SOCIALIST URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE CITY OF RIJEKA, YUGOSLAVIA,
DURING THE 1960S

by

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Abstract

The city of Rijeka is situated on the point where the Mediterranean Sea penetrates deeply into the European continent. Between 1945 and 1991 the city was governed by the Yugoslav socialist state. As an important industrial center with a wide array of manufacturing economic branches and the largest port in the entire Yugoslav federation, Rijeka witnessed a significant immigration from other parts of the country.

During the 1960s and the 1970s the Yugoslav federal government enacted a series of laws that decentralized the state. One of the most notable ones was the Law on Workers’ Self-Management which established workers’ collectives in all major enterprises. The decision-making process was lowered to the local level, and this shift had a significant impact on the urban development process in Rijeka. The urban expansion was a joint effort of four parties – the workers’ collectives, the Council for Urban Planning, the Urbanist Institute, and the large construction companies. These four parties were responsible for Rijeka’s urban development and the creation of Rijeka as a functional Yugoslav socialist city. The interrelation between the major actors in Rijeka’s urban expansion was an important element in the narrative as it produced the urban fabric that is distinctly Yugoslav socialist.

The historical heritage, challenging topography, massive immigration, and the multitude of parties involved in the urban development process were some of the notable factors in Rijeka’s urban expansion during the communist rule. However, topography and the official discourse were the most significant challenges to achieve optimal urban development. Therefore, I argue that the urban development process in Rijeka during the Yugoslav socialist period was a result of the interrelation between the Yugoslav communist ideology and the challenging terrain configuration.
Preface

This thesis is entirely the original, unpublished, and independent work of the author, Dorjan Lecki.
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List of Symbols, Abbreviations or Other

CPY – The Communist Party of Yugoslavia

SR – The Socialist Republic
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I dedicate my thesis to my parents who have supported me no matter how far away we have been during the process. I would also like to express my dedication to all the members of my family. Your continuous support and words of encouragement made this possible. Thank you!
To my parents and family
Chapter 1. Introduction

At the end of the Second World War in Europe by May of 1945, the city of Rijeka (Croatia, former Yugoslavia) lay in ruins. The aerial bombardment efforts carried out by the Allied forces and the German retaliation for losing the war left the urban fabric in terrible condition.\(^1\) The Allied air raids did not have a specific target, while the Germans wanted to decimate Rijeka’s major industrial complexes.\(^2\) As a result, both the urban fabric and the economic capacity of the city were destroyed. Fierce battles inside the city produced even more damage to the state of the majority of urban structures. After the Yugoslav forces had liberated the city on May 3\(^{rd}\), 1945, the new Yugoslav administration realized the scale of the destructiveness of the Second World War on Rijeka’s built environment.

The city was left with the question of what was to be done to repair this massive damage Rijeka’s urban fabric. A city in ruins can be perceived as a *tabula rasa* for future urban development. Therefore, many questions regarding the urban design and construction after the Second World War in Rijeka emerged. What practices the new communist authorities implemented in their efforts to reconstruct and expand the city? What challenges impeded their plans? What processes in the broader context of postwar Yugoslavia and Europe influenced the patterns of urban (re)development? Was the process of urban development static or did it evolve during the decades of the communist rule? This thesis will examine the complex narrative behind the urban expansion of the city of Rijeka during the communist period.

The study is organized in five chapters that are crucial for understanding the process of urban development of Rijeka during the communist rule. The historical context provides an overview of

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2. Rajko Samueli Kačić, “Riječka bitka.”
the most significant socio-economic and political changes that are related to shifts in sovereignties as one of the notable factors that had an impact on the spatial patterns of Rijeka’s urban expansion during the twentieth century. In Rijeka’s case, the twentieth century was very turbulent in political terms, and each state that governed the city during the last 150 years produced spatial patterns and left its spatial marks. Therefore, the first chapter of the analysis is focused on the importance of historical events and processes on Rijeka’s urban development. The attitudes of the communist authorities towards the built inheritance of certain states that governed the region before them depended on the function and the built quality of the structures. In addition, they wanted to create new spaces and incorporate their planning ideas and practices into the existing ones, thus creating an interesting urban environment consisting of new socialist neighborhoods and “socialist enriched” existing spaces.

Newly erected neighborhoods were dominant in terms of spatial prevalence. The majority of them were a result of implementing the Yugoslav specific workers’ self-management system. Hence, the second chapter of the analysis emphasizes the manner, the scale, and the legacy of the spatial application of the self-management system in Rijeka. The urban development became the responsibility of three parties – the workers’ councils that were established in every major enterprise, the local Urban Planning Institute that was responsible for the regulatory plans, and the Council for Urban Planning that was a political body related to the municipal government. The consequences of this interesting dynamic were visible in planning, regulating, financing, and erecting novel neighborhoods as a part of the urban development efforts in Rijeka.

Although workers’ self-management was the economic policy characteristic to all of Yugoslavia, its relevance in Rijeka’s case is different from the cases of the most important Yugoslav urban centers, most notably Belgrade and Zagreb. However, narrowing the focus of the comparative
analysis strictly to the two most influential ex-Yugoslav cities would not be fruitful. Therefore, the case of Rijeka is observed and compared with a half-dozen other Yugoslav urban centers, and the majority of them were of similar size, gravitational strength, and functional importance. When one compares the cities of similar scale and significance, the results of this comparison demonstrate whether the urban planning practices were similar or different in various urban centers. The third chapter of the analysis deals with Rijeka’s similarities and unique features in terms of urban development during the socialist period. Rijeka’s challenging topography, the significance of the industrial enterprises in the urban expansion, the concept of a compact, linear city with prevalent vertical development are some distinct features that distinguish Rijeka from other Yugoslav cities.

The final analytical chapter focuses on a specific area in Rijeka’s urban landscape, an area that is intertwined with historical inheritance – the downtown core as the area had urban forms that were created during the previous historical periods. The attitude of the communist authorities towards the part of Rijeka’s urban entity that was a legacy of the previous bourgeois capitalist values and ideals can be perceived as rather pragmatic. The local government embraced the individualistic approach towards the existing urban structures in the downtown core, and pragmatism is best seen in the decisions regarding the structures that were to be kept, functionally reassigned, or demolished and reconstructed. Overall, the urban core was a specific area in Rijeka due to the legacy of history, and there were several plans to address the issues of the city center.

Architecture and urbanism in the former Yugoslavian state were under the influence of various sources. Although the country was primarily socialist, a significant influence also came from the modernist architecture of the West, most notably from functionalism associated with Le Corbusier
and his Athens Charter. The Yugoslav leadership wanted to create urban spaces that would embrace both the communist ideology of the country and the global trends in architecture and urban design. Consequently, the Yugoslav interpretation of socialist urban planning was in accordance with the official political affiliation of the country – the “in-between” entity as a member and initiator of the Non-aligned movement. Hence, the guiding principles of the Yugoslav socialist urbanism were functionality and rationality. The economic hardships that the federation experienced especially in the first decade of its existence conditioned the urban development of the country. Although economic hardships existed, large-scale elaborate plans were developed in the most prominent Yugoslav urban centers, most notably the federal capital Belgrade, and Zagreb, as the two most populous cities in the federation. These two metropolises are characterized by the existence of large-scale socialist parts of the city which were named in a way that can be perceived as a break with the past or as something completely novel. In both Belgrade and Zagreb, the communist authorities decided to erect new neighborhoods that were named New Belgrade and New Zagreb, a clear distinction from the existing parts of the cities. New names were the narrative in the largest and most significant Yugoslav urban centers, however the processes and characteristics in the smaller urban entities were different.

Rijeka was the third largest city in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. With the population just under 130,000 in 1971, Rijeka was a mid-size city in the Yugoslav context. However, the city was the most important port in the federation. Around 60 percent of the entire export produce of

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the country traveled through Rijeka’s harbor. In addition, the city was a major industrial center. Some of the most prominent industrial enterprises that were located in the city included: two shipyards, the oil refinery, the torpedo factory, and the paper mill. This large industrial capacity was responsible for Rijeka’s rapid economic development. As the process of industrialization of the Yugoslavia was happening mostly in the urban centers, the logical consequence was to initiate a process of urbanization. The most significant industrial powerhouses required a substantial workforce, thus the rural population started to migrate into the large industrial centers like Rijeka. The city began to attract a large number of internal immigrants from various parts of the federation as they were able to become employees of the aforementioned industrial companies. The most intensive in-migration to the city roughly coincides with the period of the major economic and political reforms of the 1950s and early 1960s. The most important economic reform was the introduction of the workers’ self-management system in 1950. One of the main determinants of the law was the importance of the workers’ councils in the enterprises that officially became the “carriers of Yugoslav socialism”. In 1963 the Federal Assembly enacted the new constitution of the Yugoslav federation that weakened the centralism in the federation, and transferred certain responsibilities to the lower levels of the government, including the local government. The two aforementioned reforms had spatial implications throughout the Yugoslav federation, including Rijeka. Although the implementation of the workers’ self-management system changed the landscapes of various urban entities in former Yugoslavia, its impact on Rijeka was distinctive as

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two elements made Rijeka a unique case These are topography and a large-scale involvement of the city’s industrial giants.

Rijeka is situated on unfavorable terrain, surrounded by hills on one side and the Adriatic Sea on the other. It is usually less difficult to implement wide-scale urban design solutions when the topography is flat; in the case of Rijeka, the challenging terrain was a major impediment for optimal urban development. The combination of, ideology that was constantly changing in the ex-Yugoslav context, official discourse, unfavorable topography, massive population influx from various parts of the country, the limitations in financial resources, and the specific economic model that was the workers’ self-management all had an impact on the urban development efforts in the city of Rijeka. All of these factors contributed to the design and construction of new neighborhoods. When the specific and turbulent historical context is added into the narrative, the case of Rijeka becomes an interesting one for inquiry. The events and processes behind the planning and erecting new socialist neighborhoods make up just one piece of the puzzle, while a deeper insight into the historically complex urban core enriches and completes the interesting story of the urban development process during the communist rule in Rijeka.
Chapter 2. Literature review

The majority of literature on urban planning in former Yugoslavia deals with Belgrade and the plans and construction of New Belgrade. Zagreb and New Zagreb are also examined, although to a lesser extent than the federal capital. Before 1950, the Yugoslav communist authorities focused on rebuilding the country – the cities, the countryside, and the economic base. After the economic capacity of the federation was redeveloped, the functionaries of the communist party decided that it was the right moment to start creating a more socialist urban landscape. The federal capital Belgrade was, logically, the most important urban entity in the eyes of the Party, thus it received much attention regarding its urban design. Urban planning is tightly related to the socio-economic system of a country, and changes in the socio-economic system are visible in urban design as well. Belgrade as the capital and the most populous former Yugoslav city was intentionally chosen to be the showcase of Yugoslav socialist modernism, and over the last several decades many international scholars (most notably historians, urban historians, urban geographers, sociologists, and architects) have demonstrated their interest in Belgrade. Le Normand states that the Yugoslav socialist regime endorsed modernist functionalism as their guiding urbanist principle for designing New Belgrade as it was in accordance with its values, and for socio-economic modernization that would enhance Yugoslavia’s image on the international stage.\(^{10}\) However, as a result of socio-political and economic reforms the functionalist model was abandoned and new technologies were adopted.\(^{11}\) Abram claims that Belgrade was a representation of socialist “Yugoslavism” and the Yugoslav state was responsible for Belgrade’s urban planning.\(^{12}\) In addition, he expands Le

\(^{10}\) Brigitte Le Normand, *Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade*, xii.


Normand’s observation and argues that the changes in Belgrade’s urban planning process was an indirect consequence of the shift in the official discourse and moving away from a desire to create a Yugoslav supranation. As many nationalities lived in Yugoslavia, the intention of the federal government in the first decades was to stimulate the population to declare themselves as Yugoslavs, regardless of their national affiliation (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, etc.). The official communist discourse considered the capital city as a showcase of Yugoslav socialist modernist architecture, and the guiding principles of Yugoslav urban planning were supposed to expand from Belgrade to other Yugoslav urban centers. Lastly, Abram states that Belgrade’s representation shifted from being a Great-Serbian city to a Yugoslav one, and the city’s “Yugoslavism” was portrayed by various cultural and administrative activities and buildings, and ideological performances. Kulić elaborates on Belgrade's role in Yugoslavia and on the importance of administrative and cultural buildings stating that Old Belgrade was Serbian while New Belgrade should have become the capital of the entire Yugoslavia and all its peoples, and the redesigns of the most important buildings were an acknowledgment of the internationalization of Yugoslavia. Kulić states that as the Yugoslav communist state became present on the global stage, it became apparent that Yugoslavia did not “sanction modernism”, however, Yugoslavia was attracted to it. Later on, he claims that the Yugoslav socialist architecture was seeking to receive international attention, which it did achieve during the 1958 EXPO and XIII Trienale in Milan.

Italy after a calculated decision by the regime to prove the existence of intellectual and artistic freedoms in Yugoslavia, thus bolstering the country's international reputation. At first, New Belgrade was supposed to be the showcase of Yugoslav socialist urban planning to all of the Yugoslav peoples and other urban centers, however with the increasing international reputation of the state, ambitions of the Yugoslav leadership increased, and they wanted New Belgrade to be recognizable even outside of the country. Kulić argues that Josip Broz Tito’s desire to demonstrate the country’s success to the international arena became evident when Belgrade hosted the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1977–78 as he wanted a representational building as the venue for the event, and ultimately the largest state-of-the-art congress center in Southeast Europe named Sava Centar was constructed in record-breaking time (eleven months) specifically for the conference. Abram states that several Serbian historians and political leaders expressed their opinions of Belgrade being extremely “Yugoslavized”, resulting in the loss of its Serbian character. However, he points out that one of the consequences of the political and socio-economic reforms was the transfer of responsibilities to the lower branches of the government, thus the role of the state in Belgrade’s urban planning diminished. Although the prominent communist functionaries wanted New Belgrade to be the showcase of the country’s success and the Yugoslav socialist modernist architecture, over time the urban planning became the domain of the lower branches of the government. Belgrade is the most urban entity in the former Yugoslav federation as it was the national capital, the most populous urban center in the country, and its

urban development included all three branches of the government – federal, republic, and local. Also, it was envisioned as a showcase of Yugoslav socialist modernist architecture and urban planning whose principles would be transferred onto other Yugoslav cities later on.

The desire to create new socialist neighborhoods that would contain the adjective “new” in their names was a phenomenon that was not specific to Yugoslavia. Many localities constructed in the communist period throughout Eastern Europe were assigned names as an ideological determinant. For example, Nowa Huta is a neighborhood that was erected in Krakow, Poland whose “anti-communist” reputation was a thorn in the side of the authorities in Warsaw, thus they sought to demonstrate to the people the strength of the regime.22 One characteristic that is unique to New Belgrade is its openness to various international architectural and urban planning initiatives. Le Normand emphasizes the importance of different planning theories on New Belgrade, with special attention given to the Athens Charter. She claims that the Athens Charter is a holistic approach based on technocratic principles for realizing social order through implementation of science and technology.23 The Athens Charter was ultimately abandoned as a hegemonic model and was not implemented when planning New Belgrade. Logically, Belgrade received the most interest from international scholars.

Smaller urban centers attract less attention, however that does not mean that they do not warrant for the exploration. In the former communist countries, smaller cities are usually examined if they have historical significance, strategic location, or industrial weight. An example of this can be seen in Dale’s examination of the urban reconstruction efforts in Stalingrad after the Second World War, the most iconic and badly damaged of Soviet frontline cities, as well as industrial cities used

as evacuation centers, including Kuibyshev, Chelyabinsk and Magnitogorsk.\textsuperscript{24} He claims that these cities witnessed massive population influx due to their vast industrial capacity.\textsuperscript{25} Interestingly, Dale states that in the urban development efforts, local industrial enterprises constructed the neighborhoods for their labor force.\textsuperscript{26} Rijeka’s urban fabric was also destroyed after the Second World War, and the inclusion of local industrial corporations was present in Rijeka as well. Another study related to smaller urban centers is Lozanovska’s study of Skopje after a catastrophic earthquake of 1963. She states that after the earthquake hit Skopje, the mixed Yugoslav/UN committee was responsible for a competition where planners could present plans for its reconstruction, and Kenzo Tange’s view of remodeled Skopje was victorious.\textsuperscript{27} In addition, she emphasizes the importance of geographical elements and states that the method of spatial structure and spatial image is developed in critical dialogue with geographic elements.\textsuperscript{28} Lastly, she claims that the plan was functionalist as the main buildings were designed to organize movement, both pedestrian and vehicular.\textsuperscript{29} Although the \textit{tabula rasa} in Skopje was the result of a destructive natural phenomenon and in Rijeka’s case it was the consequence of the war effort, this state also presented an opportunity to create new, modernist spaces in both centers. The features of Tange’s proposed reconstruction project for Skopje prove the international reputation and orientation of the socialist Yugoslavia.


\textsuperscript{28} Mirjana Lozanovska, “Kenzo Tange’s Forgotten Master Plan for the Reconstruction of Skopje,” 146.

\textsuperscript{29} Mirjana Lozanovska, “Kenzo Tange’s Forgotten Master Plan for the Reconstruction of Skopje,” 148.
Although several studies on smaller urban entities in the socialist context exist, more research is necessary as many interesting case studies can be undertaken in order to examine the urban development patterns in various cities from the entire former socialist world. Rijeka is an interesting case as it fulfills all three criteria for study: it has historical significance, a strategic location, and industrial capacity. Furthermore, two additional factors make the project even more interesting. Literature regarding Rijeka’s urban history is quite scarce. Lozzi Barković discussed the architecture and urbanism of the interwar period in Rijeka, and using comparative analysis she concluded that although Rijeka was a divided city between 1924 and 1945, the urban forms on both sides of the city were strikingly similar as civil engineers were responsible for urban design and they were “loyal to the profession, and not to politics”. Interestingly, the mutual rivalry between architects in both Rijeka and Sušak was responsible for stunning urban forms in which the variety of architectural styles on the international stage was neatly reflected. Unfortunately, the devastating consequences of the war had a negative impact on the urban legacy of this rivalry, thus there is only one example of this competition – the two skyscrapers on both sides of the city. If more urban fabric “survived” the period of the first half of the 1940s, it would have been interesting to see the attitude of the communist authorities towards the inheritance of the fascist Italian regime. The analysis will encompass some earlier periods as well, including the Austro-Hungarian reign.

Prikril and Kolacio provide a historical overview of Rijeka’s urban expansion. As the city rapidly expanded during the Hungarian period, the first masterplan in Rijeka’s history was introduced in

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31 Julija Lozzi Barković, Međuratna arhitektura Rijeke i Sušaka: usporedba i europsko okruženje, 412.
1898, however it was implemented only in 1909.\textsuperscript{32} A parallel can be drawn to the communist period as the first masterplan was proposed in 1962, however an entire decade had passed before one was implemented. Prikril and Kolacio criticized the Hungarian masterplan as Rijeka was a “typical capitalist city” with apparent social stratification.\textsuperscript{33} The wealthy resided in spacious villas surrounded by gardens, while the factory workers were situated in “crowded barracks close to the factories”.\textsuperscript{34} This type of discourse was used to portray the failure of the capitalist urban planning, but also to pinpoint the most significant challenges to urban planners in the future – the location of the major railway, the expansion of the port, the relocation of the oil refinery, and the optimal location for new residential neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{35} It was expected of Prikril and Koracio to criticize the Hungarian masterplan. The article is ideological as it was written in the first decade of the communist regime when the regime and the socio-political system was still rigid. As \textit{Povijest Rijeke} was published in 1988, the emphasis of the collection was on the “successes” of the communist regime. During the communist rule, there were four distinctive periods in the urban development of Yugoslav Rijeka, and the two most significant were between 1962 and 1970 when three masterplans were proposed and rejected, and between 1970 and 1980 when the city witnessed the most significant urban expansion due to the rapidly increasing urban population.\textsuperscript{36} In my research I will concentrate on the period between 1962 and 1970. Why were the masterplans rejected? What were some distinctive characteristics of the urban development process in Rijeka? Who were the major actors? By answering these questions, the patterns and processes of urban expansion becomes clear. The massive population influx and the unfavorable topography were

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{33} Zlatko Prikril and Zdenko Kolacio, “Urbanistički razvoj Rijeke,” 192.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Zlatko Prikril and Zdenko Kolacio, “Urbanistički razvoj Rijeke,” 192.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Zlatko Prikril and Zdenko Kolacio, “Urbanistički razvoj Rijeke,” 198-200.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Skupština općine Rijeka, \textit{Povijest Rijeke} (Rijeka: Skupština općine Rijeka, 1988): 447.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
additional challenges for the socialist urban planning initiatives in Rijeka. The existing and newly erected urban fabric merged with the industrial complexes due to substantial internal migration into the city.\textsuperscript{37} An analytical approach was used by the authors to project the future population and economic trends.\textsuperscript{38} I claim that urban development needed to keep up with the forecasted expansion of the city. Once a divided city, whose economic and urban development had been disproportional during the Italian and royal Yugoslav period, Rijeka later became an opportunity for urban planners to integrate the city both physically and functionally. Thus, Rijeka is a distinct case when it comes to urban development in the former Yugoslav context, and some of the characteristics of the urban planning process in the city will be presented in the following chapters.

\textsuperscript{37} Skupština općine Rijeka, \textit{Povijest Rijeke}, 427.  
\textsuperscript{38} Skupština općine Rijeka, \textit{Povijest Rijeke}, 448.
Chapter 3. Methodology

Urban history is a historical discipline whose primary focus is exploring the historic nature of urban settlements and the processes that shape the urban landscape.\textsuperscript{39} Frisch states that the aforementioned field of history is interdisciplinary as it collects knowledge from various other social sciences such as urban geography, sociology, architecture, and economics in order to explain the historical development of the urban environment.\textsuperscript{40} The urban historians of the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century oftentimes utilized an interdisciplinary approach to explain the urban modernization and transformation as models that rely on the two processes that had a critical impact on the cities of the previous century – urbanization and industrialization.\textsuperscript{41} The majority of the urban historians are interested in research related to the metropolises that are defined as a highly populated and functionally important cities.\textsuperscript{42} As such, smaller urban entities are rarely explored, although the narratives behind the urban development of minor urban centers through various historical periods can also be interesting and compelling. Therefore, I have chosen to examine the urban development of a smaller city in a specific socialist context. Although much of the body of work has been written by scholars from Western countries and the urban history Europe and North America has been most researched, the main processes and driving forces in urban planning are similar in the former communist countries. The Soviet Union as the birthplace of state socialism has established two pivotal urban paradigms for socialist urban planning, and those were: to create new socialist cities,
and to radically transform the existing urban landscapes in communist countries. The radical transformation can be seen in the 1935 reconstruction of Moscow when the preservation of the urban core was not considered, and the city center was profoundly reconstructed in accordance with Stalin’s “socialist realist” vision of architecture and urban design. Many European countries in the interwar period witnessed a battle between the modernist tendencies and traditional approach to architecture and urban design. These states include the Soviet Union, fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. In the USSR, the clash between the Modernist Movement and the New Tradition (the reinterpretation of several previous styles, such as classicism) was apparent when the competition to build the Palace of the Soviets was opened. The competition drew attention from the most famous Soviet, but also international architects, including Le Corbusier and Gropius. Although the Palace was never erected, the accepted proposal embraced the monumentality of neoclassicism. Similar confrontations between the traditionalists and modernists occurred in Italy and Germany. In Italy, the clash between Futurism and rationalism existed, however the fascist regime opted for the reinterpretation of the Classical style. In Germany, the rationalists (modernists) were immediately “defeated” by the historicists as modernist architecture was labeled as “degenerate”, and a single style was adopted for all future developments. All three cases demonstrate that traditional style (or its modern reinterpretation) was favored by all three states. The evidence for this claim can be seen at the 1937 Paris World Exhibition where Albert Speer,

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Hitler’s architectural protégé realized that the Nazi and the Soviet Pavilion were similar as both employed a pseudo-Classical syntax.\(^{50}\) Although the Axis and the Soviet regime were diametrically contrary to one another, tensions between traditionalist and modernist streams in architecture and urban design were evident in all three states.

In general, the urban development in the Soviet Union and other communist states was driven by both massive urbanization and large-scale industrialization. Rijeka was not an exception from this trend as the impact of the significant immigration and the industrial expansion was critical in shaping the urban development efforts throughout the communist rule. Although Yugoslavia was fundamentally a socialist state, the rigidity of the regime was not as obvious as it was in the USSR. One example is the more “liberal” approach towards the downtown areas that were not subjected to radical and brutal redevelopment. Socialist Yugoslavia was more open to embracing the ideas from the West, and urban design was no exception. Early in the process of (re)construction, the state embraced functionalist modernist urbanism as it was in accordance with their ideals and plans to modernize the Yugoslav society, and it helped the federation to establish itself on the international stage.\(^{51}\) However, due to internal changes of the Yugoslav socialism and the rising opposition towards functionalist modernist urbanism worldwide, the model was ultimately abandoned.\(^{52}\)

The most notable model for reconstructing and “repairing” the existing cities was based on the principles of the Athens Charter and its mastermind Le Corbusier. The main component of the program was the restoration of healthy cities.\(^{53}\) Le Corbusier heavily criticized the legacy of private

interest on urban fabric, claiming that capitalism was responsible for the decay of the quality of life in urban centers.\(^{54}\) The other negative component of the evolution of cities was the machine age.\(^{55}\) Therefore, he believed that a technocratic society was the solution, and urban planners were responsible for the future urban development and the problems of the existing neighborhoods due to their knowledge and expertise. The Yugoslav communist leadership had an almost identical vision for Yugoslav urban centers and the Yugoslav society in general. Urban history as a multidisciplinary field provides a suitable framework for understanding the complex reality behind the urban development in Rijeka in a Yugoslav socialist context as it emphasizes the importance of processes that impacted and guided urban planning as both an ideological and a professional situation-resolving mechanism.

The central method used in this study is archival research. The archival material was obtained from the State Archive in Rijeka. My primary target was to analyze urban development of Rijeka during the entire communist period which lasted between 1945 and 1991. However, in the beginning I did not realize the abundance of archival material. Therefore, I needed to narrow down my research question. I chose the period of the 1960s as it was a time of profound socio-political and economic changes in the Yugoslav federation. In addition, since urbanization and industrialization were two key components of the modernization of the country, and since Yugoslavia had its ‘economic miracle’ in the 1960s, Rijeka witnessed a massive immigration as it was an industrial city and one of the most economically advanced centers in the Yugoslav socialist state. In the middle of a discussion I had with the archivist, he suggested to focus on the 1962 masterplan since it was the first postwar large-scale planning document. As I was also interested in the evolving Yugoslav


communist ideology and the influence of topography on urban development, I shaped my research questions and formulated my argument. I claim that the socialist urban development in Rijeka was the result of the interrelation between the constantly changing Yugoslav communist ideology and the challenging terrain configuration that Rijeka is known for. The material obtained in the State Archive in Rijeka consisted of several collections and types of archival documents. The valuable information that the archive contains that was useful for my project includes: the three masterplans of the 1960s with detailed explanations of certain plan elements, decisions made by the local authorities (most frequently by the Council for Urban Planning) related to urban development, cartographic representations (maps) from that period, newspaper articles (both from the official Party’s newspapers and the local, at least officially independent, newspapers), and the extremely valuable photographic collections. The archival collections I was interested in were not strictly limited to urban planning ones. Although the most significant findings were the original masterplans, specific site plans and other cartographic representations, and the photographic collections depicting the urban development, I tried to reconstruct the narrative that led to the actual planning process. Masterplans were the most important material in my research as they are an illustration of the future spatial organization in Rijeka. In addition, the cartographic representations are the least ideological archival documents of that time. In addition, fonds containing decisions from various parties closely tied to urban planning during the communist rule were also thoroughly examined. Lastly, collections containing newspaper clippings from several local media sources helped me to understand the ways in which the urban development was explained and oftentimes presented to the public. One should bear in mind that Rijeka was located in the communist state on a re-acquired or newly acquired territory. Therefore, the official documents were severely politicized, frequently emphasizing the importance of the partisan
struggle in the liberation and integration of the region into the Yugoslav socialist state. In addition, in some cases the urban landscape from the previous historical periods is criticized due to its bourgeois legacy. Thus, it was the obligation of urban planners and in the communists’ interest to be successful with the future urban development. Therefore, the urban expansion of the communist period can now be “judged” as they were precise with stating their objectives. One needs to be careful when examining the official documents of the time as the Yugoslav communist ideology is embedded in them. The rhetoric in newspaper articles was focused on the importance of optimal urban development in the socialist period, stating that urban planners should neutralize the negative features of urban development that occurred during the capitalist systems. The new achievements and successes of new socialist neighborhoods were praised by the local press, and the construction of new communities was enthusiastically reported. Interestingly, the newspapers even criticized the residents. In one case, a member of the press came across laundry hanging on the balconies of the newly erected socialist neighborhoods, and the author of the article suggested that the residents should be “re-educated”.

To summarize, the local newspapers were unsurprisingly ideologized. Although the State Archive in Rijeka takes care of the majority of archival material that was useful in my study, some of the information from the communist period is still inaccessible as it is kept secured by the municipality. The material that is lacking from the archive is mostly related to the meetings of the local branch of the Yugoslav communist party and the decisions that were enacted at the end of the meetings. This is significant because the communist party had power to overrule the decisions made by the Council for Urban Planning, hence the final piece of the puzzle is missing from the narrative. Although it would have been

beneficial to analyze the documentation that is missing from the archive, I managed to reconstruct the process of urban development during the communist period.

Urban development occurs in urban areas. Urban areas are settlements that fulfill three criteria: they need to have permanent population that lives and/or works in the city, the population density must exceed 500 people per square kilometer, and they have a built environment. Urban environment is a concept that consists of the built environment and social upgrade or “a city lifestyle”. This differs from an urban landscape which I define as a planned (designed) urban space. Spatial representation (expression) is a way in which a space is planned. The term ‘spatial implication’ is used when describing the direct impact of a socio-economic process in space, while the term ‘spatial mark’ signifies the built environment that can be tied with a state that governed the city in a certain period of time. The envisioned space is defined by relations between the urban structures and planners. Lastly, urban structures are man-made structures in an urban environment (buildings), while urban forms are defined by shapes of the urban structures. The city of Rijeka was envisioned as a harmonious urban environment consisting of a Yugoslav socialist modernist and the existing pre-socialist urban landscape, and an aspiration to create a truly socialist city which is a societal upgrade of Rijeka’s future urban landscape.
Chapter 4. Legacy of the past as a constraint to the communist regime’s perception

Since the mid-nineteenth century, the changes in sovereignties were a frequent phenomenon in Rijeka and its surrounding area. The history of Rijeka during the last 150 years was turbulent. Various ruling states left their spatial marks on Rijeka’s urban fabric. What was the Yugoslav communist perception towards the built inheritance? The answer to this question is not simple, and it is specific to every historical period. Historical context is an important component of every study that is related to history as it provides a background or a meaning to historical events and processes. Therefore, to understand the significance of the events and processes that occurred in the past, it is essential to take the historical context into consideration. From the Hungarian rule to the modern-day independent Croatian state, many states have governed the region. Thus, the historical context is quite complex for Rijeka and its hinterland, and must be taken into consideration when interpreting historical events and processes that shaped the region. From the rapid economic expansion and proliferation of many industrial branches during the Hungarian rule, the polarization of economic growth during the time when the city was divided between the Italian and the Yugoslav kingdom, the redevelopment of the city in all aspects during the communist period, and the stagnation that characterizes the city nowadays, the complex historical events and processes have been a major factor that has had a significant impact on the city, its urban fabric, its society, and its economy. Therefore, it is necessary to go into greater detail and present the main characteristics and specificities of each individual period, and the way in which they influenced the urban development of the city.

The twentieth century was very turbulent for Rijeka and the surrounding area. In that century alone, eight sovereign states controlled the region – Austria-Hungary (1868-1918), the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (1918), the Free State of Rijeka (1920-1924), the Kingdom of Italy (1924-1943),
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after 1929 (1918-1920 and 1924-1941), Germany (the Third Reich) (1943-1945), the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (de iure 1947-1991; de facto 1945-1991), and the Republic of Croatia (since 1991).57

Rijeka was under the Austro-Hungarian jurisdiction since 1868 when the city was formally incorporated into the Hungarian part of the multiethnic empire. However, the city became a corpus separatum (separated body) of Transleithania (the Hungarian portion of the empire) due to an insertion in the official document that became known as Rijeka’s Patch (Riječka krpica).58

Essentially, Rijeka became a Hungarian exclave in Northern Adriatic, and since the city was the only Hungarian access to the sea, the urban region experienced significant expansion in demographic and economic terms. The situation remained unchanged until the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated after the First World War. Hungarian rule in Rijeka was characterized by a notable population influx and economic growth. The city witnessed an economic boom in this period due to its novel role as the sole Hungarian port.59 In other words, a side effect of Hungarian expansionist and imperialist tendencies was the economic prosperity of the city.60 Due to its strategic location, the Transleithanian part of the empire initiated substantial projects that propelled the industrial growth of Rijeka. They were responsible for the construction of Rijeka’s oil refinery, one of the most modern oil processing facilities in all of Europe.61 The refinery was opened on September 14th, 1883, and was one of the most sophisticated in Europe as it implemented technology from the United States and France.62 The second major development project that was

59 Maja Polić, “Riječka krpica 1868. godine i uvjeti za njezino naljepljivanje na Hrvatsko-ugarsku nagodbu,” 82.
60 Maja Polić, “Riječka krpica 1868. godine i uvjeti za njezino naljepljivanje na Hrvatsko-ugarsku nagodbu,” 77.
undertaken by the Hungarian administration was the construction of the new port. In the latter half of the 1870s and the beginning of the 1880s, the monumental task of creating the new waterfront was finished. Using the process of land reclamation (creation of new land from underwater surfaces), the new harbor was erected and it soon became the second most important port in the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire after Trieste.\textsuperscript{63} The third significant project that was undertaken during the Hungarian rule was the new railroad that connected Rijeka with Zagreb, and consequently with Budapest and other economic centers in the eastern portion of the country. The project was finished in 1873, and the railroad was the most modern and technologically advanced railway at that time.\textsuperscript{64}

In the context of Rijeka in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hungarian sovereignty over the city’s territory had spatial implications with long-lasting consequences on the urban fabric. Primarily, the modern-day location of industrial complexes in the urban region is a direct result of the Hungarian period. The industrial belt in Rijeka spreads from the 3. Maj shipyard, the old oil refinery, and to the port of Rijeka, creating a continuous industrial region in the proximity of the coastline (see Figure 1). In latter historical periods the belt was expanded to the east, encompassing the Viktor Lenac shipyard and the new oil refinery. A number of production plants were located on the outskirts of Rijeka when they were erected. For example, the refinery was built on the outskirts of town in 1883, however due to urban expansion, the facility became surrounded by into the new urban fabric. The port was located in the city center from the beginning.


and although this location may have been considered convenient in the late nineteenth century, in
the following decades the location proved to be an issue in the growing city.

Figure 1. Spatial expansion of industry and port activities constructed during the Hungarian reign in Rijeka. From
left to right: the shipyard (later 3. Maj), the old oil refinery, and the port of Rijeka65

When Austria-Hungary capitulated in 1918 at the end of the First World War, its territory was
divided into various newly established states. In late 1918, the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs
was proclaimed, however it was not internationally recognized. Since the newly formed state was
an unrecognized entity, it decided to join the only South Slavic state that was internationally
recognized. Therefore, the leadership of the new state joined the Kingdom of Serbia and form the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was later renamed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Due to its short existence and problematic international status, the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs assented limited control in Croatia, including Rijeka. An International military administration governed the city from the end of the war until 1919 when the city was occupied by Gabrielle D’Annunzio who established his own government. The fierce confrontations between the US president Woodrow Wilson and the Italian prime minister Vittorio Orlando over Rijeka’s status were one of the most problematic for the success of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. By mid-1919, the situation was still unresolved. One of the consequences of the Treaty of Rapallo (1920) was the creation of the Free State of Rijeka. D’Annunzio led the March on Rijeka, a prelude to the famous Mussolini’s March on Rome. He gained control over the city on September 12th, 1919, further complicating the complex political situation in Rijeka. Italian intentions over the city became a reality in 1924 when Rijeka, more specifically the part of the city west of the river Rječina, was integrated into the Italian Empire. The eastern part of the city was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (see Figure 2).

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69 Hrvatska enciklopedija, 1st ed., s.v. “Rijeka.”
72 Hrvatska enciklopedija, 1st ed., s.v. “Rijeka.”
The period between 1918 and 1924 was characterized by constant political instability and economic turmoil. The urban population decreased from 66,042 in 1910 to 61,157 in 1921 as the repercussions of war and the turbulent situation in the immediate postwar period. The situation between two halves of the city at this time was diametrically different. The western, Italian portion of Rijeka witnessed economic stagnation due to Rijeka’s peripheral geographical location in the Italian state and its vicinity to its former port competitor - Trieste. This part of the city lost its natural periphery that gravitated to the city. The flow of goods stopped after the Italians took control over the western portion of the city. On the other side of Rječina, an entirely different situation prevailed. The eastern part of town was named Sušak, and due to its strategic location in

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74 Hrvatska enciklopedija, 1st ed., s.v. “Rijeka.”
the context of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it served as the country’s main port. Therefore, significant financial incentives were assigned to Sušak's development. Allocated funds were mostly utilized to improve the conditions of the harbor that served as the main export port of the country. As a result, Sušak witnessed economic prosperity, unlike the Italian portion of the city. In spatial terms, urban expansion was more notable in the eastern part of the city. Although the Italian portion of the city witnessed urban expansion to a certain extent, the majority of the developments occurred in the eastern, Yugoslav portion of the city. New residential buildings were erected along the current-day Strossmayerova Street that were stylistically different from the structures that were built in the previous periods (see Figure 3). The new buildings were modern. The characteristics of the newly erected structures were uniformity and rationality. Certain characteristics of the previous periods like ornamentation were dismissed.

Figure 3. New residential buildings on Strossmayerova Street built in the early 1930s.

75 “Sušak,” circa 1930, Personal collection of Ivana Perković.
A further phenomenon that occurred in Sušak at this period was socio-spatial segregation. The most influential individuals in the city owned properties on the coastline, and in most cases they owned spacious villas surrounded by trees and the Adriatic Sea (see Figure 4). Other residents purchased their dwellings on the hills, usually further away from the city center and the sea, as the waterfront real estate was owned by the bourgeois class. Interestingly, Sušak did not have an urban core, and this specificity will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Figure 4. Sušak in 1932. The elite neighborhood called Pećine was characterized by exclusive properties owned by the city’s elite.  

76 “Sušak - Pećine,” circa 1930, Personal collection of Aron Perković.
When Rijeka became a divided city in 1924, Sušak was cut off from the urban core as the existing city center was located on the Italian portion of the city. All major public spaces were in a different state, and Sušak did not have adequate spaces for administration, culture, education and other important functions. It did not even have a proper public space, such as a main square. Therefore, in 1935 the local government decided to erect a monument to King Aleksandar in the close proximity of the Yugoslav-Italian border (see Figure 5). That was the first major investment into creating a representational space in the eastern portion of Rijeka. However, the monument was destroyed during the course of the Second World War.

Figure 5. King Aleksandar’s Square in Sušak before the erection of the king’s monument

The most interesting moment of interwar architecture and urbanism in Rijeka happened immediately before the onset of the Second World War. It was the interesting “race to create a better skyscraper”. On the eve of the Second World War, the tensions between Italy and Yugoslavia in Rijeka were increasing. Every decision from the one side was carefully observed by the other. Each side wanted to prove to their population and the enemy its economic stability and proliferation. Hence, in 1937, the construction of Palazzo Arbori commenced on the Italian side, and the construction was finished in 1939 (see Figure 6). The building is currently known as Riječki neboder (Rijeka’s skyscraper). It was financed by an Italian American and the quality of the building satisfied the highest American standards. The structure looked like skyscrapers in the United States, the interior was luxurious, and it was the first building in Rijeka equipped with an elevator.\(^78\)

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The construction of the skyscraper on the Italian side of Rijeka provoked an immediate reaction in the Yugoslav portion of the city. In this period, almost every decision was interpreted as political by the Italians and Yugoslavs. Therefore, the Sušak government decided to erect their own high-rise, in close vicinity to the border between the two states. Sušački neboder (Sušak’s skyscraper) was a project envisioned to neatly solve the chronic lack of available space for various functions of the city. Originally, the structure would be the location of a museum, library, restaurant, and a

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80 Julija Lozzi Barković, “Riječki i sušački neboder.”
venue hall. The final solution was a slightly remodeled version of the original proposal. The notion of modernity is noticeable on Sušački neboder as it was constructed by using modern materials, particularly glass that emphasized transparency and the building’s ability to “breathe” (see Figure 7). The utilization of modern materials, especially a significant amount of glass, made this skyscraper different from its Italian counterpart. The structure was opened to the public when the Second World War had already begun, however the unique aesthetics of Sušački neboder caused the building to stand out from the urban fabric in that period.

Figure 7. Sušački neboder

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81 Julija Lozzi Barković, “Riječki i sušački neboder.”
82 Julija Lozzi Barković, “Riječki i sušački neboder.”
83 Julija Lozzi Barković, “Riječki i sušački neboder.”
The Second World War affected the city in 1941 when Italian troops crossed the Rječina river and occupied the eastern portion of the town, Sušak, that was previously controlled by the Yugoslav state. However, the Italian rule was rather short as the country capitulated in 1943. That year the Germans took over the control of the city from their former Axis partners. By April of 1945 Germany’s war effort approached its end, and the Yugoslav partisans conducted decisive measures to liberate occupied Rijeka. The ferocious battles commenced on April 21st, 1945 and Sušak was liberated on the same day. However, the armed struggle for the western part of the city were fierce, and with many casualties, Rijeka was finally liberated on May 3rd, 1945. The urban fabric was destroyed, especially the city’s industrial capacity, the port, and the urban center due to Allied aerial bombardment efforts and the Nazi’s deliberate destruction of industry and harbor as vengeance for losing the Second World War. Interestingly, after Rijeka was liberated by the Yugoslav partisans, it was not immediately incorporated into the new, socialist Yugoslav state. Legally, the territory was still under Italian control, and Democratic Federal Yugoslavia conducted an internationally approved military occupation of Rijeka. Although Yugoslav historiography recognized May 3rd, 1945 as the day when Rijeka was reincorporated into the Yugoslav state, the de jure situation was different. From 1945 to February 10th, 1947 the city was governed by the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army. Rijeka was de facto governed by the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, however, the city was de iure administered by the Yugoslav military authorities.

87 Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 165.
88 Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 165.
89 Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 165.
90 Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 165.
One of the first and most significant challenges for the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army was to redevelop the city. Their focus was specifically set on rebuilding the port, followed by the efforts to reconstruct damaged buildings, schools, and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{91} After the living conditions were improved, rebuilding Rijeka’s industry became the focal point.\textsuperscript{92} After the mandate of the Military Administration of the Yugoslav Army in Rijeka was terminated, the power and responsibility was transferred to the civil government. Although the military administration’s term in the city was rather brief, one notable project was carried out.

The Axis partners had demolished the bridges that connected two portions of the city in 1945. Therefore, in order to establish a functioning road network, bridges across the Rječina river needed to be rebuilt. The military administration was responsible for the repair of the most significant pedestrian and vehicular bridge that connected Rijeka and Sušak.\textsuperscript{93} The traffic between the two parts of the city that were divided by Rječina was disrupted. Therefore, in 1946 the military governance in Rijeka initiated a campaign to collect financial resources for the new bridge that would connect the two separated portions of the city. As a result, the citizens of Rijeka and Sušak jointly collected over 3.5 million Yugoslav dinars, while a significant amount was gathered by the diaspora.\textsuperscript{94} The bridge was designed by Krunoslav Tonković who envisioned a 2-in-1 bridge, combining both the pedestrian and vehicular traffic.\textsuperscript{95} Although the primary task of the newly erected bridge was to merge the city into a functional whole, the project had significant political implications. On the day when it was officially opened for traffic, October 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1946, the main

\textsuperscript{91} Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 167.
\textsuperscript{92} Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 167.
\textsuperscript{93} Andrea Roknić Bežanić, “Uspostava i organizacija civilnih i vojnih vlasti u poslijeratnoj Rijeci,” 167.
\textsuperscript{95} “Obilježena 60. obljetnica izgradnje i puštanja u promet mosta na Rječini.”
speaker was Josip Broz Tito, the leader of socialist Yugoslavia. The event was politicized as the legacy of the partisan struggle was still fresh, and this was a re-incorporated Yugoslav territory. In the immediate postwar period when the sentiments towards the National Liberation Struggle were very powerful, this event served as an opportunity to evoke and reassure those sentiments. Josip Broz Tito’s main points from the speech were: 1) to preserve the brotherhood and unity between the Yugoslav peoples; 2) the brotherhood and unity is a guarantee that the entire country will be redeveloped after the war as he put an emphasis on schools, factories, and cultural institutions, and 3) that the artificial border created in 1924 that separated the city was erased after the victory of the National Liberation Struggle and the objective was to prevent the division of Rijeka in the future. His statements meant that Rijeka was always a Croatian or South Slavic city that was forcefully taken away from its homeland, and the task of the following generations was to assure that the city remains under the South Slavic control. The new bridge accommodated both vehicles and pedestrians who were delighted with it as it was supposed to become one of the most notable public spaces in Rijeka. The bridge connected the city both physically and functionally. It crossed the Rječina river which was a topographical impediment. It was also a symbol of unified Rijeka under the Yugoslav socialist control.

In 1953, seven years after the grand opening, the local communist leadership decided to install a “guardian” of the bridge, and the statue to Janko Polić Kamov’s was erected. Janko Polić Kamov was a famous Croatian writer and poet in the early twentieth century. He was born in Rijeka in 1886 and died in Barcelona in 1910. His dissatisfaction towards the Austro-Hungarian regime

96 “Obilježena 60. obljetnica izgradnje i puštanja u promet mosta na Rječini.”
97 “Obilježena 60. obljetnica izgradnje i puštanja u promet mosta na Rječini.”
98 “Obilježena 60. obljetnica izgradnje i puštanja u promet mosta na Rječini.”
culminated in 1903 and 1904 when he participated in anti-Khuen demonstrations in Zagreb against the Hungarian hegemony.\textsuperscript{100} Khuen-Hedervary, who was the Hungarian leader appointed as “ban” (a prime minister of the semi-autonomous Croatian government). His 20-year-long reign is famously known as the “Dark Period” in Croatian historiography due to his oppressive pro-Hungarian and anti-Croatian policies.\textsuperscript{101} Kamov also supported Stjepan Radić who was the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, also an anti-regime political force.\textsuperscript{102} As a result, Kamov as a Rijeka native and famous for his anti-Austro-Hungarian sentiments, received a monument celebrating his life and achievements on a bridge that had both a practical use and a symbolic value for the city (see Figure 8). It is indicative of the communist regime’s desire to celebrate a famous local writer with strong anti-regime sentiments by unveiling his statue that was installed on a monument of its own – the monument that emphasized and celebrated the unity of the city. The event of unveiling Janko Polić Kamov’s statue can be related to similar ones that occurred in other Yugoslav urban centers. In many Yugoslav cities monuments were erected to glorify important figures from the past whose experiences in life can be related to the struggle against the regime or the ruling class. For example, in Zagreb, two famous Croatian writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, August Šenoa and Antun Gustav Matoš had monuments erected for them. Both supported the notion of Pan-Slavism, especially among South Slavs. More specifically, Šenoa proudly supported the program of the archbishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer who was a dedicated advocate of South-Slavic unity.\textsuperscript{103} Matoš also had a pro-Yugoslav attitude as he was a correspondent of several

\textsuperscript{102} Hrvatska enciklopedija, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., s.v. “Janko Polić Kamov.”
pro-Yugoslav newspapers. It can be concluded that both Matoš and Šenoa were against the Austro-Hungarian regime and its oppressive policies towards the Croats and Croatia. Following the same logic, Kamov received his monument at the new bridge that connected Rijeka and Sušak due to his anti-hegemonic sentiments towards Austria-Hungary. Although Kamov’s statue was not a part of the built inheritance from the previous historical periods, its installation was a clear example of the communists’ attitude towards the past. This means they were not extremely radical towards certain events and historical figures that could have fit into their narrative. The ones that fought against hegemony and had strong South Slavic sentiments were valued as their struggle was similar to the struggle of the Yugoslav communists.

Figure 8. Janko Polić Kamov’s statue on the new bridge that connected Rijeka and Sušak. As a symbol of anti-hegemonic sentiments, the famous writer became the guardian of the new bridge.


The Communist Party perceived the legacy of the previous historical periods from the nineteenth century onward differently. Although the Austro-Hungarian rule was labeled as hegemonic, some aspects of the urban development from that time were perceived as positive. The general quality of the built environment was solid, and some of the notable public spaces and buildings were constructed during the Hungarian rule. The massive industrialization and expansion of port activities had significant spatial consequences even for the Yugoslav communists. The industrial complexes erected at the time occupied vast spaces and are unfavorably located in the city as the urban fabric encompassed the industrial capacity. This was one of the major challenges to the optimal urban development that the communist wanted to achieve, as they claimed. The legacy of the first Yugoslav state (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or the Kingdom of Yugoslavia since 1929) was visible on the eastern side of the city – Sušak, however the main characteristic of the first Yugoslav regime was the expansion of residential areas. The Kingdom of Italy, on the other side of the city, did not conduct major urban development as Rijeka was on the periphery of the Italian state, and the city of Trieste was in close proximity. Logically, the attitude of the communists towards fascist Italy in the region that was re-integrated into the Yugoslav state was negative, however due to mass destruction of the urban fabric as a result of significant aerial bombardment, the strategic destruction of the most important industrial complexes, and the street battles that took place in Rijeka, the majority of the legacy of the Italian urban development, alongside previous developments, was completely demolished. Therefore, it is impossible to establish the patterns of the communist practices towards the legacy of their ideological and real life enemies, in this case Italy during the fascist regime.

After the fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were defeated, the Yugoslav communists could have focused on rebuilding the destroyed country. The immediate postwar years were very turbulent in
Yugoslavia. The country was destroyed; the horrific effects of the Second World War decimated cities, rural regions, transportation networks, and industrial capacity. The initial stage of the political evolution of socialist Yugoslavia was characterized by large-scale efforts to rebuild the country, the long-lasting dispute to settle borders with Italy, the major shift in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, and the introduction of the workers’ self-management system.

After the Second World War was over in Europe, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) secured control over the Yugoslav political system and became the only political option in Second Yugoslavia. The political landscape of Eastern and Southeastern Europe changed significantly as many states that were formed or re-formed were governed by socialist parties, and although they were nominally sovereign, in reality they were under strong influence and patronage from the Soviet Union as the most significant country of the entire communist bloc. Yugoslavia was not an exception from this trend in the immediate postwar period. In this timeframe, bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were strong, and the Soviet Union was the state that the Yugoslav leadership looked up to in terms of its political and economic system. Kulić states that Yugoslavia was the most loyal partner of the Soviet Union during this period.\textsuperscript{106} The regime characteristics between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were similar – both featured a charismatic authoritarian figure, a state-run planned economy, and a single-party political system.\textsuperscript{107} Zimmerman provides a different type of evidence to support the claim of a Yugoslav-Soviet cooperation and collaboration in the immediate postwar period – Yugoslavia supported at least 95 percent of the Soviet proposals in the United Nations in the period between 1946 and


1948. The economic policy patterns were also similar: nationalization and confiscation of property, rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture were some of the measures that the new communist government conducted after the party seized power in the country. All of the aforementioned demonstrates that the political and socio-economic system in Yugoslavia was analogous to the system of its patron state, the Soviet Union. However, in 1948 the situation changed dramatically. The ‘harmonious’ situation between the two countries was replaced by tensions and mutual distrust. The relations began to deteriorate in 1947, when Soviets warned the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia’s betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and accused them of autonomous behavior that was not in accordance with policy decisions made by the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in Moscow. Officially, Yugoslavia was accused of anti-Sovietism, failures in the collectivization of agriculture, the lack of intraparty democracy, and seceding from “the united socialist front against imperialism”. New discoveries go beyond the official explanation, and documents reveal the interesting details of the split, most notably Stalin’s dissatisfaction with Tito’s activities in Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria. Tito’s ambition in the Balkans was to establish a regional organization of the partisan movements of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece with Yugoslavia as the dominant country due to the success of the National Liberation Movement. Tito was guided by pragmatism as he sought unification of the partisan movements in the aforementioned Balkan countries due to the fact that ethnic groups from these states were significant minority populations in certain parts of the Yugoslav federation.

(for example Albanians in Kosovo) or that these states had territorial pretensions towards Yugoslavia (Greece and Bulgaria in parts of Macedonia).\textsuperscript{113} The Communist Party of Yugoslavia supported other communist parties in these states to defeat their counterparts and establish communist rule.\textsuperscript{114} Consequently, the Cominform gave Tito an ultimatum to terminate his activities in Southeast Europe, therefore undermining Soviet influence and authority in the region. As Tito rejected it, the situation culminated with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia mutually terminating their bilateral relationship in 1948.\textsuperscript{115} Stalin openly invited members of the Yugoslav communist party to overthrow Tito in order to regain control over the problematic member of the Cominform. However, Tito conducted purges in the party and was able to retain control over the governmental and political structures, and ultimately remained the country’s undisputed leader until his death in 1980. Understandably, other members of the Cominform followed the Soviet measures against Yugoslavia and terminated their relations as well. As a result, the country became both politically and economically isolated. It was expelled from the Communist Bloc, and trade with other member states of the Communist bloc was made impossible. By 1948 Yugoslavia had not recovered from the war entirely, the infrastructure was still severely damaged, and the reconstruction plans for the country were significantly affected by this isolation.

Another cause of turbulence on the political scene was the question of the country’s western border. By May 1945 the Yugoslav army liberated the Istrian peninsula, and its desire was to enter Trieste, a major port in the Northern Adriatic, before the Allied forces.\textsuperscript{116} Tito wanted to incorporate Trieste as there was a significant Slavic population in Trieste (mostly consisted of

\textsuperscript{113} Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” 43.
\textsuperscript{114} Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” 43.
\textsuperscript{115} Ivo Banac, \textit{With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism}, 125.
Slovenes), and the city was the most important port in the East Adriatic. By 1947, the disputed area was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia as the Italian Zone A and the Yugoslav Zone B were established. In 1954 the zones were officially incorporated into the Italian and Yugoslav states. This caused the massive migration from the Yugoslav-governed former Zone B into the Italian-governed former Zone A, and estimated 220,000 migrants (mainly Italians) decided to abandon the communist regime and settle in Italy. The Tito-Stalin split and the continuous struggle to settle borders with Italy were a prelude to the social crisis of the early 1950s.

A social crisis emerged in the early 1950s due to political pressure from the Eastern bloc, an economic blockade, problems regarding the implementation of the first five-year plan, and an agriculture crisis due to collectivization policies. The country’s leadership decided to create its own version of socialism. Yugoslavia’s main ideologist and vice-president Edvard Kardelj, and the leading economic expert in the communist party Boris Kidrič were the most influential in creating the concept of the anti-Stalinist development. “Yugoslavia’s Way to Socialism” was phrased as the slogan for the new, reformed version of the country’s economic system. On June 27, 1950 the federal legislative assembly supported the “General Law on the Management of State-Run Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Workers’ Collectives” or more commonly known as the “Law on Workers’ Self-Management”. The Workers’ Collectives

nominally had control over the enterprises they managed as they were democratically elected by all factory workers, however their powers were limited by the instructions from the communist party authorities.\textsuperscript{123} The main characteristics of self-management system were: 1) a significant portion of workers were involved in some kind of decision making; 2) self-management organs gained more power over time as they eliminated influences outside of the collective; and 3) self-management was first introduced to the largest (industrial) enterprise units in the same economic branches and through time the system expanded to other units.\textsuperscript{124} Over time, the system had both positive and negative aspects. One positive aspect of self-management was that it allowed enterprises to operate autonomously, and therefore the economic subjects expanded their business due to internal management and a lack of external pressure.\textsuperscript{125} In other words, the Workers’ Collectives were responsible for managing the enterprise, and most companies flourished as there was minimal competition in the country. However, by the mid-1970s the Yugoslav federal government was concerned that self-management induced economic polarization of the country.\textsuperscript{126} The companies located in the wealthier parts of Yugoslavia (particularly Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina) were more successful and efficient than the companies in other regions of the federation. Consequently, the wealthier republics and autonomous provinces witnessed rapid economic expansion, while the less developed republics and autonomous provinces lagged behind in economic terms.\textsuperscript{127} The other concern that the federal government had was the notion that self-management was responsible for technocratic tendencies coming from the directors and

\textsuperscript{125} Marius J. Broekmeyer, “Self-Management in Yugoslavia,” 136.
\textsuperscript{126} Marius J. Broekmeyer, “Self-Management in Yugoslavia,” 136.
managers.\textsuperscript{128} In simplified terms, self-management was an economic policy that allowed the workers’ councils to be in charge of managing operations of their enterprises. Therefore, housing initiatives were also under the domain of the workers’ councils, while the local government provided the location for construction of residential areas for the workers. This balance of power had its spatial repercussions throughout Yugoslavia.

Workers’ self-management was first introduced in 1950. However, in the period between the end of the Second World War and the introduction of the new economic system, Yugoslav authorities focused mostly on rebuilding the destroyed country. Rijeka’s urban development process followed the same trends that characterized the urban transformation in the entire federation. Therefore, no significant investments were directed to the future socialist urban development in the immediate postwar period.\textsuperscript{129} However, the period between the mid-1950s and early 1970s was characterized by economic expansion followed by the proliferation of tourism on the Adriatic coast and the emergence of consumerism. Yugoslavia opened its borders in 1963, and the two measurable effects of the reform were the significant number of Yugoslav nationals leaving the country to work abroad on a temporary basis and the rising number of foreign tourists.\textsuperscript{130} Between 1952 and 1960 the annual growth rate of foreign tourism in Yugoslavia was 29 percent, far above the European average.\textsuperscript{131} The earnings from tourism rose from 4.5 million USD to 133 million USD between 1957 and 1967.\textsuperscript{132} Both the Yugoslav nationals working abroad and foreign tourists were important

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Marius J. Broekmeyer, “Self-Management in Yugoslavia,” 136.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Igor Tchoukarine, “The Yugoslav Road to International Tourism: Opening, Decentralization, and Propaganda in the Early 1950s,” 121.
\end{itemize}
in the economic sense as they brought foreign currency into the country. The increasing number of tourists and “gastarbajters” (Yugoslav workers in foreign countries) accelerated the economic growth of the 1960s and the 1970s. The remittances from “gastarbajters” rose by approximately 25 percent on an annual basis in the early 1970s, surpassing 1 billion USD in 1972.133 The economic expansion and the country’s openness towards the West induced consumerist behavior amongst Yugoslav people. Two of the most visible behaviors of growing consumerist trends in the Yugoslav communist state were owning a holiday cottage on the coast and cross-border shopping in Italy and Austria.134

The overall economic situation in Yugoslavia evolved from the significant economic hardships of the late 1940s and early 1950s to the economic boom of the 1960s and the 1970s. The patterns of economic expansion in Rijeka coincided with the patterns in the Yugoslav federation. The urban expansion followed the economic one, however, several challenges limited the overall process. The local authorities needed to address three pressing issues: massive population influx, damaged buildings and supporting infrastructure, and lack of financial resources. The twentieth century was very turbulent for Rijeka as changes in sovereignties were quite common throughout the course of the century. The longer-lasting regimes left a significant spatial mark in Rijeka, while the states that governed the region briefly did not. The socio-economic changes occurred even inside the communist rule in Rijeka, commencing with the rigid military government that was eventually “civilianized” and later on became more responsible for the municipal affairs due to internal socio-economic reforms in the socialist Yugoslavia. The decentralization and to a certain degree

democratization of the urban development process was important in Rijeka’s case, and it provided the local government both the authority and the responsibility to carry out the demanding task of addressing the massive population influx and challenging terrain configuration in order to create new neighborhoods that would be in accordance with the Yugoslav socialist modernist principles.
Chapter 5. Spatial expression of the self-management system

Before the specifics of the urban development in Rijeka are discussed, the planning process in Rijeka itself needs to be clarified. The Rijeka’s Urban Planning Institute was an autonomous institution not connected with the municipal government. It proposed all the masterplans of the communist era after being asked by the Council for Urban Planning. The institute consisted of a number of professionals, mostly architects. The team working on the 1962 masterplan made up of seven architects who were focused on urbanism, and eleven construction engineers whose primary target was transportation. The other members of the project team were two historians and an economist. Their objectives were to develop masterplans, specific site plans, and the rationale behind the plans that would be submitted to the Council for Urban Planning for approval or rejection. The second major player in the urban development process was the Council for Urban Planning of Rijeka’s Public Works Department. It was a municipal political body, meaning they had the authority to revise and propose changes to the masterplans put forward by the Urban Planning Institute. However, the majority of them were non-professionals - members of Rijeka’s organization of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Some of the members were engineers, but their number was significantly lower than that of non-professionals on the Council. As the 1962 masterplan and several other ones proposed in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not adopted, it is fair to say that the Council for Urban Planning of Rijeka’s Public Works Department was the key decision maker in the urban development process in Rijeka throughout the socialist period. The Council for Urban Planning had objections to the 1962 masterplan, most notably criticizing the overall scope of the project stating that it was too narrow. In addition, they enacted decisions that would replace the masterplan for much of the city. Lastly, they were responsible for complaints made by residents regarding land disputes, construction difficulties, and matters of a
similar nature. Therefore, it can be concluded that the political strength of the Council for Urban Planning in most cases overpowered the professional expertise of the Urban Planning Institute. The Urban Planning Institute’s work might have also been political as the future urban development was in their hands. They had to satisfy the criteria of the Council for Urban Planning that was a political (communist) body, however when their expertise and the meticulousness of their proposed plans are taken into consideration, I argue that their work was not political. The Council had several objections in relation to the 1962 masterplans. First, they were dissatisfied about the proposed scale of the masterplan as they believed the masterplan should include a larger territory. Second, their objection was that the planners viewed Rijeka as an ‘autonomous body’, meaning that the surrounding area was excluded from the masterplan. The Council believed that the planners should be aware of the interconnectedness between the hinterland and the city as the surrounding area has the potential to influence the processes happening in the urban agglomeration. Third, the proposed industrial character of the city was an issue as the Council believed that Rijeka could not be the hub of light industry as the city was a major port and industrial center. Forth, the omission of tourism from the masterplan was problematic as tourism was a propulsive economic branch that would be important both for the city and for its surrounding smaller centers. The Urban Planning Institute and the Council for Urban Planning had a mutual vision of the city. They envisioned Rijeka as a compact, linear city with dominant vertical urban expansion.

In the 1960s, both planning groups in Rijeka’s urban planning needed to address the massive population influx. The most suitable land was already occupied by existing structures, especially industrial complexes that were constructed in the Hungarian period, therefore the construction of new neighborhoods needed to be cost-efficient. The Urban Planning Institute determined that the
main objective for all parties involved in the urban planning efforts was to create suitable accommodation for almost 180,000 new inhabitants that were projected to immigrate to the city between 1962 and 2000. To achieve this objective, new buildings needed to be erected rapidly, while the expenditure should have been minimal without sacrificing the quality of the buildings. In addition, the envisioned built environments were oftentimes located on unfavorable topography. Some resolutions for large-scale in-migration include: restraining the urban growth, establishing a network of satellite cities in the proximity of the urban center, and vertically expanding the city. Imposing limitations on urban growth was impossible due to the scale of the immigration. The official economic policies embraced urbanization and industrialization, therefore administrative measures to terminate or mitigate the massive in-migration to urban centers would have been against the official discourse and policies. Hence, the policies of the Yugoslav state induced the rural-urban migration. It was difficult to stop the population influx as people tended to migrate to the prosperous regions, and Rijeka was definitely one of the most developed cities in Yugoslavia at the time. Creating satellite settlements in the vicinity of the city was not in accordance with the desires of either the Urban Planning Institute or the Council for Urban Planning as Rijeka was envisioned as a linear, compact city, and not as a hub of a network of satellite cities. The Yugoslav interpretation of modernist architecture promoted compactness and rationality, and Rijeka was not an exception. Therefore, the Council for Urban Planning decided that the massive population influx must be addressed by expanding the city vertically. In other words, the challenge of meeting the population growth would create a city whose landscape will be dominated by high-rise developments (see Figure 9).

\[135\] Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 2.
The Yugoslav state was interested in engaging with modernist architecture and urban planning. The country wanted to promote itself on the international stage. Solutions that were implemented to create new socialist neighborhoods in Rijeka cannot be interpreted unless a broader context of urban planning is taken into consideration. Unlike other communist countries in Europe at this time, Yugoslavia was interested in international architecture, urbanism and urban planning. New global trends in these disciplines were interesting not only to the most prominent Yugoslav architects and urbanists, but also to individuals who worked in the planning departments on a municipal level of government. For example, the urban development process in Belgrade was

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heavily influenced by CIAM (Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne or International Congresses of Modern Architecture) and their concept of the functional city based on rationality both in resource management and in spatial implementation of the main principles of the movement.\textsuperscript{137} Yugoslav architects actively participated in various international exhibitions. Their objective was to present the Yugoslav variant of socialist modernist architecture to the international audience and experts. The most significant success was Vjenceslav Richter’s pavilion at EXPO 1958 held in Brussels, Belgium. The building received overwhelmingly positive reaction at the Brussels exhibition, and Richter created a “spectacular structure suspended from a central cable-stayed mast, its support reduced to one single point, which allowed a completely open ground floor”. The success of Richter’s EXPO project demonstrated that Yugoslavia was embracing the values of modernist architecture, thus making the Yugoslav state recognized internationally. The aforementioned cases demonstrate Yugoslavia’s distinguished architectural style that was an internationally acclaimed representation of the country’s version of socialist modernist architecture. However, it is easier to portray new planning ideals in the state’s capital city whose role was to be a showcase for new urbanism and architecture, and it is also less challenging to demonstrate modernist ideals in representational spaces and structures, such as the pavilion for the EXPO exhibition in Brussels. These ideals were more difficult to implement in smaller urban centers, especially those characterized by challenging topography such as Rijeka.

The process of urban planning under the self-management system is qualitatively different from urban planning in other Eastern European former communist states. For example, the case of Stalinstadt in the German Democratic Republic provides different spatial patterns, but more importantly the entire process of urban planning is dissimilar. Firstly, urban process was very

centralized and bureaucratized as the Ministry of Reconstruction was supervising the urban development efforts in Stalinstadt. Secondly, the ties between East Germany and the USSR were considerably stronger than those between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Therefore, urban planners embraced the Soviet ideals, including the concept of the neighborhood unit that was later implemented in Stalinstadt. The neighborhood unit concept is defined as the smallest urban planning unit that is held together by a garden laid out for several blocks, schools, kindergartens, daycare centers for infants, and other services for the daily needs of the residents. The plan was developed on the principles of the Athens Charter with one major difference – the government decreed the reconstruction program. In addition, Stalinstadt was a planned city, an urban entity that had not previously existed. Therefore, the urban development in the city was uninterrupted by previously erected structures. The proposed location was on a plain, adjacent to a large industrial complex. And lastly, as the German Democratic Republic was under direct Soviet sphere of influence, planning practices were like those of the Soviet Union. The urban forms of Stalinstadt were the result of functionalist modernism combined with elements from Germany’s past. Therefore, these urban structures fall under the “national in form, socialist in content” umbrella, thus the urban fabric was different from the one “produced” by the Yugoslav self-management system. My interpretation of the “national in form, socialist in content” slogan is that certain elements from national histories were used if they could be incorporated into the socialist project and socialist society. In urban areas, forms or motives from national histories were welcomed as long as they could be reinterpreted in a socialist narrative. Kamov’s monument in Rijeka is an

example of this practice. Certain similarities between Stalinstadt and Rijeka exist. First, the existence of industrial complexes is evident in both cities. Second, the envisioned socialist neighborhoods in both centers were supposed to function semi-autonomously, meaning that they were designed to have all the necessary amenities for its residents. However, due to the differences in the Yugoslav and East German socio-economic and political systems which I mentioned in the first half of this paragraph prove that urban development as a process was carried out in a distinct fashion.

To demonstrate that the Yugoslav state was interested in the international modernist architecture and urbanism, it needs to be acknowledged that many Yugoslav architects and urbanists participated in international exhibitions and conferences as discussed in the previous chapter. It is interesting to note that experts from Rijeka also attended various international exhibitions, conferences, and symposiums. Professor Josip Seissel from the Urban Planning Institute participated at the “International Urbanist Conference Dedicated to Urban Development Problematics” and noted that cities at that period of time were products of characteristic economic development, especially industrial expansion and rapid growth of tertiary economic branches.143 This is important in Rijeka’s case as the city was rapidly and extensively industrialized in the socialist period. Several industrial economic branches were revitalized after the Second World War, accompanied by several new production facilities. The existing industrial giants whose production plants were reconstructed, upgraded and expanded were: the city’s principal shipyard 3. Maj, the oil refinery that was renamed after Boris Kidrič, one of the most important Yugoslav

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143 Josip Seissel, Međunarodni urbanistički skupovi posvećeni problemu razvoja grada, te suradnja našeg saveza s međunarodnom urbanističkom organizacijom (Zagreb: Republički zavod za urbanizam i komunalna i stambena pitanja, 1965), 3.
communists and the country’s leading economic ideologist, and the port of Rijeka whose various specialized terminals were created even beyond the city limits. New industrial facilities were erected mostly in the eastern part of Rijeka where the new specialized shipyard “Viktor Lenac” was opened in 1948, and the new oil refinery was constructed in Kostrena, which was a part of Rijeka’s municipality in the socialist period. A large portion of the production process was transferred to the new refinery as its location on the periphery was more favorable than the old refinery inside the city. In spatial terms, the industrial complexes located within the city limits were a constraint to urban development as they occupied a massive amount of land. Also, they were located unfavorably as the most significant portion of the industrial enterprises was in a close proximity to the coast. These economic powerhouses had their production facilities inside the city as the city expanded around them, thus encircling the production plants. The second disadvantage of the spatial distribution of the industrial facilities is that it created a functionally problematic space. For example, the Rijeka’s entire waterfront was characterized by the industrial landscape due to a large concentration and spatial distribution of industry that was quite uncharacteristic in other Yugoslav coastal cities of the time (see Figure 10).

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146 Velid Đekić, “Rafinerija nafte Rijeka – europski pionir u preradi crnog zlata,” 123.
Figure 10. Spatial distribution of industry and port activities in Rijeka (purple colored). The location of industry was very unfavorable as it is in the proximity to the coast. The local communist officials (especially from the Council for Urban Planning) forecast that the future neighborhoods would surround the existing industrial complexes. The oil refinery was the most significant problem as harmful chemicals affected the entire city.147

A limitation of available land in the city was one of the most significant impediments for urbanists to develop an optimal masterplan. Barely any masterplan models considered topography as being an important element. Unfavorable topography and indecisive local authorities were other factors that had a negative role in Rijeka’s urban development in the period of Second Yugoslavia. Topography is most demanding in the eastern and northern parts of the city, however this fact had not prevented spatial transformation from happening in these areas. The proposed solution was to “concentrate habitation and decentralize zones dedicated for industry”.148 In other words, vertical expansion was deemed the most appropriate to accommodate the migrants from other parts of Yugoslavia, especially the less developed parts of the federation.

148 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 17.
The concept of a linear city was developed by the Urban Planning Institute that was responsible for creating the specific site plans. As a part of the 1962 masterplan proposal, they developed plans for eleven different sites throughout the city. Each document addressed: the size and the boundaries of the lot, transportation, green belts and recreation, amenities, and the architectural style and façade colors. Interestingly, the proposed neighborhoods that were to be prominent in the landscape were to be “designed with extreme attention and solid appearance” as they would be visible from other parts of the city and the waterfront. The intention was to create the new visually appealing neighborhoods on the most prominent locations to make the entire city more visually attractive not only for its residents, but also for tourists.

Although the Urban Planning Institute developed a masterplan for the entire city, it was not responsible for the actual implementation of plans they created. This assignment was the responsibility of local authorities, more specifically the local Council for Urban Planning and the most significant local enterprises, especially those with the largest number of employees and industrial output. This is the way in which workers’ self-management had spatial repercussions in Rijeka. Self-management as a component of the economic decentralization efforts made by the federal government was responsible for urban development of Rijeka in the socialist period. Between 1957 and 1961 the two most notable financial sources for urban reconstruction and development were the general investment fund and the enterprises’ fund. The general investment fund was a federal fund that allocated financial resources for investments in infrastructure and development of the country, however it was abolished in 1965 as a part of a massive economic reform that mitigated the rigid system of state control over the economy and transferred

150 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Obrazloženje detaljnog urbanističkog plana za individualno stambeno naselje ‘Bošket’ na Sušaku, 3.
responsibilities to the republics’ or local level of government.\textsuperscript{151} After the reform, municipal authorities were directly responsible for urban development tasks, and together with the introduction of workers’ self-management, these two factors were responsible for creating the new urban space. If specific site plans were approved, the local industrial giants would compete for them, however they needed to follow the regulations proposed by the Urban Planning Institute and approved by the aforementioned Council.\textsuperscript{152} The enterprises also established their own investment funds to finance residential neighborhoods for their employees.

Conceptually, Rijeka was envisioned as a compact city, however Urban Planning Institute’s idealistic principles of a concentric urban entity was modified to address challenging terrain configuration.\textsuperscript{153} Higher elevations and steep topography to the north, and the sea barrier to the south affected the actual shape of the city (see Figure 11). In other words, Rijeka was planned as a linear city with a longer east-west axis, while the width of the city was significantly narrower due to terrain limitations.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{153} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 18.
\textsuperscript{154} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 18.
Figure 11. The existing urban fabric in 1961 and projected urban growth until 2000. The estimated growth of the urban fabric was significant in this projection.

As a result, residential areas surrounded industrial complexes. In some cases, large industrial enterprises constructed residential areas close to the workplace, however this phenomenon did not prevail. The economic powerhouses were among the “carriers” of urban growth as they constructed their own residential buildings or in some instances even smaller urban regions. This is the way in which workers’ self-management produced new spaces. The process of creating, developing, and building new structures and neighborhoods was complex, and was guided by a number of different steps. First, housing cooperatives (zadruge) were established in those

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companies that participated in urban expansion of the city.\textsuperscript{156} In Rijeka, housing cooperatives were established in: 3. Maj (shipyard), INA (oil industry company), Vulkan (ship equipment factory), Viktor Lenac (shipyard), Svjetlost (lighting producer), and other smaller businesses. Workers’ Councils allocated 4 percent of every employee’s paycheck for building residential areas dedicated to their staff. The financial resources the workers’ councils would obtain were used for purchasing new housing for the workers and their families in Rijeka.

Secondly, large construction firms would then erect the buildings per the plans that were approved by the Council for Urban Planning.\textsuperscript{157} The municipal authorities opted for the high-rise residential urban development. The construction companies erected the buildings in locations determined by the masterplan and specific site plans. The Urban Planning Institute proposed the number of apartments and their sizes, and after the approval from the Council for Urban Planning, the construction firms would carry out the actual construction.\textsuperscript{158} Neither the construction companies nor the industrial enterprises had an impact on the location of other amenities incorporated into the plans.

They would use their internal funds to execute the construction or apply for additional financial resources from the banks or public investment funds.\textsuperscript{159} This was evident in both residential and commercial developments.\textsuperscript{160} When enough resources were secured, the construction companies would enter the building stage of the process. At this point the workers’ councils at Rijeka’s large

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{156} “Stambene zadruge u Rijeci,” \textit{Novi list}, May 16, 1960, 2.
\bibitem{159} Narodni odbor kotara Rijeka, \textit{Obrazloženje uz perspektivni plan građevinarstva na području kotara Rijeka za godinu 1955. – 1961.}, 12.;
\end{thebibliography}
industrial enterprises would purchase the apartments, or more frequently the entire buildings, for their employees and their families.\textsuperscript{161} The workers’ councils did not have any influence over the proposed locations for construction. The apartments were assigned to the individual members of the labor force depending on the size of their family, and unofficially by their position at the company. It was no secret that higher management staff would receive more spacious units in a better location. Sometimes, the financial incentive provided by the enterprises was insufficient for a worker to secure their own apartment. Every type of work inside the building that represented a “higher residential standard” was a responsibility of the owner or the company that purchased the individual units or entire buildings.\textsuperscript{162} Any construction work not specified in the original site plans was considered to be of a “higher residential standard”.\textsuperscript{163} The owners had three options, to use their own financial resources, to inquire whether their employers would cover these expenses, or to apply for loans.\textsuperscript{164} The “cheapest” loans were provided by the local government, specifically the Housing Investment Fund (\textit{Fond za kreditiranje stambene izgradnje}).\textsuperscript{165} Workers financially contributed to housing development efforts made by their firms. The overall construction costs were relatively low, as they used prefabricated units that were assembled on site. In the beginning of the 1960s, efforts were made to develop an apartment for 1.5 million old Yugoslav dinars (approximately 25,437 Canadian dollars) and even for 1 million old dinars (just under 17,000 Canadian dollars).\textsuperscript{166, 167} This was achieved using prefabricated housing units that were assembled on the construction site.\textsuperscript{168} This way of creating new urban fabric was supposed to be more cost-

\textsuperscript{162} “Povoljniji uvjeti za kolektive i pojedince,” \textit{Novi list}, September 13, 1958, 2.
\textsuperscript{163} “Povoljniji uvjeti za kolektive i pojedince,” 2.
\textsuperscript{164} “Stambene zadruge u Rijeci,” 2.
\textsuperscript{165} “Povoljniji uvjeti za kolektive i pojedince,” 2.
\textsuperscript{166} “Stan za milijun i po dinara,” \textit{Novi list}, July 3, 1958, 2.
\textsuperscript{167} “Stan za milijun dinara,” \textit{Novi list}, January 1, 1959, 3.
\textsuperscript{168} “Stan za milijun dinara,” 3.
efficient and less time-consuming. This was important as the massive population influx forced the urban expansion in Rijeka.

The industrial enterprises were not the only ones purchasing newly erected apartments or buildings. Other buyers included the police, military, transportation authorities, and bureaucracy. Although the buyers came from various economic sectors, the industrial giants were most represented in the urban development initiatives. The percentage of the labor force working in industry demonstrates the importance of this economic branch in Rijeka’s economy at the time (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic branch</th>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Percentage in Rijeka’s workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and port activities</td>
<td>10,183</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>8,139</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and public services</td>
<td>3,910</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijeka - total</td>
<td>68,224</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In reality, the largest and most powerful local industrial players were the 3. Maj shipyard and the oil giant INA Industrija nafte (INA Oil Industry) which managed the refinery inside the city, and later constructed another one outside of the urbanized region. The aforementioned enterprises were the strongest as they had a large workforce, they were high-profit, and they were strategically important. It is of interest that the most significant local companies had multiple developments around town. For example, INA financed residential neighborhoods and individual buildings in

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various parts of Rijeka, including Krnjevo and Škurinje Novo Naselje (Škurinje New District) (see Figures 12, 13, 14).

Figure 12. The location of Krnjevo Novo Naselje (blue) and Škurinje Novo Naselje (orange)\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{170} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan – obrazloženje programa izgradnje}, 39.
Figure 13. INA’s Škurinje Novo Naselje development, early 1970s. The settlement was located on a hill northwest of the city center.\textsuperscript{171}

Figure 14. INA’s Škurinje Novo Naselje development is located on topographically challenging terrain. The construction was finished by the mid-1970s.^

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The new buildings, and in some cases the new neighborhoods, purchased by large industrial enterprises were located in close proximity to the actual workplace. As an example, 3. Maj acquired residential buildings located less than two kilometers away from the shipyard. The same principle applies to INA whose housing project was located within the same distance to work as the 3. Maj’s case. This was very convenient for the labor force as the daily commute between the two most important urban functions – habitation and labor – became short. However, as the locations closer to the factories became a scarcity, industries were forced to purchase new residential developments further away from their headquarters, though still within a 10-kilometer radius. This was the case with INA’s neighborhood in Škurinje Novo Naselje. As a result, workers that joined the workforce later on, specifically in the late 1970s, were assigned housing that was less favorable compared to those at the beginning. However, the workers were satisfied when their housing situation was resolved as the workers’ councils purchased apartments well under market value. Overall, self-management policies had spatial repercussions in residential areas created by the city’s most prominent industrial powerhouses.

Spatial forms that resulted from self-management in Rijeka are intriguing. The prevalence of vertical urban structures differentiates Rijeka from the majority of other Yugoslav urban centers. The city currently has around 100 skyscrapers (8 stories or higher) that were built during the communist rule. The city consists of surface area of 44 square kilometers, meaning there are approximately 2 high-rises per square kilometer. The need to generate as much living space as possible on space-constraining parcels generated vertical expansion of the city. This was also part of the official discourse by the Council for Urban Planning that promoted the concept of Rijeka as a compact, linear city. As the population was constantly increasing throughout the communist

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173 Hrvatska enciklopedija, 1st ed., s.v. “Rijeka.”
period, the desire to build high-rise residential areas prevailed. Even today, residential skyscrapers shape the city’s panoramic contours (see Figures 15, 16).

Figure 15. The panoramic view of Sušak from the late 1970s - the eastern part of Rijeka portraying high-rises from the communist period¹⁷⁴

The urban structures in Rijeka were constructed based on the notion of Yugoslav socialist modernism. The main characteristics of the style were rationality, uniformity, and functionality. Evidence of the concept of rationality can be seen in cautious resource management, and in the lack of unnecessary architectural elements, for instance the absence of ornamentation on buildings. Uniformity is characterized by a lack of inventiveness in architectural shapes and forms. In Belgrade that was also socialist modernist, for example, uniformity did not prevail. I argue that it is due to the fact that Belgrade was the federal capital and the national showcase for Yugoslav socialist modernist architecture. Thus, both the municipal and the federal government invested in New Belgrade. Rijeka and other smaller urban centers did not have the same advantage. In other words, the urban structures are visually like one another, and in the socialist context this notion led to buildings with basic geometric forms, most notably cubes, slabs, and towers. This same

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functionality is evident in the masterplan itself. Urbanists aspired to create neighborhoods with all the necessary amenities in the proximity of the residential buildings. Healthcare, education, leisure, and commercial activities were an essential part of new neighborhoods, at least in theory (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. The plan of a new neighborhood in Rijeka contained various functions as shown in the legend. The highlighted structures are the new residential buildings. Healthcare and education institutions (especially a family doctor, a kindergarten, and an elementary school are highlighted\textsuperscript{176}

\textsuperscript{176} Prijedlog parcijalne regulacije u predjelu ‘Malonji’, mjerilo 1:1000,” 1962, The State Archive in Rijeka (JU-7 75 Fond).
The erection of new residential buildings was the most significant type of construction undertaken in the city in the 1960s. The accommodation of new migrants from the entire Yugoslav federation demanded rapid and substantial urban development. The elevation of the high-rises rose proportionally with the population increase. The population influx was the most conspicuous between 1953 and 1961 and between 1961 and 1971 as the population in these periods increased around 30 percent in each interval.\textsuperscript{177} Consequently, the new residential buildings became increasingly taller, resulting in an interesting record. The high-rises located in Turnić neighborhood on the modern-day address Franje Čandeka 23A and 23B were the highest residential structures in the entire Yugoslav federation after their completion (see Figures 18, 19). These thirty-story skyscrapers were 96 meters high, and are currently the tallest residential structures in Croatia.\textsuperscript{178} They were completed in the mid-1970s.

\textsuperscript{177} Državni zavod za statistiku, \textit{Naselja i stanovništvo Republike Hrvatske 1857 - 2001}.
Figure 18. The construction of twin 30-storey residential high-rises in Rijeka, highest residential building in former Yugoslavia at the time\textsuperscript{179}

Figure 19. The high-rise at Franje Čandeka 23A nowadays.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{180} “Franje Čandeka 23A nowadays,” 2016, Photo taken by author.
Another phenomenon specific to Rijeka that distinguishes the city from other Yugoslav urban centers is the appearance of skyscrapers rising from the hilltops. The most influential factors on the erection of residential high-rises in the most prominent locations throughout the city were: the local enterprises and government embraced the vertical urban expansion as the most economical construction method, the terrain configuration was challenging itself, and the compact city concept was selected by the Urban Planning Institute.\textsuperscript{181} Their intent was to centralize the urban fabric inside of the city’s boundaries.\textsuperscript{182} One of the consequences was that the urban development occurred even in areas where high-rises were not expected. These skyscrapers on the hilltops needed to be of high quality, as the structures were exposed to strong winds, especially the bora wind coming from the northeast. Therefore, it is interesting to note that high-rise construction occurred even in regions where natural forces were impediments. These included Kozala neighborhood just north of downtown Rijeka and Gornja Vežica which is in the eastern part of the city (see Figures 20, 21, 22).

\textsuperscript{181} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 18.
\textsuperscript{182} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 18.
Figure 20. High-rises that emerge from the hilltops in Kozala neighborhood. “Kozala neighborhood,” 2016, Photo taken by author.
Figure 21. Construction of residential buildings in Gornja Vežica in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{184} \\

\textsuperscript{184} "Izgradnja Gornje Vežice," circa 1975, The State Archive in Rijeka (RO-46 22 Fond).
Figure 22. The view of the eastern part of Rijeka with residential skyscrapers rising from the hills\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{185} “The eastern part of the city of Rijeka,” 2016, Photo taken by author.
Rijeka is not Zagreb or Belgrade. The latter capital cities were more populous and more influential in the Yugoslav context than Rijeka. Belgrade was the federal capital, the country’s most populous urban center, while Zagreb was the capital of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the second largest urban center in the Yugoslav state. As a result of the discrepancy in population sizes and the gravitational strength between Rijeka and the capital cities, I argue that a major difference between Rijeka on the one hand, and Zagreb and Belgrade on the other existed, and this was a result of two factors. First, Rijeka is a smaller city than the aforementioned capitals, and therefore its influence on a larger scale (regional, republic or federal) is significantly lower than that of Zagreb and Belgrade. Second, the capital cities had a different type of impediment in their physical environment. Both Belgrade and Zagreb are situated on major rivers – Zagreb on Sava, and Belgrade on Sava and Danube. The third difference was that both Belgrade and Zagreb had sufficient vacant land to expand the urban fabric even without crossing the major rivers that flow through the cities. Rijeka has different kinds of topographical impediments; however, the city had not expanded enough to reach the most challenging terrain configurations before the communist period. Furthermore, urban planners in Rijeka were “forced” to develop urban settlements on steep slopes, while in the case of Zagreb and Belgrade, the impediments were the major rivers. Also, the vacant land on the opposite riverbanks was an excellent opportunity to envision and erect a new “ideal” Yugoslav socialist city in the proximity of the existing urban fabric. Lastly, the amount of available land for construction is a major difference between the capitals and Rijeka, thus the notion of creating something “new” in the urban sense would have been executed more easily in Belgrade and Zagreb. The projects of New Belgrade and New Zagreb were on a much broader scale than any new neighborhood in Rijeka. The new socialist neighborhoods were almost new
cities inside of the city, and the gravitational strength of these urban centers was more extensive than in Rijeka’s case, resulting in using the adjective “new” in their official nomenclature. The question of the relevancy of these cities to the study of Rijeka emerges. There are several reasons why Rijeka is worthy of exploring and the conclusions that can be derived are relevant. Firstly, Rijeka’s strategic location led to the city becoming by far the most important port of the Yugoslav federation. Secondly, the industrial capacity was a notable pull-factor for a significant portion of the immigrants coming into the city, however the spatial distribution of the industrial complexes was a major impediment for urban planners and the development of the city during the communist period on the other hand. Thirdly, the terrain configuration was considerably different than in the Yugoslav’s most important cities, Belgrade and Zagreb. All of the aforementioned factors played a role in the urban development of Rijeka, thus it is necessary to examine them in order to understand how Rijeka was different from other Yugoslav urban centers, most notably Belgrade and Zagreb.

After the Second World War, and specifically after the initial period of economic stagnation and general reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure, the Yugoslav federal authorities decided to initiate economic reforms that promoted and induced two processes – industrialization and urbanization. Before the communists gained power, Yugoslavia had primarily an agricultural economy, however due to the program of massive industrialization throughout the entire nation, within several decades Yugoslavia became highly-industrialized. In spatial terms, the process is mostly associated with the cities, especially the larger and more populated urban regions. As the concentration of industry was highest close to urban centers, the rural population started to migrate.

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into the cities to access the labor market, higher demand for workers in industry, and a broader array of opportunities for stable jobs. The second period of the Yugoslav industrialization lasted from 1953 to 1964 and was oftentimes called the “economic miracle” as the annual growth of the secondary sector (especially industry and mining) was approximately 12 percent.\textsuperscript{188} Even after 1964, the annual industrial growth rates were high, averaging at 9 percent per year until 1979.\textsuperscript{189} At the same time, as much of the industrial capacity was in urban regions, the consequential process of urbanization was rapid. For instance, between 1948 and 1981 the percentage of urban population nearly doubled from 24.9 percent in 1948 to 46.6 percent in 1981.\textsuperscript{190} Rijeka was not an exception to this trend. The city nearly doubled its population between 1948 and 1971\textsuperscript{191}, and in addition, Rijeka’s industrial capacity was second-largest in the Socialist Republic of Croatia after the republic’s capital Zagreb.\textsuperscript{192} Clearly, Rijeka was an attractive destination for migrants, especially rural-to-urban ones. As a result, they arrived from across the entire Yugoslav federation.

In the functional regionalization of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, Rijeka was a macro-regional center.\textsuperscript{193} The first level was the republic’s capital Zagreb, while Rijeka alongside Split and Osijek was one of the macro-regional centers. These urban centers had over 100,000 inhabitants and their gravitational strength exceeded the boundaries of their urban regions.\textsuperscript{194} Rijeka’s macro-region

188 Dragutin Feletar, “Prinos poznavanju periodizacije i regionalizacije industrije Jugoslavije,” 90.
189 Dragutin Feletar, “Prinos poznavanju periodizacije i regionalizacije industrije Jugoslavije,” 90.
encompassed the territory of Istria, Kvarner (islands Krk, Cres, Rab, and Lošinj), Gorski kotar, and the northwestern part of Lika (see Figure 23).  

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Figure 23. Rijeka’s macro-region: 1) Istria, 2) Rijeka’s urban region, 3) Kvarner, 4) Gorski kotar, and 5) the northwestern part of Lika. Rijeka’s location in the macro-region is marked with a dot.  

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196 “Rijeka’s macro-region,” Image obtained using Google Earth.
Rijeka was the third most populous city in the Socialist Republic of Croatia after the republic’s capital Zagreb and Split. In 1971, the population of Zagreb was 629,896, the population of Split was 129,203, while Rijeka had 129,173 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{197} Between 1948 and 1971 Rijeka’s population almost doubled, and managing the much-needed urban development was a challenging task (see Table 2). Rijeka was one of the most developed cities in the entire federation at that time, hence the city’s desirability to internal migrants from within Yugoslavia. The percentage of workers in the industrial sector of the city was the largest in Croatia, even surpassing the capital of the republic Zagreb.\textsuperscript{198} In 1962, Rijeka had 24.5\% of its population employed in industrial enterprises, compared to 22.3\% in Zagreb.\textsuperscript{199} In addition to its industrial significance, Rijeka was a major transportation hub. The port was by far the most important in Yugoslavia as 60 percent of the entire country’s export went through Rijeka’s harbor.\textsuperscript{200} 16.6 percent of the population was employed in transportation, compared to 6 percent in Zagreb.\textsuperscript{201}

Table 2. Population of the city of Rijeka between 1948 and 1971\textsuperscript{202}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67,088</td>
<td>73,718</td>
<td>98,759</td>
<td>129,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{197} Državni zavod za statistiku, \textit{Naselja i stanovništvo Republike Hrvatske 1857. - 2001.}
\textsuperscript{198} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan – obrazloženje programa izgradnje, 1.}
\textsuperscript{199} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan – obrazloženje programa izgradnje, 1.}
\textsuperscript{200} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan – obrazloženje programa izgradnje, 1.}
\textsuperscript{201} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan – obrazloženje programa izgradnje, 1.}
\textsuperscript{202} Državni zavod za statistiku, \textit{Naselja i stanovništvo Republike Hrvatske 1857. - 2001.}
The change is more evident when the population increase is visualized. The increase between 1948 and 1953 can be characterized as stable and expected, while the population increase between 1953 and 1971 is constant, but more dramatic (see Figure 24).

![Figure 24. Population of the city of Rijeka between 1948 and 1971](image)

The population of the federal capital city - Belgrade was 1,209,360 in the same year. Although Rijeka was a mid-sized urban center in the Yugoslav context, the city was extremely important due to its vast industrial capacity and its function as the primary port of the federation due to its strategic geographical location. The geostrategic location of the city is a result of several factors: Rijeka’s location at the point of deepest penetration of the Adriatic sea (as a part of the Mediterranean Sea) into the European continent, the transportation links that the city had with the

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Croatian hinterland (railway and road network), the vicinity of many land-locked countries of the Eastern Bloc (e.g. Hungary), and the fact that Rijeka was an export port for many Yugoslav products due to its proximity to the industrially and agriculturally most advanced parts of the Yugoslav federation (mainly Croatia, Vojvodina, and certain parts of Slovenia).\textsuperscript{205} As a result of these factors, most notably the importance and strength of the port activities and its major industrial capacity, Rijeka became a desirable city for internal migration. The city was attractive to Yugoslav residents from other republics, the majority of whom came from the less developed republics and autonomous provinces. Throughout the communist period, Rijeka became a more ethnically heterogeneous urban center. For example, between 1971 and 1991 the percentage of Croats as majority of Rijeka’s urban population decreased by approximately 5 percent, while other ethnic groups from other parts of Yugoslavia (e.g. Serbs and Bosniaks/Muslims) increased their relative share in the total population of Rijeka (see Table 3).\textsuperscript{206}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|ccc|ccc|ccc|}
\hline
\textbf{Year} & \textbf{Rijeka} & & & \textbf{Zagreb} & & & \textbf{Belgrade} & \\
 & Croats & Serbs & Bosniaks & Croats & Serbs & Bosniaks & Croats & Serbs & Bosniaks \\
\hline
1971 & 77.33 & 9.44 & 0.98 & 87.13 & 5.42 & 0.76 & 3.23 & 78.47 & 0.97 \\
1991 & 71.79 & 10.51 & 2.74 & 86.05 & 5.35 & 1.40 & 1.63* & 77.86* & 0.71* \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The percentage of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks in the total population of Rijeka, Zagreb, and Belgrade in 1971 and 1991 (values highlighted with a star are from the 1981 census)\textsuperscript{207, 208, 209}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{205} Nikola Stražičić, “Rijeka – vodeća hrvatska luka,” 38.
In relative numbers, percentage of Croats who were the majority of Rijeka’s population decreased, while minorities witnessed an increase in their share in Rijeka’s population between 1971 and 1991. The patterns regarding the figures about different national groups in Rijeka were in contrast with both the republic’s capital Zagreb and the federal capital Belgrade. Rijeka is characterized by the “heterogenization” of its urban population, unlike Belgrade that witnessed the homogenization of its population and Zagreb whose ethnic populations were stagnant between 1971 and 1991. In Rijeka, the relative share of the Croatian population decreased by 5.5 percent, while the populations of Serbs and Bosniaks, the two largest ex-Yugoslav ethnic groups that resided in the city, increased. Especially notable was the expansion of the Bosniak population, or Muslims as that was the official category in the census of the time. The Bosniak population witnessed an exponential growth – their population expanded by nearly three times in just 20 years. The industrial strength of Rijeka and its multicultural character were the main reasons that members from other Yugoslav nationalities immigrated to Rijeka, including the Bosniak population. Professor Husref Hadžialagić describes Rijeka as a pleasant multiethnic community where the immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed a warm welcome from the local population.210

In the period between the 1960s and 1970s, a significant portion of the labor force in Rijeka’s shipyards was from Bosnia and Herzegovina.211

The overall population increase in Rijeka was also significant. Immigration to the city combined with the challenging terrain configuration was a difficult task to address for all the involved parties in the process of Rijeka’s urban development, including the municipal government (the Council for Urban Planning), professional institutions (the Urban Planning Institute), large construction

211 Emir Numanović, “Bosanci u Rijeci - pod širokogrudim liburnijskim suncem.”
companies, and the local industrial powerhouses that participated in the urban development efforts throughout the communist period.

Figure 25. Terrain configuration in Rijeka with the hills and the Adriatic Sea surrounding the city. The red line symbolizes the boundaries of present-day City of Rijeka.  

212 “Topographic map of Rijeka,” Image obtained using Google Maps Terrain tool.
Figure 26. Terrain configuration in Zagreb were the only impediments are the Medvednica mountain on the northern side of the city and Sava river. However, the city can expand in every other direction.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{213}“Topographic map of Zagreb,” Image obtained using Google Maps Terrain tool.
Figure 27. Terrain configuration in Belgrade where topographical obstacles are located on the southeastern portion of the city. In addition, rivers Sava and Danube can be perceived as topographical challenges in the physical sense. Unlike Zagreb and Belgrade, Rijeka had significantly more topographical obstacles that directly influenced the expansion of the urban fabric in a linear manner along the east-west axis (see Figures 25, 26, 27). The urban expansion would be mainly longitudinal, with the overall length of 9 kilometers, while transversal urban growth was limited to the maximal width of 1500 meters due to topographical impediments. Both the existing urban fabric and the planned construction were constrained by the hills on the northern side of the proposed urban expansion and the Adriatic Sea on the southern portion. The additional challenges were the Rječina canyon and the fault.

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214 “Topographic map of Belgrade,” Image obtained using Google Maps Terrain tool.
215 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 18.
216 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka – obrazloženje programa izgradnje, 40.
217 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 8.
line on the northern edge of the city which was a significant obstacle for further urban expansion in that direction.²¹⁸ Lastly, land reclamation was not a viable solution due to the significant water depth close to the coast.²¹⁹ Overall, the topography was a major obstacle to optimal urban development during the communist period.²²⁰ Even the president of the city’s People’s Committee (effectively the mayor of the city at the time) Edo Jardas mentioned in an interview with the local newspapers Novi list that “rocky terrain and inaccessible cul-de-sacs that lead to the main roads” were visible problems that planners face with Rijeka’s future urban development.²²¹ Zagreb and Belgrade are both located in the Pannonian Basin, a large Central European plain. Thus, due to flat terrain, their urban development projects could be designed and implemented more easily. In addition, certain solutions and idealistic principles of modern urbanism would not encounter the challenging topography in the cases of Belgrade and Zagreb. For example, it was less difficult to construct straight, multi-lane throughways that would connect urban antipodes of the aforementioned cities. The same opportunity did not exist in Rijeka were the unfavorable terrain configuration affected the urban development process in a negative manner.

There are a number of ways to examine the impact of topography on urban development. The significance of the challenging terrain configuration can be observed when the process is compared to urban development efforts in other major cities in the former Yugoslavia. Rijeka’s Urban Planning Institute conducted a survey in association with other major Yugoslav Urban Planning institutions in order to look at the main characteristics of the construction of new residential areas in eight major Yugoslav cities. In 1963, the Urban Planning institutes from Sarajevo (Socialist

²¹⁸ Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 8.
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Zagreb (SR of Croatia), Ljubljana (SR of Slovenia), Maribor (SR of Slovenia), Zrenjanin (SR of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina), Loznica (SR of Serbia), and Belgrade (SR of Serbia and the federal capital) partnered with Rijeka’s Urban Planning Institute to conduct a survey on patterns in urban development in these Yugoslav urban centers. The eight cities were chosen because Rijeka’s Urban Planning Institute had partner relations with the Urban Planning institutes of these urban centers. Before the discussion on the survey where Rijeka is compared with the other seven urban centers, it is important to establish a functional hierarchy of these cities in the Yugoslav context. On the one side, there were more populous and functionally more important centers like the federal or the republics’ capitals (Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo), while on the other side there were cities with the population under 75,000 in the mid-1960s. I would categorize the aforementioned cities into three categories. First, Belgrade as the federal capital should form a separate category due to its significance as the center of the Yugoslav federation. In addition, Belgrade had more actors who had an impact on the urban development of the city. In the capital city, the federal government and the government of the Socialist Republic of Serbia were also involved in the urban design and construction of new socialist areas alongside the local government. The next level would be the republics’ capitals – Sarajevo as the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zagreb as the Croatian capital, and Ljubljana as the capital city of Slovenia. Their influence was limited to their republics, thus it was weaker than Belgrade’s, however their role as the capitals of the republics distinguished them from the third group of cities. The remaining urban centers, Rijeka, Maribor, Zrenjanin, and Loznica can be considered as the third level in the proposed hierarchy. The trends in tertiary centers

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differ from the trends in primary and secondary cities, therefore it is valuable to examine them.

The study was conducted in the new socialist neighborhoods that were planned by the Urban Planning institutes in the eight cities before their actual construction. The eight new socialist neighborhoods that were included in the survey were: Slobodan Princip-Seljo in Sarajevo, Trnsko in Zagreb, Turnić in Rijeka, Trule in Ljubljana, Ljubljanski kare in Maribor, Mala Amerika in Zrenjanin, Viskoza in Loznica, and Karaburma in Belgrade (see Table 4).

Table 4. Basic parameters of the eight proposed new neighborhoods in the Yugoslav cities that were included in the survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City and Neighborhood</th>
<th>Area in Hectares</th>
<th>Number of Apartments</th>
<th>Residential Area in m²</th>
<th>Number of beds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo – Slobodan Princip-Seljo</td>
<td>19.68</td>
<td>2556</td>
<td>134,317</td>
<td>9998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb – Trnsko</td>
<td>27.70</td>
<td>2790</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>11,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijeka – Turnić</td>
<td>22.29</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>93,142</td>
<td>6934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljubljana – Trule</td>
<td>17.40</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>5510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maribor – Ljubljanski kare</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>3514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zrenjanin – Mala Amerika</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loznica – Viskoza</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgrade – Karaburma</td>
<td>30.88</td>
<td>2729</td>
<td>127,676</td>
<td>10,178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnić was the new neighborhood that was discussed in the comparative survey with seven other envisioned residential areas in other Yugoslav cities. The project was a large-scale one as the overall area was estimated to be just under 223,000 m². The plan was to construct 1815 new apartments with total residential area of just over 93,000 m². The 1815 new habitation units

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224 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 10.
225 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
226 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
227 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
would accommodate nearly 7000 beds for the new inhabitants. The comparative analysis with other projects included in the survey demonstrated the Turnić neighborhood in Rijeka was one of the most spatially voluminous projects, behind the two capitals – Belgrade and Zagreb, and of similar size to Loznica. Interestingly, the number of apartments was substantially lower than in the case of the aforementioned capital cities. The proposed residential area was 30 percent smaller than in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo. The same patterns apply to the number of beds in the new residential areas.

Rijeka’s new neighborhood covered in the survey had some interesting differences when compared to the other included projects. The overall area was approximately 30 percent smaller than the districts being compared in Zagreb and Belgrade, however the number of proposed apartment units was 35 percent lower, while the residential area (the overall surface area of all proposed buildings) is approximately 45 percent smaller than in the two most populous cities in the federation. The substantial difference between the overall area (223,000 m$^2$) and the residential area (93,000 m$^2$) is the result of the topographical impediments in the environment. This illustrates that it was less challenging to erect new buildings in flatter areas, and therefore creating more compact neighborhoods is more straightforward. The Urban Planning Institute wanted the envisioned Rijeka’s future urban development based on the principle of the continuous expansion of a compact, functional and economical agglomeration. The optimal city should radially expand from its core, but in Rijeka’s case that was difficult to achieve due to challenging topographical factors. Therefore, compactness was achieved by vertical urban expansion. The Urban Planning

228 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
229 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
230 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
231 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 11.
232 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 18.
233 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 18.
Institute planned to address the urban density in the newly erected neighborhoods by establishing green belts within the city. As a result, the newly erected residential areas were planned to have a significant portion of green spaces between the built structures.\textsuperscript{234} The vacant (unbuilt) land in the project was estimated to cover 73.2 percent of the total land area used for the project.\textsuperscript{235} The surface of the proposed residential area was about 45 percent smaller than in Zagreb and Belgrade (see Table 5). This can be a result of two factors. First, the shortage of favorable land for construction required compromise on the size of the actual habitation units. Second, the two capitals were the centers of the most substantial in-migration, and therefore it was necessary to construct larger residential spaces. The number of beds was in accordance with the number of apartments, as both have shown 30 percent lower figures than in Zagreb and Belgrade. The standard of living in the newly erected neighborhoods of the eight surveyed Yugoslav urban centers can be measured by calculating the average size of the apartments and the number of beds per every apartment unit.

Table 5. The average apartment sizes and beds per apartments in the envisioned socialist neighborhoods in eight Yugoslav urban centers (calculation is based on the figures provided in the survey)\textsuperscript{236}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City and Neighborhood</th>
<th>Beds per Apartment</th>
<th>Average Apartment Size in m$^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo – Slobodan Princip-Seljo</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>52.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagreb – Trnsko</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>48.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijeka – Turnić</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>51.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljubljana – Trule</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>60.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maribor – Ljubljanski kare</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>48.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zrenjanin – Mala Amerika</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>52.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loznica – Viskoza</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>64.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgrade – Karaburma</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>46.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{234} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 43.
\textsuperscript{235} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda}, 12.
\textsuperscript{236} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda}, 11.
The average apartment size in the Turnić project was closer to the lowest figures marked in Belgrade than the highest figures that characterize Viskoza neighborhood in Loznica. In addition, the new Rijeka neighborhood had one of the highest number of beds per apartment unit. The two parameters combined demonstrate that the planners working on the Turnić project needed to create small to mid-size apartment units with a high number of beds to accommodate a large portion of internal immigrants. This is more or less expected as the population influx was significant and the resources were often scarce. In Rijeka’s case, it was projected that the average building cost for one apartment would be around 3.5 million old Yugoslav dinars (around 59,000 Canadian dollars today), compared to 2.75 million dinars in Sarajevo.\footnote{Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 14.} Infrastructure, foundations, demolition, materials and all other costs were calculated into the estimated price.\footnote{Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 14.} It is beneficial to observe the overall costs when they are expressed as indexes (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sarajevo</th>
<th>Zagreb</th>
<th>Rijeka</th>
<th>Maribor</th>
<th>Zrenjanin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rijeka had the highest building costs per apartment unit out of all surveyed Yugoslav cities. The high expenses were due to the following factors: the construction of new roads in the neighborhood, the creation and arrangement of new green belts, the construction of the water supply system, the construction of the sewer system, and the high costs of land reconfiguration (preparing the terrain for future construction).\footnote{Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda, 15.} The Urban Planning Institute highlighted that as
the topographically higher terrains in Rijeka were slowly included in the urban expansion, the cost of supporting infrastructure was significantly higher, but they claimed it was the only viable solution for a long-term urban growth.\textsuperscript{241} It is interesting to note that the cost of construction in Zagreb is almost as high as in Rijeka. Although the expenses in Rijeka are tightly related to the physical environment, in Zagreb two administrative factors significantly increased the overall price – the cost of purchasing the land and the demolition of existing structures.\textsuperscript{242} This expense was almost four times higher in Zagreb than in Rijeka.\textsuperscript{243} All factors in Rijeka are directly related to the challenging topography. Substantial financial resources were needed to prepare the terrain for future construction. In other words, it was difficult and resource-intensive to lay out proper foundations for the future high-rises due to the unfavorable topographical elements (see Figure 28).

\textsuperscript{241} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 18.
\textsuperscript{242} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda}, 15.
\textsuperscript{243} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Anketa o ekonomsko-pravnom položaju urbanističkih zavoda}, 15.
One of the major differences between Rijeka and the country’s capitals like Belgrade and Zagreb was that there were no large-scale elaborate projects that would “break with the past” in the architectural and urbanistic sense. In other words, both Zagreb and Belgrade had constructed new socialist parts of town that were called New Zagreb and New Belgrade. By naming the planned parts of the city as “New”, the planning authorities in both capitals wanted to create novel neighborhoods that could be easily distinguished. It is fair to say that Rijeka had a smaller symbolic role in Yugoslavia than Zagreb and Belgrade, however I believe that in case of the capitals, new neighborhoods were of a much greater scale. Thus, they were identified by adding the adjective

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“new” into their names. The federal and the republics’ capital cities were more influential and had more notable gravitational power than non-capital urban entities.

In Rijeka, the new neighborhoods were fragmented as there was no large-scale project to develop a new socialist “city inside the city” like in Belgrade and Zagreb with the emergence of New Belgrade and New Zagreb. The main component that was missing was the lack of new buildings for public institutions. There was no “break with the past” in Rijeka, unlike there had been in Zagreb and Belgrade. New Belgrade and New Zagreb were envisioned as a direct socialist opposition to the existing bourgeois capitalist urban fabric, while this phenomenon did not exist in Rijeka as Rijeka was a smaller city and it was lower in the functional hierarchy of Yugoslav urban centers.

The construction of New Belgrade was envisioned by the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) since the town was liberated in 1944 and the new Yugoslav state was formed in 1945. By the end of the country’s first five-year plan, the first masterplan in which New Belgrade was envisioned was presented in 1950. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, Belgrade’s urban planners gradually abandoned the original idea based on the principles of Le Corbusier’s Radiant City and shifted their planning ideas towards functionalist modernism due to several factors: 1) it was in accordance with their official discourse, 2) it was the showcase of Yugoslavia’s modernization process, and 3) it was the showcase of Yugoslavia’s architectural and urbanist success on the international stage. New Belgrade had an important symbolic role in the Yugoslav communist ideology as the new city was set to be the first “Yugoslav socialist city”.

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245 Brigitte Le Normand, Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade, xii.
246 Brigitte Le Normand, Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade, xii.
A functional modernist layout of New Belgrade was the site where the most important political organizations and the federal government bodies were to be located. Some of the most prominent buildings that were planned to be constructed in New Belgrade included: the Central Committee building (or the Building of Social and Political Organizations), the Federal Assembly building, the Federal Executive Council building (see Figure 29), the Museum of Contemporary Art, and the Sava Centar music hall. All of these buildings were designed and constructed to emphasize New Belgrade’s role in the Yugoslav socialist state – the role of the first real Yugoslav city. These state buildings were spatial representations of a desire to create a clearly recognizable Yugoslav socialist urban entity.

Figure 29. The Federal Executive Council Building in New Belgrade was an interpretation of modernism as a desirable architectural style in socialist Yugoslavia demonstrating that the state was not an ordinary East European communist state and that Yugoslavia was not behind the Iron Curtain.

New Zagreb was officially presented in 1962, fifteen years after the first competition for the Yugoslav state buildings in New Belgrade.\textsuperscript{251} Vranić argues that the architectural style that prevailed in New Zagreb was a result of the local communist party’s political influence.\textsuperscript{252} In other words, New Zagreb was envisioned as a modernist city from the very beginning, and by the late 1940s and early 1950s the principal architects and urbanists behind the project embraced Social Realist aesthetic doctrines.\textsuperscript{253} In addition, they implemented the paradigm of the “functional city” as a model for the construction of the new socialist reality in New Zagreb, supported by the local authorities that immediately applied this idea of a modernist city through intentional infrastructure planning.\textsuperscript{254} Although New Zagreb was the most extensive development project in Zagreb, the public institutions were not relocated into the new part of the city. The Ministries’ Building (Zgrada ministarstava), more commonly known as Small Box (Kockica) as it was box-shaped, was presumably the most notable new project due to its role as the location of many ministries of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (see Figure 3).\textsuperscript{255} The building is a classic example of socialist modernist architecture in socialist Yugoslavia due to its simple shape, rationality and functionality.\textsuperscript{256} One interesting commonality between the Ministries’ Building in Zagreb and the Federal Executive Council building in Belgrade was that the interiors were designed and decorated by some of the most famous artists in the federation. In Belgrade’s case some of the most notable artists were Miho Čakelja and Vjenceslav Richter.\textsuperscript{257} Some of the most well-known painters and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{252} Dubravka Vranić, “The Resistance of Architecture to Political Regime(s): The Case of Novi Zagreb,” 41.
\bibitem{253} Dubravka Vranić, “The Resistance of Architecture to Political Regime(s): The Case of Novi Zagreb,” 41.
\bibitem{254} Dubravka Vranić, “The Resistance of Architecture to Political Regime(s): The Case of Novi Zagreb,” 41.
\bibitem{256} Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, \textit{Zagrebački leksikon (A-LJ)}, 531.
\end{thebibliography}
sculptors that had their mark on the interior of the Ministries’ Building in Zagreb were Raul Goldoni, Dušan Džamonja, and Edo Murtić.\textsuperscript{258}

Rijeka, on the other hand did not construct new buildings that would be used by local political organizations or the municipal government. Furthermore, the city did not have any portions of its new, socialist urban fabric named New Rijeka or anything similar. The major difference between Belgrade and Zagreb on the one hand, and Rijeka on the other is that in Rijeka’s case only two neighborhoods had the adjective “new” in their nomenclature. These are Škurinje and Krnjevo, hence the new portions of these areas were named Škurinje Novo Naselje (New Škurinje) and Krnjevo Novo Naselje (New Krnjevo). These are the only two cases where the adjective “new” was added to the existing name of the area. However, Škurinje and Krnjevo are neighborhoods, they are not newly envisioned socialist parts of the city that would be a clear distinction between

\textsuperscript{258} Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, Zagrebački leksikon (A-LJ), 531.  
\textsuperscript{259} Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, Zagrebački leksikon (A-LJ), 531.
the newly erected urban entity in accordance with the Yugoslav communist values and the existing bourgeois capitalist parts of town. In Rijeka’s case, these were newly constructed residential areas lacking other functions, unlike in Zagreb and especially Belgrade where many public institutions were relocated to the new socialist buildings in the new socialist parts of the cities.

In Rijeka, most of the components of urban development were smaller than in Belgrade or Zagreb. The public spaces, public buildings, and other representational spaces were not as grand as those built in the capital cities. Also, the new neighborhoods were hardly comparable in size. Several patterns of urban development make Rijeka and other smaller Yugoslav centers qualitatively different case studies. Although the scope of construction was a fraction of that occurring in the country’s capitals, the socialist urban development in Rijeka was responsible for the vertical expansion of the city. Thus, Rijeka held a record with the highest residential high-rise in the entire Yugoslav federation. The combination of industrial capacity, topography that differs from the plains of the Pannonian Basin where Zagreb and Belgrade are located, and the interesting dynamic of the urban development process differentiated Rijeka from other Yugoslav urban centers, especially from the most populous and administrative centers of the socialist federation. The interrelation between the specific Yugoslav communist economic policy that was self-management, official discourse of the local communist authorities who promoted the concept of a compact, linear city, and challenging topography that differentiates Rijeka from Zagreb and Belgrade produced dominantly vertical urban forms. The newly erected structures and neighborhoods were inhabited mostly by industry workers and their families, however, amongst all socialist neighborhoods in Rijeka there is not one that can be considered as a ‘break with the past’. In other words, no novel residential area in Rijeka distinguished itself in size or functional significance like in the cases of Belgrade with New Belgrade and Zagreb with New Zagreb.
Chapter 7. Existing Neighborhoods – A Problem or an Opportunity?

Old neighborhoods, especially city centers, often receive greater attention because they carry the “burden” of the past. These regions contain elements from the past, and they are a spatial reflection of the ideas and values of previous times. One can look at these neighborhoods from two different perspectives – a more positive one where an urban core is understood to be a witness of the previous socio-economic and political systems and cultural heritage and therefore is worthy of preserving, or a negative perspective where an urban core is labeled as a burden as it is oftentimes a reflection of an outdated system of values. In many former communist Eastern European states, communists had at some point held radical ideas about the existing neighborhoods due to the nature of the capitalist-communist anti-sentiment. This phenomenon was especially evident in Stalinist USSR. Yugoslav urban centers, including Rijeka, were no exception to radical ideas. Therefore, it would be fair to assume that even in Rijeka, the local communist leadership would have had radical views towards the downtown area as all the region was a spatial reflection of the previous systems that were driven by capitalist economy. How can we demonstrate that is was really the case?” Was the city center a burden to the communists? Or did they perceive the existing urban fabric worthy of preserving or was the reality somewhere between the two polarized sides of the story?

Existing urban fabric can come from any number of historical periods. The built inheritance is a “witness” of historical events and processes that shaped urban environments for centuries. Urban settlements are constantly changing, and the period from the first major urbanization processes that commenced over 5,000 years ago until today must be taken into consideration when explaining processes and factors that induce change in these environments.260 From the initial phase of

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creating settlements that was characterized by urban features in the Mesopotamia circa 3,200 years BC to the present day, several forces and processes have had a significant impact on the environment, including the urban one. These included: wars and conflicts between various groups (ethnic, religious, cultural), advancements in technology, and the perpetual changes of social, economic, and political situations. Substitutions of sovereignties and changes in socio-economic systems are some of the most notable processes that have spatial repercussions. For example, in the 1930s Soviet leadership put into action the large-scale plan to redevelop Moscow in order to showcase the advantages of a new socialist city.\textsuperscript{261} Regions that were characterized by perennial habitation experienced countless alterations in their physical and socio-economic environments. Observation of a sole historical period without understanding the complex reality of the previous periods may result in misinterpretations of the main characteristics of that specific era. In other words, we cannot solely criticize decisions made in a certain period of time without taking into consideration the historical context when those changes were made. These features can be applied to Europe in particular, and the southeastern part of the continent is no exception. Assertion of sovereignties in the region, followed by numerous shifts in the socio-political environment created spatial representations that mirrored the main characteristics of the ruling structures. State authorities had their own perceptions of an ideal urban space, and this could have been achieved through modernizing the existing urban fabric, replacement of the old landscape with a new one through the process of urban modernization, or a combination of the two.

In the context of the socialist Yugoslavia, the search for an ideal urban space was a continual process. The ongoing quest to create a modern urban space that would have incorporated the planning desires of the ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was determined by the

turbulent political situation after the Second World War. The period between the end of the war on the territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 was characterized by close international ties with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{262} One of the consequences of this tight relationship between the two communist states and the Soviet patronage of Yugoslavia was the implementation of both Soviet building principles and architectural style embedded in the official discourse. Belgrade, and especially New Belgrade was meant to resemble Moscow.\textsuperscript{263} Evidence for this can be seen in the proposal to design and build the new Central Committee Building that would bring to mind the Palace of the Soviets in Moscow.\textsuperscript{264} In practical terms, the Yugoslav leadership perceived that spatial representation of socialist realism was in accordance with the official discourse of the state, communist values, and desire of the ruling party to express the increasing importance of the proletariat. However, after 1948 the two countries terminated their bilateral relations, and Yugoslavia chose to create its own version of state socialism. One of the most prominent outcomes was the introduction of self-management, a significant change in the economic functioning of the state. As a result, socialist realism was labeled as a style with its foundations in the Soviet misinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and was therefore no longer desired and ultimately abandoned.

When Yugoslav communist authorities envisioned their interpretation of an ideal urban space, the question of existing neighborhoods emerged. The typical communist rhetoric would characterize old urban fabric as being erected to conform to the values of the bourgeois class.\textsuperscript{265} This situation was common all around the communist bloc. Existing cities with their distinctive urban histories

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{262} Ivo Banac, \textit{With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism}, 125.
\end{flushright}
were different from newly constructed neighborhoods it was challenging to envision changes in space that was already built, especially when a transformation of socio-political and economic systems is radical as it is the case in socialist Yugoslavia.

The phenomenon was especially evident in Belgrade which served as the federal capital. The existing urban core was discerned as the symbol of promoting “Greater-Serbianism” as an indispensable center of rule of the royal Karadžić family’s policies. Belgrade’s urban core abounded with features and spaces that celebrated some of the most notable persons from political, cultural or scientific elite from Serbian history, including a monument dedicated to Vuk Stefanović Karadžić that was erected in 1937. Representations of Great-Serbianism was correlated with the hegemonic tendencies and alleged Serbian dominance over nationalities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, as a result of a political shift after the Second World War, Belgrade was no longer perceived as the center of Serbian superiority, but as the capital of all South Slavic peoples. This was in accordance with the principle of ‘brotherhood and unity’ – the expression coined by the Yugoslav communists that expressed the deep connection between all peoples of the Yugoslav federation. Hence, the project for New Belgrade was an expression of respectfulness to all Yugoslav nationalities, and loyalty to the Yugoslav state as the homeland of all its peoples.

If we look at the broader picture, different perceptions of pre-existing neighborhoods emerged throughout the communist world. In Warsaw which was the capital and most important center of the People’s Republic of Poland, the strategies for dealing with existing neighborhoods were

characterized by a dilemma between preserving the historic neighborhoods or demolishing and redeveloping those areas. Jozefacka claims that in postwar Warsaw, there was a balance between the historic preservationist tendencies and modern architecture and urban planning. In other words, radical solutions either from a preservationist or from a socialist modernism perspective were disregarded. The attitude of the Polish communist authorities towards the preexisting parts of Warsaw was nuanced, and there were three phases in the process of finding the most appropriate solution which could incorporate all specificities. In the initial stage, old neighborhoods were depicted as undesirable due to their bourgeois connotations. This was understandable as Poland was under direct influence from the Soviet Union where bourgeois built inheritance was labeled as undesirable in the urban landscape. The Soviet influence was evident in Warsaw’s urban fabric itself as they designed and erected the Palace of Culture and Sciences building. The second phase was characterized by the aspiration to create completely new neighborhoods based on modernist socialist principles. However, in reality this initial approach was somewhat modified in the immediate postwar period when prominent architects accentuated the significance of prewar buildings, and especially monuments. This was an example of the Soviet slogan “national in form, socialist in content”. The basic understanding of the motto is that motives from national histories were allowed if they could be reinterpreted through a socialist lens. The third and final stage was characterized by the consensus that was reached. This consensus emphasized the

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advantages of both modern architecture and historic representational spaces, thus this method was utilized to guide the urban development process in postwar Warsaw.\textsuperscript{278}

Generally, the communist authorities could have implemented the following solutions for the “issue” of existing neighborhoods: 1) demolishing the historical urban areas in order to create new modernist spaces according to their principles and norms; 2) preserving them as an important showcase of national history and previous historical periods, and 3) allocating new functions to the existing parts of the city as an essential component of the communist narrative. The same process was evident in other Yugoslav centers, including the federal capital, Belgrade. In the case of the capital, urbanists approached each structure individually as that put focus on individual buildings and their uniqueness.\textsuperscript{279}

After the Second World War, a significant proportion of urban centers experienced massive destruction caused by aerial bombardment. Based on the scope of destruction caused by air raids, the urban fabric was either reconstructed or replaced. Urban planners embraced new paradigms in architecture and urban design when developing reconstruction plans. In the case of socialist states, official discourse was as important as new paradigms in urban planning. For example, in New Belgrade the authorities wanted to create a modern, functional space following the ideas of the Athens Charter and other modernist planning solutions, but the newly developed structures and neighborhoods needed to be built in accordance with the official discourse.\textsuperscript{280} New Belgrade was expected to be the showcase of the Yugoslav socialist architecture and urban design. Urbanization was one of the key processes in modernizing postwar Yugoslav society. The future urban

development was supposed to be carried out by the experts (technocrats) which is one of the principles of the Athens Charter.

After November 1944, the city of Rijeka was heavily bombarded by the Allied Forces and by May 1945 German occupation was terminated by the Yugoslav partisans. As retaliation, German forces blew up the port installations, causing significant damage to the city’s infrastructure. Even though Rijeka’s urban core was mostly rebuilt by the 1960s, specific site plans for several areas were not approved, most notably for the old city center. Although prewar Rijeka had spatially grown out of its city center, the center itself remained the most significant part of the city due to the concentration of administrative, business, commercial and leisure functions. Thus, the local communist authorities perceived that by reconstructing the urban core, this space would become the most notable sector to showcase the features of the new socio-economic and political system.

Topographically, the city center can be divided into two main areas. The northern part of Rijeka’s urban core is older, while the southern section is newer. The two components of the urban core have another key element that distinguishes them, the newer portion is a reclamation ground that was artificially created in the second half of the nineteenth century when the Hungarian authorities decided to erect a new port to boost the economy. Additionally, the terrain of the northern half of the city center is challenging due to many topographical elements (hills), while the southern portion is relatively flat. Therefore, the two zones are distinguished by their age, the condition of

the urban fabric and supporting infrastructure, and by topographical characteristics (see Figure 31).

![Map of Rijeka city center's zones based on topography and built period](image)

Figure 31. Rijeka city center’s zones based on topography and built period

A similar two-region concept of the downtown core existed in the 1960s when the city center was labeled as problematic by the local party authorities. The Local Urban Planning Institute claimed that the most significant problem was the functional discrepancy between the newer and flatter district, and older, hillier one. The southern belt was the most important part of the city in commercial, transportation, business, and leisure terms, while the northern sector was functionally outdated and visually unattractive to residents. One suggestion to mitigate this discrepancy was that the space encompassed by two major squares - Žabica and Belgrade Square (Beogradski trg)

286 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 28.
287 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 28.
and the city’s most vibrant promenade and meeting place Korzo undergo major changes to better suit the communist ideology and increasing demands of local population. Specifically, the local Yugoslav communists wanted to enhance movement in the urban core, and with the proposed reconstruction of inner city throughways and expanding the parking spaces, Korzo could have become a pedestrian zone. Among the many ideas, the Urban Planning Institute proposed in 1962, the first notable one was to spatially expand the city center. This notion was supported by Rijeka’s population expansion and its overall urban growth. Between 1948 when the first postwar census was conducted and 1961, the overall population increased by almost 50 percent. Consequently, the street grid was adapted and some of the existing structures modified (see Figure 32).

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288 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeka - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja, 29.
290 Urbanistički institut Rijeka, Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeke, 29.
The primary task of the proposed reconstruction of the road network in downtown Rijeka was to reduce traffic congestion in the urban core. This area was the principal commercial and business area of Rijeka, and as such the number of residents traveling through the downtown area was substantial. To enhance traffic flow, the extension and repair of the two major east-west axes was proposed. One of these was Rade Končara Street (Ulica Rade Končara) which was renamed to Adamićeva Street (Adamićeva ulica) and the other was the Yugoslav Navy Shore (Obala

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Jugoslavenske mornarice) which is now called Riva. The project was implemented and the streets were expanded. Ulica Rade Končara contained two lanes in a westward direction, while Obala Jugoslavenske mornarice contained four lanes after its reconstruction and the main direction was eastward. Another aspect of the road expansion project was the reconstruction of streets surrounding Rijeka’s central marketplace. Transportation of food and other commodities from Rijeka’s hinterland to the city’s marketplace necessitated that the streets around the market to be redeveloped. When the entire project was completed, the main short-term objective to reduce traffic congestion was achieved, however due to continuing population influx, the long-term success could be argued. By the mid-1960s Rijeka was the most significant transit point for tourism in the entire Yugoslav federation.292 Several thousand people arrived and departed from Rijeka’s transportation terminals daily, and in the peak of the tourist season 45,000 vehicles traveled through the city to reach their destination along the Croatian coast.293

The scope of the proposed reconstruction was substantial. Urbanists proposed the elongation of the urban core by two and a half times its existing length, from 800 meters before the implementation of the plan to over 2000 meters.294 In this proposal, the estimated width of the city center would have been expanded even more – from barely 100 meters to approximately 400 meters, and in some cases even to 600 meters (see Figure 33).295 Tourism was an expanding economic branch of the time, and the number of vehicles expected to pass through Rijeka was projected to increase by 25 percent annually.296 Therefore, the modernization of the road network through downtown was essential. The expansion of tourist activities was best seen in the urban

293 Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 11.
296 Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 11.
center; parking became a major issue for urban planners as the number of vehicles seeking parking during the tourist season increased dramatically. Tourists tended to visit cafes, bars, and restaurants that were scarce. In addition, the commercial activities were insufficient to cope with the pressure during the season. Artisans had problems during the season as their shops were often fully occupied. Lastly the local tourist board had problems with providing the tourists with necessary information about the city and region due to overwhelming demand.297

Figure 33. Proposed expansion on Rijeka’s urban core (the city center is marked black on the map). The checkerboard pattern symbolizes the historical city center, while the vertical bars mark the area of the broader urban core.298

Rijeka’s Urban Planning Institute staff were professionals and experts in their field as it mostly consisted of architects and urban planners. Although the majority of their proposed masterplans was written in a professional manner, certain sections in the documents demonstrate that even

297 Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 12.
professionals were under the influence of the official communist rhetoric. Architects and urban planners in socialist states were no longer artisans, instead they were a cog in a much larger system usually managed by the state or local political authorities.\(^{299}\) In the section where they deliberated on the expansion and functional restructuring of downtown Rijeka, planners resorted to the discourse employed by the authorities. The Urban Planning Institute stated in the masterplan that the city center could not be removed to a different location or expanded beyond the proposed boundaries, that it was essential to economize construction due to spatial restrictions, to densify the built area, and to “determinedly remove everything superfluous and obsolete”.\(^{300}\) However, urbanists stated that the most significant historical buildings needed to be preserved as they were “witnesses” of the previous periods of history.\(^{301}\) This statement by the Urban Planning Institute was preservationist. On the other side of the Atlantic, historic preservation was becoming an important component of urban development and urban regeneration. During the 1960s and especially the 1970s, the supporters of the movement were very active in the United States as they opposed the reconstruction that was carried out in order to modernize outdated American cities.\(^{302}\) Many in the US became obsessed with modernization, and as a result, the value of historic buildings and neighborhoods was often overlooked. Alternatively, in Yugoslavia, and especially in Belgrade, the authorities implemented an individual (case-by-case) approach. Therefore, they were neither pro-preservationist, nor pro-modernist.

The urban fabric in the city is a result of centuries-long development processes. The inability to resolve issues regarding the functioning of an urban organism is not a problem that emerges


suddenly, but rather is a part of a complex and perennial process. Therefore, the communists state that the aforementioned situation was a result of the “uncontrollable developments of the early-capitalist heritage” and inability to recognize both current and future challenges of the city.³⁰³ The urban planners in Rijeka argued that alongside unfavorable topography, capitalism produced severe functional disharmony between the needs and actual situation of the built environment in Rijeka.³⁰⁴ Functional zoning in the previous periods was labeled by the communists as poor and destructive to the city. The most important factors that influenced the unsatisfactory zoning were the separation of the city between Italy and Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1924 and 1941, and the industrial complexes that were located unfavorably as the majority was constructed inside the city.³⁰⁵ Other examples include the insufficient planning when it came to the spatial distribution of residential neighborhoods, and the inability to expand the port as it was surrounded by other important economic subjects.³⁰⁶ The existing residential neighborhoods were located in the vicinity of the industrial enterprises. When new housing projects commenced, the residential neighborhoods completely surrounded the local industry.³⁰⁷ Prikil claims the situation was most accentuated in the urban core as interests from the various groups intertwined, including large enterprises, smaller economic subjects, Rijeka’s residents, and ultimately the local government.³⁰⁸ In other words, the economic subjects and their activities clashed in the downtown area as the amount and strength of local enterprises surpassed the available space in Rijeka’s city center.³⁰⁹

The role of ideology is evident in depicting the urban core. Much of the existing urban fabric was

³⁰⁸ Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 8.
described in pejorative terms, and the achievements of the previous periods were labeled as “mistakes” that presented a problem for the communists to develop an optimal urban environment.

Rijeka’s urban core was perceived as obsolete at that time and it was not unusual for urban planners to describe the area using pejorative terms. The city center was a “spatial representation consisting of outdated and unhygienic objects, narrow and impervious streets, and inadequate shops”. If these deficiencies were addressed properly, downtown Rijeka would have had sufficient power and relevant functions to establish itself as: 1) a major economic hub; 2) a center of the region; 3) an important location for both internal and external trade, and 4) a significant transit location for tourism and associated economic branches. The pejorative terminology used to describe the urban core was either used to describe the quality of the built environment and the damage suffered from the devastating impact of the Second World War or it was used to convince the local residents that changes in the city center were necessary.

Interestingly, the local media did not discuss the future of the city center. The most influential newspaper Novi list enthusiastically reported on the newly constructed socialist neighborhoods in Rijeka, however the existing urban fabric was rarely mentioned. The successes of urban development efforts of the communist period were frequently included in the newspapers, while the downtown area was marginalized. There are two possible explanations of the situation. First, by hyperbolizing the advantages of the Yugoslav construction efforts, one indirectly undermines the existing built environment and the socio-economic systems that were responsible for the existing urban fabric. Second, this research is focused on the 1960s when much of the city center was reconstructed, and so the urban fabric of the area before this reconstruction would not appear

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310 Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 23.
frequently in news sources. Although the reconstruction of the downtown area was not the principal urban planning topic in the local media, it is important to examine it more thoroughly.

The challenging task of transforming the urban core could not have been achieved without major spatial interventions. In order to produce new, modern spaces in a region of dense construction, one needs to create land by demolishing of existing structures. As downtown Rijeka, especially the area called Old Town (Stari Grad) had a notable quantity of older buildings, and in some instances buildings were in ruins, the proposition was to relocate the residents from these areas and to erect buildings for predominantly commercial activities.\(^{312}\) Prikril criticized the capitalist market system arguing that individual investments produced chaos and disharmony in this area, hence he suggested a new approach – to create and implement urban plans, to work in conjunction, and to have clear objectives.\(^{313}\) The success of the proposed reconstruction project was “guaranteed” due to the new scientific (technocratic) approach, analyses were conducted using quantitative data, and the new procedures were systematic.\(^{314}\) In other words, the construction would not be the result of aspirations from individuals, but would result instead from a carefully planned development process. This was the official response to the question of whether the problems would be resolved. However, this would not be possible without the local branch of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia imposing its authority. In socialist Yugoslavia, the communist party has seen itself as a force that needs to “neutralize private interests and provide direction”.\(^{315}\) This justified the need to provide direction with the necessity to incorporate both economic and social planning with the physical urban planning.\(^{316}\)

\(^{312}\) Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 25.
\(^{313}\) Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 25.
\(^{314}\) Boris Prikril, “Neka pitanja o razvoju i prostornim rješenjima Rijeke,” 25.
\(^{315}\) Brigitte Le Normand, Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade, 38.
\(^{316}\) Brigitte Le Normand, Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade, 38.
It is obvious that the city center needed to be both structurally (architecturally) and functionally updated in order to reflect the ideas and official discourse of the communist period. Therefore, the planners and other experts employed by the Urban Planning Institute were especially attentive to the urban core, examining its issues and potential solutions. Thus, a separate document related to the problematics of the city center was published by the local authorities, specifically the Council for Urban Planning of Rijeka’s Municipal Affairs Department. They stated that downtown Rijeka, and to be more specific the Old Town, was a ‘burden” on the attempt to develop and revitalize the entire city. In 1962, the local Council for Urban Planning as a political structure of the local government suggested the following in regards to the Old Town problematics: 1) to put the locality under official protection; 2) to preserve the existing urban environment in most cases, except when reconstructing buildings in ruins and erecting new structures; 3) to convert predominantly residential areas into commercial zones; 4) to create show-windows in the most prominent public spaces; and 5) to pedestrianize the entire Old Town. The authors of the document believed that the renewed urban core would be the vibrant center of the entire city, and would be functionally in harmony with the newly erected socialist neighborhoods. The urban core connected newly developed socialist neighborhoods that were located to the east and west of the city center. Also, the downtown area provided all the necessary functions that residents did not have in their own neighborhoods. Rijeka was envisioned as a compact city, and the principal function of its urban core was to connect the future socialist neighborhoods located east and west of the city center. In other words, the city center needed reconstruction because residents traveling from one part of the

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317 Savjet za urbanizam odjela za komunalne poslove općine Rijeka, Plan uređenja trgovačkog centra Grada Rijeke u mjerilu 1:500, 4.
318 Savjet za urbanizam odjela za komunalne poslove općine Rijeka, Plan uređenja trgovačkog centra Grada Rijeke u mjerilu 1:500, 4.
319 Savjet za urbanizam odjela za komunalne poslove općine Rijeka, Plan uređenja trgovačkog centra Grada Rijeke u mjerilu 1:500, 4.
city to the other had to pass the urban core. The official position of the communist leadership, specifically the Council for Urban Planning, was not to create new urban cores in a different location as there was no available land that was sufficiently spacious. The only situation when the relocation was an option for the communists was when a substantial plot of land existed. A new public space that would be the site of the new communist agencies and local administration could be created there. In other words, the compact city concept was a part of the official agenda and it was embedded in the official communist rhetoric. The amount of changes that needed to be implemented in order to fulfill that criteria was considerable, and to better portray the scope of the reconstruction, cartographic representations need to be observed in greater detail.

![Image of a map showing pre-reconstruction situation in the southern zone of downtown Rijeka.](image)

**Figure 34.** The pre-reconstruction situation in the southern zone of downtown Rijeka. The buildings colored in turquoise are office spaces, the dark-blue ones are cultural, educational, and healthcare buildings, the light-blue ones were commercial, the green ones are artisanries, the grey ones are warehouses and garages, the red ones are markets, the purple ones are cafés and restaurants, while the yellow ones are bookstores and newsstands. There was no functional zoning in place downtown as the functions (commercial activities, public services, healthcare and educational institutions) are intertwined.

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After considering some of the most important components of the official proposition for the reconstruction of Rijeka’s urban core, two questions emerge: “How radical was the proposed plan and to what extent did it try to redevelop the city center?”. Figures 34 and 35 represent the situation before the potential implementation of the plan, each portraying two specific zones in the downtown area (see Figure 34, 35). The more important southern, flatter region was not supposed to witness significant changes in the functional sense. I argue that the lack of major structural and functional transformation in the southern belt is a result of two phenomena. First, the southern belt was relatively new, built mostly during the Hungarian reign in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Therefore, it was not perceived as being unsanitary or poorly constructed like the northern belt. Secondly, the area consisted of many representational spaces that became the symbols of the city throughout the course of history, including the City Clock, Adria Palace.

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Croatian National Theater, and ultimately the city’s main pedestrian artery – Korzo. More radical spatial intervention in the southern core was not necessary due to two factors: 1) the area was relatively new, and 2) financial resources were limited and it would have been illogical to finance the complete reconstruction of those regions where it was not necessary. These practices were also present in other socialist cities, e.g. Belgrade and Warsaw. The emerging consumerist tendencies in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s due to rapid economic expansion, the modernization of society, and the openness to some of the ideas and practices from the West resulted in the growth of commercial activities especially in the downtown core. Rijeka was no exception from this general trend. Therefore, the most significant spatial intervention was the construction of a modern shopping center between the main promenade and the port that would later be known as Robna kuća Rijeka (Eng. Rijeka Shopping Center) (see Figures 36, 37).

Figure 36. Robna kuća Rijeka after its completion from the south end. The industrial look of the structure was supposed to fit with the port located in the vicinity\textsuperscript{324}

The Council for Urban Planning decided to build over top of the most important traffic artery in downtown Rijeka. The architecture of the modernist building was inspired by the industrial heritage of the city and the proximity to the seaport. The building was ultimately incorporated into the historic downtown core, and it provoked mixed reactions among general public as some of them were delighted with the aesthetics, while others thought the building looked like a container. It was the largest planned public investment of the year as the overall construction costs were estimated at 650 million dinars. Spatial intervention was notable as the entire bloc

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327 “Ninoslav Kučan – retrospektiva arhitektonskog opusa.”
328 “Ninoslav Kučan – retrospektiva arhitektonskog opusa.”
was demolished on the northern part of the building, and an additional two buildings were
destroyed where the current-day southern part of the structure is located.\textsuperscript{330} The proposed length
was 48 meters, width 26 meters, 5 storeys high, and 3,500 square meters of space.\textsuperscript{331} Although the
structure was controversial at first, over time it became a symbol of the city. It was controversial
due to its scale, the extravagance that is present as the building expands across the throughway,
and its design. The necessity to build a new, massive shopping center in the heart of downtown
was justified by the discrepancy between the population growth and the expansion of commerce.
Commerce became an impediment in the entire local economy as its development did not follow
the increasing number of consumers.\textsuperscript{332} In addition, I argue that this location was chosen for two
reasons. First, it is economically justifiable to construct new structures on an empty parcel of land.
The southern part of the shopping center was developed on a locality that was previously occupied
by a park. Therefore, it was more resourceful to create new urban fabric when there was a free
parcel of land available before construction. Second, the city center was not connected to its port
which was an integral part of the downtown area. By creating a structure whose industrial design
would have been neatly incorporated with the harbor and its surroundings, Rijeka Shopping Center
brought the urban core closer to the waterfront.

The most prominent representational space in the entire city, the main promenade Korzo witnessed
a dramatic change in the second half of the 1960s. Before the masterplan, Korzo was essentially a
massive parking lot, an image wholly different from the current-day situation. Traffic congestion
in downtown Rijeka became a serious issue, and it had a negative impact on the new commercial,
administrative and cultural districts that occupied the buildings around the city’s most iconic street.

\textsuperscript{330} “Nova robna kuća – najveća investicija u trgovini,” 2.
\textsuperscript{331} “Nova robna kuća – najveća investicija u trgovini,” 2.
\textsuperscript{332} “Nova robna kuća – najveća investicija u trgovini,” 2.
As the number of vehicles increased, an area that was initially designated as a pedestrian zone became a parking lot. Thus, a proposition from the Urban Planning Institute was to completely ban automobile traffic, and turn the vast parking space into a pedestrian zone.\textsuperscript{333} That way, the urban core would become more attractive to residents. The plan was carried out in 1970 when Korzo’s function was changed from a stationary traffic location to the city’s most recognizable promenade (see Figure 38).

![Image of Korzo before repurposing](image)

Figure 38. Korzo served as a parking space before the area was repurposed into a promenade\textsuperscript{334}

\textsuperscript{333} Urbanistički institut Rijeka, \textit{Generalni urbanistički plan Grada Rijeke - skraćeni tekst obrazloženja}, 30.

The southern part of Rijeka’s city center was not subjected to large-scale reconstruction projects, the urban landscape of this zone was not notably altered as the significant portion of preexisting structures was kept unchanged, though the functions assigned to these buildings were revised. There were no elements of radicalism in either the scope or visual aesthetics of the reconstruction. However, the northern belt was a different case. The built environment was generally older, the infrastructure was outdated, and some localities were still in ruins, even twenty years after the war had ended (see Figure 39). Narrow and sometimes crooked streets caused several problems, most notably the street grid prevented sunlight from entering the area and air was unable to circulate properly (see Figure 40).
Figure 39. A building in ruins in the northern zone of downtown Rijeka

Figure 40. The street grid in a part of the northern, older belt in downtown Rijeka. The streets are very narrow, thus reducing the air circulation.

The amount of structures that were planned to be demolished was higher in the north than it was in the southern region of the urban core. New buildings that were to be erected on sites old structures were demolished in accordance with socialist modernism. Some proposed radical solutions included the construction of multistorey high-rises in the downtown area. The proposed new headquarters of the Social Insurance Agency included a 14-story skyscraper adjacent to a smaller office building. Two years later, in 1960, a 21-storey high-rise was planned to be erected in the northern belt of Rijeka’s downtown core. It was intended to be a multifunctional building consisted of office space, cafes, restaurants, and a viewing terrace on the final floor. The notion

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339 “Neboder od 21 kata u Starom Gradu,” 2.
of modernity was visually implemented both on the exterior and interior. On the outside, buildings were characterized by uniformity, functionality, and rationality, and on the inside the forms were eclectic (see Figure 41). The visual aesthetic of the interiors was in some cases related to the assigned function. For example, the interior of the Jugobanka bank in downtown Rijeka was more industrial and rather “serious” which accorded with the function (see Figure 42), whereas the interior of the coffee shop had cleaner lines, it was smoother, and more casual (see Figure 43). This may suggest that the authorities were strict when it came to the facades and the exterior of the buildings, while there was more “aesthetic freedom” in the interiors.

Figure 41. The uniformity of the buildings’ exteriors in downtown Rijeka. The urban structures from the communist period are those with glass façades and they are characterized by uniformity and rationality. This image portrays the ‘stylistic and historical’ chaos in downtown Rijeka as the space has elements ranging from the ancient Roman period to post-socialism.\textsuperscript{340}

\textsuperscript{340} “Architectural chaos in downtown Rijeka,” 2016, Photo taken by author.
Figure 42. The modernist interior of the Jugobanka bank branch in downtown Rijeka\textsuperscript{341}

Figure 43. The interior of a coffee shop and pastry shop in downtown Rijeka\textsuperscript{342}


The northern belt was described using pejorative terms both by the Council for Urban Planning and the Urban Planning Institute. After labeling the portion of the urban core as “unsanitary”, it was expected that spatial interventions would address the issue. After the consequences of the aerial bombardment campaign were remediated, the plans brought forward by the planning institutions projected some parts of the northern belt to be reconstructed. The problem of the older portion of the city center was never completely resolved as much of the urban fabric remained similar or identical to previous periods. Therefore, a question of why the “unsanitary” part of the downtown area was not reconstructed with the proposed plans and in accordance with the communist planning principles emerges. I argue that the official stance of the local planning institutions and the local communist party was surprisingly pro-historicist, but not necessarily pro-preservationist. By adopting an individual approach, the authorities indirectly supported the urban core that existed before the war. Although the area was commercialized, the overall character of the built environment did not change substantially. Lastly, I claim that radical solutions were not implemented in the northern belt as the urban fabric of the region was not associated with any “problematic” historical periods, specifically Italian and to a lesser extent Hungarian. If the structures were erected during the fascist or the Hungarian rule, I believe that the situation would have been different because Rijeka was a newly acquired (or re-acquired) territory and it was important for the city to look like the Yugoslav city that it was.

Much of the urban forms in the downtown area were from the Hungarian period.343 Everything south of the city clock including Korzo was erected when the new port was constructed in the 1870s. Outside of this, there remained some elements of the urban fabric in the city center from the period before the Hungarian rule, most notably from the Austrian rule. An even smaller portion

of the urban fabric was from the later period – the fascist Italian one.\textsuperscript{344} Consequently, the Yugoslav communists could not have launched a campaign against the Italian legacy in the downtown core as the portion of the built environment erected at that time was insignificant. The only Italian building that “survived” the war was the Palazzo Arbori, the Yugoslav communists did not demolish the skyscraper. However, a clear conclusion cannot be derived on one case.

Even in the urban core, the communists wanted to create vertical urban forms not because it was their desire to prove that vertical urban growth is possible, but because it was the most economically justified way to build.\textsuperscript{345} There were propositions to erect 14-story and 21-story commercial high-rises in the city center.\textsuperscript{346} However, these ideas were never realized. To restate, the local Council for Urban Planning opted for an individualistic approach towards the existing urban fabric. I argue that the newly erected urban structures in the downtown area were created due to the following factors: they were more economical and spacious than their built “predecessors”, and they were a part of the official communist agenda that promoted modernization and the Yugoslav socialist modernist urbanism.

The masterplan was an official document imagined by professionals, and no other formal plans were created by the Urban Planning Institute. Thus, no other projects regarding urban planning in Rijeka became available to the public. The evidence supporting the claim that the local government supported the development of the masterplan can be found in a variety of public statements and documents that were supplied courtesy of the State Archive in Rijeka.\textsuperscript{347} Concretely, the plan’s

\textsuperscript{344} “Operacija centar,” \textit{Novi list}, 3.
\textsuperscript{345} “Operacija centar,” 3.
\textsuperscript{346} “Operacija centar,” 3.
final details were to be examined and after approval the plan should have been sent to the Republic Secretary for Urbanism.  

The reconstruction of the urban core was a complex issue embedded in the broader context of socialist urban development in Rijeka. The adaptation of the city center was a different project compared to constructing new neighborhoods. It is different to envision and develop a completely new residential area or industrial complex when an empty parcel of land is available. It is easier to erect new construction areas and individual structures that spatially represent the notion of modernity, in this case modernity in the context of socialist Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav context is different from the rest of the communist bloc countries. In some cases, throughout the Eastern bloc it is evident that some existing (bourgeois) neighborhoods were demolished in order to facilitate new construction. As an example, in the late 1930s, Moscow witnessed substantial and to some degree radical changes in its urban fabric due to Stalin’s reconstruction ideals. Significant portions of preexisting neighborhoods were destroyed to accommodate new residential areas and large thoroughfares whose construction was following Stalin’s guidelines based on rigid socialist realist principles. The system was less rigid in the Yugoslav context, especially by the 1960s. In addition, the state created its distinct version of state socialism, therefore the basic urbanist practices and ideals were qualitatively different from the ones established in the Soviet Union. Thus, a perception of preexisting neighborhoods was also contrasted in the socialist Yugoslav context. Although it was generally acknowledged that pre-communist parts of towns had strong bourgeois ambience, the notion to preserve the history in the form of urban structures and the layout of the city was quintessential in understanding the official attitude towards the existing built

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environment. In Belgrade for instance, an individual approach was implemented. In other words, the solution for each building was enacted on an individual basis. For example, the building of the Military Museum of the Yugoslav People’s Army was built in 1878 on Kalemegdan fortress.\(^{351}\) Before the communist rule, the museum had exhibits only from Serbia, and none from other Yugoslav nationalities.\(^{352}\) However, after the communists established socialist Yugoslavia, the museum’s purpose was updated, and it was to teach all Yugoslav ethnic groups “love for the fatherland and patriotism”.\(^{353}\) The notion of preserving the important urban structures can be applied to Rijeka. Although the Old Town was perceived as somewhat unsanitary and with inefficient infrastructure to sustain the pressure of the growing city, the legacy of the past was not a thorn in the side of the local authorities. Consequently, they decided to conduct solely site-specific reconstruction. The element of topography also played a role in rebuilding Rijeka’s downtown area. The most significant and ambitious project, both in terms of allocated resources and importance to the local government, was the construction of the new shopping center with a road overpass section. Large-scale spatial interventions were possible in the southern, flatter belt, while constructing any similar massive structure in the northern, more topographically challenging region would have been considerably more resource draining. Therefore, the northern belt witnessed small scale reconstruction and site-specific spatial interventions. Naturally, ideology was an important element in the functional transformation of the downtown area. Allocating new functions to existent buildings was ultimately the decision to be made by the Council for Urban Planning. As a result of all of these factors, Rijeka’s urban core is an interesting depiction of


various historical periods. Communist influence is multidimensional as it is present in both what is recognized at first, and what is not. The shopping center is an architectural memento from the socialist period and its aesthetics and design can immediately be linked to Yugoslav socialist architecture. However, to recognize spaces that are not instantly associated with this period is even more interesting. Although the city’s main promenade existed for centuries, the current form is derived from the socialist period as it was pedestrianized at that time, and consequently it became the most notable and recognizable public space in Rijeka. In addition, we need to understand the impact of ideology on the existing urban fabric as it was qualitatively different from other parts of the city that were erected as a part of Rijeka’s urban development. First, there were no spatial repercussions of the self-management system. The Council for Urbanism had control over the decision-making process in the downtown core. Second, the architectural styles in the city center date from the earlier historical periods. Thus, the visual appearance of the built environment is different from the Yugoslav socialist modernist neighborhoods in the city. Most of the existing fabric was located on a flat terrain, however the northern portion was located on a more challenging terrain. But let us ask ourselves, why is topography generally perceived as a negative or constraining factor? That should not necessarily be the case. Why not consider topography as an advantage? The perception about topography as being a challenging, and often limiting element is outdated and negative, thus we should accept the fact that favorable topography is actually topography. Certainly, in the case of downtown Rijeka, the most significant urban development occurred in the southern region, a region of favorable topography.
Chapter 8. Conclusion

The urban development of Rijeka during the period when the city was governed by the Yugoslav communist regime was both rapid and large-scale. The historical periods that preceded the Yugoslav state socialism had spatial repercussions on the city. However, the most important implications come from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Austro-Hungarian legacy in Rijeka’s urban fabric is most significant as the urban expansion that occurred during the Hungarian rule encompassed both the vast industrial capacity and the construction in the downtown area after the new port was built. Conclusively, the scale of urban development and spatial distribution of residential, commercial, and most importantly industrial zones during this period presented a problem of optimal spatial planning in the future, including the communist period. After the Hungarian period, Italian and royal Yugoslav influences left their spatial marks on Rijeka, although to a lesser extent. At the time when the city was divided, the Yugoslav portion developed more rapidly as the Italian portion was on the periphery of fascist Italy and unfavorably close to Trieste. The urban entity expanded at the time, however the rate was incomparable to that of the Hungarian period. Unfortunately, the legacy of these historical periods was significantly altered by the horrific events of the Second World War. A potentially interesting clash between the Yugoslav planning values and the fascist Italian legacy in the urban landscape was avoided by vast destruction of the city due to aerial bombardment by the Allies and strategic destruction as an act of retaliation by the Germans. Thus, the relationship of the Yugoslav communist authorities towards the legacy of the past was limited. It is fair to say that the relationship was spatially constrained to the industrial complexes and the urban core.

The industrial corporations were an important factor in Rijeka’s urban development. The workers’ councils that were established when the law on workers’ self-management was introduced had
power to collect four percent from workers’ paychecks to purchase newly erected apartment units or buildings for accommodation of their labor force. Therefore, they were one component of the system that included the Urban Planning Institute as the planning body, the Council for Urban Planning as the decision-making body, the construction companies as the erectors of new urban spaces, and the workers’ councils as the purchasers of the newly constructed buildings. Hence, the entire urban development during the socialist period can be described as a four-step process. The Urban Planning Institute developed plans that were either approved or rejected by the Council for Urban Planning. The construction companies then bid for the approved plans, while the workers’ councils determined what properties or individual apartment units to purchase for their workers. This system that is characteristic to Yugoslavia after the enactment of self-management policies was unique among the former socialist countries. The relevance of Rijeka’s industrial enterprises is multifaceted. On the one side, they were an important cog in the urban development mechanism, and on the other they presented a major constraint for optimal expansion of the urban fabric. The spatial distribution of industry that once seemed favorable became an issue in the socialist period. The complexes were located on the outskirts of town at the time of erection, however due to massive internal immigration, the newly created residential areas encircled these zones. Thus, although they were employers for a substantial part of the urban population, their location proved to be unfavorable as the spatial incorporation of the industrial zones became inevitable in the socialist period.

The other part of the city that is characterized by its historical legacy is the downtown core. Much of the urban fabric in the area dates from the Hungarian period when the authorities expanded the port, thus expanding the city center. The area was severely damaged due to massive air raids, however a small portion of urban structures from the previous historical periods survived the
horrendous effects of the Second World War. Although the communist regimes are perceived as rigid and radical, the new communist authorities did not implement any radical solutions in the redevelopment of the city center. On the contrary, they adopted an individual approach. In practical terms, the most severely damaged structures were demolished and new buildings were erected in these locations. A significant amount of buildings was reconstructed and repaired. Lastly, a minuscule portion of the urban fabric was deliberately demolished to construct grandiose new structures, like the new shopping mall. The urban core was commercialized, the residential function was weakened as many units were converted to various commercial establishments. In addition, leisure became an important function of the renewed urban core. Surprisingly, the scarcity of newly erected public spaces and buildings hosting public institutions became a growing problem in downtown Rijeka. The reasoning is that although Rijeka was a macro-regional center, its gravitational (functional) strength was significantly lower compared to that of Zagreb or Belgrade.

This degree of functionalism is one of the major differences between Rijeka and the capitals, whether it was the former federal capital Belgrade or the capital of the republic Zagreb. In addition, the industrial and port character of the city differentiated Rijeka from the administrative centers such as the capital cities. As Rijeka was an industrial giant among Yugoslav urban centers, it attracted workers from various parts of the former Yugoslav communist state. Thus, the urban entity was heterogenized as the percentage of Croats that had been the majority of the population decreased, while the number of ethnic minorities increased. This was especially evident amongst the Bosnian population in the city whose numbers increased slightly less than three times in merely twenty years.
However, Rijeka should not be compared solely with the capitals. Therefore, the study conducted by Rijeka’s Urban Planning Institute with its partner planning institutes in other Yugoslav centers stated that the urban development was more expensive in Rijeka due to challenging topography. In other words, the unfavorable terrain configuration was responsible for high costs of constructing building foundations, efficient transportation network, sewage and waterways, and other necessary infrastructure. Also, the large discrepancy between the overall area designated for construction and the actual construction area indicates that topography was a major impediment for an optimal expansion of Rijeka’s urban fabric.

I believe that the communists envisioned Rijeka as a harmonious urban organism with the urban core as the glue that connected the newly erected neighborhoods since Rijeka was a city that was wrongfully divided between 1924 and 1945. This is one of the reasons why researchers should be interested in smaller urban centers in former Yugoslavia. The notion that history is different for various localities can be an attractive factor for historians, geographers, sociologists, architects, urbanists, and experts from other disciplines under the umbrella of the social sciences and the humanities that share a passion for exploring the urban spaces in the former communist countries. The other factor that distinguishes Rijeka from many other major former Yugoslav urban entities is topography. The terrain configuration in the entire city was a significant challenge for all the parties that were involved in the urban development efforts in Rijeka.

Whether one agrees that the urban development as a process was successful throughout the socialist period, it cannot be denied that the main objective was fulfilled. All involved parties provided appropriate accommodation for a considerable number of internal immigrants for a very affordable price, something that is rarely seen in capitalist societies. People tend to “judge” the success of spatial interventions from the current point in time, and that is not a fruitful approach.
In the post-communist society, such as that of modern-day capitalist Croatia, it is apparent that sometimes the socialist urban planning is criticized and even condemned, while the failures of the current political and economic system are often unrecognized and unacknowledged. On that thought, it can be concluded that labeling the urban planning efforts of a specific period as a “success” or as a “failure” is not beneficial as we usually “judge” the efforts from the current standpoint, while the circumstances in the specific historical periods were considerably different from the world in which we live today.
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