perspective, however, political trust is endogenous to institutional performance (see e.g. Hetherington 1998). I do not consider these two perspectives as mutually exclusive, and employ both insights in my theory. I presume that citizens’ satisfaction with the political actors and institutions serve as a yardstick in evaluation of their performance evaluations, notwithstanding the role of learned trust and cultural norms that condition the judgments behind these evaluations.

Duties of the state involve fulfillment of basic services (e.g. security, education) and provision of necessities (welfare, infrastructure) and administrative functions. Provision of security is indeed an ultimate reason for conception of state. In the early social contract theories, such as of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the right to rule was granted to state in exchange for security from war (Milliken and Krause 2002).

26 See Hetherington (1998) and Hetherington (2005) for further details on political relevance of trust.

27 Early empirical works did not find the effect of declining trust levels in the late 1960s consequential on policy outputs, public opinion (Citrin 1974, Citrin and Green 1986), or political behaviour (Miller 1980, Pierce and Converse 1989). More recent literature, in contrast, provides conclusive evidence that changing trust in government has significant repercussions on domestic policy making (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, Rudolph and Evans 2005, Hetherington 2005), foreign policy and national defense preferences (Hetherington and Husser 2012), public opinion (Hetherington 1998) and vote choice (Hetherington 1999, Peterson and Wrighton 1998, Southwell and Everest 1998). The immense volume of these studies well establishes the political relevance of political trust (see Hetherington 1998, Hetherington 2005 for a detailed explanation on the political relevance of trust), and justifies treating political trust as a dependent variable.
2.3 Impact of Political Violence on Political Trust

Political violence poses threat to security, identities, the authorities, and the institutions. In times of armed conflict, performance of the state with respect to provision of state services (the basics being security, order and general welfare) may be compromised. Long-term conflicts may also impinge on the cultural norms by changing citizen-state relationship. A state whose authority is challenged by an organized armed group and who has lost monopoly of coercion has to justify its rule and maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Even if the group that rises against the state authority is very small in numbers, the disorder it generates will have repercussions on political attitudes and behaviour.28

Most of the empirical work on political violence and political trust is situated in the terrorism literature.29 The dominant argument suggests an increase in political trust as a result of terrorism (e.g. Chanley 2002; Hutchison and Johnson 2011; Putnam 2002; Schubert, Stewart, and Curran 2002). These findings are closely related to the “rally-round-the-flag” effect—a sudden and a dramatic rise in public support in response to military and diplomatic crisis—first

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28 In the realm of political behaviour, most studies find positive effects of exposure to violence on political engagement, which are again explained by post-traumatic growth theory (Powell et al. 2003, Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004). Bellows and Miguel (2009), for example, show that war victims (by displacement and family deaths) are more likely to cast a ballot, be politically mobilized, and partake in local collective action (attending community meetings etc.) in Sierra Leone. Along the same lines, Wood (2003) observes that government violence in El Salvador prompted its victims to support and even join opposition forces out of moral outrage. Analogously, Blattman (2009) finds that abduction of children in Northern Uganda leads to substantial increases in voting and community leadership, largely due to elevated levels of violence witnessed. Palestinians surviving aerial attacks are also found to be more political active (Punamäki, Quta, and El Sarraj 1997). The terrorism literature harbours insights on the changes in voting behaviour induced by conflict (Berrebi and Klor 2006, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, Dunning 2011, Kibris 2011, Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014). Also see (Holmes and De Piñeres 2002, Bali 2007, Siqueira and Sandler 2007, Berrebi and Klor 2008, Gould and Klor 2009, Montalvo 2011, Hersh 2013, Weintraub, Vargas, and Flores 2015).

formulated by John Mueller (1973).\textsuperscript{30} Even though rallying literature largely focuses on presidential approval, it has long been argued that political trust is, in large part, a function of presidential approval (Citrin 1974; Citrin and Green 1986).\textsuperscript{31}

Against the average positive effect of terrorism comes a myriad of other studies proposing conditional effects of terrorism on political trust or presidential approval. For instance, Edwards and Swenson (1997) argue that only certain groups, such as those who are already prone to support the president, will rally. Baum (2002) asserts that the most ambivalent groups, those with a touch of disapproval for the incumbent government and with moderate political awareness, are most likely to rally behind a president. Others suggest that the effect differs across types of political institutions (Dinesen and Jæger 2013). There are also some studies from outside of the US which shows a decrease in political trust (e.g. Gates and Justesen 2013; Montalvo 2011) or imply decline in trust (e.g. Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau 2008; Montalvo 2011) as a result of terrorism. However, most of the terrorism literature looks at the impact of a singular attack rather than the effect of continuous attacks, which is what civil wars characteristically feature (see Stanton 2013).

All these works cited so far focus on international terrorism, yet civil wars feature domestic terrorism. Studies focusing on domestic attacks often demonstrate negative effects. Hutchison and Johnson (2011), in their aggregate cross-national study on 16 African countries, 

\textsuperscript{30} Although Mueller (1973) does not list terrorism among the events that can trigger a rally, his description of crises—“specific, dramatic and sharply focused” and pertinent to national security (Mueller 1973, p.209)—applies to terrorism (Chowanietz 2010). Mueller argues that sudden military interventions, major military developments in ongoing wars, major diplomatic developments, dramatic technological developments, meetings between the US president and leaders of other major powers, and the inauguration of each presidential term can trigger a rally.

\textsuperscript{31} Recent empirical studies also confirm that they go hand-in-hand: When public trust decreases, approval ratings also drop (Brody 1991, Hetherington 1998) and vice versa (Hetherington 1998), notwithstanding the occasional exceptions (Hetherington 2005). Chatagnier (2012) also finds that the rallying effect augments political trust.
find internal political violence to be deleterious to political trust (measured as generalized trust in government). Similarly, attacks by Tuaregs against the Malian state had detrimental effects on people’s trust in the national president (Gates and Justesen 2013). More evidence of negative effect comes from the Nepalese Civil War in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, where exposure to violence has been found to reduce trust in the national government (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). Others contend that the effect of terrorism on political trust is conditional on party or context. Arce (2003), for instance, finds that the subversive acts of Shining Path in Peru decreased support for the left-wing government, and did not necessarily undermine the support for the right-wing government. Chowanietz (2010), on the other hand, contends that the party effect is context-dependent: in the UK, France, and the US, right-wing parties benefited more from rallies, while in Spain it was the left-wing party that enjoyed the rally effect more.\footnote{The sample in this study includes a mix of domestic and international terrorism.}

The divergence in effects of international and domestic terrorism is usually attributed to the source of threat they pose, where the former features external threat and the latter an internal one, and my theory is inspired by this distinction.\footnote{Starting with the Samuel Stouffer's work in 1955, it is known that perception of threat is a significant spur behind attitudes and beliefs. Studies consistently show the direct effect of threat perception on decreasing political tolerance (Arwine and Mayer 2014, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), changing voting choices (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), and inducing authoritarianism, and altering policy preferences (Gadarian 2010, Gordon and Arian 2001, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Huddy et al. 2005, Kam and Kinder 2007).} External threat stems from a source that is beyond the control of the government, rendering the government and the state vulnerable in the eyes of the citizens. Also, threat coming from an outside source magnifies the perceptions of ingroup homogeneity (Rothgerber 1997; also see Hetherington and Rudolph 2008), which fosters a sense of collectivity in the public. In the face of an external collective threat, people search for a charismatic leader as a coping mechanism (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; also see Berinsky
2009). They are more inclined to turn to the government as the legitimate actor that can respond to threat (Willer 2004), per social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and tend to collectively lend in more political trust (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008; Mueller 1973). Oppositional elite voices are also usually muted as the information pertaining to external threat is limited, and elites tend to eschew appearing unpatriotic (Brody 1991).

Internal threat induced by domestic attacks originates from an insurgent group inside the territory, most likely stemming from political or economic grievances. Since the threat originates from within the territory, spurred by factors that the state, in theory, is responsible for, citizens may perceive domestic attacks as being more easily preventable. Put differently, when the source of the threat is homegrown, people may blame the government for not ensuring internal security. Furthermore, the competing elites are usually more vocal and critical (Chowanietz 2010), unlike in the case of international terrorism, where the silence of the opposition reinforces government’s handling of the threat. Even though the elites may denounce the terrorist act, the culpability of the government often underlies their interpretation of the attack. Moreover, a unified collective support from the public is usually missing in domestic crises, since these are usually a surfacing of an underlying societal issue and are more likely to exacerbate the internal discord (Mueller 1973).

I argue in the case of civil wars that the dynamics of external threat may be present. Whether the internal threat is secessionist or ideological in nature is important. Hutchison & Gibler (2007), for example, show that territorial issues bear greater significance domestically than other types of international issues. Ethnic territorial conflicts may distort the perception of internal threat. Even though the threat is homegrown, it may cause an illusion of an external threat; the internal group’s desire to secede may be perceived as an out-group posing an external
threat. Inspired by these insights, I construct my theory below.

2.3.1 Theory of Political Trust in Wartime

My theory of political trust in wartime is based on the following propositions. I begin with the assumption that threat is the main mechanism through which causal impulses for trust are affected. Threat and fear are psychological phenomena that are tightly linked to basic needs of security. Loss of security is a causal impulse that will impinge on people’s evaluation of government’s performance as well as feelings towards/judgment about other individuals (see Figure 3). I conceptualize the threat conflicts may pose on two levels: collective and individual/personal level, following Huddy et al. (2005).

![Figure 3. Conflict and Political Trust: Crude Mechanisms](image)

I argue that it is the collective threat framing that determines how civil wars will impinge on political trust. Collective-level threat is the threat the state or the regime is facing and it may be internal or external. Based on my inductive insight from my case studies (see Chapter 4), I propose that wars posing threat to the identity of the state/nation are more likely to induce a

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34 Starting with the Samuel Stouffer’s work in 1955, it is known that perception of threat is a significant spur behind attitudes and beliefs. Studies consistently show the direct effect of threat perception on decreasing political tolerance (Arwine and Mayer 2014, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), changing voting choices (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), and inducing authoritarianism, and altering policy preferences (Gadarian 2010, Gordon and Arian 2001, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Huddy et al. 2005, Kam and Kinder 2007).
strong collective threat framing by the state, assuming that the insurgents are considered militarily strong.\textsuperscript{35} In contexts where collective threat is pervasive and the nation’s identity is at stake, collective threat should drive the trust reactions, which tend to rally people around the flag. I should emphasize that collective threat framing is different from the act of denouncing the insurgents as terrorism. State elites often benefit from framing the threat as external and demonizing the insurgents as “enemies” in the eyes of the public in order to fortify their authority and legitimacy (Vasquez 1993). However, discursive framing of the threat they pose and the extent to which the conflict is depicted as a national matter underpins the concept of collective threat framing here.

Following Hetherington and Suhay (2011), I propose personal physical threat as an important component of perceived threat (also see Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003). Personal threat is the threat an individual perceives as threat to her and her family’s security, bodily rights, and property. One psychological process underlying personal physical threat is mortality salience such as heightened concerns about death (see Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986 for mortality salience), extending from fear (see Mueller 2006; Mythen and Walklate 2006 for culture of fear). \textit{When individuals feel personal threat, regardless of the perpetrator, their baseline evaluation of government performance in providing them with security will be negative, which should result in decrease in trust. Collective threat framing has, however, stronger effects on trust calculations, and such framing should boost political trust in}

\textsuperscript{35} The magnitude and severity of the threat that insurgents pose to the state also depends on the power balance between the warring parties. The state may downplay the importance of the insurgency. This may especially be the case if the insurgents are considered weak allowing the state to be dismissive of their actions or if there is power symmetry between the state’s and the insurgency’s military capacity— not to appear weak to the public.
absence of personal threat, and should moderate the negative effect of personal threat if the feared perpetrator is the insurgents (see section 2.3.1.3 for details).

2.3.1.1 Conflict Character, Threat and Micro-Level Repercussions on Trust

I suggest that ethnic territorial conflicts usually threaten the identity of the nation because secessionist claims challenge the territorial integrity that defines a nation-state while ideological conflicts only pose a kindred threat when they emerge in countries that identify with a particular ideology or regime type, as in the cases of the Soviet Union, Cuba, or the United States. My theory also suggests that the structure of civil conflicts is itself endogenous to features of state formation. I draw on my inductive insights from the conflicts in Turkey and Peru to suggest that grievances that led to the onset of insurgencies extend from nation-building (See Chapter 4 for inductive case studies). The dynamics inherent to nation-building also shape the discursive framework employed by the state to respond to the conflict. Ideology and strategies of nation-building mould societal forces, political groups, and the political landscape of the country for many years to come (See Chapter 4).

In the case of secessionist territorial conflicts, the state produces a discourse of threat against national unity and capitalizes on agitation to galvanize people to support itself in the face of an existential threat to its territorial integrity and nationhood (see 2.3.1.2 on Discourse). It should marshal all nationalist and ideological tools at its disposal to construct a discourse around national unity, portraying the insurgency as a collective threat, and rally the general public around status quo political institutions. For those identifying with the nation, this collective threat framing should have a strong rallying effect around the state throughout the conflict as long as the emphasis on collective threat continues. The underlying psychological mechanism is likely that the ethnic group represented by the state (politically powerful ethnic group) tends to
perceive the internal threat posed by another co-national ethnic group (often an ethnic minority) as an external threat, and turn to the actors representing itself and rely on them. Even when faced with a personal threat, because of the overarching collective threat they feel to the nation, their allegiance to the state does not swerve. The insurgents who are perceived to be posing a personal threat become enemies, and it glorifies the state in their eyes even further. If that is the case, personal threat should even solidify their attachments to the state and lead to higher political trust. The meaning attributed to the nation via state discourse overwhelms the value of human life.

The underrepresented/politically weak ethnic group will undergo a different process.36 As long as they subscribe to their ethnic identity, collective threat framing generated by the state should not resonate with them as they do not consider themselves as part of the collectivity of the politically represented ethnic group, thus rallying around national institutions should be less appealing. In the absence of personal threat, the conflict should not directly lead to any change in their political trust. Often, the ethnic groups claimed to be represented by the insurgency are influenced by the counterhegemonic discourse of the insurgency. This discourse and heightened salience of their ethnic identity could turn them against the state. When under high personal threat, their distrust in the state and political institutions will be aggravated. Remote co-ethnics would be indirectly affected by the sufferings of their people in these territories through ethnic bonds and insurgency discourse (see section 2.3.1.2 for discourses and section 2.3.1.5 for identities).

36 Salience of social identities is subject to change. See the section on “Identities” for a discussion on identity transformations during wartime.
In the case of ideological conflicts, for a state to marshal ideological tools to evoke patriotic sentiments to rally people, it needs to strongly identify with a particular regime. Nations identifying themselves with a particular regime (democracy, communism, fascism etc.) would be better able to weather attacks to the regime by rallying the public around the nationalist ideological tools. Nations without a clear regime or ideological identity, or that are experimenting with a new regime do not have such national ideological tools at their disposal and hence are more vulnerable to ideological threats and attacks to the regime, and they are less motivated to frame the insurgency as a collective threat as it may weaken their appearance. In such nations without a strong regime identity, I contend that collective threat framing of ideological wars will be weak.

In the absence of strong collective threat framing, personal threat should determine the trust calculations. When under personal threat (especially low intensity), the baseline evaluation of government performance in providing security should be negative, as suggested above, which will result in decrease in trust. Because there is no strong overarching collective threat, there is no force to offset the negative effect of personal threat. Prolonged extreme conditions of insecurity hurt the perception that state is doing one of its most fundamental jobs— protecting its citizens. When the collective threat framing is not strong, individuals tend

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37 It is thus worth to underscore that ethnic wars may have an ideological dimension, and non-ethnic wars may have an ethnic character. What may appear as an ethno-nationalist conflict may, at its roots, be a manifestation of social and economic grievances. Take the example of Sendero in Peru: Sendero featured itself as a Maoist insurgency, and in most datasets that involve a typology the civil war in Peru is coded as a non-ethnic, ideological, revolutionary war. However, Sendero’s discourse was tied to and intended to speak to the grievances of the indigenous groups. The leadership mobilized and recruited predominantly from the indigenous people, and it waged its war, for the most part, in the indigenous-populated areas of Peru. In the same vein, the conflict between The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government of Angola (dominated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)) was at first sight an ideological conflict. The UNITA branded itself as an anti-communist movement, and did not officially represent any ethnic group. Yet, UNITA was comprised primarily of Ovimbundu group members, while the government was comprised primarily of Mbundu group members (Collelo 1991).
to perceive their precarious security conditions more personally and lose their trust in state’s ability to protect.

Nevertheless, the fact that personal threat is ubiquitous induces a sense of collective threat, even when the state does not frame the threat of insurgency as a collective threat. The fear that the insecurity may persist long and that the idea that state of fear may be the norm pushes people towards the state and previous status quo. Works in psychology find that pervasive threat induces conservative shifts among all people, enhancing authoritarian and patriotic tendencies (e.g. Jost et al. 2003; Nail et al. 2009). Increasing authoritarianism signifies higher submission to authorities (Altemeyer 1981). Thus I hypothesize that: As the level and scope of personal threat intensifies, individuals will gradually begin to perceive a more ubiquitous threat generating a sense of collective threat, and feeling of collective threat should moderate the negative effect of personal threat on political trust.38

Cognitive dissonance is what lies behind the seemingly paradoxical response to extreme insecurities, for instance, by supporting the state at the expense of personal or collective interests. The System Justification Theory, drawing on the dissonance theory (Jost and Banaji 1994), posits that people facing threat are motivated to cognitively justify the prevailing system because of the need for order and stability; furthermore, ideologies underlying this motive act as tools to weather existential anxiety (Jost and Hunyady 2003). Members of disadvantaged groups may entertain similar justification processes for the status quo even though it is in contradiction with their personal interests (Jost and Hunyady 2003). Some of the

38 Conflict may also affect attitudes and orientations of bystanders through interpersonal communication, which is shown to be as effective as mass media in supply of information and public opinion formation (Yang and Stone 2003). Speaking to the victims, especially in contexts where identity polarization is blatant and groups are defined along identity lines, could alter the cognitive processing of conflict and thus attitudes for bystanders.
underlying reasons behind such expressions of conservatism are: “epistemic (need for order and closure, cognitive complexity, etc.), existential (fear, terror management, anger, self-esteem, etc.) and ideological (system justification, group dominance, social dominance, etc.)” (Echabe and Guede 2006, 260).

My theory distinguishes between political trust and legitimacy. I conceptualize legitimacy as a higher order concept than trust, and don’t expect lower political trust observed under conditions of high personal insecurity to necessarily damage state’s legitimacy. Legitimacy is most likely to be affected when political trust is damaged more permanently, and when recognition of state’s authority to govern is at stake rather than short-term or transient failures to provide security. Decreasing political trust is not tantamount to loss of legitimacy. Physical insecurity does not immediately lead to a loss of legitimacy. Ontological insecurity, however, entails a loss of legitimacy as explained in section 2.3.1.4.

Below, I further expound the logic of the theory and causal mechanisms by unfolding each connecting part of the theory. I start with the mechanisms of discourse and collective threat framing. Next, I discuss how individuals’ personal security risk perceptions are formed, distinguishing between physical and ontological security. Following that, implications of threat on political legitimacy are spelled out. Before presenting the theory of social trust in wartime, I offer a discussion on the role of identities and identity transformation, which affects how individuals process information about political institutions, actors and their performances, and how they perceive individual, group and national/collective threat.

2.3.1.2 Generation of Discourses and Collective Threat Framing

I define discourse here as a “social and political construction that establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which
social agents can identify” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 3-4). Official discourses of a party involved in a conflict usually aim to delegitimize the other party (or parties) while justifying their own actions, however violent those actions may be. These discourses serve as a frame of reference for the public and play major roles in threat framing and opinion formation, and they may condition or aggravate attitudinal responses.

Discursive frames pertaining to the dynamics of war emanate from the historical narratives used to explain the interaction of the parties involved in the conflict, as well as from considerations of national identity, context-specific parameters, and, most importantly, conflict character. Armed conflict assumes its character in response to the historical grievances at play and in accordance with the political orientations of the insurgency leadership. Though each case of armed conflict is unique, we can observe parallels in the discursive formations in conflicts of a similar character. For example, ethnic territorial conflicts tend to evoke a nationalist discourse by the state, while nonethnic ideological conflicts are more likely to spur a discourse rooted more around the identity of the state and the regime. Yet, the qualitative content of such discourses will vary because of differences in context, historical antecedents, and the particular dynamics of the conflicts.

The assumption is that for an insurgency to be threatening, political elites need to attribute national political salience to the insurgency. Media coverage and elite rhetoric are critical in attributing national significance to an event and shaping the public’s national importance judgments (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller 1980; MacKuen and Coombs 1981). National importance judgments have political consequences, and it is reasonable to expect them to influence political trust (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008). As an issue becomes nationally significant, the public will be more attentive to the performance of the
government in dealing with the issue and will adjust their trust levels accordingly. The larger the number of people naming an issue as nationally important, the more performance evaluations will influence political trust (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008).

Once an issue gains national importance, elites generate a discourse to frame the issue. The official discourse of a state facing a separatist insurgency often frames the issue as an existential threat to the nation and use emotional appeals to spur a sense of unity around a national collective goal of keeping the nation together. Often the nation-states have a plethora of available tools and national symbols geared towards exploiting emotional ties to the nation. Many states invest in parades, celebrations of national days and deploy national anthems, historical myths, flags and military uniforms to fashion national identity as part of nation-building (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999; Sears 1993). By producing a discourse pivoted around an existential threat to the nation and utilizing such national symbols, states may incite nationalist mobilization.

In ethnic territorial conflicts, the effect of secession is more restricted to a bounded territory. In non-ethnic ideological conflicts, the threat is to the regime or the state. Effectively, it relates to every citizen of the country where the insurgency occurs, as the change in regime will impact them all personally. However, unless a certain ideology is embedded in nationalist symbols, states that are under attack from an ideological insurgency do not have commensurate ideological tools to induce a similar nationalist support at a collective level.

The extent to which elite-generated discourses are communicated to and find resonance within the public is also crucial to consider. In wartime, it is of primary interest for the state to disseminate its official discourse on the conflict (describing its nature, its threats and its reasons) and the media are key in these communications (see Gamson and Modigliani 1989). Research
consistently shows the media’s role in agenda setting, as well as priming, and framing, referring to the ability of news coverage to highlight the importance of political issues and political judgments (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Soroka 2002; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Kinder and Iyengar 1987; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). The way the mass media communicate information on an ongoing conflict is consequential on public opinion about the war (Gadarian 2010). That’s why elites often use the mass media to convey their opinion or discourse.

To what extent the media will regenerate or perpetuate this discourse (by enhancing the visibility of the official discourse), or challenge it hinges upon the media’s capacity, relationship with the state, and press freedoms. In most democratizing countries (the “grey-zone” countries—so-called semi-democracies), the freedom of the media is limited. In transitioning regimes particularly, an independent media is usually an aspiration rather than a norm. The mass media networks are often coopted into the state’s domination mechanism.

Nevertheless, the media is not just a tool at the elite’s disposal; it has its own interests. For instance, the media benefits from sensationalist coverage, which tends to overblow events and embellish stories with evocative imageries and exploitation of emotions. The emotional cues in news media usually accentuate threat. Especially in contexts where investigative research is hampered such sensationalist coverage may be appealing to make up for the paucity of in-depth information on the conflict.

Media representations are vital for bystanders’ attitude formations. In civil war contexts where the media freedoms are curtailed and coverage of the news is strictly censored, public

39 Though the research on media effects on opinion and policy preferences mostly focuses on foreign policy coverage, and the outcome variable is usually public support for war, the pillars of the theories in this literature are applicable to public opinion on domestic policy issues.
access to both a true account of the conflict and balanced information and assessment of it is
highly restricted. The same scenario is valid for cases where the media lacks the capacity to
undertake independent investigative reporting.

2.3.1.2.1 Clash of Discourses

Against the hegemonic state discourse, insurgent discourse may unearth silent memories from
the past and arouse them. Past grievances are usually the instigator of insurgent movements and
spreading these historical grievances is an important goal of an insurgency in order to legitimize
its mission. While challenging the hegemonic state discourse at the macro level underlies this
goal, bringing the collective memories to light takes place at the meso level (community and
group-level), new discourses emerge. New memories created during an armed conflict along
with the history of repression are also quickly integrated into the narrative and the conflict
updates the collective memory. Despite high levels of collaboration between official historians
and state officials, alternative sources of historiographic knowledge have consistently challenged
the hegemonic discourses on memory (Bevernage 2010). Critical historians, civic human rights
initiatives, and of course, community elders with “unofficial” stories make it possible to resist
the totalizing tendencies of official history (Bickford 2007; Evans 2002).  

While the state discourse is likely to find resonance among those who are represented by
the central political institutions, insurgent discourse is likely to spread among the politically
weak/underrepresented groups, to marshall support for the rebellion, and decrease the
sympathizers’ political trust. Social representations of the past in the insurgent discourse

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I should note that the local memories are not necessarily in line with the cleavages of the conflict because local
cleavages are not always parallel to the national cleavages. As Wood argues: “What appears at the national level to
be the key issue—for example, class relations, constitutions, or ethnic secession—may not be salient at the local
level, which may be dominated by conflicts” (Wood 2008, 547).
influence feelings, desires and actions of the disadvantaged groups (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Liu et al. 1999), affecting the construction of who they are. Inasmuch as social representations play a big role in construction of social identities, social identity affects social representations (Breakwell 2001; Moloney and Walker 2007). The literature on collective memory and collective identity echoes the same mutually constitutive relationship between the two (Olick and Robbins 1998) (also see section 2.3.1.5).

2.3.1.3 On Personal Threat

How do people calculate the threat they are facing? What goes into the perception of risk? Individual interpretations may vary even though the type and magnitude of violence they are exposed to or they construe is the same. The literature on civilian targeting has very useful insights on this point. Scholars suggest that violence may have contrasting effects on civilian support depending on the nature of the violence (indiscriminate vs. selective), the intentionality attributed to it, the precision with which violence is applied, and the identity of the perpetrator (Downes 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013).

Personal physical insecurity is the focus in the aforementioned literature, but ontological insecurity is as important to perceived threat as physical insecurity. Physical security entails protection of the body against threats that may harm—personal threat implies an expected breach of physical security. Ontological security entails protection of identity and personhood from threats. I borrow the term ontological security from Anthony Giddens, and international relations scholars who build on his work. Ontological security denotes the need to experience stability in the cognitive environment and feel like a continuous and whole person in time, which is essential
for individual agency (Mitzen 2006). When an individual is surrounded by deep uncertainty, she feels threat to the security of her being and self.41

I suggest that loss of physical vs. ontological security is associated with different consequences for political trust. Individuals who do not feel physical security at certain times during the war do not necessarily lose their trust; the process is neither automatic nor simple. People factor in both the availability of alternative authorities on which to confer legitimacy as well as their ontological security (state’s performance/intention in providing them with identity security and the social representations for past relations with the state as well as state’s efforts and intentions in providing physical security). Hence, a person who never felt threat to their physical security may lose their political trust because of ontological insecurity while a person who was under complete physical insecurity may lend higher political support because of resonating with the collective threat framing of the state. Ontological insecurity has consequences that are more far-reaching. Individuals who lose their ontological security due to conflict should not confer any legitimacy to the state, or authorities, or even the regime (See section 2.3.1.4).

2.3.1.3.1 Determinants of Personal Threat

The repertoire of violence deployed by insurgent groups and the state influences perceived personal threat. The methods insurgents or the state use, which may range from primitive arms such as machetes to car bombs or suicide bombing, may compound the perception of risk. An

41 Jennifer Mitzen (2006, 345) articulates that:

Ontological insecurity refers to the deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore, i.e. how to get by in the world. When there is ontological insecurity, the individual’s energy is consumed meeting immediate needs… Ontological security, in contrast, is the condition that obtains when an individual has confident expectations, even if probabilistic, about the means– ends relationships that govern her social life. Armed with ontological security, the individual will know how to act and therefore how to be herself.
insurgency (such as Sendero) that engages in urban warfare with car bombs poses a different menu of threat to the general public than an insurgency that fights with an organized professional army in rural areas such as the PKK. Patterns of violence, oscillating between selective and indiscriminate, are just as important as the methods. The repertoire of violence, organizational capacity, and relative strength of the insurgency vis-à-vis the state, all together, condition or aggravate the insecurities individuals feel.

Of course, insurgents are not the only party that may pose individual-level threat. State violence is very common in civil wars. The state may resort to violence to protect its own security at the expense of individual securities. Buzan (1983, 31) contends that the contradiction between individual and state security is unavoidable and is “rooted in the nature of political collectives.” A belligerent state may violate the rights of its very own citizens to protect its self-interest and pose security risks. The counter-insurgency tactics may aggravate the grievances of the same group whose identity and other rights have already been violated. State violence, exercised to protect its sovereignty, may be the biggest threat to its legitimacy. This is observed in many intra-state conflicts. Protracted clashes between Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, between Ladinos and indigenous groups in Guatemala, between Turks and Kurds in Turkey, all contain forms of state violence.

Kalyvas (2007) argues that indiscriminate violence will induce feeling of insecurity and distrust much more than selective violence, and I think this is true for violence perpetrated by the state and the insurgents for social trust. If the state is an agent of indiscriminate violence against civilians, I expect it to have heavy repercussions on political legitimacy, which I discuss below.
2.3.1.4 Implications of Threat on Political Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is relevant to my theory as I suggest that threat has implications not only for political trust but also legitimacy. Political legitimacy is accorded a vital role in the maintenance of regimes or states as well as understanding the change in them (Easton 1957; Weber 1978), notwithstanding the critiques (Przeworski 1986). Its importance, in large part, stems from its link with obedience and hence the potential to reduce violence. Once the authority justifies itself and garners the support of the citizens, citizens will comply with the laws and regulations and the authority, and motivation for rebellion will be obviated. Political trust is often employed to operationalize legitimacy. Yet, I suggest it is a concept of a higher order, decline of which carries stronger implications for the survival of the regime than political trust.

I define political legitimacy here as the conviction of the governed that the ruler has rightful authority to govern and that they are bound to obey (Alagappa 1995; Gilley 2006). Justification of authority is ascribed an integral role in the conception of legitimacy by many theorists (e.g. Beetham 1991; Buchanan 2002; Krehoff 2008). Components of justification are sometimes described as moral and performance legitimacy (Williams 2010), which tap into “diffuse” and “specific” political support, respectively (Easton 1965). While diffuse political support represents a conviction about moral conformism between the functioning of the government and individuals’ principles about what is right, specific political support refers to performance evaluations. Moral legitimacy is inherently linked to performance legitimacy. Bad performance of governments in providing basic services

42 Other aspects of power that needs to be legitimated for the public to have the conviction that the authority in a modern state has political rightfulness are legality of acquisition and exercise of power (constitutional legality), and of consent to power (Beetham 1991, Gilley 2006).
will have repercussions on the moral legitimacy of the state. The question is how a government error would reflect on the legitimacy of the state? Easton posits that “dissatisfaction with the authorities may be of sufficient duration and of sufficient intensity to breed a more generalized feeling than the authorities…. [So it is possible that] loss of specific support for political authorities - the incumbents of roles - has thereby become converted into a decline in support for one part of the regime: the authority roles” (1975, p.449).

I argue that during wartime, when an individual or group feels ontological insecurity, the moral legitimacy of the government and the state should be damaged. Ontological insecurity operates differently from physical insecurity. It is very likely that some citizens feel personal threat from the state security forces, and those cases are when ontological security is shaken. Perception of ontological security is heavily conditioned by the discourse of the insurgency, collective memory, and group identities. Even in the absence of conceivable threat to self, people may feel ontologically insecure if their collective identities are under threat or if they feel the state does not have sincere intentions to protect them. Ontological insecurity may emanate from group-level threat depending on the state’s actions and intentions towards the group. Individuals who feel ontological insecurity not only should hold negative evaluations about the performance of the state in security provision but also question the authority of the state authority.

2.3.1.5 Identities, Group Influence, and Political Opinions

Identity crosscuts all processes linked to conflict and mediates the effects of conflict on trust on every level. Identity is “a crucial social-cognitive mediator that enables people to comprehend and act in their social worlds as self-conscious and motivated agents” (Simon 2008, 41). It is important to discuss identity because, as a great number of works demonstrate, subjective group membership is an important variable in shaping political attitudes and behaviour (Campbell et al.
The relevance of identity to this dissertation, in large part, stems from the centrality of identity in individual attitude formation as elaborated in reference group theory, and its sibling, social identity theory. Seminal works in the early American public opinion literature offered group reference points as a source people draw on to make meaningful political decisions (see Converse 1964). Individuals construct groups by placing themselves in one (in-group), and setting apart those they dislike in another (out-group). Using affection towards groups as reference cues, individuals can comprehend the political world, make political judgments on complex issues and form their attitudes (Brady and Sniderman 1985). Social identity theory echoes the insights of the reference group theory and attributes crucial role to social groups. Social identity, according to the founding father of the theory Henri Tajfel (1981, 285) is predicated upon “knowledge of membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” Again, ordinary individuals use their membership in a group to make sense of the political world.

Works in social psychology have already shown that socially shared representations of history sway peoples, with objectively akin interests, to adopt qualitatively distinct attitudes with respect to issues of international politics and internal diversity (Liu and Hilton 2005). Liu and László (2007, 86) contend that “the same political situation could engender quite a different probability space of responses from different peoples, depending on their representations of the historical experiences that have shaped them as a people.” Building on these accounts, I suggest that there would be multiple different interpretations of the same event since memories of victims and bystanders, as products of their subjective interpretations, are in constant interaction with social identities and memory frameworks.
In this dissertation, identity transformation due to conflict (especially an ethnic one) serves as one of the mechanisms through which civil war exerts influence on trust. Identities change the lens through which one sees the political institutions; alter the framework through which one processes the past; and affect the collective memories one subscribes to. As an individual undergoes identity change, she positions herself differently vis-à-vis the society and the state and perceives the political system, actors and other ethnic groups differently. This change in perspective ultimately affects political and social trust.

2.3.1.5.1 Identities in the Face of Armed Conflict

Armed conflict shapes identities by restructuring the extant ethnic or ideological or social groupings. New groups may be reconstructed because of the conflict. Construction of identities is embedded in a growing number of studies as an outcome of war. Smith (1981) spearheaded the systematic work on how wars affect the formation and cohesion of ethnic communities, building on Simmel’s (1964) path-breaking work on conflict. Brubaker (2004) also underscores that high levels of groupness may be more a result of conflict (especially violent conflict) than its underlying cause. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Bauhaug (2013) also consider the possibility of identity crystallizations as a result of conflict rather than the reverse sequence in their analysis of conflict processes. Balcells’s (2012) work on the role of victimization in generation of new political identities or redefinition of existing ones also speaks to the same pattern.

In my theory of political trust in wartime, identity transformation is an important mechanism as conflict alters trust attitudes by changing identities as well. In the course of a conflict, identities crystallize and are realigned around the main cleavages of the war, and individuals may change the way they perceive the war events if they adopt new identities. For instance, I encountered many ethnic Kurds in Turkey who came to identify themselves as
Kurdish only as a result of the Kurdish insurgency, and who altered their perception of the state and of their co-ethnics and ethnic Turks. I argue that the interplay between social representations, collective memory, and social identities reflects on trust attitudes by reinforcing reconstruction of social groups. Individuals, by crystallizing their social identities in the face of the new dynamics and discourses imposed by the conflict, may reconstruct their attitudes.

2.4 Armed Conflict and Social Trust

Trust requires a belief that others will not deliberately harm you, which contrasts with the wartime experiences where purposeful harm inflicted on others is part and parcel of life.

Generalized social trust is an important building block for large-scale, complex, interconnected social networks and institutions, and therefore is a key disposition for generating social capital. It also underwrites other essential dispositions for democratic culture such as tolerance (see Warren 1999). I also look at category-based trust, also called identity or group-based trust (Freitag and Bauer 2013; Kramer 1999; Stolle 2002). This conception of trust extends from the social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979), and identification lies at the center of it. Category-based trust entails trusting a person with whom one has an identity link even though there is no personal relationship. The logic is that people are more prone to trust those with whom they share a group identity or social category than others (Freitag and Bauer 2013; Kramer 1999).

Most of the literature on violence and social trust looks at generalized interpersonal trust. The conventional approach suggests that mutual distrust is pervasive in war-torn countries (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Collier 2003; Widner 2004). Empirical evidence from Croatia and

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43 Shared identity is defined broadly; it encompasses common fate, mores, ethnicity, regional proximity, behavioural similarities, or cultural traditions. The assumption is that sharing a social categorization magnifies the commonality among members of the category (Stolle 2002).
Uganda for instance shows that wartime trauma is associated with lower generalized trust in others (Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013). Similarly, utilizing trust games after the 2007 political outbreaks in Nairobi, Kenya, Becchetti, Conzo & Romeo (2014), find that experience of direct or indirect physical violence and/or forced relocation significantly reduces trustworthiness learning. Studies on social capital echo the negative effects of war on trust and social relations (Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2011). Some empirical social psychology studies corroborate insights of these studies and found that external threat of terrorism leads to lower social tolerance (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Huddy et al. 2005). A related strand of studies find personal exposure to terrorism leads to higher prejudice (Besser and Neria 2009), and higher exclusionist political attitudes as a result of personal exposure to terrorism (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009).44

Other studies indicate contrasting effects. A number of findings show that violence of higher intensity, counterintuitively perhaps, leads to greater levels of generalized trust, explained by post-traumatic growth theory (e.g. Blattman 2009). Bellows and Miguel (2009), for instance, show that households that had direct experience with wartime violence in Sierra Leone, are more likely to participate in community meetings and engage with local political groups. In the same vein, evidence from Burundi indicates that exposure to violence increases altruistic behaviour (Voors et al. 2012). Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii’s (2014), analogously, find that members of

44 There is also a vast literature on the psychological effects of war, ranging from trauma and accompanying stress disorders to other demographic changes such as fertility (Brunborg and Urdal 2005). Studies also consistently show the adverse psychological effects of war on children (Barenbaum, Ruchkin, and Schwab-Stone 2004, Blattman and Annan 2010, Dyregrov, Gjestad, and Raundalen 2002). Another related strand of research finds negative effects of political violence on tolerance (Hutchison 2014, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). A more recent study distinguishes between ideologies and shows that detrimental effects of continuous terrorism on tolerance are stronger on those who affiliate with the Right (Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015).
communities who were more exposed to civil war are more inclined to contribute to public goods and are more trusting. The positive effects of conflict on trust may not be exclusive to victims. Coser (1956) posits that conflict demarcates the society across identity lines, and group identities come to the fore. Conflict may increase the interpersonal trust relations by solidifying the internal cohesion of a group as a whole (Coser 1956), or divide the society as in-group and out-group members. The demonizing responses of elites to attacks or threats may further contribute to such division. Whoever is associated with the enemy through their ideological, ethnic, religious, or other group ties are excluded from the in-group. So, it is very possible that while generalized trust declines in the face of civil war, in-group trust soars.

A recent cross-national study posits conditional effects of war on the type of conflict. The authors find that religious wars on average reduce social trust more so than ethnic wars (Traumüller, Born, and Freitag 2015). The same study also suggests that generalized trust is affected more than particularized trust (trust in family) except for trust within the neighbourhood, and wars fought along ethnic or religious cleavages is most harmful on this type of trust. Yet other findings, e.g. from Aceh, Indonesia, however, fail to find a general pattern between wartime trauma and social trust—the effects of violence appears to be more context dependent (Shewfelt 2009).

Evidently, the literature has mixed findings. As possible factors driving such heterogeneous findings, scholars propose type of the civil war, context, and personal experiences. Along with these factors, my theory also suggests polarization along group lines and identity transformation as additional conspicuous mechanisms explaining the change in social trust. Elite discourse on the conflict could polarize the society along group lines,
generating an illusion of in-group and out-group distinctions even in a well-blended society, particularly in tandem with the polarization of political identities and dissolution of old social networks, which often occurs during civil war (Wood 2008). New social group categories may emerge out of these discourses. Similarly, forced displacement in wartime can change the social fabric of the society, and force individuals to reformulate their social groupings and trust relations as explained in the previous section.

It is through these changes in social groupings and identities that social trust is reshaped during wartime. My theory explains how interplay of threat and identities dictate the direction of change by distinguishing between generalized trust and category-based trust, and ethnic and ideological war.

2.4.1 **Theory of Social Trust in Wartime**

My theory presumes that ethnic territorial wars and ideological wars have distinct effects on social trust. Identities operate along with threat to determine generalized and category-based trust. Because of the differences in cleavages, ethnic and ideological wars play out differently.

Ethnic warfare heightens the salience of ethnic identity. As the war unfolds, ethnic group definitions are crystallized. Inasmuch as identity markers are clear—language, phenotypes, cultural codes are easy markers—in-group and out-group distinctions emerge. Category-based trust becomes relevant. Indeed, identity conflicts in general do not bode well for particularized trust as cleavages across the lines of ethnicity or religion polarize the society and destroy the social fabric even in local contexts (Kalyvas 2006). According to social identity theory, conflict with a rival out-group leads to stronger identification with one’s in-group, which translate into mistrust towards the out-group.
From the perspective of a powerful ethnic group, the group associated with the insurgents is not trustworthy as it is considered to be with the enemy. Based on these blanket judgments, trust levels towards the out-group will diminish. In reaction, a politically weak ethnic group facing blanket judgments from the other group based on their ethnic identity should react in a similar way. Identity-based exclusions or discriminations emanates from lower trust towards out-groups. These attitudes should further alienate the out-groups.

As a result, when group boundaries are clear, we should observe that groups curtail their out-group trust. Personal negative experiences would magnify the negative judgments towards out-groups. Even though personal relationship is not a condition for identity-based trust, personal positive experiences with a member of a social category may help reinforce positive attitude towards other members, and negative experiences may help reinforce negative attitudes towards other members. Hence, distrust for out-groups should be stronger for people who have personal negative experiences with the members of that out-group.

Ideological affiliation, in contrast, is not primordial in character and is not as sticky an identity as ethnicity. Group polarization along the lines of ideology can still occur but markers may not be as clear. Also, changing camps is an option—while undressing ethnicity is much more difficult. Because defining the groups is challenging, distinctions such as in-group and out-groups do not as easily apply to ideological conflicts. Because of the fluidity of ideological identity (i.e. it is easier to switch), group boundaries are blurry and cultivating in-group trust is harder. By the same logic, recognition of the out-group is problematic. Someone out of sympathy with insurgents may worry that he or she is the next victim. Those in sympathy may worry that the person next door is accomplice of state violence. Thus, when distinguishing groups is hard, generalized trust plummets. In contexts where the insurgency is active, I expect distrust to be
more pervasive. By the same token, I expect effect of ideological wars on category-based trust to be weak.

2.4.1.1 The Role of Context

Social context is also a strong factor for processing information and opinion formation (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder and Rhodebeck 1982; Sears et al. 1978; Tolbert and Hero 1996). I hypothesize that people living in volatile contexts or contexts that undergo major compositional changes due to the war (such as influx of internally displaced population) should have stronger negative feelings towards out-groups.

Context is defined as a bounded locality one is established in; it could be a village, town or a city. Local/social context is a subcategory, and it inheres in more proximate surroundings such as neighbourhoods or districts within a context. Social context is also integral to identity formations/transformations because it determines whether in-group/out-group categorization is instrumental or meaningful (Simon and Klandermans 2001). In the context of civil war, context also determines exposure to violence, likelihood of victimization, local forms of resistance (Balcells and Justino 2014). The seminal study of Gould (1995) on insurgent identities is an example. He contends that collective action capacity of working-class is predicated on residential location and neighbourhood network structures. Norms, culture, political identity and consequently social, political and economic opportunity structures (which altogether composes the character of a locality) influence that extent and possibility of activism, mobilization and civil society organizations in a context. For instance, being situated in a historically politically charged city may emphasize political identities, and strengthen group identities around the relevant salient social identity.
Social context may carry different memory frameworks about the conflict and the political history and state-society relationships. Most people acquire their “memory” about recent as well as distant past events through the second-hand dissemination of knowledge. The intergenerational transmission of memory through the stories told by elders is among the chief mechanisms (Harris 2006). Such transmissions are very constructive of identity in the early political socialization stage. Memory pertaining to one generation is transferred to the following by recounting the past and providing a “representation” of the past through the lens of their social identities, and that generation in turn transfers these representations to the subsequent one by bringing in their own interpretation. These memories formulate the local narratives, which may then infiltrate into the beliefs, threat perceptions and risks extending from the conflict.

Locals may be disturbed or threatened by influx of a new group because they pose threat to the social and economic order. In civil wars, the forcibly displaced migrants are highly likely to be labeled as “terrorists,” which aggravates the perception of threat. External threat from a known out-group (as observed in 9/11 attacks) or existential threat to the self, on identity basis, could be a factor that may elevate salience of a group identity. This may in turn intensify group attachments (Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003) because group-level existential concerns affect group member’s emotions and behaviour for individuals derive both meaning and self-worth from their group memberships (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Putnam (2000) suggests that displacement and migration may lead to new conflicts between long-time residents and newcomers. Such tensions, feeling of threat because of the unknown, and association of the

45 This idea also forms the basis of “social representations theory” originally generated by Moscovici (1984). According to this theory, knowledge of the past is always social and subjectively shaped and developed by interaction (Duveen 2000). Hence, accounts of the past are percolated through cultural frameworks and social identities.
migrants with the insurgency should lower generalized trust within society, and category-based trust if the migrants hold a common group identity.

2.5 The Link Between Political and Social Trust

The relationship between political and social trust is still subject to debate. Some accounts indicate that established political trust (in a democratic regime) is a strong predictor of a country’s interpersonal trust level (e.g. Jamal and Nooruddin 2010; Muller and Seligson 1994), and yet others show that the direction of effect runs more from trust in individuals to trust in government (e.g. Brehm and Rahn 1997; Keele 2007; see Kay and Johnston 2007 for a review and discussion). The possibility that they are mutually reinforcing remains strong as well (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008).

My theory assumes that insecurities leading to changes in political trust impinge on social trust relations. Threat locals may feel from the forcibly displaced migrants is highly conditioned by the collective threat locals feel from the insurgency. The causal impulses for political and social relations are interconnected, and in the empirical chapters (Chapter 7 and 8) I take these interrelations into account.

46 Three models exist: social-psychological model, social-cultural model, and institutional performance model (Newton and Norris 2000). Social-psychological model considers trust as a personality trait and posits that all types of trust are correlated. Socio-cultural model views trust as a product of socialization and predicts a positive correlation between the individual social capital and his/her trust levels. Institutional performance model downplays the role of personality and socialization, and assumes that political and social trust emanate from different sources so they are not necessarily correlated. Institutional performance drives trust in government and interpersonal relationships determine social trust.

47 Newton & Norris (2000), examining 17 trilateral democracies, contend that there is no strong association between social trust (interpersonal trust or horizontal trust) and institutional trust (also see Newton 2001).
2.6 Observable Implications of Political and Social Trust

Declining political trust implies that institutions are not fulfilling their promises with respect to service and infrastructure provision. In the context of civil war, if political trust is declining, we expect to observe:

1) Citizens’ dissatisfaction with the security forces’ (police, gendarmerie, army, etc…) ability to protect;
2) Citizens’ increasing skepticism of the government’s counterterrorism policies;
3) Declining faith in the state’s policies to protect the interest of the citizens or the nation;
4) Citizens’ decreasing willingness to engage with the political representatives;
5) Citizens’ decreasing desire to pay taxes.

Plummeting political trust may lead to casting doubt on the authority of state to govern. If that is the case, legitimacy is at stake. Observable implications of declining legitimacy, as I view it, are:

1) Increasing expression of skepticism on state’s rightfulness in governing;
2) Decreasing use of state’s system for justice;
3) Generation of alternative systems of security and leadership.

Some of the observable implications for declining generalized trust are:

1) Developing a fear that unknown others will deliberately harm you instead of being neutral or positive about their intentions;
2) Starting to avoid interactions with unknown others even though that was not a practice before;
3) Taking extra measures for self-protection (locking doors, accompanying kids to school);
4) Develop an anxiety that your family’s safety is at risk when they are away from home.

Some observable implications for declining category-based trust are:

1) Developing negative blanket judgments for members of a defined out-group and use of discriminatory language (regarding their character, trustworthiness, intentions, etc.);
2) Developing a fear that the out-group members are posing a risk to one’s interests and practicing in-group favouritism;
3) Increasing reluctance to engage with them in business/transaction settings;
4) Increasing reluctance to involve in family unions (e.g. not allowing the siblings to marry an out-group member).

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter laid out the theory of political and social trust in civil wars. The major predictions of the theory are that ethnic and ideological wars have contrasting effects on political and social trust. While ethnic violence boosts political trust, ideological violence dampens it. Furthermore, whereas ideological violence decreases generalized interpersonal trust, ethnic violence does not affect it yet category-based out-group trust is undermined in ethnic violence. The theory suggests that these contrasting effects largely stem from the differences in collective identity threat posed by ethnic and ideological wars and state’s discursive responses. Empirical chapters that test the hypotheses of the theory (Chapter 7 and 8) provide a summary of the hypotheses and the corresponding observable implications (see Table 2 and Table 6).
Chapter 3: Research Design

Establishing causal connections between violence and trust is challenging. Conflicts vary a lot in their scale, character, and level of impact, and hence they vary in the threat they pose. In addition, other factors that are exogenous to an ongoing conflict do not cease to influence political trust, so mapping the landscape of conflict onto observed changes in political trust can be a considerable challenge. As Ragin (2014, 26) suggests, “it is the combinatorial, and often complexly combinatorial, nature of social causation that makes the problem of identifying order-in-complexity demanding.”

To begin to tackle this question, I employed mixed methodology combining the rigor of rich qualitative case studies and quantitative cross-national studies. I embarked upon my research with a theory distinguishing between ethnic territorial and ideological revolutionary wars. I designed my qualitative research to assess and update the specified mechanisms in my theory. I combine multiple empirical strategies to generate and test the different pieces of my theory. Primarily, I conducted case studies of the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey (1984–) and the Maoist insurgency in Peru (1980–1992), representing ethnic territorial and ideological conflicts, respectively. The similarities between these cases demonstrate the “match on these variables,” and could work as “controlling for” the role of these factors on political trust, plus help me partially sidestep the “few cases many variables” problem often observed in comparative case studies (Collier 1993). Even though the similarities helped me test some parts of my theory, because of significant differences, my case studies cannot be described as comparative method with most similar cases design. Finally, I tested the main hypotheses derived from my theory using quantitative data to see whether the theoretical arguments and the findings of the
qualitative research can travel beyond the boundaries of Turkey and Peru. Table 1 below summarizes the empirical strategies employed for theory building and theory testing parts.

This chapter starts with a description and justification of the case selection. I then move on to delineate the fieldwork and give details about the process of case studies and micro-level data collection including my strategies for sampling, recruitment, and participant observation for the purposes of reliability. Next, I describe the coding process and how I arrived at my inferences. In the Analysis section, I discuss the method of process tracing, and how I harnessed it to make inferences to help me identify the causal pathways between the conflict and trust, and to test and update my theory.
### Table 1. Empirical Strategies for Different Parts of the Theory

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Parts of Theory and Questions</th>
<th>Questions and Empirical Strategy</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Antecedents of Conflict Character</strong> (How does nation-building/state-formation shape the</td>
<td>Comparative Macro Historical Institutional Analysis of Turkey and Peru</td>
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<td>character of conflict? Chapter 4)</td>
<td>(Inductive inferences from the political histories of the two countries to identify the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Why was the conflict in Peru ideological while the one in Turkey ethnic in character?</td>
<td>causal antecedents of conflict character)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Generation of Collective Threat Framing Through State Discourses (Chapter 5)</strong></td>
<td>Case Studies of Turkey and Peru (Archival Work, Content Analysis of Newspapers, Secondary Literature) and Process Tracing to establish collective threat framing and discursive content in Turkey and Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the collective threat framing different in Turkey from the one in Peru?</td>
<td>Micro-level evidence (narratives from interviews and focus groups with people belonging to the politically represented/powerful ethnic group) that refer to discourses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Discourse as a Causal Mechanism to Influence Micro-Level Trust Formation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Impact of Personal Threat as a Causal Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Interviews and Focus Group with Individuals who vary in terms of their exposure to violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does personal security threat affect political and social trust?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Context-Contingent Effects</strong></td>
<td>Subnational Cases—variation in terms of political mobilization, percentage of displaced people, proximity to clashes and political order was used as leverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do the predicted effects of civil war on political and social trust vary by context?</td>
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<td>For instance, does the predicted negative effect of civil war on social trust magnify in contexts that had a major change in social composition because of internal displacement?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Testing Micro-level Observable Implications</strong></td>
<td>Narratives from Interviews and Focus groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do the hypothesized individual-level relationships between civil war and trust hold?</td>
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Note: This table draws on Ana Arjona’s presentation of her framework in Rebelocracy (2016).
3.1 Case Selection: Why Turkey and Peru?

The Kurdish insurgency in Turkey (1984–) and the Maoist insurgency in Peru (1980–2000) are two cases representative, respectively, of an ethnic territorial and ideological form of conflict. Turkey and Peru have seldom been studied in a comparative fashion in political science. This may not come as a surprise given their regional and historical differences, yet a closer look at their contemporary history and social structure would reveal that they are more similar than different. In fact, despite their diverse historical origins—Turkey being a post-imperial country descending from the Ottoman Empire and Peru being a postcolonial country—, they can host enough equivalence to render their contemporary legacies similar. The similarities provide me with a leverage to identify the distinctive features, which may explain the discursive differences and collective threat framing. I should underscore that the method employed here is not most similar designs, yet the similarities are essential to emphasize as they are useful in making comparisons. The differences allowed me to build parts of my theory, and within-country variations helped me test micro-level implications of my theory.

Turkey and Peru are multi ethnic countries, featuring one group dominating over the other. The subordinate groups enjoyed significantly different status vis-à-vis the empires they were ruled by: the Kurds in Ottoman Empire were granted autonomy and functioned as an independent principality while the indigenous people in Peru were practically slaves during the Spanish empire rule. The contemporary history of Kurds in Turkey and indigenous groups in Peru nevertheless show striking parallels. Policies of assimilation (*mestizaje* in Peru reflecting the entrenched racism, and *Turkification* in Turkey reflecting the overarching nationalism), endemic subjugation and repression of subordinate ethnic groups define the cornerstones in the histories of both countries. Though Turkey did not have as stratified and as long racial
taxonomies as Peru did, Turkification of Kurds is kindred to the idea of mestizaje – the idea of gradual evolution of indigenous people by rejecting and discarding their culture and language and taking on the dominant culture as proposed by mestizo elites in Peru (which never became a state policy due to disagreements upon the meaning of the notion). The tensions between Kurds vs. Turks in Turkey and Indians vs. mestizos in Peru have centered on association of the “weak” ethnic group with backwardness. The Kurds were peripheral, traditional and religious while Turkey is on route to modernity and secularism (Yeğen 2007). Indians in Peru, also traditional, were perceived to be barbaric while Peru advanced toward a modern and civilized country (Méndez 1996). 48

The statist and centralist economic development policies in Turkey rendered the regional development levels very uneven; while the West was advancing with industrial development and investments, the East (which has been predominantly occupied by Kurds) was lagging behind. The Peruvian state, in its origins (it became independent in 1826), was oligarchic; it was grounded upon a union of the wealthy and powerful elites across the country (Burt 2007). The state was practically serving the goal of maintaining and advancing economic interests of these elites, and the state-society relations were structured around this goal, and were hence pervasively clientelist (Stokes 1995). Economic development was also fairly imbalanced: While capitalism (mining being the principal industry) was swelling mostly on the coast and some other adjacent regions, other regions made no considerable economic progress and perpetuated the old feudal relations.

48 In Peru, the historical injustices were on a larger scale simply because indigenous people comprised virtually half of the population while in Turkey Kurds have always been a minority (estimated to be around %15-%20 of the population) in their contemporary histories.
Hence, inequality between groups in both countries soared, buttressing the traditional ethnic and geographical divisions, which perpetuated the intersectionality of geography, class and race/ethnicity in Turkey and Peru. Access to basic state services such as education and health, and basic infrastructures (roads, water, electricity) has also been weak for the subordinate ethnic groups until recently. The Kurds in Turkey and the indigenous people in Peru were both treated as secondary citizens. Indeed, in Peru “Indians” who were not literate in Spanish were disenfranchised until 1979. On the other side, Kurds who constitutionally always had equal citizenship with Turks, had various restrictions placed on their identity, language and culture.

Against this backdrop, the seeds for both guerilla groups were planted during the surge of socialist movements in the late 60s and 1970s. The PKK and Sendero were kindred in their ideological orientation; both were offshoots of large communist parties. Their respective leaders, Abdullah Öcalan for the PKK and Abimael Gúzman for Sendero, were both prominent figures in the party, and were activists. They were both incarcerated by the state and developed their ideas for initiating an insurgency in prison. They both commenced the armed struggle in the early 1980s, while their respective countries were transitioning from a military rule to a civilian one. The PKK embraced a more ethnic doctrine and waged a secessionist war whereas Sendero was Maoist and adopted a class-based doctrine. That being said, intersectionality of class and ethnicity were visible in both cases. For example, “ethnic-regional” identity was the binding force for the middle and lower ranks of Sendero (Degregori 1990).

Besides these parallels in the guerilla groups and political histories, the countries display other similarities. Turkey and Peru experienced a democratic revolution from above and underwent multiple military interventions. Experiments with democracy have been interrupted by military coups in Turkey and caudillos in Peru.
The significant differences between Turkey and Peru can, however, obstruct the possibility of robust causal inferences. Peru is a postcolonial country while Turkey is postimperial. Strong elitism (*creolismo*), authoritarianism, and corporatism have featured in postcolonial Peruvian politics and nation-building (Palmer 1980), while in Turkey the keystones of the political culture have been a strong state tradition, nationalism, and secularism (see Chapter 4 for an extensive comparison between the political contexts of the two countries). These political differences are important to note, since they relate to the societal consequences of the two conflicts. I take these differences into account in my empirical discussion as well.

### 3.2 Focus of Analysis

I gathered intensive case knowledge through extensive fieldwork. When comparing the two cases to determine how conflict affects trust, I have taken into account the historical processes, institutions, and social and political configurations of both the countries and the conflicts. I focus on the period between 1980 and 2000. 1980 was the year Sendero commenced its armed operations; even though the PKK did not start its attacks against the state until 1984, for comparison purposes I start my analysis in the same year in Turkey, since by that time it was already active and preparing a base for organized guerilla war. The year 2000 saw the political conjuncture change significantly in both countries. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori resigned in 2000. Also, even though Sendero was effectively dissolved when Abimael Gúzman was captured in 1992, many researchers extend their analysis till 2000, as it was not clear for a number of years afterward whether Sendero might resume. Also, the era between 1992 and 2000 coincides with the rise of Fujimori and saw the concoction of a memory of victory and glory, extending from the times when Sendero posed the highest risk to Peru between 1989 and 1992. In Turkey, Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK, was captured in 1999, and the Justice and
Development Party came to power in 2002. The power balance within domestic politics and vis-à-vis the PKK changed a lot following the imprisonment of Öcalan. Armed struggle paused between 1999 and 2004 and resumed more fiercely afterwards. Even though beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours of the society continue to change, the first stretch of the PKK’s guerilla war (1984–1999) established the major elements of the overarching discourse that has carried over to today.

3.3 Fieldwork and Data Collection

I conducted six months of fieldwork in Peru between September 2013 and March 2014 and six months of fieldwork in Turkey between March 2014 and September 2014, with the support of International Development Research Agency Doctoral Research Award. There are five parts to the qualitative data I gathered: historiographic material, archival analysis of newspapers, focus groups, expert interviews, and in-depth interviews with ordinary people.

I mined secondary literature—including articles, books, diaries, reports, and master’s and doctoral theses—on insurgency, state, media representations of the conflict, and political trust in both contexts. I also went into newspaper archives in Lima and Ankara to see the discursive framework that the state and the media employed during the conflicts to describe the insurgencies. In doing that, I analyzed select issues of Milliyet and Hürriyet between 1984 and 2000 in Turkey (thanks to the availability of previous archival analysis on the issue (see Somer 2005) and select issues of La Republica between 1980 and 1992 (see Table A 1 in Appendix B for the months and years analyzed), and compared the visual representations of the conflict and conducted content analysis. Media representations of the conflict guided the discursive content in both contexts, and I used my archival analysis to construct the overarching and competing
discourses, the official and alternative narratives, over the course of the conflicts. I watched all
the relevant movies and documentaries I was able to access.49

Using my case study materials, I generated the causal priors of my theory where I spell
out how state formation practices and nation-building strategies may condition the nature of
contemporary insurgencies as well as the responses to these insurgencies (See Chapter 4).

Micro-level data collection took place in stages. My first exploratory field trip in Turkey
was in the summer of 2012. I conducted twelve interviews with experts who fell into one of three
categories of people, which I defined as: 1) national and local politicians; 2) informed observers
such as academics, journalists, and local notables; and 3) NGO representatives. I asked them
questions about political culture and their perception of the conflict and its consequences. My
exploratory field trip to Peru was in November of 2012. I met academics and researchers,
established my first contacts, and identified feasible research networks. Subsequently, I
conducted my second fieldwork between September 2013 and September 2014, spending 6
months in each country. Details of data collection are presented below and in Chapter 6.

3.3.1 Selecting Subnational Sites

I picked my subnational cases in light of the requirements of my theory. First, to test the micro-
level effects of interaction of collective threat and personal threat on trust as specified in my
theory, variation in terms of personal threat was necessary. Second, to test the contextual effects
as suggested in my theory, the cases need to vary with respect to exposure to violence, ethnic

49 Some of the most important sources are the PKK’s own magazine, Serxwebun, Sendero’s media outlet El Diario,
Hasan Cemal and Yalçın Küçük’s publications on the Kurdish issue, memoirs of soldiers, investigation reports of
the commissions, and the report of Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru. The documentaries and movies I
watched in Turkey were Bakur (2015), Kanun uykusu (2014), Atesten Tarih (2012), Nefes: Vatan Sağolsun (2009),
and 5 nolu Cezaevi (2009). Major documentaries and movies I watched in Peru were Matar para vivir (2013), Milk
of Sorrow (2009), Lucanamarca (2008), State of Fear (2006), Paloma del papel (2003), La vida es una sola (1993),
and La Boca del Lobo (1988).
composition, political mobilization, and concentration of internally displaced people. Selected as
guided by my theory, the subnational units helped me make within-case comparisons (Snyder
2001) as well as understand the role of social context and other contextual variables.

I chose seven cities in each country as sites for gathering micro-level data: Ankara,
İstanbul, Mersin, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, and Gaziantep in Turkey, and Lima, Ayacucho,
Arequipa, Cajamarca, Cusco, Tarapoto, and Iquitos in Peru. These cities vary with respect to
exposure to violence, socioeconomic development, ethnic composition, and the concentration of
internally displaced people (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). In Peru, exposure to violence changed
over the course of war in some localities (for example Sendero only reached Lima towards the
end of the 1980s), the temporal variation also helped me test parts of the theory with respect to
implications of personal threat in the absence of collective threat. Especially Lima being the
heart of Peru, which varied temporally both in terms of presence of insurgents and internally
displaced people was a perfect case. These variations and change in people’s trust formulations
in the face of these changes provided me with leverage for hypothesis-testing. I spent close to a
month in each city, except for Lima, where I spent close two and a half months, given its
centrality to Peruvian politics and society.
Figure 4. Selected Subnational Sites in Turkey

Note: The provinces chosen for fieldwork are marked by a black dot, where the size of the black dot indicates the percentage of Kurdish population (Ankara 8.50%, Mersin, 10.1%, İstanbul 13.8%, Gaziantep 15.4%, Mardin 75.8%, Diyarbakır 91.3%). The numbers below the province names indicate the ranking of the city in terms of socioeconomic development where İstanbul has the highest score in total of 81 provinces. The clash zones, represented primarily Şırnak and Hakkari are marked by red. The map is built with Tableau based on generated Longitude and Latitude.

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50 Official percentages of Kurdish population by province is not available in Turkey. The percentages here are estimated by the author using a survey data from 2006. Specifics of and details about the calculation are available in Appendix B.
Figure 5. Selected Subnational Sites in Peru

Note: Marked cities were the chosen sites of fieldwork. Those marked with dark red were the main theatres of operation for Sendero. The marks are used to show the variation in proximity to violent zones. The map is built with Tableau based on generated Longitude and Latitude.
3.3.2 Data Collection

For micro-level original data collection in each site, I started with a focus group to explore the conflict-related themes that are of relevance to the locals and tailor my questions to the context. Focus groups are very instrumental in canvassing a broad range of experiences in a population as interactive group conversations bring a comprehensive array of opinions, experiences, attitudes, and context-specific incidences to light. Finally, focus groups helped me recruit interviewees. Some participants had a unique source of information or would tell a narrative that is disconfirming my theory. In such cases, in order to probe, I would ask for a follow-up interview. Sometimes, after one focus group, I would start in-depth interviews, and then organize another focus group. Sometimes, if I need more collective information, I would conduct more focus groups before interviewing people on one-on-one basis.

3.3.2.1 Sampling and Data

I used purposive sampling techniques when selecting my interviewees. “Purposive sampling” is defined as a type of sampling in which “particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” (Maxwell 1997, 87). My selection criteria were determined by considerations of ethnic groups in the countries, level of victimization, amount of exposure to violence, age range, and gender, as I find these identifiers relevant to my theoretical constructs. I imposed approximate quotas for each category proportional to the size of the locality. My purpose was not only to gather systematic data to test my theory but also to diversify the inventory of subgroups in order

51 Probing may be needed when a participant utters words about a potentially significant and or sensitive issue in an ambiguous fashion. If the researcher catches a cue in what a participant says or how he or she says it, the researcher may want to know more about what is referred to or the participant’s underlying thoughts. Hence, researchers may use the probing technique and gently ask further questions.
to access different viewpoints, make my sample more representative, and update my theory (LeCompte and Goetz 1982). My field observations thus guided me to make adjustments in my quotas. For instance, I found significant in-group variation within ethnic groups with respect to their accounts of conflict, even though these interviewees were from the same context, so I added education level as a criteria and also interacted it personal experiences, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status to create new categories as I went on collecting more data. Lastly, I used theoretical saturation to determine the exact sample size, along with my own quotas. The saturation point occurred when the responses became repetitive and the marginal benefit of each additional interview started to decay fast. At that point, I ceased data collection.

I conducted phenomenological focus groups, which seek to understand the experiences of respondents. For compositions of focus groups, I used the geographical and ethnic divisions in my target populations as the main criteria and I also segregated the groups by gender and age to make sure participants are comfortable to speak about their experiences. I ran adult focus groups (25 and above) by separating men and women, and ran youth focus groups (18-25) in each city. The average size of the groups was 8 people. Recruitment strategies and the details pertinent to the conduct of the interviews and focus groups are discussed in Chapter 6.

In total, I completed 36 expert interviews, 66 in-depth interviews, and 19 focus groups with ordinary people in Peru. In Turkey, I conducted 46 expert interviews, 92 in-depth interviews, and 15 focus groups with ordinary people. I also conducted a survey with every focus group participant to collect information on their political predispositions, which helped me draw a deeper understanding of the origins of and change in their political attitudes.

I conducted 12 expert interviews in Lima, 10 in Ayacucho, 6 in Cusco, and 5 in Cajamarca. I held 22 in-depth interviews with ordinary people in Lima, 12 in Ayacucho, 14 in
Cusco, 5 in Cajamarca, 8 in Arequipa, and 5 in Iquitos. The distribution of focus groups was as follows: 6 groups in Lima, 3 in Cusco, 3 in Cajamarca, 3 in Iquitos, 2 in Tarapoto, and 2 in Ayacucho. In those cities, I conducted minimum of one focus group with adult men only and one with adult women only. In those cities where I held more than two focus groups, I conducted one with youth (18-25), and, in some cases, one mixed-gender adult group. In the capital city of Lima, I conducted two with adult men, two with adult women, and two with youth. Except for the youth groups and the focus groups in Iquitos, each group was made up of a mix of different degrees of bystanders and victims.

In Turkey, I conducted 15 focus groups: 3 in İstanbul, 4 in Ankara, 3 in Diyarbakır, 2 in Gaziantep, and 3 in Şanlıurfa. Focus groups were composed of 6 to 10 people varying in age and gender. Also, I completed 46 expert interviews and 92 in-depth interviews with ordinary people. The distribution of the expert interviews was as follows: 8 in İstanbul, 8 in Ankara, 10 in Diyarbakır, 8 in Şanlıurfa, 8 in Mardin, and 4 in Mersin. The distribution of the in-depth interviews with ordinary people was as follows: 12 in İstanbul, 15 in Ankara, 20 in Diyarbakır, 13 in Şanlıurfa, 12 in Mersin, 10 in Gaziantep, and 10 in Mardin.

The length of my interviews varied between 45 minutes and 4 hours, averaging about 90 minutes. Focus groups were on average 2 hours long. 85 percent of all my conversations were audio-recorded; in the other fifteen percent of the subjects did not consent to being recorded (21 people in Turkey, and 13 people in Peru). Details of recruitment are presented in Chapter 6.

3.3.2.2 Conducting the Interviews and Focus Groups

All interviews and focus groups began with participants consenting to the protocol (usually oral consent was granted rather than written). At the beginning of every interview, I introduced myself as a Ph.D. candidate from Canada and underscored the independence of my research and
the purpose of it. I also reiterated that, as per the consent form, they had the right to choose what
goes in the recording, end the interview at any moment, and reserve to right to decline answering
any of my questions.

Sometimes establishing rapport took longer than usual, and without rapport the answers
tended to be brief and uninformative. For instance, with the Kurdish respondents, it was a bit
hard to establish rapport sometimes because they would usually guess I am not Kurdish and
would hesitate to open up. As Leech says, rapport is much more than putting the respondent at
ease; “it means convincing people that you are listening, that you understand and are interested
in what they are talking about, and that they should continue” (Leech 2002, 665). Making sure
that no judgment or threat could be interpreted to be in my phrasing or body language when it
came to sensitive questions, I sometimes consciously extended the initial part of the interview,
where I ask nontargeting or less sensitive questions. In order to make the interviewees feel
comfortable, I would sometimes start with stories or a very general question, what Spradley
(1979) calls “grand tour questions” such as “where they grew up and how the local life was back
then” (as cited in Leech 2002, 667). I also changed the way I pronounced “PKK” depending on
the subject in order to avoid causing any offense. The Kurdish pronunciation reads the letter “k”
as “kay” while the Turkish pronunciation reads it as “ka” (as in “karate”), and, in today’s
politics, the pronunciation of “PKK” pronunciation can be a simple cue to signal one’s side or
camp.

I resorted to “soaking and poking” (heavy immersion in the details of a case) to get an
insider perspective, familiarize myself with the world of the respondent, and ensure the content
validity of my interviews, which, since they were based on open-ended questions, were
sometimes lengthy and hard to replicate. In order to overcome this reliability issue, I increased
the size of my sample, fell back on my prompts quite often, and made sure to ask the same
questions in every interview, even if in a different order.

The participants had a range of experiences: some were ex-guerillas, many were
victimized by war, some were discriminated against based on their ethnicity, some were forcibly
displaced (and these experiences were not necessarily mutually exclusive), and some were not
affected (these people were the main focus of my inquiry). The storylines and insights offered by
the participants differed greatly, and in order to integrate all these diverse narratives, I carefully
tailored my questions to each subject. To alleviate any discomfort around sensitive issues, I
would break up my inquiry into segments that I scattered throughout the course of the interview,
thus lessening the intensity of the questioning. At times, interviewees had extraordinary
experiences or unique insights to share, and I would form new questions on the spot to follow-up
on those cues. At other times, they would use a certain vernacular, and, when I was not sure what
a particular word or phrase meant, I would follow up, ensuring equivalence of meaning between
researcher and subject (LeCompte and Goetz 1982). The semi-structured format of the interview
enabled me to revisit a question later if the respondent diverged from a cue that I had wanted to
follow-up on.

I paid due diligence to the security concerns some respondents had regarding the
expression of certain opinions. In Peru, where the conflict is long over, the participants did not
indicate experiencing any tangible fear in expressing their views. In Turkey, however, because
the conflict is still ongoing, extracting honest and unfiltered responses was more of a challenge.
Misrepresentation of personal opinions out of concerns for one’s security is especially a risk in
an ongoing civil war setting (Wood 2003). Nevertheless, 2014 was an exceptionally peaceful
year to conduct a conflict research in Turkey, as the peace process was under way (2013–2015),
and, thanks to the armistice, the political situation was very calm. It was five years after the Kurdish Initiative, which extended rights and freedoms to Kurds starting in 2009, and the Kurdish participants were more comfortable than ever before to talk about “taboo” subjects such as their identities or sympathy for the PKK. They were also extremely eager to talk about the past and tell their stories, experiences, and sufferings. Both in Peru and in Turkey, many of my subjects mentioned at the end of the interview that “the interview was cathartic.”

Still, obtaining genuine answers was sometimes an issue. Expression of support for the PKK and its justification seemed especially hard for participants to utter due to the ongoing nature of the conflict. When I sensed discomfort, I would either change the topic to ease the respondents’ way back into talking about the PKK or reformulate the question. Furthermore, as Wood (2003, 35) cautions:

[T]he telling of personal and community stories in an ethnographic setting is also shaped by […] [the respondent’s] present political loyalties, beliefs concerning the likely consequences of participation in the interview and of expressing particular views, and present political objectives.

Elected officials in Turkey were especially eager to give me the official state narrative without offering any additional useful input. In such cases, it required more prodding than average to get a personal response, as the subjects typically circumvented the question with politically correct rhetoric. In Peru, the public was more used to the practice of talking about the past, especially in conflict-ridden zones thanks to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (CVR) work. The Commission sought to unearth the truth by drawing on almost seventeen

52 During the course of my field research, I took every measure necessary to ensure the privacy, confidentiality, and security of my respondents as per my ethical obligation. I kept the audio recordings in a secure, password-protected bag, with the field notes carried with me at all times. Here I present quotes from the conversations without attribution or personal identifiers, again to respect the privacy of the participants and protect their anonymity.
thousand testimonies and construct a new historical narrative—an alternative to the official accounts (Milton 2007). In Peru, I had the advantage of both immense amount of data already gathered and the public’s comfort with talking about the past.

My fieldwork in both countries was very immersive and rich; it was semi-ethnographic in nature. In Peru, I lived with local families except for my first two months in Lima, but even then I was hosted by many locals and carried on my research outside of the formal settings of focus group or structured interviews. I had numerous informal conversations with locals on politics throughout my time in the country. They shared their experiences and told me stories from their past pertaining to the times of conflict. In Turkey, I had more advantages being Turkish myself. I had the opportunity to be present during casual political conversations at dinner tables or on Sunday brunches. Even after my planned fieldwork was over, I kept in touch with some of my key contacts in both countries and continued to ask clarifying questions when needed. See Chapter 6 for further details.
Chapter 4: Causal Antecedents of the Theory: Comparative Historical Dynamics behind the Onset of the Insurgencies in Turkey and Peru

In this chapter, I present my case study materials that led me to inductively generate a theory on nation-building and conflict character as a causal antecedent. Insurgencies do not emerge in a vacuum. The historical antecedents of political violence (prewar dynamics) are important to understand not only to make better sense of the onset of the conflict but also the consequences. Much of the conflict character, dynamics and consequences are buried in the social and political context that gave rise to the reasons explaining the onset of violence.

Inductively, I theorize that nation and nation-building strategies condition not only the nature of the insurgencies (conflict character) but also the responses of the states to the conflict (official discourse) and hence trust calculations of the individuals (see Chapter 2 for discourse as a causal mechanism defining collective threat). In other words, here, I argue that threat framing and conflict character are endogenous to the historical antecedents of the conflict (state-society relations, historical injustices and grievances extending from nation-building).

Turkey, a post-imperial country, was founded upon the principle of a nation with one supra identity (Turkishness). The success in the War of Independence fought against the allied powers granted the country a proud start, cultivating a strictly nationalist identity of the new Turkish Republic, which then seeped into political, public and private sphere, from language policies to dress codes, from military conscription to city names. From the early days of the Republic, this understanding of new modern Turkish nation with non-negotiable territorial boundaries had been ingrained in the discursive sphere, which is what the state later used to construct the official discourse against the insurgency, capitalizing on the tools it had been
planning (see Chapter 5). Importantly, the same policies and discourses featuring strong state and the Turkish identity also led to the emergence of ethnic insurgency, prompted by decades-long suppression of Kurdish identity, and also shaped the political and social attitudes of the people in the face of the war, as explained below.

Peru, a post-colonial country (a post-viceroyalty specifically), underwent tumultuous state-formation. Strong elitism (creolismo), authoritarianism, and corporatism have featured in postcolonial Peruvian politics and nation-building (Palmer 1980), and national integration proved to be an arduous task. Centralist policies and entrenched racism, weakness of Peruvian national identity, lack of strong state both impeded a strong state and an overarching discourse about Peruvian state’s identity, and also led to the emergence of a Maoist insurgency. The insurgency did not pose collective identity threat to Peruvian national identity because it was not ethnic territorial and the Peruvian state did not have an ideological identity. The Peruvian government, under attack by Sendero, never successfully framed the insurgency as a collective identity threat, first because it did not have ideological tools to marshall, and second because of the issues embedded in nation-building (inferior status of the indigenous people and their being the main target initially interfered with the perception of threat (See Chapter 5).

Peru had the necessary conditions for an ethnic territorial insurgency to emerge in place, with a relatively large (indeed much larger than the Kurdish population in Turkey) marginalized ethnic group, however an ethnic territorial insurgency never broke out. The answer to this puzzle also lies in the colonial past and the post-colonial nation-building. Kurds enjoyed political and economic autonomy and maintained a privileged status during the Ottoman rule, and developed an exclusive identity and agency. The post-imperial Turkish state tried to marginalize it but never fully achieved. Indigenous peoples in Peru were enslaved by the Spaniards, which casted
the path for their inferior status in the Republic of Peru after independence. Even though they may revolt the elite, they neither had a cohesive identity, collective capital, or a coherent and consistent ethnic narrative to claim a more inclusive status, sometimes because of their very own elites’ conflicting positions.

Starting with the case of Turkey, the chapter lays out the political histories of the countries, nation-building strategies, state-society relationship with a particular focus on Kurds and indigenous groups respectively. Despite the similarity in their contemporary marginalization, the agency that Kurds were able to flourish as opposed to the relatively weak indigenous identity in Peru, explain much of the differences in the dynamics and outcomes of the insurgencies. The last section of this chapter explains how the historical grievances led to the rise of the insurgencies.

This chapter does not claim to do a deep comparative historical analysis of the two countries. Rather, it aspires to portray the remarkable parallels and variances in nation-building, center-periphery relations, political genealogy of Kurds and indigenous groups, the past and present social structure in both countries, and the onset of the insurgencies in order to lay the foundations of discourses, threat framing and identity frameworks—the causal mechanisms of my theory.

4.1 Foundations of Turkey: Modernization, Nationalism And One Nation

The Turkish Republic was formed as a nation-state from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the losses in Balkan Wars (1913), World War I (1914-1918) and the gains of the War of Independence (1919-1922).53 “Nation” (millet) had a different connotation in the

53 See (Lewis 1961) for an extensive coverage of emergence of modern Turkey.
Ottoman Empire where religion was the binder of communities. The Muslim population was, for instance, composed of different ethnic groups such as Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Albanians and so on (Timur 1998). The founders, despite this multi-ethnic legacy of the Empire, believed that only with a homogenous post-Ottoman society that was united around a common affiliation to nation, the ideal of nation-state would be achieved. Religion could not have played that role as modernization and secularism were the overarching goals of the national movement. Turkish nationalism was proposed as a new binding force.

The discourse of Turkish nationalism had indeed been expanding since the late 19th century Ottoman era. It evolved from an originally cultural and a linguistic movement to a strategy for political integration, supplanting Ottomanism (Yeğen 2007). The logic is of classic nationalism: citizens under the nation-state would be defined with historical, cultural and genealogical bonds and would speak the same language. Hence came the definition of Turkish citizenship that is above and beyond the ethnic and religious characteristic, intended to encompass everyone living under the rule of the Republic of Turkey, and supposed to serve as a primary identity. Turkism by “displacing both religion and rival nationalist formulations as the official ideology of the republic, [became] a vital tool in the process of Turkish state-building” (Hanioğlu 2006).

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54 Omanism suggested that an “Ottoman” identity could unify all subjects of the Ottoman state differing in religion and ethnicity while Turkish nationalism posited that “Turkishness” is the only plausible ground on which a political unity can be built, which builds on the idea that Turks were the unsur-i asli (chief ethnic group) (Yeğen 2007).

55 See (Yeğen 2007) for further discussion of Kurdish question in Turkish nationalism.

56 The political cadres were replete with the supporters of Kemalist principles. The intraelite conflict between the more liberal and conservative elements among the revolutionary officials during the War of Independence ended with the victory of liberals by the mid-1920s. The unity of elites, composed of military, bureaucrats, intellectuals, party elites, was remarkable; they were deeply inspired by the six principles, and pervasively undertaking the mission of transforming and modernizing Turkish society (Ozbudun 1993).
character and aspirations, its implementation bore many references to ethnic nationalism.\(^{57}\)

Along with Turkish nationalism modernization was embraced as an ultimate goal of the Republic. Indeed, the creation of a new identity and a homogenous nation was perceived as a precursor to the grand modernization project as uniformity was *sine qua non* for modernization reforms to be successful (Ergin 2008).\(^{58}\) Many reforms were then undertaken as part of the modernization project; *inter alia* were the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the introduction of law of unification of education (*Tevhid-i Tetrisad Kanunu*), the adoption of Swiss Civil Law, and other reforms in wide ranging components of social life from clothing to measurement. These reforms were also intended for homogenization of the society towards a modern and secular one.

The founders had the attitude that Anatolia is made up of one single ethnicity (Mardin 1973), and turning a blind eye to the differences in society was necessary for building a nation (Toprak 2012); however, the reality was yet to assert itself. The founders were facing a grand challenge of imbuing the very heterogeneous society composed of non-Muslim minorities (as defined in Lausanne Treaty signed in 1923),\(^{59}\) and different ethnicities – the majority of the

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\(^{57}\) Civic identity is derived from attachment to a common territory, citizenship, belief in the same political principles or ideology, respect for political institutions and enjoyment of equal political rights, and the will to be political part of the nation (Shulman 2002). Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, stems from people’s inherited ethnic characteristics including their language, religion, customs, and traditions (Ignatieff 1993).

\(^{58}\) The Republic of Turkey was founded with the aspiration of “reaching the highest level of contemporary civilizations,” which was embodied in the idea of “modernization.” Indeed, steps towards modernization had already been taken in the last era of the Ottoman Empire with the westernization movements. Yet, due to the reaction from the Islamic communities who were reluctant to accept changes in their educational and administrative system, modern institutions were added while preserving some of the traditional institutions such as *medrese*—school heavily oriented to religious studies. The juxtaposition of old and new was not embraced by Atatürk; he believed in a radical change affecting “all aspects of Turkish society, and sweep[ing] away most if not all, of its traditional beliefs and institutions (Okyar 1984).” Furthermore, Atatürk believed that theocratic Ottoman state with its different religions, culture and languages is not a suitable ground for moving the modernization steps forward. So, a newly established homogenous state to be united by the bonds of religion, language, and culture was not only auspicious but also indispensable for the goal of modernization.

\(^{59}\) When World War I was coming to an end, the Treaty of Sevres, signed in August 1920, provided for “local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas” (Article 62), and in Article 64 even looked forward to the
ethnic minorities was Kurdish—with this new identity and modernized/westernized\(^{60}\) life style and system. These top-down reforms were hard to digest particularly for the ethnically heterogeneous Muslim population. There was clearly an underestimation of the entrenched cultural paradigms as well as the role of ethnicity in one’s identity.

### 4.1.1 Kurds in a Turkish Nation-State

Kurds have lived in the geographic region stretching from upper Mesopotamia (referring roughly to contemporary south-Eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, north-eastern Syria) and to northern Iran. Tribalism defines their main organizing characteristic (Gunter 2004). Tribes (aşiret) are socio-political and economic units constructed by kinship bonds or common ancestry (see Jongerden 2007 for details). The aghas (feudal landlords or tribal chieftains) and sheikhs (religious leaders—the leader of the Sufi order) played major integrating roles in and across the tribes. Kurdish tribes, traditionally, were however subsumed under emirates /principalities, and prior to their absorption into the Ottoman Empire in the 16\(^{th}\) century, they operated somewhat independently (Gavan 1958).

Some of the Kurdish territories were incorporated into the empire in the years 1514 to 1517. As per the administrative structure of the Ottoman empire, the Kurdish territories were divided into three provinces (eyalet): Diyarbakir, Raqqa and Mosul, which were further divided into districts. Old ruling families of Kurdistan (usually aghas) were assigned important

\(^{60}\) Modernization went hand in hand with Westernization; they were perceived corollary of each other by the founders of the Republic espousing the Kemalist ideology.
administrative and political positions, and selection into such offices was hereditary, so only members of the ruling family could be elected. These local Kurdish rulers maintained their autonomy under the Ottoman rule thanks to the highly decentralized political and administrative structure of the Empire, which allowed communities (millet) to govern themselves.\textsuperscript{61}

Kurdish principalities enjoyed greater autonomy than their non-Kurdish counterparts thanks to their role as a buffer between the Iranian and Ottoman Empire (Yeğen 1996).\textsuperscript{62} These peripheral Kurdish governments were, for the most part, exempt from tax collection, or military service in the Ottoman army unlike many other peripheries (van Bruinessen 1978).

When the Ottoman empire collapsed at the end of the World War I (WWI), Kurds were promised a scheme of local autonomy with a prospect of independence in the predominantly Kurdish areas by the Treaty of Sevres (1920). On the other side, the National Resistance Movement organized by the Ottoman Turks was promoting the idea of a new sovereign state for Ottoman Muslim populations (Lewis 1961). Even though Turkish national identity was strongly embraced in this movement, Kurds opted for fighting along with the Turks for independence in the post-WWI wars. The appeal of the movement for Kurds came from the facts that Islam was employed strongly in the rhetoric of the movement and that ethnic communities were promised local autonomy. Yet, once the war was won and the Republic was established (in 1923), the Kurds realized that self-rule of ethnic communities at the local level was off the agenda, and that

\textsuperscript{61} The millet system acknowledged the pluralism within the peripheries, embraced the multi-ethnic multi-religious nature of them, accommodated this diversity, and enabled political and traditional differences. That being said, there were variations in the autonomy granted to peripheries; the terms of subjugation were usually determined at the time of annexation. For further information on administrative structure of the Ottoman empire, see (Barkey 2008, Karpat 2000).

\textsuperscript{62} Extended autonomy was not special and exclusive to the Kurdish principalities. There were many other privileged provinces which were not subject to the same rules of taxation or laws that other provinces were subject to such as: Eflak, Bogdan, Erdel (Transylvania), Crimea, Algeria, Tunisia, and etc. (Ortaylı 1979).
they had been simply absorbed in the new Turkish nation.

Finally, the centralization policy, which had commenced in the final era of the Ottoman Empire, dismantled the economic integration among Kurdish tribes. Once united by emirates under an empire, Kurdish tribes were now spread across three newly defined nation-states: Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Each of these new entities sought to create an integrated national economy within its own territory and establish new economic centers. In the new structure of Turkish Republic, the new centers were İstanbul and Izmir, and the traditional centers of the Kurdish economy, Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad, were now outside of the territory (Yeğen 2007). To resist these imposed nationalization processes, Kurds resorted to smuggling to perpetuate their economic integration.

In summary:

The politics of Islam, the autonomous political structures of tradition, and the resistance of the ‘periphery’ to an integrated national economy were all the components of the constitution of Kurdishness. The constitution and exclusion of Kurdish identity was intrinsically related to the project of transforming an a-national, de-central and disintegrated political, administrative, and economic space into a national, central and integrated one. Indeed, the exclusion of Kurdish identity was an outcome of that project (Yeğen 1996, 226).

The idea of modern, secular, and Turkish nation governed by a central authority and a national economy was hence problematic on many levels. 63 The salience of Islam in their culture and identity, 64 the tribal structure they construct themselves in, and their perennial traditions of

63 Kurdish principalities enjoyed greater autonomy than their non-Kurdish counterparts thanks to their role as a buffer between the Iranian and Ottoman Empire (Yeğen 1996). These peripheral Kurdish governments were, for the most part, exempt from tax collection, or military service in the Ottoman army unlike many other peripheries (van Bruinessen 1978).

64 Sheiks have been highly venerated in Kurdish circles. They have had absolute power over laymen. Sheik families in Kurdish politics were also prominent figures in modern Kurdish nationalism, which had been on the rise in the
governance and economy were all at odds with the national project of the new Republic.

### 4.1.2 Suppression of Kurdish Identity and Initial Kurdish Uprisings

Two major developments in the early Republic sparked the onset of the Kurdish struggle. First, the constitution drafted in 1924 defined all the citizens as “Turkish” and did not mention other ethnicities. It stipulates that: “The people of Turkey, regardless of religion or ethnicity, is regarded as Turk in respect of citizenship.” In the same year, the institution of Caliphate was abolished. The caliphate was important for binding the multi-ethnic Muslim groups. It was especially for Muslim ethnic groups (particularly Kurds) in the periphery for it allowed space for local autonomy for the periphery through strong roles Sheiks had in the system (Yavuz 2001; Yeğen 2007). Kurds’ allegiance to the new Republic, in a sense, hinged on the institution of Caliphate and promises for local autonomy while for Ataturk and his loyalists, the Caliphate was the biggest impediment before a secular and modern regime, and local autonomy for ethnic groups was a threat to the national unity.

Suppression of other identities than “Turkish,” and abrupt secularization resulted in a backlash from the Kurdish population. Kurdish uprisings commenced with the famous Sheikh Said in 1925. There are still debates regarding the nature of the rebellion; some suggest that it was religious in origin, some argue that it was a revolt to reclaim Kurdish identity, and yet others

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20th century. The sheiks embodied both religious and political power, pursued the goal of Kurdish autonomy, and preserved the tribal structure when clinging on the uniting power of Islam. They played a balancing role between Islam and Kurdish nationalism and autonomy (Tucker 2013). In tarikats (religious sect) and tekiyeyes (dervish lodges), sheiks not only taught religious principles but also cultivated nationalist ideas (Olson 2013, Yeğen 2007).

65 The first clause of the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution states: “Türkiye ahalisine din ve ırk farkı olmaksızın vatandaşlık itibarıyle Türk itlak olunur.”

66 This was the first organized insurrection against the newly formed Turkish Republic. However, Kurdish revolts date back to Ottoman era. Sheikh Ubeydullah’s uprisal in 1870 is known as the first nationalist revolt. There were also other small-scale rebellions at the level of tribes.
contend that both were at play (van Bruinessen 1978). Whatever the true incendiary cause was, it was a reaction to the project of establishing a modern nation-state by imposing new identities and new life styles. The first attempt to revolt against the state resulted in heavy crackdown by the military forces and execution of the leader.

The Turkish state, determined to obviate any further similar insurrections, took some strict measures, the reverberations of which persists today. The East Reform Plan, Şark Islahat Planı, being the most potent of all, was the first official step to assimilate Kurds, and “Turkify” (Türkleştirme) the Kurdish region via means of education, transportation, restructuration of cities, and new administrative regulations (Yeğen 2009). The plan, practically speaking, formed the framework of the state policies towards the Kurdish issue, the gist of which was denial and persecution of the Kurdish identity.

Prior to full operationalization of the Reform Plan, many follow-up Kurdish uprisings transpired in the following decade, varying in scope. The second major uprising occurred in Dersim, in response to the notorious Resettlement Law of 1934, passed to induce cultural homogeneity. It ended with a big blow from the state forces to strengthen the state authority and break the extant feudal ties. In 1935, a law (No. 2884) was passed to dismantle the tribal structure of the area, to “civilize” the inhabitants, and to change the name of the region from Dersim to a Turkish one: Tunceli.

Restrictions on the use of Kurdish were part of the strategy towards the obliteration of Kurdish identity, which was considered to be at the root of these insurrections. Soon after the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, the government heralded a campaign to dissuade people

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67 The extent of the state killings was perceived as a “massacre” and culminated in genocide controversy.
to use any other language but Turkish with a slogan of “Citizen, Speak Turkish” (*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş*). In 1944, Law No. 7267 stipulated that “village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee” (Jongerden 2009, 10). As a consequence of this policy, between 1940 and 2000, the names of more than 12,000 villages mostly in the Eastern region. Approximately one third of all villages were changed to a Turkish name (see Tunçel 2000 for the full list of renamed villages).

With the liberation of the political space in the 1960s and increasing expressions of Kurdish identity (see Chapter 5), further measures were taken towards the goal of suppressing the Kurdish identity. In 1961, Law No. 298 forbid the use “any other language or script than Turkish in propaganda disseminated in radio or television as well as in other election propaganda” (Article 58). With reference to this law, many prominent Kurdish intellectuals critical of state policies were arrested and resettled. Analogously, the Turkish Workers’ Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which was voicing concerns over the ban of Kurdish language, was banned on pretext of “encouraging separatist activities” in 1971 (Gunter 1990, 17). In 1983, a new and more comprehensive legal prohibition was introduced by the military regime on the use of Kurdish language with Law No. 2932. The prohibition came into effect a month before they turned the power back to a civilian government, supplementing the new constitution (1982) which further engraved the nationalist elements of Turkish identity and state.68 This new law forbade the use of any language but Turkish “as a mother tongue,” and banned publishing in any language other than Turkish, and it stayed in effect till 1991.

68 For the Turkish original of the 1982 Constitution and a description of all the amendments to date see (Retrieved on May 5, 2017): [http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982constitution.htm](http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982constitution.htm)
In summary, the draconian rule of the state to ensure cultural and national homogeneity, fostering a culture of fear and relative conformism in the Eastern part prevailed through the 1990s. Stipulations of displacement and forced resettlement to rearrange the demographic structure of Turkey and “dilute” the concentration of Kurds, and the de facto and de jure language bans were the most blatant strategies to the assimilation end, which were interpreted as “an attack on the social space where-in Kurdishness is constituted” (Yeğen 2007, 226). The atmosphere of fear further induced de-politicization of Kurds. The generation of Kurds that has witnessed the cruel suppression of dissent was conditioned to “behave.” The Turkish state resorting to its military power established itself as the only authority that makes the rules of the game. Many Kurds truly embraced the imposed national identity of the state and abided by the rules. They also raised their kids with the same ideology and stayed away from the politicized groups. The few decades following the brutal suppression of Dersim uprising were quiet in terms of identity rebellions. Until the burgeoning of leftist movements for equality, rights and freedom in the late 1960s, there was no noteworthy legal or illegal organized Kurdish movement.

4.2 Foundations of Peru: Colonial heritage and Nation-Building Efforts

“There is a history of conflict, both racial and geographical, which can be explained by one or more of the following: urban-rural, coastal-interior, center-periphery, and White-Mestizo-Indian” (#E32, Male, Lima, February 7, 2014).

Peru proclaimed its independence from the Spanish Empire, transitioning from colonial viceroyalty to a postcolonial republic in 1821. From the conquest of the Inca Empire by the Spaniards in 1532 onwards, Peru occupied a pre-eminent place in the Spanish Empire. All

70 For further details of the Plan, see (Bayrak 2009).
Spanish colonies in South America were governed by the Viceroyalty of Peru until the eighteenth century. Being a Viceroyalty, Peru had significant number of proud royalists to the colonial regime, and it was indeed the last country to proclaim independence in South America. The liberation from Spanish rule was brought by exogenous forces, and the resistance and reluctance of the royalists as well as the fragmentation in the population stalled the establishment of an independent country initially and bred instability throughout the early years of post-independence Peru (Contreras and Cueto 1999).

Nation-building in Peru and the search for Peruvian national identity were arduous given the strictly aristocratic state elites within an ethnically fragmented polity. The incompatibility between presence of the ideals of enlightenment, liberalism and modernization, the founding principles of the Republic, and the colonial legacy with a society based on caste system and an oligarchic state posed difficulties for state formation. The chasm between the ruling *mestizo* (mixed race) oligarchy in the center and subordinated indigenous publics (called “Indian” in a derogatory way by the creoles) in the peripheries was a strong defining feature of the colonial chapter of Peru, which spilled over to the post-independence era. Indigenous people who constituted the heavy majority in Peru were subjugated by the *criollos* (creole ruling aristocratic elites) throughout the colonial period. Although the nobility descending from Inca times were assigned aristocratic status, the indigenous local elite in charge of tax collection, they were few in number (Thorp and Paredes 2010).

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71 Peru, as a viceroyalty like Bolivia or Mexico, was one of the areas where power was centralized in contrast to “peripheries” such as Chile or Venezuela.

72 See (Galindo 1987) for the early years of the Republic.
Indigenous aristocrats occasionally challenged the Spanish oligarchic rule with small-scale uprisings, but these were to no avail until late 18th century. The counter-hegemonic rebellion of Túpac Amaru in 1781 against the Bourbon reforms, which proved to be the largest and most influential movement, had immense effects on the criollo elite, but not in the direction the insurgents were hoping for. The massive scale of Túpac Amaru’s revolt (also known as the Great Rebellion), though defeated and brutally repressed, left a deep mark on creole memory and perception of the Indians. Having lost their trust in the indigenous peoples, the colonial state gradually wiped out indigenous aristocracy lest an incident of a similar kind repeat itself. This insecurity of the ruling elites vis-à-vis Indians and their fear of being dominated by them would determine their attitude for many years to come. Méndez (1996, 220) posits that “the disdain towards and unfavourable image of the Indian grew together with the fears of an ‘outburst’ and the resulting need for the subordination of these populations.”

One essential benchmark revealing this attitude was the Peru-Bolivia Confederation between 1836 and 1839, originated from the historical unity and commercial ties between two countries in the pre-Hispanic era. The creation was led by Marshall Santa Cruz, who was indigenous in ethnicity. Though celebrated by elites in southern Peru, the creation was not welcome by all Peruvian creoles, especially the commercial elites in Lima and the coast at large (Larson 2004). Governance under the leadership and persona of Santa Cruz symbolized subordination for the creoles and was disconcerting for the aristocratic creoles of Lima. The discourse against the Confederation embodied elements of the overarching disdain towards the Indian. In the words of Méndez (1996, 206), “[t]he most outstanding feature of the anti-

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73 O’Phelan (1985) argues that these rebellions emanate from renewed dialects of freedom and renewed control, and identifies three waves: 1726-37, 1751-56 and from 1777 on which culminated in the Túpac Amaru II Revolt.
Santacrucista political discourse was precisely the definition of Peruvian national identity on the basis of an exclusion of, and contempt towards, the Indian, symbolically represented by Santa Cruz."

Following the downfall of short-lived Confederation, consolidation of Peru became a priority for the state. The composition of the oligarchy also changed during these early years of the Republic. The old aristocracy (colonial nobility), decimated in the internal wars, was replaced by military and a small but wealthy powerful civilian commercial elite who emerged through guano trade and agriculture. Integration of the Indians into the modern economy and "civilizing" the "Indian" sierra were the major goals of this new plutocracy (Rodriguez Montoya 1921). The first "civilista" initiative was undertaken under Manuel Pardo’s rule (1872-6). Railways to close the gap between the center and peripheries, introduction of modern political economy, disruption of feudal labour relations, educating the Indians, and European immigration were among the highlights of the de-Indianization strategy of the Peruvian oligarchy (Davies 1974; Larson 2004). The modernizing state embracing liberal values envisioned a unified Hispanized nation, and mestizaje, in a sense, was employed as a nation-building tool, which engendered these reforms to accelerate the assimilation of indigenous cultures; thus recognition of different ethnic and racial identities has been problematic in Peru (De la Cadena 2000).

The interest and desire of the centralist elite and the regional elites were not always compatible with respect to the Indian issue. Some of the integration policies directed towards Indians were frowned upon by the entrenched landed elites (hacendados) and actively resisted

74 See (Méndez 1996) for a thorough discussion on the discourse of Confederation.
75 Mestizaje is the idea of gradual evolution of Indians by rejecting and discarding their culture and language and taking on the dominant culture (De la Cadena 2000).
(see the next section for details on the land tenure system). Indian literacy and education, for example, were perceived as threats to the social and economic system of the sierra and in contrast to the interest of the hacendados, who benefited from being bilingual as overlords over Quecha-speaking indigenas. Most of them did not let their indigenous peasants get schooling. These types of local resistance and lack of a coherent policy to diagnose and tackle the “Indian problem” hampered and retarded nation-building in Peru.

The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) that was fought among Peru, Chile and Bolivia over the resource-rich Atacama Desert (Guano and nitrate were hot commodities in the Peruvian political economy at the time)—would aggravate the Indian problem for the Peruvian state. Not only did Peru lose devastatingly to Chile but also factional divide within the Peruvian elites resulted in a civil war and then numerous indigenous uprisings ensued right after. Though indigenous peoples fought in the war against the Chilean army by forming resistance armies in the highlands, indigenous peoples were portrayed as the reason behind the failure retrospectively.  

Landowners’ fear of peasant empowerment and invasion of haciendas by indigenous fighters was critical in this portrayal. The following excerpt succinctly states the prevailing view of the time:

The principal cause of the great defeat is that the majority of Peru is composed of a wretched and degraded race that we once attempted to dignify and ennoble. The Indian lacks a patriotic sense; he is a born enemy of the white and of the man of the coast. It makes no difference to him whether he is a Chilean or a Turk (Larson 2004, 196).

76 See (Rodriguez Montoya 1921) for comprehensive study of guano’s role in Peruvian economic history.

77 See (Larson 2004, 178-187) for a detailed narration of the involvement of peasant-organized guerilla bands, and the question of whether indigenous people were “patriots or barbarians?”
Losing the war attested to the failure of Limañean (from Lima) oligarchy in nation-building. The rhetoric of indigenous as “traitors” also further tainted the image of indigenous peoples in the eyes of the creoles (Thorp and Paredes 2010), epitomizing the “Hispanista” discourse. Though granted equal citizenship in the Constitution of 1823, indigenous people were stripped of franchise after the War of the Pacific, and remained disenfranchised until 1979 by the Spanish literacy requirement. In summary, the indigenous peoples were effectively excluded from the “national projects” of the nineteenth century (Nugent 1994).

In response to the racist “Hispanista” discourse, there arose an “indigenismo” movement. Indigenismo is a post-colonial discursive movement against the historical subjugation of indigenous peoples, their exclusion from the “imagined communities” during the nation-building, and the racism of the Peruvian oligarchy. In Peru, it was originally spearheaded by Manuel Gonzáles Prada in the late 19th century. Incorporation of the Indian masses, recognition of their rights and promotion of their interests were the main thrust of the movement. In the early 20th century, projects of indigenismo started to flourish, especially during Augusto Leguía’s rule. Though much action was taken in an attempt to recognize Peru’s indigenous communities, especially in the years of President Leguía, the undertones of the indigenista view again was

78 Electoral law of 1895 restricted the vote to the literate population.

79 The indigenista discourse was not univocal and had internal divisions. Early twentieth-century debates over the role of the “Indian” in Peruvian society, and over the merits and desirability of biological and cultural mestizaje (mixing), divided Peruvian indigenistas into two major camps, those who equated mestizaje with degeneration (Luis E. Valcarcel’s camp), and those who embraced and advocated it as a positive social force (Jose Uriel García) (Devine 1999).

80 In the 1920 constitution, indigenous communities were officially recognized. In 1921, Leguía founded the Patronato de la Raza Indígena (Guardianship of the Indian Race) to protect indigenous campesinos by investigating their complaints, enforcing their rights, and aiding their education (Heilman 2010).
colored by perception of inferiority of the indigenous race and the need to whiten them.

Between 1895 and 1919, the so-called “Aristocratic Republic” under the Civilista party once again ruled the country. Though they managed to reinstitute the national political order, exclusion of the masses and especially the indigenous peasants expanded the rift between the center and the peripheries. The center exclusively represented the commercial interests of the coastal elites and some mine owners (Miller 1982). The regional elites, especially those from the \textit{sierra} (hacendados or merchants) were more marginalized yet connected to the central government through clientelistic ties (Nugent 1994). The state became increasingly centralized around Lima with acceleration of capitalist development and under the influence of centralizing military and bureaucracy and grew more distant to the \textit{sierra}. The failure to incorporate the mass population in the economic system, to represent the common interest and to respond to popular demands further alienated the indigenous people from affiliating themselves with the state.

In summary, the centralized government in Lima could not manage to unify the fragmented population but rather aggravated the existing cleavages. The concentration of the polity and economy on Lima and the coast went hand in hand with geographic, ethnic and economic marginalization of the \textit{sierra} as well as political exclusion. The cultural and ethnic divisions intersecting with social classes persisted to the benefit of the dominant classes and to the detriment of a collective Peruvian identity (Cotler 1978).

Few initiatives emerged in the political arena that sought transformation of the country. The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party (APRA), under the leadership of Haya de la Torre, and the Communist party, under the leadership of Mariátegui in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century were founded. Political mobilization sharply increased in 1930s as economic crisis hit the country. Military forces took over the government in 1968 with a strictly populist and reformist
agenda to eliminate the “external dependence and internal domination,” causes of “national
disunity” and of the hostility between the people and the armed forces, launching the so-called
“Peruvian experiment” (Cotler 1983, 19). Yet, none of the attempts brought a sustainable
solution to the entrenched inequalities and poverty of the indigenous groups.

4.2.1 Brief History of Indigenous People in the Social and Political Structure

The natives of the geopolitical space where the Viceroyalty of Peru was established had been
inhabiting the coastal and rainforest regions that were previously home to pre-Colombian
civilizations (Dueñas 2010). Though heterogeneous in their ethnicities and cultures, Spanish
colonizers classified them all under the single “Indian” category, which they perceived to be
inferior to Spaniards. The “superiority” of Spaniards most likely originated from their ruler status
over the colonized subjects and their Catholicism rendered them closer to God. A parable from
the sixteenth century comparing Europe and America as two sisters conveys this understanding
succinctly: “The first [Europe] is beautiful and gracious and rapidly receives a visit from Christ
who weds her soul. The second has to compensate for her ugliness and country manners by
offerings of mountains of gold and silver to tempt possession” (Thorp and Paredes 2010, 91).

Being “intrinsically inferior,” the native people were relegated to a subordinate position
by the Spaniard colonizers in economic and social life. The colonial economic structure was
agrarian and built on a system of economic exploitation whereby landowners and mineowners

81 Retrospectively, this era of military government is evaluated under two phases: The Velasco regime during which reforms in land, health care, income distribution, and education took place, and Bermudez regime who ousted Velasco and dismantled many of Velasco’s reforms. Agrarian reform to end the feudal relationship between the landowners and peasants (hacendados and campesinos) and state’s increasing role in the economy are the only two that endured in the second phase (McClintock and Lowenthal 1983).

82 Broadly speaking Andeans and the Amazonians were the two major indigenous groups. The Andeans, semantically refer to the natives people of Andean highlands, were the major indigenous group at the time of the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors in the region, composed of native Quechua- and Aymara-speaking peoples.
were *criollos* and peasant labour were the *Indios* (Indian), who composed the highest and lowest social class respectively (Stavenhagen 1992). “Creole” denoted people of European (principally Spanish) ancestry who were born in Peru (Thorp and Paredes 2010). “*Mestizos*” were the middle category in the colonial caste system, referring to a mixed race— one parent of indigenous origin and one of Spanish or creole origin.

The system of economic exploitation induced and perpetuated a hierarchical social structure (a tripartite society), hindering possibilities of social mobility (Thorp and Paredes 2010). That being said, not all indigenous peoples were equally subjugated. Spaniards recognized the distinction of Inca nobility, along with their skills for political organization, and promoted them to a higher status in the class system and deployed them for the purposes of exploitation until the Túpac Amaru Rebellion in 1781 (Méndez 1996). The indigenous aristocracy (*caciques*) was in charge of collecting taxes, delivering the *mita* (labour force provision for the mines) and enjoyed rights to land and privileges to use of labour force (O'Phelan 1985).

*Mestizos*, initially small in numbers, grew considerably as the expanding colonial economy brought about urbanization and migration. With the centralization in administration brought by Bourbon reforms, they started to assume roles as small town mayors, tax collectors and postmasters. More occupational space opened up for them in the hierarchy following the defeat of Túpac Amaru revolt and the gradual destruction of indigenous elites (Thorp and Paredes 2010).

The indelible memory of the massive Túpac Amaru revolt, as well as the inherited

83 See (Thorp and Paredes 2010) for further information on the process of colonization of the indigenous population.
contempt for the Indians from the colonial state, shaped the creole vision of the Indian in the post-independence era and reflected on the nation-building strategies, as discussed in the preceding section. Méndez (1996, 221) asserts that “[t]he ideas of the Enlightenment, with its zeal for classification, hierarchies and control, probably helped to mould the creoles’ new perception of the Indians, paving the way for that theoretical rationalization of fears which were the product of an unquestionably decisive historical experience.”

Initially, emancipationist Creole elites wanted to construct a unified and rather homogeneous nation by eliminating the colonial caste system and bringing in equality under law. To the purpose of decolonization, the term “Indian” was disbanded in the official state discourse and supplanted by “indigene” and the concept of “indigenous race” was coined as part of decolonization and state formation efforts in the early nineteenth-century Peru. However, the dependence of the economy on Indian tributes in the first half of the nineteenth century reproduced the colonial domination of indigenous peasantry in a new formulation (Thurner 1997). The state made a pact with the indigenous community: in exchange for the head tax, the state was to protect Indian land by restraining its privatization and assign an indigenous authority to mediate their relationship with the state. This semi-autonomy conferred upon the indigenous communities was not serving to the ultimate goal of nation-building yet it was enjoyed by the local Indian republics as this new pact brought along rights over land that they did not have in the colonial era (Thurner 1997). Yet, in terms of the goals of decolonization and equal citizenship, this pact was detrimental as it concocted a subaltern indigenous citizenship, carrying over the “dual republic” of the colonial era.

84 In nineteenth-century everyday parlance, the term Indian was employed to address to common rural folk by non-Indians, and not urban Andean elites (Thurner 2003).
The life of this pact was very short in the end. The spike in guano sales in mid-nineteenth century resulted in replacement of guano with the Indian tributes as the primary source of revenue for the state, which practically ended the pact on the part of the state. The Peruvian state ceased to be the protector of the Indian land, and allowed its privatization, which undermined legitimate republican rule in the eyes of the indigenous communities. The state’s levying Indian tribute once again in 1879 to cover war expenses was then considered illegitimate and paved the way for a new round of indigenous uprisings (e.g. Atusparia uprising), which were again brutally repressed (Thurner 1997). As a result, illiterate indigenous people were eventually stripped from enfranchisement until 1979.

With the fast growth of the coastal economy (light manufacturing, steel production and fish-meal processing) and promotion of Lima as the political and economic center, the sierra and more so the selva (the Amazons) was consigned to “malign state neglect” (Heilman 2010, 9). While the coast developed with market capitalism and free-trade liberalism and became modernized, the sierra lagged behind, maintained traditional feudal economic structures, and perpetuated agrarian class relations.

The institution of “gamonalismo,” referring to domination by local power holders (petty hacendados (landowner), gamonales (provincial authorities) and rural caudillos),\(^{85}\) perpetuated the colonial system of exploitation, and fostered clientelism. The exploitative relationship is succinctly characterized in the following quote:

\(^{85}\) The term “gamonalismo” encompasses a broad range of local power relations in the sierra to “define the parameters of local power, based on monopolistic forms of wealth [landholding, mercantile monopoly, access to servile labour, military bands, etc.] and the privatization of provincial power [control over local offices, judicial processes, etc.]” (Larson 2004, 164). The local power holders may be mestizo or cholo (people of Indian ancestry who is acculturated in mestizo lifestyle) (Larson 2004).

See (Manrique 1991) for further information on “gamonales.”
[T]he hacendado requires more of the Indian than just a percentage of his crop. [...] The most widespread form of service is the pongaje whereby the Indians and their families are required to work free in the hacienda household as maids, butlers, chauffeurs, cooks and general handymen. The Indian receives no payment for these services (Davies 1974, 12).

The now double-layered subordination of indigenous communities, both by the central and the local power structures, aggravated their plight. Against this advance of subjugation, everything from expansion of commercial haciendas and state neglect to complaints about abusive local authorities, indigenous revolts proliferated throughout all the regions of the sierra (Cusco, Puno, Arequipa, Ayacucho etc.). The revolts culminated in the massive peasant movement of Rumi Maqui (Stone Hand) in 1915, which sought to restore the Inca Empire (Heilman 2010).

The indigenista movement described in the previous section was inspired by the Rumi Maqui rebellion (De la Cadena 2000; Heilman 2010). Indigenismo was replete with significant dissidences as to how to solve the “Indian problem,” and thus inconsistent policy attempts followed. Many assimilationist efforts failed. In the words of Devine:

[I]ndigenous culture has not been erased through education, changing modes of production, geographic relocation, or superficial alterations of physical appearance, as had been suggested by the wide variety of ‘assimilationist’ indigenistas who have sought to transform ‘Indians’ into what they considered to be ‘acceptable’ citizens, a process through which White and mestizo society would ultimately absorb and do away with Peru’s Indianness (1999, 71).

Pervasive racism extending from the creole nationalism and certain strands of indigenismo perhaps was the only persistent element of Peruvian state discourse. Indigenistas were not a uniform group; they perceived and interpreted the reality and status of Indians in distinct ways and embraced different solutions for their national integration. On one end of the spectrum lies the position that views Indians as inherently good and
unadulterated and seeks to preserve this virtue by keeping them separate. Luis E. Valcarcel spearheaded this school of thought. He believed *mestizaje* is tantamount to degeneration of Indians, *cholification*. The opposite end of the spectrum hosts the idea that advocates for *mestizaje* and gradual elimination of the Indian race through acculturation and biological blending (Devine 1999). José Uriel García was a major proponent of this approach. Marxist *indigenistas*, closer to this end of the spectrum, perceived Indians as primarily peasants and they too saw their redemption in the de-emphasis of Indianness as a distinct culture and promotion of class consciousness. What unites *indigenistas* is the understanding that “Indian identity” and “national identity” are inherently incompatible.

This concocted barrier and the fundamental schism among the *indigenistas* caused Peruvian state’s policies with respect to the “Indian problem” to be inconsistent. In the 1940s, Valcarcel was the Minister of Education and had adopted policies to shield the indigenous culture by emphasizing their distinctness, and to maintain two distinct nations within Peru. Velasco’s military government, however, overturned Valcarcel’s approach, and pushed to bury ethnic identities and instead adopt class identities. The confusion on the part of the Indians is perfectly summed up by Devine in the following quote:

> After having been taught by a paternalistic State for a quarter of a century that they were Indians, and that their only salvation was in maintaining their ‘pure’ Indianness, Peru’s rural inhabitants under Velasco’s regime were now told that the State had made a grave mistake in promoting that false identity. No, they were not really Indians (or if

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86 *Cholo* is a defamatory term to denote cultural hybrids (*mestizos*) who have roots in the *sierra* and behave like a white person; it is loaded with judgment. *Cholification* refers to the process of Indian “degeneration.” I should underscore that racial taxonomies in Peru are vague and a bit arbitrary. One mixed race person (with identical phenotype), depending on the cultural and educational attributions (not the biological), could be Indian, *mestizo* or *cholo* (contingent on the lens of the reader) or white (Devine 1999). The availability of upward mobility through education goes against the racialized geographies, rendering these categories all the more complex.
they were, they should not be); they had been peasants all along, and just had not realized it (Devine 1999, 70).

Presuming a class-based system by refraining from race and culture related taxonomies, the Velasco regime attempted to solve the “Indian problem” by land reform. The military government also implemented educational policies, which paradoxically gave recognition to the indigenous languages. However, these efforts were not enough to contain the revolutionary movement of Sendero, as will be explained in the next chapter.

4.3 Conclusion

The postcolonial Peruvian nation-making not only failed to incorporate indigenous groups but aggravated their situation due to inconsistent policies. As the criollo elites consolidated their power, the institution of gamonalismo became entrenched, and the plight of the indigenous peoples continued (Stavenhagen 1992). It is these ingrained structures in Peruvian national building that gave rise to the insurgency and made it ideological rather than ethnic. Unlike Kurds in Turkey, indigenous peoples also lacked collective capital. Despite some major revolts, agency in initiating change has been missing in Peru.

I believe the underlying reason for the lack of collective agency on the part of the indigenous peoples is the subjugation and subservience they had been subjected to after the Spanish conquest. While Kurds enjoyed political and economic autonomy and maintained a privileged status during the Ottoman rule, indigenous peoples in Peru were enslaved by the Spaniards, which casted the path for their inferior status in the Republic of Peru after independence. The Turkish state perhaps managed to successfully integrate a great number of Kurds and assimilate some others, yet Kurds maintained their collective identity that they had preserved and further cultivated thanks to the privileged status they enjoyed during the Ottoman
Empire. When it was time to revolt against the decades-long suppression of Kurdish existence in the Turkish Republic, the Kurdish nationalist movement was able to rise around an ethnic identity, which culminated into the biggest Kurdish uprising in the history—the PKK’s war against the Turkish state. As we shall see in the following Chapter, the policies of repression and national identity project engendered the counterhegemonic discourse of the PKK, and helped construct the collective memory narratives of many Kurdish activists. Sendero, on the other hand, capitalizing on the subordinate status of the indigenous people, managed to mobilize them around class consciousness rather than an ethnic one.

In sum, the insurgencies in both contexts were products of the political history. The nation-building policies in Turkey and Peru not only shaped the nature and the character of the insurgencies but also the dynamics and the outcomes of the insurgencies. In Turkey, the discourse of national unity and fixation on the territorial unity brought about the Kurdish revolt. After the onset of the war, the very same discourse marshalling the nationalist tools managed to secure political trust of the ethnic majority. In Peru, the lack of cohesive and coherent ethnic consciousness among the indigenous groups, the racialized geographies, and entrenched racism not only paved the way for the insurgency and casted its the Maoist nature, but also reflected on how the war played out, how it was perceived by the elites, and ultimately on how political and social trust changed as a result of the war.
Chapter 5: Causal Mechanisms: Insurgency Dynamics, Collective Threat Configurations and Discourses

5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide support for the argument advanced above by fleshing out the collective threat configurations in the face of rising insurgencies. It establishes the existence or absence of the primary causal mechanism in my theory—discursively generated collective threat framing or lack thereof—by fleshing out the pillars of the discourse and process of discourse generation. It is a prelude for the micro-level testing of the effects of collective and personal threat imposed by political violence on political and social trust in the next two chapters.

It has two parts: in the first part, it discusses the origins of the insurgencies with reference to political history and social structure in both countries, in the second part it presents the discourses and collective threat configurations. Beginning with Turkey, the second part first describes the pillars that constitute the official discourse of the Turkish state and then delineates the content of the discourse as well as the PKK’s counterhegemonic discourse. Next, it portrays the Peruvian state’s discourse and weak collective threat framing, the media representations of that conflict, discourse generated by Sendero.

5.2 PKK and Sendero: The Characters of, the Threats Posed by, and the Military Responses to the Insurgencies

Both the PKK and Sendero are offshoots of leftist movements that were sweeping across the world in the late 1960s. Leaders of these movements (Abdullah Öcalan and Abimael Guzmán,
respectively) were initially seeking a socialist revolution for all oppressed groups. Yet, Öcalan decided to prioritize the Kurdish issue in the party’s agenda the more he pondered the Kurdish problem and became familiar with the ideas of Kurdish nationalism. He believed in the necessity of a distinct Kurdish party when he decided that the Turkish left could not provide a solution (Romano 2006). Guzmán pursued his socialist goals yet decided to revamp the party following Maoist ideas (Poole and Rénique 1992). His push for militarization, which was at odds with the party’s general inclination, eventually led to a new and separate organization from the Communist party of Peru (PCP). Öcalan formed the PKK in 1978 with the Kurdish radicals or socialists who feel strongly about the Kurdish issue around a Marxist-Leninist ideology, and Guzmán formed a Maoist red faction with his loyalists within the PCP in 1970.

The PKK assumed an increasingly ethnic character and sought to appeal to ethnic Kurds in Turkey. Sendero, however, organized indigenous peasants around socialist goals but rejected politics or agendas revolving around indigenous identity. It is important to note that at no point in Sendero’s armed struggle, the parties involved in the conflict could be clearly distinguished with respect to their ethnicity or class positions while the ethnic positioning of the parties in the case of the PKK were quite visible.

Once the insurgent organizations had recruited and trained sufficient combatants, they initiated their armed struggle, both in the beginnings of a return to democratic rule from a military government. The PKK started its insurgency on 15 August 1984 with the Şemdinli and Eruh attacks, about a year after transition from military to civilian rule. The Shining Path

87 Öcalan was a prominent figure in the Turkish left, especially in the socialist revolutionary front party DHKP-C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi-Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front. Guzmán was the chairman of the Ayacucho Committee of the Peruvian Communist Party (Partido Comunista del Perú-PCP). See Figure A 3 in Appendix C for their initial flags.
launched its strategic offensive on the day of the first democratic election (May 17, 1980) after years of military rule (to be exact the first election since 1963). Still in fledgling stage, the transitioning elected governments did not pay much heed to the insurgent attacks at the outset. The then Turkish prime-minister Turgut Özal, and Peruvian president Belaúnde dismissed the guerillas as “bandits” (surprisingly using extremely similar denigrating phrases in respective languages: “üç beş çapulcu” in Turkish and “un grupo de abigeos” in Spanish, denoting literally a few looters/cattle rustlers). Because the threat posed by the incipient insurgencies was initially not taken seriously initially, and because not much importance was accorded to the population under attack (Kurdish and indigenous), the states delayed deploying commensurate military means to thwart further attacks and practically allowed the groups to grow. In the case of Peru, the previously ousted president Belaúnde was reluctant to empower the military lest the army take over civilian politics again. In Turkey, most authorities believed that the insurrections were remnants of the coup d’état and were not serious (as cited in Marcus 2009, 83).

The PKK initially was waging a secessionist war—indeed until the capture of Öcalan, an independent Kurdistan was the only and ultimate goal. The existential threat it posed to the territorial integrity of Turkey is the foundation of the collective threat the society felt. The

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88 On the very eve of the elections, they burned ballot boxes in Chuschi, in the province of Huamanga, Ayacucho. The perpetrators were quickly caught and the event did not get much attention in the press. They also used some symbolic violence by hanging dogs (representing the dogs of the capitalist system) from lampposts and blowing up Velasco’s tomb. Next, on the patriotic celebration of Independence Day, July 28, they placed bombs on the parade route in Lima. In Ayacucho, explosive attacks targeting government buildings and cooperatives and assassinations of local officials were launched (Barnhurst 1991).

89 Belaúnde’s personal resentment and distrust to the military also played a significant role. As a previously ousted president, he took measures to debilitate the Intelligence Service, which was used to keep political parties in check, and hence inadvertently hindered intelligence access to the strengthening insurgency (Obando 1998). Many scholars are of the conviction that this vengeful attitude of Belaúnde towards the army and the consequent delay in utilizing the armed forces to suppress the rebellion contributed to Sendero’s formidable rise (Degregori 1992, McCormick 1987, Palmer 1992, Starn, Degregori, and Kirk 1995).
collective threat Sendero posed was to the state and the regime, rather than to the territory or any other significant part of the Peruvian state’s identity. Sendero sought to destroy the state’s legitimacy, and attacked all tools and institutions of the regime. Even though Sendero had a significant popular support and was advancing quickly, the Peruvian state did not frame the violence much as an existential collective threat. As a fledgling democracy, Peru did not have strong ideological tools or democratic instruments to rally people behind the regime of democracy, or to defend it against the Maoist agenda of Sendero.

Both countries responded to the insurgencies with a delay, yet the response was much less coordinated and systematic in Peru than in Turkey. In Peru, the duty of confronting the Sendero militants was first assigned to the Police. But police forces were insufficient to impede the violence of Sendero. Eventually in December 1982, Belaúnde declared a state of emergency in eight provinces of Peru, and put armed forces in charge in those areas. In the interim, Sendero had advanced its agenda tremendously. Guerrilla groups, building on their pre-existing support from the students and teachers in the region, carried out moralization campaigns and continued to spread their message (Degregori 1990; Degregori et al. 1996). The newly assigned police forces (Sinchis, a special unit of the Peruvian Civil Guard) committed many abuses in their counterinsurgency tactics, such as beating and torturing the suspected Senderistas, but these brutal methods did little to prevent the rise of Sendero.

Although both countries had military conscription and citizen-armies, the scope, extent, significance and interpretation of military culture were different. In Turkey, military conscription for all males above the age of 18 has always been strictly enforced, notwithstanding some

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90 Military strength and capacity of Turkey has been relatively higher than Peru; indeed, Turkey is consistently listed among the top twenty countries with largest and strongest armies.
exceptions of so-called “paid military service.” 91 About 60% of the military force currently consists of conscripts—i.e. they are the backbone of the army, outnumbering the professionals. 92 Military duty is sanctified and heavily ingrained in the understanding of citizenship; sacrifice of life for the nation is exalted (see section 5.4.1.1 for detailed discussion). 93 In Peru, two-year conscripts (males between 20-25 years) similarly constitute most of the army’s manpower. 94 However, racial discrimination played a big part in the history of military conscription; forced recruitment only applied to the relatively poor indigenous Peruvian males. Dying for the nation has not been promoted as a holy concept as widely in Peru.

5.3 Discourses

Political discourses and their historical underpinnings are macro-level factors that are vital to the societal outcomes of civil wars. In the cases of Turkey and Peru, official discourses concerning the conflicts were constructed primarily in line with the vestiges of the imperial relations with Kurds and colonial relations with indigenous peoples, respectively. Historical inter-ethnic relations and racialized geographies not only culminated in the onset of the violence in both cases but also shaped the discourse that framed the violence.

91 It denotes an opportunity to ‘buy out’ the compulsory military service for a specified amount (usually around US$10,000) by an amendment in the Enlistment law in times of deficit in budget. It is usually for people who are above a certain age, varies between 25 and 30 years old (who has been postponing their service for education reasons or for residing in another country). Between 1980-2002, it has been enacted four times in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2002.


93 It is also associated with masculinity and first step to “manhood.”

94 By law, women were required to register for obligatory military service, and could be called up between the ages of eighteen and forty-five for two years. As of 1991, this had never been done. In the army, women served only in civilian capacities, such as secretaries, clerks, and nurses.
The practices, values, and beliefs imposed on society by the state through official discourse denote a form of cultural hegemony—“a monopoly of the norms and values upon which particular orders are erected” (Bauman and May 2001, 134). Imposition of these norms implies “conversion by inducing its objects to abandon their old habits and beliefs and embrace others instead or, alternatively, by castigating other cultures based upon the assumed superiority of its own” (Bauman and May 2001, 134).

Official discourse is, however, rarely the only active discourse. Counterhegemonic discourses are integral to the discussion here. Within the political elites and the masses, there have always been groups standing in opposition to some or all of these values promoted in the official discourse. Or, even though a given group may have espoused these values, there were both hardliners and moderates throughout the group’s history. Counterhegemonic discourses generated by insurgencies are another effective and pervasive discourse that exists in the public sphere, and in the following chapters both official and counterhegemonic discourses in Turkey and Peru will be explored.

5.4 Conflict in Turkey

5.4.1 Pillars of the Official Discourse

The Turkish state represented the PKK insurgency as “separatism” and “terrorism,” without any reference to its Kurdish nature until the 1990s (Dixon and Ergin 2010). But even then, the official state discourse remained “Turkey does not have a Kurdish issue; it has a terrorism issue.”95 In the 1990s, along with the growing resilience of the PKK, the armed conflict started to occupy more space in the political arena. Parliamentary debates, electoral campaigns, and

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95 This is oft-quoted line from a speech of Demirel, the then prime minister of Turkey in 1997.
cabinet meetings began to devote significant attention to the PKK. Kurdish liberation discourse also started to claim space in the public sphere, and counterhegemonic narratives with respect to the nature of the conflict emerged. In this section, I will first expound the relevant constitutive aspects of the Turkish state that undergirded the official discourse’s expression of the conflict as a “separatist terrorist initiative,” which in turn also determined the mainstream media discourse. Next, I will delineate the pillars of the PKK’s discourse, which emphasized “liberation and freedom for Kurds,” to underscore the sharp differences between the PKK discourse and the official state discourse fortified by the mainstream media. I argue that these divergent discourses help to explain the chasm between the collective memories of Kurds and Turks.

5.4.1.1 Nation, State, Army, and Territory

One of its most distinctive aspects of the Turkish state is the importance attributed to the military by the state and the citizens. The military was exalted to a sanctified by its agency in liberating the country from the occupation of the Allied powers in WWI. The founders of Modern Turkey were composed of high-ranking military officers, who put the military in charge of not only protecting the borders and the nation but also securing the fundamental values of the regime.

96 Güney and Karatekelioğlu (2005, 442) cite three major institutional legacies as reasons explaining the guardianship role of military in Turkish politics: a. The Ottoman legacy, against which the military developed a mentality of modernization and Westernization, and a Young Turk tradition from which military activism in politics is inherited. b. The legacy of the Turkish War of Independence, which legitimized the Turkish military in the eyes of the Turkish people. c. The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology that furnished the military with principles of secularism, democratic order, and integrity of the republic. The military assumed the role of a vanguard of Kemalist ideology and its principles—mainly secularism and nationalism. Military tutelage interrupted the democratic rule with two major coup d’états to secure certain principles of Kemalism. In 1960, military officers staged the first coup. Democratic rule was reinstated shortly after, and after a break of fighting between right- and left-wing groups, which was developing into a civil war, the second military coup d’état took place in 1980 to stabilize the country.

The rise of political Islam and separatist Kurdish nationalism in the past decade recreated an opportunity for the military to re-accentuate its guardianship of the Republic (Demirel 2004). On February 28, 1997, a military memorandum was issued to force the resignation of the then prime minister on the grounds of being anti-secular.

96 Güney and Karatekelioğlu (2005, 442) cite three major institutional legacies as reasons explaining the guardianship role of military in Turkish politics: a. The Ottoman legacy, against which the military developed a mentality of modernization and Westernization, and a Young Turk tradition from which military activism in politics is inherited. b. The legacy of the Turkish War of Independence, which legitimized the Turkish military in the eyes of the Turkish people. c. The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology that furnished the military with principles of secularism, democratic order, and integrity of the republic. The military assumed the role of a vanguard of Kemalist ideology and its principles—mainly secularism and nationalism. Military tutelage interrupted the democratic rule with two major coup d’états to secure certain principles of Kemalism. In 1960, military officers staged the first coup. Democratic rule was reinstated shortly after, and after a break of fighting between right- and left-wing groups, which was developing into a civil war, the second military coup d’état took place in 1980 to stabilize the country.
The military was promoted by the founders as the bedrock of nationalism. Militarism and nationalism thus became embedded as two complementing ideologies (Altınay and Bora 2002).

The vestiges and heroic legacies of the War of Independence (1919-1923) helped to build the nationalist rhetoric of the Republic. Military victories, stories of valour, and heavy human costs in the battles are often referred to in political discourses in order to provoke nationalist sentiments. It is common to hear that “this land was not gained easily” in Turkey. The persona of Ataturk, the commander-in-chief, who embodied the principles of Kemalism, and “the Great Speech (Nutuk)” he gave over the course of six days in 1927, were similarly critical in engraving the pillars of militarist nationalism.97

Nationalism and militarism were keystones of the national identity project and citizenship practices (See Chapter 4). Citizenship denotes “a capability to influence the activity of the state and thus to participate in the definition and management of ‘law and order,’” in addition to granting its holder as the bearer of rights and duties defined by the state (Bauman and May 2001, 137). The duties of a Turkish citizen were imbued with the ideology of militarism, which also penetrated into the political culture and the mass culture.

To reinforce and institutionalize the significance of the military within the understanding of nation-state and to secure the loyalty of the citizens to the institution of the military, the official discourse borrowed the concept of “citizen-army” from France and other European

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97 See (Altınay and Bora 2002) for practices of indoctrination of these militarist principles in education.
countries. Forced conscription was adopted by the new Turkish state in 1927, and was called “national service” (vatani görev). Military conscription for all males above the age of 18 has been strictly enforced, notwithstanding some exceptions of so-called “paid military service.”

Every soldier is trained to embrace the main goal: threats to territorial unity are to be thwarted at all costs.

The education system has been key to the promotion of these ideas and the mutually reinforcing ideologies of militarism and nationalism. In schools, the history of Turks was depicted as being replete with glorious victories of war—a historical narrative common to many nation-states—which advanced the notion of “soldiership” as inherent to Turkish identity (Altunay and Bora 2002). Many books were produced to exalt the military duty and the significance of the army (see İnan 1930). Serving in the army, which is integral and indispensable to the Turkish identity, is promoted as a privilege. The idea is fortified with the popular saying, “Every Turk is born as a soldier” (Altunay and Bora 2002). The concept of an “army-nation” was also reproduced in the discourses of intellectuals, academics, and the media. Commemorative rituals are deployed on the National Day for the Republic of Turkey (29 October) and on other historically significant days, as in most countries.

98 The idea of citizen-army had been circulating in the high administrative cadres of late Ottoman era (Tanzimat Reform era). See (Tilly 1990, 85-91) for the emergence of, and underlying reasons for, citizen militaries in 18th-century Europe.

99 The legislation for conscription was preceded by a law that was passed in 1914 that required every man between the ages of 18 and 45 to serve in the army.

100 “Paid military service” denotes an opportunity to “buy out” one’s compulsory military service for a specified amount (usually around US$10,000). This option is usually reserved for people who are above a certain age, typically between 25 and 30 years, and who have postponed their service for educational reasons or because they were residing in another country. Paid military service is made possible by an amendment in the Enlistment law that is typically enacted during times of deficit. Between 1980 and 2002, this amendment has been enacted four times (in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2002).
Discourses of patriotism, national heroism and sacrifice, military subculture values, and the territorial unity of the nation prevailed in the political sphere in the pre-PKK era of the Republic and afterwards (Howard 1978).\textsuperscript{101} The significance and rigidity of national borders are implicit in this understanding of national unity, extending from the mutual embeddedness of state and nation. Borders are fundamental to the notion of the nation-state, and are bounded and non-negotiable. This concept dates back to the idea of \textit{Misak-i Milli} (the National Pact) adopted in 1921 during the War of Independence, which established the current borders of Turkey.

A threat to territorial unity is an existential threat to the nation. In the official discourse, contraction of the size of the territory as a means to end conflict is tantamount to the end of Turkey (Cizre 2001). Emphasis and incessant promotion of national unity have engendered a peculiar perception of a ubiquitous territorial threat. In the words of a journalist I interviewed:

In the Interior Anatolia [referring to the cities where the War of Independence was mostly fought and which kept traditional identities more strongly than the cities in the West], there is this concern about being stateless. [...] There is always someone—be it sheria supporters, Kurds, Armenians—waiting in ambush to divide the nation. The concerns about national unity are highly agitated, and there is an identification around nationalist Turkist concerns (#E3, Male, Ankara, June 15, 2012).

The PKK conflict has fostered a reproduction of the nationalist and militarist discourse of the early Republic under the strict monitoring of the state. The projection of this discourse in the political arena was reified with the resurgence of the Nationalist Movement Party (\textit{Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi}—MHP hereafter). The party was founded in 1969 yet did not have much success in the elections before 1980. After being shut down between 1980 and 1991 by the military regime, along with many other parties, the MHP rejoined the national elections in 1995 and

\textsuperscript{101} See (Aykaç 2011) on the intersection of citizenship and militarist ideology in the context of Turkey.
received 8.5% of the votes, which was below the electoral threshold of 10%. In 1999, by contrast, it received almost 18% of the votes, arguably owing to the mounting threat the PKK had been posing in the 1990s.

5.4.1.2 Martydom and Religious Rituals

The concept of martyrdom further instilled in citizens the duty to protect the nation, exalting sacrifice of life for territory and championing Turkish nationalism. The term “martyr,” refers to people who face death in defence, in search or in the name of their faith.\(^{102}\) The modern nationalist interpretation of martyrdom has replaced religion with the state and God’s command with laws and has exalted the notion of dying for one’s nation. In Turkey, following this tradition, the concept has been employed to define fallen soldiers, as seen in the motto, “sacrifice of life for the motherland.” Later, martyrdom was extended to civil servants killed while on duty by enemies of the state, as a corollary to the pervasive militarism and nationalism. The centrality of martyrdom to the nation is symbolized in the Turkish flag, whose red color represents the blood of soldiers who fought in the War of Independence, soldiers to whom the country owes its very existence.

The religious ritual of organizing elaborate funerals for deceased soldiers bolsters the concept of martyrdom and further elevates the status of those who sacrificed their life for the nation.\(^{103}\) In addition to this function, solemn funerals also fortify the image of state. All ministers and high-cadre state officials, along with top-brass military officers, are usually present, representing the state and the military and the sanctity of both. Speeches are commonly

\(^{102}\) Christian, Muslim, and Sikh religious traditions shared this understanding of the term “martyr.”

\(^{103}\) Durkheim (1912) 1995 expounds how funeral rituals foster a collective consciousness, social cohesion, and national solidarity.
adorned with verses from nationalist poems. A prevalent one from a famous poem by Mithat Cemal Kuntay reads: “Blood is what makes flags; a land is nation when it is died for” (see Akyol 2009 for hermeneutic of these funerals).

5.4.1.3 Denial of the Kurdish Issue in the Official Discourse

The Turkish state discourse of struggle with Kurds dates back to the foundation of the modern state itself, as discussed in Chapter 4. The root of the problem is the perceived incompatibility between the ideals and ideologies of the new Republic and the Kurdish identity. The national identity project of the new Republic and its nationalist ideology was infused with modernization and westernization goals; however, this idea of a modern, secular, and Turkish national identity was at odds with the Kurdish identity, which predominantly features conservative and tribal elements. This dichotomy was conspicuous to the founders of the Turkish Republic, and their strategy to overcome this duality constituted the foundation of contemporary Turkish state discourse: denying the existence of Kurds altogether.

The Turkish state, when promoting the new unifying national identity in the early years of the Republic, chose to utterly dismiss the idea of a Kurdish identity. Kurds were promoted to be essentially Turks, and the Kurdish rebellions during the early Republic were stripped of their ethnic component. For instance, the Sheik Said Rebellion in 1925, which had both ethnic and religious motives, was framed exclusively as a religious uprising (in accordance with the modernization paradigm). Çelik (2010) aptly states that these early rebellions became Kurdish in character only after 1980 (the discursive changes will be discussed below). The term “Kurd” largely vanished in the press and publications after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. Kurds were

\[104\] In Turkish: “Bayrakları bayrak yapan üstündeki kandır / toprak eğrə uğrunda ölen varsa vatandaş.”
mentioned as a separate race only to controvert Kurdish identity in pseudo-scientific studies and governmental reports (Toprak 2012).

A comprehensive range of measures was taken to assimilate the Kurdish identity. The taboo of uttering the word “Kurds” led to a generation of “euphemistic expressions” used to denote Kurds, such as “mountain Turks” (dağlı Türkler), “people of Eastern origins” (doğu kökenli insanlar), and “Easterner” (doğulu). Besides, pejorative phrases were often employed in the official discourse featuring Kurds as “bandits” or “smugglers.” Similarly, in reference to the “Kurdish question,” the official reports characterized Kurdish regions as “regional backward,” “feudal” and “tribal” to attribute a quality of primitiveness (Yeğen 1999).

5.4.2 The Official Discourse Embellished with Hegemonic Tools

The Turkish state, associating its very existence with territorial integrity, venerated national borders as discussed in detail above. The PKK, posing a secessionist threat in its early years, was immediately portrayed as enemy to the nation. The insurgency was consistently depicted by the state as terrorism posing an existential threat to the nation.

Given the venerated status of the military and the overarching presence of the military in Turkish politics, the military held much power not only in political decisions but also in the official discourse throughout the conflict (i.e., until the mid-2000s). The accounts of military generals during the conflict indicated that they held de facto political power in the 1980s and 1990s in the Eastern provinces—that is, the governors in those provinces were under their command, martial law in practice (see Bila 2010). Military commanders effectively determined

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105 See (Cinar 2015, Chapter 3) for an extensive and detailed discussion of the narratives surrounding the “Kurdish” identity and the state’s attempts and strategies of assimilation. See (Hassanpour 1992) for more on Kurdish language policy in Turkey and (Yeğen 2009) for a discussion of the indoctrination strategies employed by the state to promote Turkish language and identity.
the scope of the counterinsurgency operations and the interpretation of the war provided by the media.

Security-force casualties were accorded the status of “martyr.” A state funeral was organized in each deceased soldier’s hometown. National and local news covered each and every funeral. The TV coverage habitually showed soldiers carrying the coffin wrapped in a Turkish flag, families in tears, and solemn state officials in prominent view. The reporting language was usually adorned with nationalist tones, perpetuating official discourse.

The Kurdish dimension of the conflict was utterly ignored in line with the state’s policy of denial. The dominant hard-core nationalist view presumed that acknowledging the ethnic dimension of the conflict would denote cultural recognition of Kurds, which in turn would foster separatist discourse. In both political communication and mainstream media, the word “Kurd” was strictly avoided; instead the news agencies used “traitors or separatists,” with no reference to ethnicity (Somer 2005). Discussions on the provenance of the armed conflict focused exclusively on social and economic grievances in the region. The official discourse used “the Southeast issue” (Güneydoğu sorunu) instead of “the Kurdish issue,” intersecting the issues of identity, representation, and socio-economic underdevelopment (Çelik 2010).

5.4.3 Media Representations

The national public broadcaster in Turkey (The Turkish Radio and Television –TRT) was the only television and radio provider until 1990, and its news programs were fraught with nationalist propaganda. In 1987, the TRT TV channel produced a program entitled “Anadolu’dan Görünüm (A view from Anatolia)” to cover stories of security operations against the PKK,

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106 This is not to say that they denied the existence of Kurds elsewhere or never used the term ‘Kurd’. Turkish media used the term to refer to the Kurds in Iraq, Iran, or Syria (Somer 2005).
heavily incorporating the nationalist militarist rhetoric of the state and defining the popular image of the East.\textsuperscript{107} To fortify the image of the strong state and its dominance over the PKK, the program frequently showed deceased bodies of guerillas (“the terrorists”) and aired the funerals of the fallen soldiers (“the martyrs”).

The print media was similarly heavily restricted to one-sided coverage; it only reported the PKK attacks, framing them as “enemy forces,” and did not cover the news of army raids or the razing of houses. The violence perpetrated by the state security forces on civilians, the mistreatment of the Kurdish activists, disappearances or tortures were never reported in the newspapers, as per the request of the government (Cemal 2003). The language in media coverage of the conflict served to fortify the image of a strong state, even when it was at its most vulnerable. In most cases, the number of terrorists killed was reported to be much higher than the “martyred soldiers” in order to reinforce the image of the military’s successful counterinsurgency.

The 1990s were perhaps the darkest time for independent media in Turkey. The armed conflict was escalating fast, reaching an apex in the second half of the 1990s. Starting from the late 1980s, forced village evacuations, mass murders, and politicides were on the rise, and these events monopolized newspaper headlines. To prevent this coverage, the government passed a statutory decree on 15 December 1990 that authorized governors in the provinces under a state of emergency to ban any publication that “could disturb the public order and galvanize the public.” In 1990 alone, 586 cases were filed by public prosecutors about 49 different local and national

\[\textsuperscript{107}\] The program broadcasted for fourteen years, without interruptions.
Furthermore, the parliament promulgated a law on the fight against terrorism in 1991 (Law No. 3713), outlawing terrorist propaganda, which was defined as “legitimizing or exalting the coercive, intimidating or violent acts of the terrorist organization or motivating to resort to these acts” (Article 7-7217/7218-1). The same article also specified that, in the case where such propaganda was carried out through the means of mass media, any sentence of incarceration would be raised by one half.

The mid-1990s also saw the soaring number of assassinations and unsolved murders of journalists (faili meçhul cinayet): A total of 37 investigative journalists, by one count, were killed during this time (Utma 2010). The government, the military, and organized crime combined their forces to combat the PKK, and the counterinsurgency operations took on the form of black operations. A car crash on 5 November 1996, known as “Susurluk Accident/Scandal,” where a top policeman, a member of Parliament and a hit man—all in the same car—died, cast light onto some of these secret operations and underground organizations established to fight the PKK. The first political discussions about the existence of JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Organization), an underground, unofficial body formed by the government to carry out extrajudicial killings, kidnapping, and intimidation of PKK members, occurred in the aftermath of Susurluk Scandal.

108 See (Utma 2010) for details on media-government relations after the 1980s.

109 The original legislation is retrieved on February 5, 2017 from: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.3713.pdf; The English translation with amendments is available at this link retrieved on March 8, 2017: www.legislationline.org/documents/id/16875.

110 See some details about the scandals in this link that was retrieved on May 5, 2016: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/10/world/scandal-links-turkish-aides-to-deaths-drugs-and-terror.html
Alternative Discourses in the 1990s

Starting from 1990s, this rigid official discursive framework became subject to contestation when a discursive space for the Kurdish issue started to emerge. An implicit acknowledgement of the Kurdish presence in Turkey began by open discussion of “the Kurdish reality” (Kürt realitesi) in political debates (Ergin 2014). The transformation on this discursive level manifested itself in the language used by the media: While between 1984 and 1990 the word “Kurd” was only used in 18% of the articles on the ethnic Kurds in a mainstream daily newspaper, between 1993 and 1998 this ratio rose to above 25%, despite the pressures from the state and the military (Somer 2005).

This slight liberation in discourse also enlarged the space for moderate beliefs in political thinking. “Moderate-nationalist elite beliefs,” for example, distinguished between the cultural and security dimensions of the Kurdish issue and expressed support for extending cultural rights and recognition of ethnic Kurds while rejecting violent movements. Indeed, in 1990, a political party called the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti) advocated for cultural-linguistic rights for ethnic Kurds. However, hardliner groups considered these moderate-nationalist beliefs to be in the same category with separatists. In the words of Somer (2005, 593), “the discursive shift reinforced hardliner-nationalist elite beliefs that vocal subnational identity groups in general, and Kurds in particular, were the divisive other.”

5.4.4 PKK discourse

Against the backdrop of this official discourse, Kurdish activists and intellectuals have developed counternarratives, which spread thanks to the intergenerational transfer of memory within families, as well as to oppositional political and social organizations. The crystallization of a coherent and politically motivated Kurdish counter-narrative truly began with the emergence
of the PKK and the concomitant consolidation of the Kurdish political movement. Of course, this owes in great part to the efforts of PKK ideologues, as well as activists and intellectuals from various political movements. Thus, the 1980s and 1990s offered an alternative space for the political socialization of Kurds inside the Kurdish region, in the western cities, and in the diaspora. Below, I will explain this process and elaborate on the elements of the counter-narrative.

The Kurdish movement preceding the PKK posed a challenge to the cultural and political hegemony of the Turkish state, particularly the denial of Kurdish identity and concerted practices of assimilation. The sympathy of the Kurdish groups towards socialism followed with the economic repression and exploitation of the Kurdish peasants, which eventually led to the idea of Kurdistan as a “colony” and the Turkish state as a “colonizer.” This idea became the backbone of the Kurdish liberation discourse. To counter the state’s efforts to homogenize identities, cultures, and languages, Kurdish intellectuals and political groups, starting from early 1960s, generated an oppositional discourse featuring the antiquity of the Kurdish nation and its rich culture and emphasizing the discrimination and oppression by the Turkish state (Gunes 2013).

Promotion of Kurdishness as a distinct identity—as opposed to just a masked Turkishness, as suggested in the official discourse—was an essential goal of the emerging Kurdish discourse. National Kurdish myths of a common ethnic ancestry (descending from the Medes) and cultural images were used extensively by the PKK (Romano 2006). Gunes (2013, 254) argues:

111 See (Gunes 2013, 250-253) for more details on the re-emergence of the Kurdish National Movement after the heavy repression in 1930s.
Gradually during the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘myth’ of Kurdish society resurfaced in Turkey to structure political discourse and as a space to register dislocations. From the 1970s onwards, the construction of the relations of difference—and the representation of the alternative Kurdish society—in the discourses of the newly formed Kurdish political organizations were done on the basis of the myth of ‘Newroz’.

Newroz is, traditionally, a Middle Eastern festival celebrating the arrival of spring with a bonfire on 21 March. It means “new day” in Kurdish. The Kurdish activists traced the origins of this festival to 612 BC when the Medes people—the ancestors of Kurds—were liberated from the oppression of the Assyrian Empire. The PKK and other Kurdish organizations utilized the myth of Newroz as a cultural tool to generate a distinct identity and a tradition of resistance (Gunes 2013). By the 1990s, the PKK and the Kurdish movement at large mobilized large crowds to celebrate Newroz on 21 March.

Since its inception in the 1980s, the Kurdish press has been active in spreading the discourse of the PKK despite the language ban that came in effect in 1983 (see Chapter 4) and pressures on freedom of the press. The PKK had published *Serxwebûn (Independence, 1982 to the present)* and *Berxwedan (Resistance, 1982 to 1995)*. *Özgür Halk (Free Public)* has, since 1990, served as one of the official channels of the PKK. Some other short-lived Kurdish publications were *Toplumsal Diriliş (Social Revival), Halk Gerçeği (Reality of Publics), and Yeni Ülke (The New Nation)*, which were around in the late 1980s. Kurdish media sources started to proliferate in 1991 when the law banning the use of any language other than Turkish was repealed. New publications were launched such as *Özgür Gündem*—active since 1992 (although the name was changed throughout the time due to various publication bans). Because these publications were run and distributed clandestinely, it is impossible to gauge their impact on the Kurdish population, but we know that they were available as media of communication in metropolitan
areas. Also, Europe-based satellite TV channels around since the mid-1990s served as a main source of information for many Kurdish households.\footnote{112}

Like the state, the PKK used “martrydom” as a tool to promote its nationalist rhetoric. Deceased PKK militants were framed as “heroes and martyrs of national resistance,” and long obituaries were published for each “martyr” in the PKK’s magazines, underscoring elements of “heroism” and “valor” (see, for example, Serxwebûn, 15 April 1994). Other acts of resistance to subjugation by the Turkish state included self-immolation or hunger strikes by the incarcerated PKK affiliates in Diyarbakır prison in early 1980s. Commemoration practices were employed by the Kurdish media to consolidate the discourse of resistance and sacrifice (Gunes 2013). The print media spread word about the suppression and mistreatment of Kurdish activists in prisons. The picture of the Turkish state as a ruthless imperial force was carefully carved in the minds of the readers using these kinds of details. With the advance of the internet in the 2000s, the dissemination of PKK propaganda reached its peak, enabling mobilization of the masses at even larger scales.

The PKK’s discourse\footnote{113} also critically engaged with Kemalist ideology and its implications for Kurdish identity. Atatürk was rejected as leader because he was the embodiment of Kemalist ideology and the “evils” that came along with it; instead, Öcalan was promoted as the liberating leader of the Kurdish movement.

The use of ideological tools in the PKK’s discourse shifted over time. At its inception,  

\footnote{112} The longest lasting channel was MED-TV, which broadcast between 1995 and 1999 and then changed its name to Roj-TV See also (Cagaptay 2007) for a list of PKK-affiliated media outlets (print and online press, television and radio stations, and websites). See (Özdemir 2009, 60) for a list of websites propagating for the PKK.

\footnote{113} I only provide the main pillars of PKK’s discourse here. Please see (Gunes 2013) for an elaborate analysis of discourse formation and a fuller representation of the PKK’s discourse.
the PKK fully embraced a Marxist discourse and emphasized the need for an “Independent, United and Democratic Kurdistan” (Özcan 2012, 104). Yet, towards the end of 1980s, both the ideals of socialism and Marxism and a separate state were slowly abandoned, and Öcalan’s ideas became more centered on “human emancipation,” as the call for “Free Kurdistan” came into focus. Changes in the international balance of power and internal political opportunity structures in Turkey and in the inner politics of the PKK played key roles in this transformation (Gunes 2009).

The PKK’s discourse found much resonance among the Kurdish public, and it was instrumental to reclaim the Kurdish identity. Especially as the PKK proved itself resilient, Kurdish population’s approach to the conflict started to clash with the dictations of the official discourse.

5.5 The Conflict in Peru: Discourses

In Peru, the conflict was ideological in character, and the Maoist insurgency brought class identities forward while downplaying ethnic identities. Nonetheless, the crosscuts of ethnicity and class were too conspicuous in the racialized geography of Peru to turn a blind eye to the importance of the indigenous issue in the discourses revolving around the insurgency. As a result, the main discursive framework of the conflict was constructed around the indigenous peoples. In this section, I will briefly review the history of the official discourse around the indigenous identity and then proceed with specifics relating to the state and Sendero discourses.

Unlike the Turkish state, which had a clear-cut attitude towards the Kurdish issue, the Peruvian state never had a coherent approach to the “Indian issue,” though the two countries share the underplaying by the state of cultural differences between the ruling ethnic group and the other ethnicities. The most blatant difference in the cooptation policies of different ethnic
groups is that in Turkey the existence of Kurdish ethnicity was consistently negated in the official discourse until the 1990s (with Kurds being subsumed under the Turkish national identity), whereas in Peru indigenous peoples and the national Peruvian identity were perceived to be discordant. Attempts to integrate indigenous peoples in the nation-state were rife with inconsistencies.

5.5.1 The Underlying Pillars of the Peruvian official discourse

5.5.1.1 The Country of Two Republics: The Inferior Position of the Indians

The duality of national identity and “Indianness” occupied a central space in Peruvian political culture, from postcolonial nation-building times to contemporary Peruvian politics, as explained in Chapter 4.114 This duality itself was a projection of the colonial dual republics: a colonial republic of Indians and a republic of Spaniards (mestizos) (Thurner 1997). The two “incompatible republics—one coastal, white, and modern, the other mountainous, Indian, and backward,” and concomitant geographical and cultural divisions plagued Peru throughout its Republican history, impeding national unity (Larson 2004, 150). José Carlos Mariátegui, the famous Marxist intellectual and the founder of the Communist Party in the country, analyzed this deep chasm within Peruvian society in the 1920s, and delineated the gist of the problem brilliantly:

The Indian race and language, displaced from the coast by the Spaniard and his language, have fearfully taken refuge in the sierra. Therefore, in the sierra are combined all the elements of a region, if not a nationality. The Peru of the coast, heir of Spain and the conquest, controls the Peru of the sierra from Lima; but it is not demographically and spiritually strong enough to absorb it. Peruvian unity is still to be accomplished. […] Instead of a single [sic] pluralism of local and regional traditions,

114 The controversy over labels, whether Indian is the right term to use for Andeans or not, also took much space in the political discourse.
what has to be solved is a dualism of race, language and sentiment, born of the invasion and conquest of indigenous Peru by a foreign race that has not managed to merge with the Indian race, or eliminate or absorb it (Mariátegui 1971, 163-164).

In practice, indigenous peoples continued to exist with their distinct language and culture, while the chasm between indigenous peoples and “Peruvians” kept enlarging. Also, mixed-race *mestizos* were not a unified group and did not embody the national identity (Degregori 1997). As explained in Chapter 4, efforts to integrate the indigenous people into the nation-state culminated in *indigenismo*, which had permeated state policies over the years yet proved to be unsuccessful in eliminating the rift between the *mestizos* and the indigenous groups. This rift between the two groups, failure of national integration, and centralism also contributed to “the inability and unwillingness of state managers to penetrate the society beyond Lima” (Cameron and Mauceri 2006, 238).

5.5.1.2 *Caudillismo* and the Military Culture in the Formation of Discourse

Turkey and Peru differ vastly in terms of their military professionalism and military tradition. “Military professionalism” encapsulates expertise, responsibility, corporateness, and ideology, all of which were missing in not only the Peruvian military but also many other Latin American military establishments (see Huntington 1957, Ch. 1). The soldiers who fought during the Independence were not military professionals, and the Peruvian national army in the mid-nineteenth century was ill-organized; hence, the conditions for establishing a corporate identity in the military were not ripe. Peru had neither the necessary facilities to train military officers nor a systematic recruitment system. Consequently, the military also did not have a clear sense of mission (Masterson 1991).
In Turkey, by contrast, the military was highly professional and had an abundance of battlefield experience and a crystal-clear mission—to serve as a vanguard for the founding principles of the Republic, especially secularism, with a duty to protect the nation and politics from both the invasion of external forces and the increasing spectre of religion. The Turkish military therefore embodied the ideology of the Republic, while in Peru the military lacked a unified ideology. In fact, the Peruvian military suffered from internal conflicts. Trained by French officers, the army embraced the French military tradition of promoting a more activist mindset, while the naval forces inherited the outlook common to Great Britain and the United States, a more apolitical stance (Masterson 1991). These opposing understandings of the military’s role aggravated the identity crisis faced by many in the Peruvian forces. In the words of Masterson,

Military men often had to choose between the role of soldier and the role of politician. Clearly, most soldiers see themselves as warriors, but few armies and even fewer naval institutions boast significant battle experience. In Peru this identity crisis was particularly acute as that nation’s military men faced a legacy of defeat dating from the disastrous War of the Pacific that made them suspect in the eyes of their fellow Peruvians. [...] The armed forces thus sought an alternative and meaningful role in national affairs that would mitigate their battlefield failures and unify a badly divided institution. [...] The search for a mission by Peru’s men in arms was made all the more difficult because they were caught up in the maelstrom of national politics as they sought to clarify their corporate identity (1991, 16-17).

The Peruvian defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883) also undermined the popular prestige of the army for many years to come. Because of the military’s bad performance in combat, army-civilian relations were based on mutual distrust, whereas the Turkish army enjoyed popular reverence for its heroic victories in the War of Independence. By the 1950s, it was clear that the Turkish army held a high status and significance to the nation, but the Peruvian army at that time had yet to justify its worth to and role in the nation.
Another obstacle to the professionalization of the Peruvian military was *caudillismo*, the nurturing of personalism in military officers instead of a common understanding of responsibility to the nation. Masterson (1991) contends that twentieth-century caudillos such as Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, Oscar Benavides, and Manual Odría hampered professionalization efforts due to their personalistic domination. Only after the institutional reforms of the 1950s (instituted by Prado for modernization of the army) did the Peruvian military begin to actively pursue a professional standard.

The concept of a citizen-army and military conscription existed in Peru as well as in Turkey, yet the scope and interpretation of militarism in Peru were starkly different. Historically, common soldiers in Peru were poor and illiterate Indians, blacks, and *castas* (mixed races), and the length of service hinged on the military necessity (Masterson 1991). The contemporary conscription policy entails a two-year service term for males between 20 and 25 years, and the conscripts constitute most of the army’s manpower today. However, racial discrimination played a big part in the history of military conscription in Peru; forced recruitment only applied to the relatively poor indigenous Peruvian males (see González-Cueva 2000). In Turkey, on the other hand, the mandatory military duty is sanctified and heavily ingrained in the understanding of citizenship; sacrifice of life for the nation is exalted above all else (as discussed above). In Peru, the notion of dying for one’s nation lacks the holiness it holds in Turkey. Given the composition of the military (mostly indigenous) and the longstanding distrust toward the armed forces, the deaths of soldiers in battle also has failed to exhort much reaction from the Peruvian

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115 By law, women were required to register for obligatory military service and could be called up between the ages of eighteen and forty-five for two-year terms. As of 1991, however, this had never been done. In the army, women served only in civilian capacities, such as secretaries, clerks, and nurses.

116 Military duty in Turkey is also commonly associated with masculinity and seen as the first step to “manhood.”
public.

5.5.2 The Official Narrative

Similar to Turkey framing the PKK as terrorists, the Peruvian state consistently framed Sendero as a terrorist group. However, Sendero lacked the dimension of secessionist forces attacking the national unity. The official discourse in Peru also was not strongly influenced by the military because of the military’s weakness vis-à-vis Sendero and lack of experience in counterinsurgency (Obando 1998).

The official propaganda against Sendero involved moral discrediting of the party and classifying the ”terrorist” supporters of Sendero as “traitors of the fatherland.” Entrenched racism in Peru and disdain toward Indians had a powerful effect on popular perceptions of the main political actors. The state adopted dehumanizing discourses to justify and legitimate their violence. However, the state never framed the insurgency as a major collective threat to the country until it reached Lima.

5.5.3 Media Representations

In Peru, unlike in Turkey, the state’s relationship with the media was not tight or cooperative, but neither was there a similar type of censorship and legal obstruction imposed upon the press by the state, nor a unified discourse on the part of the media. Indeed, the media did not always help the cause of the government, and at times it aggravated the violence (TRC, 2003).

The newspapers that had been expropriated by the Velasco regime were returned to their former proprietors in July 1980 by Belaúnde. In order to gain credibility in the eyes of the public and to recover old readership levels, the new management of the newspapers El Comercio, La Prensa y Última Hora, Correo y Ojo, and Expreso y Extra purged the staff who continued to
adhere to the principles of the military government (GarGurevich 2012). However, as Macassi (2002) notes, in the twelve years of the military regime, these newspapers did not practice much investigative journalism and tended to see the military government as the only actor. Furthermore, these papers acquired a centralist character over the years, and shedding light onto the social problems in the Highlands was neither their forte nor priority (see Peralta 2000).

The initial attitude of the media was to minimalize the importance of the attacks and treat them as mere delinquency, without any analysis of the social or cultural dimensions of the issue. However, as the frequency and number of attacks grew, the media coverage also expanded. After declaring emergency zones, the Belaúnde government imposed restrictions upon the press and prevented access to accurate information about the emergency zones and the counterinsurgency campaign. The military refused to cooperate with the press and share details as to the bloody counterinsurgency. They also attributed blame for some of their own wrongdoings to Sendero (Barnhurst 1991).

Peralta (2000), who looked at the role of the press during the armed conflict with Sendero, contends that censorship eventually led to sensationalism of the media. From the end of 1982, the Ministry of Interior Affairs imposed severe information censorship on the journalists who were charged with covering news in Ayacucho. Some journalists were uncomfortable with this measure and decided to take the risk of penetrating the emergency zones in search of news. In January 1983, however, the massacre of eight journalists in the Andean community of Uchuraccay dissuaded a large section of media from looking for an alternative source to the official state communications or uncovering the truth. Sendero’s attacks on reporters from major

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117 Respectively, the former administors of these newspapers were: Miró Quesada family, heirs of Pedro Beltrán, heirs of Luis Banchero Rossi and Manuel Ulloa Elías (GarGurevich 2012).
newspapers, magazines, and the broadcast media were another force of dissuasion for not going with investigative reporting. “With the goal of avoiding further tragedies and compensation for the censorship, many daily newspapers started to exaggerate, inflate, or make up information about the political violence, thus leading to sensationalism and generating a feeling of fear or indifference for the problem” (Peralta 2000, 9).

As was the case in Turkey, much of the violence by state security forces went unreported in the mass media. Uncertainty prevailed, which benefited the propaganda of Sendero. Effectively, the Peruvian state’s decision to silence information about the counterinsurgency effectively left Sendero as the only player in the field that was covered in the sensationalist news, and fed mistrust between the media and the state (Manrique 1992). According to some analyses, sensationalism helped boost the legitimacy of Sendero and increase its popularity among the vulnerable publics (Oviedo 1989). Other analyses suggest that the sensationalist coverage desensitized the public, whose excessive exposure to the violence inured them against feelings of fright, shock, or outrage (Rodrich 1984), and hindered their comprehension of the extent and the seriousness of the problem (TRC, 2003).

The strongly centralist character of the media turned them blind to the problems, demands, and eventualities in the interior parts of Peru (Macassi 2002). Some attempts to experiment with investigative journalism were suppressed by both the subversive group, the armed forces, and their bosses (TRC, 2003). As a result, the general public did not understand that the conflict was consuming the interior parts of Peru. Jorge Acevedo Rojas (2002), a scholar of communication, argues that it is very possible that most of Peruvian society did not grasped the full magnitude of the problem of human rights in all its magnitude in the early 1980s as the violence did not touch the inhabitants of big cities in Peru, particularly Lima.
The government of Alan García came to power in 1985 with a promise of less violence and more accountability. Yet, García also pressured the media to restrict their coverage of terrorism. *El Comercio*, the largest and most revered daily newspaper, suggested that the media adopted voluntary restrictions to tone down the violence in its reporting by decreasing visual coverage of the conflict. However, the Peruvian government did not have as strong of a command over the media as the Turkish government. *La Republica*, a relatively new and a more independent center-left newspaper, defying these self-imposed limits on the media, published some news about the guerrillas and military excesses (Barnhurst 1991).

Under Fujimori’s rule in the early 1990s, the state’s violent crackdown on subversives also involved many abuses and killings of innocents. Notorious death squads (*Grupo Colina*) committed massacres, yet these deaths were depicted as unavoidable because of the obscurity of the *Senderistas*: The lack of clear markers made it difficult to distinguish between innocents and enemies.

In sum, where the Turkish state’s strategy was to coopt the media and use it to foster nationalist feelings and hatred against the PKK by providing extensive coverage of the counterinsurgency operations, the Peruvian state’s strategy was to minimize coverage of the violence with respect to the counterinsurgency efforts. And, in Peru, unlike in Turkey, there were no symbolic elements like state funerals to rally the crowds around the flag. Security forces who lost their lives in the fight with Sendero were not accorded any special status in death as the concept of martyrdom was not employed by the state.

### 5.5.4 Sendero Discourse

Against the backdrop of state discourses, Sendero produced a rival discourse designed to resonate with the indigenous groups. The discourse was centred around countering the official
depiction of Peru. Until the 1980s, primary school textbooks described Peru as a rich, peaceful, and happy country. In contrast, Sendero depicted Peru as a country of injustices, a country where transformation required a violent revolution.

Taking advantage of the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the social reforms of the Velasco government, Sendero promoted a portrayal of Peru as a semi-feudal country (even though most of the feudal links were broken by the time they started their armed struggle). The upcoming return to democracy with the elections in 1980 was considered as a legitimating mask for a corporatist fascist regime (Degregori 1997). Furthermore, by deconstructing the Spanish invasion and laying out the mechanisms of domination, Sendero generated a story of deception for descendants of Incas.

Sendero propagated its ideology as the “scientific truth,” using education—which it portrayed as having been an instrument of domination—as its main tool of propagation. One major text was *El discurso de Sendero Luminoso: Contratexto educativo*, published in 1989 by Juan Biondi and Eduardo Zapata. The authors criticized the countersubversive policies of the state, which reduced the Senderista ideology to a “military concept,” and promoted the idea of Sendero’s discourse as an educative one (Peralta 2000).

Sendero also repudiated every element of Peruvian politics (its system, discourse, and parties) and strived to overhaul the whole structure. The need for new politics was a key part of their discourse. They also rebutted the media, characterizing it as a weapon of government and the bourgeoisie system. Through its bombings of TV stations and assassinations of reporters, Sendero tried to intimidate the media. However, in order to transmit its messages to the national elite, it relied on the Peruvian media (the TV and the newspapers) to cover its attacks and deliver its messages. Similarly, to reach its urban sympathizers and those who needed emancipation
from the government, it utilized pro-Sendero media, particularly the “printing press, mimeograph machine, movie house, television, loudspeaker, photograph, wall paintings, rumors, etc” (Fernandez, 1986, 21 as cited in Barnhurst 1991, 86).

For its rural support base, Sendero preferred archaic communication methods (e.g., pamphleteering, personal message deliveries by Inca-style runners called *chasquis*, smoke signals etc.) (Barnhurst 1991). Sendero also utilized graffiti (*las pintas y murals*) in public plazas as additional channels to promote its ideology and vision of a future Peru. These visual portrayals served not only to complement the *Senderista* textual discourse but also to communicate its ideals to a population that was largely illiterate (see Oviedo 1989). Part of Sendero’s strategy was to dictate its philosophy and way of life through its discourse and eliminate all alternative voices.\(^{118}\)

Civilian supporters of Sendero published newspapers to disseminate its ideology, despite the government’s restrictions. *El Diario*, a leftist periodical starting from mid-1980s, served as perhaps the most accessible and visible medium of Sendero propaganda.\(^{119}\) *El Diario* published a series of special, lengthy articles on the members of the insurgency who were killed or incarcerated. On 24 July 1988, they published the famous “Interview of the Century” with Guzman, where he elaborates on the goals of the People’s War and the ideology of the party.\(^{120}\)

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\(^{118}\) See (Degregori 1997, 62) for examples of discursive elements ingrained in Guzmán’s speeches.

\(^{119}\) *El Diario de Marka* was the original name of the newspaper, which began publishing in 1975. Its rhetoric with respect to the violence of Sendero was ambiguous in the early years of the war. It framed the attacks as an act of the right groups and only after 1982 came to realize that the violence in fact was largely because of the *Senderista* insurgency, with the significant support of the peasants. Also, even though in its early issues (in 1980 and 1981) they used the word *terrorista* to refer to the insurgents, they supplanted it with *guerilleros* starting from mid-1982. In 1985, following a restructuring, the newspaper continued as *El Diario* and became the official voice of Sendero. (see Degregori 1997 for details on instruments of domination and Sendero's portrayal of them).

\(^{120}\) An English transcription of the interview is available at this link that is retrieved on December 10, 2016 from [http://www.redsun.org/pcp_doc/pcp_0788.htm](http://www.redsun.org/pcp_doc/pcp_0788.htm).
It is important to underscore that Sendero discourse was exclusively ideological. In contrast to early *indigenista* intellectuals, Sendero leaders ignored the ethnic dimension of the domination and instead read the history solely through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology (i.e., class relations). Even though Sendero discourse featured historical repression and subjugation, the emphasis was on class rather than ethnicity. Hence, the Peruvian civil war and the discourse did not induce any regeneration of indigenous identity, as opposed to the case of the Kurds in the Turkish conflict.

### 5.6 Conclusion

Both the PKK and Sendero had their roots in socialist leftist movement, and espoused revolutionary principles for their respective countries. Group inequalities in social, economic, and political terms enmeshed in historical injustices, state repression, and structural disparities in Turkey and Peru constituted the main grievances that motivated the insurgent movements. Both the PKK and Sendero embedded emancipation of the suppressed and marginalized groups into the center of their discourses. Sendero perceived his party as the solution to all social, political, and economic ills of Peru, and the PKK insisted it was the only party that could appropriately represent Kurds.

Official discourses concerning the conflict in Turkey and Peru were constructed in line primarily with the vestiges of the imperial relations with Kurds, and colonial relations with indigenous people respectively. Historical inter-ethnic relations in Turkey and racialized geographies in Peru culminated in not only the onset of the violence but also the discourse that framed the violence. The differences in the national integration policies, political culture of nation building and different characters of the conflict in Turkey and Peru further explain the collective threat framing of the conflicts in the discourses.
The agency of the media in gathering information on conflict and capacity for mass communication was different in the two countries. Both were in the midst of transitioning to democracy when the violence erupted. In Turkey, even though the military government turned the power to a civilian regime in 1983, the draconian power of the military continued to cast a shadow in politics throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In Peru, the media was fledgling in terms of investigative reporting as at the outset of conflict in 1980, media networks were just regaining their autonomy after being confiscated by the military government for twelve years. The capacity of these networks for investigative journalism had become dull over the years. The media in Peru also never had a coherent attitude towards the conflict, which fluctuated between sensationalism, self-regulation (a product of the dialogue between the media representatives and state actors), and independence.

As a result, while in Peru, Sendero was downplayed in the official narrative until it reached the capital city Lima; in Turkey, the threat posed by the PKK was integrated into the official state discourse relatively quickly. The official Turkish state narrative, emphasizing territorial integrity, national unity and concept of army-nation, has dominated the educational curriculum, media and state policies for much of Turkey’s history. In Peru, the state never developed a coherent collective threat framing in response to Sendero violence, and the inconsistencies in the media representations of the conflict further distorted any possibility of a unified discourse.
Chapter 6: Prelude to Empirical Chapters: Data Collection and Analysis

This chapter adds details about data collection and analysis, compounding the information in Chapter 3. I completed 36 expert interviews, 66 in-depth interviews, and 19 focus groups with ordinary people in Peru. In Turkey, I conducted 46 expert interviews, 92 in-depth interviews, and 15 focus groups with ordinary people (see Appendix D for details on the interviews and focus groups). I also conducted a survey with every focus group participant to collect information on their political predispositions, which helped me draw a deeper understanding of the origins of and change in their political attitudes.

Below, first, the recruitment strategies and the way these interviews and focus groups were conducted are presented. Second, coding procedures and analysis techniques are described.

6.1 Recruitment of Participants for Interviews and Focus Groups

In Turkey, when recruiting people as participants, I utilized my own social and academic networks to reach the respondents fitting the criteria and then resorted to snowballing. I had an advantage as a native and I was affiliated with Bilkent University. I placed special emphasis on the variety in the networks to ensure access to diverse narratives. Avoiding bias and one-sided stories was my ultimate goal. My key contacts helped me recruit participants for focus groups and organize them. Some respondents were referred by personal contacts, either by my Research Assistants or by staff in the research institutes where I was affiliated. Often the chain of connections linking the respondent to myself was several degrees removed. This degree of removal was facilitated by forwarded e-mails with information about the project. Individuals I e-mailed asking for referrals frequently passed the request on to others, who often forwarded it in turn.
In Peru, I relied on the already established network at the IEP (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos—Institute of Peruvian Studies-) and the PUCP (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú—Pontificial Catholic University of Peru)—the institutes and the universities I was affiliated with—and my previous connections mostly set up by my committee member Max Cameron. The Institute for Survey Research at the PUCP helped me recruit focus group participants in Lima and elsewhere in Peru through their contacts. I specified the selection criteria for each group, and they organized the groups at the university. IEP also helped me find contacts in all the sites I visited.

I used multiple local informants in order to ensure that I was not gravitating toward a particular subgroup’s rhetoric. Some informants may preclude access to certain groups (LeCompte and Goetz 1982). Also, the key informants in remote localities who have access to networks in Lima or Ankara have a tendency to stand out in terms of their political stance in their locality, or may embody a power differential. To circumvent this possibility, I relied on multiple sources of information, some of which I encountered myself while on location. I struck up conversations with as many people as possible during my fieldwork and recruited some of the people I came into contact with over the course of my own daily interactions in restaurants, shops and other public places.

6.2 Conducting the Interviews and Focus Groups

I carried out all my interviews and focus groups myself except for the focus group in Tarapoto in Peru—I could not arrange travel there and hired a professional to help me. For my first two months in Peru, I had a research assistant to help me communicate my questions to focus group participants in Lima, as I was still working on language skills. In Ayacucho, most participants did not speak Spanish, so I hired a translator to help communicate with Quechua speakers. In
Turkey, virtually all my participants spoke Turkish. For the monolingual Kurdish speakers, I hired translators.

My interviews usually took place in public places such as cafes, restaurants, or parks. Sometimes, people invited me to their homes. For focus groups, a quiet location was important, so these groups usually took place in classrooms, conference rooms in offices, or people’s homes.

The interviews were semi-structured, in-depth, and discursive (See Appendix D for the interview questions). Rather than a formal conversation with strict questions, they were more in the form of a conversation where the respondent had the ability to control the flow. I used my questions mostly as a guide to navigate the course of the interview. I asked the participants about their background, origins, and socialization practice, as well as the wartime experiences of their families and themselves, their perceptions of the insurgents and the state, their personal securities, threat perceptions, social networks, and political identities. I also inquired about their children’s engagement with activism, their satisfaction with the performance of state authorities, and their welfare concerns (See 6.5 for a discussion on “Retrospective Accounts”). I had a ready list of questions and prompts, but I let the conversation determine the direction of the interview and the order of the questions. I often used prompts to either redirect the flow of the interview or to probe further to ask for clarification, more detail, or to make sure that I covered the necessary points (Leech 2002).

I encountered certain challenges in the field to establish rapport. Especially in Turkey, gaining the trust of the locals was difficult because of overarching fear of the state (President Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule). Indeed, a few journalists cancelled interviews with me last-minute because they suspected that I may have worked for the CIA or another foreign government.
Similarly, some Kurdish communities were initially hesitant to speak with me because I didn’t speak Kurdish, which implied that I was a Turk and therefore may be working for the government. Nevertheless, my regional connections and local contacts helped assuage their concerns significantly. I grew up in Gaziantep, a city in the Southeastern border, and it is also on the border of Kurdistan as it is drawn by the Kurdish groups. My status as a denizen of Gaziantep and a graduate student in Canada were useful to play down the role of my ethnicity, and my key contacts helped assure the participants that I am a trustworthy researcher.

Establishing trust in Peru was also sometimes tricky. My contacts played a critical role in dispelling any suspicion as to my potential affiliation with the state, the CIA, or any other foreign agency. The issue in Peru was not so much that the participants felt threat or insecurity associated with my identity; it was more about me being non-Peruvian. I think, however, being a foreigner actually worked in my favour, because most of my respondents were thrilled about a “Canadian” student doing research on Peru and were willing to help me to the best of their ability (See 3.3.2.2 for further details on establishing rapport and surpassing other challenges as a researcher in the field).

6.3 Coding

My observational unit of analysis (data category) is individual and the explanatory unit (theoretical category) is the social groups (see Ragin 2014 for the distinctions between the two). The narratives I worked with were subjective; they represented social processes as interpreted by my respondents and hence were buried in the collective social memories. Bearing the aspect of subjectivity in mind, when I was coding, I made sure to underpin the subjective interpretations and sources of contradictions in points of view. In a similar vein, I took the context-specific discursive practices and social processes into account for accurate meaning-making.
I had all my interviews and focus groups transcribed and uploaded them in N-vivo qualitative analysis software for coding and analysis. Coding in qualitative research denotes “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data” (Miles and Huberman 1994, 10). A code, then, is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña 2009, 3). I used a systematic and iterative coding method common to qualitative analysis (Charmaz 2006). I started out with a deductive set of codes, read the transcripts and field notes line by line, and coded the data in appropriate code(s). I generated new codes as they emerge from the data.

Coding is a data reduction exercise as well as a strong analytical tool for systematic analysis (Saldaña 2009). It is, however, very much an interpretive act. In order to diminish subjectivity, I did my coding in cycles. I spent about 15 months in coding and analysis, and I revisited the data three times with at least a three-month interval between each time. When I revisited the data, I recoded, looked for new categories, and reorganized my old themes. I consulted with my key informants in the sites to check the accuracy and meaning of my interpretations to increase the internal reliability of my analysis.

Throughout my research, data collection and analysis went hand in hand. I employed a combination of deductive and inductive strategies at all stages. Even though I generated my theory deductively with my priors and initial findings in the early phases of my study, I revisited my theory and updated both my priors and mechanisms after I collected original, rich, qualitative data.
6.4 Analysis and Inferences

My approach to the qualitative materials is holistic and interpretive. I combined relational and interpretive modes of analysis and paid specific attention to the relational structures between the subjects and the state, as well as between ethnic groups. Some of the inferences were quite straightforward. Respondents’ answers with respect to the element of threat and their narratives of individual and collective securities were great resources to help me trace the process of attitude formation, in particular changing trust relations. Discrepant cases and disconfirming evidence helped me investigate the source of deviance and improve my theory by updating my priors.

One challenge is that the process of trust formation is not static. As the conflict unfolds, people’s attitudes change, especially in accordance with the dynamic personal threat configurations. To trace the process and find out the intervention of threat mechanism, I used some of the procedures of process tracing. As Bennett and Checkel (2015, 9) suggest, “process tracing is a key technique for capturing causal mechanisms,” one which examines the “intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest” (6). The goal is to identify causal pathways and mechanisms between an independent and a dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005). Diagnostic evidences are known as Causal-Process Observations (CPOs), defined as “an insight or piece of data that provides information about context, process, or mechanism” (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010, 277). I largely focus on “mechanism CPOs,” as my theory mostly describes the causal mechanisms and intervening steps connecting conflict to trust.

My theory specifies these mechanisms in a very detailed way with clear empirical predictions, yet this strategy could also lead me to falsely reject an alternative explanation
(Jacobs 2014, 42). To avoid this error, I inductively looked for alternative processes that may be at play in explaining one’s motive in the narratives. For the sake of transparency and reliability, in the chapters to come, I underscore the evidences that I have found to be the most probative to my key inferences.

I deploy a wide range of views that appeared in a recurring fashion in the interviews and focus groups, some of which may come across as politically insensitive or too biased to be unreflective of the popular beliefs. I deliberately incorporate them as important observations that provide insights into the nature and extent of polarization in memory and identity construction processes. The fact that they were being repeated renders them worthy of attention for the purposes of this dissertation.

I should emphasize that my ultimate goal here is to explore the causal pathways and direction of effects on trust as induced by civil war violence. Yet establishing causality is challenging. For instance, some of the hypotheses in Chapter 7 predict a decline in political trust, yet political trust may be declining for other reasons: economic instability, domestic political crisis, corruption, diplomatic crisis, and the like. So, observing evidence of decline in political trust does not suffice to confirm my hypotheses. The evidence needs to refer to the conflict, experiences with the conflict, or official or counterhegemonic discourses as a reason behind the declining trust. I look for ways to determine that narratives indicating declining trust relate back to the onset of the violence.

When I am quoting from a narrative, for in-depth interviews with individuals I use “#” followed by a number assigned to the participants, and for expert interviews, I use “#E” followed by a number assigned to the experts. For focus groups, if the quote involves more than one participant, I use “P” followed by a number to indicate that sentences belong to different people.
6.5 On Retrospective Accounts

By the nature of my inquiry, the questions posed were all retrospective. Psychological research on autobiographical memory shows that there are different retrieval strategies depending on the accessibility of the memory: direct (for accessible memories), inferential/constructed (memories that are more difficult to retrieve e.g. a more distant event), or both. Factors such as the retention interval, degree of firsthand experience, predictability of parts of an event, and the original emotional state of the individual affect the retrieval method (Herrman 2012). In my research, the questions were about a distant past (pertaining to at least two decades ago). I asked about the respondents’ subjective judgments and evaluations with respect to threat, security, and welfare and the changes thereof throughout the conflict. Even though the memories belonged to a distant past, because they evoked strong emotions, both inferential and direct retrieval were likely to be at play.

Retrospective accounts are by definition reconstructed accounts (LeCompte and Goetz 1982). Research in psychology shows that present conditions could bias one’s memories of the past (Holmberg and Holmes 1994). Wood (2003) also underscores how current political opinions could bias retrospective accounts. During all my oral communications (interviews and focus groups), I asked about the participants’ evaluations of the current political events in order to get a sense of their political stance today. However, political opinions and even ideological affiliations are subject to change over time. Usually I had to rely on individuals’ self-reports as to their political judgments and personal experiences. In about 20% of my cases, I also had a chance to speak to the parents of the respondents to listen to their evaluation of their children’s attitudes and the impact of the conflict-related events. Not surprisingly, I found the narratives of the children and the parents to be very similar because a significant portion of early socialization
process takes place at home, and one’s evaluation of the past is largely formed by family discourses.

To trace respondents’ attitudes throughout the course of the conflict, I specified certain events that had resonated with the general public, such as the Velasco regime, the first democratic elections in May of 1980 or the widely covered Uchurraccay Massacre in 1983 in Peru, and the coup d’État in September of 1980, massacres perpetrated by the PKK, the political leaders in the 1990s, the capture of Öcalan in 1999, the funerals of specific soldiers in Turkey (I had a roster of all fallen soldiers by province from 1984-1999), as well as other significant memorable political events. I see these events as critical junctures, and by introducing these staple events, my purpose was to take the respondent back in time to these moments. I sometimes asked the participant to give a general description (memories of common everyday experience) or recall an episode of their lives (idiosyncratic experiences) during those times. Experienced events are associated with certain emotions, and invoking these events could remind the respondents of the specifics of the discourse they subscribed to and their judgments at the time. Sometimes, I would ask them to list major events as they remembered them and talk through them chronologically in order to anchor them more in time. My other strategies to that purpose included asking them to recount family conversations about the conflict over the years.

Throughout each interview, I would also arrive at the same question in different ways in order to verify the accuracy of the given answer. At first, I might frame a question within a particular incident or a commonly known story. For instance, I would ask respondents to remember the news coverage of soldier funerals or clashes between the PKK and Turkey, and thus evoke their emotions; after activating their memories, I would ask them about their states of being at the time, how they would evaluate their state with respect to security provisions and
welfare, and the nature of social relations. At another point during the interview, I would pose the same question but without a narrative hook to first trigger their emotions.

Research in autobiographical memory suggests that the affective valence associated with events—that is, whether a participant or witness perceived the event as positive or negative—may change the way the memories are retrieved. The findings suggest that positive events are retrieved more directly while negative events are retrieved more inferentially (Herrman 2012). Though the accuracy of direct retrievals tends to be higher (since inferential retrievals are often reconstructed) (Herrman 2012), because what I am after are subjective judgments and evaluations rather than objective accounts of events, as far as my research focus is concerned, there is no ground to cast shadow on the validity of retrospective reports.
Chapter 7: Hypotheses Testing: Effects of Civil Wars on Political Trust

This chapter aims to present the empirical findings, and to test the micro-level implications of my theory, which suggests that collective threat framing and personal threat in times of conflict are the main mechanisms that determine individuals’ trust. Collective threat emanates mostly from the interpretation of the conflict in the official discourses (see Chapter 5). Personal threat is a function of the nature of the attacks, proximity to the conflict zone, and other perceived risks of physical damage because of the collateral or direct effects of the war. In an ongoing conflict, these two kinds of threats usually operate together, mutually affecting the construction of each other. In this chapter, I use my original micro-level data gathered from the fieldwork in Turkey and Peru to test the hypotheses derived from my theory. The findings confirm the predicted relations between ethnic and ideological civil wars and political trust and add new dimensions to the theory.

Prior to presentation of the findings, one necessary conceptual distinction is between the “state” and the “government.” The conceptual discussion above featured the different levels at which trust may be measured. Even though rules and regulations of government operations are the same, people’s evaluations may change with changes in government as political actors’ behaviours mostly determine the conception of government. The state, on the other hand, is an established institution with monopoly of legitimate coercion, subsuming its subjects (people), a defined territory, and a government. This distinction may not be clear to many people. Del Pino (2008) argues that for indigenous communities, thinking about state is thinking about government. He reasons that in societies with precarious political institutionalism, what manifest itself from and on the margins of the state are the concrete actions of the government. Similar
story is valid for my participants in Turkey. “Government is a political notion and an identity required in the process of these populations articulation of state” (33). “Government as manifestation of state” is a conception that may apply to many contexts. Individuals tend to conflate the two. States have certain policies, ideologies and path-dependencies that governments are expected to comply with. Governments do not have to follow the same path with the previous ones, and may adopt approaches that are more radical. However, to challenge and eventually change the established conception of state, such changes should persist for some extended period. Hence, the narratives that refer to the state in stead of government are interpreted as pertinent to political trust. I should add that because of the difficulty in teasing out specific and diffuse political trust, i.e. trust in specific political actors or institutions vs. trust in regime and state apparatus, and because of the tendency to comment on the state and its institutions as if they are abstract notions (such as using the term “the system” to refer to collection of state apparatus and ideology), the findings presented here mostly concern diffuse political trust.

First, a table summarizing the hypotheses on political trust, observable implications and empirical evidence (Table 2) is presented. Following that comes the portrayal of the personal threat configurations in the conflicts in Turkey and Peru, compounding the collective threat configurations presented in Chapter 5. Next is presented qualitative evidence, first from Turkey and then Peru, gathered via interviews and focus groups to confirm and disconfirm the hypotheses.
### Table 2. Hypotheses for Political Trust, Corresponding Observable Implications, and Empirical Evidence Employed for Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Observable Implications*</th>
<th>Empirical Evidence from Fieldwork</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. When there is strong collective threat framing and no personal threat,</td>
<td>After the onset of the violence, I expect individuals to:</td>
<td>Narratives from the interviews and focus groups in Turkey conducted with those who were not under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political trust should increase for those who identify with the nation.</td>
<td>➢ Throw support behind government’s counterterror policies.</td>
<td>personal threat (particularly from the subnational sites that were not exposed to violence: Ankara,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Feel safety and expressing reassurance about state’s intention to protect.</td>
<td>İstanbul, Gaziantep).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Have a renewed sense of confidence in political actors for seeking the interest of</td>
<td>Expert comments and evaluations on category-based trust and social relations are considered as evidentiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the nation.</td>
<td>sources as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Turn a blind eye to low policy performance of the actors with justification of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the collective threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Make references to the content of the official state discourse.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Place emphasis on the importance of the nation, and put other personal matters in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the backburner (based on the link between national importance judgments and political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust-see Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. When there is high personal threat and weak collective threat framing,</td>
<td>After the onset of the violence, I expect individuals to:</td>
<td>Narratives from the interviews and focus groups in Peru with those who were under high personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political trust should decrease.</td>
<td>➢ Cast doubt on state’s ability to protect (with reference to the conflict).</td>
<td>threat (such as residents of Lima in the late 1980s and early 1990s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Lose belief in security forces’ (police, gendarmerie, army) capacity in bringing</td>
<td>Expert comments and evaluations on category-based trust and social relations are considered as evidentiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>order (Comment on their weakness and low performance).</td>
<td>sources as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Observable Implications*</td>
<td>Empirical Evidence from Fieldwork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ø Have less willingness to engage with the political representatives.  
Ø Be more skeptical of the government’s counterterrorism policies. | sources as well. |
| 3.1 When high personal threat and strong collective threat framing coexist, the negative effect of personal threat on political trust should be mediated by the positive effect of collective threat framing. | After the onset of violence, I expect individuals to:  
Ø Express of a mix of anger, frustration and disappointment with the state services for protection while endorsing the political institutions and actors or not showing signs of decreasing political trust as listed above.  
Ø (Of those who feel higher personal threat) Show more signs of decreasing political trust such as questioning political actors’ capacity to govern and provide security. | 3.1 Narratives from the interviews and focus groups with people who experienced high personal threat such as those who resided in Diyarbakıır, Hakkari, Şırnak, or who had sons of age for military service or kids who were waiting to be assigned for obligatory Eastern services in Turkey.  
3.2 For variation in the magnitude of personal threat, different types of personal threat is utilized. Fear of losing a son or a child to terror vs. fear of having the child assigned to the East is interpreted as low and high personal threat. For high personal threat, living close to the clash zones where guerillas may come in, demanding shelter or food such as Mardin or Hakkari.  
I did not personally visit the clash zones (due to security risks) but my sample include people who lived there in the 1990s. I also relied on Expert comments and evaluations on threat of violence and political trust. |
| 3.2 The lower the personal threat, the more effective is the offsetting power of collective threat. | |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Observable Implications*</th>
<th>Empirical Evidence from Fieldwork</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Conditions of pervasive personal insecurity should bring in a perception of collective threat, automatically conditioning the severe decrease in political trust.</td>
<td>➢ When insecurity prevails and personal threat is ubiquitous, I expect to see that people, out of desperation and fear, rally around the political institutions, and confide in their power with hope.</td>
<td>Narratives from the interviews and focus groups with people who lived in Lima between 1989 and 1992 in Peru.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1. If the state security forces are the perpetrators or one of the perpetrators of violence, political trust plummets for the victims.</td>
<td>➢ Similar to the listed observable implications for hypothesis 2 in terms of decreasing political trust.</td>
<td>Narratives from the interviews and focus groups with non-victimized ethnic Kurds in Turkey and indigenous people in Peru. These two groups are considered as empirical evidence because their co-ethnics were victimized by the state security forces in both contexts. Expert comments and evaluations on political trust are considered as evidentiary sources as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. In ethnic wars, ethnic bonding should lead co-ethnics’ political trust to decline.</td>
<td>➢ I expect to observe these implications on the non-victimized co-ethnics, in reference to the sufferings of their victimized co-ethnics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Consistent and extreme insecurity and state violence undermines state’s political legitimacy.</td>
<td>After the onset of the violence, I expect individuals to: ➢ Express skepticism on state’s rightfulness in governing ➢ Decrease their use of state’s courts when seeking justice and start to resort to alternative means of dispute resolution. ➢ Generate alternative systems of security and leadership.</td>
<td>Narratives from the interviews and focus groups with Kurdish people who were victimized by the state and ethnic Kurds who espouse the counterhegemonic discourse of the insurgency as a reaction to the sufferings of their co-ethnics. Expert comments and evaluations on state legitimacy for the Kurdish population are considered as evidentiary sources as well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The list of observable implications is not intended to be exhaustive but rather intends to highlight some of the major implications we expect to observe.
7.1 Configurations of Personal Threat in the Conflicts in Turkey and Peru

Both insurgent groups initially waged their war in the most impoverished and least developed regions of their respective countries: Ayacucho in Peru, and Hakkari, Şırnak in Turkey. In Peru, Sendero waged its guerrilla warfare in the rural in the initial years of the insurgency and embarked upon urban guerrilla campaign towards late 1980s. The PKK’s guerrilla war has almost exclusively been a rural-based guerrilla war— the attempted urban insurrections had largely failed until 2015, and the war has effectively been concentrated in the border zones in the Southeastern Turkey.

The PKK had established a guerrilla army who fought with the Turkish army while Sendero’s People’s Army fought with civilians, security forces and all state agents. Sendero’s subversive strategies included assassinations, disappearances, and torture according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Report (TRC, 2004). So did the PKK’s, however the majority of the casualties in the Kurdish conflict were soldier and guerrilla deaths (see Table 3). Another difference lies in the nature of civilian killings; in Peru indiscriminate killings were more pervasive. Indeed, fatal victims were mostly civilians who were indiscriminately killed by Sendero and the Peruvian Armed Forces.

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121 Degregori (1986) reports that the illiteracy rate in Ayacucho in the mid-1980s was 68.5 percent, and per capita food consumption is 420 calories a day, less than half the 850-calorie minimum to support life set by the World Health Organization.
### Table 3. Total Number of Deaths in the Civil Wars of Turkey and Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS</td>
<td>35,576</td>
<td>69,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Forces</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td>1,054 (Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>682 (Police Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations (Civil Servants</td>
<td>5,543</td>
<td>2,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Turkey, Local Authorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Union Leaders in Peru)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas</td>
<td>22,101</td>
<td>65,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>5,557</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Civilians+Guerillas)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Commission
+ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru—Final Report. The numbers are for both Sendero and MRTA (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) conflicts. The commission concluded that Sendero was responsible from 54% of the total deaths and disappearances, MRTA of 1.5%, and the rest was perpetrated by the state security forces. Disaggregated figures by the listed categories are not readily available in the report. Especially the civilian and guerrilla figures are almost impossible to disaggregate due to their indistinguishability.

Individual threat was also significantly different in two conflicts in large part because of the difference in type of guerrilla warfare. Sendero’s People’s War started in Ayacucho but expanded its reach quite rapidly to the urban zones. The counterinsurgency campaigns of the Peruvian state managed to slow down Sendero but did not stop it from growing. Sendero was active in 22 of 24 departments of Peru by the end of 1980. By 1990, virtually half of country was under emergency rule (Degregori 1997). Perhaps, the indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign and massive abuses therein obstructed the inception of a grassroots anti-Sendero reprisal early on and led to its expansion.

Sendero’s advance into urban zones posed tangible individual security risks to the residents. Car bombs at street corners, assassinations, blackouts and random nature of attacks made the threat all the more real and visible. Personal threat was no longer exclusive to the indigenous peasants in the *sierra*, it became a pervasive phenomenon day-by-day especially between 1987 and 1992. People who were bystanders thus far were facing increasing risks of
being a victim. With increasing individual threat were they becoming more cognizant of the scale of the war fought in Ayacucho until then and the size of the collective threat Sendero had been posing. Violence reached Lima towards the end of 1980s, and Limañeans (long-term residents/locals of Lima) felt under intense threat particularly between 1989-1992, according to my data and secondary sources. Nevertheless, many believed that the Tarata bombing incident in 1992\(^\text{122}\) was the first time people in Lima at large realized the violence of Shining Path, which people in Ayacucho had been enduring for a decade by then.

In the case of Kurdish conflict, bystanders outside of the Southeastern Turkey did not feel the same kind of individual threat that a large number of Peruvians did. Except for some bombing incidents claimed by the offshoots of the PKK, the war did not arrive in the urban zones in Turkey. The presence of the PKK was limited to Eastern Turkey, to the territories it has been claiming (Kurdistan), and mostly to the outskirts of the cities even though especially in the 1990s raids to military housings in Hakkari and Şırnak were common.

Beside the residents in these cities, it was the families that felt personal threat most strongly, worrying that their kids may be assigned as soldier or civil servant to the Eastern provinces. The relatively random nature of the location assignments for the military duty and obligatory Eastern service for civil servants contributed to the anxiety (see Huddy et al. 2005). Beyond the indirect threat, the PKK did not directly pose a tangible threat to individual security for mainstream bystanders outside of the Eastern Turkey. Unlike the civil war in Peru, indiscriminate civilian killings were also not a pervasive strategy in the ethnic war in Turkey.

\(^{122}\) It was the biggest and most impactful attack of Shining Path in its armed warfare in Lima. Car bombings occurred on Tarata street, which is replete with financial businesses located in Miraflores—one of the most upscale districts in Lima. 25 people died and 155 were injured (TRC, 2004, p. 661).
The two insurgent groups were also different in terms of the brutality of their violence. Sendero employed extremely violent methods to exterminate opponents, castigate the dissidents and instill fear, which is well aligned with one of the most fundamental elements to its discourse: “cult of death” as Degregori (1997) calls it. Emphasis on “blood” and metaphors of “rivers flowing blood” were heavily employed to underscore the importance of sacrifice of lives for triumph of socialism as well as negation of human life (Degregori 1997). The element of brutality and indiscrimination in Sendero’s strategy of violence may have further enhanced the fear and intimidation attached to the popular level threat in Peru.

The PKK, in contrast, was considerably less aggressive and violent, which most likely factored in the perception of popular threat. Substantive support for this observation comes from the total number of fatalities: The total number of fatal victims in Peru was estimated to be around 75,000 people, and Sendero was held responsible for 46% of them. While in Turkey, whose population is almost three times larger than Peru, the approximate number of victims is around 40,000 including state killings.

Another glaring difference is distinguishability of the perpetrators. In the case of Kurdish conflict in Turkey, it was relatively easy to distinguish the perpetrator; both parties to the conflict wore uniforms. In contrast, in Peru, clear distinguishing markers separating not only victims from perpetrators but also separating Sendero militants from the soldiers were missing.

The killings perpetrated by the state (mostly of the guerillas) or the cases of disappearances attributed to the state are qualitatively, morally, symbolically and instrumentally very different from the killings undertaken by the insurgents. In both contexts, the state was involved in civilian targeting, yet in Peru the episode of “Dirty War” (1983-1985 in particular) featured excessive abuse of power wielded by the armed forces. Of course, the Peruvian conflict
is long over, and we have much more information pertaining to counterinsurgency dynamics, thanks to the thorough work of the Truth Commission. In Turkey, a commensurate sort of information is yet to come. The Kurdish conflict is still ongoing, and reliable information on state violence is not available. That being said, human rights organizations and associations for the war victims and forcibly displaced people provide highly useful data to have a better sense of state’s violent counterinsurgency tactics on civilians.

Below, in light of these distinctions, I will examine micro-level experiences during times of conflict, and how personal experiences, interpersonal communications, interacting with the macro and meso-level (e.g. local context) variables affected political trust evaluations. Note that even if the micro-level experiences are the same, their effects may differ due to the variation in baseline priors. What I mean by baseline priors is the trust attitudes of the individuals before the beginning of the war. I will pay due diligence to baseline priors in my discussion. Starting with the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, I will expound the shifts in political trust due to changing identities prompted by the civil war.

7.2 The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey

7.2.1 The Collective Threat Framing

It is pivotal to reiterate that in the Turkish conflict the collective threat framing that was ubiquitous from the mid-1980s onwards, and all else took place against that backdrop. Given that in the Kurdish conflict most people did not face direct personal threat from the war, collective threat constituted the foundation upon which people’s attitudes were constructed. The official discourse perceived the PKK as a terrorist organization and dictated that the PKK posed a major threat to the national unity and integrity of the nation’s non-negotiable borders. The state had to protect its national security against the attacks of the PKK, and the means employed to that
purpose were all justified. However, collective threat only resonated with people who identified themselves with the Turkish nation. As the war unfolded and as the number of PKK sympathizers grew, the number of ethnic Kurds who feel represented by the Turkish state declined, and in contexts where Kurdish political activism was strong, the collective threat framing began to find less resonance among the publics. Table 4 below shows the distribution of subnational sites in Turkey by different magnitudes of collective and personal threat.

Table 4. Variations in Subnational Sites as Leverage for Testing the Effects of Personal vs. Collective-level Threat on Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL TRUST</th>
<th>Personal Threat</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Threat</td>
<td>Self-identified Turkish Residents in cities near the clash zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cities: Gaziantep, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Predominantly Kurdish cities nearby the clash zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cities: Mardin, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the collective threat framing via state discourse was successful in boosting the people’s confidence, one should be able to find evidence of that connection and reference to discourse in the narratives. As it turns out, most of my conversations with ethnic Turks involved references to the main elements of the discourse. A selected excerpt from one narrative reads:

I grew up with this story: they [Kurds] are trying to divide up our nation; they are our enemies, and we [Turks and Kurds] are the two sides of this war. And of course, in the background, we have the sagas of heroism from our National War of Independence. Then, there remains only one way in the face of PKK’s attacks: fight back and do what it takes to protect our land. After a point, one does not really think much. This is
the story the elites want you to know, and that’s all you know (Male, Mixed Gender Adult Focus Group, İstanbul, June 21, 2014).

Similarly, narratives were fraught with references to the martyrs. The Turkish state employed religious ritual of organizing elaborate funerals for the deceased soldiers (martyrs because of the belief that sacrifice of life for motherlands secures a place in heaven). As explained in Chapter 5 and above, interpretation of the war casualties played a major role in the construction of perceived personal threat as well as collective threat. Battle deaths were perhaps the most utilized tool by both sides in fuelling and nurturing their respective discourse. The experiences of martyred soldiers were appropriated in a nationalist discourse by both the PKK and the Turkish state. They both praised sacrifice and uncritical allegiance to their cause or policies.

The teachers, imams, and other civil servants who were assassinated by the PKK and other civilian killings committed by the PKK during its raids were all used by the state to reinforce the image of monstrosity, ruthlessness and evil in the PKK and righteousness of the state’s counterinsurgency. As it happens, Öcalan was branded “baby-killer” (bebek katili) because there were babies and children among the PKK’s civilian targets in its early raids to homes in hamlets especially between 1985 and 1990. Also, some of the women victims were pregnant, which enhanced this label and bolstered the terrorist image of the PKK, as posing challenges to the national security of Turkey.

News coverage of martyrs and civilian casualties aggravated the nationalist sentiments in the general public. A focus group participant recounts:

I remember when I was in Hatay between 1993-1996. When there was a funeral for a martyr brought to the city, so to speak, all hell would break loose. The locals would all
together condemn the PKK terror and chant: ‘Martys do not die; motherland does not divide.’ (Male, Mixed Gender Adult Focus Group, Gaziantep, May 9, 2014).

Indeed, this particular chant is still so famous that in every funeral for deceased soldiers or in every anti-PKK protests, it is the go-to motto. I interpret the support for the unity of the motherland as a reflection of the official discourse on the popular discourse.

While battledeaths and civilian casualties instigated popular anger and hatred towards the PKK, guerrilla casualties served the goal of boasting about military strength. Indeed, both the PKK and the Turkish state used casualties of the opponent to reaffirm their relative strength. The number of terrorists killed or disarmed/pacified (etkisiz hale getirmek) as reported by the mainstream Turkish media, notwithstanding the misgivings about the reported numbers glorified the power of the state.

The perceived military success helped boost national pride. Insuperability of the Turkish military with references to the past heroic victories (especially in the Turkish War of Independence) always came up in the conversations. The army, as the defender of the nation against “the enemy” was exalted to the most honourable place in the eyes of the general public (and consistently ranked first as the most trusted political institution in World Values Surveys conducted between 1980 and 2000). This deference to the Turkish army is partly a product of the decades-long emphasis on nationalism, territorial integrity, sanctity of borders, army-nation, and importance of serving in the military. These concepts were engraved in the public rhetoric, understanding, perception and interpretation. One comment of a participant illustrates the link between these concepts:

What is nationalism? Nationalism means loyalty to national stuff, namely, loyalty to the state. When the PKK attacks the nation, it is the state that protects the Turks; thence it is a must to be a nationalist (#E37, Male, İstanbul, June 26, 2014).
Another common rhetoric that I interpret as support for the state and political trust regards the blind devotion to the state and political institutions. Many people unconditionally believe that the state was impeccable despite the fact that it had not yet defeated the PKK. Blinded by nationalist indoctrination perhaps, the state’s military strength was beyond question in the eyes of the most people I talked to:

Our state is one with its army, soldiers and citizens, and it is grand. Many times, our army came to the verge of eradicating the whole PKK, but every time, foreign powers (dış güçler) intervene and provided the PKK with more ammunition. They [foreign powers] don’t want this to end. It is in their interest that our country is not stable (#14, Male, Gaziantep, April 21, 2014).

Beyond the elements of the discourse, much emphasis in the narratives was assigned to how much love they have for their motherland (vatan sevgisi) and the Turkish flag (see section 7.2.3 for the complexity within ethnic Kurds). Ethnic Turks expressed that they are reluctant to “give away any piece of territory that was hard won.” “I can’t even imagine living under another flag,” said many ethnic Kurds who identify with the Turkish nation. I consider all these claims as evidence for support for state. Because losing a piece of territory is equated with losing a defining identity of the nation – owing to the state discourse— the collective threat posed by the PKK artificially translates into support for state, its actors and institutions. The question is what is the extent to which higher support for state implies higher political trust. The literature shows that when public trust decreases, approval ratings also drop (Brody 1991; Hetherington 1998) and vice versa (Hetherington 1998). Drawing on these findings, I take the increase in support for state as implying increase in political trust.
Having established how collective threat framing well infused to the population at large and how it interfered with perceptions of state and its security forces, which factored in political trust formulations, in the next section, I will discuss the effect of personal threat and show its interaction with the overarching collective threat framing.

7.2.2 Personal Threat for Mainstream Turkish Bystander

Direct personal threat was most tangible for the population that lived close to the clash zones. As mentioned previously, most of PKK’s military activities were concentrated in the mountainous regions in the Turkey-Northern Iraq border; however, the guerrillas also penetrated into rural zones. They raided hamlets, villages and cities in Eastern Turkey, posing personal threat to the Kurdish population in the area. Except for the residents in these Eastern hamlets or provinces, most people in Turkey did not face direct threat from the guerrillas nor did they personally witness any attack. In particular, those residing in the Western provinces were completely out of touch with the reality and palpable effects of the war, as the PKK did not advance its guerilla war to urban zones until about 2014. Denizens of the Eastern provinces, however, faced a different set of struggles, risks and threat.

In this section, I focus on the Turkish bystanders, starting with those residing in the Eastern cities. Most Eastern provinces are dominated by ethnic Kurds—in particular Hakkari, Şırnak, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Batman, with the first two hit hardest. Often the Turkish population in these cities is not native to the region; especially in Hakkari and Şırnak most government officials (workers in the governor’s office, teachers, doctors etc.) are there by assignment. They live in lojmans (subsized state housing) that are patrolled and guarded by security forces. Those residents feel the personal threat most for the PKK sympathizers as they
embody the unwanted presence of state, and they were targeted by the PKK guerillas especially in the 1990s.

The subnational sites I visited do not include Hakkari and Şırnak because of security risks, yet I talked off the record to people (almost all ethnic Turks) who worked there in the late 1980s and 1990s. None of these participants mentioned any concerns about government performance in providing security despite the tangible risks to their personal security. Throughout the conversation, the participants reiterated a few times how much “they pledge to the territorial integrity and the state’s honour.” They mentioned repetitively how much more they have “started to appreciate the flag.” One participant said: “The Kurds complained that there were too many Turkish flags around. If anything, we do not have enough of them. It is thanks to that flag we have this wonderful land” (#41, Male, Mardin, May 24, 2014). All in all, every single Turkish participant who lived or served in the Eastern provinces stated that they became more nationalist than they had been. One comment captures the idea behind this transformation well: “I always said if you knew a person who was critical of the state, tell them to go there [Hakkari]. That should do the trick. Not only would they learn to appreciate the state, but also understand how righteous the counterinsurgency was” (#13, Male, Ankara, April 1, 2014).

These participants’ remarks about personal insecurity were always followed by a logic that protects the state from judgment. For instance, one participant who served in Hakkari says:

We were fulfilling our national duty. We had to protect our land and our flag, by perpetuating our presence. Everybody had to do their fair share. What is the value of one life when it is our land [vatan] that is at stake? (#59, Male, Diyarbakır, June 8, 2014).

Some of the Turkish participants who lived in the East mentioned being repudiated by the Kurdish language. A most common remark was: “We would hear this language [Kurdish] and
feel like we were in someone else’s land. This is Turkey; all should speak only Turkish” (#69, Female, İstanbul, June 26, 2014). These comments I take as a sign of nationalism and success of the discourse. I should underscore that these people were in the conflict zones for a brief period of time and were not socialized there and integrated into the local communities; they lived very segregated lives. Turkish families’ social networks in these provinces were military officers. Among the military personnel, the idea of “Kurds as enemy” was very strong because of indoctrination. Hence, the experience of living in the East and witnessing the lagged development and misery of lives there did not help soften their view against the Kurds and the PKK.

In Diyarbakır, I spoke to many Turks (students, union leaders, street vendors, academics, civil servants), again most of it off the record upon their request. Quite a few of them were also extremely nationalistic, expressing unconditional subservience to the Turkish state. Though they complained about the government’s development policies and inequalities, they did not utter any negative evaluations about the performance of security and service provisions.

Although service and infrastructure provision, especially in the fields of education, health, and transportation, are much poorer in Eastern provinces than in Western ones, the participants who have lived in both the East and the West blame the Kurds, not the state or the government, for this lack of socioeconomic development. This I interpret as interference of the collective threat framing with the cognitive processing of direct experience.

The System Justification Theory helps to explain the cognitive dissonance, as argued in Chapter 2. This theory posits that people facing threat are motivated to cognitively justify the prevailing system because of the need for order and stability; furthermore, ideologies underlying this motive act as tools to weather existential anxiety (Jost and Hunyady 2003). Nevertheless, I
argue that collective threat framing and perception of the insurgency as threat to the nation is the main trigger prompting this processing.

In the non-Eastern provinces, even though direct personal threat was not widespread, there was a powerful presence of indirect personal threat. Military and civilian deaths were perceived as threatening because of military conscription and obligatory civil service in the East. As explained above, persons with male family members of military age or with members who were just graduating as civil servants (teacher, doctor, imam) felt higher anxiety. The news of clashes affected them more, with reports of the losses connoting soaring personal risk and threat. The strict enforcement of the conscription and the obligatory service in the East, and randomness of the assignments magnified the perceived risk. In summary, the inherent risk of losing one’s husband, brother, son, or friend to war placed the victim stories at the heart of the discourse and rendered personal threat a more tangible concern.

I consider the personal threat felt because of the possibility of their son being assigned to the East for military duty as a low-level personal threat. Many mothers I talked to expressed that extremely concern for their sons serving in the military even though they were not assigned to an Eastern province. Although a PKK raid on an army station outside of the Eastern provinces was unheard of, people mentioned developing such irrational fears because it was an active insurgency. The closer to the East the family member was stationed, the greater the family’s fear was. Though concocted, such perceived insecurities led them to question the state’s power vis-à-vis the PKK, and be somewhat less satisfied in the performance of the government in handling the insurgency. Some of my participants, while deploring the PKK violence, expressed scepticism about the state’s counterinsurgency tactics and the discourse:
They said this [war] is a matter of life and death [for the nation], and we have to go all the way in. Lots of people died, and we got it. This was a war, so some people had to die, but the war did not end. How much more did we have to give? We were tired of being worried for our kids. Now ours are back safe and secure, thank God. But how about the new generation and their parents? I just hope that we will come out victorious soon, and this agony will come to an end (#9, Ankara, March 25, 2014).

Similar sceptical remarks, though rare, appear in the narratives. However, it is hard to tell how feeling low level of personal threat affected political trust as there were not enough of those to identify a pattern. I interpret the sceptical tone as a sign of lower political trust, as a consequence of perceived personal security risks. Yet, same people always made sure to indicate that they are against secession and that the state should not allow it. The collective threat idea was present in their narratives. Though it is challenging to be conclusive, I consider the references to national threat posed by the PKK as moderating the negative effect of personal security on political trust.

Those whose son/nephew/brother was assigned to an Eastern province felt higher level personal threat. They mentioned being paralyzed throughout the duration of the military service, which ranged from 3 to 15 months, and being frustrated with the state:

When my son was serving in Batman, I was not able to sleep. I was up day and night worrying about his safety, his life, and his health. I followed the news frantically in case there was an incident. Why was there a war? Why could not the state just eradicate these inglorious bastards [the PKK], excuse my language? We lived in fear for so long lest something bad would happen to our children. Enough is enough! (Women Focus Group, Ankara, April 7, 2014).

Some of the participants had close friends who lost their sons in the conflict, and this furthered the perception of personal threat. These individual sufferings aggravated animosity toward the PKK. Sadness felt for the victims and anger towards the PKK usually were expressed as two sides of the same coin.
How did hatred, anger and enmity against the PKK translate into political trust? The main mechanism was political support. Once the PKK was stripped of its historical antecedents (i.e. when people did not subscribe to the logic justifying its presence), it was just an evil organization attacking the Turkish state. The Turkish state, being eternally strong, dauntless and holy, was there to protect itself and its citizens. Inasmuch as there were indications of the state’s strength in terms of military capacity and state’s uncompromising presence in their lives with uninterrupted services, the citizenry at large did not have a tangible reason to lose trust in state because of security-related concerns. On the contrary, fighting with an enemy placed the state to an elevated level and altered the perspective of the people.

This perception altered individuals’ priorities. Many participants referred to the notion “Motherland Above All” (Önce Vatan). Especially those who felt personal threat mentioned “placing the needs of the nation ahead of their own.” Some would even avoid conjuring the picture of a future where Turkey loses the battle with the PKK. “What if the enemy forces win?”, the participants sometimes asked hypothetically in a trembling voice. The answer was that the Turkish state, though smaller in territory, would continue to exist in its current regime even if secession occurs. Yet the definition of national identity, citizenship, and official collective memory was conditioned on the idea of territorial unity. Dissolution of this unity was conceived as the end of Turkish Republic constructed in 1923. Secession was considered tantamount of death of the nation.

Heavy censorship enforced on the media reinforced these popular beliefs especially in the provinces west of the Euphrates river. The sorrow of the families of the fallen soldiers (şehit aileleri) were communicated in the broadcast media and newspapers, fomenting mass reaction even for those who do not have family members that were at risk. Empathizing with the
experiences of victimized groups helped form a mass-scale attitudinal reaction to the conflict. Some participants told me that the sorrow they felt for the fallen soldiers or civilian victims caused them to develop ailments such as high blood pressure, psoriasis, acute migraines, and the like. These bystanders, however, attributed the blame for the precarious situation in the East utterly to the PKK, not the state.

Civilian and soldier deaths were instrumental in repudiation of the PKK, and fostered the need to turn to the incumbent state for putting an end to the misery of these people. Every time there was news about a clash between the PKK and the Turkish army, the blame for the incident was placed on the PKK. Many adult female participants reported that “they were praying for the army, the soldiers and the state,” after they heard about the attacks and battle field casualties: “May the state not be harmed, and may God reinforce the stamina of the state” were some common prayers they cited. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a popular consensus around the idea that the state was doing its best to fight back, and that the soldiers were heroes (*Kahraman Asker*).

Military operations against the PKK were taken to indicate military success, and were celebrated accordingly. One participant’s comments on perceived military superiority of the Turkish army encapsulates the sentiments shared broadly by many bystanders:

> Our state and our army are one of the best in the world. […] The terrorists of the PKK are like a snake waiting in ambush to attack yet even at its most vulnerable, our army can take them down. The PKK can never reach to the military power of an army like ours (#62, Male, Gaziantep, April 28, 2014).

Military and the state are perceived to be a single entity, proving the success of militaristic character of nation-building strategy. The strength of the state came largely from the successful army and boosted political trust.
These observations were not exclusive to ethnic Turks. My data suggest that some Kurdish families of fallen soldiers also distance themselves from the PKK and its cause. The funerals and state narrative, which reproduce the “symbolic order” in Durkheim’s terms, reinforced this distancing, fostered social cohesion, and strengthened these families’ ties with the national identity. The full story of Kurdish attitudes, however, is more complex. The perpetrator behind many of the Kurdish victimizations was the Turkish state. These victimization stories, state repression, different interpretation of the guerilla deaths, and the concomitant mobilization of Kurds engendered an alternative narrative for bystander Kurds (see section 7.2.3). Yet, here I focus on the ones who sided with the state. One experience recounted by a Kurdish participant is as follows:

My cousin, when he was serving in the East, came to the verge of death in a clash with the PKK. He was the only one who survived the attack. As such, his parents, his family naturally sided with the state, and nurtured enmity against the PKK. The extended family and their Kurdish friends adopted the same approach and we all detested the PKK even though they were fighting for the rights of our ethnicity (Male, Mixed Gender Adult Focus Group, Ankara, April 20, 2014).

I interpret these narratives as rising political trust. It was challenging to encounter more specific observable implications for increasing trust in the data, yet lending full support in the military, placing the national security ahead of their own, and trusting the counter-insurgency strategies of the state are some proxy implications that I code as higher political trust. One may suggest that the indications of nationalist rhetoric may not be war-induced as the educational curriculum was designed to implant the national ideology starting from the early ages independent from the war. Yet, even those who did not attend school display similar nationalist

123 See (Shilling 2005) for detailed reading of Durkheim’s approach to funerals, body and society.
tendencies in their rhetoric, indicating the effectiveness of socialization and of the overarching discourse. Nationalism was furthered by the collective threat framing in the aftermath of the Kurdish insurgency by the state. I interpret these signs of nationalist ideology as success of the discourse, which penetrates into the processing of the personal threat.

7.2.3 The Other Side of the Story: Ethnic Kurds, Personal and Ontological Security, Spread of Counterhegemonic Discourse, and Changing Popular Perception of the State

In this section, I will explain how the alternative Kurdish narrative emerged and how significant portions of the Kurdish population subscribed to the counterhegemonic discourse, went through identity shifts. Yet, prior to that, it is vital to lay out the baseline priors – the different configurations of the Kurdish population before the PKK, as their starting points varied significantly.

7.2.3.1 Heterogeneous Baseline Priors of Kurds

The distribution of the Kurdish population in Turkey is in part a product of the early state policies of assimilation and in part a product of the economic migration starting in 1960s. In response to the Kurdish rebellions in 1920s and 1930s, the state, to obviate any further similar insurgencies, took some strict measures as explained in Chapter 4.

Lack of socioeconomic development in the Eastern provinces led to a chasm between the East and the West and Kurds and Turks in terms of economic equality. Economic migration has been taking place since the 1960s in search of better opportunities. Some of those who stayed in the East resorted to alternative methods of political economy (see White 2000, Chapter 5).

In the 1970s with expansion of agricultural capitalism came rural unemployment, and there occurred a surge of migration from the villages to cities. As the villages and hamlets became sparse, agricultural production decreased, and industrialization took off, especially in the
metropolitan cities such as Ankara, İstanbul, Izmir. The increasing urbanization and new industries necessitated labour force, which attracted many Kurds who are looking for jobs (Bahar and Bingöl 2010).

Kurds who came to the Western or mid-Anatolian regions of Turkey and Kurds who live in the East in the pre-1980 era are considered different. Ethnic Kurds who live in the East preserved most of their cultural practices. Especially those in the rural areas were still engaged in agriculture, speak Kurdish in their daily exchanges (at times exclusively) and were not blended much with the rest of the country. Even the urbanized Kurds maintained their traditions and language practices to a large extent. In contrast, ethnic Kurds in the West (those who migrated at earlier times) or in the “border cities” (alluding to the border of Kurdistan), were more subject to assimilationist practices; they absorbed the new ways of urban living, abandoned their traditions, language and customs considerably, and became more integrated to society. As they cease to maintain their distinct traditions, boundaries separating the Turkish and Kurdish identities became blurry (Tezcür 2009), and the salience of their Kurdish ethnic identity diminished. Some others managed to navigate through the Turkish system without sacrificing their Kurdish cultural practices. A young male focus group participant tells that:

My mom is Kurdish, from Pötürge which is a politically-repressed but not a pro-Kurdish movement region. My mom sometimes cooks “lorik,” it is a meal with bulgur and meat. Lorik is a Kurdish word. We eat many other Kurdish meals in our home. She preserved her roots in this way (Youth Focus Group, Ankara, April 15 2014).

Generally speaking, notwithstanding the class differences, those who had access to state resources and had upward social and economic mobility opportunities were more pressured to give up on their Kurdish roots as Turkish identity was key to access. Somer (2005, 596) notes: “Kurds were readily accepted as Turks and Turkish citizens if they embraced
the Turkish language and composite identity and kept their ethnicity in the personal realm.”

Along with this “ethnic switching” came forgoing the Kurdish language (see Nagel 1995 for ethnic switching). Even though there was no official prohibition of Kurdish language prior to 1980, pervasive social stigma accorded to Kurdish language spurred many ethnic Kurds to avoid speaking Kurdish in public sphere (Tezcür 2009). Many ethnic Kurds in the West did not teach their kids Kurdish to “keep them away from trouble.”

On the opposite side of the spectrum were ethnic Kurds in the East who did not have schooling and who could not speak Turkish. Monolingual Kurds were usually villagers, and did not have economic or social resources for attending schools. Kurdish identity hence was a very visible and salient social and personal identity for these people.

At the outset of the armed insurgency, except for the Kurdish activists and some Turkish leftists, the popular reaction both for ethnic Kurds and Turks was repudiation towards the PKK. However, both in the face of changing discourses, rapidly expanding Kurdish movement, and dynamics of victimization as well as the resilience of the PKK led to shifts in perceptions. This owes in great part to the efforts on the part of PKK ideologues, as well as activists and intellectuals from various political movements. Below, I explain some salient factors that spurred these movements, which impinged on political trust and state legitimacy.

7.2.3.2 Personal Security Threat Posed by the State and Its Consequences on Political Trust of Kurds

Violence perpetrated by state forces against the Kurdish civilians was the biggest strike on the state legitimacy for a large portion of the Kurdish population in the Eastern Turkey, and not only the victims but the bystanders were ultimately affected by state’s violent actions against Kurds. I start with unjust incarcerations. The state punished many Kurds in the Kurdish region for being
PKK accomplices absent much proof. Many activists, lawyers, civil society leaders in Diyarbakır had experienced such punishments. Unjust incarcerations on the grounds of alleged link with the PKK and maltreatment of the inmates were common. A Kurdish lawyer in Diyarbakır laments about his family’s experiences:

There were some in my family who were detained, and tortured for three months. Beyond these, all the brutality experienced in prison generates a collective perception: the state commits cruelty, violence; it tortures us; it kills us. An enemy state perception was concocted, willy nilly, in people’s mind (#E23, Male, Diyarbakır, June 9, 2014).

Incarceration, which was intended to dissuade people to sympathize with the PKK, had an opposite effect, and worked against the legitimacy of the state. Besides the direct personal effect of injustice on their attitudes, a lot of the inmates reported leaving prison more enlightened about their identity, history and the state because of an underexplored effect of imprisonment: prison as academy. Kurds who spent some time in prison all concur that they have learnt much in prison, and some of them even feel grateful for “the opportunity”:

Prison was literally an academy. It had a serious disciplined structure. We would learn Kurdish in the morning, in the afternoon everybody would do their own reading on the movement, the rights, the ideology. The books would circulate. In order to listen to the PKK from the radio, those who know a bit about electricity would summon their forces to connect to the channel’s frequency. […] Every Kurd should go to jail to learn about the movement. I wanted to stay for another five months or so; I still had things to learn. I wish there was a crime that would guarantee only five months of imprisonment; I would commit it at a heartbeat (#68, Male, İstanbul, June 25, 2014).

Not only they came out with stronger links to their Kurdish identity and the nationalist movement, but also they face bigger challenges to find a job or integrate back in the society when they get out of jail with a criminal record. This agitated group either works as an activist to
delegitimize the state’s policies and weaken its moral legitimacy or radicalize. One interviewee who was just released from long-term imprisonment (5 years or more) posits that:

When incarcerated for years, one starts to think that ‘I can no longer function in Turkey, I cannot express my thoughts, I cannot live an alternative life [other than the mainstream], I cannot materialize any of my ideas.’ In that case, I got nothing to lose. Because doors were closed for me, I turned to the Kurdish movement and defended my rights and freedoms at all costs (#48, Male, Diyarbakır, June 2, 2014).

Another major form of victimization is forced displacement—an oft-resorted counterinsurgency tactic by the Turkish state. It was originally conceived as an assimilation strategy in the 1930s. During the armed struggle with the PKK, forced displacement was also deployed to as a military tactic to eliminate civilian support for the insurgency. Between 1984 and 1999, when martial law and later the state of emergency (introduced in 1987) were in force across most of the cities in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, many Kurdish residents, especially those living in the hot conflict zone, were practically presented with two choices: taking up the role of village guards [korucu]124 to collaborate with the government as paramilitaries, or “resettling.”125 Both options were unappealing to many. Those who were reluctant to become village guards126 were forced to abandon their homes and land, and displace, either under direct orders or as a result of intense counter-guerilla attacks by the army, in violation of their

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124 The Temporary Village Guards system was introduced with Law 3175 on March 26, 1985. Temporary village guards have job security and are paid regular salaries. There also exists the voluntary village guard position, based on Law 422. Volunteers were assigned to the position provided that their records were cleared by the district-governor. The numbers have fluctuated across years. Between 1987 and 2002, the total number of village guards in the 14 provinces under Martial law was 12,275 (Kurban 2009). By 2006, the number went up to 57,000 and there were around 13,000 voluntary village guards (Akça and Paker 2013). Finally, by February 2013, the reported numbers for the temporary village guards is around 46,000 across 22 provinces (Aytar, Uçarlar, and Özar 2013).

125 Almost every individual interviewed mentioned about the dilemma residents were faced with. The cleft stick that the residents were caught in was also described by other scholars (see Kurban 2009, Özdağ 2010).

126 In many interviews, people reported that they did not want to be armed and fight against guerilla forces who included their relatives, neighbours or even brothers. They perceived the village guard position as betrayal to the family.
constitutional rights (Kurban 2008). In some occasions, displacements were in the form of village discharges followed by incineration.

Displaced populations (the size estimated to be close to a million\textsuperscript{127}) come from rural areas, which the state wanted to clear to control access of the insurgents. Displaced people usually had to leave behind their homes, means of living (livestock or farm), and memories. They usually first migrated to the closest city or locality, and depending on the economic opportunities, they either stayed or moved further in search of better prospects. They either stayed or moved further in search of better prospects. The first destination was usually places where they had some family or friends to stay with. Hence, migrants have tended to conglomerate in the cities that were already hit by the first wave of migration. The provinces most affected by internal migration are Diyarbakır, Van, Şanlıurfa, Mersin, Adana, and İstanbul (CHP Somut Politikalar Çalışma Grubu 1999).

Displaced people were not only harmed by the act of displacement but also beset by countless challenges in their new locations. Shelter and employment being the most important ones, they went through harsh episodes of resettlement and adaptation. Bereft of their major

\textsuperscript{127} The first official attempt to document the number of displaced people was made in 1998 by a special investigation commission set up by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to examine the statistical figures of internally displaced people. They reported the evacuation of 905 villages and 2,523 hamlets, and the displacement of 378,335 people. However, the migration continued until the late 2000s. In 2006, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies conducted a thorough research on migration, and their findings demonstrate that the number is between 953,680 and 1,201,200(1986 and 2005). Yüceşahin & Ö zgür (2006) estimate the displaced population to be between 670,000 and 998,000. On the other side, the ‘Migration Platform’ under the initiative of Akdeniz GÖÇ-DER (Immigrants’ Association for Social Cooperation and Culture) conducted a research on forcibly displaced people in 2011. According to their estimation (2011) 3,438 rural settlements have been evacuated, and 4 to 4.5 million Kurdish citizens were forced to migrate/displace. Many other NGOs have gathered numbers that are substantially higher than the estimates of the Parliamentary Commission or HUNEE numbers. According to TESEV’s report on Forced Migration, the numbers in the Commission’s report do not include those people who were not ordered but had to leave due to intense armed operations in their village/district/city. Also, the GÖÇ-DER uses certain methods of imputation to estimate the total number of affected people, which include children born after resettlement.
source of income (agriculture), some came to cities without any means, and had to live with their family, friends or acquaintances who came in the previous migration wave in shanty towns [gecekondu mahallesi], in abysmal conditions (Adaman and Keyder 2006; Barut 2002).

Let alone the absence of any specific support from the state, they encountered various limitations in social, political and economic life. The intersectionality of discrimination and social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and social class (which included elements of urban hostility towards rural migrants, as much as discrimination on the basis of education and income) aggravated the psychological traumas they have been experiencing before and during displacement (Gülsen, Knipscheer, and Kleber 2010). 128 Many ethnic Kurdish migrants reported resistance from Turkish landlords, and stigmatization as PKK supporters and/or “rural savages.”

Declining social trust and ruthless discrimination they became subject from the society (both ethnic Turks and Kurds) further weakened the attachment they had to country. Failing to integrate in the society, they created their own habitus, which generated segregated but internally cohesive communities. 129 As such, new Kurdish social networks were constructed and the Kurdish identity, which was under collective and existential threat, were embraced stronger than ever.

Lack of protection and resources by the state beget resentment on the parts of displaced Kurds. It broke the very essential link between the state’s responsibility to protect and serve the

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128 This dissertation portrays a general picture; however, it is crucial to note that the experiences and traumas were vastly different across genders. There is a large literature looking into the women’s experiences specifically (e.g., Karslı 2012, Mengüloğlu 2006, Çelik 2005), which adds another layer of complexity to the discussion. Despite its high importance, due to space limitations and the different general scope of this paper, we will not be discussing it in detail in this paper.

129 A habitus is defined as a “system of practice-generating schemes which expresses systematically the necessity and freedom inherent in the collective conditions of life of a certain group of people” (Bourdieu 1992, 172).
general interest of the citizens. Their place, status, value in the society and as citizens became flimsy, inducing ontological insecurity. So, it was not just the physical security but the ontological security that was under threat for increasing number of Kurds.

7.2.3.3 The Foundations of the Counterhegemonic Discourse

Victimizations by the state were at the center of this counterhegemonic narrative of the Kurdish nationalist movement. Incarcerations of Kurds, extralegal actions against them and outright discrimination were debated in circles. Just as importantly, battle deaths were integral to this Kurdish discourse. Insurgent fighters, who are simply nameless terrorists for the state and the mainstream Turkish media, when lost their lives, became martyrs for the PKK. The nameless dehumanized fallen terrorists are then personified by the PKK; the “martyred” guerrillas were identified with their names, ages and birthplaces and published in PKK’s magazines and later the website. The families of the fallen guerrillas usually did not even know that their kids were alive so their death was an idea already in the back of their mind or they were already inured to the possibility of their children’s death.\(^{130}\) When the news arrived, because of the state pressures, families were afraid to claim the guerilla corpses or organize a funeral for them. The sanctity of guerilla bodies was damaged by the official discourse and military pressure, and grieving over the guerrilla deaths were condemned.\(^{131}\)

Meaning of the guerrilla deaths, hence, assumed a different twist. While the mainstream Turkish society celebrated them, the Kurdish families in the East especially mourned for them.

\(^{130}\) In some rare cases, families had both guerilla and soldier deaths. Their sons either was forced to serve in PKK’s army by the rule of forced conscription enforced between 1984 and 1991 or voluntarily joined the guerillas (usually the case after 1991), and other(s) had to serve in the army, and they both died in clashes. Brothers fighting on two opposite sides of the war is a phenomenon inherent in many guerrilla wars.

\(^{131}\) My reference here is to Butler (2006) where she asks “What makes a grievable life?” and looks into the power of mourning.
While the mainstream society considered killing terrorists a proof of state’s strength, for Kurdish families who sympathized with the PKK, it was a painful price paid for the liberation of Kurds. Increasing media network of the PKK, and mobility of radical Kurdish youth helped disseminate the alternative interpretations of the conflict, the battledeaths, and the purpose of the war.

These actions led the targeted Kurds lose their faith and trust in the system, but also found resonance in the Kurdish population at large. The PKK skilfully interweaved these new suppressions with the grievances endured by the previous generations of Kurds, reconstructed a rhetoric of “marginalized identity,” and portrayed it as a continuity rather than a new policy designed because of the PKK (conviction of a mainstream citizen who is aware of these repressive acts). Promotion of Kurdishness as a distinct identity, as opposed to being just a masked Turkishness as suggested in the official discourse, has been an essential goal of the movement (See Chapter 4 and 5).132

The idea that Kurdish identity is an impediment before integration into the society, employment prospects, security and recognition as a full citizen became more widespread. Many Kurds developed an awareness that proclaiming Kurdishness came at a cost of being rejected by the state and majority of the population. This point is raised by the majority of the interviewees and focus group participants:

It is a problem to be Kurdish in the country. Demanding freedom as a Kurd is the second big problem. Once you become interested in the identity issue, you can guess more or less what you will go through in the country (#61, Female, Diyarbakır, June 10, 2014).

132 The Turkish state, when promoting the new unifying national identity, chose to utterly dismiss the Kurdish identity. Kurds were promoted to be essentially Turks. The term “Kurd” largely vanished in press and publications after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, and ‘race’ for Kurds was used for the sole purpose of rebutting Kurdish identity in pseudo-scientific studies and governmental reports (Toprak 2012). As part of obliteration of the Kurdish identity, Kurdish names, language, folklore and other cultural representations were banned (McDowall 2003).
The state likes the Kurds who acquiesce, and then grants them good positions. Then it says ‘we helped Kurds to be successful; other Kurds are bad Kurds.’ Kurds who own their Kurdishness are stigmatized as terrorists (Female, Youth Focus Group, Gaziantep, April 15, 2014).

Kurds deprived of welfare services and security interrogated their status vis-à-vis the state, and came to realize that their identity is at the root of the problem. In other words, there was no need for the PKK’s discourse to show “the truth,” according to a professional architect who spent a fair amount of time doing research on exclusion: “You see it for yourself. You don’t need much propaganda. The very repression and cruelty on the part of the state brought about enlightenment for many Kurds” (#E27, Male, Diyarbakır, June 14, 2014). The state in a way, through its repressive policies and victimizations, helped rebuild the Kurdish identity and augmented its salience through its counterinsurgency policies and decrease its own legitimacy.

The memories transferred from the previous generations about these insecurities and incessant inculpations is ingrained in the discourse of many Kurdish activists as well as many other Kurds who do not take political action. Most of the current young Kurds haven’t even experienced any violence themselves or were not excessively devoid of basic state services but they are inculcated with the doctrine of the state injustices. The head of a Kurdish civil society organization utters the common discourse among the Kurdish youth:

The state raped our mothers, our daughters. To refrain from the cost of armory, they used bludgeons to hit the heads of our people in Dersim. We know of those who are defanged, who had their mouths defocated into. That’s where we come from; our struggle is struggle for legitimacy. We are not invaders; on the contrary we are fighting against it. Yet, the state is of the opposite conception; a conception that exterminates, that massacres and that perceives those as legitimate (#E29, Female, June 16, 2014, Diyarbakır).
Both the forced displacement and lack of protection by the state beget resentment on the parts of local Kurds. The village guards who were established to provide protection against the PKK threat, aggravated the situation. Their mission was to deter people from collaboration with the PKK. Yet, they abused their power, they exerted undue violence, and damaged the moral legitimacy.

They appropriated the lands of the people, belittled them, and established hegemony in the village. They had arms, money and all the tools. They were reinforced economically; they assumed power. The [local] people in those villages abandoned their homes due to the cruelty of the village guards. Very many people were hurt due to such blunders on the part of the state (#E18, Male, Mardin, May 25, 2014).

The state was condemned and punished by many who were aware of these violations. All these experiences made them concoct an image of “enemy state.” One famous imagery is “kids throwing rocks at soldiers or police officers” which dates back to 2000s (Yağcioğlu 2010). As an act of protest, some Kurdish kids resorted to rocks in street demonstrations, and police officers epitomized the state in their minds. They tend to be the kids that had experienced forced displacement. The symbolic violence they employ via rocks against the state indicates crossing the borders drawn by the state, rooted in animosity towards the state or reacting to the draconian rule of the state (Darici 2011 as cited in Yağcioğlu 2010).

In mass protests, kids were the ones revolting against the state, and once I attended a trial, and the judge asked ‘why did you throw rocks at the soldier?’ The kids responded ‘because he burned down my house that’s why I am throwing rocks’ (#E26, Female, Diyarbakır, June 14, 2014).

Objection to the authority of the state is widespread among Kurdish activists and the Kurdish kids (who then grow to be prominent adult activists) who are raised in the politically charged cities. Politicization brings forward the lack of protection, and violence perpetrated by
various state forces, which then led to condemnation of the state and declining legitimacy. It is important to note that not every city with a majority Kurdish population hosts the same level of politicization. Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Şırnak are much more politicized than Şanlıurfa or Adıyaman. Questioning the moral grounds of the state legitimacy is corollary to politicization in the Kurdish population. So, as the number of politicized Kurds grows, the number of people the state loses its legitimacy on also does.

Politicization is, thus, corollary, to these psychological traumas as well as developing ethnic consciousness; reproducing political identity is a natural reaction and is highly integral to being in existentialist terms.

A person who suffered especially if it is imposed by the state and it is persisting with obstinance, you have to situate yourself accordingly. For instance, many had their villages incarcenated, many suffered financial harm, and then they are suppressed in their new location. Hence once the injustices become evident, what happens? In many cities of Kurdistan, a form of right seeking struggle, returning of the rights movement commenced. It spread because it is an outcome of righteous demand (#E24, Male, Diyarbakır, June 10, 2014).

These findings point to cohort effects, which is not articulated in my theory. In protracted wars, cohort effects seem very relevant. Along with the dynamism of the war, changes the context, identities and discourse, and different generations are exposed to different combinations of discourses (see Schwarz and Sudman 2012). Adults may be less susceptible to such changes while children who are at the age of identity exploration may be socialized with the new discourse. When it comes to the counterhegemonic discourse of the insurgency, the generation that grows up in the time of available alternative narratives of the past and present is especially subject to espousing new perspectives and attitudes. Unlike the new generation, adults who were
previously victimized, repressed or discriminated against may not respond to these macro-level changes due to inculcated fears or intimidation by the state.

Memories of future generations are constructed by social representations of their parent; victims who are still haunted by the painful memories of the past pass it onto their children. Recent research shows that victim identities are transmitted across generations, where identities include a heightened threat perception and strong in-group attachment. Those socialized in a victim family develop kindred identities, which shape how descendants’ processing of political information and behaviour (Balcells 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017). Those who were children when they witnessed the crimes, grow up with these memories, which, then, construct the foundation of their trust levels in state. My data indicate that younger generation Kurds are more politicized and more distrusting in the state. It is, however, an ongoing conflict, and the PKK has proven itself successful in withstanding the attacks of the Turkish army. It is hard to generalize it to other conflicts or expect similar reactions in the case of Peru, but it is worth noting the relevance of cohort effects here.

Finally, I should reiterate that at the popular level there was a significant variation; not every ethnic Kurd developed the same reaction to the state mostly because not all Kurds embrace their ethnic identity. The reasons for distancing oneself from the Kurdish identity abound. For instance, the damage the PKK inflicted by violence and protests was shunned by some of the Kurds. Some of the Kurds who voluntarily migrated to the West to escape the conflict hold the PKK responsible for their misery, and turned their back to their Kurdish past. Furthermore, in nonpoliticized contexts (even with a Kurdish majority), Kurds were weary of the PKK attacks/ belligerence/ protests against the state. Symbolic actions such as closing the shutters in protest of the state upon command of the PKK were condemned by some. They blame the PKK for the
underdevelopment of their cities, lack of investment etc. Kurds who embrace the national identity resent the separatist tendencies of other Kurds. One participants complains that:

I was born and raised under this flag. If they are really sincere about freedoms, they can do it under this flag. What is the need for separation? I would never want to live under another flag (#33, Male, Mersin, May 13, 2014).

7.2.4 Implications of Threat on Legitimacy

A declining or fading legitimacy entails shift of recognition from one authority to another. One visible observable implication of this phenomenon in the case of a conflict is through the choice of fighters: picking the guerilla forces over the state army. The ex-guerilla fighters, the families of the guerillas, and civil society organizations I interviewed all concur on the argument that the discrimination, violence, and ruthlessness of state propelled many Kurdish youth to join the PKK insurgency as they didn’t share any moral grounds with the state to justify it as authority. Their reaction was to rebel and challenge its authority.

Similarly frustrations with lack of opportunities and discrimination against politicized Kurds have pushed them further away from the state. Many residents in Diyarbakır uttered a version of the following comment: “Unemployment was at peak in the South East. Everybody was in depression, marijuana and drugs are all around; they were looking for an exit and joined the PKK ranks” (#42, Male, Diyarbakır, June 3, 2014).

People who were detained when they were 15, 16 were sentenced to prison for 17 years or 15 years [referring to cases for throwing rocks], and once they were released they joined the PKK. When those who are jailed now are released, they also will join the PKK because they are harassed, violated, marginalized, suppressed, and even when he is out, they [state forces] won’t leave him alone. So, they [ex-prisoners] will also join [the PKK]. They didn’t throw rocks for no reason. Here, the court of appeal believe 17 years of prison time is insufficient and raises it to 34 years so that they would never show disrespect to state panzer, this is their strategy (#E28, Male, Diyarbakır, June 15, 2014).
What lies behind the choice of PKK over the state is the lack of moral ground for state. In contrast, they have the necessary identity link with the PKK, and hence are disposed to view it as an alternative authority to confer legitimacy on. Many of my interviewees expressed that “The PKK is the party who defends our rights and speak out our demands” (#E22, Male, Diyarbakır, June 8, 2014). The lack of identification with the state is only part of the story. For certain state services, such as justice and security, they do not resort to state agencies unless absolutely necessary. Many displaced people in Mersin and İstanbul seek justice in Kurdish establishments rather than the state organizations. Most of my interviewees in Mersin, Diyarbakır and Mardin mentioned about having recourse to the “party” (The Kurdish party- Democratic Society Party as it stands now) for dispute resolution. Instead of taking conflicts to state courts, they opt for solving such disputes through arbitration conducted by authorities they recognized such as an elected official or an elderly leader. A Kurdish resident in Mersin who does not identify himself with the insurgency mentions that there are two routes one can take there:

In case of conflict, we go to the police station. But they are many who go to HADEP [one of the previous names of the Kurdish party]. The party is their police (#39, Male, Mersin, May 15, 2014).

The reasons why they prefer resolving disputes through the party but not the police are complex, and it would be wrong to reduce it all to state violence though it is related to much of it. Many Kurds complain about ensuing maltreatment in the police stations, and they express mistrust, and some mentions that they trust in the justice of their system, referring to more traditional codes of conduct based off the old feudal system. Some also do not speak good enough Turkish to express, and feel more comfortable talking to a respected Kurdish person and
asking their help than a state official who may denounce them for the wrong reasons, or who may not understand their complaints due to language restraints and may despise them.

To what extent such methods of arbitration pose a danger to state legitimacy is controversial. Countries such as the UK or the US recognize the rulings of religious arbitration. However, in the context of Turkey, there are no binding rules or there is no state authority involved in the procedure. The way they handle things in the dispute resolution allude to stepping over the state authority and yielding to an alternate authority. That being said, these arbitrations do not rule out visits to the court for bigger crimes. If the scale of the dispute is larger, say a murder, they may still go to the courts. Yet, even in those cases, many Kurds employ a Kurdish lawyer due to the language barriers or that they have higher trust in them because they believe only another Kurd would truly defend their rights.

The question of authority manifests itself in other forms in the administrative life. The local administration is delegated to the winning parties through elections in Turkey, and they are in charge of providing basic state services such as electricity, roads, water, etc. as defined by law. In the 2014 local elections, the Kurdish party (BDP) won the municipality administration in 11 cities, 68 districts (ilçe) and 23 towns (belde). In many of the municipalities ruled by the Kurdish party, the dynamics of representation and authority are different. Autonomy is in place in many of them, at least in the minds of the people. A civil society representative I talked to in Mersin argues:

They don’t trust the state. For instance, in the Akdeniz municipality, a woman came in, and she was blatantly Kurdish, she handed a petition and said ‘I would like to see Fazıl’. Fazıl is the mayor. The secretary in charge said ‘How may I help you?’ The

133 There are, in total, 81 city, 400 district and 397 town municipalities in Turkey.
lady said ‘I have to talk to Fazıl, they cut my electricity connection’, and the secretary directed her to TEDAŞ [Turkish Electricity Distribution Company]. Yet, she insisted ‘I want to see Fazıl,’ and then started to speak in Kurdish. She responded ‘I don’t want to go to the state. I elected you as my representative and you have to solve this (#E26, Male, July 2, 2014, Mersin).

Municipality is a state organ but what they recognize as the authority is not the state that bestows upon the ruling power to the municipality per se but the people they elected. That is not to say that they do not respect the state authority or write it off. However, there are certainly multiple sources of legitimacies at play (Williams 2010). The state may claim the constitutional legality and consent, but the Kurdish leaders certainly have more moral grounds to attract many victimized or politicized Kurds along with other sympathizers. According to some accounts, the demands of Kurds go as far as protection from the Kurdish insurgency instead of state forces:

Ultimately there is power with the insurgent group, there is an army reserve. For instance, in our surveys, we find: Especially in locations like Diyarbakır, smaller but grew similar to Istanbul, the streets are not safe anymore. People say that ‘we want something like Rojava. We want the guerrilla forces to come to town and protect us’. The demand formed itself because in the 1990s, through militias, the PKK was able to control the city differently. Back then it was smaller, and there was a moral societal structure, feeling the existence of the PKK (#E25, Female, Diyarbakır, June 13, 2014).

They feel more powerful having an armed group as an alternative force. Many express deep gratitude to the PKK for claiming their identity rights, for fighting for their freedom and against the injustices. In the conversations, they blatantly mention how the PKK is the organization that rescued them from ‘assimilation’, and thanks to which they can survive their identity.

R: We owe a lot to the PKK. The Kurdish society owes a lot to the PKK. 30 years ago, I remember, we would do our best not to speak Kurdish.
Sule: It was also constitutionally banned in 1980.
R: It was already forbidden. [It was about] who speaks the best Turkish. We needed to speak the best Turkish. I mean from that point, as I said, the state was about to reach
its goal of cultural assimilation, [cultural] massacre in the cities. And it was trying to turn to villages to expand the reach. Of course, with the emergence of the PKK, I figured I was Kurdish. I realized my mother tongue is Kurdish, and as people learn more, they became proud of their identity, language and culture, and they ventured on to revive it…I owe it to the movement that if I was able to learn some. If the public became politicized, if a 33-year old or a 5-year old can do the peace sign, and can say ‘Apo,’ this is all thanks to the PKK. There is no return from this. The die is long cast (#E30, Male, Diyarbakır, June 16, 2014).

With all these observed implications, it is fair to claim that the extensive and expansive challenge of the PKK on the sovereignty and authority of the state and state’s heavy-handed responses have had strong negative repercussions on the moral dimension of the state legitimacy, and helped the PKK gain significant legitimacy in the Kurdish region.

7.3 The Maoist Conflict in Peru

7.3.1 Collective Threat Framing or Rather Lack Thereof

Collective threat in Peru, in contrast to Turkey, was not as much articulated during the conflict, especially in the first decade of the war. Reasons behind the lack of a well-formulated collective threat in Peru are many (see Chapter 5), and here I discuss some of the striking factors. I argue that the conflict character is the most conspicuous factor. The conflict in Peru was Maoist Popular Guerilla War, posing a direct threat to the regime rather than a secessionist territorial conflict. Sendero sought to destroy state’s legitimacy, and attacked all tools and institutions of the regime in search of establishing a new regime. Even though it had a significant popular support and was advancing fast, the Peruvian state did not frame the violence much as an existential collective threat. My theory suggests that for ideological conflicts to harness tools similar to nationalist symbols, they need to be engraved in the nation-building strategy. That is to say, the country, in its foundation, needs to have an ideological character. Communist countries that emerged out of an ideological revolution such as Cuba or Soviet Union have such
ideological tools enshrined in their identity. As a fledgling democracy, Peru did not have strong ideological tools or democratic instruments to rally people behind the regime of democracy, or to defend the democratic regime against the Maoist agenda of Sendero. The Peruvian state did not generate a discourse around the casualties; neither civilian nor military victims had much visibility as compared to the conflict in Turkey—one exception is the Uchuraccay massacre where eight journalists from Lima was killed by the peasants by mistake (see Bourque and Warren 1989 for media representations of this massacre).

Also, Peruvian nation-building did not to incorporate strong nationalist tools, unlike Turkey (See Chapter 4). If nationalism was a founding principle in Peru, would the state utilize the nationalist ideology in its discourse against Sendero? It is possible that the state then could frame Sendero as a threat to the nation rather than the regime, and bring in nationalist mobilization methods. Yet, the articulation of collective threat would still face the barriers of macro-social and macro-historical characteristics of the Peru, which partly obstructed a coherent nation-building.

One conspicuous macro-historical characteristic is the entrenched disdain for and ignorance of the plight of the indigenous peoples, as explained in Chapter 4 and 5. This dismissive attitude towards the indigenous peoples interfered with the elite processing of the collective threat Sendero was posing. As discussed in Chapter 4, indigenous people were never fully integrated into the Peruvian society, and they have always been in the back burner. In the initial years of the war, the violence exclusively afflicted the highlands inhabited predominantly by the indigenous population, and the victims were primarily indigenous. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) report writes that 79 percent of the total number of victims
lived in rural areas and 75 percent of those killed speak Quechua or another native language as their mother tongue.

The “duality of republics” was not an exclusively academic observation (Thurner 1997). Most participants I talked to referred to the split of the Peruvian society as the coast (mainly Lima), and the rest (ordered as sierra and selva, the highlands and the jungle) as a long running issue that has plagued the Peruvian society and politics and as a factor leading to the armed conflict. Some representative remarks are as follows:

Previously Peru was a centralist government, very oligarchic, and then they left the peripheries forgotten. There were no roads; the peripheries were so isolated. [...] It was certainly a reprisal of those forgotten people, those who were very far away. They started to revolt which turned into terror, and it transferred from the rural areas (campo), the periphery, to exteriors until Lima. Because the real power was concentrated in Lima, and they did not really care about what was consuming the inlands (Male, Youth Focus Group in Iquitos, November 5, 2013).

Most people I had a conversation with in Ayacucho, Arequipa and Lima also unanimously argue that “the lives lost here [in Ayacucho] did not matter to them [the Peruvian state].” In the words of another participant: “Sometimes the newspapers would say ‘80 people dead,’ and the reaction of the people would be ‘Ah, they are a few cholos.’ Only when they [Sendero] bombed the city, they [Peruvians at large] became conscious of the danger” (Men Focus Group, Lima, October 20, 2013). This portrayal is compatible with the picture portrayed in Chapter 4 about the state’s relations with the indigenous people in Peru. In the words of Kimberly Theidon, “the dead people who—in the national imaginary—had counted for little during their lives and went largely unaccounted for in their deaths” (2013, 7).

Media representations of the conflict were diverse, and did not characterize a uniform language tailored to achieve popular mobilization of support, unlike the case of Turkey. By
contrast, the sensationalist tones of the news covering violence may have induced insensitivity to
the violence in the *sierra* (see Chapter 5). The media neither provided a comprehensive account
of the fundamental issues behind the violence nor a good understanding of the collective threat
Sendero was posing to Peru. When devoid of this frame, the news reports may have perpetuated
the association of indigenous people with violence.

The collective threat Sendero was posing became clearer when Lima was under siege.
Indeed, a common understanding was that until violence reached in Lima (with particular
reference to the Tarata bombing\(^{134}\) in Lima on July 16, 1992), the government did not take the
guerrillas seriously. A comment of one expert I interviewed represents how the war had
assumed a different interpretation for the state after Lima became afflicted:

> It was first the poor and the peasants but then came a moment where it [the violence]
> reached the cities and then it touched the doors of the power, of the wealthy, and of the
> lofty, and threatened them. Only then it became a national issue (#E13, Male,
> Arequipa, October 29, 2013).

The civil war that had been consuming the *sierra* for almost a decade only became a
national phenomenon after the Tarata bombing. Experts I talked to converge on the belief that
what lies behind that attitude of ignorance before the Tarata incident was the racial attitudes:

> Because Limañeans thought that the war was far away, that it would never touch them.
> It is because of the racism that exists in the country from the early days of Peru to this
day. They [Limañeans] believed that the war in Puno or Ayacucho was not a problem
of ours—it is their problem and will never touch us. Until the Tarata thing happened.
Only that we cannot say this in public, because they resent (#E19, Male, Ayacucho,
January 20, 2014).

\(^{134}\) It was the biggest and most impactful attack of Shining Path in its armed warfare in Lima. Car bombings occurred
on Tarata street, which held the financial businesses located in Miraflores—one of the most upscale districts in
Lima. 25 people died and 155 were injured (TRC, 2004, p. 661).
I think that fear we felt was that the system could collapse, and that the politics could be impaired. The governments did not have the capacity to control. This was what worried us, the collapse of the system with all its errors. It would have been catastrophic. What would have happened if a system that they proclaimed [Maoist Peru] had entered? The dictatorship of the proletariat—a whole another form of government, and a scary one (Male, Adult Men Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 15, 2014).

The feeling between ‘85 and ‘90 was that nobody knew what was going to happen. The country did not seem viable any longer; it did not seem like it had a future (Men Focus Group, Lima, October 20, 2013).

Even when Sendero was terrorizing Lima, however, the Peruvian state, did not capitalize on Sendero’s threat to bolster its support not even nearly to the extent that the Turkish state did. I believe that difference was due to two major reasons emanating from the weakness of the state. First, there was more of a power symmetry between the two parties by early 1990. The insurgency was already controlling one third of the territory, and 22 out of 24 departments were
under a state of emergency. Sendero argued that they reached a strategic equilibrium even though Sendero’s strength in terms of support and resources took a big hit after its excessively violent tactics.

Second, the conflict was not the only major issue the state was grappling with. Peru had been wracked by economic crisis for more than a decade by 1990, and it was getting worse. Hyperinflation verging on 60 percent per month was “wreaking havoc on the population and destroying the state with even greater efficiency than the subversives themselves” (Degregori 1997, 36). Increasing military expenses aggravated the condition. In the midst of this chaos, Sendero increased its urban warfare with bombs and murders, taking advantage of this paralysis of the state.

Besides the soaring political violence and the economic collapse, urban violence and organized crimes were skyrocketing. A report by the Special Commission on the Senate on the Causes of Violence indicated a fivefold increase in reported crimes against property, including assaults, robberies, kidnappings, and extortion and homicides between 1968 and 1989 (as cited in Burt 2007, 54). The report also noted that the integrity of police forces was compromised—police officers (former or current) were found to be linked to organized crime groups—and trust in police and judicial institutions were plummeting. The rising urban crime rate also seeped into the sphere of social trust (see Chapter 8).

In summary, the state was crumbling in the face of “expanding political violence, growing public insecurity, the ensuing vacuum of power in many parts of the country” (Burt 2007, 54). Under these circumstances, playing on the collective threat may have meant acknowledging the strength of Sendero, which perhaps they thought could weaken the state in the eyes of the public rather than strengthening it.
7.3.2 Personal Threat

The truth is that there was no security at that time. It was as much because of Sendero as the police. [...] If you happen to be in a marked village, you were a suspect. One was not able to confide in neither the insurgents nor the police. There was fear from both; there was no security. Total distrust!

(Male, Adult Men Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 15, 2014)

The direct threat of violence was more pervasive in Peru because of the fast expansion of Sendero. Indiscriminate killings and number of civilian casualties were also much higher in the conflict in Peru than the one in Turkey. Nevertheless, because of a lack of a commensurate type of collective threat and different practices of conscription and other macro-level characteristics peculiar to Peru, the distribution of personal threat remained limited to the areas that were directly affected by violence until Sendero reached Lima. The subnational sites I visited varied in terms of exposure to violence as presented in Table 5 below, enabling me to test my hypotheses.

Table 5. Variations in Subnational Sites in Peru as Leverage for Testing the Effects of Personal vs. Collective-Level Threat on Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL TRUST</th>
<th>Personal Threat</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective Threat</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Areas where Sendero never reached in the last two years of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Last two years of the conflict—all over the country + Red zones throughout the conflict</td>
<td>Areas where Sendero had presence but that were not main theatre of operations in the last two years of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Areas in the sierra were under threat of Sendero’s reach</td>
<td>Initial 6 years of the conflict in areas remote to the conflict zones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the early years of the conflict (1980-1986), violence was more concentrated in the sierra. Violence and social exclusion was intermingled in Peru as well, and the regions most
affected by violence were also the poorest regions (TRC, 2004). Ayacucho alone had about two thirds of the total victims, and 78% of the victims were indigenous people from the _sierra_ (TRC, 2004). Personal threat was ubiquitous in the afflicted departments of the highlands, which kept growing in numbers with time to include Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac, Cusco, Tarapoto (though it was the MRTA\textsuperscript{136} not Sendero) by 1988. Even though those in the country (highlands) were facing more grave risks to their lives, the bystanders in the urban areas were by no means shielded from personal threat.

Personal threat in these regions was compounded by the impossibility of staying impartial, and the indistinguishability of guerrillas from noncombatants, and sometimes guerrillas from the security forces. As explained in Chapter 5 and 6, civilians were in the middle of two fires. _Sinchis\textsuperscript{137} _engaged in abusive operations and committed excesses in their civilian targeting in the initial years. During the Dirty War (1983-1985), everyone could presumably be a subversive in the eyes of the police and the military because Sendero militants did not have regular uniforms, and Sendero was hastening its punishment (executions) for “traitors.” Civilians had no choice of being impartial, and they were under attack by all. The testimonies given to the TRC revolve around overarching mistrust and insecurity, and they were also the most common theme in my conversations with people who resided in the redzones in the mid 1980s.

Insecurities were terrible when I was in Ayacucho. I always wanted to escape, to Lima or wherever, because the fear was terrible. It was not just those that would come and steal, but also the military that come to do their patrol [*hacer sus rondas*]. We were

\textsuperscript{135} If fatalities from neighbouring rural regions such as Junín, Huánuco, Huancavelica, Apurímac, and San Martín were added, the total percentage would rise to 85 percent.

\textsuperscript{136} The MRTA refers to Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and it was another insurgency active simultaneously with the Sendero, but on much smaller scale.

\textsuperscript{137} A special unit of the Peruvian Civil Guard.
supposed to be collaborating with them [the soldiers], and they would come to investigate us because they thought we were collaborating with the others [subversives]. What does it even mean to ‘collaborate’ with people that come with guns?’ We did not have a choice. Because of all this, one was not able to trust anybody (#2, Lima, September 19, 2013).

During that period, I lived in Yurimaguas, working in the agricultural sector, and there were many inconveniences. Nobody was able to pass through freely; there were always fear of running into a terrorist. I remember very well that at some point they invaded Yurimaguas solely to scare us. The whole world was terrorized and everybody was involved (Women Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 20, 2014).

We are a community here, and we were all affected – it was not just the peasants. […] The vulnerability of being a human was very much felt at that time. What could a violated nurse supposed to do? The teachers were not able to teach their classes; they would eventually disappear because of fear. The situation was bad for the whole world, all of us (Men Focus Group, Cusco, January, 21, 2014).

The participants underscored and lamented the police brutality—pervasive before the Dirty War—and indiscriminate killings by the armed forces much more than Sendero violence. Their accounts were substantiated by the TRC report showing that the Peruvian Armed Forces were responsible for more than one third of the fatalities (TRC 2004). Two examplary accounts are:

The truth is there was no security at that time. It was as much because of Sendero and MRTA as the police. […] If you happen to be in a marked village, you were a suspect. One was not able to confide in neither the insurgents nor the police. There was fear from both, and there was no security. Total distrust! (Men Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 15, 2014).

The police had provoked those deaths. No one was sure whether we are being vigilated or not. We would all walk with fear. We had to run our errands very fast so that we do not stay out too long or have a conversation (Men Focus Group, Cusco, January, 21, 2014).

Furthermore, some civilians were not able to recognize the uniforms. Confounded by the similarity of abuse they encountered from the police and Sendero militants, reported that they did not know who the authors of the crimes were:
Many police officers violated the *provincianas* [women from the provinces]. Why did they do that? I don’t know. Because they were just like that? I do not understand, to this day, whether they were terrorists or the police, but they had uniforms and entered and raped and asked for food. That’s why *provincianas* are still angry with the policeman (Women Focus Group, Lima, November 15, 2013).

We were living in an episode of confusion where we did not know who are terrorists or the police. We were in danger, and each one of us had to take care of his/her own life. Lots of people here in Tarapoto closed down their restaurants, recreational facilities. Everyone was hiding in his or her home (Women Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 20, 2014).

Section 7.3.3 discusses the existential fears of the indigenous peoples in more detail, and how those fears reflected on the state’s legitimacy. Beyond the regions that were hit hardest, personal insecurities were still very much present in other areas. Peasants in Cusco, Tarapoto or Arequipa, departments that were adjacent to the hot zones, in contrast, were more aware of the looming Sendero threat due to their proximity to Ayacucho. The increasing number of internally displaced people in these departments contributed to and fortified this perception of threat. The residents I talked to from these departments mentioned having serious fears and personal security threat starting from 1985. The ones in the country told me that they chose sleeping in their fields hiding in case Sendero comes for a visit in the night to their houses. Excerpts below represent some common narratives:

I used to live in Tocache [a town in the department of San Martin] and we would go to play in the nearby hamlets. On the road, there were many dead bodies. Sometimes, in the night, motorbikes would come, wake up the residents, and we would hear executions. It was a very traumatic issue. Nobody was able to talk to the police or the soldiers because then they would be accused of being an informer, a spy, and they would be executed (Male, Mixed-Gender Immigrants Focus Group, Lima, October 25, 2013).

In those years of terrorism, Cusco lived with fear, fear and violence of criminals. Terrorists infiltrated everywhere. Many mobilizations. There was a lot of influence in the universities to convert people to *Senderismo*. Many young people took that path, everywhere including Cusco. Children of many people were going that way, because the same teachers of the university educated them, and thanks to that they are like
communists. The teacher converted many, and nowadays there is not so much, but at that time there were many (Women Focus Group, Cusco, December 5, 2013).

S: So how was security in the streets in Cusco?

P2: I felt a bit secure because the soldiers were out, hovering like this [spinning her finger]. But Senderistas were not afraid of anything. They went into the houses to recruit the young people and tell them their ideas. Soldiers were not able to protect everybody.

P5: There was no security, that's why we were afraid, always scared and we were hidden, we were not able to do anything, we lived with fear.

P3: We had no confidence in going out on the street; there was no trust in police.

P7: Well, indeed yes, as the friends say, there was not enough security. The absence of the military was noticeable. They [Sendero guerrillas] went back to the red zone and entered a police station in Andahuaylas and killed even the cops. During that time it was a curfew in Andahuaylas, people were not coming out. All fearfully that they would go in any time to the house and kill them. There was always fear here too. I lived that time here.

The pervasive insecurity reflected badly on the score of the government. Especially, the indigenous people I talked to in these departments of the sierra expressed resentments against the government:

In those years, there was distrust in the government because the government did not govern for the country; it was rather governing for others, the abroad. And it was as if we are not part of Peru. Abuses by the Armed Forces in the provinces, at least the zones of state of emergency. Why would a state do this to its own citizens? (Focus Group with Adult Men, Cusco, January 21, 2014).

My interviews with the residents of Lima, Cajamarca, and Iquitos, areas that were not affected at least in the early years of violence [Iquitos was never affected], show that even though some bystanders were aware of the extensive violence in other parts of their country, they were not personally preoccupied by it till it arrived in Lima around 1988. One oft-used remark was “si no te tocaba como que no te preocupaba,” meaning “if it was not touching you, it was not concerning you.” The perception was that the conflict was exclusive to the indigenous people.
in Ayacucho or its surrounding departments, and they did not feel any real threat—individual or collective up until late 1980s. In the 1980s, the media technology was weaker; many households did not have TV. Even if they did, or were regular newspaper readers, the media coverage was more limited and self-censored (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, most people in Lima or other parts of Peru didn’t know about the extent of violence or indiscriminate state killings in the hot zones; it became public knowledge only after the TRC report in 2004, a decade after the intense violence practically ended.

The implications of the war changed significantly when Sendero became active in Lima from 1988 to 1992. Not only personal threat but also collective threat became more palpable; Sendero proved its strength by advancing to the capital city. The ubiquity of car bombs and blackouts indicated Sendero’s presence and were intended to signal its political superiority. Car bombs on the streets and regular blackouts fostered the sense of ubiquity of threat, and the state’s failure to forestall them escalated the physical insecurities. Too often, my participants provide me with a depiction of their emotional state of being at the time along with the conditions surrounding them:

It was a period when there was an immense amount of distrust especially in the period when curfew was enforced. One was not able to walk outside in certain hours, too much fear, there was always a word on the street about an imminent attack. Sometimes, you would see amputations or beheaded bodies on the street (#3, Male, Lima, February 5, 2014).

As a self-protection strategy, they indicated that they would avoid walking close to the banks or police stations, as these places were more likely to be targeted. On many occasions they reported missing school because of fear of leaving the house or not being able to go to the market because it was too close to a bank.
Every time one leaves the house, there was a risk of not coming back. The anxiety associated with that risk was a common theme in all my conversations in Lima. Radio was used as the main medium of communication; because of the regular blackouts the TV was not accessible most times and landlines were very scarce—cell phones did not exist back then. Every household would be tuned in to one radio station and listened to the updates. Most of my participants recalled a memory of calling the radio station to report that they are safe to communicate their status to their families.

These physical insecurities and the state’s failure to wield coercive power certainly translated into distrust in the government. Figure 6 below shows the distribution of available data on presidential popularity and terror, signalling a negative relationship (Arce 2003; Arce and Carrión 2010). An expert on political affairs of Peru articulates on this link:

I believe that one central element of the civil war was perception of citizens that the government are not acting well, they are not fulfilling their functions and are not developing good counterterrorism strategies to provide security to the public. The governments were delegitimized very quickly. Belaúnde fell because of the terrorism; citizens did not lend trust. Alan García, the same, very low percentages [of public support] for not acting with clear public policies to fight with terrorism. […] It was one of the worst governments of Peru, and this is how the public remembers it (#E13, Male, Arequipa, October 29, 2013).

This very same point was raised by many academics, journalists, or other independent researchers working on the conflict in Peru. Common characteristics in the analyses of these experts are references to Hobbesian state of war and state’s responsibility to protect its citizens. One example from the 1980s is:

As the fear of terrorism has spread in Peru and become part of the repertoire of symbols used by the general population to understand and adapt to violence, the government’s legitimacy has been challenged. In the process, the Peruvian state, particularly under Belaúnde, failed Hobbes’s minimal test of political legitimacy.
García’s administration is now being severely tested in the emergency zones, where it has been unable to prevent acts of revenge against the peasantry by its own troops or by Sendero Luminoso, as is attested by the mounting civilian death toll. The government is being further undermined by the glaring mismanagement of its judicial system and prisons and by the growing violence in Lima. In each of these cases, the Peruvian state’s claim to legitimate use of coercive powers is open to public question (Bourque and Warren 1989, 25).

Figure 6. Distribution of Terror and Presidential Popularity in Peru (1985-1993)

Note: The data on terror is available from August 1985 onwards and comes from Perú: Compendio Estadístico Económico Financiero and Perú: Compendio de Estadísticas Sociodemográficas, both published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, INEI (various years). Presidential Popularity refers to presidential approval rates, and it is on a scale from 0 to 100. I borrowed the integrated dataset from Moises Arce (Arce 2003; Arce and Carrión 2010).

In Lima, in contrast to sierra, people mainly hold Sendero responsible for their insecurities was Sendero. When I asked to my Limañean participants whether they felt
sufficiently protected by the government, the answer was almost always a definitive “No,” with an additional comment along the lines of the following:

[We had] absolutely no [protection by the government]; nobody did. Many state officials were under attack. […] The citizens were living in constant fear because of Sendero (#12, Male, Lima, September 19, 2013).

The difference is that people in Lima, unlike indigenous peasants in Ayacucho did not feel abandoned by the state. The death of one individual in Lima was accorded a lot more importance than the death of several dozens or even hundreds of indigenous people. News coverage, press conferences in the aftermath of incidents as well as my interviews all confirmed the unequal treatment of victims in Lima versus elsewhere in Peru. Hence bystanders in Lima, though dubious of state capacity to subdue Sendero during the peak of violence in late 1980s, were of the view that state was exerting itself to the utmost of its power to protect. Despite the incompetence of the state, they felt their lives were valued. Many participants expressed sympathy for the Peruvian state instead of anger: “The state was caught unprepared— anything could have happened. There was the police and the army, and they were doing everything they can to stop the violence (#17, Female, Lima, September 25, 2013).” The essential link necessary to recognize the state as authority was not broken. Many participants who witnessed wartime conditions in other departments said:

I felt much better here in Lima. Even though there was threat, my workplace was secure and protected by the police. […] The government can only do what it can [within its capacities] (#18, Female, Lima, October 10, 2013).

Peruvians who lived in cities where Sendero presence was weak, or absent, did not experience as strong a threat to their personal security. When I asked about their lives in the
1980s, the main characteristic defining those times for them was economic difficulties, not security-related concerns. This was also the case for the Limañeans prior to the arrival of Sendero and even during the siege of Sendero. Economic performance is one of the most significant drivers of political trust (Feldman 1983; Hetherington 1998; Miller and Borrelli 1991; Catterberg and Moreno 2006). Even in the face of an ongoing conflict, the economic performance of the state played an important role in political evaluations— for those not exposed to these attacks from Sendero, perhaps more important. In other words, for the remote bystanders, the economic situation had much more palpable impact in their trust in government and authorities than the ongoing conflict. Arce (2003) shows that rising inflation had a consistently negative impact on presidential support.138

7.3.3 Physical and Ontological Security, and the Ethnic Bond of the Indigenous Peoples

Residents of the highlands in Ayacucho and other departments in the sierra had witnessed the most brutal crimes and been victimized in the most unfathomable ways. Anguish caused by violence and extreme physical insecurity may have started with Sendero, yet the general condition of repression, impoverishment, and suffering date back to the pre-Sendero era. I argue that the conventional unresponsiveness and absence of the state in the sierra, when compounded by military brutality and outright targeting of the civilians, converted physical insecurities into an ontological insecurity for the afflicted indigenous population in Peru. Unlike the Kurds in Turkey, however, there was no mechanism to build collective ethnic consciousness among Peru’s indigenous populations. Below I start with unfolding the baseline priors for the people in

138 He also shows that higher-levels of political violence hurt left-leaning governments more on average than right-leaning governments. Yet, his analysis is at country level, and cannot capture the role of individual-level variables.
the sierra. Then I describe the process through which they became more ontologically insecure and discuss the reasons behind the missing ethnic bond.

As outlined in Chapter 4, the history of the Peruvian state is characterized by a desultory relationship with indigenous peoples and the failure of national integration of “Indians.” As one reason for this characterization, the chapter presents the shadow of the colonial relations that had been cast on contemporary Peru’s struggles with its indigenous population. The subjugation and subservience the indigenous population of after the Spanish conquest casted the path for their inferior status in the Republic of Peru after independence.

My conversations with the indigenous people echo the main themes raised in Chapter 4. Unanimously, the participants asserted that state “has always forgotten” or “abandoned” these zones; that “the people [in the sierra] have always stayed marginal to the interest of the state,” or “they were never a priority.” Along the same lines, they believed that “the state has always been indifferent to the needs of [indigenous] people,” “there was never support for development—no schools, no roads, no job opportunities,” and people “had to take care of themselves.” Indeed, many tied Sendero’s success to the very absence of state:

The state was never in the provincias. Then when Sendero came, it was an open field. The population had been left alone for long. […] It is not Sendero who destroyed the state; it is the absence of the state. As a consequence, Sendero was able to wander freely. It did not have to fight with anybody, as there was no one to fight with. The growth of Sendero was not because of its operating capacity but the absence of state. (#E20, Male, Cusco, December 20, 2013).

A bit of background on Sendero’s early years and how it mobilized scores of people is in order here. The emergence and growth of Sendero coincided with the most expansive social reform undertaken in contemporary Peru. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of the Velasco regime (1968-1975) developed a progressive social and economic reform plan in
response to the large-scale rural unrest in the 1960s that posed challenges to the domination of hacendados (feudal landlords), demanding redistribution, land rights and more equality. To diminish these grievances, the military government initiated an agrarian reform (The Plan of Túpac Amaru) and nationalization of the industry, known as “the Peruvian experiment,” or el proceso (McClintock and Lowenthal 1983). 139 The idea was to structure the society to ameliorate the class disparities, alter property relationships and generate a societal bond to induce national values, the unfilled goals of the independence or later years of nation-building (Lowenthal 1983).

The reform program targeted the already feeble feudalistic hacienda regime and achieved to undertake changes in land tenure—increased rural wages and ended serfdom. Yet, it did not provide a fast, sufficient and effective policy to solve the social and economic problems and to empower the peasants. Instead of, for instance, placing individuals or communities in charge of the land, the government installed state-controlled cooperatives, which disheartened the peasant communities (Berg 1992; Rénine 1994). In summary, despite some achievements, the Peruvian experiment failed.

The Velasco regime’s reforms indeed inadvertently assisted the growth of Sendero rather than obstructing it. Elimination of free education gave Sendero a legitimate occasion to mobilize the peasants and secure their sympathy. With the dissolution of the feudal land regime, there occurred a void in authority positions that used to belong to hacendados (large landowners). The Shining Path, very opportunistically, filled that void (Theidon 2013). Furthermore, Sendero’s leaders took advantage of the failure of the government to deliver the promised changes and fueled peasant frustrations. At that point, the Peruvian government’s decision to return to civilian

139 See (Fitzgerald 1983) for the political economy of Peru in the 1970s.
regime and to extend the franchise to illiterate people (in 1978) did not suffice to gain support of disenchanted peasants. The revolutionary leaders of Sendero used these auspicious moments and popular dissatisfaction to promote their ideas: abolishing the national market economy, industry and currency, and bringing in a communal economy based on barter exchange (McCormick 1987).

Sendero also capitalized on the soaring resentment among campesinos. In 1975, the Morales regime applied deflationary policies in response to the economic crisis, which led to a huge decline in wages, inflation in prices and devaluation of the Peruvian sol (by 500%). Compounding on the frustrations with the land reform, campesinos became more agitated. All of this helped advance the cause of Sendero whose indoctrination efforts found more response in public (Barnhurst 1991).\footnote{See (McClintock 2001) for evidence of popular support for Sendero in Ayacucho.}

Sendero pursued a “winning the hearts and minds” policy, promising solutions to the most pervasive problems for the indigenous peasants: robbery, petty thievery, and cattle rustling—serious problems since the 1970s which were not solved by the state bureaucracy. Sendero also punished abusive government officials and local elites, actions that were usually well received by the local population. Hopeful that Sendero could fill the void of authority, bring order and welfare, they considered Sendero as a legitimate alternative to the Peruvian government. During the first three years of violence, many indigenous people joined the ranks of Sendero, knowing that it was a revolutionary movement.

Sendero took control over many peasant communities and declared them “liberated zones.” Pursuing its goal for popular justice, it implemented “people’s trials” where Senderistas
executed abusive landowners, corrupt local officials, castigated unfaithful husbands, wife-abusers, cattle rustlers and thieves, through extremely violent means (mutilation, beheading, hanging etc.). They also provided selective benefits to induce collaboration and subservience by distributing goods that they confiscated from abandoned haciendas. Locals, especially the older generation, weary of a nonresponsive state, celebrated Sendero’s authority and a large number of them lent their support. Those who did not support Sendero assisted out of fear.\textsuperscript{141} In those liberated zones, Sendero tried to put the Maoist social order in place with varying degrees of success, eliminating all local forms of capitalism and restructuring modes of production. Sendero pushed its ideology of subsistence level economy and destroyed crops and farm equipment, shut down local markets and tortured and killed community members who were reluctant to support these measures (Fitz-Simons 1993).

Sendero also started to expand its attacks against government buildings, power stations, and telecommunication facilities and businesses, which disrupted the day-to-day operations of the locals and increased antagonism. Assassinations of authorities, as part of Sendero’s plan to eliminate all local institutions and disrupt state functions, also fuelled resentment and incipient resistance. The TRC (2004) received assassination reports of 930 local authorities by the Shining Path; however, they suspected the real figure was much higher. Such killings by the armed guerillas inculcated fear and threat in all state authorities and caused people to flee from the highlands. The Shining Path, in the end, eviscerated the already feeble state in those regions, and the pervasive absence of state was perpetuated and even aggravated.

\textsuperscript{141} See (Berg 1992, Isbell 1992) for detailed analysis of peasant responses to Sendero in Ayacucho and Andahuaylas respectively.
A positive atmosphere induced by the celebration of justice and hope for new life brought by Sendero soon was replaced by climate of fear and distrust. Sendero’s unforgiving attitude to “villains” was perilous, as the definition of a “villain” was arbitrary and attacks became more unpredictable. Whoever got in contact with the police or government was under threat, as were the resistant indigenous communities. Personal antagonisms often led to accusations against neighbours, which wiped away the communal trust and turned communities against each other (see Theidon 2013 for "Intimate Enemies"). Moreover, the brutality of the killings was worrisome, and as attacks became extensive, villagers started to question Sendero’s methods. Sendero’s disrespect for the indigenous culture and traditions also raised concerns among the indigenous peasants.142

Repression and maltreatment of the armed forces, and being treated as “an enemy rather than a citizen” broke the already feeble link between the state and the indigenous publics (#45, Female, Ayacucho, January 21, 2014). Similar to Kurds in Turkey, indigenous people felt ontologically insecure and started to question the authority of the state. Oblivion to their security during times of clashes aggravated the extant resentment towards the state on the part of especially the indigenous peoples who were victimized. One expert comments:

I believe the difference between the insecurities of those times and insecurities of today, which is partly inherited from those times, is that in the 1980s started the trivialization of life, values of solidarity, and of humanity. Life had no value. Insecurity in general was a quotidian issue (#E21, Male, Ayacucho, January 19, 2014).

142 Heilman (2010, p.198) elaborates on the absurdity of Sendero’s “callous disdain for the very same humble peoples they claimed to be defending,” and provides some rationale in the Conclusion chapter. One plausible explanation also comes from Degregori (1992, 46): “Sendero’s attitude resembles that of certain indigenista intellectuals of the past who expressed the authoritarian, tortuous, violent love of the superior for the inferior, whom they sought to redeem or “protect” from the evils of modern world.”
7.3.3.1 Meaning (lessness) of Death

In Peru, unlike in the case of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, war victims did not play much of a role in general public’s reactions to the conflict, or their security perceptions. The fact that most of the victims were indigenous peasants, and that the fatalities from the armed forces did not have as heroic and a religious interpretation rendered them less visible and instrumental for the rest of the society and the state.

To start with, military service did not connote a holy service for the nation. Forced conscription, which was in place throughout the conflict in Peru, was not really enforced. That is to say, it was possible to buy out the service or avoid it. González-Cueva (2000) asserts that there was a common understanding that only those without means or contacts should serve in the army. Hence, unlike in Turkey, the insecurities the armed forces faced did not resonate with the general public, especially with the mestizos who had the resources to escape the military duty. Furthermore, the number of soldier fatalities was negligible as compared to civilian fatalities. The victims were disproportionately indigenous.

The indigenous peasants who live in the afflicted departments but who were further away from the conflict zone expressed that they were concerned about what was happening to Ayacuchenos and felt sorry. However, there was not any further link connecting them to the sorrow or plight of the indigenous peasants facing the Sendero threat. The heightened salience of ethnic identity that we observed for bystander ethnic Kurds in the face of the injustices and violence their co-ethnics were subject to did not occur in Peru.

Geographical distance from the ongoing violence is a logical rationale for low levels of personal threat. However, many analysts raised flags about the nonchalance of the rest of Peru to the bloodbath in the sierra. Even though the full story may not have been accessible to the
Peruvians away from the conflict zones, there were sufficient available sources to be informed about the ongoing violence and the sufferings of the indigenous victims. Yet, most chose to turn a blind eye to it. Diana Taylor calls this self-blinding phenomena “percepticide,” defined as losing sight, hearing and seeing due to spectacles of violence and fear, and looking away from the volatile areas (Taylor 2003).

Even though indigenous people constitute about 40% of the population in Peru, the lack of promotion for their ethnic identity and the general lack of agency on their part inhibited possible bonding between the bystanding and victimized indigenous people. Exclusion of and mistrust towards the indigenous people, both because of the entrenched racism in Peru and association of Sendero with the indigenous people, contributed to the dismissal of their predicament.

Even after the public became aware of the brutality consuming the sierra, their response was not fraught with judgment or blame against the government. A large majority now condemns the indiscriminate killings, but they are also of the view that “the state had to do what it had to do”:

The government didn’t know who is who, and many were infiltrated into the schools. It was a war, and they had no other way but killing them. Unfortunately, many innocent people also died, but again it is war (#24, Male, Arequipa, October 25, 2013).

Some, on the other hand, refuse to believe that many of the victims were innocent; they instead argue that virtually everyone in Ayacucho was Senderista, and it was impossible to know the innocent ones, as discussed in Chapter 8.
Ever more marginalized, the victimized indigenous groups lost any possibility of trust in the government who targeted them, and the society who excluded them and furthered their plight.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter sought to test the micro-level hypotheses derived from the theory presented in Chapter 2. The findings, for the most part, confirm the hypotheses. The way conflict affects individuals’ trust is conditioned by a discourse that features collective threat framing. As shown, collective threat was played out so very strongly by the Turkish state and that it proved highly effective in changing the attitudes and perceptions of people. The official discourse has been the only source of reliable information for most bystanders. Subscription to the official discourse was not exclusive to ethnic Turks. Most remarkably, we see that even in the absence of direct personal threat, collective threat was able to penetrate into people’s judgments, galvanize them around the nationalist ideology and rally them around the state. Legacies of nation-building continued to mould the discourse and state’s ideology, and concepts of army-nation, policies of conscription all together determined collective and personal threat configurations. For the politicized Kurdish population, my findings indicate sliding of legitimacy from the state to the PKK, which is menacing for the sovereignty of the state in the region. Also, ethnic bonding seems to at work to build a new collective ethnic consciousness for Kurds.

In Peru, the war in Peru was ideological in character, and even though ethnicity was not a promoted dimension to the war, it was integral to the dynamics, processes, interpretation and outcome of the war. Sendero’s emergence, its popular support base and the counterinsurgency policies of the government are “all closely linked to Sendero’s rural roots and the enduring complexity of ethnicity in Peruvian politics and national life. The increasing threat of social
disorder has occasioned renewed recognition of the political implications of cross-regional
tensions and Indian ethnicity in shaping the origins, ideology, and spread of the guerilla threat’
(Bourque and Warren 1989, 13-14). It is indeed this very component of ethnicity that taints the
popular attitudes towards the war.

In Peru, because of a lack of commensurate collective threat framing to the one in Turkey, conflict was not a factor in people’s political trust evaluations unless they faced personal insecurity. Those who were under personal threat did not have confidence in the government and security forces to protect them. Yet, the loss of trust was rather transient for the ones who feel represented by the state. More permanent damage on trust was for the victimized indigenous groups whose link with the state had already been weak. They felt ever more excluded and ever less Peruvian. They lost their faith in the state because as indigenous groups their ontological presence was questioned. The Peruvian state, instead of being a protector, was an agent of violence itself. In the memory of many indigenous people, this grim picture of state was looming. The difference from the case of Kurds is that indigenous peoples in Peru do not have nearly as strong ethnic bonds and because there was no insurgent group representing them, the violence perpetrated against the indigenous people from the sierra by the state security forces did not generate a more global wave of mobilization against the state.
Chapter 8: Hypotheses-Testing: Effects of Civil Wars on Social Trust

“Societies — that is to say, given ethnic or other communities — owe much of their form and solidarity to the exigencies of war.”
Anthony Smith. 143

This chapter tests the hypotheses derived from my theory presented in Chapter 2, using qualitative data from Turkey and Peru. My theory of social trust in wartime distinguishes between generalized interpersonal social trust and category/identity-based social trust, where the category-based trust is less dispositional and more knowledge and experience-based than generalized social trust (Freitag and Bauer 2013). The theory suggests that when group boundaries are clear, one should observe decline in category-based trust where groups curtail their out-group trust. When group boundaries are not clear, generalized social trust should decline. Based on the presumption that group identities are clearer in ethnic wars such as the case in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, I expect to see clear in-group/out-group distinctions and declining out-group trust (category-based trust) after the onset of the war. By implication, in ideological wars such as the Maoist guerilla war in Peru, I expect to see lower generalized trust, as group markers are harder to identify.

The suggested causal mechanism between civil war and social trust is two-pronged: it could be top-down (via the overarching state discourse framing the conflict, similar to political trust) or it could be bottom-up (generated at the grassroots by intergroup hostility, which sometimes extends from personal insecurities). In ethnic wars, it is more likely that the state discourse features a divisive rhetoric emphasizing the ethnic cleavages of the war. Such a

143 Smith (1981, 377).
discourse, when effective, should realign the popular level social groupings along ethnic lines. Alternatively, popular level resentments towards the out-groups by implicit association with the war cleavages may incite similar group alignments. As the salience of ethnic identity heightens, and because ethnic groups are easy to identify as suggested above, we expect to see social groupings along ethnic identity lines in ethnic wars. Because each group is identified with one of two warring parties, after the onset of the war, out-group members are likely to be seen as allies of the “enemy forces,” and consequently trust in them should decline.

In ideological wars, the main cleavage is class identity, whose markers could be more ambiguous than ethnicity and boundaries less clear. Official discourse is often not as effective in inducing collective threat framing as in the case of ethnic wars; hence its ability to realign the society along the cleavages of the war is more limited (see Chapter 2). Bottom-up generation of hostility towards out-groups is also difficult for similar reasons: class boundaries are vague, and winnowing out the affiliates of the insurgency is hardly possible, as ideological affiliation does not usually come with clear markers. Hence, we expect to see a steep decline in generalized social trust and decline in out-group where the imposing group boundaries are feasible.

My theory also presents two contingent hypotheses based on personal experiences and context. First, it suggests that personal negative experiences would magnify the negative judgments towards out-groups in ethnic wars. Hence, category-based distrust should be stronger for people who have personal negative experiences with the out-ethnic group. The second one concerns contextual dependency: people living in volatile contexts or contexts that undergo major compositional changes due to the war (such as influx of internally displaced population) should have stronger negative feelings towards out-groups (See Table 6 for the full list).
Table 6. Summary List of Hypotheses for Social Trust, Corresponding Observable Implications, and Empirical Evidence for Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Observable Implications</th>
<th>Empirical Evidence from Fieldwork</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.a. Ethnic territorial wars should lead to a decline in out-group trust.</td>
<td>After the onset of violence, I expect individuals to:</td>
<td>1.a. Narratives from the interviews and fieldwork in Turkey with respect to personal relations and attitudes towards other social/ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Develop negative blanket judgments for members of a defined out-group and use of discriminatory language (regarding their character, trustworthiness, intentions, etc.).</td>
<td>1.b. Narratives from the interviews and fieldwork in Turkey conducted with people who reported having personal negative experiences with out-groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.b. Category-based distrust should be stronger for people who have personal negative experiences with the out-ethnic group.</td>
<td>➢ Develop a fear that the out-group members are posing a risk to one’s interests and practicing in-group favouritism.</td>
<td>1.c. Narratives from the interviews and fieldwork in Turkey conducted in Mersin and İstanbul, locations which received a major influx of internally displaced Kurdish population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.c. People living in volatile contexts or contexts that undergo major compositional changes due to the war (such as influx of internally displaced population) should have stronger negative feelings towards out-groups.</td>
<td>➢ Have higher reluctance to involve in family unions (e.g. not allowing the siblings to marry an out-group member).</td>
<td>Expert comments and evaluations on category-based trust and social relations are considered as evidentiary sources as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>➢ In extreme cases, refuse to be present in the same room with an ethnic out-group or get into a conversation.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative experiences with the out-group could include being harmed/victimized by an out-group member, having a personal dispute or finding out vast differences in fundamental values/opinions.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger negative feelings may manifest as having more/extreme versions of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Observable Implications</td>
<td>Empirical Evidence from Fieldwork</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1. Ideological wars should decrease interpersonal trust.</td>
<td>After the onset of violence, I expect individuals to:</td>
<td>2.1. Narratives from the interviews and focus groups in Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Develop a fear that unknown others will deliberately harm you instead of being neutral or positive about their intentions.</td>
<td>2.2. Narratives from the interviews and focus groups in Peru, particularly from Lima, Ayacucho and Cusco where Sendero was active.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Start avoiding interactions/eye contact with unknown others even though that was not a practice before.</td>
<td>Expert comments and evaluations on category-based trust and social relations are considered as evidentiary sources as well.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Take extra measures for self-protection (locking doors, accompanying kids to school).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Develop anxiety that your family’s safety is at risk when they are away from home.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. The decline in interpersonal trust should be of higher magnitude in areas where there is active violence.</td>
<td>If 3.1 is the case, after the onset of violence, the list in Hypothesis 1 should apply here.</td>
<td>3.1. Narratives from the interviews and focus groups in Peru where participants define and discuss judgments about groups and group members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger negative feelings specified in 3.2. could manifest as having more/extreme versions of the implications listed above.</td>
<td>3.2. Lima in Peru is the context that received the highest number of displaced population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expert comments and evaluations on category-based trust and social relations are considered as evidentiary sources as well.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The empirical strategy is to look for observable implications of the theory in the narratives of the participants.¹⁴⁴ Some of these implications (such as those listed for Hypothesis 1) may also follow from declining political trust. If one does not trust in the security forces to fulfill their jobs, it is natural to be overly cautious and anxious about safety. When these implications are observed, it is hard to know whether it is the social trust or political trust that is declining. Yet, as explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.5, these two types of trust are not always independent; indeed, they may be rather enmeshed in each other. Lower political trust could imply lower social trust. Hence, my inferences below will not be exclusively about declining social trust.

As for evidentiary sources, remarks regarding relations with others (neighbours, ethnic or social groups, personal experiences, interpersonal communications) are used. The narratives I present usually reflect the most common reactions, though I occasionally refer to exceptionally provocative narratives to emphasize the range of viewpoints. Furthermore, subnational variation in context is leveraged to test the hypothesis on the magnifying effect of context (See Chapter 6 for further details on the logic of inference using qualitative data).

This chapter starts with presenting the results from the case of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and then proceeds to the case of the Maoist insurgency in Peru. For each case, first the pre-war dynamics are depicted, and then the changing dynamics after the onset of the war is explained. Using personal narratives, observable implications for the hypotheses listed above are presented.

¹⁴⁴ I should underscore that what I am testing here is the outcomes not the processes of my theory.
8.1 Social Trust in Turkey in the face of the Kurdish Insurgency

8.1.1 A Sketch of Pre-War and Wartime Dynamics

Pre-war relations between the two ethnic groups representing the main cleavages of the war, the Turks and Kurds, are essential to understand in order to gauge the change in social relations and trust after the war. My interviews often started with a general question on the past asking about societal dynamics and interethnic relations. As a reminder, my interviews took place in 2014, and by then there was a wide discursive space accommodating Kurdish identity unlike the 1990s (see Chapter 5). Retrospectively when I asked about the period between 1980 and 2000, I find a clear reflection of the official discourse on popular discourse, sometimes denying the existence of “Kurds” as an ethnic group. My adult participants confessed that they believed that “there was no such thing as Kurds” or “Kurds were nothing but a made-up category concocted by the West to meddle in the domestic affairs of Turkey” (implying that the PKK was a tool of the Western powers).

Other participants told me that even though differences in ethnicities were acknowledged, these differences were never an issue. Virtually all my interviewees and focus group participants concur that “before [the PKK] there was not a big separation between Kurds and Turks,” and emphasize “fraternity of Kurds and Turks [Kürt-Türk kardeşliği],” notwithstanding the contrasting accounts. Some excerpts are as follows:

Before the mid-1970s, we would not know or care about people’s ethnic background. Some people had nicknames such as ‘Kür [Kurd] Mehmet’ [Mehmet is a male name] but the term ‘Kurd’ did not carry any pejorative meaning back then (#32, Female, Gaziantep, May 9, 2014).

Honestly, until I was in my 20s [referring to mid-1970s], there was not even an existence of Turkish-Kurdish distinction. We did not know each other’s ethnicity and we did not care, let alone separation (Mixed Adult Focus Group, Istanbul, June 9, 2014).
All these accounts repeatedly suggested that the hostility between the ethnic groups only started with the war. A comment of a participant who identify herself as Turkish represents this recurring belief:

> When I was growing up in Haymana, Ankara [in the 1960s], we had great friendships with Kurds—there was no separation. We knew they were Kurdish, but it was not something that could have been an issue. Nowadays, people get goose bumps when they hear the word ‘Kurd.’ The politicians and the PKK caused this. Ever since the fight started, things have been deteriorating between us [Turks and Kurds]. I cannot believe that things have gotten so bad (Ankara Female Focus Group, April 9, 2014).

Importantly, the change in salience of ethnic identity and emerging hostility between the two groups are seldom on a personal basis, even though all the accounts are individual-level. In other words, it is not the personal experiences that led Turks to change their attitudes towards Kurds; it is the discourse (see Chapter 5). Numerous accounts reported not ever having a Kurdish friend or knowing anybody who is Kurdish yet they have firm opinions about the members of that ethnic group, which I argue is the reflection of the official discourse on interpersonal relations. One example is as follows:

> I did not know anybody who was Kurdish before I came to Gaziantep for school [in 2000] but I had strong prejudices against them. In my neighbourhood in Ankara [where she grew up], there is this extreme hostility towards Kurds—they are not liked or approved. Indeed, it was something to be feared—or at least that was my perception. I grew up with a discourse that denigrates and denounces Kurds every time there was a news about martyrs or clashes (Female, Gaziantep Mixed Youth Focus Group, May 11, 2014).

> When I was a third year student in college in 1995, I remember being very disturbed when a student told in a sociology class that she is a Kurdish feminist. How dare she could say she is Kurdish. After all, to me being Kurdish and supporting the PKK were the same thing. After the class, we talked among ourselves how we have a terrorist in our class, and how we should report her to the department head. Now looking back how little I knew. I hadn’t even met any Kurd until like 10 years ago [2007]. However, back then [in the 1990s] this was the norm. We all thought the same way (Female, Mixed Adult Focus Group, İstanbul, June 9 2014).
The discourse of animosity towards Kurds by Turks is inextricably and overwhelmingly related to rise of the PKK. Official discourses on the Kurdish issue in the post-PKK era, incorporating tools of “martyrdom” and “sanctity of national borders,” disseminated through the educational system and the media, have always played a determinant role in the political socialization of citizens. The emergence of the PKK and concomitant official discourse of the state fuelled nationalism among Turks, and the dialectic of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism helped to construct ethnic identities at a popular level (Tezcür 2009). At the root of Turks’ negative attitudes towards Kurds lies the stigma of Kurds being PKK affiliates.

Not every Kurd was attached this stigma, however. Many of the interviewees make a distinction among different groups of Kurds: the migrant Kurds or the Kurds who live in the Eastern provinces (Easterner Kurds—“the bad Kurds”) and Kurds who came with previous wave of migration (mostly on economic grounds) who are considered more “local” now. The previous wave of Kurdish migrants tended to be more integrated in the society (economic migrants of the 1960s and 1970s) and stood out less, often siding with the state. They were usually considered as the “good Kurds.” More recently migrated (or forcibly displaced) Kurds (post -1980), however, were approached with suspicion due to their presumed link with the PKK or presumed desire to secede even by some of the other Kurds in the migrated cities. The logic behind discrimination was expressed as follows:

We don’t judge people just because they are Kurds. I am part Kurdish too, my dad is Kurdish [yet the person identifies as Turkish], and I have many Kurdish friends. However, there are those who came from the East, those who support the PKK [PKK ’ll]. Our problem is with those; those who see the state as enemy cannot be our friends (#82, Female, Istanbul, June 30, 2014).

I am not against Kurds in general; I am against those who are in favour of a separate Kurdish state. For instance, I am not against Harun [security guard in their
neighbourhood who is a Kurd], he is not mean at his heart, unlike others (Ankara Women Focus Group, April 9, 2014).

Here in Gaziantep, the Kurds do not support the PKK. They came a while ago [before the war] and are very patriotic. It is common [for Turks here] to marry into a Kurdish family; however only to the local Kurds [i.e. those who moved there a while ago]. Marrying into a family from Şanlıurfa [a conservative Kurdish dominant city—one of my field sites] for instance would be problematic; their cultures and traditions are quite backwards and extremely conservative. They would oppress woman in the East, and of course there is the issue of supporting the PKK— an irreconcilable difference (#28, Female, Gaziantep, May 6, 2014).

To further justify their negative attitude towards “bad Kurds” most of my participants commented on how Kurds were able to take advantage of everything the country has to offer, how they were co-living peacefully and “all that jazz about injustices and repression” are unfounded. One dialogue captures the gist of this narrative well:

Sule: What do you think about Kurds’ access to opportunities in Turkey?
P4: Kurds were never restricted. They had jobs in the highest echelons of the society. Turgut Özal [Prime-minister (1983-1989) and president (1989-1993)] was a Kurd [the most common example used to justify the logic of no discrimination]. Most of the artists are Kurdish, there are many Kurdish MPs in the parliament, the richest people in İstanbul are Kurdish. They can do anything and be anything in this country. There is no injustice.
P7: Not only that, fishermen are Kurdish, grocery vendors are also Kurdish. They are everywhere, yet they still complain they do not have enough. What now? They won’t be happy until they take away our land (Women Focus Group, Ankara, April 9, 2014).

Kurdish participants’ accounts also referred to this distinction between “good Kurds” and “bad Kurds.” Good Kurds are perceived to be docile and are not vocal about their identity or they do not embrace their Kurdish identity. Indeed, among the Kurds I talked and from the depictions of “good Kurds” in the accounts of ethnic Turks, I inferred that the “good Kurds” often identify themselves as Turkish citizen and would underplay or even refute their
ethnic identity. It is so much so that some Kurds realized their ethnic identity only after they are labelled as a “good Kurd.” One interviewee tells:

I went to Gazi University, and there they were telling me that I am not like the other Kurds and that I am sweet. How so, I wondered? What they meant is that the other Kurds are basically terrorists, I figured later. I figured that I am different, realized that ‘huh, we are Kurdish.’

Such intra-group distinctions and nuanced categorization is not predicted in my theory. Even though sweeping judgments are present, people often distinguished between different out-group members. These intra-group distinctions are constructed in light of social dynamics and they vary by both local and national context. My data show similar intra-group distinctions in Peru as well (see section 8.2.2.1). In Turkey, the wave of migration, birthplace, accent and other local cues were used as identifiers. Whether these distinctions make a difference in the realm of behaviour and trust attitudes is discussed below. In light of these findings, I will update my theory (see Conclusion for further discussion).

This section laid out the general patterns of relationships between the two ethnic groups, and rising in-group/out-group distinctions. These excerpts exemplify that the discourse is a strong driver of individual-level attitudinal change. Below, I move on to examination of observable implications of declining trust.

8.1.2 Declining Out-Group Trust in the form of Discrimination

In my conversations, evidence for discriminatory practices abounds, especially from ethnic Turks towards Kurds. Many examples relate to neighbourhood relationships and business transactions. One Kurdish participant tells:

In 1992, in this neighbourhood [currently a Kurdish dominated neighbourhood in İstanbul], should you mention that you were Kurdish, they would beat the hell out of you. They would never rent an apartment in a building to a Kurd— always basement
suites. That’s what Turks here thought we deserved (#62, Female, İstanbul, June 23, 2014).

In Mersin, let’s say you are looking to buy a land and they are asking 50,000 [Turkish] liras for it. One may negotiate and bid lower. I have witnessed many conversations where they offered the land to a low bidder because he was Turkish. They say ‘just let it go— this land should not go to a Kurd.’ They sold it for 45,000 [Turkish liras] to make sure the owner is Turkish (Male, Ankara Youth Focus Group, April 15, 2014).

Most of my Kurdish interviewees who voluntarily migrated in the post-PKK era referred to an anecdote where they themselves were personally discriminated against or witnessed their families or friends to be subject to discrimination in their new locations. Those who had some markers of Kurdishness such as an accent, birthplace or traditional clothing were more likely to personally experience it in the post-PKK era, especially more in the 1990s. A young male Kurdish participant recounts his experiences from his childhood. His family migrated from the East to the West in the 1980s for economic reasons, and his stories well reflect some of the common experiences I heard:

We migrated to Nazilli due to economic difficulties. We speak Kurdish at home, and back then it was prohibited. Because we are Kurdish, they [locals in Nazilli] were targeting us, even assaulted us with knives. “You are killing our soldiers, and we are going to kill you.” […] When I was in school, they ostracized me because I was from the East. My parents were discriminated whenever they had to visit state bureaus because they did not speak good Turkish. We suffered a lot (Youth Focus Group, Şanlıurfa, May 21, 2014).

My data show that the “good Kurd” vs. “bad Kurd” distinction is relevant in the behavioural realm as well. Some participants drew my attention to a parallel distinction they title “assimilated [good] vs. politicized [bad] Kurds” and reiterated the same logic. For example:

In general, at an individual-level, in Izmir, if a Kurd is assimilated, then he/she will not encounter any hostility—assimilated ones can well integrate and get absorbed in the society. However, if you are politicized, if you are vocal about the Kurdish rights
and freedoms, and historical injustices, then you will be ostracized in the society (Female, Ankara Youth Focus Group, April 15, 2014).

Official practices of discrimination may have been emboldening similar practices at the popular level. Many Kurdish lawyers or professors who are currently employed in the Eastern cities recounted their unpleasant experiences of discrimination by the state officials from the times when they were students during earlier episodes of the conflict. Implied forms of discrimination were directed at those who did not have as clear markers of Kurdish identity but had origins in the East. Even though they did not speak Kurdish (most likely because of reluctance of their parents to teach them), where they come from was usually known. One lawyer recounts:

While we were [university] students in Ankara in the 1990s, we were able to see the blatant discrimination committed by the security forces. For instance, they checked your IDs when you were at the university entrance. If they saw that you are from a place to the East of Euphrates [designates the region where proportion of Kurdish population is heavier] on your ID, you would be subjected to verbal abuse (#E29, May 25 2014, Diyarbakır).145

Following such official practices, the cues insinuating Kurdish identity would sometimes lead teachers and students to treat the Kurdish students as an affiliate of the then-separatist movement of the PKK and discriminate against them.

One additional reason of discrimination or prejudice against the Kurds is cultural. Many of my Turkish interviews in urban contexts drew attention to the cultural gap between the eastern Kurds and the Turks. Denigrating comments on their clothing and family size were common. One most repeated judgment regards the number of kids Kurdish families in the East have:

145 Checking IDs at the entry was a common practice in many universities in the past. The tradition continues in some universities up to this day, such as the Middle East Technical University in Ankara.
They [Kurdish families] have ten or eleven children. They say that they are raising soldiers. Theirs are not children; they are more like puppies. We only have one kid, and when he dies we lost it all, whereas for them it is one out of eleven. Not much of a loss, really (Women Focus Group, Ankara, April 7, 2014).

The other cultural dimension concerns the urban/rural divide. Most of my Turkish participants who identify themselves as liberal—which means open-minded and respectful for differences in the context of Turkey—expressed being prejudiced against Kurds on the basis of their life style and cultural practices that are incompatible with urban living:

P3: Some of them [Kurdish migrants] are senseless and stubborn. They came here [to İstanbul] like two decades ago, yet still haven’t learned how to dress or even speak Turkish. They somehow made it and became able to afford a place in a nice neighbourhood, yet they do not try to adapt one bit. They are still shaking their tablecloths from the balcony. They put their shoes outside of their apartment. They do not even close their door as if this is some commune life. It is unconscionable. I am sorry but I don’t understand and it bothers me big time.

P7: Exactly! That bothers me too. They could be good Kurds and do not have a separatist agenda but the fact that they are not willing to adapt is the reason they are considered as a problem here (Mixed Adult Focus Group, İstanbul, June 9, 2014).

Reverse discrimination i.e. discriminatory attitudes on the part of Kurds towards Turks also existed. Ethnic Kurds who were previously discriminated or targeted by Turks, or who were victimized seem more likely to engage in discriminatory behaviour towards Turks and in-group favouritism towards Kurds. Participants told me similar business transaction stories where the roles were reversed, seller is Kurdish and a potential buyer/renter is Turkish, and the owner is reluctant to sell/rent to a Turk. One Kurdish participant laments to justify his discriminatory attitude towards Turks: “Where were they when I needed a place most. No Turk wanted to rent a

146 See Section 8.1.4 for more discussion on cultural gap, displaced populations and context.
place to me in Antalya when we were told to leave our village. Well, now I won’t rent my place to a Turk.” One expert also adds:

Displaced populations have prejudice and negative reaction towards Turks. Subconsciously perhaps, they developed this attitude. They are intolerant and discriminatory towards Turks (E33, Male, Mardin, May 23, 2014).

However, my findings show that negative attitudes towards the out-groups are more likely to be observed among Turks than Kurds. The blanket statements I heard about Kurds being terrorists do not have a counterpart in the Kurdish narratives. That is to say, the Kurds who discriminate against Turks almost always had a personal experience of being discriminated against, while Turks are more likely to engage in more sweeping judgments. Three expert opinions offer some explanation on this asymmetry:

Generally speaking, I don’t think there was ever a pervasive antipathy for Turks, or viewing Turks as the enemy or discriminate against them. I will tell you an interesting story. I went to Dohuk University in Kurdistan, and in Iraqi Kurdistan there are two official languages: Arabic and Kurdish, so students have to learn both languages. The professor I was talking to teaches Constitutional Law for which Arabic is quite essential. He told me that students are very reluctant to learn Arabic because they are coding it as the language of the enemy, which is very problematic because Arabic is a fantastic language of law. Knowing Arabic enriches us, yet the students have reservations about learning it. In our case, however, Turkish was never the language of the enemy. There are many Kurds who only speak Turkish (#E46, Male, Şanlıurfa, May 30, 2014).

Kurds felt sorry for the fallen soldiers though no Turk has ever sympathized with the family of a deceased guerrilla. Actually some of the befallen soldiers were kids of our neighbours, acquaintances or relatives. As such, most people here [in Diyarbakur] were upset about the soldiers. This is a war in the end, and both sides will lose blood, however, there was never a blanket negative judgment about Turks, like: ‘they are the other side and hence are our enemies.’ Rarely existed here this sort of thinking. However, it is hard to say the same for the other side. Even today, seasonal [Kurdish] workers, when they go to the West, they are denied of labour; they are mistreated and discriminated, especially in Bursa where nationalism is strong (#E27, Male, Diyarbakır, June 14, 2014).

No Turk has even been assaulted for his identity in Kurdish cities, yet many Kurds have been attacked in the West. The Kurdish movement did not allow a growth of
anti-Turkism. We did not believe that it would help our cause or serve any purpose. Of course there could be personal instances of vengeance etc. but promotion of identity-based discrimination against Turks never took place (#E19, Male, Mardin, May 24 2014).

The asymmetry between the Turks’ and Kurds’ attitudes towards their ethnic out-groups has been observed in other studies as well. One recent study points to stronger exclusionary attitude towards Kurds among Turks (see Figure 7). Significantly, lower support is reported by ethnic Turks for having a Kurdish son/daughter-in-law, business partner, tenant or neighbour. I interpret these as indicators of lower trust.147

![Figure 7. Attitudes of Kurds and Turks Towards Each Other](image)

**Figure 7. Attitudes of Kurds and Turks Towards Each Other**

Note: The figure is reproduced from Figure 1 in Sarigil and Karakoc (2017, 207). Respondents’ ethnic origins are self-identified.

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147 The reasons behind this asymmetry could be manifold. One explanation comes from the identity theory, which suggests that more-powerful and dominant groups have a higher tendency to be more prejudiced against the minority groups in settings of prolonged conflict (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Sarigil and Karakoc (2017) also discuss Kurds’ having more out-group contacts and more information about Turks as a potential contributor to lower prejudice towards Turks.
8.1.2.1  Personal Experiences in Wartime as an Aggravating Factor Diminishing Out-Group Trust

My primary focus in this dissertation is not the victims but bystanders. However, the stories of the victims often are incorporated in the official discourse to perpetuate the ideology of nationalism. Victims’ stories also resonate with the general public through personal threat. The idea that “what happened to their son could happen to my son” places victims’ experiences to a central position in their attitude formation rather than a marginal or peripheral one. Interpersonal communications with the victims even in the absence of personal threat impact people’s judgment for others and help shape their interpersonal trust.

My cousin’s son was martyred in 1992 in Bitlis. I grew up with this story: Kurds vs. us Turks, and how they [Kurds] are trying to destroy our national unity. All we feel is pain and anger, and these emotions interfere with your thinking ability. All I have felt for Kurds is animosity (Youth Focus Group, Gaziantep, May 11 2014).

Uttering the word “Kurd” around a family who lost their son in the war [şehit ailesi] was like, and is still like, saying a swear word, understandably. If they can’t even tolerate hearing the word, we should not expect them to talk to Kurds (#59, Female, Gaziantep, May 12, 2014).

My mom would cry whenever she heard of a news about martyr even though she did not have a son. This war is depicted as Kurdish-Turkish war and that’s how people see it in the West. They don’t even want to investigate what is really going on. Pumped up with this narrative, most people I know, when they find out that someone is Kurdish, they stay away—because of all the prejudices they accumulated. I did too, till recently. I am now working on my attitudes (#23, Male, Gaziantep, April 25, 2014).

These beliefs and presumptions about Kurds manifest themselves in discriminatory behaviour, which I used as an evidentiary source of declining out-group trust.

8.1.3  Contextual Effects

Even though the clashes mostly concentrated in the Kurdish region, the effects have pervaded the country. As depicted above, there is a general pattern for approaches towards the out-group,
nonetheless reactions still vary in magnitude across contexts, as hypothesized in Chapter 2. Context determines the likelihood of interethnic contact, mobilization opportunities for the weak ethnic group, hence impinges on trust attitudes via local politics, subnational discourses, different levels of politicization and implications for experiences. For one, cities have varying ethnic composition; those in the East are often predominantly Kurdish, and the West predominantly Turkish, and yet others are mixed. Cities also have an identity derived from the dominant historical and ideological view in the context. Some of them are strongly nationalist, and others are very conservative or liberal. As a result of these differences, some are more politicized while some are subservient. Some struggle with changing social fabric due to the influx of migrants while others do not experience much change in their social structure because of war. This section discusses the context-contingency of social trust dynamics, drawing on field notes, secondary sources, and original individual-level data. I argue that contexts that are politicized tend to be more polarized along ethno-political identities, as politicization not only reinforces but also aggravates in- and out-group distinctions and further diminishes social trust.

Starting with the Turkish-dominant cities, one example that came up often in my conversations was Erzurum, known to be very nationalist even though it is an Eastern city, stemming from its historical importance in the War of Independence; many of the critical conventions prior to the declaration of the Turkish Republic took place in Erzurum. Participants familiar with the interpersonal dynamics in Erzurum told me that animosity towards Kurds in this city is a bit more aggravated as expected in my theory:

Erzurum is a beacon of the Turkish right and is very nationalist. In the 1990s, there was an influx of Kurdish migrants from the East, escaping the violence, and they settled into the outskirts of the city, forming their own little neighbourhoods. Whenever there is a damage inflicted on the Turkish state by the PKK, whenever there is a martyr, young local Turks travel to these Kurdish neighbourhoods and wave the
Turkish flag. Revenge is the motive. If a Kurd comes out and dares to defy “the tour de force,” he will pay for it. […] Most Turks here view Kurds as an embodiment of the PKK—they do not distinguish between supporters and nonsupporters (Male, Ankara Youth Focus Group, April 15, 2014).

Regarding the cities in the Kurdish region, one expert lays out the variation among the cities:

The state mostly invested in Şanlıurfa because it was a more neutral [in the sense of being politicized] city. Diyarbakır, Mardin, Hakkari, Şırnak lagged behind. That’s why the PKK does not have a strong base in Şanlıurfa; the population is mostly pro-Turkish state. They have been on a straight line of [economic] progress. When you look at Hakkari, Şırnak, the [economic] situation is abysmal, and the locals feel abandoned. The state never did anything in those areas, and it is hard to convince them at this point that the state is going to be there for them (E37, Female, Mardin, May 25, 2014).

My participants from Diyarbakır, which is the headquarters of the Kurdish nationalist movement and the best candidate for a capital should there be an independent Kurdistan, are considerably more political than participants from other cities. It is also one of the most affected cities by internal migration (CHP Somut Politikalar Çalışma Grubu 1999).

Collective consciousness for Kurds is well articulated and generated in Diyarbakır owing to its historically political identity. An expert in a development agency illustrates:

In terms of social genetics, Diyarbakır has many cultural and artistic works representing Kurdish identity, they have plays in Kurdish, produce music in Kurdish, sell books in Kurdish, which are all invaluable tools to disseminate a culture. These localities [referring to cities along Tigris-Euphrates river system] hosted old civilizations [Mesopotamia], social structures and cultural practices are reflective of that [#E17, Female, Mardin, May 24, 2014).

Variation in collective attitudes due to contextual differences, especially within the cities with a significant Kurdish population, are glaring. One interviewee comments:

In Mardin, Ağrı, people were standing up to the state cruelty while in Urfa they were bearing it. In 1995, when they were building schools in İstanbul, Ankara, they would
build police stations here [in Şanlıurfa]. Was there any resistance or angst from the public against the state? [They say that] let the sleeping dog lie. [...] In Şanlıurfa, tribes and religious congregations and cults loom large in the social structure of the city. Hence it is a relatively more conservative city; the religion, not the ethnicity, constitutes the primary identity in the city (Men Focus Group, Şanlıurfa, May 21, 2014).

Indeed, Kurdish nationalist discourse could not penetrate much in Şanlıurfa. Many local experts I talked to attribute this to the historically religious character of the city and strong influence of tribes. Religion has always been the collective supra-identity, and the city prides itself on being “the city of prophets.” Şanlıurfa has tombs of many prominent Islamic figures from the early ages of Islam. Furthermore, the historical influence of tribes did not allow development of individual agency. Tribes (aşıret) are socio-political and economic units constructed by kinship bonds or common ancestry (see Jongerden 2007 for details). The aghas (feudal landlords or tribal chieftains) and sheikhs (religious leaders—leaders of the Sufi order) played major integrating roles in and across the tribes. Sheiks have been highly venerated in Kurdish circles. They have had absolute power over laymen (Saeedpour 2002). Now that the tribes are slowly dissolving, and the city is more liberated. However, there is still strong resistance to primacy of Kurdish identity. Because it is a predominantly Kurdish city, they worry that stronger affiliation with the Kurdish identity and concomitant politicization will transform the city to a more politically charged city, which they consider an impediment to economic prosperity. The Kurdish cities where political activity is often observed (e.g. Diyarbakır, Şırnak, Hakkari)—the cities where support for the PKK is highest—are also relatively underdeveloped cities (perhaps with the exception of Diyarbakır). Many of the local vendors told me: “We do not

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148 Even though tribal structures have been dissolving with urbanization, migration and modernization, some of the tribes continue to have strong influence in certain localities till today (see Tan and Baran 2011).
want to be like Hakkari or Diyarbakır, closing down our shutters upon PKK’s order; we want to be like Gaziantep [the most prosperous city in the Southeastern Turkey].” Put differently, they resist the triggers for increased salience of ethnicity because of the positive images they attach to their locality’s identity over their group identity as well as economic opportunities they associate with the group identities.

Without doubt, the state’s provision of resources and opportunities is key here. As Tezcür and Gürses (2017) also argue, “state practices that increase opportunities for individuals from ethnic minorities to achieve social mobility undercut the appeal of ethnic mobilization.” That is not to say that such structural barriers in a locality are always cemented. The overarching local culture and norms are subject to change in the face of conflict. Especially in cities where victims are conglomerated, social composition changes significantly, which also changes the collective character of the city. The local public is both shaped by the city, and they also could reshape the city, so it is mutually reinforcing.

I define politicization as the process by which an issue or event takes on a political character. 149 Politicization of ethnicity then denotes the process through which ethnicity becomes a political matter. I consider politicization as a precondition for ethnic identity to be a political identity. Yet, as Tezcur (2010) remarks ethnic identity does not immediately suggest political loyalty and behaviour in ethnic wars especially when there is competition for political support. Politicization of ethnicity was described as an outcome of victimization in some studies (Balcells 2012; Blattman 2009; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009). An expert’s comment, who was exposed to violence in Şırnak and observed victims, sheds light onto these dynamics:

149 Silvan, Kulp, Lice in Diyarbakır, Kızıltepe in Mardin, Cizre in Şırnak, Hakkari all exemplify Kurdish towns or cities that became extremely politicized in the aftermath of the conflict.
I lived in Şırnak from 1998-2008 and had been through a lot. I was used to walking everywhere. Public buses did not work most of the time. The city was paralyzed more often than not because of the war. [...] They were saying that the police is mean in the Gezi protests. We have been saying that since the 1990s. Babies died because of tear and pepper gas. The whole region is traumatized. Everyone needs rehabilitation. The chasm between Kurds and Turks is very visible and widening. This whole narrative about peaceful coexistence is not realistic. Just think about it: if someone kills your brother, you will hate the killer. It is a human reaction; you do not need to pick sides. Everyone has a loss here, and family bonds are very strong. Even if it is your cousin who died, it affects the extended family (#E16, Female, Mardin, May 24, 2014).

I concur that victimization plays a big role in politicization but perhaps it is more of a correlate rather than a direct causal factor. Not every victim’s ethnicity is politicized, while many nonvictims’ (bystanders’) is; so victimization is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for politicization, it is just a strong parameter. Here, it is necessary to parse out what politicization implies in the behavioural realm as it has various behavioural implications. When ethnic identity becomes political, it may manifest itself in the vote choices, or as more active involvement in politics or in radical ways such as joining the guerilla group. The level of integration and the context interact with victimization to determine the behavioural outcome; they may act as an inhibitor or promoter of for advanced politicization.

Ergil (1995) argues that displacement causes radicalization, extrapolating from his findings that a heavy majority of respondents who favours an independent Kurdish state are forced migrants. Akkaya (2000), going a step further, posits that displaced people without stable employment are very politicized. Other studies also discuss the effects of forced displacement on the politicization of ethnicity (Darıcı 2009; Geerse 2011). The next section discusses the implications of displacement on both context and social relations.
8.1.4 Displacement, Politicization, and Social Trust

Forced internal displacement has permeated the individual memories of Kurds and Turks in vastly different ways. The shuffling of the population has had immense effects on the quotidian experiences of the locals and the migrants, as well as on their political attitudes. Even before the migration, the local population and the would-be migrants had already endorsed some memory narratives based on their political socialization process, which both shaped and in turn were shaped by the post-migration interactions. For example, news of an anti-Kurdish riot in a neighbourhood in western Turkey has political ramifications way beyond that neighbourhood, as citizens elsewhere interpret the news with a concern for their imagined in-group members or adopt a more universalistic discourse of class or national solidarity beyond ethnic groups.

The contact between the communities did not foster dialogue and mutual understanding; to the contrary it often exacerbated polarization. For many (but by no means all) native Turks, the Kurds were not displaced people in need of employment; they were seen more like “foes siding with the PKK,” “rurals destroying their job market and jeopardizing the security in their cities” or “villagers sully[ing] the image of their neighbourhood” – the use of the possessive pronoun is notable, of course. One expert sums up the rationale behind these comments:

In İstanbul, the issue with Kurds is more on a personal basis. In the 1990s, with forced displacement, many Kurds came to İstanbul and searched for a job. They were willing to work for less money just to make ends meet. Then the employers were more motivated to hire Kurds who were okay with little amount of payments that no Turk would ever work for. Then started Turkish resentment towards the migrants Kurds because some lost their job to a Kurd. They started to say that “Kurds came and took our jobs from us” (#E37, Male, İstanbul, June 26, 2014).

In Mersin, a city that also had a large influx of displaced population, the accounts were pointing to the similar dynamics. Group-based discriminatory practices, as explained above,
were more frequently observed than Gaziantep or Ankara, cities which are relatively less affected by the wave of conflict-induced internal migration. The residents of cities are more likely to be personally affected by the changing dynamics of the social and economic life in the cities receiving large numbers of migrants and hence are more likely to develop negative attitudes towards the group that they blame for the changing dynamics, as predicted in my theory.

8.1.4.1 In-Group Trust of Kurds

Increasing in-group bonding among Kurdish immigrants was very evident. Kurdish migrants had constructed new social spheres and networks because they were not able to integrate due to the prejudices and discriminations directed against them. The prejudices they encountered rendered adjustment and adaptation to the new urban setting even harder. Already unfamiliar with urban life as well as the cultural practices, they – especially those without resources— were having serious difficulty with integrating in the city. They instead renegotiated their existing habits and value orientations in light of the urban experience and created their own space. Many scholars explain this process in light of Pierre Bourdieu’s concept “habitus” (Gürkaş 2013; Ünal 2013; Yılmaz 2007). Absent interaction with, or integration to, urban life, certain groups of Kurdish migrants maintained their habitus, which drew increasingly hostile and nationalist reactions from the locals, and accusations of bringing into the city “rustic” [köylü] lifestyles and cultural practices. Despite these reactions, in these micro-geographies, they reproduced their

150 Interestingly, the reason that forced them to displace in the first place was their reluctance to become a village guard—who were considered as ‘traitors’, because they did not want to be shunned by their community or betray their identity. Yet, in the cities, they were the ‘traitors’ for the same reason. Many reported reluctance of landlords to rent their house to them, stigmatization they faced for being PKK supporters and/or “rural savages.”

151 A habitus is defined as a “system of practice-generating schemes which expresses systematically the necessity and freedom inherent in the collective conditions of life of a certain group of people” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 172).
rituals, perpetuated traditions, language and most importantly identity. The existential threat posed to their self and group on the basis of their identity led to greater in-group cohesion and strengthened their adherence to their traditions. Some suggest that “collective angst” is the psychological mechanism behind this outcome (Wohl, Branscombe, and Reysen 2010).

Marginalized Kurds reported feeling more empowered as new Kurdish social networks became available, which they could engage without fear and intimidation. Collective consciousness reversed the inferiority, evil and treachery that were attached to Kurdish identity and made the Kurdish identity more attractive to be affiliated with.

We were ashamed of who were when we first came here [İstanbul]. I remember my neighbour checking to see if I had a tail [one of the legends about Kurds]. We were not wanted. We questioned ourselves. Were we really such monsters? Thanks to the party [Kurdish party], associations [for displaced people or people who lost family members in the war] and the PKK, we rediscovered ourselves, our history as Kurds. Thank God, we rewrote our fate (#71, Female, İstanbul, June 28, 2014).

The new discourse offered by the PKK portrayed Kurds as oppressed, and the unearthed injustices changed the color of reality for many Kurds. PKK’s defense of the Kurdish cause induced positive emotions about the Kurdish identity. Per the prediction of social psychological research on emotions, positive emotions led to stronger and more salient group identities.

Language barriers contributed a lot to the politicization of ethnicity. Kurdish was associated with the language of “terrorists,” and speaking their mother tongue in public sphere was not welcome in the eyes of Turkish citizens. Some migrants never had an opportunity to attend school and learn Turkish, so they were restrained by their language abilities. Such individuals turn to create their own reality, identity, and political persona. For some it is just the collective suffering rather than a personal experience that acts as a powerful impetus for political mobilization (Harris 2006). Politicization is thus a corollary to these psychological traumas as
well as to stronger ethnic consciousness; reproducing political identity is a process integral to “being” in existentialist terms.

In such politicized contexts, especially starting from the 1990s, many associations to advocate the rights and identities of Kurds emerged (Çelik 2005). Previously non-existent or latent tensions became increasingly visible across communities in mixed neighbourhoods and cities, as polarization accompanied the process of violence and the resulting demographic, economic, and cultural transformations. As a corollary to the polarization came lower trust in out-groups.

8.2 Social Trust in Peru in the face of the Maoist Insurgency

Those were years when you could not get out to the street in Lima. People could not even put their head out of their window because there was someone with a gun out there. I think it was an episode when only fear ruled (#36, Male, Cajamarca, January 10, 2014).

The conflict in Peru, being mainly ideological in character, brought forth class identities; yet ethnic identities still permeated both the dynamics of the conflict and the impacts of the conflict. As explained in Chapter 4, Peru had always suffered from a divide between the indigenous peoples and mestizos, between the center and the peripheries. Hierarchy among the ethnic groups was a colonial legacy and efforts of national integration were to no avail. So, the war started against this backdrop of racialized geography. Even though Sendero systematically used a discourse of class not ethnicity, the target population for mobilization was indigenous groups. Hence, even though ethnicity was not the main cleavage of the war, it was ubiquitous in every stage of the war and its aftermath. Consequently, entrenched racial perceptions had manifested themselves in the social trust dynamics in the aftermath of the war.
This section starts with a sketch of pre-war social relations in Peru and then explains the changes after the onset of the war. I argue that the ideological character of the war was an important impetus for declining social trust, and that the macro historical and macro sociological factors loomed large in the changes in social trust after the conflict. The evidence confirms the hypothesized decline in generalized trust. Displacement along with the already existing prejudices against the indigenous groups and the conflict-induced affiliation of indigenous peoples with Senderistas perpetuated the weak social relationships, and undermined category-based trust based on ethnicity.

8.2.1 A Sketch of Pre-War Dynamics

My fieldwork in Peru took place in 2013-2014, more than 20 years after the end of active violence (the capture of the leader Abimael Gúzman), hence the questions were retrospective about the times of the conflict, and before and after. Most of my conversations started with questions on the prewar social relations and dynamics. Often times, the participants, especially from the sierra, interpreted this question as security-related and replied: “it was very peaceful [tranquila].” Only when I specified that the question inquired also about the interpersonal relationships would they mention about the prejudices. Indeed, responses, both from the ordinary people and the experts, converged around one common theme: discrimination.

Discrimination has always been pervasive in Peru: *el negro* mistreats *el cholo*, *el cholo* mistreats *el chino* [Chinese immigrants], *el negro* mistreats *el gringo* [often used to refer to white tourists from the US] and *el rubio* [the blond], so, this is a mix of races without any common identity (#19, Male, Lima, Feb 10, 2014).

There is so much discrimination in this country, from the government, from our own mayors, community leaders to friends (Women Focus Group, Cusco, December 5 2013).

When I moved here from Ayacucho in 1985, I was in a middle class area by Miraflores [a wealthy district in Lima]. There was so much discrimination and racism, which was shocking for me. It has declined a bit now, thanks to Toledo. For example,
a provinciano [a person from the provinces] comes from the sierra [to Lima], they [Limañean] would look and say ‘This is a chola,’ and that was shocking because in my village nobody has ever humiliated one another. That’s why them making fun of me was quite shocking (Mixed Focus Group, Female, Lima, October 25, 2013).

Peru has always been afflicted by discrimination, from the poor to the rich. Rich Indians also discriminate against poor Indians. I have witnessed that many times (#E12, Male, Ayacucho, January 7, 2014).

We have a very discriminating society from the moment of modern Peru to current times, it is extremely discriminating, racist. […] They do not value indigenous people or the peasants from our country that are in the sierra, as if they do not mean anything and are not worth anything. They never cared those who were dying in provincial while in Lima tranquility prevailed (#7, Male, Lima, September 9, 2013).

Such discriminatory attitudes afflicted social relations in Peru even before the conflict. The roots of this societal divide and inferiority assigned to the indigenous people in general can be traced back to the colonial era (See Chapter 4). The colonial dual republic (the subordinate position relegated to the “inferior” indigenous people), and the failure of integrating the indigenous people into the nation in the postcolonial nation making continued to cast shadow on the contemporary Peruvian society and shape the intergroup relations.

8.2.2 Declining Generalized Interpersonal Trust

Starting from the early 1980s, the war wreaked havoc in the sierra in particular (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Junín). Because Sendero deployed Popular Guerilla Armies, threat and distrust was more pervasive. All my interviewees in those regions woefully complained about the lack of a neutral option; they had to side with one camp: Senderista or anti-Senderista. Most families were not sure if their children had joined the ranks of Sendero let alone knowing about one’s neighbours, colleagues, or friends. One common comment was:

152 In today’s politics in Peru, the idea of dual republic has been superseded, yet in the immediate post-war era and its aftermath its shadow was still noticeably present.
One did not know who is a terrorist. Your next-door neighbour could have been a terrorist, and you would not have known that (Women Focus Group, Ayacucho, Jan 20 2014).

There were people who did not even know that their children, or their husbands were involved until after they found out, when they had already died or were in prison…They [those who were involved with Sendero] were teachers, ordinary people, or university students. Sendero used them and washed their heads, especially in some universities. Those were the worst times of Peru (#13, Women, Lima, September 25, 2013).

Especially in contexts where Sendero had a stronghold such as the “liberated zones,” being anti-Senderista could implicate someone and cost him his life. On occasion, brothers killed each other in the clash. Furthermore, due to constant threat of attacks and ensuing violence between 1980 and 1992, population in the rural highlands ceased to engage in any communal activity including church visits, which further disrupted and even destroyed social capital (Theidon 2001). “Intimate Enemies,”153 borrowing the term from Theidon (2001) destroyed the societal ties from its very root.

Pervasive distrust was not exclusive to the hot zones. Areas where Sendero had any presence were also afflicted with distrust. In all my conversations, there came up the issue of “now knowing who is who,” especially in Lima. Some selected remarks from my conversations to this effect are as follows:

At the time, I was in Lima, and we were just afraid about having a conversation. We did not know who we are talking to (#26, Male, Arequipa, October 30, 2013).

You question everything, including your own family. There were many cases where the family members did not know their son or nephew was involved in Sendero. For instance, there were many professors in the university who were later found to be affiliated with Sendero. I had professors who died in prison. Díaz Martinez, Casanova

153 I borrowed the phrase “Intimate Enemies” from the anthropologist Kimberly Theidon. She used it as a title to her book where she extensively analyzes the social relationships during the conflict in Peru.
were very good professors. Those years were times of distrust. You would not even know if a person is Sendero or the police (#E9, Female, Lima, October 20, 2013).

Simply, who would not be able to talk, you would not know who stands next to you, you would not know who you are talking to. You would not even know about your husband or your children. Lots of people who used pseudo names, they would not use their names (Women Focus Group, Lima, November 15, 2013).

Numerous similar accounts exist in my data. The impossibility of identifying one’s ideological orientation and strong possibility of informers in every circle rendered the social interactions very precarious. In Lima especially, universities, state departments, unions, and many public institutions were infiltrated by Senderistas. See the following excerpt for instance:

Because Sendero infiltrated the work places, I had fellow Senderistas. Elena Iparraguirre, the wife of Abimael Guzmán, was a teacher, and she was my desk partner. We didn't know she was on the command team of Sendero. It really was difficult to assume that you know someone well (#16, Female, Lima, September 26, 2013).

When one could not even trust a close colleague or a family member, trust in unknown others naturally plummeted. Many of my participants lamented about committing the error of talking to a stranger, just to find out later that he was a “terrorist.” One example is:

My cousin was in college studying psychology and always invited us to parties and all that. One day we were invited to a birthday party, which was I believe in San Martín de Porres. I remember perfectly the faces of those people who were there. A week or two later, to my great surprise, I found out on TV that the people who were there, who were fellow students, were terrorists (Women Focus Group, Tarapoto, Feb 20 2014).

As a result, even the most mundane interactions became impossible in the besieged areas. The participants also recounted avoiding eye contact even when buying groceries, paying bills, or waiting for a bus. The state of fear and distrust was all the more striking for out-of-town visitors:
I remember going to Lima in 1990, my first time there. Lima at that time was very different. The attitude of the people: so aloof and afraid. It was like a psychosis all over Lima. When someone asks for an address, they would get super tense, nobody would respond, and just walk away. Extreme distrust! (Men Focus Group, Cusco, December 7, 2013).

The evidence for declining generalized trust was overwhelming, as implied by the number of excerpts shared above. Not only trust in unknown others but also trust in known others (particularized trust) decreased. The reported uncertainty about one’s orientation, identity, and trustworthiness all was tied back to the beginning of the armed struggle. Not having easily identifiable markers contributed to fast evaporation of trust in unknown others, as it was practically impossible to “know who is who.”

I interpret references to Sendero as the reason behind distrust as evidence of conflict-induced decline in social trust. The accounts cited above are all from afflicted departments. My conversations in the less affected regions by conflict such as Cajamarca were along the same line. A dialogue among some focus group participants illustrates the context in the 1980s.

P5: Sendero and its sympathizers caused a lot of trouble. They generated distrust. We did not know whom we were with. They were everywhere.

P1: The incursions in the city were said to be committed by the students themselves, because they themselves disappeared afterwards. It was hard to decide which path to take when you need to go to a place, because they could be intercepted by the secret police. They [the police] camouflaged their clothes, hid in some places looking for a culprit and they could take the wrong people. At a point, terrorism advanced so much that people would openly declare who they are and who they are not. It made me feel like I was surrounded by those people [Senderistas]. The professors at the university. We have had a professor René Casanova Silva Renal, his daughter was married to Chávez Morote. His son-in-law was in prison and their son had a teacher. And the teacher said, “They’re in jail fighting for their ideals and for all of us.” They were openly proud of it, on top of everything.

P6: In the university we were friends [point to two other participants in the group]. In the classes, that professor would start talking about the armed struggle and its logic, because it was normal, and then move on to the lecture (Women Focus Group, Cajamarca, January 4, 2014).
One important point that is worth reiterating is the difficulty with not knowing who is who is that you cannot express your thoughts, besides the discomfort and risk with being with a Senderista or anti-Senderista/police/informer. For example:

My primary fear in those times was to express myself freely because you did not know who you are talking to. You may have contradicted a colleague, and they would think you might be a soplón [spy]. One was not able to express his opinion freely. They wanted you to be subordinate to the principles of the groups. For me that was the hardest thing. Travelling was hard because you weren't sure of anything. They could grab you in the street and take you against your will (Men Focus Group, Tarapoto, February 15, 2014).

Where I used to live, there was a terrorist. There was an avenue, which had a bar, called el túnel that my dad used to go. People knew about that terrorist, that he was working for Sendero. Yet, nobody had said anything. My dad was threatened. If he had said anything, he did not know what the consequences would be. His children were at risk. There was also a neighbour above where I lived, too. He knew all that, too, but no one was able to speak because they could kill you. What if one speaks and suddenly they kill your children? So it was better to be quiet (Women Focus Group, Lima, November 15, 2013).

Restrictions in the freedom of expression coupled with risk of being arrested for what they may have assumed about you, or worse yet being killed, ruptured possibility of any healthy social interaction and destroyed generalized social trust. Beyond the generalized trust, category-based trust was affected due to collateral effects of the war, particularly displacement. The following section shows how internal migration had perpetuated and aggravated the discriminatory judgments towards the indigenous groups.

8.2.2.1 Displacement, Context-Dependency, and Declining Out-Group Trust

Under the conditions of extreme insecurity, and because of the rising uncertainty, a wave of migration took place. Those who were able to (with financial resources and/or with family or acquaintances in other parts) opted for changing their place of residence. There were three kinds
of migration: from villages to the closest cities, between cities (mostly to Lima and Arequipa), and from Peru to abroad. A survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Information in Peru shows that over 600,000 people were displaced between 1980 and 1992 as a result of the conflict, more than half of the internally displaced families are from Ayacucho, and 60% of the people who left on the ground of violence returned to their place of origin\textsuperscript{154} somewhere between 6 and 15 years after, and the rest remained in their new place of residence (INEI, 1997).

Forced displacement, which was as pervasive in Peru as it was in Turkey, added a new layer to the negative perception of indigenous people. Discrimination and barriers for integration were perhaps more present in Peru than Turkey. Upon the already prevalent racism, the conflict brought a new “terrorist” stigma for indigenous groups, aggravating their struggle for integration. Intersectionality of lower socio-economic status and indigenous identity further marginalized the peasants. I used the narratives from contexts, which received significant influx of internal migrants to test the magnifying effect of certain contexts that had an extra layer of collateral effects from the war.

Coupled with the rising threat of Sendero, people originating from the *sierra* were already considered a threat, before their arrival in Lima, Arequipa, or other adjacent relatively safer cities. Virtually all my conversations with Ayacuchanos had a reference to the prejudice they faced coming from the *sierra* in times of the conflict.

P3: During those times, when Ayacuchanos went to Lima and Limañeans all thought that all were *terrucos*, that all Ayacuchanos were *terrucos*. We were marginalized.

\textsuperscript{154}The regions where the study was conducted were Ayacucho, Apurímac, Huancavelica, Junín, Huánuco and Áncash.
P4: It happened to me, personally. Once we went to the Ministry of Economy and Finance. We were working in the finance department and we had to reconcile accounts. It was 1986, I think. When in Lima, they would check us out, almost interrogate because we are from Ayacucho. Many professionals moved to Lima to look for work, they did not get any jobs because they were from Ayacucho (Men Focus Group, Ayacucho, January 19, 2014).

With the influx of the internal migrants, the social composition of Lima changed significantly. In Lima, urban slums were formed with all internally displaced people, amounting to 200,000 people in San Juan de Lurigancho in 2009 (White 2009), and exceeding a million people in 2013, rendering it the most populous district in the entire country. Even though the incoming displaced population settled in the outskirts, survival needs beyond shelter required them to be more present in the city, in the hopes of finding employment. This rapid change in the social demographics of Lima was not well received. One observer tells:

The amount of migration of the people from *sierra* to the capital has been overwhelming. That is, the people from Lima became much fewer compared to the waves of people coming from the interior of the country. They lost their power in the city. The character of Lima changed, maybe for the worst, and the Limañeans hated that (#20, Male, Lima, October 20, 2013).

The conflict-induced prejudices against the displaced populations – presumed affiliations with Sendero – exacerbated the social tension between the groups, and fomented hostility. Observations and remarks of my participants shed light onto the post-migration social dynamics in Lima in the 1980s and 1990s:

What happens is that distrust at that time was so pervasive; it made people think that the *sierra* was a terrorist. They rejected people from the *sierra*, did not hire them for jobs or accommodated them in any way. *Provincianas* were treated badly in general. That's why people started working on the street, because they didn't have any other

155 The information is retrieved on June 1, 2017 from http://www.inei.gob.pe/media/MenuRecursivo/publicaciones_digitales/Est/Lib1095/libro.pdf
option. What happens is there's a difference between people who see themselves as people of the mountains or people the jungle, who appears different physically from me. So, it was easy for them to separate those and label them as ‘terrorist.’ That was the reason behind discrimination, and I think so far continues (#59, Women, Lima, February 19, 2014).

The discrimination against the migrants was not a phenomenon exclusive to Lima. My participants from other contexts portrayed very similar dynamics, from Arequipa, Cusco and Huamanga. One striking example is as follows:

Cities did not receive the migrants well, and there continues the exclusion. It is all because of racism. In Huamanga for instance, there is a group of Huamanguinos who claim an aristocratic origin. They are ancestors of landowners ruined by agrarian reform. With illustrious surnames and many of them are liberal professionals linked to the institutions of the State. Lawyers, professors, doctors. They consider that the city was ruined when the migrants arrived, when the city really long ago was ruined. It hears phrases like ‘Huamanga is not what it was before’ or ‘there is no pure (neto) Huamanguino, all are foreign.’ For me that's a demonstration of racism (E19, Male, Ayacucho, January 20, 2014).

The cultural gap and urban/rural divide was an issue in Peru just like in Turkey. One issue that was brought up in Lima around this theme was expansion of informal economy, with particular reference to public transportation means, as they are a most visible legacy of the conflict-induced migration in today’s Lima. When the population was fast increasing, there was not enough public transportation to meet the needs, which spawned informal transportation in the forms of combis (minivans) and micros (minibus). Many Limañeans complained that along with the migration came chaos, and they would depict the combis as embodiment of the chaos that they attributed to the arrival of the migrants:

Lima used to be a calm, organized, and a beautiful city. Then came those from the sierra in the 1980s, and ever since then chaos has prevailed. They brought in their life styles, they are turning this city into a place in the sierra. Lima was not meant for this many people. The city got destroyed upon the arrival of the cholo crowd. […] Why are they not in their pueblo, why did they come here? Lima had terrorism, too. We went
through hell as well. Now the terrorism is over, yet they are still here (#17, Female, Lima, September 30, 2013).

These negative judgments had reverberations on their trust attitudes as well. Especially from women, I heard time and again that their new neighbours were from the sierra, and they had no trust in them. Some common remarks were “who knows what they had done before they came to Lima”; “they are strangers and it was impossible to know who they really are.” They specified that they did not want their kids to ever talk to the kids from these houses (playing together was already not feasible due to threat from the car bombs or overarching fear from terror). The migrants were geographically stigmatized.

Another recurring theme was the blame they attributed to the migrants for increasing delinquency. Virtually all my conversations in Lima mentioned the high crime rates, especially theft and armed robbery. However, often their remarks were for the time period after the end of the violence, 1990s and 2000s. I consider that era outside the scope of this project. Yet judgments about the migrants being thieves, killers, and rural savages stood, preventing any possibility of trust.

Insurgent identities became enmeshed with ethnicity through indigenous identities in the eyes of the locals due to the racialized geography of Peru and the mobilization dynamics of the war that Sendero waged, affecting category-based trust configurations. However, in Peru, my data show that there was not a corresponding emergence of nation-wide distrust towards out-groups (in this case, indigenous peoples) as opposed to the Turkish case, which had a more general pattern of conflict-induced out-group distrust. My conversations in Iquitos or Cajamarca did not indicate any strong judgment against the people from the sierra after the conflict, unlike the ones in Lima. Distrust towards the out-groups in Peru was most conspicuous in areas that
attracted an influx of displaced population such as Lima or Arequipa. I argue that the spatially bounded nature of category-based distrust in Peru stems mainly from the fact that the main cleavage of the war was not ethnic, and that there was no discursive framework around intergroup hostility.

Furthermore, similar to Turkey, people distinguished between “good” and “bad” indigenous peoples, using geographical cues. Those coming from the sierra, especially Ayacucho, were strictly labeled as “terrorist” yet identity-based negative judgments were not extended to other indigenous people. The distinction was also made based on clothing, customs, and socio-economic classes, reproducing Peru’s social ill of “racism.”

Asymmetry between the trust of highlanders and urban mestizos for each other also existed in Peru. Even though indigenous groups did not lend trust in the urban mestizos for not harming their interest (definition of social trust), their primal concern was the marginalization and social exclusion. Hence, the distrust on the part of indigenous groups was a culmination of their experiences of being discriminated against, disparaged and excluded without much chance of integration. Even though relocation brought a bit of relief with respect to physical security, their ontological security was crushed, as they were ever-more marginalized and denigrated.

8.2.3 In-Group Trust of Indigenous Groups

Pervasive generalized distrust had plagued the indigenous communities in the sierra, perhaps more than anywhere else. Intra-community violence destroyed their social ties for many years to come. When they migrated to “safer” zones, indigenous immigrants created new communities for themselves in the outskirts of the cities they moved to. However, they did not have the agency to reproduce their identity, neither did they have any institutional support. In the case of Kurds, they had the PKK; though repressive itself, it was a group speaking for the rights and
recognition of Kurds. Sendero, as a Maoist group, argued to be fighting for all the oppressed and was “blind” to the ethnic dimension in Peru. Indeed, Sendero inflicted the most harm on the indigenous groups, which led it lose popular support on the ground pretty quickly (See Chapter 5). In the face of these predicaments, indigenous groups were not able to redefine their collective identity and form or reclaim an ethnic bond, unlike the Kurds.

Military groups in the conflict zones were instrumental for fostering solidarity among the groups that did not have the means to relocate. Coercing peasant communities to organize self-defence committees (comités de autodefensa) was one of the wartime counterinsurgency strategies. In the hot zones (or gray-zones\textsuperscript{156}) where the military deemed these units absolutely necessary, peasants did not have a choice; neutrality was not an option. Resistance signified being Senderista (Isbell 1992). These groups were later called rondas campesinas, borrowing from the established structures of autonomous peasant vigilante committees in Cajamarca (Starn 1993). The military encouraged these groups to defend themselves by mobilizing all their resources. Militarization of these communities at times led to disasters (see the Uchuraccay massacre).\textsuperscript{157} For the most part, they did not have effective and sufficient weapons to systematically resist Sendero. To strengthen them, President García and then Fujimori issued an order to arm these groups, which gained legal recognition by promulgation in 1991. Beside the ones formed by the army, some other communities voluntarily organized rondas campesinas and demonstrated support for the counterinsurgency. Rondas rose in number from 700 in 1989 to 1200 in 1991, particularly concentrated in the Andean departments of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Apurímac, Ayacucho, and

\textsuperscript{156}Burt (2007) uses this term in her analysis which refer to the situation where state do not have the ability, capacity or incentive to preside over certain parts under its territory.

\textsuperscript{157}On January 26, 1983, eight journalists were brutally killed by almost a hundred peasants (with machetes) as they were mistaken for guerillas.
Junín, Huancavelica and Pasco (Starn 1993). They proved successful in dispelling Sendero on many occasions yet also abused their power to settle personal disputes.\textsuperscript{158} 

The communities where rondas proved successful were rare cases where I heard expressions of in-group trust in my conversations. One example is:

> During the time of the violence there was a need for forming groups, a collective, also to have a system of vigilance among themselves. To flee from the violence they made all the people who were scattered to gather in the nearby towns. Everyone had to leave their farm and go live in those places. But no one wants to move from his farms, because it meant the abandonment of their land. That's where a defense system starts, too. From a certain time you had to return to the group, all at 5.30 obligatorily had to return. That's when the patrols went. My dad once was commanding a patrol, self-defense committees. The community had trusted the system and the committees, and followed the commands. It was like a refuge where they felt a glimpse of protection (E15, Ayacucho, January 20, 2014).

These committees helped to cultivate trust within indigenous groups even in the most precarious locations where trusting anybody would be inconceivable. Nevertheless, their effectiveness was limited to the boundaries of their towns. In relatively less affected or unaffected areas such as Cajamarca or Iquitos, in-group trust of the community members remained relatively intact. Yet, the war impeded possibility of a spectacle of a more encompassing in-group trust of indigenous population in Peru. Sendero’s extremely brutal and violent insurgency campaign aggravated the perception of the indigenous peoples in the red zones. It was not just mestizos who viewed the indigenous groups from the sierra as terrorists; indigenous groups in other parts of Peru also resented them for being so violent, though perhaps

\textsuperscript{158} These civilian militias became specific targets for Sendero from their very first inception onwards. They were the epitome of much despised peasant collaboration with the government. Determined to punish the members of these committees, Sendero committed mass atrocities. The Lucanamarca massacre on April 3, 1983 was one of the bloodiest incidences in the history of the armed struggle, when sixty-nine peasants were murdered.
with more compassion, as they were more likely to sympathize with their preconditions and why they may have been allured to Sendero. Indigenous focus group participants in Iquitos tell:

P1: I remember at that time that I was watching the TV and the news was striking. Terror after terror, I could not understand how those people could act in that way. I did not conjure myself committing those acts, thinking all about my formation and values. I could not grasp how they could have those ideas, convictions, their political ideas that they wanted, and through the means they used. Changing the country, destroying the old Peru. I put in a lot of thought yet could not figure what exactly they wanted and how they brought themselves to commit all these acts. That's something that struck me personally.

P2: Those poor kids, all brainwashed with the ideals of revolution. So much inequality, so much poverty. They were deceived to think that they can change all that. Why so much violence though? [...] Terrorism is all they ended up doing, nothing more (Women Focus Group, Iquitos, November 4, 2013).

I should underscore again that these are retrospective accounts. The era of Violence in Peru is long over. The human cost of the violence, the dynamics of the war and its economic and social impacts have been brought to the surface and they are now common knowledge. The retrospective reflections of the people are tainted by this knowledge and do not necessarily give an accurate portrayal of the wartime attitude formations. Hence, I rely more on my inferences from their narratives on the wartime social dynamics and their reported behaviour in those times.

8.3 Conclusion

The findings, generally speaking, corroborate the hypothesized relationships between ethnic and ideological civil wars and social trust. In Turkey, I showed evidences of declining category-based trust, and in Peru of declining generalized trust. In Turkey, my data did not feature any significant evidence about a visible change in generalized trust in either direction, which I take as a reassurance as to the predictions of my theory. Nonetheless, Peru was struck by increasing
category-based distrust against the indigenous groups from the *sierra*. Even though the conflict was ideological, entrenched geographical/racial taxonomies and the involvement of the indigenous groups in the insurgency brought in a dimension of ethnicity. As a result, not only did generalized trust plummet but also category-based trust was also affected and extant prejudices against the indigenous groups waxed.

My findings show that even though sweeping judgments exist against a particular out-group, some individuals make in-group distinctions. In Turkey, identifiers beyond ethnicity are used to make in-group distinctions (between “good Kurds” vs. “bad Kurds”) such as accent, clothing, birthplace etc. In Peru, indigenous people from the *sierra* were particularly affected by lower category-based distrust. These findings warrant updates in my theory and call for attention to such contextual nuances in category-based trust measures. My data are limited in terms of quantity and variation of narratives to find out which micro-level characteristics induce people to make such distinctions. My hunch is that intergroup contact and ethnic composition of the local context are important drivers. Future quantitative studies may shed more light on that by using fine-grained micro-level data on perceptions of out-groups in ethnically heterogeneous and relatively polarized societies.

Another aspect worth underscoring is that the duration of the war in Peru, though much more intense than in Turkey, was shorter. And the war is long over, in contrast to Turkey. Furthermore, it was a popular guerrilla war rather than a war that was fought between two armies in a delimited territory. Inasmuch as I attribute my observations and the evidentiary narratives to the ideological character of the war, the cleavages were only one characteristic that engendered the observed outcomes. The fact that it pervaded most of Peru by posing personal threat because of being a popular guerilla war, which often goes together with the ideological character of a
war, is another characteristic that shaped the outcomes of the war. Hence, we can only attribute causal power to the character of the war if the scale of the violence is considered a component of the character.
Chapter 9: Quantitative Hypothesis-Testing: Gauging the Generalizability of the Theory

This chapter seeks to find whether the theory and the findings from the case studies can travel beyond the boundaries of Turkey and Peru. In Chapter 2, I suggest that when there is an existential collective threat to the nation (a threat to the identity of the nation) as in the case of ethnic territorial conflict, I expect people to side with the state and lend more support to the state and the governing institutions. When the threat is not existential i.e. when it is to the government or regime, the capacity of the government to provide order and to secure its regime is compromised. The public should judge the government’s performance in providing security negatively and lend it lower political support. Hence, we can expect that ideological violence decreases political trust. Regarding social trust, I hypothesize that ethnic territorial violence will not have a significant effect on interpersonal trust (for reinforcing identity-based trust); while ideological violence decreases it. My theory (Chapter 2) and the empirical chapters (Chapter 7 and 8) argue that further distinctions apply to ethnic and political groups. For example, politically underrepresented/ disempowered groups are more likely to lose their political trust as they are more likely to be victimized. Similarly, ethnic violence is more likely to emphasize in- and out-group distinctions along ethnic lines and induce a decrease in out-group trust.

Available cross-national data do not allow me to test for all the nuanced hypotheses embedded in the theory. I narrow the list of testable hypotheses and focus on the most general predictions (also see Figure 8).

H1a: Ethnic violence should, on average, increase political trust.

H1b: Ideological violence should, on average, decrease political trust.
$H2a$: Ethnic violence should not have a significant effect on generalized interpersonal trust.

$H2b$: Ideological violence should, on average, decrease interpersonal trust.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8. Summary Diagram of the Expected Average Effects in the Theory**

### 9.1 Data and Method

The design is multi-level. Individual-level data on attitudes and values in political culture come from all waves of the World-Values Survey (WVS).\(^\text{159}\) These data are available from 1980 to 2015. Aggregate data on political violence and countries’ institutional and historical characteristics come from the Quality of Government Dataset (QoG) and Ethnic Power Relations datasets (Version 3.0). The major variables of interest in the QoG are from the Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset prepared by the Center for Systemic Peace.

The resultant dataset is multilevel, pooling individual- and aggregate-level indicators from 95 countries over the full time span of the WVS. However, the data are unbalanced: while individual-level data are gathered in waves (conducted every five years), country-level violence indicators are available for every year. Some countries were part of the survey only in a few

\(^{159}\) I integrated the WVS data with the European Values Survey (EVS) dataset for the years between 1980-2008.
waves, and some appear only once. Although the dataset certainly encompasses both space and time (pooled time-series of cross-sectional data), the panels are too unbalanced to exploit the time series properties. Worse yet, countries that were undergoing intense civil wars were less likely to be included in the survey study because of the security risks (See Table A 2 in Appendix D for the excluded countries). For all that, the data can provide information on general patterns and tell whether my hypotheses have a feature of generalizability.

9.1.1 Dependent Variables

Political Trust: The WVS and EVS have confidence questions for a wide range of public institutions: parliament, government, political parties, civil services, police, armed forces as well as many other formal institutions such as church, labour unions and press (EVS 2015; WVS 2015). The question is:

“Please look at this card and tell me, for each item, how much confidence you have in them. Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or none at all (1)?”

Because of missing data problems, I am forced to use confidence in “parliament” as the sole indicator for political trust due to missing data problems. Although trust in parliament, government, and political parties correlate strongly with each other, coverage is spotty, and creating an index variable is not feasible. The number of observations would be cut in half. Confidence in “government” is a proper measure for political trust yet it also suffers from missing values, and missing value imputation does not seem proper for two reasons: 1) the question was not asked in the surveys until 1990, and for many countries, it was not asked until the third wave; 2) predictors that can be used in the imputation model suffer from missing values themselves. Given the high correlation between confidence in parliament and government (alpha=.55, and scale reliability coefficient= .79), I used for the indicator with highest coverage:
confidence in parliament. As Golder (2005) shows, even dictatorships tend to have parliaments. For robustness checks, I run additional models with confidence in government.

The variable measuring “confidence in parliament” is converted into a 0 to 1 scale, where the higher values indicate higher confidence.

**Interpersonal trust:** This is the classic question, asked in every wave and every country:

“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” The two choices are coded as the following: 1) Most people can be trusted, 0) Can’t be too careful.

This question, though being popular, received many criticisms. Especially those regarding the validity of the measure are noteworthy. For instance, whether the question elicits a response based on past experience or a moral predisposition has been debated. Uslaner (2002) argues that the question does not gauge experiential trust; it measures a moral predisposition. Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston (2006) empirically confirm Uslaner’s argument. Given that it is a moralistic trust, it may be harder to change even in the face of violence, yet it seems to be an appropriate measure for testing my theoretical argument about generalized interpersonal trust.

**9.1.2 Independent Variables**

**Ethnic and Ideological Violence:** Violence data come from two sources: The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) and the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Version 3.0). The CSP defines major episodes of political violence as “the systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups that result in at least 500 directly-related deaths over the course of the episode” (Marshall 2010, p.2). The dataset includes four different categories of violence: civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war, ranging from Category 01 (Sporadic or Expressive Political Violence) to Category 10 (Extermination and Annihilation). Marshall (2010, p.2)
distinguishes war from violence with “information regarding the degree of militant organization, tactical and strategic characteristics, and expressed level of commitment to the use of violence.” As such distinctions seem extraneous to the purposes of this paper, I merged civil violence and civil war into the category of “ideological violence” and ethnic violence and ethnic war into the category of “ethnic violence.” Magnitudes reflect multiple factors including interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. Scores are considered to be consistently assigned (i.e., comparable) across episode types and for all states directly involved” (Marshall 2010, p.7).

Table 7. Distribution of Country-Year Observations on the DV and IVs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magnitude of Wars</th>
<th># of Country-Years with Data on Confidence in Parliament</th>
<th># of Country-Years with Data on Interpersonal Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of Country-years</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 above shows that the data are positively skewed and contains a substantial proportion of zeros. This form of distribution is due to the patchy nature of the individual-level data. To reiterate, the excessive zeros indicating “no war violence” is not just because peace reigns (though it is partly true—there are increasingly fewer countries with war than without) but also because we do not have as many trust measurements from countries with conflicts as we do from peaceful countries (See Table A 7 in Appendix D for countries with war indicators that were not included in the WVS survey). In order to be able to extract some information from this messy data, I first created a “presence data”— recoded the ethnic and ideological wars as binary
variables to see whether they are present or absent. Then, I created simple categories as explained below.

My theory regards ethnic territorial and ideological wars. Nonetheless, the theoretical predictions may be applicable to all ethnic wars (not just the territorial ones) if the specified parameters are in place such as state discourse for collective threat framing and heightening salience of ethnic identity. The question to explore here is whether the findings and the theory apply only to ethnic territorial conflicts or all ethnic conflicts. The EPR dataset has a variable that indicates whether the ethnic war was fought for secessionist claims or not. Using this variable, I created a new categorical variable which distinguishes between nonsecessionist ethnic wars (governmental) and secessionist ethnic wars (territorial): 0) no ethnic war, 1) nonsecessionist ethnic war, 2) secessionist ethnic war. Finally, I created a categorical variable for ideological conflicts to probe into intensity, where 1=low intensity 2=high intensity (magnitude >2).

9.1.2.1 Country-level Control Variables

I controlled for some aggregate-level indicators to increase the accuracy of my estimates and to avoid omitted variable bias. Countries have different baseline levels of trust, stemming from their history of conflict, colonial history, regime type, economic development, and other aggregate-level factors. Absent controlling for these variables, estimating the effect of violence will produce inaccurate results. Furthermore, some of these variables such as level of democracy correlate with both levels of trust (see Inglehart 1999; Uslaner 2002) and the likelihood of conflict (Hegre et al. 2001). Omitting them would result in omitted variable bias. Hence, I include the major variables that may explain country-level differences in trust (and likelihood of conflict).
**Democracy**: I used the Freedom House/Polity indicator of level of democracy, which is available in the QoG dataset. The variable is constructed by combining the averages of Freedom House and Polity scores. The variable is scaled to range from 0-10, where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. As a robustness check, I also used an index variable constructed by the Varieties of Democracy project, measuring the level of achieved liberal democracy, to see if these parallel estimations change the output. The index factors in “the constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances, and the level of electoral democracy” (Teorell et al. 2017, 589).

**Colonial Past**: This variable shows whether or not the country had been colonized by a Western power. The original variable comes from the EPR dataset, and is categorical where each category codes the name of the colonizing power. I converted the variable to a binary indicator.

**State Strength**: GDP per capita is the most common proxy in the civil war literature for state strength and seems to predict conflict onset consistently (Lacina 2006; Sambanis 2001). I used the measurement of World Development Index, included in the QoG dataset, called GDP per capita purchasing power parity rates constant 2011 international $.”. This variable indicates gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates, and it has the most complete measure of GDP for the highest number of countries. Because it is right skewed, the log form of the variable is used.

160 The variable in the dataset is named “fh_polity2.”
161 The variable is named “wdi_gdppcpppcon.”
162 “An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2011 international dollars” (Teorell et al. 2017, 634).
**Ethnic Fractionalization:** This variable is often used in analysis of onset of violence (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003), and ethnically fractionalized societies may have different patterns of political and social trust (e.g. Finseraas and Jakobsson 2012). Hence, it is important to control for this variable in a global analysis of trust, at least to estimate the baseline country-level trust measure correctly. I use the measure from Alesina et al. (2003), available in the QoG dataset. The indicator reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not share ethnicity, the higher the number the less probability of the two sharing that characteristic. The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The variable is time-invariant.

**Interstate War:** This variable is a binary indicator of country’s involvement in an interstate war in a given year. The source is the QoG dataset, and the indicator measures the magnitude score of episode(s) of international warfare. I used this indicator to create a binary “presence” variable for interstate war. This variable is included to ensure that the estimated change in trust is independent from the exogenous effect of an interstate war on trust.

**War History:** This variable indicates the number of civil conflicts in country series starting from 1946. The measure comes from the EPR dataset and the original version of the variable ranges from 0 to 11. I recoded it into a 6-category variable, where the 6th category refers to “6 wars or more,” and it is treated as a categorical variable. Countries that experienced higher number of conflicts may be more likely to have lower trust, and this variable is included to control for that effect.

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163 The QoG dataset’s source for this variable is the Systemic Peace dataset.
164 The variable is called “cspv_intwar.”
9.1.2.2 Individual-level Control Variables

National Pride: This variable is to control for the effect of identification with the nation, as minority groups or politically underrepresented groups may have systematically lower trust because of weak identification. Defining oneself as part of a majority or minority is mostly about feeling connection or belonging to that group. In the WVS, respondents are asked how proud they are of their nation. Priding oneself on the nation is on the same line with defining yourself with the majority in the case of an ethnic conflict as if there is no feeling of pride it may easily signify sympathy for the insurgent ethnic group. Similarly, in the case of ideological violence, being proud of the nation dispels any affiliation with the insurgent group. The variable is with response coded on a four-point scale, ranging from “Not at all proud (1)” to “Very proud (4).” Sex (Female), Education (Three-category variable: Lower, Middle, Higher Education), and Age are also controlled for.
# Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ideological Violence_dum</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Categ. Ideological Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Intensity</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Intensity</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ethnic Violence_dum</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Categorical Ethnic Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Ethnic Violence</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsecessionist</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War history</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 civil conflict</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 civil conflict</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 civil conflicts</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 civil conflicts</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 civil conflicts</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 or more civil conflicts</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Democracy (FH/Polity)</td>
<td>7.572</td>
<td>2.646</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Interstate War</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Proud</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very Proud</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite Proud</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Proud</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Education</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Education</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=326,160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.2 Model and Estimation Strategy

The data are pooled time-series cross-sectional survey data and hierarchical. Individuals (i) are nested within country-year (time, t) and country-years are nested within countries (j). I define individual trust as a function of both individual-level variables, time-varying country-level indicators (e.g. GDP or level of democracy) and fixed country-level attributes (e.g. ethnic fractionalization or colonial history). Because the model includes time-varying variables, including fixed effects for time is not feasible because if the model includes time dummies, it is not possible to include any other variables that vary only over time.

The model is a three-level random intercept model to capture the effect on trust of both violence variables and other country-level variables that vary both across countries and within countries over time. The time-variant country-level variables are lagged to sidestep endogeneity bias. Furthermore, I assume that individual’s trust level in year t is conditioned by the economic and institutional performance of the country from year t-1.

\[
Y_{itj} = \alpha + \beta X_{itj} + \gamma N_{t-1j} + \delta K_j + \rho_j + u_{tj} + \varepsilon_{itj}
\]

where \(Y_{itj}\) is individual-level trust at time t, in country j,

\(X_{itj}\) is the vector of individual-level variables,

\(N_{t-1ij}\) is a vector of lagged time-variant country-level variables,

\(K_j\) is a vector of time-invariant country-level variables,

\(\rho_j\) is the country-level error component, \(u_{tj}\) is the country-year level error component, and \(\varepsilon_{itj}\) is the individual-level error component, with \(E(\varepsilon_{itj}) = 0, Var(\varepsilon_{itj}) = \sigma^2; E(u_{tj}) = 0; Var(u_{tj}) = \tau^2; E(\rho_j) = 0, Var(\rho_j) = \varsigma^2\), and covariances are assumed to be independent and zero.
Political trust, measured as confidence in parliament, is a categorical variable, and I used ordered logistic regression for the preliminary analysis. As interpersonal trust has dichotomous indicators, all estimations involving these variables use logit as the link function. However, multilevel modeling commands for logistic regression in Stata 14 (*meologit* and *melogit* respectively) could not calculate the initial values, reporting that they are not feasible, likely because of the unbalanced panels.

To overcome the modeling hurdles, I start with running pooled regressions clustering by country and year to relax the assumption that all observations are independent, as intra-group correlations exist across country-year clusters. Clustering enables robust standard errors. Next, I run three-level random intercept models, with the command *mixed*, which treats the variables as if they are continuous. Population weights are used in all models. Finally, I stretched the statistical significance test to report p-values lower than .10 (unlike the convention of assigning significance only for coefficients that have p-values lower than .05 in Political Science) so that important patterns do not get lost in disciplinary standards of significance.

9.3 Findings
At the most general level, pooled logistic regression with country-year clusters produces results that confirm the hypothesized expectations. Models 1 and 2 in Table 9 shows that ideological violence decreases the confidence in parliament while ethnic violence boosts it. Ideological violence undermines interpersonal and ethnic violence seems to power it, which runs against the hypothesis of no significant effect. Models 3 and 4 in Table 9 separate the ethnic violence into secessionist and nonsecessionist types. Model 3 shows that both kinds of ethnic violence increase political trust. The surprising positive effect of ethnic violence on interpersonal trust seems to be
true only for the nonsecessionist conflicts. Secessionist conflicts, as Model 4 shows do not have any significant effect on interpersonal trust, as hypothesized.

These estimations use the simplest strategy for dealing with clustered errors. I am fully aware that the setups suppress variation across systems in slopes and intercepts and that this approach fixes the effects. To allow intercepts to vary across countries and time (country-year), I run three-level random intercept models (See Table 10).

**Table 9. Civil Violence and Trust_Country-Year Cluster Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Political Trust</th>
<th>(2) Interpersonal Trust</th>
<th>(3) Political Trust</th>
<th>(4) Interpersonal Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged ideological viol.</td>
<td>-0.483***</td>
<td>-0.399***</td>
<td>-0.506**</td>
<td>-0.345**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged ethnic violence</td>
<td>0.744***</td>
<td>0.428***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged ethnic violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(base=no ethnic violence)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsecessionist</td>
<td>0.623***</td>
<td>0.692***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
<td>0.856***</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.847***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.846***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>317,836</td>
<td>326,163</td>
<td>317,836</td>
<td>326,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation</td>
<td>Ordered Logistic Regression</td>
<td>Logistic Regression</td>
<td>Ordered Logistic Regression</td>
<td>Logistic Regression</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Note: The coefficients are in units of log odds. They are used in order to indicate the sign of the relationship. Odds ratios are reported in Table A 11 in Appendix E. Models include all control variables but the GDP. Due to high collinearity with the democracy indicator, it is omitted from the analysis. In the robustness analysis, models alternate democracy and GDP, and the results are robust to changes in the control variables.
Three-level random intercept models lend support to the hypothesized relationships and introduce new nuance. Model 1 and 3 in Table 10 show that only secessionist conflicts have a positive effect on political trust while the effect of nonsecessionist conflicts on political trust is insignificant. The negative effect of ideological violence is not captured in Model 1. To probe further, I categorize the ideological conflict variable into: no ideological violence, low intensity violence, and high intensity violence. This clears the picture to an extent (see Model 3). Low intensity ideological violence captures the more sporadic and limited cases while high intensity encapsulates serious and more pervasive conflicts and warfare. The findings suggest that low intensity ideological conflicts significantly decrease political trust while high intensity ideological conflicts do not have a significant effect. The very low number of observations in high intensity ideological conflicts may be preventing detection of patterns. Finally, high intensity ideological conflicts significantly decrease interpersonal trust while low intensity ideological conflicts do not have a significant effect; though the sign of the relationship is negative. This finding is intuitive as loss of generalized trust is more likely when the magnitude of violence rises, and it fits with the general argument in this dissertation.

The clarity of the findings is remarkable considering the heterogeneity of the countries in the design and the allowance for random intercepts at country and time levels. The magnitudes of effect are substantial, as Figure 9 and Figure 10 reveals. The figures show the predicted probabilities of trust as a function of ethnic and ideological violence. All else equal, where there is an effect from ideological violence, the range of negative average impact on the probabilities of political trust across plausible values of the independent variable is from 0.10 (for high intensity) to 0.29 points (for low intensity) (See Figure 9). Though given the high confidence intervals on the low intensity conflicts, it is hard to be confident about the magnitude. Yet,
overall, the predicted decrease in political trust as a result of change in ideological conflict (both its presence and the move from low to high intensity) is noteworthy. In contrast, both nonsecessionist and secessionist conflicts are associated with an increased probability of political trust; average predicted probabilities being .05 for nonsecessionist and .09 for secessionist conflicts (Figure 9).

Figure 10, Plot A shows that the effect of ideological violence on interpersonal trust is a bit more ambiguous. High intensity ideological violence is predicted to decrease the probability of interpersonal trust by .06 points while the noise in low intensity cases render it impossible to make any meaningful prediction. Figure 10, Plot B, meanwhile, shows that secessionist conflicts do not have any significant impact as my theory predicts. Nonsecessionist ethnic conflicts, nonetheless, are predicted to increase the probability of interpersonal trust by .05 points. This is both surprising and counterintuitive. What is captured as an increase in interpersonal trust in the case of nonsecessionist conflict may just be category-based trust i.e. increase in in-group trust. Yet, given the imperfection of the measure, it is hard to know with the dataset at hand.

Considering the noise in the data and the very low number of observations on the left side of the equation, these are powerful relationships. Allowance of random intercepts at both country-level and country-year level enable making meaningful inferences about the correlations between violence and trust. The results are consistently confirming the hypothesized relationship except for the positive effect of nonsecessionist ethnic violence on interpersonal trust.
Table 10. Three-Level Random Intercept Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Political Trust</th>
<th>(2) Interpersonal Trust</th>
<th>(3) Political Trust</th>
<th>(4) Interpersonal Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ideological Viol.</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.041*</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ethnic Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(base=No ethnic wars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NonSecessionist</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.060**</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ideological Viol.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(base=No ideol. violence)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.288***</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.053***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td>0.354***</td>
<td>0.452***</td>
<td>0.348***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.0494)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>317,836</td>
<td>326,168</td>
<td>317,836</td>
<td>326,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Country)</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Country-year)</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Residual)</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.172***</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.172***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Group-level Variables: Country (N=89), Country-year (250)
Political trust here is treated as a continuous variable ranging from 0-1.
Figure 9. Predicted Probabilities of Political Trust for Different Values of Ethnic and Ideological Violence

I ideological Violence
Figure 10. Predicted Probabilities of Interpersonal Trust for Different Values of Ethnic and Ideological Violence

9.4 Controls and Robustness

I also ran several robustness checks, and the findings are robust to different measures/forms of the existing control variables, inclusion of new control variables, and relaxing the assumption of independence of variances and covariances in the mixed models. Models with different measures of political trust (Confidence in Government) (See Table A 13 in Appendix E), of level of democracy (e.g. Varieties of Democracy’s liberal democracy index), with GDP by omitting level of democracy due to high collinearity, and different measures of GDP (by the Maddison Project\textsuperscript{165} for instance) available in the QoG dataset yield similar results (See Table A 12 in Appendix E).

One assumption in mixed models is that the random effects (error terms at each level) are independent, yet this is unrealistic. For instance, variance of individual level random effect may be dependent on variance of country-year level. In order to state dependence, I run all the mixed models with the unstructured covariance option, which relaxes the independence assumption and assumes that all variances and covariances may be different. And the results remain the same and are reported in Table A 14 in Appendix E.

9.5 Discussion

The findings are encouraging in terms of the generalizability of my theory; however, they are far from being conclusive. This is a first effort to extract some meaningful information with respect to the relationship of different kinds of violence on two different kinds of trust. Despite the

impressive volume of data, the dataset is fraught with challenges. To name a few, the current
dataset is rife with mismatch between the amount of data on the dependent and independent
variables in the dataset. Even though the data on the violence indicators is complete, data on trust
are relatively scant because it is collected in waves rather than annually unlike the other
aggregate data. This very unbalanced panels and large gaps between the trust observations
hampers possibility of modeling change.

Model specification is strictly guided by the availability of data, and some major
variables such as the organized crime rate, that may affect both political and social trust
judgments are missing from the analysis. Excessive amount of noise in the data and unbalanced
panels hampers causal identification. With the data at hand, the best one can do is to see whether
the models predict a change in the hypothesized direction in trust along with change in conflict
indicators. Despite all the challenges, finding robust results with the available data and different
estimation strategies is worthy of attention.

Secondly, the measures are imperfect and weak. I operationalized political and social
trust, using very old single-item indicators. I chose “confidence in parliament” as a measure of
political trust, yet a single-item measure on an institution (parliament) is a slightly odd indicator
for an analysis that includes countries where parliament is designed not to inspire confidence.
Though results were the same when I use confidence in government as a measure of political
trust, a better way to conceptualize political trust require an index measure. Indicator of
interpersonal trust is old and rife with issues, though it enables comparison for being around for
long. It goes at least back to the early years of the behavioural revolution, and thanks to the
efficiency of the measure, most general surveys have been using it since the 1960s. Many steps
have been taken ever since to further theorize the concept, bringing its complex dimensions to the fore, yet the measures here do not capture any of that.

There is, thus, much room for improvement both in the realm of measurement and operationalization and data. Trust measures are becoming more and more available with the mounting data from the regional Barometers (e.g. Arab Barometer, Americas Barometer, Asia Barometer). Question wording and incompatibility in operationalization of the variables are still issues that need to be addressed. That being said, constructing globally applicable measures of political and social trust could be possible by finding commonalities in the operationalization of the concepts. Item Response Theory Models and Principal Component Analysis Techniques provide tools to achieve this goal. These techniques when combined with wealth of data enable new item constructs for political and social trust measures to capture the complexity of these concepts.

Once data quality and frequency are improved, new explorations could be undertaken. For example, interaction of the conflict variable with the level of democracy would be interesting to examine, to see whether trust moves differently in democracies than it does in authoritarian regimes in the face of conflict and find out the democratic cost of long-term conflicts.

Controlling for individual-level ideological affiliation may be possible with new data, which is essential, as people who are left wing tend to be less trusting in government. An ideology question exists in the WVS but it is too sparse to allow its inclusion in the models here. Aggregate and subnational level crime rates are important to control to gauge the unconfounded effect of the conflict on social trust in particular.

With the incorporation of these variables, accuracy of the model predictions will be improved. Furthermore, models may be able to accommodate more random effects. In the mixed
model used above, the intercept is the only random component i.e. it differs from country to
country and year to year. The slope of the regression line for each country is, however, fixed.
When more data with fewer lags are available for the left side of the equation, not only can
change be modeled but also the cross-level effects can be estimated, and the random slope
models would be more feasible.

9.6 Conclusion

I find that ethnic territorial and ideological revolutionary forms of violence do indeed correlate
differently with political and interpersonal trust measures. Secessionist ethnic violence increases
political trust while ideological violence, particularly those of high intensity, decreases political
trust. High-intensity ideological violence undermines interpersonal trust but secessionist ethnic
violence has no effect. Of course, these results do neither suggest conclusive evidence nor robust
correlation or causation. Massive amounts of individual variation with under-conceptualized
indicators meshed up with aggregate indicators render estimations very challenging. In the face
of all the challenges, finding robust relationships in the hypothesized directions is an indication
of the generalizability of the results in my case studies.
Chapter 10: Conclusion

This dissertation contributes to the literature on consequences of civil wars on individual attitudes and societal dynamics. The premise is that internal political violence casts a shadow on the capacity of the state to protect, disturbs the societal peace, and induces citizens to fear one another. Besides creating feelings of threat and insecurity, conflict—through the collateral effects of forced displacement and victimization—changes the social fabric of the society. When the violent episode lasts for a long period, it poses the risk of leaving deep marks on the society with respect to social capital and citizens’ perceptions of the state’s legitimacy. Social capital and political trust are essential for political and social order, and regimes, particularly democracies, to function. As such, it is important to identify how violent conflicts impact trust.

The few studies looking at the consequences of violent conflict on trust have produced mixed findings. This dissertation argues that these inconsistent findings stem in part from lumping together different types of civil wars, and from not disaggregating the social groups. With respect to the first point, civil wars differ in terms of characteristics such as the main social cleavages, motivation for the insurgency, type of the war waged, or civilian targeting practices. Secondly, the same war could have different effects on individuals depending on their identity, exposure to violence, exposure to personal threat, and degree and kind of interpersonal communication. Recognizing these distinctions, my dissertation develops and tests a new theory of how civil wars impact on political and social trust.

This dissertation argues that violence in civil wars featuring strong collective threat framing, such as ethnic wars, lead to higher levels of political trust, even in the presence of strong personal threat. Ethnic violence induces category-based social trust, where citizens become more trusting of co-ethnics, clarifies in and out-group distinctions, and reduces out-
group trust. By contrast, violence in ideological civil wars, which do not have the same level of collective threat framing as civil wars, diminishes general trust.

These hypotheses are tested using mixed methods: quantitative analysis of cross-national data, and case studies of the civil wars in Turkey and Peru. The first case study considers the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey as a case of ethnic war (the PKK against the Turkish state, from 1984 until present). The second case study considers the Maoist insurgency in Peru as a case of ideological war (Sendero against the Peruvian state, 1980-2000). My quantitative results and qualitative findings support my central argument that in ethnic conflicts, violence increases trust (at least among co-ethnics), whereas in ideological conflicts, violence decreases trust.

Below I review my dissertation’s major findings, summarize my contributions, and discuss the generalizability of my results and the limitations of my present work. The last section presents possible avenues for future research.

10.1 Review of Findings

Chapter 2 presents the dissertation’s theory. It begins by introducing key concepts (trust, civil war, threat, bystander) and continues to specify the causal mechanism that links civil wars to political and social trust. My central argument is that collective threat is more strongly emphasized in state discourses where the motivations of the conflict challenge the identity of the state and nationhood, as in the case of ethic territorial wars. Civil wars featuring strong collective threat framing lead to higher political trust (even in the presence of personal threat). In the absence of a strong collective threat (more likely to be observed in ideological wars), personal threat should undermine political trust. Empowered ethnic groups represented by state institutions – such as ethnic Turks in Turkey – are more likely to sympathize with state discourse framing insurgent minority ethnic group members’ violence in terms of a collective threat.
Because ethnic wars (especially territorial ones) feature discourses of collective threat, violence should increase politically empowered ethnic group members’ wartime political trust. Politically disempowered ethnic groups are less likely to subscribe to discourses emphasizing collective threat to the nation (since they are often excluded from the national identity). Politically disempowered ethnic groups are expected to be more sympathetic to the insurgency’s counterhegemonic discourses, which in turn should lead to plummeting political trust.

Regarding social trust, ethnic violence clarifies in- and out-group distinctions, and increases category-based (within-group) trust. By contrast, ideological violence diminishes social trust across the board. In ideological conflicts, the main factor driving trust is personal exposure to violence—those exposed to more violence have lower trust. The main mechanisms for social trust, identities and personal experiences, are strictly shaped by the cleavages in the war.

Chapter 4 establishes the causal priors of the theory. This chapter shows that the state-building and pre-war socio-political dynamics condition both the nature of the insurgency and how the conflict will be framed by the state via the official discourse, drawing inductive insight from the two cases of conflict. That is, both whether the conflict is ethnic or ideological in nature and the nature of collective threat framing is partly embedded in the history of state-society relations. In Peru, the pre- and postcolonial history of racial and geographical conflict along urban-rural, coastal-interior, center-periphery, and White-Mestizo-Indian lines shaped the contours of state-society relations and entrenched inequalities across geographies. These dynamics penetrated the formation, character, and mobilization of the insurgency, and the state’s reactions to it. For example, the reason the Peruvian state did not take the threat of Sendero’s insurgent violence seriously was because the original group that was targeted by Sendero were indigenous peoples. Due to entrenched racism toward indigenous groups, represented in part...
through a history of abandoning indigenous peoples, Sendero’s indigenous victim’s deaths did not generate a sense of threat to the state. This was partially why the state did not initially portray the insurgency as a collective threat, and why the state lacked the tools to do so. Similarly, in Turkey, post-imperial nation-building efforts around one identity and one language, and concomitant policies of suppression of all ethnicities other than Turkish paved the way for both the rise of the Kurdish insurgency as well as the official state discourse that arose in response to the insurgency.

Chapter 5 describes the dynamics behind the generation of official state discourse and collective threat framing (or the lack thereof). The official state discourse in both countries proscribed the respective insurgent organizations—PKK in Turkey, and Sendero in Peru—as terrorist. However, in Peru, Sendero was downplayed by the official state narrative until Sendero’s violence reached Lima, the capital city. By contrast, in Turkey, the PKK’s threat was integrated into the official state discourse relatively quickly. In Turkey, collective threat was emphasized to a greater degree than in Peru, and the framing of collective threat was crafted by the official state discourse. The discourse featured many references to the sanctity and non-negotiability of the national borders. I argue that this was because of the secessionist character of the war in Turkey—the threat the PKK posed was to the territorial integrity of the nation, which was a fundamental part of the identity of the nation.

The collective threat Sendero posed was to the state and the regime, rather than to the territory. Sendero sought to destroy the state’s legitimacy, and attacked all tools and institutions of the regime in search of establishing a new regime. Even though Sendero had a significant popular support and was advancing quickly, the Peruvian state did not much frame the violence as an existential collective threat. Unlike Turkey, where civilian and military victims had a
greater degree of visibility, the Peruvian state did not generate a discourse around the casualties. This was partly an extension of the history of relations with Peruvian indigenous peoples and the difference in the practice of military conscription—enforced only for the poor indigenous males.

Chapter 6 lays out the details of data collection and analysis. Chapter 7 and 8 test the main observable implications of the theory qualitatively, using micro-level interview and focus group data. Chapter 7 examines the effects of the civil war on political trust by delving into participants’ narratives. The evidence confirms the general hypotheses that ethnic war increases political trust and ideological war decreases political trust. Chapter 8 confirms that ideological war diminishes generalized interpersonal trust and ethnic territorial war decreases out-group trusts. These two chapters also provide evidence for more detailed hypotheses. Where the state is the perpetrator of violence, threat not only diminishes political trust but also undermines legitimacy. Kurds and indigenous Peruvians question the moral legitimacy of the state, and I explain this using the concept of ontological security. The ethnic groups targeted by the state lost their faith in the state because their ontological presence as a group was questioned. The state, instead of being a protector, was itself an agent of violence itself. Evidence supports these observations.

The qualitative component of my research also revealed nuances to be integrated to my theory. Specifically, although Turks’ out-group trust towards Kurds declined significantly, I did not find a symmetric response on the parts of the Kurds towards Turks. In both cases, my data also show that with respect to category-based social trust some individuals make intragroup distinctions (between the “bad” –possible affiliates of the insurgency— and the “good” ones) while others throw blanket judgments onto the group. Even though sweeping judgments exist against a particular out-group, some individuals make in-group distinctions. These findings
inform and enrich my theory. My theory does not articulate as detailed distinctions or make as nuanced predictions about the reality as the empirical evidence shows. For instance, in Turkey, identifiers beyond ethnicity are used to make in-group distinctions (between “good” Kurds vs. “bad Kurds”) such as accent, clothing, birthplace, and the like. In Peru, indigenous people from the sierra were particularly affected by lower category-based distrust. These findings warrant updates in my theory, and call for attention to such contextual nuances in category-based trust measures.

Chapter 9 quantitatively tests the presumptions of the theory and examines the generalizability of the argument inasmuch as it relates the direction of civil wars’ effect on trust: ethnic and ideological wars have distinct effects on political and social trust. The findings indicate that ethnic and ideological wars have contrasting effects on political and social trust. While ethnic territorial violence boosts political trust, ideological violence dampens it. Furthermore, ethnic territorial violence does not affect generalized trust, whereas ideological violence decreases it.

10.2 Contributions

The dissertation makes theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. Theoretically, my dissertation contributes to the trust literature by developing a theory of political and social trust in civil wars. The theory diverges from extant studies by disentangling the effects of collective and personal threat. Most studies focus on the impact of personal experiences of violence on attitudes and reveal contradictory results across different contexts. My dissertation explains this inconsistency. I show that people react differently to personal threat depending on whether the source of the threat is also framed in terms of collective threat, which results in different cognitive processing of personal insecurities.
Empirically, the dissertation represents the first effort to identify how civil war transforms trust attitudes to, using ethnographic fieldwork-based methods. My work is also unique in that I shift the focus from victims to bystanders. My findings are important for studies on legacies of wars on attitudes, as transformation in attitudes that occur during wartime persist long after the war (e.g. Lupu and Stokes 2010; Wittenberg 2006).\textsuperscript{166}

By opening the black box of civil wars to understand the wartime transformations of political and social trust in two relatively young and unconsolidated democracies, Peru and Turkey, my work provides new information on the general societal dynamics of and intragroup relations within these countries. As such, the dissertation not only informs a deeper understanding of the politics and society of Turkey and Peru, but also starts a conversation on the implications of nation-building on contemporary conflicts and identity politics in Latin America and the Middle East — two regions that have much more in common than scholarship has so far acknowledged. My dissertation also offers policy implications for practitioners working in the field of reconciliation, particularly with respect to the question of rebuilding the foundations of social capital.

My research is particularly important for understanding contemporary Turkish politics, and the looming Kurdish question. The discussions on state legitimacy in the Kurdish cities in section 7.2.4 are ever more relevant in the face of the increasing possibility of an independent Kurdistan. Kurdish autonomy in Rojava-Syria has made a huge impact on the Kurdish politics in Turkey. In January 2014, the Kurds under the leadership of the Democratic Unity Party—

\textsuperscript{166} Similarly, certain political attitudes endure even after the collapse or elimination of the institutions that generated them (e.g. Lankina and Getachew 2012, Peisakhin 2012). Expanding from these works, Balcells (2012) and Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) argue that political violence has a long-lasting legacy on victims’ identities, which are then passed down on future generations through political socialization channels. They conclude that violence defines political attitudes across generations.
considered an extension of the PKK—declared autonomy in the Rojava region of northern Syria,\(^{167}\) defeating ISIS. This is important because an autonomous Kurdish region of Rojava in northern Syria represents the living example of Kurds’ dreamland. The Kurds I talked to in Kızıltepe in Mardin or Suruç in Şanlıurfa (Turkish districts along the border of Rojava) refer to Rojava with fascination; they aspire to be a part of it and even consider themselves as the fourth or fifth canton. If the clashes continue and if the PKK gains a stronger hand, secession may be a closer reality than imagined. My dissertation’s discussion of how the war has reduced the Turkish state’s legitimacy in provinces with predominantly Kurdish populations explains the background of this development. This is a living example of how wartime transformations in political trust because of ontological insecurity may have strong implications on the political landscape for many years to come.

Beyond the micro-level trust formation, the dissertation also provides empirical and theoretical insights into the impact of macro-historical factors, particularly nation-building dynamics, on contemporary insurgencies. Both the character of the wars (whether insurgency is ethnic or ideological) as well as the state’s reactions to it and consequences are embedded in the dynamics of nation-building. This finding has implications for studies of civil war consequences: evaluating the effects of wars without reference to the history of state-building not only distorts causal identification efforts, but may also lead to inaccurate and even dangerous inferences. For instance, reconciliation efforts could backfire absent a dialogue on the history of injustices that form the basis of the grievances.

\(^{167}\) Cezire (on January 21st), Kobanê (January 27th), and Afrin (on January 29th).
My work also lends insight into the question of why the insurgent movement in Peru was not ethnic in character, even though Peru’s indigenous peoples and Turkey’s Kurds share many similarities in the history of state-society relations. My research reveals that, in contrast to Turkey’s Kurdish inhabitants, Peru’s indigenous peoples lacked collective capital. Despite some major revolts, a spectacle of agency in initiating change for the misery of indigenous peoples was missing in Peru. I believe this may be because of the subjugation of Indigenous peoples in Peru after the Spanish conquest. While Kurds enjoyed political and economic autonomy and maintained a privileged status during the Ottoman rule, indigenous peoples in Peru were enslaved by the Spaniards, which may have had socio-psychological consequences even after Peruvian independence from Spain. These observations and arguments may motivate new lines of inquiry in the social movements literature.

My dissertation makes two methodological contributions. First, I challenge the conventional ways of studying trust, by undertaking bold fieldwork research in conflict zones and attempting to operationalize declining trust. Trust is an elusive concept that is hard to measure even in quantitative studies. I used qualitative data and traced observable implications to measure trust. In doing so, my dissertation integrates by positivist and interpretivist research traditions in understanding of the trust in conflict settings—a rare attempt. Second, my dissertation contributes to the field of measurement. Especially the findings of intragroup distinctions people tend to observe regarding identity-based trust (such as “good” vs. “bad” Kurds) urge survey researchers to formulate new questions to capture these distinctions, which is important for operationalization of the concept of category-based social trust. At the survey design stage, working with experts who know the ethno-social categorizations well would be a
good start. One way to operationalize could be preparing a list of out-groups that intersects with different geographies or different backgrounds, which will be context-dependent.

**10.2.1 Implications for Democracy**

My dissertation starts with the premise that trust is particularly central to democratic regimes, with a focus on political trust, which is key for legitimacy, and social trust, essential for cultivation of social capital (civic engagement and stronger social ties). When democratic regimes, particularly the nascent ones, undergo long-term violent conflicts, decline in social and political trust would be deleterious for the maintenance of the regime. Hence, discussing what the findings of this dissertation may mean for democracies is in order.

First, the dissertation shows that the effects of civil wars vary not only across types of civil wars but also within countries across subgroups. Hence, there is no hard and fast rule to diagnose problem areas in post-conflict democracies. Secondly, my work shows that ethnic wars have a positive effect on political trust among those who feel represented by the central political institutions, while ideological wars do not have this effect. This does not mean that ethnic wars are good for democracies. Indeed, governments often abuse such rallying effects of violence to implement anti-democratic measures for security and to curtail liberties (Dempsey 2002; Gordijn and Stapel 2008). The threat that induces higher trust in the rulers could also breed authoritarian tendencies (e.g. Landau et al. 2004; Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg 2003).

The Fujimori era in Peru exemplifies yet another form that an authoritarian slide may take. Capitalizing on the support Fujimori received in the election, Fujimori went as far as suspending the parliament and constitution, declaring the infamous *autogolpe*. All in all, an increase in political trust does not necessarily bode well for the democratic regimes. This insight
calls for revisiting the conditions under which political trust is necessary and desirable for democratic regimes.

10.3 Limitations of the Study

While the research design of this dissertation has clear merits in offering causal explanations using mixed methods, it entails some limitations in terms of causal identification and generalizability. First, tracing the causal effect of civil war on trust is difficult because the dissertation shows that nation-building dynamics are a causal prior of the theory. The main causal mechanism linking civil wars and political trust—collective threat framing—is further embedded in the nation-building. Even though the war itself is the causal impulse for the trust outcomes, the reasons why trust increased in some areas and decreased in other are buried in the prewar dynamics. This restricts the ability to know how much causal power should be attributed to civil wars and how much of the outcomes observed are because of the pre-war dynamics. One reassuring fact is that ethnic and nonethnic/revolutionary civil wars emerge for different reasons, which implies that pre-war dynamics of these wars may have parallels across different contexts. Studies found common grievances behind the onset of ethnic wars (Sambanis 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003), and a different set of patterns behind the onset of revolutionary wars (Sambanis 2001). Given these similarities in the factors leading to the onset (causal antecedents), wartime trust transformations depicted here have a higher likelihood to be generalizable to other settings.

After establishing nation-building strategy as a causal antecedent, the dissertation goes on to test the impact of the difference in collective threat framing, which are different between the conflicts in Peru and Turkey. This difference provides leverage to test the impact of collective threat framing on trust formation, as suggested by my theory. However, the two cases also different in terms of personal threat: the civil war in Peru was significantly bloodier, and it
penetrated into a much larger area in the country than the civil war in Turkey. These differences render causal identification challenging. The outcomes observed could be confounded by the difference in personal threat. I used the variation in personal threat across different regions of Peru and across time to control for its possibly confounding effect, yet these strategies are still limited because Peru’s geography is racialized, the political structure is so centralized. It is hard to ascertain if the responses would have been the same should the people at stake in the initial years of the war were not just indigenous people, or if there were more soldier casualties. Nonetheless, ideological wars are often fought with popular guerrilla armies, where civilian targeting and personal threat tend to be more pervasive than they are in the cases of ethnic territorial wars. Hence the variation in personal threat is to an extent a feature of the conflict character, which does not eliminate the potentially confounding role of personal threat but alleviates it.

This brings me to a bigger challenge in the context of Peru. Even though the war was ideological in character, ethnicity played a role in the war, because of both the intersection of social class and ethnicity (a corollary of racialized geographies) and entrenched racism. The intermingling of class and ethnicity obstructs the possibility of measuring how much causal power one can attribute to the ideological character of the war. Of course, the intersectionality of social class, ethnicity and geography is not exclusive to Peru. Many Latin American countries with a history of revolutionary civil war (Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador) exhibit similar characteristics, though perhaps not to the extent of Peru. However, such parallels are reassuring for the applicability of the findings of this dissertation.

Furthermore, it is challenging to parse the causal effect of the civil war in Peru because other potential causal factors were occurring simultaneously with the conflict. For instance, an
economic crisis wreaked havoc in the country in late 1980s, the state became increasingly weak during this period, and high crime rates are a potential confound. Although the confluence of these factors probably impacted people’s judgments, the fact that the conflict also inflamed all these issues supports my arguments. Even so, attention to cases where such factors did not co-occur with the conflict would be instructive.

Additionally, using qualitative data to make inferences about trust is as much a weakness as a strength. The depth of the qualitative data comes at the cost of precision. Observable implications of different trust levels do not necessarily manifest themselves in a kindred fashion in the narratives, and I sometimes resorted to interpretive methods to extract information as to the political and social trust of the individuals. Furthermore, political trust as a concept is a bit elusive; it has many dimensions and trust in political institutions is not necessarily a coherent unit. One may have low trust in gendarmerie but high trust in the police. On top of this, individuals’ accounts are unbalanced. Some avoid talking about the government and its institutions while others only recount their judgments about the political actors and institutions. Some equate government with the state while others lecture on how state is above and beyond governments. As a result, my measures ended up being rather clunky and deficient in providing a cohesive narrative. Yet, I was transparent in the delivery of the narratives and my own interpretations, to prevent the reader from having misleading impressions or making wrong inferences. Overall, the implications for political trust mostly relates to diffuse political trust, rather than specific political trust.

Finally, the war in Peru is long over while the war in Turkey is still ongoing. Despite my efforts to overcome problems with retrospective accounts, it is hardly possible to completely remove the effect of today’s conjuncture from peoples’ accounts of the past. I discussed my
strategies of tackling the issues that may come with retrospective accounts in my research design chapter (Chapter 3). Furthermore, I looked for recurring accounts instead of unique narratives.

Furthermore, these limitations restrict the generalizability of the findings. Taking the issues discussed above, it is necessary to add delimiting adjectives to the type of wars that the findings could apply to when defining the scope conditions. I limit the applicability of my arguments about ethnic territorial wars to the ones that emerge in countries where national identity is built on an ethnic one. My arguments about the ideological/revolutionary wars can extend to those that feature popular guerilla armies and that fight a bloody war. Furthermore, the scope of my theory is limited to contexts, which feature one group dominating over the other(s). The results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 9 endorses that the argument can travel across other nations, though more data are needed for causal inference.

10.3.1 Future Research

While my dissertation’s findings are significant, they represent the beginning, not the end, of a broader research agenda. For a qualitative test of the theory, I use in-depth studies of two civil wars with sub-national research design, which were instrumental in updating the causal priors. My dissertation then uses quantitative cross-national data to demonstrate that some of the main patterns of trust predicted by the theory are observed across different countries. Nevertheless, the dissertation does not have a test for external validity of the full theory (with interaction of collective and personal threat) beyond Turkey and Peru.

In the future, I hope to do this in two ways. First, I plan to examine other cases of ethnic and ideological wars to see if the causal mechanisms identified here help explain those events as well. Possible cases where this could be explored include the Bosnia or Sri Lanka for ethnic wars, and Colombia, Guatemala or El Salvador for ideological war. The Turkish and Peruvian
civil wars contrasted not only in collective threat framing but also in personal threat (scale of violence, civilian targeting) and duration. Despite these differences, variation in personal threat in each context enabled me to test my theory within limits. To further identify the causal role of collective threat framing and expand the scope of my theory, two best cases of civil wars could be the Ethnic territorial Sri Lankan War (1983-2009) and Ideological Guatemalan War (1960-1996), as they vary in duration and personal threat.

Second, I will continue to test my theory quantitatively. I acquired panel survey data from Colombia gathered between 2014-2018 (in reference to the Colombian Civil war of 1964-2016), and from Turkey (2015-2017). Both surveys have questions on ethnicity, exposure to violence, displacement, demographics and attitudes on a representative sample of the population, and I will collect data for local-level indicators of violence. Combining the rigor of advanced statistical methods on such fine-grained quantitative data with rich qualitative data from these four cases of civil wars will not only produce a robust theory but also will probe the scope, limits, and applicability of my theory.

168 The PKK had an organized army concentrated in the mountains where most of the battles took place for more than three decades, whereas the Shining Path had mobilized and armed masses (Popular Guerrilla War) who were dispersed across Peru engaging in indiscriminate killings, for little over a decade.
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Appendices

Appendix A Extra Material for Chapter 1

Figure A 1. Global Distribution of Political and Social Trust (1995-1998)

Note: The figure is drawn using the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2017). Country-level trust data in the dataset comes from part of the fourth wave (1995-1998) of World Values Survey data. The y-axis indicates social trust while the x-axis shows political trust. In order to fit the country names as markets and to avoid overlaps, some countries are omitted from the figure. (The list of countries omitted: Armenia, Lithuania, South Korea, Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Uruguay, Georgia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary). The scale of the axes is different in order to maximize the plot space for accommodation of higher number of countries.
Figure A 2. Global Distribution of Political and Social Trust (2006-2008)

Note: The figure is drawn using the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2017). Country-level trust data in the dataset comes from the fourth wave (2006-2008) of World Values Survey data. The y-axis indicates social trust while the x-axis shows political trust. In order to fit the country names as markets and to avoid overlaps, some countries are omitted from the figure. The list of omitted countries are: Cyprus, Ethiopia, France Malaysia, Pakistan, Moldova, Latvia, Indonesia, Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, Slovakia, Macedonia, Thailand, Norway, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Vietnam. The scale of the axes is different in order to maximize the plot space for accommodation of higher number of countries.
Appendix B  Extra Material for Chapter 3

Table A 1. Selected Issues of Peruvian Newspapers for Content Analysis

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Kurdish Population Estimations

There is no up-to-date official estimate of Kurdish population in Turkey. Turkish census data included a question about mother tongue up until 1985, although the percentages were not reported in government publications after 1965. The enactment of the 1983 law banning the promotion of mother tongues other than Turkish made it difficult to ask about mother tongue in the census. The language question was omitted from the Census in 1990. Mutlu (1996) made very sophisticated projections using the information from 1965 data to calculate the Kurdish population percentages per province for the year 1990. Many studies used these projection figures in their analysis even for further years (e.g. Kıbrıs 2015; Tezcür 2015). However, internal migration and especially forced displacement (conflict-induced) altered the demographic structure of many cities. Thus, 1990 projections are out of date for especially the large cities.

1) Projections using the Census Data based on Address and Place of Birth

Turkish Institute of Statistic (TIS) had collected information about the place of birth from citizens in their census data. I used data from 2010 and 2014 and in conjunction with the 1990 Kurdish population projections of Mutlu (1996), to estimate the Kurdish population percentages in respective years.

I used Kurdish population estimates of 1990 as the likelihood of a person born in that province to be Kurdish. For every province, the distribution of birthplaces is provided in the TIS data. I calculated the percentages of ethnic Kurds in each province by multiplying the percentages of total Kurdish population estimations from 1990 for each province by the number of people who were born in that province according to the 2010 and 2014 TIS data separately.
2) Survey Aggregation Technique

I used Konda Research and Consultancy Company’s survey data from their research titled “Who are We?: Social Structure Survey,” conducted in 2006, as the major source of information. The primary goal of the survey was to draw an accurate map of the distribution of different ethnic groups in Turkey. In order to ensure statistical accuracy of the estimations, they worked with TIS in Turkey for sampling. They took into account distributions of rural and urban populations, population sizes of residential areas, education status, 2002 election results, labour force participation of women and price of land values as announced by the Ministry of Finance, published by TIS. Using these data, they produced a randomly stratified target sample of 49,000 adults (>18) in 2721 neighbourhoods (target of 18 adults in each) in 79 of the 81 provinces in Turkey (Bitlis and Şırnak are the two cities they haven’t collected data from). More than 1500 interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews, and in the end they were able to interview 23,000 people. They asked respondents about their mother tongue, the ethnic origin of their parents, and their self-ascribed identity. As far as the sample size, representativeness, the currency of the data goes and reliability of the measure for ethnic origin goes, this dataset is the best in hand to get at Kurdish population estimates by provinces.

There are multiple indicators of ethnicity. Mother tongue is generally a very good proxy for measuring ethnicity; however, there are many people of Kurdish descent yet who does not speak Kurdish in Turkey. Some of those may still identify themselves as Kurdish even though they do not speak the language and others may not. Or some could speak Kurdish but as their second language rather than as a mother tongue. Moreover, there are intra-ethnicity disputes among Kurds about what constitutes Kurdish. Some would report Zaza as their mother tongue and argue that it is not Kurdish. Hence, mother tongue, on its own, does not prove to be a
sufficient measure of ethnic origin.

I relied on self-identification question whereby respondents are asked how they ethnically identify themselves. In the end, it is about claiming a Kurdish identity rather than ethnic origins that determines the attitude. Hence, I believe self-ascribed identity is the best measure. However, there are many cities in the dataset where they did not interview anyone with Kurdish origins, and hence the percentages appear to be “0,” which may not necessarily be the case. Hence, those possibly inaccurate and missing values (Bitlis and Şırnak) are filled with Konda 2010 dataset, which has more than 10,000 cases, and whose sampling procedure is random stratification, though not as comprehensive in its scope (number of provinces visited). If Konda 2010 dataset does not have the city in its sample, or the percentage appeared to be zero, then we resorted to the 1990 projections made by Mutlu (1996).

**Gaps filled with Konda 2010**

Balıkesir, Bitlis, Çanakkale, Isparta, Kastamonu, Kütahya

**Gaps filled using Mutlu’s data**

Artvin, Çankırı, Corum, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Niğde, Sinop, Trabzon, Zonguldak, Aksaray, Bayburt, Kırıkkale, Şırnak

The data in Konda is limited to the adult population. In order to make inferences about the total percentages of the overall Kurdish population, researchers in Konda, drawing on the information about household size, and the population growth in provinces, calculated the number of children per adult. According to their estimations, per every 66 Turkish adult, the number of kids is 33 while per every 53 Kurdish adult, the number of kids is 47 (Konda 2006, 17). I assumed the same ratio in our calculation of the child population for both Kurdish and Turkish population in order to estimate the total Kurdish population in every province. I also assumed...
everybody who is not Kurdish as Turkish in this calculation.

I first calculated the total number of ethnic Kurds and Turks using the percentages for Kurdish population as described above and the total number of adult population (above 18) published by TIS. Then, using the assumptions of child per adult depicted above, and the TIS data for the youth population (<18) we estimated the total number of Kurdish and Turkish kids. Then, I summed the adult and kid population across ethnicities, and then calculated the percentages using the total population figures.
Partido Kommunististat del Perū—Sendero Luminoso

Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê

The PKK abandoned this flag upon the collapse of Soviet Union.

Figure A 3. The Original Flags of Sendero and the PKK
Appendix D  Extra Material for Chapter 6

Table A 2. Details of Fieldwork and Data Collection in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Sites</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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Table A 3. Details of Fieldwork and Data Collection in Peru

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<th>Number of Expert Interviews</th>
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Table A 5. Details of Focus Groups in Peru

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Table A 6. Detailed Profiles of Interview Participants in Turkey

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D.1  Interview Guide for Turkey

GETTING TO KNOW THE RESPONDENT
  o  Where were you born?
    o  If not in Turkey, since when do you live in Turkey?
    o  Probe whether Kurdish or not.
  o  Where did you live in Turkey?
    o  Probe if there is any migration story.
  o  Where did you go to school?
  o  What is the highest level of education you and your parents get?

PREWAR TIMES
Now, I would like to ask some questions about the past.
  o  How were your neighbourhood relationships when you were growing up?
  o  How was the general social context like in the pre-1980?
  o  Would you know people's ethnic/racial/religious backgrounds?
  o  Did you talk about politics in your family when you were a kid?
  o  How about your adult life? Was politics an important component of your life? Did you talk about politics at work?
  o  Do you remember the governments? The big political events of the time?
  o  What did you think of the Turkish state? Were you proud to be Turkish?
  o  What did Turkish flag mean to you?
  o  Do you remember Ozal government in 1980? What did you think about the return to the civilian rule?

POSTWAR TIMES
  o  Where were you living when the PKK first began guerilla war? (in 1980)
  o  Did you hear about the attacks?
    o  If yes, tell me about it. (Use probe questions below if need be)
      - What did you think about it when it first began?
      - Did you consider it serious?
      - Did it affect your life then?
o What do you think about government’s response to the insurgency when it first began?
o Do you remember a specific incident in the 1980s or the 1990s that particularly affected you or your family?
o Do you think there was support for the PKK?
  o Did you support their ideology and demands?
o What do you think about ‘state of emergency’ declaration in the Eastern provinces, and military’s actions in those regions (Hakkari, Van, Tunceli)? (adjust the question to the region/province)
  o How do you think they performed in managing the conflict?
  o Did you support their actions?
  o Do you think it was right to employ violence against in response to violent attacks by the PKK?
o Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances killed by the military/ government/ PKK?
  o How did you feel about it?
  o Did you take any action in response?
o Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances disappeared during the conflict?
  o When and through which channel did you learn that he/she was “disappeared”?
    Was it through the advocacy organization, government officials or the press?
  o Who do you think was responsible?
o How did these developments affect your life?
  o Did you talk about the situation with your family, social circle, co-workers?
  o Has there been any change in your life? How was your daily life then?
  o Probe in to see whether there has been any change in his/her friendship circles, or relationship with neighbours?
  o Did it change anything in your political involvement?
  o Were you worried? Did you feel threatened?
    ▪ If yes, what was your main worry?
    ▪ Probe to look for perception of collective vs. personal threat
  o How did you perceive government’s performance in its counterinsurgency?
o Did you feel any sympathy towards the PKK?

o Was the state right in its response? How else could the situation be handled?

o Did you feel protected in the 1990s?

o Was the state the righteous authority for you, after the war started?

o How did you perceive your role in the conflict?

o How strong do you think Turkish state is?

DISPLACED POPULATIONS

o What do you think of the internal migration?

o How did the city/locality change after the wave of migration?

o How do you see/evaluate the impact of these migrants in your community?
  
  o Probe in for damages/contributions

o Do you mind having one of them as your neighbours?

o Do you care about the owners of businesses?
  
  o Probe in to see if he discriminates against Kurds/Turks

o Would you care if your daughter/son marries a Kurdish/Turkish spouse?

o What do you think about Kurdish language rights?

POST-2000

- What do you think about Erdogan?

- What do you think about e-coup?
  
  o Do you think accumulation of power in one hand was useful as compared to a coalition structure?

- How do you think Erdogan was in managing the conflict situation?
  
  o Try to probe in to understand whether the respondent can differentiate government and state.

- Have you ever considered moving elsewhere?

- What did you think/feel when you heard about the capture of Öcalan?
  
  o Did you think it was over?

  o Did it feel safer to live in Turkey?
o Did it increase your trust in government?

- How did you feel when PKK was back after a cease-fire promise?
  o Probe in to see whether he/she felt hopeless, wasn’t able to see the end, was very afraid?
  o Did you feel protected enough by the government?

- Did you have the same opinion for the PKK from the very beginning? Or did the developments alter your evaluation/perception?

CURRENT SITUATION

- Do you think violence is over?

- Do you participate in politics? (Vote, membership in parties, demonstrations, etc…)

- Tell me what you think about current Peruvian politics.
  o Probe in to understand his/her trust in parties, parliament and government.
D.2 Interview Guide for Peru

GETTING TO KNOW THE RESPONDENT
- Where were you born?
  - If not in Peru, since when do you live in Peru?
  - Probe whether indigenous or not.
- Where did you live in Peru?
  - Probe if there is any migration story.
- Where did you go to school?
- What is the highest level of education you and your parents get?

PREWAR TIMES
Now, I would like to ask some questions about the past.
- How were your neighbourhood relationships when you were growing up?
- How was the general social context like in the pre-1980?
- Would you know people's ethnic/racial/religious backgrounds?
- Did you talk about politics in your family when you were a kid?
- How about your adult life? Was politics an important component of your life? Did you talk about politics at work?
- Do you remember the governments? The big political events of the time?
- What did you think of the Peruvian state? Were you proud to be Peruvian?
- What did Peruvian flag mean to you?
- Do you remember Belaúnde government in 1980? What did you think about the return to the civilian rule?

POSTWAR TIMES
- Where were you living when Shining Path first began guerilla war? (in 1980)
- Did you hear about the attacks?
  - If yes, tell me about it. (Use probe questions below if need be)
    - What did you think about it when it first began?
    - Did you consider it serious?
    - Did it affect your life then?
What do you think about government’s response to the insurgency when it first began?

Do you remember a specific incident in the 1980s or the 1990s that particularly affected you or your family? (emotionally, psychologically, etc.)

Do you think there was support for Shining Path? Did you support Shining Path’s ideology?

How strong do you think the Peruvian state was in the 1980s?

What do you think about state of emergency declaration, and military’s actions in those regions (Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurimac)?
- How do you think they performed in managing the conflict?
- Did you support their actions?
- Do you think it was right to employ violence against in response to violent attacks by Shining Path?

What do you think about rondas?
- Were they successful?
- How you think their actions affected the course of conflict?
- Did you know any rondas?
- Did you trust them?

Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances killed by the military/ government/ Shining Path?
- How did you feel about it?
- Did you take any action in response?

Were any of your friends/colleagues/acquaintances disappeared during the conflict?
- When and through which channel did you learn that he/she was “disappeared”?
- Who do you think was responsible?

How did the war-related developments affect your life?
- Did you talk about the situation with your family, social circle, co-workers?
- Has there been any change in your life? How was daily life?
- Probe in to see whether there has been any change in his/her friendship circles, or relationship with neighbours?
- Did it change anything in your political involvement?
o Were you worried?
  ▪ If yes, what was your main worry?
  ▪ Probe to look for perception of collective vs. personal threat
o Did you trust in the state for providing security? Was there enough police/security force?
o What kind of protective measures did you take?
  ▪ Probe in to see trust in the security forces
o What do you think about Fujimori?
o What do you think about autogolpe?
  o Do you think accumulation of power in one hand was useful as compared to a more democratic structure?
o How do you think Fujimori do in managing the conflict situation?
  o Try to probe in to understand whether the respondent can differentiate government and state.
o How did you feel during the 1990s when Shining Path had expanded into cities, and when it was more powerful?
  o Probe in to see whether he/she felt hopeless, wasn’t able to see the end, was very afraid?
  o Did you feel protected enough by the government?
o Have you ever considered moving elsewhere?
o Did you have the same opinion for Shining Path from the very beginning? Or did the developments alter your evaluation/perception?
o What did you think/feel when you heard about the capture of Gúzman?
o Have you EVER heard of Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
  o If yes, what do you think about its findings?
  o Do you think that the Commission Report satisfied your expectations? What was the best aspect about it? The worst?
  o What do you think is the best way for a society to come to terms with a violent past?
DISPLACED POPULATIONS
- What do you think of the internal migration?
- How did the city/locality change after the wave of migration?
- How do you see/evaluate the impact of these migrants in your community?
  - Probe in for damages/contributions
- Do you mind having one of them as your neighbours?
- Do you care about the owners of businesses?
  - Probe in to see if he discriminates against indigenous peoples
- Would you care if your daughter/son marries someone from the Sierra/indigenous person?

CURRENT SITUATION
- Do you think violence is over?
- Do you participate in politics? (Vote, membership in parties, demonstrations, etc…)
- Tell me what you think about current Peruvian politics.
  - What do you think about current parties?
  - Probe in to understand his/her trust in parties, parliament and government.
Table A 7. Data by Country Summarizing the DV and IVs Across the Years

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Table A 9. Full Results of the Country-Year Cluster Models

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| National Pride                |                |                     |                |                     |
| (base=Not proud)              |                |                     |                |                     |
| Not Very Proud                | 0.510***       | 0.0821*             | 0.514***       | 0.0714              |
|                               | (0.045)        | (0.044)             | (0.046)        | (0.044)             |
| Quiet Proud                   | 1.020***       | 0.269***            | 1.026***       | 0.257***            |
|                               | (0.058)        | (0.051)             | (0.058)        | (0.051)             |
| Very Proud                    | 1.308***       | 0.235***            | 1.311***       | 0.232***            |
|                               | (0.070)        | (0.063)             | (0.071)        | (0.063)             |
| Age                           | 0.0107         | 0.0269***           | 0.0108         | 0.0265***           |
|                               | (0.007)        | (0.008)             | (0.007)        | (0.008)             |
| Intercept                     | 0              | -0.847***           | 0              | -0.846***           |
|                               | (0.201)        | (0.200)             |               |                     |

Observations: 317,836 326,168 317,836 326,168

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Standard errors in parentheses
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Group-level Variables: Country (N=89), Country-year (250)
Political Trust is on a 0-1 continuum and Interpersonal Trust is coded as 0 and 1.
Table A 11. Logit Models with Exponentiated Coefficients/Odds Ratios

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<td>-------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Very Proud</td>
<td>1.664***</td>
<td>1.085*</td>
<td>1.672***</td>
<td>1.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
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<td>Quiet Proud</td>
<td>2.771***</td>
<td>1.307***</td>
<td>2.787***</td>
<td>1.291***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Very Proud</td>
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<td>3.702***</td>
<td>1.258***</td>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>1.003***</td>
<td>1.002*</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table A 12. Robustness Checks Results With Different Sets of Variables

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Lagged Ideol. Viol_ Categorl. (base=No ideol. viol.)</th>
<th>Political Trust</th>
<th>IP Trust</th>
<th>Political Trust</th>
<th>IP Trust</th>
<th>Political Trust</th>
<th>IP Trust</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-1.438***</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>1.279***</td>
<td>1.333***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>-0.708***</td>
<td>-0.254</td>
<td>-0.702***</td>
<td>-0.370**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ethnic Viol_Categoryl. Base=No ethnic wars</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsecessionist</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.607***</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.688***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
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<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.821***</td>
<td>0.161</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>Lagged GDP (WDI)</td>
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<td>0.207***</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
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<td>Dem. Index VDem</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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<td>(0.28)</td>
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<td>321742</td>
<td>231037</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Note: IP refers to Interpersonal.
Table A 13. Comparing the Results Different Indicators of Political Trust

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Confidence in Parliament</th>
<th>(2) Confidence in Government</th>
<th>(3) Confidence in Parliament</th>
<th>(4) Confidence in Government</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ideolog. Viol.</td>
<td>-0.483**</td>
<td>-0.266*</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged Ethnic Violence</td>
<td>0.744***</td>
<td>0.335*</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Ideological Violence_Categorical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(base=No ideol. viol.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-2.007***</td>
<td>-1.831***</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.643***</td>
<td>-0.315*</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged Ethnic Violence_Categorical</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(base=No ethnic viol.)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.575***</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
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<td>0.458***</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Political Trust</th>
<th>(2) Interpersonal Trust</th>
<th>(3) Political Trust</th>
<th>(4) Interpersonal Trust</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Lagged Ideological Violence</td>
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<td>-0.041*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagged Ideological Violence_Categorical</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>-0.053***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>Lagged Ethnic Violence_Categorical</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(base=No ethnic viol.)</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>Var (Country)</td>
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<td>0.012***</td>
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<td>(0.00)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var (Country-year)</td>
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<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
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<td>0.073***</td>
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