PACIFYING ALEMÃO: ARTICULATIONS OF PUBLIC SECURITY, MARKET FORMALIZATION, AND AUTOCONSTRUCTION IN RIO DE JANEIRO

by

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Abstract

The complex of favelas known as Complexo do Alemão in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil has recently been targeted by two large-scale state projects: infrastructural upgrading via the country’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC, or “urbanization”) and military police occupation via the Police Pacifying Unit program (UPP, or “pacification”). In this dissertation I focus on the various regimes of power, profit, and discourse that constitute these state presences. Based on participant observation, interviews, policy analysis, and popular discourse analysis, I argue that a global urban research agenda requires theorizing in historically and geographically-situated ways. Inspired by the Gramscian tradition, by Brazilian urbanists, by modernity/coloniality scholars of Latin America, and by local activists, I develop a conceptual framework that integrates four different characteristics of urbanization projects. They are informed by historical processes; shaped by flows of capital, people, and policy; negotiated between civil society and state; and influenced by myriad regimes of power. Through this framework I make two related arguments. First, I argue that PAC and pacification strategies overlap in a nexus that I call PACification. PACification joins together marketization, the construction of racialized threats, and violent securitization. It manifests in strategies to attract international investment, extend microfinance, enroll people in mortgages, and foment entrepreneurial behavior, often informed by military police violence. Second, I argue that residents’ and activists’ modes of autoconstruction – in which people build their own communities often over generations – are central to the contemporary manifestation of PACification. Presently, residents are not only building communities out of bricks and mortar, but also through discourses, images, texts, and digital practices in order to safeguard their neighbours and to improve their daily lives.
Lay Summary

Rio de Janeiro’s low-income communities have recently become sites of government programs and investment designed to “upgrade” favelas, to improve the lives of their residents, and to redirect money to state-supported public and private entities. Drawing from field research in one such community, Complexo do Alemão, this dissertation examines the relationship between two of these large-scale state projects: infrastructural upgrading via the country’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC); and military police occupation via the Police Pacifying Unit program (UPP). I call the nexus of these programs PACification. I find that, first, PACification echoes and transforms a longer history of exploitation of racialized peoples and low-income communities by state officials and military police to secure infrastructure and attract international business investment. Second, I find that favela residents’ reactions and resistance are both influential in shaping the implementation of these projects and integral to residents’ sense of community.
Preface

This dissertation is original and independent work of the author, Valerie Carolyn Prouse.

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Glossary

AgeRio: Rio de Janeiro’s State Development Agency

Alemão: hill in Complexo do Alemão (the complex of favelas takes its name after this one hill); also the name of a station on the teleferico line

Alvorada: a hill in Complexo do Alemão on which B55 is located; it is also the hill on which UPP-Nova Brasília and the Itararé teleferico stations are located

Asfalto: asphalt; a colloquial term used to refer to the formal city, the non-morro

Banco do Brasil: Bank of Brazil

Barraco #55/Barraco/B55: a cultural and research institute in Complexo do Alemão run by Eddu Grau and Ellen Sluis

BNDES: O Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento; The Brazilian Development Bank

BNH: O Banco Nacional da Habitação; National Housing Bank

Bonsucesso: a neighborhood in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro located at the base of Complexo do Alemão; also the site of the first teleferico station where the gondola integrates with the train station

BOPE: O Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais; Police Special Operations Battalion of the PM of Rio de Janeiro

CEF: Caixa Econômica Federal; Federal Savings Bank

CJ: Complexo Jornal; Complexo Journal; a Facebook news page

CNPJ: Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica; National Registry of Legal Entities; the registration of a legal person or entity with the Receita Federal do Brasil

COHAB: Companhia de Habitação do Estado (State Housing Company)

CPR: Coletivo Papo Reto (Straight Talk Collective); an anti-militarization collective in CPX

CPX: Complexo do Alemão/Complexo/Alemão: A complex of favelas in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro; commonly referred to as “CPX” and “Complexo” by residents who live there, and “Alemão” by those who do not

CRI: Cartório de Registro de Imóveis; Real Estate Registry Office
Dilma: Dilma Rousseff; leader of the PT; former President of the Republic of Brazil

Eduardo Paes: former mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro; affiliated with the PMDB

EMOP: Empresa de Obras Públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro; Public Works Company of the State of Rio de Janeiro; the public company responsible for PAC-Social Work and infrastructural development of PAC-Alemão

Empresa Bacana: “Cool” Company; the municipal program that promotes formalization of businesses in pacified communities

FAFEG: Federação de Associação de Favelas do Estado da Guanabara; Federation of Favela Associations of the State of Guanabara; became FAFERJ when Guanabara became Rio de Janeiro

FAFERJ: Federação de Associação de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro; Federation of Favela Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro; previously FAFEG

FAT: Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador; The Worker’s Assistance Fund

FGTS: Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço; Guarantee Fund Based on Service Time Contributions

FI-FGTS: O Fundo de Investimento do Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço; The Investment Fund of the Guarantee Fund Based on Service Time Contributions; a special fund of the FGTS used to finance infrastructural projects

FJRF: Fórum de Juventudes de Rio de Janeiro; Youth Forum of Rio de Janeiro

Fundão UPP Empreendedor: UPP Entrepreneur Fund

IADB: InterAmerican Development Bank

IPAC: Instituto de Aposentadorias e Pensões dos Comerciários; The Retirement and Pensions Institute

IPEA: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada; Institute for Applied Economic Research

IPP: O Instituto Pereira Passos; Pereira Passos Institute

Itararé: the name for the teleferico station on Alvorada; the closest station to B55
ITERJ: O Instituto de Terras e Cartografia do Estado do Rio de Janeiro; *The Institute of Land and Cartography of the State of Rio de Janeiro*

JCN: Jornal Complexo Noticias; *Complexo Notices Journal*; a Facebook news page run by a journalist and photographer in CPX

Jovem Negro Vivo: *Young Black Alive*; an Amnesty International campaign

Lava Jato: *Car Wash*; the federal level judicial investigation into graft and bribery scandals targeting many Brazilian politicians and corporations such as Cabral and Odebrecht

Lula: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; former leader of the federal PT; former President of the Republic of Brazil

MCMV: Minha Casa Minha Vida; *My House, My Life*; the PT’s federal housing project intended to simultaneously tackle Brazil’s housing deficit and be a counter-cyclical economic program

Morar Carioca: *Live Rio*; a progressive planning program for favela urbanization of Rio de Janeiro

Morro: *hill*; a colloquial term used to refer to the informal city, to favelas

Nós por Nós: *Us for Us*; a digital application for police accountability developed by FJRJ

Nova Brasília: a neighborhood that is part of Complexo do Alemão; also the name of the UPP unit located adjacent to the Itararé teleferico station

Odebrecht: one of the Four Sisters of Brazilian construction oligarchies; a central actor in the consortium that won the bid for PAC-Alemão

PAC: O Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento; *Growth Acceleration Program*; a project of the former PT government of Brazil focused on mitigating financial crises and upgrading infrastructure throughout the country

PAC-Trabalho Social: *PAC Social Work*; the body responsible for consulting with the Complexo do Alemão community; administered by EMOP

Palmeiras: a hill in Complexo do Alemão; also the last station on the teleferico line and site of a tourist market

PDT: O Partido Democrático Trabalhista; *Workers’ Democratic Party*

PF: Pastoral das Favelas; *Pastoral of Favelas*; an entity created by the Catholic Church in 1976 and informed by liberation theology
PM: A Polícia Militar; Military Police; a civilian force of the state of Rio de Janeiro

PMDB: O Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

PRONASCI: O Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania; the Program for Public Security with Citizenship; PAC’s public security program

PT: O Partido dos Trabalhadores; Workers’ Party

ReM: Raízes em Movimento; Roots in Movement; a Complexo-based NGO

Rio de Janeiro: both a municipality and a state in Brazil

Rio Mais Social/Rio+Social: Rio Plus Social; formerly UPP Social, now run by the municipality of Rio de Janeiro; focused on social inclusion and economic development programs in pacified favelas

SEBRAE: O Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas; Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service; a private entity that promotes competitiveness and sustainable development of small businesses

SEHAB: A Secretaria de Estado de Habitação de Interesse Social; State Secretary of Social Interest Housing

Sérgio Cabral: former governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro; affiliated with the PMDB; now incarcerated via the Lava Jato investigation for taking bribes while governor

SMDS: A Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social; Municipal Secretary of Social Development

SMH: A Secretaria Municipal de Habitação; Municipal Secretary of Housing

UPP: A Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora; Police Pacifying Unit Program; a program administered by the government of the state of Rio de Janeiro; commonly referred to as “pacification”

UPP Social: the former third stage of the UPP program, now called Rio Mais Social

VdC: Jornal Voz da Comunidade; Voice of the Community Journal; a multi-platform social journalism collective founded in CPX

WB: World Bank
ZEIS: also AEIS; Zonas/Áreas Especiais de Interesse Social; *Zones or Areas of Special Social Interest*; a special planning tool to allow for regularization of low-income areas
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To those missing from our lives, from Complexo do Alemão, Brazil to Toronto, Canada
Chapter 1: Introduction: PACifying Alemão

A few times a week, four of us residents from Barraco #55 in Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, would walk to the top of our hill, Alvorada, and enter Itararé station. The inside of Itararé station is sparse, made of concrete and painted bright yellow. Classical musical can be heard emanating from the speakers above the low-grade din. We wait in line for our turn to climb onto the gondola system. After the Supervia worker invites us into an empty car, we are whisked along the heavy cable and emerge from the other side of the building (Fig 1.1). The complex of favelas opens up underneath. One hundred feet in the air we can see thousands of reddish-orange brick buildings on the eight hills that were within view. People, cars, VW vans, and motobikes fill the alleyways and streets of varying sizes that meander between the buildings. We can see clearly onto the rooftops (“lajes”) of many houses, on which people are cooking, tanning, chatting (Fig 1.2). It feels uncomfortably voyeuristic, floating so high above Complexo residents. But the vantage point, the speed, create a thrilling sensation, too. This is the teleferico, Complexo do Alemão’s largest Growth Acceleration Program (O Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, or PAC)-funded project.

We ride the gondola system only one stop and get off at Alemão. This station is much like Itararé, but also houses a number of large recreation rooms occupied by Rio municipal and state services, such as a medical clinic and a crèche for children. Our destination is different: we head around the outside of the building and enter a long, bright room with mirrors at one end and blue mats covering the floor. Mestre Juarez, a lean, older man with greying hair, greets us enthusiastically and ushers us into a circle in the middle of the room. Here, we will practice capoeira and, if we are lucky, today we will face one another in a roda (Fig 1.3).₁

On our way home after class, we emerge from Itararé teleferico station and happen upon six heavily armed military police officers. They are young, in their 30s, both men and women sporting black uniforms with bullet proof vests. Most conspicuous are the long machine guns

₁ Capoeira is an Afro-Brazilian martial art. Its heritage is often traced to the slave plantations in Brazil, where enslaved peoples – generally African or of African descent – would practice fighting moves in a dance-like, clandestine manner. When slavery was officially abolished in Brazil in 1888, the government outlawed practices of capoeira (see Huggins 1984). Today, it is resurging as a martial art. The roda is the manner of playing capoeira. All players stand in a circle, while two enter the person-made ring and face one another.
they hold at their sides. They chat with each other, ignoring the local residents around them. To my right, towering next to the large teleferico station is another building, similar in structure, whose concrete and glass overshadows the short, brick houses and shops of the favela. Written in large blue letters at the top of the building is UPP Nova Brasília. This is a station of the pacification project, housing the occupying military police force that is attempting to drive out narcotraffic and facilitate formal market activities in favelas deemed high risk in Rio de Janeiro.

These two large buildings, nestled side-by-side on the top of Alvorada, represent two of the largest so-called public security, development, integration, and inclusion programs in Rio at the current socio-historical conjuncture. They epitomize what Mariana Cavalcanti (2009; see also Cavalcanti 2014a, 2014b, 2015) calls the two most significant vectors of social change in Rio’s favelas: the politics of concrete (upgrading) and the politics of cocaine (narcotrafficking). The politics of concrete refers to the construction of large-scale infrastructural projects in Brazilian favelas, a process also called favela urbanization, favela consolidation, or slum upgrading. The most concerted and comprehensive project of upgrading is the Urbanização de Assentamentos Precários (Urbanization of Precarious Settlements) arm of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) of Brazil’s federal PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or Workers’ Party) government, which has invested the most money to-date in infrastructure for Rio’s favelas. The teleferico has been the largest and most visible PAC project in the country’s precarious settlements. However, it has recently proven to be the largest white elephant of PAC: as of early 2017, the teleferico is not currently operating due, reportedly, to the state’s non-payment to the Consortium that runs the system because of lack of adequate financial returns. The teleferico’s management companies (first Supervia, then the Consortium of Rio Telefericos) and its owner (SETRANS, the Secretary of State for Transport for Rio de Janeiro) have not been able to profit from the subsidized costs of Complexo residents’ tickets, and residents and tourists have not been using the teleferico at the rates anticipated. The infrastructural project has also been in the news for another insidious reason: Brazil’s contentious Lava Jato investigation and parallel inquiries have accused Odebrecht, the large Brazilian construction company that won the so-called public
and open bid to build the teleferico, of bribing the state’s PMDB (the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) government.

The politics of cocaine refers to the circuits of narcotraffic that are embedded in some favela communities. The politics of cocaine has resulted in what is officially called the Police Pacifying Unit Program (also called A Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP, or pacification), the Rio state government’s program to permanently occupy favelas that have a large presence of narcotraffic activity. The goal of the program is to drive out narcotraffickers and retake territory in three stages: invasion, occupation, and training/social development (UPP’s Concept 2012; Prouse 2012). The military police, the force that operates the UPP project, has been in Complexo since 2010. But they, too, like the teleferico have recently been making headlines for all the wrong reasons: since Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup in 2014, shootouts between narcotraffickers and police have increased substantially in Complexo, such that not a day goes by without gunfire, and people on all sides of the violent encounters are being killed.

The UPP and teleferico stations are the infrastructural manifestations of these disparate but sometimes overlapping new state projects (Fig 1.4 & Fig 1.5). They also materialize the contradictions between said projects. The attempt by the UPP to secure the community for infrastructural development has brought violence that makes the infrastructure sometimes impossible to use. Indeed, the close proximity of the teleferico and pacification stations throughout Complexo meant that, while the teleferico was operational, if there was tension or active shootouts, it was nearly impossible to ride the gondola system safely and service was often halted for this reason.

This dissertation interrogates the articulation of PAC and pacification projects, and the effects that these projects have had on the lives of people in Complexo. In this introductory chapter I outline how I arrived at this project, and then discuss my main research questions and arguments. Next, I briefly examine the term favela and argue that, although being a fraught concept, retains usefulness for its centrality in policy discourse and popular socio-spatial imaginaries. I conclude the chapter by presenting an outline of the dissertation.
1.1 Research Journey

I begin this dissertation with capoeira not only because it was my major and regular interaction with the teleferico, but also because it helps me to think about my positionality as a researcher in Complexo. While I could not always understand what Mestre said – particularly at the beginning of my trip – I could understand, to a certain extent, the bodily movements.² It was here, moving on the mats, that I first started to feel at ease in Complexo – it was a space where I first felt that I could understand what was happening. But my ability to play also put me ill at ease. My race, gender, and foreignness, alongside my quasi-adeptness at the game, made me a favourite of Mestre, as the gringa capoeirista. I garnered too much attention from him, often to the frustration of my friends and other capoeira players. My ongoing experiences of capoeira forced me to constantly confront this positionality: as someone who was an “outsider” with privileges because of this status, and also as someone who did not always understand what was being said (explicitly or implicitly). But it also allowed me to see how forms of communication other than the spoken word are important for earning trust and knowledge, and indeed my commitment to playing and the friends I made through the game were important in sustaining my work – both in contributing to my research, but also in providing a support network in times of stress and isolation.

It would be irresponsible of me to write away the differences of privilege, race, and positionality that divide me from those I engaged with most closely for this dissertation. However, this project was envisioned as a way to more responsibly engage with urbanization processes happening in the Global South, despite my successes and failures at so doing. Initially entering the PhD program at UBC I had planned on conducting a research project on FIFA – the Federation Internationale de Football Association, and its prestigious tournament – the FIFA World Cup of Soccer – to be hosted by Brazil in 2014. I quickly become

² That is not to stay, of course, that my embodiment of the movements was akin to slaves who practiced capoeira – often for their own protection – on plantations in Brazil. Rather, I simply mean to suggest that I could mimic these movements and use my body in similar ways.
frustrated with the mega event literature’s propensity to fetishize or ignore the multiscalar and co-constitutive ways that mega events manifest on the ground. Specifically with respect to the World Cup in Brazil, there was a tendency for this literature to study only FIFA, the immediate event itself, and its impact, and to not engage the complexities of Brazil’s own political economies, histories of racialization, and gender relations, amongst other forms of power. At the same time, new to geography, I was increasingly compelled by current debates in urban studies about the need to decolonize the discipline, to provincialize urban theory. Interested in establishing meaningful relationships with Brazilians affected by mega-event developments, as well as understanding Rio de Janeiro’s own urbanization processes that were articulated to a mega event agenda, I turned my focus to Brazil’s upgrading and integration programs.

After this initial shift in focus, my purpose (written into my research proposal) was to understand how PAC decisions are made and how the teleferico, specifically, came into being. However, living amongst Complexo residents, I became more sensitive to their own concerns. Even while the teleferico was operational they often referred to it as a white elephant – a large flashy project of President Lula’s that has had less-than-hoped for impacts on favela mobility. The people with whom I lived were as, if not more, interested in discussing pacification – their daily lives are shaped not only by infrastructural upgrades, but also by the presence of the military police and the conflicts with drug traffickers that the security force incites. Residents often spoke of these programs in the same breath, as both represent new forms of state intervention in a territory that has, historically, appeared (at least superficially) abandoned by all levels of government.

My research is also shaped by personal connections that placed me in a fortuitous relationship with a research, culture, and arts organization in Complexo do Alemão. Barraco #55, known by locals as Barraco, or simply B55, is located near the top of Alvorada, in close proximity to both the aforementioned Itararé teleferico station and the UPP Nova Brasília headquarters (Fig 1.6). One of the founders of Barraco – Eddu Grau – was born and raised in Complexo. He is a respected musician and community organizer. His wife, Ellen Sluis from
Holland, is the other founder of Barraco. Barraco #55 has set itself up to be a gathering place for researchers from around the world to come and contribute to programs and initiatives being developed by the Complexo community. Living in B55 placed me at the center of Complexo activist events. Ellen and Eddu are prominent members of the activist community and often host meetings in their kitchen. Their door is also always open to community youth, who would come into the house for a glass of water, to work on a song with Eddu, or simply to chat. I got to know quite a few residents and activists through living in B55. Moreover, I partook in a number of different projects that resident artists and researchers were organizing. For instance, I helped set up an exhibit about kite-flying, a favourite pastime of youth in Complexo. I also swept floors and prepared food for community parties. Staying with Barraco #55 allowed me to be participant observer in these programs and spaces and allowed me to develop invaluable relationships that hopefully will last well beyond this specific dissertation project. It also allowed me to work closely with Andre Valle, who became a valuable interlocutor in Complexo (Fig 1.7). I discuss this methodology at greater length in the following chapter. First, however, I turn to the major arguments that these methods have helped me formulate.

1.2 The Argument

This dissertation is guided by a number of interrelated concerns. How have these twin state projects – infrastructural upgrading and pacification – come into being, how are they connected, and how have they re-ordered life in Complexo do Alemão? I follow Mariana Cavalcanti in thinking of infrastructural upgrading as “embedded in very specific regimes of power that have not been as of yet fully assessed in social science research and are glossed over by generalizing ‘slum’-type arguments” (2009:1020-1021). I focus specifically on the

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3 Their organization does not identify as an NGO because NGOs in this community are often thought of as outsiders that do not respond to the needs of Complexo residents; they tend to be associated with “external” agendas.

4 Projects such as these have proliferated since pacification and urbanization programs began in CPX. I was part of a first wave of scholars and researchers to enter the community post-pacification (occupation), and certainly benefited from lack of research fatigue and the interest many (though certainly not all) residents had in talking with me. This situation is quickly changing, I gather, as more and more dissertations and theses are being published on the pacification process.
regimes of power that have produced the teleferico – particularly as these regimes operate through Brazilian political elites who have often relied on favelas as spaces of “informality” for political capital. But I also look at the connections between the two projects of upgrading and pacification, discussing their points of articulation. In focusing on these articulations I draw on the provocation of Brazilian urbanist Vera da Silva Telles, who compels me to “unravel the links between production and expansion of markets, the forms of control and power dispositifs, and the situation of renewed conflict that spreads to all spaces” (2015:22). These programs are not simply top-down impositions of power. Telles urges me to look at the “government interface,” or the myriad agents and contested relationships between political and civil society that characterize these programs. Indeed, the actions of civil society are crucial for understanding processes of urbanization in Brazil’s peripheries. The targeted communities of contemporary large-scale infrastructural projects – such as Complexo do Alemão – have historically been autoconstructed by residents themselves, who over a period of decades have built their own houses and communities in relationships with one another, fomenting a critical consciousness, or insurgent citizenship, that seeks rights and resources from the state (Caldeira 2017; Holston 2009).

In this dissertation project, instead of drawing primarily on theory produced about Global North cities, I have followed a postcolonial/global urbanism agenda by focusing on urbanization projects in spaces often relegated to the margins of urban theorizing – in this case, Rio de Janeiro. But I have tried to not only displace my theorizations to particular urban centres such as Rio; I have also tried to engage responsibly and reciprocally with people who tend to be marginalized by hegemonic theory production of the urban, such as Brazilian urbanists and residents and activists of favelas such as Complexo do Alemão. As such, I follow modernity/coloniality theorists, informed by historical experiences in what is now called Latin America, to shift the locus of enunciation of theory production. Following this

5 Scholars from across the world engage with the modernity/coloniality approach. However, much of this framework has been informed by the specific experiences of colonization in the so-called New World and, more specifically, South America and Latin America. Much of their argument is oriented towards decolonization – or undoing the harmful and ongoing effects of coloniality. As such, throughout this dissertation I variously refer to this framework as “modernity/coloniality,” “decolonial” and “of Latin America,” but realize these terms are contentious and worthy of geographical critiques.
methodology, I try to understand how knowledges continue to be marginalized both by large infrastructural projects and within the very theory produced about these projects.

The objective of this dissertation research project is thus two-fold: the first is political, as my research contributes to understanding ongoing forms of uneven power relationships that marginalize particular bodies, spaces, and knowledges through practices of urbanization. Hopefully some of my insights may be of use to social justice movements in Brazil. The second purpose is theoretical, as I attempt to bring into conversation debates in Brazilian urban studies, Latin American decolonial philosophy, and hegemonic English-language urban and critical development studies, and think about how to theorize Rio de Janeiro as an “ordinary city” (Robinson 2006) whose politics and programs are rooted in historically contested processes.

My broad research questions, then, are as follows:

1. What are the effects of locating theory in and of the so-called South to explain urbanization processes? How might debates in and of Brazil (with respect to favelas) and Latin America (with respect to coloniality), alongside contentions of locally-based activists, inform a conceptual apparatus and mode of understanding urban politics in ordinary cities? How does shifting the locus of enunciation of theory production allow us to understand the contestations over power, meaning, and ways of being in these spaces that are increasingly the target of market formalization and public security projects?

Drawing from this conceptual and methodological orientation, I ask specifically:

2. How are PAC projects, such as the teleferico, created through historically embedded and contested regimes of power in Brazil? How might we understand so-called favelas (and other precarious settlement-like places) not as spaces of exteriority and exoticism, but instead as integral to, relational with, and co-constitutive of, the more “formal” city and its regimes of power? What can the articulations of these regimes of power tell us about the tensions and contradictions of current market formalization and security projects?
3. How do PAC and pacification articulate? In other words, what are their points of
resonance – their shared purposes and effects? What are the histories of
accumulation, marketization, and violence that undergird both of these programs?
How do these projects, together, shape the actions of people in their everyday lives?
4. And how are the citizens targeted by “inclusive” infrastructural and public security
projects making new claims on political society and the state? How are they
mobilizing their own means of formalization, inclusion, and autoconstruction as a
function of these government-led projects?

My argument is both methodological and conceptual. I argue that a postcolonial or global
urban agenda requires theorizing in historically and geographically-situated ways. It requires
shifting the locus of enunciation of theory production to include theorizations from: linguistic
margins such as Brazilian Portuguese geography; the people who grapple with these projects
in their everyday lives; and activists who are naming and contesting various forms of state-led violence. Such people hold an epistemic privilege for the myriad forms of power that intersect and shape their lives, and thus inhabit a crucial situated perspective from which to understand the ways these projects come into being and their differential effects. Relatedly, urbanization programs – here formalization and public security programs – are never simply top-down, state-led impositions but rather take shape through contested processes operating at different scales. As such, I argue that a conjunctural conceptual framework – inspired by Gramscian scholars, Brazilian urbanists, and modernity/coloniality philosophers of Latin America – is crucial for understanding present-day patterns of urbanization.

Following this framework, I make two interrelated arguments with respect to market
formalization and public security in Rio’s favelas wrought through PAC and pacification.
First, I argue that these projects are articulated in a nexus that I call PACification.6
PACification represents the conjoining of conjuncturally-specific activities related to

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6 Mariana Cavalcanti (2014b) briefly introduces the term PACification in her chapter in Graham & McFarlane’s *Infrastructural Lives* (it is, admittedly, an obvious portmanteau that I began developing before reading her chapter). She uses it to refer to how PAC and UPP have both been used as a form of social control and business investment in Rio’s quest to become an Olympic city. While some of our contemporary focus is similar, I use the concept in a more deeply historical way, pointing to continuities and cleavages with forms of power and social difference throughout Brazil’s history. I also emphasize the militarized and racialized nature of this project of market formalization and extension (see Chapter 4.4).
marketization promoted by both PAC and pacification. These include income and employment generation, infrastructural development, attraction of international investment, regularization of property rights, and advancement of microcredit. Such activities are shaped by a historically-determined public security apparatus that attempts to violently manage socio-political processes of the past, specifically the proliferation of the narco-trade, the inherited tactics of military police violence, and racialized-classed intersections that shape hyperexploitation and killability. In other words, both PAC and pacification are simultaneously oriented towards market formalization, consumption, and public security in Rio’s favelas, and are indelibly shaped by past struggles. The term PACification captures these intertwined impulses. Understood this way, PACification is the latest iteration of a historical project that unites market-making with security through military police action in Brazilian territory. I argue that, taking this longer historical view, PACification is a conjuncturally-specific territorialization, in Rio’s favelas, of the coloniality of power: a nexus that is shaped by ongoing forms of coloniality that articulates market formalization and extension, the construction of racialized threats, and a militarized approach to public security. To see PAC and pacification as interrelated also points to how these projects rely upon, but also contradict, one another, thus shaping their ongoing failures in places such as Complexo do Alemão.

Second, I argue that residents’ and activists’ modes of building their own houses and communities – of autoconstruction – are central to the contemporary manifestation of PACification. Autoconstruction in PACified places such as Complexo do Alemão is being transformed as these communities become targets of large-scale urbanization projects, being brought into new visceral relationships with multiple state forces. While previous forms of autoconstruction created insurgent citizens who fought the government for rights, at the present moment these insurgent citizens are trying to hold the government apparatus accountable for its actions and to the constitutionally-enshrined rights that previous movements achieved. They do so in the wake of ongoing contradictions, failures, and violences of PACification. These insurgent citizens are not simply building communities out of bricks and mortar, but also through discourse, images, texts, and digital practices. The productive power of discourse – of enunciations – is crucial to how their critiques and
insurgence operate. They are intervening in popular discourses of PACification to critique resource usurpation and lack of consultation; and they are re-shaping the knowledge-power apparatus of the military police by proliferating images of police killings. These new forms of autoconstruction involve negotiations over both digital and physical space, as residents and activists appropriate and re-shape government-led efforts of surveillance and formalization. Here, autoconstruction is not a practice exterior to power, but is often a reaction to, or operates in relation with, myriad state actors. Ultimately, though, the auto remains an important signifier in these PACification struggles, as the construction of community and insurgent citizenships continues to be a negotiated, community-led effort to live with and protect one another under conditions of violence.

1.3 Brief Note on Favelas

Before presenting an outline of this dissertation, it is important that I briefly address a tension that underpins my work. I use the term “favela” throughout the dissertation, yet a favela is a fraught concept. Favela is generally translated into English as “slum” or “shantytown,” and may be used as a metonym for backwardness (Rao 2006; Roy 2011). The term favela also has negative connotations in Brazilian Portuguese: it tends to codify low-income spaces as informal, violent, and poor; and it has been used as a label that homogenizes “peripheral” regions of Brazilian cities. In reality, however, poverty cannot be mapped specifically onto favela space. Many favelas have low- and middle-income residents, and many other impoverished communities are not considered favelas (Cavalcanti 2009).

There are a number of different characteristics that Brazilian scholars utilize to define and problematize favelas. What unites many communities popularly deemed “favelas” is their

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7 The term “periphery” gained widespread usage in the 1960s to replace previous terms for marginal spaces (namely “suburb” and “rural”). Explains James Holston: “In this changing vocabulary, the notion of periphery does not refer to an excluded outer space of capitalism in which the underclasses supposedly exist. Rather, it refers to relations of mutual dependence – to social productions of space – in which component parts define each other through apparatuses of domination and response. Each comprises political, legal, social, and infrastructural elements whose interrelations change and whose discursive use sometimes homogenizes. Consequently, as both places and concepts, the key terms ‘periphery,’ ‘city,’ and ‘urban’ shift in location and significance through time and juro-political contexts, which, in any case, are almost always lost in translation.” (2009:147)
autoconstructed nature – homes built by family and community over generations (Caldeira 2017; Holston, 2009); the presence of various “illicit” electricity, cable, and internet connections (Holston 2009; Alves & Evanson 2011); and the fact that many residents have de facto but not legal title to land (Cavalancti 2009). Most residents of so-called favelas buy or rent their houses within the informal market (McCann 2014). Bryan McCann believes that “absence of property title…has remained the single most consistent characteristic of favelas for more than a century” (2014:25), although this situation is quickly changing with large-scale land regularization programs. Many scholars, too, focus on a particular form of stigma as defining the difference between morro (hill, favela, informal city) and asfalto (asphalt, neighborhood, formal city). Janice Perlman explains, “Perhaps the single persistent distinction between favelas and the rest of the city is the deeply rooted stigma that adheres to them and to those who reside in them” (2011:30).

Defining favelas as “risky” territory has been central to evolving forms of state intervention in these territories. Historically this risk has been framed in terms of poverty and disease (Fischer 2014, 2008), but more recently has been associated with narcotrafficking and violence: “This stigma of favela residents as the carriers of violence seemed to replace an older one based on class prejudice” (McCann 2014:11). The result has been increasingly large scale infrastructural and public security interventions intended to ameliorate the favela’s risk and to facilitate market formalization. Theorists of Brazil thus often refer to favelas as “frontiers” of global capital (see Telles 2015; Martins 1997), pointing to the historic absence of formal markets in these spaces and the increasing focus of the state on introducing market mechanisms.

Most of these definitions, or defining features, of favelas emphasize lack. What is also indisputable to people who call themselves favelados,8 however, is that the favela entails a range of knowledges and experiences from which communities derive strength and cohesion, though these latter aspects are underrepresented in political, popular, and scholarly discourses. I thus use the term “favelas” throughout the dissertation, as most of my

8 The term “favelado” has historically been used with derision to connote people living in favelas as backwards and lazy. However, many favela residents have recently re-appropriated the term to refer to one another with a sense of pride and community (Leeds 1996).
interviewees and interlocutors used this term. The notion of “favela” is also central to the policy agendas of municipal, state, and federal governments, which depend on the popular socio-spatial imaginary of favelas as “risky” territories, but also potential market opportunities. In using the term favela, then, I do not want to reproduce this stigma, rather draw attention to its performative effects. I also want to take seriously the ways that people living in Complexo do Alemão talk about themselves.

1.4 Dissertation Outline

The dissertation is structured in two parts. The first part lays out my foundational and conceptual approach of a conjunctural analysis, while the second part operationalizes this approach with respect to more empirically-focused material. In the next chapter, which begins part one, I present my conceptual framework and methodology. Here I discuss the interrelated problem spaces of urban studies that guide my methodological considerations. These include: postcolonial provocations to theorize from ordinary cities; Brazilian urban theorizations of the relationality of favelas and contested state/civil society interface; and Latin American decolonial philosophy that stresses the centrality of ongoing histories of colonialism. I then elaborate a conceptual framework that guides my method and analysis. Drawing on the aforementioned scholars, and placing them in conversation with the work of Gramscian-inspired geographers as well as activists and organizers in Complexo, I explain my conjunctural analytic. This framework centres four different characteristics of urbanization projects: they are historically determined, shaped by histories of colonization and relations of power that continue to exert influence over contemporary programs; they are shaped by flows of ideas, capital, and discourses operating at multiple interrelated scales; they are constructed through processes of articulation in the word’s dual sense (they manifest through the *conjoining* of modes of production and regimes of power, and are constituted through the productive power of *enunciations* and discourse); and they represent ongoing contestations of the relationality between state, economy, and civil society. I then discuss the methods used throughout the dissertation.
In Chapter 3 I present a granular genealogy of public security and urbanization projects in Rio de Janeiro, specifically. Through so doing, I demonstrate how favelas must be understood as the product of specific conjunctural forces I outlined in Chapter 2 (that is, they are historically determined, are shaped by interscalar flows, are the products of articulated power regimes and socio-spatial imaginaries, and are territorializations of negotiations between state and civil society). Here I highlight the ongoing relationships between these so-called “informal” areas and the formal city. Indeed, favelas have never been abandoned, despite popular and policy rhetoric. Rather, they have always been objects of intervention for different levels of government and elite actors, and present-day manifestations of public security and market formalization in these areas are informed by, and transform, these historical regimes of power. I conclude this chapter by presenting a history of the specific community of favelas within which I worked: Complexo do Alemão.

In Chapter 4 I make a deep historical analysis of the PACification complex also drawing on the conjunctural approach developed in Chapter 2. Inspired by modernity/coloniality theorists, I take seriously how different regimes of accumulation, marketization, and bodily difference – namely racialized difference – have been historically articulated and transformed through the contemporary functioning of PACification, in which young black men are able to be killed with impunity for economic ends. I also trace resonances between PACification of the present moment and pacification of the military dictatorship, discussing the continuities and fissures between each project’s articulation of economic development and public security. I ultimately present PACification as an ongoing and specific territorialization of the coloniality of power. Here, racialization processes and accumulation regimes are intertwined and transformed in the contemporary moment of urbanization and market formalization, which depends on racialized threats and militarized policing that often operates through a grammar of war. The history and conceptual analysis I develop in this chapter informs the subsequent arguments I make throughout the dissertation.

The next three chapters – five through seven – shift conceptually as a product of the progression of my research. Chapter 5 is focused predominantly on PAC upgrading, given that this was my initial research design. In Chapter 6 I discuss the articulations of PAC and
pacification: the market formalization and public security logics that shape both and define their nexus. Chapter 7 is focused predominantly on pacification, and how community leaders, journalists, and activists are mobilizing in the wake of police violence.

Chapter 5 centres on the largest PAC infrastructural project – the teleferico – and interrogates how Complexo residents narrativize its existence. I focus on two sets of narratives: decision-making and money appropriation. In this chapter I am particularly interested in how discourses serve as enunciations that are inherently political: they mount a critique of state power and resource usurpation. Yet they also demonstrate the contested nature of the state/civil society interface. I thus attend to the political entities around which these narratives condense: how the ongoing and transforming articulations between different governance regimes and actors shape PAC territorializations.

In Chapter 6 I shift focus to the relationship between PAC’s and pacification’s market formalization strategies. Drawing on state policy and interviews with government officials, I document the shared purpose of these projects: to extend the formal market to Complexo do Alemão, and to securitize the rest of Rio to attract international investment. I thus draw on critical geographers’ theorizations of formality/informality as a state practice that, among other projects, attempts to extend a market frontier. I also, however, pay particular attention to how these projects exceed strict economic ends – they are also shaped by a project of coloniality that has, at its core, an attempt to civilize, modernize, and formalize the behavior of morro residents. I end the chapter by discussing how residents themselves often practice modes of formalization – or negotiating with one another on how to better use a space – in the wake of continued state informality. I call this process subversive formalization.

The final empirical chapter focuses on pacification and how community members – specifically activists and journalists – are organizing in the face of state violence. Here I document social media collectives of both journalists and activists that are attempting to protect the safe passage of their neighbours through city streets, and that are using viral video and image to hold police accountable for slayings. I think of these processes as forms of
digital autoconstruction, in which community members leverage and engage digital practices to intervene in material, discursive, and epistemological regimes of state power.

I end the dissertation by reflecting on the conjunctural analytical I developed in Chapter 2. In so doing, I draw together threads of the dissertation that demonstrate, or were analyzed through, processes of historical determination, relationality, interscalar flows, and dual modes of articulation. I explain how each relates to my overall argument regarding PACification. Finally, I reflect on how I have variously fulfilled the purposes of the dissertation set out here in the introduction, and the importance but difficulties of continuing to undertake global and postcolonial urban scholarship.
1.5 Figures for Chapter 1

**Figure 1.1** The teleferico of Complexo do Alemão. Photo taken 16 Jan 2014 by author.

**Figure 1.2** View of Complexo do Alemão from B55’s laje. Photo taken 13 Jan 2014 by author.

**Figure 1.3** Me in capoeira practice. Photo taken 22 April 2014 by Andre Valle
Figure 1.4 Itararé teleferico station. Photo taken 13 Jan 2014 by author.
Figure 1.5 The UPP at Palmeiras teleferico station. Photo taken 25 Jan 2014 by author.

Figure 1.6 Barraco #55. Photo taken 2 May 2014 by author.

Figure 1.7 My research assistant, Andre Valle, in a teleferico cable car. Photo taken 30 March 2015 by author.
Part 1: Foundations

Part one of this dissertation establishes my conceptual and methodological foundations. Responding to postcolonial calls to “provincialize” and “situate” urban theory, in the next three chapters I elaborate a situated conjunctural methodology – drawing together insights from Gramscian geographers, Latin American decolonial philosophers, and Brazilian urbanists. In Chapter 2, specifically, I develop this conceptual framework and forefront four key tenets of my approach: historical determination; relationality of civil and political society, and of favelas; interscalar spatio-temporal flows; and articulation in its dual sense. Chapter 3 and 4 put this framework to work as I historically chart the present day PAC and pacification projects. Most of the material in these chapters is from secondary sources, although I do draw on some contemporary policy documents and interviews.

The purpose of these chapters is to draw on already-existing literature to theorize the historically-determined nature of favelas and the PACification project. Thus, in Chapter 3 I present a granular policy history of urbanization and public security projects, paying particular attention to how they take shape through negotiated civil society/political interfaces, and thus how favelas represent a particular (and ever transforming) territorialization of these relations. I focus also on the interscalar flows of financialized capital and policy, and the historical forces that have shaped present day relations between government officials and construction conglomerates in Brazil.

Yet the development of PAC and pacification projects is also informed by deep and historically entrenched axes of social difference. Thus in Chapter 4 I use notions of articulation and coloniality to understand how PACification – as a marketization and public security nexus – has taken shape through colonial, capital, and racialized histories. These histories take a conjuncturally-specific form at this contemporary moment. This chapter is largely conceptual and theoretical. In it, I also establish key foundations of my argument that carry into subsequent chapters: favelas as racialized and classed spaces; and PACification as an articulated nexus advancing a formalized market frontier.
Chapter 2: Situating a Conjunctural Urbanism

During my first major research trip to Complexo do Alemão, I was invited to an anti-World Cup and anti-militarization event co-organized by a number of community groups. The event was called “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver” (The Cup for the German to See – a play on the namesake of the community), implying that it would show Germans, and the rest of the global spectators, what was actually happening in Rio’s favelas during the World Cup. The event was being filmed as part of a documentary by the same name (Fig 2.1). The documentary was created by six youth from Complexo, in collaboration with a Belgian organization and with production by Raízes em Movimento (ReM), a local grassroots organization. The gathering also included members from Complexo-based collectives such as Coletivo Papo Reto (CPR), Ocupa Alemão, and Barraco #55 (B55), among others.

The event itself was held at the bottom of the Alemão hill, close to the neighborhood of Ramos. People were standing outside, gathered around red plastic tables, drinking Antarctica beer and listening to baile funk music. To play baile funk music out loud in favela streets is itself a contentious act, as this style of music is sometimes associated with narcotrafficking due to its frequent references to money and drugs; it has previously been outlawed in many UPP-occupied, or “pacified,” favelas.

People filtered in and out throughout the evening. I helped string up banners, shared beer, and chatted with some members of ReM I had not yet met. During the event, three military police officers of the local UPP unit stood ten feet from the gathering. They did not say a word, just watched us. A rumour quickly circulated: someone had overheard one military police officer say to another that they had to be very careful because so many of the organizers were activists and were filming with both documentary cameras and smartphones. There were no incidents with the military police that night, but we were always aware of their presence just a few feet away.

That night, a number of different street artists spray-painted art on the walls around the small praça (square). These messages took the PT government to task for investing in mega event-
and tourist-related infrastructure at the expense of community priorities. One such image displayed a soccer ball being kicked into a favela homes (Fig 2.2). Another stated “Cup for whom? We need education, hospitals, housing, respect” (Fig 2.3). Yet another depicted a flag comparing PAC money invested in the teleferico (100%) to sanitation infrastructure (35%), and listed the number of occupying policing units (x5) for every clinic, school, and hospital. This last image explicitly juxtaposes common concerns with PAC and pacification – that they are highly visible projects not responsive to community needs.

I begin with this anecdote because it is these activists, organizers, and residents who have inspired me, and shaped my knowledge of, new large-scale state interventions in communities such as Complexo do Alemão. Although none of them have termed it as such, organizers such as these have helped me think through the mutual imbrication of PAC and pacification – the nexus I call PACification. They provide me with my entry point for understanding what is happening in their communities, knowledge that is inevitably shaped by my own positionality and by the theories I carry with me. In other words, my analytic framework, my understanding of the relationship between PAC and pacification, and my interventions into urban studies are shaped by the particular confluence of theories that have informed my thinking, and the myriad contentions I heard while in Complexo. This is not to say that all activists, organizers, and residents saw the projects in the precise way I theorize them here. Rather, I mean to suggest that the way I understand these projects is inevitably shaped by the particular position I had with respect to these activists, and the theories and ways of knowing that followed me to this part of the globe.

In this chapter I discuss how I came to be at the bottom of the morro (hill) that June of 2014. I pay specific attention to how my relationship with organizers, activists, and residents has guided my thinking. I then construct an analytic framework that is inspired by the intersection of activists’ contentions and urban theory from the “South.” I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the specific methods I used throughout this research.

9 Street art and wall art is a political tactic used by many artists in Complexo. They often will paint messages aimed at the government on the sides of PAC-demolished houses, the ruins of which have been left by the government.
2.1 “Walking With” Organizers

I took my first research trip to Rio de Janeiro in October of 2013 to determine the feasibility of my research proposal and to make initial contacts with PAC representatives. While there, Emily Baron, a Master’s student at Simon Fraser University, invited me to visit her at her host research and arts institute. She was studying a phenomenon called favela tourism, and was doing so in a group, or complex, of favelas called Complexo do Alemão. The institute that was hosting her was Barraco #55 (Shack #55). Her invitation to me was fortuitous, not least because Complexo is the site of one of the largest PAC-funded projects in Brazil’s precarious settlements: the teleferico. She met me in Bonsucesso, the first cable car station, and we rode the gondola together to the Itararé station atop the Alvorada hill. I followed her as she walked the hilly streets, heading to the institute. It resembles the adjacent houses, with an innocuous door down a narrow alley. Inside was teeming with people – an artist from France, a PhD student from the Netherlands, and 4 youth from the hill, chatting with B55 co-founder Eddu. After eating lunch with the group, Eddu and his partner, Ellen, invited me to stay with them for my own research. Little did I know at the time, this trip to Complexo would fundamentally shift my research. Instead of focusing on the people who have built PAC, it allowed me to understand how many people saw, understood, and remade these projects themselves.

As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, Barraco #55 is a central node of community organizing in Complexo. They position themselves as an arts, culture, and research centre that hosts international visitors – many from other Latin American countries – and is a hub of activity for youth in the community (Fig 2.4-2.7). Eddu Grau is a well-respected musician from Complexo and is very involved in local bands. It is common for youth and other community members to drop by B55 to play music, chat, or simply grab a glass of water. They have, at times, hosted outdoor movie nights in the square across from their house, they have organized myriad rap and dance nights, and they support local street artists.

While B55 does not often identify as an “activist organization,” they are close to and often work alongside different activist collectives in Complexo. They have worked with Raízes em
Movimento (ReM – see Chapter 5), a long-standing group that advocates to the government for progressive change in the community, among other initiatives; they are friends with members of Coletivo Papo Reto (CPR – see Chapter 7), a new social media collective that is trying to hold the military police accountable for acts of brutality; and they are regularly visited by local journalists and photographers. There is not a homogeneous activist community in Complexo, yet many active organizers will work with one another when their common interests intersect.\(^{10}\) Staying with B55 allowed me to meet, learn, and speak with many of these activists and try to better understand their concerns. Many of the contentions I make throughout the dissertation reach beyond B55’s and other organizers’ actions or arguments – this is not a dissertation reformulating what they say and, indeed, some have not always agreed with aspects of my arguments. Yet they have been central to my engagement with the community and with other organizers, activists, and residents in Complexo.

Crucially, living and working at Barraco #55 put me in touch with Andre Valle. Andre is a local musician and a former tour guide. He has lived in Complexo – specifically on the morro of Alemão – since his family migrated to the community when he was young. Andre taught himself to speak English by watching videos of American movies. Because of these efforts, he works regularly as a translator, interpreter, and assistant for researchers such as myself, in addition to conducting the odd tour for B55. Andre became one of my most important confidantes in Complexo. He helped me organize interviews and accompanied me to meet residents and activists, particularly early on in my journey. Many times we would be walking along the road when we would run into a friend or family member of his, who would share their latest thoughts on PAC and pacification. These encounters, and Andre’s connections, were crucial to how I began to understand the varied impacts of new state intervention in the community.

I arrived in Complexo at a specific moment in both the UPP and PAC projects. After two years of relative stability with the occupying military police (PM), tension and violence

\(^{10}\) A key issue that sometimes creates tension between different organizations is their commitment to talk about violence. For instance, B55 is very cognizant of the narratives of violence that characterize Complexo, and thus tries to avoid these discussions. Some organizations, on the other hand, are committed quite explicitly to combatting violence and the militarization of their communities.
between the PMs and local narcofactions were increasing. More shootouts were occurring, and rumours proliferated about narco retaliation. I thus entered the community at a particularly heightened moment of anti-UPP sentiment, which had become more critical of the project in recent months and would continue to build towards the World Cup. PAC infrastructural upgrading, too, had been ongoing for almost six years. When I arrived at B55, most of the construction was over and many in the community were wondering if, and when, builders would come back to clean up the debris left from the previous interventions. Ellen reported rumours to me that EMOP (the state company for construction) was due back in January, but they never materialized. As such, many of the actions and contentions of residents and organizers described in the dissertation have been made during a period of frustration with the government, following a period of relative hope of better conditions in the community.  

Through my residency at B55, I have attempted to “walk with” organizers and residents in Complexo, a decolonial process conceptualized by the Zapatista movement in Mexico and elaborated as methodology by Juanita Sundberg. Sundberg (2014) urges scholars to walk with Indigenous communities or other groups who have been systematically oppressed or exploited. Walking with emphasizes the processual nature of knowledge production, and how engagement with different knowledges actively performs the world(s) in which we live. I have attempted to walk with residents of Complexo do Alemão by living with B55, assisting with community-driven artistic events, and attending protests both inside and outside the community. Walking with has required me to engage with the contentions being made by people in favelas. This methodology has often resulted in activists providing me with the

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11 The current political situation in Brazil has also forced me to be very reflexive about the arguments I make in the dissertation. My case is contemporary PACification, and its associated processes of corruption, for instance, in Complexo. I am hypercognizant of the current political climate in the country, in which narratives of the left-leaning PT’s corruption have been appropriated by the middle and upper classes to oust the government in favour of a conservative, right-wing faction. Following the conjunctural methodology outlined above, I have tried to present the PT as a party with left wing ambitions but also one that has been transformed by the state apparatus and practices that the party inherited (see Chapter 3.2). But I am also aware that this dissertation takes a risk in critiquing the projects of the leftist government. Indeed, if these arguments are decontextualized and appropriated, they could inadvertently bolster conservative forces and interpretations.

12 The social world, following Roy, “requires multiple forms of epistemic authority for its analysis” (Roy 2016:821). In taking seriously the actions and enunciations of Complexo residents, I am drawing implicitly on feminist standpoint theorists. Feminist standpoint theory does not deny an external reality; rather, it recognizes
impetus for theorization – such as calling the state genocidal – after which I have engaged with relevant literatures in a recursive fashion.

Beyond sweeping floors and setting up exhibits, one of the ways I have tried to practice solidarity has been through witnessing violence. In other words, I have understood my role as a foreign researcher partly to be one of documenting the different violences happening in Complexo. Yet militarized projects such as pacification achieve legitimacy in places like Complexo because these places are discursively constituted as endemically violent. As such, I have also attempted to move beyond theorizing only violence (in other words, not discursively or analytically equating Complexo with violence). This difficulty is compounded by trying to engage responsibly with different knowledges and practices that are not my own and that I cannot fully know. Here, I became a witness and an intervener in academic and popular discourse, trying to create space for other ways of knowing without appropriating these knowledges. These lines between documenting violence and trying to complicate a narrative based solely on violence, and engaging with different knowledges without appropriating them, are difficult to walk, and I am not always successful. But working through these challenges is the constant preoccupation and backdrop to how I think about and write this dissertation.

I approach the space of Complexo and situate myself as a researcher with reference to the relational ontologies elaborated by Walter Mignolo. Mignolo (2013:113) argues that a relational ontology is that in which “the knowing subject and the known object or processes are configured at the crossroads of racial and geohistorical colonial frames” (see also Mullings 2005). In this sense, my knowledge and understanding of events in Complexo do Alemão and favelas in Rio are intimately shaped by my white, Northern, female social the situatedness through which different people have access to a particular understanding of this reality, as a result of their social locations (informed by, inter alia, class, race, gender, and geographic location) (Alcoff 2010; Mohanty 1997, 2002). Feminist philosophers such as Linda Alcoff (2010) have forwarded the notion of epistemic privilege to capture this potentially “privileged” epistemological position that women of the Third World have for understanding intersecting forces of power such as racism, imperialism, colonialism, and patriarchy – they have access to, and experiences of, this articulated system of power in a way that others do not (see also Mohanty 2002; Nagar et al. 2002). That is not to say that everyone in this position will be a critical theorist, or that academically-trained scholars cannot help elucidate these processes. Rather, this philosophical understanding of epistemology can inform the ways we (as scholars in the academy) build responsible and informative research relationships with people who have these privileged epistemological locations.
positionality.¹³ The ways in which I feel violence are markedly different than the embodied experiences of young racialized youth, who face constant threats of brutality every day. Methodologically, then, I have not always, indeed rarely, if ever, experienced violence or state interventions the ways that Complexo community members do. Yet I can listen, and be self-reflexive of how my knowledge and social positionality constantly inform my understandings of what people tell me and what I myself experience. I have also repeatedly had to confront my own privileges: with increased tension and violence I have experienced privilege mobility (that is, I have been able to leave the community); and have experienced racial privilege (that is, by being hurt I could put the community at heightened risk). Throughout my research I have had to negotiate these challenges and I have tried to do them some justice throughout this written dissertation.

2.2 Theoretical Provocations Concerning the “Urban”

I arrived at Barraco #55 as a scholar from Canada trained in North Atlantic geography and exposed to a particular set of debates. With a background in feminist and critical development studies, I was particularly interested in and intrigued by the recent calls in English-language urban studies to “provincialize” theory. Such critiques have deeply informed the way I have come to understand Complexo and other favelas in Brazil. Using this methodology, and being attuned to postcolonial, decolonial, and critical Brazilian urbanisms, it has been important for me to constantly reflect on language. My research has been shaped quite substantially by my proficiency (or limits) in Portuguese. Although my basic skills improved while I was in Brazil, I always remained a linguistic outsider, in addition to my other outsider signifiers. While this can be an obvious disadvantage, it also proved advantageous in some circumstances, particularly as it forced me to rely upon and work with Brazilian scholars and Cariocas who speak both Portuguese and English, at minimum for my daily linguistic survival in Brazil before I learned enough working Portuguese. Indeed, collaborations across linguistic divides are particularly important in geography, which tends to be dominated by English from the North. Thus, through this dissertation work and beyond, I have tried to make a commitment to Brazilian scholars, creating space for Portuguese ideas in English geography (see, for instance, Melgaço & Prouse 2017). It is also worth mentioning the added time and commitment this undertaking requires: it has taken me substantial emotional and physical energy to learn enough Portuguese to do justice to this project, and every little task – from transcribing to reading – is much more time consuming in Portuguese (for instance, it takes me three times as long to read an article in Portuguese versus English). Of course, I recognize that the decision to undertake this work was mine alone and ultimately shaped by my privilege in choosing to do research “elsewhere.”
Rio de Janeiro, the city of my research, is located in what hegemonic urban studies often calls the “Global South.” It is an ordinary city – an urban experience with which Northern theory has not often engaged (see Robinson 2006, 2010; Parnell & Oldfield 2014). Yet there are many Brazilian urbanists, and indeed a quite robust Brazilian geographic tradition. In this dissertation I attempt to operate across linguistic and geographic theoretical divides (see Melgaço & Prouse 2017). In so doing, I situate this work in a postcolonial or global urbanism that is attentive to the situatedness of both urbanization processes and knowledge production about urbanization. However, because the postcolonial critique has largely been developed in regions and institutions that privilege the experiences (and theories derived from) recently decolonized nations, I also pay particular attention to a decolonial way of theorizing, inspired by scholars of Latin and South America, who privilege the ongoing histories of colonization and imperialism in the “New World.”

Complexo do Alemão, the community in which I lived and whose experience of urbanization forms the basis of this dissertation, is comprised of what are often called favelas. Favelas, sometimes translated into English as “shanty-towns” or “slums,” have been debated in Anglo geography and Portuguese Brazilian geography. Critical Brazilian theorists and Brazilianists, in particular, have sought to disrupt notions and theorizations of favelas as “marginal” to the city and marginal to urbanization processes (Perlman 1976, 2011; Fischer 2008; McCann 2014a; Cavalcanti 2014a). There is also much debate over the use of the term favela – is it analytically productive, or does it reify slum-type arguments (Rao 2006; Roy 2011) that designate these areas as backward, marginal, and uncivilized?

In this section I present three key problem spaces of critical urban theory that have guided me in this dissertation – namely, the call to theorize from ordinary cities, the call to take seriously histories of colonization and racialization, and the call to disrupt notions of favelas as marginal. I then propose an analytic that responds to these problem spaces, and to the myriad contentions of activists and residents themselves. I highlight four key components of this analytic framework, including the notions of historical determination, relationality, interscalar analysis, and articulation.
2.2.1 Postcolonial Provocations

Postcolonial critique has motivated what Ananya Roy (2015) calls “new geographies of theory” informed by experiences of urbanization not captured in models emanating from the so-called West (see also Robinson 2012, 2016; McFarlane 2010; Sheppard et al 2015; Parnell & Oldfield 2014). Scholars such as Roy have called for a theorization from the “South” where, following postcolonial theory, the South is a “relation, not a thing in and of itself” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012:47; in Roy 2015:8). Postcolonial urbanism is an approach, rather than a theory, as it is self-consciously trying to move beyond theorizing universals (an agenda that is consistent with decolonial approaches: see Sundberg 2003, 2005; Mignolo 2000; Grosfoguel 2007). Rather than seeking to create or refute a universal theory, in this dissertation I attempt to both situate and extend theory by drawing together different knowledges and theorizations in order to explain this particular socio-historical conjuncture in Brazil.

Postcolonial urbanism has been a reaction to a particular, yet hegemonic, form of political economic theorization of the urban and urbanization processes. It has made two interrelated critiques of this dominant approach that are relevant to me here. The first critique is that urban studies has historically been economistic, reading off abstract level concepts of capitalism, globalization and neoliberalism, for instance, that are then used to explain diverse experiences the world over. A potential problem with this methodology is that it assumes all difference is solely the result of these abstracted systems (Hall 1996). Relatedly, a second major critique leveled by postcolonial urbanists is that the features and models that have been used to define the urban – such as the global cities model (see Sassen 2001) or mechanisms of agglomeration (see Scott & Storper 2015) – are derived from particular Western cities’ experiences. There are a number of significant implications of these ways of theorizing. For one, explanations of different urbanizations are made in the image of the West, with different cities spatio-temporally marked on a developmentalist chain as “behind” hegemonic cities and nation-states (Robinson 2006). For another, geographical differences tend to be understood as simply empirical variations of these supposedly universal systems that have developed in some Western/Northern cities (Roy 2015).
Academics with a postcolonial sensibility have recently called for a “provincialization” of urban theory, and are developing theoretical concepts from regions that have been marginalized by contemporary theory production (Robinson 2006, 2010; Leitner, Sheppard & Sziarto 2008; Parnell & Oldfield 2014; Peck 2015; Leitner & Sheppard 2015). Similarly, recent scholarship in critical urban studies has sought to theorize urbanization processes “from the South,” though of course many scholars have been doing this for decades (see Santos 1979; Caldeira 2000; Vainer 2014; Melgaço & Prouse 2017). Two key tenets of postcolonial urbanism, according to Jennifer Robinson, include: taking all cities as “ordinary” cities and thus any can serve as the starting point for theory generation; and creating new theory through comparing across any presumed North/South, developed/developing divides (or cities that would not ordinarily be thought comparable) while being attuned to the socio-spatial processes of power wrought through (neo)colonialisms and imperialisms (Sheppard et al 2013). Helga Leitner and Eric Sheppard (2015) elaborate four moves towards provincializing urban theory: engaging a multiplicity of actors, from academics to activists to community members, in order to increase the range of epistemological engagements; taking seriously the agency of the material world in a non-fetishistic fashion; situating knowledge and taking seriously the theorizations of and from places generally used as sites of empirical data extraction; and being constantly reflexive of one’s ethico-political commitments. The call to provincialize theory is thus one to re-orient knowledge politics and practices in urban studies.

To work through a postcolonial methodology does not, however, mean to approach a research problem or space with no prior analytic categories or questions. Indeed, to assume that one can approach research without being informed by his/her experiential history and social positionality is to assume a Eurocentric, God’s-eye view of the world (see Mullings 2005; Sundberg 2003). What a postcolonial approach does call for is an attentiveness to the situatedness of theory: who is producing theory, for what purposes, and to explain what experiences. We must, according to these scholars, theorize from the experiences of particular urbanizations, and engage with knowledges already produced about these particular experiences. I thus now turn to two main, situated schools of thought that I engage
with to understand urbanization processes in Rio de Janeiro: decolonial or modernity/coloniality theory, elaborated in and through the colonization experiences of Latin America; and theory produced in and of urbanization processes in Brazil’s so-called favelas or precarious settlements. I discuss each briefly in turn, and then elaborate them more fully throughout the dissertation.

2.2.2 Decolonial Provocations

My work is explicitly animated by political concerns of decolonization. Decolonial Latin American scholars who have developed the modernity/coloniality framework, such as Walter Mignolo, Sylvia Wynter, Anibal Quijano, Linda Alcoff, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Ramón Grosfoguel, interrogate power relations that were consolidated during the first modernity of colonization and continue to this day. They argue that contemporary dynamics of race and labour, amongst other axes of difference, were shaped by the first experiences of colonization in the so-called New World. Quijano (2008) and Wynter (2003) argue, for instance, that race was consolidated in the 16th and 17th centuries during Iberian colonization (that is, Spanish and Portuguese colonization of South America), and that categories of race were used, in part, to divide labor within this colonial system (Quijano 2008; see also McIntyre & Nast 2011; Werner 2011). Contemporary racial formations, in which biological bodies are typologized according to value/worth (Omi & Winant 2014), are the product of colonial encounters of the 1500s (Grosfoguel 2007; Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2008) in which the question of the “human” was first posed through the figure of the indio (Maldonado-Torres 2007). This abstracted notion of race continues to shape contemporary experiences, even though the actual form race takes is a concretely contested, and geographically specific, one (see Hall 1996). Coloniality as a concept describes how the articulation of race and labor, specifically, persists into the present period (McIntyre & Nast 2011; Morana, Dussel & Jauregui 2008; Werner 2011). The coloniality of power, explicitly theorized by Anibal Quijano, is the “the articulation of hierarchical forms of social difference with wage and non-wage forms of labour control” (Werner 2011:1576). Quijano’s focus is on how the race/labour relation continues to be articulated in ever-transforming ways in the present moment.
Coloniality is not simply a labor/race relation, however, but also an intersectional matrix of power. Ramon Grosfoguel draws on black feminist theorists of intersectionality to codify the colonial matrix as “multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies (‘heterarchies’) of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures” (2007: 217). As such, heteropatriarchy, Christian religiosity, Enlightenment epistemologies, and white supremacism have been negotiated across the world through official colonial relations but also, more recently, through globalization, neoliberalization, and other forms of global interconnectivities. Such systems of power are not totalizing, however; although they have been exercised with considerable domination, there exist many other epistemologies, cosmologies, and ways of being throughout the pluriverse that are being practiced in articulation with other ways of knowing, many which have never disappeared, and some of which are experiencing a concerted effort at resurgence (Sundberg 2014; Blaser 2014).

Theorists of coloniality do not always or necessarily speak to the Brazilian experience, yet what they say has important implications for understanding Brazil. Decolonial theorists point to the necessity of understanding how histories of colonization in the so-called New World continue to inform the present moment. For instance, Portuguese colonialism in what is now called Brazil was crucial to helping establish the race/labour relation that underpins coloniality. Indeed, the majority of slaves brought through the transatlantic slave trade docked in Rio de Janeiro and worked sugar and coffee plantations in Brazil. According to some scholars of race, the contested and incomplete nature of Portuguese colonialism shaped the forms of race/labour that continue to operate into the present (Santos 2002; Cesarino 2012), which I elaborate in Chapter 4.2. More generally, the idea of coloniality opens up a specific problem space in my work: how the intersectional matrix of power continues to shape neodevelopmentalist urbanization projects. Yet, being sensitive to the postcolonial critique, I do not want to simply “read off” systems of colonialism and assume they shape Brazilian urbanization in simple or straightforward ways. Instead, I want to understand the particular forms that social differences (some of which were violently negotiated through
colonization) take at this particular socio-historical conjuncture. I thus use a conjunctural approach to understand coloniality in the contemporary period, which I outline below. First, however, I turn to another specific and situated theoretical approach: how critical urbanists have interrogated urbanization processes in Brazilian favelas and, indeed, thrown into question what a favela is.

2.2.3 Favelas and Marginality Debates

The nature and definition of favelas have long been debated in academic literature and public policy in Brazil. Last chapter I discussed how the notion of favela itself is fraught, yet retains usefulness as a concept in my dissertation because it points to particular policy prescriptions and socio-spatial imaginaries. In this chapter, I am interested in historical debates about the idea of favelas as marginal to urbanization processes and to the city in general. In this section I discuss these marginality debates that have transformed academic theorizations of favelas – from being marginal to integral to the urban. I then turn to how contemporary theorizations of precarious settlements inspire a conjunctural approach to understanding urban phenomena.

Popular and academic debates of the “urban condition” in Latin America were, in the first half of the 20th century, characterized by a marginality thesis, in which precarious settlements, slums, and favelas were understood as sites of prostitution, criminality, and informal employment, as a function of the cultures of the people who settled these areas. Much of this work was inspired by the Chicago School (AlSayyad 2004) and modernization theory (Perlman 2004). Simmel and Park’s theorizations of migrants and racialized Others as passive and marginal, as a “cultural hybrid” constantly trying to find a place in the city, was influential around the world (AlSayyad 2004). In Brazil, marginality debates were grounded in similar “cultures of poverty” theses (Perlman 2004, 2011), and were inherently racialized and civilizational arguments: people who have migrated to Brazil’s favelas are often from more rural areas of the country, assumed to be backward (Fischer 2008), and from the North-East with its predominant Afro-Brazilian population. Crucially, these “margins” of Brazilian cities were thought to be spaces of endemic and ontological informality.
However, in the 1960s and 70s scholars in and of South America began to discredit the “myth of marginality” (Perlman 1976, 2004; see also AlSayyad & Roy 2004; Caldeira 2009). Janice Perlman, who titled her dissertation-turned-book after this myth (see Perlman 1976), argued that in fact people in marginal areas were very much integrated with the city in myriad ways: structurally, they were part of the logic of capital accumulation as they partook in low-wage industrial and domestic jobs or formed a reserve army of labour, lowering the costs necessary for urbanization; they were part of the politics of the city, with mass mobilizations fighting for rights to tenure and housing through both sanctioned and non-sanctioned channels; and they were part of the cultural fabric of the urban, sharing music and dance across morro (hill) and asfalto (concrete) borders. Scholars who argued against marginality, including Anibal Quijano and Manuel Castells, were often speaking from experiences of “peripheral capitalism,” steeped in dependency theory (Perlman 2004), and thus inclined to disrupt notions of inherent backwardness or an “outside” to capitalism, and any modernist-like conceptions of development.

These critiques of marginality also shifted meanings of informality. If spaces such as slums and other precarious settlements were not inherently backward bastions of cultures of poverty, neither were they inherently informal as a function of these cultures. A significant wave of scholarship from this more “critical” perspective on informality was conducted by theorists of urban labour markets, who posited informality as an ontological sector of the labour market that is a structural feature of capitalism (Roy 2015; AlSayyad 2004; Perlman 2004). Characterizing slums and informal settlements as spaces of informal employment, or as spaces inhabited by those “thrown out” of the capitalist system, continues today under Wacquant’s notions of “advanced marginality” and Mike Davis’s “planet of slums,” where “slum” becomes a metonym for violence, informality, lack and despair (Roy 2015; Caldeira 2009).

Recent critical urban scholarship in Brazil has approached Brazilian favelas and precarious settlements not as ontologically distinct and marginal spaces standing apart from the

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14 By the 1970s, some theorists also believed the informal sector to be a potential solution to unemployment: the inefficiency of production in this sector was theorized to create a larger number of jobs than in the more “efficient” formal sector (see Armstrong & McGee 1968; Potts 2008).
“formal” city and its urbanization mechanisms. Instead, this scholarship – reacting against marginality theses – takes as its starting point that favelas and other precarious settlements are places that have always been co-constitutive of urban forces. While some scholarship and much policy still sees favelas as places of “premodern” and “feudal” rule – characterized by an absence of state and thus as spaces of “incomplete modernity” (see Arias 2006a) – much work disrupts this notion of incompleteness, absence, and lack. Scholars such as Mariana Cavalcanti, Vera Telles, and Teresa Caldeira argue that informal settlements’ endurance is not “residual” but rather crucial to new spatial configurations of power, profit, and politicization in Rio. They throw into question the very definition of a favela, precarious settlement, informal community, or slum, asking us to understand how these communities are always-already related to urbanization processes and governance logics, and how they transform these logics. This analytic task is particularly crucial at the present moment, when favelas and precarious settlements have become hypervisibilized through the new politics of concrete and cocaine (Cavalcanti 2009; see Chapter 1). In the contemporary period, how can we theorize the qualitatively new relationships between Rio’s favelas and the state apparatus as places such as Complexo do Alemão become the target of large-scale infrastructural development and public security initiatives? Vera Telles (2015) argues that the only way to methodologically understand contemporary processes of market formalization and new state violence in precarious settlements is to interrogate their specific microconjunctures: to tease apart, via ethnographic work, the new relationships between citizens, state officials, market logics, and violences that characterize these new initiatives. We must, she urges, look at how the relationships between these forces are constantly transformed, and how their boundaries are continuously negotiated in transversal ways (see also Caldeira 2017).

In sum, these recent debates in critical urbanism have opened up a particular problem space of theorization. The postcolonial critique in hegemonic and English-language geography has compelled scholars to interrogate the specificity of urbanization processes in different parts of the world, theorizing from the experiences of cities and processes not heretofore taken seriously in urban research. In essence, it asks us to account for historical difference not as empirical variation, but as situated and negotiated through the specific historical processes that shape diverse urban forms. It also asks us to pay attention to the situatedness of our
theorizations. As a response to this invocation (admittedly operating in hegemonic urban theory myself), I have presented two theoretical interventions, or provocations, for understanding urbanization processes in Brazil, specifically. I have discussed modernity/coloniality theory of Latin America, which compels me to take seriously the specific histories of colonization, racialization, and other processes of social difference-making that continue to inform the present moment, albeit in ever-transforming fashion. I have also discussed critical urban theory of Brazilian favelas, which urges scholars to understand the co-constitutive relationships between precarious/informal settlements and the so-called formal city, and the urbanization projects and governing logics that operate across these different (but not ontologically distinct) spaces. To do so, following Telles, one must understand the specific conjunctures, or microconjunctures, through which governance, market creation and formalization, and violence operate. I outline this approach in the following section.

2.3 Towards a Postcolonial Conjunctural Urbanism

These diverse theorizations all point to the necessity of undertaking a historically-informed, relational, and interscalar analysis of urbanization processes in places such as Complexo do Alemão. Yet it is not only theory that has pointed me in this direction. The contentions of activists and organizers have also informed my analytic for understanding urbanization projects in Rio de Janeiro. In this section I offer a way to incorporate these inter-related concerns through the analytical approach of conjunctural urbanism. I do so by first engaging with scholars in English-language urban studies, specifically, who are promoting different forms of conjunctural urbanism. I then propose four specific tenets of this approach that responds to the aforementioned invocations of modernity/coloniality theory, critical urban theory of Brazil’s precarious settlements, and the contentions being made by activists themselves. These tenets are: historical differentiation; relationality; interscalar analysis; and articulation in its dual sense. As it is relevant to each, I put into conversation three different
theoretical inspirations: Gramscian-inspired geographers; Latin American-inspired modernity/coloniality theorists; and critical Brazilian urbanists.\textsuperscript{15}

As described above, a major stake in recent hegemonic discussions of the urban is how to account for historical differentiation. In other words, are differences in urbanization simply empirical variations of a general model, or are there fundamentally different processes of urbanization? Both political-economic and postcolonial-oriented scholars have proposed a \textit{conjunctural} approach to understanding difference. Inspired and guided by postcolonial theory, Ananya Roy (2015) urges scholars to account for historical differentiation wrought through diverse histories that include colonial and imperial relations. To her, a conjunctural approach “theorize[s] historical difference as a fundamental constituent of global urban transformation” (Roy 2015:8). She compels urban scholars to:

\begin{quote}
pinpoint the conjunctures at which the urban is made and unmade, often in a highly uneven fashion across national and global territories…It is [the] persistence of historical difference that is of concern to me and that I want to pose as an analytical challenge to current conceptualizations of the urban (Roy 2016:814 & 817)
\end{quote}

Jamie Peck (2017) has also recently deployed the Gramscian notion of the conjuncture to develop and codify a methodology for creating new theories of the urban. He proposes an “arcing” method through which to develop mid-level concepts that account for shared urban phenomena in the North Atlantic region. Peck pays careful attention to the multi-scalar “context” of neoliberal hegemony – that there is something common to the experiences of different cities that must be deduced from inter-case comparison. Context here is “about finding and accounting for contextual effects ‘all the way down’, as well as ‘all the way across’ unevenly developed terrains” (2016:16). This involves paying attention to how political economic power operates from the macro to the micro in one location and region, as well as understanding how this power joins or articulates – operates across – seemingly distinct places. His purpose is to, in part, account for a “wider landscape of transformative change” (2016:16).

\textsuperscript{15} I categorize these approaches in a heuristic fashion, while recognizing there is, or could be, significant overlap between them.
These scholars’ emphases are different. Peck pays greater attention to the relationality between different urbanization processes in different places and attends to the contexts that shape these processes in common ways, whereas Roy emphasizes the situated and diverse histories of colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism that shape vastly divergent urbanization processes. Yet each is interested in understanding how urban spaces develop as the result of historical processes, and uses a variation of a Gramscian historical conjunctural approach to do so.

What, then, is a Gramscian historical conjuncture? In the *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci (2010:177) defines a conjuncture in a number of different ways but perhaps most explicitly as “the set of circumstances which determine the market in a given phase, provided that they are conceived of as being in movement, i.e. as constituting a process of ever-changing combinations, a process which is the economic cycle.” Drawing on Gramsci, Sapana Doshi and Malini Ranganathan (2016:16) argue that the conjuncture is the “coming together of social and political forces to establish hegemonic regimes and new opportunities for contestation.” As such, a conjunctural analysis focuses on “how diverse forces come together in particular ways to create a new political terrain” (Hart 2003:27). These forces, or “relations of force” (Hall 1996), come together, or articulate, in specific ways at particular moments to create an over-determined social formation (Hall 1996) and, indeed, to produce particular places. Relations/forces here “cannot be deduced from abstract logics but must be made historically specific” (Hart 2003:31), a process that “requires attention to race-class (and other) articulations forged through situated practices in the multiple arenas of daily life” (Hart 2003:31). A conjunctural analysis thus avoids reading off systems of capitalism, globalization, colonialism, or race, and focuses instead on the historically specific and concrete ways that diverse forces produce reality.

Different scholars emphasize various components of a Gramscian conjuncture. I focus on and elaborate four specific tenets based on the invocations of both activists and urban theory: historical determination; relationality of the state and favelas; interscalar processes; and dual modes of articulation. I begin each section with how activists, organizers, and residents
inspired me to approach each tenet, based on implicit and explicit arguments they were making at “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver” and similar events. I then discuss each tenet in relation to academic literature.

2.3.1 Historical Determination/Overdetermination

At “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver,” we gathered around as organizers projected images onto the streets and buildings across the way. This is a common tactic among activists in Brazil: to re-appropriate, or re-signify, public space by inscribing a new meaning onto it. At this event, organizers used a laptop computer to project images about police violence onto the street. One image read “No to the genocide policy of the Brazilian government” (Fig 2.8). Another juxtaposed an image of police brutality during the military dictatorship with that which has occurred during democracy (Fig 2.9). Both images point to the historically embedded processes and practices of police violence that shape the current UPP project, and allude to the fact that it is young black men from favelas who are disproportionately exposed to state violence. Both, thus, have prompted me to think of how new “inclusion” projects such as pacification and PAC are informed by historically-shaped racialized geographies, and how they draw on, yet reconfigure, previous modes of police violence.

Due to contentions such as these, I draw upon an analytic that centres historical determination. A Gramscian-informed methodology, specifically, assumes a complex social structure or reality\(^{16}\) that is comprised and (re)produced socially through diverse axes of power (Glassman 2003). The methodology is historical materialist in that it looks, historically, for the various social forces that have shaped a socio-geographical conjuncture.

\(^{16}\) Postcolonial and decolonial theories can take issue with this conception of historical reality or, rather, the ways this reality is interpreted by scholars. Historical materialist analyses may suppose that a scientist can approximate a real world “truth” about how social forces operate. It can, therefore, (re)perform a male, God’s-eye view of the world from which the all-seeing researcher can discover said “truth” (Sundberg 2003). Moreover, decolonial and postcolonial thought is often attentive to the performativity of reality: that diverse worldings may be constructed through the onto-epistemological cosmologies of people not captured in analyses focused on Western notions of “reality,” or the concepts that are privileged in Eurocentric knowledge frames (Blaser 2014; Sundberg 2014; Mignolo 2000). These diverse worldings remain admittedly unresolved in my dissertation due to limits of research time and constrained by responsible research practices/ethics. Rather, what I hope to add to a Gramscian conjunctural approach attuned to postcolonial and decolonial theory is how different social forces of colonial and imperial power continue to shape particular historical conjunctures.
Here, a given social structure is “conditioned...by the specific character of the material ('economic') process of production and social reproduction” (Glassman 2003:690). However, it is not economic processes alone that account for any given conjuncture; rather, social reality is overdetermined in that “the struggle to produce class transformations [that is, the appropriation of surplus] is itself simultaneously a political, cultural, ideological and – it must be added, against a culpable historical Marxist silence – gendered and racialized struggle, within and against specific crystallized forms of power” (Glassman 2003:692).17 Numerous processes of gendering, racialization, and social production and reproduction thus inform any given historical conjuncture and the ways in which economic surplus is appropriated in any given space-time. In other words, according to Gillian Hart, “economic practices and struggles over material resources and labor are always and inseparably bound up with culturally constructed meanings, definitions and identities, and with the exercise of power, all as part of historical processes” (Hart 2003:27)

Drawing on Latin American decolonial philosophers and critical Brazilian urbanists, historical determination must account for Portuguese colonialism and how it has influenced particular social formations such as race and class in Brazil. These are not static formations but indeed have been shaped and transformed over the last five hundred years. The particularity of class processes in Brazil, for instance, manifests in a specific form of what Erminia Maricato (2009) calls internal colonialism. This is a dependent form of development that has allowed a Brazilian elite (guided by international interests in an increasingly financialized global climate) to appropriate surplus from, and violently control, racialized peoples and lower classed populations in Brazil (see also Alves 1985). Historical determination also requires me to pay attention to the genealogy of urbanization policies and public security programs in Brazil. This approach situates these contemporary projects and

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17 Here I draw on Jim Glassman’s notion of overdetermination, which is based in Leninist and Maoist thought. Glassman (2003:680) argues that “a conception of social process as both overdetermined (i.e. involving complex underlying structures, rather than simple monocausal forces) and overdetermined (i.e. having a discrete number of such structures the relative causal efficacy of which can be practically judged in given contexts) is crucial to strategic political thinking.” In this conceptualization, the social world is comprised of numerous interlocking “structures” such as patriarchy, capitalism, and (neo)colonialism in which people partake because these social relations are central to the “the production and reproduction of social life” (Glassman 2003:681). Yet I augment this notion of overdetermination with the more cultural approach taken by Hart, where meanings and identities that are socially and discursively constructed also affect social reality in any given instance (and, in many cases, are tied to axes of structural power).
policies as the result of historical negotiations between diverse state and non-state actors. The seeming contradictory logics of these projects can often be explained through analyzing how they arose historically. Urbanization is not an accident of the present, but wrought through particular historical configurations that have often been hotly contested amongst elite and non-elite actors.

2.3.2 Relationality (of Political and Civil Society, and of Favelas)

At another community event, this one in May of 2014, a prominent local activist toured a group of 30 researchers, journalists, and community residents around Complexo, showing areas where PAC and other infrastructural projects were built. He also pointed out where the new developments had necessitated the destruction of houses and left, in their wake, a major mess. On one of these demolished houses, we watched two artists paint a message saying “Poverty isn’t a case for the police” (Fig 2.10). The actions and audience at this event expose something of the relationality of favelas. They demonstrate the movement of people between morro and asfalto, as many of the journalists and researchers, such as myself, were from “elsewhere.” In some respects, the organizers of the event were trying to get their message “out” and create new relationalities across what are often considered “distinct” spaces, with some of us attendees as conduits of this knowledge. It also demonstrates how people are reacting to new forms of state presence: they shed light on the ways that the government is active in re-making urban space through PAC and pacification, but they are also trying to reconfigure the relationship with each, in part by calling for greater accountability to clean up the area and to decrease violent policing. Events such as these have inspired me to think of the relationality between favelas and the state (and the porous and contested presence of the latter), and of the relationality between morro and asfalto.

The State is, indeed, central to Gramscian notions of the conjuncture. It is, in my conceptualization, a “historical bloc” (Dussel 2008:40) of the ruling class, in which a “certain social organization of sectors, classes, groups” is allied and consolidated as a function of specific space-times. The integral state, to Gramsci, consists of both political society (the official government) and civil society – it may comprise officials in government
positions, the legislature, and people outside the official government apparatus who nonetheless influence its actions and appropriate surplus in various ways.\(^{18}\) This bloc rules through hegemony and domination.\(^{19}\) Hegemony, here, is a contested political process (Hart 2003; Dussel 2008), the result of both coercion and consent by the ruling class, or the State: “the State is the entire complex of practice and theoretical activities through which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent over those whom it rules” (Gramsci 1921: 244; in Hart 2003:26). The bloc is also provisional and conjunctural: it is always at risk of losing consent and, when it does, must operate in more forceful and coercive fashion through military and police violence (Dussel 2008).

Drawing on Gramsci’s notion of the integral state, then I think of the state as the dominant class interests that achieve, maintain, and defend hegemony in and through the government apparatus but that are also always tied to elite actors outside formal government institutions – such as construction conglomerates, political machine operators, and narcotrafficking leaders. Moreover, in Brazil, specifically, social movement factions – such as labour unions and urban land rights movements – have been crucial to achieving new hegemonies and transforming the very composition of the state. Movement actors have, indeed, become the government in cases such as the Worker’s Party, and these parties have been transformed as a function of assuming the government apparatus and entering new elite relationships (see Chapter 3.2).

Critical urban scholars of Brazil emphasize the relationality of the state and its territorializations in and through favelas. These communities in Rio have always had diverse relationships with state officials and logics. There is a complex and ever-shifting interface of government, as Telles (2015) calls it, present in precarious settlements, from tax collectors, urban managers, and councilors, to police forces and the military. All are present in various

\(^{18}\) In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci (1921) uses multiple definitions of the State. Sometimes he uses the State to refer to political society (or the official government apparatus), while at other times he mobilizes the idea of the integral state – or the ruling class that operates through both the formal government and civil society organizations and services such as newspapers and education. In this dissertation I draw primarily on this latter conception of the integral state.

\(^{19}\) Gramsci (1921:80) elaborates: “Between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic of certain situations when it is hard to exercise hegemonic function, and when the use of force is too risky). This consists in procuring the demoralization and paralysis of the antagonist (or antagonists) by buying its leaders…in order to sow disarray and confusion in his ranks.”
configurations, being involved in ever-transforming relationships of clientelism, extortion, corruption, and/or sharing of appropriated surpluses (Telles 2010, 2015). Clientelist and neoclientelist relations, in particular, have long been important to governance and industry in Rio de Janeiro, where favelas and other precarious settlements were (and continue to be) political capital for politicians, who would often exchange small gifts, such as water spigots or garbage collection, for votes (see Fischer 2008, 2014; I elaborate on the ever-transforming clientelist relations in Chapter 5). Moreover, informal settlements have allowed large numbers of city labourers to exist on subsistence wages in the absence of significant state and industry funding, and as such have been central to urbanization and industrialization processes (McCann, 2014a&b). Thus in Rio, according to Brazilianists Bryan McCann, Vera Telles, and Brodwyn Fischer, politicians and capitalists have often had significant political and economic interest in precarious settlements, and have been present in these territories in myriad ways. They have, for various reasons, benefited from not fully legalizing, regularizing, or formalizing these communities. Favelas are thus territorializations of relational state processes that seek to accrue economic and political capital for the elite. The task of scholars, in these contexts, is to understand how relationships between political and civil society are being transformed through new state-led projects. How, for instance, do different factions of capital seek to appropriate surplus through new infrastructural projects, how do these projects operate through both consent and coercion, and how are different governing logics traversed and reshaped through these actions?

Yet there is also significant agency on the part of people who live in favelas and other precarious settlements. Residents of the Brazilian periphery who are not members of the state or ruling elite often engage official and formal logics in “transversal” ways (Caldeira 2017), negotiating “legal” and “illegal” folds throughout their everyday lives (Telles 2010). Teresa Caldeira has coined the term “Peripheral urbanization” to account for the ways that people construct their communities and engage transversally with the state. Peripheral urbanization is a condition of the periphery, where the periphery is understood not as an ontological location, but as a space where “official logics...of legal property, formal labor, state regulation, and market capitalism” (Caldeira 2017:7) do not operate in a straightforward
Residents do not directly contest these logics and the officials who attempt to govern and enforce them; rather, local residents engage them in transversal ways, for instance through squatting unoccupied land, negotiating with local political operators, and operating in both legal and illegal markets simultaneously (see also Telles 2010). Crucially, “by engaging the many problems of legalization, regulation, occupation, planning, and speculation, [citizens] redefine those logics and, in so doing, generate urbanizations of heterogeneous types and remarkable political consequences” (Caldeira 2017:7). Peripheral urbanization is, then, a “distinctive form of agency” in which “Residents are agents of urbanization, not simply consumers of spaces developed and regulated by others” (Caldeira 2017:5). This condition of agency has resulted in residents autoconstructing their homes and communities over many years, creating urban spaces that are “always in the making” (Caldeira 2017:5). Methodologically, peripheral urbanization points to the necessity of understanding the agency of residents: how they engage different state logics and actors to build, and in some cases protect, their communities. Moreover, it is crucial to understand how peripheral urbanization and autoconstruction are being transformed in different spatio-temporal conjunctures, where particular places are indeed being invested, in ambivalent ways, with capital and new state presences.

2.3.3 Interscalar Analysis

At “A Copra Pra Alemão Ver,” street artists were painting highly politicized messages onto the walls surrounding the square in which we were standing. One image, in particular, stood out to me; it was the image showing a soccer ball being kicked into, and destroying, a number of favela homes (Fig 2.2). Written on the soccer ball was the word “FIFA.” Encapsulated in this image, as I have read it, is a sense that football’s world governing body has a direct hand in the day-to-day forces of destruction in Complexo and other Brazilian favelas. The effect of the imagery is compounded by the fact that it is painted next to the site

20 Peripheral urbanization has a specific geography: it is a process occurring in many Southern contexts, according to Caldeira, due to inconsistent or informal state support and recognitions of large swaths of lands and communities. It also shifts spatio-temporally within a given region: because community members are always building up their property and lobbying the state for investment and housing rights, they often increase the value of their settlement, and thus the community is increasingly inaccessible to others. As a result, “peripheral urbanization is a process that is always being displaced, reproduced somewhere else where land is cheaper because it is more precarious or difficult to access” (Caldeira 2017:6).
of a demolished house, which forms the visible daily landscape of people living in this particular neighbourhood. The painting suggests, then, that seemingly global forces – such as FIFA – have ongoing local and embodied effects, and inform the symbolic and material landscapes that people constantly navigate. Processes and outcomes of urbanization can here be understood as multi-scalar, with effects that permeate and shape daily life.

A conjunctural methodology or analytic is inherently multi- and interscalar. The “set of circumstances” (Gramsci 2010) and “relations of force” (Hart 2003) that shape a conjuncture can operate from the local to the global scale, defining both a very particular social formation in an urban centre, but also creating a more expansive context through which different urbans must “play the game,” so to speak. To outline her notion of the conjuncture, Gillian Hart uses Doreen Massey’s notion of spatiality and space-time. Massey conceives of spatiality “as constructed out of the multiplicity of social relations across all spatial scales, from the global reach of finance and telecommunications, through the geography of tentacles of national political power, to the social relations within the town, the settlement, the household, and the workplace” (Massey 1994:3 in Hart 2003:35). Place, such as a municipality like Rio de Janeiro or a complex of favela communities such as Complexo do Alemão, is formed through the specific articulations of different spatio-temporal trajectories operating at “interlocking and socially constructed scales” (Hart 2003). Here, the “specificity of a place – however defined – arises from the particularity of interrelations with what lies beyond it, that intersect or come into conjuncture in particular ways” (Hart 2003:35). Spatio-temporal flows of knowledge and power may be long term in nature – for instance, racializations that have arisen and been consolidated through histories of colonization; or shorter term – for instance flows of financial capital “during particular moments…of economic and political crisis” (Sheppard et al 2015:1956).

The national and global scales have long been central objects of analysis to many Brazilian scholars. For instance, many point to the ongoing forms of dependent development that shape Brazil, particularly the ever-transforming relations between national elite actors, federal state officials, and international markets (for example, see Alves 1985; Maricato 2009; Rolnik 2011). These relationships operate at diverse scales, however, and require
interscalar analyses. Financialized markets, for instance, are co-constituted by relationships between internationalized financial capital, multilateral lending institutions, national pension funds, and personal consumer debt. They also affect national and municipal economic growth strategies as well as create new debt relations between homeowners and lending institutions. An interscalar analysis also requires interrogating the relationships between different levels of government: how municipal, state, and federal governments are aligned (or not) for particular public security or urbanization ends. But space-time flows also exceed the state. New digital technologies, for instance, are bringing into new relation different parts of the globe, and non-state actors – such as NGOs – are increasingly involved in urbanization projects in Brazil. A multiscalar conjunctural analysis must account for these diverse actors, knowledges, and technologies working across scales to produce particular urban formations at any given conjuncture.

2.3.4 Dual Modes of Articulation

Because I was initially studying the teleferico, the street art that held the most significance to me at “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver” was the image comparing resources invested in PAC and the UPP to those invested in the priorities of the community (schools, hospitals, sanitation, and clinics) (Fig 2.11). This image, as I read it, creates a visual equivalence between the teleferico and the UPP units, as all are lined up in the left-hand column of the flag. In listing these two distinct projects in such a manner, the artist (whether intentional or not) has created an impression that links, or articulates, PAC and pacification. Both, as suggested by the image, are highly visible projects prioritized by different levels of government. Yet it is not just the artist’s rendering of these projects – together – that has inspired me. It also compelled me to understand the power effects of these types of discourses. This image itself is productive in a sense: it constructs and articulates a visual critique, from this particular location in the favela, of these projects. As such, it is crafting a new regime of visibility and a new way of knowing these forms of state intervention through sometimes-contentious imagery and discourse. The painting thus articulates – joins – PAC and the UPP, and it articulates – enunciates – a critique of the projects.
Central to my conjunctural approach is the neo-Gramscian notion of articulation: the joining together – and consequent transformation – of different modes of accumulation at specific socio-historical conjunctures. In this dissertation I am interested not only in the articulation of different modes of production, but also in how different actors and forms of governance are articulated. Actors in precarious settlements are articulated “in an arena of disputes, negotiations, accommodations, agreements and conflicts revolving around the distribution of resources, modes and place of urban improvement, service implementation” (Telles 2015:23). The constantly transforming relationships between different actors – the diverse ways in which they are articulated to one another – shape politics, knowledge, and resource distribution at any given moment. The idea of articulation, moreover, is central to the projects I am interrogating: I am interested in the interconnections, points of resonance, and relationships between pacification and PAC, between militarized public security and infrastructural development, which I call PACification.

Drawing on the aforementioned decolonial scholars, it is also crucial to understand how different axes of coloniality are articulated through urbanization projects. Here, articulation does not simply mean intersection; rather, following Judith Butler (2006) and Walter Mignolo (2000), the concept captures how different axes transform one another when they come into relation. For instance, how processes of racialization and regimes of accumulation transform one another over time (see Chapter 4.2); and how ideologies of civilization and developmentalism are transformed through new market formalization and expansion projects (see Chapter 6.5).

Yet I also push beyond this notion of articulation as simply a joining together. Following Stuart Hall (1996), I think of articulation in its dual sense: this joining together (of, for instance, modes of production; see also Wolpe 1980); but also as an enunciation, a discursive production. Both the act of joining and the enunciation transform that which is being joined or depicted. For instance, through articulation, “class position and cultural forms are combined in the making of collective identities, during the ongoing struggle and negotiations over power and resources” (Yiftachel 2009:254). Throughout this dissertation I am particularly interested in the discursive, or power-producing, effects of enunciation. In this
conceptualization, all people produce power effects when they participate in naming, enunciating, imaging, or witnessing. Yet, of course, different people are able to appropriate and use discourses to varying degrees and for different (often violent) ends. Members of the state, for instance, may produce their own discursive renderings of internal enemies, informality, and abandonment, in order to create and justify new markets or stimulate investment. These discursive constructions are articulated to and through new regimes of or attempts at capital accumulation. But it is not just the state that has the power to enunciate. In a more Foucauldian vein, every articulation has power effects which can create and reproduce established discourses (or, in a more Gramscian mode of analysis, reproduce hegemony), or they can disrupt these established discourses, attempting to unsettle normalized ways of doing politics and normalized forms of violence. I am particularly interested in this latter notion of enunciation as unsettling; I pay attention to how narratives of corruption are constructed (Chapter 5) and digital images of violence are made viral (Chapter 7) to disrupt normalized or hidden state violences.

Favelas, themselves, are a discursive articulation. As discussed briefly in the introduction and elaborated in this chapter, there is no ontological condition of a favela. Rather, following Perlman, favelas are socio-spatial imaginaries that have stigma as a defining characteristic. While there may indeed be no ontological distinction between precarious settlements and the formal city, they are discursively opposed to one another such that one gains meaning through the other’s negation: the morro, the favela, is the not-asfalto, the uncivilized, the non-modern, highly stigmatized spaces of the city (Perlman 2011). In this dissertation I think through the relationality of morro and asfalto via an anticolonial or decolonial lens, as I pay particular attention to how colonial notions of “backwards,” “informal” and “uncivilized” are articulated to favelas and discursively used to underpin capitalist market expansion and to further state violence. Overall, then, I think of Complexo do Alemão in this dissertation not as a community ontologically distinct from the so-called formal city, but as relational and discursively produced as a function of its specific socio-historical conjuncture.

In this dissertation I employ the conjunctural analytic I developed above. First, I think of Complexo do Alemão as a particular place shaped by multiscalar flows of capital and
knowledge that have been informed by Brazil’s specific history of colonization, but also by present day relations of financialized capital and the country’s neodevelopmentalist agenda. I thus, second, conceive of historical processes as central, and vital, to the current manifestation of state interventions in Complexo. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the seemingly contradictory impulses of PACification without tracing how the projects have come into being, and how infrastructural development and public security have been articulated, in its dual sense, through Brazilian history. Third, I consider favelas as territorializations of the ever-transforming relationships between civil and political society. Inspired by Caldeira and Telles, I discuss how community members themselves continuously traverse relational dynamics with the state, from engaging in new forms of clientelism to calling out state violence and corruption. I also think through new forms of agency and transformed modes of autoconstruction, as residents continue to build their own communities in ways that are necessarily in relation with, and a function of, new large-scale infrastructural and public security interventions. Finally, I consider how articulation, in its dual sense, operates through PAC and pacification. I think through how new articulations (or conjoinings) of diverse actors and axes of colonality operate through PACification. I also pay particular attention to the enunciations of Complexo activists, journalists, and residents: how they are not only building their own public spaces with bricks and mortar and formalizing their property through official registration channels, but are also enunciating new discourses and visibilities that seek to unsettle normalized violence.

Historical processes are central to understanding contemporary urbanization programs in Complexo do Alemão, thus the dissertation has two chapters that are historically oriented and three of a more contemporary nature. The next chapter, Chapter 3, traces the policy histories of so-called inclusion projects in Brazil and Rio de Janeiro. It crafts a genealogy of public security and urbanization policy and programs that takes seriously the relationality of favelas with the so-called formal city and with elite political actors. In this chapter I also consider the space-time flows of financialized capital and Brazil’s neodevelopmentalist agenda, defining and situating PACification within the contemporary conjuncture.
Chapter 4 takes a long historical view of the articulations of public security and infrastructural development throughout Brazil’s history. In this chapter I pay close attention to the articulation (as joining) of racialization and accumulation regimes; and the articulation (as enunciation) of internal enemies that has been crucial to the legitimation of these projects. I also draw on the abstracted notion of the coloniality of power, as developed by modernity/coloniality philosophers of Latin America, and concretize it at the particular conjuncture of PACification in Complexo and Rio more generally.

The three empirically-oriented chapters take seriously the history documented and theorized in these chapters. Each also deploys concepts developed at different levels of abstraction. For instance, chapter 5 is inspired by work in India that has analyzed the progressive and interventionist nature of corruption narratives in a move that Jennifer Robinson (2016), in her recent work on the comparative gesture, would call an unexpected comparison. Here I am motivated and inspired by work done “elsewhere” to ask a question in a particular context. I also inductively engage with Complexo residents’ own narratives of corruption, discussing academic literature (and Brazilian concepts of neodevelopmentalism, for instance) where appropriate. Chapter 6 uses notions of formalization developed in Brazil and other Southern contexts, as well as more abstracted notions of the coloniality of power, to interrogate the effects of formalization mechanisms in Complexo. Chapter 7 focuses on the concepts of peripheral urbanization and autoconstruction – developed specifically through experiences of the Brazilian peripheries – in conversation with literature from North America on digital visualities. What holds these chapters together, beyond on an empirical focus on PACification in Complexo do Alemão, is a conjunctural analytic: all of these concepts are deployed, tweaked, and reconfigured according to the four tenets of a conjunctural methodology outlined above (namely, historical determination, relationality, interscalarity, and articulation). While I engage with academic literature of postcolonial, decolonial, and critical Brazilian urbanism to do this, I also take seriously the provocation of postcolonial and decolonial theory to re-orient knowledge production. Each chapter, then, is also inspired by the words and actions of journalists, activists, and other residents of Complexo do Alemão.
2.4 Methods “In the Field” (or “How I Did It”)

In following the aforementioned conjunctural methodology – attuned to interscalarity, historical determination, articulation (including enunciation), and relationality – I have had to utilize a number of different research methods. In brief, I have attempted to spiral both up and down (following Peck 2017) PAC and pacification projects in Complexo. I have done so by interviewing people at a range of positions and positionalities, from senior level government and World Bank officials, to local shopkeepers and activists. I have also attempted to account for the context and spatio-temporal flows of the conjuncture in Brazil by engaging with Anglo- and Portuguese-academic literature and policy documents. Of course, this attempt to scale from the macro to the micro, from the global to the local risks superficiality. I hope that I have been able to engage different voices and opinions in developing explanatory logics and theorizations, but recognize that the ambitions of my project leave some depth wanting.

My research utilized three main techniques: first, participant observation of (or sometimes more accurately, walking with) community gatherings, resident association meetings, and social inclusion-based movements; second, interviews with city planners, activists, development professionals, and state officials; and third, public policy and public news analysis. Each is elucidated below.

As part of my participant observation, I lived in Alvorada, Complexo do Alemão, adjacent to the new UPP Nova Brasília and Itararé teleferico stations. Most of this work was completed in the five months prior to and during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, although I supplemented this work with a preliminary research trip in the fall of 2013 and a follow-up trip in March of 2015. I lived in Barraco #55 the majority of the time, but also stayed in central Rio and spent a month in São Paulo.

My work has not been a “classical” ethnography, as I did not spend the amount of time necessary for such a method in Complexo. However, I believe that spending time with people in their communities did reveal to me some of the commonsense and everyday ways
in which people are living. It was also crucial for me in gleaning some of the harder-to-spot politics that are sometimes hidden from visitors, such as fractured or tense relationships with Resident Associations (see Chapter 5.1.3). As stated above, my situation in B55 allowed me to attend activist meetings, help organize events, and engage in the daily rhythms of life in Complexo, from darting to the local bakery for fresh bread every morning, to discussing the trajectory of bullets and mapping safe places to walk. There was also considerable community mobilization at this time due to the large presence of, and heightened tensions with, the military police officers in the lead up to the World Cup. As such, I attended protests, spoke with activists, conducted formal and informal interviews, and engaged in discussions in public forums – both online and in public gatherings. I participated in protests in Centro (Rio’s downtown), Zona Sul (Rio’s South Zone, including the major beach districts), and in Complexo do Alemão.

I conducted expert interviews with city planners, government officials, construction workers, engineers, social movement actors, community activists and residents. By “expert” interviews, I refer to people who are considered experts in developing urbanization projects – specifically the projects in Complex but others, too – and also those who are the experts at being targets of these projects. Interviews were semi-structured in nature, consisting of a number of guiding themes that were elaborated as deemed important by the respective interviewees. Following Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore (2012:26), I approached the interviews as dialogical knowledge-production encounters, where “interviews enable the purposeful coproduction of social data, at the nexus of interviewee worldviews and the evolving bundle of questions actively pursued by the researcher.” In total I conducted 41 formal interviews, of which 26 were recorded. Some interviews were not recorded because they were not arranged as interviews but became so as the dialogue continued. Others were not recorded because the interviewees did not want to be captured on tape for security reasons. These so-called formal interviews were augmented by the hundreds of conversations I had with friends, activists, and community residents during my stay in Complexo, many of which informed my thinking even if not offered here in the form of verbatim quotations.
All interviewees are identified by pseudonyms. This was not a straightforward decision, as journalists and activists deserve credit for their actions. I had numerous conversations with Ellen about this issue. She felt that many Complexo residents wanted their names to appear in print because they have for so long been rendered voiceless and nameless by many in political society. However, due to the context of police violence and the recent Brazilian turn towards authoritarianism, as well as my own institutional ethics rules, the identities of the interviewees will remain anonymous unless their words have appeared in a public forum.\(^{21}\) Their collectivities/organizations, if public, retain their original names.

Finally, I conducted discourse analyses of news media and policy documents about PAC, UPP, and PAC Social initiatives and the communities that these projects target. Following Foucault, I take the discourse about a certain event to be constitutive of truth, which frames what can or cannot be said or done about a particular topic. News analysis and policy documents both reflect what people think is happening at a particular time-space, but also give us clues as to how stereotypes, knowledges, and socio-spatial imaginaries act as enframing devices, legitimating and making true notions of endemic criminality, for instance, which justifies violent military intervention. Following this approach, I have analyzed gray literature about PAC and pacification – specifically public policy and legislation (such as the City Statute and Constitution) – created by the Brazilian government and other non-state actors. For each of these types of literature, I read and coded the respective documents according to shared dominant themes. This gave me a sense of how different truths are being constituted and framed.

\(^{21}\) My ethics application said all interviewees would remain anonymous.
2.5 Figures for Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 A Copa Pra Alemão Ver gathering. Photo taken 8 Jun 2014 by author.

Figure 2.2 A Copa Pra Alemão Ver anti-Cup street art. Photo taken 8 Jun 2014 by author.

Figure 2.3 “Cup for whom?” Photo taken 25 Apr 2014 by author.
Figure 2.4 A typical gathering in B55’s kitchen. Photo taken 24 June 2014 by Ellen Sluis.

Figure 2.5 B55 residents. Left to right: Eddu Grau (co-founder of B55); Dave Rono (B55 resident from Kenya); me. Photo taken 22 April 2014 by author.

Figure 2.6 Breakfast at B55. Photo taken 29 Jan 2014 by author.

Figure 2.7 The animals of B55. Photos taken 21 April 2014 by author.
Figure 2.8 A Copa Pra Alemão Ver projection: “No to the genocide policy of the Brazilian government.” (See chapter 8 for more on this event). Photo taken 8 Jun 2014 by author.

Figure 2.9 Another A Copa Pra Alemão Ver projection. This one compares military police action under the dictatorship to that under democracy. Photo taken 8 Jun 2014 by author.
Figure 2.10 “Poverty isn’t a case for the police.” Photo taken 21 Apr 2014 by author.

Figure 2.11 A Copa Pra Alemão Ver anti-UPP and -teleferico street art. Photo taken 8 Jun 2014 by author.
Chapter 3: Histories of Urban Upgrading and Public Security in Río’s Favelas

When you ascend the steps of Bonsucesso station, the first teleferico station that sits on the edge of Complexo do Alemão, a sign greets you:

Welcome to the Alemão’s Cable Car, the first cable mass transport of Brazil. The system has 6 stations with 3,5km of length and 152 cabins. Bonsucesso is the first station and it makes integration with the railway of Rio de Janeiro. (Fig 3.1; typos in original)

Stations form not a circuit but a line, extending from Bonsucesso, a suburb on the edges of Complexo do Alemão, up into the communities. The stations of Adeus, Baiana, Alemão, Itararé, and Palmeiras are each located at the top of different hills throughout the complex. In all cases but one, the teleferico station name refers to the name of the hill. Itararé is named after the road that connects the concrete (the asfalto) to the top of the hill (the morro); the hill itself is called Alvorada. Different stations have different sponsors: TIM – a cellular service company – sponsors Bonsucesso while Kibon – a Brazilian-Argentine ice cream producer – sponsors Alemão. The gondola system was the largest investment of the Workers’ Party (PT) Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) in favela urbanization projects. The teleferico is also currently a white elephant: the government is no longer running the system because it has not proven financially viable.

When I first arrived in Complexo, my interpreter and interlocutor, Andre, immediately toured me through the interior of the Bonsucesso teleferico station. After we walked through the turnstiles into the “fare paid” zone, he pointed out a series of placards on display against the wall of the station that detailed, in chronological fashion, the history of favela urbanization projects in Rio de Janeiro (see Cavalieri 2013; Fig 3.2). Of course, as with any history, the displays tell a particular version or truth of events as they occurred in Rio. Yet they offer a chronology of favela interventions that is consistent with much academic literature on Brazilian urbanization that focuses on state-driven policy. Below I trace these key moments, telling a fairly typical (albeit contested) story of urbanization policy as told to
residents, tourists, and researchers alike through academic and popular forms of story-telling such as the teleferico displays.

Inspired by the conjunctural analytic developed in Chapter 2, in telling this story I focus on the historical development, relationality, and space-time flows of urbanization and public security programs in Rio de Janeiro, generally, and Complexo do Alemão, specifically. Drawing on secondary literature, I argue that the development and purposes of contemporary urbanization and public security projects cannot be understood without historicizing how they have come into being in the first place. In other words, they are necessarily historically determined. Such programs have always been the result of varying alignments between political parties and national elites operating at different levels of the government, and have shifted according to negotiations between who is in power and able to realize their agenda. I emphasize that contemporary large-scale urbanization projects such as PAC, for instance, are a result of the particularities of the Workers’ Party (PT) government, shaped by its left-leaning and interventionist politics, but also by the space time flows of financialized capital and relations with elite national and global capital that have been central to the party achieving and maintaining power. I also demonstrate that while politicians, including Dilma and Lula themselves, often invoke the myth of marginality and rhetoric of abandonment to justify contemporary large-scale urbanization and public security programs (see Chapter 5), these areas have never been fully abandoned. A primary purpose of the chapter, then, is to demonstrate the relationality of favelas and their upgrading programs: how these spaces have always been a concern of the state, and have been created through various state and economic logics where residents, themselves, have had a vital hand in shaping service provision, albeit in variable and contested ways.

This chapter is organized into four main sections. First, I trace the history of urbanization projects in Rio, specifically, as a function of the multiple state and non-state actors that have

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22 This chapter is based on secondary literature rather than primary archival research. Much work has already been done to document the history of public security and urbanization programs in Rio. As such, I do not aim to reproduce this research, rather emphasize key points that are central to understanding contemporary projects in Complexo, which I detail at greater length as the dissertation proceeds.

23 This, of course, would not last, due in part to allegations of the very forms of corruption that the PT has had to engage in to operate effectively within Brazil’s political apparatus.
brought them into being. I then turn to the most recent and large-scale form of urbanization created by the PT – the country’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). Here I emphasize the historically determined nature of the PT (and thus of PAC), and its relationship to space-time flows of capital and other national elites. Next, I document a brief history of public security projects in Rio, specifically, which have oscillated between a war on crime and a community policing approach, depending on the political climate (and political party) of the moment. This section ends with a brief introduction to pacification, as the latest manifestation of Rio state government’s approach to community policing – albeit with characteristics of a war on crime approach – implemented as Rio seeks international investment. Finally, I conclude the chapter by discussing the historical development of Complexo do Alemão, specifically, and how this complex of favelas has become the target of both PAC and pacification.

3.1 History of Urbanization Policies

The federal, state, and municipal governments of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro, respectively, have always had variable and contested relationships with precarious settlements. In this section I present, via secondary sources, how favelas have always been related to the economic and governance logics of the state – being both a problem and solution for industrial development, economic growth, and the safety of cities. Over the last one hundred years, the state’s policy towards favelas has shifted between eradication and in situ upgrading efforts, depending on the different governments in power. Yet the state is not the only actor that has been enrolled in, or indeed led, service provision and regularization in favelas. In this section I thus also pay attention to the myriad actors involved in the contestation and negotiation of urbanization policy.

3.1.1 Favelas as a Problem and Solution for Political Society

Most accounts of the history of Rio trace favelas’ emergence to the late 19th century, when many former slaves migrated from coffee plantations to Rio de Janeiro, settling on Morro da
Providência in temporary dwellings (Fischer 2008; Leeds 1996). At a similar time in the late 1800s, military commanders allowed homeless soldiers who had fought in the Canudos War to inhabit the hill in central Rio home to the convent of Santo Antonio (Abreu 1988; Leeds 1996). Cholera and yellow fever outbreaks would come to plague these communities and the rest of the city, ushering in a form of “hygienist urban modernization” (Cavalieri 2013). This so-called modernization targeted these early favelas, assumed to be the locus of disease, for eradication (Fischer 2008, 2014). The sanitary code of 1890 and 1904 created the legal framework for evicting residents in the name of public health, which operated as “selectively enforced instruments that effectively granted city officials the power to allocate the tolerance of illegality” (Fischer 2014:34). The discursive articulation of favelas as backward and disease ridden was central to legitimating eradication campaigns.

At the turn of the century, Rio underwent a period of Hausmann-inspired modernization in which Prefect Pereira Passos and French urbanist Alfred Agache designed and constructed large open avenues (Fischer 2008; Cavalcanti 2014a). At the same time, the federal government offered incentives to industry to construct workers’ villages, “villas” (Fischer 2014) or “shanty settlements” (McCann 2014a,b). Such a pattern of development was common in areas adjacent to large institutions. Through the creation of these villages, according to Bryan McCann,

settlement was tolerated, not directed, but it obeyed the codes of institutionalized patronage and responded to the exigencies of a labor environment where subsistence-level wages required a workforce living in the immediate vicinity without paying rent. (McCann 2014b:104)

Cases such as these offer early examples of the government’s cultivation of – and thus inherent relationality with – seemingly “informal” (or unregulated/regularized) spaces and communities.

24 Brazil was the last country in the Western Hemisphere to officially abolish slavery, which it did in 1888.

25 One of the best-documented examples of these early villas occurred in 1904 when the Brazilian navy set up a hospital on a hill adjacent to Rio’s beaches and tolerated the building – or autoconstruction – of informal housing by its workers and their families (McCann 2014a).
Between the 1920s and 1940s the population of Rio tripled due to rural-urban migration: agricultural crises and drought, alongside the federal Getúlio Vargas administration’s promise of industrial employment, drove many to Rio (Fischer 2008; Leeds 1996). In the 1940s, yellow fever resurfaced as a major issue instigating another round of favela eradication efforts by Vargas appointed-mayor of Rio Henrique Dodsworth (1937 to 1945) (Cavalieri 2013; Fischer 2008). Vargas and Dodsworth were behind the construction of temporary proletarian parks for the displaced residents and for industrial workers. Different levels of government also created new agencies to assist in eradication efforts: with American funding, the state of Guanabara (the precursor to the state of Rio de Janeiro) focused on slum removal programs via the Cooperativa de Habitação Popular do Estado da Guanabara (COHAB) (Cavalieri 2013; Gay 1994). Simultaneously, the National Housing Bank (BNH) became enrolled in relocation efforts, funding accommodation for 140,000 dispossessed favela inhabitants in a ten-year span. With the anti-favela orientations of Rio state governor Carlos Lacerda (of the National Democratic Union – UDN; elected 1960) and the new federal military dictatorship (seizing power in 1964), thousands of old and new favela residents would be evicted from communities in Rio de Janeiro (Leeds 1996).

3.1.2 Non-State Organizing and Insurgent Citizenships

But the government apparatus was not the only force working in favela communities. As detailed in Chapter 3.1, favelas have long been a territorialization of the efforts of different actors – a contested interface of civil and political society. Church, NGOs, and residents alike have long been involved in crafting new urbanization efforts. During the 1940s and 1950s, for instance, a new major player would enter favelas: the Catholic Church. At the time, the government was worried about communism spreading through unregularized, precarious settlements, and thus actively recruited the Church to become involved in favela consolidation (Gay 1994; McCann 2014b). With support from the federal government, the Church focused on improvements in favelas as well as on resettlement projects (Cavalieri 2013). In fact, the Catholic Organization of Cruzada São Sebastião, with federal funding,
implemented the first large-scale housing project within a favela.\(^{26}\) The Church continued its efforts into the 1960s.

Another key favela policy stakeholder, this one oriented towards upgrading, entered the scene during the 1960s. A number of economists, planners, and architects, with the backing of USAID, created the Community Development Company (CODESCO) in 1967, which, working at cross purposes with COHAB and BNH, focused on urbanization (that is, upgrading) projects (Gay 1994). As Janice Perlman frames it, CODESCO was “a radical counterexample to BNH” (Perlman 2011:269) because it focused on in-situ housing vis-à-vis pilot projects that would serve as experiments for future upgrading efforts. One of CODESCO’s first projects was to convince then-governor of Rio, Francisco Negrão de Lima (of the Partido Social Democrático – PSD), to advance low-interest loans for construction materials to the settlements of Mata Machado, Morro União, and Brás de Pina (Perlman 2011; Cavaliere 2013).\(^{27}\) While the program was relatively successful in supporting favela residents to transform housing (Cavaliere 2013), the project ended in 1969 because the federal government (the military dictatorship) continued to be pro-eradication (Perlman 2011).\(^{28}\)

People who lived in favelas were also central organizers for improving favela conditions. Many favela resident associations, having been politicized through eradication efforts and state neglect, created the Federação das Associações de Favelas do Estado da Guanabara (Federation of Favela Associations of the State of Guanabara – FAFEG) (Gay 1994; also Fischer 2008) which became highly influential in organizing for land, infrastructure, and services (Rodrigues 2016; McCann 2014a; Gay 1994).\(^{29}\) The insurgent organizing of these

\(^{26}\) They also codified an understanding of urbanization as “the minimum condition necessary for human existence and moral, intellectual, social, and economic elevation” (Fischer 2008:75).

\(^{27}\) The PSD was directly at odds with the federal dictatorship.

\(^{28}\) At the federal level, the military dictatorship channeled its efforts at favela eradication through the Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana (CHISAM). CHISAM removed over 100 favelas in Rio (Gay 1994).

\(^{29}\) FAFEG was created largely through the mobilization of residents of favelas in Rio’s industrial North Zone, where Complexo do Alemão is located.
groups was thus central to attracting new investment into favelas. In fact, the organizational efforts of favela leaders were so important at this time that McCann (2014a) argues these associations were the so-called “vanguard” against the military dictatorship. The favela movements were also intrinsic in electing new favela-friendly municipal and state governments (Israel Klabin of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB; and Leonel Brizola of the Partido Democrático Trabalhista, PDT, respectively) (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016). Brizola, specifically, saw favelas not as problems but as “solutions” to the need to live close to employment and foment close community ties. Residents organizing efforts through FAFEG and through the political electoral apparatus were thus central to favela-targeted urbanization projects.

3.1.3 The Political Interface of Urbanization After the Dictatorship

The national government’s eradication efforts slowed in the 1970s, due to the political and economic infeasibility of the programs: relocated people were angry and organizing, often through FAFEG, and the relocation programs could not recover the cost invested (Perlman 2011; Gay 1994). The mid-1970s was also the beginning of the long and uncertain transition to democracy. In this climate, and with extensive flooding in Rio that destroyed many favela homes, the national government created its first upgrading project in 1979 called Promorar, which focused on five favelas including the Complexo do Maré of Rio’s North Zone (Perlman 2011; Gay 1994).

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30 Both created their own upgrading initiatives with the support of CODESCO – Klabin used UNICEF financing to begin urbanization efforts in Rocinha, while Brizola focused on land titling in different carioca favelas (Perlman 2011; Rodrigues 2016).

31 Both created programs that harnessed the labour of favela residents: the municipal government’s Projeto Mutirão (1985-95) paid residents a minimum wage to construct sanitation infrastructure, while the state government’s Cada Família um Lote (1983) also used residents’ labour to upgrade two favelas in Rio, focusing on water, sewage, and land titling (Perlman 2011; Cavalieri 2013; Rodrigues 2016).

32 During this period, in addition to the federal government’s re-oriented efforts, the Catholic Archdiocese of Rio and the city’s municipal government created their own upgrading agencies. New organizations included: the Pastoral das Favelas of Rio – a grassroots entity informed by liberation theology created by the Catholic Church in 1976 (Perlman 2011; Gay 1994); the Municipal Secretary of Social Development (SMDS) – “the first government agency that had been created to deal specifically with the problem of the favelas” (Gay 1994:23); and the Pereira Passos Institute (IPP) – responsible for developing projects and conducting censuses of Rio’s favela.
The official transition to democracy in 1985 (when the military regime ended) consolidated the new *in situ* upgrading approach. This consolidation was due in part to the financial crisis of the mid-80s, which forced BNH to close, thus ending the major form of government housing for dispossessed residents (Cavalieri 2013). The shift to democracy was also inspired by a Right to the City movement and, as previously mentioned, widespread social mobilization, with favela activists and resident associations organizing for land titling, education, and public security (McCann 2014a). Their demands became codified in the new democratic federal Constitution of 1988 and the subsequent City Statute of 2001 that prioritized integration and participation\(^{33}\) of low-income residents and communities into the urban fabric (Maricato 2009, 2010).\(^{34}\)

A number of consolidation or urbanization projects, led by both state and non-state actors, followed. With heavy rain and flooding in the early part of the 1990s, then-mayor Cesar Maia (1993-1997) had the political clout to begin a municipal program called Reflorestamento-Mutirão Remunerado (Remunerated Self-Help Reforestation) that used community labour for growing vegetation to prevent flooding, and also provided educational services within the favela (Perlman 2011). The successes of the Reforestation program inspired the first large-scale urbanization program of the municipal government, starting in 1994, called Favela-Bairro (Favela-Neighborhood).\(^{35}\) Yet this program was not led solely by Rio government actors; it also had the support and direction of international banks and civil society leaders. The cost of the program was 600 million dollars, of which the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB) lent 300 million, with the World Bank also providing funding (Cavalieri 2013; Cavalcanti 2009). The program also drew heavily on the expertise of, and

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\(^{33}\) The City Statute also required that each city prepare five-year master plans with one of their goals being said integration through participation and consultation with community members (Maricato 2010).

\(^{34}\) The city of Rio’s first five-year plan outlined steps to, among others, formally recognize favela residents and their land, collect garbage, and pave streets (Cavalieri 2013). This plan would never be fully implemented, however, due to an inter-state political crisis in which the state governor (Moreira Franco) refused to release funds to the City Council still loyal to former governor Brizola (Perlman 2011). With Saturnino Braga (PDT) as city mayor, the municipality went bankrupt, partly as a result of hyperinflation and conflicts between different levels of government (McCann 2014b). Key components of the original plan would, however, be resurrected in the five-year plan of 1990.

\(^{35}\) This program operated until 2008 and reached 300,000 people in favelas (Cavalieri 2013).
experiments with, the Brazilian Institute of Architects. Favela-Bairro expanded when the federal government-owned bank, Caixa Econômica Federal (Caixa or CEF), began financing loans for the initiatives, thus requiring a formalized bidding process and precise project timelines. These urbanization efforts in favelas, then, represent a complex relationship between multiple actors and space-time flows of capital that extend beyond Rio’s municipal or Brazil’s national formal government apparatus.

3.1.4 Interscalar Political Alignments and Attracting International Investment

The late 2000s and early 2010s ushered in a new approach to upgrading, the result of new political alignments between different scales of government in Brazil and their desire to attract international business investment. In situ upgrading was a central component of Eduardo Paes’ (PMDB – Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) mayoral election campaign and his city plan oriented to Rio’s hosting of the 2016 Olympic Games (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014; Leitão & Delecave 2011; Cavalcanti 2014b). Paes’ administration – in alignment with Rio governor Sérgio Cabral and then-president of the Republic, Lula – strategized to market Rio as a global city, which they coined Rio Global (Brum 2016).

Central to their plan for Rio’s development was to attract mega events and create a business-friendly climate for international investment. Favela urbanization was to be a central legacy project of the government’s mega event strategy (Brum 2016). In 2010 the municipal government thus introduced the Morar Carioca program. The goal of Morar Carioca was to scale up the Favela-Bairro municipal project and urbanize all favelas in the city by the year 2020 (Leitão & Geronimo; Cavalcanti 2014b). The central philosophy of the program was inspired by the participatory logic of the Brazilian Constitution’s City Statute: the program was to ensure “participation of organized society in all of the steps of the execution…through assemblies and meetings in the communities, and open presentations and debates for the

36 In the first phase of the program, the municipal government held a contest via the Brazilian Institute of Architects for innovative approaches to favela design. The municipality selected 15 favelas in need of upgrading, and assigned to each a winning architectural team (Perlman 2011). The goal of the project, according to Perlman, was to test and compare different approaches to favela urbanization.

37 A municipal decree provided the framework for the project, positioning the Municipal Secretary of Housing (SMH) in a coordinating role, and placing responsibility for favela mapping and censuses with the municipality’s Pereira Passos Institute (IPP).
participation of organized civil society and of citizens” (Article 1.2: 2). Morar Carioca was to be an integrated effort, focused on urban land regularization and infrastructural projects as well as social service provision (Decreto N36388 2012). Tucker Landesman (2017), a recently graduated doctoral student from the London School of Economics, calls this new approach integration, which includes but also operates beyond infrastructural upgrading: these projects are oriented towards marketization, employment, and extending public services. Crucially, Leitão and Delecave argue, the program also represents a shift in the state’s understanding of favelas: in the alignment between municipality, state, and federation, all levels of government sought to expand formalized market activity into these heretofore informalized favelas – framed as “untapped markets” – and to project an image of security, competence and strong investment climate onto the world stage during the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games.

However, the project would be dismantled in 2013 with few initiatives ever materializing. While Paes cited lack of financial resources, Mariana Cavalcanti argues that, in light of the mayor’s right-wing, international investment-oriented agenda, Morar Carioca was likely never central to his plans (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014). With the massive infrastructural projects needed for hosting both the World Cup and the Olympics – such as the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) System – by 2013 the municipality emphasized eradication practices, particularly in favelas adjacent to mega event projects (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014). The result has been that, “in the past decade, policy has retained the Favela-Bairro program’s basic tenets, but now these tenets are applied in the context of increased investments in strategic planning for the city in order to prepare for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016” (Cavalcanti 2014a:201). In other words, favela upgrading policy has shifted according to the capital accumulation efforts of Rio de Janeiro, efforts that are the result of alignments between different levels of government in Brazil, and that are focused on formalizing and growing economic markets in both the so-called formal and informal spaces of the city.

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38 As Theresa Williamson of Catalytic Communities explains, “Morar Carioca, as it is written on paper, is an urban planner’s dream for favelas” (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014:para 3).

39 See Chapters 4 & 6 for more on the marketing of Rio and articulations between public security and upgrading policies.
Favela policy in Rio de Janeiro has thus shifted significantly over time, from large-scale eradication efforts to recent experiments in *in situ* upgrading. Yet there has always been a state relationship to favelas – whether these territories have been objects of concern for the hygiene and safety of the city, or have been understood as crucial to subsidizing industrial labour or, more recently, extending consumer markets. Thus, favelas have always been related to state economic and governance policy. The above discussion also highlights, though, that it is not just the state that has been present and vested in favela policy. These initiatives have enrolled a variety of actors, from the Church, state and international banks, to Brazilian and international architectural teams, to favela residents themselves. Indeed, social movements that have arisen in and through favela organizations (such as resident associations) have been central to not only favela-oriented policy and service provision, but have also been central agents in electing political parties at all levels of government and shaping present-day urban constitutional law.

### 3.2 Scaling Up Urbanization Through Financial and Patrimonial Channels

The latest, largest-scale, and most comprehensive attempt at *in situ* upgrading has been implemented by the political party that the social movements of the 1980s and 1990s helped elect: the Workers’ Party (PT). During the PT’s reign, the federal government became a major stakeholder in favela urbanization projects through its national Growth Acceleration Project (PAC). In this section I focus on both the PT and PAC as historically determined entities, shaped by an inherited state apparatus that, as many commentators argue, has made so-called corrupt practices (via patrimonial politics) normal and perhaps even necessary to effect national-level change. Here, political society emerges as a function of relationships sedimented between the governing party and elites/factions of capital that shape how parties in power carry out their policies. I also point to how both the PT and PAC are the result of, and are re-shaping, space-time flows of capital, specifically financialized capital.

The PT government’s Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) was oriented towards global capital and global social inclusion agendas. In the state’s own rhetoric, the program was to “privilege large mobility and infrastructure projects and geared to combat the economic
crisis” (“Sobre o PAC” 2013; Cavalieri 2013). The PT boasted that PAC was largely intended to be a stimulus package to create jobs and generate income in the wake of the decidedly global 2008 financial crisis (“Sobre o PAC” 2013). Yet this project, according to Denise Ferreira da Silva (2016:199), was also part of a broader Brazilian orientation necessarily responding to “global capital’s need for a larger consumer market and smaller labor force.” Lula and Dilma’s economic agenda focused on natural resource extraction and agricultural production benefitting internationalized firms, in addition to expanding consumption of both commodities and debt (da Silva 2016). It was also articulated to human rights mandates promoted by international NGOs, informed by American programs of “affirmative action” that, in the late 1990s and through the early 2000s, have been increasingly incorporated into Brazilian national law and policy (da Silva 2016). These human rights agendas have more recently promoted social inclusion technologies that target “slum”-like territories for integration; international monetary and financial institutions such as the World Bank support and enact in situ urbanization projects as part of this new global mandate.40

The target areas of PAC/PAC2 included major social infrastructure, urban planning and energy distribution throughout Brazil. The first iteration of this program, from 2007-2010, occurred under the Workers Party (PT) government headed by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). PAC2, the second iteration of the program (2011-2014), continued under the PT administration of President Dilma Rousseff. The program was divided into sub-programs that included: PAC Cidade Melhor (Better Cities), PAC Comunidade Cidadã (Citizens’ Community), PAC Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life housing project), PAC Água e Luz Para Todos (Water and Light for All), PAC Transportes (Transportation), PAC Energia (Energy), and PAC Urbanização de Assentamentos Precários (Urbanization of Precarious Settlements). In addition to generating income, a primary objective of the program was for “fast and sustainable development” of “underdeveloped”/peripheral areas, and it intended to grant land tenure to favela residents across the country (Cavalcanti, 2014a). The first PAC program invested over R$504 billion (US$306 billion) into the economy,

40 World Bank publications and professionals often cite Brazil’s favela upgrading projects as key examples of this integration-sans-removal agenda.
while the second PAC2 aimed to invest R$959 billion (US$582 billion), money which came from “federal, state, and municipal government as well as private and state companies” (Skalmusky 2011:para 2). The arm of PAC that targeted favelas – Urbanização de Assentamentos Precários – was specifically oriented to fund favela infrastructural upgrading projects. Via this latter channel, PAC money has filtered down through the federal and state government to target three main favelas in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro: Complexo de Manguinhos, Rocinha, and Complexo do Alemão. It has thus been touted, in part, as a redistributive project that transforms relationships between government actors and favela communities.

3.2.1 Historical Determination and “Traditional” Brazilian Patrimonialism

It is impossible to understand PAC without understanding the federal party that implemented it: the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Worker’s Party. While the PT was elected to power as a left-leaning, social welfare-oriented party, it inherited a class-based institutional state formation structured on patrimonial politics and a financially-dependent economy. Many scholars in Brazil argue that corruption and patrimonialism are so deeply sedimented, and the national elite so powerful, that the PT has had to follow suit with what Maricato, Oliveira and Raquel Rolnik call more “traditional” ways of doing politics, “strongly based on clientelism, patronage and control by business interests” (Rolnik 2011:244). Oliveira has called this a “seizure of the party by the state” (Oliveira 2006:17), in which “the [PT] is being dissolved into the state, in the sense that the tasks, obligations and rationale of the state have imposed themselves on the functions of the party” (Oliveira 2006:20). This “seizure” has resulted in the continuation of the “traditional political logic” (Rolnik 2011:244) in which the PT entered a coalition with other parties to gain a majority in parliament, while the “powerful elite, including landowners, businesses, and family oligarchies continued to be well represented in in Congress” (Rolnik 2011:244). Because he had been elected on a leftist platform, Lula did not want to continue the “traditional practices” of Brazilian patrimonialism, in which the ruling party would dole out seats in exchange for votes and favours (Anderson 2016; Oliveira 2006; Morais & Saad-Filho 2011, 2012). Instead, according to reports at the time, Lula began to disburse monthly payments to the
representatives of other parties and the ruling elite – such as construction company oligarchies – in what would be known as the Mensalão (monthly payment) scandal of 2005. After the Mensalão scandal broke, the PT reportedly reverted to the practices of previous administrations in order to maintain its power in Congress and Parliament, and to keep its elected seats: by placing people in positions of power in return for favours/votes – in the “worst traditions of Brazilian patrimonialism” (Oliveira 2006:20).

The teleferico represents one of the primary infrastructural projects that has reportedly redirected wealth through patrimonial relationships of favours and bribes. Odebrecht, known as one of the Four Sisters of Brazilian oligarchic construction companies involved in building the teleferico, has been central to patrimonial relations in Brazil since its meteoric rise during the military dictatorship.41 Since the end of the dictatorship era, a central strategy of the Four Sisters for retaining political power, and continuing to win so-called public bids, has been through donating to political campaigns.42 In 2013 alone, Odebrecht invested R$11 million of the R$17 million raised by the ruling PMDB party of Rio’s state government – the party that hired the firm to construct the teleferico (Belisário 2014). At the federal level, Odebrecht was one of the first companies to ever support the workers party (PT) (Campos 2011, 2013). That Odebrecht has emerged as a central player in the controversial Lava Jato investigation, and that the federal police have recently investigate bribery in its negotiations of the PAC Complexo do Alemão project, has come as little surprise to many in Brazil given this history.

But patrimonialism and clientelism have a new face as a function of the socio-historical conjuncture in Brazil. Alba Zaluar (1997) calls this a “neo-clientelism,” involving a new class of actors that head the state’s pension and hedge funds, development/investment bank, and public services. New patrimonial relationships have formed between fund managers –

41 Odebrecht epitomizes “family-based control” as a “feature of monopoly capital formation of economic groups” (Belisário 2014:para 2). The company rose quickly through Emílio Médici’s reign during Brazil’s military dictatorship period, as Médici was linked to Baiana and Paulista bourgeois business interests. Ernesto Geisel became president of state-owned Petrobras during this era and systematically hired the construction firm (Campos 2011, 2013).

42 Indeed, between them the construction companies contributed more than R$479 million to party committees and candidates in Brazil (Belisário 2014).
often former union leaders – and traditional elite family oligarchies in Brazil that rule many of Brazil’s construction companies, among others (Rolnik 2011). The PT has consolidated the power of

a new social class, defined by its access to and control over public funds. One wing of this class consists of an upper strata of workers’ leaders, who rose through the autonomous labour movement of the 1970s and 80s…[and were] appointed as workers’ representatives to the boards of pension funds…Well before 2002, this fund-management stratum had crystallized within the core leadership of the Workers Party (Oliveira 2006:10)

Thus, the Workers Party as government had a central hand in this financialization of the state, which continues to shape the interscalar flow of capital through large-scale urbanization projects, as discussed below.

3.2.2 Interscalar Flows of Financialized Capital

The transnational and national dominance of finance capital has indelibly shaped PAC investments. The financialization of Brazil’s economy did not begin with Lula, although the PT has exacerbated the process. Brazil has undergone neoliberal financial reforms since the 1980s and implemented both Washington Consensus mechanisms to “open” the economy, and Brady Plan measures to decrease debt (Feijó, Lamônica & Lima 2016; Klink & Denaldi 2014). While Brazil successfully repaid its debt to external lenders such as the IMF, the country did so by borrowing domestically at much higher interest rates (Nakatani & Herrera 43They “had, by dint of their positions, become major players in Brazilian finance; their task now being to press for redundancies, sell-offs, and shut-downs, in pursuit of high returns on their investments” (Oliveira 2006:10)

44Pre-PT experiments with housing finance – dependent on the creation of pension and retirement funds and the National Housing Bank – occurred in Brazil as early as the 1930s and 1940s (Klink & Denaldi 2014). Lula’s PT implemented a number of pro-finance measures to attract fictitious foreign capital: they abolished income taxation on foreign investors buying government bonds, and created the world’s highest real interest rates (Bin 2016). The pursuit of foreign capital investment by the state was an attempt to switch from a manufacturing-dominated to technologically-centred industrial economy (Feijó, Lamônica & Lima 2016). While Brazil has indeed been successful in attracting global financial inflows, as Feijó, Lamônica, and Lima argue, this attempt has not created the expected economic growth, and has manifested a structural change in the economy: the manufacturing sector has been significantly weakened, while the country has become more dependent on foreign financial capital. The country’s economic growth in the mid-2000s was due to a commodity boom – and the high prices of exported commodities heading to China (Feijó, Lamônica & Lima 2016) – rather than any growth achieved by finance or technology sectors.
In other words, Brazil switched its external debt to internal debt. The country borrowed from domestic banks and investment funds such as Caixa, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES – the largest development and investment bank in Latin America), and the Workers’ Pension Fund (Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço, or Guarantee Fund Based on Service Time Contributions, FGTS). Since then, the country’s debt has been the main asset circulating within Brazil’s financial markets (Bin 2016). There has thus been an “explosive expansion of the public debt with interest payments draining off substantial public resources to the benefit of the financial markets” (Maricato 2010:21). In other words, payment on domestic debt has come at the expense of welfare sectors, with cuts to healthcare, sanitation, housing, urbanization, and unemployment insurance (Bin 2016; Maricato 2010).

Financialization, often associated with neoliberalization and globalization, has occurred in Brazil within the PT’s neodevelopmentalist (Morais & Saad-Filho 2012) or social-developmentalalist (Klink & Denaldi 2014) agenda. Neodevelopmentalism in Brazil has a focus on “constructive interactions between a strong state and the private sector, with the former providing macroeconomic stability, supporting distributive outcomes directly, and nurturing large domestic firms (‘national champions’)” (Morais & Saad-Filho 2012: 790; see also Campos 2013) such as Odebrecht. Morais & Saad-Filho call Lula and Dilma’s PT policy prescriptions the “juxtaposition” of a neoliberal framework inherited from Cardoso with a more developmentalist agenda focused on a more activist state, spurring development and (increasingly financialized) investment in the national economy.

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45 Federal domestic public debt accounted for an average of 41.1% of Brazil’s GDP in 1999-2014, compared to an average of 18.9% in the 1994-1998 period (Bin 2016). Brazil’s second largest budget expense after social security is the interest on this debt (4.5% per year of the GDP) (Bin, 2016).

46 They continue: “[N]eo-developmentalist policies are not limited to the narrow neoliberal goal of monetary stability. Their broader aims are summarized by the umbrella term ‘macroeconomic stability’, which includes inflation control, exchange rate and balance of payments stability supported by capital controls, fiscal sustainability, low interest rates and the reduction of uncertainties related to future demand, which should provide a more stable environment for private investment decisions…Achievement of these goals will require complementary monetary, fiscal, exchange rate and wage policies…aiming to restore the power of the state to control the currency, facilitate the implementation of industrial policies, promote competition, and support improvements in the distribution of income” (Morais & Saad-Filho 2012:790).
The Growth Acceleration Program, or PAC, is a neodevelopmentalist project, relying on state-owned and private sector enterprise investment that is shaped by a financialized neoclientelism (Zaluar 1997). Put another way, PAC has circulated large sums of financial capital as a counter-cyclical measure, facilitated by the state, to mitigate the global financial crisis, with this capital reportedly flowing through long-standing patrimonial channels. PAC investment has been facilitated by the expansion of credit lines of state owned banks (including BNDES, CEF, Banco do Brasil) for both production and consumption of infrastructure, and offering tax rebates to private investors (Barbosa & Souza 2010). PAC, specifically, has received much of its funding from FI-FGTS as well as FAT (the Worker’s Assistance Fund), and BNDES. PAC’s slum-upgrading or urbanization component has sought to use financial resources of securitization and secondary mortgage markets to develop infrastructure in low-income communities (Klink & Denaldi 2014). The program has also allowed the government to support “private ‘national champions’…with subsidized credit, preferential contracts, and share purchases by the state-owned banks and pension funds” (Morais & Saad-Filho 2011:35). This money has reportedly found its way to the large construction oligarchies – the so-called private national champions – that are now under investigation for “traditional practices” of bribery via Lava Jato and other federal police investigations.

PAC is closely aligned – both politically and programmatically – with another federal project based on both neodevelopmentalism and finance capital: Minha Casa, Minha Vida (MCMV – My House, My Life). This national program was introduced in 2009 and intends to both stimulate the economy and tackle Brazil’s housing deficit. It has been financed largely through offering inexpensive credit to both producers (developers, construction companies) and consumers (residents) of housing (Klink & Denaldi 2014). MCMV is a key partner of PAC: the project has built homes for some of the populations displaced by PAC infrastructural projects in favelas (see Chapters 5.2.3 & 6.3). MCMV also relies on PAC-supported municipal and state projects: the housing developments are supported through infrastructural investments, land, and beneficiary registration carried out at more local levels often financed by PAC. Both projects have sought to extend financialized capital and investment to its low-income “beneficiaries,” predominatly through enrolling people in new
loan arrangements such as low-interest mortgages. This social assistance housing is subsidized through both the federal budget and FGTS. It thus relies on finance capital invested in FGTS, and attempts to enroll increasing numbers of people in mortgage financing. Yet this capital continues to flow through aforementioned patrimonial and neo-clientelist channels: “There is increasing evidence that grants, subsidies and tax incentives have been capitalized by oligopolistic players in the real estate-finance complex, effectively reinforcing combinations of land price escalation, higher profit margins and lower quality of increasingly standardized units” (Klink & Denaldi, 2014:225).

Federal stimulus packages such as PAC and MCMV are thus a manifestation of the forces that have brought the PT to power. They take shape through channels of (increasingly) financialized capital flows and elite relations that have been historically sedimented through the state apparatus. PAC, and its forms of urbanization interventions in Complexo do Alemão for instance, are thus necessarily shaped by the neoclientelism and patrimonial relations with construction conglomerates like Odebrecht that helped the PT achieve and maintain political power. One cannot understand how the teleferico has come into being, for instance, without taking seriously these historically determined relations and space-time flows of capital. Yet large urbanization projects focused on in situ upgrading are not the only state-led projects operating in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. In the next section I explore the history of public security interventions into these so-called “precarious” territories.

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47 Brazil’s social assistance housing, targeted at people who make between 0 and 3 minimum salaries, has long been funded by both the federal budget and by compulsory contributions of formal sector workers to the FGTS (again, a main financer of Brazil’s internal public debt and the PAC project) (Klink & Denaldi 2014). In this potentially redistributive housing project, people with 0-3 minimum incomes are given subsidized credit/loans (with 60-90% of their mortgages funded by the federal budget and FGTS), and interest rates on FGTS loans are proportionate to income (anywhere from 5% to 8.15%) (Klink & Denaldi 2014).

48 Many commentators in Brazil also argue that MCMV has been largely ineffective. The program has not allocated enough housing to low income groups, with only 40% of housing earmarked for this Target I group that comprises 91% of the nation’s housing deficit, and has not included mandatory participatory mechanisms (Klink & Denaldi 2014). Thus, while MCMV has some qualities of a redistributive progressive project intended to diminish the housing deficit, it has mainly created liquidity and facilitated FGTS financing of lower-middle class housing built by the private sector (Klink & Denaldi 2014).
3.3 Public Security and Pacification Policies

Rio’s favelas and other precarious settlements have, throughout history, been understood as threats to the city’s safety – health or otherwise. Yet this sense of threat grew markedly in the 1980s as the narcotrade trade, tied to international movements of cocaine and arms, expanded across South America and took root in carioca favelas. A global security agenda has emerged, which Denise Ferreira da Silva (2016) calls a “global security industrial complex,” focused on managing those people – often racial subalterns – who have been expelled from, or no longer labour in, the “formal” market economy and/or those involved in the narcotrade. This complex has been significantly influenced by the United States, which justifies its presence and deployment of violence in Latin America through the figure of the narcotrafficcker (da Silva 2016; see Chapter 4 for more). Yet this security complex takes specific conjunctural shape in Brazil, as a result of global influences but also, as is my focus in this dissertation, on the historically informed security and policing apparatus operating at a more local (in this case, state) scale in Rio de Janeiro. In Chapters 4 and 6 I describe at greater length the historical articulations between economic growth and investment (often via infrastructural development) and public security in Brazil. In this section, my purpose is to briefly summarize the transformations of the state of Rio de Janeiro’s official public security programs within this larger global security paradigm. I rely heavily on Gomes & Burlamaqui’s (2016) Portuguese documentation of these projects, which has not been translated into English. This review is not exhaustive but gives a sense of how public security in Rio has shifted between community policing and war on crime approaches, as a function of popular sentiment and electoral politics. It demonstrates how these projects are always historically determined, and are the result of ongoing contestations between civil and political society.

49 Cocaine is produced in Peru, amongst other Latin American countries, and Rio de Janeiro has emerged as a major port of entry and exit for the drug (Leeds, 1996; Telles, 2010). Narcotraffic has gained a foothold in carioca North Zone favelas, specifically, where some narcofactions fomented during the military dictatorship have taken root, often employing un- or underemployed youth in the dangerous lower rungs of the trade’s hierarchy (Arias 2006a; see Chapters 4.3.2).

50 Brazil has had, however, a more contentious relationship with a hegemonic American security complex than other Latin American countries.
Public security projects have tended to oscillate between repressive and preventative orientations with successive state governorships. The first community policing initiatives were established by the Brizola state government (1983-1987) in the early 1980s. Brizola was pro-favela and anti-military dictatorship, and thus focused on changing the militarized structure of policing in Rio’s poor communities. To this end he appointed reformer Nazareth Cerqueira as Coronel of the military police and, drawing from community policing models in Koban (Japan), Ontario (Canada), and New York (USA) (see also Ribeiro 2014), crafted two pilot projects with the goal of strengthening the relationship between comunidades/favelas and the police force.51 Yet continued violence in Rio saw Moreira Franco of the PMDB win the 1986 state elections on a platform of “stop the violence in 100 days.” His government implemented a repressive form of invasion intended to re-assert the soberanía (sovereignty) of the state in favela territory.

Franco’s style of repressive policing created greater insecurity and violence, ushering in Brizola’s second term as governor (1991-1994), who again tried to implement public security policy with both preventative and repressive mechanisms. He reappointed Cerqueira to Coronel and together they created four new programs to permanently locate police in strategic favelas and enact a new philosophy of community policing focused on human rights. But robberies, kidnapping, and homicides continued to increase, and the federal government sent 15,000 troops to Rio to securitize the UN’s Eco-92 event hosted in that city. The following administration of Marcello Alencar (1995-1999) again mobilized military and police repressive measures52 and continued the federal government’s program in Rio called “Operation Rio.”53 These state and federal projects heightened insecurity and, as a result, voters in Rio elected Anthony Garotinho governor in 1998 on a platform of community

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51 The project was ultimately unsuccessful due to lack of trust and continued fear between community members and the police.

52 Alencar promoted a war on crime policy that proved disastrous and murderous: victims of police violence increased from 16/10,000 under Brizola to 121/10,000 under Alencar, with simultaneous increases in overall homicide rates.

53 This project operated under President Itamar Franco. It was framed as controlling the frontiers of the state, and used army and military police siege tactics to invade favelas and apprehend (or kill) traffickers, along with seizing arms and drugs.
policing and decreasing the lethality of the military police forces.\textsuperscript{54} His wife, Rosinha Garotinho, subsequently assumed governorship and continued this approach, working increasingly in partnership with the NGO Viva Rio.

In 2006, Sérgio Cabral of the PMDB (aligned with the federal PT under Lula) ran for state governorship on a platform of repressing violence in Rio’s favelas.\textsuperscript{55} After he was successfully elected, Cabral appointed José Mariano Beltrame as public security secretary of the state of Rio to combat narcotraffic violence.\textsuperscript{56} Similar in style to Alancar, the first two years of Cabral’s governorship were shaped by a war on crime policy, inspired by Rudy Giuliani’s zero tolerance approach in New York City (Gomes & Burlamarqui 2016). However, continued siege and destroy tactics in Rio’s favelas – particularly in Complexo do Alemão, the seat of Comando Vermelho\textsuperscript{57} – dispersed traffickers to various comunidades across the city. Due to the resulting spread of violence, and the heightened spotlight of the city’s mega events, the state of Rio shifted approaches in 2008: back to simultaneous repressive and preventative programs relying on notions of community policing, and attempting to weed corruption out of the police force.\textsuperscript{58}

Thus in 2009, Cabral and the PMDB passed law 41.650 creating the Police Pacification Unit (UPP) project, and followed in 2011 with law 42.787, creating the structure and guidelines for implementing the program. Often referred to as pacificação, or pacification, the UPP

\textsuperscript{54} This project was inspired in part by Boston’s Gun Project.

\textsuperscript{55} His so-called Government Plan also prioritized health alongside this repressive form of public security.

\textsuperscript{56} At the time, imprisoned trafficker Márcio or Márcinho VP launched a series of attacks against the police and citizens of Rio, motivating Lula to send the National Guard to Rio and inspiring a government policy of public order and war on crime. Cabral declared war in national newspaper O Globo: “our government is going to win the war against these criminals, we are going to give security to our population” (Gomes & Burlamarqui 2016:31).

\textsuperscript{57} Comando Vermelho (Red Command) is one of the largest and most notorious narcofactions in Rio. It was started on Ilha Grande during the military dictatorship when political prisoners were imprisoned with so-called “common bank robbers,” and the former taught the latter forms of organizing for rights and resources inside and outside of prison (see Chapter 4.3). When the narcotrade began flourishing in the 80s, Comando Vermelho became involved in the movement of drugs and arms. See Elizabeth Leeds (1996) for more.

\textsuperscript{58} This community policing approach was pilot tested by Cabral and Beltrame in Santa Marta in 2008, which would serve as the model for the state’s pacification program.
program consists of invasion by Brazil’s special elite forces and permanent occupation by the military police, with the eventual goal of training local residents in security and social programming (“UPP’s concept” 2012; Prouse 2012) through a proximity policing model (Willis & Prado, 2014). According to Beltrame, this approach to community policing differs from previous attempts because the objective is not apprehension of narcotraffickers, rather it is “retomar o território” (to return or re-take territory). The project is premised on both community and military police buy in, so to speak, and attempts to shift relations between these stakeholders. The project has achieved some success in various Zona Sul favelas, where homicide rates have decreased (Cano 2012; Amar & Carvalaho 2016). However, in these comunidades located in or adjacent to Rio’s more affluent neighborhoods, the UPP’s success has “also unleashed gentrification and social displacement” (Amar & Carvalho 2016:5). Land valuation is increasing in these areas, as are rents, food prices, and payments for new “formal” service provision such as electricity. Pacification in Rio’s North Zone has been less straightforward, met with periodic increases in tension, violence, and death.

Favelas have thus, since the 1980s, emerged as central narcotraffic concerns to various levels of government. Indeed, both municipal and state political parties have been elected in large part on the basis of their public security platforms or how, in other words, they have intended to manage these seemingly “insecure” spaces. No approach has been entirely successful, and the lack of success has created an oscillating effect as subsequent governorships shift between repressive and community policing endeavours. These endeavours, too, are the result of flows of policy models shared across transnational space. The most recent public security intervention of the state – the UPP – is the result of this historically determined oscillation, and the constantly transforming flows across space (flows of policy models, arms and drugs, and mega events). Moreover, the pacification program is bringing into new relation political actors, civil society organizations, activists, and narcotraffickers throughout

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59 The program represents a departure from previously intermittent and violent police invasions of favelas space: it is, in part, an effort of the civilian police forces to weed out corruption and to maintain order in a more community-oriented fashion (Willis & Prado 2014; Cano 2006).

60 Unfortunately, due to time and resource constraints, following these transnational flows of policy is beyond the central scope of this dissertation. However, these relationships between policy models do point to the need for conjunctural analyses to attend to these space-time flows that are central to a situated conjuncture, perhaps following Peck’s (2017) arcing method.
Rio and, specifically, in Complexo do Alemão, relations which I document throughout the dissertation.

3.4 PAC and Pacification in Complexo do Alemão

Complexo do Alemão has been targeted by both PAC and pacification projects. In this section, I discuss how this complex of favelas has come into being through a contested history of various state interventions and civil society mobilizations. It is currently home to the largest PAC-Urbanization project – the teleferico or gondola system – and perhaps the most notorious and incomplete attempt at pacification. Here, I pay particular attention to the relationality of Complexo with state governance, and the active role community members have always played in its development. I also discuss how Complexo has been created as an object of intervention via governance codifications and socio-spatial imaginaries. These discursive articulations have been crucial to both PAC and pacification efforts in this community.

Complexo do Alemão in Rio de Janeiro is a complex of favelas in the city’s industrial and working class North Zone. It is comprised of 11 to 13 favelas, depending on which agency is doing the counting (Matiolli 2014; Oliveira 2016). Official accounts generally include Morro de Baiana; Morro do Alemão; Itararé-Alvorada; Morro de Adeus; Morro da Esperança; Matinha; Morro dos Mineiros; Nova Brasília; Palmeiras; Fazendinha; Grotas; Reservatório de Ramos; Casinhas (Oliveira 2016).

3.4.1 The Growth of Complexo do Alemão as a Contested Civil/Political Society Interface

Historically these favelas were separate from one another and had different administration or governance regimes. They were also settled at different periods of time. At the turn of the 19th century, settlers – non-Indigenous peoples – occupied the general region that Complexo covers today. In the 1920s, these farmers began fractioning their lots on this territory (Couto
Due to urbanization pressures⁶¹ (Holston 2009), the state pressured two local framers⁶² to sell portions of their land, on which it built the Instituto de Aposentadorias e Pensões dos Comerciários (The Retirement and Pensions Institute – IAPC) (Perlman 2011). This institute was partially responsible for relocating people who were being evicted from favelas in other parts of the city – generally in Zona Sul – and IAPC allowed many of the dispossessed to settle on this state-owned land.⁶³

According to Rodrigues (2016), the area saw two key moments of expansion: the 1950s and the 1970s, respectively. During the 1950s, popular favelado movements were proliferating across Rio, organizing into resident associations and fighting for rights to basic services through new political bodies such as FAFEG. Key leaders affiliated with these movements invaded parts of Misericórdia, re-naming it Alemão (“German”) (Rodrigues 2016; Perlman 2011). They also settled the areas called Grota and Nova Brasília, with leaders of these respective communities forming the União para a Defesa e Assistência dos Moradores do Morro do Alemão (UDAMA) (Rodrigues 2016). Because they were settling predominantly public land, and because the federal government had recently approved the Lei das Favelas (1956),⁶⁴ movement leaders assumed there was room to negotiate for access and services on and adjacent to IAPC land (Rodrigues 2016). Relations with IAPC became tense, however: the Instituto used legal measures to try to repossess some of their land from squatters, a move which proved ineffectual due to the mobilization of community leaders and the press coverage the latter were able to garner (Perlman 2011). The federal government was simultaneously targeting the area for eviction: Nova Brasília was on the military

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⁶¹ Urbanization pressures here refers to large influxes of people migrating from rural regions in Brazil and immigrating from European countries, the former based on Rio’s industrialization and the latter based on the federal government’s racialized immigration policy (Holston 2009; see Chapter 4.2).

⁶² A Polish immigrant named Leonard Kaczmarkiewicz owned the land on a hill called Misericórdia (Rodrigues 2016; Perlman 2011) and a Portuguese merchant, Manuel da Veiga, owned a piece of land conjoining the bottom of Misericórdia and nearby hills (Perlman 2011).

⁶³ IAPC’s relocations were central to the expansion of the area in the 1940s, but macroeconomic factors were also exacerbating migration: industrial agricultural practices alongside widespread drought were pushing migrants form the Northeast of the country, while industrial factories were locating to Zona Norte, drawing migrants to the region. Industry at this time was largely concentrated in the Rio suburb of Leopoldina in which Misericórdia was located (Oliveira 2016).

⁶⁴ This law prohibited the removal of people in areas that were settled for more than 10 years
government’s list of favelas to be removed. Eviction never occurred however because, according to Perlman, the neighbourhood was located far from Zona Sul, it supplied vital labor to industry, and the community’s leadership was successful in mobilizing public support through the press (Perlman 2011). Resident mobilization and organizing – insurgent citizenship – was thus central to the expansion of favelas in what would come to be known as Complexo do Alemão.

During this period, both the government and the newly founded resident associations were involved in infrastructure and service provision. In the early 60s, the state funded basic infrastructure and social housing in the region – the government contributed materials, while local resident associations organized their own community volunteers to build and implement the projects through mutirão (Rodrigues 2016) – capitalizing on residents’ practices of autoconstruction.65 The government also assisted in access to land. When occupiers settled on private land, the government would often work to expropriate it from the private owners, thus taking it into public possession. Crucially, however, the state never legalized the tenure of those who settled there. The local resident associations were responsible for recording any housing transactions, but they could only issue a property registration document for the house, never for the land (Rodrigues 2016).

The continued organizing of leaders – through resident associations and their liaisons in government – were also able to secure small electricity contracts and water distribution infrastructure in the region (Rodrigues 2016). In 1961, the local community organized the Light Commission, which distributed electricity to nearby homes through connections to local power lines, while the state water company began to supply water to easily accessed homes along the main road of Nova Brasília (Perlman 2011). The population of the region grew from 8,000 to 30,000 at this time, which forced new residents to encroach on territory beyond Alemão, Grota, and Nova Brasília (Rodrigues 2016; see also Leeds 1996).

The second major period of expansion of what would become Complexo do Alemão occurred between the late 1970s and the late 1980s. At this time, many Brazilians were

65 Carlos Lacerda was governor at this time.
migrating to Rio from the country’s Northeast (Leeds 1996), and popular movements again targeted Alemão, Grotá, and Nova Brasília for settlement. Crucially, these movements had the support of the new Pastoral das Favelas (PF) and the Federação das Associações de Favelas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (The Federation of Favela Associations of the State of Rio de Janeiro – FAFERJ, the successor to FAFEG) (Rodrigues 2016; see also McCann 2014a), which operated with the support of favela-friendly governor Brizola. PF and FAFERJ organized, for example, the movement of residents from Alemão to Baiana, and from other favelas in the city to Palmeiras (Rodrigues 2016).

The area was also a target of increasingly larger-scale government interventions. The municipal and state governments were both heavily involved in infrastructural projects. At the same time, the Canadian-Brazilian electric company for Rio de Janeiro – called Light – installed large-scale electricity infrastructure. This period was thus characterized by new urban service provision whereby service utilities agencies were directly providing services (Cedae – water; Light – energy; Comlurb – garbage) (Rodrigues 2016). Resident associations generally heavily mediated service provision for individual favela inhabitants, and most people still did not have legal land tenure (Perlman 2011; Rodrigues 2016; McCann 2014a).

Favela populations in the North Zone of Rio would face two major transformations in the late 1980s. The first was related to deindustrialization alongside the physical growth of the city. Rio de Janeiro was spreading into Zona Norte, thus raising land prices. Valuation of land, alongside “environmental regulations (demanding) substantial investments from companies to remain in their original locations” (Perlman 2011:103), drove out of the region large textile factories such as Nova América Tecidos, beer factories, and finally, in 1997 the Coca-Cola bottling company (Perlman 2011; Fig 3.3). Deindustrialization of Zona Norte would create increasing unemployment, economic precarity, and social isolation in those

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66 At the municipal level, the Municipal Secretariat of Social Development (SMDS), with funds from IADB, spent R300 million between 1981 and 1983 trying to “diagnose” problems in Rio’s favelas, much of which found its way to six in the Complexo region (Matiolli 2014). At the state level, Brizola created O Programa de Favelas da Cedae (PROFACE) to implement basic sanitation and sewage systems in Rio’s favelas. The program’s largest mark in the region was the installation of five fiberglass water tanks at the tops of hills, new sewage collection infrastructure, and the construction of 12,000 new buildings (Perlman 2011; Rodrigues 2016). Favelas in the area were also targeted by the aforementioned Mutirão program, which provided new sanitation infrastructures.
favelas primarily inhabited by factory workers. The second major transformation was linked to the expansion of the aforementioned Latin American drug trade and its territorialization of key operations in carioca favelas. As detailed at greater length in Chapter 4.3.2, narcofactions often took root in North Zone favelas and employed impoverished, racialized youth in these territories.

3.4.2 New Discursive Enunciations and Codifications of Complexo do Alemão

While these processes were dramatically transforming the everyday lives of favela inhabitants, the region also shifted administratively. “Complexo do Alemão” became consolidated on August 4, 1986 as Administrative Region XXIX through Municipal Decree No. 6011. Its boundaries were set on December 9 of 1993 to comprise 11 adjacent favelas (Matiolli 2014). With the creation of Complexo as an Administrative Region, the complex of favelas was now considered, administratively, a “bairro” (a formal neighborhood), while the favelas that comprised it were still recognized as favelas (informal neighborhoods) (Cavalcanti 2014a). CPX’s population was documented at 60,000 inhabitants and 18,400 homes (according to IBGE census 2010), although local community leader and activist Alan Brum estimates that there are currently more than 150,000 people living in Complexo (Rodrigues 2016).

Crucially to Thiago Matiolli (2014), a doctoral candidate and researcher with local community organization Raízes em Movimento, the effect of creating Complexo do Alemão as an administrative region has codified a new scalar object of intervention in favela policy. Indeed, the municipality socially constructed a new scale that has allowed for particular forms of governance. Here, the government is less concerned about demographic data, or details of who exactly lives in the favela, and is more concerned with creating interventions and initiatives at the level of this new territorial scale. And, indeed, the new territorial scale

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67 This consolidation occurred under the mayoralty of Saturnino Braga, who also created the new administrative regions of Rocinha, Jacarazinho, and Maré. Braga’s hope was that these regions would function as Conselhos Governo-Comunidade (CGCs) in which local community representatives would facilitate dialogue between relevant sectoral government agencies and their respective communities (Matiolli 2014). The process lacked democratic legitimacy in the eyes of many favela residents, however, as community representatives had to be affiliated with Braga’s PDT (Matiolli 2014).
matters for policy, for geographical imaginaries, and for senses of belonging. With regards to policy, the amalgamation of Complexo into a single administrative entity meant that the region was too large to be targeted by Favela-Bairro, which was a project intended for medium-sized favelas. However, the size of the complex allowed it to be one of the major targets of PAC Urbanização de Assentamentos Precários, because this latter program was geared only to favelas of a large size (Fig 3.4).

The geographical imaginary – or discursive articulation – of Complexo do Alemão as a space of endemic narcotraffic violence has also been crucial for how the region has been targeted by urbanization initiatives. In the 1980s, Brazilian news media began to report of gunfire and military police interventions in CPX (Rodrigues 2016). Conflicts between narcotraffic factions and military police became common occurrences in the mid 1990s (Rodrigues 2016; Cavalcanti 2009), and Complexo was made infamous in popular media and discourse as a primary locus and headquarters of Comando Vermelho narcotrafficking activity (Matiolli 2014; Perlman 2011; Leeds 1996). The community was the target of several high profile police invasions and executions in the 2000s (Alves & Evanson 2011). The complex has become so notorious in popular discourse that it is often called the “faixa de Gaza carioca” (the Gaza Strip of Rio de Janeiro) (Perlman 2011:105).

But this violence would not spell the end of urbanization activities in Complexo. Rodrigues (2016) argues that narcotraffic concerns have shifted favela policy from service provision to public security, particularly at the state level, while Cavalcanti (2009) argues that the politics of cocaine has paradoxically increased the visibility and justification for the politics of concrete. Indeed, former Brazilian President Lula operated at the intersection of the politics of concrete and cocaine when he introduced the largest PAC project in Complexo. After Lula traveled to Medellin, Colombia, and witnessed the success of a gondola system at integrating narcotraffic-controlled communities into the “formal urban fabric” of that city, he decided to

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68 In June of 2007, after an unsuccessful citywide operation called Operação Cerco Amplo (Operation Wide Net), the military police and BOPE, alongside national armed forces, used large-scale military siege tactics to try to take the Complexo territory from drug traffickers (Alves & Evanson 2011; Perlman 2011). The first day of the operation killed 22 people, none of whom had criminal records (Perlman 2011). Stray bullets would kill at least 19 children in the siege (Alves & Evanson 2011). See Chapter 4.3.2 for more.
emulate the project in this heretofore notorious region of Rio. Teleferico construction began in 2010 with the paving of roads to allow for large construction trucks to reach the tops of the favela hills. The teleferico was inaugurated in July of 2011 by then-president Dilma Rousseff.

While the teleferico was being built in November of 2010, Complexo do Alemão was again invaded by the BOPE, military police and armed forces in an occupation that “was heralded as a victory comparable to D-day in the media” (Cavalcanti 2014a:209). After two years of military occupation, multiple police pacification units (UPP) were officially installed in Complexo (Oliveira 2016), stationed generally at the tops of favelas hills directly adjacent to the new teleferico stations. Initially the pacification effort in Complexo was relatively calm, but shootouts have since become the norm. Unlike other favelas in Rio, where pacification has proceeded to the social programming stage, the UPP program in Complexo is characterized by repeated invasions by the special elite forces. Violent confrontations between the military police and narcotraffickers are increasingly a fact of everyday life. The spring of 2015 was particularly dangerous, when “we didn't have one day that didn't have any shooting (gunfire). Everyday of this year we had shootings in the community.” As of early 2017, popular discourse is beginning to call the UPP in Complexo a failure, questioning why it has not seen decreased rates of violence in the community.

Complexo do Alemão is thus an administrative unit, a socio-spatial imaginary, a community, and an object of intervention of both pacification and PAC projects. The territory has been socially constructed through discursive articulations and codifications, and through policies that target the community. Moreover, the community’s growth has always been the result of contestations between political and civil society. The state has been central to its development through promoting industry, locating favela-oriented agencies in its vicinity, and buying land for relocated populations of Zona Sul. The state has also provided different

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69 Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014

70 The UPP program and narcotraffic activity continue to be particularly violent in Complexo do Alemão, with the military police repeatedly calling on the military and BOPE (Special Elite Forces) to invade the territory.

71 Interview with Complexo activist 6, March 2015
forms of services, resources, and infrastructure throughout the region’s growth. Yet much of this growth and development has been the result of favela residents themselves mobilizing with, and sometimes against, the government for resources. From the state harnessing the labour power of residents through Mutirão, to resident associations fighting for service provision, Complexo do Alemão has always been a contested relation between a variety of actors, with residents themselves central to these contestations.

3.5 Towards the present

My purpose in this chapter has been to turn a conjunctural lens on the development of urbanization and public security policies in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I have highlighted several key components of the conjunctural approach outlined last chapter. I have focused on how these projects are historically determined, as they are a function of elite players in the government apparatus and factions of capital, such as large construction conglomerates. But citizens, too, have been crucial to the shaping of these policies, as insurgent subjects have organized social movements for a Right to the City, elected governments according to the public security concerns of the moment, and organized favela federations and associations to pressure the government for service provision. I have also documented, albeit necessarily superficially, PAC and the PT as the product of space-time flows of capital. PAC, specifically, is a neodevelopmentalist solution to a global financial crisis, and leverages and entrenches its own financial capital markets (often along historically-entrenched patrimonial channels) for income generation and infrastructural development. The above discussion has also hinted at other flows of policy and imaginaries, such as Lula wielding designs from Medellin where a teleferico has united a so-called “narco-controlled” territory with the rest of the city, and flows of public security policies, architects, and bank officials across transnational space. Favelas here are territorializations of these relations and negotiations between myriad actors and forces operating at multiple scales. This understanding of favelas is necessary for the ideas I develop throughout the dissertation.

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72 It would take a whole dissertation project in its own right to document these flows, so I have just hinted at them here because they are relevant, but not central, to the arguments I develop in this dissertation.
I have also presented Complexo do Alemão, specifically, as a community that has come into being through historically-embedded state, civil society, and economic forces. I have ended by pointing to Complexo as an object of intervention targeted by both PAC and public security. These projects currently exist in uneasy relation with one another in this complex of favelas. Infrastructural development (PAC) and public security (pacification) projects do not just sit side by side one another atop favela hills, but their market-generation and securitization logics are articulated in complex and ever shifting fashion. I discuss the deep historical relationships between PAC and pacification at greater length in the following chapter. In it, I pay particular attention to the articulations of different racialized and marketization regimes that have developed throughout Brazilian history and continue to inform the state’s relationships with Rio’s low-income and darker-skinned favela populations.
3.6 Figures for Chapter 3

**Figure 3.1** Teleferico information sign. Photo taken 25 Jan 2014 by author.

**Figure 3.2** Teleferico display of Rio de Janeiro’s urbanization history. Photo taken 25 Jan 2014 by author.

**Figure 3.3** View of old Coca Cola factory from teleferico. Photo taken 24 March 2015 by author.

**Figure 3.4** PAC construction in Complexo. Photo taken 21 Apr 2014 by author.
Chapter 4: PACification as the Coloniality of Power

*Eu só quero é ser feliz e andar tranquilamente a favela onde eu nasci*

I only want to be happy and walk peacefully in the favela where I was born

-lyrics from the song “Eu Só Quero É Ser Feliz” by Cidinho and Doca (1994)

The young, largely Afro-Brazilian protestors sang out the words of this popular anti-violence favela anthem as police shots and stun grenades banged, just feet away from where my colleague and I stood. We were sent running up the steep and narrow streets of Complexo do Alemão, encountering units of heavily armed military police with their assault rifles trained on all passersby. It took us one hour to make the normally ten minute trek to the top of the hill, as we were forced to join the crowds of people darting for cover into shops each time gun fire erupted.73 When we finally reached the top of the hill, my friend took a terrifying ride on the teleferico to reach her bus; her gondola car hung from cables as shots fired into the air around her. The teleferico service was suspended only minutes later due to “safety concerns.” In the following days, the special elite force of Rio’s state government would re-occupy Complexo do Alemão, and the fighting between the military police and drug traffickers would become increasingly lethal (Fig 4.1).

73 Shootouts forced me to repeatedly grapple with my positionality. A couple of months into my stay in Complexo, a big shootout on Alvorada (our hill) ignited a nearby electricity transformer. Our lights were out, as were those of our neighbours, as we listened to the gunfights one hundred metres below us. Eddu began to pack a bag, urging all of us to join, saying we should leave and head to his other house in Zona Oueste. At first I was reluctant; how could I take advantage of my privileged mobility like that, when I was here to understand the day-to-day livelihoods of people living under state violence? Eddu looked at me like I was ridiculous. “Why wouldn’t you leave if you could?” he asked. “Most people here don’t have anywhere else to go, or they would, too.” I dug my heels in for a few minutes, unsure what to do. Then Eddu turned to me again, trying to figure out how to communicate his greater fear. He explained that if anything were to happen to me—a young white woman from Canada—the military police would crack down with even greater strength on Complexo do Alemão, bringing more casualties and death. If I thought what I was seeing right now was bad, my death would only bring much worse. I decided to leave with Eddu.
The protest had been organized by a number of local community groups and collectives in Complexo do Alemão in March of 2014. We were protesting the previous-day arrest and seizure of two young boys, Kleyton da Rocha Afonso and Hallan Marcilio Gonçalves.\textsuperscript{74} Hundreds of people, many of them young black mototaxi drivers, occupied the middle of the busy street at the base of the hills of Complexo in an area called Grota. When the military police (PM) began unleashing stun grenades and bullets (rubber and otherwise), the mototaxi drivers dropped their bikes and went running. As the smoke slowly dissipated, we could see the PMs lining up the bikes, writing down plate numbers as they handed the keys back to drivers. After the protest, according to reports sweeping Facebook, the civil police were searching plate-by-plate for all the bikes at the demonstration. Numerous activists chimed in online, calling the police seizure of the bikes a criminalization of protest activity and obstruction of waged employment. These activists simultaneously accused the media and the state of being racist, by assuming all dark-skinned favela inhabitants to be traffickers, and called the state “genocidal,” by targeting young black men through military operations (see Madeiros 2014, Alves 2007; see Fig 2.8).

Violent encounters do not just occur periodically (at moments of protest, for instance) but have become a part of the everyday fabric of life in Complexo do Alemão. Military police, narcotraffickers, and residents alike are being killed in this community. Many are killed by what the police apparatus calls “balas perdidas,” or lost bullets, to designate stray gunfire that kills bystanders in the streets and residents in their homes. However, not everyone is at the same risk of being killed by balas perdidas. It is predominantly young black men who get struck by these bullets that are “lost” from the rifles of the military police. Indeed, in Rio de Janeiro, police kill black youth at rates disproportionate to non-black populations. Human Rights Watch found that, in the last decade, the military police in Rio de Janeiro state have killed 8000 people, most of them young black men from favelas. The police in Rio killed 645 people in 2015, and this rate increased in the lead-up to the 2016 Olympic Games (Acebes 2016).\textsuperscript{75} More than 75% of these victims were black youth and few of these killing are ever

\textsuperscript{74} See Livingstone (2014) for a \textit{Rio on Watch} report about this protest.

\textsuperscript{75} Human Rights Watch has recently released a report on violence and extrajudicial killings in Rio de Janeiro (see Acebes 2016).
prosecuted (Anistia Internacional 2016). Military police officers often attribute street fatalities to “resistance followed by death,” which, though not an official legal category, “is accepted in the judicial process” (Telles 2010:118; Telles 2015; Vargas 2013). According to the state’s attorney general, Marfan Martins Vieira, the police often “simulate” crime scenes by planting drugs on a corpse or placing a gun in a victim’s hand (Acebes 2016).

The military police who violently dispersed the aforementioned protestors and mototaxi drivers, and who repeatedly kill young black men, are in Complexo do Alemão and other favela communities as part of the UPP program, or pacification effort, which has as its purpose the “return” of the territory to the state (see Chapter 3.3). Part of this “return” is to project the idea of safety to potential international investors, and to extend the formal market into Complexo. Indeed, the final stage of the UPP project was initially called UPP Social (which now operates under municipal jurisdiction as Rio Mais Social, or Rio+Social), with a goal of “productive inclusion through training and entrepreneurship” (Governo RJ Nd), and which extends microcredit financed via the UPP Entrepreneur Fund. Pacification, here, operates alongside PAC projects, with UPP units securitizing territory for PAC infrastructural upgrades, and with PAC, too, focused on stimulating entrepreneurship and generating employment amongst its target favela populations. Thus, both PAC and pacification are intended to protect and promote entrepreneurs, workers, families, and citizens of Complexo, and to “integrate” the community with the so-called formal city. Both PAC and the UPP, too, are attempting to extend microcredit and mortgages, and enroll people in formalized employment and regularize their property (I elaborate on these project impulses in Chapter 6). They are aimed at securitizing the national economy in times of economic crises and securitizing Rio for international investment (see Chapter 3.3). Both thus have marketization and consumption impulses, but operate through the policing, and often killing, of low income and racialized populations living in Rio’s favelas.

76 See Anistia Internacional (2016) (Amnesty International) for more details and for a description of their recent campaign called Jovem Negro Vivo (Black Youth Live).

77 Dilma repeatedly refers to Complexo residents as “citizens” in her teleferico inauguration speech (see Rousseff 2011). See Chapter 6 for a fuller account of the “integration” rhetoric used by both Rio Mais Social and PAC-Urbanization.
In this chapter, I historically trace violent racial and accumulation logics in Brazil. Following Laura Pulido, I want to understand how “the devaluation of Black (and other nonwhite bodies) has been a central feature of global capitalism…and creates a landscape of differential value which can be harnessed in diverse ways to facilitate the accumulation of more power and profit than would otherwise be possible” (Pulido 2016:1; see also Buckley 2014; Derickson 2015). My purpose is thus to understand how interrelated processes of public security, investment, consumption, and formalization are premised on, and reproduce, racialized geographies in Brazil.

I argue that the current moment of pacification and PAC has created an articulated public security and marketization complex called PACification. This state-led project is premised on, and reproduces, racialized and devalued landscapes that have been built over centuries of colonization. The complex has specific continuities with the processes of racialization and development fomented through the conquest of the Americas, and with military strategies deployed during the years of Brazil’s military dictatorship. I explore how PACification is a conjuncturally-specific territorialization of the coloniality of power in Rio’s favelas.

PACification, here, articulates three central components: marketization (creating new formal markets through attracting investment, formalizing labour, and building infrastructure); the discursive articulations of internal enemies (relying on the constitution of racialized, threatening peoples to legitimate its practices); and a militarized public security regime that often operates through a grammar of war (deploying militarized violence to manage social difference for capital accumulation ends). This coloniality of power draws upon, and reproduces, favelas as low-income, racialized territories in which both “innocent” and “guilty” can be selectively killed by a state that is seeking to preserve itself and accumulate capital.

In making this argument, I draw on key components of the conjunctural analytic outlined in Chapter 2. I take seriously historical determination as inspired by modernity/coloniality scholars. In particular, I am interested in how histories of colonization in the so-called New World have informed contemporary race/labour relationships in Brazil. I also draw explicitly on the dual notion of articulation. First, I explore how different forms of race, labour, and
investment have been brought together, or conjoined, in transforming manner throughout Brazil’s history and pre-history. Second, I take seriously articulation as enunciation. I discuss how a key component of the coloniality of power during both the military dictatorship and contemporary PACification is the discursive constitution of internal enemies, such that the state is legitimated in killing for accumulation and market formalization.

Before moving into the body of the chapter, it is useful to address my specific thinking with respect to race and coloniality. I have been trained in critical race theory from a situated position – one steeped in North American approaches to race as it has been codified as a racial formation (as per Omi and Winant) underpinned by notions of racial difference, segregation, and exclusion (da Silva 1998). Exposed to decolonial thought in the Canadian settler colony, I have also understood race partly through the lens of colonization and ongoing forms of colonialism/coloniality. Yet, living in Canada, I have also been influenced by popular imaginaries of Brazil as a racial democracy, and, like many Canadians, had very little knowledge of the history of slavery and ongoing forms of racialization shaped in, and re-shaped by, this nation. Similarly, most of the Brazilian urban scholarship I was familiar with prioritized class and citizenship, rather than race, when conceiving of inequality and social injustice. What I confronted in Brazil was very different than this socio-spatial imaginary of a racial democracy. Race, and the racialization of favela space, specifically, appeared to me (as it does to many Complexo activists) as a key social formation that has allowed the state to kill people with impunity in Rio’s favelas. This chapter is thus, in part, the result of my grappling with race and the history of colonization in Brazil. As such, it focuses on the longue durée of racialization processes, tracing ongoing (yet always transforming) modes of racial subjugation. This longue durée focus may leave depth of the current conjuncture wanting. Yet it is written for a North American and North Atlantic audience largely unaware of this history of race, and informed by the modernity/coloniality school that privileges deep historical continuities in its analyses.

In addition to being influenced by North American and decolonial scholars of race, some of my concerns in this chapter resonate, at moments, with two different ways of thinking about race that have been developed in Brazil or by Brazilians. The first, the Carioca school,
recognizes ongoing historical forms of structural racism that are not reducible to class processes (da Silva 2004).\textsuperscript{78} The Carioca school interrogates miscegenation and racial democracy as repressive ideologies that have inhibited the formation of a critical race consciousness (da Silva 1998, 2004; see, for instance, Vargas 2004; Alves & Vargas 2017). Some of my thinking in this chapter is consistent with this way of understanding race, as I think historically and structurally about ongoing forms of racial subjugation.\textsuperscript{79} I also, second, draw on conceptualizations of race in Brazil (and beyond) that depart from the idea of miscegenation as a false ideology. Instead, as elaborated by Denise Ferreira da Silva, race and racial thinking are productive strategies and subjectivization processes: racial subjects are produced in the modern episteme through intersecting narratives of class, race, gender, and the nation (see, for instance, da Silva 1998, 2001, 2004). As da Silva notes, “in Brazil as elsewhere, race is a productive symbolic device, a principle that governs modern social configurations when it produces social subjects that [are] differentially placed in their economic, juridical, and moral dimensions” (da Silva 2004:730). As such, miscegenation is a national script that writes race differently than in the United States, but is also shaped by the placing of racial subjects (here, black and mestiço) outside universal law and justice. Some of my key arguments in this chapter share commonalities (albeit not exhaustively or systematically) with both conceptualizations; I think of race as both a historical and structural ordering of society, and as a “productive symbolic device” that make groups of people, following Gilmore (2002), more susceptible to premature death.

The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I introduce the concept of the coloniality of power as conjuncturally-specific articulations of profit generation, wealth appropriation, and race. In the following section I detail different moments of the coloniality of power in Brazilian history, paying attention to how racial and other social differences have been (re)produced and violently managed for, among other things, capital accumulation and wealth generation purposes. I then focus specifically on the transformation of pacification of

\textsuperscript{78} The Carioca school is a response to the earlier Paulista school, the latter which conceives of racial discrimination as a “premodern” mode of social organizing that continues as a holdover from slavery (da Silva 2004). This way of conceiving race, informed by modernization theory, holds that racial subjugation will disappear as the nation modernizes and class becomes the primary mode of social differentiation.

\textsuperscript{79} A key difference, though, is that these theorizations do not tend to use the framework of the “coloniality of power,” and thus often have a shorter (and more in-depth) conjunctural focus.
the military dictatorship to PACification of the current conjuncture, discussing their respective articulations of public security, marketization, and internal enemies.

4.1 (Re)producing Race and Social Difference through the Coloniality of Power

The conquest of the so-called New World instituted what Peruvian philosopher Aníbal Quijano (2008) calls the “coloniality of power.” This concept, following Marion Werner (2011:1576), captures “the articulation of hierarchical forms of social difference with wage and non-wage forms of labour control.” The coloniality of power is defined by intertwined race and labour regimes that emerged historically and geographically:

The codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered [manifest] in the idea of “race,” as supposedly different biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others. The conquistadors assumed this idea as the constitutive, founding element of the relations of domination that the conquest imposed...The other process [shaping the coloniality of power] was the constitution of a new structure of control of labor and its resources and slavery, serfdom, small independent commodity production and reciprocity, together around and upon the basis of capital and the world market. (Quijano 2008:243-4)

Because racial thinking and highly exploitative labor relations still underpin capitalist relations today, the “conquest” of indios – and the racial thinking and labour regimes the “conquerers” introduced/violently negotiated in these colonies – remains central to the contemporary world system (Quijano 2008; see also Werner 2011; Wynter 2003; Mignolo 2000). 80 Yet these labourers have also, recently, become key consumers and sites of consumption in the contemporary global political economic landscape.

Race, here, can be understood as an abstract concept, first negotiated through these colonial encounters in what would later become Brazil and Latin America, that orders humanity and

80 Many decolonial scholars of Latin America argue that the first racial thinking was fomented through the colonization of the Americas during the long sixteenth century. It was here that Europeans grappled with Indigenous people’s “rights” and “humanity.” According to scholars such as Mignolo and Wynter, this grappling became the foundation of racial thinking and difference. Racial difference as a questioning of the human was constituted at this time and place of conquest, and was consolidated through the emerging transatlantic slave trade (Wynter 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2007).
the valuation of life, but takes on a specific formation (Omi & Winant 2014) or assemblage (Weheliye 2014) in different parts of the world. In other words, following Stuart Hall (1996), race is a midlevel construct that materializes in conjuncturally-specific ways – as a product of the histories and geographies of different places. Race must be located, and located interactions have always been productive of race. The coloniality of power draws attention to how these conjuncturally-specific racializations become useful to, and transformed through, new political economic relations.

A main institution that reproduces the coloniality of power is the state. Raciality, specifically, was at the heart of the formation of the modern state as it was developed through Spain and Portugal’s colonization of the so-called New World (Silverblatt 2004). Newly forming colonial states partook in “bureaucratic rule” (Silverblatt 2004:18), a hallmark of the modern state, and created abstract and corporate categories of European/Spanish, Indian, and Negro – each with specific rights and obligations – in order to culturally protect and securitize the growing Iberian empire. These categories continue to haunt the practices of the state in the contemporary period. As Denise Ferreira da Silva (2009) notes, at present the modern state exercises legitimate violence to preserve itself and its populations from the violence now assumed to be inherent to these racialized categories. Racialized categorical distinctions construct less-than-human “enemies” who exist, in post-Enlightenment formulations, outside rational, European man, and can be killed for the greater good of the state and its population (da Silva 2009).

The state is also legitimated through its ability to foster capital accumulation and (re)productive growth (Federici 2004). It thus can also exercise “legitimate violence” against racialized populations for economic ends. Capitalism “is necessarily committed to racism and sexism” for accumulation, and “to justify and mystify the contradictions built into its social relations” (Federici, 2004:17). Racialized hierarchies are continuously reworked through capitalist accumulation, as the state and other elite actors “redraw…the social and spatial boundaries between hyper-exploited wage work and the people and places cast out

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81 Irene Silverblatt (2004) develops this argument through analyzing the practices of the Spanish Inquisition that began at the end of the 15th century. She argues that the Inquisition was, in fact, a modern bureaucracy that was formed to protect cultural security and, through so doing, instituted racial designs and categorizations.
from its relations” (McIntyre & Nast 2011:1465; see also Werner 2011). The state, responsible for economic growth and the (re)production of its population, is thus invested in creating and reproducing axes of social difference (Federici 2004; see also Gilmore 2002). Taking the production of social difference seriously in this way demonstrates that the “biopolitical,” or life-giving, social-reproductive apparatus of the state, is always-already “necropolitical,” life-destroying:

We can also see that the promotion of population growth by the state can go hand in hand with a massive destruction of life; for in many historical circumstances – witness the history of the slave trade – one is a condition for the other. Indeed, in a system where life is subordinated to the production of profit, the accumulation of labor-power can only be achieved with the maximum of violence so that, in Maria Mies’ words, violence itself becomes the most productive force. (Federici 2004:16)

State violence, in other words, is central to capital accumulation and to the (re)production of racial, gender, and other axes of social difference, and thus to the coloniality of power.

“The state,” as described throughout this dissertation, is a contested entity comprised of many different institutions and negotiated amongst diverse actors. It is porous, heterogeneous, and contradictory. When I use the term “state” in this chapter, I refer primarily to these raisons d’etre of the modern state formation that manifest through particular institutions. The logic to preserve the state (and its capital accumulation efforts) is quite viscerally manifest through the military police apparatus in the current from of the UPP program. This state institution often contradicts other government-led logics and projects (see Chapter 6.6) yet operates with considerable force to violently shape the daily lives of Complexo and other favela residents. Moreover, by drawing on the Gramscian notion of the integral state I developed in Chapter 2, I am able to interrogate how elite political actors (who are not formally a part of the government apparatus, such as the media) also have

82 Here, the coloniality of power involves a “casting out” of not only ownership over the means of (re)production, but also a category of being human (Man2) (Wynter & McKittrick 2015), enacted through racialized assemblages of, inter alia, institutions, discourses, images, and architectures (Weheliye 2014). This casting out becomes useful for, but not reducible to, capitalist hyperexploitation. Inherent to this notion of race (as one axis of coloniality of power) is that if capitalism were to be transformed, processes of racialization would not disappear, although they would likely shift, and racialized differences would likely be enacted in new (and always violent) regimes of power and accumulation.
considerable agency and power in shaping racialization processes and regimes of accumulation.

4.2 Articulations of Race and Accumulation in Brazil

There have been different articulations of accumulation regimes and racialization processes in Brazil since the territory’s so-called discovery to the contemporary conjuncture. In this section I briefly describe key moments in the history of the coloniality of power in Brazil. This is not a thorough genealogy, which would be a dissertation project in its own right. Rather, in this section my purpose is to show how slave labour was central to early economies in Brazil, and how, post slavery, race and class intersections have become spatialized in Rio’s favelas.

The conquest of the Americas marks the first period of coloniality, initiating racialization as a process of questioning humanity, or what Maldonado-Torres (2007) calls misanthropic skepticism (see also Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2008). Prior to their landing in the “New World,” though, the Portuguese had already instituted a slave-trading system in 1441 out of Senegal/West Africa in order to bolster its mercantile networks. The proceeds of this system financed Columbus’s voyage across the ocean, and proved foundational for the future transatlantic slave trade (Wynter 2012). Columbus’s “discovery” of the Americas introduced a period of more than three hundred years of Iberian colonial rule over what would later become Latin America, with the Portuguese, specifically, colonizing the antecedent of the republic of Brazil. The regime of accumulation that emerged in the New World is termed a mercantile strategy of extraction focused on “large-scale agricultural and mining operations powered by slave labour” (Holston 2009:116). From 1500-1600 this slave labour was predominantly Indigenous. However, with the dramatic decreases in Indigenous populations due to wars and disease – and with the declaration that indigenous peoples were vassals of the king and hence could not be enslaved (Mignolo 2000) – the Portuguese became major

83 Misanthropic skepticism refers to the questioning of the human. Following Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), “contact” between indios and European explorers involved the latter questioning the very humanity of the former. Instead of asking “what type of human are you?” the question became “are you even human?” instituting a misanthropic skepticism that continues to underpin racialized ontologies and racialization processes today.
stakeholders in the transatlantic slave trade. Thus, from the early 17th century until 1888, African slaves were the disposable labour force that bolstered Portuguese and Brazilian extraction and plantation economies – characterized largely by feudal-like relationships (Holston 2009; Wynter 2003). Over these years, Brazil would import almost 5 million slaves, more than ten times the number that went to the United States. As previously stated, in 1888, it would be the last Western country to officially abolish slavery (Fig 4.2 & 4.3).

The social structure that underpinned the mercantile and feudal-like plantation economies was a triadic relationship between Portuguese/Spanish settlers, Indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans (Wynter 2012; see also Tuck & Yang 2012). In this system, Africans were the killable labour, although Indigenous peoples were also being exterminated through war, disease, and policies of miscegenation that sought to decrease the indios gene pool. Indios may not have been legally enslaved but they continued to be labour coerced through various legal mechanisms.

Portugal’s form of colonialism was specific, of course, and many scholars argue that this specificity was central to the development of Brazil’s contemporary racial formation. For instance, some scholars attempt to account for Brazil’s contemporary ideology of race-mixing, or miscegenation, by arguing that there was significant fluidity between different

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84 Walter Mignolo (2000) argues that the first period of modernity was characterized by a notion of race based on the Catholic Church’s religious “purity of blood” principle. Early debates among Iberian explorers centred on whether or not Amerindians had souls and, thus, what rights they should be granted – they were concerned with a “rights of the people” principle, in which Amerindians were questioned for their humanity. Pope Paul III eventually determined that Amerindians had souls and were “vassals of the king,” and therefore they could not be enslaved, unlike African slaves who were deemed “commerce” (the so-called Sublimis Deus edict). With the declaration of Indigenous peoples as vassals of the king, Africans became the “legitimate” slaves and would thus “come to embody the new symbolic construct of Race or of innately determined difference that would enable the Spanish state to legitimate its sovereignty over the lands of the Americas in the postreligious legal terms of Western Europe’s now-expanding state system” (Wynter 2012:11). Silverblatt argues, alternatively, that racial categories emerged through the Spanish Inquisition and other state-making practices in which people living in the New World were juridically divided into distinct castes based on presumed ancestry. These included categories or corporate groups of Spanish (españoles), Indian (indios) and blacks (negros), defined legally or socially rather than biologically. Racial doctrines of the 19th century – grounded in notions of inherent biological difference – were founded on these “preliberal” caste categories. Silverblatt continues: “race and caste were not separate systems, but interpenetrating. Race thinking helps us understand how race and caste might, chameleonic-like, slip in and out of each other, how a relatively innocent category (like color) could become virulent, how politically defined differences (like nationality) could so easily become inheritable traits” (Silverblatt 2004:17).
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) argues that because Portuguese colonizers were some of the first in the so-called Americas, categories of labor and race were negotiated, sometimes for the first time, in these colonies, but were also re-produced and transformed at different moments as new colonizers came to exercise power in the world system. Following this line of thought, Portuguese colonialism thus created ambiguous divisions between the colonized and the colonizers in Brazil (see also Cesarino 2012). De Sousa Santos (2002) calls these categories “semicolonizers” and “semicolonized.” Both, he says, have existed in Brazil in a contingent, expansive, assemblage of people whose social (and thus racial) positions change according to which actors are involved in any particular encounter. As such, according to de Sousa Santos, there is more fluidity of racial identity in Brazil and thus miscegenation is Brazil’s dominant racial ideology. Also attempting to account for 20th century ideologies of miscegenation, some theorists in Brazil argue that early race mixing was a function of Portugal’s less harsh form of slavery (see, for example, Gilberto Freyre 1946). But critical race theorist Abdias do Nascimento (1989), among many others, maintains that while miscegenation was common amongst Portuguese slave holders, this “race mixing” during slavery was violent rape.

Brazil is often associated with the racial ideology of “miscegenation.” According to Edward Telles: “Rather than segregation [in the United States], race mixture or miscegenation (in Portuguese, mestiçagem or miscigenação) forms the foundational concept of Brazilian racial ideology. Race mixture represents a set of beliefs that Brazilians hold about race, including the belief that Brazilians have long mixed across racial lines, more so than in any other society, and that nonwhites are included in the Brazilian nation” (Telles 2004:4).

De Sousa Santos (2002) argues that Portugal has always been at the “periphery” of the world system and in a position subordinate to England, Spain, and the Dutch, even though it has been a colonizer. Yet Portugal’s and Brazil’s dominance in the transatlantic slave trade somewhat problematizes this notion.

Gilberto Freyre was a foundational scholar of race in Brazil, and was one of the first to speak positively of racial mixing with respect to slavery. In his highly influential text, The Masters and Slaves, published in 1946, Freyre argued that the particular forms of Portuguese colonialism, sugar and coffee plantation economies, and slave relations in Brazil manifested in the propensity for different “races” to procreate with impunity. He celebrated Brazil because, “The absence of violent rancors due to race constitutes one of the peculiarities of the feudal system in the tropics, a system that, in a manner of speaking, had been softened by the hot climate and by the effects of a miscegenation that tended to dissolve such prejudices” (Freyre 1946:xii).

Afro-Brazilian political activist and theorist Abdias do Nascimento argues: “The interbreeding of white masters with African women, far from being a result of absence of race prejudice, can be explained at least in part as an outcome of the nature of the colonial situation. The difference was that the Portuguese had come to the New World to make a fortune and return to Europe. They left their women home. English settlers had come to stay, so they brought their wives with them. The use of African women to satisfy slaveowners in the absence of white women was outright rape. It had nothing to do with ‘respect’ for the victims as human beings” (Abdias do Nascimento 1989:63). He continues, “The process of sexual exploitation of Black women resulted in simple genocide. With the growth of the mulatto population, the Black race began to disappear. This development was
Local elites in Brazil wished to maintain slavery and the plantation economy. The planter class, specifically, led the country’s independence from Portugal in 1822 “primarily to institute free trade to benefit [them, and]…to maintain the existing social structure and its regime of slavery” (Holston 2009:124) and to allow continued “free appropriation of crown land” (Holston 2009:125). However, by the 1850s international sentiment regarding slavery was shifting, and the Brazilian elites were increasingly aware that the slave trade would not continue for long. As a result, the planter class, through the Imperial and soon to be Republican state, attempted to attract new labour to participate in the coffee plantation economy through promoting the migration of white Europeans (Holston 2009; Skidmore 1993; Nascimento 1989). To prevent the new migrants from occupying “unused” Brazilian land (wanting, instead, to direct new labour to the plantations), the state introduced measures in 1850 to commoditize property and outlaw squatting. Despite the state’s attempts to attract new migrants to the plantations in an increasingly “quasi-capitalist,” dependent regime of accumulation (Huggins 1984), within a few years most new arrivals would find their way to the peripheries of coastal cities such as Rio de Janeiro, attracted by the promises of industrialization (Holston 2009; see also Chapter 3.1). The criminalization of squatting also, crucially, affected the thousands of poor Brazilians, often of Indigenous or African ancestry, who already lived on land that was “informal” or not legally recognized through

89 This is often called the Imperial period in Brazilian history.

90 A “whitening ideal” has indeed informed Brazil’s race relations and continues to influence the practice and performance of race relations – both social and economic – today. This whitening ideal manifests in a desire at the state and the individual level to become whiter. There exists a long genealogy of whitening ideology in Brazil (Skidmore 1993; Nascimento 1989). Thomas Skidmore argues that political debates of the 19th and 20th centuries with respect to immigration, education, and marriage were all predicated upon the idea that Brazil was getting whiter, and that this is the direction in which it should continue, although traits of other races could help improve whiteness (Skidmore 1993).

91 Until this point, the state and other elites had accepted and, in some cases, cultivated squatting, a practice it would continue when beneficial for political and capital accrual (Holston 2009; Fischer 2008; McCann 2014a). See Chapters 3.1 & 3.4.1 for more.
property rights (Holston 2009; see also Fischer 2008). The imposition of new regimes of land tenure was thus central to impoverishment. Racialized and impoverished Brazilians were thus also forced to the peripheries of growing urban centres, as many people lost the means of subsistence that slavery sometimes offered,92 lost the ability to squat land, and lost rural jobs due to increased mechanization of agricultural production (Huggins 1984). Afro-Brazilians, specifically, formed a low-waged labour force for the industrial-led development of cities such as Rio de Janeiro.

Due, in part, to these historical processes, race has become spatialized in Rio’s favelas. The first favelas in Rio were founded by soldiers of the Canudos war and by slaves freed after abolition in 1888 – most of these were darker skinned people directly from Africa or of African ancestry (Leeds 1996; Fischer 2008; see Chapter 3.1.1). Present day migration from Brazil’s Northeast (due to expropriated lands for mechanized agricultural production – another change in land tenure regimes) continues this trend of Afro-Brazilians moving to Rio’s hillsides. These racialized people are also, generally, exploitable labour who do not control the means of production because they have been pushed off “their” land. In other words, class intersects with race in Brazil, generally, and in Rio’s favelas, specifically.93 While Rio’s favelas are today racially and economically heterogeneous (Perlman 2011), there is a disproportionate number of black and mixed-race people who live in these territories: almost all of Rio’s black population live in favelas, even if only 50% of people in these territories self-identify as phenotypically black (see Perlman 2004; Nascimento 1989). As such, when processes of de-industrialization hit Rio de Janeiro, it was Afro-Brazilian industrial workers, often living in favela territories, who suffered disproportionately.

Yet favelas do not just have an over-representation of racialized peoples living in them; they have also become racialized spaces in their own right. They are racialized territories because a disproportionate number of people who live in them – specifically Afro-Brazilians – are not

92 I do not mean to indicate that slavery was a positive experience – it was brutal even if plantations sometimes offered small plots of land for slaves’ small-scale crop farming. Rather my point is to indicate that the end of slavery had migratory impacts.

93 Since slavery, people of African ancestry have been disproportionately impoverished in Brazil – they have much lower socioeconomic mobility than lighter skinned people, are overrepresented in low-paid industrial and domestic work, and have faced decades of employment and education discrimination (Perlman 2011).
recognized as people, as fully human (Wynter 2003). They have been hyperexploited and killed throughout Brazil’s history and pre-history and, following da Silva (2004), have been placed outside Universality in modern epistemological, juridical, and ethical regimes. Today, favelas have become spaces in which almost anyone – black or otherwise – can be killed with impunity for the survival of the state and its capital accumulation logics. In the next section I detail how this contemporary situation – and the techniques and technologies deployed by the police – has been influenced by practices of Brazil’s military dictatorship, specifically.

4.3 Articulations of Public Security and Infrastructural Development in Brazil

People are presently being killed in Rio’s favelas as a function of PACification: the articulated projects of attracting international investment, market formalization, and public security that target these racialized spaces. Yet the UPP is not the first time that an official program of pacification has been implemented in Brazil. The articulation of public security and economic growth strategies was central to the military-industrial complex of the military dictatorship, which deployed its own form of pacification. In this section I discuss the two projects of pacification as conjuncturally-specific conjoinings, or articulations, of public security and economic development/marketization strategies. I then turn to the historical continuities and divergences across these periods, discussing how each is oriented around, inter alia, infrastructural development and the attraction of international investment through the discursive articulation, and militarized management, of enemies and threats to the nation.

4.3.1 Pacifying the National Territory

By the 1950s and 1960s in Brazil, working class movements were organizing to elect Brazil’s 24th president, João Belchior Marques Goulart. Goulart’s governance regime supported nationalist policies that threatened multinational investment (Alves 1985). Incensed members of the Brazilian clientele classes (which profited from multinational capital), alongside the Brazilian military and American CIA, developed a destabilization policy that toppled the Goulart regime on April 1, 1964. The coup instituted a military
dictatorship and a new clientelist class that Alves (1985) calls the civilian-military class alliance. They were guided by an ideology of national security understood as a tool the ruling classes, associated with foreign capital, utilize to justify and legitimize the continuation, by nondemocratic means, of a highly exploitative model of dependent development. (Alves 1985:6)

This model of dependent development, unlike other military dictatorships in South America, espoused a state-centred form of capitalist development: it was based on Keynesian interventions into the economy made by a highly authoritarian regime. National security ideology was central to the functioning of the military dictatorship and this form of capitalist development. The Doctrine of National Security, crafted and espoused by the clientele classes, military and the American CIA, explicitly articulated economic development with internal security, coining the new program “security with development” (Alves 1985). At this moment, the “internal enemies” that compromised the regime’s security – and, according to the dictatorship, national security – were working class social movements and potential communist threats exercising guerilla revolutionary warfare (Alves 1985). Black leaders and Afro-Brazilian practices were also hyper-surveilled and criminalized in this context (Huggins 1984).

Economic development to the military dictatorship involved the “achievement of complete integration and complete national security” (Alves 1985:25). Widespread infrastructural development was central to the development/security nexus, aiming to “counteract the extreme vulnerability resulting from the country’s vast empty spaces” (Alves 1985:25). The authoritarian regime focused on building railroad infrastructure to “integrate” the national territory (Alves 1985; Aracri 2017), and legitimated development projects in places such as Amazonia (still home to many “unmiscegenated” Indigenous groups) through the rhetoric of civilization and colonization (Alves 1985). In addition to infrastructural development, a central component of this “development with security” economic policy was to create a business-friendly climate for multinational capital investment. At this conjuncture, the military government sought to bolster extractive industry, and thus the dictatorship unleashed
security forces to “pacify” areas for access to resources (Alves 1985). The government launched both explicit and clandestine military operations against rural peasants, the latter sometimes supported by guerilla groups, on lands of interest to new consortia formed by state-owned and multinational companies. These “pacification” projects, as the military government called them, killed over 45 rural trade union leaders and agents working with local peasants and Indigenous peoples. Alves has called this nexus of security and economic development – this pacification project of the military dictatorship – the military-industrial complex (1985:120).

The military dictatorship developed an apparatus of repression against those threats they characterized as “internal enemies.” These threats were generally, albeit not exclusively, articulated on ideological, as opposed to explicitly racial, grounds. They were worried about Brazilians in general adopting communist ideologies. To combat these threats, the government introduced legislation that allowed for death penalties, life imprisonment, and banishment for any “enemy within.” They also introduced a National Security Law that banned political assembly and opposition parties, and circumscribed press freedom (Alves 1985; Huggins 1984). In a move that proved to have remarkably enduring consequences, the military government imprisoned “political criminals” – these internal enemies – with “common bank robbers” in a particularly notorious prison on Ilha Grande, Rio de Janeiro. In this prison, the political prisoners taught the so-called common bank robbers the politics of collectivity, and (ironically) these new criminal collectives would become the first and most powerful narcotraffic factions in Rio de Janeiro (Leeds 1996; Arias 2006a; see Chapter 3.3 & 3.4). As Elizabeth Leeds notes, the Brazilian military government thus “Created a mechanism for violence by fusing common or civilian elements with political and military

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94 Pacification was also an explicit policy in Southeast Asia at a similar moment. During the Vietnam War, for instance, South Vietnamese fighters, supported by the United States, developed, “an array of programs that sought to bring security, economic development, and local self-government to the rural regions of the Republic of Vietnam...Throughout the Vietnam War pacification, or ‘the other war,’ played an essential role in the conduct of the struggle” (Hunt 2011:869). Here, pacification was a means to extend control over the countryside and improve the lives of refugees and villagers through social services and infrastructural development, in part to dissuade support of the Viet Cong. Jim Glassman (2004) argues that pacification in Thailand, backed by the CIA, was a Western strategy that used psychological, infrastructural, communication, and economic development tactics to securitize the countryside against a communist threat.

95 A primary example of this type of consortium is the Superintendency of Amazon Development or SUDAM.
segments” and “inadvertently helped reshape violent criminal organization into its current form” (Leeds 1996:64).

The military regime also fundamentally influenced the practices of Rio de Janeiro’s Polícia Militar (Military Police, or PM). The Portuguese Royal Family created Rio’s first police force in 1809 in the wake of the monarchy’s move to Rio de Janeiro and concern over slave rebellion after the Haitian Revolution (Ashcroft 2014). It continued to be a civilian force that, in 1969, was placed under the armed forces by the new military dictatorship (Leeds 1996), an act that “gave the PM a direct day-to-day role in public order and expanded its national security function” (Arias 2006a:35). The PM operated within anti-terrorism units and created so-called informal death squads where they honed torture skills. After the disbanding of the military dictatorship, the military police continued to use similar repressive tactics now as part of a newly coined “War on Crime” (Leeds 1996; Arias 2006a). The war on crime was focused not on potential communists in the national territory, but on narcotrafic factions in favelas where the PMs would continue using strategies of spectacular violence (Larkins 2013, 2015; Arias 2013).

The military dictatorship thus depended on threatening subjects or “internal enemies” for its particular form of dependent development: the military-industrial complex. These internal threats were not necessarily racialized as black or Indigenous. Rather, they were “ideological” threats (Alves 1985), those that threatened national/multinational capital – often but not necessarily of a communist nature. The military regime created discursive, legal, and militaristic mechanisms that sought to destroy these threats for the sake of its own perpetuation, that is, for the sake of the nation-state and its security – economic, political, and otherwise. These mechanisms were crucial to perpetuating and legitimating violence against various peoples – in this case, against communists and their associates. While not racialized in the ways that black and Indigenous peoples have been, the state killed and tortured so-called communists and guerillas for its own capital accumulation purposes. Importantly, these mechanisms also disproportionately displaced Indigenous peoples and

96 See also Martha Huggins (1984) for the continued targeting of Afro-Brazilians and their practices by this public security force after the end of slavery.
targeted leaders of the black movement. And, as Leeds alludes to above, the efforts of the military dictatorship would have key continuities with current racialized violence against narcotraffic factions: some of the actions and techniques of the military government would soon be articulated to, and transformed through, new strategies of accumulation and security in Rio’s favelas.

4.3.2 PACifying Rio’s Favelas

In reaction to international oil and debt crises, and as a response to the mobilization of working class, rural, and Black social movements, the authoritarian regime of the military dictatorship gradually “opened” (called the “abertura”) and the country was returned to full democracy with the Constitution of 1988. Under the “guidance” of international financial organizations, Brazil would also implement structural adjustment measures, which made more permeable the country’s borders to the transnational trade of goods. These measures helped foment the proliferation of the international drug trade – the movement of arms and cocaine from Peru, specifically – across Latin America (Arias 2006a; see also Leeds 1996). Rio became a major port of entry and exit for narcotraffic (Leeds 1996; Telles 2010; Alves & Evanson 2011), with the favelas in Zona Norte (close to the port and airport) serving as points of drug storage and distribution, and favelas in Zona Sul as key sites of the Brazilian consumer market (Arias 2006a). While it is difficult to know precisely who comprises the “shadowy upper levels of Rio narcotics dealing” (Arias 2006a:32), Desmond Arias points to evidence that the leaders of the factions operate primarily from within prisons, and that the drug and arms wholesalers are associated with the owners of Rio’s lottery-like numbers game, and likely have ties to the federal military and Brazilian Congress (Arias 2006a). The Civil Police in Rio, in particular, have been implicated in corruption and facilitating the movement of drugs and arms through Rio’s ports and favelas.

At the same time, neoliberal reforms exacerbated the exclusion of many impoverished and racialized Brazilians from the formal labour market. This process was spatialized: people living in favelas and other precarious settlements in Rio’s industrial Zona Norte were particularly hard hit. The narcotraffic factions that had formed on Ilha Grande during the
military dictatorship, such as Comando Vermelho, began to hire unemployed locals, often Afro-Brazilian youth, in Rio’s favelas (Arias 2006a, 2013; Leeds 1996; Zaluar 2010). These youth exist on the “lower rungs” of the trade, employed to do the dangerous work of moving and selling drugs (Zaluar 2010). As a result, favelas have become associated with narcotraffic criminality and are framed as sites of endemic violence (despite the fact that the vast majority of people residing in favelas and other precarious settlements have nothing to do with the trade). Thus, when the military police declared its War on Crime (the successor to the War on Communism; see Leeds 1996), the state institution specifically targeted favelas. Here, special armed forces in Brazil used the dictatorship-era tactics of siege and destroy, torture and execution, against black and brown low-income people of Rio’s favelas.

Alongside the war on narcotrafficking, new tactics of attracting international investment have targeted Rio’s favelas in the last decade. In 2006, Eduardo Paes of the PMDB was elected mayor of Rio de Janeiro, introducing a new municipal regime that was closely aligned with the federal PT party of Lula (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016). Sérgio Cabral, a member of the state-level PMDB, was elected governor of Rio in the same year largely on the strength of his law and order, war on crime approach to policing, which was modeled after the zero tolerance scheme of New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016; also see Chapter 3.4). These political parties at the municipal, state, and federal level were aligned in their urban politics: all wanted to market Rio as a global city through, in part, the attraction of mega events (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016; Brum 2016; Gaffney & Robertson 2016; Cavalcanti 2014b), and with a central focus on constructing a secure business environment for investment (Brum 2016). With the new configuration of Rio Global, the federal, state, and municipal governments also cultivated a strategy of poverty management: “ensuring large market agents have full access through the formalization of the growing consumption market in the favelas, which moves 12 billion reais a year” (Brum 2016:208).

According to Brum, different levels of government saw the attraction of foreign investment and the management of poverty (through the formalization of markets) operating hand-in-hand. In other words, the formalization of property and employment in favelas, alongside the entrance of formal businesses, would help grow the consumer market, thus also attracting foreign capital.
But the narcotraffic regimes operating through Rio’s favelas put this strategy at risk. Not only were narcotraffickers shooting each other in these territories, but the military police, army, and special operations units had been treating these spaces like a war zone, intermittently mobilizing extraordinarily repressive tactics that involved raids, air surveillance, and torture. Violence reached a public media zenith in 2006, when Márcio Amaro de Oliveira (also known as Márcio VP or Márcinho) organized an attack against the police from within prison. In order to curtail further violence, Lula offered recently-elected Sérgio Cabral the use of the National Armed Forces (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016). In part as a response to the attack, and in the lead-up to Rio’s hosting of the Pan Am Games, in 2007 Cabral declared war against Complexo do Alemão, using Lula’s National Armed Forces as well as Rio state’s Military Police and Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) (Alves & Evanson 2011). These forces used war-like siege, search, screening, and sniper techniques as they encircled the complex of favelas. Alves and Evanson explain, “The operation…used techniques of war, including besieging the area for four months, until the Pan American Games ended in August” (2011:1). According to the authors, 43 people were killed, including 19 children, some of whom were murdered via summary execution tactics.

The killing of 43 people was not good for the city or country’s image. Nor was it effective: narcotraffickers held ground, but were also able to disperse when necessary to other favelas in the city (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016). Brazil had just been elected to host the 2014 World Cup and Rio was vying to host the 2016 Olympic Games. Security was thus a concern for elite Brazilians dedicated to a mega event agenda – specifically corporate developers and construction conglomerates, and the mayor, governor, and President – as well as the Games’ officials (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016; Brum 2016). In response, halfway through his first term, Cabral introduced a new public security policy of “pacification” that was to be operated by his security secretary, José Mariano Beltrame (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016; Brum 2016). The pacification program drew on previous administrations’ attempts to curb

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97 However, as outlined in Chapters 3 & 6, there has not been a linear progression of repressive public security policy in Rio; rather, the municipal government’s orientation to “favela management” in the last three decades has oscillated between militaristic repression and more progressive community reforms.
corruption in the police forces and to help construct a “securitized” environment for future mega event and business opportunities in Rio (Willis & Prado 2014; see also Chapter 3.4). It intended to create institutional change within the police force itself: hiring new officers, often from favelas, to comprise the units, who had not been affected by previous police culture and corruption (Willis & Prado 2014; Cano 2006, 2012).

A main purpose of the UPP program has been to “return” favela territory to the state. Part of this return, as discussed in Chapters 3 & 6, is the formalization of markets and attraction of international investment, both within favelas, specifically, and within Rio de Janeiro more generally. The UPP has been central to this strategy. As former Chief of Staff of Administration of the State Military Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) and former Coordinating Commander of the UPP Col. Robson Rodrigues da Silva explains it:

Logically, the [UPP’s] implementation process was part of a larger strategic intention of the Rio de Janeiro state government to make the city more peaceful and, consequently, attractive for people to invest in. It was an effort to lower the tension among different areas of the city and lower the perception of violence. Thus, the local government worked hard to align its priorities with the federal government in making Rio de Janeiro a safe place to invest in. In order for that to happen, however, the perception of a lack of security had to be changed and crime indicators would have to be lowered by developing a specific plan. The government approved the implementation of the UPPs after making a cost and time assessment for the current administration. (Vargas 2012:180)

But pacification has not just intended to safeguard the city from violence in favelas in order to attract multinational investment. The third stage of the UPP, now coined Rio Mais Social, has the purpose of attracting investment into pacified favelas, too, alongside formalizing entrepreneurial activity and extending microcredit loans in these spaces (I elaborate these

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98 As described last chapter, the Police Pacification Unit program was aimed at “community policing” after a period of invasion by the military police, BOPE and, in some instances, the armed forces. According to Beltrame, it differed from previous administrations’ occupation efforts because the program’s stated purpose was not to capture drugs, arms, or the traffickers themselves; rather, it was to “return the territory” to the state and the favelas’ “good workers” (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016).

99 This has meant, according to a key Complexo do Alemão anti-pacification activist, that the UPP program is premised on “the poor killing the poor” in the interests of the state; Interview with Complexo activist 2, February 2014
The security logic of the UPP is thus premised, in part, on market formalization, consumption, income generation and attracting national and international investment alongside securitizing areas of narcotraffic presence.

While the municipal and state governments of Rio were implementing the UPP pacification project to attract investment and manage poverty in Rio, the federal government was also directly investing in Rio’s favelas. It was developing and implementing PAC infrastructural projects in many UPP-occupied favelas, focusing on infrastructural investments, employment generation mechanisms, and public security measures. PAC had its own public security program called O Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania (the National Program of Public Security with Citizenship, or PRONASCI) (see Motta 2014; PRONASCI 2010). This program was intended to be a “systemic” approach to security across the country – institutionally and financially (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016). Yet the federal government also couched PAC’s infrastructural development in Rio’s favelas as a public security intervention in its own right. Infrastructural upgrading was meant to: generate jobs so that youth would be dissuaded from joining narcotraffic factions (Zaluar 2010); create greater visibility through widening streets and erecting public lighting in order to make nefarious activity (read: narco dealing) more difficult (EMOP 2014); and establish more permanent state presence in these communities, similar to Cabral and Beltrame’s goal of taking back territory. Indeed, Cavalcanti (2015) argues that PAC, and its associated increased state presence in Rio’s favelas, is a result of the heightened visibility of violence associated with the narcotrade. She argues that the “underlying logic here is that it is because the favelas are violent that their material infrastructure should be improved” (Cavalcanti 2015:110). PAC also prioritized its infrastructural investments in so-called pacified communities: the program regularized land and property only in communities that had UPP units (see Chapter 6.3 for

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100 Cavalcanti calls this “pacification urbanism” which is an upscaled form of favela consolidation associated with PAC works. She argues “while previous urbanization programs represented a push toward the legal recognition of the favelas, the legacy of contemporary urbanization programs lies in the favelas’ spectacular, monumental incorporation into the urban landscape. This is because the political, discursive, and imaginary construction of a city suited to host global events has upscaled favela consolidation both in its urbanistic and military components under the aegis of the larger project of ‘Olympic Rio.’ The PAC works constitute one aspect of a larger ‘pacification’ central to the city branding strategies currently reshaping Rio in the context of the winning bids to host the World Cup and the Olympics. Favela consolidation is thus upscaled into ‘pacification urbanism’” (Cavalcanti 2015:111).
more). PAC, then, like pacification, has been a program that articulates economic growth (or, at least, attempts to mitigate global financial crises – see Chapter 3.2) through infrastructural development *with* public security, sometimes relying specifically on the pacification project, while at other times operating separately but with similar security goals.

Together, PAC and pacification create what I call PACification. In so doing, I build on the introduction of the term by Mariana Cavalcanti (see 2014b), who uses it to refer to the contemporary juxtaposition of PAC and pacification for securitization of Rio in pursuit of a mega event agenda. I use the term, specifically, to refer to the historically-embedded conjoining of public security with infrastructural upgrading, employment formalization, the opening of new (often consumer) markets, and attracting international investment. Both PAC and pacification couch infrastructural development and market formalization *as* public security, while also relying on the military police’s securitization of “problem spaces” to attract international investment. Both are thus oriented to capital accumulation and rely heavily on a public security apparatus inherited from previous regimes.

It is worth briefly reflecting here on the continuities between the security agenda of the military-industrial complex and the security agenda of favela-targeted PACification. Both utilize military intervention or techniques to create a “business-friendly environment” for resource extraction purposes and, increasingly, the formalization of property rights, employment, and markets in favelas. Moreover, the very actions of the military government during the dictatorship years helped create the conditions for the current PACification effort: their imprisonment schemes helped foment the development of narcotraffic factions, and their methods of training the civilian military police in war-like tactics of territorial control have been utilized against favelas (see Fig 2.9). Both past and present pacification efforts have also have focused on infrastructural upgrading as public security practice: during the military dictatorship, infrastructure was a means to “integrate” the national territory and establish state presence in and control over previously “neglected” areas – both in the interior.

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101 Cavalcanti uses the term to refer to the contemporary situation of attracting international investment. My own development of the concept is more explicitly historically embedded, as I relate it to pacification of the military industrial complex and racialized/accumulation regimes in Brazil. Moreover, I place greater emphasis on the militarized violence of these projects. Yet Cavalcanti’s brief introduction of the term has, crucially, opened the door for me to make these arguments.
4.4 PAcification as Coloniality of Power

What I am calling present-day PAcification in Rio’s favelas is a re-working of the coloniality of power. In other words, it is a particular re-configuration of a race/accumulation regime that creates new markets and attracts international investment, facilitated by the Brazilian state. PAcification is a market formalization, investment, and consumption strategy that depends on spatialized racial and class differences, but is also a mechanism to manage the differences that the state and previous regimes of accumulation (such as slavery and feudalism) created.102 In this section I detail key elements of this current conjuncture’s coloniality of power in Rio. I discuss three axes of this coloniality that are articulated through PAcification: formal marketization strategies; the discursive enunciation of racialized threats; and militarized tactics of war. I pay particular attention to how these are spatialized elements in which favelas have become territories where community members can be killed for the self-preservation of the state and for these market strategies.

PAC and pacification articulate public security and marketization. On the one hand, each program is meant to produce new formal market logics through security, sometimes independently and sometimes in support of one another. The final “social” stage of the UPP, for instance, has always been concerned with bringing the formal market to favelas. A primary raison d’etre of Rio Mais Social (or Rio+Social, formerly UPP Social) is to offer employment educational training such as entrepreneurial courses. The program also offers microfinance loans to individuals and small businesses – a way to accrue poverty capital (Roy 2010; see Chapter 6.3). The PT’s PAC project, too, attempts to stimulate financialized accumulation through land regularization and extending mortgages in PAC Urbanization-targeted favelas. This strategy sometimes relies explicitly on the UPP’s public security

102 This accumulation strategy is based, in part, on poverty and financialized capital (Roy 2010), which I explain at greater length in Chapter 6.3.
program: ITERJ, Rio’s land regularization agency, prioritizes property registration in so-called pacified favelas.\textsuperscript{103} Through these market formalization strategies, both PAC and pacification are targeting darker skinned, lower income peoples. The projects are not trying to exploit the labour of darker skinned people in ways akin to former slave regimes. Rather, they are trying to mobilize and accrue greater amounts of financial capital and formalize employment. Put simply, PACification is targeting Rio’s impoverished and racialized territories for infrastructural investment and for the expansion of consumer markets; and targeting these territories’ inhabitants for microcredit schemes, mortgage payments, and workers’ fund (FGTS) contributions.

On the other hand, PACification can be understood as a way to manage, through a public security apparatus, the contradictions created by previous governance regimes and local, national, and global accumulation strategies. As detailed above, the previous military dictatorship created the conditions for the development of the nation’s largest narcotrafficking regimes, and government-implemented neoliberal reforms – alongside deindustrialization – have opened the borders to the proliferation of the drug trade.\textsuperscript{104} The military police is now attempting to re-take territory from these narcotraffickers in order to securitize Rio’s environment for safe national and international business investment and the hosting of mega events. The UPP, then, is tied to the accumulation strategies of Rio, as it attempts to militarily manage the poverty and racial divisions that have been created throughout Brazil’s history and pre-history (also see Perlman 2011). In this sense, the UPP is a militarized reaction to previous regimes’ capital accumulation strategies (such as the military-industrial complex) and racial formations (such as histories of Indigenous extermination, slavery, and the continuing intersections of dark skin and impoverishment in Rio’s favelas).

These strategies of accumulation are intertwined with the discursive construction of threats and logics of war. Infrastructural development in Brazil has long been part of a public

\textsuperscript{103} ITERJ is the Rio-based institution tasked with mapping and regularizing land in Rio de Janeiro by PAC and municipal upgrading programs. See Chapter 6.3.

\textsuperscript{104} These actions have occurred through a nation-state that has built upon, and continues to re-circulate the wealth derived from, the stealing of Indigenous land and the slave labour of Africans and their descendants.
security regime articulated to and through “threats to the nation” or “threats to the city.” As described in Chapter 3.1, different governance regimes have built infrastructure in Rio’s favelas since these territories were first settled: early efforts by different municipal governments and Church associations to build roads, sewage systems, and housing were intended to protect against the hygienic risks that poor, often formerly enslaved Afro-Brazilians and so-called peasants were thought to pose to the rest of the city (Fischer 2008, 2014; see Chapter 3.1). Infrastructural upgrading in favelas was also a way for the state to mitigate the risks of communism spreading throughout these territories (McCann 2014b). These efforts were transformed through the military dictatorship’s “pacification” program: a military strategy used by the dictatorship to attract and protect transnational investment in extraction infrastructure (Alves 1985).

National and multinational infrastructural investment in this era was also a means to “integrate” the national territory to prevent an amorphous “communist threat” (Alves 1985). Favelas, during the dictatorship, were often slated for removal in order to prevent the threats that communism and workers’ organizing posed to the regime.

The communist threat has now morphed into a narcotraffic threat, where infrastructural investment has become, among other things, a primary way to increase state presence in Rio’s favelas, bearing the promise of employment and credit. Yet the threat posed by narcotraffickers is distinct from that posed by communists. The former has taken shape through a racial narrative in a way that the latter never has been. There is not a fear that just

105 Although one could also count violence against slaves and slave-uprisings as the first moment of pacification, even if it was not explicitly called such.

106 Cavalcanti (2015:110) argues “Violence and the stigma attached to the favelas thus create the conditions for their residents’ political recognition and political visibility – while reproducing the stereotypes and power relations that reinforce the idea of their cultural ‘otherness’ vis-à-vis the formal city. Thus favela consolidation is also the story of the construction of a consensus about the ‘favela issue’: if violence increases and the drug gangs’ territorial control over vast stretches of the city results from an alleged absence of the state there, then the solution to the favela issue is the state’s ‘arrival’.”

107 As briefly discussed last chapter, this threat – and the security apparatus that accompanies it – is a multiscalar formation, informed by a “global security industrial complex” that constructs narcothreats in order to justify American military intervention in Latin America (da Silva 2016). Here, a multinational security apparatus is mobilized to protect projects of global capital such as mega dams, agribusiness lands, and international mega events (da Silva 2016). Da Silva (2016) documents how Dilma Rousseff deployed National Security Forces and the Federal Police, alongside Rio’s Military Police, in order to quell protestors in cities and Indigenous protests in the Amazon and more rural areas.
“anyone” can be turned into a narcotrafficker (which was the concern with communist threats – see Alves 1985). Rather, the threat is located quite clearly in darker-skinned bodies. Through Brazil’s miscegenation racial narrative, both black and mestiço people are constructed as socially degenerate, pathological, and illegal (da Silva 2001:441). In other words, they are understood as “pathological social subjects” with “their bodies and the urban spaces they inhabit as signifiers of illegality” (da Silva 2001:423). The location of this threat is thus also spatialized: favelas, with their high proportion of Afro-Brazilians, have become racialized, such that dark-skin bodies are understood as synonymous with favelas and crime (da Silva 2009; Vargas 2004; Alves & Vargas 2017; Amar 2013; Prouse 2012).

However, favelas are not presently conceived in state policy as unidimensional, homogeneous threats to the so-called formal city. Pacification and PAC projects instead articulate – or enunciate – a dichotomy between “good workers” and “bandits.” Former president Lula, specifically, articulated this distinction when speaking at a PAC-funded inauguration event in Complexo do Alemão:

And, importantly, Sérgio [Cabral], I want to congratulate you for the courage that few governors have had, in the history of Rio de Janeiro, to confront the delinquents/offenders of this state with the capacity with which you are facing them. To try to climb the hills, to take the bandits without molesting the good women and men who live here and that built their families here, and that want to continue living, is extraordinary work…It is true that there are dealers here and bandits here, but it is true that they are also in São Paulo…[W]e have to prove every single day, that most of the people here are people who live from their salary, their sweat and their blood. (Lula 2010:7)

In this speech in Complexo, Lula inaugurates a PAC infrastructural investment project while simultaneously congratulating Cabral’s UPP public security apparatus. In so doing, he echoes PAC and Rio+Social policy that seeks to invest in the “existence of many entrepreneurs” present in Rio’s favelas (EMOP 2014:33; see also Chapter 6.4), and to support “intelligence actions…that dismantle the criminal structures operating in the

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108 Denise Ferreira da Silva (2001:437; emphasis in original) argues that Brazil’s national narrative of miscegenation and racial democracy emerged in the 1930s, in which the social subject of the mestiço “embodies both the outsidedness signified in blackness and africanaity and the pathologies the science of man associated with miscegenation.”
neighborhood without penalizing residents” (EMOP 2014:61). Cabral, specifically, has understood the UPP project as a way to protect the “many lost assets” of the “innocents” (iG 2010:para 6), and to safeguard the “hardworking, orderly” (Lemos 2010:para 4) populations in favelas. Lula’s and Cabral’s rhetoric, alongside official PAC and UPP policy documents, reveal a new threat that has been mobilized through PACification discourse: narcotraffic as threat to the good workers of favelas.

In this discursive context, activists and residents, too, are compelled to articulate these distinctions. They construct themselves as “innocent,” that is, not drug traffickers, to be understood as legitimate subjects. As Gabriel Feltran (2015a) argues, in this political climate, legitimate life is only extended to the innocent; there is no space in the public sphere to fight for traffickers’ political right to life. Thus activists tend to hold protests for people who are not drug traffickers, organizing under the slogan of innocence, such as occurred during the protest described at the beginning of this chapter. Similarly, the most outrage in Complexo do Alemão, particularly over social media, is expressed for the death of “innocent” young boys and older women – those who are not traffickers. To secure their own rights, favela residents distance themselves from narcotraffic. In so doing, they (inadvertently) entrench the state’s innocent/guilty subject dichotomy.

Conceiving of the city as fundamentally divided between “workers” and “banditos” undermines any rights the latter might have to citizenry, and, as Gabriel Feltran argues, “the notion of security emerges as the basis for sociability” (Feltran 2015a:3). Renowned Brazilian theorist Alba Zaluar elaborates:

> In all cases, it is around these marginal figures – which do not correspond to what really happens empirically¹¹⁰ – that the centre of power of the state is organized. In this representation, the conflict is

¹⁰⁹ Dilma also made a similar statement in her teleferico inauguration speech, when she recognized Beltrame for “constructing here an environment that doesn’t dialogue with violence, that doesn’t leave kids and youth at the mercy of violence and, often, drugs” (Rousseff 2011:para14).

¹¹⁰ This stark distinction between “good worker” and “bandit”, between “innocent” and “guilty” is untenable – people move in and out of “illicit” circuits all the time, and favela residents who are in some way involved in the narcotrade often are so as a function of impoverishment (Telles 2010).
organized as an opposition between civilized vs. uncivilized, citizens against internal enemies, good versus evil, and it destroys the logic of universalist rights as a possibility to mediate the conflict. War becomes the paradigm of politics. (Zaluar 2010:23)

To reiterate, the division between “workers” and “banditos” makes “war the paradigm of politics.” Discursive distinctions between subjects thus become productive for highly militarized interventions in the name of market formalization and investment.

The “grammar of war” is indeed one mode of state rhetoric for its governance of favela (and other racialized) territories (Feltran 2015a; Sanjuro & Feltran 2015; Gutterres 2014). Despite some of its community policing impulses, the UPP has been couched at key moments as a project of war. Rio’s former governor Cabral used this rhetoric when describing the public security situation in Rio: “This is a war. And, as in every war, you are reconquering territories. What we are doing is regaining territories” (Lemos 2010:para 4). In this logic, as former Public Security Secretary Beltrame explained, “Safety is an endless fight” (G1 Rio 2016:para 3), where the common Brazilian saying “A good bandit is a dead bandit”¹¹¹ is made violently real. Complexo residents and activists also recognize pacification as a project of war, and critique it as such. As one interviewee explained,

> Why would you carry more weapons to a place you want to disarm?…
> “Oh, there was shooting the whole night.” And then tomorrow: “Let’s increase the armed forces.” …You will get shot more. Criminals will not fail to shoot the police, the police will not fail to shoot the criminals. Only thing is that we will have more weapons shooting more than usual.¹¹²

To the military police apparatus and to many community members, then, pacification rests, in part, on a logic of war.

Crucially, PACification as a public security and market formalization nexus – and not just the UPP – makes use of this logic of war, underpinned by discursive distinctions between

¹¹¹ 57% of Brazilians agree with this statement according to 2016 data from Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP; see G1 São Paulo 2016).

¹¹² Interview with Complexo activist 6, March 2015
good workers and bandits. By saying both categories of residents co-exist, any violence against people in Rio’s favelas can be legitimated by attempting to save good workers (Amar 2013; Prouse 2012). These good workers are the structural foundation of the state: as da Silva notes, the state in its modern guise has been established to protect itself and its people from threats posed to it (and, I add, to its capital accumulation/social reproduction processes). The good workers are also a part of the structural foundation of the economic accumulation strategies that both PAC and the UPP promote: these projects can only open markets if there are “good” people available to work and to consume. By discursively locating “good workers” in favelas, the contradictory logics of pacification and PAC are justified. The projects’ market formalization and repressive components are discursively reconciled in the guise of safeguarding workers.

Yet the allowable killing of both bandits and good workers in Rio’s favelas extends deeper than rhetorical justification. The killing of each is legitimated through the spatialized logic of race in Brazil. In Rio’s favelas, it is the very function of being of that space – of being uncivilized, marginal, and less-than-human – that allows even good workers to be killed without unleashing an ethical crisis (da Silva 2009). Indeed, many Complexo residents feel that their being in favela streets makes them guilty and killable to the UPP apparatus, regardless of whether or not they are involved in the narcotrade. One young woman, born and raised in Complexo, argues:

Because when something happens, anything, the guilty is always the resident. [The UPP says] “you should not be on the street”. [This is what] happened to the woman who died back there. The woman was at her door. Looking, I think, at her child. She took a shot in the belly.

A middle-aged man, newer to the Complexo community, feels a similar phenomenon:

113 Da Silva (2009) notes that “sociological truths” of favelas as spaces of criminality and the sites of reproducing “backwardness” have made it so that even “good workers” can be killed here. I argue that the current moment represents a transformed “sociological truth” of favelas and other places characterized as “slums,” in which these areas are, based on theorizing of scholars such as Hernando de Soto, inhabited by people who have an inherent entrepreneurial ethos (see Roy 2011). Favelas (and other “slum-like” places) are thus not only the site of backwardness and criminality, but also potential market opportunities for global and poverty capital.

114 Interview with Complexo resident 12, March 2015
Everybody is suspect. So, if we shoot at someone, the person was in the wrong place, or he was... or he was one of drug dealers, they always try to make themselves the heroes and everybody that lives there as criminals. They were doing something. Or just bad luck.  

In favela streets, the “justice” and “policing” functions of the state are collapsed and police killing emerges as justice within these racialized territories (da Silva 2009). Securitization is informed by raciality, in which new social inclusion measures (such as affirmative action programs) coexist with a violent security apparatus (da Silva 2016). Here, “racial (state) violence, serves the needs of global capital as it takes care of an excess population” (da Silva 2016:202). In favelas, da Silva (2009:213) elaborates, “[R]aciality immediately justifies the state’s decision to kill certain persons – mostly (but not only) young men and women of colour – in the name of self-preservation. Such killings do not unleash an ethical crisis because these persons’ bodies and the territories they inhabit always-already signify violence.” Preservation of the state, and its securitization of global capital and international investment opportunities, is central to justifiable killings in Rio’s favelas. This moment of violent securitization is thus, in part, for accumulation elsewhere; it operates at the scale of the global city, and seeks to attract investment to higher income areas of Rio de Janeiro.

Yet, as PACification demonstrates, these territories signify not only violence, but also potential consumer markets, financial capital, and entrepreneurial activity. There is no contradiction between violence and capital, between accumulation logics and militarized killings, when we consider the racial history of Brazil, where black peoples have always been killed for marketization and accumulation; where people deemed “less-than-human” have been exploited and killed for the sake of evolving economic regimes. The current moment of PACification is only the latest manifestation – or a conjuncturally-specific form – of a coloniality of power linking new market strategies with the continued (and ever-transforming) racialization (and thus killability) of peoples in particular territories.

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115 Interview with Complexo resident 4, January 2014
4.5 Articulated Histories of PACification

In this chapter I have not intended to tell a linear story of Brazil’s history. Rather, I have chosen to focus on points of resonance of coloniality: how racialization and capital markets are articulated in new ways at different conjunctures, and how they are spatialized in Rio’s favelas. I deploy an abstract conception of race as the ordering of humanity – making some peoples less than human and thus killable – that was historically and geographically shaped through the colonization of the Americas. I then turned, albeit briefly, to how race has taken a specific formation in Brazil and Rio. The current conjuncture has seen the continuation of racialized peoples being killed, less for hyperexploitable labour, than for access to consumer markets and circulations of financial capital, and to securitize “risky” space for the attraction of national/international investment.

I have focused also on different moments of articulation between public security and capital. PACification in Rio’s favelas is not new but premised on intertwined histories. I have discussed two historical continuities in particular: processes of racialization and exploitation of labour and land (and the spatialization of these processes in Rio’s favelas); and repressive tactics of the military police to securitize territory for investment and to prevent the spread of threatening subjects to higher income areas of Rio. Contemporary PACification has continuities with both: it draws on historically produced uneven landscapes of racialization to formalize markets in Rio’s favelas, and it articulates violent military police intervention with infrastructural development.

PACification in Rio is a conjuncturally-specific form of the coloniality of power. It is comprised of the articulation of three key elements: market formalization strategies; the discursive construction of racialized narcotraffic threats; and a highly militarized logic of public security, sometimes conceived in terms of war. This nexus is also territorialized: favelas themselves have become racialized such that almost anyone within these territories can be killed with impunity (even good workers), because these spaces always-already represent potential violence. According to Denise Ferreira da Silva, it is here that the policing and justice functions of the state are collapsed. Taking da Silva’s ideas a step further, I argue
that, through PACification in Rio’s favelas, the security and market generation functions of the state have been collapsed, with Rio’s darker-skinned populations the killable by-product of marketization, investment, and formalization strategies.

In Chapter 6 I describe at greater length this contemporary articulation between market formalization and security through both PAC and pacification, and the effects that these programs are having on Complexo residents’ everyday lives. First, however, I turn to PAC and its largest infrastructural project, the teleferico. In what follows, I discuss how PAC materializes through: socio-spatial imaginaries of Complexo as a narco-controlled region; a contested civil/political interface specific to this territory; and classed processes that shape contemporary flows of capital and resources. In so doing, I take seriously residents’ own articulations, or narratives, of decision-making with respect to PAC investments.
4.6 Figures for Chapter 4

Figure 4.1 The military police of the Nova Brasília UPP. Photo taken 13 Mar 2014 by author.

Figure 4.2 New Blacks Institute and Cemetery (IPN), Rio de Janeiro. This small cemetery and memorial museum was erected when the occupants of the house discovered the remains of slaves on their property. Photo taken 6 Jun 2014 by author.
Figure 4.3 Valongo Wharf, a main slave market in Rio de Janeiro. Photo taken 6 Jun 2014 by author.
Figure 4.4 Bairro Chic event for innovation in Rio’s pacified favelas (a project of Rio Mais Social). Photo taken 4 Jun 2014 by author.
Part 2: Contemporary Engagements

Part two of this dissertation is premised on fieldwork, policy analysis, and online encounters undertaken between September of 2013 and June of 2017. It is thus more empirically focused than part one. The following three chapters draw both implicitly and explicitly on the conjunctural analytic and histories I have just developed. They take as their starting point the contemporary moment of PACification in Brazil as socio-historically produced through: varying state/civil society interfaces; interscalar space-time flows of images, capital, and discourses; histories of colonialism and racialized violence; and ongoing forms of autoconstruction and insurgent citiizenships.

In Chapter 5 I explore the civil/political society interface in greater depth, interrogating how PAC money has flowed through Complexo territory in ways always historically determined. I centre the dual notion of articulation: how different regimes of power are historically articulated, and how enunciations of residents serve as critiques of corrupt state practices. In the following chapter, Chapter 6, I follow up on this theme of articulation, but focus on the articulations between the pacification and PAC projects. Informed by the theoretical arguments laid out in Chapter 4, I explore, empirically, the relationships between marketization and security as the state attempts to “formalize” Complexo do Alemão in order to extend a market frontier. Yet these acts are often contradictory, being a function of the contested nature of the state, and always exceed market integration. They are, I argue, also projects of coloniality that attempt to civilize and modernize. But residents, too, are always active in discourses of formalization. I thus introduce the notion of “subversive formalization” to account for the myriad ways residents also negotiate ways of living with one another and, in some cases, attempt to hold the state accountable to its own rhetoric of formalization. Finally, in Chapter 7, I continue to foreground the actions of Complexo residents, this time through their social media practices in the face of PACification’s police violence. I explain how activists and journalists are involved in a conjuncturally-specific form of insurgent citizenship that I call “digital autoconstruction.” Here, actors are reshaping digital practices to shift discourses, articulations, and visibilities of violence.
Chapter 5: Articulating Corruption in Alemão

December of 2013 saw a massive rainstorm hit Rio de Janeiro that caused flooding in many homes throughout the city. There was a differential distribution of damages. Homes in what are commonly referred to as “precarious settlements” – often located in favelas that dot the hills of Rio – were at heightened risk. Such was the case on the Morro do Alemão (the German Hill) in Complexo do Alemão where, on the 12th and 13th of December, 85 homes collapsed. But this was not a natural disaster. Many in the community believe that the new station for the gondola system sitting atop the Alemão hill rendered the houses more precarious. Previously the houses near the summit had been nestled close together, offering support to one another on soil that absorbed most of the rainwater. But PAC-related projects changed this delicate and always slightly precarious situation. According to activists and community leaders, the removal of some houses for teleferico construction decreased the supportive infrastructure that each house relied upon for its security, and the massive amounts of concrete that were laid down for the new station created substantial runoff that flooded the houses below (Fig 5.1). Ironically, the people who had lost homes during the flood sought refuge in the Alemão teleferico station, setting up temporary beds in one of the few structures considered “public space” on the hill.

João was the first person to share this story with me. João is affiliated with Raízes em Movimento, one of the longer-existing political organizations in Complexo. For days after my arrival in the community I had been advised by many interlocutors to speak with João, who is recognized as “a catalyst type of person. [João] makes everyone move, everyone join.” After three minutes of meeting João it is not hard to understand why. Lithe, animated, with a head of graying hair, he practically jumps out of his seat with oscillating frustration, anger, and tenacity as he explains the recent PAC projects that, in some ways, have failed to properly “integrate” Complexo with the formal city fabric. He speaks quickly in what can only be described as well-rehearsed fashion, having likely given a similar spiel to

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116 Interview with Complexo activist 3, February 2014
other researchers, activists and politicians many times over. At one particularly animated moment during discussion of the flooding, João exhorted:

You don’t make a process of urbanization in which you invest billions of reais, without a study of the soil…Houses have mines of water under them…It wasn’t a public policy to look into these questions. To attend to these problems. It’s a public policy, it’s a project of urbanization much more electoral, so that it can create money for the contractors that earn the money who aren’t actually doing the work. [They] are the same contractors that…pay the electoral campaigns of the governor and the municipality. Officially. Now the contractors that come do the work don’t resolve the problems, but try to justify receiving the resources. They don’t resolve the problems.117

This was not, of course, the narrative envisioned by Lula when he called the PAC investments in Complexo “reparations” for “decades and decades” of “bad rulers” (Lula da Silva 2010), or by Dilma during her teleferico inauguration speech when she called it a “symbol of PAC” (Rousseff 2011:para 20) that “shows immense respect to the residents of the Complexo of Favelas of Alemão, immense respect to them as citizens. They have the right to have access to the best mass transport technologies, respecting the conditions that over many years, abandoned by the government, were created” (Rousseff 2011:para 8; Fig 5.2).

These narratives about PAC are just two extremes of a discourse that is grappling with the teleferico as a major state investment in a community among which many have felt was heretofore ignored by the state. In this chapter I am less interested in finding the “truth” of how the teleferico came into being, than with the stories and money that circulate with respect to its creation – the circuits of truth and capital (Roy 2010) that converge around the teleferico. In other words, I am interested in articulations of power and capital in the dual sense (Hall 1996): the joining together of different modes of power and governance at the specific conjuncture of large-scale upgrading in Complexo do Alemão; and the narratives and enunciations that residents and government officials tell about circulations of power and capital, which can (de)legitimate state and elite actions (Doshi & Ranganathan 2016) and foment new identities (Yiftachel 2009). While critical geographic literatures have looked at

117 Interview with João, January 2014
the dominant circuits of truth and capital of development projects (Roy 2010), I am interested in the myriad contestations of these views and iterations of the teleferico – their resonances and their occlusions. I pay particular attention to how these narratives coalesce around different relations of power and inequality that evoke myriad actors, and how “The geographies of the relations of inequality they describe are patterned not only internationally, but subnationally, and transnationally, and they are patterned according to deep historical roots as well as ongoing enclosures, invasions, and exclusions across scales” (Silvey 2010:832).

Recent work in both critical ethnography and postcolonial urban geography has interrogated how discourses are mobilized to contest the activities of state and civil society (Gupta 1995; Jeffrey & Young 2014; Doshi & Ranganathan 2016). Doshi and Ranganathan have discussed the political work accomplished by discourses of corruption, specifically. To them, corruption is “a host of wealth-usurping collusions between states and elites” (Doshi & Ranganathan 2016:2) that are quite specific to the socio-historical formation in which they are embedded – their socio-historical conjuncture. Talking about corruption is political, they argue: “corruption talk by lower class residents advances an ethical critique of accumulation by dispossession…Such narratives reveal much about how polarizing sociospatial transformations are advanced, narrated, and contested” (Doshi & Ranganathan 2016:3).

Here, corruption talk is a way for residents in so-called slum areas – or informal, precarious settlements – to contest inequalities in resource distribution and dispossession.

In the spirit of recent calls to compare across “urbans” (see Robinson 2016; McFarlane 2010; Lancione & McFarlane 2016), I find in Doshi and Ranganathan’s work in Indian cities a provocation: How do narratives of corruption function in Complexo do Alemão? In asking this question, inspired by work in India, I mobilize an “unexpected comparison” (Robinson 2016) across cities not normally placed in conversation with one another (see Chapter 2.3.4). The purpose of this chapter is to understand how teleferico-related narratives manifest in Complexo as a function of the community’s socio-historical conjuncture in Brazil: how not only corruption becomes an object of contestation in narrativizing the teleferico, but also participatory and consultation logics enshrined in Brazil’s City Statute, and the often violent
relationships that exist at the state-civil society interface in Carioca favelas. To investigate these objects of contestation, I trace two types of discourse: first, decision-making narratives (specifically with respect to community consultation and participation in the planning of PAC projects); and second, capital or wealth appropriation narratives (specifically with respect to accusations of skimming, bribery, patrimonialism, and clientelism). I seek to understand the active role that narratives play in (de)legitimating “urbanization” processes – how the articulations (or enunciations) of corruption, for instance, act as a form of resistance to resource usurpation. I am also interested in how these narratives reveal the articulations (or conjoining) of different forms of class and other relations of power that are a product of the specific conjuncture. Finally, in somewhat different fashion than Doshi and Ranganathan, I investigate the different scales to which these narratives adhere and point, in order to capture the multi- and interrelated-scalar nature of these contestations. Focusing on the narratives that residents mobilize of each other as well as of government and elite actors helps elucidate, for instance, the agency and sometimes mutual imbrication that residents have in these processes.

To this end, several key questions guide my discussions in this chapter: what are the dominant narratives in Complexo about how decisions were made with respect to the teleferico, specifically, and PAC projects more generally? What do they tell us about how power is organized in CPX and how the territory is connected to other state/class entities throughout Brazil? And how do these discourses ultimately shape knowledge of the teleferico and the state’s legitimacy with respect to its new relationship with Complexo do Alemão?

I draw on the conjunctural and relational conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 2 to highlight the relationality between “citizen” and “state” officials manifest through PAC constructions. In “favelas” and other precarious settlements, the “interface” of government includes a wide range of actors, from taxation agents, urban managers, and councilors, to resident association representatives and police, whose actions operate through various legal “extralegal” processes such as bribery, corruption, exchanging favours, clientelism, and extortion (Misse 2006; see also Telles 2009). I seek to understand how this interface between citizens and government officials is a fraughtly negotiated relationship shaped by ongoing forms of class power and historically entrenched (yet ever-transforming) ways of doing politics. To understand state relationality here requires upsetting dualisms between citizens and government officials. It also requires understanding how new capital investments coalesce around historicized class factions at the level of government procedures as well as at the scale of favela residents’ everyday actions.
The chapter is largely inductive, as I draw on relevant literature and theory throughout my discussion as it becomes pertinent to the narratives of interviewees and interlocutors and their occlusions.\textsuperscript{119} It thus reflects much of the research process itself, where literatures become germane due to the conversations and experiences one has. I believe that this more inductive methodology is important to use in this first empirically-oriented chapter, as it highlights my own experiences of engaging with and trying to make sense of the myriad community narratives with which I was confronted when I first arrived in Complexo do Alemão.

In this chapter I thus present different narratives that are told about the teleferico and PAC, from João’s advocacy efforts noted above to the perceptions of people who have been relocated for the new projects, to government officials in charge of program implementation in Complexo. I argue that Complexo residents see these projects as ongoing manifestations of a state – a condensation of class interests, in this case – not attuned to their interests. Residents’ discourses – both what is said and what is not said – comprise a regime of truth that (de)legitimates state actions and critiques resource usurpation. These actions are deemed illegitimate and, indeed, violent, as a result of the specific articulations of power regimes that operate in and through Complexo do Alemão such as clientelism, narcotraffic, and patrimonialism. These narratives, however, are also a particular form of residents’ agency: not only do they contain critiques of violent state interventions (vis-à-vis Doshi & Ranganathan), they also serve to demonstrate how residents themselves are attempting to intervene in these processes in myriad ways, from taking their own piece of the pie, so to speak, to attempting to hold the government accountable to its constitutionally-enshrined consultation mechanisms.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The two major empirical sections are based on the two aforementioned nodes around which teleferico and PAC stories tend to condense (that is,\textsuperscript{119} This chapter draws on formal interviews with government implementers of PAC projects, with teleferico managers and workers, with residents who were relocated for teleferico construction, and with Complexo activists. It is also informed by myriad informal interviews, conversations, and participant-observation that allowed me to better understand “everyday” narratives and their occlusions. In other words, I pay attention to what is said, what is actively not said, and what is hidden in both official and unofficial narratives of PAC projects. Finally, my analysis is informed by official PAC policy documents, as well as more recent revelations about state corruption presented in both Brazilian and international newspapers.)
decision-making and wealth appropriation, respectively). I present residents’ and government officials’ narratives in conversation with Brazilian literature that elucidates the ongoing forms of state/civil society power that operate in and through favelas. In the first section – focused on PAC decision-making – I discuss, in turn, contestations over: who decided to build the teleferico in Complexo and why; how consultation and participatory mechanisms were inadequate for and contested by the “average” resident; and how different political entities in Complexo (specifically resident associations and narcotraffic factions) influenced the decision-making processes. The second section – focused on narratives of money appropriation – presents narratives that target three different groups of stakeholders, and how each has reportedly done its own form of “skimming”: the large construction conglomerates recently charged with corruption, bribery, and graft scandals in the controversial Lava Jato investigation\textsuperscript{120}; the third party contractors hired by the project developers; and residents themselves. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the conjunctural politics that these narratives reveal. Here, I focus on the relationality exposed between political and civil society, the performativity of narratives that delegitimize state interventions, and the agency of residents in discursively targeting state appropriation but also in appropriating their own forms of money where possible.

\textsuperscript{120} Lava Jato, also known as “Operation Car Wash,” is a Federal Police and justice system investigation into political bribery in Brazil that began in August of 2014. The probe was initiated when Paulo Roberto Costa, the former director of Petrobras, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, was arrested for bribery and released corruption information in return for a plea bargain. He accused many of Brazil’s political elites of being involved in graft scandals. Lava Jato has allegedly “revealed” numerous kickback campaigns, in which construction firms were awarded contracts in return for financing political parties, among other actions. To date, under investigation are the last five presidents of Brazil, 155 members of Congress, and a third of the country’s cabinet ministers (Nolen & Mendonça 2017). Former Odebrecht executive Benedicto Barbosa da Silva Júnior, and Odebrecht CEO Marcelo Odebrecht, both received plea deals and released names of Rio government officials who received money for contracting the construction giant. Lava Jato is not, however, without controversy. The Brazilian group Collective Lawyers for Democratic Principles recently wrote a letter to UBC’s Allard Prize committee (which nominated Lava Jato for a prestigious award for International Integrity), saying that “You need to know that Constitutional Principles are violated daily by the Lava Jato Task Froce that are dear to us, such as the Principle of the Presumption of Innocence and the Principle of the Exercise of the Ample Right of Defense…[Lava Jato’s actions are an] affront to the fundamental rights of the Brazilian citizens, hard won after the violent and long process of civil-military dictatorship suffered by Brazil, facts that are destroying the legal order and social peace in the country, with methods proper to the dictatorships that have plagued humanity” (Pablo 2017:para 9-10). Indeed, some commentators in Brazil argue that the investigation has committed many legal and physical violations and abuses, and has favoured right wing factions in the country seeking to unseat democratic and left leaning political entities.
5.1 Narratives of Circulating Decisions

The social movements that guided Brazil’s transition from a military dictatorship to democratic governance demanded popular participation and consultation in urbanization projects (Maricato 2009). The requirement for popular participation was codified in the City Statute and realized within the Ministry of Cities, through which PAC proposals are vetted. Abiding by Ministry of Cities principles, PAC projects must “promote the autonomy, social leadership, and the development of the beneficiary population, through actions of community participation, mobilization and organization” (Ministério das Cidades 2010:19). The PAC Complexo project had a budgetary allotment and institutional support for popular participation processes: 2.5% of total investments (US$22.6 million) in the community were allocated to the new Trabalho Social/PAC Social (TS) team within the Empresa de Obras Publicas (EMOP) – the state construction company responsible for planning the PAC projects (EMOP 2014). TS had three purposes within the Complexo community: the management of impacts, sustainable development, and shared management, the last premised on participation (Oliveira 2016).121 According to official documents, TS realized participation through conducting household and business surveys of all 14 comunidades that comprised CPX in March of 2008 and, subsequently, holding meetings with civil society organizations, business owners, entrepreneurs, and neighborhood association leaders (EMOP 2014; see also EMOP Nd). The myriad governmental agencies involved in PAC implementation were also structured to prioritize resident participation. They hired territorial managers to act as mediators between residents, civil society organizations, and resident associations; and hired community members to assist with surveys and housing assessments (Oliveira 2016).

121 According to official EMOP publications, the central focus of the TS team was “community support during the period of the works, resolving issues arising from the impact of the works on [residents’] lives and, on another front, creating the conditions for sustainable development of the region and promoting actions that facilitate the access of the population to work and improving living conditions” (EMOP 2014:15-16).
5.1.1 Destabilizing Danger: Origin Stories of the Teleferico Beyond Consultation

Government officials responsible for PAC projects have at length documented their public participation efforts via official project documents. These include EMOP’s “Censo Favelas PAC” (PAC Favelas Census – Nd) and “Relatório do Plano de Desenvolvimento Sustentável do Complexo do Alemão – Caderno de Resultados” (Report of the Sustainable Development Plan of Complexo do Alemão – 2014), and the Ministério das Cidades’ (Ministry of Cities) “Urbanização de favelas: a experiência do PAC” (Urbanization of Favelas: The Experience of PAC - 2010) and “Instruções Específicas para Desenvolvimento de Trabalho Social em Intervenções de Urbanização de Assentamentos Precários” (Specific Instructions for the Development of Social Work in the Urbanization Interventions of Precarious Settlements – 2007). Notwithstanding these formal performances of consultation, not a single person I interviewed could recall being consulted about the gondola system. Indeed, despite the rhetoric of (and financial investment in) consultation, origin stories of the teleferico promulgated by residents, project implementers, and Lula himself invoke Complexo’s “danger” and troubles with narcotrafficking as inspiration for the gondola project and PAC interventions in general, rather than the community’s needs as determined through public participation.

Community members often say that the primary inspiration for the teleferico was Lula and his PT party’s agenda of introducing a highly visible infrastructural project in an “abandoned,” narcotraffic-controlled polity. João explained in our conversation:

Lula, the President, in 2005…wanted to present the [teleferico] project. He said, “No, it’s possible. We can do it there.” And he focused on Morro do Alemão because it’s a place very emblematic. Is a key place for Rio de Janeiro. Because it’s a large community in the middle of Zona Norte to Zona West and to Centro. A lot of crime was here, a lot of things happened here. Drug traffickers were hiding there. It’s a very big place. The police were afraid to enter. So let's do something here, to show to Brazil, to show to the world, that we can install the stations in a place that was demonized. So it's like to legitimize the region. When they said, "(Morro do) Alemão is the place to be" in 2006, everyone focused on trying to do something here. And the Medellin cable car was announced in 2007. When Lula announced the idea of the Medellin cable car in 2007, right? It was a year of people laughing at the enterprise. It began in 2008,
but it was announced in 2007. They said “What? Lula wants to make a cable that is going to link I don’t know what, the hill with another.” The people laughed at the idea of having the teleferico.\footnote{Interview with João, January 2014; emphasis added}

Other interviews reflected a similar incredulity after learning about the project via the television. One resident of the Alemão hill, a middle-aged man who moved to the community with his mother and aunt when he was a child, explained:

They announced on TV that President Lula would put a teleferico here. Everybody thought it was a joke, because ah, they can't do a cable between Alemão and Adeus because Alemão and Adeus were, was the enemies. How can you just, come to the hill, move people, build a station, make a cable between one hill and the other? Nah nah, it's not possible. But they started to show the Medellin stuff, people start to get used to the idea, and in three years, everything was done.\footnote{Interview with Complexo resident 15, May 2014}

Although not homogeneous, community sentiment about the teleferico is consensual that the project arrived with Lula – it was not an idea inspired by community members themselves. Indeed, as the interviewee asserts above, he first learned about the teleferico project through a television broadcast.

A high level official as EMOP, and responsible for TS in Rio, also stated that the teleferico was Lula’s project inspired by Medellin, where a gondola system was crucial in linking a previously marginalized and drug-trafficked community to the “city core.” According to this interviewee, “[the entity] that chose Alemão was the federal government, President Lula, together with the governor…because of these encounters of violence, lack of sanitation…The government chose the community because it was a community of low income, high incidence of violence, and high unemployment index. The choice was this.”\footnote{Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014} She continued to explain that Lula wanted to build the teleferico, specifically, in Complexo because of his
visit to Medellin to understand their integration – which arrived very fast, this reconnection of the territory with the formal area. It was this...[B]ecause this project today is a success in Medellin (and we already understand it as a success here, too), the state government resolved that part of the investment in Alemão should be for the construction of the cable car.\textsuperscript{125}

Hindsight would prove this statement false, however: today, the teleferico is out of commission due to its financial instability,\textsuperscript{126} and gunfights between the military police and narcotraffickers have only increased during the state government’s pacification effort.

Lula himself pointed to the novelty of attempting such a large-scale infrastructural project in a “dangerous” neighborhood in Rio. During his MCMV inauguration speech, Lula noted that “I don’t know in what moment of the history of Rio de Janeiro a president of the Republic could come to a neighborhood that is as complicated as Complexo do Alemão, to announce that the state government, the federal government, and the municipal government are making an investment here of R$832 million, almost R1 billion” (Lula da Silva 2010). “Complicated,” here, refers to criminality: Lula continues his speech by congratulating then-governor Sérgio Cabral of the PMDB for his “courage” in confronting the “delinquents of this state” through new PAC projects (see also Chapter 4.4).

Discursively positioning Complexo as a space of narcotraffic rule is crucial to PAC project legitimation. The community emerges as an object of intervention through state rhetoric of previous state abandonment – as Dilma claimed in her teleferico inauguration speech (see Rousseff 2011) – and homogeneous narcotraffic rule that can be integrated into the “formal city” through the teleferico, as was done in Medellin. In other words, rhetoric of abandonment and narcotraffic creates a justification for new forms of state intervention, and creates Complexo do Alemão as an object of knowledge that can be compared to (or interreferenced with – see Roy & Ong 2011) Medellin’s own “previously abandoned” communities in order to help legitimize the project.

\textsuperscript{125} Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014

\textsuperscript{126} Initially the gondola system, owned by the state, was managed by SuperVia, the company also responsible for the train system in Rio de Janeiro. This past year SuperVia decided not to renew its contract because it was not profiting in Complexo: most of the money circulating through the teleferico was state SETRANS money that heavily subsidized the cost of transportatation for Complexo residents and thus did not accrue profit.
Residents also invoked narcotraffic in narratives about the teleferico’s origins. Some, from their situated position within the community, did not believe that the teleferico plan was feasible due to the intricacies of violence between different factions on different hills. These narratives – both outside and within the community – consolidate the notion that the teleferico is from elsewhere. It was not the product of consultation but was what interviewees called a “highly visible”\textsuperscript{127} and “cosmetic”\textsuperscript{128} project of Lula’s, and then Dilma’s, Worker’s Government. Thus, state and community officials alike used rhetoric of narcotrafficking and state abandonment as justifications for the teleferico, rather than being the result of any consultation processes stipulated in Brazilian law and PAC documents. The constant allusion to narcotraffic also reveals a contradiction of the contemporary “urbanization” moment in Rio’s favelas: as Mariana Cavalcanti (2009) writes, the notion of danger is often mobilized (and may indeed be exaggerated) in order to justify the influx of capital and resources necessary for infrastructural development projects.

5.1.2 Corrupted Consultation: (Non)Participatory Logics

Specific processes of consultation were highly contested objects in the discussions of my interviewees. Their narratives were often underpinned by uncertainty, disbelief, and ignorance. Many residents’ whose houses had to be removed for construction of the gondola system did not necessarily know what was happening. A community journalist and vocal critic of PAC explained:

This was the big error of teleferico construction, because when the population began to see this large construction already had marks on their houses to leave…Many residents didn’t know what was going to be constructed. Only after…Because if you live in an area that no one knows that a large construction will be made. So it’s kind of like “Ok, it will be done.” But nobody asked me. So now I have to guess what to do. Or sell my home or stay with someone else.

\textsuperscript{127} Interview with Complexo resident 13, April 2014

\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Complexo resident 7, March 2014
I think they earned money to shut up and let the government do what they want.\footnote{Interview with Complexo journalist 4, March 2015}

My interviews with residents revealed a sense of \textit{ongoing} uncertainty. One young woman, who was born and raised in Complexo, explained how this uncertainty continues to shape the present:

\begin{quote}
But every time, every month there's a new map. No, they will pass here and go straight to Inhaúma. No, they will pass here and go the same way, just wider…. Oh my god. Is my house going down or not. People are still asking that.\footnote{Interview with Complexo resident 15, May 2014}
\end{quote}

When “consultation” meetings were indeed held, they often felt like unidirectional forms of communication. An older man, moved off the hill for teleferico construction, complained, “PAC came to Associations and never asked what could be done – just sent people to talk but not actually do anything.”\footnote{Interview with Complexo resident 4, January 2014} These meetings were, to one community journalist, “an agenda meeting…When you say that you are going to do something in some place,” aimed only at “community leaders” in which “the community didn’t participate.”\footnote{Interview with Complexo journalist 4, March 2015}

As these interviewees attest, participatory logics enshrined in the City Statute (see Maricato 2010) and codified in official PAC and EMOP documents were contested discursive objects. Many, if not most, residents felt that consultation, fought for by the urban social movements of the 1980s, has been hollowed out so to speak in their community. They explained to me that the teleferico construction process was a top-down initiative and pet project of Lula, rather than negotiated with the community itself. And this lack of consultation was felt in violent dispossession: people lived in a state of perpetual uncertainty about whether or not they would lose their homes (Fig 5.3 & 5.4). When consultation meetings did occur, moreover, the residents who attended felt that they were being told, in a unidirectional manner, what was happening, rather than being key stakeholders in the planning process.
João has gone to great lengths to demonstrate that the teleferico has never been the priority of community members. As I sat across from him that morning in Raízes em Movimento, listening to him explain the ongoing need to expand the roads in Complexo, he suddenly jumped up. “Have you heard about the IPEA report?” he exclaimed. IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, or Institute for Applied Economic Research) is an official research institute of the federal government. They had commissioned an evaluation of PAC projects in Complexo but, according to João, had not yet released the results because they cast the government – and the PAC project specifically – in a poor light. But, João explained, he was able to take advantage of new access to information laws in Brazil and retrieve the report, which he later emailed to me (Fig 5.5). The report documents the dissatisfaction of Complexo residents with the PAC process (see “Relatório Final” 2011). Similar to my own conversations, while many interviewees and focus group participants were ambivalent about the teleferico as a finished project – some indeed quite liked the teleferico and used it often while it was still running – the majority said that the project never should have been built in the first place. Summarizing the report, João states “the implementation of the teleferico isn’t associated with the improvement of mobility of the majority of people of Morro do Alemão...[there is] a profound dissociation between public interventions and the will of the community.”

For instance, according to multiple interviewees, the teleferico only serves people who live at the top of the favela hills, leaving 70% without easy access to the greatest PAC investment in Complexo. The will of the community, according to João, was sanitation:

The people that participated in discussions within the community to think of priorities, participation, to influence the process of urbanization, the teleferico never was a priority. The first priority was always universal basic sanitation...By universal I mean the total of the territory of Complexo do Alemão. And [universal basic sanitation] connotes a system that is connected to the network in the city and that won’t contribute to more pollution of Guanabara Bay...It’s sewage, potable water, rainwater, waste, and prevention of disease caused by vectors. This is basic sanitation.

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133 Interview with João, January 2014

134 Interview with João, January 2014
This sentiment was echoed by numerous of my own interviewees. While many of the people who were given new homes on the surrounding *asfalto* after being removed were, in general, satisfied with their new situations and with the teleferico, they were more ambiguous when I asked about the opportunity costs of the project. The number one priority for them, too, was sanitation. According to the IPEA report, US$ 72,197,421 was invested in sanitation, while the teleferico consumed US $265,164,396 of the money invested in Complexo (“Relatório Final” 2011) (Fig 5.6).

Crucially, this IPEA report is not a static object that people point to in order to simply undermine the legitimacy of PAC projects. The report itself emerges as a truth object of the consultation process, being leveraged by community members such as João to attempt to hold the government accountable to its investments. He has presented the results of the report, alongside pictures of homes that have been destroyed but not removed or replaced, to government officials in an attempt to force PAC operators back into the community to “clean up the unfinished mess”\(^\text{135}\) that teleferico construction created.

The *truth* of consultation - whether or not consultation actually occurred – is not my central concern here. Community views and discourses about popular participation are not homogeneous. However, even the minority of residents who regularly used the teleferico feel as though they were not consulted – that their community had alternate priorities. These contestations over participation and consultation are inspiring community activists such as João to utilize state laws of transparency to hold the government accountable to its earlier PAC promises. Truth objects, such as the IPEA report, and discourses of uncertainty and alternate priorities help consolidate narratives that delegitimate the consultation process outlined in official PAC documents.

\(^{135}\) Interview with João, January 2014
5.1.3 Paving Pathways: “Nefarious” Political Entities’ Contestations of Urbanization’s Geographies

These narratives of frustration over participatory logics and decision-making processes are based in material power relations. They are shaped by the myriad institutions, actors, and relations of power that have historically been embedded in, and realized through, Complexo’s territory. Bruno Coutinho de Souza Oliveira, a PhD candidate and former employee of EMOP for PAC Complexo, argues that social participation did occur in Complexo, but not within the “participatory standards” laid out by the government (Oliveira 2016). Participation was manifest through the specific social-political context of the CPX territory. This context includes a new civic arena of organizations mobilizing to exert influence, resident association leaders jockeying for legitimacy with their own constituents, and myriad political entities attempting to secure favours from the territorial managers assigned to their respective comunidade (see also Cavalcanti 2014b).

In my own interviews, it was the occlusions, silences, and “off-the-record” conversations that had the most to (sometimes not) say about public participation in this complex and contested political arena. These narratives pointed to two crucial entities that mediated government decisions with respect to PAC: the different Resident Associations that theoretically “represent” each of the different favela communities within Complexo; and narcotraffic factions.

Resident associations (RAs) arose repeatedly in my conversations about PAC. Interviewees attributed many decisions to these long-standing institutions. However, most of my interviewees and interlocutors never associated with the resident associations, attended meetings, or even knew of the projects with which they were involved. It took some time for me to understand the function of resident associations and their role in the community. My research assistant asserted, “PAC works with resident associations – they are the go-betweens, the ones who nominate people to work for PAC.”

136 A widely respected community photojournalist and confidante explained at greater length:

136 Interview with Andre, February 2014
They are simply representatives of each community, of the region, of the locality. Now they are the direct intermediary with the Municipality, the government, the state, these services that are very bureaucratic. They have meetings with residents, yes? It’s true. Hold meetings to let the residents know what is happening, but very few do this. They do this type of process in order to know what the community needs, necessities or services…But with time this has been degraded. Now almost none of this happens. They are not representatives. It’s only a figurative institution… [Government workers] never directly contact the resident, always the president of the association of residents. It’s kind of a sub-prefecture in the favela. It’s a symbol that the government comes and contacts and says “Hey, you guys! I am going to pass this to the community, to the favela.” But everything that comes is closed.137

Interlocutors told multiple stories of how a PAC-paved path or a road would deviate unexpectedly from its straight course because a “leader” or “association president” had exercised his or her power in the decision making process, re-ordering the path to suit his or her interests and needs (Fig 5.7). Early in my visit a young man, previously hired by the government to conduct a preparatory census of the community, described one such event: “So uh, in Alemão, you, you can see if you walk in Alemão there's places that the PAC passed…[B]ut sometimes you see the paths they change. Why there's no path here? If you go to the right, somebody used the path for his own village.”138

The EMOP official who was closely affiliated with TS, and thus responsible for organizing the community consultations, would not afford this much power to the resident associations. She explained the multiple actors involved in the decision-making process: “it’s very difficult…but we now work not only through the association but also with the leaders that are leaders of the ‘normal’ community, natural, that do their work…[and] the NGOs.” She conceded, however, that “the associations are always present. They want to be present.”139

137 Interview with Complexo journalist 2, May 2014; emphasis added
138 Interview with Complexo resident 2, January 2014
139 Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Resident associations have long been important facets of favela politics in Rio de Janeiro. As described in Chapter 3.1.2, resident associations organized through the 1960s to represent the interests of favela inhabitants in a political climate of neglect, exploitation and clientelism. They were fundamental mediators of state projects in “informal” precarious settlements and fought for government policy that targeted their communities’ needs (Leeds 1996). The resident association movement was reacting to regimes of clientelist governance. Historically, elites within favela territory entered “symbiotic relationships” with state officials through the exchange of votes for favours – referred to in Brazil as “water spigot politics” (Fischer 2008, 2014). Water spigot politics is a form of clientelism that instrumentalized personal loyalty for electoral purposes based on asymmetrical relationships between a local political machine and a favela community (Oliveira 2016; Zaluar 1997). For example, a local political boss would negotiate with a politician for a small favour – such as a water spigot – in exchange for votes in the territory that he/she “managed.” These were patrimonial relationships that fostered dependency of favelas on politicians around election time (Gay 1994; Leeds 1996). Favela federations tried to eliminate these relationships and fought for larger scale, more concerted favela policies in the 1960s, but authoritarian regimes – particularly Chagas Freitas of the 1970s – reconsolidated clientelism (Fischer 2008; Leeds 1996). Thus, over time, resident association leaders became closely entwined with local politicians or local bosses who attempted to secure or maintain political power through vote-buying or exchange. Now, according to Elizabeth Leeds (1996:74, emphasis in original), “‘política de bica d’água’ (politics of the water tap) has been re-created at the end of the twentieth century on a larger scale, by politicians running for office as well as by incumbents wishing to retain electoral support.” With the larger-scale state investment of PAC – and the Ministry of Cities guidelines for “popular participation” – resident associations have re-emerged as a crucial mediating actor for the resources entering the community. They are currently attempting to perform their legitimacy to represent constituents and grapple for leadership with other community organizations such as local NGOs (Cavalcanti 2014b).

140 Here, a political machine is “the organization that is based on power of attracting material compensation/rewards" that includes access to “jobs and positions in the public service by manipulating the political influence of party leaders and cadres, obtaining privileges of different types, from contracts to supply government agencies with goods and services, to maximize the ability to realize particular business opportunities through political contacts and influence peddling…to the business circle, the political head provides privileges and opportunities special that allow immediate economic gains” (Diniz 1982, 27-28 quoted in Oliveira 2016).
PAC, a large-scale infrastructural program with many investments directed at favela urbanization, is quite distinct from the small-scale favours that were negotiated through earlier clientelist relationships. Yet these long-standing political channels, according to some residents and scholars, continue to mediate capital influxes and decision-making associated with PAC projects. PAC Complexo, as explained by one-time employee and PhD candidate Oliveira, functioned through a “patron-client relationship” as state officials hired territorial managers – acting in the remit of Trabalho Social – to mediate requests for employment, food, and clothing. Through these hiring practices, “the relation that is established – sometimes more covertly, sometimes quite explicitly – is the exchange of favors, of negotiations for direct demands” (Oliveira 2016:102). One of these demands was for jobs with the third party contractors hired by the consortium responsible for PAC Complexo, Rio Melhor. Resident associations were responsible for “vetting” job applications, and would reportedly advise the local public manager on whom to hire.\footnote{Interview with teleferico worker 3, April 2014} Oliveira (2016:105) argues that the elections of 2010 had a marked impact on this process, as the “personalized relationships between government and community” strengthened the “local party machine in the region” and helped reelect Sérgio Cabral of the PMDB – the party that has historically been responsible for fomenting clientelist relations in Rio de Janeiro.

In many narratives of PAC-related decision-making, narcotrafficker power is articulated to the clientelist relationships of resident associations. While the EMOP official argued that, in the past, narcotraffickers have had a “much larger presence”\footnote{Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014} in resident associations – a point the literature corroborates – a Brazilian colleague of hers asserted that consultation is very difficult in Complexo because the resident associations are “controlled by traffickers.”\footnote{Interview with former World Bank official, March 2014} According to Brazilian scholarship, the relationship between resident associations and narcotraffickers can be traced back three decades. With trade liberalization in the 1980s there was increasing presence of narcotraffic factions in Brazilian favelas (Leeds 1996). These factions exerted force through resident associations, fomenting the
gradual erosion of the latter’s autonomy (Leeds 1996) and the erasure of public participation in the allocation of goods and services (Zaluar 1997). During the 1980s and 90s, many elected resident association leaders found themselves in a difficult position, having to negotiate the increased influence (and violence) of narcotraffickers – some ceding control, others standing ground (and often being killed) (Leeds 1996). Still others would leave the community for NGOs and the state “where they find some leeway to politically impact daily life in the favela, but that does not place them in direct interactions with the drug trade” (Cavalcanti 2014b:106). Gradually, the presence of narcotraffickers re-shaped relationships of clientelism into what Enrique Desmond Arias (2006b) calls neo-clientelism (not to be confused with Zaluar’s neoclientelism – see Chapter 3.2.2). In this new configuration, “through brokers, traffickers augment their resources for patronage in favelas by negotiating among a number of outside political patrons during each election cycle” (Arias 2006b:429). According to Arias, they have a “captive” clientele in the communities that they rule – sometimes alongside, sometimes within resident associations – and have thus been significant mediators of resources into and out of some carioca favelas over the last three decades.

It is important to note that not all resident associations are ruled by narcotraffickers, but RAs are often associated with illicit and/or “nefarious” activity. According to Mariana Cavalcanti, “The general sense is that from the 1990s onwards, residents’ associations lost their legitimacy in the eyes of their alleged constituents” (Cavalcanti 2014b:106-107). Indeed, I encountered numerous difficulties in speaking with Resident Association representatives. When I initially attempted to line up interviews through B55, I was repeatedly told that the RAs “wouldn’t have anything interesting or relevant” to say to me. It was only after a month of evasions that an associate, finally frustrated with my repeated questions during a B55 meeting, exclaimed “they are dangerous! You shouldn’t talk to them” – bringing to the fore my own ignorance and arrogance. She pulled me aside after the meeting and explained, in gentler tones, that if people saw me speaking with the resident associations it could put B55 at risk and undermine their constructed “independent” status in the community. She did not say that narcotraffickers controlled the local RA, but only implied that they were involved in illicit activities. Although it would have been beneficial for my research to have spoken with
the RAs, the independence and safety of my host organization had to be top priority in this research. I did not interview the RAs.

Complexo community leaders also ascribed considerable PAC decision-making agency (or force) to narcotraffickers operating outside the purview of/isolated from resident associations. According to one interviewee, at community “consultation” meetings the PAC representative would say: “This is what we are going to do. This and this and this.’ but ‘Ah, but we can’t there because there is a bandido’.”144 When I asked a vocal community leader involved in similar meetings about how paving and sanitation decisions were made, she motioned for me to turn off the tape recorder. She explained, off the record, that PAC was supposed to pave a road lined with houses on which sewage gathers, but that the “bandidos” would not agree because they prefer narrow alleys that are better for “clandestine” activities. Thus, according to this interviewee, the project never materialized. In these particular narratives, narcotraffickers are less involved in skimming off resources, that is, neoclientelism (Arias 2006b), than in attempting to maintain the political and physical geographic status quo for their own ends.

What these narratives of Complexo residents demonstrate is that resident associations and narcotraffic factions continue to coalesce as nefarious within Complexo discourse, being entities to which failures, disappearances, and inequality are assigned. Resident associations in particular emerge as institutions that continue to be illegitimate representatives of favela residents’ interests because they now act as merely a figurehead in the community and are too dangerous to associate with. The occlusions, silences, and “off the record” conversations that point to these political entities are vital to understanding how politics is organized in Complexo. Whether or not narcotraffic factions and other seemingly “illicit” characters are actually involved in decision-making capacities, these narratives demonstrate that the life worlds of Complexo are still influenced by discourses and practices of illicit rule. Narratives that invoke these entities – directly or obliquely – have a performative effect: they undermine the actions of state officials disseminating PAC projects, bringing into question the interests that these new investments serve. These illegitimate processes of participation reflect back

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144 Interview with Complexo journalist 4, March 2015
on PAC as a larger political project: “the mechanisms of political participation that underpin projects like the PAC remain hostage to local power structures” (Cavalcanti 2014b:108) which have been, crucially, fomented over decades of state-society relations through practices of clientelism, as but one example. “Corruption talk” (Doshi & Ranganathan 2016) here emerges as a political contestation that points to these historical structures and relations of power that are being reconfigured and re-articulated through large-scale infrastructural projects.

5.2 Narratives of Circulating Capital

Heterogeneous community narratives also point to PAC projects as influxes of capital and resources that are shaped and directed by different forms of “corrupt” practices. According to interviewees, the federal project has represented myriad ways for diverse actors to make or appropriate money, from the woman who builds an extra floor on her house in the hope that the state will buy it from her, to large construction companies who secure bids through bribes. As a central community interlocutor explained to me, “in 2008, 2009 it was a lot of money invested here. And so much money invested that the corruption came out. Even here in the hill, uh, every person who put the hand on the money, to make directions for the money, put something in their own pockets.”145 My initial intention to “follow this money,” so to speak, was impossible: narratives of politicians, PAC employees, community leaders, and residents pointed in multiple directions. This largely became, then, a story of missing money, skimmed money, re-diverted money, fictitious money, and people trying to make money by myriad means. I explore these narratives – and the power relations to which they allude – at greater length in this section. The following is organized around the political “knots” in residents’, government officials’ and media’s narratives of “corruption” and “money skimming,” or the three political entities around which discourses condense: national construction companies and development consortia, third party contractors, and residents themselves.

145 Interview with Complexo resident 5, February 2014
5.2.1 Construction Conglomerates

Rumours in Complexo suggested that it was the large construction conglomerates that siphoned off the greatest sums of money designated for PAC-related projects – the teleferico, in particular. As João pointed out at the start of this chapter, PAC to him has been “a project of urbanization much more electoral, so that it can create money for the contractors that earn the money who aren’t actually doing the work.” When João speaks of PAC as “creat[ing] money for the contractors,” he could be variously referring to reported patrimonial relationships of third party contractors or between construction conglomerates and the state. The latter of these relationships – between construction conglomerates and the state – is, according to popular discourse at the present conjuncture, manifest through the large construction companies that comprise the consortium Rio Melhor. This consortium was formed by a partnership between Odebrecht, OAS, and Delta, three of the “big sisters” of construction firms in Brazil (see Chapter 3.2.1). Rio Melhor “won” the public bid for PAC Complexo do Alemão. Its constituent firms, alongside Anderade Gutierrez (responsible for PAC Manguinhos) and Queiroz Galvão (PAC Rocinha) have all been accused in the controversial Lava Jato investigation of forming a cartel within Petrobas. Odebrecht, specifically, has long been a major “donator” to the PMDB, the party holding power in Rio’s state government for most of the PAC era, and thus responsible for organizing many of the program’s projects (see Chapter 3.2.1).

João’s statements anticipate any formal investigation into the construction companies’ work in PAC Complexo do Alemão. At that time of interview, officials with EMOP asserted that:

> these companies win the bid to do the works. It’s a public bidding. [It] wasn’t only Odebrecht in Alemão, it was Odebrecht with SA Delta, three companies, creating a consortium to make a better proposal. To realize the works there... And every community has a public bid, open, international, companies from other areas of the world can come, too.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Despite these statements, rumours circulated in popular media as to alleged collusion between the construction firms of PAC Complexo, PAC Manguinhos, and PAC Rocinha. At this current juncture, João’s statements have been reinforced by state-level “official” investigations. In January of 2016 the Federal Police launched a bribery investigation into Odebrecht for its bidding on PAC projects. On 27 September 2016 the federal police reported that Odebrecht paid bribes for at least eight PAC projects, including the teleferico in Complexo do Alemão. In April, 2017, the incarcerated former president of Odebrecht, Benedicto Júnior, has testified against PMDB Rio governors Sérgio Cabral and Luiz Fernando Pezão in the Lava Jato investigation in exchange for a lighter prison sentence. He has asserted that Odebrecht indeed paid the PMDB electoral campaigns R$120 million in exchange for the PAC Complexo do Alemão contract (among others). Whether or not these Lava Jato allegations are true, they contribute to a discursive context that delegitimates state and construction companies’ actions.

These framings of “corruption” by both organizers and Lava Jato point to a conjuncturally-specific form of what Alba Zaluar (1997) calls “neoclientelism” (distinct from Arias’s aforementioned narcotraffic neoclientelism). In this codification of neoclientelism, PAC investments in places like Complexo are realized through patrimonial relationships between representatives of the politically-aligned national PT and state and municipal PMDB, and large national construction companies (often family-owned, elite actors who gained power through the military dictatorship – see Chapter 3.2). These investments are also dependent on high levels of borrowing financialized capital from domestic sources. These discourses of elite corruption maintain that neodevelopmentalist clientelism has resulted in significant state resources appropriated by elite construction firms like Odebrecht.

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147 Sérgio Cabral (ex-governor of Rio), was investigated by Lava Jato for corruption and money laundering, and in June 2017 was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. According to the lead judge, Sergio Moro, the former governor systematically collected a percentage of all public works bribes in the state of Rio. In total, Cabral is reported to have received R$220 million in state construction company kickbacks, with R$6 million in bribes for PAC-Complexo do Alemão. Officials are also reportedly investigating former mayor Eduardo Paes for his role in 2016 Olympic Games kickbacks. According to reports in April of 2017, Lava Jato is investigating Paes for receiving over R$15 million from Odebrecht. Again, however, the Lava Jato investigation is itself fraught and contested: it has not necessarily revealed a “truth” to money appropriation, and operates within a right-wing political climate.
Whether or not the Lava Jato allegations are true, the narratives of corruption surrounding Rio Melhor position the teleferico as a highly contested object that is increasingly seen by community members as representative of corrupt state and contractor practices. Popular media, judiciary investigations and discussions in Complexo about the corrupt practices of these construction companies are productive: they further delegitimate the state project of the teleferico construction and management.

5.2.2 Third Party Contractors

Rio Melhor hired third parties to construct specific PAC-Alemão projects in CPX. Because one principle/axis of PAC is committed to hiring from within the community (EMOP 2014) many of these third parties were based in Complexo or had connections to the resident associations with which Rio Melhor representatives conversed (Oliveira 2016). A woman who had previously run for the Nova Brasília Resident Association – and lost – explained that PAC invested a lot of money into the community, funds which were divided among many people, often via these third party contractors. She had tried to investigate where the money had flowed but it was like “working in a void. The cost of the teleferico increased dramatically because people kept pocketing the money – ‘this is more expensive now, need more employees.’”¹⁴⁸ She ironically referred to this skimming as “cultura brasileira.” A local journalist described this as “embezzlement,” in which “all the money left. No one knew where it went.”¹⁴⁹

In explaining Complexo politics to me, one central interlocutor stated, “there is no construction without some deviation – always someone will charge materials, employees, etc, to make more money. For example, they will charge R$300 for 10 brooms – they don’t ask for what they need, just ask for money.” He continued, “They [the RA leaders], sometimes they are like really corrupt, just thinking about getting money from the thing. Sometimes they are just like, uh, I want to earn something for myself because these guys can come so

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Complexo resident 7, March 2014
¹⁴⁹ Interview with Complexo journalist 3, June 2014
According to this one interviewee, “The construction people, the engineers and stuff, the workers” were all trying to get hands on the money that was being invested in the community. Always quick with a metaphor, he compared these actions to the “mafia” in the United States.

5.2.3 Residents

Residents of CPX often pointed to themselves and their neighbours as people who were trying to make some money via these projects. This money would come from the state government, for instance, when it bought houses that needed to be removed for construction of the teleferico. Juliana, a community member hired by EMOP, accompanied state officials to help assess the various houses slated for removal. After assessment, residents were offered a Minha Casa, Minha Vida (MCMV) house, a chit designated specifically for buying a new house, or cash. While many people were satisfied with their relocations, Juliana expressed frustration at the tendency for some residents to complain about the initial offer, secure a reassessment, and then spend the money on things other than a house. In her narrative, some people would buy “new cheap houses…after getting lots of money and now [the houses] are going down because of rain.”151 Additionally, many rumours circulate about residents who have added additional floors to their homes in the hopes that government officials will “return” and buy their houses at increased value. While many interviewees wanted to stay in the community because of their community ties to the hill – a finding corroborated by the IPEA report – many also have seen PAC as a way to make some money out of their house, which they can use to buy a place on the nearby asfalto – maintaining community ties but moving off the morro (see also Cavalcanti 2014a). However, a perpetual state of uncertainty characterizes these desires and rumours, as people in the community do not know if and when the government will “come back” for more construction.

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150 Interview with Complexo resident 5, February 2014; emphasis added

151 Interview with Complexo resident 14, April 2014
Residents and local workers also found ways to earn money from the new employment generated by the teleferico and other PAC projects. Some were hired directly by SuperVia to operate the gondola, for instance (although not always in transparent fashion). But the teleferico also provided a new site of tourism through which people were able to take advantage of the influx of visitors’ dollars. One former tour company employee, also a resident of Complexo, invoked “corruption,” specifically, to explain his own attempts at appropriating money: “Even me, I was kind of corrupt when I would work, because, not because I was corrupt, I…sometimes you have some ideas.” His “corruption” was as follows: the state government subsidized teleferico tickets for residents (who paid R$0 for two daily trips on the teleferico, and could buy a card for added trips at R$1 each), while tourists and people without CFPs had to pay R$5 per ticket. He explained:

> When this R$5 ticket was announced, I told them “Hey, people…we have a card with just one real. So if we can pay for them, like one, and they pay five, we can get four reais from everyone. We can do that… [If] they come with us they will pay 10 but they will be paying like 2 and we will be getting 8 from them.” It's not a very fair idea…So, I proposed that thing. Let's use the card for these people…to allow them to have a cheaper trip to the teleferico and we get paid from that. In a very fair way.

His contradictory statements – oscillating between calling himself “corrupt” and “not corrupt,” between being “fair” and “not fair,” reveal the constant negotiations of licit/illicit practices that low-income favela residents make. They negotiate these discursive objects of “corruption,” though, in ways that also expose their class position: they are trying to reap quite small rewards from the new influx of resources brought by urbanization programs, while they have been largely ignored in the consultation processes of said programs. This former tour company employee, in particular, highlights the contested way that “corruption” is defined – he is searching for a term that captures what he thinks is fair (making a small amount of money in relation to the tourists’ comparatively large pockets and the construction companies’ large – and reportedly bribery fueled – development contracts), while the practice admittedly sits beyond what might be considered “fair” or condoned by the state government, or written into the regulations of the subsidized teleferico cards.

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152 Interview with former tour operator 2, March 2015
Interviewees’ discussion of “embezzlement” and the “disappearance” of money points to the myriad scales at which capital is flowing, and the myriad actors believed to be involved in this process of skimming – from the $R4 profit of the local tour guide to the multimillion real bribes of large construction conglomerates that finance electoral campaigns. “Corruption,” here, is a contested term that is being used by almost all actors throughout Brazil but in very different ways that reveal diverse class positions and forms of power relations. It points to long-standing and elite patrimonial relations within the state, as well as to residents’ own efforts to appropriate very small amounts of money that are not necessarily earned in a “licit” manner. Crucially, this latter use of “corruption” points to a distinctive form of agency on behalf of Complexo residents: they not only call large construction corporations corrupt, but also indicate their own efforts to appropriate money at far lesser amounts.

5.3 Articulating Narratives

This chapter has been organized around the narratives that residents and government officials tell about PAC investments and developments in Complexo do Alemão. I have focused on two dominant themes that emerged from my interviews: forms of decision-making (or lack thereof); and forms of corruption and resource appropriation. I think of these narratives in terms of Stuart Halls’ dual notion of articulation: that the narratives themselves are enunciations that create, or intervene in, specific forms of discursive power; and that they indicate the joining together and transformation of historically embedded systems of class power. I explain each at greater length below.

5.3.1 Articulation, Take One

Narratives of the teleferico and other PAC infrastructures are productive: they shape what the teleferico means to people in their everyday lives, and they shape how residents understand their relationship with the state in this era of large-scale “upgrading.” In the dominant discourses discussed above, PAC infrastructural projects emerge in a few different ways. They represent a highly suspect decision-making process, from the teleferico as a highly
visible project imposed by Lula; to the paving of streets at the discretion of illegitimate resident association leaders; to the non-pavement of alleys under the violent threats of narcotraffickers. The projects also represent a new, large-scale influx of resources and thus a way for actors at all scales to make money through sometimes illicit means. Finally, and consistent with Doshi & Ranganathan (2016), the infrastructures represent to many community members corrupt state and elite practices, and precipitate a moral critique of the state and its decision-making mechanisms and financial relationships. Interviewees did at times speak favourably of the PT – being one of the first political parties with a large-scale, visceral presence in the community. Yet when speaking of corruption, they often equated the Workers’ Party with “the state,” accusing it of bribery and vote scandals like the party’s predecessors in power.

Central to my interviewees was how money appropriation and decision-making contestations occur at a variety of inter-related scales. While Doshi & Ranganathan focused on residents’ and organizers’ moral narrativizing of elite resource usurpation, this chapter has also introduced a new layer or scale of theorizing: residents point to one another as people who are appropriating money if and when they can. However, the ways they talk about appropriating money expose the class distinctions in “corruption”: that, indeed, their own efforts of reaping R$4, or building another floor on their houses in case the state “comes back,” is an understandable (and perhaps “not corrupt”) form of illicit practice, in light of national elites’ own bribery and vote-buying schemes. In other words, they themselves constantly grapple with adequate terms to codify this form of wealth usurpation, given that their class status destabilizes any straightforward association with national elites’ reported corrupt practices. Many residents’ attempts to make money in ways that traverse licit/illicit logics may even be understood as a form of agency, rooted in their relatively impoverished class position.

The effect of these narratives is to delegitimate PAC projects – and thus the state in general – in the eyes of many Complexo residents. These narratives are thus inherently political. They intervene in the state’s official discourses of consultation and public bidding, and they attempt to hold the state accountable for failing to abide by constitutionally-enshrined rights
to participation. These narratives, of course, are formed by political – and politicized – beings: from the local social media journalist posting consultation meetings to Facebook, to neighbours complaining about their unpaved road while riding the teleferico, to activists heading to Brasília with the IPEA report, residents are active, and are critical of corruption long before official audits or Lava Jato-esque investigations are launched.

5.3.2 Articulation, Take Two

Residents’ narratives do not simply evoke a homogenous “state”; rather, they call attention to ever-shifting power relationships between residents, community leaders, activists, resident associations, narcotraffic factions, local contractors, construction companies, and government officials. Thus, while interviewees are indeed making a moral critique of elite resource usurpation, they do so in ways that point to the conjunctural and contested nature of how power operates in Complexo. Residents point to the favela territory (and attempts at “re-territorializations” through PAC infrastructural projects) as being an “arena of negotiations” (Telles 2010), or a contested state/civil society interface imbued with class power. Here, relationships of clientelism, patrimonialism and bribery are not couched as new, nor are they traditional in any “backward” or “historical” sense; instead, they are understood as the result of centuries of elite class rule in Brazil that is constantly being reconfigured through the Worker’s Party’s (former) coalition government, through an increased reliance on financialized capital, and through an international financial crisis that has propelled a favela-friendly federal government to invest significant money in infrastructural upgrades. Patrimonial and clientelist relations are thus shifting within this new political arena and conjuncture. Patrimonialism is believed to operate as large construction companies “win” public bids held by the parties they recently financed into power, while PAC’s new local territorial managers help secure votes for the municipal and state PMDB parties. Clientelism has been reconfigured, too, as narcotraffic power has become articulated to and through the local resident associations, and as a new arena of NGOs and community organizations all attempt to jockey for position in decision-making processes.
Conjunctural politics and the relationality of favelas (specifically the territorialization of the state/civil society interface) have been central to my analysis. Interviewees’ own narratives demonstrate that “state” and “citizen” are not necessarily useful categories for understanding corruption or the flow of money; rather, they point to the constantly shifting relations between, inter alia, government officials, contractors, residents, and association leaders that take shape through clientelist politics, through narcotraffic rule, through variable class interests. This chapter has demonstrated that analysis of geographically-specific forms of “urbanization” and “upgrading” must account for the historically- and territorially-embedded forms of articulated power that are constantly renegotiated and reconfigured.

Finally, hinted at in this chapter is how the hegemony of upgrading projects – and the PT governance regime – has been a contested and negotiated process in Complexo. For instance, some, but certainly not all, residents have looked upon the teleferico (while it was still operational) as a welcome form of state presence. As indicated, many residents thought the teleferico was a positive intervention, despite the lack of consultation and the project’s opportunity cost. They were, indeed, happy to be receiving something from the state, even if it was not what was desired or needed (such as sanitation). But, again, many also contest this project, from activists like João to community journalists, who are not content to settle with a state presence that continues to privilege historically-embedded elite rule and ignore the voices of many Complexo residents.
5.4 Figures for Chapter 5

Figure 5.1 Teleferico and concrete. Photo taken 30 Mar 2015 by author.

Figure 5.2 Teleferico inauguration plaque. Photo taken 25 Jan 2014 by author.

Figure 5.3 Remains of PAC-demolished homes. Photo taken 14 Feb 2014 by author.
Figure 5.4 Houses demolished for teleferico post. Photo taken 11 Feb 2014 by author.

Figure 5.6 New drainage being installed on Adeus. I captured this project being built on a return trip to Complexo in 2015, five years after the construction of the teleferico. Photo taken 24 Mar 2015 by author.

Figure 5.5 IPEA report. Photo taken 7 Feb 2014 by author.

Figure 5.7 New PAC-funded paved alleyway in CPX. Photo taken 14 Feb 2014 by author.
Chapter 6: PACification through (Subversive) Formalization

PAC, pacification, and upgrading are supposedly inclusionary projects. The general purpose of PAC Urbanization investments is touted as “overcoming the precarious conditions of the chosen settlements, incorporating them into the formal city” (Ministério das Cidades 2010:9). The purpose of PAC-Alemão, specifically, is “to integrate Complexo do Alemão into the formal city” (“Relatório Final” 2011) and “city life” (EMOP 2014:10) and “to improve the conditions of housing, access, and mobility, consolidating the presence of the State with the offering of essential public services” (“Relatório Final” 2011). The Ministry of Cities, responsible for creating PAC Urbanization policy, describes precarious settlements as being historically produced in an “informal manner” through a “disordered form” of “autoconstruction.” Integration, then, is meant to “leave behind this long period of economic and social decline” (EMOP 2014:10).

Rio+Social, formerly the UPP Social program, is also inclined towards a similar goal: “The implantation of the Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio's favelas are transforming the city, ensuring security and freedom and opening new opportunities for thousands of Cariocas. After decades, the challenge of Rio de Janeiro is now to promote urban, economic and social development of the pacified areas to realize full integration of the city” (Governo RJ Nd). The World Bank, which helped fund UPP Social and its current iteration of Rio+Social, believes that a primary goal of the pacification program is for “integration of favela residents into the rest of the city and the restoration of their citizenship” (World Bank 2012:16; in Freeman 2014:32)

This integration is codified, in part, as increased state presence in these formerly “abandoned” spaces. As former president and PAC2 designer Dilma asserts,

Brazil has had a habit of condemning a part of the population to abandonment, to the maximum negligence and to not have the right to any of the major public services. What we are doing here today is, above all, making the Brazilian state assume its role to spend resources on those with the most need, because they were abandoned for years and years. (Rousseff 2011:para 7)
These precarious settlements, according to official state policy, are thus not a part of the formal city; they are, indeed, the informal city, and need to be integrated through state-led formalization efforts.

In the 2000s Brazil has faced a conjunctural moment of transition in which formalization of previously informalized spaces has become politically and economically productive. In light of the 2008 global financial crisis and the country’s focus on economic growth, the state has focused, in part, on expanding the formal market frontier to heretofore marginalized actors and forms of labour. This expansion has occurred through the Worker’s Party government’s focus on increasing consumption: Brazil’s recent growth of the middle class, and the decrease in absolute poverty rates, have been the result of a government-oriented focus on consumption through the expansion of credit and cash transfers, often to favela residents (Whitener 2016). The PT has also attempted to stimulate growth (or prevent recession) through, inter alia, the PAC project’s focus on \textit{in situ} favela upgrading via neodevelopmentalist means. As a result, a new formalized market frontier has found its way to previously “informalized” (or non state-recognized) spheres and places such as Rio’s favelas. PAC, here, has been involved in enrolling people in mortgages offered by Caixa Economica Federal (CEF), formalizing property and employment, extending microcredit, and increasing contributions to the worker’s pension fund, FGTS.

The conjunctural moment is also characterized by violence of the narcotrade. With favelas as loci of narcotraffic exchange, and as spaces where middle-level gang members “hide,” these areas could not be easily entered by construction companies building infrastructure and banks bestowing credit. Moreover, the violence and insecurity caused by the trade proved problematic for the federal, state, and municipal governments when Rio was vying for the Pan Am Games, the Olympic Games, and when the federal government was attempting to win the bid for the FIFA World Cup. Rio’s city strategy of trying to attract international investment through hosting mega events, articulated to Rio state’s strategy of a militarized approach to crime, resulted in the Police Pacification Unit Program (Gomes & Burlamaqui 2016; see Chapters 3.3 & 4.3.2). But the program is not simply meant to securitize areas for
the mega events or for PAC-related constructions. It has also been a central apparatus in its own right for extending the formal market frontier, through UPP Social (now Rio+Social). The program is a collaborative effort between the Rio municipality and UN-HABITAT, partly funded by a grant from the World Bank and carioca (former) billionaire Eike Batiste, that has brought myriad NGOs and private companies into pacified favelas through their (militarized) public-private partnerships with entities such as: SindRio (a syndicate of hotels, bars, and restaurants); Viva Rio (an NGO offering courses in journalism and photography); Pro-Natura Brasil (an NGO specialized in constructing “sustainable economic development”); Coca-Cola (the corporation offering “Coca-Cola Rooms” for training youth in retail); and Shell (the oil giant focusing on the so-called “green” reform of football fields) (Rio+Social 2016).

“Formalization,” here, is shaped by global financial capital flows, in which nationalized, internationalized, and globalized states, banks, the NGO sector, and corporations attempt to expand the government-recognized market. In her book Poverty Capital, Ananya Roy argues that informality has been conceived as a “market frontier” of what she calls “bottom billion capitalism.” To Roy, bottom billion capitalism is “a set of dispersed but coherent efforts to construct, and make productive, a global economy where the world’s bottom billion – the billion or so people living under conditions of poverty – are integrated into circuits of capital accumulation” (Roy 2015:821; see also Telles 2015). This form of capitalism depends upon a formal/informal distinction: it involves “formalizing” practices and modes of labour that were heretofore considered informal by the state. Microcredit schemes are a central project of bottom billion capitalism, in which small loans are given to people (often women) of low income to stimulate formally-recognized (in this case, state- and bank-recognized) entrepreneurial activity. While microcredit schemes proliferate across the globe (indeed, one could say they are a global phenomenon), they are not socio-spatially universal: they take specific form as a function of a country’s conjuncture. Thus, in Brazil, the extension of microcredit, mortgages, and formal labour/land recognitions is indelibly shaped by the country’s reliance on the Worker’s Pension Fund (FGTS); by its consumer credit orientation to economic growth (Whitener 2016); by its neodevelopmentalist infrastructure agenda; and by its militarized approach to managing the narcotrade. The tensions and contradictions
inherent to these market formalization projects are, too, a function of the conjuncturally-specific historical power relations that have shaped the present-day targets of these schemes, such as Complexo do Alemão.

In this chapter, I delve more deeply into conjuncturally-specific logics and processes of formalization in Complexo do Alemão. As indicated above, the state deploys a notion of “informality” as state absence – and as an inherent condition of favelas – for state-centred formalization processes that advance a capitalist (in this case, neodevelopmentalist, consumer, and financialized) market frontier. I pay particular attention to the formalization of land, labour, and behavior, and how each is appropriated into capital circuits but also exceeds accumulation impulses. In this chapter I draw on two primary points of articulation: how both PAC and pacification are articulated, or overlap, in the pursuit of market formalization; and how these programs also exceed market-opening, articulating axes of coloniality that include market formalization alongside modernizing and civilizing impulses. I argue that, ultimately, these new state tactics are underpinned by historical forces that have made present-day formalization efforts contradictory and tension-fuelled. As such, both political and civil society actors constantly negotiate a formal/informal divide through their everyday actions. In this context, residents themselves are trying to formalize and re-make diverse forms of property and behavior through processes of what I call subversive formalization.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First I outline recent debates on formality and informality as articulated by postcolonial theorists and theorists of/from Brazil. I then turn to the matrix of coloniality, and, inspired by modernity/coloniality scholars, discuss how the formal/informal dichotomy is not employed just for capital accumulation logics, but also to civilize and modernize behaviours and asfalto ways of being. The following three sections empirically detail three different modes of formalization precipitated by PAC and pacification: formalizing property, formalizing employment, and formalizing behavior. I end each empirical section with a vignette, or scene, that demonstrates the always-contested nature of these formalization processes. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of the contradictory and conjunctural politics of formalization in Complexo do Alemão, and argue for taking seriously subversive formalization, precipitated by residents
(sometimes alongside, sometimes at odds with state actors), that is characterized by ongoing entanglements across the formal/informal, *asfalto/morro* divide.

### 6.1 Post and Decolonial Approaches to Formality/Informality

Post and decolonial approaches to informality are concerned with troubling the binary between “formal” and “informal” spaces and actions. Informality in this postcolonial vein refers not to an ontological territorialization, but to a “socio-spatial logic” (Roy 2015) or “organizing urban logic” (AlSayyad & Roy 2004:5). This logic structures the constant negotiation of the legal/illegal border where state actors, the elite, or other governmental actors can follow or suspend the law according to their own interests (Roy 2005). Drawing on Ananya Roy, Vera da Silva Telles, Colin McFarlane, and Gabriel Feltran, I conceive of “informality” as a heuristic that foregrounds three different concerns: territorial practices of state power that produce informality; the violence that often characterizes the negotiations between formality and informality; and informality/formality as a performative distinction. I detail each below. I then discuss how modernity/coloniality scholars contribute to an understanding of the informal/formal divide, by pointing to its origins in modernity and its civilizing impulses.

Formality and informality are created through processes and practices of state or political society recognitions. Thus notions of informality depend upon an (often implied) notion of the state, or governmental apparatus, and its centrality in creating new legalities and illegalities. Urban informality here is:

> best understood as a heuristic device that makes possible an analysis of the territorial practices of state power… The formal and the legal are perhaps better understood as fictions, as moments of fixture in otherwise volatile, ambiguous, and uncertain systems of spatial regulation… It is of course the state that determines what is informal and what is not, thereby generating an uneven geography of spatial value. (Roy 2015:820)

Informality is thus “produced by the state itself” (Roy 2005:149) rather than being an ontological condition existing outside of the state. Similarly, with respect to Brazil, Raquel
Rolnik argues, “if it is true that there is a lack of public goods, services and social facilities in informal settlements, these settlements are only created within and because of state presence” (Rolnik 2011:245). While some of this literature evokes a homogeneous state entity, Roy emphasizes that the state here is an apparatus of governmentality, or governmental power, that may include NGOs, local elites, transnational banks, and professional architects, among myriad actors in so-called “civil society” (see Ferguson & Gupta 2002 for more about this porous nature of the state). The state and governmental apparatus therefore acts as a sovereign that exists in, and can impose, a state of exception, stepping in and out of laws, creating and suspending laws, crafting legitimacy (Roy 2005; Telles 2015). Political society thus produces the formal/informal divide but also, crucially, is comprised of formal and informal practices itself.

Vera da Silva Telles (2010, 2015) draws on Roy’s conception of state-produced informality to argue that favelas and other “peripheral” spaces in Brazil are spaces of border negotiations between legal and illegal where the state and its actors – the police, tax collectors, government urbanization agents – can create and suspend the law, often normalizing “illegal” activities. Residents, too, operate across the borders of legal and illegal, often traversing these borders in their day-to-day economic and reproductive practices (Telles 2010; Caldeira 2015, 2017). Teresa Caldeira (2017) refers to these boundary-crossings as “transversal negotiations,” a function of peripheral urbanization, in which residents build their own autoconstructed homes and communities in ways that can exist within or outside state regulations. Autoconstruction, here, is an informal process occurring through often-shifting relationships with different state legalities and officials. Decisions by government officials to implement or exceed the law occur via relationships with residents, and can take the form of tolerance, clientelism, open conflicts, consented transgression, repression – their form depending upon the specific microconjuncture (Telles 2015; also see Chapters 2.3.2 & 5.2). Crucially, to Telles, violence is central to the management of formality and informality in Brazil’s favelas and other precarious settlements. The aforementioned

153 For instance, government officials may tolerate residents illegally squatting and autoconstructing homes, and may indeed benefit from and cultivate this informality via clientelist relations (such as water spigot politics – see Chapters 3 and 5), but at another moment may use the law to evict communities when beneficial to the elected officials.
relations are always capable of erupting into violence, into daily conflicts over spaces and resources.

The creation of the distinction between “formal” and “informal” is performative and has real effects. A central methodological question is, then, “what work the notions of ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ do for different constituencies” (McFarlane & Waibel 2012:1) and how they “are put to work as resource, disposition, practice, or classification in the production of urban inequalities” (MacFarlane & Waibel 2012: 7). Gabriel Feltran (2015b) thinks specifically of the “periphery” as ceaselessly being produced as a cognitive construction, as a homogeneous space that exists in a discursively-produced binary opposition with the core. But empirically, Feltran (2015b) argues, there is significant overlap between core and periphery, legal and illegal markets, and people may operate in both throughout the course of their day (see also Telles 2010). He uses the terms border and frontier to designate the “limit” and “distinction” constantly being (re)produced between formality/informality – the border as the act and process of producing distinctions.

The informal/formal divide itself is a function of modernity – notions of informality did not exist prior to modernist legalities and forms of rational planning and design. Moreover, the designation of areas as marginal, backward, and informal is rooted in a civilizational imaginary that associates informality with backwardness, incivility, rurality. Here, efforts to “modernize” and “formalize” are often also efforts to “civilize.” In Brazil, this takes a spatial form: popular, academic, and policy literatures often characterize favelas and other precarious settlements as marginal, informal, and unmodern (see Chapter 2). These so-called “informal peripheries,” characterized as such in the aforementioned PAC/UPP policy documents, are cited as evidence of the “incompleteness” of Brazilian modernity – as a

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154 Partha Chaterjee argues that informality and paralegality “are not some pathological condition of retarded modernity, but rather part of the very process of the historical constitution of modernity in most of the world” (Chatterjee 2004:75). Indeed, there was little concept of informality – or a very different one – prior to modernity (AlSayyad 2004). In other words, modernity has created the informality/formality border (AlSayyad 2004; Chatterjee 2004), and developmentalist projects such as land registration create both ‘formality’ (the registered property) and ‘informality’ (the non-registered property). This boundary-making is achieved through modernist planning, for instance, which is steeped in scientific notions of rational design, abstract mapping, cadastral surveys, formal legal codes, and private property ownership (Scott 1999; Li 2007; Mosse 2005; Ferguson 1994).
tenuousness or lack of the modern (Telles 2010). The *asfalto* – the pavement, the formal city – is the space of modernity and civilization, whereas the *morro* – the hill, the space of informality – is the site of backwardness and rurality (Perelman 2011; Fischer 2008). Thus, efforts to “integrate” so-called informal areas, to modernize and formalize, are also efforts to pave the *morro*, both materially (through concrete) and symbolically (through behavior). The distinction between *asfalto* and *morro*, between formal and informal city, is not ontological but performative (Feltran 2015b): to discursively and cognitively construct a spatiality as informal justifies and underpins formalization-as-civilizational efforts.

To civilize, formalize, and modernize is to impose a conjuncturally-specific formation of the matrix of coloniality. The colonial matrix is the “multiple and heterogeneous global hierarchies (‘heterarchies’) of sexual, political, epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial forms of domination and exploitation where the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the European/non-European divide transversally reconfigures all of the other global power structures” (Grosfoguel 2007:217). Formalization, here, involves imposing (sometimes through direct imposition, sometimes through negotiation) different axes of the matrix: linear forms of chronology (of mobility but also of time, such as mortgage payments and debt relationships with the state) (Tuhiwai Smith 2012); heteropatriarchal family relationships (Grosfoguel 2007); a mono-theistic religiosity (often Christianity) (Grosfoguel 2007); land as private property that can be owned individually, collectively or by the state (Porter 2010, 2016; Blomley 2003; Coulthard 2014); rational accounting and registration through bureaucratic systems (Freeman 2014; Scott 1999); and enrollment in courses that teach “proper” and “civil” behaviours. While some of these axes of coloniality are crucial to market opening, they also exceed a strict capitalist project (Quijano 2008; Mignolo 2000). Overall, a post/decolonial perspective on “informality” undercuts any assumed or ontological binary between formality and informality. Instead, this approach interrogates how this binary is deployed, by whom, and for what purposes. It understands informality as a governing logic, through which state agents, governmental actors, or political society that recognize or bestow formality and informality, often for political purposes and/or for capital accumulation. The formal/informal binary is not just manifest for market formalization or
expansion, but has also taken shape through a conjuncturally-specific matrix of coloniality. Here, the formal/informal binary can be understood as an invocation and practice of modernity/coloniality, in which to “formalize” also means to civilize and modernize seemingly non-rational, non-asphalt ways of being. In the following empirical sections I outline how these efforts articulate and manifest through three forms of “formalization” in Complexo do Alemão: the formalization of property, labour, and behavior.

### 6.2 PACification as Formalization

Both PAC and pacification (a nexus I call PACification – see Chapter 4.4) are focused on integration as, partly, market formalization in Complexo. PAC-Alemão has three principal axes of investments: first, the infrastructural works for “physical” integration with the formal city (costing $793 million US – most of which funded the teleferico but also housing units) (“Relatório Final” 2011); second, “land regularization,” or the granting of title to over 27,000 households (costing $11.4 million) (“Relatório Final” 2011); and third, PAC Trabalho Social (Social Work), attempting to support community involvement and generate income and employment for people living in favelas (Ministério das Cidades 2010; EMOP 2014). Rio+Social has a similar objective to its PAC namesake counterpart: “to promote productive inclusion through training and entrepreneurship, culture and sports” (Governo RJ Nd) in UPP-occupied favelas.

While there are many modalities of formalization operating through both PAC and pacification, here I trace three that are of particular relevance to Complexo do Alemão: regularization of land title; formalization of employment; and the conditioning of behavior through public education courses. Following Roy and Telles, these mechanisms capitalize on “informality” through a bottom billion capitalism oriented to finance capital. I pay attention to the articulations of PAC and pacification – how they overlap – and how they are shaped by contradictory forces. My purpose in this empirical section is also to understand how, in part, these projects might exceed formal market integration. In other words, I am interested in how they have purposes and effects beyond marketization, such as civilizing morro behaviors, instituting new power-laden gazes and imaginaries, and controlling territory. I
thus also present three scenes of contestation that demonstrate how the boundary between formal and informal is constantly negotiated; is characterized by violence and extra-economic concerns; and is mobilized by residents themselves in the face of state contradictions.

6.3 Formalizing Property

Land titling, or regularization, is one of the main components of PAC Urbanization. Regularizing land is not simply bestowing ownership rights (although sometimes it is); it also involves registering property that is owned by someone else (such as the state). The Institute for Land Titling – ITERJ – is Rio state’s unit responsible for mapping and regularizing land. Mapping and regularizing is wound up with extending the ability of residents to partake in “formal” economic transactions: according to Luiz Claudio Vieira of ITERJ,

Bringing families into the formal city is a great benefit for Rio. You integrate community into the city, you put thousands of homes on the formal market, you take residents out of the shadows, give them an address. This property starts to exist for legal and credit purposes. (Associated Press 2012: para 12)

The conferral of addresses, according to Vieira, facilitates residents’ applications for both jobs and credit. The title itself is placed in the woman’s name, if a woman lives in the household, because “men come and go”; female registration is thus, according to official logic, a “way to protect family.” Such a logic is common in international development policy, in which “the global order of millennial development…is also a gender order” premised on the “Third World woman” as an “icon of indefatigable efficiency and altruism” (Roy 2010:69). Through projects in poverty capital – including microfinance loans,

155 Interview with senior officials at ITERJ, April 2014

156 The ITERJ interviewee explained that this focus on women was first introduced by the Brizola administration (see Chapter 3.1.2).

157 Roy (2010: 70) continues that this “feminization of policy”…[indicates] the ways in which development operates through women-oriented policies that in turn serve to maintain traditional gender roles of social
conditional cash transfers,\textsuperscript{158} and, here, the titling of land – notions of good and responsible motherhood are entrenched and disciplined, often increasing the “altruistic burden” (Roy 2010:70) on women.

PAC tasked ITERJ with regularizing property in Complexo do Alemão along two axes (Ministério das Cidades 2010).\textsuperscript{159} The first axis was to grant possession title to families so that people could buy and sell their homes, have formalized service delivery, and have access to credit (Ministério das Cidades 2010) because “regularized land is valued, it generates income for the family and can be used as a guarantee/collateral for loans” (EMOP 2014:56).\textsuperscript{160} Second, regularization was needed to build new infrastructural projects. The construction of the teleférico, in particular, required the removal of homes along the roads newly widened to make way for construction trucks, the gondola stations at the top of several CPX hills, and the posts holding up the lines placed intermittently between the different hills. In order to make space for the gondola infrastructure, the state was required to buy impeding houses from residents, and this could only happen if there were titles or deeds. State officials working for PAC prioritized the titling process on these lands. Once deeds were realized, residents had properties bought by the state in one of three ways: through cash payment, by receiving a chit for housing in the neighborhood, or by being moved into a Minha Casa Minha Vida (federal) or Morar Carioca (municipal) housing unit at the bottom of the hill.\textsuperscript{161} PAC funded 2,620 of these residential units to house relocated persons (EMOP 2014:79) and

\textsuperscript{158} In conditional cash transfer programs such as Mexico’s Oportunidades (see Roy 2010; Webber & Prouse forthcoming) and Brazil’s Bolsa Família (see Peck & Theodore 2015), money is given to a female “head” of the household, if possible, rather than a/the male.

\textsuperscript{159} Interview with senior officials at ITERJ, April 2014

\textsuperscript{160} This logic informs many development schemes throughout the world. Based on the thoughts of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, the assumption is that by extending property rights people will be able to participate in the “formal” economy. De Soto believes that people who live in so-called “informal slums” have an inherent entrepreneurial ethos, and thus work towards profit when their “dead capital” is turned into “liquid capital” (AISayyad, 2004). As Ananya Roy (2011) argues, this notion of an entrepreneurial ethos casts an ontological divide between so-called “slums” and more formalized areas of the city, and constitutes a subaltern subject characterized by flexibility and innovation.

\textsuperscript{161} Interview with EMOP official, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
5,600 families in CPX were relocated (“Relatório Final” 2011). These new occupants are now “owners of regulated real estate, with addresses and attended by public services” (EMOP 2014:56) and with the new ability to offer collateral for future loans. State agencies have also been involved in extending mortgages for this housing; according to the official PAC budget, 197.8 billion reais (35% of the total PAC budget – urbanization and non) went into financing “physical people,” comprised primarily of Caixa Economica mortgages (Comitê Gestor 2011).

While any level of government can regularize property, ITERJ was set up specifically for this purpose and has grown significantly through the PAC years. The Institute works with the State Public Defender, the Attorney General’s Office, the State Department of Justice, and the Coordinator of Citizens’ Rights. The ITERJ regularization process involves a number of phases: identifying who owns the property and defining its limits; creating a map of the area; conducting a socioeconomic cadastral survey of the homes; working with the Prefeitura to determine which areas will be “protected” for public facilities and for the environment; and zoning “Areas” or “Zones of Special Social Interest” (AEIS, or ZEIS), a special planning tool to allow for regularization of low-income areas regardless of their “dominion” (Casa Civil Law #11.481; see Governo Federal Nd; Ministério das Cidades 2010). When and where the state is the outright owner of the land, residents are given “concession of use” for 99 years, a contract that can be terminated by the government if breached. If no owner is identified, but if a person has been using the land for five or more years, they have the ability to claim possession as per their constitutional right inscribed in the City Statute. To gain title, the beneficiary must submit to a highly bureaucratic process of property registration through the local Cartório de Registro de Imóveis (CRI – Real Estate Registry Office) (Ministério das Cidades 2010). These methods attempt to resolve issues by “extrajudicial

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162 Interview with official at SEHAB, January 2014

163 Regarding the “use value of land,” the City Statute of the Constitution states: “an individual possessing an area or urban construction measuring up to 250 square metres for a period of five years, uninterruptedly and unopposed, using it as a place for him and his family to live, acquires dominion of such a place providing the individual does not own another urban or rural property” (City Statute Article 9).

164 Interview with official at SEHAB, January 2014
means” in order to simplify the process (Ministério das Cidades 2010:18). Land titling is also, importantly, linked to the UPP pacification project: ITERJ prioritizes registering property in communities that have UPP units.\textsuperscript{165}

According to interviewees at ITERJ,\textsuperscript{166} the process of land titling in Complexo has been a headache. It is particularly difficult to identify who owns land in this community, and even when identification is made, there are long waits at the local cartório/CRI. Because cartórios do not receive added funding through PAC, they are not incentivized to regularize, causing 16,000 families to be put on a waiting list. According to my interviewees, many people do not know how the regularization process works and, when they do know, do not want to stand in what they feel will inevitably be long waiting lines. Even ITERJ representatives were tellingly contradictory in their discussion of whether or not people wanted to be regularized: at one moment, an ITERJ rep saying that “everybody wants to be regularized” for tax purposes, for electricity because “when everything is regularized, everything comes”; and then, when asked about their biggest challenge, saying that they have had trouble raising demand for regularization. As one prominent urban activist, lawyer, and former WB employee explained, people already have de facto land rights, so unless they are interested in immediately selling their property, many do not feel the need for regularization.\textsuperscript{167}

As the ITERJ representative indicates above, regularization allows for the formalization of services. There has, indeed, been the implementation of a more predictable garbage collection service (COMLURB), the extension of formal cable service to replace “illegal” hookups (called “gatos”), and the entrance into favelas of private electricity companies such as Light Serviços de Eletricidade S.A (Light). However, these new services have come with their own challenges. In Complexo and other Carioca favelas, formalization of services has been underwritten by militarization; in other words, formalization has happened as a function of pacification. While banks have been entering favelas intermittently over a period of years,

\textsuperscript{165} Interview with senior officials at ITERJ, April 2014

\textsuperscript{166} My interview at ITERJ was particularly strange. After sitting in the waiting room for over an hour, I was led into the room of the CEO herself, who sat at her desk at the back of the office, listening in as six employees explained to me the purpose of their institute.

\textsuperscript{167} Interview with former World Bank official, March 2014
it is a common refrain amongst myriad comunidades in Rio that the first people to enter the favela after the tanks rolled in were Light trucks (Fig 6.1). Indeed, Light has been a “key private sector partner of the [UPP] program…regularizing electricity service in every pacified community” (Freeman 2014:16) for occupants who have regularized land or houses. According to Jim Freeman (2014), before pacification unpaid electricity costs in favelas were estimated at US$200 million per year. Since pacification and UPP Social (now Rio+Social), “Light has been very successful charging for electricity under the new regime, going from close to 100 percent illegal connections to close to 100 percent paid accounts in pacified favelas” (Freeman 2014:16). PAC and pacification are both thus central to Light’s monetary success, through the former’s registration of formal property and the latter’s official partnership.

The provision of “formal” services has also brought with it higher payments. As one interviewee explained, “why would you want to be regularized when you have to pay so much more money for gas? It’s now cheaper to live off the hill than on it in some places.”

Activist/citizen journalist site Rio on Watch reports that the price of electricity has increased 41-fold in some of Rio’s “pacified” favelas (see Parkin 2014). These increases in cost disincentivize regularization for some Complexo residents.

Efforts at formalizing property relations are therefore not complete, as indicated by the aforementioned long waiting lists and lack of demand. Regularization is often not desired because of a long and confusing process, as well as higher payments on “formal” services. Moreover, different state actors, such as the military police, are not always keen to recognize formal property. Instead, and especially in places such as favelas where informality has historically been cultivated by elite actors, the border between formality and informality is never complete, is constantly negotiated, and is often characterized by violence (Telles 2010, 2015). This violence is particularly visceral in spaces where “formalization” is practiced through militarized interventions such as the Police Pacifying Unit program. The following scene demonstrates how the formal/informal binary is differentially invoked by the state – in

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168 Interview with Complexo resident 4, January 2014

169 See also the short documentary by Thiago Firmino and Tandy (2013) on Light in pacified favelas
this case, the PM – for its specific institutional purposes (in this case, to “re-take territory”). Yet residents also invoke and indeed practice their own forms of formalization, which I highlight.

6.3.1 Scene 1: The Public Square

Two weeks before I arrived in Complexo do Alemão in January of 2014, Barraco #55 had cleaned up an open area that was previously used as a dump. They had cleared away the garbage and built a bench for people to wait for the local kombis, the VW vans that carry residents up and down favela hills. They also installed a ping pong table in the adjacent area across the narrow street. Their efforts were aimed at claiming a public space for local youth – a form of contentious politics in the face of narcotraffic recruitment of young boys (Zaluar, 2010). This new “public space” was, however, constantly contested within the community: some people continued to put their garbage in this “praça” (square), as they had done for many years prior, while other youth and community organizations continued to frequent the square, sometimes cleaning up the garbage so that they could use the space for recreational activities.

One day in March of 2015, a member of B55 was sitting in his kitchen with other local community organization leaders when the nearby UPP unit targeted this particular space. One person describes the events: “I was talking with [Fernando] in his new house... and I saw a police pick-up come with a lot of cement and bricks and stuff, and they stopped there [in the square]... [The Polícia Militar (PM) said] ‘we're making a point here because we see that it's a good place to be.’ Like 12 cops, 15 cops there.”170 He recounts the dialogue between a PM officer and the B55 member:

PM: You are invading a place that is from the mayor’s office, is from the union.

170 Interview with Complexo activist 5, March 2015
B55: No, it was a garbage point, we cleaned this, everything, to make a public square. If it wasn't for us...you'd have to clean everything here...Now you're making a barricade and you are occupying our place.
PM: No, you are irregular. If you are irregular we can occupy anywhere
B55: But you know this house, we recently built it. If you're doing a barricade here [the square], [the house] becomes a target. It's already a target... nobody walks here now.

In this instance, the officer invokes “irregularity” as a state of being in the favela, not as a piece of property (indeed, the particular site was “public” in that it was state owned, although the activists had invested the initial labour into building or autoconstructing the new recreation infrastructures and other community members contributed by keeping the space clean). Interviewees also complained that the military police would sometimes climb onto the lajes (patio-type roofs) of their houses or even enter with force, whether or not the homes were legally owned, because they “don’t respect the houses on the morro.”

This example demonstrates that the military police mobilize a formal/informal divide whether or not the area is officially “formalized” through modernist regularization processes. The PM, in the dialogue above, calls a public square “informal” due to the assumed “irregularity” of inhabitants who have cleaned up the space. Indeed, the PMs here invoke an imaginary of favela space – the morro – as being inherently informal. The lack of obvious rights to the square, and the fact that the favela in general is characterized as being informal in policy and popular imaginations, allows the militarized faction of the state to exercise control over this particular “public” space, and over the more “private” houses of favela residents. The ability to traverse this boundary between formal and informal – to deploy either binary category when necessary and desirable – is productive. The military police, when they felt it was a position from which they could better target narcotraffickers, called this particular square both informal and from the mayor’s office – contradictory statements, but having the effect of delegitimating the square as formalized, public space for youth.

171 Interview with Complexo resident 8, March 2015
But this example also demonstrates that residents themselves are enacting new “formalization” processes that are sometimes at odds with the militarized state’s practices. By “cleaning up” the garbage dump, these activists and their allies attempted to create their own public space that they did not necessarily own, but which could be frequented by multiple residents. They did not claim liberal ownership over this land – they invested it with their own labour but did not view it as their property. Rather, they argued that it is public and community space over which the military police should not be able to exercise dominion. These activists’ own efforts, I argue, are attempts at a more subversive process of “formalization.” They are attempts to come to consensual agreement amongst myriad stakeholders in the community about how a particular area will be used, itself a drawn out and conflictual process.

6.4 Formalizing Employment

In addition to the formalization of property rights, the formalization of the labour force is, according to official documents, central to both PAC and pacification in Complexo. To the Ministry of Cities, a central aspect of “social inclusion” that PAC targets is “fomenting the socioeconomic development of the comunidades…of support for cooperatives and the generation of work and income, based on the analysis of local demands and potentials” (Ministério das Cidades 2010:18-19). Indeed, “Generating Employment” and “Entrepreneurship” are two of the main axes of EMOP’s sustainable development plan for PAC-Alemão (see EMOP 2014). This strategy has been linked to the Brazilian government’s more general attempt at creating, through PAC, “new formal jobs...in confrontation with the financial crisis” (Comitê Gestor 2011:8). Discursively demonstrating the need for greater employment in CPX, EMOP argued that 10.3% of residents did not have jobs, in contrast to the city average of 6.8%, and that youth under 29 have the highest rates of unemployment (EMOP 2014). A major goal of theirs was thus to create what “is considered a good job: formalized, with adequate salary and a formal contract” (EMOP 2014:38). Large infrastructural projects such as the teleferico were not only meant to create new formal and public-owned spaces but also to “facilitate the access of people, generate increased sales and attract new companies to the region, which will create new jobs. With this, there will be an
increase in the population’s income, creating a cycle of development” (EMOP 2014:33).

According to official statistics, PAC-Alemão itself “directly employs 3 300 people, 67% of them coming from the beneficiary communities, plus a multitude of indirect jobs, emerging to meet the demands of these workers” (EMOP 2014:39).

Formalizing already-existing entrepreneurs, and stimulating the creation of more, is central to the PAC-Alemão program: “Entrepreneurs are those who, creating formal enterprises, create employment and increase the income of the population. They are fundamental for economic growth, the first step towards sustainable development” (EMOP 2014:31).

According to EMOP’s Sustainable Development Report, there were 5367 business owners and entrepreneurs in CPX, with 58% not having completed elementary school and almost all exhibiting “informality.” EMOP’s surveys showed that, for the most part, people were satisfied with their jobs, but,

The informality of the businesses is another striking characteristic of the region: 92% of the businesses don’t have CNPJ,172 that is, there is no legal record of their existence. The reasons for this are varied, but basically have origins in the ignorance of the advantages and in the difficulties of having a legal enterprise...Limited resources, lack of access to bank credit programs and the inexistence of special lines of financing and of microcredit agencies hinder investment, modernization, and growth of the existing enterprises in Complexo do Alemão (EMOP 2014:32)

To confront this “issue” of informality faced by entrepreneurs, PAC-Alemão focused on registering businesses by creating CNPJs and linking them to microcredit programs.

PAC as a national development strategy targeted the extension of credit as one of its primary goals. Initial PAC investments allowed “Bank credit to continue to expand, reaching, in October 2010, 47% of GDP (compared with 24% in 2003)” (Comité Gestor 2011:9). To stimulate finance and credit, the government introduced a variety of “institutional measures,” including increasing BNDES credit operations and creating the Fund for Infrastructure with

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172 Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa Jurídica (CNPJ) is the number that registers a legal person or entity with the Receita Federal do Brasil (essentially the IRS of Brazil) and is “necessary so that the legal person can have the capacity to carry out business, make contracts, sue, or be sued” (Prefeitura RJ Nd).
FGTS resources (FI-FGTS) (Law 11.491/2007) which disbursed R$ 13.7 billion in 2009. Financing loans has also been a central PAC strategy through, for instance, Caixa Economica Federal’s extension of mortgages for MCMV houses (Comitê Gestor 2011, 2015). What this has meant for PAC-Alemão, specifically, is that although a disproportionate amount of this project’s money was shuttled to teleferico construction, the enrolling of people in mortgages, the extension of loans to small businesses, and the registering of “formal” employment for taxation purposes and pension fund investment have been key components of the project.

The UPP’s pacification project is also involved in market formalization through credit expansion strategies. Some of the largest microcredit programs implemented in Rio’s favelas operate through the Rio+Social program. Rio+Social works with SEBRAE (the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service) to help facilitate entrepreneurship and to offer small loans (see SEBRAE Nd). The program has extended micro credit to people living in pacified favelas through AgeRio – the State Agency for Development of Rio. AgeRio administers the state’s Fundo UPP Empreendedor (UPP Entrepreneur Fund) created in 2011 through state law 6.139/2011. They also use resources from the BNDES to incentivize entrepreneurship. As of 2016, AgeRio’s microcredit program is in 37 UPP-occupied communities. According to their latest data, AgeRio has closed 7000 contracts for a total of R$ 35million. Microcredit through this source is “used exclusively for productive activities in the community” with the “most popular sectors” being “food, clothing and beauty salons” and, increasingly, hostels (Gandra 2014: para 5). Rio+Social also works with Empresa Bacana, the municipal program that promotes formalization of businesses in pacified communities. This latter program has formalized 1339 entrepreneurs (Empresa Bacana 2012: para 1) by registering them with the government.

But contradictory forces of formalization have characterized (and sometimes subverted) employment generation efforts. For example, the teleferico was the largest investment of PAC in CPX and, as described above, was justified to the community in part because it was to provide construction and service jobs, as well as attract companies and corporations into the comunidade. However, and ironically, local business people were the community members most frustrated with PAC interventions, and with the teleferico, in particular. The
government-commissioned IPEA report (“Relatório Final” 2011; see also Chapter 5.1.2) found that the frustration of these “entrepreneurs” stemmed not from whether or not they were eventually “formalized” and registered with a CNPJ, but because many were forced to relocate for the teleferico. They believed that the compensation they were offered was inadequate, and they could not move the commercial enterprises into their new MCMV and Morar Carioca units because both programs forbid the selling of goods within their condos. Moreover, the largest expropriated region in question, Rua Joaquim de Queiroz, had been autoconstructed over many years into a primary site of consumption in the community: it “had already consolidated a network of businesses and customers, and undergone numerous improvements over the years, promoted by the merchants” (“Relatório Final” 2011). As discussed last chapter, respondents were also disappointed with the hiring process for infrastructural works such as the building and servicing of the teleferico: they had to apply through resident associations, which many accused of hiring via patronage relationships. The much-lauded teleferico jobs would be cut in half four years after being built, due to decreased revenue, and would disappear when service was halted in September of 2016.

Business formalization and employment generation have thus been contradictory processes that have not benefited the targeted comunidade in the ways outlined by EMOP and the Ministry of Cities. Much of the contradiction stems from the ongoing “informalities” present in the state and its operations in CPX. Central here is the contention that the state is wracked with informality, too, which has real effects for “formalization” processes (Roy 2005). Two “informal” processes of the state or political society undermined the promise of employment generation via teleferico construction. First, the patronage relationships between the state, resident associations, and other powerful actors in Complexo do Alemão delegitimated third-party contractors’ and SuperVia’s teleferico hiring processes. In other words, the promised teleferico employment was not, in the eyes of many residents, fairly open to all because the resident associations would privilege particular hires based on historically unequal relationships between different political actors (see Chapter 5.1.3). Second, many community members lost employment because the large construction project displaced so-called informal local traders. In the case of Rua Joaquim de Queiroz, histories of informality and autoconstruction (fomented via the state’s consented transgression) were undermined and
jobs were fundamentally reconfigured or consumed through formalization logics – the previously (informally-) tolerated autoconstructed market was literally paved over. PAC has thus been an ambivalent source of employment in the everyday lives of Complexo residents. Its employment, or lack thereof, also reconfigures relationships across the morro and asfalto divide beyond a capital accumulation logic. I elaborate the contradictions of teleferico employment generation, specifically, and the way the infrastructural project’s effects exceed accumulation logics in the scene below.

6.4.1 Scene 2: The Teleferico

One day Andre, my research assistant, accompanied me to conduct interviews at a small tourist market located at the last stop of the gondola system, Palmeiras (Fig 6.2). We first travelled through Bonsucesso station, the main entrance to the teleferico from the asfalto, where Andre pointed out a series of placards on display against the wall of the station. He explained to me that these displays, which related a history of favelas in Rio, had put out of business the tourism company for which he had formerly worked, because tourists could no longer see the booth where he solicited customers. Moreover, Andre argued, tourists were now equipped with the knowledge gleaned from the new placards and felt sufficiently informed to make the round trip above the favela without a local guide. He felt that the teleferico thus had a contradictory existence: it created his employment, and then took it away.

We rode the teleferico to Palmeiras and met Lucas, a tour company operator, who also manages a small booth in the tourist market. Here he and his wife make small souvenirs for tourists to buy. At his booth, Lucas explained to me that tourist traffic through his company ebbs and flows. Like Andre, he was ambivalent about the gondola system, acknowledging it gave him work, but also allowed residents to tour the complex of favelas.

173 Interview with Complexo tour operator, June 2014
on their own. He explained that the teleferico has thus introduced a problematic form of favela engagement that he equates with a safari or zoo: “[The tourist] is only going to arrive, take the teleferico, come here to the top [i.e. Palmeiras station], look down from here and he isn’t going to see anything. He isn’t going to see Dona Bia, he isn’t going to see Andre, he isn’t going to see me” (see also Freire-Medeiros 2010). While Lucas recognizes that the teleferico has been a “door of entrance” to the comunidade, it has also created a problematic form of distanced engagement with favela life and inhabitants. Many tourists have the confidence to travel the teleferico without a local tour operator (after all, it functions much like a gondola system at a ski resort) and thus may only engage the favela in top-down fashion, gazing at people on the lajes of their houses, not having to converse with or learn from locals. When tourists choose not to hire local tour operators and instead ride the teleferico on their own – in other words, when they do not support teleferico-generated entrepreneurial employment – they may inadvertently reproduce problematic lines of sight that further entrench socio-spatial distances and imaginaries between morro and asfalto residents.

What Lucas and Andre’s stories demonstrate are the inherent contradictions of teleferico construction: its simultaneous generation and destruction of employment. Their stories also indicate that the modernist design of the gondola infrastructure has its own potential contradictions and violences. While the teleferico has been crucial to attracting visitors and creating tourism jobs, the tourists themselves, now armed with placard teachings and gondola-system know-how, can traverse the favela on their own without ever engaging community members (tourist operators or otherwise) in any meaningful relationships – financial or interpersonal.

### 6.5 Formalizing Behaviour

The previous two sections highlight key processes that are attempting to expand the formal market – through formalized property regularization and employment, respectively.

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174 The presence of pacification, Lucas argues, has further slowed business, as the area continues to be deemed by popular media as unsafe despite the new infrastructural works. Tourism has continued to plummet as the pacification violence has increased in the last two years and as the teleferico has stopped operations.
However, formalization exceeds rendering visible (via property registration or CNJP) for capital accrual. To integrate the hill with the city also involves crafting *asfalto*-like behavior of living a so-called formal life. In this section, I attempt to further tease out how formalization exceeds market integration. I explore, specifically, how formalization processes in Rio’s favelas are premised on, and constitutive of, a colonial matrix of power that advances modernist and civilizational notions of cultivating proper behavior.

A major strategy of PAC was to “foment socioeconomic development” (EMOP 2014:18) in CPX and other PAC-targeted favelas. It attempted to do so, according to official documents, “through educational actions and confronting diagnosed vulnerabilities, as well as promote [educational courses’] articulation with other professional qualification programs” (EMOP 2014:19). EMOP’s Trabalho Social offered training courses in entrepreneurship education, environmental sustainability, and condominium living. The entrepreneurial programs trained residents in management strategies and microcredit, amongst other technologies of income generation (CAIXA Econômica 2013). In CPX, 3,757 residents were registered in entrepreneurial training courses (although the number who actually finished the entire programs was much lower according to the IPEA report – see “Relatório Final” 2011). PAC and its associated educative units also offered courses to “change attitudes in relation to the environment and to lifestyle health” (CAIXA Econômica 2013:18). Environmental education here forefronted the “necessity of preservation and restoration of vegetation” and discussed “the losses of and consequences to nature” due to the “community’s improper waste disposal” (Ministério das Cidades 2010:21).

The state also offered courses to “[prepare] the comunidade for the correct use of housing” (CAIXA Econômica 2013:18). These education courses, targeted at people who were relocated to MCMV or Morar Carioca units, offered lessons in condominium living. Residents were required to attend so-called “patrimonial educational” courses before receiving the keys to their new houses, and were strongly encouraged to continue to attend ongoing course offerings once they moved into their respective units. The education was focused on “the correct…use of common spaces,” “preventative maintenance,” “basic information on water systems, sewage, solid waste collection” (CAIXA Econômica
2013:23), and “what to do if someone is at the door.” These courses are needed because, according to a SEHAB spokesperson, “people who never pay for anything in the comunidade go down the hill to the asfalto and don’t know how to pay their water bills. But now they have duties of formal housing [‘moradia formal’].” According to her, this is “uma cultura nova” (“a new culture”) and people are having a difficult time learning it, with defaults up to 90% on mortgages and many not wanting to pay electricity bills. The purpose of the education, then, is to “teach people that they have both duties and rights” and that they ultimately need to learn how to pay taxes. Other disciplinary measures also exist. In addition to the educational courses required to live in MCMV housing, new residents can only receive title to the property if they “do not sell or trade it for a period of five years after receiving the keys” (“Relatório Final” 2011), if they “pay bills on time” (“Relatório Final” 2011). Moreover, new residents are not allowed to refurbish the homes or paint their walls and, as indicated above, cannot sell commercially out of their units (see also “Relatório Final” 2011).

The condo education courses, specifically, are premised on a symbolic imagination of the favela as morro – as being the space of “informal” life. Wellington da Silva Conceição (2014:6) argues that “the formal here represents not only the insertion in the legal system recognized by the State, but also the question of forming (to put into form) the behavior recognized as normative.” The condo education courses are thus as much about inculcating a new way of living as they are about enrolling people in market mechanisms (Freire & Souza 2010:50). Conceição (2014:15) argues that such courses are just the latest iteration of Rio’s “civilizational projects” that “have always walked arm-in-arm with the practices of discipline and control.” In other words, they are part of:

a great ongoing disciplinary-civilizing process...They are justified by inserting the civilized normative standard into the popular classes,
considered undisciplined, dangerous, and obstacles to the political and economic development in the city of Rio de Janeiro. (Conceição, 2014:14-15)

I want to emphasize Conceição’s notion of formalization as “to take form” in new normative modes of “behavior” and “asfalto-living.” His argument echoes the etymology of the term “civilized” itself, relating to modes of being a city dweller in the “formal” city. Residents of the morro, inhabiting the space of “informality” and “abandonment,” are assumed to be uncivilized – they carry rural, racialized, and impoverished backwardness and have not learned how to pay bills or use common areas associated with the “civilized” (read: formal) city. The education courses are one way to teach people how to live on that asfalto. The morro/asfalto distinction is thus not an ontological divide, but is a distinction performed through public imaginaries as well as political technologies such as education courses.

What it means to live in asfalto houses as a “modern citizen” – with formal behavior – is underpinned by the matrix of coloniality: education courses, mortgage relationships, and condo infrastructures manifest a re-ordering of behavior through spatio-temporalities of modernity. For instance, MCMV housing infrastructure privileges a heteronuclear family configuration: they are “44 metres squared divided into living room, kitchen, two bedrooms, bathroom and outdoor patio” (EMOP 2014:79), intended to house a man, woman, and children. Many morro homes, on the other hand, are not built with this floor plan. They have been autoconstructed over decades to take shape around different configurations of family living that might include single-parent households or extended family dwellings, with walls and floors that can be expanded when necessary. It is not just physical floor plans that privilege modern ways of living and exert a disciplinary influence, however, but also new relationships with the state and corporate entities. Residents have had to take out mortgages and enter debt relationships for MCMV houses (much like the aforementioned microcredit loans). These forms of mortgaging and debt create a linear, chronological relationship between borrower and creditor that is manifest with risk for both, but exerts significantly more pressure on the former. They also create new “formalized” justifications for invading homes and expropriating property when the state’s lending terms are not meet (Whitener 2016). These new relationships are disciplining technologies that depend on the creation of
financialized, market subjects (García-Lamarca & Kaika 2016) and bind people in
relationships of indebtedness that shape and circumscribe lifestyle futures in ways much
different than even 20 years ago.

6.5.1 Scene 3: The Minha Casa, Minha Vida Condo Unit

However, these new forms of “living” are constantly contested in MCMV houses
themselves. In the first few weeks of my stay in Complexo, Andre brought me to the home of
a woman and her friend who had recently moved into an MCMV condo unit at the foot of the
Alemão hill (Fig 6.3). One of the women had been given the rights to the unit by the
government when her property was bulldozed for teleferico construction. The visiting friend
had also had her home razed, but had yet to receive compensation from the government. The
visitor was staying in this unit, being hosted by her previous morro neighbor, until she had
another option sorted out.

For the most part, the woman who had been given the MCMV house was quite happy with
her new situation. The friend was understandably angry at the government’s seeming
inability to secure housing for her. As I chatted with them at greater length, however, they
began to reveal a complaint of a more symbolic sort. The woman who had title to the unit
explained that she is unhappy with her new neighbours. According to her, the neighbours
have “brought the favela with them” and “act as though they’re still living on the morro.”

Despite being upset with the neighbour’s morro behaviours, towards the end of the interview
the “formal” resident (who had papers for the unit) joked that she herself did not abide by
some of the condo rules because “no one checks up anyway, even when there’s a problem
with the boiler.” The younger woman laughingly agreed, but stated she would rather stay in
this MCMV unit than rent or buy a new condo far from the community.

What these discussions and actions reveal is that not only do education courses attempt to
teach people ways of living on the asfalto, but that people who live in new residences, such
as MCMV condos, also often wish to move away from the stigma and diverse styles of living

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179 Interview with MCMV resident 2, February 2014
that the *morro* represents. Indeed, in Rio, to live on the *asfalto* is often considered an achievement, a reward for a life of hard work (see Cavalcanti 2014a). In doing so, people will police their own behaviors and those of their neighbours to fit with civilizational and modern imaginaries of proper form and behavior – of formal behavior. However, this formal living is incomplete: in this particular example, the woman who holds title to the unit is allowing a woman to stay with her – frowned upon in the MCMV regulations and lesson plans – because her friend cannot find her own place to live. In the continued absence of the state – in the lack of building oversight, for example – the occupants often decide to paint walls, sell goods commercially, and sublet rooms, shaping, in the process, a new *asfalto-morro* way of living.

### 6.6 Ongoing Contested Histories of (Subversive) Formalization

At the current socio-historical conjuncture in Brazil, the government’s positing of favelas as informal, marginal spaces, heretofore abandoned by the state, has legitimated its quest to introduce new mechanisms of formalization for marketization and consumption in a highly securitized environment. Market formalization is not universal, but articulated through particular processes of power as a function of a locale’s socio-historical conjuncture. For example, the imposition of land rights and private property ownership is happening globally throughout so-called precarious settlements, but takes quite specific form in Brazil’s favelas and peripheries. It was here, for instance, that urban social movements historically fought for the use value of land (hence creating a five-year occupation-to-ownership model that informs regularization today); and for subsidized mortgages for low-income residents (that informs the lower interest payments on MCMV units). Moreover, in Rio’s favelas, bottom billion capitalism is shaped through historically-informed violent relationships between the military police and favela residents. Thus, the military police apparatus – through pacification and Rio+Social – is simultaneously killing youth and extending financialized capital in the form of microcredit programs. PAC and pacification thus both have conjuncturally-specific market formalization and consumption functions. The term PACification points to these interrelated purposes (see also Chapter 4.4).
While most postcolonial and decolonial orientations to formality/informality understand formalization as a state or governmental practice, it is also important to note that the state itself is contested. The state, for instance, is contested institutionally, in that different agencies, actors, and levels of government are often simultaneously enacting different formalization and informalization processes. Thus, while ITERJ tries to formalize land rights, the military police often do not recognize these rights in their day to day transversal of favela space. Moreover, there are temporal contradictions of the state: as detailed in Chapters 3.1 & 3.4, government officials and elite Brazilian actors have historically benefitted from informalizing favela space (through water spigot politics, for instance, which has elected many carioca leaders), and have been central to the proliferation of the narcotrade (through practices of incarceration and border liberalization). These historical practices conflict with the present moment, as some state agencies (alongside NGO and corporate sectors) attempt to formalize land, labour, and debt relationships. These temporal contradictions have resulted in: inconsistent and incomplete regularization; confrontations with narcotraffickers and other residents over and within public space; and contestations over the loss of so-called “informal” employment in the wake of attempts to formalize.

What is more, the previous “neglect” of some of these so-called informal communities, and the state’s historical interest in keeping them informal, has also fomented desires of citizens themselves to practice various modes of formalization. Teresa Caldeira’s (2017) notion of “peripheral urbanization” captures this process: over the course of decades, so-called “peripheral” citizens have autoconstructed their own homes; created collective associations that have fought for urban land and property rights; and engaged transversally with official logics in ways the benefit their own well-being and social reproduction. Citizens, themselves, are thus also involved in creating particular forms of formalization, sometimes in coordination with the state, sometimes in opposition to it. These activities range from urban social movements fighting for a state-recognized use value of property, to fighting the military police in order to build “public” common areas for children to play. Residents of Complexo also continue to try to create their own employment, even when they have been displaced by the teleferico, and they attempt to hold their neighbours accountable to symbolic standards of living on the asfalto.
Residents of Complexo do Alemão are thus crafting their own forms of belonging to both property and to one another in light of state attempts to formalize. Indeed, retaining a notion of “formal” to describe some residents’ activities might be useful and even politically important. I propose to do so in ways similar to what Keenan (2015) calls acts of “subversive property” (see also Porter 2016): taking seriously different claims to living with one another and to creating specific relationships with land. To Keenan, property can be understood in the dual sense of belonging: of having ownership over an object (subject-object belonging); and having the properties/identities of a community (part-whole belonging). Power relations – which she sees as being enacted through the state – often institute the former (ownership of things such as land) while reshaping and sometimes undermining marginalized identities of the latter (disturbing a people’s group-based identity by disrupting the practices and modes of being that are central to this identity).

Yet the above scenes demonstrate that many people in Complexo are trying to enact myriad forms of belonging – both subject-object and part-whole – that are deeply informed by the history of their relations with one another and with the particular land they inhabit. In other words, residents and community members attempt to control land, labour, and behavior in ways that have been informed by histories of autoconstruction and belonging to a morro community – they often desire to institute new ways of being that combine, in shifting ways, these histories with the rhetoric of PAC and UPP formalization. For instance, Scene 1 demonstrates how people are constantly negotiating the use of a space that was historically a garbage dump for the autoconstructed community, yet now is being transformed into an autoconstructed recreational space for youth. Community members are contesting the use of this area amongst themselves, and are trying to come to an agreement about how to use the area in the face of conjuncturally-specific violence (such as the recruitment of youth in narcotrafic factions; and the military police’s attempts to “take back territory”). Scene 2 illustrates how some people in Complexo do want to partake in a paid “formal” tourist economy, but are also concerned about their community’s identity and the way in which they are being viewed through a more formalized zoo-like gaze. They are thus concerned simultaneously with ownership over their labour but also their place as a member of a larger
comunidade and how that community is understood. The third scene demonstrates that people want to discipline their own behavior – and that of their neighbors – in a manner that aligns with socio-spatial imaginaries of *asfalto* living. But they do so in ways that retain the histories of autoconstruction and community relations that exist amongst CPX residents – inviting one another to stay in their homes, decorating their units in ways that are consistent with their *morro* houses.

To think of residents as also enacting formalization – in sometimes subversive ways at odds with legal property rights and state violence – would undermine any notion of an “outside” to formality, and would undercut an informal/formal, periphery/centre, political/civil society binary. It would shed light on the myriad ways that people enact “formality,” often through advocating for collective belonging and organizing, staking claims to public spaces, and holding diverse governmental actors accountable to the latter’s own rhetoric of formalization. While Keenan sees *subversive* property as systems of belonging that exist/are performed outside the state and the legal system, I use the term subversive formalization – an oxymoron – to connote that there is no obvious outside to the state. The state, in other words, is porous (Ferguson & Gupta 2002). People in Complexo work with the government (as employees, auditors, contractors, etc) and have in many ways tried to implement PAC-style formalization. Alternately, not all so-called “state” agents enact the rhetoric of formalization (such as the military police) and may subvert Complexo residents’ own entrepreneurial activity (through paving over the largely autoconstructed market of Rua Joaquim de Queiroz, for instance). Subversive formalization, then, intentionally points to the impossibility of separating state from non-state, formal from informal.

Using the lens of the coloniality of power allows us to see this subversive formalization. When interrogating PAC and pacification as more than market integration – as civilizational and modernizing projects that shape new behaviors – it also becomes possible to see those ways of being that may indeed be colonized by the projects, but that also continue to persist, in ever-transforming fashion. Here, modern/non-modern, *asfalto-morro*, formal/informal, are entanglements that are traversed by *both* political and civil society, at the increasingly marketized interface of the two.
Subversive formalization, in sum, is the ongoing attempt amongst people who are the targets of new state-led, formalization processes, to live a good life, one of belonging with one another and negotiating transformed relationships to land, property, and behavior. It is the action not of a revolutionary subject, but as the day-to-day practices of survival and well-being in the face of violence (both military police and narcotraffic), formal/informal transversals, and new formal market recognitions. It is based on histories of self-building, yet here a new form of autoconstruction is being constituted, one that exists in ongoing relationship with so-called state-led projects. In the following chapter I elaborate on how autoconstruction is also being reconfigured as a function of pacification’s violence, specifically, and how people are forming new digital communities to combat a violent police apparatus and care for one another.
6.7 Figures for Chapter 6

**Figure 6.1** “UPP + Light = Removals.” Photo taken 23 Jun 2014 by author.

**Figure 6.2** Tourist market outside of Palmeiras teleferico station. Photo taken 25 Jan 2014 by author.

**Figure 6.3** Minha Casa, Minha Vida housing project for relocated CPX residents. Photo taken 16 Jan 2014 by author.
Chapter 7: Autoconstruction 2.0: Social Media Contestations of Racialized Violence in Complexo do Alemão

7.1 #genocídio

On 11 March 2014, I attended a demonstration in Complexo do Alemão against the military police seizure of two young boys suspected of drug trafficking. When the military police unleashed tear gas upon the crowd not everyone dispersed. I could see community journalists visible through the smoke, continuing to walk the streets with arms held high as they recorded the military police actions on their smartphones. The video footage was later posted on activist and community journalists’ social media sites. After the protest, Complexo activists’ hashtags on Facebook and Twitter read #genocídio, calling the ongoing presence and actions of the military police “genocide” due to the number of black youth that have been killed by state violence. A few of these journalists and activists would later form Coletivo Papo Reto (Straight Talk Collective), an organization that has recently garnered international news headlines for their citizen-journalist reporting of military police infractions in Complexo (see Duarte 2016; Shaer 2015).

Much of my own research journey has been shaped by walking, or protesting, with activists. I went to many anti-militarization and anti-World Cup protests in downtown Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and was present at events staged in favelas in both Zona Sul and Zona Norte of Rio. These events were concerned, primarily, with occupying physical space. Yet virtual space, social media, and digital practices were central to their functioning. Activists often organized events through Facebook or Whatsapp, and would post images and video from the demonstration after-the-fact. Much of my own knowledge about what was happening in Complexo, and indeed throughout Rio and Brazil, was gleaned through digital sources. I learned, for instance, of many events happening in Complexo – baile funks, dance-offs, mutirão efforts to build community gardens – all often organized through Facebook. My life in Complexo was shaped by the mobilities of the teleferico infrastructure, on the one hand, but also by the digital infrastructures that allowed me to communicate with friends on

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180 See Chapter 4 for more about this protest.
different hills, to chat with my capoeira mestre, to alert me to an anti-militarization event in Complexo while I was staying in São Paulo.

Social media did not always, however, have positive impacts on my ever-transforming relationship with Complexo do Alemão. When I conducted a follow-up research trip in March of 2015, I was more nervous than I had ever been to enter the community. For the last few months I had been watching over Facebook and Twitter as more and more military police, special elite forces, and army personnel entered Complexo in the name of pacification. During my actual visit, two people in the community were murdered by “balas perdidas” (lost bullets) and their deaths were filmed and posted to Facebook. I watched on my computer from a room in Botafogo, Zona Sul, Rio de Janeiro181 as two men carried a woman from her home into a waiting car, yelling that she had been shot by a stray bullet while sitting in her house. Another video showed a man lying lifeless in Rua Dois, his blood streaming down the streets as passers-by stood next to him, some filming with their smartphones, others talking about what had happened. These videos documented the horrors of pacification as they were happening in the community. They also had affective consequences for those of us outside the favela: they structured the way I, and no doubt others, felt about Complexo do Alemão and the dangers associated with visiting this community.

But throughout my research – when I was physically in Complexo and when I was following events via Facebook from Vancouver – I gradually became aware of something more significant taking place online. People were not just posting images of violent scenes, and they were not just inviting members of the public to cultural events. Rather, many were trying to do something – effect some sort of change – by sharing digital videos, texts, and images. Almost daily when I opened my computer in Complexo, a community journalist and friend, Marina, would be making numerous posts on her Facebook news page about what was happening and where in the favela – where the military police were located, where shootouts had just occurred, where it was safe to walk and where it was not. I frequently

181 I was staying in Botafogo for this trip because Ellen and Eddu were not currently running B55 due to the heightened tension in Complexo.
spoke online and in person with a friend who also happened to be a member of Coletivo Papo Reto, and heard from him first hand, as well as via recent video documentaries, about their ongoing efforts to hold the military police accountable for killing members of their community.

In Complexo, people have indeed been using digital media to make very political claims, or articulations, about what is happening in their communities (Fig 7.1). On social media some residents are calling the state genocidal for killing black youth, accusing the military police apparatus of criminalization for arresting mototaxi drivers (see Chapter 4), and organizing anti-militarization events staged, in part, for journalists to take pictures and then proliferate them globally via social media. I, too, was an active participant in these activities, tweeting out news of gun shots in Complexo while the World Cup was staged just twenty minutes away; posting and sharing others’ posts on Facebook about violent military police actions; and even writing an online blog during the World Cup, in part critiquing the effect that the mega event was having on places like Complexo. Social media, then, was a central channel for my own and my friends’, activists’, and residents’ political critiques of the pacification project.

Inspired by the actions of community journalists and activists – particularly those that continually put their lives at risk to communicate about violence – in this chapter I focus on how different actors in Complexo are using social media as a form of contentious action in a context of urban violence. How are their digital practices shaped by, and reshaping, urban spaces, urban embodiments, and urban citizenships? Here I am also interested in how their efforts are focused on the social reproduction – indeed, the keeping alive – of one another. These efforts are, as documented last chapter, informed by histories of autoconstruction in which people have relied on one another to build and safeguard their own communities over generations. In this chapter, then, I also discuss how autoconstruction is being transformed through the new digital infrastructures that have been increasingly available to Complexo residents, simultaneous to the pacification project.
I ultimately argue that activists and journalists are participating in a process of digital autoconstruction. At present, community members are not only using bricks and mortar to build their neighbourhoods, but are also deploying new digital technologies to build social media collectives and share information digitally in order to intervene in racialized violence. Through this digital autoconstruction, favela activists and journalists are re-shaping embodied, epistemological, and discursive regimes of state violence in significant ways: they are materially re-directing urban mobilities and transforming violent encounters; leveraging the epistemological power of witnessing to hold military police accountable for violence; and re-shaping socio-spatial imaginaries of favelas to disrupt notions of endemic criminality.

I draw on various dimensions of the conjunctural analytic I developed in Chapter 2. Digital data – coding images, video, text, locational tags – flows through diverse spatio-temporal and interscalar trajectories, bringing into new relation distant parts of the globe. I discuss how new relationships across diverse geographic locations – such as New York and Rio de Janeiro – have been facilitated by digital infrastructures, and how these relations are also transforming digital infrastructures and applications. Viral image flows of police killings, too, are provoking new responses from different scales of government. Digital images, here, are becoming key objects of evidence against the military police apparatus; they, alongside text and hashtags, serve as articulations – or discursive enunciations – about what violence is happening, where, and to whom.

I also take seriously the relationality of favelas and of the political/civil society interface that operates through these territories. I document how various actors in Complexo – from activists to journalists to community organizers – are trying to shift the socio-spatial imaginaries of the morro/asfalto divide and also, increasingly, mobilize a greater number of people across these imagined borders. As the previous chapters have documented, there is not always a clear distinction between who is a so-called state actor and who is a resident. I thus attend to how journalists in Complexo are also becoming enrolled in more state-controlled, hegemonic media.
A central concern of most activists and many community journalists in Complexo is the killing of racialized youth at the present conjuncture of PACification. Although they may not call it such, they are targeting the present day coloniality of power in Rio – they are trying to make visible violence committed against people who have long been harmed, often killed, for the capital accumulation logics of the political establishment in Brazil. PACification via the UPP, specifically, is shaped by a racialized devaluation of life in which young black men are being killed by military police forces in part to extend a market frontier and securitize Rio de Janeiro for international investment (see Chapters 4.3.2, 4.4 & 6). In this climate community journalists are, indeed, trying to make life for people not often recognized as being worthy of such.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review mechanisms of state violence in favelas in Rio that operate both materially and discursively. I then turn to how activists in Brazil and beyond are increasingly using social media and digital technologies as the basis of social mobilizations. The next sections turn empirically to how activists are responding to violent management tactics of the military police. I attend to four main axes of social media contestation: the virality of images and texts to make visible police violence; the sharing of events and cultural activities to shift socio-spatial borders between morro and asfalto; the creation of social media collectives to communicate with residents; and the design of new digital applications to unsettle risk-laden mobilities. The final section reflects on how these new digital communities and applications are re-shaping the urban form and fomenting new forms of urban citizenship and knowledge politics.

7.2 Militarized Urban Control and Regimes of Visible Violence

Critical urban theory is often concerned with the social control of racialized, classed, and gendered populations through urban spatial segregation, socio-spatial imaginaries, and violent militarization (Yiftachel 2009; Kipfer & Goonewardena 2007; McIntyre & Nast 2011). Literature in and about the so-called Global South has focused specifically on how people living at the “the pseudo-permanent margins of today’s urban regions” (Yiftachel 2009:250) exist between “the ‘lightness’ of legality/approval/safety and the ‘darkness’ of
eviction/destruction/death” (Yiftachel 2009:250). Of central concern here is how state violence is deployed to control “the rapidly expanding slums of the South” (Kipfer 2007:721) through, for instance: Hausmannization, modernization, urbicide, gentrification, public housing, and reservization (Kipfer & Goonewardena 2007); discourses of criminality that result in the “essentialization of identities” (Yiftachel 2009:254); and increasingly digitized surveillance (Albagli 2017).

In Rio de Janeiro, social control operates not only through highly militarized police occupation campaigns (Cano 2006; Feltran 2015b; Sanjurjo & Feltran 2015; Telles 2010, 2015) but also through regimes of visibility that legitimate or erase this violence. In favelas, in particular, military police impunity is informed by – and justified through – myriad enunciations and ways of seeing violence. As discussed in Chapter 4.4, the military police apparatus in Brazil operates through the discursive construction of internal enemies, and mobilizes dichotomous distinctions between “good” and “evil”, between “civilized” and “uncivilized”, between “bandits” and “good workers”; and also, at the present conjuncture, between “narcotraffic” and “military police” control. These discourses are constructed by the military police apparatus itself (epitomized by the rhetoric of Sérgio Cabral and José Mariano Beltrame) as well as by hegemonic Brazilian news media. At the aforementioned protest, for instance, this news media accused narcotraffickers of initiating the violence, and alleged that protestors were working on behalf of the narcofactions.182 The Brazilian news

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182 Coverage of conflict in Complexo predominantly focuses on narcotrafficking, as was the case before, during, and after the protest in March of 2014. The day before the protest, O Dia reported “traffickers have returned to occupy, with arms, some localities [in Complexo] and are trying to show their power” (Trindade et al 2014:para 1). Both O Dia (Trindade et al 2014) and Dia Rio de Pernambuco (‘Policia civil’ 2014) argued that, consequently, more force is needed in these territories. The morning of the protest day, Agencia Brasil reported that drugs in Complexo are being controlled by a “foragido” (Abdala 2014:para 5), an outlaw. News outlets blamed traffickers for the violence during the protest. O Globo called the military police and Choque intervention a response to someone who “shot into the air and fled” (Jannuzzi 2014: para), and O Dia explained that “the shots would have been fired by a bandit” (Magalhães 2014: para 2). Activists are presented as inciting conflict: “Activists threatened to set fire to a truck, which was used as a barricade, and bonfires with tires, wood, and trash cans” (G1 Rio 2014:para 2). The military police released tear gas to “contain the confusion” (G1 Rio 2014:para 1). O Globo reported that narcotraffickers instigated the violence in the moments after the protest, as “bandidos” shot the Nova Brasília UPP station, inciting an “exchange of shots” (G1 Rio 2014:para. 4). O Globo rhetorically linked the protest activity in Complexo to another, “uncontrollable” territory of Rocinha, where narcotraffickers are reportedly trying to disrupt military police strategy (Jannuzzi 2014). Finally, Extra accused the street protestors of either being narcotraffickers, or being paid by the cartels (Moura, 2014; see also de Medeiros 2016), an accusation that is familiar to Complexo inhabitants (see Goulart 2013).
media that produces these discourses are large corporate conglomerates controlled and managed by the country’s elite and ruling political parties (de Lima 2013). Their discourses of otherness, of uncivilized cultures, and of endemic conflict work to violently manage identities (Yiftachel 2009) and to make true and legitimate the killability of favela residents (da Silva 2009; Vargas 2013). Moreover, the media work to invisibilize the military police’s own violence in these neighborhoods: they either do not report on military police killings, or legitimate police violence by accusing narcofactions of instigating any conflict. Police impunity is upheld by the criminal justice system, in which military police officers are rarely convicted and often not charged (see Chapter 4). These practices of the state-led media and the criminal justice system thus reproduce epistemologies of visibility that erase state violence (Elwood & Leszczynski 2013).

Militarized regimes of public security are also, increasingly, using digital surveillance to manage threatening citizens and subjects. Digital technologies provide new ways to control urban populations and to mediate mobilities through uneven urban space. Across the globe, national and urban public security is being reoriented towards a data-security calculus (Leszczynski 2016; see also Jefferson 2017). While it is beyond the purview of this chapter to document digital surveillance, per se, hegemonic media and state officials in Brazil have indeed used digital infrastructures to variously surveil protest, and to cut communication between movement leaders (see Gaffney & Robertson 2016; Melgaço & Botello 2015; Wood 2013).

7.3 Autoconstruction and Social (Media) Mobilization

It is politically insufficient to interrogate only processes of control, militarization and racialization. A central concern of this dissertation, following Katherine McKittrick (2011), has been to also attend to the ways people exist under and respond to these tactics. Such is the case in Brazil, where urban processes that have created the “periphery” have been accompanied by citizens’ own forms of “peripheral urbanization” (Caldeira 2015). Peripheral

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183 For instance, members of the state and civil society are enrolled in mapping and surveillance exercises that codify and thus constitute particular places as risky through data-driven algorithms (Leszczynski 2016; see also Jefferson 2017).
urbanization, as discussed and exemplified in the last two chapters, is a “distinctive form of agency” in which “Residents are agents of urbanization, not simply consumers of spaces developed and regulated by others” (Caldeira 2017:5) through, often, practices of autoconstruction. Where the factory floor has historically been the conception site of class consciousness to many Marxists, Brazil’s urban peripheries are spaces where less privileged peoples have mobilized and sought greater distribution of rights and access to the city (Holston 2009). In other words, residents’ “experience of these peripheries – particularly the hardships of illegal residence, house building, and land conflict – became both the context and substance of a new urban citizenship” (Holston 2009:4), an insurgent citizenship. Their strategies have ranged from illegal land occupations to formal channels of government negotiations (Holston 2009). Insurgent citizenships in Brazil have achieved significant improvements in income, infrastructure, and Rights to the City, most notably inspiring the rise of the Workers’ Party (Cardoso 2013; Maricato 2009; Rolnik 2011; see also Chapter 3.2).

More recent waves of mobilization in Brazil’s peripheries depart from earlier social movements because they are necessarily a function of the new forms of democracy and consumption that these previous movements achieved (Caldeira 2012, 2015; Zaluar 1997). The post-dictatorship consumer economy has made smartphones ubiquitous across Brazil, and these technologies are increasingly being used as tools of social mobilization (Rolnik 2014). Favela residents in particular are robust users of social media; more people on the impoverished hillsides of Rio access the internet than in wealthier neighborhoods (Coelho 2016). Recent social media research by SemioCast has ranked Brazil second worldwide in gross number of Twitter accounts and third in Facebook accounts (Faulkner 2016). The most

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184 New contentious action has often not taken the form of organized social movements but, rather, is based increasingly in individual forms of consumption and peripheral residents’ ability to move about and imprint on the city. Teresa Caldeira (2015:S135) argues that in São Paulo, in particular, this new moment has seen a proliferation of forms of cultural production that are critical of the periphery and that make new claims to the city through hip hop and graffiti. These new forms also carry risk of depoliticization or slacktivism (Gerbaudo 2012): Caldeira warns, “new forms of politics must move beyond posters, hashtags, graffiti” (Caldeira 2015:135).

185 This data was originally published by the organization Data Popular but is no longer available on their website. It has more recently been reported on the Rio on Watch Community Reporting (see Faulkner 2016).
popular social media application in Rio is Whatsapp – a messaging and calling app that uses free wifi (Faulkner 2016; Ruvolo 2015).

Activists, journalists, and other citizens in Brazil are using these new social media outlets to “defy…the arboreal logic of state control” (D’Andrea 2014:941). Like community organizations and social movements across the world, people in Rio are engaging in digital practices that transform knowledge politics and constitute new urban subjects (Elwood & Leszczynski 2013). Social and spatial media are technologies, or “networked spatio-technical presences” (Leszczynski 2015:730), that link people through new technical objects (such as the smartphone) and produce often geographically based digital information that “enable, extend, or enhance our ability to generate, share, interact with, and use geographical information online” (Leszczynski 2015:739). Through recording and sharing images of state violence, journalists and activists, in particular, are troubling the state’s regime of knowledge/power that erases its violence against particular populations, such as racialized

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186 Brazilian geographer Milton Santos wrote of the contemporary period as the technical-scientific-informational milieu, in which information has replaced energy as the primary force that brings spaces into relation, as the “true instrument of union between the various parts of a territory” (Santos 2017:28). While Santos theorized the co-constitution of the local and global through networked space, he understood informational networks predominantly as a globalizing force that results in hegemonic and violent surveillance of oppressed populations (Ablagli 2017; Melgaço & Botello 2015). Writing at a similar time, Manuel Castells theorized the political economic transformations that have led to a new “network society” in this age of globalization. To him, the restructuring of markets and firms after the economic crises of the 1970s coincided with, and indeed was a condition of possibility for, an information technology revolution. Here, the “emergence of a new technological paradigm organized around new, more powerful, and more flexible information technologies makes it possible for information itself to become products of production process” (Castells 2000:78). Information is thus central to new forms of organizing production and has been a de-territorializing agent (Castells 2000, 2010).

187 Scholars have documented the ways that social media have helped “soft leaders” in the Arab Spring and Occupy, for instance, construct symbolic imaginaries of public spaces that are important for gathering masses of individuals in one location (Gerbaudo 2012). There has also been recent writings on the “cellularity” of protests, whereby new media outlets like Mídia Ninja stitch together thousands of cellular feeds from citizen journalists to create new narratives that counter the dominant media (Dent & Pinheiro-Machado 2014).

188 Post-structural conceptualizations of the networked urban focus on the relationalities that emerge between various actors and objects in an urban milieu, whereby “urban actors, forms, or processes are defined less by a pregiven definition and more by the assemblages they enter and reconstitute” (McFarlane 2011:653). Within actor-network theory, objects themselves can be construed as a network. Here, the “object [holds] itself together in a particular web of relations” (Law & Mol 2001:611) that renders the object immutable – it has a similar purpose and brings into being similar users as it traverses Euclidean space (Law & Mol 2001; see also Leitner, Sheppard & Sziarto 2008). With respect to social movements or contentious activity, urban actors are mobilizing immutable mobiles (Law & Mol 2001) such as smart phones and viral videos to create new transnational networks that bring into relation seemingly distant places (Leitner, Sheppard & Sziarto 2008).
peoples (Elwood & Leszczynski 2013). But these digital practices are neither simply virtual nor do they flatten power relations. As feminist and critical race scholars of digitality note, new media is always embodied and often reproduces difference across race, class, and gender, as a function of who can access and encode digital information, as well as what populations and landscapes are the target of different digital visualities (Leszczynski & Elwood 2015; Jefferson 2017; Wilson 2011).

In the contemporary conjuncture of pacification in Rio, I am interested in how digital technologies are changing the “tactics, the tempo, and the terrain of any activism” (Merrifield 2013:63) and are transforming peripheral urbanization: how social media is being used as a tool to intervene in mechanisms of racialized police violence, and to remake urban encounters and the very space of the urban. In what follows I turn to the ways that Complexo activists and journalists are using social media as a tool to: digitally-visibilize police violence; craft new urban imaginaries; organize community collectives; and develop new police accountability applications.

7.4 Digital Visualities: Unsettling Discursive Regimes of Military Police Violence

 Actors in Rio de Janeiro, generally, and Complexo do Alemão, specifically, are attempting to intervene in epistemologies and discourses of military police violence. State violence, as discussed above, operates in part through discourse and enunciation, through regimes of visibility that mask, normalize, and impunitivize killing. Many activists, organizers, and residents are disrupting these regimes through, inter alia: new digital media practices that record and make viral the images of police brutality; digitized textual descriptions of violence and remembrance on social media platforms; and live-streaming meetings and proliferating digital manifestos that discursively recodify public security. In this section I discuss each, in turn, and then reflect on their importance for witnessing, knowing, and remembering military police violence and the people most affected.

Five days after the aforementioned protest, on 16 March 2014, thirty-eight-year old Cláudia da Silva Ferreira was hit by two balas perdidas fired by the military police in a shootout with
narcotraffickers in her neighbourhood of Madureira, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The military police put her in the trunk of their car. The trunk was not properly latched and thus opened, dragging a still-living Ferreira for more than 300 metres. She was dead on arrival at the hospital. Her death was filmed by the occupants of a trailing car, who released the images to the press under condition of anonymity. The digital recording went viral, garnering over 35,000 views to-date on YouTube. There are now, in effect, 35,000 digital witnesses to her death.

Cláudia da Silva Ferreira’s death is one of many at the hands of the military police, yet hers incited responses from official state actors in a way heretofore not seen. For instance, then-president Dilma Rousseff took to Twitter to express her condolences, saying, “the death of Cláudia has shocked the country. In this hour of sadness and pain, I give my solidarity to the family and friends of Cláudia.” Sitting heads of state in Brazil do not, in general, tend to discuss the military police killing of racialized people in Rio de Janeiro. However, the quick proliferation of this violent video – facilitated by the enhanced shareability of digital images – provoked an almost immediate state response.  

Six police officers were indeed charged with homicide in the case of her death, a rarity in Brazil (although the case has been passed through numerous judges and the officers have not been convicted – they continue to work; see Barreira 2014; Soares 2016).

Ferreira has had lasting impacts on discourses of police violence in Brazil. The viral images of her death became a lightening rod for broader discussions of state-led killings in Rio’s low-income and racialized communities. For instance, the viral video recording was closely followed by an Amnesty International campaign called Jovem Negro Vivo (Young Black Alive), which targeted and tried to make visible Brazil’s police violence. Moreover, numerous civil society campaigns were mounted in the wake of her death that also harnessed the power of digital image. 100 Vezes Cláudia, for example, crowd-sourced artistic renderings of Ferreira in order to commemorate her life (that is, not just the horrific images

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189 Ferreira’s gendered social position was also foundational to this country-wide reaction. As a woman, she was less likely to be discursively tied to the narcotrade, and descriptions of the military police’s atrocity in this case repeatedly referred to Ferreira as a mother.
of her death), and shared them widely through an online website, allowing everyday forms of remembrance for a woman killed by the military police apparatus (Fig 7.2).  

A year after Ferreira’s death, activists in Rio de Janeiro organized a memorial event. They advertised the gathering over social media – Facebook, specifically – and digitally commemorated the event after it happened:

Brothers and sisters of various collectives that work for justice and equality, those of us specifically in favelas, gathered for an act of remembrance of Cláudia da Silva Ferreira murdered by the state (“assassinada pelo estado”) in March of 2014 on the hill of Congonha, Madureira, RJ. Some of the mothers of victims also attended the event and spoke of their pain and their struggles to bring to justice the murderers of their children (all killed by police of the PMRJ) [Military Police of Rio de Janeiro].

Two days later Mora Alemão (“Live Alemão”), an anti-militarization collective in Complexo do Alemão, posted to Facebook the death of another resident at the hands of the military police:

Today 19/03/2015 we lost Vanessa, another resident of Complexo do Alemão.

Every week GENOICDE IS PRESENT!!!!!!

-WE WILL NOT FORGET Dona Dalva, resident of Complexo do Alemão for more than 40 years.
-WE WILL NOT FORGET Caio da Silva, 20-year old black mototaxi driver.
-WE WILL NOT FORGET…the 100 youth killed and missing… in the INSTITUTIONAL SLAUGHTER (“CHACINA INSTITUCIONAL”) of the UPP implementation in Alemão. David de Souza Lima, a 14-year old boy who had gone to visit his aunt and was caught by police officers and tortured and killed. Rafael Bernardino da Silva (20 years old), Geraldo Batista Ribeiro (41), Jairo César da Silva Caetano (28), Bruno Vianna Alcântara (22), Cléber Mendes (36), Bruno Rodrigues Alves (21), Emerson Goulart (26), Uanderson Gandra Ferreira (27) e Marcelo Luiz Madeira (27). Paulo Eduardo dos Santos

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190 See Padrão (2014) for information about the 100 Vezes Cláudia campaign and for a reproduction of the artists’ images.

191 Mora Alemão, Facebook post, 17 Mar 2015

192 This is a pseudonym.
Various people – from organized collectives to single artists and social media users – are thus recording, posting, sharing, and making viral images of police killings and digital names of people who have been killed. They are making digitally visible those whose lives are not remembered, commemorated, or valued within the police apparatus and justice system of Rio de Janeiro, that is, within the coloniality of power of the PACification project.

Activist groups are indeed calling the current conjuncture’s military police violence, specifically, a crisis of representation and discourse. In addition to invisibilizing and sanctioning state-led killing, both the pacification apparatus and Brazilian mass media engage in discursive violence by articulating a dichotomy between “either” military police occupation “or” narcotraffic violence. For instance, according to Coletivo Vinhetando and other Complexo activists I interviewed, when residents fight against the military police violence in their communities, the news media and politicians will often accuse them of preferring narcotraffic rule. Complexo activists argue that this framing simplifies and erases many of the more complex demands of people living in favelas. They have been using social media to make visible and proliferate these demands. For instance, in April of 2014, when I had left Complexo do Alemão to conduct interviews at the World Bank, I sat in a finished basement apartment of a house in an upscale suburb of DC, following on Facebook as a group of activists held a large meeting at the base of Alvorada, at an amphitheatre in Nova Brasília. At this meeting, which they streamed in real time over Facebook Live, they discussed a manifesto to call for an end to military police violence and to discursively reframe notions of public security in their community. In the Manifesto they stated:

The government says that the favelas are pacified. Why then do the police display so many weapons? We want more dialogue between favela residents and the State’s public security present in the territory. We want the freedom to come and go. We want more schools and basic sanitation for residents instead of a cable

193 Ocupa Alemão, Facebook post, 19 Mar 2015
car for tourists. We want the guarantee of our right to expression … Proposals for “PEACE” must be elaborated collectively with all of the favela. A policy for peace is not built with one foot in the door, gratuitously assaulting residents. Peace is not built with a caveirão (war tank). (Coletivos do Alemão 2014)

The writers, organizers, and signatories (of which I am one) were discursively redefining security as, in part, public consultation, and as more than the current forms of repressive militarization. One activist elaborated on the Manifesto, explaining to me, “We are far from advocating the end of the UPP…The fact is that there is no way back to what it was, and neither do we want the arbitrary acts committed by the traffickers. What we can’t accept are the same outrages committed by the state.”

The organizers of the Manifesto distributed it over social media channels, targeting academics and politicians. Their reach was far and digital and their intent discursive and political – to codify public security on their own terms.

In sum, activists in Complexo, specifically, and Rio de Janeiro, more generally, are taking to social media to shift the epistemologies and knowledge politics of state violence. They are doing so by making viral images of police violence, by remembering and celebrating the life of people who have been killed, and by discursively re-codifying public security. While not every effort is successful – indeed, no military police have been convicted in Ferreira’s death – these activists, journalists, and everyday citizens are involved in a discursive battle. They are making visible, via social media and digital technologies, forms of violence heretofore invisibilized by the state and its hegemonic media apparatus.

7.5 Crafting New Urban Imaginaries

Many community journalists and activists in Complexo also express frustration about mainstream media’s portrayal of their favela communities as endemically criminal, and believe that social media offers the potential to disrupt hegemonic discourses of criminalization. They argue that, to mass media outlets, “a favela is always seen as

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194 Interview with Complexo activist 8, March 2015. This activist continued to argue that the weakness of the UPP is the absence of dialogue between the Secretary of Public Security and the people who reside in the favela.
something exotic and different, and a no-go area.”¹⁹⁵ In this section I discuss how local organizers are attempting to intervene in socio-spatial imaginaries of the morro, and how they are leveraging social media to shift discursive boundaries and mobilities between morro and asfalto.

A former tour guide related to me that when non-residents have infrequently entered his community, they have done so under the impression of endemic violence. Tourists, want to take pictures with the poor. Like “Ah, look, look how I am brave and go here. I could be shot there, I could be robbed, but I was there with the poor.” So people were, they feel really brave of coming here, “Oh, I have so much courage, I go to [Complexo do] Alemão.”¹⁹⁶

As this tour guide explains, traversing an imaginary boundary between favela and non-favela space has allowed higher-income, often lighter-skinned people to perform their privileged identities through encounters with this assumed “violence” (see also Freire-Medeiros 2009). In this context, social media has become a tool for community journalists to “Talk to people and spread more and more information to the favela and outside, and spread the other things that we need.”¹⁹⁷ Through social media, activists “try to show that we live amidst violence because the state itself creates violence, but violence is not the only thing that we have inside the favela…The favela is rich, the favela is beautiful. The favela is culture; it’s creativity.”¹⁹⁸

One community organizer elaborated on how social media technologies have been crucial for undermining discourses of violence and have facilitated contact with other, non-morro, Cariocas. Her youth organization stages musical and arts events in locations throughout Complexo, and she promotes these events primarily through Facebook. Her goal is, in part,

¹⁹⁵ Interview with E on 23 March 2015
¹⁹⁶ Interview with former tour operator 2, March 2015
¹⁹⁷ Interview with Complexo journalist 4, March 2015
¹⁹⁸ Interview with Raull Santiago featured in Front Line Defenders’ (2016) video documentary.
to attract Rio residents to favelas for cultural, rather than violent, encounters (Fig 7.3). Social media has thus been a tool to traverse discursive and physical boundaries:

And I think that [the technologies]...increase the interest of people from the asfalto, the formal city about what is actually happening in the favelas...Twitter and Facebook became really big...The tools also became available.... So it sort of made an entrance to the favela. Physically but also symbolically or virtually...Middle class Brazilians now go to the favela to enjoy a party or go to an exhibition...normal things, treat the favela like they're normal, like any other neighborhood, I think that's the first step into some sort of integration, to inclusion of these neighborhoods.199

Social media, to this community organizer, is a way to promote the arts and culture of favela residents without having to engage with a corporate elitist and racist national media. It also allows her to advertise her events to middle class Brazilians and asfalto residents who might not otherwise recognize the vitality of the Complexo community.

One of Complexo’s largest events promoted through Facebook and other social media applications is called Circulando. Circulando is an annual “street event organized by Instituto Raízes em Movimento at a local square” and “is one of the oldest festivals in the favela.”200 Last year, the event included “an exhibition with photographs of the oldest residents of Alemão and there was a small stage where local and guest artists put on a show.” In addition to multiple styles of music – from baile funk, to reggae, to black resistance music – there were also film exhibitions and people presenting their research projects at various locales throughout the expansive complex. Events such as these are a way to “unite all of the organizations of the Complexo do Alemão,” and to “reclaim the necessity of cultural spaces, public spaces in, in the favela.”201

Organizers are staging events like these, in part, to shift digitally-encoded socio-spatial imaginaries. Organizers promote events over Facebook, Whatsapp and Twitter to entice both

199 Interview with Complexo activist 7, March 2015
200 Interview with Complexo activist 7, March 2015
201 Interview with Complexo activist 6, March 2015
favela and non-favela residents to attend Circulando and other cultural shows that feature performances by Complexo artists. They also often record and livestream, or later share via social media, performances. In so doing, they hope to facilitate movement of people across imaginary *asfalto-morro* borders, and also to disrupt the socio-spatial imaginaries of the favela. Through digital sharing of the events, organizers attempt to demonstrate that the favela is not simply a space of endemic violence or police brutality, but houses artists, athletes, musicians, and dancers, much like any other neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro.

### 7.6 Organizing New Media Collectives

Complexo residents are also creating social media collectives to bypass elite-controlled, hegemonic media for their own communication purposes, often for the safety of their community members. There are many different media outlets in Complexo, from Facebook pages of lone journalists to websites of government-funded organizations. In this section I document the variety and breadth of these new social media collectives, and discuss how they are organizing to keep their community members safe in the face of the violent PACification project.

Social media collectives in Complexo do Alemão have myriad purposes, and the journalists who post stories identify in various ways – from activists against state violence to independent media journalists. Marina, who runs a well-frequented community Facebook page, was quick to correct me when I called her an activist:

> The media here we try to say it’s independent media, right? But they are separately distinguished as activist media and community media…There is a group that is totally focused on activism, and one that is totally dedicated to information. Communication. But both are important, right? One impels people to fight. To fight and to be aware of their rights. And the other is important to communicate, disseminate information, and multiply networks.

Four “independent” outlets are representative of the array of new forms of digitized community media in Complexo do Alemão. Marina’s Facebook page is called *Jornal*.

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202 Interview with Complexo journalist 5, March 2015
Complexo Notícias (JCN)\(^{203}\) and she alone is the primary operator. She seeks to “collect and communicate” information to her 17,803 followers with the intent of improving the community. Much of her account activity is sharing posts from a broad network of community journalists, activist reporters, and official Rio institutions. For example, she shares posts from Rio’s Centro de Operações (Centre of Operations) about traffic congestion on the highways near Complexo; pictures of a kombi (VW van) that was recently stolen; promotions of a theatre event in the upscale neighborhood of Leblon; notice of the cancellation of a Riofilme event due to “public security concerns” (read: recent shootouts); and a rooftop image captured by an anti-militarization organization showing blood on the street with the caption “Facts that the traditional media doesn’t show!” Marina is also a well-known photographer in the community and frequently attends cultural and protest events, capturing images that she later posts to Facebook.

One of the first and most well-known Complexo community media outlets is called Jornal Voz da Comunidade (VdC). The organization began as a school assignment in 2005: Rene Silva dos Santos created a one-page community bulletin to share news with residents in the favela complex. The newsletter went online in 2010 and the journal has since developed into a multi-platform media presence with a Twitter account that recently won an international Shorty award (the so-called “Oscars” of social media), a Facebook page that has over 64,000 followers, a website, and Instagram and Snapchat accounts. A sample of posts from VdC’s much-visited Facebook page indicate the broad purview of news VdC reports: celebrating a gold medal win at the Olympics by Cidade de Deus’s Rafaela Silva; sharing news of 35-year old Complexo resident Cristina Elaine succumbing to gunshot wounds suffered during a shootout between military police and narcotraffickers; advertising a giveaway for a local circus in partnership with EDUCAP (Democratic Space of the Union); and relaying social media reports of a shootout in Grota, an entrance to Complexo. While VdC now has a paid staff, Santos continues to be the face of the organization, appearing on both talk shows and telenovelas, and travelling to the United States to share his experiences about what he believes are the “democratizing” potentials of social media. VdC has also become a primary

\(^{203}\) This is a pseudonym.
conduit of information for mass media outlets due in part to Santos’s visibility. *O Globo*, for instance, will sometimes use reports from VdC for their own stories.

Protest and police violence have inspired the creation of specifically anti-militarization collectives. For example, *Coletivo Papo Reto* (CPR) was formed after the aforementioned 2014 protest by a group of community journalists and activists disenchanted with the discourses of criminalization produced by the mass media. This collective calls itself an activist organization and is using social media to try to hold military police accountable for their actions. Members of this group do so through recording and communicating information about military police violence in the name of citizen journalism. This group’s primary goal is to use smartphones to document police abuses and to attempt to hold police accountable in the Carioca context of police impunity:

> For Papo Reto this [technology] is a tool, not only for dialogue, but for resistance and self-protection. Killings have happened here for years, but because of the democratization of social networks, alternative communication, everyone with access to mobile phones, things have become a lot more visible.\(^{204}\)

CPR became well known across Brazil and is receiving international attention (see Duarte 2016; Shaer 2015) after the 2015 military police killing of ten-year-old Eduardo de Jesus Ferreira in Complexo do Alemão. De Jesus Ferreira was shot in what the military police called an “exchange of gunfire” with narcotraffickers. The narrative circulating among Complexo residents recounts that Dona Cleurice, who overheard the shot that killed Ferreira, immediately sent a Whatsapp message to CPR. Members of the collective began filming upon their arrival at the scene. The public prosecutor has since filed homicide motions against the military police officer who fired the shot that killed de Jesus Ferreira, in part due to CPR’s smartphone-recorded video (Salomon 2016). According to Amnesty International, Coletivo Papo Reto’s videos have thus become “key evidence in one of the few investigations ever conducted into what appears to be a deliberate and arbitrary killing committed by the police in a favela” (Salomon 2016:para.11) Although, at the time of writing, the case has been archived and no convictions made. Crucially, CPR points to the

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\(^{204}\) Interview with Raull Santiago featured in Fusion’s video documentary (see Olive, Guzman & Pool 2016).
racialized nature of this violence, calling pacification a genocide against black and brown youth in Rio’s favelas. They have also consulted on Amnesty International’s aforementioned *Jovem Negro Vivo* campaign. CPR’s mandate is, however, broader than recording abuse: they post to their Facebook page images and notices from their large network of followers about the locations of recent shootouts, and offer advice for safe alternate routes of commute. Coletivo Papo Reto’s efforts are also not limited to discussions and incidents of state violence. They attempt to showcase the favela as a space of creativity. CPR’s YouTube channel, for example, shares videos not only about violent events, but also features interviews with local funk DJs and MCs from Complexo.

Finally, *Complexo Jornal*\(^{205}\) is another media outlet that has a large Facebook presence – its page has over 37,000 followers. Like JCN, the page is largely operated by one person. The administrator himself writes most of the page’s posts, and he can make up to 50 a day. The purpose of his page is to “demystify” the “awful” news coverage of Complexo and to undermine the poor misconceptions of the community. His posts, however, focus almost exclusively on violence. For instance, he begins numerous days with a post about waking up to gunshots, and accompanies the description with an ironic “bom dia” (good morning); he writes about cars, houses, and residents being shot; and he notifies favela residents of the suspension of the teleferico due to gunfire.

Although these organizations have different *raisons d’etre* and use social media for different ends, they all have in common a concern for the safety of favela residents. They all use Facebook, specifically, to re-direct people’s safe passage through favela streets, posting information about the locations of shootouts and helping to explain moments of tension and confusion. Even though journalists such as Marina do not want to identify as activists, the delineation between “community” and “activist” media is blurred in a context of state violence. Community media, such as her own Facebook page, is of necessity involved in discussions of violence and rights. She and other outlets such as VdC communicate information about the location and timing of violent incidents and provide advice for commuters to circumvent dangerous areas. This slippage between “community” and

\(^{205}\) This is a pseudonym,
“activist” has a temporal aspect: community news organizations post images, video, and sound clips of shootouts – generally recorded by smartphones – when tension is particularly high in the community. The frequency of violence-related posts by these “non-activist” organizations thus increased during military crackdowns associated with the FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. At these moments the journalists organized many of their posts under hashtags such as #GuerranoAlemão (#WarinAlemão), #SOScomplexo, #genocidio, and #paz (#peace). Even though community media would prefer to circulate information about cultural events rather than images of shootings, the militarization of their communities has necessitated an engagement with discourses of violence.

Moreover, even though these journalists and collectives identify as “independent,” they are also increasingly being included in mainstream media coverage as special favela correspondents. Raull Santiago, a vocal activist and member of numerous community organizations including CPR, has been working for O Globo to report news from Complexo, and has been featured in American-produced, English-language documentaries about police accountability and smartphone technologies. Perhaps most visible to the non-Complexo population, Santos of VdC is regularly featured in O Globo news stories online and on television in addition to his organizing efforts. Outside Brazil, the British newspaper The Guardian recruited Daiene Mendes, a reporter for VdC, to write diary entries for their special Olympic feature “View from the Favelas.” In her work for The Guardian Mendes calls herself a “trafficker…of culture and information…Our weapon is our narrative, and our struggle is for the right to live in Alemão” (Mendes 2016:para24). Overall, then, the boundaries between community/activist, and community/hegemonic media are blurred in the technological practices of Complexo residents.

**7.7 Developing New Digital Applications**

Community journalists, activists and residents are using new web-based applications as tools to communicate with one another both internally (within favela space) and externally (with other actors in Brazil and in different cities in the United States). Community collectives are, in turn, re-shaping these technologies through the new networks that digital infrastructures
facilitate. In what follows I discuss how activists are using and even developing digital applications to facilitate organizing efforts and to hold military police accountable for acts of racialized violence.

Web-based social media applications such as Whatsapp are central communication devices in Complexo. Raull Santiago explains that CPR has a WhatsApp, group called ‘Papo Reto and Residents’. In this group there are taxi drivers, business owners, and residents from every part of Complexo do Alemão. It’s an internal group of survival for the residents, where we exchange information such as for example: ‘There’s a shootout happening on Second Street [Rua Dois]’.

This application has become vital – in its dual signification – for the safe circulation of residents through favela streets.

Whatsapp is also a primary means of communication between community organizers in Complexo. While many activists can be found throughout the favela complex, there are the “usual suspects who have a group on Whatsapp, so that’s where…things are discussed, like we’re going to meet up now.” When the military police of the local UPP recently occupied a public square built by Barraco #55 (see Chapter 6.3.1), a leader of B55 posted a picture on Facebook and Whatsapp. The image was received by the aforementioned “usual suspects” in the Whatsapp group and galvanized a number of organizers to meet in B55’s kitchen the next day. In the meeting the activists planned a music event to be held in and around the square, attempting to reclaim this “cultural” space for their community.

Community collectives are also shaping new digital technologies. Different favela organizations, often in partnership with actors on other continents, are developing new software applications to record police abuses. Coletivo Papo Reto has worked with Witness,

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206 Interview with Raull Santiago featured in Fusion’s video documentary (see Olive, Guzman & Pool 2016).

207 Interview with Complexo activist 7, March 2015
a New York-based Human Rights organization, and NYC app developers Harlo Holmes and Nathan Freitas to help rollout smartphone app CameraV for filming violent military police actions in Complexo. Working across multiple “pacified” Carioca favelas, Forum de Juventudes de Rio de Janeiro (FJRJ, Youth Forum of Rio) recently developed the Android smartphone app called Nós por Nós to record human rights violations of the UPP. The development of the application has involved financial and technical support from Amnesty International, the Ford Foundation, iBase, the Network of Communities Against Violence, and Global Justice. The app is meant to be a “self-defence tool for people to report violence, assaults and killings, particularly by the police” (Cosme Vinicius Felippsen of FJRJ) (Coelho 2016:para 6). According to FJRJ, the app has two crucial features: first, it ensures anonymity of the recorder by coding video, texts, and pictures; second, because FJRJ is responsible for analyzing all recordings, the organization can forward relevant and useful footage directly to the Public Prosecutor or Public Defender’s office: “The app specifically bypasses the police due to the lack of trust between favela residents and officers” (Mastrigt & Reist 2016:para 4).

The interface of Nós por Nós is shifting relationships between users and state officials. The menu offers four options: to enter a complaint; to access a network of support; to know one’s rights; and to map the territory. To submit a complaint the user can enter the location, date and time of the event. He or she can also choose from two drop-down menus to enter the entity that is committing the violation (such as the military police) and the type of violation (such as the abuse of power). The person can then upload an image or video that he or she has recorded on the smartphone. FJRJ not only directs the complaints to the appropriate public office, but also, through the app, gives the contact information for the different entities. The menu option #NetworkofSupport lists different public offices that might be of use to community members whose rights have been violated, such as the Human Rights Coordinator, and offers the physical address, hours of operation, telephone numbers, and email addresses for each. In addition to directing complaints itself and allowing users to follow-up with the appropriate state institutions, FJRJ also has a much-visited Facebook page where the organization posts information about police shootouts and other violences recently reported through Nós por Nós to alert residents of troublesome areas in the community.
Crucial, then, is that activists and organizers are both *using* digital media applications as well as *developing* new ones. They do so for various reasons that range from community organizing, to alerting one another to dangerous areas, to recording police abuse, to linking favela residents with state institutions. Rio residents and organizations are often the instigators of these actions, yet they also communicate and work with so-called experts in application development in places such as New York City. These efforts are also often funded and supported by international NGOs. As such, new digital application technologies are simultaneously remaking networks of Carioca residents and re-shaping relationships across transnational scales of action.

### 7.8 Digital Autoconstruction: Social Media Interventions into Racialized State Violence

In Complexo do Alemão, many of the people I spoke to, protested with, and followed online are deeply engaged in social media practices. At the current conjuncture of PACification’s violence – informed by histories of racialized killing in Brazil – these actors are mobilizing a new form of insurgent citizenship. This citizenship is fomented through the experiences of racialized violence in favelas, and through the new digital spaces of social media. In other words, this conjuncturally-specific insurgent subject, who tries to protect the life of his or her community members, is articulated to subjectivization processes of digital technologies. In this section I elaborate on how social media collectives are being *auto*constructed, led by Complexo residents, but are also linked to state media and transnational entities. I then turn to the significance of their digital practices. I discuss how digitally autoconstructed collectives, alongside other Rio residents, are intervening in three forms of racialized state violence: material mobilities, visibilities of killing, and socio-spatial imaginaries of criminality.

The activists and journalists who are building new digital collectives are engaging in what I call digital autoconstruction. This process is characterized by community members organizing locally-based social media collectives and developing digital interfaces. In Complexo, digital autoconstruction occurs as journalists and activists create Facebook news pages, Whatsapp groups, and web-based technologies in multiple and dispersed form.
Digital autoconstruction is a process that operates in relation with political society and across diverse scales. Just as autoconstruction vis-à-vis Holston (2009) and Caldeira (2017) has been a historical response to state neglect or its transversal logics, recent forms of digital autoconstruction in Complexo are, in part, also a reaction to the state – this time, to the racialized and embodied violence of pacification and other militarized action. The digital autoconstruction demonstrated by activists in Complexo also exposes the relationality between so-called state media and independent media – a contested interface between political and civil society actors. The latter may use or digitally share information produced by “formal” media channels even as they react to the problematic preconceptions of these very sources. They also enter partnerships with state agencies for various giveaways and promote government-sponsored events. *O Globo*, the largest media conglomerate in Brazil, is increasingly featuring leaders from some of Complexo’s most highly visible autoconstructed media collectives such as Santos of VdC and Santiago of CPR. Thus, while hegemonic media remains just that – and still has a tendency to perpetuate discourses of racialized criminality – it operates in relation with these new media collectives. Moreover, Complexo collectives are engaged with and across different scales of action. Groups such as CPR and FJRJ are working with American-based NGOs in New York City, for example, to develop web-based police accountability apps.\(^{208}\) However, the *auto* remains an important signifier to digital autoconstruction: most of the community-based collectives and journalists have created their own social media presences from the ground-up, in an increasingly dispersed

\(^{208}\) CPR has also developed relationships with the Black Lives Matter movement in the US, through physical public forums and the virtual sharing of hashtags. The relationship between the two loosely-defined anti-racial violence “campaigns” is not limited to hashtags. There is increasing dialogue between activists in Brazil and the United States that have resulted in physical meetings both in the US and in Brazil. These communications culminated in a four-day event called *Julho Negro* (Black July) in Rio de Janeiro in July of 2016 (see Barber 2016; Barber et al 2016. The event was co-organized by Amnesty International and included leaders from anti-violence organizations such as Coletivo Papo Reto, FJRJ and Black Lives Matter. Activists and organizations that use social media have been at the forefront of these meetings, and, through the summits, the importance of various forms of media has been debated. Daunasia Yancey, founder of Black Lives Matter Boston, explained that across the two countries, “This is a system of police and the way that the police work. We need the media to be honest, to tell the truth and to share all of these stories. Together we must refuse that any more killings happen” (Barber 2016:para 11). Activists touted social media as a primary means to hold the police accountable in both the US and Brazil where mainstream media often portrays black youth as criminals. In this context of untrusted hegemonic national media, one activist, Debora Maria da Silva, hopes that “international media can bring greater visibility to the police violence that is happening in Brazil” (Barber 2016:para 9).
form of expertise (Leszczynski & Elwood 2015), and are continually mobilizing to counter or circumvent conjuncturally-specific police violence.

Through these new forms of autoconstruction, activists and journalists are engaging in specifically digital practices. Yet these practices are always shaped by and reshaping embodied racialized violence. Whatsapp groups, Facebook pages, and police accountability applications must here be understood as not simply virtual, but as technologies that mediate, and are mediated by, materiality (Leszczynski 2015, 2016; Jefferson 2017). On the one hand, these digital technologies are crafted through material histories of racialized violence. For instance, shootouts on the street, informed by geographically specific histories of racial violence, shape the messages and images that appear on social media. And it is police violence in Carioca favelas that has motivated community members to develop specific forms of digital applications, such as police accountability apps. On the other hand, activists and journalists are using social media in manners that transform material mechanisms of state violence. They do so in a number of significant ways. They intervene in the embodied violence of shootouts on city streets; in the regimes of (in)visibility of state violence perpetrated against racialized peoples; and in the socio-spatial imaginaries of criminality that legitimate violent public security programs. I detail each below.

Through digital networks in Complexo, activists and journalists are attempting to subvert and reshape violent material, embodied encounters. For instance, social media collectives use Whatsapp and Facebook to post images and send messages that communicate the geographic locations of hostile activity. Here digital technologies are leveraged to bypass violence on city streets: followers of JCN, for instance, will circumvent particular areas of the community where Marina has documented tension or shootouts via digital post. In other words, these technologies are reshaping material urban mobilities and thus the very space of the urban. The smartphone and its applications are also mediating new embodied encounters between activists, journalists, and military police officers. Activists are using Whatsapp, for instance, to organize meetings amongst one another to counter military police occupation of public space (such as B55’s recreational square). Citizen and community journalists are also occupying the streets during violent protests and after military police shootings to record
video on their smartphones. These are new risky encounters: while the video recordings may be used in court proceedings, the moment of shooting – with rifle or with smartphone – is shaped by racialized and classed histories of differential precarity. In other words, community journalists are potentially placing themselves in harm’s way and increasing their visibility to the military police apparatus through the embodied nature of these technological practices. Networked media, then, cannot be fetishized, and must be understood as always-already embodied, (re)shaping conjuncturally-specific geographies of violence.

Activists, community organizers, and other residents are using the smartphone and its recording capacity to make visual claims on the state. The digital video recording of the military police dragging Cláudia da Silva Ferreira, for instance, made thousands of people digital witnesses to her death, and the video’s virality incited a state acknowledgement of her killing. CPR’s after-the-fact recording of Eduardo de Jesus Ferreira’s death was partly responsible for the public defender laying charges against the military police. Moreover, and equally significantly, Cariocas have used social media to celebrate the lives of their lost neighbors, posting online events, messages, and visualities in commemoration.

Through these actions, activists, community journalists, and “everyday” citizens are leveraging the epistemological value of visuality (Elwood & Leszczynski 2013; Amoore 2009) – of seeing police violence against racialized bodies – to force the state to take actions against the police, or, at the very least, to make visible police impunity. They are, indeed, sharing digital images to legitimate their claims about disproportionate and embodied violence. Such actions intervene in the state’s power/knowledge apparatus that has heretofore invisibilized state violence. They trouble the ability of the military police to simulate a crime scene, for instance, or to claim homicide as an act of self-defense (see Chapter 4). By proliferating images and video of the act of killing, and attempting to use this digital data in court proceedings via the Public Defender, activists harness and reproduce the value afforded to witnessing violence (Elwood & Leszczynski 2013). Here the image becomes a truth claim about what has really occurred between military police officer and resident. Digital practices are thus shifting the epistemologies of violence in Complexo and Brazil more generally.
Finally, these activists and community journalists are intervening in the socio-spatial imaginaries that characterize their communities. Through social media, community journalists and actors are attempting to dispel myths about favela residents by disrupting criminalization discourses. They do so through promoting events on Facebook pages, recording and sharing cultural activities in favela communities, and trying to attract non-favela residents into their communities for events such as Circulando. They are also re-codifying what public security is to favela residents via, inter alia, the online distribution of digital manifestos. As such, these activists are attempting to disrupt simplistic state-articulated binaries of “military police” versus “narcotraffic” rule that legitimates the pacification project.

7.9 Digital Communities of Care?

At the current conjuncture in Complexo do Alemão, activists and community journalists are creating social media collectives and digital applications through a process of digital autoconstruction across increasingly networked space. Digitally autoconstructed collectives take diverse from, from single Facebook pages with thousands of followers, to organizations operating across multiple social media platforms, to groups designing digital applications focused on police accountability. What remains central to this process, however, is that it is a predominantly bottom-up form of organization concerned with communicating, via digital means, with community members and with the state apparatus. It operates through an increasingly dispersed form of expertise and epistemologically privileges visuality, both processes engendered by social media.

Digital autoconstruction in Rio’s favelas is intervening in the state’s racialized violence. In these communities, state mechanisms have historically and contemporarily attempted to violently manage racialized and impoverished peoples through: tactics of militarized control; erasing and invisibilizing police violence; and constructing socio-spatial imaginaries of endemic criminality. Social media collectives and actors in Complexo do Alemão are using digital technologies, specifically, to contest these mechanisms of state violence. They are intervening in material violence by mediating new embodied urban mobilities and
encounters; they are leveraging visual imagery to make visible state violence and to hold the police accountable for killings; and they are using social and hegemonic media channels to disrupt the socio-spatial imaginaries of their communities and to recodify public security in their own voices. Activists and journalists in Complexo ultimately demonstrate that digitally autoconstructed collectives and their digital practices are shaped through specific histories of racialized violence. Yet these digital practices also provide the means to subvert and re-shape violence in complex and embodied ways, and thus to develop new communities of care and commemoration for one another.
7.10 Figures for Chapter 7

Figure 7.1 “Militarization in the favela—Dislike!” Photo taken 12 Apr 2014 by author.

Figure 7.2 Wall commemoration of pacification’s homicides. Photo taken 23 Jun 2014 by author.

Figure 7.3 Capoeira at an anti-pacification event in a carioca favela. Photo taken 23 Jun 2014 by author.
Chapter 8: Conclusion: Reflecting on the Situated Conjuncture

Many of the activists and organizations I have discussed throughout this dissertation, such as Barraco #55, Coletivo Papo Reto, and Raízes em Movimento, join forces at opportune times to try to hold the state accountable for the latter’s “formalization” and “integration” projects, to safeguard community members, and to autoconstruct “public” space for community residents. While there is no homogeneous activist community, many organizers often do support each other. Members of each were present, for instance, at “A Copra Pra Alemão Ver,” the protest event I described in Chapter 2. This event was one of the last that I attended during my lengthy research trip in Complexo. I was invited by a friend in Coletivo Papo Reto who I had gotten to know quite well, and, once there, spent the evening helping to string up banners and witness activists’ myriad forms of remaking public space. I return to this event, here, for two main reasons. First, it serves as a sort of microcosm of the lifeworlds of Complexo. The event itself comprised film artists from abroad (from Belgium); film and street artists from Complexo (Fig 8.1); local activists and organizers; and “ordinary” residents. All of these people are situated differently in Complexo, but came to speak out against, or form a sort of resistance to, tourist and mega event infrastructures and the violent militarization of the community. As such, it also demonstrates a juxtaposition of residents’ and activists’ messaging with respect to the qualitatively new state presence in Complexo. Many of the political messages were directed at PAC or pacification, and often both simultaneously through the prism of the World Cup (see Fig 2.2, 2.3, & 2.11). They often targeted the PT party and Dilma, specifically, as the “government” that was paying substantial interest rates on debt and building tourist infrastructure rather than meeting the basic needs of favela residents. The event also demonstrated some of the myriad ways people are trying to make claims to live safely in their communities. They were (and continue to) assert their agency and rights in re-making space for themselves by occupying physical space in the square while listening to baile funk, and by painting political message on so-called “public” walls, all under the watchful gaze of the military police. The event thus demonstrates the building of community – through art making, music listening, and, yes,
beer drinking – while also targeting and critiquing violent (state) projects within this community.

Second, the name of the event itself exposes the ongoing history of PACification: the contemporary politics of a mega event-driven municipal agenda alongside the deep histories of race and racialization, intersected with class, in Brazil that have made some lives more expendable than others in this pursuit of investment and market formalization. “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver” (The Cup for the Germans to See) is in part a play on the name of the community – Complexo do Alemão meaning, in English, the German Complex or the Complex of the German. At this particular moment, the organizers were attempting to draw German (or other nationalities’) eyes to the atrocities of the country’s (Brazil) and city’s (Rio de Janeiro) mega event-driven urbanization agenda, particularly those aspects of PACification that have adversely affected Complexo do Alemão. The organizers were indeed using the visibility of the World Cup to simultaneously critique it (and its related infrastructural and security manifestations) and spread their message to a wider audience (through, for instance, filming documentaries).

But “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver” is also a play on the phrase “para inglês ver.” This latter saying is common in Brazilian Portuguese. It means “for the English to see.” People in Brazil often use this term to refer to an image Brazil is trying to project to “outsiders” (through, for instance, a progressive law, regulation, or program), while the politics of how it actually manifests may look quite different on the ground (or, indeed, it may never come to fruition). “Para inglês ver” has been important for me to keep in mind, methodologically, throughout this research project, because it has provoked me to understand how interviews or events might be staged to communicate a particular message. In other words, it has forced me to question what is being shown to me as an “outsider,” as a Canadian, “pra canadense ver” (for the Canadian to see). But the genealogy of the term “para inglês ver” is also central to my conceptual framework for this project. The phrase was first used when the British were beginning to abolish slavery in their colonies, yet colonial and imperial Brazil wished to maintain the transatlantic slave trade because its economy relied on slave labour. Under pressure from the British, Brazil instituted Feijo’s Law in 1831 that prohibited slaves being
brought to Brazil. Despite this law, the transatlantic slave trade to Brazil actually intensified in the period following the law’s imposition, and slavery within the country continued (Holston 2009). The law was, in effect, “para inglês ver” (for the English to see). While, as far as I am aware, most people do not allude explicitly to the origins of the term when using this phrase, or derivations such as “pra alemão ver” or “pra canadense ver,” the meaning continues to haunt these phrases and practices, just as racialized economies continue to haunt present-day PACification violences. With PACification, some organizers and journalists are interpreting “saving good workers” and building large cable car systems as “pra brasileiro ver,” “pra canadense ver,” and “pra inglês ver.” As in 1831, however, the Brazilian economy continues to rely on and reproduce racialized and classed geographies, albeit in transformed fashion as a function of this conjuncture’s marketization strategies and accumulation needs.

In this concluding chapter I draw out some of these key themes as I briefly return to the overall argument of my dissertation. I then discuss the conjunctural analytic I developed in Chapter 2, and turn to the ways it has helped me make sense of the divergent empirical and conceptual threads throughout the dissertation, and how it has contributed to my main argument. Finally, I conclude this chapter (and dissertation) with some reflections on the difficulties but necessities of continuing this work.

8.1 The Argument (Redux)

In this dissertation I have been arguing that PAC’s infrastructural upgrading and pacification’s military police occupation must be understood as interrelated projects, that is, as PACification. Both have simultaneously brought a large-scale, visceral, and violent state presence to Complexo do Alemão. PACification is a market and security nexus: it has sought to advance a formal market frontier through the Workers’ Party’s neodevelopmentalist agenda, through extension of microcredit loans, and through registering property and employment for collateral and for contributions to the Workers’ Pension Fund on which

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210 A Rio on Watch report (see Ashcroft 2015) also argues that the Complexo do Alemão teleferico is a project “para inglês ver,” and, in fact, many projects or laws that are para inglês ver disproportionately hurt Afro-Brazilians because of their disenfranchised positions in Brazilian society.
Brazilian political and civil society relies. Both PAC and pacification have also sought to “return” favela territory to the state, in order to securitize Rio de Janeiro more generally for international investment, and to secure the new projects of market formalization in Complexo and other carioca favelas. While PACification is novel, in that it is oriented to contemporary municipal politics and creates a conjuncturally-specific relationship between favelas and a powerful political apparatus (Cavalcanti 2015), it also must be understood in its historical lineage. It is not simply a new project, but is historically informed by past governance administrations such as the military dictatorship and in historically-embedded regimes of racialized accumulation. That people can be killed, for instance, in the name of securitizing territory and in the cause of market formalization can be understood through a focus on historically-produced killability, and who can be rendered expendable for the sake of capitalist development. Through this lens, PACification is not contradictory, but is an attempt to manage past processes (such as the growth of Comando Vermelho), as well as to accumulate financial and poverty capital at the present moment.

Yet PACification is also a united project because it appears so to, and is lived as such by, residents of Complexo do Alemão. As demonstrated at “A Copa Pra Alemão Ver,” residents often speak of the projects in the same breath, or in the same street art painting, and, indeed, their (and my) mobility throughout the complex was shaped by the physical (and not simply conceptual) proximity of the UPP and teleferico stations. PACification is thus not simply a top-down imposition of power, but is a concept that also must capture how people live and negotiate these projects in their day-to-day lives. And it is through their own historically-informed actions such as autoconstruction that residents and activists simultaneously remake their own communities and their relationship with PACification’s political apparatus. I tease these ideas out below.

8.2 The Situated Conjuncture

PACification is aconjuncturally-specific project. It is a manifestation of historical forces that are shaped by the present-day need to mobilize financial capital in a Brazilian context of internal debt and external financial crises and global circulations of finance. A primary
purpose of this dissertation has been to develop a conjunctural analytic that helps guide a historically-informed understanding of urbanization projects such as PACification. As such, it can be situated within postcolonial or global urban research agendas. It also takes seriously political economies, regimes of accumulation, and the deep histories of social difference across time and space that may be more common to political economic and structural theoretical approaches. As such, the conjunctural methodology developed throughout this dissertation can be thought of as a bridging methodology between sometimes disparate and discrepant tendencies in English language urban studies.

Instead of using models of the urban developed in North-Atlantic contexts, or reading off abstract conceptualizations of capitalism, I have drawn specifically on two located provocations and theoretical impulses: inspired by Brazilian urbanists, I have developed an analytic to think of favelas relationally – as not separate from, but foundational to, urban governing logics; and, inspired by decolonial philosophers of Latin America, I have foregrounded ongoing forms of coloniality (such as racialization) that shape contemporary PACification. I have also drawn on the work of Gramscian geographers, in conversation with these Brazilian urbanists and decolonial philosophers, to develop a situated conjunctural framework that can help explain urbanization processes such as market formalization in and securitization of “informal” or “precarious” settlements. This framework emphasizes four related characteristics of conjunctures. Here, spatio-temporal conjunctures (and their urbanization processes) are shaped by, first, historical determination, or the myriad social relations that have been negotiated historically and continue to inform the present. Second, relationality between civil/political society (and, in Brazil, between favelas/the formal city), or the constant negotiation between myriad actors and governance regimes that depend on and unite seemingly distinct spaces. Third, interscalar space-time flows, or the spatio-temporal trajectories of capital, people, policies, and symbols that influence urban projects. And fourth, dual modes of articulation, or the conjoining of regimes of accumulation and racialization processes, and the enunciations, or discourses, that shape governing logics and variously (de)legitimate different forms of urbanization. Below I return to this conjunctural analytic and describe how it has helped me make sense of the current project of PACification in Complexo do Alemão.
8.2.1 Historical Determination

To Gramscian scholars conjunctures are historically determined. Urbanization processes, in any given conjuncture, are shaped by the appropriation of economic surplus through historically-situated classed, racialized, and gendered struggles (Glassman 2003). Centering historical determination in this dissertation exposes the actors (and relationships) that seize large amounts of PAC money, and focuses on how these actors have come to exert the influence they currently do, as well as the character of that influence. In Chapter 5, specifically, I discussed how Brazil’s construction conglomerates – such as Odebrecht – are an integral part of a political society that is rumoured, at least, to siphon money through oft-time illicit and “informal” means. These construction conglomerates are able to do so as a function of their historical development, including their significant growth during the military dictatorship; and their historically carved out role in the political apparatus, in which they reportedly reproduce the longstanding practice of bribing state officials (at the time of research, former Rio governor Sérgio Cabral) for public works projects such as PAC-Alemão. Residents, too, may attempt to appropriate influxes of capital, but their narratives demonstrate their differential class status, and indeed cast this appropriation as perhaps a form of agency. In other words, some residents have been able to seize some money (albeit minimal amounts compared to Odebrecht) to improve their homes or augment their income in what can be considered a constrained but generative fashion.

Decolonial scholars working within the modernity/coloniality framework point to other macro or meso level historical processes that shape any given conjuncture, including the coloniality of power, or interrelated race/accumulation regimes. Throughout this dissertation, and particularly in Chapter 4, I have argued that PACification is a conjuncturally-specific project of the coloniality of power. It is premised on situated processes of racialization that, in Brazil and Rio, include miscegenation narratives/ideologies, the spatialization of race in favelas, and the casting of narcotraffickers as internal enemies who can be legitimately killed by the state. These historically-embedded processes are articulated with contemporary regimes of accumulation, such as the accrual of poverty capital through neodevelopmentalist ends. In this context, favelas have been targeted for the extension of microcredit loans and
regularization of property rights. Thus, as a function of this specific conjuncture, PACification targets racialized communities for market formalization and debt consumption with its simultaneous, and historically-derived, military police security apparatus.

Yet the empirical chapters in this dissertation also demonstrate the importance of the historically informed, everyday ways people try to respond to and live under these conditions. In other words, conjunctures are not simply shaped by large-scale processes, or tectonic plates, such as colonialism and capitalism, but also by how myriad people engage with these processes. And these ways that people behave, too, are shaped by the histories of their own communities. In Brazil, this has meant that the practices of, and identities associated with, autoconstruction – or building homes over generations – continue to shape contemporary practices, even as they are transformed in the face of large-scale upgrading. Autoconstruction – and belonging to favela communities – remains important at the contemporary conjuncture, as new Minha Casa, Minha Vida residents house their neighbours whose homes have been razed by PAC works; as community members add a roof to the top of a home in case the government will “come back” and buy it; as organizers and leaders build new recreational facilities for youth; and as journalists and activists create new digital communities that attempt to keep one another safe. These forms of autoconstruction are conjuncturally-specific: they are a function of contemporary PACification forces – facilitated, in part, by new housing and digital infrastructures – and reshape PACification in residents’ everyday lives. Here, the conjuncture must be understood at the level of behavior, affect, and belonging, and not simply race or labour relations.

8.2.2 Relationality of Political and Civil Society, and of Favelas

Conjunctures – and their respective urbanization processes – are also shaped by ever-transforming relations between civil and political society. Throughout this dissertation I have employed a Gramsican notion of the “state” as the “ruling class,” which exceeds the formal government apparatus (Dussel 2008). The integral state in Brazil includes construction conglomerates, real estate developers, the military police apparatus, members of congress, political machine operators, and a whole host of people who move in and out of relationships.
with these entities throughout their daily lives (Telles 2010, 2015). The state, to Gramscians, rules through hegemony, or negotiated consent and coercion. PACification is, indeed, a conjuncturally-specific project of hegemony. PACification operates, in one sense, in the colloquial meaning of the term “pacification.” It has involved highly visible infrastructural projects that may (incompletely) pacify the community: residents who I interviewed in Complexo were, in general, happy that they were receiving something from the government in the wake of historical neglect or much smaller-scale interventions. They saw the PT as a party that redistributed some money, albeit in a way that did not accurately reflect the community’s needs and that left many promises broken. Moreover, the neodevelopmentalist agenda of PAC is a function of historically-negotiated hegemony: urban and workers’ social movements in Brazil – most obviously manifest in the Workers’ Party (PT) – were successful in achieving electoral power, and thus introduced this (somewhat) favela-friendly, redistributive project. People in Rio’s favelas, too, are active in negotiating PACification’s hegemony, as some “entrepreneurs,” for instance secure third party contracts for building the actual PAC projects. Here, infrastructural works can be thought of as a form of negotiated consent.

Yet this consent is not complete. As shown in Chapter 5, residents’ critiques of consultation and corruption repeatedly demonstrate that the community has long had alternate priorities, and that many within the complex – such as João of ReM – will continue to fight for more meaningful investment. PACification also demonstrates how hegemony is achieved through coercion when consent cannot be maintained: the military police apparatus has had to operate through violent repression (Dussel 2008) in order to securitize Rio, generally, and Complexo, specifically, for investment.

Relations between political and civil society have taken specific, historical, and territorialized form in Rio’s favelas. Historically, the (informal) development of these communities was supported by political elites who benefited from the low-waged labour of civil society. Favelas were also spaces of clientelist relations and water spigot politics that tied voters to politicians. Now, through PACification, these racialized and classed spaces continue to be used as political capital but in contemporary, conjuncturally-specific ways:
residents repeatedly described to me how large-scale projects such as the teleferico have been means for the municipal and state PMDB and federal PT to gain visibility and retain electoral power amongst Brazil’s lower-income populations.

This dissertation has also demonstrated the ongoing porosity between civil and political society, and the ever-contested government interface that is negotiated through urbanization projects. Each empirical chapter has focused on this porousness and relationality in a different way. Chapter 5 documented the many different people or entities in Complexo related to government-led PACification. For instance, residents were often hired to take censuses and to assist in housing valuation determinations; many people were employed by the state, via resident associations, to operate the teleferico; and numerous locally-owned construction companies were engaged (in sometimes clandestine fashion) as third party contractors. Narcotraffickers, too, were influential in how PACification decisions were made, although how they did so is less easy, or safe, to determine. I have also focused on how notions and practices of formalization flow across a contested civil and political society interface. In both Chapters 5 and 6 I discussed how residents have been trying to hold the government accountable to the latter’s rhetoric of formalization and consultation, from João of ReM meeting government officials in Brasília, to activists building common areas for youth while the military police calls their existence “informal.” Here, the idea of formalization as a state or government practice is troubled, as residents, too, engage in various forms of subversive formalization. Finally, in Chapter 7 I documented how community journalists and activists are increasingly engaging with, and becoming a part of, the state/hegemonic media apparatus, as they share images and news from the latter, and are increasingly being hired as special favela correspondents. Even when these autoconstructed collectives are targeting the violence of the military police, they exist in constant relation with the state: military police violence is a primary condition or inspiration for their being.

Teresa Caldeira’s (2017) notion of peripheral urbanization captures the transforming relationality between residents of the periphery and state/government/civil society logics. She argues that residents of Brazil’s periphery have engaged the state in transversal ways, which Vera Telles (2015) documents as relationships of repression, consented transgression,
clientelism, and extortion, among other forms. Caldeira emphasizes peripheral urbanization’s spatio-temporal displacement: as homes become upgraded and increase in value, peripheral urbanization—and these transversal engagements—move elsewhere. What this dissertation has demonstrated, however, is that these transversal engagements continue to exist (albeit in transforming ways) as previously “peripheral” neighborhoods are “upgraded” and “integrated.” Through digital autoconstruction and subversive formalization, for instance, many residents continually relate to the state, and, indeed, appropriate official government rhetoric and practice, even when different state actors—such as the military police—do not. These practices, though, are intricately and intimately tied to shifting modes of belonging to a morro-community: formalization is articulated to and through practices of community-led autoconstruction; and digital forms of autoconstruction are premised on saving community member’s lives. In other words, forms of belonging associated with peripheral urbanization do not disappear, but continue to inform (in ever-shifting ways) the practices of community members.

8.2.3 Interscalar Analyses of Space-Time Flows

Conjunctures, following Gillian Hart (2003), are the result of myriad social relations operating at various interconnected scales. These include flows of capital, images, identities, cultural symbols, digital media, and relationships. PACification can only be understood as the result of conjuncturally-specific flows of finance, for instance: it is a neodevelopmentalist project intended to mobilize capital investment to protect the Brazilian economy from global financial crisis; it is a redistributive project that directs flows of capital to construction conglomerates and diverse political actors; and it enrolls people in new financialized relationships with banks and the state that facilitate capital contributions to FI-FGTS (O Fundo de Investimento do Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço, or The Investment Fund of the Guarantee Fund Based on Service Time Contributions) (which then recirculates this money into banks, some of which fund the country’s infrastructural projects).

PACification, too, as marketization and security complex is the result of political alignments, tensions, and relationships across different scales of government. The federal PT of Lula,
alongside the state PMDB of Cabral and the municipal PMDB of Paes, were all operating in a shared project to market Rio as a World and Olympic City, with a goal to stimulate investment through this mega event-driven agenda. As Mariana Cavalcanti (2015) argues, PACification here can be understood as a project to securitize Rio and make highly visible the integration of morro/asfalto through large-scale projects such as teleferico systems. I add, too, that this political relationship across different levels of government was both an alignment of urbanization policies and an alignment of security policies and personnel: Lula, for instance, sent the National Guard to Complexo to securitize the Pan Am Games, and the municipal government, in collaboration with the NGO sector and the state military police, is now administering Rio+Social. Yet urbanization and securitization policies are not simply derived from within the national context. Both the “social inclusion” impetus of PAC, and the securitization impetus of pacification, are manifestations of a Brazilian government oriented to global capital and the protection of international investment. These projects are also shaped by transnational policy mobilities. Complexo’s teleferico, for instance, was inspired by a similar gondola system in Medellin; and the community orientation of pacification was derived from models in North America and Colombia. Thus, a conjunctural analytic must also pay attention to these transnational policy mobilities, in ways that I have only been able to gesture towards in this dissertation.

Of central concern in this dissertation has been the importance of PACification’s space-time flows of images, media, symbols, and digital information that may disrupt, or transform, asfalto-morro divides. PACification has, in some senses, been an attempt to physically, behaviourally, and symbolically integrate morro and asfalto. Indeed, the teleferico, while it was running, brought tourists and other cariocas to Complexo. Some of these tourists hired community-based tour companies, and were thus able to learn about the Complexo community from locals. Others rode the gondola system and, with its zoo-like gaze across residents’ rooftops, potentially re-entrenched colonial lines of sight. Moreover, PACification’s formalization projects have attempted to “put into form” particular behaviours associated with civilized, asfalto-living through, for instance, condominium living courses. Yet these impulses are not entirely repressive. Activists and organizers are using digital media to circulate images, news stories, and event advertisements to undermine
discourses and imaginaries that equate favelas with violence. Autoconstructed digital communities are, specifically, using digital flows of information to communicate with, and indeed intervene in, state regimes of visibility that erase the deaths of favela-residents. They are also developing web-based applications to report violence directly to the Public Defender and, in so doing, digitally by-pass the untrusted police apparatus. Rio activists are developing these apps with assistance from designers in New York, and are thus engaging in new transnational solidarities that bring into closer relation points distant in Euclidean space.

8.2.4 Articulation in its Dual Sense

Finally, the conjunctural analytic I have developed throughout the dissertation foregrounds the notion of articulation in its dual sense – as both conjoining and enunciation. My focus has been, in part, on understanding the relationship, or juxtaposition, of PAC and pacification strategies. As Cavalcanti argues, the two projects are united in their goals of securitization for economic development in pursuit of Rio Global. Yet I have also historically situated this project, arguing that it is a transformation and mutation of previous manifestations of the coloniality of power, or articulations of race and accumulation regimes. Contemporary PACification in Rio de Janeiro is premised on accruing financialized capital and extending a market frontier by focusing marketization and securitization efforts in racialized space. As such, the project is predicated on previous regimes of racialization, but also creates new ones as the state codifies new “internal enemies” of its capital accumulation strategies.

Thus, enunciations have been central to PACification and urbanization processes of the present conjuncture. The distinction between “internal enemies” and “good workers” has legitimated the state’s quest to “re-take territory” for accumulation efforts. The policing and media apparatus of the state/political society constructs these criminal threats as endemic to favela territory, and violently manages them through military tactics, while invisibilizing the deaths of those killed (both narcotraffickers and those hit by “balas perdidas” or lost bullets). PACification is thus also a regime of selective visibility and performative discourse, premised on historical racial formations and lethal practices of the military police informed, in particular, by the military dictatorship.
But discursive enunciations are also central to the political critiques of PACification. For instance, many anti-militarization activists are discursively intervening in regimes of invisibility, making virally and digitally-visible the lives of those lost through the PACification effort. Many organizers and residents are also, as described above, attempting to shift socio-spatial imaginaries of favelas, promoting cultural events, artistic endeavours, and dance parties to complicate a narrative of violence. Finally, many activists, journalists, and residents continually mount critiques of the state’s diverse forms of “corruption” and investment appropriation, thus delegitimizing the PACification effort and disrupting some of its hegemonic impulses. Discourse here is productive in creating the “truth” of PACification, and unsettling official government rhetoric.

8.2.5 Moving Conjunctural Analyses Forward

The conjunctural analytic I have developed throughout this dissertation is by definition situated. I have crafted it through engaging with literatures developed in Brazil and Latin America, which have foregrounded contextual concerns. As such, the way I have deployed a conjunctural analysis may not be completely transferable to other contexts throughout the globe. For instance, histories of racialization may be less important than caste in some conjunctures, although the two may be interrelated. As such, I understand this analytic as a starting point for ways to do conjunctural analysis from a global urban or postcolonial urban standpoint, but one that needs to be contextually amended based on the theories being generated and created by academics, activists, and residents in different parts of the globe.

A conjunctural analytic also begs the question: can the concepts derived from this approach travel, and if so, how far? In other words, can PACification as a concept move beyond Complexo to explain urbanization processes in other Rio favelas? And urbanization processes in other precarious settlements across the globe? PACification, as I have developed it throughout the dissertation, is a midlevel concept premised on the experiences of people in Complexo do Alemão that will also have something to say, albeit less specifically, the greater the conjunctural differences. In other words, PACification processes will be more
similar the greater the similarities that exist between respective conjunctures (for instance, other favelas in Rio will likely share more similar conjunctural characteristics with Complexo than with precarious settlements in São Paulo or Johannesburg). I have developed this conceptualization based on the particularity of histories in Brazil, such as national militarization strategies and municipal development agendas. Thus, PACification as a concept necessarily points to urbanization processes in Rio de Janeiro, specifically, and perhaps Brazil more generally. Yet at an abstract level, PACification can also pose particular questions of and insights for different conjunctures: it points to the articulations of public security, market formalization, and investment attraction that take shape through deeply embedded racialized histories and also contemporary transnational economies. A further refined approach would situate these seemingly local, regional, and national projects transnationally and globally, attempting to understand how they operate within a security archipelago (Amar 2013) or a global security industry (Tadiar 2017; da Silva 2016).

8.3 Final Reflections

This research project has been difficult and is far from perfect. It would be disingenuous of me to end the dissertation without reflecting on my own goals and abilities to realize them. I would also like to take some space to reiterate the necessity of conducting responsible “global urban,” “postcolonial,” and “decolonial” research, and the inherent difficulties in so doing.

I had two primary goals for this dissertation, one theoretical and one political. My first goal was to begin to elaborate a conjunctural analytic that takes seriously postcolonial urbanism, decolonial philosophy, and Brazilian urbanists writing in both English and Brazilian Portuguese. Most of the above discussion has attempted to reiterate and consolidate this approach. And while this dissertation is certainly a step towards developing a conjunctural urban methodology, it is by no means exhaustive nor should it supplant other postcolonial approaches such as comparative urbanism. Taking seriously the call to disrupt a God’s-eye

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211 Due to the limits of dissertation research, I have paid less attention to transnational flows of policy, capital, and people, although these too are important lines of analysis of any conjuncture.
view of urbanization processes, this dissertation presents only one of multiple ways of developing understandings of the urban and engaging urbanization processes. Yet I do believe it is a step towards thinking about the situated ways urbanization occurs – as situated processes that must be understood through situated analytics. There are still, however, numerous ways to continue to develop this analytic with respect to PACification itself. A conjunctural analysis should better account for transnational processes (as explained above), but it should also better incorporate epistemological and ontological differences in how people live their everyday lives. While I had initially wanted to understand and engage with different spiritual and cosmological ontologies present in Complexo (as per the Zapatista “walking with” methodology; see Sundberg 2014), this proved too difficult in a limited-term research project, while also raising the risk of cultural appropriation. These forms of engagement require time, attention, care, mutual respect, and long-term relationships, much of which exceeds the parameters of a dissertation project. As such, I have not realized this particular desire, but believe that future research should work towards ongoing and responsible engagements with different ways of being and living.

My second purpose was political – to intervene in debates about urbanization and to support the efforts of local activists. On final reflection, I have only partly fulfilled this goal. I have stood with activists, I have recorded PACification’s abuses in this dissertation and beyond, and I have continued to work on relationships fomented in Complexo. This dissertation, too, serves as a written record and witness to some of the hardships, but also the agency, love, and care, shown amongst people in Rio’s most notorious complex of favelas. Hopefully, my discussion within these pages might help shift morro/asfalto discourses and imaginaries, and has perhaps amplified the voices of some people who are often silenced in academic and hegemonic discourse (although always retold, inevitably, through my own framing and research agenda). How much this will contribute to on-the-ground organizing efforts, as Brazilian politics continues to experience upheaval and as the military police continue to kill people in Rio’s favelas, I am uncertain.

This project has revealed to me the difficulty of conducting research attuned to a postcolonial, global, or decolonial agenda. I have not decentered my voice as much as I
wished, for lack of knowledge of the best ways of doing so, and for the lack of time and tools required for such a demanding task. This project was, in many ways, too ambitious, attempting to learn a new language and a new geographical context, and develop new relationships, with very little previous knowledge of Brazil. And yet… Despite the physical, emotional, and psychological toll of the research, living in Complexo, standing with activists, dancing baile funk, and playing capoeira have been some of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and I only hope to do some justice to the relationships I have developed and people who contributed to this project as I continue my work into the future.
8.4 Figures for Conclusion

Figure 8.1 A Copa Pra Alemão Ver setup. Photo taken 8 Jun 2014 by author.
Bibliography


