CANADIAN CIVIC EDUCATION,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, AND DISSENT

by

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Abstract

This thesis develops two normative standards for the evaluation of secondary-level Canadian civic education curricula, and evaluates British Columbia (B.C.)'s Civic Studies 11 and Ontario's Civics (Politics) curriculum accordingly. Both standards are concerned with the models of democracy that inform each curriculum and, more specifically, how these models open or close curricular spaces to prepare students to dissent in civic and political life. These standards are also sensitive to policymakers' desire to increase Canadian youths' civic engagement. Chapter One outlines the author's agonist and semi-archic theoretical framework, positionality, research questions, and literature review. Chapter Two employs qualitative thematic analysis and determines that deliberative models of democracy inform both curricula. Chapters Three and Four use philosophical inquiry to develop normative evaluative standards based on critiques of deliberative democracy. Chapter Three makes the case that civics curricula should teach dissent as a positive right. Chapter Four argues that curricula should give critical attention to the passionate demands of civic life, especially as civic and political passions prepare students to exercise dissent. Chapter Five applies these standards to B.C.'s and Ontario's civics curricula, and offers concluding thoughts.
Preface

This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Ryan James van den Berg.
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Chapter One: The Challenges of Civic Education

Strange women lying in ponds, distributing swords is no basis for a system of government. Supreme executive power derives from a mandate from the masses, not from some farcical aquatic ceremony!
— Dennis, Monty Python and the Holy Grail

Introduction

What does it mean to be a good citizen? What role should citizens play in civic and political life? How should the public education system foster good citizenship, if at all? There is no single, best answer to any of these questions but for civic educators, the stakes are high. “Citizenship” itself is a highly contested term, and debates on the subject are not limited to conceptions of what “good citizenship” might be. Some scholars eschew the very concept of citizenship as an exclusionary and even oppressive idea, for example for Indigenous and transnational peoples. Important to their concerns are questions about who determines the parameters of citizenship, who benefits from citizenship, which understanding(s) of rights or justice hold primacy, what the scope of citizenship leaves out, and similarly critical questions.¹ Other scholars—particularly from the liberal tradition—defend citizenship as the most appropriate tool for rights-claiming within contemporary nation-states (e.g., Rawls, 2001; Schudson, 2003). My use of the term “citizen” throughout this thesis remains consistent with liberal-democratic assumptions about citizenship as “a conception of the relationship between an

¹ For further reading on the exclusionary or oppressive implications of (Canadian) citizenship, see Alfred, 2009; Bottery, 2003; Fraser, 2009; Gouthrau, 2007; Mackey, 1998; and Preece, 2002.
² In Chapter 5 I return to a discussion of the limitations of the concept of citizenship and the need for
individual and a political body” (Bottery, 2003, p. 102) and a vehicle for rights-claiming, particularly because I study Canadian curricular texts that treat it as such.\textsuperscript{2}

Citizens’ understandings of the civic world, the laws that empower and bind them, the rights they hold dear, the duties they are demanded to uphold, and the consequences of political (in)action are all shaped by the world around them. Civic educators attempt to intervene meaningfully in this process, but each one has a unique understanding of what constitutes the best knowledge, dispositions, capacities, and values to foster among citizens.

Academic investigations of civic education are situated at the intersection between educational studies and political science. Scholars in both fields dispute each step of the civic education process, from questioning which conception of “the good society” should inform curricula, up to which finer points of pedagogical practice are required to implement it. Troublingly, one of the only points of general consensus among scholars is that civic education in Canada has considerable limitations in preparing students to fully understand and participate in a liberal-democratic society (Ferguson, 2011; Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011; Lévesque, 2003; Milner & Lewis, 2011; Osborne, 2000; Peck et al., 2008; Sykes, 2011). My research speaks to the very core of this issue, investigating underexplored issues within the conception of democracy that underpins formal civic education in Canada. This work is a normative attempt at considering more socially just and inclusive alternatives when questioning what it means to be a citizen of a liberal democracy.

\textsuperscript{2} In Chapter 5 I return to a discussion of the limitations of the concept of citizenship and the need for further research that pushes beyond this concept.
I first developed an interest in civic education as a tour guide at Canada’s Parliament. It was during those two summers that I became increasingly interested in Canadian civic life and grew more aware of its influence on Canadians’ day-to-day lives. At the same time, it became clear that many of the Canadians who visited their Parliament had only a basic knowledge of its more detailed functions and history, just as I had had before starting work there. In many cases, their knowledge of the parliamentary system appeared incomplete, ill informed, or devoid of its historical roots. In other cases, visitors expressed fervent patriotism for Canada, seemingly without critical thought about its limitations. There were, of course, also many visitors and colleagues whose knowledge and criticisms of the various aspects of Canadian history, citizenship, parliamentary democracy, or current political affairs surpassed my own. However, in all cases, I began to consider that there was a need to better educate Canadians about their own civic affairs. I became increasingly interested in how this was possible to achieve through formal, non-formal, and informal settings.

My interest in civic education developed further during my undergraduate degree in Canadian Studies. Many of the topics covered were problem-centered, and I came to believe that many issues the country faces could be better resolved if there were a culture of critical public participation in civic life. I determined that a more comprehensive and critical formal civic education—including the knowledge, skills, and disposition\(^3\) to engage in political life—would be essential in fostering such a culture. Throughout my studies, I also learned that many of the people who choose not to participate in political life “opt out” because they feel that formal politics are elitist.

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\(^3\) I explain how dispositions relate to emotion, affect, and passion in Chapter Four.
exclusionary, or disconnected from the Canadian public (Bastedo et al., 2012). This information helped explain the political frustration I perceived around me at the time; attending a predominantly left-leaning, liberal arts university while the Harper Conservatives held federal power was an invaluable political experience. While many students’ frustration and indignation with the status quo seemed to spur their political participation, others grew apathetic when their voices were repeatedly ignored by those in power. I have thus grown to believe that fostering participation in political life requires the provision of channels for people to express their political emotions and exercise dissent when they perceive injustices. I call the culture of critical participation for which I advocate “an impassioned consciousness for dissent,” and I elaborate on this idea in Chapters Three and Four.

Before introducing the particulars of my work, it is necessary to define what I mean by “civic education.” I define civic education quite broadly as any formal, non-formal, or informal education that prepares students for civic life through direct involvement in the civil sphere or by exploring subjects related to civic life such as citizenship; politics; governance; social activism; law; intercultural or global affairs; or the like. I am particularly interested in formal civics curricula in mainstream public schools. Many “alternative” schools, particularly models in which students have a high degree of democratic control over learning and school affairs (e.g., Summerhill in the United Kingdom), offer inventive and arguably more effective means of civic learning. However, since the majority of Canadian students attend public schools, I am interested in how these institutions prepare students for democratic life.
Virtually all provinces in Canada have introduced civic content into their curricula, usually as part of Social Studies courses. As of 2016, however, only two provinces have developed secondary-level courses focusing exclusively on civic education. I focus on these two throughout this thesis. In 1999, worries about Ontario’s “democratic deficit” (roughly, low levels of political trust and engagement—more on this below) drove the province to implement Canada’s first formal civics course of the post-World War Two era (Hardwick, Marcus, & Isaak, 2010; Milner, 2009). It introduced a compulsory, half-credit, Grade 10 Civics (Politics) course and revised this curriculum most recently in 2013. British Columbia (B.C.) followed suit shortly after, in 2005, by implementing its optional Civics 11 course (Milner, 2009). This is a one-credit course offered as an alternative to Social Studies 11 or BC First Nations Studies 12.

With this in mind, it is important to make the distinction between “civic education,” “education for citizenship” and “citizenship studies,” which are often conflated or ill-defined in existing literature. I consider citizenship studies to be a necessary (but not sufficient) component of a complete civic education. Citizenship studies are concerned with teaching students about citizenship. For instance, they might foster the critical skills necessary to question what citizenship means in a given context or teach about the historical development of various forms of citizenship, but they do not promote any particular model of citizenship. “Education for citizenship,” by contrast, promotes a specific and normative conception of “good” citizenship. For instance, in promoting “informed” and “active” conceptions of citizenship, Ontario’s

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4 In addition, education can be deemed “civic” even if it is not formally presented as such. For example, while History or Social Studies courses may not state outright their intention to foster civic capacities, they might teach vital elements of civic education (such as citizenship studies or democracy studies).
civics curriculum gives education for citizenship more prominence than citizenship studies. Education for citizenship is not a necessary component of civic education.

I make a similar distinction between “democracy studies,” “education for democracy,” and “democratic education.” Democracy studies teach students about the concept(s) of democracy, and they are a fundamental part of civic education. An “education for democracy” teaches students that one particular conception of democracy is desirable.5 “Democratic education” refers to a democratic pedagogy that ensures students have a high degree of “democratic” control over their own learning by, for example, minimizing teacher-student hierarchies. I argue that democracy studies are a vital part of civic education but that neither education for democracy nor democratic education are necessary—even though the latter can certainly be valuable. However, teacher-student hierarchies may continue to exist and students may have little to no control over what or how they learn, but education for/about democracy is still possible in this context (though many others disagree; see Biesta, 2011; Lenzi, Vieno, Sharkey, Mayworm, Scacchi, Pastore, & Santinello, 2014).

I also agree with Chantal Mouffe (1999) that the structure of modern, western democracy—and by extension, democracy studies and education for democracy—must be that of a liberal-democratic regime in which liberty and equality constitute fundamental “ethico-political principles” (p. 155).6 This is because it is only in the

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5 Common usage may consider “education for democracy” to be a form of education actively favouring democratic modes of governance over non-democratic ones. I define it here as advocating for one particular model of democracy since I am interested in civic studies within a Canadian, liberal-democratic order.

6 Mouffe nuances this view in her later work, especially On the Political (2005) and “Which World Order?” (2008), in which she discusses how some regimes are capable of respecting human dignities despite not
context of liberal democracies that students have the freedoms to consider one another as free and equal political subjects in their inevitable disagreements over their interpretations of these core principles. When compared to more minimalist variants of democracy (e.g., electoral democracy), liberal democracies ensure the greatest level of human rights protections, the most extensive freedoms to exercise rights, and the strongest commitments to checking the power of elected governments (Diamond, 1999). Thus, when I refer to “civic education,” I am referring only to civic education within a Canadian, liberal-democratic context. Citizenship studies and democracy studies are both vital components of civic education within this framework.

Liberal democracy is compatible with the first-order theory of liberalism and its commitments to individual rights, especially liberty and equality. First-order theories require ontological commitments to principles or values that, by definition, reject other first-order theories (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 13). For instance, liberalism rejects communitarianism and other competing theories of justice. Since I have established my commitment to the first-order theory of liberal democracy, my concern is with “second-order” theories of democracy, specifically within a Canadian educational context. Second-order theories adjudicate between competing first-order theories. Thus, second-order theories must have a procedural component in addition to any substantive component(s) they purport to have. For example, deliberative models of democracy are second-order theories because they advocate the procedure of deliberation to adjudicate between opposing political preferences. I explain the

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being liberal democracies. I nevertheless cite her earlier work here because Canada operates through the western liberal-democratic, ethico-political values she champions.
similarities and differences between deliberative models and other second-order models below.

**Research Questions**

The purpose of this study is to develop two interrelated, social justice-oriented, and underexplored criticisms of deliberative models of democracy as they relate to Canadian students’ civic education and (dis)engagement with/from civic life in liberal-democratic societies. More specifically, I critique deliberative models’ capacity to prepare students to exercise dissent, including “everyday” disagreement between political subjects as well as deep disagreement in favour of counter-hegemonic alternatives. Thus, the primary question I seek to answer is, “Insofar as they are informed by deliberative models of democracy, how might civics curricula in Ontario and B.C. foster or limit students’ ability to engage in dissent?”

I focus my critique on deliberative models of democracy because, as we will see in Chapter Two, these models tend to underpin B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula. Since deliberative models tend to be consensus-oriented, a major part of this project explores the limitations of teaching for consensus in political life. It may be the case that consensus-based citizenship is more appropriate for Canadian liberal democracy because it contributes to good order and highlights shared national ideals. However, my desire to explore this topic is largely born out of the conviction that consensus-based models of deliberative-democratic citizenship may not invite all students equally to critically examine and respond to the socio-political orders in which they live.

It is irresponsible to examine dissent without also addressing its affective, emotional, or passionate components (I make the distinction between these three terms
in Chapter Four). Deliberative models of democracy, like western philosophies in general, have valued rationality over emotion in the public sphere (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006; Boler, 1999) and so affect remains an underexplored topic in political theory. Because rational modes of thought have also positioned neutrality and objectivity as the only valid means of determining what constitutes “truth,” some students—particularly those espousing non-masculinist, non-European worldviews deemed “unreasonable” or worse, “irrational”—may not be inclined to engage in a political climate that excludes their views (Pinto & Portelli, 2012).

The role of affect in civic education is highly relevant to classroom discussions of activism and dissent (Brown & Pickerill, 2009; Wilkinson, 2009; Zembylas, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). In this context, there is much room for debate about whether—and, if so, which—emotions are dangerous or productive, and whether they have a place in the political sphere. I also recognize that ostensibly rational and reasoned responses to difference are emotionally charged, which is not always clear in deliberative models. I do not intend to delve into pedagogical questions of how to teach for political affect. However, it is necessary to ensure that the political relevance of affect and emotion are made explicit in civics curricula in order for students to explore how emotion is constructed and to what ends it might be mobilized.

To summarize: my main research question is “Insofar as they are informed by deliberative models of democracy, how might civics curricula in Ontario and B.C. foster

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7 Defined as the ability to give due consideration to the various sides of the issue while the standards of evaluation remain unchallenged. One can only be neutral and objective if the standards used to determine validity are clearly agreed upon and immune from challenge, which is rare in political life.
or limit students’ ability to engage in dissent?” In order to answer this question, I will ask the following sub-questions:

1. To what extent and in what ways are the curricular documents of Ontario’s and B.C.’s civics courses informed by deliberative models of democracy? Which features of deliberative models of democracy are particularly prominent in these curricular documents?

2. Why should civics curricula teach for dissent in political life?

3. Why should civics curricula help foster students’ affective and emotional responses to political issues?

4. How do the conceptions of democracy that underpin B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula open or close spaces for affective and emotional responses to political issues?

5. How do the conceptions of democracy that underpin British Columbia and Ontario’s civics curricula open or close spaces for dissent?

**Methodology and Theoretical Perspectives**

Because I have analyzed existing curricular documents and evaluated them against normative claims, my research has required both qualitative and philosophical inquiry. To better understand how official curricular texts conceptualize “democracy” (thus creating or closing space for dissent and emotion), I have conducted a qualitative thematic analysis of the curriculum documents for Ontario’s Grade 10 Civics and B.C.’s Civics 11 courses. This grounds my research in existing curricular documents while
providing clear conceptualizations of democracy to form the basis of the *philosophical critiques* (established largely through dialectic) that follow.

Thematic analysis involves “identifying and describing both implicit and explicit [themes] within a text” (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012, p. 13). As part of this thematic analysis, I first needed to provide a clear conceptual understanding of the three major streams of democracy I study (namely, aggregative, deliberative, and post-deliberative streams) to determine how to code instances of this theme. I did not conduct a formal and analytic conceptual analysis to achieve this, but reviewed the major streams of democratic thought to find commonalities between them and developed codes based on these commonalities. Since I wanted to make explicit the variants between democratic models, I also determined more precisely *which elements* of the various models informed both curricula. After coding both provinces’ civics curricula, I compared code frequencies and co-occurrences to determine the degree to which each model of democracy informs both curricula. I determined that they are primarily—but not exclusively—underpinned by deliberative models. This allowed me to evaluate these curricula according to normative standards.

To develop these normative standards, my primary approach involved philosophical inquiry, which has focused on critiquing the deliberative models of democracy insofar as they inform civics curricula. As Helmut Heid (2004) explains, a critique requires a criterion (or criteria) to evaluate the object of critique. He states that “this criterion cannot be derived from the description [of the object of critique]; it depends on a decision of the critic, and it is expressed in the evaluative position he [sic] takes” (p. 325). I have justified my criteria—namely, the extent to which the curricula
acknowledge, allow for, and encourage dissent and civic emotions—primarily by
drawing on other scholars’ work (see below). Often, this has required me to engage
these ideas in dialectic with one another, though I have recognized and adopted some
theories wholesale. I have also justified my criteria by grounding them in a Canadian
socio-political context. In so doing, I theorized how civics courses can help foster
students’ civic and political engagement by attending to dissent and emotion. Only after
justifying these criteria did I begin the evaluative work involved in critique. This means
I exposed concrete spaces where deliberative models in both curricula open or close
possibilities for teaching about dissent and civic emotions.

However, in pursuing this critique I have avoided setting up a sharp binary
between deliberative models of democracy and models that focus on dissent and
political passions. While the objects of my critique are consensus and rationalist models
of democracy, I do not believe there is as sharp an opposition between deliberative and
more critical-radical models as sometimes appears to be the case. On the contrary, to
highlight the contiguous relationship between deliberative and critical-radical models, I
use Claudia Ruitenberg’s (personal correspondence) framework and distinguish
between more traditional “deliberative” models (including both liberal and
communitarian approaches) and more critical-radical “post-deliberative” models
(more on this below). The term “post-deliberative” acknowledges that there are many

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8 To be clear, deliberative models are the product of liberal traditions. According to Abowitz & Harnish (2006), “civic republican discourse values the common good of political communities, [while] political liberalism envisions a more limited political arena with greater focus on procedures that would ensure fair, inclusive deliberation” (p. 662).

9 Rene Boomkens (2010) uses the term “post-deliberative democracy” differently, namely in reference to more populist, media-driven forms of democracy that aim to influence voters with personal attacks
hybridized conceptions of democracy that grow out of critical and agonist critiques of deliberative models (Dahlgren, 2006; Gouthrau, 2007; Karpowitz, Raphael, & Hammond, 2009; Kohn, 2000). Many of these critiques, my own included, focus on the rationalist and consensus-oriented deliberative models. Note that, from this point forward, any references to “deliberative models” include only these rationalist, more consensus-oriented forms and not the post-deliberative forms—both of which I outline below.

Throughout this thesis, I also witness the deconstruction of a key binary that informs debates about democratic citizenship. Specifically, I challenge the binary of the “rational” and “irrational” (or “emotional”) subject. The importance of the spaces opened by this act of witnessing will become clearer once I explain my agonistic and semi-archic theoretical perspectives below. Bear in mind that various theorists use the terms “rational,” “reason,” and “reasonable” differently. Some use these terms interchangeably. To minimize confusion, I rely on the following definitions throughout this thesis unless noted otherwise: “rational” refers to the capacity to recognize and advocate for one’s own, self-interested position. Political theorists have traditionally link this self-interest to the cognitive faculties of reason, although more recent theories have troubled this assumption (e.g., Mouffe, 2014). Irrationality is thus the (perceived)

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10 I recognize the tension here between employing deconstruction as a method, and Jacques Derrida’s (1983) assertion that “deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one” (p. 3). I instead follow Gert Biesta’s (2009) suggestion that deconstruction happens and can be “witnessed.” I have focused on the spaces where rationality and emotion constitute one another. As such, witnessing deconstruction may not be a “method” so much as a theoretical framing of my questions.
misuse of one’s cognitive faculties, particularly where an actor is understood incapable of recognizing his own interests.¹¹

“Reason” is closely related, being a cognitive faculty (or the cognitive faculty, depending on one’s school of thought).¹² I use the corresponding term “reasoned” to describe a process or outcome relying on the use of reason. “Reasonableness” has a dual meaning, depending on its context: to call people reasonable means they are open-minded and willing to change their mind after taking others’ positions into account. However, reasonable preferences are those deemed sufficiently well-reasoned that they can be considered politically legitimate (i.e. “up for discussion”). I discuss how reason/rationality relates to affect/emotion/passion in Chapter Four. This focus on emotion and passion will be key to fostering an impassioned consciousness for dissent among Canadian students.

In addition, because my work is largely philosophical, I develop core conceptual and theoretical frameworks throughout my thesis. However, I outline here the main theoretical perspectives that inform the critical-radical approach I take in this research. Throughout this project, I take the standpoints that agonistic and semi-archic theories of democracy are highly valuable yet underexplored conceptualizations of democracy that can open critical spaces in B.C. and Ontario’s curricula. Semi-archic theories recognize (but depart from) the contributions made by anarchic theories in that their aim is to avoid reifying the existing political order and structures. They therefore presume that people’s primary loyalties are not to the established order of the state, but to the core

¹¹ The accusation of irrationality in politics is most often a condescending insult.
¹² Contra rationalist traditions, I treat affect, emotion, and passion as cognitive faculties as well.
democratic values that liberal-democratic states are supposed to—yet sometimes fail to—uphold. However, while anarchic theories of democracy concur that students should not learn for particular models or structures, semi-archic theorists believe that a certain measure of order is necessary to uphold core political principles.

I am drawn to semi-archic theories because I believe they best expose the exclusionary nature of the archic political order of democracy. Semi-archic theory holds that “when democratic politics is restricted to those who already agree on the basic rules of the political game, [...] the process though which such an agreement about basic rules is achieved is left out of the picture,” resulting in the “displacement” of politics (Biesta, 2011, p. 143; Honig, 1993). More practically, semi-archic theorists believe that schools should not teach for specific conceptions of citizenship or democracy, but prepare students to engage with “always undetermined political processes” (Biesta, 2011, p. 141). For example, students should learn to engage with formal, traditional structures (such as Canada’s Parliament) and in more participatory fora (such as participatory budgeting meetings) alike.

This perspective is well suited to illuminate whether deliberative democracy is capable of creating space where political subjects can negotiate, at once rationally and emotionally, their dissenting interpretations of the core liberal-democratic values of liberty and equality. To further ground this theory in the context of my own research, civic education must ensure students understand not only who is excluded from the political order, but how and why, and what avenues may exist or be created to contest such exclusions. Because semi-archic theories of democracy have borrowed heavily from anarchism, and because my work focuses on dissent, I also include some strands
of anarchic thought in my work, particularly as espoused by Jacques Rancière (1999; 2010).

A related theoretical perspective I take is agonism, which holds that difference and conflict between political subjects is inevitable and even desirable for democratic life. This does not mean that differences justify inequality; agonists maintain that conflict can be channeled productively.\footnote{Throughout this thesis, I use term “productive” to refer to forms of engagement that can feasibly help people achieve their political ends while remaining in line with the core ethico-political principles of liberal democracies (namely, liberty and equality). I recognize that “productive” is a slippery term, particularly as it relates to neoliberal conceptions of responsibility and accountability for work produced. However, I have in mind the more critical-radical connotations of productivity: acts of engagement may be “productive” if they contribute something new to the discursive field or bring new identities into being (see my discussion of subjectification below). Note, however, that these outcomes are not necessary for engagement to be deemed productive.} Particularly influential in my research is Mouffe’s (1999) concept of \textit{agonistic pluralism}, which argues that the aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism, through agonism, into political legitimation for excluded subjects. A crucial portion of my thesis argues that students should learn to channel their dissent in ways that do not isolate their fellow political subjects (or themselves) from a commitment to liberty or equality. I explain this position further in my literature review. This model is appropriate for my work because it offers direct criticisms of deliberative democracy’s consensus-based nature (particularly, that consensus is necessarily provisional and hegemonic), understands that political identities are constituted by both the passionate and the rational, and maintains that “a pluralist democracy needs to make room for dissent” (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 755-756).

One of Mouffe’s (2005) aims is to open avenues for political dissent that do not lead to political violence. I have chosen to focus on non-violent dissent throughout this thesis simply because I do not believe I can do justice to the nuance and breadth of this...
topic within the scope of this thesis. I recognize that there are many situations in which violent dissent—including, for example, property damage or physical violence—can be considered legitimate, even within liberal democracies (see Fanon, 1961/1963; Freire, 1970/2000, pp. 54-56; Humphrey & Stears, 2006; O’Boyle, 2002; Young, 2001). I recognize, especially, that calls for non-violence have been used as tools of oppression and have vastly different implications for marginalized groups (Fanon, 1961/1963; Freire, 1970/2000). However, this question is highly contested and has extremely high stakes, and so discussions thereof require particular finesse in the educational sphere. In addition, it raises deep questions for my project about how one can be violent and still respect the core ethico-political principles of liberty and equality, and I do not have the space to address all these questions here. Thus, while I focus on non-violent forms of dissent, I keep the door open to the possibility of teaching about political violence in secondary civics courses.

Together, these perspectives form my critical-radical framework. They are radical insofar as they challenge the deep archic and consensus-oriented roots (radix in Latin, which is also the origin for the term, “radical”) of liberal democracy. I employ the radically democratic perspectives of semi-archism and agonism as means to advocate for what might be considered critical outcomes. My work is critical in that it conceives of schools as inherently political institutions, one of whose roles is to “identify and criticize systemic inequities... by focusing on... critical democracy” in order to mitigate injustices (Portelli & Menashy, 2011). It counters dominant discourses about the political order, which tend to silence other, so-called “irrational” voices from
participating as equals, and encourages students to challenge these discourses by demanding their critical examinations of the world around them.

**Literature Review**

Despite the broad range of studies about the strengths and limitations of deliberative models of democracy, I have limited this literature review to four areas of interest that I deem most perciplent for evaluating the conceptions of democracy that currently underlie Canadian civics curricula. First, I situate my project in the body of work that ties civic and political engagement to civic education. Second, more procedurally, I distinguish deliberative models from what I believe to be the other dominant conceptions of democracy, namely aggregative and post-deliberative models. The last two topics are tied together by a common commitment to social justice and political engagement, and I explore them in greater detail in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. One strand examines consensus and dissent in civic education, and the other, rationality and emotion in civic education. Taken together, these topics expose and critique invisible structures that weaken certain individuals’ or groups’ political voices. In other words, they are designed to inform more critical and radical conceptions of democracy that might resonate with the many students whose voices may not have found their way into formal civics curricula.

**Civic and Political Engagement.** Much of the available research on civic education links the success of civics curricula to their ability to improve youths’ civic engagement (Ménard, 2010; Milner & Lewis, 2011; Straughn & Andriot, 2011; Ten Dam et al., 2011). Recent research concludes that young Canadians are increasingly
disengaged from formal politics,\textsuperscript{14} although they are becoming more active over time in \textit{non-traditional} political activities\textsuperscript{15} and in civic life\textsuperscript{16} more generally (Howe, 2010; Turcotte, 2015). Still, there is a small but growing group of young Canadians who are more disengaged from \textit{both} civic and political life than their peers and elders alike. Marginalized Canadians, particularly those with low income levels and especially with low levels of formal education, are strongly overrepresented in this group (Howe, 2010).

These self-identified “political outsiders” report becoming disenchanted with politics for the same reason: when their everyday avenues for bringing about change consistently prove fruitless, they conclude that their voices are systematically or deliberately ignored by the “insiders” in power (Bastedo et. al, 2011). Similarly, political trust has declined in Canada, particularly among people with less social or economic capital (Martin, 2012). Given these assertions, it appears that the Canadian political system, as it currently exists, is failing to respond to marginalized youth—not the other way around. My critiques of existing civics courses reflect my desire to open more inviting, and perhaps more effective, political channels for youth. I believe these channels will be especially inviting for students who are disengaged from or marginalized within Canada’s existing democratic structure.

\textsuperscript{14} This includes actions such as voting, joining political parties, and volunteering in an election.

\textsuperscript{15} This study conceives of political engagement as participating in a protest or demonstration, expressing political views online, signing a petition, wearing a political badge or T-shirt, and supporting or opposing a political or social cause (Turcotte, 2015).

\textsuperscript{16} This study conceives of civic engagement as volunteering for (non-political) causes as well as memberships in cultural, educational or hobby organizations (such as theatre groups, book clubs and bridge clubs); religious-affiliated groups (such as church groups or choirs); school groups, or neighbourhood, civic or community associations (such as PTA, alumni, Block Parents or Neighbourhood Watch); and service clubs (such as Kiwanis, Knights of Columbus or the Legion) (Ménard, 2010; Turcotte, 2015). There is often no clear divide between distinctly political and apolitical, civic engagement.
As exemplified by the curricula I analyze in Chapter Two, civics courses tend to encourage students to participate in civil society according to pre-written “scripts,” but do little to teach students to challenge the scripts themselves (Isin, 2008, 2009). These scripts may come in a variety of forms, from civics curricula themselves to the parliamentary Speech from the Throne. Civic and political scripts tend to dictate that desirable engagement includes behaviours that maintain and enrich the existing civic order and its conventions, such as informed voting, volunteering, and even protest—if the protest is orderly and legal. However, these same scripts risk the exclusion of other forms of non-violent dissent that create spaces for productive disorder or that are not strictly speaking legal, including civil disobedience. Recent Canadian examples of this latter category include Brigette DePape’s 2011 disruption of the Speech from the Throne with a “Stop Harper” sign and Idle No More’s highway roadblocks.

While these are clearly forms of engagement in the political sphere, recent literature on youth political engagement tends to ignore these forms of dissent or subsume them under the label of “protest” (see, for example, Samara, 2013). It is problematic to consider engagement simply as manifesting itself in the political obligations or responsibilities that citizens exercise to uphold their rights. It must also include a sense of personal agency (Straughn & Andriot, 2011), political efficacy (Hahn, 1998), and, I will argue, a critical disposition. In failing to recognize this, much of the related literature fails to critique the forces that “write” these scripts and thus legitimize only more established forms of civic or political activity, which may in turn delegitimize other means of political engagement. I am particularly interested in teaching the skills and dispositions necessary to engage in both deliberative and non-
deliberative dissent (terms I describe below), in part because I believe those who find
traditional and formal politics unresponsive or anemic would benefit most.

Since there are countless factors contributing to civic and political engagement,
the task of establishing direct, causal links between civic education courses and youth
engagement is a daunting one.\(^\text{17}\) It is not my aim to do so here; my work draws on—but
departs from—qualitative and quantitative studies that detail who is engaged in the
civic sphere, to what degree, and in which fields. My work can instead be situated in the
more theoretical vein of research that explores and critiques the frames through which
civic education prepares students for liberal-democratic life.\(^\text{18}\) If civics curricula are to
be evaluated for their ability to engage citizens in liberal-democratic life, it is first
necessary to critique their theoretical foundations, which shape how engagement is
conceived. Some scholars focus on the models of citizenship that inform the courses
(e.g., Kennelly, 2009; Westheimer, 2003). Instead, I focus here on the curricula’s
democratic underpinnings. There is very little work investigating civic education that
also draws links between the specific models of democracy that underpin formal civic
education courses and politically (dis)engaged Canadians. Both B.C.’s and Ontario’s
commitments to the first-order theory of liberal democracy provide insights into their
intentions, but the second-order theories that inform them reveal more for the

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\(^{17}\) Formal education can have quite a significant influence on civic and political engagement (see
Schugurensky & Myers, 2003), but civics courses cannot be understood as the only (nor likely even the
primary) factor influencing youths’ engagement.

\(^{18}\) This practically oriented theoretical work (rightly) tends to be limited to analyses of one or two
important features of existing curricula or courses. Many scholars in this vein apply their frameworks to
existing curricula or courses, evaluating whether they include sufficient critical emphasis on a given
perspective or skill (Ferguson, 2011; Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011; Orlowski, 2008; Osborne, 2000; Peck et
al., 2008; Stitzlein, 2014; Sykes, 2011). These frameworks relate broadly to topics like gender and sexual
equality; the role of affect or emotion; conceptions of the public sphere; the capacity for dissent or
disobedience; multiculturalism; and service learning, among others.
purposes of this study. As we will see in Chapter Two, both curricula predominantly (but not exclusively) favour delibera*ve second-order conceptions of democracy.

**Aggregative, Deliberative, and Post-Deliberative Models of Democracy.** My understanding of what constitutes these three models of democracy is strongly influenced by Iris Marion Young’s (2000) and Joshua Cohen’s (1997) frameworks. I discuss these distinctions further in the subsequent chapter, and they are summarized in Appendix A. Recall that, like Ruitenberg (personal communication), I believe that these models fall on a spectrum and are thus contiguous. Aggregative models such as those espoused by Joseph Schumpeter (1976/2003) and Anthony Downs (1957) are centered on representative governance where citizens’ primary democratic responsibility is to vote. Unlike deliberative models and post-deliberative models, which demand that participants *justify* and *refine* their ideas publicly, aggregative models treat voters’ *preference formation as exogenous* to the political process.

Traditional deliberative models aim to achieve *consensus* in line with the common good. While deliberative thinkers like Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1986, 2001) and especially John Rawls (1996, 2001) grapple to develop pragmatic forms of liberalism that are underpinned by thin conceptions of the common good, post-deliberative thinker Young (2000, 2001) points out that they still rely quite heavily on substantive ideas and values. Thus, deliberative conceptions of the common good are actually fairly *thick.* In contrast, post-deliberative theories believe in a much *thinner conception of the common good,* one more sensitive to *deep differences* and to the ways in which *power inequalities* pre-determine or influence outcomes (Fraser, 2009; Young, 2001). All models of deliberative democracy trace their roots to the Aristotelian
position that *rational deliberation* leading to majority consensus is the best way to ensure legitimacy of decision-making (Wilson, 2011). Deliberative models attempt to refine participants' reasoning of how best to reach the common good through *universalizing conceptions of reason* (Mouffe, 2005), whereas post-deliberative models treat *reason and reasonableness as socio-historically constructed phenomena* that exclude some groups in practice (Young, 2001).

Related to this, deliberative models favour calm and objective forms of rational discussion over more passionate forms of discourse. They do not reject impassioned means of deliberation nor “less deliberative” discourse like boycotts or demonstrations, but they frame these as last resorts if reasoned and reasonable deliberation should fail, or as merely strategies leading to better deliberation down the road (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Post-deliberative models consider passionate and less deliberative forms of discourse as equally valid means of influencing decision-making, and often as more valid because they question power inequalities and act as inclusive means of public discourse (Young, 2001). In more radical post-deliberative models, especially in their deliberative forms, passions are important because they provide channels through which to express positions on political questions with no rational solution (Mouffe, 2014).

**Consensus and Dissent in Civic Education.** Tomas Englund (2011) favours a Habermasian conception of schools as weak public spheres¹⁹ that encourage rational deliberation to find common ground. He argues this creation of mutual trust will

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¹⁹ *Weak* public spheres are arenas where “deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not also encompass decision making,” whereas strong public spheres involve both (Fraser, 1997, p. 90).
develop students’ moral and procedural capacities to participate in cosmopolitan politics. Many others also argue that teaching dissent is valuable, although they diverge on their justifications for encouraging it, and on what education for dissent would look like. Sue Winton (2007), for example, examines southern Ontario’s emphasis on character education in civics courses, analyzing 181 educational documents’ commitment to knowledge, active participation, and pluralism. She concludes that the character education policy is assimilationist in that it “promotes an undemocratic notion of social cohesion and the status quo” and that it values only a narrow conception of difference (p. 18). As such, character education helps silence dissent, which Winton argues is a necessary component of citizenship. While certain forms of character education are more associated with communitarian approaches (i.e., the fostering of character traits valued in particular communities), more traditional liberal deliberative models also emphasize character traits required for participation in rational deliberation (see Callan, 1997).

Similarly, Kathy Bickmore’s (2006) document analysis of three Canadian provinces’ civic-political curricula determines that “many elements […] could marginalize conflict and dissenters” (p. 365). She is particularly concerned with their marginalization of non-conforming opinions or events and with the lack of opportunities to practice conflict resolution. Both works are valuable for their criticisms of current Canadian practice, though Bickmore’s justification for dissent as a necessary component of citizenship is more fully developed. Llewellyn, Cook and Marina (2010) draw many of the same conclusions, arguing that civic education should
be driven by notions of social justice in order to “envelope [sic] students in collective action” (p. 1).

Other research arguing in favour of dissent or disobedience is more theoretical. Nancy Fraser’s (1990, 2008, 2009) work is consistent with Mouffe’s and Rancière’s in that it questions how the current order—particularly its understanding of the public sphere—limits who can participate in public life and how the structure permits them to do so. Like Rancière, Fraser (2009) focuses on the terms by which those excluded can insert themselves into political processes to make justice claims. She discusses how the political grammar of the public sphere (by which she means the terms by which people can make meaningful justice claims in public) precludes some people’s participation. She perceives many competing political grammars (i.e. justice as representation, as identity, and as redistribution) that contest the grammar of the majority, so no single grammar can be considered “normal.” As such, she emphasizes that all those subjected to a decision should not only be included in decision-making processes, but that these participants should decide together which grammar should dictate claims (2009). I disagree with Fraser that participants should decide on a common grammar of justice through the Habermasian conception of “communicative rationality” (p. 42). Like Mouffe (2000), I do not believe that a common conception of rationality can ever achieve consensus on political matters. I discuss these concepts in Chapter Two.

Stitzlein’s (2014) work is more practically oriented. She argues that political dissent in the United States should be considered a positive right, and thus actively fostered in schools, by tracing its roots to the United States’ “Founding Fathers.” She also argues that dissent is compatible with communitarianism by contending that
progressive-era Pragmatist Americans drew from communitarian thought to organize civil disobedience. While this book is distinctively American in its focus on Pragmatism and its contextualization of the concept of dissent, Stitzlein’s arguments about the nature and importance of dissent, as well as how to ensure its inclusion in curricula, hold for Canada as well. What is perhaps most provocative in Stitzlein’s work is her assertion that dissent must channel anger only in certain circumstances, and that it must be grounded in pragmatist conceptions of hope.

**Affect and Rationality in Civic Education.** Stitzlein (2014) maintains that “anger is an important part of sharing one’s frustrations and rallying others around oneself” (p. 147), but she cautions that anger cannot lead to narrowed viewpoints or violence. For her, it is habitual, “subversive and courageous” hope (p. 148) that assuages anger and prevents anarchy on the path to a more desirable state of affairs. This pragmatist hope is realistic yet generative in that it connects ideals with action toward particular ends. Thus, she develops a humanities-based curriculum for cultivating hope as a necessary component of dissent among students. Stitzlein is not the first to suggest that emotions are a vital component of dissent, or of political life.²⁰ Megan Boler (1999) also explores how students learn to express emotions. In *Feeling Power: Emotions and Education*, she dedicates Part 2 to a discussion of “Emotions as a Site of Political Resistance.” Unlike Stitzlein, Boler examines emotions largely through a feminist lens. This means she understands emotions as “constructed psychic terrain” (p. xxi) that are neither public nor private; that are gendered; and that are controlled pastorally by historically situated, socio-cultural forces. Particularly useful for work on

²⁰ Martha Nussbaum (1996), for example, argues for the importance of compassion as a social emotion.
citizenship education are her discussions of emotional learning and control (Chapters 1-3), of feminists’ politicization of emotion (Chapter 5), and of the limits of emotion in multicultural education (Chapter 7).

Ruitenberg (2009) adds to this field by outlining how civic education might enact Mouffe’s call for an agonistic public sphere. Among other proposals, she suggests that education for political and moral emotions is important not only for the vibrant democracy Mouffe advocates, but for “understanding the cultural significance and significations of emotions” (p. 276). Like Boler and, to a lesser degree, Stitzlein, Ruitenberg believes that anger is useful for dissent. She also finds useful Mouffe’s distinction between moral and political anger, adding that citizens should feel angry “on behalf of a political collective” (p. 277). Elsewhere, Ruitenberg (2010) makes the case that political identities are formed around affective identification with a particular group at the expense of another. As such, students should learn to recognize the significance of the social imaginary of their own and other social orders so they can perceive those with whom they disagree as adversaries rather than enemies. Although anger and hope appear most often in related literature as necessary political emotions, other dispositions such as trust, honesty, and courage also appear.21

What is telling about the recent literature on reason and emotion is that female authors have tended to champion justifications for emotional inclusion in the public sphere, while more traditional, rationalist conversations tend to be male-dominated. This trend hints at invisible gender processes within academia and in dominant

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21 Patricia White (2010) provides a survey of various works on political emotions in making a case for early education of civic virtues.
conceptions of democracy. A curious exception to this trend is that men seem to dominate the literature on patriotism in education, itself an emotionally laden concept (e.g., Blattberg, 2010; Callan, 1994). Michalinos Zembylas’ (2009a, 2009b, 2013) work straddles the divide between these gendered areas of study. It should be noted, however, that his work owes much to feminist interventions into the educational sphere insofar as it leaves space for emotions (see Boler, 1999; Noddings, 1984). His work elucidates how emotions are socially constructed to serve certain pedagogical ends, often to reinforce borders—national and imagined—between students and “others.” In response, he proposes that practices of critical citizenship education include analyses of how nation-states mobilize affect and emotion (2009a), teach against politics of fear (2009b), and teach for “critical emotional reflexivity” (2013). The latter of these is particularly important for this research and relates to students’ ability to reflect on how their emotions can be mobilized for activism.

Alternative Conceptions of Democracy. I am also sympathetic to Rancière’s radical and anarchic conception of democratic life. Rancière’s (1999) work is extremely valuable for its treatment of dissent / dissensus as the crux of political interactions. While I believe he focuses too narrowly on politics through dissensus alone in this work, his presupposition of equality is valuable for asking what new possibilities can emerge once people treat one another as equals (1999). For him, it is only through political subjectification—the creation of new subject identities that contest the “police order”—that people can claim full recognition of their right to equality as citizens. I share Biesta’s (2011) concern that Rancière leaves little space for politics within the police order, and I am suspicious of his assertion that the “police order” cannot work
toward establishing core political values through institutions. I am more sympathetic to Mouffe’s semi-archic understanding of how core democratic values must be upheld via institutions. While Mouffe recognizes that neither equality nor liberty can ever be fully realized, these values are still a common good toward which people must work (1992, p. 30).

These disagreements notwithstanding, Rancière’s conception of *dissensus* is highly valuable since it helps demonstrate how conflict creates the conditions for a more just social order through the process of political subjectification. His work also clarifies how conflict acts as a claim for substantive recognitions of people’s equality. Rancière’s nuanced understanding of the power of “policing” (in the sense of maintaining a current social order) is valuable for showing that dissent is integral to political life (for exposing the limitations of the established order in its ability to respect rights or core ethico-political values), and for illuminating creative ways for humans to interact more inclusively. As we will see in later chapters, Rancière’s (2000/2004) emphasis on art is valuable for showing how creative works and acts of dissent extend the field of what can be considered *sensible* instead of merely noise. Michel Tremblay’s (1973) play *Hosanna* is a good example of this, since it reveals how gay and trans* identities are marginalized, through straight policing, to exist only as theatrical representations of themselves since they are not otherwise *sensible* to the majority. Moreover, the play helps educate its audience about queer struggles and thus *itself* extends the field of what can be considered *sensible* within the police order.

Mouffe’s (1992) conference paper, “Citizenship and Political Identity,” also lays foundations for investigating alternative notions of political identities. Presupposing the
existence of a fluid, non-essentialist political identity, Mouffe argues that political subjects are different but equivalent. What binds subjects together is a common discourse of res publica (roughly, “public affairs”), which obligates citizens to work toward the goods of universal liberty and equality. Mouffe’s implicit understanding of the public sphere presumes that any theoretical model of the political subject must justify what connects (or does not connect) citizens. This discussion is useful because it presents an alternative to the essentialist, deliberative model of the public sphere that underpins so many existing civic education curricula, although Mouffe’s model does not require an archic society; rather, her work suggests a semi-archic alternative to deliberative democratic models. This work is particularly important for conceiving of agents as fluid beings free of the constraints that rationality and consensus-orientation pose for their political subjectification.

Mouffe’s later works build on her agonistic conception of democracy, growing into an increasingly poignant criticism of deliberative models. In The Democratic Paradox (2000), she agrees with deliberative democrats that aggregative models such as those outlined by Schumpeter (1976/2003) and Downs (1957) are deeply flawed because they rely too heavily on instrumentalism over citizens’ active involvement in political life. Instead, she believes that citizens’ commitments to democracy must be strengthened by multiplying the “institutions, the discourses, the forms of life that foster identification with democratic values” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 96). However, she is heavily suspicious that the deliberative alternative of rational consensus can be achieved.

These practices should be cognizant of the antagonism inherent to the political,
particularly as constituted by hegemonic power relations. As such, politics should be a practice of “domesticating hostility and ... trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations” by transforming political enemies (“us” v. “them”) into adversaries who share a common commitment to the core ethico-political values of liberty and equality (p. 101). Mouffe elaborates further on the dangers of post-political modes of being—that is, those that fail to recognize how power constructs objectivity—in her monograph, *On the Political* (2005). For her, post-political relations, including rationalist and consensus-oriented models of democracy, are perilous because they are based on the illusion of objectivity that exclude deviant, yet valid and deeply held views. Siding with Bonnie Honig (1993), Mouffe (2005) contends that those with greater power displace legitimate political avenues and increase the risk of more violent political acts, such as terrorism (p. 80).

For another examination of semi-archic models of democracy, Biesta (2011) examines both Mouffe’s and Rancière’s ideas to find a middle path in the “ignorant citizen.” He determines that civic education should not be underpinned by any particular notion of citizenship since students’ subjectification “is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes” (p. 142). Although the notion of the ignorant citizen relies on a public sphere, Biesta’s article critiques deliberative models of the rational public sphere, which assume that “the political/civic identities of those who take part in the deliberation are already shaped before the deliberation starts” (p. 147). In other words, he suggests that students learn to deviate from predetermined “scripts” that dictate acceptable interactions with the public sphere.
This review of the key literature on the intersection between civic education, deliberative democracy, and engagement in civic life reveals salient patterns and underexplored trajectories for future research. First, it is important to note that there is still heavy debate around the ability of deliberative models to adequately accommodate difference on equal and just terms. A separate branch of literature reveals that the rational and consensus-oriented nature of deliberative models may exclude certain worldviews, particularly non-masculinist and non-European viewpoints (Hébert, 2002; Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1994). Much of this research identifies similar exclusions that may contribute to students’ disengagement. These scholars often conclude that the exclusion of emotional responses to dissent has negative consequences for femininity and women’s issues in democracy. They tend to theorize passions as a site of resistance, advocating that certain emotions—especially anger, courage, and hope—can be politically mobilized in dissent (Boler, 1999; Ruitenberg, 2010; Sparks, 1997; Stitzlein, 2014). This body of work also suggests, contrary to Stephen Elstub’s (2010) assertion, that deliberative democracy has not been capable of leveling inequalities and injustices in decision-making. Thus, students in civic classrooms may be less inclined to engage with political life that they do not perceive is welcoming of, or relevant to, them.

**Chapter Structure and Research Significance**

Chapter Two uses qualitative methodology to answer my first set of sub-questions, “To what extent and in what ways are the curricular documents of Ontario and B.C.’s civics courses informed by deliberative models of democracy?” and “Which features of deliberative models of democracy are particularly prominent in these
I employ qualitative thematic analysis to determine which conception(s) of democracy B.C. and Ontario’s curricula espouse. This lays the foundations for my analysis of these models in Chapter Five. Since the available literature already suggests strongly that both curricula are primarily informed by deliberative models, this chapter also clarifies the relationship between the major models of democracy and the variations within them. Here, I situate both provinces’ models within existing conceptions of deliberative democracy based on my thematic analysis.

Chapter Three is normative in nature, answering my second sub-question, “Why should civics curricula teach for dissent in political life?” I make the case that civic education should actively foster students’ capacity for, and inclination toward, political dissent. To make this argument, I draw on an agonistic theoretical perspective that emphasizes the inevitability and desirability (if productively channeled) of political dissent. Once this is established, I contend that it is not sufficient for schools to teach for the negative right to dissent. Rather, I make the case that civic education should teach for the positive right to engage in civic and political dissent. The distinction here is that conceiving of political dissent as a negative right only obligates schools to teach students that certain forms of political dissent are legal (i.e., students should be free from interference in their right to dissent), whereas conceiving of it as a positive right requires that schools teach students that disagreement and dissent are actually desirable political activities for engaged citizens of a liberal democracy. Considering dissent to be a positive right obligates schools to teach when, how, and why dissent can be appropriate. While this runs the risk of reproducing educators’ and policymakers’
potentially limited conceptions of what constitutes “appropriate” dissent, my semi-archic perspective means that limitations will be minimalist. Specifically, I argue for the disposition and capacity to engage in forms of dissent that do not isolate students or their fellow political subjects from their commitments to core liberal-democratic values. Students may also be more inclined to engage in certain forms of protest that are not strictly compatible with deliberative models of democracy (e.g., street theatre, boycotting, blocking highways, etc.).

Chapter Four also builds a normative argument, answering my third sub-question, “Why should civics curricula help foster students’ affective and emotional responses to political issues?” It argues that civic education should include critical attention to the affective/passionate demands of democratic citizenship instead of its cognitive/rational aspects alone in order to engage more students in civic and political life. While I do not make the case that schools should teach for any particular emotions, I draw on the literature that does advocate teaching for specific emotions. This argument relies in part on elucidating how the exclusively rationalist elements of deliberative models of democracy fail to engage all students equally. In particular, I argue that more impassioned responses to dissent may encourage students’ engagement by teaching them how affect and emotion might be channeled productively. I also argue that the emphasis on rationality in deliberative models has developed largely through European, masculinist epistemological traditions and thus helps maintain hegemonic power inequalities in political decision-making processes. Key to this project is a feminist focus on the collective (as opposed to private) nature of passions.
Chapter Five examines how well B.C. and Ontario’s civics curricula measure up to the normative standards delineated in Chapters Three and Four. As such, it answers my fourth and fifth sub-questions, “How do the conceptions of democracy that underpin B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula open or close spaces for affective and emotional responses to political issues?” and “How do the conceptions of democracy that underpin British Columbia and Ontario’s civics curricula open or close spaces for dissent?” In so doing, this chapter also answers my primary research question, which asks how the conceptions of democracy that inform civics curricula in Ontario and B.C. might foster or limit students’ ability to engage in forms of dissent. As in Chapter One, I rely here less on theoretical methodologies and more on thematic analysis to answer this question. I situate this investigation in other scholars’ problematizations of deliberative models of democracy as they pertain to secondary-level youths’ civic and political engagement.

This thesis contributes to a larger project aiming to expose and evaluate the strengths and limitations of actually existing Canadian civic education courses. Because it finds a middle ground between purely theoretical and practically oriented work on civic education, other researchers might build on the criticisms I elucidate here in other contexts. This project is also important because it demands critical questions about the sweeping, “common sense” assumptions that inform how democracy in Canada has been taught. Investigating the roots of these issues helps identify areas for improvement that may not be addressed in more practically grounded research. To educate for liberal-democratic life necessitates theoretical underpinnings that ensure all students’ equality and freedoms are upheld.
Little research in this field employs agonistic and semi-arhic theoretical lenses, which helps propose productive avenues for addressing the inevitable occurrence of civic and political dissent. Moreover, the critical-radical nature of this study promises to illuminate, if not suggest alternatives to, exclusionary frameworks and systemic barriers in civic education. These investigations show potential to empower students for political engagement outside the demarcated confines that western philosophies have traditionally reinforced. Together, these criticisms may help policymakers and researchers to rethink curricular practices. By critiquing the very roots of Canada’s formal educational commitments to create a thicker liberal democracy, this thesis contributes to critical and radical work envisioning a more socially just and equitable society.

I use the term “thick” here in line with Fernández and Sundström’s (2011) distinction between thick and thin ethical dimensions of citizenship education. Ethical thickness refers to a “dense education that trains young boys and girls to become citizens of a certain (good) kind” and a thin education as “non-ethical education that reduces preparation for citizenship to morally neutral knowledge of the home country and the world” (p. 369).
Chapter Two: Analyzing the Democratic Underpinnings of Two Civics Curricula

It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried. (Churchill, 1947, cc. 208-209)

Before critically evaluating the models of democracy that underpin Ontario and British Columbia’s (B.C.’s) civics courses, it is necessary to determine what those models actually are. In this chapter, I use qualitative thematic analysis to determine which conception(s) of democracy inform both provinces’ civics curricula. I am particularly concerned with identifying their second-order theories of democracy. Second-order theories determine to a greater extent than first-order or procedural conceptions whether and how actors might exercise dissent. As Any Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2009) explain,

First-order theories seek to resolve moral disagreement by demonstrating that alternative theories and principles should be rejected. [Examples include] libertarianism, utilitarianism, [and] liberal egalitarianism… Second-order theories are about other theories in the sense that they provide ways of dealing with the claims of conflicting first-order theories. They make room for continuing moral conflict that first-order theories purport to eliminate. (p. 13, emphasis in original)

In other words, second-order theories of democracy adjudicate between competing first-order theories. Thus, second-order theories must have a procedural component in addition to any substantive component(s) they purport to have. Among the most familiar second-order theories of democracy are aggregative models, deliberative
models, and what might be referred to as “post-deliberative” models (Ruitenberg, personal communication).

**Qualitative Thematic Analysis**

The points around which these models converge or diverge (discussed below) acted as themes for my qualitative thematic analysis. Thematic analysis involves “identifying and describing both implicit and explicit [themes] within a text” to identify with precision how that text treats an object of study (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012, p. 13). After coding both texts, I supplemented my analysis by comparing code frequencies and conducting Key Word in Context (KWIC) analysis to determine which models of democracy inform each curriculum. The texts I have analyzed here are the curricular documents from B.C. and Ontario’s civics courses.

These curricula do not explicitly support any particular model of democracy. Because these courses cater to Grade 10 and 11 students, and because these are the most fundamental courses dealing explicitly with civic education in Ontario’s and B.C.’s respective secondary curricula, their content is intended to provide an introductory-level analysis of democratic issues. For instance, they do not explicitly avow a commitment to Rawlsian understandings of justice or to Habermasian ideals about deliberative speech conditions. Still, elements of each democratic model are present in both curricula, and I determine here where, generally, to situate each curriculum in terms of these models. As we will see, although they do not “fit” perfectly within any

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23 British Columbia's curriculum repeatedly makes explicit its commitment to "deliberative democracy" but, since it has not made the same distinction I do between deliberative and post-deliberative models, it was not immediately obvious which (if either) of these models it espouses.
model, both curricula appear most committed to deliberative models. In the subsequent two chapters of my thesis, I will outline two normative standards for Canadian civics curricula, based on critiques of deliberative democracy. I will then measure Ontario and B.C.’s civics curricula against these normative standards, and so the purpose of the analysis in this chapter is to make clear why the normative standards I will set out are critiques of certain tenets of deliberative models of democracy in particular.

Documents

The curricular documents I analyze here are the primary, official documents (or “full curriculum”) for each province’s civics course, and they do not include textbooks or cross-curricular resources. Prior to my analysis, I removed sections of each curriculum irrelevant to this research, such as the sections of the Ontario curriculum focusing on the Geography and History courses. This helps ensure that the analysis accurately reflects the aims of the civics curricula when coding for keyword frequencies.

British Columbia’s full curriculum (2005) is called the Civic Studies 11: Integrated Resource Package 2005. This document contains a rationale for teaching Civic Studies 11 in B.C. schools, the curriculum goals and prescribed learning outcomes, “various considerations for program delivery,” classroom assessment models, additional learning resources, and a glossary. These sections comprise roughly 38,000 words total. Since 2005, it has not been revised. The document is generally prescriptive; while there are many sections of the text that ask students to reflect on which courses of action are favourable to them, the choices tend to be circumscribed by a wide, albeit limited, list of options. The document is “open” about its democratic underpinning, explicitly avowing
a commitment to deliberative democracy. However, this is not particularly helpful for our purposes because I make the distinction between deliberative and post-deliberative models, whereas many theorists subsume the latter under “deliberative” as well.\textsuperscript{24} The curriculum has multiple authors, but is generally coherent in that its prescriptions do not contradict one another.

Ontario’s “full curriculum” (2013) for Civics and Citizenship is grouped together with its Grade 9 and 10 Geography and History courses in a document called \textit{The Ontario Curriculum, Grades 9 and 10: Canadian and World Studies, 2013}.\textsuperscript{25} Insofar as is relevant for my purposes, this document contains the rationale for the Canadian and World Studies courses, the introduction to the Civics 10 Course, information about the three “strands” into which Civics 10 is divided, an overview of the “Concepts of Political Thinking,” an overview of the “Political Inquiry Process,” the learning outcomes of each strand, an appendix about the “Citizenship Education Framework,” and a glossary. These sections are roughly 32,000 words. Aside from being about 6,000 words shorter than the B.C. curriculum, this version of Ontario curriculum is also more recent. Ontario initially implemented a civics course in 2000, revising it in 2005 and again in 2013. Ontario’s is also more opaque about its commitment to a particular model of democracy so this information must be inferred from an analysis of various themes. Moreover, it is

\textsuperscript{24} The critical, but less radical post-deliberative theorists such as Young (1996) and Fraser (2008) might be characterized as deliberative, but more radical post-deliberative theorists like Mouffe (2014) are virtually never described as deliberative. Despite these similarities, I make the deliberative/post-deliberative distinction to highlight the salient differences between deliberative theorists and the less radical post-deliberative theorists. See my explanation for this in Chapter One.

\textsuperscript{25} Although Ontario’s Canadian and World Studies curriculum includes both Geography and History courses in addition to Civics, I have removed both of the former from this analysis. For example, even when the sections of the curriculum dealing exclusively with the History course discuss a protest movement or public deliberation, this will not find its way into my analysis.
less prescriptive than B.C.’s in its learning outcomes, focusing on skill development and asking questions of students to encourage discussion. However, the types of questions asked and examples of potential responses provide insight into its more prescriptive elements. Like B.C., the document has multiple authors and contributors but its message remains consistent throughout.

**Conceptual Framework: Major Models of Democracy**

A breakdown of the distinctions between the models for which I am coding can be found in Appendix A. All deliberative models have in common that they legitimize decision-making by demanding that free and equal opponents *justify* and *refine* their positions publicly, through deliberation. This is the most important way that deliberative models differ from aggregative models. Most aggregative models aim to enshrine the majority position and view the process of forming preferences as extraneous to the political process. On the other hand, deliberative models value deliberation as endogenous to democratic procedure because it helps substantively refine preferences. All democratic models, including aggregative ones, see discussion as important, even if only to pool information. But aggregative models do not share the deliberative-democratic belief in the importance of forming a “public” conducive to deliberation, where participants aim to modify others’ positions.

Since deliberative theories aim to create a political public whose interests and preferences are subject to change, discussions of *inclusion* figure prominently. This does not mean that all participants’ input will be reflected in the final outcome of decision-making, but deliberation must ensure that all participants can participate equally.
Political equality here refers to participants’ equal opportunity to provide input and criticize other positions, all with freedom from domination (Young, 2000). Post-deliberative models take this a step further, aiming for what Fraser (2008) calls “participatory parity.” This means that deliberations are not only formally inclusive of all with freedom from domination, but also that social, economic, and cultural barriers to participation are minimized. Moreover, the scope of deliberation should ensure that all who are subjected to a policy are included, even across state boundaries (Fraser, 2009). Aggregative views also favour inclusion insofar as they believe all participants should have an equal voice (expressed most importantly as a vote). Some aggregative models guarantee a degree of political equality in that they recognize that collective choices may depend on discriminatory views. Still, there must be heavy evidence of discrimination in order to override unjust outcomes (Cohen, 1997, pp. 411-412).

For Schumpeter (1976/2003), a proponent of aggregative models, the “masses” lack the sense of volition and responsibility required for political life, so ruling is best left to their elected delegates (p. 263). Citizens’ primary responsibility is thus to vote for their own interests. Because deliberative democrats contest these pessimistic assertions, a key feature of deliberative models is reasonableness (or open-mindedness) rather than simply discussion to pool options. Aggregative models see people’s preferences as rational because they consider adults to be “the best judges and most vigilant defenders of their own interests” (Cohen, 1997, p. 411). Rationality, in this context, refers to actors’ ability to recognize what their own interests are and to

26 I maintain that most deliberative models have a fairly narrow, formal interpretation of political equality, but that post-deliberative models have a more substantive view that better resembles equity.
advocate for them publicly. While deliberative and post-deliberative theorists define rationality this way as well, we will see that post-deliberative theorists recognize the broadest range of mental faculties as “rational” and “reasoned” (compared to the more aggregative and deliberative tendency to dismiss some as irrational).

Aggregative theorists such as Downs (1957) argue that people’s rational self-interest can and should dictate political outcomes since this is highly efficient. In contrast, *reason giving* (as opposed to more impassioned or embodied forms of persuasion) is the most common and legitimate form of justification according to most deliberative theorists. Still, deliberative models assume that the citizenry is at least minimally rational in order to take part in this deliberative process (Minch, 2009, p. 161). For most deliberative theorists, reasonableness is linked to rationality because the former reflects actors’ ability to recognize that other participants are advocating rationally for their respective interests (Habermas, 1984).

The deliberative demand that all participants be reasonable is inseparable from its aim of enshrining or creating *consensus* in decision-making (Habermas, 1984, p. 19). As Young (2000) puts it, “while actually reaching consensus is not a requirement of deliberative reason, participants in discussion must be *aiming* to reach agreement to enter the discussion at all” (p. 24). Moreover, deliberative theorists debate amongst themselves whether (i) deliberation can only occur amongst those who already agree on common principles, (ii) the aim of deliberation should be to enshrine agreement, or (iii) both (pp. 40-41). Post-deliberative models, on the other hand, are more sceptical about the possibility and desirability of consensus.
This consensus-oriented nature is virtually always tied to theorists’ faith in reasonable participants and well-enshrined procedures to bring about agreement or compromise by presenting rational, mutually acceptable reasons. Rawls (1995, 2001), for instance, suggests that participants in deliberation appeal to a common, primary conception of political justice—accessible in the “original position” through reason—to adjudicate between competing “comprehensive doctrines” (religions, ideologies, etc.). In so doing, deliberation will ideally result in increasingly reasoned outcomes and thus bring participants closer to total consensus, rather than result in an impasse.

Habermas (2001; 2003, p. 248) aims to achieve consensus on moral rightness through communicative rationality, which he views as teleological and which is mobilized in pursuit of truth. In this model, participants are presumed to be reasonable insofar as their positions reflect their own rational capacities, and if they recognize opponents’ positions as reasoned, as well (1998). Gutmann and Thompson (1996) highlight the principle of reciprocity, which “regulate[s] public reason” by creating the “terms in which citizens justify ... their claims” (p. 55). These terms are procedurally fair, they claim, because they are created through deliberation. Post-deliberative thinkers, on the other hand, are critical of the idea that either “reason” or “reasonableness” will always lead to consensus, particularly since they do not believe in the universality of reason.

Post-deliberative thinker Young (1996) is careful to note that policies should be decided in a rational way but that western institutions have constructed “universal”

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27 Alongside the other key principles of accountability, publicity, basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity.
reason in culturally specific ways (pp. 121-123). Western philosophies have monopolized reason, drawing on Eurocentric and masculinist conceptions of neutrality, objectivity, and calm communication as the only paths to truth (Hébert, 2002; Pateman, 1988; Pinto & Portelli, 2012; Walby, 1994). Mouffe (2000) contests deliberative conceptions of universal reason more strongly, explaining that the ideal, neutral conditions necessary for fair deliberation on rational grounds can never exist. Moreover, she proposes (2014) that there are simply some questions to which there is no rational solution acceptable to all, and passions inevitably play a role in the articulation of preferences.

While Gutmann and Thompson (2004) argue that agreement is usually desirable because it leads to stability, they also recognize that expecting consensus on every issue is unrealistic in pluralist societies. Thus, they acknowledge that deliberation’s requirement for mutually accessible reason-giving is not morally neutral, and that “no standard of reasoning could be” (1996, p. 51). Accordingly, the standards of reciprocal public reason can sometimes be rejected justifiably. Dissenting minorities can overcome the moral biases favouring status quo reasoning through deliberative strategies by “economizing on moral disagreements” (2004, p. 28). Economizing is deliberative and consensus-oriented since it entails an effort to find mutually acceptable moral ground through deliberation. Where economizing is not possible and unfair deliberation results in egregious, unjust outcomes (e.g., racial segregation), these outcomes should be challenged even if this polarization disrupts the political stability of convergence (p. 55). Non-violent civil disobedience can, then, be acceptable if it results in improved deliberation (Smith, 2013, p. 10). Notwithstanding, deliberative
disagreements are provisional, but should never be so deep as to disrupt the shared
grounds of justice or the good of democracy (p. 8).

In response, Young (1996) explains how notions of the common good, or even
what constitutes common ground, are often predicated on assumptions about what the
most powerful deem reasonable. Thus, most post-deliberative thinkers view any thick
conception of the common good as exclusionary. The idea of the common good is thus
not conducive to the transformation of participants’ opinions (as deliberation aims to
do). Young proposes instead a minimalist conception of unity, where participants
reframe difference as a resource rather than something to be overcome, and where they
grasp that they cannot understand one another’s experiences fully enough to reduce
them to the common good (1996, pp. 126-127). Similarly, Fraser’s (2008) post-
deliberative work on abnormal justice explains how the presumption that all
participants share a common understanding of “normal” justice jeopardizes the more
fundamental principle of participatory parity within deliberation (p. 406). For her,
“justice discourse is normal just as long as public dissent from and disobedience to its
constitutive assumptions remain contained” (p. 394). She perceives dissent and civil
disobedience as means for the subaltern to voice counter-hegemonic concerns
authoritatively and to reveal the moral outrage of contemporary injustices.

Mouffe’s (2000) concern that there can be no universal conception of the
common good is premised on her assertion that there is no universal conception of
reason. The rationally oriented nature of contemporary politics, she argues, masks the
hegemonic nature of political terrain. However, those with fundamentally different
positions still share a common ground, albeit a thin one: both recognize the legitimacy
of their adversaries' positions as long as they are grounded in interpretations of the core ethico-political principles of liberal democracies, namely liberty and equality. Her focus, then, is not on displacing adversaries within the same hegemonic terrain, but rather on advancing the possibility for counter-hegemonic alternatives. As such, it is necessary to recognize the temporary and provisional nature of any political compromise, which remains open to contestation. Moreover, it is important to provide channels for the expression of political passions for issues on which there is no rational solution.

Habermas attempts to avoid these pitfalls in his deliberative theory. He recognizes that consensus may be difficult to achieve on all “epistemic” questions in modern pluralist societies (Habermas, 1996, pp. 394-414), so he aims to bring about the “ideal speech conditions” under which rational discussion can bring about maximal sincerity, rightness, and truth (1971/2001). Where these are not possible, weaker forms of communicative action or even rational, strategic action may be preferable (Bohman & Rehg, 2014, 3.1, par. 12). Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) emphasize that deliberation is procedurally fair because deliberative strategies can encompass many forms of discourse, including passionate rhetoric—not just calm logic and rational argumentation (pp. 50-51). Even “non-deliberative” or “direct action” forms (e.g., sit-ins and anti-war demonstrations) often lead to more deliberation (p. 51). In their view, all decisions must be deliberated at some point to be legitimate (p. 56). In short, Gutmann and Thompson defend deliberative democracy by pointing out its “self-correcting capacity... and malleable and expansive character [which, they claim,] allows it to respond to all such criticisms” (Minch, 2009, p. 215).
Post-deliberative thinkers throw into doubt that ideal speech conditions can ever be met, particularly since they perceive Habermasian (1998) presumptions of communication or language free of domination as unrealistic (Kohn, 2000). Communication, for them, can never be as neutral, transparent, or universal as Habermas or Gutmann and Thompson envision. Young (1996, 2000) asserts that the deliberative emphasis on critical argumentation is culturally biased and thus leads to exclusions in practice. In particular, she is weary of traditional deliberative assumptions that deliberation brackets inequalities for communicative purposes (p. 122). As such, power re-enters the deliberative arena unevenly through supposedly neutral forms of communication. She suggests that democracies should make space for other forms of communication that are not grounded in dialogical reason, such as greeting, rhetoric, and storytelling.

However, Young (2001) also notes that these deliberative forms may harbour a mechanic of exclusion because participants are likely to have different group-based cultures with varying levels of symbolic or material privilege. Thus, many activists eschew deliberation in favour of non-deliberative discourse (e.g., street theatre, boycotts, picketing, etc.). Violence, according to Young, is not acceptable (except in self-defence), but minor property damage is “not to be condemned” (p. 674), especially if this damage advances fairer terms for deliberation (Humphrey & Stears, 2006). Unlike in Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, these non-deliberative forms do not aim only for fairer deliberation; they offer “reasonable appeals to justice” while also exposing structural and hegemonic inequalities (Young, 2001, p. 688).
Method and Theme Selection

Because I am conducting a top-down, “theoretical” style of qualitative thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84), I have identified themes based on the theoretical discrepancies between the democratic models above, rather than drawing them inductively from the texts themselves. Thus, I selected terms related to each theme before coding began, and added additional, related terms as they appeared in the text during the coding phase.

The first theme I code for is preference formation (see Appendix B), which identifies how the curricula presume people form preferences, opinions, and positions on civic issues. The most effective way of determining how curricula attend to preference formation is by identifying the types of skills and capacities students are meant to develop. Coding for frequency is helpful here because repetition reflects the importance of skills students are meant to learn. This theme take into account the skills and attitudes students are meant to learn to determine whether preference formation is treated as endogenous or exogenous to the political process, and how preferences are shared with others (if at all).

The second theme is rationality and passion (see Appendix C). This theme is best measured by coding for both frequency and Key Word In Context (KWIC) analysis, since references to its sub-themes will likely be present in both curricula but treated differently depending on the democratic models that inform them. References to this theme in the curricula are scant, and as such are of limited use for this project. Still, the absences of rationality and passion in certain spaces are telling. The sub-theme of rationality can best be determined by examining whether the standards of rationality
and reason are presented as objective and universalizing; agreed upon within communities; or entirely constructed based on power relations. It thus considers whether or not refined reasoning will always lead to better solutions. Furthermore, it asks whether passions are given space in curricula, whether these passions are mobilized politically, and whether they are connected to political partisanship.

Closely related is the third theme for which I code, **means of participation and communication**. This theme identifies *how* participants are expected to present ideas in order for them to be considered valid and legitimate. The various models place differing emphases on the various means of civic participation (such as voting, deliberation, or demonstrations). Depending on the model, communication might be considered valid if it is deemed rational (argumentation, formal language, clear flow of logic, etc.) or if it is relatively impassioned (rhetoric, storytelling, embodied communication, etc.). This theme can also be measured by determining the types of skills and dispositions the curricula aim to inculcate. Moreover, it addresses the degree to which curricula support participation in view of countering the current hegemony. Determining whether curricula discuss civil disobedience or violent forms of participation is particularly helpful for distinguishing between deliberative and post-deliberative models.

The fourth theme is **inclusion and political equality** (see Appendix D), which identifies who is to be included in the democratic process, to what degree, and whether political equality is formal (all participants are presumed to have equal voice in process) or substantive (measures must be put in place to even out power imbalances and hegemonic forces). This theme is designed to capture the degree to which the
curricula espouse commitments to formal or substantive equality of political participation so references to this theme are scattered across the curricula. It is expected that all models (particularly in a Canadian context) discuss equality and inclusion but that the way they frame these issues may differ heavily (with aggregative models on the one hand, and deliberative and post-deliberative models in the other). As such, code frequency must be coupled with KWIC. Finally, this theme considers whether difference and disagreement are treated as resources, facts of political life, or problems to be solved.

The fifth and final theme, **consensus and conflict** (see Appendix E), determines the standards by which decisions are considered legitimate. The democratic models diverge on whether standards such as majority rule, consensus, and compromise ensure legitimacy. This theme also considers the thickness of each model’s notion of the common good. I use the term “thick” here in line with Fernández and Sundström’s (2011) distinction between thick and thin *ethical* dimensions of citizenship education. Ethical thickness refers to a “dense education that trains [students] to become citizens of a certain (good) kind” and a thin education as “non-ethical education that reduces preparation for citizenship to morally neutral knowledge of the home country and the world” (p. 369). This theme is perhaps the most helpful for differentiating between democratic models because the models have clearly distinct positions on this topic. It is best determined by coding for terms related to majority rule, consensus, conflict, and the common good, which are scattered throughout the documents. While measuring code frequency is important here, supplementing this with KWIC analysis is necessary to understand how consensus and conflict are treated.
Discussion

Theme one: Preference formation (see Appendix B). There is insufficient information to determine precisely which of the three models of democracy either B.C. or Ontario’s curriculum espouses in terms of political preference formation. The available information does, however, provide strong evidence that the curricula go beyond aggregative conceptions of democracy. This is because both curricula emphasize the sorts of skills, capacities, and dispositions that would only be important if preference formation were considered endogenous to the political process. Said differently, the curricula presume that citizens will form, justify, and refine political positions and opinions through public\textsuperscript{28} discourse and emphasize that citizens should be open to modifying or changing their views based on others’ input.

Both curricula aim to inculcate certain skills necessary in all liberal democracies, in their aggregative as well as their deliberative and post-deliberative forms. For example, they teach the skills necessary to be critically informed and critically literate, including the ability to research, assess, evaluate, judge, detect bias in, and reflect upon politically relevant information from a variety of sources. These skills are largely helpful for developing one’s own preferences. However, the curricula are also highly concerned with students’ ability to communicate, argue,\textsuperscript{29} consider and reconsider, debate, defend,\textsuperscript{30} justify, refine, and reassess their own positions, as well as listen actively and

\textsuperscript{28} It is unclear if the curricula conceive of the “public sphere” as a singular entity, or as many public spheres.

\textsuperscript{29} B.C.’s curriculum references the capacity to argue 60 times, compared to Ontario’s 2 times.

\textsuperscript{30} B.C.’s curriculum references the capacity to defend views 18 times, while Ontario’s never does.
respond to others’ views. This public-mindedness is characteristic of deliberative and post-deliberative models alike.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to specify further which of these models the curricula espouse insofar as they are concerned with the theme of preference formation. Deliberative models and post-deliberative models do not differ significantly from one another in this regard. Because the curricula do not provide much insight on this distinction, other themes are better suited to help situate the curricula’s democratic positions.

**Theme two: Rationality and passion (see Appendix C).** As we have seen in the preceding theme, the curricula emphasize predominantly rational skills and capacities. However, as with the previous theme, it is difficult to determine precisely how the curricula treat reason and passion and thus which model of democracy they best align with. This is unsurprising; secondary-level curricula should not be expected to differentiate explicitly between sophisticated political theories of reason or passion. Similarly, neither curriculum discusses whether nor how reason and rationality are constructed, which is a key difference between deliberative and post-deliberative models.

Nevertheless, both provinces’ treatments of emotion and passion are easier to identify, and both are highly consistent with deliberative thinking. For a list of the frequencies of rationality and passion terms, see Appendix C. The front matter of both curricula (Ontario’s Preface and B.C.’s Prescribed Learning Outcomes) frame affect and emotion as important parts of students’ overall well-being and personal growth. Only B.C. gives these issues substantial consideration in the main body of the text. The B.C.
curriculum (2005) is concerned with the “affective domain” of learning, which “concerns attitudes, beliefs, and the spectrum of values and value systems” (p. 21). For our purposes, the attitudes that B.C. attempts to inculcate most closely match what I call civic and political dispositions (see Chapter Four). These include narrow conceptions of “ethical behaviour” (including honesty, fairness, and reliability), along with open-mindedness, respect for diversity, empathy, questioning and promoting discussion, tolerance for ambiguity, collective responsibility, remaining informed over time, advocating productively for their own and others’ rights, reconciling conflicting rights and responsibilities (e.g., individual vs. group), ongoing re-examination and assessment of own beliefs, and willingness to participate (p. 34). These attitudes are notably deliberative in their focus since they place particular emphasis on the reasonable reassessment of civic positions.

The B.C. glossary defines “beliefs and values” as “those viewpoints and perspectives that guide decision making (e.g., fairness, reliability, logic, empathy, objectivity, honesty, respectfulness, expediency, economy, public perception, collective responsibility, tolerance for ambiguity, willingness to participate, altruism, efficacy)” (p. 169). Values and beliefs, so conceived, are dissimilar to the sorts of values and beliefs that inform Mouffe’s post-deliberative conception of partisan political identities. They emphasize instead procedural virtues over libidinal attachments to particular signifiers and identities. Moreover, the specific examples of values provided in this glossary definition (especially objectivity and collective responsibility) are consistent with relatively communitarian conceptions of democratic processes and are thus more consistent with deliberative models.
Despite these commitments, B.C.’s commitment to the passionate demands of civic education is questionable. In terms of more specific passions, the main text of B.C.’s curriculum refers to emotions only as part of an evaluation scheme for students’ mock trial, in which participants are graded based on how realistic their emotional responses to the issue are (British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 110). Moreover, when emotion and affect are referenced in the front matter, they are framed as symptoms of unease. One instance warns educators about passions when discussing current events: “Be aware that such issues may involve highly emotional debates,” the text advises. Another reads: “Discussion related to some of the topics in Civic Studies 11 may evoke an emotional response from individual students. Inform an administrator or counsellor when any concern arises” (p. 15). Aside from the more communitarian (or at least, traditional liberal) beliefs and values mentioned above, passions are never framed as desirable phenomena or as more equitable channels of expression for subaltern groups, as post-deliberative theorists would maintain. I explain why this is important in Chapter Four.

Ontario’s (2013) main text references a few, select passions it considers healthy for civic life, each related to the common good. These are limited to caring, dignity, empathy, and trust. Aside from these specific passions and affective dispositions, the curriculum’s avowed commitment to emotional health has no backing in the main text. For example, Ontario makes only one reference in its glossary to emotion: “Social welfare programs” are defined as “government programs designed to help meet the personal, economic, *emotional*, and/or physical needs of citizens” (p. 182, emphasis added). Furthermore, its focus on emotional development is predicated on the narrow
development of passion as empathy and motivation, and more tellingly for our purposes, as “emotional regulation” (p. 4). The lack of attention to passion in the curriculum overall is indicative of deliberative tendencies in Ontario’s curriculum.

However, Ontario is quite concerned with the development of students’ identities. Identity formation is framed as a passionate phenomenon insofar as it involves inculcating a sense of connectedness with others in students’ local, national, and global communities. Identities are also treated here as personal yet fluid. Overall, identity formation is understood as synonymous with developing a “sense” of being part of a community. This tends toward, but does not fit neatly within post-deliberative conceptions of civic and political identity. The attention to passions in identity formation is a very post-deliberative concern, but Ontario’s curriculum is more concerned with a sense of shared belonging than a sense of shared antagonisms. In this regard, it appears as though identity is a political tool insofar as it aims to help students develop a sense of empathy for, and understanding of others’ political perspectives and ethics. Identity formation thus appears to be a consensus-oriented process, one that is predominantly passionate. Therefore, this straddles the boundary between deliberative and post-deliberative models of democracy.

**Theme three: Means of communication and participation.**

**Means of communication.** Both curricula favour predominantly rational modes of communication over embodied and passionate ones, a characteristic consistent with deliberative models, and formal schooling in Canada more generally. The wide variety of proposed means of civic participation (see below) underline this further. The sorts of communication skills the curricula espouse are largely limited to cognitive and
metacognitive skills, including argumentation, debate, and the logical articulation of a rationale to support “reasoned decisions.” More embodied and passionate forms of communication as espoused by post-deliberative models, which might include storytelling, rhetoric, and artwork, are seldom mentioned. Both curricula do, however, suggest that more impassioned forms of participation are helpful.

**Means of participation.** Both curricula clearly extend beyond aggregative means of civic participation in this regard. Rather than emphasizing discussion and voting, both present a wide variety of means of publicly presenting, justifying, and refining positions. These include entering into debate or deliberation; undertaking litigation; blogging; making posters, artwork, or a webpage; buying fair trade; getting involved with city council; taking part in a lobby group, political party, or interest group; petitioning or making a presentation to a commission of inquiry or town hall meeting; communicating with an ombudsperson; and engaging in civil disobedience or non-violent protest. Both curricula place equal emphasis on a variety of inventive forms of civic engagement, in both reasoned and impassioned forms. But particularly important is how each province treats embodied forms, including art, protest, and civil disobedience, since these are the topics that best differentiate between deliberative and post-deliberative models.

Both curricula note that artwork, multimedia, and visual methods of communicating work can be valuable. However, B.C.’s references to these forms of communication are far overshadowed by more rational or logical forms of communication such as argumentation and debate. Its curriculum refers to argumentation 30 times, negotiation 17 times, and debate 38 times. By comparison, it
makes only nine references to visual artwork (including making posters or collages, taking photographs, etc.) and none to song, dance, rhetoric, or storytelling. Ontario has less disparity between purportedly logical and impassioned forms of communication. It makes two references to argumentation, one to negotiation, and four to debate, while making three references to visual artwork, three to music, one to gestures, and none to storytelling or dance.31 These factors suggest that Ontario leaves space for deliberative and post-deliberative views of communication alike.

The provinces’ treatment of protest and civil disobedience require a separate analysis because these forms of participation are uniquely situated to reveal the curricula’s democratic underpinnings. While both curricula tend to treat protest and civil disobedience as negative rights (see Chapter Three), this is particularly true for Ontario. This is in part because there is more emphasis on developing individual, deliberative skills such as listening and debating than capacities related to “direct action,” such as group organization or creative expression. This is not to say that the curricula condemn protest; rather, they tend to treat protest as one among many options and imply that it can be effective in certain circumstances.

Ontario’s curriculum mentions demonstrations once and non-violent protest four times, each instance occurring as an example in a list of various forms of acceptable civic action. The curriculum frames protest as consistent with “fundamental beliefs and values associated with democratic citizenship in Canada” (2013, pp. 152) and notes that

31 The lower frequency of references to communication skills in Ontario’s curriculum is partially explained by its shorter length (roughly 32,000 words compared to B.C.’s 38,000) and because a far greater proportion of Ontario’s text is dedicated to examples of prescribed learning outcomes rather than explanations of what those outcomes mean (as B.C.’s does).
it can contribute to the common good if it “heighten[s] awareness of an issue and pressure for change” (pp. 156). It never mentions violent protest, civil disobedience, or law breaking as civic action. Since it treats protest as secondary to deliberative means of participation and as a means of contributing to—rather than disrupting—the common good, the Ontario curriculum espouses a deliberative conception of appropriate means of participation.

The B.C. curriculum, on the other hand, references non-violent protest 11 times, civil disobedience four times, demonstrations five times, and direct action four times, including a case study of the Clayoquot Sound protests in 1993 (2005, p. 95). There are no mentions of violent protest. References to these ideas frame them as viable means of “civic discourse” or “civic action,” with the exception of civil disobedience. The curriculum takes a non-prescriptive stance on the matter of civil disobedience, asking students to evaluate their moral beliefs and the power relations involved in the decision to engage in these forms of action. It does not address directly any strategies for protest or describe what protest might look like aside from mass demonstrations, but it does not close space for these discussions either. Even if it treats protest and civil disobedience as secondary to more deliberative forms of civic action, the B.C. curriculum appears most consistent with a post-deliberative stance on appropriate means of civic participation.

**Theme four: Inclusion and political equality (see Appendix D).** Both provinces avow their commitment to ensuring that all members of society are equally included in civic life, regardless of their backgrounds, gender, or customs. The curricula also emphasize the variety of different perspectives, interests, and views that exist in a
democracy. The high frequency of terms related to inclusion and diversity is evident in Table 4. This is unsurprising, considering Canada a liberal democracy and an officially multicultural country, but also since all models of democracy attend to these differences (albeit to different degrees). More important for our purposes, then, is the form that this political equality takes, namely whether it is formal or substantive.

Both curricula go beyond aggregative conceptions' formal understanding of political equality, since the documents attend to the power differences that permit some people to influence civic change with greater effectiveness than others. One of B.C.’s prescribed learning outcomes (PLOs), for instance, ensures that students are able to “evaluate the relative abilities of individuals, governments, and non-governmental organizations to effect civic change in Canada and the world” (2005, pp. 38). Similarly, one of the Ontario curriculum’s core “elements” is for students to learn about “power and systems within society.” Both documents also put considerable emphasis on recognizing political inequalities and, in many cases, questioning why these inequalities exist and how to address them. Since deliberative and post-deliberative models are both concerned with mitigating political inequality, this is unhelpful as a point of distinction. Moreover, where the curricula discuss how to contest uneven power relations, the prompts for teachers and suggested questions for students do not circumscribe answers to any given framework, so they reveal little about the underlying models of democracy.

Furthermore, neither curriculum is explicitly concerned with modifying underlying social structures to better attend to power inequalities as post-deliberative models might. Nor do they explicitly constrain discussions to mitigating inequalities
through existing deliberative structures. It is tempting to glean from the information above how discussion depth or content might be influenced by the content elsewhere in the curriculum. For example, we might decide that Ontario’s emphasis on deliberative means of communication and participation would drive student discussion toward deliberative solutions to political inequality. But this would infer too much from the little information available. In short, analysis of this theme leads to unsatisfactory conclusions due to the non-prescriptive nature of discussions on political inequality.

**Theme five: Consensus and conflict (see Appendix E).** This theme is the most helpful for differentiating between democratic models because the models have clearly distinct positions on the topics of majority rule, consensus, disagreement, and the common good. By coding for frequency of “agreement” and “disagreement” terms, coupled with KWIC analysis, it is possible to determine how consensus-oriented each text is. This can be supplemented with a discussion of the common good, as espoused by each text. Both documents frame consensus and conflict largely in deliberative terms, but approach the topic in different ways. British Columbia’s is more highly consensus-oriented, while Ontario’s is underpinned by a thicker conception of the common good.

Agreement terms include agree/agreement/mutually agreeable, collaborate/collaboration/collaborative, cooperate/co-operate, consensus, constructive, common, common good, compromise, fundamental activities/fundamental principles, mediate, problem-solving/problem solvers/solve problems, reconcile/reconciliation, resolution/resolve/solution, similar/similarities, and social cohesion. Disagreement terms include conflict, controversy/controversial, disagree/disagreement, dispute, different/differences, dissent, oppose/opposition, and problem. Note that there are 14
terms included in the “agreement” search and only seven in the “disagreement” search, and that this disparity reflects all relevant terms in both documents. Note also that, among the agreement terms, many presume some values or principles must be shared between participants prior to civic engagement (e.g., collaborate, fundamental activities/principles), but that the majority presume that the goal of civic engagement should be to reflect the common good (e.g., compromise, reconcile).

The “thinness” or “thickness” of a curriculum’s references to the common good can indicate particularly strongly which model of democracy it is informed by. The B.C. curriculum’s references to the common good, while fairly numerous, are nevertheless too vague to indicate much about its underpinning democratic model. Every reference to the common good is concerned with “balancing the common good with the rights of individuals,” but the curriculum does not elaborate on what the common good might be short of identifying this balance as a “fundamental principle of democracy.”

Coding for frequency of “agreement” terms in B.C.’s curriculum results in 112 instances, with 67 instances of “disagreement” terms. Of the disagreement terms, KWIC analysis reveals that 15 are directly accompanied by a term related to mitigating or resolving disagreements (“conflict resolution,” “dispute resolution,” “solve problems”). The rest are largely vague, standalone terms. By contrast, none of the agreement terms were accompanied by a term that problematizes agreement (e.g., the provisional or hegemonic nature of compromise), as would post-deliberative models. Thus, the text often treats disagreement as though it is a problem to be solved, as deliberative models might. It should also be noted that, while KWIC analysis reveals that disagreement is treated as a fact of life, it also reveals that the curriculum is fairly concerned with
inculcating the skills to disagree respectfully or resolve them procedurally (e.g., through litigation).

Furthermore, on three occasions, B.C.’s curriculum suggests that students attempt to “reach a consensus” amongst themselves on the ethics of curtailing immigration (p. 84) and international aid (p. 106), and on the effectiveness of civil disobedience (p. 102). These activities accompany mock trials and debates as the only conceptualizations of the classroom as a “strong” public sphere (a public with decision-making power), and all aim to achieve consensus or at least compromise. Thus, the greater number of agreement than disagreement terms and the higher frequency of agreement than disagreement terms in the text are consistent in their reflection of the B.C. curriculum as consensus oriented. Together, these factors indicate that B.C.’s curriculum is largely deliberative in terms of how it treats consensus and conflict.

The Ontario curriculum is also quite strongly consensus oriented. Frequency coding results in 61 agreement terms and 39 disagreement terms. This discrepancy initially appears small until one takes into account that 31 out of 39 references to disagreement terms are for the word “different” (or “difference”). KWIC analysis suggests that the curriculum emphasizes recognizing, respecting and appreciating differences, and ensuring that different people’s voices are equally valued. These references do not suggest any link between difference and deep disagreement or conflict, nor do they treat difference as a resource. Rather, difference appears to be merely a fact of civic life that, in its most challenging iteration, “influence[s people’s] position and actions” (2013, p. 14). This makes a stronger case for the curriculum’s espousal of a deliberative perspective.
Ontario’s curriculum is also highly concerned with the common good. Its glossary defines the common good as the well-being of all or most of the people in a community or society as well as of components of the natural environment. Factors such as peace, justice, economic fairness, and respect for human rights and the environment contribute to the common good. (p. 173)

In addition, the curriculum explicitly identifies a substantial number of values, habits of mind, and character traits\(^{32}\) that “healthy” citizens share and which are “associated with responsible citizenship” (p. 47). These include active and informed citizenship, anti-discrimination, caring, collaboration, cooperation, dignity, equity, fairness, inclusiveness, open-mindedness, respect, responsibility, and trust.

The curriculum also attempts to inculcate the desire for equity, freedom, and social cohesion. In isolation, none of these characteristics of healthy citizens or the common good is defined prescriptively (e.g., good citizens espouse a utilitarian notion of economic fairness). However, the effort to inculcate a large number of character traits—all of which have in common that they contribute to the stability of a thick public sphere—hints at a communitarian conception of citizenship often associated with traditional deliberative conceptions of democracy (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006).

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\(^{32}\) This is not as strong a focus on character education as Winton (2006) identifies, but I agree with Deirdre Kelly (personal communication) that character education is on the rise in Canadian schools.
Conclusion

Both B.C. and Ontario’s civics curricula are most clearly aligned with deliberative models of democracy as compared with aggregative or post-deliberative models, even if there are some tendencies toward the latter. Still, both curricula are sufficiently non-prescriptive as to leave teachers the space to interpret the curriculum through either a deliberative or post-deliberative lens (see Orlowski, 2008). However, I am more concerned with reading the curricular documents as texts than with how they will be interpreted in the classroom. For my purposes in this study, it is enough to focus on how the texts frame the various tenets of the democratic models, and what they leave out.

The curricula’s treatment of citizens’ preference formation indicates only that they move beyond aggregative models, focusing on the skills and values aiming to prepare students to refine and justify positions in public. Deliberative and post-deliberative models do not differ significantly enough in this regard to narrow down our analysis of this point further. Similarly, neither text frames reason or rationality in a way that might indicate which democratic model informs them (e.g., by determining whether reason is universal or constructed). However, they tend to emphasize reason and rationality over passion, especially in the sorts of skills students are meant to develop. While this is the case for both curricula, it is especially true for B.C.’s. Furthermore, where B.C. does address passion, emotion, or affect, these qualities are commonly framed as impediments to civic discourse. This indicates a more deliberative approach to reason and passion.

33 Orlowski’s argument is about the B.C. (2005) curriculum, but I believe it applies to Ontario’s as well.
The means of communication and forms of participation that inform each curriculum dismantle any notions that the curricula espouse aggregative conceptions. In B.C., rational forms of communication overshadow more impassioned forms, which suggests a stronger deliberative than post-deliberative focus. Ontario, however, gives relatively equal space to rational and impassioned forms of communication. This is not particularly salient given the general scarcity of references to communication throughout Ontario’s curriculum, but hints at more balanced thinking. Still, both texts present a wide range of possible forms of civic engagement and participation, so they are certainly open to deliberative and post-deliberative interpretations of civic engagement and communication. This is especially true for B.C.’s discussion of protest and civil disobedience. Whereas Ontario’s curriculum seems to endorse protest and non-violent disobedience only as secondary means of participation (and, it seems, only where these activities would advance deliberation), B.C. addresses these forms of engagement as effective for disrupting the status quo. Thus, it appears more consistent with post-deliberative models when it comes to citizens’ means and forms of engagement. This is not to say B.C. takes a radically post-deliberative outlook on civil disobedience, but it provides plenty of space for educators to treat related topics critically.

Because each model of democracy I discuss here is avows a commitment to inclusion and mitigating power inequalities without suggesting means of achieving these ends, and because the texts do not provide in-depth insights on the specifics of what inequality looks like, there is too little information to determine which model of democracy underpins each province’s commitment to political equality. There is plenty
of space for educators to interpret these questions as they wish, with formal inclusion and equality for all citizens at minimum, and fuller substantive equality for all at best.

While unhelpful for the purposes of this particular study, this limitation holds an important implication for future discourse analyses of course content: it reveals the difficulty of selecting themes from the top-down, that is, mapping pre-existing models onto existing documents to see which model the texts best fit. Researchers must be aware that pre-selected criteria may not fit their data perfectly. Thus, researchers must revisit and modify their themes to fit the context of their documents of study where possible, as I have done, and as is common for qualitative thematic analytic studies. Moreover, where revisiting themes is not possible (i.e., if the themes in question are immutable), researchers should be prepared to accept the limits of data and work within them rather than draw potentially inaccurate conclusions.

Finally, references to the common good and a stronger focus on “agreement” than “disagreement” terms in each curriculum, including explicit references to consensus building in each, indicate that these curricula are highly consensus oriented. While B.C. focuses more on consensus building and compromise than on thick notions of the common good, the reverse is true for Ontario. Consensus-orientation is a principal characteristic of deliberative models, whereas aggregative models are more concerned with majority rule. Post-deliberative models either eschew political consensus or are suspicious of its hegemonic nature.

All in all, both curricula are fairly well aligned with deliberative models of democracy. They show virtually no preference for aggregative models, but both leave a considerable space for post-deliberative interpretations with some imagination. Now
that it is clear which models of democracy B.C. and Ontario’s curricula espouse, we can proceed to the development of normative standards by which it is possible to evaluate civics curricula more generally. Both curricula’s rationally- and consensus-oriented natures are particularly demonstrative of their deliberative underpinnings, and I focus my critiques on these two characteristics in the subsequent chapters in order to develop my normative, evaluative standards.
Chapter Three: Educating for Political Dissent as a Positive Right

There was no telling what people might find out when they felt free to ask whatever questions they wanted to... The only people who were allowed to ask questions were those who never did. Soon the only people attending were those who never asked questions, and the sessions were ended altogether since... it was neither possible nor necessary to educate people who never questioned anything.

—Joseph Heller, *Catch 22*

We have seen in the previous chapter that Ontario and British Columbia’s curricula expect good citizens to engage directly with their civic and political environments to enact change (British Columbia, 2005; Ontario, 2013). However, the same texts largely conceive of engagement in democratic life through deliberative means (in the more traditional liberal and communitarian sense I have outlined); they tend to treat non-deliberative dissent as a means of engagement when deliberation fails. This may leave students underprepared to engage in certain forms of dissent if and when they perceive injustices in civic life. In this chapter, I discuss how a narrow focus on traditionally deliberative forms of engagement may preclude certain avenues of political dissent, and I accordingly make a case for the value of teaching political dissent as a positive right.

I begin by clarifying what exactly I mean by “political dissent.” I then elaborate on my critical-radical, agonistic theoretical perspective. Next, I elucidate the limitations of teaching students that dissent is a negative right—which, I contend, is how B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula presently conceive of it, due in part to their deliberative underpinnings. The subsequent section explains how teaching dissent as a positive
right may increase youth political engagement and cultivate more vibrant democratic practices. I finish by discussing the risks of teaching dissent as a positive right, and how curricula can help to reduce these risks. Note that I am not advocating for curricula that teach students to dissent; rather, I argue that construing dissent as a positive right can encourage students to consider when, why, and how dissent can be productive.

**Defining Political Dissent**

I define dissent here as disagreement with an established norm in which the actor endeavours to counter, disrupt, or dismantle it. This definition is inseparable from my critical-radical, semi-archic theoretical perspective, which I explain in Chapter One. For Engin Isin (2008, 2009), citizens only claim full rights by dissenting from the established order. He considers the habits and behaviours that uphold the order of these scripts to be “actions,” while “acts” of citizenship purposefully disrupt the established order. Isin claims that acts of citizenship create “activist” citizens who work creatively to re-write pre-established “scripts” of behaviour, whereas those who subscribe to the scripts of orderly citizenship are merely “active” citizens. He believes a person must break the habitus of citizenship in order to become an activist citizen.

Contra Isin, my aim is to normalize a consciousness for acts of dissent as a vital part of democratic citizenship. I draw on Sherry Ortner’s (2005) conception of subjectivity as a historical and cultural consciousness that constrains “how people (try to) act on the world even as they are acted upon” (p. 34). Consciousness is concerned with choices and life trajectories as they are shaped at an individual and collective level by both past and present factors. At the individual, psychological level, it presumes that
actors are “knowing subjects” who have some insight about the factors that shape and constrain their life choices (even if most of these factors are unconscious). I prefer to discuss subjectivity and dissent in terms of consciousness rather than other terms such as the Bourdieusian habitus, since consciousness leaves space to theorize critical acts as sensible courses of action. Habitus, instead, emphasizes instead the “inaccessibility of the underlying logic of [actors’] practices,” and I fear it leaves insufficient room for actors to consciously deviate from the externally constructed logic of what “acceptable” practices might be (Ortner, 2005, p.34).

At the collective level, then, consciousness is concerned with the “collective sensibility of some set of socially interrelated actors” (p. 34). Moreover, despite common understandings of “consciousness” as something that only involves one’s mind, my focus on consciousness here understands actors’ choices and practices as mental and embodied phenomena alike. A consciousness for acts of political dissent does not imply that students’ democratic subjectivities can be reduced to their consciousness for dissent. Rather, I use this phrase to highlight how students’ attitudes, thoughts, and feelings about dissent, which inform their dispositions to exercise dissent (or not), are constructed at an individual and collective level.

A consciousness for acts of dissent differs from what I perceive is the dominant, deliberative consciousness among Canadians, which conceives of non-deliberative dissent either as either a last resort or as radical.34 It is because I am concerned with

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34 My perception of this deliberative consciousness largely stems from my experiences with the Canadian public in professional and community spaces. For example, while facilitating a recent set of community discussions around civic engagement, the leaders of our organization asserted the strengths of deliberative-style, “peaceful” and “cooperative” discussion as part of Canadians’ shared values.
critical citizenship education that this emphasis on the “knowing” subject is vital. Formal education is only one factor contributing to students’ democratic consciousnesses, and I believe that civic education is uniquely situated to foster the critical capacities to question how students’ attitudes, thoughts, and feelings about dissent are formed by their circumstances. It is important for students to normalize a consciousness for acts of political dissent so that they do not internalize orderliness as normal and dissent as radical (a consciousness they might internalize through the “external curriculum”). Students should recognize that it is possible to consciously deviate from any and all “scripts” of citizenship they learn in or outside of school. Thus, teaching for a consciousness for dissent means that, if students disagree with established interpretations of core ethico-political values, they will be aware that both deliberative and non-deliberative dissent offer legitimate political channels through which they can express their own interpretations.

Complementary to my focus on consciousness, I share with Mouffe (2005) and Biesta (2011) a semi-arhic perspective on democratic modes of human togetherness. By this, I mean that the suppositions and values that underlie the “script-writing” processes of liberal-democratic citizenship are more important than state institutions or the scripts themselves.\(^\text{35}\) I presume here that the task of civic educators is to ensure that citizens’ primary loyalties are not to established state institutions, but to the core democratic values that liberal-democratic institutions are supposed to—but sometimes

\(^{35}\) In the context of civic education, a semi-arhic approach dictates that students be taught to be “ignorant” about what it means to be a “good” citizen (Biesta, 2011). Rather, by conceiving the \textit{arkhe} (roughly, “origin”) of democratic politics as constantly in construction, “the democratic citizen [cannot be conceptualized as] a pre-defined identity that can simply be taught and learned, but emerges again and again in new ways from engagement with the experiment of democratic politics” (p. 152).
fail to—uphold. This perspective recognizes the contributions that anarchist thinkers such as Rancière (whose ideas I outline below) make to democratic theory while also maintaining that core democratic values must be inscribed in institutions.

This semi-archic perspective aligns well with my agonistically informed definition of the political. I agree with Mouffe (2005) that the political is constituted by the “antagonism that is inherent in human relations” (p. 9), where conflict arises over citizens’ deeply rooted disagreements in their incompatible interpretations of the core ethico-political values of liberty and equality (Mouffe, 2000). Moreover, all politics entails the exclusion of some party from the existing hegemonic order, creating an inevitable “we/they” distinction. As I explain below, I share Mouffe’s (2005) aim to transform these antagonistic relationships into agonistic ones—those in which political opponents are treated as adversaries and not enemies. Whereas enemies aim to destroy one another to destroy their political associations (p. 20), adversaries perceive themselves as “sharing a common symbolic space” while keeping alive their political associations. The consequences of destroying political associations, for agonists, are at best to “displace” politics—to sweep conflict under the proverbial rug (Honig, 1993)—or at worst, to transform opposition into violence and terrorism (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 72-87).

Despite (or perhaps because of) Mouffe’s radical position, this is a pragmatic premise. Agonists hold that the homogeneity of values necessary for consensus cannot be expected in today’s pluralistic democracies. By defining the political as the sites of inevitable conflict over values, it follows that a vibrant pluralistic democracy requires its citizens to channel dissent productively and to take opposition seriously. Recall that
I use term “productive” to refer to forms of engagement that can feasibly help people achieve their political ends while remaining in line with the core ethico-political principles of liberal democracies. Engagement may contribute something new to the discursive field or bring new identities into being (more on this below), but neither is necessary for engagement to be deemed productive. However, this definition of the political will cause concern for those committed to more consensus-oriented forms of deliberation. Such deliberative democratic theories treat disagreement as a problem to be solved, often through rational, communicative channels. Whereas many deliberative models aim for consensus, the critical-radical models I outline above stress that consensus is not always possible in pluralistic contexts. Deliberative thinkers may nevertheless find comfort in my argument that political dissent, while inevitable, is also productive and desirable.

Fraser’s (1990) critique of the bourgeois public sphere is also useful for troubling basic assumptions about liberal-democratic politics and, accordingly, the forms of dissent considered legitimate within this framework. Fraser demonstrates how the dominant, Habermasian conception of the public sphere as a unitary and bourgeois entity limits who counts as a citizen, and thus who has a legitimate voice. This public sphere’s understandings of discourse, she argues, carries marks of distinction that tend to privilege middle- and upper-class, articulate men. Since I am concerned with ensuring that all political subjects have equal voice, I extend my understanding of engagement beyond traditional deliberative means alone. These traditional means tend to be dialogic, rationalist, and masculinist. Other, more
inclusionary forms of engagement are also valuable, particularly for the avenues they open for dissent.

Fraser’s work helps justify the legitimacy of non-dialogic forms of dissent with her expanded, multiplied understanding of the public spheres, especially as they create space for counterpublics. Fraser (1990) defines counterpublics as “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (p. 67). I conceive of dissent, then, not only through the traditional deliberative lens that characterizes discourse in the bourgeois public sphere, but as potentially more embodied, creative, and passionate. Dissent, so conceived, must not necessarily be dialogic in nature, nor directed at nor channelled through the traditional political structures and institutions that dominate the comprehensive public sphere.36

The Productive Nature of Political Dissent

At its roots, political dissent is a tool to challenge an established order’s encroachments on the core ethico-political principles of a liberal democracy, or to express political subjects’ disagreements over the interpretation of these values. As such, many scholars (Bickmore, 2006; Bond, 2011; Hörschelmann & El Refaie, 2014) implicitly treat dissent as a fundamental good in democracies. Mouffe (2005) and Rancière both make strong arguments for conflict’s productive nature, particularly as it

36 The comprehensive public sphere is the “the structured setting where cultural and ideological contest or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place” (Eley, as cited in Fraser, 1990, p. 68).
relates to subjectification, or the creation of political subjectivities. For Mouffe (2014), subject positions are fluid and non-essentialist (i.e. not based on immutable qualities). They are created when people, moved by affections (roughly, driving emotions), insert themselves into discursive signifying practices. This insertion requires the “articulation” of their political identities in two senses of the word. Subject positions are articulated through the strategic articulation (linking) of political identities, which happens by articulating (voicing and embodying) demands with others with whom one shares antagonisms. This process modifies—but does not erase—existing political identities and creates a shared signifier under which subjects can unite.

The emergence of the term “Person/People of Colour” (P.O.C.) represents one instance of political subjectification as Mouffe describes the term (see the Colours of Resistance Archive, n.d.). The term refers to non-White people and can be mobilized politically to highlight shared antagonisms (most often related to being non-White in a predominantly White society). While Black and Hispanic identities (for example) are clearly differentiable, both groups can unite under the P.O.C. banner to highlight the shared barriers they face. Thus, while being Black or Hispanic may be an immutable quality, identifying as a P.O.C. strategically highlights the constructed binary between (privileged) Whites, on the one hand, and “everyone else,” on the other. I agree with Mouffe that dissent in this sense is productive for making possible the transformation

37 Note that subjectification, political subjectivities, and subject positions, here, are not to be confused with the discussion of consciousness as subjectivity above. The former three terms relate roughly to people’s fluid, political identities, while consciousness as subjectivity refers to (the construction of) people’s life trajectories, life choices, and agency to make those choices.
and mobilization of counter-hegemonic subjectivities, and thus creates space for clearly differentiated political alternatives.

Like Mouffe, Rancière (1995/1999; 2000/2004) considers conflict to be the primary site of democratic politics. He speaks of subjectification in terms of a specific form of productive disagreement he calls *dissensus*. However, Rancière and Mouffe disagree on the role of equality in society; Mouffe (1992, p. 30) considers it a principle to which citizens should aspire (though it is impossible to reach), while Rancière (1995/1999) presupposes equality as a starting point (p. 33). Rancière nevertheless recognizes that many citizens do not regard one another as equal, so he theorizes democratic societies as a “police order.” The police order designates what is doable and sayable and thus what is *sensible*\(^{38}\) (understandable as discourse) and what is not (incomprehensible as noise). Anyone who presupposes a configuration that breaks with established ways of doing, being, and saying is not ejected from the police order. Rather, they are designated “the part of those who have no part” (p. 30).

Rancière conceives of politics quite narrowly a tool for those who have no discernible role in the police order to make claims for equality. They do so through a multiplicity of acts that, together, constitute *dissensus*. *Dissensus* breaks with the established order to create space for new forms of collective enunciation within the police order, and transforms what the police order considers “noise” into meaningful discourse (Rancière, 1995/1999, pp. 29-30). In so doing, it transforms the ordering that treats equal people unequally, and thus extends the field of what the police order

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\(^{38}\) Rancière is concerned with sensibility in quite a literal sense; those who are considered *sensible* are those who understand sensory data through a similar frame of experience (2010, p. 152). This has consequences for the aesthetic and political realms alike.
considers sensible and thus equal. Dissensus is, at its core, “a decision inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is given and about the frame within which we see something as given” (Rancière, 2010, p. 69). Political subjectification is vital for dissensus. Subjectification creates, alongside a new subjectivity, an intelligible and thus sensible signifier under which people can unite to claim rights.

Ruitenberg (2010a) uses the example of queer politics as a claim to equal rights through the Rancièrian conception of political subjectification. Identifying as “gay” or “homosexual” is, in western culture, often sufficiently commonplace that these identities do not challenge the police order in claiming equality (p. 622). The gay community in Canada certainly does not enjoy full equality as does the straight community, but the former’s rights claims have at least formally been recognized as sensible. But for people whose gender or sexual identities the police order still does not recognize as sensible, “queer” becomes a viable subjectivity for rights claiming. To speak as queer is to take up a subject position rather than claim an identity because it provides a vehicle for rights-claiming (sufficient to be an identity) while also extending the field of the police order (necessary for being a subject position).

I am by and large sympathetic to Rancière’s radical conception of democratic life, and his work is extremely valuable for its treatment of dissent / dissensus as the crux of political interactions. However, I disagree with him on two points. First, Rancière focuses too narrowly on politics through dissensus alone. He presupposes equality
among all people, but argues that the police order introduces inequalities between citizens and exclusions of some people from citizenship. His presupposition of equality is valuable for asking what it means to recognize one another as equals. Thus, it is only through subjectification that people can claim full recognition of their right to equality as citizens. Like Biesta (2011), my concern here is that Rancière leaves little space for politics within the police order.

Second, I am suspicious of Rancière’s assumption that the police order cannot work toward establishing core political values through institutions. I am more sympathetic to Mouffe’s semi-archic (as opposed to anarchic) understanding of how core democratic principles must be upheld via institutions. While Mouffe (1992) recognizes that neither equality nor liberty can ever be fully realized due to inevitably competing interpretations thereof, these principles must still act as a “grammar of conduct” toward which people must work (p. 30). As Balibar (2008) states, “[this institutional dimension] cannot be left aside because equality also has to be written in institutions . . . and the democratization of institutions, including ‘public’ institutions, should not become confused with the problem of the construction of the sovereign state” (p. 526, cited in Ruitenberg, 2015, p. 3). These disagreements notwithstanding, Rancière’s conception of *dissensus* is highly valuable since it helps demonstrate how conflict creates the conditions for a richer social order through the process of political subjectification. His work also clarifies how conflict acts as a claim for substantive

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39 Rancière speaks of equality in terms of people’s equal ability to reflect consciously and intelligently on their own situation. In so doing, Rancière conceives of equality as inseparable from liberty, in that subjects are equally free to act equally to demand equality (May, 2010).
recognitions of core political values, even if I disagree with him on how those values should be realized.

There are also similarities between Isin’s (2008) and Rancière’s (1999) conceptions of individuals’ claims to rights through dissent, particularly in their commitment to “acts” as foundational for claiming equal rights. However, there are important differences: I refer here to Isin’s less anarchic conception of dissent because his does not require extreme outcomes for citizens to claim full rights, whereas Rancière’s conception of dissensus requires political boundaries to be redrawn or new modes of being to be created. In Canada’s liberal-democratic context, Isin’s sole requirement for dissenters to claim rights—to be creative in rewriting societal scripts—is simply more realistic for everyday dissent.

Said differently, while I agree that Rancière’s conception of subjectification is desirable and that it creates space for dissenters to claim rights, dissensus is an extreme outcome of democratic politics. Dissent can occur without dissensus, and I am concerned here with dissent in both its dissensus form and more commonplace forms of dissent such as those Isin and Mouffe discuss. To use Rancière’s terms, while Rancière and I are both concerned with dissensus about political matters (those that modify the aesthetics-political terrain of what he calls the “police order”), I am also interested in dissent as it occurs within the “police order.” Notwithstanding, Rancière’s conception of democratic politics is a strong argument for the desirability of dissent / dissensus because of its nuanced understanding of the power of policing. As I discuss in the subsequent chapter, it also provides insights about the impassioned nature of dissent. The key conclusion I draw from Rancière is that dissent is integral to political life for exposing the limitations
of the established order in its ability to respect rights or core ethico-political values, and for illuminating creative ways for humans to interact more inclusively.

Isin, Rancière and I share the conviction that dissent is desirable because it provides space to expose and mitigate inequities, infringements on liberty, and unequal distributions of rights. I also agree with Mouffe that agonistic dissent is necessary for keeping legitimate political channels open, thereby fostering respect for political opponents, encouraging those in power listen to subaltern groups’ counterhegemonic concerns, and diminishing the disposition to engage in violent activities. In what follows, I apply this conception of dissent to civic education and argue that it is not enough to simply teach students that many forms of dissent are legal. Rather, schools should normalize dissent by helping create a political consciousness for acts of dissent, thereby preparing students to channel their dissent productively and, in turn, help increase students’ civic and political engagement.

**Dissent as a Negative Right to Foster Engagement**

I borrow from Stitzlein (2012) the distinction between dissent as a negative or positive right as these concepts relate to civic education. These two differ in that negative rights cannot be infringed upon from the outside (e.g., the right to freedom of movement), whereas positive rights guarantee entitlement to certain goods or freedoms (e.g., the right to clean water). Conceiving of dissent as a negative right in Canada means that actors are able to dissent without fear of reprisal from fellow citizens or state institutions, provided they do not infringe on other citizens’ liberties or rights, as interpreted by the judicial system. Considering dissent a positive right
requires that students be entitled to an education that adequately prepares them to dissent.

In Canada, provincial courts are charged with determining whether students have received an “adequate” education. For example, in permitting an appeal in a case for adequate special education the Supreme Court deemed that B.C. defined special education as a positive right:

The purpose of the School Act in British Columbia is to ensure that ‘all learners . . . develop their individual potential and . . . acquire the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed to contribute to a healthy, democratic and pluralistic society and a prosperous and sustainable economy’. This is an acknowledgment by the government that the reason children are entitled to an education is that a healthy democracy and economy require their educated contribution. Adequate special education, therefore, is not a dispensable luxury. (Moore v. British Columbia, 2012, pp. 361-362)

As such, various provinces might differ in deciding whether teaching dissent only as a negative right (or failing to teach for/about dissent) constitutes an (in)adequate education. I argue here that only an education that teaches dissent as a positive right should be considered adequate, especially since the capacity for and disposition to dissent are indispensable for a healthy democracy.

The External Curriculum

The primary concern I have with teaching dissent as a negative right is that doing so leaves students uninformed of alternatives to the dominant conception of
dissent. If schools do not teach for dissent, students are likely to adopt attitudes they are exposed to in the external curriculum. The external curriculum “refers to what students learn outside of the classroom (e.g., from other students in the school, and from other sources such as the family, the media, religious leaders, neighbours, friends, etc.), and has a greater influence on youth where formal curricula are far removed from students’ lived experience (Mazawi, 1998; Schugurensky, 2002, p. 5). Students will doubtless witness dissent as well as efforts to silence that dissent in the external curriculum, though “exactly how students make sense of these experiences is unclear” (Stitzlein, 2012, p. 112).

The dominant model of formal politics in Canada is deliberative, so this likely leaves the greatest impression on students’ understandings of dissent. Deliberative thinkers often consider less obviously deliberative forms of dissent to be last resorts, for example when Habermasian “ideal speech” conditions\textsuperscript{40} cannot be met (and most now believe these conditions will be difficult to meet) or when one side ceases to be reasonable (Habermas, 1974/1988; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Even in newer models of deliberative democracy, Narval (2007) notes that “rationality remains privileged even where other forms of communication are incorporated into the deliberative space” (cited in Bond, 2011, p. 165). In most deliberative theories that inform Canadian political life, many forms of dissent (e.g., road-blocking, overloading administrative systems, etc.) are viewed as non-rational and thus illegitimate. Students who learn only that dissent is permissible under exceptional circumstances may feel

\textsuperscript{40} Namely, that all people considered “competent” in the public sphere can inform discourse, or introduce or question any assertion without hesitation, without coercion (Habermas, 1990, pp. 43-115).
confined to consensus-oriented actions. In a socially (neo-)liberal climate where the “good citizen” is portrayed as active as opposed to activist, and where police are expected to curb “public anxiety about terrorist threats,” youth may feel actively discouraged from engaging in dissent (Kennelly, 2009).

Opposition to dissent in external curricula may also neutralize the forms of dissent that students learn to perceive as legitimate. There exist other forms of non-violent civil disobedience that may also modify the “scripts” of the existing democratic order without relying on the rationalist means commonly considered appropriate. I have already alluded to DePape’s “Stop Harper” Senate protest. Other examples include sit-ins, roadblocks, hanging posters where posters are not allowed, the insistence of using language not normally recognized as legitimate (e.g., naming non-consensual sex within marriage as “rape” before this was recognized as a legal possibility), and the like. Gutmann and Thompson (2004), the leading authorities of this generation of deliberative democracy, might condemn such actions as “bargaining” and thus devoid of “moral reasoning,” and in turn more prone to unjustifiable outcomes (p. 155). In Canada’s rationalist climate, which normalizes dissent as a negative liberty, youth may learn to condemn these ostensibly non-rational activities, despite their actually being moral grey areas in my view. These activities need not be secondary or last-resorts, though I believe them to be most effective as responses to marginalization or exclusion.

**Exclusionary Limitations of a Negative Right to Dissent**

There are limits to teaching the negative right to dissent beyond falling back on the external curriculum and its probable outcome of neutralizing dissent. Without
fostering the capacity to dissent, schools are complicit in reproducing the institutional inequities inherent to deliberative models of democracy. Deliberative democracy has deep roots in Aristotelian, rationalist traditions and has developed according to Eurocentric and masculinist worldviews (Wilson, 2011). This is not to say that only males from European backgrounds can be rational. Rather, in Derrida’s (1974) terms, “the white man takes his own mythology (that is, Indo-European mythology), his logos—that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that which it is still his inescapable desire to call Reason” (p. 11).

In other words, rationalist democratic models developed in masculinist and European traditions have typically identified as “rational” only those forms of thought that are consistent with masculinist and European thought traditions, even if many they exclude are equally reasonable. For Mouffe (1999), this “point of convergence—or rather, mutual collapse—between objectivity and power that we call ‘hegemony’” is inevitable in democracies, but deliberative models fail to acknowledge the link between legitimacy and power (p. 753).41 Those articulating European and masculinist reasons for political outcomes currently have an advantage in the deliberative sphere over those articulating different—but no less valid—reasons, by virtue of Eurocentric and masculinist worldviews wielding greater power in Canada’s political climate. Political outsiders are thus faced with the choice of learning and adopting the “language of power” in order to gain political influence, or communicating issues on their own terms and risk having their position or entire worldview dismissed as bizarre or irrational.

41 Mouffe’s (1999) aim is not to eliminate power, but to determine “how to constitute forms of power that are consistent with democratic values” (p. 753).
(Levinson, 2003). As a result, students whose thinking is inconsistent with Eurocentric or masculinist worldviews may be less disposed or less prepared than their peers to engage in deliberative politics.

This is in part because their interpretations of core ethico-political values may differ on a more fundamental level than disagreements between those with similar worldviews. For example, a student might disagree with the Canadian government on its resource development policies while also espousing an Indigenous worldview. It is possible these concerns can be recognized through deliberative means. However, if these concerns are fundamental, (e.g., if they stem from the differences between the student’s and the Canadian government’s conceptualization of humans’ relationship with the natural world), then deliberative channels may not offer an effective means of voicing disagreement.

To begin with, other stakeholders may be ill prepared to understand the terms this student uses and might resort to paraphrasing her discourse—and with it, her argument—into their own terms. Alternatively, this student may need to translate her own argument into masculinist and European terms, watering it down in the process. Other stakeholders may also consider this student naive or irrational because her ideas do not fit into the same sphere of experience as their own. This might lead them to perceive her disagreement as merely an obstacle to be overcome, rather than providing valuable input to modify the existing proposal. In the worst of cases, this attitude might transform the student into a political “enemy” (more on this below). It might also cause them to believe that this student is best left ignored since “she doesn’t know what we’re talking about.” My point is not to equate individuals with their cultural backgrounds or
worldviews. There are certainly Indigenous issues that are commensurable with the current hegemony and which might be addressed through deliberative channels. I use this example to illustrate how non-masculinist and non-Eurocentric views are more easily dismissed through this model of democracy. I thus hold that deliberation is deeply flawed since it aims for—but cannot propose—solutions for disagreements on fundamentally different values.

According to Mouffe (2000), the fundamental reason for the exclusionary nature of deliberative strategies is their inclination to treat those holding fundamentally different positions as “enemies to be destroyed” (p. 102). However, deliberative models’ Eurocentric and masculinist backgrounds also mean that they value rational discourse above other communicative strategies. This is problematic because reason’s unmitigated primacy in decision-making presumes all actors are entirely rational, even though politics is a passionate affair. I explain this premise further in the following chapter. Rationalism has also been used to justify decisions that are supposedly “value-neutral,” despite the impossibility of neutrality in either the political or educational spheres. This is particularly problematic in pluralistic contexts, where those with non-Eurocentric, non-masculinist views are often considered unreasonable—or worse, irrational (Kohn, 2000).

These “political outsiders” might respond in one of three ways. First, internalizing their supposed (and imposed) irrationality, they might disengage from political life altogether, delegitimized. Second, they might disengage politically out of a sense of hopelessness without ever accepting their ideas as less valid, fostering at the same time a sense of resentment for political life. This seems a likely option, given how
“outsiders” in Canada have articulated their disengagement (Bastedo et al., 2011; Martin, 2012). Third, they might redouble their engagement in the political sphere through non-deliberative strategies, particularly through dissent, and this time with a different affective impetus (see Coulthard, 2014). I discuss these affective components in the subsequent chapter. In the worst cases, turning to dissent after failing to be recognized through deliberative means may involve exercising dissent through non-legitimate channels, including violent ones (Mouffe, 2005). This underscores the need to open and maintain legitimate channels for dissent.

This third outcome also requires a strong sense of political efficacy as well as the capacity and disposition necessary to engage in dissent. Because of these requirements and because of the extra barriers that political “outsiders” face, civic educators must acknowledge that deliberative channels are insufficiently prepared to address deep pluralism. These channels may seem unappealing because they often demand certain, exclusive styles of communication (especially rationalist ones). They may also limit the capacity to voice positions or disagree through constraining procedures and structures (consider Robert’s Rules of Order). In other cases, the “entry requirements” for deliberation might be difficult or impossible to access, such as when politicians take only pre-approved questions or the fact that Parliamentary committees require witnesses to be invited. Teaching dissent as a negative right ignores these inherent inequalities. By incorrectly presuming that students have equal capacities to engage in deliberative politics, schools fail to prepare students whose voices are marginalized through deliberation—by virtue of their deeply divergent positions—to engage politically through channels they are likely find most effective.
When, and Why, and How to Dissent

Perhaps the greatest danger of teaching dissent as a negative right is that students will enter the public sphere without the knowledge of when, why, or how dissent can be valuable. Without schools to foster critical thinking about dissent, students are more liable to dissent in unproductive\textsuperscript{42} ways—if they do so at all. One benefit of teaching for/about dissent is that students may gain valuable understandings about the legal risks of dissent, since the legal restrictions on protest are the main limitation on this right. However, if dissent is construed as a negative right, students may not learn to question \textit{when} their moral imperatives to dissent outweigh the legal implications for their actions and \textit{why} it can be important to dissent. A recent example of this dilemma occurred when Canadian environmentalist and Indigenous rights groups protested oil company Kinder Morgan’s right to survey for a pipeline through Burnaby, British Columbia.

While Canadian courts upheld Kinder Morgan’s surveys, nine coastal Indigenous nations signed an intertribal treaty to protect the Salish Sea from environmental destruction. Canadian law does not recognize this treaty, but the pipeline runs through traditional First Nations land, including fifteen Reserves, and endangers other unceded Indigenous territories. During the ensuing protests, some dissenters broke court injunctions protecting Kinder Morgan’s surveys and crossed police lines. Although they were arrested for their actions, they called the moral underpinnings of the laws themselves into question. This highly publicized event delegitimized existing laws in

\textsuperscript{42} Recall that by “productive” avenues, I refer to forms of dissent that might feasibly achieve outcomes without isolating dissenters or their opponents from their commitments to core ethico-political values.
many observers’ eyes while garnering both support and disdain for environmental and Indigenous perspectives on resource development and land claims. As such, these acts of dissent provide an external curricular lesson on the moral and legal implications of dissent. However, there is no guarantee that schools teaching dissent as a negative right would foster similarly critical attitudes. I will discuss below how teaching for dissent as a positive right can open space for more criticality.

Conceptualizing dissent as a negative right might also discourage educators from teaching students how and why to dissent. Mouffe (1992) fears that political opponents in liberal models (which I take to include deliberative models) are liable to isolate their fellow citizens from the core ethico-political values of liberty and equality, rather than simply disagreeing over these values’ interpretations. If opponents cease to treat one another as free and equal persons who merely differ from one another, then they will close political channels and thus erode mutual respect. In extreme cases, Mouffe (2005) argues, eroding legitimate political channels can also lead to violence and terrorism as the disagreement seeks a channel outside the legitimate political sphere. Teaching that dissent is a negative right is thus dangerous because it leaves little room for students to learn how to channel dissent while respecting their mutual opponents.

Ruitenber (2010b) focuses on students’ capacities to engage with political questions. She argues that students not only need to learn to recognize injustices, but also challenge them. However, she perceives both an ethical deficit (recognizing the injustice) and a motivational deficit (wanting to do something about it), the latter of

43 The legal distinctions between those charged with “civil contempt” (whose charges were dismissed) and those charged with assault or obstruction of justice provide further material for discussion (CBC News, 2014).
which is rooted in students’ *articulatory* deficits. For Ruitenberg, students cannot be considered “politically educated” until they have learned to articulate political demands with others (p. 377). However, articulation requires that students undergo a process of political subjectification; that is, they must establish relationships with similarly motivated people “such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, as cited in Ruitenberg, 2010, p. 375). If they cannot undergo subjectification, students will remain “objects of the existing social order” (Ruitenberg, 2010, p. 379). Curricula that conceive of dissent as a negative right provide very limited opportunities for students to correct their motivational deficit. They may help students develop a sense of ethical motivation, but they do very little to foster their capacity to articulate politically or experience subjectification.

**Dissent as a Positive Right to Foster Engagement**

How, then, can conceptualizing dissent as a positive right encourage students to engage in dissenting practices where they perceive injustices? The short answer is that teaching dissent as a positive right fosters the disposition as well as the critical and moral capacities necessary for dissent. Together, these characteristics can build a consciousness for acts of dissent. As I will explain in this section, teaching dissent as a positive right is in many ways a riskier position to adopt compared to teaching it as a negative right. However, I maintain these risks far outweigh the dangers of displacing politics by failing to teach for dissent. Stitzlein (2012) makes a more pragmatist argument than Isin, Mouffe, Rancière, and Ruitenberg in favour of political dissent as a positive right, although she is still sympathetic to an agonistic perspective (p. 72).
Stitzlein (2012) contends that civil disobedience is rooted in pragmatist moral reflections on the injustices that laws create for the dissenter’s lived experience (pp. 53-57). Writing about the United States, where rhetoric often associates civil disobedience and concerns about the existing social order with disloyalty and unpatriotic aims (p. 68), she appeals to the Founding Fathers to argue that dissent avows an actor’s commitment to a political community in its aim to create a “better version of itself” (p. 68). Like deliberative and post-deliberative thinkers alike, Stitzlein argues that incommensurable values are a fact of life (p. 72). Even where values are not in direct conflict, she maintains that effective dissenters will illuminate underrepresented or underexplored perspectives. Specifically, Stitzlein is concerned that the voices of subaltern counterpublics may be marginalized through deliberative discussions, thus reproducing power inequalities (p. 73). What is especially useful about her pragmatist position is that she emphasizes how the legitimacy of the state (understood broadly as the formal government) depends on the consent of the governed and its responses to dissent. To prevent the state from coercing its citizens into consenting, the state must treat dissent as a positive right so citizens “have the ability, the skills, and know-how” to invoke it (p. 85). Fostering the ability to (self-)critique does not only justify resistance, Stitzlein argues, but also empowers students to resist (p. 184).

Stitzlein’s (2012) work is highly valuable for grounding my arguments about the desirability of dissent and schools’ responsibility to conceptualize it as a positive right in practice. However, there is an unresolved tension about whether her ideal humanities curriculum is archic or semi-archic (whether or not she favours a specific conception of the *arkhe*, and by extension, the “good citizen”). She does not state
outright that any specific activities (even dissent) characterize the “good citizen,” but she aims to foster the capacity to dissent in all students. It is nevertheless unclear whether she wishes to encourage the disposition to dissent. She reiterates cogently that vibrant democracies cannot exist without “a sufficient number of citizens” who dissent (p. 185), but this leaves unanswered whether those who are not disposed to dissent (as Stitzlein rightly notes is inevitable) can also be considered to be “good citizens.” In light of these tensions, I wish to echo Biesta’s (2011) call to teach for the “ignorant citizen” who resists any attempt from educators to mould her according to a particular conception of the “good citizen.”

Biesta (2011) challenges “the idea that political subjectivities and identities can be and have to be fully formed before democracy can ‘take off’ ” (p. 151). My aim in fostering a consciousness for dissent is not to produce citizens who always dissent or who must dissent in order to be considered good citizens. Rather, a consciousness for dissent implies that if students disagree with established interpretations of core ethico-political values or perceive injustices in their distribution, they will be able and disposed to counter these issues through legitimate political channels. It also implies that dissent is normal and not radical, and also expected but not necessarily desirable. If, as radical theorists such as Rancière and Mouffe argue, educators are serious about students’ commitments to core ethico-political values, curricula must leave space for students to develop their own interpretations of these values. By extension, students

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44 As I explain below, “legitimate” refers more to a commitment to core ethico-political values than to certain actions’ legality.
will develop subjective notions of good citizenship—or, more importantly, of favourable modes of human togetherness—accordingly.

I therefore disagree with Isin (2008) when he implies that it is altogether preferable to become an “activist” citizen. As Stitzlein (2012) suggests, activist citizens are necessary for a vibrant democracy to exist because they keep checks on the existing order at minimum and create new ways of being within that order at best. But activist citizens are not necessarily better than active citizens, informed citizens, or any other prescriptive model of citizenship. For many citizens, whose interpretations of core political values are relatively consistent with the existing political order (through state institutions or otherwise), it may be sufficient to uphold rather than challenge the existing order. In addition, as I discuss below, some citizens will inevitably face unequal obstacles when considering whether to engage in dissent. Thus, while I normatively agree that dissent is usually a desirable act as long as it is consistent with core ethico-political values,45 I recognize that many are more comfortable with the status quo or simply uncomfortable with dissent. As such, the most desirable civics curricula does not teach students that they should dissent, although it will conceive of dissent as a positive right in order to encourage them to consider when, why, and how dissent can be productive.

45 This means that dissent that contests core ethico-political values, such as white supremacist protests, are never desirable, but that other controversial movements that merely contest these values’ interpretations, such as pro-life rallies, are acceptable.
The Risks and Limitations of Teaching Dissent as a Positive Right

Readers may be wary of teaching dissent as a positive right. I acknowledge that this is a risky prospect, but likely not for the reasons that proponents of consensus-oriented models would deem problematic. I have already made clear my agonistic position, which I maintain is more realistic and productive than a consensus-oriented model because it respects the deep-seated nature of many disagreements. Notwithstanding, I suspect consensus-oriented theorists will question whether it is appropriate to teach secondary-aged students about dissent. Moreover, I expect that some readers will find the idea of dissent as a positive right to be controversial or even dubious, especially if it may create space for civil disobedience. I address these concerns here.

As Stitzlein (2012) points out, many people judge youth to be either apathetic or troublemakers, or too young to handle the responsibility that comes with dissent (p. 142, p.170). These perceptions are particularly true for boys, and for Indigenous or Black youth (Martino, Kehler, & Weaver-Hightower, 2009; Ruck, Harris, Fine, & Freundeberg, 2008). Opponents may fear that, without “real-world” experience or the capacity to reflect on the consequences of their actions, dissenting youth will provoke disorder and violence. However, these are precisely the same concerns that teaching dissent as a positive right addresses. I argue that it is much riskier not to teach students to dissent when they perceive injustices, because this opens the more serious possibility of displacing politics or closing political channels.

Consider the parallel between educating dissent as a positive right and sex education: in Ontario, sex education is premised on “the knowledge and skills needed to
make sound decisions about matters affecting their health and well-being before they
experience real-life situations in which decisions have to be made” (Ontario Curriculum,
2015, p. 42). The curriculum does not take a position on whether or not sexual activity
is desirable, but allows students to critically reflect on “the benefits and consequences
of a sexual relationship” and “to consider [their] values and beliefs to be sure [their]
actions are consistent with them” (p. 124). Including sexual education as part of the
health and physical education curriculum is premised on helping students reflect on
their values and character so they can make informed decisions about situations they
will very likely face anyway. Similarly, a good civic education should help students
determine the benefits and risks of dissent, and refine their understandings of their
own values so they will be prepared to decide when, where, and how to dissent (if at
all). In short, it does not follow that teaching young people about dissent will make
them unruly and civilly disobedient. Rather, teaching dissent as a positive right may
reduce students’ dispositions to engage in unproductive forms of dissent since they will
be more aware of the moral and legal implications of their behaviour.

While it does not follow that teaching dissent as a positive right will encourage
students’ civil disobedience, it does provide room for civil disobedience to be discussed
as a legitimate option in the right circumstances. I have already alluded to the
distinction between legality and legitimacy, and I maintain that Canada’s judicial
institutions do not have a monopoly over that which is morally legitimate—even if
there is a high degree of overlap between legal and moral legitimacy. This is a
controversial statement, especially since Canadian educators are subject to one of the
most stringent legal standards of any profession and may be subject to legal or
professional action if their teachings are found too controversial or dangerous. Accordingly, educators must tread carefully here. Note that, in line with my semi-archic perspective, I insist that educators should not teach students that civil disobedience is always a preferable option. Similarly, they should provide justifications for the importance of laws as they teach curricular content about the process of lawmaking. However, during this process, they should also ensure students understand that laws are human constructs and thus fallible. Moreover, they should teach students that the judicial system, for all its benefits, is likely to mete out justice unevenly in practice.

Because civil disobedience may entail breaking laws or other rules, it is difficult to conceive of it as a positive right if positive rights are defined as entitlements that the state guarantees to provide its citizens. We should not pretend that the judicial system (with the exception of, perhaps, the Supreme Courts) will overlook civil disobedience if citizens argue, “Well, I’m justified because x should be a right!” Most civil disobedience has as its ultimate aim the modification or reinterpretation of existing laws to recognize specific rights or freedoms, so the performance of disobedience primarily targets the morality of the legislative system and general public opinion rather than the judicial system. Any discussion of civil disobedience must be attentive to the risks involved, including judicial consequences, a criminal record, personal harm, and harm to others. Despite these caveats, it is still possible to frame the teaching of civil disobedience as a positive right if curricula espouse a semi-archic perspective—even though this is very sticky terrain that requires cautious treatment.

Curricula can frame civil disobedience in terms of claims for (or defences of) the core ethico-political principles of Canada’s liberal democracy, which are themselves
positive rights. Educators may stress that legal infractions can be morally right if they respect core ethico-political principles. They may even suggest that it is an ethical duty to consider civil disobedience in egregious cases of rights violations, as long as they remind students of the potential risks and the need to respect core ethico-political values. This approach can be similar to how the Ontario curriculum treats sexual education, which falls under the purview of the Health and Physical Education curriculum. Rather than teach that sex is a desirable or undesirable activity, the curriculum teaches that safe sex can be a part of students’ overall health, which is itself a positive right. Similarly, civil disobedience should not be taught as always desirable or always undesirable, but curricula should teach that productive civil disobedience can be a part of citizens’ claims to core ethico-political values.

In addition, to avoid the controversy of having educators express their own views on current political issues, it may be helpful to illustrate civil disobedience through historical examples. One suggestion might be the activism undertaken by American civil rights advocates protesting Jim Crow laws. This, however, might reinforce the problematic teleological or “Whig” conception of history which implies that “social progress” has moved Canadians beyond the discriminatory attitudes “of the past.” If educators choose to supplement these with present-day examples to illustrate the productive potential and risks of civil disobedience—and I believe they should—this is most safely approached through a non-prescriptive presentation. For instance, if the Kinder Morgan example I discuss above is used, educators might ask students to reflect on questions such as, “Is there a cause for which I would be willing to break the law and face consequences?” “What is the cost of breaking the law for this cause?”
“What is the cost of not breaking the law for this cause?” and “Are there other options, and would they be more or less effective?”

Again, this does not mean that educators should teach that civil disobedience is always desirable. The role of curricula should open spaces for discussion about civil disobedience, which I maintain is only possible by teaching civil disobedience as a potential channel through which to claim or defend the positive rights of core ethico-political values. By inculcating the understanding that laws are fallible and that political subjects’ commitments to core ethico-political values are among the most vital components of a functioning democracy, educators can find a “middle ground” in which to teach civil disobedience productively. This middle ground respects that laws are vital for democratic life, but also that core ethico-political values sometimes create room for civil disobedience to occur legitimately.

There is another risk to teaching dissent as a positive right, but this one is of more concern to critical and radical theorists. When teaching dissent at the classroom level, educators may conceive of dissent quite narrowly, neutralize dissent, or reproduce limited hegemonic views of what constitutes “appropriate” forms of dissent. This could involve teaching that dissent should only be through deliberative channels which policymakers might easily ignore (such as letter-writing) as opposed to teaching that more obstructive, non-deliberative forms of dissent (such as road blockades) can be productive in some situations. If educators fall back on the dominant, deliberative conceptions of acceptable forms of dissent or continue to teach for “active compliance” except as a last resort (Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011), they risk silencing subaltern discourses. In so doing, they will reproduce systemic injustices and leave little room for
students to (re)interpret core ethico-political values. For policymakers and educators hoping to increase youths’ democratic engagement through education, this is a serious risk.

It may be difficult for educators to adhere to the semi-arhic ideal I discuss here because students and teachers will likely be thinking of concrete issues in their society while in the classroom. It will be challenging to avoid coming down on one side of the debate or another. However, the semi-arhic perspective I espouse does not equate with neutrality or objectivity, in part because total non-partisanship is virtually impossible in civics classrooms. Educators’ task is to open the discussion, with students as active participants, to as many different avenues and perspectives as is viable within a classroom setting. They should thus avoid pedagogic approaches that foreclose full debate. However, it is also educators’ task to ensure that classroom interactions remain in line with core ethico-political values, and to make sure that they call the status quo into question, even if students or teachers themselves agree with the status quo. In short, teachers should avoid reifying or legitimizing any one perspective over another and educate for the critical capacities necessary to exercise informed dissent if students so choose.

The most pressing limitation in teaching dissent as a positive right is that some students face greater risks in exercising dissent than others. I have postulated that, by fostering a consciousness for dissent according to which dissent is normalized, Canadians might expect more citizens to dissent when they perceive injustices. The risk for subaltern groups here is two-fold. First, by virtue of being subaltern, they are more likely to experience injustices themselves and are thus more likely to find reasons to
dissent. I am unaware of any studies measuring subaltern groups’ disposition to dissent, but my point is that the stakes are higher for these groups, whether or not they choose to express dissenting views. Second, if subaltern groups—racialized groups in particular—do choose to engage in acts of dissent, they are more liable to be labelled as “dangerous” (Dhamoon & Abu-Laban, 2009). This has led to more serious sanctions and more violent police responses, and is becoming increasingly concerning due to new and proposed legislation (Bill C-51 is a good example of this). There is evidence that Canada is at once expanding the definition of what constitutes “terrorism” while at the same time policing “terrorist” activity more closely (Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015; Linnit, 2015).

Although the risks of judicial sanctions and police violence are serious concerns, I do not believe that teaching dissent as a positive right or fostering a consciousness for dissent place students in unwarranted harm. In some cases, fostering the growth of certain counterpublics (particularly those networked into schools) can even create more secure environments because these “more private publics” act as safe discursive arenas (Kelly, 2003, p. 126). In perhaps rarer cases, students who perceive educators as supportive of productive dissent may be inclined to seek out school authorities (maybe in informal spaces such as hallways or outside school hours) to discuss strategies for expressing dissent (Johnson, 2009, p. 53). The relationships between these students and educators, with whom students have already established trust and who may be well-situated to understand students’ dissenting attitudes and dispositions, can act as avenues for the safe exploration of productive exercises of dissent. Educators in these situations are likely better suited to inform and foster productive dissent as compared
to the potentially less trustworthy sources students might turn to in those educators’ absence (e.g., online sources, pre-existing counterpublics).

Moreover, to say that it is ultimately an individual’s own decision to exercise her right to dissent is only partially true. The role of civic education in this regard is to minimize the risks inherent to engaging in acts of dissent by asking students to reflect on their values and by informing them of the legal and moral risks of dissent. It does demand that students “pick their battles” and weigh the importance of their values with the risks they take in expressing dissent. But the state does have a role in mitigating inequalities for those expressing dissent. As such, educators have an obligation to students to reveal how “othered” youth are disproportionately likely to be constructed as dangerous rather than presume that judicial authorities will treat all dissenters equally. Civics curricula can only do so much by helping students make informed decisions regarding their own wellbeing.

We must also remember that curricula—especially civics curricula—do not exist independently of the civic world, and that the state and its citizens are obligated to ensure that policies and society actively make curricular goals possible. State institutions can make possible a positive conceptualization of dissent and minimize risks for students who exercise that right by providing what Fraser (2008) calls “participatory parity.” This entails the ability of all members of society to participate with substantive equality in civic and political matters. Fraser identifies three spheres that require attention: first, the society’s economic structures must ensure that citizens have the resources to interact “as peers.” Second, people’s cultural value must be recognized as equal, and so societies must eradicate institutional hierarchies of this
value. Third, formal decision rules must ensure that people are substantively included and represented (pp. 405-406).

This project cannot happen overnight, nor is it solely the responsibility of the state. Educators must make clear that it is not solely the marginalized who must stand up for their own rights (and face uneven consequences accordingly). They must also make clear that dissent is not an individual endeavour, but a collective endeavour. Dissent should not always be only for one’s own sake; as we will see in the subsequent chapter, dissent is driven by concern for others and by a substantive vision of a just society for all. Thus, curricula should also highlight the role of “allies” in dissent and collective struggle. In addition to asking students to reflect on questions like, “Is there a cause important enough for me that I would be willing to face the risks of dissent?” they should also be asked to consider, “Is there a cause important enough for others that I would be willing to face the risks of dissent on their behalf?” In short, teaching dissent as a positive right requires an awareness that citizens share responsibility for one another’s well-being, and that they are sometimes uniquely situated to support those who face disproportionate risks.

**Conclusion**

Teaching dissent as a positive right will make democracies richer, more socially just, and safer. If curricula create space for agonistic and semi-archic political perspectives, democracies will be richer as they will be better suited to deal with the pluralism inherent to an increasingly diverse society. By fostering a consciousness for dissent, civics curricula will also animate space for productive dissent, particularly for
those whose backgrounds and interpretations of core ethico-political values are marginalized through hegemonic processes. Finally, Canadian democracy will be safer since teaching positive dissent through semi-archic and agonistic lenses aims to keep legitimate political channels open, thus encouraging citizens to treat one another as respected adversaries and not enemies to be destroyed.

There is nevertheless a crucial element of this argument that I have not yet addressed. In the following chapter, I will balance the affective, emotional, and passionate components inherent to dissent with the rational components necessary for dissent to be productive.
Chapter Four: The Passionate Demands of Democratic Citizenship

Reasoning will never make a Man [sic] correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he never acquired.

—Jonathan Swift, A Letter to a Young Gentleman

In the previous chapter, I made the case that dissent is a vital part of democratic life, and that teaching dissent as a positive right fosters the disposition as well as the critical and moral capacities necessary for dissent. But dissent is also a passionate affair (a term I explain below). Still, it is as yet unclear in this thesis how passion figures into political life. For many, especially for some deliberative democrats, passion is a distraction that prevents “proper” consideration of the issues and presents an impediment to legitimate decision-making. This attitude has gained legitimacy in formal Canadian politics. The late Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, for instance, was deeply informed by the mantra, “Reason over passion,” which underpinned many key principles of his constitutional projects (Von Heyking, 2009, p. 41). However, I hold that passions are far from being an undesirable social fact, and are inseparable from and necessary for political life. Moreover, I believe we should be wary of the exclusionary nature of political models that claim to be entirely rationally oriented. I also believe that

46 We might attribute the contemporary prevalence of rationalist understandings of deliberation to Habermas’ mid-20th century works. However, this rationalist line of thought can be traced back as far as Aristotelian deliberative politics, in which reason plays the preeminent role in producing just and virtuous outcomes (Wilson, 2011). Neither Aristotle nor his contemporaries, the early Stoics, made a radical distinction between reason and passion. However, since Stoics believe that emotions (understood as primary impulses) are often created by flawed reasoning, people should ignore their emotions in favour of reason wherever possible (Solomon, 2003). The hierarchal dominance of reason over passion intensified with the Cartesian mind/body split, with passions “conceived as alien intruders from the realm of the body” (Lloyd, 2003, p. xv). Despite interventions by 18th and 19th century thinkers such as David Hume and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, rationalist understandings of passion witnessed a resurgence early in the 20th century due in part to cognitivists like William James (Solomon, 2003). This is by no means a complete genealogy of the rationalist underpinnings of deliberative democracy; I wish only to offer some historical perspective on the deep-rootedness of rationalist ideals.
passions are intrinsically valuable for human life and particularly for human togetherness, though I do not develop these arguments here.

I advance, instead, the normative argument that civic education in Canada should include critical attention to the passionate demands of democratic citizenship, especially insofar as passion prepares students to exercise their positive right to political dissent. I begin by making the case that teaching political passions can inspire students’ political engagement, but that this must be balanced with the need to harness and channel passions productively. Second, I argue that the narrow focus on rationality and reason in civic life at the expense of passion circumscribes not only democratic procedures *how certain issues can be discussed*), but also the substance (*what is discussed*). Third, I argue that teaching students about how political passions are constructed and mobilized can help them resist manipulative forms of political emotion.

**Political Passion**

*A Conceptual Clarification.* Much as the expression of the human capacity for reason can be called rationality, I refer to expressions of affect as “passion.” The term *affect* is often used across disciplines (including but not limited to cognitive psychology, cultural studies, neuroscience, and sociology) to subsume all terms relating to feeling, emotion, passion, and the like. There is little agreement between (or within!) these schools about what any of these terms mean. As I discuss below, my own understanding of passion does not fit neatly into any particular school of thought. First, however, I would like to explain why I elect to discuss “passion” rather than affect, emotion, or feeling.
In addition to using affect as an overarching term, many schools (e.g. cognitive psychology, neuroscience) use affect to correspond to the body's capacity to experience a perceptual, “pre-personal” and “non-conscious experience of intensity,” one that cannot be qualified by words (Shouse, 2005, par. 5). Said differently, affect can be conceived as the “primarily sensory modality through which we perceive the internal (psychic) world of reality” (Solms, 2002, p. 55). I find this dual meaning of “affect” as both a primary sensory modality and as a term to subsume the cognitive psychological affective states I describe above unnecessarily confusing. I wish to avoid conflating discussions of (what I mean by) passion with those about unqualified, unconscious, sensorial intensity.

Some theorists (see Bond, 2011; Nussbaum, 2013) instead subsume terms like anger, hope, love, and fear under the term “emotion.” Emotion has the advantage of being a commonplace term. However, as Sara Ahmed (2004) points out, the “psychologization of emotions” has emphasized the now-familiar ways that emotions originate from within and then “get out” (p. 28), perhaps against one’s wishes. While more recent work (including Ahmed’s) has challenged this perspective, I believe this “inside-out” perspective still dominates understandings of emotion. The term “feeling” is also unsuitable for my purposes, too easily connoting the sensational, fleeting elements of passions (Boler, 1999, p. xx).\(^\text{47}\) This leaves little room to describe how they might also be mobilized or channelled politically.

\(^{47}\) Dispositions have an opposite characteristic of feelings, in that they are amalgamations of temporary passions over time. More on this below.
I choose instead to use the term “passion” throughout this thesis. I find this term most accurately reflects the intense, motivational force that drives political action, especially dissent. Like Mouffe (2014), I believe the term “passion” is most suitable to “challenge the rationalist view dominant in democratic political theory” (p. 155). In my view, this is because it embraces the “disruptive” and “uncontrollable” (or difficult-to-control) nature that rationalist traditions (e.g., the Stoics, Descartes) have attributed to it. Rather than trying to suppress or master passions, I focus here on how they might be channelled, or directed at a political object.

Following Mouffe (2014), I recognize that the term entails both the collective construction and partisan nature of political identities:

From the perspective that I advocate it is essential to distinguish between ‘passions’ and ‘emotions’. Indeed it is with regard to the political domain that my approach has been elaborated and one of its central tenets is that in that field we are always dealing with collective identities, something that the term ‘emotions’ does not adequately convey because emotions are usually attached to individuals. To be sure ‘passions’ can also be of an individual nature but I have chosen to use that term, with its more violent connotations, because it allows me to underline the dimension of conflict and to suggest a confrontation between collective political identities, two aspects that I take to be constitutive of politics. (p. 149)

Mouffe makes explicit here that political identities are always bound up in passions and thus necessarily partisan. As we will see, this element helps refocus democratic theory on conflict rather than the consensus typical of rationally oriented models. Moreover,
passion is not merely a product of the individual, as rationalist traditions have tended to treat it. Departing from these traditions leaves space to consider how passions are collectively constructed and even how they shape collective identities.

**What Is Passion?** To counter the rationalist hierarchy of reason over passion that many liberal and deliberative theorists uphold, I witness here the deconstruction of the binary between reason and passion. In so doing, I demonstrate how democratic theory is limited if it treats the two as the separate, opposed, and hierarchically related sides in a binary pair (see Biesta, 2009). Witnessing the deconstruction of this binary between reason and passion permits us to “bear witness to what is made invisible by [the presence of reason] but is nonetheless necessary to make this presence possible” (Biesta, 2009, p. 394). In other words, this method does not merely attend to the “other side” of reason in the reason/passion binary; it strengthens our understanding of reason and passion alike.

The act of witnessing opens up the binary between reason and passion and permits us to think more inventively about the spaces where reason and passion constitute one another. We will see that the role passion plays (and has always played) in the political realm has been rendered less visible by the emphasis on reason. Attending to the spaces where reason and passion constitute one another not only elucidates passion’s instrumental value, but also illuminates how political processes that we have recognized as solely rational are in fact inseparable from passion.

I am by no means the first to witness this deconstruction; other scholars, especially feminist scholars in the 20th century, have made these interventions into the reason/passion binary possible. Alison Jaggar (1989), for example, argues that Western
epistemological traditions have obscured how emotion contributes to knowledge and shows how the myth of “dispassionate investigation” has undermined women’s and many non-Euromericans’ perfectly valid knowledge claims. Genevieve Lloyd (2003), too, exposes how reason was partially constructed on the exclusion of the feminine.

Spurred in part by these interventions, scholars in the “affective turn” of the last fifteen years—from socio-cultural and scientific perspectives alike—have “fended off the emotions = irrationality equation... arguing that all human beings are both rational and emotional, and that feelings are a necessary component of, rather than a barrier to, rational thought” (Gould, 2010, p. 35). Psychologist Daniel Batson (2014), for instance, argues that emotions reflect people’s goals (or changes in their situational relation to their goals), which are in turn based on rational considerations. Neo-stoics and cognitivists have also shown that passions possess both an intentional quality and are open to rational assessment (Solomon, 2003). As such, emotions and other passionate states are “intelligent appraisals” of moral worth and other important decisions (Hordern, 2012, pp. 25-28). But reason is not just a key component of our passions; passions also inform our rationality such that it is irresponsible to treat reason and passion as a hierarchy or binary. It would be difficult to exercise reason without a driving force to motivate political decision-making. People are “emotionally invested” in their own interests, or there would be no affective “reward” for achieving them. Indeed, Archer (2013) critiques the assumption that instrumental reason is devoid of emotion, asking what else could provide the “shoving power” to motivate one’s attempts to maximize a given utility (p. 6). Neurological research also demonstrates that emotions are especially helpful for decision-making that was once considered entirely rational,
not only for “gut decisions” but also for “thoughtful deliberation” (Morris, 2015, pp. 14-15).

My understanding of passion straddles the boundaries between various schools of thought. To help deconstruct the reason/passion binary, I rely on cognitivist views that conceive of passions and cognition as intimately linked in nature, particularly in their capacity to act as intelligent appraisals of an object’s moral worth (see above). On the other hand, I draw from constructivist accounts that explain how people feel and express passions based on external circumstances, such as language (see Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990). Ahmed (2004) helps make this perspective clear. She understands passions as mediators between the individual and the collective that shape the fabric of collective identities by establishing shared feelings: “How we feel about others is what aligns us with a collective, which paradoxically ‘takes shape’ . . . as an effect of such alignments” (p. 27). She also explains how passions are intentional in that they are directed at objects, and how passions move us to create attachments or borders with those objects. As we will see, passions’ moving component is key to political engagement.

Ahmed’s work is consistent with Mouffe’s (2014) more psychoanalytic perspective on how collective, impassioned political identities reflect and shape shared antagonisms. Both perspectives highlight the collective, rather than internal or private nature of emotion, and are as such consistent with a feminist politics of emotion (Boler, 1999). Moreover, Mouffe’s psychoanalytic perspective leaves room to discuss how people can “channel” political passions. Following from Boler’s (1999) distinction between moral anger (on behalf of a collective) and defensive anger (threats to our own identities), Ruitenberg (2009) defines political emotions as those that are “necessarily
bound up with the power relations in a society and with a substantive vision of a just society” (p. 277). In this chapter, it is these specifically political passions I am interested in.

In what follows, I argue that attending to political passion is vital for civic education. I will draw on critical-radical, agonist, and semi-archic understandings of passion to elucidate how the treatment of passion in many deliberative models of democracy precludes some desirable aspects of decision-making processes. I share policymakers’ desire for youths’ heightened civic and political engagement and argue that passions provide the mobilizing force necessary to inculcate students’ disposition to engage. Moreover, since I am concerned with students’ disposition to and capacity for dissent when students perceive injustices, I argue that educating for an impassioned consciousness for dissent will help students to exercise dissent productively, in line with the core ethico-political values of a liberal democracy. Finally, since I am concerned that students may lack preparedness to be critical of the construction of political passions, I argue that attending to passions is necessary if students are to resist manipulative exercises of passion.

**Inspiring Engagement Through Passion**

**Engaging Students in Civic Life.** One of the key aims of the civics curricula I study is to encourage students to engage in civic life (B.C. Ministry of Education, 2005; Ontario Ministry of Education, 2013). A disposition to engage is developed through an amalgamation of temporary passions over time, resulting in a relatively permanent sentiment toward a specific object or other. The “object” or “other” may be any number of civic ideas or fellow citizens (e.g., a longing for an end to human trafficking or
compassion for the homeless). Remembering also that feelings act as mediators of collective affect, a disposition to engage is in part a product of the “moving” elements of passions and a contributor to the social world. This move to engage with another “reshapes the bodies in the contact zone of the encounter” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 31). Said differently, a student who is moved by her passions (e.g., compassion) to engage with another (e.g., a homeless man) modifies the way that both people, and all those in proximity who share their feelings, will read one another in the future. In this sense, to be moved by our passions is to shape history (p. 39). Fostering students’ sense of being inextricably woven into this fabric, where the social and the personal meet, may instil in them a sense of the importance of heeding the moving component of passions. To learn to heed passions in productive ways is key to strengthening one’s disposition to engage in civic life.

Educators are doubtlessly aware that fostering the disposition to engage effectively requires them to attend to the more passionate aspects of democracy. This is particularly true for contested and controversial issues. Barton & McCully (2007) argue that “if emotional issues are ignored, then far from learning to deal with difficult issues rationally, students may simply come to see [subject matter] as irrelevant to their own concerns” (p. 14). Students might understand why issues such as climate change are important, but if they do not feel sufficiently concerned to do anything about them, they are unlikely to engage. Pedagogical efforts to engage students in civic life are thus a very fundamental reason to include attention to passion in civics curricula, but I do not

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48 As per my semi-archic perspective, I believe that a chief aim of democracy studies must be to instil in students an impassioned longing for democratic modes of human togetherness, generally, rather than for a specific model of democracy.
discuss these in detail here. I am more concerned with engaging students in civic life beyond the classroom.

Activists have long deployed passion strategically “to engender sufficient commitment amongst activist collectives to maintain their on-going participation” and to engender solidarity (Brown & Pickerill, 2009). We probably have no trouble bringing to mind images of angry protesters, but it may be more difficult to think of other examples of how Canadians mobilize passion productively. It is less obvious why passion might be useful on a day-to-day basis. However, disgust over the country’s rising income inequality and gratitude for military sacrifices are both examples of these everyday political passions.

For Rawlsian (1995) deliberative democrats, principle-dependent emotions (those based in a shared sense of justice) seem to be enough to inspire people to act morally. In a Canadian context, one example of a principle-dependent emotion is the public sense of shame over the Komagata Maru incident. The Canadian Government’s apology in May of 2016 for the country’s 1914 rejection of Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu migrants acts as a call to reinvigorate Canadians’ commitment to the shared (Rawls would say “overlapping”) principle of multiculturalism. In Rawls’ “well-ordered society,” this might be a sensible way of strengthening people’s commitment to moral action. Building on this argument, and following in the footsteps of Enlightenment thinkers like Mill and Kant, Nussbaum (2013) believes that eudaemonistic political emotions—those tied to people’s circle of concern—are important to help “people to think larger thoughts and recommit themselves to a larger common good” (p. 3).
A key part of the task, Nussbaum (2013) argues, is to “cultivate... the ability to see full and equal humanity in another person” (p. 3). This ability is important because people “care most about those in their circle of concern,” and most easily perceive them as equally worthy of dignity (pp. 11, 120). Fostering a sense of equal humanity requires cultivating a range of emotions and dispositions, all of which (for Nussbaum) are bound together by love. Nussbaum’s humanistic project reveals much about the ability to foster citizens’ engagement with civic life. In particular, she “imagine[s] ways in which emotions can support the basic principles of the political culture of an aspiring yet imperfect society” (p. 6). She also imagines how passions can play “an important role in generating practices of resistance and cultural resurgence” if they are mobilized through means such as popular music, public monuments, and festivals (p. 120).

Nussbaum’s project is heavily based in Rawlsian understandings of the “overlapping consensus” (roughly, a common conception of justice to adjudicate between multiple comprehensive viewpoints). I disagree with this idea for being too democratically “thick” and thus unsuitable to deal with deep difference. Nevertheless, contemporary societies such as Canada have enshrined a commitment to some thin (and sometimes, fairly thick) common principles. Canada’s commitment to cultural pluralism, for instance, is enshrined in a liberal conception of multiculturalism that citizens are expected and legally bound to uphold. Nussbaum’s work offers practical insights about the ways that passions work in tandem with moral rationality to uphold these sorts of principles. If applied to civic education, students can learn about the shared moral principles that any given society espouses, as well as learn to appreciate these principles both rationally and affectively. For deliberative democrats and more
critical-radical thinkers alike, passion can foster students’ dispositions to engage in civic life by supplementing principle-dependent reasons for engagement.

**Toward an Impassioned Consciousness for Dissent**

Critical-radical thinkers identify how passions can be mobilized at a deeper level. Passion is not only important to supplement status-quo principles or to inspire engagement in actions that uphold the pre-written “scripts” of citizenship (Isin, 2009). It is even more important for students to learn for political passions to prepare them to engage in acts of dissent.49 This is because the stigma against political dissent as “anti-social” (or at least antithetical to civic responsibility in a liberal-democratic environment) makes it likely that students are more likely to learn so-called “pro-social” behaviours—and with them, “pro-social” affective dispositions—than behaviours and affective dispositions that disrupt the “scripts” of citizenship (Kennelly, 2009). Kennelly & Llewellyn (2011) make the case that the dominance of neoliberalism since the 1980s has modified the form of citizenship Canadian students learn, such that it now emphasizes the “pro-social” characteristics of responsibility/self-regulation, rationality (i.e. informed and ethical citizenship), and duty to the nation (as opposed to subverting its goals through activism). These are perfectly compatible with the deliberative ideals of engagement I discuss in Chapters One and Two.

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49 I say “learn for political passions” rather than “learn political passions” here because I am concerned that students in Canada’s socio-cultural climate, which I perceive to be rationally oriented, may otherwise fail to recognize the value of passions in civic life. Learning for political passions is equally concerned with teaching students to understand and channel passions as it is with teaching students why doing so is important. More on this below.
In addition, Canadian civics curricula tend to treat many of the feelings, emotions, and sentiments that support pre-written scripts of citizenship (e.g., a sense of civic fraternity) as “public” and therefore important, while those that cause tensions are treated as unimportant, “private,” or potentially disruptive passions (Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011). I argue in Chapter Three that for civic educators to foster a consciousness for dissent, students must learn the critical and moral capacities necessary for dissent. Political passions are one such capacity, but the stigma around “anti-social” affective dispositions makes students comparatively less likely to develop these capacities through today's formal or external curricula. If these socio-cultural tendencies—and the accompanying lack of critical attention to political passion—result in students’ inability to understand, harness, and channel their passions productively, many forms of political acts may be rendered less effective or even hazardous for the participants and those around them.

As discussed in Chapter Three, Stitzlein’s (2012) work is valuable because it is concerned with practical matters about how to address dissent in schools. She raises the obvious concern that teaching for dissent in secondary schools is difficult, because a classroom full of teenagers could be liable to take too many liberties with the idea of dissent (p. 147). Underlying this concern is the implication that teenagers are more likely to take impulsive action and may lack the experience necessary to make responsible choices. Stitzlein allays these concerns by pointing out that “hope is the most important foundation of dissent... Though students may be more confident and willing to voice their opinions, hope steers them away from mere retribution and anarchy” (p. 148). I agree with Stitzlein that teaching for dissent will contribute to their
disposition to engage actively in civic life. However, I wish to take a less archic path than Stitzlein to allay the same concern, one that does not rely on any one emotion as the “foundation” of hope. I believe that instilling in students a desire for more democratic modes of human togetherness draws on and fosters a wider array of passions than hope (or anger or trust or compassion) alone.

I argue that students’ relative lack of political experience is precisely why giving attention to political affect in civic education is so important. Students in a civics course will almost invariably express political passions, and I believe that these courses should provide semi-structured environments where students can learn to channel their dispositions to engage productively. Like Mouffe, I believe the danger does not lie in a fear of political subjects’ descent into “mere retribution or anarchy,” as Stitzlein (2012, p.148) maintains. Rather, as Mouffe (2014) states,

> Emphasizing the role of passions is no doubt open to the objection that those passions can be mobilized in ways that will undermine democratic institutions. This is clearly the fear that leads many theorists to exclude them from democratic politics. But ... this is a very perilous viewpoint because refusing to provide democratic channels for the expression of collective affects lays the terrain for antagonistic forms of their mobilization. (p. 156)

Said differently, it is more dangerous to treat these passions as non-existent or unimportant than to provide channels for their expression.

I have been arguing that the risk of treating passions as non-existent is that, when the time comes to express political dissent, students may not learn to do so productively—that is, in line with the core ethico-political principles of a liberal
democracy, namely liberty and equality. The question then becomes, Who decides what counts as “liberal” and “equal?” The framework Mouffe (2000) has set out to address this concern is, in my view, minimally prescriptive and avoids making thick, normative claims about these principles. She argues that all interpretations of these core principles are legitimate, and that the goal of agonistic politics is to assert one’s interpretation of these principles while also recognizing the legitimacy of adversaries’ alternative interpretations—especially counter-hegemonic ones (p. 8).

This disposition to express political dissent is quite common among young Canadians. Other than voting, Canadian youth aged 15-24 are more likely to participate in “non-traditional” forms of civic engagement (such as petition-signing, boycotting products, and attending demonstrations) than in formal politics. They are also the demographic most likely to participate in political demonstrations (Turcotte, 2015). In short, many youth are already engaging in civic life through affectively charged activities, and appear drawn to forms that encourage public expressions of dissent. The solution I propose here, following Mouffe (2005), is to provide channels where this sort of expression can be exercised productively so as not to expose the student or others to the sorts risks I discuss in Chapter Three (including arrest, incarceration, a criminal record, personal harm, and harm to others).

Educators and curricula are well situated to provide, or encourage students to find, channels to express political passions. This raises questions about how educators might work with students to build their articulatory capacities, help them find political collectives with whom to identify, and the like. A student who feels outraged about a social problem should find channels for her outrage such that she does not turn to
violent solutions. Educators might suggest that she express her outrage by writing to a representative, boycotting a company, or attending a demonstration. They might also provide class time, perhaps in the form of a discussion or class project, to develop strategies for the expression of these passions. One example of the latter includes Reed’s (2009) “stencilling dissent” project, in which the students’ project was to create stencil images, similar to those used in street protest. The stencils were designed to feature “lesser-known” activists who protested for social justice causes.

But there are other examples we might use that feature less obviously “political” passions. A student might also feel shocked upon learning, say, about the inequalities between the standards of living on and off Indigenous reserves. His teacher may ask that he reflect on the root causes of this passion, which might result in the student developing deeper feelings of shame and disquiet about Canada’s avowed commitment to equality. He might then translate these feelings into a more critical disposition toward Canada’s Aboriginal policy or mobilize these feelings in search of a solution. Mobilizing passions in such a way is a particularly important strategy for marginalized groups, for whom rational argumentation and a reliance on “reasonableness” are often not guarantors of fair treatment in decision-making processes. This strategy of collective, critical self-reflection on one’s passions, involving the development of “accountability for how we see ourselves,” the questioning of deeply held beliefs, and—hopefully—catalyzed action reflects what Boler (1999) calls the “pedagogy of discomfort” (p. 188). I will return to this idea below.

Some scholars, such as Ruitenberg (2010b), have argued that anger is the “basic political emotion.” It is perhaps easiest to see how certain passions, such as anger or hope, can be political. I wish to avoid these sorts of generalizations to demonstrate how other passions can be political as well.
Note also that educating for political passions involves teaching for the ability to harness and channel passions at every step of the process of dissent. Moreover, it is important to foster the understanding that virtually all passions, including those that (neo-)liberal traditions have typically labelled anti-social (e.g., anger, fear), can actually be productive (Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011). Educating for political passions also requires students to be able to identify which civic emotions and feelings they have experienced (or will experience) so that they can articulate and direct those passions toward the appropriate object when the time comes. Recall that, as per my semi-archic perspective, students will decide on their own terms—not based on thick, external norms—what constitutes an “appropriate” object of their passions. They must ensure that their own terms are consistent with the core ethico-political principles of liberty and equality, but the interpretation of these principles is their own decision.

**Circumscribing Decision-Making Through Deliberation**

The disdain for or misrecognition of passions in civic deliberation, as it has traditionally been described, circumscribes not only democratic procedures (*how certain issues can be discussed*), but also the substance of discussions (*what is discussed*). Deliberative democrats are relatively more concerned with proceduralism than are other major models, believing that just outcomes are largely determined by the degree to which the process of deliberation is fair. As such, many deliberative models—particularly in their early, Habermasian and Rawlsian forms—value rational and reasoned forms of communication to ensure that the speech conditions are neutral and objective. This focus on reason—that is, the degree to which ideas are recognized as
rational and thus worthy of discussion—is problematic precisely because its grammar is often determined by the elites.\(^{51}\) Drawing on agonist and deliberative thinkers alike, Fraser’s (2008) work on abnormal justice explains how the presumption that all participants share a “normal” grammar of justice jeopardizes the more fundamental principle of participatory parity within deliberation (p. 406). However, Iris Marion Young presents perhaps the most recognized critiques of these rational ideals of communication, and I focus on her ideas here because I believe she presents the most pragmatic arguments for improving deliberative inclusivity.

**Circumscribing How Issues Are Discussed.** Young (2001) describes how the very premises of deliberation are unfair for the disempowered. Activists might eschew deliberation because they recognize that the powerful have little motive to sit down and find an acceptable solution. They are more liable to use power and influence to steer the discussion in their favour, or to delegitimize the activists’ interests (p. 673). Instead, an activist opts for louder, more overtly critical actions such as picketing or guerrilla theatre that are designed to spread information and awareness, or more directly realize the desired outcome. Communication relies more on passionate appeals, slogans, and irony in order to delegitimize the claims of the more powerful. Deliberation leaves little room for these passionate displays because they detract from reasonable argument.

Implicit in Young’s (2001) criticism is the concern that what is considered “reasonable” (or even “rational”) is socially, culturally, and historically constructed, virtually always according to the interests of the dominant group. Here, Fraser’s (2009)
criticism of the liberal “comprehensive public sphere” strengthens Young’s case. In the comprehensive public sphere, a nation-state’s sovereign power depends on normative legitimacy and communicatively-generated public opinion, both of which can be “marshalled as political force” (pp. 76-77). This normative legitimacy depends in part on common political grammar that helps the public and state officials adjudicate between competing justice claims.

For instance, contemporary theorists frequently conclude that neoliberal and post-fordist conceptions of rationality—conceived roughly as instrumental reason or individual preference maximization—inform the dominant political and regulatory grammar that informs much of decision-making today in Canada’s comprehensive public sphere (Belskies & Knight, 2016; Fraser, 2009). These conceptions of rationality present the serious obstacle that participants in decision-making must understand and conform to market logic. Those who do not might easily be dismissed as irrational or unreasonable. Fraser’s point is that, unless we also take into account the mechanisms that dictate who determines ostensibly “common” grammar, public spheres have built-in mechanisms of exclusion.

Young (2001) also makes the case that the most powerful participants in deliberation often believe they are listening to the concerns of marginalized groups, but this apparent reasonableness may not be sufficiently critical or simply not genuine. According to many activists, the outcome is already predetermined by the illusion of reasonableness in deliberative procedure. A more passionate display of dissent, for the disempowered, is more likely to “command attention or inspire action” than are discursive strategies (p. 676).
Even when there is a possibility of reaching a truly reasonable consensus, Young (2000) points out that an emphasis on rational argumentation as the only legitimate form of communication comes with built-in “internal exclusions” (p. 55). By this, she refers to insidious mechanisms of including marginalized people in political discussions at a formal level while substantively excluding their ideas. For her, the deliberative emphasis on dispassionate discussion “dismisses and devalues embodied forms of expression... People’s contributions to a discussion tend to be excluded from serious consideration not because of what is said, but how it is said” (p. 56). Style and idiom are disregarded in favour of articulateness and explicit logic presented in a linear fashion. This kind of discussion is exclusive, because people who do not or who are less able to communicate this way may easily be brushed off as naive or uneducated. Thus, to mitigate these effects, Young proposes that deliberative conceptions of what constitutes “valid argument” be communicatively expanded to include greeting, rhetoric, and narrative.

While Young’s proposal would do much to mitigate the exclusionary effects of deliberation’s rationally oriented nature, it does not resolve the issue of passion’s relegation to the sidelines. For instance, Young’s focus on the inclusion of marginalized groups implies that the more embodied and passionate forms of communication she offers are most useful for marginalized people and suggests that they are forms to which dominant groups need not “resort” (Norval, 2007, p. 68). This implicitly reproduces the “us/them” divide between the dominant and the marginalized. As such,

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52 Norval’s critique is of Dryzek’s Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, but I believe it applies equally to Young’s proposal.
it closes opportunities within the deliberative process for “social learning”—that is, for participants to appreciate one another’s communicative preferences as equally valid instead of merely what “we” do to accommodate the less privileged other (p. 68).

Still, Young’s suggestion that marginalized people will benefit most from these proposals is accurate. People do have unequal access to dominant, deliberative forms and norms of speech and argumentation, most significantly based on their socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. Although a valuable critique, Young’s communicative proposal can only improve inclusivity in an environment where participants acknowledge both one another and one another’s communicative authority. The focus here is the need to “be taken seriously” by the dominant groups in society, particularly by those from backgrounds that privilege ostensibly rational discussion in the first place.

Sue Campbell’s (1994) classic essay on bitterness supports and complicates this position. She writes from a place of frustration and disempowerment after being dismissed for expressing bitterness. For her, arguments that bitterness is justifiable as a “legitimate” and “rational” emotion place the accountability of justification on the person accused of being bitter. Instead, we should refocus arguments on the public formation of passions like bitterness. In so doing, we create the conditions for social accountability of the interpretive context of emotional expression. This, I believe, helps redistribute communicative authority more equally among all participants and creates space for the sorts of impassioned communication for which I advocate.

Young (2000) makes the convincing case that greeting, rhetoric, and narrative are already involved in deliberative argumentation, but dominant actors are still not
inclined to recognize the value of these less explicitly rational forms (e.g. storytelling) of argumentation. Empirical evidence demonstrates that storytelling helps participants in deliberation build trust, provide support for otherwise unpopular ideas, encourage collaboration, identify their own preferences, demonstrate their appreciation of competing preferences, advance unfamiliar views, and reach areas of unanticipated agreement (Polletta & Lee, 2006). In spite of these advantages, participants tend to believe storytelling is of limited use. This is not because of storytelling's intrinsic rhetorical characteristics, but because it is popularly perceived as unserious, and valuable only for normative (as opposed to technical) discussions (p. 719).

Like many privileged Canadians, I was predominantly taught for fluency in “rational” forms of communication. I learned to consider non-argumentative forms of communication in formal settings as (in the words of one English teacher) “rhetorical fluff.” I recall one occasion when I stumbled across a rally against a proposed pipeline, which included an Indigenous speaker. This man recounted the history of his people’s displacement and mistreatment at the hands of the Canadian government, and did not mention the pipeline or oil extraction once. At first, I was frustrated that he was using this unrelated space as a platform for “his own agenda.” It was only later that I realized this man’s narrative heavily relied on argumentative elements, and that he was communicating his increasing frustration with the Canadian government’s disregard for the environment and his people’s land. Moreover, his was an engaging speech because it appealed to people’s sense of frustration, injustice, and solidarity. The issue was not with his narrative, but with my inability and unwillingness to recognize and accept his narrative as espousing a valid position.
This story underscores Rancière’s (1995/1999) argument about how the boundaries of the police order are formed and contested. Though my policing power in this situation was weak as a passive observer (limited, perhaps, to the fact that I did not applaud), my attitude reinforced boundaries between what could be considered sensible and what was noise. In articulating a claim that “had no part” in this particular protest (the oppressive nature of the Canadian government), this speaker was engaging in a micro-struggle to have his claims recognized as a sensible contribution to environmental politics. Similarly, it highlights Fraser’s (2008) claim that misframing political issues can easily lead to exclusions in who is allowed to make justice claims. My understanding was that the speaker should have focused only on the pipeline to make a direct, argumentative case to the federal government. This understanding, I now recognize, framed the pipeline issue in such a way that excluded discussion of the broader context, including who was subjected to the policy, who could make justice claims, and how the policy shaped—and was shaped by—relationships between actors.

I am sure I am not alone in this experience, and so I argue here that Young’s proposal may only come to fruition once those of us from dominant groups learn to recognize the value of passionate or seemingly “informal” forms of communication. I contend that formal education is the ideal place for this to happen, because it is one of the primary spaces where students learn to communicate argumentatively. Students must learn how to identify the argumentative elements of rhetorical and passionate forms of communication, but this understanding would be incomplete without also teaching students (particularly those from advantaged backgrounds) that passionate
communication is valuable even in formal settings. More importantly, students should understand that passion is inherent in virtually all forms of communication.

All communication, including ostensibly rational, argumentative forms, are charged with passion, even if they are culturally masked as dispassionate and thus “neutral.” News agencies, for example, usually compete to be the most factual, objective, and neutral, and reporters often adopt a particular style of “rational” communication to exemplify this. This style developed in the Walter Cronkite era of journalism (roughly, the 1960s), in which reporters adopted the calm, detached, and cool disposition that culturally characterizes North American understandings of neutrality (Peters, 2011). Neither the news nor its reporters have ever been emotionally neutral, but “hard-hitting” stories have increasingly made this cool style more explicit and tied it to their apparent trustworthiness (Peters, 2011). This example shows how rationality can be considered an affective stance or comportment (Boler, 1999). The same style has been applied to deliberation and teaching alike (Barton & McCully, 2007), and I have shown how these norms continue to circumscribe how political issues can be discussed.

**Circumscribing Which Issues Are Discussed.** We have seen that a focus on rationality sets up deliberation according to uneven power relations that circumscribe how an issue can be discussed, but deliberative models’ focus on reasoned discussion also limits which issues are discussed. While various models of democracy define “rationality” and “reasonableness” differently, rationality generally refers to the capacity to advocate for one’s own interests through the use of the cognitive faculty of reason. Reasonableness, on the other hand, is used in political literature to describe participants’ willingness to be open-minded and modify their positions according to
others’ input. Especially in its Habermasian forms, this quality presumes that participants recognize other participants as rational as well. The emphasis on “reasoned discussion” limits which issues are discussed because the socio-historical construction of reason as dispassionate neutrality and deliberative aim of consensus-building help certain participants pre-determine common interests and even notions of the “common good.” These, in turn, can result in the exclusion of some topics and circumscribed outcomes for deliberation before it even begins. In addition, the emphasis on reasonableness alone does not prepare the participants in deliberation to productively address dissent, given that political disagreement is by definition affectively charged.

*The Construction of Reason as Dispassionate Neutrality.* As Mouffe (2000) points out, deliberative theory in its early Rawlsian and Habermasian conceptions relies on a rationalist/universalist tradition. This tradition holds that there can only be one answer about what constitutes the “good regime,” meaning that there must be a common framework for argument based on ideas of neutrality, dispassionateness, and objectivity. However, Mouffe counters liberal and deliberative theories with a Wittgensteinian critique of the ideas of rational objectivity. Indeed, many scholars have pointed out how western philosophies have monopolized reason, drawing on Eurocentric and masculinist conceptions of neutrality, objectivity, and calm communication as the only paths to truth (Hébert, 2002; Jaggar, 1989; Pateman, 1988; Walby, 1994).

Mouffe (2000) explains that it is impossible to provide a rational justification of liberal-democratic principles as deliberative theorists propose, since these could only
be made in “ideal” conditions that can never exist. Moreover, contractarian agreements about liberal-democratic principles are derived from “particular judgments we are inclined to make as practitioners of specific forms of life,” and we cannot expect all others in every situation to uphold them (Gray, 1989, as cited in Mouffe, 2000, p. 64).

She thus holds that that progression in democratic politics should not be linked to progressiveness in rationality, since reasoning is so contingent on the content of deliberation and on shared beliefs, and since it is impossible to find neutral ground on which to stage politics.

Therefore, when people denounce one another as “irrational” in a liberal political system, the denouncers are mistaken in accusing their opponents of misusing their mental faculties. More often, the perception of irrationality is actually based on a difference in beliefs (Mouffe, 2000, p. 65). This constructed, Eurocentric and masculinist conception of rationality has become reified in western societies such that it is largely uncontested in practice, and is now understood as the only means of being rational. Moreover, this conception of reason as neutrality has become so hegemonically entrenched in western consciousness that to be “politically neutral” is to adhere to the universalist conception of reason (and thus, consider the political world to be unipolar) in the first place.\footnote{It is this mutually constitutive relationship between reason and neutrality that makes this hegemonic conception so difficult to dislodge. If reason had been constructed in such a way that it did not consider neutrality or objectivity as key components of rationality, it could not have deemed itself the only reasonable position to hold. Universal reason has been constructed on circular logic: to be reasonable, one must be neutral and objective. One cannot be neutral and objective unless there are conditions according to which neutrality and objectivity can be validated. Reason provides the tools to validate something as neutral and objective (in this case, the claim that there can be a universal conception of the good regime, which can be inferred through reason). Thus, reason is neutral and objective, and vice-versa.}
**Reasonableness and Rational Consensus in Deliberation.** Deliberative models’ tendency to legitimize only those ideas that all participants would find reasonable—and thus, in western societies, that all participants would ideally recognize as rational, neutral, and objective—prevents certain issues from influencing decision-making. Meira Levinson (2002) elaborates on minority groups’ relative lack of influence when participating in deliberation. She explains how majority groups often misinterpret minority views as “extreme,” how the double-standard for majority and minority norms dismisses the latter’s norms as “sectarian,” and how majority groups often reinterpret minority positions to make them seem more “reasonable.” It follows that certain issues tend not to be discussed at all, since those who wish to contest a norm feel as though they will not be heard or because those in power shut down their attempts to raise issues.

Levinson (2002) discusses how a religious conservative might wish to ban pornography because it “desecrates God sacred vessel,” but can only advance this argument publicly if she frames it in secular terms (e.g. pornography promotes violence against women). “While this act of translation may allow her to promote her ultimate goal of banning pornography [...] it also distorts her position in the meantime” (p. 268). Even if the end result is that pornography is banned, the religious perspective on pornography does not form part of the solution and gains no ground for legitimacy in public deliberation. It may be that hardcore pornography is banned in the name of women’s protection but that softcore pornography remains permissible, and now secular feminists (for the sake of argument) are all content with the solution. But the religious issues with softcore pornography will continue to exist for religious
conservatives, and the most “reasonable” channel for them to express this issue (i.e. the reframing of the issue in secular terms) has been all but exhausted. If the particular socio-historic construction of reason dismisses religious arguments as irrational, the issue of softcore pornography may remain unchallenged (or simply be dismissed) through deliberative channels.

Levinson’s example makes a strong case for the conscientious expansion of what can be considered “reasonable” and thus provides a critique of the intersection between reasonableness (as emphasized by deliberative democrats) and the socio-historical construction of rationality. Her example demonstrates that deliberation’s consensus orientation is exclusionary because the religious conservative in her example is unable to speak to the majority on her own terms, specifically because the terms of discussion have been hegemonically constituted. However, this argument alone does not make explicit why it is important to attend to the passionate demands of civic life. The case for passions becomes clearer only when we acknowledge that exposing the contested nature of supposedly neutral hegemonic terrain is always a passionate affair.

Mouffe (2005) explains how truly political relationships are always partisan in nature, because they are bound up in affective ties between left and right. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, she argues that those on the same end of the political spectrum are affectively inclined to view one another as “friends.” However, departing from Schmitt (1932/1976), she favours an agonistic view of the political other as an “adversary” who has a different interpretation of core ethico-political values. Mouffe

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54 Schmitt’s (1932/1976) original thesis was that the deep differences between political communities could be explained in terms of the “friend/enemy” distinction, where the enemy must be “utterly destroyed” (p. 36).
(2005) argues that “liberal” democratic theories (under which I classify deliberative models) also eschew the “friend/enemy” distinction, but create instead a framework based on liberal economics (i.e., capitalism). The deliberative focus on consensus requires that those who participate in deliberation must consider agreement a possibility before entering (Young, 2000, p. 24), and this orientation toward consensus precludes the friend/enemy distinction. Deliberative frameworks instead rely on the “friend/competitor” distinction in which participants vie to displace one another within the existing hegemonic structure (the market), which they recognize as neutral terrain (Ruitenberg, 2009). However, they do not contest the neutrality of this terrain and thus do not argue for “clearly differentiated democratic positions” as the friend/adversary would in an agonistic model (Mouffe, 2005, p. 278).

At an affective level, then, deliberative models mask conflict by construing as a “friend/competitor” distinction what is really only a “friend/friend” distinction. In so doing, they create the illusion of conflict (and thus of conflict resolution). This might easily exclude certain viewpoints that (in much of the western world) contest the neutrality or objectivity of the rational hegemonic structure. Returning to Levinson’s (2002) example of a religious conservative, it becomes clear that adversarial issues in deliberative frameworks must be reframed in the language of “competitors” lest they be dismissed as too radical or sectarian. An agonist framework can help resolve this issue in demonstrating that we need not treat adversaries as moral enemies or as merely competitors. Ruitenberg (2009) argues that educators must show how “the supposed neutrality of the terrain in which different groups fight for their view of a just society is contested, and that the economic paradigm that pervades both politics and education is
made explicit as paradigm” (p. 278). I maintain that this work is not possible unless curricula open spaces for students to passionately determine what views they consider friendly or adversarial, and how to express dissenting ideas through political subjectification. I return to this idea below.

For their part, deliberative models can prepare students to critically dissect issues in order to determine which principles underlie them. Since most deliberative models presume some universal commonalities among participants as a starting point for political deliberation, students learn to analyze how and when certain issues cross these limits. Joseph Diorio (2011) discusses how civic education prepares students to deliberate about political issues. Most civic education courses in practice, he claims, presume the existence of

two domains of citizenship: one a realm of unchallengeable beliefs which all people must share, and another in which political contests can be pursued by divergent parties. Social membership requires acceptance of the beliefs defined in the first domain, which are assumed to be extra-cultural; political contests thus supposedly do not challenge fundamental social beliefs. (p. 505)

His agonistic criticism of deliberative models is that the first realm of shared principles can and ought to be legitimately challenged in the political sphere, even if civic educators rarely like to acknowledge it. Following Mouffe, he insists that the interpretation of these shared principles and beliefs is open to challenge. I add that the domain of unchallengeable beliefs is often simply too thick to permit any real disagreement.
Diorio (2011) worries that, as a consequence of upholding certain domains of
citizenship as unchallengeable, civic educators will reify status quo interpretations of
political inclusion. Writing from the context of Northern Ireland, he uses gay marriage
(there, illegal) as an example. Rather than asking students to deliberate whether gay
citizens should be granted equal rights in marriage, educators are inclined to engage
students in discussions that fail to address the political and thus exclusionary
limitations of citizenship as a vehicle for rights-claiming (pp. 506-507). Diorio argues
that this liberal conception of politics, which aims for consensus based on rational
principles, effectively banishes these tougher questions—and the passions that come
with them—from the classroom.

A classroom based on the liberal model, Diorio (2011) asserts, constrains
discussion in a way that the “real world” does not by formally narrowing the field of
“acceptable” discourse to certain interpretations of principles that are, in reality,
contested. It thus fails to prepare some students to face defeat since they may only learn
to face situations where they are guaranteed to win (p. 521). Moreover, classroom
discussions about political issues like gay marriage are about more than reasoned
argumentation; they have an impact on many students’ “life chances” (p. 522). Thus,
they are far from dispassionate and should not be treated as such. Rather than sweep
these questions under the rug or depoliticize them, an agonistic framework can teach
students how to channel the passions they are likely to feel inside and outside the
classroom.

Accordingly, educators cannot simply treat certain issues as emotionally neutral.
Rather, they must create spaces for students to explore the more passionate
consequences of the issues. In so doing, educators will better prepare students for political life outside of school, where people’s life chances really are at stake and where political debate is risky rather than merely competitive. Politics in the “real world” is not dispassionate, and students must be emotionally prepared to face any possible outcome. Equally importantly, educating for political passions will open other avenues for students to creatively and critically question, on the grounds of impassioned partisan attachments, the supposedly unshakeable foundations of “shared” rational principles.

Thus, passions reveal weaknesses in deliberative presumptions of the common good by reminding students that ostensibly shared principles, which may appear fair and just on paper, have consequences for students’ lived, impassioned experiences, and are open to modification. This helps demonstrate how passion is not at odds with reason, since the former can open spaces for more deeply critical argumentation. Said differently, by opening classroom discussion to highly passionate issues and by making clear the impassioned nature of supposedly “emotionally neutral” issues, students have the opportunity to depart from depoliticized ways of thinking and exercise their critical reasoning in a different way. They may be asked, for instance, to investigate what makes the agonistic dynamic between conflicting issues so passionately charged, and to reflect on how their passions inform their (supposedly reasoned) beliefs on a given issue (more on this below).

Another consequence of the construction of rationality according to masculinist, European values is the idea that more obviously passionate issues should be private rather than public matters, and are thus “inappropriate” for public deliberation. As we
will see, many issues about identity—or, more particularly, subjectivity—are considered private ground, leaving many questions largely untouched until very recently. The question of transgender rights, for example, has been considered irrelevant and private until recently. Bill C-279 was introduced in 2011 and has died (and been revived) twice since. This controversial Bill proposes the addition of “gender identity” to the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code, making it illegal to discriminate against people based on their gender expression. This example demonstrates that attending to identity and subjectivity as impassioned, political phenomena can be productive in liberal democracies. The exclusion of ostensibly “irrational” ideas from political life has particular consequences for exercising dissent, since dissent on political matters is always affectively motivated.

Acting upon one’s political, adversarial ties in the form of dissent requires the transformation of a political subject—a process known as political subjectification. As I explain in Chapter Three, I draw from both Rancière and Mouffe in my understanding of subjectification. Recall that Mouffe (2005) rejects liberal, rationalist models of democracy and demands that we consider subjectification an impassioned process. For her, liberal theories treat the world as “post-political,” that is, as unitary to the degree that all disagreement can be resolved through rational processes (including deliberation). While it is necessary to have thin consensus about a liberal-democratic society’s core ethico-political values, politics is really about the interpretation of these values along the adversarial lines of “left” and “right” (p. 31). Unlike deliberative models, Mouffe’s is a conflict-centered approach to politics that takes as given these deep differences in interpretation and examines how these differences inform political
identities. Traditional deliberative models’ emphasis on rationality leaves little room to prepare students to transform their passionate (and supposedly private) identities through political subjectification.

Deliberation can leave room for subjectification, depending how deliberation is conceived. Rancière (2000/2004) discusses literature, among other arts, as a channel through which the aesthetico-political field can be modified to expand common considerations of what is “common to language and the sensible distribution of spaces and occupations” (p. 40). Michèle Lalonde’s (1971) poem, *Speak White*, is a good example of this sort of literature. This poem counters Anglophone Canadians’ assertions that English is the language of the rational, the sensible, and the White, and that French is the language of a “*peu brillant*” (not-so-bright) and “*rancunier*” (bitter) nation. It instead ties the English language to the linguistically, racially, ideologically and economically oppressive Anglophone world, implicitly questioning what is so sensible about such a repressive and violent order. This poem acts as a form of impassioned dissent in its own right by appealing to a sentiment of unity in shared struggle, but it does more. *Speak White* at once transforms the identity of an ostensibly “*inculte et bègue*” (uncultivated and stuttering) nation into a subversive yet sensible people, and unites this (d)enunciative collective against Anglo-imperialism.

If this sort of literature is considered deliberative, then deliberative democracy does indeed provide space for subjectification and thus for passionate dissent. However, the consensus-oriented deliberative models I am concerned with tend to dismiss the uncertain, (d)enunciative collectives that this literature creates (whom I equate here with subaltern counterpublics). In either case, since I conceive of dissent as
a positive right, civic educators must ensure that students are prepared to mobilize their passions for subjectification if their claims to equality are infringed upon. However, useful as the ability to dissent passionately may be, students should not only understand how to harness and channel their passions because this capacity prepares them to dissent. The capacity to harness and channel passions can also provide resistance to external manipulation of students’ passions, and the lack of this capacity can be dangerous.

**Teaching for Resistance to Manipulations of Passions**

**Passions as Constructed Terrain.** In order to understand how passions can be manipulated as a means of socio-political control (and in resistance to this control), it is first necessary to accept that, in addition to being biological phenomena, passions are socially and politically constructed. Because I take a broad view of passions as cognitive responses to the socio-cultural environment, there is space to consider how power relations influence political passion. I am particularly concerned with the ability of the powerful to mobilize others’ passions as part of a hegemonic project. They do not only do so explicitly (consider the demagogue who harnesses the people’s fear of the other to gain political power), but they also construct the dominant socio-cultural terrain in ways that shape and police passions.

This terrain is, in part, constructed through a series of discursive signs. Abu-Lughod & Lutz (1990) explain how

Power relations determine what can, cannot, or must be said about self and emotion, what is taken to be true or false about them, and what only some
individuals can say about them. [...] Emotion discourses establish, assert, challenge, or reinforce power or status differences. (p. 14, as cited in Zembylas, 2013, p. 86)

As we have seen in Chapter Two, and will see in Chapter Five, Canadian civics courses generally disregard certain forms of passionate expression. This is particularly true for those that do not reconcile easily with consensus-oriented forms of deliberation, as they may be considered antithetical to Eurocentric norms of objectivity, and thus, validity (see Peters, 2011).

Students are often taught to approach topics without expressing strong forms of passion that, they are told, can preclude problem solving. For example, students may be asked to downplay their anxiety about a local factory closure or their nostalgia for a provincial park out of concern that these passions will “cloud their judgment” on related issues. In these cases, the powerful have established and re-asserted discourse about what is “acceptable” by actively reproducing masculinist and Eurocentric norms of objectivity, and by demanding that students internalize these norms and behave accordingly (“Be reasonable!”) (O’Brien, 2004). Students embody (or resist embodying) these norms, thus influencing the expression of their passions on a moral level.

**Against Manipulative Exercises of Passion.** Despite the potential for these norms to become oppressive, establishing a structure for the productive expression of passions is not always a bad thing. As Mouffe reminds us, it is necessary to ensure that expressions of passion do not isolate the actor or other people from core ethico-political principles. For instance, expressions of passion in favour of Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) cannot be considered legitimate, since they are premised on the rejection of the core principles of
a pluralist liberal democracy. What is particularly dangerous is when the mobilization of political passion is uncritical or manipulative. By witnessing the deconstruction of the binary between reason and passion, it becomes clearer that passions are always present in civic life and, by extension, the civics classroom. A more narrow focus on developing rational capacities and reasonableness alone will do little to prepare students to face situations where their passions are put to the test. I have in mind the exclusionary appeals to passions put forward by demagogues, appeals to unfettered devotion to a given object (e.g., the nation-state or the monarchy), and similar challenges that entice people to separate their rational capacities from their passions. I argue in this section that to manipulate passions involves the separation of rationality and passion such that subjects are coerced into exercising one at the expense of rendering the other invisible.

To resist the forms of manipulation I have in mind, it would be helpful for students to learn what these challenges look like. This requires the understanding that passions are constructed as well as cognitive in nature, and an understanding of how passions can be mobilized unproductively or uncritically. Educators should also teach students how they might harness their passions in resistance to uncritical mobilizations of passion. This requires students to develop the capacity and disposition to evaluate their passions rationally and critically, and to attend to their passions to evaluate their critical reasoning.

Teaching students to understand and guide their own passions, and to resist the manipulation of their passions by others, involves what Zembylas (2013) calls critical emotional reflexivity. Emotional reflexivity demands that curricula provide space for
“teachers and students [to] critically reflect on how emotion discourses may contribute to perpetuating or challenging social exclusions and injustices” (p. 94). Critical emotional reflexivity asks students to reflect “specifically how emotions can be engaged as critical and transformative forces,” specifically as they relate to power (in)equalities (Zembylas, 2008). Classroom discussions of political matters will inevitably be passionate, and it is crucial that students learn to attend to the ways that passions shape their critical responses to what they learn. This will help students learn to identify the passions they are experiencing and thus how to channel them more productively. More importantly for this discussion, critical emotional reflexivity can help students recognize when others are appealing to their passions in hopes of mobilizing them for political gain.

The ability to recognize when others are appealing to one’s passions is vital because it helps people decide whether this appeal is worth their time and energy. Demagogues, for instance, often appeal to emotions like anger, pride, or fear as a substitute for critical reflection on an issue. Adding to Zembylas’ account of emotions as critically transformative forces, I mean by “critical reflection” the sort of appraisal deeming whether a political endeavour is consistent with core ethico-political principles, and also worth a student's time and energy. Critical reflection does not mean that students ask whether they are feeling the “right” kind or proportion of passions according to some external standard, but rather determine for themselves what their own standard for these questions should be.

It is largely to feminist scholarship that this sort of reflexivity can be considered a legitimate pedagogical tool, especially to transform consciousness. In particular,
Boler’s (1999) account of how analytic reflection can “evaluate the complex relations of power and emotion” is key for this project (p. 157). The development of critical passions counters manipulative appeals by putting into question the potential lack of criticality that informs the mobilization of these passions as well as the conditions necessary for these appeals to be considered sensible in the first place. A leader’s appeal to fear the “others” who seek refuge within “our” borders, for example, can be countered by questioning the logic of the arguments that influence such fearful dispositions (“are they really dangerous?”), considering the contingency of “our” versus “their” territory, or by throwing into question the socio-cultural conditions that gave this leader a platform in the first place.

This form of resistance reminds students to be wary of attempts to separate their critical capacities from their passions, and especially to attend to the evaluative, moral intelligence that is bound up in their passions. This does not mean that all students will become less fearful of refugees; indeed, they may determine that there is good reason to fear the other. It does, however, provide space to reflect on why the refugee crisis arouses emotions such as fear or pride, or dispositions such as empathy or hatred. In this sense, I am arguing for increased attention to passions in civics curricula, but in a way that avoids thick, gendered, or culturally specific ideas about what constitutes “good” or “bad” passions. Political passions should be considered good or bad only insofar as they respect liberal-democratic societies’ thin, core ethico-political values.

Boler’s (1999) call for a feminist politics of emotion also guides this project in a helpful direction. A feminist politics of emotion is informed by the mantra, “the personal
is political.” It asks students to “articulate and publically name their emotions, and to critically and collectively analyze these emotions not as ‘natural,’ ‘private’ occurrences but rather as reflecting learned [power structures]” (pp. 112-113). In so doing, students learn to recognize how passions are both a means of social control and of resistance to said control. By emphasizing the collective and public nature of passions, these passions are politicized. The public expression of political passions demonstrates to students that their passions are not merely personal; they may share the same feelings with others. This is particularly helpful for those who feel marginalized in the current structure, and who may believe they are “crazy” for not feeling the same as “everyone else” (p. 114).

Indeed, the public expression of these passions is necessary for subaltern groups to form what Rancière (2000/2004) calls enunciative collectives (p 36), or what Fraser (1990) calls subaltern counterpublics. In both instances, shared passions can stimulate the marginalized to create or foster the development of parallel discursive arenas and “alternative” cultural production. Recall that passions are situated to do so because they provide dissociation from the existing order or dominant public and create signifying banners under which people can unite. For example, Spanish Civil War veteran Ted Allan (1939) penned his novel, *This Time, a Better Earth*, to garner support for Canadian communists fighting in the conflict. It appeals not only to readers’ anger against the fascist atrocities, but also to Canadians’ sense of guilt for ignoring the conflict and hope for a brighter future. Most importantly for our purposes, the novel counters the stigma

55 Boler is more specifically concerned with “hierarchies and gendered roles” but I believe it is possible to extend this concept to other power structures.
against Canadians who volunteered in Spain (then, an illegal and unpopular act) by fostering a sense of camaraderie and solidarity with “Norteamericano” communist communities. These sorts of collectives provide a degree of legitimacy, or at least mutual support, for subjects to explore why they feel the way they do, create and refine language with which to express their passions, agitate together for recognition, and recast their political identities accordingly.

A feminist politics of emotion—that is, the public naming, and collective analysis of emotions as sites of resistance—thus helps explain the importance of articulating passions to resist systemic injustices. The capacity to resist external appeals to disregard one’s passions is less bound up in the capacity to say, “No, I feel this way for a reason” and more in the capacity to say, “No, we feel this way for a reason. We, who heed our passions insofar as they recognize the injustices done to us or to others, will not stand for this.” Tired portrayals of passions as private terrain are a means of disregarding passions’ role as reasonable, evaluative appraisals. They presume that the subject is irrational, and that “the system is fine the way it is; it works for us. It’s your problem if you feel that way.” For this reason, it is important to remind students that their passions are rational and intelligent, and that they are not merely private matters.

Ruitenberg (2010b) maintains that schools must leave space for students to imagine alternative forms of collective life:

Asking students to imagine the society in which they would like to live can lead them to be disappointed with or angry at the current order, but this disappointment and anger are signs of affective engagement with an alternative social imaginary, and should not be feared or ruled out of bounds. (p. 50)
In so doing, students may find solidarity with others who empathize with their alternative imagining, and thus be better prepared and more disposed to articulate collective disagreement with the current social order. By witnessing the deconstruction of the binary between reason and passion, a feminist politics of emotion brings legitimacy to feelings of dissatisfaction or anger with the current order, and helps students resist the manipulative assertion that “everything is fine.” Leaving space for alternative imaginings is merely one means of collectively questioning any injustices of the status quo.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this chapter, I have theorized passions as a vital component of the capacity to dissent, but also as necessary for political life more generally. Most importantly for this thesis, it is irresponsible to ignore or suppress passions when they will inevitably be present in civics classrooms and civic life more generally. Students who never learn to channel passions productively may never foster the disposition to engage in civic life, including but not limited to the disposition to voice dissent when things go wrong. Additionally, if students do not grasp the passionate nature of the political, they may be unprepared to exercise dissent through channels that respect core ethico-political values, especially if those channels rely on affective ties to a collective. Failing to teach students that politics *qua* the political is a passionate affair may also leave them unable to resist manipulations of their passions for political gain. Civics curricula will be unable to counter these outcomes unless they witness the deconstruction of the binary between reason and passion that many deliberative theories uphold.
Chapter Five: Evaluating B.C.’s and Ontario’s Civics Curricula

In my youth, it was my good luck to have a few good teachers, men and women, who came into my head and lit a match.

—Yann Martel

We are right to admire the teachers who spark inspiration in students’ minds. But to kindle that flame and keep it alight is a much more difficult task, and teachers cannot accomplish it alone. I began this project in hopes of contributing to a culture of critical participation in Canadian democratic life, envisioning how formal schooling and the external curriculum might move students to develop an impassioned consciousness for dissent. Since that time, many events in Canada and around the world have underscored the importance of this work. Most recently, Black Lives Matter (B.L.M.)’s show of civil disobedience at Toronto’s Pride Parade highlighted how dissent can be legal, peaceful, political, impassioned, deliberative, embodied, and productive, yet still dismissed as “unreasonable” (Gollom, 2016). Within a few short days, B.L.M. and Pride alike were shamed in the media (Jamieson, 2016) and B.L.M. Toronto was “flooded with hate mail” (Black Lives Matter flooded, 2016).

The issue for this chapter is not whether B.L.M.’s most controversial demand in this protest, namely the barring of police floats from the parade, should be met by Pride Toronto. Rather, it is the (in)ability of many Canadians to treat this demand as legitimate and to consider those with whom they disagree as adversaries instead of enemies. In light of the antagonistic attitudes cited above, and similar attitudes

56 The productiveness of this protest is still disputed; while Toronto Pride’s executive director initially agreed to demands to bar police floats from participation, he has since backtracked on this promise, stating he only agreed to “get the parade moving again” (Gollom, 2016).
elsewhere since undertaking this project, I have only strengthened my conviction that schools should help instil an impassioned consciousness for dissent. The critiques I have advanced in the previous two chapters are designed to contribute to such a consciousness, but there must be curricular space to accomplish these aims.

The first of these critiques focuses on the capacity of deliberative models to open curricular spaces for students to learn the skills and dispositions to dissent when they perceive injustices in civic life. The second critiques deliberative models’ ability to create curricular space for students to harness and channel their political passions, especially as they pertain to dissent. These critiques form the basis for the normative standards I use in this chapter to evaluate B.C. and Ontario’s civics curricula.

In light of these critiques, the evaluative questions I am concerned with are:

2. How do the conceptions of democracy that underpin British Columbia and Ontario’s civics curricula open or close spaces for dissent?

3. How do the conceptions of democracy that underpin B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula open or close spaces for passionate responses to political issues?

Together, these help answer my primary research question, which is, “Insofar as they are informed by deliberative models of democracy, how might civics curricula in Ontario and B.C. foster or limit students’ ability to engage in dissent?” I will begin to answer these questions by reiterating the normative standards I have developed in the previous two chapters. I will then examine the degree to which each curriculum meets these standards before offering some concluding thoughts.
Normative Standards for Curricular Evaluation

Before outlining specific normative standards, I would like to remind readers here of four provisions that I have outlined throughout this thesis, all of which can ensure these standards are most easily implemented. First, I presume that civics curricula actively attempt to instil in students a desire to engage in civic life rather than treat them as passive recipients of rights who fulfill civic responsibilities without question. This means curricular values and content must be aligned with a commitment to participatory parity. Second, I propose that curricula adopt a semi-archic perspective to avoid constraining students’ engagement with civic life (see Biesta, 2011). This will prepare students to engage in civic life in any of its liberal-democratic forms because it instills in them a desire for the core ethico-political values that underpin liberal democracies, rather than for any particular democratic models or institutions. Moreover, this can foster students’ yearning for more democratic modes of human togetherness, both within the current order and in imagined, clearly differentiated alternatives.

Third, and related to this, I have developed these standards in view of a critical-radical, agonistic model of democracy. My intention in doing so is to ensure curricula make space for students to explore this perspective as one among many rather than adopt a critical-radical or agonistic model exclusively (or ignore these perspectives outright). This includes teaching the strengths and limitations of agonistic models just as would be done with other models of democracy. Fourth, I have argued that curricula should instill in students an impassioned consciousness for acts of political dissent. This is not an evaluative criterion but a framework that takes three normative statements as
given: (i) dissent, conceived broadly, can be an acceptable, effective, and sometimes uniquely appropriate means of engaging in civic life; (ii) political life is invariably a passionate affair; and (iii) both dissent and passions should be given critical attention in civics curricula.

The more specific evaluative standards I argue for are scattered throughout the previous chapters, and they touch on a wide variety of issues. As such, I summarize and organize them here into eight standards for clarification. In order to open spaces for dissent, as I have argued is valuable, curricula should:

1. Teach dissent as a positive right.
2. Teach what it means to channel impassioned dissent productively (i.e. dissent in line with core ethico-political values).
3. Discuss the legal implications of dissent.
4. Leave space for the consideration of democratic politics as a conflictual affair.
5. Help students identify which passions are valuable for democratic life.
6. Teach how passions are collectively constructed and how they can be mobilized collectively.
7. Teach for “reasoned” and “impassioned” forms of communication alike.
8. Make explicit the role passions play in dissent, in both its everyday and political forms.

I discuss each of these criteria in greater detail in the subsequent section, in which I determine the degree to which the models of democracy that inform B.C.’s and Ontario’s curricula open or close spaces for dissent.
Evaluation

1. Teaching dissent as a positive right

This criterion demands that curricula actively foster the critical and moral capacities for, and the disposition to, dissent when students perceive injustices in civic life. They should pay special attention to students’ ability to articulate disagreement with others. Curricula should also prepare students to express dissent on “everyday” matters as well as political matters (those dealing with claims to or infringements on core rights, especially those that extend the aesthetics-political field and transform political grammar). As I explain earlier, by “political grammar,” I refer to the language with which political claims (e.g., to justice, core democratic principles) might be meaningfully articulated between the empowered and disempowered.

B.C.’s curriculum (2005) is moderately effective at treating dissent as a positive right. It includes, for instance, deliberative and non-deliberative forms of dissent in a list of suggested means of civic engagement (p. 41). This curriculum frames dissenting activities among other forms of “civic discourse” and there is no guarantee that teachers will move beyond a descriptive approach to discuss how, when, or why they might be effective. Nevertheless, the curriculum offers two suggestions for assessment activities that frame non-deliberative dissent as a positive right (pp. 95, 102). Its suggested mock trial activity asks students to draw on a historic example of mass protest in Canada and to analyze what the outcome was, how effective this means was, determine alternative forms of civic action that could also be effective, and “the ways in which the protest may have had a positive impact, even if the protest was ‘shut down’” (p. 102). Its suggested quick-writing and debate activity on civil disobedience asks students to reflect on
causes for which they would be prepared to protest about and even to “break the law and perhaps be arrested... and/or go to jail” (p. 95). It also asks that students reflect on the causes of the 1993 Clayoquot Sound protest, including the power relations and ethical questions involved in the dispute. Together, these factors make space for dissent to be treated as a positive right in the B.C. curriculum.

Notwithstanding, there is substantial room for improvement here. While there are sections of this curriculum dedicated to in-depth discussions of dissent and disagreement, it is telling that these are merely suggestions for assessment activities that teachers may choose to use (or not use). These suggestions aside, there is no section of the curriculum that requires educators to discuss when, how, and why dissent might be appropriate. While the document asks educators to “help students understand that debate and controversy are part of the processes of civic discourse in a democratic society” (p. 47), it does not suggest that debate and controversy can be productive. Instead, controversy is framed as something to be avoided despite its inevitability. In a similar vein, the curriculum instils an understanding of the various political ideologies (e.g., liberalism, fascism, etc.), but circumscribes how these positions might conflict with one another. It suggests that ideological conflicts are to be resolved through party politics, but gives no mention of less formal strategies (pp. 68-69, 72).

Moreover, the overwhelmingly deliberative focus of the rest of the curriculum does not give readers the sense that dissent is a normal course of civic action. As Ruitenber (2015) points out, the B.C. curriculum’s deliberative democratic underpinning “de-emphasizes the egalitarian, constitutive aspect of citizenship, which positions the citizen not as rational, deliberative contributor to the state but as a critical
assessor of the state and potentially in disagreement with it” (p. 5). Said differently, the consensus-oriented nature of the text, with its emphasis on contributing to the social and political order rather than bringing it into question, largely treats dissent as an afterthought. Educators can certainly interpret the document to treat dissent as a positive right, but this may not be their initial impression.

Ontario’s curriculum (2013) fares quite poorly in this regard, treating dissent as a negative right. To begin with, dissent is rarely mentioned in the curriculum, and where it is, it is listed as one among many options for civic engagement. Moreover, the skills, attributes, and dispositions it inculcates among students highlight its aspiration to create informed citizens who cooperate and collaborate for social cohesion (p. 10). These are desirable aspects of civic life to be sure, but virtually devoid of—and even antithetical to—a view of society that views conflict or dissent as productive. In addition, the curriculum teaches the communicative skills and dispositions to articulate ideas with others, but it appears that these skills are intended to be used in “pro-social” problem-solving contexts rather than to articulate collective demands.

The curriculum attends to power dynamics and uneven influence among actors, but nowhere does it suggest how these power relations can be contested in view of a more equitable society. Given the highly deliberative tone elsewhere in the document, it seems as though citizens are expected to reduce power inequalities themselves through deliberative means. Overall, the curriculum does not explicitly open spaces for discussions of when, why, and how dissent can be appropriate or valuable, suggesting simply that dissent is one means of engaging in civic action. It does, however, suggest that people engage in civic action for “everyday” and political reasons alike. Ontario's
curriculum does not close spaces for discussion of dissent as a positive right. However, the text gives no indication that such discussion should be included.

2. Teaching what it means to channel passions productively, especially for dissent.

This criterion demands that curricula teach which channels are available for students to exercise civic and political passions productively (meaning that they are in line with the core ethico-political values of a liberal democracy). Channels providing space for dissent are particularly important. Where channels are inaccessible, curricula should provide channels of their own. These channels should be sensitive to the diverse means of civic and political engagement that various individuals and groups have found accessible and effective. This must include productively impassioned forms of engagement, especially dissent. The passions that curricula inculcate should not aim for control of passions, but should aim instead to open as many avenues for the productive expression of passions as possible. In addition, they should not advocate violence, but should open spaces for discussions of whether civil disobedience can be appropriate or effective.

Curricula should also make clear that students must respect those they disagree with and dissent from, as long as their opponents’ positions are in line with core ethico-political principles. This includes making clear why students might disagree with some positions so as to help them determine which channels are appropriate for dissent. Specifically, to help determine which channels are most appropriate, curricula should
help students decide whether they disagree with their opponents because they are acting unreasonably,\textsuperscript{57} or because they simply interpret core principles differently.

B.C.’s curriculum (2005) puts ample focus on respect as an attribute of good citizens, including respect for privacy, diversity, differing viewpoints, others’ contributions, and rights and freedoms. It is dedicated to promoting an open and inclusive environment, and there is good reason to believe the document fosters this endeavour. The text is nevertheless vague about what sorts of differences students should expect to encounter in a given classroom, limiting this to a vague discussion of the “beliefs and values [that] might affect their position” and the “challenges of reconciling diverse value systems” (p. 39). Although it is unclear whether there are some beliefs and values that have no place in the B.C. civics classroom, the document’s frequent references to various human rights codes suggest that beliefs and practices violating these codes should be constrained accordingly.

While this establishes a loose framework for the limits of what should or should not be up for discussion in a liberal democracy, the document does little to teach students why they might disagree with one another. I maintain that the link between differing viewpoints and the limits of acceptable beliefs and values should be made clearer, so that it is clear which political channels should be opened or closed for dissent while still enabling respectful disagreement. The document already lists—and in some case, discusses in depth—many channels available for citizens to exercise dissent.

\textsuperscript{57} Unreasonableness should not be equated with irrationality. Opponents cannot remain respectful of one another if treat each other as irrational. Unreasonableness refers to unwillingness to listen to the other’s position or change one’s views accordingly.
Altogether, it seems to me that the B.C. curriculum creates space for students to determine which channels can express disagreement, but it is limited in two key respects. First, as noted above, I believe its discussion of direct action in the forms of protest and civil disobedience should be made compulsory rather than a suggested assessment activity. Second, the document largely favours deliberative channels for dissent, but it provides inadequate attention to many impassioned forms of expression that marginalized groups have used to form counterpublics by transforming or countering the common grammar of sensibility. Those related to cultural production (e.g., songs, poetry, dance, book clubs, etc.) are particularly important yet notably absent.

Ontario’s curriculum at once opens and closes spaces for students to learn to channel dissent productively. Its non-prescriptive nature leaves ample space for these discussions to occur, and it suggests a wide variety of means students might engage with civic life to protect or contribute to the common good. These include more creative, countercultural forms that B.C.’s leaves out, such as writing a protest song (p. 150). However, even when the document suggests activities related to “direct action” that express disagreement (e.g., boycotts, demonstrations), it tends to neutralize them. First, the curriculum’s consensus-oriented nature presumes that these acts will not throw into question what constitutes the common good. Second, the text’s fairly thick understanding of the common good and its notions of how ideal citizens should act within the current order are not conducive to channelling disagreement in view of counter-hegemonic alternatives.
Still, like B.C.’s curriculum, Ontario makes fairly clear what expectations there are of students to be respectful of those with whom they disagree. Both documents inadequately define the parameters of what constitutes appropriate limits on values and beliefs in a liberal democracy. The curriculum never explicitly defines these values outside references to formal declarations of human rights. Accordingly, references to dissent in the form of direct action appear reserved for these rights infringements and less appropriate for “everyday” dissent. The curriculum is better prepared to open and provide channels to deliberative forms of dissent, especially in so-called “reasoned,” argumentative discussions. As such, I suggest that direct action channels be opened for less explicitly “political” dissent; these channels are particularly useful where inequalities give those in power few incentives to be reasonable about dissenters' demands (Young, 2001).

Particularly concerning is that Ontario’s curriculum makes no reference to civil disobedience. Should students exercise non-deliberative dissent in the forms of direct action and civil disobedience, it is likely they will lack the knowledge of how to do so effectively, what the ethical implications of their actions may be, and what risks they pose to themselves or others in so doing. I suggest that, following B.C.’s example, Ontario create space for students to determine whether there are occasions where breaking the law may be a form of productive civic action. However, unlike B.C., Ontario should make these spaces explicit and ensure that students are aware of the potential effectiveness and implications of civilly disobedient actions.
3. Addressing legal questions

Civics curricula should explain why laws are important and citizens have good reason to respect most of them. Ideally, this would include a discussion of how the legislative and judicial branches work, with particular attention to how laws are made and enforced. However, it should also be made clear that the legislative branch does not have a monopoly on morality, and that laws are fallible because they are human constructs. Curricula should also ensure students are aware of the legal risks of dissent, and especially that marginalized groups are likely to face greater risks.

B.C. and Ontario are both committed to ensuring that students uphold the law and recognize that their rights and responsibilities are enshrined in the legal system. Both also teach about how laws are formed and upheld, and how these processes are influenced by various beliefs and power dynamics. While these factors imply that laws enshrine certain ethics, values, and beliefs over others, this imbalance is not made explicit in Ontario’s curriculum. In B.C.’s suggested discussion of civil disobedience, however, it acknowledges that laws can or should sometimes be called into question.

Thus, both curricula currently leave space for these discussions to occur, but I suggest that the human construction of laws be made explicit and compulsory in view of providing students more political efficacy. This suggestion is aligned with contemporary deliberative theory (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996), and can also provide more space for counter-hegemonic alternatives to current interpretations of core values, as post-deliberative models favour. Ontario’s more deliberative outlook on civil disobedience and the limitations of laws provides insufficient space to throw dominant, “shared” conceptions of justice into question. Thus, while students should understand
why laws are important and reflect many shared concerns and even common goods in society, they should recognize that the law does not have a monopoly on morality.

In another vein, both curricula disavow political violence, as they should. What they fail to discuss is how students face uneven risks when exercising dissent—even non-violent dissent—both in the judicial system and in the possibility of personal harm. I recommend that both curricula explicitly discuss these risks with students, focusing especially on the trends of unevenly dispersed justice for marginalized groups. Historical and contemporary examples should be used here, but educators should open these discussions non-prescriptively to avoid overt bias. One recent, historical example includes the women arrested at the Clayoquot Sound protests of 1993, who faced intimidation and sexual harassment behind bars (MacIsaac & Champagne, 1994, in Walter, 2007, pp. 259-260).

4. Leaving space for the consideration of democratic politics as a conflictual affair

To repeat my assertion above, despite my normative views, curricula should not espouse agonistic models of democracy alone. They should instead provide space for the strengths and limitations of major democratic models. As such, curricula should make clear that what is “reasonable” can be determined by political communities, but should also make students aware that universal conceptions of reason and justice can have constraining and exclusionary effects on decision-making. Similarly, the curricula should substantively discuss with students whether civic and political life can ever be neutral or objective. All models of democracy aim to minimize political inequalities, but to varying degrees. While aggregative models consider the “one person, one vote”
principle a sufficient guarantor of equality, virtually all post-deliberative and many
deliberative models pursue equity by minimizing power inequalities of culture, class,
and the like. Thus, curricula should discuss how equality and equity—a distinction
already present in these curricula—provide different interpretations of how to contest
power inequalities. They should also critically explore with students how power
inequalities can be minimized.

Moreover, any conception of the common good should be grounded in the core
ethico-political principles of liberal democracies so that students can determine for
themselves whether additional guiding principles are appropriate for their local,
provincial, state, and global communities. No realm of discussion consistent with core
principles should be considered “unchallengeable.” Curricula should also include a basic
definition of what hegemony is and how it operates. This should open space for
students to question whether or not the assumptions underlying the current order (for
instance, the goods outlined in the constitution) are best for everyone, along with a
description of how the amendment formula permits for constitutional amendments.

Neither curriculum provides much space for considerations of democratic life as
an inherently conflictual affair. Neither text forecloses this possibility, but their
consensus-oriented nature (especially B.C.), as well as their fairly communitarian
notions of ideal citizens’ character and thick notions of the common good (especially in
Ontario) are more likely to sway discussion in favour of democratic cohesion. Despite

58 B.C. has already introduced discussions of hegemony into its Grade 12 Social Justice course (B.C.
Ministry of Education, 2008). However, this course is an elective, and not widely available across the
province. I have made note of it here to suggest that this concept can be appropriate for secondary-aged
students.
these deliberative tendencies, neither curriculum discusses to a significant degree whether and how reason is constructed. This is perhaps unsurprising for students in Grade 10 (Ontario) and Grade 11 (B.C.). However, I maintain that students at this level are prepared to understand that some views can be dismissed as irrational even when they are perfectly valid. For example, a student’s demand to be addressed with a pronoun outside the male-female gender binary (e.g., “they,” “ze,” etc.) does not mean the student is merely “seeking attention.” They likely have legitimate reasons—intimately tied to their passions—to eschew the binary, even though others may dismiss this demand as irrational.

It may be challenging to explain to students of this level that Canadian discourse of “reasonableness” tends to favour masculinist and European views. However, they might be asked who has typically enacted major decisions and laws in Canada, and why they might favour some groups and individuals over others. Both curricula already include these discussions. However, I maintain that curricula can do more still. Both provinces should also explain how this relates to a basic conception of hegemony in order to show students that laws and presumptions about the common good can, but do not necessarily, reflect everyone’s best interests.

These discussions can be linked to questions of pluralism and diversity in society, but in a way that makes clear that decision-making involving deep differences virtually always results in some people being excluded from these decisions. In line with other criteria here, there should be space to explore which channels are appropriate for those who might be excluded to voice their disagreement. Even if these discussions are watered down to make them appropriate for students at this level,
educators can at least provide a vocabulary for students to understand these discussions when they are better prepared to do so. For instance, educators might point to the exclusion of Indigenous languages such as Inuktitut from Canada’s official bilingualism policy, and ask what arguments can be made for and against their inclusion. More importantly, students should be asked to consider who enacted the official bilingualism policy, what the socio-cultural and historical context of that decision was, why this policy remains unchanged, and what role concepts such as “dominant culture,” “reasonable accommodation,” and “systemic discrimination” play (or do not play).

5. Helping students learn which passions can be important for civic life

Curricula should not treat reason and passion as separate or hierarchal entities, but instead deconstruct the reason-passion binary either implicitly or explicitly. They should foster the understanding that specifically “political passions” are expressed on behalf of a collective rather than to address personal affronts, and that they are connected to a “substantive vision of a just society” (Ruitenberg, 2009, p. 277). The texts should include attention to principle-dependent passions as well as those that disrupt existing “scripts” of democratic citizenship. These passions may be considered acceptable whether or not they are “pro-social,” as long as they remain consistent with the core principles of a liberal democracy. Curricula should not advocate for any particular passion over another, as long as those passions can be considered “political.”
Finally, they should include ample space for critical emotional reflexivity (Zembylas, 2013).59

The B.C. curriculum (2005) is concerned with the “affective domain” of learning, which “concerns attitudes, beliefs, and the spectrum of values and value systems” (p. 21). Of particular interest here are the “attitudes” that B.C. attempts to inculcate, since this term most closely matches what I have called here civic and political “dispositions.” British Columbia’s conception of appropriate civic attitudes is highly consistent with deliberative dispositions (p. 34). I am concerned that these attitudes are too narrowly focused on deliberative procedure, especially reasonableness, and do not openly avow commitments to attitudes that are not necessarily “pro-social” in deliberative terms. For instance, they do not give attention to students’ willingness to voice disagreement or their disposition to articulate demands with others, as post-deliberative models might. Furthermore, the lack of space for the treatment of passions privileges a rationalist view of democratic life over a passionate one. This is highlighted by the front matter assertion that “domains of learning and, particularly, cognitive levels, inform the design and development of the Graduation Program examination for this course” (p. 21, emphasis mine).

Aside from empathy and care—often considered “pro-social” emotions—the B.C. curriculum makes no references to specific political passions such as anger, love, hope, and the like. This leaves space to consider any emotion as a political passion, but it is far

59 Recall that for Zembylas, emotional reflexivity demands that curricula provide space for “teachers and students [to] critically reflect on how emotion discourses may contribute to perpetuating or challenging social exclusions and injustices” (p. 94). Critical emotional reflexivity, asks students to reflect “specifically how emotions can be engaged as critical and transformative forces,” particularly as they pertain to power relations (Zembylas, 2008).
more likely that these discussions will fall to the wayside due to the rationalist democratic consciousness that these curricula (and, I believe, most Canadians) espouse. Similarly, B.C.’s promotion of traditionally pro-social civic emotions over more disruptive, political ones may lead discussions to be framed through a deliberative lens and creates little space for the post-deliberative model I advocate for here. Finally, the absence of space for discussions of passion in B.C.’s curriculum does not actively open spaces for critical emotional reflexivity. It does not open spaces, for instance, for students and teachers to reflect on how their passions can be constructed according to certain ideologies or how they can be mobilized for political power. This absence will almost certainly leave students underprepared to understand which political passions can be important for civic and political life.

Ontario’s curriculum (2013) fares no better since its references to passions are scant overall. It makes explicit that the dispositions and emotions of caring, dignity, empathy, and trust are all vital for healthy relationships, but this is a very short list. Moreover, like B.C.’s preferred civic emotions, all of these passions are typically considered pro-social from a consensus-oriented standpoint. The text does not make explicit that other passions, especially those that disrupt pre-established scripts of citizenship, can be valuable as well. Overall, the curriculum opens virtually no spaces for critical emotional reflexivity. Unlike B.C., however, it does not explicitly avow a commitment to cognitive demands over emotional ones. Instead, it considers these concepts distinct yet connected (p. 4). Despite this avowed commitment to fostering students’ cognitive and emotional development, the text opens virtually no space for
students to learn which civic passions can be appropriate or valuable for civic and political life.

6. Considering how passions are collectively constructed and how they can be mobilized collectively

Curricula should make clear that the ways passions are constructed and expressed are not only biological and embodied, but also influenced by collective norms and circumstances. Moreover, they should demonstrate how passions can be mobilized by collectives for particular civic and political purposes, including in manipulative forms (e.g., by demagogues or for blind patriotism). This standard demands that students learn to express emotions publicly rather than internalizing them privately (see Boler, 1999). This underscores the importance of teaching the role of allies and accomplices\(^\text{60}\) in a social justice context.

Neither curriculum deals extensively with how passions are collectively constructed and mobilized. Neither makes clear whether passions are embodied, biological, public, or private, although Ontario’s provides a significant number of examples of embodied channels through which political passions can be expressed (more on this below). Each curriculum should make explicit that passions come in all of these forms and that each can be channelled differently. In addition, if we consider Ontario’s (2013) references to values and beliefs as impassioned as does B.C. (2005), this consideration opens more space for the understanding of passions as constructed

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\(^\text{60}\) “Accomplice” may be a more appropriate word than “ally,” since “accomplices put their body on the line” (Cayungal, cited in Plaut, 2016).
terrain. Ontario should make explicit whether values and beliefs, phenomena it considers individual and social (p. 183), are also impassioned phenomena (and I maintain that they are). However, both curricula need to dedicate clearly demarcated space to this discussion, along with why passions’ collectively constructed nature is important. This should include understandings that collectively constructed passions can be empowering as well as manipulative. These topics will provide a backbone for the existing discussions in both curricula about how passions, expressed as values and beliefs, can be mobilized. They will also create more space to teach the importance of allies in social justice movements. Here, too, curricula should ensure that specific emotions—not just impassioned values and beliefs—can be constructed and mobilized collectively.

7. Teaching for “reasoned” and “impassioned” forms of communication alike.

Curricula should recognize that all forms of communication are at once rational and impassioned, and that those considered “impassioned” have equal merit in civic life. Curricula should inculcate the skills and dispositions necessary to express and understand forms of communication generally considered more impassioned (e.g., greeting, storytelling, rhetoric). B.C.’s curriculum (2005) emphasizes highly rational, cognitively oriented forms of communication such as argumentation and debate in its curriculum. Openly committing to the “cognitive domain” of students’ development over the affective domain (p. 21), the skills B.C. asks students to develop largely are largely framed through a deliberative lens as dispassionate. The more passionate aspects of supposedly “rational” forms of argumentation—such as the “heated” nature
of an argument or the partisan nature of a debate—are given virtually no space in the
document. Students are not asked to develop the more creative or embodied skills
associated with more impassioned forms of communication, and considerations of
passion in this regard are nearly always relegated to the sidelines. The emphasis on
respect for differences leaves space to consider more passionate forms of
communication, but does little to develop the skills required to exercise them. Overall,
then, it is highly unlikely that relatively impassioned forms of communication or their
corresponding skill-sets will receive much consideration in this curriculum.

Ontario’s (2013) curriculum leaves more space for these sorts of considerations,
advocating relatively impassioned and cognitive forms of communication with fairly
equal frequency. Like B.C., however, Ontario’s curriculum focuses on cognitive and
rational skills instead of more creative and embodied ones. This may leave students
comparatively unprepared to exercise relatively impassioned forms of communication.
For instance, the curriculum teaches quite heavily for logical argumentation skills,
which can easily be put to use in debate. Although the same document contends that a
relatively impassioned form—a protest song—can be a useful form of communication,
it does not attempt to inculcate corresponding skills and capacities (e.g., creative
attributes, comfort with public performance) that are also useful for civic life. The
relatively rationalist skills emphasized elsewhere do little to prepare students to engage
in embodied communication. Consider, for example, a sit-in, where a dissenter’s body is
the primary means of communication. I suggest that Ontario continue to emphasize
traditionally rationalist and impassioned forms of communication equally, but include a
greater diversity of forms of communication in its examples. Furthermore, the text
should emphasize the skills and capacities necessary to engage in comparatively impassioned forms of communication.

8. Making explicit the role passions play in dissent, in both its everyday and political forms

Curricula should make clear that passions are useful for everyday engagements in civic life but also for expressions of dissent. As part of this understanding, they should inculcate the ability to imagine alternative forms of democratic togetherness and the role of public passions in creating and strengthening identities. Furthermore, this requires them to provide space for students to explore subject positions and undergo subjectification through their reason and their passions. To do so, curricula should teach that political identities are fluid and can be strategically articulated with others. This in turn requires space for students to explore what views they consider friendly or adversarial, a process involving self-assessment and critique.

British Columbia’s (2005) curriculum does a poor job in this regard. Its references to dissent do not suggest that it is a passionate affair so the document is ill prepared to teach which roles passions might play in students’ decisions to dissent. This is not to say it precludes imaginings of alternative forms of collective life. Rather, the document encourages students to understand the various “isms” of the political world (e.g., socialism, conservatism, etc.) in terms of the political spectrum and existing parties. This, however, is limited in two regards: first, the curriculum openly avows a commitment to deliberative democracy so students are limited in what they might imagine. Second, this process is not presented as a passionate endeavour so students
may lose out on the opportunity to articulate shared hopes or collective frustrations with others.

Students’ political identities are instead treated as static, and their cultural and linguistic backgrounds as synonymous with, or determinants of these identities. The curriculum does move in a helpful direction here when it asks students to “conduct a self-assessment of their own beliefs and values, and give examples of how these might affect their position and decisions on a range of issues” (p. 39). Notwithstanding, the document does not discuss how identities can be fluid, formed by political passions, or mobilized in view of forming or strengthening collective political identities. I suggest that the B.C. curriculum take these factors into account; it should reframe identity formation as an impassioned and fluid process, and openly discuss with students how identities are important for individual and collective engagement, especially dissent.

Ontario’s (2013) curriculum also fails to treat dissent as an impassioned process, but its comparatively strong emphasis on impassioned identity formation provides a fairly strong foundation for doing so. While the document does not foreclose the treatment of dissent as an impassioned process (and references to dissent are scarce), it does little to open discussion in this vein. For instance, students are asked to reflect on how they can enact civic change, but the emphasis is on contributing to the existing order rather than imagining alternative forms of democratic life. This leaves out two impassioned elements of civic change. First, these imaginings are often tied to students’ dissatisfaction with (elements of) the current order, and any articulations of their grievances are inevitably charged with passion. Second, these imaginings make space for identity formation along partisan and thus passionate lines. The absence of these
understandings in the current curriculum may limit students’ imaginings to “friendly,” deliberative alternatives to the status quo, or leave them unprepared to channel any adversarial passions through legitimate political channels.

I argue that Ontario should make spaces for impassioned exercises of dissent by combining its emphasis on identity formation—in which it acknowledges passions play a role—with discussions of dissent. Ontario already treats students’ identities as fluid and malleable, which can foster the strategic articulation of students’ democratic subjectivities. However, the document largely frames identity formation as a personal matter, and references to collective identity treat identity formation as static (e.g., synonymous with cultural background). To ensure that students can articulate shared passions and strengthen their collective democratic subjectivities, Ontario’s curriculum should emphasize how identity formation can occur as a collective and impassioned process. This should highlight the role of (counter-)publics in subjectification, examples of which include reading groups, gay-straight alliances, punk concerts, and the like. It should also demonstrate how students’ identities can be bound up in shared antagonisms or substantive notions of social justice to act as “allies” with one another.

To facilitate this, Ontario should also ask students to reflect on which views they consider friendly or adversarial and how best they can express impassioned disagreements through legitimate political channels.

**Conclusion**

In Chapter Two, I conducted a qualitative thematic analysis on B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula and determined that both are primarily underpinned by
deliberative models of democracy. Both documents also leave space for educators to interpret them according to other models of democracy (especially post-deliberative ones). However, the primarily deliberative nature of the curricula constrains how civic dissent, and especially the passionate demands of dissent might be taught. My critiques of deliberative democracy in Chapters Three and Four develop normative standards for the partial evaluation of civics curricula.

In this chapter, I have drawn out these evaluative standards and applied them to B.C. and Ontario’s curricula. I have determined that both B.C.’s and Ontario’s civics curricula are currently limited in their ability to prepare students to exercise dissent or channel their political passions through legitimate channels. Some of the shortcomings I address in this chapter are simply due to absences in both curricula’s treatments of dissent and political passion, perhaps due to normative considerations of what policymakers deem important or because these topics are underexplored in civic education literature more generally. However, many curricular limitations are tied to the documents’ deliberative democratic underpinnings.

To begin with, both documents are more closely aligned with an “education for democracy” rather than “democracy studies.” That is, both educate for a particular model of democracy—a deliberative model—instead of teaching students about various models of democracy to help them decide which is most appropriate. In B.C.’s case, this commitment is overt, while it is implicit in Ontario’s case. In both curricula, we have seen how educating for one particular model of democracy limits how discussions of

61 I maintain students should be aware that deliberative democracy is dominant in Canada, but that there are alternatives to the status quo that also deserve consideration.
dissent and especially of political passions can be framed. This is particularly evident in the types of skills and dispositions students are taught to embody, the ways they are taught to engage with civic and political life, and the absences of aggregative and post-deliberative concerns alike in the curriculum. For these reasons, I hold that B.C.’s and Ontario’s curricula would benefit from adopting a semi-archic perspective in which they educate for more democratic modes of human togetherness rather than for a particular model of democracy.

More concerning for the purposes of this study, however, is how the curricula’s specifically deliberative underpinnings close—or at least, do not explicitly open—spaces for attending to dissent. Deliberative models’ consensus orientations and rationalist view of democratic life are particularly constraining in these regards. As we have seen, these elements are characteristic of both curricula, albeit to different degrees. Their consensus orientation leaves little room for post-deliberative conceptions of democratic life as an inherently conflictual affair. Accordingly, students may not learn to exercise dissent when they disagree with dominant interpretations of core ethico-political principles. A consensus orientation may fail to provide the skills and dispositions to treat dissent as a positive right, and students might be left underprepared to imagine and act for clearly differentiated modes of democratic togetherness. Both provinces aim to resolve problems and reconcile differences, with little indication that difference can be a resource.

At its roots, a consensus orientation can also be highly exclusionary and mask existing conflict. This consensus orientation is evident in the way that B.C. treats dissent as an afterthought and a tool in service of the common good. Similarly, Ontario tends to
instil a thick conception of the common good along with “pro-social” dispositions among its students. A consensus orientation may even be dangerous by foreclosing spaces for political subjects to express dissent through legitimate political channels. While neither curriculum forecloses these spaces, neither is particularly helpful for opening these spaces, either.

Deliberative models’ rationalist view of democratic life is problematic because it tends to universalize understandings of the common good and disregard alternative, yet equally valid, understandings of core ethico-political principles. The deliberative underpinnings of both curricula may go so far as to preclude deep, partisan discussion of clearly differentiated alternatives. This rationalist view may leave students unprepared to channel the passions they will inevitably experience when engaging with civic and political life. Each province’s wariness of passions more generally is indicative of this attitude.

The same can be said for the corresponding absence of any form of critical emotional reflexivity in both curricula. A rationalist view may also dismiss certain forms of communication and engagement as invalid or counterproductive, and these exclusions are particularly detrimental to marginalized groups. Although Ontario is stronger in this regard, B.C. sharply privileges rationalist modes of communication and engagement over more impassioned or embodied forms. Furthermore, a lack of attention to the passionate nature of democratic politics can leave students without an understanding of how political identities can be collectively articulated, strengthened, and mobilized. Without this understanding, their passions may also be subject to
manipulation by others for political gain, especially if curricula treat passions as separate from and subordinate to reason.

Throughout this thesis, I have developed normative arguments for the importance of teaching political dissent and political passions in Canadian civics curricula. These arguments form the basis for a critical-radical evaluation of Canadian civics curricula. I have also made the case that teaching for deliberative models of democracy alone will insufficiently prepare students to meet these criteria. I conclude that, overall, B.C.’s and Ontario’s secondary-level civics curricula do not adequately provide students the skills and dispositions necessary to meet the criteria I have outlined. This is largely, but not entirely, due to the deliberative models of democracy that inform each document. In particular, the consensus orientations and rationalist perspectives characteristic of deliberative models tend to foreclose spaces for teaching productive dissent and political passions.

This is not to say that either curriculum fails to teach the importance of dissent or political passions. Indeed, both curricula are sufficiently non-prescriptive for educators to interpret them in ways that open discussions of dissent and political passion. Nor are deliberative models wholly flawed; rather, they should be applauded for navigating the sticky terrain of popular sovereignty and re-inscribing within it a deep and empowering faith in participants to advocate for their own interests. Despite these strengths, I have offered a critique of deliberative democracy because of my normative belief that they are no longer the best suited to address the most complex demands of Canada’s contemporary, liberal-democratic society. I respect, however, that many believe deliberative democracy to be the most promising model of democracy,
and that this understanding is rooted in a different interpretation than my own of the core ethico-political principal of equality.

My core concern is that a predominantly deliberative focus in civic education can easily fail to create space for critical-radical perspectives, which I believe can encourage and help prepare students to engage in civic life more effectively and productively. I contend that critical-radical perspectives provide alternative interpretations of democratic principles and make way for more open and equitable modes of democratic togetherness, and should be included in Canadian civics curricula. Thus, I hold that B.C. and Ontario should adopt a semi-arichic perspective so as to help students determine for themselves, with an adequate understanding of the major democratic models, which view of civic and political life they favour. This perspective can make space for aggregative, deliberative, and post-deliberative models of democratic life alike to play a more explicit role in both curricula. Taken together, these models will better empower students to collectively bring more inclusive, critical, and socially just visions of civic life into being.

**Further questions remain.** First, there is the concern of implementing these ideas at the classroom level. If civics curricula are designed to teach the productive potential of democratic conflict, how can we ensure that teachers feel comfortable opening spaces for conflict in the classroom? Educators might be tempted to mitigate conflict or relegate it to the sidelines for fear of alienating students and losing control of the class to “mere retribution and anarchy” (Stitzlein, 2012, p. 148). However, it may be possible to minimize these risks by employing “democratic” pedagogic strategies, that,
among other characteristics, leave conflict management—including the ability to direct conflict to the appropriate channels—in students’ hands.

Teachers’ role might be to create the conditions for students to explore conflict respectfully and according to the core ethico-political principles of liberal democracy, and to arbitrate only when students overstep those boundaries. This way, classrooms can remain spaces for students to explore ideas while learning to apply conflict management skills in the “real” civic world. One pedagogic tool is particularly strong as a means of democratizing civic education and demonstrating to students the centrality of conflict in political life. The Civic Mirror (2006) asks students to simulate their own nation to foster experiential learning. Students in these simulations are asked to draw up a mock society, including designing a constitution, electing officials, running their economy, and trying accused criminals. This encourages students to manage consensus and conflict alike, while also opening spaces for critical—and perhaps impassioned—reflection on their experiences. Note that this guide only includes state-based conceptions of democratic politics. The Civic Mirror has created modules designed specifically for Ontario’s, BC.’s, and Alberta’s civic and social studies curricula, and is well suited to advance many of the normative aims outlined throughout this thesis.

Pre-service and in-service teacher education programs should also play a role in discussing teachers’ (dis)comfort with the expression of political passions and dissent in the classrooms. Although many other strategies exist, I have in mind Boler’s (1999) call to engage with a pedagogy of discomfort for both students’ and teachers’ sake. Teacher education might foster teachers’ dispositions to embrace their own discomfort by creating space for political passions and dissent in their classrooms, even though
doing so can leave them exposed to certain risks (of “losing control,” of exposing students to discomfort, etc.). Here, both student and teacher stand to benefit; this disposition can help teachers experience first-hand how consensus-oriented and rationalist approaches to democracy have constrained their thinking, perhaps unsettling long-held assumptions. It can also foster trust between student and teacher since both are navigating potentially unexplored territory together. This is merely one space where teacher education might intervene; what other possibilities might we imagine?

Yet another question arises here: How might educators navigate this dilemma in culturally diverse classrooms? I have advocated for the shared, collective expression of political passions, but public expressions of emotion are not considered appropriate in every culture. Here, we may consider once again how a pedagogy of discomfort can open spaces for self-exploration and risk-taking. If students are unprepared to step out of the comfort of keeping passions private, teachers might merely invite them to share their passions without adding pressure to do so (for instance, by grading them on this expression). The nature of students’ exploration is key here: for some students, self-reflections might be a better means of exploring passions than group sharing.

There are also macro-level questions that remain about civic education: is the amount of space allotted to civic education in secondary schools sufficient to address the issues I have discussed here, as well as the limitations that other policymakers, scholars, and communities have identified? My own experience in Ontario’s secondary

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62 This approach underscores that learning is always a risky and potentially uncomfortable process since it continually threatens to violate students’ sovereignty by challenging “who and where our students are” (see Biesta, 2006, pp. 27-29).
school system and my work to educate the general public about civic and political issues in Canada suggests otherwise. Recall also that Ontario’s Civics 10 course is compulsory, but only worth half a credit. B.C.’s Civic Studies 11 is not compulsory, and boasts a far lower enrolment. In 2014/15, only 852 (1.5 percent) of B.C.’s 56,661 Grade 11 students completed the Civic Studies 11 exam, as compared to the 42,502 (75 percent) who completed the alternative exam in Social Studies 11 (B.C. Ministry of Education, 2015).

Much of the existing content of both courses is fundamental, but admittedly basic. Take, for example, the amount of space dedicated (in both curricula) to the three branches of government, Canadian identity, and rights and responsibilities. Many of these topics might better be addressed at an earlier level, and the overlap between elementary and secondary content minimized, to create space for more critical thinking at the secondary level. The existing structure of both provinces’ elementary-level Social Studies curricula equips them to implement these changes.

This thesis has also left a major issue untouched: many are uneasy with the concept of citizenship and its exclusionary or even oppressive nature. Fraser (2009), for instance, discusses how political exclusion often occurs as a result of misframing who is entitled to justice. Although the normalcy of Westphalian justice grammar (i.e. justice allocated according to people’s shared citizenship/nation-state) has long been contested, many decision-makers still cling to the concept of citizenship as the most appropriate frame for justice claims. Framing justice claims through citizenship status

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63 I am not suggesting that these topics are unimportant; each one undoubtedly is. However, I believe they are basic enough to teach at the elementary level and merely revised at the secondary level to leave more space for deeper investigation.
is not only inaccurate, Fraser argues, but it can easily exclude people who are subjected
to a decision. To which body, for example, can Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada
voice justice grievances without fear of reprisal if they are not afforded the same labour
rights as Canadian citizens?

Indigenous scholars have troubled the concept of citizenship further. Taiaiake
Alfred (2009) summarizes the prevailing Indigenous views on citizenship. Traditional
circles have failed to rationalize Indigenous sovereignty in the language of citizenship,
he argues, due to the incommensurable disconnect between a “rights-based liberal
philosophical orientation and the fundamentals of Indigenous teachings and
worldviews” (p. 11). Other, more statist attempts to bridge Indigenous and liberal
notions of identity/political organization/governance fail to recognize that collective
Indigenous identity is based on kinship or clan ties rather than loyalty to the state. For
Alfred, these perspectives constitute assimilation. Others, still, recognize that
citizenship is a vehicle for rights-claiming, but eschew statist lenses of citizenship in
favour of more cultural ones (pp. 15-16). These arguments, alongside the critical
perspectives espoused by thinkers such as Fraser (2009), open an important line of
inquiry revolving around the question: what are the limitations of teaching for
dissensual citizenship when citizenship is itself an exclusionary concept?

My thinking about this term has evolved along with my argument. It may be that
the term “political subject” offers a more inclusive and more accurate view of
democratic actors than does “citizenship.” This language contests the antiquated
primacy, in liberal theory, of actors’ relationship to the nation-state as their primary
relational institution. Moreover, “political subject” refocuses justice claims toward those subjected to a given decision instead of those holding a specific and exclusive status.

Finally, there are other questions I intend to pursue that I do not have the scope or space to address here. I have alluded to the need to develop comprehensive evaluative critiques of civics courses. Which other elements of civics curricula open or close spaces for teaching dissent in civic education? These might include the models of citizenship, structures of governance, understandings of Canada’s international role, and conceptions of legal frameworks that underpin civics courses. We should also consider how aggregative, deliberative, and post-deliberative models of democracy create or limit space in civic education for civic and political concerns other than dissent or engagement. For example, how might they create or limit space for various conceptualizations of the public sphere? For cultural pluralism? For gender-inclusive understandings of citizenship? Clearly, there is still much work to be done to create inclusive and critical civics courses for Canadian students. This thesis has explored only a small fraction of these questions; scholars, policymakers, and educators alike should endeavour to seek out and investigate others.
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10.1177/1367549406066073


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## Appendices

### Appendix A - Themes for Qualitative Thematic Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aggregative</th>
<th>Deliberative</th>
<th>Post-deliberative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preference Formation</strong></td>
<td>- Exogenous to political process</td>
<td>- Endogenous to political process.</td>
<td>- Endogenous to political process</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Majority rule</td>
<td>- Justify and refine positions</td>
<td>- Justify and refine positions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Occurs in the public sphere</td>
<td>- Occurs in multiple public spheres</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rationality and Passion</strong></td>
<td>- Actors are rational (self-interested)</td>
<td>- Actors are rational (self-interested)</td>
<td>- Actors are rational (self-interested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- It is irrelevant whether/how reason is</td>
<td>- Reason is universal or communitarian</td>
<td>- Reason is constructed and can never be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>constructed</td>
<td>- Terms of reasonableness are legitimate if</td>
<td>neutral or objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Passion does not figure into this model</td>
<td>constructed through deliberative means</td>
<td>- There are rational solutions to most but</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- There are rational solutions to nearly all</td>
<td>not all issues</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Issues that are rationally incommensurable</td>
<td>- Issues that are rationally</td>
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<td>should be kept private</td>
<td>incommensurable should be given space in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>public and/or decided through</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>passionate means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of Communication and</strong></td>
<td>- Voting is the crux of democratic life</td>
<td>- Public sphere refines public opinion(s)</td>
<td>- Public spheres refine public opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td>- Discussion helps pool options</td>
<td>- Reasonableness valued</td>
<td>- Reasonableness valued</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Passionate rhetoric and embodied forms</td>
<td>- Passionate rhetoric and embodied forms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>acceptable but not preferred</td>
<td>equally valuable as rational argumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Preference for deliberative means in</td>
<td>- Deliberative means, boycotts, protests,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ideal conditions</td>
<td>and non-violent civil disobedience all</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Protest, boycotts, and non-violent civil</td>
<td>equally acceptable if they respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disobedience are acceptable if they</td>
<td>core democratic principles</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>advance deliberation and respect shared</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>principles</td>
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</table>

Rationality and Passion

- Actors are rational (self-interested)
- Reason is universal or communitarian
- Terms of reasonableness are legitimate if constructed through deliberative means
- There are rational solutions to nearly all issues
- Issues that are rationally incommensurable should be kept private

Means of Communication and Participation

- Voting is the crux of democratic life
- Discussion helps pool options
- Public sphere refines public opinion(s)
- Reasonableness valued
- Passionate rhetoric and embodied forms equally valuable as rational argumentation
- Deliberative means, boycotts, protests, and non-violent civil disobedience all equally acceptable if they respect core democratic principles
### Inclusion and Political Equality
- All citizens get one vote, formally equal voice
- Heavy burden of proof of discrimination to overturn decisions
- Disagreement helps refine decision-making but is treated as a problem to be resolved
- Attend to power inequalities
- Aim for more minimal conception of substantive inclusion

### Consensus and Conflict
- Majority rule valued; compromise and consensus unnecessary
- Common good is majority good
- Consensus-building and compromise are desirable and virtually always possible
- Fairly thick conception of common good
- Consensus only desirable if power relations are equal, which is virtually impossible
- Compromises or uneven decisions are possible but always provisional
- Thin conception of common good
Appendix B - Frequency of Preference Formation Terms in B.C.’s and Ontario’s Civics Curricula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
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<tr>
<td>Argue, arguing, (reasoned) argument, argumentation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articulate</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assess, assessing, assessment, self-assess</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bias (detecting, distinguishing bias)</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Challenge, be challenged</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Engage, engaged, engaging, (civic) engagement</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate, communication</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consensus, consensus building</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Consider, consideration</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contend</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical, critical thinking, critically, criticize, critique</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Debate</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defend, defending</td>
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<td>Deliberate (individually and with others), deliberation, deliberative</td>
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<td>Dialogue, dialectical</td>
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<td>Discourse</td>
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<td>Discuss, discussion</td>
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<td>Evaluate, evaluating</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explore new ideas</td>
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<td>Influence, influential</td>
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<td>Inform, information, informed</td>
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<td>Interests, interest group</td>
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<td>Judge, judgment</td>
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<td>Listen, listening</td>
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<td>Literacy, media literacy, literate</td>
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<td>Majoritarian, majority, majority rule</td>
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<td>Object, objection</td>
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<td>Open-minded, openness</td>
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<td>Participate, participation</td>
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<td>Pluralism, pluralist</td>
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<td>Plurality</td>
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<td>Reassess, reassessing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reach (supportable conclusions), reach reasoned decisions</td>
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## Appendix C - Frequency of Rationality and Passion Terms in B.C.’s and Ontario’s Civics Curricula

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<td>*Care, caring</td>
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* Indicates that results were excluded if they appeared in a non-civic context. For example, “Students will be evaluated on...” was excluded while “Students learn to evaluate civic decisions” was included.
### Appendix D - Frequency of Terms Related to Inclusion and Political Equality in B.C.’s and Ontario’s Civics Curricula

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Appendix E - Frequency of Terms Related to Consensus and Conflict in B.C.’s and Ontario’s Civics Curricula

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* Indicates that results were excluded if they appeared in a non-civic context. For example, “Students are expected to *demonstrate*...” was excluded while “protest movements and/or *demonstrations*” was included.